


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




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WILLIAM WARBURTON,
BISHOP of GLOUCESTER.



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THE
WORKS
OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

A NEW EDITION,
IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

A DISCOURSE BY WAY OF GENERAL PREFACE;

CONTAINING

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER
OF THE AUTHOR;

BY RICHARD HURD, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

1758/1
17/11/22

London :

Printed by Luke Hansard & Sons, near Lincoln's-Inn Fields,

FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND.

1811.



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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Edition of Bishop WARBURTON's Works by Bishop HURD, published in 1788 in seven volumes quarto, being out of print, it has been thought advisable to give this new Edition a form more adapted to the prevailing taste; to improve the arrangement, and to make the whole correspond, in size and appearance, with the intended Edition of the Works of Bishop HURD. In the annals of our Church, it would not, perhaps, be easy to find two Prelates of equally splendid fame, who were so closely united by the sympathies of personal esteem and similarity of literary pursuits: and this uniform exhibition of their respective Writings, may be regarded as an attempt to render them inseparable as was the friendship of the Authors.

In transforming the Volumes to a smaller size, without losing sight of propriety and system, much care and attention were required. These, the Editors hope and think, have been exerted in such measure, as cannot fail to be satisfactory.

Brief enumeration of the CONTENTS:—

The first Six Volumes are occupied by THE DIVINE LEGATION, divided, agreeably to the original plan of the Author, into three parts, as follow :

The First Part, comprising Books I. II. III. with their appropriate preliminary matter, Appendices and Notes, occupy the first, second, and third Volumes.

The Second and Third Parts of the *Divine Legation*, comprising Books IV. V. VI. & IX. also with their respective preliminary matter, Appendices and Notes, followed by a GENERAL INDEX, and a List of AUTHORS quoted; occupy the fourth, fifth, and sixth Volumes.

It had been objected to former Editions, that the margins of the *Divine Legation* were too much crowded with Notes, and with extracts under the name of Postscripts or Appendices: We have therefore followed the mode adopted by Bishop Hurd, in the quarto edition, of printing these at the end of each Book, referring to them in the Text.


The Seventh Volume contains THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE; or, *The Necessity and Equity of an Established Religion, and a Test-Law, demonstrated*. A work, in the opinion of the late Bishop Horsley, exhibiting “one of the finest specimens that are to be found in any language, of scientific reasoning applied to a political subject.”—Here also, as in the *Divine Legation*, the Notes are placed after each Book; and at the end is given a copious INDEX.

The Eighth Volume includes JULIAN, *or, A Discourse concerning the Earthquake and Fiery Eruption, which defeated that Emperor's Attempt to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem*; and, THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE, *or, The Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit vindicated from the Insults of Infidelity and the Abuses of Fanaticism.*

The Ninth and Tenth Volumes comprise the SERMONS and DISCOURSES of our Author: Together with *A CHARGE to the Clergy of the Diocese of Gloucester, in 1761*; *A DISCOURSE on the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*; and DIRECTIONS *for the Study of THEOLOGY.*

The two last Volumes (the Eleventh & Twelfth) contain Bishop Warburton's CONTROVERSIAL TRACTS; concluding with *A LETTER from an Author to a Member of Parliament, concerning LITERARY PROPERTY*; and his CORRESPONDENCE with Doctors *Middleton and Lowth.*

In the First Volume, is given a Portrait of the AUTHOR, from an Original Picture: And in the Fourth Volume, the 4th and 6th Sections of Book IV. of the *Divine Legation*, are illustrated by Engravings.



A
DISCOURSE,
BY WAY OF
GENERAL PREFACE
TO THE
WORKS
OF
BISHOP WARBURTON;
CONTAINING
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS,
AND CHARACTER,
OF
THE AUTHOR.



T H E
L I F E
O F T H E
A U T H O R :

FIRST PRINTED IN

1794.

WILLIAM WARBURTON

WAS descended from an antient and very considerable family in Cheshire, at the head of which is the present Sir PETER WARBURTON, baronet, of Arley, in that county.

I leave the rest to the Genealogist; and go no farther back in his pedigree than to his Grandfather, of the same name, who distinguished himself in the civil wars of the last century. He was of the Royal party, and shewed his zeal and activity in that cause, by serving under Sir George Booth at the affair of Chester. I mention this little circumstance chiefly for the use I shall make of it elsewhere. All that I know more of him, is, That he married Frances, daughter of Robert Awfield, of Etson in the county of Nottingham, by whom he had three sons; the

second of whom, GEORGE, was Mr. WARBURTON'S father.

It seems probable, that upon this marriage he removed into Nottinghamshire. His residence was at Shelton, a village about six miles from Newark, where he died.

Mr. George Warburton, the second son, as I observed, of William Warburton, Esq. of Shelton, was bred to the law. He settled at Newark, where he practised as an attorney, and was particularly esteemed for his integrity in that profession.

He married Elizabeth, daughter of William Hobman, Alderman of Newark, and had by this marriage five children, George, William, Mary, Elizabeth, and Frances.

George died very young. WILLIAM (the subject of this memoir) was born at Newark, Dec. 24, 1698. He was first put to school there under Mr. Twells, whose son afterwards married his sister, Elizabeth: but he had the chief part of his education at Okeham, in Rutlandshire, under Mr. Wright. Here he continued till the beginning of the year 1714; when his cousin, Mr. Warburton (who also bore the name of William), being made head master of the school at Newark, he returned to his native place, and was, for a short time, under the care of that learned and respectable person, of whom more will be said presently. I only now add; that he was father to the reverend Mr. Thomas Warburton, the present very worthy Archdeacon of Norfolk, to whom I am indebted for the particulars here mentioned, concerning his family.

I cannot, I confess, entertain the reader of this narrative with those encomiums which are so commonly

monly lavished on the puerile years of eminent men. On the best enquiry I have been able to make, I do not find that, during his stay at school, he distinguished himself by any extraordinary efforts of genius or application. My information authorizes me to go no further than to say, That he loved his book, and his play, just as other boys did. And, upon reflexion, I am not displeas'd with this modest testimony to his merit. For I remember what the best judges have thought of premature wits. And we all know that the mountain-oak, which is one day to make the strength of our fleets, is of slower growth than the saplings which adorn our gardens.

But, although no prodigy of parts or industry in those early years, with a moderate share of each, he could not fail of acquiring by the age of sixteen (the time when he left school) a competent knowledge of Greek and Latin, under such masters, as those of Okeham and Newark.

It had been his misfortune to lose his father very early. He died in 1706; and the care of his family devolved, of course, upon his widow; who, as we have seen, gave her son the best school-education; and, in all respects, approv'd herself so good a woman, as well as parent, that her children paid her all possible respect: her son, in particular, (all whose affections were naturally warm), gave her every proof of duty and observance, while she lived, and, after her death, retained so tender a regard to her memory, that he seldom spake of her but with tears.

The circumstances of the family could be but moderate; and when Mr. Warburton had now finished his education at school, he was destined by his friends to that profession, which is thought to qualify men

best for the management of their own affairs, and which his father had followed with so much credit in that neighbourhood.

He was accordingly put out clerk to Mr. Kirke, an eminent attorney of Great Markham in Nottinghamshire, in April 1714, and continued with that gentleman five years, *i. e.* till the spring of the year 1719. Tradition does not acquaint us, how he acquitted himself in his clerkship. Probably, with no signal assiduity. For now it was that the bent of his genius appeared in a passionate love of reading, which was not lessened, we may believe, but increased, by his want of time and opportunity to indulge it.

However, in spite of his situation, he found means to peruse again and digest such of the classic authors as he had read at school, with many others which he understood to be in repute with men of learning and judgement. By degrees, he also made himself acquainted with the other elementary studies; and, by the time his clerkship was out, had laid the foundation, as well as acquired a taste, of general knowledge.

Still, the opinion and expectation of his friends kept him in that profession to which he had been bred. On the expiration of his clerkship, he returned to his family at Newark; but whether he practised there or elsewhere as an attorney, I am not certainly informed. However, the love of letters growing every day stronger in him, it was found advisable to give way to his inclination of taking Orders: the rather, as the seriousness of his temper and purity of his morals concurred, with his unappeasable thirst of knowledge, to give the surest presages of future eminence in that profession.

He did not venture, however, all at once to rush into the Church. His good understanding, and awful

sense of religion, suggested to him the propriety of making the best preparation he could, before he offered himself a candidate for the sacred character. Fortunately for him, his relation, the master of Newark School, was at hand to give him his advice. And he could not have put himself under a better direction. For, besides his classical merit (which was great), he had that of being an excellent Divine, and was a truly learned as well as good man.

To him then, as soon as his resolution was taken of going into Orders, he applied for assistance, which was afforded him very liberally. "My father (says Mr. Archdeacon Warburton in a letter to me) employed all the time he could spare from his school in instructing him, and used to sit up very late at night with him to assist him in his studies." And this account I have heard confirmed by his pupil himself; who used to enlarge with pleasure on his obligations to his old tutor; and has celebrated his theological and other learning in a handsome Latin epitaph, which he wrote upon him after his death.

At length he was ordained Deacon the 22d of December 1723, in the cathedral of York, by Archbishop Dawes: and even then he was in no haste to enter into Priest's Orders, which he deferred taking till he was full twenty-eight years of age, being ordained Priest by Bishop Gibson in St. Paul's, London, March the 1st, 1726-7.

Some will here lament that the precious interval of nine years, from his quitting school in 1714 to his taking Orders, was not spent in one of our universities, rather than his private study, or an attorney's office. And it is certain, the disadvantage to most men would have been great. But an industry, and genius,

like his, overcame all difficulties. It may even be conceived, that he derived a benefit from them. As his faculties were of no common size, his own proper exertion of them probably tended more to his improvement, than any assistance of tutors and colleges could have done. To which we may add, that living by himself, and not having the fashionable opinions of a great society to bias his own, he might acquire an enlarged turn of mind, and strike out for himself, as he clearly did, an original cast both of thought and composition ;

Fastidire lacus et rivos ausus apertos :

while his superior sense, in the mean time, did the office of that authority, which, in general, is found so necessary to quicken the diligence, and direct the judgement, of young students in our universities.

The fact is, that, without the benefit of an Academical education, he had qualified himself, in no common degree, for Deacon's Orders in 1723 : and from that time till he took Priest's Orders in the beginning of the year 1727, he applied himself diligently to complete his studies, and to lay in that fund of knowledge, which is requisite to form the consummate Divine. For to this character he reasonably aspired ; having that ardour of inclination, which is the earnest of success, and feeling in himself those powers which invigorate a great mind, and push it on irresistibly in the pursuit of letters.

The fruits of his industry, during this interval, appeared in some pieces, composed by him for the improvement of his taste and style, and afterwards printed (most of them without his name) to try the judgement of the publick. As he never thought fit to

reprint or revise them, they are omitted in this edition. But they are such as did him no discredit; on the contrary, they shewed the vigour of his parts, and the more than common hopes which might be entertained of such a writer.

Among these *blossoms of his youth* (to borrow an expression from Cowley) were some notes, communicated to Mr. Theobald, and inserted in his edition of Shakespeare; which seems to have raised a general idea of his abilities; before any more important proof had been given of them. But of this subject more will be said in its place.

It was, also, in this season of early discipline, while his mind was opening to many literary projects, that he conceived an idea, which he was long pleased with, of giving a new edition of Velleius Paterculus. He was charmed with the elegance of this writer; and the high credit in which emendatory criticism (of which Paterculus stood much in need) was held in the beginning of this century, occasioned by the dazzling reputation of such men as Bentley and Hare, very naturally seduced a young enterprising scholar into an attempt of this nature. How far he proceeded in this work, I cannot say: but a specimen of it afterwards appeared in one of our literary journals, and was then communicated to his friend, Dr. Middleton; who advised him very properly to drop the design, *as not worthy of his talents and industry, which, as he says, instead of trifling on words, seem calculated rather to correct the opinions and manners of the world.*

These juvenile essays of his pen, hasty and incorrect as they were, contributed, no doubt, very much to his own improvement. What effect they had on his reputation, and how soon they raised it to a considerable

derable height among his friends, will be seen from the following curious fact.

In the year 1726, a dispute arose among the lawyers, about the judicial power of the Court of Chancery. It is immaterial to observe on what points the controversy turned, or with what views it was agitated. It opened with a tract, called, *The History of the Chancery; relating to the Judicial Power of that Court, and the Rights of the Master*; printed without a name; but written, as was generally known, by a Mr. Burrough; and so well received by the Lord Chancellor King, that he rewarded the Author of it, the same year, with a Mastership in Chancery.

To this book an answer presently appeared, under the name of, *A Discourse of the Judicial Authority of the Master of the Rolls*; and so well composed, that they who favoured the cause of the *Historian*, saw it must suffer in his hands, if it were not supported by some better writer than himself, who was evidently no match for the *Discourser*.

In this exigency, he was advised by one of his friends (I forget, or never heard, his name) to have recourse to Mr. Warburton, as a person very capable of supplying his defects. Accordingly, when he had prepared the proper materials for a reply, he obtained leave to put them into Mr. Warburton's hands, and afterwards spent some time with him in the country; where, by their joint labours, the whole was drawn out, and digested into a sizable volume, which came out in 1727, and was entitled, *The Legal Judicature in Chancery stated*. This book was so manifestly superior to the *History*, that such of the profession as were not in the secret, wondered at Mr. Burrough's proficiency in the art of writing; and
the

the Lord Chancellor King, as much as any body. The author of the *Discourse* saw it concerned him to take notice of such an adversary, and in 1728 reprinted his work “with *large additions*—together with a “*Preface*, occasioned by a book entitled, *The Legal Judicature in Chancery stated.*” And with this reply, I believe, the dispute closed.

Many years afterwards (the secret being now of no consequence) Mr. Warburton chanced to mention, in conversation, to Mr. Charles Yorke, the part he had taken in this squabble: when Mr. Yorke smiled, and said he fancied he was not aware who had been his antagonist; and then named his father, the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, who, though Attorney General at the time, had undertaken to plead the cause of his relation, Sir Joseph Jekyll, then Master of the Rolls.—But I have dwelt, perhaps, too long on this little anecdote.

Upon Mr. Warburton's taking Priest's Orders, Sir Robert Sutton procured for him the small vicarage of Griesley, in Nottinghamshire; and in 1728 presented him to the Rectory of Brand-Broughton, in the diocese of Lincoln. He was, also, the same year, and, I suppose, by the same interest, put upon the King's list of Master of Arts, created on his Majesty's visit to the university of Cambridge.

Brand-Broughton was a preferment of some value, and, from its situation in the neighbourhood of Newark, pleased him very much. Here then he fixed himself, with his family, and spent the best part of his life, that is, from 1728 to 1746.

They who are unacquainted with the enthusiasm which true genius inspires, will hardly conceive the possibility of that intense application, with which Mr.

Warburton

Warburton pursued his studies in that retirement. Impatient of any interruptions, he spent the whole of his time that could be spared from the duties of his parish, in reading and writing. His constitution was strong, and his temperance extreme. So that he needed no exercise but that of walking; and a change of reading, or study, was his only amusement.

His mother and sisters, who lived with him, and were apprehensive of the hurt he might do himself by this continued industry, would invite themselves to drink coffee with him in his study after dinner, and contrive to lengthen their stay with him as much as they could. But when they had retired, they saw no more of him that evening; and his sister, Mrs. FRANCES WARBURTON, told me, that he usually sat up a great part of the night. What is most extraordinary, the vigour of his parts was such, that his incessant labour neither wearied his spirits, nor affected his health.

In this way it was, that he acquired that habit of deep thinking, with that extensive erudition, which afterwards astonished the reader in his works; and made himself acquainted with the whole range of polite and elegant learning, in the way of diversion, and in the interval of his graver studies.

I express myself with exact propriety. For it was his manner at this time (and the habit continued with him through life) to intermix his literary pursuits in such sort as to make the lighter relieve the more serious; and these again, in their turn, temper and correct the other. He was passionately fond of the more sublime poets, and (what is very uncommon) had almost an equal relish for works of wit and humour. One or other of these books he had always
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lying by him, and would take up when he found himself fatigued with study; and, after spending some time in this sort of reading, was so much refreshed by it, that he returned with new life to the work he was upon; and so made these amusements, which are apt to get the mastery of common minds and to exhaust their whole force, only subservient to his more important meditations.

And this humour (to observe it by the way) of associating the so different powers of reason and fancy in the course of his studies, passed into his style, and indeed formed one distinctive character of it. For in all his writings, on whatever subject, you see him, occasionally, ennoble his expression by picturesque imagery, or enliven it by strokes of wit: And this (though the practice be against rule) with so much ease, and with so little affectation, that none but a very captious, or very dull, reader can take offence at it.

With that passion for letters, which, as I observed, transported Mr. Warburton at this time, the sobriety of his judgement is to be admired. The little taste he had had of fame in the early publications, before alluded to, did not corrupt his mind, or seduce him into a premature ambition of appearing as an author in form, till he had fully qualified himself, by the long course of reading and meditation, now mentioned, to sustain that character. It was not till the year 1736 that he published the first of those works, on which his great reputation is raised. This was, *THE ALLIANCE BETWIXT CHURCH AND STATE**: the occasion, and end, and substance of which work cannot be expressed in fewer or clearer terms, than his own.

* Vol. VII. of this Edition.

After a short historical view of religious parties in England, from the Reformation downwards; of the discordant notions entertained of Religious establishments; and of the heats and animosities which those notions had produced: he proceeds thus - - -

“ In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State* found the sentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and Establishments, when he proposed his *Theory* to their Consideration: a Theory, calculated to vindicate our present happy Constitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjusting the precise bounds of either Society; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION, to all who dissented from the national worship.

“ He first shewed the use of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all ages: He inquired from whence the use arose, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very essence and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the nature of Religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a Society: And then, from the natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the *Body* and its interests; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that both Societies are Sovereign, and Independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are

“ concerned

“ concerned in contrary provinces, they can never
 “ meet to clash; the sameness of *original*, or the
 “ sameness of *administration*, being the only causes
 “ which can bring one, of two distinct Societies, into
 “ natural subjection to the other.

“ To apply Religion therefore to the service of
 “ Civil Society, in the best manner it is capable of
 “ being applied, he shewed it was necessary that
 “ the two Societies should UNITE: For, each being
 “ sovereign and independent, there was no other way
 “ of applying the service of Religion in any solid or
 “ effectual manner. But no such union could arise
 “ but from *free compact* and convention. And free
 “ convention is never likely to happen, unless each
 “ Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advan-
 “ tages. The Author, therefore, from what he had
 “ laid down of the natures of the two Societies, ex-
 “ plained what these motives and advantages were.
 “ Whence, it appeared that all the rights, privileges,
 “ and prerogatives of the two Societies, thus united,
 “ with the Civil Magistrate at their head, were in-
 “ deed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives,
 “ which we find established and enjoyed under our
 “ present happy Constitution in Church and State:
 “ The result of this was, that an ESTABLISHED
 “ CHURCH and a free TOLERATION are made per-
 “ fectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW.
 “ This Law, therefore, the Author in the last place
 “ proceeded to vindicate, on the same general prin-
 “ ciples of the law of Nature and Nations.

“ This is a true, though short analysis of the
 “ *Alliance between Church and State**.”

* See Vol. XII. “View of Lord Bolingbroke’s Phi-
 losophy,” Letter IV.

This

This work made a great impression on the best judges. One* of them, to whom he had sent a present of his book, expresses himself thus :

“ I had formerly been very agreeably entertained
 “ with some emendations of your’s on Shakespeare,
 “ and was extremely pleased to find this work was
 “ by the same hand. Good learning, great acute-
 “ ness, an ingenious working head, and depth of
 “ thought, will always please in an author, though we
 “ are not entirely in the same ways of thinking.”—
 And, in the close of it, he adds—“ You have not, Sir,
 “ only my thanks for what you have done, but my
 “ sincere wishes, that what was intended for the
 “ service of the publick may prove also to be for
 “ your own, to which my endeavours, in any proper
 “ way, shall not be wanting.”

This was candid and generous, considering that the eminent person was not altogether in the author’s sentiments on the subject of his book. But he was struck with his great abilities, and became from this moment his sincere friend.

The truth is, no sort of men, either within or without the Church, was prepared, at that time, for an indifferent reception of this new theory, which respected none of their prejudices. It was neither calculated to please the High-Church Divines, nor the Low ; and the Layity had taken their side with the one or the other of those parties.

However, though few at that time were convinced, all were struck by this essay of an original writer, and could not dissemble their admiration of the ability, which appeared in the construction of it. There was indeed a reach of thought in this system of

* Bishop Hare.

Church-policy, which would prevent its making its way all at once. It required time and attention, even in the most capable of its readers, to apprehend the force of the argumentation; and a more than common share of candour to adopt the conclusion, when they did. The author had therefore reason to be satisfied with the reception of his theory, such as it was: and having thoroughly persuaded himself of its truth, as well as importance, he continued to enlarge and improve it in several subsequent editions; and in the last, by the opportunity, which some elaborate attempts of his adversaries to overturn it, had afforded him, he exerted his whole strength upon it, and has left it in a condition to brave the utmost efforts of future criticism*.

Some indeed, have taken offence at the idea of an *Alliance*; but without cause: for the meaning is this, That our Church-Establishment is such as in equity it must have been, had the terms of it been settled by mutual agreement between the two parties. Which, in other words, is only saying, That those terms are just and reasonable.

The idea of an *Alliance* was conceived, in preference to any other mode of conducting the argument, because the theory of civil government had been

* An eminent writer has delivered his opinion of it in these terms: "Bishop WARBURTON, in his *Alliance between Church and State*, hath shewn the general good policy of an establishment, and the necessity of A TEST for its security, upon principles which Republicans themselves cannot easily deny.—His work is one of the finest specimens, that are to be found perhaps in any language, of scientific reasoning applied to a political subject." Dr. HORSLEY's *Review of the Case of the Protestant Dissenters*. PREF. London, 1787.

formed

formed on the like notion of a contract between Prince and People. This way of reasoning, therefore, without being less conclusive, had the advantage of being more popular than any other, and as such, was very properly adopted by our author.

Notwithstanding this management, the *Alliance*, as I observed, was not generally understood. But he did not wait for the reward of publick favour, to encourage him in the resolution he had taken of dedicating his great talents to the service of religion. In the close of this first edition of *The Alliance*, he announced his next and greatest work, THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES; which he had now planned, and in part composed. For, when such a writer as this, has by a long course of study laid in the proper materials for invention to operate upon, and has, by one vigorous essay, assured himself of his own strength, his progress to perfection is rapid, and almost instantaneous; like the pace of Homer's gods, whose first step reaches to Olympus, and the second, to the ends of the earth.

It had been pretended by those who called themselves Deists, and, in the modesty of free-thinking which then prevailed, had, or affected to have, a respect for the natural doctrine of a future state, That the omission of this doctrine in the Mosaic Law was a clear decisive proof of its imposture, as no institute of religion, coming from GOD, could be without that principle.

The author of the *Alliance* saw the *omission* in another light; and was so far from admitting the Deist's conclusion, that he thought himself able to prove, in the clearest manner, and with the evidence of what is called *Moral demonstration*, the divinity of the Mosaic Law from that very circumstance.

Such

Such then was the subject and scope of Mr. Warburton's capital work, *The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated on the principles of a religious Deist*. But in the conduct of this new and paradoxical argument, so many prejudices and objections, both of believers and unbelievers, were to be removed; and so many collateral lights to be let in upon it; that the discourse extended itself far and wide, and took in all that was most curious in Gentile, Jewish, and Christian antiquity.

In the beginning of the year 1738, the first volume of this work appeared, and immediately drew all eyes upon it. Some were too weak, and some, too much dimmed or distorted by prejudices, to take a full and distinct view of its contents. No wonder then if such readers misconceived of the writer's purpose, and misrepresented it. Yet few were so blind, as not to admire the execution. "I hear nobody speak of your book," says the Bishop of Chichester, "who do not express themselves highly entertained with it; though they think the principal point which remains to be proved, a paradox *." And what the Bishop himself thought of it, before publication, when the sheets were sent to him from the press, he tells the author in these words—"I can say, without any compliment, that your papers have given me high delight. So many beautiful thoughts, such ingenious illustrations of them, such a clear connection, such a deduction of notions, and so much good learning upon so useful a subject, all expressed in proper and fine language, cannot but give an intelligent reader the greatest satisfaction †."

* MS. Letters, Feb. 21, 1737-8. † Oct. 18, 1737.

And to much the same purpose another learned friend, the Bishop of Salisbury *—“ Last night I received some sheets of your book, and ran them over with great pleasure, though not with the attention which the subject and your way of treating it demand †.” And in another letter, when he had taken time to consider the contents of this volume—“ The learning and ability of the author of the D. L. are not called in question; and the first part has raised a great desire and expectation of the second ‡.”

I quote these passages so particularly, because the Bishops, Hare and Sherlock, were, without doubt, among the ablest of his judges, and because their temper was far enough from inclining towards an officious and lavish civility to their friends.

After authorities of so much weight, I should not think it worth while to take notice of what was objected to him by ordinary writers, but that he thought fit to answer one § of them, in a style so soft and elegant, that they who have a taste for the gentler polemics will read it with great pleasure.

The real ground of the abuse cast upon him, though other causes were pretended, was the handsome manner in which he had spoken of Dr. Middleton, in his preface to the first volume. This ingenious man (of whom more will be said, as we go along) had written some things, which gave occasion to suspect him of a leaning towards intidelity. Mr. Warburton was personally acquainted with him, and had a real esteem for him. He wished therefore, if possible, to draw

* Dr. Sherlock.

† MS. Letters, Oct. 18, 1737.

‡ March 2, 1737-8.

§ Dr. Webster. See Vol. XI.

his friend off from that bias, which his passions, rather than his judgement, he conceived, had impressed upon him, by putting the fairest constructions on his writings, and by affecting to understand them in the most favourable sense. But, instead of clearing his friend, by this means, from the guilt of heterodoxy, the effect was to involve himself in the suspicion of it: And it was thought proper that he should disclaim and repel so groundless an imputation. This it was not difficult for him to do, so far as respected his own character; but that of his friend required managing, and he would not justify himself at his expence.

In these delicate circumstances, he acquitted himself with dexterity, yet with perfect good faith, and to the singular satisfaction of his friends. “ I received “ yesterday,” says Bishop Hare, “ your Vindication, “ which I read twice over with great satisfaction— “ The part that relates to Dr. Middleton, we think “ extremely well done. It was the only difficult part, “ and it cannot but please every candid reader to see “ you do justice to yourself, and yet not do it at his “ expence, nor say a word, that either he or his friends “ can be offended at, or that is in the least giving up “ a man, with whom you live in friendship. Here “ is courage and integrity very agreeably joined*.”

The Bishop here gives a very just account of the *Vindication*, and indeed of Mr. Warburton's general conduct towards Dr. Middleton; as appears from the whole of his intercourse with him, which began in 1736, and was carried on, by a frequent exchange of friendly and affectionate letters, from that time to 1741, when it seems to have ceased, or to have been inter-

* March 23, 1737-8.

rupted at least, for reasons which will be mentioned hereafter.

In the whole course of these letters, which I have in my hands, every sort of polite insinuation is employed to soften and remove his prejudices against revealed religion; by joining with him, sometimes, in his graver complaints of bigoted divines, and, sometimes, in his ridicule of their pretended orthodoxy; but in taking for granted, every where, his respect for revelation, and his real belief of it, and in seeming to think that, if other opinions were entertained of him, they had proceeded from an ignorance of his true character.

But the friendliness of his views will best appear from his own words.

He had taken occasion to acquaint Dr. Middleton with the manner in which he meant to address the Free-thinkers, in his dedication to them, prefixed to the first volume of the D. L. and with his purpose of making respectful mention of him in it. To this information Dr. Middleton replies, Sept. 22, 1737, " I am pleased with the manner of your address to the Free-thinkers, and obliged to you for your friendly intentions with regard to myself; and though I should be as proud to have the testimony of your judgement and good opinion, as of any man, yet I would have you consider, how far such a declaration of it may expose you to a share of that envy, which has lain, and still lies very heavy upon me."

This was handsome on his part, but was not likely to divert his friend from the measures he had taken. Accordingly in a letter, dated Dec. 23, 1737, after telling him that his book was coming out, and that he

had ordered a copy of it to be sent him, he proceeds thus, with a manifest allusion, in the concluding sentence, to Dr. Middleton's letter—" I have your pardon
 " to ask for the liberty I have taken of designing you,
 " by your character, in one place of the body of the
 " book, as well as in the dedication to the Free-
 " thinkers. For I would fain contribute to abate
 " an *unjust prejudice*, that might lie in the way of
 " those honours which wait for you, and are so much
 " your due. *And I shall reckon it for nothing, in so*
 " *honest an attempt, to run the risk of sharing that*
 " *prejudice with you.*"

And again, writing to him March 18, 1737-8, on the subject of his answer to the author of the Weekly Miscellany, he says, " I am to thank him for the
 " agreeable necessity of vindicating you (by a quotation
 " in one of the defences that pass for yours) from his
 " *false accusation* of denying the inspiration of scrip-
 " ture ; and from his *imagination* (which is the ground
 " of this clamour) that you defend Revelation, not as
 " true, but only useful ; and that, as to other points,
 " you and I can differ without breach of common hu-
 " manity, friendship, and Christian charity."

I have put these things together, because I would not interrupt the recital of what concerns the first appearance of those two capital works, The Alliance, and Divine Legation (so closely connected with each other that the former, in the original design, was but a chapter of the latter) ; the reception they met with from the publick ; and the occasion they gave him of justifying an obnoxious friend, as well as explaining his own sentiments.

I must now go back a little, to mention a circumstance in his life, which does the parties concerned too

much honour to be omitted by me, and which happened in the latter end of the year 1737. The Alliance had now made the author much talked of at Court; and the Bishop of Chichester, on whom that work had impressed, as we have seen, the highest ideas of his merit, was willing to take that favourable opportunity of introducing him to the Queen. Her Majesty, it is well known, took a pleasure in the discourse of men of learning and genius; and chancing one day to ask the Bishop, if he could recommend a person of that description to be about her, and to entertain her, sometimes, with his conversation, the Bishop said, he could, and mentioned the author of the Alliance between Church and State. The recommendation was graciously received, and the matter put in so good a train, that the Bishop expected every day the conclusion of it, when the Queen was seized with a sudden illness, which put an end to her life the 20th of November, 1737.

I find this transaction alluded to in a letter from the Bishop, dated Nov. 11, that is, nine days before that unhappy event. His Lordship thanks Mr. Warburton for some sheets of the first volume of the Legation, which were just then sent him from the press, and, after making some remarks upon them, takes notice of a stroke of pleasantry, which, it seems, had escaped him, on Mr. Wollaston's famous book on *The Religion of Nature*, and which he advises him to strike out, *as it would give great offence to the admirers of that book.* *I have besides,* continues his Lordship, **A PARTICULAR REASON for advising you to alter that passage, which you shall know at a proper time.**

And, afterwards, in the same letter—*I would advise, not only the cancelling that leaf, but the doing it IMMEDIATELY; that it may not get into many hands.*

When

When I see you, I am persuaded, you will allow this is right advice from a FRIEND.

The secret was, that he was then endeavouring to serve his friend with the Queen, and was apprehensive that the freedom he had taken with that work, which she much admired, might hurt him in her Majesty's opinion, and defeat his design.

This disappointment, when he came to know it, did not abate his ardour in prosecuting his studies at Brand-Broughton. After publishing the *Vindication*, before mentioned, early in the year 1738, he applied himself with great industry to compose the second volume of his work, notwithstanding the clamours, which had been raised, and now grew louder, against the first. "I go steadily on," says he in a letter to Dr. Middleton, Nov. 12, 1738, "amidst much ill treatment. If you ask, what it is that supports me, I will tell you, my excellent friend: It is the love of truth, and a clear conviction of the reality of the Jewish and Christian Revelations."

Animated with these principles, he went on with his great design, and seems to have spent the two or three succeeding years upon it. Only, in 1739, he drew up and published a short defence of Mr. Pope's *Essay on Man*, against M. de Crousaz, who had written a book to shew that it was constructed on the principles of Spinoza, and contained a dangerous system of irreligion. But though this was a slight thing, and took up little of his time, yet as it respected so eminent a person, and had great consequences with regard to himself, it will be proper to enlarge upon it.

It has been objected to Mr. Warburton, that, in his earlier days, he had himself entertained a prejudice against Mr. Pope, and had even expressed it in very

strong terms. The offence taken had probably been occasioned by a severe reflexion, in one of his satires, on Mr. Warburton's friend and patron, Sir Robert Sutton. And, in that case, it is likely that he might express himself of the poet, with too much warmth. For I will not conceal or disguise the infirmity of my friend. When his moral feelings were touched, he was apt to be transported into some intemperance of expression, and was not always guarded, or even just, in his censures or commendations. But a mind, naturally great, does not long retain this fervour, and, when cooled by reflection, is in haste to make amends for its former excesses. It is impossible, indeed, that, under any provocation, he should be blind to so much merit; as our great poet possessed; and what he saw of this sort in any man, he was not backward to declare to others. In his Vindication of himself, last year, he had shewn how much he admired Mr. Pope, by quoting a fine passage from him, and applying it to himself in a way, that shewed an esteem of his morals, as well as poetry. Since that time, he had suffered so much abuse himself from angry zealots, and felt so strongly, in his own case, what it was for a well-meaning man to have his religious sentiments misrepresented, that this attack of M. de Crousaz would naturally find him in a disposition to resent it.

Add to all this, that he saw with concern the ill use which some were ready to make of the supposed fatalism of Mr. Pope, and how hurtful it was to religion to have it imagined, that so great a genius was ill-inclined towards it.

These reasons, working together, seem to have determined him to take the part of the injured poet; as indeed he explains the matter himself in a letter of

July

July 16, 1739, to Dr. Middleton :—“ A certain great
 “ man is very angry with me for speaking of you in the
 “ manner I did. I make no question but another sort
 “ of those they call *great* men will hold themselves
 “ outraged by me in my vindication of Mr. Pope
 “ against M. de Crousaz in some letters which are
 “ going to be collected together and published. But
 “ I cannot forbear shewing my esteem of merit, and
 “ my contempt of their calumniators, or thinking that
 “ it is of use to Religion to prove so noble a genius is a
 “ friend to it.”

These letters* were much read, and gave a new lustre to Mr. Warburton's reputation. They shewed the elegance of his taste in polite literature, as well as his penetration into moral subjects. Mr. Pope was supremely struck with them †, and might now exult, as his predecessor Boileau had done, when he cried out, in the face of his enemies—

“ Arnauld, le grand Arnauld, fait mon apologie.”

From this time there was an intimate acquaintance formed between the poet and his commentator. The effects of this union will be taken notice of presently. I now only add, that it was strongly cemented by a mutual profession of esteem, and a constant interchange of letters.

Among these I find one which Mr. Warburton addressed to his friend, in vindication of Sir Robert Sutton; written, as appears, with the view of prevailing with him to strike that gentleman's name out of his satires. As it sets the author in an amiable light, and seems to confirm my conjecture, that his former dissatis-

* See Vol. XI.

† See his Letter in his Works, April 14, 1739.

faction with Mr. Pope had arisen from this circumstance, I shall give it in the Appendix [A].

Towards the end of this year [1739] he published a new and improved edition of the first volume of the D. L. and sent it to his friend Bishop Hare ; who, in a kind letter of Dec. 1, 1739, returns his thanks for it, and adds—" I hope not only posterity, but the present age, will do justice to so much merit, and do assure you, it shall not be my fault if it do not." Which I mention to shew that the envy which was then rising very fast against the author of the D. L. and which was supposed to have the countenance of some considerable Churchmen, had made no alteration in the sentiments of that great prelate, or lessened his esteem of him. Indeed on all occasions he expressed his regard for Mr. Warburton in the friendliest manner, of which the following instance must not be omitted.

Sir Thomas Hanmer, who was a man of business, and had been Speaker of the House of Commons in Queen Anne's time, grew ambitious, in the latter part of his life, to be taken notice of as a critick on Shakespear. He had seen some notes on his favourite poet by Mr. Warburton in Mr. Theobald's edition : and as he was now preparing one of his own, which he afterwards printed at the Clarendon press, he very justly conceived that the assistance of Mr. Theobald's coadjutor might be of service to him in the execution of that project.

With this view he got himself introduced to Mr. Warburton by the Bishop of Salisbury, Dr. Sherlock, and managed so well as to draw from his new acquaintance a large collection of notes and emendations, which were, in confidence, communicated to him in a series of private letters.

What

What followed upon this, and what use he made of those friendly communications, I need not repeat, as the account is given by Mr. Warburton himself in the lively preface to his and Mr. Pope's edition of Shakespeare, of which something more will be said in its place. It is enough to say here, that he very reasonably resented this usage, and complained of it to his two friends, the Bishops of Salisbury and Chichester. The *former* expresses his concern at this ill-treatment, and the more so, he says, *as he had in some measure been the occasion of it*; i.e. by bringing Mr. Warburton and Sir Thomas Hanmer together.

The *latter* tells him, in a letter of May 9, 1739—
“ Sir Thomas Hanmer's proceeding with respect to
“ Shakespeare is very extraordinary.—I think you do
“ very well to get your own papers out of his hands :
“ 'tis pity they have been so long in them, since 'tis
“ probable he has squeezed what he could out of them ;
“ which is most ungenerous treatment.” He concludes
with saying—“ I hope you will find leisure to give the
“ world a Shakespeare, yourself, which the sooner 'tis
“ made known the better.”

And thus ended this trifling affair, which I should scarcely have mentioned but to do justice to the friendly temper of Bishop Hare, who interested himself so kindly in all his concerns ; and to shew that Mr. Warburton's conduct was not directed by caprice or petulance, but was that of a man of sense and honour, and as such was approved by his most judicious friends.

Mr. Warburton was so taken up with his studies, and found so much delight in them, that he rarely stirred from home ; which he would often say there was no good reason for doing, except necessary business,
and

and the satisfaction of seeing a friend. What the world calls amusement from a change of the scene, passed for nothing with him, who was too well employed to be tired of his situation, or to have a thought of running away from himself; which, after all, they, who are incessantly making the experiment, find impossible to be done. Yet he sometimes found himself obliged to go to London; as he did in the spring of the year 1740; and he took that opportunity of making his first visit to Mr. Pope, of which he immediately * gave Dr. Middleton the following account:

“ I passed about a week at Twickenham in the most agreeable manner. Mr. Pope is as good a companion, as a poet; and what is more, appears to be as *good* a man.”

The last was indeed the consideration, that so much endeared Mr. Pope to him. He found him an honest and well-principled man; zealous to promote the interests of virtue, and impressed with an awful sense of religion, natural and revealed. In short, he found an image of himself in his new acquaintance: no wonder then, their esteem and affection grew so fast as to give umbrage, in no long time, to a certain Nobleman, who had taken to himself the honour of being the *guide and philosopher* of Mr. Pope.

The acquisition of this new friend came very seasonably to support Mr. Warburton under the loss of another, the excellent Bishop Hare, who died, after a short illness, the 6th of April this year.

How he felt that loss, the publick has been informed by himself in the preface to the second volume of the D. L. and with a flow of sentiment and expression, which only the truest friendship, operating on a mind

* May 6, 1740.

like his, could inspire. But we are better pleased to hear him express his sense of it in a private letter to a friend. Speaking of the Bishop's death to Dr. Middleton, in the letter above mentioned of May 6, 1740, he says—"He has not left his fellow behind him for the love and encouragement of learning. I have had a great loss in his death. He honoured me with his esteem and friendship. This I esteemed a great obligation. I never sought to increase it by any other dependance upon him; and by the terms on which we kept up a correspondence, he did me the justice to believe, I expected no other."

This freedom of correspondence does honour to both parties; and was observed, with address, in this letter to Dr. Middleton, who had conceived Bishop Hare to have taken a prejudice against himself, for his liberty in professing some sentiments, not conformable to his Lordship's. He therefore insinuates there was no ground for such a suspicion, for that he himself, so much and so long in the Bishop's favour, had lived with him on the same free terms. He knew very well, that nothing could recommend his patron or himself to his friend's good opinion more, than such liberality on the one part, and so manly a conduct on the other.

But the truth is, though Mr. Warburton very properly *sought not* to increase his obligation to Bishop Hare, he would certainly have received the highest, had it been in the Bishop's power; which very probably ended with the Queen's death.

In May, 1741, was published the second volume of the D. L. which completed the argument, although not the entire plan of that work. A work! in all views, of the most transcendant merit, whether we consider the invention, or the execution,

A plain simple argument, yet perfectly new, proving the divinity of the Mosaic Law, and laying a sure foundation for the support of Christianity, is there drawn out to a great length by a chain of reasoning, so elegantly connected, that the reader is carried along it with ease and pleasure; while the matter presented to him is so striking for its own importance, so embellished by a lively fancy, and illustrated, from all quarters, by exquisite learning and the most ingenious disquisition, that, in the whole compass of modern or antient theology, there is nothing equal or similar to this extraordinary performance.

Such is the general idea of the Divine Legation of Moses. But for a more distinct conception of its frame; to see at once

—“ the bearings and the ties,

“ The strong connections, just dependencies ;”

the reader is referred to the recapitulation at the end of the VIth Book*, where the author himself has drawn up a brief comprehensive view of his whole scheme, with great spirit.

This year, but something earlier, came out Dr. Middleton's famous *History of the Life of Cicero*; which was received by the publick, as it deserved to be, with great applause. Mr. Warburton took the first occasion to compliment his friend upon it; and, as in the concluding part of that work Dr. Middleton had controverted the account given of Cicero's philosophical opinions in the first volume of the D. L. he takes notice, that *he had a more particular pleasure in the last section, as he was more particularly interested in it*; and then proceeds to moralize in the following manner:

* See Vol. VI.

“ We perhaps shall neither of us be esteemed ortho-
 “ dox writers. But this we shall do, we shall give an
 “ example to the world, which orthodox writers rarely
 “ do, and perhaps of more use to mankind, than most
 “ of the refined subjects they engage in, that we can
 “ differ in many important points, and publicly avow
 “ our difference, without the least interruption of the
 “ declared friendship and esteem, we bear to each
 “ other. And the Life of Tully, and the D. L., will be
 “ a rule, which few have set us and perhaps few will
 “ follow, how men, who esteem and love each other,
 “ should comport themselves when they differ in opi-
 “ nion. So that whichever is right or wrong in *opinion*;
 “ the honest part of the world will judge both of us
 “ to be right in *sentiment* *.”

To whom Dr. Middleton replies, with great compla-
 cency, in the same strain—“ As to the circumstance,
 “ from which you draw so just and useful a lesson, of
 “ our differing from each other in some particular
 “ opinions, as I was always persuaded that it could
 “ not have any other effect upon you, so I have the
 “ comfort to assure you, that I never felt the least im-
 “ pression from it disadvantageous to our friendship.
 “ It is the necessary consequence of that privilege of
 “ our nature on which all men of sense set the highest
 “ value, the liberty of judging for ourselves; yet since
 “ it would be a great satisfaction to me in all cases to
 “ find my judgement confirmed by yours, so, when
 “ you are at full leisure, I should be glad to know the
 “ particular reasons which force you to differ from me
 “ on the subject of Cicero’s opinions; to which alone
 “ our difference in the present case is to be referred,

* April 29, 1741

“ that

“ that as far as is possible we may come still nearer to ‘ each other *.”

Thus these two ingenious men; and the same spirit breathes through the rest of their letters: so that their whole temper seems to have resolved itself into a principle of general candour. Yet, within a month or two, a fresh difference of opinion taking place (though on a subject of no more importance than the other about Cicero, respecting only the origin of popish ceremonies) and neither side giving way, our two candid friends cooled insensibly towards each other, and seem, thenceforward, to have discontinued their correspondence; for I find no letters, that passed between them, of a later date than those of this year, which touch upon that difference. A memorable instance of our common weakness! which shews how little stress is to be laid on those professions of candour, with which our letters and conversations overflow; and how impossible it is for any lasting friendship to subsist between men of opposite principles and persuasions, however their feelings may for a time be dissembled, or disguised even to themselves, by a shew of good breeding.

For a contrary reason, the conformity of their sentiments, the friendship between Mr. Warburton and Mr. Pope became every day closer and more confidential. In the beginning of this summer, when the business that had called him to London, on the publication of his book, was over, he went down again to Twickenham, and passed some weeks with Mr. Pope there, and in a country-ramble, which led them at last to Oxford. The university was naturally pleased at the

* Cambridge, April 5, 1741. I suppose a misdate for May 5th, or Mr. Warburton's letter is misdated.

arrival of two such strangers, and seemed desirous of inrolling their names among their graduates. The degree of Doctor of Divinity was intended for the Divine, and that of Doctor of Law for the Poet, as a testimony of their great respect for each. But intrigue and envy defeated this scheme; and the university lost the opportunity of decorating with its honours the two greatest geniuses of the age, by the fault of one or two of its members*. Mr. Pope retired with some chagrin to Twickenham, but consoled himself and his friend with this sarcastic reflexion—"We shall take our degree together in Fame, whatever we do at the university †."

The time they spent together this summer gave occasion to some interesting conversations. Mr. Warburton suggested many alterations and improvements of Mr. Pope's moral writings, and particularly advised him to strike out *every thing in them that might be suspected of having the least glance towards fate or naturalism*; which he consented to, we are told, *with extreme pleasure* ‡. It was also at this time, that he concerted with him the plan of the IVth Book of the Dunciad §.

Mr. Pope lost no time in carrying it into execution. In November following he presses his friend to meet him at Prior-Park, on the invitation of Mr. Allen, with whom he then was, and tells him it was there that he should find most leisure to profit by the advice he had given him "to resume the studies, which he had almost laid aside by perpetual avocations and dissipations."

* Pope's Works, Vol. IX. Lond. 1753. Letter CVII.

† Sept. 20, 1741.

‡ Pref. to his Works.

§ Pope's Works, Vol. IX. Letter CX. note.

Here accordingly they met : a great part of the new poem was read and highly approved : the rest was finished in the course of the year 1742, and a project formed for making Mr. Warburton the Editor of the IV books complete ; which was executed very early in 1743 ; and so much to the author's satisfaction, that he afterwards engaged him to sustain the like office with regard to the rest of his Works *.

I shall find a fitter place, in the course of these reflexions, to speak my own sentiments of the edition of Mr. Pope's works. All I have now to add on this interesting part of Mr. Warburton's life, is, that the most unreserved confidence continued between the two friends till Mr. Pope's death, in May 1744 : and with what warmth of affection on both sides, appears from the last will and testament of the latter, and from the zeal of the former to fulfil his intention, and to do all possible honour to his memory.

It must, indeed, be regretted that this memorable friendship commenced so late, and ended so soon. We might otherwise have seen the most valuable fruits of it. Their hearts and heads were exactly attuned to each other ; and, had the life and health of Mr. Pope permitted, this harmonious agreement in the powers and purposes of two such men could not have failed to produce many a noble design in favour of virtue and religion.

The death of our great poet, was an event that could not fail of putting the spirits of the ingenious in motion, and of exciting an emulation, among the lovers of polite literature, to adorn his memory and virtues. It accordingly produced Mr. Brown's *Essay on Satire*, which was addressed to Mr. Warburton, and so far

* Letters 112, 113, 114, 115.

approved by him, as to be prefixed to his edition of Mr. Pope's works. It also brought on the dawn of Mr. Mason's genius, in *The Monody*, entitled *Musæus*; which gave so sure a presage of his future eminence in poetry, and so advantageous a picture of his mind, that Mr. Warburton, on the sight of it,

“ With open arms received one poet more.”

Soon after Mr. Pope's death, Mr. Warburton received a letter from a learned and ingenious lady, Mrs. Cockburne, lamenting that event, and making some enquiry after Mr. Pope's works; but the real purpose of the letter-writer was to draw Mr. Warburton into an explanation of his system concerning *Moral Obligation*, as delivered in the first volume of the *D. L.* it being different from one espoused by herself, which was that of Dr. Samuel Clarke.

His answer to this Lady is written with great civility and politeness, and was so well received, that, when, a year or two afterwards, she drew up her confutation of Dr. Rutherford's *Essay on Virtue*, she sent the manuscript to Mr. Warburton; who was extremely pleased with it, and wrote a short preface in recommendation of that work. His Letter may be seen in the Appendix [B.]

But to return to what I was saying of Mr. Pope's friendship for Mr. Warburton.

Next to the enjoyment itself of such a friendship, the chief benefit Mr. Warburton derived from it, was the being introduced by his means to his principal friends; particularly Mr. MURRAY, and Mr. ALLEN; two of the greatest and best men of the age. As I had myself the honour of being well acquainted with these excellent persons, and very much obliged to them,

I may the rather be allowed to indulge myself in the recollection of their virtues.

Mr. MURRAY, afterwards Earl of Mansfield and Lord Chief Justice of England, was so extraordinary a person, and made so great a figure in the world, that his name must go down to posterity, with distinguished honour, in the public records of the nation. For his shining talents displayed themselves in every department of the State, as well as in the supreme Court of Justice, his peculiar province; which he filled with a lustre of reputation, not equalled perhaps, certainly not exceeded, by that of any of his predecessors.

Of his conduct in the House of Lords, I can speak with the more confidence, because I speak from my own observation. Too good to be the leader, and too able to be the dupe, of any party, he was believed to speak his own sense of public measures; and the authority of his judgement was so high that, in regular times, the House was usually determined by it. He was no forward, or frequent speaker; but reserved himself, as was fit, for occasions worthy of him. In *debate*, he was eloquent as well as wise; or rather, he became eloquent by his wisdom. His countenance and tone of voice imprinted the ideas of penetration, probity, and candour; but what secured your attention and assent to all he said, was his constant good sense, flowing in apt terms and the clearest method. He affected no sallies of the imagination, or bursts of passion; much less would he condescend to personal abuse or petulant altercation. All was clear, candid reason, letting itself so easily into the minds of his hearers as to carry information and conviction with it. In a word, his public senatorial character resembled
very

very much that of Messala, of whom Cicero says, addressing himself to Brutus—

“ Do not imagine, Brutus, that, for worth, honour,
 “ and a warm love of his country, any one is com-
 “ parable to Messala: So that his eloquence, in which
 “ he wonderfully excels, is almost eclipsed by those
 “ virtues. And even in his display of that faculty,
 “ his superior good sense shews itself most: with so
 “ much care and skill hath he formed himself to the
 “ truest manner of speaking! His powers of genius
 “ and invention are confessedly of the first size; yet
 “ he almost owes less to them, than to the diligent and
 “ studious cultivation of his judgement*.”

In the commerce of private life, he was easy, friendly, and agreeable; extremely sensible of merit in other men, and ready on all occasions to countenance and produce it. From his early youth, he had attracted the notice, and obtained the friendship and applause, of our great poet.

Mr. ALLEN was a man of plain good sense, and the most benevolent temper. He rose to great consideration by farming the cross-posts; which he put into the admirable order in which we now find them; very much to the public advantage, as well as his own. He was of that generous composition, that his mind enlarged with his fortune; and the wealth he so

* “ Cave putes probitate, constantiâ, curâ, studio reipub-
 “ licæ, quidquam illi simile esse; ut eloquentia, quâ mi-
 “ rabiliter excellit, vix in eo locum ad laudandum habere
 “ videatur. Quanquam in hâc ipsâ sapientia plus apparet:
 “ ita gravi judicio multâque arte se exercuit in verissimo
 “ genere dicendi. Tanta autem industria est, tantumque
 “ evigilat in studio, ut non maximè ingenio, quod in eo sum-
 “ mum est, gratia habenda videatur.” Cic. ad Brutum, I. 15.

honourably acquired, he spent in a splendid hospitality, and the most extensive charities. His house, in so public a scene as that of Bath, was open to all men of rank and worth, and especially to men of distinguished parts and learning; whom he honoured and encouraged; and whose respective merits he was enabled to appreciate, by a natural discernment and superior good sense, rather than any acquired use and knowledge of letters. His domestic virtues were above all praise. With these qualities he drew to himself an universal respect; and possessed, in a high degree, the esteem of Mr. Pope, who, in one of his moral essays, has done justice to his modest and amiable character.

To these two incomparable persons Mr. Pope was especially anxious to introduce his friend; and it was not long before he experienced the most substantial benefits from this recommendation.

In the mean time, his attention was turned towards that numerous host of answerers, which the D. L. of Moses had brought down upon him. The extensive argument, and miscellaneous nature of that work, had led him to declare his sentiments on a multitude of questions, on which he thought differently from other writers, and of course to censure or confute their opinions. Whole bodies of men, as well as individuals of the highest reputation, were attacked by him; and his manner was to speak his sense of all with freedom and force. So that most writers, and even readers, had some ground of complaint against him. Not only the free-thinkers and unbelievers, against whom the tenour of his book was directed, but the heterodox of every denomination were treated without much ceremony; and of those, reputed orthodox, some
tenet

tenet or other, which till then they had held sacred, was discussed and reprobated by him. Straggling heresies, or embodied systems, made no difference with him; as they came in his way, no quarter was given to either: "his end and manner of writing," as Dr. Middleton truly observed, "being to pursue truth, wherever he found it, and, from the midst of smoke and darkness, to spread light and day around him*."

Such a writer (independently of the envy, which ever attends superior genius) must needs have innumerable enemies. And as all could not receive, nor the greater part deserve, his notice, he determined to select a few of the more respectable, out of the gross body of assailants, and to quit his hands of them at once, in a general comprehensive answer. This was done by *Remarks on several occasional Reflections*, in two parts; the *former* published in 1744, and the *second* (which he styles the *last*) in 1745; and both, executed in such a manner as was not likely to invite any fresh attacks upon him †.

Yet the rage of his answerers was not presently subdued. Writing to a confidential friend from Prior-Park the year following [July 15, 1746] he tells him—"I have a deluge of writers against me. But two great men have made me promise to answer none of them. They said—'You imagine the world takes as much notice of your answerers, as you yourself do. You are mistaken. The names of none of them were ever heard of in good company. And the world wonders you should so misemploy your time.' To

* Letter VII. in Dr. Middleton's Works, Vol. II.

† See Vol. XI. of this Edit.

this I said, 'It was true. But that there was another body to which some regard should be had, the inferior Clergy.' They said, if such writers misled them, it was in vain for me to think of them. And indeed I begin to think Aristotle mistaken when he defined man to be a rational animal. Not but I know the source of all this opposition is rather to be attributed to a bad heart, than a bad head. And you would be surprized at the instances of envy I could give you. Had I the complaisance to die to-morrow, it would all be over, before the end of the week. I am in this condition of a dead man, already, with regard to the Indies, there being, at this immense distance, no room for envy, as you will see by the following extract of a letter I received from one of the Governors of Virginia:"

" I never had so much profit from any book, except
 " the Bible, as from your's. The flood of infidelity
 " has reached us. The blessing of GOD upon your
 " excellent pen will, I hope, preserve us from the
 " evil influence. Pennsylvania seems to be over-run
 " with Deism. The Quakers are generally infected,
 " and it being their constitution to have no established
 " religion, their too-universal toleration receives all
 " without distinction. And they who worship GOD,
 " and they who do not, are in the same esteem.

" Your first and second volumes of the Divine
 " Legation came over to their public library. I
 " recommended it strongly. It soon became the
 " subject of all conversation. Never were such
 " struggles about any book, who should first read it.
 " The reasonable were convinced; the obstinate were
 " astonished. A friend of mine, of learning and station
 " there, spoke of it with the warmest praise: he said,
 " it

“ it had made him ten times more a Christian, than he had ever been.”—

These reflexions were consolatory to him, and made him bear with more temper the petulance of his adversaries; whom he seems to have neglected, till one of high fame and confident pretensions forced him again into the field of controversy. But this was not till some years afterwards.—I now go on with my narrative from 1745.

Mr. Pope had very early introduced his friend to the notice of Lord Chesterfield; who going this year Lord Lieutenant to Ireland, was desirous of taking Mr. Warburton with him, as his first Chaplain. He had his reasons for declining this offer; but he had a proper sense of the civility, and made his public acknowledgements for it in a dedication of the *Alliance*, reprinted with many corrections and improvements in 1748. The style of compliment in this piece will perhaps be censured as too high. But the truth is, that specious Nobleman had the fortune to be better thought of, in his lifetime, than he has been since. The general opinion therefore (which came confirmed to him by Mr. Pope) very naturally inflamed the expression of his gratitude, in that panegyrical epistle.

After an acquaintance of some years, Mr. Allen had, now, seen so much of his friend, that he wished to unite him still more closely to himself by an alliance of marriage with an accomplished Lady of his own family*.

This event took place in the beginning of the year 1746; and soon after, the preachership of Lincoln's-Inn happening to become vacant, Mr. Murray, then

* Miss Gertrude Tucker, Mr. Allen's favourite niece.

Solicitor General, easily prevailed with the learned Bench to invite so eminent a person, as Mr. Warburton, to accept that Office.

II.

FROM the time of his marriage, Mr. Warburton resided chiefly at Prior-Park. In so agreeable, or, rather, splendid a retreat, he enjoyed health, affluence, and leisure; the best company, when he chose to partake of it; and every other accommodation, which could be acceptable to a man of letters. His ambition was, also, gratified with the highest personal reputation; and, in due time, he succeeded to the chief honours of his profession. All this he could not but be sensible of. Yet, I have heard him say, that the most delicious season of his life was that which he had spent at Newark and Brand-Broughton. So delightful are the springing hopes of youth! and so enchanting the scenes which open to a great genius, when he comes first to know himself, and to make trial of his powers! The impression, these left upon him, is very agreeably described in a letter to Mr. C. Yorke, so late as the year 1758. Mr. Yorke had acquainted him with an excursion he had been making into Nottinghamshire. In his answer from P. P. Oct. 2, 1758, he says—"I am glad to understand you have amused
 " yourself agreeably with a ramble into Nottingham-
 " shire. It would have been the greatest pleasure to
 " have chopped upon you at Newark: And I would
 " have done so, on the least intimation. I could have
 " led you through delicious walks, and picked off, for
 " your amusement in our rambles, a thousand notions
 " which I hung upon every thorn, as I passed, thirty
 " years ago."

But

But to return from this reflexion.

The Preachership of Lincoln's-Inn had been offered him in so handsome a manner, that it could not be refused. Otherwise, the thing was not agreeable to him.

In a letter to Dr. Taylor * from Prior-Park, May 22, 1746, he says—" I think I told you in my last, that the Society of Lincoln's-Inn had made me an unanimous offer of the Preachership; which therefore I could not refuse, though I would gladly have done it. For it will require five or six months attendance. And the advantage of the thing itself you may judge of, by this: Mr. Allen would have me take a house, for which I pay as much rent, as the whole Preachership is worth. This only to you. And don't think I speak with any affectation when I tell you in your ear, that nothing can be more disagreeable to me, than this way of life. But I hope and determine that it shall not continue long. Don't you pity me? I shall be forced to write sermons: and God knows what will become of the D. L. But if I can do any good in this new station, I shall know how to bear the disagreements of it, and that's all. How capricious is the fate of mortals! Any other clergyman would think himself happy in such an honour as the Society has done me. I believe it is the first † that has been done to their Preacher. Yet I have no joy in it."

* The Physician—first of Newark, afterwards of London, very eminent in his profession, and from his early youth a friend of Mr. Warburton's.

† He means, by the unanimous offer of their preachership.

The truth is, the attendance on the term broke in upon his leisure; and, what was worse, the necessity he was under of composing sermons, with which he was but slenderly provided, diverted him from other things, for which he judged himself better qualified, and which he had more at heart.

The fruits of his industry in this new office there will be occasion to speak of, and to appreciate hereafter. For the present, it is true, his greater designs received some interruption, and particularly, as he intimates, that of the D. L.; although other reasons concurred to make him defer (indeed much too long) the prosecution of that noble work.

In the year 1747 appeared his edition of Shakespeare's works, which he had undertaken at the instance of Mr. Pope. "He was desirous"—the editor speaks in his own person—"I should give a new edition of this poet; and that his edition should be melted down into mine. In memory of our friendship, I have therefore made it our joint edition*."

As the public envy was now at its height, from the rising fortune, as well as fame, of the author; this edition awakened a spirit of criticism, which haunted him in every shape of dull ridicule, and solemn confutation. Happening to speak of this, in a letter written to him 1749 (for by that time I had the honour of being personally acquainted with him) he replies to me in the following lively manner—"I have, as you say, raised a spirit without designing it. And, while I thought I was only conjecturing, it seems I was conjuring. So that I had no sooner evoked the name of Shakespeare from the rotten monument

* Preface to Shakespeare.

“ of his former editions, than a crew of strange devils,
 “ and more grotesque than any he laughs at in the
 “ old farces, came chattering, mewling, and grinning
 “ round about me *.”

The outcry against him was, indeed, pretty much what is here so pleasantly described. His illustrations of the poet's sense were frequently not taken; and his corrections of the faulty text, not allowed. And, to speak candidly, it could scarce be otherwise. For, though all pretend to be judges of poetry, few have any idea of poetical criticism. And, as to what concerns the emendation of the text, the abler the critic, the more liable he is to some extravagance of conjecture (as we see in the case of Bentley himself); it being dulness, and not judgement, that best secures him from this sort of imputation †.

For

* Prior-Park, Sept. 28, 1749.

† The apology, which an eminent French writer makes for Joseph Scaliger, may serve for all Commentators of his size:

“ Je ne sçay si on ne pourroit pas dire que Scaliger
 “ avoit trop d'esprit, et trop de science, pour faire un bon
 “ commentaire; car à force d'avoir de l'esprit, il trouvoit
 “ ans les auteurs qu'il commentoit, plus de finesse et plus
 “ de genie, qu'ils n'en avoient effectivement; et sa profonde
 “ littérature étoit cause qu'il voyoit mille rapports entre les
 “ pensées d'un auteur, et quelque point rare d'antiquité.
 “ De sorte qu'il s'imaginoit que son auteur avoit fait
 “ quelque allusion à ce point d'antiquité, et sur ce pied-là
 “ il corrigeoit un passage. Si on n'aime mieux s'imaginer
 “ que l'envie d'eclaircir un mistere d'érudition inconnu aux
 “ autres critiques, l'engageoit a supposer qu'il se trouvoit
 “ dans un tel ou tel passage. Quoiqu'il en soit, les com-
 “ mentaires qui viennent de lui, sont pleins de conjectures
 “ hardies, ingénieuses, et fort sçavantes, mais il n'est gueres
 “ apparent

For the rest, such is the felicity of his genius in restoring numberless passages to their integrity, and in explaining others which the author's sublime conceptions, or his licentious expression, had kept out of sight, that this fine edition of Shakespeare must ever be highly valued by men of sense and taste; a spirit, congenial to that of the author, breathing throughout, and easily atoning, with such, for the little mistakes and inadvertencies, discoverable in it.

Mr. Warburton very properly neglected all attacks on his own critical fame. But of one, that was made soon after on the moral character of his friend, he took more notice. In 1749 an insignificant pamphlet, under the name of *A Patriot King*, was published by Lord Bolingbroke, or by his direction, with a preface to it, reflecting highly on Mr. Pope's honour. The provocation was simply this. The manuscript of that trivial declamation had been intrusted to the care of Mr. Pope, with the charge (as it was pretended) that only a *certain* number of copies should be printed. Mr. Pope, in his excessive admiration of his Lordship (which was the chief foible of his character) took that opportunity, for fear so invaluable a treasure of patriot-eloquence should be lost to the public, to exceed his commission, and to run off more copies, which were found, after his death, in the printer's warehouse; but with so little secrecy that several of his friends, and in particular Mr. Allen (as he told me) was apprized of it at the time, and by Mr. Pope himself. This charge, however frivolous, was aggravated beyond
measure;

“ apparent que les auteurs ayent songé à tout ce qu'il leur
 “ fait dire. On s'éloigne de leur sens aussi bien quand on
 “ a beaucoup d'esprit, que quand on n'en a pas,” &c.—
Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, Juin 1684.

measure; and, notwithstanding the proofs Lord Bolingbroke had received of Mr. Pope's devotion to him, envenomed with the utmost malignity. Mr. Warburton thought it became him to vindicate his deceased friend; and he did it so effectually, as not only to silence his accuser, but to cover him with confusion.

And here let me have leave to pause a little, while, in emulation of this generous conduct of my friend towards one great man, I endeavour to perform the same office towards another; the most amiable of his time; who has suffered, in the public opinion, by a charge of immoral meanness brought against him by Mr. Pope himself, and, as I am persuaded, without the least foundation. The person I mean is Mr. Addison, in whose good name, as in that of Mr. Pope, Virtue herself has an interest. He and Mr. Pope were, likewise, friends; and this relation between them brings the two cases into a still nearer resemblance with each other.

The charge, I allude to, is briefly this—Mr. Addison had uniformly * advised and encouraged Mr. Pope's translation of the *Iliad*, from the year 1713, when the design of that work was first communicated to him. He had even been zealous to promote the subscription to it; and in May 1716, when a considerable progress had been made in the translation, and some parts of it published, he speaks of it in the *Freeholder*, N^o 40, in the following manner:

“ When I consider myself as a British freeholder,
 “ I am in a particular manner pleased with the labours
 “ of those who have improved our language with the
 “ translation of old Latin and Greek authors; and by

* See Letters to and from Mr. Addison, in Mr. Pope's Works.

“ that means let us into the knowledge of what passed
 “ in the famous governments of Greece and Rome.
 “ We have already most of their historians in our own
 “ tongue : and what is still more for the honour of our
 “ language, it has been taught to express with elegance
 “ the greatest of their poets in each nation. The
 “ illiterate among our countrymen may learn to judge
 “ from Dryden’s Virgil, of the most perfect Epic per-
 “ formance : and those parts of Homer which have
 “ already been published by Mr. Pope, give us rea-
 “ son to think the Iliad will appear in English with as
 “ little disadvantage to that immortal poem.”

Notwithstanding all this, Mr. Pope believed, and his friends, as was natural, believed with him, that in 1715 Mr. Addison either translated himself, or employed Mr. Tickell to translate, the first book of the Iliad, in opposition to him.

If we ask on what grounds this extraordinary charge is brought against such a man as Mr. Addison, we are only told of some slight and vague suspicions, without any thing that looks like a proof, either external or internal. What there is of the *latter* tends to confute the charge. For whoever is acquainted with Mr. Addison’s style and manner, must be certain that the translation was not *his own*, though Steele, in a peevish letter written against Tickell *, has, it seems, insinuated some such thing. And for *external* proof, we have absolutely nothing but a report from hearsay evidence, that Mr. Addison had expressed himself civilly of Tickell’s performance ; whence it is concluded that this translation was, at least, undertaken by Mr. Addison’s advice and authority, if not made by himself.

* Dedication of the Drummer to Mr. Congreve.

Still, it will be owned, that so generous a man as Mr. Pope must believe he had some proof of this charge against his friend: and I think, I have, at length discovered what it was.

I have seen a printed copy * of Tickell's translation, in which are entered many criticisms and remarks in Mr. Pope's own hand. And from two of these, compared together, I seem to collect the true ground of the suspicion. But the reader shall judge for himself.

To the translation, are prefixed a DEDICATION, and ADVERTISEMENT. The *latter* is in these words—“I must inform the reader, that, when I began this first book, I had some thoughts of translating the whole Iliad: but had the pleasure of being diverted from that design, by finding the work was fallen into a much abler hand. I would not therefore be thought to have any other view in publishing this small specimen of Homer's Iliad, than to bespeak, if possible, the favour of the Public to a translation of Homer's Odyssey, wherein I have already made some progress.”

To the words in this advertisement—*when I began this first book*—Mr. Pope affixes this note—*See the first line of the Dedication.*

Turning to the dedication, we find it begin thus—“When I first entered upon this translation I was ambitious of dedicating it to the late Lord Halifax.”

* It was then in Mr. Warburton's hands. It was afterwards sold, by mistake, among the other books which he had at his house in town, to Mr. T. Payne, and came at length into the possession of Isaac Reed, Esq. of Staple-Inn; who was so obliging as to make me a present of it, to be kept in the library at Hartlebury (in which that of Mr. Pope is included), where it now remains.

—Over against which words is, likewise, entered, in Mr. Pope's hand, the following note. *The translator was first known to him [Lord Halifax] four months before his death. He died in May 1715.*

Now, from comparing these two notes together, one sees clearly how Mr. Pope reasoned on the matter. He concluded from Tickell's saying—*when he first entered on this translation, that is, began this first book, he thought of dedicating his work to Lord Halifax*—that he could not have entertained this thought, if he had not at that time been *known* to Lord Halifax. But it was certain, it seems, that Mr. Tickell was *first* known to that Lord only *four months* before his death, in May 1715. Whence it seemed to follow, that *this first book* had been written within, or since, that time.

Admitting this conclusion to be rightly made by Mr. Pope, it must indeed be allowed that he had much reason for his charge of insincerity on Mr. Addison, who, as a friend that had great influence with the translator, would not have advised, or even permitted, such a design to be entered upon and prosecuted by him at this juncture. But there seems not the least ground for such a conclusion. Lord Halifax was the great patron of wits and poets: and if Tickell had formed his design of translating the Iliad long before Mr. Pope was known to have engaged in that work, he might very well be supposed to think of dedicating to this Mæcenas, as much a stranger as he then was to him. Nothing is more common than such intentions in literary men; although Mr. Pope might be disposed to conduct himself, in such a case, with more delicacy or dignity.

I see, then, no reason to infer from the premises, that Mr. Tickell began *his first book* but four months

before

before Lord Halifax's death. For any thing that appears to the contrary, he might have *begun*, or even *finished* it, four years before that event, and have only relinquished the thoughts of prosecuting his translation from the time that he *found this work had fallen*, as he says, *into an abler*, that is, Mr. Pope's hand.

These passages, however, of the *Advertisement* and *Dedication*, reflected upon and compared together, furnished Mr. Pope, as I suppose, with the chief of those *odd concurring circumstances*, which, as we are told *, convinced him that this translation of the first book of the Iliad was published with Mr. Addison's participation, if not composed by him. If the work had been begun but *four* months before its appearance, it must have been at least by his allowance and participation: if before that time (Mr. Tickell's acquaintance with Lord Halifax not being of so early a date) it was, most probably, his own composition. And to this latter opinion, it seems, Mr. Pope inclined.

How inconclusive these reasonings are, we have now seen. All that remains therefore is to account for the publication at such a time. And for this, I see not why Mr. Tickell's own reason may not be accepted as the true one—that he had no other view in publishing this specimen, than to bespeak the favour of the public to a translation of the *Odysséis*, in which he had made some progress.

The time, it must be owned, was an unlucky one. But if Mr. Addison had reason to believe his friend's motive to be that which he professed, he might think it not fit to divert him from a work which was likely to serve his interest (poetical translation being at that time the most lucrative employment of a man of

* In the notes on Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot.

letters), and though it had less merit than Mr. Pope's, to do him some credit. And for the civility of speaking well of his translation afterwards, or even of assisting him in the revisal of it, this was certainly no more than Mr. Addison's friendship for the translator required.

That Mr. Addison had, in fact, no unfriendly intention in the part he had taken in this affair, is certain from the passage before cited from the *Freeholder*, where he speaks so honourably, in May 1716, of Mr. Pope's translation, after all the noise that had been made about Mr. Tickell's first book in the summer of 1715. We may indeed impute this conduct to fear, or dissimulation: but a charge of this nature ought surely not to be made, but on the clearest and best grounds.

I have the rather introduced these observations into the account of my friend's life, as he himself had been led by Mr. Pope's authority to credit the imputation on Mr. Addison; and, on more occasions than one, had given a countenance to it. And it is but justice to him, to assure the reader that when, some years before his death, I shewed him this *Vindication*, he professed himself so much satisfied with it, as to say, if he lived to see another edition of Mr. Pope's works, he would strike out the offensive reflexions on Mr. Addison's character.

To return now to our subject.—We left Mr. Warburton illustrating the works of one of our great poets, and vindicating the moral character of another. But whatever amusements, or friendly offices, might employ his pen, he never lost sight of what he had most at heart, the defence of Religion. And a controversy then carrying on, concerning the miraculous powers of the Christian Church, between Dr. Middleton and his

his opponents, and so managed, on both sides, as to hurt the cause of Christianity itself, gave him occasion to explain his own sentiments on the subject in an admirable book, entitled JULIAN; or, *A Discourse concerning the earthquake and fiery eruption which defeated that emperor's attempt to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem.* This work was published in 1750, and is written throughout in the genuine spirit of its author*.

It is introduced by an exquisite preface on the literary character of the Fathers, and on the condition of moral science before, and after, the appearance of Christianity.

This excellent book had the fate of the author's other writings, to be censured at home. In a letter from Prior-Park to Dr. Balguy, Jan. 17, 1751 2,—“They tell me,” says he, “there are some remarks published against my Julian. I don't know the nature of them, nor ever shall. That matter interests every clergyman, that is to say, every Christian, in England, as much as myself. Besides, I have long since bid adieu to controversy. I give my sentiments to the publick, and there's an end. If any body will oppose them, he has my leave. If any body will defend them, he has my thanks. I propound them freely: I explain them as clearly and enforce them as strongly, as I can. I think I owe no more either to myself or truth. I am sure I owe no more to the publick. Besides, I know a little (as you will see by the new edition of the first and second volumes of D. L.) how to correct myself; so have less need of this assistance from others: which you will better understand, when you see that I have not received the least assistance from

* See Vol. VIII. of this Edit.

“ the united endeavours of that numerous band of
 “ answerers, who have spared no freedoms in telling
 “ me of my faults.”

Again, some months afterwards, writing to the same friend—Bedford Row, May 12, 1752, he observes,

—“ I think you judge rightly of the effects of
 “ Lord Bolingbroke’s writings, as well as of their
 “ character. As to his discourse on the Canon of
 “ Scripture, I think it below all criticism, though it
 “ had mine. He mentions (and I believe, with good
 “ faith) that foolish rabbinical fable of Esdras’ re-
 “ storing the whole lost canon by Inspiration; and
 “ argues from it. However, the redoubtable pen of
 “ Sykes, though now worn to the stump, is drawn
 “ upon him; or, at least, threatened to be drawn. He
 “ threatened, too, to draw it upon poor Julian; but he
 “ left the execution to another. And who do you
 “ think that other proves? Somebody or other, by
 “ far more curious than myself, would unearth this
 “ vermin: And he is found to be one Nichols, which
 “ your university some time ago prosecuted for stealing
 “ their books, or rather should have prosecuted,
 “ Have I not reason to blame you for your ill-timed
 “ clemency? Had they hanged him, as Justice called
 “ upon them to do, my book had been safe. It is
 “ true, he has not fulfilled the old proverb, but rather
 “ contributed to a new one, “Save a rogue from the
 “ gallows, and——he will endeavour to save his fellow,
 “ I had gibbeted up Julian, and he comes by night to
 “ cut him down.”—The pleasantry of these reflexions
 has drawn me into a citation of them. Otherwise,
 it was scarce worth while to tell the reader what
 some of our own prejudiced countrymen thought of
 Julian. For the learned abroad were generally much
 taken

taken with this work. Among others, the president Montesquieu *, who, it seems, was then meditating a visit to his friends in England, writes thus to Mr. Charles York from Paris, June 6, 1753: “When you see Dr. Warburton, pray let him know the satisfaction I propose to myself in making a further acquaintance with him, and in taking a nearer view of his great talents. *His Julian charms me*; although I have but indifferent English readers, and have, myself, forgotten a great deal of what I once knew of that language.”

And speaking of this work some years afterwards, in a letter to me, Mr. Warburton says, “My Julian has had a great effect in France, where Free-thinking holds its head as high as in England. This is a consolation to me, as my sole aim is to repress that infernal spirit.” And again,—“It has procured me the good will of the best and greatest man † in France; while there is hardly a nobleman in England knows I have written such a book ‡.”

This

* “Quand vous verrez Mr. le Docteur WARBURTON, je vous prie de lui dire l'idée agréable que je me fais de faire plus ample connoissance avec lui; d'aller trouver la source du sçavoir, et de voir la lumiere de l'esprit: son ouvrage sur Julien m'a enchanté, quoique je n'aie que de très mauvais lecteurs anglois, et que j'ai presque oublié tout ce que j'en sçavois.”

† Duc de Noailles—The intelligence was communicated to the author by his friend, M. de Silhouette: who admired his writings, and has translated some of them. See Preface to *Alliance*.

‡ In planning his treatise on Julian, he had proposed, as the title-page sets forth, to *enquire into the nature of that evidence, which will demand the assent of every reasonable man*

This admirable work, as I observed, took its rise from Dr. Middleton's Inquiry concerning the miraculous powers in the Christian Church. That ingenious man died towards the end of this year; and although some difference had arisen between them in 1741, and seems to have kept them asunder for the rest of Dr. Middleton's life, yet no change appears to have been made, by this misadventure, in Mr. Warburton's opinion or even esteem of him, (so constant was he in his friendships!) as the reader will see in the following extract from a letter, which he wrote to me just before the Doctor's death; " Prior-Park, July 11, 1750.—
 " I hear Dr. Middleton has been at London (I suppose to consult Dr. Heberden * about his health)
 " and is returned in an extreme bad condition.—I am
 " much concerned for the poor man, and wish he may
 " recover, with all my heart. Had he had, I will
 " not say, piety, but greatness of mind enough, not to
 " suffer the pretended injuries of some Churchmen to
 " prejudice him against Religion, I should love him
 " living,

to a miraculous fact. But this part of his plan he reserved for another discourse. The subject was, in fact, resumed, and has been sufficiently explained in the Discourse on the Resurrection, Vol. X. Discourse XXIX.

* Dr. Middleton had been well acquainted with Dr. Heberden at Cambridge, where he flourished in great reputation, for several years, before he removed to London. He has now [1794], for some time past, declined all business; but, through the whole course of it, was the most esteemed, of any physician I have known, not only for his skill, but generosity, in the exercise of his profession.—My own personal obligations to him must be my excuse for the liberty I take in paying this small tribute of respect to his merit and character.

“ living, and honour his memory when dead. But,
 “ good GOD, that man, for the discourtesies done him
 “ by his miserable fellow-creatures, should be content
 “ to divest himself of the true viaticum, the comfort,
 “ the solace, the asylum from all the evils of human
 “ life, is perfectly astonishing! I believe no one (all
 “ things considered) has suffered more from the low
 “ and vile passions of the high and low amongst our
 “ brethren, than myself. Yet GOD forbid, it should
 “ ever suffer me to be cold in the Gospel-interests!
 “ which are indeed so much my own, that without it
 “ I should be disposed to consider humanity, as the
 “ most forlorn part of the creation.”

What this letter tenderly hints at, was the exact truth. Dr. Middleton was an elegant scholar, and very fine writer : but, his vanity having engaged him early in religious controversy on a subject which he did not understand, he had given just offence to some considerable Churchmen ; and yet would not condescend to recover their good opinion by retracting what he had hastily and unwarily advanced. Hence, the obstruction to his views of preferment ; which by degrees soured his temper so much, that his best friends (as Mr. Warburton found by experience) could not calm his resentments, or keep them from breaking out into some unhappy prejudices against Religion itself. This misadventure was the effect of his passion, not judgement : for his knowledge of theology was but slight, and his talents not those which qualified him to excel in that science. The bent of his genius and studies lay another way, and had raised him to great eminence in polite literature ; of which his *Letter from Rome*, and his *Life of Cicero*, are shining instances. His

other works are of much less value, and will soon be forgotten.

Nothing shews the extent of Mr. Warburton's genius, and the command he had of it, more, than his being able to mix the lightest with the most serious studies, and to pass, as his friend speaks,

“ From grave to gay, from lively to severe,”

with so much grace and facility: a striking instance of which power we have, here, in finding *Julian* between our two poets. For in the very next year [1751] he appeared again, as a critic and commentator, in the noble edition he gave of Mr. Pope's works. And, as here there was no room for emendatory criticism, of all others the easiest to be misapplied or misconstrued, so the public found very little to censure on this occasion. Indeed the main object of the edition being to do justice to his friend, it was natural for him to exert his whole force upon it; and as none can *divine* so happily of a poet's meaning, as the well-exercised critic, if he be at the same time of a congenial spirit with his author, it is no wonder that he made this (what I formerly said of it, and still think it to be) *the best edition that was ever given of any classic.*

But, admirable as Mr. Warburton was in this elegant species of literature, we are now to take our leave of him under that character; his editions of Shakespeare and Pope being, as he himself expressed it to me, *amusements, which his fondness for the works of one poet, and for the person of another, had engaged him in.* We are, henceforth, to see him only in his proper office of *Divine*; which he resumed when Mr. Pope's volumes were out of his hands, and ennobled by a set
of

of Sermons, preached by him at Lincoln's-Inn, and entitled *Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in two volumes*; the former published in 1752, and the other in 1754; to which he added a *third* in 1767, consisting chiefly of occasional discourses*.

I bring his works of this sort together under one view, that I may consider them at once, and give the reader an idea of their true character.

He had used himself very little to write sermons, till he came to Lincoln's-Inn. His instructions to his parish had either been delivered without notes, or extracted from the plainest discourses of our best preachers. In his present situation, he found it necessary to compose his sermons, and with care; his audience consisting wholly of men of education, and those accustomed to reasoning and inquiry. Here was then a scene, in which his learning and knowledge might be produced with good effect; and it was in this kind of discourse, that his taste and studies had qualified him to excel. His sermons are accordingly, all of them, of this cast; not slight harangues on ordinary subjects, but close, weighty, methodical discourses, on the most momentous doctrines of natural and revealed religion; opening the grounds of them, and supporting them against objections; expressed in that style of nervous eloquence, which was natural to him, and brightened occasionally, but without affectation, by the liveliest strokes of imagination. In short, they were written for the use of men of parts and learning, and will only be relished by such. They are masterly in their way; but fitter for the closet, than the Church; I mean, those mixt auditories, that are usually to be expected in that place.

* See Vols. IX. & X. of this Edit.

There had been a friendship of long standing between Mr. Warburton and Mr. Charles Yorke; cultivated with great affection and esteem on both sides; the fruit of which appeared in 1753, in the offer of a prebend in the Church of Gloucester, by the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. In acknowledgement of this favour, Mr. Warburton addressed the first volume of the D. L. to his Lordship, when he gave the next edition of that work. Some, who were curious in observing coincidences, and meant to do honour both to the patron and client, took notice that the stall, to which Mr. Warburton was preferred, was the same in which the Lord Chancellor Nottingham, that great patron of all the learned Churchmen in his time, had placed Dr. Cudworth; Such a similitude was there apprehended to be between the two Magistrates; and, still more strikingly, between the two Divines, authors of *The Intellectual System*, and *The Divine Legation!*

But what idea of Dignity soever might be annexed to this prebend, he exchanged it, a year or two after, for one of more value in the Church of Durham, which Bishop Trevor (who did himself honour by the disposal of his preferments) very obligingly gave him, at the request of Mr. Murray (now Attorney General) in 1755.

He had been made Chaplain to the King, the year before; and that promotion, as well as the present, making it decent for him to take his Doctor's degree, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Herring, very wisely took to himself the honour (which the University of Oxford had unhappily declined) of conferring that distinction upon him.

But while his friends were vying with each other in their good offices and attempts to serve him, a
matter

matter far more interesting to him, than any preferment, engaged his attention during the course of these two years.

Lord Bolingbroke died in 1751, and his philosophical works were published in 1753. Every one knows the principles and presumption of that unhappy nobleman. He was of that sect, which, to avoid a more odious name, chuses to distinguish itself by that of *Naturalism*; and had boasted in private, what feats he should be able to perform, in the attack, he had long threatened, on *all our metaphysics and theology*; in other words, on natural and revealed religion.

Some had the simplicity to believe him on his word; and others, it may be, wished him success. All serious men stood aghast at the loud vaunts of this Goliath of the infidel party; and, prepossessed with the ideas of consequence, which the fond applauses of his friends, and (what must ever be lamented) of his *tuneful* friend, had thrown about him, waited with anxiety for the event.

In the mean time, as that friend said divinely well (for surely, in this instance, he prophesied, as well as sang)

“ Heaven with loud laughter the vain toil surveys,
“ And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.”

Dr. Warburton had very early penetrated the views of Lord Bolingbroke; and, observing some tincture of his principles (but without the knowledge of the author, who could not be trusted with the secret) artfully instilled into the *Essay on Man*, had incurred his immortal hatred by making the discovery, and, in consequence of it, by *reasoning Mr. Pope out of his hands*.

*hands**. It was easy to foresee what would follow from this vigilant and able Divine, when his Lordship's godless volumes should come forth; and the dread of it seems to have kept them back, for the remainder of his life. The interval, however, was made good use of, in seasoning them with poignant invectives against the Alliance and Divine Legation, and with whole pages of the grossest personal abuse. So that, when they appeared, Dr. Warburton was provoked, as well as prepared, to give them a strict examination, and was animated to the undertaking by a just resentment, as well as religious zeal.

And these two principles (the most operative in our nature) were never exerted to better purpose, or with greater effect. He planned the VIEW of his Philosophy in *Four Letters to a Friend* †, and in writing it has surpassed himself; the reasoning and the wit being alike irresistible, the strongest and keenest that can be conceived. He himself was not a little pleased with this work, and says in confidence to a friend ‡, “ I have given to it all the finishing in my power; and “ reckon, if any thing of mine should stumble down “ to posterity, it will have as good a chance as any. “ And now—*Cæstus artemque repono.*”

Some of Dr. Warburton's friends (such of them, I mean, as had been the friends of Mr. Pope) had, of course, been acquainted with Lord Bolingbroke; and were very naturally in the common opinion of his parts and abilities, without knowing much, or perhaps

* See Vol. XII. of this Edit. “View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy,” Letter IV.

† Mr. Allen of Prior-Park.

‡ Dr. Balguy.

any thing, of his religious sentiments. These were likely to take offence at the freedom of the *View*, which was to shew him in a light very different from that in which the world had hitherto seen him. The consequence to himself was clearly foreseen, and with no small concern.

Writing from P. P. to Mr. C. Yorke, Aug. 24, 1754, while these letters were drawing up, he says—" I am
" busy with my second volume of Sermons, which I
" propose to publish early in the winter. I amuse
" myself too with another thing, which, were you here,
" you would be plagued with: because I never like
" my things so well as while you are reading them.
" I have a better reason for your reading them. But,
" to tell you the truth, this flatters me most.—The
" thing will be without my name, and a secret. I wish
" it may in no degree displease one I have so much
" reason to value, as our friend; nay, I would not
" have it displease any of his friends, on his account.
" You will ask me then why I venture upon it? I
" will tell you sincerely. I think it my duty; for I
" am a Christian. I think I was designed to be the
" declared enemy of Infidelity; for I am a little
" fanatical."

In a letter also to me, Sept. 7, 1754, he says—" As
" to my *View* of Bolingbroke, I tell it you in con-
" fidence, I am apprehensive of displeasing some by
" it whom I most honour, and at a critical time. So
" that I solemnly assure you, nothing but the sense
" of indispensable duty, as a Christian and a Clergy-
" man, could have induced me to run the hazard of
" doing myself so much injury. But *jacta est alea*.
" All other considerations are now past with me;
" and I let Providence take its course without any
" solicitude on my part."

And

And again, Dec. 10, 1754, some time after the two first letters were published, and while he was preparing the two last—"I go on pushing this grand enemy of GOD and Godliness. But what I predicted to you, I am sorry to tell you, I have experienced to be true; that I tread *per cineres dolosos*. However, my duty tells me, this is a capital case, and I must on."

What he alludes to, is an anonymous letter, sent him by the post, and expostulating with him, but in the friendliest terms, on the manner in which he had treated the subject of the *View*, in the parts already printed. He guessed at the writer*, and had the highest respect for him. He resolved, therefore, to make his apology to him, and (as he was denied the opportunity of a private explanation) in a public answer to his letter. Accordingly, in 1755, he printed the two concluding letters of the *View*, with an *Apology for the two first* †; which now stands in this edition, as it did in the subsequent ones of the *View*, in the author's lifetime, as a prefatory discourse in vindication of the whole work. The occasion of the subject fired the writer. His very soul came out in every sentence, and is no where seen to more advantage than in this *Apology*; which is written throughout with a peculiar glow of sentiment and expression, and is, at once, the most interesting, and the most masterly of all his works.

It had the effect, which was natural, on the so much respected letter-writer; who thought fit to preserve an inviolable silence in regard to this apology,

* Mr. Murray.

† See Vol. XII. of this Edit.

but, by a signal act of friendship, done to the author very soon after*, shewed how entirely satisfied he was with him.

As to the "View" itself, it was universally read and admired. The followers of Lord Bolingbroke and his philosophy hung their heads: the friends of religion took heart: and these big volumes of impiety sunk immediately into utter contempt.

After this complete triumph over the great Chieftain of his party, it would scarce be worth while to celebrate his successes against inferior adventurers, if *one* of them had not published his own shame; and if what I owe to Dr. Warburton's memory did not require me to explain a trifling matter, in which I happened to be concerned.

Mr. Hume had given an early specimen of his free-thinking philosophy in some super-subtile lucubrations of the metaphysical kind: which however did no great mischief to religion; and, what chagrined him almost as much, contributed but little to his own fame, being too sublime, or too dark, for the apprehensions of his readers. For so good a purpose as that of assisting in the common cause of impiety, he thought fit to come out of the clouds, and to attempt a popular vein of writing, as the more likely to get himself read and talked of in the world. In 1749 he therefore gave the public a hash of his stale notions, served up in the taking form and name of *Essays*, and with a stronger, at least a more undisguised, mixture of *Atheism* than before.

Dr. Warburton, who was then sending his *Julian* to the press, saw these *Essays*, and had thoughts of closing that work with some strictures upon them. In a letter of Sept. 28, of that year, to a friend at Cam-

* See page 60.

bridge, he says,—“ I am tempted to have a stroke at Hume in parting. He is the author of a little book called *Philosophical Essays*: In one part of which he argues against the being of a GOD; and in another (very needlessly, you will say) against the possibility of miracles. He has crowned the liberty of the press. And yet he has a considerable post under the government. I have a great mind to do justice on his arguments against miracles, which I think might be done in few words. But does he deserve this notice? Is he known amongst you? Pray, answer me these questions. For if his own weight keeps him down, I should be sorry to contribute to his advancement to any place, but the pillory.”

No encouraging answer, I suppose, was returned to this letter; and so the author of the *Essays* escaped, for this time. His next effort was to discredit Religion by what he calls, its *Natural History*. This book came out early in 1757, and falling into the hands of Dr. Warburton, provoked him, by its uncommon licentiousness, to enter on the margin, as he went along, such remarks as occurred to him. And when that was too narrow to contain them all, he put down the rest on loose scraps of paper, which he stuck between the leaves. In this state the book was shewn to me (as I chanced at that time to be in London with the author) merely as matter of curiosity, and to give me an idea of the contents, how mischievous and extravagant they were. He had then written remarks on about two thirds of the volume: And I liked them so well, that I advised him, by all means, to carry them on through the remaining parts of it, and then to fit them up, in what way he thought best, for public use, which I told him they very well deserved. He put by

this proposal slightly ; but, when I pressed him again on this head, some time after, in a letter from Cambridge, he wrote me the following answer.

“ As to Hume, I had laid it aside ever since you were here. I will now, however, finish my skeleton. It will be hardly that. If then you think any thing can be made of it, and will give yourself the trouble, we may perhaps between us do a little good, which I dare say we shall both think will be worth a little pains. If I have any force in the first rude beating out the mass, you are best able to give it the elegance of form and splendour of polish. This will answer my purpose, to labour together in a joint work to do a little good. I will tell you fairly, it is no more the thing it should be, than the Dantzick iron at the forge is the gilt and painted ware at Birmingham. It will make no more than a pamphlet ; but you shall take your own time, and make it your summer’s amusement, if you will. I propose it bear something like this title—‘ Remarks on Mr. Hume’s late Essay, called, *The Natural History of Religion*, by a Gentleman of Cambridge, in a Letter to the Rev. Dr. Warburton.’—I propose the address should be with the dryness and reserve of a stranger, who likes the method of the Letters on Bolingbroke’s philosophy, and follows it here, against the same sort of writer, inculcating the same impiety, Naturalism, and employing the same kind of arguments. The address will remove it from me ; the author, a gentleman of Cambridge, from you ; and the secrecy of printing, from us both.”

I saw by this letter, he was not disposed to take much trouble about the thing. Accordingly his papers were soon after sent down to me at Cambridge, pretty

much in the state I had seen them in at London, so far as they then went, only with additional entries in the latter part of the book. However, in this careless detached form, I thought his observations too good to be lost. And the hint of the *Address* suggested the means of preserving them, without any injury to his reputation, and indeed without much labour to myself. Having, therefore, transcribed the Remarks,* with little alteration, I only wrote a short introduction and conclusion, merely to colour the proposed fiction; and in this form, sent them to the press.

When Dr. Warburton saw the pamphlet, he said, I should have done much more, and worked up his hasty remarks in my own way. He doubted, also, whether the contrivance, as I had managed it, would not be seen through. But in this he was mistaken; for the disguise, as thin as it was, answered its purpose in keeping the real author out of sight.

Mr. Hume in particular (understanding, I suppose, from his bookseller, who was also mine, that the manuscript came from me) was the first to fall into the trap. He was much hurt, and no wonder, by so lively an attack upon him, and could not help confessing it in what he calls his *own Life*; in which he has thought fit to honour me with greater marks of his resentment, than any other of the writers against him: nay the spiteful man goes so far as to upbraid me with being a *follower* (indeed, a closer, in this instance, than he apprehended) of *the Warburtonian school*.

This idle story would not have been worth the telling, but for the reason already given, That I could

* They are given in Vol. XII. of this edition, in their original form.

not, in justice to the author, take the merit of so fine a work to myself. And yet in disclaiming it, the reader sees, I make but an awkward figure, as being obliged to open the secret of our little stratagem, in which the grace of it mainly consists.

Dr. Warburton had now, for some time, been preparing, and in 1758 he printed, a correct and improved edition of the first volume of the D. L. The notes to this edition are numerous and large; some of which are answers to objections made to him by Archbishop Secker. “Where you find me, says he in a letter to one of his friends [P. P. April 19, 1758], speaking, in the notes, of objections that have been made, understand them of the present Archbishop’s, who formerly gave me some sheets of them, which I have still by me, and have in this edition considered all I thought worth observing.”

Dr. Secker was a wise man, an edifying preacher, and an exemplary Bishop. But the course of his life and studies had not qualified him to decide on such a work, as that of the D. L. Even in the narrow walk of literature he most affected, that of criticising the Hebrew text, it does not appear that he attained to any great distinction. His chief merit (and surely it was a very great one) lay in explaining clearly and popularly, in his sermons, the principles delivered by his friend, Bishop Butler, in his famous *Book of The Analogy*, and in shewing the important use of them to Religion.

Of this last admirable prelate, what Dr. Warburton’s sentiments were, appears from a letter he wrote to Dr. Balguy on his death, which happened in 1752—
 “You have heard of the death of the poor Bishop of
 “Durham. The Church could have spared some other
 “prelates

“ prelates much better ; and, in its present condition,
 “ could but ill spare him. For his morals and serious
 “ sense of religion (to say nothing of his intellectual
 “ endowments) did honour to his station. His death
 “ is, particularly unhappy for his chaplain, Dr. Forster.
 “ He is my friend, whom I much value, as one of
 “ great worth, and whose ill luck I much lament. He
 “ has not only seen his hopes drop through, when he was
 “ every thing but in the very possession of them, but
 “ has lost a patron, who deserved the name of *friend*,
 “ which goes much harder in the separation than the
 “ other.” [P. P. June 21, 1752.]

In the memoirs of such a life, as I am now writing, nothing, I am sensible, interests the reader less than the chapter of preferments. Yet these must not be wholly overlooked. Towards the end of the year 1757, Dr. Warburton had been promoted to the Deanery of Bristol. And in the beginning of the year 1760, by Mr. Allen's interest with the minister, Mr. Pitt, he was advanced to the Bishopricks of Gloucester.

III.

IN the common estimation, this last was a preferment suitable to his merit. Mr. Pitt himself gloried in it, as what did honour to his administration. I remember to have seen a letter of his, in which he said—*that nothing of a private nature, since he had been in office, had given him so much pleasure, as his bringing Dr. Warburton upon the Bench.* This virtuous self-gratulation became the minister ; and others may be of his mind. But I have sometimes doubted with myself, whether the proper scene of abilities, like his, be not a private station, where only great writers have the leisure to do great things.

Here,

Here, at least, it was that THE ALLIANCE and DIVINE LEGATION were written: And here, too, was composed the immortal work of ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, which, in the end, proved so fatal to our *English Disciplinarians*; now rising again in the shape of *Levellers* and *Socinians*; but to fall again, in good time, by one or other of our learned clergy, going forth against them, in the spirit of order and orthodoxy, from the cool invigorating shade of private life*.

But let me not be misunderstood. When I say that great men should not be taken from their privacy, I speak of great men *indeed*. The Church is, no doubt, much benefited and adorned by a learned prelacy. The pastoral functions cannot well be discharged by any other. But a genius of the high order, here mentioned, is given by a gracious Providence, now and then, in a course of ages, *to correct*, as Dr. Middleton observed, *the sentiments and manners of mankind*.

Such a man as this, is lessened by elevation: he is, in himself, methinks, too great to be advanced.

But be this, as it may; it must be allowed that religion and learning suffered somewhat by his promotion, as it interrupted those designs which he had formed for the service of both, and would have executed, if his whole time had been at his command. He himself lamented this inconvenience of his public

* Soon after I had hazarded this prediction, I had the pleasure to see one half of it completely fulfilled. See Dr. Horsley's *Charge to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of St. Alban's*, and his unanswerable *Letters*, in vindication of it.—This able Divine was deservedly advanced to the see of St. David's in 1788; and has since [1793] been translated to that of Rochester;—and this year [1802] to that of St. Asaph.

station; and, after all, was not able (such was the root his former habits of study had taken in him) to be so active in it as he wished.

He performed the ordinary duties of his office with regularity; but further than this he could not prevail with himself to go. And perhaps, on the whole, it was better that he did not; as the leisure he thus procured to himself, was spent to more advantage in defending Religion, than it could have been in a vain endeavour to support that discipline, which the spirit of the times has utterly overthrown.

They who stood at a distance from him, and knew him only by the report of such as had no kindness for him, concluded, at least, that he would take an active part in the House of Lords. I have heard of a certain minister, who dreaded his promotion on this account, and thought he saw a second Atterbury in the new Bishop of Gloucester. But all such were egregiously mistaken. Alas, he had neither talents nor inclination for parliamentary intrigue or parliamentary eloquence. He had other instruments of fame and consideration in his hands, and was infinitely above the vanity of being caught

“ With the fine notion of a busy man,”
as one of our poets * well expresses it.

On the 30th of January 1760, ten days after his consecration, he preached the customary sermon before the Lords. I mention this only, because his sermon, which of course was printed, is one of the best he ever wrote, and the best, without question, that ever was preached on that day. It could not be any other, since, besides his great abilities, as a writer, he pos-

* Dryden.

essed a perfect knowledge of our history, and of that period of it in particular. I have heard him say, there was scarce a pamphlet or memoir, published between 1640 and 1660, which he had not read. This predilection for the history of the rebellion, seems to have been occasioned by a circumstance just touched by me in the entrance of this discourse. I observed that his grandfather had been active in that scene. His grandmother, a woman of sense and spirit, lived to a great age, and would often (as I have heard him say) take a pleasure to relate to him, when a boy, such passages of those times as she remembered and was well acquainted with. This taste of those transactions, made interesting to him by the part which his family had taken in them, raised an eager curiosity in him, as he grew up, to know more of the subject. And thus, he not only acquired an early insight into that part of our history, but continued through life to be so fond of it, that he had thoughts, at one time, of writing the history of the civil wars; and would without doubt have done it with supreme ability, and, as the tenour of his sermon shews, with equal candour, if the studies of his own profession had left him at leisure to engage in so great a work.

Lord Clarendon was one of his favourite characters, as well as writers; he honoured the man, and admired his history of the Grand Rebellion in the highest degree. Yet there is a copy of that work, now extant and in the hands of his family, in which he has entered marginal notes containing so minute a censure of all that is blameable in it, that a stranger who had heard nothing of his predilection for Lord Clarendon, would be apt to think him an enemy to

the noble person's writings and reputation. With such wonderful impartiality is the censure made*!

Another instance of his skill in the story of those times, and of his fairness in representing it, may be mentioned. When he was one summer in residence at Durham, he found Neal's History of the Puritans in their library, and for his amusement took it with him to his own house, and *scribbled enough upon the margins of the several volumes* (I use his own words in a letter to me), *to expose and confute the mistakes and misrepresentations of the writer*. By the favour of a friend, I have obtained a correct copy of those notes, and believe the reader will agree with me, that they deserve a place in this complete collection of his works †.

To put things of a sort together, I will here mention another book, which he has rendered valuable by some manuscript animadversions. Writing to me from Weymouth, where Mr. Allen had a house, and where he generally passed some part of the year with his family, he tells me how his hours of leisure were employed at that place. The letter is dated Sept. 3, 1758. "If you were here, you would see how I have scribbled over the margins of Tindal's *Christianity as Old as the Creation*. I think I have him as sure as I had Collins. That is, I overturn the pillars of this famous edifice of impiety: which all the writers against him hitherto have left standing: busying themselves only to untile his roof. This

* Since I wrote this paragraph, the valuable copy, alluded to, of Lord Clarendon's History, has been very obligingly put into my hands, to be preserved in Hartlebury Library.

† See Vol. XII.

“ is my present amusement for a fortnight at Weymouth*.”

The Bishoprick of Gloucester was the more agreeable to him (as the Deanery of Bristol had been for the same reason) on account of its situation, being in the neighbourhood of Prior-Park. At so small a distance from his diocese, he could perform the duties of it without much trouble, or loss of time in journeys, which were always irksome to him. Yet some months in the summer he usually passed at Gloucester, and resided there altogether after Mrs. Allen's death.

Wherever he was, he chiefly employed himself in revising his printed works, with the view of making them as complete and useful as he could.

Among others, he spent some time on his *Sermons*; and in 1761 he reprinted one of them, which he took to be of importance, in a small size, that it might be more known, than it was likely to be in the larger volume. This was a well-considered and elaborate discourse on *The Lord's Supper* †: a subject, which had been so embroiled by two eminent writers of opposite principles, that it became necessary to take it out of their hands, and to guard the public from being bewildered and misled, either by a Popish or Socinian comment. In a moderate compass (for he never dealt in the verbiage of ordinary writers) he has refuted the system of either party, and explained his own notion of the sacrament (which was, also, that of the great Cudworth) in so clear a manner, that few men of sense and judgement will now question where the truth lies.

* This book is also in my possession, and will be found in the Library at Hartlebury.

† See Vol. IX. of this Edit.

But the good Bishop was always meditating something for the benefit of religion. What is called Methodism, had now spread among the people. It was a new species of Puritanism, or rather the old one revived under a new name. This sect first appeared at Oxford, where two fellows of colleges, Mr. George Whitefield and Mr. John Wesley, were its chief promoters and supports. They were both of them, it may be, frank enthusiasts at setting out. The former is said to have been a weak, the latter was unquestionably a shrewd, man.

Mr. Wesley had rambled through a part of Germany and North America, as well as Great Britain and Ireland, pretending every where to a sort of Apostolic mission: and, at a convenient distance of time from these peregrinations, his manner was to print journals of them, for the edification of his followers. The Bishop of Gloucester had watched his motions with care for some years; and now thought he had gained such an insight into his views and character from his journals, which he constantly read, as to be able to give a fair and full account of him to the public.

It seems to have been principally for this reason that he altered and enlarged what he had written on the influence of the Holy Spirit, in the second volume of his Sermons: or rather, he composed that discourse anew, and with many improvements moulded it into a regular treatise on the subject; which he published in 1762, under the name of *The Doctrine of Grace: or, The Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit vindicated from the insults of Infidelity, and the abuses of Fanaticism*; in two small volumes, 12mo*.

* See Vol. VIII. of this Edition.

He designed this work, as the title shews, for a vindication of that most important Christian doctrine from the abuses of libertine as well as fanatical writers. The former he confuted with his usual energy and precision. The latter, as not being accessible on the side of reason, he attacked with ridicule, in holding up to view and exposing their leader and archetype, John Wesley, out of the materials, largely furnished to him in that adventurer's own journals. This discourse, like Pascal's Letters, and for the same reason, the singular merit of the composition, will be read, when the sect, that gave occasion to it, is forgotten; or rather the sect will find a sort of immortality in this discourse.

As to the grave and reasoning part of this work, that also, as I said, is written with great weight and authority. But I think I see a degree of labour, in the expression of some parts, which shews his pen had now lost something of its wonted freedom and facility, though it retained its force.

From this time, he seems to have planned no new work of difficulty and length, but to have confined himself very properly to the single purpose of giving the last finishing* to his former writings.

Accordingly in 1765 he published a new edition of the *Second Part* of the D. L. in three volumes; and,

* The Bishop grew very exact and critical in giving the later editions of his works; so that he would review the same sheet several times, and, of course, gave the compositor no small trouble. Which made his learned printer, Mr. Bowyer, whom he much esteemed for his friendly qualities, as well as merit in his profession, say pleasantly to him on a certain occasion—'Those were fine times, when you never blotted a line, but allowed mé to print your copy as fast as it came to hand, and without interruption.'

as it had now received his last hand, he presented it to his great friend, Lord Mansfield ; as he had done the former part, when finished to his mind, to Lord Hardwicke. But there was this difference in the character of the two Dedications. That to the Lord Chancellor, was respectful and ceremonious, being little more than a letter of thanks to his patron : this other to the Chief Justice, was sublime and pathetic, in short, the overflowing of an affectionate heart to a generous and much-esteemed friend.

The subject, too, of the latter is of that high importance which a great writer chuses, when he would consult his own and his friend's dignity, and transmit them both, with advantage, to succeeding times. It sets before him the state of religion in England for half a century past, and, with a confidential freedom, deduces the causes of that alarming neglect, into which it had fallen, and by which indeed the author had been induced to project this defence of it, and to put it into his Lordship's hands. The information is interesting ; and the manner in which it is conveyed, solemn and awful. It will be read hereafter with no small attention ; and the time will come, when this discourse will be reckoned among the chief honours of the noble person addressed.

This edition of 1765, besides many other improvements, with which it was enriched, is further distinguished by a remarkable discourse, printed at the close of the last volume, and entitled *An appendix concerning the book of Job* *. In this short piece (which is exquisitely written) he repels an attack made upon him by Dr. Lowth. The dispute was managed, on both sides, with too much heat ; but, on the part of

* See Vol. VI. of this Edit.

the Bishop, with that superiority of wit and argument, which, to say the truth, in all his controversial writings, he could not well help. For it may, I believe, be as truly said of him, as it was of Carneades,—*That he never defended an opinion which he did not prove, nor opposed any, which he did not confute* *.

Dr. Lowth, afterwards Bishop of London, was a man of learning, and ingenuity, and of many virtues: but his friends did his character no service, by affecting to bring his merits, whatever they were, into competition with those of the Bishop of Gloucester. His reputation as a writer, was raised chiefly on his Hebrew literature, as displayed in those two works †—*his Latin Lectures on Hebrew Poetry—and his English Version of the Prophet Isaiah*. The *former* is well and elegantly composed, but in a vein of criticism not above the common: The *latter*, I think, is chiefly valuable, as it shews how little is to be expected from Dr. Kennicott's work, (which yet the learned Bishop pronounces to be *the greatest and most important, that has been undertaken and accomplished since the revival of*

* Qui nullam unquam, in illis suis disputationibus, rem defendit, quam non probarit; nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Cic. de Or. l. ii. c. 38.

† In saying this, I speak the sense of those who rate his talents at the highest, and would be thought to do most honour to his literary character. For myself, I confess I have always considered a juvenile essay of the excellent person, I mean a poem published by him under the name of THE JUDGMENT OF HERCULES, as the best specimen of his taste and genius, and one that gave the promise of greater things, than he ever performed afterwards.

letters *), and from a new translation of the Bible, for public use.

On the subject of his quarrel with the Bishop of Gloucester, I could say a great deal; for I was well acquainted with the grounds and the progress of it. But, besides that I purposely avoid entering into details of this sort, I know of no good end that is likely to be answered by exposing to public censure the weaknesses of such men.

In the next year, 1766, he gave a new and much-improved edition of *The Alliance*; meaning to leave these two great works, now wrought up to all the perfection he could bestow upon them, as legacies to the public; or rather as monuments to posterity of his unwearied love of the Christian religion, and (for the sake of so dear an interest) of the Church of England.

With a third volume of Sermons, already alluded to, and printed in 1767, he closed his literary course: except that he made an effort towards publishing the IXth and last book of the Divine Legation; on a subject, he had much at heart; which he had long and diligently considered; and which now, for some years, he had been labouring to digest and explain in the best manner he could. But of this matter it will be expected that I give the reader a more particular account.

The argument of the D. L. properly so called, was completed in six books: but the plan of it required three more; in which the author proposed, as he tells us, "To remove all conceivable objections against the conclusion, and to throw in every collateral light upon the premises."

* Prel. Diss. p. 62.

But the argument itself was so ill received and so violently opposed by many of the clergy, that he grew disgusted at the treatment he met with, and could not be prevailed upon to finish his design in support of it. His letters are full of complaints on this head. In 1741, some time before he published the second volume, he says to one of his friends—"I am still condemned to drudge in the mines of antiquity. I may well give it that slavish appellation, while I am so used by my masters, the clergy, for whose ease and profit I am working." And writing to another in 1754, when the two first letters of the View were coming out, he observes with indignation—"You will see there is a continued apology for the clergy: yet they will neither love me the more, nor forgive me the sooner, for all I can say in their behalf*."

And so on a hundred other occasions. The truth is, his resentment at the established clergy for their long and fierce opposition to his favourite work, was the greatest weakness I ever observed in him. The number of books and pamphlets, that appeared against him for twenty years together, was, indeed, very great. But, the nature of his work considered, and his own freedom in dissenting from all others, as occasion offered, what less could be expected? And when he had given two or three of his principal adversaries, as he did, a complete answer, he should not have suffered the clamour of the rest to divert him from the great design he had projected. But his conduct in this instance was not that which might have been expected from his usual magnanimity. When I sometimes expostulated with him upon it, his answer was—

* MS. Letters in my hands.

“ I surely have reason to think myself very ill used.
 “ The enemies of Revealed Religion and of the
 “ Church of England I have treated as they deserved,
 “ and am neither surprized nor hurt at their resent-
 “ ments against me. To their censures or com-
 “ mendations I can be equally indifferent. But that
 “ my brethren the established clergy, the friends of
 “ religion, and fellow-members of that society whose
 “ cause I am pleading, that these should set them-
 “ selves against me with so much rancour, is what I
 “ cannot so well bear. If indeed the published volumes
 “ of the D. L. be so weak or so mischievous, as they
 “ suppose, I will not add to the offence given them
 “ by adding any more.”

One sees what was at the bottom of the good man's mind. He loved the Church of England and its ministers, and had shewn his zeal for them on all occasions. He was therefore hurt at not receiving that return of good-will from them, which his life and conscience told him, he might expect, and had deserved. Yet, as much as he felt the injury, and complained of it, he was never moved by it (as many others, with less provocation, and of less irritability, have been) to retract his good opinion of them, or to alter his conduct towards them in any respect.

He only withheld the sequel of his capital work from them; and unhappily he persisted in this resolution till time had softened their passions, and, of course, his own.

At length, the orthodoxy of his sentiments seemed gradually to be acknowledged; his own resentments proportionably abated; and, from the time he had
 given

given the corrected edition of his D. L. in 1765, he was in earnest about resuming so much at least of his long-neglected work, as he had meant to comprize in the last or IXth book. The VIIth and VIIIth (though the materials for them, too, were at hand) he had long since despaired of composing: but this last, being an attempt to give a *Rationale of Christianity*, he anxiously wished, for the importance of the subject, to leave behind him complete.

But the time was now past. Not only the business of his station broke in upon his leisure: The infirmities of age came insensibly upon him. His faculties, hitherto so bright and vigorous, suffered some eclipse and diminution of their force, from his growing indispositions. "I read still," he would often say to me, "with the usual pleasure. But I compose with less ease, and with less spirit." In a letter to me from Gloucester, Sept. 4, 1769, he writes in the following manner:

"I have received your kind letter of *advice**.—
 "You know, by experience, how difficult it is, when
 "we have once got into a wicked habit of thinking,
 "to leave it off. All I can promise is, if that will
 "satisfy you, to *think to no purpose*: And this I
 "know, by experience, I can do; having done so
 "for many a good day.

"I think you have heard me say, that my delicious
 "season is the autumn; the season, which gives most
 "life and vigour to my mental faculties. The light
 "mists, or, as Milton calls them, the *steams*, that rise
 "from the fields in one of these mornings, give the

* Not to pursue his studies too closely.

“ same *relief* to the views, that the blue of the plum
 “ (to take my ideas from the season) gives to the ap-
 “ petite. But I now enjoy little of this pleasure,
 “ compared to what I formerly had in an autumn-
 “ morning, when I used, with a book in my hand, to
 “ traverse the delightful lawns and hedgerows round
 “ about the town of Newark, the *unthinking* place of
 “ my nativity.”

And again, July 11th, 1770 :—“ Hunter sent me
 “ his View of Lord Bolingbroke’s character. He is
 “ a good man; but in this book, I think, he has
 “ shewn himself very absurd and indiscreet: absurd,
 “ in a florid declamation; and indiscreet, as well
 “ as very injudicious, in the most extravagant en-
 “ comium of Bolingbroke’s parts, that ever was,
 “ even to say—*he reasoned with the pride of a*
 “ *superior spirit, and I had almost said with the*
 “ *faculties of an angel.*”

“ This disposed me to look again into the reasoning
 “ of this *superior spirit*, this *angelic man*, as I have
 “ collected together the best he has, in my View of his
 “ Philosophy. I have done it justice. But this re-
 “ trospect is accompanied with a mortifying conviction,
 “ that the time is now past when I was able to write
 “ with that force. Expect to find in my future
 “ writings the marks of intellectual decay. But so
 “ much for that matter.”

In my answer to this letter from Thurstaston, July
 the 23d, to sooth the mind of my friend under this
 unwelcome discovery, and to prevail upon him, if I
 could, to relax those efforts in composition, which, not
 being so easy to him as they had been, might affect
 his health and spirits, I wrote as follows :—“ As to

“ what you say of your not writing with the *force*,
 “ you formerly did, it may very well be, and yet
 “ be no subject of mortification. For, besides that
 “ you can afford to abate something of your antient
 “ force and yet have enough left, *force* itself has not, in
 “ all periods of life, the same grace. The close of one
 “ of these long and bright days has not the flame
 “ and heat of noon, and would be less pleasing if it
 “ had. And I know not why it may not be true,
 “ in the *critical* as well as moral sense of the poet’s
 “ words,

“ *Lenior et melior fis accedente senectâ.*”

“ But what I would chiefly say, on the subject, is
 “ this, That, whether with force, or without it, I would
 “ only wish your future writings to be an amuse-
 “ ment to you, and not a labour; and this I think is
 “ the proper use to be made of your observation, if
 “ it be ever so well founded.”

In short, I continued to express myself in this way
 to him and his family with so little reserve, that he
 saw my intention was to draw him off, by degrees,
 from writing at all; which he takes notice of in a
 letter of the next year, June 2, 1771, though with
 some little chagrin, as was but too natural, at this
 plain dealing.

“ I never believed I should feel so tenderly for ——
 “ as I now do. A suffering friend’s good qualities,
 “ in such a condition, separate themselves, and rise
 “ superior to his failings, which we are insensibly dis-
 “ posed to forget. If this be the case of common
 “ acquaintance, in certain seasons, what must be our
 “ constant sentiments of a real friend, at all seasons;

“ who loses no occasion of expressing every mode
 “ of tenderness towards those he loves! I fell into this
 “ train of thinking by what my wife told me, with
 “ much pleasure, a little before I left London. She
 “ said that Dr. Hurd assured her, that I would write
 “ no more. I received this news, which gave her so
 “ much satisfaction, with an approving smile. I was
 “ charmed with the tenderness of friendship which
 “ conveyed, in so inoffensive a manner, that fatal
 “ secret which Gil Blas was incapable of doing,
 “ as he ought, to his patron the Archbishop of
 “ Granada.”

I insert these extracts, chiefly in reference to the IXth book of the D.L. which twenty years before would have been finished in a few weeks, and with that flame of genius which irradiates the former books, but which now lay under his hands many years, was written by snatches and with difficulty, and left incomplete by him at last*. An unwelcome part this of the little history I am writing! yet not unuseful, if it may admonish superior writers to place a just confidence in themselves, and little ones to treat them with something more respect. Cudworth and Warburton are memorable and instructive instances, to either purpose.

* Yet it may be concluded from the subject, which is a general view of GOD's moral dispensations from Adam to Christ [See Vol. VI. Div. Leg. Book VI. Sect. vi. at the end, and Book IX. at the beginning] that very little is wanting to complete the author's design; only, what he had proposed to say on the apocalyptic prophecies, and which may be supplied from the Discourse on Antichrist [See Vol. X. Discourse XXVIII.]

The

The misfortune, in the case of the latter, was, that although he had digested in his own mind, long ago, the substance of the IXth book, and was perpetually meditating upon it, yet he had committed very little of it to paper; his way being to put down in writing only short notes of what he intended to enlarge upon, and to work them up only when he was preparing to send his copy to the press. This, in his best days, was so easy to him, that, in printing some of his elaborate works, he had not in his hands two sheets together, but sent the copy to his printer as fast as it was composed.

I know indeed that many persons, from the compass and variety of his learning, imagined that he drew the materials of it from a voluminous common-place. The fact was just otherwise. His memory was so tenacious, that he trusted every thing to it: or, if he may be said to have kept a common-place, it was nothing more than a small interleaved pocket-almanack, of about three inches square; in which he inserted now and then a reference to a curious fact or passage, that he met with in his reading, but chiefly short hints of sentiments and reflexions, which occasionally struck him, and might some time or other be put to use. At the end of every year, he tore out of his almanack such leaves as contained any of those reflexions, and put them together under general heads, that he might recur to them, on occasion, the more readily. Of these papers, or rather collections of papers, I have many in my hands, relative to the subjects of the three last books of the D. L.; and from these the IXth book, such as he left it, was composed.

Another inconvenience, attending the late compo-

sition of this book, was, That he had occasionally delivered, in his sermons, and other printed works, some of the leading principles contained in it. Thus, he had, in effect, anticipated a good part of his subject. Nor was this all. Finding the labour of composing troublesome to him, he quoted from himself very freely; and such passages, as had found a place elsewhere, when the purpose of completing the last book was suspended or laid aside, were now inserted in it, without much alteration, in order to carry on the thread and order of his discourse.

From both these causes therefore (his not having reduced to form the materials he had provided for the IXth book, and his having already worked up some part of them) it is easy to see the disadvantage with which he came, in the close of his long life, to the composition of this work. His memory and invention were not what they had been; his facility and variety of expression was not the same; and, what was worst of all, the grace of novelty in the subject was in some measure gone off.

It was therefore matter of deliberation with me, for some time, whether I should insert the IXth book (though printed, so far as it goes, by himself) entire and in its own form, or only some fragments of it. But, on further consideration, I judged it right to give that work exactly as the author left it: especially, as the subject is highly interesting, and even new, unless where anticipated by himself; the method, clear and exact; and the whole cast of composition, masterly; his reasonings being carried on, if not with the splendid ease and perspicuity of his best manner, yet with a force and spirit, both in the sentiment and expression,
which

which may well excite our admiration, when the circumstances, under which he wrote, are considered.

In a word, this IXth book of the D. L. under all the disadvantages with which it appears, is the noblest effort that has hitherto been made to give a *Rationale of Christianity*. How far it may satisfy those who have so long and so loudly called for it, will be now seen: without doubt, no farther, than as it may agree (if, in any respects, it should agree) with *their* reason. In the mean time, the investigation is made with the best design—

“ To justify the ways of GOD to man ;”

and, let me add, in a way that entitles it to another sort of regard, than is due to theories, constructed, as they usually are, on fanciful suppositions, and arbitrary assumptions: since every thing, here, is advanced on the sure grounds of natural and revealed religion: the one, estimated by the purest reason; the other, interpreted with an awful reverence of the written word, and according to the rules of the soundest and soberest criticism.

While the good Bishop was thus exerting his last strength in the cause of religion, he projected a method by which he hoped to render it effectual service after his death. This was by the institution of a Lecture on PROPHECY; a subject, which he conceived had not been considered with the care it ought; and from a thorough discussion of which, he assured himself, much additional force would arise to the proof of the Christian religion. He had himself opened a way to the successful investigation of the general subject, in some principles delivered in the D. L., and in his confutation
of

of Collins's book by means of those principles. But some particular prophecies had struck his attention, as furnishing the most decisive argument for the truth of Christianity. In the preface to his Remarks, Part II. printed so long ago as 1745, he says—" I have ever
 " thought, the prophecies relating to Antichrist, inter-
 " spersed up and down the New and Old Testament,
 " the most convincing proof of the truth of the
 " Christian religion, that any moral matter is capable
 " of receiving." And again—" This question (namely,
 " what individual power is meant in the prophecies)
 " is one, on the right determination of which alone,
 " I am fully persuaded, one might rest the whole truth
 " of the Christian religion *."

Under this persuasion then in 1768 he gave £. 500. in trust to Lord Mansfield, Sir Eardley Wilmot, and Mr. Charles Yorke, for the purpose of founding a Lecture at Lincoln's-Inn, in the form of a sermon, ' To prove the truth of revealed religion in general, and of the Christian in particular, from the completion of the prophecies in the Old and New Testament, which relate to the Christian Church, especially to the apostacy of Papal Rome.'

The subject is infinitely curious, and of vast extent : for those who have taken it to be too much narrowed by specifying the prophecies concerning Antichrist, seem not to have understood the compass of the controversy, nor the terms of the institution itself. The truth is, there is more danger that Lecturers will be wanting to the institution, than that it will not afford matter and scope enough for their discussion. He

* See Vol. XI. of this edit. " Remarks on several occasional Reflections," &c. Part II. Pref.

was anxious to leave this important trust in the best hands. And while it continues in such as have had the management of it, there is no doubt that the best supply, which the age furnishes, will be provided for this lecture. And, if I had not myself preached the first course of these sermons, I should add that, hitherto, their choice of lecturers has afforded no signal cause of complaint.

It was afterwards in the Bishop's contemplation to double the original endowment. But he was diverted from this design (though with some difficulty) by those who represented to him, that the sum given was sufficient to answer his purpose of engaging men of ability to read his lecture if they were influenced by such motives as became them, a regard for their own honour and a zeal for the service of religion; and that more could answer no good purpose, nay might easily be abused to bad ones, if they were not.

The last years of the Bishop's life were clouded with misfortune, as well as indisposition. He had for some time been so sensible of his declining health, that he read little, and wrote less. But, in the course of the year 1775, the loss of a favourite son and only child *, who died of a consumption in his 20th year, when

* He had been placed, much to his father's satisfaction, under the care of Dr. HALIFAX; then an eminent tutor of Trinity Hall at Cambridge, and the King's professor of law in that university; who in 1782 was advanced to the see of Gloucester, and translated in 1789 to that of St. Asaph. He died March 4, 1790.—His distinguished worth and ability deservedly raised him to the high rank he held in the Church.—But his character is given more
at

when every hope was springing up in the breast of a fond parent, to make amends, as it were, for his want of actual enjoyment—this sudden affliction, I say, oppressed him to that degree, as to put an end to his literary labours, and even amusements, at once. From that disastrous moment, he lived on indeed for two or three

at large in the following elegant inscription, composed by his father-in-law, the Reverend Dr. William Cooke, dean of Ely, and provost of King's College, Cambridge, and engraved on his monument in the church of Warsop, in Nottinghamshire; of which church the bishop was rector, and in which, for the reason assigned in the two first lines of the inscription, he was buried.

Hic juxta filiolum dulcissimum acerbo olim fato
 Præreptum paternas exuvias deponi voluit vir
 reverendissimus SAMUEL HALIFAX LL.D. & S.T.P
 Ex hac vicinia oriundus primisque literis imbutus in
 academiâ protenus Cantabrigiensi floruit juris civilis
 prælector publicus & professor regius in curiâ prærogativâ
 Cantuariensi facultatum registrarius in hâc ecclesiâ
 rector in ecclesiâ cathedrali Glocestriensi primò deinde
 Asaphensi episcopus quæ per omnia officia ingenio claruit
 & eruditione & industriâ singulari summa in ecclesiam
 Anglicanam fide concionum vi ac suavitate flexanima
 Scriptorum nitore & elegantia vitâ insuper id quod primum
 sibi semper habuit inculpabili
 Natus est apud Mansfield Jan 18, 1733, calculo oppressus
 properata morte obiit Martii 4, 1790, ætatis eheu 57.
 Catharina conjux cum filio unico & sex filiabus superstes
 relicta in aliquod desiderii sui solamen mœrens P.

three years; but, when he had settled his affairs, as was proper, upon this great change in his family, he took no concern in the ordinary occurrences of life, and grew so indifferent to every thing, that even his books and writings seemed, thenceforth, to be utterly disregarded by him.

Not that his memory and faculties, though very much impaired, were ever wholly disabled. I saw him so late as October 1778, when I went into his diocese to confirm for him. On our first meeting, before his family, he expressed his concern that I should take that journey, and put myself to so much trouble, on his account. And afterwards, he took occasion to say some pertinent and obliging things, which shewed, not only his usual friendliness of temper, but the command he had of his attention. Nor was this all. The evening, before I left him, he desired the family to withdraw, and then entered into a confidential discourse with me on some private affairs which he had much at heart, with as much pertinence and good sense, as he could have done in any former part of his life. Such was the power he had over his mind, when roused to exert himself by some interesting occasion! But this was an effort, which could not be sustained very long. In less than half an hour, the family returned, and he relapsed into his usual forgetfulness and inattention.

In this melancholy state he languished till the summer following, when he expired at the Palace in Gloucester, on the 7th of June 1779, and was buried in his cathedral, at no great distance from the West door, and near to the grave of one of his predecessors, Bishop Benson.

A neat mural monument has been put up there to his memory, with the following inscription :

TO THE MEMORY OF
 WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.
 FOR MORE THAN 19 YEARS
 BISHOP OF THIS SEE:
 A P R E L A T E
 OF THE
 MOST SUBLIME GENIUS, AND EXQUISITE LEARNING:
 BOTH WHICH TALENTS
 HE EMPLOYED, THROUGH A LONG LIFE,
 IN THE SUPPORT
 OF WHAT HE FIRMLY BELIEVED,
 THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION,
 AND OF WHAT HE ESTEEMED
 THE BEST ESTABLISHMENT OF IT,
 THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

IV.

IT only remains for me to draw together the several parts of the Bishop's character, and to present them to the reader in one view; which I shall now attempt, with the affection of a friend, no doubt, yet on the whole, with as much severity as I ought. For I remember the wise and humane reflexion of the great biographer, who in his life of Cimon expresseth himself to this purpose: "When a painter undertakes to give us the portrait of a beautiful person, if there be any smaller blemishes in his subject, we do not expect him to omit them altogether; for then the picture would be unlike: nor to express them with too much care; for then it becomes disgusting.

"In like manner, it being difficult, or rather impossible, to find a faultless character, the writer of a great man's life will lay himself out in delineating his good qualities, and not dwell with pleasure, or an anxious diligence, on his foibles; out of a respectful tenderness to human nature, which unhappily is not capable of attaining absolute perfection*."

And with this little apology for myself, I proceed to give the outline of my friend's character.

HE possessed those virtues, which are so important in society, Truth, Probity, and Honour, in the highest degree; with a frankness of temper very uncommon; and a friendliness to those he loved and esteemed, which knew no bounds: not suspicious or captious,

* Plutarch. Cimon. sub init.

in the least; quick, indeed, in his resentment of real manifest injuries; but then again (as is natural to such tempers) of the utmost placability.

He had an ardent love of Virtue, and the most sincere zeal for Religion; and that, the freest from all bigotry and all fanaticism, that I have ever known. He venerated the civil constitution of his country, and was warmly attached to the Church of England. Yet he was no party-man, and was the sincerest advocate for toleration. It was not his manner to court the good opinion of our Dissenters. But he had nothing of prejudice or ill-will towards them: he conversed familiarly with such of them as came in his way; and had even a friendship with some of their more noted ministers*; who did not then glory in Socinian impieties, or indulge themselves in rancorous invectives against the Established Church.

I know, indeed, that he spoke his sense of men and things, occasionally, with force, which in the language of some persons will be termed bigotry. And the truth is, he never indulged his candour so far as to treat all opinions and all characters alike. On the contrary, he held prophane and licentious writers to be fit objects of public reproof: and though civil penalties should not be applied to the coercion of mistaken, or even, to a certain degree, of hurtful opinions, yet literary chastisement, he thought, should; an equal acceptance of *all* being the ready way to introduce Scepticism, under the specious name of Liberality, or rather irreligion itself, under the mask of charity. And if this zeal

* See a *Collection of Letters to and from Dr. Doddridge, of Northampton*; published by T. Stedman, M. A. vicar of St. Chad's, Shrewsbury, 1790.

may be abused, as without doubt every thing may, at most, he had only to answer for that abuse: The use itself being surely unquestionable, if there be truth or meaning in the Apostle's aphorism, "That it is always good to be zealously affected in a good matter." But the reader, if he thinks fit, may see his own vindication of himself in the *Apology for his View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy*.

Indeed his conduct had been always uniform, in this respect. Even in the year 1738, when the first volume of the D. L. was published, he makes a full and frank declaration of his character. For, in his Dedication to the Free-Thinkers, speaking of the advantage he should have, in that address, of not being called upon to disgrace himself, or them, by a style of adulation, he goes on thus—"Not but I must own you have been managed, even by some of our Order, with very singular complaisance. Whether it was that they affected the fame of moderation, or had a higher ambition for the honour of your good word, I know not; but I, who neither love your cause, nor fear the abilities that support it, while I preserve for your persons that justice and charity which my profession teaches to be due to all, can never be brought to think otherwise of your character, than as the despisers of the Master, whom I serve, and as the implacable enemies of that Order, to which I have the honour to belong. And as such, I should be tempted to glory in your censures; but would certainly refuse your commendations."

Such were his early, as well as late notions, of *candour*. They who affect to push them still farther, may do well to reflect, whether they be their own dupes, or the dupes of others: I mean, whether they have indeed

any principle themselves; or can be content to serve the views of those, whose interest it is, that men of principle *speak* and *act*, as if they had not any.

His love of letters was extreme, and his disposition to countenance all those in whom he perceived any kind or degree of literary merit, the most prompt and generous; as appeared by his incessant recommendation of them to his great friends, when his own scanty patronage (as he would oft and vehemently complain) denied him the means of rendering them any service himself.

If we consider him as a WRITER, and a DIVINE, it is not easy to find terms that will do justice to his merit.

His reading was various and extensive; and his discernment exquisite. He saw and seized what was just and useful in every science which he cultivated, and in every book he read. The lumber and the refuse he shook off, and left to others. Perhaps, no learned writer ever dealt less in ordinary quotation. Even the more familiar passages, unless when cited by him as direct authorities, take an air and turn in his application of them, which makes them in a manner new. The same observation may be extended to his reasonings; which are either purely his own, or appear to be so, by his management of them. So that it seems a natural question which one * of his friends put to him, on the receipt of a volume of his sermons—*how do you manage always to say something new upon old subjects, and always in an original manner?*

To say all in a word, he possessed, in an eminent degree, those two qualities of a great writer, SAPERE ET FARI; I mean, superior sense, and the power of doing justice to it by a sound and manly eloquence.

* Mr. C. Yorke, in one of his letters, Feb. 2, 1767.

It was an ignorant cavil, that charged him with a want of taste. The objection arose from the originality of his manner; but he wrote, when he thought fit, with the greatest purity and even elegance, notwithstanding his strength and energy, which frequently exclude those qualities*.

The character of his style, is freedom and force united. As that of the style, now in vogue, is *effort* without either. Nobody understood the philosophy of grammar better; yet in the *construction* of his terms he was not nice, rather he was somewhat negligent. But this negligence has no ill effect in works of reasoning, and of length; where the writer's mind is intent on the matter, and where a certain degree of irregularity gives the appearance of ease and spirit.

In his use of the *terms* themselves, especially of what are called *mixt modes*, and in the nice adjustment of the *predicate* to the *subject* (in which the accuracy of style chiefly consists) he was of all writers the most scrupulously exact. It was by this secret in his expression (so far as it depended on art and design) that he is never stiff or languid in his style, but every where free and nervous. It never flattens upon you, not being over-laboured in the phrase, or too general in the terms. There is the appearance of freedom, with the utmost energy and precision.

For the rest, the higher excellencies of his style were owing to the strength of his imagination, and a clear conception of his subject; in other words, to his sublime genius.

* Mr. Pope gives the true character of him, as a writer, where he says, that "*he had a genius equal to his pains, and a taste equal to his learning.*" Works, Vol. X. p. 291. Ed. 12mo. 1754. L. CXIII.

Thus his style was properly his own, and what we call, *original*. Yet he did not disdain to draw what assistance he might from the best critics ; among whom Quintilian was his favourite.

By this union of art and nature, he succeeded, of course, in all sorts of composition. But in one, especially, the **CONTROVERSIAL**, he was so much superior to himself, that barely to say he excelled in it, would be a poor and scanty praise.

From his first entrance on theological studies, he had applied himself with care to the reading of our best writers in controversy, such as Hooker, Chillingworth, and Locke ; of whom he was so fond, that he had their works bound up in small detached pieces, for the convenience of carrying them with him in his hand or pocket, when he travelled, or walked abroad by himself. Of these, I have several in my possession, which appear to have been much used. It is no wonder, he should have this taste ; for, besides that controversy was then in vogue, he disdained to oppose the enemies of religion in any other way, than that of logical confutation ; and *against those*, to use his own words in a letter to me, *he had denounced eternal war, like Hannibal against Rome, at the altar*.

Thus disciplined, he came with advantage to the use of his arms, when he found himself obliged, as he soon was, to take them up. Use and habit did the rest. So that he became consummate in this mode of writing, and at the same time original. For to the authority of Hooker, the acuteness of Chillingworth, and the perspicuity of Locke, he added more than all their learning ; together with a force of style, and poignancy of wit, of which we had hitherto seen no example in theological controversy.

With these talents and qualifications, he was the terror of the infidel world, while he lived, and will be their disgrace to future ages. His sublime reason, aided by his irresistible wit, drove them from their old fastnesses of logick and philosophy, and has forced them to take shelter in the thin cover of history and romance; whence we now see them shoot their arrows, dipt in irony and badinage; to the annoyance indeed of some witless passengers; but to the wary and well-appointed, who take a fancy to ramble into those paths, perfectly harmless and insignificant.

But, when I mentioned his making war on our free-thinking philosophers, let me be understood to mean, not the minute, and plebeian, but the more considerable, and, as one may say, *sizeable* men of that party; such as pretended to erudition; and reasoned at least, though weakly or perversely. For, as to those insect-blasphemers, of whatever condition, which the fashion, rather than the philosophy of the age has generated, and sent forth in swarms over a great part of modern Europe, he regarded them but as the summer flies, which tease a little by their murmurings (for stings, he would say, they have none) and are easily brushed away by any hand, or vanish of themselves.

Next to infidels professed, there was no set of writers he treated with less ceremony, than the Socinian; in whom he saw an immoderate presumption, and suspected not a little ill faith. For, professing to believe the divine authority of the Scriptures, they take a licence in explaining them, which could hardly, he thought, consist with that belief. To these free interpreters of the word, he was ready to say, as St. Austin did to their precursors, the Manichæans—“ *Tell us plainly, that ye do not at all believe the Gospel of*

Christ: for ye who believe what ye will in the Gospel, and disbelieve what ye will, assuredly believe not the Gospel itself, but yourselves only.*"

It is true, he himself would reason on revealed truths farther than to some may seem necessary; but he never reasoned *against* them. It was his principle, and his practice, to follow the Apostolic rule of *casting down all imaginations, that exalt themselves against the knowledge of God†:*" which, when clearly revealed, he held it an extreme impiety in any Christian, not only to question directly, but to elude by any forced interpretation. In short, he regarded Socinianism (the idol of our self-admiring age) as a sort of infidelity in disguise, and as such he gave it no quarter.

Other religionists he would confute, as occasion offered, with his usual vivacity: but he made allowance for their prejudices, and, when no malevolence intervened, treated their persons with respect. But enough, you say, of his controversial merits: let us hear something of his *defects*.

"He was arrogant, and impatient of contradiction." It is true, he knew his own strength, and confided enough in it. But then, as that quality made him incapable of envying his opponents, it should have made him careless of being censured by them. Still, it must be owned, that he had the common infirmity of being better satisfied with such as adopted his opinions, than with those who rejected them. I say the *common* infirmity: for, I doubt, it adheres to our

* "Apertè dicite non vos credere Christi Evangelio: nam qui in Evangelio quod vultis creditis, quod vultis non creditis, vobis potius quam Evangelio creditis." *Contr. Faust.* L. 17. c. 3.

† 2 Cor. x. 5.

very nature, and that we shall in vain seek for a man dispassionate enough to be indifferent to contradiction ; especially, when direct, and public ; and urged, too, with some degree of eagerness, or rather sharpness, which is scarcely separable from controversy.

“ But he was *violent* in his resentments, and excessively severe in his expression of them.”—As to this charge, hear, first, his own apology for himself.—“ The paper I send you *, is the introductory note to —. I need not explain it to you. You will understand every word. What I want to know is, whether some parts of it be not too severe. Whatever there is of this kind, I shall gladly strike out. For though I have had provocation enough, I can assure you, I have no resentments. I perhaps may not be thought the best judge of my own temper in this matter, and reasonably. But why I say I have so little resentment, I collect from hence, that there is not one word in this volume against them [his adversaries], which I could not with the greatest indifference strike out, either with reason or without. I do not expect the world should do me this justice, because they are to judge by appearances ; and appearances are against me ; for there are caustic strokes enough against the ignorance and ill faith of my adversaries. But, if this be resentment, it is the resentment I should shew in the case of any other honest man.”

His resentment then was impartial : and that it was so, he shewed in his vindication of Mr. Pope, and in other instances. But I take upon me to go farther, and to assert, that the severity objected to him, was the

* In a Letter to me, Jan. 18, 1757.

effect of his genius, and of no vindictive spirit. For the difference between him, and ordinary writers, who seem to be at their ease in disputing, whether on religion or any other subject, is merely this—He felt strongly and wrote forcibly: They are incapable of doing either. This is the simple truth, if it may be told; and hence it is, that the same complaint has been made of every great genius in controversy, from Jerom down to our author.

Not but another consideration may be worth attending to. The end of controversy is either to convince the person you dispute with, or simply to confute his opinions. When the *former* is the object, without doubt the softest words are the best. But, the *other* is best done by vigorous expression; because it shews the disputant to be in earnest, and sets the error, contended against, in the strongest light; the likeliest means, to prevent others from being infected with it: And such was the Bishop's view in most of the controversies, in which he engaged. The same observation may be extended to what has been called his *dogmatic manner* of writing; which is only the firm tone of one who believes what he says, and is indeed very different from the careless unconcerned air of the Sceptick.

But, lastly, I must observe, that the charges of *impatience*, and *severity*, in the sense intended by those that urge them, are not true. When no unfriendliness appeared in those who differed from him, he heard their reasons as patiently, confuted them as calmly, or gave way to them as readily, as other men. Which I may the rather affirm, having had the experience of it on many occasions. Our sentiments, no doubt, agreed in the main: there could not, otherwise, have been so entire a friendship between us, as there was.

But

But I never took greater liberties with any man, than with him, nor with less offence; and that, in matters of no small delicacy; as the reader will see from the following example, among many others which I could easily give him.

Voltaire had spent a great part of his miserable life in railing against the Jewish law and its Divine Author. His complete ignorance of the subject disposed men of learning, very generally, to treat his censures with neglect. But the Bishop of Gloucester, observing the impression they made on a licentious public, thought it might be of use to shew this fashionable blasphemer in his true light; to strip his sophistical reasonings of the little plausibility they had; and, for the rest, to turn his favourite weapon of ridicule against himself.

With this view, he had been at the pains to plan a work of some length, in *three Dissertations*, which would take in the whole of that subject, and give him occasion to expose, with much force, Voltaire's libertine glosses upon it. When he had sketched out the contents of this discourse, he sent it to me, and desired to know what I thought of it, and whether he should proceed in the design, or no. I told him very frankly, That, although I thought his plan an excellent one, and could trust him with the execution of it, yet, upon the whole, I wished him to prosecute his design no farther. I said, there was no end of confuting every shallow, though fashionable scribbler against religion; that he had done enough already in exposing so many others of that family, and, very lately, the noble writer that was at the head of it in England, to the just scorn of thinking men; that to go on in this agonistic course, was not only needless, but would
bring

bring a storm of envy upon him from all quarters; and that even his friends would, many of them, consider him as too fond of controversy, and as indulging himself too freely in the talent he had for it.—I added other considerations, and particularly this, That I thought it beneath him to commit himself with a person so little acquainted, as Voltaire confessedly was, with the matter in question; and that for *him* to answer such a writer in form, would be like *breaking a butterfly upon a wheel*, according to his friend Pope's ingenious illustration of such achievements.

In conclusion, I pressed him earnestly to leave this man of merriment to his own serious reflections, if he ever had any; and to reserve his force for some better occasion, than that of repelling the slight cavils of ignorant and ill-informed men.

This free remonstrance was not ill taken. He answered me without hesitation, and in one word—“In the matter of Voltaire, your advice will have its usual weight with me.”—The plan was accordingly laid aside, and forgotten.

After such an example of facility in taking advice, the Bishop of Gloucester will not be thought that impracticable man, he has been sometimes represented to be. Many perhaps will think, with more reason, that his easiness went too far in this instance; for that his *Three Dissertations* on the Jewish law and history would have been highly entertaining, at least; and perhaps as useful in repressing the petulance of the French poet, as the *Four Letters* had been in dismounting the arrogance of the English philosopher. And upon these grounds, I might indeed have repented me of the free advice I gave him, but for the pleasure I have since had in seeing the same design undertaken,
and

and executed with great elegance and ability, by another hand*.

But perhaps I have misemployed my pains in setting the controversial character of my friend in a just light. There are those, I know, who will regard this praise, whatever it be, as injurious to the learned prelate, rather than honourable to him; who will be ready to tell us that controversial janglings are out of date; that they never did any good, and are now at length fallen into general and just contempt.

To these wise men I should have much to say, if I could find means to do it without disgracing myself, and disgusting them, by an air of controversy. And would to God that religious controversy were now of no use in this manly age of the world! I should then be for laying it aside with other childish things. But is this the fact? and when all quarters, besides, resound with controversy, is there no demand for it in the schools of religion? After all, the reader sees what is aimed at by this affected contempt of theological altercation. A hint, in passing, is more than enough on a subject, which the Bishop himself has treated at some length, and with his usual force †.

I apprehend therefore no discredit to my friend or myself, in having dwelt so long on the virtues of the *Controversial writer*. They were eminently conspicuous in him; and exerted for a just purpose, that of confuting error, and repressing calumny. Not that I am concerned to deny all mixture of frailty in my friend's exercise of his polemic talents. It will be

* See *Lettres de quelques Juifs, &c.* in 3 tom. 12^o, Par. 1776.

† See Vol. VIII. "Doctrine of Grace," Book III. Ch. ii. near the end.

found in our best performance of the best things. And it is credible enough, that the abundance of his wit, the vivacity of his temperament, and the petulance of his adversaries, may have sharpened his style too much in some instances. Yet, on the whole, he might apologize for himself, as Erasmus has done in a fine letter to his friend Sadolet—" *Some of my opponents,* " says he, *because they deserved no better of me, I have* " EXPOSED, *perhaps, rather than confuted: yet with* " *more temper, as I think, myself, than they attacked* " *me. Although I am sensible, that passion may have* " *biassed my judgement. For I must confess that I* " *am easily warmed by ill usage; but so, as not to re-* " *tain the resentment of it long, and to forget injuries* " *as soon as any man*."*

As a DIVINE, properly so called, he filled and adorned that character with the highest ability.

Strength of reason, exquisite learning, a critical knowledge of antiquity, an enlarged view of the scheme of Revelation, a wonderful sagacity in discovering the sense of Scripture, and in opening the probable grounds of its clearly revealed doctrines, with the profoundest submission of his understanding to them, whether those grounds of reason were apparent to him or not—These rare and admirable qualifications shone out in him with greater lustre, than in any other ornament

* " Quosdam, quia sic merebantur, IRRISI veriùs quàm " confutavi, nusquam non temperatior his à quibus laces- " sebar, ut mea quidem fert opinio; nam fieri et potest et " solet, ut meo judicio imponat affectus; atque is sum fateor, " qui possem lacesitus incandescere, sed nec iræ pertinacis, " et injuriarum obliviosus, ut si quis alius." Ep. MXCIV. Ed. Cler. L. B. 1703.

of our church, Stillingfleet, and Barrow, and Taylor himself not excepted. To which I must add that first and noblest quality, of all, A perfect honesty of mind, and sincere love of truth, which governed his pen in all his religious inquiries*.

After

* Considering him in this view, I mean as a CONSUMMATE DIVINE, one cannot but lament the fate of a work he had projected, but never executed, at least in the manner intended by him, *On theological studies, for the use of young people*: a plan of which he had digested in his own mind, and communicated to me, by letter, so early as the year 1750.

The principal heads were,

1. The right state and disposition of mind to make proper improvements—in this were to be considered the natures of scepticism, dogmaticalness, enthusiasm, superstition, &c.
2. The previous studies of morality and natural religion from their first principles and foundations; and of antiquity, critical, historical, and philosophical.
3. The study of the Scriptures.
4. Fathers and modern Divines.
5. Ecclesiastical history.
6. Sermonizing, or the art of preaching.

This work he reserved for the amusement of his declining years. But, as what is deferred so long, is rarely executed at all, and never so well as at an earlier season, so this noble design, which required the exertion of his best faculties in their full vigour, was not wholly neglected indeed, but slightly attempted by him, a few years before his death: as I find from a brief sketch of it among his papers, which appears to have been drawn up hastily for the use of a friend, and was afterwards made to serve by way of charge to his clergy.

Such

After mentioning to me, in one of his letters*, some interesting meditations, he was then engaged in, he stops short, and asks—"But what is man! A fit of the spleen, a fit of illness, and lastly death, may wipe out all these gloriuous visions, with which my brain at present is painted over: as LAW said, it once was with hieroglyphics. But I hope the best; because I only aim at the honour of GOD and good of men. When I say this I need not perhaps add (as I do with the utmost seriousness) *that I shall never wittingly advance one falsehood, nor conceal or disguise one truth.*"

So that those, if any such there were, who thought he wrote for a party, with the views of interest, for the sake of reputation, or, in short, from any other cause than conviction, and the purest zeal for the advancement of truth, knew nothing of his character, and did him great wrong.

But to take him out of his study, and to consider him in the common walks of life.

He was of a chearful temper; yet subject, at times, to fits of absence, and, if we may believe himself, even of melancholy. For so he paints his own complexional habit

Such as it is, I have judged it worth preserving. The reader will be pleased to see the thoughts of so great a man on this subject; and will, without doubt, make the proper allowances for their being laid before him in this imperfect state; without the detail, which was intended, and without those embellishments of style and composition, which in his best time, he could so easily have bestowed upon them.

This discourse, under the name of *Directions for the Study of Theology*, will be found in the Xth Volume.

* Jan. 12, 1757.

habit in two remarkable letters, addressed to a friend, and lately made public*.

In one of these, dated Feb. 14, 1742-3, he writes thus:—"We have all something to make us think less
 " complacently of the world. Religion will do great
 " things. It will always make the bitter waters of
 " Marah wholesome and palatable. But we must not
 " think it will usually turn water to wine, because it
 " once did so. Nor is it fit it should, unless this were
 " our place of rest, where we were to expect the
 " Bridegroom. I do the best I can, and should, I
 " think, do the same, if I were a mere Pagan, to make
 " life passable. To be always lamenting the miseries,
 " or always seeking after the pleasures of it, equally
 " takes us off from the work of our salvation. And
 " though I be extremely cautious what sect I follow
 " in religion, yet any in philosophy will serve my turn,
 " and honest Sancho Panca's is as good as any; who
 " on his return from an important commission, when
 " asked by his master, whether they should mark the
 " day with a *black* or a *white* stone; replied, 'Faith,
 " Sir, if you will be ruled by me, with neither, but
 " with good *brown ochre*.' What this philosopher
 " thought of his commission, I think of human life in
 " general, *good brown ochre* is the complexion of it."

The other letter, I hinted at, is dated Feb. 2, 1740, and is of a still darker cast. For, speaking of what had made him delay so long the second volume of his D. L., he proceeds in the following manner—"I
 " would not have you think that natural indolence
 " alone makes me thus play the fool. Distractions of
 " various kinds, inseparable from human life, joined

* In the collection before mentioned.

“ with a *naturally melancholy habit*, contribute greatly
 “ to increase my indolence, and force me often to seek
 “ in letters, nothing but mere amusement. This
 “ makes my reading wild and desultory: and I seek
 “ refuge from the uneasiness of thought from any
 “ book, let it be what it will, that can engage my at-
 “ tention. There is no one whose good opinion I
 “ more value than yours. And the marks you give
 “ me of it make me so vain, that I was resolved to
 “ humble myself in making you this confession. By
 “ my manner of writing upon subjects, you would
 “ naturally imagine they afford me pleasure, and attach
 “ me thoroughly. I will assure you, No. I have
 “ amused myself much in human learning, to wear
 “ away *the tedious hours inseparable from a melan-*
 “ *choly habit*. But no earthly thing gives me pleasure,
 “ but the ties of natural relation, and the friendship
 “ of good men. And for all views of happiness, I
 “ have no notion of such a thing, but in the prospects
 “ which revealed religion affords us.”

These letters appear to have been written, the latter
 of them especially, in a splenetic moment. But what
 is said of a *melancholy habit* means no more (for there
 was no gloom of melancholy in the tenour of his life
 or conversation) than that, being of an inventive turn,
 or, in the language of his friend Bishop Hare, having
 an *ingenious working head* *, the driving of his thoughts
 sometimes wore his mind too much, and forced him to
 relieve it by changing the object of his attention.
 Hence the *desultory reading*; which, however, stored
 his memory with images of all sorts, and, as I before
 observed †, while it repaired the vigour of his mind,

* Page 14.

† Pages 10, 11.

threw a richness and variety of colouring over all his writings.

But to go on with what I proposed to say of his companionable qualities.

In mixed companies he was extremely entertaining; but less guarded than men of the world usually are; and disposed to take to himself a somewhat larger share of the conversation, than very exact breeding is thought to allow. Yet few, I believe, wished him to be more reserved, or less communicative, than he was. So abundant was the information, or entertainment, which his ready wit and extensive knowledge afforded them! In private with his friends, he was natural, easy, unpretending; at once the most agreeable and most useful companion in the world. You saw to the very bottom of his mind on any subject of discourse; and his various literature, penetrating judgement, and quick recollection, made him say the liveliest, or the justest things upon it. In short, I was in those moments affected by his conversation, pretty much as Cato was by that of Maximus Fabius, and may say, as he does in the dialogue on *Old Age*—“*I was so fond of his discourse, and listened to it so eagerly, as if I had foreseen, what indeed came to pass, that when I lost him, I should never again meet with so instructive a companion* *.”

I spoke of his *private friendships*. They were with men of learning and genius; chiefly, with clergymen of the Established Church; and those, the most considerable of the time. It would be invidious to give

* “*Ejus sermone ità tum cupidè fruebar, quasi jam divinare id, quod evenit, illo extincto, fore, undè discerem, neminem.*” *Cic. de Senectute.* C. IV.

a list of these. I shall only mention, by way of specimen, the learned Archdeacons of Stow and Winchester.

The former of these, Mr. Towne, was of his early acquaintance, when he lived in Lincolnshire, and much respected by him to his death. He was an ingenious and learned man, and so conversant in the Bishop's writings, that he used to say of him, "He understood them better than himself." He published some defences of the Divine Legation, in which, with a glow of zeal for his friend, he shewed much logical precision and acuteness*.

The latter, Dr. Balguy, was a person of extraordinary parts, and extensive learning; indeed of universal knowledge; and, what is so precious in a man of letters, of the most exact judgement: as appears from some valuable discourses †, which, having been written occasionally on important subjects, and pub-

* The following is, I believe, an exact list of them :

1. Critical Inquiry into the Practice and Opinions of the antient Philosophers concerning the Soul, &c. Lond. 1748.
2. Exposition of the Orthodox System of Civil Rights, and Church Power; addressed to Dr. Stebbing.
3. Argument of the D. L. fairly stated. Lond. 1751.
4. Free and Candid Examination of Bishop Sherlock's Sermons, and Discourses on Prophecy. Lond. 1756.
5. Dissertation on the antient Mysteries. Lond. 1766.
6. Remarks on Dr. Lowth's Letter to Bishop Warburton. Lond. 1766.

† These discourses, with some others, were afterwards collected into one volume in 1785, and presented, with a handsome Dedication, to His Majesty.—This excellent person died Jan. 19. 1795, while the concluding sheets of this Discourse were yet in the press.

lished

lished separately by him, had raised his reputation so high, that his Majesty, out of his singular love of merit, and without any other recommendation, was pleased in 1781 to make him the offer of the Bishoprick of Gloucester. Dr. Balguy had a just sense of this flattering distinction; but was unhappily prevented by an infirm state of health from accepting it.

With these, and such as these, the Bishop was happy to spend his leisure hours. A general conversation he never affected, or rather took much pains to avoid, as what he justly thought a waste of time in one of his temper, talents, and profession.

But to draw to an end of this long, and, as it may seem to those who knew little of Him, too fond a character of my Friend.

He had his foibles, no doubt; but such as we readily excuse, or overlook, in a great character. With more reserve in his writings and conversation, he had passed through the world with fewer enemies (though no prudence could have kept a genius, like his, from having many); and, with a temper less irritable, he would have secured a more perfect enjoyment of himself. But these were the imperfections of his nature, or rather the excrescences of his ruling virtues, an uncommon FRANKNESS OF MIND, and SENSIBILITY OF HEART. These qualities appear in all his writings, especially in his private letters; in which a warm affection for his friends, and concern for their interests, is every where expressed. But his tenderness for his family, and, above all, his filial piety *, strikes us with peculiar force.

In

* A leading feature in the character of great men. See Plutarch's Coriolanus, Ed. Xyland, p. 215. Marcius, says
I 2 his

In a letter to me from Durham, July 12, 1757, he writes thus—" I am now got (through much hot
 " weather and fatigue) to this place. I hurried from
 " the heat of London at a time, and under circum-
 " stances, when a true Court Chaplain would never
 " have forgiven himself the folly of preferring the
 " company of his friends and relations, to attendance
 " on the Minister. But every one to his taste. I had
 " the pleasure of finding you well at Cambridge; I
 " had the pleasure of finding a Sister and a Niece
 " well at Broughton, with whom I spent a few days
 " with much satisfaction. For, you must know, I
 " have a numerous family: perhaps, the more en-
 " deared to me, by their sole dependance on me.

" It pleased Providence that two of my sisters
 " should marry unhappily: and that a third, on the
 " point of venturing, should escape the hazard, and
 " so engage my care only for herself.—I reckon this a
 " lucky year: For I have married a niece to a re-
 " putable grocer at York, and have got a commission
 " for a nephew in the regiment of artillery. These
 " are pleasures," &c.

What his filial piety was, will be seen from the following extracts.

" I am extremely obliged to you " (says he to a confidential friend*) " for your remembrance of my
 " dearest, my incomparable Mother, whom I do more
 " than

his biographer, *ἐκ ἐνεπίμπλοιο οὐλομνίαν εὐφραίνων καὶ τιμῶν*—
 When I complimented my friend on his promotion to the see of Gloucester,—“ It comes, said he, too late: If my
 " mother had been living, it might have given me some
 " satisfaction.”—Seneca says to his mother, of his brother Novatus, ‘ In hoc dignitatem excolit, ut tibi ornamento sit.’ De consol. ad Helviam, c. xvi. H.

* Dr. Taylor. May 22, 1746.

“ than love, whom I adore. No mortal can ever
 “ merit more of me, than she has done.—Her decline
 “ of life possesses me with anxiety; and I have no
 “ support for this but in the thoughts of that last
 “ meeting, which excludes all farther chance of se-
 “ paration. But I must break off. You have had
 “ long experience what pain it is to me to speak of
 “ subjects that affect me most.”

And, again, to the same person, on occasion of her death in 1748—“ You should have heard from me
 “ sooner, but that the afflictive news of my dear
 “ Mother’s death, which met me at this place *, made
 “ me incapable of writing, or indeed of doing any
 “ thing but grieve for the loss of the most admirable
 “ woman that ever was. She was the last of her
 “ family; and had in herself alone more virtues than
 “ are generally possessed by whole families throughout
 “ the whole course of their existence. My extreme
 “ sorrow for her death can only give place to my
 “ incessant meditation on her virtues and adoration
 “ of her memory. This is one of those losses that
 “ nothing can repair, and only time can alleviate.
 “ For I shall never enjoy that happiness as in the
 “ days when you and I were conversing together, while
 “ she was giving us our coffee. At present, I can
 “ think of nothing,” &c.

But I grow prolix again (for the reader’s sake I will not say, *tedious*) while I indulge myself in extracting these tender passages from his letters.

To conclude at length, in one word.

How differently soever men might think of him in his lifetime, all are, or will be, agreed in their opinions of him, now he is dead. For, as a Divine of his own

* Prior Park.

size, and one after his own heart, said excellently well —“ When great prelates are living, their authority is “ depressed by their personal defaillances, and the “ contrary interests of their contemporaries; which “ disband, when they are dead, and leave their credit “ entire upon the reputation of those excellent books “ and monuments of learning and piety, which are “ left behind them *.”

What that *credit* of our great prelate is, this collection of his works will shew; and will, if I mistake not, deliver him down to posterity as the ablest Divine, the greatest Writer, and the first Genius of his age. They are faithfully printed from the last editions of the author, and those in many places corrected by his own hand. In one respect only, I have some apology to make to the reader. Several of his friends had observed to him (and he was, himself, convinced of it) that he had filled the margin of the *Alliance* and *Divine Legation* with too many notes; and had swelled those volumes, in the latter editions, with too many extracts, under the name of Postscripts, or Appendices, from his controversial tracts. The longer NOTES occupy the reader too much, and divert him from the main argument, which, as it lies in the text of the *Divine Legation* especially, is drawn out to a sufficient length; otherwise, they are infinitely curious and learned, and deserve to be read with great care. They are now, therefore, printed together at the end of each book, and referred to in the text. By this disposition, the reader's convenience is consulted, and the dignity of those capital works is preserved. As for such of the POSTSCRIPTS, as are extracted from his controversial works, these I ought, perhaps, to have withdrawn; but,

* Bishop Taylor, L. P. p. 210. 8vo. Lond. 1709.

as hereafter they may have their use in separate editions of the Alliance and Divine Legation, I have permitted them to keep their place. I did this the rather, because these discourses are not merely repetitions, but have received many corrections and alterations from the author; while the controversial treatises, from which they are taken, were never retouched by him, but left in their original state.

Those CONTROVERSIAL PIECES themselves could by no means be suppressed, or altered in the least, as they present the liveliest image of the writer's character and genius, and derive a peculiar grace from being seen in that connexion of thought, and glow of colouring, which they took, in the heat of composition, from his careless and rapid hand.

Some of his private letters (such as had been printed in his lifetime by himself, or others) conclude the last volume; and shew how much he excelled in this sort of composition, for which he was indeed singularly qualified by the characteristic virtues both of his head and heart. The reader will therefore wish for a larger collection of them; and he may, in due time, be gratified with it, out of the Editor's long correspondence with him.

It may be proper to add, that this elegant edition* of his works is given at the sole expence of his widow, now Mrs. Stafford Smith †, of Prior-Park: who also erected the monument, before spoken of, to his memory in the church of Gloucester.

* 4^{to}. 1788.

† She survived the Bishop somewhat more than seventeen years; and died at Fladbury near Evesham (a living of good value, which I had given to Mr. Stafford Smith) September the 1st, 1796. R.W.

I have now, as I found myself able, and in the manner I judged most fit, discharged my duty to this incomparable man: a duty, which he seemed to expect would be paid to him by one or other of his surviving friends, when, in the close of his preface to Mr. Pope's works, he has these affecting words—"And I, when
 "envy and calumny take the same advantage of my
 "absence (for, while I live, I will trust it to my life to
 "confute them) may I find a friend as careful of my
 "honest fame, as I have been of his."—I have, I say, endeavoured to do justice to his memory; but in so doing I have taken, the reader sees, the best method to preserve my own. For, in placing myself so near to him in this edition of his immortal works, I have the fairest, perhaps the only chance of being known to posterity myself. Envy and Prejudice have had their day: And when his name comes, as it will do, into all mouths, it may then be remembered, that the writer of this life was honoured with some share of his esteem; and had the pleasure of living in the most entire and unreserved friendship with him, for near THIRTY YEARS.

Hartlebury-Castle,

Aug. 12, 1794.

R. WORCESTER.

I DECUS, I, NOSTRUM; MELIORIBUS
 UTERE FATIS.

Virg. Æn. VI. 546.

A P P E N D I X

TO

T H E L I F E.

LETTER [A] p. 26.

—“ I HAVE known this Gentleman about twenty years. I have been greatly and in the most generous manner obliged to him. So I am very capable, and you will readily believe, very much disposed to apologize for him. Yet for all that, if I did not really believe him to be an honest man, I would not venture to excuse him to you. Nothing is more notorious than the great character he had acquired in the faithful and able discharge of a long embassy at Constantinople, both in the public part, and the private one of the merchants affairs. The first reflexion on his character was that unhappy affair of the Charitable-corporation. I read carefully all the reports of the committee concerning it: And as I knew Sir Rober Sutton's temper and character so well, I was better able than most to judge of the nature of his conduct in it. And I do in my conscience believe that he had no more suspicion of any fraud, carrying on by some in the direction,

than

than I had. That he was guilty of neglect and negligence, as a Director, is certain : but it was only the natural effect of his temper (where he has no suspicion) which is exceedingly indolent. And he suffered sufficiently for it, not only in his censure, but by the loss of near £. 20,000. And at this very juncture he lost a considerable sum of money (through his negligence) by the villany of a land-steward, who broke and run away. Dr. Arbuthnot knew him well ; and I am fully persuaded, though I never heard so, that he had the same opinion of him in this affair that I have. But parties ran high, and this became a party matter. And the violence of parties no one knows more of than yourself. And his virtue and integrity have been since fully manifested. Another prejudice against him, with those who did not know him personally, was the character of his brother, the General, as worthless a man, without question, as ever was created. But you will ask, why should a man in his station be engaged in any affair with such dirty people ? 'Tis a reasonable question ; but you, who know human nature so well, will think this a sufficient answer. He was born to no fortune, but advanced to that station in the Levant, by the interest of his cousin Lord Lexington ; besides the straitness of his circumstances, the usual and constant business of that embassy gave him, of course, a mercantile turn. He had seen in almost every country, where he had been, societies of this kind, subsisting profitably to themselves, and beneficially to the public. For not to think he came amongst them with a view to his own profit principally, would indeed be absurd. Yet I am sure with a view of an honest profit. For he is very far from an avaricious man. He lives up to his fortune, without being

guilty of any vice or luxury. He is an extreme good and faithful husband, and with reason indeed, for it is to one of the finest women in England. He is a tender and indulgent father to very hopeful children ; a kind master, and one of the best landlords to his tenants. I speak all this of my own knowledge. He has a good estate in this place. My parishioners are good people. The times (till very lately) for this last fifteen years have been extreme bad for the graziers ; I got of him, for them, two abatements, in their rents, at two several times. I will only beg leave to give you one more instance that relates to myself, and is not equivocal in his character. I chanced to know him, when I was very young, by means of my neighbourhood to Lord Lexington (whom I never knew) where he oft came. And, without any consideration to party or election interest, he seemed to have entertained an early esteem for me. He had two good livings, on estates he had lately bought : and without the least intimation or solicitation he told me I should have the first that fell. He was as good as his word. But this was not all. As soon as I became possessed of the living, he told me, that (from what he had been informed by my predecessor, who at his death was going to commence a suit for his just dues) the living was much injured by a low and illegal composition. That he thought I ought to right myself, and he would join with me against the other freeholders (for his estate is something more than one half of the parish). I replied, that as he paid all the tithes for his tenants, the greatest loss, in my breaking the composition, would fall upon himself, who must pay me half as much more as he then did. He said, he did not regard that ; I was his friend, and it was my due. I answered, that,

that, however, I could not do it yet, for that the world would never conceive it to be done with his consent, but would say that I had no sooner got his living, than I had quarrel'd with him. But, when I came to my parish, I found them so good a sort of people, that I had as little an inclination to fall out with them. So (though to my great injury) I have deferred the matter to this day. Though the thing in the opinion of Sir R. Raymond, who gave it on the case, as drawn up by the parishioners themselves, is clear and indisputable; yet they won't give it up without a law-suit. In a word, there is nothing I am more convinced of than the innocence of Sir R. S. in the case of the Charitable Corporation, as to any fraud, or connivance at fraud. You, who always follow your judgment, free from prejudice, will do so here. I have discharged my duty of friendship both to you and him."—

LETTER [B] p. 35.

Newark, Jan. 26, 1744-5.

GOOD MADAM,

I HAD the honour of your obliging letter of the 25th of last August, sent me to Bath, where I then was. After some stay there, where my time was taken up more than I could have wished, I went to London, where I was still less in my own power. I am just now returned home; and the first thing I thought of was to make my acknowledgements for that favour.

I do not wonder that the goodness of your heart, and your love of letters, should make you speak with

so much tenderness of poor Mr. Pope's death; for it was a great loss both to the literary and moral world. In answer to your obliging question, what works of Mr. Pope have been published with my commentaries and notes? I am to inform you, they are the *Dunciad* in quarto, and the *Essay on Man* and on *Criticism*, in the same size. Which affords me an opportunity to beg the favour of you to let me know into whose hands in London I can consign a small parcel for you: For I have done myself the honour of ordering these two volumes to be sent to you, as I believed you would with difficulty get them of your booksellers so far North; and I hope you will forgive this liberty.

Towards the conclusion of your letter, you have sent me one of the politest cartels imaginable. I think, his answer was generally commended, who told the Emperor, when he pressed him, that he never would dispute with a man who had twenty legions at his beck. And do you think I will enter the lists with a lady, whose writings have twenty thousand charms in them? If I confided in myself, and aimed at honour, I could not indeed do better: for the case is there, as in the works of the Italian poets; who have, with great decorum, when they introduced female warriors, made the overcoming one of them the highest point of valour and address in their heroes. Besides, to speak out of a figure, we differ in what is the true foundation of morality. I have said all I have to say on the subject. And though it be hard to guess when a writer so much the mistress of her subject has said all, yet if I believed what you have said was *all*, I might perhaps be in some measure excuseable; as I see you say so much more than any writer of your side the question had done before you.

One thing, and only one, you will give me leave, Madam, to observe : that I am a little surprized at the consequence drawn from my position—"that, as without a God there could be no obligation, therefore the Atheist who believes there is none (and might deduce that truth concerning obligation from the principles of right reason) would have no *tye* upon him."

Hence I concluded, and I thought rightly, that Atheism was highly injurious to society. But how any one could conclude from this (for this is the amount of what I said on that subject) that, on my principles (for as to my opinion, I believe no one would question that) *an atheist is not accountable in a future state for any enormities he may commit here*, I do not see. And my reason for saying so is this. It is a principle, I suppose, agreed on, "That crimes committed upon *wrong principles* are equally punishable with those committed *against right*; for that the falling into this wrong principle was occasioned by some punishable fault in the conduct." Now I have not said one single word, throughout the discourse, that tends to invalidate this principle: Consequently all I have said cannot affect that truth, That *an Atheist is accountable*. I ask your pardon, Madam, for this trouble. It is what I have not given to any other; though several have made the same objection. They deserved nothing at my hands; and you deserve every thing.

You enquire with great civility concerning the third volume of the Divine Legation. Several offices of friendship, several offices of domestic piety and duty, weariness with contradiction of *simmers* both against sense and grammar (for such have been my adversaries) have prevented me doing any thing at the last volume, since

since the publication of the second. But now being just upon the point of, not washing, but drying, my hands of controversy, I am about to sit down in earnest to the conclusion of the work.

I beg, Madam, not only my best respects and services to Mr. Cockburn, who, I presume, is your spouse, but, in that case, my congratulations with him, for his honour and happiness in such a consort.

I am, Madam,

With the greatest regard and esteem,

Your very obliged and

Obedient humble Servant,

W. WARBURTON.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated September 17, 1787. It is a very important document, as it is the first time that the President has addressed the Congress. The letter is a very long one, and it contains a great deal of information about the new government. It is a very important document, as it is the first time that the President has addressed the Congress. The letter is a very long one, and it contains a great deal of information about the new government.

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THE
DIVINE LEGATION
OF
MOSES
DEMONSTRATED.

BOOKS
I. II. III.

ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΥΣ ΜΟΥ
ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΩ ΤΑ ΘΛΥΜΑΣΙΑ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ ΣΟΥ.
PSAL.

REVISED EDITION

MOSES

THE HISTORY

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

C O N T E N T S

OF THE

FIRST III. BOOKS

OF

THE DIVINE LEGATION.

- DEDICATION to a new Edition of Books I. II. III.
in 1754—to the Earl of Hardwicke - - p. 137
- Dedication to the First Edition of Books I. II. III.
in 1738—to the Freethinkers - - pp. 141—190
- PREFACE to the First Edition, in 1738 - pp. 191, 192
-

B O O K I.

- PROVES THE NECESSITY OF THE DOCTRINES OF A
FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS TO
CIVIL SOCIETY, FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING,
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- SECT. I. The Introduction, the nature of internal evidence;
the occasion of this discourse, and the proposition
pp. 193—203
- SECT II. Of the original of civil society; the causes of
its defective plan: that this defect can be only supplied
by religion: that religion, under the present dispensation
of Providence, cannot subsist without the doctrine of a
future state of rewards and punishments; therefore that
doctrine necessary to civil society - - pp. 203—220

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- SECT. III. The arguments of those who deny the necessity of religion to society considered: *Pomponatius* falsely ranked in that number, and vindicated: *Cardan* characterized and censured - - - pp. 220—230
- SECT. IV. & V. Mr. *Bayle*, the great defender of this paradox in his apology for atheism, examined. His arguments collected, methodized, and confuted. In the course of this disputation, the true foundation of morality enquired into, and shewn to be neither the *essential difference of things*, nor the *moral sense*, but the *will of God*. The causes of the contrary errors shewn: and the objections against morality's being founded in the *will of God*, answered - - - pp. 230—280
- SECT. VI. The Author of the *Fable of the Bees*, who contends that it is *Vice*, and not *Virtue*, that is useful to society, examined, exposed, and confuted, pp. 280—290

B O O K II.

PROVES THE NECESSITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE TO SOCIETY, FROM THE CONDUCT OF THE ANCIENT LAWGIVERS, AND FOUNDERS OF CIVIL POLICY - - - p. 297

SECT. I. The magistrate's care in cultivating religion, shewn, 1. From the *universality* of it, amongst all civil policied nations. 2. From the *genius* of *pagan* religion, both with regard to the *nature* of their gods, the *attributes* assigned to them, and the *mode of worship* in civil use amongst them - - - pp. 297—314

SECT. II. The *particular* arts the legislator employed to this purpose: as, 1. the universal practice of pretending to *inspiration*. It is shewn that this was done to establish the

the opinion of the *superintendency* of the gods over human affairs: not to secure the *reception* of their laws; nor to render those laws *perpetual* and immutable when received - - - - - pp. 314—323

SECT. III. The next art the legislator used was to preface his laws with the doctrine of a providence in its full extent. The prefaces to the laws of *Zaleucus* and *Charondas*, the only remains of this kind, proved genuine against the arguments of a learned critic, pp. 323—348

NOTES to the First and Third Sections.

[*What follows, is contained in the II^d and III^d Volumes.*]

SECT. IV. The next art was the legislator's invention of the *mysteries*, solely instituted for the propagation and support of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. Their original and progress deduced: their nature and end explained: their *secrets* revealed: and the causes of the degeneracy accounted for. To give a complete idea of this important institution, the sixth book of *Virgil* is examined, and the descent of *Aeneas* into hell, shewn to be only an initiation into, and representation of the shows of the *mysteries*:—With an APPENDIX.

SECT. V. The next instance of the magistrate's care of religion, in establishing a national worship. That an *established religion* is the universal voice of nature. The right of establishing a religion justified, in an explanation of the true theory of the *union between Church and State*. This theory applied as a rule to judge of the actual *establishments* in the *pagan* world. The causes that facilitated the establishment of religion amongst them; as likewise those causes that hindered their *establishments* from receiving their due form.

SECT. VI. The last instance of the magistrate's care for the support of religion; in the allowance of a general *toleration*: the measure and causes of it: the nature of the ancient *tolerated* religions: how, under the supervision and direction of the magistrate: and how first violated and destroyed by civil tyranny.

NOTES to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Sections.

B O O K III.

PROVES THE NECESSITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE TO SOCIETY, FROM THE OPINION AND CONDUCT OF THE ANCIENT SAGES AND PHILOSOPHERS.

SECT. I. Testimonies of ancient sages and philosophers, concerning the necessity of the doctrine of a future state to civil society.

SECT. II. That none of the ancient philosophers believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, though, on account of its confessed necessity to the support of religion, and consequently of civil society, all the theistical philosophers sedulously taught it to the people. The several senses in which the Ancients conceived the permanency of the human soul explained. Several general reasons premised, to shew that the ancient philosophers did not always believe what they taught, and that they taught the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments without believing it: Where the principles that induced the ancient sages to make it lawful to deceive for public good, in matters of religion, are explained, whereby they are seen to be such as had no place in the propagation or genius of the *Jewish* and *Christian* religions. In the course of this enquiry, the

rise, progress, perfection, decline, and genius of the ancient *Greek* philosophy, under its several divisions, are considered and explained.

SECT. III. Enters on a particular enquiry into the sentiments of each sect of philosophy on this point. The division and succession of their schools. The character of *Socrates*; and of the *new* and *old Academy*. The character and genius of each sect of the grand *Quaternion* of theistic philosophy, the *Pythagoric*, the *Platonic*, the *Peripatetic*; and the *Stoic*: shewing that not one of these believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The character of *Tully*, and his sentiments on this point. The original of the ancient fables, and of the doctrines of the *Metempsychosis* and *Metamorphosis*, occasionally enquired into and explained.

SECT. IV. Shews, in order to a fuller conviction, that the ancient philosophers not only *did* not, but that they *could not possibly* believe a future state of rewards and punishments, because two metaphysical principles, concerning the nature of *God*, and of the *human soul*, which entirely overturn the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, were universally held and believed by all the *Greek* philosophers. These doctrines examined and explained: In the course of this enquiry, the true genius of the ancient *Egyptian* wisdom explained; and their pretended philosophy, as delivered by the later *Greek* writers, shewn to be spurious. The Section concludes with the use to be made of this remarkable fact (of the ancient philosophers not believing, and yet sedulously teaching, a future state of rewards and punishments) for the support of our main question.

SECT. V. This account of the ancient philosophy, so far from being prejudicial to Christianity, that it greatly credits and recommends it. Proved from the mischiefs

that attend those different representations of paganism, in the two extremes, which the defenders of religion are accustomed to make: where it is shewn that the difference in point of perfection, between the *ancient* and *modern* systems of morality, is entirely owing to Christianity.

SECT. VI. The atheistical pretence of religion's being an invention of statesmen, and therefore false, clearly confuted, and shewn to be both *impertinent* and *false*. For that, was the Atheist's account of religion right, it would not follow that religion was *false*, but the *contrary*. But the *pretence* false and groundless, religion having existed before the civil magistrate was in being.

APPENDIX and NOTES to the Third Book.



MOITADHUM

DEDICATION

TO A NEW EDITION OF

BOOKS I. II. III. OF THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES;

1754.

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

PHILIP EARL OF HARDWICKE,

LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN.

MY LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP having so far approved of the good intentions of my endeavours for above twenty years past, in the cause of RELIGION, as to confer upon me a distinguishing mark of your favour, I am proud to lay hold of the first public opportunity which I have had, of desiring leave to make my most grateful acknowledgments.

I take

DEDICATION

I take the liberty to inscribe to your Lordship a new Edition of a work tending to shew and illustrate, by a new argument, *The Divine Legation of Moses*; which in our own, as well as former times, the most celebrated Champions of Infidelity have cunningly, for their own purposes, laboured with all their might, to overthrow.

If I have succeeded, or as far as I have succeeded, or may hereafter succeed, in the further prosecution of this attempt, I shall strengthen one foundation of Christianity.

As an author, I am not solicitous for the reputation of any literary performance. A work given to the world, every reader has a right to censure. If it has merit, it will go down to posterity: if it has none, the sooner it dies and is forgot the better.

But I am extremely anxious that no good man should mistake the view with which I write; and therefore cannot help feeling, perhaps too sensibly, when it is misrepresented.

So

TO LORD HARDWICKE.

So far as any censure can shew that my poor labours are not calculated to promote *Letters* or *Learning*, to advance *Truth*, or, above all, to serve the cause of *Religion*, which I profess as a Christian and a Member of the Church of *England*, I own, I have missed my end; and will be the first to join with the censure which condemns them.

In the mean time, the first book of this work, such as it is, is here humbly commended to your Lordship's protection. For to whom does it so properly belong to patronize an argument shewing the *UTILITY* of Religion to Society, as to that great Magistrate, Legislator, and Statesman, who is best able to recommend and apply the subject, by his being convinced of the *TRUTH* of Religion; and by his giving the most exemplary proof of his belief, in a steady regard to it's dictates in his life and actions?

It is this which makes me presume on your Lordship's protection, not any thing extraordinary in the work itself. It is enough for your Lordship to find in those you favour a real zeal for the interests of *Virtue* and *Religion*. The
effectual

DEDICATION.

effectual service of those interests depends on so many accidents, respecting both the ability of the Writer and the disposition of the Reader, that your Lordship's humanity and candour, enlarged, and not (as it often happens) diminished by your great knowledge of mankind, will always dispose you to estimate merit by a better rule than the success.

I am,

MY LORD,

With the utmost Gratitude,

Your Lordship's

Most obliged and devoted Servant,

London,
Nov. 5. 1754.

W. WARBURTON.

DEDICATION
 TO THE FIRST EDITION OF
 BOOKS I. II. III. OF THE
 DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES;
 1738.

TO
 THE FREE-THINKERS.

GENTLEMEN,

AS the following discourse was written for your use, you have the best right to this address. I could never approve the custom of dedicating books to men, whose professions made them strangers to the subject. A discourse on the Ten Predicaments, to a leader of armies, or a system of casuistry to a minister of state, always appeared to me a high absurdity.

Another advantage I have in this address, is that I shall not lie under any temptations of flattery ; which, at this time of day, when every topic of adulation has been exhausted, will be of equal ease and advantage to us both.

Not

Not but I must own you have been managed, even by some of our Order, with very singular complaisance. Whether it was that they affected the fame of moderation, or had a higher ambition for the honour of your good word, I know not; but I, who neither love your cause, nor fear the abilities that support it, while I preserve for your persons that justice and charity which my profession teaches to be due to all, can never be brought to think otherwise of your character, than as the despisers of the Master whom I serve, and as the implacable enemies of that Order, to which I have the honour to belong. And as such, I should be tempted to glory in your censures; but would certainly refuse your commendations.

Indeed, were it my design, in the manner of modern dedicators, to look out for powerful protectors, I do not know where I could sooner find them, than amongst the gentlemen of your denomination: for nothing, I believe, strikes the serious observer with more surprize, in this age of novelties, than that strange propensity to infidelity, so visible in men of almost every condition; amongst whom the advocates of Deism are received with all the applauses due to the inventors of the arts of life, or the deliverers of oppressed and injured nations. The *glorious liberty of the Gospel* is forgotten amidst our clamours against church-tyranny; and we slight the fruits of the restored *Tree of Knowledge*, for the sake of gathering a few barren leaves of Free-thinking, misgrafted on the old prolific stock of Deism.

But let me not be misunderstood; here are no insinuations

nuations intended against liberty: for, surely, whatever be the cause of this epidemic folly, it would be unjust to ascribe it to the freedom of the Press, which wise men have ever held one of the most precious branches of national Liberty. What, though it midwifes, as it were, these brain-sick births; yet, at the same time that it facilitates the delivery, it lends a forming hand to the mishapen issue: for, as in natural bodies, become distorted by suffering in the conception, or by too strait imprisonment in the womb, a free unrestrained exposition of the parts may, in time, reduce them nearer to their natural rectitude; so crude and rickety notions, enfeebled by restraint, when permitted to be drawn out and examined, may, by the reform of their obliquities, and the correction of their virulency, at length acquire health and proportion.

Nor less friendly is this liberty to the generous advocate of religion: for how could such a one, when in earnest convinced by the evidence of his cause, desire an adversary whom the laws had before disarmed; or value a victory, where the Magistrate must triumph with him? Even I, the meanest in this controversy, should have been ashamed of projecting the defence of the great Jewish Lawgiver, did not I know that the same liberty of thinking was impartially indulged to all. And if my dissenting in the course of this defence from some received opinions need an apology, I desire it may be thought, that I ventured into this track the less unwillingly, to shew, by my not intrenching in authorized speculations, that I put myself upon the same footing with you, and would claim no privilege that was not in common.

This

This liberty then may you long possess; may you know how to use; may you gratefully acknowledge! I say this, because one cannot, without indignation, observe, that amidst the full possession of it, you still continue, with the meanest affectation, to fill your prefaces with repeated clamours against the difficulties and discouragements attending the exercise of Free-thinking: and, in a peculiar strain of modesty and reasoning, employ this very liberty to persuade the world you still want it. In extolling liberty, we can join with you; in the vanity of pretending to have contributed most to its establishment, we can bear with you; but in the low cunning of pretending still to groan under the want of it, we can neither join nor bear with you. There was indeed a time, and that within our own memories, when such complaints were seasonable and even useful; but, happy for you, Gentlemen, you have out-lived it: all the rest is merely Sir Martin*; it is continuing to fumble on the lute, though the music has been long over. For it is not a thing to be disguised, that what we hear from you, on this head, is but an aukward, though envenomed imitation of an original work of one, whoever he was, who appears to have been amongst the greatest, and most successful of your adversaries. It was published at an important juncture, under the title of *The difficulties and discouragements which attend the study of the Scripture*. But with all the merit of this beautiful satire, it has been its fortune not only to be abused by your bad imitations, but to be censured by those in whose cause it was composed; I mean the

* In a comedy of Dryden's.

friends of religion and liberty. An author of note thus expresses himself*: “Nor was this the worst: “men were not only discouraged from studying and “revering the Scriptures by—but also by being told “that this study was difficult, fruitless, and dangerous; “and a public, an elaborate, an earnest dissuasive “from this study, for the very reasons now mentioned, “enforced by two well-known examples, and believed “from a person of great eminence in the church, hath “already passed often enough through the press, to “reach the hands of all the clergymen in Great “Britain and Ireland: God in his great mercy for- “give the author †.” Seriously it is a sad case! that one well-meaning man should so widely mistake the end and design of another, as not to see by the turn and cast of the *Difficulties and discouragements*, that it is a thorough irony, addressed to some hot bigots then in power, to shew them what dismal effects that inquisitional spirit, with which they were possessed, would have on literature in general, at a time when public liberty looked with a very sickly face! Not, I say, to see this, but to believe, on the contrary, that it was really intended as *a public, an elaborate, an earnest dissuasive from the study of the Scriptures!* But I have so charitable an opinion of the great author, for a great author without doubt he was, as to believe that had he foreseen that the liberty, which animates this fine-turned piece of raillery, would have given scandal to any good man, he would, for the consolation of such,

* Revelation Examined with Candour, in the preface.

† The author was the excellent Dr. Hare, late Bishop of Chichester.

have made any reasonable abatement in the vigour of his wit and argument.

But you, Gentlemen, have a different quarrel with him: you pretend he hath since written on the other side the question. Now though the word of his accusers is not apt to go very far with me, yet, I must own, I could be easily enough brought to believe, that an author of such talents of literature, love of truth, and of his country, as this appears to have been, would as freely expose the extreme of folly at one end, as at the other; without regarding what party he opposed or favoured by it. And it is well known, that, at the time this is pretended to have been done, another interest being become uppermost, strange principles of licence, which tended to subvert all order, and destroy the very essence of a Church, ran now in the popular stream. What then should hinder a writer, who was of no party but that of truth, to oppose this extravagance, as he had done its opposite? And if he pleased neither bigot nor libertine by his uniformity of conduct, it was for his honour.

How public a blessing is such a virtue! which, unawed by that *fatal enemy of sense*, as the poet calls it, the *danger of offending*, dares equally oppose itself to the different follies of Party in extremes.

But to return to our subject: The poor thread-bare cant of *want of liberty*, I should hope then you would be, at length, persuaded to lay aside; but that I know such cant is amongst your arts of controversy; and that something is to be allowed to a weak cause, and

to

to a reputation that requires managing. We know what to understand by it, when after a successful insult on religion, the reader is intreated to believe that you have a strong reserve: but till the door of liberty be set a little wider, you have not room to display it.

Thus, at the very entrance of your works you teach us what we are to expect. But I must beg your patience, now I am got thus far, to lay before you your principal abuses of that liberty indulged to you for better purposes; or, to give them the softest name I can, in an address of this nature, your ARTS OF CONTROVERSY.

By this I shall at once practise the charity I profess, and justify the opinion I have passed upon you.

Your writers, I speak it, Gentlemen, to your honour, offer your considerations to the world, either under the character of petitioners for oppressed and injured truth; or of teachers to ignorant and erring men. These sure are characters that, if any, require seriousness and gravity to support them. But so great strangers are we to decorum, on our entry on the stage of life, that, for the most part, like Bayes's actor in the Rehearsal, who was at a loss to know whether he was to be serious or merry, melancholy or in love, we run giddily on, in a mixt and jumbled character; but have most an end, a strong inclination to make a farce of it, and mingle buffoonry with the most serious scenes. Hence, even in religious controversy, while the great cause of eternal happiness is trying;

and men and angels, as it were, attending the issue of the conflict, we can find room for a merry story; and receive the advocate of infidelity with much welcome*, if he comes with but a disposition to make us laugh: though he brings the tidings of *death*, and scatters round him the poison of our *hopes*, yet, like the dying assassin†, we can laugh along with the mob, though our own despair and agonies conclude the entertainment.

This quality making a writer so well received, yours have been tempted to dispense with the solemnity of their character; as thinking it of much importance to get the laugh on their side. Hence **RIDICULE** is become their favourite figure of speech; and they have composed sad treatises to justify its use, and very merry ones to evince its utility. But to be fair with you, it must be owned, that this strange disposition towards unseasonable mirth, drives all parties upon being witty where they can, as being conscious of its powerful operation in controversy: **RIDICULE** having, from the hands of a skilful disputant, the same effect in barbarous minds, with the new invented darts of Marius‡, which though so weak as to break in the

* Hence Anthony Urceus, surnamed Codrus, as vain and impious as any Free-thinker alive, being asked the reason (as we are told by Blanchini, the writer of his life) why he mixed so much buffoonry in his works, replied, "That nature had formed mankind in such a manner, as to be most taken with buffoons and story-tellers."

† Balthazar Gerard, who murdered the Prince of Orange. See his story.

‡ See Plut. Vit. Mar. tom. II. p. 766, 767. Edit. Crusarii, 8vo.

throw, and pierce no farther than the surface, yet sticking there, they more intangle and incommode the combatant, than those arms, which fly stronger, and strike deeper. However, an abuse it is, and one of the most pernicious too, of the liberty of the Press. For what greater affront to the severity of reason, the sublimity of truth, and the sanctity of religion, than to subject them to the impure touch of every empty scurrilous Buffoon? The politeness of Athens, which you pretend so much to admire, should be here a lesson to you; which committed all questions of this nature, when they were to be examined, to their gravest and severest court, the Arcopagus: whose judges would not suffer the advocates for either party to apply to the passions, so much as by the common rules of the chastest rhetoric*. But a preposterous love of mirth hath turned you all into Wits, quite down from the sanguine writer of *The Independent Whig*, to the atrabilaire blasphemer of the miracles †. Though it would be but charity to tell you a plain truth, which Cicero told your *illustrious predecessors* long ago, when infected with the same distemper: “Ita salem istum, quo caret VESTRA NATIO in
“irridendis nobis, nolitote consumere. Et mehercule,
“si me audiatis, ne experiamini quidem: non decet;
“NON DATUM EST; non potestis.” However, if you will needs be witty, take once more your example from the fine author of *The difficulties and discouragement*,

* Exemplo legis Atticæ, Martique judicii causæ Patronis denuntiat Præco neque principia dicere, neque miserationem commovere. Apul. Lib. X. Asin. Aur. p. 827. Lugd. 1587. 8vo.

† Woolston.

ments, and learn from him the difference between Attic irony and elegance of wit, and your intemperate scurrility and illiberal banter.

What a noise, you will say, for a little harmless mirth. Ah, Gentlemen! if that were all, you had my leave to laugh on: I would say with the old comic,

Utinam male qui mihi volunt, sic rideant.

But low and mean as your buffoonry is, it is yet to the level of the people; who are as little solicitous, as capable, of the point of argument, so they can but catch the point of wit. Amongst such, and to such, you write; and it is inconceivable what havoc false wit makes in a foolish head: "The rabble of man-kind," as an excellent writer well observes, "being very apt to think, that every thing which is laughed at, with any mixture of wit, is ridiculous in itself*." Few reflect on what a great wit† has so ingenuously owned, *That wit is generally false reasoning*. But one, in whom your party most glories, hath written in defence of this abusive way of *wit and raillery*, on serious subjects. Let us hear him then‡: "Nothing is ridiculous, except what is deformed; nor is any thing proof against raillery, except what is handsome and just; and therefore it is the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon; which can never bear an edge against her-

* Mr. Addison's Works, vol. iii. p. 293. Quarto.

† Mr. Wycherley to Mr. Pope, Letter XVI.

‡ Characteristics, Vol. I. Essay on the freedom of wit and humour.

“ self. One may defy the world to turn bravery or
 “ generosity into ridicule: a man must be soundly
 “ ridiculous, who, with all the wit imaginable, would
 “ go about to ridicule wisdom, or laugh at honesty or
 “ good manners.” Yes, ridiculous, indeed, to laugh
 at bravery, generosity, wisdom, honesty, or good
 manners, as such: and I hardly think, Gentlemen, as
 licentious as some of you are, you will be ever brought
 to accept of his defiance. And why need you, when
 it is but shewing them, with overcharged and dis-
 torted features, to laugh at your ease? Call them but
 temerity, prodigality, gravity, simplicity, foppery, and
 as you have often experienced, the business is done,
 and the ridicule is compleat. And what security will
 the noble writer give us, that they shall not be so
 called? I am persuaded, if you are never to be thought
ridiculous till you become so, in the way this gen-
 tleman marks out, you may go safely on in the FREE-
 DOM OF WIT AND HUMOUR, till there be never a
 virtue left, to laugh out of countenance.

But he will say, he means such clear virtue as hath
 no equivocal mark about her, which a prevaricator can
 lay hold on. Admit this: the man of wit will then
 try to make her ridiculous in her equipage, if he
 cannot make her so in her person.

However, will he say, it shews at least, that nothing
 can be done against her, till she be disguised. A mighty
 consolation this to expiring Virtue, that she cannot be
 destroyed till you have put her on a fool's coat. As if
 it were as hard to get that *on*, as Hercules's *off*!
 The comparison holds better in the converse, that

when once *on*, it sticks as close as the envenomed one of old, and often lasts her to her funeral.

But if this noble writer means that truth cannot be obscured, however disguised; nor consequently, be made ridiculous, however represented; the two celebrated examples, which follow, seem to shew he was mistaken. Where, in the first, it is seen, that nothing was stronger than the ridicule, nor, at the same time more open and transparent than the disguise; in the latter, nothing more clouded and obscured than the beauty of the truth ridiculed, nor more out of sight than the fallacy in the representation. Which together may teach us, that any kind of disguise will serve the turn; and, that witty men will never be at a loss for one.

Of all the virtues that were so much in this noble writer's heart, and in his writings, there was not one he more revered than *love of public liberty*; or which he would less suspect should become liable to the impressions of buffoonry. Methinks I hear him say, "One may defy the world to turn the love of public liberty into ridicule: a man must be soundly ridiculous, who, with all the wit imaginable, would go about it."

However, once on a time, a great Wit set upon this task; he undertook to laugh at this very virtue; and that too, so successfully, that he set the whole nation a laughing with him. What mighty engine, you will ask, was employed, to put in motion so large a body, and for so extraordinary a cause? In truth, a very

very simple one: a *discourse*, of which all the wit consists in the title; and that too sculking, as you will see, under one unlucky word. *Mrs. Bull's vindication of the indispensable duty of CUCKOLDOM, incumbent upon wives, in case of the tyranny, infidelity, or insufficiency of husbands**. Now had the merry reader been but wise enough to reflect, that reason was the test of ridicule, and not *ridicule the test of truth*, he would have seen to rectify the proposition, and to state it fairly thus: *The indispensable duty of DIVORCE, etc.* And then the joke had been over, before the laugh could have begun.

And now let this noble writer tell us, as he does, that *fair honesty can never bear an edge against herself, for that nothing is ridiculous but what is deformed*; and a great deal to the same purpose, which his Platonic manners supplied.

But very often the change put upon us is not so easily discernible. Sulpicius tells Cicero, that returning by sea from Asia, and seeing in his course Ægina, Megara, the Piræus, and Corinth in ruins, he fell into this very natural, and humane reflexion: "And shall we, short-lived creatures as we are, bear with impatience the death of our fellows, when in one single view we behold the carcasses of so many lately flourishing cities †?" What could be juster or wiser than the piety of this reflexion? And yet it could

* History of John Bull, Part I. chap. xiii.

† Ex Asia rediens, cum ab Ægina Megaram versus navigarem, cæpi regiones circumcirca, prospicere. Post me erat Ægina; ante

could not escape the ridicule of a celebrated French buffoon. "If neither (says he*) the Pyramids of Egypt, nor the Colosseum at Rome, could withstand the injury of time; why should I think much that my black waistcoat is out at elbows?" Here, indeed, the first thing to be observed is the superior resistance of truth.

The buffoon, before he could throw an air of ridicule on this admirable sentiment, was forced to change the image; and in the place of Ægina, Megara, etc. to substitute the *Pyramids* and *Colosseum*, monuments of human pride, and folly; which, on that account, readily submitted to the rude touch of buffoonry: while those free cities, the noblest effort of human wisdom, the nurseries of arts and commerce, could not easily be set in a ridiculous or an idle light.

But then, how few of his readers were able to detect the change put upon them, when it is very probable the author himself did not see it? who, perplexed at the

ante Megara; dextra Piræus; sinistra Corinthus: quæ oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nunc prostrata, & diruta ante oculos jacent. Cæpi egomet mecum sic cogitare: Hem! nos homunculi indignamur, si quis nostrum interiit, aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse debet, cum uno loco tot oppidum cadavera projecta jaceant? Sulpicius M. T. Ciceroni, lib. iv. ep. 5.

* *Superbes monumens de l'orgueil des humains,*
 Pyramides, Tombeaux, dont la vaine structure
 A temoigné que l'art, par l'adresse des mains
 Et l'assidu travail, peut vaincre la nature!
 Vieux palais ruinez, chef d'œuvres des Romains,
 Et les derniers efforts de leur architecture,

Collisée,

the obstinate resistance of *truth*, in the various arrangement of his ideas turned the edge of his raillery, before he was aware, against the phantasm, and was the first that fell into his own deceit.

Hence may be seen what the noble writer seems to have spoken at random, at least, not at all to the purpose of the question he was upon, that such indeed is the inflexible nature of truth, that all the wit in the world can never render it ridiculous, till it be so distorted as to look like error, or so disguised as to appear like folly. A circumstance which, though it greatly recommends the *majesty of virtue*, yet, as it cannot secure it from insult, doth not at all shew the *innocence of ridicule*; which was the point he had to prove,

But to see what little good is to be expected in this way of *wit and humour*, one may go further; and observe, that even the ridicule of *false virtue*, which surely deserves no quarter, hath been sometimes attended with very mischievous effects. The Spaniards have lamented, and I believe truly, that Cervantes's just and inimitable ridicule of *knight-errantry* rooted up, with that folly, a great deal of their *real honour*.

And

Collisée, ou souvent *ces peuples inhumains*,
 De s'entr' assassiner se donnoient tablature,
 Par l'injure des ans vous estes abolis,
 Ou da moins la plus part vous estes demolis :
 Il n'est point de ciment que le temps ne dissolde,
 Si vos marbres si dares ont sentis son pouvoir,
 Dois-je trouver mauvais, qu'un meschant pourpoint noir,
 Qui m'a duré deux ans, soit percé par le coude ?

SCARRON.

And it was apparent, that Butler's fine satire on *fanaticism* contributed not a little, during the licentious times of Charles II. to bring *sober piety* into disrepute. The reason is evident: there are many lines of resemblance between *Truth* and its *Counterfeits*; and it is the province of *wit* only to find out the *likenesses* in things; and not the talent of the *common admirers* of it to discover the *differences*.

But you will say, perhaps, Let *Truth*, when thus attacked, defend itself with the same arms; for why, as your master asks, should *fair honesty* be denied the use of this weapon? Be it so: come on then, and let us impartially attend the issue. We have, upon record, the most illustrious example of this contention that ever was. The dispute I mean, was between *Socrates* and *Aristophanes*. Here *truth* had all the advantage of place, of weapons, and of judges: *Socrates* employed his whole life in the cause of virtue: *Aristophanes*, only a few comic scenes against it. But, heavens! against what virtue! against the purest and brightest portion of it that ever enlightened the *gentile* world. The wit of the comic writer is well known: that of the philosopher was in a supreme degree, just, delicate and forceable; and so habitual, that it procured him the title of the *Attic buffoon*. The place was the politest state in the politest time, *Athens* in its glory; and the judges the grave senators of *Areopagus*. For all this, the comic poet triumphed: and with the coarsest kind of buffoonry, little fitted, one would think, to take so polite a people, had the art to tarnish all this virtue; and, what was more, to make the owner resemble his direct opposite, that character

he was most unlike, that character he most hated, that very character he had employed all his wit to detect, lay open, and confound; in one word, the SOPHIST. The consequences are well known.

Thus will *raillery*, in defence of vice and error, be still an overmatch for that employed on the side of truth and virtue. Because *fair honesty* uses, though a sharp, yet an untainted weapon; while knavery strikes with one poisoned, though much duller. The honest man employs his wit as correctly as his logic: whereas the very definition of a knave's raillery is a sophism.

But, indeed, when a licentious buffoonry is once appealed to, and encouraged; its effects have no dependance on the fit choice of its object. All characters fall alike before it. In the dissolute times of Charles II. this *weapon*, with the same ease, and indeed in the same hands, completed the ruin of the best, and, of the very worst Minister of that age. The historians tell us, that Chancellor Hyde was brought into his master's contempt, by this court-argument. They mimicked his walk and gesture, with a fire-shovel and bellows, for the mace and purse. The same ingenious stroke of humour was repeated on Secretary Bennet, and, by the happy addition of his black patch, with just the same success. Thus, it being the representation, and not the object represented, which strikes the fancy, Vice and Virtue must fall indifferently before it*.

I hope

* The author of a late book called *Elements of Criticism*, speaking of men's various opinions concerning the *use of ridicule*, proceeds against what is here said, in the following manner—

“ This

I hope then, Gentlemen, you will in time be brought to own, that this method is the most unfair in itself, and

“ This dispute has produced a celebrated question, *Whether Ridicule be, or be not, a test of Truth?* Which (says he) stated in ACCURATE TERMS, is, *Whether the SENSE of Ridicule be the proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects from those that are not so?* To answer the question with PRECISION, I must premise that Ridicule is not a subject of reasoning but of SENSE or TASTE.” Vol. ii. p. 55. The Critic having thus changed the question, which he calls *stating it in accurate terms*; and obscured the answer, which he calls, giving it *with precision*, he concludes, that *Ridicule is not only the best, but the only, test of Truth.*

But what is all this to the purpose? Is the Dealer in Ridicule now debarred the liberty of doing what he has so often done, putting his object in a false light; and, by that means, making Truth appear like Error? As he is not, I inferred, against Lord Shaftesbury, *That Ridicule is not a test of Truth.* How does our Critic address himself to prove the contrary? Not by shewing, that *ridicule* is such a test: but that *the TASTE of ridicule is the test of what is ridiculous.* Who doubts that? It is the very thing complained of. For when our *taste* for ridicule gives us a sensible pleasure in a ridiculous representation of any object, we do not stay to examine whether that representation be a true one, but conclude it to be so, from the pleasure it affords us.

His second change of the question is a new substitution, viz. *Whether Ridicule be a talent to be used or employed at all?* Of which he supposes me to hold the negative. What else is the meaning of these words? “ TO CONDEMN A TALENT FOR RIDICULE, because it may be converted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one forbear to *smile* if A TALENT FOR REASONING was CONDEMNED, because it also may be perverted?” p. 57. He has no reason to *smile* sure, at his own misrepresentation. I never *condemned a talent for ridicule* because it may be abused; nor for any other reason. Though others, perhaps, may be disposed to *smile* at his absurd inference, that we may as well *condemn a talent for reasoning.* As
if

and most pernicious in its consequences : that its natural effect is to mislead the judgment, and to make the heart dissolute.

It is a small matter, that the State requires of you, sobriety, decency, and good manners, to qualify you for the noble employment of thinking freely, and at your ease. We have been told this, you will say, before: But, when it came to be explained; By, *sober writing* was meant, writing in the *language of the Magistrate*. It may be so; but then, remember, it was not till you yourselves had led the way to the abuse of words; and had called calumny, plain dealing; and a scurril licence, urbanity. Happy for you, that you are in times when liberty is so well understood. Had you lived in the boasted days of classic freedom, he amongst you who had escaped best, had been
branded

if *reason* and *ridicule* were of equal importance for the conduct of human life.

He may then perhaps ask, "If I do not *condemn* the *use* of "Ridicule, on what employment I would put it, when I have excluded it from being *a test of truth*?" Let him not be uneasy about that. There is no danger that the *talent for ridicule* should lie idle, for want of proper business. When *reason*, the only *test of truth* I know of, has performed its office, and unmasked *hypocrisy and formal error*, then *ridicule*, I think, may be fairly called in, to quicken the operation. Thus, when Dr. S. Clarke had, by superior reasoning, exposed the wretched sophistry which Mr. Collins had employed to prove the Soul to be only a quality of Body; Dr. Arbuthnot, who very rarely misemployed his inimitable *talent for ridicule*, followed the blow, and gave that foolish and impious opinion up to the contempt and laughter it deserved, in a chapter of the *Memoirs of Scriblerus*. But to set Ridicule on work before, would be as unfair, indeed as scandalous, as to bestow the language due to convicted Vice, on a character but barely suspected.

branded with a character, the ancient Sages esteemed most infamous of all, AN ENEMY TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. A very candid and respectable author, speaking of the ancient *restraints* on free-thinking, says, "These were the maxims, these the principles, which the light of nature suggested, which reason dictated*." Nor has this fine writer any cause to be ashamed of his acknowledgment; nor his adversaries any pretence that he must needs esteem it the measure for the present times. For, as a great Ancient well observes, "It is one thing to speak of truth, and another to hear truth speak of herself †." It was CHRISTIAN TRUTH and CHARITY, the truth and charity you so much insult, which only could take off those restraints; and require no more of you than to be *as FREE, but not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness ‡.*

I have now done with your buffoonry; which, like chewed bullets, is against the law of arms; and come next to your scurrilities, those stink-pots of your offensive war.

As the CLERGY of the established church have been more *particularly* watchful in what is yet the common cause of all, the interests of *Christianity*, and most successful in repelling the insults of its enemies, they have fallen under the heaviest load of your calumny

* Letter to Dr. Waterland, p. 52, & seq.

† "Ἄλλως τις περὶ ἀληθείας λέγει, ἢ ἀλήθεια ἑαυτὴν ἐρμηνεύει.

‡ 1 Pet. ii. 16.

and slander. With unparalleled licence, you have gone on, representing them as debauched, avaricious, proud, vindictive, ambitious, deceitful, irreligious, and incorrigible. “ An order of men profligate and abandoned to wickedness, inconsistent with the good of society, irreconcilable enemies to reason, and conspirators against the liberty and property of mankind*.”

To fill up your common-place of slander, the most inconsistent qualities have been raked together to deform them: qualities that could never stand together but in idea; I mean, in the mishapen ideas of a Free-thinker.

The Order is now represented as most contemptible for their politics; ever in the wrong, and under a fatality of continued blunders, attending them as a curse: But anon, we are told of their deep-laid schemes of a separate interest, so wisely conducted, as to elude the policy of Courts, and baffle all the wisdom of Legislatures.

Now they are a set of superstitious bigots, and fiery zealots, prompt to sacrifice the rights of humanity to the interests of Mother-Church: but now again, they are *Tartufes without religion; Atheists and Apostates without faith or law.*

This moment, so united in one common confederacy as to make their own Church-policy the cause of God:

* Rights of the Christian Church, and Christianity as old as the Creation, passim.

But, the next, so divided, that every man's hand is against his brother, *tearing and worrying one another*, to the great scandal of the charitable author of the *Discourse of Free-thinking*.

But it is to be hoped, as the evidence is so ill laid together, the accusation may be groundless.

But why do I talk of the Clergy, when there is not one, however otherwise esteemed by, or related to you, that can escape your slander, if he happen to discover the least inclination for that cause, against which you are so virulently bent? Mr. Locke, the honour of this age, and the instructor of the future, shews us, in the treatment he received from his FRIEND and from his PUPIL, what a believer is to expect from you. It was enough to provoke their resentment, that he had shewn *the reasonableness of Christianity*; and had placed all his hopes of happiness in *another life*.

The intimacy between him and Mr. Collins is well known. Mr. Collins seemed to idolize Mr. Locke while living; and Mr. Locke was *confident* Mr. Collins would *preserve his memory when dead**. But he chanced to be mistaken: For no sooner was he gone, than Mr. Collins publickly† insults a notion of his *honoured friend* concerning the *possibility of conceiving how matter might first be made and begin to be*:

* "I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory "now I am dead," says he in his letter to be delivered to Mr. Collins at his death.

† Answer to Dr. CLARKE'S third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell, at the end.

And

And goes affectedly out of the way to shew his good will to his memory.

The noble author of *the Characteristics* had received* part of his education from that great philosopher: And it must be owned, that this Lord had many excellent qualities, both as a man and a writer. He was temperate, chaste, honest, and a lover of his country. In his writings he hath shewn how largely he had imbibed the deep sense, and how naturally he could copy the gracious manner of Plato. How far Mr. Locke contributed to the cultivating these qualities, I will not enquire: But that inveterate rancour which he indulged against *Christianity*, it is certain, he had not from his master. It was Mr. *Locke's* love of it that seems principally to have exposed him to his pupil's bitterest insults. One of the most precious remains of the piety of that excellent man, are his last words to Mr. Collins: " May you live long and
 " happy, &c. all the use to be made of it is, *that this*
 " *world is a scene of vanity, that soon passes away,*
 " *and affords no solid satisfaction,* but the conscious-
 " ness of well doing, and the HOPES OF ANOTHER
 " LIFE. This is what I can say by experience, and
 " what you will find when you come to make up your
 " account†." One would think, that if ever the parting breath of pious men, or the last precepts of dying philosophers, could claim reverence of their survivors, this noble monument of friendship, and religion, had been secure from outrage. Yet hear, in how unworthy,

* See *Bibl. Choisie*, tom. vi. p. 343.

† Amongst his letters published by Desmaizeaux.

how cruel a manner, his noble disciple apostrophizes him on this occasion: "*Philosopher!* let me hear concerning life, what the right notion is, and what I am to stand to upon occasion; that I may not, when life seems retiring, or *has run itself out to the very dregs**, cry VANITY! condemn the WORLD, and at the same time complain that LIFE IS SHORT AND PASSING. For why so *short* indeed, if not found *sweet*? Why do I complain both ways? Is *vanity*, mere vanity, a happiness; or can misery *pass away* too soon†?" Here the polite author had the noble pleasure of ridiculing the *philosopher* and the *Psalmist*‡ together. But I will leave the strange reflexions, that naturally arise from hence, to the reader; who, I am sure, will be beforehand with me in judging, that Mr. Locke had reason to *condemn a world* that cast him upon such a *friend* and *pupil*||.

But

* Mr. Locke was then in his 73d year.

† Characteristics vol. i. p. 302. 3d ed.

‡ *Man is like to vanity: His days are as a shadow that passeth away.* PSAL. cxliv. 4.

|| The noble writer did not disdain to take up with those vulgar calumnies which Mr. Locke had again and again confuted. "Some even (says he, *Charact.* vol. i. p. 80. 3d ed.) of our most admired modern philosophers had fairly told us, that virtue and vice had, after all, no other law or measure than mere fashion and vogue." The case was this: When Mr. Locke reasoned against *innate ideas*, he brought it as one argument against them, that virtue and vice, in many places, were not regulated by the nature of things, which they must have been, were there such *innate ideas*; but by mere fashion and vogue. Is this then *fairly told* of our *admired modern philosopher*? But it was crime enough that he laboured to overthrow *innate ideas*; things that the noble author understood to be the foundation of his

But to go on, and consider the nature of this abuse of the Clergy: It is not only an affront to *Religion*, which, by your practice, you seem to regard as one of the essential branches of literary liberty; but likewise, an insult on *civil Society*. For while there is such a thing as a *Church established by law*, its Ministers must needs bear a *sacred*, that is, a *public* character, even on your own principles*. To abuse them, therefore, as a body, is insulting the State which protects them. It is highly injurious likewise, because a *Body-politic* cannot preserve the reverence necessary for the support of government, longer than its public officers, whether civil or religious, are treated with the regard due to their respective stations†.

And

moral sense. (See vol. iii. p. 214.) In vain did Mr. Locke incessantly repeat, that "the divine law is the only true touchstone of "moral rectitude." This did but increase his pupil's resentment, who had all his faculties possessed with the MORAL SENSE, as "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." But the whole Essay itself, one of the noblest, and most original books in the world, could not escape his ridicule: "In reality (says he, vol. i. "p. 299.) how specious a study, how solemn an amusement, is "raised from what we call philosophical speculations! The "formation of ideas! their compositions, comparisons, agreement "and disagreement!—Why do I concern myself in speculations "about my ideas? What is it to me, for instance, to know what "kind of idea I can form of space? Divide a solid body, *etc.*" and so he goes on in Mr. Locke's own words: And lest the reader should not take the satire, a note at the bottom of the page informs us, that "these are the words of the particular author "cited." But the invidious Remark on this quotation surpasses all credit. Thus the atomist, or EPICUREAN.

* "They also that have authority to teach, *etc.* are *public ministers*." *Leviathan*, p. 124. London. 1651. 4to.

† Ἀρχισιν ἡ ὀφειλομένη αἰδώς, καὶ τιμὴ φυλασσομένη, κόσμον σώζει πόλεως, καὶ διατηρεῖ. Ant. Scrip. apud Stob. de rep. Serm. 41. p. 270. Tiguri, 1559, fol. circa finem.

And here, your apology, when accused of using holy Writ irreverently, is out of doors. You pretend that the Charge is disingenuous, because it takes for granted the thing in dispute. But in the case before us, it is agreed, that the Ministers of the established worship have a *sacred*, that is, a *public* character.

Out of your own mouths likewise, are you condemned. A few instances there are in the first ages of *Christianity*, of something resembling this misconduct; where the intemperance of private zeal now and then gave the affront to the national religion. But who are they that so severely censure this disorder*? that raise such tragic outcries against the factious spirit of primitive *Christianity*? Who, Gentlemen, but Yourselves! The very men who, out of spite and wantonness, daily persist in doing what a misguided devotion, now and then, though rarely, betrayed a martyr to commit †.

But would you read *Christian* antiquity with equal minds, you would not want examples of a better conduct. For in general the Apologists for the *Christian* faith observed a decency and moderation becoming the truth and importance of the cause they had to sup-

* "The list of Martyrs consisted, I believe, of those who suffered for breaking the Peace. The *primitive clergy* were, "under pretence of Religion, a very Lawless Tribe." L. Bolingbroke, vol. iv. p. 434.

† In the LXth canon of the council of Eliberis, held about twenty years before the council of Nice, it is decreed, that they who were slain by the Gentiles for breaking down their idols, should not be received by the church into the number of Martyrs, since neither the precepts of the Gospel nor the practice of the Apostles gave any countenance to such licentious behaviour.

port. We need only look into *Lactantius* for the modesty of their conduct in this respect.

This eloquent Apologist, who wrote in an age which would have indulged greater liberties, giving in his *divine institutions*, the last stroke to expiring paganism; where he confutes the *national Religion*, spares as much as possible the *Priests*; but in exposing their *Philosophy*, is not so tender of their *Sophists*: For these last having no public character, the State was not concerned to have them managed. Such, I say, was the general behaviour of the first *Christians*.

Nor can you plead, in your excuse, any other necessity, than that inseparable from a weak cause, of committing this violence. The discovery of truth is so far from being advanced by it, that, on the contrary, it carries all the marks of design to retard the search, when you so industriously draw off the reader's attention from the *Cause*, by diverting him at the expence of the *Advocate*.

It is true, that at what time the Clergy so far forgot the nature of their office, and of the cause they were appointed to defend, as to call in the secular arm to support their arguments against wrong opinions, we saw, without much surprise or resentment, You, Gentlemen, in like delusion, that any means were lawful in support of truth, falling without scruple to affront the Public (then little disposed to give you an equal hearing) by the abuse of a Body, whose *private* interests the State had indiscreetly espoused. For

where was the wonder, when Government had assumed too much, for those who were oppressed by it, to allow it too little? You thought this a fair return; and your candid enemies confessed, that some indulgence was to be given to the passions of men, raised and enflamed by so unequal a treatment. But now, that the *State* hath withdrawn its power, and confined the Administration within its proper office; and that this *learned Body* hath publicly disclaimed its assistance; it will surely be expected, that You, likewise, should return to a better mind, and forsake a practice insolently continued, without any reasonable pretence of fresh provocation.

Your last abuse, Gentlemen, of the liberty of the press, is a certain dissolute habit of mind, regardless both of truth and falsehood, which you betray in all your attacks on Revelation. Who that had not heard of your solemn professions *of the love of liberty, of truth, of virtue, of your aim at the honour of God, and good of men*, could ever believe you had any thing of this at heart, when they see that spirit of levity and dissipation which runs through all your writings?

That you may not say I slander you, I will produce those marks in your works, on which I have formed my accusation of this illiberal temper.

1. The first is an unlimited buffoonry; which suffers no test or criterion to your ridicule, to shew us, when you are in jest, and when in earnest.

2. An

2. An industrious affectation in keeping your true character out of sight; and in constantly assuming some new and fictitious personage.

3. To support your chicane, an unnatural mixture of the Sceptic and Dogmatist.

And here, Gentlemen, in illustrating these three circumstances of your guilt, one might detect all your *arts of controversy*, and easily reveal the whole mystery of modern *Free-thinking*. But the limits of this address will only permit me in few words to describe the general nature of each; in order to shew, how certain an indication they are of the turn of mind of which I accuse you.

1. The illimited, UNDISTINGUISHABLE IRONY, which affords no insight into the author's meaning, or so much room as to guess what he would be at, is our first note. This, which is your favourite figure of speech, your noble Apologist owns to be "a dull " sort of wit which amuses all alike*." Nay, he even ventures to pronounce it "a gross, immoral, and " illiberal way of abuse, foreign to the character of a " good writer, a gentleman, or man of worth †." What pity, if he should chance to fall under his own censure! Yet this is certain, he hath so managed his *good humour*, that his admirers may always find a handle either to charge us with credulity, or want of charity, determine as we will of his *true* and *real*

* Charact. vol. i. tract ii. part i. § 2.

† Vol. iii. Miscel. iv. c. 2.

sentiments. However, the noble writer hath not aggravated this folly, in the character he hath given of it: For, here forgetful of your own precepts, (your common-place topic against public instructors) while you prescribe ridicule to be so managed, *as to shew it tends to a serious issue*; you practise it so indiscriminately, as to make one believe you were all the time in jest. While you direct it *to unmask formal hypocrisy*, you suffer it to put sober truth out of countenance; and while you claim its aid, *to find out what is to be laughed at in every thing*, you employ it to bring in every thing to be laughed at.

That a RESTRAINT on free inquiry, will force writers into this vicious manner, we readily allow. Under these circumstances, such a key to ridicule as just writing demands being unsafe; and the only way men have to escape persecution being to cover and intrench themselves in obscurity; it is no wonder that *ridicule* should degenerate into the *buffoonry which amuses all alike*: As in *Italy*, which gave birth to this degenerate species of writing, it is the only way in which the *poor cramped thinking wretches can discharge a free thought*. But in *Great Britain*, happily for Truth, and You, PHILOSOPHY is at her ease; and you may lead her safely back to Paganism, through all the ancient modes of *doubting, objecting, and refuting*.

It is difficult, therefore, to assign any other likely cause of this extravagance, than that vicious levity of spirit, I have charged upon you. For as Man is formed by nature with an incredible appetite for
Truth;

Truth; so his strongest pleasure, in the enjoyment, arises from the actual communication of it to others. Without this, it would be a cold purchase, would abstract, ideal, solitary Truth; and poorly repay the labour and fatigue of the pursuit. Amongst the Ancients, who, you will allow, had high notions of this SOCIAL SENSE, it was a saying recorded by *Cicero* with approbation, “that even heaven would
 “ be no happiness, to him who had not some com-
 “ panion or *social Spirit* to share with him in the
 “ pleasure of contemplating the great truths of nature
 “ there revealed unto him.” “ Si quis in cœlum
 “ ascendisset, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem
 “ siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem
 “ ei fore; quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui
 “ narraret, habuisset*.” *Seneca* goes yet further:
 “ Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia sit et salu-
 “ tatis, quam mihi uni sciturus sim. Si cum hac
 “ exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam teneam,
 “ nec enunciem, rejiciam: nullius boni, sine socio,
 “ jucunda possessio est †.” It was this passion which gave birth to writing, and brought literary composition to an art; whereby the Public was made a sharer in those important truths, which particulars had with so much toil excogitated for its use and entertainment. The principal object therefore of an author, while his passions are in their right state, must needs be to deliver his sentiments and opinions with all possible clearness; so that no particular cast of composition, or turn of expression, which he held conducive to the embellish-

* De Amicitia. Edit. Oxon. 4to, T. III. p. 349 et 50.

† Ep. vi.

ment of his work, he suffered to throw an ambiguity on his propositions, which might mislead the reader in judging of his real sentiments. To such a one, nothing can be a greater mortification than to find that this his principal purpose was defeated.

But when, on the contrary, we see a writer, so far from discovering any thing of this care, that an air of negligence appears in every thing he delivers; a visible contempt of his reader's satisfaction; to which he prefers a dull malicious pleasure of misguiding him in the obscurity of an illimited ridicule; we cannot possibly avoid concluding that such a one is far gone in this wretched depravity of heart.

2. Another mark, is your perpetually assuming some **PERSONATED CHARACTER**, as the exigence of chicanery requires. For the dispute is to be kept on foot; and therefore, when in danger of coming to an issue, a new personage is to be assumed, that the trial of skill may be fought over again with different weapons. So that the modern Free-thinker, is a perfect *Proteus*. He is now a Dissenter, or a Papist; now again a Jew or a Mahometan; and, when closely pressed and hunted through all the shapes, he at length starts up in his genuine form, an **INFIDEL** confessed*.

Indeed where the Magistrate hath confined the liberty of free debate, to one or two Professions of belief, there an unlicensed writer hath no way of publishing his speculations, but under the cover of

one of these authorized Sects. But to affect this practice when the necessity is over, is licentious and immoral. For the personated character, only arguing *ad hominem*, embroils, rather than directs us, in the search of truth; has a natural tendency to promote scepticism; and if not this, yet it keeps the dispute from ever coming to an issue; which is attended with great public inconveniencies. For though the discovery of speculative truth be of much importance to the perfection of man's nature, yet the studious lengthening out literary debates is pernicious to Society, as Societies are generally formed. Therefore, though the good of mankind would set an honest man upon publishing what he supposes to be discoveries in truth; yet the same motive would oblige him to take the fairest, and most direct road to their reception.

But I would not have it thought, by this, that I condemn the assuming a *personated character* on all occasions whatsoever. There are seasons when it is fair and expedient. When the dispute is about the PRACTICAL application of some truth to the good of a particular society; there it is prudent to take up a suitable character, and to argue *ad hominem*. For there, the end is a benefit to be gained for that society; and it is not of so great moment on what principles the majority is prevailed upon to make the society happy, as it is, that it should speedily become so. But in the discovery of ABSTRACT SPECULATIVE truth; the affair goes quite otherwise. The business here is *demonstration*, not *persuasion*. And it is of the essence of truth, to be made appear and shine out only by its own lustre.

A familiar

A familiar example will support this observation. Our great *British* philosopher, writing for *religious liberty*, combats his *intolerant* adversary, all the way, with his own Principles; well knowing that, in such a time of prejudices, arguments built on received opinions would have greatest weight, and make quickest impression on the body of the People, whom it was his business to gain. But the method he employed in defending mere *speculative truth* was very different. A Prelate of great name, was pleased to attack his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*; who, though consummate in the learning of the Schools, yet happened at that time to apply his principles so very awkwardly, as gave our Philosopher the most inviting opportunity of turning them against him. An advantage most to the taste of him who contends only for *victory*: but he contended for *truth*; and was too wise to think of establishing it on *falsehood*; and too honest to affect triumphing over Error by any thing but by its Opposite.

You see then, Gentlemen, you are not likely to escape by this distinction; the dispute with you is about *speculative truth*: Yourselves take care to give the world repeated information of it, as often as you think fit to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment.

But of as little use as this method, of the *personated character*, is, in itself, to the just end of controversy; you generally add a double share of disingenuity in conducting it. Common sense, as well as Common honesty, requires that he who assumes a *personated character*

character should fairly stick to it, for that turn, at least. But we shall be greatly deceived, if we presume on so much condescension: the late famous author of *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, took it into his head to personate a *Jew*, in the interpretation of some prophecies which he would persuade us are not applicable to *Jesus*. The learned Prelate, who undertook to answer him, having shewn that those prophecies had no completion under the *Jewish* dispensation, concludes very pertinently, *that if they did not belong to Jesus, they belong to no one*. What says our impostor *Jew* to this? One would be astonished at his reply: *Suppose they do not*, says he, *I am not answerable for their completion*. What! not as a *Jew*? whose person he assumes, and whose argument he borrows: which argument is not founded on this, That the characters of completion, according to the *Christian* scheme, do not coincide and quadrate; to which, indeed, the above answer would be pertinent; but on this, that there are complete characters of the completion of the prophecies, under the *Jewish* œconomy; and therefore, says the *Jew*, you are not to look for those marks under the *Christian*. The only reasonable way then of replying to this argument, is to deny, that there are such marks under the *Jewish* œconomy; which if the *Jew* cannot prove, his objection, founded on a prior completion, is intirely overthrown. Instead of this, we are put off with the cold buffoonry of, *I am not obliged to find a meaning for your prophecies*.

3. The third mark of this abandoned spirit, is that
 UNNATURAL MIXTURE OF THE SCEPTIC AND DOGMATIST,

TIST, which so monstrously variegates your mishapen works. I do not mean by it, that unreasonable temper of mind, which distinguishes the whole class of Free-thinkers; and suffers you, at the same time that you affect much *scepticism* in rejecting Revelation, to *dogmatize* very positively on some favourite points of civil tradition. The noble author, your Apologist, could not forbear to ridicule his party for this foible*.

“ It must certainly, says he, be something else than
 “ incredulity which fashions the taste and judgment
 “ of many Gentlemen, whom we hear censured as
 “ Atheists. Who, if they want a true *Israelitish*
 “ faith, can make amends by a *Chinese* or *Indian*
 “ one.—Though *Christian* miracles may not so well
 “ satisfy them, they dwell with the highest content-
 “ ment on the prodigies of *Moorish* and *Pagan*
 “ countries.”

This is ill enough; but the perversity, I speak of, is much worse: and that is, when the same writer, on different occasions, assumes the *Dogmatist* and *Sceptic* on the same question; and so abuses both Characters, in all the perversity of self-contradiction.

For instance, how common is it for one of Your writers, when he brings *Pagan* antiquity to contradict and discredit the *Jewish*, to cry up a Greek historian as an evidence, to which nothing can be objected? An imperfect hint from *Herodotus*, or *Diodorus*, though one lived a thousand, and the other fifteen hundred years after the case in question, picked up

* Characteristics, vol. i. p. 345. edit. 3.

from any lying traveller the one met with in his rambles, or the other found in his collections, shall now outweigh the circumstantial History of *Moses*, who wrote of his own people, and lived in the times he wrote of. But now turn the tables, and apply the testimony of these Writers, and of others of the best credit of the same nation, to the confirmation of the *Jewish history*, and then nothing is more uncertain and fallacious than classical Antiquity. All is darkness and confusion: then we are sure to hear of,

- - - Quicquid Græcia mendax
Audet in historia. - - -

Then *Herodotus* is a lying traveller, and *Diodorus Siculus* a tasteless collector.

Again, when the choice and separation of the *Israelites* for God's peculiar People, is to be brought in question, and made ridiculous, they are represented as the vilest, the most profligate, and perverse race of men: then every indiscreet passage of a *declamatory Divine* is raked up with care to make them odious; and even the hard fate of the great historian *Josephus* pitied, that he had "no better a subject than such an illiterate, "barbarous, and ridiculous people*."

But when the Scripture-account of the treatment, which the Holy *Jesus* met with from them, is thought fit to be disputed; these *Jews* are become an humane and wise Nation; which never interfered with the teachings of sects, or the propagation of opinions, but

* Discourse of Free-thinking, p. 157.

where the public safety was thought to be in danger by seditious doctrines.

But so it is, even with the BIBLE itself, and its best interpreter, HUMAN REASON. It is generally allowed that the Author of *the Discourse of Free-thinking*, and of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, was one and the same person. Now it being to this man's purpose in the first pamphlet, to blast the credit of the book in general, as a *rule of faith*, the Bible is represented as a most obscure, dark, incomprehensible collection of multifarious tracts. But in his discourse of *The Grounds*, etc. where * he is to obviate the reason of the difficulty in explaining ancient Prophecies, drawn from the genius of the Eastern style, sentiment, and manners; this very book is, on a sudden, become so easy, plain, and intelligible, that no one can possibly mistake its meaning.

Again, the same Writer, where, in his *Essay concerning the Use of Reason*, he thinks fit to discredit the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, and other mysteries of the *Christian Faith*, represents human reason as omniscient, and the full measure of all things: but when the proof of the *immateriality of the soul*, from the qualities of MATTER and SPIRIT, is to be obstinately opposed, the scene is shifted, and we are presented with a new face of things: then Reason becomes weak, staggering, and impotent: then we know not but one quality may be another quality; one

* Discourse of Free-thinking, p. 68. and of the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, p. 81, 82.

mode, another mode; Motion may be consciousness; and Matter sentient*.

These, Gentlemen, are the several ways in which you have abused the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. One might defy you, with all your good will or invention, to contrive a new one, or to go further in the old; You have done your worst. It is time to think of growing better. This is the only inference I would draw from your bad conduct. For I am not one of those who say you should be disfranchised of the Rights you have so wantonly and wickedly abused. *Natural* rights were less precariously bestowed: the *Civil*, indeed, are frequently given on the condition of the Receiver's good behaviour. And this difference, in the security of the possession, is founded in the plainest reason. *Natural* rights are so necessary to our Being, that, without them, Life becomes miserable; but the *Civil* only contributing to our easier accommodation, in some circumstances of it, may be forfeited without injury to our common Nature.

In a word then, all that we desire is your amendment; without any sinister aim of calling upon the Magistrate to quicken your pace. So I leave you, as I dare say will *He*, to yourselves. Nor let any good man be above measure scandalized at your faults; or more impatient for your reformation, than mere charity demands. I do not know what panic the present growth of Infidelity may have thrown some of us into: I, for my part, confide so much in the goodness of our Cause, that I too could be tempted to *laugh* in my turn,

* See his Answers to Dr. Clarke.

while I think of an old story told us by *Herodotus**, of your favourite EGYPTIANS; of whom you are like to hear a great deal in the following work. With this tale I shall beg leave to conclude my long address unto you.

He tells us then, that at what time their Deity, the NILE, returns into his ancient channel; and the husbandman hath committed the *good seed* to the opening glebe, it was their custom to turn in whole droves of SWINE; to range, to trample, root up, and destroy at pleasure. And now nothing appeared but desolation, while the ravages of the obscene herd had killed every chearful hope of future plenty. When on the issue, it was seen, that all their perversity and dirty taste had effected, was only this; that the SEED took better root, incorporated more kindly with the soil, and at length shot up in a more luxuriant and abundant harvest.

I am,

GENTLEMEN, *etc.*

* Lib. ii. c. 14. Vid. Plutarch. Symp. l. iv. Prov. 5. The learned Gale cannot be reconciled to this kind of husbandry. He is therefore for having the word ὄνος, used by *Herodotus*, not to signify *swine*, but *cows* or *heifers*. His authority for this use of the word is *Hesychius*. But *Plutarch* is a much better for the other signification, who in his *Symp.* quoted above, speaking to the question Πότερον οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι σεβόμενοι τὴν ἕν, *etc.* mentions this very circumstance of tillage from *Herodotus*, and understands by ὄνος *swine*. The truth of the matter seems to be this, *Hesychius* found that ὄνος, in some obscure province or other, meant a *Heifer*, as κάρκος amongst the *Tyrrhenians*, we are told, meant a *goat*, and so put it down to enrich his dictionary with an unusual signification.

POSTSCRIPT

TO THE

DEDICATION TO THE FREE-THINKERS;

IN THE EDITION OF

1766.

A POET, and a Critic *, of equal eminence, have concurred, though they did not start together, to censure what was occasionally said in this *Dedication* (as if it had been addressed to them) of *the use and abuse of Ridicule*. The Poet was a follower of Lord Shaftesbury's fancies; the Critic a follower of his own. Both Men of TASTE, and equally anxious for the well-doing of RIDICULE. I have given some account of the latter in a note of the *Dedication* †. The other was too full of the subject, and of himself, to be dispatched with so little ceremony: he must therefore undergo an examination apart,

Since it is (say he) *beyond all contradiction evident, that we have a natural sense or feeling of the ridiculous, and since so good a Reason may be assigned to justify the Supreme Being for bestowing it; ONE CANNOT WITHOUT ASTONISHMENT reflect on the conduct of those Men who imagine it for the service of true Religion to vilify and blacken it WITHOUT DISTINC-*

• See Pleasures of Imagination, and Elements of Criticism.

† Page 157, &c.

TION, and endeavour to persuade us, that it is never applied but in a bad cause*. The Reason here given, to shew, that *Ridicule* and *Buffoonry* may be properly employed on serious and even sacred subjects, is admirable: it is because we have a natural sense or feeling of the ridiculous, and because no sensation was given us in vain; which would serve just as well to excuse *Adultery* or *Incest*. For have we not as natural a sense or feeling of the voluptuous? Yes, he will say, but this sense has its proper object, virtuous love, not adulterous or incestuous: And does he think, I will not say the same of his sense of the ridiculous? Its proper objects are, not weighty and Sacred matters, but the civil customs and common occurrences of life. For he stretched a point when he told the Reader, I vilified and blackened it without distinction. The thing I there opposed, was the abusive way of art and raillery on religious Subjects. With as little regard to Truth did he say, that I endeavoured to persuade the Public, that it is never applied but in a bad cause: For, in that very place, I apologized for an eminent writer who had applied it in a good one.

Ridicule (says he) is not [i. e. ought not to be] concerned with mere speculative Truth and Falsehood. Certainly. And, for that very reason I would exclude it from those Subjects. What need? he will say, for when was it so employed? When, does he ask?—When his Master ridiculed the Subject of Mr. Locke's ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in the manner there mentioned. When the same noble person

* Pleasures of Imagination, p. 105, 106.

ridiculed REVELATION, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put *a wrong bias on their Reason* in order to believe right*.—

He goes on, *It is not in abstract Propositions on Theorems, but in Actions and Passions, Good and Evil, Beauty and Deformity, that we find Materials for it; and all these Terms are relative, implying Approbation or Blame.* The reason here given, why, not *abstract Propositions, &c.* but *Actions and Passions, &c.* are the subject of *ridicule* is, because these latter are *relative Terms implying Approbation and Blame.* But are not the former as much *relative Terms, implying Assent and Denial?* And does not an absurd Proposition as frequently afford materials for *Ridicule* as an absurd Action? Let the Reader determine by what he finds before him.—*To ask then, (says he) whether Ridicule be a Test of truth, is, in other words, to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be just and becoming: or whether that which is just and becoming can be ridiculous. A question that does not deserve a serious answer.* However, in civility to his Master, or rather indeed to his Master's Masters, the ancient *Sophists*, who, we are told † in the *Characteristics*, said something very like it, I shall give it a *serious answer.* For how, I pray, comes it to pass, that to ask, *whether ridicule be a test of truth, is the same thing as to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true?* As if, whatever thing the *test of Ridicule* was applied to, must needs be *ridiculous.*

* Charact. Vol. III. Misc. 2. C. 3. p. 99.

† It was a saying of an ancient sage, "that humour was the only test of ridicule." Vol. I. p. 74.

Might not one ask, *Whether the Copel* be a test of gold*, without incurring any absurdity in questioning, Whether the matter to which the Copel is applied be standard gold. But he takes a *test of truth* and a *detection of error* to be one and the same thing; and that nothing is brought to *this test* but what was known beforehand, whether it was *true* or *false*. His Master seems much better versed in the use of things †. Now, *what rule or measure* (says he) *is there in the world, except in considering the real temper of things, to find which are truly serious, and which ridiculous? And how can this be done, unless by applying the ridicule* TO SEE WHETHER IT WILL BEAR?

But if the Reader be curious to see to the bottom of this affair, he must go a little deeper. Lord Shaftesbury, we find, was willing to know, as every honest man would, Whether those things, which had the appearance of seriousness and sanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The way of coming to this knowledge had been hitherto by the *test of reason*. But this was too dull and tedious a road for this lively genius. He would go a shorter and a pleasanter way to work, and do the business by *ridicule*; given us, as his Disciple tells us, *to aid the tardy steps of reason*. This the noble Author would needs *apply*, to see *whether the appearances would bear the Touch*. Now it was this ingenious expedient, to which I thought I had cause to object. For when he had applied this *Touch*, and that that, to which it was applied, was found to endure it, what reparation could he make to

* *Copella*, It. in English, a *test*.

† *Charact.* Vol. I. p. 12.

Truth, for thus placing her in a ridiculous and idle light, in order only, as he pretended, to judge rightly of her? Oh, for that, said his Lordship, she has the amends in her own hands: Let her rally again; *for why should fair Honesty be denied the use of his Weapon**? To this so wanton a liberty with sacred Truth, I thought I had many good reasons to oppose; and so, it seems, thought our Poet likewise: Or why did he endeavour to excuse his Master, by putting another sense on *the application of ridicule as a Test*, which implies that the Truth or Falsehood of the thing tried, is *already known*. But the shift is unlucky; for while it covers his Master, it exposes himself. For now it may be asked, what need of ridicule at all, after the Truth is *known*; since the sole use of a *test*, according to his Master, consists in enabling us to *discover* the true state of things?

But now he comes to the *Philosophy* of his Criticism on my absurdity. For *it is most evident* (says he) *that as in a metaphysical Proposition offered to the Understanding for its assent, the faculty of Reason examines the terms of the Proposition; and finding one Idea, which was supposed equal to another, to be in fact unequal, of consequence rejects the Proposition as a falsehood: So in Objects offered to the Mind for its esteem or applause, the faculty of ridicule feeling an incongruity in the claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt.* And now, how does this sublime account, of Reason and Ridicule, prove the foregoing Proposition to be absurd? Just as much, I suppose, as the height of St. Paul's proves GRANTHAM Steeple to stand awry.

* Charact. Vol. I. p. 128.

However,

However, if it cannot *prove* what precedes, he will try to make it *infer* what follows: *When THEREFORE* (says he) *we observe such a claim obtruded upon Mankind, and the inconsistent circumstances carefully concealed from the eye of the Public, it is our business, if the matter be of importance to Society, to drag out those latent circumstances, and, by setting them full in view, convince the World how ridiculous the Claim is; and thus a double advantage is gained; for we both detect the moral Falsehood sooner than in the way of speculative enquiry, and impress the minds of Men with a stronger sense of the vanity and error of its Authors. And this, and no more, is meant by the application of Ridicule.* A little more, if we may believe his Master: who says, it is not only to *detect Error*, but to *try Truth*, that is, in his own expression, to see *whether it will bear*. But why all this ado? for now, we see, nobody mistook what was *meant by the application of Ridicule*, but himself.—As to what he said before, that when *Objects are offered to the Mind for its esteem and applause, the faculty of Ridicule, feeling an incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt*; it is so expressed, as if he intended it not for the description of the *Use*, but the *essence of Ridicule*. But the dealers in this Trash frequently *urge the Mind to reject many things with laughter and contempt*, without *feeling any other incongruity*, than in their own pretensions to Truth and Honesty. And this our Poet seems to be no stranger to.

For now he comes to the point.—*But it is said the practice is dangerous, and may be inconsistent with the regard we owe to Objects of real dignity and excellence.*

cellence. I answer, the practice, FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous. Who ever thought any thing FAIRLY MANAGED to be dangerous! The danger is in the *abuse or unfair management.* The use of Stilletos and Poisons, FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous. And yet this has not hindered all wise States, whenever they have found a violent propensity to the handling of these things, to forbid their promiscuous use, under the severest penalties, to prevent abuse and *unfair management.*

However, he allows at length, that *Men may be dishonest in obtruding circumstances foreign to the Object; and we may be inadvertent in allowing those circumstances to impose upon us; but——but what? Why, the SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT.* And he had told us before, that this is a *natural sense, and bestowed upon us by the supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of Reason.* Why, as he says, who can withstand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be dishonest; Readers may be misled; and, the Public judge wrong. But what then, the *sense of ridicule always judges right.* And while we can support our *Platonic Republic of Ideas,* it signifies little what becomes of the People, the *Faces Romuli.* And so again it is in the use of Poisons: *Men may be dishonest in obtruding them; and we inadvertent enough to be imposed upon.* But what then? The Virtue of Poison always does its kind. *It is a natural power, and bestowed upon it by the supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of Vermin.*—In truth, one would imagine, by this extraordinary argument, that the question was not of
the

the injury to Society by the abuse of Ridicule, but of the injury to Ridicule itself.

But let us hear him out; *The Socrates* of Aristophanes is (it will be said) *as truly a ridiculous character as ever was drawn. True; but it is not the character of Socrates, the divine Moralist, and Father of ancient Wisdom.* Indeed!—But then, if, like the true *Sosia*, in the other Comedy, he must bear the blows of his fictitious Brother, what reparation is there to injured Virtue, to tell us, that he did not deserve them?

Again,—*What then? Did the ridicule of the Poet hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming those foreign circumstances which he had falsely introduced into his character, and thus rendering the Satirist doubly ridiculous in his turn?* See here again! all his concern, we find, is, lest good Raillery should be beat at its own weapons. No, indeed, I cannot see how it could possibly hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming. But *this* it did, which surely deserves a little consideration, it hindered the People from seeing what he had detected and disclaimed—A mighty consolation, truly, to the illustrious Sufferer, that he disclaimed the Fool's Coat they had put upon him!

But what is the Sacrifice of a SOCRATES now and then to secure to us the free use of that inestimable blessing, BUFFOONRY? So thinks our Poet; when all the Answer he gives to so natural, so compassionate an objection as this,—*it nevertheless had an ill influence on the minds of the People,*—is telling us a story of the Atheist Spinoza; while the godlike Socrates is left deserted, in the hands of his Judges; whither

whither RIDICULE, this noble guide of Truth, had safely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding answer which the *respectable* Spinoza is employed to illustrate.—*And so* (says he) *has the reasoning of Spinoza made many Atheists; he has founded it indeed on Suppositions utterly false; but allow him these, and his conclusions are unavoidably true. And if we must reject the use of Ridicule because, by the imposition of false circumstances, things may be made to seem ridiculous, which are not so in themselves, Why we ought not in the same manner to reject the use of Reason, because, by proceeding on false Principles, conclusions will appear true which are impossible in Nature, let the vehement and obstinate Declaimers against Ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare trust it with any one; whose common sense is not all run to *Taste*. What! because REASON, the guide of Life, the support of Religion, the investigator of Truth, must be still used though it be continually subject to abuse; therefore RIDICULE, the paltry buffoon Mimic of REASON, must have the same indulgence! because a KING must be intrusted with Government, though he may misuse his power; therefore the King's FOOL shall be suffered to play the Madman! But upon what footing standeth this extraordinary Claim? Why, we have a *natural sense of the Ridiculous*; and the *Ridiculous has a natural feeling of the Incongruous*; and then—who can forbear LAUGHING? If to this you add *Taste, Beauty, Deformity, Moral-sense, Moral-rectitude, Moral-falsehood*; you have then, I think, the whole Theory of the RIDICULOUS. But who would have imagined, that

that while he was defending Ridicule from the charge of ABUSE, he should be adding fresh exceptions to his own Plea? Not indeed, that the comment disgraced the Text; or that there was much *Incongruity* in pleading for a fault he was just then committing. But so it is, that, where he is poetically marshalling the follies of human Life, he places the whole *body of the Christian Clergy* in the foremost rank. Amongst such, who, he tells us, *assume some desirable quality or possession which evidently does not belong to them**.

“ Others, of graver Mien, behold; adorn’d
 “ With holy Ensigns, how *sublime* they move,
 “ And, bending oit their *sanctimonious* Eyes,
 “ Take homage of the *Simple-minded Throng*,
 “ AMBASSADORS OF HEAV’N †.”

—But let it go for what it is; A poor joke of his Master’s †, and spoil’d too in the telling. The *dulness* of the *Ridicule* will sufficiently atone for the *abuse* of it.

* Page 49

† Page 96.

‡ Charact. Vol. III. p. 336.

P R E F A C E
TO THE FIRST EDITION OF
B O O K S
I. II. III.
OF THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES;
1738.

THE following sheets make the *first volume* of a work, designed to prove the DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE JEWISH RELIGION. As the Author was neither indebted, nor engaged to the Public, he hath done his Readers no injury in not giving them more; and had they not had *this*, neither he nor they, perhaps, had esteemed themselves losers. For writing for no Party, it is likely he will please none; and begging no Protection, it is more likely he will find none: and he must have more of the confidence of a modern Writer than falls to his share, to think of making much way with the feeble effort of his own reason.

Writers, indeed, have been oft betrayed into strange absurd conclusions, from I can't tell what obsolete claim, which LETTERS have to the patronage of the GREAT: a relation, if indeed there ever were any,
long

long since worn out and forgotten; the *Great* now seeming reasonably well convinced, that it had never any better foundation than the rhetorical importunity of Beggars.

But however this claim of Patronage may be understood, there is another of a more important nature; which is the Patronage of RELIGION. The Author begs leave to assure Those who have no time to spare from their attention on the Public, that the Protection of Religion is indispensably necessary to all Governments; and for his warrant he offers them the following volume; which endeavours to shew the necessity of RELIGION in general, and of the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE in particular, to civil Society, from the nature of things and the universal consent of Mankind. The proving this, I make no question, many Politicians will esteem sufficient: But those who are solicitous to have Religion TRUE as well as USEFUL, the Author will endeavour to satisfy in the following volumes.

THE
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES
DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK I.

SECT. I.

THE WRITERS, in defence of revealed Religion, distinguish their arguments into two sorts: the one they call the INTERNAL, and the other the EXTERNAL Evidence. Of these, the first is, in its nature, more simple and perfect; and even capable of demonstration: while the other, made up of very dissimilar materials, and borrowing aid from without, must needs have some parts of unequal strength with the rest; and, consequently, lie open to the attacks of a willing adversary. Besides, the *internal* evidence is, by its nature, perpetuated; and so fitted for all ages and occasions: while the *external*, by length of time, weakens and decays. For the nature and genius of the religion defended affording the proofs of the first kind, these materials of defence are inseparable from its existence; and so throughout all ages the same.

But Time may, and doth, efface memorials independent of that existence; out of which the *external* evidence is composed: which evidence must therefore become more and more imperfect, without being affected by that whimsical and partial calculation, to which a certain *Scotchman** would subject it †. Nay, of such use is the *internal* evidence, that, even the very best of the *external* cannot support itself without it: for when, for instance, the supernatural facts done by the founders of our holy faith, are unquestionably verified by human testimony, the evidence of their divinity will not follow till the nature of that doctrine be examined, for whose establishment they were performed. Indeed, in the instance here given, they must be in-

* Craig, *Theologiæ Christ. Principia Mathematica*, London, 1699, 4to.

† This gradual weakening of the *external evidence* hath in fact actually happened; and was occasioned by the loss of several ancient testimonies, both Pagan and Christian, for the truth of Revelation; which learned men, on several occasions, have frequently lamented. This is the only way, I suppose, the *external evidence* can weaken.—As it is of the nature of *true Religion* to suffer by time, so it is of the nature of the *false* to gain by it. “ *L’Antiquité convient à la Religion* (says the learned President *de Montesquieu*) “ *parce que souvent nous croyons plus les choses à mesure qu’elles sont plus reculées; car nous n’avons pas dans la tête des idées accessoires tirées de ces temps-la, qui puissent les contredire.*” *L’Esprit des Loix*, lib. xxvi. c. 2. For whatever Religion, thus circumstanced, the Writer had then in his thoughts, he must needs suppose it to be a false one; it being nonsense to suppose the true should ever be attended with any *external evidence* which argued it of falsehood.

forced

forced in conjunction before any conclusion can be drawn for the truth of the Revelation in question. But were there no other benefit arising from the cultivation of the *internal* evidence than the gaining, by it, a more perfect knowledge of God's word; this, sure, would be enough to engage us in a vigorous prosecution of it. That this is one of its fruits I need not tell such as are acquainted with its nature. And it is not without occasion I take notice of this advantage: for who, in this long controversy between us and the Deists, hath not applied to certain advocates of Revelation, what was formerly said of *Arnobius* and *Lactantius*, that they undertook the defence of Christianity before they understood it? A misfortune which probably, the more careful study of the *internal* evidence would have prevented; because no one, well versed in *that*, could have continued ignorant of so important a principle, as that THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION IS OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Notwithstanding these superior advantages, it hath so happened, that the *internal* evidence hath been hitherto used as an introduction only to the *external*: and while by the *latter*, men have proved our Religion actually divine, they have gone no further with the *former*, than to shew it worthy indeed of such original.

What may have occasioned this neglect, is not so easy to say. Perhaps it was because Writers have, in general, imagined that the difficulties of prosecuting the *internal* method to effect, are not so easily surmounted as those which attend the other; as supposing that the Writer on the *external* evidence hath only need of the usual provision of church-history, common

diligence, and judgment, to become master of his subject; while the reasoner on the *internal* proof, must, besides these, have a thorough knowledge of human Nature, civil Policy, the universal history of Mankind, an exact idea of the *Mosaic* and *Christian* Dispositions cleared from the froth and grounds of school-subtilties, and church-systems; and, above all, should be blessed with a certain sagacity, to investigate the relations of human actions, through all the combinations of natural, civil, and moral complexities. What may suggest this conclusion is, their reflecting, that, in the *external* evidence, each circumstance, that makes for the truth of revealed Religion, is seen to do so, as soon as known: so that the chief labour, here, is to search and pick out such, and to place them in their proper light and situation; but that, in prosecuting the *internal* evidence, the case is widely different: a circumstance in the frame and composition of this Religion, which perhaps, some time or other, may be discovered to be a Demonstration of its divinity, shall be so far from being generally thought assistant in its proof, that it shall be esteemed, by most, a prejudice against it: of which, I suppose, the subject of the following discourse will afford a remarkable example. And no wonder, that a Religion of divine original, constituted to serve many admirable ends of Providence, should be full of such complicated mysteries, as filled the learned Apostle with astonishment. On the other hand, this Religion being for the use of man, we need not despair, when we have attained a proper knowledge of man's nature, and the dependencies thereon, of making still growing discoveries, on the *internal* evidence, of the divinity of its original.

Now, though all this may be true; and that, consequently, it would appear a childish arrogance in an ordinary writer, after having seen the difficulties attending this method, to hope to overcome them, by the qualities here said to be required; yet no modest searcher after truth need be discouraged. For there are in revealed Religion, besides those interior marks of truth, above described, which require the delicate operation of a great Genius and master-workman to bring out and polish, others also, no less illustrious, but more univocal marks of truth, which God hath been pleased to impress upon his Dispensations; which require no great qualities, but humility, and love of truth, in him, who would from thence attempt

To vindicate the ways of God to Man.

The Subject of this Discourse is one of those illustrious marks: from which, the discoverer claims no merit from any long, learned, or laborious search. It is honour enough for him that he is the first who brings it out to observation; if he be indeed the first. For the demonstration is so strong and beautiful, and at the same time appears to be so easy and simple, that one cannot tell whether the pleasure of the discovery, or the wonder that it is now to make, be the greater.

The Medium, I employ, is the Omission of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, in the laws and religion Moses delivered to the Jewish people. By this, I pretend to carry the internal evidence much further than usual; even to the height of which it is capable, moral demonstration.

Why I chuse to begin with the defence of *Moses*, is from observing a notion to have spread very much of late, even amongst many who would be thought *Christians*, that the truth of Christianity is independent of the *jewish* Dispensation: a notion, which was, till now, peculiar to the *Socinians*; who go so far as to maintain*, that the knowledge of the *Old Testament* is not absolutely necessary for *Christians*: and, those who profess to think more soberly, are generally gone into an opinion that the truth of the *jewish* Religion is impossible to be proved but upon the truth of the *Christian*. As to the first sort of people, if they really imagine Christianity hath no dependance on *Judaism*, they deserve our compassion, as being plainly ignorant of the very elements of the Religion they profess; however suitable the opinion may be to a modern fashionable notion, not borrowed from, but the same with, the *Socinian*, that *Christianity is only the republication of the religion of Nature*. As for the more sober, it is reasonable to think, that they fell into the mistake from a view of difficulties, in the *jewish* Dispensation, which they judged too stubborn to be removed. I may pretend then to their thanks, if I succeed, by coming so seasonably to their relief; and freeing their reasonings from a vicious circle, which would first prove the *christian* by the *jewish*; and then the *jewish*, by the *christian* Religion.

Why I chuse this medium, namely, *the omission of a future state in the jewish Dispensation*, to prove its divine original is;

* Cuper, advers. Tract. Theol. Polit. lib. i.

First, for the sake of the DEISTS: being enabled hereby to shew them, 1. That this very circumstance of *Omission*, which they pretend to be such an imperfection, as makes the Dispensation unworthy the Author to whom we ascribe it, is, in truth, a Demonstration that God only could give it. 2. That these several important passages of Scripture, which they charge with *obscurity, injustice and contradiction*, are, indeed, full of *light, equity, and concord*. 3. That their high notions of the antiquity of the Religion and Learning of the *Ægyptians*, which they incessantly produce, as their *palmary argument*, to confront and overturn the history of *Moses*, do, in an invincible manner, confirm and support it.

Secondly, For the sake of the JEWS; who will, at the same time, be shewn, that the nature of the THEOCRACY here delivered, and the OMISSION of the doctrine of a future state in that Dispensation, evidently obliges them to look for a more perfect revelation of God's Will.

Thirdly, For the sake of the SOCINIANS; who will find, that *Christianity* agrees neither with itself, nor with *Judaism*; neither with the Dispensations of God, nor the declared purpose of his Son's Mission, on their principle, of its being only a *republication of the religion of Nature*.

In this Demonstration, therefore, which we suppose very little short of *mathematical certainty*, and to which nothing but a *mere physical possibility* of the contrary can be opposed, we demand only this single

Postulatum, that hath all the clearness of self-evidence ; namely,

“ That a skilful Lawgiver, establishing a Religion,
 “ and civil Policy, acts with certain views, and for
 “ certain ends ; and not capriciously, or without
 “ purpose or design.”

This being granted, we erect our Demonstration on these three very clear and simple propositions :

1. “ THAT TO INCULCATE THE DOCTRINE OF A
 “ FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISH-
 “ MENTS, IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING
 “ OF CIVIL SOCIETY.
2. “ THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST
 “ WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY,
 “ HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING AND
 “ TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF
 “ SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.
3. “ THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE
 “ OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IS NOT TO
 “ BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF,
 “ THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.”

Propositions so clear and evident, that, one would think, we might directly proceed to our Conclusion,

THAT THEREFORE THE LAW OF MOSES IS OF
 DIVINE ORIGINAL.

Which, one or both of the two following SYLLOGISMS will evince.

I. Whatsoever

I. Whatsoever Religion and Society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

The *Jewish* Religion and Society had no future state for their support :

Therefore, the *Jewish* Religion and Society were supported by an extraordinary Providence.

And again,

II. The ancient Lawgivers universally believed that such a Religion could be supported only by an extraordinary Providence.

MOSES, an ancient Lawgiver, versed in all the wisdom of Egypt, purposely instituted such a Religion.

Therefore, *Moses* believed his Religion was supported by an extraordinary Providence.

But, so capricious are men's passions, now for PARADOX, and now for SYSTEM, that these, with all their evidence, have need of a very particular defence; Libertines and Unbelievers denying the MAJOR propositions of both these *Syllogisms*; and many Bigots amongst Believers, the MINOR of the first. These passions, however different with regard to the objects that excite them, and to the subjects in which they are found, have this in common, that they never rise but on the ruins of Reason. The business of the Religionist being to establish, if his Understanding be too much narrowed, he contracts himself into *System*: and that of the Infidel, to overturn; if his will be deprived,

depraved, he, as naturally, runs out into *Paradoxes*. Slavish, or licentious thinking, the two extremes of free enquiry, shuts them up from all instructive views, or makes them fly out beyond all reasonable limits. And as extremes fall easily into one another, we sometimes see the opposite writers change hands: the Infidel, to shew something like coherence in his *paradoxes*, represents them as the several parts of a *system*; and the Religionist, to give a relish to his *system*, powders it with *paradoxes*: in which arts, two late *Hibernians**, the heroes of their several parties, were very notably practised and distinguished.

It was not long then before I found, that the discovery of this important truth would engage me in a full dilucidation of the *Premises* of the two *Syllogisms*: the *Major* of both requiring a severe search into the civil Policy, Religion, and Philosophy of ancient times; and the *Minor*, a detailed account of the nature and genius of the *jewish* Dispensation. The present volume † is destined to the first part of this labour; and the following ‡, to the second. Where, in removing the objections which lie in our way, on both sides, we shall be obliged to stretch the inquiry high and wide. But this, always, with an eye to the direction of our great master of reason §, to endeavour, through-

* See the discourse called Nazarenus—An Epistolary Discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul.—Dissertationes Cyprianicæ, &c.

† Books I. II. III.

‡ Books IV. V. VI.

§ Hooker.

out the body of this discourse, that every former part may give strength unto all that follow, and every latter bring some light unto all before.

SECT. II.

THE first proposition, THAT TO INCULCATE THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY, I shall endeavour to prove, from the nature of man, and the genius of civil society.

The general appetite of self-preservation being most indispensable to every animal, nature hath made it the strongest of all. And though, in the rational, this faculty alone might be supposed sufficient to answer the end, for which that appetite is bestowed on the others, yet, the better to secure that end, nature hath given man, likewise, a very considerable share of the same instinct, with which she hath endowed brutes so admirably to provide for their preservation. Now whether it was some *plastic Nature* that was here in fault, which *Bacon* says, *knows not how to keep a mean**, or, that it was all owing to the perverse use of human liberty, certain it is, that, borne away with the lust of gratifying this appetite, man, in a state of nature, soon ran into very violent excesses; and never thought he had sufficiently provided for his own being, till he had deprived his fellows of the free enjoyment of theirs. Hence, all those evils of mutual

* *Modum tenere nescia est.* Augm. Scient.

violence, rapine, and slaughter, which, in a state of nature, where all are equal, must needs be abundant. Because, though man, in this state, was not without a law, which exacted punishment on evil doers, yet, the administration of that law not being in common hands, but either in the person offended, who being a party would be apt to enforce the punishment to excess; or else in the hands of every one, as the offence was against all, and affected the good of each not immediately or directly, would be executed remissly. And very often, where both these executors of the law of nature were disposed, the one to be impartial, and the other not remiss in the administration of justice, they would yet want sufficient power to enforce it. Which together would so much inflame the evils above mentioned, that they would soon become as general, and as intolerable, as the *Hobbeist* represents them in that state to be, were it not for the restraining principle of RELIGION, which kept men from running into the confusion necessarily consequent on the principle of inordinate self-love. But yet Religion could not operate with sufficient efficacy, for want, as we observed before, of a common Arbiter, who had impartiality fairly to apply the rule of right, and power to enforce its operations. So that these two PRINCIPLES were in endless jar; in which, Justice generally came by the worst. It was therefore found necessary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE as the Ally of Religion, to turn the balance.

*Jura inventa metu injusti, fateare necesse est,
Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.*

Thus

Thus was *Society* invented for a remedy against injustice; and a *Magistrate*, by mutual consent, appointed, to give a sanction “to that common measure, to which, reason teaches us, that creatures “of the same rank and species, promiscuously born “to the same advantages of nature and to the use “of the same faculties, have all an equal right*.” Where it is to be observed, that though society provides for all those conveniencies and accommodations of a more elegant life, which man must have been content to have lived without, in a state of nature; yet it is more than probable that these were never thought of when Society was first established †; but that they were the mutual violences and injustices, at length become intolerable, which set men upon contriving this generous remedy: because Evil felt hath a much stronger influence on the mind than Good imagined; and the means of removing the one is much easier discovered, than the way to procure the other. And this, by the wise disposition of the Creator; the avoiding pain being necessary to our nature; not so, the procuring pleasure. Besides, the idea of those unexperienced conveniencies would be, at best, very

* Locke.

† Though the judicious Hooker thinks those advantages were principally intended, when man first entered into society: *this was the cause*, says he, *of men's uniting themselves at first into politique societies*. Eccl. Pol. l. i. § 10. p. 25. l. 1. His master Aristotle, though extremely concise, seems to hint, that this was but the secondary end of civil society, and that That was the first, which we make to be so. His words are: γινομένη μὲν ἔν τῷ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, ἕστα δὲ τῷ εὖ ζῆν. Pol. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 396. B. Tom. III. Paris, 1639. fol.

obscure:

obscure: and how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that Society would bestow them, we may guess by observing, how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy these blessings, know or reflect that they are owing to society, or how it procures them; because it doth it neither immediately nor directly. But they would have a very lively sense of evils felt; and could see that Society was the remedy, because the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes so. Yet because *civil Society* so greatly improves human life, this improvement may be called, and not unaptly, the *secondary end* of that Convention. Thus, as *Aristotle* accurately observes in the words below, that which was at first constituted for the sake of *living*, is carried on for the sake of *happy living*.

This is further seen from fact. For we find those savage nations*, which happen to live peaceably out of society, have never once entertained a thought of coming into it, though they perceive all the advantages of that improved condition, in their civilized neighbours, round about them.

Civil Society thus established, from this time, as the poet sings,

----- *absistere bello*
Oppida ceperunt munire, & ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.

* See § V. iv. 2. where it is shewn, how it might happen that men, in a state of nature, might live together in peace; though we have there given the reasons why they very rarely do.

But

But as before bare RELIGION was no preservative against moral disorders; so now, SOCIETY alone, would be equally unable to prevent them.

I. 1. For *first*, its laws can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open transgression; while what is done amiss in private, though equally tending to the public hurt, escapes their animadversion; and man, since his entering into Society, would have greatly improved his practice in this secret way of mischief. For now an effectual security being provided against *open violence*, and the inordinate principle of self-love being still the same, *secret craft* was the art to be improved; and the guards of Society inviting men to a careless security, what advantages this would afford to those hidden mischiefs which civil laws could not censure, is easy to conceive.

2. But, *secondly*, the influence of civil Laws cannot, in all cases, be extended even thus far, namely, to restrain *open transgression*. It cannot *then*, when the severe prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the case when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual appetites. Hence it hath come to pass, that no great and opulent Community could ever punish *fornication*, in such a sort as its ill influence on Society was confessed to deserve: because it was always found, that a severe restraint of this, opened the way to more flagitious lusts.

3. The very attention of civil Laws to their principal object occasions a further inefficacy in their operations. To understand this we must consider, that the care of the State is for the WHOLE, under which
individuals

individuals are considered but in the second place, as accessories only to that *whole*; the consequence of which is, that, for the sake of the Aggregate, individuals are sometimes left neglected; which happens when *general*, rather than *particular* views ingross the public attention. Now the care of *Religion* is for PARTICULARS; and a *Whole* has but the second place in its concern. But this is only touched upon to shew, in passing, the natural remedy for the defects here explained.

4. But this was not all, there was a further inefficacy in human Laws: the Legislature, in enquiring into the mutual duties of Citizens, arising from their equality of condition, found those duties to be of two kinds: the first, they entitled, the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION; because civil Laws could readily, and commodiously, and were, of necessity, required to enforce their observance. The other they called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; not, that morality does not as strongly exact them, but because, civil Laws could not conveniently take notice of them; and, that they were supposed not so immediately and vitally to affect the being of Society. Of this latter kind are gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c. Concerning such, civil Laws, for these reasons, are generally silent. And yet, though it may be true, that these duties, which human Laws thus overlook, may not so directly affect Society, it is very certain, that their violation brings on as fatal, though not so swift destruction, as that of the duties of perfect obligation. A very competent judge, and who also speaks the sentiment of Antiquity in this matter, hath not scrupled to say: “*Ut scias per se expetendam esse grati*
“ *animi*

“ *animi adfectionem*, per se fugienda res est *ingratum*
 “ esse : quoniam nihil æque concordiam humani generis
 “ dissociat ac distrahit quam hoc vitium *.”

5. But still further, besides these duties both of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation, for the encouraging and enforcing of which civil Society was invented ; Society itself begot and produced a *new set of duties*, which are, to speak in the mode of the Legislature, of *imperfect obligation* : the first and principal of which is that antiquated forgotten virtue called the LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY.

6. But *lastly*, Society not only introduced a new set of duties, but likewise increased and inflamed, to an infinite degree, those inordinate appetites, for whose correction it was invented and introduced : like some kind of powerful medicines, which, at the very time they are working a cure, heighten the malignity of the disease. For our wants increase, in proportion as the arts of life advance. But in proportion to our wants, so is our uneasiness ;—to our uneasiness, so our endeavours to remove it—to our endeavours, so the weakness of *human restraint*. Hence it is evident, that in a STATE OF NATURE, where little is consulted but the support of our being, our wants must be few, and our appetites, in proportion, weak ; and that in CIVIL SOCIETY, where the arts of life are cultivated, our wants must be many, and our appetites, in proportion, strong.

II. Thus far concerning the imperfection of civil Society, with regard to the administration of that

* Seneca de Benef. lib. iv. cap. 18.

power which it hath, namely of *punishing* Transgressors. We shall next consider its much greater imperfection with regard to that power which it wanteth; namely of *rewarding* the Obedient.

The two great sanctions of all Law and Command are REWARD and PUNISHMENT. These are generally called the two hinges, on which all kinds of Government turn. And so far is certain, and apparent to the common sense of mankind, that whatever laws are not enforced by both these sanctions, will never be observed in any degree sufficient to carry on the ends of civil Society.

Yet, I shall now shew, from the original constitution and nature of this Society, that it neither had, nor could enforce, the SANCTION OF REWARD.

But, to avoid mistakes, I desire it may be observed, that by *reward*, must needs here be meant, *such as is conferred on every one for obeying the laws of his country*; not such as is bestowed on particulars, for any eminent service: as by *punishment* we understand *that which is inflicted on every one for transgressing the laws*; not *that* which is imposed on particulars, for neglecting to do all the service in their power.

I make no doubt but this will be called a paradox; nothing being more common in the mouths of politicians*, than *that the sanctions of reward and punishment are the two pillars of civil government*; and all the modern *Utopias* and ancient systems of speculative politics derive the whole vigour of their laws from

* Neque solum ut Solonis dictum usurpem, qui & sapientissimus fuit ex septem, & legum scriptor solus ex septem. Is rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, premio & pœnâ. Cic. ad Brutum, Ep. 15. Edit. Oxon. 4to. T. IX. p. 85, 86.

these two sources. In support then of my assertion, permit me to inforce the two following propositions :

I. That, by the *original constitution* of civil Government, the sanction of rewards *was not* established by it.

II. That by the very *nature* of civil Government they *could not* be established.

I. The truth of the first proposition appears from hence. On entering into Society, it was stipulated, between the Magistrate and People, that *protection* and *obedience* should be the reciprocal conditions of each other. When, therefore, a citizen obeys the laws, that debt on Society is discharged by the protection it affordeth him. But in respect to *disobedience*, the proceeding is not analogous; (though protection, as the condition of obedience, implies the withdrawing of it, for disobedience;) and for these reasons: The effect of withdrawing protection must be either expulsion from the Society, or the exposing the offender to all kind of licence, from others, in it. Society could not practise the first, without bringing the body politic into a consumption; nor the latter, without throwing it into convulsions. Besides, the first is no punishment at all, but by accident; it being only the leaving one Society to enter into another: and the second is a very inadequate punishment; for though all obedience be the same, and so, *uniform protection* a proper return for it; yet *disobedience* being of various kinds and degrees, the withdrawing protection, in this latter sense, would be too great a punishment for some crimes, and too small for others.

This being the case, it was stipulated that the transgressor should be subject to pecuniary mulcts, corporal
 P 2 infliction,

infliction, mutilation of members, and capital severities. Hence arose the Sanction, and the *only sanction* of civil Laws: for, that protection is no reward, in the sense which these are punishments, is plain from hence, that the one is of the essence of Society itself; the other an occasional adjunct. But this will further appear by considering the opposite to protection, which is *expulsion*, or banishment; for this is the *natural* consequence of withdrawing protection. Now this, as we said, is no punishment but by accident: and so the State understood it; as we may collect, even from their manner of employing it *as a punishment* on offenders: for banishment is of universal use, with other punishments, in all societies. Now where withdrawing protection is inflicted as a punishment, the practice of all States hath been to retain their right to obedience from the banished member; though, according to the nature of the thing, considered alone, that right be really discharged; obedience and protection, as we observed, being reciprocal. But it was necessary all States should act in this manner when they inflicted exile as a punishment, it being no punishment but by accident, when the claim to subjection was remitted with it. They had a *right* to act thus; because it was inflicted on an *offender*; who by his very offence had forfeited all claim of advantage from that *reciprocal condition*.

II. The second proposition is, that by the nature of civil government, *the sanction of rewards could not be enforced by it*: my reason is, because Society could neither distinguish the objects of its favour; nor reward them, though they were distinguished.

1. First,

1. First, *Society could not distinguish the objects of its favour.* To inflict punishment, there is no need of knowing the *motives* of the offender; but judicially to confer reward on the obedient, there is.

All that civil judicatures do in punishing is to find whether the act was *wilfully committed*. They enquire not into the intention or motives any further, or otherwise, than as they are the marks of a *voluntary act*: and having found it so, they concern themselves no more with the man's motives or principles of acting; but punish, without scruple, in confidence of the offender's demerit. And this with very good reason; because no one of a sound mind, can be ignorant of the principal offences against right, or of the malignity of those offences, but by some sottish negligence which hath hindered his information; or some brutal passion which hath prejudiced his judgment; both which are highly faulty, and deserve civil punishment.

It is otherwise in rewarding abstinence, from transgression. Here the motive must be considered; because as *merely doing ill*, i.e. without any *particular* bad motive, deserves punishment, a crime in the case of wrong judgment being ever necessarily inferred; so *merely abstaining from ill*, i.e. without any *particular* good motive, cannot, for that very reason, have any merit.

In *judicially rewarding*, therefore, the *motives* must be known, but human judicatures cannot know them but by accident: it is only that tribunal, which searches the heart, that can penetrate thus far. We conclude, therefore, *that reward cannot, properly, be the sanction of human laws.*

If it should be said, that though rewards cannot be equitably administered, as punishments may, yet, nothing hinders but that, for the good of Society, all who observe the laws should be rewarded, as all who transgress the laws are punished;—The answer will lead us to the proof of the second part of this proposition.

2. That *Society could not reward, though it should discover the objects of its favour*; the reason is, because no Society can ever find a fund sufficient for that purpose, without raising it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward.

But the universal practice of Society confirms this reasoning, and is explained by it; the sanction of *punishments* only having, in all ages and places, been employed to secure the observance of civil laws. This was so remarkable a fact, that it could not escape the notice of a certain admirable *Wit* and studious observer of men and manners; who speaks of it as an universal defect: *Although we usually (says he) call reward and punishment the two hinges, upon which all government turns, yet I could never observe this maxim to be put in practice by any nation except that of Lilliput**. Thus he introduceth an account of the laws and customs of an *Utopian Constitution* of his own framing; and, for that matter, as good, perhaps, as any of the rest; and, had he intended it as a satire against such chimerical Commonwealths, nothing could have been more just. For all these political romancers, from *Plato* to this *Author*, make civil rewards and punishments *the two hinges of government*.

* Gulliver's Travels, Vol. i. p. 97.

I have often wondered what it was, that could lead them from fact, and universal practice, in so fundamental a point. But without doubt it was this: The design of such sort of writings is to give a perfect pattern of civil Government; and to supply the fancied defects in real Societies. The end of government coming first under consideration; and the general practice of Society seeming to declare this end to be only, what in truth it is, *security to our temporal liberty and property*; the simplicity of it displeased, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined, that, by enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the structure; and, therefore, formed a romantic project of making civil Society serve for all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing. And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of civil Government, they jumbled together all sorts of Societies into one; and confounded the *religious*, the *literary*, the *mercantile*, the *convivial*, with the CIVIL. Whoever reads them carefully, if indeed they be worth reading carefully, will find that the errors they abound in are all of this nature; and that they arise from the losing, or never having had, a true idea of the simple plan of civil Government: a circumstance which, as we have shewn elsewhere*, hath occasioned many wrong judgments concerning it. No wonder, then, that this mistake concerning the end of civil Society, drew after it others, concerning the means; and this, amongst the rest, that *reward was one of the sanctions of human laws*.

On the whole then, it appears, that civil Society hath not, in itself, the *Sanction of rewards*, to secure the

* See The Alliance between Church and State, Vol. VII.

observance of its laws. So true, in this sense likewise, is the observation of *St. Paul*, that THE LAW WAS NOT MADE FOR THE RIGHTEOUS, BUT FOR THE UNRULY AND DISOBEDIENT.

But it being evident, that the joint sanctions of rewards and punishments are but just sufficient to secure the tolerable observance of Right (the mistaken opinion, that these are the two hinges of government, arising from that evidence) it follows, that, AS RELIGION ONLY CAN SUPPLY THE SANCTION OF REWARDS, WHICH SOCIETY NEEDS, AND HATH NOT; RELIGION IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Thus, on the whole we see,

I. That Society, by its own proper power, cannot provide for the observance of above one third part of moral duties; and of that third, but imperfectly. We see likewise, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlarges the duty of the Citizen, at the same time that it lessens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We see, which is a thing of far greater consequence, that Society totally wants one of those two sanctions which are owned by all to be the necessary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be supported.

To supply these wants and imperfections, some other coercive power must be added, (which hath its influence on the mind of man) to keep society from running back into confusion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which, teaching an overruling Providence, the Rewarder of good men, and the Punisher of ill, can oblige to the duties of imper-

fect

fect obligation, which human laws overlook: and teaching also, that this Providence is omniscient, that it sees the most secret actions and intentions of men, and hath given laws for the perfecting their nature, will oblige to those duties of *perfect obligation*, which human laws cannot reach, or sufficiently enforce.

Thus have we explained in general the mutual aid, *religion* and *civil policy* lend to one another: not unlike that which two Allies, in the same quarrel, may reciprocally receive against a common enemy: while one party is closely pressed, the other comes up to its relief; disengages the first; gives it time to rally and repair its force: by this time the assisting party is pushed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which it relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation. From henceforth the two parties act in conjunction, and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a stand.

Having thus proved the service of Religion in general to Society; and shewn after what manner it is performed, we are enabled to proceed to the proof of the proposition in question: For by what hath been said, it appears that Religion doth this service solely, *as it teacheth a Providence, the rewarder of good men, and the punisher of evil*: so that although it were possible, as I think it is not*, that there could be such a thing as a Religion not founded on the doctrine of a Providence; yet, it is evident, such a

* St. Paul supposes there can no more be a Religion without a Providence, than without a God: *He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.* Hebr. xi. 6.

Religion would be of no manner of use to Society. Whatsoever therefore is necessary for the support of this doctrine is immediately necessary for the well-being of Society. Now the doctrine of A FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments is absolutely and indispensably necessary for the support of the general doctrine of providence, under its present dispensations in this life; as we shall now shew.

Religion establishing a Providence, the rewarder of virtue, and the punisher of vice, men naturally expect to find the constant and univocal marks of such an administration. But the history of mankind, nay even of every one's own neighbourhood, would soon inform the most indiligent observer, that the affairs of men wear a face of great irregularity: the scene, that ever and anon presents itself, being of distressed virtue, and prosperous wickedness; which unavoidably brings the embarrassed Religionist to the necessity of giving up his belief, or finding out the solution of these untoward appearances. His first reflexion might perhaps be with the poet* :

- - - - - omnia rebar
 Consilio firmata Dei; qui lege moveri
 Sidera, qui fruges diverso tempore nasci,—
 Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
 Adspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
 Vexarique pios, rursus LABEFACATA CADEBAT
 RELIGIO. - - - -

But, on second thoughts, Reason, that, from the admirable frame and harmony of the material universe,

* Claud.

taught him that there must needs be a superintending Providence, to influence that order which all its parts preserve, for the sake of the Whole, in their continued revolutions, would soon instruct him in the absurdity of supposing, that the same care did not extend to Man, a creature of a far nobler nature than the most considerable of inanimate beings. And therefore human affairs not being dispensed, at present, agreeably to that superintendence, he must conclude, that Man shall exist after death, and be brought to a future reckoning in another life, where all accounts will be set even, and all the present obscurities and perplexities in the ways of Providence unfolded and explained. From hence Religion acquires resistless force and splendor; and rises on a solid and unshaken basis*.

Now this doctrine of a FUTURE STATE being the only support of Religion under the present and ordinary dispensations of Providence, we conclude (which was what we had to prove) that the *inculcating*

* Hear an unexceptionable evidence to this whole matter: Et quidem (says the free-thinking Lord Herbert) præmium bonis, & supplicium malis, vel hac invita, vel post hanc vitam dari, statuebant Gentiles.—Nihil magis congruum naturæ divinæ esse docuerant, tum philosophorum, tum theologorum Gentilium præcipuorum scholæ, quam ut bona bonis, mala malis remetiretur Deus. Cæterum quum id quoque cernerent, quemadmodum viri boni calamitatibus miserisque oppressi heic jacerent; mali improbique e contra lautitiis omnibus affluerent; certissimis ex justitia bonitateque divina argumentis deductis, bonis post hanc vitam præmium condignum, malis pœnam dari credebant: SECUS ENIM SI ESSET, NULLAM NEQUE JUSTITIÆ NEQUE BONITATIS DIVINÆ RATIONEM CONSTARE POSSE. *De religione Gentilium, cap. Præmium vel pœna,*

this

this doctrine is NECESSARY to the well-being of Society.

That it was the general sentiment of mankind, we shall see hereafter; where it will be shewn, that there never was, in any time or place, a civilized People (the *jewish* only excepted) who did not found their Religion on this doctrine, as being conscious it could not be sustained without it. And as for the necessity of Religion itself to Society, the very enemies of all Religion are the loudest to confess it: for, from this apparent truth, the Atheist of old formed his famous argument against the divine origin of Religion; which makes so great a figure in the common systems of infidelity. Here then, even on our adversary's confession, we might rest our cause; but that we find (so inconstant and perverse is irreligion) some modern Apologists for Atheism have abandoned the system of their predecessors, and chosen rather to give up an argument against the divine original of religion, than acknowledge the civil use of it; which with much frankness and confidence they have adventured to deny.

These therefore having endeavoured to cut away the very ground we stand upon, in proof of our proposition, it will be proper to examine their pretensions.

SECT. III.

THE three great Advocates for this paradox are commonly reckoned POMPONATIUS, CARDAN, and BAYLE; who are put together, without distinction: whereas nothing is more certain than that, although
Cardan

Cardan and *Bayle* indeed defended it, *Pomponatius* was of a very different opinion: but *Bayle* had entered him into this service; and so great is *Bayle's* authority, that nobody perceived the delusion. It will be but justice then to give *Pomponatius* a fair hearing, and let him speak for himself.

This learned *Italian*, a famous *Peripatetic* of the fifteenth century, wrote a treatise* to prove that, on the principles of *Aristotle*, it could not be proved that the soul was immortal: but the doctrine of the mortality of the soul being generally thought to have very pernicious consequences, he conceived it lay upon him to say something to that objection. In his xiiiith chapter, therefore, he enumerates those consequences; and in the xivth, gives distinct answers to each of them. That which supposeth his doctrine to affect society, is expressed in these words: “*Obj. 2.* “ in the second place, a man persuaded of the mortality of the soul ought in no case, even in the most “ urgent, to prefer death to life: And so, fortitude, “ which teaches us to despise death, and, when our “ country, or the public good requires, even to chuse

* *De Immortalitate Animæ*, printed in 12mo, An. 1534. It is of him chiefly that the celebrated *Melchior Canus* seems to speak, in the following words: “*Audivimus* “ *Italos quosdam, qui suis & Aristoteli & Averroï tantum* “ *temporis dant, quantum sacris literis ii, qui maximè sacra* “ *doctrina delectantur; tantum vero fidei, quantum Apos-* “ *tolis & Evangelistis ii qui maximè sunt in Christi doctri-* “ *nam religiosi. Ex quo nata sunt in Italia pestifera illa* “ *dogmata de mortalitate animi, & divina circa res humanas* “ *improvidentia, si verum est quod dicitur.” Opera,* l. x. c. 5. p. 446. *Colon.* 1605, 8vo.

“ it, would be no more. Nor on such principles
 “ should we hazard life for a friend: on the contrary,
 “ we should commit any wickedness rather than
 “ undergo the loss of it: which is contrary to what
 “ *Aristotle* teacheth in his *Ethics**.” His reply to
 this, in the following chapter, is that *virtue requires*
we should die for our country or our friends; and
that virtue is never so perfect as when it brings no
dower with it: But then he subjoins, “ Philosophers,
“ and the learned, only know what pleasures the
“ practice of virtue can procure; and what misery.
“ attends ignorance and vice:—but men not under-
“ standing the excellence of virtue, and deformity of
“ vice, would commit any wickedness rather than sub-
“ mit to death: to bridle therefore their unruly appe-
“ tites, they were taught to be influenced by hope of
“ reward, and fear of punishment †.”—This is enough
 to shew what *Pomponatius* thought of the necessity
 of Religion to the State. He gives up so much of

* *Secundò, quia stante animi humani mortalitate, homo in nullo casu, quantumcunque urgentissimo, deberet eligere mortem: & sic removeretur fortitudo, quæ præcipit contemnere mortem, & quod pro patria & bono publico debemus mortem eligere: neque pro amico deberemus exponere animam nostram; imo quodcunque scelus & nefas perpetrare magis quam mortem subire: quod est contra Arist. 3 *Ethic.* & 9 ejusdem. P. 99.*

† *Soli enim philosophi & studiosi, ut dicit—Arist. 6 *Ethic.* sciunt quantam delectationem generent virtutes, & quantam miseriam ignorantia & vitia.—Sed quod homines non cognoscentes excellentiam virtutis & fœditatem vitii, omne scelus perpetrarent, priusquam mori: quare ad refrænandum diras hominum cupiditates, data est spes præmii & timor punitionis. P. 119.*

the objection as urges the ill consequence of the doctrine of the mortality to mankind in general; but in so doing hath not betrayed the cause he undertook; which was to prove that the belief of the mortality of the soul would have no ill influence on the practice of a learned Peripatetic: he pretends not that it would have no evil influence on the gross body of mankind to the prejudice of Society. This appears from the nature and design of the treatise; written entirely on peripatetic principles, to explain a point in that philosophy: by the force of which explanation, whoever was persuaded of the mortality of the soul, must give his assent on those principles; principles only fitted to influence learned men. It was his business therefore to examine, what effects this belief would have on such, and on such only. And this, it must be owned, he hath done with dexterity enough. But that this belief would be most pernicious to the body of mankind in general, he confesses with all ingenuity. And as his own words are the fullest proof that he thought with the rest of the world, concerning the influence of Religion, and particularly of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, on Society, I shall beg leave to transcribe them at large. “ There are
“ some men of so ingenuous and well framed a
“ nature, that they are brought to the practice of
“ virtue from the sole consideration of its dignity;
“ and are kept from vice on the bare prospect of its
“ baseness: but such excellent persons are very rare.
“ Others there are of a somewhat less heroic turn
“ of mind; and these, besides the dignity of virtue,
“ and the baseness of vice, are worked upon by fame
“ and honours, by infamy and disgrace, to shun evil
“ and

“ and persevere in good: these are of the second
“ class of men. Others again are kept in order by
“ the hope of some real benefit; or the dread of corporal
“ punishment; wherefore that such may follow virtue,
“ the Politician hath contrived to allure them by
“ dignities, possessions, and things of the like nature;
“ inflicting mulcts, degradations, mutilations, and
“ capital punishments, to deter them from wickedness:
“ There are yet others of so intractable and perverse
“ a spirit, that nothing even of this can move them,
“ as daily experience shews; for these, therefore, it
“ was, that the Politician invented *the doctrine of a*
“ *future state*; where eternal rewards are reserved for
“ the virtuous, and eternal punishments, which have
“ the more powerful influence of the two, for the
“ wicked. For the greater part of those who live
“ well, do so, rather for fear of the punishment, than
“ out of appetite to the reward: for misery is better
“ known to man, than that immeasurable good which
“ Religion promiseth: And therefore as this last con-
“ trivance may be directed to promote the welfare of
“ men of all conditions and degrees, the Legislator,
“ intent on public good, and seeing a general propen-
“ sity to evil, established the doctrine of the IMMOR-
“ TALITY OF THE SOUL. Little solicitous for
“ *truth*, in all this, but intent only on *utility*, that he
“ might draw mankind to virtue. Nor is he to be
“ blamed; for as the physician deceives his patient in
“ order to restore his health, so the lawgiver invents
“ apologues to form the manners of his people.
“ Indeed were all of that noble turn of mind with
“ those enumerated under the first class, then would
“ they all, even on the supposition of the soul’s mor-
“ tality,

“tality, exactly perform their mutual duties to one another. *But as there are, upon the matter, none of this disposition*, he must, of necessity, have recourse to arts*, more fitted to the general disposition.”

* Aliqui sunt homines ingenui, & bene institutæ naturæ, adeo quod ad virtutem inducuntur ex sola virtutis nobilitate, & a vitio retrahuntur ex sola ejus fœditate: & hi optimè dispositi sunt, licet perpauca sunt. Aliqui vero sunt minus bene dispositi; & hi præter nobilitatem virtutis, & fœditatem vitii, ex præmiis, laudibus, & honoribus; ex pœnis, vituperiis, & infamia, studiosa operantur, & vitia fugiunt: & hi in secundo gradu sunt. Aliqui vero propter spem alicujus boni, & timore pœnæ corporalis studiosi efficiuntur: quare, ut tales virtutem consequantur, statuunt politici vel aurum, vel dignitatem, vel aliquid tale; ut vitia vero fugiant, statuunt vel in pecunia, vel in honore, vel in corpore, seu mutilando membrum, seu occidendo puniri. Quidam vero ex ferocitate & perversitate naturæ, nullo horum moventur, ut quotidiani docet experientia; ideo posuerunt virtuosus in alia vita præmia æterna, vitiosus vero æterna damna, quæ maxime terrent: majorque pars hominum, si bonum operatur, magis ex metu æterni damni quam spe æterni boni operatur bonum, cum damna sunt magis nobis cognita, quam illa bona æterna: & quoniam hoc ultimum ingenium omnibus hominibus potest prodesse; cujuscunque gradus sint, respiciens legislator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono, sanxit animam esse immortalem, non curans de veritate, sed tantum de probitate, ut inducat homines ad virtutem. Neque accusandus est politicus; sicut namque medicus multa fingit, ut ægro sanitatem restituat; sic politicus apologos format, ut cives rectificet.—Si omnes homines essent in illo primo gradu enumerato, stante etiam animorum mortalitate, studiosi fierent; sed quasi nulli sunt illius dispositionis; quare aliis ingeniis incedere necesse fuit.—Pag. 123, 124, 125.

After all this, it is surprizing that Mr. *Bayle* should so far mistake this book, as to imagine the author argues in it *against the usefulness of religion to society*: especially, when we consider that Mr. *Bayle* appears to have examined the book so nearly as to be able to confute a common error concerning it, namely, *that it was wrote to prove the mortality of the soul*: Whereas he shews, that it was wrote only to prove, that, on the principles of *Aristotle*, neither that, nor the contrary, could be demonstrated. But let us hear him; “ That which *Pomponatius* hath replied to the “ reasoning borrowed from hence, that the doctrine “ of the mortality of the soul would invite men to all “ sort of crimes, deserves to be considered *.” And then he produces those arguments of *Pomponatius*, which we have given above, *of the natural excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice; that happiness consists in the practice of the one, and misery in that of the other, &c.* These he calls *poor solutions*: Indeed *poor* enough, had it been, as Mr. *Bayle* supposes, *Pomponatius’s* design to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* of the soul did not invite the generality of men to wickedness: for the account given by *Pomponatius* himself of the origin of the contrary doctrine, shews, that, but for this, they would have run headlong into vice. But supposing the Peripatetic’s design to be, as indeed it was, to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* would have no ill influence on the learned followers of *Aristotle*, then these arguments,

* Ce que Pomponace a repondu à la raison empruntée de ce que le dogme de la mortalité de l’ame porteroit les hommes à toutes sortes de crimes, est digne de consideration. Dict. Hist. & Crit. Art. POMPONACE Rem. (H.)

which

which Mr. *Bayle* calls *poor ones*, will be found to have their weight. But he goes on, and tells us, *that Pomponatius brings a better argument from fact, where he takes notice of several, who denied the immortality of the soul, and yet lived as well as their believing neighbours.* This is indeed a good argument to the purpose, for which it is employed by *Pomponatius*; but whether it be so to that, for which, Mr. *Bayle* imagined, he employed it, shall be considered hereafter, when we come to meet with it again in this later writer's apology for atheism. But Mr. *Bayle* was so full of his own *favourite question*, that he did not give due attention to *Pomponatius's*; and having, as I observed above, refuted a vulgar error with regard to this famous tract, and imagining that the impiety, so generally charged on it, was solely founded in that error, he goes on insulting the enemies of *Pomponatius* in this manner: "If the charge of impiety, of which *Pomponatius* hath been accused, was only founded on his book *of the immortality of the soul*, we must needs say there was never any accusation more impertinent or a stronger instance of the iniquitous perversity of the persecutors of the philosophers*." But *Pomponatius* will not be so easily set clear: For let him think as he would concerning the soul, yet the account he gives of the origin of Religion, as the contrivance of statesmen, here produced, from this very tract *De immortalitate animæ*, is so highly impious, that his

* Si l'on n'a fondé les impietez, dont on l'accuse, que sur son livre *de l'immortalite de l'ame*, il n'y eut jamais d'accusation plus impertinente, que celle-la, ni qui soit une marque plus expresse de l'entetement inique des persecuteurs des philosophes.

enemies will be hardly persuaded to give it a softer name than downright atheism. Nor is it impiety in general, of which, we endeavour to acquit him, but only that species of it, which teaches *that Religion is useless to Society*. And this we think we have done; although it be by shewing him to have run into the opposite extreme, which would insinuate it was *the creature of politics*.

Cardan comes next to be considered: and him nobody hath injured. He, too, is under *Bayle's* delusion, concerning *Pomponatius*: For, writing on the same subject*, he borrows the Peripatetic's arguments to prove that *Religion was even pernicious to Society*. This was so bold a stroke, that *Mr. Bayle*, who generally follows him pretty closely, drops him here: Nor do I know that he ever had a second, except it was the unhappy philosopher of *Malmsbury*; who, scorning to argue upon the matter, imperiously pronounced, that he who presumed to propagate Religion in a Society, without leave of the Magistrate, was guilty of the crime of *Lese Majesty*, as introducing a power superior to the *Leviathan's*. But it would be unpardonable to keep the reader much longer on this poor lunatic *Italian*, in whom, as *Mr. Bayle* pleasantly observes, *sense was, at best, but an appendix to his folly* †.

Besides,

* *De immortalitate animorum liber*, Lugd. ap. Gryph. 1545; et *Opera omnia*, fol. Lugduni, 1663, Tom. II. p. 458.

† The charming picture he draws of himself, and which he excuses no otherwise than by laying the fault on his STARS, will hardly prejudice any one in favour of his opinions. How far it resembles any other of the brotherhood they best know, who have examined the genius of modern

Besides, there is little in that tract, but what he stole from *Pomponatius*; the strength of which, to support *Cardan's* paradox, hath been considered already; or what Mr. *Bayle* hath borrowed from him; the force of which shall be considered hereafter: But that little is so peculiarly his own, that as no other can claim the property, so no one hath hitherto usurped the use. Which yet, however, is remarkable; for there is no trash so worthless, but what some time or other finds a place in a Free-thinker's system. We will not despair then but that this paltry rubbish may one day or other have an honourable station in some of these fashionable fabrics. And, not to hinder its speedy preferment, I shall here give it the reader in its full force, without answer or reply. He brings the following argument to prove that the doctrine of the *immortality* of the soul is even destructive to society;—

“ From this flattering notion of a FUTURE STATE, ill
 “ men get opportunity to compass their wicked de-
 “ signs: and, on the same account, good men suffer
 “ themselves to be injuriously treated. Civil laws,
 “ relying

infidelity. However, thus he speaks of his own amiable turn of mind: “ In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis
 “ contemptorem, injuriæ illatæ memorem, invidum, tristem,
 “ insidiatorem, proditorem, magum, incantatorem, suorum
 “ osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitarium, inamœnum,
 “ austerum; sponte etiam divinantem, zelotypum, obscœ-
 “ num, lascivum, maledicum, varium, ancipitem, impurum,
 “ calumniatorem,” &c. We have had many *Free-thinkers*, but few such *Free-speakers*. But though these sort of writers are not used to give us so *direct* a picture of themselves, yet it hath been observed, that they have unawares copied from their own tempers, in the ungracious drawings they have made of HUMAN NATURE and RELIGION.

“relying on this fanciful assistance, relax their necessary severity; and *thus* is the opinion productive of much mischief to mankind*.” And then, by another argument as good, he shews the benefits accruing to the state from the belief of the soul’s mortality: “Those who maintain that the soul dies with the body, must needs be, by their principles, honester men than others, because they have a peculiar interest in preserving their reputation; this being the only future property they pretend to: And the Profession of the Soul’s mortality being generally esteemed as scandalous as that of usury, such men will be most exact and scrupulous in point of honour, as your usurer, to keep up the credit of his calling, is of all men the most religious observer of his word †.”

SECT. IV.

MR. BAYLE, the last supporter of this paradox, is of a very different character from these *Italian Sophists*: A writer, who, to the utmost strength and clearness of reasoning, hath added all the liveliness, and delicacy of wit: who, pervading human nature at his ease, struck into the province of PARADOX, as an exercise for the unwearied vigour of his mind: who, with a soul superior to the sharpest attacks of fortune, and a heart practised to the best philosophy, had not yet enough of real greatness to overcome

* *De immortalitate animorum*, cap. ii.

† Cap. xxxlii. ejusd. tract.

that last foible of superior minds, the temptation of honour, which the ACADEMIC EXERCISE OF WIT is conceived to bring to its professors.

A writer of this character will deserve a particular regard: for *paradoxes*, which in the hands of a *Toland* or a *Tindal* end in rank offensive impiety, will, under the management of a *BAYLE*, always afford something for use or curiosity: Thus, in the very work we are about to examine*, the many admirable observations on the nature and genius of polytheism, happen to be a full answer to all which the Author of *Christianity as old as the Creation* hath advanced against the use of Revelation. For a skilful chemist, though disappointed in his *grand magisterium*, yet often discovers, by the way, some useful and noble medicament; while the ignorant pretender to the art, not only loses his labour, but fills all about him with the poisonous steams of *sublimate*.

The *professed* design of Mr. *Bayle's* work is to enquire, *which is least hurtful to mankind, ancient idolatry, or modern atheism*: And had he confined himself to that subject, we had had no concern with him, but should have left him in the hands of Mess. *Jacquelot* and *Bernard*. I freely own they are both stark naught: All the difference is, that Atheism directly excludes and destroys the *true* sense of moral right and wrong; and Polytheism sets up a *false* species of it.

* *Pensées diverses, écrites à un docteur de Sorbonne à l'occasion de la comete qui parût au mois de Decembre, 1680. &—Continuation des Pensées diverses, &c. ou Reponse à plusieurs difficultez, &c.*

But the more particular, though less avowed, purpose of this elaborate treatise is to prove, that *Atheism is not destructive of society*; and here he falls under our notice; no distinct answer, that I know of, having been yet attempted to this part of his performance.

His arguments in support of this Paradox, are occasionally, and so without any method, interspersed throughout that large work: But, to give them all the advantage they are capable of, I have here collected and disposed them in such order, that they mutually support, and come in to the aid of one another.

It had been generally esteemed a proof of the destructive nature of Atheism to Society, that *this principle excludes the knowledge of moral good and evil*; such knowledge being, as will be seen, posterior to the knowledge of a God. His first argument therefore for the *innocence of Atheism* is,

I. “ That an Atheist may have an idea of the moral
“ difference between good and evil, because Atheists,
“ as well as Theists, may comprehend the first prin-
“ ciples of morals and metaphysics, from which this
“ difference may be deduced. And in fact (he says)
“ both the *Epicurean* atheist, who denied the provi-
“ dence of God, and the *Stratonic* atheist, who denied
“ his Being, had this idea *.”

This often repeated argument is so loosely expressed, that it is capable of many meanings; in some of which

* Voiez les Pensées diverses, cap. clxxviii. & suiv. & l'addition à ces Pensées cap. iv. Reponse à la 10 & à la 13 objections, & la Continuation des Pens. div. cap. cxliii.

the assertion is true, but not to the purpose; in others to the purpose, but not true. Therefore before any precise answer can be given to it, it will be necessary to trace up moral duty to its first principles. And though an enquiry of this sort should not prove the most amusing either to myself or my reader, it may be found however to deserve our pains. For a spirit of dispute and refinement hath so entangled and confounded all our conclusions on a subject, in itself, very clear and intelligible, that I am persuaded, were MORALITY herself, of which the *ancients* made a Goddess, to appear in person amongst men, and be questioned concerning her birth, she would be tempted to answer as *Homer* does in *Lucian*, that her commentators had so learnedly embarrassed the dispute, that she was now as much at a loss as They to account for her original.

To proceed therefore with all possible brevity: Each animal hath its *instinct* implanted by nature to direct it to its greatest good. Amongst these, Man hath his; to which modern philosophers have given the name of

1. The MORAL SENSE: whereby we conceive and feel a pleasure in right, and a distaste and aversion to wrong, prior to all reflexion on their natures, or their consequences. This is the first inlet to the *adequate idea of morality*; and plainly, the most extensive of all; the Atheist as well as Theist having it.—When instinct had gone thus far,

2. The *reasoning faculty* improved upon its dictates: For, men led by reflexion to examine the foundation of this *moral sense*, soon discovered that there were
real

real essential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature; and, consequently, that the love and hatred excited by the *moral sense* were not capricious in their operations; for, that in the essential properties of their objects there was a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE. Reason having gone thus far (and thus far too it might conduct the *Stratonic* atheist) it stopped; and saw that something was still wanting whereon to establish the MORALITY, properly so called, OF ACTIONS, that is, an OBLIGATION on men to perform some, and to avoid others; and that, to find this something, there was need of calling in other principles to its assistance: Because nothing can thus *oblige* but,

3. A superior WILL: And such a *will* could not be found till the being and attributes of God were established; but was discovered with them.

Hence arose, and only from hence, a MORAL DIFFERENCE. From this time human actions became the subject of *obligation*, and not till now: For though INSTINCT felt a difference in actions; and REASON discovered that this difference was founded in the nature of things; yet it was WILL only which could make a compliance with that difference a DUTY.

On these three Principles therefore, namely *the moral sense, the essential difference in human actions, and the will of God*, is built the whole edifice of *practical morality*; Each of which hath its distinct motive to enforce it; Compliance with *the moral sense* exciting a pleasurable sensation; compliance with the *essential differences of things* promoting the order and
harmony

harmony of the universe ; and compliance with the *will of God* obtaining an abundant reward.

This, when attentively considered, can never fail of affecting us with the most lively sense of God's goodness to Mankind, who, graciously respecting the imbecility of Man's *nature*, the slowness of his *reason*, and the violence of his *passions*, hath been pleased to afford three different excitements to the practice of Virtue ; that men of all ranks, constitutions, and educations, might find their account in one or other of them ; something that would hit their *palate*, satisfy their *reason*, or subdue their *will*. The first principle, which is the *moral sense*, would strongly operate on those, who, by the exact temperature and balance of the passions, were disengaged enough to feel the delicacy of its charms ; and have an elegance of mind to respect the nobleness of its dictates. The second, which is the *essential difference*, will have its weight with the speculative, the abstract and profound reasoners, and on all those who excel in the knowledge of human nature. And the third, which resolves itself into the *will of God*, and takes in all the consequences of obedience and disobedience, is principally adapted to the great body of Mankind.

It may perhaps be objected, to what is here delivered, *that the true principle of morality should have the worthiest motive to enforce it : Whereas the Will of God is enforced by the view of rewards and punishments ; on which motive, virtue hath the smallest merit.* This character of the true principle of morality is perfectly right ; and agrees, we say, with the principle which we make to be the true : For the legitimate motive to virtue, on that principle, is *compliance with*
the

the Will of God; a compliance which hath the highest degree of merit. But this not being found of sufficient power to take in the Generality, the consequences of compliance or non-compliance to this Will, as far as relates to rewards and punishments, were first drawn out to the people's view. In which they were dealt with as the teachers of mathematics treat their pupils; when, to engage them in a sublime demonstration, they explain to them the use and fertility of the theorem.

To these great purposes serve the THREE PRINCIPLES while in conjunction: But now, as in the *civil world* and the affairs of men, our pleasure, in contemplating the wisdom and goodness of Providence, is often disturbed and checked by the view of some human perversity or folly which runs across that Dispensation; so it is here, in the *intellectual*. This admirable provision for the support of virtue hath been, in great measure, defeated by its pretended advocates; who, in their their *éternal squabbles* about the true foundation of morality, and the obligation to its practice, have sacrilegiously untwisted this THREE-FOLD CORD; and each running away with the part he esteemed the strongest, hath affixed that to the throne of God, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all unto it.

This man proposes to illustrate the doctrine of the MORAL SENSE; and then the morality of actions is founded only in that *sense*: with him, metaphysics and logic, by which the *essential difference*, in human actions, is demonstrated, are nothing but *words, notions, visions; the empty regions and shadows of philosophy*. The professors of them are *moon-blind wits*; and Locke himself

himself is treated as a school-man*. To talk of reward and punishment, consequent on the *will of a superior*, is to make the practice of virtue mercenary and servile; from which, pure human nature is the most abhorrent.

Another undertakes to demonstrate THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES OF THINGS, and their natural fitness and unfitness to certain ends; and then *morality* is solely founded on those differences; and God and his Will have nothing to do in the matter. Then the Will of God cannot make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust; nor consequently be the cause of any obligation on moral Agents: because the essences and natures of things, which constitute actions good and evil, are independent on that Will; which is forced to submit to their relations like weak Man's. And therefore, if there were no natural justice; that is, if the rational and intellectual nature were, of itself, undetermined and unobliged to any thing, and so destitute of *morality* properly so called, it were not possible that any thing should be made morally good or evil, obligatory or unlawful, or that any moral obligation should be begotten by any Will or positive command whatsoever.—And then our knowledge of moral good and evil is solely acquired by abstract reasoning: And to talk of its coming any other way into the mind, is weak and superstitious, as making God act unnecessarily and superfluously.

A third, who proposes to place *morality* on the *will of a superior*, which is its true bottom, acts yet on the same exterminating model. He takes the other two

* Characteristics, passim.

Principles to be merely visionary: The *moral sense* is nothing but the impression of education; the *love of the species* romantic; and invented by crafty knaves, to dupe the young, the vain, and the ambitious. Nature, he saith, hath confined us to the narrow sphere of *self-love*; and our most pompous pretences of pure disinterestedness, but the more artful disguise of that very passion. He not only denies all *moral difference* in actions, antecedent to the Will of God, which (as we shall shew anon) he might well do; but likewise, all *specific difference*: will not so much as allow it to be a RULE to direct us to the performance of God's will; for that the *notions* of fit and unfit proceed not from that *difference*, but from the arbitrary impositions of *Will* only; that God is the free cause of Truths as well as Beings; and then, consequently, if he so wills, two and two would not make four. At length his system shrinks into a vile and abject selfishness; and, as he degrades and contracts his nature, he slips, before he is aware, quite besides his foundation, which he professes to be the *Will of God*.

Thus have men, borne away by a fondness to their own idle systems, presumptuously broken in upon that TRIPLE BARRIER*, with which God has been graciously pleased

* St. Paul might have taught them better; who, collecting together and enforcing all the motives for the PRACTICE OF VIRTUE, expresseth himself in this manner: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just"—Τὸ λοιπὸν, ἀδελφοί, ὅσα ἐστὶν ΑΛΗΘΗ, ὅσα ΣΕΜΝΑ, ὅσα ΔΙΚΑΙΑ—ἀληθῆ evidently relating to the *essential difference of things*; σεμνὰ (implying something of worth, splendour, dignity) to the *moral*

pleased to cover and secure Virtue; and given advantage to the cavils of Libertines and Infidels; who on each of these three Principles, thus advanced on the ruins of the other two, have reciprocally forged a scheme of Religion independent on Morality*; and a scheme of Morality independent on Religion †; who, how different soever their employments may appear, are indeed but twisting the same rope at different ends: the plain design of both being to overthrow RELIGION. But as the Moralists's is the more plausible scheme, it is now become most in fashion: So that of late years a deluge of moral systems hath overflowed the learned world, in which either the *moral sense*, or the *essential difference*, rides alone triumphant; which like the chorus of clouds in *Aristophanes*, the

Αένας

moral sense which men have of this difference; and *δικαιοσύνη*, just, is relative to Will or Law. The Apostle proceeds—“*whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report*”—ὅσα ἀγνά, ὅσα προσφιλή, ὅσα εὐφημα. In these three latter characters marking the nature of the three preceding: ἀγνά pure, referring to abstract truth; προσφιλή lovely, amiable, to innate or instinctive honesty; and εὐφημα of good report; reputable, to the observation of Will or Law. He concludes, “*If there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think of these things.*” εἴ τις ἀρετὴ, καὶ εἴ τις ἔπαινος, ταῦτα λογίσεσθε. That is, If the moral sense and the essential difference of things can make the practice of morality, a virtue; or obedience to a superior Will, matter of praise, think of these things.

* See The Fable of the Bees, and confer the enquiry into the original of Moral virtue, and the search into the nature of society, with the body of the book.

† See the fourth Treatise of the Characteristics, intituled, “An Enquiry concerning Virtue and Merit.”

Αἰνάοι Νεφέλαι, the ETERNAL RELATIONS, are introduced into the scene, with a gaudy outside, to supplant *Jupiter*, and to teach the arts of fraud and *sophistry*; but in a little time betray themselves to be empty, obscure, noisy, impious Nothings.

In a word, with regard to the several sorts of *Separatists*, those, I mean, who are indeed friends to Religion, and who detest the Infidel's abuse of their principles, I would recommend to their interpretation the following oracle of an ancient sage. ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΥΡΕΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΤΗΝΗΣ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ ΟΥΔΕ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ, Η ΤΗΝ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΟΙΝΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ.

This noble truth, *that the only true foundation and original of morality is the Will of God interpreted by the moral sense and essential difference of things*, was a random thought of *Chrysippus the Stoic*. I give it this term, 1. Because the ancient philosophy teaches nothing certain concerning the true ground of moral obligation. 2. Because *Plutarch's* quoting it amongst *the repugnances of the Stoics*, shews it to be inconsistent with their other doctrine. And indeed, the following the ancient philosophers too servilely, hath occasioned the errors of modern moralists, in unnaturally separating the three principles of practical morality, *Plato* being the patron of the *moral sense*; *Aristotle* of the *essential differences*; and *Zeno* of *arbitrary will*.

And now, to come more directly to our Adversary's argument: We say then,

1. That the Atheist can never come to the knowledge of the MORALITY of actions properly so called.
2. That

2. That though he be capable of being affected with the *moral sense*, and may arrive to the knowledge of the real *essential differences* in the qualities of human actions; yet this *sense* and these *differences* make nothing for the purpose of Mr. *Bayle's* argument: because these, even in conjunction, are totally insufficient to influence Society in the practice of virtue: which influence is the thing in question.

Both these conclusions, I presume, have been clearly proved from what hath been said above, of *the origin of Society*; and, just before, of *the foundation of moral virtue*: But that nothing may be wanting to the argument, I shall crave leave to examine the matter with a little more exactness.

1. And first, *that an Atheist, as such, can never arrive to the knowledge of the morality of actions properly so called*, shall be further made good against the reasoning which Mr. *Bayle* brings to prove, *that the Morality of human actions may be demonstrated on the principles of a Stratonicean, or atheistic Fatalist*; whom he personates in this manner: “The * beauty, “ symmetry, regularity, and order, seen in the universe, “ are the effects of a blind unintelligent Nature; and “ though this Nature, in her workmanship, hath copied “ after no ideas, she hath nevertheless produced an “ infinite number of species, with each its distinct “ essential attribute. It is not in consequence of our

* La beauté, la symétrie, la régularité, l'ordre que l'on voit dans l'univers, sont l'ouvrage d'une nature qui n'a point de connoissance, & qu'encore, &c. Cotin. des Pensées diverses, c. cli.

“ opinion, that fire and water differ in species, and
 “ that there is a like difference between love and
 “ hatred, affirmation and negation. Their specific
 “ difference is founded in the nature of the things
 “ themselves. But how do we know this? Is it not
 “ by comparing the essential properties of one of
 “ these beings with the essential properties of another
 “ of them? But we know, by the same way, that
 “ there is a specific difference between truth and
 “ falsehood, between good faith and perfidiousness,
 “ between gratitude and ingratitude, &c. We may then
 “ be assured, that vice and virtue differ specifically by
 “ their nature, independent of our opinion.” This,
 Mr. *Bayle* calls their being *naturally* separated from
 each other: And thus much we allow. He goes on:
 “ Let* us see now by what ways *Stratonic* atheists
 “ may come to the knowledge of vice and virtue’s being
 “ *morally* as well as *naturally* separated. They
 “ ascribe to the same necessity of nature the esta-
 “ blishment of those relations which we find to be
 “ between things, and the establishment of those
 “ rules by which we distinguish those relations.
 “ There are rules of reasoning independent of the
 “ will of man: It is not because men have been
 “ pleased to fix the rules of syllogism, that therefore
 “ those rules are just and true: they are so in them-
 “ selves; and all the endeavours of the wit of man
 “ against their essence and their attributes would be
 “ vain and ridiculous.” This likewise we grant him.
 He proceeds: “ If then there are certain and immu-

* Voions comment ils pouvoient savoir qu’elles etoient
 outre cela separées moralement. Ils attribuoient, &c.
 Idem *ibid.*

“ table rules for the operation of the understanding,
 “ there are also such for the determinations of the
 “ will.” But this we deny. He would prove it thus:
 “ The * rules of these determinations are not altogether
 “ arbitrary; some of them proceed from the necessity
 “ of nature; and these impose an indispensable obli-
 “ gation. The most general of these rules is this,
 “ *that man ought to will what is most conformable to*
 “ *right reason:* for there is no truth more evident
 “ than this, that it is fit a reasonable creature should
 “ conform to right reason, and unfit that such a crea-
 “ ture should recede from it.” This is his argument.
 To which I reply, that from thence, no *moral difference*
can arise. He contends that *things are both*
naturally and morally separable. He speaks of these
 ideas as very different (as indeed they are) and proves
 the truth of them by different arguments. *The natural*
essential difference of things then, if we mean any thing
 by the terms, hath this apparent property; that it
 creates a *fitness* in the agent to act agreeably thereto:
 As the *moral difference* of things creates, besides this
fitness, an obligation likewise; when therefore there is an
obligation in the agent, there is a *moral difference* in
 the things, and so on the contrary, for they are inse-
 parable. If then we shew, that right reason alone
 cannot properly *oblige*, it will follow that the knowledge
 of what is agreeable to right reason doth not induce a
moral difference: or that a Stratonicean is not under
 any *obligation* to act agreeably to right reason; which
 is the thing Mr. *Bayle* contends for.

* Les regles de ces actes-là ne sont pas toutes arbitraires : il y en a qui emanent, &c. Idem *ibid.*

1. Obligation, necessarily implies an Obliger: the Obliger must be different from, and not one and the same with, the obliged: to make a man at once the Obliger and obliged, is the same thing as to make him treat or enter into compact with himself, which is the highest of absurdities. For it is an unquestioned rule in law and reason, that whoever acquires a right to any thing from the obligation of another towards him, may relinquish that right. If therefore the Obliger and obliged be one and the same person, in that case all obligation must be void of course; or rather no obligation would have commenced. Yet the *Stratonic* atheist is guilty of this absurdity, when *he* talks of actions being *moral* or *obligatory*. For what *Being* can be found whereon to place this obligation? Will he say *right reason*? But that is the very absurdity we complain of; because *reason* is only an attribute of the person obliged, his assistant to judge of his obligations, if he hath any from another Being: To make *this* then the Obliger, is to make a man oblige himself. If he say, he means by *reason* not every man's particular reason, but *reason in general*; I reply, that *this* reason is a mere abstract notion, which hath no real subsistence: and how that which hath no real subsistence should *oblige*, is still more difficult to apprehend.

2. But farther, *moral obligation*, that is, the obligation of a free agent, implies a *Law*, which enjoins and forbids; but a *Law* is the imposition of an intelligent superior, who hath power to exact conformity thereunto. But blind unintelligent Nature is no lawgiver, nor can what proceeds necessarily from thence come

under the notion of a Law: we say indeed, in common speech, the *law of necessity*, and *the law of reason and nature*; but these are merely popular expressions: By the first we mean only to insinuate, that *necessity* hath, as it were, one property of a *law*, namely, that of *forcing*; and by the second, we mean the rule which the supreme Lawgiver hath laid down for the judging of his Will. And while this light and direction of *reason* or *nature* is considered as a rule only, given by the *God of nature*, the term may be allowed: Those who so considered the term were the first who so used it. After-writers retained the name; but, by a strange absurdity, separated the *Law-giver* from his *Law*; on a fancy of its being of virtue to *oblige* by its own intrinsic excellence, or by the good of which it is productive. But how any thing except a Law, in the proper philosophic sense, can oblige a dependent reasonable Being endued with will, is utterly inconceivable. The fundamental error in Mr. *Bayle's* argument seems to be this: He saw the essential difference of things; he found those differences the adequate object of the *understanding*; and so too hastily concluded them to be the adequate object of the *will* likewise. In this he was mistaken: they are indeed the adequate object of the *understanding*; because the *understanding* is passive in its perceptions, and therefore under the sole direction of these necessary differences. But the *will* is not passive in its determinations: for instance, that three are less than five, the *understanding* is necessitated to judge, but the *will* is not necessitated to chuse five before three: therefore the essential differences of

things are not the adequate object of the *will*; the Law of a Superior must be taken in, to constitute *obligation* in choice, or *morality* in actions.

Hobbes seems to have penetrated farther into this matter, than the *Stratonicean* of Mr. *Bayle*; he appeared to have been sensible that *morality* implied *obligation*, and obligation a *law*, and a law a *Law-giver*: therefore, having (as they say) expelled the Legislator of the universe, that morality of actions might have some foundation, he thought fit to underprop it with his earthly God, the *Leviathan*; and to make him the creator and supporter of *moral right* and *wrong*.

But a favourer of Mr. *Bayle*'s paradox may perhaps object, that as he was allowed a *fitness*, and *unfitness* in actions, discoverable by the essential difference of things; and as this fitness and unfitness implies benefit and damage to the actor, and others; it being in fact seen, that the practice of virtue promotes the happiness of the Individual, or at least of the Species, and that vice obstructs it; it may be said, that this will be sufficient to make *morality*, or *obligation*, in the *Stratonic* system; if not in the strict sense of the word, yet as to the nature of the thing. To this I reply, that in that System, whatever advanced human happiness, would be only a natural good; and virtue as merely such, as food and covering: and, that which retarded it, a natural evil, whether it was vice, pestilence, or unkindly seasons. *Natural*, I say, in contradiction to *moral*, or such a good as any one would be *obliged* to seek or promote. For 'till it be made appear that Man hath received his being from the

will

will of another; and so depending on that other, is accountable to him for it; he can be under no *moral obligation* to prefer good to evil, or even life to death. From the *nature* of any action, MORALITY cannot arise; nor from its *effects*: not from the first, because, being only reasonable or unreasonable, nothing follows but a *fitness* in doing one, and an *absurdity* in doing the other: not from the second, because, did the good or evil produced make the action *moral*, brutes, from whose actions proceed both good and evil, would have *morality*.

If it be farther urged, that the observance of these essential differences is promoting the perfection of a particular system, which contributes, in its concentration, to the perfection of the universe; and that therefore a reasonable creature is OBLIGED to conform thereto: I answer, first, that (on the principles before laid down) to make a reasonable creature *obliged* in this case, he must first be enforced by the Whole, of which he is part. This enforcement cannot here be by intentional command, whose object is free agency, because the *Stratonic* Whole, or universal Nature, is blind and unintelligible. It must force then by the necessity of its nature; and this will, indeed, make men obliged as clocks are by weights, but never as free agents are, by the command of an intelligent Superior, which only can make actions *moral*. But secondly, an uniform perfect Whole can never be the effect of blind fate; but is the plain image and impression of one intelligent self-existent Mind. In a word, as it is of the nature of the *independent* first Cause of all things to be obliged only by his own *wisdom*; so it seems to be of the nature of

all *dependent* intelligent beings to be obliged only by the *will* of the first Cause.

“ All things therefore (says the great Master of reason) do work, after a sort, according to Law : All other things according to a LAW, whereof, some SUPERIOR, to whom they are subject, is Author; only the works and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the Law whereby they are wrought. The Being of God is a kind of Law to his working; for that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he DOETH*.”

Nor does this contradict what we have asserted, and not only asserted, but proved, in speaking of moral obligation, *that nothing, but Will, can oblige*: Because our whole reasoning is confined to *man's obligation*. And if there be any thing certain, in the first principles of law or reason, this must be confessed to be of the number, *that a man can neither oblige himself, nor be obliged by names and notions*; so that, to create an obligation, the *Will* of some other being must be found out. A principle, which the common conceptions of man, and the universal practice of human life confirms. But, as in our discourse of God, the weakness of our intellects constrains us to explain our conceptions of his nature by human ideas, therefore when we speak of the *morality* of his actions, finding them to be founded in no other, or superior Will, we say, he is *obliged only by his own wisdom*: *obligation* when applied to God, meaning no more than *direction*: for, that an *independent* being can be subject to ob-

* Hooker's Eccl. Pol. B. I. Sect. 2. p. 3 circa finem.

ligation in the sense that a *dependent* being is subject, is, by the very terms, an high absurdity. *Obligation*, therefore, when applied to man, being *one* thing; when applied to God *another*; the strictest rules of logic will allow different attributes to be predicated of each. It is confessed, we have a clear and adequate idea of *obligation*, as it relates to man; of *this* obligation we have affirmed something plain and evident: It is likewise confessed we have a very obscure and inadequate idea of *obligation*, as it relates to God: of *this* obligation, too, we have affirmed something, whose evidence must needs partake of the imperfection of its subject. Yet there have been found Objectors so perverse, who would not only have *clear* conceptions regulated on *obscure*; but what is *simply predicated* of God, to destroy what hath been *proved* of man.

But to set this matter in a fuller light, I will just mention two objections (*not peculiar* to the *Stratoniceans*) against morality's being founded in will.

Obj. 1. It is said, "That, as every creature necessarily pursues happiness, it is *that* which obliges to moral observance, and not the Will of God; because it is to procure happiness that we obey command, and do every other act: and because, if that Will commanded us to do what would make us unhappy, we should be forced to disobey it." To this I answer, that when it is said *morality is founded on Will*, it is not meant that every Will obliges, but that nothing but Will can oblige. It is plain the Will of an inferior or equal cannot be meant by it:

it*: it is not simply Will then, but Will so and so circumstanced: And why it is not as much Will which obliges, when it is the *Will of a superior seeking our good*, as the *Will of a superior simply*, I am yet to learn. To say then that happiness and not Will makes the obligation, seems like saying, that when in mechanics a weight is raised by an engine, the *wheels* and *pullies* are not the cause, but that universal affection of matter called *attraction*. *Obj. 2.* If it be still urged, “that *one* can no more be called the “obliger than the *other*; because though happiness “could not oblige without Will, on the other hand, “Will could not oblige without happiness;” I reply, this is a mistake. Will could not indeed oblige to unhappiness; but it would oblige to what should produce neither one nor the other, though all considerations of the consequence of obeying or disobeying were away.

Obj. 3. It is said, “That if, according to the modern “notions of philosophy, the will of God be deter- “mined by the eternal relations of things, they are “properly those relations (as Dr. *Clarke* would “have it) which oblige, and not the will of God. “For if A impel B; and B, C, and C, D; it is A “and not C that properly impels D.” But here I

* “Whence comes the restraint [of the Law of Nature]? “From a higher Power; nothing else can bind. I cannot “bind my selfe, for I may untie my selfe again; nor an “equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. “It must be a superior power, even God Almighty.”—
SELDEN'S Table Talk, art. LAW OF NATURE.

suspect

suspect the objection confounds *natural cause and effect* with *moral agent and patient*; which are two distinct things, as appears, as on many other accounts, so from their effects; the one implying *natural necessity*, the other, only *moral fitness*. Thus, in the case before us, the eternal relations are, if you will, the *natural cause*, but the will of God is the *moral agency*: and our question is, not of *natural necessity* that results from the former, but, of *moral fitness* that results from the latter. Thus that which is not properly the natural cause of my acting, is the moral cause of it. And so on the contrary.

On the whole, then, it appears, that *Will*, and *Will only*, can constitute *obligation*; and, consequently, make actions *moral*, *i. e.* such as deserve *reward* and *punishment*. Yet when men reflect on the affections of their own minds, and find *there* a *sense of right and wrong* so strongly impressed as to be attended with a *consciousness* that the one deserves *reward* and the other *punishment*, even though there were no God; this so perplexes matters, as to dispose them, in opposition to all those plain *deductions*, to place morality in the *essential difference* of things. But would they consider that *that very sensation*, which so much misleads us in judging of the true foundation of morality, is the plainest indication of *WILL*, which, for the better support of virtue*, so framed and constituted the

* We have explained above the admirable disposition of things, by the God of nature, for the support of virtue. And it was from this view that an able writer, who is for moderating in the dispute about *moral obligation*, calls the
essential

the human mind; a constitution utterly inconceivable on the supposition of *no God*; would they, I say, but consider this, the difficulty would intirely vanish.

But so it hath happened, this evident truth, that *morality is founded in will*, hath been long controverted even among *Theists*. What hath perplexed their disputes is, that the contenders for this truth have generally thought themselves obliged to deny the *natural essential differences* of things, antecedent to a Law; supposing, that the *morality* of actions would follow the concession. But this is a mistake, which the rightly distinguishing between things *naturally* and *morally* separable (as explained above) will rectify. That

essential difference of things, discoverable by reason, the *internal obligation*, and the *will of God*, the *external*. J'entends (dit-il) par *obligation interne* celle qui est uniquement produite par notre propre raison, considerée comme la regle primitive de notre conduite, et en consequence de ce qu'une action a, en elle-meme, de bon ou de mauvais. Pour l'*obligation externe* ce sera celle qui vient de la volonté de quelque être, dont on se reconnoit dependant, et qui commande ou defend certaines choses, sous la menace de quelque peine. *Burlanaqui, Principes du droit naturel*, pag. 76.

If he had called the first, *the improper obligation*, and the other the *proper*, his terms had been a great-deal more exact. For it being of the essence of the relative term, *obligation*, to have an outward respect, or external relation, *internal obligation* must be a very *figurative*, that is to say, a very absurd expression, when applied to man. Perhaps, indeed, that ruling Nature which draws all MACHINES, whether *brutal* or *rational* (if there be any of the latter kind) to pursue *happiness*, may, in a *philosophic* sense, be called the *internal obligation*; but, surely, when applied to *man*, supposed a free-agent, the terms are mere jargon.

That the distinction hath not been made or observed, is owing to the unheeded *appetite* and *aversion* of the *moral sense*: And their adversaries being in the same delusion, that the *one* inferred the *other*, never gave themselves any farther trouble, but when they had clearly demonstrated the *natural essential difference*, delivered *that* as a proof of the *moral difference*, though they be, in reality, two distinct things, and independent of each other. More than one of our ablest writers have not escaped this delusion. Dr. S. Clarke going on the Principle, that Obligation was founded in the nature of things, to support it, was perpetually forced to confound *moral* and *natural* fitnesses with one another; which makes him, contrary to his character, very inaccurate and confused*: And Mr. Wollaston†, dissatisfied with all the principles, from which the preceding writers of his party had deduced the morality of actions, when he had demonstrated, with greater clearness than any before him, *the natural essential difference of things*, unluckily mistook it for the *moral difference*; and thence made *the formal ratio of moral good and evil, to consist in a conformity of men's actions to the truth of the case, or otherwise*. For it is a principle with him, that things may be denied or affirmed to be what they are, by *deeds* as well as *words*. But had both parties been pleased to consider *this natural essential difference of things*, as, what it must be confessed by both to be, THE DIRECTION WHICH GOD HATH GIVEN HIS CREATURES TO BRING THEM TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS

* Evidence of Nat. and Rev. Relig. 6th ed. p. 5—27.

† The Religion of Nature delineated.

WILL; AND THE RULE OF THAT WILL; the dispute had been at an end: and they had employed *this difference*, not as the atheist does, for the *foundation* of morality; but, as all true theists should do, for the *medium* to bring us to that only sound foundation; the *will* and command of God. Those who imagine, as the author of *the Principles of Natural Law* seems to do, that this is only a dispute about words*, are much deceived. The man who regards the essential difference of things as a command or a Law properly so called, hath a very different idea of it, from him who regards it only as a Rule or a Law improperly so called. And the reason is plain, because these relative terms have an essential difference; a *Rule*, referring singly to those directed by it; but a *Law* has a double reference; to those governed by it, and to the Lawgiver who gave it. He therefore who regards it as a *Rule*, stops short, and rests obligation there where no obligation can abide: but he who regards it as a *Law* properly so called (for those who consider it as a *mere rule* give it the name of *law*, because they make *obligation* to arise from it) rests obligation in a Lawgiver, and pursues it to its true source, the throne of God. The dispute, therefore, is not about *words*, but *things*: Or if we will needs have it to be about words, it is of the *proper* and *improper* use of them,

* Je conclus— que les differences qui se trouvent entre les principaux systemes sur la nature & l'origine de l'obligation, ne sont pas aussi grandes qu'elles le paroissent d'abord. Si l'on examine de pres ces sentimens, l'on verra que des differentes idées, reduites à leur juste valeur, loin de se trouver en opposition, peuvent se rapprocher—
Burlamaqui, p. 75, 76.

which

which intimately concerns *things*; indeed TRUTH itself and COMMON SENSE. We say a *sound is sweet*, or a *colour hot*; and as nobody is misled by these expressions, we hold it foolish to divest them of their figure, and formally to contend that (strictly and philosophically speaking) inconsistent properties are ascribed to them. But should it once be assumed that a *sound* may be the subject of *taste*, and a *colour* the subject of *touch*, it would be time, I suppose, to rectify an absurdity which tends to confound all our *ideas of sensation*: Just so it is, in the expressions of *truth* or *happiness*, OBLIGING: while these were considered as the *rule* or *reward* of actions, given and imposed by a Master on his servants, by a Creator on his creature, the figure was neither forced nor inellegant; and did not deserve to be quarrelled with. But when the question was of *real obligation*, in a metaphysic sense, then, seriously to contend, that it arises from *truth* or *happiness*, or from any thing but WILL, is the very philosophy of *tasting sound* and *feeling colour*; and equally tends to the confusion of all our *ideas of reflexion*.

On the whole then we see, that an Atheist, as such, cannot arrive to the knowledge of MORALITY*.

* One would not have imagined any body could be so wild to assert, that, on these principles, it could not be proved, that a vicious Atheist deserved punishment at the hand of God. To such shrewd discerners, I would recommend the following case. Your servant gets drunk; and, in that condition, neglects your orders, forgets your relation to him, and treats it as an imposture. Does he, or does he not, deserve punishment? When this is resolved, the point in question will be so too.

2 We now come to our second conclusion against Mr. Bayle's argument, "that the idea of the *moral sense*, and the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things*, are, even in conjunction, insufficient to influence Communities in the practice of virtue:" But we must, previously observe, that the arguments, which we allow to be conclusive for the *Stratonic* atheist's comprehension of the natural essential difference of things, take in only that species of atheism: the *other*, which derive all from chance and hazard, are incapable of this knowledge; and must be content with only the *moral sense* for their guide. Let us therefore *first* enquire what this *moral sense* is able to do alone, towards influencing virtuous practice; and *secondly*, what new force it acquires in conjunction with the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things*.

1. Men are misled by the name of *instinct* (which we allow the *moral sense* to be) to imagine that its impressions operate very strongly, by observing their force in brute animals. But the cases are widely different: in Beasts, the instinct is invincibly strong, as it is the sole spring of action: in Man, it is only a friendly monitor of the judgment; and a conciliator, as it were, between Reason and the sensual appetites; all which have their turn in the determinations of the Will. It must consequently be much weaker, as but sharing the power of putting upon action with many other principles. Nor could it have been otherwise, without destroying human liberty. It is indeed of so delicate a nature, so nicely interwoven into the human frame and constitution, and so easily lost or effaced,
that

that some have even denied the existence of a quality, which, in most of its common subjects, they have hardly been able to observe. Insomuch that one would be tempted to liken it to that *candid appearance*, which, as the modern philosophy has discovered to us, is the result of a mixture of all kinds of primitive *colours*: where, if the several sorts be not found in fit proportions, no whiteness will emerge from the composition. So, unless the original passions and appetites be rightly tempered and balanced, the *moral sense* can never shew itself in any strong or sensible effect. This being the state of *moral instinct*, it must evidently, when alone, be too weak to influence human practice.

When the *moral sense* is made the rule, and especially when it is the only rule, it is necessary that its rectitude, as a rule, should be known and ascertained: But this it cannot be by an Atheist: For till it be allowed there was design in our production, it can never be shewn that one appetite is righter than another, though they be contrarious and inconsistent. The appetite therefore, which, at present, is most importunate to be gratified, will be judged to be the right, how adverse soever to the *moral sense*. But, supposing this *moral sense* not to be so easily confounded with the other appetites; but that it may be kept distinct, as having this peculiar quality so different from the rest, that it is objective to a *whole*, or entire species; whereas the others terminate in *self*, or in the private system (though as to *whole* and *parts*, an Atheist must have very slender and confused ideas); granting this, I say, yet national Manners, the issue of *those appetites*, would, in time, effectually, though insensibly, efface the idea of the *moral sense*, in the generality

of men. Almost infinite are the popular Customs, in the several nations and ages of mankind, which owe their birth to the more violent passions of fear, lust, and anger. The most whimsical and capricious, as well as the most inhuman and unnatural, have arisen from thence. It must needs therefore be, that customs of this original should be as opposite to the *moral sense*, as those appetites are, from whence they were derived. And of how great power, Custom is to erase the strongest impressions of Nature, much stronger than those of the *moral sense*, we may learn from that general practice, which prevailed in the most learned and polite countries of the world, of EXPOSING THEIR CHILDREN *; whereby the strong instinctive affection

* Of all the moral painters, TERENCE is the man who seems to have copied human nature with most exactness. Yet, his Citizen of universal benevolence, whom he draws with so much life, in that masterly stroke, *homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*, is the same person who commands his wife to expose her new-born daughter, and falls into a passion with her for having committed that hard task to another, by which means the infant escaped death,—*si meum imperium exequi voluisses, interemptam oportuit*. Hence even the divine PLATO reckons the exposing of infants, if not amongst the dictates of nature, yet amongst the prescripts of right reason: For in his *book of laws*, which he composed for the reformation of popular prejudices and abuses in human Policies, he decrees, that if the parents had children, after a certain age, they should expose them; and that so effectually, he says, that they should not escape dying by famine. Chremes therefore speaks both the dictates of Philosophy and Custom, when he characterizes such who had any dregs of this natural instinct remaining, as persons—*qui neque jus, neque bonum atque æquum sciunt*.

of Parents for their offspring was violated without remorse.

This would lead one into a very beaten commonplace. It suffices that the fact is too notorious to be disputed. And what makes more particularly for my argument is, that *Custom* is a power which opposes the *moral sense* not partially, or at certain times and places, but universally. If therefore Custom in the politest States, where a Providence was taught and acknowledged, made such havock of Virtue; into what confusion must things run where there is no other barrier than the feeble idea of the *moral sense*? Nor can it be replied, that the customs here spoken of, as so destructive to the *moral sense*, are the product of false Religions; which spring and fountain-head of evil, Atheism at once dries up: For the instance here given is of a Custom merely civil; with which Religion had no manner of concern. And so are a vast number of others that are carefully collected by *Sextus Empiricus* and *Montaigne*.

2. But now, secondly, for our *Stratonic* Atheist; in whom, we suppose, the *moral sense*, and the *knowledge of the essential difference of things* act in conjunction to promote virtuous practice. And in conjunction, they impart mutual strength to one another: For as soon as the *essential difference* is established and applied, it becomes a mark to distinguish the *moral sense* from the other appetites, which are irregular and wrong. And, the *moral sense* being thus carefully kept up and supported, the mind, in its metaphysical reasonings on the *essential difference*, is guarded from running into visionary refinements.

The question then is, “Whether a clear conviction of right and wrong, abstracted from all Will and Command, and consequently, from the expectation of reward and punishment, be sufficient to influence the generality of Men in any tolerable degree?” That it is not, will, I suppose, be clearly seen by the following consideration. All, who have considered human nature attentively, have found *, that it is not enough to make men follow Virtue, that it be owned to be the *greatest* good; which, the *beauty, benefit, or reasonableness* of it may evince. Before it can raise any desire in them, it must first be brought home to them; and considered by them as a good that makes a necessary part of their happiness. For it is not conceived needful, that a man’s happiness should depend on the attainment of the greatest possible good; and he daily forms schemes of complete happiness without it. But the gratification of craving appetites, moved strongly by self-love, being thought to contribute much to human happiness, and being at the same time so opposite to, and inconsistent with Virtue, the generality will never be brought to think, that the uniform practice of it makes a necessary part of human happiness. To balance these appetites, something, then, more interesting must be laid in the scale of Virtue; and this can be only rewards and punishments, which Religion proposes by a *morality founded in Will*.

But this may be farther understood by what hath been observed above, concerning the nature and original of civil Society. *Self-interest*, as we there shew, spurring to action by hopes and fears, caused

* See Locke’s Essay, Chap. Of Power, § 71.

all those disorders amongst men, which required the remedy of civil Society. And *self-interest*, again, operating by hopes and fears in Society, afforded means for the redress of those first disorders; so far forth as Society could carry those hopes and fears. For to combat this universal passion of *self-love*, another, at least as strong, was to be opposed to it; but such a one not being to be found in human nature, all that could be done was to turn this very Passion in an opposite direction, and to a contrary purpose. Therefore, because Society failed (from the natural deficiency of its plan) in remedying the disorders it was instituted to correct, and consequently was obliged to call in the aid of Religion, as is above explained; it is evident it must proceed *still* on the same principles of *hopes and fears*. But, of all the three grounds of Morality, the third only thus operating, and an Atheist not having the third, Religion, which only can give it, must be unavoidably necessary for Society. Or in other words, the *moral sense*, and the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things* in conjunction, will be altogether insufficient to influence the generality in virtuous practice.

SECT. V.

BUT Mr. *Bayle*, who well understood the force of this Argument, is unwilling to rest the matter here; and so casts about for a motive of more general influence. This, he thinks, he finds in that strong appetite for glory, praise, and reputation, which an Atheist must needs have as well as other men. And this makes his second Argument.

II. “ It is most certain *, (says he) that a man
 “ devoid of all Religion may be very sensible of
 “ worldly honour, and very covetous of praise and
 “ glory. If such a one find himself in a country
 “ where ingratitude and knavery expose men to con-
 “ tempt, and generosity and virtue are admired, we
 “ need not doubt but he will affect the character of
 “ a man of honour ; and be capable of restoring a
 “ trust, even where the Laws could lay no hold upon
 “ him. The fear of passing for a knave would
 “ prevail over his avarice. And as there are men,
 “ who expose themselves to a thousand inconveni-
 “ encies, and a thousand dangers, to revenge an
 “ affront, which perhaps they have received before
 “ very few witnesses, and which they would readily
 “ pardon, were it not for fear of incurring infamy
 “ amongst those with whom they had to do ; so
 “ I believe the same here ; that this person, whom
 “ we suppose devoid of Religion, would, notwith-
 “ standing all the opposition of his avarice, be capa-
 “ ble of restoring a trust, which it could not be legally
 “ proved he had withheld ; when he sees that his good
 “ faith will be attended with the applauses of the
 “ whole place where he resides ; while his perfidy
 “ might, some time or other, be objected to him, or
 “ at least so strongly suspected, that he could not
 “ pass in the world’s opinion for an honest man :
 “ For it is that inward esteem in the minds of others,
 “ which we aspire at, above all things. The words

* Il est—fort certain, qu’un homme destituté de foi, peut être fort sensible a l’honneur du monde, &c. Pens, div. c. 179.

“ and actions, which mark this esteem, please us on
 “ no other account, than as we imagine them to be
 “ the signs of what passes in the mind : A machine
 “ so ordered as to make the most respectful gesticula-
 “ tions, and to pronounce the clearest articulate sounds,
 “ in all the detours of flattery, would never contribute
 “ to give us a better opinion of ourselves, because we
 “ should know they were not signs of esteem in the
 “ mind of another. On these accounts therefore, he,
 “ of whom I speak, might sacrifice his avarice to his
 “ vanity, if he only thought he should be suspected
 “ of having violated a trust. And though he might
 “ even believe himself secure from all suspicion, yet,
 “ still, he could easily resolve to prefer the honour-
 “ able part to the lucrative, for fear of falling into the
 “ inconvenience, which has happened to some, of pub-
 “ lishing their crimes themselves, while they slept, or
 “ in the transports of a fever. *Lucretius* uses this
 “ motive to draw men, without Religion, to virtue.”

To this, I reply, 1. That it is indeed true, that
 commendation and disgrace are strong motives to men
 to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules
 of those, with whom they converse ; and that those
 rules and opinions, in a good measure, correspond, in
 most civilized countries, with the unchangeable rule
 of right, whatever *Sextus Empiricus* and *Montaigne*
 have been pleased to say to the contrary. For virtue
 evidently advancing, and vice as visibly obstructing
 the general good, it is no wonder, that *that* action
 should be encouraged with esteem and reputation,
 wherein every one finds his account ; and *that*, dis-
 countenanced, by reproach and infamy, which hath
 a contrary tendency. But then we say, that seeing

this good opinion of the world may be almost as surely gained, certainly with more ease and speed, by a well acted hypocrisy than by a sincere practice of virtue, the Atheist, who lies under no restraints with regard to the moral qualities of his actions, will rather chuse to pursue *that* road to reputation, which is consistent with an indulgence of all his other passions ; than *that* whereby they will be at constant war with one another ; and where he will be always finding himself under the hard necessity of *sacrificing*, as Mr. *Bayle* well expresses it, *his avarice to his vanity*. Now this inconvenience he may avoid by resolving to be honest only before company, which will procure him enough of reputation ; and to play the rogue in secret, where he may fully indulge his avarice, or what other passion he is most disposed to gratify. That this will be his system, who has no motive, but popular reputation, to act virtuously, is so plain, that Mr. *Bayle* was reduced to the hardest shifts imaginable to invent a reason why an Atheist, thus actuated by the love of glory, might possibly behave himself honestly, when he could do the contrary without suspicion.—“ And
 “ though he might believe himself secure from all
 “ suspicion, yet still he could easily resolve to prefer
 “ the honourable part to the lucrative, for fear of
 “ falling into the inconvenience which hath happened
 “ to some, of publishing their crimes themselves,
 “ while they slept, or in the transports of a fever.”
Lucretius, says he, *uses this motive to draw men, without religion, to virtue*. It had been to the purpose to have told us, what man, from the time of *Lucretius* to his own, had been ever *so drawn*. But they must know little of human nature, who can sup-

pose, that the consideration of these remote, possible indeed, but very unlikely accidents, hath ever any share in the determination of the Will, when men are deliberating on actions of importance, and distracted by the shifting uncertain views of complicated Good and Evil. But granting it to be likely, or common; the man, Mr. *Bayle* describes, could never get clear of the danger of that contingency, which way soever he resolved to act. Let us suppose him to take the honourable part, even then, sleep or a fever might as easily deprive him of the reputation he affects: For I believe there is no man, of this turn, but would be as ashamed to have it known, that all his virtuous actions proceeded from a selfish vanity, as to be discovered to have stretched a point of justice, of which civil laws could not take cognizance. It is certain, the *first* makes a man as contemptible, and much more ridiculous in the eyes of others, than the *latter*; because the advantage aimed at is fantastical: And one discovery sleep or a fever is as likely to make as the other.

But, 2. Supposing our Atheist to be of so timid a complexion, as to fear that, even in a course of the best-acted hypocrisy, he may risque the danger of being discovered, yet as this practice, by which he so well covers all the lucrative arts of fraud, enables him to provide well for himself, he will be easily brought to hazard all the inconveniencies of a detection, to which, indeed, the course is liable, but which it can so easily repair: for he has ample experience that though indeed esteem is generally annexed to apparent good actions, and infamy to bad; yet that

that there is no virtue which so universally procures popular Opinion as *riches and power*, there being no infamy which they will not efface or cover : and this being a road to Opinion which leads him, at the same time, to the gratification of his other passions ; there is no doubt but it will be his choice*.

After many detours, Mr. *Bayle* is, at length, brought to own, that Atheism is, indeed, in its natural tendency, destructive of Society ; but then, he insists upon it, that it never in fact becomes so.

III. *Because* (and this is his next argument) *men do not act according to their principles*, nor set their practice by their opinions. He owns this to have very much of a mystery ; but for the fact he appeals to the observation of mankind : “ For if it were not so,” says he †, “ how is it possible that Christians, who “ know so clearly by a Revelation, supported by so “ many miracles, that they must renounce vice, if “ they would be eternally happy, and avoid eternal “ misery ; who have so many excellent preachers— “ so many zealous directors of conscience—so many “ books of devotion ; how is it possible, amidst all “ this, that Christians should live, as they do, in the “ most enormous disorders of vice ?” And again ‡, agreeably to this observation, he takes notice, “ that

* — Πλάτων δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπιηδεῖ.

Δαίμων δ' οἶος ἔησθα — Hesiod. Op. & Dies, v. 311, 312.

† — Si cela n'étoit pas, comment, &c. Pensées diverses, cap. cxxxvi.

‡ Cicéron l'a remarqué à l'égard de plusieurs Epicuriens, &c. c. clxvii.

“ *Cicero* hath remarked, that many *Epicureans*, contrary to their principles, were good friends and honest men; who accommodated their actions, not to their principle, the desire of pleasure, but to the rules of reason.” Hence he concludes: “ That those lived better than they talked; whereas others talked better than they lived. The same remark,” says he, “ hath been made on the conduct of the *Stoics*: their principle was, that all things arrived by an inevitable necessity, which God himself was subject to. Now this should naturally have terminated in inaction; and disposed them to abstain from exhortations, promises, and menacing. On the contrary, there was no sect of philosophers more given to preaching; or whose whole conduct did more plainly shew, that they thought themselves the absolute masters of their own destiny.” The conclusion he draws from all this, and much more to the same purpose, is*, that “ therefore Religion doth not do that service towards restraining vice as is pretended; nor Atheism that injury in encouraging it: while each professor acts contrary to his proper principle.”

Now from this conclusion, and from words dropped up and down †, of the mysterious quality of this phæ-

* Contin. des Pens. div. cap. cxlix.

† Je conçois que c'est une chose bien étrange, qu'un homme qui vit bien moralement, & qui ne croit ni paradis, ni enfer. Mais j'en reviens toujours-là, que l'homme est une certaine creature, qui avec toute sa raison, n'agit pas toujours consequemment à sa creance; ce seroit une chose plus infinie que de parcourir toutes les bizarreries de l'homme. Une Monstre plus monstrueux que les Centaures & que la Chimera de la fable. Pens. div. cap. clxxvi.

nomenon,

nomenon, one would suspect Mr. *Bayle* thought that there was some strange Principle in man, that unaccountably disposed him to act in opposition to his opinions, whatsoever they were. And indeed, so he must needs suppose, or he supposes nothing to the purpose: for if it should be found, that this Principle sometimes disposes men as violently to act *according* to their opinions, as at other times it inclines them to act *against* them, it will do Mr. *Bayle's* argument no service. And if this Principle should, after all, only prove to be the violence of the irregular appetites, it will conclude directly against him. And by good luck, we have our Adversary himself confessing, that this is indeed the case: for though, as I said, he commonly affects to give our perverse conduct a mysterious air, the necessary support of the sophistry of his conclusion; yet, when he is off his guard, we have him declaring the plain reason of it; as where he says,

“ The * general idea we entertain of a man, who
 “ believes a God, a heaven and a hell, leads us to
 “ think, that he would do every thing which he knows
 “ agreeable to the will of God; and avoid every thing
 “ which he knows to be disagreeable to it: But the life
 “ of man shews, he does the direct contrary. The
 “ reason is this: Man does not determine himself to
 “ one action rather than another by the general know-
 “ ledge of what he ought to do, but by the particular
 “ judgment he passes on each distinct case, when he is
 “ on the point of proceeding to action. This particular
 “ judgment may, indeed, be conformable to those general
 “ ideas of *fit* and *right*; but, for the most part, it is
 “ not so. *He complies almost always, with the reigning*

* L'idée générale veut que, &c. Pens. div. c. cxxxv.

“ *passion*

“ *passion of the heart, to the bias of the temperament, to the force of contracted habits,*” &c. Now if this be the case, as in truth it is, we must needs draw from this Principle the very contrary conclusion, That if men act, not according to their opinions, and that it is the force of the irregular appetites which causes this perversity, a Religionist will often act against his principles; but an Atheist, always conformably to them: because an Atheist indulges his vicious passions, while he acts according to his principles, in the same manner that a Religionist does, when he acts against his. It is therefore only accidental that men act contrary to their opinions; then, when they oppose their passions: or in Mr. Bayle’s words, when *the general knowledge of what one ought to do, doth not coincide with the particular judgment we pass on each distinct case*; which judgment is generally directed by the passions: But that coincidence always happens in an Atheist’s determination of himself to action: so that the matter, when stripped of the parade of eloquence, and cleared from the perplexity of the abounding verbiage, lies open to this easy answer.

We allow, men frequently act contrary to their opinions, both *metaphysical* and *moral*, in the cases Mr. Bayle puts.

1. *In metaphysical*, where the Principle contradicts common sentiments, as the *stoical fate, and christian predestination* *: there, men rarely act in conformity to their opinions. But this instance doth not at all affect the question, though Mr. Bayle, by his manner of urging it, would insinuate, that an Atheist might be

* Pens. div. c. clxxvi.

no more influenced in practice, by his speculative opinion of *no God*, than a Fatalist by *his*, of *no liberty*. But the cases are widely different: for, as the existence of God restrains all the vicious appetites by enforcing the duties of morality, the disbelief of it, by taking off that restraint, would suffer, nay invite, the Atheist to act according to his principles. But the opinion of *fate* having no such effect on the morality of actions, and at the same time contradicting common sentiments, we easily conceive how the maintainers of it are brought to act contrary to their principles. Nay, it will appear, when rightly considered, that the Atheist would be so far from not acting according to his opinions, that were his principle of *no God*, added to the fatalist's of *no liberty*, it would then occasion the fatalist to act according to his opinions, though he acted contrary to them before; at least, if the cause Mr. *Bayle* assigns for men's not conforming their practice to their principles, be true: for the sole reason why the fatalist did not act according to his opinions, was, because they could not be used, while he was a Theist, to the gratification of his passions; because, that though it appeared, if there were no liberty, men could have no merit; yet believing a God, the rewarder and punisher of men, as if they had merit, he would act likewise as if they had. But take away from him the belief of a God, and there would be then no cause why he should not act according to his principle of *fate*, as far as relates to moral practice.

2. Next, *in morals*. We own that men here likewise frequently act contrary to their opinions: For the
view

view (as we observed above) of the greatest confessed possible good, which to a religionist, is the practice of virtue, will never, till it be considered as making a necessary part of our happiness, excite us to the pursuit of it: and our irregular passions, which are of a contrary nature, while they continue importunate, and while one or other is perpetually soliciting us, will prevent us from thus considering virtue as making a necessary part of our happiness. This is the true cause of all that disorder in the life of man, which Philosophers so much admire; which the Devout lament; and for which the Moralist could never find a cure: Where the appetites and reason are in perpetual conflict; and the man's practice is continually opposing his principles. But, on the other hand, an Atheist, whose opinions lead him to conclude, *sensual pleasure to be the greatest possible good*, must, by the concurrence of his passions, consider it as making a necessary part of *his* happiness: and then nothing can prevent his acting *according to his principles*.

We own, however, that the Atheist, Mr. *Bayle* describes, would be as apt, nay apter, to act against his opinions than a Theist: but they are only those slender opinions concerning *the obligation to virtuous practice* which Mr. *Bayle* hath given him: for if men do not pursue the greatest confessed possible good, till they consider it as making a necessary part of their happiness; I ask, which is the likeliest means of bringing them so to consider it? Is it the reflection of *the innate idea of the loveliness of virtue*; or the more abstract contemplation on its *essential difference*, to vice? (and these are the only views in which an Atheist can consider it) or is it not rather the belief,
that

that the practice of virtue, as religion teaches it, is attended with an infinite reward? To those opinions, I say, an Atheist is like enough to run counter: but his principles of impiety, which cherish his passions, we must never look to find at variance with his actions: for our adversary tells us that the reason why practice and principle so much differ, is the violence of human appetites: from which a plain discourser would have drawn the contrary conclusion; that then, there is the greater necessity to enforce religion, as an additional curb to licentiousness; for, that a curb it is, at least in some degree, is agreed on all hands.

And here, at parting, it may not be amiss to observe, how much this argument weakens one of the foregoing: *There* we are made to believe, that the *moral sense* and *essential differences* are sufficient to make men virtuous: *Here* we are taught, that these, with the *sanction of a Providence* to boot, cannot do it in any tolerable degree.

As to the lives of his *Epicureans*, and other Atheists, which we now come to; the reader is first of all desired to take notice of the fallacy he would here obtrude upon us, in the judgment he makes of the nature of the two different principles, by setting together the effects of *Atheism*, as they appear in the majority of half a score men; and those of *Religion*, as they appear in the majority of infinite multitudes: A kind of sophism, which small sects in religion have perpetually in their mouths, when they compare their own morals with those in large communities, from which they dissent: And now, to come to his palmary argument taken from fact. For,

IV. In the last place, he says*, “ that the lives of
 “ the several Atheists of antiquity fully shew, that this
 “ principle does not necessarily produce depravity of
 “ morals.” He instances in *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*,
Evemerus, *Nicanor*, and *Hippon*: “ whose virtue
 “ appeared so admirable to a Father of the Church,
 “ that he would enrich Religion with it, and make
 “ Theists of them, in spite of all Antiquity.” And
 then descends to “ *Epicurus*, and his followers, whom
 “ their very enemies acknowledged to be unblame-
 “ able in their actions, as the *Roman Atticus*, *Cassius*,
 “ and the elder *Pliny*.” and closes this illustrious
 catalogue with an encomium on the morality of *Vanini*
 and *Spinosa*: But this is not all; for he tells us
 farther †, of whole nations of Atheists, “ which mo-
 “ dern travellers have discovered in the islands or
 “ continents of *Afric* and *America*, that, in point of
 “ morals, are rather better, not worse, than the
 “ idolaters who live around them. It is true, that
 “ these Atheists are savages, without laws, magistrate,
 “ or civil policy: but this (he says) ‡ supplies him
 “ with an argument *à fortiori*: for if they live
 “ peaceably together out of civil society, much rather
 “ would they do so in it, where equal laws restrain
 “ men from injustice.” He is so pleased with this
 argument, that he reduces it to this enthymeme §:

* Pens. diver. c. clxxiv. & Contin. des Pens. diver.
 c. cxliv.

† Contin. des Pens. div. c. lxxxv. & cxliv.

‡ Contin. des Pens. div. c. cxviii.

§ Des peuples athées divisés en familles indépendantes
 se sont, &c.

“ Whole nations of Atheists, divided into independent families, have preserved themselves from time immemorial without law.

“ Therefore, much stronger reason have we to think they would still preserve themselves, were they under one common master, and one common law, the equal distributor of rewards and punishments.”

In answer to all this, I say (having once again reminded the reader, that the question between us is, *whether atheism would not have a pernicious effect on the body of a people in society*)

1. That as to the lives of those philosophers, and heads of sects, which Mr. *Bayle* hath thought fit so much to applaud, nothing can be collected from thence, in favour of the general influence of atheism on morality. We will take a view of the several motives those men had to the practice of virtue: for thereby it will be seen, that not one of these motives (peculiar to their several characters, ends, and circumstances) reaches the gross body of a people, seized with the infection of this principle. In *some* of them it was the *moral sense*, and the *essential difference of things*, that inclined them to virtue: but we have fully shewn above, that these are too weak to operate on the generality of mankind; though a few studious, contemplative Men, of a more refined imagination and felicity of temperament, might be indeed influenced by them. In *others* it was a warm passion for fame, and love of glory. But though all degrees of men have this passion equally strong, yet all have it not equally pure and delicate: so that though *reputation* is what all affect,

affect, yet the gross body of mankind is little solicitous from whence it arises; and reputation, or at least the *marks* of it, which is all the people aspire to, we have shewn, may be easily gained in a road very far from the real practice of virtue: in which road too, the people are most strongly tempted to pursue it. Very small then is the number of those, on whom these motives would operate, as even *Pomponatius*, in his ample confession taken above, hath acknowledged: and yet these are the most extensive motives that these philosophic Atheists had to the practice of virtue: for, in the *rest*, the motive must be owned to have been less legitimate, and restrained to their peculiar ends or circumstances; as concern for the credit of the sect they had founded, or espoused; which they endeavoured to ennoble by this spurious lustre. It is not easy for a Modern to conceive, how tender they were of the honour of their Principles: The conference between *Pompey* and *Posidonius* the Stoic, is a well-known story*: and if the fear of only appearing ridiculous by their principles were strong enough to make them do such violence to themselves, what must we believe the fear of becoming generally odious would do, where the principle has a natural tendency, as we see *Cardan* frankly confessed, to make the holder of it the object of public abhorrence? But if the sense of shame were not strong enough, self-preservation would force these men upon the practice of virtue: for though, of old, the Magistrate gave great indulgence to philosophic speculations; yet this downright principle of atheism being universally understood to be destructive to Society, He frequently let loose his severest resentment against the maintainers

* Tusc. Disp. 1. ii. c. 25. Edit. Oxon. 4°. t. II. p. 297.

of it: so that such had no other way to disarm his vengeance, than in persuading him by their lives, that the principle had no such destructive tendency. In a word then, these motives being peculiar to the leaders of sects, we see that the virtuous practice arising from thence makes nothing for the point in question.

2. But he comes much closer to it, in his next instance; which is of whole nations of modern Savages, who are all atheists, and yet live more virtuously than their idolatrous neighbours. And their being yet unpolicied, and in a state of nature, makes, he thinks, the instance conclude more strongly for him. Now, to let the truth of the fact pass unquestioned; though *Homer* seemed to have a very different opinion of the matter, when he makes the atheistical *Cyclops* to be the most unjust and violent, as well as most brutal, race of men upon earth. And what faith might be expected from such a people, the poet gives us to understand, in that fine circumstance, where one of them was accosted by *Ulysses*, who was then a stranger to their Principles. This wary hero, imploring the assistance of a *Cyclop*, tells him with great openness who he was, whence he came, and the sum of his adventures. But no sooner had the Monster professed himself a thorough FREE-THINKER, than the experienced traveller lost all hopes of faith or justice from him; and from that moment, put himself upon his guard, and would not trust him with one word of truth, more.

Ἄλλὰ μιν ἄψορρος προσέφη δολίοις ἐπέεσσι.

But

But I say, to let this pass, I shall endeavour to detect the sophistry of his conclusion (which I had before obviated in the second section *, concerning the insufficiency of human Laws alone) in a fuller explanation of that reasoning.

It is notorious; that man in Society, is incessantly giving the affront to the public laws. To oppose which, the Community is as constantly busied in adding new strength and force to its ordinances. If we enquire into the cause of this perversity, we shall find it no other than the number and violence of the appetites. The appetites take their birth from our real or imaginary wants: our REAL wants are unalterably the same; and, as arising only from the natural imbecility of our condition, extremely few, and easily relieved. Our FANTASTIC wants are infinitely numerous, to be brought under no certain measure or standard; and increasing exactly in proportion to our improvements in the arts of life. But the arts of life owe their original to Society †; and the more perfect the Policy, the higher do those improvements arise; and, with them, are our wants, as we say, proportionably increased, and our appetites inflamed. For the violence of these appetites, which seek the gratification of our imaginary wants, is much stronger than that

* See p. 206.

† There is one remarkable circumstance in the *Mosaic* history, that I should fancy, must needs give our *free-thinkers* a high idea of the *veracity* or *penetration* of the author. It is, where, having represented *Cain* as the first who built a city, or made advances towards civil society, he informs us, that his posterity were the inventors of the arts of life, in the instances he gives of *Jabal*, *Jubal*, and *Tubal-Cain*.

raised by our real wants: not only because those wants are more numerous, which give constant exercise to the appetites; and more unreasonable, which make the gratification proportionably difficult: and altogether unnatural, to which there is no measure; but, principally, because vicious custom hath affixed a *kind of reputation* to the gratification of the fantastic wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that when things are in this state, we have shewn above, that even the most provident Laws, without other assistance, are insufficient. But in a state of nature, unconscious of the arts of life, men's wants are only real; and these wants, few, and easily supplied. For food and covering are all which are necessary to support our Being. And Providence is abundant in its provisions, for these wants: and while there is more than enough for all, it can hardly be, that there should be disputes about each man's share.

And now the reader sees clearly how it might well be, that this rabble of Atheists should live peaceably in a state of nature, though the utmost force of human Laws, in the improved condition of Society, could not hinder them from running into mutual violence. But the sophistry of this enthymeme is further seen from hence. Not even Mr. *Bayle* himself would pretend that these Atheists, who live peaceably in their present state, without the restraint of human laws, would live peaceably without this restraint, after they had understood and practised the arts of life in credit amongst a civilized people. In Society therefore, which the arts of life inseparably accompany, an imposed curb, he will own, would be necessary. I then argue thus, If a people, who out of Society could
live

live peaceably without the curb of Law, could not live peaceably without that curb in Society; you have no reason to believe, that though out of society they might live peaceably without the curb of religion, they could live peaceably, without that curb, in Society? The answer to this must bring on again the question, How strong the curb on man, in Society, should be? which we have fully examined in another place. This argument, therefore, proves nothing but the folly of pretending to conclude, concerning man in Society, from what we see of his behaviour, out of it.

And here, in conclusion, once for all, it may not be amiss to observe, the uniform strain of sophistry which runs through all Mr. *Bayle's* reasonings on this head. The question is, and I have been frequently obliged to repeat it, he so industriously affecting to forget or mistake it, *Whether Atheism be destructive to the body of a Society?* And yet he, whose business it is, to prove the negative, brings all his arguments from considerations, which either affect not the gross body of mankind, or affect not that body, in Society: in a word, from the lives of *Sophists* or *Savages*; from the example of a few speculative men far above the view of the common run of *citizens*; or from *that* of a barbarous crew of *savages* much farther below it. All his facts and reasonings then being granted, they still fall short and wide of his conclusion.

But the last stroke of his apology is more extravagant than all the rest: for having proved atheism very consistent with a state of nature, lest it should happen to be found not so consistent with civil society, but that one of them must rise upon the ruins of the other, he gives a very palpable hint, which of the two

he thinks should be preserved; by making it a serious question, discussed in a set dissertation*, WHETHER CIVIL SOCIETY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF MANKIND †? and very gravely resolving it in the negative.—And here let me observe, that these PHILOSOPHERS (as Mess. *Voltaire* and *D'Alembert* call all those who despise Religion) never suffer a good hint to lie unimproved. The famous citizen of *Geneva* building upon this before us, hath since written a large Discourse, to shew that CIVIL SOCIETY IS EVEN HURTFUL TO MANKIND.

SECT. VI.

I HAVE here given, and to the best advantage, all the arguments Mr. *Bayle* hath employed to prove Religion not necessary to civil Society; by which it may be seen, how little the united force of wit and eloquence is able to produce for the support of so outrageous a paradox.

The reader will imagine, that now nothing can hinder us from going on to our *second* proposition; after having so strongly supported the *first*. But we have yet to combat a greater monster in morals, before we can proceed.

As the great foundation of our proposition, *that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to civil society*, is this, *that religion is necessary to civil society*; so the foundation of this

* Contin. des Pens. div. c. cxviii.

† Si les societéz sont absolument necessaires pour conserver le genre humain.

latter proposition is, *that VIRTUE is so*. Now, to the lasting opprobrium of our age and country, we have seen a writer publicly maintain, in a book so intitled, that PRIVATE VICES WERE PUBLIC BENEFITS. An unheard-of impiety, wickedly advanced, and impudently avowed, against the universal voice of nature: in which *moral virtue* is represented as the invention of knaves; and *christian virtue* as the imposition of fools: in which (that his insult on common sense might equal what he puts on common honesty) he assures his reader, that his book is a system of most exalted morals and religion: And that the *justice of his country*, which publicly accused him*, was pure calumny.

But I shall undertake to shew, and that in very few words, to the admirers of the low buffoonry and impure rhetoric of this wordy declaimer, that his whole fabric is one confused heap of falsehoods and absurdities.

I. *First* then, it is to be observed, that though his general position be, *that private Vices are public benefits*, yet, in his proof of it, he all along explains it by *Vice only in a certain measure, and to a certain degree*. And, as all other writers have deduced the necessity on private men in society, to be virtuous, and on the magistrate severely to punish vice, from the *malignity of the nature of Vice*; so he enforces this necessity, on both, from the *malignity of its excess*. And indeed he had been only fit for Bedlam, had he not given this restriction to the general sense of his proposition.

* By the Grand Jury of Middlesex.

However,

However, this is full enough to expose the falsehood of that assertion, which his whole book is written to support, namely, *that vice is absolutely necessary for a rich and powerful Society.* For whatsoever is *absolutely necessary* to the well-being of another in matter of morals, must be so, by its essential properties; the use of which thing will be, then, in proportion to its degree. And this the common moralists observe of Virtue with regard to the State. But whatsoever is useful to another, only when in a certain degree, is not so by its essential properties; if not by its essential properties, then, of course, by accident only; and, if by accident, not necessary.

The first part of the former assertion may be proved thus. If A be absolutely necessary to B, it is, because neither C, nor D, nor any thing but A can supply the wants of B. But if nothing but A, can supply these wants, it is because the suppli^{al} is afforded by the *essential* properties of A; which essential properties are incommunicable to all other beings; the communication of them to C, D, &c. making C and D the same as A, which is absurd: for if the suppli^{al} of the wants of B were caused by what was not *essential* to A, but *accidental*; then might these wants as well be supplied by C, D, &c. as by A; because that which is *accidental* only, may belong in common to several different beings. The second part may be proved thus: These *essential qualities can never be excessive*; as for instance, There can never be too much *Virtue* in a state. *Specific* Virtues, indeed, may be pushed to excess; but then they lose their nature, and become *Vices*; in which state of things, Society will be so far from having too much, that it will have too little
Virtue.

Virtue It is not so with *generic* Virtue; therefore that *essential* Quality in A, which in a lower degree profits B, must in a higher degree be still more useful to B. On the other hand, *accidental Qualities may be excessive*; so that, that *accidental* Quality in A, which profiteth B in a lower degree, may injure B in a higher. This is the case of REAL LUXURY, in its effects on Society; as will be shewn in the progress of this section: for though a specific Virtue carried to an excess becomes Vice, yet a Vice, so pushed on, never becomes Virtue; but, on the contrary, by advancing in malignity, more clearly evinces its true nature, and exposes its baleful effects.

From all this, it appears, that a great and powerful Community, which is, in itself, a natural good, and, as such, desirable, may procure and preserve its grandeur without Vice, though Vice so frequently produces and supports it: because this utility of Vice not arising from its essential qualities, but from some accidental circumstances attending it, may be supplied by something that is not Vice, attended with the same circumstances. As for instance, the consumption of the *products of art and nature* is the circumstance which makes states rich and flourishing. Now if this consumption may be procured by actions not vicious, then may a State become great and powerful without the assistance of Vice. That it may, in fact, be thus procured, shall now be shewn.

II. The Author, descending to the enumeration of his proofs, appears plainly to have seen, that Vice in general was only *accidentally* productive of good; and therefore avoids entering into an examination of particulars;

particulars; but selects, out of his favourite tribe, LUXURY, to support his execrable paradox; and on this alone rests his cause. By the assistance of this ambiguous term, he keeps something like an argument on foot, even after he hath left all the rest of his City-crew to shift for themselves. And it must be owned, there is no word more inconstantly and capriciously applied to particular actions; or of more uncertain meaning, when denominating such actions, than the term *Luxury*. For, unapplied, it has, like all other moral modes, an exact and precise signification; and includes in it, *the abuse of the gifts of Providence*. The difficulty is only to know when this question is abused. Men have two ways of deciding; the one, by the *principles of Natural religion*; the other, by the *positive institutions of Revealed*. In those *Principles* all men are reasonably well agreed; but, concerning these *Institutions*, when taken separately, and independent on those *Principles*, there are various opinions, which superstition and fanaticism have greatly distorted: consequently, those who estimate *Luxury* by this latter rule, (where obscurity, and of course confusion, are so difficult to be avoided) will disagree extremely about it: and amongst such diversity of notions, it would be strange indeed, if some or other had not ideas of *Luxury*, which would serve the wildest hypothesis; and much stranger, if so corrupt a Writer did not take advantage of them. He has done it like a master: and with a malice and cunning to intitle him, though he be but a follower, to be a Leader of a sect.

First, in order to perplex and obscure our idea of *Luxury*, he hath laboured in a previous dissertation,
on

on *the origin of moral virtue*, to destroy those very principles, by whose assistance we are only able to clear up and ascertain that idea: where he decries and ridicules the essential difference of things, the eternal notions of right and wrong; and makes VIRTUE, which common moralists deduce from thence, the offspring of craft and pride.

Nothing now being left to fix the idea of *Luxury*; but the positive precepts of *Christianity*, and he having stript these of their only true and infallible interpreter, the principles of *natural Religion*; it was easy for him to make those precepts speak in favour of any absurdities that would serve his purpose, and as easy to find such absurdities supported by the superstition and fanaticism of some or other of those many Sects and Parties of *christianity*, who, despising the principles of the Religion of Nature as *the weak and beggarly elements*, soon came to regard the natural appetites, as the graceless furniture of *the old man, with his affections and lusts*.

Having got CHRISTIANITY at this advantage, he gives us for Gospel, that meagre Phantom begot by the hypocrisy of *Monks* on the misanthropy of *Ascetics*: which cries out, AN ABUSE! whenever the gifts of Providence are used, further than for the bare support of nature. So that by this rule every thing becomes *Luxury* which is more than *necessary*. An idea of *Luxury* exactly fitted to our Author's hypothesis: for if no State can be rich and powerful while its members seek only a bare subsistence, and, if what is more than a bare subsistence be *Luxury*, and *Luxury* be *Vice*; the consequence, we see, comes in pat, PRIVATE VICES ARE PUBLIC BENEFITS. Here you
have

have the sole issue of all this tumour of words. But it is difficult to think, that a Writer of such depravity of heart, had not farther ends in this wicked representation of *natural* and *revealed* Religion. We cannot doubt his purpose, when we reflect upon his gains, which are, the fixing of his followers in a propensity for *Vice*, and in a prejudice against *Christianity*. For what can be more in favour of *Vice*, than, that there is no moral duty? What more in discredit of *Christianity*, than, that all the enjoyments of life are condemned by it as evil?

III. But the GOSPEL is a very different thing from what Bigots and Fanatics are wont to represent it. It enjoins and forbids nothing in moral practice, but what natural Religion had before enjoined and forbid. Neither indeed could it, because one of God's Revelations, whether ordinary or extraordinary, cannot contradict another; and because God gave us the first, to judge of others, by it. Accordingly we find, that though it be indeed one of the great ends of *Christianity* (but not the main and peculiar end) to advance the practice of moral virtue amongst men; yet the New Testament doth not contain any regular or complete system or Digest of moral laws; the detached precepts enforced by our divine Master in it, how excellent and perfect soever, arising only from the occasions and circumstances which gave birth to those discourses or writings, in which such precepts are delivered. For the rest, for a general knowledge of the system of moral-duty, the founders of our Religion hold open to us the great Pandect of the law of nature, and bid us search and study that. *Finally*, says the apostle

apostle Paul, *whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; think on these things.* But where vicious custom, or perverse Interpreters, had depraved the Religion of Nature, there, particular care was taken to remove the rubbish of time and malice, and to reinstate the injured moralities in their primitive dignity and splendor.

The *Religion of Nature*, then, being restored, and made the rule to explain and interpret the occasional precepts of *Christianity*; what is *Luxury* by *natural* Religion, that, and that only, must be *Luxury* by *revealed*. So that a true and precise definition of it, which this Writer (triumphing in the obscurity which, by these arts, he hath thrown over the idea) thinks it impossible to give, so as not to suit with his hypothesis, is easily settled. *LUXURY is the using the gifts of Providence, to the injury of the User, either in his person or fortune; or to the injury of any other, towards whom the User stands in any relation, which obliges him to aid and assistance.*

Now it is evident, even from the instances this Writer brings of the public advantages of consumption, which he indiscriminately, and therefore falsely, calls *Luxury*, that the utmost consumption may be made, and so all the ends of a rich and powerful Society served, without injury to the User, or any one, to whom he stands related: consequently without *Luxury*, and without *Vice*. When the consumption is attended with such injury, then it becomes *Luxury*, then it becomes a *Vice*. But then, let us take notice, that *this Vice*, like all others, is so far from being advanta-
gous

geous to Society, that it is the most certain ruin of it. It was this *Luxury* which destroyed *Rome*. And the very definition given above, informs us of the manner how it came to pass : namely, by enervating the body, debauching the mind, beggaring the fortune, and bringing in the practice of universal rapine and injustice. But the wretched absurdity of supposing *Luxury* beneficial to society, cannot be better exposed, than by considering, that, as *Luxury* is the abusing the gifts of Providence, to the injury of himself and of those to whom we stand related ; and as the *Public* is that, to which every man stands nearest related ; the consequence is, that *Luxury* is, at one and the same time, beneficial and injurious to the *Public*. Nor can the absurdity I here charge upon him, be evaded by saying it is deduced from a proposition of his, and a definition of mine, set together : Because, however we may differ whether the use of things, where no one is injured, be *Luxury* ; yet we both agree in this, that where there is that injury in the use, it is *Luxury* ; and *Luxury*, in this sense, he holds to be beneficial to Society.

The case I here put, of *Luxury's* injuring the *PUBLIC*, by depriving the state of that aid and assistance from particulars, which, the relation they stand in to it, requires them to give, is no imaginary or unlikely supposition. This effect of *Luxury* it was which contributed, more immediately than any other, to the destruction of the Roman Commonwealth. For in the last struggles for liberty by a *FEW*, against the humour of a debauched *luxurious* people, when nothing but a sufficient fund was wanting to enable those godlike men to restore the Republic, the richest citizens, who

who yet wished well to their Country, could not be prevailed upon to retrench from their private *Luxury*, to support the Public in this critical exigency : which therefore, having been long shaken by the *Luxury* of its enemies, fell now a sacrifice to the *Luxury* of its friends. Thus the great *Roman patriot* describes the fatal condition of those times ; *Nos habemus LUXURIAM, atque avaritiam ; publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.*

In a word then, it is not *Luxury*, but the *consumption* of the products of art and nature, which is of so high benefit to Society. That this *consumption* may well be, without *Luxury*, appears plainly from the definition given above. All the difference is, and that a very essential one, when the *consumption* is made without *Luxury*, infinitely greater numbers share in it ; when it becomes *Luxury*, it is confined to fewer. The reason of this, and the different effects this different consumption must have on the Public, is very evident. Had the consumption of the commodities and products of Greece when conquered (which indeed were necessary to render the Romans polite and wealthy) been more equally made by that people, it would have been extremely beneficial. But being unjustly claimed by one part, exclusive of the rest, “ *omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidebat,*” it became luxury and destruction. The Historian shews us how it was brought about : “ There (says he) the Roman
“ people first began to intrigue, to debauch, to affect
“ a taste for statues, pictures, and high-wrought plate.
“ To come at which, they oppressed the private,
“ plundered the public, violated the temples of the

“ Gods, and polluted and confounded every thing
 “ both sacred and profane*.” Till at length,

- - - - “ Sævior armis

“ LUXURIA incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem.”

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

HAVING endeavoured to shew in this and the two following Books, *that* the PRIESTS and LAWGIVERS of former times all concurred in supporting the belief of a FUTURE STATE, I am stopped in the midst of my course, by a late noble Writer, who hath taken advantage of this notorious truth, to represent the labours of those Moderns, who have trode in the same steps, as A CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE.

“ After pleading the cause of natural and revealed
 “ Religion, (says his Lordship) I am to plead the
 “ cause of God himself, against DIVINES AND
 “ ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY †.

“ The conduct of Christian Divines has been so far
 “ from defending the Providence of God, that they
 “ have joined in the clamour against it. Nothing has

* Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare, potare, signa, tabulas pictas, vasa cælata mirari, ea privatim ac publice rapere, delubra s poliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere.

† Lord BOLINGBROKE's Works, Vol. V. p. 305.

“ hindered, even those who pretend to be his Mes-
 “ sengers, his Embassadors, his *Plenipotentiaries*,
 “ from renouncing their allegiance to him (as they
 “ themselves have the FRONT TO AVOW), but the
 “ hypothesis of a FUTURE STATE. On *this hypothesis*
 “ *alone*, they insist; and therefore, if this will not
 “ serve their turn, God is disowned by them, as effec-
 “ tually as if he was so, in terms *.” “ Divines, if
 “ not Atheists, yet are ABETTERS of Atheism †.”

“ That there were some men who knew not God
 “ in all ages, may be true: but the scandalous task
 “ of COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the mask
 “ of Theism, was reserved for Metaphysicians and
 “ Theologians ‡.”

“ ——— Divines are still more to be blamed. A
 “ CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the
 “ professors of Theism. No matter. They PERSIST,
 “ and have done their best, in concert with their allies,
 “ to DESTROY the belief of the GOODNESS of God:—
 “ They endeavour to DESTROY that of his GOODNESS,
 “ which is a farther article of their ALLIANCE §.”

“ The CONFEDERACY between Atheists and Divines
 “ appears to have been carried VERY FAR—Nay
 “ the Atheist will appear, to that reason, to which
 “ they both appeal, more consistent in his ab-
 “ surdity than the Divine ||.” “ Divines UPBRAID
 “ God’s GOODNESS, and CENSURE his JUSTICE ¶.”—
 “ INJUSTICE is, in this life, ascribed to God, by
 “ Divines **.”

* Vol. V. pp. 487, 8. † Ib. p. 485. ‡ Ib. p. 307.

§ Ib. p. 393. || Ib. pp. 348, 9. ¶ Ib. p. 417.

** Ib. p. 541.

“ The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaston and
 “ Clarke, do, in effect, RENOUNCE the God whom
 “ you and I adore, as much as the rankest of the
 “ Atheistical Tribe. Your Priests and our Parsons
 “ will exclaim most pathetically, and RAIL OUTRA-
 “ GEOUSLY at this assertion. But have a little patience,
 “ and I will prove it to their shame to be true*.”

The Reader will give me leave, in a few words, to vindicate the body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy.

He may be pleased then to understand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to support itself, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of sense and experience can give it; namely, *the unequal distribution of moral good and evil, here below.*

“ Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
 “ Adspicerem, *lætosque diu florere nocentes,*
 “ *Vexarique pios*— LABEFAC TA CADEBAT
 “ RELIGIO,” - - -

was the common language of the impatient sufferer. From hence the Atheist inferred, that the Universe was without an intelligent Ruler; and that all things were driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which first produced them. DIVINES opposed this *Conclusion*; for they did not venture to be so paradoxical as (with his Lordship) to call in question *the Premisses*, a phenomenon which objected itself to all their Senses. They first demonstrated, strictly demonstrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL ATTRIBUTES: and then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were

* Vol. V. p. 485.

included within this life, the present distribution of good and evil would contradict that Demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole of man's existence was not included within this life : but that he was reserved for an after-reckoning ; in which, an *equal distribution of rewards and punishments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheists* were not the only enemies whom *Divines* had to deal with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those MORAL ATTRIBUTES, which the *Divines* had demonstrated : and, on that account, called themselves *DEISTS*. Yet they agreed so far with *Atheism*, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the *Divine* combated, in their turn ; and with the same arms ; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the *ATHEISTS*, the principle held in common was *the present unequal distribution of Good and Evil*. So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of NO GOD, he *demonstrated the Being and Attributes* : and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With *DEISTS*, the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God*. Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a *FUTURE STATE*, he appealed to the present *unequal distribution of good and evil*, (which these Men, as well as his Lordship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to see ;) and from that inequality inferred, that there must be such a State.

This is a short and true account of the *DIVINE'S* contest with *ATHEISTS* and *DEISTS*, so far as the subject of a *future state* came in question : In both

controversies that *state* is deduced from *the moral attributes*: only with this difference. In the dispute with Atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is *made*; in the dispute with Deists, it is *allowed*. The final purpose against Atheism is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpose against Deism is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can subsist without *believing that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of them that seek him* *. Thus, we see, the *question*, in each controversy, being different; the *premisses*, by which each proposition was to be proved, must needs be different. The difference is here explained; the premisses, in the argument against Atheists, were the *moral attributes*; the premisses, in the argument against Deists, were the *unequal distribution* of good and evil.

What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to see a Calumny either thrive or rise on so unpromising a ground? or flatter himself with the expectation of an Advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS, to *decry God's Providence; to blot out his Attributes of goodness and justice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very Existence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more;—he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity so far, had he seen his way clear before him.—His Lordship is always sublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a distance to look into the detail

* St. Paul. Hebr. xi. 6.

of things, or to enter into their *minuteness*: (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled these two Controversies into one; and, in the confusion, hath commodiously slipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making a *future State* THE PROOF of God's moral attributes: Whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF of a *future State*. Let us consider how the dispute stands with the *Atheist*. These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine answers, by demonstrating *God's Being and Attributes*: and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the *Deist*. Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a *future state* from the unequal distribution of things.--But his misrepresentation was to support his slander of a CONFEDERACY: there was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious by proving a *future state* from his Attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future state*, he would easily find credit with his kind Reader, for all the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheists hold a principle in common*; but, in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of good and evil here below. And did any thing forbid *Divines* to employ this common principle, in support of Religion against *Atheism and Deism*! But whatever his Lord-

ship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing, the most careless Reader will never overlook ; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, you see lurking that poor species of a Bigot's calumny, which, from *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious Party, charges his Adversary, with *all* the tollies or impieties which have rendered that Party odious. This miserable artifice of imposture, had now been long hissed out of learned controversy, when the noble Lord took it up ; and, with true political skill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT ; to make RELIGION distrust its best Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

THE
DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES
DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK II.

SECT. I.

HAVING now proved the first PROPOSITION, *That inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to the well-being of Society*, by considerations drawn from the *nature of Man*, and the *genius of civil Society*; and cleared it from the objections of licentious Wits;

I proceed to the *second*; which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

This I shall endeavour to prove,

I. From the conduct of Lawgivers, and Institutors of civil policy.

II. From the opinions of all the Learners and Teachers of wisdom, in the schools of ancient philosophy.

I. FROM THE CONDUCT OF LAWGIVERS, AND INSTITUTORS OF CIVIL POLICY: who never omitted
to

to propagate and confirm Religion, wherever they established Laws; RELIGION, I say, which was always first in their view, and last in their execution. They used it as the instrument to collect a body politic; and they applied it as the bond to tie and keep that body together: they *taught* it in civilizing man; and *established* it to prevent his return to barbarity and a savage life. In a word, so inseparable, in the ancient World, were the ideas of LAWGIVING and RELIGION, that Plutarch (in his paradoxical preference of atheism to superstition) supposes no other Origin of divine worship than what was the work of the Lawgiver. “How much happier had it been” (says he) for the Carthaginians, had their first Lawgiver been like Critias or Diagoras, who believed “neither Gods nor Demons, rather than such a one” as enjoined the public sacrifices to Saturn*!”

That the Magistrate, as such, hath taken the greatest care and pains to inculcate and support Religion, we shall prove at large: That this care and pains must arise, and was employed, on account of its confessed and experienced utility to the State, will need no proof.

But here it will be necessary to remind the reader of this previous truth, *That there never was, in any age of the world, from the most early accounts of time, to this present hour, any civil-policed nation or people, who had a Religion, of which the chief foundation and support was not the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE*

* Τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἔκ ἐλυσιτέλει Κριτίαν λαβῶσιν ἢ Διαγόραν νομοθέτην ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, μήτε τινὰ θεῶν μήτε δαιμόνων νομίζειν, ἢ τοιαῦτα θεῶν οἷα τῷ χρόνῳ ἔθουσιν;—Περὶ δεισιδ. P. 171. tom. II. fol. 1599. Francof.

of rewards and punishments; the JEWISH PEOPLE only excepted. This, I presume, our adversaries will not deny. Mr. *Bayle*, the indulgent foster-father of Infidelity, confesseth it in the fullest manner, and with the utmost ingenuity: “ Toutes les religions du monde, tant la vraie que les fausses, roulent sur ce grand pivot, qu’il y a un juge invisible qui punit & qui recompense, *apres cette vie*, les actions de l’homme tant exterieures qu’interieures. C’est de la que l’on suppose que decoule la principale utilité de la religion:” and thinks, it was the utility of this doctrine which set the Magistrate upon inventing a Religion for the State: “ C’est le principal motif qui eut animé ceux qui l’auroient inventée*.”

This truth, we beg the reader always to have in mind: So that when, in the sequel of this discourse, he meets with ancient testimonies for the necessity of RELIGION to Society, he may be sure, that the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments, was the chief idea included in that term. And on this account it is, that frequently, where the Ancients speak of the *source* of those utilities, which can proceed only from the doctrine of a *future state*, they give it the common name of *Religion*: as, on the other hand, they often call *Religion* by the restrictive name of a *future state*: On which account, I have not scrupled, throughout this discourse, to use the same liberty of applying the generic or specific term, one for the other, without any apprehension of being thought not to understand my argument, or of being misunderstood by my reader: Who, when he sees me

* Dict. Crit. & Hist. Art. SPINOZA. Rem. (E.)

bring facts and opinions of Antiquity, which shew the utility of religion in general, to prove the utility of the doctrine of a future state in particular, will understand that I speak home to my purpose, and to the full proof of my second proposition.

So that, had I done no more than produce *such facts and opinions*, I had done all that was necessary. But since the bare *necessary* is esteemed almost as poor and unhandsome a thing in literature as in civil life, I have employed the greatest part of the present and following books to shew, from ancient facts and opinions, the more than ordinary care and concern of all the wise and learned for perpetuating the specific doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

Having premised thus much to prevent mistakes, I proceed, in the first place,

1. To shew, *in general*, the civil Magistrate's care in this matter.

The popular doctrine of a Providence, and, consequently, of a future state of rewards and punishments, was, as we have said, so universally received in the ancient world, that we cannot find any civilized country where it was not of national belief. The most ancient *Greek* poets, as *Musæus**, *Orpheus*†, *Homer*, *Hesiod*, &c. who have given systems of theology and religion, on the popular creed of such nations, always reckon the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments as a fundamental article; And all succeeding writers have given testimony to the same concerted plan. *Æschylus*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Aristo-*

* Plato Rep. lib. xi. p. 364. E. T. II. Edit. Steph. 1578. fol.

† Plutarch, Vita Lucul.

phanes whose profession it was to represent the manners and opinions of all civilized people, whether *Greeks* or those whom the *Greeks* called *Barbarians*, are full and express to the same purpose. Further, it is recorded in the works of every ancient historian and philosopher, which it would be endless to recite. But *Plutarch*, the most knowing of them all, shall speak for the rest: “Examine*,” says he, in his tract against *Colotes the Epicurean*, “the face of the globe, and
 “you may find Cities unfortified, unlettered, without a
 “regular Magistrate, or appropriated habitations;
 “without possessions, property, or the use of money,
 “and unskilled in all the magnificent and polite
 “arts of life: But a City without the knowledge of
 “a God, or the practice of Religion: without the use
 “of vows, oaths, oracles, and sacrifices to procure
 “good, or of deprecatory rites to avert evil, no man
 “can or ever will find.” And in his consolation to *Apollonius*, he declares it † was so ancient an opinion, that good men should be recompensed after death, that he could not reach either to the author or original of it. To the same purpose had *Cicero* and *Seneca* declared themselves before him. The first in

* — εὔροις δ' ἂν ἐπιῶν κὶ πόλεις ἀτειχίστους, ἀγραμμάτους, ἀβασίλευτους, ἀοίκους, ἀχρημάτους, νομίματα μὴ δεομένας, ἀπέριους θεάτρων κὶ γυμνασίων ἀνίερη δὲ πόλις κὶ ἀβία, μὴ χρωμένης εὐχαῖς, μηδὲ ὄρκοις, μηδὲ μαυρίαις, μηδὲ θυσίαις ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς, μηδὲ ἀπειροπαῖς κακῶν, ἕδεις ἔστιν ἕδει ἔσται γεγονὼς θεαλῆς. Edit. Francf. fol. T. II. p. 1125. E.

† — Καὶ ταῦθ' ἔτις ἀρχαῖα κὶ παλαιὰ διηλεῖ νομισμένα παρ ἡμῶν ὥς τὸ παράπαν ἕδεις οἶδεν ἕδὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔτι τὸν θέντα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπειρον αἰῶνα τυγχάνουσι διὰ τέλους ἔτις νομισμένα.

Edit. Steph. 8°, 1572. T. I. p. 201,

these

these words; “ * As our innate ideas discover to us
 “ that there are Gods, whose attributes we deduce
 “ from reason; so, *from the consent of all nations*
 “ *and people, we conclude that the soul is immortal.*”
 The other thus: “ When † we weigh the question
 “ of the immortality of the soul, *the consent of all*
 “ *mankind, in their fears and hopes of a future state,*
 “ is of no small moment with us.”

In a word; *Sextus Empiricus*, when he would discredit the argument for the being of a God, brought from universal consent, observes that it would prove too much; because it would prove the truth of the *poetic fables of hell*, in which there was as general a concurrence ‡.

But of all nations, the EGYPTIAN was most celebrated for its care in cultivating Religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular: inso-much that one of the most ancient *Greek* historians affirms, *They were the first who built altars and erected statues and temples to the Gods* §.—*The first who taught that the soul of man was immortal.* And

* —Ut Deos esse naturâ opinamur, qualesque sint ratione cognoscimus; sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium. *Tuscul. Disp. l. i. c. 16. in initio.* Edit. Oxon. 4^o. T. II. p. 245.

† Cum de animarum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. Ep. 117.

‡ Adv. Physicos, l. viii. c. 2. Comment.

§ Βωμῆς τι κὶ ἀγάλματα κὶ τῆς θεοῖσι ἀπονείμαι σφέας πρώτως. *Her. Euterpe, c. 4.*—Πρώτοι δὲ κὶ τοῦδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες ὡς ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι. *Id. ib. c. 123.*

Lucian

Lucian tells us*, *That they were said to be the first who had the knowledge of the Gods.* Which only amounts to this, that they were the first and wisest civil-policied people: as will appear presently.

But, at present, to prove *the Magistrate's care from hence.*—For this account of the antiquity and universality of Religion is not given to evince its *truth*; for which purpose other writers have often and successfully employed it; but to manifest its *USE*; which will be best done by inquiring what share the Magistrate had in it.

I. Now though no civilized nation was ever without a Religion in general, and this doctrine in particular; and though it was of general belief even before civil policy was instituted amongst mankind; yet were there formerly, as now there are, many savage nations, that when first discovered, appeared to have long lost all traces of Religion: A fact which implies some extraordinary care in the Magistrate for its support and preservation. For if Religion hath been supported in all places, at all times, and under all circumstances, where there was a magistrate and civil policy; and scarce in any place, or under any circumstance, where these were wanting; what other cause than the Magistrate's care and contrivance can be assigned for its support?

If it should be said, which, I think, is the only plausible thing can be said, that the reason why the Citizen had religion, and the Savage none, might be, that,

* Πρῶτοι μὲν ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτιοι λέγονται θεῶν τε ἔνοιαν λαβεῖν. *De Dea Syria*, § 2. Edit. Reitzii.

amongst the advantages of civil life, the improvement and cultivation of the mind is one; and this necessarily brings in the knowledge of God and religious observance: It is sufficient to reply, that all the national Religions of the ancient and modern Gentile world are so gross and irrational, that they could not be the product of reflection or improved reason, but were plainly of the Magistrate's fitting up, adapted to the capacity of minds yet rude and uncultivated, which could bear nothing of a finer texture than what was made out of the stuff he found, the genius of the Nation and the nature of the Government.

To give the proof of what we have been saying: The *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* in the South, and the people of *Canada* in *North America*, were on a level with regard to speculative knowledge. Or, if there were any natural advantage, the *Canadians* had it. These, when discovered, seemed to have no rudiments of Religion: The *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* had one formed, digested, and established: but such a religion as discovered something worse than mere ignorance, but never could be the result of improved thinking: However, a religion it was which taught the great articles of the worship of a God, a providence, and a future state. Now how happened it, that these two great empires had a Religion, and the *Canadians* none, but that the Lawgivers of the former saw it necessary to countenance, add to, and perpetuate what they found*, for the benefit of the state? which advantage the *Canadians* wanting, they lost, in course of time, the very footsteps of Religion. If this will not be allowed, it will be difficult to assign a reason.

* See Book III. Sect. 6. II. 1. and pag. antepenult.

Let us suppose, according to the objection, that *Gentile* Religion owes its birth to the improved and cultivated mind. Now, if we make collections from the nature of things, it will be found more likely that these northern Savages should longer preserve the notions of God, and the practices of Religion, than the southern Citizens, uninfluenced by their Magistrates.

The way of getting to the knowledge of a God, best suited to the common capacity of man, is that very easy one, the contemplation of the works of nature: For this employment the Savage would have fitter opportunities given him by his vacant and sedentary life; and by his constant view of nature, which all his labours, and all his amusements, perpetually presented to him naked and unsophisticated. The *Comte de Boulainvilliers*, a writer by no means prejudiced in favour of religion, gives this reason why the *Arabians* preserved so long, and with so much purity, their notions of the Divinity*.

On the other hand, Nature, by which we come to the knowledge of a first Cause, would be quite hid from the southern Citizen, busied in the works of barbarous arts, and inhuman practices; or taken up with the slavish attendance on the will, and a more slavish imitation of the manners of a cruel and capricious Tyrant.

Nor, if we may credit the relations of travellers, do the northern people any more neglect to exercise

* La Vie de Mohammed, p. 147. Ed. Amst. 1731. Je reviens volontiers à la louange de la solitude des Arabes. Elle a conservé chez eux plus longtems, & avec moins de mélange, le sentiment naturel de la véritable divinité, &c.

their reason than the southern: It is constant, they are observed to have sounder intellects than those nearer the sun: which, being owing to the influence of climes, is found to hold all the world over. Notwithstanding this, the issue proved just the contrary; and, as we said, the *Peruvians* and *Mexicans* had a Religion, the *Canadians* none at all.

Who then can doubt but that this was owing to the care and contrivance of the Magistrate? But indeed (which makes this instance the more pertinent) the *fact* confirms the *reasoning*. The Founders of these two monarchies pretended to be the messengers and offspring of the Gods; and, in the manner of the Grecian, and other Legislators (of whom more hereafter) pretended to inspiration, established Religion, and constituted a form of worship.

II. But not only the *existence*, but the *genius* too of pagan Religion, shews the Magistrate's hand in its support.

First, From the *origin* of their Gods.

Secondly, From the *attributes* given to them; and

Thirdly, From the *mode of public worship*.

First, The idolatry of the Gentile States was chiefly the worship of dead men; and these, Kings, Lawgivers, and Founders of civil policy. The benefit accruing to the State both from the *consecration* and the *worship* of such Gods, shews it to be a contrivance of the Lawgiver. For, 1. Nothing could be a greater excitement to good government, than to shew the Magistrate that the public benefits, which he should invent, improve, or preserve, would be rewarded

with an immortality of fame and glory. *Cicero* gives this as the original of the civil apotheosis: "It may be easily understood, that the reason, why most Cities prosecuted the memory of their valiant men with divine honours, was to spur up their Citizens to virtue, that every the most deserving of them might encounter dangers with the greater cheerfulness, in the service of his country. And for this very cause it was that, at Athens, Erectheus and his daughters were received into the number of the Gods*." 2. Nothing could make the people so observant of their Laws, as a belief that the makers, framers, and administrators of them, were become Gods; and did dispense a peculiar providence for their protection and support.

The records of antiquity support this reasoning. The EGYPTIANS were the first people who perfected Civil-policy, and established Religion: And they were the first, too, who deified their kings, lawgivers, and public benefactors †; as we may collect from the passage of *Herodotus*, quoted above, which says, *they were the first who built altars, and erected statues and temples to the Gods*: For the erecting statues was, by this historian, esteemed a certain mark that the

* Atque in plerisque civitatibus intelligi potest, augendæ virtutis gratiâ, quo libentiùs reipublicæ causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratam. Ob eam enim ipsam causam Erectheus Athenis filiæque ejus in numero deorum sunt. Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 19. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. II. p. 503.

† Ἄλλως δ' ἐκ τέτων ἐπιγίαις γενέσθαι φασίν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν Διητῆς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τετυχηκότας τῆς ἀθανασίας ὧν ἰνίαις καὶ βασιλεῖς γεγονέναι κατὰ τὸν Αἴγυπτον. Diod. Sic. l. i. p. 8. Steph. Ed.

worshippers believed the Gods had *human natures*; as appears from the reason he gives why the Persians had no *statues* of their Gods, namely, *because they did not believe as the Greeks, that the Gods had human natures**, that is, they did not believe the Gods were dead men deified: This, as we say, was a practice, invented by the *Egyptians*; who, in process of time, taught the rest of the world their mystery †. So when arts and civil policy were brought into *Greece* by *Cadmus* and *Ceres* (the first, though a *Phenician* by birth, being an inhabitant of *Thebes* in *Egypt*; and the other, though coming immediately from *Sicily*, was yet a natural *Egyptian*) then, and not till then, began the custom of deifying dead men; which soon overran all *Greece* and the rest of *Europe* ‡.

* Ὅτι μὲν ἱμοὶ δοκίμην, ὅτι ἐκ ἀνθρωποφυίας ἐνόμισαν τὸς θεὸς, καθάπερ οἱ Ἕλληες εἶναι. Clio. L. 131. And see note [A] at the end of this Volume.

† Προδιαφθῆσαι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν αὐθις σαφήνειαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν μετὰ μέρθ' διάβρωσιν, ὅτι οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν βασιλέων, ἐξαίρετως δὲ Φοίνικες τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρέλαβον ἀνθρωποί, θεὸς ἐνέμιξον μεγίστες τὸς τὰ πρὸς τὴν βιολικὴν χρεῖαν εὐρύθλας, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τι εὐ ποιήσασθαι τὰ εἶδη. εὐεργέτας τε τέττες καὶ πολλῶν αἰτίας ἀγαθῶν ἠγάμενοι, ὡς θεὸς προσκίοντες. Philo Bibl. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. ii. c. 9.

‡ Sir Isaac Newton, who, probably, had not this matter in his thoughts, hath yet a remarkable passage to this purpose in his *Chronology of the Greeks*: “*Idolatry* (says he) began “*in Chaldaea and Egypt*.—The countries upon the *Tigris* and the “*Nile* being exceeding fertile, were first frequented by mankind, “and grew first into kingdoms; and THEREFORE began first to “adore their dead kings and queens:—Every city set up the “worship of its own founder and kings, and by alliances and con- “quests they spread this worship, and at length the *Phenicians* “and *Egyptians* brought into *Europe* the practice of deifying the “dead.” Pag. 161.

2. *The attributes and qualities assigned to their Gods*, always corresponded with the nature and genius of the government. If this was gentle, benign, compassionate, and forgiving; goodness and mercy were most essential to the Deity: But if severe, inexorable, captious, or unequal; the very Gods were Tyrants; and expiations, atonements, lustrations, and bloody sacrifices, composed the system of religious worship. In the words of the great Poet,

Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
Whose attributes were rage, revenge, or lust;
Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
And, form'd like tyrants, tyrants would believe*.

But, 3. *The mode of public worship* was alone sufficient to betray the Mover of the whole machine. The *object* of what we call *Religion*, being God, considered as the creator and preserver of a species of rational beings, the *subject* of it must needs be each individual of that species. This is that idea of Religion, which our common reason approves. But now, in ancient paganism, *Religion* was a very different thing: It had for its *subject*, not only the *natural man*, that is, each Individual; but likewise the *artificial man*, Society; by and for whom, all the *public* rites and ceremonies of it were instituted and performed. And while that part of pagan Religion, whose *subject* were individuals, bore an inferior part, and was confessed to be under an unequal Providence, the consideration of which brought in the doctrine of a future state for the support of God's government; the other, whose subject was the artificial man, Society,

* Essay on Man.

taught a more equal Providence, administred to the State. The consequence of which was, that Religion and Government ran into one another; and prodigies and portents were as familiar as civil edicts; and as constantly bore their share in the public administration: For the Oracles, without which nothing was projected or executed, always denounced them as rational directions, declarative of divine favour, or displeasure; in which *particulars*, as such, were not at all concerned: So that to accept or to avert the omen; to gratulate the mercy, or deprecate the judgment; the constant method was the revival of *old rites*, or the institution of *new*. A reformation of manners, or enforcement of sumptuary laws, never made part of the State's atonement to the Gods.

The oddness and notoriety of this fact so forcibly struck Mr. *Bayle's* imagination, that, mistaking this for the whole of Paganism, he too hastily concluded, that *the worship of false Gods in the ancient world, did not at all influence morals**: And from thence formed an argument to support his favourite question in behalf of Atheism. This was a strange conclusion: For though it be indeed true, that the *public* part of pagan Religion had no influence on morals, it is utterly false that the *private* part had not: For in the doctrine of a future state, which was the foundation of, and inseparable from, this sounder part of pagan Religion whose subject was the *individual*, the merit and demerit, to which rewards and punishments were annexed, was virtue and vice

* *Pensées diverses sur un comete, &c.* And *Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial.* And *Continuation des Pensées diverses, &c.*

only. This will be proved at large in the fourth section of the present book: Though I am ready to allow, that the nature and administration of the public part of pagan Religion did lead *individuals* into many wrong conclusions concerning the efficacy of exterior acts of worship.

But what seems to have occasioned Mr. *Bayle's* mistake (besides his following the Fathers, who in their *declamations* against paganism have said a great deal to the same purpose*) was his not reflecting that ancient History only presents us with *one* part of the influence of Paganism, that which it had on the Public as a body: The *other*, the influence it had on individuals, it passes over in silence, as not its province.

Whoever now considers the genius of Paganism in this view, (and unless he considers it in this view he

* Yet St. Austin himself cannot but own that the MYSTERIES however (of which the Reader will hear a great deal in the 4th Section of this Book) were principally instituted for the promoting of virtue and a good life, even where he is accusing *Paganism* in general for its neglect of moral virtue:

“ Nec nobis nescio quos susurros paucissimorum auribus anhelatos & arcana velut religione traditos jactent, quibus vitæ probitas castitasque discatur.”—Civ. Dei, l. ii. c. 6.

“ Iidem ipsi Dæmones—perhibentur in adytis suis, secretisque penetralibus dare quædam bona præcepta de moribus quibusdam velut electis sacratis suis—Proinde malignitas dæmonum nisi alicubi se, quemadmodum scriptum in nostris litteris novimus, transfiguret in angelos lucis, non implet negotium deceptionis. Foris itaque populis celeberrimo strepitu impietas impura circumsonat, & intus paucis castitas simulata vix sonat: præbentur propatula pudendis, & secreta laudandis: decus latet, & dedecus patet,” &c. c. 26.

will never be able to judge truly of it*) can hardly doubt but that the civil magistrate had a great hand in modelling *Religion*. What it was which enabled him to give this extraordinary cast to Paganism, is not difficult to discover: It could be nothing but that *popular disposition* arising from, and the necessary consequence of, those general notions, which, by his contrivance and encouragement, had overspread the heathen world. 1. That there were local tutelary Deities, who had taken upon themselves, or were intrusted with, the care and protection of particular Nations and People; (of which, more hereafter.) 2. That those great benefactors of mankind, who had reduced the scattered tribes and clans into civil Society, were become Gods. 3. and lastly, That their systems of Laws and civil Institutes were planned and digested by the direction of the legislator's patron-Deity †.

On

* What is here said of the genius of Paganism well accounts for a circumstance in ancient history, which very much embarrasses the modern critics. They cannot conceive how it happened, that the best ancient historians, who understood so well what belonged to the nature of a Composition, and how to give every sort of work its due form, and were besides free from all vulgar superstition, should abound so much in descriptions of religious rites and ceremonies; and in relations of omens, prodigies, and portents. Many an idle hypothesis hath been framed to give a solution of this difficulty; and many a tedious work compiled to justify these ancient historians, upon mere modern ideas. But now a plain and easy answer may be given to it. *This part* of pagan Religion was so interwoven with the transactions of State, that it became *essential* to civil history. And how much soever it may be supposed to have deformed ancient story, yet the Critic and Philosopher gain by what disgusts the delicacy of the Politician; the Greek and Roman history being the repository of all that concerns the *public part* of pagan religion.

† See the beginning of the next section.

On the whole then, The foregoing considerations of the *preservation* of Religion in general; the *origine* of the pagan Gods; their *attributes*; and the *mode of public worship*;—will, I am persuaded, incline the reader to think that, for the *universality of religious belief*, the world was chiefly indebted to the civil Magistrate; how much soever the illegitimate or unnatural constitution of particular States, or the defective views of particular Lawgivers, contributed to deprave the true Religion of *nature*; or, if you will, the *patriarchal*. The learned St. *Austin*, who excelled in the knowledge of antiquity, seems to have been determined by this way of thinking, when he gives it, as the result of his enquiries; that the civil Magistrate had a large share in pagan superstition. His words are these*,

“—Which indeed seems to have been done on no other
 “ account, but as it was the business of princes, out
 “ of their wisdom and civil prudence, to deceive the
 “ people in their Religion—princes, under the name
 “ of religion, persuaded the people to believe those
 “ things true, which they themselves knew to be idle
 “ fables. By this means, for their own ease in go-
 “ vernment, tying them the more closely to civil
 “ Society.”

But if now it should be objected, that it was natural for the people, left to themselves, to run into those superstitions, we may readily grant it without prejudice

* —Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia hominum principum velut prudentium & sapientium negotium fuit populum in religionibus fallere—Homines principes ea, quæ vana esse noverint, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant: Hoc modo eos civili societati velut arctius alligantes, quo subditos possiderent. De Civit. Dei, l. iv. c. 32.

to the argument: For they are always such notions as are apt to be entertained and cherished by vulgar minds, whose current the wise Magistrate is accustomed to turn to his advantage. For to think him capable of new modelling the human mind, by *making* men religious whom he did not *find* so, is, as will be shewn hereafter, a senseless whimsy, entertained by the Atheist to account for the origin of Religion. And, when it is seen that all these various modes of superstition concurred to promote the Magistrate's purpose, it can hardly be doubted but he gave them that general direction. The *particular* parts of Gentile Religion, which further strengthen and confirm this reasoning, are not here to be insisted on. Their original will be clearly seen, when we come to shew the several methods which the Magistrate employed for this great purpose. What these methods were, the course of the argument now leads us to consider.

SECT. II.

IT hath been shewn in general, from the EFFECT, that Lawgivers and founders of civil policy did indeed support and propagate Religion. We shall now endeavour to explain the CAUSES of that effect, in a particular enumeration of the arts they employed to that purpose.

I. The FIRST step the Legislator took, was to pretend a Mission and revelation from some God, by whose command and direction he had framed the Policy he would establish. Thus *Amasis* and *Mneves*,
lawgivers

lawgivers of the *Egyptians* (from whence this custom spread over *Greece* and *Asia*) pretended to receive their laws from *Mercury*; *Zoroaster* the lawgiver of the *Bactrians*, and *Zamolxis* lawgiver of the *Getes*, from *Vesta*; *Zathraustes* the lawgiver of the *Arimaspi*, from a good spirit or genius; and all these most industriously and professedly propagated the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. *Rhadamanthus* and *Minos* lawgivers of *Crete*, and *Lycaon* of *Arcadia*, pretended to an intercourse with *Jupiter*; *Triptolemus* lawgiver of the *Athenians*, affected to be inspired by *Ceres*; *Pythagoras* and *Zaleucus*, who made laws for the *Crotoniates* and *Locrians*, ascribed their institutions to *Minerva*: *Lycurgus* of *Sparta*, professed to act by the direction of *Apollo*; and *Romulus* and *Numa* of *Rome* put themselves under the guidance of *Consus*, and the Goddess *Egeria**. In a word, there is hardly an old Lawgiver on record, but what thus pretended to revelation, and the divine assistance. But had we the lost books of *Legislators* written by *Hermippus*, *Theophrastus*, and *Apollodorust*, we should have had a much fuller list of these inspired statesmen, and doubtless, many further lights on the subject. The same method was practised by the founders of the *great outlying empires*, as Sir *William Temple* calls them. Thus the first of the *Chinese* monarchs was called *Fagfour* or *Fanfur*, the *son of Heaven*, as we are told by the *Jesuits*, from his pretensions to that relation. The *royal commen-*

* Diod. Sic. l. i. & v. Ephorus apud Strabonem, l. x.—teste veteri scriptore apud Suidam in [*Λυκάων*]—Arist. apud Scholæ Pind. ad. Olymp. x.

† Athen. l. xiv. D. Laertius.

aries of Peru inform us, that the founders of that empire were *Mango Copac*, and his wife and sister *Coya Mama*, who proclaimed themselves the son and daughter of the *Sun*, sent from their father to reduce mankind from their savage and bestial life, to one of order and society. *Tuisco*, the founder of the German nations, pretended to be sent upon the same message, as appears from his name, which signifies the interpreter*, that is, of the Gods. *Thor* and *Odin*, the lawgivers of the *Western Goths*, laid claim likewise to inspiration and even to divinity †. The *Revelations of Mahomet* are too well known to be insisted on. But the race of these inspired Lawgivers seems to have ended in *Genghizcan*, the founder of the *Mogul empire* ‡.

Such was the universal custom of the ancient world, to make *Gods* and *Prophets* of their first kings and lawgivers. Hence it is, that *Plato* makes *legislation* to have come from God, and not from man §: and

* Vide Sheringham, De Anglorum gentis origine, p. 86.

† Olim quidam magicæ artis imbuti, Thor videlicet & Othinus,— obtentis simplicium animis, divinitatis sibi fastigium arrogare ceperunt.—Adeo namque fallaciæ eorum effectus percerebit, ut in ipsis cæteri quondam numinum potentiam venerantes, eosque deos, vel *deorum complices* autumantes veneficiorum auctoribus solennia vota dependerent, & errori sacrilego respectum sacris debitum exhiberent. Saxo-Gram. l. vi. Histor. p. 93. Francof. 1576. fol.

‡ Ils ont attribué des revelations à *Genghizcan*; & pour porter la veneration des peuples aussi loin qu' elle pouvoit aller, ils lui ont donné de la divinité. Ceux qui s'interessoient à son elevation eurent même l'insolence de le faire passer pour fils de Dieu. Sa mere plus modeste, dit seulement qu'il etoit FILS DU SOLEIL. M. Petit de la Croix, le pere, Histoire du Genghizcan, c. 1.

§ Θεός ἢ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὃ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως; KA. Θεός, ὃ ξένη, θεός, ὡς γε τὰ δικαιοτάτου εἰπεῖν. De Leg. l. i. lin. 1.

that the constant epithets to kings, in *Homer*, are ΔΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΣ *born of the Gods*, and ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ *bred or tutored by the Gods**.

From this general pretence to revelation we may collect the sentiments of the ancient lawgivers concerning the use of Religion to Society. For we must always have in mind what *Diodorus Siculus* so truly observes, *That they did this, not only to beget a veneration to their laws, but likewise to establish the opinion of the superintendency of the Gods over human affairs* †. One may venture to go farther, and say, that to *establish this superintendency* was their principal and direct aim in all their pretensions to inspiration.

The reader may observe, that *Diodorus* does not so much as suspect them of having a third end, distinct from these two; that is to say, the advancement of

* Θυμός δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος. Il. B. ver. 196. which title of διοτρεφέος is not given, says Eustathius on the place, to signify that such a one is descended from Jupiter, but that he receives his honour and authority from him. Ἐφερμηνεύει διατὶ ΔΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΣ καὶ ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ τὴς βασιλεῖς λέγει, ὅτι ἐκ Διὸς τὸ γένος ἔλκεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ΕΞ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ Η ΤΙΜΗ.

† Μετὰ γὰρ τὴν παλαιὰν τῆ κατ' Αἴγυπτον βίβη καλίστατι, τὴν μυθολογούμενην γινόμεναι ἐπὶ τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἡρώων, πείσαι φασὶ πρώτων ἀγράπτους νόμους χεῖρασθαι τὰ πλῆθη βίβη τὸ Μιεύη, ἄνδρα καὶ τῆ ψυχῆ μέγαν καὶ τῷ βίῳ κοιότατον τῶν μνημοευομένων, προσποιηθῆναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὸν Ἑρμῆν δεδωκέναι τέχνης, ὡς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίες ἰσομένους καθάπερ παρ' Ἑλλήσιν ποιῆσαι φασὶν ἐν μὲν τῇ Κρήτῃ Μίνωα, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις Λυκάργον τὸν μὲν παρὰ Διὸς, τὸν δὲ παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος φέσαντα τέχνης εἰληφέναι καὶ παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ πλείοσιν ἔλκεται παραδεδόται τῆτο τὸ γένος τῆς ἐπινοίας ὑπάρχει, καὶ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίων γενέσθαι τοῖς πεισθεῖσιν—

—εἶτε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δύναμιν τῶν εὐρεῖν λεγομένων, τὴς νόμους ἀποδεδείκται τὸν ὄχλον, μᾶλλον ὑπακίσεσθαι διαλαβόστας. L. i. p. 59. Edit. Steph.

their

their own private interest. And this with great judgment. He knew well the difference between a **LAWGIVER** and a **TYRANT**; though the World soon after seems to have lost the memory of that distinction*. Such views became not the former; they destroyed his character, and changed him into his direct opposite; who applied every thing to his own interest; and this amongst the rest. *Aristotle*, in his maxims for setting up, and supporting a **tyranny**, lays this down for one, *to seem extremely attached to the worship of the Gods, for that men have no apprehension of injustice from such as they take to be religious and to have a high sense of providence. Nor will the people be apt to run into plots and conspiracies against those, whom they believe the Gods will, in their turn, fight for, and support* †. And here it is worth noting, that, anciently; **Tyrants**, as well as **Lawgivers**, gave all encouragement to **Religion**; and endeavoured to establish their irregular Wills, not by convincing men that there was no just nor unjust in actions; but by persuading them that the privilege of *divine right* exempted the **Tyrant** from all moral obligation. Hence

* Quintilian L. VIII. C. 6. (pag. 415. Edit. Oxon. 1693, 4to) *de Tropis*, says that *Pastor Populi*, though used by Homer, is so **POETICAL** that he would not venture to use it in an oration: and ranks it with Virgil's—*Volucres pennis remigare*. What could occasion so strange a piece of Criticism, but that when Quintilian wrote under the **Tyrants** of Rome, the People had lost the very idea of the *Kingly Office*?

† Ἐτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θεὰς φαίνεσθαι αἰεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε γὰρ φοβῶνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαιμονοὶ νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρονιζέειν τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν ἥτιον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τὰς θεάς. Polit. l. v. c. 11. T. III. p. 547. D. E. Edit. Paris. fol. 1639.

may be seen the absurdity of *Hobbes's* scheme of Politics, who, for the sake of the Magistrate, was for eradicating Religion. But the ancients knew better; and so too did some of the moderns*.

The question then is, whether these pretensions of the ancient Lawgivers were feigned in *the first intention*, for the sake of Society or of Religion? For it is no question, but that what we here shew was contrived by the Magistrate for the service of Religion, was done *ultimately* for the sake of Civil Government. Or in other words, the question, I say, is, Whether this pretence to inspiration was made to establish a *civil* or a *religious* Society? If a *civil*; the ends aimed at must be the *reception of his policy*, or *provision for its perpetuity*. I speak not here of that third end, *the securing a veneration, for them, to posterity*; and for a good reason, because *this* is the very thing I contend for; such *veneration* being only to be procured by the influence of Religion; the peculiar mode of which, the pretended inspiration introduces. The ends then in question, are *reception for the policy*; or provision for the perpetual *duration* of it.

1. For the *reception*, there would be small need of this expedient. 1. Civil laws are seen by all to be so necessary for the well-being of every individual, that one can hardly conceive any need of the belief of divine command or extraordinary assistance to bring men to embrace a scheme for associating, or

• Et non è cosa piu necessaria à parere d'havere che questa ultima qualita [religione] perche gli huomini in univarsale giudicano piu a gli occhi che alle mani, perche tocca à vedere a ciascuno a sentire à pochi. Machiavel del Principe, c. 18.

And nothing is more necessary to
 to
 in general judge more by the eyes
 - because they are more immediately
 given to the senses, than by the ears

to manifest the right they have of so doing. For (as the great Geographer says) *Man was born with this inclination to associate. It is an appetite common both to Greeks and Barbarians: for, being by nature a civil animal, he lives readily under one common policy or law**. Besides several of these Legislators gave laws to a *willing people*, on the strength of their personal character of virtue and wisdom; and were called upon to that office, in which nothing was wanting to beget the necessary veneration to him who discharged it. And though it might possibly have happened to a people to be so far sunk into brutality, as to be disinclined towards the recovery of a reasonable nature, like those with whom it is said *Orpheus* had to deal; who (*being savages, without the knowledge of morality or law*) reduced them into society, *by recommending to them piety to the Gods, and instructing them in the ways of superstition †*: yet this was not the case of the generality of those with whom these Lawgivers were concerned: and therefore if we would assign a cause of *this pretence to revelation* as extensive as the fact, it must be that which is here given. But, 2dly, we find, that where Religion was previously settled, no inspiration was pretended. On this account neither *Draco* nor *Solon*, Lawgivers of Athens, laid claim to any: for they found Religion well secured by the institutions of *Triptolemus* and *Ion*. And we know,

* Πίφουκε γὰρ ἔτι. Καὶ κοινόν ἐστι τῆτο καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ τοῖς Βαρβάροις· Πολιτικοὶ γὰρ ὄντες, ἀπὸ προσάσματι κοινῶ ζῶσιν. Strabo, Geogr. l. xvī. Edit. Casaub. p. 524. lin. 16.

† —Ὅτι θηριώδεις ὄντας τὰς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἔτι ἔθνη, ἔτε νόμους, εἰδότες εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν ἀγαγῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβεῖν παρακαλίσας. Heraclit. de Incred. c. 23.

that,

that, had *pretended inspiration* been only, or principally, for the easier introduction and reception of civil policy, the sanguinary laws of *Draco* had stood in more need of the sanction of a revelation, than any other of antiquity. Indeed, *Maximus Tyrius* goes so far as to say, that *Draco* and *Solon* prescribed nothing in their laws, concerning the Gods, and their worship*; which, if true, would make as much against us, on the other hand. But in this he is mistaken. *Porphyry* quotes an express law of *Draco's* concerning the mode of divine worship. *Let the Gods and our own country heroes be publicly worshipped, according to the established rites; when privately, according to every man's abilities, with terms of the greatest regard and reverence; with the first fruits of their labours, and with annual libations* †. *Andocides* ‡ quotes another of *Solon*, which provides for the due and regular celebration of the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES. *Athenæus* does the same. And how considerable a part these were of divine worship, and of what importance to the very essence of religion, we shall see hereafter.

2. As to a provision for the perpetuity of national laws and institutions; This entered not into the inten-

* Πῶς γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι συνίεναι, — τὸ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον, πῶς δὲ τιμησίαν; ἔτι γὰρ τῶν κούρων λαχόντες δικασταὶ χίλιοι ταῦτα ἐξείλασσιν, ἔδδὲ Σόλων τὸ ἐπὲρ αὐτῶν γέγραφε, ἔδδὲ αἱ Δράκωνος σέμνοι νόμοι. Dissert. xxxix. p. 383. Edit. Lugd. 1630, 8vo.

† Θεὸς τιμῶν καὶ Ἡρώας ἐσχαρίως ἐν κοινῷ, ἐπομένως νόμοις παλαιοῖς, ἰδίᾳ κατὰ δύναμιν σὺν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν, καὶ πελάνοις ἐπελείοις. De Abst. l. iv. § 22. (Edit. Cantabr. 1655, 8vo.) according to the emendations of Petit and Valentinus.—The law is thus introduced, Θεσμός αἰώνιος τοῖς Ἀθίδοι νεμομένοις, Κύριος τὸν ἄπαλλα χρόνον.

‡ Orat. Περὶ Μυστηρίων, apud Decem Orat.

tion of the old *Greek* legislation ; nor, if it had, could it have been obtained by giving them a divine original. Amongst the wild projects of the barbarous eastern policy, one might find, perhaps, something like a system of *immutable* laws ; but the *Grecian* Lawgivers were too well acquainted with the nature of man, the genius of Society, and the vicissitude of human things, ever to conceive so ridiculous a design. Besides, the *Egyptian* legislation, from which they borrowed all their civil wisdom, went upon very different principles. It directed public laws to be occasionally accommodated to the variety of times, places, and manners. But had they aimed at perpetuity, the belief of a divine imposition would not have served the turn ; for it never entered their heads, that civil institutes became irrevocable by their issuing from the mouth of a God ; or that the divinity of the sanction altered the mutability of their nature : the honour of this discovery is due to certain modern writers, who have found out that divine authority reduces all its commands to one and the same species. We have a notable instance of this in the conduct of *Lycurgus*. He was the only exception to the general method, and singular in the idle attempt of making his laws perpetual. For his whole system being forced and unnatural, the sense of that imperfection, it is probable, put him upon the expedient of tying them on an unwilling people. But then *he did not apply* divine authority to this purpose ; for, though he pretended to inspiration like the rest, and had his revelations from *Apollo*, yet he well knew that the authority of *Apollo* would not be thought sufficient to change the nature of positive laws : and therefore he bound

the People by an oath, to observe his policy till his return from a voyage, which he had determined beforehand never to bring to that period.

Having shewn that there was no need of a pretence to revelation, for the establishment of *civil Policy*, it follows, that it was made for the sake of *Religion*.

SECT. III.

THE SECOND step the Legislators took to propagate and establish *Religion*, was to make the general doctrine of a Providence (with which they prefaced and introduced their laws) the great sanction of their institutes. To this, *Plutarch*, in his tract against *Colotes* the *Epicurean*, refers, where he observes, that *Colotes himself praises it; that, in civil Institutes, the first and most important article is the belief of the Gods. And so it was* (says he) *that, with vows, oaths, divinations, and omens, Lycurgus sanctified the Lacedemonians, Numa the Romans, ancient Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion all the Greeks in general: And by HOPES and FEARS kept up amongst them the awe and reverence of religion**. On this practice was formed the precept of the celebrated *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*; which sect, as we shall see hereafter, gave itself up more professedly to

* — Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἦς γε καὶ Κολώτης ἰπαινεῖ διαλέξεως τῶν νόμων, πρῶτον ἔστιν ἢ περὶ θεῶν δόξα, καὶ μέγιστον. ἢ καὶ Λυκῆργος Λακεδαιμονίως, καὶ Νῆμας Ῥωμαίως, καὶ Ἴων ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀθηναίως, καὶ Δευκαλίων Ἑλληνας ὁμῶς τοὺς πάντας καθωσώσωσαν εὐχαῖς, καὶ ὄρκοις, καὶ μαντεύμασι, καὶ φήμασι, ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα δι' ἐλπίδων ἅμα καὶ φόβων κατασῆσαι τις. Edit. Francof. fol. 1599. p. 1225. D.

legislation; and produced the most famous founders of civil policy. This Lawgiver, in the fragments of his work *de lege*, preserved by *Stobæus*, delivers himself in this manner: *The first law of the Constitution should be for the support of what relates to the Gods, the Dæmons, and our Parents, and, in general, of whatsoever is good and venerable**. And in this manner, if we may believe Antiquity, all their civil institutes were prefaced; its constant phrase being, when speaking of a Lawgiver, ΔΙΕΚΟΣΜΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΘΕΩΝ ΑΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ.

The only things of this kind now remaining, are the PREFACES to the laws of ZALEUCUS and CHARONDAS, Lawgivers of the *Locrians* and of the *Chalchidic* cities of Italy and Sicily, contemporaries with *Lycurgus*†. These, by good fortune, are preserved in *Diodorus* and *Stobæus*. A great Critic has indeed arraigned their authority; declared them spurious; and adjudged them for an imposture of the *Ptolomaic Age*‡. And were it as he supposes, the fragments would be rather stronger to our purpose: for, in that case, we must needs conclude, the very learned SOPHISTS who forged them had copied from the general practice of antiquity: And that very learned they were, appears both from the excellence of the composition, and the age of the pretended composers. Whereas, if the fragments be genuine,

* Δεῖ τὸν νόμον τὰ περὶ Θεῶν καὶ δαίμονας καὶ γονέας, καὶ ὅλων τὰ καλὰ καὶ τίμια πρῶτα τίθεσθαι. *Stob. de Rep. Serm. xli. p. 269. lin. 13. Tiguri, fol. 1599.*

† *Arist. l. ii. c. 12. p. 449. Edit. Du Val.*

‡ *Dissert. on the Epistles of Phalaris, with an Answer to the objections of Mr. Boyle.*

they do not so directly prove the *universality*, as the *antiquity*, of the practice. But as my aim is truth, and truth seeming to bear hard against this learned Critic's determination, we must hold to the common opinion, and examine what hath been offered in discredit of it.

The universal current of antiquity runs in favour of these remains, and for the reality of their author's legislative quality. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Tully, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, the most learned and inquisitive writers of their several ages, declare for their being genuine. However, TIMÆUS thought fit to deny that *Zalucus* had given laws to the *Locrians*; nay, that there was ever such a Lawgiver existing. We shall be the less surprised at this paradox, when we come to know the character and studies of the man: he was by profession an historian, but turned his talents to invent, to aggravate, and expose the faults and errors of all preceding writers of name and reputation. Polybius, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus, three of the wisest and most candid historians of Greece, have concurred to draw him in the most odious colours. The first speaks of him in this manner: *How he came to be placed amongst the principal writers of history, I know not.—He deserves neither credit nor pardon of any one; having so manifestly transgressed all the rules of decency and decorum in his excessive calumnies, springing from an innate malignity of heart* *. This envious rabid

* Οὐκ οἶδ' ὕψας ἐκφέρεται δόξαν, ὡς ἔλκων τὴν τέττε συγγραφῆως προφασίαν, — Ἐκεῖν' δ' ἂν οὐκ εἰκότως τυγχάνοι συγγνώμης ἐδὲ πίστεως ὑπ' ἑδανός, διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἐκπίπτειν τῷ καθήκοντος, διὰ τὸν ἔμφυτον φικρίαν. Excerpt. ex l. xii. Hist.

temper, joined to a perversity of mind, delighting in contradiction, gained him the title of EPITIMÆUS, the CALUMNIATOR. And, what is a certain mark of a base and abject heart, he was as excessive in his flattery; as when he makes *Timoleon greater than the greatest Gods* *. He took so much pleasure in contradicting the most received truths, that he wrote a long treatise, with great fury and ill language, to prove that the bull of Phalaris was a mere fable. And yet Diodorus and Polybius, who tell us this, tell us likewise, that the very bull itself was existing in their time: To all which, he was so little solicitous about truth, that Suidas says, he was nicknamed ΓΡΑΟΣΥΛΑΕΚΤΡΙΑ, a composer of old wives fables. Polybius informs us with what justice it was given him. *In censuring the faults of others, he puts on such an air of severity and confidence, as if he himself were exempt from failings, and stood in no need of indulgence. Yet are his own histories stuffed with dreams and prodigies, with the most wild and improbable fables. In short, full of old wives wonders; and of the lowest and basest superstition* †. Agreeable to all this, Clemens Alexandrinus gives him as the very pattern of a fabulous and satiric writer. And he appeared in every respect of so ill a character to Mr. Bayle, that this excellent Critic did not scruple to say, that, “in all appearance, he had no better authority when he denied that

* Suidas in Timæo. Τίμαιος δὲ μείζω ποιεῖν Τιμολέοντα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων Θεῶν.

† Οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν πείρας κατηγορίαις πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνει δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τεράτων καὶ μυθῶν ἐπιθέων, καὶ συλλήθεθον καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγενεῖς καὶ τεραλείας; γυναικώδους ἐστὶ πωλήρης. Excerpt. de Virt. & Vit. ex l. xii.

“ *Zaleucus* had given laws to the *Locrians**.” To say all in a word, he was the *OLDMIXON*† of the Greeks; and yet this is the man whom the learned writer hath thought fit to oppose to all antiquity, against *Zaleucus*’s legislation and existence. It appears the more extraordinary, because he himself hath furnished his reader with a violent presumption against *Timæus*’s authority, where he says ‡, *That Polybius charges him with false representations relating to the Locrians.* He adds indeed, *that nothing is now extant that shews Polybius thought Timæus mistaken concerning Zaleucus.* But since *Polybius* quotes a law as a law of *Zaleucus*, it seems a proof, in so exact a writer, of his being well assured that, amongst *Timæus*’s falsehoods concerning the *Locrians*, one was his denying *Zaleucus* to be their Lawgiver.

Timæus’s reasons are not come down to us from Antiquity: But the fragments of *Polybius* §, mentioning his outrageous treatment of *Aristotle* concerning the origin of the *Locrians*, speak of one *Echecrates* a *Locrian*, from whom *Timæus* boasted he had received information on certain points in question: Hence the learned Critic, as it would seem, concludes this to have been a part of the *Locrian*’s intelligence, *that there was no such man as Zaleucus*||. As if, because *Timæus* relied on *Echecrates*’s information in the dis-

* Et apparemment il ne fut pas mieux fondé, quand il nia que *Zaleucus* eût donné des loix à ce peuple, [les *Locriens*.] *Timée*, Rem. F.

† See *Clarendon* and *Whitlock* compared.

‡ Dissert. upon *Phalaris*, p. 337.

§ Excerpta ex *Polybio* de *Virt. & Vitiis*, ex l. xii.

|| P. 336. Dissert. upon *Phalaris*.

pute between him and Aristotle, therefore Echecrates must, of necessity, support all his paradoxes concerning that people. But admit Echecrates to have been of the same opinion with Timæus, in this matter; Is he, who, for aught we know, might be as singular and as whimsical, in his love of contradiction, as Timæus himself, an evidence to be opposed to Cicero's? who tells us, that his Clients the *Locrians* had, in his time a Tradition of *Zaleucus's* legislation*. And we may well presume, that Cicero, inquisitive, and even curious, as he was in matters of antiquity, would examine this point with care: and, had their archives reclaimed it, he had hardly thought it worth his while to mention their Tradition. But, says the learned Critic, *if Echecrates, in that age, did not believe there was any Zaleucus, he is certainly as credible as Cicero's Locrians, who came so many generations afterwards, after so many revolutions and changes in their Government* †. This reasoning has small force, because, from the same premisses, we may argue just the other way, and say, that if the Tradition kept its ground through all those changes and revolutions of State, it would seem to have had a very strong foundation.

The authority then of Timæus against the existence and legislation of *Zaleucus* in general, is of no weight. Let us next see what the learned Critic hath to urge against the authenticity of those laws which go under *Zaleucus's* name. His arguments are of two sorts: the one drawn from the *dialect*, and from the use of

* De Legibus, l. ii. c. 6. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. III. p. 141.

† P. 336. Dissert. upon Phalaris.

several *words*, which are indeed later than his time; the other, from *Zaleucus's* being no Pythagorean.

1. The *words* objected to, are these; *Λεπτός κ̄ παχέας* — *ἰσομιλήσιον* — *Κόσμον* — *Τραβηδίαις*. This, and the fragments being written in the *common dialect*, instead of the *Doric*, are, in the Critic's opinion, sufficient evidence of the forgery.

He has employed a deal of good learning*, to prove the *words* to be all later than the time of *Zaleucus*.

Let us see then the most that can be made of this sort of argument. And because it is the best approved, and readiest at hand, for the detection of forgery, and supposed by some not a little to affect the sacred writings themselves, we will enquire into its force in general.

It must be owned, that an instrument offered as the writing of any certain person, or age, which hath words or phrases posterior to its date, carries with it the decisive marks of forgery. A public Deed, or Diploma, so discredited, is lost for ever. And to such, was this canon of criticism first applied with great success. This encouraged following critics to try it on writings of another kind; and then, for want of a reasonable distinction, they began to make very wild work indeed. For though in compositions of *abstract speculation*, or of *mere fancy and amusement*, this touch might be applied with tolerable security, there being, for the most part, no occasion or temptation to alter the diction of such writings, especially in the ancient languages, which suffered small and slow change, because one sort of these works was only for

* From pp. 346 to 356 of the Dissertation.

the use of a few learned men; and the principal rarity, and often the beauty, of the other sort, consisted in the original phrase; yet in public and practical writings of Law and Religion, this would be found a very fallacious test: It was the matter only which was regarded here. And, as the matter respected the whole people, it was of importance that the words and phrases should be neither obscure, ambiguous, nor equivocal: This would necessitate alterations in the style, both as to words and phrases. Hence it appears to me, that the answer, which commentators give to the like objection against the *PENTATEUCH*, is founded in good sense, and fully justified by the solution here attempted. The Religion, Law, and History of the Jews were incorporated; and consequently, it was the concern of every one to understand the Scriptures. Nor doth the superstitious regard, well known to have been long paid to the *words*, and even *letters* of Scripture, at all weaken the force of this argument: for that superstition arose but from the time when the masoret doctors fixed the reading, and added the vowel points. I have taken the opportunity, the subject afforded me, to touch upon this matter, because it is the only argument of moment, urged by Spinoza, against the antiquity of the *Pentateuch*; on which antiquity the general argument of this work is supported.

The application of all this is very easy to the case in hand: The fragment of *Zaleucus* was part of a body of Laws, which the people were obliged to understand; so that a change of old words and obsolete phrases would be necessary: and to make *this* an argument against the antiquity of the fragment, would be
the

the same good reasoning as to suppose, that the remains of the *Twelve Tables*, or the earlier laws in our common *Statute books*, were the forgeries of later times, because full of words unknown to the respective ages in which those laws were composed and enacted. But, indeed, the change of obscure words, or obsolete phrases, for others more clear and intelligible, was a common practice amongst the Pagan writers. Porphyry, making a collection of heathen oracles, professes to have given them just as he found them, without the least alteration; except, says he, changing an obscure word, now and then, for one more clear: a practice, which, for its fairness and frequency, he ranks with amending a corrupted word, or reforming the metre*. But this licence was not confined to the Ancients; for, being encouraged by the reason of things, it was likely enough (as is, in fact, the case) that all times should afford examples of it. One of the editors of *Froissart* speaking of his author's text, says, "touchant le stile, & ancienne maniere d'escrire de nostre auteur, je ne doute point qu'il n'ayt esté quelques autrefois changé & aucunement renouvelé selon les temps †." All the Editions of Jomville's life of St. Louis bear testimony to the same practice; which was so general that Pasquier says, "s'il y eut un bon livre composé par nos Ancêtres, lorsqu'il fut question de le transcrire,

* ἐπεὶ καὶ γὰρ τι θεὸς μαρτύρομαι, ὡς ἔδδεν ἔτε προσέθεικά, ἔτε ἀφείλον τῶν χρησθέντων νοημάτων· εἰ μὴ περὶ λέξιν ἡμαρτημένην διώρθωσα, ἢ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΣΑΦΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΒΕΒΑΗΚΑ, ἢ τὸ μείζον ἐλλείπον ἀνεπλήρωσα, ἢ τι τῶν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρῶθεσιν συνεινόντων διέγραψα. Porph. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. iii. cap. 7.

† Dennis Sauvage, Avertisement aux Lecteurs.

“ les Copistes le copioient non selon la naïve langue
 “ de l'Auteur, ains selon la leur*.”

As to the change of *dialect*, the great Critic thus expresses himself: *The last argument I shall offer against the Laws of Zaleucus, is this, that the Preface of them, which Stobæus has produced, is written in the common dialect, whereas, it ought to be in the Doric, for that was the language of the Locri.—The Laws of Zaleucus therefore are commentitious; because they are not in Doric †.*

What hath been said above will shew this argument to have small force; but it is urged with a peculiar ill grace by the learned Critic, who, in his *Dissertation upon Phalaris*, hath discovered, that Ocellus Lucanus wrote the treatise *Of the nature of the universe* in *Doric* †: and from thence rightly concludes, it ought to be acknowledged for a genuine work, which hitherto learned men have doubted of, from this very business of its being writ in the common dialect. For we now see that every word of the true book is faithfully preserved; the Doric being only changed into the ordinary language, at the fancy of some copier §. Now, surely, the rash suspicions of those learned men in the case of Ocellus Lucanus, should have made him more cautious in indulging his own. He should have concluded, if this liberty was taken with books of mere speculation, it was more likely to be indulged in works so necessary to be understood as a body of laws; especially when he had observed (after Porphyry) that the Doric is always clouded with obscurity ||.

* Rech. L. viii. c. 3.

† Pp. 135, and 358.

‡ P. 47.

§ P. 49.

|| P. 317.

Hence,

Hence, doubtless, *trans-dialecting* was no rare practice. For, besides this instance of Ocellus Lucanus, we have another, in the poems going under the name of Orpheus : which, Jamblichus says, were written in the *Doric* dialect. But now the fragments of these poems, left us by those who did not write in *Doric*, are in the common dialect. It is plain then, they have been *trans-dialected*.

2. The learned Critic's other argument for the imposture runs thus : *The Report of Zaleucus being a Pythagorean, was gathered from some passages in the system of laws ascribed to him, for where else could they meet with it ? so that, if it can be proved he was more ancient than Pythagoras, this false story of his being a Pythagorean being taken from that system, must convict it of being a cheat* *. He then proceeds to prove him more ancient than Pythagoras ; which he does, on the whole, with great force of learning and reasoning, though his arguments are not all equally well chosen. As where he brings this for a proof that *Zaleucus* was no scholar of Pythagoras, " Because " he ascribed all his laws to Minerva, from whom he " pretended to receive them in dreams : which (in the " learned Critic's opinion) has nothing of a Pythagorean in it. For Pythagoras's scholars ascribed every " thing to their master : it was always ἀὐτὸς ἔφα with " them, *he said it*. Therefore, if *Zaleucus* had been of " that society, he would certainly have honoured his " master, by imputing his laws to his instructions †." But this argument is of no weight : for, 1. From what has been said above of the genius of ancient legislation,

* P. 337.

† P. 338.

it appears, that the general practice required, and the nature of the thing disposed the Lawgiver to ascribe his laws to the inspiration of some God. 2. As to the famous *αὐτὸς ἔφα*, it was not peculiar to the Pythagoreans, but common to all the sects of Greece, *jurare in verba magistri*. A device to keep them distinct and separate from each other; and a compendious way of arguing amongst those of the same school. It would then have been ridiculous to have urged its authority to any out of the sect; more so, to the common people; and most of all, to them, upon public and practical matters; the *αὐτὸς ἔφα* being used only in points of speculation, and in the schools of philosophy. Indeed, so unlucky is this argument, that, on the contrary, the reader will be apt to conclude, that this very circumstance of *Zaleucus's* ascribing his laws to Minerva, was one of the things that gave rise and credit to the report of his being a Pythagorean. And, doubtless, it would have much weight with those who did not carefully enough attend to the chronology. For *Zaleucus*, in this, might be thought to follow both the example and the precept of Pythagoras, who himself pretended to be inspired by Minerva; and taught it to his scholars as the most efficacious way of establishing civil justice, *to propagate the opinion of the Gods having an intimate intercourse with mankind**.

But notwithstanding the defect of this argument, the learned critic, as we said, proves his point with great clearness, that *Zaleucus* was earlier than Pythagoras: and, in conclusion, draws the inference abovementioned, in these terms: *It was generally reported Zaleucus*

* See Jamblichus's Life of Pythagoras, p. 147. edit. Kust.

was a Pythagorean; it is proved he was not. This will refute the book itself. For if any intimation was given in the book, that the author was a Pythagorean, the imposture is evident. “And yet it is hard to give any other reason, that should induce the later writers to call him a Pythagorean.” Some impostor, therefore, made a system of laws under the name of Zaleucus, and in it gave a broad hint that he was a scholar of Pythagoras.

Here he rests his point. *If, then, it be not hard to give another reason, that should induce the later writers to call him a Pythagorean*, his long discourse to prove Zaleucus the earlier of the two, is of no kind of use to convict the pretended laws of imposture. I have already hinted at another not improbable reason, which was his having the same inspiring Goddess with Pythagoras: And this will be much strengthened by the observation, that Minerva became the peculiar patroness of the Pythagorean Lawgivers, on account of the assistance she had given to their master. To which we may add these further circumstances, that the laws were in *Doric* (and supposing them genuine, they certainly were so) which idiom was peculiar to the Pythagoric school*: and, that the whole proem of Zaleucus’s laws was formed agreeably to the precepts of Pythagoras in this matter; who directs, that, next after the worship of the Gods, *Dæmon*, and *Parent* worship should be enjoined †. Now, later writers, seeing these two visible marks of a Pythagorean, might, without further reflection, be reasonably disposed to

* See note [B] at the end.

† Μὲν δὲ τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, πλείστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον γυνέων.
Jamb. Vit. Pyth. c. xxx. p. 148.

think *Zaleucus* of that sect. But, as the learned critic has well made out, from sure chronological evidence, that this was a mistake, we must seek for some other cause of the uniformity between them; which I take to be this: *Zaleucus*, when Pythagoras flourished, was in the highest repute in Greece for legislation; which might incline this philosopher to imitate him, both in his inspiring Goddess, and in the proem of his laws: so that posterity only mistook the copy for the original. This they might very well do; for Pythagoras and his sect had soon engrossed all the glory in the practice of lawgiving: and this leads me to another probable cause of the common opinion of *Zaleucus's* being a Pythagorean: The character of this sect, as will be seen hereafter, was so great for legislation, that after-ages thought nothing could be done to purpose in that way, which had not a Pythagorean for its author. So, besides *Zaleucus*, the ancients supposed Charondas, Numa*, Zamolxis †, Phytius, Theocles, Elicæon, Aristocrates, nay the very DRUIDS ‡, the legislators of Gaul, and, in a word, all the eminent Lawgivers who lived any where about the time of Pythagoras, to be instructed by him. But will the learned Critic say, that, *therefore*, all these Legislators were imaginary persons, and did not give laws to their several cities? This notion, arising from Pythagoras's great character and reputation, was nursed up and improved by his followers themselves, to beget honour

* Quinetiam arbitror propter *Pythagoreorum* admirationem, Numam quoque regem *Pythagoreum* à posterioribus existimatum: Tull. Tusc. Disp. lib. iv. c. 1. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. II. p. 331.

† Herod. lib. iv. c. 95. Edit. Gale.

‡ Ammian. Marcell. lib. xv. c. 9. p. 75. Edit. Gronov. fol. 1693.

to their master; as, in fact, appears from several passages in Jamblichus's life of that Philosopher. So that was there no more in it than this; as *Zaleucus's* Institutions were in great repute, we might very naturally account for the mistake.

But, lastly, it is indeed very true (as the learned Critic suspected) that the principal ground of the report of *Zaleucus being a Pythagorean*, was from some passages in the system of laws ascribed to him. He is only too hasty in his conclusion, that therefore these must needs convict the system of a cheat. What hurried him on, was his supposing, that no such report could be gathered from passages in the system, but such as must be an intimation that the author was a *Pythagorean*: and that there is no difference between giving and taking an intimation. If, then, this report might be gathered from passages which contained no intimation, and if the reader might understand that to be such, which the writer never intended; the consequence will be, that the credit of these fragments will remain unshaken, though we grant the learned Critic his whole premises, and all the facts he contends for.

It seems, then, to be certain, that the report of *Zaleucus's* being a Pythagorean arose principally from a passage in his system of laws. And it was not difficult to discover what it was: *Zaleucus* in his preface speaks of an EVIL GENIUS or *Dæmon*, ΔΑΙΜΟΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ, as influencing men to wickedness. This, though a notion of the highest* antiquity, whose origin

* Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας, καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (Μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτὸς εἶναι ἀρχαίς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα, καὶ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ.

origin and author are much disputed, yet became at length the distinguishing doctrine of the Pythagoreans. Plutarch, speaking of Pythagoras's opinion of the first principle, says, that that philosopher called the *Monad*, God, and *Duad*, the EVIL GENIUS*. Which *Duad* the Pythagoreans used extremely to vilify, as the cause of all evil, under the name of the BAD PRINCIPLE, as Plutarch would make us believe †. The application of this doctrine I suppose Pythagoras might borrow from *Zaleucus*, and here again posterity be mistaken only in the original author. However, we may collect from the same Plutarch, that that opinion was cultivated by all the ancient Lawgivers. For this learned man,

who

ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ. Diog. Laert. Vit. Phil. Proœm. Seg. 8. Edit. Amstel. 1692, 4to.—Οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν ΠΑΝΤ ΠΑΛΑΙΩΝ τῶν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκαθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονῆτα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ ταῖς πρόξεσιν ἀνισάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβος ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοῦσα τὴν ἀρετὴν ὡς μὴ διαμείναντες ἀπλῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι, βελλίονθ' ἐκείνων μόρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τέχων· Plut. Vita Dionis, in initio.

* Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεόν, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν ἦτις ἐστὶν ἢ τῷ ἐὶς φύσει, ἀπὸ τοῦ οὗ τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ, καὶ τὸ ΚΑΚΟΝ, περὶ ἧν ἐστὶ τὸ ἴλικόν πλῆθος. De Plac. Phil. lib. i. c. 7. p. 1624. E. S. (T. II. p. 881. D. Edit. Francof. 1599, fol.)

† Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλείονων ὀνομάτων κατηγόρησι, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἐν πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περισσόν, τὸ τετραγώνον, τὸ δεξιόν, τὸ λαμπρόν· τῷ δὲ ΚΑΚΟΥ, τὴν ΔΥΑΔΑ, τὸ ἀπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρριον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερόν, τὸ σκυδαιόν ὡς ταῦτα ἀρχὰς γενέσεως ὑποκειμένας. Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣΙΡ. p. 660. St. Ed. I suppose the reason, why *Duads* was amongst the ill names said to be given by the Pythagoreans, to the *bad principle*, was, because, in their superstitious designations of the various qualities of numbers, this *Duads* is very heavily loaded. Ὅτι ἡ μὲν ΜΟΝΑΣ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητά καὶ τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ Δυὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Anon. de Vita Pythag. apud Photium. Edit. Hæschelii, fol. 1612. pag. 1314.

who favoured the notion of TWO PRINCIPLES, the one good, the other evil, affects, I observe, to draw every ancient writer, who but mentions an *evil dæmon*, into his own sect. In his treatise of Isis and Osiris, he speaks to this purpose, “That it was a most ancient opinion, delivered as well by LAWGIVERS as Divines, that the world was neither made by Chance, neither did one Cause govern all things, without opposition*.”

This notion therefore, delivered in the proem of *Zaleucus’s* law, might be very well *taken* for an *intimation of the author’s being a* Pythagorean, and yet, not being so *given*, it has not the least tendency to discredit the compilation.

On the whole then, I presume, it appears, that the credit of these remains stands unshaken by any thing the learned Critic has advanced to the contrary; and that we may safely produce them as of the antiquity they lay claim to.

Thus *Zaleucus* begins his preface: “Every inhabitant, whether of town or country, should first of all be firmly persuaded of the being and existence of the Gods: which belief he will be readily induced to entertain, when he contemplates the heavens, regards the world, and observes the disposition, order, and harmony of the universe; which can neither be the work of blind chance, nor of man. These Gods are to be worshipped as the cause of all the real good we enjoy. Every one therefore

* Διὸ καὶ σαμπάλαι αὐτὴ κάτεισιν ἐκ Θεολόγων καὶ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΩΝ— ὡς ἔτ’ ἀνεὺν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, ἔτε εἰς εἶσιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ καλευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἶαξιν ἢ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγῳ. Ibid. de Is. et Osir. p. 658.

“ should so purify, and possess his mind, as to have
 “ it clear of all kinds of evil ; being persuaded that
 “ God is not honoured by a wicked person, nor accept-
 “ ably served, like miserable man, with sumptuous
 “ ceremonies, or taken with costly sacrifices, but with
 “ Virtue only, and a constant disposition to good and
 “ just actions. On which account, every one should
 “ labour all he can to become good, both in practice
 “ and principle, whereby he will render himself dear
 “ and acceptable to God ; should fear more that which
 “ leads to ignominy and dishonour, than that which
 “ leads to loss of wealth and fortune ; and esteem
 “ him the best Citizen, who gives up his worldly
 “ goods, rather than renounce his honesty and love of
 “ justice : But those, whose headstrong appetites will
 “ not suffer them to be restrained within the limits
 “ of these things, and whose hearts are turned with a
 “ natural bias towards evil, whether they be men or
 “ women, citizens or sojourners, should be told, to have
 “ the Gods always in mind, to think upon their nature,
 “ and of the judgments they have in store for wicked
 “ men ; to *set before themselves the dreadful hour*
 “ *of death, a period they must all arrive at ; when the*
 “ *memory of evil actions past will seize the sinner with*
 “ *remorse, accompanied with the fruitless wish, that*
 “ *he had submitted his actions to the rules of justice.*
 “ Every one, therefore, should so watch over his be-
 “ haviour, *as if that hour were still present with him,*
 “ and attended all his motions : which will be the way
 “ to keep up in himself an exact regard to right and
 “ justice. BUT IF THE WICKED DEMON BE INSTANT
 “ TO INFLUENCE HIM TO EVIL, let him fly to the
 “ altars and temples of the Gods, as the surest asylum
 “ from

“ from that cruellest and wickedest of tyrants, EVIL,
 “ and implore their assistance to drive her far from
 “ him. To this end, let him also have recourse to those,
 “ whose reputations are high for probity and virtue*;
 “ whom he may hear discourse of the happiness of
 “ good, and the vengeance attending evil men †.”

* Meaning the men set apart for the service of religion, such as Virgil describes in his Elysium, *Æn. L. vi. p. 265. Ed. Ven. 1638.*

Quique sacerdotes casti, dum vita manebat ;
 Quique pii vates & Phæbo digna locuti.

Which not only shews the Legislator's sense of their use, but of the necessity of their practising what they teach to others.

† Τὸς κατοικῆντας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, πάντας πρῶτον πειθεῖσθαι χρὴ, καὶ νομίζειν θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἀναβλέπουσας εἰς ἕρανόν, καὶ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διακόσμησιν, καὶ τάξιν· ἔ γάρ τύχης, ἐδ' ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δημιουργήματα σέβεσθαι δὲ τέττος καὶ τιμᾶν, ὡς αἰτίας ὅλης ἀπάντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν, τῶν κατὰ λόγον γινομένων. Ἐκαστον ἔν ἔχειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν δεῖ τὴν αὐτῆ ψυχὴν, πάλιν τῶν κακῶν καθαρὰν ὡς ἐ τιμάται θεὸς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου φαύλω, ἐδὲ θεραπεύεται δαπάναις, ἐδὲ τραγῳδίας τῶν ἀλισκομένων, καθάπερ μυχθηρὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἀρετῆ καὶ προαιρέσει τῶν καλῶν ἔργων καὶ δικαίων. Διὸ ἕκαστον δεῖ εἰς δύναμιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ πρᾶξι καὶ προαιρέσει τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι θεοφιλεῖ καὶ μὴ φροεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς χρήματα ζημίας μάλλον τῶν εἰς αἰσχύνην τεινόντων· καὶ πολίτην ἀμείνονα ἑνομάζειν τὸν τὴν ἑσῖαν προῖεμενον μάλλον τῆ καλῆ καὶ δικαίᾳ ὕσσις δὲ μὴ φρόδιον πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν ὁρμὴν πειθεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχουσι εὐκίνητον πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ὧδ' ἡμῖν παρηγέλω· πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πολίταις, καὶ πολίτισι καὶ ξενίοις μεμνησθαι θεῶν ὡς ὄντων, καὶ δίκας ἐπιπεμπόσιν τοῖς ἀδικοῖς καὶ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τῆτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλος ἑκάστῃ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆ ζῆν· πᾶσι γάρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῖς μέλλουσι τελευτᾶν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἀδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τῆ βέλεσθαι πάντα πειπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς· Διὸ δεῖ ἕκαστον παρ' ἑκάστην πρᾶξιν αἰεὶ συνοικεῖν τὸν καιρὸν τῆτον, ὡς δὴ παρόντα ἔτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τῆ καλῆ καὶ τῆ δικαίᾳ φρονιεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ τῷ παραστῆ ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ τρίπων πρὸς ἀδικίαν διαβρίθει πρὸς ναοῖς, καὶ βωμοῖς καὶ τεμένεσι, φεύγουσα τὴν ἀδικίαν ὡς δέσποιναν ἀσεβηστάτην καὶ χαλεπωτάτην ἰκελεύουσα τοὺς θεὸς συναπείρειν αὐτήν· εἶναι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀνδρας δόξαν ἔχουσας ἐπ' ἀνδραγαθίᾳ ἀκροσόμενοι περὶ εὐδαίμονος βίης, καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν τιμωρίας ἵνα ἀποβρέπη τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων. *Apud Stobæum, Serm. xlii. p. 279. lib. 13. Tiguri. fol. 1559.*

One would wonder, that any man, who had attentively considered this admirable fragment, could think it the forgery of a Sophist. It is plain, the author of it understood human nature and society at another rate. He hath not only given us an exact portrait of natural Religion; but, in applying it to the State, hath explained the use and subserviency of its parts to the three great classes of mankind. He hath recommended the intrinsic excellence of virtue, and compliance with the *Will* and example of the Gods, to those who are of so ingenuous and well-framed a nature as to be always disposed to embrace truth and right: to others, of a less heroic turn of mind, such who idolize their *honour*, he holds out fame and ignominy, as the inseparable attendants of good and evil actions: and, to the common run of more intractable and perverse tempers, he preaches up the doctrine of *future rewards and punishments**. I will only observe, it appears to have been from hence, that POMPONATIUS borrowed the beautiful passage, which is quoted at large in the first book of this discourse.

Thus ZALEUCUS. And much in the same fashion does CHARONDAS introduce his *Laws*.

In imitation of the practice, PLATO likewise, and CICERO, both preface their *Laws* with the sanctions of Religion. And though these two great men were not, strictly speaking, Lawgivers in form; yet we are not to suppose that what they wrote in this science, was like the dreams of the Sophists, for the amusement of the idle and curious. They were both well practised in affairs, and deeply conversant in human nature; and

* See note [C] at the end.

they formed their speculative Institutes on the plan, and in the spirit and views of ancient legislation: the foundation of Plato's being the *Attic Laws*; and the foundation of Cicero's, the *Twelve Tables*: who himself takes care to warn us of this particular. "In imitation of Plato, the most learned, and, at the same time, the wisest of the philosophers, who wrote best* of a republic, and likewise, separately, of the laws thereof, I think it will be proper, before I give the law itself †, to say somewhat in recommendation
" of

* I read here, with Turnebus, *qui princeps de rep. conscripsit*. Lambin objects to this reading, because we gather from Aristotle, that *Plato was not the first who wrote of a republic*; he supposing *princeps* signified *primus*, whereas it means *optimus*. This was Tully's opinion of Plato, as may be gathered from many places in his writings. And in this sense, Turnebus, without doubt, understood the word; a sense familiar to his author, as in *Fer. lib. iv. cap. 49.* "in qua [*Patria*] multis virtutibus & beneficiis floruit PRINCEPS." But the word *primus* itself is sometimes used in this sense of *princeps*; as in Virgil,

Prima quod ad Trojam - - -

† "Ut priusquam ipsam *legem* recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam." This passage is not without its difficulty. If by *LEX* be meant the whole system of his laws, which the tenor of the discourse leads one to suppose; then, by *LAUS*, the *recommendation* of it, we are to understand his shewing, as he does in the following chapter, that the Gods interested themselves very much in the observance of civil laws; which implies, that they were indeed their laws: and so Tully calls them, in the 4th chapter of this book: "Ita principem legem illam, & ultimam, mentem esse dicebant, omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei; ex qua illa lex quam Dii humano generi dederunt, recte est LAUDATA." And the shewing that civil laws came originally from the Gods, was the highest recommendation of them. But if by *LEX* we

“ of it: which, I observe, was the method of Zaleucus
 “ and Charondas. For their system of laws was not
 “ an exercise of wit, or designed for the amusement
 “ of the indolent and curious, but composed for the
 “ use of the public in their several cities. *These, Plato*
 “ *imitated*; as thinking this likewise to be the business
 “ of Law; to gain somewhat of its end by the
 “ gentler methods of persuasion, and not carry every
 “ thing by mere force and fear of punishment*.”

Here, we see, he intimates, that Plato and himself had the same view, in writing laws, with Zaleucus and Charondas: namely, the service of a Public. The difference between them was, that the two Originals were employed by their country: and the two Copyists generously undertook an office they were not called to.

However, Plato and Cicero are the greatest authorities antiquity could afford, and the most deserving to be heard in this matter. Plato makes it the necessary introduction to his laws, to establish the *being and providence*

are to understand only the *first* law of the system, which begins, “ Ad Divos adeunto caste,” &c. then by LAUS is meant his shewing, as he does likewise in the following chapter, the use and service of religion to civil society.

* Sed, ut vir doctissimus fecit Plato, atque idem gravissimus philosophorum omnium, qui princeps de republica conscripsit, idemque separatim de legibus ejus, id mihi credo esse faciendum; ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam. Quod idem & Zaleucum & Charondam fecisse video; cum quidem illi non studii & delectationis, sed reipublicæ causa leges civitatibus suis scripserunt. Quos imitatus Plato, videlicet hoc quoque legis putavit esse, persuadere aliquid, non omnia vi ac minis cogere. De Legg. lib. ii. cap. 6. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. III. p. 141.

evidence of the Gods by a law against SACRILEGE. And he explains what he means by *sacrilege*, in the following words: “ Either the denial of the being of
 “ the Gods; or, if that be owned, the denial of their
 “ providence over men; or, thirdly, the teaching, that
 “ they are flexible, and easy to be cajoled by prayer
 “ and sacrifice*.” And afterwards; “ It is not of
 “ small consequence, that what we here reason about
 “ the Gods, should, by all means, be made probable;
 “ as, that they ARE; and, that they are GOOD; and
 “ that their concern for justice takes place of all other
 “ human considerations. For this, in our opinion,
 “ seems to be the noblest and best PREFACE that can
 “ be made to a body of laws†.” In compliance with
 this declaration, Cicero’s *Preface* to his laws, is conceived in the following terms: “ Let our citizen then
 “ be first of all firmly persuaded of the government and
 “ dominion of the Gods; that they are the lords
 “ and masters of the world; that all things are dis-
 “ posed by their power, direction, and providence;
 “ and that the whole race of mankind is in the highest
 “ manner indebted to them; that they are intimately
 “ acquainted with every one’s state and condition;
 “ that they know what he does, what he thinks; with
 “ what disposition of mind, and with what degree of

* ἀλλὰ ἐν δὴ τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχω, ἢ τῆτο—ἐχ ἠγάμεν, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας, ἢ φρονιζέιν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον, εὐπαραμυθήτας εἶναι, θυσιάς τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παρασφόμενος. De Legg. lib. x. p. 885. B. Tom. II. Edit. H. Steph. fol.

† διαφέρει δ’ ἐ σμικρὸν ἀμωσγέπως πιθανότητά τινα τὸς λόγους ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς θεοί τ’ εἰσι, καὶ αγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τῆτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων τῶν νομῶν κάλλιστον τε καὶ ἄρρετον προοίμιον ἀπ’ αἴης. Id. ibid.

“ piety he performs the acts and offices of religion ;
 “ and that, accordingly, they make a distinction be-
 “ tween the good and bad. The mind being imbued
 “ with these opinions, will never deviate from TRUTH
 “ and UTILITY. And what *truth* is more evident than
 “ this, that no one should be so stupidly arrogant, as
 “ to suppose, there is Mind and Reason in himself,
 “ and yet none in the Heavens and the World ; or,
 “ that those things, whose uses and directions can
 “ scarce be comprehended with the utmost stretch of
 “ human faculties, may yet perform their motions
 “ without an understanding Ruler? But, He whom
 “ the courses of the heavenly bodies, the vicissitudes
 “ of day and night, the orderly temperature of the
 “ seasons, and the various blessings which the earth
 “ pours out for our sustenance and pleasure, will not
 “ excite, nay compel to gratitude, is unfit even to be
 “ reckoned in the number of men. And since things
 “ endowed with reason, are more excellent than
 “ those which want it ; and that it is impiety to say,
 “ any particular is more excellent than the universal
 “ Nature: we must needs confess this Nature to be
 “ endowed with reason. That these opinions are
 “ likewise *useful*, who can deny, when he considers
 “ what stability is derived to the Public from within,
 “ by the religion of an oath ; and what security it
 “ enjoys from without, by those holy rites which affirm
 “ national treaties and conventions : how efficacious
 “ the fear of divine punishment is, to deter men from
 “ wickedness ; and what purity of manners must reign
 “ in that Society, where the immortal Gods them-
 “ selves are believed to interpose both as judges and
 “ witnesses ?

“ witnesses? Here you have the PROEM of the law:
 “ for so Plato calls it*.”

And then follow the laws themselves; the first of which is conceived in these words: “ Let those who
 “ approach the Gods, be pure and undefiled; let their
 “ offerings be seasoned with piety, and all ostentation
 “ of pomp omitted: the God himself will be his own
 “ avenger on transgressors. Let the Gods, and those
 “ who were ever reckoned in the number of Celestials,
 “ be worshipped; and those likewise, whom their
 “ merits have raised to heaven; such as HERCULES,
 “ BACCHUS, ÆSCULAPIUS, CASTOR, POLLUX, and
 “ ROMULUS. And let chapels be erected in honour

* Sit igitur jam hoc a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri, ditione, ac nunne, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri; & qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri; piorumque & impiorum habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili, & a vera sententia. Quid est enim verius, quàm neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem & mentem putet inesse, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ut ea, quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea, quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant, huac hominem omnino numerari quí decet? Cumque omnia, quæ rationem habent, præsent iis, quæ sint rationis expertia, nefasque sit dicere, ullam rem præstare naturæ omnium rerum: rationem inesse in ea confitendum est. Utiles esse autem opiñiones has, quis neget, cum intelligat, quàm multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ salutis sint fæderum religiones, quàm multos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit; quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos, Diis immortalibus interpositis tum iudicibus tum testibus. Habes legis præmium; sic enim hoc appellat Plato. De Legg. lib. ii. c. 7. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. III. pp. 141, 42.

“ to

“ to those qualities, by whose aid mortals arrive
 “ thither, such as REASON, VIRTUE, PIETY, and
 “ GOOD-FAITH*.”

* Ad divos adeunto castè; pietatem adhibento; opes amovento. Qui secus faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit.—Divos, & eos qui cœlestes semper habiti, colunto: & ollos, quos endo cœlo merita vocaverint, Herculem, Liberum, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem, Quirinum. Ast olla, propter quæ datur homini adscœsus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunt. De Legg. lib. ii. c. 8. Edit. Ox. 4to. T. III. pp. 142, 43.

N O T E S

APPERTAINING TO

THE FIRST AND THIRD
SECTIONS

OF

B O O K II.

 P. 308. [A]

VALLA explains the word ἀνθρωποφύας by *ex hominibus ortos*; and, I think, rightly. But our learned Stanley, in his notes to the *Persians* of Æschylus, understands it otherwise: and that it rather signifies *humana forma præditos*. I suppose it appeared harsh to him, that any one could imagine the Gods had *human natures*; but the meaning is explained above. Yet the ingenious writer of the *Letters concerning Mythology*, p. 217. sides with our countryman, and understands ἀνθρωποφύης to signify,—*made like a man*—or, *of the shape and figure of a man*. But if we regard the literal meaning of the two simples which make up this compound, we cannot avoid understanding it to signify, *being of man's nature*. How then does this learned writer support his criticism? By
a passage

a passage from Hecataeus; who, on pretty much the same occasion, uses (as he supposes) *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*, in the place of *ἀνθρωποφυής*; and *ἀνθρωπομόρφος*, he thinks, all will agree, must signify, *of the shape and figure of a man*. No, not if his own method of interpretation be right: for, if *ἀνθρωποφυής* (transferred from the literal, to the figurative sense) must signify of man's *form*, then *ἀνθρωπόμορφος* so transferred, must signify *of man's nature*. But it is not true, that Hecataeus uses *ἀνθρωπόμορφος* in the place of *ἀνθρωποφυής*. The propositions of Herodotus and Hecataeus are different, and therefore we may well suppose these two words, in the predicate of each, to be different. Herodotus, speaking of the PERSIANS, says, they had no statues of their Gods, because they did not believe, with the Greeks, that the Gods had *human natures* [*ἀνθρωποφυέας*]. And Hecataeus, speaking of MOSES, says, he permitted no images of the Gods, because he did not hold, with the Gentiles, that God had a *human form* [*ἀνθρωπόμορφόν*]. And their use of different words, as we shall now see, was with accuracy and discernment; for they were asserting different things. The question between the *Persians* and the *Greeks* (who worshipped many Gods in common) was; whether these Gods were *partakers of human nature*, *ἀνθρωποφυέας*; that is, whether they were dead men deified. But the question between *Moses* and the Gentiles, was; whether the God of the universe had a *human form*, *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*; not whether *the gods had human natures*; for these Gods, the Jews had nothing to do with; they worshipped only the one God: and several of the Gentiles, who had some knowledge of this one

God,

God, imagined he might have a *human form*. So that we see, the use of these two terms, on the *same* occasion, is so far from shewing their signification to be the *same*, as the learned writer supposes, that the occasion demonstrably shews their signification to be *different*. Let me only observe, it appeared so evident to Eusebius, that the custom of making the statues of the Gods in *human form* was an indication of their original from mortality, that he says, ὁ γέ τοι ἀληθῆς λόγος βροτῶν καὶ κέκραγε, μόνον ἐχὶ φωνῆν ἀφιεῖς, Θνητῶν ἀνδρας μαρτυρῶν γεγονέναι τὲς δηλημένους. Ευαγγ. προπαρ. β. γ.

P. 335. [B]. This we are told by *Jamblichus*: his words are, λέγεται τοῖσιν ὡς φωνῆ χρῆσθαι τῇ πατρῴᾳ ἐκάστοις παρήγγελον, Vit. Pythag. 194. Kust. Ed.—Dr. Bentley understands them to signify, that *every one should use his own mother-tongue*. And, indeed, without reading the context, one could scarce avoid giving this sense to the passage. VIZZANIUS, —that *every one should use the mother-tongue of Crotona*; which was *the Doric*. Of these, the learned Critic says, *which is the true, perhaps all competent readers will not be of one mind*, p. 386. But I believe there will be no great difference of opinions amongst those who weigh the following reasons:

1. *Jamblichus* adds, τὸ γὰρ ξενίζειν ἐκ ἰδοκίμαζον; by which I understand him to mean, that *the Pythagoric sect did not approve of a foreign or stranger dialect*. For if he meant, not the sect in general, but the particulars of which it was composed, the several provincial *Greeks* who entered into it, no *dialect* could be called *foreign* to one or other of them: if he meant the

Sect,

Sect, which we may suppose had a *dialect* peculiar and consecrated to the Community, all, but that, was *foreign* to it; and the expression becomes proper and pertinent.

2. *Jamblichus*, in the same place, tells us, that Pythagoras valued the *Doric* above the other Greek Dialects, as most agreeable to the laws of harmony, Τὴν δὲ Δωρίαν διάλεκτον ἑναρμονίαν εἶναι: Now having made the essence of the soul to be harmony, it was no wonder he should chuse a dialect, which he supposed approached nearest to its nature; that the mind and tongue might go together.

3. Pythagoras seems here to have imitated his master Orpheus, from whom, as we shall see hereafter, he borrowed much of his philosophy; for *Jamblichus* tells us, that the old writings that went under the name of Orpheus, were composed in *Doric*.

4. But, lastly, a passage in *Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras* seems alone sufficient to determine this matter: *Porphyry*, giving the causes of the decay of the Pythagoric philosophy, assigns this for one, that *their commentaries were written in Doric*. Ἐπειτα διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα Δωρίδι γεγράφαι, p. 49. Kust. Ed. This is the clearest comment on the words in question, and determines them to the sense contended for. One would wonder, indeed, that so learned a Critic could take them in any other. But the secret was this, Dr. Bentley having pretended to discover, that *Ocellus Lucanus* did not write his book in the common dialect, as it is now extant, but in *Doric*; (*Dissert. upon Phalaris, &c.* p. 47.) his adversaries (*Dissert. examined*, p. 54.) charge him with having stolen this discovery from *Vizzanius*. This, Dr. Bentley flatly denies; (*Dissert. defended*, p. 384.)
But


But the only proof he gives of his innocence, is, that the Greek passage, quoted above from Jamblichus, on which both he and *Vizzanius* had founded their discoveries, is differently translated by them. “ The “ thing, as I said it (says the Doctor) is thus; the “ *Pythagoreans* enjoined all the *Greeks* that entered “ themselves into the society, to use every man his “ mother-tongue (φωνῆ χρῆσθαι τῇ πατρίῳ.) *Ocellus*, “ therefore, being a *Dorian* of *Lucania*, must have “ writ in the *Doric*. This I *took* to be Jamblichus’s “ meaning. But *Vizzanius* has represented it thus: “ that they enjoined all that came to them to use the “ mother-tongue of Crotona, which was the *Doric*.— “ Whether *Vizzanius* or I have hit upon the true “ meaning of Jamblichus, perhaps all competent “ readers will not be of a mind.” The diffidence of this conclusion would make one suspect the Doctor was now convinced, that *Vizzanius*’s was the right meaning. Yet, I will venture to say, that the words of Jamblichus, as quoted by *Vizzanius* without the context, would have been understood by every man, skilled, as Dr. Bentley was, in Greek, in the different sense he has given to them. From whence I conclude, that, when Dr. Bentley wrote his *Dissertation on Phalaris*, he had seen the words of Jamblichus nowhere but in *Vizzanius*.

P. 342. [C]. Some have affected not to understand, where it is, in the foregoing passage, that *Zaleucus* inculcates this doctrine. The place, methinks, was not hard to find: it is, where *wicked men* are bid *to set before themselves the dreadful hour of death*. For how should a picture of this scene allure men to virtue,


or deter them from vice, but as it opens to them a view of those rewards and punishments they are just going to receive? Hence, too, we learn what those *hopes and fears* were, which Plutarch, in the passage p. 346, says the *ancient lawgivers* impressed upon the minds of the people, to keep up the awe and reverence of religion: for Plato assures us it was their general practice, to inculcate the distinction between soul and body; and to teach, that, at their separation, the soul survived the body; and this, says he, we should believe upon their word, unless we would be thought to be out of our senses.—*πιστεύειν δ' αὖ καὶ τοῖς ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΟΥΣΙ ταῦθ' ἕτως ἔχειν, ἄνπερ μὴ πανόλασι ἀφρονες φαίνωσιν.* De Legg. lib. xi. But, in his next book, he informs us, more at large, why the ancient Lawgivers inculcated that *distinction*. It was, in order to build upon it the belief of a *future state of rewards and punishments*: for he says, the Lawgivers were to be believed, when they teach the total difference between soul and body, that the former is immortal, and that when it is on the point of departing for the regions of immortality (where it must give an account of its conduct in the body) the good man will meet death with courage and constancy, and the evil man with affright and terror. And then takes occasion to mention the punishments reserved for the latter: *πειθεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ χρεῶν τάτε ἄλλα, καὶ λέγουσι ψυχὴν σώματι εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν.—τὸν δὲ ὄψα ἡμῶν ἕκασον ὄψως ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεῶν ἄλλες ἀπίεσαι δώσουσα λόγον, καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πατρις λέγει, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θάρραλέον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ μάλα φοβερόν—ἀτιμώτηρ ἂν κακῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐγίγνετο τῶν*
μεῖλα

μετὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον. De Leg. l. xii. t. ii. p. 959. A. B. C. Edit. H. Steph. fol. And here let me observe, that Plato, in the words τῷ ἀγαθῷ Δαρράλειον, &c. seems to have had the very passage of Zaleucus in his eye, τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τῆτον, &c.—But this cavil had been obviated, Section 1. of this Second Book, pp. 297, 298.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.



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