





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
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
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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

A THIRD VOLUME

EDITORIALS
FROM
THE NORTH AMERICAN
PHILADELPHIA

AUGUST, 1916—MAY, 1917

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FOREWORD

TWO previous volumes containing some of this newspaper's principal editorials on the war were welcomed by so many readers in this country and abroad that the series is continued. The articles are arranged, as before, in chronological order, and comprise a more or less connected survey of important developments in the period treated.

The first collection dealt with events from the beginning of the war to the operations at Gallipoli. The second carried the record to the Battle of the Somme. The present volume pertains to the history of the third year, down to the time when the Russian revolution and America's participation had changed the whole character of the conflict.

THE NORTH AMERICAN.

Philadelphia, February 22, 1918.

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THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

A THIRD VOLUME



TWO YEARS OF WAR

August 3, 1916.

BY COMMON consent, official and non-official commentators on the war marked its second anniversary last Sunday. The date was convenient and not illogical. It was on July 28, 1914, that Austria's declaration against Servia, dictated by Germany, was thrust like a firebrand in the face of Europe. It was on July 30 that a German ultimatum to Russia, followed forty-eight hours later by notice of hostilities, gave the struggle a continental scope. It was on August 2 that Luxemburg was occupied and French territory invaded. But August 3 will always have a tragic pre-eminence in the chronology of the conflict. For it was on this day two years ago that the faith of nations was treacherously struck down at the frontier of Belgium, and a controversy of governments became a war upon mankind.

There have not been in the history of the race two years more significant or more ominous. They have seen the energy and ingenuity of man at his highest development turned from the processes of creation to the processes of destruction. They have seen vast territories blasted by war, untold treasures of wealth consumed, millions of human beings submerged in misery. They have seen the ancient foundations of law shaken, the structure of civilization itself imperiled, the very hopes of humanity mocked. The impossible war, the unthinkable war, has been a reality for two years, and no man can say, with assurance, how much longer it is to con-

tinue nor what regions now at peace are to be afflicted. What, then, is the suggestion brought by this melancholy anniversary? We can measure approximately the descent of civilization since the great betrayal of August 3, 1914; but wherein is the world better or worse off now than twelve months ago? Which of the two irreconcilable principles now at war is to guide the destinies of the world? One may put the issues in the form of two questions that have become almost colloquial—Can Germany win? and How long will the war last?

A curious example of human fallibility was the widespread theory in the beginning that the conflict would be brief. "The shortest great war on record," was the confident prediction of one expert. And during the first few weeks it seemed likely to be verified. At any cost, it was believed, the nations would soon compromise their differences, rather than invite the immeasurable sacrifices which a war in this age of scientific destructiveness must entail. What optimism failed to perceive at first was that this was no mere clash of national ambitions, but the collision of two fundamental ideas of human government, only one of which could survive. Force had challenged Law, and until one or the other had gained the mastery there could be no hope of settlement. This is the truth which Germany, after two years of successes, is just beginning to glimpse. If military superiority alone could command victory, she long ago would have dominated Europe and imposed her will upon the world. But by her acts she stirred the very depths of human conviction and aroused against herself the inextinguishable will of man to be free. And against these forces the mightiest arsenals of militarism cannot prevail. The marvel, then, is not that the spirit of her adversaries remains unbroken, but that they have been able, while withstanding twenty-four months of savage

punishment, to create a military power commensurate with the great task of liberation. What Germany had succeeded in accomplishing by concentrated effort during forty years of peace, they had to achieve during twenty months of war. How far they have succeeded may be judged from a comparison of the conditions of August, 1915, with those of today.

A year ago the military ascendancy of Germany was established in every field. Altho the program of a quick elimination of France had been shattered at the Marne, there were tremendous triumphs to record. Belgium and the richest regions of France had been subjugated and made secure by formidable defenses; Poland had been overrun and German armies planted deep in Russian territory; the desperate valor of the French and British was to spend itself in vain against the intrenchments in the west, while in the Balkans German diplomacy was to win Bulgaria, and Teuton arms were soon to open a highway from Berlin to Stamboul and the East. The conquest of Servia, the Anglo-French disaster at Gallipoli and the British humiliations in Mesopotamia were already foreshadowed.

But the vital evidence of Germany's ascendancy was her command of the initiative. She dictated at her pleasure the problems which her antagonists must work out; and before they had solved one, thru exhausting endeavor, she had put before them another—she was always one campaign ahead. While the French were reeling from one savage thrust, she smote the British line; before Russia was able to halt her disordered forces, Teutonic armies were hacking their way thru Servia. She reached across two continents to buffet the English back from Bagdad, and shortened her blow to smite them at the Dardanelles. It is small wonder that, being blinded to the spiritual forces she had awakened, seeing

the war merely as a contest in military might, she asked in bewilderment and scorn why her deluded enemies did not seek terms before they were utterly destroyed. The same German ascendancy was maintained thruout the rigors of a second winter campaign and was emphasized with striking force in the beginning of the titanic effort at Verdun in February and the Austrian drive into Italy in May. But these were its last manifestations. Unity of effort by the Allies was arranged at a conference in Paris late in March, and its effects were seen in the simultaneous campaign in France, on the eastern front and against Austria. Temporarily, and perhaps definitely, the initiative has passed from Germany to her enemies. Her task now is not to set military problems, but to solve them under compulsion.

The hardest work of the Allies during the year was to wait; to hold their defenses against relentless attack; to build up, under galling fire, forces adequate for a sustained offensive. France had a great veteran army and the priceless possession of an heroic, united national spirit, but could not advance; Great Britain had vast wealth and productive power, but no trained armies; Russia, with inexhaustible human resources, lacked guns and ammunition. The problem was to endure the merciless blows of Germany and her allies until attacks, backed by ample material, could be co-ordinated.

Altho Entente successes on both fronts have been notable, they do not yet supply sound basis for definite judgment. But they reveal a complete transference of the initiative and of preponderant striking force. Statement of two vital conditions will illustrate the change of a year—organization, which was Germany's exclusive and most powerful weapon, the Allies now have; and in the matter of resources they have an immediate superiority, which time must steadily increase. There remains

the psychological factor—the stimulating effect of an offensive, long delayed but finally launched with impressive success, and the contrasting depression which inevitably follows a surrendered initiative. And in the present war these conditions have a national as well as a military influence. Every imperial proclamation, every newspaper utterance, reveals now a realization in Germany that victory in the German sense is impossible and that the nation fights now, not in the inspiring hope of dominion, but with desperate need to avert disaster. While each battle seemed a prelude to triumph, the German army and people displayed superb discipline and devotion; will they reveal the same qualities under the prolonged agony of a violent siege? To win a war demands supreme confidence in victory, absolute belief in the justice of a cause which demands such terrible sacrifices. That the Germans have been inspired by such a faith, their great deeds testify. But is it still theirs? If so, how long will it withstand the knowledge that a war of triumphant aggression has become for them a war of painful resistance, of agonizing suspense—no longer a means of national aggrandizement, but a desperate struggle to extort favorable terms from relentless antagonists? How long will it survive the revelation, now emerging dimly thru the murk of battle, that the nation was drugged by a false philosophy and led to disaster by a deluded statesmanship? And there is a still deeper source of weakness. The national spirit which could exult over the corpse of Belgium and glory in the Lusitania massacre is not sound. It has been strong in victory; will it be as valiant in adversity?

RUMANIA HESITATES

August 18, 1916.

MOST persons, we fear, were but imperfectly enlightened by a recent news dispatch which told of the capture by the Russians of the village of Tustobaby, and continued:

The Austrian line now runs from Berestechk thru Sheruzovitse and Stanystavezyk along the Styr, and thru Olesko-Zboroff to Brzezany, forming a zigzag to the upper Zlota Lipa; along that stream to Zawatow, thence southwest to Jezupol, at the mouth of the Bystritza-Maidan, ten miles northwest of Stanislaw; thence south to Solotvina, northwest of Nadvorna. Military critics look for their eventual withdrawal to the line of Kamionka, Lemberg, Mikolayoff and Stryj.

There is one region, however, outside of the two countries directly involved, where these appalling names are read with avid interest, and where mention of each incredible arrangement of consonants conveys an enthralling significance. Rumania, at whose northern frontier the great battle line begins its uncertain course thru Galicia, watches with absorbed attention the progress of the Muscovite armies, and feverishly speculates upon the effect which this mighty movement will have upon her fortunes. For two full years the little nation has baffled the most adroit diplomats of Europe and the keenest students of Balkan politics. A few news headlines will illustrate the bewildering nature of the record:

Rumania and Bulgaria Will Aid Russia (September 8, 1914); Rumania Held by German Diplomacy (February 24, 1915); Rumania Deaf to German Urging (September 27);

Rumania Bides Her Time (October 12); Rumania Soon to Make Decision (November 19); Greece and Rumania May Join Teutons (December 10); Rumania to Join Allies, Says Leader (January 3, 1916); All Rumania Strongly Pro-Ally (January 27); Rumania Still Dodging War (February 19); Germany Worried Over Rumania (March 14); Rumania to Join Allies in April (March 23); Rumania to Join Allies at Proper Time (March 25); Rumania Decides to Stay Neutral (August 4); Rumania Waiting for Best War Bid (August 7); Rumania on Eve of Fateful Decision (August 14).

For twenty-four months, eager yet fearful, ambitious yet calculating, the restless little kingdom has presented a fascinating spectacle of indecision. Now it would seem that the choice must soon be made, if she hopes to establish a claim to a share in the spoils of war. True to the Balkan character, Rumania has made self-interest her guiding star. Her sole concern is to enlarge her boundaries, by the addition of either Transylvania and Bukowina, Austro-Hungarian territories on the west, or of Bessarabia, a Russian province on the east. The former regions she covets because they contain 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 Rumanians languishing under the Magyar yoke; the latter she demands because it was awarded to her by the treaty of Paris in 1856 and arbitrarily conferred upon Russia by the treaty of Berlin in 1878. Russia, then, is the arch-enemy or the prospective benefactor of the wavering nation, according to the political convictions which at the moment prevail. As the czar's hosts sweep on toward the Carpathian passes, beyond which Hungary lies open, Rumanian ambition is fired with the prospect of receiving Transylvania and Bukowina in return for assistance. On the other hand, one Rumanian frontier bristles with Austrian bayonets and another with Bulgarian guns, and there is the fate of Serbia to instill caution. Moreover, the national spirit revolts against giving hostages to the vast neighboring empire which tore Bessarabia from the

kingdom's side and which casts its shadow over the straits of Constantinople, the ultimate mouth of the great Rumanian highway, the Danube.

One used to think of "The Prisoner of Zenda" and its imitations as extraordinary products of fancy; yet the most extravagant inventions of the Ruritanian fable never surpassed the strange existence in this remote, semi-Oriental corner of Europe, with its atmosphere of regal splendor and gipsy gayety, of garish romance and intricate intrigue. A Hohenzollern monarch and court, a spirit of fierce nationalism, a scheme of politics based upon territorial ambition and international antagonisms, a population nine-tenths illiterate, a statesmanship at once far-seeing, subtle and audacious and a moral sense subjugated by self-interest—here are the elements of an unending drama. And that is what they have produced.

The geographical and racial reasons for Rumania's interest in the war are familiar to most readers. She advanced her frontiers, at trifling cost, by joining Servia and Greece in overwhelming Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, and now she hopes to accomplish a great deal more in the same direction, by like economical means, thru delivering her military power to that group which appears certain to be victorious in the continental struggle. The vital question for her is, of course, which side will win. Bulgaria's guess seemed plausible, but the easy conquest of Servia did not establish Teuton supremacy in Europe, and now the Bulgars are waiting in ill-concealed anxiety for the revenge which the Entente Powers will try to take. When the Russian armies, early in the war, were swarming thru the Carpathian passes, Rumanian advocates of intervention wept with rage because the government let pass the glittering opportunity; yet Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen were to roll back the invaders, overrun Poland and open the

Teutonic highway to Constantinople, and if Rumania had rashly joined then, she would have become another Belgium within thirty days. Popular opinion has unquestionably been pro-French and pro-Italian, some of it even strongly pro-Russian. But this sentiment has been held in check by influences more powerful than the pro-German court. Rumania for years has been subject, in an economic sense, to Germany. "Peaceful penetration" had brought her finance, her industries and much of her vast commerce under Teutonic control. Always the chief markets for her vast products of grain and oil, Germany and Austria during the war became of overshadowing importance as customers. In general, three main lines of policy have divided the nation. The government, while professing a resolute nationalism and a determination to achieve the dream of a greater Rumania, has clung desperately to neutrality, upon the ground that the country could not afford to make a mistaken choice. The strongest element of opposition, led by Take Jonescu, a former minister, demands an alliance with the Entente Powers. And this movement is modified by a party which condemns the government for having failed to seize its opportunities, but at the same time is implacably hostile to any deal with Russia. Between these policies the nation oscillates.

Jonescu has been called by a pro-German writer the Sir Edward Carson of Rumania—"adroit, devoid of conscience, not burdened by principles." Rather, he is the Rumanian Venizelos, for in his indefatigable championship of the Entente against a Teutonized court he closely resembles the brilliant Cretan who has challenged the Greek sovereign. His reasons are as frankly material as those of any other Balkan statesman—Rumania must satisfy her "national aspirations" by absorbing outside territory. Yet those who imagine that publicists in this

semi-barbaric region are incapable of lofty thought and expression should read this man's speech in the chamber of deputies a few months ago, with such passages as these:

If Germany were to win, there would be no more liberty, not even for the great American democracy. If German unity had sprung from the liberal movement of 1848, a great new nation would have been added to the liberal nations of Europe. But German unification is the product of Prussian militarism.

This is a war of nations, not a war of armies. If Germany is victorious, her rule will be the rule of the mailed fist; if the others win—and they will—the law they will impose will be the law of justice. * * * Some one has just remarked that it was childish to introduce the idea of morality into international politics. How slight must be his acquaintance with the philosophy of history! Peoples, like individuals, pay for the offenses they commit against morality; there would be no order in the universe were it not that we have the conviction of the existence of a moral law above us.

Another leader has summed up a more popular Rumanian view in a sentence. "We would fight," he says, "Germany with regret, Austria with indifference, Hungary with the keenest satisfaction." Perhaps his cynicism is a truer reflection of the national spirit than Jonescu's ardent phrases. But in any event the decision would seem to be nearly due. "Now or never!" is the summons that echoes back to Rumania from the battlefield in the Carpathian heights.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN ALLIANCE

August 22, 1916.

DIPLOMACY was not bereft of its functions when half the world chose to settle clashing interests by war, nor is it reduced to inertia while awaiting the issue of the titanic struggle. Statesmanship and intrigue have never been more active than during the last two years, and the nations are as feverishly intent upon preparations for the silent strife which will be called peace as they are upon prosecuting the deadly conflict of arms. Few persons, perhaps, realize how numerous and far-reaching are even the known agreements which have been consummated or projected amid the very fury of battle. Germany's alliances with Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, and the treaties which unite her adversaries, will come instantly to mind. But these are merely the most notable instances. Austria and Bulgaria have agreed upon new boundaries in the Balkans. Rumania, most businesslike of neutrals, has a useful arrangement for exchange of products with the Central Powers, is believed to have an understanding with Greece, and has been in negotiations concerning trade with Turkey and with Sweden. Denmark and Holland conduct their complicated import and export affairs under conventions made with both groups of belligerents. The three Scandinavian nations are allied for mutual defense or offense. France and Italy have accommodated their claims in northern Africa. The British protectorate over Egypt required recognition of

French suzerainty in Morocco. And finally there is the tremendous alliance recently completed which is designed to wage economic war against the group of nations headed by Germany. Only one diplomatic event has approached this last in importance, and that is the agreement announced a few weeks ago from Tokio and Petrograd—a Russo-Japanese treaty which amounts virtually to an alliance. No one outside of the two governments, of course, knows what secret provisions the instrument contains, but those published as a “summary” are sufficiently sweeping. They are:

First—Japan will not participate in any political arrangement or combination against Russia, which assumes the same obligations.

Second—In case one country's Far Eastern territorial rights and special interests recognized by the other are menaced, both Japan and Russia will confer on methods to be taken with a view to mutual support and co-operation in order to protect and defend those rights and interests.

Thus the two autocratic empires which were in desperate collision a little more than ten years ago have gone to the other extreme, justifying those observers who said that they must be either enemies or allies. Neither country was satisfied with the treaty of Portsmouth, which ended their war, and it was certain that their conflicting interests in the Far East would result in another clash or in a settlement on a partnership basis. Within two years of the peace, indeed, they made amicable terms over the development of Manchuria, and they were to be brought, or driven, closer together by action of the United States. In 1910 Secretary of State Knox sought to buttress the Hay doctrine of the “open door” by urging that the Manchurian railways, projected under Russo-Japanese auspices, should be neutralized; and the joint refusal to entertain the proposal was more decisive than friendly. From

that time Russian and Japanese diplomacy has operated with increasing cordiality, and the present war, of course, has hastened the inevitable union. As a member of the anti-Teutonic alliance, Japan performed her allotted tasks with efficiency and dispatch, and, at trifling cost, established her claim to be considered the arbiter of eastern Asia, particularly of China. But a far greater contribution has been in the supplying of guns and ammunition to Russia. It is owing chiefly to her munition plants that her former enemy has been able to overwhelm Austria and double the effect of every blow against Germany in France.

The published terms of the treaty are vague enough to justify any interpretation—even the bland explanation of Premier Okuma that the sole aim is to “promote peace in the Far East.” But the obvious meaning is that the two countries have pooled their interests to the extent that Russia recognizes and will support Japan’s asserted right to paramountcy in China and the Far East generally, while Japan will give at least moral support to Russian policies thruout the rest of the world. This means that Russia is determined to have a free hand in replacing Teutonic domination over the Balkans with her own, and in establishing herself at Constantinople, whether with or without the consent of Great Britain, whose veto has closed the Dardanelles to Russia for nearly a century. It is a striking circumstance that this agreement should have been made within a few days of that by which the anti-Teutonic Powers completed their trade war plans. In a single week one group of nations undertook to decide the economic future of Europe and half the world besides, and another announced the destinies of the Far East. Both these events should be rather disconcerting to those Americans who have the complacent belief that, because this country shuns “entangling

alliances" and has been "kept out of war," such developments do not greatly concern us, and who are not at all perturbed by the contemptuous indifference which the intriguing governments display toward the United States in announcing exclusive title to the world markets. As a fact, this nation will be profoundly affected, and the mythical nature of its supposed "isolation" from world problems will become painfully apparent before the echoes of the war have subsided.

It is unofficially intimated that the nations allied with Russia and Japan are "satisfied" with the arrangement; but the truth is that their approval was not sought, and their objection would not greatly distress the high contracting parties. It may be taken for granted that when Japan renews her demands for recognition of "predominating influence" in China, they will be stamped with the powerful assent of Russia and will be imposed. The "open door" is closed, and outside are stationed a trooper of the mikado and a Cossack of the czar.

THE BALKAN TURMOIL

August 29, 1916.

IN THEIR efforts to find phrases fit to describe the intensified European conflict, noted writers have referred to the present campaign in France as the Battle of Europe. No doubt this application of the resounding title has logic, since the future of the continent is being shaped in that terrific struggle. Yet in another sense it would be singularly appropriate to the impending clash in the Balkans, where, for the first time, forces of all the European belligerents save one are arrayed for a great encounter of nations. Cannon speak but a single tongue; if they uttered the language of those whom they serve, what an astounding polyglot thunder would rise to heaven from that battleground of nationalities! On one side are Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgars, Turks and representatives of the lesser races which they include. On the other side are gathered British forces, with contingents of Canadians and Australians and New Zealanders saved from Gallipoli or transferred from Egypt; an army of French veterans from the western field, despite Verdun and the Somme; 100,000 Servians brought around from Corfu, hardy survivors from the Teuton conquest and the retreat thru Albania; restless mountaineers from Montenegro and half-tamed tribesmen from the heights of Albania. For weeks transports have been unloading at Saloniki regiments of Italians from Brindisi and of Russians brought up thru the Red sea from the Persian gulf, and

batteries of artillery from Portugal. And now Rumania joins. Of the countries involved, Belgium and Japan alone are unrepresented, so far as is known, on this spectacular front.

The operations in Greece, now in a somewhat halting and confused beginning, have been referred to as another great offensive against the Central Powers. Russia began her tremendous drive against Austria on June 4; the Anglo-French forward movement in Picardy started July 1; Italy advanced in the Isonzo region August 4, and the activities in Macedonia have been widely heralded as the fourth attack in the co-ordinated strategy of the encircling forces. In this assumption, however, it would seem that interpretation has outrun the news. As a fact, there has been desultory fighting in this territory ever since last spring, and no movements of major importance have yet taken place. The Entente commanders show no signs of haste, and up to this time the offensive, such as it is, has been carried out by their opponents. While Anglo-French forces have seized some advanced positions about sixty miles north of their base at Saloniki, the Bulgars have been more aggressive, establishing themselves in Greek territory at the western end of the line and occupying Greek Macedonia—the chief prize which Bulgaria seeks—clear down to the Aegean coast, including the port of Kavala. The military situation, as shown by the map, has a certain picturesque simplicity which appeals to the inexperienced observer. The 100-mile battle line extends from east to west in a rough curve near the frontiers separating Greece from Bulgaria and from Servia, and almost opposite the center of it is the base of the Allies; thus the line resembles the edge of an opened fan, with the vast intrenched camp of Saloniki at the point where the sticks of the fan meet. Last May it was reported

that the British, French and Servians had more than 650,000 troops making ready for the advance, but later information indicates that it will require rather heavy Italian and Russian reinforcements to bring the total up to this number.

The stakes are worth all the effort that will be made on either side, for it is control of the Balkans, where Germany has been supreme thruout the war, that is to be decided. The immediate problem of her antagonists, of course, is to inflict such punishment upon Bulgaria that she will be detached from the Teutonic alliance, and at the same time to sever the line of communications between Germany and Turkey, thereby eliminating another belligerent. Reconquest of Servia would be a further and more costly undertaking. And there are other factors, of both a political and military nature, which loom large in the operations. Decision by the two Balkan states which remained neutral has been in the scale; already the developments have shattered the caution of Rumania, and they are almost certain to cause the fearful Greeks to forget their terrors, thus ranging both countries with the Entente. Rumanian neutrality was always of a temporary and coolly calculating character; government and people hardly attempted to conceal their purpose to take part in the war on that side which showed a certain grasp of victory. Popular sentiment is anti-Teuton because of the national ambition to possess Hungarian territory, and pro-Ally because of racial sympathy with Italy. At the same time it is cold toward Russia, because Rumanian Bessarabia was awarded to the czar at the congress of Berlin; but this feeling has been modified by the impressive spectacle of Russian successes over Austria. Rumanian participation was hastened by the

demonstration that the operations in the Balkans were to enlist all of the belligerents and were to lead to a definite decision.

The position of Greece is desperate rather than uncertain. All students of the war are familiar with the dizzy evolutions of Hellenist politics since the conflict began—the daring insistence of former Premier Venizelos upon an alliance with Britain, France and Russia; his overthrow by King Constantine, brother-in-law of the kaiser, and the setting up of an unconstitutional but determined government devoted to the impossible task of avoiding hostilities; the secret intrigues with Bulgaria, resulting in Bulgar occupation of Greek forts and territory in Macedonia; the Allies' coercion by blockade, and the government's surrender, signalized by demobilization of the army, which had been put into the field to resist Bulgar aggression and then ordered to submit to it. A more vital demand enforced by the Allies, however, was that there should be a real national election. This final test of public opinion has been set for early in October; if events on the battlefield have not settled matters by that time, the Greeks will decide by ballot, once for all, whether they want Venizelos returned to power with a mandate to join the forces against Bulgaria, or are content to let that historic enemy have cherished Macedonia. The drastic measures employed by the Allies in Greece have been feelingly denounced by Germany. It is to be recalled, however, that there is a certain warrant for them. It was the combined fleets of Great Britain, France and Russia which won the independence of Greece at Navarino, in 1827, by defeating the Turco-Egyptian sea forces; and three years later, when the new kingdom was established, those three nations undertook the obligations of guardianship. Having protected

the liberties of their ward for three-quarters of a century, they feel that they have some right to enforce actual neutrality pending a popular decision. Demobilization of the army was insisted upon because it was clear that the government would not permit it to act against Bulgaria, and might conceivably attempt to employ it in harassing the Anglo-French forces upon the ground that their occupation of Greek territory was a violation of sovereignty. These suspicions were tremendously strengthened, of course, when it was disclosed that the government was secretly committed to allowing the Bulgar invasion. Whatever the future may bring in the way of new complications and combats in the Near East, the attention of the world is likely to be attracted for some time to that troubled region, where the situation is more interesting now than it has been at any other time since the Allies discovered that German diplomacy and military power had put the "balk" in Balkans.

THE BALKAN MESSAGE

August 31, 1916.

IF THE Rumanians are blessed with a sense of dramatic values, it must be gratified by the world interest which their remarkably deliberate intervention in the war has caused. Two years ago, or even one year ago, their joining would have been only a mild sensation; today it fills the capitals of one group of belligerents with exultation and those of the other group with apprehension and gloom. The entrance of a country with a population less than that of Pennsylvania causes a perceptible swaying of the balance between huge alliances of nations that number their peoples by hundreds of millions. Its immediate effects recall a statement made in these columns nearly a year and a half ago:

It was in the Balkans that the great war began, and there, in all likelihood, it will be decided. The battles on the plains of France and in the mountain passes of Hungary are hardly more vital than the grim struggle which diplomacy is waging for control of the little states whose explosive politics has kept Europe's nerves on edge for half a century. That side which wins the Balkans wins the war.

Six months later Bulgaria joined Germany, Austria and Turkey and completed the long-planned highway between Berlin and the Bosphorus, the gateway to the East. Servia, Montenegro and most of Albania were quickly brought under domination of the alliance, Rumania was isolated by the rolling back of the Russian hosts, and Greece terrorized into neutrality, while

Anglo-French prestige in the peninsula was reduced to the vanishing point by the failure at Gallipoli. Unless the Entente Powers could retrieve that disastrous record, they had lost the Balkans and the war. The essential error in their policy was that they conceived the Balkan problem to be diplomatic, whereas it was really military. Their political agents were just as industrious, just as lavish in promises and perhaps just as adroit as those of Germany. But behind her diplomacy Germany massed her guns, and these were the negotiators that carried conviction to the observant peoples of the region. Bulgaria joined the Teutons because she knew that Mackensen had 300,000 troops ready to overrun Servia. Rumania, eager to profit at the expense of Hungary, clung to neutrality only because the Russians were driven out of Galicia. And Greece, where popular sentiment was overwhelmingly for alliance with England and France, collapsed in fear when she discovered that those Powers could not save a foot of Servian soil from the invader. The Dardanelles fiasco and the futile expedition from Saloniki taught the Entente governments that their diplomacy was no match for German cannon; that the Balkans were to be won only, if at all, thru the creation of an overmastering military power. And just as soon as they had demonstrated this achievement, the gaining of the peninsula became only a matter of time. With Russian armies once more hammering at the gates of Hungary, and with 650,000 troops representing all the Allied Powers intrenched around Saloniki, Rumania could no longer doubt which path led to realization of her ambitions, and a like decision by Greece is no more in doubt.

That these events portend the wresting of control of the region from the Teutons is reasonably clear. Germany, of course, has had ample warning of the blow,

and it is conceivable that she could make another Serbia of Ferdinand's kingdom. Geographical and military conditions, however, make her problem infinitely more baffling than that she solved by her drive from Belgrade to the Grecian frontier. A vital factor, of course, will be the extent and efficiency of Rumania's preparations. On these points there is no trustworthy information, but it is unlikely that Russia has neglected to share with her new ally the apparently inexhaustible supplies of guns and munitions which she has acquired during the last year. Rumanian hostility erects a barrier between the Central Powers and their allies. It creates a menace to the flank of the Austrians, whose line already is reeling under the Russian attacks, and to the rear of the Bulgarians, who are involved in the beginnings of a dangerous campaign in Greek Macedonia. It opens at last a direct path southward for Russia, and announcement is already made that forces of the czar are pouring down toward Bulgaria.

An additional result will be the entrance of Greece. That unhappy country, victimized by its own fears and the audacious policy of an autocratic king, had not the skill or the luck of Rumania, and had to endure, besides, the rather suffocating embraces of the Entente Powers, her guardians. Neutrality is a singular commodity, in that, under adroit management, it can be sold and still possessed. Rumania collected untold millions for it, yet held it until belligerency was more profitable. Greece permitted hers to be marketed by an unconstitutional sovereign, and received no return except the suspicion of both sides and the threat of national disaster. And she has not even the satisfaction of realizing the ideal of the feebler kind of statesmanship, which is to "keep out of war" even at the cost of national dignity, justice and sovereignty. She never had a chance to escape.

Betrayal of her treaty obligations toward Servia brought her not peace, but peril. And she is to enter the conflict, not as a nation worthy to be an arbiter of its issues, but as one which must wipe out the shame of having deserted an ally and surrendered to an aggressor. The government of Constantine, yielding to the false allurements of "safety first" as a national policy, sought to maintain it by a mobilization which was a hollow sham. Not a soldier would it send to the aid of Servia. But it proclaimed that every one of them would be ordered to die where he stood before the Bulgar flag should be planted on Greek territory. Yet when Bulgarian forces crossed the frontier it surrendered fort after fort, and abandoned to the invader the entire region of eastern Macedonia, with its Aegean littoral, which was the nation's prize in the second Balkan war. It is small wonder that this record has driven the Greek people to humiliation and rage, and that they are now ready, unless all reports are deceptive, to fight for the rights of the nation even if they must reach the battlefield only after enduring the throes of a revolution.

After Italy's declaration of war against Germany, Rumania's decision was inevitable. Each act was long deliberated, and was dependent upon convincing demonstration that Germany could not win; for neither Italy nor Rumania dared to contemplate the possibility of inviting the hostility of that empire, to which both were formerly allied, if there was a chance of Teuton victory. What Rome and Bucharest have proclaimed to the world is that over German power is passing the shadow of defeat, and that nothing can save it from ultimate eclipse.

GREECE "KEPT OUT OF WAR"

September 5, 1916.

ACCORDING to an old prophecy preserved in Greek folklore, a sovereign named Konstantinos, with six fingers, is some day to restore the ancient glories of Hellas. This legend may have had something to do with the popularity and influence of King Constantine. While he is normally furnished as to fingers, it is credibly reported that he has six toes on each foot, which conceivably might satisfy the oracle. Current events suggest, however, that if he really possesses this extra equipment, he will need it all to keep his royal feet on the ground in the present turbulent condition of affairs. A highly efficient Anglo-French censorship prevents the world from observing the course of the political upheaval which is shaking the kingdom; but rumors of a possible abdication and news of actual revolts against the government, together with the imposing of more rigid supervision by the Allied forces, unmistakably forecast developments which will profoundly affect the destinies of the nation and the outcome of the great war.

From the beginning of the struggle the involvement of Greece has been a spectacle full of interest and suggestion. Since the conflict had its rise in the Balkans, and since its chief issues center there, none of the states in that troubled region could hope by any good fortune or necromancy to escape. Yet the government of Greece—which was Constantine—undertook to achieve that

impossible feat, and the country's present plight affords an enlightening study in the effects of a policy whose overshadowing aim is to "keep out of war" at any cost. The ambition was a worthy one, but even a superficial acquaintance with the bewildering criss-crossing of racial, political and economic forces in the peninsula will suggest insuperable obstacles to its realization. Geography itself forebade that the Balkans should ever know tranquillity; and when control of the region became a prize contended for by the great Powers, which played ingeniously upon the inveterate enmities, prejudices and rivalries of the little states, the widening of the war was inevitable. In no single country was there a simple problem. Serbia, selected as a victim by Austria-Hungary, was a ward of Russia and an ally of Greece, and had awakened the mortal hatred of Bulgaria by repudiating an agreement concerning division of the spoils won in the victory over Turkey in 1912 and by defeating the enraged Bulgars in 1913. Rumania, economically a dependent and politically a satellite of the Teutonic alliance, was racially sympathetic with Italy, yet deeply distrustful of Italy's ally, Russia. She yearned to wrest territory from Hungary, yet hesitated long before she made war upon her most profitable customers and accepted partnership with the Muscovite, who in 1878 had torn Bessarabia from her possession. She faced, moreover, the fierce hostility of Bulgaria, since she had assisted Serbia and Greece to humiliate that kingdom in the second Balkan war. Bulgaria, freed from Moslem misrule by Russia, was drawn to her liberator by ties of religion and blood; yet these influences were cast aside in favor of an alliance with the Teutons, the reward for which was to be revenge upon Serbia and the regaining of the Macedonian territories which

Bulgar arms had won from Turkey, only to lose them to Servia and Greece. And thus national ambition brought about the incongruous union of the Slavic Bulgars with their historic foes, the Turks, against their blood-brothers, the soldiers of the czar.

But it would seem as if the very dregs of the bitter Balkan broth had settled at the bottom of the peninsula. Immeasurably fortunate, thus far, when compared with Servia, Greece has enjoyed neither the commanding independence of Rumania nor the feverish gambling excitement of Bulgaria's desperate adventure. She has known the miseries of indecision, the distractions of political warfare, the humiliation of surrender and the shame of unresisted invasion. And now she endures the pangs of civil strife, and faces at the end a forced participation in the conflict. Greek events during the last two years afford a striking exemplification of the saying that history is made up of the biographies of great men, for during all that period only two memorable figures have emerged from the news of the kingdom—Constantine, the king, and Venizelos, former premier and present leader of the revolutionary movement. Venizelos has always been an avowed advocate of an alliance with Great Britain, France and Russia, the creators and guardians of Greek independence. It was he who formed the Balkan league that overthrew Turkey, and he drafted the defensive alliance with Servia, which was to protect both nations from Bulgaria's revenge after the Balkan wars. When the final Teuton invasion of Servia began, therefore, he decided, as a matter of course, that Greece should go to the aid of her ally. Constantine intervened and repudiated the treaty; it had not been meant to apply, he argued, in a general war, and the danger was too great. Venizelos

retorted that no peril could excuse such a betrayal, and that, if for no other reason, Greece could not afford to remain passive while Bulgaria, with German aid, became the dominating power in the Balkans. While he still had power, therefore, Venizelos invited the British and French to land at Saloniki in order that they might fulfill Greece's defaulted obligation to Servia. For this he was dismissed by the king, who, when the Venizelists won at the ensuing election, virtually abrogated the constitution and set up a puppet ministry devoted to his policy of "keeping out of war."

Constantine's caution, which he said was inspired by a belief that Germany would win, was justified temporarily by the disaster at Gallipoli and the collapse of the effort to rescue Servia. But it was not long before the policy of peace at any price began to prove a slender guarantee. The Allies exacted a declaration of "benevolent neutrality" and intrenched themselves solidly on Greek soil. Germany poured out dire threats of reprisal for this concession to her enemies. But worst of all, Bulgaria showed a disposition to make her agreement to respect Greek territory a "scrap of paper." In such national crises leadership is everything, and Greece was afflicted with a leadership which was neither consistent nor courageous nor far-seeing. The spirit of the people was sound enough, but it was paralyzed by the pressure of a government which had enough force to be despotic, but not enough to uphold national rights against foreign aggression. Day by day it became clearer that the opportunity for Greece to protect her interests and satisfy her aspirations was receding, yet the government clung with frantic grip to its impossible doctrine of neutrality. The first blow fell when Germany, after solemnly assuring Greece that she would herself hold

Monastir, in Servia, turned that border city over to the forces of Bulgaria. Later the Bulgars, likewise in violation of pledges, crossed the northern frontier and occupied Greek forts; and the nation was stupefied by the discovery that this invasion was by consent, Athens having ordered the garrisons to evacuate the positions. Under the circumstances, the Allies wisely demanded demobilization of the army. It had been sent into the field for the announced purpose of resisting any Bulgarian violation of Greek territory; and when that aim was openly abandoned, its maintenance not only was a mockery, but might become a source of danger. The government sullenly yielded. After that the Bulgars threw aside all pretense. They have overrun all eastern Macedonia, the region of which they consider they were robbed by Greece, and have occupied fifty miles of the Aegean coast, including the port of Kavala.

King Constantine is entitled to all the fame which accrues to leaders who put expediency above honor, safety above justice. He has "kept his country out of war"; but it is a country bankrupt in finances and in prestige, torn by revolution, stripped of its rights and possessions, and doomed to be dragged at last, with meager hopes of reward, into a conflict which he bartered the nation's soul to avoid.

A REAL OFFENSIVE

September 12, 1916.

IN ESTIMATING the importance and effect of various war operations as they develop, the amateur observer has learned to be cautious, especially since military experts themselves have been so often at fault in their predictions. During the twenty-five months of fighting, so many "decisive" battles and campaigns have languished, leaving the general situation but little changed, that the average reader has become skeptical. Thus the cumulative reports of the Anglo-French offensive in Picardy, now in its eleventh week, while they have been followed with interest, have not made any unusual impression. So far as surface indications go, this movement seems to differ only in extent and continuity from the Champagne advance of a year ago, a victory which was really a defeat for the assailants. That sections of the most elaborately prepared intrenchments can be taken by either side, by sufficient preparation and expenditure of lives and ammunition, was demonstrated long ago. The vital question is whether this campaign has in it any novel factors, reveals any fundamental changes in conditions, promises any definite transformation.

It is still too early, of course, to pass final judgment, but every careful student will discern in the battle of the Somme unmistakable signs that the war has entered a new phase. If this great struggle is not yet decisive, it is significant. If it does not presage the collapse of

Germany, it marks definitely her loss of superiority to her adversaries. If it leaves Allied victory still undetermined, it makes German victory unthinkable and brings German disaster within the range of possibility. In all these aspects it differs from and overshadows any previous campaign on the western front, from the Marne to Verdun. In measuring the difference, the military events are not exclusively to be considered. The evidence will be found not alone in the reports of ground gained and prisoners taken, but in the varied signs of an augmented force and precision on one side, a diminished vigor and confidence and power of recuperation on the other. And the former change is no more striking than the latter. There was a certain element of surprise in the first assaults, and Germany was not at all shaken by the loss of positions in the opening clash.

A month later—that is, a month ago—they were still more assured. While trenches and villages had been yielded under pressure, the enemy's advance, they asserted, was being made at insupportable cost, and the force of his blows was perceptibly weakening. An American correspondent at the German headquarters made these inspired statements on August 12:

The critical stage of this gigantic operation has now definitely passed. The climax was reached on August 7 and 8. The much-advertised offensive has now spent its uttermost fury. Any further attempt by the English and French would mean wanton sacrifice of human lives. No new phase conceivable on this side of the line can make any possible impression on the German front. Enemy resources, human and otherwise, have been drained to the dregs. The campaign is a tragic failure.

"The offensive has been stopped," the German commander was quoted by another writer. "The crucial point has passed. They will keep on with their hopeless

task another month, perhaps, two. But a break thru my front is 'ausgeschossen'." In six weeks, wrote another, the Allies had recovered only fifty-eight of the 8000 square miles of German-held French territory. The offensive that had passed its climax, that had failed, is still in progress, and the unadorned facts suggest that its intensity is increasing rather than diminishing. The hardest blows since the beginning were delivered on September 3, September 4 and September 10. In three days of this month 7000 prisoners were taken, and the September total reported is above 12,000. Capture of many heavy guns shows that the German retirement is often hasty. Since July 1 the French and British have conquered more than thirty villages, every one of which had been transformed by German military science into a formidable stronghold. But the significance of the record lies less in these statistics than in the methods employed, the strategical results achieved and the unrelaxed grip of the Allies upon the initiative. Three important changes in tactics have been observed. First, of course, is the employment of heavy artillery for the chief work of reducing positions. This plan has been brought to such perfection that losses in the advance are greatly decreased. Infantry no longer assaults intrenchments; it merely occupies them after they have been devastated by shells. Second, the strongest positions, such as fortified villages, are not subjected to frontal attack, but to a double flanking by the driving of a wedge on either side; as these thrusts go deeper, the fortress becomes pocketed, and is readily reduced. Third, instead of the familiar device of attempting to crush in an enemy salient, the offensive forces make salients of their own; and then the aim, instead of forcing the point forward, is to widen it. The former

method might be compared to the operation of a pair of tongs; the latter, to the operation of a pair of scissors, thrust in and then wrenched open.

An additional point to be observed is that the British and French have no delusions about "breaking thru" the German front. Their purpose is not the impossible one of smashing that mighty line, but the rational one of wearing it thin, of keeping it under such a deadly and sustained grinding that ultimately it must be withdrawn to avert collapse. No less impressive than the unrelenting vigor of the offensive, however, are the evidences of a wavering of German confidence, of tremors of weakness in that superb military and political machine. All readers who recall the terse satisfaction, even arrogance, of the early official reports from Berlin, and the exultant descriptions of victory written by German correspondents, must be struck with the change of tone. Even official communications have a tone of what might be called wondering complaint; they speak of battles "of indescribable extent and ferocity," and describe artillery fire "exceeding all previous efforts." But the newspaper writers give free rein to their disconcerted feelings. "Never before," says one, "have such colossal instruments of homicide been assembled. In destructiveness and agony of effort the struggle surpasses anything in the history of human conflict." "Germans," says another, "are resisting the most terrible mauling, battering, grinding blows that have ever fallen on an army. It is a battle symphony of death. It is awful. It is appalling. The theological hell has no terrors for those who survive this inferno." While Germany was making a threshing-floor of Belgium and France she was moved to no such acknowledgments of the horrors of war, and it is at least suggestive that such expressions are being wrung from the nation now.

But there are more definite signs of weakness. The dismissal of Von Falkenhayn as chief of staff is one, and the almost superstitious acclaim that greeted the substitution of Von Hindenburg, as tho there were magic in his very name, is another. It is undeniable that the victor of Tannenberg is a great soldier; but it is equally true that he is the one commander who could order the line shortened—that is, territory surrendered—without creating a panic in the empire. The most significant item of all, however, is that virtually every foot of French soil reconquered from the invader has been held. The shrewdest test of the force and spirit of an army is its striking power in counter-attack—the celerity and impetuosity with which it wrests back ground once yielded. Here the Germans, on the Somme, have signally failed. Their resistance, while gallant and devoted, has not in it the power of effectual aggressive response. The world does not look for any sudden shattering of Germany's line, any spectacular breach in the wall of her defense. But it cannot mistake the evidence that henceforth her task is to endure punishment, not to inflict it, and that she is less fitted for one than for the other. She was defeated, experts have said, at the battle of the Marne. But she was to learn that fact at the battle of the Somme.

THE BATTLE OF DEMOCRACY

September 15, 1916.

AS WE watch the absorbing spectacle of the world war, and from time to time discuss its tremendous events, we are conscious of an increasing sense of hesitancy, an instinctive leaning toward conservatism in opinion. Upon the fundamental issues of the conflict one is secure in supporting the judgment of mankind; as to the final outcome there need be hardly more uncertainty. But two years of observation have taught all rational beings the folly of dogmatic assertion concerning other aspects of this mighty upheaval, and such are wary of positive generalizations and predictions. In the early days of the struggle discussion was more confidently assertive; we can almost envy the assurance with which we accounted for the first defeats and triumphs of the defenders of France. Comparing the French people of the third empire and of the republic of today, we said:

It is an axiom of political science that the most efficient system, particularly in war, is an intelligent autocracy. Such prodigious feats as Germany's swift mobilization and the irresistible drive toward Paris require the surrender of popular rights to a centralized power. Democracy is never so well prepared, never can mobilize so readily in full strength. But, on the other hand, autocracy must have victory to endure, while democracy can survive defeat. Autocracy is at its maximum of strength in the beginning; democracy, if not then overwhelmed, steadily increases its efficiency and striking power. Thus the military strength of France, despite enormous losses, is greater today than at any other time since the war started.

This was written on November 20, 1914, and the paragraph is resurrected now chiefly because it embodies a statement of principle that has been signally justified. The great fact about the war is that it is to decide whether autocracy or democracy shall guide the development of civilization, and at this very hour each is proving its worth, not only as a scheme of government, but as an effective system for preserving or advancing national ideals by force of arms. One may deplore the barbarous nature of the test, but that does not evade it. Under autocracy, war is an accepted probability of existence, to be studied, planned for, met with minute preparation and prosecuted from the beginning with merciless precision. Under democracy it is an almost incredible chance of evil, preparation for which, if not wholly neglected, is undertaken with languid or laggard interest. Yet in the end the fate of both rests upon the application of sheer force, upon skill and audacity and efficiency in the business of destruction. Each must stand or fall by the verdict of the battlefield. And that is no cloister for the presentation of fine-spun theory, however logical. The principle that seeks vindication there cannot hope to repulse assaults with arguments nor to refute cannon with declarations of belief. That which is being determined, then, is whether democracy can be efficient as well as true; whether in pursuing the ideals of peace and justice it necessarily loses the power to maintain itself against the terrible efficiency of its remorseless enemy. Events are answering now the challenge framed many months ago by a writer on behalf of Britain and France. "See which will crack first, our democracy or Prussianism, now that both have been plunged into the furnace together. The day of God's testing has come, and we shall see which can best abide it."

Autocracy has certain obvious advantages in war, aside from its power over its subjects, individually and in the mass. It is, as we have said before, answerable to no one—until the final settlement; its mistakes are covered up, its weaknesses concealed, its decisions subject to no inquiry. Democracy, on the other hand, must pay in blood and dissension for every blunder. It is the product of the common mind, and must answer to the common judgment for its delinquencies. When those charged with its administration fail, they must give way to better men, tho the change shakes the very foundations of confidence and creates disunion in a critical hour. These weaknesses have been manifested in a score of political upheavals and military disasters. Autocracy in Great Britain would never have allowed the nation to drug itself into false security and confront a sudden peril unarmed. Autocracy in France would not have neglected to pile up adequate ammunition reserves, nor permitted cabinets to be disrupted in the face of the enemy. It would not have sacrificed scores of thousands of lives to incompetent leadership at the Dardanelles and Bagdad. It would be incapable of such indolence and inefficiency as are reported from India, where sick and wounded soldiers have been allowed to suffer and die in remote encampments without even decent care. On the other hand, autocracy in these countries could not have withstood the staggering shock of defeat and disillusion; it could not have fashioned victory from the elements of discord and neglect and inexperience; it could not have transformed a national spirit of fierce individualism into a devoted, self-sacrificing patriotism; it could not have called into being that implacable will to be free, which is intensified by delay and invigorated by disaster.

What is the message that the thunderous echoes from the Somme convey? It is that what autocracy

accomplished in forty years, democracy has achieved in two; that all the mighty preparations of the one during four decades have been overtaken and surpassed by the efforts of the other in twenty months. A great host rolling in resistless waves across Belgium and France, every detail of transportation, supply and tactical movement perfectly co-ordinated in harmony with pre-existing plans—that is autocracy in war. A few divisions of British troops flung hastily in the path of the advance, to stay with their bodies the tidal wave of invasion; a French army, loyally disciplined, but unequally prepared, fighting in gallant yet almost hopeless retreat; then the sudden stiffening of the line, the swift onslaught of a hidden army—15,000 troops dashing into battle in taxicabs!—the miraculous achievement at the Marne and the beginning of the long, desperate war of trenches; two years of patience, of iron endurance, of incredible labor, and then the revelation of vast new armies, of inexhaustible supplies, of devastating power, of a spirit of victory that nothing can withstand—that is democracy in war.

In the beginning, Germany's superiority in every department of military science and equipment was overpowering; thus far autocracy had justified itself. But once the initial drive had been halted and the defenses made secure, it was certain that in time the genius of democracy would turn the scale. It filled the depleted ranks as fast as they were emptied. It created new armies, not only summoning millions of men by right, but drawing them from the ends of the earth in free-will response. It built up gigantic industrial activities, reorganized the forces of labor, drafted a million women into the ranks of production. It devised guns that dominate the mightiest products of Krupp, ranged them in a barrier of steel from the sea to the Swiss frontier, and heaped up behind them such mountainous supplies of

ammunition that the torrent of destructive fire upon the enemy never ceases. And this was done while the invader held in his grasp nine-tenths of the ore-producing and metal-working territory of the defenders.

Democracy's weaknesses in the earlier stages of a war are obvious. It is contented with itself, careless and skeptical. Its counsels are confused and embittered by dissension. Its spirit is often stolid when it should be eager, and querulous when it should be calm. Its energies are dissipated in contention and wasted thru inefficiency. But suffering and adversity change all that. Democracy learns, grows in stature, mobilizes the common strength into one cohesive force and directs it by the power of universal purpose. So there comes a day when autocracy has done all that it can do, when the doctrine of the superman is revealed as a myth, and the contest emerges as one between two systems of government, two ideals of the human soul. Then the expanding vigor of an aroused and disciplined democracy declares itself, strikes and strikes again with ever-increasing power and carries its cause steadily toward triumph. This is the transformation that the startled world witnesses today in France. In the forefront of that stupendous battle for civilization, shining thru the murk of death like the white plume of Navarre or the oriflamme of St. Denis, it is the standard of democracy that is carrying the hopes of mankind to victory.

ISHMAEL AWAKES

September 19, 1916.

IT WOULD be an extravagance, we suppose, to say that a sixteenth nation has entered the war because certain tribes of Arabia have declared their independence from the Turks. But it is a picturesque and not unimportant circumstance that that land of forgotten history, source of one of the great religions of mankind, has been caught into the current of the world conflict, and that its fortunes are involved, no one knows how deeply, with those of the great belligerents representing a newer civilization. As a fact, tremendous interests hang on the result of obscure skirmishes in the vast deserts beyond the Red sea, and one may profitably spare a glance from the mighty struggles in Europe for this upheaval in the birthplace of Islam. There are no special correspondents at the headquarters of the grand shereef of Mecca, commander-in-chief of the insurgent people. This is a loss to the world, for the glimpses we have had of that political ecclesiastic, who combines in his person spiritual and military leadership and the office of mayor of the holy city, reveal him as a man of parts. "You are an ignorant youth," was the calm dismissal he uttered a few months ago to Enver Pasha. Strong words to fling in the teeth of the man who dominates the Turkish throne in behalf of his great patron, the kaiser; one can imagine the Oriental scorn of the turbaned, graybeard ruler, seated in the city whence the Moslem philosophy went forth to conquer, for the suave,

frock-coated intriguer who had made the commander of the faithful the vassal of an infidel sovereign. But a keener point is that this descendant of Mohammed—thru Fatima, the prophet's favorite daughter—is making good his sentence in the field. The revolution, which began early last June, has already overturned Turkish rule in Mecca, where the founder of Islam was born; in Medina, where he died; in Jiddah, the Red sea port thru which scores of thousands of world pilgrims pass to and from the holy places every year, and in other coast cities.

Politics and religion are inextricably intermingled in Oriental affairs, and both elements are equally prominent in this portentous drama of the desert. The main reason for the uprising is that the Arabs, who have never tolerated more than nominal rule by Turkey, and that only because of an historic claim by the sultan to leadership of Islam, consider that the tie has been broken by Turkey's submission to Germany. Foreseeing the collapse of the Osmanli power in Europe, they are fired with the vision of a restoration of the glories of an Arabian empire; a revival of the days when Saracenic law and faith held sway over Syria, Palestine, Persia, Egypt, northern Africa and Spain. How much of this feeling is due to religious zeal and how much to the diplomacy of Germany's antagonists cannot be known. But in any event it is ominous for Turkey that the chief bond holding together her shaking empire has been severed by the people whose religion has been the source of all her power. Aspiration toward liberty is with the Arabs a birthright, a fundamental racial characteristic, not the product of evolution or enlightenment. They trace the lineage of the greater part of their race to Ishmael, and that child of the desert they venerate as the eldest and favorite son of Abraham. The Bedouin may be taken as the unchanged descendant of the youth

whose "hand was against every man." Certainly the Arabs represent the Semitic race in its purest form.

Arabian history begins fifteen centuries before Christ. While the country was subjected to foreign invasion and interminable tribal wars, it was never wholly subjugated, and in the seventh century it was to become itself a world power. Mohammed, prophet of a faith whose adherents, thirteen centuries after his death, were to number 200,000,000, conquered the entire peninsula within ten years by the sheer power of an idea judiciously enforced by arms. He was of the influential tribe of Koreish, centered in Mecca, and the city of his birth inevitably became a place of pilgrimage. It had been, indeed, a community of holiness from time immemorial, and the prophet, like many other religious innovators, took over and adapted to his own creed the visible equipment of the paganism which he overthrew. The Kaaba, that strange cubical structure which stands in the mosque and is the chief sanctuary of Islam, was a temple of idolatry; and its holiest relic, the black stone set in a corner of the wall, while venerated as a gift from the Angel Gabriel to Abraham, is really a meteorite which generations of pre-Islamic heathen had worshiped. But behind and beyond these superstitions there was in the teachings of Mohammed a force that was to sway the minds of unnumbered human beings. Islam embodied above all things a militant faith, and for many stirring years carried on the conversion of the world by the sword. East and west swept the tide of conquest, until Mecca had become the capital of a religious empire extending from the islands of the Pacific across Asia, Africa and Europe to the Atlantic. The fact which links this mighty religious movement of the Dark Ages to the world war of the twentieth century is that the chief authority in Islam has centered in the caliphate, of

which the sultan of Turkey, ally of the kaiser and enemy of Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, is the present de facto holder. A glance at the complicated matter of succession will explain the revolt against him.

Of Mohammed's successors, the first four are known to the faithful as the "perfect" caliphs, in that they represented the pure ideals of the faith, and under them (632-661 A. D.) Islam extended its sway over vast territories. Their capital was Medina. But inevitably the rulership became the prize of ambition and factionalism, and the faith of Mohammed eventually was divided into more sects than trouble even Christianity. Under the Ommiad caliphs (661-750) the wave of Moslem conquest rolled over northern Africa and Spain, and would have submerged what now is France, had it not been arrested by Charles Martel in 732. The Ommiad capital was Damascus, but from 756 to 1031 an independent line of twenty-two caliphs reigned at Cordova, while another branch was recognized and protected by the rulers of Egypt until the sixteenth century. To the orthodox Ommiads succeeded the Abbassid dynasty, thirty-seven representatives of the line having their seat at Bagdad. After five centuries, the last of these was overthrown in 1258 by the Mongol invaders, precursors of the Turks, who came out of central Asia to adopt the religion of the Arabs and extinguish the civilization which was Arabia's gift to the most benighted age of the world.

It is singular to reflect that to the Arab, whom most of us picture as a sort of picturesque savage, compounded of barbarism, superstition and hopeless ignorance, the world owes priceless services. Arabian philosophers, jurists, theologians, historians, mathematicians, poets and astronomers were producing literature and enlarging the bounds of science when most of Europe

was in darkness. There were schools at Bagdad, Cordova and Cairo where the translated works of the Greek philosophers were expounded, and these themselves sent forth treatises that were studied for generations in western seats of learning. The library at Cairo contained 6000 works on astronomy. In Cordova there were eighty Moslem schools and a collection of half a million volumes, and to this day the glories of the Moorish era are reflected in the relics of its wonderful architecture. But the very spread of the Moslem faith thruout the world had operated to reduce the importance of its birth-place, and Arabia sank rapidly to the rank of a fourth-rate power, then to an unconsidered region of neglect. The Turks, who had national cohesion as well as military power, made themselves the political masters of Islam and created by the sword an empire which covered western Asia, southeastern Europe and northern Africa. Then, at the height of their power, in the sixteenth century, they made secure for long years their domination of the Mohammedan world. Sultan Selim I, after mastering Persia and Kurdistan, extended his sway over Egypt, and there, in 1517, the last descendant of the Abbassid caliphs—which had been exiled from Bagdad in 1258—solemnly invested the Osmanli sovereign with the title of caliph for himself and his successors. For just four centuries, then, the sultan of Turkey has been titular “commander of the faithful.” While the Arabs have given to him little more than nominal allegiance politically, they have for the most part recognized his spiritual authority; first, because Turkey was the leading Mohammedan state, and, second, because it was the guardian of Mecca and Medina, the shrines of the Prophet. What veneration they had for the vicegerent of Allah was dissipated, however, by the spectacle of Turkey revolving as a bewildered satellite in the system

of Teutonic ambition. "Our aim," says the sententious grand shereef of Mecca, "is the preservation of Islam," and his followers thrill to the summons of a Pan-Arab movement that is to make Mecca the center of a real Moslem empire.

This is, of course, a fantastic vision. There is no solidarity in Islam, nor ever will be; and the Arabians, hardy as they are, have not the capacity for united action beyond the boundaries of tribal loyalty. The spirit of Ishmael still sways their minds and souls. There is a grim poetic justice in the fact that the "holy war," which Germany boasted she would use to destroy her enemies has had its only manifestation in a religious uprising that threatens to destroy her ally. The ferment among the Arabs, which constitutes merely an episode in the world upheaval, may well have far-reaching results. Months hence we are likely to learn that the diplomacy of Great Britain has inspired the expulsion of the Turks, and that a caliphate seated in Mecca, with British agents supervising the pilgrimages thru Damascus and Jiddah, will signify the doom of Germany's Asiatic ambitions, the final extinction of Turkish power and the establishment of a protectorate by the most Christian nation over the land which gives law to the hosts of the Prophet.

AMERICAN WEAPONS IN THE WAR

September 23, 1916.

DURING the earlier period of the war its developments had fascination not only because of their extent, but because of their novelty. Besides involving military operations on a scale of unprecedented magnitude, twentieth-century warfare was revealed as a new science, with methods and devices which had never been employed before in actual combat, some of which had been unknown except to their originators. The aeroplane and the submarine, to mention only two, were to have their first real tests. But in its later stages the struggle produced nothing exceptional. Apparently it had become a contest in endurance and productive capacity, with the element of surprise largely eliminated. There was a genuine thrill, therefore, in the appearance the other day of an innovation that shattered the routine of offensive and defensive trench warfare. The familiar idea of the armored motorcar had been secretly developed, and suddenly the battlefield was invaded by a new death-dealing monster. One can imagine the excitement caused by the apparition of the great gray things as they lurched thru the mists of dawn and the battle smoke—swaying and plunging, grunting and straining over the shell-torn earth, stumbling into craters and ponderously heaving themselves out again, plowing thru swamps and crawling over gaping trenches and battering down walls with their steel snouts—all the while ejecting devastating streams

of bullets from their sides while themselves impervious to assaults. The Germans had had their Zeppelins and poison gas, the French their terrible "soixante-quinze" guns and bomb catapults, but here was something new from the British side. John Bull, the conservative, plodding worshiper of tradition, had at last startled his competitors by a feat of pioneering. And it is no more than just to say that he deserves credit for his imaginative ingenuity in transforming a well-known device into a formidable engine of war.

But the interesting point to us is that the only novelty was the combination of armor plate and machine guns with a familiar machine. The essential part of the new crawling fortress is the American caterpillar tractor, thousands of which are in daily and peaceful use in the United States. The terrifying monster of the battlefield is but a modification of a device which millions of Americans have seen at work, from digging ditches and hauling whole trains of laden trucks for big contractors to plowing the great wheat fields of the middle west. We emphasize this fact, not because it is unique, but because it is typical of a condition which few Americans realize—and never will, if they wait for European nations to advertise it. This is the circumstance that the belligerents owe to American invention virtually all the more effective weapons they are using in this war. It would be unworthy, perhaps, to exult in such a tribute to this nation's genius, but none the less it is instructive to glance at the record.

One might begin at the beginning of modern naval equipment, and recall that steam navigation was made practicable by John Fitch on the Delaware river and commercially successful on the Hudson by Robert Fulton, who was born in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania. The first ocean steamship voyage was made from New

York to Philadelphia, by John Stevens' Phenix, in 1807, and Fulton built, for the United States navy, the first war vessel propelled by steam power. Men still young can recall the death of John Ericsson, Swedish-American, whose screw propeller revolutionized navigation and who built for this country the first screw-driven warship in the world. But if these things seem too elementary, let us inquire where mankind got its chief military and naval defenses and weapons. Floating batteries were used as early as the siege of Gibraltar, in 1782; but it was Stephens—whose son founded the famous institute of technology in Hoboken—who made the first practicable proposal for an armored steam vessel. This was in 1812, and the idea was too advanced for the time. An American warship of the new type was first laid down in 1854, but even then was not completed, and the French launched the first iron-hulled armorclad, about 1858. It was Ericsson who gave to naval warfare the revolutionary device of the revolving turret; the idea was offered to Napoleon III in 1854, but had its first real demonstration on the ever-memorable Monitor, eight years later. While this vessel was not strictly a seagoing warship, but rather a floating battery, its engagement with the Merrimac opened a new era in naval history by proving conclusively the value of protective armor and the revolving turret. The naval mine and torpedo, which Germany has boasted would bring her victory, were American in conception and development. In 1775 Captain David Bushnell failed by a hair's-breadth to blow up an English warship by attaching a mine to a submerged part of its hull. Fulton experimented in this direction in France, and in 1801, as a demonstration, sank a vessel by means of an underwater torpedo. Samuel Colt, of Connecticut, devised the electrically exploded mine for harbor defense, and a Phila-

delphian, Rear Admiral John Cumming Howell, first applied the principle of the gyroscope to the automatic guidance of the torpedo.

What of the submarine, which is the chief reliance of one of the belligerents in sea strategy? While navigation under water had been accomplished in crude fashion long before, the first undoubted success was made by Bushnell, for it was in a primitive submarine propelled by foot power—a sort of undersea pushmobile—that he approached that frigate of King George's in the effort to blow a hole in her oaken planks. Fulton, too, was a foster parent of the submarine, for he navigated under the surface of the Seine for the edification of Napoleon Bonaparte and launched a torpedo successfully from his ingenious craft, the Nautilus. It was Fulton who perfected the first effective steering attachments and the first safe artificial device of air supply. During the civil war the Confederates used spar torpedoes from submarine boats with conspicuous success. Finally, the modern submarine may be said to have originated in the experiments of John P. Holland and Simon Lake forty years ago, for they first demonstrated efficient methods of propulsion and control of the vessels.

No weapon has been more vital in the present operations than the aeroplane; and while mechanical flight by heavier-than-air machines had been studied for centuries, the problem was solved by Americans. The father of aviation was Professor S. P. Langley, of the Smithsonian Institution, who put forth basic new ideas of flight in 1891, and two years later startled the world by sending a model "aerodrome" on a flight of three-quarters of a mile. By 1903 he had developed a machine which was capable of carrying a man, but the demonstrations were marred by accidents, the

experiments had to be abandoned for lack of funds, and the inventor died unhonored for his splendid achievement. Within five years of his unfortunate failure man had conquered the air. On September 9, 1908, Orville Wright, at Fort Myer, Va., flew for fifty-seven minutes, and a few days later, in France, his brother Wilbur remained in the air for an hour and a half, covering fifty-six miles. After the triumph of these young Americans, the evolution of the present aeroplane, with its astounding feats, was only a matter of developing the principles they had demonstrated. Warfare on the sea, under the sea and in the air owes much, therefore, to American inventive skill. But perhaps the most striking item in the record is that the machine gun, which in modern operations on land is second in importance only to heavy artillery projecting high explosives, is in its most effective form a thoroly American product. The only type of machine gun used by the British in their first line today is the Lewis gun, which a high official in the government has declared to be "the envy of all Europe." The inventor, Colonel Isaac N. Lewis, U. S. A., retired, is a Pennsylvanian, now living in New Jersey.

Those who feel that the Allies are, as they declare, "fighting America's battles," may take comfort in the fact that they are doing it with American weapons.

WHEN THE WAR WAS WON

September 26, 1916.

MANKIND'S remembrance of this war will be studded with anniversaries of significant or spectacular events—the ultimatum to Belgium, the fall of Liège, of Namur, of Maubeuge, of Longwy; the conquest of Servia, the defense of Verdun, a hundred sanguinary battles on land and sea, a score of stupendous campaigns. But none of them, unless it be the final combat that will be the prelude to peace, will occupy a more lustrous page in history than that which the French, with characteristically clear perception, commemorated recently as the sure signal of victory. This was the series of engagements known as the battle of the Marne, fought September 6-12, 1914.

At that time the sudden and dramatic change in the tidal currents of the war sent a thrill thruout the world; it even aroused extravagant hopes that the menace to Europe was to collapse as swiftly as it had arisen, and that the invaders were about to be flung back upon their own soil. Yet in time it passed out of common recollection, except as a convenient phrase. The unending fury of trench warfare, the terrific offensives of the defeated Germans, the vast operations in Russia, the Balkans and Asia, caused the startling reversal to recede in interest, until to most inexperienced students of the conflict it became only a striking incident with no more than local and temporary significance. Yet the recent national celebration by France was just and logical. It

forecasts the judgment of posterity, which will be that the great European war was won and lost two years ago this month—hardly six weeks after it began—and that the stupefying slaughter which ensued, and which must continue no one knows how long, is but the methodical registering by fate of a decision then irrevocably rendered. The star of German victory, which had led the hosts of the empire in their exultant, rushing advance, was extinguished in the reddened waters of the Marne. This fact, we say, has been obscured by the glamour of succeeding events. Yet while there were many who, like ourselves, grasped by a vague intuition the meaning of the encounter, there were those of deeper knowledge and better-trained vision who proclaimed the truth and expounded it convincingly even in those doubtful days. Early in 1915, when the military superiority of Germany over her enemies was being constantly demonstrated, a book on the strategic developments of the “first phase” of the war was written by Count Charles de Souza, a noted French commentator. The title was “Germany in Defeat,” and the theme—or rather the conclusion which the facts as stated unerringly supported—was thus summarized by a British expert in his introduction:

Germany was defeated at the Marne. She has been a defeated nation ever since. * * * France not only bore the onrush of Germany's legions with consummate strategic ability, but she came within an ace of crushing the German armies on Belgian soil; and within a few weeks had not only stalled off the German attack, but had defeated the German arms in a series of battles that decided the destinies of European civilization.

Even now, after the earlier events of the war have fallen into something like their true perspective, this is a staggering conception, for it implies that all those colossal struggles that have since taken place in France,

in Poland, in Servia, in Asia Minor and beyond, have been inconsequential, so far as concerns the ultimate result—that the issue was decided within forty days of the beginning. It is interesting to piece together again the kaleidoscopic happenings of those tumultuous days and examine the fateful design which the experts see in them. It is a commonplace that success of the plan framed by Germany during her years of preparation required the elimination of France by a series of swift, crushing blows; unless the armies of the republic could be scattered or destroyed before the slow-moving might of Russia was in full action and before other possible allies could effectually intervene, Germany would face, her strategists knew, the slow strangulation of a siege. This condition dictated the “military necessity” of the perfidious violation of Belgium. There has been, therefore, a virtually universal belief that this crime was the first step in an elaborately planned rush to capture Paris—that the Germans chose to dishonor a treaty and devastate the territory of a helpless neighbor in order to avoid the costly operation of hacking a way thru the strong frontier defenses of France between Belgium and Switzerland. But the French expert offers a quite different exposition, and supports it by impressive arguments. Liège was attacked on August 5, and the action was commonly accepted as the first preliminary to a sweep thru France. And yet, altho several army corps were within striking distance and inactive, it was not until August 20 that Namur was invested. There was nothing to prevent an overwhelming advance on Brussels on the very hour that Liège fell. Yet for nearly two weeks the mighty German forces skirmished and feinted and maneuvered in Belgium, and the world was led to believe that they were being held impotent by the heroic little army of the Belgians. The more plausible explanation

neither relieves Germany of the odium of her invasion nor dims the glory of Belgium's sacrifice. It is simply that the Germans were in no hurry to reach French soil by that route; that, on the contrary, they planned that the crown prince should pierce the French center and march in triumph to Paris thru Rheims—after the French and British had been lured into Belgium, trapped and destroyed. This plan failed because Joffre refused to strip the center of troops for an adventure into Belgium, but did make such spirited advances there that the Germans believed their invitation to battle on their own ground had been accepted. Thus it was that the crown prince found the central gateway to the west barred against him; thus it was that the Germans were finally impelled to make their principal inroads into France thru Belgium; and thus it was that there began that stupendous movement, like the swinging of a gigantic whip, the extremity of which snapped viciously at Paris, missed it by a hair's-breadth and then recoiled far from the capital.

In such a brief survey as this we cannot even note the series of historic encounters that made up the tragedy and glory of the Anglo-French retirement. The German advance was seemingly as resistless as the tides. They had limitless forces of men, overpowering superiority in guns, remorseless efficiency and a driving sense of victory. Few impartial observers could foresee a check. Yet day by day Joffre was giving ground by intention as well as because of pressure; day by day he was waiting for the position to develop which would give him an opening for a crashing blow. The time came none too soon. The French government had left Paris, and the fall of the capital, where the guns of the invader could be plainly heard, seemed imminent. The German right, under Von Kluck, was sweeping down upon it

swiftly. But Joffre knew, and the Germans knew, that the storming of Paris was an impossibility, its investment would be folly, while the French armies, virtually intact, remained in the field. The essential objective of that mighty rush was not the sentimental triumph of a seizure of the capital, but the decisive achievement of an overwhelming of the republic's armed forces. This explains the historic swerve of Von Kluck, who suddenly wheeled his army to the southeast, leaving Paris on his right, and launched an attack against the French and British at the left center of the line, which then stretched from Paris to Verdun. The answer was Joffre's terse order of September 6, in which he told his battered but undaunted legions that "the time has passed for looking behind," that an advance was necessary, and that every group would be expected to "keep the ground conquered or die upon it." Then it was that the army hidden behind Paris fell upon Von Kluck's flank; that General Gallieni put a grim jest into military history by speeding 15,000 troops to the battlefields in taxicabs; that Von Kluck extricated his forces only by extraordinary suppleness and because the French corps on the extreme left attacked too precipitately; that the French and British forgot the miseries of retreat in the fierce joys of pursuit, and by sheer fighting power rolled the German armies back seventy miles from the imperiled capital. The popular idea still is that the defeat of Von Kluck "saved Paris"; but as a fact the vital action was in the center, where General Foch overthrew the ablest strategists Germany could put into the field.

Plainly, these and other actions along the line were not "decisive," in that they did not end the war. But they were conclusive in the sense that they shattered beyond resurrection the German plan; that they pinned the German forces to a line of trenches where for two

years they have been compelled to stay while their enemies collected overwhelming forces; and that they marked the beginning of the siege of Germany. The kaiser's troops went from Liège to the outskirts of Paris in thirty days; but for twenty times that period, since the battle of the Marne, they have been held immovable, awaiting execution of the sentence there passed against them. According to a familiar judgment, there have been fifteen decisive battles in the history of the world. Among the most noted were: Marathon, where the Persian wave of conquest was shattered; Chalons, a thousand years later, where the hordes of Attila were checked; Tours, in the eighth century, which turned back the Arab incursion; Hastings, which established Norman civilization in Britain; the defeat of the Spanish armada, which created a new maritime power; Blenheim, where the domination of Louis XIV was broken; Saratoga, the turning point in the war for American independence; Valmy, which confirmed the French revolution, and Waterloo, the end of the Napoleonic era. The list was framed before Gettysburg had saved the great republic of the west from disruption. And now must be added the battle of the Marne, where the democracy of Europe rose victorious from defeat and rescued civilization from enslavement to brute force.

ISOLATING AMERICA

September 28, 1916.

GERMAN hatred of the United States, inspired by the military party for political purposes and fostered thru the utterances of the controlled press, has been one of the familiar phenomena of the war. The work of creating anti-American feeling has been done so thoroly that in the remotest corners of the empire there is universal animosity toward this country. The extent and bitterness of the feeling are reflected in the propaganda of German sympathizers here, who denounce the American government and people as enemies of their fatherland. Far less widely recognized is the fact that in Great Britain and France there exists a like feeling of unfriendliness, which, altho not so unreasoning and venomous, is daily becoming more deeply rooted and more vigorous in expression. To the "average" American such a sentiment is baffling. He has assumed that the people of those countries would be gratified by the circumstance that an overwhelming majority of this nation is opposed to Prussianism and identifies the cause of the Allies with that of democracy and international justice. It has seemed to him, further, that the intemperate and often malignant anti-Americanism which finds voice in Germany must make her enemies feel a sense of comradeship with the United States. This comforting conception is quite erroneous. Both in England and in France this country is regarded with cold aversion, and the public opinion of those nations is stead-

ily developing unreserved hostility. Every returning American brings the same story. In business circles the atmosphere of enmity is unmistakable, and among the masses of the people the feeling is so pronounced that the dullest stage clown can raise a jeering laugh by a gibe at the expense of the United States. Official England, of course, is scrupulously careful to avoid unfriendly utterances; it would be folly to irritate needlessly a powerful neutral nation. Thus the diplomatic fiction of cordiality is maintained, but in private conversation members of the government express themselves in terms that are not less effective because they are veiled under polite restraint.

It is difficult for one who has not experienced the sentiment to understand how it could have attained such widespread proportions, in view of American sympathy with the Allies' cause, which manifested itself at the very beginning of the war and has since gained in force despite the organized efforts to undermine it. And this sympathy has been expressed in the most practical manner—in vast contribution to works of relief and charity; in overwhelming defeat by public opinion of proposals to interfere with the supplying of the Allies' armies; even in the enlistment of thousands of citizens of this country under their banners. American youths by the score are driving French war ambulances and risking their lives in France's air battles. Hundreds of Americans have lost their lives in her foreign legion. And recently a whole battalion of native-born Americans went from Canada to join Britons, Australians, Irishmen and Canadians in the trenches. What, then, is the cause of this extraordinary aversion? Upon what charges or misconceptions is it based? The critics say, first, that this nation is "mercenary"; not only has it exultantly turned to enormous profit the sufferings of

Europe, but it submitted to the murder of some of its own citizens, while rousing itself to anger when a cargo of copper was delayed in a prize court. America, they aver, is a Shylock among nations, and they cite the action of bankers in exacting excessive terms for loans to nations fighting for their lives and for civilization. They even sneer at it as cowardly, in that its government has shrunk from the elementary duty of protecting the lives and rights of its citizens. But such criticisms emanate from a limited class in France and England, from men who are students of national policies and tendencies. Far more deadly is the sentiment which pervades the masses—which the man in the street expresses, which music hall audiences savagely cheer, which the very children echo. And, strangely enough, this popular sentiment is not the result of any action by the government or people of the United States; it is the product of utterances by President Wilson. Of this there can be no doubt, because it finds constant expression in repetitions of his lamentable phrases.

“Too proud to fight”—who can measure the evil caused by that shameful implication which fell so glibly from the presidential lips? Consider the circumstances under which it was uttered. More than a hundred Americans, men, women and little children, had just been slaughtered on the *Lusitania*, and the whole world, aghast at the horror of the deed of blood, looked for a declaration that would fitly voice the just wrath of the American people and their determination to exact justice. And this was the response. But the shock to believers in the American spirit was less injurious than the incredible affront to the anguished peoples of Europe. That was in May, 1915. Great Britain, her original army almost destroyed, was raising new forces that tore gaps in millions of families, and sending them into the

terrors of an unequal conflict. France, bleeding from a thousand wounds, was throwing her very soul into the task of withstanding a ruthless invasion. And the same voice that had advised us to be "neutral even in thought" and had boasted of America's "self-possession" loftily admonished the stricken nations that a righteous pride might have saved them from their folly. If they felt a contempt for a country that could neither avenge its dead nor protect its living, what must have been their emotions upon receiving from it this taunt?

Yet they were not suffered even to believe that their motives were conceded to be just or their cause worthy of sympathy. "With the causes and issues of this war," said President Wilson, "we have no concern." He said this at a time when Belgium lay prostrate, the victim of dishonored faith; when international law had been trampled to fragments; when the people of France and of Britain and Ireland and Canada were enduring unspeakable sacrifices for the cause to which they had pledged themselves; when millions of women were sending their husbands, their brothers, their sons into the dreadful ordeal of battle. Men discuss, not unjustly, the commercial aspects of modern war, the policies which create and prolong conflicts for purposes of trade aggrandizement. But who can contemplate the immeasurable sacrifices and unfathomable griefs of those peoples and charge to them—those who go forth to die and those who remain to mourn—any motive of sordidness? They fight and suffer for their ideals, for preservation of their liberties, for the sanctity of law—and, they profoundly believe, for the rights of humanity and the security of institutions which are fundamental to the life of America itself. And they are mocked with the declaration that none of these things is America's concern. Moreover, lest the abandonment happily should

be forgotten, the president was moved to give it a new emphasis. When the spirit of devotion and sacrifice had been intensified and the losses had become more terrible, he referred lightly to the "war madness" of Europe, and deftly pictured those peoples as the victims of sanguinary delusion.

To these three utterances may be traced that sentiment of searching condemnation which has been passed upon this nation by the French and British people. To this every intelligent American who has studied the matter at first hand will testify. Paul D. Cravath, a well-known New Yorker, said on his return from Europe the other day that the French and British believe they are fighting the battle of civilization, and deeply resent the announcement that the United States is indifferent to the cause and its outcome. Even more explicit and convincing is the finding of James M. Beck, the eminent lawyer and writer, whose recent visit to Europe, because of his high repute and the reception given to him, had almost the force of a diplomatic mission. He was cordially thanked for having enlightened his audiences by convincing them that this country had been misrepresented; that the spirit of Americanism was not dead, not sordid, not indifferent to the moral and spiritual significance of the issues in this conflict. Yet he could reach only a few, and he was impressed by the well-nigh universal existence of adverse opinion. As to the causes, his experience left him in no doubt. He says that everywhere he found evidence that Europe's hostile judgment of the United States was due most to President Wilson's three deplorable statements—that a nation may be "too proud to fight," that America has "no concern" with the causes and issues of the war, and that Europeans are afflicted with "war madness."

Standing alone, the foreign policy of the administration would be enough to create abroad a skepticism as to the worth of American expressions of idealism; but diplomatic issues are always debatable, and time would soften the world's judgment. Standing alone, the president's three utterances will have a more lasting sinister effect, because they have imbedded themselves in the memories of millions to whom international policies are mere abstractions. But when the two things are combined—when the administration's acts are studied with the president's declarations, each illuminating the other—one may well despair of a rehabilitation of this country's repute. Peace will make the task more hopeless. For those peoples will come out of the furnace of conflict with higher conceptions of duty and loftier ideals of conduct, more than ever convinced that they endured its torments in the cause of justice, of civilization, of humanity. And who can doubt that, as they contemplate anew the record and the sentiments fastened upon this nation by its chief spokesman, their scorn will become fixed, an invisible but terrible barrier between their spirit and ours.

THE BATTLE OF DECISION

September 29, 1916.

A YEAR and a half ago, when the German intrenchments in the west were being subjected to frequent attacks, which then seemed of impressive importance, General Joffre remarked lightly that he was "just nibbling." The phrase implied that the really important operations would take "bites" out of that formidable line, and the first demonstration of that process is now to be observed. The steel jaws of the Anglo-French war machine have bitten a twenty-mile semicircle out of the territory held by the invader, and are sinking deeper and deeper into his defenses. The daily dispatches give the impression of stupendous activity, and, as a fact, the battles of the Somme campaign excel in magnitude and fury all other combats. Yet on the map the accomplishment of three months looks absurdly small. Less than one-twentieth of the line has changed in position, and the seventy square miles taken is but a tiny patch in the vast provinces that have been in the grasp of the enemy for two years. If the occupied parts of Belgium and France had to be reconquered at this rate, it would be years before the invader was expelled. The results, however, are not to be computed merely in terms of the advances made. The campaign has a far broader significance, in that it marks a new phase in the war, in which is revealed not only Germany's loss of the initiative and of offensive strength, but a definite decline in her powers of resistance.

It cannot be observed too often that the object is not to cut the line by a desperate thrust at one point, but to keep it under such continuous, unendurable pressure that it must eventually weaken, necessitating a withdrawal upon a much wider front. Success of the drive will depend not upon the number of trenches or fortified villages actually conquered, but upon the extent of territory surrendered by a forced retirement. Capture of a single base might conceivably compel evacuation of half a province. Aside from this, the results thus far are impressive. Beginning on July 1, the French and British have advanced on a front of twenty miles for from two to eight miles; they have taken scores of miles of trenches, in many places passing the third line of defense; upward of thirty-five fortified villages and towns, every one of which had been transformed into a fortress with elaborate subterranean citadels; large numbers of guns, vast stores of supplies and 60,000 prisoners. Their early difficulties were the worst, because they had to fight their way up to heights bristling with deadly defenses; having gained those, their guns command enemy positions on lower ground. They have reduced the fighting strength of their opponents by not less than a quarter of a million men. And they have carried pivotal points, like Thiepval and Combles, whose capture threatens the German hold upon a wide region. These great accomplishments, however, are of less importance than is the proof which they afford that behind the offensive is a definite superiority. The Germans have concentrated on the Somme front 1,000,000 men and the most powerful array of artillery they can collect. Their troops are brave, their strategists resourceful, their defenses the product of their ablest military scientists. Yet every attack during two months has been carried thru to success.

Study of the situation on the German side, as indicated in the developments and the dispatches recounting them, shows striking evidences of diminishing powers. Over a wide front the first great system of defenses—the trenches and dugouts of reinforced concrete, the massive blockhouses and elaborate entanglements, created during two years of unremitting effort—has been lost, and the invaders have only such protection as is afforded by intrenchments hastily constructed under fire. In many instances the fighting has been in the open, a return to the methods of former wars. The failure to remove huge stores of ammunition and supplies from Combles, the certain fall of which was long foreshadowed, shows astonishing indecision or lack of foresight on the part of the German staff. And there is evidence in the official reports even of a sense of confusion and despair. The most convincing fact, however, is that the once terrible German counter-attack is no longer effective. For two months the French and British have ceaselessly assaulted and intermittently advanced, and not yet has one foot of the ground conquered by them been retaken. It is not necessarily prophetic, but it is significant, that rumors of an extensive retirement have arisen.

It did not need the campaign of the Somme to prove that any field intrenchments, however strong, can be taken if the assailants have enough artillery power and can stand the necessary losses. Hence it is not the actual gains made, but the continuity and undiminished vigor of the advance that are ominous for the invaders. This is, by accounts from both sides, immeasurably the most terrific struggle in all history; yet, after three months, its fierceness is unabated, is even increasing. A fortnight ago the opinion came from Berlin: "Even if Germany's opponents have not been weakened, a con-

tinuance of the attacks with their former intensity is impossible, because the Anglo-French offensive, especially last week, cost them so heavily." And since then the Allies have taken Thiepval, Combles and a dozen other fortified places, and have thrust far into the new German defenses. The matter of outstanding importance is that they assert, and thus far have demonstrated, that they are prepared to continue these deadly and far-reaching assaults, as Premier Asquith declared, "indefinitely." It is worth noting, however, that there is no foolhardy belief in an early collapse of German resistance.

In a word, the conception is that the Somme offensive is to be made the beginning of the end of the war. An unending battle, ever widening in scope and ever increasing in fury of attack, until by sheer destruction the enemy is overborne—this is a staggering conception, of which only a glimpse is caught in the struggle of the last three months. Field Marshal von Hindenburg may have it in him to shatter it, but as yet he has shown no evidence of being able to do so. The greatest danger to the Germans is that their courage and pride and desperate resolution may lead them to delay too long the inevitable retirement, and so bring upon themselves irremediable disaster.

GERMANY KNOWS

October 11, 1916.

WE CAN imagine nothing more futile than to cite a newspaper opinion three months old that never was published; yet we intend to do just that inconsequential thing. When the submarine *Deutschland* arrived at Baltimore last July, and the press of this country was prostrating itself before the evidence of German power, the event seemed to us so ominous that we framed, but did not print, an editorial of protest and warning. While conceding that the feat showed daring seamanship, we were infinitely more impressed by its palpably sinister intent; by the fact that Americans not only tolerated an audacious affront, but accepted it as a compliment, and by the subtle threat which it conveyed of a different demonstration of naval efficiency in American waters. That the submarine carried 750 tons of dyestuffs—about $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent of the amount consumed in this country annually—gave German propagandists a pretense for asserting that the voyage marked a restoration of commercial relations. The submarine was hailed as the forerunner of a whole fleet of undersea freighters, and thoughtless citizens complacently swallowed the fable that this perilous voyage was undertaken as a mark of esteem for this country, whose suffering commerce it was the consuming desire of Germany to relieve. Yet it was plain that the real purpose was to impress upon the American people the far-reaching power of Germany, to teach them that their

fancied isolation was an exploded myth. But there were circumstances which gave to the incident the color of a studied insult. Of all places in the world, it seemed to us, the last that would be chosen for a friendly demonstration by a German submarine would be a port of the United States, where the very name of that weapon is enveloped in memories of horror and loathing, and where it must recall an outrage without parallel in history for perfidy and atrocity, for which neither reparation nor disavowal had been offered. We could conceive of no commercial disguise that could make such a visit anything less than an offense to decency and an incitement to just anger. Above all, we were perturbed by the threatening implications; for if there was anything to prevent the unwarned appearance and activity in these waters of an armed submarine—even of the very craft that sank the *Lusitania*, with the identical crew that perpetrated that crime—it was concealed from our understanding. We expected, therefore, an outburst of indignation from the public, and the announcement of a governmental policy that would explicitly discourage visits from sister ships of the craft that had murdered American men and women and children on the high seas.

We hopelessly misjudged both the spirit of the American people and the attitude of the administration. The officers and crew of the submarine were officially entertained in Baltimore, and felicitations forwarded to the government which sent them on their mission of intimidation. A member of the family of the vice president of the United States, it was reported, inspected the vessel. It was solemnly announced that these were simple seamen from Germany's mercantile marine—as tho it were not known that every available German is a conscript member of the armed forces of the empire and as tho it were possible that men trained as submarine

experts would be sent 3000 miles from the zone of war merely to carry dyestuffs to a neutral country. At any rate, we threw aside our editorial; it was too hopelessly discordant with the prevailing contentment, and might have appeared to be unduly alarmist, even unpatriotic. But we recall that the concluding paragraph ran something like this:

Germany has delivered here more than a cargo of merchandise—she has delivered a threat. And she has taken away more than some urgently needed war supplies—she has taken the measure of the American government and people. How long will it be before one of her submarines—or a squadron of them—appears on the coast of the United States, to thrust again into the very face of this nation the still unsettled questions of international law and “the sacred rights of humanity”?

The interval of time that elapsed is not important, but Americans can judge for themselves now the merit of the deductions which we were led to suppress. The German war craft are here; one of them has penetrated an American harbor; they have sunk half a dozen merchantmen and passenger ships almost within sight of our shores; and they have forced American citizens—with women and children—who were “exercising their indisputable rights,” to seek precarious safety in row-boats at sea. The *Stephano* was a British-owned vessel, regularly engaged in passenger service between Newfoundland and New York. She was bound to the latter port, the Americans aboard being chiefly home-coming tourists. She was unarmed, and, so far as is known, carried no contraband. Yet her American passengers, under threat of death, were forced to abandon their property and risk their lives in open boats when she was sunk.

Already administration organs intimate that if it is shown that the vessel was “properly warned” and that

"provision was made for the safety" of those aboard, "the incident probably will end there." But the notes which achieved President Wilson's celebrated "diplomatic victory" explicitly denounced as unlawful, inhuman and intolerable the practice of leaving the occupants of torpedoed vessels "to the mercy of the sea in small boats"; he condemned "so much as putting the lives of those aboard the ship in jeopardy." The submarine commanders interpreted their obligation to end with the permitting of men, women and children to scramble into lifeboats thirty miles from shore in a season of sudden storms. The fact that rescues were made by American warships does not relieve the atrocity in the least degree, unless we are to accept the shameful imputation that such vessels are justly to be required to follow humbly in the wake of German submarine raiders and pick up their victims. The complicated and menacing controversies which these events have brought upon the United States are obvious enough in outline, and the discussion promises to range thru boundless regions of disputation. But a matter of more immediate consequence is that this country is now directly and irrevocably involved in the European conflict.

The final answer to those infatuated souls who have babbled of "America's splendid isolation" and "the protective rampart of the broad Atlantic" is the impudent appearance of a war submarine in an American harbor and its assaults upon American citizens in the presence of American naval vessels. Whether there is one German craft at work, or half a dozen, does not signify; if one can be sent on such an errand, fifty can be sent, and this country is no more immune from attack than Great Britain found herself to be. Yet there is a matter which to us is graver even than this, and that is that there has not yet developed in the United

States a national spirit which would discourage and forbid such contemptuous invasions of its rights as have been inflicted upon it. No other neutral nation has suffered such grievous wrongs as this, yet is there another in the world that would have tolerated, would actually have welcomed with adulation, the presence of a Deutschland? After the Lusitania crime, the coming of that vessel, with its transparent pretense of a commercial mission, was palpably designed as a test of American public opinion. Holland, living in the very shadow of Germany, would not admit it to her ports; even Sweden, which is pro-Teuton in sentiment, would resent its appearance in her waters. But if Americans would submit, the way was opened for far different operations. The feting of the Deutschland's crew by the countrymen of the Lusitania victims was a signal to Berlin that the next step would be safe, and that the demand for "strict accountability" which was abandoned off the coast of Ireland would not be dangerously revived off the shores of Massachusetts. It was not even deemed necessary to proclaim a new "war zone," or to announce the purpose thru an advertisement by the imperial embassy. And only a few hours ago partisan folly was bleating its praises of the administration that has "kept us out of war"—of a policy that has drugged the nation into surrendering its rights in return for a fictitious safety, and has brought the conflict 3000 miles to menace us at our very doors!

SUBMARINE RIGHTS AND WRONGS

October 13, 1916.

TO ANY citizen who may have been apprehensive lest adequate measures should not be taken respecting the recent submarine activities in American waters we can convey this encouraging information:

If there is a continuance of the operations and Germany's pledge to the United States is violated, no word or deed will be spared by this government to protect not only the interests of the United States, but of other and less formidable neutrals. * * * The present crisis offers an opportunity for the Wilson administration to make more emphatic than ever its heretofore announced determination to protect American lives at sea, whatever the cost and regardless of the consequences.

The announcement, which has all of the vigor—and some of the phraseology—of a Wilson note, was made by the New York World in a dispatch written at Shadow Lawn, and, therefore, has behind it the authority of the chief administration organ. In our own discussion of the matter we shall not presume to offer suggestions as to the immediate duty of the government, but shall examine the controversy in the light of past events and shall offer such observations as may appeal to minds not burdened with official responsibility nor clouded with technical knowledge. It is the more embarrassing to do this because official and expert judgment seems to be almost unanimous that the submarine raid on the Massachusetts coast was conducted legally, humanely and with perfect propriety. It was semiofficially announced that

the state department believed the German commander "observed strictly the rules of international law and the pledges made to the United States." The navy department, Secretary Daniels remarked, was interested only to the extent of exerting itself to prevent loss of life. Washington, it was made known, has "little disposition to believe that American interests are menaced by the new campaign." And an eminent professor of international law sweeps the whole case out of court with the finding that "Germany had a perfect right to pursue the course she did." In the face of such positive utterances only the lay observer, we suppose, would have the temerity to pursue the subject, and it is in that role that we shall inquire into certain issues of fact and principle.

The most obvious result of the raid is to raise anew the question of the submarine's status in relation to international law, the established usages of warfare and the rights of humanity. The German contention, supported by many Americans, is that the undersea boat is legally a warship, nothing more and nothing less, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities conceded to a belligerent vessel which moves upon the surface. It has a right, they say, to visit neutral ports, subject only to the customary rules as to length of stay, etc.; it may stop and search all craft at sea, and it may wage war upon enemy commerce after the manner of surface cruisers. Germany's opponents, on the contrary, argue that the submarine cannot justly claim treatment by either neutrals or enemies as an ordinary craft of war, for the reasons that it cannot, like other vessels, be held subject to control and observation, and that its identity and character cannot be positively determined. It can enter and leave neutral waters without knowledge of the government having authority therein; it can secretly obtain supplies where an ordinary warship could not

even appear; and it can do its work of destruction from concealment, leaving its government free to repudiate responsibility. Upon these grounds the Allies have formally urged that neutrals shall close their ports to submarines of any nationality or character, and such countries as Sweden, Norway and Holland have done so, as much for their own safety as out of regard for the request made. But no laborious argument need be wasted upon the point that the submarine is essentially different from other war craft. Germany herself has volubly and vociferously argued that the U-boat has quite changed the character of naval warfare; that it has such serious weaknesses of structure that the ancient right of merchantmen to carry arms for self-defense, for example, must be rescinded in its behalf, and that the ordinary cruiser's obligation to save the occupants of a ship about to be destroyed shall be canceled for the submarine.

Not being an expert, one might ask with due timidity why the rules should be changed only so as to benefit the fragile assassin of the deep. If it is to be conceded that the submarine has revolutionized the character of warfare at sea, is it unreasonable to suggest that neutrals would be wise to revolutionize their rules also? It is the promoters of submarine frightfulness who insist that their weapon is essentially different from ordinary ships of war. Then by what right, may one inquire, do they demand identical treatment for it? A German submarine, we are loftily informed, has precisely the same right to come uninvited into Newport harbor, and depart thence on a mission of destruction, that a German or a British cruiser would have. Has it, indeed? Then by what logic is it relieved of the obligations that are exacted from the surface vessels? Neither a German nor a British cruiser would dare to sink an unarmed ship and consign American passengers to precarious

escape in lifeboats. The submarine cannot at the same time claim the privileges of other warships and repudiate their responsibilities.

Another point raised by the operations off the American coast is that many months ago the United States government sternly protested against the "hovering" of British and French warships "about American coasts and ports," and persisted until the objectionable vessels were withdrawn. Having justly denounced those naval forces for exercising their acknowledged rights of visit and search in an obtrusive manner, the government is now advised by weighty opinion to countenance the actual sinking of vessels and the endangering of American lives in the same waters by the opposing forces! Viewing the matter apart from special incidents, it should be remembered, we think, that the submarine is the one type of vessel which is available exclusively for war purposes. The voyage of the *Deutschland*, despite its peaceable cargo, was a feat of war, and all talk of commercial undersea freighting is pretense, because in time of peace such a device would be preposterous. The first steam warship might have been entitled to special consideration, because steam embodied a benefit to all mankind. But the submarine, designed for war and useful solely for destruction, should be held to "strict accountability," not aided by relaxation of rules.

In considering the facts of the raid, discussion as to its legality would be profitless. The vital issue concerns the extent to which Germany observed the rules of "cruiser warfare" and the pledges she gave to this government. She gave due warning to each ship, say the experts, and no American lives were lost. But in every one of Mr. Wilson's eloquent notes it was demanded that she should not alone avoid killing Americans, but should avoid placing them in jeopardy. The submarine gave

the passengers of the Stephano—men, women and children—the choice of drowning with a sinking ship or taking to the open sea in small boats. Germany had formally promised not to take such measures “except when the conditions afford absolute certainty that the boats will reach the nearest point” on the coast. The only “certainty” the submarine officer had was the knowledge that American naval vessels were in the neighborhood. But this precedent makes the intolerable implication that this government should supply rescue ships for Germany’s victims in order to relieve the raiders of responsibility. Everything about the sinking of the Stephano, say the experts complacently, was strictly legal. Yet it was concerning the sinking of the Sussex that President Wilson sent an ultimatum to Germany; the Sussex was a passenger liner plying between two belligerent countries, France and England, while the Stephano was bound from a belligerent country, Canada, to a neutral country, the United States; in each case American lives were endangered, yet in neither was an American lost. If, then, the Sussex outrage justified an ultimatum, based not only upon the absence of warning, but upon the imperiling of passengers by forcing them into small boats, why does the torpedoing of the Stephano appear to be an unassailable act of war?

CRETE MAKING HISTORY AGAIN

October 17, 1916.

AMONG the little noted victims of the war must be counted that populous company of authors graduated from "The Prisoner of Zenda" school of fiction. Not because the conflict has discredited their borrowed inventions, but because, on the contrary, their most ingenious tales of palace intrigues and subtle diplomats and turbulent peoples and royal adventures have been made flat and tame by the realities. Who will be impressed by the tinsel romance of Ruritania when he has witnessed the real throes of Rumania? What are the imagined events of Graustark to the actual woes of Greece? True, Constantine is of middle age and somewhat bald, and Eleutherios Venizelos, the other hero of the drama, is a graybeard statesman in spectacles and a frock coat, who campaigns in the newspapers instead of from the back of a prancing charger, and who would be incapable of holding a staircase with a rapier against half a company of the guard. Nevertheless, the scenes and properties of theatrical pageantry appear in the history as we see it unfolded—the king and his faithful courtiers withstanding the popular will; armed troops patrolling the palace grounds; the beautiful queen up to her royal ears in plot and counter-plot; foreign ministers in gold-laced uniforms conducting their devious maneuvers with ceremonious dignity; mobs in the streets, traitors in the army, insurgents in the navy, spies everywhere; and finally the departure of the revolution-

ary leader by night in a rowboat—ah!—to be picked up at sea by a warship and landed in his native Crete.

It is a sufficient testimony to the genius of that extraordinary man that ever since he was dismissed from the premiership his personality has overshadowed that of the sovereign, while even in exile he commands the destinies of the country he raised from obscurity, only to see it fall back thru indecision. He had not been in the island capital two hours before its eleventh revolution in a hundred years was an accomplished fact, and he was head of a provisional government pledged to promote war by Greece against Bulgaria, Turkey and their allies. This was three weeks ago. Simultaneously it was announced that King Constantine, yielding at last to the nation's demands, would summon it to expel the invader, and the act awaits only the making of satisfactory terms with the exacting and suspicious diplomats of the Entente. Crete, therefore, is the dominating factor in the Greek crisis, and deserves consideration apart from its calculating foster parent. Aside from that, the island will have historical notoriety because its complicated problem was one of the main causes of the Balkan war and of the world conflict.

Physically, Crete is not impressive—a narrow strip of land with about one-fifteenth the area of Pennsylvania. Of its population of 300,000, one-fifth, perhaps, are Moslems; the others, Greek Christians, and 80 per cent of all are illiterate. But politically it has baffled the wisdom of Europe, while historically it is the inspiration and the despair of scientific inquiry. For here was one of the first of human abodes, and here there rose and vanished in forgotten centuries a civilization coeval with the Pharaohs and the glories of Babylon the great. Venizelos, riding in an automobile from the quay of Canea to government house, stirred with his

wheels the very dusts of prehistoric time. Those who left school so recently as twenty years ago, and there-upon joyfully abandoned the study of ancient things, have a vague idea, perhaps, that Crete has a respectable antiquity; but they do not know that her story links us to the remotest periods of human existence. It has been only within the last few years that archeology has uncovered on the island the architectural relics of races that make the myths of Greece seem modern. Within sixty miles of the capital the debris of apes has been dug away, and the sun now shines into the roofless habitation of dynasties that ruled before the pyramids were built.

The palace of Cnossus covered six acres, and science dates its erection in the fourth millennium before Christ. And below those ruins are strata filled with evidences of still older races, so that on this spot, it is computed, Neolithic humanity was settled at least 12,000 years ago. This palace and others that have been found tell in their sculptured remains and in their faded wall-paintings of a highly advanced prehistoric civilization whose existence was unsuspected until the opening of the twentieth century of this era. They reveal the startling fact that Minos, king of Crete, who had been considered one of the creations of Greek mythology, was an actual monarch—or more probably the name belonged to a dynasty. The legend of the dreadful minotaur, to which Athens paid annual tribute of seven youths and seven maidens, has curious support in scenes pictured on Minoan coins, even to the fabled labyrinth where Theseus slew the monster. Daedalus, the mythological father of aviation, may have been an authentic architect, as the Iliad avows, for such a dancing place for Ariadne as that record says he built in Crete has been laid open to the sky.

These discoveries, indeed, have revolutionized ideas of prehistoric developments of the human race, and Crete now rivals Mesopotamia in archeological interest. If the latter can claim renown as the site of the Garden of Eden, the former boasts of being the birthplace of Zeus himself, father of all the gods. After this it sounds commonplace to say that a tribe of the Philistines, whom Samson fought, were transplanted Cretans, or Cherethims, as the Bible calls them. But perhaps the most astonishing revelation is that the Minoan civilization had the art of writing in a primitive form twenty centuries before the Phoenicians introduced letters. On clay tablets from Cnossus are alphabetical signs scratched when Moses was planning the exodus from Egypt. In the light of these facts the history of Crete during the last 1900 years seems wholly modern. It has been one unending story of strife. "For this cause," Paul wrote to Titus, "left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting"; and the settlement is not yet. The plain-spoken apostle quoted against the islanders a saying of one of their prophets: "The Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies." But in recent times, at least, their sufferings have been due to other causes. Conquered by Rome in 67 A. D., Crete became a part of the Byzantine empire and so remained, except for a century under Saracen rule, until 1204, when it was sold to Venice, which held it for 400 years. Its subjugation by the Turks, completed in 1669, was marked by the longest siege in history, Candia being invested for more than twenty years. For nearly two centuries and a half Crete was the worst governed of the Turks' hapless provinces, Moslem misrule being complicated by the irreconcilable strife between the Christian population and the ruling Mohammedan minority.

Present events had their immediate rise in the revolt of 1896-97, which led Greece to proclaim annexation, precipitating her disastrous war with Turkey. The great Powers intervened, and decreed—in their fatuous policy of bolstering up the collapsing rule of the sultan in Europe—that Crete must not be Greek, as she desired, but must have autonomy under authority of Constantinople. Prince George of Greece was made high commissioner, with autocratic powers; the last Turkish troops were removed in 1898, and the constitution revised. Venizelos, a leader in the successful revolution, was made one of the five councilors of the prince, but was dismissed in 1901, and four years later led another revolt against the despotic ruler, proclaiming annexation to Greece. The Powers solemnly hauled down the Greek flag that he had raised, re-formed the constitution again, and tried a new high commissioner, M. Zaimis, who is still prominent in news from Athens. In 1908 the assembly, in the absence of Zaimis, voted again for union with Greece, and the Powers, dealing now with the Young Turks in Constantinople, laboriously evolved another compromise which satisfied neither faction. Venizelos, sick of the blundering intrigues of the statesmen of Europe, whom he pungently described as “a parcel of old women,” determined to manage the business of annexation himself, and in 1910 went to Athens as a member of the Greek chamber. He did not overestimate his powers. Within a few months he was premier; within a year and a half he had reorganized the entire political, military and naval administration of the kingdom; within two years he had created the Balkan League, which stripped Turkey of most of her European dominions, and within three years he had enlarged the boundaries of Greece at the expense of Bulgaria.

Even in this hasty and imperfect outline of Cretan history may be traced intimate connections with the world conflict. Ever since the congress of Berlin in 1878 the selfish Powers had sacrificed the Christian subjects of the Moslem to promotion of their own political and commercial interests at Constantinople. This policy created the Balkan question; it fomented the strife between Austria and Servia, which precipitated the great struggle; but before that it drove to despair the misgoverned Cretans, whose passion for liberty found personification in Venizelos; it sent him to Greece, where he was to become the avenger of Turkish misrule and the destroyer of the integrity of the Ottoman empire, which diplomacy conspired to maintain; and so it toppled over the balance of power and plunged the whole continent into war. Surely there is no stranger fragment of the vast fabric of human existence than this, which reveals in a little Mediterranean island threads of fate whose beginnings are lost in the dim regions of unrecorded history, yet which are being woven into the story told in this morning's newspapers.

THE "LEGALIZED" SUBMARINE

October 20, 1916.

THE widespread belief that British controversial methods lack adroitness will be shaken, we think, by the extraordinary statement of Viscount Grey the other day respecting the submarine raid off the American coast. Altho the scene in the house of lords palpably had been rehearsed, it was managed with deadly skill. No American with a decent sense of pride could have read without humiliation the suave secretary's studied phrases, so ironically considerate, but so bitterly contemptuous in implication:

The United States government did request us very emphatically not to patrol near their coast, and instructions were sent to British warships to avoid causing unnecessary irritation. When we come to what has passed with regard to German submarines we do not know.

We know that American warships saved lives. The questions asked me are: What did they do before any vessel was sunk, and is it true that a German submarine requested them to clear out of the way in order that the sinking of a defenseless ship should be facilitated, and did they, in fact, comply with that request and so facilitate the sinking of vessels? On that we know nothing more than what has appeared in the press. I assume that the only persons who can give an account of it are the officers of the German submarine and the officers of the United States navy who were on the scene.

In September, 1914, the United States authorities intercepted wireless communications from H. M. S. Suffolk to New York asking for supplies and newspapers, and we were informed that the United States government considered that this would be making use of American territory as a base for supplies and information as to shipping movements. We

do not know what precautions were taken to prevent the German submarine from obtaining supplies or information from the newspapers as to the movements of merchant ships. Nor do we know whether American warships facilitated the operations of the submarine by getting out of the way.

* * * As to the proceedings of the submarine, the United States government will, I suppose, in due course let it be known to the world what view they take.

If Viscount Grey really had any such expectation, he now knows that it is hopeless; for it is announced that the Washington authorities will make no statement of any kind concerning any phase of the matter, not even the sinking of an unarmed passenger ship and forcing of American men, women and children to take to open boats forty-two miles from the nearest port. Of the three points raised by the secretary, his reference to the action of American warships is perhaps the most irritating. It can only be said that it was stated in the news dispatches, and not contradicted, that the German submarine asked an American destroyer to move aside, as a ship was about to be torpedoed, and that the request was complied with. Washington reports it has found "no evidence verifying this report." The two other issues raised concern the American attitude toward submarines and surface warships, respectively, and the status of the submarine itself. It will be useful to glance at the record. In October and December, 1914, and in April and December, 1915, Secretary Lansing protested against the patrolling of the high seas near the United States by warships of Great Britain and France. He did not even intimate that their procedure was illegal, but expressed this government's irritation at "the hovering of belligerent warships about American coasts and ports." The United States, he said,

has always regarded the practice of belligerent cruisers patrolling in close proximity to its territorial waters and making the neighborhood a station for their observations as incon-

sistent with the treatment to be expected from the naval vessels of a friendly Power in time of war, and has maintained that the consequent menace to the freedom of American commerce is vexatious and uncourteous.

Great Britain gave assurances that she "had issued instructions which would prevent further molestation of American commerce in the trade lanes approximate to American waters," but Mr. Lansing insisted that the warships be withdrawn to a considerable distance, and Great Britain complied. The established position was, then, that it was objectionable for a war vessel of the Allies to get newspapers from an American port or to exercise the lawful rights of visit and search even in the neighborhood of American waters. On the other hand, Washington peremptorily rejected the suggestion that submarines were not entitled to all the privileges of surface warships, and has conceded the right of German submarines to use American harbors, freely obtain American newspapers and destroy unarmed vessels in the very waters from which British and French cruisers were indignantly warned. The British charge is, in short, that the Allied vessels are forbidden even to patrol nearby waters and exercise therein the legalized customs of warfare, while German submarines are invited to prosecute in those identical places methods which the American government has repeatedly denounced as unlawful, intolerable and inhuman. We have no inclination to argue Great Britain's case for her; we simply state the facts and let the reader judge for himself. As to the status of the submarine, it is to be remembered that the same Wilson administration which was properly resentful of the "hovering" of belligerent cruisers in this part of the Atlantic ocean made a special plea for a radical alteration of the rules of warfare for the benefit of the submarine. It proposed that, because of the "weakness" of that type of vessel, merchantmen should

be deprived of their ancient right to carry defensive armament. But after arguing in this manner that the submarine was vitally different from an ordinary warship, the administration held that the undersea boat was in legal respects the same thing—that it is entitled to all the customary privileges in American ports and waters, but is relieved of the customary responsibilities.

Do we overstate the case? Let us see. The U-53, armed with guns and torpedoes, was escorted into Newport harbor by an American warship. Its commander exchanged visits with the American rear admiral of the station and obtained newspapers. Departing, it sank five unarmed vessels within sight of Nantucket lightship—one of them a neutral (Dutch) freighter carrying an American cargo to a neutral (Dutch) port, another of them a British passenger ship carrying Americans from Newfoundland to New York. This latter had essentially the status of a ferryboat, as had the *Sussex*, the sinking of which in the English channel impelled President Wilson to send an ultimatum to Germany. The passengers were forced to enter lifeboats, and but for the presence of American destroyers would have had to row forty-two miles to reach the nearest port. On these undisputed facts, the finding of the administration is apparently not only that the submarine's course was legal and its operation close to American waters unobjectionable, but that it fulfilled the pledges made not to sink vessels until all on board had been put in safety. A summary of the Wilson position is, therefore, that the searching of vessels by patrols of Great Britain and France is "vexatious and uncourteous," while the sinking of vessels and the imperiling of passengers by German submarines is a matter of indifference. The incident recorded is ominous enough; but what Americans must face is the prospect that it will be repeated indefinitely. Unless Germany

has lost her vigor and efficiency, other submarines of hers will visit American ports, exchange courtesies with the authorities, and then sink unarmed ships offshore, in accordance with the consenting silence of Washington and the tacit understanding that American warships will dutifully stand by to rescue the victims. A point we must emphasize is that the situation is not new, but merely aggravated. The New York Tribune solemnly remarks that "no one disputes the right of the U-boats to act as commerce destroyers so long as they follow the methods of 'cruiser warfare.'" Yet only last April President Wilson wrote to Germany:

The use of the submarine for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

The exact value of President Wilson's robust declaration is shown by the fact that now these vessels and their methods are advertised by the administration as legal, even when they extend their operations close to American waters and endanger the lives of Americans within a few miles of their own shores. Thus the nation has been "kept out of war"!

AN OMINOUS SITUATION

October 23, 1916.

THE contentment which pervades official circles in Washington regarding recent developments in Germany's submarine tactics is regarded by many Americans as reassuring. Partisan supporters of the administration, in particular, argue that indorsement of the raid off Nantucket lightship, when scores of Americans were driven from a passenger vessel to lifeboats, is a guarantee against renewed complications over under-sea warfare. The truth is, of course, that the controversy is certain to be revived; and in its next form, because of the accommodating attitude of the administration toward operations in these waters, will be more acute than in the last. The note-writing achievement, which the president's adherents are celebrating with such unction, would be nullified within an hour if Germany were to decide that advantage lay that way, and during the last few months there have been ominous signs that eventually the Diplomatic Victory—that unarmed and pacific craft—will be torpedoed without warning.

Research need go no further back than President Wilson's note of April 19 last, when he warned that diplomatic relations would be severed unless Germany "should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels." On May 4 Germany gave her final pledge not to sink

unarmed and unresisting ships without warning and without providing for safety of the occupants; but she expressed a hope that the United States in return would act vigorously to break the force of the British blockade, and added to her promise this reservation:

Should the steps taken by the government of the United States not attain the object to have the laws of humanity followed by all the belligerents, the German government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of action.

President Wilson, asserting that possible action by this government on other matters could not affect this, answered that the United States would "rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the imperial German government." The "settlement" was hailed, not without some justice, as a triumph for the administration; but the considerations which moved Germany to yield temporarily had very slight connection with the literary factor in the controversy. First and foremost was the fact that the submarine enterprise had been excessively costly—it was Great Britain's deadly counter-measures which led Germany to suspend a campaign in which many of the submersible cruisers and their crews had been lost. There were also more abstract reasons. It seemed worth while to find out whether the United States, gratified by a German concession, would not undertake to force modifications of the British blockade. Another argument of caution was that continued submarine lawlessness might impel the Allies so to intensify their economic pressure that neutral neighbors of Germany would be coerced into closing their frontiers against her, if not into actual hostility. Third, there was the remote but discernible chance that the United States might actually be stung into making good some of President Wilson's resonant

but forgotten demands. And, fourth, there were not wanting Germans who insisted that the submarine account showed a net loss to the nation. It is to be noted that all five of these factors, in the view of most Germans, have steadily lost force. The partial suspension of indiscriminate raiding has enabled the government to put a new fleet of more powerful submarines in commission—the exploits of the U-53 are significant of increased equipment and powers in this arm. The hope that the Wilson administration would exert pressure on Great Britain vanished when it failed even to stop the rifling of American mails. The fear of neutral hostility has greatly evaporated, and the sedulous Wilson cultivation of pacifist sentiment is regarded as a guarantee that the United States will be “kept out of war” regardless of any outrages committed. And, finally, the ceaseless Allied assaults and advances in the west, with the rejection of all tentative offers of peace, are steadily breaking down German objections to the revival of “frightfulness” as a last resort to force favorable terms. Those who have taken it for granted, because no Lusitania horrors have been perpetrated recently, that the Wilson administration re-established law and vindicated the sacred principles of humanity, may be interested to know that more than 300 passenger and freight vessels have been torpedoed since the “settlement.”

But a more perturbing condition is that for months Germany has been divided into hotly contesting camps upon the direct issue of renewing “ruthless” submarine warfare, and that every reverse on land adds vigor to the movement which demands unrestrained operations. Backed by such influential organizations as the Navy League and the Conservative and National Liberal parties, it is gaining adherents in the reichstag and thruout the whole empire. Against this agitation Chan-

cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg is standing firmly. Nevertheless, advocates of ruthlessness are indefatigable, and it is more than probable that in the end they will overcome the policy of the government. They declare that the "new situation" which the German pledge made the basis of a reservation has arrived—the unlawful British blockade is inflicting suffering, the United States has made no effective move to interfere, and the utmost reprisals have become a national duty. The meaning of all this is, of course, that Germany yielded to the demand as a matter of cold calculation, not of conviction, and will reverse her position at any time when it seems necessary and expedient to do so. She will weigh the consequences, and will be guided by the probabilities of advantage which lie in one course or the other and not in the least by consideration for President Wilson's "diplomatic victory," especially since his administration has championed the submarine commerce-destroyer as a legitimate weapon and indorsed its operations almost within sight of the American coast. The reopening of the controversy has been immeasurably hastened by the fact that this government is taking down, one by one, the bars which it erected against the outlaw of the seas; and, in pursuance of the deluded idea that thus the nation is "kept out of war," has tacitly conceded that American passengers have been put in places of safety when they are forced to take refuge in rowboats forty-two miles from the nearest port.

ANOTHER YEAR OF WAR?

October 25, 1916.

ONE of the eminent authors who have astonished the public by turning readily from imaginative literature to the discussion of abstruse problems of war strategy offered the other day a singular variation of a once popular theory. He was moved to revive at this late day the suggestion that war is to be eliminated by its own destructiveness—that weapons so powerful are being perfected that even the present conflict may be “terminated by its own terrors.” His estimate would have been more impressive if the devices of which he wrote—the “tanks” used by the British—had revealed the devastating power which he ascribed to them. Those lumbering monsters have been undeniably effective, but it seems hardly rational to expect that a contest involving half the world should survive the employment of Zeppelins and submarines and poison gas and liquid fire, only to collapse at the appearance of armored tractors. It may be that the writer’s enthusiasm was an unconscious reflection of the common habit of trying to foresee the end of the appalling struggle. The war has reached a stage where the thought of its cessation is the background against which its every development is projected. Few of the earlier illusions of conquest and of spectacular victories remain, and each event now has the appearance, in the mind of the observer, of something that is important because it brings nearer the consummation, whatever that is to be.

There is, indeed, a never-failing interest in the complicated problems touching the probable duration of the hostilities; and the present situation affords a logical opportunity to examine the factors which may affect the length of that term. This is a subject of overshadowing concern to hundreds of millions whose existence the war has darkened, while it pervades the thoughts of unnumbered millions more who seem to be spectators merely, yet whose future is to be colored by the result. Obviously, the first thing to be considered is the military situation on the various fronts. While columns of space would be required to describe the disposition and possible movements of the opposing forces, a few lines will outline the contest as it stands with sufficient clearness for our purpose. In the west the trench warfare that began after the battle of the Aisne is now being subjected to its first important modification in the campaign of the Somme, which has been in progress for nearly four months. Its outstanding feature has been the demonstration that Germany is now overmatched there in man power, gun power and striking power. The French and British advance at will, altho that is not to say that they advance far or swiftly; their artillery commands that of the enemy, not only because it is superior in aggregate weight and ammunition supply, but because they have almost absolute dominion of the air. It is fairly well established that they can continue to bend back the German line as long as they care to expend the necessary lives. That they have not "broken thru," as the Germans proudly declare, means nothing, for they have no expectation of accomplishing that incredible feat. They are not conquering territory so much as they are forcing Germany to relinquish it.

The Russo-German front shows intermittent activity, but it is unlikely that any large operations will be

possible there before winter descends. On the northern and southern borders of Rumania actions are under way which may well be decisive; Falkenhayn and Mackensen between them may eliminate the latest ally of the Entente Powers, or may fail to do so while the weather remains open, and so fail entirely. The northward movement toward Servia and Bulgaria by the forces of General Sarraill is singularly slow, largely because of the uncertain attitude of Greece. Italy and Austria continue their desultory campaigns, while the Russians and Turks are conducting operations in Asia Minor which give no promise of visible results in the near future. At sea there are prospects of a renewal of unrestrained submarine warfare and the possibility of another North sea battle.

The dove of speculation will surely bring back no olive leaf from a flight over such war-flooded regions as these. There is nothing of a military character anywhere to suggest that peace is not still remote. It will be of interest to examine some recent opinions, which reveal a singular unanimity upon this point. Utterances of public men in the belligerent nations differ in tone, but not in essential meaning. French statesmen, for example, declare resolutely that the war must go on; German publicists, while no less determined, express disappointment that the peace which they hold would be reasonable does not arrive. Americans returning from Europe bring back but one judgment—there are no signs of faltering on either side and no real hope of a settlement within a twelvemonth. British sentiment is perhaps the most outspoken in forecasting a prolonged struggle. Two months ago Winston Churchill argued that the nation must prepare for a severe test of endurance, and Lloyd George considered himself optimistic when he said: "I think in the dim distance we can see

the end." General Robertson, chief of the British general staff, remarks with military brevity: "It took us two years to begin the war; we are now in the middle stage; the end is not yet in sight." Not without significance is the feeling which pervades the men who are actually doing the fighting. "In spite of the steady advance," wrote a correspondent from the Somme front a few weeks ago, "British officers and soldiers alike are always talking of 'next year.' The phrase has become almost a byword." An American writer, who talked with many Allied statesmen and military leaders, put the case with heaped-up superlatives of emphasis:

There will be, there can be, no peace before the end of the fourth campaigning season (1917). It seems to me safe to state positively that the known factors of the situation make a conclusion of hostilities before September or October of next year absolutely impossible.

Long ago, we suppose, most observers gave up all hope of a settlement before the coming winter, and if there has been produced recently anywhere a plausible forecast of peace short of next summer or fall it has escaped our attention. The reasons are quite discernible. In no field of operations has there been a decision. The Germans, suffering reverses from week to week in the west, profess to be satisfied that they can hold Belgium and northeastern France, or most of those territories, long enough to force a compromise. The fighting in the east and in the Balkans shows no signs of bringing definite results—German conquest of Rumania or German loss of Bulgaria would not fatally shift the balance either way. And winter weather will soon reduce all fronts to comparative quietude. It needs no argument to show that even tho Germany cannot win, she is still far from overcome. Nor is it absolutely certain that she would yield if all her allies were detached from her, one by one. If that condition marked the beginning of

a war of invasion, it is possible that the nation, with vastly shortened lines to defend, would be capable of a prolonged resistance, altho it is difficult to conceive of any people so abjectly the slaves of a despotic militarism that they would sacrifice themselves uselessly rather than repudiate it. Her adversaries, on the other hand, are still less inclined to negotiate on the basis of the present war map, for the excellent reason that they have not yet exerted their full power. They believe they can make the blockade of Germany more stringent, and they aver that not until next spring will their military equipment be at its zenith of destructiveness. The campaign of the Somme, they declare, is a mere rehearsal. Thus the opposing ideas of practicable peace terms are not more irreconcilable than the opposing ideas of military strength. Finally, it is clear that none of the peoples concerned would now tolerate a patched-up peace. Each nation feels that its dreadful sacrifices would be made a mockery and its dead dishonored by concessions yielded to an arrogant foe.

Every indication suggests that the war has definitely arrived at the phase when compromise is utterly impossible, not only because of irreconcilable demands, but because of military aims which have not had their final demonstration. It is to be henceforth a test of endurance, of resources, of individual and national spirit. One will not expect it to be brief.

A BATTLE ANNIVERSARY

October 28, 1916.

AFTER two years, what is the thought of mankind concerning Belgium? If a sculptor sought to arrest in a single figure the spirit of that name, what would his chisel create? A suppliant, perhaps—a drooping form of tragedy and woe, stretching out pitiful hands to receive the charity of a sympathetic world? Is it not thus that one is too ready to think of a nation whose sacrifice moved the hearts of men to admiration and succor? And is our feeling quite free from a sense of complacency because we responded so quickly and so generously? Belgium, we say, is the ward of humanity. Are we to forget that she was the savior of Europe and of civilization, and that her true figure is not that of a helpless dependent, but of a champion, who met hopeless odds with valor unsurpassed, of a heroism and devotion which set a mark that all the great deeds since then shall not efface? History will see events in their true perspective, and will be more just than contemporary opinion, dazzled by the swiftly changing panorama. It will record that the battle which reached its climax two years ago today was the precursor of the crucial combat of the Marne; for it gave the first premonitory sign that brute force was not to subjugate law in Europe, and there, in a struggle which was to be obscured by others more vast and more spectacular, the most vital phase of this stupendous war was decided.

If the battle of the Marne saved France, the battle of the Yser saved England. Between October 16 and 30, 1914, Germany tasted her bitterest defeat, and to this day she has not advanced beyond the place where the shattered remnants of the Belgian army made their last stand. That little corner of their country, where they fought and died thru fifteen days and nights of ceaseless agony, still mocks the invader and still is the bulwark behind which his most powerful adversaries are secure. On this anniversary, then, let us remember that Belgium has given to the world not only its most inspiring record of national honor and devotion, but also one of its most stirring pictures of human valor. Let us think of Belgium's astonishing victory, as well as of her martyrdom and her misery. The imagination is thrilled now by the spectacle of titanic forces, virtually equal in strength and skill and equipment, battling for supremacy. Far different was war in the remote days of two years ago, when that mighty German military machine came thundering across the plains of Flanders, leaving devastation behind it and scattering before it a terrorized nation. It seemed that nothing could withstand it; against its monster weapons and its remorseless blows the defenders could oppose forces so meager and arms so inadequate that their cause appeared as hopeless as that of the last spearmen resisting the first riflemen. And the prelude to this battle was a succession of terrifying disasters. The proud fortresses of Liège and Namur had been reduced to worthless fragments in a few days. Louvain was a ghastly ruin; Dinant and Aerschot and Malines had become sepulchers, and from the Meuse to the Scheldt there were desolation and despair. Worse than all, Antwerp had fallen—on October 9—and six days later the sweep of the Germans westward had carried them into Ostend. After the

exhausting siege of the great seaport the Belgian army, by supreme effort and endurance, had extricated itself and retreated to the west; but for two months and a half the troops had been waging desperate war against cruel odds, and it was a pitifully weakened force that finally established itself near the line of the Yser. There were hardly 80,000 men, with only 350 pieces of ordinary artillery, two dozen machine guns and only enough ammunition for one battle. They had scarcely more food than the men could carry in their knapsacks; their sick and wounded were scattered in improvised and ill-equipped field hospitals; physically and spiritually they were on the verge of exhaustion.

It was against this broken and impoverished army that the Germans, flushed with success, hurled huge forces of fresh troops, backed by their mightiest guns. The enterprise was a crucial one for the invaders. The drive for Paris had been halted at the Marne, France was unconquerable for the time, and the imperial staff planned a sudden, irresistible thrust to seize Dunkirk and Calais, outflank the British and French, and establish bases from which England could be destroyed by systematic assaults. Between the Germans and their goal there were the 80,000 Belgians and 6000 French marines, the latter with no guns. The front to be defended, extending from the North sea to Dixmude, measured twenty-two and a half miles. While easterly outposts were held, the real line was the winding Yser, with several bridges, and beyond that the straight railroad from Nieuport to Dixmude. So thinly was the position held that there were only two brigades and some cavalry in reserve. Yet it was in this situation that King Albert addressed to his soldiers an order which inspired them to unsurpassed resistance. "Let it be understood," he said, "that in whatever positions I

place you, your eyes are to remain toward the front. And you are to consider as a traitor the man who shall pronounce the word 'retreat' before the formal order for it has been given." It was a splendid audacity which could give such an order, but it was a superb devotion that caused it to be literally obeyed. The shattered and exhausted armies stiffened into a desperate resolve to make that little winding river a scene of victory or extinction.

The battle began with outpost actions on October 16, and within twenty-four hours the center was so menaced that it had to be reinforced. Next day the Germans launched their main attack toward the bridge-heads of Nieuport and Schoorbakke, and made serious advances everywhere except at Lombaertzyde, where French and British warships checked them. On October 19 the fighting increased in intensity, and on the 20th virtually the entire Yser line was raked by murderous fire, while Nieuport and Dixmude were in flames. For five days the Belgians, now reinforced by a division of French, had been fighting without cessation, yet on October 21 they had to meet still more furious assaults from fresh German forces. The help which they had counted upon from their allies did not arrive, and their last reserves had to be flung into the sanguinary struggle. That night occurred one of the most desperate encounters of the battle—the fight for the Tervaete bridge, capture of which meant the piercing of the line and irremediable disaster. In the darkness the defenders fought literally to the death, but they held their position. On October 23, after a week of unimagined endurance, French reinforcements began arriving; but they were sent to Nieuport to attempt an offensive, and the Belgian center began to crumble under the terrific battering. An urgent appeal brought to that point a French

brigade, but too late to avert a retreat. Foiled at Nieuport, the Germans then opened, on October 24, a series of savage assaults on Dixmude. Fifteen times during the night they hurled masses of troops against the intrenchments, but fifteen times the Belgians, as tho in a sort of "grievous and heroic dream," rose from their ditches and flung them back. This terrible combat, most of it with the bayonet, came upon the defenders after they had endured seventy-two hours of fighting without rest. On the next day the imperiled center was strengthened by French reinforcements, but it was seen that human flesh and blood could no longer withstand the cataract of German shells, and the Belgians prepared to retire and flood the land between the river and the railroad. Exultantly the invaders pressed forward, and for three days poured upon the defenders a merciless bombardment. On October 30 they began to drive home attacks on the railway. But the released waters were doing their work. Slowly the inundation spread, turning fields into morasses, and covering the roads, so that when the Germans awoke to their peril it was only by violent effort that they succeeded in drawing back, under galling pursuit by the Belgians and French.

This was the battle of the Yser, and there, after two years, the Germans are still held. The Belgians had been asked to hold the line for forty-eight hours; they held it alone for one full week, and then, with the help of one French division, for eight days and nights, against overwhelming numbers. Shelterless in the ditches, weakened by hunger and tortured by lack of rest, that gaunt wraith of an army stopped the hosts of the invader and saved the channel ports, whose capture would have paralyzed Great Britain and doomed France. There is not in military annals a more brilliant achievement than this Thermopylae of yesterday. And its

glory is enhanced by the spiritual triumph of which it was the expression and which was pictured so vividly in the words of Cardinal Mercier to his countrymen:

Which of us would cancel this page of our national history? Which of us does not exult in the brightness of the glory of this shattered nation? The laws of conscience are sovereign laws. We should have acted unworthily had we evaded our obligation by a mere feint of resistance. And now we would not rescind our first resolution; we exult in it. Being called upon to write a most solemn page in our history, we resolved that it should be also a sincere, also a glorious page. And so long as we are required to give proof of endurance, so long shall we endure.

Minds incredibly paltry and blind have found in Belgium's defiance of Germany a theme of reprobation; she has suffered, they say, because she deserved to suffer, having resisted overpowering injustice instead of submitting. They cannot discern that defeat has brought to her imperishable glory. And to this is to be added the deathless renown of having achieved a victory which means her restoration and which manacled militarism to await the slow vengeance of civilization.

THE FRUITS OF A "VICTORY"

November 3, 1916.

THERE are some forty American citizens in an Irish port, and five more dead in the waters of the Atlantic, whose testimony concerning one of the principal issues in the present political campaign would be of singular value if it could be expressed. They were members of the non-combatant crew of a west-bound cargo vessel, torpedoed without warning last Saturday by a German submarine. The survivors, picked up from open boats in a storm, know what it is to be "kept out of war" according to the prevailing formula; and the slain victims knew, in the last moments of consciousness they may have had as they were flung mangled into the sea. It was theirs to learn just how false is that parrot-cry of partisanship and poltroonery, just how ghastly is the farce of reiterating it as an excuse for surrender and a palliative of shame. No doubt it was due to chance, but none the less it has the effect of malignity, that the submarine Deutschland, that peaceable sister of the craft which destroyed 115 Americans on the Lusitania, arrived to demand and receive the hospitality of an American port within a few hours of the latest torpedo crime. In any event, the coincidence may profitably be studied by those who are to pass judgment upon an administration which has not yet exacted reparation for the Lusitania victims, which has conferred upon the stealthy submarine of both the "merchant" and the warlike classes certificates

of character, and which has thereby invited renewal of the campaign of assassination.

Let thoughtful Americans take what comfort they can from the announcement that the administration "realizes the gravity of the situation" and is "surprised" by renewal of the submarine campaign. The concern of official circles is encouraging, but why the astonishment? What observer of ordinary unbiased intelligence has been able to foresee any other result of the policy pursued in Washington? What was the first trip of the *Deutschland* but a device to discover how sincere and how vigorous was American detestation of submarine lawlessness? When the sinister craft was adjudged an innocent and welcome merchantman, and its officers were feted by countrymen of the unavenged slain of the *Lusitania*, how much force was there left in the stern demands for "strict accountability" and for "immediate abandonment" of a campaign "utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity"? If one of the vessels indirectly associated with the most infamous assault upon this nation's rights ever perpetrated could be greeted with lavish official courtesy, would the visit of one without disguise be tolerated? If so, might it not even gain useful sanction from the very country that had been wronged? Thus came the U-53, insolently showing its guns and torpedoes, to extort from the complaisant administration recognition as an ordinary ship of war, entitled to all the privileges of such a vessel; and thus it went out from an American harbor to sink an unarmed passenger ship and expose nearly 100 American men, women and children to peril, from which they were saved only by the efforts of American naval vessels. When the *Deutschland* first arrived last July, our judgment was that thru her "Germany has delivered a threat," and we believed that she had taken away

"more than some urgently needed war supplies—the measure of the American government and people." And after the U-53 had struck its foul blow and disappeared, we stated only the obvious when we said:

The reopening of the submarine controversy has been immeasurably hastened by the fact that this government is taking down, one by one, the bars which it erected against the outlaw of the seas; and, in pursuance of the deluded idea that thus the nation is "kept out of war," has tacitly conceded that American passengers have been put in places of safety when they are forced to take refuge in rowboats forty-two miles from the nearest port.

It was always plain that Germany yielded only because, for naval and political reasons, it was more profitable at that time to suspend than to continue the tactics of indiscriminate destruction. She needed an opportunity to replace the submarines she had lost, and she needed precedents that would enlarge the sphere of their operations. Recent events show that she has the submarines—scores of neutral vessels have been lawlessly destroyed within the last few weeks—and in the American attitude toward the Deutschland and the U-53 she has recognition for which she maneuvered. The sinking of the steamship Stephano off Nantucket lightship was accepted in silence; it occasioned no protest, not even a public inquiry. If, then, the driving of scores of men, women and children into open boats off the shore of the United States was condoned, why should Germany fear complications over the killing of half a dozen obscure horsetenders off the coast of Ireland? American warships busied themselves to rescue the victims of the first outrage; is it fantastic to suggest that Germany may regard this, too, as a precedent, and may deplore the failure of the United States navy to extend its life-saving patrol to European waters?

As we recount again and again the circumstances of this nation's humiliation and danger, illumined as they are by successive incidents of unchecked aggression, we are perfectly conscious that our discussions avail but little, and that our indignation seems to many citizens quite groundless. There is truly an irreconcilable conflict of opinion as to what constitutes the requirements of national honor and safety and justice, and in a few days we will know just how the conditions which appear to us so ominous have impressed the majority of the American people. Nevertheless, we should declare our judgment if we believed it had no popular support whatever, for we are utterly convinced that it is right. It is some satisfaction, at least, to recall that there have been American statesmen courageous and farseeing enough to warn against the perils of craven submission to wrong. Far better than our statement of the issue is an utterance made by Josiah Quincy in 1808, when the controversy with Great Britain was verging toward war:

But to my eye the path of our duty is as distinct as the Milky Way. It is the path of active preparation, of dignified energy. It is the path of 1776! It consists not in abandoning our rights, but in supporting them, as they exist, and where they exist—on the ocean as well as on the land. But I shall be told, "This may lead to war." I ask, "Are we now at peace?" Certainly not, unless retiring from insult be peace; unless shrinking under the lash be peace! The surest way to prevent war is not to fear it. The idea that nothing on earth is so dreadful as war is inculcated too studiously among us. Disgrace is worse! Abandonment of essential rights is worse!

HOW 20,000 BOYS DIED

November 21, 1916.

IN HOW many homes where this newspaper is read are there sons from 12 to 18 years old? If the proportion is one in ten, we are to imagine 20,000 boys. Would it matter much if suddenly every one of them was forced to leave his home, and if, within a few weeks, the whole 20,000 were to perish miserably, of cold and hunger and disease? One cannot begin to measure the anguish and horror of such an event, nor even to imagine it as a credible thing. Yet that is precisely the story—except that the locality is distant and the victims unknown—that we are minded to recount today. Possibly it will impair the interest of the narrative when we admit that the occurrence it describes is twelve months old. Obviously it has no merit as news, and we are not sure that it has any special appropriateness as an editorial theme. So we offer it merely as a casual contribution to the imperfect knowledge which the most industrious of us possess about the war.

The matter was noted at the time only in a few hasty news paragraphs. For an instant the dreadful picture flashed into view in the kaleidoscopic panorama, then was whirled away and forgotten. We should not be recalling it now unless we had come upon the recital of one who witnessed the beginning of this fantastic tragedy of childhood. It makes a chapter of "With Serbia Into Exile," by Fortier Jones, an American volunteer in relief work. His glimpse of the first ominous

scene came to him when he and a detail of English women nurses whom he was escorting were caught in the torrent of the retreating Servian army and the hosts of refugees fleeing before the Teutonic invasion. This was in November, 1915. The scene was the plain of Kossovo, in central Servia, across which a vast multitude of soldiers and civilians, men, women and children, struggled in desperate confusion. The autumn rains had made the plain a morass, and the single road, rutted by the wheels of thousands of wagons, ox-carts and gun-carriages, was little better, while in many places it was submerged by floods. For twenty miles this highway of desolation and despair was filled with the ghastly cortege of a people in flight—broken companies of soldiers, homeless families of peasants, men and women staggering under bundles that contained all their possessions, mothers clutching babies to their breasts as they floundered thru the mud, children stumbling along behind them, and here and there great army motortrucks and lumbering batteries and plodding ox-teams. And by day and night there rolled up from behind the mutter of the ever-nearing guns. Once when the twenty-mile line became entangled somewhere and halted, the writer heard a strange commotion rearward, and out in the marshy field he saw 1000 or 1500 boys running thru the mire like stampeded cattle. Mounted officers were herding them back into the road, riding furiously among them and slashing at them with whips. The youngsters—many of them not more than 12 years old—were constantly straggling, and would have perished in the empty waste if they had not been driven back into line. This was just a detachment of the nation's youth, which by tens of thousands had been drafted by the government, not for military service, but in order to keep them out of the grasp of the invader. For the Germans and

Austrians were at pains to make prisoners of all Servian boys they found who were "almost ready for military service." And so, as each village and town was evacuated, the boys from 12 to 18 years old were ordered to march away with the retreating army. The writer had seen throngs of them all the way from Belgrade:—

Many for the first time in their lives were away from their own villages, and most of them had never before been separated from their families. There was no one to look after them. They did not even have the advantage of a soldier in getting food and shelter. If there was bread left over at the military stations, they got it; if not, they did not. They slept where they happened to stand when night came on. Few had sufficient clothing. I used to see the smaller of them sitting on top of the railway cars crying together by the dozens. They were hungry, of course; but it was not hunger or thirst or cold—it was old-fashioned homesickness that had them, with the slight difference that they longed for homes which no more existed.

They were concentrated finally at Mitrovitze, but before provision could be made for them, an order came to evacuate that town, and the boys were put on the march again. Yet they started away cheerfully; for to each one was given a rifle and all the ammunition he could stagger under, and, boylike, they exulted in being "soldiers." As they straggled along they sang and shouted and fired their rifles in reckless fusillades, until hunger and weariness gripped them, and then they wandered away from the road and had to be driven back to the line of march. So the writer saw them hurried past him in the retreat, and it was months later when he learned what had been the staggering climax of the little drama he had seen. During that night the famished, shelterless hosts creeping across the plain were overtaken by a blizzard. In an hour Indian summer changed to winter, the treeless expanse was swept by a snowstorm driven by an icy gale, and by hundreds

the ill-clad refugees stumbled aside and perished. But these are commonplaces of war's miseries; we are tracing the obscure story of that amazing army of leaderless boys. One recalls the piteous tales of the children's crusade, but who can say how much of truth there is in the records of that strange pilgrimage, when multitudes of children marched singing across Europe, some to litter the medieval highways with their bodies and thousands to be sold into slavery in Egypt? That, too, was 700 years ago; this Servian tragedy was but yesterday. How many were lost by the way may never be known, but 30,000 boys reached the Albanian frontier. There a gendarme pointed to the west, and told them to march on and they would reach the sea and safety. Without a leader or a guide, without food or means of shelter, they set out thru the defiles of the Albanian mountains in winter weather. Columns of soldiers overtook and passed them, and gave them what food they could spare. When that was gone they gnawed roots and bark. At dusk they crawled into hollows and under fallen trees and huddled together in groups for warmth. Each night found the broken ranks thinner as starvation and exposure claimed the weaker, and each morning there were wasted little forms that did not rise from the trodden snow.

How long it took the boys to reach the sea, and what they suffered by the way, no one knows. But from Prizrend, near which they crossed the frontier, to the port of Avlona is 150 miles, thru almost trackless mountains. When they reached the city, where an Italian army was in occupation, there were only half of those who had started to find the sea—15,000 had perished. And those who survived the terrible journey found no safety at the sea, after all. Gaunt from famine and disease, "there was nothing human about them,"

said one who saw them, "but their eyes." And there were no hospitals, no shelters, even, for the 15,000 pitiable creatures that dragged themselves toward the city. They were put in a camp in the open country, and arrangements were hastily made to send them to Vido, an island near Corfu. By the time the ships that were to transport them arrived, 6000 had died, and 2000 more succumbed on the twenty-four-hour journey. The French and Servian doctors at the island encampment said that, if it had been possible to give each boy a bed and special diet and careful nursing, perhaps two-thirds of the remaining 7000 might have been saved. But at Vido there were neither beds nor nurses, nor food for invalids, and for weeks the boys died at the rate of 100 a day, so that every morning a steamship came and carried away scores of bodies and buried them at sea, while the great warships in the harbor of Corfu, helpless for all their mighty power, lowered their flags in salute to the boys of Servia.

This is the story, tragic even in its incompleteness, for the world does not know how many more than 23,000 died. Yet there is the inevitable historical interest. The plain of Kossovo, where the martyrdom of this army of youths began, is to us a mere geographical expression, but in the ears of the Servian the name rings like the blast of a trumpet. It was there, in 1389, that the power of the great Servian kingdom was broken by the armies of the Turks, and to this day every peasant croons the songs that have been handed down from generation to generation in memory of the lost battle. The slaughter was so great, their legend runs, that after the fighting ceased the sky was darkened with flocks of vultures; and Kossovopolje, the Field of Blackbirds, the desolate place has been known for half a thousand years. And now it has a new meaning which intensifies the

spirit of nationalism that has outlived five centuries of hope deferred; for there is an army of Servians that marched singing into Monastir, that fights the fiercer because of the boys who were driven to hideous death by a ruthless invader. Otherwise, as we have remarked, the episode was of no importance whatever in respect to the great political and military developments of the conflict. This was not a battle or a massacre. No general won a decoration because of the destruction of these thousands of boys, nor is any one execrated as the author of the appalling sacrifice. It was just a minor incident, an obscure interlude, a gruesome bit of fate's byplay in the stupendous drama of war in civilization's most enlightened age.

THE BALKAN BATTLES

November 24, 1916.

IN ATTEMPTING to estimate the scope and meaning of the extraordinary campaigns now proceeding in the Balkans, a useful preliminary is to reduce the spaces of that region to familiar terms. If the Balkan map is placed over a map of the eastern United States drawn to the same scale, with Saloniki covering Philadelphia—they are, by the way, in the same latitude—a fairly clear idea of the distances is obtained. Monastir, captured the other day by Servians and French, will be found in about the location of Harrisburg. Northeast of Saloniki, the Anglo-French base, is Constanza, a Rumanian Black sea port recently seized by the German-Bulgar forces—it will be represented on the American map by Portland, Me. Three hundred and twenty miles west of Constanza and 300 miles north of Saloniki is Orsova, at the other extremity of Rumania—this would be Oswego, N. Y. From that point the Transylvanian Alps, separating Rumania from Hungary, extend northeast and north, the barrier being 360 miles north of Saloniki, or nearly as far as the Quebec frontier from Philadelphia. The Danube, dividing Rumania from Bulgaria, is 120 miles south of the mountains—relatively to Philadelphia, about in the region of the Adirondacks. These rough comparisons suggest the magnitude of the problem involved in the current news dispatches. And the fighting is proceeding on a scale worthy of the tremendous stage, the various battle lines extending for

nearly 1000 miles. These operations, indeed, for the time being dwarf in importance those on the western front. If they lack the concentrated fury of the great spectacle that was centered around Verdun, and the tremendous volume of force expended in the struggle of the Somme, their action is immeasurably swifter and their possible results not less vital.

Of the seven Balkan countries, Montenegro, Serbia and most of Albania have long been held by the Teutons, their allies, Bulgaria and Turkey, completing their control of the central part of the peninsula from the Adriatic to the Black sea and from the Danube to the Bosphorus. For many months the Entente forces have been established in Greece, and have made some progress in pressing back the Turco-Bulgarian invaders, the Allied line extending from the neighborhood of Seres, fifty miles northeast of Saloniki, virtually all the way to Avlona, an Albanian Adriatic port held by Italy. Last Sunday they consolidated their hold upon a small strip of Serbia by occupying Monastir, ten or twelve miles over the border. Greece, still technically neutral, is torn by civil war and is in effect a forced ally of Great Britain, France and Russia, their occupation deriving a color of legality from the circumstance that they have been her recognized protectors since 1830. The last of the Balkan group, Rumania, joined the Entente cause late in August, and, after a brief experience of conquest against her northern neighbor, Hungary, is now being rapidly subjugated by a Teuton invasion. There are, therefore, three great campaigns in progress, altho they are distinctly related.

After the Entente Allies had been established in Greece for nearly a year, Rumania decided that that was the winning side, and late in August declared war against the Teutonic alliance. From the beginning, political

considerations guided her moves. Her chief ambition was to "redeem" the 3,000,000 Rumanians living in Hungary under a hated rule, and she immediately invaded Transylvania, counting upon her principal ally, Russia, to protect her southern frontier by driving back any Bulgarian incursion. This arrangement appealed to both governments: Rumania wanted to conquer Transylvania without assistance, while Russia, aiming toward Constantinople, preferred a free hand in dealing with Bulgaria, whose "treacherous" adherence to the anti-Slavic cause was bitterly resented in Petrograd. For several weeks the plan prospered exceedingly, and in the Entente countries the participation of Rumania was hailed as the decisive move in the war. When the Rumanian armies dashed thru the mountain passes and down into Transylvania, the Austrians retired, and within thirty days the invaders were achieving successes fifty miles beyond the frontier. After the Rumanians were deeply involved on this adventure, the Germans and Bulgars suddenly struck from the south, swept back the Russo-Rumanian forces there, and soon held a line from Constanza, on the Black sea, to Czernavoda, on the Danube, threatening ultimately to force the river barrier and endanger the capital, 150 miles to the westward. Meanwhile, Von Falkenhayn had gathered a great army in Hungary, and when he started his drive, the Rumanians in Transylvania were swept thru the lofty passes in a disastrous defeat.

The capture of Monastir last Sunday, on the anniversary of the day when Servia wrested it from the Turks in 1912, and almost a year from the time when they evacuated it before the onslaught of the Bulgarians and Teutons, sent a thrill thru the Entente countries. Standing alone, this victory would be counted an achievement of high importance; but in relation to the Balkan

campaigns as a whole it proves to be of hardly more than local significance. For while the Servians and French, with some assistance from the Italians operating from Albania, were advancing a dozen miles into Serbia, Von Falkenhayn's armies smashed the Russo-Rumanian line, plunged southward to the main railroad, captured the vital junction point of Craiova, midway between Bucharest and the western Rumanian frontier, and thus split the defensive forces into three parts. Already the Teutons control one-third of Wallachia and its principal railroads, have isolated a large Rumanian force concentrated at Orsova, and are in a position to make a swift onslaught toward the capital. Nothing short of a military miracle can now save Rumania.

Perhaps the most striking result is the demonstration that even the terrific battering Germany is enduring in the west has not prevented her striking a crushing blow in the east. This is the first achievement of the plan of the new chief of staff, Von Hindenburg, the essentials of which are to fight defensively in France and offensively in the Balkans. The former region will see the most sanguinary fighting, but the latter is the inevitable scene of Germany's chief endeavors. For, while what she holds in Belgium and France might be valuable to her in peace negotiations, what she holds and seeks to acquire in the Balkans represents the domination for which she went to war and which she would consider a sufficient reward for all her sacrifices.

PEONAGE IN BELGIUM

November 27, 1916.

IN DISCUSSING, a few weeks ago, the more extensive use of poison gas as a weapon of the battlefield, we offered the trite comment that "familiarity dulls the edge of interest"—that the human mind becomes habituated to horrors oft repeated. Events of the war which two years ago would have shocked the world are now accepted as episodes in a sort of terrible routine. This may explain the public's attitude of detachment concerning Germany's latest ingenuity in calculated terrorism—the deportation of thousands of Belgians for forced labor beyond the Rhine. The martyrdom of that little nation was the first event of the war, and still stands forth as its worst atrocity. The violation of Belgium, the sacrifices of Belgium, the nobility of her heroism and the anguish of her suffering—these things have been burned into the mind of mankind; and perhaps the very depth of her woe makes it difficult for sympathy to arouse itself adequately over this new barbarity. Nevertheless, the subject seems to us to merit examination. There is, it is true, nothing novel in the wholesale deportation and enslavement of the civilians of a conquered territory—the captivities of Israel began twenty-six centuries ago. But this particular form of military criminality has not been practiced since the world reached enlightenment, until this year of grace. And it challenges American attention because it is a violation of a law which the United States helped to frame and because

its victims are a people toward whom this country has assumed peculiar obligations. Because a rigorous censorship stifles the cries of the tortured nation, it has taken weeks for the details of the outrage to become known. Even now, only the German authorities know how many thousands of Belgians have been exiled, how many families have been sunk in terror and despair by forced separation. But gradually the repellent story is being made known—in the fragmentary news dispatches, in the ringing protests of Belgian officials, and, more clearly than anywhere else, in the characteristic pleas offered by Prussianism in defense of the crime.

A military occupying force, being responsible for the orderly administration of territory so held, properly exercises a control over the subjugated people more drastic than that of the native government during peace. In theory, therefore, one might justify German decrees issued in August, 1914, and May, 1915, which ostensibly were directed toward reducing unemployment. They forbade voluntary idleness, regulated conditions of employment and provided for the forcible exaction of labor from able-bodied men who persisted in rejecting opportunities of work. But these orders, rigorous as they were, apparently contemplated only labor in Belgium; it was not suspected that they were the efficient preliminaries for a system of peonage under which workers would be seized and transported to Germany. The earliest evidence of the malign purpose appears to be a decree dated October 3 last, imposing forced labor on all Belgians fitted for work who were receiving public support, and conveying the threat that they might be compelled to work "away from their domiciles." The meaning of this was made clear in the posting of notices in the villages of the Mons district, summoning the entire male population above the age of 17

to present themselves at an appointed place at 8 o'clock on the morning of October 26. Herded in an open yard in a pelting rain, they were finally inspected by German officers. Priests, school teachers, officials, old men and the physically unfit were dismissed, and from the others selections were made. In some cases men unemployed were sent home, in others men who had not been idle—including clerks, students and farmers—were taken. In all, 1200 were retained, about one-fourth of the able-bodied male inhabitants of the district. These were divided into groups and escorted by soldiers to the railroad station. There they were loaded into a train of cattle cars and sent away. Having had no warning of their fate, the men had not brought clothing or food for a journey. When the alarm of the deportation spread thru the countryside, distracted women by hundreds ran to the station, carrying coats and wraps for their men; but soldiers barred the way, and the train departed for an unknown destination. For weeks scenes like this have occurred in numberless places in Belgium. It is said that some of the men were induced to sign long-term contracts for work at stipulated wages; others, who refused, were imprisoned or taken forcibly. Large companies were sent into the German-held part of France; whole trainloads were forwarded to Germany, where the exiles will be put to work in mines, quarries and other industrial enterprises. Ten days ago official reports stated that 40,000 men had thus been exiled, and that they were being shipped away at the rate of 2000 a day. It was declared that not fewer than 300,000 would be torn from their homes. When the sinister purpose of the order became known, Belgian municipal authorities refused to furnish to the Germans lists of unemployed persons in their districts. This resistance was severely punished. Tournai was fined \$50,000, and

the council was informed that \$5000 penalty would be exacted for every day the list was withheld. For the same offense the entire board of aldermen of Brussels was imprisoned.

As in the case of all Germany's war dealings with Belgium, the defense offered for these ruthless deportations is compounded of effrontery and false pretense. After an occupation of more than two years, with an unarmed population under guard of a huge military force, the authorities cite as an excuse a rule of war which requires them to "re-establish and maintain order"—unemployment, they protest, is dangerous to peace. But another part of the same article—requiring the invader to feed the population—they conveniently ignore; that has been made the business of the United States and other neutrals. They argue further that idleness puts an intolerable burden upon charity; they seem quite oblivious of the fact that the charity which suffers is American, not German. But the principal plea is more offensive in its hypocrisy. "Nothing," says the German governor, "so demoralizes a man as long idleness, and nothing tends more to weaken a nation than that a large part of it is compelled for years to do nothing." This intimation that the Belgians, the most industrious people in the world, have become a nation of loafers and grafters would be indecent from any source, but from Germany it is utterly revolting. For the German invaders did more than strike down the government of Belgium and reduce its population to political servitude; they stripped the country of its crops, its seeds, its raw materials; they seized every factory, and either turned it to their own use for military purposes or dismantled it and shipped the machinery across the Rhine. And it is after they have destroyed the industry and paralyzed the business of Belgium, after they have

wrung from the helpless people a war levy of \$8,000,000 a month—twenty times the normal taxation—and forced them to exist upon the doles of charitable neutrals, that they taunt them with their impoverishment and denounce them as idling vagabonds. If Germany's purpose were merely to eradicate unemployment, she could have every able-bodied man at work within twenty-four hours upon projects of public improvement at the expense of the Belgian nation. When she drags these men from their homes, and sends them by trainloads into Germany and into the regions behind the trenches in France, she is reviving the slavery that sometimes disgraced mediæval warfare, and is using a subjugated people to strengthen her armies, than which there is no more infamous perversion of the rights of conquest. For every famished Belgian who can be tempted by high wages, or coerced by threats and maltreatment, into working in German industries releases a German for the firing line and becomes a unit in the forces devastating his own land. Those who want first-hand evidence of the situation will find it in the protest issued by Cardinal Mercier on November 7:

At first the ordinances threatened only unemployed men. Today all able-bodied men are carried off pell-mell, penned up in trucks and deported to unknown destinations, like slave-gangs. It was already a matter of forced labor for Belgium; today it is labor in Germany for the Germans' benefit. The whole truth is that each deported workman means another soldier for the German army; he will take the place of a German workman, who will be made a soldier.

Parties of soldiers enter by force peaceful homes, tearing youth from parent, husband from wife, father from children. They bar with bayonets the door thru which wives and mothers wish to pass to say farewell to those departing. They herd their captives in groups and push them into cars, and as soon as the train is filled an officer waves the signal for departure. Thus thousands of Belgians are being reduced to slavery.

The strange force of justice that works thru the blind moves of fate was never more clearly illustrated than in these events. Belgium, that was counted upon by Germany to be her stepping-stone to glory, remains for her the threshold of everlasting infamy. And it is in relation to Belgium, above all else, that the Prussian mind seems doomed ever to baffle its own desires. It was the violation of Belgium that ranged the might of Great Britain and the sentiment of the world against Germany; it was the methodical brutality of the conquest—the burning of cities and levying of crushing tribute, the shooting of civilians and the execution of a nurse—that raised vast new armies against her. And now, when the German people yearn for peace because of the horrible slaughter they and their enemies are enduring, and when new victories in the Balkans persuade them that soon their adversaries must succumb, their infatuated rulers revive the terrorism of slavery and inspire against them more bitter condemnation, more implacable resolve. How much nearer peace may be brought by the overthrow of Rumania is already an exultant theme in Germany. How much further it has been put away by the enslavement of the helpless survivors of Belgium's martyrdom she has yet to learn.

SUBMARINE NEWS AND VIEWS

December 1, 1916.

TWO news reports, which are unequal in credibility, but are singularly eloquent when associated, appear among the numerous recent dispatches relating to the threatened revival of unrestrained submarine warfare by Germany. One tells of persistent rumors that two of the undersea craft are lying in wait in the steamship lanes off the American coast; definite warnings to this effect have been sent out daily for some time by British cruisers, and as a result vessels leaving or approaching New York and Boston have been making long detours. One ship thus added eight days to the customary length of her voyage from London to New York. Last Monday there was not a liner or cargo boat to be found within miles of the usual course near Nantucket lightship. The other news story told of the departure of the United States dreadnoughts on a target-practice cruise. The huge battleship Connecticut, on orders from Washington, dropped behind the fleet as it passed out beyond Sandy Hook on Monday, and anchored near the three-mile limit. The incident was of less interest than the explanation confidently offered by a pro-German newspaper in New York:

She is waiting to see that fair play is done. She will do the work of mercy that the American destroyers did when the U-53 raided the shipping off Nantucket, should more ships be sunk. The navy department was taking time by the forelock.

If an historian of the future, seeking light upon the attitude of the United States toward the complications raised by the war's invasions of American rights, should come by chance upon this astonishing announcement, what would be his judgment? Standing alone, of course, the paragraph would be dismissed as the most worthless of fabrications, a preposterous libel upon the government of a great, free people. Indeed, that is our opinion of it now. But the historical inquirer would be bound to take into account preceding circumstances; and he would find that the scandalous imputations made are deduced from events of record. When it is implied that an American battleship has been stationed near the expected scene of lawless attacks, in order to perform "the work of mercy" of rescuing the victims and thus facilitating the criminal operations, the suggestion is based upon an actual precedent. One does not credit the charge that the Connecticut has any such instructions; but one cannot ignore the fact that in a like situation American warships did watch a submarine at its work of law-defying destruction, and dutifully gathered up American passengers who had been forced to leave a steamship in defiance of this government's explicit declarations. We remarked the other day that it is not our purpose to revive old issues for the mere sake of controversy, but that new developments would justify such discussion. New developments in the submarine matter are ominously present. Not only do daily dispatches tell of official alarm in Washington over signs of a resumption of unrestrained use of this weapon, but there are constant warnings that the raiding of nearby waters will be repeated. What this would mean was sufficiently indicated by the exploits of the U-53, which boldly sought the hospitality of an American port, obtained information as to the sailing of vessels, and

within twenty-four hours had sunk five in sight of Nantucket lightship, one of them a steamship bound from St. Johns to New York with nearly a hundred passengers, the majority Americans.

At the time of this outrage we discussed frankly the dangerous issues it raised. It was the logical result, we argued, of the policy that not only had failed to enforce just demands, but had given a certificate of character to the submarine as a warship entitled to all the courtesies, immunities and privileges of vessels that can be kept under observation and control. We gave it as our opinion that the reception of the *Deutschland*, at a time when the *Lusitania* murders still lacked reparation or even disavowal, would be a sign to Germany of American indifference to her practices, while the official recognition given to the U-53 would be a calamitous precedent. But we had our perturbation to ourselves. Washington exhibited only the mildest professional interest in the sinking of the passenger ship and the endangering of the American occupants, while most newspapers forgot the women and children tossing in small boats forty-two miles at sea in testifying to the "strict observance of Germany's pledge" which that circumstance embodied. The only support we found was in the Army and Navy Journal, which suggested that the visit of the U-53 was intended by Germany to establish a precedent nullifying that set up by President Grant in 1870. It is worth while to recall the terms of that declaration, expressed in a note from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to the American minister in Paris:

Altho vessels of either belligerent may not actually shelter within the jurisdiction of the United States and proceed thence against vessels of its enemy, this government would regard as an unfriendly act the hovering of such vessels upon the coast of the United States, near to its shore, in the neigh-

borhood of its ports and in the track of the ordinary commerce of these ports, with intent to intercept vessels of trade of its enemy.

France and Germany then yielded to the warning. But the U-53 not only came into the jurisdiction of this country and proceeded thence against enemy vessels; not only hovered near our shores, in the neighborhood of our ports and in the track of their ordinary commerce and intercepted enemy vessels, but destroyed them by lawless methods in defiance of this government's warning, and subjected American citizens to hardship and peril which it had denounced as intolerable. Renewed outrages of this nature might disturb and incense the American people, but what reason has Germany to fear anything from an administration which has been at such pains to recognize and condone her deliberate jeopardizing of the lives of American passengers "exercising their indisputable rights"? There have been many steps in the abandonment of national rights in this matter, but not the least deplorable was the recognition given to the U-53 in the harbor of Newport and actually in the prosecution of her lawless work of destruction.

No thoughtful observer can escape the conviction that the administration's avowed concern over pending developments is justified, and that at any time this country may be involved anew in a crisis invited by its own complaisance.

THE WAR BEGINS ANEW

December 7, 1916.

THAT familiar expression, "the war has entered a new phase," often inexactly applied, is distinctly appropriate today. At no other time since the struggle began has the situation presented so many factors of capital importance, such a stupendous clashing of the forces of the human will. In other periods of stress it was possible to observe national and military crises singly. At one time submarine warfare was the commanding spectacle; at another, the intricacies of Balkan intrigue; at another, a western offensive, a Russian campaign or operations in the Far East. Gallipoli, Lusitania, Warsaw, Bagdad, Trentino, Verdun and the Somme are names that seem to recall isolated events. But today the whole vast area of belligerency is shaken at once. It is as if the nations, after two years and a half of blind struggling, had looked for the first time into the abyss of universal ruin and were simultaneously making convulsive efforts to save themselves. Far more significant than the movements of armies are the desperate maneuvers of governments and the ferment of the peoples. When it seemed that the limits of human power and endurance had been reached, there is a new straining and heaving of the vast forces, demands for sterner sacrifices, and a menace of war more bitter than has yet been seen. It is certain that peace never seemed more remote than now, when its terms are a subject of daily speculation.

Developments have been so rapid that news of them has overlapped, and events of far-reaching importance are obscured by others before their meaning has become clear. When every belligerent capital is a political storm center, one great change counteracts another in the public mind, and it is difficult to see them in their true value. Before attempting detailed discussion of the various upheavals, therefore, we shall outline briefly the general situation. In the military field there are operations of importance on only three main fronts, and in each case Germany is once more in the ascendant. As to the position in the west, this is true only in the sense that her defense is still unbroken and that the attacks of her adversaries have become relatively weak. The great Somme offensive, now in the beginning of its sixth month, has been reduced—chiefly on account of unfavorable weather—to local actions and artillery duels. The Anglo-French superiority in men, guns, ammunition and striking power has been definitely established, and the initiative is still with that side. But it is impossible to maintain that the pressure there exerted is of crushing force when the Teutons can simultaneously conduct a triumphant campaign in a distant field. The attacking forces have performed remarkable feats in taking strongly fortified trenches and villages, and are still animated by the invigorating consciousness of holding the mastery. But for the present the western struggle is once more a deadlock.

Quite overshadowing this, the campaigns in Rumania have dominated the news for several weeks. Participation of that country on the side of Great Britain, France and Russia, which was hailed by them as the turning point toward victory, has proved to be their most costly miscalculation. It is, indeed, one of the direct causes of the political unrest in all three countries.

The ingenious explanation is now offered that Rumania, armed chiefly with guns from German and Austrian factories, intended to delay her joining until next spring, when she would have been fully equipped by her allies, and that the Teutons, aware of her weakness, forced the issue. However this may be, it is clear that the Rumanians were hopelessly outclassed, that Russia was unable to give effective aid, and that the international forces operating from Saloniki have failed miserably to perform their part in the Balkan plan. This project was for a quick subjugation of Transylvania, a movement which was to hold Austria while Bulgaria was crushed between a Russo-Rumanian drive from the north and an Anglo-French-Servian advance from the south. The Transylvanian adventure was a fatal success, for neither the Russians nor the Allies operating in Macedonia made good. After leisurely preparation, the Teutons and Bulgars began a gigantic encircling movement, Von Falkenhayn driving down thru the Transylvanian Alps and Von Mackensen sweeping north to the Danube. Capture of Monastir by the Servians and French had no effect, Russian reinforcements arrived in Rumania too late, and within a few weeks the invaders had cleared virtually all of Wallachia and added its fertile plains to their prizes of war.

In this calamitous affair the utter inability of the Rumanians to withstand a grand German attack was not surprising. Russia's failure, too, is explained by inefficiency and the distraction of a political crisis. But the comparative inertia of Sarrail's army of more than half a million men in Macedonia is as much a mystery now as it has been for six months past. Had the plan based upon Rumania's intervention been carried out with vigor and success, the results would have been ominous for Germany. Bulgaria would have been eliminated,

Turkey isolated from her powerful allies, and a barrier erected across the highway to the East which Germany had opened at such heavy cost. Collapse of the enterprise is correspondingly serious for the Entente Powers. For not only is Rumania virtually crushed, but Bulgaria is immeasurably strengthened and the Berlin-Constantinople line made more secure. But the effects are reflected most clearly in the reactions they have caused in the defeated countries—a political crisis in Great Britain, drastic criticism of the government in France, and turmoil in Russia. British unrest has been growing for many weeks, notable signs being violent attacks on the government, discussion of a food dictatorship, reorganization of the navy command and furious complaints of the mishandled Balkan situation.

Whatever succeeds the overturned coalition cabinet, therefore, it is clear that British confidence has received a severe check. Hilaire Belloc, a capable military authority, tells his countrymen that this is an attack of "nerves"; but it will take more than soothing advice to overcome the effect of the Balkan rout—the latest of a dismal succession—and of the sinister prospects in Greece. Even in France, where the frank expression of democracy is tempered by a sterner discipline, the questionings of disappointment and alarm will not be stifled. "Time passes—we talk, Germany acts," cries one influential journalist. Another writes: "It is the life of the republic which is at stake. If it is proved in the eyes of the nation that we cannot organize for war—despite numerical, financial and naval supremacy—the parliamentary régime will be held responsible. The republic itself will be blamed." The nation, which has endured almost unimaginable sufferings and losses, cannot conceal its dismay that these sacrifices are not enough to command victory, and that an advantage in

the Balkans has been squandered thru military feebleness and lack of co-ordination. The censorship conceals most of the developments in Russia, but there is no doubt of the existence of serious conflict between the people and the autocratic ruling class. Even that vast population feels the stupendous loss of blood the war has inflicted, and Russian inefficiency has made the food problem acute. And yet, singularly enough, the overthrow of Premier Sturmer was due to a popular uprising against subtle suggestions for a separate peace. Sturmer was a representative of the strong German element that still remains in Russian governmental affairs; Treppoff, his successor, is an advocate of war to the end. Yet even the appointment of the latter did not pacify the duma, and the new premier could not make his first address until shouting assailants had been ejected.

Outweighing all these events in importance, however, and responsible in great measure for them, is the action of Germany in summoning to active war work, under government control, the entire male population between the ages of seventeen and sixty years. No other movement in the struggle has been comparable in magnitude to this. It means that this is to be really a war to the death. Against the superiority of her enemies in numbers, in supplies and in sea power, Germany is able, thru the discipline of her people, to pit such a concentration of energy as the world has never seen. It shows how momentous and confusing are the developments of the last few weeks that this colossal move has occasioned less world interest than the battles in Rumania. When we say, therefore, that the great war has entered a new phase, we have in mind two new elements—Germany's tremendous initiative in organizing, once for all, the entire power of her people, and the appearance among her antagonists of a realization that

thereby she has once more forged to the front and that she cannot be defeated unless she is first overtaken. In addition, there is the obvious revelation that hopes of an early peace are vain. Germany's eagerness to capitalize by settlement her holdings and her latest victories is not more ardent than the determination of her enemies to smash her power. And now she has multiplied it to such a degree that their task has become more formidable in appearance than at any other time since her legions were sweeping toward Paris.

THE REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

December 8, 1916.

A MEMBER of the staff of the New York World, returning recently from a long sojourn in Germany, wrote several pages of enlightening matter upon affairs in that country. The essence of it all, however, was in these sentences:

Seventy million people with their backs against the wall. Seventy million people fighting as one. Seventy million people, and not a quitter among them. That is one of the deepest impressions that I brought back with me from my visit to Germany. Powerful as is the pressure under which they are standing; heavy as are the blows they receive; dark tho their eventual prospects may be, the spirit of patriotism, of steadfastness, of courage, of defiance, that the Germans are showing burns as brightly and as fiercely today, after more than two years of war, as at the outset.

The most significant thing about the writer's estimate is that it is already out of date. When he referred to "seventy million people fighting as one" he wrote figuratively—and now Germany has made it a reality. By a law passed a week ago every able-bodied male in the empire who is not under arms is made liable to compulsory civilian service under government control. Literally, not metaphorically or thru voluntary effort, the whole national power is organized for war, from the foremost trench in France or Rumania or Russia to the remotest village and last man in the empire. During the whole conflict of twenty-eight months there has not been any project, military or economic, that approached this in magnitude and significance.

It marks the opening of a new epoch, not only in Germany, but in all Europe; it will profoundly affect the course and duration of the war, the terms of peace and the future of civilization thruout the whole world. It may well be as revolutionary as the American war of independence or the introduction of steam power. For what Germany has done is to erect, almost over night, the framework of a socialized state. That the movement is directed by autocracy, that the purpose is to accomplish a temporary arrangement and that the inspiration is the abnormal need of war—these things are of minor importance in presence of the fact that one of the foremost nations of the earth has organized itself essentially according to the formula with which Bellamy, in "Looking Backward," amused an incredulous world thirty years ago. It is a grim Utopia that confronts us in the present manifestation, and will awaken no envy. But the vital point is that it is a fact, and will compel emulation. Already Germany's allies are following her lead, and her enemies must do the same or lose all they have won. And who can say that the restoration of peace will mean the discarding of methods which may prove effective in carrying a great people thru the terrific ordeal of implacable war?

The causes of the move are plain enough. This war has resolved itself into a contest of endurance—a combat of money and metals and men. The first need Germany has met by ingenious devices of finance and self-support. The second she has supplied by conquering and holding metal-producing territory. The third presents a problem infinitely more difficult—the factors are an increasing demand and a diminishing supply. Germany's declining man-power has long been a matter of remorseless calculation by her enemies. The populations upon which she can draw are known, she is unable to command

further reinforcements, and precise estimates have been made as to when the wastage of lives will fatally impair her human resources and compel her to yield. It is not surprising that a nation which has found ways to withstand a suffocating blockade, maintaining itself in food and war supplies virtually without imports, should have recognized long ago the threat of such a condition. The German government knows as well as do its adversaries that the supply of men is a question of life and death, and its devices for solving the problem are characteristically direct, efficient—and Prussian. The first move was to make use of the stores of human material lying unused in conquered territory. It required no extraordinary keenness to discern that the way to make all Germans of reasonable age available for actual military service was to replace those still employed in productive enterprise and other civilian activities, and even in munition plants. If 25,000 French peasant women could be sent from the Lille district to harvest German crops, that meant just so much German energy conserved for war purposes. If 100,000 Belgian workmen could be seduced or coerced into peonage in German mines and factories and quarries, every one would release a German worker to be sent to the firing line. This is, of course, the explanation of the ruthless "slave raids" in Belgium. German papers have hailed the infamous decree as an act of humanitarianism, designed to redeem the suffering Belgians from idleness; but Governor General Bissing has bluntly told one true reason:

I consider that I am serving the emperor and the fatherland to the best advantage when I cause the least possible German blood to flow here and the fewest possible Germans to be withdrawn from our front line to watch over Belgium.

So the men of Belgium by tens of thousands are torn from their homes and families and sent into Ger-

many in order that the garrison of the country may be diverted to the trenches in France. And another purpose, as frankly stated in the reichstag, is that these victims shall take the places of German artisans likewise needed at the front. The "freeing" of that part of Poland taken from Russia is a similar expedient. For the German chancellor has announced to the reichstag that the promise to create the new kingdom was only conditional, being dependent upon the success of the plan to raise a Polish army of "volunteers" to fill the depleted ranks of the kaiser's. But these are mere subordinate parts of the great plan of utilizing every scrap of human energy which is available to an autocratic government that has the confidence of its subjects. The main plan is embraced in the bill which was passed last week, under which all male citizens between 18 and 60 years old are made subject to "compulsory civilian service in the interests of the empire." Only a few hours were devoted to discussing the far-reaching revolution proposed. The advocates put forth by the military authorities merely explained briefly that the measure was "necessary to secure the victory already won in the field." Germany's enemies, they said, still cherished illusions of triumph; and altho the defense lines were impenetrable, it was needful to strengthen both the military and economic fronts of the nation during the winter. Not only, it was said, must gaps in the firing line be filled, but subtractions from economic enterprise, thru raising the age limit for active service, must be replaced. The essential aim was to link up every productive activity of the whole empire into one vast network, centering in the government, so that all efforts should be concentrated and directed toward achieving victory.

It was frankly admitted that this was the "most revolutionary measure ever submitted to a German

legislature." Yet the disciplined people accepted it as tho they had contemplated it for years, instead of having become acquainted with it a few days before. The bill passed by a vote of 235 to 19. The objectors, singularly enough, were a few radical Socialists, who winced at submitting to the "enslavement" of labor by a form of compulsory enlistment and autocratic military control—a very different thing from their ideal of a socialized state. We have emphasized, in the face of a general attitude of indifference toward this event, our opinion that it is the most important and significant development of the war, and therefore a matter of the deepest concern to all the world. The German chancellor himself declares that "there never has been a mobilization of national energy so gigantic in its scope," and that the empire has embarked upon "an enterprise of staggering magnitude." Certain it is that Germany has once more seized the initiative in the prosecution of the struggle. Already her action has startled and shaken her antagonists; the political turmoil in Great Britain, France and Russia is a sign that those nations realize that a new and more stupendous force has been launched against them. What the effects are likely to be upon them, upon the duration of the war and upon the future of civilization, we shall discuss at another time.*

*See "Back to Sparta," page 189.

DIVIDED GREECE

December 14, 1916.

EXACTLY one year ago today, in one of our numerous discussions of the ever-changing Balkan situation, we offered the following remark:

There has been no more interesting political episode in the war than the complicated evolutions of Greece during the last ten months, by which she has been transformed from an almost certain ally of the Entente Powers to a sullen neutral, of a temper which may flame at any moment into hostility.

The events of the twelve months have more than justified this comment, for they are about to culminate—unless Germany's peace proposal acts as a stay—in a new complication of belligerency. While one-half of Greece is in arms against Bulgaria and with the Entente forces, the other half, led by the king, is awaiting a signal from Berlin to fall upon the rear of the Allied armies. Unless, therefore, Great Britain, France and Russia apply effectually the "radical solution" for which, it is announced, they are prepared, the kingdom whose independence they created, guaranteed and protected for three-quarters of a century will be officially their open enemy and a new ally of the Central Powers. In view of the fact that differences of opinion among the Greeks themselves as to the course of the government have led to bitter civil war, it is hardly remarkable that neutrals have been somewhat bewildered by the kaleidoscopic changes during the last two years. After moving for many months toward her natural alliance with the Entente, Greece compromised upon a guarantee of

“benevolent neutrality”; when this arrangement was broken by the will of the pro-German sovereign, revolution began; and finally the strong royalist remnant, after a year of shifting intrigue, has revealed its purpose as unqualifiedly hostile. And, involved with the international developments, there has been an irreconcilable conflict between the country’s ambitious military autocracy and the champions of constitutional government. Obviously, no understanding of these intricate issues and their possible results can be had without study of events in their order; and, since no normal memory could recall them without assistance, we shall supply a brief chronological survey.

It is necessary to remember, first, that for nearly four centuries Greece was under Turkish rule, until she won her independence in 1830 with the aid of Great Britain, France and Russia. Those Powers thereupon assumed guardianship of the new state, and fulfilled their obligations on several occasions at rather heavy cost to themselves. The first king, a Bavarian, was an impossible despot, and when he was expelled, a better dynasty was founded by the selection of a Danish prince, known as George I. The guarantors of the “monarchial, independent, constitutional state” showed their interest by granting big loans and by contributing \$100,000 annually to the king’s civil list. They have done this ever since the treaty of 1863, and, so far as is known, Constantine has regularly drawn his royal allowance. When Greece, in 1897, undertook the mad adventure of war on Turkey, it was Great Britain, France and Russia that intervened when the German-led Moslems were about to reconquer the peninsula; and they even upheld the crown prince, now the king and their implacable enemy, when the disillusioned people wanted to overturn the royal house. Treaty rights and duties, therefore, are cited by those

countries as legal ground for their active participation in Greek affairs when the world war submerged the Balkan countries. But there was justification of a far more direct kind. When the Teutons, in September, 1915, began their assault upon Servia, that nation invoked its defensive alliance with Greece. Premier Venizelos, who from the beginning had urged his country's participation in the war against Germany—he resigned office and was overwhelmingly returned to power on that precise issue—pledged the aid of Greece to her stricken neighbor. But King Constantine, a brother-in-law of the German kaiser, repudiated the treaty. There was in that agreement a provision that, in case of default by Greece, it should rest with France and Great Britain to fulfill the terms if they chose. Accordingly, the premier, supported by the parliament, invited the landing of Anglo-French forces to carry out the task Greece had rejected; whereupon the king dismissed him and embarked upon a policy which was in flagrant violation of the constitution, but which he defended as for the best interests of the nation. Half a dozen puppet cabinets pledged "benevolent neutrality" toward the Entente, and this attitude was maintained to the extent of permitting the Allies to occupy Saloniki and adjoining territory and many Greek islands as naval bases. Moreover, the king was vociferous in his protestations of friendship and his complaints because the occupying Powers seemed suspicious of his intentions. Only a belief that the Teutons were invincible and that Greece would invite the fate of Servia by joining the unprepared Allies, he said, induced him to stifle the aspirations of the people. Yet court and army circles were so unmistakably pro-German that the Entente leaders never dared to relax their vigilance. Ever since last spring a great force has been ready to

advance against Bulgaria, but has been held by the ominous possibility that Constantine would hurl his forces against them from the rear.

That their distrust was justified was shown last June, when suddenly the Bulgarians overran Grecian Macedonia, the Greek forces, under orders from Athens, surrendering fort after fort without firing a shot. Seres, Drama and Kavala, the three principal cities—the last named an important seaport—were occupied by the invaders, and enormous quantities of guns, ammunition and other war material were acquired without a struggle. Constantine insisted that this shameless deal was necessary to his patriotic plan for “keeping the country out of war”; but in plain terms it was the surrender of hard-won territory to an inveterate enemy and the arming of that enemy at the expense of Greece. The supplies seized and the losses inflicted amounted to \$40,000,000. The anger and dismay of patriotic Greeks culminated late in August in a tremendous demonstration, which in formal resolutions warned the king that the nation would resist his attempt to seize autocratic power thru the agency of a German victory. A few days later a revolution started at Saloniki, and thirty warships of the Allies arrived at the port of Athens. This was the beginning of unceasing turbulence—huge defections from the army and navy, intermittent outbreaks of civil war, more desperate shifting by the king and his pro-German military party, more drastic measures of repression and coercion by the French and British. While the revolt gathered strength in the provinces, the capital remained a hotbed of German propaganda and espionage, until, on September 2, the Allies demanded and received control of the postal and telegraphic service. A fortnight later a new ministry renewed the pledge of “benevolent neutrality”—and signified its sincerity by surrendering

the last of the Kavala forts to the Bulgars. On September 24 the revolutionists took complete control in Crete, whereupon the king told the Associated Press that he was ready to join the Entente in return for definite and certain advantages. But the worthlessness of his word had been proved too often. During the night Venizelos left for Crete, with the commander-in-chief of the Greek navy, and there a provisional government, pledged to war on Bulgaria, was established. Almost simultaneously the chief of the army staff and 500 officers presented to the king a memorial urging him to abandon neutrality. Even then, had he taken the field against the Bulgars, the whole nation would have followed him. At that time German papers predicted a declaration of war from Greece. But Constantine, it has been shown, was only maneuvering for time, and as the government's hostility was becoming dangerous, the French, on October 11, took over all Greek warships. Six days later furious riots began in Athens, armed crowds attacking the Allies' patrols. The menace of an attack on the rear of the Saloniki armies had become so plain that the Entente demanded withdrawal of the Greek royal forces from Larissa to the southern peninsula. Constantine resisted, but finally promised to comply—and methodically broke his pledge.

By this time all hope of a friendly arrangement had been abandoned, and the repeated suggestions that Greek aid be purchased with arms and equipment were ignored. "That," said Paris, "would be to arm a potential enemy." Incidentally, it was a proposal by the king's partisans that the Entente equip and finance the forces of a government which had actually supplied the Bulgarians with arms and ammunition to use against the Allies. The sanguinary battle in Athens on December 1 was the result of the Allies' demand, and the king's

written agreement, for the surrender of armament equivalent to that he had given, or sold, to the enemies of Greece. But a more sinister part of the record is that the 3000 Anglo-French troops that landed were subjected to "treacherous and unprovoked attack" by royalist forces secretly placed to trap them. With that encounter the mask of Constantine dropped, and he disclosed himself the determined ally of Germany. Whether he acted thru pure love of Greece, or, as his enemies charge, with "hideous treachery" and falsehood to Greece's friends, the fact remains that his course during the two years has been more serviceable to Germany than if he had declared war simultaneously with the kaiser against Britain, France and Russia.

What the outcome will be cannot be foretold. Probably the peace move by Germany will chill Constantine's enthusiasm; possibly the Allies' "radical solution" will be to depose him by force and recognize the Venizelist provisional government; perhaps the ambitious sovereign will attempt, as the German papers predict, to smash thru to a junction with Von Mackensen and "make a clean sweep in the Balkans." But it seems certain, at least, that the long period of baffling intrigue and duplicity in Athens has come to a close, and that forced settlement will soon be made of the fate of unhappy, disunited, distracted Greece.

GERMANY'S PEACE PROPOSAL

December 15, 1916.

THERE is not an American of decently humane impulses, we suppose, who did not feel a thrill of relief and hope upon first reading the news that at last a formal and authoritative proposal for peace negotiations had been made by one group of belligerents. The uninterrupted spectacle of death and destruction has become so dreadful to contemplate, and the increasing range and bitterness of the conflict so ominous, that any definite move toward ending it must be hailed with satisfaction. The severest critic of Germany's policies and war methods and the most skeptical analyst of her motives will not withhold, therefore, the recognition due to a striking and forceful action. The dramatic instinct which is so marked in the character of the kaiser never was displayed to greater advantage nor on a stage so vast. For the background of the magnificent interlude there was Von Hindenburg's triumphant progress in Rumania; for incidental music the thunder of unnumbered guns; for supporting principals, a king-emperor, a czar and a sultan; for supernumeraries, 70,000,000 faithful subjects, and for audience, the nations of all the world. It is in no petty spirit of distortion that we represent the kaiser as the central figure in what was heralded as an event of "world-wide historical importance." Not only did the imperial chancellor ascribe the momentous decision to "his majesty," but it was made without even the form of consulting the nation. The reichstag

assembled in total ignorance of the action that had been taken, and the people knew nothing of it until it was irrevocably accomplished. It was considered no more a concern of dutiful citizens of the empire than was the issuance of the order that mobilized them for war twenty-eight months ago.

The very first words of the proposal challenge attention—the war is called “a catastrophe.” There is no other evidence of a change of heart; therefore, this phrase has a hollow sound coming from a statesmanship which held that “war is a biological necessity,” and that its “inevitableness, idealism and blessing must be repeatedly emphasized.” That the Central Powers “gained gigantic advantages over adversaries superior in numbers and war material” is a statement that will flatter their people more than it will impress their enemies. They won the territory they hold from armies outnumbered and ill prepared; they have made no appreciable advance—except in Rumania—since their opponents effectually organized their resources. Events have demonstrated, they say, that the resistance of their forces cannot be broken. But events have demonstrated that it can be seriously impaired, and the indications are that present pressure is to be vastly increased. Assuredly, Verdun yielded no “gigantic advantage,” nor can such a term be applied to the hurling back of the line on the Somme. Moreover, this is a war, not of battles merely, but of endurance. The boast that “our lines stand unshaken” is not without reason; but the same may be said by the enemy—and the real question is, which will stand the longer? And in the exultant celebration of complete triumph what becomes of the “freedom of the seas”? Is a nation “unconquerable” and “victorious” when its fleet is in hiding, its merchant flag driven from the ocean and its trade reduced to com-

merce with its subject neighbors? Germany says she "fights to assure the integrity of her frontiers"; by whom were they ever threatened? She fights "for the right to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations"; but where, and from what Power, did she ever suffer restrictions in these activities? Were these the crimes of Servia and Belgium?

The chancellor insists that his country is "ready for fighting and ready for peace" and that supplies are "inexhaustible." If this be so, what is the meaning of drafts in starving Poland and slave raids in stricken Belgium? If the enemies of Germany do not yield forthwith, he threatens, "every German heart will burn in sacred wrath" against them; but why should this possibility dismay peoples that have withstood submarine slaughters and the invention of poison gas and liquid flame ejectors? What terrors are there in a new Hymn of Hate? That the imperial government is moved by a "deep moral and religious sense of duty" we have no right to deny, but its vehement protestations of regard for humanity are not wholly convincing. What is the humanity for which Germany has suddenly become solicitous? It cannot be the humanity of Great Britain, which is utterly abhorred; nor the "barbarous" Russians; nor of the "degenerate" and "vengeful" French; nor of the "idle" and "treacherous" Belgians. She is "seized with pity," it must be, for the humanity of Germany, which, after two and a half years, has attained nothing definitely but a desire to return to the conditions of peace. It was inevitable that Germany should repeat her complaint of a war of aggression, and her sentence that her enemies shall bear the odium of continuing the struggle against her power. But, while she disclaims responsibility for this "before humanity and his-

tory," she dishonors humanity by enslaving a helpless people and mocks at history by reiterating the fable concerning "war forced upon us."

Having stated these matters of dissent, we may turn to the really serious aspects of the problem. If Germany's offer be regarded as a sincere move toward peace, its essential defect is that it is avowedly the proposal of a victor—her alliance, she says, has "unconquerable strength," continuance of the war means "further successes," there will be "a victorious end," and the kaiser proclaims his "consciousness of victory." This basing of peace proffers upon military success is, of course, not novel. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg several times has publicly invited a settlement, choosing as his occasion some notable demonstration of military prowess. But it is unfortunate for the cause of peace that this first formal proposition should convey explicit notice that its acceptance will be an acknowledgment of defeat.

Aside from this defect in diplomacy, the form of expression is undeniably justified if examined according to the only formula that the German mind will admit—with a reference to the "war map." Altho stripped of her colonies and barred from the sea, Germany, with her allies, manifestly dominates the belligerent area on land. She holds 189,000 square miles of foreign territory. In the west her defenses are not likely to be seriously threatened during the winter. Her might overshadows the Balkans and looms ominously across the path of Russia. She has opened her long-coveted highway from the North sea to the Bosphorus and beyond, and guards it with powerful legions. If she could command peace now, it would be a German peace; she could make what might seem substantial concessions and still impose her will as acknowledged victor.

Her maximum terms, as outlined by the devious process of diplomacy, would contemplate "restoration" of Belgium, evacuation of French territory, erection of Russian Poland and Lithuania as "independent" kingdoms, return of Austrian lands occupied by Italy, restoration of German colonies, addition of Servia to Austria-Hungary, compensation for Bulgaria and ratification of Turkey's possession of Constantinople. To the German student of the "war map" these arrangements are dictated thereby with mathematical precision, and the German mind is astonished at its own moderation. But that is, perhaps, the most serious obstacle to peace—that Germany's success thus far has been too great, and that each successive victory, since it cannot be decisive, only makes a settlement more remote. It is the proud declaration of Berlin that Germany's enemies have lost 15,000,000 men. Granting that this estimate be substantially accurate, what does she offer in the tentative proposal toward the balancing of those sacrifices and the establishment of a "lasting peace"? Belgium is to be "restored" as an impoverished and subject nation. Servian nationality is to be extinguished and the people thrust under Hapsburg domination. Russia is to submit to the loss of two kingdoms and final exclusion from the Mediterranean. France is to receive back her devastated provinces and doomed to cower, burdened with debt and bleeding from deadly wounds, in the shadow of Prussianism. Great Britain is to surrender her sea power, restore the possessions won by her loyal colonial forces and abandon her empire with only half a battle. It may be—the German philosophy will insist—that all these arrangements would redound to the benefit of the human race. But we need not discuss that here. The vital matter is the probability, or otherwise, of their receiving in

any recognizable degree the indorsement of the other side, let the "war map" say what it may.

We have given candidly our impressions of certain provocative qualities which we find in the German proposal—its incidental manifestations of hypocrisy, its evidences of self-deception, its understandable but unfortunate tone of arrogance. Despite these things, it seems to us quite clear that Germany's action is logical and essentially honest. She wants peace, ardently desires peace. And why not? She has won all the things—excepting only the "freedom of the seas"—for which she made war upon Europe and civilization. Readers of this newspaper need not be reminded that Germany's goal has been in the East; that her purpose is the erection of an overland empire stretching from her "German ocean" thru the Balkans, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to the Persian gulf. "Look," as her people say, "at the map"—adding the interpretation of the terms she would like to enforce. The empire is there—Germany, Austria-Hungary plus Servia, Rumania subjugated, Greece a humble satellite, Bulgaria and Turkey well rewarded and devoted allies. Is it any wonder that the German people, counting their list of 4,000,000 dead and wounded and surveying the dazzling products of autocracy's genius, yearn for the peace that is so gloriously mapped? Their government has taken the only course possible under the circumstances.

But the published engagements among the Entente Powers must be taken into account. None of them can consider a separate peace without confessing unmitigated perfidy. Individually and unitedly they have declared that their terms—which, they insist, are necessary to the rebuilding of civilization—must prevail. Within a fortnight they have made known that they

intend to seat Russia in Constantinople. In the face of these facts, is there a single visible factor of reconciliation?

Great Britain, France and Russia are just completing drastic reorganization of their governing systems; in each country democracy is at last taking control—not to seek peace, but to make more relentless war. There is in those nations a belief that they are fighting, not for political aggrandizement, but for the rescue of civilization. They are convinced that Prussian domination must be destroyed—that they are making war against war. And the peace they want is not the peace offered to them on the point of the Prussian bayonet. To accept it, they are persuaded, would be to destroy law in the world, to enthrone militarism and autocracy and to establish the doctrine of force as the ruling principle of civilization. That end is conceivable, anyway, if one can stifle one's faith in human destiny. Germany's confidence in a German victory and a German peace may be justified. But unless the events of the last two years belie themselves and these monstrous things are to be imposed upon the world, it will be thru the sheer weight of brute force, and not thru a premature surrender by those nations that have undertaken to re-establish law and justice.

WHAT WILL BE THE ANSWER?

December 18, 1916.

IT IS, of course, far easier for neutrals than for belligerents to consider judicially Germany's proposal for peace negotiations. They have no multitudes of dead to mourn, no crushing burdens to bear, no grinding suspense to endure. Elementary justice demands, therefore, that they make generous allowances for some of the curious reactions which the event has caused in the countries at war. The most notable result in Germany was an outburst of rejoicing. Statesmen and newspapers for the most part expressed themselves with reserve; but the populace—which knew nothing of the action until it had been taken—hailed it as though the announcement that Germany was ready for a conference were equivalent to the signing of a peace protocol. The demonstrations suggested that the German people have considered peace, like other matters of their experience, to depend upon the promulgation of an imperial decree.

Two answers, of an exceptionally definite nature, have already been made. The brilliant French victory northeast of Verdun is a sanguinary satire upon the German boast of "our unconquerable front." And the unanimous declaration of the Russian duma for "a categorical refusal to enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever" will have a tremendous effect upon the ultimate action. With these two responses already on record, the chance that Germany's move would give her commanding ascendancy becomes

remote. For it must be remembered that, aside from her genuinely ardent desire for peace, her proposal was a skillful diplomatic maneuver. Upon the theory that military successes precluded the bringing against her of a charge of weakness, taking the initiative put her in a position of tactical advantage. It was calculated to appeal to neutral sentiment and also to stimulate whatever peace longing there might be in enemy countries. If successful, it would irrevocably give to her the prestige of victory. Moreover, a request for her terms would enable her to outline a settlement which would create dissension among the Entente nations by offering tempting concessions to some of them at the expense of others. Such devices as contemptuous silence or contumelious affront would give imperialism new weapons. Justice and reason require that the Allies state anew the conditions which impel them to continue the conflict, and, in understandable terms, the objects for which they intend to invoke further bloodshed.

It must be said for them that their fundamental demands have never been in doubt. The ideas expressed in Germany during the last two years have ranged from restoration of conditions before the war to insistence upon radical schemes of annexation and indemnity. The aims of the Entente were first stated in Mr. Asquith's announcement in November, 1914:—

We shall not sheathe the sword, which we have not lightly drawn, until Belgium has recovered more than she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against menace, until the rights of the smaller nationalities have been placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is finally destroyed.

Since that time the problem has been complicated by the conquest of Servia and Rumania, the operations

of Italy and the avowal of an agreement to place Russia in control of Constantinople. The most drastic demands suggested include these items:

Evacuation by Germany of all occupied territory, with full indemnities and repayment of illegal levies; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France; recognition of Russian control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; indemnity for shipping unlawfully destroyed by submarines; punishment of those responsible for acts contrary to the laws of war; agreement for the limitation of armaments.

Mr. Asquith once put the case in a few words—"adequate reparation for the past, and adequate security for the future." And this idea the French, with their genius for concise utterance, have reduced to the three words, "restitution, reparation, security." Specific aims might well await presentation at the conference which must ultimately be held, but it is recognized that the Entente Powers would seriously weaken their position if they refused to state the main objects to which they are committed. And there is offered to them an opportunity of far greater moment—to make clear to the German people the purposes of the empire's adversaries. Thus far public opinion in that country has been formed wholly upon the declarations and interpretations put forth by the German government. In the absence of any united utterance by the opposing coalition, the authorities, thru control of the press, have been able to inflame the patriotism and the hatred of the Germans by emphasizing the most venomous assertions from enemy sources; thus millions of persons in that country are persuaded that the Entente has planned to "destroy" them, to reduce them to utter humiliation and servitude, to strip them of territory and inflict upon them remorseless economic enslavement. Such projects, never urged except by irresponsible imitators of the author of the Hymn of Hate, are palpably grotesque.

If the Entente governments were to declare as clearly and as candidly as diplomacy will allow the readjustments they purpose to enforce, and were to state explicitly that they are making war, not against the German people, but against the intolerable system to which that people has surrendered its liberties and the safety of Europe, they would begin a campaign of education which would go far to promote peace. For this is, if it is anything, a war of conquest—not conquest of armies alone, not conquest of territory, but conquest of a delusion. For forty years the German people have been taught to believe that autocracy was invincible; that they were advancing civilization and serving humanity by subordinating the rights of men to the power of a supreme state; that “for its own salvation the world must be Germanized,” and that their racial superiority, manifested in kaiserism and militarism, must impose itself by means of systematic aggression and triumphant war. If the Allies were soberly and reasonably to demonstrate the fallacy of these doctrines; if they were to present convincing proof that their aims, rather than those of Germany, are “to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution,” and if they were to make clear that the enemy they would destroy is not the German nation, but the insufferable system which perverts the genius of that great people, they would assuredly find some there to understand. Such an utterance no despotic censorship could stifle; it would be the first authoritative refutation of charges that we must believe are false, and it might be the final thing needed to awaken thinking Germans from their infatuation.

MAKING PEACE IS NOT SIMPLE

December 20, 1916.

ON THAT July day in 1914 when Austria severed diplomatic relations with Servia and made certain the most terrible conflict in history, Secretary of State Bryan said of a series of agreements which he had just signed: "These treaties ought to make war almost impossible." Considered as the aspiration of a humane mind, this utterance was highly creditable; viewed as the judgment of a responsible official, it contained, we suppose, more folly than could easily be concentrated into any other eight-word sentence in the language of statesmanship. It is in quite a different character—"as the friend of the nations at war, as a Christian and a lover of humanity"—that Mr. Bryan now applies himself once more to the problem of extinguishing war. He has sent a message to the British premier urging acceptance of Germany's offer to enter negotiations. "There is no dispute," he says, "that must necessarily be settled by force; every guarantee that can possibly be secured by war can be stated as a condition precedent to peace"; and so on. One might remark that it is difficult to see how the very serious dispute as to which alliance holds the keys of victory can be settled except by force. But pacifism refuses, of course, to recognize the existence of such a controversy, so it is not worth while to raise the point. We shall consider merely the curious theory that it would be a simple matter to arrange the conference and a task of ordinary accommodation to set-

tle the affairs of three continents aflame with strife. Mr. Bryan is by no means alone in his placid optimism. German newspapers and publicists, while making allowances for the "madness" and "delusions" of the enemy, are confident that the imperial summons will be obeyed and that the result will infallibly be peace. "The conference will be held," says one journal cheerfully, "on or about January 15." And Professor Delbrueck, the noted historian, remarks that "once the delegates sit around the council table and begin to negotiate, it is highly probable that they will finally come to agreement." A New York banker, representing German governmental financial institutions, predicts that within ninety days arrangements of "a lasting peace" will be in sight.

That pacifists should leap to such agreeable conclusions is not remarkable, for theirs is a philosophy of unreality, the basis of which is a repudiation of facts. But the prevalence of like ideas among the Germans has a more practical explanation. The determined discussion of the proposed peace conference as a matter of certainty has a psychological purpose—it tends to create thruout the world a vague impression that the meeting has really been arranged, and that refusal to join would be in the nature of an affront to the family of nations. Yet when the situation is examined, not as one hopes it might be, but as it actually is, one must discern that tremendous obstacles intervene between the present and the assembling of negotiators, and that beyond that loom difficulties still more appalling in the problems of restoring peace to the world. Experience has shown that it is no simple task to bring even two warring nations to the council table, particularly when there has been no decisive proof of military superiority. But here are fifteen nations, five of them ranking as "first-class" Powers, divided into two alliances whose territories

cover the greater part of the habitable world and whose purposes affect literally every country on the globe. They have been fighting for twenty-eight months; their relative strength is not greatly different from what it was at the beginning, and their aims are no less in conflict. Surely it is not a sign of dull pessimism to recognize these indisputable facts and to inquire as to what likelihood there is that the comforting predictions of pacifism and Prussianism—how significant is their agreement!—will be fulfilled. Considering first the probability of agreement upon a conference, the most obvious difficulty is that the war has reached no logical conclusion. When Japan, after Mukden, proposed negotiations to Russia, in response to President Roosevelt's urging, both belligerents were satisfied that further contest would be futile. But what rational observer will contend that a decision in the present struggle has been reached? Germany proclaims that it has, and thru her exultation there cuts the grim rejoinder of the French thrust beyond Verdun, with its 11,000 prisoners from the "unshakable" front. And out beyond the barred gates of the sea still lies the British fleet, tactically vanquished, we are informed, at the battle of Jutland, but impenetrably existent, nevertheless. Germany's alliance, on the other hand, holds vast reaches of enemy lands in Belgium, France, Russia, Servia and Rumania. Yet this advantage, far from making a conference inviting to her foes, makes it singularly unattractive. And Germany speaks not only in the character but in the tones of a victor. Acceptance of her proffer would be an acknowledgment of defeat. To a nation of Bryans such a course might appeal; but how far the opponents of Germany are from this frame of mind may be judged from the utterances of their governments, their newspapers and their people.

Not alone is the war undecided as it stands, but the arsenals of the antagonists contain weapons and forces not fully exerted or wholly untried. The naval blockade is still capable of development. New armies are being prepared in the east and the west. New accumulations of guns and ammunition are being heaped up. It may be deplorable that nations which have millions of dead to mourn should contemplate fresh sacrifices to achieve what they believe to be right; but that they plainly do so is a circumstance not to be blown away by a puff of pacific admonition. A conference without an armistice, formal or informal, is inconceivable; but an armistice under existing circumstances would be the last desire of Germany's foes, for negotiations could be prolonged to any extent, and their only hope lies in exerting unremitting pressure. Apart from the military factors, there is the obstacle of an unexampled hostility. A war that has produced the atrocities of the submarine and the Zeppelin and the Belgian slave raids does not yield to ordinary devices of alleviation. And the proposal is inopportune, because the adversaries of Germany have just reorganized their governments for the distinct purpose of intensifying their efforts. Moreover, their acquiescence must be united—the weak must stand with the strong. The belief in ultimate victory is as fierce on one side as on the other.

But it is when one has conceived, by a stretch of the imagination, an acceptance of the German plan, and when one attempts to visualize a ready agreement, that the colossal nature of the task becomes apparent. Those who think the issues of this war must dissolve in the presence of a group of delegates, gathered together under existing conditions, cannot have given much study to the factors involved. The first is that there are two solidly allied groups of Powers, the one holding enormous

advantage in the field, but essentially in a state of siege, the other possessing unused forces by which it is persuaded ultimate victory can be achieved. We cannot regard these facts as pointing toward peace. Enough is known of the conflicting aims regarding Belgium and Courland and Poland and Servia and Rumania and a score of other territorial matters to make it a test of the most sublime faith to foresee a compromise while force remains untried. Every nation involved would go into such a conference aware of its staggering burdens of death and debt. Are these stupendous losses to be easily adjusted when neither group acknowledges the possibility of defeat? Because of what she holds, Germany's minimum demands would now have a force hard to weaken by argument or diplomatic maneuvering. And the same may be said of those of her opponents. "Restitution" is easily defined, perhaps. But "reparation" opens unending regions of controversy. If it is to be exacted for Belgium and Servia and France, what of the Russian invasion of East Prussia and Galicia? "Security for the future" is likewise clear in phraseology, but how shall it be defined in a treaty? Germany beaten in the field would give security of peace when her armies yielded; how shall it be exacted from Germany "at the council table," with her forces deep in enemy lands? The interests of her enemies are intricately interlocked by an oft-proclaimed pledge. Her group might conceivably make peace with one antagonist, but how with ten? Other wars have turned upon matters affecting a small area—this covers Europe, Asia, Africa and the remotest highways of the sea, the government of unnumbered millions and the development of continents. There must be delegates from the antipodes as well as from the capitals of Europe. And when the crucial matters touching Belgium and France and sea power and mili-

tarism have been settled in imagination, let the hopeful observer consider that Russia's claim upon Constantinople is to be adjudged and the map of the Balkans redrawn. Having visioned these things peacefully accomplished, he can contemplate the simple arrangements to be made concerning disarmament and a league of nations.

It requires no special aptitude for controversy to list the palpable difficulties that beset the path of the nations toward peace, and our purpose is by no means to condemn efforts to hasten a righteous solution of the problem that darkens the future of the world. But we find it discouraging to a belief in human intelligence that men whose utterances attract attention help to obscure the realities by loquacious insistence upon empty formulas. Mankind has loosed against itself forces which are not to be stayed by words, and it can bring them under subjugation only by paying the price of suffering. That millions are ready to die to achieve peace, not that others are ready to grant peace or talk peace, is the hope of civilization.

MORE ABOUT PEACE

December 22, 1916.

WITH far greater emphasis than we said it one week ago today, we may now repeat that every humane-minded person must be hopeful regarding the outcome of Germany's remarkable proposal for peace negotiations. Opinions differ radically as to the inspiration and essential significance of President Wilson's intervention, but there are reasons to expect that it will bring settlement appreciably nearer. The rapidity with which events have moved during the last ten days is quite contrary to experience, for in past wars it has been a matter of prolonged effort to prepare even the preliminary grounds of discussion. On December 12 Germany addressed to the Entente governments a proposal "to enter forthwith into peace negotiations," declaring that her propositions would have "for their object a guarantee of the existence, honor and liberty of evolution for their nations"—those of the Teutonic alliance—and "an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace." Rejection of the proffer was vigorously demanded by the statesmen and press of the enemy countries. Such utterances led to an expectation that the British response would intensify and make irrevocable that group's refusal to treat. But the speech of Premier Lloyd George distinctly left open the way to a discussion, at least to the extent of an interchange of notes. This was in harmony with public sentiment not only in the United States and other neutral countries, but

in the belligerent nations. Lloyd George's address, therefore, was studied with the closest scrutiny. He frankly acknowledged the "terrible responsibility" resting upon the decision of his government, but announced that the Entente Allies had "arrived separately at identical conclusions" which they purposed unitedly to maintain. He gave "clear and definite support" to the answers already made by France and Russia, and announced "complete restitution, full reparation and effectual guarantees" as "the only terms upon which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained." Nevertheless, he offered an oratorical inquiry as to what terms the German government had in mind.

This hopeful indication was emphasized in the subsequent comment in all countries—so much so, indeed, that a striking factor in the speech was obscured. This was that while the British premier opened his address with an examination of the subject of peace, nearly three-fourths of it was devoted to discussion of projects for intensified war looking to ultimate victory. He explained the reorganization of the government machinery, announced plans for control of shipping and food distribution, and outlined schemes for the mobilization of all the man-power of the nation in a system of compulsory national service analogous to that adopted in Germany. Explicitly and vigorously he proclaimed that Great Britain and her allies were resolved to carry the conflict to a victorious conclusion, if that were necessary to impose the terms they held to be vital to the security of civilization.

All interpretations of these utterances left certain outstanding revelations. First, it was shown that the nations opposing Germany remain firmly united; not only were all her efforts to divide them by force or guile futile, but they exhibited a common resolution in their

individual attitudes toward her proposal. Second, they were engaged in far-reaching preparations for more relentless war. Third, their fundamental terms had not changed during the two years and four months of conflict. Fourth, they were willing to hear what readjustments and guarantees Germany considered suggesting. Fifth, and not least in importance, was the disclaimer of a purpose to "destroy" Germany. That mythical purpose has been, of course, a fable created by Prussianism to alarm and infuriate the German people, but its disavowal was significant of a dissolving of belligerent implacability. The situation, then, was that the Entente Allies were to answer Germany's note by uninterrupted prosecution of the war and by a formal rejection, with, however, an invitation to present a tentative program.

We come now to President Wilson's intervention. The circumstances described would seem to make it either marvelously well-timed or appallingly indiscreet. The chances favor the former description, because it is unthinkable that action of this kind would be taken without private assurances that it would be accepted as friendly and appropriate. But it is not obviously fortunate that the note was dispatched on Monday night, nearly twenty-four hours before the British premier had expounded the attitude of his government. In other words, despite President Wilson's protestations, his appeal was essentially a pendant to the German proposal, and was deliberately offered so as to forestall the British rejoinder to Germany. The terms of his communication are too familiar to need emphasis. He disclaims proposing peace or offering mediation, yet expresses himself ready to serve in any useful capacity. What he explicitly asks is a candid definition of the war aims of each side and a clear statement from each as to what guarantees of future peace they recommend.

In stating that "the objects which the statesmen on both sides have in mind are virtually the same," the president makes an assumption which will not tend to strengthen his appeal to the antagonists of Germany. The assertion is likely to recall to their minds his admonition to be "neutral even in thought" and his remark that "with the causes and objects of the war we have no concern." If the Prussian conception of international justice, the rights of nations and the maintenance of treaties is not distinguishable in Mr. Wilson's mind from that of Germany's opponents, concealment of that circumstance might have been more serviceable to the cause of peace than its avowal. These features explain the unfavorable attitude taken at first by Entente diplomats in Washington, who have been said to regard the note as an indorsement of Germany's demand for a conference which she would enter in the role of a victor.

Whatever may have been his purpose, two things, in our judgment, he has accomplished. First, a way has been provided for the Entente Powers to join Germany in making peace, if the attainment of peace, rather than the establishment of the principles for which they fight, be their paramount desire; and second, Germany's proclamation of victory has been indorsed by the president of the United States. It was as a conqueror, as the proposer of terms to beaten adversaries, that Germany suggested holding negotiations, with an alternative threat of more ruthless war. If she gains her point, with or without the aid of President Wilson, the defeat of her enemies is confirmed, and she has shown that she can make war and command peace at will.

PEACE HOPES MARRED

December 26, 1916.

NOT in a belief that the statements were relatively important, but because they were in a modest sense prophetic, we reprint some sentences from our editorial last Friday, concerning that extraordinary action by President Wilson which was hailed by pacifists as a master-stroke of diplomacy:

The circumstances would seem to make it either marvelously well-timed or appallingly indiscreet. The chances favor the former description, because it is unthinkable that action of this kind would be taken without private assurances that it would be accepted as friendly and appropriate. * * * Despite President Wilson's protestations, his appeal was essentially a pendant to the German proposal * * * deliberately offered so as to forestall the British rejoinder to Germany. * * * Events alone can show whether the device was helpful to the cause of peace.

The impulses of patriotism and of humanity strongly urged us to hope that the move would prove sound; only experience with Mr. Wilson's methods made us cautious. And how deplorable has been the confirmation of our fears! The whole world longed for light and leading, and the results of incompetent intervention are greater obscurity and confusion. The warring nations have been filled with new suspicions, the power of neutrals has been compromised, the hope of a just and early peace has been dimmed. Any good results will be in spite of, not because of, this intervention. It is the duty of thoughtful Americans to examine the bewildering record. The main sub-

ject of study comprises three official utterances—President Wilson's circular note to the belligerents, dispatched on December 18 and published last Thursday; an explanation thereof by Secretary of State Lansing, issued on Friday morning, and an explanation of his explanation, put forth that afternoon. In addition, there is a series of inspired interpretations, published thru the Associated Press, these being still in progress. And into these main streams of controversy there have flowed torrents of speculation and debate from all quarters of the globe. until every landmark of understanding seems submerged.

It is vital to recall, first, the circumstances preceding the inundation. Germany, on December 12, proposed peace negotiations, explicitly declaring that her alliance was victorious and would present a victor's terms at the desired conference. France, Russia and Italy, thru official utterances, rejected the proffer as unsound, if not insincere, and as impossible of acceptance because it proclaimed their defeat, obviously not a fact. The British premier, it was announced, would reply on December 19. But on December 18 President Wilson, without consulting other neutrals or any member of congress and without the slightest intimation to the public, interposed with an urgent appeal that all the belligerents forthwith state the terms of settlement they would favor, in order to hasten a conference. He gave as reasons his belief that the war was proceeding "toward undefined ends by slow attrition," which meant irreparable injury to civilization, and particularly the danger that the situation of neutral nations might become "altogether intolerable." Regardless of its details, and under any circumstances, action of this kind is a matter of obvious delicacy. Mediation is an art calling for special talents of address, singular acuteness

of judgment and the keenest possible perception as to propitious opportunity. It needs an atmosphere of confidence, even of expectancy; so well recognized is this requirement that governments have universally avoided offering such suggestions until privately assured that they would not be offensive or embarrassing. For a government to thrust forward, without warning, demands or recommendations upon belligerents affecting their quarrel was an unheard-of procedure. In this case it was exceptionally dangerous, because the move actually followed a proposal by one side and was deliberately interposed before one of the chief participants on the other side had answered.

Only extreme urgency could justify such defiance of amenities, and only the most transparent sincerity and explicitness could give it force. Yet in all the archives of diplomacy there is not to be found another document so clumsy in its purpose or so cloudy in its meaning. Not only has it baffled the understanding of belligerents and neutrals alike, but it has defied the most laborious efforts of its framers to interpret logically its stupefying implications. After six days of controversy, neither the causes nor the aims of the move have been clearly revealed, while the deadlock it was presumably intended to break has been immeasurably complicated. That the action was calculated to embarrass the belligerents, regardless of considerations of justice, naturally excited the admiration of pacifists, who set up a clamor that Mr. Wilson was about to command peace. But he specifically declared that he was not "proposing peace," "not even offering mediation," but merely seeking a definition of the objects of both sides. This might conceivably have been useful, were it not for two facts—first, that that was essentially the demand of Germany, rejected by her opponents; and

second, that the Entente Powers had already stated the fundamental terms upon which they would treat, while Germany had not stated hers. In other words, despite his disavowal, President Wilson indorsed the German position that the time had come for negotiations, and condemned the Entente assertion that the war must go on until Germany signified her willingness to discuss "restitution, reparation and securities for the future."

But if his plea was inopportune, the statements with which he supported it were diplomatically impossible and historically false. When he said that "each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states secure" he affronted every person who knows the fate of Serbia and Belgium; and when he said that the objects on both sides, as described by the opposing statesmen, are virtually the same, he put upon an equality governments which made war to destroy treaties with governments which made war to defend them. To justify these assertions by citing what the leaders say is to argue that there is nothing to choose between the statements of pledge-breakers and pledge-keepers. If, after two years and four months of cogitation, President Wilson does not yet know which side is fighting on behalf of Serbia and Belgium, or if he considers their assertions of equal weight, what reason is there to hope that any of his representations are sound? A more perilous diplomatic move, however, was the threat—for such it was—that unless the belligerents yielded, this government would have "to determine how best to safeguard its interests if the war is to continue." This might have been allowed to pass as merely a characteristic bit of meaningless fluency had not the secretary of state given this astounding explanation:

The situation is becoming increasingly critical. I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war our-

selves, and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks, in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future. * * * The sending of this note will indicate the possibility of our being forced into the war. That possibility may serve to force an earlier conclusion of the war.

With this utterance, of course, every capital and business center in the world was flung into ferment—the note was not a move to promote peace, but to prepare for possible war. Whereupon this most agile of administrations made the quickest reversal in its record, Secretary Lansing, within a few hours, retracting his statement, substituting an assurance that neutrality would be maintained. By this time the helpful influence of the note, if it ever had any, had quite evaporated, and there remained only the irreconcilable disputes as to whether it was pro-German or pro-Ally, truculent or pacifist, ineffably stupid or miraculously subtle. From all the unnumbered speeches and letters and news dispatches and “interpretations” it is impossible even now to derive any convincing idea of its inspiration, its meaning or its result. There is a disposition to charge the worst blundering to Secretary Lansing; but it is announced that the note was under consideration for at least five weeks, and it is utterly incredible that he should have misconceived so completely the president’s intentions. But the shocking thing is the disclosure that the interests of this nation are committed to a diplomacy so inept that its utterances need a concordance and a glossary.

THE EXPLANATION

December 27, 1916.

AFTER a full week of inquiry and discussion, the world controversy over President Wilson's note to the belligerents has brought no decision. The causes and conduct of the war itself have not produced more irreconcilable disputes than has this effort to clarify the issues. Mr. Wilson declares that he desires a clear definition of the meaning of the conflict, but a more urgent need now is a satisfying interpretation of his own procedure. German public opinion, of course, will eventually be determined by government decree, but while awaiting imperial instructions the nation is in a ferment of contradiction. One element hails the note as a commanding service to humanity, inspired by the genius of a far-visioned statesmanship; but the other condemns it as a sinister attempt to paralyze German might and save the tottering enemy from just retribution. Russia is stolidly hostile. France is courteously scornful. In Great Britain the action is regarded variously as a treacherous blow, a blunder due to ignorant benevolence and a diplomatic experiment which may deftly be turned to good account. From Switzerland, on the other hand, comes "a mighty echo" of approval, which may be repeated from other neutral sources.

The conflict of opinion is no less marked in the United States, where the communication is described in terms of adulation or contempt, according to the predilections of the observer. Pacifists and the pro-German

press find it a product of inspired humanitarianism, while others declare it will strengthen injustice and defer a righteous peace. And the dispute touches not only the effects of the move, but the reasons which prompted it. After patient study we are prepared to offer our own explanation, which we shall support by analyzing the language of this master of words and by deductions from incontrovertible facts. Let us first examine the internal evidence. Does the note suggest that President Wilson plotted to help Germany by indorsing her arrogant demand for peace negotiations on the basis of Teutonic victory? Partisans have made this charge, but it refutes itself; his neutrality certainly does not lean in that direction. The contradictory theory that he revealed prejudice the other way, and aimed to extort from Germany an explicit statement of terms for the advantage of her enemies, is no more logical; for his statement that the objects "seem the same on both sides" was as deadly a blow as he could deliver against the Entente Allies. Was he moved, then, by solicitude for humanity, for the restoration of law and the establishment of justice? One would wish to think so, and such an impulse is indicated in the assertion that this government has an interest "as quick and ardent" as any other in defending smaller nations against "wrong and violence." Unfortunately for this theory, however, the administration was silent when smaller nations were trampled upon by aggression, when law was flagrantly violated and when justice was brutally defied. Mr. Wilson's interest in this cause may be "ardent," but, since he has yet to declare himself upon the rape of Belgium, it can hardly be regarded as "quick." There remains the interpretation that his aim was to promote an early peace, upon the ground that further war threatens to destroy civilization. But he explicitly declared that he

was not "proposing peace" nor "even offering mediation," and Secretary Lansing added later that "neither the president nor myself regard this as a peace note." Indeed, all previous conceptions were swept away by the explanatory comment of the secretary of state. The chorus of praise from pacifists, who characteristically saw nothing in the document except the magic word "peace," was stilled when he peremptorily disavowed any purpose to compel or hasten settlement, and any administration conviction as to the justice of the contentions of either side.

If the note, then, was not designed to help Germany or support the other alliance or advance the cause of a righteous peace, what *did* it signify? The true explanation stands forth clearly, even amid the cloudy rhetoric of the note, and is absolutely confirmed by the incautious candor of the secretary of state. The administration's concern, wrote the president, "arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those (American) interests if the war is to continue." He urged settlement "lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable." The only reasonable deduction from these deliberate phrases, the product of five weeks of literary effort, is that the administration fears a continuance of the war might involve the United States. And Mr. Lansing gave that precise interpretation on the following day, when he said:

The reasons for the sending of the note were that
* * * more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical. I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and, therefore, are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks, in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future. * * * The sending of this note will indicate the

possibility of our being forced into the war. That possibility ought to serve as a restraining and sobering force, safeguarding American rights. It may also serve to force an earlier conclusion of the war.

Language could hardly be plainer. The president intervened, not with a "peace note," but with a warning to the belligerents that their violations of American rights made possible the participation of this country, and with a demand that they state explicitly the objects for which they are fighting, in order that the United States might "regulate its conduct"—presumably in taking sides. At the very least, there is the announcement that the paramount consideration is the danger of this nation's being driven to defend its rights by force of arms. A few hours later, of course, Secretary Lansing was compelled by events to "correct that impression." But he did not retract his statement, he merely made it obscure by a labored explanation; and the obvious fact remained that what he had first said was true. It is incredible that after weeks of discussion and conference Mr. Lansing so completely misconstrued the president's thoughts and misstated the administration's policy. He may have been indiscreet, but he was not misinformed. This country is, as he said, "near the verge of war"—as it has been for nearly two years, or ever since the administration entered upon its perilous course of making demands which it had no intention of enforcing and of accepting hollow "diplomatic victories" as compliance. And that the nation is now "drawing nearer" to conflict is patent to the meanest understanding.

Conditions have indeed become "increasingly critical." Germany, holding the fruits of military victory, is nevertheless without hope of extorting terms consonant with her present triumph. Enduring a suffocating

economic pressure, she ardently longs for peace—she must have peace if she is to retain any profit from her sacrifices. If her overtures are rejected by her enemies, self-interest, if not self-preservation, will demand that she finally repudiate all restraints and make war with utter ruthlessness. The imperial government as now constituted would yield much to avoid this frightful future, but it has no wish or power to abandon what has been won. If its peace move fails, it must either employ every weapon of destruction, however lawless or injurious to neutrals, or else give way to a government that will. It is Von Bethmann-Hollweg or Von Tirpitz. President Wilson knew this. He knew that German shipyards are turning out flotillas of submarines with unparalleled range and armament; that if the effort to compel negotiations fails these craft will be sent out in hundreds, with orders to sink at sight all enemy merchantmen and neutral ships bound to or from enemy ports, regardless of war regulations or the endangering of crews. He knew, too, the position of the United States. He knew that long ago he gave warning that diplomatic relations would be severed unless the killing of Americans ceased; that the German pledge had been violated; that so long as the present chancellor remains in power a break can always be averted by accepting “regrets” and “reparation”; but that rejection of the peace overture means unbridled submarine warfare. What was to be done? Infallibly the administration turned to the familiar device of a note. It was a desperate chance, and it was certain to be misunderstood by both sides; but notes had heretofore been effective at least in confusing the issue, and might do so again. So a note was drafted. When Germany made her sudden move, and when rejection of her offer was indicated, action was forced, and the American govern-

ment announced to the world that its situation was becoming "intolerable" and that its possible intervention should be "a restraining influence" upon the belligerents.

After giving President Wilson all possible credit for sentiments of peace and humanitarianism, the plain fact is that his action was an expedient of desperation designed to stave off menacing complications. Two years of vacillation and the abandonment of just demands have bankrupted the administration's diplomacy. The only hope was to create a new controversy, to introduce an issue that would involve belligerents and neutrals alike, and thus, perchance, to escape the alternative of defending or finally abandoning the rights of this nation. If one can forget the fundamental requirements of international justice and permanent peace, one must hope, for the sake of the United States, that the audacious device will succeed.

STILL MORE CONFUSION

December 29, 1916.

WE HOPE that our frank criticisms of President Wilson's diplomatic intervention in the war have not created an impression that we see in the maneuver no possibility of merit. It is our belief, on the contrary, that under certain circumstances it might have had far-reaching results for good. If it had been inspired by a genuine desire to promote a righteous settlement, rather than peace on any terms; if the time had been opportune; if the appeal had been phrased clearly and forcefully instead of ambiguously, and if the way had been prepared by giving confidential notice to the belligerents, according to the recognized requirements of diplomacy, it is conceivable that the basis of an understanding might have been laid. But the actual results, so far as they can be discerned at this time, have been confusion, distrust and a hardening of the attitude of each warring alliance against the other, together with an impairment of the influence of the United States as a possible mediator. The reasons for this unfortunate outcome are plain. The revelation that the American government was indifferent to the issues of right and wrong involved in the war embittered one group, while the other group was encouraged by the confession that this country's chief concern was its own safety. Instead of being lucid, the utterance was so obscure that it has created the most hopeless controversy of the war. And the expedient of hasty intervention, without the cus-

tomary preliminaries, has evoked resentment on one side, and contemptuous satisfaction on the other, with astonishment on both.

The failure of the note to achieve any real progress is most clearly shown, however, by Germany's reply, which is, in some respects, the most striking diplomatic document in the records of the war. That a response so inevitable should be termed a "shock" and a "disappointment" to the administration shows how imperfect has been the understanding in Washington of the problems approached. Two qualities in the Berlin note—its deliberate candor and its incisive brevity—must commend themselves to those who have tried to extract the essence of meaning from Mr. Wilson's involved declarations. Having determined to deny his request, the imperial government wasted no words in conveying its purpose and left no room for misconception. But while this helps to clear the atmosphere, the studied curttness of the note and its publication by Germany in advance of its receipt in Washington indicate the low esteem in which this country is held.

If the communication is to be regarded as an acceptance, one would like to inquire what his excellency would consider a rejection. President Wilson urged an avowal of war aims by all the belligerents; it is true that he rather recklessly declared he was "indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this," but he explicitly urged the move for the enlightenment of "the neutral nations with the belligerent." Germany counters with a proposal for "an immediate exchange of views" among the warring Powers, specifying a meeting of delegates from those countries, from which neutrals would be excluded. In other words, Germany brushes aside the Wilson suggestion, with a gesture not too courtly, and repeats the identical proffer she made to her enemies.

Gratifying indorsement of the American note has come from some neutral governments, and others undoubtedly will join. How effective this pressure will be cannot be foretold, but the complete failure of neutrals to exact recognition of their own rights does not argue that they will be able to impose their views regarding the issues between the belligerents. Moreover, President Wilson persistently declined to co-operate with these nations in an appeal to the warring Powers. If any such intervention was to have hope of success, the most logical expedient would have been an expression representing the well-considered and united thought of all neutral governments. But Mr. Wilson, while ready to commit this country to the dangerous enterprise of a world alliance, refused to accept support in the far simpler matter of urging an avowal of the belligerents' views. Thus the project loses most of its force, the action of other neutrals is discounted, and they are compelled to indorse a move which was so maladroit that already it is discredited. It may be argued, on the other hand, that President Wilson was right in maintaining an isolated position, for the reason that his real concern—as Secretary Lansing declared—was lest this country should be drawn into the war by a renewal of submarine murders.

But if this was his inspiration—if, as we believe, he acted from a desire to protect the United States, regardless of the issues involved in the war—his procedure was extraordinarily inept. For in that case his duty was to inquire into the intentions of the belligerents toward the United States, not as to their intentions toward each other. Germany, for her part, has now refused to state her terms in the manner he designated, and it seems inevitable that her opponents will take the same course. It is to be hoped that in doing so they will

show equal restraint, and will not take advantage of the opening he made for an embarrassing rejoinder. In his note President Wilson laid the greatest emphasis upon the desirability of a frank avowal by the belligerents of their aims in the war and their attitude upon its issues. What if they were to reply that if the time had arrived when they should state, for the benefit of neutrals, the objects for which they are making immeasurable sacrifices, there is a still more urgent obligation for the United States to declare its own position?

In this war there are involved great international and moral issues—the rights of nations, the sanctity of treaties, the preservation of law, the fate of democracy and autocracy. Supposing it should be asked by what right a government which has remained silent upon these vital matters now demands information concerning such incidentals as “political or territorial changes”? Each day’s developments seem to reduce the hope that the president’s well-intended intervention will serve either the interests of the United States or the cause of peace. And a more perturbing thought is, there is no assurance that he will not be impelled to commit the nation without warning to other and more doubtful undertakings.

NOT YET

January 2, 1917.

IT WOULD be forming judgment upon incomplete data to estimate the prospects of peace upon the Entente governments' joint reply to Germany's proposal for a conference. They are still to answer President Wilson's request, and what they say to him—while its nature is clearly foreshadowed—will shed new light upon their purposes. The note to Germany is, however, of far-reaching import in itself. A feature of incidental interest is its failure to fulfill confident predictions as to its tone. Rejection of the German offer was a foregone conclusion—this explains the haste of Germany in responding to President Wilson's plea with an apparent compliance; but there was a widespread belief that the decision would be expressed in terms of devastating hatred and scorn. The reply was to be "a damning indictment" and an utter repudiation of any possibility of negotiating with Germany until her forces had been destroyed and she had become a prostrate suppliant for mercy. That the statement of the case presented seems mild is due, of course, to the fact that the world has become habituated to violent denunciation and defiance in discussions of the war. The language of diplomacy is stiff, and the responsibilities its use entails make for conservatism. Examined in this light, the studied hostility of the Entente note becomes ominously impressive, and its repetition of merely familiar terms of condemnation discloses a grim purpose. One must remem-

ber that behind those relatively subdued utterances is the combined might of five first-class Powers and five smaller nations.

Naturally, the first declaration following the introductory paragraph is a denial of two provocative assumptions by the enemy—that the Entente alliance forced the war and that the Teutonic alliance must be recognized as victorious. As to the first point, the ruling of the court of world opinion will be "Objection sustained"; as to the second, it would, we think, grant an exception, with leave to present further argument. Repudiation of these assumptions put forth by Germany and her allies signifies much more than irritation. It is important because while there remains such direct conflict upon these matters a parley is impossible. So long as Germany asserts—in defiance of historical facts—that she was the victim of aggression, and so long as she proclaims—in defiance of Verdun and the Somme and her condition of economic siege—that she is now in the position of a conqueror, she appeals for a conference in vain.

The indictment charges that "the war was desired, provoked and declared" by the Teutonic empires, and supports the accusation by citing facts which no impartial student of the conflict will dispute. Austria's ultimatum to Servia, her declaration of war in spite of satisfaction offered, the repulse of British, French and Russian proposals for settlement by means of conference, international commission or arbitration, and the flagrant dishonor of the attack on Belgium—these familiar items in the record are stated briefly, but unanswerably. Dismissing the past, the note then turns to the present situation, and rejects the idea that peace might be made with reference to the present war map in Europe, "which represents," it is declared, "nothing

more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation and not the real strength of the belligerents."

We have discussed many times the fallacy of Germany's dependence upon occupation of enemy territory as a means of extorting peace from unbeaten foes. Regardless of the fact that they have taken greater areas in her colonies, nine-tenths of what she holds was won by taking her opponents by surprise and relatively unprepared. If they did not succumb when she had overpowering superiority, they are not likely to ratify her precariously held conquests just when they become conscious of ascendancy themselves. Moreover, her possession of Belgium and northern France, once a military asset, has become a peace liability; and she would be far nearer to the settlement she craves if her forces were out of those ravaged regions. In any event, her adversaries hold that the war map is subject to revision. As to the future, they decisively retort upon the self-proclaimed victors by demanding "penalties, reparation and guarantees." There could hardly be a more irreconcilable contrast than between the Teutonic idea that that side is to grant peace terms, and the opposing conviction that the Entente will impose its own stern conditions. It is charged that the proposal of the Central Powers—"less an offer of peace than a war maneuver"—was really an uncandid device designed to aid them and embarrass the enemy rather than to promote a just settlement. One object, says the note, was "to create dissension in public opinion" in opposing nations; another, to encourage the people of the Teutonic group; another, "to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral countries"; and finally, "to justify in advance a new series of crimes," such as submarine outrages and the enslavement of enemy civilians. These interpretations do not

lose force because they suggested themselves at once to most students of Germany's proffer.

But all these matters are of subordinate interest to four significant features of the note. First is the final and conclusive demonstration that the ten nations—and the name of Belgium leads all the rest—are united in conviction and purpose as to the fundamental terms upon which the war should be terminated. In view of the desperate efforts Germany has made to detach some members of the alliance, this evidence of unity is impressive. Very suggestive, we think, is the appearance of a studied effort to discredit the Teutonic proposal as not only unwarranted in its terms, but essentially false in its inspiration. This testimony of a hostile attitude is given in a quite surprising array of opprobrious phrases—"pretended propositions of peace," "a sham proposal lacking all substance and precision," "these sham offers," "calculated misinterpretation," "empty pretense," "a proposal empty and insincere." In such declarations it is clearly set forth that Germany's opponents do not even concede that she has shown an honest desire for peace. The third pronouncement of importance is phrased in three words—the allied governments "refuse to consider" the proposition for a conference. A fourth fact, or rather an apparent intimation, must be taken into account. When the note charges that the German proffer "lacks all substance and precision," and argues that "a mere suggestion without a statement of terms that negotiations should be opened is not an offer of peace," there is a seeming implication that a more specific and less arrogant declaration would receive attention which this does not merit. The opening is a narrow one, but there it is—if Germany communicates to her enemies a willingness to discuss the only terms upon which peace can

now be had, negotiations are possible; or if she conveys to them a clear statement of her own purposes, they will reopen the subject of a conference. Until she does one of these two things, her overture stands rejected.

Except for the pending reply of the Entente Powers to President Wilson, therefore, it is Germany's next move. Let her proclaim ever so loudly that continuance of the war will be due to the inhumanity and folly of her enemies, the fact remains that it lies with her to command, not the victory of which she dreamed, but the peace which she so sorely needs. Even the suspicions and enmities awakened by President Wilson's maladroit intervention can be overcome if Germany is willing to abandon a false and sanguinary quest and give security for a return to law. To yield to moral compulsion in an hour of ostensible military triumph would be a bitter decision, but far worse would be the prolonged agony of an effort that must be sterile in the end. No amount of frightfulness could win for her greater advantages for negotiation than she possesses now, and they will diminish with every day that she maintains the pretense of being innocent and invincible when she is guilty and vulnerable.

A DARKENING CLOUD

January 3, 1917.

WE ONCE knew a dear old lady who had a whimsical program for the encouragement of filial affection and the promotion of family discipline. "I'll teach my children to love and respect me," she used to say, "if I break every bone in their skins." As her actions never approximated the violence of her statement, it is unfair to trace a parallel between her philosophy and that of Germany, yet we cannot help doing so. "We will compel peace negotiations for the sake of an afflicted world," says that astonishing empire, "if we have to drown whole shiploads of non-combatants to prove our solicitude for humanity." Germany's remarkable endeavors to force a diplomatic settlement with her enemies have so completely dominated public thought that there is a vague idea that the worst of the war, at least, is over, and that even if her overture fails the future can hold nothing more terrible than the past. Yet it is certain that her proposal constitutes only one-half of her prepared program. She is ready for an alternative procedure, and final rejection of her efforts will be the signal for more desperate, more sanguinary and more ruthless methods of attack. This settled purpose has been forecast by her antagonists, recognized by neutrals and virtually avowed by the imperial government. It was implied in the chancellor's speech three months ago, when he cried out—and he has been an opponent of submarine frightfulness—that "a German

statesman who would refrain from using every proper means of warfare which is apt to shorten the war ought to be hanged." It supplied an ominous undertone to the formal peace offer, with its threat of "terrors which hereafter will follow" if the enemy should refuse to treat. It was the inspiration of President Wilson's extraordinary intervention, with its prediction that the position of neutrals might become "altogether intolerable," and of Secretary Lansing's announcement that "we are drawing nearer to the verge of war ourselves." It is explicitly charged in the Entente note, which declares that Germany's proposition is an "attempt to justify in advance a new series of crimes," including unrestrained lawlessness in submarine warfare.

To those who have carefully followed the news dispatches of the last six months the peril will bring no surprise. As every well-informed observer knows, public opinion and political thought in Germany have long been sharply divided upon the submarine issue. One element, supporting the kaiser and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, has maintained that Germany could win while restricting her undersea craft to the rules of war, and that there would be more loss than gain in arousing neutral sentiment by lawless procedure. The other, represented by Von Tirpitz, a determined group in the reichstag and some influential newspapers, has demanded a ruthless submarine campaign as the only method of counteracting the blockade and beating the foe into submission. But at all times it has been understood that concerning the utmost use of the submarine as a last resort—to avert defeat or to compel a peace otherwise unattainable—there would be no disagreement; the chancellor himself, as already noted, concedes that circumstances might make that course necessary.

The situation now existing was accurately pictured in the vivid phrases of Maximilian Harden many months ago. He wrote:

There is still a short space of time during which Germany might come to terms. If these proposals are refused, Germany will have paid the last debt she owed the world and humanity, and can proceed to be more frightful than ever, with complete indifference to the views of neutrals, especially the United States. If Great Britain is yearning for proof that we cannot wound her heart with submarines and aircraft, and if she will not discuss peace until this has been proved, the United States must reconcile itself to the conviction that no further hesitation will cripple our submarine war and no stars or stripes will protect a ship in the war zone.

Three months ago a staff correspondent of the New York World, after a long stay in Germany, returned on the same ship that bore Ambassador Gerard for a conference with the president; and he declared that the ambassador's mission was to convey the warning that the German government must soon yield to the overpowering demand for unrestricted submarine war. "Peace with the world or war with America," he said, was a formula that was becoming the cry of the nation. The impatient advocates of frightfulness tried to force an open discussion in the reichstag early in October. The demand was voted down in committee—for the practical reason that the peace move was then in preparation. The Lloyd George speech called forth new threats. "We must abandon all other considerations," declared a Berlin journal, "and grasp all the means of war at our disposal." Three days before President Wilson made public his significant note a Washington dispatch declared officials there realized that if Germany's offer was spurned she would loose her submarine squadrons for a campaign of unparalleled destruction.

The imminence of the danger is in exact proportion to Germany's desperate need of peace. Every German believes utterly that unrestrained use of the submarine would destroy the power of the enemy coalition within a few months. What has been accomplished already is cited as proof—3,636,500 tons of hostile shipping has been destroyed, and British statesmen have openly referred to the problem of food supply as "extremely grave." Only the pledge extorted by the United States, the Germans are convinced, postpones a victory for the empire; and now that the enemy has spurned the proffer of peace the demand for repudiation of the compact gathers deadly strength. Not only is there nothing between the world and a demonstration of unbridled ferocity but a "scrap of paper," but that scrap is singularly thin. From the time that Germany learned that the demand for "strict accountability" had only a rhetorical significance she has had no fear concerning that which she was resolved to do if necessary. She made her famous concession, and gave Mr. Wilson a "diplomatic victory," for the sole reason that she hoped to use the United States in compelling recognition of a "German peace." And she expressly reserved "liberty of action" if American support of her demands was not successful. That "new situation" has now arisen. The enemy governments have refused to consider peace on the basis of the victory Germany proclaims—even the intervention of the president has failed to move them—and the counsels of moderation in Germany are being overwhelmed by cries for relentless war. Lawless sinkings are multiplying, submarine commanders are being decorated, and the kaiser proclaims that "the gallant deeds of our submarines have secured for my navy glory and admiration forever." It did not need the warning of Secretary Lansing to reveal that these developments profoundly

concern the United States. For the impending campaign is to be war without law or limit, and the field of operations is to extend almost to our very shores.

And not the least disturbing thought is that the government of the United States opened the door for the menacing incursion. When the administration which had exacted no penalty or disavowal for the Lusitania massacre welcomed the Deutschland, sister of the blood-stained craft that sank that ship; when it opened its harbors to foreign submarines in the guise of merchantmen and warships also; when it gave to such vessels a certificate of character and condoned as "perfectly legal and proper" the procedure of driving American men, women and children to open boats forty miles from land, it all but invited Germany to do what she is about to do. The sending of the Deutschland was a test of American public opinion; the maneuvers of the U-53 were a test of governmental policy; the Nantucket raid was a device to establish a precedent that forcing non-combatants to take to lifeboats far at sea was "placing them in safety." The ultimatum that followed the sinking of the Sussex in the English channel was nullified by the complacent silence that followed the sinking of the Stephano off the American coast. Prattle about President Wilson's "noble efforts for peace" does not alter the fact that his note was essentially and properly a warning that this nation is "drawing nearer to the verge of war." And it does not alter the fact that the country faces the peril uninformed, unaroused and unprepared.

BACK TO SPARTA

January 5, 1917.

IN A burst of admiring satisfaction, a Cologne newspaper remarked the other day that "Germany is approaching with rapid strides ever nearer the Spartan ideal," and predicted that within a year conditions in the empire will approximate those in the Peloponnesian state of 2500 years ago. The reference, of course, was not to the Spartan virtues of simplicity and courage, but to the relations between the government and the governed; and the parallel is closer, perhaps, than the complacent commentator realizes. The German authorities do not decide which infants shall be reared and which eliminated by exposure; but they enforce a Spartan claim upon the service of the citizen, especially in arms, and exact from the youth an equal measure of self-denying obedience to the state. The government of Sparta, under a dual kingship, was a militaristic oligarchy, whose purpose was to impose the Kultur of the nation upon less vigorous nations by brute force. While there was a popular assemblage, its functions—not unlike those of the reichstag—were chiefly to accept or reject proposals offered to it by the autocratic régime, and its decisions could be set aside by the council of elders, an irresponsible body. It is not without interest that the great Peloponnesian war was a conflict between the democratic principle of government, represented by the league headed by Athens, and the oligarchical principle, represented by Sparta's confederacy. To complete the parallel, there was a Belgium in

the peninsula—the Spartans deemed it a military necessity to subjugate the Messenians, their neighbors on the west, and make helots of them. But what the German editor had in mind was his country's approach to the system for which Sparta had been unique in history—the complete subordination of the individual to the will and service of a despotic state. The empire has long been subject to the idea of a supreme cult of militarism, and now the exigencies of a desperate war have intensified the relation by the state's assumption of absolute control over civilian life and individual activities, even to the Spartan device of rationing the populace.

What has been termed "monarchical socialism" is not, of course, a new thing in Germany, where for many years the state has increased its power and minimized the rights of the individual by appropriating and enforcing social reforms—the purpose being not to enlarge the liberty and increase the happiness of the individual, but to exalt the state as an institution apart from and superior to its subjects. But the stress of war has suddenly given to this system an extraordinary development, not only carrying Germany back to the political ideals of ancient Sparta, but dictating an adaptation of the system in democratic France and Great Britain. It is the more worthy of serious study because its influence will assuredly survive the conflict and present new problems to America in its commercial relationships with the world. We outlined the other day the terms of that revolutionary enactment which makes every able-bodied male in the German empire, between the ages of 17 and 60, liable to compulsory service, military or civil. It had been the careless habit of observers for more than two years to refer to Germany as literally a nation at war, to take it for granted that the government had completely organized, and was completely directing, all the

resources and energies of the empire. But the truth is that the mobilization of these forces, while far more extensive than in the enemy countries, did not reach its logical development until a month ago. The bill passed on December 2 provides for completion of the national organization. There are in the system five main factors—compulsory military service; government control of industries, agriculture and other productive activities; rationing of the population; government purchase and distribution of raw materials for manufacture, and compulsory civilian service.

The purpose was to strengthen both the military and economic defenses of the nation, in preparation for the terrific ordeal of the war during 1917 and beyond, by directing the entire energies of the people toward the two tasks of self-sustenance and prosecution of the conflict. Hindenburg and Ludendorff are charged with the military operations; General Groener is the dictator of the stupendous economic consolidation of the productive capacities of 70,000,000 people. He is to make all the empire's resources, human and material, available for adding force to the blows of the army and for upbuilding the economic independence made necessary by the pressure of the blockade. The problem in its essentials is, first, to release more men for the firing line by replacing industrial workers of military age with civilians unfit for campaigning, and, second, to increase steadily the output of guns and shells and other war materials. And both factors require the registration of every man capable of any sort of work, and his employment in whatever task he can be most useful, regardless of any consideration save efficiency of the military and economic machines. The basic need is increased production of coal and iron; then enlarged transportation facilities; then greater supplies of auxiliary raw materials, greater

output of semi-finished products, and, finally, vastly bigger production of weapons and ammunition. When one department loses a worker to the army, another must take his place; for the latter—if in an indispensable industry—there must be found a substitute; and so on back to the places which can be filled by persons not now employed. At the same time, of course, there is rigid supervision of industries, those which are not vital to support or defense of the nation being closed down. General Groener has declared the far-reaching nature of the plan:

Germany is preparing for a war lasting to all eternity. We shall first double our production of war materials, then treble it, and so on and on until every man and woman will be working in defense of the fatherland. By spring we shall be running under full steam. The mobilization of labor and economic resources is not a temporary or halfway measure; it is an evolution from one organic state to another, embracing and affecting the whole nation. We must make ourselves completely independent, not only for the duration of the war, no matter how long it may last, but also for the war after the war, should it be forced upon us.

In the United States there is an astonishing indifference to this gigantic social revolution, but the countries at war with Germany are already preparing to follow her example. Mobilization of the entire human resources of France is provided for in a bill recently introduced in the French chamber, and the foundation of Premier Lloyd George's dictatorship is a determination to draft the man-power of Great Britain to exactly the same degree. When Germany took her extraordinary step we said we believed "there has not been any project in the war, military or economic, approaching it in magnitude and significance." And now we see the three leading nations of the Old World transformed almost overnight, putting into practice on a stupendous scale eco-

nomie and social devices which have been regarded as the visions of impractical theorists. We are encouraged to note that one other American newspaper, at least, has discerned the colossal significance of the event, and we urge a thoughtful reading of the comment of the Chicago Tribune:

The two tremendous facts—the mobilization of all the active manhood of a nation of 70,000,000 directly under state control, and the taking over of the whole buying function of her industries—are the two longest strides ever taken toward complete state socialism. One of the great changes in world organization is taking place under our eyes. If there are such things as epochs, a new epoch is dawning.

It may be pointed out that the measures now being taken in Europe are war measures and will pass with the coming of peace. They will not pass entirely, but there is to be no such peace as will permit any nation to fall back into the lower national organization of the past. Every measure taken to heighten a people's power, to economize their collective resources and more effectually direct their collective energies will be retained so far as it has been successful and can be applied in "the war after the war."

Collectivism or socialism, in democratic and autocratic forms, is the world system. This may be what Herbert Spencer called the coming slavery. Meanwhile, it is for us to confront the facts before us and to realize that, whether we distrust their beneficence or welcome them as human progress, we must deal with them. The optimistic indifference of American thought must give place to a courageous and realistic study of the world movements and a practical adaptation of its lessons to our own interests and needs.

GERMANY'S STUPENDOUS PRIZE

January 12, 1917.

IN A recent issue of *Punch* there was an amusing picture of a squad of British soldiers in a trench, nervously yet eagerly awaiting the order to go "over the top" and follow the curtain of shell-fire into the German lines. "I suppose," remarks one of them to the sergeant, "we shall be making history in a few minutes?" And the grim leader of the squad retorts: "History be blowed! What you've got to make is geography!" A simple jest, but singularly striking because of its unconscious truth. It is an epitome of the war. The contending governments are not indifferent to history; but their immediate concern is geography—let them make the map of Europe, and they care not who tells how it was done.

Germany, in particular, set out to make a new map, and thus far she alone has changed the political configuration of the continent. Her military frontier in the west is admittedly temporary, and her line in Russia she would be willing, perhaps, to modify. But in the southeast she has drawn boundaries which she means to be permanent—Serbia, Montenegro and Albania conquered, Bulgaria and Turkey in contented vassalage, and now Rumania in process of subjugation. The long-planned confederation stretching from the North sea to the Bosphorus and beyond virtually exists; whatever the future may hold, it is a present fact. There has not been such map-making since Napoleon shook Europe

apart and disdainfully rearranged the fragments to suit his imperial whims.

The central idea of the Teutonic ambition is familiar to every reader; but there is a fundamental factor in the tremendous Balkan campaign which has escaped general attention. This is the Danube. Military strategy on a large scale is governed by the natural obstacles to be overcome—mountains, marshes and rivers. The last named are the most frequently encountered. The progress of campaigns is measured in these terms. Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon was a declaration of war. In the present conflict the story is told in such river names as Meuse and Moselle and Marne, Somme and Sereth and Struma. At this moment the vast operations in the east are dominated by the Danube. It might even be said that that mighty stream dominates the war. For what Teuton and Slav are now battling over is more than the remnants of Rumania—it is control of the greatest waterway in Europe, a highway of mankind since history began, and destined to be the route of a colossal commerce in the future. The Danube and the Dardanelles—these are the symbols of empire, the prizes for which two races have come to a death grip. To grasp the significance of the conflict it is necessary first to recall the facts of the Rumanian campaign. Combined attacks of Germans, Austrians and Bulgarians swept the Rumanians and Russians out of Wallachia, the western part of the country, and captured Bucharest, the capital. Then, to the dismay of the Entente Allies, the Teutonic plan was found to comprise also the conquest of Moldavia, which thrusts itself northward between Hungary and Russia, and likewise the Dobrudja, lying north of Bulgaria between the Danube and the Black sea. With hardly a check Mackensen drove the Russo-Rumanian forces northward and across the great river, taking the

important cities of Czernavoda and Constanza, and finally clearing the Dobrudja. Meanwhile Falkenhayn's armies rolled eastward thru Rumania; they have just taken Braila, at the head of sea navigation, and soon will have Galatz, a few miles further downstream; and they are steadily pressing the Russians back on the Sereth river and toward their own frontier. A few weeks, perhaps a few days, will see, therefore, the culmination of the greatest achievement of the war—the Danube, the most important waterway in Europe, hitherto jealously neutralized in its lower reaches and held free to the navigation of all nations, will be under Teutonic control from its source to its mouth. The left bank for the last hundred miles is Russian, but the Teutonizing of that also is not inconceivable.

If these conquests are ratified they make stupendous changes. Germany will have a direct, closely guarded outlet to the Black sea—for her commerce and her submarines. She will have a route by water, as well as by rail, virtually from Berlin to Constantinople, for the upper Danube is connected by canals with other rivers in Germany. With the Dardanelles, the gateway to Asia and the eastern portal of the Mediterranean, held by her Moslem allies, she will control the other great factor in the military, commercial and political domination of southeastern Europe. To most of us the name of the Danube suggests waltz music and picturesque tours and such pleasurable trifles; but when we trace its wonderful course on the map we realize that it is one of the world's greatest waterways, as vital to the economic life of central Europe as the Mississippi is to that of our middle west. Its mere magnitude is impressive. Rising in Baden, in the hills of the Black forest, this father of waters flows southeastward thru one of the richest and most beautiful regions of the continent, to empty at last

into the Black sea. It is the only great European river running from west to east. Its length is 1750 miles, nearly four and a half times that of the Delaware; and its basin of 300,000 square miles is twenty-five times the area drained by our river. It has more than 300 tributaries, sixty of them navigable. On its banks are three capitals—Vienna, Budapest and Belgrade.

Historically, the Danube excels in interest any other river in the world. It was long a frontier of the Roman empire; near the present site of Regensburg, in Bavaria, there was for five centuries the chief imperial outpost against the incursions of the northern barbarians. Traces of Trajan's wall and fortifications may be found where Bulgars and Russians met in the Dobrudja, and in the gorge thru which the river flows where the frontiers of Hungary, Servia and Rumania meet. The Danube was the route westward of the great barbarian migrations of Huns, Slavs, Magyars and Turks, and the path eastward of the Franks and the Crusaders. Along its banks Napoleon's legions fought some of their most sanguinary battles. But it is as a commercial highway that the river is of modern importance. It traverses Bavaria, Wurttemberg and Hungary; forms parts of the boundaries between Hungary and Servia, Servia and Rumania, Rumania and Bulgaria, and Rumania and Russia. It is the great export route for the products of Austria-Hungary to the Balkans, Russia, Turkey and Persia, and for Balkan products to Russia and the regions around the Black sea. It provides for eastward passenger traffic a quicker and cheaper route than the rail. From Ulm, in Wurttemberg, all the way to the mouth, nearly 1600 miles, the stream is in some degree navigable. Shallow-draft barges are used in the 500-mile stretch between Ulm and Vienna. From Vienna to Orsova vessels drawing five feet can ply. Below the Iron Gates—a huge rock

ledge near the Rumanian border, thru which a channel has been blasted—600-ton ships and 2000-ton barges use the river to Braila, 400 miles eastward; and below that port, distant from the Black sea just as far as Philadelphia from the Atlantic, 4000-ton steamships have access. A century of labor and prodigious expenditures have been required to make the huge waterway serviceable, the greatest progress having been made during the last sixty years. Like nearly everything else that is an issue in the war, the Danube is involved in the interminable Balkan question; its present status is linked with Russia's unsuccessful attempt to obtain control of the peninsula in the Crimean war.

Under the treaty of Paris, in 1856, the Danube for sixty-six miles from the chief of its three mouths was placed under direction of an international commission comprising one delegate from each of the contracting Powers—Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey. Designed as a temporary expedient, the commission was kept alive by other agreements until 1878, when its powers were extended by the congress of Berlin to cover the waterway as far as Galatz. In 1883 the jurisdiction was enlarged to include Braila, and the life of the commission extended to 1904, since which time it has continued automatically, in the absence of withdrawal by any of the Powers. Vast works of dredging, straightening and jetty-building have made Braila a notable seaport. A twenty-four-foot channel is maintained from the docks to the sea, a hundred miles distant. The treaty of Paris neutralized the Black sea—no warship was to trouble its waters. In 1870, however, Russia canceled this provision, and Prussia agreed in order to obtain Russia's assent to the crushing of France. By that contract, too, the Danube below the Iron Gates was neutralized; but the war has made a scrap of paper

of this treaty, and the appearance of Austrian submarines in the Black sea is a prospect which the Russian fleet commanders must now take into account. These are the reasons why the remorseless conquest of Rumania constitutes a remaking of the economic as well as the political map of Europe. Germany has her grip on Constantinople, and is now taking the mighty Danube into her control. Russia covets chiefly the straits, but the Teutonic confederation must have both. The Danube and the Dardanelles together are vital to the scheme of the empire. More than eighty years ago Field Marshal Radetzky, a great Austrian general, stated the problem which is being worked out under our eyes today:

The Danube is Austria's main artery. Its lower reaches are as necessary to her as the Dardanelles to Russia, and, in order to utilize the Danube fully, Austria requires also free use of the Dardanelles. Hence it follows that the conflicting interests of Austria and Russia must lead to war unless both nations agree with regard to Turkey.

From the participation of Rumania, which was hailed by the Entente alliance as a fatal blow to Germany's ambition, she has extracted her most tremendous victory thus far. For she has opened a second highway to the east and holds them both in a grip that no effort has yet been able to loosen. It may be, as experts never tire of telling us, that the decision in the war must be had in the west. But what an overwhelming triumph Germany's foes will have to win there if they hope to break her hold in the east!

TO "REORGANIZE EUROPE"

January 15, 1917.

THERE has been a disquieting impression among thoughtful persons that President Wilson's note to the belligerents, because of its inopportuneness, its inept phrasing and its irritating assumptions, really extinguished the faint hopes that had been lighted by Germany's bold bid for peace. Despite this, there is a clean-cut achievement to the credit of his intervention—he has obtained from one group an avowal of the objects for which it makes war. It is, we believe, unique in the record of great conflicts—if we except the American war of independence—that so clear and decisive a declaration should be made so far in advance of any possible settlement. Remote as it seems to make the ending of the struggle, the world is distinctly benefited by definite disclosure of the aims which one side fights to realize. While we saw the obvious weaknesses of President Wilson's communication, we supported from the first his contention that the warring governments should declare their reasons for continuing the most terrible war in all history.

Whatever may be opinions as to the justice of their demands as a whole or in detail, it will hardly be denied that the Allies' answer is completely responsive to the president's request. The advantage which Germany won by her proffer to enter a peace conference has been squandered. She has lost the initiative. If she had immediately declared her basic terms, and supported

them with sound reasoning and generous aspirations, the Allies' note to President Wilson, instead of being an aggressive and convincing declaration, would be an echo, a plea in defense. But instead of forcing the diplomatic campaign, Germany thought it subtle to forestall the expected rebuff from her enemies by rejecting the invitation of the United States and standing upon her impossible proposal for a conference which she would enter as a self-proclaimed victor. Worse than that, the kaiser's fatal gift of eloquence overcame him, and he issued a bombastic proclamation in which he celebrated victories "in all theaters of war on land and sea" and the "gallant deeds" of his submarines, and announced that his terms—still unacknowledged—would be enforced by ruthless war against the arrogant foe. At that time the Allies' reply to President Wilson was almost ready for dispatch, but the attitude of Germany caused it to be held back for revision, and there is little reason to doubt that its expressions did not lose vigor in the process. The matter of present importance, however, is that the Entente governments declare that they will "act with all their power and consent to all sacrifices" which may be necessary to compel acquiescence in these terms:

Restoration and indemnification of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro.

Evacuation of German-held territories in France, Russia and Rumania, with reparation.

Restitution of territories wrested in the past from Entente nations by force or against the will of their populations—such as Alsace-Lorraine.

Liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czech-Slovaks (in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans) from foreign rule.

Enfranchisement of peoples "subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks"—Armenians, Syrians and Arabs.

Expulsion of the Turkish empire from Europe.

Re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, under Russian protection, to include the Polish territories partitioned by Prussia and Austria as well as by Russia.

"The reorganization of Europe, based upon the principle of nationalities."

Liberation of Europe "from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism," but without destroying the political integrity of the German people.

Establishment of permanent peace "upon the principles of liberty and justice and fidelity to international obligations."

Such of these adjustments as are intended to restore invaded territories need no explanation and present no problems that of themselves need make peace impossible. None of them approaches in magnitude that object, overlapping them all, which is stated in these simple but stupendous terms:

The reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by stable governments based alike upon the principle of nationalities and on the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development.

The "reorganization of Europe" has been the aim of statesmen in a multitude of wars. The difference here is that the basis outlined is not national aggrandizement or dynastic glorification or empire-building, but the long-suppressed principle of free nationalities. Metternich and Bismarck were exponents of the old system, and its fallacies are revealed in this devastating war, the origins of which may be traced to the selfish scheming of the congress of Vienna, in 1815, and the congress of Berlin, in 1878. Now a new expedient is advocated. The obvious complications involved might appall the most optimistic observer. From the German-Austrian border to the Aegean sea there are entanglements of races that might baffle superhuman intelligence to rearrange. Western Russia, Hungary and the entire Balkan peninsula have problems that have created gen-

erations of turmoil and cost unnumbered lives. Yet assuredly the principle is sound, and the ideal is far better worth pursuing than is the outworn device of map-making with regard to the political ambitions of the great Powers. Because of the military situation, many persons have expressed surprise at the extent of the Allies' demands. They have been justly called "the terms of a conqueror"; but they are not terms of conquest. Great Britain asks nothing for her sacrifices except security for peace thru the destruction of Prussian militarism. France seeks only territory torn from her by force. The matter of Constantinople is left open. The compensations for Italy and Rumania would have to be justified by "the principle of nationalities." If, therefore, Germany "fights for her existence," as she says, which of these adjustments, deeply as they might wound her pride, would threaten her? Unless she denies the right of small nationalities to free development; unless she is making war to subjugate lesser peoples and perpetuate the dismal anachronism of Turkish rule in Europe, how can she repudiate the ideals proclaimed?

But debate of these and like considerations becomes rather futile in the face of the outstanding fact that hope for early termination of the war must be abandoned. The most ominous thing is not that the Allies have stated terms which wring from Germany a cry of fury and scorn, but that they deliberately declare peace "is impossible to attain at this moment." The antagonists might approach agreement upon some propositions, such as the evacuation of Belgium and France. But the impassable barrier to peace is Germany's arrogant proclamation that she is definitely the victor and that the settlement is hers to dictate. The Allies are resolved, at any cost, not to enter negotiations until they

have broken the power which thus far has triumphed over them. Utter rejection of Germany's proffer has caused to her statesmen as much surprise as anger; this is another manifestation of the limitations of the Prussian mind. Militarism did not foresee the desperate resistance of Belgium; it disparaged the valor and endurance of France; it was skeptical of the vigor of Great Britain; and now it has wholly misjudged the implacable purpose created by its own excesses.

The Germans have raised up against themselves a force more powerful than armies, and that is the deep, abiding conviction that their system is immoral, impossible, intolerable, that life in its shadow is not to be endured. The peoples of the allied nations do not conceive that they are fighting Germans, but the ravishers of Armenia, the violators of Belgium, the destroyers of the Lusitania, the enslavers of the helpless, the betrayers of international justice, the arch-enemies of human liberty. While this spirit prevails, compromise is unthinkable. This is to be a war of resources, carried to exhaustion. As we said two years ago, two irreconcilable philosophies of government are in a death grapple, and one must succumb; either Europe will be Prussianized, or it will be freed to work out its destinies by racial development.

CONFUSION OF TONGUES

January 17, 1917.

ONE of the minor difficulties that have hampered the progress of the peace correspondence has been the diversity of tongues. The Teutonic alliance, perhaps, was not seriously embarrassed in expressing itself, because its power is centralized and its proposal was quite indefinite. But the Entente nations, in order to make their remarkably candid profession, had to combine in one utterance the ideas of ten independent governments, representing in languages English, French, Italian, Russian, Portuguese, several Balkan tongues and dialects, and Japanese. The note had to be examined in each capital; it was finally put into French in Paris, and we received a version in English. Altho the most scrupulous care must have been devoted to the translations, experts find faulty rendering and confusing variations. These difficulties are enhanced by the fact that translations even technically exact convey different impressions to different peoples. For there are diversities not in language alone, but in national spirit, in the complex influences of historical and spiritual development. And finally, as between belligerents and neutrals, there is a chasm of thought which only the most far-reaching sympathy can bridge so as to bring the two into intellectual contact.

Apart from the avowal of aims by one side in the war, the outstanding result of the extraordinary interchange is that the antagonists are apparently further

apart than ever before. While there is much controversy as to the merit of this or that document, belligerents and neutrals seem to be agreed that hopes of an early peace have receded, and that the war must proceed to unimagined limits. To what degree, if any, this result is due to President Wilson's intervention it is impossible to determine. Since he undeniably accomplished a great service to the world, in leading one group to state clearly its objects, credit for his initiative is his due as much as criticism of his defects in manner is the right of his countrymen. Nevertheless, discretion is as useful a quality as courage, and in diplomacy particularly there is required a nice discrimination in the use of words. When the purpose, as in this instance, is to clarify and illuminate a situation, ambiguity is intolerable and dangerous. Considered solely as a peace effort, was the president's move helpful? Speculation on this point might range far, but it would come back, we think, to this proposition: if he had held his hand, the warring governments assuredly would not be further apart than they are now. Germany had made a bold proposal to enter negotiations with her enemies. They were preparing to reply, and, despite violent and contemptuous expressions from unofficial sources, they could not avoid a serious response. The Allied governments could not afford to flout the world and their own peoples by ignoring a peace declaration, however offensive its form. The situation was of unparalleled delicacy. The Allies could not consider only their dreadful sacrifices in the past and the military and economic situation in the present; they had to contemplate the immeasurable costs of a future shaped by their decision. It was into this momentous situation that President Wilson suddenly projected himself. And his note, while manifestly designed to create an atmosphere of accord, in three

vital respects was framed so as to incite distrust and ill-feeling. First, it was dispatched without private notification to the governments addressed, a formality customary and obviously desirable; it was even hastened so as to forestall an utterance by the British premier. A matter of American concern only is the fact that the people of this country were committed without warning to an extraordinary act of intervention. Attorney General Wickersham finds this disturbing:

Under no government would it have been possible for such a communication to be made without any premonition on the part of the electorate and without knowledge on their part of any surrounding circumstances which would make such a proceeding desirable in the interests of the country.

A second fault in the note as a device of conciliation was its incontestable effect in strengthening the position of one group of belligerents against the other. Its hasty issuance in advance of the Allies' reply to Germany could have had no other effect, and the unconcealed satisfaction in Berlin and among Germans in this country increased the resentful distrust of the opposing nations. No one now suspects President Wilson of any such design. Nevertheless, the most ordinary judgment might have foreseen that the inevitable result would be to give force to Germany's demand for a conference at a time when such an arrangement would be wholly to the advantage of the side in military ascendancy. The third and most damaging defect was, of course, the reference to "objects virtually the same," imperfectly qualified in the phrase, "as stated by the statesmen in general terms." Never was an incautious expression more difficult to overtake with explanatory comment. When the utmost emphasis had been put upon the modifying clause, the fact remained that President Wilson drew no distinction between the assertions and policies of

those who broke the peace and those who united to repel attack. To attain such dizzy heights of impartiality one must ignore facts which every human being who can read knows.

Because of these indiscretions it is not fantastic to believe that President Wilson, instead of smoothing the way toward peace, actually intensified existing animosities. Especially was his utterance calculated to make the Allies more hostile toward Germany when they found that her audacious demand had apparently enlisted the support of the most powerful neutral. Mr. Wilson's remarkable assumption that it is neutrals who chiefly desire peace laid him open to two rejoinders whose very simplicity is deadly. Those who are fighting and dying for their ideals, said the main note, "have as profound a desire as the government of the United States to terminate the war as soon as possible"; and the Belgian reply put the thought still more deftly: "This government desires as much as Mr. Woodrow Wilson to see the present war ended as early as possible." From Belgium this is a singularly eloquent retort. The reply was essentially a rebuke also, because it demonstrated how impossible is that peace which President Wilson found it so easy to recommend. This was one thing we had in mind when we spoke of the deeper divisions in the languages of nations. Both Mr. Wilson and the Allies are sincere, but they speak in different tongues, because they view conditions from different planes—the plane of observation and the plane of experience. "It may be," he said, "that peace is nearer than we know, that the terms of the belligerents are not so irreconcilable as some feared." How could such expressions be translated to peoples who are pouring out their blood in the absolute knowledge that their ideals and objects and those of the enemy *are* irreconcilable? His animating

idea, too, was that peace—the cessation of the war—was the thing supremely desirable. Their answer is that justice—according to their conception of justice—is infinitely more important. The whole essence of the note was summarized in a sentence by Lloyd George:

Knowing well what war means, knowing especially what this war means in suffering, in burdens, in horrors, the Allies have still decided that even war is better than peace at the price of Prussian domination over Europe.

It may be said that such sentiments come glibly from statesmen, especially if they represent ambitious empires; that truer conceptions prevail among pacific people who have no lust of national aggrandizement. Let us, then, call another witness:

If there is a country which has a right to say that it has taken up arms to defend its existence, it is assuredly Belgium. Compelled to fight or to submit to shame, she passionately desires that an end be brought to the unprecedented sufferings of her population. But she could only accept a peace which would assure her, as well as equitable reparation, security and guarantees for the future.

“War better than peace,” peace at any price unacceptable—has paganism, then, returned to earth to mock at the idealists of pacifism? What! will men lay down their lives, will women give their sons and husbands, will whole peoples endure privations and sacrifices for the sake of justice, when they could have tranquillity by abandoning it? Incredible! Yet there exist such men and women, millions of them; and if civilization is restored to Europe, it will be because they hold that peace without righteousness would be even more disastrous and dreadful than war.

THE "GUILT OF BELGIUM" AGAIN

January 19, 1917.

FOR a people noted for a certain skill in controversy, the Germans have been singularly unfortunate in their spokesmen during the war. We have in mind not so much the violences of the controlled press and banal absurdities like the "Hymn of Hate" as the official utterances. The defect is due, no doubt, to the fact that south Germany, the source of the intellectual vigor of the nation, has been submerged by Prussianism. For the Prussian system of advocacy is doomed always to make a bad case worse, so much so that its most energetic protestations of virtue infallibly serve as demonstrations of guilt. Perhaps the most curious thing to observe is the fatal fascination which leads the imperial government to revive, at the most inopportune times, subjects whose discussion must damage the German cause. After two years and a half, during which the evidence has been analyzed to its remotest implications, Berlin still uses the preposterous formula of "a war forced upon us." But a more astonishing sign of delusion is the making of an appeal to the sympathy of neutrals by traducing the name of Belgium. In issuing the recent statement simultaneously with the Entente reply to President Wilson, the obvious design was to break the force of the enemy utterance by counter-charges which would divide public attention. Perhaps the strategy was sound, but the execution was deplorable, for as a fact Germany's plea had no effect whatever

except to emphasize the contrast between her vague recriminations and her opponents' frank response to the American request.

That which gives the note its only serious claim to attention, however, is the passage in which the German government once more assails the honor of the nation whose land it has seized, whose property it has shamelessly stolen and whose people at this very hour it is brutally maltreating. When the kaiser invokes the "holy wrath" of his subjects against England and France and Russia the sentiment is intelligible, altho ridiculous. But how shall one fathom the reasoning which suggests to German statesmanship that the way to attract neutral sympathy is to malign those whom that statesmanship has robbed and enslaved? It is sufficiently baffling to find that Germany is sensitive about criticism of "the measures taken in Belgium in the interest of military safety" and "offers energetic protest against these calumnies." Perhaps the authors of this disclaimer believe that Belgian civilians were not put to death, that Louvain was not burned, that none of the historic infamies of the occupation in the early days were really committed. But what is their impression concerning the slave-raids which are being carried on today? Are these also "calumnies"? The vital matter, however, is the repetition of the revolting charge that Belgium was not the heroic defender of international faith, but a betrayer of sacred obligations. These are the words:

The imperial government is unable to acknowledge that the Belgian government has always observed the duties which were enjoined upon her by her neutrality. Already, before the war, Belgium, under England's influence, sought support in military fashion from England and France, and thus herself violated the spirit of the treaty which she had to guarantee her independence and neutrality.

Because this atrocious fabrication is revived in a formal address to neutral nations, and because some of the facts may have been forgotten, we intend to set down once more the irrefutable record of Germany's guilt. Mere mention of certain facts will suffice, because even Prussianism does not deny them. Belgium was declared "a perpetually neutral state" by treaties of 1831 and 1839, signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia. They guaranteed that in war her territory should be inviolable, while Belgium for her part was "bound to observe such neutrality toward all other states." The arrangement was reaffirmed in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, when Great Britain obtained a formal pledge from both sides to respect Belgian sovereignty. Yet, on the night of August 2, 1914, Germany presented a twelve-hour ultimatum at Brussels, demanding that Belgium permit the German forces to pass and attack France, another guarantor of her neutrality, and threatening otherwise to treat Belgium as an enemy. When she refused to abandon her nationality and her sworn duty, her martyrdom began. Up to this point there is no controversy. The German chancellor publicly admitted that the invasion was "contrary to law," was undertaken against "just protests," was a "wrong." The only justification was "necessity," altho that was based upon the utterly false pretense that France—which had just expressly pledged to respect Belgian neutrality—was "prepared" to commit the perjured action which Germany actually did commit. But the German slander now repeated is based upon facts learned after that confession. In Brussels the invaders found documents recording that in 1906, and again in 1912, the British military attache had discussed his government's plan to send 100,000 troops into Belgium "in

case Belgium should be attacked." But in the very correspondence upon which Germany makes her vicious assault is this official record:

The landing of the English troops would take place on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

Furthermore, there was an explicit declaration by Belgium that she would protest against such help, while she would actually resist any British incursion, even tho it were designed to anticipate a German violation. In other words, Belgium was scrupulously faithful to her obligations of neutrality, against any and all countries that might challenge it or seek by force to protect it. The statement that she "sought military support" is false; the support was offered to her—but it was to be given only in the event of, and following, a German invasion. Great Britain was a guarantor of Belgian neutrality, and that she planned to fulfill that obligation was as creditable to her as Germany's repudiation of her own part in the compact was infamous. That the German staff had long planned an instant invasion of Belgium in case of war was so far from a secret that the project was discussed in the imperial military textbooks and revealed in the building of elaborate military railroads, with vast yards for the handling of troop trains at the very frontier of the doomed state. If "perfidious" Britain was culpable, it was not because she examined the problem of making good her pledged word, but that she failed to take adequate measures in the face of a certain threat. As to the German slur against France, the answer is this statement by the French minister at Brussels, dated August 1, 1914:

I am authorized to declare that in the case of international conflict the government of the republic will in all

cases respect the neutrality of Belgium. If this neutrality shall not be respected by another Power, the French government might, for the purpose of its own defenses, have to modify its attitude.

As a fact, not a French soldier entered Belgium until the German invasion was far advanced. The record stands, therefore, that Belgium was absolutely true to her neutrality; that France did not violate it, that Great Britain did not, and that Germany did. And now, having extracted from this act of perfidy all possible advantage, she has the hardihood to accuse her victim and defame those whom she betrayed! "Twice," says the imperial statement, unctuously, "Germany offered to guarantee the integrity and independence of the kingdom" and "to spare it the terrors of war." But the "guarantee" twice offered was predicated upon the repudiation of another guarantee twice affirmed! It may be that another than a Prussian mind could originate such a proposal; but certainly no other would solemnly recall the circumstances as evidence of fidelity and generosity. "Upon her and those Powers which instigated her," ends the Berlin note, "falls the responsibility for the fate which befell Belgium." This is the answer of German statesmanship to an indictment for a hideous wrong committed before the eyes of all mankind; this is the plea by which it seeks to awaken neutral condemnation against those who have united to overthrow Prussianism!

Touching some of the objects stated by the opposing governments there may be doubts. But if even their schemes of dismemberment and annexation have caused no outburst of dissent, it is because the heart of the world is hardened by the spectacle of the despoiler of Belgium, with bloodstained hands, flinging insults upon the prostrate victim.

STRANGE VIEWS OF PEACE

January 23, 1917.

THERE is no doubt that a considerable number of Americans agree with the opinion expressed by President Wilson that the European war is mere "madness" and that "with its causes and objects we are not concerned." It is not surprising, therefore, that a New York newspaper should put forth this remarkable concept of the peace problem:

Sir Sam Hughes is quoted as saying: "Peace? Canada is not fighting for peace. Canada is fighting for human liberty, and we'll fight till that is secured."

Bosh! Whose liberty? Belgium's? But the Germans are ready to get out of Belgium and to pay Belgium its bill of damages. Besides Belgium, the Germans have military possession of Rumania and Servia. The people of Rumania never had any liberties at all. And Servia is far from being a democracy. But Germany is willing to withdraw from both.

Every time we hear this kind of sentimental tommyrot uttered and applauded we realize more fully the good common sense of the president in asking the belligerents to submit a bill of particulars.

There are, we say, not a few to whom this will seem an utterance of wisdom, of that direct common sense which pierces thru the mists of partisan argument and illuminates the heart of a question. Why pretend that Belgium's freedom is at stake when that country could have release and reparation tomorrow? Why indulge in "sentimental tommyrot" about human liberty when Germany is ready to come to a businesslike understanding with her enemies on the basis of her conquests

to date? Unfortunately for the value of the suggestion, neither the premises nor the conclusions are sound. If the Germans are ready to evacuate and reimburse Belgium, and to withdraw from Rumania and Servia, they have been singularly reticent about it. The courteous demand of President Wilson, backed by the opinion of the whole world, has not been able to extort such an avowal from them. And meanwhile influential leaders in the empire openly proclaim that Belgium must be annexed or reduced to political and economic servitude; must be rendered powerless ever again to resist or delay a German military campaign. But even if complete liberation and restoration of Belgium were conceded, by what process of reasoning could that be regarded as a settlement of the fundamental issues of the war and a guarantee of future peace? Germany would still be Germany—with the addition of a justifiable sense of triumph and military supremacy; Prussianism would still be the guiding spirit of her government—and strengthened by an overwhelming demonstration of power; Belgium would still be a weak neighbor—with a population terrorized by the memory of a long agony and the contemplation of ineffaceable ruins; and the guarantee of her security, if such were given, would still be “a scrap of paper.” Grievous as the sufferings of Belgium have been, the injury done to her is but an incident in the towering crime of treacherous aggression. If the invaders could restore life to every Belgian slain and rebuild every devastated Belgian home, an immeasurable offense would still be unexpiated, a stupendous wrong to humanity unatoned. Towns can be rebuilt, exiles repatriated, sovereignty restored. But what shall give sanction to a new oath sworn upon the ruins created by violation of the old? How shall international faith, shattered by deliberate repudiation, be made once more

the security of nations? Another recent utterance will illustrate the strangely distorted conceptions held by those who support Germany's demand for peace at her chosen time. It is from an article by John W. Burgess, professor emeritus of political science and constitutional law at Columbia University. While strongly pro-German—he has eulogized the kaiser, lauded militarism and defended the invasion of Belgium—he is manifestly sincere and is a scholar of wide experience and repute. Yet this is his idea of how the war should be settled:

If anything had been necessary to prove the wisdom of the original German proposal for trusted representatives of the belligerent nations to gather around the council board and suggest to each other, face to face, terms of peace and discuss the same until an agreement should be reached, certainly the answers of the Allies to the German note and to the note of President Wilson furnish this proof in fullest measure. The German government evidently foresaw and attempted to forestall a useless and harmful campaign of recrimination in the public press * * *.

It is entirely evident that the only hope for a speedy peace is the assembly of the trusted representatives of the nations at war around the council board, where the personal contact of large-minded men may soften the hatreds bred by nonintercourse and misunderstanding, and where face to face discussions and deliberations shall take the place of recrimination in the public prints.

For an expert in historical research—he says that for fifty years he has been studying international affairs—Professor Burgess seems to have a singularly restricted point of view. Possibly he has been so intent upon the perusal of diplomatic documents that he has not had time to estimate the human and economic and moral forces involved. He has not yet discovered that this war is a clash of hostile civilizations, of conflicting theories of human society. To him it seems merely the result of deplorable misunderstandings and animosi-

ties between statesmen. The embattled peoples, the struggle of irreconcilable principles of government, the maintenance or the repudiation of international faith, the rights and liberties and aspirations of unnumbered millions of human beings—such things do not trouble his vision. The whole titanic upheaval is to him but a species of madness, to be quelled by friendly conversations among eminent politicians around a council table—a matter of adroit negotiation, of individual accommodation, of compromise, barter and diplomatic huckstering. No doubt the professor has as much sympathy as any one for the afflicted peoples; but what do they know of the subtleties of statesmanship, how can they judge the delicate issues of international politics? These are the concerns of their betters—of those same “trusted representatives” who precipitated the conflict by their hole-in-corner intrigues.

In this view peace depends, not upon smashing projects of aggression, establishing justice and enforcing respect for national rights, but upon getting a collection of high-well-born negotiators face to face. If Prince Muenchner-Schwarzkopf discovers that the Right Honorable the Earl of Hammersmith is a reasonable sort of person, and if the sultan’s delegate finds that he can sit between the representatives of the czar and the French republic without having his pocket picked, everything can soon be arranged. The peoples of the various countries may have the infatuated idea that they are giving their lives for principles, but the only real bar to peace is that their respective statesmen have not had a chance to dissolve their personal misunderstandings and comfortably reorganize Europe upon a basis of mutual accommodation. The professor has permitted his judgment to be affected too much, we fear, by his researches into the peace movements of the past. His

picture faithfully represents the manner of settling other wars—he visualizes another congress of Vienna or of Berlin, when “trusted representatives” haggled in secret over the spoils and made those precious settlements that produced this dreadful conflict. If ever there was an event in human history which demanded wide and untrammelled discussion, if ever there was a war whose issues needed candid exposition and whose peace terms should be the product of the thought of all mankind, it is this. The thing most needed is public controversy, and even “recrimination in the public press” between the two groups of governments serves a purpose in revealing responsibility and disclosing national designs.

It is the prevalence of such views as we have quoted that gives timeliness and value to the lucid exposition of the issues which has been made by the British foreign secretary. Among the voluminous state papers produced by the war there is none that has approached it in closeness of reasoning and in forceful assertion conveyed in moderate language. It is not needful to indorse every detail of the proposed settlement as expounded by Mr. Balfour to recognize that his presentation of the fundamental factors in the peace problem is unanswerable. Candid as the joint note of the Entente governments was, this utterance clarifies the whole question. He explains in the simplest terms the charge that Germany forced the war, and the remedies which her opponents believe will reduce the chances of future aggressions. But he admits that territorial rearrangements and treaties alone provide no security for lasting peace—“so long as Germany remains the Germany which overran a country it was pledged to defend, no state can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.” A whole volume of his-

tory, too, is compressed in the comment upon the German system of making war: "The staffs of the Central Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it." But the vital point urged is that mere cessation of the war would be a disservice to the world—that "such a peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal." "If existing treaties are no more than scraps of paper," it is asked, "can fresh treaties help us?"

The two essential obstacles to peace are that Germany has proclaimed her alliance the victor and that her people still uphold the vicious system which struck down international faith in order to gain a military advantage. Tho her terms were ever so "moderate," to negotiate with her now would be to acknowledge that the most hideous wrong, if successful, is tolerable, and to make a mockery of all peaceable methods for the maintenance of national rights and the preservation of world order. That permanent peace would be promoted by such a device as giving Austria's only seaport to Italy is worse than doubtful, and there are other proposals which appeal no more strongly to the impartial mind. But upon the basic proposition that a peace made with Germany while she is victorious and unrepentant would be worse than continued war, the Allies are supported by the logic of history and the moral judgment of the world.

THE PEACE DICTATOR

January 25, 1917.

THE outstanding fact concerning President Wilson's latest intervention in the European war seems to us to be this—that by a single arbitrary action, unsupported by any public demand or official advice and in defiance of strong sentiment, he has taken it upon himself to reverse the policies of three presidents of the United States, not the least eminent among our chief executives. George Washington abandoned to discredit the autocratic procedure of delivering presidential messages to the senate in person. After more than a century, Woodrow Wilson has revived it. James Monroe established the doctrine of excluding European interference in the political and territorial affairs of the western hemisphere. After it has stood the test of eighty years, Woodrow Wilson has discarded it. Abraham Lincoln set up the principle that foreign dictation to belligerents fighting for irreconcilable principles was harmful and intolerable. After sixty years Woodrow Wilson has destroyed it.

Ever since the last reply to his note was received there has been a nervous expectancy of further activities, and thoughtful Americans, aware of his eccentric habits of thought, braced themselves for a shock. But his most infatuated admirers and his most distrustful critics were unprepared for the revolutionary utterance which he prepared secretly and delivered unwarned. Even by sympathetic observers the action is described

by such doubtful characterizations as "bold," "momentous," "startling," "amazing." Our own judgment is that it has conferred no benefit upon the world, while it has dangerously compromised the future of the United States.

The first thing requisite to an understanding of the address is to observe that Mr. Wilson discusses two distinct problems—the settlement of the war and the project of establishing permanent peace thereafter. It is unnecessary to state this because the celebrated facility of the speaker in the uses of language was not equal to the task of separating the two matters. As a fact, they are bafflingly involved in the carefully chosen phrases. As to the first problem, he disavows any right to name the terms for ending the war, and then proceeds to dictate them. As to the second, he lays down "fundamental and essential" principles which must be embodied in the peace treaty if the United States is to become a party to the "concert of power" which he has decided must be established. These radical assertions illustrate very strikingly the wavering of the mind which represents itself as guided by immutable principles and unchanging conviction. For two years President Wilson has been emphasizing the complete aloofness of this country from the war. He has declared that "with its causes and objects we have no concern." So recently as December 18 he wrote to the belligerents that "the terms upon which it is to be concluded the American people are not at liberty to suggest"; even in this latest statement he says "we shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be"; but almost in the same breath he says, "it makes a great deal of difference (to the United States) in what way and upon what terms the war is ended." And he declares, "without reserve and with the utmost explicitness," his own ideas

on the matter. If it be granted that this country has a right to dictate, some of the generalities are highly conceived. The peace must be "just and secure," founded upon "equality of rights" and upon the principle that "governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." But in the application of these sentiments Mr. Wilson is less happy.

"Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland." Such looseness of statement would discredit an irresponsible newspaper; from a high official it is contemptible. Statesmen are more widely apart upon the problem of Polish nationality than upon any other issue of the war. If "united" Poland means that section which Germany and Austria propose to erect into a kingdom, the settlement is repudiated by Russia; if it means the inclusion of Posen and Polish West Prussia and Galicia, the Central Powers must first be crushed. "Inviolable security of life, worship and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own." This implies the tearing apart of Europe in an impossible project of rearranging nationalities and religions that have become entangled thru centuries of migration and intermingling; more than that, it implies the withdrawal of European governments from Asia and Africa, even of Japan from Korea. In such casual terms does Mr. Wilson "frankly uncover realities." It occurs to him that "every great people should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea," and he adds that recommendation, which may mean that Russia should have the Dardanelles, or that Austria should resist the demand of Italy for Trieste, or that Poland should have Danzig, and Switzerland a navy. He is very sure that "freedom of the seas" is requisite; and

since the seas are absolutely free in time of peace, his remarks can be directed only at their control by naval forces in time of war, and amounts to a demand that sea power be paralyzed. But the peculiar intellectual processes of Mr. Wilson, and his fatal propensity for originating inept phrases, are best shown in his assertion that the peace "must be a peace without victory." He attempts to qualify this by alleging that both sides have implied the same thought; whereas, each has explicitly declared that victory alone can bring a just settlement. But his own amplifying words show that he demands a cessation of the war upon inconclusive terms:

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished; it would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory. Only a peace between equals can last.

That these phrases have so intensely irritated European peoples as to injure the cause of peace is unfortunate; but we are still more concerned over the fact that they are false in logic and immoral in significance. They have in them the same essential fallacy which pervades the doctrine of peace at any price. They imply that victory in itself is vicious, regardless of the cause, just as pacifism holds that resistance, even to wrong, is wicked. "Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser." That is obvious. Likewise the punishment of a malefactor means obedience forced upon a violator of law. If President Wilson still maintains that neither side was the aggressor, that both are equally guilty of the crimes against Servia and Belgium, and that there is nothing to choose between the nations which repudiated law and faith and those which defend them, his words are intelligible. But if he sees no issue of right or wrong involved, his assumption that he speaks "on behalf of humanity and the rights of all neutral nations"

is monstrous. Moreover, since Germany and her allies are at this moment victorious, his phrase is addressed to their opponents—they are the nations which must make peace without victory. And that is manifestly impossible, because any such peace would leave Germany triumphant.

The peace he demands must be "between equals." The manner of equality he does not specify; but since he recognizes no issue of right on either side, it must be supposed that they are to agree as equals in morality and observance of the principles of international justice; in other words, Belgium stands on the same plane as Germany, and France is to be considered the counterpart of Turkey. Such features of the address have caused bitter accusations of pro-Germanism against the president. These are unjust, for his sympathies are really the other way; his weaknesses are simply a distorted conception of the meaning of the war and a blindness to its deepest significance. He believes that his judgment rises superior to that of millions who are giving their lives for principle, and that he has a nobler vision of what humanity needs. None the less, his action is manifestly a tremendous aid to Germany. In arguing that peace must come soon, in demanding settlement without a decision and in emphasizing the abstraction of "freedom of the seas" he supports explicitly the main contentions of Germany since she began her world-wide propaganda to avert her defeat. Even more clearly is his action hostile to the opponents of Germany. The central thought in the note of the Entente governments, developed with deliberate care in the supplementary communication of Mr. Balfour, was that there can be and will be no peace until the Teutonic alliance has been defeated. That they have been wounded is of less importance to us than the fact that America, founded to advance the

cause of human liberty and justice, is placed in the position of subordinating concrete issues of right and wrong to projects of an abstract internationalism. Nor is it inspiring to reflect that this dissertation upon the proper methods for safeguarding all humanity comes from an administration that has failed to protect its own citizens from lawless aggression, and that the scheme for reorganizing the world upon a basis of order, peace and justice is a product of the genius which has been impotent before the violence of a turbulent neighbor.

It is becoming wearisome to repeat, after each fresh indiscretion by Mr. Wilson, that he means well. Sincerity is no adequate defense for recklessness of temperament, for arrogance of judgment, for an infatuated belief in formulas, for an itching meddlesomeness; it makes those qualities, on the contrary, so much the more dangerous. If any hopeful American thinks that the president's persistent intervention has advanced the prospects of a just peace, let him study the developments in Europe. If any one thinks that the action has served the interests of America, let him examine, as we shall do tomorrow, the proposal that the United States become a party to the quarrels of all the world.

MILLENNIUM BY PROCLAMATION

January 26, 1917.

THOSE "very frank and explicit" propositions of President Wilson touching peace terms having become involved, like his other illuminating utterances, in hopeless controversy as to their meaning, Americans may turn to the other feature of this extraordinary address. This was the pledge that, provided the war ends "without a victory," so that the settlement is indecisive, the United States will join a world-wide "league for peace." Obviously, it is a matter of infinitely greater importance, designed to change the whole course of our history and the direction of our development, and threatening the very existence of our institutions. It is astounding, we must repeat, that in a democratic country the chief executive should take it upon himself to commit the nation to such a revolutionary procedure. For the president was emphatic in making his proposal official. "I am speaking," he said, "as the responsible head of a great government." Moreover, he sent copies of the address in advance to be presented to foreign Powers. An inquiry into the scope of the plan meets varying interpretations. One officer of the League to Enforce Peace indignantly denies that the idea would compel us to make war upon a nation defying a decree of the international alliance; the purpose would be, he says, merely to "enforce delay." Mr. Taft, head of the league, likewise disavows the only function which could make the scheme really effective. But what these gen-

tlements think and say is unimportant. President Wilson is the sponsor for the project, and his declarations are conclusive:

The United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed to realize these (the league's) objects and make them secure against violation. I am sure the people would favor our joining a universal association to maintain the inviolate security of the seas, and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a *virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence*.—Address in Washington, May 27, 1916.

We are ready to use *all our force* to maintain peace among mankind. The starting of wars can never again be the private concern of any one nation. We must use *all our force, moral and physical*, to uphold a league of nations, to uphold the peace of the world.—Address in Omaha, October 5, 1916.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world, the people and government of the United States are vitally and directly interested. Their interest in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is quick and ardent. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends with every influence *and resource* at their command.—Note to belligerents, December 18, 1916.

Peace must be followed by some definite concert of power. It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. That service is to add their authority *and their power* to the authority and *force* of other nations to guarantee peace and justice thruout the world. * * * If peace is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by *the organized major force of mankind*.—Address to the senate, January 22, 1917.

This means, incontestably, that the United States will assume, proportionately to its population and wealth and area, a share of the responsibility of policing all the earth and of a "virtual guarantee of territorial integrity

and political independence"; that to that extent it will defend small nations against aggression and uphold "peace and justice thruout the world"; and that to these ends it will devote "all its force, moral and physical." Equally clear is the obverse—that all other nations will have a corresponding right and obligation to supervise the foreign affairs of this country; that any injury against us will have to be adjudicated by European and Asiatic governments, and that if we reject their findings we shall be coerced by their armies and navies. The plan involves surrender of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Wilson offers the fantastic plea that he is proposing "that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of Monroe as the doctrine of the world"; but if the United States is to participate in controlling Europe and Asia and Africa, it follows necessarily that the other Powers will have equal authority in this hemisphere. To cite one plain example, the Monroe Doctrine has kept European nations out of Mexico; the Wilson Doctrine would invite them in. Possibly the Monroe Doctrine should be abandoned; but it ought to be abandoned openly and without any false pretense that it is being safeguarded or extended. It is remarkable that the league plan evokes anthems of praise from many pacifists, altho Mr. Bryan, for one, roundly condemns any suggestion that international decrees be enforced. President Wilson has been quite frank about this obligation:

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it.

The Teutonic alliance commands perhaps 10,000,000 soldiers; their opponents, half as many more. These figures suggest the size of the requisite "major force"

and the contribution that the United States, as the wealthiest of nations, with a vast area and a population of 100,000,000, would be called upon to make. And lest there be any illusions that the world league would use only moral suasion, there is this warning from Viscount Grey, formerly British foreign secretary:

The nations must be prepared not to undertake more than they are prepared to uphold by force, and to see when the crisis comes that it is upheld by force. We say to neutrals who are occupying themselves with this question that we are in favor of it. But we shall ask when the time comes for them to make any demand on us for such a thing: "Will you play up when the time comes?" It is not merely a sign manual of sovereigns and presidents that is required to make a thing like that worth while.

If anything could be more depressing, more sickening, than the current chatter about a federation of the world and a ready-made millennium, it is the nonsensical theory that the reign of force, revived by the most powerful alliance, save one, that the world has ever seen, is to be ended by moralizing admonitions, and universal peace is to be established by resolutions. President Wilson is candid enough, at least, to acknowledge that naval and military coercion must be the foundations of the project. But neither he nor any other theorist of pacifism seems capable of facing the facts which this revolution would involve—that it would mean the entanglement of America in every international squabble, racial, political or religious, around the globe, the participation of Europe and Asia in the affairs of this continent, and the maintenance of stupendous armament. It would mean that there would be not a day in the year when the United States was not a party to some distant controversy; it would mean that we must preoccupy ourselves with the interminable problems of nationality in central Europe and western Asia and northern Africa;

it would mean that ultimately American soldiers would be drafted into European trenches.

Nor do the visionaries recognize that a "league to enforce peace" has been tried and has failed. Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria and Russia were bound by solemn covenant, not to preserve peace thruout the whole world, but merely to protect the sovereignty of one small nation, Belgium. Yet the league did not save Belgium from martyrdom, and after two years and a half the nation has not been restored, altho 15,000,000 troops have been flung into the cause. President Wilson's idea has precisely the same weakness that wrecked the league which guaranteed the peace in Belgium—it cannot provide against faithlessness except by piling up force; and we have before our eyes an example of how easily millions can be enlisted for a cause founded upon perjury and aggression. If all nations were devoted to the same ideals and aspirations, and maintained the same institutions, even then differences of temperament and language and economic necessity would create colossal difficulties in the way of world federation. But when one contemplates the irreconcilable conflict between the habits of thought and principles of government of all the teeming countries of the earth, the idea becomes grotesque.

When all else has been taken into account, there remains the certainty that a world league would be an incitement to alliances more secret and more selfish than any that have hitherto afflicted mankind. Every issue arising would be made the subject of desperate intrigue by the nations directly concerned to enlist support for their respective contentions, and the certain result would be rivalries and animosities worse than before.

MYSTIFICATION

January 29, 1917.

IF BY some incredible chance the latest state paper of President Wilson should vanish from human knowledge, and reappear, as an anonymous production, for the edification of a future age, its authorship would not long remain in doubt. Students of this period of American history would recognize not only the unmistakable marks of a literary style which has become famous, but a quality which sets Mr. Wilson's utterances apart from those of the other statesmen of his time. This is their obscurity. The involutions of his reasoning and the ambiguities of his diction darken what they should illuminate. A familiar cynicism is that the chief use of speech is to conceal thoughts; in the case of Mr. Wilson the faculty, despite his utmost efforts, becomes a device to becloud the obvious and baffle interpretation. The defect is most noticeable in his recent address because of the contrast between the intent and the result. With almost painful care, he aimed to achieve precision of statement and clarity of exposition, but succeeded only in creating new controversies, not only as to the wisdom of his action, but as to the meaning of his neatly fashioned phrases. It is curious that such a deficiency should mark one who has been acclaimed as a practiced expert in the uses of language, a master dialectician. He is believed to have all human history at his finger tips, and to be steeped in the subtleties of speech. Yet it is a fact that no other states-

man is so liable to be misunderstood; certainly none has done more to obscure plain issues and to lead discussion into impenetrable jungles of disputation.

The note addressed to the belligerents on December 18 was a striking example. To this day it is not known whether it was a move toward peace, a threat, an offer of mediation, an effort to end the war or a desperate expedient to avert the conflict from the United States. British opinion, having disciplined itself into indorsing a responsive reply to the note of last month, found it difficult to welcome so soon afterward another admonitory communication. For a day or two it tried to combine praise for the president's idealism with resentment for his customary maladroitness of expression. "Peace without victory" harshly drowned all the resonant phrases celebrating those principles for which Britons believe they fight. It was agreed that the address was admirable as "an abstract pontifical statement of future international morality." Meanwhile, it seemed to many to be violently pro-German, while a member of the cabinet was able to say, "Our aims are the same as President Wilson's; what he is longing for, we are fighting for." French writers somewhat mockingly commend the speaker for voicing sentiments which have inspired France for more than a hundred years, but they confess themselves quite unable to fathom the philosophy which urges compromise with the embattled enemies of those principles. "How will it be possible to guarantee the future," asks one, "if we are declared incapable of taking care of the past?" And another remarks: "Mr. Wilson's scheme is simplicity itself, except that it requires a new type of human being." Officially, Russia "gladly indorses the communication," as embodying the ideals to which the empire is devoted, but the ablest newspaper in Petrograd declares itself "unable to pene-

trate the inner meaning" of the speech. As for Germany, these typical comments will show how lacking in precision were the statements which Mr. Wilson described as being of the "utmost explicitness":

The message was inspired by preconceived anti-German ideas. Application of its principles would mean the destruction of Germany.

His ideas are identical with the principles underlying German policy for a long time and expressed in the peace offer of the Central Powers.

So far as he means anything, his position is favorable to the Entente.

They are beautiful words, which are immediately dispelled in fog when an effort is made to discover a practical meaning in them.

The principles laid down for future peace are as acceptable as those put forth in the Entente reply, which were impossible.

It corresponds much more closely to the idea expressed by the Central Powers than to the senseless demands of our enemies.

There was no doubt at the German embassy in Washington, however, where it was said that Mr. Wilson had supported the three fundamental points in the German position—an early peace, a drawn war and "freedom of the seas." But the confusion abroad has been no more marked than that at home. While a faithful organ of the administration complains that "much skill and ingenuity have been devoted to misunderstanding the address," the truth is that far greater ingenuity is required to expound it intelligently. The same paper furnishes a striking instance, when it argues that the ending of the American civil war was "a classical example" of "peace without victory"! The surrender at Appomattox was unconditional; peace was imposed by sheer force, without treaty or negotiation; the defeated government was abolished, and its adherents

compelled to accept another allegiance. And a friendly interpreter says this is the settlement which Mr. Wilson recommends to Europe!

When we turn to congress to learn what the president's utterance meant, we find hopeless contradiction. It was "a magnificent contribution to international thought," "the noblest utterance that has fallen from human lips since the Declaration of Independence," "a giant's stride in world comity"; also, "it would make Don Quixote wish he hadn't died so soon," and it "implies surrender of our independence." One member, pressed for an opinion, desperately said, "I heard the address, but cannot comprehend it," and fled. Other Americans differ as sharply. One eminent expert in international law finds the speech "epoch-making," while another thinks that "unless the president is acting on information received from the belligerents, it is just a sermon." Gifford Pinchot says it flagrantly "supports the German demands," while Oscar Straus is sure Mr. Wilson's peace "would include the ideals for which the Allies are fighting." Elihu Root, ablest of analysts, expresses sympathy with the terms outlined because, he says, "they involve the absolute destruction and abandonment of the principles upon which the war was begun" by the Teutonic governments. But when he comes to the "league for peace" proposal he is baffled. "I hope," he says plaintively, "that that paragraph means what I hope it means."

As a whole, then, Mr. Wilson's essay in explicitness is singularly defective, and the failure is emphasized when one examines the specific statements. No one has more than the remotest idea what he means by "a united, independent and autonomous Poland," "freedom of the seas," or the right of all nations to "direct outlets to the highways of the seas." If it be argued that he

had no right to be precise on these matters, the answer must be that suggestions which merely increase controversy are less helpful than silence would have been. If he could afford to avoid all mention of Belgium, surely he could restrain himself concerning other factors in the problem. A diplomatic effort toward peace must be judged by its effect, and when it produces hopeless misunderstanding rather than a softening of controversy its value may be doubted.

"The peculiarity of the president's deliverances," says Dr. David Jayne Hill, "is that they cannot be derived from experience and do not contain any prevision of consequences." This is an acute judgment, illustrated by many parts of the record of the last four years. But the utterances have another peculiarity. Despite his ill-success, President Wilson's command of the resources of language is not to be denied, and, therefore, there must be some other explanation than lack of skill. We find it in the fact that he has shown that words whose meaning is absolutely clear to all civilized human beings convey no such significance to him—or at least that he can readily bring himself to disregard it. So long as his interpretation of "strict accountability" mystifies a sardonic world, there is small hope that such phrases as "peace without victory" and "disentangling alliances" will commend themselves as either conclusive or enlightening.

THE BLOW FALLS

February 2, 1917.

A REMARKABLE thing about Germany's resumption of methodical murder, as announced in the note dated January 31, is that the hideous action created surprise in this country. President Wilson, it is declared, was "incredulous" when the first outline of the note reached him. "Washington Astounded by the Sudden Act," read a headline in an administration organ. "The unexpected move," says a dispatch, "seemed to stun members of congress, who, in the light of recent events, had turned their thoughts rather toward peace." Yet there has not been a development in the war more clearly foreshadowed, more certain in its approach. That the German autocracy, defeated and desperate, would attempt wholesale piracy and assassination, would be willing to destroy civilization itself, rather than face its deluded subjects, was known to every rational observer. "Peace with the world, or war with America," has been the rallying cry of the empire's baffled and bloodstained militarism; the coming campaign of slaughter was threatened in the speeches of statesmen, the demand for peace and the proclamations of the kaiser. Fifteen weeks ago we stated only the obvious when we said:

Germany yielded to the United States as a matter of cold calculation, and will reverse her position at any time when it seems necessary and expedient to do so.

And a full month ago we based upon facts patent to every reader this explicit warning:

Germany's endeavors to force a diplomatic settlement with her enemies have so completely dominated public thought that there is a vague idea that the worst of the war, at least, is over, and that even if her overture fails the future can hold nothing more terrible than the past. Yet it is certain that her proposal constitutes only one-half of her prepared program. She is ready for an alternative procedure, and final rejection of her efforts will be the signal for more desperate, more sanguinary and more ruthless methods of attack. * * * Prattle about President Wilson's "noble efforts for peace" does not alter the fact that his note was essentially and properly a warning that this nation is "drawing nearer to the verge of war." And it does not alter the fact that the country faces the peril uninformed, unaroused and unprepared.

There is a condition still more ominous than the drugging of the public mind with false representations of security, and the neglect of preparation to meet a peril long foreseen. Two years of temporizing, of empty bluster and craven retreat, have left this government bankrupt in moral force. It confronts today precisely the same choice that it confronted two years ago—resolute championship of law and justice, or submission to murderous aggression. Submission served then to postpone the conflict; it will serve even the poor cause of a shameful peace no longer. It would not now be a device of safety, but only an added infamy to conquest by criminal brutality. Unless the spirit of manhood and justice is extinct in this nation, there will be no toleration of any proposal to palter with international outlawry. The one hope of this country and of humanity is that American leadership can link the neutral nations of the world in a program of united sentiment and action, by which they may overcome and bind in chains the hellish Thing which has leaped at the throat of civilization.

THE WAR AGAINST NEUTRALS

February 3, 1917.

TWO of the strangest diplomatic documents exchanged during this momentous period in the world's affairs will never see the light. Their concealment is, perhaps, no serious loss to the historian or to the sum of human knowledge; yet one is curious to know what was the message of birthday felicitation which President Wilson sent to the kaiser last week, and how that monarch responded to the compliments of his "great and good friend." For at the very hour when the words of good will were received from Washington, his imperial majesty was preparing to deliver to the American republic a declaration of war against it and against civilization, a declaration based upon perfidy, phrased with every ingenuity of insult, and backed by a program of savagery unparalleled in the annals of enlightened races. One effect of the German action is to reduce the controversy to the simplest terms. There is no longer any room for debate over technicalities and interpretations of the law concerning contraband, neutral rights, freedom of the seas, armed merchantmen or the obligations to rescue non-combatants. Germany has now avowed the prosecution of that war of indiscriminate assassination which for two years she has been waging with hollow protestations that its horrors were unintentional. She merely proclaims that her campaign of terrorism and murder is to be systematized and extended.

Simplification of the issue makes only four documents closely relevant. First, is the American ultimatum of April 18, 1916, which announced that diplomatic relations would be severed unless Germany should "immediately declare and effect an abandonment" of submarine lawlessness. The response was a pledge to observe the rules of law and humanity, but with a reservation; unless the United States should compel lifting of the Allies' blockade "the German government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision." This placing of a price upon recognition of American rights and respect for American lives was promptly rejected, President Wilson serving this notice:

The United States cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of American citizens upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

By ignoring this communication Germany signified that her ostensible submission to law was only temporary, and would be repudiated as soon as she found it expedient to do so. And "a new situation has been created," she now says, by disclosure of the Allies' terms of peace, and she purposes to destroy all shipping which she can reach with torpedoes and mines, regardless of any rules or any injury to neutrals. The murderous program is comprehensive, and presumably efficient. All the waters around Great Britain and France and most of Holland, and virtually the entire Mediterranean, are designated as "barred zones," in which vessels will be sunk indiscriminately, without warning and without any provision for the safety of occupants. "Neutral ships

plying within the zones will do so at their own risk." Nothing in the arrangement is more remarkable than the studied effrontery of the offer to the United States. Germany will permit—subject to "mistakes" by submarine commanders—one American vessel weekly to and from Falmouth, provided they are painted with vertical red and white stripes from water-line to superstructure, fly a flag designed by the German government, follow the narrow path where official murders will not be attempted, and sail under guarantees by the American government that they carry no contraband—that term, as defined by Germany, including virtually every commodity human beings need or can use.

The announcement presents such a complete picture of the official soul of Germany that the accompanying note is of subordinate interest. But it reveals qualities of arrogance, hypocrisy and criminality which give it pre-eminence even over the other documents from the same course. The program of assassination directed against neutral nations is accompanied by expressions of high regard for the freedom of the seas, "which has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program." Mention is made of the desire "to maintain friendly neighborly relations" with Belgium, where even now German slavers are driving the helpless people into brutal bondage. Unrestrained lawlessness and an ambitious scheme of murder are adopted as "a benefit to mankind" and "in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense." And to all this is added the crowning insult of a recommendation that the United States shall "view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist"—presumably by submission to the infamous threats—"to prevent further misery." As shocking as anything, perhaps, is the shameless avowal now made that the German

government has never ceased to plan for this revolting procedure; that those statesmen who posed as the restraining influence upon elements eager for frightfulness have been themselves its ready instruments; and that the German people exult in being ruled by the exponents of calculating ferocity. The pretense that the employment of murder has just now been "forced" upon Germany is, of course, an impudent invention; for the horrible device has been used for two years, and the extension has awaited merely the assembling of a sufficient number of weapons.

In its relation to the world at large, the campaign has a meaning which must be clearly recognized. This measure is directed, not against the enemies of Germany, but against those nations with which, because of their tolerance, she is still officially at peace. It is a war against neutrals. For many months Germany has made unrestricted war upon the shipping of Great Britain and her allies. Instances where she has shown regard for law and humanity have been exceptional. They have little more to fear from her open resort to methodical slaughter. The only new development is to be that neutrals will be subjected to the same assaults. These facts are supported by Berlin's own boasts. Only three days ago it was announced that more than 4,000,000 tons of enemy shipping has been destroyed during the war; in December were added to the list 152 vessels, with aggregate tonnage of 329,000. And the records show that most of them were sunk in utter defiance of law, and with the loss of hundreds of lives. The actual contrast between the past and present becomes even less distinct when it is recalled that Germany proclaims she has destroyed 401 neutral vessels of 537,500 tons gross. A vital feature of the situation confronting the world is, we repeat, that Germany not only has declared in prin-

ciple a war upon civilization, but that in actual practice her new measures add nothing to the perils of belligerent shipping, but are designed to exterminate neutral shipping. The one other change in tactics is the announced purpose to sink hospital ships, which seems to indicate that militarism has actually produced in official Germany that sort of perversion which is manifested in blood lust. Otherwise, the outburst is an avowal of desperation. Her first dream of conquest shattered, her eastern forces at the limit of their advance, her western armies doomed to await the shock of a terrific offensive, and her people reduced to economic privation, Germany is making one last, frantic thrust for victory at any price. It is a dreadful choice, not alone for the world, but for the people once admired by all mankind. If she succeeds, there is an end of law and safety and all the institutions of civilized intercourse among nations. If she fails, she will stand at the bar of justice impotent and abhorred, without a friend in all the world to plead her cause.

It is of little use now to contemplate this country's part in bringing about the impending catastrophe, yet the record should not be ignored. For two years the United States has pursued a policy whose end was plain to every rational being, yet whose follies were supported by blind partisanship and infatuation in the face of developments ever more threatening. The American people have been committed to demands without sincerity and to concessions without reason or justice; not one crime against them or mankind has been expiated, not one sound principle has been established, and in the ultimate crisis the country finds itself without authority, without credit, without safety or the means of attaining it. And in all the record, we are persuaded, there is no action comparable in unwisdom to the ill-timed, illogical and futile intervention undertaken by President Wilson

by his so-called peace notes and speeches. If he did not recognize the imminence of Germany's resort to submarine savagery, which was clear to all the world, he is unequal to the responsibilities of his office. If he did know the facts, his projection of a visionary scheme of a league of nations and his superficial eloquence upon the subject of future world peace were flagrant pretense.

It would be preposterous to say that President Wilson created the crisis, but it is obvious—as Germany bluntly admits—that he hastened it. What action the government now contemplates the public cannot know, but it is certain that any course designed to resist an intolerable aggression and defend the rights of the United States and of humanity will be loyally supported by the American people. But just as the issue is greater than this country, so must the means of meeting it be based upon wider than national considerations. This new war is against all the neutral nations of the world, and they must unite to overcome the common enemy or else abandon the civilization whose final representatives they are.

THE PRUSSIAN MIND

February 6, 1917.

THRUOUT the entire conflict in Europe the psychology of Germany's attitude and procedure has been a baffling study, and never more so than in the latest crisis, precipitated by her desperate proclamation of war against the neutral world. The subject is one upon which Americans should inform themselves, not by any means to seek other grounds for enmity than now unhappily exist, but in order to understand a force which profoundly affects the present controversy and will go far to determine whether a peaceable solution can be attained. Our conviction, which is familiar to most of those who have followed our discussions during the last thirty months, is that in so far as the judgment of the German people has been subordinated to the inspiration and guidance of Prussianism, it is essentially defective. It has "blind spots." Remorselessly logical in working out the implications of its own premises, it fails to discern that often its premises are wrong. Even when it does make such a discovery, it readily produces a new set of facts and embarks upon a new course of reasoning which leads to a satisfactory result. And above all, it is quite incapable of recognizing the existence of different standards of conduct, or recognizes them, at least, only to dismiss them as non-German and, therefore, negligible. Thus it might be conceivable that another government should have sunk a *Lusitania* or killed an *Edith Cavell*; but it is incredible that any other

government or people should have termed one deed of blood a "lesson" to reckless neutrals or the other a vindication of justice. Nor can it be imagined that from any capital save Berlin would the project of indiscriminate destruction and assassination now under way be characterized as an effort "to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense."

The violation of Belgium was manifestly a product of perverted thought and policy, yet it was less strange than the attempts to justify it, which are painstakingly continued to this day. The methodical defiance of law and the recourse to barbarous and inhuman devices of warfare could have had no other effect than to move all civilized people to abhorrence, yet German statesmen have continued solemnly to address the world as representatives of a superior culture, and their people have exulted in each new horror, as tho it were a proof of genius which mankind must respect and admire. That American public men should have been "incredulous" and "stunned with amazement" when the imperial order for sea ruthlessness was promulgated denotes a singular lack of discernment and of familiarity with a record that has flamed across the vision of mankind for thirty months. They seem to have been struck with the idea that this was a new phase of Prussianism, a dreadful novelty for which the minds of men were totally unprepared. Yet, if ever an event was plainly foreshadowed, it was this; and if ever a government carried to a logical conclusion the fundamental principles of its polity, it is that which is driving the German empire to disaster.

Where is there a shred of evidence to suggest that this hideous device marks a change in German thought or purpose? This is the same Germany as that which plunged forsworn across the frontiers of a peaceful neighbor; which invoked "military necessity" to justify

the terrorizing of civilian populations, the massacre of women and children in an unarmed passenger ship, the raining of bombs upon defenseless and sleeping villages, the employment of lawless weapons in battle to blind and torture enemy troops; which has extorted from a famishing people stupendous tribute and revived the miseries of Assyrian enslavement to break the spirit of a nation subjugated by perfidy and brute force. America and Spain and Holland are no more neutral, no more entitled to immunity from assault, than was Belgium. The ships which now are being barbarously destroyed, and the seamen who are now being hunted with stealthy ferocity, are no more clearly under the protection of international law than were the *Lusitania* and the *Arabic* and the *Sussex* and their passengers and crews. Germany can be convicted of any offense except inconsistency or deception; even the intention to repudiate her pledge was avowed in the making of it. And this is identically the same Germany, too, that was complimented in a famous communication upon her "humane and enlightened attitude" and her unswerving "influence upon the side of justice and humanity"; the same Germany which but recently was entitled to demand "peace without victory" and a place in negotiations as "an equal"; the same Germany whose adherence to a world "league for peace" was invited as a guarantee of re-established law. But we have wandered a little from the subject of the curious intellectual processes of German statesmen and other representatives of the nation's thought. Some very striking examples are to be found in recent utterances. We have already mentioned the robust declarations for "freedom of the seas" and the "rights of neutrals" which marked the proclamation of the enlarged murder zones. Quite as remarkable was this assertion:

The imperial government could not justify before its own conscience, before the German people and before history the neglect of any means destined to bring about the end of the war.

The specific means not overlooked, of course, is the wholesale destruction of ships and crews, including those of neutral nations. The imperial government seems unconscious, and probably is, that it has studiously neglected several measures to attain the desired end. Some of them might have been adopted in the beginning—such as restraining Austria and keeping faith with Belgium. Some would have tended to increase the prospects of peace at later periods in the war—such as the liberation of the Belgians and abandonment of the practice of impoverishing them by forced levies and crushing them by slave raids. Observance of the ordinary dictates of humanity toward enemies and neutrals might have increased the chances of an early settlement. In general, among the means neglected have been honor and justice and an elementary regard for the rights of human beings. Unless we are to regard as a studied insult the offer to pass one American ship each way weekly, provided the vessels were painted with red and white stripes—floating advertisements of national degradation—we must refer that astonishing proposal to the eccentricities of the German mind; for any other would scorn to address a government that would consent to send forth craft as shamefully bedizened. Unmistakably German, too, was the avowal of the imperial chancellor the other day of the reasons which prompted the extended campaign of ruthlessness. For months he had accepted the homage of the world as the humane opponent of this measure; but new conditions, he was forced to admit, had overborne his virtuous feelings. There had been a change, he said, and soberly went on:

Where has there been any change? Why, in the first place, the most important fact is that the number of our submarines has been very considerably increased as compared with last spring, and thereby a firm basis for success has been established.

The other reasons do not matter. This in itself supplied the logical and sufficient justification for the murderous undertaking. Surely it must have been the good chancellor who indited, as representative of the Triple Alliance which launched this war upon the world, that quaint paragraph in the recent note wherein "the German people repudiate all alliances which serve to force the countries into a competition for might and to involve them in a net of selfish intrigues!" A staff correspondent of the New York World now in Berlin furnishes another example of the unintelligible mode of German reasoning. A few hours before President Wilson took his inevitable action, the writer cabled that thruout all circles there was a serene conviction that America would submit to unrestrained submarine lawlessness. "The fate of Rumania," one newspaper sagely observed, "has been too instructive," and it added with complacence that the "concessions" made—in the matter of painting American ships with the red-and-white badge of poltroonery, for example—would allay any neutral restiveness. Such delusions seem to us abnormal, but they must be taken into account as factors in our national problems. Originating in distorted German ideas, the entire war has been marked by like misconceptions, and now they confront in baffling manner the safety of the whole world.

INEVITABLE

February 7, 1917.

ALTHO the break with Germany has been almost unanimously approved by the people of this country, and altho there has been manifested even a sense of welcome relief from long-endured uncertainty and humiliation, no rational citizen can regard the possibilities of the action, necessary as it was, without sober apprehension. President Wilson justly said he "could do nothing less"; short of an abdication of sovereignty and a betrayal of humanity he had no alternative. Yet the preservation of human rights and liberties has ever demanded sacrifices, and the nation may be called upon to pay a heavy price for its championship of principle. It is encouraging, therefore, to note that the sudden crisis not only has invigorated the spirit of the American people, but has enlightened their judgment. For it has disclosed with vivid clearness the vital meaning of the struggle which for thirty months has convulsed the earth. That audacious challenge which sped from the war clouds of Europe has illuminated like a lightning flash the issue that confronts civilization—the existence of a powerful and remorseless system animated by a soulless ideal and founded upon a philosophy at war with reason. The beginning of the conflict may be traced to a score of causes, and its increasing bitterness to many influences; every observer will recognize the workings of racial hostility, political rivalry, commercial and territorial ambition, the passionate desire to curb aggres-

sion and release peoples from enslavement. But deeper than all these things lies the heart of the contest—the irreconcilable antagonism of autocracy and democracy. The issue was clear, indeed, from the beginning. It was demonstrated as conclusively in the historic act of perfidy which began the war as it is in the final repudiation of law which now shocks the world. On August 11, 1914—eight days after the assault upon Belgium had mystified mankind by its sheer iniquity—this newspaper gave an interpretation which every event from that hour to this has supported:

The lesson that is to be written in blood and fire for the world to read is plain. It is that in the twentieth century autocracy is an intolerable anachronism, a menace to civilization, a burden upon humanity. This war is its death-grapple among enlightened nations. The result will be the doom of a system which gives to despotic governments control over the peace of nations and inflicts upon the race a war against which the judgment of the whole world revolts.

The most obvious fact concerning the present threat to world order is that it is no sudden development of abnormal conditions, but the logical and infallible product of forces which have been at work since the remote times of tribal society, but which survived chiefly in central Europe. From its betrayal of international faith and violation of a peaceful state, thru all the exemplifications of lawlessness and desperation down to the latest defiance, the government of Germany has never deviated from a chosen path, has followed consistently the dictates of a false philosophy. What we have seen, what we see now, is autocracy manifesting itself. Medieval in inspiration, it is essentially and implacably hostile to that instinct of human liberty which expands with the spread of enlightenment. Existing only thru subjugation of the individual spirit, it requires the enslavement of civic intelligence and authority to its

will. Upholding and upheld by the doctrine of force, it is ever in rebellion, passively or actively, against the restraints of international morality and law. Pursuing the ideal of power, not of justice, it recognizes no principle save might, no tribunal save the "necessities" of its own purpose. We do no wrong to the German doctrine in these rough elucidations. "Democracy," wrote one of the empire's eminent spokesmen the other day, "is a swindle." Another, a scholar and historian, emphasizes the difference:

It is not a case of petty variation. It is the irreconcilable antagonism of the two conceptions of life, which have ever fought and are still fighting for mastery in the world's civilization.

The value of the present crisis is that it impresses upon us the inevitableness of its coming. It was projected from the beginning. "The Germany of today," wrote Dr. David Starr Jordan two years ago, "is an anachronism; her scientific ideals are of the twentieth century, her political ideals hark back to the sixteenth. A great nation which its own people do not control is a derelict on the international sea—a danger to its neighbors and a greater danger to itself." Given a people highly intelligent and efficient, yet drugged with the theory that they can progress only thru submission of their will to that of an ambitious autocracy, and what result could there be but this war upon the institutions of free humanity? There is no mystery in the revelation of Germany as a rebel against law, for her theory of government is at enmity with the spirit of the age, and both cannot prevail. And that theory has not been enforced by imperial authority alone, it has been inculcated by those who mold the thought of the nation. So long ago as September, 1914, we described the menacing system that now overshadows our peace:

All that monstrous deification of absolutism and force; all that scorn of democracy; all that anachronistic doctrine of a people chosen of God to rule the earth; all that brazen, trampling, merciless militarism which subordinates the laws of morality and of civilization to the purposes of national aggrandizement—these are the products of a philosophy which emanates from the cloisters of German scholarship.

It is the inspiration of the militarist cult; of the contempt for treaties as "scraps of paper" and for international pledges as "mere words"; of the invoking of "military necessity" to justify lawlessness. * * *

In support of these policies the basic principles of a materialistic philosophy have been invoked. These teach that in international affairs, as in nature, the law of the survival of the fittest is supreme, hence force is the ultimate test; that the importance of national growth outweighs all so-called ethical considerations; that militarism and autocracy are the true weapons of a conquering civilization, and war the noblest means of national expression.

It is to the honor of liberal nations that they are shocked by the sanguinary cynicism of the latest attack upon their rights, yet it is the product of a sure sequence. Militarism has not changed; autocracy has not degenerated; they are simply carrying to a logical conclusion their fundamental ideas; it was inevitable that their orbit should cross that of democracy and that the two forces should meet in deadly collision. The American people are witnessing now a demonstration of the truth of what we said twenty-seven months ago:

Militarism teaches that might makes right; that the only true test of national greatness is brute force; that the mailed fist is the emblem of a triumphant civilization. It holds that the strong alone have the right to exist, and that the weak must be thrust aside in the interest of evolution toward more vigorous types. Such abstract virtues as sympathy and generosity and justice it derides as symptoms of weakness, to be humored in times of peace, but to be stamped out ruthlessly in the test of war. It inculcates the atrocious theory of a supnation, the intolerable doctrine that some particular people or race, by reason of superior force, has the right to

impose its institutions or its civilization upon other nations or upon the world. It crushes initiative, subverts liberty and reduces a people to be the slaves of a barrack-room despotism. It means Bonapartism plus twentieth century science and a perverted modernism. It exhausts the resources of ingenuity to make a nation read, think, write, talk, dream and act war; and then, when the war it has worked for comes, it whimpers that a malignant world is persecuting the only champions of peace. It mocks at neutrality, puts "military necessity" above international law and scorns solemn treaties, making its international policy that of a fraudulent bankrupt. Where obligations of honor and the rights of others obstruct its path, it "hacks a way thru." Between it and democracy there is irreconcilable antipathy. One or the other must disappear from this world.

The war was not thirty days old when we expressed our judgment in terms that might be repeated today:

Autocracy is wholly devoid of international morality. Its leaders have no conception of or regard for the moral aspects of the relations between the peoples of the earth. To German statesmen the loftiest conception of power is that huge war machine which is thundering across Europe. To them diplomacy is also a machine, remorseless, soulless—a force that can ignore the facts of human nature and the basic aspirations of the human heart. It is because of this distorted vision of Germany's leaders that she finds herself in her hour of trial alone, her destiny committed to the doubtful theory that an engine of war, tho the most powerful the world has ever seen, is mightier than law and morality and the eternal principles of justice.

The crisis of February, 1917, is but a development of the crisis of August, 1914. And America, as the chief exponent of the democratic principle, was bound sooner or later to face the ordeal of defending it. There is no more security for her in 3000 miles of ocean than there was for Belgium in a treaty-guarded frontier. So long as armed and ambitious autocracy exists, democracy is in peril.

ANOTHER "SCRAP OF PAPER"

February 13, 1917.

EVERY American possessing a shred of national spirit, or even of self-respect, must have felt a sense of personal anger over the German government's insulting detention of Ambassador Gerard. The incident was the more infuriating, perhaps, because its insolence and treachery were overshadowed by its dull-witted stupidity, which happily made it so contemptible that it did not rise to the dignity of an act of war. The unprecedented action was regarded, in fact, more as a manifestation of boorishness than as a move of hostility. Having earned the moral detestation of the world by studied inhumanity, the German authorities could hardly be expected to observe the amenities of decent intercourse, particularly toward a people they had affronted by their barbarous threats. Their own country is, perhaps, the worse sufferer, in that they have represented it as the cad among nations. Yet the wretched proceeding had a serious motive. Germany is not wasting time or energy in devising idle insults. Her violation of the immemorial rights of an ambassador—which are sacred even after a war has begun—was intended to coerce the United States into acquiescence in a German demand. The imperial government took this shabby means of exerting pressure to force reaffirmation of a treaty between the two countries, for the strengthening of its own military designs. And the startling fact is that the convention which Germany sought by these atrocious

methods to establish makes her murderous submarine campaign a flagrant and perfidious crime against the other party to the agreement. Nothing more characteristic of the processes of Prussian thought has been observed than the demand for renewed recognition of a treaty which in one part serves Germany's interests, while in the other part it brands her as a violator of solemn engagements. Berlin dispatches passed by the censor during last week repeatedly emphasized the purpose of the government to treat Americans in Germany virtually as hostages for German subjects in the United States, and also to use their presence as a means of extorting compliance with the treaty demand. These extracts reveal the design:

It is stated authoritatively that Germany will propose to Ambassador Gerard a special reratification of the Prussian-American treaties of 1799 and 1828, allowing nationals in case of war nine months in which to settle their affairs and leave hostile countries. A representative of the foreign office pointed out that the treaties were still in effect, and contained an unusual clause that they should not be invalidated by the outbreak of hostilities. Germany would certainly hold to these treaties, he said, and there would be no question of internment of Americans here. * * *

Both governments have repeatedly referred to articles of the treaties as bases for certain contentions, so there is no doubt they would be valid in case of war. * * *

The German foreign office has asked (ex) Ambassador Gerard to sign a protocol reaffirming the treaties of 1799 and 1828. Mr. Gerard replied that he was no longer in a position to negotiate any diplomatic instrument. * * * Mr. Gerard has not yet received his passports, and there is no certainty when this formality will take place. For delay in the departure of other Americans, it is understood that the treaty of 1828 is responsible. The imperial government apparently sets great store by it. * * *

Foreign Secretary Zimmermann made it clear that the government laid emphasis upon this treaty, and desired specific assurance that the American government would recognize it as binding in the event that war ensued.

Germany's well-known regard for the sanctity of treaties in general, and these in particular, was expressed with passionate vehemence upon receipt of false reports that the United States had seized interned German ships and put their crews under restraint. One Berlin paper's denunciation was quite withering:

The breach of diplomatic relations will probably be made the occasion for leveling against us again charges of "breaking treaties" in order to mobilize the indignation of the world against our "shameful" acts. The United States itself has been guilty of an unjustified breach of treaty in confiscating German property and condemning German subjects to compulsory detention. It has violated the treaty of 1799 and the general principles of the law of nations, before Germany has undertaken anything which could give the slightest shadow of a pretext for such action.

Aside from the fact that the United States has done none of the things charged, the assertion of Germany's unsullied innocence and undeviating friendship was a truly Prussian accompaniment to the reports of torpedoed passenger ships that appeared in the same issue. But the important matter concerns the terms of the treaties to which appeal is made. The New York Sun has carefully elucidated their salient provisions. There were three instruments, signed in 1785, 1799 and 1828. The last one superseded the other two, but continued in force certain of their articles, thus:

The twelfth article of the treaty concluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was concluded at Berlin in 1799 * * * are hereby revived with the same force and virtue as if they made part of the context of the present treaty.

One of the provisions of the treaty of 1799 thus revived, and the one about which Germany is now so solicitous, is this:

Article 23.—If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the merchants of either country when residing in the other shall be allowed nine months to collect their debts and settle their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects without molestation or hindrance.

Special immunity of this kind is assured to "scholars, cultivators, manufacturers," etc.; also "all others whose occupations are for the common benefit of mankind." It is the German idea that the sacred "effects" include the interned ships, and that all Germans of military age in this country are to be sent home, in case of war, to carry on, in the imperial army, their occupations "for the benefit of mankind." The provision is strengthened by this declaration:

Neither the pretense that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other, whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this or the next preceding article; on the contrary, the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided, and during which they are to be as sacredly observed as the most acknowledged articles in the law of nature and of nations.

Germany's vociferous appeal to these provisions is intelligible, and does credit to her foresight. But there is another which she characteristically ignores. The treaty of 1828, as noted, revives with precisely the same force Article 12 of the treaty of 1785, negotiated with Prussia by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. And that solemn agreement reads:

Article 12.—If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, in so much as all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, altho such things belong to an enemy of

the other; and the same freedom shall be extended to persons who shall be on board a free vessel, altho they should be enemies to the other party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such enemy.

We invite the reader to study attentively this comprehensive engagement, which is an integral and inseparable part of that very treaty to which the German government now demands that the United States shall adhere. It is the pledge of Germany that in this war American commerce "shall not be interrupted"; that American vessels, "as in full peace, may navigate freely"; that goods on such vessels, even if enemy-owned, shall be free from molestation, and that passengers and other persons thereon, excepting only enemy soldiers "in actual service," shall be likewise immune. And the demand for reaffirmation of the treaty—for the sake of the provision concerning German subjects and property in America in case of war—is made by the government which has declared that it will ruthlessly destroy American ships and murder American citizens if they venture into a designated part of the high seas!

Whether the treaty of 1828 is now valid we do not know. It is said that the seamen's act, recently enacted, terminated all treaties containing conflicting provisions, and that an offer to Germany to continue the treaty in amended form was ignored. Both governments, however, have cited the ancient convention in disputes arising from the war. In any event, we think, no time should be lost in reaffirming the instrument of 1828, if only for the purpose of emphasizing the conscious, deliberate and inveterate perfidy of the government which has the audacity to claim the benefits of the treaty while barbarously violating its obligations.

THIS COUNTRY IS IN WAR

February 14, 1917.

THOSE who have been mystified by the "calmness" of the American people in the present crisis do not take into account a singular delusion which is manifest not only in the attitude of the public, but in the utterances and actions of officials. This is the theory, which amounts to a contented conviction, that the country is still at peace; that war, while an ominous possibility, has not yet directly involved the United States. President Wilson himself gave currency to the belief when, in the face of Germany's declaration that American ships or citizens overtaken in a certain part of the high seas would be destroyed, he said "we do not desire any hostile conflict with the imperial government," thus implying that the murder threat was not a hostile act. Secretary Lansing, as recently as last Saturday, assumed the existence of peace when he said there was "hope that we may not be forced into the conflict."

"If any nation attacks us, we ought to fight," says that sturdy patriot, Mr. Bryan; but he is sure that "none has yet challenged us." The pacifists are busy with mass meetings and resolutions and delegations urging the president to "keep us out of war" and demanding that there be "no war without a referendum." All these expressions are based upon the assumption that the issue is still within the control of the American government; that so long as it remains passive or undecided the country is free from war. The German government

has no such illusions ; despite its affected "surprise" and "regret" over the refusal of the United States to accept the submarine campaign, it knows that Germany is making war against this nation. For months the cry in that country has been, "Peace with the world or war with America," and the chancellor announced the choice when he proclaimed the new policy and declared, "We stake all." German statesmen and newspapers have boldly discussed and discounted armed resistance by the United States to those definitely hostile declarations in the note to Washington:

Within the barred zones all sea traffic forthwith will be opposed. * * * Neutral ships plying within the barred zone do so at their own risk. * * * All ships met within that zone will be sunk.

Ambassador Bernstorff had no doubts. When informed that diplomatic relations had been severed he said, "I expected it. My government expected it. The United States could do nothing else." And the latest dispatches from Berlin say there is "little or no expectation" of maintaining the pretense of peace. But opinions and interpretations, however exalted their sources may be, are not conclusive. War is not a state of mind, nor a condition which prevails only when it is recognized and proclaimed according to precise formulas. It exists, or it does not. And the truth is that fourteen days ago Germany declared war against the United States, and that during that period this country has been subject to every hostile activity of which Germany at the moment is capable. Mr. Bryan denies it, the busy pacifists close their eyes to it, the administration refuses, from laudable motives, to admit it. But it is a concrete, unmistakable, irrefutable fact, nevertheless. To the normal mind, Germany's declaration itself is sufficient to reveal the theory of peace as an extraordinary delu-

sion. In plain terms she announced her purpose to destroy American ships and kill American citizens, engaged in lawful and peaceful errands on the high seas. By stating certain conditions which would give them immunity she emphasized the hostility of her intentions; for thereby she made clear that submission to her lawless decree was the sole means of avoiding direct, sanguinary attack. What she has made known is that in a designated area of the high seas American vessels will be sunk on exactly the same terms of British or French ships, and American citizens will be slain in precisely the same manner as British or French citizens. She makes no distinction between Americans and her declared enemies; wherein, then, is there any distinction between the war which she wages against Britain and France and the "peace" which she maintains toward the United States?

History, curiously enough, presents an almost exact parallel to this intolerable condition, resulting in a war conducted without being officially recognized as such. For three years, 1798-1800, France and the United States were engaged in an almost continuous struggle at sea; ships were captured and sunk, battles were fought, hundreds of merchant and naval seamen were killed—yet there was never a declaration of war, and the supreme court held that the operations "did not at any time amount to open and public war."

Those who cling today to the idea of a fictitious peace, however, will reject arguments and analogies; they will still urge that war is not war until the government of the United States admits the definition. Therefore we must deal in facts, not words. Here is one: German submarines, in pursuance of a program lately enlarged, have already killed more than 200 American citizens. If that is not war, what is? Germany has

systematized and extended her campaign so that American ships and their occupants are to be destroyed in the same manner and on the same terms as enemy-owned vessels and their crews. If such measures are not "actual hostilities," what are they? The effect of her proclamation, accompanied by acts of criminal and indiscriminate destruction, have been to blockade American ports, paralyze American overseas commerce, hold up American mails, forbid the sailing of American shipmasters and passengers upon lawful voyages. If a cordon of submarines lay at the mouth of each of our harbors, with published orders to sink at sight all vessels emerging therefrom, the action might be more theatrically hostile, but the effect would hardly be more complete. If this lawless blockade, this prohibition of traffic, this avowed methodical arrangement of destruction, do not constitute war, what is lacking? The government is awaiting an "overt act." Prohibition of lawful commerce, enforced by threats of murder and by the killing of Americans, apparently does not meet that definition. Then what will? The slaying of a score or a hundred Americans on the passenger steamship California certainly would have been regarded as a hostile action. But it was thru no omission by Germany that that crime was not committed—the intention of the torpedo was "overt," if the result was not. Incidentally, an "overt act," as defined, would affect one American ship, perhaps one American life. Is the existing state of war more endurable because it affects all American ships and all American travelers having lawful errands in the murder zone? "If," the president has said, Germany should "destroy American ships and take American lives," all necessary means will be employed "for the protection of our seamen and our people." Would the measures be immoral if they were undertaken to avert such a crime

instead of to prevent a repetition of it? Would the victims have been any less entitled to protection from threatened assault than those who followed them? And how could protection overtake those who might be far at sea when the necessary "overt act" justified the action?

We do not impugn the sincerity of the policy of "watchful waiting," but we doubt its efficacy, for the reason that we utterly reject its presumption that war against this nation does not exist. When was war against Belgium begun? Was it when the first German troops followed the ultimatum across the frontier, or was the country at peace until an unspecified number of Belgian civilians had been killed? "Keep us out of war," plead the pacifists, blind to the fact that we are in war. War is here—in our very harbors, where American commerce is prostrate and American sovereignty in abeyance. To surrender would not be to avert war, but to yield to it; we should not be keeping out of war, but keeping out of resistance to war. That may be the purpose of the American government and its people; but if they do not want to face an aggressor, they should at least have the honesty to face a fact.

A WAR MADE BY PACIFISM

February 16, 1917.

WAS it because they are constitutionally opposed to preparedness, or because they are incapable of discerning the clearest meaning of plain facts, that the pacifists were caught unawares by Germany's "sudden" proclamation of a program of active hostility toward the United States? Their "emergency" peace committees, their hastily called mass meetings, their half-baked resolutions and their excited recourse to every threadbare scheme of mischievous agitation indicate a deplorable lack of foresight. We could have told them—we did tell them—that this crisis was inevitable. We suspect, indeed, that we taxed the patience of our readers, as we did our own, by laborious citations of fact showing that the clash was being made certain, and that it would be due not alone to Germany's lawlessness and desperation, but also to the course of the United States, in so far as that course was dictated by idealistic pacifism in the presidency, infatuated pacifism in the cabinet, political pacifism in congress and miscellaneous pacifism thruout the country.

The truth is that no term was ever so egregiously misapplied as the term pacifist. Implying one who promotes peace, it is used to designate those who are the busiest and most pestiferous promoters of strife. It is because of their pernicious advocacy of a false doctrine, more than any other influence, that the nation now finds itself face to face with war, helpless to avert it and

impotent to meet it. To describe as "peacemakers" those whose activities undermine justice and invite aggression is a preposterous misuse of language. To Americans of rational understanding and unimpaired memory the assertion that the pacifist fallacy governed the administration during the controversy with Germany, and that it encouraged the aggression which has culminated in open war, will need no further proof than reference to the record. By pacifism we mean the base, immoral and utterly fallacious theory that acquiescence in wrong is the best way to avoid strife; that abandonment of challenged rights brings safety and submissiveness turns aside aggression.

To show how clearly war was foreshadowed and invited by this policy, let us glance at the events in their order and quote from our obvious warnings. When the atrocious advertisement warning Americans not to sail on the *Lusitania* was published, after an American had been killed on the *Falaba* and the *Gulflight* had been torpedoed, this newspaper said: "We must decide whether 'strict accountability' means what it says, or was only a conversational phrase." Pacifism decided, and the murder of 115 American men, women and children was met with a paper demand for disavowal and reparation and an announcement that this nation would "omit no word or act" necessary to maintain its rights. When Germany responded with impudent evasions and falsehoods, Mr. Bryan's pacifist infatuation sent him scuttling out of office; he had demanded "strict accountability" and had promised to "omit no word or act" necessary to enforce it, but he confessed by his resignation that his signature was a shameful false pretense. At that time—twenty months ago—we said of his policy:

The inevitable result was that Germany exhibited increasing lack of respect for the United States, and finally inaugu-

rated a series of acts which steadily increased in arrogance and hostility. The policy of surrender, far from promoting peace, invited a constantly renewed aggression, the surest provocative of war. * * * It will be strange now if the attitude of Berlin does not become more truculently insupportable; it is not inconceivable that his act may inspire such profound contempt for the United States that another sacrifice of American citizens will be planned and consummated, and that his mad project for the "prevention of war" will bring that catastrophe upon us.

The note which Mr. Bryan shrank from signing repeated the American demands and said this nation contended for "the high and sacred rights of humanity." This was a noble and resonant utterance, but Germany, aware of the vociferations of the pacifists, was moved merely to novel forms of insult. She proposed to stop murdering Americans if they would travel in ships painted according to a design dictated by Berlin and obedient to orders of submarine commanders as to their course in the high seas. Still trying to reconcile defense of rights with the craven spirit of pacifism, the administration replied with another note, announcing that further assassinations would be considered "deliberately unfriendly." But by this time the "hyphen" and pacifist propagandas for surrender were in full swing, and Germany felt she had nothing to fear. Any intelligent observer might have written what we wrote at the time—in July, 1915:

The most active peace propagandists have given tacit acquiescence to the defiance of international law, and thereby have consented to the destruction of that without which world peace is impossible. They think to bring the vision nearer by condoning the piecemeal destruction of the code which alone stands between civilization and the supremacy of brute force. * * * What other effect could these policies have upon Germany than to convince her that there did not exist in this great nation a single sentiment or conviction to which she need defer? The present condition puts to confusion the

theorists who believe that peace is to be attained and maintained by "a conciliatory attitude," by "avoiding strife" or by meeting aggression with a demeanor of meekness and surrender. Our penalty is that our freedom from war is now at the mercy of a ruthless belligerent.

It was because of the intrigues of pacifism that Germany felt secure in making her answer—the torpedoing, without warning, of the westbound unarmed passenger ship *Arabic*, with two American victims. The crime was so monstrous that Germany thought it wise to interpose a pledge which might avert a crisis until she had enough submarines; so she promised that "liners will not be sunk," etc. Yet the end was so plain even then that we said—this was September, 1915:

The policy pursued in Washington, far from being surety for peace, is pushing this nation steadily toward war; every move brings the United States nearer to the time when it must accept one of two alternatives—war or utter and humiliating abandonment of its rights. Germany will decide the issue of peace or war just as she defines and delimits at will the rights of American citizens. * * * The president, with the best intentions, has put this nation in an impossible position, for he has delivered a series of ultimatums which necessitated the possible use of force, while absolutely determined not to use force—that is, to "keep the country out of war" by threatening Germany with war. This policy, called our protection against being drawn into the conflict, is almost irresistibly carrying us in that direction. * * * To issue ultimatums without the disposition or the means to enforce them is so far from being a policy of peace that it is the surest preliminary to war—or abject surrender.

The murder of an American consul in the sinking of the *Persia* brought 1915 to an ominous close, and in the following February Germany renewed her threats to sink all ships. At this time partisanship and pacifism coined the phrase "safety first" to represent their ideal. This policy we denounced as the moral atrocity which it

is, "even if the doctrine were effective in the purpose which it proclaims." But, we added:

All history shows that therein its failure is infallible. The nation which brands itself with the stigma of seeking safety first is as false to itself as to humanity. Such a policy not only debases character; it inflames those whom it seeks to conciliate. The nation professing it awakens contempt, invites humiliation and courts the very destruction which it has bartered its soul to avert.

A few days later the Sussex horror revealed anew Germany's criminal purpose, yet the pacifists continued their malignant work, and we offered this accurate forecast of what they must accomplish:

They imagine that strife is to be stilled by self-betrayal and wrong paralyzed by submission. And they seem incapable of realizing that at this moment they threaten the peace and the very existence of this nation.

Long before this the infamous doctrine had found spokesmen in congress, and if Germany still had left any respect for the United States, it must have evaporated when she saw American representatives arguing for the formal withdrawal of this government's protection from citizens traversing the high seas where she had laid out her murder zone. But this was not all. As a test of public sentiment here, she sent over, in the guise of a merchantman, a sister of the submarine that sank the Lusitania; and when this evoked expressions of gratitude from the pacifists, who hailed the event as a signal of friendship and a triumph of peaceful enterprise, she dispatched a war submarine on an errand of piracy in American waters. Its depredations were condoned as "perfectly legal," even tho American passengers—men, women and children—were driven to open boats from an unarmed steamship, forty-two miles from land; and the pacifists openly rejoiced that peace had

been made sure by this convincing evidence of American friendship. We could only reiterate our warning of the inevitable result:

The reopening of the submarine controversy has been immeasurably hastened by the fact that this government is taking down, one by one, the bars which it erected against the outlaw of the seas, in pursuance of the deluded idea that thus the nation is "kept out of war."

As we have said before concerning such quotations from our own columns, they are not marked by any mysterious prophetic faculty; the reasoning in them was elementary, the conclusions and predictions obvious. Pacifism has accomplished, by its senseless infatuation, the evil result which it professes to combat. Even if it tended to reduce the possibility of war, it would still be odious, for it ignores justice. But while mouthing against a mythical militarism in this country, it has encouraged aggression from a real militarism abroad; while paralyzing the defenses of America, it has strengthened the arm of an enemy; while chattering of the blessings of peace, it has, by urging national abasement, taken the surest means of inviting war. For it has taught Germany to despise the United States as both feeble and false, and a nation with that repute can never know security in this world.

A DIALOGUE IN THE "BARRED ZONE"

February 20, 1917.

WE HAVE no correspondent aboard that exceptionally favored neutral passenger ship which is carrying the late German ambassador, his suite and some 200 other fortunate subjects of the kaiser toward the fatherland. Nor have we any strong reason to believe that such a discussion as is outlined below is likely to take place. But, granting the existence of the correspondent and of the circumstances imagined, one may regard the conversation as plausible, and may fancy that the wireless dispatch reporting it would read substantially as follows:

ON BOARD STEAMSHIP FREDERICK VIII (off the northwest coast of Ireland), Feb. —th.—After the harassing delay at Halifax and the monotonous days in midsea, even so somber an experience as entering the "barred zone" proclaimed by the imperial German government has had a stimulating effect upon the spirits of the passengers. All are thrilled by the thought that we are traversing an area ever to be distinguished in the annals of naval warfare. For we are now in that grim region where hidden death, swift and remorseless, stalks every craft afloat upon the waters.

The formalities of visit and search at Halifax were rigorous, but were endured with resignation because they were a necessary factor in obtaining the safe conduct which guarantees the occupants of this ship against attack or molestation by the enemies of their government. The voyage thence to this point has been without incident, except for scrutiny and release by watchful patrols in the western Atlantic. Now comes the dramatic experience of passing unharmed—it is to be hoped—thru the double blockade of British cruisers and German submarines.

It is very singular to reflect that this ship is the first to enjoy such immunity for many months, and is the last that will enjoy it, undoubtedly, for many months to come. British sea tyranny concedes a safe path for a shipload of Germans, while Germany would unhesitatingly destroy, in the same part of the high seas, a vessel bearing as many Britons or Americans. This circumstance is a tribute to the power of both the belligerent nations which has occasioned lively comment in the saloon and smokeroom.

It was my privilege to be present this afternoon during a conversation of curious interest, which illuminates the somewhat baffling subject. Having the honor of Count von Bernstorff's acquaintance, I was standing with him at the star-board rail, where we were trying, with glasses, to catch a glimpse of the Irish coast thru the mists and rain-squalls. A fresh young voice calling "Good afternoon, Excellency," interrupted us, and the count turned to greet a friend, the 14-year-old daughter of the former German consul in a middle western city. Ever the most courteous of men, the ambassador smiled a welcome into the eager face of the child. She is a favorite with all the passengers, and particularly with the eminent diplomat, whom she has made quite a confidant.

"Won't you tell me something, Excellency?" she said. "I heard our stewardess telling mamma that now we are in the 'barred zone.' What is a 'barred zone'?"

"That is a war term," answered the count. "It is a part of the sea which all ships are forbidden to enter. If they do, they may be sunk by our submarines. It is a part of the war, little fraulein."

"Oh, yes—the ships of the English, our enemy?"

"All ships. It is necessary."

"Oh, Excellency! Then will this ship be sunk?"

"No, my dear. This ship is an exception. Our brave submarine commanders know it is coming. They will let it pass because it has you on board, and other German children, and their papas and mammas, and the emperor's ambassadors and consuls."

"How splendid! But the English—don't they have a barred zone, too?"

"They have," said Count von Bernstorff, grimly.

"Then will they sink us?"

"No. You see, fraulein, it is different, quite different. The English do not need to destroy vessels like this. They

have a great fleet, while we—well, our fleet is needed in the Kiel canal, and so we must use submarines, and we must sink all ships except this one. But why trouble your pretty head about this dreadful war, little one?"

"Oh, but I know a lot about it! I have been at school for six years in our home in America, and I read the papers, until a few weeks ago, when papa said we must go to Germany. But I am so glad the English will not sink us. Perhaps they will capture us! Wouldn't that be exciting?"

"Very," said the count, gravely. "But they will not capture us. We have a safe conduct."

"What is that, Excellency?"

"Why, the English have given us perm—that is, the United States demanded that we have the right to sail to our home thru the English blockade—which is against the law, you know—and England yielded."

"The Germans do not give safe conducts, do they Excellency? I remember the *Lusitania*—it was on my birthday—and there was a little girl from our school and her mother on board. I was so sorry for her and for the other children. But it had to be done, for my papa said so. And those were not children of consuls, were they?"

"No, fraulein. War is a terrible thing——."

"But once I read in the newspaper of a ship that was sunk—it was called the *Persia*. And there was one of our consuls—I mean, an American consul—on board, and he was killed. He did not have a safe conduct, did he?"

"No. You do not understand. War is cruel——."

"Yes, but it is not cruel to us. Isn't that good?"

"Well, persons in our position—those we call diplomatic and consular officers—have certain privileges. International law and custom protect us, and——."

"Oh, look, Excellency! What is that?"

Out of the mists there suddenly appeared a swift gray craft with four funnels; the steamship slowed down, and the stranger swung around on a parallel course with ours. There was a short, sharp interchange by megaphone between the two ships; then a boat came toward us, a ladder was lowered, and four men clambered up. Two others, wrapped in blankets, were carried. The boat rowed away, the steamship's engines speeded up, and presently the other craft sheered off and was lost in the haze.

"That was a British destroyer," said Count von Bernstorff. "We shall meet many of them. No, they will not molest us; they have their orders. * * * So, as I was saying, international law protects us. Besides, altho we are officials, we are not combatants—that is, we do not fight. Ah, steward!" to a man hurrying along the deck, "what men were those?"

"Survivors from a Norwegian grain ship, Excellency. Torpedoed. Six of a crew of twenty-nine picked up by the destroyer day before yesterday, two of them badly injured. No trace of the others. We are to land them at Kirkwall," and he hastened on.

Count von Bernstorff leaned on the rail and looked thoughtfully out over the sea. The little girl was silent for a time; then she turned a wistful face toward her friend.

"I wish," she said, "that the law which protects us had protected those poor men. Had they broken the law, Excellency?"

"They broke the orders of the emperor by entering this part of the sea," he answered.

"Then they did very wrong," said the child, seriously. "Only—the law cannot protect sailors from our submarines, but it protects us from English warships. I do not understand!"

Count von Bernstorff put his hand on her shoulder and patted it comfortingly.

"Be thankful, little fraulein," he said, "that you do not understand." And he muttered something under his breath—I was not sure, but it sounded as tho he had said, "Out of the mouths of babes——."

Slowly, almost imperceptibly, the mist had been clearing. A fresh breeze sprang up from the northwest, and presently a great yellow shaft of light from the setting sun behind us shot thru the clouds and illumined the waters. And as the curtain of haze rolled back an extraordinary sight came into view.

The sea that we had thought to be empty was alive with ships on all sides. Half a mile to the southward a fleet of trawlers was busy in the hazardous work of mine-sweeping. Beyond them hovered watchful destroyers, darting hither and thither, smoke pouring from their funnels. Northward the scene was the same. Directly ahead a pair of destroyers accommodated their speed to ours, and showed us the way, their snapping signal flags spelling out reassuring directions.

So we steamed on our course thru hostile waters, wards of an enemy's honor, shepherded by his grim fighting craft, our path cleared and guarded by his vigilance.

A strange and moving experience, this solicitude from an adversary, this sense of sanctuary amid the pitiless exigencies of war! We were within range of a hundred guns; a score of torpedo tubes might have launched missiles that would rip open our defenseless hull; and we were as safe from them as tho we lay in a German harbor.

Yet were we of greater worth, or more justly under the protection of international law, than those Norwegian sailors whose ship was riven beneath them by a hidden bolt, or than the helpless women and children who sank to agonizing death with the *Lusitania*?

"What means this singular discrimination of fate? Is there at work in our behalf some mysterious force more potent even than 'military necessity,' more significant than terrorism? Or is that which we are witnessing so simple a thing as a manifestation of what law is, what international honor demands, what the faith of nations and the principles of humanity impose upon civilized peoples? Is not this the best way to prove that a nation 'fighting for its existence' has an existence worth preserving?"

"I thought at first that these musing words came from Count von Bernstorff; but when I turned to answer him, I found that he had gone. So they must have been the utterance of my own thoughts.

THE EVILS OF DELAY

February 28, 1917.

A RESIDENT of Harrisburg notifies us that he will no longer read this journal, "because of the unwarranted, unpatriotic and un-American stand The North American has taken against President Wilson." "Every move that the president has made for months," he adds, "has been unjustly criticised by your paper." The name of the writer is Morgenthauer. Our regret over losing a reader is tempered, therefore, by gratification over evidence of a sensitive loyalty on the part of a citizen whose sympathies in the present crisis might be divided. Instead of resenting, as some German-Americans have done, this newspaper's stand for national rights against foreign aggression, he accuses it of failing to support the president. But we do not recall having criticised any "move" made by the president toward maintenance of the nation's rights. From the time when he demanded "strict accountability" for submarine outrages down to the day when he dismissed the German ambassador we indorsed every measure he announced to prevent invasion of American sovereignty and to guarantee protection to American life and property. It has not been the administration's moves, but its immobility, that we have deplored; we have not criticised its declared policy, but its failure to put that policy into effect.

When notice was given two years ago that the United States would exact "strict accountability" for

threatened crimes against its rights and the laws of humanity there was not an American of respectable instincts who did not echo the demand—even William J. Bryan affixed his pacific name to the document which embodied it. When, three months later, more than a hundred American men, women and children were massacred in the Lusitania horror there was only one thought—the time for the accounting had come. Americans, facing the clearest issue that ever confronted a people, stiffened their resolution for the certain test—a summons to defend sovereignty, law, life, all the things that make this a nation. And what they got was an admonition concerning the virtue of being “too proud to fight,” followed by a renewal of the correspondence with the arrogant aggressor. It would be distasteful and futile to tell over again the tale of demands and evasions, new outrages and new devices to delay the decision which every day became more inexorably pressing. Yet the people never failed to give loyal support to each declaration; if there was a lessening of enthusiasm and even a diminishing realization of the actuality of the perils overshadowing the country, it was not because the president’s utterances lacked vigor, but because the government made no move, even in the way of preparation, to fulfill their implications. The severance of diplomatic relations was, of course, an exception. But even that was not voluntary, in that the action was withheld despite many incidents which would have justified it, and was taken at last only when Germany’s murder decree left absolutely no alternative. President Wilson at the same time announced, with commendable frankness, what the next step would be—he would, when events justified the measure, ask congress for authority “to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their

peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas." This was on February 3. He made the request on Monday, February 26. That delay, filled with doubts and disputations, with uncertainty and contradiction, has been but another example, and the most striking, of the administration's habit of shrinking from decision.

Germany had exhausted the power of language to make her proclamation of lawless war against neutral rights explicit and all-inclusive. She left not a loophole for misunderstanding, compromise or negotiation. And the effect of her hostile campaign was immediate—American transatlantic commerce was paralyzed as completely as if her fleet invested our harbors. Yet this utter extinction of this nation's rights at sea was represented as merely a threatening condition, which would not become a fact requiring concrete treatment until it had been manifested in an "overt act," such as the illegal destruction of American vessels and lives. Meanwhile, the government of the United States would not extend to American shipping the protection without which it dared not venture from our ports; thus, by the simple expedient of submitting to exclusion from the sea the injury of an isolated "overt act" was avoided, while the far more serious "overt act" of a lawless blockade, enforced by a murderous threat, was tacitly accepted. It was perfectly obvious from the beginning that Germany's aim, which was to sweep American commerce from the Atlantic, would be accomplished just as effectually if sailings were suspended thru terrorism as it would be if the ships were torpedoed; it was equally clear that this method would be more agreeable to her. Hence, every postponement of advertised sailings, every announcement that the cabinet had "deferred decision" as to giving the ships lawful protection, was, in effect, a

submission to invasion, and tended, moreover, to impair the principle at stake by implying doubt of its justice.

Even the brutal precision of Germany's decree did not discourage the habit of seeking comfort from an avowed enemy. Altho Austria had formally declared her adherence to the program of submarine ruthlessness, the American ambassador was instructed to inquire whether the Vienna government really meant what that implied. He reported that there were no reservations, and that, furthermore, if hostilities between Germany and the United States resulted, this country might consider itself at war with Austria also. Whereupon, it is declared, the ambassador was directed to ask whether this notice, too, was to be accepted literally. Such a policy may appeal to thoughtless sentimentalists as a manifestation of exemplary patience and self-restraint, but as a means of meeting aggression based upon the efficacy of fear it has palpable perils. To question and quibble over the meaning of a threat so explicit as that issued from Berlin could not be regarded by the prosecutors of the submarine campaign as anything but a confession of timidity or a revelation of disunion; and to consume three weeks in arguing as to whether lawful methods of defense against lawless attacks should be employed must be to cloud the ultimate decision with doubt.

It cannot be too often repeated that the issue, the law and the needful action were alike plain from the beginning. To await an "overt act," as was said the other day, was to make peace or war depend upon an incident, while permitting the principle to be obscured. Attempted evasion by keeping American ships in port would be, not to avert war, but to refuse to resist war. And the procedure of arming vessels for the prosecution of "peaceful and legitimate errands" was as plainly justified by law and immemorial practice on February 3 as it is

today. It had to come to that, or abject surrender of national rights and abandonment of law, in the end; and temporizing could have no other effect than to incite in the German government a stronger contempt and in the German people a fiercer demand for implacable destruction. No less deplorable has been the inevitable result of procrastination in this country. When the president severed diplomatic relations with Germany the American people, as they had done so often before, rallied to him in united support. Pacifism and pro-Germanism in congress subsided before the sweep of sentiment for the defense of national rights and established law. Then followed the days and weeks of inaction and vacillation, the imprisonment of ships and the timorous controversy as to when and how they might resume their lawful undertakings. Public confidence was weakened, the clamors of pacifism and disloyalty grew more strident, and in congress, which had been ready to back the executive in any reasonable policy of national defense, the representatives of hyphenism boldly championed the murderous submarine campaign and decried the rights of the nation they were sworn to serve. Now that President Wilson has once more taken a definite step, we look for a revival of unity and national spirit. There is, at least, a decision which will inspire loyalty and force an open alignment, instead of a policy of temporizing which created uncertainty and encouraged secret intrigue.

HEEP

March 3, 1917.

ON THE day following Germany's declaration of her submarine murder policy, an eminent British author quoted from a classical source an observation which he considered apt to the occasion. "Ten years after the birth of Christ," he said, "a Latin author wrote: 'The character of the Germans shows a terrible mixture of ferocity and infamy. They are a people born to lie.'" Whether the quotation was authentic or not seems to us immaterial, since disclosure of the Berlin plot to incite Mexico and Japan to make war upon the United States. Any such indictment of a people is, of course, absurd. But if the ancient writer had specified German statesmanship, and could return to earth today, he would be astonished, we think, at the moderation of his estimate, or, rather, at the progress made in ferocity, infamy and mendacity during the 1900 years of his absence.

The first effect upon the American mind of this revelation of calculating criminality was, naturally, to inspire profound indignation and disgust. The plot was so monstrous, it revealed a statesmanship so hideously false, that one turned from the spectacle of the imperial government pilloried by its own treachery as from something indecent. Yet there was one feature which relieved the revolting baseness of the picture; this was the solemn stupidity, the ineffable and imbecile folly of its inspiration and execution. No one can doubt that

the banditti who masquerade as a government in Mexico could be—and have been—bribed to harass the United States; nor is it incredible that under certain circumstances Japan might seek to force a settlement of her grievances against this country. But where, outside of Bedlam or Potsdam, would this fantastic scheme be conceived—conquest thru the debauchery of a pompous and puerile despot and thru the seduction of the proudest nation in two hemispheres by the empty promises of an outlawed and thrice-perjured government? The results of German intrigue in Mexico have been palpable for months, and documentary evidence touching this part of the plan occasioned no shock of surprise. But history would lack an interesting chapter if it did not record the sentiments of Japan concerning the tactful suggestion that she forswear herself and squander all her gains in the war in order to achieve the honor of an alliance with Carranza and the kaiser. The preposterous design was not wholly, however, the result of unbalanced desperation. We have no doubt whatever that it appealed to the authorities in Berlin as a perfectly logical and hopeful enterprise. It presents but another manifestation of the fatal defects of Prussianism—an atrophied moral sense and a total incapacity to understand the psychology of normal-minded nations. Those statesmen who imagined that Japan's honor and self-interest could be purchased by a German offer conveyed thru Mexico are the same ones who thought they could buy the soul of Belgium, who believed the British to be craven and the French decadent, and who confidently expected that one of the first results of the war would be seizure of Canada by the United States.

There are two circumstances, however, which will make this crime memorable in the annals of international perfidy. One is that the victim was to be a nation

which for two years had endured German insults and injuries without resistance; and the other is that while the foul plot was being prepared, and long after it had been secretly launched, the German government was expressing sentiments of loyal friendship for the United States and of sorrow that Americans had misjudged German policy. This point will be made clear by a glance at the chronology of events. The German "peace offer" to her enemies was made on December 12, and was followed six days later by President Wilson's speech urging both sides to state their terms. The Entente rejection was published on January 11, and almost immediately Germany decided upon her long-prepared campaign of indiscriminate destruction and murder. For on January 19 the details were so far perfected that Foreign Secretary Zimmermann instructed the German minister in Mexico to arrange for a Mexican-Japanese war against the United States, in the event that this country did not submit to violation of its rights and the murder of its citizens. It is not soothing to American pride to recall that three days later President Wilson advocated settlement of the European war upon the basis of "peace without victory" and "freedom of the seas," two of the cardinal demands of Germany. A copy of his address, indeed, had been cabled to the American ambassador in Berlin on January 15, four days before the treacherous message was sent to Mexico. On January 24 the imperial chancellor sent for Mr. Gerard, and during an hour's conference expressed his profound sense of gratification that the United States had taken a position of "high humanitarianism." At the same time the controlled press of the empire echoed these praises. It has not yet been disclosed whether the debauchery of the Mexican government was consummated, but it is significant that on January 31 Germany felt all was ready

for her challenge to civilization. She then issued her monstrous decree announcing a policy of murder "to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense." And the same statesmen who had begun, twelve days before, an attempt to incite a mercenary war against the United States penned these lying words:

Sincerely trusting that the people and the government of the United States will understand the motives for this decision and its necessity, the imperial government hopes that the United States may view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality, and assist, on their part, to prevent further misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life.

On February 3 President Wilson announced the severance of diplomatic relations, and one can imagine the guffaws that must have echoed thru the imperial offices when those there read Mr. Wilson's generous expressions of confidence in their honor:

I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own.

Yet hypocrisy had still its part to play in deluding the German people with hints of American enmity. So Zimmermann unctuously told them that "President Wilson's decision has surprised and disappointed us." Count von Bernstorff, in Washington, was more honest or less discreet, for his comment upon his dismissal was: "Well, I expected it; my government expected it; the United States could do nothing else." It adds, of course, an exceptional touch of infamy to the whole proceeding that the treacherous communication was actually sent thru the German embassy in Washington. Insolence and hypocrisy went still further. Three days before diplomatic relations were broken, orders from Berlin procured the criminal crippling of German vessels intrusted

to the protection of the United States at the beginning of the war. And for a week after the break the government which had sought to incite war against the United States had the hardihood to hold the American ambassador a virtual prisoner, in an attempt to force recognition of certain provisions in an ancient "treaty of amity" which would be to Germany's advantage! On February 10 the Zimmermann who indited the Mexican note complained bitterly that the clouding of German-American relations was due to "British lying dispatches," and two days later the Swiss minister in Washington conveyed the final affront in a message from the conspirators that they were "willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States." It remained only for the imperial chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, to complete the revelation of unredeemed hypocrisy. On February 27 he said to the reichstag that the United States had broken off relations "brusquely"; in contrast, presumably, with the ceremonious politeness of the submarine murder proclamation, issued without an hour's warning. "No authentic communication about the reasons for this step reached me," said the chancellor, with gentle melancholy, and he added this sorrowful rebuke for American truculence:

For more than a century friendly relations between us and America have been carefully promoted. We honored them—as Bismarck once put it—as an heirloom from Frederick the Great. We regret the rupture with a nation which by her history seemed to be predestined surely to work with us, not against us.

There was unconscious but grim satire in the chancellor's citation of Frederick the Great. For that monarch, the real founder of the German empire, was the author of the false and cynical philosophy which still guides German policy. Events today show with what

fidelity Berlin is following the precepts which Frederick bequeathed in writing to his successors, for among them are these:

Statesmanship can be reduced to three principles: First, maintain your power, and, according to circumstances, increase and extend it; second, form alliances only for your own advantage; third, command fear and respect even in the most disastrous times.

Do not be ashamed of making interested alliances from which only you yourself can derive the whole advantage. Do not make the foolish mistake of not breaking them when you believe that your interest requires it. Above all, uphold the following maxim: "To despoil your neighbors is to deprive them of the means of injuring you."

Nor is kaiserism today false to the precepts of Bismarck, who wrote:

That any one should act in politics out of complaisance or from a sentiment of justice others may expect from us, but not we from them! Every government takes solely its own interests as the standard of its actions, however it may drape them with deductions of justice or sentiment.

Rational Americans, therefore, will hardly be surprised by the latest evidence of what militaristic autocracy means, because it is in perfect harmony with every other move it has made. The really sickening feature is the revelation that Germany's is the Uriah Heep among governments, that she is dishonored by a statesmanship which snivels while it betrays and lies in the face of friendship which it means to stab.

PROOF NOT NEEDED, BUT USEFUL

March 5, 1917.

THE stolid cynicism of Herr Zimmermann's admission that Germany did try to incite war against the United States assures him of a certain eminence in history—not inferior, perhaps, to that which the imperial chancellor achieved by his "scrap of paper" utterance. These two statesmen between them have rendered valuable service to posterity by their complete revelation of what Teutonic *Kultur* means to its official exponents. Still more distinct is the benefit which the avowal has conferred upon the United States. No one of balanced mind and honest judgment doubted the authenticity of the dispatch sent from Berlin to Mexico City; the internal evidence of the document was persuasive, and the guarantee of the government at Washington was absolutely convincing. Yet German officialdom has a hardened villainy, and a robust denial would not have been surprising. And while this would have been worthless against the documentary evidence, it would have given seditionists here an excuse to continue their defense of the outlawed and perjured government.

It was well, however, that the verification was delayed long enough to permit the accomplices of autocracy to disclose their sentiments. The exposure of Germany's treacherous undertaking was hardly more shocking or more enlightening than the indecent chorus which it evoked from the agents of kaiserism. Pacifists darkly hinted that the plot was an invention of "the munitions

trust" and the "war-makers." Pro-Germans in congress charged that the president was the tool of intriguing enemies of the slandered Teuton. German-American disloyalists denounced the proof of Berlin's perfidy as a criminal fabrication, designed to create enmity against America's dearest friends. Senators of the United States did not scruple to insinuate that the president was assisting a monumental and palpable fraud. "This would not be the first time," said O'Gorman, of New York, "that a belligerent has resorted to forgery to line up support against an enemy." Smith, of Michigan, boldly declared his belief that the dispatch was "a forgery and a sham." But among German-American newspapers and propagandists the defense of Berlin was vindictively anti-American. "Either the note is falsified or misconstrued by the state department or the White House," said the *Detroit Abend Post*. It was "only one item of the series of noisy phenomena," declared the *New York Herald*, and "the doubt of its authenticity was by no means dispelled by Secretary Lansing's explanation." The *New York Staats Zeitung* was more cautious, but was not sure that the evidence had not been "made in London." "If such a note exists," declared Ludwig Nissen, a leader of German-Americanism, "it was forged for the purpose of driving this country into war with Germany. There are thousands of English propagandists in this country who would do anything to earn their pay by fomenting such a war." Herman Metz, another of the same stripe, rashly added to his denunciation a certificate of character for maligned German statesmanship. He said:

There is nothing Teutonic about the note. Zimmermann would not have signed such a dispatch, had it been written; Von Bethmann-Hollweg would not have signed it. It is bunk. Do you think that German officials would have referred to the

submarine campaign as "ruthless warfare"? It is a fool proposition from beginning to end, intended to stir up feeling here. It was probably made in London.

But the most impudent of the champions of kaiserism was George Sylvester Viereck, editor of a New York weekly called the *Fatherland*, which thruout the war has defended every German atrocity and incited hostility to the American government. His status was shown in the summer of 1915, when he sent to a German agent a "statement for June," showing \$250 received and \$1500 still due, and advising that payment be made thru a lawyer, "whose standing as my legal adviser would exempt him from any possible inquiry." This is the same Viereck who said of the Zimmermann note:

The alleged dispatch is obviously faked; it is impossible to believe that the German foreign secretary would place his name under such a preposterous document. It is unquestionably a brazen forgery, planted by British agents to stampede us into an alliance. It is an impudent hoax. If Germany were plotting against us, she would hardly adopt so clumsy a method; the statesmen of Berlin would hardly offer an alliance based upon such ludicrous propositions. The creaking of the machinery of the British propaganda is clearly perceptible. The American people are willing to be thrilled, but refuse to be humbugged.

And the answer to all these mouthings is Zimmermann's avowal that the German government betrayed the hospitality and long-suffering patience of the United States by sending, thru its embassy in Washington, an order directing the incitement of war upon this country if it dared to resist intolerable aggressions. German officialdom not only coolly confessed the treachery, but exhibited all the "folly" which its abject supporters had declared to be incredible. A more interesting disclosure, however, is that these propagandists are afflicted with the same mental blindness as afflicts the government they serve. They are surprised, altho no one else is,

to find that German statesmanship is precisely the cynical, immoral, treacherous and almost unbelievably stupid institution which they proclaimed it would be if it had produced this wretched plot. What they considered, or pretended to consider, "clumsy," "a brazen forgery," "a fool proposition" and "an impudent hoax" is, of course, a natural and characteristic manifestation of that system which they have the hardihood to serve behind the shelter of American citizenship. It may be that "the British propaganda" has all the genius with which these infatuated adherents of kaiserism endow it; but it would be beyond the capacity of any "forger" to invent a proposal bearing so indelibly as this one did the marks of German official reasoning and morality.

Only the dumbest or most perverse mind could argue that this project, fantastic and monstrous as it seemed, was incredible, in the face of the record of the last two years and a half. Why should it be supposed that a government which argued that the neutrality of Belgium was "only a word," and described a treaty bearing its own signature as "a scrap of paper," would shrink from inciting a foul attack against a nation which it hated as only the perpetrator of causeless injury can hate the victim? Upon what ground should one think that this plot would be too base a device for the government which had methodically violated and dishonored every principle of law and humanity? Was there anything in the crimes against Belgium, in the Lusitania horror, in the long succession of brutal outrages at sea and seditious operations in the United States, or in the infamy of the submarine proclamation, to suggest that Germany would be delicate about devising treachery against a country toward which she professed intentions of peace?

A LITTLE STUDY IN PACIFISM

March 9, 1917.

ALMOST side by side in a newspaper we find two news reports concerning the senate filibuster which are as significant, in their way, as the scornful denunciation visited upon the plotting senators by the legislatures, press and people of their home states. One tells of the enthusiasm in Germany for "these fine Americans who remained uncontaminated by Wilson's blind devotion to England," and whose example "will make a deep impression." That the old congress adjourned without action on the defense bill, says one leading journal, "cannot but influence the next congress, new members of which have to thank the pacifists for their elections." The other report quotes a telegram sent to each of the senatorial plotters by a peace society in New York, expressing "grateful recognition of the courage and devotion with which you have served the cause of peace and democracy."

It is not at all remarkable that the scene which most Americans considered disgraceful should cause both the Germans and the pacifists to exult. For their aims regarding the United States in this matter are absolutely identical—both want to avert war between the two countries, and both urge as the proper means to that end the acquiescence of the United States in a lawless and sanguinary decree. Upon this point militarism and pacifism are in perfect agreement. Nor will your ardent pacifist be incensed, or even disturbed, if he

is charged with being an accomplice of pro-German propaganda. He believes that he stands for an ideal far loftier than patriotism, far broader than the area of the United States; American citizenship he considers a convenient and not dishonorable privilege, but what really elevates his soul is the consciousness that he is a citizen of the world. Hence he is able to divest himself of such primitive ideas as national honor, national rights and international justice, and to recognize the essential oneness of humanity, the bonds of brotherhood which link the purveyors of assassination to their victims. But his most familiar attribute is his devotion to what he calls peace, a condition which is triumphantly revealed in the existing relations between Germany and the United States—on the one side murderous aggression and on the other submission. He is frankly for peace even in this guise, and at any cost. And it is just here that his processes of reasoning become most baffling. For he follows the idea that peace is to be attained by the singular expedient of encouraging war. This is shown clearly by the pacifist compliments to the filibustering senators upon the ground that they "have served the cause of peace." Served it how? By preventing the arming of American ships? They have not done so. By making it impossible for the United States to protect its rights? They have not. All they accomplished was, as President Wilson said, to make this country for the time being "helpless and contemptible." And the infallible result is to bring war nearer by inciting new outrages and grosser invasions of sovereignty.

But a still clearer revelation of pacifism was the "grateful recognition" of the service of these men "to the cause of democracy." Even an intellect clouded by this perverse doctrine can discern, we must suppose, that the essential principles of democracy under our sys-

tem are government by duly elected representatives, majority rule, and, above all, free expression. Now how did the recreant senators stand as to these things? The measure they foully struck down was passed by the house by a vote of 403 to 13—more than thirty to one. It was supported in a signed statement by seventy-six senators out of ninety-six. Yet, by shabby trickery, by methods of willful despotism and chicane that would not be tolerated in the Prussian diet, they prevented a vote, strangled the will of the senate, made it impossible for the congress of the United States to take action one way or the other. If they had opposed the measure to any extent and had voted against it, they would have been merely bad Americans. When they blocked the right of expression they were false to democracy itself and at open enmity with the fundamental principles of the republic.

The incident is merely typical of the vagaries of the pacifist mind, the distortions of its eccentric reasoning. Other examples appear in the news from day to day. A Professor Muzzey, of Columbia, offers this outline of a national policy: "Before going to war I would wait until they had sunk seven ships. Yes, I would wait until they had sunk seventy times seven ships—and then I wouldn't go to war. They can't insult the American people; the American people are the only ones who can insult themselves." A delegation of Harvard men told senators in Washington that we should "conquer our enemies by good will," and that even in case of invasion our duty would be non-resistance. These sentiments are plain enough. Monstrous as they appear, they are real. Pacifists believe that the United States should "waive" or "suspend" or even abandon its rights to send ships across Germany's lawless "barred zone" on the high sea. Let us imagine this doctrine in effect and examine the devel-

opments. Supposing Germany found that her murder campaign lagged, and that she needed a wider range; she would thereupon extend her "barred zone" to mid-Atlantic. Naturally, the United States would have to recognize that. If such an extension proved insufficient, a decree might follow that any American ship leaving its port would be sunk at sight; and we could not more justly object to that than to the present prohibition. Even this measure might not bring Great Britain to terms, and Germany conceivably would announce that she must, "in order to serve the higher interests of humanity," forcibly suppress all American industries serving her enemies. This would necessitate armed invasion—and pacifism would counsel submission. If the next step were a German occupation of the national capital, what then? And if the next were suspension of the republic and appointment of the crown prince as viceroy of this country, what then? These speculations are, of course, fantastic—but not more so than pacifism itself. What we are trying to find out is, at what point might resistance be made. There are pacifists who declare that it would be our duty to submit even to the overturning of the government by an invader, in order that our "vicarious sacrifice in the cause of peace" might lead the world out of the morass of war. But most of them see no further than the proposition that we surrender our rights at sea. In the matter of logic, however, there is nothing to choose between the two classes. One holds that we would advance the ideals of justice and Christian civilization by abandoning them to destruction, and the other imagines that the surrender of some vital rights would protect others.

The theory is appealingly stated by a peace committee of the Society of Friends. National honor, they say, "is maintained by patience and self-control," and "peace

will come when some great nation dares to stake all upon persistent good-will." Now, they declare, is "America's supreme opportunity." It may fairly be said that the United States has staked all upon good-will for thirty-one months, for it has submitted to wrongs ranging from trespass to murder without taking action. And the result—are we nearer to peace? Are our rights safer and our sovereignty more secure? Have we placated Germany? Have we inspired her to more moderate and civilized behavior? Have we advanced the cause of international justice and peace? "Between nations, as between individuals," urge these sincere folk, "the rights of all are securely defended by mutual confidence, not suspicion; by universal co-operation and law, not by private armed defense." As an expression of hope this is admirable; as a statement of fact it is, we think, defective. There is not, and cannot be, mutual confidence between nations when one side persistently makes war upon the other. As for "universal co-operation and law," what defense are they so long as armed might repudiates and defies them? And to what extent is law re-established by those who urge that no effort be made to enforce it—that, on the contrary, its most ruthless violations be condoned? An English pacifist, speaking in New York the other day, showed that the doctrine causes the same imperfect modes of thought abroad. He found the ideals of both sides in the war equally just, and advocated "peace without victory" and internationalism. Some one asked him what would happen to the monarchical systems in Europe in that case, and he made this reply:

The kings won't stand in the way when the people make up their minds. We have dealt with them before in England—we have cut their heads off.

A robust answer for an advocate of non-resistance. But the most curious feature of it was the speaker's

hallucination that it was pacifism that overthrew the Stuarts and established democracy in Great Britain. "We," he says, "know how to deal with kings." He would see nothing incongruous in comparing himself and his associates to the stern Ironsides of Cromwell, those hardy souls who thought justice was worth fighting for, whose motto was "Trust God, but keep your powder dry!" But perhaps the most illuminating manifestation of pacifism was the action of its convention a few weeks ago, when thirty-three societies first passed a resolution to resist war for any purpose whatsoever, and then another advocating no war without a referendum—which amounted to a declaration that the people should express themselves, and, if the verdict was for war, it should be overruled. Even some of the delegates called the proceeding "puerile, foolish and dangerous."

It is only by examining such evidences that one may learn what pacifism means and is. And the more we study it the more justice we find in an estimate we offered a year ago:

In the ordinary relationships of life pacifists are not abnormal; many of them have a genuine feeling for democracy and humanity. But in respect to this passion they are impervious to facts; they live in a world of exalted and baseless visions; they pursue distorted ideals thru a phantasmagoria of perverted sentiments. * * * In all its aspects pacifism is hopelessly unsound and essentially vicious. It is at enmity not alone with loyalty and patriotism and the ideals of this republic, but with justice itself. Assuming to represent reason, it invokes folly and confusion. Exploited as the one force that can eradicate war, it is a serious obstacle to that achievement; for it is the one thing in this world that tends to make peace unattractive and conceivably could make it revolting.

ACTION AND DELAY

March 12, 1917.

OUTLINES of a definite policy concerning the crisis with Germany have appeared at last, in the calling of an extra session of congress and the announcement that American merchantmen bound for the "barred zone" will be armed for defense. Whether these moves are considered as bringing war nearer, or as being dictated by a war already in operation against the United States, is a matter of minor consequence compared to the fact that an actual clash is imminent. We are inclined to emphasize this point because a great many Americans, influenced by months of optimistic inertia in Washington, cannot bring themselves to recognize the reality. Much of the significance of recent events lies in their dates, and a chronological review will assist understanding of the situation and its probabilities. On February 3 President Wilson announced to congress that diplomatic relations with Germany had been severed as a necessary result of her proclamation of a lawless submarine war against American and other neutral shipping. When convinced of Germany's purpose, he said, he would ask for authority "to use any means necessary for the protection" of this country's rights at sea. On February 26 he requested authority "to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary." A bill embodying the first provision, but not the second.

passed the house of representatives by a vote of 403 to 13. The senate was ready to pass a measure including all the president asked, but a dozen members were able, because of the short time remaining before the end of the session, to prevent a vote. On March 4, after this check to his plans, President Wilson denounced the filibuster as having made the United States government "helpless and contemptible." He argued, however, that "it would not cure the difficulty" to call an extra session, because "the paralysis of the senate would remain," and he urged that "the rules of the senate shall be so altered that it can act." On March 8 the senate—only three members dissenting—adopted a rule curtailing the power of obstructionists by providing that two-thirds of the membership may always force a vote. On March 9 President Wilson proclaimed an extra session, to assemble on April 16, at the same time letting it be known that the arming of ships for defense would proceed forthwith.

Five circumstances standing out in this record should be noted: First, following the decisive procedure of a severance of diplomatic relations there was a period of twenty-three days—February 3-26—during which the administration hesitated, neither ship owners nor members of congress being able to obtain any clear information as to the government's policy. Second, a struggle arose between the president and congress over the form of authorization of measures of national defense, this culminating in the calamitous filibuster and failure of the bill. Third, the senate promptly met the accusation of the president, by altering, within four days—March 5-8—rules which it had maintained for a hundred years. Fourth, President Wilson with even greater promptitude—within twenty-four hours—disclosed the policy of arming ships and summoned an extra session.

Fifth, he provided for a further delay of five weeks—March 9-April 16—before the government of the United States can exert its full power to meet the supreme crisis in its history.

It could be discerned at the time, and has been demonstrated since then, that the three weeks of inaction and uncertainty which followed the breaking of relations must produce complications, and it must be said that most of the difficulties that developed may be traced to that delay. If the circumstances justified Ambassador von Bernstorff's dismissal—and they assuredly did—they justified the immediate taking of measures of defense. Certainly there was no ambiguity in Germany's declaration of submarine war; "all ships found in the barred zone," she had said, "will be sunk" without warning, and she particularly specified neutral vessels. Yet for more than three weeks this lawless purpose was allowed to stand unchallenged, American shipping was driven from the sea, American ports were virtually blockaded by an illegal prohibition, and daily the threats of Germany grew more arrogant and direct.

Besides intensifying the foreign peril, the attitude of the administration created a menacing domestic situation. The dispute between the executive and legislative branches of the government arose over two matters—the extent of authority demanded by the president, and his avowed determination to deal with the problem after March 4 without the advice or co-operation of congress. Some members objected to the grant of power asked; many more were convinced that an extra session should be summoned at once. If President Wilson had taken the logical course of requesting the authority from congress at the time when he announced the severance of diplomatic relations, it would have been given to him almost without question.

But as the delay extended from days to weeks, with uncertainty manifested in contradictory reports concerning the arming of ships and the appearance of the president before congress, the pro-Germans and their allies were encouraged and were enabled to foment discord. Even those members of congress most loyal to him and most inclined to give him all he asked found it difficult to reconcile his sudden activity with his long inertia. During many months, they said, the administration had permitted outrages to pile up, and for three weeks had remained silent and inscrutable in the face of unmasked peril; and then the president came rushing to congress in the last days of an expiring session, when the legislative machinery was already clogged, with a demand for action such as might justify serious debate. And even then the executive had no clear message to deliver. The president asked authority to act "should that become necessary," and said that the method remained to be chosen "if occasion should indeed arise." So late as March 5, indeed, he was still in apparent doubt as to the situation, for he said "we stand firm in armed neutrality," whereas no move to realize that policy had been made, except for his unsuccessful appeal to congress. It was as a result of this confusion and working at cross purposes that "a little group of "willful men" were able to prevent action entirely.

Turning to the more serious aspect of the problem, it is recognized, of course, that "armed neutrality" is hardly more than a phrase; in practice, the sending out of American merchantmen armed fore and aft, and with trained gunners authorized to resist submarine attack, means war, unless in the extremely doubtful event that Germany tacitly abandons her loudly advertised purpose. Her proclamation was explicit enough, but developments since it was issued have stiffened her inten-

tions. She has won enough success to make her implacable, and, so far as the United States is concerned, she has read fear and helplessness in the weeks of hesitating inaction. Her readiness to accept war, and her expectation of it, were shown by the fact that in advance of her announcement she undertook her intrigue for a Mexican-Japanese alliance. It would be idle to recount again the errors in policy which made the present sinister condition of affairs inevitable. And besides, even these mistaken expedients might be excused in part as measures which it was hoped would avoid actual conflict. But that which cannot be defended is the neglect, during the two years of acute controversy, of preparation to enforce the demands or even to defend the nation against further wrongs.

Need for the employment of all the government's power now is obvious and urgent. The country has no adequate army, and the appropriation for the army that does exist failed in the recent session. Provision has been made for new naval construction, but the ships already available are insufficiently manned. Only prompt co-operation of the executive and legislative branches can effectually hasten defensive work. Yet President Wilson compels a delay of five weeks.

BAGDAD, A GERMAN DEFEAT

March 14, 1917.

AMONG all the dramatic contrasts of the war, none excels in vivid appeal that which is suggested by the fall of Bagdad. Behind the picture of a triumphant army entering the city of the caliphs looms another, of humiliation and defeat. From such grim scenes does fate fashion the tale of war. Thousands of those to whom the news would bring exultation will never hear it. Their bodies lie in fever-ridden swamps or in shallow graves scooped from the desert sands; their bones bleach along the thousand-mile pathway of a broken army into captivity. And somewhere in Anatolia, that inhospitable fastness of the Moslem in Asia Minor, the survivors are enduring the torments of privation and disease in Turkish prison camps. Theirs are only the bitter memories of an adventure that failed, of a sacrifice to heedlessness and incompetence. They had glimpsed the golden minarets of "the glorious city" in the glow of seeming victory, only to watch the vision fade, and to be driven into bondage thru the gates they had hoped to pass as conquerors. All the stirring events in other fields of the world conflict have not been able to dim the fascination of these remote campaigns in mid-Asia. For more than two years the wastes of Mesopotamia, for centuries silent and solitary, have been filled with the clamors of war, and every movement of the contending forces has disturbed the dust of pre-historic ages. Over the buried capitals of forgotten

empires the tides of strife have ebbed and flowed; the region that saw the birth of the human race and all the barbaric splendor and cruelty of its youth sees now a new and remorseless struggle for its control; the land that was furrowed with the chariot wheels of Assyrian and Babylonian princes, of Persian kings and Grecian conquerors and Roman centurions, is tracked by the death-dealing machinery of modern science, and the rivers that welled forth from the biblical paradise are highways for flotillas of destruction. Thru the brief words of the day's dispatches one may peer into fathomless depths of antiquity. Some musings of many months ago are recalled:

* * * of fighting columns that tramp over the graves of cities entombed by time; of wireless signals thrilling beneath the sky that looked down upon the canals and hanging gardens of imperial Babylon; of trenches dug in the dust of peoples whose life-story can be guessed but fragmentarily from rude scratches in tablets of clay. The shadows of wheeling aeroplanes cross and recross the path that Abraham traversed when he heard the call in Ur of the Chaldees and set forth to claim the inheritance of Canaan, covenanted to him and to his seed forever. Gunboats trouble the waters of Eden, within sight of the place where Nebuchadnezzar fell from majesty to become as a beast of the field; where Belshazzar saw the livid letters of his doom start out from the wall of the banquet room; when Semiramis held her legendary court, and Sennacherib led his hosts to battle; where Darius the king "called with a lamentable voice" to know whether Daniel had been delivered from the lions; where Cyrus overthrew the Babylonian dynasty and imposed upon the world the changeless laws of the Medes and Persians; where Alexander halted to contemplate the wonders of his conquests and died, ruler of the earth, at thirty-two.

But it is not alone for the antiquity of the land that the fall of Bagdad appeals to the imagination. That city is itself one of the milestones on the pathway of human history. It was the center of wealth and culture

when Europe was benighted; there was the source of Oriental romance and legend which have enriched the literature of the world; there was the heart of Islam and the capital of its far-flung empire, which today, after twelve centuries, we see dissolving before the blasts of universal war. And the event is of still more compelling interest because it signifies another mighty change in the world map—the shattering of Germany's tremendous project of Eastern power, the snatching beyond her grasp of the coveted scepter of Asiatic dominion. It is not strange that Great Britain exults in this dramatic triumph. For it not only avenges the humiliation of Gallipoli and erases the disaster of Kut-el-Amara, but proclaims to the Mohammedan world that British power is still mighty and that the holy places of the faith have passed from the custody of the Turk and the shadow of Teuton domination.

That Bagdad would be one of the chief objectives of the war was made known to readers of this newspaper less than twenty days after the conflict began with the invasion of Belgium. We showed that Germany's goal was in the East; that her aim was to erect a federation of states stretching from the North sea to the Bosphorus, and thereby to command a highway extending thru Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to the Persian gulf and the frontier of India; that this was the challenge of the world's greatest military power to its mightiest naval power—to create an overland empire across two continents and wrest from Great Britain and her allies the overlordship of the Eastern world. The accuracy of the forecast was shown in the adherence of Turkey, with its titular control of Islam, and the systematic subjugation of the Balkan peninsula. But long before Berlin had been linked to Constantinople, the struggle for supremacy at the remote end of the projected empire

was under way. Great Britain, having sent forces to guard the oil fields at the head of the Persian gulf, undertook to sever the taproot of German expansion in that region by seizing control of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and of the ancient seat of Moslem power, 300 miles above the mouth of the rivers. For nearly a year this great enterprise was carried on without attracting the attention of the world, until, on September 29, 1915, the expedition drove the Turks from Kut-el-Amara, less than 100 miles from Bagdad. Two months later a dashing advance had reached Ctesiphon, a lifeless ruin which marks the place where there stood, 2400 years ago, the splendid palaces of Parthian kings. Bagdad and victory were but eighteen miles distant, beyond a defenseless plain.

But Germany reached across the continents to strike a crushing blow. One of her greatest soldiers, Von der Goltz, was in command, and suddenly the British found themselves forced to recoil under the battering attacks of Turkish reinforcements that poured out from the city. Outnumbered, outmaneuvered, their ranks thinned by the losses from battle and disease during a year's campaigning in the desert, they were driven back to Kut-el-Amara. There General Townshend, with 10,000 men, made a stand, the rest of the force—as many more—retreating down the river to join new columns which were on their way up from the gulf. Relentlessly the Turks closed in, and early in December had the encampment besieged. The relief expedition, fighting with desperate courage, had progressed by January 24, 1916, to within eight miles of the beleaguered garrison, but was flung back. Another attempt brought it within twenty-two miles, but again the Turks held firm. At the end of April, after nearly five months of heroic resistance, the surrounded British were starved into sur-

render, and the 9000 men and officers were sent upon the terrible march of 1000 miles to the prison camps of Anatolia. The disaster was worse than that of Gallipoli, for there the defeated army was extricated. In the Orient, where power alone commands fealty, failure cancels all obligations, and British prestige had received a staggering blow. Thruout the whole Eastern world spread the news that the Turks and their allies had humbled the English, and that the kaiser, new "protector of the faithful," was to be the lord of Asia.

Great Britain knew that at any cost her supremacy must be reasserted. The defeat had been due to the fatal misconception that sent a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men to conquer a vast province held by a courageous foe with the backing of the strongest military power in Europe, and to hold a line of communication across 300 miles of swamp and desert. The lesson was a bitter one, but it was well learned. When General Maude began his main advance toward Bagdad last December, he led 120,000 troops, equipped with powerful artillery, a strong fleet of gunboats and an elaborate system of transport and supply. The progress of the forces on land and by the rivers was swift and sure. Again and again the Turks made a stand, but always they were driven back, and on February 26 the British were in control of Kut-el-Amara, where Townshend and his garrison had been overwhelmed ten months before. From this point the advance was dazzlingly rapid. Ctesiphon was reached in ten days, and there the fatal check of November, 1915, was wiped out by the routing of the Turks from their intrenchments. Without allowing the defenders an instant's rest, the British commander flung his cavalry in pursuit; after seventy-two hours of ceaseless fighting the Tigris was bridged and crossed, and last Sunday the victorious army marched into the

ancient capital of the caliphate. For reasons of sentiment, strategy and political influence this is one of the outstanding events of the entire war. Bagdad is more than a populous city, more than a commercial center commanding ancient caravan routes between West and East, more than the projected terminus of a transcontinental railroad. Its possession gives command of Mesopotamia. For five centuries it was the seat of the caliphs, and is sanctified by the tombs of prophets of the ancient faith. It is a symbol of military power, of religious headship, of imperial dominion. What its fall means we told when it was first threatened sixteen months ago:

When Germany holds the Berlin-Constantinople section of her Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad line, she may find that her adversary holds the other end, from Bagdad to the gulf. If the British capture that city, they will control the lower valleys of the region thru which passes the overland highway of the future from Europe to the East. When the terms of peace come to be written, Bagdad will weigh as well as Constantinople and Brussels.

Combined with the British advance from Egypt into Palestine, and with the Russian sweep thru Persia into Mesopotamia, the event seems to forecast the final overthrow of the Turkish power; certainly it signifies the weakening of Germany's arm, which once was able to thrust back her enemy from the very gates of the ancient city, yet now must submit to its loss without striking a blow.

GERMANY'S DEFEAT IN RUSSIA

March 17, 1917.

EVENTS in three widely separated fields darken the shadow of defeat looming upon the path of Germany. Forced retirement of the line in France signifies paralysis of her power of sustained offensive and the necessity of hoarding a diminishing supply of troops. The fall of Bagdad dissipates the grandiose dream of a Teutonic empire in the East. And the revolution in Russia strikes from beneath the German autocracy one of its strongest props. Here are three developments of profound significance. And the most ominous for Germany, strangely enough, is the upheaval which has overthrown the Slavic czar. For while it reveals the dissension and violence of civil strife, its vital meaning is that the domination of Russia by German intrigue and bureaucratic treachery is at an end, and that Berlin's hope of attaining a separate peace with one of her mightiest enemies has been shattered. The shortening of the line in France is a concession to necessity. The loss of Bagdad is a check to important plans of imperial expansion. But the revolution in Russia is a Teutonic disaster, military and political. The collapse of czarism may even presage the downfall of Prussianism, if the deluded and exploited German people have a spirit equal to that of the awakened Slavs. That the war would give new impetus to the forward movement of democracy was apparent from the beginning, and, as we remarked more than sixteen months ago, this effect was most clearly

foreshadowed in Russia, where the people were still enslaved by absolutism, a régime medieval in its falsity, rapacity and incompetence. And at the same time we showed that the empire needed liberation from Germanism as much as from despotism. In November, 1915, we wrote:

Reform or revolution—that will be the narrow choice that will confront the Romanoff dynasty. If Germany were to be wholly triumphant, the Russian despotism would be strengthened. For German influence has always been the backbone of Russian reaction and the most effective obstacle to democratic movements in the nation; Berlin has supported autocracy as assiduously in Petrograd as in Vienna and Sofia and Constantinople.

It is to be borne in mind, therefore, that the revolution has had a dual inspiration—to break the shackles of absolutism by establishing the forms of constitutional government and a free parliament, and to liberate Russian nationality from the enslaving power of a Germanized bureaucracy. The immediate purpose, of course, is to prevent the betrayal of the nation by pro-German treachery and to insure prosecution of the war until Russian territory has been freed of invaders and until the ideals of the people are realized. To understand this stupendous movement one must glance at the developments in Russia during the war. When the conflict began, the democratic movement was already in full tide, but the aggression of Austria and Germany produced a spirit of unity such as the empire had never before known. Venerating the czar as the divinely appointed head of the state and the church, the people were inspired also by passionate loyalty to "holy Russia." Patriotism was intensified by the manifesto of the sovereign, in which he invoked the names of justice and liberty. The duma, summoned to co-operate in defense of the empire, thrilled with devoted enthusiasm. Even the

Nihilists proclaimed adherence to the policies of the government for the safeguarding of the nation.

But these bright hopes were soon extinguished. One of the tragedies of the first year of the war was the betrayal of the people who put their trust in the worthless pledges of a medieval despotism and a rapacious bureaucracy. Made arrogant by military successes, the government dishonored every promise. Poland and Finland were not freed; the duma was mercilessly repressed whenever it attempted to do more than vote appropriations; the press was gagged, and every popular movement to obtain justice was crushed by police tyranny. But even worse than these things was the actual betrayal of the army by grafting incompetents and German intriguers in high places. War funds were stolen, enormous supplies disappeared or were diverted from the front. Within a few months the reserves of ammunition were exhausted, while nothing had been done to organize production. Germany, fully aware of these conditions, which had been brought about largely by her agents, struck when Russia's strength had been fatally undermined. When her guns began to hammer the Russian line it broke, for the simple reason that it was without means of defense. Russian batteries had no shells to fire; Russian reserves were sent empty-handed into the trenches. When supplies did reach the front, enormous quantities of shells and cartridges were found not to fit the weapons for which they were sent. Germany took Warsaw with comparative ease because her well-equipped troops were faced by Russian regiments armed only with clubbed muskets. No censorship could keep these ghastly evidences of treachery from the people. Every soldier sent unarmed into the trenches, every crippled fighter crawling back to his home village, became a witness against autocracy, a living testimony to the

betrayal of the people by their masters. Yet thru all the time of anguish the nation remained faithful to the czar, and again and again gave him opportunity to free it and himself from the "dark forces" of German conspiracy. But he lacked the wisdom, or the strength, to meet the issue. Sometimes showing signs of patriotic independence, he always slipped back into association with the enemies of the people. Exposure of actual treachery in a minister of war led to the dismissal of Premier Goremykin in February, 1916, but there was sinister meaning in the choice of his successor—Boris Sturmer, a Baltic Prussian.

No sooner had this alien marplot assumed power than rumors arose that Russia would soon make a separate peace. This was the confident prediction of Berlin, and all the resources of its world-wide propaganda were employed to disseminate it abroad. German agents in the United States spread the idea industriously. "I know from reliable sources," said Professor Muensterberg, of Harvard, last October, "that Russia is half bankrupt and starving, and will be ready for a separate peace before spring. The result will be an alliance between Germany, Austria, Russia and Japan." And only a few days ago a Berlin statesman made the same prediction. For nine months the nation struggled against the throttling grip of the reactionary government. By sheer persistence, the people took over themselves the supplying of the armies, and this vital work was organized on a tremendous scale thru the zemstvos, or local councils. But it was not until November last that the дума was able to break the strangle-hold of the German bureaucracy. Sturmer was overthrown. For the first time in Russian history a government had succumbed to the populace. And the most significant fact was that the result was achieved thru the support of the parliament by the

leaders of the army and navy. These forces had always been the instruments of autocracy, but they had learned that it was only the sacrifices of the people which had overcome the betrayal of the defenders of the empire by their masters. The victory, however, was inconclusive. Alexander Trepoff, the new premier, was a progressive, but he was compelled to surround himself with reactionaries, and the loyalists realized they must fight on. Their ablest champion was Paul Miliukoff, chief of the Constitutional Democrats, who formed a coalition of the liberal forces in the duma and so commanded a majority of that body. Late in December there was a violent attack on the government, and the muttered imprecations upon the "dark forces" plotting a betrayal of the country became louder. Russia was awake at last.

Then came one of the most dramatic events that ever marked a revolution. On the night of December 29 a motorcar drove up to a house in St. Petersburg; two young men entered the house and dragged from it the muffled figure of a man. The captive was taken in the car to the lonely garden of a mansion some distance away. Shots were heard, and when the police arrived they found the snow in the garden trodden as by a struggle and stained with blood. The body of the victim was never found, but his identity was known thruout all Russia within a few days. He was Gregory Rasputin, a fanatical monk, who had become the closest confidant and adviser of the czar and was notoriously an accomplice of the reactionary and pro-German cliques in the government. The midnight assassination proved how desperately in earnest were those who had declared war upon the secret enemies of Russia. The executioners could have been named by scores of public men, but they were never arrested. This act seems to have infuriated the czar beyond restraint, for he had a superstitious ven-

eration for the monk. On January 9 he dismissed Treppoff and named as premier Prince Golitzine, the most implacable reactionary in the empire and a Russian of Prussian birth and instincts. Golitzine's attitude was revealed in two statements. One, made publicly, was to the effect that all efforts must be bent to winning the war, and there would be "no time for progressive ideas or reforms." The other, which he was reported to have made privately, was that the дума "would never be quiet until it had had a beating." But the дума was not taking beatings. The spirit that moved it was illustrated in a speech which had been delivered in December by a deputy, once a bitter reactionary, who had been transformed, by witnessing the treachery of the government, into a foe of the bureaucracy. He said:

The disorganization behind the army is being created with the help of the German party, which works tirelessly among us, and with the help of those fallen elements of our public who consider it right to serve the enemy. While military campaigns are being planned at the imperial headquarters, an incomprehensible campaign is being waged here for the German cause. It is necessary that the дума, representing the entire country, shall raise its voice against the portentous and evil decomposing of our national life.

The infatuated reactionaries and pro-Germans tried to hamper the democratic organizations which were managing the supplies for the army. Protopopoff, minister of the interior and the real power in the cabinet, whose partisanship for Germany was openly boasted in Berlin, waged open warfare against these bodies, sending police to disperse their conferences and arrest working men participating in the war industrial committees. The betrayal to Germany was in full process, and on March 11 came the final preliminary in a ukase dismissing the дума. The answer was decisive. The liberal majority met in secret on Monday, March 12, and

decreed that a provisional government should be formed. A dispatch was sent to the czar, who was at the front. "The hour has struck," it said, "when the will of the people must prevail." When leaders of the army adhered to the revolutionary cause the end was in sight, and a few days of rioting, which resulted in the desertion of whole regiments to the side of the people, consummated the overthrow of the absolute régime.

What this means to the Russian people is obvious. It marks the opening of a new era, an era of democracy in the historic stronghold of despotism. There may be some further upheavals, but the barriers are down, and the tide of liberty will not be turned back. The event means, too, that Germany has to reckon with an aroused and united nation instead of with a government controlled by her own plotters. But a far more startling possibility is a sympathetic movement in Germany itself. Czarism and kaiserism have supported one another. It is not without significance that on the very day that the czar was driven from his throne, the kaiser's chancellor announced that after the war the German empire must be reorganized so as to give the people a greater share in the government.

THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA

March 19, 1917.

ONE of the least noted, but not the least important, of the documents of the war was a ukase issued in August, 1914, by the unlamented "autocrat of all the Russias." He decreed that the capital should henceforth be known as Petrograd instead of St. Petersburg. The new designation was politely adopted by the world, but to most non-Russians the change of the name from the Teutonic to the Slavic form seemed trifling. It had the appearance merely of a concession to patriotic sentiment. Yet it had a profound meaning. It was meant to signify the end of German domination and the beginning of a new era—an era of Russia for the Russians, of a government and people working in harmony for true Slavic development. If Nicholas II had fulfilled the promise of that act, it is probable that there would have been no revolution, or at least no overturning of the throne. It was because he faltered and vacillated, and finally abandoned his high resolve, that he was deposed and the government seized by the people.

The outstanding fact in Russian history during the last two centuries has been, of course, the misrule of the country by a medieval autocracy, and the slow, painful struggles of the nation to liberate itself. But behind this lies the main cause—the ascendancy of Germanism in the government, supported by a purblind dynasty and an infatuated autocracy. For 200 years the nationalism of Russia has been strangled by the parasitic growth,

and it was to root up this evil, which was actually betraying the nation in time of war, that the people rose and smote czarism to the dust. And it was because the ruler had permitted himself to become a part of the alien system that the dynasty fell with the rotten government. Nothing could have been more abnormal than the persistent policy of imposing upon the Russians the rigid formalism of Prussian autocracy. That system made of Germany a powerful state because the Germans are temperamentally docile and feel helpless without strong leadership. They have never developed a determined demand for liberalization of their government. But of all the peoples of the earth—and this is a fact not widely recognized—there is none so democratic as the Russian people. By instinct and tradition they have always clung to the ideal of self-government. Left to themselves, they invariably revert to the simple forms of tribal life. And even their long submission to autocracy was inspired, not by admiration for despotism, but by the vision of a "people's czar," who should some day arise to liberate them from the tyranny of undemocratic rule. The ideals of mankind, as defined by the French revolution, were liberty, equality and fraternity. Western Europe and America have won liberty in varying degrees; but it is among the Russian people that the principles of equality and fraternity have been most nearly realized. The long conflict between these aims and Prussianism makes one of the strangest chapters in history.

For centuries before the founding of the Russian state the Slavs lived in small, self-governing communities, all members of which were free and equal; they bowed to no feudal chiefs; their local affairs were decided by assemblies of heads of families and elders of the tribes. And in this respect the character of the vast majority of the people remains unchanged. The first

move toward a state was the inviting of three princes of the Northmen, in the ninth century, to establish order in the land; under them and their descendants it was divided into scores of independent principalities. But these divisions often were really military republics, and princes who attempted to encroach upon the liberties of the people were summarily expelled. In the thirteenth century a contest for supremacy between the leading republic, Novgorod, and the autocratic grand duke of Moscow was interrupted by the Mongol incursion, and for more than 200 years the Russian princes ruled under the Tartar yoke. In time the Moscow princes became the chief representatives of the Oriental power, and, having wrested control from the degenerate Mongols, they established the autocratic czardom of Moscovy. Yet even in those days autocracy was tempered by popular forms, remnants of the pure democracy which had existed before the Asiatic invasion. Vast numbers of Russians refused to submit to the repugnant system, however, and emigrated to found the military democratic republics of the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga and other remote regions. The introduction of serfdom, in the sixteenth century, led to a condition of violence and anarchy for many years, until a national assembly elected as czar Michael Romanoff (1613), head of a trusted noble house.

But the founder of the Russian empire was Peter the Great (1682-1725), the last sovereign whose official title was czar. In 1721, at request of the senate, he assumed the title of emperor, and his successors have been czars only in popular speech. Peter broke the power of the aristocracy, subjugated the church and made the monarchy really absolute, while giving the people a measure of local self-government. But his policy of "Europeanizing" the servants of the state created of

them a bureaucratic nobility, separated by a great gulf from the taxpaying, subject populace; and this division was responsible for the generations of evil which followed. His planting of the capital at his new-built city of St. Petersburg emphasized the separation of the government from the people and made possible that Germanic invasion which was to bring such fatal results. For his great projects of reform Peter needed strong, able men who would help him to curb the native aristocracy, and he found them among German barons of the Baltic lands, who were accustomed to tyrannize over subject races. And they were followed to the Russian capital by hordes of adventurous foreigners. In succeeding reigns the Teutonizing of the Russian court and government was hastened by the intermarriage of the ruling houses with branches of German royal families. In the wake of these high-born immigrants came hordes of German teachers and professional men, who soon monopolized the positions of privilege. The Russian Academy of Sciences became so German that it published its works in that language. German schools were favored. Russian schools were restricted, and even down to the beginning of the present war there were many trades and professions reserved exclusively to the Germans.

Thus the Russian empire became virtually a Germanic power, whose forces were employed to serve the interests of German rulers. The evil reached a climax under the Empress Anna (1730-1740), when her German favorite, Biron, instituted a reign of terrorism against all Russians suspected of anti-German and national feelings. The reign of Catherine the Great marked a revival of nationalism and the spread of local self-government. Yet she invited in vast numbers of German colonists and gave them extraordinary privileges over her own peo-

ple. Worse still, she yielded to Prussian tempting and agreed to the criminal partition of Poland, an act which completed the political enslavement of Russia to Prussia and Austria in matters of foreign policy. Under Paul I and Alexander I the Germanization of the empire proceeded relentlessly. The latter sovereign, in particular, was an abject worshiper of Prussianism. Twice he prepared to grant his people a liberal constitution, and twice was dissuaded by the Teutonic bureaucrats, while the absorption of power by the alien interests was increased. Nicholas I (1825-1855) was patriotic, but considered it his duty to model the government upon the "efficient" Prussian model; the only result was to make the Germanized bureaucracy more oppressive. Baltic Germans rose still higher in favor, because of their absolute loyalty to the ruling powers and their devotion to autocracy. Russian diplomacy became a closed career for those of Russian birth or name. For nearly forty years the foreign policy was guided by Nesselrode, a German, who contemptuously refused even to speak the language of the country, and always the policy was framed to serve the interests of Prussia and Austria. Alexander II (1855-1881) was an earnest liberal and humanitarian, as shown in his emancipation of 43,000,000 Russian serfs and his extension of such vital reforms as municipal self-government and religious tolerance. Unhappily, however, he inherited a fallacious belief in the civilizing mission of Prussianism and a confiding trust in the Hohenzollerns, which made him an easy dupe of Kaiser William I and of Bismarck. He supported every Prussian scheme of aggrandizement, even the war of 1870 against France. His successor, Alexander III (1881-1894), was as firm an autocrat, yet was patriotic enough to throw off the German yoke and make an alliance with republican France. During his reign, never-

theless, Germany was able to penetrate still further into Russian life by putting thru vast projects of colonization in Russian territory, while she plotted to Germanize Turkey and the Balkans and shut Russia from the sea for all time. Under the emperor just deposed these measures were intensified. The colonization plans were carried on more extensively, the government became more and more Germanized, and thruout the empire the pan-German propaganda was openly conducted. A subtle means of influence was the persistent preaching of the doctrine, to the Russian conservatives, that only Russo-German friendship could save the monarchy from the forces of democracy. It was the influence of the Teutonized bureaucracy that obstructed and hampered every project of liberalization which Nicholas undertook.

These were the "dark forces" that the Russians always confronted in their struggles toward freedom. Autocracy in Germany would never consent to democratic advance in Russia; it upheld czarism as the surest defense of kaiserism. But in carrying their designs to the extent of practicing war treachery the plotters overreached themselves. Not only has their power to betray the nation been paralyzed, but the tide of democracy has isolated Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, the last autocracies in Europe.

DEMOCRACY'S WAR

March 21, 1917.

THE Russian revolution at any time would have been an event of far-reaching import, but at no other period in the world's history could it have had so stupendous an effect as now. That the cruelest and the most benighted despotism in Europe has fallen, and that 170,000,000 human beings have freed themselves from the tyranny of kingcraft, are facts which will loom large in the record of our generation. But there are secondary results of even wider significance. There has been consummated a moral revolution, a great enlightenment of mankind. The world war, overshadowing all other manifestations of the time, has taken upon itself completely the character of a death struggle between autocracy and democracy. From the beginning, indeed, this meaning of the tumult of nations was discernible, but now the truth is revealed before the eyes of all men. The Russian people have liberated themselves from the yoke of medieval absolutism; they have freed Europe and civilization from the possibility of a triumph of kaiserism; and, above all, they have clarified the fundamental issue of the mighty conflict. What we are witnessing now is the fulfillment of this newspaper's interpretation offered in the first week of the war:

The lesson that is to be written in blood and fire for the world to read is plain. It is that in the twentieth century autocracy is an intolerable anachronism, a menace to civilization, a burden upon humanity. This war is its death-grapple among enlightened nations. The result will be the doom of a

system which gives to despotic governments control over the peace of nations and inflicts upon the race a war against which the judgment of the whole world revolts.

Even earlier than this—on August 1, 1914, two days before the invasion of Belgium had loosed the great woe—we could foresee dimly the course of events and wrote:

Will allies be true to allies? The czar and the kaiser stand for the same ideals of government. Is it possible that these two may be forced to an agreement? * * * The very autocratic ambition that stirs Russia to action now may find itself defeated by victory. For the Slav is an idealist and a dreamer. This war will put the Slav into touch with the western world. His allies are liberals and republicans. Victory over the Germans may strengthen the prestige of the czar, but it will quicken the thoughts of his people and turn their minds to larger liberty. A group of Slav republics is not an impossibility as the eventual result of the conflict.

For two years and a half this theme has been emphasized in our discussions of the issues of the war—the irrepressible conflict between autocracy, as represented by Germany and her alliance, and democracy, as represented by Belgium, France, Great Britain and their supporters. Yet always there was the qualifying circumstance that one of the chief enemies of the Central Powers was Russia, a government steeped in oppression and tyranny, typifying the sway of dynastic ambition and the rule of the knout. From the beginning this anomaly has been a check upon the flow of neutral sympathy toward the cause of the Entente Allies. Even among Americans who gave whole-hearted moral support to wronged and heroic Belgium, to republican France and to liberal Britain, who saw in those nations the defenders of civilization against a menacing militarism, there have been perturbing doubts concerning the participation of Russia. And there were Britons, as well, who deplored the association. More than two years ago

George Kennan, an American authority on Russian affairs, noted this palpable feeling of unrest:

In a recent discussion an Englishman visiting the United States remarked to me: "Some of us Englishmen feel a little ashamed of our alliance with a despotic and semibarbarous power like Russia. It seems to be a sort of compromise, for selfish advantages, with the forces of evil." Many Americans who sympathize with the Allies have said to me, under the influence of the same thought: "It is a pity that such civilized nations as the English and the French should have to fight beside such semibarbarous allies as the Russians. If the forces of the Triple Entente win, won't the victorious and uncivilized Russian be as dangerous a menace to Europe as the Germans have been?"

"Great Britain, France and Germany are all three committing a crime against civilization for the benefit of Russia," said George Bernard Shaw. "If we on this side should smash Germany, we shall have to defend her from Russia." And only a few weeks ago a New York newspaper favorable to Germany utilized the same idea:

It is an astonishing thing that democratic England and republican France should be fighting to make autocratic Russia the dominant Power of the world, but that is exactly what they are doing. They are sacrificing their life's blood not merely to give Russia all of Asia, but to give her an enormous preponderance of power and possession in Europe.

Another New York journal, ardent in sympathy for the Allies' cause, remarked that the depth of the world-wide feeling against Prussianism was illustrated by the fact that "millions who have never thought of Russia except with loathing and dread are looking to the terrible Cossack—save the mark!—to save the world from the nearer menace." Needless to say, the German propaganda made full use of the just prejudice of liberty-loving peoples against the Muscovite absolutism. Systematically and continuously the advocates of kaiserism preached Germany's war as a holy crusade against

"Asiatic barbarism" and pictured the Prussian autocracy as the unselfish defender of western civilization against "the Slav peril." The kaiser himself, the imperial chancellor, the Prussianized professors in Germany and the United States and all the organized promoters of pro-Germanism everywhere cried aloud in warning against the "onrushing Slavic world" and denounced the "race treachery" of those who were upholding the eastern "barbarians" against Teutonic "*Kultur*." And it cannot be denied that this subtle pleading was effective. When Asquith and Grey and Lloyd George and Bryce and Poincare and Briand testified that the Allies were fighting the battle of democracy and small nations, their enemies raised a derisive shout and asked how an alliance with the Russian czar served the cause of liberty, how the rights of the weaker peoples were being advanced by strengthening the government which tyrannized over Poland and Finland and a score of cruelly subjugated races. The saving facts were, of course, that the spirit of the Russian people has been democratic from time immemorial; that they, if not their rulers, were animated by ideals of liberalization, and that the war must eventually give them an opportunity to express themselves. As Mr. Kennan wrote in the article we just mentioned:

There is a sharp distinction between the Russian government and the Russian people. I should describe Russia as a semienlightened, progressive and liberty-loving nation, which happens at present to be barbarously governed by a selfish and unprogressive oligarchy. In other words, the "semibarbarism" of which some Englishmen are ashamed is in the government, not in the people.

Thus the designation of Russia as an autocracy was never more than a half truth; the people submitted to the system under duress, not, as in Germany, with contentment and slavish admiration. Every one who ever intelligently studied Russian history has found that

from its beginnings until today the Slavs have ever had liberty and democracy as their ideals. Czarism was founded upon, inspired by and maintained for the benefit of kaiserism. The despotic government of Russia was not Slavic, it was Teutonic. The people were misruled, not by a native tyranny, but by a transplanted Prussianism; their armies and the nation were being betrayed by the intrigues of an alien bureaucracy. And those who created the myth of a "Slav peril" knew that so long as they controlled the Russian government Slavdom would be paralyzed, while liberation of the people would make schemes of conquest unthinkable.

What form the new government will finally take has not been decided, but that it will be democratic in spirit is made sure from the program announced, which includes liberty of speech and of the press, abolition of all social, religious and national restrictions, a general amnesty for victims of tyranny on account of political activity and the convoking of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage. The fall of the great citadel of absolutism is a tremendous victory for the Russian people; but the immeasurable gain is to the cause of human freedom thruout the world. For the alignment in the war is now clear-cut and uncompromising—the democracy of Europe and the democratic sentiment of all mankind against the autocracies of Germany and her deluded allies.

RUSSIA AWAKENS GERMANY

March 22, 1917.

IT WAS in the intolerance of his youth that Rudyard Kipling exhibited his epigrammatic skill and his superficiality by writing this estimate: "Let it be clearly understood that the Russian is a delightful person till he tucks in his shirt. As an Oriental he is charming. It is only when he insists upon being treated as the most easterly of western peoples instead of the most westerly of easterns that he becomes a racial anomaly extremely difficult to handle." One forgives the arrogance of the remark for the excellence of the tale which the young Anglo-Indian introduced with it. But how curiously it reads today, when "the most westerly of eastern peoples" has calmly reached up and pulled a tremendous despotism from power, with less bloodshed and bluster than many other nations have expended to achieve incomparably smaller results. The Russian has tucked in the badge of his Orientalism in a manner to awaken the startled respect of those boasting superior "culture." The occasion would be historic even if it meant only that a people of 170,000,000 had liberated themselves from the sway of an archaic and tyrannical system of misgovernment. But this Slavic upheaval, as we remarked yesterday, has wider effects. It establishes finally the character of the war as a struggle of democracy against autocracy; by clarifying this fundamental issue it adds enormously to the strength of the cause of civilization; and it will hasten peace because it

completes the moral isolation of the false philosophy which the Teutonic peoples and their allies have followed with idolatrous fidelity.

Czarism for two centuries has been at once the tool and the support of kaiserism. Now that the one has been destroyed, is it credible that the other will endure? The possibility of a revolution in Germany, and the nature of it if it should come, have suddenly become engrossing subjects of speculative thought. How much of prophetic truth was there in that striking cartoon we printed day before yesterday—the German soldier as “The Thinker,” brooding upon the news from the Eastern empire that was, wondering whether his mighty strength must always be expended for the glorification of an all-powerful State? It must be said that until Europe was shaken by the reverberating collapse of the Prussianized autocracy in Petrograd there were few signs of a desire for political emancipation in the kaiser’s dominions. Indeed, the extraordinary military strength of the nation was founded upon a system which exalts the State above the citizen; which makes the ideal of government not justice, but power. “The idea of an emperor,” wrote Professor Muensterberg, “is that he is the symbol of the State as a whole, independent from the will of the individuals and, therefore, independent of any elections; the bearer of the historic tradition, above the struggle of single men. For the German, the State is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the State.” The Germans, as we wrote more than two years ago, found their greatest cause for pride in their absolute unity; there was not heard among them any voice speaking for humanity or in condemnation of the philosophy that exalts militarism and provokes aggression. Yet this boasted unity we found to be ominous for civilization. “In this day of democracy,” we said, “the abso-

lute surrender of individualism to an autocratic State, so that among a whole people there is no variation of thought or utterance upon the mightiest and most complex problem that ever confronted the world, is a painful spectacle, from which humanity will derive no inspiration and to which it will pay no admiring tribute." Still more apt to the conditions of today was the survey we made of German history, which showed that during 300 years, when every other country in Europe, all of America and half of Asia had had their great, impulsive movements toward democracy, there had never been in Germany a successful revolution, nor an apparent desire for one. Even such forms of popular government as do exist there, and the institutions which have given Germany leadership in social progress, have been conferred upon the people by their rulers, who thereby have solidified their own power.

It is for these reasons that the repercussion in Germany from the overthrow of czarism is suggestive. Even while the throne of the Romanoffs was crashing down, carrying with it the Prussianized bureaucracy, audacious demands were being uttered in the face of German imperialism, and the kaiser's chancellor himself was crying a warning to the forces of absolutism and reaction. According to plausible account, on Wednesday of last week, the chancellor happened to walk into the lower house of the Prussian diet—of which he is minister president—in the midst of an acrimonious debate upon recent aggressive moves by the "conservative" forces of junkerdom. A contest between the reactionary and liberal elements has been under way for months, the latter declaring that, after the war, privilege must be curbed, and the former sullenly resisting. The "Tories" recently made two threatening moves. In the upper chamber they introduced a bill strengthening the inheri-

tance laws benefiting the landed aristocracy, and a little later rejected a bill providing for members of the lower house their customary daily "salary." The purpose was to serve notice that the reactionaries would "stand pat" against all reforms. The chief demand of the liberal forces is for a more just electoral system. It is true that the imperial reichstag is chosen under universal suffrage; but the emperor can dissolve it at will, he nominates and dismisses all officials, the ministers are responsible to him alone, and the legislature has no control whatever over the policy of the empire. Indeed, it has less power than the English parliament had under Charles I. The Prussian system is even less democratic. The diet of that kingdom is indirectly elective, but the franchise is ingeniously arranged to perpetuate the sway of privilege. The voters are divided into three classes, according to taxation paid, in such a way that the gross taxation paid by all three classes is the same; and each class in a district elects a proxy to vote for the legislator. Of 300,000 voters in a district, 2000 may be of the first class—they poll 200 votes each; 10,000 may be of the second class—they poll thirty votes each; and the remaining 288,000 citizens poll one vote each! The practical result is that 4 per cent of the population outvotes overwhelmingly 96 per cent. These facts explain the struggle that has now become acute. As the chancellor entered the chamber the leader of the National Liberals was declaring that the people demanded an end to this intolerable system, not after the war, but at once. The Progressive party leader echoed the demand, and roundly criticised the minister president for making merely vague promises. It was in reply to this that Von Bethman-Hollweg, speaking extemporaneously and with thundering emphasis, made the

speech that was regarded as an echo of the tumult in Petrograd. In it he said:

After the war we must establish equal rights and participation for all in the work of the State. We shall be confronted with gigantic tasks, and the entire people must solve them. Woe to the statesman who does not recognize the signs of the times; who believes that after this war catastrophe he can take up his work at the same point at which it was interrupted! I will devote my last effort to the carrying out of this idea of making our people strong.

This challenge and warning to the privileged classes created a commotion thruout the empire. In the chamber where it was delivered the succeeding debate was furious, as these utterances will show:

We must abolish the herrenhaus (the upper chamber, or house of lords), which is a millstone around the neck of progress. It wants the people to be commandeered into war and out of it, and that things afterward should remain as they were. That is impossible. The people demand peace. We are no longer serfs whom the king may buy and sell or order us to bleed and die at the word of command. We are a nation that has reached political manhood.

The nation is bleeding for the sins of those in power. It is high time for an operation to remove this appendix (the herrenhaus) of the body politic. Absolutism has hurled Germany into the horrors of this war and turned the whole world against us. This feudalistic system of government must go.

Militarism bears the responsibility for the bloodshed in Europe, and only when militarism and despotism are removed will the people breathe freely. The revolution in Russia should be a warning to our rulers. The German submarine war is opposed to the laws of humanity and to international law.

These are not quotations from editorials in The North American; they are sentences taken from the speeches of members of the Prussian diet eight days ago. And they are echoed in the enlightened press of the empire. Says the Socialist organ Vorwaerts:

Only with liberty and justice can the best forces of the nation unfold. And after the world catastrophe, the fact is that without maximum internal liberty we cannot continue to exist at all. The chancellor made the strongest thinkable argument that liberty is a national necessity demanded in the interest of German self-preservation.

The less radical Berliner Tageblatt says this:

The old one-sided Prussian spirit will at last be banned from the Prussian government. There can be no doubt that the chancellor has the will to live up to his words. But the power of reaction is great. The kaiser himself has experienced that, and many of his social, economic and political wishes came to naught because the junkers would have none of them. Bethmann has laid down a course not only for himself, but possibly for his successor. He has imposed the duty of fulfilling his promise on every succeeding government.

Surely, as we said in the first week of the war, "the leaven of the age is working," when the disciplined subjects of German autocracy will thus openly question the sanctity of privilege and the supremacy of the State over the citizen. The despised Russian moujik may be the liberator of his enemies as well as of himself, and Prussianism may pass away in Berlin as it has in Petrograd. Yet the future is not wholly clear. How effectual the awakened demand for liberalization in Germany will be, and what conditions there are which will hamper its expression and may limit its achievements, are subjects we shall discuss within a day or two.

GERMANY'S SHACKLED DEMOCRACY

March 27, 1917.

THERE is a somewhat remarkable aptness to current events in an observation we made during the first week of the war. The theme was "The Doom of Autocracy," and it was introduced by the following paragraph:

Overthrown by the avenging allies almost a century ago, Napoleon uttered this singular forecast: "In a hundred years all Europe will be Cossack or republican." There is still time for fulfillment—time enough, as events now move. From their better vantage ground the people of today can determine which force will prevail. The facts of the hour declare that Europe will not be Russianized. It is the other alternative that will justify the vision of the great Corsican. From the flaming brand thrust into the face of civilization will be lighted fires that will consume dynasties.

It is curious to note that the Napoleonic prophecy has found its greatest realization in the nation which he thought might subjugate the continent—Europe has not become Cossack, while Russia herself is teaching her neighbors republicanism. Naturally, the upheaval there turned the attention of the world upon the last great stronghold of autocracy remaining. What effect would the collapse of czarism have upon the more massive and more powerful institution of kaiserism? If the terrorized and benighted masses of Russia could so easily overturn a venerated dynasty, what might not be accomplished by the intelligent German people? Perhaps it

was expectation, rather than facts, which gave rise to recent rumors from neutral European countries concerning "a situation in Germany of the utmost gravity, due to food shortage, strikes and general discontent over the war," with troops being withdrawn from the battle-fronts to overawe the murmuring populace. An anonymous German writer who has repudiated the absolute régime goes so far as to predict that the emperor will soon abdicate in order to forestall revolution. There is no doubt that the German people are to some degree dissatisfied and depressed, even a little restive. The submarine campaign lags, Bagdad falls, the western armies retreat, and day by day the economic privation grows more severe. In such circumstances the most efficient system of government loses its glamour. But we credit the report of William Bayard Hale, that there are no visible symptoms of revolution. Such liberalization as Germany may attain will come, we think, in a manner different from the Russian uprising. As we showed the other day, the movement toward more democratic institutions in the empire is openly supported. What we are to discuss now is how effectual the demand is likely to be, and "what conditions there are which will hamper its expression and may limit its achievements."

During the first eighteen or twenty months of the war, the imperial régime in Germany manifestly was strengthened. Autocracy seemed to justify itself by a succession of dazzling triumphs in military and administrative science. The swift subjugation of Belgium and northeastern France was a victory hardly dimmed, in the German mind, by the check at the Marne. Soon Russia's offensive power was broken, Servia was conquered, Bulgaria and Turkey added to the alliance. Then followed the humbling of Great Britain at Gallipoli and Bagdad, some not discreditable naval exploits, and the

occupation of Rumania. These successes gave new vigor to the teaching that only an efficient autocracy, served by a disciplined, submissive people, could carry the Teutonic cause to triumph or protect the nation from inferior, but desperate, foes. But as the miseries of a third war winter approached, these brilliant results palled. The German people were surfeited with victories; and when it dawned upon them that they were winning everything except the peace which they craved, they turned with irrepressible eagerness to speculate upon how the war, with its costly triumphs, might be brought to a close. Those who examined the problem coldly reduced the possible methods to four. First, peace would certainly follow a decisive German victory; but that hope had long been abandoned by the thoughtful. Second, it would be forced automatically by a crushing German defeat; but that was unthinkable. Third, it might be attained thru a compromise, "peace without victory"; that conception was attractive and plausible, until it was dissipated by the enemy's peremptory rejection of the offer. The fourth road to peace, it appeared, lay thru democratization of the government of the empire. This, it was conceded, would go far to bring a settlement, by ending talk of conquest and by making the hostile democratic nations more willing to discuss terms. Thus the liberal movement in Germany is bound up with the consuming desire of the people for peace, rather than with deep-rooted aspirations for political freedom. Nevertheless, the chancellor's recent pledge of electoral reforms was given in response to sturdy demands based upon principle as well as upon expediency. The ideas behind the propaganda are somewhat chaotic as yet, but two quotations will suggest what they are. Philip Scheidemann, Socialist leader, speaks plainly:

It does not require many words to explain why almost the whole world is against us. It sees among our enemies more or less developed forms of democracy, and in us it sees only Prussians. We have always answered by pointing to the absolutism of Russia; but now czarism is gone. In Asia the empire of the mandarins opposed every reform. Here similar spirits seek to build like Chinese walls and hinder progress. Russia, too, promised reforms "after the war"; but the war lasted too long. Why postpone till tomorrow what is absolutely necessary today?

More significant, perhaps, was the earlier statement by Foreign Secretary Zimmermann:

It would be useless and dangerous to deny that the trend of political thought in Germany today is toward liberalization. The important feature of the change will be the erection of direct responsibility of government to the people thru their representatives in the reichstag. Under the present system there is actually no such responsibility. The chancellor owes responsibility only to the kaiser, by whom he is created.

Such utterances as those of Zimmermann and Bethmann-Hollweg are portentous. They signify that at this moment a "revolution" is impending in Germany, even tho it has the doubtful character of being supervised by representatives of the established order. Conceivably it might gather a momentum which would carry it beyond their paternal guidance; but few well-informed observers expect any such dramatic upheaval as swept the Romanoff despotism into oblivion. There are several reasons why a revolution of that type is unlikely. In the first place, the forces of reaction are formidable in numbers, and infinitely more enlightened than those which misruled Russia. The Conservative party, representing the "landocracy," and the National Liberals, who correspond to our stand-pat high protectionists, are strongly intrenched, and the privileges for which they fight are buttressed by complicated laws. Their temper is obdurate; many of them would rather

see Germany crushed than Germany freed. Rejection of the peace offer last December intensified the devotion of the German people to their system, personified in the kaiser, whose unquestioned ability gives him prestige apart from the historic virtue of his office. The radical program of the Russian revolutionary government is being used to warn the cautious Germans against wandering after the strange gods of unbridled democracy. A Berlin paper is horrified by the spectacle of "the extirpation of a national system sanctified by a thousand years," and many Germans will agree that an evil which is hoary must also be venerable. A more practical discouragement lies in the circumstance that a few months ago every German citizen between the ages of 18 and 60 years was drafted by law into the service of the State, those unavailable for military duty being assigned to civilian employment under government orders. Agitation which might be permitted to private citizens becomes a grave offense in conscripts of the State.

But aside from all this, the German temperament and habit of thought are unfavorable to revolution as it is understood by other races. The people are of a docile disposition, not because they lack virility, but because they have been schooled for generations in a belief, which has become a settled conviction, that an all-powerful State and a disciplined populace are the ideal elements for producing national unity, prosperity and power. Their extraordinary economic progress they refer to this system, and even their social progress has been accomplished upon the initiative and under the strict control of an almost untrammelled monarchism. We showed once that during the last 300 years Germany alone, of all the civilized nations on the globe, had never had an effective revolution. And the reason for this singular condition is clear to those who have observed

the German character in this country. Nine-tenths of the former subjects of the czar in the United States, we suppose, hailed the overthrow of Russian absolutism. But the vast majority of German-Americans are still devoted admirers of kaiserism.

Two predictions may safely be made. If Germany should win the war, democracy will be extinct in that empire for a generation. If she should be decisively defeated, it will take a great stride forward. For autocracy cannot survive a war that is not victorious. Let it stand empty handed before that desperate people—with no Calais, no Bagdad, no "freedom of the seas," no indemnity, nothing but death, debt, disease and despair—and its days are numbered. More likely than either of these results, we think, is a peaceful, orderly "revolution" conducted by the properly constituted authorities. "The democratization of Germany," cables Mr. Hale, "is certain to proceed along the lines sketched by the chancellor in his historic speech"; that is, freedom sufficient to satisfy the moderate aspirations of the well-disciplined Germans will be handed down to them by a benevolent autocracy. The German people have shackled themselves to the chariot wheels of a soulless militarism; and if they free themselves, it will be only when the system they have venerated is doomed by the militant democracies of other races.

BELATED DEFENSE

March 29, 1917.

IF A visitor newly arrived from Mars were to survey the present state of public affairs in the United States, he would be profoundly impressed, we doubt not, by the tremendous activities of the nation in preparation for war. He would find military posts and naval stations busy, recruiting offices alert and crowded, arsenals and shipyards resounding with the clamor of industry. In Washington he would be made aware of bureaus and departments working day and night; of composite boards and committees and councils of defense deep in their multifarious tasks; of cabinet officers holding portentous conferences; of captains of industry and transportation perfecting vast plans of co-operation with the government. And he would see the president devoting himself with consuming patriotism and energy to the directing of all these vast enterprises—issuing orders and proclamations, conducting vital diplomatic negotiations, summoning forth the latent resources of the nation, dictating measures of vigilance and mobilization, personally inspiring his subordinates to haste, and yet more haste. The magnitude and earnestness and visible progress of the activities stir the imagination of any one who contemplates the operation of the mighty forces; and the average citizen, scanning the daily reports of great plans, developments and achievements, goes about his affairs with a comforting consciousness that the problem of safeguarding the nation is in process

of solution. And the work being accomplished is really stupendous. The government executives, the army and navy chiefs and the civilians called to their aid are performing prodigies toward putting the country in a posture of defense.

Yet how many Americans realize that the remorseless factor of time makes a mockery of most of these projects; that the country is virtually as defenseless as it was two years ago; that if Germany could strike today, there is not enough military and naval power at the command of the United States to make a respectable resistance? How many of the citizens whose hearts swell with pride in the strength of America realize that all the potential power of wealth, the industrial skill, the newly awakened patriotism, the inventive genius and the vast resources of this land, and all the frantic, eleventh-hour concentration of the government, would not protect us for a day if a well-equipped enemy could reach us? How many have asked themselves what would be the result to us if the rampart of French and British troops in France were to break and the British fleet were to be dispersed? Here we are, busily engaged upon our ordinary affairs of business and pleasure; buying and selling, entertaining ourselves with the stirring news of the day, hanging out our flags, making patriotic speeches, cheering at mass meetings, writing solemn editorials about America's championship of civilization—just as tho it were not patent to every intelligent human being that the country is hardly more ready for war than is China; just as tho what we wrote on August 28, 1915, were not as true today as it was then, nineteen months ago:

The appalling condition of defenselessness into which this country has sunk is a fact which no longer can be thrust aside. The United States is hopelessly unready to defend its terri-

tories and its liberties, and an attack by any first-class Power would infallibly mean humiliating surrender or overwhelming disaster. This assertion is not based upon the theories of imperfectly informed alarmists, but upon the irrefutable statements of qualified experts.

Secretary Daniels' recent appeal to the newspapers to get recruits for the navy and the marine corps is suggestive of the conditions, but any examination of the country's completed defenses yields facts to make the stoutest patriot gasp. Let us glance at the army. A year and a half ago—and the improvement since has been moderate—the Scientific American found that our total mobile force, regulars and militia, consisted of 90,000 men. And "in case of invasion we should need 380,000 stationary volunteer coast-guard troops and 500,000 mobile troops to meet the enemy wherever he might land." As a fact, wrote the investigator, "we would have no coast-guard troops, and it would take thirty days to collect our 90,000 mobile effective regulars and militia." The government now plans raising the regular army to 250,000, increasing the militia to 400,000, and calling 500,000 volunteers. Toward this force, approximately 1,000,000 men, it has a regular army of about 60,000; the national guard, numbering 100,000 and invigorated by the training on the Mexican border, and a virtually unlimited supply of possible volunteers. Recruiting, which had been almost negligible recently, has been stimulated by the war situation. Every postmaster in the United States was made an agent, but the results were not impressive—a total of 495 new soldiers from this source in the six months ending February 1. An army of 1,000,000 men would require 25,000 officers; we have in the regular army a few more than 7000. Three weeks ago the war department directed regimental commanders to designate from the enlisted men of each unit sixty men for commissions. A month before that

the department announced the need for "a large corps of reserve officers," of whom "fewer than 1000 had been commissioned," and urged eligible citizens to take examinations. "There is no reason," it said, "why any eligible man should hesitate to apply for a commission on account of being deficient in technical military matters." There are fewer than 800 field guns ready for service, hardly one-fourth the number that would be needed; 1325 machine guns out of 17,000 required, and 750,000 rifles instead of the necessary 1,500,000. Three months ago Secretary Baker declared that there were "plenty of arms for a force of 1,000,000 men," but General Crozier, chief of ordnance, estimated that by June 30 next we should have only 850,000 rifles. Then, why not stop the making of arms for Europe, asks the intelligent reader, and turn those plants to making rifles for our own soldiers? Such a change would consume months. No two European rifles are the same, and all are different from the American type. In order to procure absolute uniformity, large numbers of special machine attachments must be made. The plants, said General Crozier, could not be working to capacity inside of a year. For 1,000,000 men a billion rounds of small arms ammunition would be needed at the start, and a reserve of twice as much maintained. There are 350,000,000 rounds available, and the capacity of the only government manufactory is only 80,000,000 rounds a year. And it would take months to equip new plants to multiply the output.

Plans for mobilizing the fleet on a war basis, establishing a coast patrol and protecting commerce, were completed on February 28; but it would take six months, said a Washington dispatch to the New York World, to put the plans in operation. At that time there were twenty-two battleships and seventy-five other warships

out of commission, without crews or ammunition; many had not had steam up for months and would need extensive repairs. It would take sixty days to put them in commission, and four months to make them fit for fighting. For coast patrol work, it was decided to build a flotilla of high-speed, light-draft motorboats. Contracts for these vessels cannot be completed under five months. And the 10,000 men they will need are still to be enlisted. The navy's shortage of men is 27,000. An official advisory committee on aeronautics has reported that adequate defense will require 4000 aeroplanes and 2400 aviators—a force which ought to be available in 1919! There are only twelve plants in the United States capable of producing the machines. And it takes nine months of training to make an efficient military aviator. Mobilization of the country's industrial and transportation resources is an undertaking to which the ablest experts are devoting themselves with splendid results. But nothing was done toward this until a few weeks ago, and it is declared that it would take five years, at the present rate of progress, to co-ordinate the systems and enable the nation to exert effective military power and at the same time maintain its productive capacity.

We have just touched upon some of the palpable deficiencies in national defense. They are not secret. The facts we have cited are taken from published official reports and from news dispatches printed since war became threatening. And they represent conditions which cannot be soon overcome by any amount of devoted energy. With time, the United States could make itself impregnable; if time is not granted, there will be a heavy price to pay for neglect. For the incredible fact is that all our active preparation has been accomplished or begun within the last sixty days. For more than two years and a half the involvement of this

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country in war has been a steadily increasing probability, and for a year—since the ultimatum to Germany—it has been a virtual certainty. Yet, until the beginning of the avowed campaign of extermination against American commerce there was made no effectual move to safeguard the nation's sovereignty and safety. A policy of inertia, of waiting, of false optimism, of dependence upon hollow "diplomatic victories," of cold discouragement for every plea and project looking to preparedness, finally brought the country face to face with conflict unarmed. The ominous truth was told in vigorous words recently by Senator Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey:

We are the custodians of fabulous wealth, without the organized power to protect it. We have 25,000,000 homes, and are unable to say that one of them is secure. We deal in paper leagues to enforce peace on a world intrenched in steel. We dabble in rudimentary theories of defense against possible enemies who have developed the art of ruthless war into a deadly science. The demands of national honor and the safety of our homes have been discussed at leisure, and in thirty months of debate no definite plan of defense has been formulated. We have shrugged our shoulders and stuffed our pockets.

"The surest way for a nation to invite disaster," said Theodore Roosevelt, "is to be rich, aggressive and unarmed." And no country, as we have said before, ever made the invitation more emphatic, in all three respects, than has the United States.

AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR

March 30, 1917.

WHEN a great throng gathered at New York city hall recently to greet former Ambassador Gerard upon his return from Germany, he paid a high tribute to President Wilson, "who will stand in American history," he said, "beside Washington and Lincoln." No doubt the words were sincere; but as the speaker looked into the eager faces of his countrymen he was impelled to put aside the compliments of oratory and speak the solemn truth. And this is what he said, in his very next sentence, of the record made by the equal of Washington and Lincoln:

When I came back to this country it was a positive shock to me to find that in the two years in which the world has been on fire we have done nothing to prepare for even a reasonable means of national defense. I have seen the Germans take more prisoners in one afternoon than there are men in the entire United States army.

This curious association of conflicting ideas is not uncommon. There are innumerable Americans who admire the high motives and lofty patriotism of President Wilson, yet who are profoundly shocked by his consistent neglect of national defense during two years and a half when activity was demanded by every consideration of reason and was made urgently necessary by his own foreign policy. Beyond these general perils, war became virtually inevitable when the United States definitely and irrevocably challenged the announced military purposes of Germany. This was in February, 1915.

From the day when President Wilson justly declared that this nation would exact "strict accountability" for invasions of its rights, there were only three ways in which conflict could be averted—by early triumphs of the Allies; by surrender of Germany to the United States, or by abandonment of the American demands. Yet for exactly two years the government, while reiterating its demands, made no move whatever toward preparing for the certain crisis which would leave no choice except submission or war. Until sixty days ago the policy remained that which The North American described on August 28, 1915:

Obstinate resistance to measures of preparation has been maintained while the government has been compelled actually to threaten war against the strongest military Power in the world. Six months ago President Wilson justifiably warned Germany that she would be held to "strict accountability" for aggressive acts. He declared this country would "omit no word or act" to uphold its rights. He gave notice that further injury would be considered an "unpardonable offense" and "deliberately unfriendly."

There never has been in history, we think, a more striking example of temerity than has been furnished by the United States during the last half year in formulating demands which at any time may involve it in war, while neglecting the most elementary precautions to enforce its high-sounding words or even to resist further aggression.

There were no measures taken to exact "strict accountability." The government was fully prepared to "omit no word," but was not ready to perform any act. It had no means, and sought none, for punishing an "unpardonable offense," or resisting practices "deliberately unfriendly." Its policy was clearly set forth in the forcing out a year ago of Secretary of War Garrison, who had given warning again and again that "the country is not prepared to defend itself—is not even prepared to prepare," and the substitution of Mr. Baker, a pro-

nounced pacifist and an opponent of adequate military training. Finally came the ultimatum of April 19, 1916, for which there was no alternative. But when President Wilson notified Germany that continuance of her lawless attacks would mean a severance of diplomatic relations, that action introduced merely a new period of inertia and neglect of preparation. Even Germany's announcement that her pledge would be withdrawn at her pleasure made no change. There followed ten months of precarious "peace," interrupted from time to time by such plain threats and open hostilities as the sinking of American ships and the torpedoing of passenger vessels within sight of the American coast, and by the special journey of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin to Washington to give warning of the inevitable. The policy outlined by the president in December, 1914, was rigidly followed. "We shall not turn America into a military camp," he had said. "There is another sort of energy in us; it will know how to declare itself and make itself effective should occasion arise." The theory of the administration was expressed by Secretary of State Bryan, who said that "if this country needed 1,000,000 men, and needed them in a day, the call could go out at sunrise, and the sun would go down on 1,000,000 men in arms." It was manifested in President Wilson's rebuke that advocates of preparedness were "nervous" and "excited," and that any defensive arrangements "might create very unfavorable international impressions." To this policy the government adhered, despite the urgent pleas of newspapers, of military experts, of eminent public men, of organizations of patriotic citizens. And there was not even the excuse of ignorance, for on September 13, 1915, the president himself had given this warning: "We are all hoping and praying that the skies may clear, but we have no control of that

on this side of the water, and it is impossible to predict any part of the course of affairs." Thus the nation was driven headlong to its fate, making imperious demands and issuing threatening ultimatums without the first rudiments of preparation to exact fulfillment of them.

But measures of defense were finally undertaken—after Germany had begun openly and systematically the war she had conducted intermittently for two years; after the United States had taken the fateful step of severing diplomatic relations! Historians will find it difficult to believe that this government took not one active step to perfect the country's defenses during twenty-four months of steadily increasing menace, and undertook its first work in this direction after hostilities had begun. Germany declared her submarine war on February 1, and two days later President Wilson dismissed her ambassador, a preliminary foreshadowing war. It was then, and not before, that the government began to put in motion the forces that are to create the country's defenses. Let the reader mark the dates of these activities. On February 9 the war department asked bids for material to make 500,000 military uniforms, and requested from congress an appropriation of \$1,573,950 to construct a submarine base at the Atlantic end of the Panama canal. "Ten more trucks," it was proudly announced, "were engaged in hauling material for erection of a new fortification at Rockaway Point," a vital feature of the defense of New York. Submarine nets were ordered for the protection of various harbors. The council of national defense was called to meet on February 12, nine days after relations with Germany had been severed. It forthwith named seven committees to plan mobilization of the country's resources, a task that will consume many months. On February 16 it was made known that work had not yet been begun on

two new battleships authorized in March, 1915, and four battle cruisers authorized in August, 1916. Several hundred recruits for the army began drilling at Governor's island—with broomsticks—and the war department advertised for civilians to become reserve officers, "technical military experience" being unnecessary. On February 19, two years after the demand for "strict accountability," army and navy chiefs were directed to make an "immediate appraisal" of the nation's fighting forces for the information of the president. On February 23 he sent to congress the war college staff's bill for universal military training, with this "recommendation:—

As yet I am not prepared to say officially that the need of the country can reasonably be said to be for so great an establishment, nor can we yet, without further study and deliberation, be confident that the means suggested are the most appropriate to the need which it shall be determined wise to foresee.

On February 26 the assistant secretary of the navy made a public appeal for 750 motorboats and 10,000 men as a naval reserve coast-defense force. "There is no question," he said, "of training these men for next year or the year after, but immediate creation of a fighting force out of nothing." Two days later—four weeks after Germany's proclamation of a war of extermination against American commerce—the first steps were taken to procure anti-submarine guns, bids being opened for 2400 3-inch guns and several thousand one-pounders. On March 10, five weeks after he had dismissed the German ambassador, President Wilson let it be known that he favored equal military training for all citizens. Secretary Daniels two days later consulted shipbuilders about the construction of 200 high-speed motorboats. Keels of forty of them were laid at Brooklyn Navy Yard, and the first will be delivered "in sixty to seventy days"—

about June 1. On March 21 Secretary Baker appointed a board of experts to standardize the manufacture of munitions; this was seven weeks after war became a fact, and two years and one month after it had been recognized as a probability. At the same time—and for the first time—plans were made to hasten the manufacture of aeroplanes, the existing capacity of the country being so small that only sixty-four of 366 machines ordered in 1916 were delivered. In a real war there would be need for 4000 airplanes and 2400 aviators; and it takes nine months' training and uses up one and a half machines to make an efficient pilot.

It would be futile to continue a recital in which every detail only adds emphasis to the appalling unreadiness of this country to defend itself; every citizen may read for himself, in the news from day to day, the evidence of long neglect and belated activity. Much criticism has been leveled against the foreign policy of the government, by those who believe that it has lacked vigor and by those who hold that it has been needlessly provocative. The judgment of most Americans will be, however, that the government could not do less than insist upon American rights, as it has done with impressive eloquence. The grave charge lying against this administration is not that it upheld the nation's rights and sovereignty, but that it obdurately refused to prepare for their defense, and thus has brought them and the safety of the republic into peril.

AMERICA SPEAKS

April 4, 1917.

TO FEW leaders of men has it been given to make a declaration so momentous, so charged with the destiny of nations, as that which Woodrow Wilson was called upon to make to congress and to the world on Monday night. And from none of them, in our judgment, have the compulsion of events and the force of conscientious conviction brought an utterance more powerful in appeal or nobler in spirit. When the history of these dark days comes to be written by those whose understanding will be clearer than ours can be, a document of imperishable value and inspiration will be that sober yet exalted utterance, voicing the ideals of a generous people and the fundamental aspirations of all enlightened mankind. It is not needful to see in it evidences of superhuman genius or miraculous insight, for it was the authority of the speaker's office which gave dynamic force to his words; it is tribute high enough to say that he proved worthy of the tremendous responsibility imposed upon him as the spokesman for 100,000,000 people and for the sacred cause of democracy.

During the last two years and a half many Americans have been bewildered and depressed by the vacillating counsels and hesitant policies of their chosen leader, but all these feelings will be swept away by his splendid vindication of this nation's historic spirit and mission. Americans today will stand straighter, think clearer and grasp more firmly the heritage of their citizenship by

reason of his ringing interpretation of their decision. They will respond to the dread summons he has been forced to give, not because they are covetous of war nor heedless of its perils, which may mean "many months of fiery trial and sacrifice," but because he has set before them an ideal worthy of their traditions, because he has done that which gives new life to the wasting soul of the nation.

It is the tone of the address, no less than its matter, which calls to the spirit of America as deep calls unto deep. Solemn yet eager, stern yet chivalrous; vibrant with the restrained passion of a forbearing people impelled at last to action; innocent of rancor, yet consuming in its condemnation of wrong manifest and unrepentant; filled with lofty patriotism, yet breathing devotion to the broader ideals of humanity and civilization, it is an utterance fit to arouse the most indifferent and give new vigor to the most ardent. In diction and logic it is as direct as former declarations were involved. Instead of vague questioning, there is sharp assertion; instead of prolix dissertation, statements of clear meaning and austere justice; instead of plausible but attenuated theories, a definite and decisive program of action. Here may be read how a democracy makes war—not from desire, but from compulsion; not for lust of world power nor to impose its culture upon other nations, but in defense of its rights, in service to justice, in championship of the liberties of mankind. If for nothing else, the statement of America's cause would be notable for its blasting indictment of Prussianism's lawlessness, perfidy and inhumanity. In measured but remorseless phrases Germany is shown to be waging "a warfare against mankind." Ruled by "an irresponsible government" which is a "natural foe to liberty," that empire has come to represent the worst evils of autocracy, of a

soulless militarism, of a policy which employs savagery against foes and treachery against friends. That government has lost all title to consideration as it has lost all semblance to an institution of world order. "In the presence of its organized power there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world." It is "running amuck." These are things which have been said a thousand times by publicists and the press representing democratic peoples. Discernment of the irreconcilable antagonism between the two philosophies of government has been the inspiration of our war discussions since the first week of the conflict. But now the truth is declared by the spokesman of the greatest republic in the world, and there is stamped upon Prussianism the final stigma of outlawry. Yet the president had the equitable instinct to differentiate between the government and the people of Germany. Perhaps the concession was more generous than just, for the Germans still prostrate themselves before their blood-stained autocracy. But it is true that the quarrel of the United States is with Prussianism, and not the least of the benefits from the great declaration may be the convincing of the German people that their moral isolation is due to the intolerable system they support. Of more direct service to his countrymen was President Wilson's statement of their decision. Like the sweep of an invigorating breeze which dissipates fetid vapors was his answer to the advocates of surrender: "There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission, and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated." And again, as he voiced the sense of solemn responsibility which the fateful action stirred:

It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace.

Alluring and blessed are the benefits of peace—prosperity and ease, tranquillity of mind, orderliness of life, the opportunity to carry on freely the tasks of an upward-moving civilization. But it may be purchased at too heavy a cost. America could not afford to pay for it the price of a sovereignty surrendered, a law betrayed, a righteous cause abandoned to criminal aggression. Once and for all the advocates of pacifism have had their answer. In the measures he recommended the president was no less vigorous and explicit than in his statement of the issues. Because the cause is as sacred as justice itself and as broad as all humanity, he declared for a war that should express to the uttermost the righteous determination of this people and should enlist all of their resources. He urged no war of private revenge or of mere national defense, but a war whose aim is to establish law and peace, which must be insecure so long as Prussianism is uncurbed. National safety, if no higher consideration, demands that the sacrifices to be exacted from America shall not be in vain. The suggestion of a league of nations to make future peace secure was revived by the president, but with a change which lifted a visionary project into the realm of reason. Americans would never consent that their country should enter such an association when membership would mean involvement in all the remote quarrels arising from the intrigues of ambitious autocracies. But President Wilson's plea now is for a league to be "maintained by a partnership of democratic nations." And there would be no place for a Prussianized state, for "no autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants."

No rational American can contemplate the future without sober reflections. Participation in any war means suffering and sacrifice; this one may bring burdens hardly to be borne. Yet the choice has been made with deliberation, after unexampled efforts to find an easier way, thru concession and conciliation. Thus it was that the president, speaking the thoughts of his own heart, voiced also the ideals of his countrymen. They fight because they must; because self-preservation is linked with honor, safety with justice, the maintenance of national rights with the cause of civilization. They fight with clear conscience and clean hands. It has been remarked that this month has been fateful in the history of America. It was in April, 1775, that the shot heard round the world rang out at Lexington; in April, 1846, was fought the first engagement in the war with Mexico; on April 12, 1861, Fort Sumter was attacked; on April 25, 1898, war was declared for the liberation of Cuba; on April 19, 1916, the ultimatum to Germany foreshadowed the ranging of this nation on the side of civilization against the despoiler. But no date will be held in higher honor in the annals of America than that on which its people declare, in the words of their leader:

We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the rights of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

GREAT WORDS DEMAND GREAT DEEDS

April 6, 1917.

EVEN if President Wilson's address to congress had not borne its own evidence of greatness, its world-wide effect would promise it a high place among the history-making documents of this momentous period. Only one thing is needed to give it imperishable renown as a declaration of vital principles. If it is translated into action, it will be graven upon the memory of mankind like one of the great charters of human freedom; lacking that, it will be recalled only as one striking episode among a multitude. If elegance of diction and sureness of logic were the standards of comparison, any of Mr. Wilson's notes to Germany, or any of his previous addresses to congress, would be as admirable as this. But the notes were essentially nothing more than brilliant essays in legal and moral controversy, and the earlier speeches but adventurous flights of suggestion and inquiry. One exception must be noted. The message sent a year ago, to the effect that diplomatic relations would be severed unless Germany abandoned her murderous submarine policy, was an ultimatum. For the first time a distinct course of action was announced, and from that day war between the two countries was inevitable, unless Germany were overcome by her enemies. With this single exception, each of the president's utterances prior to his address of last Monday left a way open for retreat. Even the severance of diplomatic relations was accom-

panied by an assurance that the speaker "could not believe" Germany to be deliberately hostile; even the request for authority to mount guns on merchantmen and establish "armed neutrality" was modified by the assurance, "I am not now proposing or contemplating war or any steps that need lead to it."

But one will search the final utterance in vain for any qualifying clauses of this nature, any sign of hesitating judgment or faltering will. The president spoke with relentless precision words which set the feet of this nation irrevocably in the path of a righteous war. His charges against Germany were remorselessly exact, his statements of principle uncompromising, his recommendations of action explicit. Where formerly he had testified, in the face of a calculated atrocity, to "the humane and enlightened attitude of the imperial German government in matters of international right," he now indicted that government as a foe to liberty, a menace to civilization, an irresponsible and inhuman force which must be destroyed. Where he had argued that the aims of both groups of nations were ostensibly the same, he now found that one represents justice and freedom, the other criminal aggression and enslavement. Where he had counseled acceptance of "peace without victory," lest continued conflict with wrong should injure mankind beyond repair, he took his stand upon the truth that civilization cannot know security until Prussianism is overcome by the united force of enlightened nations. And where he had urged a peace league to include all governments—an impossible association of kaiserism, czarism and democracy which would spawn intrigue and treachery and war—he turned to the rational demand for a concert of power which should unite the free nations as the guardians of world order. The program he outlined was no less clear—the declaration of a state

of war; prosecution of it with all the resources at the country's command, and the fullest co-operation with the nations now battling with the German peril.

To the dullest mind this tremendous utterance must appeal as epoch-making. And in a sense it is so, if for no other reason than that it lays the foundation for a structure that should make this age illustrious—a federation of nations, not linked by racial sympathies or ambitious policies, but united for the common good upon the fundamental basis of devotion to democratic institutions. Yet the fact remains that the declaration, even tho it voices in inspiring terms the convictions and aspirations of a great people, even tho it awakens hopes among multitudes in other lands, in itself stands only as an expression of sound doctrine and lofty ideas. Grant that it reveals noble conceptions and far-reaching vision, it will mean exactly so much as action in support of it accomplishes, and nothing more.

At this moment President Wilson is indubitably the most commanding figure in world affairs. Adulation rises to him thruout the continents, and myriads of men hail his words as the proclamation of a new era of human freedom. But suppose—if this were thinkable—that he should conceive that the promulgation of great thoughts and principles were the end, instead of the beginning, of his mission; suppose that in contentment with the great service of having spoken nobly for humanity he should fall short of fulfilling the obligations of leadership; suppose that inefficiency in congress or slackness of fiber in the American people should result in a paralysis of the mighty force just now called into being—what would remain of that splendid declaration, except the echo of resounding words? Let it be understood that we do not offer these chilling suggestions with any motive of disparagement. We yield to none in admiration for

the forthright courage of the president's stand and in ardent purpose to support it. Yet only the utmost loyalty of service and sacrifice can give vitality to the cause so valiantly asserted.

The noblest document in human history is the Declaration of Independence. From its immortal words people unnumbered have caught inspiration, and generations yet unborn will be uplifted by its majestic utterances. But if the men who penned it had done no more than to declare their principles, what would it be except a half-forgotten memento of a vision, an example of well-turned rhetoric? Why does the world honor these men? Not merely because they had a sublime idea, but because they gave all they had to realize it; not only because they enunciated a faith, but because they devoted to its establishment their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor. Without Lexington and Valley Forge, there would be no State House for us to venerate, no liberty for us to enjoy and defend. Without leadership that shall drive this government today to great deeds, without unity and willingness on the part of the American people to make sacrifices for the cause they have championed, all that the president has so magnificently declared must become a mockery, and the world must find itself betrayed by false hopes. A policy commensurate with the colossal problem of saving civilization at the eleventh hour, and the prosecution of that policy with crusading zeal and relentless efficiency—these are the imperative needs. They will not be easily met. Neither the administration nor congress has revealed hitherto a capacity for dealing even with great national problems, and this one has factors of unparalleled magnitude and menace. Sinister forces, moreover, are gathering to exert their hampering and harassing influences upon the projects of protecting national rights

and championing law and democracy. Their opposition is based upon two subtly dishonest appeals. They cloak disloyalty under the pretense, first, that they will support to the uttermost a "defensive" war, which they would restrict to resistance against actual invasion of American soil; and second, that under no circumstances should the United States commit itself to "entangling alliances" with foreign nations. These two pleas will be pressed with tireless ingenuity and with every imaginable scheme to awaken prejudicial fears. Yet they are transparently false and vicious, and loyal Americans should be prepared to repudiate them whenever they are made.

The rights and the sovereignty of this government and its people have been as flagrantly and as dangerously assaulted on the high seas as they would be if German troops were intrenched on the American coast. The lawless sinking of American ships and the methodical murder of American citizens are as definitely acts of war as would be the dropping of bombs on Philadelphia. The first requirement of a defensive war is to strike the enemy, and if the United States must send ships to the North sea or troops to France, in order "to bring the government of Germany to terms," those will be as clearly acts of defense as are the patrolling of American waters and American railroad lines. The government may be trusted not to make any "entangling alliances" which would commit this country to the support of schemes of territorial aggrandizement or political aggression. But the American who resists an open, clearly defined and energetically fulfilled arrangement of co-operation with the forces already engaged with Germany is either dishonest or misled.

If there is any meaning in what President Wilson declared, and if there is any logic in the events of the

hour, the United States is summoned to defend not only its own rights, but the institutions of democracy and civilization. For two years and a half, at untold cost in blood and treasure, nations have been fighting to overcome the intolerable menace of a world power based upon autocracy and militarism; and now, when the greatest of republics at last takes its stand with the defenders of human liberty, it is urged that it conduct a private war and repudiate the cause for which they sacrifice themselves. When Russia, in czarism, had its counterpart of the cruel and rapacious system which makes Germany an international danger, there was some merit in maintaining the tradition of aloofness. But the Russian people have clarified the issue and made the war absolutely a test as to whether autocracy or democracy shall survive; and this nation would be false to its first principles if, having declared at last for the cause of justice and freedom, it did not stand shoulder to shoulder with those whose sufferings have served it. Aside from considerations of sentiment and justice, national safety itself dictates this course. Following an isolated policy, the United States not only would fatally weaken the nations ranged against Germany, but would endanger its own future. The first line of American defense today lies in the British fleet and the troops of France, Britain and Belgium, who hold the trenches from the North sea to the Swiss border, and to deny them active aid would be to serve the enemy that threatens us.

HOW ARE WE TO WAGE WAR?

April 7, 1917.

THE United States is now actually and irrevocably in war and at war. The last permissible debate as to its participation ended with the action of the house of representatives early yesterday morning; controversy will be revived only by the deluded or the disloyal. The one duty of government and people henceforth is to prosecute the war with energy, intelligence and undivided purpose. At first glance the problem, while clearly formidable, will appear to offer its own solution. This country has a population of 100,000,000; it possesses vast reserves of money, credit and natural resources; its industries are tremendous and highly organized, and it is geographically remote from the scene of conflict. Victory depends simply upon developing latent forces and bringing them to bear with reasonable dispatch. But the devising of a method of doing this presents the most stupendous and intricate problem that ever confronted the nation.

Two general theories of procedure are advocated, and they are in irreconcilable conflict. One holds that the sole issue lies in Germany's invasion of American rights at sea, and that all cause of war would disappear the instant that Germany offered, or was compelled, to abandon the sinking of American ships and the murdering of American citizens. Hence, the United States should confine its activities to the conduct of a "strictly defensive" war; it should proceed independently, remain-

ing absolutely aloof from other belligerents; should do no more than guard the American coasts, protect American shipping and prepare to defend American territory against possible danger. Moreover, consent by Germany to recognize and respect American rights should be the signal for making a separate peace and the withdrawal of the United States from the conflict. This view has had ardent support. Only a few weeks ago Representative Lenroot, of Wisconsin, who voted finally for the war resolution, made the following plea:

We will vote to maintain our liberties upon the sea. But that does not mean that we will vote a general declaration of war; it does not mean that we will intervene in the European conflict, nor send our men to European trenches, nor participate in the settlement of European questions. When Germany shall again respect our rights our quarrel with her will be over, and we will be ready to make peace, regardless of European nations or European quarrels.

Mr. Lenroot is an independent and courageous patriot. Yet at that time he was misled into saying just what pro-Germans advocate. This is from the leading American newspaper apologist for kaiserism:

If Germany offered to cease submarine attacks without warning upon merchantmen, there would be nothing for us to do in honor and self-respect but to accept that offer and make peace, regardless of what the Allies did or were about to do * * * Let us insist that our fleets and our armies be used to fight only for America! We want no allies. We will have use for every American dollar and ship and soldier in defending America!

This is to be the last device of pacifism, the last ditch of disloyalty—the plausible demand that the United States shall wage only a “defensive” war, by which is meant an isolated war, without either joining our resources to those of Germany’s other adversaries or making use of their organized power; a war to be abandoned without regard to world issues involved. Dia-

metrically opposed to this program is that which recognizes that Germany, as President Wilson has said, is making "warfare against mankind"; that while militarism and autocracy remain uncurbed all democracies are in peril, and that the object must be "to bring the German government to terms and end the war." This program requires that the United States should make common cause with the democracies of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Russia against the confederated autocracies of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey; should ally itself with them, not politically, but in a military sense, for the duration of the war, and should arrange the closest possible co-operation of effort against the common enemy. This is the policy which the government has adopted; which, indeed, it has already put into effect. Decision could not await the formal action of congress, and this course was so manifestly sound that tentative arrangements had been made for co-ordinating American activities, so far as possible, with those of the forces already in the field. One of the most noteworthy features of President Wilson's address was his clear enunciation of the program:

It (declaration of war) will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. * * * We should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible, in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces, with the duty of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field, and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

The logic of these proposals is manifest. No matter how much force there may be in the tradition of

our "isolation" and the sentiment for keeping this nation from "foreign entanglements," the demand of existing conditions is imperative. The United States, one of the weakest nations of the world in military equipment, is at war with the strongest military Power. Acting independently, the United States could not possibly overcome Germany; could not, indeed, exert any appreciable pressure upon her. It could not operate against her submarines or against her troops except in co-operation with her other antagonists, and she has no merchant marine afloat which might be attacked. Some unity of action, therefore, is a strategical necessity. Such an arrangement is no less vital to national safety. We have seen what Germany considers a "peaceful" attitude toward the United States; from this may be deduced what she would deem justifiable in the event that, having subdued the Entente alliance or having made peace with it, she faced the United States alone. All the soothing arguments for an "independent" or "limited" or "restricted" war, conducted as tho there were nothing more at stake than the lawless attacks upon American ships, are palpably unsound and dangerous. Even if this nation could wage a war of this kind, it is inconceivable that Germany would do so. Her wars are not limited. And neither is her hatred. And it is inconceivable that she would be more relenting toward the United States, after it had become an avowed enemy, than she was while it was submitting to outrage or trying the experiment of armed neutrality.

Expediency forbids any paltering with the facts; altruism itself would not justify such a course. Germany undefeated means the United States doomed to resist, alone and unaided, that which the greatest coalition in history has not yet been able to overcome. It is the idlest folly to believe that acceptance of a German

pledge, even if such a concession were thinkable, would dissipate the peril; it would, on the other hand, intensify it. Germany would not consent to stop sinking American ships even to keep American friendship; from this may be estimated what she would do at the first opportunity in return for American hostility. German defeat, then, is vital to American safety; there can be no turning back now. All available means must be used to accomplish that end; and they must be used at the earliest possible day and in the manner which will give them the greatest force. If the United States could do most toward defeating Germany by independent action, that would be our logical course. But it is obvious that we cannot even strike a blow, for we lack the opportunity. Association with those already in contact with the enemy is therefore imperative. We serve ourselves by putting our resources, which they lack, behind their organization, which we have not. This means "team work" by the navies of the United States, Great Britain and France in patrolling the submarine murder zones. It means the extension of credit; organization of the supply of food, munitions and other needed materials; the building of ships, and the mobilization of our industrial resources in the common cause.

It means, also, the raising of a great army. And it means the employment of an army in Europe, if that should become necessary. This is against American tradition, and it is against American desire; but tradition and desire must give way if compulsion arises. We struck Spain first in the Philippines, and if it would best serve American defense to strike Germany in Belgium or France, there we must strike her. Obviously, such action must take into account the requirements of territorial protection; the possibility of invasion must always be kept in mind. But the best way to prevent an attack is

to make one. The one means of making the United States secure is to defeat Germany, and it may be found that the place to do that is in Europe. No hasty adventure of this kind need be expected. With our financial and material resources at their command, the forces now in the field probably can hold the line; and in any event an American expedition could hardly be made ready for trench war, nowadays an intricate science, for many months. A force just large enough to give the American flag a place in the battlefront of democracy might be sent, however. This would be a symbol of America's whole-hearted enlistment in the cause; an inspiration to those already fighting and a final emphasis to the condemnation of the German government by civilization.

The idea upon which the American people must lay hold is that they are committed now, thru no fault of their own, to the greatest and most exacting enterprise of their history, and that they cannot emerge from it successfully unless they put into it all their energy. This nation would be not only unworthy of the cause it has championed, but would be false to its own safety, if it did not determine to do everything that is necessary to accomplish the defeat of Germany, without which "there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world."

THE MISSION OF AMERICA

April 9, 1917.

ALL Americans are stirred by the consciousness that the United States is at war with the greatest military Power in the world, is a participant in the most colossal conflict in human history. But there are varying interpretations of the significance of this tremendous fact. The majority of citizens discern that the nation has embarked upon a momentous enterprise, but they face the grim undertaking with a serene courage which does not question the future. Others, a class by no means small, refuse to take the situation seriously. They conceive that the peril will presently be dissipated by some sort of negotiation, or by some dramatic military gestures; or, at the worst, by the extension of our credit to other nations fighting Germany, and by intensified production of munitions and other war materials for them to use. In a third group are those who realize that the United States confronts the gravest and grimmest ordeal of its existence, which will test its strength of sinew and of soul as never before.

No living person knows how long this war will last. There are now, and will be again, vague rumors of peace moves. But there is just as much reason now to prophesy three years of conflict as there was when Kitchener startled his countrymen with such an estimate thirty months ago. The entrance of the United States gives virtual assurance that the ultimate outcome must be the defeat of Germany; yet well-informed observers

are agreed that the participation of this country by no means guarantees an early termination of the struggle. If we were prepared to defend ourselves and maintain our rights, as we should be; if we had heeded the warning which events thundered at us with ever-increasing clamor for two years and a half, a mere declaration of our purpose to uphold justice would have broken the hardy spirit of lawlessness and dictated the re-establishment of order. The end of the war would be in sight, and the world would have escaped the bloodshed which now must ensue. But heedlessness and delusion blinded us, and for this there is a price to be paid. It is inspiring to read the impressive estimates of our vast war resources, and the ardent welcome which the hard-pressed antagonists of the common enemy give to our promised aid. But the important estimate is not that which is held by Americans or by the Allies, but that which is held by Germany. And Germany holds our military power in utter contempt; she knows that she has nothing to fear from it for twelve months, perhaps for twice that time. Her experts are aware of the United States' mighty financial and economic power; but most of that, they say, has been at the disposal of her enemies since the beginning, and cannot be brought to bear directly upon her in the near future. Germany scorns not only our armed strength, but our national spirit. She believes that American manhood and womanhood have a flabby fiber; that the nation has a commercialized conscience and a sordid soul.

Even before the decision of America, this newspaper felt no serious doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the struggle. In man-power and economic strength and means of supply the Allies outmatch the four autocracies, and in scientific mobilization of their resources they have approached Germany's marvelous accomplishments.

A Teutonic triumph, therefore, could not be calculated, altho the extent of the defeat to be inflicted, and the nature of the settlement that would be made, could not be estimated. Our optimism, we confess, was stimulated to some degree by an unshaken belief in the eternal justice of things, as well as by considerations of the practical factors. We had faith that the civilization built upon the principles of democracy and the rights of man, ideals which have been expanding thru nineteen hundred years of mankind's upward striving, was not to be overthrown, at this late day, by a philosophy which belongs to the Dark Ages. And the addition of America's tremendous moral and material force makes the end still more certain. Yet no one can soberly study the events of the past and the prospect of the present without bringing into view the possibility that the United States may be called upon to take upon itself the chief burden of a cause which has all but exhausted its first defenders.

Even in the darkest view of the future there is, nevertheless, the promise of material benefits which far-seeing observers are calculating. Out of this time of peril, they discern, the nation will at last emerge prepared, as it should have been years ago, to discourage or resist aggression from any quarter, a free republic ready to maintain its freedom. It should be a cause for thankfulness that even now the protection of the navies and the troops of Britain and France gives us opportunity to construct our belated defenses. It is urged that national military training, which never could have been made possible except under the compulsion of unavoidable war, will not only promote the country's safety, but will upbuild the physical vigor of the people. And the daily record of the examination of recruits shows that this measure will not come too soon to check deterioration.

Great advantages will flow from the development of national control over transportation and other quasi-public enterprises; from the stimulated conservation of natural resources; from the elimination of waste and the co-ordination of effort; from more intelligent and scientific direction of agriculture; from the reorganization of our vast industrial power, which will put us abreast of the revolutionary achievements that necessity dictated in Great Britain and France, and so will give us the equipment and momentum that will be needed to carry us thru the relentless commercial contest to follow the war. Out of the stress and strife, it may be believed, will emerge a people rid of the intolerable weakness of hyphenism; the great American republic will stand before the world a nation instead of a conglomeration of racial fragments, the home of a loyally united people instead of an international boarding house. The mere enumeration of these advantages which will come in compensation for the sacrifices of war is impressive, and some of them have a nature vital to America's existence. We are not unmindful of all the practical good which they will accomplish. But there are in view facts of infinitely greater import, the contemplation of which might well uplift the soul of Americans with heroic inspiration.

The participation of the United States in the world war, upon the platform set forth by President Wilson in his address to congress, has made it possible for this nation to confer immeasurable benefit upon the world. For the judgment thereby expressed is to be the judgment of humanity and of history, and the issue thereby declared is to stand clear in the vision of mankind to remote ages. So long as men write and read and think, there will nevermore be any doubt as to why this war afflicts the earth. White books and green books and all

the studied controversies of diplomacy will be but for the research of the laborious student; the orations of imperial statesmen and the fulminations of imperial professors will be scanned merely as curious records of human prejudices and infatuation. Towering above and obscuring them all will stand the monumental fact that, after two years and eight months, the leading neutral and the greatest republic in the world was driven by sheer conviction to outlaw and everlastingly condemn the intolerable institution of Prussianism, giving the final and irrefutable demonstration that this is a war to decide whether autocracy or democracy shall govern the destinies of the race. That issue, indeed, was manifest from the beginning to all who did not fasten their attention upon minor causes. Before a shot had been fired, while the teeming ranks of continental armies were not fully assembled, two days before the violation of Belgium signalized the colossal rebellion against law, this newspaper predicted that the struggle then opening would mean "an upheaval of democracy," and charged the catastrophe to "unbridled autocracy." And before the conflict was a week old we declared the obvious truth which is today the world verdict:

The lesson that is to be written in blood and fire for the world to read is plain. It is that in the twentieth century autocracy is an intolerable anachronism, a menace to civilization, a burden upon humanity. This war is its death-grapple among enlightened nations.

Democracy is a guarantee that war, when it is waged, shall be waged for liberty, not for territorial greed or lust of conquest; in defense of human rights, not for the glorification of ambitious rulers and a besotted statesmanship. The leaven of the age is working. The mighty convulsion will shake into new alignment the powers of the world and the forces of mankind. Unless all signs fail, it will mean the stern curbing of imperial aggression, perhaps the extinction of imperial systems. Great new republics may arise upon

the ruins of despotic institutions. For the tide of democracy will not be stayed, and autocracy will be submerged with the futile barriers it has erected to guard its medieval privileges.

Commerical rivalries, clashing political ambitions, racial animosities—all of these things, and many more, had their influence in precipitating the appalling conflict. But ever clearer emerged the basic cause—the irreconcilable antagonism between autocracy and democracy. Again and again we declared that only one of these could survive; there was not room for both upon this earth, and in the end the alignment must be between these two systems of government, of one of which this nation is the chief exponent. This was our unchanging interpretation, maintained thru months when ignorance and pacifism were urging that America was supremely blessed in being “isolated” from an “insane and meaningless” war; when the popular concept was expressed in the heedless phrase, “Oh, let them fight it out, it’s none of our affair”; when the president of the great American republic was admonishing his countrymen to be “neutral even in thought,” was declaring that “with the causes and objects of the war we are not concerned,” and was arguing that there must be “peace without victory,” a peace arranged between autocracies and democracies treating “as equals.”

All civilization has thrilled to the noble expression of the truth in President Wilson’s great utterance of last week—“the world must be made safe for democracy”; “in the presence of autocracy’s organized power, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world”; “a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations.” But these truths have shone undimmed thru the murk of war from the very beginning. The single aim and inspiration of Prussian mili-

tarism was to prepare against the day when it might suddenly overwhelm democracy and enthrone absolutism as the ruling philosophy of government. The imperishable service America has performed is to demonstrate, at the peril of sacrifices which no mind can foresee, what is that issue which has locked the nations of the earth in deadly combat in this, the most enlightened age of human history. So much has been accomplished by the mere decision and declaration. Of still greater import will be the result of this nation's active participation—an alliance of the democratic peoples of the world to meet at their Armageddon, the confederated forces of autocracy. Without America this battle to re-establish and make secure the structure of human liberty was impossible. Without America the dream of world peace was vain, for that can never be realized until democracy rules the earth. With America, the alignment is irrevocable and irresistible. For autocracy has summoned into the field against itself a force mightier than fleets and armies—it has challenged an indestructible idea, which for nineteen centuries has been the ever-expanding inspiration of mankind. Nor has there been, since the beginning of that era, an event of greater moment for humanity than the resurgence of democracy amid the ruins of its hopes. Like its great Teacher and Martyr, the cause of justice has had its grim Golgotha and its triumphant resurrection, promise and proof of a glorious immortality.

GERMANY CAN FORCE PEACE

April 10, 1917.

HERE is an arresting and hope-inspiring paradox—peace was never so easy of accomplishment, never lay so ready to the grasp of those who alone can command it instantly, as in this hour when the fiery circle of war threatens to inclose the entire earth and when the embattled nations are nerving themselves for a struggle to the death. Just when the issue has narrowed to a single principle, concerning which no compromise can be imagined and no mercy shown; just when great new forces have been added to the battle line and the prospect is for a conflict more pitiless and more prolonged than seemed possible, just then is it revealed that there is one simple decision by which the war could be ended forthwith. The choice lies with the German people. If they were to do what the Russian people did—were to take control of their own government—there is no power in earth or hell that could prevent the coming of peace within thirty days. This is no visionary estimate. It is self-evident. Civilization is in arms against Germany because that empire is the citadel of autocracy; with a Germany freed of kaiserism, a Germany democratized, it would have no quarrel that could not be settled justly, generously and peaceably. This is the message that is thundering from the guns on the great battle-front and echoing from every enlightened nation. The truth is finding lodgment even in Germany, where a people oppressed with woe and sitting

in darkness look wonderingly at the glimmering idea, not yet fully comprehending its stupendous meaning.

The dullest imagination can picture what would happen if some day soon the news were to speed from Berlin that absolutism had been overthrown, junkerdom cast down and self-government substituted for the monstrous anachronism of an all-powerful, irresponsible State. Russia would silence her guns to hail a sister nation. The United States would turn joyfully from the stern business of war to welcoming the prospect of restoring an ancient friendship. In Great Britain, France, Italy, all the world, distrust and aversion would give place to confidence and admiration, and the implacable demand for vengeance to a universal cry for peace. Peace! That is the agonizing dream of the tormented and desperate German people. And they could have it tomorrow—not a peace of enslavement, but peace with honor, peace with safety, peace with that “free existence” which they crave, peace with liberty to develop their precious *Kultur* to glories it could never attain as the instrument of a besotted militarism; peace with no shadow except the inextinguishable sorrow they must endure for the losses inflicted upon them by the autocracy they still cherish. And this they might attain, not by suffering further sacrifices, not by piling up their dead in greater and more futile heaps, but by merely asserting their manhood and intelligence, by taking into their own hands the control of their destinies. The decision rests with them: the alternative they know. Democracy, aroused at last, has passed irrevocable sentence—kaiserism must go. Hohenzollernism must end, for “in the presence of its organized power there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world.” What America has said is the judgment of mankind. It has been a matter for won-

derment that the nations battling with Germany did not long ago proclaim that peace would be made only with the German people. There were two reasons for avoiding an explicit and official declaration—first, it would have strengthened kaiserism among its subjects, and second, it would have made difficult a refusal to consider really moderate terms offered by the imperial government. The idea, nevertheless, has been strongly intimated. The Allies have said that they were fighting for the liberation of all peoples, including the Germans. It was vital, said Mr. Balfour in his note, that Prussianism “should fall into disrepute among the Germans themselves.” When they accepted terms, said Lloyd George, they would find that “they have attained self-government for themselves.” It would be impossible, declared the speaker of the house of commons, to make peace with the German government “as at present constituted.” The leader of the British Socialists was far more emphatic:

It is unthinkable that the Entente would conclude a lasting peace with the Hohenzollerns. The peoples of the allied countries would repel the thought of such a peace. Revolution in Germany and the fall of the dynasty seems the only way to the reconstruction of Europe on a stable basis.

President Wilson spoke for democratic civilization when he said that peace must be secured by a league of democratic nations, because “no autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” But the most direct message is that which Germany has heard from liberated Russia. A united utterance from Russian workmen and soldiers a week ago implored the Germans to “throw off the yoke of autocratic rule,” so that the two peoples might “stop this awful war.” And to this popular expression is now added the official declaration of the Russian minister of

justice: "If the German people are about to follow our example and dethrone their emperor, we can do no other than warmly applaud, for that would offer the possibility of entering upon preliminary negotiations." Despite the censorship and the disciplined habit of thought among Germans, realization of the truth is rapidly taking possession of their minds. This is shown not only in a new boldness of utterance among the few really democratic elements, but in the furious resentment of the reactionaries and the hasty maneuvers of autocracy to forestall revolution by concessions. "It does not require many words," the Socialist leader in the reichstag wrote recently, "to explain why almost the whole world is arrayed against us. It sees among our enemies more or less developed forms of democracy, and in us it sees only Prussians." "We regard a German republic as an inevitable development," said another. "History is now marching with seven-league boots." Vorwaerts, the party organ, voices stern demands:

Democracy against autocracy! The freedom of nations against the lust of conquest! It rings thru the world. In the eyes of most of the earth's inhabitants Germany appears as a tyrant, our enemies as bringers of freedom. Thru the Russian revolt and America's declaration this storm of the public opinion of the world has become a tempest. We are fighting for home and hearth, but not for antiquated conditions whose elimination has been promised us; and if there are things that make this fight for life more difficult to us, then—away with them! The bringing about of that national freedom which exists in other nations, even monarchies, is the political offensive we need if the pressure of the moral attack against us is not to become too great.

Yet against the movement signified by these expressions there is ranged a tremendous force of opposition. Bourbonism is the same under every sky—it never learns, it never yields until it is too late. "The perils threatening Germany's future," cried one organ of the

autocracy, "would be formidably increased if a democratic State were to arise in Russia." And every exponent of the old order is bitterly resolved to concede nothing or else to concede only so much as will satisfy the docile people and undermine the cause of genuine liberalization. Chief among these latter are the kaiser, his chancellor and some other powerful figures in the autocratic régime. They openly proclaim that electoral reforms and other measures to make the government more responsive to the nation will be taken—after the war. And the controlled press dutifully applauds the program embodied in a proposed "people's kingdom of the Hohenzollerns," which the emperor himself has been "graciously pleased" to advocate. These devices would be transparent enough, even without elucidation. But the spokesmen for autocracy emphasize the fact that the concessions are meant "not only to maintain, but to strengthen, the bonds between ruler and people." The studied phraseology of the discussion is suggestive. Such terms as "democracy" and "popular government" are avoided as tho they were unknown in the German language; autocracy always refers to its design as "the new orientation of policy." But its most effective appeal is made by irritating the nerve of nationalism. Nothing in President Wilson's address has aroused more savage resentment than his differentiation between the German government and the German nation. "The kaiser and his people are one," has always been the response of devoted Germans to Americans who wished to absolve the nation from the odium of autocracy's crimes, and this is still the defiant answer. "The German people," cries a leading paper, "see in President Wilson's words nothing but an attempt to loosen the bonds between the people and princes of Germany so that we may become an easier prey for our enemies.

What slave soul does he believe exists in the German nation when he thinks that it will allow freedom to be meted out to it from without?"

The truth is, of course, that precisely that compulsion may have to be applied. The German people have had the same chance as others to liberate themselves; they still have it. But if they refuse, the alternative is that civilization will accomplish it for them, and that the benefit will come to them only thru great anguish. Russia has shown them one way to freedom and peace; America shows them the other. Surely their brothers in this country could perform no better service to their fatherland than by urging it to choose the easier and the nobler way. For Germany is encircled now by a force more powerful by far than the "iron ring" which she believed she could break. Over against every line where her troops are intrenched, democracy is encamped in relentless vigil; and autocracy will sooner turn back the slow-revolving wheels of time than it will overcome the idea against which it made audacious war.

WHAT IF RUSSIA MADE PEACE?

April 17, 1917.

THAT is a very singular battlefield scene pictured in a dispatch from Petrograd: "At many points on the Russian front Austrian soldiers came out of their trenches carrying parcels of peace pamphlets, which they tried to get the Russians to accept. Shrapnel drove them back." The incident may seem absurd, yet it is a symptom of a situation which has serious concern for the United States and for the world. Just as desperately as she is fighting to escape military disaster in the west, Germany is striving to achieve diplomatic victory in the east—to coerce or cajole the new government in Russia into negotiating a separate peace that would break the iron ring of democracies encircling the Central Powers. It is hardly too much to say that upon the course of Russia depends the outcome of the war. And the matter is of the greater concern to America because this country can do more than any other to avert action which might have disastrous results. When one considers the magnitude of the change wrought in Russia—the sudden liberation of 170,000,000 people, of a score of races, from a system rooted in the habit of centuries—one marvels that the new régime has been so steady and so strong. There never was a revolution so tremendous and so tranquil. Yet its very completeness has produced dangers. This new-born democracy found itself burdened with a staggering inheritance from autocracy—military inefficiency, shortage of food, muni-

tions and other supplies, and a transportation system almost paralyzed by mismanagement.

Problems political as well as military and economic faced the untried government. To the vast mass of the people liberty was a dazzling boon which they accepted with reverent joy; but in the minds of those who had preached red revolution thru bitter, hopeless years it awakened a more insatiate ambition. They want to reconstruct the entire social order as rapidly and as ruthlessly as they and the more moderate progressives reconstructed the governmental system. Toward the provisional authorities they are distrustful, intolerant and aggressive. At a time when the need is for a more resolute patriotism, they are preaching with intensified passion the doctrine of internationalism. These radicals are Socialists before they are Russians. They would betray the nation to Germany in the serene conviction that thereby they were serving humanity. Since that end was being promoted by the Russian autocracy, the revolution was a staggering blow to kaiserism. But when the Germans had recovered from the shock they turned with characteristic efficiency to the devising of means to extract advantage from the defeat. At first the Prussianized mind refused to accept the accomplished fact—czarism must soon be restored. "It is absolutely impossible," solemnly declared an eminent professor of the University of Berlin and a privy councilor, "for the revolutionary committee and the duma to work together long. It is opposed to all reason. It is impossible to deny the possibility of a counter-revolution in favor of the old régime." But more practical ideas gained ground—what could not be obtained from a seduced autocracy must be snatched from a disorganized democracy. Affairs in Russia were palpably in confusion. The effect of sudden freedom on a people long suppressed would be to encour-

age license and political turbulence. The army, conscious of its part in destroying absolutism, would cast away discipline and repudiate authority. Most of all, the war sufferings of the people would awaken among them a passion for peace, which for the first time would find free expression. There probably was a good deal of truth, therefore, in the Berlin dispatches, which reported that the Russian situation commanded far greater interest in Germany than did the war preparations of the United States. The newspapers were filled with hopeful intimations that an offer of "generous terms" would soon detach Russia from her allies. When the Austrian premier made a new peace suggestion two weeks ago, the semi-official comment in Berlin was that "it now lies with Russia to return an answer." More recently the Socialist organ, *Vorwaerts*, has renewed the invitation:

In the hands of the liberated Russian people now lies the decision regarding peace and war. Matters between the Central Powers and Russia can be settled without a further drop of blood being shed. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary wishes to humble Russia or keep a bit of her territory. We wish for peace, and the statement of the provisional government shows that the same feeling in Russia is very great.

This newspaper statement is especially significant because Prussianism relies upon Socialism to bring about a settlement which will perpetuate autocracy. The German Socialists have never failed to uphold kaiserism during the war, and they are now exerting their utmost endeavors to undermine the democratic coalition against Germany by appealing to their Slav "brethren." And that this movement is promoted by the imperial government was shown last week, when a special train was provided to carry across Germany a company of Russian

revolutionaries who had long been in exile in Switzerland, extremists of this type being the readiest instruments for the German peace intrigue.

A glance at the political situation in Russia is necessary to illuminate these movements. The revolution was the joint achievement of two parties, the "Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" and the duma organization. The former, made up of labor unions, Socialists and radicals of various types, did the active work of inciting the army and the people against the autocracy. The latter, organized nationally thru the zemstvos, comprises men of liberal and democratic convictions, whose aim, however, has been to democratize the government, but not to overturn the entire social order. This party had long been in political insurrection, and, when czarism was overthrown, it had the machinery ready to set up the new government. The present ministry represents a coalition, the "reds" having been persuaded finally to hold in abeyance their demand for the creation of a full Socialist republic, and to co-operate with the duma party for the period of the war. The sudden acquirement of liberty of speech and action, nevertheless, has had an intoxicating effect upon the radicals, who have modified their pledge of loyalty to the government by declaring that they will ignore its authority when, in their judgment, its decrees override popular freedom. Workmen spend so much time in union meetings and agitation for greater privileges that industries have become disorganized, and pacifists insist upon their right to send committees to the front to harangue the troops in behalf of peace at any price. Thus there are at work, promoting the very policy of internal strife and dishonorable peace which cost autocracy its life, elements which helped to overturn that discredited régime. Naturally, German agents are aiding the propaganda.

It is plain, therefore, that there is active in Russia a determined element which would make terms with Prussianism. In this emergency the vital need is that the government be supported in every possible way by the nations which have only a foreign enemy to fight. The United States has given invaluable aid, in the stirring tribute to free Russia offered by President Wilson in his last address to congress, and especially in the prompt recognition of the new régime. But the problem of stabilizing the system created overnight in the midst of war is a stupendous one, and help must be given generously in other forms than words. "Russia," says the premier, "needs administrative, mechanical and engineering experts to assist in the vast work of reorganizing the muddle created by the autocratic régime. We need war materials and railway rolling stock." And she needs money. All these things the United States can supply. And there is no more urgent task before this nation. It should send to the Russian people such a ringing message of encouragement as will rally them in solid support of their democratic government, and such practical aid as will hasten the effective mobilization of the country's resources. The commission which the president has in mind to send cannot be dispatched too soon, nor the arrangements for forwarding supplies too liberal. Germany will spare no effort to break down the democracy on her eastern frontier. Her success might be fatal to the cause of civilization; in any event it would inflict upon her opponents—among them the United States—a defeat more costly than a year's campaigns. To prevent such a catastrophe, every resource of this nation might well be pledged.

OUR FLAG IN THE TRENCHES

April 20, 1917.

HERE is a fact which may be taken as evidence of the weakness or of the strength of democracy, according to the point of view: While earnest folk have been arguing laboriously as to whether this country should send troops to Europe, and while the government of the United States has been making plans for a large army to be employed a year or two hence, if necessary, and issuing urgent appeals for recruits to fill up the depleted ranks of the regular army and the national guard, 100,000 Americans have volunteered to go to the trenches, upon the mere announcement of a private citizen that he hoped to lead such a force. Once the great decision of war was made, the overshadowing national problem became the choice of means for bringing the power of this nation to bear upon the enemy. Plans vital to this end are being worked out with encouraging vigor. There is to be close co-operation with the governments already in the conflict; they are to have all the financial, industrial and economic support which American resources can provide. Because of the character of their needs and the relative unpreparedness of the United States in other respects, these matters are the most urgent. But the military program is, likewise, of vast extent. The regular army and the national guard are to be enlisted to war strength—this will require about 300,000 men—and 500,000 troops in addition are to be raised by selective conscription.

Yet it is the official judgment that none of the total force of more than 1,000,000 shall be sent into action for at least a year. Practical reasons of undoubted weight are cited in support of this policy. It would mean, nevertheless, that for twelve months, perhaps the most critical of the war, America would be represented by its wealth, not by its citizenship; and it might mean that the flag of the world's greatest republic would never reach the battle-front at all. No one, we suppose, has so imperfect an understanding of what the colossal struggle is that he believes the United States could soon add decisive strength to the armies now fighting in France. It must be conceded that we have neither the trained men sufficient to swing the balance, nor the means of transporting them. But the fact remains that the sending of an American force to the front would have a moral effect translatable in military terms. The most serious reverse Prussianism has suffered since the battle of the Marne was the president's declaration to congress a fortnight ago; every word had the power of an armed host. And in the same way, every American soldier in France would be multiplied, because his presence would signify to Germany and the world democracy's sentence of outlawry against autocracy. It is for this reason, and not from visionary belief that America can turn the tide in the field, that leaders in the European democracies hail the suggestion. A French statesman said recently:

The moral factor involved would be more important than the military aid. This war is a struggle of liberal, progressive nations to overthrow a reactionary governmental system. It is of the highest moral importance that the United States, the most progressive Power in the world, should be represented in this new army of crusaders.

"The appearance in Europe of even one American division," says Lord Northcliffe, "would be a sign and portent of America's devotion to the cause of freedom.

France and the world will never forget the day when a division flying the Stars and Stripes shall make its way to the fighting line at Verdun or on the Meuse." Nearer still in sympathy with American ideals and understanding of the American character, Viscount Bryce states clearly the meaning of such a contribution:

Even a small American force would have an immense moral effect. The German government would see less hope than ever of success. The German people, hitherto deceived and kept in the dark by their rulers, would turn the sooner against the military class whose arrogance and cruelty, they would see, have turned the whole world against them.

Finally, American support of the idea has been powerfully expressed by Elihu Root, a citizen whose services as secretary of war and secretary of state will long outlive in memory his disservice in political affairs:

One thing that ought to be done at the earliest possible day is to send an American army, great as it may be or small as it must be, to the battle lines of France and Belgium, so that the whole world will know that America is willing to fight for the principles of American freedom; so that the Stars and Stripes shall float beside the tricolor of France, the meteor flag of England and the banner of the new Russian democracy; so that no one may have any doubt that we are willing to fight with our friends in a cause in which we have so much to gain and so much to lose.

There are, indubitably, objections to the plan. Pro-Germanism, which could exult over the Lusitania massacre, cloaks its hostility under pretended concern lest Americans "die in a European quarrel." Pacifism is aghast at the suggestion that the place to fight for justice is where its enemy seeks to slay it. And narrow-minded patriotism holds that the United States should wait until its territory, as well as its sovereignty, is invaded. But none of these pleas, whether of disloyal interest or sincere delusion, should deter the nation from giving this convincing testimony of its championship of

civilization. Objections on military grounds are more serious, and require careful consideration. "For every trained man sent abroad at this time," says a war department official, "the army will have been deprived of the services of a hundred trained men for two years hence. The vital need is the raising of an immense army and the training of it. We cannot neglect this work for the sake of sentiment." Great Britain, it is pointed out, nearly wrecked herself and her allies by sending her trained troops to the front at the beginning, and depriving herself of their invaluable services for the training of the vast levies that were necessary. The logic of this position is impressive, and if the factors in the problem were as rigid as represented, there could be no question of undermining the nation's resources and impairing its defenses in order to achieve any moral or psychological effect, however far-reaching it might be. But the difficulties had been foreseen and conquered. There was one man in the United States, and only one, who had the vision, the capacity and the power of leadership to make possible the realization in this manner of America's ideals.

Theodore Roosevelt's accomplished plan for the raising of a division to serve in France has been but one item in his extraordinary service to his country during the war. It is but the concrete expression of that ardent spirit of patriotism and humanity that made his voice the voice of true Americanism when the soul of the nation was drugged with false doctrine. Yet it will be remembered of him that during all the months when he was championing, almost alone among our leaders, the cause of national rights and international justice, and preaching the need of defensive preparedness, he was tirelessly organizing a force that might carry the standard of his country to the field of honor. Thus it

was that when the inevitable war began he had ready for enlistment 22,000 picked men, eager to prove their faith in him and in America even unto death. And thus it was that he could formulate a program which meets every objection raised against the proposal of an early expedition. Having personally pledged his loyal service to the president and to all military commanders who should be placed over him, he was able to offer for dispatch within sixty to ninety days, "an infantry division of three three-regiment brigades and one divisional brigade and one divisional brigade of cavalry, together with an artillery brigade, a regiment of engineers, a motorcycle machine-gun regiment, an aero squadron, a signal corps, supply service, etc."—22,000 men selected from 100,000 applicants, every one fit to undergo intensive training in France for the grim work of the trenches. No achievement of sheer leadership ever excelled this. But far more important is the fact that the plan of which this is a part would obviate the dangers justly feared by the military experts.

Colonel Roosevelt urges the raising of 100,000 volunteers—to include his division—"not in the smallest degree as a substitute for, but as the necessary supplement to, the obligatory system." He would, moreover, have the enlistment restricted absolutely to men who would not be taken under the conscription law and could not be expected to enter the regular army or the militia. Three regular army officers for each 1000 men—sixty-six officers in all—would be the trifling extent of his drain upon the experts whose services are vital in the creation of the main armies of the republic. From the day when Colonel Roosevelt's plan was first made known it has been assailed by ignorance and partisanship. Critics sneered that he was "going off half-cocked"—and the answer is the revelation that his force is ready

for mobilization within two months. They charged that he was embarrassing the government—and the answer was his visit to the White House to offer loyal support, and his powerful advocacy of the president's entire policy. They complained that he threatened to disrupt the military program of the general staff—and the answer is a proposal which adds strength to it. Sentiment and strategy alike urge that at the earliest day American patriotism and energy can accomplish it, the flag of this nation shall be in its appointed place on the firing line. For our sins of neglect and self-indulgence we must suffer the reproach of being unable to send it there with a force that would be decisive; but let us send it, if only as a symbol of our faith and high resolve! Let us send it in the spirit which Theodore Roosevelt has so splendidly interpreted:

We owe this to humanity. We owe it to the small nations which have suffered such dreadful wrong from Germany. Most of all, we owe it to ourselves, to our national honor and self-respect. For the sake of our own souls, for the sake of the memories of the great Americans of the past, we must show that we do not intend to make this merely a dollar war. Let us pay with our bodies for our souls' desire. Let us without one hour's unnecessary delay put the American flag on the battle front in this great world war for democracy and civilization and for the reign of justice and fair dealing among the nations of mankind.

A SOLDIER OF DEMOCRACY

April 30, 1917.

IF THE spirits of the dead could return at will to mingle consciously with the living, there are two illustrious figures from the past who would assuredly visit Philadelphia this week and contemplate with serene joy a scene that will link their great day with ours. At the side of Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre, marshal of France, when he receives a sword of honor from the citizens of the republic's birthplace, would be the invisible presence of Benjamin Franklin, the diplomatist and statesman who won the friendship of France for the struggling colonies, and of Marie Joseph Paul du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, the gallant soldier whose service in the cause of American independence cemented the indissoluble bond of sympathy between the two peoples.

Overshadowing reasons of state required that Washington should be the chief goal of the French leader's journey; but sentiment and historic fitness will give to his appearance in Philadelphia a memorable character. This was the home, and it is the burial place, of Franklin, the brilliant envoy whose democracy charmed the most aristocratic court in Christendom; here the very spirit of his political philosophy and civic principles is the ideal of a newspaper descended from his own. It was to this city, the seat of government, that Lafayette hastened to offer his sword to the Revolution, and to receive from the congress, at 19, a commission

as major general in the Continental army. And it was the torch of liberty lighted at the old State House that was to set the soul of France aflame and fit her for the great mission she is now consummating as the champion of law, justice and democracy. It is inspiring to this newspaper, descendant of that which expressed the genius of Franklin and chronicled the founding of the nation, to have a part in offering the city's tribute to the most distinguished citizen of our sister republic. But every Philadelphian, every American, will feel that the greater honor is conferred upon those who give. For this man who comes to us is more than a soldier, more than a great national leader; in that modest, massive, indomitable personality we shall see France. Too many Americans have pictured her as a devotee of careless frivolity and luxury and self-indulgence, a graceful, coquetting, wholly adorable yet inconsequent figure among the nations. They know now that the conception which saw France in the boulevards and race tracks, in tinsel gayety and alluring extravagance, in political irresponsibility and philosophical skepticism, was an utter distortion. They know that France is to be found in her sturdy, industrious, resolute citizenship; that her passion is a devoted patriotism and humanity; that her spirit is sternly inflexible and her soul unconquerable.

It is of these qualities that Joffre is the product and personification. He represents the France of serene courage, of heroic service, of dauntless sacrifice. Let pacifism take what comfort it may from the fact that the world recognizes in a soldier the symbol of a great nation's faith and idealism. But Joffre is more than the embodiment of France; he is a reflection of democracy itself. His career, spanning the gulf between obscurity and world-wide honor, exemplifies the power of the indestructible idea that underlies that principle. And, like

that of many other leaders who have risen from the people, it is almost colorless in its simplicity.

The marshal of France was born in January, 1852, in Rivesalte, a mountain village in the most remote corner of France, near the Mediterranean end of the Pyrenees. Some of his ancestors were Spanish—the name was originally Gouffre—and he delights, when he visits the old home, to chat in the ancient Catalan language. The son of a cooper—as was Ney, his illustrious predecessor—and the third of eleven children, his prospects in life were not brilliant. Nor did he show any of the signs of military genius; the man destined to command millions of troops in the bloodiest war in history is remembered as a youth singularly gentle, retiring and sweet-tempered. Yet there was in him some instinct which led him to break loose from his environment. At 15 he competed for a place in the national training school for artillery officers, and passed fourteenth among 132 applicants. It is odd to record that his one failure was in German. More significant was his passion for mathematics, which was characteristic also of Napoleon and Grant and Lee. He commanded a battery at the siege of Paris in 1870, and after the war helped to reconstruct the fortifications, beginning a long and useful career as a military engineer. Promotion was steady, but slow. Serving in Indo-China, Madagascar, Formosa, Africa and France, he rose to be major in 1889, lieutenant colonel in 1894, colonel in 1897, brigadier in 1901, and general of division, the highest peace rank, in 1906. Three years later he was made a member of the general staff, and in 1911 was made its vice president, in supreme command of the French armies in peace and war, his title, upon the outbreak of hostilities, to be generalissimo. Forty-four years of service, thirteen campaigns and a record of steady but not dramatic professional

successes—this was the history of the new commander-in-chief of the republic's forces. The French were inclined to be impatient over the appointment; Joffre had none of the striking fame and popularity of such dazzling leaders as Pau and Castelnau. But those men themselves recognized that what the country needed was precisely the genius for organization, the deep patriotism and the zeal for democracy which animated the almost unknown Joffre.

The world knows that he saved France from Germany at the battle of the Marne; but a greater achievement was that he saved France from herself, during the three years preceding the war. When Joffre took command, in 1911, the nation was sunk in lethargy and pessimism and sinking toward degeneracy. The people distrusted their political leaders, the army, even themselves. They were terrorized by Germany, yet lacked the spirit to prepare for defense. They had permitted their foreign minister to be dismissed at the demand of Berlin. A sense of national impotence and impending disaster produced fitful outbursts of civil strife and anarchy. Alcoholism was spreading, race suicide was becoming a peril; a craven spirit of pacifism pervaded the cities, while appeals to patriotism were met by ugly sneers; sabotage developed to a dangerous extreme, and syndicalism threatened to disrupt the social order. Statesmen as courageous and far-seeing as Joffre by stupendous effort aroused the people at last to a sense of national self-respect and duty, but none of them accomplished more for the country than he did by re-creating the army of France and breathing into it a living soul. It was due to his administration that evils of laxity and political favoritism were stamped out, every department reorganized, the whole structure of national defense solidified, and it was the invisible force

of his personality, his justice and his tireless passion for efficiency that swiftly eliminated the distrust between the nation and its army, and in less than forty months welded them into that magnificent force against which the mighty German machine, after preparation of forty years, could not prevail. Of his career as commander-in-chief in the war it is needless to speak. His great work came to an end, as the work of all men must. But he held the supreme post longer than any leader of France's allies or enemies; he saw Sir John French and Von Moltke and Von Falkenhayn displaced. This son of a humble cooper had a Belgian king and a British field marshal as his aides, and dominated for two years and four months a 400-mile battle-front in the most colossal conflict in human history. His rewards have been worthy of his service. He has the devoted admiration of his countrymen and imperishable renown throughout the world—and a title which does not yield in glory to that of the president of the republic. To be a marshal of France was always a brilliant honor, but not before in centuries has it been unique. Francis I had two, Henry III had four, Louis XIV had twenty. The rank had long lapsed when Napoleon revived it to dazzle the imagination and stimulate the ardor of his leaders, and he conferred the coveted baton lavishly. But its glories were dimmed in 1870 by the failure of Bazaine and the mediocrity of other holders, and flickered out with the second empire. Altho the title was retained in the law of 1873, the conditions under which it might be conferred were not formally settled, and the republic was nearly half a century old when it revived the supreme honor as the only fit decoration for the national savior. Field marshals there are on every front and in every capital of Europe. But there is only one marshal of France, and that is the gentle, unassuming, sweet-tem-

pered, white-haired man from whose brain leaped the thunderbolt attacks that shattered German hopes at the Marne.

Philadelphians will see a physically big man; a figure benignant in appearance; suggesting health and normality rather than commanding genius or overpowering force. They will see a man of kindly habit and tranquil mien, with nothing to suggest the relentless will needed to devise and enforce decisions which mean life and death to millions, nothing to suggest the swaggering arrogance of militarism. And what they see will be the real Joffre, as real as that silent, remote figure which for two years directed the battle of civilization, decreeing death to vast numbers of his beloved countrymen in order that their nation and its ideals might live. For the holder of the proudest title in Europe is a product of democracy, and to that principle his simple soul pays instinctive fidelity. Napoleon gave to his glittering marshals peerages, even royal rank. Bernadotte he raised to the throne of Sweden; Murat he made king of Naples; Junot became duke of Abrantes; Massena, duke of Rivoli and prince of Essling; Soult, duke of Dalmatia; Lannes, duke of Montebello; Ney, duke of Elchingen and prince of the Moskowa. But if Joffre shares one title with them, there is another which he would not exchange for all the others. To the army of the republic he is "Papa" Joffre—not the commander-in-chief alone, but the friend, the trusted and high-minded and tender-hearted countryman of every *poilu*. Imperial France could make kings, but it could not make citizens like this.

It is recorded that during the terrible days of the retreat, when the tide of invasion was rolling remorselessly nearer and nearer to the capital, when the government had been removed to Bordeaux and all

France was grimly facing the possibility of overwhelming disaster, there was one place where tranquillity reigned. In Rivesalte the village folk read the disquieting bulletins gravely, yet without fear. "It will be well," they said. "We have our Joffre." And then came the change—the sudden stiffening of the line, the thrilling order of the commander-in-chief, the swift onslaughts, the sweeping back of the invaders to take refuge in the trenches where they were to be held two years. "You see," said the Rivesalte folk, "we still have our Joffre." And that evening they celebrated. They did not parade or shout or exult; but they came in little groups, men and women and children, and they laid flowers on the doorstep of the house where their Joffre had lived, until the threshold was banked high with the fragrant testimonial of love to a good neighbor and a good citizen.

We cannot hope to equal the simple and gracious sentiment of that spontaneous act; our tribute must be more impersonal, more formal. Yet the Philadelphians who join in it may feel, and we think they would like the recipient to feel, that there goes with this jeweled emblem of military glory a proffer of admiration and love for a dauntless people, whose spirit is personified in the presence of Joseph Joffre, marshal of France and soldier of freedom.

THE SUBMARINE PERIL

May 3, 1917.

A RESPONSIBLE European statesman a few days ago made the public assertion, "We have won the war." It was suggestive that he stated this as an accomplished fact, and not in the customary form of a prospect of the future. Still more surprising is the circumstance that the speaker was vice chancellor of the German empire, the defeat of which is commonly believed to have been made infallible by the addition of the great power of the United States to the opposing coalition. It was a strangely confident estimate to make, in view of the terrific battering which Germany is receiving on the western front and the sullen restlessness of some of her populace. But it was based upon a theory which, if sound, would make temporary military reverses and domestic discontent relatively unimportant. Blockaded, suffering sharp economic privation, her armies forced to retreat to avert disaster and then compelled to fight desperately to hold the new line, Germany still boasts, "We have won the war." The meaning is that she has won by pursuing relentlessly a policy of piracy and murder what she could not win by legitimate warfare. The immorality and inhumanity of the ruthless submarine campaign are subjects that need no further discussion. The vital question is, what basis is there for the German boast? How much of the vice chancellor's statement was bluff, designed to encourage the sorely tried subjects of autocracy and turn their

gaze from the slaughter of the battlefields, and how much of it was sinister truth? Can the submarine menace be overcome, and if so, how? These are matters worth examining, especially because it is becoming clearer day by day that only the United States can turn the scale against the stealthy assassin of the seas. Just as truly as if submarines were sinking American ships off Sandy Hook or the Delaware capes, their operations are threatening the interests and the safety of this country.

Study of the facts will convince any impartial observer that the danger is far more serious than most persons had foreseen. The announcement that after January 31 last all ships would be attacked on sight, regardless of their ownership or destination or the safety of their occupants, created less a sense of alarm than of loathing for the government which would resort to such barbarism. Germany had so long been sinking vessels in defiance of the rules of law and the requirements of humanity that the avowal of systematic criminality seemed important chiefly because it meant the involvement of the United States in the war. This optimistic feeling was increased by the confident statements of the British and French admiralties that adequate provision had been made to meet the long-threatened move. But for three months piracy has been eating steadily and remorselessly into the shipping of both the Allies and the neutral nations, no conclusive solution to the problem has been found, and at last the candid admission is made that unless there is devised a counteracting device which is swift and sure, Great Britain and France will face privation, if not famine, and a serious weakening of their military capacity. And obviously such a calamity would mean dire peril to the United States. It will be enlightening to glance at the concrete results of

the campaign of ruthlessness, and no less interesting to trace the psychological effects upon the nations concerned, as revealed in the carefully phrased official comments.

The German government had planned to sink 1,000,000 tons of enemy and neutral shipping a month. On February 19 the vice chancellor, giving no figures, said the campaign was "certain of success," while Vice Admiral Capelle said, "the results have surpassed expectations." The North sea, he added, had been virtually cleared of shipping, neutral vessels being held in port; and "not even one U-boat" had been lost. "Complete realization" of the plan was assured. A week later the chancellor gave a similar report. "The results thus far have been very satisfactory," said Foreign Minister Zimmermann on March 9. An official statement of March 11 declared that losses were small, while the increase in the number of submarines was "continuous and uninterrupted." At the end of March the navy chief repeated that the number of U-boats destroyed was lower than had been expected, while in February, he declared, they had sunk 781,500 tons of shipping. It was the opinion, nevertheless, of Captain Persius, a naval expert, that hope of bringing Great Britain to starvation was vain, because the people could live on their reserve supplies until July, when new crops would be available. What he looked for was that the loss of 500,000 tons of shipping a month would bring peace by convincing England that continuance of the war was unprofitable. On April 27 the report was that "the reduction of tonnage at the disposal of hostile nations is taking place with mathematical certainty," while only six submarines had been lost in two months. The campaign, it was said, had "hit a vital nerve of the enemy." Last Saturday it was announced that in February and March alone 1,600,000

tons of shipping had been destroyed, 1,000,000 of it British. And it was then that the vice chancellor said: "If we remain true to ourselves, keep calm, maintain our nerve and internal unity, we have won the war."

No less striking than the optimism in Germany was the scornful confidence among the Allies. It was announced that at the beginning they were "fully prepared" for the onslaught, Britain alone having a fleet of 4000 submarine chasers in service. "More lives will be lost," said a French expert, "heavier material losses will be suffered, but the campaign cannot win the war." Lord Beresford, on February 13, said 4,000,000 tons had been lost since the beginning of the war, but 3,000,000 tons had been replaced. The situation, he said, was serious, but there was "not the slightest reason for panic," and the danger would be "under control within six weeks." The admiralty expressed "the utmost confidence" of dealing with the problem.

Official figures showed the sinking of 234,696 tons, February 1-18, an average of 10,900 a day. At this rate it would take three years to destroy the British merchant marine, even if no new ships were built. The Germans were "far behind their schedule." On March 6 the official report said the February losses total 460,000 tons. While there had been 18,000 arrivals and departures from British ports, only 123 British vessels had been sunk. The German campaign had "failed by 50 per cent." The British government took neutral correspondents on a tour of the chief ports, in order to demonstrate that shipping was almost normal and the supplies of food enormous. An official review of the first six weeks, issued March 14, said losses were being "steadily reduced," and that it would take a year to destroy half of Britain's shipping. "We have practically ceased to worry about submarines," said a dock superintendent.

There were those, however, who early recognized the possibilities of peril. Sir Edward Carson, head of the admiralty, said on February 21 that the situation was "grave," and the government's drastic order limiting imports, issued in March, gave a hint of the condition. The first information given by the Balfour mission was that the vital needs of the Allies were "ships and food, in ever-increasing quantities." Last week officials began to tell the grim truth. Lord Devonport, the food controller, said:

Our shipping is being depleted every day in large volume, and altho our existence depends thereupon, it is a wasting security. Unless we exercise self-denial in the consumption of bread, we shall not get thru to next harvest without severe privation and all that that implies.

The report of April 25 sent a thrill of alarm thru the country. It showed shipping arrivals and departures reduced to 5200 for the week, and the sinking of forty ships of more than 1600 tons each—the greatest loss suffered since the campaign began. "We have not yet found a way of dealing with the submarines so as to remove the danger of their being an enormously important factor in determining the outcome of the war," announced the president of the board of trade. "The losses are appalling," said Lord Beresford on Tuesday. The ominous meaning of these facts for the Allies and for the United States is obvious—unless the submarine menace can be overcome by destruction of the craft, or the losses of shipping counteracted by American efforts, the campaign of lawlessness and murder will win. President Wilson stated the sober truth in his proclamation of April 15:

We must supply ships by the hundreds to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there. The food and the war supplies

must be carried across the seas no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom. The places of those that go down must be supplied, and supplied at once.

Ships and food—these alone can avert disaster. To meet the former need, American ingenuity is applying the principle of standardization that made Henry Ford famous. Major General Goethals, for the government, is directing the establishment of a shipyard system that will turn out 320,000 tons of shipping a month. Within a few weeks the keels of the first ten vessels will be laid, and when the plants are working at full capacity one 3000-ton ship will be launched every twenty-four hours. These craft will be of wood, all of identically the same dimensions and design; each will have a cargo capacity of 5000 tons. The theory is that by sheer numbers the food-carrying fleet will baffle the efforts of the submarines to prevent the supplying of our allies with food and war materials. The plan is magnificent in conception and likely to succeed—if France and Britain can hold out for six months longer. The German hope is that they cannot do so. "The wooden ships which the United States intends to build to save England," sneers the imperial vice chancellor, "will come into use only when there is nothing more for them to save." He does not mention, of course, another factor—the circumstance that Germany is far worse off than her enemies. But to this grim posture the war has come—hunger will decide, and upon the United States rests the responsibility of determining the result. What a ghastly commentary it would be upon our policy of inaction and unpreparedness if our feverish efforts were too late!

SEND ROOSEVELT TO FRANCE!

May 7, 1917.

THE general staff has reluctantly approved the sending of at least a division of American troops to France without unnecessary delay. Only an exceptionally potent influence could induce this powerful body thus to reverse its judgment. The change was due to the urgent representations of the French and British envoys. The "higher command" of the United States army comprises a small group of military experts, whose function is to formulate war plans, including the raising of armies and the disposition of forces for defensive or offensive action. Their work is of a nature highly professional and technical. They deal with human beings as abstract figures in mathematical problems. They make abstruse calculations in which the resources of the nation and the lives of its citizens are factors to be weighed and measured with cold detachment as so much material force and charted in blue prints according to the rigid requirements of strategy. These men know the intricate details and far-reaching possibilities of modern warfare only by study of lifeless reports; they have had no actual experience with its vast and novel developments. Yet in their field of work—which is important, altho restricted—they are undoubtedly conscientious and able. Their confidence in their own judgment is natural, but they showed wisdom in yielding to the united recommendation of the Allied missions. Its source could not fail to make an impression. Back

of the appeal were Balfour, a statesman of ripe experience who has "a sound grip on the fundamentals of naval and military policy"; Viviani, prime minister of France during the period of her most terrific trial and still a strong leader in the republic; trained experts in every branch of warfare, and, finally, Marshal Joffre, the premier soldier of Europe and one of the great military figures of all time, who has commanded in battle more troops than our general staff has ever had the audacity to mobilize on paper.

The conflict of opinion that existed at first is readily to be explained—the two groups have been engaged upon different problems, have dealt with different circumstances, have had experience with different needs. The general staff has faced the necessary task of creating an army where none existed, of drawing plans on paper for a great, new machine; and they have put into that work all the knowledge they have of the technical requirements of numbers, equipment, training, and so on. To their minds an army is so many units—brigades, divisions, corps—with mathematically computed supplies of guns, rifles, aeroplanes, food. On these concrete matters the European visitors are perhaps not less adept; but they also take into account psychology, national sentiment, human emotions—impalpable forces to which the professional mind of the strictly technical expert is impervious, yet which exert a tremendous influence in the struggle of nations against nations. The French and British leaders know—none better—how vital to victory are money and guns and ammunition and transport and masses of men; but during nearly three years of desperate conflict they have learned how potent a thing is moral force, the element of dramatic and sentimental appeal. They know that the day upon which an American detachment landed on British or French soil, on its way to the front, would

mark a strengthening of the Allied cause greater than that to be derived from the capture of a dozen towns and villages.

No recent news from Washington has met heartier approval than the announcement that an American army, if a relatively small one, will be dispatched to France as soon as transport can be arranged. The response shows that overwhelming sentiment for the enterprise had already crystallized. And equally manifest is the growing strength of the demand that the first detachment shall include the division enrolled by Theodore Roosevelt and ready for mobilization at thirty days' notice.

Naturally, the project is urged by his political supporters and those who stood by him in his two-year campaign to arouse the spirit of Americanism. But it is indorsed also by the majority of his political opponents and by millions of others. The opposition is numerically small but disproportionately powerful. It includes malignant partisan enemies, who see in every public act of Roosevelt a political maneuver. Composite types of these are found in the congressmen whose vision does not extend beyond the boundaries of their districts; in state machine bosses and hidebound administration politicians. The general staff is opposed to recognition of Colonel Roosevelt, for reasons more creditable but hardly more conclusive. He does not fit into their blue-print plans, any more than did the sending of early assistance to the French. They want to wait a year, and then dispatch a force so large that its weight would be decisive. According to their system of computation, a Roosevelt division of 20,000 sent now would amount to just one-fiftieth of the 1,000,000 they plan to send twelve months hence—an insignificant and valueless contribution! It is a matter of common knowledge that the Allied envoys, while necessarily making their request in general terms,

believe that the sending of Colonel Roosevelt with the first division would be of incalculable benefit. But the members of the general staff are not impressed, because the plans they have worked out with rule and compass and adding-machine do not disclose moral influence as a factor in military operations. To the opposition of the staff must be added that of President Wilson.

The demand for enlistment of the Roosevelt division has gained such momentum that it could not be kept out of the debates in congress, where his enemies checked it only by resort to the false charge that it was interfering with conscription. Yet in the senate the plan was supported by every Republican except the discredited La Follette, and by many Democrats. It is now in conference, and is not likely to be adopted; but the issue will be fought out again in both houses. If political enmity is to defeat the demand of the American people and the request of their Allies, it is well that the foreign representatives should be here to observe how the deplorable result is achieved, how antagonistic the action is to the sentiment of the nation. For they know that if there would be inspirational and practical aid in the mere addition of a small American force to the millions already at the front, its influence would be vastly multiplied by the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, former president of the United States, the greatest civic figure in the world today, the foremost exponent of democracy; who was first among American leaders to interpret the true significance of the war and champion the principles for which the Allies fight.

They know what it would mean to hard-pressed Britain and bleeding France to see this champion of human liberty leading thru the streets of their capitals the vanguard of America's legions; what it would mean to Belgium, whose cause he so valiantly espoused; what

it would mean to uncertain Italy and the mangled peoples of the Balkans. They know what grim notice it would convey to the deluded Germans and the wearied Austrians and the restive Hungarians that the uttermost resources of this mighty nation are pledged to the overthrow of militarism. They know what a thrill of enthusiasm it would send along the trenches, where for nearly three years men have fought and died while waiting vainly for a sign that the great republic would come to the defense of democracy. Above all, they know what magic would be wrought in Russia, where folly and fanaticism threaten to drive the nation into anarchy and a shameful peace, yet where every moujik knows the name of the great advocate of freedom and justice. And they know how the will of America would be strengthened and her spirit uplifted by the spectacle of her foremost private citizen, the veritable human symbol and expression of this people's ideals, leading his countrymen to the battle-front of liberty. The European envoys could not with propriety suggest the sending of any particular person. But never did diplomats more clearly disclose their desires than these men did by urging that "even a division" of American troops be sent to the firing line forthwith. The message they brought was this: For the sake of France and Belgium, for the sake of civilization, for the sake of America's honor and her soul, send troops, send them now, and send with them the one man who before the whole world stands as the exemplar of virile democracy.

WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO US

May 11, 1917.

FROM the swift current of the war news we snatch out for examination two fragments of exclamatory driftwood, both of them curiously illustrative of American habits of thought:

HARTFORD, Conn., May 4.—“Unless the United States marshals all its resources, both military and industrial, and does it immediately, there is a great probability that we shall see German troops in this country within a year,” said Judge Burpee, chairman of the state military emergency board, on his return from the conferences of the national council of defense at Washington.

NEW YORK, May 5.—William L. Saunders, chairman of the naval consulting board, said today that a solution had been found for the submarine problem, and that the menace would soon be removed.

We cite these opinions—the accuracy of both of which has been questioned—chiefly to suggest that the Connecticut alarmist seems to us to have contributed the more valuable estimate. For, even if an invention to paralyze the submarine has been found, it could not be put in operation for months, while the war might be lost in the next hundred days; a public sense of the possibility of a German invasion, on the other hand, would be wholesome. The truth is that to the vast majority of Americans the conflict in which their country is engaged is still remote. They are not ignorant of what it may mean to them, yet they choose not to face the facts. They refuse to think in terms of war, or to recognize war as an actuality.

The attitude is due in part to American optimism and self-confidence, but the failing is a common one. Paris did not take the German irruption seriously until the French government had moved to Bordeaux. As for the British, they made "Business as usual" their stolid slogan, when their army was being cut to pieces, and indignantly resisted curtailment of their cherished "personal liberties" even while the shadow of irremediable disaster was creeping upon them. So it is here. The aggressions and crimes of Germany inevitably produced in the American mind a determination to fight for national sovereignty; but it seems to be outside the nature of a democratic, prosperous, self-centered people to visualize what war means until the truth is forced upon it by actual demonstration. Thus when President Wilson, in his fine declaration of the country's purpose, said that there might be "many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us," these words were accepted as mere oratorical flourishes, a not unpleasant touch of the somber in a situation of dramatic interest. The chorus of praise from the Allies for America's idealism, and the flattering estimates of America's power, were exhilarating enough to overcome any sense of impending peril or privation. The prompt creation of a colossal war loan raised confidence still higher, and autocracy was pictured as fleeing in disorder from the devastating assault of America's wealth. Yet every one knows that seven times \$7,000,000,000 would not defeat Germany if that financial power could not be translated in terms of supplies, and those supplies delivered. The United States navy is justly celebrated, but it obviously cannot do what the fleets of Britain and France have been powerless to accomplish. The American imagination is stirred by plans for an army of 1,000,000 a year

hence, and of 5,000,000 in three years; meanwhile, the war may be decided in three or four months.

In a word, this country is up against the most gigantic task that ever faced a nation, and lacks virtually everything except raw resources, the development of which must consume time; and it must pay for its unreadiness by sacrifices of blood and treasure which no man can compute. Let us face the situation squarely. And first of all, let us examine the popular theory that, because Germany's defeat is assured, the United States need contribute nothing except money and "moral force." A general survey shows that Germany is beaten on land, but at sea has a chance of winning thru—victory by foul means, but victory, nevertheless. No "indictment by the civilized world," no "crack in the Hindenburg line," would avail anything against submarine successes that paralyzed Britain or France or both of them.

Now a glance at the main battle-fronts—what is their promise of a war in which America will command victory without effort? In Mesopotamia, the Turks are undeniably defeated, and the brilliant campaign that won Bagdad has been pushed northward with success. But these gains will become of real value only in the event of an Allied victory in Europe. A British Bagdad by no means balances a German Antwerp. The Macedonia line remains inert and uninspiring. Not only are there no signs of a move against the Teuton-Bulgar forces in Servia and Rumania, but it is possible that transport losses will imperil the Allied line and compel withdrawal of the entire Balkan expedition. Italy has done nothing for many months, and is unlikely to accomplish much this year. The government is dependent upon the United States for money and food, and faces a sullen public opinion. From Russia no substantial aid can be expected; the betrayal of a separate peace, thru

the fatuous maneuvers of the scatter-brained fanatics now dominating the provisional régime, is a possibility not remote. There remains the western front, where the spring offensive has been checked—temporarily at least—by the Hindenburg defense. Great battles rage there almost continuously, and for the most part with French and British gains. But the most hopeful forecast does not see the invaders driven this summer further back than the Meuse—and beyond that is the Rhine line of fortifications. Here, again, the submarine factor intrudes—time is not now fighting for the Allies, but against them.

On the whole, nevertheless, the military situation is promising. It is at sea that real peril looms. All the navies of the world are powerless against the submarine when it is employed lawlessly, murderously and remorselessly. Ships and food the Allies must have if they are to live and fight; ships and food the submarine is destroying with results that are admitted to be "appalling." Already France and Britain are alarmed by the diminishing flow of supplies—and submarines are being launched more rapidly than they are being sunk. Germany and her allies are suffering also, of course, but that they can be starved into surrender before distress in France and Britain becomes acute is unlikely. Herbert C. Hoover, who knows European food conditions better than any other living man, says Germany can fight for two years longer. The people are groaning under punishment, but still are hypnotized by autocracy. "There will be no revolution," is the repeated warning of former Ambassador Gerard, who knows the infatuation and docility of the German mind. And there are the submarines and Russia's chaos to encourage the nation's hopes.

What is the one unavoidable conclusion from all these facts—Great Britain overtaxed, France heroically bleeding to death, Italy feeble and uncertain, Russia for the present worse than useless? It is, we think, that if this war is to be won it must be won by the United States; and that it will not be won by beautiful invocations to democracy and liberty, by magnificent loans or dazzling plans for action a year hence, but only by stern, unremitting work on the part of an efficient government and a united people, by privation and sacrifice and woe grimly endured.

For what is it that we must do, we well-fed, comfortably housed people, by whom peace and security and abundance have come to be regarded as privileges never to be interrupted? We must take from our stores of food products, already insufficient to meet the imperious demands of our luxurious standard of living, and help to feed the millions of our allies who have fought so long the fight that has become ours. We must send shiploads of food to sea, while our own markets clamor for it and while we feel ourselves the pinch of scarcity. To do this we must develop our agricultural resources with unheard-of energy, and must bring our habits of living under hard discipline. We must join in the ceaseless hunt for the sea assassins, which means that warships will be lost and brave men slain. We must build millions of tons of shipping, even tho it be necessary to disrupt a dozen industries to do it. We must supply to our allies an unending stream of money, munitions, coal, steel, oil, railway supplies—not, as before, at their risk, but at our own. And we must, beginning forthwith and continuing indefinitely, create and send thru the death zone to the battle-front armies of infantrymen, of artillerymen, of engineers, of aviators, of surgeons, with all the vast equipment they will need. The United States,

in short, must take upon itself at once most of the financial and economic burden of the greatest war in history, and at the same time prepare to assume also the chief military burden—to attain commanding power in a science which has become the most deadly and exacting known to mankind.

That we shall win is certain. To doubt that would be to doubt right and justice and eternal truth, to discard our faith in humanity and its high destiny. We shall win because we must; because failure would destroy the ideals of law and honor among nations and enslave the world to brute force; because defeat would mean a civilization Prussianized and democracy doomed. No higher cause ever summoned a nation, none was ever more worthy of the last full measure of a people's devotion. That the men and women of America will pass thru the ordeal triumphantly is sure. But they will meet it with greater strength and emerge from it the sooner if they recognize now the magnitude of the task they have undertaken, and dedicate themselves from the beginning to its faithful performance, however severe the trial of their fortitude may be.

“DARKEST RUSSIA”

May 14, 1917.

ALTHO the French revolution was one of the epochal events in the history of human freedom, its name always brings first to mind, not the liberation which glorified it, but the Terror which degraded it. In like manner, it would seem, the Russian revolution is to have a dual fame—as the rising of a people against despotism, and as an exhibition of national incompetence more deplorable than the bloodiest irruption of violence. Even in the worst excesses of the tumbrel and the guillotine there was a tragic dignity, but the spectacle in Russia today is one from which democracy might well turn in humiliation. Liberty in a burst of sanguinary fury over ancient wrongs may still bear the semblance of an enraged goddess; Liberty drooling and grimacing in a clown's cap and bells is of all sights the most lamentable. Because every move in the descent of the mighty Russian mass toward anarchy means a heavier burden upon the United States and greater sacrifices for this nation, it is well that Americans should understand how their hopes have been destroyed and how little a separate peace between Russia and Germany would add to the peril which we face at this moment.

The overthrow of czarism and its Prussian support was the joint work of intelligent liberalism and fanatical radicalism. The former was represented by the duma, which provided the statesmanship, and the latter by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which pro-

vided the force by its influence with organized labor and the army and all the elements of Socialism. The duma appointed a ministry to exercise the powers of a provisional government pending the framing of a new constitution by an assembly to be elected by the people. The radicals, clinging to their ideal of establishing a completely socialized state, have declined to participate in this arrangement, but have given their support to the temporary régime—a support which has become domination. The sudden liberation of a nation of 170,000,000 who had been in political and economic slavery to autocracy inevitably created problems of the greatest complexity, and the difficulties were immeasurably increased by the country's involvement in war. All the old forms had been swept away in the tempest of the revolution, and those which were improvised were wholly inadequate to withstand dissension. There began almost immediately a contest between the temporary government—which had ample power theoretically but lacked the means of enforcing its decrees—and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which declared itself the sole author of the revolution and the sole guardian of popular rights and usurped the functions of a sort of super-government, possessing the power to dictate but acknowledging no responsibility. The Council—as we shall call it for the sake of brevity—found it easy to obtain mastery. The revolution had produced among the teeming millions of Russia a form of intoxication. Simple-minded, visionary and for the most part illiterate, the people translated the magic word freedom in the most primitive and personal terms. To them it meant that every peasant was instantly to become a land-owner; that the worker was to be his own employer; that the soldier was emancipated from compulsory military service and even from the restraints of discipline.

Thus it was that no sooner had the absolutism of the Romanoffs collapsed than the absolutism of an unintelligent populace was erected in its place. All over the country little republics were set up, landlords were solemnly abolished and the delighted peasants divided up the lands. Industries vital to the economic life of the nation and to the prosecution of the war were paralyzed, while the workers, manipulated by adroit leaders, undertook to settle domestic and foreign policies by parades and mass meetings. And the army, under the same inspiration, was utterly disorganized. “We, the people of England,” began the famous proclamation of the three tailors of Tooley street. With equal solemnity, and with very little more warrant, this irresponsible Council has arrogated to itself the right to speak for Russia. Its sway is due, first, to the fact that it controls the politics of the industrial centers, which gives it a compact force; it represents not more than 15 per cent of the population, but its organization is concentrated where it is most effective, while the peasantry, four-fifths of the population, is incapable of united action. But by far the more important source of the Council’s power lies in the fact that the workers control the industries and railroads—munitions and transportation, the two vital necessities of a nation at war. These circumstances explain the extraordinary efforts of the provisional government to conciliate the Council, which again and again has compelled the real authority in Russia to take action palpably against the national interest. It is interesting to trace the successive assumptions of this group of zealots, whose principles range from conservative Socialism to extravagant syndicalism and downright anarchy, down to the present open campaign for a treacherous peace with Germany.

It first appeared in the news on March 20, five days after the czar's abdication, in a plausible report showing that rumors of its interference in the government were "baseless." But only four days later the organized radicals began to show their teeth. The Council, hearing that the Romanoffs were to be permitted to leave the country, prepared to order troops to prevent the move. A member explained, with grim humor:

Defying the provisional government? Far from doing that, we are part of it, representing the great mass not otherwise represented. The government asks our advice—and sometimes, as in this case, we volunteer it!

The conflict became sharper early in April, when the Council announced that it was its "prerogative to ignore governmental authority when in its opinion such authority overrides popular freedom"—as interpreted by the Council. "We let the bourgeois classes form the government," boasted a leader, "because we knew we could count upon the proletariat." On April 16 the Council formally gave modified approval to the program of the government, but called upon the "revolutionary democracy" to be ready "vigorously to suppress any attempt by the government to elude the control of democracy." A note by the provisional government to the Allies, renewing its oft-made pledges to stand firmly by Russia's treaty engagements, precipitated an open clash on May 3. The Council ruled that the pledge of "war to a victorious conclusion" was offensive to the proletariat, and that the government should immediately withdraw the note and declare for peace "without annexations or indemnities"—which is the formula Germany is dangling before Russia thru her serviceable Socialist lackeys of kaiserism. When this conflict had been compromised by a government "explanation," the Council—which, it is to be remembered, has no legal authority

whatever—announced the establishment of its own "department of international relations" and actually compelled the government to agree that the body's cable messages should be sent at state expense! These astonishing maneuvers have resulted, of course, in conditions approaching anarchy. The responsible government is browbeaten and terrorized by a group of radicals backed by workers and soldiers, who are heedless of anything but the expansion of their new-found personal liberty. In the absence of a parliament, the irresponsible Council seeks to conduct the affairs of state by means of parades, demonstrations and mass-meeting resolutions, inciting the workers to constantly renewed demands and arbitrarily dictating domestic and foreign policies. But the most shocking result has been the disorganization of the army facing an enemy intrenched deep on Russian soil. The revolution, as already noted, shook the military establishment to its center, and for several days the troops, altho showing no tendency to actual mutiny, were largely out of control. The Council sent emissaries to the front to explain that the upheaval did not mean that military service was abolished; but, when the first excitement had been quelled, it deliberately undertook to "democratize" the army by encouraging a program which would infallibly disrupt the armed forces of the nation. This news dispatch of April 20 will illustrate:

General Gurko, commander on the western front, has issued a proclamation to the soldiers declaring that the election, arrest and dismissal of officers by soldiers' committees is an undesirable practice and threatens serious consequences.

Three days later the minister of war issued a "frank appeal" to the soldiers urging them not to leave the front without permission. The troops were deserting in shoals—not from motives of treason, but because they had heard that lands were being distributed, and that

men not at their homes would miss the allotment. The simple-minded peasants could not be restrained by their officers, but they always promised to come back as soon as they had got their land. Even as late as April 30 an official of the war office cheerfully admitted that "soldiers are still going home and elsewhere without leave," but he added quaintly, "there is not the slightest danger that the armies at the front will be weakened." It was in the face of these conditions that our sapient state department gravely assured us that there was no danger of a separate peace, while Ambassador Francis was "pained and provoked" by the suggestion that Russia might not keep faith with her allies.

The truth is, of course, that for all practical purposes a separate peace between Russia and Germany is in effect. While desultory fighting may be resumed, it would be folly to expect any offensive by the Russian army. It is an undisciplined mass, and Napoleon himself could not put into its disintegrated elements the unity and enthusiasm without which a strong operation is impossible. And back of it is a government which has only the semblance of power, its existence dependent from day to day upon the whims of an organization of zealots who are incapable of patriotism and whose conception of democracy is a travesty upon the name.

RUSSIA'S CHAOS

May 15, 1917.

IT IS a poor illustration that can't be used on both sides of an argument, so we quote once more Kipling's acrid characterization: "Let it be clearly understood that the Russian is a delightful person till he tucks in his shirt. As an Oriental he is charming. It is only when he insists upon being treated as the most easterly of western peoples instead of the most westerly of easterns that he becomes a racial anomaly extremely difficult to handle." Contemplating the workmanlike overthrow of czarism, we cited this remark as singularly superficial and unjust. We must confess, however, that the Muscovite has not tucked in the badge of his Orientalism in a manner to satisfy the requirements of enlightened civilization. And, besides presenting an inappropriate figure in the highways of the world, he is obstructing traffic to a threatening degree. We discussed yesterday the extraordinary political situation which has paralyzed the power of Russia as a member of the alliance waging war to curb German autocracy. The provisional government, appointed by the duma to administer affairs until a new constitution can be framed by representatives of the nation, has the most precarious hold on power. Its members, including the ablest leaders of liberal thought, pledged themselves from the beginning to faithful fulfillment of the nation's engagements with the Allies, because it is obvious that the security and progress of Russia depend upon the breaking of

Prussian militarism. But against this and virtually every other rational program of action there has arisen a menacing force of fanaticism, which has attracted to itself every element of discontent, class hatred and disloyalty. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has usurped the functions of the duma. Representing only a small fraction of the population, it has been able to impose its will by means of its influence with organized labor and the army, the two absolutely vital factors in national defense. It has nullified governmental decrees, disorganized industry and utterly destroyed military discipline, with the result that it has relieved Germany and Austria of all fear of co-operation between their western and eastern antagonists.

Except that the Teutons have not yet gained access to the stores of food in the interior of Russia, they have attained most of the advantages of a separate peace—an unintelligent revolutionary group confers upon them that which czarism was overthrown for secretly offering. But now unbalanced radicalism has gone further. It is openly demanding, and using all its powers to compel, a peace conference based upon the precise principles which Germany professes and which would give her victory in the guise of a generous accommodation of all issues. It is possible that the Russian promoters of the scheme engineered by the kaiser's trained Socialist retainers deceive themselves, but it is certain that they deceive no one else. They pretend to abhor the idea of a separate peace; their aim, they protest, is a general peace which shall secure the rights of all peoples. But in effect their propaganda increases the strength of the Central Powers and makes so much the more difficult the struggle of the world's democracy against military despotism. A month ago the Council adopted one of its peremptory demands in a resolution declaring that the provisional government "must

endeavor to induce the other allies to repudiate the forcible annexation of territory and also any money indemnities." What Russia has done in the war to give her a right to dictate to the other nations fighting Germany, and whence this irresponsible group of radical visionaries derives its authority to override the Russian government, are questions less important than the fact that the Council echoes the demands of Berlin. It went a step further ten days ago, when it demanded that the government repudiate its pledge of fidelity to the anti-Teutonic alliance, and sought to carry the point by organizing a turbulent demonstration against the foreign minister. Treaties with the Allies, it declared, must be held in abeyance, and the government must "take active steps toward ending the war." Further, the Council appealed to "the revolutionary democracy to rally around" the anti-government organization, and urged "the peoples of all the belligerent countries to force their governments to enter upon negotiations for peace." And it had the effrontery, after browbeating the provisional authorities, to utter threats against Russia's allies. "Now that the question has been settled here," declared the leader, "our aim must be realized abroad. We must know the attitude of the democracies of our allies." Last week came the launching of the plan for a peace conference under the auspices of international Socialism, the project backed by the German government. "We must fight for peace by breaking the determination of the governments," declares the Council, "and force them to commence negotiations. All workers of all countries must embody the will for peace."

It is worth while recalling that Socialism failed lamentably in its boast that it would prevent the long-threatened war. And now it has undertaken a mischievous campaign to obstruct a just settlement. Kaiserism

has been well served by its army and its murderous submarines and its disciplined people, but it has had no more useful agency at its command than German Socialism, which condones every measure of aggression and ruthlessness used by autocracy and then appeals tearfully to the ties of international brotherhood in order to gain by seduction the fruits of national criminality. It is revolting to the rational mind to find the Council, an utterly arbitrary and undemocratic organization, confidently invoking the aid of "the proletariat" in other countries, but this is just the kind of false sentimentality that international Socialism has been trying to promote for years. International brotherhood is a fine and inspiring thing in theory. But when one group of nations undertakes to destroy law and enthrone force, a higher duty demands fulfillment, and that is patriotism, defense of the liberties of mankind and the principles of international good faith. How paltry is the appeal to selfish and unpatriotic class consciousness, compared to the bond that links the democracies of the world in a real brotherhood for the championship of law and honor and humanity! The Russian fanatics are incapable of understanding this, of course. They are blind even to the fact that while they are mouthing about democracy and the sacred will of the proletariat they are serving the ends of kaiserism and putting the rope of Prussianism about their own necks. Germany triumphant—as she would be if she dictated the peace outlined by this infatuated Council—would mean the blighting of Russia's hopes and the rule of autocracy in Europe for another half century.

It is a deplorable and desperate situation which Russia presents to the allied democracies. The floor leader in the first duma, now a member of the faculty of Yale, gives solemn warning that a separate peace—or its equivalent, a disorganized Russian army—is imminently

threatened, and that such a German victory would mean a five-year war for the United States, Great Britain and France. The mission headed by Elihu Root faces a stupendous, almost hopeless, task; indeed, there is danger that the betrayal will be accomplished or Russia involved in civil war before the envoys reach the scene. Their understanding of the situation no doubt is clear and their powers ample. But it is obvious that their most important function will be to demonstrate that the United States has recognized the provisional government, not any irresponsible organization of hare-brained disunionists, and that neither during the war nor afterward will this country deal with a Russia dominated by those destructive influences. It is to be hoped, at least, that the commissioners will not be swayed by the optimistic opinions of the American ambassador in Petrograd, who has assured the state department that "all Russia needs to defeat the Germans is a plentiful supply of munitions, financial credit and railway equipment"—as tho these things would be of any use to a nation whose government is terrorized, whose public affairs are dominated by a society of half-baked visionaries and whose armies are rotten with sedition.

Americans will take pride in the fact that from this country two answers to the arrogant appeal of the Council have expressed in ringing terms the sentiments of workers and of Socialists who know what democracy and liberty mean. The message of the American Federation of Labor was a forceful presentation of the cause for which this nation fights. And the ablest Socialist leaders in the United States have cabled to the party in Germany that the democracies of the world will not be satisfied until the end of autocracy is signalized by the overthrow of kaiserism. Yet how are these truths to reach the minds of that great, helpless people over yonder? How

can light penetrate the vast region of darkness? How can the victims of delusion who are pushing Russia toward the abyss be made to understand that the democracy they think to serve is shamed and wounded by their self-willed course? The spectacle of Russia is a terrible, yet fascinating, one. Her mighty mass hangs menacingly over the path of liberty, and at any moment the avalanche may descend in thunderous ruin. Yet no precaution now possible can avert the peril. Civilization can only brace itself for a longer and costlier struggle, made necessary because liberty is misunderstood and misused by those who ought to be its strongest champions.

A STRANGE IDEA ABOUT MR. WILSON

May 17, 1917.

THERE could not be stronger evidence of the stability of this republic and the healthful vigor of its democracy than is to be found in the united support given to President Wilson in the great task laid upon him. From the time when he ended a long period of uncertainty by uttering in memorable words the judgment and the decision of the American people, his leadership has commanded the undivided and ardent allegiance of his countrymen. Injudicious admirers are not satisfied with this, however. They are not content that the admirable declaration of the cause of democracy, and the policy of action which it introduced, should counterbalance the two-year record of inertia which preceded them. They are inclined to insist that President Wilson, misjudged by the heedless and maligned by the envious, was always moving steadily toward this goal; that the apparent indecision which bewildered public thought and confused the common judgment was really a subtle device of super-statesmanship, designed to lead the nation to make the choice which Mr. Wilson's sagacity has discerned from the beginning to be wise and necessary. No sooner had the chorus of "He kept the country out of war" been drowned by the clamor of martial preparation, than there arose among his partisans an admiring refrain celebrating the fact that he had led the country into war. He is represented as the misunderstood, but far-visioned,

statesman who labored for two years to fit the nation for its part in the conflict, gradually instilling in his unresponsive countrymen a spirit of high resolve, and acting at last when he was quite persuaded that slow-moving public opinion had come abreast of his advanced position. This astonishing theory is promoted with an emphasis that gives the movement the proportions of a propaganda. It is urged in speeches, in letters to newspapers, in editorials and other political writings. The president's "wise patience," his "political prudence" and his "penetrating foresight" are subjects of lavish eulogy. We shall quote two characteristic and influential utterances. Partisans have given great prominence to a tribute from an eminent political opponent, Joseph H. Choate:

Some of us in the past have criticised the president; some of us long hesitated and doubted, thought that watchful waiting would never cease. But now we see what the president was waiting for, and how wisely he waited. He was waiting to see how fast and how far the American people would keep pace with him and stand up to any action that he proposed.

The New Republic, a discriminating and sometimes impartial commentator, states the theory even more boldly:

In so far as the country is united at the present time, its unity must be attributed to Mr. Wilson's method of allowing the dogmatic opposition to war to be gradually dissipated by its own futility, and of allowing the feeling of the inevitability and necessity of war to accumulate until it became irresistible.

The argument is plain. It is that President Wilson, possessed of broader vision, keener perception and deeper conviction than his countrymen, was aware from the beginning that the United States must enter the war in defense of its own rights and the principles of demo-

cratic civilization; that he desired the nation to take this path of high duty and of service to humanity, but was compelled to dissemble his purpose until such time as public opinion should become enlightened enough and aroused enough to support his policy. It is clearly implied that his task was to arouse a sluggish people to a sense of their peril and their duty, and to inspire a backward national thought with sentiments of virile Americanism and ardent championship of international justice. Such a conception would be appropriate enough in a complimentary speech from a foreign visitor; but for Americans to express it in the face of events so recent and familiar reveals on their part a low estimate of public intelligence.

There are no reservations in our loyal adherence to the president's leadership, and it has been our judgment that the errors and deficiencies in his past course might be left for the scrutiny of history. But we must object to the studied promotion of a theory which has no foundation in fact and which is intolerably unjust to the American people. It is refuted by a record so well known as to require only the briefest review. If the case rested upon the state papers of President Wilson concerning the war, it might have a shadowy merit. The strong notes to Germany, altho they were worse than meaningless without action to fulfill their implications, derived historic importance finally when measures to enforce the demands were undertaken. But if these were designed as preliminaries to war, they made the boast that he had "kept the country out of war" a monstrous deception. The argument requires, however, that we should take into account all of the president's utterances. Did they signify a purpose to inject martial ardor into the national mind? Can there be extracted from them, by any process of intellectual chemistry, evi-

dence that he was resolved himself to vindicate the principles of justice at any cost, but was waiting and hoping for the people to reach his high level of decision? Let us see.

One of the earliest of the presidential utterances upon the war was a solemn injunction that Americans should be "neutral even in thought." At that time a peaceful nation was being ravaged by an invasion which struck at the very foundations of international law and thereby threatened the safety of this republic. The American people waited for a sign. Filled with generous indignation, they felt that there should be at least some formal expression of abhorrence for the crime, some protest that would keep the case of violated law open for adjudication. But they were told that the greatest neutral country, inheritor and guardian of human liberty, should remain silent, and that its citizens should not only express no opinion, but should hold none. The Lusitania massacre stirred deep anger. The crime was so causeless and barbarous, the injury to the United States so direct and criminal, that then, if ever, a leader might have counted upon united support in any measure of defense. But the righteous wrath of the people was chilled by the disdainful recommendation that the nation show itself "too proud to fight." Whenever public resentment against aggression flamed up, Mr. Wilson had ready admonitory suggestions that Americanism was best expressed in "self-control." The resistance of European democracies to Prussianism was represented by him as "war madness," and it was loftily predicted that presently those infatuated peoples would "turn to America and say, 'You were right and we were wrong; you kept your heads when we lost ours.'"

Do these utterances suggest that President Wilson was "allowing the dogmatic opposition to war" to evapo-

rate? Or that he was, on the contrary, doing his best to obscure the plain issue and lull the nation into a sense of contented indifference and security? It is said that he was "waiting" for the people to come up with him. Yet when he was invited to speak at Independence Hall on July 4, 1915, this was his reply in declining: "This is, perhaps, the very time when I would not care to arouse the sentiment of patriotism." If his vision was so much clearer than that of the public, his confessions of indecision were strangely emphatic. He found the time "of very great perplexity," the issues those upon which "no man is wise enough to pass judgment." "We are all hoping that the skies may clear," he said, "but we have no control of that on this side of the water." But definite and conclusive was his declaration after the life and death struggle of democracy had raged for twenty-two months: "With the causes and the objects of the war we are not concerned; the obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore."

He was waiting, it is argued, for the people to indorse his judgment for war. Yet his main charge against the party opposing his re-election was that "if the Republican party is put into power our foreign policy will be radically changed—the certain prospect is that we shall be drawn into the European war." And his own campaign textbook devoted one-third of its 500 pages to celebrating his courage and success in restraining the war sentiment of the nation, which his eulogists now say he longed to arouse. But they do not realize, apparently, that the fiction they are propagating would convict the president, if it were true, of outrageous neglect of duty, if not of a betrayal of trust. He knew, they proclaim, that war was inevitable, necessary and desirable. Yet for two years and a half he not only failed to

take measures for the upbuilding of national defense, but sought by ridicule and invective to discourage projects of preparedness. If he was merely waiting for public opinion to justify him in committing the nation to participation in a titanic conflict, what shall be said of his failure to provide weapons of defense? Down to the very time of the war declaration, his every utterance was calculated to discredit American service to democracy. He found the aims of the two groups of belligerents, as stated by them, "virtually the same." He insisted that there must be "peace without victory." In the face of Germany's final announcement of her murder policy he "could not bring himself to believe" that it was genuine. He sought authority to defend American rights and protect American lives "if occasion should arise"—when those rights were being violated every hour and when the murder of 200 Americans was unavenged.

Our support of President Wilson in the present crisis is cordial and sincere, and to revive this controversy for partisan reasons is furthest from our desire. We have a genuine concern, however, to resist a propaganda which seeks to enhance his political fame at the expense of the truth and of the American people.

THE REJECTION OF ROOSEVELT

May 21, 1917.

TO MOST Americans the action of President Wilson in overriding the will of congress and rejecting the division raised by Theodore Roosevelt for service in France was a surprise; to many of them, no doubt, it was a shock. In order not to interfere with the government's military policy the newspapers have withheld information respecting the plan, which was almost in the nature of a political conspiracy, to prevent utilization of the former president's services and of the tremendous power of his leadership. But those who have followed closely recent events at the capital would have been surprised if the president had followed the course urged by congress and heartily indorsed by public sentiment in the United States, in France and in Great Britain. During all the time that the proposition was before congress he opposed it relentlessly but secretly, employing every influence at his command as chief executive and as party leader to compel adverse action. He had determined from the beginning that the nation and the cause it has championed should not have the benefit of Colonel Roosevelt's ability and personality, but naturally he was anxious that the burden—or the odium—of rejecting the division should be borne by congress rather than by himself. When the proposal was negatived by the house committee on military affairs, he hastened to thank the chairman for reporting the bill "free from any feature that would embarrass the system of draft upon which

it is based"—by which he meant to discredit the Roosevelt plan, altho it did not interfere with, but supplemented, the conscription program. Two weeks later he was gratified by rejection of the proposal in the house, 170 to 106. But the arrival of the British and French commissioners, whose eagerness to have Roosevelt sent to France not even their diplomatic reserve could conceal, created such sentiment that the senate adopted, 56 to 31, an amendment authorizing the Roosevelt division. Renewed obstruction from the White House followed, but the influence of the attitude of the foreign envoys could not be stifled, even by the device of "toning down" the formal statement of Marshal Joffre, and on May 12 the house reversed itself. By a vote of 215 to 178 it repudiated the action of its own conferees in standing out against the senate amendment, and directed them to take the army bill back to conference with the Roosevelt plan included. The senate, overwhelmingly in favor of the project, naturally agreed, and the bill went to the president with the feature which he disliked and feared indorsed by both chambers. This put upon him the responsibility of killing the plan himself.

The motives actuating President Wilson in this affair will always remain, of course, a matter of controversy. A great many citizens will sincerely contend that his action was inspired by the loftiest convictions of patriotism. As many more will find in it calculating politics and nothing else. Others, perhaps a majority of the people, will feel that he was under both influences—that he sought to serve plausible military considerations, and at the same time to gratify an instinct of partisanship, if not of vindictiveness. The president was quite within his powers in rejecting the proffer. But this circumstance makes it all the more desirable that the reasons he saw fit to give the public should be

subjected to scrutiny and analysis. In the interest of historical accuracy, it has been found, Mr. Wilson's statements always require close examination. We may say to start with that none of his state papers revealed more clearly his adroitness in controversy. In every detail of tone and phraseology the statement is calculated to belittle and discredit the proposal which provided the one hope of invigorating the spirit of the nation, while at the same time to enhance the president's repute as a Spartan patriot. There is a candid avowal of personal judgment in the first words. "I shall not avail myself," says Mr. Wilson, "of the authorization * * * added with a view to providing an independent command for Mr. Roosevelt." What he meant, but what it would be too much to expect him to say, was that he would not permit the nation to avail itself of that proposal; would not permit France and Great Britain and Italy and Russia and Belgium to have the aid and inspiration of the presence at the front of a former president of the United States, the foremost living American and the one private citizen in the world whose leadership is capable of making tens of thousands of men willing and eager to brave death for principle.

It would, argues the president, "seriously interfere with the prompt creation and early use of an effective army, and would contribute practically nothing to the effective strength of the armies now engaged against Germany." The first assertion is disingenuous, the second, gratuitous. The Roosevelt division would not interfere with creation of the drafted army, because it would not contain a man subject to conscription. As to the slur that it would add nothing to the strength of the Anglo-French line, that is totally unsupported by evidence and is in defiance of reason. The 25,000 regulars who are to be sent are no younger, on the average, are

no more intelligent, and certainly no more brave or devoted than the same number who would go at Roosevelt's call. The latter, too, have had military experience, and would not be more unfamiliar with the novelties of trench warfare than those who exclusively recommend themselves to Mr. Wilson's military judgment. How sincere were the president's smooth compliments to Colonel Roosevelt's "distinction" and "gallantry" cannot be known. But he was singularly obscure in the slighting remark that to permit the former president to serve "would no doubt have a very fine effect politically and make a profound impression." What political effect did Mr. Wilson have in mind? If he meant to imply that his own political fortunes would be impaired, or those of Colonel Roosevelt would be enhanced, this expression was contemptible. We think, we hope, that rather his idea was that there would be a wholesome effect upon the popular mind in this country and in Europe, but that this consideration must be put aside. If this is the interpretation to be put upon the phrase, it reveals anew the most serious defect in the president's character as a war leader; for the "political effect" which he slurs would be worth more at this time than an army corps.

"This is not the time or the occasion," he insists, "for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war." Yet the judgment of congress and the American people and the Allies is that the Roosevelt division would have a more immediate and more beneficial effect than any other contribution this country could make. For to its military value—assuredly equal to that of regulars who are no more familiar with modern warfare—would be added incalculable moral force. But even regarding concrete facts, Mr. Wilson's attitude is no more admirable. He asserts that he acts "under expert and professional advice from both sides

of the water," and according to the judgment of "men who have seen war as it is now conducted." The implication is that the Allied missions discountenanced the sending of a division in which Roosevelt would have a command. It is notorious, on the contrary, that the foreign visitors laid all the stress diplomatically permissible upon the value which the former president's appearance on the battle-front would have. Mr. Wilson is safe in representing otherwise, for they are not here to express their opinions, and could not do so with propriety if they were. As a fact, however, there is evidence to refute his representation. A week ago the New York Times, a strong opponent of Colonel Roosevelt and his division, printed a cabled interview with "one of the military authorities of France," in which he said:

Your problem is to render yourselves as useful as possible. Roosevelt in America seems to be the man, as Kitchener was in England—the man capable of raising an army. If there is any one else, get him, too; but get somebody. Roosevelt, we understand, is indifferent as to the grade he occupies. What is important is to get him or somebody here with the men.

More direct and authoritative was a statement from the French commander-in-chief, General Petain. While he did not mention Colonel Roosevelt's name, his request was based upon the one volunteer project under way. He said:

We look to America to send volunteers immediately. If no further time is lost in calling for volunteers, it is calculated that the first troops can arrive in France in three months with their equipment, and three months later they would have sufficient instruction to enter the line of combat.

Far more audacious is Mr. Wilson's expressed solicitude for the opinions of the general staff of the American army. For nearly two years and a half he and his

entire administration flouted and obstructed every suggestion of that body—in the federalizing of the national guard, in opposing universal military training, in decrying conscription, in discrediting and denying the staff's urgent recommendations for preparedness. And in ordering General Pershing and a division of regulars to France, President Wilson overrules the judgment of the staff as directly as he would if he accepted the Roosevelt division; for those experts have maintained firmly that the sending of any small force would be useless and would seriously hamper the work of raising the great drafted army. Colonel Roosevelt, the president says, wanted to have assigned with him "many officers of the regular army who cannot possibly be spared from the too small force of officers at our command for the duty of training regular troops." In this there is evasion which is close to deception. In his formal outline of his plan, sent to the chairmen of the military committees of congress, Colonel Roosevelt explicitly said he would ask for the detail of "two officers for every 1000 men"—less than fifty in all. General Pershing will take with him 500. More than that, all his troops will be regulars, every one of whom, as well as the officers, would be valuable for training drafted recruits. There is no way of estimating to what extent, if any, President Wilson was influenced in his action by personal or political motives. But the military reasons he alleges are utterly inadequate and specious.

STIFLING PATRIOTISM

May 22, 1917.

NO OFFICIAL statement of national importance that we can recall was ever more swiftly discredited than that in which President Wilson put forth his carefully framed explanation for rejecting the services of Theodore Roosevelt and his division of volunteers for France. Indeed, the two military reasons he gave were refuted instantly by well-known facts. Colonel Roosevelt wanted, said the president, officers of the regular army who "cannot possibly be spared." Yet he had asked for only fifty, while the force to be sent under Major General Pershing will include more than 500. The president's second military excuse was that he was determined to be guided in all matters by "expert and professional advice." Yet in sending 25,000 regular troops to the trenches at this time he overrides the almost unanimous judgment of the army general staff. These two reasons being palpably unsound, more weight is given to the theory that the president was either animated in great part by political motives, or else was misled by a sincere error of judgment. To what extent he was influenced by politics is far less important than the revelation he has made that he totally misconceives the essential character and need of the war. The deplorable thing he has done is to rebuff and chill that spirit of ardent patriotism which was just beginning to assert itself in American thought, and to retard immeasurably

that awakening of the nation without which the war can never be prosecuted with vigor or to victory.

Seldom has a national leader made so fatal a disclosure of self-delusion. President Wilson was emphatic, even loftily censorious, in condemning the Roosevelt project of a volunteer division made up of selected, exceptionally fit men outside the ages specified in the draft law. But in one burst of candor he revealed the heart of his policy. "The business now in hand," he said, "is undramatic, practical and of scientific definiteness and precision." Here, in a dozen words, is outlined with vivid clearness the narrow and unseeing leadership which dulls the edge of American patriotism. Here is made manifest one of the chief reasons why the people of this country lack enthusiasm for a war which their judgment persuades them is just and necessary. Despite the fine, impulsive service of large numbers of the population, it is obvious to every careful observer that to this day the great masses are not spiritually enlisted for the war. They are convinced that the United States is upholding vital principles; they are willing that congress should vote their money in colossal sums; they give countenance to the necessary arrangements of alliance with other nations fighting for civilization; they even submit to the drastic innovation of a nation-wide draft. But they have not been uplifted to the point where they are conscious of being individually and personally concerned in the conflict, where they fervidly dedicate themselves to achieve victory at any cost. The hesitant attitude has been shown in the deficiency in enlistments, which remain below the required number, despite an unprecedented campaign of publicity and expenditure. What is the cause of this attitude of observant quietude, of conviction without enthusiasm?

There is only one explanation. For two years and a half the American people were instructed that their paramount duty was to be individually, as well as nationally, neutral concerning the issues of the war. With its causes and objects, they were admonished, they should have no concern. It was an outburst of madness from which they were happily isolated, and their sole function was to be to heal the wounds of strife utterly remote from their affairs. Then, quite suddenly—or so it seemed to the masses of the people—President Wilson committed the nation to the fullest participation in the conflict. He gave to the country and the world his conclusions in a statement of masterly logic and force. His decision was sound. It was based upon considerations of the highest patriotism and humanity. It was unanswerable in its justice. But it was reached by the precise and calculating processes of intellectual examination. The expression was coldly judicial, and for that reason the more powerful in its effect upon the opinion of the world. But there was not in it a glint of the feeling, the ardor, the inspiration which stirs the souls of men.

The reason is that the government has made the war, according to President Wilson's ideal, "a business, undramatic, practical, of scientific definiteness and precision." It is a remote and uninspiring project of formal proclamations and blue prints and statistical undertakings. To the official mind, the cause which should bring Americans leaping to its defense is embodied in acts of congress and the printed forms for registering drafted soldiers. Sentiment is not recognized in Washington. There must be no appeal to patriotic emotion, no act or utterance to thrill the public mind and unlock the latent energies of patriotic zeal. Americans yielded to the commanding logic of President Wilson's declaration. After that, they waited for a summons that should uplift

their hearts and fire their souls. And what they have got is the admonition that "this is no war for spontaneous impulse; it means grim business on every side of it." When they yearned for stirring words of inspiration, they were told that "we had gone into this war with no special grievance of our own." If there is no grievance in the defiance of national sovereignty, in the murder of peaceful citizens, in a war of extermination against democracy, they ask themselves, why are we called upon to give our lives, or the lives of those dear to us? The truth is that President Wilson has not the power to inspire his countrymen, for the reason that he is temperamentally incapable of entering into their aspirations and emotions. His leadership commands respect, but it does not enlist devotion. Lincoln could call for volunteers and raise the song of an aroused people, "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand strong!" A nation singing is a nation marching to victory. But can one imagine legions springing to arms with the cry, "We are coming, Father Woodrow"? If that were possible, it would be discouraged as sentimental, dramatic, impractical. Soldiers are wanted to dig trenches and learn the manual of arms, not to march against the enemy with songs on their lips and fire in their hearts!

"We have entered this war with no special grievance." That may be highly moral, but it is spoken in a language which the people do not understand. They would fight to the death for their homes, the rights of their nation, the safety of their institutions. But they are asked to fight for an abstract principle, to go thru hell for the sake of stern duty, while discarding every invigorating sentiment and emotion. This was the folly, the injury to the nation, which lay in the rejection of the services of Theodore Roosevelt—that his leadership

and the ardent patriotism of his followers would have supplied that which this government is totally incapable of supplying. Just as Roosevelt in his personality and his convictions expresses the American people, so that force which he enlisted would have put the nation on the firing line as no number of West Pointers and regular troops can do. Major General Pershing is unquestionably an able soldier and a practiced military leader—Colonel Roosevelt would have been delighted to have him command the division in which he himself would be a subordinate. He is skilled in tactics; no doubt he could excel Roosevelt easily in solving problems of engineering and field technique and artillery practice. But who will pretend that his presence on the battle-front would have one-tenth the moral effect—on the people of France and Great Britain and Germany and the United States—that the presence of Theodore Roosevelt would have? Division commanders there are in France by the score, by the hundred. Among them General Pershing will be a respectable figure, he may even attain prominence. He will gallantly and adequately represent the intelligence and skill of the American army. But will he represent America? Will he personify the spirit and the soul of this nation, its passion for democracy and its purpose to defend at any cost that cherished principle? What thrill will there be in his name for the hard-pressed troops of France and Belgium and Britain? How much will his presence on the firing line mean to the German people, who had been told that America was to send there the man who embodies as no one else does that cause which this nation has made its own?

To considerations like these, it must be recognized, the mind of President Wilson is impervious. To him the war is "undramatic, practical, of scientific definiteness and precision"; it has nothing in it like psychology

or emotion or human appeal. God help the man, does he think that practical reasons or the summons of the British general staff brought men from Canada and Australia by the hundred thousand to die in the trenches of France? Does he conceive that the Boers, a few years ago in arms against the empire, or the Irish, with their bitter memories, joined hands with Britain in response to an act of parliament or the precise arguments of logicians? Can he not see that what roused them was the sense of the dramatic which he scorns, the sentiment which he shuns, the passion which he deplotes? This, we say, was the almost miraculous fitness of Theodore Roosevelt—that he would carry to the battle-front of democracy the hearts of his countrymen; that from the hour he and his division set sail, the soul of this nation would be aroused, eager, implacably resolved on victory. Never, to such a degree, will it be stirred by the sending of regulars, however brave, led by professional army officers, however brilliant.

The awakening of America must come by some other means. It must be deferred until the lists of casualties begin to mount up, until the hospital ships steam back into our ports with their loads of broken men. Then the spirit of the nation will rise; then Americans will realize what this war means; then the pulse of the nation will beat high and its mighty power will be stirred to the depths. The rousing in this country of the spirit of sacrifice and of victory is sure. All the more deplorable is it that it must come this way, because a blind leadership rejects the one means of enlisting in the war the hearts and the souls of the American people as well as their bodies.

A GREAT "DISCOVERY"

May 23, 1917.

IT IS a commonplace observation that the convert is ever the most zealous in the faith. Similarly, when an obvious fact at last penetrates the skull of one who has obdurately denied its existence, it appears to him in the light of a miraculous discovery, which he must vociferously expound to a benighted world. The government in Washington, for example, startles the country with the revelation that Germany had long planned, and thus far has achieved, military and economic domination of southeastern Europe, as the foundation of a scheme of world empire.

This disclosure is made with impressive detail in a two-column dispatch purveyed by the Associated Press, but inspired and sanctioned by official authority. Every assertion in it is true and every deduction sound. But the astonishing thing is that they are represented as recent discoveries. Germany's plans, it is said, are here "revealed for the first time," and "hitherto obscure features of German policy" have become known "only within the last few weeks."

We do not know whether Washington's air of excitement is real or assumed, but in either case it is a curious phenomenon. For there is just about as much news in the project of a Teutonic sphere of influence or customs union or economic confederation covering central Europe as there would be in the announcement now that Servia had been invaded.

The facts deserve all the prominence which the government and the newspapers have given them; we feel that they should even have the further emphasis of repetition. For this reason we reprint the essential parts of the Washington dispatch, paralleled by extracts from editorials appearing in *The North American* during the last two years and ten months. The reader will be able to observe how much of novelty there is in the government's revelations:

From
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1917. — Germany's next peace declaration, expected to suggest a program of territorial renunciation on the east and west, is regarded here as largely answered beforehand by information revealing *for the first time* the full scope of the imperial government's aspirations for conquest in the south. This information discloses as one of the primary aims of the war a plan for the consolidation of an impregnable military and economic unit stretching from the North sea to the Mediterranean, cutting Europe permanently in half, controlling the Dardanelles, the Aegean and the Baltic, and eventually forming the backbone of a Prussian world empire.

In the light of German history the plan shows how implicitly the kaiser has followed out the "blood and iron" politico-economic methods of Bismarck for the development of Prussian power. Considered in view of

From
THE NORTH AMERICAN

August 20, 1914.—So far as the German empire is concerned the real issue is defined in a single term—Pan-Germanism. Back of the racial idea, back of militarism, back of imperial unity and industrial expansion, lies this splendid vision of Teutonic domination of Europe and of the world. It is the policy of Bismarck developed and adapted to modern conditions. He warred against Austria, against Denmark, against France—always, he declared, for the defense of Teutonic institutions, but always with the result that Prussia's boundaries were extended. Now once more the people are inspired to fight for "racial preservation," but the goal is commercial and political supremacy. Pan-Germanism, the mightiest international force of modern times, is not at its heart a movement to preserve a threatened race, but to make it supreme; not to defend Germany, but to subjugate the

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the present war map it shows that the major portion of the kaiser's war program has been accomplished, regardless of what disposition's made of conquered territory in France, Belgium and Russia.

A full realization of this situation adds new force to the repeated declarations of allied statesmen that the German peace maneuvers are in reality war moves, and that a premature peace would only give Germany a resting period in which further to Prussianize and prepare for a greater world war the territory to the southeast which she has conquered under the guise of a friendly alliance.

How minutely defined is the German plan and how accurately it is being carried out have become fully apparent only with the opening up during the last few weeks of several *new avenues of information*. The return of American diplomatic agents from the Central Empires, the visit of the British and French war missions, detailed confidential reports of the recent frank expressions in the reichstag and in the German press and the deductions of American agents abroad have supplied the explanation of more than one *hitherto obscure* feature of the German policy.

In her southeastern conquests it is apparent Germany has fol-

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world. "The Germans consider feasible a great confederation of states, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey, which would control territory from the North sea to the Persian gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Bagdad would establish a shorter route to India than via Suez."

November 4, 1914.—The policy of Pan-Germanism embraces an extension of Teutonic influence thru the Balkans and Turkey into Asia Minor and thence to the Persian gulf. The German-built Bagdad railway is an ambitious link in the chain, and the reorganization of the Turkish army and navy by German officers has been an important factor, together with the vast German loans. Great Britain's influence at Constantinople began to wane sixteen years ago, when the kaiser made his theatrical pilgrimage to the tomb of Saladin, and, turning to the Ottoman governor, said, "Say to the 300,000,000 Moslems of the world that I am their friend."

March 31, 1915.—It was in the Balkans that the great war began, and there, in all likelihood, it will be decided. The side that wins the Balkans wins the war.

October 19, 1915.—The spectacular dash from the Danube toward the Bosphorus is the working out of the basic strategy of German world policy,

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lowed almost in toto the long-established plan of the Pan-German league, whose propaganda has been regarded outside of Germany as the harmless activity of extremists, too radical to be taken seriously. As early as 1911 the Pan-German league is said to have circulated a definite propaganda of conquest, with printed appeals containing maps of a greater Germany, whose sway from Hamburg to Constantinople and then southeastward thru Asiatic Turkey was marked out by boundaries virtually coincident with the military lines held today, under German officers, by the troops of Germany, Austria - Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Adhesion of the German government itself to such a plan was not suspected by the other Powers. How closely the German government did adhere to the plan has been demonstrated clearly, it is considered now, by the course of the war. Emperor William chose war as the means of establishing the broad pathway to the southeast which was essential for the realization of a greater Germany. * * *

Bulgaria's declaration of war on the side of Germany was actuated by a German diplomatic coup which in itself is regarded as further evidence that a clear road thru to the Dardanelles was considered in Berlin as a

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in which the invasion of France, the raiding of England and the hammering of Russia into helplessness have been but preliminary details. The goal of the Germans was not Paris or London or Warsaw, but Constantinople; not the absorption of neighboring territory, but the opening of a highway to the illimitable East; not the mere domination of Europe, but the carving out of a colossal empire whose shores should be washed by the North sea and the waters of the Indian ocean. * * *

The essential details of Pan-Germanism are, first, the erecting of a confederation of states including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan nations and Turkey; second, a German-controlled railroad from Constantinople to Bagdad, and third, the gaining of a strategic position which would enable Germany to imprison Russia and split the British empire in twain at Suez.

February 4, 1916. — Germany has extended her political and military influence from the North sea to Asia Minor. * * * While she must continue to suffer the economic pressure exerted by enemy sea power, it would be a fatal error to regard her unofficial peace proposals as a sign of weakening will. She wants peace, not because she is losing, but be-

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primary and imperative purpose of the war. In the case of Turkey, German domination is believed here to be even more complete than in Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.

These developments throw a new light on many events before the war. Among them is the long-unexplained declaration of Emperor William at Damascus in 1898 that all Mohammedans might confidently regard the German emperor as "their friend forever." There also is a complete understanding now of Germany's eagerness to obtain a concession for the Bagdad railroad, an artery of communication now indispensable to the German operations.

Fitting in squarely with an actuating desire for conquest to the southeast is the general German military policy during the entire war. It is noted that even at the expense of recessions on the eastern and western fronts Germany took pains to overrun Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania and to keep in check all allied attempts to strike from Saloniki at the road to the Dardanelles. * * *

All of this is taken as revealing the point of a premature peace which should leave the German southeastern domains unbroken. * * * There is every evidence that the government understands in concrete

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cause she is winning; not because she fears defeat, but because she desires to capitalize her victories.

February 8, 1916.—What are the terms which appear to the Germans to be logical? Evacuation of Belgium and France, without indemnities; partition of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania; an independent Poland under a German prince; recognition of a German protectorate over Turkey. The real heart of the matter is that Germany demands recognition of her political supremacy over Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Turkey, with the right to extend her commercial domains thru Asia Minor with Turkish consent. * * * Germany's Balkan victories and her virtual absorption of Turkey make it utterly impossible for Great Britain to stop the war while she has a battleship or an army corps left.

December 15, 1916.—It seems to us quite clear that Germany's peace proposal is logical and essentially honest. She wants peace, ardently desires peace. And why not? She has won all the things—excepting only the "freedom of the seas"—for which she made war upon Europe and civilization. Her purpose is the erection of an overland empire stretching from her "German ocean" to the Per-

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form the crucial southeastern element of the situation and realizes the enormity of the struggle that must be won before the world is made "safe for democracy."

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sian gulf. "Look," as her people say, "at the map." The empire is there—Germany, Austria-Hungary plus Servia, Rumania subjugated, Greece a humble satellite, Bulgaria and Turkey well rewarded and devoted allies.


The world has marveled that the government of the United States is only now preparing for the conflict which was foreshadowed from the beginning. But not less remarkable, we think, is the fact that it has taken two years and ten months to discover what the war is about.











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