




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


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# THE NORTH AMERICAN

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THE NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY  
THE NORTH AMERICAN BUILDING  
BROAD AND SANSON STS.  
PHILADELPHIA



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# THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE

A *FOURTH VOLUME*

EDITORIALS  
FROM  
THE NORTH AMERICAN  
PHILADELPHIA

MAY, 1917—DECEMBER, 1917

197316  
11/7/25

PRESS OF  
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY  
EAST WASHINGTON SQUARE, PHILADELPHIA

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
## FOREWORD

**T**HIS volume, the fourth in a series containing war editorials from *The North American*, continues a chronologically arranged survey of the important developments of the conflict as they occurred.

*These contemporary discussions of momentous issues and events will now have a greater interest, perhaps, because of the ending of the war and the consequent urgency of the problems of peace.*

THE NORTH AMERICAN.

*Philadelphia, January 31, 1919.*



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
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# **THE WAR FROM THIS SIDE**

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**A FOURTH VOLUME**





## THE FIGHTING IN FRANCE

*May 26, 1917.*

**T**HERE has been during the last few days, we learn from the dispatches, a "lull" on the western front. This means, probably, that the never-ending bombardment is somewhat less than volcanic in its intensity, that the battles which flare up and die down along the line engage bodies of troops smaller than army corps, and that only a few hundred men, instead of many thousands, are being killed or wounded each day. But for the purposes of discussion we may accept the official view that these conditions, which would seem to the novice in the trenches to approximate violent war, are of unusual quietude; and the "lull" suggests a review of the struggle that has been raging without cessation for nearly seven weeks. To say that this pause interrupts the bloodiest and most colossal battle in history conveys no adequate impression; not because the statement is not true, but because the imagination of mankind has been exhausted by contemplating three years of war of a magnitude and fierceness beyond human comprehension. The only way to catch a glimpse of the reality is to compare this with famous battles of the past. It may convey an idea to say that more men have been killed or wounded in this encounter than fought on both sides in the battles of Waterloo and Gettysburg. It is not in mere size, however, that this struggle is noteworthy. While no spectacular or sudden decision from it is likely, it emphasizes the turn in the war which

became manifest last summer in the transfer of the initiative from Germany to her antagonists.

To all observers except those trained in the intricacies of modern warfare the details which reach us are only vaguely enlightening. We have read day after day of so many miles of trenches taken, so many villages stormed, so many prisoners captured; of "sanguinary losses by the enemy"; of "gains consolidated" and "counter-attacks repulsed" and "withdrawals according to pre-conceived plans." But as a whole the accounts are unintelligible to the ordinary reader, nor are the results easily to be understood. Without attempting to deal with questions of tactics or strategy, we shall try to sketch in broad outline the progress and meaning of this titanic struggle. The first fact to be grasped is that, while the battles just closed constituted the first phase of the "spring drive" of the Allies, the great collision for which both sides prepared for many months, the fight is distinctly a resumption of, or a sequel to, the battle of the Somme. It is essentially accurate to say that the present operations began, not seven weeks ago, but on July 1, 1916. They were suspended, not abandoned, when winter prevented movement, and they were resumed in March—by a German retreat which failed to avert the test. Examination of the whole enterprise, therefore, naturally divides it into three events—first, the battle of the Somme; second, the "strategic retreat" of Von Hindenburg in March; and third, the French and British offensives, beginning early in April.

The battle of the Somme was the name given to the Allies' great offensive of 1916, which lasted thru the months of July, August, September and October. The intensely active part of the battle-front extended about sixty miles, from near the frontier of Belgium to a point below Noyon, where the German line was nearest to

Paris. Preparations for the attack had consumed months of time and the labor of millions of men. The vital need of overwhelming artillery-power had been met by prodigious accumulations of ammunition; hundreds of miles of roads and light railways had been built, and the real power of the new British armies was at last ready to be launched against the enemy. The Allies had done more than admire German efficiency, they had emulated it, and in certain details they surpassed it. The result was a series of advances which for a time raised hopes of a decision. Mile after mile of the most formidably fortified trench systems were reduced by high explosives, village after village was captured, and the skill of the German staff was taxed to shift reserves rapidly enough to prevent the breaching of the line. Most of the gains, naturally, were made during the early weeks of the conflict. The achievements of the four months included the driving back of the Germans from two to eight miles on a front of twenty miles; the capture of forty or more villages and towns that had been transformed into fortresses, with some hundreds of guns and about 60,000 prisoners. From the beginning our judgment, based upon ordinary reasoning rather than military knowledge, was that the driving of the Germans out of France in this action was improbable. Nor did the taking of strongly fortified positions seem to us to be in itself a decisive result, for it had been demonstrated many times that no works which military engineers can construct are capable of withstanding the torrent of metal and high explosives which massed artillery can turn upon them.

What we found significant was the convincing evidence of augmented force and precision on the part of the Allies, and a diminished vigor and power of recuperation on the part of the Germans, these changes being

manifested most plainly in the seizure by the former of the initiative, which they held until the end of the campaign. This appeared to us important for other than strategical reasons, in that it subjected the German troops to a new and searching experience—fighting on the defensive. They had shown impressive power and audacity in campaigns where they were always the aggressors; how would their spirit withstand the pressure of prolonged attack from a relentless foe? Thus the gains made seemed to us of relatively small moment unless they should result in depressing the spirit of the German armies and the German people with “the sensation of a definitely halted advance and a vanished hope of victory.” It should be remembered that, despite German assertions to the contrary, the Allies never counted upon “breaking thru” the line. Their aim was to keep it under constant and pitiless pressure, wearing it down until it must break or withdraw. And it was clear to us even last September that the latter result was indicated—first, by the failure of the Germans to regain any of the territory wrested from them, and second, by the appointment of Von Hindenburg to the supreme command. He was the one leader, we remarked, who could order the line back without creating a panic thruout the empire. There were no outward signs, however, of a weakening of German confidence. As early as mid-August a correspondent at general staff headquarters described the campaign of the Allies as “a tragic failure,” an opinion which was not altered even by the severe German reverse in the first week of September, when 10,000 prisoners were taken. “In three months of agonized exertion,” it was exultantly declared at the end of the month, “with a loss of 500,000 men, the Entente has regained three-tenths of 1 per cent of the lost territory. At the same rate of progress the Allies

will reach the German frontier in eighty-four years." The great offensive, said a German expert, had been "stifled in blood and mud." Early in November the stupendous contest died down and the winter siege began.

Against the German official view may be put that of Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander-in-chief. The offensive had accomplished, he declared, the three main objects for which it had been undertaken. It relieved the pressure upon the French at Verdun and rendered worthless all the sacrifices the German crown prince had exacted there from his troops; it held the main German force on the western front, preventing drives against Russia and Italy and the Allies in Macedonia; and it "wore down the enemy's powers of resistance." Furthermore, he said that the battle of the Somme had "placed beyond doubt the ability of the Allies to gain their objects," bad weather for attack having given the Germans a respite and saved them from disaster. The outstanding results of the fighting were, then, that the Allies had definitely wrested the initiative from their opponents; had demonstrated their superiority in man-power and artillery-power and equipment; and had shown that no field defenses within the power of the Germans to build could withstand such attacks as the assailants could deliver. Yet the German leaders expressed undiminished confidence. It is interesting, in view of events this spring, to recall the statements of Field Marshal von Hindenburg. On October 30 he said:

It is nonsense if they tell you I intend to shorten my line in the west. I never thought of it; why should I do it? The front in the west stands as firm as a rock, and if our enemies, by gigantic use of artillery, here and there gain a little terrain, they shall never break thru. To do this they would have to attack for thirty years.

“What our enemies did not accomplish in 1915, they could not accomplish in 1916,” he said in December. “So their long-sought goal is to be reached in 1917? Let them come on! They shall see and we will see!” At about the same time Major Moraht, an eminent military critic, offered this judgment upon a typical factor in the problem of the west front: “The Spanish army could capture Gibraltar more easily than the French and British could take Bapaume, fortified as it is today.” What was to be the answer of the new year to these robust assertions? Bapaume, as an example, was occupied by the Allies on March 18, three weeks before the main offensive began. And the “Gibraltar” of the west front was yielded almost without a struggle. In a word, the battle of the Somme, which had been celebrated in Germany as a great victory, reopened with a German retreat, the object of which was to prevent a resumption of the conflict. This withdrawal, one of the most remarkable and significant movements of the whole war, we shall discuss in a day or two.

## VON MICAWBER, STRATEGIST

*May 28, 1917.*

**T**HERE is no work of familiar literature less militaristic, we suppose, than "David Copperfield"; and surely there is no character in the agreeable narrative less warlike in nature than Mr. Wilkins Micawber. Yet it is of that affable and impecunious optimist that we are irresistibly reminded in examining German accounts of the retreat in France a few weeks ago. This, for example, might have been Field Marshal von Hindenburg himself, explaining to an interested world his "strategic retirement":

"You find us, Copperfield," said Mr. Micawber, "at present established on what may be designated as a small and unassuming scale; but you are aware that I have, in the course of my career, surmounted difficulties and conquered obstacles. You are no stranger to the fact that there have been periods in my life when it has been requisite that I should pause until certain expected events should turn up; when it has been necessary that I should fall back before making what I trust I shall not be accused of presumption in terming—a spring. The present is one of those momentous stages in the life of man. You find me fallen back for a spring; and I have every reason to believe that a vigorous leap will shortly be the result."

The parallel between Mr. Micawber's strategy and that of the Germans is singularly impressive, not only because they fell back for a spring, according to his ingenious method, but because, like him, they failed to make the contemplated forward movement. They fell back, and stayed back. This retirement, one of the out-

standing events of the war, was long foreshadowed. It was, as we remarked two days ago, directly the result of the battle of the Somme, which began on July 1, 1916, reached its climax in September, and ended only with the closing down of winter. That was one of the major operations of the war, and an important Allied success, the benefits of which are still accruing. According to the German view, it was "a tragic failure," in that it cost the assailants heavily and yielded a relatively small gain in territory. As a fact, only one-twentieth of the trench line changed materially in position; while the Allies took 60,000 prisoners and put out of action some hundreds of thousands of Germans, their own losses were severe, and they recaptured less than seventy square miles of France. The victory was theirs, nevertheless, in that they had seized and retained the initiative; had proved their superiority in striking power, and had demonstrated that they could crush any defenses which Germany could build.

Upon these facts we based our judgment that the next move would be a German withdrawal. Our final comment on the Somme campaign, on September 29, was this: "The greatest danger to the Germans is that their courage and pride and desperate resolution may lead them to delay too long the inevitable retirement, and so bring upon themselves irremediable disaster." The indications were no less clear, of course, to better informed observers. Early in October a London correspondent reported military experts as being convinced that "the Germans must do one of two things—they must embark on a great offensive, or they must radically shorten their lines," and he gave the reasons for expecting the movement on the western front. "The Germans were forced into the trenches against their will," said General Castelnau, one of the ablest of the



French leaders, a few months ago, "and the day will come when they will be forced out." A news story from Paris, dated March 8, more than a week before the main withdrawal began, recorded the official view that the invaders would retire from the Noyon salient during the spring. All of these predictions were fulfilled. In view of the robust defiance in Germany's "peace offer" of December 12, when she boasted of being "victorious on all fronts," it is instructive to examine the movement upon which she was even then decided, and which she made with all possible haste as soon as the weather permitted.

It is to be understood that the Somme drive was never officially abandoned. Thruout the entire winter the pounding of the German lines continued, altho infantry actions were few; and the result was seen late in February, when the Germans skillfully evacuated seventy square miles of territory in the region of the Ancre river, and yielded about twenty square miles more under pressure. But this was only a preliminary adjustment. On March 17 began a systematic retreat, the invaders giving way before the French and British from two to four miles on a front of thirty-five miles. The most important point destroyed and evacuated was Bapaume, the British objective in the battle of the Somme. In leaving this position the Germans surrendered a crest and retired to a plain. The movement as a whole meant the abandonment of the great Noyon salient, where the Germans had been entrenched since the battle of the Marne, Noyon being the nearest point to Paris in the 440-mile line. It was clearly their intention to retire to the "Hindenburg line," which, so far as is known, is a formidable system of intrenchments extending 100 miles almost in a straight line from Douai thru Cambrai and St. Quentin to La Fere, and

situated approximately twenty-five miles behind the old positions. Peronne, Roye, Noyon and other fortified towns were taken by the Allies after sharp rear-guard actions. The retreat rapidly extended to a front of 100 miles. In three days the French recovered 770 square miles of invaded territory; within a week they had occupied 1300 square miles, including 250 towns and villages. As a feat of military efficiency the retreat was, of course, a remarkable achievement. To withdraw a huge army, its heavy guns and supplies under the vigilant observation of an enemy equipped with aeroplanes is an undertaking which might invite disaster; but the Germans did it with masterly precision. By sacrificing their rear-guard troops they extricated their main forces, and by making a literal desert of the evacuated territory they made difficult the advance of the enemy. But they were not content with the credit due to them for a skillful operation; they insisted that the world recognize the retreat as a stupendous victory. There is nothing in the literature of the war more diverting than the German arguments offered to prove that the evacuation of the blood-soaked battlefield of the Somme was a triumph which shattered the designs of the enemy and was the preliminary to a devastating Teuton onslaught. The official comment from Berlin, which gave the keynote to the enraptured press of the empire, ran this way:

The evacuation is one of the most decisive moves in the war. It is intended to secure our troops' freedom of movement and end trench warfare. We are now getting the enemy out of their trenches. The giving up of this portion of our front puts an end to all their finely laid spring offensive plans. All the work of months of preparation has gone for nothing. They must make entirely new plans, entailing months of labor. Meanwhile, they are at the mercy of our plans. The enemy must advance over a devastated battlefield, against new positions built with the aid of every possible

device developed by two years and a half of warfare. We are reshaping the line so that we will have an aggressive initiative.

Mr. Micawber "falling back for a spring" is certainly not a more astonishing figure than German leadership attaining "freedom of action" and "getting the enemy out of their trenches" by the simple expedient of running away. But observe how the idea of triumph was developed by the experts of the German press:

Our leaders found the way to render null and void all the preparations of our enemies, to frustrate the whole plan of a spring offensive. A ghastly scene of emptiness stretches in front of our new positions, and over this terrain the enemy must attack. Thanks to this stroke of genius, Germany has at one blow achieved freedom of decision and movement, and will be able to prepare the most frightful surprises. The Entente leaders are utterly bewildered and demoralized. The giant offensive has turned at last into miserable confusion.

The kaiser gave imperial sanction to this inspiring theory in a telegram to Von Hindenburg, in which he declared "the withdrawal occupies a worthy place next to your great success in the east," and creates "a new base for further prosecution of the war." An unidentified "military expert" in Washington loftily rebuked those who thought the retreat was a confession of weakness. He said:

It is a strategic move, pure and simple. The German army could hold its lines indefinitely. But the retreat has disorganized the Allied forces. They must prepare all over again for a major offensive. As a cold-blooded military proposition, the Germans have decidedly the better of the situation. It will be weeks, even months, before the French and British are ready for a new drive.

The expert view was, then, that the Germans had amplified their "victory" on the Somme by surrendering the battlefield; had demoralized the enemy by giving up what he was willing to fight for; had put the Allies to

confusion by permitting them to occupy in March territory which they had not hoped to occupy until midsummer; had revealed overmastering power by evacuating positions which they had spent thirty months in fortifying, in order to seek protection in new positions twenty-five miles to the rear. But if this remarkable theory was sound, it required something more than a skillful retreat to demonstrate it. The Allies were to be rendered helpless for months; yet within twenty days they were furiously assaulting the triumphant Germans, and within a fortnight thereafter were methodically pounding holes in the mighty "Hindenburg line" itself. The astonished invaders found that in "getting the enemy out of his trenches" they had somehow got him into considerable stretches of their own, and that the "freedom of movement" they had won comprised liberty of moving backward and in no other direction whatever.

The simple truth is, of course, that the Germans retreated because they had to; because they had learned in the battle of the Somme that their "impregnable" defenses could not withstand another such hammering; because they realized their inferiority in men, metal and morale, and discerned that their only hope lay in delaying the Allied advance long enough to permit submarine ruthlessness to accomplish its hoped-for results. But a more serious matter for them is that there was a fundamental error in their calculations concerning the efficacy of this move, as will appear when we examine the operations which have followed it.

## THE ORDEAL

*May 29, 1917.*

ONE of our cherished war records is a faded newspaper clipping bearing the date September 29, 1916. The writer, an American violently pro-German in his sympathies, sent from Berlin a very sardonic computation of the results of the Somme campaign, then in its thirteenth week. Comparing the fifty-four square miles gained by the British and French with the 18,000 square miles of France and Belgium held by Germany, he wrote:

In three months of agonized effort, with a loss of 500,000 men, the Entente has now regained three-tenths of one per cent of the lost territory. It is a simple matter of calculation that at the same rate of progress the Allies will reach the German frontier in eighty-four years, provided they are willing to sacrifice 150,000,000 men.

It would be interesting to see the same arithmetical strategist computing upon the same basis the changes in the war map during the last sixty days. He would find that on March 17, 18 and 19 the Germans evacuated under pressure 1300 square miles, one-fourteenth of the total held; "at the same rate of progress," they would be back in the fatherland in fifty-two days. We recall this absurdity merely because it illustrates the singular processes of reasoning by which the hopes of the German people are sustained in the ordeal of suffering punishment in the shadow of approaching defeat. It would not be worth even this attention if it had not been outdone in folly by the hailing of the recent retreat as a

stupendous victory. In examining the spring operations, now temporarily halted, one should take into account the expressed purposes and forecasts of the opposing leaders. These were based, of course, upon the evidence of the Somme battle as interpreted on either side. "The front in the west stands as firm as a rock," was the declaration of Von Hindenburg in October. "We have no fears for the coming year; let them come on," he said in December. The American correspondent to whom this statement was made drew an impressive picture of Germany's titanic preparations for the "last great battle," which was to shatter the Allies' hopes and end the war:

"Hold the line" is the slogan in Germany today, and to that end the nation is bending every nerve and sinew. The soil of France is being burrowed, excavated and tunneled into a series of connected positions and fortresses such as never were dreamed of. The Germans are building a wall such as military history has not seen. Hindenburg inspected the ground. Then the best military and civil engineers—the men who build the big canals and harbors—began surveying and laying out a new line of positions behind the front. This army of diggers numbered 1,000,000. Around Peronne and further north on the Somme line they did their work. In December, 43,000 expert miners were sent to the western line, followed by steam shovels, boring machines and compressed-air tunneling engines. "We are building a wall which the English and French cannot get over nor under nor thru," said a high official.

On the other side, confidence was certainly not less. An official of the British war office said the whole army was convinced that it would "push on until the Germans on the western front are utterly routed." Asked whether a decisive victory was expected, he answered, "Exactly. With the French, we are going to drive the foe back until he is vanquished." Much more important was a state-

ment by Field Marshal Haig, usually so reticent. On February 13 he said to French correspondents:

You ask me whether we shall break the German front. Most certainly we shall, severely and at many points. We shall strike with full force until we achieve the destruction of the German army.

The first move in a test heralded by both sides as decisive was, as we have seen, a great German retreat. Incidentally, one section of the terrible "wall" that early fell was "around Peronne," where the engineering genius of the empire was observed building its most massive defenses. Disregarding the curious German conception that this signified a great victory, two theories as to the purpose were advanced by experts—that Von Hindenburg planned to stake everything on a pitched battle in the open, or that he intended, by shortening his line, to release a powerful force for an irresistible offensive elsewhere, probably against Russia. If his design was either one or the other of these, it ignominiously failed. The Germans are as definitely on the defensive now as at any time since the initiative was wrested from them in July, 1916. Another interesting theory was that Von Hindenburg planned to compel the Allies to exhaust themselves by delivering ineffective blows at heavy cost. He had devised, it was said, an "elastic" line, which could be withdrawn rapidly wherever attacked, forcing the enemy to advance over devastated territory, while he was subjected to murderous fire from the defenders operating on firm ground. The scheme was an adaptation of the tactics of the skillful boxer, whose sidestepping causes his heavier opponent to swing wildly and tire himself. This was probably the purpose of the retreat—to delay the expected Allied attack and to lead the British and French into territory that had been made a desert, where they could be overwhelmed. Cer-

tainly, the Germans made their preparations efficiently. Never in all human history was destruction so complete, so monstrous, inflicted upon a habitation of mankind as was perpetrated in the evacuated territory. Scores of villages and towns were swept away by fire and explosion. Every tree was leveled; every railroad was torn up; every highway was plowed and churned into impassable gullies and ravines; at every cross-roads a huge mine was exploded, leaving a crater from thirty to sixty feet deep; every bridge was flung down in ruins; every well was choked up with earth and refuse. Between them and the enemy the Germans had put, they exultantly said, a "kingdom of death" which no armies could cross for months to come.

But this, too, failed. The retreat began on March 17, and, while it was carried out with masterly skill, there was hardly an hour when the assailants were out of touch with the withdrawing forces. Instead of the months that were to have been consumed in preparing for the offensive, in exactly twenty-two days the British were hammering whole sections of the new German line into pulp and capturing the dazed defenders by regiments. In the first forty-eight hours they took nearly 15,000 prisoners. In ten weeks of fighting on the Somme last year the Allies seized 315 guns and 56,000 prisoners. Within a month of the beginning of the battle of Arras, they had taken 50,000 prisoners, 444 heavy guns, 943 machine guns and 386 trench cannon and mortars. The improvement in the British record was most marked, for in four weeks they took twice as many prisoners, four times as much territory and five times as many guns as during the whole Somme campaign. The explanation was simply this—preparedness. Behind their lines the Allies had assembled everything needed to overcome the devastation which they knew would fol-



low the foreseen German retreat. There were thousands of motortrucks, mountains of broken stone, cement, railroad ties and rails; spikes, tools, road-making machines, bridge material—and skilled workmen. As the Germans withdrew, they were followed not only by long-range fire and advancing infantry, but by an army of engineers, and they were hardly settled in their new positions when the terrible big guns were being hauled by caterpillar tractors over the new roads and bridges, to begin afresh the irresistible pounding and hammering. The Hindenburg device of an elastic defense never had a chance. His line became painfully rigid, and his troops have had to endure the same punishment from which he had hoped to extricate them by his masterly retreat. Nor has his mighty line of fortifications itself proved infallible, for it has been breached at more than one point.

The net results of the operations thus far are by no means decisive—no one outside of Germany expected that they would be—but they are tremendously significant. First, it has been demonstrated once more that the Allies can smash any defenses the Germans can build; what they have done once they can do again. Second, they have revealed a deadly efficiency and foresight. The great Hindenburg line was wrecked, in preparation, before it was constructed. Third, the superiority of the Allies in man-power and gun-power has been made clear to them and to the Germans, with the natural effects upon the morale of both sides. Official reports at the beginning of the year explain what this offensive means. They show that France then had thirty times more big guns than in 1914; was making 300 times as many rifles, 170 times as many machine guns, 40 times as many three-inch shells, 90 times as many heavy shells. Great Britain was making in one week three to

five times as many guns as she made during the whole of the first year. The production of eighteen-pound shells had been multiplied 43 times; field howitzer shells, 46 times; medium-caliber shells, 66 times, and heavy-gun shells, 323 times. For every ton of explosives used by the British in September, 1914, 350 tons were used in July, 1915, and 1200 tons in July, 1916—and far more this year.

To the observer who measures results on the map they appear insignificant. But there is always the invisible, yet potent, effect upon the minds of the German soldiers and people. In their recent counter-attacks the troops of Von Hindenburg have shown splendid courage and devotion; yet not even a race of supermen could fight for ten months on the defensive and in retreat without suffering in mental and spiritual conviction. And the Germans know that there is no hope of victory, only the faint chance that by pouring out torrents of blood they may hold on until the murderous submarine wins a foul victory. This is the climax of military effort on both sides. It is a battle of reserves, a test of the ultimate resources of flesh and blood and machinery. If the French and British can do no better than they have done—if they can merely hold that terrible line—the power of America will reinforce theirs, and the great engine of German militarism will be smashed where it stands.

## KEEPING T. R. OUT OF THE WAR

*June 1, 1917.*

**T**O MOST Americans, the arbitrary exclusion from military service of Theodore Roosevelt and the division which he had recruited remains a mystery. They recognize, of course, that the president acted within his official powers in rejecting the force, but they do not in the least understand why he deprived the country and the Allies of the most inspiring aid that could be given in the war. The reasons of military policy which he gave were not convincing, because they were obviously unsound; and this circumstance has drawn under keener scrutiny the incidental expressions and phraseology of his explanation, which was a studied attempt to discredit Colonel Roosevelt's judgment and to represent his association with the war as a project to be discountenanced as incongruous, worthless and even harmful. It would, wrote the president, "seriously interfere with the early use of an effective army," and "would contribute practically nothing to the effective strength of the armies now engaged against Germany." In other words, neither Colonel Roosevelt nor the 25,000 selected men ready to enlist under him were regarded by Mr. Wilson as military effectives. The remark that the rejected provision was intended to give Colonel Roosevelt "an independent command" was not true, but it served to give official sanction to the slur so often reiterated by the partisan press, that he was engaged in "personal recruiting" for a "private army." "It would

be very agreeable to me to pay Mr. Roosevelt this compliment" was another adroit expression designed to belittle a patriotic offer of invaluable service. "This is not the time or the occasion for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war" was a worthy sentiment, but what it implied was that Colonel Roosevelt was incapable of making any contribution of that nature.

It is by no means our purpose to attempt an elaborate answer to this depreciation, or to revive a controversy which must be futile. Colonel Roosevelt himself has accepted the bitterest disappointment of his career with characteristic self-command, and has continued his active, patriotic support of the governmental policies which serve the war interests of the nation. And those who believe in him and emulate his splendid Americanism will follow his example. Yet it is interesting to observe that the administration which has gone so far in its efforts to discredit him has unconsciously paid the highest possible tribute to his leadership and his discernment of the essentials of war problems. For those who have been first chosen to fill the most vital posts in the nation's military, naval and economic operations are men whose capacities were recognized by Roosevelt and who owe their opportunities to his decisive judgment in their favor. It was not from motives of admiration, perhaps, that Leonard Wood was transferred from the important position of commander of the department of the east, with headquarters in New York, to the remote command at Charleston, S. C. But the fact remains that there he will be in charge of fourteen of the thirty-two national training camps, and will be one of the chief figures in the creation of the first army of 500,000. Now, who is Leonard Wood, and how did he reach this high place? He entered the army in

1886 as an assistant surgeon with the rank of lieutenant, and became captain in 1891. And that would have been his position today, in all likelihood, had it not been that Theodore Roosevelt recognized in him a born military leader. When Roosevelt resigned as assistant secretary of the navy, in 1898, to raise a regiment of rough riders, he obtained the appointment of Wood as its colonel and his own superior; and the choice was so well justified that President McKinley made the former army surgeon a brigadier general of volunteers, and six months later a major general of volunteers. This rank lapsed with the end of the Spanish-American war, but Wood's ability had been so signally demonstrated that he was commissioned as brigadier general in the regular army and made governor general of Cuba, where he established the efficient government later turned over to the islanders. When Roosevelt became president on the death of McKinley, he took Wood into the closest association with him, and after five years—in 1906—promoted the young soldier to a major generalship over the heads of 111 seniors. This action created a storm of opposition, for it meant that Wood, a former surgeon and the veteran of a single war, would ultimately become head of the United States army. Yet he filled even that high post with credit, and is regarded thruout Europe today as the foremost American military leader.

When President Wilson sought the strongest and ablest administrator capable of carrying thru the stupendous shipbuilding program necessitated by Germany's submarine warfare, he wisely selected George W. Goethals, a retired major general, the one man in the country, perhaps, big enough for the job. And who was Goethals? He was a West Pointer, a highly efficient engineer who had risen steadily by merit to a place on the general staff, but, until ten years ago, was quite

unknown to the public. President Roosevelt wanted a man to dig the Panama canal, the most gigantic construction undertaking ever attempted. The man to carry thru that work must be an engineer of commanding ability, a skillful diplomat, a great executive and an administrator of tremendous force. Roosevelt picked Goethals, and Goethals cut the backbone of two continents in schedule time, giving to the United States and the world an asset of immeasurable value. And when a war task almost equal in magnitude clamored for a man fit to perform it, the army engineer whom Roosevelt had made chairman of the canal commission was the only nominee the government could intelligently consider.

Over in London there has been for several weeks an American naval officer named W. S. Sims. He has been the authorized representative of the navy and government of the United States in all the important negotiations and arrangements pertaining to the co-operation of the sea forces of this nation with those of Great Britain and France. He is in command of the squadron of American destroyers now in European waters fighting submarines, and undoubtedly will be the chief of any greater force sent over. Last week President Wilson promoted him from rear admiral to vice admiral, a rank now held by only one other American. By the way, who is Sims? "He is one of the Roosevelt 'finds,'" says the New York Sun. "It is largely due to Roosevelt's recognition of his progressive spirit that he has been in a position to advance so rapidly." In 1902 President Roosevelt's attention was attracted by sharp criticisms of American target practice methods, which came from a young naval lieutenant named Sims, then serving as fleet intelligence officer on the Asiatic fleet. His reports offended the bureaucrats of the navy department, but

Roosevelt saw in them such evidences of keen expert judgment that he put him in charge of target practice for the whole navy. He directed that work for seven years, rising to the rank of commander, and made the efficiency of American naval gunfire noted the world over. For several years he was President Roosevelt's naval aide.

When President Wilson rejected the Roosevelt division he "turned a very clever political trick," said the *New York Times*, in designating as leader of the first force to be sent to France Major General John J. Pershing. Now, why was the selection of this highly capable officer a "clever political trick"? Because, said the candid *Times*, "Roosevelt has been placed in a position where he cannot criticise the appointment"—Pershing being another product of Roosevelt "favoritism." John J. Pershing, whose fitness to lead the first American division into battle is universally recognized, was a major of volunteers in the Spanish-American war. After serving in Cuba he was sent to the Philippines, where he revealed audacity and skill in military leadership and high ability as an administrator. He returned to the United States in 1903, however, with the rank of captain in the regular army. President Roosevelt singled him out for special promotion as a reward for exceptional services; he wanted to make him a colonel, but was baffled by certain red-tape regulations. This struck Roosevelt as so unjust that he made strong reference to it in one of his messages to congress, Captain Pershing being, perhaps, the only one of that rank to be mentioned by name in such a document. Finally, in 1906, President Roosevelt overcame the difficulty by the characteristic procedure of making the captain a brigadier general. In doing this he jumped him over the heads of 862 officers his senior in age and service; but the action

has been vindicated abundantly and has been indorsed by the present administration, which made Pershing a major general last September.

These facts will not tend to make clearer to the American people the justice or wisdom of the administration in representing that Theodore Roosevelt knows nothing about war and is incapable of rendering efficient service. They will continue to regret that the country is not to have the benefit of his leadership and personality at the front. Yet they will feel the greater confidence in the actual conduct of the war, perhaps, because of these convincing evidences that Roosevelt's ideas are not "practical or effective"—Wood, a Roosevelt man, will run half the training camps for the new army; Goethals, a Roosevelt man, will build the ships to overcome the submarine menace; Sims, a Roosevelt man, is to command the American sea forces; Pershing, a Roosevelt man, is to be the leader of the army of the United States in France.



## THE LISTS OF HONOR

*June 5, 1917.*

**T**HERE takes place today thruout the nation one of the most significant events in the history of the republic. This registration of all citizens designated as eligible for military service, as preliminary to a selective draft, is more than remarkable; it is, we believe, unique, because no other nation ever put into effect compulsory service under these circumstances. Conscription has been in force in several countries for many years; others have adopted it in the midst of war, as was done by the Confederacy and the Federal government half a century ago and by Great Britain in this conflict; but this is the first time that a people has made it an original part of a war program. Every loyal American will feel a serious sense of responsibility as the momentous procedure is carried out. In millions of homes it will be observed with solemnity and not a little apprehension; for there is hardly a household in the land which has not a member, a relative or a close friend among those summoned to present themselves. It seems to bring the war, the terrors of which have seemed so remote from us, to our very thresholds. And yet, despite the sobering thoughts which it brings, there is something in it inspiring, this orderly recognition of law, this nation-wide response of a people to the call of their government. One sees significance even in the fact that the registration will not be made at military offices, but at the polling places, where the highest func-

tion of free citizenship is exercised. For, tho the act is compulsory, it is none the less an expression of democracy. It is because American common sense has recognized this fact that the elaborate conspiracy to create a general movement against military service is foredoomed to failure.

From the time when involvement of the United States in the war became a probability, the pro-German and pacifist forces have had for one of their objects the discouragement of enlistments and the weakening of the government by the fomenting of sentiment against necessary measures of national defense. They were so strong a year ago that there was actually a majority in the house of representatives ready to pass a resolution abandoning national sovereignty and withdrawing protection from American citizens exercising their lawful rights at sea. Only drastic action, backed by the full power of the administration, prevented that shameful act from being consummated. When the president sought authority to protect American lives and ships from murderous outrage, there were agents of pro-Germanism and pacifism in the United States senate audacious enough to obstruct and defeat the will of congress and the people. Every device of political trickery and agitation has been employed to embarrass the government in its foreign relations by creating the impression of a divided nation, and to interfere with its measures of national defense.

Passage of the so-called conscription law, which provides only for compulsory service by selected, eligible citizens, was a victory for sound public opinion over the forces of disloyalty and delusion. Yet at the same time it gave them a new opportunity for intrigue. The idea of conscription had always been unpopular in this country; even Washington and Jefferson and Lincoln

could not make it acceptable. And a plausible campaign was waged to incite the people against an undertaking falsely represented as a form of Prussianism. But the conscription law, to call it that, proved to carry its own antidote against the poison of the pro-German and pacifist propaganda. Americans, having become persuaded that war was necessary in defense of their rights and institutions, calmly decided that it should be fought according to the principles underlying the republic—the principles of democracy. They refused to be alarmed by the word conscription; for they saw in it, not merely compulsory service, but equitable service. The law, it is true, applies to a restricted number of citizens, within designated age limits; but it makes no discrimination between classes. And it was the knowledge that rich and poor, the son of the capitalist and the son of the wage-worker, must give the same service, that made the public cold to the clamoring of agitators against the draft. There have been, and will be, sporadic outbursts of discontent and opposition. But the scheme of a great national uprising, planned with true Prussian efficiency, has been shattered. If we must fight, Americans feel, the way to fight is under democratic rules.

It is this loyal acquiescence of the people in the measure necessary to meet a great emergency that makes inappropriate, if not offensive, the attitude which some zealous but misguided patriots assume toward the system effective today. One of the most deplorable results of the volunteer system is that, while it calls into action a splendid force of ardent patriotism, it creates at the same time an unjust and false distinction. It brings into currency such ugly words as "slacker." It is responsible for the signs and posters playing upon the irritating phrase, "Your Country Needs *You*," sometimes emphasized by a scowling Uncle Sam pointing an

accusing finger at every passerby. It is obvious that the admonition is sound; there is no citizen who is exempt from service of some sort. But the implication that every man who does not enlist in the army or navy is a shirker or skulker is worse than unsound; it is silly. There are ingenious variations of the theme. "Be a Went, Not a Sent," "Don't Be a Slacker—Enlist With Honor Now," "Come in Out of the Draft," these and kindred arguments have been used for their coercive effect, and with the heedless purpose of casting a vague discredit upon those who loyally obey the government's summons to register for selection. The mistaken and ungenerous spirit was expressed characteristically by Champ Clark:

I protest against the slur of being a conscript being placed upon the men of Missouri. There is precious little difference between a conscript and a convict. I hope and pray that my son may go into battle, not by the side of loafers and slackers, but shoulder to shoulder with free men who serve gladly.

The pretense that only the man who volunteers enlists with honor, the infamous comparison between the law-abiding patriot who cheerfully answers his country's call and the criminal in his livery of shame—these are expressions of folly. They are an insult to the devoted troops of France, who count it a heritage of liberty that each citizen of the republic bears an equal burden with his fellow, and to the drafted soldiers of Great Britain who are fighting with such tenacious gallantry in our cause. The British people have tried both systems, and to ask them to abandon conscription now for the wasteful, inefficient and cruel methods of coercive volunteering would be to affront their intelligence. The slurs of the thoughtless and the malignant opposition of the disloyal are thoroly unjust, immoral and vicious in

their effects. What is the meaning of the selective draft which they would discredit? It has been admirably stated by President Wilson:

The idea is that those should be chosen for service in the army who can be most readily spared from the prosecution of the other activities to which the country must devote a great deal of its best energy and capacity. The volunteer system does not do this. When men choose themselves they sometimes choose without due regard to their other responsibilities. The principle has at its heart this idea, that there is a universal obligation to serve, and that a public authority should choose upon whom the obligation of military service shall rest.

All honor to the volunteers! But who sends them to war? In most cases the heart-searching decision must be made by a mother or a wife. Is this just? Representative Anderson, of Minnesota, out in the "anti-militaristic" middle west, has put the case unanswerably:

The right to serve or not to serve is not a privilege of the individual, it is an obligation to the government. It is not fair that the mothers of America should bear the burden of the decision to send their sons to the front. That burden belongs to the government, to the nation whose life is at stake.

Call it compulsion, call it a draft, call it conscription, call it anything that it is or is not—it is fair and square and American, the clearest possible expression of democracy. It is inspiring to every patriotic citizen to see the tens of thousands of ardent young men who have voluntarily offered themselves; by that action they have demonstrated conspicuous courage and loyalty. But no less is honor due to the millions who quietly assemble at the polling places today to place themselves at the disposal of the nation's government. They are honorably and cheerfully paying a debt, they are acknowledging and fulfilling the highest obligation of citizenship—

can any man do more? The theory that a possibly eligible man who has not volunteered must be a shirker is illogical and contemptible. Who is to know his circumstances? Who is to decide his fitness, his proper place in the scheme of national defense? His life belongs to his country, not to his neighbors or the irresponsible writers of inflammatory recruiting posters; the government, not the community or the man himself, is the authority that should decide where his duty lies. What we urge is that Americans shall rise to the dignity and sound patriotism and democratic equality of today's memorable procedure. Let the thoughts of all follow the millions of young men as they respond loyally to the nation's summons. Not one in twenty of them, perhaps, will be called upon now for military service; yet their registration is a certificate of good citizenship and of patriotic duty. With all its solemnity, this event should be an inspiration to every American, for there is in it that uplifting meaning which President Wilson has nobly expressed:

It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass. It is essential that we accord to the day the honor and the meaning that it deserves; that it be carried in our hearts as a great day of patriotic devotion and obligation, when the name of every male citizen of the designated ages is written on these lists of honor.

## JAPAN, RUSSIA AND THE WAR

*June 8, 1917.*

THE ever-changing panorama of the war has brought into view one of its strangest possibilities in the report that Japan is prepared to take drastic action if the forces of anarchy in Russia bring about a separate peace. The vicissitudes of international politics never produced a more singular record in the relations of two first-class Powers. A dozen years ago Japan and Russia were at war over irreconcilable ambitions. In this conflict they have fought on the same side, and last July the governments of mikado and czar formed a definite alliance. And now Japan finds it necessary to safeguard herself against a defection which would be as dangerous to her as to the other Entente nations. This move—which official denials by no means discredit—constitutes one of the most interesting complications of the world war. And it is of obvious concern to the United States. Japanese warships are already operating in European waters; Japanese troops may yet be fighting side by side with Americans, and Japanese diplomats will occupy high seats at the council of nations which will reorganize the affairs of the world. To estimate the far-reaching possibilities of the situation it is necessary to understand the past relations between Japan and Russia, Japan and Great Britain, Japan and the other nations in the anti-Teutonic alliance.

The treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese war, did not satisfy either side. It merely

made a temporary peace. The policies of the two empires in the Far East made it inevitable that they should be either enemies or allies. Japan's participation in the world war was due to her alliance with Great Britain, but she fulfilled its terms with genuine pleasure. It was the kaiser who instigated the European combination that snatched from Japan the fruits of her victory over China in 1895. The Japanese yielded by necessity to the galling veto, but with a settled purpose to take revenge at the first opportunity. This feeling became a smoldering passion when, only two years after the humiliation, Germany audaciously seized a maritime colony in the rich Chinese province of Shan-tung. When Great Britain, therefore, asked Japan to undertake the expulsion of Germany from China and the whole Orient, the enterprise was more than welcome. The kaiser's cherished port of Kiao-chau was methodically besieged and captured, and the German islands in the Pacific were taken over. All these things Japan accomplished at a minimum cost. Then, with her fleet and armies intact, and her industries piling up vast wealth for the nation thru the manufacture of war supplies for Russia, she modestly withdrew into the background of the conflict; but she remained vigilantly aware of the slaughter and the changing political events in Europe, and ever observant of the effects upon her own interests, present and prospective. We do not imply that she was in any degree insincere in her loyalty to the Entente, but it is not unjust to say that the Japanese always give first consideration to the interests of their own country. There is very little of the "service to humanity" spirit in the statesmanship of Nippon.

It was in pursuance of this cautious nationalistic policy that Japan, last July, quietly perfected an alliance with her old enemy. There may have been some secret



provisions, but those published were sufficiently important. They stipulated that neither country should participate in "any political arrangement or combination" against the other, and that in case the territorial rights or special interests of either in the Far East were menaced, they would mutually protect and defend them. The announced object, of course, was "to promote peace in the Orient." But the general interpretation was that the two empires had pooled their interests to the extent that Russia recognized Japan's paramountcy in the Far East, while Japan pledged at least moral support to Russia's policies elsewhere—which meant in the Mediterranean. The Japanese foreign minister said as much, when he pointed out that as a result of the war Russia would be most nearly concerned with European problems. Japan, meanwhile, has been scrupulously faithful to her general engagements with the Entente. She has policed the trade routes of the Pacific and Indian oceans, guarding the sea highways from Shanghai to Aden; her troops, with merely formal British aid, reduced the Kiaochau stronghold; she seized and held in trust for the alliance Germany's Pacific islands; and her armies have been ready at any time to safeguard British rule in India. But her most effective contribution has been in the supplying to Russia of guns, ammunition and other material which Russia had no means of obtaining from her western allies. Despite these substantial acts of assistance to the common cause, the more direct participation of Japan in the European conflict has been a live topic for two years, ever since hope of a swift and decisive victory over Germany was abandoned. Great Britain has never given any sign of desiring the presence of Japanese troops, but many influential representatives of France, where the drain on man-power has been more severe, have persistently urged that the Oriental mem-

ber of the alliance should exert all possible force to hasten the end. To all such suggestions and unofficial pleas Japan has been politely attentive, but studiously reserved. Why should she do more than she had done? She had fulfilled her engagements, her own interests were adequately secured by the agreement with Russia, and she could stand aloof upon an honorable record and collect her rewards without further sacrifices.

And then, overnight, her house of cards collapsed. If the overthrow of czarism and the uprising of anarchy in Russia startled Great Britain and France and the United States, they staggered the complacent lords of the Far East. Every development in the great upheaval has emphasized the fact that the alliance of July, 1916, is the most worthless of the scraps of paper preserved in the archives of statesmanship. If the infatuated visionaries who are just now dominant in Russian affairs are ready to repudiate the solemn agreement not to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers, what reason is there to believe that they will be tender about Nicholas Romanoff's convention with the mikado? If they care nothing for the woes of Belgium or the horrors perpetrated in France or the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, is it likely that they will concern themselves over political ideals in the distant Orient? The ominous meaning of all this for Japan is plain. For it must be remembered that, while she has attained a position of dominance in the Far East, it still lacks indorsement by the other great Powers. The acquiescence of Russia was a substantial point gained; now that that has proved illusory, Japan more than ever needs to be prepared and watchful, more than ever desires to strengthen herself with her allies, among whom now is the United States. Official disclaimers of a warning to the Russian revolutionists, therefore, do not alter the fact that Japan would

consider a Russo-German peace and a betrayal of the Entente a catastrophe; that she would probably be impelled to act in such a case upon request of the Allies and in order to protect her own interests. A clear outline of her position was given recently by Doctor Iyenaga, an influential Japanese now in this country:

Japan would not send her troops as mercenaries. But, while we are all united in a common cause, even the United States will want a quid pro quo. It has been said that thru the war Japan has already gained a commanding position in the Orient, but this position has never been recognized. At present we are holding our forces to safeguard Allied interests in the East. The danger that these will be threatened comes from the possibility of a separate peace by Russia. This would throw under German control potential resources almost equal to those of the United States, and would create the very great danger of Russo-German aggression in the Far East. It is against that eventuality that Japanese resources are being held. She will throw her energies fully into the war if it becomes essential for the success of the Allied cause; but if Russia makes a separate peace, Japan will probably have to throw them in anyway to protect her own interests.

Lack of shipping makes it difficult to see how Japanese forces in great number could be put on any of the European fronts. Nevertheless, the project is to be recognized as a possibility, and the United States must face its implications. Already a reader reminds us that we expressed concern over Great Britain's action in calling Japan into the war. He quotes our comment of August 22, 1914:

Her partisanship with Japan may serve her immediate purposes, but she is likely to find her needless call for its fulfillment the costliest move she ever made. For she has strengthened the cause of the Germans, who contend that they are fighting for western civilization, and she has let loose upon Europe and America influences which may embarrass them for generations to come.

The warning then was sound; the involvement of an Oriental empire in the affairs of Europe was a hazardous enterprise, in which the United States, for obvious reasons, was especially concerned. But it must be remembered that circumstances have been completely changed. At that time the United States was standing aloof; its policy of "neutrality even in thought" had aroused the suspicion and resentment of the Allies. The danger was that Japan thru her war efforts would be able to exact from them at least moral support in her contentions with the American government. If such differences became acute, who would be our friend? Not Germany—she would be delighted at such a collision; not Britain or France, whose fight for democracy we officially declared to be none of our concern. Circumstances now are vastly different. The United States is a participant in the war, with full responsibilities and full right to consideration. It must not only help, it must carry most of the burden of the war against autocracy. This country has a definite and commanding status in world affairs, and no move by Japan or any other member of the alliance will be taken without our consent and the safeguarding of our interests. If events necessitate full participation in the conflict by Japan, that action, which formerly would have been a menace to the United States, will be considered in this country an advantage, calculated not only to hasten world peace, but to make easier an amicable settlement of the issues which have threatened to embroil the two countries.

## MAKING HISTORY FOR GREECE

*June 15, 1917.*

**A**MONG the copious writings of an English author well known half a century ago and still read by the curious are two volumes of entertaining biographies facetiously entitled "Monarchs Retired From Business." A third volume by another hand would be a valuable addition to current literature, especially since the war has multiplied the vicissitudes of the royal profession. The sovereigns of Servia, Montenegro, Russia and Greece have already been dispossessed, and unless all signs fail additional chapters would be necessary to bring the history down to date at the close of the conflict. In more than one case the kingly exit from affairs has been an episode of dramatic or tragic interest; but Constantine I. leaves his throne without grace or dignity, in circumstances that make no appeal to the sympathies of the world. A discredited ruler, a baffled intriguer and an unsuccessful despot, he passes into obscurity amid general relief, regretted only by the autocracy he tried to emulate and serve.

It is a depressing thought that this "radical solution" of Greece's troubles, long threatened by the Allies, will call forth reverberating condemnation from Berlin. The ravishers of Belgium have always made the most of their enemies' coercion of the treacherous government conducted at Athens by the kaiser's brother-in-law, and new objurgations upon the "hypocrisy" of the Entente may be expected. But the truth is that the

shifty and maladroit king of the Hellenes was treated with generous consideration and that his expulsion is as much a service to the Greek people as to the exasperated guarantors of the nation's integrity. At least it may be hoped that the reign of duplicity in Greece will be definitely ended and that the unhappy country will have a chance to work out its destiny according to the will of its inhabitants, whatever that may be. For it is undeniable that the woes of Greece have been due fundamentally to the strangling of popular government by a German-inspired despotism and a deluded factionalism. One of the aims professed by the Entente is to "establish unity of feeling among the Greeks." Certainly, this was an impossible ideal so long as Berlin manipulated the government thru a puppet sovereign; and it may be attained when the supervision is transferred to Powers which gave the nation its independence and protected it for three-quarters of a century. There was historic warrant, of course, for the stern decree presented on Monday by a French envoy as "minister and high commissioner of France, Great Britain and Russia." It was these three countries which intervened in 1827 in Greece's heroic war of liberation from Turkish tyranny, and crowned it with victory when their combined naval forces shattered the Moslem fleet at Navarino. Thereupon, they undertook the guardianship of the "monarchical, independent, constitutional state," and faithfully fulfilled their obligations.

When the first ruler, a Bavarian, drove the nation to revolt in 1862 against his stupid Teutonic despotism, the representatives of the people showed their sentiments by electing almost unanimously Prince Alfred of Britain. Because of agreement among the protecting Powers, however, he was ineligible, and they designated as a suitable candidate a Danish prince, who was elected

by the national assembly as "George I, king of the Hellenes," and reigned with credit for more than half a century. At his accession the guaranteeing Powers provided a firm financial foundation for the new government, and Great Britain ceded to it the important territories which, since the treaty of Paris of 1815, had been under her protection as "the United States of the Ionian Islands." This fostering care of Greece's interests was never relaxed or betrayed. As late as 1897 France and Britain and Russia saved the country from Turkish revenge for a recklessly undertaken and futile war. Thus, one of the most confidently expected moves in the present conflict was the adherence of Greece to the Entente cause, especially since the three Powers had once saved the dynasty from overthrow by the people and enabled Constantine to ascend the throne in 1913 as the popular ruler of a united nation. It is with this record in view that the world will judge the course of the deposed king.

Greece's participation in the war was first demanded of her in September, 1915—not by the Allies, it should be observed, but by the requirements of international honor. Serbia had been invaded by Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, and a solemn treaty stipulated that in case either Greece or Serbia was attacked, the other party to the alliance should join forces in defense. Premier Venizelos—who since last October has been head of the provisional government confronting the kaiser's figurehead—had urged from the beginning that Greece should join the Entente. He had resigned office and had been overwhelmingly returned to power by the people upon that precise issue. Naturally, he pledged the nation's assistance to its ally; but Constantine interposed his veto. The treaty provided that in the event of default by Greece, Serbia might seek the aid of France

and Britain. Venizelos, therefore, inquired whether they would undertake the task his own country had rejected, and Anglo-French forces were landed at Saloniki for the purpose of trying to save Servia. Immediately Constantine dismissed his premier and began that devious adventure of pro-German intrigue which has landed him in exile. He always protested that he was inspired wholly by love of Greece, and that only the certainty of Germany's triumph led him to "keep the country out of war," even at the cost of violating the constitution by dismissing the parliament and establishing a personal government. But the undeniable fact is that if he had delivered Greece to Germany as an ally in the beginning, he would not have been more serviceable to his imperial brother-in-law than he was by his course of evasion and successive promises and repudiations.

His control of the army, the higher command of which was as strongly pro-German as he, enabled him at once to annul the will of the people and to paralyze the operations of the Allies. When their inadequate relief expedition was driven back from Servia, he threatened to disarm the troops and expel them from Greece. For more than a year a great force has been ready to advance against Bulgaria, but its leaders have had to guard against the obvious menace of an attack from the rear. That they had good reason for their suspicions was shown last June, when the Bulgars invaded the coveted territory of Grecian Macedonia, and, upon orders from Athens, several forts were surrendered without the firing of a shot. The historic enemies of the nation were actually supplied with vast military stores by this atrocious maneuver, one reason for which, by the way, was that the alien occupation of Greek territory deprived the Liberal party of about sixty seats in parliament. This betrayal intensified the growing revolution-



ary spirit, and in August a great demonstration served notice on the king that the people would rise unless he abandoned his plot to promote a German victory and erect thereon a Prussian autocracy in Greece. A few days later Saloniki was in insurrection, and an Allied fleet arrived at the port of Athens to protect Anglo-French interests. There followed months of intermittent civil strife, with more desperate maneuvering by the king and his adherents, and more severe measures of coercion by the Entente. One cabinet after another was set up by the king, and again and again he promised to make real the "benevolent neutrality" which he had solemnly guaranteed. But his course was so plainly dictated by Berlin that the patriotic Greeks took the final step of repudiation. On September 24 Crete had a bloodless and complete revolution, and two days later Venizelos, backed by the commander-in-chief of the Greek navy and other powerful leaders, established there a provisional government pledged to war against the Bulgarian invaders.

Even then Constantine, had he assumed the leadership of the people, might have saved his throne. But he played for time, gambling upon the promises from Berlin that presently the Teuton hosts would sweep down and drive the French and British into the sea. There were riots in Athens, patrols of the Allies were treacherously attacked and movements in the rear of their Saloniki forces became so menacing that they demanded the withdrawal of all royalist troops a stated distance from the zone of operations. The contest culminated in an ultimatum requiring the surrender of arms and munitions equivalent to those which Constantine had permitted Bulgaria, enemy of Greece and of the Entente, to take; and the result of another attempted evasion was a bloody battle in the streets of

Athens, when French and British troops were ambuscaded by Greek regulars and guerrillas placed to trap them. This was on December 1 last, and from that time Greece virtually disappeared from the news. The Allies discerned that they would never be safe while Constantine's forces hung on their flanks, and they employed the weapon of a relentless blockade to break his power. The censorship has hidden the results, except for fragmentary dispatches, but some day it will be known what privations the hapless Greeks have suffered because of the obduracy of their alien king. It is impossible to say whether it was true, as reported a couple of months ago, that Constantine offered to form a cabinet sympathetic to the Allies provided they would guarantee his possession of the throne. But the proposal, if made, was not seriously considered, for about the same time it was announced in Washington that the state department was preparing to recognize the provisional government headed by Venizelos. What the Greeks will do now, whether they will be able or unitedly willing to take an effective part in the war for democracy, cannot be accurately foretold. But it is something gained for the cause of human liberty that they will be able to express themselves upon the issue, and to begin a new era of Grecian history free from the blight of kaiserism.

## SOCIALISM ON TRIAL

*June 16, 1917.*

**T**HE Socialist party in America is doomed. From the early days of the war it has been committed to a program essentially unneutral, un-American and pro-German. The very word Socialism has acquired a hateful significance for many thousands of Americans. It has been so thoroly discredited by the recent achievements in disloyalty of some of its professed advocates that for many years it will be enough to "hoodoo" any proposal to which it is attached.

We are aware that these are grave and controversial assertions, yet we print them here with the utmost confidence that they are justified. For they are quoted direct from public statements made by Americans who have been active and eminent in Socialist party leadership for years—men who are still ardent believers in the doctrines and principles of the philosophy, and have left the organization only because it has been prostituted to a false cause. It is undeniable that Socialism has fallen under general suspicion and condemnation. It is coming to be regarded as a sort of international nuisance. Representing only a minority of the peoples concerned in the war, it arrogates to itself the right to dictate the terms of peace in a conflict which it persistently misrepresents and condemns. More than that, in each of the countries battling for the life of democracy it obstructs national defense and incites seditious opposition to measures indorsed by the popular will.

In reprobating Socialism, of course, we discriminate between the movement as it has been understood and its unwholesome manifestations in the world war, such as the antics of the Russian fanatics and the hypocritical device of the Stockholm conference engineered by Berlin. No open-minded student denies that in the fundamental doctrines of Socialism—its championship of freedom, equality, popular government, public ownership of utilities, political and industrial democracy—there are sound ideas. No intelligent observer can fail to discern that the war has already established vital features of the program, and that advances have been made toward the Socialist ideal which the reaction peace will bring can never fully counteract. What we mean is the Socialistic influence which reveals itself in a sickly distortion of humanitarianism; which seeks to obliterate national distinctions, discredit patriotism and decry loyalty. Such a propaganda is folly, because it defies and affronts human nature; it is immoral, because it condones international crimes and would perpetuate their evil results; and it is, in the present circumstances, flagrantly dishonest, because it palpably serves autocracy and militarism, while professing to stand for democracy and peace. The collapse of Socialism as a power for world betterment is the more striking because it had, at the beginning of the war, the greatest opportunity any association of men ever had to advance a great cause and serve mankind. It rested with international Socialism, which long had boasted of being able to dictate the foreign policies of European countries, to avert the appalling conflict. Yet never was there a more lamentable failure, a more shameless scuttling of principle. For this the odium rests upon German Socialism, the parent organization, the source of the cult. The Social Democratic party of the empire half-heartedly

deplored the infamy of Belgium's spoliation; it has reprobated programs of conquest and expended vast energies in discussing peace. But in practice it has consistently voted for war; it has upheld kaiserism, supported aggression and defended policies of barbarity; and at the present moment it is the most serviceable agent of autocracy in intriguing for a "German peace," which would mean the extinction of democracy. Yet the indictment does not lie against German Socialism alone, for in every country there are adherents of its doctrines who promote the same ideas—even in the United States, where citizens of the republic are not ashamed to conspire with the Socialistic lackeys of kaiserism. International Socialism was bankrupt from the hour that the German element indorsed the war of subjugation begun against Europe. A basic principle of the creed was, of course, that all wars were created by capitalism for selfish ends, and that they must be ended by a union of the "proletariat" of all countries. Patriotism was condemned as a survival of tribal society, unworthy of enlightened men of this day and wholly antagonistic to their best interests. It is enough to quote from "The Truth About Socialism," written a year before the war by Allan L. Benson, an able American advocate. Melancholy reading now are his jeers for those who are "patriotic," who "follow the flag"; his offhand predictions of world peace guaranteed by Socialism:

Socialists will not go to war. They will not join the army, the militia or the navy. All over the world this is true. They preach against war in season and out of season. They will vote for no bill that seeks to draw another man or another dollar into the horrible game of war. \* \* \* We refuse to kill men, either for ourselves or for any one else. Nor do we believe that Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans or any others are less our brothers than are Americans.

Mr. Benson is no less a Socialist today, but he has quit the party which has tied itself to the chariot wheels of Prussianism. He can sympathize with such men as Emile Vandervelde, one of the heroic statesmen of Belgium, who has the painful memory of having declared, just before his country was betrayed by German Socialism: "Because all governments are capitalistic, we openly declare that patriotism and Socialism are utterly contradictory."

But Americans are most concerned with the attitude of the party in this country. It has worn threadbare, of course, the devices of "neutrality" and solicitude for "true democracy"; but from the beginning it has stood for every demand of Germany and against everything that Germany opposed. It was for warning Americans to surrender their rights at the behest of the murderous submarine; it was for an embargo upon the supplies that enabled the Allies to wage their fight for civilization; it has never uttered a word in condemnation of the outrages upon Belgium; it has condoned and apologized for every infamy of German frightfulness. Nor was this policy abandoned when the United States, after suffering atrocious wrongs and intolerable aggression, took up arms in defense of its sovereignty. At the Socialist convention held in St. Louis in April the American declaration of war was called a "crime" and the president's address to congress "rank hypocrisy." "In all modern history," said a resolution, "there has been no war more unjustified than the war in which we are about to engage." The party pledged itself "to the support of all mass movements against conscription" and against "any attempt to raise money for the payment of war expenses by taxing the necessaries of life or issuing bonds which will put the burden on future generations." It demanded that "the capitalist class,

which is responsible for the war, pay its cost." It has attacked the American mission sent to carry moral and material aid to the democracy of Russia and to avert a separate peace with Germany. It has expelled Charles Edward Russell for accepting appointment to that body. The Socialist party in the United States, in a word, is hostile to the government, to defense of national rights, to the vindication of international law and the establishment of a just peace. Professing to stand for democracy, it supports the transparent trickery of the peace movement based upon the crooked formula of "no annexations, no indemnities," which means a German victory and perpetuation of the most malignant autocracy the world has ever seen. It indorses the dishonest Stockholm conference, which American Socialists who are faithful to their country have exposed as "the most dangerous of all the kaiser's plots." What is the reason for this disloyal and undemocratic propoganda? It is given by William English Walling, a leader who has been impelled to leave the party because of its abasement:

If the majority report (the anti-American resolution passed at St. Louis) is adopted by the party members, as I have no doubt it will be, a majority of the American Socialists will leave the party. The Russian Jews and Germans will remain. The report will be indorsed only because 75 per cent of the members now are foreigners.

The Socialist party in the United States is anti-American, anti-democratic, pro-German. It is not even genuinely Socialistic. "It has ceased to be an efficient instrument for the advancement of Socialism," declares John Spargo, who for more than twenty-five years was a leader in the cause and was long a member of the national executive committee. In repudiating the party he writes:

What is it but a betrayal of the accepted principles of international Socialism to declare that the issue in this war is

“no concern of the workers”? What is it but a denial of nationalism—without which there can be no internationalism—to say that the only struggle which would justify the workers in taking up arms is the social war; that, therefore, all struggles for national independence are unjustifiable? What is it but a fundamental departure from the Socialism of Marx and Engels, of Liebknecht and Jaures, to urge equally upon Belgian and German workers to “withdraw all support from their governments”? The Belgian government in defending its territory merited the support of all Belgian Socialists, while the German government, engaged in a dastardly violation, merited the opposition of the German Socialists to the end of their power. To contend otherwise is to set Socialism against the moral sense of mankind.

Those Americans who have left the party—such able champions as Russell and Benson and Walling and Spargo—are called “patriot Socialists” by the anti-American majority. Those who employ the term mean it as a sneer; could there be more striking evidence that in this republic the Socialist party, as now constituted, is an abnormal and offensive institution? Socialism is on trial before the world, and especially before the American people. It has been, and may be again, a beneficent force in many ways, but in the face of the clearest issue ever raised between justice and brute force, between right and wrong, Socialism is found serving the power that threatens the very existence of civilization. If this is humanitarianism, then Americans want none of it; if this is the basis of a program of a Socialized world, then they will repudiate and everlastingly war upon its monstrous fallacies.



## “NO ANNEXATIONS, NO INDEMNITIES”

*June 19, 1917.*

**M**OST intelligent Americans have viewed with irritation and scorn the fanatical maneuvers of the Russian extremists, and especially the truculent attitude of that element toward the United States and its allies. Yet a good many of the people of this country have been attracted, we think, by the exceptionally moderate peace program of the revolutionists, with its sweeping requirement of “no annexations, no indemnities” and its insistence that the anti-Teutonic alliance shall forthwith revise its war aims to meet the lofty ideals of the Russian proletariat. Nothing, it would seem, could be in greater contrast to the habits of autocracy or more suggestive of the generous instincts of a people free to express its sense of international brotherhood. Russia has lost vast treasure and millions of men, but she neither yearns for conquest nor seeks revenge nor demands reparation. But the proposal of a basis upon which to reorganize the world after an upheaval which has shaken the very foundation of human society invites close examination. Because it is neatly phrased and superficially generous it is not necessarily sound.

The formula of “no annexations, no indemnities” is not, of course, the product of the statesmanlike genius of the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, that remarkable body which conceives that it has proved

its fitness to decide the fate of mankind by producing a state of anarchy in its own country. "No annexations, no indemnities" is the peace program of German Socialism—and likewise of Prussianism, militarism and kaiserism. We are quite aware that a vociferous and influential element in Germany is implacably for the annexation of Belgium, the mineral regions of north-eastern France, part of the Channel coast and large sections of Russian territory, and that opposition to this policy of conquest is denounced as treason. But these proposals constitute the rewards of military victory, and that is not possible—now. For the present war the aim of the kaiser, the imperial chancellor, the entire government and the most powerful interests in the ruling class is peace with "no annexations, no indemnities." Settlement on that basis would appeal to many citizens in all the opposing nations as equivalent to a German defeat. It would mean—aside from the injustice to Belgium and France—a German triumph. For every development emphasizes the truth of what we wrote sixteen months ago—that Germany wants peace "not because she fears defeat, but because she desires to capitalize her victories"; of what we expounded from the very first month of the war:

The goal of German might was not Paris or London or Warsaw, but Constantinople; not the absorption of neighboring territory, but the opening of a highway to the illimitable East; not the mere domination of Europe, but the carving out of a colossal empire whose shores should be washed by the North sea and the waters of the Indian ocean. Pan-Germanism is a tremendous reality. Its voice is the hum of German civilization, the roar of German workshops, the thunder of German cannon; its spirit is the indomitable will of a great people; its desire is the conquest of the earth.

And at this moment Germany has attained her first goal; nay, she won it long ago—when she brought Tur-

key and Bulgaria under her sway, overran Serbia and Montenegro and Rumania, made the mighty Danube a Teuton highway virtually from its source to its mouth, and laid the foundations for a confederation of states splitting Europe in twain and projecting the shadow of Germany's power across Asia and around the globe. With this colossal prize in her possession, and needing only the ratification of her war-burdened adversaries, Germany has been ready and eager for many months to negotiate a settlement, and she would "astonish the world," it was intimated, "by the moderation of her terms." These were unofficially, but plausibly, made known in February, 1916—evacuation of occupied territories, without reparation, and recognition of German dominance in the Balkans. "The real heart of the matter," as we then said, "is that Germany demands recognition of her political supremacy over Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Turkey, with the right to extend her commercial domains thru Asia Minor with Turkish consent." Let no one imagine that "no annexations, no indemnities" is a recent or Russian formula! This, then, is what it means—a Central European and Asiatic empire ruled from Berlin.

But even so, it may be asked, why should the United States spend vast treasure and waste its young manhood to resist a project which might be conducive to world order, and in any event is no intimate concern of ours? Why should not the Germans, as skilled in the arts of peace as in war, unite the backward peoples of southeastern Europe under an efficient suzerainty and carry the benefits of modern government to the dark places of the earth? The answer is written in the record of the last three years—in law defied, humanity outraged, liberty enslaved; in that long chapter of infamy which began with the foul assassination of Belgium and

recounts the deliberate prosecution of a national policy of plunder and barbarism; in the revelation, nevermore to be dimmed or doubted, that the German empire as now ruled is not to be trusted with power; that Prussianism is a menace to civilization and that armed autocracy and human freedom cannot co-exist. More than a year ago the precise danger now confronting the world in the treacherous "peace without victory" movement was foretold by a French writer who spent twenty-one years in an inquiry into Pan-Germanism, his research taking him thruout Europe, America and Asia. In his masterly book he wrote:

Let us suppose that Germany should declare herself disposed not only to evacuate Poland, the French departments, Belgium and Luxemburg, but also to restore Alsace-Lorraine, and even to give an indemnity, under the sole and tacit conditions that Germany should keep her preponderant influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey. Many worthy people, weary of the prolonged strife, would at once say, "After all, these are acceptable terms—let us make peace." Should the Allies negotiate on such a basis, the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine would be only temporary; for with such a peace as that Germany would obtain all the elements of power which might enable her, after a very short respite, to retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in the end to overcome all the Allies and to achieve in its entirety the Pan-German plan, not only in Europe, but in Asia—nay, in the whole world. It is not enough for Americans to constitute themselves the champions of right and justice against Teutonic barbarity; they must understand that the maintenance of the independence of the United States absolutely depends on the complete victory of the Allies in Europe. At no price, under no pretext, should the United States suffer Germany to execute her project from Hamburg to the Persian gulf.

But again the advocate of peace on "moderate" terms asks, Why not? What menaces America in Germany's control of Central Europe and western Asia? Let us add to the testimony of this investigator and the

conviction of every intelligent student the measured words of President Wilson:

Government after government has, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired. \* \* \* The plan of the rulers of Germany was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and into the heart of Asia; and they have actually carried the greater part of that plan into execution. From Hamburg to the Persian gulf the net is spread. If they can secure peace now, with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people; they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it—an immense expansion of German power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with it their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside. If they succeed, they are safe and Germany and the world are undone, and America will fall within the menace.

All this, and nothing less, is behind the innocent-appearing demand for "no annexations, no indemnities"—Germany the acknowledged victor over the united democracies of the world; Germany the ruler of a vast empire, with unnumbered hordes of troops at her command; Germany eager to extend her power and take revenge upon the peoples that challenged her aggressive designs. And think! What nation, what alliance of nations, could ever hope in the future to forbid her most audacious project of conquest or to turn aside her vengeance? "Peace without victory," "no annexations, no indemnities"—these phrases may have the sound of humane and enlightened policy, but they are the echoes of autocracy's hidden purpose, and their acceptance would mean the betrayal of civilization to brute force.

Let no American deceive himself into believing that a surrender so made would be a prelude to universal peace. It would be a prelude to a Prussianized world; to a system dominated by the forces which have robbed Serbia, tortured Belgium, desecrated France, mocked at law and humanity, made remorseless war against democracy. What concern have we to spend billions of our wealth and the lives of tens of thousands of our citizens to resist the erection of German dominion in Europe and Asia? Just this—that Germany at Bagdad would be nearer to America than she is at Berlin; that Germany unbeaten would mean the turning against this hemisphere of autocracy's ambition and against this country of the full fury of its barbarous power; that for generations the free peoples of the world would be doomed to cower under the shadow of Prussianism amid the ruins of their liberties.

## PEACE, NOT A TRUCE

*June 20, 1917.*

A WHOLE chapter of the history of the Russian revolution, a complete explanation of its erratic developments, was compressed in a single phrase in Monday's dispatches from Petrograd. Germany's intrigue for a separate peace, it said, had been repudiated by "all the national governing bodies of Russia." One need not marvel at uncertainties in the domestic and foreign policies of a country whose affairs are in the hands of an indefinite number of "national governing bodies." At any rate, all of them have severally declared against the German proffer and desertion of the Allies. This is the position of the *duma*, of the provisional government, of the Peasants' Congress, of the central Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, of the national congress of these bodies, of the financial and business interests and of other organizations participating in the guidance of the republic. There still is a possibility that the truce which has prevailed on the eastern front will continue indefinitely. But there has been, and is, little likelihood of the bald betrayal of a sudden and arbitrary settlement. German diplomacy is not so uncouth as to propose open treachery; its desperate design to detach Russia from the enemy coalition is prosecuted by means of the propaganda of international Socialism, with its platform of a union of the "proletariats" of all nations and its seductive program of "no annexations, no indemnities."

The purpose is plain. The radical elements in Russia, dominant in the government, are not to be asked to commit the dishonor of making a separate peace, but are to be persuaded into delivering to Russia's allies an ultimatum upon acceptable terms for a general peace. Even the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates has repeatedly affirmed that its aim is to end the war, not merely to force the withdrawal of Russia. But the menace is that the effect may be the same. If the numerous "national governing bodies" of Russia persist in demanding a settlement upon terms which would enable Germany to emerge from the conflict a victor, the Allies would be compelled to reject the plan. And this would create the most favorable possible conditions for German intrigue to persuade the Russians that their noble ideals had been spurned and that they were being sacrificed to further the imperialistic schemes of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States—a long step toward a real disruption of the Entente alliance. While the powerful Russian extremists remain fascinated, therefore, by the German formula of "no annexations, no indemnities," which they imagine they invented themselves, the cause to which the United States is committed is in peril.

Americans might condemn more severely the Russian delusion if their own countrymen were wholly free from it. But every close observer knows that there is here, too, an element which believes that a settlement on this basis, without any attempt to curb Germany's power or exact reparation for hideous wrongs, would promote lasting peace, while efforts to establish justice and indemnify wronged nations would create hatreds and sow the seeds of future war. Such persons are still under the impression that this is an ordinary conflict, a collision of international policies. They do not yet



see that its causes go down to the very foundations of human society, and that upon its issue depends, not only the fate of governments, but the future of civilization thruout the world. It seems to them reasonable that Germany should be allowed to emerge from the struggle with her crimes unpunished, her power unimpaired and her prestige vastly increased; with her sway over Central Europe and western Asia recognized, and her autocracy secured for generations. This is the meaning of the attractive phrase, "no annexations, no indemnities." Its ratification would mean that Belgium would be left helpless and impoverished in the shadow of German might; that France would be utterly crippled; that Holland and Denmark would be absorbed and Russia reduced to political and economic vassalage; that Britain would face the prospect of an attack infinitely more terrible than this, at the will of her implacable antagonist; that Prussianism would stamp out the last vestiges of democracy in Central Europe and make it powerless thruout the whole world; and that the United States would be exposed to the full fury of revenge which autocracy would seek for losses and humiliations inflicted. In a word, the principle of "no annexations, no indemnities," useful enough in making a temporary peace, would not last an hour after the confederation of Central Europe was ready to resume its project of Germanizing the world.

It is to avert such a calamity, to preserve the rights and liberties won by the free nations of the earth during centuries of struggle, that democracy is waging this sanguinary war. Upon what terms, then, is the conflict to be ended? They have been stated clearly and repeatedly; they have become articles of national and international faith, to be upheld and enforced at any cost, for the simple reason that anything less would leave

democratic civilization at the mercy of autocratic militarism. How far they are from the crafty formula of Berlin will appear from the official declarations made concerning them. The first and irreducible demands of the Entente, stated in January to President Wilson, were for the restoration of territories invaded by Germany and indemnification of the wronged countries. Beyond this there must be a "reorganization of Europe, founded upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development"; "restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations," "liberation" of various races from foreign domination; and expulsion of the Turk from Europe.

This program certainly comprises indemnities, and, to the German mind, would include annexations, in the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and Austria's Italian conquests and the freeing of Prussian Poland. Nevertheless, the principles invoked are vital to the project of permanent peace. But the cause goes deeper, the necessary elements in a durable reorganization of world society are more fundamental, the need for a decisive victory is more vital, than would appear from consideration of proposed political and territorial readjustments. The nations now allied against Germany have taken their stand upon the declaration of the United States, framed by its president. Let those who are inclined to meet half way the subtle suggestion of Prussianism for a "moderate" settlement recall the proclamation of America's purpose, now the creed of the world's greatest democracies and the hope of all free peoples:

Our object is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.

Prussian autocracy was not and never could be our friend. In the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power.

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the trusted foundations of political liberty.

We act without animus, not in enmity toward a people, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government, which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.

The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

“The world must be made safe for democracy.” That is the issue, that is the cause for which millions have died and millions more are ready to give their lives. German autocracy alone, backed as it is by a disciplined and infatuated people, would be a menace to free institutions thruout all Europe; but German autocracy, supreme from the North sea to the Persian gulf, would have this world under such dominion that democracy never could survive. To Woodrow Wilson, more than any other leader, mankind owes the final, convincing revelation of what this war means. Yet history will note that his far-echoing declarations find their most baffling obstacles in his own misguided counsel.

For two years and a half he confused and paralyzed the judgment of America, and the errors he implanted in the minds of millions of his countrymen are not to be eradicated easily. The very delusion of the Russian extremists is a reflection of his former policies, for they declare, with palpable sincerity, that their peace platform is fashioned upon the plan of his noted demand for "peace without victory." Yet every day the incontrovertible truth of his great war declaration gains new adherents. If America is to know peace and safety, if human liberty is to be vindicated, if law is to be restored and civilization resume its ordered progress, "the world must be made safe for democracy." And that can never be until the power of Prussianism is curbed.

The German people themselves can help to achieve the world's liberation and their own from an intolerable burden. Failing that, the end must be accomplished by the infliction of such defeats, indemnities and even "annexations" as will make impotent "this natural foe to liberty."

## A SHORT ROAD TO VICTORY

*June 21, 1917.*

**E**VERY day's developments point unerringly to one conclusion—that this war must be won thru the addition to the Allies' strength of the resources of America, and that that contribution must be swift if stupendous waste of life and treasure is to be averted. For two years and a half the fate of civilization was in the balance, while the American government suspended judgment on the issue. At last the decision was made, and the ultimate result of the conflict became certain. But that decision created a more urgent and specific problem—how was the vast power of this nation to be exerted most readily and most effectually? The most obvious need of the overburdened Allies was money and credit, and these were furnished promptly. The colossal task of overcoming the food shortage was attacked with vigor that promises success. Plans have been made to meet so far as possible the Allies' tremendous demands for coal and war supplies and shipping. The creation of a great army was undertaken. But most of these projects are of indirect influence, and all of them require time. Altho the weight of America's financial, economic and military resources will be decisive, it must be many months before the increasing pressure is felt in Germany. How can this country strike quickly and directly at the power of Prussianism?

The answer to this question, it is agreed by experts in modern warfare, lies in a swift and complete conquest of the air; in placing on the battle-front such an overwhelming force of winged warriors that German strategy will be blinded and put at the mercy of the Allied armies. Given time, the strength of America must prevail. But it is declared that by this means, and by this means alone, it can actually turn the tide of battle on the western front and reduce the mighty German military machine to impotence. The idea is magnificently simple, altho to realize it there must be an expenditure of energy incomparably great. It is that airplanes and aviators shall be sent to France, not by hundreds or by thousands, but by tens of thousands; that squadrons and fleets of these deadly machines shall be mobilized in ever-increasing numbers, until the Germans are driven from the air as they have been driven from the sea, and their armies, eyeless and helpless, are shattered by land assaults directed from the clouds. This audacious, yet logical, design has been under consideration for several weeks. It is indorsed by the military experts of France, Great Britain and the United States, and has taken shape in a recommendation, which the administration will soon submit to congress, for a continuing program of development of aviation calling for an expenditure of \$600,000,000, a sum exceeding the appropriations for the army and navy combined two years ago. It is planned by sheer weight of numbers to dominate the air absolutely next spring and thereafter.

That such an achievement would mean the paralysis of Germany's great military machine is obvious. The airplane is the one big, new factor in twentieth-century warfare. By virtually eliminating the element of surprise and making open campaigning impossible, it forced

the contending armies into the trenches. It took over the scouting functions of cavalry and some of the attacking functions of infantry and artillery. Its uses are almost infinite. It observes, it protects, it destroys, it fights. It is the army's organ of vision, enabling the commanders to keep watch upon the enemy, penetrate his designs and forestall his maneuvers. It patrols land and sea, hunts submarines, guards coast lines; and it has been developed into an offensive weapon of extraordinary power, for the bombing machine smites the enemy in his communication nerve-centers far beyond his lines, and the battle-plane can swoop down and pour streams of death into his very trenches. Control of the air is declared by competent authorities to mean early success in the war. "European experts agree," Rear Admiral Peary told a senate committee, "that in the comparatively near future air service will be more important than the army and navy combined. That statement has been made in the British parliament." Howard E. Coffin, head of the aircraft production board, says that "unless the Allies can obtain a preponderance of aircraft with which to overwhelm the Germans, the war probably will drag on for years, with a constantly increasing toll of lives. Neither side can possibly win without attaining supremacy in the air over a strip of territory from fifty to sixty miles beyond the fighting front." All experience in the war supports this view. The official British comment on the victory at Arras said that "definite superiority in the air" was largely responsible. Before the assault began, on April 7, Haig sent a great fleet of scouting and fighting planes over the German lines to map the territory. That day saw the fulfillment of the poet's vision of "the nations' airy navies battling in the central blue," for twenty-eight of the

British machines were lost, while fifteen German planes were destroyed, thirty-one others driven down and smashed, and ten captive balloons wrecked. But the fliers who returned brought 1700 snapshots, and when the British batteries opened their terrible drumfire the gunners worked from photographs showing every detail of the defense on every square rod of the Hindenburg position. The other day the British stormed the remnants of Messines ridge, which the Germans had been fortifying for two years, and the report says: "Our success was due to superiority of artillery fire, and this in turn was due to superiority of air service." Every big drive has taught the same lesson. Command of the air means command over the enemy.

The contest for control of the air has reached a virtual deadlock. In this, as in other departments of war, Germany had the initial advantage; she had developed aviation as a branch of military science, while in France and England it was pursued chiefly as a sport. Not until after the battle of the Marne did the Allies begin the long, uphill fight to obtain mastery. In order to win, the Allies must have overwhelming superiority; they must be supreme in the air. Great Britain and France have reached the limit of production possible without drawing men from the firing line. The United States alone can decide the issue. This is the military contribution that this country can make most quickly and most effectually. It cannot strike Germany with heavy artillery for perhaps two years. It cannot put an effective army in the field in less than a year—more than two months were consumed in merely preparing for the selective draft. But the making of aviators can produce a force that would increase the Allies' striking power this summer.



Secretary Baker makes a striking comparison when he says that 1000 trained fliers could be transported as easily as 1000 infantrymen, and would be many times more valuable now. In that vast battlefield 1000 American soldiers would be unnoticed—ten times that many prisoners are taken in a day; but send 1000 skillful, daring American aviators over the German lines, and the effect would be equivalent to that of an army corps.

From every angle this audacious project appeals to the imagination and the judgment. Americans should realize, however, that it is not advanced by extravagant estimates and overconfident predictions. It is a national weakness to assume that vast undertakings are accomplished when they are plausibly outlined on paper—Mr. Bryan found credence for his 1,000,000 men that were to spring to arms overnight, and we have been celebrating the launching of fleets of wooden ships, the timber for which is still in the Oregon forests. So it is with the plan to sweep the Germans from the air—men ordinarily sensible are talking of 100,000 American airplanes and pilots and fighting aviators within a year. This is sheer delusion. There are, it is said, nearly 30,000 applicants for the service, which is a great many; but it takes nine months to train a battle flier, and there are not 200 airplanes or 500 competent instructors in the whole United States. If work is started at once, 3500 machines, and no more, can be manufactured by January 1 next in available plants. Moreover, these will be merely "school" planes for training purposes; the swift and powerful scouting craft and battle-planes in use in Europe are beyond our capacity at this time. How many Americans realize that there is not a single American machine employed at the front? No one doubts that the inventive skill and manufacturing effi-

ciency of America can overwhelm Germany in the air in time. But time is one thing that money cannot buy. Once more we are confronted by the results of our appalling unpreparedness.

The task proposed is a staggering one, but every consideration urges that it be undertaken with all the energy the government can command. Some citizens will be startled by the magnitude of the expenditure suggested, and \$600,000,000 is an impressive sum—until one notes that the outlay, if successful, would be balanced if the war were shortened only two or three weeks. Great Britain spent on aviation \$575,000,000 last year, and France as much, and both will spend more this year. In Britain there are 958 factories in the airplane industry, with 67,000 employes; there are hardly a score of plants in this country. Never did American genius face a bigger or a more inspiring problem than this of making sure the conquest of the air. But big talk won't solve it, vast appropriations alone won't solve it; it will need commanding efficiency and implacable energy. Germany is driven from the sea and hemmed in on land, yet she will not be beaten, except at a cost hardly to be contemplated, unless she is swept from the air. What a glorious achievement it would be if American skill and daring and power should save civilization at last by smiting Prussianism from the clouds!

## QUAKERS AND THE WAR

*June 26, 1917.*

AT INTERVALS since the United States entered the war observant readers have noted such headlines as "Quakers Discuss War Problems," "Friends Pledge Aid to Nation," "Quakers to Work Behind Firing Line," and these activities have created a wider interest than usual in a small but influential group of citizens. Indeed, it is chiefly the strong "testimony" of the Quakers against war, for any purpose whatever, which sets them apart from their countrymen. The members of this admirable body are now in most respects so far from being the "peculiar people" which the founders undertook to fashion that it needs some such sharp divergence of conscientious conviction to distinguish them from the multitude. To the popular mind, we suppose, the designation suggests, first, an equable temperament and certain sturdy virtues of character, and, second, an uncompromising opposition to the use of armed force. It is only in a national crisis such as this, therefore, that the idea of separation which was originally so important becomes a reality. The Society of Friends is the only important religious organization which rejects the fundamental obligation of the citizen to defend the nation; almost all others, by contrast, emphasize that duty as a Christian virtue.

It should be noted, in the first place, that in practice the Quaker attitude upon this issue is no more unanimous than that of Socialists, of whom some are

ardent nationalists and some inveterate pacifists. The Friends have their patriotic and military heroes. Betsy Ross, who made our first flag, was a member of the society. Thomas Mifflin, a major general and Washington's first aide-de-camp, was a Quaker; so was Major General Nathaniel Greene; so was Jacob Brown, a Bucks county schoolmaster who rose to be commander-in-chief of the United States army. Robert Morris financed the Revolution largely by means of Quaker loans. John Bright, one of the foremost of English Quakers, justified the American war to exterminate slavery. Whittier's abolition poems were militant to the last degree. Even William Penn proposed an international "league to enforce peace," requiring compulsion by arms if necessary. The doctrine of pacifism, nevertheless, always has been vital in the principles of Quakerism, and one of the curious chapters in American history deals with the strange expedients which members of the society employed to make their genuine love of country harmonize with their beliefs by supporting necessary projects of defense which they could not officially countenance. Franklin gives an illuminating account of "the embarrassment given them (in the Pennsylvania assembly) whenever application was made to grant aids for military purposes." Unwilling to offend the government, and averse to violating their principles, he says, they used "a variety of evasions," the commonest one being to grant money "for the king's use" and avoid all inquiry as to the disbursement. But once, when New England asked Pennsylvania for a grant to buy powder, this ingenious device would not serve:

They could not grant money to buy powder, for that was an ingredient of war; but they voted an aid of £3000, and appropriated it for the purchasing of bread, flour, wheat "and other grain." Some of the council, desirous of giving

the House still further embarrassment, advis'd the governor not to accept the provision, as not being the thing he had demanded; but he reply'd, "I shall take the money, for I understand very well their meaning—other grain is gunpowder." Which he accordingly bought, and they never objected to it.

Concerning an appropriation "for the queen's use," in 1711, the fund being to outfit a military expedition, an eminent Friend wrote: "We did not see it to be inconsistent with our principles to give the queen money, notwithstanding any use she might put it to, that not being our part, but hers." The society's conscientious objection to war was manifested in the various revolutions in England; the Quakers were always loyal to the existing government, and transferred their allegiance only when the "warlike" elements of the population had forcibly changed the system. A typical representative, perhaps, was John Dickinson, who wrote nearly every important state paper designed to extort justice from England for the American colonies, but refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, which necessitated an appeal to arms. The general Quaker attitude was expressed in a quaint statement of the society made in 1696: "The setting up and putting down Kings and Governments is God's peculiar prerogative, for causes best known to Himself." Hence, altho on the roll of the patriots of the Revolution may be found such well-known Quaker names as Biddle, Mifflin, Wharton, Wetherill and Morris, opposition to the liberation movement was strong among the Friends. When Howe's army was approaching Philadelphia the Continental congress advised the council of Pennsylvania to arrest certain British sympathizers, specifying that "a number of persons who profess themselves to belong to the society called Quakers are with much rancor and bitterness dis-

affected to the American cause." And the pacifism of '76 is still held in high repute, for a well-known historian of the society, a member of the faculty of Haverford College, wrote only six years ago:

Who will now say that if the American statesmen of Dickinson's day had been all of his mind all that we secured by war could not have been secured by diplomacy, and the bitter memories which lasted a century have been avoided?

The sincerity of the Friends' religious convictions against participation in war, and their right to maintain them, have long been recognized, and in the selective draft act a clause was included, with general approval, exempting from military service members of "any well-recognized religious sect or organization" holding such principles. Some Friends, however, are by no means satisfied with this exclusion; they hold that even to pay war taxes would be to dishonor their faith. And there are some who become almost bellicose in resenting recognition of their scruples. At a meeting in New York a few days ago an eminent Quaker educator, the president of Haverford College, offered this singular protest:

The best advertisement that our movement could have lies in the possibility of being able to stand up for liberty of conscience. Personally, I do not think exemption will be a good thing. On the contrary, I think it would be a good thing if all our young Quakers should go to jail. In this way, by making the government feel that we are ready to suffer and die for our convictions, we would perpetuate our ideals and pass them on to future generations.

The intelligence which can concern itself with the project of extorting advertisement for a sectarian group from the nation's peril presents, we think, a curious subject of study. And it seems not to have occurred to the speaker that even the incarceration of the young Quakers whom he lightly consigns to prison would not noticeably perpetuate anti-war ideals in a Prussianized

world, which would be the infallible result if his scheme of resistance to the American government were successful. It is to the credit of the New York society that it adopted a resolution of appreciation for the exemption, and a pledge to join "in any constructive work in which we can conscientiously serve." Again it must be noted that all Quakers are not extreme pacifists. There has not been from the representative of any group a more vigorous definition of the duty of American citizens at this time than that given recently by Horace Mather Lippincott:

Unquestionably the Society of Friends has stood from the beginning for peace to the limit of toleration, and their present book of discipline breathes this spirit. There are extraordinary circumstances, however, which cannot be rigidly or fully met by any man-made set of rules. The life, liberty and pursuit of happiness which we enjoy are guaranteed and made real by our government. The industry which produces our livelihood exists thru its protection. It does not seem right for any of us to accept these benefits unless we bear our share in maintaining them; and in a democracy such as ours we do not look with favor upon a privileged class which will not do so, but sets itself up as "a little group of willful men" to render the government helpless in an emergency which most of the best minds and hearts are determined to meet after patient but unrewarded gentleness.

It might even be argued that it is invidious to treat as "news," rather than as matters of course, the various declarations of loyalty from Friends' meetings. Quakers, as a fact, have ever been noted for their fidelity to the "constituted authorities"; indeed, if they have a fault, it is too rigid an allegiance, as illustrated in the support given to Toryism in the eighteenth century and to Penroseism in the twentieth. They furnished an exceptional proportion of their membership in the Union armies half a century ago, and they will unquestionably give invaluable service in this great struggle to preserve

democracy. Tho there should be not a single American Quaker in the trenches in France, there will be thousands of them who will be as truly soldiers of civilization. The Friends of the United States will enlist and maintain a force of disciplined, uniformed but unarmed men whose task it will be to restore the shell-torn battlefields, rebuild shattered homes and make the war-ravaged territory behind the front once more fit for human habitation. The first unit in this army of reconstruction, by the way, is to train on the Haverford campus, and we hope the president of that venerable institution will see in its activities an advertisement not inferior to that which might be derived from the imprisonment of the members.

It is the judgment of impartial historians that the influence of the Friends thruout the last 250 years has been wholly beneficent and out of all proportion to the limited number of the society's adherents. To their fidelity and courage, even unto death, the world owes much of its priceless heritage of religious liberty and democracy. Their services in education, in philanthropy, in overcoming slavery and in promoting the moral welfare of mankind is incalculable. In this great war for human freedom and the peace of justice, it may confidently be believed, they will perform their part with that humane zeal and quiet efficiency which mark all their undertakings and have won for their association universal respect.



## MAKING WAR WITHOUT SENTIMENT

*June 28, 1917.*

**A**LL the incisive vigor and expert authority in the personality of Secretary of War Baker marked his response the other day when the daring suggestion was made to him that troops destined for the European battlefields should be paraded before their embarkation. "Under no circumstance!" said the director of military affairs of the United States. And the policy will be continued of sending American soldiers on the mission from which many will never return, without the heartening memory of a farewell from the people for whom they are to fight, and without permitting the inspiring spectacle of their departure to touch the imagination and the hearts of their countrymen. Even the civilian mind will acknowledge the wisdom of withholding information concerning the actual movement and destination of troops. But parades of the detachments could be held at such times and places as would not disclose any facts not readily obtainable by agents of the enemy, and these public demonstrations would be of incalculable benefit in stimulating nationally a spirit of unity and victory. The case has been put with striking force by an influential newspaper:

Before its departure on foreign service every American regiment should be publicly paraded. The exact place of embarkation and the hour of sailing need not be advertised, but to deny to the troops the inspiration of an enthusiastic

leave-taking and to the people the stimulus such spectacles give can be nothing less than a blunder. The spirit that fills the ranks of armies, mans the ships and supplies the money cannot be created and maintained in darkness and mystery. Military concealments that hide nothing and serve only to depress the ardor of both soldiers and people have characterized this war from the first. They will be especially deplorable in this country. To renew enthusiasm and courage, to promote enlistments, to awaken the indifferent, to emphasize the call for service and sacrifice, why should not the people see also the glorious optimism of the nation's bravest on their way to war?

To the vast majority of Americans this will seem sound advice. What makes it remarkable, however, is the fact that it comes from the *New York World*, which condemned with bitter scorn the one military undertaking that would have brought the American people into instant touch with the distant conflict and would have fired their very souls with patriotic ardor. When Theodore Roosevelt offered to the government the divisions he had ready for enlistment, and urged that they be sent to carry into battle the flag of the United States, a thrill of real war enthusiasm was felt thruout the whole country and was reflected in the Allies' eager welcome of the project. Millions of men and women here and abroad recognized that the appearance at the front of the foremost American citizen at the head of a force of volunteers would mean more to the cause of America and civilization than any other action that could readily be taken. For they discerned that a Roosevelt division in France would have a psychological effect out of all proportion to its military value, substantial as that would be. But the suggestion was damned by official disfavor, and nowhere was its rejection more vehemently urged than in the *New York World*, which now is concerned to find that its contempt for the inspirational

factors in making war is shared in Washington, where it is decreed that "under no circumstances" shall there be an appeal to the patriotic emotions and sentiments of the American people. When President Wilson rebuked the Roosevelt proposal upon the ground that "the business now in hand is undramatic, practical, of scientific definiteness and precision," the New York World was quite enraptured with his inflexible purpose to make a grim undertaking grimmer, and to discountenance any "pandering to sentiment." But now it has discovered that psychology is really important, for it complains:

It has been the policy of the British government from the first to suppress all information as to the capture or destruction of German submarines, and Washington has adopted the same wretched policy. The whole world breakfasts, dines and sups upon the hideous crimes of the U-boats, but of the heroism and the triumphs of those who go bravely forth to meet them we have no word. Why?

There is a psychology of war, and it cannot be cultivated wholly by the spoken and written word. If, as we often hear, the American people are not yet fully awake to the conflict upon which they have entered, the fact is due in some degree to the mistaken official theory that it is not admissible, even on proper occasions, to exhibit the defenders of the republic as they go forth to battle. An impressive public farewell to every regiment would enable the people to visualize the war, and it would not disclose any material fact not already known to agents of the enemy.

These are true words. But what would be the psychological effect of the parading of a regiment, to be witnessed by a minute fraction of the American people, compared to that which would be produced by the knowledge that Theodore Roosevelt and 25,000 eager, fit Americans were on their way to the trenches? For every man and woman who saw them go there would be a thousand who would witness the scene in spirit and who from that time forth would "visualize the

war" more vividly than they would if the entire regular army and general staff were to depart. The paper which assailed a patriotic, soundly planned enterprise as "Colonel Roosevelt and his private army" is solicitous now for measures to appeal to American sentiment. But it is up against the policy which its own venomous partisanship helped to create. It must face the fact that the war, officially, is "practical," "undramatic," "grim," with no place in the strategic scheme for sentimental parades or for such "emotional" suggestions as that made by former Premier Clemenceau, of France, in a letter to President Wilson:

Allow me to say in all candor that at the present moment there is in France one name which enhances the beauty of American intervention. It is the name of Roosevelt, your predecessor, even your rival, but with whom there can now be no other rivalry than that of heartening success. He is an idealist, imbued with simple, vital idealism. Hence his influence on a crowd—his prestige, to use the right expression. The name of Roosevelt has a legendary force in our country at this time, and, in my opinion, it would be a great error to neglect a force which everything counsels us to make use of as quickly as possible. Roosevelt represents a vast potential factor which no statesman is able to overlook. He cannot come alone, for his prestige on our battlefields demands that he come with the prestige conferred upon him by his countrymen. I claim for him only what he claims for himself—the right to appear on the battlefield surrounded by his comrades. We have just heard of the arrival of the first American unit at our front. All our hearts beat fast. With what joy our soldiers greeted the starry banner! Yet you must know, Mr. President, that more than one of our *poilus* asked his comrades, "But where is Roosevelt? I don't see him." It is not for me to dispute technical questions; my ambition is more modest. I have not consulted our soldiers, but it was not necessary, for I have seen them work and know them well. Send them Roosevelt. I tell you, because I know it—it will gladden their hearts!

President Wilson ruled that the sending of the Roosevelt division not only would "seriously interfere" with important military plans, but "would contribute practically nothing to the effective strength" of the Allies' forces. Yet it appears that the French, who are not unfamiliar with the "grim" and "practical" side of war, study its psychology also—they saw in the coming of Roosevelt tremendous moral effect. And it may be believed that their judgment is not inferior to that of President Wilson and the *New York World*, even tho the latter concedes at last that there may be something in sentiment after all. At the very time when the proposition to parade departing troops was awaiting his stern rejection, Secretary Baker was moved to deplore, in a public address, the "callousness" of the American people. "The element of shock no longer arouses them," he said. "They no longer appreciate the horrors of international immoralities." One would think he was unaware that for two years and a half they had been educated by their official leaders to regard international moralities as none of their concern, and that this false, but seductive, teaching cannot be counteracted in a few weeks. The picturesque and inspiring experience of cheering our gallant soldiers on their way to the trenches would help, but "under no circumstances" are they to have that privilege. The arousing of them is to be deferred until "the element of shock" operates upon their feelings in the publication of the lists of killed and wounded and the homecoming of crippled fighters who are being sent away to the fields of death without a godspeed from their countrymen.

## THE GERMAN CREED

*June 30, 1917.*

QUITE early in the war—in December, 1914—we shared with our readers enlightenment we had received, from the writings of German statesmen, educators and other publicists, upon the astonishing irruption of barbarism in a country asserting leadership in peaceful civilization. Even then, when involvement of the United States in the struggle seemed remote, observant Americans discerned that in German methods of thought, German theories of human existence and German convictions touching the destinies of mankind in general there was abroad in the world a very strange and sinister force. Prussianism was revealed as an intolerable menace, not alone because it wielded the mighty weapons of autocracy and militarism, but because supporting it was a fanatical creed of racial superiority, of a mission to Germanize the earth by brute force, which had taken possession of the German mind. Far more significant than the resounding utterances of the Treitschkes and Bernhardis was the complete subjugation of the national intellect to their revolting teachings. It was in the newspapers, in the popular poems and songs and pamphlets, in the unnumbered utterances which represent the voice of the multitude, that one could read the evidences, not of an insane leadership, but of an infatuated people. Now that Americans are committed to the task of helping to overcome the monstrous thing that threatens to destroy world order

and extinguish human liberty, they should acquaint themselves more intimately with the force that has challenged them. They should seek to identify and understand the evil spirit which they must exorcise. We can pit our armies and our resources against those of the enemy; but we shall not fight with intelligence as well as tenacity unless we know what thoughts, what philosophies, what passions inspire those against whom we have been compelled to wage this war of defense.

And it is undeniable that the majority of Americans lack information on these points. They have been admonished again and again by the highest authority that "we have no quarrel with the German people," and have come to believe vaguely that all this horror is the product of a few bedeviled minds which totally misrepresent the proverbial kindness and justice and humanity of the German character. They try to trace the lineaments of Prussianism, as it is described to them, in the affable, order-loving German scholars and tradesmen whom they happen to know as neighbors, and they cannot do it. Until they learn what this war means to the people in Germany, until they realize how irreconcilable with American ideals are those to which the German people give passionate adherence, they will fight half awakened, half convinced and half armed. Complete revelation of the thought of 70,000,000 people in a time such as this is not possible, altho the actions of Germany during the last three years, which have yet to be condemned by any audible German voice, are sufficiently enlightening. But there is in addition a mass of literature which fairly reflects the national habit of mind. Americans who think they have undertaken to fight merely an army and a fleet of murderous submarines should examine this testimony that they confront a

force even more potent, in the fixed ideas which dominate the judgment of the German people. The available records are vast in volume, and we shall make citations more than once. But we may as well begin with what may be called the religious factor in that national creed which has wrought such hideous wrongs. The quotations are made available in a compilation called "Hurrah and Halleluiah," made by a clergyman in a neutral country, and published in book form. Pastor W. Lehmann first exhorts, in a famous sermon "On the German God":

If God is for us, who can be against us? It is enough for us to be a part of God. It is no want of humility when we more and more let the faith prevail within us that God has taken the German nation under his special care, or in any case has some special purpose in view for it. The German soul is the world's soul; God and Germany belong to one another. We are beginning slowly, humbly and yet with deep gladness to divine God's intentions. In all humility we say it, the German soul is God's soul; it shall and will rule over mankind. On us Germans the eye of God, we take it, must especially rest in this war; we must be His ultimate purpose. Germany is the center of God's plans for the world.

These devotional utterances give a new effect of reality to the pious ejaculation of "Gott mit Uns," which is the German motto. They show, too, that there is sacerdotal as well as imperial authority for the kaiser's frequent public reference of military problems to the Higher Strategy of Omniscience. Indeed, one German writer invokes the Creator as "Our Great Ally, who stands behind the German battalions, behind our ships and U-boats." But let Pastor H. Francke address the congregation in his published "War Sermons":

Is the living God, the God whom one can only have and understand in the spirit of Jesus Christ, is He the God of those others? No; they serve at best Satan, the father of lies. One thing, I think, is clear: God must stand on our side. We fight for right and truth, for *Kultur* and civiliza-



tion and human progress and Christianity, against untruth and hypocrisy and falsity and un-*Kultur* and barbarism and brutality. German craving for truth and German strength of faith, working along biblical paths, have attained to the true faith whose first and greatest spokesman is Jesus Christ. Thus the Germans are the very nearest to the Lord. We could draw many instructive parallels; we could say that as Jesus was treated so also have the German people been treated.

This is the favorite theme of the German pulpit, for Pastor Tolzien inculcates humility in these terms:

As was Israel among the heathen, so is Germany among the modern nations—the pious heart of Europe. The soldier who spat in the face of the thorn-crowned Savior did not act more shamelessly than does England now.

The idea was eloquently elaborated in a burial sermon at the front by Pastor F. X. Munch:

In this solemn hour we experience more deeply than ever before the passion of our Lord. Is not Germany herself transformed into a suffering Christ? We, too, have gone thru our hour of trial on the Mount of Olives, when with our kaiser we prayed that the cup of suffering might pass away from us; and we, too, obeying the unfathomable will of God, have begun to drain it. We, too, were betrayed by those to whom we had shown nothing but justice and kindness; and around us, too, resounded, in accents of hatred and envy, the cry of "Crucify him!"

Precise and powerful are the exhortations of Pastor J. Rump, whose book of "War Devotions" was issued after the invasion of Belgium:

What a difference is there between armies, one of which carries God in its heart, while the others think they can conquer by weight of their numbers, by cunning tricks of devilish cruelty, by shameless contempt for the provisions of international law. The kingdom of God must now assert itself against the kingdom of all that is base, evil and vile; the kingdom of light against the kingdom of darkness. As heralds of God's will, messengers of His word, we shall take up our work after the war, and with German faith and piety permeate, in the name of God, a world which has become

poor and desolate. God's people will come forth from this war strengthened and crowned with victory, because they stand on the side of God. Brethren and sisters, we have become the heirs of Israel; we shall be the bearers of God's promises. Verily the Bible is our book. We read in it the original text of our destiny, which proclaims to mankind salvation or disaster, according as we will it. A Jesusless horde, a crowd of the Godless, are in the field against us. May God surround us with His protection, since our defeat would also mean the defeat of His Son in humanity.

Pastor Gottfried Traube is epigrammatic. "Kant and Jesus," he writes, "go thru our people, seeking their disciples," while Court Preacher Stipberger assures the Germans:

A hard and steep *via crucis* lies before the great benefactor and magnanimous liberator, the German people. Altho it looks beyond the gloom of Good Friday to the dawn of Easter morn, beyond the dark days of war to the beacons of triumph—yet the cross still rests on its shoulders and the Golgotha of the hardest decision still awaits it.

And a seat among the clerical prophets of Germanism has been earned by a layman. H. S. Chamberlain, an Englishman, who has lived since boyhood in the home of *Kultur*, tells us incisively that "he who does not believe in the Divine mission of Germany had better hang himself, and rather today than tomorrow." For Germany, he says, "is chosen, for her own good and that of other nations, to undertake their guidance; Providence has placed the appointed people, at the appointed moment, ready for the appointed task."

To the sober and instinctively reverent feelings of most Americans such utterances will seem fantastically offensive, altho hardly to be taken seriously. Yet they are thoroly, avowedly and unashamedly German; they represent the profound convictions of the great mass of a deeply religious people. And they constitute one of the chief inspirations of the tremendous force which

the people of the United States must overcome or to which they must submit. It would be possible, no doubt, to collect from American writings and speeches expressions on the war which are palpably injudicious, illogical and unintelligent. But do the spokesmen for America rave? Do they gibber? These astounding manifestations are of more than pathological interest; they indicate what it is that we make war upon besides militarism and lawlessness and a lust of conquest. For tho these apostles of kaiserism are creatures of a state church—imperial office holders—the monstrous doctrines they preach have saturated the minds of the whole German people and are upheld by a united nation in arms.

## WAR AND THE SOUL

*July 7, 1917.*

THE horrors of war have supplied the theme for a voluminous and appealing literature. For every modern writer who has dared to challenge the judgment of mankind by praising it as noble or glorious or a "biological necessity," there have been a thousand to denounce it as monstrous, repulsive, inhuman, the ultimate manifestation of the savage instincts that lurk in human nature. The most effective essay of the kind was "The Human Slaughter House," by Wilhelm Lamszus. Issued only two years before the world conflict began, this relentless word-picture of the ghastliness and brutishness of the battlefield reached a sale of 100,000 copies within three months, was translated into a dozen languages and was hailed by the Geneva peace congress as the greatest contribution ever made to the cause of pacifism. The irony of this was that the author was a German and the most enthusiastic readers of his book were his countrymen. There will be many like efforts to combat the evil of war by emphasizing the dreadful cruelties it inflicts. This stupendous conflict in particular will inspire appalling recitals of the soulless ferocity that flings masses of human flesh against destroying machines, of the extinction of martial glory and the calculated murder of chivalry. It will be argued that if war at any time encouraged or recognized noble instincts, that saving grace has been rejected, and armed

strife is revealed as wholly foul and debasing and dehumanizing.

Yet nothing can be clearer than that appeals of this kind are futile. One outstanding demonstration of three years of the most sanguinary and implacable war in history is that human ingenuity can invent no device of destruction or of torment that can paralyze the will of men or enslave by terrorism his dauntless soul. The reign of force will some day be ended, but never by invoking fear of anguish and death as the penalties for resisting injustice; for so long as armed evil exists in the world, there will be men to brave it in defense of their faith and their liberties. More than that, it is this very war of scientific savagery, this enterprise described as "grim, practical and undramatic," that has produced the most inspiring examples ever recorded of pure devotion and unselfish idealism. It is amid the unutterable sordidness and miseries of the trenches that men have seen the vision of a nobler humanity born of their sacrifice, and in the face of death have found the serenity of spiritual peace. When all that logic and mercy can say against war has been said, let it be remembered that to unnumbered millions this struggle is sanctified, that from its blood-soaked fields have sprung influences which will uplift and ennoble the mind of man for all time. Let it be discerned that out of its cruelty and pitifulness and immeasurable waste shines the soul of a consecrated humanity. If these were the sentiments merely of sheltered observers, seeking a gleam of comfort in a spectacle of appalling woe, they would have no weight against the overpowering misery which the war has produced. But they come to us from the battlefield. This is the message of inspiration which is our heritage

from men who have died or are to die that liberty may not perish from the earth. Listen:

Never have I regretted doing what I am doing, nor would I at this moment be anywhere else than I am. I pity the poor civilians who shall never have seen or known the things that we have seen and known. Great as are the pleasures that they are continuing to enjoy and that we have renounced, the sense of being the instrument of destiny is to me a source of greater satisfaction. You must not be anxious about my not coming back. But if I should not, you must be proud, like a Spartan mother, and feel that it is your contribution to the triumph of the cause whose righteousness you feel so keenly.

Everybody should take part in this struggle which is to have so decisive an effect not only on the nations engaged, but on all humanity. There should be no neutrals, but every one should bear some part of the burden. If so large a part should fall to your share, you would be in so far superior to other women, and should be correspondingly proud. There would be nothing to regret, for I could not have done otherwise than what I did, and I think I could not have done better. Death is nothing terrible, after all. It may mean something even more wonderful than life. It cannot possibly mean anything worse to the good soldier. So do not be unhappy; but, no matter what happens, walk with your head high and glory in your large share of whatever credit the world may give.

This was written by a soldier in the trenches to his mother. After eight months of ceaseless peril and privation, with death or crippling wounds his almost certain fate, it was thus that his heart spoke to hers. Who will say that Alan Seeger did not choose well when he gave his life for France and liberty? Who can measure the influence which the sacrifice of this brave young American has had and will have upon his countrymen? It was sheer idealism that led him to his glorious death. It was not his government that called him, but the cry of mangled humanity, of freedom betrayed and imperiled. Young, ardent, filled with love of life and

already marked by fame as a poet, he put aside all the alluring promise of existence and gave himself to the task that seemed to him greater and nobler than all others. Deliberately he sought the most dangerous service—with the foreign legion—and in its ranks he died. It was no cynical distaste for life, no deluded passion for glory, that urged him. Even amid the dirt and staleness and grinding discomforts of the trenches he could write of the tragic beauty of the stricken fields, and always there was in his heart the exalting sense of being a part of a great cause:

I am perfectly content here, and happier than I could possibly be anywhere else. I was a spectator, now I am an actor. I was in a shallow, now I am moving in the full current. As in times of peace there is nothing better than love and art, so in times of war there is nothing better than fighting, and one must make the best of it, finding recompense in feeling one's heart pulse in concert with those of the elite who are doing the most admirable thing, rather than with those of the multitude who are concerned with second-best things. \* \* \* Come to love France and understand the almost unexampled nobility of the effort this admirable people is making, for that will be the surest way of your finding comfort for anything that I am ready to suffer in their cause.

This is what this war, with all its horrors and cruelties and degradations, did for one man; it was in this spirit that he went out to keep his "rendezvous with death" and to give the final testimony of his faith. In terms somewhat different, yet with the same appeal, another soldier has sent from the battlefield an uplifting message to all men and women who think and feel. Coningsby Dawson is an English novelist, but much of his life has been lived here, and it may be said that it is to Americans that the unstudied letters to his family, recently published, are addressed. There is in them no pretense that war itself is anything but ghastly and

abominable, but there is a deep realization of what this contest means to the souls of men and to the future of humanity:

When you've faced the worst in so many forms you lose your fear and arrive at peace. There's a marvelous grandeur about all this carnage and desolation; men's souls rise above the distress—they have to, in order to survive. When you see how cheap men's bodies are, you cannot help but know that the body is the least part of personality. \* \* \*

The great uplifting thought is that we have proved ourselves men. In our death we set a standard which in ordinary life we could never have followed. Inevitably we should have sunk below our highest self. Here we know that the world will remember us, and that our loved ones, in spite of tears, will be proud of us. What God will say to us we cannot guess; but He can't be too hard on men who did their duty. \* \* \*

As Americans face the great ordeal they may learn something from the thoughts of a man who is enduring what they must endure, and who, altho of another blood, had come to know them well:

I hear that the United States threatens to come over and help us. I wish she would. Somewhere deep down in my heart I've felt a sadness, ever since I've been out here, at America's lack of gallantry—it's so easy to find excuses for not climbing to Calvary; sacrifice was always too noble to be sensible. I would like to see the country of our adoption become splendidly irrational, even at this eleventh hour; it would redeem her in the world's eyes. She doesn't know what she's losing.

From these carcass-strewn fields there's a cleansing wind blowing for the nations. Tho there was only one Englishman left to carry on the race when this war is victoriously ended, I would give more for the future of England than for the future of America, with her ninety millions whose sluggish blood was not stirred by the call of duty. It's bigness of soul that makes nations great, and not population. America as a great nation will die, as all coward civilizations have died, unless she accepts the stigmata of sacrifice which a divine opportunity again offers her.



This war is a prolonged moment of exaltation for most of us. To lay down one's life for one's friend once seemed impossible. All that is altered. We lay down our lives that future generations may be good and kind, and so we can contemplate oblivion with quiet eyes. These men may die childless, but their example will father the imagination of all the coming ages. \* \* \* I believe the decision of the next few days will prove to be the crisis in America's nationhood. If she refuses the pain which will save her, the cancer of self-despising will rob her of life.

The decision was what he had hoped it would be. It will be America's part now to share in the suffering and sacrifice in defense of democracy. What she does means the preservation of law and liberty, but it means also the salvation of her own soul. It means that this nation is to make a living faith once more the battle hymn of the republic—"As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free!"

## WHY DO WE FIGHT IN EUROPE?

*July 10, 1917.*

**T**HE transportation of the first American contingent to France will long be remembered as a striking feat of organization and efficiency, even tho official stupidity did its worst to make a fine achievement ridiculous by exploiting a mythical battle with submarines. France and Great Britain have been tremendously impressed by this successful dispatch to the distant front of several thousand trained troops, and many persons in those countries expect other detachments to follow in rapid succession. Yet the event really emphasizes the fact that the forces which the United States must send are still to be mobilized, armed and trained. But our military weakness is a matter which has been discussed to exhaustion. Every citizen is aware of the obstinate neglect of national defense during two years and a half, a policy which brought us into the conflict wholly unready to meet its stupendous responsibilities.

The nation suffers, however, from another form of unpreparedness, which is just as serious and may be harder to overcome. That is the unpreparedness of the public mind, the widespread lack of understanding of what this struggle means and threatens. The creation of an army is a task of vast magnitude, demanding intense application for a long period. Hardly less formidable is the problem of awakening the American

people to a realization of the relentless facts and necessities of the situation. A Philadelphia business man told us the other day that he had been surprised and disturbed to note the attitude of many citizens. They are genuinely patriotic, he said, and have no misgivings about the justice of the war. They approve this country's contribution of naval power, financial aid and supplies to the Allied cause. But they think it unnecessary and unwise to send troops to Europe—"we ought to keep our boys at home," they say, "to defend the country in case of attack." "Three times in as many hours," said our informant, "I heard that opinion expressed in substantially the same terms—by a well-dressed woman in a suburban train, by an elevator operator and by a stenographer in my own office. And in each instance the person addressed agreed. I am convinced that this feeling is more general than most of us have realized. Is it not remarkable that after three years of war there are so many intelligent Americans who have the most imperfect ideas as to what the fighting is about and what we must do to save this country from disaster?" We could give our friend only the doubtful comfort of assuring him that his observation was correct. Vast numbers of citizens still regard the war as essentially a foreign affair. They approve our participation, to a limited extent; but they have no clear conviction that a just settlement is as vital to America as to Europe, nor do they realize that the place where this country must make its fight for defense is in the trenches of France and Belgium.

How serious for the nation is this popular misconception is indicated by the extraordinary measures undertaken to counteract it. Plans have been announced for a campaign of education on the issues and develop-

ments of the war, thru addresses delivered nightly to moving-picture audiences thruout the country. That such an elaborate system of enlightening the nation should be deemed necessary, three years after the beginning of the war and three months after the entrance of the United States, is a remarkable commentary upon the state of American public thought. Every event, from the invasion of Belgium down to the last submarine murder, has been known to all the world; every belligerent government has submitted its case to the judgment of mankind; every official declaration has been published broadcast and submitted to the closest examination. Yet there are multitudes of Americans who are still unaware of the significance of the conflict and incredulous of the catastrophe that Germany's escape from defeat would bring upon this country. It is a startling paradox that such a condition should exist in a nation which has already devoted billions of dollars to the war and has revolutionized policies maintained from the founding of the republic, by entering an alliance and by adopting compulsory military service. Even "the element of shock," says the secretary of war, "no longer stirs the people," and he gives warning that "the country must be aroused by an understanding of the issues."

The explanation of the anomaly is, of course, that for more than two years and a half the people were taught to believe that there was no issue of reason or justice in the war, and that their duty was to cultivate indifference to it. When it is advertised that the nation's peril and its duties are to be expounded by 15,000 speakers addressing 1,000,000 persons each night, one cannot but recall that President Wilson had an audience of 100,000,000 always within reach of his voice, and used his power—with the highest motives, it must be con-

ceded—to create precisely that distorted public sentiment which now baffles the government. There was no man in the world whose words were so weighty with influence, so potent in swaying the minds of men. Belligerents and neutral peoples alike hung upon his utterances, because what he said had the effect of being the voice of America, whose judgment must be decisive; and among his countrymen his declarations were even more powerful, in that they seemed to fulfill the nation's traditional policies and were actually in harmony with the instinctive popular aversion to war. Thus when he advised Americans to be "neutral even in thought," the admonition was welcomed by large numbers of citizens as justification for an attitude of immoral indifference to hideous wrongs against all mankind. When he declared that "with the causes and issues of the war we have no concern," it quieted any uneasy fears they might have had that the safety of the United States was being compromised by the remorseless destruction of international law and the rise of a soulless military power. And when he demanded settlement upon the basis of "peace without victory," the sentiment was echoed by millions who conceived it to be an aspiration of the loftiest humanitarianism instead of a mockery to every principle of justice and every hope of permanent peace.

It stands to the lasting credit of President Wilson that he went far to undo the wrong of his mistaken teachings by his masterly declaration to congress. The utterance was memorable for its restraint, its loftiness and its stern logic, but most of all because it contained a statement of the fundamental issue of the war in eight words—"the world must be made safe for democracy." That is the cause for which the free peoples of the world

are fighting. That is the all-inclusive, unanswerable, irreducible minimum of the demand of embattled civilization. The difficulty is, first, to convince Americans that the existence of their liberties depends upon the overthrow of autocracy in Europe, and second, to persuade them that they must seek the enemy where he is, and not wait until he seeks them. It shows how pernicious was the doctrine formerly upheld by the leaders of this nation that there are still Americans who believe that a victory for Germany, whether won by arms or by the seduction of a compromise peace, would carry no threat to the United States. Yet can anything be clearer than that the perpetuation and expansion of Germany's autocracy would make inevitable a clash between it and this republic? We have seen that Germany, even while battling against the united democracies of Europe, could reach across the seas to strike at America. Let her overcome the nations which are striving to curb her power, and how long would it be before she sought to revenge and recoup herself for the costs of her audacious and only partially successful enterprise? And how would she seek satisfaction save by turning from impoverished Europe to wealthy America?

But it is argued that if this menace actually threatens, it makes imperative the upbuilding of home defenses—we should hoard our gold and our food and our supplies; above all, we should keep our troops in this country, preserving our great new armies against the peril of the future. The answer is, of course, that unless Germany is defeated now, she will never be defeated; unless her military machine is smashed and her autocracy dethroned now, they will subjugate the world, not only politically and commercially, but spiritually. The world

cannot be made safe for democracy unless and until Germany is defeated. And the way to defeat her is to add our power to that of the other nations which have fought her for three years. This is not only one way to save Europe, but it is the one way to save America. For nothing is clearer than that without the United States the anti-Teutonic alliance could not gain a decisive victory; and in the event that those nations were compelled to make terms, this nation would face alone an undertaking too vast for Great Britain, France, Belgium, Russia, Italy and half a dozen lesser countries. Patriotism, common sense and the inexorable logic of events dictate the strategy which the United States pursues. The sending of American troops to fields of carnage 3000 miles away seems to some Americans a fantastic and dangerous enterprise. It is, on the contrary, the most elementary requirement of national safety and conservation of defensive power. These troops in Belgium and France will be fighting in American trenches as truly as if they were resisting a German invasion of New Jersey or Virginia. Until this war is won, our frontier is not the Atlantic coast, but the battle line where autocracy is making its last stand against the forces of democratic civilization.

## THE FOOD WAR

*July 11, 1917.*

**T**HE war has entered a new phase. This expression, often loosely employed, has now a clear and logical application. The conflict has definitely and irrevocably become a struggle for food. And in this aspect it is truly a world war—a universal war. For there is no country in which the problem of food is not serious, and there are some upon which lies the shadow of impending famine. From Germany, a beleaguered fortress for three years, to the United States, still almost untouched in its power and resources, every belligerent nation is bending its sternest energies to the task of fighting off the specter of want. And outside the grim circle of strife sit the helpless neutrals, already feeling the pinch of scarcity and haunted by the fear of being doomed to slow starvation. To precisely this has the mighty clash of races come. Irreconcilable principles divide them, great causes inspire them to desperate endurance; yet in essence they battle now for bread. Americans have been urged to believe that the last million bushels of wheat will decide the fate of civilization. A German leader tells his countrymen that victory will depend not on the last bullet, but on the last crust. We see projected across the ages into the century of science and enlightenment the shadow of hungry cavemen fighting over a bone.

Food has been, of course, a vital factor in the contest ever since the might of British naval power was



pitted against the militarism of Germany and began to exert the slow, strangling pressure of a blockade. This is the reason behind the murderous submarine campaign, the most revolutionary feature of the struggle, and it is fundamental in the strategy of both alliances. But it is the participation of the United States that has made food the dominating and decisive force in the war, destined not only to determine the fate of the nations now fighting, but also to change the existence of some still at peace. For this country is the last great storehouse of the products upon which mankind depends for life, and its government has taken upon itself the stupendous responsibility of rationing the world, so far as American resources are concerned. There has been no more interesting or momentous development of the conflict than this inevitable coming of the phase which makes hunger the final arbiter of the world's destiny. In its simplest terms, of course, the new strategy of the anti-Teutonic alliance aims to make the siege of the Central Powers absolute and to crush their resistance by economic pressure. Marvelous as has been the self-sustaining power of Germany, she never could have endured so long had it not been for the supplies she received from friendly or terrorized neutral neighbors; and the purpose is to close these channels by reducing to a minimum the import of American products by those countries. For nearly three years this system was ardently desired by the Entente governments. Even the most radical extension of the rules of their maritime blockade and cargo seizures, protested as arbitrary and illegal, could not prevent the delivery of vast amounts of food to "enemy destination." The United States, as a neutral, properly insisted upon its right to trade freely with other neutrals, and refused to dictate what disposition they should

make of their imports. But the United States as a belligerent has far different interests. Its overshadowing purpose is the defeat of Germany, and its first duty the cutting off of the support of that nation by American products or by neutral products made available for sale to her by reason of counterbalancing shipments from the United States. Thus, while the drastic new export regulations govern traffic in the specified commodities to all the countries of the world, their most ominous meaning is for the neutral neighbors of blockaded Germany—Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

The perils of neutrality were never more strikingly revealed than in the situation of these nations. They have been able to avoid actual involvement in the struggle of arms, but they are at the mercy of both sides, because each has supplies which they must have in order to live. While the United States held aloof, they could and did conduct a tremendously profitable trade with Germany, feeding her with their own products, while feeding themselves with America's. But now this country is at war with Germany; it faces the problem of feeding itself and its allies and millions of neutrals from a store wholly inadequate; and the inexorable requirements of self-preservation, as well as of war, dictate that not a pound of food shall be diverted to sustaining the enemy. Regardless of whether it is the desire of the United States to weaken Germany's power of resistance, the first claims upon the insufficient supplies here are those of the American people and their allies, and the second—that of neutrals—must be subject to rigid control. Inevitably this will work hardship to the European neutrals, which have had free access to American markets. But the condition is not of our making. It is due, primarily, to the war created

by Germany, and particularly to her piratical submarine campaign, which has destroyed whole fleets of vessels carrying food to the neutrals. And it must not be forgotten that they themselves have remained passive under Germany's lawless aggressions, while they have actually profited by their commercial relations with the invested empire. It must be conceded that they have been subject to almost irresistible coercion; with the fate of Belgium before their eyes they could not run the risk of inviting war, which would be the effect of refusing to exchange any goods with Germany. But the fact remains that the United States, in assuming the tremendous burden of the war, has undertaken responsibilities which are at least as worthy of recognition as are Germany's murderous submarines.

It has been urged that three requirements shall be laid upon the neutrals thru the exercise of the unprecedented powers administered by the president. First, food exports to them shall be limited to amounts absolutely necessary to supplement their home production in sustaining their populations. Second, they shall receive no raw materials in which they have been trading with Germany. And third, they shall purchase their supplies from the Allies, so as to obviate the excuse that they must trade with Germany in order to get coal, iron and other materials needed in their industries. In regard to the vital matter of food, President Wilson has stated that the aim is to avert stringency and excessive prices in this country; to meet the needs of its allies, and to make equitable division with neutrals in such a way that "our supplies will not become available, either directly or indirectly, to feed the enemy." The application of these principles will rest with the new-created export council, licenses from which will be necessary for

the export of any products named in the proclamation. There is strong proof of the need for drastic action in the figures of our exports of foodstuffs. In March there was sent out of the country food to the value of \$84,000,000. In April the shipments were worth \$99,000,000, and in May, \$104,000,000. In the eleven months ending May 31, 1916, the food exports were valued at \$744,000,000; in the eleven months ending May 31 last the figure was \$833,000,000. From 1912 to 1914 the United States supplied 40 per cent of the total wheat exports of the world, while between August, 1914, and August, 1915, we sent abroad 75 per cent of the total ocean traffic in wheat, and in the succeeding twelve months our share was 80 per cent. Three years ago our exports of all commodities to Holland and Scandinavia averaged \$60,000,000 a month, and by the middle of 1915 our shipments to those countries were valued at \$205,000,000 a month. But still more conclusive is the shortage of food, already serious and threatening to become critical. Of grain alone the Allies will require 1,000,000,000 bushels during the next twelve months, and it is possible that severe restrictions will be put upon the diet of Americans. Under the circumstances a relentless control of exports to neutral countries contiguous to Germany is an obvious requirement of safety.

Aside from the purpose of tightening the blockade against Germany, the Entente governments do not conceal their desire to bring pressure to bear upon the neutrals so as to compel them, if not to make war upon Germany, to deprive her of all the economic support they have given her. As early as May 4 this design was suggested in a dispatch from Washington. "The unceasing ravages of the submarine campaign and the necessity of taking drastic measures to cope with them,"

it said, "may force Holland and the Scandinavian countries to face the alternative of joining in the war against Germany or going without food imports until the war is ended. This new aspect of the international situation loomed up today as a result of a conference held by Foreign Minister Balfour and others with Secretary Lansing." Much more remarkable, because explicit and relentlessly candid, was the declaration of Mr. Knox in a speech in the senate:

The power of embargo, wisely and boldly exercised, should serve to hasten the day when many peoples still neutral thru fear or indifference and not thru conviction shall join the nations arrayed for freedom and civilization against ruthless militarism and lust for world domination. It will end the absurdity of our supplying the necessaries of life to countries which find it possible to export to Germany similar or corresponding necessaries. Those who are not with us are against us. In such a struggle, economic and political and moral pressure upon neutrals is not to be overlooked as a weapon.

There is, naturally, no avowal by the government of a design to coerce the European neutrals into joining, actively or passively, in the war to curb Prussianism. The action taken is amply justified and necessitated upon the mere grounds of expediency and self-preservation. Yet it is likely to have far-reaching political and military results; for it seems impossible that the remaining neutrals will long be able to avoid a decision demanded by the menace of German might on the one side and the control of the necessaries of life by the opposing alliance on the other side.

## SHALL THE SWISS HUNGER?

*July 13, 1917.*

**I**T IS impossible as yet for Americans to visualize the horrors of war as Europe knows them, and it is probably as difficult for them to realize the horrors of neutrality. The two years and a half during which this country remained aloof from the conflict produced some serious problems, but for the neutral peoples of Europe the upheaval has been an ever-present terror. And now the addition of the United States to the list of belligerents reduces them, despite our good intentions, to a situation which they find hardly less menacing than the strife that rages beyond their borders. Thruout the neutral nations close to Germany the new regulations governing the export of American food and other necessaries have caused almost as much alarm as the invasion of Belgium. For the policy which aims to tighten the blockade of Germany includes the placing of her neutral neighbors on more meager rations. It is notorious that traffic with Germany has been enormously profitable to Holland and Scandinavia, and has made fortunes for many of their citizens. Yet the flood of prosperity has not averted conditions of economic distress and peril.

The fate of these countries, swinging dizzily on the edge of the whirlpool of war, is grievous enough, but Americans will feel a deeper interest, we believe, in the even more desperate situation of Switzerland. Altho 70 per cent of the Swiss speak German, and the people

are under the influence of a vindictively active pro-German propaganda, the preponderance of sentiment is strongly against the Central Powers. It could hardly be otherwise in the most ancient of democracies, the oldest of republics, a land where liberty has been maintained in the teeth of overshadowing aggression for 400 years. As a confederation of sovereign states, under a constitution modeled upon ours, Switzerland has a peculiar claim upon the sympathies of America. Justice, charity and history alike plead that the great democracy of the west shall deal generously with the gallant little Helvetic republic, which thru so many stormy generations kept the beacon of freedom alight in despot-ridden Europe.

When the conflagration of war swept over Europe the menace to Switzerland was desperate, for the country lies in the center of great belligerent territories, bounded by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and France. Yet she has maintained her neutrality with jealous care, fulfilling scrupulously the obligations of the treaty of 1815, which require her not only to forbid invasion by belligerents, but to resist it. Her citizen army has been mobilized for three years at a cost of \$120,000,000—a staggering burden for a population less than half of that of Pennsylvania. But tho preparedness and an intrepid spirit of nationality averted the peril of military or political subjugation, there remained a danger hardly less menacing—economic ruin. The war blighted almost instantly the great activities which constituted the wealth of the nation. It obliterated the tourist traffic, representing an investment of \$150,000,000 and gross receipts of \$50,000,000 a year. Manufacturing likewise was paralyzed, for the skill of the Swiss lay in making luxuries—laces, fine textiles and

watches—and the markets for these were closed. It must be remembered that Switzerland is the most intensively developed industrial country in the world, nearly 60 per cent of the population being engaged in manufacturing. And virtually the whole system had to be reorganized and the productive energies of the people turned to new uses. Geographically in the very shadow of her powerful warring neighbors, Switzerland was also at their mercy economically. With virtually no raw material resources, she has to import all the silk, cotton and metals used in her industries and every pound of coal they need. More than that, most of her food must come from beyond her borders. She cannot work, she cannot live without freedom of barter with other countries. And Germany, especially during the war, has been her principal source of supply; without the 3,000,000 tons of coal, 2,500,000 tons of iron, 30,000 tons of fertilizer and vast amounts of chemicals, dyes and metals she imports annually from Germany, Switzerland could not exist. These are as vital to her life as the breadstuffs she has obtained, at heavy cost and under burdensome restrictions, from America and elsewhere.

Thus it was necessary for Switzerland to make terms with both groups of belligerents. To Germany she has sent beef, condensed milk, butter and cheese under a scheme of "compensations." For each of 5000 cattle shipped daily, for example, she has received not only the purchase price, but the right to import from Germany a ton of potatoes. Her imports of coal have been balanced in the same way. Her commerce with the rest of the world, on the other hand, has been rigorously supervised by an official trade-governing body which works under close direction of the Entente governments. Not a bushel of grain or a barrel of oil or anything else



can be bought by Switzerland in any market of the world or shipped home without the approval of this organization, which gives binding guarantees, furthermore, that no products so passed shall be permitted to reach Germany. And the few fragments of sovereignty left by this system disappeared when Germany began her murderous submarine warfare. She announced that Swiss imports would be allowed to pass only thru the French Mediterranean port of Cette, 200 miles from the Swiss frontier; and the little republic has to maintain a great force of workers at that distant point to unload the cargoes that escape the submarines and pass, by grace of another belligerent, over the railroad to Switzerland.

Bread is Switzerland's supreme need. Her arable land is so limited in area that she can raise only enough grain to feed the population three months in the year; she must import 1300 tons daily or suffer hunger. In peace times Russia and Rumania furnished much of her supply; now she must depend upon the United States. An economical diet is enforced by law. For two years the Swiss have been on government rations of "black" bread—and in recent months consumption has been discouraged by a rule that the bread cannot be sold until it is a day old. To a people existing under such conditions it is necessarily a shock to learn that the Allies, controlling the sea, and the United States, possessing the greatest remaining store of foodstuffs, intend to use their power to compel the neutral neighbors of Germany to sever commercial relations with her, or at least to submit to further restrictions, under penalty of being deprived of food imports. The proposal has wrung from the Swiss a cry of alarm and indignation. They protest that they have obeyed faithfully the humiliating orders

governing their foreign commerce, and that they have exchanged commodities with Germany only to such extent as is required by the urgent needs of their own country. To stop the supplying of home-produced foods to Germany would be suicidal, they say, for that would mean that they would get no coal or iron, for these the Allies cannot spare. The sentiment is expressed vigorously by the editor of the Geneva Journal, a strong sympathizer with the war against kaiserism:

The German submarines, which, to blockade England, torpedoed neutral ships, are doing an abominable work; and yet now, upon the supposition of blockading Germany, a suggestion is made to reduce to starvation entire populations of neutral countries. Is this much more admirable? President Wilson, speaking, as we believe, for the American people, made a proclamation that lifted high the hearts of every democratic people and gave hope and courage to the small nations—America was fighting in the name of humanity and democracy against autocracy. The echo of the expression of the highest human ideals is still resounding in our ears. Are they only empty words? Could America even now be contemplating as great a crime against right and justice as Germany herself?

But the claim of Switzerland does not rest alone upon her fidelity to democracy and the duties of neutrality. She has been for three years, at heavy cost, a benefactor to unnumbered multitudes of the war's victims. On August 1, 1914, two days before Belgium was invaded, the Geneva Red Cross organized an agency for prisoners of war, and since then 1200 volunteer workers have performed immeasurable service in ameliorating the miseries of captives in Germany and elsewhere. They have handled from 1500 to 1800 letters a day—sometimes the number ran to 20,000. They have forwarded hundreds of thousands of packages of clothing and food. They have traced thousands of prisoners to relieve the

anxiety of stricken families. The Swiss have brought about the exchange of 20,000 civilian prisoners and 30,000 crippled and mutilated soldiers unfit for service, and have tenderly cared for them in transit. They have fed and clothed 100,000 persons deported by the Germans from northern France. They have sent to the prison camps in Germany hundreds of carloads of mail, free of postage, and to the same destination 22,000,000 pounds of bread for the captive troops of the Allies. If it comes to an enforced choice, it is believed, Switzerland will be compelled to declare that her commerce with Germany is vital to her existence, and that it cannot be replaced by any arrangement the Allies can offer. Such a decision, placing the citizens of the world's oldest republic in economic subjection to Germany, would be against their strongest sentiments, and would be, moreover, a reproach to the nations fighting the battle of democracy. President Wilson has said that neutrals will receive supplies "as nearly in proportion to their needs as the amount to be divided permits." Let it be hoped that special recognition will be given to Switzerland, whose needs are imperative and irreducible, and to whose intrepid championship of the rights of man the world owes much of its heritage of freedom.

## THE UNREST IN GERMANY

*July 16. 1917.*

THOSE who have been impressed only by the economic influence of the blockade of Germany—her deprivation of food and war supplies—now have before them evidence of another and not less striking effect. This is the intellectual isolation of the German people. During three years of war they have been so shut off from communion with the world that they are only now becoming vaguely conscious of the real meaning of the great revolt against them; and they are still so mentally benumbed by half a century's submission to a false philosophy that a political shadow-dance seems to them to present the features of a world-shaking drama. Even the heavily censored and contradictory dispatches from Berlin indicate that the empire is profoundly agitated by the crisis which has resulted in dismissal of the chancellor, some other ministerial changes and the promise of minor political reforms; but the confused and feeble forces of public opinion must become much more effective before they can convey to civilization a message intelligible and impressive. Yet the ferment, limited as are its immediate effects, will be closely observed, since it marks a stage in the painful acquirement of knowledge by a powerful and deluded people.

Sentiment in Germany for a modification of the autocratic régime, long confined to the elements of radicalism, has attained popular strength in recent months in exact proportion to the spread of the belief

that military victory was impossible. Maximilian Harden, whom the government gagged the other day by drafting him to a military clerkship, made the need for democratization of the empire his perpetual text. Foreign Secretary Zimmermann, one of the victims of the upheaval, declared it was "useless and dangerous to deny that the trend of political thought today is toward liberalization." The Socialists boldly charged that the chief obstacle to peace was that the world saw in Germans "only Prussians." The movement was strong enough to extort notice from exalted quarters. The chancellor—speaking hurriedly under the spur of the Russian revolution—announced that a program of equal political rights must be undertaken after the war, and on April 7 the kaiser graciously proclaimed that "the free and joyful co-operation of all the members of our people" must be assured thru reform of the electoral system in Prussia. These and like events led some observers to believe that the Germans were at last about to achieve their liberation. But developments thus far rather justify our skeptical estimate at the time:

Such utterances signify that a "revolution" is impending in Germany, even tho it has the doubtful character of being supervised by representatives of the established order. \* \* \* Two predictions may safely be made. If Germany should win the war, democracy will be extinct in that empire for a generation. If she should be decisively defeated, it will take a great stride forward. More likely than either of these results, we think, is a peaceful, orderly "revolution" conducted by the properly constituted authorities; that is, freedom sufficient to satisfy the moderate aspirations of the well-disciplined Germans will be handed down to them by a benevolent autocracy.

Precisely this is the outcome to date—substitution of another personally selected chancellor, a shifting of puppet ministers and an imperial promise that an equi-

table ballot system will be established in Prussia. Thus autocracy, thru its anointed representative, "holds a just balance between the people and the monarchy to serve the welfare of the whole." It was about the vague and immaterial program of political reform as announced by the chancellor last March that all the turmoil in parliament and press has raged. Party leaders lashed themselves into a frenzy over proposals that constituted but a glance toward the democratization of the empire, and the various groups of industrial, intellectual and radical elements wrangled interminably about details that did not approach the issue they thought was being decided. Finally it came to the prolonged secret sessions of the reichstag last week, when all the disillusion of the nation found voice in demands affecting the conduct of the war, the formulas of peace and the loosening of the chains of absolutism. When the leader of the powerful Center party assailed the government, signifying defection of the sentiment of the Catholic states and a probable understanding with Austria, the chancellor's power dissolved and his retirement became inevitable.

It would be an interminable undertaking to attempt to follow all the involutions of the political quarrel, but some facts in the situation were fairly clear. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg could not remain in office if the reichstag declared for a peace "without annexations or indemnities," even tho that declaration would be a mere expression of opinion, since the reichstag has no real power. The National Liberal party, representing industrial capitalism, was determined to fight political reform unless annexation was made the fundamental requirement of peace. The Center party, inclined to join with the Socialists and Radicals in support of democratic changes, would not do so unless the chancellor was

ousted. And, singularly enough, the Radicals wanted him to remain—fearing that he might be replaced by a mere figurehead of kaiserism, who would mask the creation of a military dictatorship. But in viewing the upheaval as a possible prelude to political revolution, the outstanding fact to be recognized is this—that the movement is not due in any recognizable degree, except in its Socialist support, to democratic instincts or desires on the part of the German people. It is wholly a product of the universal, anguished yearning for peace. The truth is at last penetrating the German mind, so long drugged by false teaching, that democracy is the demand of mankind, and the nation snatches eagerly at the idea of rehabilitating itself by acquiescing in a doctrine which it really distrusts and is still incapable of understanding. When one notes, therefore, the pathetic belief in Germany that ministerial changes and a proposal of Prussian electoral reform are stupendous achievements of liberalization, one should remember how foreign are democratic ideals to the public mind. The nation can boast of its battles of Leipsic and Sedan, but its history is glorified by no Lexington or Valley Forge. The Germanic heroes are Frederick the Great and Bismarck and Von Hindenburg; there is among them no Hampden or Milton, no Rousseau or Mazzini, no Washington or Lincoln.

This confused reaching after some meager forms of democracy is but a desperate device to bring nearer the peace that the tormented people crave. It is inspired, not by genuine aspirations for freedom, but by the unendurable losses of war and the unendurable pangs of privation. Consider the influences that have tended to make the devoted worshipers of autocracy willing to contemplate, even tho they do not understand,

the possibilities of democracy. The murderous submarine campaign, altho measurably effective, has not brought the promised triumph. The attempted seduction of distracted Russia into a separate peace thus far has been a humiliating failure. To the tale of victories, once a daily stimulant, has succeeded month after month of defensive fighting, the deadly cost of which is relieved only by occasional "strategic retirements." With the loss of Bagdad vanished the heart of the dream of eastern dominion. To the ring of the empire's enemies has been added the United States, with its vast population and resources. Steadily the issue is narrowing to a final conflict between the passion of national pride and the instinct of self-preservation. As for the uncertain and almost inconsiderable movement toward political emancipation, that is not a manifestation of enlightened democratic conviction. It is governed by two forces—the impulse of autocracy to perpetuate itself by making hollow concessions and the demand of the people for bread and for an end to their useless sacrifices. It shows how far the German people have to travel before they reach the frontiers of freedom when they consider that the meager beginning made brings them into approximate harmony with the ideals for which civilization is fighting. The truth is stated with admirable lucidity and force in the official comment from Washington:

The question of changes in the personnel of the German government is subordinate in importance. In spite of the bitterness of the contest, there is not the slightest reason to believe that it will result in anything remotely approaching revolution or in any diminution of Germany's military power. The crisis will probably lead to internal reforms, which, from the point of view of Germany, will seem colossal, but will be, in truth, only the first steps toward making the German people masters of their own destiny. Germany will not be



on the road to political freedom until the chancellor has been made responsible to the reichstag and until he has been given control over the military authorities.

A new chancellor, a coalition government, electoral reform in Prussia—these things mean just about nothing toward liberalization, since the chancellor remains the absolute creature of the kaiser, and the reichstag, ostensibly a legislature, is but “a hall of echoes,” with little more power over imperial policies than a university debating society. It is peace, not democracy, for which the desperate German people are striving. They have yet to reveal the first evidence of a genuine passion for political liberty. They have yet to learn that freedom cannot be handed down to subjects from an autocracy, however intelligent and benevolent it may be. Likewise, that they cannot attain peace that way, either.

## THE ONE WAY TO PEACE

*July 18, 1917.*

**W**HEN the imperial government the other day drafted Maximilian Harden for service as a military clerk, there disappeared from the disordered public life of Germany a more interesting and more useful figure than the former chancellor himself, another distinguished victim of the political crisis. But Harden carried with him into bondage the satisfaction of having planted this final editorial shaft in the vitals of autocracy:

Only a miracle can bestow an early peace upon us. Either our enemies must be smashed, or Germany's aspirations must find unity with those of a majority of the world. And only the second miracle can be accomplished by human strength. The goal of our enemies is democracy and independence for every race ripe for freedom. If Germany sees blazing over the goal the great celestial sign of the times, then peace is reachable tomorrow.

This is the truth that shines with ever-increasing clearness thru the murk of battle and of confused political strife; that is just now beginning to let a glimmer of light into the darkness enshrouding the minds of the German people. The price of the peace they crave is their self-emancipation. For many months the desire among them for an ending of the war has swayed public thought more even than the tragedy of the conflict itself. No subject except food has been so enthralling. There were three ways, they conceived, by which peace might come—it might be achieved thru a German victory; or

imposed thru a German defeat, altho this was not recognized as a real possibility; or attained thru a negotiated compromise among the belligerents. But since the declaration of the United States they have begun to realize with wonderment that the fourth way, and the surest, is by democratization of the empire. And here their fate lies in their own hands. Each day's events add force to our observations of three months ago:

Peace was never so easy of accomplishment, never lay so ready to the grasp of those who alone can command it instantly, as in this hour when the fiery circle of war threatens to inclose the entire earth and when the embattled nations are nerving themselves for a struggle to the death. Just when the issue has narrowed to a single principle, concerning which no compromise can be imagined and no mercy shown; just when great new forces have been added to the battle line and the prospect is for a conflict more pitiless and more prolonged than seemed possible, just then it is revealed that there is one simple decision by which the war could be ended forthwith.

The choice lies with the German people. If they were to do what the Russian people did—were to take control of their own government—there is no power in earth or hell that could prevent the coming of peace within thirty days. Civilization is in arms against Germany because that empire is the citadel of autocracy; with a Germany freed of kaiserism, a Germany democratized, it would have no quarrel that could not be settled justly, generously and peaceably.

And this is the only way to peace. In the merciless ordeal of their defensive armies, in the gates of steel that bar them from the sea, in the suffocating pressure of privation, in the steadily growing list of enemy nations, the German people read infallible signs that they cannot triumph. That their military power can be completely broken they will not believe. So they turn hopefully to the alternative of a peace on the basis of a drawn conflict. It seems to them an act of moderation and mercy when they offer to renounce the plans

of conquest to which they sacrificed their honor and their liberties. "The government," cried a Socialist member of the reichstag a few days ago, "could have peace this summer if it would offer to make terms without annexations or indemnities." And a majority in that body, which has no power whatever over imperial policy, goes thru the mummery of declaring that Germany, "as on August 4, 1914"—when Belgian nationality was foully struck down—fights only for "liberty and independence and the integrity of her territories." This is not studied arrogance; it is delusion. The German mind is closed against the fact that the question of Teutonic annexations and indemnities was settled when the massed legions of kaiserism were flung back almost from the gates of Paris and forced to begin the war of trenches. For three years they have reckoned and gambled with the spoils of expected conquest, just as an amateur speculator exults in his paper profits until they suddenly vanish; and now they try to palter with reality by self-deceiving concessions. That which they have yet to recognize is that democracy, awakened at last and implacably resolved, has passed judgment—kaiserism must end, for "in the presence of its organized power there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world."

This is today the center and circumference of the peace program of the free nations. It was not so always. Observers whose judgments were not swayed by the passions and sufferings of participation in the war discerned from the very beginning that this was to be a life-and-death struggle between the two irreconcilable principles. But it takes time for national policies in the stress of war to simplify themselves into one supreme essential demand. For months the adversaries of Ger-

many were content to say that they were fighting to free Serbia; to rescue and avenge Belgium; to restore the overturned balance of power; to vindicate outraged law and re-establish the sanctity of treaties. But gradually the central and overshadowing issue emerged—the cause for which millions must die was the securing of the rights of nations, the preservation of human liberty, the perpetuation of democracy. It was for this that the United States, where every popular impulse and conviction is for the maintenance of peace, entered the world war. President Wilson caught into a few decisive phrases the judgment of his countrymen and of mankind. We make war, he declared, against “an irresponsible government which is running amuck”; in the presence of armed autocracy “there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world”; imperialist Germany had become a “natural foe of liberty,” and until its malign power was curbed the world could not be made “safe for democracy.” Three weeks ago the British premier translated this ultimatum into a direct admonition to the German people. The best guarantee of peace, he said, would be “democratization of the German government,” and he added:

No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government under which they would choose to live. But it is right we should say that we will enter into negotiations with the free government of Germany with a different attitude of mind and a different temper and different spirit, with less suspicion and more confidence, than we should with a government which we feel to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism.

A few days ago, in a message to Russia, Lloyd George emphasized the demand, when he said, “There can be no lasting peace until responsibility of governments to their peoples has been clearly established from

one end of Europe to the other." That which was once a vague idea, conveyed in cautious intimations, is now proclaimed with unmistakable emphasis—the German people can have peace when they repudiate kaiserism and set up a free and responsible government. An imperfect realization of the truth is the cause of the present unrest in Germany. Because they yearn for peace, and not because they really aspire to political freedom, the German people are groping confusedly toward some forms of democracy which they hope will satisfy the world's demands. But they have been so long and so completely enslaved that their efforts are feeble and uncertain; they are helots of Prussianism, intellectually as well as politically. Hence, the convulsive movement for liberalization has been easily controlled by the government, which thinks to cheat the world with empty pretenses and so attain a peace that would leave autocracy uncurbed and unrepentant. Even those Germans who have genuine aspirations toward liberty are more concerned to resent the demand of civilization than to free themselves. "What slave soul does President Wilson believe exists in the German nation," cries one journal, "when he thinks it will allow freedom to be meted out to it from without?" It is precisely the "slave soul" which submits to autocracy rather than to the judgment of the age that is a menace to the world and must be freed, not for its own sake, but for the sake of mankind. How narrow and dangerous are the processes of German logic may be learned from the resentful protest of one of the most eminent advocates of political reform. "It is being loudly proclaimed," says Prof. Hans Delbrueck, "that peace with us can be made only when we have finally become internally democratized. Such irritating interference in our domes-

tic affairs goads a self-conscious people into contradiction and fortifies the reactionary forces." The concept that Prussianism is a "domestic affair" is truly Teutonic in its perversity. When intellectual leaders of Germany consider that the violation of Belgium, the submarine murders and the inciting of Mexico and Japan to attack the United States are manifestations of internal policy, of no international concern, what hope is there that the people will soon realize that peace with them is impossible until they have rejected the system? The truth they have still painfully to absorb is that which was expressed recently by a representative of the French government in this country:

We now know that we can drive the Germans out of France whenever we wish. But to do so would cost a million French and British lives. We are not willing to pay that price unless we have to. But we do not have to. We have only to hold Germany fastbound as she is until the German people realize that their rulers have brought all these miseries upon them. Then the German people will end the war—by ending their present faithless government. Thus the end of the war is not any longer a military question; it is a question of the internal politics of Germany.

## WHAT IS GERMAN AUTOCRACY?

*July 19, 1917.*

**F**OR the American people this is no longer a question of abstract or remote interest. So nearly does it concern them that because of facts which answer it the destinies of the republic have been changed and the lives of tens of thousands of its citizens, it may be, are to be sacrificed. The United States has undertaken, in alliance with other free nations, to overthrow the autocratic system which has its last and most powerful manifestation in the Central Powers of Europe—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. The purpose is just and necessary. Americans know it to be so. But not all of them, we think, could clearly define German autocracy; and few of them, we are sure, know to what extent and in what respects the German people lack the political liberty which other civilized nations enjoy. This imperfect understanding is not surprising. In the first place, historians have taught us that the free institutions of today had their beginnings in ancient Teutonic civilization. It was the German tribes, with their hardy spirit of independence, that saved Europe from the despotism of decadent Rome, and to their stand for freedom we owe the idea that developed thru the centuries into the constitutional governments of non-Germanized Europe and the republican government of America, now the ideal of half the world. Students of German history are aware, too, that the intellectual



leaders of that nation—such as Goethe, Schiller, Kant and Fichte—were eulogists of democracy and ardent admirers of the republicanism of France. But if there is uncertainty as to the meaning and essential viciousness of German autocracy, it is due chiefly to the persistent propaganda of Germans—and of many German-Americans—to create the idea that the citizens of the empire know a liberty far greater than that existing under democracies.

This doctrine has become an article of national faith, preached unceasingly by the leaders of thought. "The German constitution," wrote Delbrueck just before the war, "represents by far the highest of those forms of political organization which are actually existent in the world." Houston Chamberlain, the Germanized Englishman, says the final word. "Liberty which is not German," he says concisely, "is not liberty." The American people, thru their president, have declared that German autocracy is "the natural foe of liberty." Both views cannot be right. Either Americans have embarked on a false quest, or else there is a monstrous perversion of truth in these defiant eulogies of the German system. Let us inquire into the meaning of the thing called autocracy, kaiserism, Prussianism.

There are now in the world only three governments of absolutism—in Abyssinia, Afghanistan and Siam. There are twenty-seven republics and twenty-one limited monarchies. Among the latter are counted the four Central Powers, but they stand apart, nevertheless, as representatives of autocracy under the forms of constitutionalism. The German empire is a federal union, created in 1870 from the North German Confederation and the South German States. It comprises four kingdoms—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg—six

grand duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, three free cities (Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck), and the imperial territory of Alsace-Lorraine. Each state has its own constitution and parliament, and there are like instruments for the empire, the legislators being elected by the people. Here, apparently, are the elements of a far from autocratic governmental system; but its true character appears only when one looks behind the forms and the constitutional scraps of paper to the actual conditions. The first fact to be grasped is that the German empire is an artificial product, the arbitrary creation of the Prussian sword. Sheer brute force added to the original Prussian kingdom East Prussia, Silesia, parts of Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse and Alsace-Lorraine, and this dominating growth made Prussia supreme when the states were linked up in Bismarck's imperial creation half a century ago. Prussia overshadows the empire by its mere size—it comprises about two-thirds of the area and two-thirds of the total population; also by the prestige of having formed the great union; also by its military power—Prussia furnishes nineteen of the twenty-five army corps of Germany in peace times; also by the constitutional provision that the king of Prussia is by virtue of that office the German emperor; also by almost absolute control of the law-making and executive machinery of the empire. We may examine first, therefore, the government of Prussia.

The king of Prussia, who is also the kaiser, is virtually an absolute monarch, in that he has veto power over the Prussian legislature, while the ministers of state are responsible to him alone. He is supreme head of the army and the church; he makes and revokes all executive appointments; and the upper house of the

legislature is made up of his nominees together with the nobility, which depends for its privileges and its existence upon the perpetuation of autocracy. In this chamber sit princes of the royal blood, ninety-eight minor princes and hereditary nobles, and 207 men nominated by the sovereign from universities, cities, religious bodies, etc. Two-thirds of the members are "junkers," the rich, reactionary landowners. The lower chamber, or house of deputies, is ostensibly a "popular" body, the members being elected for five years by what is called universal suffrage. But in its workings one can observe the full flower of Prussianism, that "German liberty" which evokes the adulation of loyal Teutons.

The citizens are not allowed to vote for their legislators; they vote for electors who choose the representatives, and they do it under the most astonishing system of political enslavement known to modern history. The kingdom is divided into districts, and these into sub-districts, and in each of the latter the voters are classified according to the taxes they pay. Those who pay the largest sums, aggregating one-third of the total taxes, constitute the first class—these are the landowners, financiers and capitalists—and elect one-third of the electors. Those who pay the second third—the well-to-do middle classes—comprise the second class, and they also choose one-third of the electors. The remaining citizens—the masses whose taxes, in small amounts, make up the last third—name the last third of the electors. The shameless inequality of this system is obvious, but its utter atrocity can be understood only from the actual results. It means, of course, that property outvotes manhood. In 2200 sub-districts in 1907 one man, paying one-third of the taxes, named one-third of the district electors; in 1700 districts, two men exer-

cised that power; in Prussia as a whole, one-third of the electors were chosen by 3 per cent of the voters, the second third by less than 10 per cent, while 87 per cent of the citizens named the other third. An eminent sausage-maker in Berlin constituted the entire first class in his district, his vote being equal to that of some hundreds of his fellows. The effect upon the composition of the legislature is interesting. In 1900 the Socialists cast a majority of the total vote—and captured seven seats out of 443 in the house. In 1903 the Conservatives cast 324,000 votes and got 143 seats; the Socialists, with 314,000 votes, not a single one. In 1908 the Socialist vote, under a just computation, would have given that party 112 members—and it got seven; while the Conservatives, entitled to sixty-seven representatives, won 152. Incidentally, the balloting is not secret; each voter must express his politics by spoken word—in the presence of agents of his landlord or employer.

Such is Prussianism in its own territory. Now let us see what it means thruout the empire. The king of Prussia is ex-officio German emperor. Where in other monarchical systems there is a ministry or cabinet responsible to the elected representatives of the people, there is in Germany a single official, the imperial chancellor, who is appointed and dismissed by the kaiser and is answerable to him alone. The secretaries of state who administer the various departments are not colleagues of the chancellor, but merely his subordinates, his clerks; nor has the legislature any control over them—they are responsible only to the chancellor, who executes the will of the emperor. The kaiser is commander-in-chief of the army and navy. All executive appointments are made by him. It is his constitutional right to declare a defensive war without consulting any

one—his decision as to its defensive character being final. Also, he can declare an offensive war with consent of the upper house of the legislature—a body which is an essential part of the monarchy and is utterly beyond reach of the people.

We have given merely a rough outline of what German autocracy is—a system which has the sanction of constitutional forms, but in practice approximates absolutism. "The idea of an emperor," wrote the late Professor Munsterberg, of Harvard, answering American criticisms early in the war, "is that he is a symbol of the state as a whole, independent of the will of the individuals and, therefore, independent of any elections; the bearer of the historic tradition, above the struggle of single men." The professor's concept seems to be accurate. German liberty is symbolized by a ruler "independent of any elections"; a king whose power is based upon a voting system which makes citizenship the slave of wealth, and an emperor who exercises his despotic will thru a chancellor owing no responsibility to parliament or people. Not less striking is the mockery of popular government revealed in the legislative system of the empire. This amazing and menacing product of autocracy we shall discuss tomorrow.

## IMPREGNABLE PRUSSIANISM

*July 20, 1917.*

THE latest guess as to the outcome of the German contest over peace terms and political reforms is that the kaiser's appointment of a new chancellor is merely a device to allay public unrest while preparations are made for the sudden erection of a military dictatorship, under General von Ludendorff. Any alarm the populace may feel over the prospect, however, must be based more on sentiment than logic; for the difference between a Ludendorff régime and kaiserism in its ordinary manifestations will be in degree and not in principle. The German people live now in war, as they do in peace, under the most autocratic and irresponsible governmental system existing outside of the three remaining despotisms, Abyssinia, Afghanistan and Siam. Yet how can it be said, readers may ask themselves, that the German people are without freedom when their rights are protected by written constitutions for the several states and for the empire; when each state has its parliament and when the national legislature is elected under one of the freest ballot systems in the world?

Pro-German propagandists, when their activities in this country were permitted, made the most of these facts. The Germans, they proclaimed, were the freest people on earth, and they roundly rebuked Americans for daring to assert that democracy, with its inefficiency,

confusion and graft, was superior to the system that created a great, powerful state, while giving to its citizens unexampled prosperity, justice and happiness. The emperor, they said, while his will was supreme in certain matters and above the strife of parties, was really only a sort of president of a federal union of free states, each with its own law-making body, and even as king of Prussia ruled under a liberal constitution. And the two chambers of the imperial parliament corresponded to the American senate and the house of representatives. Nay, the pro-German advocate argued, as German papers have recently vociferated, that an American president is a czar compared to the ruler of Germany, and they declared that the kaiser would never have had the audacity to undertake personally conducted wars, as Mr. Wilson did in Mexico, and then demand the sanction of the nation's representatives. There is just enough truth in these comparisons to make them effective with the heedless, but not enough to save them from being impudent. All they need to make them approximately just is that the presidency of the United States should be hereditary in a single family; that the president should appoint one-third of the members of the senate, that body having the power to initiate all legislation and to dismiss the house of representatives at will; and that the president, thru his appointees in the senate, should have power of veto over any amendment to the constitution.

The essential vice and villainy of German autocracy is not that it is centered in an hereditary ruler, but that it is not responsible to the German people and is beyond their power to change. As to this, we may quote at once German testimony. Several months ago Foreign Secretary Zimmermann said the public interest demanded "the erection of direct responsibility of the

government to the people thru their representatives." There now exists, he said, no such responsibility, the chancellor, the administrative chief, being answerable to the kaiser alone. The German empire was not intended to be, and is not, a union of its people, but a union of its states, whose authority is vested in hereditary princes. The constitution, framed in 1871, was designed so as to make it possible for the new-made empire to become, as it did, the first military Power in the world. Quite as suggestive is the fact that it contains no bill of rights, no mention whatever of such abstract principles as justice and liberty, and very little relating to the rights or privileges of individuals. The chief powers of the government rest in the emperor, his personally appointed chancellor, and the upper chamber of the imperial legislature, whose members are likewise named by the kaiser. Where the ruler in other countries is represented by a minister or cabinet, whose tenure of office depends upon parliamentary support, the German emperor acts thru a single official responsible to him alone. The status of the imperial chancellor is unique. The constitution provides that he "assumes responsibility" for the imperial decrees; but since it was not specified to what authority he should be responsible, in practice he acts solely as the agent of his august master.

But, says the eulogist of German liberty, there is the reichstag, one of the great deliberative bodies of the world; a democratic assemblage of 397 members elected for five years by direct, secret ballot of all male citizens 25 years of age or older; an institution where criticism, inquiry and free speech are exercised under the most liberal rules, and radicals of all degrees have the right to be heard. Yes, there is the reichstag, and if unhampered oratory comprised the whole of human freedom,



it would be a veritable shrine for lovers of liberty everywhere. But the truth is that its powers are largely limited to its cherished function of conversation. The electoral system is free enough, but there has been no change in the voting divisions since 1871, the result being that representation is flagrantly unequal. The reactionary rural districts elect one member for every 24,000 voters, while in the cities, where progressivism rules, it takes more than 100,000 votes to elect a member. But this is merely incidental. The vital fact is that the popular chamber has the most meager legislative powers, and no control whatever over the imperial government or its policies. It may discuss measures, may even block them; it may criticise the administration and admonish the chancellor; but that is all. Its very life depends upon the will of the emperor, who may dissolve the house at any time with the assent of the upper chamber. It is in the latter body that bills originate; and after the reichstag has passed them they are returned to the real legislature for final scrutiny.

That real legislature is the bundesrath, the most amazing governmental body in the world, the very heart of German autocracy, more truly than the kaiser himself the instrument of its despotic sway. The bundesrath is not in the remotest sense representative of the German people, nor in the smallest degree responsible to them; yet it virtually makes and administers the laws, and is, with the emperor and the chancellor, its president, the government of Germany. It is composed of sixty-one members from the states comprising the empire; three are chosen by the three free cities; fifty-eight are appointed by the kings, grand dukes, dukes and princes who rule the various states. Under the constitution Prussia has seventeen members; Bavaria, six; Saxony,

four; Wurttemberg, four, and the others, from one to three each. Twenty-three of the sixty-one votes are Prussia's, thru control of the six votes of Waldeck, Brunswick and Alsace-Lorraine. It should be borne in mind that the delegates are not senators. They do not represent the peoples of their states, but the rulers. They are really ambassadors. Yet they exercise legislative, administrative and judicial as well as diplomatic powers. As personal agents of the kaiser, of the grand dukes, dukes and princes, they prepare the bills—even revenue measures—for submission to the conversational reichstag. In effect, the bundesrath makes the laws of the empire, with the assent of the reichstag—and that assent can be forced. It governs the finances, it supervises the executive administration, it is a supreme court of appeal from state tribunals, and the court of last resort in controversies between states or between the imperial government and states. The delegations vote as a unit, and according to the instructions given by their state governments. All members have the right to address the reichstag. The bundesrath may meet and act when the reichstag is not in session, but the reichstag may not be convened without the bundesrath. The bundesrath, with assent of the kaiser, may dissolve the reichstag at any time—and has exercised that power more than once. Incidentally, Prussia holds every committee chairmanship save one. And, finally, the proceedings of this all-powerful body are secret.

It comes, then, to this: that the government of Germany consists of, first, an hereditary emperor, acting thru a chancellor who is absolutely his creature; second, of an irresponsible assemblage of the agents of the emperor—as king of Prussia—and of the other hereditary rulers of the states. The reichstag, which bulks so

large in the political news of the empire, is a hollow sham, a futile and impotent mockery of the forms of self-government, which would not be tolerated an hour by a people with the first instincts of democracy.

Why, then, do not the German people change the system which their fathers saddled upon them? The national habit of docility is not the only reason—their constitution, the charter of that “German liberty” which they hail as the noblest achievement of mankind, is, in practice, unalterable. For it contains the neat provision that fourteen adverse votes in the bundesrath kill any amendment proposed; and the kaiser has seventeen votes and controls six more, and the other thirty-eight votes are cast as directed by the grand dukes and their accomplices. The people and their precious reichstag may make demands until they are black in the face, but constitutional reform in Germany can be attained by only two means—either by the grace of the kaiser and his autocratic supporters, or by bloody revolution. These are the facts which justify the declaration of the United States that “in such a government we can never have a friend, and in the presence of its organized power there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world”; this is the system which has undertaken to make its will supreme over law and national rights and the principles of human freedom; this is the monstrous institution of Prussianism, which democracy must destroy or by it be destroyed.

## PRUSSIANISM STANDS PAT

*July 23, 1917.*

**T**HE rulers of Germany have been accused of many crimes and derided for many errors of judgment; but it must be conceded that in respect to one vital matter they are masters of their profitable craft—they understand the people with whom they have to deal. Autocracy knows with scientific precision the nature of the beast of burden upon which it rides—when to encourage the patient creature with soothing words, when to slash at its timidly waving ears, when to drive the spurs deeper into its scarred flanks. The wonder is that any one was found credulous enough to believe that the recent political maneuvering in Germany foreshadowed a popular effort to rid the nation of misrule or indicated genuine democratic feeling among the people. The total result of the violent discussion of peace aims and the resounding demands for the forms of representative government is the withdrawal of one imperial chancellor and the substitution of another, who is somewhat more accurately the reflection of Prussianism. So the great “crisis” evaporates, and the German people return dumbly, if not contentedly, to their treadmill task of trying to reverse the wheels of time against the driving power of an enlightened world sentiment. This is deplorable, of course, in that it means death to multitudes of brave men; but it will be useful in spreading realization of the fact that force alone, the relentless

application of all the strength and resources of the self-governing nations, can make the world safe for democracy. The problem is to smite an arrogant autocracy; but that cannot be accomplished until the national delusion upon which it rests has been destroyed, and there is no argument which can penetrate the German mind except the rigors of implacable siege and the pains of sanguinary war.

If it were possible to take a detached view of recent events, one might pay a tribute of admiration to the completeness with which the masters of the German people demonstrated their power and the minute efficiency with which they devised a particular insult and penalty for each audacious demand of the few outspoken agitators. There had been complaints that the former chancellor was too remote from the populace and its representatives, too obviously the creature of kaiserism; and as his successor was chosen a bureaucrat of forty years' standing, a Prussian of the Prussians. "A chancellor who does not hold the confidence of the people must go," cried a daring paper; and the response was an appointment enforcing the lesson that the chancellor must hold the confidence of the emperor and no other. It was indispensable, declared another, that the new leader should effect a clear separation of the political and military administrations; and the first act of Michaelis was to call Hindenburg and Ludendorff into secret conference. The new chancellor must show, said an organ of liberalism, that he is prepared to give parliament full power to control future events; and he was named without the slightest pretense of consultation with that body, accepted the post without seeking its confidence, and outlined a policy of reaction that almost gives a certificate of good character to the displaced

régime. Whereupon the reichstag, which had been pictured as seething with the spirit of revolution, obediently voted a new war credit as a mark of its enthusiastic approval. The utter feebleness of public opinion was shown in the reception given to the totally unexpected selection. No two newspapers agreed as to the political leanings of the appointee, and he was acclaimed by each party as a representative of its ideals. The Pan-Germans proclaimed that his accession meant an end to paltering with the heresies of "no annexations, no indemnities." The junkers jubilated over the elevation of one of their own kind. Reactionaries were confident that he would stamp out the embers of the movement for political reform, while advocates of liberalization looked hopefully for aid. And the Social Democrats, as their habit is, changed overnight from stern critics of the despotic tendencies of the government to eulogists of its moderate and conciliatory actions.

These confused and futile expressions might be considered, however, mere devices of politics. The real revelation of the enslavement of the national intelligence came when the kaiser's personal representative expounded to a submissive parliament and people their duties, and his declarations of uncompromising bourbonism were acclaimed by those who had been posturing as the unrelenting champions of peace and freedom. His very first words emphasized the role in which he appeared. "Appointed chancellor by the emperor," he said, "I have the honor for the first time to communicate with you." By no means was he the chief statesman of the nation inviting co-operation from the representatives of the people; he was the spokesman of autocracy delivering instructions to subordinates. Responsibility for the war was, of course, a prominent theme in his address,

and he exhibited his ability in not only reasserting some of the original German myths, but in inventing some new ones. To the familiar charges of Russian aggression and British plotting he added the remarkable plea that Germany had given notice that "we must refuse to permit ourselves to be involved in a world-war thru Austria-Hungary disregarding our counsels." As it is a matter of record that the Austrian assault upon Serbia was supported, if not instigated, by Berlin, this new version opens a further gap between the German position and a settlement of the issue that convulses the world.

No less striking, as evidence of a more arrogant spirit of Prussianism, was the contrast between this utterance and that of the chancellor in power when the war began. Von Bethmann-Hollweg justified the initial crimes of Germany as necessary acts of self-defense, but he admitted that they were committed in defiance of law. Michaelis scorned to apologize or excuse. For every deed of infamy, from the foul attack on Belgium to the hideous enslavement of its helpless people and the campaign of murder at sea, he had a benison. For weak-willed doubters of the policy of submarine assassination he had an answer which must be Prussian in its simplicity. "We deny," he said, "the accusation that the submarine warfare is contrary to international law and violates the rights of humanity." Von Tirpitz himself could not be more concise, and might not be as daring. The chancellor's elaborate expressions of indifference over the intervention of the United States were intended, of course, to reassure the German people, and it should be recognized that they will go far to have that effect. He knows, and the general staff knows, approximately what is meant by the addition to the empire's adversaries of the power of a nation of 100,000,000; but the

Germans have been officially informed that even now there are no American forces in Europe except General Pershing and his aides and an ambulance corps, and enlightenment will come from other than government sources. The same effort to keep the suffering populace deluded with prospects of victory was manifested in the description of the military situation. Autocracy which cannot deliver victories is doomed; therefore, the people are assured that on every front the kaiser's troops are triumphant, while at sea the submarine is swiftly accomplishing its appointed work. And in the face of these achievements, how can the nation suffer its attention to be diverted to such matters as the lack of food and the remoteness of peace? But even so, the chancellor was forced to admit that "the burning question in our hearts is how much longer the war is to last," and to disclose the outlines of his peace policy. Here he became studiously obscure, juggling phrases, deprecating schemes of conquest, advocating a "give and take" settlement which might mean anything from restoration of conditions as before the war to a rearrangement of frontiers and a new distribution of colonies. Upon the demands for political reform he was more explicit. They must be met, he said, "without impairing the federal character and constitutional basis of the empire" or "the rights of the imperial administration to conduct our policy." This was notice that the reichstag might receive an extension of its privilege of conversation, but that power must remain concentrated in the kaiser, his personally appointed chancellor, and the bundesrath, named by the autocratic rulers of the states and utterly beyond the reach of the people.

What the kaiser and the militarists and the junkers said thru their puppet concerning the conduct of the



war and the terms of peace is of inferior interest. The outstanding revelation is that Prussianism is unchanged, except that it has become more desperate, more resolved to perpetuate itself. Its one hope lies in continuing the war; in that policy it has nothing to lose and everything to gain, for it knows that with it the democracies of the world will never make peace. Therefore, it deceives the people with meaningless changes in the government; therefore, it permits the energies of discontent to dissipate themselves in futile discussions of whether programs of annexation shall be reaffirmed or abandoned. The one thing it will not be able to do is to give the German nation self-government, thru which alone peace can come. More ominous than this, however, is the fact that the German people do not yet show signs of being able, if they are inclined, to free themselves. If the new chancellor, as some believe, is merely a lay figure employed to mask the preparation of a military dictatorship, there is hope that that final throttling of their liberties might rouse in them a spirit of political manhood. Failing that, civilization will have but one recourse—to destroy autocracy by the dreadful, but necessary, expedient of beating its deluded adherents into submission.

## DEMOCRACY MOBILIZES

*July 24, 1917.*

**I**N THE early days of the war, when the kaiser's huge military machine was thundering across Europe in its first crashing advance, the world watched with fascinating interest that tremendous revelation of remorseless power. The perfidy of Germany's assault upon civilization aroused feelings of anger and loathing; yet even those who most deeply detested her criminality could not withhold admiration from her masterful exhibition of the three essentials of success in war or in any other great undertaking—foresight, preparation and efficiency. Within twenty-five days she had mobilized, equipped and put into the field on the western front four armies aggregating nearly 1,000,000 men; had swept across Belgium, reduced strong fortresses, paralyzed desperate attacks and smashed the center of her antagonists' main line. Yet the spectacular feats of the battlefield were less impressive to the observant than was the vast system which had made these things possible, the product of forty years of planning by the ablest military experts of the empire.

They had long discerned that the war they projected would be no romantic adventure, but a problem to be worked out with scientific exactitude. When Germany finally took the field it was not to play a game or to create a spectacle, but to conduct a great business enterprise; and behind the dazzling maneuvers of armies was a

nation-wide organization perfected to the last detail and responsive instantly to the briefest orders. At the single word "Mobilize," the millions of civilian reservists almost automatically became soldiers equipped for the field. Each one had long had exact instructions telling him where to report in case of war. Arriving at the designated place, he found ready his complete campaign outfit, the shoes and clothing having been made to his measure in time of peace. Regimental, brigade, division and corps commanders opened their sealed orders and learned the first destination of their forces and the precise hour of departure. The troop trains in every part of the country moved according to timetables prepared months before. With almost incredible celerity the mighty war machine was assembled and started upon its way. Altho it had been known that Germany had developed the art of war almost into an exact science, the swiftness and precision of her first military movements created a profound impression. What had enabled her to gain such an advantage over her opponents? What she had done, declared her jubilant supporters, was merely the logical result of her perfectly organized governmental system; a complete demonstration of the incomparable strength of a strongly centralized state, exacting blind obedience from the citizenship to autocratic power.

This, they argued, was the justification for the system of autocracy to which the German people had intelligently subjected themselves; it had produced that spirit of unity, discipline and unquestioning service which enabled the nation to call instantly into being an invincible defensive and offensive force; it had not only created armies ready to strike, but had built up a reserve power of trained men that would guarantee full ranks in a war of any conceivable length or magnitude.

Such efficiency as Germany had exhibited in her military operations could be attained, they said, only by an all-powerful state; whatever might be the theoretical merits of democracy, its fatal defects must be revealed in the relentless test of war. That France had in a reasonable state of preparedness a large and well-trained army they attributed to the powerful example of Germany and the ever-present prospect of a clash between the two nations. But they pointed with scorn to Great Britain's melancholy experience as proof that a nation which permitted civic freedom to assert itself during peace must suffer defeat in war. The splendid devotion of her volunteers, they said, only emphasized the folly of the system, for its unscientific improvisation produced not only an imperfect military machine, but dangerous dislocation of the economic life of the country. It was represented that the Britons' passionate adherence to personal liberty and the ideals of democracy in government had reduced the nation to impotence, while the Germans' submission to autocratic rule had given them irresistible power. But it was in the United States that the advocates of Prussianism found their chief argument. Behold, they said, to what a lamentable condition had democracy brought the world's greatest republic! They found that here the doctrine of individualism had attained a sway greater even than in England. They found it to be an almost universal belief that defensive preparedness and military service were antagonistic to national freedom and enlightenment.

This was the position of the pacifists and the pro-German elements, and from these sources was carried on a nation-wide propaganda to discourage and discredit every movement for strengthening the national defense, and in particular to resist the idea that every fit citizen

owed an obligation of military service. The president himself was a powerful exponent of the doctrine, and for months used his influence to persuade his countrymen against measures of preparedness and the maintenance of national rights, winning a majority of them at the election on these issues. In America, then, the advocates of autocracy found the most effective arguments in support of their charge that democracy in peace impairs national efficiency, destroys unity and paralyzes patriotism, and in war must infallibly result in confusion, feebleness and disunion. Last week they had their answer, in the most remarkable demonstration of democratic unity and patriotism ever given in any country.

At the opening of this year the influences hostile to the creation of adequate national defense were seemingly in absolute control. Pacifism was waging a bitter campaign against proposals for universal military service, pro-Germanism was conducting its virulent campaign of disloyalty and the administration forces were still maintaining the policy of inertia. Yet six months later, on a single day, this greatest of democracies participated in a project of conscription unparalleled in history. The nation which had been taught for years to hate the very suggestion of compulsory enlistment for war submitted loyally, soberly and with perfect unanimity to the drafting of more men than were ever before summoned to present themselves for service under a flag. Only a few weeks ago it was being predicted that this test would cause an outburst of agitation and turbulence; that the attempt to impose conscription would be met by violent resistance. Yet the tremendous undertaking was carried out more peaceably than many an election. Ten million men, in obedience to the national will as expressed in law, had registered as subject to military

service. The determining of the order in which they should be called to the colors affected virtually every household in the land. Yet there was not a sign of unrest, not an expression of discontent or resentment. On the contrary, the result was awaited in calmness and accepted with universal confidence in its necessity and justice. The manhood and womanhood of America faced a grim duty with cheerfulness and high resolve.

This is the answer of a free people to the vicious theory that liberty and loyalty cannot co-exist; to those who proclaim that only under autocratic forms of government can there be a true understanding of the obligations of the citizen of the nation. It is the final refutation of their teaching that democracy has within it the seeds of disunion; that a people which exalts individual liberty and asserts political rights is incapable of subordinating them to national need or of making sacrifices for the country's good. Such virtues they have represented as being peculiar to the subjects of autocracy. This was one of the themes of the eloquent Doctor Dernburg when he was attempting to give Prussianism a character in the eyes of America. "The supreme discipline of the German forces," he wrote, "has its deepest root in the thoroly imparted idea that a nation can be strong only when it responds obediently to constituted authority. You may call this militarism if you will, but it lies at the very foundation of that efficiency which has taught the world how to make the individual subordinate his own habits and selfish interests to the strength and success of the state." Dr. Franz Erich Junge was even more blunt:

There can be no doubt that it is instructive to talk freely about the range of democracy in theory. But it is a reflection upon the intelligence of trained observers to speak seriously of the effectiveness of popular government in prac-

tice. We all know the fallacy of government by numbers, and refuse to adopt it in factory or business. But, while the Germans admit the providence of enlightened leadership, even in the administration of the commonwealth, where it is most needed, Americans deny the proof of eminent control, because it is more diplomatic to maintain the illusion of "the powers of the people." I do not know whether our frankness is stupid or your disavowal hypocritical.

With such arguments have the advocates of Prussianism sought to show that there cannot exist under democracy a spirit of genuine loyalty and national obligation. Yet for all their boasted candor, they are not so frank, nor are they so discerning, as was Bismarck, who bequeathed to his countrymen in his published memoirs this contemptuous characterization:

In order that German patriotism should be active and effective it needs as a rule to hang on the peg of dependence upon a dynasty; independent of dynasty, it rarely comes to the rising point. The German's love of Fatherland has need of a prince on whom it can concentrate its attachment. Suppose that all the German dynasties were suddenly deposed; there would then be no likelihood that German national sentiment would suffice to hold all Germans together.

Probably it is true that only the grip of autocracy can produce in the German people unity, discipline and loyalty. But Americans have given proof to the world that they are of a different type—that from democracy they derive a spirit of civic responsibility and national obligation which are the highest expressions of true liberty.

## A LESSON STILL UNLEARNED

*July 25, 1917.*

**N**O AMERICAN, no intelligent citizen of any country, can have failed to be impressed by the spectacle of last week's draft, which was carried thru with orderly precision and manifest public support. Even the kaiser's chancellor and his military experts, tho they affect to despise American intervention, know the tremendous meaning there is in the registration of 10,000,000 men as subject to military service and the drawing of the 1,000,000 from whom the first army of 500,000 will be selected. Remarkable as a demonstration refuting the theory that a democracy cannot display unity and efficiency, the event was especially significant because it marked a triumph of patriotism and national intelligence over the powerful influence of tradition and prejudice. For generations it had been a matter of faith with Americans that defense of the country in time of war was the business of volunteers. Most of them never analyzed the injustice of putting upon the ardently patriotic the burden of sacrifice that should be shared by all, and they had an inveterate aversion to the idea of compulsory military service, which seemed to them to imply an invasion of personal liberty and to reflect upon public honor. These prejudices, too, had been encouraged by the persistent teachings of pacifism and pro-Germanism and by the administration's disapproval of projects to strengthen the country's defenses. Yet



the American people finally laid hold upon the fact that in this system were embedded the principles of democratic justice and equality; their demands put thru the legislation, and when the supreme test of loyalty came they met it courageously and serenely.

These things justify the sober pride and new sense of national security they have aroused. Yet they cannot obscure the fact that there are deficiencies which no present or future activity can fully overcome—sins of the past for which heavy penalties must be borne. It is true that we have taken the first great step toward providing the nation with adequate military defense. It is true that we have on call the material for an army of the republic. But it will be many months before the new troops are fitted to take their places in the battle line to defend the rights of America and the cause of civilization. And during that interval every day, every hour, will add to the sum total of human suffering items which never can be expunged, miseries which never can be alleviated. Let America be now ever so ardent and self-sacrificing, she must wait, and the world must wait, until the deficiencies due to past neglect are slowly made good. Reasonable preparedness to defend the national rights and the principles which were so vigorously asserted would have enabled the United States, when the decision finally became necessary, to exert appreciable power against the forces of international anarchy. But for thirty-two months, while the inevitable conflict drew steadily and visibly nearer, proposals of national defense were officially ignored, even decried. Therefore it was that the world's greatest democracy was compelled to enter the war totally unready to make any contribution except money. And not for another year will it be able to strike a decisive blow for law and liberty.

It is depressing enough to realize that because of studied neglect America must delay so long effective participation in an undertaking vital to national safety and the re-establishment of world order. But consider what the condition signifies in concrete terms of the war's effects. It means that for another twelvemonth Belgium must endure the anguish of Prussian enslavement; that France must continue to bleed from wounds that prompt American support would stanch; that the men of Great Britain and Canada and Australia must die by tens of thousands in a cause which is theirs no more than ours, in order that we may have time to prepare; that the submarine will wage its murderous war unavenged by the nation upon which it already has inflicted intolerable injury. As a matter of cold logic, is it not just to say that these things will be chargeable to America's dilatory policy? The war must end some time; the intervention of the United States, it is recognized, will be the decisive factor; and since the military force of that intervention is delayed by lack of readiness for a year, to what else will be due the grievous losses that must be suffered in the interval?

But Americans who think that our allies will have to bear all the burden of our neglect of duty deceive themselves; that year which it adds to the duration of the war will mean that much additional suffering and sacrifice for the people of this country. Preparedness would have enabled the nation to strike swiftly and effectually; unpreparedness means an extra year of service for the soldiers, an extra year of suspense and separation for their families, an extra year of economic stress, perhaps of privation. For more than two years our involvement in the war was manifestly inevitable, and the hearty acceptance of the draft shows that one-tenth

of the activity devoted by the administration to discrediting the necessity of general military service would have sufficed to make the policy effective twenty-four months ago. In that case, the United States would have had available, when its declaration became necessary, a vast reserve of partially trained men and full equipment for them; and by this time the army which will not be actually recruited until fall would be far advanced in the process of being made fit for service in the field. And it would be made up, as it should be, of young men who had not yet found their places in the productive life of the nation and had not assumed family responsibilities; it would not involve the drafting, as is now requisite, of tens of thousands of men whose withdrawal will impair national efficiency and mean hardship to families, despite all efforts to minimize those results.

But, apart from the deplorable effects of the policy of neglecting preparedness and evading the just, democratic demand of obligatory military service, the nation must pay the penalty for a related yet distinct failure in duty. This has been the deliberate rejection of the idea of universal military training, which might have been adopted in the beginning without committing the country to compulsory service. No suggestion aroused more bitter official hostility, yet its advocacy by *The North American* and other newspapers evoked the most convincing expressions of public approval, the genuineness of which has been demonstrated by the virtually unanimous acceptance of the draft. Universal military training does not imply or require conscription, which becomes necessary only in case of dire national peril. But its adoption at the time it was urged would have obviated the needless delay which now confronts us with unknown burdens and menaces. For under that

fair, square and democratic system which calls the youth of a nation for yearly training, at specified ages, there would have been ready for the draft, when it did come, a vast supply of competent recruits. Instead of being taken from their work and their homes to spend a year in preparation, the members of the army might have been made ready for the field in a brief time. To send men to war at all is a bitter necessity; but it is no more welcome, the sacrifice is made no easier, because many months must be devoted to the preparatory training which they might have received at the ages when it would be least costly to them and to the nation. And the rational system would have made for better citizenship and better physical development of our youth. Only when Americans learn from experience what a large proportion of the drafted men will have to be set aside as unfit will they begin to realize what universal military training would have accomplished in lifting the general level of health and efficiency.

The record of past neglect and the certainty of the needless losses it will produce do not comprise, however, the whole misfortune of the situation. Universal military training is not yet accepted or indorsed by the government. Contrary to widespread belief, the United States has adopted no permanent military policy—neither obligatory service nor obligatory training. All the tremendous activity of the present is devoted to meeting the existing emergency. If the war were to end tomorrow, all of the army in process of draft, all of the national guard and all but a meager remnant of the regular army would automatically pass out of existence as an available military force. The nation would possess a smaller army than it did six months ago; the government would have no power, without new legislation, to summon any one to military service, and there

would be no provision for the universal military training which many citizens mistakenly think has become an established system. There are two great perils confronting the American people. The first is the unbroken power of German autocracy, the triumph of which would mean the destruction of international law and the reduction of free nations to terrorized impotence. The second is that public preoccupation with this overshadowing menace will enable the administration to carry out its fatal policy of treating national safety as a mere emergency matter and evading the adoption of a permanent, continuing policy of defensive preparedness. What we said seven weeks ago demands greater emphasis now:

It will be no excuse to plead that the nation must concentrate upon the business of winning the war and that future needs can be dealt with later. Genuine preparedness, a continuing policy of national defense, will be established now or not at all; for just as surely as the duty is neglected until peace comes, it will become impossible of performance. If the necessary, just and democratic system of universal military training is not adopted now, when enlightened public sentiment has read the need for it in the dire peril that confronts us, it will never be adopted in time of peace, and the nation will face its next crisis unprepared and foredoomed.

## RUSSIA'S COLLAPSE

*July 27, 1917.*

**A**S A designation by which this world conflict may be known, why not The Incredible War? From the unbelievable perfidy of its beginning down to the immeasurable menace of the present and the future, it taxes the faculty of belief. Incredible in its cruelties and heroisms, its manifestations of dehumanized ferocity and sacrificial devotion, in baseness and grandeur, it now challenges credulity with such spectacles as those described in official dispatches from the Russian capital:

Our troops have shown complete disobedience toward their commanders and are continuing their retreat. The Germans have broken the front of the army. This terrible operation has been facilitated by the criminal levity and blind fanaticism of some and the treachery of the others. Most units are in a state of complete disorganization. They no longer listen to orders, and they neglect all exhortations of comrades. Some elements evacuate positions without awaiting the approach of the enemy. Cases are on record in which an order given to proceed with all haste to assist comrades in distress has been discussed for several hours at a meeting, and the reinforcements consequently have been delayed.

There is a sort of ghastly humor in the picture of those meetings of simple-minded soldiers, solemnly debating whether to obey the orders of their government, and exalted, no doubt, by a sense of fulfilling the destinies of democracy, until the gatherings are adjourned by the onslaughts of a derisive enemy. Yet it is deeply tragic, too; a glimpse of the hideous catastrophe which has been brought upon the Russian people by false and

fanatical leadership. And it has a somber meaning for this country, since every unfolding of the appalling drama of a nation's delusion signifies that more Americans must die to save the cause imperiled by this collapse. The events which have produced it are so recent that they would hardly need retelling, were it not that they have been so swift and so confusing that they have left most observers bewildered. Ever since the Prussianized system of czarism was overthrown, expectations regarding the course of the new régime have fluctuated violently. Russia is so vast, and the conflicting forces in her life are so irreconcilable, that the impression of one day's news is dissipated the next; thus movements of seemingly capital importance have proved to be meaningless, while incidents and actions apparently trivial have developed into events of tremendous concern.

Every reader knows that the revolution was the product of two main sections—the *duma* party, representing the aspirations of rationally conceived democracy, and the various elements of radicalism and anarchy. The former, having experience, cohesion and some command of political machinery, was able to establish a provisional government. But at the same time the latter set up and maintained by force an irresponsible authority, and put into effect a program which has brought both to disaster. This organization was the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Representing not more than 15 per cent of the population, it exerted disproportionate power because, as its name implies, it was a vehicle for the demands of labor and of the army, both of which had been intoxicated by sudden liberation, and was a rallying point for every element of discontent, class hatred, pro-Germanism and disloyal pacifism. The Council openly asserted its authority to

be superior to that of the provisional government. It assumed to nullify official decrees, incited disorder in industry, undermined discipline and fomented sedition in the army. While the government was pledging Russia's fidelity to the cause of democracy and civilization, this body usurped executive functions and proclaimed that the revolutionary democracy must make a separate peace with kaiserism. It sent deputations to the front to persuade the troops that only British and French and American greed continued the war, and at the same time it issued threats that Russia would repudiate her obligations unless the Allies agreed to a peace on Germany's false terms of "no annexations, no indemnities." It was the Council and the scatter-brained Socialist extremists working with it that framed and promulgated a new system of regulations for the army and navy—abolition of salutes, proclamation of equality among officers and men, and the delivering of disciplinary authority, and even the powers of military direction, into the hands of committees elected by the rank and file. The inevitable results have been seen in the record of uncontrollable desertions and mutinies; in the shameful fraternization with the country's armed enemies on Russian soil, and finally in disordered and treacherous retreat.

To any sensible observer the coming of the present situation was clearly foreshadowed from the time when the ascendancy of the forces of disunion, unbalanced radicalism and anarchy was made apparent. Yet statesmen and publicists have deluded themselves and many Americans with optimistic predictions. "All that Russia needs to defeat the Germans," reported our ambassador, "is a plentiful supply of munitions, financial credit and railway equipment"—as tho these things could be effectively employed by a nation whose government was terrorized by an organization of irresponsible and selfish



agitators, and whose armies had become an undisciplined rabble. A patriotic declaration by a body of peasants or a regiment of soldiers would inspire glowing editorials upon Russia's return to sanity. No doubt the members of the American mission had sound reasons for expressing confidence in the situation. Yet it was not convincing to read that Mr. Root "marvels at the self-control and sound common sense" of the populace; that Charles Edward Russell decried reports of anarchy and criticism of Socialist follies, and that Major General Scott found the spirit and efficiency of the army beyond praise. The spectacular offensive during the first week of July, under the heroic leadership of Kerensky, then minister of war, was palpably artificial and unrepresentative, and did not refute the judgment we expressed six weeks before:

The spectacle of Russia is terrible, yet fascinating. Her mighty mass hangs menacingly over the path of liberty, and at any moment the avalanche may descend in thunderous ruin. Yet no precaution now can avert the peril. Civilization can only brace itself for a longer and costlier struggle, made necessary because liberty is misunderstood and misused by those who ought to be its strongest champions.

Now even those whose arrogant fanaticism invoked the demon of anarchy are terrified by the results of the success in which they exulted. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, still arrogating to itself the functions of government, joins with the Council of Delegates of the Peasants of All Russia in "granting" to Premier Kerensky and his associates the powers of a dictatorship. And it has the audacity, in deploring the mutinies at the front, to rebuke the victims of its own vicious propaganda. The sudden freeing of 170,000,000 people, most of them ignorant, from the centuries-old repression of czarism could not but produce extravagances and confusion. Absolutely the first need was

the establishment of order thru the instrumentality of a strong centralized government, especially with an invader encamped far in the nation's territory; the more loyally it was supported, the easier would be the accomplishment of political and economic liberation. Creation of a dictatorship, now adopted as a last resort to avert complete disaster, should have been the first and unanimous demand. But the infatuated social revolutionists could not restrain their greed of power; the ignorant masses of Russia and their half-educated leaders must forthwith give lessons in democracy to nations that have fought their way toward its realization thru centuries of slow and painful enlightenment.

Even tho the results are so ominous for the democratic forces of the world, it would be unjust to feel anger against the Russian peasant, who represents 90 per cent, perhaps, of the population and the army. He has in him a simplicity and generosity, a primitive nobility of character, which command admiration. Even his abysmal ignorance is hardly repellent. It is not the ignorance of the fool, but of the child. When his leaders tell him that the war should be ended by a "peace without victory," he applies to the problem an infantile, but remorseless, logic. The Germans have said they want to stop fighting, so why not stop? Why continue to kill each other? For liberty? Why, Russians have that. To avenge wrongs Germany has committed against other nations? If Russia is content to suffer her losses, why should not they endure theirs? A typical incident is illuminating. An officer was patiently expounding to his troops, by order, the issues of the war, and had made a good impression until he mentioned the Dardanelles. What was that? demanded the soldiers. He explained, laboriously. "Then it's water!" they cried. "We don't want water, we want land. Let us go home." Which

they accordingly did. As to the Socialists' clamor about the national passion to exclude annexations and indemnities, it is only necessary to say that there is no equivalent for those words in the Russian language, and it would take nation-wide lecture courses to convey their meaning to the populace.

The Russian people are not to blame for their plight; those responsible are the "intelligent" agitators who set the nation in pursuit of false and destructive ideals. And these are the men who have threatened and plotted against the democracies of the world, and have had the effrontery to demand acceptance of their concept of international justice and stable principles of government. How menacing is the problem which their headstrong folly has created is suggested in the warning uttered three months ago by Prof. Alexander Petrunkevitch, son of the floor leader of the first Russian duma, and now a member of the faculty of Yale:

We ought to carry to the Russian people in some way the news that freedom at this moment is dependent, not upon a socialized state, but upon the situation at the front. If the Germans should be able to overthrow a disorganized Russian army, the United States and Great Britain and France will have to fight for perhaps five years to come to preserve democracy.

## THIS IS AMERICA'S WAR

*August 2, 1917.*

**A**LL thoughtful Americans who read the speech delivered by Senator Borah the other day must have been impressed by his forceful warning that there is no ardor in the country's attitude toward the war and no general understanding of the meaning of the conflict to this nation. Yet even more suggestive to us was a chance remark overheard in a street car on the same day. Two national guardsmen had just left the car, and as they swung away two women watched them soberly. "I suppose it must be," said one, "but what a pity!" "Yes," said the other, "and it wouldn't be so hard if they were going to fight for America. We must help those other countries, I suppose. Still——." The unspoken thought was plain.

This is a symptom. It arrests the attention of the observant a dozen times a day. This is what unnumbered earnest, patriotic Americans are thinking. Day by day realization grows of our calamitous unreadiness to fulfill the functions of a nation at war. It is six months since the foremost military Power of the world invaded our rights and defied our sovereignty, four months since we perforce accepted the atrocious challenge and undertook to defend our integrity by the only means left to us. And we are still in the midst of preliminary preparation, still without defenses that would check, or even inconvenience, the enemy of the republic were he not held by the strength of other opponents. The new

armies, the airplanes, the cargo ships—the three most vital requisites in the scheme of national defense—exist only on paper. Two recent announcements of the war department sufficiently illustrate our deficiencies—the first troops at the front must use British rifles, because it is impossible to manufacture the American arm, the Springfield, in adequate numbers; and they must use French artillery for a similar reason. We march to Armageddon weaponless; with our vast material and industrial resources, we are dependent upon the arsenals of our allies, who have had to improvise armament while fighting for their very lives.

Yet this condition, humiliating and alarming as it is, represents only one-half of our present unfitness for war. The lack of trained men and of arms is not more serious than the absence of clear, universal, inspiring conviction that our war is not only just, but absolutely necessary; that its purpose is not merely to deliver Europe and rescue civilization, but actually to save America from irretrievable disaster. The unpreparedness of the country's military defense is no more ominous, hardly more difficult to overcome, than the unpreparedness of the public mind and the national soul. If by some miraculous process the United States could create overnight a vast army, completely equipped and fully trained, the nation would still lack fitness for the mighty struggle because its judgment would still be uncertain and its spirit untouched by the fire of passionate resolve. This is a palpable fact. Frenchmen and Britons and Belgians know why they are fighting, why they must keep on fighting; yet what has been burned into their minds by actual invasion is as clear to Canadians and Australians and South African Boers, whose lands are as remote from immediate peril as is ours. Americans are not less intelligent and patriotic. Why,

then, are they less aroused, less convinced? Their apathy and doubts are the reflection, first, of thirty months of persuasive teaching which doubtless was sincere, yet none the less was false; and second, to the failure of their leaders to define the issues of the conflict in American terms, to reveal it as a war not only for world democracy, but for American liberties and lives and homes.

Those who made the records of our diplomacy and statesmanship during the period which led infallibly to the final declaration had before them at all times the whole mass of evidence; they were prepared for the great decision; they could see that there was no other way. But to the great mass of the people the change of policy appeared revolutionary, inexplicable. Month after month they had been urged and implored to keep their thoughts from the war as a thing wholly apart from their interests. How should they understand that a conflict which was none of their concern had become within a few months, and without visible approach, an issue demanding stupendous sacrifices? How could they applaud "peace without victory" as the American watchword in December, and respond to "no peace without victory" as the ultimatum of April? But if past errors of leadership created a spirit of hesitancy, present deficiencies have intensified it. Americans have been summoned to face the supreme test of a nation's fiber by appeals to abstract principles. They have been admonished that they are to give their lives for civilization, and must not dishonor their lofty mission by fighting for themselves. They are to endure privation and bereavement and death and wounds in order to make the world safe for democracy; what they do not understand, because it is contrary to all that their leader had said, is that they must fight to make the world safe for

America. Thus it is that they enter upon the arduous task with the idea that they are sacrificing themselves for others—a belief which may encourage a sense of self-esteem, but does not make for national enthusiasm or military ardor. Thus it is that they picture American soldiers dying in the trenches solely to save Frenchmen and Britons, and do not realize that if America is still safe, still has time to prepare, it is because millions of those men have defended with their bodies the battle line of their liberties and ours. They conceive that we are nobly rescuing neighbors in distress, whereas we are belatedly joining our strength to theirs against a common foe, whose victory over them would mean our destruction. How widespread is this misconception any American may readily learn for himself. He will find that there is ominous truth in the declarations of Senator Borah:

We must arouse the interest of the American people and let them know definitely and specifically the things for which they are expected to fight and to die. We cannot carry on this war without an aroused and sustained public opinion, which does not now exist.

The government and diplomacy may be interested in Constantinople or the Bagdad railroad. But out yonder in the open, where every move toward war means toil and suffering, where families are to be broken up and sons and brothers and husbands are to be offered on the altar—that altar must be our country. You must speak to them of things at home, and of the flag. You must give them an American issue for which to die.

We have our allies, and with them a common purpose. But America is still America, with her own individuality, with her distinct and noble institutions, with the intellectual and moral conceptions of her own people. She is still a sun and not a satellite.

I say that this is an American war. But that is not the manner in which it has been presented to the American people. We have been supposed to be fighting for the rehabilitation of certain nations in Europe, for the establish-

ment of democracy and the rights of humanity in Europe. But the peril which confronts the American people, immediate and imminent, has not been presented to them; and senators' correspondence, if it is like mine, will disclose that the American people do not understand it.

The truth is being spread, nevertheless, by one powerful agency. Just as Theodore Roosevelt preached Americanism and preparedness during the two years and a half when they were under official disfavor, so now he is leading his countrymen to understand that this is a war to defend not only world democracy but American liberties. His message delivered in Pittsburgh will carry far:

We shall pay heavily if we do not in time wake from our short-sighted apathy and foolish, self-sufficient optimism. We live on a continent; we have trusted to that fact for safety in the past; we do not understand that world conditions have changed and that the oceans and even the air have become highways for military aggression. The battle-front of Europe is slowly spreading over the whole world. Unless we beat Germany in Europe, we shall have to fight her deadly ambition on our own coasts and our own continent. A great American army in Europe now is the best possible insurance against a great European or Asiatic army in our own country a couple of years or a couple of decades hence.

Make no mistake. We are fighting for humanity; but we are also, and primarily, fighting for our own vital interests. Our army in France will fight for France and Belgium; but most of all it will be fighting for America. We announced that we were coming to the help of our allies. As a matter of fact, we owe our safety solely to the fact that these hard-pressed and war-worn allies protect us with their lives, with their trained bodies and perfected machines, while we endeavor to get ready to do something. We have been saved only because, for their own purposes, our allies had to protect us.

We are fighting for humanity, for the right of each well-behaved nation to independence and to whatever form of government it desires; and we are fighting for our own hearthstones and for the honor and welfare of our children and our children's children.



It is encouraging to note that the administration is at last undertaking to define this as an American war. Secretary Lansing's forceful address the other day, emphasizing the fact that "the United States is in real danger" and refuting the fallacy that "we are fighting others' battles," was a public service. President Wilson could make no better use of his talents and his great influence than by laboring to undo the harm which his erroneous teachings of the past have wrought. For it is certain that the United States will not exert its full power in the war, and will not advance toward national safety, until its people realize that our first line of defense is in Europe, and that our troops in the trenches will be fighting, not *for* France and Belgium and Great Britain, but *with* them, and for the security of America as well as the liberties of those nations.

## WHY DO WE FIGHT?

*August 8, 1917.*

LAST week's anniversaries of the war's beginnings awakened only slight interest. Burdened with the woes of three years of conflict and facing the possibility of still more grievous suffering and sacrifice, the world has little time for musing upon dates and events buried under heaps of slain. Rather, the occasion suggested sober computation of the cost already laid upon civilization, and stern preparation for the tasks of the fourth year, which threaten to be more arduous than those which have set new marks of mankind's capacity for endurance. The mere statistics of the struggle, which can give no adequate idea of the sum of human anguish which they represent, almost defy understanding. In 1100 days of fighting the nations have expended \$85,000,000,000—nearly six times the combined financial cost of the American Civil war, the Franco-Prussian war, the conquest of South Africa and the conflict between Russia and Japan. All of Europe is belligerent, except Switzerland, Spain, Holland and Scandinavia; all of Asia and America, except a few remote and primitive regions. Seven countries—China, Panama, Costa Rica, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala and Chile—have taken steps preliminary to acts of war. Of the world's merchant shipping 5,000,000 tons have been destroyed. The slain number 5,000,000, the total casualties, 18,000,000—thirty times as many as were killed and wounded in the war between the North and South.

More important, however, than these results, appalling as they are, is the beginning of a new phase. The war has had two periods—that in which Germany was in the ascendant, and that in which the supreme efforts of her opponents gradually brought them into a position of superiority. Now comes the third phase—the addition to their power of the resources of the United States. The war henceforth is America's war; it is to be won thru the strength, or lost thru the weakness, of this country.

Hence its issues become of vital interest and concern to the American people. It is no longer our privilege to view with detachment the causes, the progress and the effects of the war. We must fight, and we must know why we fight. We have had three years to make up our minds; the evidence upon which judgment could be formed has been piled mountains high. It is inconceivable that any nation, at this time, should commit itself to participation in such a struggle without urgent and irresistible reasons. Every tradition and instinct of the American people impels them to avoid war. What are the reasons which justify, which command, that they shall add to the stupendous machinery of slaughter? Many attempts have been made to reduce the cause of the United States to a brief formula. President Wilson employed his mastery of words to frame a statement that might satisfy contemporary thought and the judgment of posterity. The United States entered the war, he said, to "make the world safe for democracy." This is, in truth, all-inclusive; the declaration represents the irreducible minimum of the demands of civilization. Yet all Americans are not scholars, historians, statesmen. They do not readily conceive that any such abstract aim is sufficient to justify the abandonment of a century-old policy and the incurring of colossal responsibilities. They

want specifications. Of these there is no lack. The three-year record is not so much an argument for American intervention as it is an indictment of American neutrality. It is only because of narrow interpretation and mistaken pleading that the imperative summons of events went so long unheeded. If ever a nation had a just cause, it is the United States. If ever a nation took up arms in honor and by necessity, it is this. America makes war not for one reason, but for many.

We fight because of Serbia. Obscured by the murk and wreckage of thirty-six months of savage warfare, the assassination of that people's nationhood remains one of the fundamental issues; for when armed might struck down Serbia, it delivered a blow at the very heart of world order. We fight for Belgium, for the sake of her trampled rights, her ravished cities, her people smitten by brutal invasion and the torments of enslavement. Horror over acts of cruel aggression and sympathy for a wronged people might not in themselves be adequate cause for war; but when Germany violated Belgian neutrality, she struck at all treaties, all law, all the code of international honor. Condoned or unavenged, that hideous crime would mean that henceforth no nation would be safe, no compact of governments worth the paper on which it was written. We fight for France, a sister republic, the first friend of American independence, whose history and aspirations are so closely linked with ours. Or rather, we fight with France; not sympathy alone, but justice and self-interest summon us to her side. It was France that received the full force of autocracy's onslaught, and that for three years, at immeasurable cost, has held the battle line of liberty. If France were to be overcome, democracy in Europe would be destroyed and democracy in America would be doomed. We fight for and with Great

Britain, whose language is ours and from whose laws we derived our heritage of individual rights and political freedom. Against her imperialism America was ever a relentless witness, as in the long misrule of Ireland and the subjugation of the Boer republics; yet it was Britain's stand for law that saved civilization from sudden overthrow, and it is because of British endurance that America has time now to prepare.

We fight to destroy a system that has dishonored even the cruel code of war by acts of lawless and calculated barbarity; to express our detestation of the savagery responsible for the ghastly innovations of bombing sleeping cities, of poison gas and liquid flame, of murder at sea and slave raids on land. It may still be said that all these things were beyond our right to redress, that they did not directly endanger the security of our own country. But Prussianism sought us out to make war upon us; it invaded our rights and challenged our sovereignty with unexampled deliberation and ferocity. We fight because Germany undertook to close against us the open seas; because she lawlessly attacked our commerce and murdered our citizens, in defiance of international law and in mockery of our patient protestations. Let ideas of vengeance be deprecated as they may, we fight because of the American men and women and children massacred in the sinking of the *Lusitania*, because of the countless others slain by criminal cruelty and stealth.

We fight because the safety of America and of all civilization lies in the restoration of law, the vindication of international honor, the perpetuation of democracy; because the continued existence of Prussianism, undefeated and armed, would be a perpetual menace to peace; because to submit to it would be to enthrone brute force above good faith as the ruling power in the world's

affairs. We fight because a refusal to fight would be an abdication of sovereignty to terrorism; because we know that if democracy cannot maintain its rights against autocracy it lacks the fundamental justification for its existence; because the choice lies between a Prussianized world and a free world; because autocratic Germany is a bad neighbor, a faithless friend, a perfidious enemy.

But if all this be true, it may be asked, are we to fight for causes so remote as the readjustment of European frontiers and the disposition of Asiatic territories? Are we to send Americans to the trenches to free Alsace-Lorraine and keep Germany out of Bagdad? The answer is that our need is concentrated in the single war aim of defeating German autocracy and destroying the menace of its power; and if that is to be accomplished by these means, they demand our fullest co-operation. We fight, then, to end an intolerable threat to our rights and our freedom; because in no other way can we re-establish peace and safety; because it is necessary that such a settlement shall be imposed as will meet the situation described by President Wilson:

Government after government has, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

## THE UNBEATEN SUBMARINE

*August 9, 1917.*

**T**WO events during the last few days emphasize the fact that the great submarine problem is still unsolved, still holds the menace of a German victory, or at least of Prussianism's escape from full punishment. First is the announcement that the navy department has abandoned its far-trumpeted plans for the building of 1000—or was it 10,000?—small, swift submarine chasers; the scheme, which looked so devastating on paper, appears to have had every virtue except practicability, and the projected fleet of flivvers fades away with other dreams of half-baked strategy. Reports of mysterious inventions that are to eliminate the peril have no foundation. The second event bearing upon the problem is the Anglo-French drive in Flanders. This offensive, promising to be one of the major operations of the war, was quite unforeseen by the military experts; but their judgment now is that its ultimate objective is not so much to break or flank the Germans' western line as it is to reconquer the Flanders coast and so eliminate the submarine peril at its source. This is the aim that the kaiser sees in the attack, as he made clear in his telegram to the commander of the forces meeting it. It is from Ostend and Zeebrugge that the German airplanes and undersea craft start on their forays against England and merchant shipping in the Channel and the North sea. But the main submarine base is the deep canal that

links Zeebrugge and Bruges, and an advance to those points would cut the vital nerve of the system of sea terrorism.

The war has become, of course, a struggle for food. It is essentially a contest between two blockades—that of Germany by armies and fleets and that of the Allies by indiscriminate submarine warfare. The latter is, therefore, of supreme importance, and its development is one of the overshadowing factors in the whole conflict. It is undeniable that, next to the airplane, the submarine is the most revolutionary factor in the war. It was responsible in part for the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, and helped to make the Saloniki campaign so precarious that withdrawal may result. While it has not by any means changed control of the sea, as German enthusiasts like to tell themselves, it has put serious pressure upon the Allies and presents an obstacle which will test all their powers. Germany has been waging a campaign of murder at sea ever since February, 1915, with occasional modifications offered to avert, if possible, American intervention; but her undertaking really dates from the proclamation of the end of last January, announcing definitely that all enemy and neutral ships would be sunk without warning or mercy. Hospital vessels were explicitly included by a later decree. Determination to resort to organized piracy and assassination followed the battle of Jutland. That engagement, celebrated thruout Germany as a great triumph, destroyed the last hope of naval success by lawful means, and the imperial government undertook to snatch victory by ruthless destruction of merchant shipping. As the chancellor remarked, with cheerful candor, earlier concessions to law and humanity had been made only because the number of submarines were inadequate. How many are available now is known only



to Berlin. Three months ago the editor of the Scientific American estimated that the Central Powers had 200 of the craft in service and that the German yards, with facilities for building 500 of them at once, could turn out 700 in six months and 1200 by next spring. At about the same time it was stated in Washington that four submarines of the most modern type were being launched every week. Amsterdam's information was that 325 were in commission, several score of them being the large, submersible cruisers of the kind that made the raid off Newport. Each boat of this size carries a crew of fifty-six men and can remain at sea for a fortnight or longer. Important improvements have been made in the way of twin periscopes, armored conning towers and heavier guns. Since the decision to employ the submarine with utter ruthlessness meant war with the United States, the German leaders had to give their people in advance the most convincing assurances that it would be effective. From the beginning of the campaign, therefore, they declared that its results must operate with "mathematical accuracy" to paralyze the enemy by destroying his communications and depriving him of the means of getting food, supplies and reinforcements. Great Britain and France, they predicted, would be in insupportable distress by midsummer and forced to sue for peace by autumn.

For several weeks official opinion in Great Britain and France was openly scornful. Germany's efforts, it was said, would cause inconvenience and necessitate some economies, but "the utmost confidence" was expressed that the defensive preparations made would keep the menace in check. "It is the greatest difficulty we have had so far," said Lord Northcliffe in May, "but to pretend that the war can be won by the submarine is postposterous." Three months ago Premier Lloyd George

reported that the condition was being dealt with "more effectively than during any corresponding period of the war." One of the most popular forms of current fiction comprised wondrous tales of submarines being destroyed wholesale by new secret devices, some of the yarns being worthy of Mr. Creel himself; but at the same time it was admitted that the solution had not been found, for there were constant expressions of hope that "American inventiveness" would presently produce it. Meanwhile, many stern warnings were given. "Our shipping is being depleted every day in large volume," said the British food controller on April 25, and the head of the board of trade declared: "The effect is simply this—that we cannot continue to bring into this country all the supplies needed for our existence and for the continuance of the war." Last week Admiral Jellicoe, chief of the British naval staff, admitted that the submarine had not been mastered and that the Germans undoubtedly had more craft at sea than they had in March. The results of the campaign are indicated, altho by no means clearly, in the official reports of British ships sunk:

Week Ending	Over 1600 Tons	Under 1600 Tons	Week Ending	Over 1600 Tons	Under 1600 Tons
Feb. 10	38	22	May 6	24	22
" 17	17	10	" 13	18	5
" 24	27	18	" 20	18	9
Mar. 4	14	9	" 27	18	1
" 11	13	4	June 3	15	3
" 18	16	8	" 10	22	10
" 25	18	7	" 17	27	5
Apr. 1	18	13	" 24	21	7
" 8	17	2	July 1	15	5
" 15	19	9	" 8	14	3
" 22	40	15	" 15	14	4
" 29	38	13	" 22	21	3
			" 29	18	3

Startling as this record is, it is misleading in that the figures are incomplete. A ship of "over 1600 tons" may be a small steamship or a huge vessel of 18,000 or 20,000 tons; no information is given as to the tonnage lost, and that is the vital thing. To realize the gravity of the situation, it should be remarked that during April, for example, there were sunk 1,000,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping; and that the American shipping board plans to build 3,000,000 tons during the next eighteen months—our capacity being one-sixth of Germany's capacity for destruction at the April rate. Rear Admiral Beresford declares the loss is at the rate of 7,000,000 tons a year, and in a recent statement from London calls attention to this "inexorable fact":

At the present rate of construction and destruction there cannot possibly be at the end of a few months shipping enough, unless British commitments elsewhere are considerably curtailed, to feed England and France and maintain the present armies in the field; and as for conveying America's armies to Europe and maintaining them, it will simply be out of the question.

It is, indeed, a matter of simple arithmetical computation that the Allies and the United States would be at the mercy of Germany were it not for one thing—the other blockade is even more effective. Economically, Germany is almost at the limit of her endurance. To save her, the submarine must win within a few weeks, for with the passing of the long summer days it will be less and less effective, and Britain and France have successfully withstood the pressure thus far. The backers of the campaign of ruthlessness made good their predictions as to the tonnage they would destroy, but they miscalculated as to the effects of the destruction—they have not starved the enemy nor paralyzed his fighting power, and cannot do so this year. Their predictions are returning to plague them. "Your submarine watch

has run down," was the bitter taunt of a reichstag leader to the government the other day. It should be understood that the German people get no nourishment out of any number of sinkings. They urged the murderous use of the submarine, not because they wanted enemy and neutral ships destroyed, but because they wanted, and had to have, peace. That is the test of success or failure. Tho they were to sink twice as many vessels, the result would be of no more use to them than their land victories have been, if it did not compel the besiegers of the empire to make terms; and there is no sign yet that they have broken the will or the power of their opponents.

It has been a desperate gamble, and the account as it stands is not encouraging for those who put victory above law and humanity—against the advantage won by resorting to tactics of savagery is the bringing of the United States into the war and the lining up of many other nations in implacable opposition to the Central Powers. Nothing but swift success of the audacious venture—and that seems impossible—could save it from a disastrous blunder. Moreover, there is in the frantic undertaking an open avowal of the bankruptcy of Prussianism; it confesses that its boasted military might is spent, and that only the employment of lawless and inhuman methods can save it from overthrow. So much the greater will be the infamy if failure results, whether that failure be signaled by Germany's economic collapse or by the smashing of the defenses which guard her submarine bases on the Belgian coast.

## PREMATURE PEACE TALK

*August 11, 1917.*

**N**O GREAT nation, we suppose, ever maintained so peculiar a relation to a war as does the United States at this moment. For four months a declared belligerent, formally engaged with the foremost military Power of the world, it has yet to give or receive a blow, and will not be prepared for several months to undertake any considerable operations. The singular status of this country is illustrated in the fact that it has not yet trained or equipped—or even mobilized—its main armies, and does not possess a gun or an airplane fit to send to the battle-front. Our unpreparedness for the action to which we are committed is, however, a somewhat threadbare subject; no good purpose can be served by discussing deficiencies which we may hope to have time to make good. But the matter is of interest, because in the face of this remarkable condition a great many Americans are busying themselves in debating the terms upon which the United States should end the war that it has not yet begun. Before we have struck a blow, while we are still in most respects in the paper stage of preparation, these citizens are discussing volubly their ideas of a peace program. At a time when it is necessary to employ all the energies and resources of the nation in perfecting the country's defenses, they are doing their utmost to divert public attention to a controversy that is untimely and obstructive. Various societies are sending to congress resolu-

tions urging negotiations with Germany upon the basis of the helpless reichstag's expression of opinion a few weeks ago. Last Saturday two proposals for peace discussion were introduced in the house of representatives, one by the Socialist member, and the other by a Democratic pacifist from Mississippi. Senator Stone, of Missouri, threatens to resume in a speech the sinister activities which he suspended after failing to prevent recognition of the state of war created by Germany. Senator Borah, of Idaho, who is, on the contrary, ardently for the vindication of American sovereignty, likewise considers a statement of the war aims of the United States is urgently demanded. In his notable speech a fortnight ago he said:

We cannot carry on this war without a thoroly aroused and sustained public opinion in favor of the war, which does not at this time exist. And one of the reasons why it does not exist is because of the nebulous and uncertain terms and conditions upon which we are supposed to be in the war, and the utter want of knowledge as to what conditions will take us out of the war.

As a result of all these influences there has arisen a demand that President Wilson shall restate definitely and precisely the war aims and the peace ideas of the government of the United States. It is argued that such a declaration would help to dissipate uncertainty in the public mind concerning the purposes for which this nation fights and the conditions which would satisfy its aspirations and end the German-American phase of the world war. That such a demand should engage attention in the midst of the nation's preliminary war preparations, and at a time when the enemy is most threatening toward this country and most contemptuous of its power, shows how far astray American public opinion was led by the teachings which emanated from Washington for nearly three years. The doctrine that

“with the causes and issues of the war we have no concern” still commands a vague belief, and the strange formula of “peace without victory” still influences wide regions of thought. As a fact, while the cause to which this nation has devoted itself has not been set forth in terms to arouse the national spirit and appeal to American sentiment, its general principles have been stated with perfect clarity. We make war upon Germany, as President Wilson said to congress, because “there is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making—we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated”; because Germany’s course was “nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States”:

We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe of liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the trusted foundations of political liberty.

In his message to the provisional government of Russia, and again in his Flag day address, President Wilson amplified these ideas. “We are fighting,” he said, “for the liberty, the self-government and the undictated development of all peoples,” to attain which “wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again.” He made clear that agreement with the present masters of Germany is impossible, because “if they can secure peace now, with immense advantages still in their hands, they will have justified themselves before the German people; they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it; their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power; if they

succeed they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone, and America will fall within the menace."

The war aims of the United States may be summed up in two words—German defeat. That includes everything; less than that includes nothing, neither the safety of democracy nor the peace of the world nor the security of American rights, liberties and territory. Allied statesmen, too, have recently made declarations to which the most cautious of Americans may safely subscribe. "Peace," says Lloyd George, "must be guaranteed by destruction of Prussian military power, so that the confidence of the German people shall be put in the equity of their cause and not in the might of their armies. A better guarantee than either would be democratization of the German government." Mr. Balfour's concise phrase is telling—the war will end, he says, when Germany is "either powerless or free."

There are just three ways in which this conflict can be brought to a close; first, by a German triumph, which would mean the mastery of the world by brute force; second, by liberalization of the government of Germany, which would eliminate the one thing which menaces civilization and prevents peace; or third, by a German defeat, which will have the same result. For the purposes of controversy, Americans may select whichever one of the three that appeals most strongly to their judgment. But for the purposes of action, as the basis of a national policy looking to the safety of the United States, they must concentrate upon the last. The one task before them—and it will require all their energies—is to help to make sure the defeat of the imperial German government. Most of those who are troubling themselves so prematurely about the precise terms of peace are those who tried to prevent our entering the war under any circumstances. But there are others,



genuinely patriotic, who are still under the spell of the fallacy that this is a European war, and who think we are fighting solely for other nations. To such we commend the recent address of Secretary Lansing. No man knows better the meaning of this struggle. It was thru him that all the patient negotiations with Germany were conducted, and before him passed in every detail the record revealing the conscienceless mendacity, the systematic perfidy and the boundless, sinister ambition of Prussianism. And this is what he says:

We know now that that government is inspired with ambitions which menace human liberty; that to gain its end it does not hesitate to break faith, to violate the most sacred rights, to perpetrate intolerable acts of inhumanity. We came slowly to a realizing sense that not only was the freedom of the European nations at stake, but that liberty thru-out the world was threatened by this powerful autocracy.

Let us understand once for all that this is no war to establish an abstract principle of right. It is a war in which the future of the United States is at stake. Every man who crosses the ocean to fight on foreign soil against the armies of the German emperor goes forth to fight for his country and for the preservation of those things for which our forefathers were willing to die. The independence of no nation is safe, the liberty of no individual is sure, until the military despotism of Germany has been made impotent forever. Appeals to justice, to moral obligation, to honor, no longer avail with such a power. There is but one way to restore peace to the world, and that is by overcoming the physical might of German imperialism by force of arms.

It is irritating, of course, that those who intrigued the most desperately to bring about the surrender of American rights and sovereignty should now presume to dictate the terms upon which this nation shall deal with its proved and implacable enemy. But their propaganda gets support from some who are honest and patriotic. Senator Borah conceives that we are at war wholly and solely to re-establish American rights; that it is "an

American war, to be fought on American principles and discontinued whenever American interests say so." A fair interpretation of this is that the United States should stand ready to make peace with Prussianism as soon as it gives satisfactory guarantees to respect American rights, regardless of the wrongs committed against others and regardless of the perpetuation of that evil power. The suggestion is for a separate peace at our convenience. Apart from the fact that "American interests" absolutely require the overthrow of kaiserism, adoption of the program outlined would open some ominous possibilities. Supposing Great Britain and France were to make a like reservation; supposing they were invited, by seductive German offers, to come to terms, with "American interests" left out of the reckoning—are we to expect that they would stand immovably for the aims of an ally which had ostentatiously refused to support theirs?

It will do no harm, it may do great good, if President Wilson restates the simple yet vital things for which this nation makes war. But the one thing most needful now is to fight; the all-inclusive aim is to destroy the power of Prussianism. If we do that, then we shall be able to impose the terms which the unselfish purposes of liberty-loving America will dictate, and the democracies of Europe will stand with us. If we fail, thru inefficiency or neglect of duty or waste of energy in inopportune discussions of details of a peace we have done nothing yet to earn, then our terms will have not the slightest weight whatsoever.

## AMERICAN TROOPS TO RUSSIA?

*August 14, 1917.*

**I**N THE form of "specific requests" to the newspapers, more stringent rules for voluntary censorship were issued in Washington the other day. These regulations, which will be honorably observed, forbid the publication of news concerning the movement, numbers, identity and destination of American armed forces in this country or abroad. The need for a certain reticence in such matters is obvious. Yet it is a somewhat disquieting thought that some day the people of the United States might face without warning the fact that their soldiers were engaged "southeast of Brzezany," or were being cut to pieces in the "Halicz-Stanislaw" sector while their Russian allies were executing a "voluntary retirement" or holding mass meetings to debate the orders of their commanders. Any American who thinks that such an unpleasant surprise is impossible must be imperfectly informed as to the strategic policies under consideration in Washington. The project of sending a small expeditionary force to Russia "for moral effect" has been vaguely discussed for several weeks. The head of a Russian military mission which reached San Francisco recently gave this strong intimation: "If America will send us 100,000 men, the force will be the nucleus of a Russian army of 1,000,000, stiffened and encouraged by the presence of your troops." It was reported at first that the Root commission would recommend the sending of an American division to the eastern front.

This was denied, the only member favoring the plan being Charles Edward Russell. But on the same day Senator Lewis, recognized as spokesman for the administration, made this declaration:

The next legions of our men to go forth will be to Russia, to support the loyal Russian armies now fighting for principles of our making. To these shattered but struggling people we must go with food and supplies, also with men.

This was on August 8. Next day it was made known that the scheme "had been under consideration for some time"; on the other hand, it was stated by an administration paper that "the war department is openly opposed to the idea." On August 11, nevertheless, the New York Times reported "on the highest authority" that the proposal was "still under consideration," and there was "a tendency to believe that such an expedition would be highly advantageous both to Russia and America and incidentally to the Allies." Nor is the astonishing suggestion without support. So well informed a critic as the New York Tribune asks, "Why shouldn't American troops go to Russia?" and argues gravely that our "surplus of man-power" could be employed more easily and more effectually in Russia and Rumania than in France, in view of the submarine menace in the Atlantic. It is quite clear, therefore, that the prospects of having American troops involved in the sinister military operations on the eastern front is not to be dismissed as incredible. If Washington should succumb to the persuasive "moral effect" theory, the fantastic and perilous adventure may be undertaken.

There is obvious wisdom in extending help by every rational means to the new democratic régime in Russia, threatened as it is by invasion from without and sedition and fanaticism from within. Already the United States has given to the wavering young republic.

generous moral and practical support. It led the world in indorsing the revolution and recognizing the provisional government; it has sent messages and missions of cordial encouragement, and staffs of engineering experts to reorganize the collapsed transportation system; and it has loaned to the nation \$175,000,000. Direct military assistance, moreover, has been given by the hard-pressed Allies on the western front, whose offensives have saved Russia more than once from the penalties of incompetence, and whose efforts have been repaid by a period of "fraternization" with the Germans which permitted the transfer of whole German army corps to France. The proposal to send American troops to the aid of our undependable but exacting Slav ally, therefore, calls for rather close scrutiny. To send such a force, with its supplies, across the United States, the Pacific ocean, Siberia and Russia presents in itself a formidable problem, especially on account of the lack of rolling stock on the Trans-Siberian line and the complete demoralization of the transportation system thruout Russia. These difficulties, however, might be overcome; the vital consideration is as to whether the plan is sound, safe and necessary.

One need not be an expert to know that the last of Russia's needs is men. "Russia," said the American chief of staff upon his return, "has 10,000,000 troops, most of them well trained by three years of war." In that mass an American division would be utterly lost; it would have no measurable military value. And it would be at the mercy of every gust of delusion that sweeps thru the teeming ranks of the Russian forces. Despite the brilliant advance in one sector a few weeks ago and the gallant resistance of units fighting now in Rumania, the palpable truth is that the Russian armies are enfeebled by loss of discipline and saturated with

sedition. "Following the revolution," says Major General Scott, "3,000,000 soldiers deserted the front and went to their homes." Most of these, it is asserted, have been coaxed or driven back to their duty; but the fact remains that we are invited to co-operate with forces capable of such acts as have been officially described in these terms:

At first the attacks were repulsed. But at 10 o'clock the \_\_\_\_\_ regiment left its trenches voluntarily and retired, with the result that neighboring units also had to retire. Several detachments, having received a command to support the attacked forces, held meetings and discussed the advisability of obeying the order, whereupon some regiments refused to obey. Efforts of commanders and committees to arouse the men to fulfillment of the orders were fruitless.

The spectacle is shocking enough as it is; but supposing the "neighboring units" sacrificed were American troops, sent half way round the world to help a suspicious and intolerant people? For it is a fact that the Russians, despite all their amiability and their eager pursuit of what they believe to be democratic ideals, are intensely distrustful of the United States. When the Root mission arrived at Vladivostok, curt inquiry was made as to why Russia was to be honored by its visits and advice. Received with distinguished courtesy by the officials in Petrograd, the commissioners were ignored by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the real power in the government; even the Socialist member of the delegation had difficulty in obtaining a hearing. American officers were shouldered into the gutter in the streets of the capital by Russian soldiers, in testimony that military rank and discipline had been abolished. More ominous than these things, however, is the fact that the dominant faction openly resented from the beginning the suggestion that American advice and support were needed. If these leaders

refused to co-operate with an American civilian mission, the possible effect of the arrival of a division of troops may be imagined. Fanaticism and pro-German agitation could convince the Russian army within a week that "American plutocracy" had undertaken an invasion to destroy the glorious revolution and enslave the liberated nation to the imperialistic greed of the anti-Teutonic alliance. The circumstance that such a propaganda would be utterly false and treacherous to Russia would not diminish its deadly effect.

Mr. Russell, nevertheless, ardently advocates the proposed expedition, and his personal observation gives weight to his judgment. "The presence of American troops on that battle line," he says, "would make it impossible for any Russian troops to retreat even if they wished to, which they positively would not." It is singular that Mr. Russell should deem anything impossible in Russia; but he is answered by direct evidence. Rumania, betrayed by Russian czarism, is at this moment being betrayed again by Russian Socialism. She was seduced into her premature invasion of Transylvania last year by promises that Russia would strike at the same time; the pledge was dishonored, and half her territory was conquered. Now the other half is being overrun because the Russian armies in Galicia have been corrupted by the seditious propaganda. Only a few days ago it was revealed that the British armored-car forces on the eastern front were deserted in battle, and were compelled to fight their way to safety thru hordes of Russian troops that had left them in the lurch.

If the Russian armies will not stand by a neighboring people in its hour of supreme trial; if they will not support British forces that have been fighting side by side with them for months; if they will not obey the orders or respond to the pleadings of their own com-

manders, what reason is there to hope that they would support a detachment from America, skillfully represented to them as mercenaries of a capitalistic and imperialistic republic? But it is argued that such an expedition would have a great "moral effect"; that it would give to the deluded but well-meaning Russian people convincing demonstration that the United States is a real ally and is whole-heartedly in the war for democracy. That this result would be accomplished there is grave doubt. In any event, Russia is far less in need of evidence of America's sincerity than America is of proof of Russia's stability. Not in resentment, but in ordinary caution, it should be remembered that the fidelity of the United States is questioned, and its democracy challenged, by forces in Russia which have deliberately destroyed military discipline and have intrigued for a shameless peace with Prussianism. To give to the distracted young republic all possible moral, economic and financial encouragement is a requirement of self-interest and duty alike. But it would be a hazardous experiment to send American troops to a front where they might be butchered to make a proletariat holiday.



## THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

*August 16, 1917.*

GERMAN diplomacy during the war has exhibited traits so offensive and has employed methods so uncouth that superficial critics might be inclined to regard it as wholly discredited and impotent. The clumsy infamy of the Zimmermann Mexican plot, for example, would be considered enough to damn any government. But it must be conceded that in its manipulation of the Stockholm conference, Berlin has displayed remarkable adroitness and persistence, and has achieved a failure that is hardly to be distinguished from a success. The astonishing fact is that there is no real Stockholm conference, and it seems unlikely that there ever will be one of any substantial character. Yet for months Germany has been able not only to keep the dishonest project alive, but to cause with it acute embarrassment to all the enemy governments. With this device she has brought the revolution in Russia to the verge of collapse. It has provided an excuse for odious maneuvers by disloyalists in the United States. It has put at odds the Socialist party and the Socialist government in France. And it has almost wrecked the British ministry—in any event, has created in that country a condition of ominous tension between the government and organized labor.

The fate of Arthur Henderson, the labor leader who was compelled to resign his seat in the British war council under a cloud, is of concern to the people of the

United States, not only because of its influence upon the war situation, but because it reveals the curious effect of "internationalism" upon the minds and morals of men who succumb to its subtle influences. Mr. Henderson, secretary of the Labor party, has been for more than a dozen years one of its leaders in parliament. A man of undoubted sincerity and a strong supporter of the war against autocracy, he had been a trusted adviser of the government during the conflict, as minister of pensions, as president of the board of education and finally as labor's representative in that supreme body, the war council. His services to the nation, especially in promoting support of the government in the ranks of the workers, have been universally recognized. So strong was the confidence in him that the government facilitated his journey to Petrograd last May, with two other union representatives, as a mission from British labor to the revolutionary government. In the Russian capital he was profoundly impressed by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and particularly, it seems, by the prevailing doctrine in that body that peace terms should be dictated by the "proletariat" of the warring countries and not by the nations. He returned an advocate of British participation in the still mythical Stockholm conference, with the reservation, however, that the gathering should be consultative merely and should not assume mandatory powers. This position was embarrassing to the government of which he was a member, but was passed over after announcement had been made that Great Britain would not send official representatives and would defer decision as to allowing any delegates to attend. The Labor party discounted the scheme. The itch for negotiation proved irresistible, however. Mr. Henderson, without the knowl-

edge of his colleagues, went over to Paris to consult with French Socialists as to sending agents to Stockholm. The action was quite in line with his duties as a party leader, but its impropriety as an enterprise of a responsible representative of the government was obvious. Mr. Henderson had the uplifting consciousness of acting in behalf of his political organization and the cause of peace, but was impervious to the obligations resting upon him, as a member of the nation's war council, to shun private activities which would have the color of official undertakings. The crisis came at the labor convention last week. The government, according to the immemorial British custom, had compromised with the Stockholm issue—it would send no delegates, but would consider the matter of issuing passports for unofficial representatives. Upon the first point the cabinet was unanimous, and there was a strong feeling that no participation whatever in the German-inspired conference should be tolerated. All Mr. Henderson's associates understood that he agreed with them. Yet he boldly advocated before the convention the sending of a Labor party delegation, and the proposal was carried by a vote of two to one. This reversal was wholly due to the fact that a member of the war council urged it.

No more astonishing episode of international politics has taken place than this revelation of what may be called unconscious duplicity on the part of a responsible and conscientious minister, and the letter sent Mr. Henderson by Premier Lloyd George will long be remembered for its cold yet devastating analysis of his conduct. Mr. Henderson's colleagues, wrote the prime minister, "were taken completely by surprise"; the labor member knew they were unanimously opposed to the Stockholm scheme, and "clearly led them to believe" that he would

use his influence to have it discountenanced by the labor convention. The heart of his offending was thus declared:

When you spoke at that conference you were not merely a member of the Labor party, but a member of the cabinet, responsible for the conduct of the war. Nevertheless, you did not deem it necessary to inform the conference of the views of your colleagues, and the delegates accordingly were justified in assuming that the advice you gave was not inconsistent with their opinions.

Incidentally, Mr. Henderson had been furnished by the prime minister with a message just received from the Russian government stating that while it would not prevent the sending of delegates to Stockholm it would regard the action of the conference as in no way binding; and this changed attitude on the part of the Russian authorities he concealed from the labor meeting. His resignation from the cabinet was, of course, a necessity after disclosure of his deplorable tactics, and his impassioned defense of his course has not softened the adverse judgment of his former colleagues, even those representing labor. The American Federation of Labor, thru Samuel Gompers, was already on record as refusing to participate in the conference engineered by the kaiser's tame Socialist agents. Neither Italy nor Belgium will be represented, and the French government has denounced the scheme. Now the British government has decided that no passports for the gathering will be issued. "The four allied Powers," says Mr. Lloyd George, "definitely have arrived at the conclusion that if terms of peace are to be discussed they must be discussed by the representatives of their whole nations."

It appears, therefore, that the last state of the famous Stockholm conference is worse than the first. Moreover, it should be understood that the British Labor party is not a Socialist organization, and that before

voting to send delegates it framed a declaration of peace terms which would satisfy the most ardent enemy of Prussianism. The French Socialists, too, announce that if they go to Stockholm it will be to demand reparations for the crimes of autocracy and to urge that international Socialism denounce and declare war upon those governments responsible. An effort will be made to have British labor free itself from the false position in which it has been placed; meanwhile, the union of firemen and seamen vows that no steamship carrying delegates to Prussianism's treacherous peace conference will leave a British port. General repudiation of the scheme will have a wholesome effect, no doubt, yet it leaves Germany opportunity to extract further advantage from her ingenious maneuver. Arranged upon the basis of candor and with sound regard for the principles of justice which must underlie the peace, the dispatch of a British labor delegation to Stockholm would have been beneficial; for the delegates, backed by the vigorous declaration of the party for the complete overthrow of autocracy and the indemnifying of its victims, would have exerted a healthful influence in the gathering of Prussianized Socialists, pro-German neutral Socialists and bedazzled Russian revolutionaries. Since it is likely that some sort of a conference will eventually be held, the subjection of the Russian delegates to the unobstructed persuasion of the kaiser's agents is a prospect that has sinister possibilities. The United States and its allies may yet have to pay heavily for the ineptitude which leaves the Russian fanatics unsupported and unchecked.

Apart from this, the chief lesson of the episode is that, next to Prussianism, the greatest obstacle to a just peace is the meddlesome arrogance of international Socialism. The essential fallacy and viciousness of that

institution has never been more strikingly manifested. Mr. Henderson and those whom he misled are not Socialists; but no man whose judgment had not been undermined by the doctrines of a perverted "internationalism" would have attempted to serve at the same time the nation and a special interest. Certainly it reveals an impaired moral sense when a responsible government official undertakes to promote, as leader of a minority group, negotiations with representatives of an enemy nation. And it is not encouraging to note that advocates of this unpatriotic kind of double-dealing have been found in the British cabinet and in the United States senate. The Socialist party in this country has discredited itself and alienated its American adherents by prostituting itself openly to the service of Prussianism. In Europe, too, the system has overreached itself by decrying patriotism, putting peace above justice and insisting that a nation consists wholly of its "proletariat." The doctrine which teaches that all power should reside in a class has its perfect realization in the present chaos in Russia. It cannot make a nation, and it is a hopeless basis for world peace.

## THE POPE'S PEACE MESSAGE

*August 18, 1917.*

**O**F ALL the state papers promulgated during the war, the message of Pope Benedict "to the leaders of the belligerent peoples" is in some respects the most memorable. Of all the expressions concerning peace it will be the most closely studied and will have the most distant echoes. To hundreds of millions of people that message is not the deliverance of a man, but the utterance of a Voice, potent in wisdom and moral authority. No national ruler or leader has so vast an audience, none commands such wide confidence and veneration. Where kings and presidents awaken respect, the supreme pontiff of the Catholic Church exacts reverence. Where they speak to nations, he addresses an empire that girdles the world, that knows no frontiers and no distinctions of race, that represents to unnumbered adherents a power superior to all earthly might. The appeal of the head of the Holy See is received, therefore, with universal respect and examined thruout the whole world with studious attention. The forms of its expression are worthy of the tremendous subject with which it deals. Even in translation from the original there is preserved a noble eloquence, and it is recognized as the exalted outgiving of a spiritual leader whose heart's desire is the welfare of the race.

Yet if we were asked to designate the most remarkable feature of the history-making document, we should point, not to the things that give it substance, but to

the lack that deprives it of efficacy. Notable as is this production of high scholarship and statesmanship, it leaves between it and the thought of civilization a chasm which cannot be bridged. The most pregnant message of the pope to the world lies in what he leaves unsaid; not in his eloquence, but in his silence.

The move would be fully accounted for by the pope's earnest desire to see peace restored to the world. Two years ago he issued a general appeal with this aim, and he intimates now that the Vatican has been assiduous in efforts to end the war—"publicity has not been given," he says, "to all that we have done to attain this noble aim." But while some action undoubtedly would have been taken in any event, it is hardly to be questioned that the direct inspiration came from Austria-Hungary, whose court is one of the great secular citadels of the Catholic faith and whose powers of endurance have almost reached their limit. German approval of the intervention may also be taken for granted. Despite their confident utterances, the imperial authorities have abandoned hope of being able to dictate the terms of settlement, while they find it increasingly difficult to withstand the battering of the Anglo-French offensives and at the same time the terrible economic pressure. Their one chance of escaping overthrow, either by the enemy or by revolution, is to compel a peace by negotiated compromise. But belief in German influence as a principal force behind the move does not rest upon this surmise. As long ago as last April a diplomatic mission by the Bavarian premier to the Austro-Hungarian court indicated closer co-operation between the Catholic states of South Germany and the government of the dual kingdom. And early in July came the reichstag upheaval, when the Catholic Centrists overthrew the administration of Bethmann-Hollweg.



It does not in the remotest degree raise a question as to the sincerity of the Vatican to recognize from these evidences that its action followed conferences with Vienna and Berlin. As a fact, it was performing a well-understood function. It must be remembered that the papacy is in reality a political as well as a religious institution; it maintains formal diplomatic relations with virtually every great nation except France, Italy and the United States. No well-informed observer will doubt, therefore, that the Vatican had received intimations that a move toward peace would be not unacceptable to the Central Powers.

Three aims, his Holiness reveals, have governed the Vatican's policy during the three years of the war. His purpose "to do all the good possible, without distinction of nationality or religion," has been manifest. The attitude of "perfect impartiality toward all belligerents" might have been expounded with more detail. As a political organization, the Vatican was urged by every consideration, no doubt, to maintain neutrality toward the Powers at war, in so far as the conflict concerned political and territorial questions. But "perfect impartiality" respecting the moral issues—such plain questions as the violation of Belgium, the defiance of international law and the systematic invasion of neutral rights and the principles of humanity—might conceivably have been the subject of representations from the head of a church that stands for justice, mercy and law. The third aim of the Holy See has been "to hasten deliberation on a peace just and durable." The vital matter, however, is the pope's conception of "points which seem to be a basis of a just and durable peace." These may be summarized as follows:

1. "A fair agreement by all for the simultaneous and reciprocal diminution of armaments."

2. "Substitution for armies of the institution of arbitration," with penalties for recalcitrant states—a league to enforce peace.

3. "The true liberty and community of the seas."

4. "As to the damage to be repaired, complete and reciprocal condonation"—that is, no indemnities; but "if for certain cases there exist particular reasons, they would be deliberated upon with justice and equity."

5. "Reciprocal restitution of the territory at present occupied"—that is, "on the part of Germany, the complete evacuation of Belgium, with the guarantee of her full political, military and economic independence, and the evacuation of French territory; and restitution of the German colonies."

6. "Other territorial questions," such as those concerning Alsace-Lorraine, Italian and Austrian claims, Poland and the Balkans, to be examined "with a conciliatory disposition, taking into consideration the aspirations of the peoples, the special interests and the general welfare of the great human society."

"Such," declares the supreme pontiff, "are the principal bases whereon we believe the future reorganization of the peoples ought to be built." The first impression made upon the student is, of course, that the pope's outline of terms is an elaboration of President Wilson's proposal of eight months ago. Mr. Wilson held, as Rome now does, that "the struggle more and more appears a useless massacre," and he advocated settlement upon virtually the same bases—"peace without victory," "freedom of the seas," "limitation of armament" and a general compromise of "concession and sacrifice." One reason for the widespread comment that the Vatican's terms would mean a German peace is that they follow so closely the deplorable and futile proposition that emanated from Washington. Assuming that they were to be accepted as a preliminary to negotiations, the position of Germany would be clear. She would take her place in the peace conference unconquered and admit-

tedly unconquerable; the return of her colonies stipulated in advance; free from all obligation to answer for her crimes against law and liberty or to make reparation for the havoc wrought by her aggressions and barbarities; her territory secure and untouched by the ravages of war; her domination of Central Europe indorsed, and her autocracy confirmed in power, with all its prestige and privileges enhanced by a successful war against the self-governed nations of the world. In other words, all those things which are suggested as the foundations of a "just and durable peace" would require for their fulfillment a recognition of the Prussianized government of Germany as a justice-loving, trustworthy institution, whose assent to the agreement of the peace conference would mean faithful adherence to the compact. Yet what guarantee for Belgium could be stronger than the "scrap of paper" which Germany stamped with the ineffaceable sign of her perfidy? What reliance could be placed upon the peace pledges of a government which forswore itself to gain a military advantage and deliberately plunged the world into a hideous conflict in pursuance of a policy of imperial brigandage? It has been said that peace cannot come until Germany is either "powerless or free," and that is the truth. For German militarism unwhipped would mean a world never safe from aggressive and treacherous war. A truce with mere power there might be; but a truce with a power which has demonstrated that no sense of honor or good faith limits its designs would be for civilization an act of suicide. And to admit that there need be no reparation for acts of systematic devastation and savagery would be to open a future wherein brute force would overshadow the world.

But we have said that the papal message is most remarkable for its omissions. It deals forcefully with

certain matters of controversy; not once does it touch upon the fundamentals of the conflict—the causes of the great convulsion, the responsibility for its dreadful evils, the great issue which it is to decide. Not by a phrase or a word does Pope Benedict accord recognition to the issue that is at the bottom of the world struggle, and upon the settlement of which depends the future of the human race. He ignores—by intention, it must be—the overshadowing question as to whether autocracy or democracy shall prevail on the earth. Compared to this the fate of territories is a subordinate matter; involved in it are the restoration of order and peace and the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties; upon its settlement hangs the destiny of unnumbered millions and the fate of civilization. Yet, that issue, fundamental and irreconcilable, to determine which millions have died and multitudes are ready to give their lives, is studiously avoided in a proposal designed to halt the vital test.

We shall not open now the far-reaching subject of the Vatican's historic position respecting movements toward the democratization of government and society. We may offer, however, this judgment: some of the terms which Pope Benedict urges may well furnish parts of the ultimate temple of world peace which mankind hopes to erect, but the plan which he presents lacks the cornerstone without which the blood-cemented structure would never endure.

## “THE MENACE OF PEACE”

*August 21, 1917.*

FROM European expressions on the pope's powerful appeal for peace, two clearly defined opinions emerge. All commentators concede that the head of the great Catholic Church, both as a spiritual leader and as a neutral sovereign exercising international functions, is animated by the highest motives. But those on either side in the war profess to find, in the bases of “a just and durable peace” which he suggests, objectionable advantages for the enemy nations. In Great Britain and France—as in the United States—there is outspoken judgment that settlement on such terms would constitute a German peace and a German victory. In Germany, on the contrary, the adherents of militarism and Pan-Germanism bitterly assail the proposal as being in the interests of the Entente alliance, while even the minority that deprecates the imperial policies of conquest complains that Germany would suffer by acceptance. But upon one point the observers of all nationalities and shades of opinion are agreed. London and Paris, Rome and Berlin, Stockholm and Petrograd unite in finding the Vatican's message a reflection, or an elaboration, of the policy which President Wilson promulgated last December and discarded in April.

The papal plea is in sum and detail but an expansion of the president's argument in behalf of “peace without victory.” And there is a spirit of accord between the two utterances not only in the animating thought

behind them, but in the very phrases which the two leaders have made memorable. The pope's "perfect impartiality toward all the belligerents" is not more inclusive than Mr. Wilson's avowal of "neutrality even in thought." The supreme pontiff, who "has no particular political aim" and does not "listen to the suggestions or to the interests of any of the belligerent parties," is in the same position as the executive who declared, in the name of his countrymen, that "with the causes and the issues of the war we have no concern." When he recoils from the spectacle of nations acting "as if stricken by universal madness," and finds that the struggle "more and more appears a useless massacre," he gives powerful sanction to opinions once expressed in almost the same terms by the president of the United States. In urging reduction of armaments, "freedom of the seas" and a league to restore peace he likewise advocates familiar expedients. In truth, his one contribution to the cause of peace has been the tremendous authority he wields over the vast masses of his followers by virtue of his high office, together with the moral influence which, for the same reason, he exerts upon all world affairs. Close as is the association of his program with that once laid down by President Wilson, there is an even more striking similarity to the formula which Germany has fastened upon the Socialist movement staged in Stockholm. If the pope is avowedly for the general idea of "peace without victory," he is just as clearly for the explicit terms of "no annexations and no indemnities."

To some of the aspirations which he so nobly expressed there will be universal response. That "the force of arms be substituted by the moral force of right" is an ideal of all mankind—outside of Germany; and even she pays lip service to it. Substitution of arbitra-

tion for the might of armies is likewise the aim of civilization. The only question arises when it is suggested that these things may be realized by absolving the one governmental system that exists to defy and betray them, and by recognizing that institution as an equal, admirable and trustworthy factor in the relationships of the world's peoples. But, like many other far-seeing statesmen, the pope would provide safeguards against the contingency of a faithless partner in the agreement upon perpetual peace. There should be "rules drawn in concert, and under sanctions to be determined, against any state which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." This means, for example, that if Germany at some future time should find it a "military necessity" to overrun Belgium again and to make the league of peace compact "a scrap of paper," she would face the other nations in an alliance bound to resist and punish her crimes. Perhaps the prospect would deter Prussianism from the venture—but it did not do so three years ago this month. Then Germany, with a roar of defiance and exultation, flung herself upon Europe, altho she well knew that Russia barred her path, and that behind ravished Belgium and stricken France would spring up the power of Britain. Italy joined the league to enforce peace, but that did not suffice to substitute the moral force of right for the force of arms. A half dozen other nations, and finally the United States, added their power, and Prussianism has remained unrepentant—nay, it turns a front of brass against the condemnation and detestation of the whole civilized world. There were rules and sanctions without number in existence three years ago to forbid Germany's crimes. Where are they now? There has been created finally from the linked-up democracies of the world a league to enforce peace for the

present and insure it for the future. Is that league to dissolve when its pacifying power is approaching its zenith, and with its work undone? Are all the travail and anguish of thirty-six months to go for naught, because to finish the task may be costly and painful? Will the peace which the world's democracies have united to attain by destroying the one power that menaces it be made secure by submission to that power, by signing compacts with a government thrice forsworn?

Civilization, in a word, is doing now what the pope urges it should agree to do in the future. And unless it does it now by defeating Prussianism, an agreement to do it later would be a mockery. Compared to this issue, the proposal for "entire and reciprocal condonation" in respect to damages suffered is of subordinate importance. Yet in this, too, there seems to be a defect of justice, even of logic. It implies, for example, that a balance should be struck between the injuries of Germany against Belgium and France, and of Belgium and France against Germany. Germany treacherously invaded one country and has devastated the richest territory of the other; they are to condone those incalculable crimes. But what is Germany to condone? It can only be surmised that she is to forgive Belgium for resisting brutal violation, and France for fighting to recover the ruins of her looted cities. And there is nowhere in the papal message a word in recognition of the United States as a belligerent. Reciprocal condonation of injury would require that this nation overlook the Lusitania massacre, the grisly series of murders at sea, the systematic invasion of its rights and sovereignty, the atrocious plot to incite friendly countries to make war upon us. But what American assault would Germany condone in return? Would it satisfy the requirements of reciprocity if she forgave us for using



harsh language in our complaints, or for interfering with her belligerent rights by rescuing victims of her murderous submarines off our own coasts?

But the sentiment of rejection which manifests itself around the world in response to the papal plea is inspired by deeper reasons than dissent from detailed proposals. The message, as we have said before, was notable for its omissions. By intention, the pope draws no distinction between the inspirations and aims of the belligerents. He ignores the fundamental question of responsibility for the war. He avoids dealing with the vital matters of dishonored treaties, governmental perjury, policies of conquest, acts of conscienceless aggression, systematic violations of law and humanity. He withholds recognition of the basic issue, which is as to whether autocracy or democracy shall control the destinies of mankind. He raises in no word or phrase a question of right or wrong as between Prussianism and its victims and opponents. If, in truth, none of these things matter; if the great uprising of democracy for the vindication of justice is a mere delusion; if Belgium and Germany, France and Turkey, are alike “stricken by madness,” then surely the judgment of mankind is darkened and this struggle is “a useless massacre.”

But some millions of men have died for a faith that is otherwise, and there are some millions more who have pledged their lives that the dead shall not have died in vain. Those who gave and those who give themselves have laid hold upon a belief which is stronger than fear of pain or shrinking from death—the ineradicable hatred of mankind for injustice, the inextinguishable passion of mankind for liberty. How these things weigh, what they mean, what force they exert in fashioning the will of humanity, is set forth in a striking utterance which we have quoted before and which we intend to present

again as a vital message for this hour. "The Menace of Peace" is an answer to compromising philanthropy as well as to selfish doubts:

It matters infinitely which side shall win. And the thing that counts is, not when the war shall end, but what it shall seem to mean. For the war to close, and the world not know what it has been fighting about, would be the supreme catastrophe of history. A compromise would be a betrayal of the peoples of every nation. A peace that recognizes neither victor nor vanquished, that ignores the conflict's causes and questions, that evades all judgment as to the right or wrong of the matter—such a peace would be the last disaster of mankind.

Germany stands squarely in the world's way into a new and nobler era. Humanity is at a standstill before the Prussian sword and system. There can be no peace, nor can the race take another onward step, until that sword and that system are destroyed. \* \* \* For a peace that leaves Germany undefeated is essentially a German victory, and straightway leads to the Germanization of the world; is nothing else than the capitulation of the world to Prussian might and mastery. And it would not only be a German triumph that such a peace would procure, but a triumph immeasurably more terrible than Germany could have won by force of arms. For such a peace could issue only from a veritable fall of man. \* \* \* If the war end in universal evasion, if the race refuse its hour of great decision, then downward, into long and impenetrable darkness, we shall surely go.

## CANADA'S CONSCRIPTION CRISIS

*August 27, 1917.*

**E**VERY loyal American feels proud of the nation's acceptance of the selective draft law, the passage of which was, indeed, a reflection of a popular demand. Altho there is an odious campaign of opposition among a minority, and altho the war is not a welcome undertaking, the system under which the new armies are being created has almost universal support. This condition gives peculiar emphasis to the contrasting situation in Canada, where the passage of a compulsory military service law has occasioned not only such protests as malcontents utter here, but mutterings of sedition, outbreaks of mob violence and threats of civil war, which have actually been made upon the floor of parliament. So much has been written of the solidarity of Britain's democratic empire and of the self-sacrificing loyalty of her overseas dominions that these evidences of disunion make a painful impression. To Americans who are not familiar with all the facts the spectacle gives a sense of superiority. Some of them, perhaps, are not without a slight feeling of resentment that our neighbor and ally should make this response to our wholehearted action. The United States, they say, adopts at the very beginning of its participation in the war the system which not only is just and democratic, but which will yield the greatest number of troops; why, then, should Canada, owing a special duty to the British empire, set a limit to her contribution?

Before adopting this critical attitude, however, Americans would do well to inform themselves as to what Canada has done and is prepared to do to make the world safe for democracy. They will find that the United States has a long distance yet to go before it will have done proportionately so much. Even if conscription were now to be rejected, Canada has set a mark of sacrifice and achievement which it will tax American energy, resourcefulness and patriotism to reach. Mere statistics can give no just idea of a nation's war activities, yet they afford an index which is enlightening. Let it be remembered, first, that Canada entered the war on August 4, 1914. Altho she is no nearer to Belgium than is the United States, and is no more concerned than is this country in the sanctity of treaties and the maintenance of international law, she delayed just twenty-four hours after the invasion of Belgium to join in the war against the foremost military Power of the world. And for two years and eight months, while the United States contented itself with a complaining neutrality, she gave her wealth and her manhood without stint to the cause of civilization.

Consider what has been done by a country whose population does not exceed that of Pennsylvania. Pledging herself at first to raise 50,000 troops, Canada has enlisted, equipped and trained 406,000 volunteers, and has sent 300,000 to the battle-front. Her war expenditures have been in excess of \$600,000,000, and now are more than \$1,000,000 a day. She has 600 munition plants in operation, with 300,000 employes, and has sent to Europe munitions of war to a value of more than \$500,000,000—financing most of the Allies' purchases herself. At the same time she has vastly increased her agricultural production, while her people have contributed \$11,000,000 to the Canadian Red Cross, nearly half as

much, in addition, to the British Red Cross, and \$33,000,000 for extra pay for soldiers and support of their dependents. Americans are properly impressed by the magnitude of the task of sending 1,200,000 troops to the front; yet to do as much as Canada has done they would have to put more than 5,000,000 men on the firing line, double their \$100,000,000 contribution to the Red Cross, and raise \$500,000,000 additional for war relief. Of the military record of the Canadian forces it is needless to speak; at Ypres, St. Julien, the Somme, Vimy Ridge and now at Lens they have made a record of valor and efficiency that will forever be illustrious.

In view of these great deeds and greater sacrifices, opposition on the part of the Canadian people to the further burden of a selective draft could not be unsparingly condemned. But as a fact the vast majority of them accept it loyally and cheerfully. Canada is singularly free from the pernicious influence of pacifism. Aside from objections voiced by some elements of organized labor and some political factionists, the movement against compulsory service is wholly a manifestation of racial disunion. The campaign of obstruction is not Canadian, but French-Canadian. It is an outgrowth of an historic division of the people by prejudices of race and religion. The anti-draft, anti-war propaganda is promoted by the French-Canadians of the province of Quebec, is led by their politicians and indorsed by the authorities of their church. How closely the division of sentiment follows racial lines some figures will show. Canada's population at the 1911 census was 7,200,000, Quebec having 2,000,000. Of the latter, 1,600,000 were French-Canadians, while there were 400,000 more in other provinces. Yet of the 406,000 Canadian volunteers, the Quebec French have furnished hardly 7000. But there is no attempt on the part of the French-

Canadians to conceal their hostility to the war, and particularly to the impending draft; they proclaim it.

The sentiment is traceable to three main causes. The French-Canadians consider themselves separated from the rest of the population upon grounds of race and religion. They are loyal to the British crown, yet inveterately oppose Canadian participation in imperial wars—upon this issue many of them deserted their idol, Premier Sir Wilfrid Laurier, when he supported the Boer war in 1899. And finally, the Catholic Church in Quebec has condemned the draft law as an invasion of its rights and privileges. Politically, the campaign enlists two forces. Laurier, whose Liberal government was displaced in 1911, and who has been for nearly half a century one of the most commanding figures in the dominion, has fought the proposal on the ground that the present parliament, elected before the war, has no mandate from the people to make such a revolutionary change, and insists upon a referendum, either by a direct vote upon the proposition or by a general election. Uncompromising hostility to the draft, or even to a referendum, is the policy of the Nationalists, a party formed among the French-Canadians in 1908 by those who considered Laurier's Liberalism insufficiently French. When the conscription act passed the house of commons on July 24 the racial division became absolutely clear. The English-speaking Conservatives voted for it solidly. They were joined by twenty-two English-speaking Liberals, who left Laurier with bitter words of repudiation. The French-speaking members almost to a man voted no.

The need for conscription, if Canada is to keep her overseas forces at full strength, is manifest. In one week recently their casualties numbered thousands, and volunteer enlistments have fallen to a low level. But

apart from this, public opinion holds that the French-Canadians must not be permitted longer to obstruct a national policy and evade the obligation of supporting the country's defenses. The Conservative premier, in offering the policy, invited Laurier to join in forming a coalition ministry. He refused, and now the issue will be settled at a general election in October, when the government, it seems likely, will receive an indorsement and will forthwith put the law into effect. Serious strife may result. Already sedition is preached thruout Quebec, and extremists among the Nationalists openly advocate secession. When a French member of parliament hinted at civil war, Laurier did not repudiate the threat, and it is known that Nationalist volunteers are forming armed forces to resist the draft. More ominous, perhaps, is the recent proclamation of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Quebec, denouncing the conscription law as "a serious blow to the rights of the church," in that the customary exemption does not extend, as the church demands, not only to priests, but to teachers and to all students at its clerical institutions. Thus Canada faces a severe test of the strength of her confederation and her capacity to deal with a threatening irruption of racial and religious dissension. The problem would be difficult enough if its origins were recent. But the roots of the trouble go deep into the history of the country. The strife of today had its beginnings a century and a half ago, as we shall make clear in a further discussion.

## THE WAYS TO PEACE

*August 28, 1917.*

**E**VEN the Vatican authorities, it is made known, did not expect peace to result directly from the pope's message to the belligerents, and unfavorable responses from the opponents of Germany will occasion no surprise. Each day's discussion, on the other hand, makes it clearer that the powerful intervention of the Holy See has had two beneficial effects of immeasurable value. Pope Benedict gave the weight of his great office to a restatement of some of the highest aspirations of mankind respecting future foundations of peace. At the same time, his far-reaching utterance stirred the democracies of the world to make a new assessment of the issues of the war, with the result that they are more firmly, more intelligently and more unitedly resolved to carry thru the great task of delivering civilization from the menace of Prussianism. It needed this urgent appeal for a peace without victory, made by a leader universally respected, to bring into clear relief the truth that the fundamental issue of the conflict is not territorial adjustment, but the fate of two irreconcilable principles of government, two eternally warring conceptions of international conduct and relationships, of which one or the other must be destroyed.

The papal letter applied the rules of a broad and skillful statesmanship to certain of the outstanding disputes arising from collision of governmental policies and also from the havoc wrought by the struggle. It dealt



with questions of frontiers, military occupation and war damage, and aimed, one must believe, to outline just settlement thereof. But upon the basic matters it was silent. It avoided judgment as to the guilt for the dreadful upheaval; it recognized the existence of no controversy or choice between autocracy and democracy. And it has been thru these studied omissions that the self-governing peoples have been enlightened anew. They discern more clearly than ever before that even if all the hideous wrongs perpetrated by Germany could be undone or atoned, there would still remain untouched the principles of action which prompted those deeds of infamy. They are fighting now to make Germany give up not alone the territories she has ravaged, but the doctrines she has sought to impose by force, her vicious ambition to Prussianize the world and make it unsafe for democracy.

Due weight will be given to the explanation in a semi-official note from the Vatican that the pope "had the intention of acting as peacemaker, not as judge," and that "no peacemaker would have the faintest chance of success if he began by trying to prove which side is right and which is wrong." Yet one must perceive that in respect to this war, if no other, silence has the effect of judgment. To withhold condemnation of Germany's acknowledged lawlessness and perfidy is to condemn those who resist and would punish them. If Germany, as represented by her government, is not an international criminal, then the nations which war upon her are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy; and to refrain from accusing her is to accuse them. If the record of the last three years provides no ground for a verdict as between the forces of good and evil, they never have been and never will be distinguishable. Yet, a sympa-

thetic interpretation of the Vatican proposal is that the nations arrayed against Germany must choose between making peace with autocracy or standing convicted of a crime against civilization. The supreme pontiff, says an organ of his church in New York, "has set morality over against ruthless brute force and challenged men to choose between them; the nation that refuses to hearken to such a call writes itself down not as a vindicator of justice, but as a monster lustful of men's blood."

This can mean only that the war to destroy Prussianism is a manifestation of ruthless brute force, while negotiation with the unrepentant foe of human liberty would be an act of morality, in that, as the pope has written, it would tend to substitute the moral force of right for the force of arms. But it is to accomplish precisely that end that the allied nations fight. The moral force of right protected Serbia and Belgium and France—until it was swept aside by Germany's armies; and it will never be restored to efficacy so long as the system which sent those armies upon their mission of conquest remains in power. If there were no other proof of this, it might be found in the experience of the United States. For two years and eight months this nation placed reliance upon the moral force of right, only to learn that against Prussianism it was impotent, and must so remain until the force of arms had overcome the power which defied it. Upon the ultimate aims of world peace, of course, the utterance of the pope is a reflection of the best world thought. Dissent arises only over the means of attaining the ideal. He is persuaded, in the first place, that no decision by fighting is possible; the struggle appears to him "more and more a useless massacre." As to this, one must take into account the evidence of events at Lens and Verdun, where Germany's power

of resistance is steadily being reduced. But apart from this, the pope urgently recommends a resort to conciliation, negotiation and compromise.

Conciliation and mutual concession respecting territorial questions will certainly be required; but these are matters relatively subordinate. Immediate negotiation is a more vital demand. Germany is ready and eager for it. But with what agency are her opponents to negotiate? With the government which avowed that its own interests and purposes were superior to the rights of weaker nations and the sanctity of treaties, and has not to this day exhibited a sign of repentance for its crimes or of adherence to the institutions of law? There can be no negotiations except upon a basis of proved good faith on the part of both sides; and in diplomatic credit the present government of Germany is a confessed bankrupt. What guarantees could it give that would be more solemn and more binding than those which it repudiated three years ago? Compromise is the third recommendation. In respect to some of the controversies this, again, may be invoked. But in respect to the fundamental issue it is impossible—there can be no abatement of the purpose to compel Germany to abandon her doctrine that might makes right; and that cannot be accomplished until she is “powerless or free.” The demand of the nations arrayed against Germany is that the world shall be made safe for democracy. How can that be compromised, or left to the hazard of negotiation with a government whose pledges are worthless and whose existence is a threat to democracy? What such a settlement would mean was indicated a few days ago by General von Liebert. “We cannot sign a peace,” he said, “until we have the Flanders coast, a colonial empire and maritime bases. Should we not realize this now, we must prepare to work for it

after the war in view of the next war." It would be unjust to assume that this "next war" represents the purpose of the whole German people; but it would be absurd not to recognize that it reflects the policy of the imperial German government. And it is to smash just that program of interminable war that the free nations of the world have united.

It must not be overlooked that by merely gaining the point of bringing her adversaries into a peace conference at this time Germany would win an immeasurable victory. For it is certain that, once an armistice was declared or the plenipotentiaries assembled, there could never be a resumption of hostilities. With her military power unbroken and her autocracy made secure by the prestige of having withstood the greatest coalition in history, Germany could enforce her most arrogant demands, for the reason that the peoples of the opposing alliance, cheated of hard-earned victory, would lack the determination and unity to undertake a new and hopeless struggle.

The position of the United States is admittedly of crucial importance, and was, indeed, one of the chief considerations behind the papal note. "The pope," said a recent dispatch, "sought to embody in it the larger part of the program for peace and readjustment of the world proposed by President Wilson. 'How is it possible,' Vatican officials ask, 'that President Wilson should not approve the fundamental bases of his own program?'" This is a shrewd thrust, invited by the president's deplorable recommendation last December of "peace without victory." Yet if an utterance which had no basis of logic or justice or national sentiment needs an answer, Germany herself has supplied it. For it was after this statement that she forced the United States to take up arms in self-defense, by pro-

claiming anew her murderous submarine campaign and by undertaking to incite friendly nations to make war upon us. From that time the United States was committed to the cause of defeating the government "in the presence of whose organized power there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world." Advocates of premature negotiation and compromise should realize that the Wilson program of December was abrogated by Germany, and that the president six months later declared the purpose of the opposing alliance in these terms:

The German government is seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the status quo ante. It was the status quo ante out of which this iniquitous war issued forth. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

The enthronement of the moral force of right, which is the aim of the pope's peace move, is also the purpose of the continuance of the war. Moral force cannot prevail until the doctrine of brute force is discredited and destroyed. And that can be accomplished only by the overthrow of Prussianism, thru the democratization of Germany or thru victory of the Allies—by one of these two things and no other.

## THE SOLDIERS OF THE NAVY

*August 30, 1917.*

THE marine is not an American invention. But a common judgment of military authorities is that the United States has brought the marine to a position of usefulness and efficiency not approached in other countries. Not only does the American marine hold supremacy among marines, but it is frequently conceded by foreign critics that the United States Marine Corps is the most efficient military unit of its size in the world. Every American must take patriotic pride in this judgment. But it is particularly gratifying to the people of Philadelphia and that territory, including a half dozen states, of which Philadelphia is the heart. For thru a period of nearly a century and a half the history of the United States marines has been peculiarly intimate to this city and port. And during later years, when the Marine Corps was carrying forward its glorious traditions of courage and daring, and at the same time attaining that perfection of organization which has made its spirit many fold more effective, its home has been at League Island. It has been looked upon by our people as almost a Philadelphia institution. In the days of peace, when foreign visitors to this country were wont to comment on the absence of military color from American streets, Philadelphia was an exception. Our thoroughfares were flecked with blue. And now that the formal dress uniform of the marines

has been laid aside and the lean, lithe figures of the men show behind their khaki as the muscles of a tiger thru its stripes, there is no Philadelphian or Pennsylvanian or American with red blood in his veins who does not thrill at this symbol of American manhood.

History abounds with the names of military organizations to which the glamour of romance has added laurels to those won by the glory of reality. Perhaps of all the military units of ancient times the most famous was Caesar's own Tenth Legion. The man who ranks among the very first of history's soldiers could not refer to the Tenth, even incidentally, without a positive caress in his written words. One can imagine that in recruiting his beloved legion, the great Roman imposed some such standards of physical and mental worth as those which keep the United States Marine Corps the pick of all the fighting forces of this great Republic. Down thru history we find the names of great military units, noted for their daring, their endurance, their courage, their power—and, too often, for their cruelty. The bowmen of Harry the Fifth made Agincourt a victorious Thermopylae. The White Company of the Black Prince carried the tiny English power into the heart of a hostile continent. The footguard of a Spanish princess gave its name to all modern infantry. The little army of the Mad Snow King, and again of Gustavus Adolphus, struck terror to the heart of giant tyranny. The Ironsides of Cromwell turned the tide for democracy on many a bloody field. Hungary gave the word "Hussar" to history. The cruel Turk created the Janissaries. Nearly every nation has imitated the Zouaves of France. In our own wars, individual units have attained glory, only to pass out of existence when the citizen soldiery, their work of fight-

ing done, went back to the paths of peace. Our own state gave to the cause of the Union the deathless Pennsylvania Reserves and the daring Bucktails. New Jersey's Yahoos are still talked of at every Grand Army reunion. Pickett's Virginians melted on the slopes of Cemetery Ridge, but their story shall never die. And scores of other famous fighting units thrill the American heart all thru the pages of American history.

These units were, however, mostly the products of exigencies, and their gallant story was in the very nature of things of short duration. But thru all our history, from the days of the Continental congress to the first American military movement for world freedom in the present titanic conflict, the American marines have stood out as a force of rare gallantry and power. With the years grew the traditions. With the traditions the task of the marines grew more exacting. Time put the standard higher and ever higher. And higher and ever higher rose the spirit, the physical equipment, the efficiency and the reputation of the Marine Corps. Its work had begun in the Revolution. No fighting force could have had better beginnings. For its earliest standards were established under the intrepid John Paul Jones. It learned its lessons well on the Bonhomme Richard. It contributed a notable chapter to Philadelphia history when it took a deciding part in the capture of the British ship General Monk in Delaware bay. The naval history of 1812 abounds in the glories of the marines. It was the marines who were the first to plant an American flag on an Old World fortress, when an intrepid company marched from Alexandria 600 miles across the desert and captured Tunis of the Barbary pirates. Marines were called to protect the frontiers in some of the early Indian wars. They were among the first fighters in the



Florida war. Their success in suppressing the Barbary pirates was remembered twenty years later, when the United States found it necessary to send a force against the sea robbers of Sumatra and the China coast.

Marines were the first to land at Vera Cruz with Winfield Scott, and they led his column from the coast to Chapultepec. The story of the marines runs thru the Civil war like a brilliant thread. And while the nation's attention was fixed on that vital struggle, United States marines were fighting the Japanese at Simonosaki to enforce the rights of Americans in the east. In the Spanish war the marines were a more important factor than any similar organization had ever been in a conflict between great nations. Their story is almost the history of the war. But the marines have demonstrated their greatest value at times when the other military establishments of the nation had been permitted to disintegrate. Especially since the close of the Civil war have the marines borne the fight for American honor on the frontiers of civilization. They have been the chief bulwark of the Monroe Doctrine, the right arm of the government in making that vital policy effective. In a hundred battles fought under tropic suns and amid the miasma of half-civilization, they have been fighting to make the world safe for democracy. Probably no other military unit in all the history of the world has such a record of watchfulness, of uninterrupted victory, of courage amid unnamed dangers, of power to strike and of gentleness with the stricken.

The mind is projected in vain thru the mists of the ages to discern an analogy. If the Three Hundred Spartans had survived the fight in the pass and had been made the nucleus of a permanent organization, we would have had an ancient prototype of our Marine Corps. For

uniform courage and efficiency and intrepidity, we must go to Caesar's Tenth. But the beloved legion passed with Caesar, while the Marine Corps is in the very flower of youth at 142 years. And on the battle-front of freedom the marines are now awaiting the command that shall write in blood a new and more glorious chapter in the story of this Republic's devotion to the eternal principles of truth and justice.

## THE LAST WORD

*August 31, 1917.*

WHEN the historian undertakes his study of the diplomatic records of the war to this date, he will find three state papers which will obscure all others, by reason of their epochal significance, their completeness and their finality. The declaration of the German government last January was its ultimate proclamation of self-outlawry. The pope's message to the belligerents was the supreme expression of the appealing doctrine that the hope of the world lies in peace, not justice. And President Wilson's response was the irrevocable sentence of civilization against the criminal power that undertook to enslave it. Written in the grim story of the last three years there are utterances and actions innumerable which must be examined, terrible wrongs to be surveyed, policies of defiant rapacity and calculating self-interest and high idealism to be assessed, expressions of narrowness and folly to be analyzed. But in these three documents will be found the key to the meaning of all the horror and suffering of the past, and from them is projected the outline of the events which are to come. We have said that the great service of the pope was in reawakening the democracies of the world to the real meaning of the deadly conflict in which they are engaged, with the result that they have laid hold more firmly upon the faith that has inspired them to immeasurable sacrifices. And now the chosen spokesman of that faith has declared it in terms

that will be heard above the tumult of battle, and has delivered the judgment from which no appeal shall lie now or hereafter—that there can be no peace until Germany, foe of liberty and scourge of mankind, is made “powerless or free.”

By one of fate's inscrutable decrees, the leader who thus declares the fate of nations and charts the course of human affairs for generations unseen was but a few months ago the exponent of doctrines which were the despair of democracy and the hope of its implacable enemies. It was President Wilson, the inflexible judge, whose words sound the doom of Prussianism, who demanded last December a “peace without victory.” Some will argue that the spirit of that phrase is preserved in his stern reprobation now of policies of dismemberment and the exaction of punitive indemnities. But his reversal of judgment is complete. For it was to this self-same German government, whose pledge he now repudiates as worthless, that he then gave a certificate of character by urging that “only a peace between equals can last.” There could be no more striking tribute to the moral might of America than the fact that what its leader has now done has swept into oblivion all his misconceptions, errors and groping compromises. Face to face he came at last, five months ago, with the stark realities of the war; and from the day of his great decision, when he voiced the determination of his countrymen, his utterances have steadily gathered power, until finally he is able to deliver a decree that has behind it not only the armed force of a great coalition, but the unchangeable moral judgment of the world.

Among the many impressive features of the declaration the achievement of finality is the most striking and the most sobering. This is the end of all proposals for a compromise peace, whether inspired by German

intrigue or by lofty humanitarianism. The most powerful and the most venerated of the world's sovereigns has intervened in vain; and behind his earnest plea was the force of a sacred office and a world-wide organization. There is no other whose summons would be heard. That issue which declared itself when Germany struck down the institutions of law and liberty, and which has cost the world lives untold and treasure beyond computation, has come to a decision. Either autocracy or democracy shall prevail on this earth, which cannot know peace while they co-exist. President Wilson justly interprets the appeal of the pope as being for a settlement embodying general condonation, disarmament and a peace league of nations, all based upon a restoration, so far as possible, of conditions as before the war. And it is in response to this that he delivers the most terrible indictment ever framed against a government:

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government, which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-established principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children, also, and of the helpless, the poor—and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

But it is not alone, nor chiefly, the hideous crimes of the German government which make it impossible for the embattled democracies to treat with it. Between them and it there is a great gulf fixed:

This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. To deal with such a power upon the plan proposed would involve a recuperation of its

strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

The test of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government upon the one hand, and of a group of free peoples on the other? We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German government, no man, no nation, could now depend on.

Concisely stated, the terms of the antagonists of Germany have covered three things—restitution, reparation, guarantees. Most of the factors involved in restitution are obvious; the principle of reparation once admitted, the details can be determined in peace conference; the vital feature is the guarantees, and it is this that the United States, speaking for all the nations allied against Germany, interprets. The guarantees required are that the German government shall be responsible, not irresponsible; that its power shall rest in the people, not in ruthless masters of the people; that its pledge shall be based upon the faith of the nation, not merely upon the word of a faithless autocracy. There were in the highly conceived proposals of Pope Benedict two fatal defects. He advocated essentially a return to the conditions before the war, which would be to create the causes of new conflict; and he stipulated for negotiations now, when there exists no agency in Germany with which parleys fruitful or safe could be held. Negotiation requires a sure basis of good faith, of credit; and

of these the German government stripped itself three years ago. Forsworn and unrepentant, it has no longer a language in which to speak to the nations it betrayed. Such a wrong as that against Belgium, committed in hot anger or in defense against an imminent peril, and repaired in part by genuine acknowledgment and measures of mercy and justice toward the victims, might call for less than the extreme penalty. But the perjury was deliberate, the excuse false, the succeeding policy one of methodical greed and barbarity. Moreover, violation of Belgium was a violation of every neutral country; the striking down of that solemn treaty was a blow at all treaties; and the government which perpetrated these offenses, and which to this day has never ceased to add crimes to its record, is by its own acts an outlaw with which there can be no treaty, compromise or communication.

All mankind knows now that Prussianism is intolerably arrogant, ambitious, rapacious and cruel. But its overshadowing vice, its unforgivable infamy, is that it lies. Sooner will the democracies of the world condone its iniquities and forget its savagery than they will commit the peace of nations and the security of civilization to the mercy of pledges from its perjured lips.

## GERMANY MUST CHOOSE

*September 4, 1917.*

**T**HE outspoken vigor and forceful eloquence of President Wilson's note to the Vatican have led some enthusiasts to regard its declarations as unique. The announcement that no terms of settlement will be discussed until the German government is made responsible to the German people is hailed as a revolutionary departure, the first conclusive statement of the basic requirement of peace. Yet in this respect it is but the elaboration of an idea which declared itself at the very beginning of the conflict. It is the timely expression of a purpose outlined again and again as the program of the free nations—which was manifest even when the president was representing the war as of no more than European concern. That he merely reaffirmed the oft-recorded judgment of mankind does not detract from the force of his action; rather his success is a tribute to his leadership and the moral influence of America. Nevertheless, the record should be kept straight.

From the day when the German government revealed itself in the invasion of Belgium it was clear to every rational mind that the war was to be a life-and-death struggle between autocracy and democracy, and this issue was never wholly obscured. When President Wilson put forth his deplorable platform of "peace without victory," the result was to make dominant the idea that only thru a triumph of democracy could lasting



peace be attained, and since that time a treaty with Prussianism has never been possible. Foreign Secretary Balfour, in his supplement to the Allies' note in December, declared it to be absolutely essential that the doctrine and institutions upheld by the Central Powers "should fall into disrepute among their own people." More recently he asserted that there can be no peace until Germany is either "powerless or free." In June last, Premier Lloyd George made an almost direct offer to the German people by stating that "the best guarantee of peace would be democratization of the German government." Later he declared that "there can be no lasting peace until responsibility of governments to their peoples has been clearly established from one end of Europe to the other." Even in Germany progressive thinkers have recognized the truth. "The whole world is arrayed against us," said a reichstag Socialist, "because it sees democracy among our enemies, and in us sees only Prussians." Political liberalization, said a Socialist newspaper, could alone avert "the storm of public opinion of the world, which has become a tempest." "The goal of our enemies," wrote Maximilian Harden, "is democracy and independence for every race ripe for freedom; if Germany sees blazing over the goal the great celestial sign of the times, then peace is reachable tomorrow." So plain was the truth that five months ago this newspaper foreshadowed the terms now made known:

There is one simple decision by which the war could be ended forthwith. The choice lies with the German people. If they were to take control of their own government, there is no power that could prevent the coming of peace within thirty days. Civilization is in arms against Germany because that empire is the citadel of autocracy; with a Germany freed

of kaiserism, a Germany democratized, it would have no quarrel that could not be settled justly, generously and peaceably.

Two weeks before the pope's plea for a compromise with autocracy we repeated the obvious:

The price of the peace which the German people crave is their self-emancipation. Democracy, awakened at last and implacably resolved, has passed judgment—kaiserism must end. This is today the center and circumference of the peace program of the free nations.

President Wilson's great service to mankind was in making this irrevocably the demand of Germany's united adversaries. Incidentally, he won a diplomatic encounter of almost decisive importance. Every peace maneuver of the German government—whether made thru intrigue in Petrograd or Stockholm or thru open declaration—has aimed to create dissension among the enemy governments and to weaken their support among their own people. And now, by one swift assault, autocracy's position has been stormed and organized against it. It is the German government which is on the defensive with its own subjects, revealed as the single obstacle to the peace for which they yearn. Clearly before them is placed the choice between autocracy and war, democracy and peace. They will not recognize at once the imperative demands of the situation. National pride and the habit of venerating the system whose shackles they wear will lead them still to see glamour in the "war map" and to hope for a peace dictated by Hindenburg and the murderous submarine; the imperial government will do its worst to distort and discredit the purposes of the nation's opponents. But eventually the German people must learn that only by this means can they end the war. Offers of "give and take" negotiations, of territorial bribes to this or that nation, will not serve. Hollow proposals based upon the false prin-

inciple of "no annexations and no indemnities" won't do. Suggestions of "reciprocal condonation" and agreements with a perjured government carry no appeal. Peace is impossible, its very discussion is impossible, until the German people have taken into their own hands the power to dictate, ratify and guarantee the pledges of their rulers. Some hasty interpretations have represented President Wilson as declaring that there will be no negotiations until the Hohenzollern dynasty is overthrown. His terms are far less drastic. This is his language:

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany *unless* explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting.

It is not required that the German nation shall forthwith create a republic, nor even that it should dismiss the reigning house; but only that the government shall be made responsible to the people, that there shall be popular control of its policies and the faith of the whole nation behind its engagements. When the ultimatum is made known to the German people there will be, of course, an outburst of resentment; the demand will be denounced again as an intolerable interference with the empire's internal affairs, an infamous attempt to dictate its domestic policies. The truth is, of course, that the existence of autocracy in Germany is no more a matter of internal policy than is the war itself. So long as the German government victimized only its own subjects, the system was of only German concern; but when it undertook to make its villainous power supreme over Europe, when the meaning of autocracy was manifested in Belgium and in France and in the submarine murders, the question of the government of Germany became international, and lies at the very heart of the

issue which is to be determined now, whatever the cost may be in blood and treasure. The most striking feature and most serious weakness of the pope's proposal was its avoidance of this issue. In response to inquiries, the papal secretary of state gave the following explanation:

The holy father said nothing about democracy and the democratization of any existing government, because history teaches us that a form of government imposed by arms does not and cannot live, and also out of respect for the free will of the people themselves, who, having the right of universal suffrage, may choose whatever form of government they please.

The defect of this plea is threefold. First, history tells of no other effort to impose *democracy* upon a nation by force of arms. Second, the purpose is not to destroy, but to create, political liberty in Germany; not to deprive the people of self-government, but to impel them to achieve it. And third, the German people, despite a broad electoral franchise, are powerless to alter their form of government except thru revolution or defeat, for the reason that the autocracy has an absolute right of veto over constitutional changes. Force is required now only because the German people have employed their strength in support of autocracy's scheme to dominate the world. They have had the same opportunity as other nations to establish self-government; they have refused to do so, and have engaged in a war against democracy everywhere. Forty years ago they chose to sacrifice their liberties to create a powerful state. They have gloried in their submission, and have attributed to it all their advancement and prosperity. Infatuated by the doctrine that they constituted a super-nation, fit and destined to rule the world, they exulted

in the assault upon civilization, and thruout the war have applauded or indorsed every deed of infamy perpetrated in pursuit of that ideal.

They cannot even yet bring themselves to repudiate the system which outlaws them from world society. Spiritually, as well as politically, enslaved, they still conceive that self-government is a heresy which they must combat. Hence it has become necessary for the free nations, for their own security, to exert compulsion. And this they can do with clear conscience, because it is axiomatic that the liberalization of Germany can bring only benefit to her own people. In any event, there can be no compromise or abatement of this fundamental demand. Round about the last fortress of absolutism the forces of democracy are encamped in relentless vigil. It is for the German people to decide whether they will fight on thru bitter suffering to humiliating defeat or heed now that "fiery gospel writ in burnished rows of steel."

## “NO QUARREL WITH THE GERMAN PEOPLE”

*September 6, 1917.*

**T**HE sharp contrast between President Wilson's earlier and later declarations on the war has impressed every observer; but there is one idea to which he has clung from the beginning with singular consistency. In nearly all of his addresses and state papers dealing with the conflict there has been a laborious insistence upon the theory that it is solely the government of Germany, and not its inhabitants, which is engaged in a war against civilization. To a certain extent the distinction is not only generous but just. Yet it may be pressed too far. Americans will deceive themselves, and will invite an unhappy awakening, if they rely upon a soothing belief that the Germans are the helpless victims of a rapacious autocracy, when the truth is that they have been its subservient and hopeful instruments. Even in his diplomatic protests against the submarine murders President Wilson tried to differentiate between the imperial government and its subjects; but it is in his recent utterances that he has given the strongest emphasis to the idea. His great war address to congress on April 2 contained these passages:

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship.  
\* \* \* We act without animus, not in enmity toward a

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people, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government. \* \* \* We are the sincere friends of the German people.

We resist, he wrote on May 22, "the pretensions of the autocratic government which acts upon purposes to which the German people have never consented." In his Flag day address he declared: "We are not the enemies of the German people, and they are not our enemies." To the pope's peace proposal he answered that the object of the war is to free the world from a power which "is not the German people," but "the ruthless master of the German people," upon whom this country "desired no reprisal." The persistent repetition of this idea is the more remarkable because there is no suggestion which meets more emphatic repudiation among the Germans themselves. In the early days of the war, Americans who thought to please their German-American friends by laying the guilt to the kaiser and his ring met an outburst of wrath and scorn. "The German people and their kaiser are one," was the retort, and it was declared that German liberty was immeasurably superior to that enjoyed in this country. The most virulent abuse of the German press was evoked last April by President Wilson's reservation on this point. "He has the audacity," cried a Cologne paper, "to draw a distinction between the German government and the German people, who indignantly reject this artifice. All classes stand behind the government." The suggestion, said another, was "perfidious and stale," and from countless popular organizations the kaiser received fulsome resolutions pledging fealty. With equal acerbity the German press assails his latest attempt to absolve the people of the empire from responsibility. It is called "absolute mendacity," "grotesque nonsense." "The climax of all the nonsense," says the leading journal, "is

that the German people are groaning under a cruel government. Has not the entire German people, rich and poor, Socialist and Conservative, continually repeated that it stands firm for the kaiser and the empire? The German people may be relied upon to range themselves more firmly around the emperor against this hypocrite."

The effort to encourage anti-dynastic feeling in the enemy nation may be adroit; but when this is carried to the extent of picturing the Germans as a humane and liberty-loving people who have done us no injury and with whom we have no quarrel, the policy becomes meaningless. It used to be a favorite theme of pro-Germanism that the country which had given to the world such great names in philosophy and science and the arts could not be guilty of war-lust or atrocities. Yet it was the same nation which gave birth to Kant and Goethe and Beethoven which exulted in the Lusitania massacre. If the record of infamy has been written by the imperial government, it has been indorsed in every detail by the German people. Who were the most ardent defenders of the rape of Belgium? The writers and publicists who reflect and mold German thought, the clergymen who expound German religion, the professors who govern the intellectual life of the nation from their seats in the imperial universities. Where has been manifest the most adroit and most useful service to kaiserism? Among the Socialists, who have supported every war measure and at this very time are scheming for a peace that would intrench militarism and autocracy for half a century. Who are the most implacable advocates of annexation and conquest? Not the aristocracy of the court and of junkerdom, but the financial and commercial interests and their vast middle-class following. No quarrel with the German people? Why, without the support, the united, admiring adhe-



rence of the German people, that imperial government which we denounce would be but an aggregation of trumpery titles and medieval pretensions. What would the resounding proclamations of the kaiser signify, were they not the echoes of a doctrine which is the implicit faith of the nation? How could a government, however powerfully entrenched, prosecute a policy of lawlessness and barbarity for three years if it did not thereby express the national character and aspirations? Of any other nation rather than of Germany can it be said that the war lacks full popular sanction. It is the creation of autocracy, but not until it became a losing venture was there a German voice raised in doubt of its worth, and even now the desire of the populace rises no higher than a yearning for a profitable peace. There is in the German mind a sense of disillusion, but no consciousness of guilt. The truth has been forcefully stated by Professor Ladd, of Yale:

It is not true to the facts, nor quite safe as a political utterance, to say that we "have no quarrel with the German people." For the world is, in fact, fighting not simply an autocratic government, but an autocratized nation. The army that went gayly goose-stepping into Belgium was not driven as slaves. They were, rather, inspired by the horrid lust of conquest. The insane and immoral ideal embodied in the phrase "Deutschland ueber Alles" is that of Germany as the autocrat of nations. And in the crime of cherishing, preparing to execute and method of executing it, the whole of the autocratized nation, and not its government only, is deeply and responsibly involved.

Let it be remarked that Americans who have had the best means of judging have no delusion that "we have no quarrel with the German people." Dr. David Jayne Hill, formerly ambassador to Berlin, said a few weeks ago: "The people of Germany are more loyal to the emperor than the Democratic party is to President Wilson. Do they not support the government? Did

not a wave of popular rejoicing go thru the empire when the Lusitania went down? How many Germans in Germany are not imperialistic? I have never found one." "The American people," says Herbert C. Hoover, "should be under no illusion that the forces making for popular government in Germany have as yet consequential weight." Former Ambassador Gerard said on his return: "As to the possibility of a German revolution, we might as well put that aside; the Germans are not the kind of people to indulge in revolutions." Hardly a month ago, Prof. Herman Fernau, a German publicist, now a political refugee in Switzerland, gave this estimate:

I consider a revolution in Germany possible only in event of a sweeping military victory by the Allies. Only after a stinging defeat will the people of Germany be sufficiently aroused against the Hohenzollerns and the military caste.

Many powerful influences tend to keep the German people in subjection to their autocracy—the strength of the reactionary forces, the chaotic results of revolution in Russia, the compulsory drafting of all citizens into service of the state, military censorship of the press, and, above all, the habit of submission to the idea of an all-powerful state. In them the natural human instinct toward freedom has become atrophied by disuse. The political change a few months ago, for example, which some Americans regarded as a convulsion, was only remotely a popular movement. The apathy of the docile populace was strikingly described by a correspondent:

The change in the chancellery has done much to restore the equanimity of the people, if that was disturbed at all. The masses seem glad that Bethmann-Hollweg is gone; but if you ask the people why, they can hardly give a reasonable explanation. They wanted a change. Well, they have had their change—Michaelis in place of Bethmann—and they are quite satisfied. They would have accepted Baron von Itzenplitz with much the same equanimity.

For the purpose of attempting a diplomatic flanking movement it may be serviceable to keep up the pretense that "we have no quarrel with the German people," but as a matter of cold truth, the United States faces the bitter enmity and united military power of 70,000,000 Germans. If it was the kaiser's general staff that planned the destruction of Belgium, it was the reichstag that applauded the foul blow. If it was Von Tirpitz that conceived the murderous submarine campaign, that crime has been exulted in by the entire nation. If the whole scheme of world domination was set in motion by the autocracy, it had behind it the sordid ambition of a people which despises and loathes democracy and hoped to sweep it from the earth. It is time that the United States abandoned reliance upon a theory which is empty and fallacious. American soldiers who face the troops of the kaiser and the hideous engines of war invented and perfected by German scientists will have no illusions about fighting merely an autocratic régime. That idea, so soothing to contemplate, in practice is a bit of dangerous nonsense. The German people forty years ago chose their government. They support it, they obey it, they glory in its rapacity and brute strength. And the way to overcome its power is not to flatter or cajole its adherents, but to make upon them such relentless war, by force of arms and economic pressure, that they will learn thru suffering what they are incapable of learning from the example and judgment of the self-governing nations of the world.

## DISUNION IN CANADA

*September 7, 1917.*

**E**VERY nation in the democratic alliance has its problems of discord and dissension. These domestic conflicts range from the virtual anarchy that prevails in Russia to the activities of pacifism and pro-Germanism in the United States. But in some respects the most remarkable, and not the least difficult, is the conscription crisis in Canada, which has produced the gravest condition since the strife over confederation just half a century ago. It seems strange that such an upheaval should be threatened in a part of the British empire which has been ardently loyal, and which has supported with splendid generosity the cause of law and liberty. As we noted the other day, Canada has sent to the fighting front more than 300,000 men; the United States, to do as much proportionately, would have to contribute 5,000,000 troops. Now the volunteer system has reached its limit of efficacy; it is necessary to raise an additional force of 100,000, and a law signed last week provides for the enlistment by means of a selective draft, in order that agriculture and other necessary industries shall not be weakened. Yet resort to this just, efficient and democratic system, which the United States adopted upon entering the war, is denounced and resisted with bitter violence.

The present struggle is but a manifestation, more striking than usual, of an issue which has been dominant in the whole history of Canada since Great Britain

wrested the territory from France. It became acute last May, when Premier Borden returned from an imperial conference in London with a message that Canada must raise 100,000 men to keep the ranks of her expeditionary forces filled, and committed the government to passage of a selective draft act. The announcement was applauded by most of the people, for it was clear that the volunteer system, if pressed further, would not only produce injustice, but disorganize the productive activities of the country. But virulent opposition developed immediately. The Socialists and some labor organizations attacked the proposal. The most formidable antagonism, however, declared itself in Quebec, among the French-Canadians. While their great leader and the head of the Liberal party, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, demanded that there be a referendum on the proposition—upon the ground that the present parliament, elected before the war, had no mandate from the people to make this drastic change—his French followers spurned all suggestions of compromise, while the radical Nationalists proclaimed that they would choose civil war before submission. Premier Borden, Conservative, sought to avert the conflict by inviting Laurier and his aides to join in forming a coalition ministry, but the offer was rejected. Thereupon, the selective draft act was passed, and on August 29 was signed. The English-speaking members, regardless of party, carried the bill against the French-speaking minority. This result intensified the ill-feeling. Agitation became more bitter; supporters of conscription were mobbed in the streets; French speakers and newspapers openly preached sedition and secession; an attempt was made to dynamite the home of a Montreal publisher whose newspaper favored the draft; suppression of disloyal meetings led to rioting. Finally, the government arrested the insur-

reactionist leaders and seized hidden stores of arms. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, meanwhile, has announced that the law, having been placed upon the statute books, should be obeyed, and has agreed to join in naming the exemption boards. He relies upon the general election, which will be held in a few weeks, to overturn the Conservative government and open the way for repeal. The statistics which we cited recently showed the sharp divergence in sentiment concerning the war. Canada's population at the last census was 7,200,000. The province of Quebec has 2,000,000, four-fifths of them being French, and there are 450,000 French in the other provinces. Out of the 406,000 Canadian volunteers, the French in Quebec furnished about 7000; with more than one-fifth of the total population, they gave to the dominion's forces little more than one-sixtieth of the volunteers, and even among the French battalions recruited there have been wholesale desertions.

It is manifest, therefore, that the French population is worse than indifferent to the war; it is hostile. There is, indeed, no concealment of the feeling. This condition would seem the more remarkable because of the double tie which links the French-Canadians to the Entente alliance—they have always been loyal to the government of Great Britain and ardently attached by sentiment to the country from which their ancestors came. Yet they dissociate themselves completely from the cause which means life or death to both Britain and France, and, indeed, to Canada itself. The causes of this anomalous situation are a combination of racial and religious influences, presenting curious parallels and contrasts with the problem of Ireland. In Ireland a British and Protestant minority, long dominant in the country's affairs, resists the will of the Irish and Catholic majority and prefers union with Great Britain to participation

in Irish self-government. In Canada a French Catholic minority, secure in control of its own territory, is irrec- oncilably opposed to the policies of the British Prot- estant majority, and, while loyal to the crown, threatens to secede from the Canadian confederation rather than submit. The policy of Canadian and imperial unity is Canada's parallel to the Irish home rule controversy, with Quebec corresponding to Ulster. But anti-war feeling is also a political expression. Non-participation in imperial wars is a fundamental doctrine of French- Canadian nationalism, manifested emphatically during the struggle with the Boers. The idea of this element is that Canada is not concerned in the European con- flict and should remain apart from it. The educated leaders of the movement in the cities refuse to recognize that the war endangers world democracy; as for the rural population, it has very little knowledge of the war and only the vaguest interest in it. These sentiments have historic origins.

It was 300 years ago that France undertook to cre- ate a great colony on the western continent, and in time her sway extended from the mouth of the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi. Continued friction with the British settlements culminated after 150 years in transfer of the territory to the stronger Power, the treaty of 1763, which ended the Seven Years' War, ceding the whole of New France to Great Britain. In a military and politi- cal sense the conquest was complete, but the British neither annihilated nor assimilated the French col- onists. Numbering only 60,000 at the time of the treaty, they have grown to more than 2,000,000, and they are today as distinct a race as were the adventurous traders brought over by Samuel de Champlain three centuries ago. It seemed for a long time that the extraordinary fecundity of the French-Canadians would result in estab-

lishing the dominance of their race, but the ravages of infant mortality and the drain of emigration to New England checked the rate of growth. The decisive factor, however, was the enormous immigration from Great Britain. This finally and irrevocably determined that Canada should be British in character and civilization. A singular feature of the record is that the French have never swerved in their loyalty to the government which conquered them. They fought for Great Britain in 1776 and 1812; one of their leaders has declared that the last shot fired in America in defense of British sovereignty would be fired by a French-Canadian; it is almost certain that in a war between Great Britain and France they would be neutral, if not favorable to the former. But they have clung tenaciously to their own language, creed and traditions.

The reason for this is that the French-Canadians are intensely loyal adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, which from the time of the conquest has never deviated from the policy then adopted. In that policy there were three cardinal features—first, complete acceptance of British rule; second, recognition of the severance from France as final; and third, preservation of the racial integrity of the French race in Canada. The third aim has been pursued with astonishing pertinacity and success. The dangers which threatened the policy of separation were absorption and dispersion of the French element; these the church has combated by isolation. By encouraging the French language and discouraging English, by exercising complete control over education and over family and community life, by strict religious discipline and by establishing a system of political authority, the hierarchy has kept the French-Canadians a race apart. Thus religion is at the root of the whole condition. In general terms it may be said



that the British population is Protestant and imperialistic; the French population, Catholic and nationalistic. Following their religious leaders, the French are perfectly loyal to the crown, because Great Britain, according to her traditional policy, has always accorded to them the right to enjoy their own laws and institutions. They consider themselves, moreover, to be better Canadians than their British countrymen, in that they put Canada's interests above those of the empire. They are intensely jealous of the system they have erected in Quebec. There the government is avowedly Catholic—the state is the church. The rights and privileges guaranteed to it at the conquest, and confirmed by succeeding legislative acts, have given the church extraordinary powers, even that of taxation for church purposes. It participates as a matter of course in elections, designating the candidates who are to be supported by the faithful; it officially approves or condemns laws; it controls absolutely the system of education—the schools of Quebec are either Catholic or Protestant, there are no “public” schools; it exercises a rigid censorship over libraries and the press—more than once a French-language newspaper has been destroyed by a bishop's interdict for expressing opinions obnoxious to the church. The policy will be made clear by two or three official utterances. In 1870 a bishop's pastoral letter declared:

It is impossible to deny that politics and religion are closely allied and that the separation of church and state is an absurd and impious doctrine. This is especially true under a constitutional government, which, by intrusting full legislative powers to a parliament, places a very dangerous weapon in the hands of its members.

The Quebec episcopate announced in 1875: “Not only is the church independent of the commonwealth—she stands above it. It is not the church that is com-

prised in the state ; it is the state that is comprised in the church." In 1896 the bishop of Rimouski wrote:

An elector who is at heart a Catholic cannot say, "This is my own opinion and I must vote according to my conscience," and go against the orders of his bishop, without sinning grievously and rendering himself unworthy of the Sacraments. That opinion of his is a culpable opinion, and his conscience in this matter is a false conscience.

There was nothing unusual, therefore, in the recent declaration of the primate of Quebec that the selective draft law is "a serious blow to the rights of the church," and the open advocacy by the clerical authorities of resistance to its provisions. A government which is a theocracy could not but condemn a proposal which is the essence of democracy. It is difficult to describe briefly the complex attitude of the French-Canadians and their leaders, but the outlines are clear. These people are unreservedly loyal to Great Britain, but as a matter of self-interest only ; they have no affection for the British nation and no concern over its fortunes, altho they are grateful for the extreme liberty they enjoy. Toward the British-Protestant majority in Canada, on the other hand, they are inveterately suspicious and antagonistic, and the feeling is cordially returned. But surely, it will be said, there must be a sentimental attachment for France, the mother-country. There is—but it is a strictly platonic love, and by no means inspires giving to France aid and comfort in her terrible ordeal. The truth is that the French in Canada revere the France of Louis XIV, Louis XV, Louis XVI ; for the France born in 1789 they have a feeling of sorrowful distrust. She symbolizes to them the wicked theory of secular government, the triumph of irreligious modernism, the hateful principles of revolution. When the republic separated church and state, the last bond with the French in Canada was broken. When it was urged a few years

ago that scholarships be established to send medical students from Laval University to Paris for post-graduate study, a Quebec church organ uttered this stern warning:

If the project can be carried out without peril to the faith of our future physicians, well and good. If not, let it be put aside; for it is of infinitely greater moment that we should have physicians a little less learned but sound in matters of religion than a little more learned and without faith.

The conflict over conscription and Canada's full participation in the war for the empire and democracy reveals itself, therefore, as an outgrowth of a century-old contest between two irreconcilable principles—British-Canadians stand for national and imperial unity; French-Canadians, for separation. These opposing aims govern their respective systems of education and politics; they have not approached a compromise in 150 years, and now, in the presence of a great national crisis, they are less than ever likely to produce united sentiment.

## RUSSIA'S PARALYSIS

*September 10, 1917.*

OCCUPATION of Riga may be the only result of the German campaign in that region; or it may lead to the reduction of Reval, another naval base; capture of the Russian fleet and a move against Petrograd. But in any case, the event emphasizes two facts—Germany's desperation and Russia's utter demoralization. It may seem strange to deduce German weakness from an operation which has the effect of a substantial victory; but that is what is revealed in the hysterical outburst of exultation over an achievement which in a military sense is paltry. Riga could have been taken at any time during the last four or five months; the mutinies and wholesale desertions and "voluntary retirements" in Galicia and Rumania demonstrated long ago that the Russian armies' power of resistance had been destroyed. The German staff was perfectly aware of this, but postponed attack, while the kaiser's tame Socialists carried on their intrigue for a separate peace. As soon as it was made clear that the Stockholm conference scheme had failed, and that the provisional government in Petrograd could not be overturned by the pro-German plotters, the advance on Riga was ordered. At the first assault the defenses crumbled; within a few days Von Hindenburg's forces entered the evacuated city and passed beyond it, driving before them the uniformed rabble that had been an army. A few Russian detachments gallantly sacrificed themselves in hopeless counter-

attacks, but the general condition was described in a dispatch of September 4:

The German attack on Riga had been expected for a considerable time. Evacuation of the principal establishments had already been undertaken and provision had been made to abandon the town, owing to the slight resistance expected from the troops on the northern front, who, as elsewhere, were largely contaminated by the internationalist propaganda.

In the face of these notorious facts, the German government galvanized its docile subjects into a celebration which would have been appropriate for a great military triumph. An order from the kaiser set all the church bells ringing and all the clergy making patriotic speeches, while Berlin was decked with flags as it was after the great achievement of the capture of Warsaw. The truth is, of course, that the campaign is a political, not a military, maneuver. It was designed less as a blow at the opposing alliance than as a stimulant for the flagging spirits of the German people. For more than a year they had had no other encouragement than the imperial assurances of invincibility and divine favor. It was necessary to do something spectacular to revive confidence in the winning of a "German peace" and reconcile the people to the inevitable ordeal of a fourth winter of war. The most economical method was to strike at the disorganized Russians, thereby acquiring some more territory to be used in the "give and take" negotiations around the peace table, and also some cheap glory with which to dazzle the discouraged populace.

The most important aspect of the situation is the new evidence it provides of Russia's demoralization, which means that greater effort and sacrifices will be required of the United States. The folly and arrogance and infatuation of the elements constituting and supporting the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates have brought within sight the catastrophe which every rational

mind foresaw that they would produce. When czarism and its Prussianized autocracy were overthrown, it was obvious that the first needs were to establish a strong, universally supported provisional government and to prosecute relentlessly the war against the enemy that had almost accomplished a betrayal of the nation. A government worthy of the fullest confidence was established; but straightway the forces of Socialism and pacifism and revolutionary radicalism of all sorts set up, in the organization of workmen and soldiers, an irresponsible and hostile authority. Charles Edward Russell, of the American mission, has assured us of "the high character, the clear vision and the natural capacity of the delegates" to this body of meddling zealots; but as a fact, its policies have been mad, its program destructive and its acts disastrous. With the enemy entrenched deep on Russian soil, it subscribed to the German peace formula of "no annexations, no indemnities," coerced the provisional government into indorsing it and insolently demanded that the other nations in the alliance settle with Prussianism on those terms. But far worse than this traitorous propaganda was the council's insane procedure of pulling to pieces the structure of discipline in the army and navy, already shaken by the fall of the czar. In the name of democracy salutes were abolished, the authority of officers over their men was drastically curtailed, and the direction of military and naval operations intrusted to committees elected by enlisted soldiers and sailors. Emissaries of the council went to the various fronts to harangue the troops on the wisdom of making peace with Germany and the folly of fighting to serve the "greed" of Great Britain and France and the United States. The results were fraternization with the enemy, the desertion of 3,000,000 Russian troops and the shameless retreat of whole divisions at the first sign

of pressure. A succession of such events shocked the deluded visionaries into a partial realization of what they were doing, and they sternly admonished the armies to discipline themselves. But altho Premier Kerensky gave warning last week that the nation was in "mortal danger," and altho General Korniloff begged for authority to punish treachery and desertion, the council stood out against surrender of the "rights" of the "revolutionary democracy." "Already," cried Korniloff, "the enemy is knocking at the gates of Riga. If our army does not hold the shore of the gulf, the road to Petrograd will be opened wide." That was two weeks ago; Riga has fallen, the road to the capital is open, and still the usurping extremists babble of preserving the sacred revolution by curbing the power of those who are trying to save it from a foreign foe. One fact shows the condition into which Russia has sunk. While the campaign against Riga was beginning in the last week in August, there were in session in Moscow four distinct national congresses—one of merchants and manufacturers, one of "middle-class and democratic" organizations, one representing ostensibly all national interests, and one of church delegates. Russia is in less danger of being throttled by Germany than of choking to death on her own loquacity.

On August 24, after the evacuation of Riga had begun, the United States loaned \$100,000,000 more to the provisional government, making \$275,000,000 advanced, and at the same time Secretary Lansing said, "I feel that Russia is stronger today than ever." If money and optimism can save the distracted republic, which is being driven to ruin by forces of disunion and anarchy, one of the strangest miracles of history is about to be performed. But there is no evidence yet that either of those things can overcome artillery or counteract a

poison that has eaten into the very soul of the nation. It is well enough to say that the free nations of the world must support the youngest democracy. But Russia must save herself first, and that she cannot do unless there is among her people enough intelligence and patriotism to stamp out the wretched propaganda carried on by the elements which foment a class war in the face of an invading enemy. Many Americans who were perturbed by the spread of sedition in the army predicted that when Germany abandoned the seductions of "fraternization" and invaded further Russian territory the spirit of the nation would be aroused and unified. The theory thus far has proved fallacious; those who taught the army and the people to put class interests above patriotism could not, if they would, undo quickly their deadly work; they are to see their revolting doctrine interpreted by the forces with which they shamefully trafficked. There seems little likelihood that the provisional government will make a separate peace. But if Russia simply stops fighting, the difference between that and a formal desertion of the alliance will hardly be distinguishable.



## WHAT ARE OUR TERMS?

*September 11, 1917.*

**F**IVE translations of President Wilson's note to the pope, it is announced, have been published in Germany. They are in substantial agreement, however, upon the vital feature—the demand for democratization of the German government as a prerequisite to peace negotiations—and the abusive chorus of the nation's press shows that there is no misunderstanding of the issue there. It is in the United States, singularly enough, that confusion has arisen. The single version of the note published here has had more interpretations than the five published in Germany. Assertion of that demand which overshadowed all else in the president's communication obviously put a very grave responsibility upon him and upon the American people. Peace for the world, life or death for tens of thousands of Americans, might hang upon the interpretation of a sentence or two. Therefore, it is a sobering thought that even now, two weeks after the note was sent, there is no authoritative and conclusive definition of the position to which the United States has been committed. Moreover, danger has not passed that adroit maneuvering by the German government might bring this country face to face with the embarrassing alternative of accepting a false peace or shifting to new ground after having issued an ultimatum, as it did after the "strict accountability" demand. We do not in the remotest degree question the good faith of President Wilson, nor do we minimize

the force and justice of his declaration; we join in the general opinion of the world that it was a masterly summing up of the judgment of mankind. Nevertheless, its obscurities should be recognized and their possible results canvassed. The general terms set down are clear enough—the plan of peace must be “based upon the faith of all the peoples involved,” and not “merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government.” But the essential words were these:

We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. \* \* \*  
We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers.

This manifestly was not a demand for overthrow of the Hohenzollern dynasty or the dismissal of any of the present rulers of Germany. President Wilson merely announced that we could not take their word *unless* it was convincingly guaranteed by the German people. Such was the meaning accepted by a leading German-American newspaper, the Illinois Staats-Zeitung. “He does not unconditionally decline,” it said, “to deal with the present rulers of Germany, but does state the conditions under which he will do so.” Yet many papers, after due inquiry in Washington, read into the declaration what was not there. “President Wilson said plainly,” ran a Washington dispatch to the New York Times, “that the United States would not deal with the present rulers of Germany”; and the same paper remarked editorially that Germany “is fighting for the life of the Hohenzollern dynasty, for that life the president means to have.” But on the following day this deduction was contradicted in a new dispatch from the capital which said: “In a high authoritative quarter,

the statement was made today that the administration had never declared that the Hohenzollern dynasty and the monarchical form of government in Germany must be abolished." The New York World was more explicit:

The state department discredits reports that President Wilson would not consider a democratization of Germany which was not predicated upon abdication of the kaiser. "The German people may do anything they please," said Secretary Lansing. "This government will not be in the position of dictating to them the measures they should take. The United States, however, is to be the judge of whether the changes in the form of government effected are such that this country can trust the German government."

This reprieve for the Hohenzollerns, however, lasted only twenty-four hours, for on the following day, according to the New York Sun, "Secretary Lansing authorized a denial of published reports that he had stated that elimination of the Hohenzollerns was not necessary as a peace condition." That newspaper elaborated:

The president demands that the German government change its character so that it will be responsible for its obligations and representative of the German people. These primary conditions must be fulfilled, and diplomats point out that this necessarily indicates that the kaiser and the leaders responsible for the war must be eliminated. President Wilson is not attempting to stipulate what kind of a government he will deal with. He has stipulated what kind of a government he will not deal with, and that is the Hohenzollern government of today. No half-way changes, such as might result from reichstag resolutions or changes in the personnel of the German cabinet, would be likely to affect the situation.

Finally, the United Press disseminated on Sunday a decisive formula "vouched for by the highest authorities":

Full suffrage for a Germany rid of Hohenzollernism  
\* \* \* means peace. Nothing short of this can terminate the war. The Allies cannot talk peace with the Hohenzollerns. The German people should act promptly to eliminate entirely this dynasty and abandon all militaristic rule if the war is not

to go on indefinitely. Bluff reform, such as merely making the chancellor subject to the will of the reichstag, is not sufficient.

We do not yet know which of the two contradictory interpretations of the president's note is correct; but we incline to the latter. If the administration did not mean at first to stand upon a demand for complete regeneration of the German government, it means it now. Such a decision, indeed, is dictated by the convincing evidence at hand that a majority of the German people indorse the infamous policies of their autocratic government, and lust for the profits of a peace dictated by it. It is their very infatuation that has served to extricate the United States from the danger of being caught in a diplomatic trap. If the German people and their leaders had kept their tempers, they might have given the present government a certificate of democratic character which would be difficult to reject. Already they make a boast of the meaningless device of allowing seven members of the reichstag and seven members of the autocratic bundesrath to "consult" with the chancellor in framing the reply to the pope.

But supposing they had adopted some adroitly planned measure declaring that the chancellor's negotiations should be guaranteed by the reichstag, which is elected under a broad franchise, what then? This would be represented as meeting President Wilson's vital "unless"; and yet kaiserism and junkerdom and militarism would still be supreme, and the United States would have to treat with them and the representatives of a people exulting in victory, or else sidestep its own offer. American and German discussion of the obscure passage has clarified the situation and removed its menace. Unofficially, but none the less decisively, the administration has taken a position far in advance of that

declared in the president's note. It has apparently adopted the world-wide view that the malign force which confronts civilization is not merely the autocratic power of the German government, but the perverse character of the German nation and the dangerous delusion which possesses it. Censorship alone does not explain that well-nigh unanimous outburst of rage with which the German press met the demand for liberalization of the government. That vociferous adulation of autocracy, that foaming fury against principles of self-government, represent the mind and spirit of the German people, and these are the forces, not the forms of German administration alone, which threaten human liberty. The new German declaration of war against the spirit of the age means many months more of war, yet it is hardly more ominous than a calculating appearance of agreement would have been. A Germany that merely went thru the motions of democratization might easily be as dangerous to civilization as it is now, when it is the last citadel of autocracy. A government is what it is, not what it is labeled. Great Britain is called a monarchy, and is really a democracy; the republic of Mexico is a seat of despotism; Russia, where democracy ostensibly has full sway, is in the throes of anarchy. A parliamentary régime in Germany today would be a parody, for the people would remain spiritually enslaved to the autocratic idea. The deadly truth has been stated by two Frenchmen, with the incisiveness of their race. Denys Cochin, a leader of the Catholic party, notes that President Wilson uses about the same language as the allies used against Napoleon in 1811, and says:

My notion is quite different. There was only one Napoleon, while there are among the Germans millions of Hohenzollerns—among the manufacturers and bankers of Prussian cities, among the legions of avid merchants, even among the Socialist workmen, all of them animated by the

fury of domination. I do not see in the fall of a traditional autocrat and in his being replaced by some other elected autocrat a solution of the catastrophe. For us that would not be worth another week of the war.

And on Lafayette day Ambassador Jusserand uttered this judgment:

When will the end come? It can come only when the enemy understands; when he sees the evil he has caused and regrets it; when he is ashamed. The change must not be merely one on paper, one in the laws of his country, but one in his mind.

Long ago we said that a democratized Germany could have peace at once. But that change is impossible while the nation is undefeated and impenitent. The lofty theory that "we have no quarrel with the German people" is a fundamental and perilous fallacy. Democracy, which they reject and loathe, has with them, as well as with their chosen rulers, a quarrel which means its life or its death, a controversy which will be settled only when international law and the principles of free government are overthrown, or when that nation of Hohenzollerns has been made powerless for evil.

## DIPLOMATIC FRIGHTFULNESS

*September 12, 1917.*

WE TRUST that interest in more important aspects of the affair will not obscure the fact that publication of those shameful diplomatic papers from Buenos Aires has served poetic justice as well as international welfare. "The acting minister for foreign affairs (of Argentina)," wrote the aristocratic spy of the imperial German government, "is a notorious ass"—and lo! he finds that the designation belongs to himself. It is hardly to be doubted that in the annals of diplomacy it will be as securely attached to his name as the Prussian title which he bears; for there has been nothing in the way of intrigue to compare with the uncouth clumsiness of his activity since his former chief, Herr Zimmermann, intrusted to the cable his Mexican-Japanese war plot. The facts in this case are just as complete and unanswerable as in the other. They reveal the German charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires—the accredited envoy to the Argentine government—sending to Berlin cable messages in which he outlined methods for cheating that government, continuing the ruthless destruction of its shipping and evading responsibility by killing survivors of submarine outrages.

The first thing of interest is the disclosure of the characteristically Prussian intent and phraseology of these treacherous communications. The lawless sinking of vessels sailing under the neutral flag of Argentina had brought the two countries to the verge of war, and

a severance of relations was being averted only by German representations that the crimes were not deliberate and would not be intentionally repeated. And in the midst of the negotiations the German agent secretly advised Berlin: "I beg that the small steamships Oran and Guazo, which are now nearing Bordeaux, may be spared if possible or else sunk without a trace being left." The meaning of the recommendation could not be misunderstood. The vessels, being small, might be spared without serious injury to the cause of *Kultur*; but if imperial policy required that they be destroyed, let the job be done so as to leave no evidence—let no Argentine seamen survive to spread calumnies about German savagery and perhaps incite their countrymen to join in the brutal war against a high-minded people! Here, then, is the official emissary of the imperial German government, in phrases repeated as a set formula, specifying the precise degree of frightfulness to be applied in a particular case and intimating that piracy would be safer if wholesale murder was added. The incident may help to explain the horrible action of a submarine a few months ago, when its commander ordered the entire crew of a torpedoed steamship to the deck of the undersea craft, then destroyed their lifeboats, closed the submarine's hatches and submerged, leaving the thirty-eight victims to drown. Only the survival of one of them, who was picked up by a British ship after clinging for many hours to a piece of wreckage, revealed the attempt to silence witnesses of the sinking. Incidentally, the Buenos Aires disclosure recalls Ambassador Bernstorff's advertised threat that American passengers sailing by the *Lusitania* would be in danger of assassination. Will it be questioned any



longer that that massacre was arranged, with Prussian efficiency, thru communications between Berlin and Washington?

But revelations of German perfidy no longer have the quality of surprise. The remarkable feature is the evidence of duplicity and violation of neutrality on the part of Swedish officials and the Swedish government. The state department in Washington explicitly declares that the murder messages "were dispatched from Buenos Aires by the Swedish legation as their own official messages, addressed to the Stockholm foreign office." If only one message were in evidence, it might be pleaded that it was not forwarded to Berlin, and that the Swedish legation had been ordered to stop transmitting such information under cover of neutral diplomatic privilege. But there were at least three communications, and how many more can only be surmised—these are numbered 32, 59 and 64. This single discovery provides circumstantial evidence in support of a suspicion long held that the Swedish foreign office—which is conducted by a minister who is avowedly and rabidly pro-German—has been a telegraphic relay depot for Germany's world-wide system of espionage. The Swedish government stands charged, therefore, with a grave offense against Argentina, a friendly nation, in that its legation in that country and its own foreign office were used by, or acted in complicity with, Germany's murderous submarine policy against neutrals. The course pursued by the German agent in Buenos Aires presents nothing new, when it is recalled that for months the embassies of Germany and Austria in Washington were clearing houses for the most villainous activities of intrigue and violence against the nation whose hospitality cloaked their conspiracies. But Sweden has been neutral in profession, and the employment of her facilities in furthering hostile proj-

ects against a friendly nation was far more reprehensible. She must answer also for complicity in a violation of privileges extended by Great Britain, which passed the coded messages over British-controlled cables under seal of diplomatic inviolability from censorship. To the secret murder advices was given the appearance of official communications from the Swedish minister to his foreign office, and in this character they were forwarded to Stockholm—and transmitted thence to Berlin. Unless the Swedish government can exonerate itself, therefore, it faces grave complications with Argentina and with Great Britain. But the offense, whatever its degree may prove to be, concerns also the United States and every other nation at war with Germany, in that Sweden is placed in the position of indorsing and assisting the lawless submarine campaign.

All of the injured nations, however, will survive the damage inflicted upon them. The really vital matter is the possible effect upon the status of Sweden herself. For the disclosure of her involvement with Germany comes at a time when a special commission from Stockholm is in this country to plead for modification of the United States' embargo regulations governing the export of foodstuffs to the neutral states of Europe. Sweden's economic situation has been grave; this might well make it desperate. Most Americans are familiar with the interesting development of Swedish sentiment during the war. From the beginning the court, the aristocracy, the higher command in the army and the "intellectual" classes influenced by them have been ardently pro-German. Altho the dynasty was founded by a Frenchman—Charles XIV, first of the line, was Jean Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals and the son of a French attorney—a century of Teutonic intermarriage has Germanized it completely. King Gustav and the queen, who

is a cousin of the kaiser, have never concealed their sentiments. The Lutheran clergy, most of its members having been educated in German universities, has been preponderantly for the Central Powers. But there were also historical reasons for anti-Ally feeling. Swedish nationalism never forgave the conquest of Finland by Russia a century ago, and the implacable desire of the czar's régime to "acquire" an ice-free Atlantic port in Scandinavia furnished a perpetual source of irritation between the two countries. Political sympathy with Germany was based, therefore, largely upon distrust and fear of Russia. The enormously profitable trade in contraband with Germany, maintained in defiance of the Allies, also had its influence. A very large part of the masses of the people, nevertheless, have been hostile to Prussianism, and the king, who undoubtedly favored open or secret assistance of Germany, found that the best he dared do was to dictate a policy which the Allies justly term "malevolent neutrality." When the Russian revolution removed all danger of aggression from that quarter, the last excuse for intervention in behalf of Germany disappeared. But it did not check the system of providing Germany with enormous war supplies, her imports of Swedish iron and iron ore during the last three years having been more than 8,000,000 tons. These shipments, which have been convoyed by Swedish warships, account in part for Germany's vast output of guns, ammunition and submarines. But this profit-seeking neutrality has had its penalties. Sweden, like every other country, faced at last an era of soaring prices, food shortage and economic distress. The contraband traffic to Germany steadily looted her reserves of food-stuffs and raw materials, industries were embarrassed, unemployment spread, and recently there have been great public outbursts of discontent over the privations.

The fate of the Swedish dynasty, however, really rests with the United States, which controls the supplies which alone can ease the privations of the people and make them endure an unrepresentative government. What they want is bread, not more democracy than they enjoy; and they must get it, if at all, from this country. The embargo regulations of the United States have three aims—to protect the American people against food shortage, to guarantee sustenance to our allies, and to render more effective the blockade of Germany by making it impossible for her neutral neighbors to supply her and make up the resulting deficit in their own stocks by imports from America. But there is a fourth purpose, in reserve—to discipline those neutral governments which violate their obligations; and that is what Sweden has cause to fear. It is suggestive that the exposure of Swedish complicity in German intrigue was made on the same day that a dispatch from Stockholm reported the government as “anxious to give guarantees to the United States” that imports licensed would not be turned over to Germany. Germany persistently exults in the fact that the United States has not yet exerted any military force in the war. She may be assured that this deficiency will be overcome in time; but, meanwhile, her despised antagonist has inflicted blows that have damaged Prussianism as much as would lost battles. Better might the kaiser’s troops have yielded trenches in fair fight to American soldiers than have America expose to the world such perfidy and stupidity as were involved in the Zimmermann plot and the Buenos Aires treachery.

## KORNILOFF AND KERENSKY

*September 15, 1917.*

**H**ISTORY reminds us how deep, yet how narrow, is the gulf that sometimes separates rebellion from revolution, black treason from glorified patriotism, the dangerous zealot from the inspired liberator. Just assessment cannot always be made amid the tumult of violent changes. Only time can show whether Korniloff, the audacious and erratic soldier who precipitated Russia's latest crisis, is to be condemned as an enemy of his country or regretted as a victim of his own impulsive loyalty and the forces of unintelligent radicalism against which he struck. In any event, there is no evidence, beyond the testimony of his foes, that the rising he led was in behalf of czarism; and certainly it was not disgraced by the perfidy of pro-Germanism or a separate peace with autocracy. There has never been a revelation in the news to suggest that Korniloff is not as ardent a patriot as Kerensky, to whom the democratic nations have looked with confidence and whom they have supported with generous aid. The issue between the two leaders has been as to the methods by which Russia might be saved from the catastrophe of subjugation by kaiserism or the horrors of utter disunion. No observer who has followed developments will be deceived into believing that the controversy has been merely between the head of the provisional government, as such, and an ambitious military adventurer. It goes back to the malign ascendancy of the element of ill-balanced radicals

which, at the beginning, seized the power of the revolution, set up an irresponsible and meddling authority, and usurped the functions, not only of civil government, but of military administration. Korniloff, the one man who has shown a capacity to put a fighting spirit into the demoralized army, tried for months to serve under the impossible régime. He revolted only when the final shame of the abandonment of Riga made him despair of national salvation except thru a military dictatorship. "Optimism as to Russia received a staggering blow" in his action, was the solemn comment of a New York newspaper. But where has there been optimism concerning Russia, except among self-deluded circles in Washington? What rational student of events could see hope in the ever-increasing domination of forces which are determined to prostitute the liberation of Russia into a struggle for class supremacy and have made a mockery of patriotism?

Every intelligent reader knows that the anarchy which prevails is the direct and infallible result of the new government's subserviency to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which from the hour of the overthrow of czarism has hampered authority, spread venomous doctrines of anti-nationalism and sedition, and nullified all efforts to establish an efficient régime. It plotted the pro-German Stockholm conference. It maintained the pernicious theory of a class war as a counter-force to the war against Germany. It assailed the Allies, and also the United States, and declared that no Russian blood would be shed in support of their "imperialistic aims." It decried patriotism, and supported an offensive against Germany only as a means of protecting its personal property in the revolution, not of serving Russia. Its appeals to soldiers and workers were made in the name of class programs, not of national

ideals or world justice. But its most malignant work was the remorseless destruction of naval and military discipline. The issue came to a head, and the clash of the irreconcilable elements was forecast, at the great "national conference" held in Moscow on August 25-26. There the two forces which must strive for mastery in Russia came face to face. No sharp distinction can be drawn, of course, between the confused and overlapping groups which manifest themselves in Russia's public affairs, but that gathering was the first sign of coalescing opposition to the reign of ultra-radicalism. Already the portents of a collision were plain. Kerensky, courageous and implacable, threatened "blood and iron" against "those who think the moment has come to overthrow the revolutionary power with bayonets." Tho once they trembled before autocracy, he said, they now march against the government with arms. "Let them understand," he cried, "that they will have to settle with an authority which will make them remember the days of czarism!"

Korniloff, undaunted, pitilessly laid bare the degradation wrought at the front. "We have lost," he said, "the whole of Galicia and Bukowina, all the fruits of recent victories; the enemy is knocking at the gates of Riga." The old régime, he said boldly, bequeathed to Russia an army which had defects of organization, but at least had a fighting spirit, while the government had destroyed all sense of discipline and capacity for victory. He demanded restoration of discipline thru reviving the authority of officers, and the withdrawal from soldiers' committees of any right to decide whether orders should be obeyed. Yet this program, manifestly the minimum requirement of national defense, was applauded by a minority only—the workmen's and soldiers' delegates received it in sullen silence. Their president outlined

measures more to their liking—he proposed that Russia, confronting an invading host with a demoralized army, should save herself by decreeing fixed prices for food, rigorous laws dealing with the income tax and war profits, land reform and a definition of the rights of soldiers and their commanders!

Korniloff was soon to learn that his authority as commander-in-chief was to remain a fiction. The provisional government announced that it accepted his recommendations “in principle”; but the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Council nullified them in practice. On the day before the treasonable abandonment of Riga the Council overwhelmingly rejected the proposal for restoration of the death penalty for deserters and mutineers; better, it held, that Germany should seize Russian territory than that the rights of the Russian proletariat to betray their duty should be denied. The “Bolsheviki”—the I. W. W. element of Russian Socialism—had regained control of the Council and of the government. It was then that Korniloff determined on his despairing stroke. On September 6 a London dispatch told of rumors “in Russian circles” there that the commander-in-chief would soon become dictator, and, with the nucleus of 250,000 Cossacks, build an army that would fight instead of fraternizing. But it was not until September 10 that news came of his remarkable enterprise of demanding supreme power. Unless we are to believe that this brave soldier, whose loyalty to the revolution had never wavered, had become a despicable and insane plotter for czarism or for personal power, we must concede that his proclamation was the utterance of a sincere patriot. Certainly it stated truths:

Our great fatherland is perishing. The government under pressure of the “Bolsheviki” majority of the council, is acting in full accord with the plans of the German gen-



eral staff. \* \* \* I require nothing personally, nothing except the salvation of mighty Russia. I shall never betray Russia into the hands of its traditional foe, the German race, or make the Russian people the slaves of Germany.

In announcing his dismissal and ordering his arrest, the government denounced him as a traitor and agent of "the reactionary elements," conspiring to "restore the despotic régime." Of the truth of these charges there is no evidence whatever, unless it be considered "reactionary" to wish that the Russian armies should be changed from a uniformed rabble to a faithful and disciplined force. The whole democratic world has admired and sympathized with Kerensky. Never has such a burden been laid upon mortal man as that which he has borne. He is devoted to his ideals of a regenerated Russia; he is tireless in his labors; he has been unswervingly true to the cause of Germany's adversaries. Yet it must be remembered that before he is a Russian or a statesman he is a social revolutionist, saturated with the doctrines of a cult which is a mortal danger to a nation fighting for its existence against a relentless autocracy. He yielded from the beginning to the domination of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. It may be urged that he had to, lest the revolution sink swiftly into civil war; but the fact remains that he yielded, and never since has been able to extricate himself from the malign power, if, indeed, he has desired to do so. Measured by character and aims, he is a great leader and a pure patriot; but measured by results, he is not the savior of his country. Since he attained power, almost the power of a czar, the economic conditions have grown steadily worse, while the national armies, despite the brief offensive which he gallantly led, have become just the wretched thing that his government's policy could not but produce. While suc-

cess of Korniloff's thrust might have temporarily reduced the sum of freedom in Russia, it would have meant a real war against Germany; it would have given the nation an army of defense, which just now would be worth all the charters of Utopian liberty and license that the extremists of Petrograd can evolve from their overheated brains.

Whatever may be the fate of this audacious gambler with fortune, the "little man with a Tartar beard and Japanese eyes" gave for a moment a gleam of hope that the spirit of Russia was about to declare itself in forthright action instead of in eloquent factionalism and immature idealism. That he is a tool of absolutist reaction we do not believe. If his judgment in this crisis was wrong, the error was due to temerity, not to treacherous ambition. Even an overdeveloped sense of patriotism, we conceive, could not do Russia such dire injury as has been done to her by flabby internationalism, which has brought her at last into the shame of unresisted invasion and the perils of unredeemed anarchy. Which of these two leaders has been at fault history must judge. We can only regret that the more intelligent should be in subjection to the fallacy of socialistic radicalism, while the stronger lacks the constructive ability to balance his consuming patriotism and his military genius. For Kerensky and Korniloff as enemies can produce only further chaos; acting together, they might have achieved for Russia a swift salvation, and for democracy an early triumph.

## ITALY THE AUDACIOUS

*September 18, 1917.*

**I**F ANY one battle name is to stand out in unapproachable pre-eminence in the history of the war, it probably will be Verdun, that glorious symbol of a nation's valor, devotion and sacrifice. But next to it—for brilliance of military attainment, at least—will rank the campaign of the Isonzo; there will be no chapters in the record more thrilling than those which tell of the pitiless struggle for supremacy waged by the armies of Italy and Austria amid the crags and defiles of this forbidding region. It is a reflection upon the judgment of military and lay observers that only within the last few weeks has there been any clear realization of the mighty part which Italy is playing in the great drama of the nations. The submarine menace, the spectacular combats of the western front and the bewildering events in Russia have monopolized public interest, until suddenly there comes into view this astounding spectacle of two huge armies, Latin and Teuton, locked in a deadly struggle for four weeks on end, along a mountainous battlefield of fifty miles. The surprising fact is that this gigantic operation—it is the most extensive, the longest sustained and the most desperately contested offensive of the war in any field—is declared now by competent authorities to have possibilities of being the decisive movement in the world conflict. The Italians may accomplish the great feat of taking Trieste, the principal territorial objective of their war policy; but of

infinitely greater importance would be the achievement of splitting the Austrian line in twain, which might result in the smashing of the military power of the dual monarchy and the dealing of a mortal blow at the Teutonic confederation.

For many months the Italian government has been representing that the war could be decided on the Austro-Italian front. These claims were discounted, because the staffs of the other Allied nations held it to be impossible that any rapid progress could be made in mountainous territory where the defenders held every height. But the Italians have already accomplished things that seemed incredible, and they insist that with adequate support—they need coal and iron and guns, not men—they can destroy Austria's resistance and open the way for a peace dictated by the Allies. There have been two reasons for the world's failure to recognize the magnitude of Italy's contribution in the war. First, interest in her campaigns lagged because they were siegeliike in their deliberation; after nearly two years of fighting the capture of Gorizia seemed to most persons the only outstanding achievement. But a more potent influence has been psychological. Italy never at any time appealed to the imagination of the world by asserting the high aims which the other nations proclaimed. She had no brutal violation of her sovereignty to give her cause a glamour of martyrdom, like Belgium; she had no invasion of her territory to avenge, like France; and she made no professions of championing any great principle, of defending democracy or fighting for the rights of small peoples. Her war policy was bounded strictly by her own "national aspirations." She added nothing to, and derived nothing from, the great world inspiration toward the perpetuation of law and liberty. She declared that she fought to "fulfill her destiny," to "complete her national unity,"

phrases which fired the souls of her peoples, but left the rest of humanity cold, since what they really meant was the wresting of disputed territory from Austria upon the ground that the inhabitants were largely Italian and that wider frontiers would make Italy more powerful. Most of her claims might be historically just, but they did not enlist the sympathy of the world as did the altruistic professions of her allies. Thus it was that until the development of the present startling operations the work of Italy has not been generally estimated at its true value. A year ago Marconi candidly warned his countrymen that they were misjudged, and urged a campaign of information for the benefit of foreign nations.

Yet when the record is examined it becomes clear that Italy's participation in the war literally saved the Allied cause, and that her actual accomplishments, considering the obstacles she had to overcome, have been remarkable in extent and importance. How many of us have realized that Italy is the only antagonist of Germany fighting on enemy soil, and that for two years, altho a poor country, she has maintained in the field a larger armed force, in proportion to populations, than any other nation engaged?

In the very beginning, Italy saved France from swift subjugation by that terrible German onslaught thru Belgium. She was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, and her adhesion to that compact would have meant that France would face enemies on two fronts; instead, Italy announced that the Teutonic Powers had begun an aggressive war, which released her from joining it. But the vital fact is that she made her fateful declaration instantly. Had she delayed, even for a few days, France would have been compelled to send great forces to her Italian frontier as

a precaution. Let it be remembered that on August 1, 1914—two days before the invasion of Belgium and three days before Great Britain declared war—Italy proclaimed her neutrality, and thereby enabled France to concentrate all her powers of defense against the German peril. Ten months later Italy rejected the desperate offers of the Teutonic alliance and declared war on Austria, later in that year on Turkey and Bulgaria, and finally on Germany. She is a full party to all the agreements of the opposing coalition. But what has she done in its behalf? It must be taken into account that she has had to overcome economic weaknesses more serious than those of any of her allies, and to solve military problems of unparalleled difficulty. From her own meager resources, and with an industrial equipment developed only in recent years, she had to improvise means of producing prodigious quantities of war material. Dependent upon imports for the prime requisites of coal and iron, she has built up a system of supply which employs 2500 factories and nearly 500,000 workers. Lacking wealth, she has expended nearly \$6,000,000,000, her people bearing courageously a staggering burden of taxation. With a population of only 32,000,000, she has put 4,750,000 troops in the field—1,500,000 more than France, and 740,000 more than Great Britain.

But the question remains, what use has she made of these great forces, none of which has been employed except in her own campaigns? The answer is found in the colossal tasks which nature and a powerful enemy created for the Italian armies. It will surprise many Americans, we think, to learn that the Italian battle-front extends for 500 miles—is longer than that held by the Belgians, the British and the French on the west. But it is its formation, not its extent alone, which makes it formidable beyond description. Virtually thruout its

whole length it is a region of towering mountains and turbulent rivers and rock-strewn plateaus, every mile of which presented natural barriers that military science had converted into fortresses. The main objective lay in Austrian territory eastward of the Adriatic; but before this problem could be attacked it was necessary to close the passes in the Alps encircling the Trentino, that great mountainous salient from which Austria threatened the plains of Lombardy and Venetia. For fifty years the Austrians had been fortifying these lofty defiles, and during the period of Italy's neutrality had perfected defenses of unequalled strength. Yet the Italians overcame them all. Month after month they toiled up the heights against deadly resistance. The armies, with their guns and equipment, scaled mountains that had been traversed only by Alpine climbers; they crept up the faces of beetling crags, they crossed glaciers, they swung themselves and their artillery across great chasms, they stormed fortresses above the clouds. And at last they won thru, mastering every pass and establishing themselves on Austrian territory. Then the easterly campaign developed, in country no less difficult, the first phase ending with the siege and capture of Gorizia. Meanwhile, an apparently ominous reverse had occurred. The Austrians, massing a great force of men and guns, blasted open some of the Alpine passes and threatened to pour down into the Italian plain; but in time they were driven back and the gateways sealed again, and once more the tireless smashing of the main Austrian line along the Isonzo river was resumed.

It is this campaign, extending from Tolmino to the sea, which General Cadorna calls "the great battle of the war." The feats of the Italians have staggered the enemy and stupefied observers. At the northern end of the line they mastered the swift river barrier under

the concentrated fire of the huge Austrian fortresses on the opposite heights; they have stormed their way up almost impassable mountains, defying death and the rules of strategy—even, it seemed, the law of gravitation. Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele are theirs, and they are conquering the great plateaus of Bainsizza. The southern army, meanwhile, has fought its way foot by foot over the terrible crater-region of the Carso, where the whole land is one vast system of natural fortifications, and is battering at the intrenched flanks of the Hermada mountains, while great naval guns hammer the Austrian defenses from the sea. This is the direct movement toward Trieste. But the other drive is that which, if sustained, will shatter the Austrian line at its center and signal disaster to Germany's principal ally. Italy has the men and the strategic genius needed to accomplish this great undertaking; if she fails, it will be because her supplies of artillery, of coal and of iron prove insufficient. But even if she should fall short of delivering the decisive blow of the war, she has made a record of achievements incredible, and has exhibited a sustained spirit of audacity and endurance that will make her name illustrious even in the military annals glorified by the deeds of France.



## AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S ORDEAL

*September 19, 1917.*

THE stupendous campaign which Italy is waging on the fifty-mile battle-front between Tolmino and the Adriatic revives interest in a remarkable feature, or defect, of the strategy of the Allies during the war. Except for the abortive attempts of Russia, the Dardanelles fiasco and the distant operations in Mesopotamia, their endeavors have been directed almost wholly against Germany. The first principle of successful war is to strike with overwhelming force at a point where decisive results can be attained; if this is also a weak point, peace may be forced so much the easier. Yet Great Britain and France, the strongest of the Allies, have expended their greatest efforts in battering at that part of the Teuton defense which is most powerful. To a great extent this course was dictated by the German invasion of Belgium and France. Still, it would have been possible to fight there on the defensive, and to concentrate in a drive against Austria-Hungary. Many experts hold that if the Allies in the beginning had sent adequate help to Servia, and had established themselves in overpowering force at Belgrade instead of hesitating in Macedonia, a deadly thrust could have been made from the south against the fortress of the Central Powers. However that may be, Italy's superb offensive in the Isonzo river region brings into the range of possibility the scattering of the Austro-Hungarian armies and a real invasion of Hapsburg territory—even a cam-

paign toward Vienna. This vast operation, in a word, is the first promising blow at the weak point in the encircling defenses of the Teutonic empires. Recognition of its importance is seen in the reinforcement of the Italian attack by detachments of British heavy artillery. Should it result in a crushing defeat for Austria, the immediate and ultimate effects would be far-reaching. Such a result would make tremendous inroads upon the military power wielded by the German staff, would separate Bulgaria and Turkey from their allies, and would sever at a vital point the backbone of the Pan-German scheme of a Teutonic empire stretching across middle Europe and southwestern Asia.

It seems strange that it is only after three years, and by the independent action of Italy, that a determined essay is made toward breaking thru the Teutonic line at its weakest point; for from the very outset it was universally recognized that the Hapsburg state was rotten with decay, and, at its best, was but a feeble reflection of the efficient, centralized Hohenzollern empire. Its inherent weaknesses have been patent for generations. It does not constitute a nation, nor even a union of nations, but an ill-assorted assemblage of peoples without any common interest of policy, language, religion or blood; a mixture of races divided by intense prejudices, and held together only because in Austria and in Hungary alike a strong minority controls the government by compact resistance to the divided majority. Hungary hates Austria; Bohemia chafes under the Hapsburg yoke; Slavs and Croats, Poles and Ruthenes ceaselessly agitate for independence. The proud Magyars have a constant struggle to maintain their racial supremacy in Hungary. The long reign of Franz Josef was embittered thruout by the conflicts of the warring factions, and for years the prediction was

confidently made that his death would be followed by swift disintegration of the impossible union. Undoubtedly, this would have been the result but for the common danger of a foreign war and the stern repression of the entire population thru German command of the armed forces. Governmentally, the country comprises two separate states—the empire of Austria and the kingdom of Hungary; each is completely independent of the other, with its own parliament and government. The unity of the dual monarchy, as it is popularly called, is expressed in the rulership of the common sovereign, who bears the title of emperor of Austria and apostolic king of Hungary, and in the common administration of foreign affairs, the army and navy and joint financial expenditures. It must always be borne in mind, therefore, that the idea of a nation of Austria-Hungary is fallacious; the term really signifies two nations which are essentially hostile to each other, and the most bewildering intermixture of races anywhere on the globe. Austria has 10,000,000 Germans, 5,000,000 Poles, 3,500,000 Ruthenes, 6,500,000 Tchecho-Slovaks, 2,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, 275,000 Rumanians and 800,000 Italians. Hungary's population includes 10,000,000 Magyars, 2,000,000 Germans, 475,000 Ruthenes, 2,000,000 Tchecho-Slovaks, 3,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and 3,000,000 Rumanians. The Germans, because the other races cannot unite on any proposition, rule Austria and have a predominating influence in the affairs of the whole country. The Magyars, who loathe the Germans, exercise an iron sway in Hungary. Among all the non-German elements there is a bitter memory of the war of 1866, when Prussia humiliated Austria.

All the enmities resulting from this forced association of unsympathetic elements have been intensified by the sufferings due to the war. So dangerous has been

the inter-racial strife that for three years the emperor did not dare convene the Austrian parliament; and when it met last May, for the first time since the beginning of the war, the assembling started a series of furious political controversies. Why, then, was Austria-Hungary the tool of Germany in starting the war, and why has she remained faithful and subservient? The answer is that her dependence, altho not voluntary, has been necessary to her existence as a state. Financially, economically and politically she is but a satellite of Prussian power. Her banking system, her trade, her industrial life, the development of her resources—all depend upon German capital, enterprise and guidance. It has been German support that has kept the impossible political structure of the country from collapsing, and German military domination that has given it a powerful defense in the war. In the great scheme of a Central European confederation ruled by Germany lies the sole hope of preserving the Hapsburg dominions as a political entity. Hungary presents a distinct problem. Intensely jealous of and hostile to Austria and Germany alike, her dream is independence from both. She has strong historic sympathies with Great Britain and France, which supported her revolutionary movement in 1848, and her political ideals are western. If she had had satisfactory guarantees that her territory would not be endangered, she probably would have undertaken a revolt against Austria at the beginning of the war; but when the Entente coalition encouraged the claims of Russia and Rumania the Hungarians united with the hated Teutons against a common peril.

Such are complex forces—with the addition, of course, of Italy's land war—which have held Austria-Hungary faithful to Germany and the Middle Europe project. But her heart has never been in the war, and

since the specter of Russian aggression has been laid the unending cry for peace has become clamorous. Such unity and discipline as prevail in Germany are manifestly impossible in Austria-Hungary; she has no autocratic genius to venerate, no military achievements to stimulate her pride, no racial cohesion to link up her energies. She has fought bravely, but only because grim necessity left her no alternative to following the Prussian chariot. Peace discussion in Austria-Hungary, therefore, has been a consuming topic for months, and has been far more intense than in Germany, where the wildest projects of annexation and conquest still have their believers. Unquestionably it was Austrian court influence which encouraged the German Catholic party to campaign for peace, and Austria-Hungary was bitter over the dismissal of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, upon whom she relied to effect a compromise between the Pan-Germans and the moderate peace elements. Even before that, the possibility of a settlement with Russia had been eagerly discussed, until the German press arrogantly demanded by what right the kaiser's ally "dared" to formulate "independent war aims." Late in July the foreign minister boldly declared for "an honorable peace"—which meant a peace on almost any terms short of dismemberment—and said defiantly that he did not care whether the assertion was regarded as "a sign of weakness or of strength." This utterance called forth savage denunciation in Germany. But a more drastic move was to follow. The pope urged "peace without victory," he said, "at the solicitation of our children who implore our intervention"—all but naming the most Catholic court in Europe. President Wilson's response, which roused the German press to fury and was condemned as a matter of course by the official organs in Austria, was openly acclaimed in Hungary.

There have been two forces retarding peace sentiment in Austria-Hungary—the impossibility of yielding to Italy's demands without a fight, and the country's fear of and dependence upon Germany. The first factor seems likely to be settled by the Italian offensive; the other is still powerful, but is steadily being overcome by the remorseless pressure of economic distress. All accounts agree that war losses and famine must soon destroy the nation's capacity for resistance. The key of the situation is Hungary, and to a less degree Bohemia, in both of which sections there is a strong sense of political sympathy with the United States. In those regions the people are perfectly confident that their independence will be achieved very soon after peace removes the necessity for united action, and, therefore, they promote every means to bring the war to an end, provided that does not imply surrender of territory. Hungary, by the way, is not deeply concerned over the Italian drive on Trieste, as the fall of that city would make the Hungarian port of Fiume more important. In any case, nothing short of a complete German triumph can save the dual monarchy from disintegration. Long ago it was said that Austria-Hungary is not a nation, but merely a geographical expression. If Italy breaks thru, it will soon cease even to be that.

## GERMANY'S SOUTH AMERICAN LOSS

*September 21, 1917.*

WHEN his excellency, Count Karl von Luxburg, was summoned to Buenos Aires from his holiday trip the other day, to receive his passports and the maledictions of the nation whose hospitality he had violated, there were already signs of the storm of public wrath that was to break against the German population in the Argentine capital. Conveyed to the legation under guard and by a roundabout route, the envoy expressed pious depreciation of the national character which resented an atrocious betrayal. "So these," he said bitterly, "are my friends the Argentines!" This might stand as the farewell of the discredited minister of Prussianism and agent of submarine frightfulness. But it would serve appropriately also as an epitaph upon the grave of German colonial ambitions in South America. For the exposure of the perfidious policy of Berlin did more than wreck the career of a titled diplomat; the friendship of a great neutral nation was torpedoed, the hopes of Germanism itself in all Latin America were "sunk without leaving a trace." From the Caribbean to the Horn there is no longer a country where German honor is not derided, where German policy is not a thing of loathing.

That one of its spies should be disgraced would give the imperial government not a qualm. And altho Argentina's neutrality has been valuable, the alienating of official and popular sympathy in a region so distant

would hardly be counted a catastrophe of vast magnitude. But what Germany may well contemplate with anguish is the collapse of an edifice of colonial enterprise and political influence patiently erected thru many years of costly intrigue; what she may face with dismay is a future clouded by the enmity of a continent. The commercial possibilities that have suffered irreparable damage cannot be ignored, and will trouble the thrifty soul of Prussianism more than an incidental revelation of official perfidy. South America in normal times imported nearly \$1,000,000,000 worth of goods annually, Europe's share being \$660,000,000. Of the total, Germany shipped \$180,000,000 worth—as much as France, Italy and Belgium combined, and \$25,000,000 more than the United States. In trade with Paraguay and Bolivia she led; in all the other countries except Venezuela and the British, French and Dutch colonies, she stood second only to Great Britain. Her most profitable customers, of course, were Brazil and the Argentine, which together bought every year \$115,000,000 of her products and sent her \$104,000,000 of theirs.

But more than a rich trade has been destroyed by a war of conquest. The convincing disclosure to Latin America of what German autocracy means has shattered the vision of a great colonial system, the foundations of which were laid by the processes of "peaceful penetration," but which some day was to be erected by sterner methods, when the subjugation of Europe had made it easy to kick aside the Monroe Doctrine and every other restraint and confer by force upon the degenerate Latins of the western hemisphere the blessings of *Kultur*. German "colonization" and political aggression in South America has long been one of the most important of the overseas projects fostered by the imperial government and its ambitions for world power. Even before the war



it was recognized by far-seeing statesmen as creating a problem which menaced the tranquillity of this half of the globe and foreshadowed a deadly controversy with the United States. Against the commercial enterprise which had established a vast trading and banking system in the Latin republics and had linked their ports to Hamburg and Bremen by great steamship lines there could be no just complaint; Americans might be chagrined to see their natural markets conquered by German industry and efficiency, but that movement could not be challenged as hostile, and its success was a reproach to the United States rather than to its rival. What disturbed well-informed observers was the prospect that German commercial leadership, when achieved, would awaken ambitions for political domination. Already the doctrines of Pan-Germanism were being openly proclaimed, and its advocates never concealed the fact that the policy eventually must override the Monroe Doctrine—the “benevolent assimilation” of South American territory must lead to its actual Germanization, no matter what prohibition or resistance might be offered by the United States. There are more than 600,000 Germans in South America, but the problem centers in Argentina, where they number about 70,000, and especially in Brazil, where 400,000 have settled, three-fourths of them in the extreme southern districts of Parana, Santa Caterina and Rio Grande do Sul. The influx, which began in 1825, was encouraged by the Brazilian government thru attractive land laws, but it was fostered also by the Hamburg “Kolonisationsverein.” The earlier immigrants turned to agriculture, but during the last generation the project of building up a compact and powerful German system of trade and finance has been sedulously prosecuted by Berlin. It has been the avowed purpose to make southern Brazil eco-

nomically and politically an annex of the empire. Altho the Germans to some extent intermarried with the Portuguese and half-caste natives, they have tenaciously preserved their language, their customs and their loyalty to the empire. They have their own churches, clubs and newspapers; they conduct nearly 1000 schools; their banks and trading houses, closely allied to those of Germany, are the leading institutions. Moreover, of the later immigration nearly every individual has been an advance agent of German *Kultur*, a representative of imperialism, an industrious collector of information useful to the home government. Even those who transferred their allegiance to the country where they lived have been taught to make a mental reservation which would preserve their status as Germans, under the imperial law which provides for dual citizenship. As to the bearing all this has upon Pan-Germanism, it is necessary only to quote eminent exponents of that program:

We must desire that at all costs a German country of millions of Germans may grow up in the twentieth century in South Brazil; no matter whether it remains a part of Brazil or becomes a self-containing state.

The Monroe Doctrine is the greatest danger to our world policy that exists. Germany must decide either to abandon all idea of a colonial policy in South America, or by means of a firm policy—which would not quake before the chances of war—compel the Americans to restrict the application of the Monroe Doctrine, and to guarantee not to make any opposition should Germany seek to draw such parts of that continent into her sphere of interest as may appear useful and necessary.

Decrepit states like the Argentine and Brazilian republics, and more or less all those beggarly states of South America, would be induced, either by force or otherwise, to listen to reason.

Needless to say, this interesting enterprise has been promoted for years by an elaborate propaganda. Both

before and during the war, Germanism in South America has been served by a German press, German financial institutions and German trading firms. In Argentina and Brazil alone the system operates thru twenty-one newspapers and more than forty of the most powerful banking and commercial houses and their branches. Thus the opening of the war found Germany's outposts firmly intrenched there, and equipped to make serious trouble for her antagonists, including the United States. Yet all this mighty campaign of seduction and espionage has failed. The Latin Americans instinctively resent the meddlesome and blustering arrogance of Prussianism; moreover, they are utterly hostile to the pretensions of autocracy and naturally sympathetic toward the cause of political liberty, while their sense of chivalry revolts from the brutality of the systematic submarine murders. The result has been that not a single Latin American government has failed to denounce Germany's methods, while four of them have broken diplomatic relations with her and two have joined the United States in the war. They discern clearly that Luxburg is not, as Germany pretends, a blunderer or an exception; he is a type, a perfect reflection of the national policy that dictated the invasion of Belgium, the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the detestable plot to incite Mexico to war against this country. He has revealed to them the soul of Germany. Hence it is not merely the confidence and the trade of a continent that she has lost by her criminality; Pan-Germanism itself in the western hemisphere has been "*spurlos versenkt.*"

## WORTHLESS WORDS

*September 25, 1917.*

THE replies of the two kaisers to the pope may evoke dutiful applause from their admiring subjects; they may encourage the supreme pontiff to make a new effort to bring about negotiations upon a basis of "peace without victory"; but they will not go very far to enhance the repute of Teutonic diplomacy, which recent revelations have exposed afresh to the scorn of the world. Quite the most striking feature of the two utterances is their vagueness, their emphasis of abstract ideas and non-essentials and their studied avoidance of straightforward contact with realities. There is not in either or both of them combined a single definite proposition which bears directly upon the issues of the war or the necessary preliminaries of peace. In offering his suggestions, the pope deemed it wise to deal largely in generalizations; yet he found it possible, as all the Entente Allies have done, to speak openly of nations and territories and some of the obvious requirements of settlement. Not so the imperial respondents. They mention not Belgium nor France nor Poland nor Servia; they recognize no dividing question of principle, no moral issue, no fundamental conflict between the philosophy which they represent and the ideals of free peoples. After five weeks of cogitation upon the most tremendous problem that has confronted the human race in centuries, they have produced nothing save protestations, platitudes and a threadbare insistence that the fate of civilization and the hopes of mankind shall be left to the

mercy of star-chamber negotiations, infallibly to be dominated by the idea and the fact of a Teutonic triumph in the war. This explains why the statements from Berlin and Vienna have been received with such languid interest. The papal intervention commanded universal attention; the American response, which was that of all the nations arrayed against Prussianism, still has its echoes and reactions in every corner of the globe; but the kaisers' words meet indifference and skepticism. The reason is, of course, that they manifestly bring peace not one hour nearer, because they do not approach even remotely the issues of the conflict.

This calculated avoidance of any explicit declaration is more noticeable, perhaps, in the response of Austria-Hungary, more than one-half of which is devoted to expressions of veneration for the papal office and gratitude for the peace efforts of its exalted incumbent. Yet there is in this message one quality which gives it an appeal wholly lacking in the other. It is palpably sincere. The young emperor and his people do genuinely yearn for peace; the sufferings of their country long ago eclipsed the hope of glories promised to them when they harnessed themselves to the Prussian chariot, and it is not to be doubted that they would welcome any settlement, short of a national dismemberment, which would ease the anguish they now bear. For the rest, the note is but an obedient echo of the deliverance from Berlin. Austria-Hungary solemnly joins in aspirations that world affairs henceforth shall be arranged upon the basis of "the moral force of right and on the rule of international justice and legality," with "appropriate guarantees," reduction of armaments and "compulsory arbitration." And these ideals are to be realized by negotiations. The German reply, without even sincerity to recommend it, is as much an affront to intelligence as to international

morality. What the German government did all the world knows:

Having secretly planned to dominate the world, it proceeded to carry out the plan without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and the long-cherished principles of international action and honor; it chose its own time for the war, delivered its blows fiercely and suddenly, stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood, and now stands balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world.

Yet this is the government which unctuously declares its "most sacred task" has been "to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world," and its pious ambition that "the material power of arms shall be superseded by the moral force of right"; that has the effrontery to cover its responsibility for the war with the flippant phrase, "a disastrous concatenation of events in the year 1914." According to the preposterous forms of imperial diplomacy, all these utterances are made in the name and on the personal authority of "the kaiser and king." Yet it must be remembered that the reply was deferred for weeks in order that an inspired campaign should produce passionate expressions of loyalty and subserviency on the part of the German people toward their autocracy. Newspapers, civic authorities and public gatherings have proclaimed with violent emphasis that kaiserism is their ideal of government, and that the decisions of the emperor and his advisers are law. Special care is taken to emphasize this national defiance of the terms set forth by President Wilson. The note avers that it was framed "in closest contact with representatives of the German people" and "in accordance with the peace resolution of the reichstag." As a fact, the collaboration of the legislative committee was an empty formality, since the parliament

remains a mere lyceum for political debates and the government an irresponsible power.

While the notes present a flattering appearance of accepting the papal suggestions, therefore, they afford no real basis of agreement even upon those moderate terms. To go no further, there is complete silence respecting the pope's stipulation for "the complete evacuation of Belgium, with the guarantee of her full political, military and economic independence." It comes to this, that the Central Powers repeat, without the addition of a single concession or the offer of a single measure of reparation, the offer they made last December. Their one aim is to bring about negotiations, in which all moral issues and all questions of right or wrong would be eliminated, and they could use their possession of stolen and ravaged territory as a weapon of blackmail to extort advantage. The most extravagant optimism, of course, would not pretend that from such negotiations anything better could result than a return to conditions as they were before the war; and what that would mean has been stated in arresting words:

A peace that leaves the nations where they were, that recognizes neither victor nor vanquished, that ignores the conflict's causes and questions, that evades all judgment as to the right or wrong of the matter—such a peace would be the last disaster of mankind. A peace that leaves Germany undefeated is essentially a German victory, and leads straight to the Germanization of the world.

This is the essential issue, and Prussianism knows that therein lies its fate, whether of triumph or extinction. The advantages of Germany in the war are many, but not the least of them is this, that she does not need to impose her will fully at this time in order to emerge the victor. Many months ago a member of the reichstag stated with relentless clearness the real situation. "If England does not win the war," he said, "she has lost it.

But if Germany does not lose the war, she has won it." And that vital distinction holds true as between all the Allies and Germany. She could afford not to win; but they dare not fall short of victory, or defeat and enslavement are their certain fate. That which makes the German notes quite worthless, however, is their evasion of the two overshadowing issues. Of these, one is the conflict between the principles of autocracy and democracy; the other is the character of the German government, its proven perfidy, its utter and callous and systematic treachery. Concerning the first of these there can be no compromise; and the second prohibits negotiation. Even if the German government were to declare itself ready, as it notoriously is not, to discuss the fundamental requirements of restitution, reparation and guarantees, treaty with it would be impossible. It is bankrupt in credibility and honor. Deliberately, in pursuit of sordid gain, it chose three years ago the path of dishonor. When it struck down Belgium it slew also the world's confidence, and there is no power that can restore that murdered thing. How useless are the protestations of that government, its smooth invitations to a negotiated peace, when there stands against it that devastating verdict of America and the civilized world:

Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty? We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting.

The disingenuous and evasive response of Germany has made clearer even than before that any peace made while Prussianism is unbeaten and impenitent would be a German victory and a world disaster.



## ALSACE-LORRAINE

*September 26, 1917.*

**T**HERE are more reasons than most persons realize for the special prominence which the term "small nationalities" receives in discussion of war aims and issues. When the great conflict started, in the month of August, 1914, hostilities began almost simultaneously in four seemingly unimportant corners of Europe—Serbia, Poland, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine—and each of these regions presents a problem the solution of which concerns the whole civilized world. It might even be said that these names stand for the principal causes of the war and represent the chief factors in the reorganization of the continent. Not the least important is Alsace-Lorraine. Seized by Germany as spoils of war in 1871, this territory symbolizes Franco-German hostility, and its recovery is fundamental in the war aims of the republic. More than that, it embodies a question which long ago was recognized as a menace to the tranquillity of Europe. The International League of Peace, which met in Geneva in 1884, made this declaration: "The conquest and forcible annexation of Alsace-Lorraine constitute the principal obstacle to peace and the true cause of vast armaments."

Views concerning territorial changes as a result of the war range from the fanatical demands of Pan-Germanists to the Socialist program of "no annexations." But the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine—whether it is to remain German or again become French—is a matter of

dominating interest and importance. What is the merit of the opposing claims? What is the attitude of France, of Germany, of the Alsatian people? Where do the allies of France stand on this question? How deeply is the United States concerned? What bearing has the controversy upon the duration of the war and the probable terms of peace? It may be remarked at once that there is only malignant pretense in the German charge that the war was due largely to a French desire for "revenge" and "reconquest" of the disputed provinces. This issue as a serious reason for aggressive war lost its efficacy in France a generation ago. To assert that she would ever have attacked Germany upon such a ground is preposterous. But when Germany became the aggressor against civilization, and when she began a systematic devastation and looting of the republic's richest provinces, then the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine became an imperative demand of the French government and nation. That would be, they have held, the first requirement in a just program of "restitution, reparation and guarantees." The inflexible purpose of France was declared in immediate response to the unprovoked invasion which she suffered; but we need quote only recent official statements. Re-elected president of the chamber of deputies last January, Paul Deschanel said: "The first articles of our program remain the deliverance of Belgium and the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine." On the anniversary of the battle of the Marne Premier Ribot declared:

France makes pretensions only for the recovery of her own, to regain possession of provinces wrested from her by the odious abuse of force. Let no one ask her to compromise on that question; the nation could not do it without betraying the cause of justice. What a preface to the peace if the wrong consummated half a century ago should be consecrated anew! The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is not one of those questions that may be given over to discussion by diplomats.

It is the first condition of the establishment of the rights of nations which ought to guarantee peace in the future against fresh violence.

By a vote of 453 to 55, on June 5, the chamber of deputies adopted a statement of war aims, including a demand for "the return of Alsace-Lorraine to the mother country." Ten days ago the declaration of the new ministry, headed by Paul Painleve, reaffirmed the claim for the "disannexation" of the provinces. This policy is supported not only by the general agreement of the Entente governments to make "no separate peace," but by specific avowals. On January 10 the Allies stated as one of the terms for which they stood "the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations." Amplifying this note for Great Britain, Foreign Secretary Balfour said "the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France," implying that the latter was an obvious requirement. On July 30 he told parliament he did not see how Great Britain could refrain from assisting France until she "obtains restoration of that of which she was violently robbed more than forty years ago." The United States, of course, has taken no definite position, but President Wilson must have had in mind Alsace-Lorraine, as well as Poland, when he declared to the senate on January 22:

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all of their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. \* \* \* Henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

All such assertions and proposals Germany contemptuously rejects. Government and people are willing to negotiate concerning the future status of Belgium and Poland and the Balkan territories, but respecting Alsace-Lorraine they are implacable; they will not even admit that it is a subject of discussion. When they do not ignore the issue, they furiously resent its presentation as a debatable question. These recent German utterances are typical:

Alsace-Lorraine belonged for 800 years to Germany, and was forcibly wrenched therefrom by Louis XIV. It has always been German in language, tradition and sentiment.

In taking back Alsace-Lorraine, Germany accomplished an act of supreme national and historic justice.

Any German government showing an inclination even to discuss such peace propositions would not be tolerated for one day by the German people. The question of Alsace-Lorraine does not exist for us at all.

It is upon historical and racial grounds, therefore, that Germany justifies her conquest. What have the records to say? Alsace and Lorraine lie west of the Rhine; and Caesar and Tacitus both found that that river was the boundary between Germania and Gaul. Yet it may be conceded that for centuries Alsatia was debatable territory, and in quite modern times its neutralization was urged as the only means of settling an insoluble dispute. The people were of Celtic ancestry; it was a Gallo-Roman, not a Teutonic, population which the Germanic tribes found when they overran the region in the fourth and fifth centuries. Moreover, the land was not "German for 800 years"; it was a part of the Holy Roman empire for that period, and was ruled by the sovereigns of that vast domain as Roman emperors, not as German kings. French conquest began as early as 1552, and the greater part of the territory was ceded to France by Austria in 1648, the possession being con-

firmed by the peace of Ryswick in 1697. Alsace-Lorraine was French, therefore, from 1648 to 1871; if an interval of 223 years is not long enough to establish title, where must the unmaking of history begin? These provinces were French seventy years longer than Canada has been British, yet France would hardly claim Canada as an "unredeemed" part of the motherland. But it was the French revolution which sealed the union which Prussianism violated. Nowhere did the ideals of liberty evoke more passionate adherence than among the Alsations. Loyal to France under the monarchy, they became her devoted sons when she proclaimed the reign of democracy. It was a mayor of Strassburg—and his name was Diedrich—who asked Rouget de Lisle to compose a war song for the army in 1792, and in that Alsatian city that "The Marseillaise" first rang out as the battle hymn of freedom. This section of France gave more soldiers and generals to the revolution and Napoleon than any other—Kellermann, Kleber, Rapp and Lefebvre gave it military renown.

French government, even under the absolute régime, had kept Alsace-Lorraine loyal for a century and a half; but democracy fused the people of that region with the nation. From 1793 they were French at heart, linked to France by conviction and sentiment, by common ideals and aspirations. Suddenly, violently, and without the slightest regard to their historic habits of life and their profoundest feelings, they were torn from that happy association as the prize of a Prussian war. No French Alsatian has ever consented to the arbitrary transfer enforced by Bismarck in 1871; even among the German-speaking population it has been resented for forty-six years. This does not mean that there has been a universal and unchanging desire to rejoin France; at any time within the half century Germany could have

won the loyalty of the provinces by granting them self-government in the empire. But Prussianism is incapable of justice, and its tyranny implanted in the people a hatred of Germany which kept alive and intensified the old love for the republic. The experience of Alsace-Lorraine under Prussian rule we shall discuss later. For this is no local or remote question; it is one of the basic causes of the war which is summoning millions of Americans to the battle-front. As our troops depart to fight for democracy we see the tragic fulfillment of a prophecy recorded by the deputies of the provinces in a declaration to the world dated February 17, 1871:

Europe cannot permit or ratify the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine. The civilized nations, as guardians of justice and national rights, cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their neighbors, under pain of becoming, in their turn, victims of the outrages they have tolerated. Modern Europe cannot allow a people to be seized like a herd of cattle; she cannot continue deaf to the repeated protests of threatened nationalities; she owes it to her instinct of self-preservation to forbid such abuses of power. Peace concluded at the price of this cession of territory could be nothing but a costly truce. It would be for all a cause of internal unrest, a permanent and legitimate provocation to war.

## KULTUR REVEALED IN PRACTICE

September 28, 1917.

**T**HAT astonishing literature of Germanism, with which mankind has recently become familiar, is based upon the idea expressed in these typical utterances:

For its own salvation the world must be Germanized.

We are intrusted here on earth with a sacred mission—to impart *Kultur* in its most august purity, nobility and glory to the whole of humanity, and thereby contribute not a little to its salvation.

Germany hitherto has neglected the highest duty of every *Kultur-State*—to carry its *Kultur* into foreign parts, and to win the confidence and affection of other peoples.

Belgium is not, as might be the first thought, the best example of the application of these interesting doctrines; because of the distractions of war, Prussianism has not had leisure to bestow upon the survivors of its first lessons the full course of education. Alsace-Lorraine, on the contrary, has been under the beneficent sway of *Kultur* during nearly half a century of peace; there, if anywhere, should be found those fruits of justice and contentment, of German liberty and admiring loyalty, which it infallibly produces. Asidé from the fact that the territory was seized in 1871 without any other excuse than a successful war, conditions for the experiment were favorable. Geographically and commercially it was linked to Germany by a great river highway, while separated from France by a mountain barrier. The inhabitants were largely Teutonic; it was

a German boast that they had been German in language, tradition and sentiment from the dawn of history—were long-lost brethren, indeed, redeemed from a hateful foreign yoke. Yet so late as 1913 an eminent statesman in Berlin remarked that “in Elsass-Lothringen our people are in the enemy’s country.” After forty-six years of the elevating influence of Germanization, these obdurate folk are still unreconciled. In 1870 they were either pro-French or neutral; today they are ardently pro-French and passionately anti-German.

It is significant that the history of the country naturally divides itself into two periods—the fourteen centuries before the Prussian conquest, and the forty-six years since. The first we surveyed the other day, showing that the region was French territory from 1648 to 1871, that its civilization was wholly Gallic, and that from the time of the revolution the people had been French and democratic to the core. We are now to survey the era of *Kultur*, which produced one of the main causes of the world war and one of the most urgent problems of the peace settlement. The people of Alsace-Lorraine had no part in fomenting the insane war of 1870; that was the product of Bismarck’s cunning and the unbalanced ambition of Napoleon III. Yet they were its chief victims. The terms imposed upon the shattered empire were an indemnity of \$1,000,000,000 and cession of these provinces. Bismarck himself hesitated to tear so great a territory from the side of France; he would have spared the region of Metz, fearing the results of attempting to Germanize a district preponderantly French. But he was overruled by Moltke and the militarists upon the ground that possession of the great fortress would mean a difference of 100,000 German troops in the next war. The arrogant demand wrung from the Alsatians a bitter cry of anguish. There are



few documents in history more moving than the protests which their deputies made to the French national assembly. On February 17, 1871, they solemnly declared:

Alsace and Lorraine refuse to be alienated. Associated with France for more than two centuries, they have consistently sacrificed themselves for the cause of national greatness; they have sealed with their blood the indissoluble compact that binds them to the nation. Under the present menace they affirm their unshakable fidelity. With one accord citizens at their firesides and soldiers in the field proclaim to Germany and to the world the unalterable will of Alsace and Lorraine to remain French. France cannot consent to nor sign the cession without imperiling the continuity of her national existence and with her own hands dealing a death-blow to her unity.

When the peace treaty was ratified, they put on the record these words:

We, who in defiance of all justice have been given over by an odious abuse of power to foreign domination, have a last duty to perform. We declare a compact which disposes of us without our consent null and void. It will ever remain open to each and all of us to claim our rights in such manner and in such measure as conscience shall dictate. Our brothers of Alsace and Lorraine, now cut off from the common family, will preserve their filial affection for the France now absent from their homes until the day when she returns to take her place there again.

The people were soon to know *Kultur* "in its most august purity, nobility and glory." Government by France, under monarchy, republic and empire alike, had been by no means perfect; but it had been broad-spirited and generous. The institutions, the habits and the sensibilities of the Alsations had been scrupulously respected. During the more than 200 years, for example, both French and German were official languages, public documents of record being printed in both. But no sooner had Prussia gripped the country than the inhabitants were commanded to change their

customs, abandon their traditions, ignore their history and forget their mother tongue. Forthwith every department of the government, education and public life was Germanized. Conscription was enforced, so that men who had just laid down the arms they had borne for France were compelled to wear the uniform of her enemies. The French language was proscribed; its use even upon tombstones was forbidden, because some patriotic families had dared to inscribe over the graves of loved ones sentiments obnoxious to the new kaiserism. Badges and insignia suggesting French association were rigorously prohibited, and many societies, even those of a social nature, were suppressed. The country was put under the rule of a foreign governor, responsible only to the kaiser, and backed by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police. Newspapers were censored, public meetings restricted, citizens harassed by espionage and prosecuted upon the slightest pretext. A government possessing normal capacity might have won from the people at least a resigned acceptance of alien rule; but the Germans went at their task without discretion, tact, sympathy or psychological insight. They had annexed some square miles of territory, and, according to their ideas, they had also annexed the minds and souls of the inhabitants; therefore they undertook to make German overnight a people which had become French only thru generations of considerate treatment. The experiment was foredoomed to failure. Pastor Wagner has given the reason in a striking sentence. "The influence of France," he says, "penetrated the country like a perfume; that of Germany, like a projectile."

Aside from the petty persecutions, the Alsatian grievance was that the country was a mere vassal territory of Berlin; it had no semblance of sovereignty, none of the rights of the states. This, said Germany, was

because it belonged to all the states alike; it was in the nature of an imperial colony, not a part of the empire on equal terms with the others. Only five years ago a German writer gave the national idea: "We acquired Alsace-Lorraine because the land is necessary to us in a military sense. The inhabitants were thrown in. The constitution should be abolished." For finally, in 1911, a constitution was granted. After forty years of the mechanical application of *Kultur*, with alternating periods of agitation, repression and persecution, a Prussianized form of home rule was granted. Altho the *Statthalter* remained an appointee of the kaiser, a local legislature was established. The lower chamber is elected by genuine popular vote; but of the senate one-half the members are named by municipalities, chambers of commerce, religious bodies, etc., and the other half by the emperor, so that the concession was a characteristic sham. A year after the change was made, the kaiser was so enraged by continued agitation for self-government that he publicly threatened to cancel the constitution and annex the territory to Prussia. "We salute the imperial words," said a German Socialist in the reichstag sardonically, "as the confession that annexation to Prussia is the heaviest punishment that one can threaten to impose upon a people—equivalent to a prison sentence with hard labor and loss of civil rights."

These are the facts which explain why the undoing of the wrong of 1871 has become an inflexible demand of France, which for nearly half a century has seen her former citizens maltreated at her very borders. They explain why 45,000 Alsatians left their country in 1872 rather than take the German oath of allegiance; why tens of thousands of them fled to take service in the armies of the republic; why even the German immigrants planted in the territory became Alsatian in senti-

ment and among the strongest advocates of self-government; and why the people, who could have been made loyal to Germany by justice, have come to hope that out of the terrible sufferings of this war their deliverance will be achieved thru reunion with France. The German assertion that Alsace-Lorraine was annexed for reasons of "national and historic justice" is sheer pretense. The seizure was made, first, to give Germany command of the Rhine valley and the crest of the Vosges mountains during war; and, second, to give her possession of the vast coal and iron deposits of Lorraine. The same reasons impel France, but behind them is the weight of historic right and of a claim for compensation for the immeasurable wrongs she has suffered in this war. Her case stands even against the Socialist demand for "peace without annexations," for she asks only "disannexation"—restitution of that taken from her by brute force. Many observers—including some French Socialists—urge that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine be decided by a vote of the people. The idea is plausible, until one recalls the scores of thousands of Alsatians who have been driven into exile by German tyranny, or forced into the German armies, and would be unable to vote; and the further fact that the plebiscite would necessarily be conducted by the government which exploits the country. But if there were no other reason, the return of the land to its French status is demanded as an act of high moral import, a symbol of the driving of Prussianism within its own borders. The German people have not yet shown a capacity to rule themselves; and assuredly they are unfit, as the record shows, to rule an alien race inspired by totally different ideals.

## “FREEDOM OF THE SEAS”

*October 3, 1917.*

ONCE more the imperial chancellor has refused to state the ends which Germany hopes to gain by her war. Her ambitions regarding annexations, indemnities and the general reorganization of world affairs are still treated as autocracy's private concern, not to be disclosed to the German people nor to the opposing countries until the latter confess themselves beaten. But there is one issue upon which Germany has repeatedly declared herself. It was the subject of the single plain avowal which appeared in the recent Austrian and German notes to the Vatican, and was common to both. The Central Powers stipulate for "freedom of the seas." The phrase is undeniably attractive, and has a semblance of elementary justice. If it means precisely what it says, no less and no more, the principle must be approved by every liberty-loving American and every rational human being who desires to see established a reign of law and peace upon the earth. And the issue does not derive its force from Prussian advocacy alone. The German demand has had notable indorsement from representatives of neutral thought. President Wilson and Pope Benedict both have asserted that "freedom of the seas" is one of the first requirements of a just and enduring peace.

What is, in fact, the meaning of the term? Why is this the principle concerning which Germany is apparently most solicitous? Why is her claim, ostensibly based upon regard for the common interests of mankind,

resisted and reprobated by her adversaries? What is implied when a government which has made the ocean highways a field of piracy and murder declares that these waters must be made "free"? And what effect is the ruthless prosecution of those methods likely to have upon the cause of the desired liberation? These and related questions demand the closest study by Americans, who have pledged their entire resources of treasure and life to the attainment of a just settlement of the war.

The first thing to be noted is that this demand on the part of Germany is of comparatively recent origin. She did not strike at Servia and invade Belgium and France to achieve or champion "freedom of the seas." That idea was, according to official and unofficial utterances, quite absent from her policy. Land power—continental domination and the erection of an overland empire—these were her real purposes; "defense of the fatherland" was her avowed aim. "Freedom of the seas" was not mentioned in any of the kaiser's speeches or manifestoes early in the conflict; nor in the addresses of his chancellor; nor in the interviews given by his ambassadors; nor in the elaborate propaganda carried on by imperial professors at home and "loyal" German-Americans here. The causes discussed to exhaustion by German statesmen and advocates were the "Slav peril" and the French spirit of "revenge" and British "commercial jealousy." They wandered uneasily from one excuse to another, but not for months—not, in fact, until the pressure of the sea power wielded by the opposing coalition began to counteract the force of Germany's preponderant military strength—did they discover that Prussianism was endowed with a mission to deliver the seas from despotism. But from the time that this new idea received official sanction it became an article of faith to which all good Germans subscribed. The propaganda

in America, in particular, made it a constant theme. The affable Doctor Dernburg took the trouble to prepare a map of the world showing how British naval bases and coaling stations commanded virtually every ocean channel; from which he deduced that the maritime trade of the whole globe was at the mercy of England, and that in the event of Germany's defeat all civilization would be enslaved by this malign power. Professor Kuno Francke, of Harvard, declared that the greatest benefit the war could bring would be insured “if the United States and Germany should succeed in incorporating the freedom of the seas into the permanent law of civilized nations at the peace conference.” Just after Germany's first murder zone decree, Albert Apponyi, an Austrian publicist, wrote to an American:

There is much talk about “German militarism,” tho nobody takes the pains to explain why militarism should be called essentially German; but what is whosoever's militarism when compared to English navalism? When did Germany or any other nation pretend to a monopoly of power on land such as England claims on sea? Is it not the common interest of the seafaring nations to throw off the yoke of a maritime ascendancy that amounts to the most humiliating and disastrous tyranny?

In her second note justifying the Lusitania massacre, Germany solemnly declared that “German and American statesmen have always stood together in the struggle for the freedom of the seas and for the protection of peaceable trade.” In November, 1916, when the record of murders was reaching a length that was soon to force war with the United States, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg plaintively said:

The threat to the world of German militarism is a chimera conjured up by fevered minds; the actual menace and destructiveness of England's navalism is plainly apparent to and felt by all the world, and by no means the least of

those seeing and feeling this strangling, killing power is America.

By this time the German people had dutifully learned what was the high cause for which they were fighting, and "freedom of the seas" explained everything to them. It became the price of Belgium's deliverance from the horrors of enslavement, and as such made its appearance in every open or masked war threat or peace proposal from Berlin. There was a ghastly sort of humor in Germany's declaration, as a part of the submarine murder proclamation last January, that "the freedom of the seas has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program." The famous reichstag resolution of last July, outlining the peace views of that interesting but quite powerless body, stipulated that "the freedom of the seas must be assured." Finally, the Austrian note to the Vatican declared for reduction of armaments, "where the high seas, which rightly belong to all the nations of the earth, may be freed from domination or paramountcy, and be opened equally for the use of all." Germany, too, assured the supreme pontiff that she shares his desire for "the true freedom and community of the high seas." And, as we have already remarked, this demand has had powerful neutral support. President Wilson, even when protesting against the murder of American citizens traversing the ocean on lawful errands, thought it expedient to compliment Germany upon having been a champion of this principle, while in his famous plea for "peace without victory" last January he became an ardent advocate:

The paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation. \* \* \* The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and



the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe.

Pope Benedict, again, gave exceptional emphasis to the theme in his appeal to the belligerents. After urging diminution of armaments and a league to enforce decrees resulting from compulsory arbitration, he wrote:

Once the supremacy of right has thus been established, all obstacles to the means of communication of the peoples would disappear, by assuring, by rules to be fixed later, the true liberty and community of the seas, which would contribute to averting numerous causes of conflict and would also open to all nations new sources of prosperity and progress.

It is clear, therefore, that "freedom of the seas" represents an idea which is considered by high authorities to be of the very first importance; it is set forth as a principal issue in the conflict by one of the groups of belligerents, and as a basic requirement of peace by some representatives of neutral opinion. Yet our examination of the utterances on the subject has brought us no nearer to an understanding of what the term means or implies. Germany's conception of it, whatever that may be, would hardly appeal to a world which has observed her ideas of freedom on land. But what did President Wilson and the pope intend by urging that the peace treaty should make the seas "at once free and safe," should establish their "true liberty and community"? As a fact, the seas have been free ever since piracy was eradicated and since ancient pretensions to sovereignty over the oceans were abandoned more than a century ago. In times of peace the rustiest old tramp or the smallest craft, under any flag, sails all waters without hindrance, and threads the narrows of the world indifferent to frowning guns. This German issue is purely a problem of war times, and particularly of the innovations made during this war. It arises wholly from Ger-

many's discontent because her long-prepared scheme of conquest has been nullified by her enemies' control of the sea. One of the fundamental demands is that that control shall be abolished. She has not been able to break it herself, and calls upon the civilized nations to condemn and prohibit it, arguing that they, no less than herself, are victims of a system which blights civilization and retards human progress. Great Britain is, manifestly, the symbol and the actual possessor of this power; her fleet is of overwhelming strength, and she has her sentinels at virtually every narrow waterway. It is her fleet that has held Germany from triumph until the forces of the world could be organized to make that triumph impossible. Her navalism undeniably represents a power comparable in magnitude to Germany's militarism. Having undertaken to destroy one of these, the democratic nations are urged to destroy the other also, lest a worse thing befall them. They are advised to curb Prussianism, and then eliminate that force which prevented its complete victory. A survey of the historical developments and present conditions bearing upon the "freedom of the seas" is interesting and instructive, as we shall attempt to show in a further discussion.

## FREE SEAS OR A FREE WORLD?

*October 4, 1917.*

**N**O REPLIES to the pope's peace message, so far as is known, have been sent by the lesser allies of the kaiser, but it must be supposed that they, too, are profoundly concerned for the "freedom of the seas," which Germany and Austria make fundamental in their demands. If Austria-Hungary, land-locked except for a scrap of Adriatic coast which she may soon lose, considers this an issue of transcendent importance, it must appeal with equal force to those other great maritime Powers, Bulgaria and Turkey. If they do join in the demand, it is to be hoped that they will express it more intelligibly than their allies. As we showed the other day, Germany has been as careful to conceal her interpretation of the term as she has been to hide all her other war aims. One fact is clear, however. The phrase does not apply to conditions in times of peace, for then the seas are demonstrably free. Up to the very hour when Germany made war upon international law and honor and the institutions of world order there was not a spot on the ocean where shipping under any flag or on any lawful errand might not sail in perfect security from molestation or question. Many months later, even, the *Lusitania*, passenger-laden, sailed across the Atlantic under the protection of laws and usages held sacred for generations. It is remarkable, too, that of all the nations of the earth Germany had least cause to complain of interference with her maritime growth. In shipbuilding and overseas commerce she had attained a commanding

position. In 1913 her foreign trade exceeded \$5,000,000,000 in value; during the less than half a century of the empire's existence its merchant steamship tonnage had grown from 82,000 to more than 3,000,000.

Before the war German lines not only traversed the great ocean highways, but carried the German flag to the remotest parts of the earth, and linked every considerable port to Hamburg and Bremen; and never a hand was raised to restrict or challenge Germany's right to carry on this campaign of peaceful conquest. She had all the world in which to trade; all the seas and narrows and harbors were hers on equal terms with every other nation. An American traveler has told of sitting on a club veranda in Singapore and counting, at one time, twenty-five funnels of a single German line in the roadstead. When he went to Borneo it was in a German ship. From Singapore to Siam he sailed under the same flag; to Hongkong, to Java, to Australia the journey was the same—in a German steamship, carrying British mails between British ports. So "freedom of the seas" was not an issue before August, 1914. The only candid avowal of the German idea we have found is that of Doctor Dernburg; "The aim of Germany is to have the seas, as well as the narrows, kept open permanently for the free use of all nations in times of war as well as in times of peace." That is what Germany wants, "freedom of the seas in times of war." Treaties protecting land frontiers may be "scraps of paper," but there must be inviolable covenants to protect her maritime interests when she goes forth conquering and to conquer. German troops may spread havoc in neighboring territory, German airships may rain death and terror upon sleeping cities, but there must be no interference with the sea-borne supplies necessary to carry on these enterprises. Lands and peoples may be enslaved by

armies, but the "liberty" of the open seas must be respected.

Behind this, as behind all other issues of the war, there is an interesting background of historical development. The doctrine of the "freedom of the seas" during peace, which seems to this age so obviously just, is of comparatively recent origin. Every maritime Power in earlier times claimed and enforced, as best it might, control over specified regions of the earth's water surface. "Dominion of the seas" and "sovereignty of the seas" were phrases of solemn import. Venice exacted heavy tolls from all foreign sails in the Adriatic; France and Genoa asserted sovereignty over the western Mediterranean; a papal decree assigned to Spain lordship over the Pacific and the gulf of Mexico, and to Portugal title to the Atlantic south of Morocco; Denmark and Sweden divided the Baltic between them. England had precedent in abundance, therefore, for declaring the waters around the British Isles "his majesty's seas," and so late as 1805 an admiralty order so designated them. Inevitably these pretensions clashed. First, Great Britain challenged Spain's exclusive ownership of the western oceans; then the Dutch gallantly tried to break British domination of northern European waters. The result was to make Britain's sea supremacy a matter of actual naval preponderance, but finally to destroy the theory that any nation or nations could establish title to the high seas. In 1609 the "*Mare Liberum*" of Grotius undermined the ancient doctrine so seriously that the British answer, Selden's "*Mare Clausam*," fell of the weight of its own absurdity; and even tho the Dutch were beaten in their effort to defy the custom of compulsory salutes to the English flag, the fiction of sea sovereignty gradually lapsed into disuse. Perhaps the last serious attempt to enforce it was in 1824, when Russia claimed

ownership of Bering sea, and was successfully resisted by Great Britain and the United States. "Freedom of the seas" in times of peace is, therefore, a long-established fact. For a hundred years great fleets did not restrict world trade any more than did the great German army before the present war. Nevertheless, a strong issue is made of "freeing" the seas in war also. President Wilson and the pope have asserted it. Dr. Charles W. Eliot voices a popular view in these terms: "The other nations, watching the tremendous power in war which Great Britain possesses thru her wide control of the oceans, will rejoice when that control, tho limited and wisely used, is replaced by international control."

The problem is essentially, therefore, "British navalism," which many earnest persons soberly compare, as a menace to civilization, with "German militarism." Its existence is an undeniable and concrete fact. The British fleet is overwhelmingly the most powerful in the world; the globe is encircled by chains of British naval bases and coaling stations, commanding every important channel, sea highway and strategic area. Yet this power is to be judged, not by its magnitude, but by the manner of its use. Britain has "controlled" the sea, in this sense, for a hundred years. What is the record of that century of navalism, as compared with the record of German militarism during the last thirty-eight months? Let us disregard the fact that British sea power changed the destiny of America and made its civilization Anglo-Saxon instead of Spanish. Within our own century that same power stood between European autocracy and the western continent; for it was Britain's refusal to support the Holy Alliance—Russia, Austria and Prussia—that blocked the policy of those nations to destroy the republics set up by the insurgent Spanish colonies in South America. This was in 1822. And a year later it was a

British suggestion that called forth the culminating declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, which for three-quarters of a century has had behind it the might of the British fleet.

Even Germans admit that Great Britain needs a great navy, because of her absolute dependence upon sea-borne supplies and the vast distances that separate the parts of her empire. But, they urge, Germany's army is proportionately no greater, and its need as a defense is equally clear; why, therefore, is "militarism" condemned and "navalism" condoned? In the first place, the comparison should embrace both arms, as they were before the war. Germany had the strongest army—and the second strongest fleet; Great Britain had the strongest fleet—and the smallest army in the world, according to population, except that of the United States. German militarism, commanding a vast army and a powerful navy, was equipped for world conquest. British navalism, without the backing of a great army, could not threaten the territory of any nation. But to this must be added a comparison of the two during the war. The record of German militarism needs no emphasis; against that must be put the fact that British navalism has not destroyed one neutral vessel nor the life of a single non-combatant. And so far as the United States is concerned, it will be remembered that when President Wilson made his demand for "freedom of the seas" this country for two and a half years had remained at peace, and was able to prepare for national defense only because the British fleet was in action against Germany. As a fact, however, it is not the size of a nation's armed forces that counts, but the spirit and the institutions that govern them. A half million troops under Prussian autocracy would be an instrument of militarism and a perpetual menace; ten times that number in America would

not be a threat of aggression. It is because democracy rules the British empire that the fleet which commands the sea awakens no fears save in Berlin and Vienna. What, on the contrary, has been Germany's conception of sea power and her ambition in this field? "The sea trident must be in our fist," was the kaiser's ultimatum twenty years ago. "Without the consent of Germany's ruler nothing must happen in any part of the world." Count Reventlow, spokesman of Pan-Germanism, disdains the customary plea. "What we mean," he says "is not mere peace-time freedom of trade in all seas, but such a degree of German naval power as shall guarantee its immediate superiority over possible enemies on the seas. That is why the Belgian coast is necessary to us. We must have the power and facilities immediately to bring our submarines and other naval forces to bear on our enemy." A Berlin paper frankly declares that the return of Germany's colonies is vital because they will provide submarine bases for the next war!

In the doctrine of the "freedom of the seas" there is concerned a principle of manifest justice which ultimately must prevail, but just now it is clouded by Prussian advocacy. Germany's object is not to serve humanity; it is merely to paralyze a force which stands in her way, as a century ago it stood in the way of the masterful genius who was her oppressor and is her model. As between navalism backed by British democracy and militarism directed by German autocracy, the free peoples have made their choice—they will help the one to destroy the other. In so far as the former has injured neutral rights it will be held to strict account. But the nations which wield this weapon of defense will not readily surrender it at the demand of one which puts no limit of law or honor upon its military power.



## EVERY FLANDERS MILE COUNTS

*October 8, 1917.*

**I**N ESTIMATING the importance of the British drive in Belgium last week, the impression derived from a careless examination of a war map may be deceptive. If the reader measures the advance on a large-scale map of Flanders, he gets the idea that the assailants made substantial progress toward Berlin; but if he tries to mark it accurately on a map of the whole western front, the result is almost invisible. The actual gain was from a mile to a mile and a half on a nine-mile front; half a dozen villages, with their connecting defense systems, and 5000 prisoners, were captured. But these facts do not explain why correspondents at the front characterize the movement as "the greatest British victory of the war." If the action meant no more than the liberation of a dozen square miles of Belgium, it would be of minor significance. But in this case every yard of territory conquered is of importance, for two reasons. First, the advance gives the British command of ridges dominating the next German positions; and second, only a few miles separates them from the main objective of this campaign, the line of railroad and fortifications extending from Zeebrugge, on the coast, thru Bruges and Roulers to Lille, in northern France. If the British reach that line, the Germans will lose the bases from which their submarines and raiding airplanes operate, and will have to withdraw far to the eastward.

The plan which Germany, after forty years of preparation, put into effect in August, 1914, involved

a swift onslaught on France thru Belgium; Paris was to be taken before Russia could mobilize, and a German peace imposed. This program was shattered at the Marne thirty days after hostilities opened, while the battles of Ypres and the Yser confirmed the defeat. Thereupon Germany resorted to defensive fighting in the west, and undertook to smash Russia, hoping to eliminate her great antagonist in the east before Great Britain could create an army to reinforce that of France. This plan yielded brilliant military successes; again and again the Russian forces were sent reeling, and huge gains of territory were made. By September, 1915, Germany was so well placed in the east that she was able to carry thru her basic undertaking of consolidating Central Europe as a military confederation. Bulgaria joined her, Serbia was conquered, and the opening of the highway to Constantinople permitted such a flow of supplies to the Turks that the Anglo-French attack on the Dardanelles was frustrated. With the aim of forestalling an Allied offensive in the west in the spring of 1916, Germany launched her desperate campaign against Verdun; the direct design was to crush the French by assaults so heavy and so merciless that the strength of the nation would be exhausted and its very soul shaken with despair, in which case Great Britain's aid would be too late to prevent the forcing of a separate peace. But as to both factors Germany miscalculated. With heroism and steadfastness never equaled in the history of warfare, the French made the enemy pay a frightful price for his gains; and then, when the armies defending Verdun had reached the utmost limits of endurance, French and British together opened their great attack on the Somme. That campaign relieved the threatened fortress; it yielded more than 60,000 German prisoners; it marked the passing of the initiative

from the kaiser's general staff to the Allies; and it resulted, after the spectacular overwhelming of Rumania, in Germany's peace proposal of last December, followed by her "strategic retreat" in March.

Thus 1917 opened with Germany everywhere on the defensive, everywhere yielding ground at each attack. Bagdad fell to the British. The Russian revolution shattered the hope of making a separate peace with the Prussianized autocracy of Petrograd. Italy developed her great campaign against Austria. And on the west front the Allies have attained such command that they strike at will, always with success, while no German counter-attacks have force enough to regain ground once surrendered. From these events it is reasonable to deduce that a decision might have been won this year had not the military collapse of Russia disrupted the program of co-ordinated offensives on the three main fronts. But despite Russia's failure, Germany's diminishing economic and military strength compels her to remain on the defensive. Hindenburg's retreat last March, described as a strategic triumph that was to paralyze the enemy for the rest of the year and give the Germans room for an "aggressive initiative," was really forced by the certainty that to await punishment meant disaster. The spasmodic attacks at Verdun and the Chemin des Dames yielded nothing but losses of men and material. In their operations in the Arras region the Allies showed that their ascendancy was growing. During August they took 40,000 prisoners. Because its ultimate object is capture of the German submarine bases, the Flanders campaign has a special importance which Germany recognizes. One of her experts wrote from the front to a Berlin paper on August 24:

Nobody here conceals the colossal gravity of this endless struggle. On its outcome depends whether England is able

or not to wrest from our hands the strongest weapon we possess. Decisions of life and death are being made here—of our life or our death. If we are defeated here, we shall be face to face with the certainty that all will be over with the glory of the empire and the splendor of the German name. Here we know it. That is why we shall not be defeated.

With such great issues at stake and with such gigantic forces employed in the unending assaults, many persons are disappointed that the "victories" reported from time to time imply only advances of a mile or two; at this rate, they say, it would take years to expel the Germans from Belgium and France. But it should be understood that the Allied commanders know the chance of smashing that formidable line is remote; as we have often remarked, their purpose is not to overwhelm the invaders and drive them in tumultuous retreat, but to keep them under such sustained and pitiless pressure that they must give way at each blow, and thereby to conquer their spirit of resistance. Already they have destroyed in the minds of the German armies and the German people the hope of triumph, have put in its place a desperate longing for peace; and from that condition it is not far to a fatal sense of defeat. In support of what we have said many times we may cite military authority. A French expert said a few weeks ago:

What is to prevent the Germans from falling back by short stages for years? Such a theory is untenable; no army could retreat for long without its morale being affected enough to break the equilibrium. As things are going now, the Allies are breaking the Germans' hearts as Grant broke those of the Confederates in the Wilderness; and when the defenders' hearts are broken the most impregnable position may fall like a house of cards.

Precisely the same idea has been expounded by Sir William Robertson, chief of the British general staff. Asked whether a military decision in this war is possible, he said that the question involved "the psychology of

peoples." This war, he said, is "a sifting of nations, a trial of character, a test of racial quality," and continued:

It is too early to say that the defensive in modern warfare is impregnable. The guns are speaking now. Let them go on speaking, and let us remember while we wait that, whether or not vast armies can be conquered in the field as they were years ago, the will of nations can be broken by hopelessness and despair. If the army does not crack, the nation behind it may crack. Suppose you cannot roll up the flanks of your enemy's army—cannot you break his heart? Suppose you can only drive him yard by yard, hammering him back to his frontiers month by month—suppose that is all you can do—cannot you destroy his civilian confidence and break his political will? If that is the effect of your strategy, the decision is a military decision. You have broken his will; you have imposed your will upon him; you have conquered his resistance.

Another clear exposition of the plan came not long ago from authoritative sources in Paris; this is of particular interest because it emphasizes the part assigned to the United States:

Three times this year Field Marshal Haig has struck, and every time his blow has told. Further blows impend—not in a desperate effort to break thru the German front, as it is realized that the American army will participate in that cataclysm when it is fighting in force—but blows accomplishing exactly what they are aimed to do.

That is, to grind the German army down, weakening it steadily, inexorably. Von Hindenburg's front cannot be broken by a slight numerical superiority of men and guns, nor even by double his force; but if the proportion jumps to three to one, artillery and the flying corps included, the result will be a catastrophe for him. To accomplish this, it is the Franco-British strategy to destroy as many Germans as possible without regard to their own losses, so long as they are less than the enemy's, so that every arriving contingent of Americans will increase the ratio of the Allied superiority.

\* \* \* The fiercest fighting yet is coming, as the veterans prepare the enemy for the death-blow the United States army will deliver when it takes the field in force.

## REPRISALS

*October 11, 1917.*

THE most informal public speech, perhaps, ever made by a prime minister of Great Britain, and one of the most important, was delivered by David Lloyd George on Tuesday of last week. He was visiting the scene of a German bombing raid the night before, in a district of working men's homes in southwestern London. As he passed thru the drab streets a gathering crowd followed him, and confused cries of anger and appeal reached him; he could hear the shouts of men and the wailing of women. And as he looked about at the wrecked homes, where sleeping folk had been horribly slain, it was a man, as well as the ruler of the British empire, who turned to the crowd and uttered this response: "We shall give it all back to them, and we shall give it soon. We shall bomb Germany with compound interest." For two years there has been a steadily growing demand in England for reprisals in kind for Germany's sanguinary air attacks upon open towns, and many times there have been rumors that the government was about to announce such a policy. But this statement by the premier was, we think, the first official avowal. The informal circumstances under which it was made seemed to give it added force. Confirmation came two days later, in an address by Lieutenant General Smuts, formerly commander of the expedition against German East Africa and now a privy councillor and an adviser of the war council. There is a touch of dramatic interest in the fact that the government's

decision was made known by a Boer, one of those leaders whom Germany counted upon to aid her in destroying the British empire. General Smuts remarked that during September British airmen dropped 207 tons of explosives on German encampments, railroad stations and other military depots behind the battle line, while in the same period German aeroplanes had dropped four and a half tons of bombs upon London, and he continued:

The material damage in these raids upon London has been negligible, and as for the loss of life, many times more persons have been killed and injured in street traffic accidents. But, applying the principle of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," we are most reluctantly forced to apply to the enemy the bombing policy which he has applied to us.

Allow me to emphasize two points: Firstly, we did not begin this practice; the enemy began it, just as he began the use of poison gas and other devices contrary to international law. Secondly, I look upon these developments of the arts of war as utterly bad and immoral; I should infinitely prefer that both sides should abandon such cruel practices. It is almost unbearable to think that another chapter of horrors must be added to the record of this war; but the blame must rest on an enemy who knows no pity or restraint. In the face of such abominations as his it is not for us to fold our hands meekly. We can only fight to the uttermost for the ideals of a more humane civilization, which we feel convinced will triumph in the end.

General Smuts hardly needed to say that his words were "serious and far-reaching in their import"; the extension of aerial warfare decided upon will carry the world conflict into a new phase which will affect all the nations concerned. The assertion that the decision is taken with extreme reluctance and aversion should lead, in our judgment, to a formal announcement that the action is not to be regarded as establishing a precedent. There are, of course, two aspects of the problem, involving military and moral considerations; one raises the question of the utility and effectiveness of the project,

the other the matter of its justification. Is it likely that adequately equipped and vigorously prosecuted aeroplane raids into Germany would accomplish worthwhile results? We think there is little doubt as to this. The Germans would very probably prove much more susceptible than the British to the terrorism and uncertainties of this method of attack; certainly they could not be less affected. And there is a definite reason for believing that there would be a depressing influence upon their resolution. The extraordinary confidence and unity of the German people have been maintained during a prolonged ordeal very largely by the fact that their own territory has been free from actual conflict. This has been the constant boast of autocracy and its subjects; kaiserism and the army, that "wall of steel," have enabled the empire to load upon its enemies the heaviest burdens of the war; Belgium and France might suffer the torments of invasion, but the soil of the fatherland was secure. It will be a searching experience, a new test of the spirit of endurance, if devastating raids upon German cities far from the battle-front bring home to the people what war has been made to mean to non-combatants of other nations, which for three years have withheld retaliation.

The second factor in the military problem, that of practical means, is already solved. Ever since the battle of the Somme, in the summer of 1916, the Allies have had sufficient surplus of strength in the air to make reprisal raids possible. But they determined, said General Smuts, to wait until they could conduct "an air offensive on a large scale," and vast energies have been devoted to the work of preparation. The British minister of munitions stated three months ago that between May, 1916, and May, 1917, the output of aeroplanes had been tripled, and by the end of this year would be doubled



again, while the production of motors would be multiplied fourfold. As a fact, the policy just announced is not an improvisation, and does not signify a change in sentiment. The vast majority of the British people have urgently demanded reprisals upon Germany, and the government delayed only in order to prepare the necessary forces and equipment. Since the recent series of murderous raids on London, opposition to the general demand has ceased; no one any longer pleads that retaliation would be "merely imitating the Hun." It is believed that no other argument can reach the German people, who have exulted in every lawless assault by their own bombing squadrons and have jeered the inability of the Allies to reply.

Last week French fliers bombed Frankfort, 235 miles from the battle-front, and it is less than 300 miles from Arras to Essen, the site of the great Krupp plant. The proposed system of attacks obviously presents greater difficulties than confront the enemy raiders; for while the German airmen do not face any danger until they are actually over English soil, the Allied fliers will be exposed to serious gunfire and aerial assaults from the moment they start, and will have to run a deadly gauntlet for the entire distance. But this condition simply means that the squadrons must be sent out only in extraordinary strength and that severe losses must be endured. Another difficulty often cited was that it would be unwise to weaken the air service at the front by diverting men and machines to raiding of only partial military value. But what the Germans could do, the British and French, with American aid, certainly can do.

The moral objections to bombing raids are of undeniable force, even tho the rules of warfare have always recognized reprisals as legitimate. Incidentally, it is required that reprisals shall be in kind, or at least not

more severe than the offense; the German plea, therefore, that the Lusitania massacre was a just penalty for the Allies' naval blockade is irrelevant and false. But even the strictest moral judgment must take into account two justifying facts—first, that the German government and people for three years have perverted their energies and their scientific ingenuity to perfecting illegal devices of slaughter, and have no basis of complaint when finally their own weapons are turned against them; and, second, that they are demonstrably impervious to any influence or appeal save that of force, relentlessly applied. When the hostile squadrons hurl death and havoc into peaceful German cities, it will give to an infatuated people their first realization of the crimes autocracy has perpetrated in their name and with their approval. The Vatican is exerting itself now to bring about a discontinuance of raids upon open towns, making urgent representations to this end in Berlin and Vienna. There would have been greater force in the intervention, perhaps, if it had been made earlier; attempted at the end of three years, and at the moment when those who have suffered from Germany's policy are at last ready to attack her in the same manner, it falls short of opportuneness.

One powerful influence in deferring the action now in prospect has been, no doubt, a fear lest neutral opinion be antagonized. The danger was long ago eliminated. There is no neutral opinion in this war, anywhere in the world. There can be none, for between Prussianism and civilization there is irreconcilable war. Germany has torpedoed and gassed neutrality to death, and the judgment of mankind will interpose no plea of mercy in her behalf.

## PEACE WITH VICTORY ONLY

*October 15, 1917.*

**T**HERE is no lack of published speeches by President Wilson, yet it is regrettable, we think, that a full report was not given of his remarks last Monday to members of the League for National Unity, who called upon him at the White House. The fragmentary account issued shows that the president made one of his concise and forceful analyses of the issues of the war as they concern the United States, and upon this matter it is still needful that the voice of assured authority and trusted leadership should be heard. Nothing will seem more curious to the historian of a generation or two hence than the uncertainty of public opinion at this time respecting the requirements of the war and of peace. He will note with surprise that six months after the declaration recognizing a state of hostilities that had long prevailed, at a time when American forces were about to move into the battle line and when hundreds of thousands of new troops were in training, it was necessary to form a national organization to undertake, by systematic propaganda, to educate the people upon the fundamental causes of the conflict and this nation's aims therein. For that such a movement is necessary must be manifest to every observer. Despite the fine spirit of patriotism with which the people have met the searching test of the selective draft, there is still a widespread feeling that the sending of American armed forces abroad is an extravagance, and that we should seize the first plausible opportunity to encourage a nego-

tiated peace with Germany. Upon these vital points the League for National Unity makes unanswerable declarations:

Our aims are explicit, our purposes unspoiled by any selfishness. We defend the sanctities of life, the fundamental decencies of civilization. We fight for a just and durable peace and that the rule of reason shall be restored to the community of nations.

Agitation for a premature peace is seditious when its object is to weaken the determination of America to see the war thru to a conclusive vindication of the principles for which we have taken arms.

We believe in the wise purpose of the president not to negotiate a peace with any irresponsible and autocratic dynasty.

Either we fight the enemy on foreign soil, shoulder to shoulder with comrades in arms, or we fight on our own soil, backs against our homes, and alone. While this war lasts, the cause of the Allies is our cause; their defeat, our defeat, and concert of action and unity of spirit between them and us is essential to final victory.

This is the critical and fateful hour for America and for civilization. To lose now is to lose for many generations.

President Wilson's response was worthy of these affirmations. Public opinion, he said, as indirectly quoted, "needed guidance to remember that the war should end only when Germany was beaten and her rule of autocracy and might superseded by the ideals of democracy." Talk of peace before Germany is defeated, he declared, should not cloud the national vision, for "German success would mean not only prevention of the spread of democracy, but possibly the suppression of that already existing." Judgment truer was never uttered. And perhaps it was delivered with the greater emphasis because President Wilson is aware—or we hope he is aware—that "misdirected thought" must be put straight and American sentiment must have "guidance" because of his own teachings, maintained persistently in

defiance of facts and warnings not to be misunderstood. Some of the people, he finds, are being "misled into byways of thought." But it was full three years ago that they began to stray, when advice to be "neutral even in thought" urged them to cultivate indifference to hideous wrongs against humanity. Lest they discern that the safety of the republic was threatened by the destruction of international law and the rise of a remorseless military power, they were told that "with the causes and issues of the war we have no concern." And when two years and a half of systematic barbarity had piled proof mountain high that Prussianism and human liberty could not co-exist, they were urged to demand a "peace without victory." It was only last January that this declaration was made, and it would be miraculous if all of the multitudes who hailed it as a wise and lofty solution of the world's problem should have adopted at once its exact antithesis.

Since his decisive declaration to congress last April, President Wilson has spoken for America and humanity with a clarity and force never surpassed by any statesman. Yet history will recognize that the task of the hour is not merely to bring the people of the United States up to his present policy, but to bring them abreast of truths that challenged civilization at the very beginning of the war and have been proclaimed ever since by far-seeing men. A few days before the president emphasized anew the need for Germany's defeat, Theodore Roosevelt asserted it in these terms: "The only peace that will make the world safe for democracy is a peace based upon the complete overthrow of Germany and the dissolution of the power of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The only peace we can accept is the peace of overwhelming victory." To declare this, Roosevelt had no need to explain or ignore utterances of his own which it contra-

dicted. For three years he had maintained—and for many months against the policy of the government and the majority opinion of his countrymen—that when Prussianism struck down Belgium it wounded every nation; when it violated a solemn treaty, it weakened the safeguards of law that protected all peoples, and when it sought to establish brute force as the ruling power of the world, it declared war upon democracy everywhere. It is because of the vision and courage and powerful leadership of this American, more than any other influence, that there remains only a dwindling minority unconvinced or unaroused. The issue was plain, moreover, to observers with far less equipment of experience in international affairs. This newspaper expressed only the inevitable and obvious judgment of rational minds when it said, during the very first week of the war, that “an unbridled autocracy has laid the great German empire under indictment for arrogant assault upon the peace of nations and the security of human institutions”; that “in the twentieth century autocracy is a menace to civilization, a burden upon humanity, and this war is its death grapple among enlightened nations.” For three years we did not cease, altho the assertion offended many readers, and repetition became wearisome, to declare that between the governmental philosophy of Germany and the doctrines of human liberty there was irreconcilable war, and that one or the other must succumb. A paragraph written four months ago will serve for a hundred:

“Peace without victory,” “no annexations, no indemnities,” these phrases may have the sound of humane and enlightened policy, but they are the echoes of autocracy’s hidden purpose, and their acceptance would mean the betrayal of civilization to brute force. Let no American deceive himself into believing that a surrender so made would be a prelude to universal peace. It would be a prelude to a Prussianized world; to a

system dominated by the forces which have robbed Serbia, tortured Belgium, desecrated France, mocked at law and humanity, made remorseless war against democracy. What concern have we to spend billions of our wealth and the lives of tens of thousands of our citizens to resist the erection of German dominion in Europe and Asia? Just this—that Germany at Bagdad would be nearer to America than she is at Berlin; that Germany unbeaten would mean the turning against this hemisphere of autocracy's ambition and against this country the full fury of its barbarous power; that for generations the free peoples of the world would be doomed to cower under the shadow of Prussianism amid the ruins of their liberties.

What are the "war aims" of the United States, concerning which disloyal and disordered minds are so solicitous? They may be summed up in two words—German defeat. That, as we have said before, includes everything; less than that includes nothing, neither the safety of democracy nor the peace of the world nor the security of American rights, liberties and territory. It is a severe test of one's belief in human intelligence to find that there are still Americans with pretensions to a capacity for logical thinking who solemnly argue that the United States and its Allies should seek a "negotiated peace" with Germany; they seem to be afflicted with a veritable itch for making treaty with the enemy of every principle for which America stands.

But there is a fatal deficiency in their program. With whom should we negotiate? With representatives of the irresponsible government which assassinated treaty honor and international law? With the instigators and impenitent defenders of the Lusitania massacre? With those who plotted and fomented and paid for organized schemes of violence against American rights and American citizens, while this country was at peace? With an arrogant and irresponsible despotism, represented by a treacherous and perjured statesmanship?

When the German people establish a government embodying their will and backed by their proven faith, the world can treat with them; until that is done there can be no treaty, for there can be no negotiators. Further, about what, at this time, are we to negotiate? About the right of Belgium and France to restitution, reparation and guarantees? About justification for the submarine murders? About the terms upon which sworn treaties shall hereafter be observed and helpless populations shall be made secure from slave raids?

Muddle-headed theorists and marplots chatter of a negotiated peace with Germany as tho the idea were a novel and heaven-sent inspiration. As a fact, it was tried, and tried again, and each time with more palpable failure and more menacing threats of disaster. For two years and eight months the government of the United States invited and besought a peace by negotiation, and when advocates of the plan were at the summit of their hope, Germany was preparing her deadliest blow and secretly plotting to turn against us nations with which we were at peace. German militarism and American pacifism together brought this war upon the United States. To let either or both of them dictate the peace that is to end it would be a worse disaster than the first.



## THE WAR FOR IRON

*October 17, 1917.*

**M**ANY conscientious and hopeful students of the peace problem are inclined, no doubt, to regard the question of Alsace-Lorraine as a subsidiary factor. They recognize the moral force of France's claim and the appeal of her passionate sentiment, and weigh these judicially against Germany's legal rights as possessor of the provinces by treaty since 1871, taking into account also the desires of the Alsatians and possible dangers of making territory a prize of war. But they do not realize the tremendous, the almost overshadowing issue involved in the disposition that is to be made of these lands. The truth is that settlement of this controversy means more to France and to Germany, more to the reorganization of Europe, more to the cause of permanent peace and a world made safe for democracy, than any other one thing. The consuming purpose of the French to recover the region torn from them needs no emphasis. Mere mention of its name, as an American correspondent wrote from Paris recently, fires the national soul:

Say "Alsace-Lorraine," and a French mother will give her only son with a smile. A holy passion for the lost provinces warms those who might otherwise be cold, feeds the hungry, rests the weary, thrills the indifferent, makes soldiers eager for death and civilians equal to all sacrifices.

But to Germany, too, this matter is vital; it is the one issue upon which the kaiser's government and people are implacably resolved. Its supreme importance to

them was strikingly confessed in the address of Foreign Secretary Kuehlmann last week:

There is absolutely no impediment to peace, no question which could not be solved by negotiation or a settlement in such a way as to render superfluous the further sacrifice of blood—except the demand of France for Alsace-Lorraine. There is but one answer to the question, Can Germany in any form make concessions with regard to Alsace-Lorraine? That answer is No! So long as one German can hold a gun, the integrity of the territory handed down to us as a glorious inheritance by our forefathers can never be the object of negotiations or concessions—never, never, never!

What does it mean, this theatrical defiance that could hardly be more robust if the proposal were to annex Prussia to France, instead of to restore territory wrested from the French by brute force? Why does autocracy declare that it would submit to negotiation its claim to the Belgian coast and the return of its colonies, but not possession of lands historically and racially part of France? German writers and orators and statesmen will argue volubly that their determination is justified by sentiment, by the facts of history, by the rights of conquest. They unctuously protest that in seizing Alsace-Lorraine forty-six years ago they performed an act of "national and historic justice," redeeming territory that was German-owned for eight centuries. And perhaps some of them believe what they say. But the truth is that Germany tore those provinces from the side of France for reasons of cold-blooded military strategy and economic greed—because they gave to her a frontier from which she could keep France cowed, and a guarantee of the industrial supremacy of Europe. She saw that the key to empire lay buried in the soil she stole. Alsace-Lorraine is the basis of Germany's prosperity in peace and of her might in war. The edifice of her imperial power was erected upon the foundation of that larcenous

seizure. Wholly because of what she gained there she was able to attain leadership of the continent in industry and shipping, to fashion a war machine designed to conquer the world, and to drench Europe with blood before her ruthless advance was stayed. Let that land be restored to its rightful owner, and the colossus of Prussianism is paralyzed. For there, and in the adjacent region occupied by the Germans for the last three years, lie the richest iron deposits in all Europe, and iron is the symbol, the very soul, of world mastery in peace and war. As a Dutch newspaper said the other day:

Kuehlmann calls Alsace-Lorraine a glorious heritage; but the only thing glorious about it is the mineral wealth which enabled Germany to prepare for the present war. Without that mineral wealth, Germany would be at a great loss to prepare for another. The return of these two stolen provinces to France should be a fundamental security for future peace.

It was chiefly to gain possession of Lorraine's treasures of iron that Germany enforced her predatory demand in 1871. And it was by seizing France's remaining metal-mining and metal-manufacturing resources three years ago that she has been able almost to conquer the most formidable alliance ever formed. Let the reader note one of the fatal "ifs" of the war, as explained by an expert:

If only the French could have made an advance of three miles on a ten-mile front (in the region of Briey) instead of being compelled by the suddenness of the attack to retire, the war never could have been continued by Germany. The frontier presented to the Germans in 1871 had given them a jumping-off ground so convenient that once they had violated the neutral ground of Belgium and Luxemburg it placed them at one bound in the center of the coal and iron districts of France. By the time the battle of the Marne was fought, a large percentage of the coal, iron and steel production of France was in German hands. During the war Germany has

had all her own coal and iron mines to count upon, plus 83 per cent of those belonging to France.

Almost immeasurable was the difference made when the German invaders, sweeping past the fortress of Longwy, overran the Briey basin and surged to the right and left of Verdun. Together with their conquest further north they held, within a month, 78 per cent of France's coke, 90 per cent of her iron ore, 86 per cent of her iron foundries, 70 per cent of her steel mills, 16 per cent of all her industrial machinery, 34 per cent of her manufacturing horsepower. But for the resources of Great Britain, and, later, those of the United States, France would have been weaponless, and in a few weeks must have succumbed. One of the chief features in the original German plan was to demand at the peace a "rectification" of her frontier by the addition to Lorraine of the Briey basin. The territorial acquisition would appear modest in extent, but what it would have meant has been described by Ferrero, the historian:

This slight enlargement would be enough to turn upside down from top to bottom the whole balance of the old world. It would reduce all continental Europe to vassalage under a protectorate of Germany. Briey contains, perhaps, the most colossal and richest layers of iron in all Europe; Luxemburg also is very rich in iron; in the French territory occupied by the Germans near Belgium there are the richest coal mines in France, some of them being among the richest in the world. If Germany succeeded, she would be gaining possession of almost all the mines of fossil coal and of iron in Europe; she would have almost a monopoly on the continent of metallurgical industries.

It was, in fact, in the hope of making secure her hold upon the Briey region that Germany sacrificed half a million men in vain efforts to take Verdun. Verdun meant iron, and iron meant victory and an empire shadowing the world. And it is for precisely the same reason that the Prussian clutch upon Alsace-Lorraine

will never be loosened until autocracy is beaten to the dust. This is the age of iron; iron production is the infallible index to a nation's economic power; and Alsace-Lorraine enabled Germany, between 1870 and 1910, to stride from fourth place among the iron-producing countries to second place, first passing Great Britain, France and the United States, and then yielding supremacy only to America. During that period her iron and steel output grew from 1,000,000 tons a year to 15,000,000.

Iron, equally with food, is the controlling force in this world war. Command of it almost made Germany the dictator of Europe; deprivation of it almost reduced France to slavery. But her iron supremacy would make Germany a victor even in a drawn war, as Ferrero says:

It is not possible today for a nation to be a great industrial or mercantile or military power without being at the same time a great metallurgical power. Iron is the metal by which man creates, keeps and extends empires. If her plan succeeded, Germany's power would overrun the world. Dominion in the metal industries would assure to her uncontested pre-eminence over all continental Europe in all businesses.

That is why Germany clings with remorseless grip to the region of Briey, eastward from Verdun. That is why she will retreat from Belgium before she will retreat there. That is why she will fight to exhaustion to hold the stolen provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. But that is why, also, the world should recognize that the surest means of protecting itself against another assault from Prussian militarism is to restore to France the territory which created the power of autocracy and would supply it with weapons for its next war of conquest.

## FRANCE THE EFFICIENT

*October 25, 1917.*

**I**N ONE of our war discussions more than two years ago we echoed in these terms an opinion generally expressed by neutral observers:

When the dreadful storm has died away and the tranquil light of peace once more bathes the devastated earth, mankind will justly apportion the rewards of honor and of infamy. Which nation is assured of the unfading guerdon of the admiration of the ages? Which has most signally proved its patience with its valor, the fidelity of knighthood with the grim tenacity of martyr-like conviction?

Our judgment is that the supreme heroine among the nations is France. Whether she emerges triumphant or is doomed to suffer defeat, her honor will shine resplendent and the story of her devotion will inspire the sons of men for all time.

The succeeding record has sealed the verdict of that time; no glory dims that of the dauntless republic which broke the first onslaught of autocracy's power and has endured for three years its terrible reprisals. That which challenged the world's admiration then, as now, was the moral and spiritual heroism of the French—the intrepid courage of the troops, the steadiness and sobriety of the people, the spirit of uncomplaining sacrifice and high devotion. But there has been a revelation of the nation's power which is not less striking yet is less widely understood—of an efficiency which Prussianism itself could not equal, of constructive resourcefulness and energy which the American people, credited with unusual development of those qualities, will not

excel. Every reader knows that the French have been surpassingly brave in battle; that victories have moved them to no boastfulness, while defeats have occasioned neither panic nor despair; that the troops at the front have been supported by a populace whose spirit no privations can break and no burden of grief can crush. But how many of us realize that France, while fighting for her life, has transformed her territory into a great workshop of war industry; that, stripped of the resources which were the first requisites of her defense, she improvised stupendous projects of construction amid the clamors of battle and the exhausting perils of invasion; that she has provided a veritable arsenal for her allies, not only arming her own troops to repel the massed legions of the enemy, but making and delivering vast stores of war material to half a dozen nations besides?

In recalling France's contributions to the cause of civilization, let us put aside such facts as that she has expended more than \$16,000,000,000 of her wealth, and that she still holds two-thirds of the western battle-front, besides having sent armies to the Dardanelles and Saloniki. Let us examine now only her industrial achievements. In estimating these, it is to be remembered that the first fierce assaults of the Germans, as they had planned, wrested from France the very treasure house of the republic—almost its entire resources of coal, of iron and of manufacturing energy and equipment. Even before the war she had been largely dependent upon Belgium and Germany for her coal and coke; and at one blow she was deprived of both fuel and ore, which were added to the resources of the invader. After the battle of the Marne—before the end of September, 1914—France had lost, and the Germans had gained, 68 per cent of the republic's coal, 78 per cent of its coke,

90 per cent of its iron ore, 86 per cent of its casting foundries, 70 per cent of its steel mills, 40 per cent of its sheet metal and rolling mill plants, 16 per cent of its machinery and 34 per cent of its developed power. And this was in the first forty days of the war already revealed as a war of machinery, of guns and ammunition, of iron and steel, of manufacturing capacity! The miracle is not that France broke the power of the mighty German military machine, but that she did it almost with bare hands. What the vast seizure meant to the French and to their enemies was vividly set forth by an American correspondent at German field headquarters, writing in February, 1915:

“War is business,” and the Germans, with characteristic system, are making the occupied territories contribute to the support of their armies. Within a week or two after they had occupied Liège, the great arms factories there were turning out ammunition and arms for the German forces; coal mines in southern Belgium soon resumed operations for the German government, which now has opened a wide field of activity in the industrial region of northern France. That is the richest part of the republic. While it contains only 3.7 per cent of the total area, it has 80 per cent of the iron and 70 per cent of the coal industries of France, and very large woolen and cotton industries. Large supplies of raw materials for these and other industries were sent to Germany. From Lille and its vicinity about \$125,000,000 worth of raw wool and yarn was thus confiscated, equal to a full year’s consumption of all the German mills. Rubber in large amounts was found. Coal mines around Lille are now operated by the Germans.

This was the condition under which France faced the war—her armies driven back by superior forces, the whole of her great industrial region held by the enemy, virtually all of her raw materials and machinery for the fabrication of war supplies gone. Americans can best realize the situation if they imagine the United States called upon to defend itself against a ruthless invader



in possession of the coal mines of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the ore beds of Tennessee and Superior, the steel industries of Pittsburgh and Bethlehem, and the manufacturing regions of this state and all New England. Now what did France accomplish? All the world knows that she wrecked the German plan of conquest at the Marne and buried the remnants at Verdun; that she has kept in the field armies which aggregate today, after the war losses of thirty-eight months, more than 3,000,000 men; that with the aid of coal and ore and iron from Great Britain and the United States she has created colossal supplies of artillery and ammunition. But the magnitude of her achievement can be understood only when figures are set down indicating the products of her genius and exhaustless energy.

In August, 1914, France was equipped to expend 15,000 of her famous "seventy-five" shells daily; now her forces can fire 250,000 of these deadly projectiles every twenty-four hours, and 100,000 shells from the heavy artillery besides. In August, 1913, she had 300 big guns; in June of this year she had 6000. Of trench, field and heavy guns of all calibers, she has enough to place one every twenty-six feet along her whole front. In July, September and October, 1916, the French batteries fired 19,000,000 shells. But these figures constitute only a part of the story. France has armed not only herself, but others. She has supplied to her allies 800 heavy guns. Of her total production to the end of 1916, of the weapons and supplies named below, she has turned over to them the following proportions: Of rifles, 30 per cent; of cartridges, 22 per cent.; of ammunition for field and heavy guns, 20 per cent; of trench mortars, 13 per cent; of hand grenades, 27 per cent; of gas masks, 10 per cent; of powder, 8 per cent. Up to October 16, 1916, France had sent to Russia more than 600,000

rifles, 300,000,000 cartridges, several hundred pieces of heavy artillery, with millions of projectiles and hand grenades, and some hundreds of experts in the use of all these weapons and the transformation of industrial plants into munition factories. To Italy, France sent large quantities of raw materials and coal; many batteries of heavy artillery, with ammunition; empty shells at the rate of thousands daily; 500,000 steel helmets; 40,000 trench shields; 100 trench mortars, and hundreds of tons of chemical products for war use. French flying experts helped to defend Venice and to teach the British to protect London.

It was France that supplied Servia with the means of fighting. From the end of 1914 until the evacuation of Servia, France sent to her ally 2000 three-inch shells a day. After the retreat, France undertook the reorganization and refitting of the shattered Servian forces; she supplied exclusively the armament and ammunition, and co-operated with Britain in the huge task of transporting the army to Corfu and then to Saloniki, which employed 150 vessels. From the day of Rumania's entrance in the war, that country drew its war supplies wholly from France. She obtained from the republic 100,000 rifles at first, then 10,000 a month; 80,000,000 cartridges; 1000 machine guns, with ammunition; 1,000,000 hand grenades; artillery of all calibers, with projectiles; anti-aircraft guns and experts to work them; all telegraphic, telephonic and wireless and engineering equipment; 400 searchlights and 4500 tons of barbed wire; 200 aeroplanes and material for 100 more; 200,000 helmets and 500,000 gas masks. Most of these supplies were shipped by way of Archangel and Russian railroads. In addition, enormous contributions of material have been made to Belgium, and the Greek army has been equipped by French industry. These

achievements by a nation whose industrial life was suddenly paralyzed by invasion are more than impressive, they are staggering; they reveal a creative capacity and energy which put to shame the accomplishments of the United States, still untouched by actual war yet still confusedly preparing to fill the most urgent demands which the conflict makes upon its vast resources. And they justify what was written twenty-two months ago by Ferrero, the eminent Italian historian:

At the outbreak of the war, every one thought France owed her salvation to England and Russia. Today the world knows that if France had not made herself the Allies' shield against the furious hammerstrokes of Thor, Europe would not have escaped German hegemony. Her terrible sacrifices, heroically supported, give France precedence in authority in the councils of the Allies.

## BULGARIA WANTS PEACE

*October 30, 1917.*

THE world will never know exactly what passed between the German emperor and his great and good friend, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, during the former's recent visit to Sofia; and it is, we conceive, a loss to the literature of diplomacy that the remarks of the harried kaiser and the "fox of the Balkans" must remain among Unpublished Conversations Affecting the War. For Bulgaria wants peace. If her troops do not carry into battle, like the German and Austrian forces in the drive against Italy, banners with that strange device, she has sent her confidential emissaries abroad to seek means of hastening a settlement. The Associated Press last week described the activities of these agents in neutral European capitals, where they are assiduously trying to convince Entente diplomats that Bulgaria wishes to be regarded after the war as independent of Germany and a cordial friend of the anti-Teutonic alliance. These maneuvers have, of course, a significance out of all proportion to Bulgaria's military efforts in the war. That country is the bridge linking up the great highway between Berlin and Constantinople and the projected eastern empire of Pan-Germanism; if she were to be detached from the coalition, now or hereafter, the whole structure of a Prussianized Middle Europe would be laid in ruins. Just as her adherence to the German cause two years ago signaled Teutonic conquest of the Balkans, so her defection would mark the crumbling of the audacious plan.

No one will expect immediate or open moves in this direction, especially while the disaster to Italy serves to revive hopes of a German victory in the war. But peace sentiment in Bulgaria is manifestly genuine, and it is of interest because it is inspired by different reasons from those that sway the other countries in the alliance. The Bulgars are, first, a proud race, and they have endured with difficulty the complete subjugation of their national interests to the requirements of the German plan as enforced by arrogant representatives of Prussianism. From the first days of her participation in the war Bulgaria's actions have been dictated by Berlin, her highest military command has been subordinate to the kaiser's generals, her economic life has been ordered by an alien power. That she has received full price for her subservience does not lessen the humiliation; perhaps it aggravates the feeling. In the second place, the series of peace notes and the discussions they occasioned have awakened in Bulgaria an uneasy feeling that German promises might become "scraps of paper" as readily in a peace conference as in the beginning of a war. She holds rich rewards for her sordid bargain, but is becoming conscious that possession which is contingent upon the triumph and the good faith of her powerful allies is rather precarious. The murderous submarine has not brought victory, the Hindenburg line fails to prove impregnable, and long ago it became clear that the best hope Germany can have is to avert complete overthrow. With the German and Austrian people clamoring for "peace without annexations," is it conceivable that they would fight on merely to make secure Bulgaria's grip upon conquered territories? But, above all, Bulgaria yearns for an end to the war because she has nothing further to gain from its continuance. Her sentiment for peace has the singular

nature of being inspired, not only by the general weariness and economic restraints which afflict her allies, but also by satisfied ambition. Bulgaria is the one nation among the score engaged in the conflict that has gained every objective, has fulfilled every national aspiration.

Within a few weeks after pawning her honor to Berlin and Vienna she was in possession of Servian Macedonia, and had not only enlarged her boundaries to the westward, but had avenged the humiliation which her treachery brought upon her in the second Balkan war. Thru the connivance of the faithless Constantine, she added to her territory Grecian Macedonia, including ports on the Aegean sea. And by participating in the Teuton drive against Rumania she acquired from her old enemy the Dobrudja, thereby extending her sway to the northward and along the Black sea. Having won these coveted prizes, her interest in the war naturally languished, except as the result might affect her new possessions. With the Balkan map rearranged upon this comfortable basis, it has seemed to her deplorable, not to say un-Christian, that the conflict should be continued, whether in behalf of such vague principles as "freedom of the seas" or in pursuit of such visionary ideals as "making the world safe for democracy." Several events have caused tremors of agitation in the Bulgarian mind. It was bad enough when the Russian revolution shattered the plan of a separate peace negotiated with the Prussianized autocracy in Petrograd, but far worse was the revolutionary declaration for "no annexations," which has had advocates even in Berlin. Then the pope made the alarming suggestion that readjustments in the Balkans should be studied in "a spirit of equity and justice"—he might just as well have condemned the Bulgarian pretensions outright. More ominous still, German Socialists have displayed the most

unfeeling candor in declaring that they will not support the continuance of the war for a single day to advance Bulgaria's frontiers, and some of them have actually urged that Servia should regain the lands stolen by her perfidious neighbor. When she turns from her allies to her enemies Bulgaria meets even less comfort. She finds the latter proclaiming the hideous doctrine of "restoration" for the Balkans, and is appalled by the implications of that term. If Servia and Greece and Rumania are to be "restored," the process can be carried out only at the expense of her conquests. And this is, obviously, the program of the Allies. They cannot do less than re-establish Rumania; having brought about the participation of Greece in their cause, they are bound to undo the betrayal of her territory by Constantine to Ferdinand. And as to Servia, the declaration of Premier Lloyd George a few weeks ago was explicit:

The first condition of peace is restoration, complete and without reservation. However long this war may last, Great Britain's honor is involved in seeing Servia free. Servia and Belgium are the guardians of the gates, and bravely have they defended them. The British extend once more the hand of friendship to Servia. We will go thru the war together to the end.

The United States is not officially at war with Bulgaria, and the minister from that country in Washington remarked the other day that he could not see "any possibility" of fighting between the two nations. In any case, it is certainly as just to say that "we have no quarrel with the Bulgarian people" as to say the same thing of the Germans. Both peoples are cursed with Prussian rulers, and in Ferdinand the evil qualities of the Hohenzollerns are exaggerated, while the good qualities of the kaiser are absent. When the Russian government characterized Bulgaria's alliance with Germany

two years ago as "unthinkable treachery" the epithet was justified. It was at the cost of enormous Russian sacrifices that the Bulgars were freed from Turkish tyranny in 1877, and, altho the people learned to resent the somewhat suffocating embraces of their powerful Slav neighbor, they would never have joined Russia's enemies had they not delivered the management of their affairs into the hands of a Prussianized ruler. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, elected prince in 1887, is a statesman of acknowledged adroitness, but quite unprincipled and almost insanely ambitious. He pursued undeviatingly two policies—first, to eliminate Russian influence, and, second, to make himself, thru enlargement of Bulgaria's power, the dominating figure in the Balkans. Much of the second purpose was accomplished in 1912, when the Balkan League—Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece—overwhelmed Turkey and divided the territory wrested from the Moslem. But when dispute arose over the spoils Ferdinand overreached himself by a sudden and treacherous attack on Serbia and Greece, his allies. The result was the second Balkan war, in which Bulgaria lost not only the territories she had conquered, but prestige and honor as well. The final blow was delivered by Rumania, and she, with Serbia and Greece, divided the prizes of battle. Ferdinand had not many months to wait for revenge. After the great war began he deluded the ministers of the Entente governments with hollow negotiations and promises until Germany and Austria were ready for their thrust to Constantinople; then he joined them, with the cynical avowal that he did so because they were certain to be victorious, and committed his country to war against the nations which had rescued it from the Turk and saved it more than once from the sultan's vengeance. A severe but



just estimate was that written at the time by Stephen Pinchon, an eminent French statesman:

Above the subjects of King Ferdinand was the king himself, his ambitions, his hates and his hallucinations. Bulgaria has been false to her birthright. She has betrayed her liberators, duped her friends, sacrificed her independence. She has ceased to be Slav to become Prussian and Turk; she has ceased to be free in order to place herself under the yoke of the worst possible tyranny—that of Prussian militarism.

But of what use are the rewards of this policy if their retention depends upon the vanished hope of a German triumph? Short of that result, the government of Bulgaria begins to realize, possession of the territory of neighbors may be a liability rather than an asset; hence, the efforts to persuade the opposing alliance that German domination of the Balkans is not a Bulgarian ideal and that an arrangement of frontiers more modest than the war map indicates would be conceded in return for Entente friendship. Perhaps it is just as well that the United States maintains the fiction of being at peace with Bulgaria, for under this arrangement Washington is in a position to enlighten Sofia concerning the fundamental purpose of the nations at war with Germany. And that purpose is to prevent, at all costs, that plan whose first step, as President Wilson has declared, was "filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes"; whose aim was "to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia," and whose ultimate design was to dominate the world.

## ITALY'S MILITARY COLLAPSE

*November 1, 1917.*

AS AMERICANS contemplate the military disaster that has overtaken Italy, which means for the United States a future of sacrifices unforeseen and immeasurable, the most ominous consideration will be that the Allies were totally unprepared for the blow that has smitten them. The most powerful and destructive offensive of the war was organized without the knowledge of the forces against which it was directed, and has been carried thru to a victory not yet limited, before a single effective measure of co-operation could be taken to meet it. If anything could be more disquieting than the ignorance of the Allied governments concerning a movement of such vast extent and import, it would be a complacent belief in their own omniscience. And while the massed artillery of the Germans and Austrians was already pouring upon the Italian lines the terrible drum-fire which presages assault, that estimable young man, the former mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, selected to direct the military destinies of this nation in the world war, issued the following profound observations:

Rumors of an impending Austrian offensive against Italy have been current during the last week. Reports of concentration of Austrian and German divisions to take part in the attack are noted. Any one familiar with the situation can at once determine that these rumors are exaggerated. Even should the season permit it, the concentration of the number of fresh enemy divisions could not, as a physical possibility, take place in the narrow Trentino valley. However, it is possible that the Central Powers, fearing further

Italian successes along the Isonzo front, have massed a considerable number of troops in an effort to check the Italian advance and if possible regain some of the terrain lost during recent engagements.

This was published just twenty-four hours before the first fatal breach was made by the Teutons in an onslaught not equaled in magnitude and force since the great thrust into Belgium and northern France three years ago. It may be urged, of course, that Secretary Baker could not be expected to know more in advance than the Allied commanders in Europe; and it is a fact that on the very same day a British correspondent on the Italian front said the staff was mystified by the enemy's "apparently objectless bombardments." But day before yesterday, when the Teuton forces were driving irresistibly down into the northern Italian plain and threatening to paralyze the military power of one of the chief members of the Entente alliance, Mr. Baker enlightened his countrymen with these comments:

The two outstanding features of the situation of the past week are the relentless British offensive in the Ypres salient and the sudden, well-aimed and sustained thrust of the French north of the Aisne. \* \* \* Italy is passing thru a difficult moment. \* \* \*

In the face of this astonishing judgment, every fact proclaims that the catastrophe that has befallen Italy is the most menacing event of the war since the dark days that preceded the battle of the Marne. There are now under way or in prospect in many fields military and naval operations and political movements of arresting significance—the British and French offensives, preparations for the next German drive on Petrograd, the remorseless forays of Germany's submarines, the desperate efforts of the Allies to counteract deadly shipping losses, political unrest in France, a cabinet crisis in Italy, the threatened collapse of Rumania, the anarchistic fer-

ment in Russia. But overshadowing in importance any of these is that tragic spectacle of Italy—the transformation of a great victorious army into a beaten rabble, the smashing of one of the principal fronts of the Allies in Europe, an invasion which conceivably may reduce Italy to the pitiable status of Russia, and which certainly means a prolongation of the conflict and stupendous new burdens upon the United States. The suddenness of the change is well-nigh stupefying. For months, despite the calamitous enfeeblement and worthless activities of Russia, every day's events have emphasized the commanding superiority of the anti-Teutonic alliance, as a whole. In military and economic power, in the essentials of money and munitions, men and morale, they have demonstrated their ascendancy and made victory only a matter of time. But almost overnight the swing of the balance is arrested. There has not been a like period during the war which has produced such a shift as that of the crowded hours of the last week. Let us indite the depressing diary in the briefest possible form. It was on October 23 that Secretary Baker announced the impossibility of an Austro-German offensive. On October 24, after a blasting fire of high explosives and gas shells, the Teuton forces crashed thru the Italian line on the upper Isonzo river, taking vital positions and 10,000 prisoners. Two days later the men captured numbered 30,000, the defenders had lost 300 guns, and their exposed flanks were in peril. On October 27 the toll of captives reached 60,000, with 500 guns, and the assailants were pouring thru the passes of the Julian Alps into Italian territory. Within twenty-four hours more it became clear that the entire Italian front from Tolmino to the Adriatic shore, a distance of sixty-five miles, was hopelessly broken; the Teuton hordes were driving down into the northeastern plain of Venetia and enveloping the very city of the

headquarters; the defenders had lost 100,000 men and 700 guns and were threatened by the annihilation of whole army groups.

To realize the tragedy of it all, one must look at the map. By incredible labor, audacity and endurance during many months of the most arduous campaigning of the whole war, the Italians had fought their way far into Austrian territory. Their line extended from the Adriatic in a generally northeastern direction, traversing rugged plateaus and forbidding heights and torrential rivers, which had been conquered only at terrible cost in energy and life. And within a week they had lost it all and were fighting desperately to check the enemy's onrush into their own territory. It is a staggering fact that the gains purchased by two years of prodigious effort and sacrifice were snatched away within three days. Moreover, the Italians had been within a dozen miles, or a brief campaign, of achieving what promised to be the decisive victory of the war. Another tragic "if" mocks the world that is arrayed against the Prussian menace. If the French had been able to hold the iron treasures of the Briey basin in September, 1914, Germany could not have kept her war machine going. If the Anglo-French expedition on Gallipoli had advanced another league, the power of Turkey would have crumbled, and the Teutons would have lost their Balkan stronghold. And if the Italians could have struck another blow such as those of the late summer, they would have brought Austria to her knees, smashed the confederacy of Middle Europe and opened the way for a dictated peace.

That they failed was due to many causes, but not the least was the commanding power of German strategy, initiative and military skill. To these qualities the whole world must pay a tribute of admiration. A Washington

expert makes the fatuous comment that "most of Mackensen's great drives have taken place where the enemy was weak—as tho that circumstance were an evidence of meager ability, instead of being the most convincing demonstration of high military capacity. That the Germans were able to direct and perfect so tremendous a concentration of troops and guns without revealing their purpose is a serious reflection upon the Italian staff, but it is no less a triumph for the German command. In territory which was under observation from innumerable mountain outposts and incessant aeroplane reconnaissance they assembled overwhelming masses of men and artillery, and at the chosen moment dealt a blow which ripped the line apart. The strategy employed was of deadly simplicity. It illustrated the elementary principle of warfare that success depends upon striking at a selected position of the enemy with resistless force. The Italians had not been able to conquer the far upper region of the Isonzo, where the Austrians still held a bridge. It was from that point that the Teutons struck across the line; and, once they had broken thru, their path lay open down the whole rear of Cadorna's armies. The Italians had but the choice between swift retreat or a rolling up of their whole line and annihilation. Before the movement could be well organized, three great wedges had been driven thru their defenses, and the contest became a pursuit, with whole divisions cut off and enveloped in the mountain positions from which they had no time to escape. The problem and the result vividly recall the similar triumphs won by Germany—the rout of the Russians after their exploit in overrunning Galicia and threatening a descent into Hungary thru the Carpathian mountains, and the crushing of Rumania after her spectacular invasion of Transylvania.

The causes of the disaster are not mysterious. The

Italians had extended themselves until their line was too thin to resist a concentrated assault. They had exhausted their reserves of ammunition in the terrific battles which gained for them their brilliant victories, and they lacked sufficient heavy artillery to beat off a powerfully organized assault. Above all, they fell victims to the madness of Russia, where disunion and unbalanced radicalism and imbecile anarchism had so poisoned the nation's soul and paralyzed its fighting strength that the Germans and Austrians were able to withdraw whole armies to strike at another front. If the results are appalling for Italy, they are also perilous to the entire Allied cause. The military damage wrought is colossal—all of Italy's gains have been lost, her armies have been disrupted, her offensive power destroyed for many months if not for the period of the war, her insufficient equipment dangerously reduced; and these things mean that greater strain will be put in all respects upon Great Britain, France and the United States. But the political possibilities are hardly less menacing. While invasion of their territory may fire the Italian people with new resolve and weld them in closer unity, it may, on the other hand, encourage the ever-active forces of pacifism and sedition, and impair fatally the nation's power of resistance. There will not be lacking those who will incite the shaken populace with charges that the Allies abandoned Italy to destruction by withholding the guns and supplies for which she begged. In any case, no rational mind can measure the effects of this event upon Austria, upon Germany and upon Italy without realizing that hope of an early victory for civilization is in eclipse, and that the democratic nations must prepare themselves anew for a struggle more bitter and more prolonged than they had ever contemplated.

## THE UNSOLVED ITALIAN PROBLEM

*November 7, 1917.*

IT SEEMS remarkable, even uncanny, that so little has been heard from the loyal and voluble German press about the disastrous defeat inflicted upon the Italians. Except for a brief telegram from the kaiser to his imperial ally, there has reached us hardly an expression of the exultation that the event must have caused. Certainly this is not a theme upon which the Germans would be reticent, whether from modesty or lack of understanding. Even those on the losing side, whose natural impulse is to minimize the disaster, must be staggered by the Teutonic achievements of the last fortnight—the capture of 200,000 troops, with 1500 guns of various calibers, the occupation of 10,000 square miles of Italian territory and an invasion of such driving force that it may overpass even the first line of defense prepared against its seemingly remote peril. The seriousness of the situation is emphasized by one English writer:

Another sudden and terrible crisis of the war has arisen; it may prove the beginning of the end for good or ill. If Cadorna cannot stay the rush at the Tagliamento river, he might even be compelled to leave all Lombardy and Piedmont to the mercy of the invader. That, however, will not happen, for the reason that before this stage is reached Italy will have made peace. Russia may soon be virtually out of the war. If Italy were to go out, too, America's help may come too late to prevent that drawn or negotiated peace which for us means defeat.

That Italy held 2,500,000 Austrian troops for two



years, and conquered many miles of the most difficult territory in campaigns of supreme audacity and endurance, will furnish brilliant chapters in her military annals; yet the strategists who left a vital part of the line unwatched and weakly held, and were surprised by an assault which must have been in preparation for many weeks, face a record difficult to explain. Some critics do not withhold slurs against the qualities of the Italian armies. "They should have had enough fighting ability," writes an American observer, "to hold back the onslaught until steps could have been taken to counter against it." A British expert speaks condescendingly of "the stampede of the impressionable Italians by a rough-and-tumble attack to which they are unaccustomed." It is true that they defeated the Austrians, as the Russians and Servians and Rumanians had done before them, only to succumb to German science and striking power; and it is a matter of fact that only the British and French have been able to break concentrated German offensives. But who will doubt that the dashing troops that overcame fortified Alpine heights would equal the feats of their allies if they were fighting side by side on the western front? The most effective plea in behalf of the Italian command is that the enemy's rush could not be stayed because of a lack of heavy artillery and ammunition; responsibility for that defect must be shared by the allied governments, which denied urgent requests. Yet such deficiency may reach a degree which nothing can excuse. That the Italians had not enough guns and shells to continue their great offensive, which had been enormously costly in material, was not discreditable; but surely it is a reckless leadership which exhausts vital supplies to such an extent that even defense is rendered impossible. The most serious reflection upon Italy's allies is that Germany

discovered and recognized the meaning of conditions in the enemy's lines which they ignored on a front which was really one of their own.

Germany's plan was not new and in nowise mysterious; it was merely a repetition of the other efforts which brought her substantial gains and reduced her adversaries to temporary confusion and a costly defensive. Her strategic design has always been to strike down her opponents one at a time. Her first thrust at France failed when the armies of the republic rallied at the Marne. But her second blow, at Russia—in May, 1915—broke the Muscovite power and began the disintegration which has left that great nation in the throes of anarchy. Then Serbia and Montenegro were eliminated, and a rampart erected across the Balkan peninsula which has resisted every attack. Once more she attempted to destroy France, in the merciless campaign against Verdun, in order to forestall the action of the newly created British armies. And now she has made her most desperate drive, the aim of which is to paralyze Italy before American participation becomes formidable. The force of each one of the former efforts—those of complete and those of partial success—was counteracted by additions to the Allied strength. When the Russian rout was in progress, Italy joined in the war. The Balkan victories were described as of local significance, in view of the confident belief that Anglo-French assaults would gain a decision on the western front. The terrible ordeal of France at Verdun doomed German hopes of triumph, and they were buried at the Somme. And the final collapse of Russia was balanced by the entrance of the United States in the war to preserve democratic civilization from overthrow. But what compensation is there to be for the swift destruction of Italy's offensive power and her reduction to the status

of an ally in distress? Cogent reasoning has been employed to minimize all the other checks or defeats; it is true that the war was not won by the overrunning of Belgium and Poland and Servia. But there is a mathematical factor of grave weight in the problem, and that is the cumulative effect of these events. Single losses may be endured, but there is a stage in such developments where the aggregate becomes ominous; and it may well be considered to have arrived when Italy, apparently sweeping toward a great victory, suddenly falls into a state of helplessness only less serious than that of Russia.

We should deem it not only unpatriotic, but absurd, to cry out that this disaster is fatal. We have the highest confidence in the recuperative power of Italy, the proved force of France and Britain and the untried might of America; also, we recognize that Germany's dramatic triumph does not relieve in the minutest degree the crushing economic burdens that ultimately must break down the resistance of the Central Powers. Nevertheless, we recognize that this is nearly the last reverse of this magnitude that the cause of civilization can survive, for there is no longer a reserve of power which it can summon to its defense. France and Great Britain have been prompt in sending troops and guns to reinforce the shaken armies of Italy, and the United States, besides supplying a credit of \$230,000,000, has turned over some shipping, altho this country's deplorable unreadiness makes the latter contribution meager. The need for immediate action was urged last week by the British writer already quoted:

If Cadorna is to hold his own he must have more men, and, above all, more heavy guns. For guns he cannot wait. England and France must forward them to him without a day's delay, even tho by so doing they plant wrath and sorrow

in the hearts of army commanders elsewhere, and cause the pace of the operations on the western front to slow down for a while. There is no duty before us at the moment so urgent as that of warding off the lightning stroke aimed at Italy's heart and keeping her army from being knocked out of the war.

Assuredly it will take heroic measures to offset the advantages won by the Central Powers' drive, the military and political effects of which are of grave significance. Austria's hopes have been revived and her flagging energies aroused by the swift liberation of her territory and the excitement of a victorious offensive. The German people will be less than ever inclined to doubt the genius of autocracy or desire a liberalization of their government, while their spirit will be strengthened to endure the privations of another war winter. Italy, which had been one of the strongest assets of the Allied cause, has become almost a liability. The forces of pacifism and pro-Germanism in Russia will be encouraged. In Great Britain and France the hopes of an early decision will be dimmed. As to the military prospects no distant and imperfectly informed observer can make a plausible estimate, but certain obvious conditions will be recognized. The most menacing possibility is a second invasion by the Austrians thru the passes from the north, which would supplement the deadly drive from the east, and, unless speedily checked, would compel another drastic retreat.

Against these sobering conditions, of course, lies the fact that Germany's spectacular military success does not relieve the economic siege which is remorselessly wearing down her powers. By a prodigious effort she has pressed back the encircling forces at one point, but, unless she eliminates Italy entirely, she has gained nothing more than a prolongation of the war.

## MAKING WAR AT CROSS PURPOSES

*November 9, 1917.*

**I**N HIS latest weekly review of the war situation, Secretary Baker offered this sapient if not original observation: "The western front today stretches from the North sea to the Adriatic; the Venetian plain has become part of the western battle-front." If the Italians are forced back much further, the joining of their line to that of the French may become an actual physical fact. But in any case, the disaster that has overtaken them has brought belated recognition of a grave defect in the program of the nations fighting the Teutonic alliance. All the costly reverses they have suffered have been due to the fact that they have made war without effectual unity of purpose, without a cohesive plan, political or strategical. With admirable celerity, Great Britain and France have sent reinforcements of men and guns to stiffen the retreating armies, while the United States is giving such meager aid in the way of shipping as its neglect of preparations makes feasible. But Italy, like Belgium and Servia and Montenegro and Rumania, receives help too late to save her from grievous loss and the Allied cause from a deplorable check.

Clearly, the desperate problem confronting us is the result, first, of Germany's remarkable power of organization and initiative; and, second, of imperfect preparation on the part of the Italian high command. But fundamentally, the peril is a product of disjointed and haphazard planning of the Allied operations as a whole. The facts are astonishing in their suggestion of heed-

lessness. When Italy, in May, 1915, denounced the Triple Alliance, which had bound her to the Central Powers, and joined Great Britain, France and Russia in the Quadruple Entente, her action was hailed by the governments in the latter group as decisive. It was regarded as a moral and military event of stupendous import that one of the great Powers of Europe, possessing vast resources of men, a substantial fleet and a strategical position which threatened Austria, had added its strength to the coalition. Yet after the felicitations had died away, little was done to make the reinforcement effective, beyond occasional interchange of visits of courtesy from one capital to another. When Italy, by prodigious effort, forced the Alpine passes to the Trentino and so made her flank secure as a preliminary to the great drive eastward, her feats evoked applause and little else; her allies seemed to regard her campaign as a creditably arranged spectacle rather than as an undertaking that might be vital. Many months of comparative inaction followed, and interest languished until it was reawakened by the storming of Gorizia and the dazzling advances that conquered the heights beyond the Isonzo; these achievements won resounding praises. But even as late as the recent summer, Italy's tremendous effort was treated as a detached operation in which the allied countries were only sympathetically concerned. It seems incredible now, but one of the four principal nations of the Entente, and the only one battling on enemy soil, was permitted to plunge ahead with constantly lengthening lines of communication and steadily diminishing supplies, without the benefit of counsel or co-operation or a single effective measure to make secure her hazardous position. It was not Italy's fault that she waged her arduous war isolated and unsupported. From the time when her great drive toward the heart of

Austria-Hungary became formidable, she persistently and urgently argued that adequate backing would enable her to crush the weaker member of the Teutonic alliance. Seven weeks ago, when victory was almost within her grasp, we emphasized the need for instant reinforcement of her blows:

For many months the Italian government has been representing that the war could be decided on the Austro-Italian front. These claims were discounted because the staffs of the other allied nations held it to be impossible that any rapid progress could be made there. But the Italians have already accomplished things that seem incredible, and they insist that with adequate support—they need coal and iron and guns, not men—they can destroy Austria's resistance and open the way for a peace dictated by the Allies. Italy has the men and the strategic genius needed to accomplish this great undertaking; if she fails, it will be because her supplies of artillery, of coal and of iron prove insufficient.

Our estimate is now authoritatively supported by the chief of the Italian military mission in the United States. "If," he declares, "the importance of the Italian front had been understood before, this front being nearer the heart of the weakest enemy than any other, much better results would have been obtained, and there would have been found the key for the quickest solution and for the end of the war." Some British heavy batteries took part in the Isonzo campaign, but the aid was so small as to be negligible. The staffs of Great Britain and France were intent upon the great campaigns in Flanders and along the Chemin des Dames, and could not bring themselves to abate the remorseless demands for guns and shells on those fronts. Admittedly, the blows administered to the Germans there have been of tremendous importance and effect. But in the end France and Britain have been compelled to send lavish reinforcements to Italy, inevitably at the cost of their western operations—they have had to do, in order to avert com-

plete disaster, what they would not do to clinch a victory. The men and guns and ammunition now pouring down by trainloads to strengthen the shattered lines of Cadorna, if sent six months ago, even two months ago, would have smashed the Austrian defense.

What have been the secrets of Germany's astonishing powers of defense and attack, maintained for three years against encircling enemies? Aside from the complete subservience of the national intellect and will to autocratic demand, they have been three. First is her strategic situation, enabling her to wage war on "interior lines"—to concentrate her forces quickly on any front and deliver a blow at a selected point before her widely sundered adversaries can unite or co-operate to meet it. Second is her relentless enforcement of unity of command—her staff dominates the strategic operations of all armies in her group of nations; her officers and civil administrators dictate in all the regions they hold near any front. Moreover, she both renders and exacts service; she sends Germans and Austrians to help Bulgaria overrun Serbia, reinforces the defense of Hungary against Russia with Turkish divisions, and concentrates forces of all four nations, under titular command of the Austrian emperor, to smite Italy. The third secret of her success is a vision which takes in the military, political and economic problems on all fronts and guides the exercise of a centralized power toward their solution. The history of the war from the side of the Central Powers has been the history of the application of these three principles. At first, tho it meant devastation to her eastern provinces, Germany struck with all the force and fury at her command at France, and only the superhuman valor of the republic prevented a disaster. After nine months of preparation she turned upon Russia and dealt the power of the czar a blow which was to wreck



it and send the nation reeling into anarchy. With one swift thrust she destroyed Servia and rescued Turkey from defeat. With another she all but reached the heart of France, at Verdun. With another she drove audacious Rumania from her path. Now she hurls overwhelming weight at Italy. In every instance her action has had behind it unity of purpose, directness of aim, concentration of power upon the task in hand.

The Allies, on the contrary, have pursued detached plans of operation, sometimes with harmonious intent, but too often with insufficient force. While France was exhausting herself in repelling German assaults during the first year, Russia's hosts were battering at the lines of Austria. When Russia's might crumbled under German onslaughts in 1915, huge Anglo-French forces were undertaking the calamitous campaign of the Dardanelles. Largely because of this misadventure, the French had to endure the dreadful ordeal of Verdun for five months without British aid. An important project in Mesopotamia ended in disaster at Kut-el-Amara because it was neglected. And Italy's gains in two years of heart-breaking war have been lost because their possibilities and the necessity to secure them were ignored. The Allies' lack of system in prosecuting the war is not, of course, a recent discovery nor the need for strategic unity a late disclosure. On the contrary, the weakness is the more deplorable because assurances were given quite early in the conflict that it had been recognized and would be remedied. The idea first took definite shape in November, 1915. After fifteen months of disjointed warfare, the British premier announced that arrangements had been made for closer co-operation between the British and French war offices, and ventured the suggestion that the novelty "might take the form of a common war council, in which he hoped Russia and Italy

would join." Eventually the project was developed, and periodical conferences have been held by the Allied political and military leaders, meeting in Paris. In March, 1916, formal resolutions were adopted confirming "all the measures taken to realize unity of action and unity of front," to include not only economic and diplomatic co-operation, but "military unity of action as assured by the agreement concluded between the general staffs." A resolve could not be more explicitly expressed. "The Allies," said the Paris Temps, "are fully aware that harmony of operations on all fronts is the price of victory, and they are willing to make mutual sacrifices. The world's mightiest preparations for war are complete." Yet events show that to this day there has been established no cohesive, centralized system of military direction. Assuredly the policy which could not save Serbia or Montenegro or Rumania, which could not avert the collapse of Russia nor prevent the overwhelming of Italy, falls short of efficiency. Its results justify the criticism of the Manchester Guardian:

The military conduct of the war as exercised at home is profoundly unsatisfactory. We are not fighting with our heads. That must be so, for in everything else we are superior to the enemy. We have more men, greater resources. If, then, we ask why, in the fourth year of the war, we are, but for the entry of the United States and the growing exhaustion of the enemy, in relatively worse posture than at the war's beginning, there is no other answer.

Singularly enough, it was Italy, the latest victim of the Allies' lack of unity, that most persistently urged concerted action. In October, 1915, after the conquest of Serbia, her newspapers and publicists made a strong campaign for the formation of "an international diplomatic and military committee" which would "obtain uniform and simultaneous action wherever the Allies are facing the common enemy." Far more urgent than

past movements is the demand of present events. Unity of purpose and policy among the antagonists of the Central Powers is so little regarded that to this hour the United States is not at war with any of Germany's allies. We are expending billions of our wealth and dedicating the lives of hundreds of thousands of our citizens in furtherance of a military program which has been so indefinite that it did not recognize the stupendous Italian campaign against Austria as a vital operation. In all other matters save the grand strategy of the war the coalition has adopted rational measures of co-operation. The vast resources of the United States—its credit, its industrial output, its food supply, its shipping potentiality—are being apportioned by agreement among the associated governments and with regard to the relative needs. But it was still possible within a fortnight for a great army to pursue an isolated campaign, the failure of which would react perilously upon the whole Allied cause. There can be no adequate compensation for a reverse so needless and so costly. But a step toward undoing its effects and reinsuring ultimate victory will be a definite arrangement whereby the anti-Teutonic nations shall really pool their resources, shall unify their military purposes, shall concentrate their powers, and shall subordinate all merely national projects to the requirements of a general plan.

## DELUSION ABOUT RUSSIA

*November 10, 1917.*

**C**URRENT news from Russia is colored by the anarchistic forces which have seized the capital; but every dispatch indicates that a separate peace with Germany is possible, a reign of terror probable and civil war almost certain. Unlike the military disaster in Italy, collapse of the Russian national structure has long been foreseen by attentive observers. There could have been, indeed, no other result from the steadily growing domination of the public mind by pro-German treason, insensate pacifism and unintelligent socialistic radicalism. Yet the authorities in Washington have persistently ignored and misinterpreted plain facts and have deluded the American people with baseless assurances. Readers of this newspaper, however, were not surprised by the outbreak of anarchy. How clear was the meaning of events, and how heedless were the estimates of Washington, will appear from a glance at characteristic official statements and *The North American's* editorial comments on Russian affairs. As early as April 17 we discussed the possibility of a separate Russian peace thru the intrigues of "a determined element which would make terms with Prussianism." A week later the state department gave out a cable message from Ambassador Francis, in which he said he was "pained and provoked" by suggestions of this nature, and that "all the Russians require to defeat Germany are munitions, railroad equipment and credit." On May 14 and 15 we said:

It would seem that the Russian revolution is to have a dual fame—as the rising of a people against despotism, and as an exhibition of national incompetence more deplorable than the bloodiest irruption of violence. Every move in the descent of the mighty Russian mass toward anarchy means a heavier burden upon the United States and greater sacrifices for this nation. The responsible government is browbeaten and terrorized by a group of radicals, backed by workers and soldiers who are heedless of anything but the expansion of their newfound personal liberty. But the most shocking result has been the disorganization of the army. The truth is that for all practical purposes a separate peace between Russia and Germany is in effect. While desultory fighting may be resumed, it would be folly to expect any offensive by the Russian army. It is an undisciplined mass, and back of it is a government which has only the semblance of power, its existence dependent from day to day upon the whims of an organization of zealots who are incapable of patriotism, and whose conception of democracy is a travesty upon the name.

The mission headed by Elihu Root faces a stupendous, almost hopeless, task. It is to be hoped that the commissioners will not be swayed by the optimistic opinions of the American ambassador, who says that "all Russia needs to defeat Germany is a plentiful supply of munitions, financial credit and railway equipment"; as tho these things would be of any use to a nation whose government is terrorized, whose public affairs are dominated by a society of half-baked visionaries and whose armies are rotten with sedition.

The spectacle of Russia is a terrible yet fascinating one. Her mighty mass hangs menacingly over the path of liberty, and at any moment the avalanche may descend in thunderous ruin. Yet no precaution now possible can avert the peril. Civilization can only brace itself for a longer and costlier struggle, made necessary because liberty is misunderstood and misused by those who ought to be its strongest champions.

The contrasting view was that expressed by Mr. Root at a meeting in Moscow late in June:

We have seen nothing since we came to Russia that gives cause for criticism. We marvel at the self-control and sound common sense that the Russians display. We feel that you are on the right path toward an actual, permanent democracy.

"My latest advices," said the Russian envoy in Washington at the same time, "give joyful confirmation of the establishment of a firm power, strong in its democratic precepts and activity, strong in the trust reposed in it and in its ability to enforce law and order." From Petrograd on July 12 came a protest by Charles E. Russell, of the American mission, against "wild-eyed stories of impending ruin and chaos." "There is no anarchy here," he said. "These people know their job and will do it." On July 23 a Washington dispatch stated: "The United States today emphasized its faith in the Russian government by extending a further credit of \$75,000,000." On July 27, nevertheless, The North American declared:

The catastrophe brought upon the Russian people by false and fanatical leadership has a somber meaning for this country, since every unfolding of the appalling drama of a nation's delusion signifies that more Americans must die to save the cause imperiled by this collapse. \* \* \* The spectacular offensive during the first week of July, under the heroic leadership of Kerensky, was palpably artificial and unrepresentative. \* \* \* The Russian people are not to blame for their plight; those responsible are the agitators who set the nation in pursuit of false and destructive ideals.

When the American mission returned, early in August, its members expressed serene confidence. "The Russians," said Mr. Root, "have exhibited remarkable self-control. There is in them a power of cohesion, a marked capacity for united action." Mr. Russell was "greatly encouraged," and General Scott, American chief of staff, reported that "Russia is sound at heart." As a result of these assurances there arose a suggestion, strongly supported in Washington, that an American army be sent to Russia, which impelled us on August 14 to give this warning:

An American division in Russia would be at the mercy of every gust of delusion that sweeps thru the Russian ranks.

The palpable truth is that the Russian armies are enfeebled by loss of discipline and saturated with sedition. \* \* \* It is argued that such an expedition would have a great "moral effect." But Russia is far less in need of evidence of America's sincerity than America is of proof of Russia's stability. Not in resentment, but in ordinary caution, it should be remembered that the fidelity of the United States is questioned and its democracy challenged by forces in Russia which have deliberately destroyed military discipline and have intrigued for a shameless peace with Prussianism.

Political and military disorganization in Russia were at their height when the German campaign to seize Riga began, late in August. But "as material evidence of its continued faith in the ability of Russia to overcome her difficulties," the United States made another loan of \$100,000,000, and Secretary Lansing on August 24 rebuked doubters in these terms:

There seems to be an impression that there is a feeling in the government that Russia is on the verge of collapse. There is no such feeling here. I feel that Russia is stronger today than ever.

A few days later, when the hopeless disunion of Russia was revealed to every rational observer by the turbulent Moscow conference, it was announced that "dispatches received by the state department and the Russian embassy contradict the impression that the conference was a failure," and "surprise was expressed that the news reports had reflected so much pessimism." Even the fall of Riga, due to military disorganization, was "not regarded with so much alarm as might be supposed." But The North American's view was:

The most important aspect of the situation is the new evidence it provides of Russia's demoralization. The folly and arrogance and infatuation of the elements constituting and supporting the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates have brought within sight the catastrophe which every rational mind foresaw that they would produce. \* \* \* If American money and optimism can save the distracted repub-

lic, which is being driven to ruin by forces of disunion and anarchy, one of the strangest miracles of history is about to be performed. But there is no evidence yet that either of those things can overcome artillery or counteract a poison that has eaten into the very soul of the nation.

When General Korniloff made his despairing attempt to gain power and restore military discipline, Washington gave its support to Kerensky—as, indeed, it was bound to do. But this newspaper regretted that the soldier patriot could not win:

If his judgment was wrong, the error was due to temerity, not to treacherous ambition. Even an overdeveloped sense of patriotism, we conceive, could not do Russia such dire injury as has been done to her by flabby internationalism, which has brought her at last into the shame of unresisted invasion and the perils of unredeemed anarchy.

A week ago today was received Kerensky's extraordinary statement, intimating that Russia had not been adequately supported by her allies and declaring that they must now "shoulder the burden of the war." A Washington newspaper headed the dispatch, "Russia Quits War"; whereupon Secretary Lansing gave this rebuke:

There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received by the department of state, nor information derived from any other source whatever, to justify the impression created. Our own advices show that the provisional government is attacking with great energy the problems confronting it.

At that very time threats of civil war were being openly made in the Russian capital, and six days later the government was declared overthrown. Yesterday's Washington dispatches complete the record:

Serious as the Russian situation is shown to be, the government here remains optimistic, and is inclined to regard conditions as no worse than they have been for several months.



## RUSSIA QUILS

*November 12, 1917.*

**A**LTHO the prevailing opinion in Washington's exalted circles seems to be that the Russian upheaval is "only temporary" and that the reign of irresponsible extremists "cannot last," we believe that present conditions will continue at least until this comment appears in print. Therefore, we shall venture to give our interpretation of events which no placid assurances can change. The optimism of many Americans concerning Russia has been one of the most remarkable manifestations of our national ideas about the war; but that it should persist in the face of the present situation is astounding. On November 3, only a few hours before the elements of anarchy overturned the compromising, vacillating provisional government, a leading New York newspaper said gravely that "the assurance that Russia is still in the war was not necessary from the premier." Saturday's dispatches from Washington breathed hope, almost contentment. The situation was found "not as bad as news from Petrograd would seem to indicate." While the administration was "concerned," the idea that Russia "would remain in the Allied column" had "not been abandoned." The state of mind in the capital is indicated by the fact that "great significance" was attached to the following powerful utterance by Secretary of War Baker:

I am a great believer in the ability of Russia to find itself and to re-establish law and order. If there is any lesson to be gained from history, it is that a great people

find that liberty and order go hand in hand. The Russians, being a great people, soon will stabilize their government and their liberties in a firm and orderly way.

Valuable as this sagacious statement may be as an observation upon the philosophy of history, its bearing upon current military prospects seems somewhat remote; for it would be quite possible, while the Russians were trying to "find" themselves, for the United States and its allies to lose the war. Our own judgment is now, as it has been for months, that no safe reliance can be placed upon Russia as an effective member of the coalition against Germany. Those interested in the matter may have noted, from the editorial comment we reprinted on Saturday, that we never were able to reconcile the hopeful views of the American mission to Russia with the plain message of events in that country. There was one member of the mission, however, who did not let his wishes cloud his judgment. Charles R. Crane, an American of achievement and keen judgment, remained in Russia after his colleagues came home; he was there nearly five months; and at the end he said, when asked for his opinion: "Things have been growing steadily worse right along. They are still getting worse, and the end is not in sight. The situation is too big for any one man to handle and save it." Whether the result is to be a separate peace, sudden cure of the Bolsheviki madness or the paralyzing turmoil of civil war, what Americans have to face is the prosecuting of the great struggle without Russia's aid. They should estimate calmly and candidly just what loss they have suffered and derive what benefit they can from a study of the causes of the disaster, and of the best means of counteracting its effects. The travail of Russia has lacked thus far the thrilling tragedy of the French revolution, yet it has not been without its dramatic features. The mere

descent from dizzy heights of idealism and promise to the depths of futility and anarchy has been of fascinating interest. A rapid survey of the significant episodes, roughly chronological, will be useful.

It was only eight months ago that a single gust of popular defiance suddenly brought down in ruins the towering structure of czarism, founded upon the nation's ignorance and superstition and supported by Prussian intrigue. The almost bloodless destruction of an aged autocracy was accomplished by two forces—intelligent liberalism, represented by the duma, and fanatical radicalism, represented by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. The former body provided the statesmanship, the latter the force, by reason of its influence with labor and the army. Never was there a more striking demonstration of the power of democracy—almost at a word, a despotism rooted in centuries was swept away. But at that hour there began a new contest as irreconcilable as that between the people and their discarded rulers. It was a struggle for the soul of the nation, between democracy and Socialism, between national union and class warfare, between order and anarchy. And the evil forces, up to this time, have won. The antagonism was fundamental. The provisional government, created by the elected representatives of the people, stood for a political revolution and the establishment of a democracy to be made secure by the defeat of Prussianism. The radical manipulators of the workers' and soldiers' organization stood for the creation of a socialized state; they repudiated the war, demanded the abolition of property and dazzled their followers with visions of communism. In the name of democracy they destroyed discipline in the army, encouraged sedition, trafficked with the agents of kaiserism and sowed hatred and distrust of Russia's allies, particularly the United

States. In this way they undermined the government and brought about the shameful exhibitions of military disorder and treachery.

It should be understood that this, like political groupings in all countries and all times, had its factions. The Bolsheviki or Maximalists—the radicals of the most extreme type—were long in a minority; it was not until September 14 that they obtained full control of the Petrograd council. But even during the ascendancy of the “moderates” government was a travesty. Constructive leaders like Miliukoff and Lvoff were driven from power; Kerensky’s dictatorship, “granted” to him by the irresponsible agitators, was a hollow farce; the republic he was allowed to proclaim, with authority lodged in five ministers, was a hopeless expedient. Steadily the elements of disunion usurped the function of administration and destroyed the efficacy of the nation’s defensive forces. Korniloff’s despairing effort to create a genuine military command failed. Kerensky’s policy of conciliation and compromise failed. The generous aid and loyal friendship of the United States for the Russian people failed. Russia’s soul was enslaved by falsehood and fanaticism. The prospects are outlined with sufficient clearness in the program of the Bolshevik victors—the offer of an “immediate democratic” peace; division of proprietarial lands among the peasants; requisition of private property for the benefit of the soldiery, and a three months’ armistice, during which “elected representatives from all nations” are to settle the terms. The proposals may be unprincipled, but no one can deny that there is genius in them. The word “peace” sends a thrill thru the darkened minds of millions. The pledge of land expropriation stirs the peasant soul. The soldiers, already exulting in domination over their officers, hail the prom-

ise of prosperity at the expense of "capitalism." And the settlement of terms by the "proletariat" of all countries seems a device of miraculous simplicity. Hence the program makes a headway that must disconcert the optimists. Petrograd, they say hopefully, is not Russia; but the army is, essentially, and it responds to the Maximalist appeal. The provisional government, it is predicted, will re-establish itself at Moscow, the ancient capital, where radicalism is powerless; and the prophecy is overtaken by the news that Moscow is in the hands of the Bolsheviki. These fanatics, we are assured, constitute only a minute fraction of the Russian people; but they were strong enough to terrorize and overthrow Kerensky's party. And let them be ever so small in numbers, and their term of power ever so brief, what would happen if they made a separate peace with Germany and proclaimed it to the war-weary troops in the trenches?

Every rational human being knows, of course, that the program is dishonest, where it is not imbecile. A "democratic peace" at this time is a contradiction in terms, since the peace would have to be made with kaiserism and junkerism and an unwhipped, impenitent autocracy. But the whole scheme of the uprising is at war with the principles of democracy. "Now," boasts Lenine, premier of the bedlamite régime, "we have a real revolution—the peasants and workmen control the government, and this is only a preliminary step toward a similar revolution everywhere." The "democracy" of the Maximalist would disfranchise and enslave all the human race outside of those classes. German opinion seems to take a cynical view of the fantastic procedure. The triumphant invaders of Italy are not attracted by stipulations against annexations and indemnities, and they may not take seriously the proposal of an armistice

and negotiations which their enemies would contemptuously ignore; another Stockholm fiasco would be humiliating. But a formal peace with Russia would hardly be more advantageous than conditions now existing.

In any event, it is unthinkable that Russia will ever fight again for a cause which her people cannot understand, in which they are incapable of taking any intelligent interest. To give the infatuated ultra revolutionists their due, their ideal is a general peace, and they insist that no separate arrangement with Germany will be made. If the German people do not force their autocratic rulers to stop the war, say the Bolsheviki, the Russians will fight "like lions." This view, if sincere, reveals their utter delusion. The Russian army cannot fight. It lacks discipline, conviction, a sense of nationalism. It is a living corpse, for its soul has been slain within it by those who boast of its power. Already the collapse of Russia has cost the Allies the assistance of Italy. Still to be counted and felt is the release of more of the 147 divisions which the Teutons have had to keep on their eastern front. But a worse disaster than either of these things would be persistence in the policy of depending upon effective aid from a nation whose energies are exhausted and whose most hopeful outlook is for civil war, prolonged, bitter and doubtful in result.

## THE BOLSHEVIKI

*November 13, 1917.*

**I**F ONE could forget the tragedy of the Russian spectacle, the terrible burdens of human suffering and woe which must be borne by mankind because of it, one might enjoy the vivid melodrama of its episodes. Strange are the beings it projects upon the stage; stranger still the fate that has suddenly whirled them from obscurity to a dazzling eminence of power. Consider the two men in whom the present crumbling revolution is personified. For years Nicolai Lenine and Leon Trotzky were but two figures among the multitudinous forces of revolt against the ordinances of human society. Their lives were narrow, their influence minute, their habits of life necessarily furtive. They haunted the byways of civilization, unknown and ignored by a busy world. Ceaselessly active in pursuit of their destructive aims, they were reduced to haranguing their own kind amid sordid surroundings and conducting precarious intrigues from back rooms in cheap lodging houses. Today they sit in the seats of the mighty. For an hour, their sway is that of autocrats. They hold the power of life and death over thousands; they speak with the voice of millions; their words influence the fate of nations. The one is premier, the other foreign minister, in the government of 170,000,000 people. The astonishing movement represented by these men will provide one of the most interesting and instructive chapters in the history of human progress. Of course, their success is artificial and transitory. No rational being will expect

Russia to resume decisive action in the war, but it would be still more illogical to believe that anarchy's reign is to be permanent.

The deplorable thing is that first both Russia and the world must suffer because the principles of human rights are distorted and liberty abused by incompetence and fanaticism. All the outrages and imbecilities of Bolshevism are committed in the name of democracy. To realize the travesty upon the name it is necessary only to trace the rise of this cult to dominance. Of the Russian people, about 80 per cent are peasants, and a still larger part of the population have hardly emerged from the intellectual darkness that enveloped them during the night of serfdom. For generations they had been crushed under the suffocating weight of a rapacious autocracy, until the idea was burned into their very souls that authority and order were themselves the enemies of the race. Suddenly the burden of ages was lifted. They were free. Inevitably, liberty meant to them the antithesis of everything they had endured. They awoke, as it were, from a hideous dream, and, as the horrid shapes of tyranny and cruelty and extortion vanished, there went with them the habit of obedience and the sense of nationalism. They accepted liberation in its most literal and individual sense; it must mean, of course, that there was to be no more fighting, much less labor, higher pay and the complete, immediate transfer of authority to the mass. In such circumstances it was fatally easy for the exponents of ultra-radical doctrines to gain power; they could promise anything, and, what is more, they could demonstrably deliver much of what they offered. Because labor and the army already presented the machinery of organization, the extremists were able thru them to attain early control of the industrial centers and the military forces; and, dominating



the processes of production and transportation as well as the nation's defenses, they steadily substituted their will for the decrees of the provisional government. Thus from the hour of the overthrow of czarism there was an irreconcilable conflict. The elements represented by the duma, the Constitutional Democrats and the rational Socialists stood for a political revolution and the establishment of a democratic state, preferably a republic. The opposing forces comprised the advocates of the immediate erection of a completely socialized state. These latter, now in the ascendancy, are the Bolsheviki, or Maximalists. It is important to know what these now familiar terms mean. We have collected some expert definitions by various observers:—

The Bolsheviki include the most radical, the idealists, the fanatics, even to the anarchists. Everything they do not like, everything that is a fixed point in an established social order having good points, is to them "bourgeois." By "bourgeois" they mean all forces which resist the establishment of a state of complete Socialism; or, what amounts to the same thing in their minds, all forces which resist taking the goods of the "bourgeoisie" and giving them to the proletariat.

Bolshevism is the state of mind that cannot support another instant the old injustices. The Bolshevik is in such a state of wrath against all the unfairness he and his father have endured that he is going to end it all right now, if he wrecks the whole fabric doing it.

The Bolshevik faction is made up of the disgruntled, unfit, defective elements of the population.

The Bolshevik movement in Russia is the same thing as the I. W. W. movement in America. The Bolsheviki are having much more success here, because the great body of the Russian people are densely ignorant, and have lived under an autocracy that was even more stupid than they. The more the Bolsheviki promise them, the better they like it. The agitators could have no such success in a country with an established national life; but in the midst of a revolution that upset everything they flourish.

Perhaps the last paragraph conveys the clearest

idea. The Bolsheviki are made up, first, of German agents and pro-German agitators; second, of unbalanced or fanatical radicals; and, third, of a vast following of workmen and soldiers, who conceive that liberty means a transfer of the powers of tyranny from the few to the many. The movement has a single aim—creation of a socialized state. The clamor for peace is incidental. Cessation of the war is a preliminary requirement, because fighting delays the program. To the Bolsheviki the war is simply a nuisance to be got rid of. To the great mass of Russians, moreover, it appears as a relic of czarism. Their reasoning is simple. They fought for the czar because they had to; now the czar is gone; therefore, why fight? And especially, why fight to realize the aims of governments which were the allies of czarism and not of the Russian people? So they, too, are bored by the war. What interests them is the revolution—which means raising wages 300 or 400 per cent; running factories by committees of employes and regiments by committees of soldiers; distributing proprietary lands among the peasants; a government by the proletariat. Americans ask themselves what effect the revolution will have on the war; but all the Russians care about is what effect the war will have on their revolution. A government by the proletariat—that is the business they have in hand. This is, of course, cruelly unfair as well as atrociously undemocratic. Had it not been for the courage and democratic vigor of the hated “bourgeoisie,” czarism would still be astride the necks of the people. A mere uprising by seditionists and radical extremists would have been easily and mercilessly repressed; the revolt became a revolution because the sane and intelligent citizenship put its weight behind the movement. And its reward is a proclamation that the “property-owning class” shall have no part in the

government. Whether this decree is to disfranchise the peasants after they have become landowners does not appear. But it should make clear to Americans the gulf that separates democracy from the Bolshevik perversion of that doctrine. An American eyewitness of every development of the revolution gives this lucid interpretation:

The word democracy does not mean the same thing in Russia as in the United States. We mean all the people of the United States. The Russians mean all the people who habitually button their collars at the side instead of in front. Without the "bourgeoisie" there would have been no revolution, and the "narod" (the "common people") would still be under the yoke. But the "narod" forgets that. In fact, most of it is mentally so backward as to know nothing about it. It knows it is free, and its idea of freedom is that it rules. What the Russian "democracy" stands for is not democracy, but government by the "narod," government by—unpleasant word that it is—the "lower classes."

The revolution against czarism, in a word, abolished political privilege and created equality. Bolshevism would abolish political equality and set up a privileged majority. It is a grievous thing for the world that this painful ordeal in the evolution of a backward people has to be endured. But, since the experience was necessary, it is well that falsehood should receive the fatal gift of power. As an instrument of obstruction, capable of attacking abuses and stimulating progress, Bolshevism was bound to gain in strength; but as a governing institution, a creative and constructive force, it is manifestly impossible, and must be swept away by the collective good sense that exists even in the distracted minds of the Russian people. The great pity is that an inscrutable fate permits it to arise at a time when it can most effectively bring discredit upon the name of liberty and most dangerously compromise the cause of democracy.

## KERENSKY

*November 15, 1917.*

**I**F THE overburdened leader who commands the forces of Russian democracy and patriotism in their uncertain conflict with anarchy finds time amid the turmoil for reflection, he must recall with bitterness the delusion which has brought him and the nation to the verge of ruin. Within a month after the downfall of czarism the failure of the provisional government was already foreshadowed in the growing arrogance and aggression of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which had set up an irresponsible authority and was promoting political disunion, industrial disorder and military treachery. Kerensky, who had been one of the chief architects of the revolution, was minister of justice. In response to warnings that this conflict of power must bring catastrophe, he denied the existence of such a conflict and argued that safety lay in placating the elements of disloyalty and fanaticism. "We have decided," he said, "that we can better attain our ends without the use of force or rigid authority." In this utterance is to be found the reason for Russia's collapse. For six months force and authority were withheld, and when at last their employment was attempted it was too late to divert the menace of a destructive system entrenched in the capital and backed by an army. The conflict of abstract doctrines had swelled into civil war.

The fact that responsibility for this situation rests chiefly upon Kerensky is in itself a striking tribute to his dominating personality. Whether he returns to Petro-

grad as dictator or passes thru defeat into obscurity, he has been for many months the one figure of commanding stature in Russian affairs, and his character, compounded strangely of statesmanship and folly, of strength and weakness, presents a fascinating study. His natural qualities of leadership were developed by rigorous experience. Born in Siberia about thirty-seven years ago, Alexander Kerensky reached manhood a convinced democrat, an ardent champion of popular rights and a relentless foe of the autocracy that was strangling the nation. He became a lawyer, and as such made himself a sort of counsel for the people against the abuses of political and capitalistic despotism. He first won distinction by defending striking miners who had risen against tyranny and injustice, and in 1912 he was elected to the fourth duma by an overwhelming vote. That parliament, because of reactionary changes in the election laws, was less representative of the people than preceding bodies had been; yet there was a vigorous opposition. In this the majority was made up of sixty Constitutional Democrats led by Miliukoff, while the extreme Left comprised fourteen Socialists of the "internationalist" type and ten of the "nationalist" variety. Of these last agrarian Socialists, representing the peasantry, Kerensky was the leader. Revered by the peasants and trusted also by the industrial workers, he stood for a drastic program of political and economic reform, but especially for the doctrine of "land and liberty" for the enslaved agricultural population. Altho properly classified as a Socialist, he was rather a Populist. For five years he made open war in the duma against the bureaucracy, and dared even to assail czarism. When the final break came, it was his skill in negotiation and his tireless activity that did most to carry thru the hazardous undertaking. As a member of the first pro-

visional government he rapidly became the recognized leader. It was a task of enormous difficulty which his genius invited. He had to promote the interests, yet check the excesses, of both the peasantry and the labor forces; to advance Socialistic ideals while encouraging support from the constitutional and "bourgeois" elements; to be at once aggressively radical and sanely liberal; to reconcile the demands of extremists with the requirements of national safety; to arouse the people against a foreign foe while satisfying their demand for a policy leading to early peace. And these ends he had to pursue while holding as a fundamental principle that Russia's only hope lay in fidelity to her allies and victory over Germany. As minister of justice, minister of war and premier he consistently championed this idea. That he had vision and deep conviction upon the vital issues will appear from characteristic utterances during the early stages of the contest with radicalism's greed of power:

The passing from servility to freedom is not a parade, but painful work. If we are unworthy slaves, not an organized state, we face a sanguinary period of internal discord, ending in the administration of force to set things right. Is Russia a free state or a collection of mutinied serfs? My own energies are nearly gone. I have lost my daring, my faith that we are not slaves in revolt instead of free citizens creating a new state. I am sorry I did not die two months ago, when the dream of a new life was growing in the hearts of the Russian people, when I was sure the country could govern itself without the whip.

At no time, indeed, did he fail in vigor of declaration. When made minister of war, his first proclamation was that the crumbling national defenses must be rebuilt thru the application of "iron discipline" in the army and navy. In his tour of the front he ceaselessly exhorted the troops to obedience and unity, and had his reward in the spectacular offensive of July, which, had

it not been halted by Bolshevik intrigue and interference in Petrograd, would have smashed the Austrian resistance. "If argument and reason, honor and conscience, are not sufficient," he proclaimed, "we will beat Russia into unity with blood and iron." This was after the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, alarmed by the results of its own excesses, had "granted" to the provisional government "unlimited powers" to restore the disorganized military forces. But the fatal weakness of Kerensky's policy was that from the beginning he sought to compromise with elements which were relentlessly determined upon rule or ruin. He permitted them to dictate, and he himself issued those lamentable regulations which abolished the authority of officers, and intrusted not only discipline, but military decisions, to committees of soldiers and sailors. On every issue he sought to temporize with Bolshevism, to satisfy the implacable forces of social revolution by yielding to their demands. The result was, of course, that at each encounter they grew stronger and the provisional government weaker. Civil war really began, or was shown to be inevitable, at the conference of all political elements in Moscow, during August. There General Korniloff delivered his warning of the impending fall of Riga and of national disintegration unless discipline was restored, and there the exultant Maximalists broke into shouts of defiance and contempt for the government. A few days later Korniloff made his despairing attempt to re-establish military authority. His aim was plainly to save the provisional régime, but Kerensky, terrorized by the Bolsheviks, joined them in denouncing the commander-in-chief as an "enemy of the revolution," and the movement was stifled. What we said then events have justified: "Kerensky and Korniloff as enemies can produce only further chaos;

acting together, they might have achieved for Russia a swift salvation, and for democracy an early triumph." Opinion in Great Britain and France was strong that Kerensky had fatally impaired his power by vacillation and treaty with the extremists, and that Korniloff's success might save Russia. But the American government ostentatiously announced its support of Kerensky, the opportunity passed, and Bolshevism had gained a new triumph. A keen observer on the ground gave this vivid picture of the demoralization:

The bright hopes of the revolution are being darkened; patience and hope have been exhausted by a series of futile compromises. The Korniloff affair has intensified mutual distrust. The government is shadowy and unreal; the influence of the Bolsheviki has increased enormously. Kerensky's prestige has declined, and he is not actively supported by either the Right or the Left.

The final evidence of the leader's distraction was his issuance a fortnight ago of a bitter and wholly unjust complaint that Russia had "borne the brunt of the war," and had lacked adequate support from her allies, particularly in Great Britain's failure to attempt the impossible feat of forcing the entrance of the Baltic. A few days later he ousted the minister of war, who was offensive to the Bolsheviki because he strongly advocated real discipline in the army. Even when the anarchist uprising had started, Kerensky hesitated. A delegation of Cossacks pledged their loyalty—but asked that the government define its attitude toward the Bolsheviki, even to the extent of declaring them outlaws. "I find it difficult to do so," answered the premier; and twenty-four hours later he was a fugitive, while the conspirators whom he hoped to disarm by kindness ruled the capital. The one merit of the Bolsheviki is that they speak plainly, act accordingly and do not compromise. If Kerensky had adopted these methods from the begin-



ning, there would have been strife, it is true, but it would have been short and decisive, whereas now it threatens to be prolonged and uncertain. His mistake was in attempting to avert by concessions a conflict which was irreconcilable. A French publicist's comment is severe but just:

Kerensky had long been judged in France. When we saw him inundate Russia with speeches, when the situation demanded the strong hand of a dictator, we and the entire world understood he was riding revolution to its fall. He failed to seize Korniloff's plan to substitute action for words. From that day he was lost.

Our own estimate of two months ago has not changed:

He yielded from the beginning to the domination of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and never since has been able to extricate himself from that malign power. Measured by character and aims, he is a great leader and a pure patriot; but measured by results, he is not the savior of his country.

At last he has joined forces with Korniloff, and conceivably the two may revive the drugged soul of the nation. But if Kerensky succeeds, and proves himself the builder he dreamed of being, it will be because he has learned that liberty cannot be served by paltering with forces which are at war with order and the fundamental principles of democracy.

## ALLIED UNITY OR ALLIED DEFEAT

*November 19, 1917.*

**E**VEN tho the Germans are a good deal preoccupied just now with the conquest of northeastern Italy, the comforting progress of anarchy in Russia and the perpetual problem of a food shortage, they must observe with sardonic satisfaction the first results of their enemies' efforts to attain unity. Thus far the principal effect has been to create among those governments and peoples a sense of uneasiness and confusion and vague distrust. It would seem to the ordinary American observer, basing his judgment upon the record of the last three years, that the most logical, obvious and urgent need is for the establishment of a unified program, to be carried out thru studied co-operation respecting every consideration of political policy, economic action and military strategy. Yet such a proposal, made in moderate terms by so potent and trusted a leader as Premier Lloyd George, has occasioned the bitterest controversy Great Britain has known during the war, and has actually awakened suspicions of disunion among the Allies. One should not take too literally, of course, the outburst of invective from his countrymen which greeted the premier's remarkably candid speech in Paris. While the English people are still doggedly determined, they have endured for forty months things which we have still to experience, and the strain is beginning to tell upon them. Heavy tax burdens, the requirements of a disordered life, the pain of numberless bereavements and the anguish of hope deferred have

inevitably made them sensitive and exacting. Their nerves are raw, and wince at the lightest touch. Americans should take these circumstances into account when judging the violent attacks upon a rational suggestion, the chief fault of which is that it merely skirts the edges of a stupendous and vital problem. Events have moved so quickly since our discussion ten days ago of the need for Allied unity in prosecution of the war that a glance at the developments and their meaning may be helpful in showing what serious difficulties confront this nation and those which it has joined.

An inter-ally military conference had been called for November 15, but the Italian collapse made quick intervention necessary, and on November 4 there was a meeting of the premiers of Great Britain, France and Italy, with political and military advisers from each country. Joint defense of the Italian front was arranged, and the three governments set up a "supreme war council" to supervise their future operations in the west. It was on November 12, in Paris, that Mr. Lloyd George caused a British upheaval by reviewing the failures and disasters of the last three years, and charging them to lack of unity in the purposes and efforts of the Allies. They permitted Serbia to be destroyed and the Balkans to be seized by Germany because "no one in particular" was responsible for guarding that region. By the same "unbelievable fault" Rumania was crushed. "That would not have happened," he said, "had there existed some central authority, charged with meditating upon the problem of the war for the entire theater of the conflict." Had not co-operation been finally arranged, he declared, he would have resigned, for he "could no longer accept responsibility for the direction of a war condemned to disaster from lack of unity." Every item in this statement was so true that Ameri-

cans were astonished to find it assailed in England with a ferocity which mere party feeling could not wholly explain. Enemies of the premier, chiefly Tories, cried out that his immediate aim was to supersede the general staff with an international committee of politicians, and his ultimate purpose to displace Field Marshal Haig and General Robertson for "amateur strategists." The new council was denounced as a scheme "fatal and disastrous," and the speech "the most lamentable blow against the Allies during the war," struck by a "dangerous and unscrupulous demagogue." A whole series of explanations and interpretations followed, each of which seemed to add to the confusion. Secretary Lansing had said that the American delegates to the forthcoming inter-ally conference were to join in "devising means to intensify the efforts of the belligerents against Germany by complete co-operation under a general plan." This was vague, yet intelligible. But the misconceptions created in the American mind were suggested by the absurd assurance of one newspaper that "every regiment, every battery, will be directed from a central point, if present intentions are fulfilled." The premier of France, a party to the arrangement, gave this outline:

The object of the council is not to direct the details of military operations, but to define the general war policy and the general plans of the Allies, adapting them to the resources and means at their command, so as to assure the strongest possible results.

But the controversy was to have an almost ridiculous anti-climax. Last Wednesday Premier Lloyd George, challenged in the house of commons, read the text of the terrible agreement, disclosing it as the mildest and feeblest instrument of unity that a war alliance ever devised. The mission of the "supreme war council"—comprising two ministers of each of the gov-

ernments concerned—is “to watch over the general conduct of the war” and to “prepare recommendations for the consideration of the governments.” Each Power is to send one military representative as “technical adviser.” The general staffs of the armies in the field “remain responsible to their respective governments.” Lest any excuse for alarm remain, the premier explained:

The council will have no executive power; final decisions in the matter of strategy and the distribution and movements of the various armies in the field will rest with the several governments. The object has been to set up a central body charged with the duty of continuously surveying the field of operations as a whole, and of co-ordinating the plans prepared by the different general staffs, and, if necessary, of making proposals of their own for the better conduct of the war.

Compared to the unity of plan and command which prevails in the Central Powers' alliance this is, of course, a mere scrap of paper. An American critic accurately remarks that the proposed “supreme war council” has two distinguishing features—it is not supreme and it is not a war council. It represents merely a step, and a short and hesitating one, toward that unity which for three years has been a lavishly advertised fiction. To understand the futility of such half measures, one has only to try to imagine how far Germany would have got with a “supreme war council” in which assorted statesmen and strategists representing Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey exercised supervision, without authority, over the imperial general staff and its operations. It was precisely because there was one command, one central source of decision, that she was able to destroy the power of Servia, Montenegro, Rumania, Russia and Italy and to subordinate clashing policies to a single aim. It must be said at once, however, that such complete centralization of authority among the Allies is impossible. Domination of their

political and military strategy by Great Britain, by France, by the United States or by any other single Power, is unthinkable. Germany is backed by three states which are her vassals; the nations in the opposing coalition are equals. Other difficulties in the way of a complete amalgamation are obvious. Each of the three European principals has special aims which seem to it paramount. Great Britain's safety depends upon ejecting Germany from the Flanders coast and western Asia. The soul of France is wrapped up in the redemption of her ravaged territory and her lost provinces. Italy, if she is saved from complete downfall, will turn with inextinguishable longing to Trieste and the Trentino. That the purposes of these nations are at variance does not imply enmity or sordidness; the history of a hundred years has created for them problems which cannot easily be reconciled and fashioned into a coherent program. The United States alone is free from embarrassing political and territorial desires. Its single need and resolve is to defeat Germany. And for this reason America's power is the one thing that may finally lead to the creation of a real unity.

Certainly every consideration which can be separated from special national aims urges that the Allies, as we said the other day, shall pool their resources, unify their military purposes and concentrate their powers. The calamitous record of the last three years cries out against a continuance of disjointed effort. The fall of Antwerp, the disaster of Gallipoli, the sacrifice of Servia and Rumania, the wasting of Russia, all these losses resulted from lack of cohesive planning and united execution. The overthrow of Italy is merely a more glaring example, for the coming of the German blow was known weeks in advance, and not a move was made to meet it.

Americans should not be too critical of the failing

which leads each nation to consider its own particular front the one vital concern. Britons are furious over the suggestion that any "general plan" should divert a man or a gun from the precious line in Flanders, and we say lightly that they are short-sighted. But when the United States has lost a half million men, and the American casualty list runs to 25,000 or 30,000 a month, is it not likely that we shall consider our part of the line the very heart of the war? Shall we be eager to share our troops or our weapons at a critical stage of a campaign? National psychology, admittedly, is all against the ideal project of unity; yet to that, we are convinced, the peoples fighting Germany must come before they can command victory. There is one thing more important than military strategy, however big or vital the field, and that is general war policy. It is essential that there shall be created, in some way, a centralized joint control, which shall direct the political, economic and military efforts of the coalition according to an ordered plan. The French premier stated the clear truth:

A single front, a single army, a single nation—that is the program requisite for future victory. If after forty months of war and its lessons the Allies were not capable of that sacred international union, then, in spite of their sacrifices, they would not be worthy of victory.

## THE TESTING OF ITALY

*November 21, 1917.*

THE importance and intensity of the struggle in Italy is indicated by the fact that on all other fronts there is a noticeable pause in the fighting. While Germany has concentrated there all the force she dared divert from other regions, it would seem that the necessity for strengthening the Italian line has compelled Great Britain and France also to diminish their operations in the west. Yet the real battle-ground is not that upon which the interest of the world is centered. The Germans and Austrians may take Venice and carry their invasion miles further without gaining a decisive victory. The contest that counts is being fought unseen throughout the whole country—in the city streets, in towns and villages, in unnumbered homes, in the minds of the men and women of Italy. It is the soul of the nation that is being tried. If that soul be true, Italy will emerge from the ordeal strong with the spirit of unity and high resolve; if it falter thru fear or the deadly poisoning of selfishness and sedition, military defeat will be but the prelude to a worse disaster, and the glory of her nationhood may be eclipsed like that of Russia. From the day of that fatal break in the line which let in the Teuton flood, the spokesmen for Italy have not ceased to proclaim that the catastrophe was due to lack of co-operation by her allies, and there is undeniably a basis of truth for the charge. The reinforcements now being laboriously moved to her support, if sent two months ago, would have enabled her to deal Austria-Hungary a



mortal blow. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the initial collapse was due to moral, not military, weakness; and the forces which Italy has most to fear are not the armies which threaten her treasure-cities in the north, but those subtle forces which would undermine her intelligence, her patriotism and her national unity.

The military situation is the most interesting, as it is the most critical, since the French armies and the "first hundred thousand" of Great Britain's troops made that terrible retreat before the first German onslaught. For one thing, the battle area has certain sharply defined geographical features which make it comparatively easy for the inexpert observer to grasp the meaning of the evolutions. The theater of war since the retreat began is that rounded, blunted projection of Italy which extends in a northeasterly direction above the Adriatic. It is bounded on the south by the sea, and on the north by the semicircular sweep of the Dolomite, Carnic and Julian Alps. The first crashing blow pierced the defenses in the last-named region on the east, and necessitated a swift withdrawal of the whole line between that point and the sea. There was no hope save in a retirement southwestward, in order to shorten the front and the lines of communication, link up with the forces in the Trentino region, and gain time for reorganization.

These operations, so far as both sides were concerned, have been dominated by a series of rivers whose names have become familiar to every reader. One simple fact makes understandable the whole problem. From the Alps there descend to the sea, in a general southerly or southeasterly direction, a series of streams. Each of these, flowing roughly at right angles to the direction of retreat, forms a natural line of defense for the Italians and a natural obstacle to the invaders. First to be reached was the Tagliamento, and there a strong rear-

guard action was fought to cover the retirement of the main forces. For a few days, indeed, many observers talked of that as the possible scene of another battle of the Marne; but it soon appeared that Cadorna never hoped to stop the invasion there. Twenty miles westward similar operations were carried out at the Livenza, and another twenty miles brought the contending forces to the Piave. There they remain, the Germans and Austrians on the east bank, the Italians holding the west bank, except for one or two places where the assailants have forced crossings. Because the Italians have shown a disposition to stand at the Piave, that river also has been named as the limit of the invasion; but it is generally agreed now that the Italians dare not accept battle at that point, because their defense is threatened by a turning movement from the north exactly like that which compelled them to flee from the Isonzo.

From the Adriatic shore—where the Italians have protected themselves by flooding a wide area—the line follows the river northwestward for about fifty miles, then bends westward across the Asiago plateau, thru the Dolomites and across the lower tip of the Trentino. It is from the north that the most serious menace comes. The Teutons are making strong thrusts there, and, if they should break thru, they would threaten to flank the whole Piave line. Unless the Italians and their allies are perfectly confident, therefore, that the northern defenses will hold, they will fight only delaying actions on the Piave; otherwise they would run the risk of another Isonzo rout. The next river to the west is the Brenta, but it affords slight defense; and the next retirement, if it becomes necessary, will be to the further bank of the Adige. Venice lies midway between the Piave and the Brenta, and between the Brenta and the Adige are Padua and Vicenza, with Verona on the banks of the latter

river. Therefore, withdrawal from the Piave will mean abandonment of these four important cities; but between such a surrender and the destruction of the armies in the field there can be but one choice. Retirement to the Adige would yield to the invaders 4000 or 5000 miles of the richest and most-cherished soil of Italy; but far worse would be the results if the movement were attempted too late. Not only would another disaster like that of the Isonzo break the morale of the Italian armies and people, but it would leave defenseless the industrial region lying beyond the Adige, and Italy would be in the same position as France, when she lost her mines and factory cities during the first fortnight of the war, while the Teutons would be correspondingly strengthened. If, therefore, the invaders do not force abandonment of the Piave line, they must accept defeat, for they will gain neither Venice, nor the paralysis of Italy, nor the separate peace which they hope to impose. And if an orderly Italian retirement ends in the organization of an effective defense at the Adige, the German victory will still be indecisive; it will have given the kaiser's subjects a new "war map" over which to gloat, but will have added nothing to their food supply or their chances of dictating terms to the Allies.

Thus far we have discussed only the military aspects of the problem. But there is another factor of profound importance, and that is the temper and spirit of the Italian people, soldiers and civilians. Conditions are not without disquieting features. All the world knows now that it was not wholly lack of heavy guns and ammunition which caused that disastrous collapse of a mountain sector on the Isonzo line. The first official bulletin from Rome bluntly charged the broken detachment with "cowardice," and, tho the epithet was eliminated in a revised bulletin, it was not formally withdrawn. The

truth is that the troops in that region were deluded and seduced by the same vicious propaganda that destroyed Russia's fighting spirit. The sector had been quiet for several months. Austrian aviators had scattered myriads of peace and Socialist pamphlets in the Italian lines, while German spies and Italian agitators of the Bolshevik type smuggled in similar stuff from the rear. There were even adventures in fraternization, and the Italian soldiers found their enemies apparently as eager as they for a "just" peace that would bring in a Socialist millennium for the proletariat of both countries. The final preparation for the assault was distribution of forged copies of Italian newspapers, purporting to describe revolutionary outbreaks at home, with English regiments slaughtering the people in behalf of imperialism and capitalism. Then the "friendly" Austrians were secretly withdrawn from the front, and when the Germans who replaced them advanced behind their gas waves and curtain of fire, they met slight resistance; the dazed defenders fled from strongly fortified mountain positions, and the gains of two years were sacrificed in thirty-six hours. Once more Prussianized Socialism had served kaiserism better than its generals and armies.

But the outbreak of sedition in the field was merely a symptom of a disease which has steadily eaten into the vigor of the nation. Pro-Germanism, pacifism and Bolshevism have brought Italy to the verge of the catastrophe that overwhelmed Russia. Invasion has galvanized the country into a semblance of unity, but the tireless agents of autocracy and disunion have redoubled their efforts, and the danger has not passed that they will deliver the nation into bondage. Economically exhausted and militarily shaken, Italy is politically distracted. One weak cabinet succeeds another, while the parliament, elected before the war, is dominated by

"neutralists" who have supported the government against their convictions. Sanguinary bread riots have occurred in some centers, and strikes incited by enemy agents keep the industrial regions in turmoil. Everywhere the craven, the disloyal and the fanatical whisper their sinister tale of a nation betrayed and a peace withheld because of greed and ambition. Because the country is in need of food and coal and iron, the plotters spread the tale that the United States is false, and this fable finds credence because America has not declared war on Austria, Italy's implacable enemy. Of all the agencies of disunion, the most dangerous is Socialism. The "official" party, alarmed by the effects of its propaganda for peace at any price, now pledges a political truce and support of the government; but that does not prevent the extremist agitators of the cult from scattering their poisonous doctrines. Of German origin, Socialism remains German in every country, and all the victories autocracy has won by force of arms do not compare with the advantages it has gained thru its Socialistic lackeys at home and its Socialistic stoolpigeons abroad. If Americans marvel that Italians have been deluded by these advocates of kaiserism, let them remember that identically the same forces are openly at work in the United States.

A reorganized and invigorated army can do much for Italy; replenishment of her depleted supplies will strengthen her power of resistance; the new war council of the Allies may stiffen her defenses. But fundamentally her fate depends upon the spirit of the Italian people; they will save themselves and their nation only if they stamp out the treacherous propaganda which perverts the noblest ideals of humanity to the service of a rapacious despotism.

## THE BATTLE OF THE TANKS

*November 27, 1917.*

**A**MONG the results of the still unfinished combat near Cambrai may be counted, very probably, the negative but happy achievement of averting another arrogant peace offer from Germany. Having reduced Russia to impotence and Italy to a doubtful and costly defensive, the imperial government must have been preparing for a new drive to undermine the determination of the Allied peoples with seductive proposals for settlement by negotiation. But even Prussian self-esteem would hardly be equal to the task of making peace suggestions to the accompaniment of cheers from an enemy exulting in a brilliant victory. While the crushing of a section of the Hindenburg line is an event of obvious importance, and while one cannot forget its inevitable cost in human life and suffering, the episode has on Germany's opponents something of the effect of a highly stimulating bit of humor. Solemn old John Bull has contributed to the cause of humanity a colossal piece of strategical persiflage, the point of which lies in the fact that it has cost the Germans 10,000 prisoners, about fifty square miles of hostage territory, immeasurable prestige, confidence and peace of mind. Despite the somber thought of the price that has been paid, the world will find a grim enjoyment in the spectacle of the great German war monster receiving such a surprising clout across its muzzle; and that by a method which violated the military precedents hallowed by three years of sanguinary experience, and yet, paradoxically, was an

application of strategical principles as old as warfare, which is to strike the enemy at a selected spot with overwhelming force.

There is little need to recount the details of the battle, which have been made familiar in vivid dispatches. Every reader knows the outlines of the dashing accomplishment of Byng—how at dawn last Tuesday the German defenses between the Scarpe and the Somme were suddenly invaded by scores upon scores of the lumbering landships known as tanks, which crashed thru the wire entanglements, heaved themselves across trenches and dugouts, smashed blockhouses and gun emplacements, all the while pouring upon the bewildered enemy a devastating fire; and how thru the gaps torn in the massive barrier there followed a torrent of British troops, bombing and bayoneting their way irresistibly to a depth of more than six miles on an eight-mile front, with gains tapering off on either side to twice that front in the aggregate. If this was not, as the early reports suggested to the optimistic, the most significant Allied victory since the battle of the Marne, it was an exceptionally dramatic episode, and one whose effects will be felt for months on both sides. For the works that were thus carried in an operation almost unique constituted part of the strongest section of the mighty Hindenburg line. Here the master strategists of the kaiser had selected, at their leisure, the site for a defense that was to be unbreakable and immovable. The ground was chosen with minute care, and all the engineering skill and military experience perfected by three years of testing were lavished upon the fortifications. Thus when the "strategic retreat" of last March lodged the invaders behind this formidable barrier, it was the boast of Prussianism that there the enemy would be held until he was disillusioned and ready to

accept a German peace. Yet between one dawn and another, miles of massive defenses were pulverized, the occupants killed, captured or put to flight and British cavalry, with infuriating insolence, was harrying the troops of the kaiser almost to the gates of Cambrai.

The event derived its special interest, of course, from the novelty of the tactics employed. Costly experience had made it an accepted principle of action on the western front that ground could be gained only by application of one formula—first, devastating artillery fire, which tore to pieces the wire entanglements and churned up the front trenches; then, when the destruction by high explosives was complete, a sudden, concerted infantry advance behind a curtain of shells. But last week's thrust was made without any artillery preparation whatever. Instead of a hurricane of gunfire for two or three days, advertising an offensive so clearly that the enemy would have time to make effective concentration of forces to meet it, there was not a preliminary shot to herald the attack. The Germans had every reason to feel secure, for so long as their mazes of wire were intact, any imaginable assault must be caught and held there, under fire from machine guns, long enough for resistance to be organized. The British solved the vital problem of the wire with their tanks. These great engines, impervious to any attack except from big guns, did the preliminary work of artillery, and with far greater expedition; and, once the gaps were opened, the preponderant force of the infantry assailants easily did the rest. There was no need, as there was no opportunity, for a barrage from either side, so swiftly did the troops come to close quarters, and for the first time in three years the armies battled in the open, with horsemen performing their almost forgotten functions of pursuit and harassment. Both to the startled Germans and



the exultant British, it must have seemed a topsy-turvy engagement altogether—an offensive without bombardment, wire leveled without gunfire, infantry advancing without the protection of a barrage, cavalrymen sabering gunners, miles of trenches overrun by troops with no other support than armored tractors. But the main feature was not, except in its extended use, a novelty. The British tank, an ingenious adaptation of an American device, was first used so long ago as September, 1916, in the battle of the Somme, where it proved remarkably effective. It was employed in the Arras operations last April, in the stirring battle of Messines ridge in June, and around Ypres in August. Not since its first appearance, however, has the monstrous thing—land cruiser, rolling fortress or whatever it may be called—been used on such an ambitious scale and with such deadly effect as in the drive toward Cambrai.

Depending for its success on this weapon, the operation required certain favorable conditions, recognition of which was the real evidence of strategic genius on the part of the British. Lacking the element of surprise, a grand offensive without artillery preparation would be suicidal; therefore the assailants had to choose for their attempt an inactive sector, where even German vigilance would be imperfect because of long immunity and confidence in massive defenses. Also it was necessary that the tanks should have reasonably firm ground over which to advance. They can perform incredible feats in traversing shell craters and trenches, but the fewer the natural obstacles the less hazardous would be the experiment. Around Cambrai artillery action had been light, and the tanks had comparatively level ground for their evolutions. A third vital requirement, of course, was secrecy, and here the British won a decisive triumph, while the German command suffered a corresponding

humiliation. It must have taken many days, perhaps several weeks, to mass the big engines and other supplies for the assault; yet not until the monsters were rolling and roaring thru the wire did the Germans realize that a great peril was upon them. The battle was won by masterly skill in preparation and efficiency in co-ordinated effort; but beyond that, it was an expression of strategical insight, imagination and audacity which must extort the respect, if not the admiration, of the kaiser's much-advertised leaders.

As was inevitable, the German command comforts its people with the assurance that the British made a supreme effort to "break thru," and were "repulsed." Perhaps this threadbare explanation satisfies the Germans, but it convinces no one else. For it is an incontestable fact that the "impregnable" Hindenburg line has once more proved vulnerable. It has been pierced, and with almost ridiculous ease; and that nothing more was designed is apparent from the circumstances that the British had not assembled a force large enough to do anything else. The purpose was to do just what they accomplished—to give the Germans a memorable beating, killing and capturing as many of them as possible in the operation; to destroy their confidence in their boasted security; to undermine the spirit of resistance; and, in more definite terms, to advance toward the reduction of Cambrai, one of the main links in the Hindenburg chain of fortifications, the snapping of which would probably force a "strategic retreat" along the whole line between Lille and Reims. In the result, the British gained half as much territory in forty-eight hours as they gained during four months of the struggle on the Somme, and when their guns are advanced they will dominate Cambrai, with its vital railways and supply roads, from a distance of less than four miles. Until

they capture that fortress, or compel its evacuation, they will have won nothing really decisive; but at least they have made substantial progress toward that achievement, which will mean, when it comes, the liberation of a great part of invaded and devastated France. Meanwhile, they have dealt a staggering blow at the German morale, and have correspondingly strengthened the fighting spirit of all the Allied peoples.

In the stress of excitement over the first reports, several American military experts who anonymously expound the battle news for us on this side talked ponderously of a "revolution in strategy" and the discrediting of artillery as the vital factor in overcoming the Germans' trench defenses. Washington even put out hints that "the change in tactics was due to counsel from General Pershing," and, presumably, modest geniuses in the war department who believe that intrenchments can habitually be carried by sudden and unsupported infantry attacks. These intimations, in our judgment, are baseless. Not only is the tank no novelty, and infantry attack without artillery preparation a device tried before, but the whole effectiveness of the action was due to the factor of surprise, plus remarkable efficiency. To assume that the Germans can always be caught unprepared, or that their forces can be driven out of France by bayonet rushes, is manifestly absurd. There is not likely to be a repetition of the triumph of the tanks for some time, and certainly not in the Cambrai sector. It is enough to know that the enterprise was a dazzling success this time, and has served to emphasize the fact that the Germans can be outgeneraled and their proudest defenses overcome by armies whose fighting vigor is growing, while the German morale is as steadily weakening.

## THANKSGIVING DAY

*November 29, 1917.*

FOR the fourth time in this period of humanity's severest trial a long-honored custom bids the American people "turn in praise and thanksgiving to Almighty God for His many blessings and mercies to us as a nation." Four times the festival has come in the shadow of such woe as the world has never known. Yet today, when America stands face to face with the grimdest ordeal of her history, there lies in the observance an inspiration higher and nobler than it ever possessed before. When the words of the president's proclamation last year and this are compared, one feels a momentary sense of bewilderment. Twelve months ago he called for thanksgiving "for the blessings of peace"; now he summons his countrymen to express gratitude for the benefits of war. "Even amidst the darkness that has gathered about us," he has said, "we can see the great blessings God has bestowed upon us, blessings that are better than mere peace of mind and prosperity of enterprise." No one will doubt that even behind the formal words of these public proclamations there is deep and reverent conviction; President Wilson was no more sincere when he hailed peace as the acme of human felicity than when he discerns good in the summons of war. Tranquillity and ease and freedom from care are blessings indeed. But no less is the stern choice that has put into the hand of America a sword and into her heart a flaming purpose to defend to the uttermost liberty and justice and mercy. It is her spirit that speaks from the

lips of her leader: "We have been given the opportunity to serve mankind, by taking up arms against a tyranny that threatened to master and debase men everywhere. We have been brought to one mind and purpose. A new light shines about us. The great duties of a new day awaken a new and greater national spirit in us." So long an occasion when a sense of gratitude was mingled with a feeling of stolid contentment and vainglory in our riches, Thanksgiving Day in these years has had a new and searching significance, with which, let us confess, the spirit of the celebration has not been in the truest harmony. Let us recall the festival of 1914.

Seemingly without warning or reason, human passions had let loose upon the earth a storm of violence and wrath. The whole structure of civilization was shaken by the blast, and it seemed as if every beacon of progress thruout half the world was to be extinguished and all the achievements of human genius for ages were to be laid in ruins. From our place of sheltered isolation we looked upon that spectacle of dread with awe, and upon the helpless victims with sympathy, yet not without a sense of being ourselves above and beyond such savage strife. As a people we did not see—we were forbidden by leaders of our thought to believe—the grim warning that was written across the face of Europe in letters of fire and blood. We did not understand that the blow which struck down Belgium wounded all nations; that the irruption of brute force was a challenge and a dire threat to our safety, our existence, the perpetuation of the liberties of all mankind. And so the president found complacent hearers when he urged thanksgiving for "our peace and self-control," for "the self-possession of a great people amid the most serious anxieties and difficulties." Peace we had. But how much was it due to self-control or any other virtue, and how much to the

separation of distance? How much to indolence of thought, which forbade us the realization of peril? How much to a hard belief that we could escape the fearful test which nations no less deserving than we were enduring? Well might we credit to a merciful Omnipotence the peace which we had done little to deserve and naught to secure. But wherefore should we have taken comfort in a "self-possession" which was silent in the face of barbarous wrong, which counted the murder of justice none of our concern, and had no response except almsgiving for the appeal of law defied and humanity stricken? A year passed, and in our second war Thanksgiving we looked upon a world conflagration ever widening, ever more consuming; yet still we listened to the soothing doctrine that this death struggle between faith and perfidy, between right and wrong, between liberty and despotism, was remote from our borders and our affairs. We were bidden to think of and to serve ourselves; to regard it as "madness" that nations should battle for such things as honor and national ideals; to take pride in being apart from strife and superior to the passions that had engulfed less-balanced peoples. Yet even then, despite these seductive teachings, there was visible the dawning of a realization that perhaps this war really did touch our interests as a nation and as human beings; that in truth the forces engaged were not mere armies of blindly fighting men, but two irreconcilable principles of human government and society; and that in the issue of the conflict was bound up the fate of America as well as Europe. Also there were uneasy murmurings against the obdurate policy of unpreparedness, and here and there men and women began to listen eagerly to far-sighted leaders who warned them that not humanity alone, but self-preservation, demanded

that we make secure our heritage of freedom by being ready to defend it.

In the year that followed, the lesson of events became steadily clearer, its admonitions sterner. To the summons of national duty, so long disregarded, was added the force of intolerable threats, even murderous aggressions, from a Power now self-revealed as the unrelenting foe of justice and liberty everywhere. Yet still decision was avoided by paltering evasion, still actions of defense were neglected or postponed, still the people were smoothly urged to acknowledge "the blessings of peace and unbroken prosperity." And the nation declared its satisfaction that it had been "kept out of war." Truly, it had, but at the cost of dimmed ideals and a shrunken soul, of a bitter awakening that was soon to dissipate the dream of safety. Just two months later autocracy flung its challenge straight in the face of America, and declared in set terms the war of savagery which it had been waging against this country for two years. And altho the issue had not changed nor the peril become plainer from the day of the first foul thrust at international law and honor, the statesmanship which had boasted of keeping us out of war was summoned by implacable necessity to lead us into war—a nation unaroused, uninformed, unprepared. Yet the American people responded, as they always will, to courageous leadership; the president's ringing declaration found its echo in a united nation, and so he is able today to bid them give thanks for "the opportunity to serve mankind." It is a noble, sincere and uplifting phrase, yet these virtues do not hide what its somber meaning is. The heart of many an anxious mother knows. Millions of men and women, cheerful and steadfast despite the clutching pain of fear, know. Those in countless homes today know, as they turn to a vacant place at the table

and try not to think that it may be empty forever. We are to serve humanity, but we are to feel the pressure of a stupendous national burden, many of us the suffocating sense of ever-tightening anxiety, the sickness of hope deferred, the anguish of bereavement unassuaged even by farewells.

In the face of such an ordeal; how shall one say that this should be a day of thanksgiving? With the energies of the nation turned from enterprises of peace and creation to works of destruction; with a million of our youths taken from their homes to be trained for battlefields beyond the sea; with our roll of the slain and the maimed already begun and growing, and with many months, perhaps years, of sorrow and sacrifice before us, can there be any circumstance or consideration to awaken our gratitude? Even so. If ever a nation had cause to acknowledge mercies providential, it is America in this hour. For let us remember always that this test had to come. God knows—we say it reverently—that it is thru no act or desire of ours that we have undertaken the conflict. If hatred of strife, if eager generosity, if even a willingness to endure studied defiance and aggression, could have averted war, we should have escaped. But all of these things were vain, and it came to a choice at last between defense or abandonment of our national existence, of justice and liberty here and thruout the world, of civilization itself. And since it was inevitable, how shall we measure the gratitude we owe that there was given to us, despite our heedlessness and self-willed neglect of duty, a day of grace—time to realize our delusion, time to face and make good our defaulted obligations; above all, time to prepare! To nations no less righteous than we this boon was denied; peril smote them like a thunderbolt, and, tho none of them was so unready as we were, and are, they have paid in unutter-



able anguish for their failure to discern and prepare against the assault.

Surely we can give thanks, in humility and contrition of spirit, that because of the supreme sacrifice of Belgium, because of the dauntless heroism of France, because of the courage and enduring strength of Great Britain and because of Italy's fidelity to her perilous choice between democracy and autocracy, we have had time to repent of our folly and repair our neglect. Surely we can remember in our grateful acknowledgments today the millions who have died in a cause that is ours as truly as it was theirs, and the millions who still hold the battle-front of liberty for our belated coming. And well might we add thanks for nearer and more spiritual blessings—the awakening of a sense of national unity; the realization that freedom and justice and honor are the common heritage of humanity, the defense of which is the common duty of all enlightened peoples; the sure perception that it were better for a nation to perish than to barter its ideals for safety, real or false. Immunity we could not have had except at a dastard's price, and that we would not pay. For this, if for nothing else, we may give thanks even in the shadow of our sacrifice, for thereby was the cause of human liberty saved from extinction, and the soul of America redeemed from the dishonor that is worse than death.

## WAR WITH AUSTRIA?

*December 1, 1917.*

**I**N THE interallied war conference, that imposing assemblage now meeting in Paris, the influence of the United States is admittedly of the highest importance. Among the noted statesmen and military and political leaders of the sixteen nations represented, the American delegates occupy a commanding position, and their recommendations, reflecting the judgment and the decisions of the government of the great western republic, will go far to shape the course of the conflict. The fundamental purpose of the gathering, of course, is to bring about unity of aims and co-ordination of policy among the Allies, an accomplishment which the United States has urged as being vital to success. It must appear to most observers incongruous, therefore, that this country still maintains officially an attitude of neutrality toward Germany's principal ally, the government which destroyed Servia, Montenegro and Rumania, helped to break down Russia, and is waging bitter war against French, British and Italian forces.

Nothing in the secretive and temporizing diplomacy of Washington has been more remarkable than the artificial relation it has produced with Austria-Hungary. The persistent attempt to discriminate among the four autocratic governments which are solidly united in the war against democracy has created not only an anomalous situation, but a complication which actually impairs the Allied strength. For in undermining the morale of the armies and people of Italy, pro-German

propagandists have found their most effective argument in the fact that the United States is not at war with Italy's inveterate foe. Promoters of pacifism and sedition have persuaded multitudes of Italians that America has discountenanced their war aims, and even has been secretly favorable to the nation that has overrun their most cherished territory. As a matter of abstract logic, no doubt the cause of the United States is adequately represented in our indictment of the imperial German government. It was the ambition of a Prussianized autocracy which inspired the assault upon law and liberty. It was Germany that struck down international law at the frontiers of Belgium; which turned loose the murderous submarine against peaceful commerce and slew helpless citizens of this republic; which incited friendly nations to make treacherous war upon us; which instigated and financed and directed in this country systematic crimes of espionage and violence. Yet from the very first overt act in the conspiracy against civilization, down to the latest efforts to crush the democratic coalition in the field, Austria-Hungary has been the zealous ally of Prussianism. It was her ultimatum to Servia that was the selected pretense for starting the long-planned undertaking of Germanizing Europe and the world. Her armies helped to overrun Servia and Montenegro and Rumania; they have been used to fight and to seduce the forces of Russia, and now are assisting Germans and Bulgars and Turks to smite Italy.

Austrian submarines have sunk American vessels and murdered American citizens. The government in Vienna gave its indorsement to the lawless and barbarous submarine warfare proclaimed by Berlin, and its U-boats have been as ruthless in the Mediterranean as those of Germany in the North sea and the Atlantic. But beyond all this, it has engaged in specific and treach-

erous acts of hostility against the United States, by conducting here a campaign of spying, subornation and criminal violence. Austria's anti-American efforts have differed from those of Germany only in that they have not been so elaborately financed nor so efficiently prosecuted. None of the conspiracies of Von Bernstorff, for example, was more odious or more flagrantly hostile than the activities of the Austrian ambassador, Doctor Dumba, in inciting plots to destroy American property and lives, revelation of which led to his ejection from the country. Only a few weeks ago documentary proof was laid before the senate that Austrian officials had bribed foreign-language newspapers here to advocate the German cause and assail the United States; and it is notorious that to this day Austrian spies are conducting a systematic campaign to seduce and intimidate the tens of thousands of immigrants of races subject to the dual monarchy, by threatening that unless they resist the American government's military measures their property and their relatives in Austria-Hungary will be penalized. Despite all these things and for reasons that have never been fully disclosed, the administration has kept up the fiction that our sole antagonist is Germany. Yet every policy and act of the Central Powers has proclaimed that they are absolutely united in their political aims as well as their military operations. Austria-Hungary is merely a vassal of Germany. Her diplomatic measures are inspired by Berlin, just as her military operations are dictated by the kaiser's staff. Every soldier she put into the field in the Balkans or against Russia or Italy released a German to fight on the western front; it is no exaggeration to say that the Americans who have been killed in France were slain because Austrians are fighting the battles of autocracy elsewhere. But the dominating fact is that Austria-Hungary is the

keystone of the structure of Pan-Germanism. The scheme of a Teutonized Middle Europe would be impossible unless the dual monarchy supported it. Long subject to Germany politically and economically, the country is the most vital part in that "broad belt of power" which Prussianism sought to lay across two continents, and so make its force supreme in the world. Last June President Wilson himself outlined vividly the threatening aim and successes of the "military masters of Germany":

They have actually carried out the greater part of their plan. Austria is at their mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation, ever since the war began. The so-called Central Powers are, in fact, but a single Power. \* \* \* Government after government has, by their influence, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

Nor has Austria-Hungary ever failed to acknowledge the vassal's part she plays. "In true co-operation with our old ally, the German empire," said the ruler of the country last May, "we shall remain ready to force, if necessary by arms, a good end of the war"; and Berlin itself did not produce more bitter repudiation of President Wilson's reply to the pope than was expressed by the government organs in the Austrian capital. Washington's reason for attempting to ignore the extremely practical hostility of Austria-Hungary has never been officially avowed, but there is no doubt that it was inspired by a hope that Germany's principal ally might be detached from the Central alliance. The administration has been fascinated by the idea that if we kept up the pretense of being at war with the autocracy of Berlin alone, and not with the equally pernicious autocracy of Vienna, the latter would in some way succumb to our

ostentatious tenderness and abandon the shelter of Germany's military power for reliance upon our rather doubtful protection. It is obvious to the meanest understanding, of course, that Austria-Hungary is helplessly enslaved to her masterful neighbor, and that, moreover, the one hope of her autocracy lies in a Prussian victory; her government dare not desert Germany if it would, and would not if the maneuver were safe. Incidentally, the theory that the diplomacy of Washington might gain such a victory over the most adroit and unprincipled statesmen of Europe has its ridiculous aspects. It is not impossible, indeed; that the extraordinary consideration shown to Austria has been due to plausible and carefully camouflaged representations originating in Vienna. If the Central Powers succeeded in persuading Washington that Austria might be overcome by kindness, the result has made their trouble worth while.

For the influence in Italy of America's equivocal attitude is not to be doubted. "No one who has not been recently in Italy," wrote an able American correspondent from Rome three weeks ago, "can realize the harm done by crafty propaganda whose theme is America's abstention from war with Austria. A declaration against Austria and of complete solidarity with the Entente would take the strongest weapons from the hands of the anti-Italian elements in Italy."

Apart from this special reason for a candid and effective war policy, the very purpose which we have proclaimed in entering the conflict demands that we fight all our enemies. "A pledge to 'make the world safe for democracy,'" as Theodore Roosevelt has said, "is a solemn engagement to smash the two nations which most conspicuously make democracy unsafe within their own borders, Austria and Turkey." Certainly, it is no spirit of hesitancy on the part of the American people

that dictates the quibble. Congressmen assembling in Washington report a strong sentiment thruout the whole country that the United States end a false situation by declaring a state of war with the governments that support every criminal act and ambition of Prussianism. Confident predictions were made until a few days ago that President Wilson's address to congress would recommend this course; but later an administration organ made these direct assertions:

President Wilson is not yet convinced that Austria has been guilty of any overt act which calls for war. He has been in close touch with every move of the dual monarchy, and there has been no justification therein, he believes, for hostilities. In this view he has the support of every member of his cabinet.

If he holds to this decision, he will doubtless enforce it, despite the open declarations of leaders in congress that a state of war with Austria exists and should be recognized, for there is the strongest possible desire to support his conduct of the war. We are satisfied, nevertheless, that persistence in maintaining a fictitious relation with a dangerous foe involves peril to this country without any compensating advantages; for it leaves tens of thousands of alien enemies here free to obstruct the war activities of the nation, while it must prevent effective unity of spirit and purpose among the American people. Above all, such a course would make a mockery of the project of the interallied war conference, with its design of creating complete co-operation among the nations that have undertaken to prevent the Prussianizing of Central Europe and the world.

## USELESS AND DANGEROUS

*December 3, 1917.*

**W**HATEVER may have been the underlying motives of the Marquis of Lansdowne in putting forth at this time his extraordinary peace letter, its immediate and unconcealed purpose was to create a controversy. And in this respect it was a triumphant success. Avowedly an appeal no less to the Germans than to the Allied peoples, it has been discussed with animation in every belligerent and neutral country, and has produced echoes comparable with those awakened by President Wilson's utterances and the pope's memorable message. This result is a striking tribute to the character and influence of the titled author of the plea. While it was ostensibly the expression of a private citizen—only by the accident of heredity a member of the British legislature—it has had almost the force of an official declaration. This is true especially of the effect in Germany, the enemy country, and in the United States, the last hope of the democratic alliance. The reason is, of course, that British institutions give to the noble lord a status of peculiar power. Not only has his name the glamour of high lineage and historic dignity, but his words have behind them the cumulative weight of a distinguished career. For nearly forty years he was the holder of great offices in the imperial administration, and is an outstanding representative of the "governing class" which only in recent years the British people have undertaken to curb. The fact that from 1900 to 1906 he was secretary for foreign affairs would



alone make his utterance noteworthy. Britons' traditional respect for rank, however, does not protect him from assault in a controversy so bitter as this. Credited by some of his countrymen with powers of far-visioned statesmanship, he is accused by others of sinister partisanship or moral poltroonery; hailed in one quarter as a spokesman for civilization and humanity, he is denounced in another as a political conspirator, or cruelly excused as a victim of senility. This phase of the discussion may be ignored; but his proposal literally compels examination with respect to its terms, the circumstances of its delivery, and its world-wide effects.

Like all human beings of intelligence and feeling, Lord Lansdowne is burdened by a realization of the war's magnitude, its appalling devastation, its ever-increasing works of horror and of woe. No one will challenge his judgment that its "wanton prolongation" would be an unforgivable crime. The issue he raises lies in his theory that peace will be promoted by a revision of the war aims of the nations fighting Germany, and by a proffer of assurances to the German people that they are not in danger of vindictive punishment, nor even of severe restrictions, for the crimes they and their government have perpetrated. Let us see whether this is not a fair outline of his recommendations. The one overshadowing necessity, if the war is not to end as useless slaughter, he dismisses with a careless sentence. "What," he asks, "are we fighting for?" And he answers, "To beat the Germans, certainly; but that is not an end in itself." Yet if that be not an end, what meaning is there in words, what reason in all the unimaginable sacrifices demanded of the free peoples? The purpose of Germany was, and is, to conquer, to inflict her will upon Europe and the world, to subjugate mankind. The purpose of democracy is to defeat that design. That

end can be accomplished by only two methods. One is to overcome by arms the military power of Germany, which Lord Lansdowne considers too costly; the other is thru the substitution for autocracy in that country of a responsible government, and this he would leave to the discretion of a people flushed with victories and utterly hostile to democratic ideals. Of the two fundamental demands, "reparation and security," he considers the first not important enough for discussion—for Belgium and France and Servia he has not the merest mention—and the second he would achieve thru "a solemn pact to submit future disputes to arbitration," guaranteed by the "joint military and naval forces" of a league of nations.

This idea, long ago made familiar by President Wilson and other national leaders, in the abstract is unassailable. A world-wide federation, committed to the defense of law and righteousness, and coercing the rebellious by the application of political, economic and armed force, is an ideal which appeals to every enlightened mind. But that, no less than the system shattered by this war, must be a mockery without one fundamental requirement—good faith. What compact would be more solemn, more binding, than that which Germany tore up in the face of mankind forty months ago? What single act or incident in all that time of horror, what yearning hope, gives promise that the same government which forswore itself in 1914 would keep its pledges in 1917 and beyond? Lord Lansdowne has been impressed by some of the earlier teachings of President Wilson—"peace without victory" satisfies him. But he overlooks, or rejects, later and sounder lessons from the same source, as these:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No auto-

cratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. \* \* \* We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany, unless explicitly supported by conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves.

But the compact, says the marquis, in the familiar argument, would be guaranteed by the force of the united nations; make peace by negotiation with Germany now, and if she attempts again to set up a military empire in Central Europe, she will face a world-wide coalition. But that is exactly what she defies and withstands at this hour; and we are asked to believe that the way to make her surrender her ambitions is to dissolve the league of nations that has battled against her for three years and four months, and form a new league, with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey added as deterrent forces against her future designs of aggression! For the rest, the appeal of Lord Lansdowne is a confession of despair. He fears that peace will be valueless if the war be prolonged, because civilization will be too exhausted to enjoy its blessings. We are forbidden to doubt Lord Lansdowne's patriotism and aversion toward Germany's designs of conquest; yet it is a singular fact that he insists upon a drastic modification of the Allies' terms, which have often been outlined with candor, and displays not even curiosity concerning Germany's terms, which she has never dared to avow. Furthermore, he sets forth five declarations which he thinks should be made—that the Allies do not desire the annihilation of Germany, nor seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice; that no economic blockade will be carried on after the war; that the question of "freedom of the seas" shall be accommodated; and that there be an international agreement for arbitration hereafter. Of these

just one is vital, in that it reveals the utter incapacity—or refusal—of Lord Lansdowne to face the fundamental issue in the whole war. Not by a phrase or a word does he recognize the existence of a struggle between autocracy and democracy. Indeed, he virtually rejects that idea, for he argues that no compulsion must be exercised upon the choice of the German people as to their form of government. Like the Germans themselves, he considers that the maintenance of an ambitious autocracy, wielding vast military power which is a proven threat to law and liberty the world over, is a purely domestic matter in which other nations have no just concern.

This astonishing theory is, of course, a reflection of the noble writer's concept of human society and government. An aristocrat, an inveterate reactionary and a beneficiary of the most intolerable forms of privilege, he distrusts and abhors democracy. Once a Liberal, he became the most obdurate of Tories when Gladstone opened his fight for justice to Ireland, and is today one of the chief antagonists of the progressive doctrines represented by Lloyd George. A great Irish landowner, he bitterly resisted the emancipation of the peasants of that country; a believer in class government, he has been a relentless foe of home rule and of interference with the medieval privileges of hereditary lawmakers in the house of lords; every measure designed to liberalize the laws and remedy flagrant economic inequalities has found in him an obstinate foe. He may be incapable of realizing it, but he is at one in spirit with the junkers of Prussia, and would consider the overthrow of political privilege in Germany in the light of a disaster to human society. The essential fallacy of his whole proposition, however, is that it rejects the necessity for a German defeat. Let Prussianism be beaten, and every recommendation he makes becomes rational and desirable;

otherwise the program would be a hideous mockery, the charter of mankind's enslavement to brute force.

Lord Lansdowne is an old man, and must have a sense of responsibility; he is an experienced statesman, and must know the effect of public actions. Against his high repute for sincerity, therefore, must stand the fact that his utterance was made at a time which could not have been better chosen to promote the German cause if he had had that malignant purpose. It was delivered when the German chancellor was exultantly proclaiming victory; when anarchy was about to betray the deluded Russian people to an alien autocracy; when pacifism and sedition were doing their worst in stricken Italy; when France was taking breath after a political crisis and a cruel ordeal in the field; when the democratic nations were seeking at last to concentrate their efforts and unify their purposes. These circumstances multiply the evil effect of every misjudged word and irrational plea, and make a statement which might have been merely injudicious a production which the Bolsheviki will envy and acclaim.

## PACIFISM IN EUROPE

*December 4, 1917.*

**T**HERE was not a thought or a suggestion in the remarkable peace letter written by the Marquis of Lansdowne which had not been expressed a thousand times and had not been discussed to exhaustion in every civilized tongue. What, then, gave to the illogical and inopportune utterance its power to start a new controversy over the terms of a peace that is yet to come within the vision of the most far-seeing? This effect cannot be due wholly to the prestige of the writer; suspicions that he was the instrument of a partisan political conspiracy are not verified. Then why is it, as a London correspondent reports, that these commonplace proposals respecting matters remote "overshadow everything in the news," at a time when critical battles are being fought and the whole decision of the war is trembling in the balance? The reason is that the declaration, in its despairing tone, its vague yearning for a return of tranquillity, its indifference to the moral issues of the conflict, its timid appeals to German public opinion and its belief that negotiation can subdue Prussianism after force has been abandoned, reflects a considerable body of sentiment in Great Britain and the Allied countries. Call it war weariness, call it social unrest, call it internationalism or pacifism or a combination of all these, the existence of a discernible amount of such a sentiment among the peoples opposing Germany is a weighty fact; and the possibility of its growth is a matter of serious

consequence to the American nation, which is just taking up the chief burden of the war for democracy.

To readers familiar with the numberless utterances of unswerving purpose by Allied statesmen and publicists, ours may appear an alarmist suggestion. How many times, and in how many ringing phrases—devoutly sincere, too—have they proclaimed that the war will be prosecuted “to the end,” that “only victory can bring peace,” that compromise is unthinkable! Yet the fact remains that nowhere outside of the Central Powers is statesmanship autocratic or its authority reasonably permanent. These men, strong and able as they are, are but the servants of their peoples. Behind them are teeming millions who do not think in unison, who are swayed not only by fine instincts of loyalty and solidarity, but by impulses of personal interest and individualistic aims, by perverse doctrines and romantic illusions. In Russia we see the power of a misdirected public opinion at its worst—armies transformed into an undisciplined rabble, the people in a hopeless daze, the government usurped by audacious conspirators who are consummating a betrayal of the nation to autocracy. But it is not alone in that distracted land that the ferment is working. In Italy the very troops set to guard the outposts of the national defense were corrupted, the government is ceaselessly menaced by movements of sedition and disunion, pacifism and pro-Germanism are boldly exploiting military defeat and economic distress as reasons for surrender. Even France, which has inspired the world by unexampled heroism and devotion, is not free from influences that sap her vigor. Many of her Socialists gave encouragement to the Prussian maneuver of the Stockholm conference, and have cast doubt upon the justice of the republic’s claim to Alsace-Lorraine. And in Great Britain the same forces are at work. Altho

the unity of the empire has been one of the marvels of the war, and altho the people of the island kingdom have accomplished miracles of war effort and suffered tremendous losses with courage, pacifism has manifested itself in multifarious forms, and has made its most emphatic advance at an hour when the nation was exulting in a brilliant feat of arms. It was British labor which did most to keep alive for months the German project of a Socialist peace conference in Stockholm, and a British cabinet member who wrecked his political career in a determined effort to promote that treacherous enterprise. It was the British Socialist party which declared that responsibility for the war rested upon all the belligerents alike, and that reparation for its injuries must be made from a common fund contributed by all. It was in England, last June, that 1500 labor and Socialist delegates assembled to undertake the formation of a British counterpart to Russia's Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, and declared that peace must be made, not by armies, but by the "common people" of the nations, presumably a class distinct from citizen soldiery. And in Great Britain at this hour there are, according to a public statement by a member of parliament, fifty peace societies actively engaged in varying efforts to bring about a compromise with Germany.

No doubt these anti-war manifestations represent but a fractional part of British public opinion; yet that they exist at all will surprise those who have regarded Great Britain as the very type and figure of dogged, enduring purpose. It is the boast of her people that they are of the "bulldog breed"; slow to anger, difficult to arouse, yet implacably determined once their will backs their awakened conviction. They recall with just pride that they fought Bonapartism for a decade after its ascendancy seemed secure. Early in the present war



a German leader flung the taunt that "England will not beat us in thirty years," and the British retort was, "Then we shall beat you in the thirty-first." A week ago Lloyd George took comfort in the "historical character of our people; that they never let go, once they have started." And it was with reliance upon that character, no less than upon the mighty British fleet, that the American people entered the world war with all their preparation still to make. Nevertheless, it is in Britain that pacifism is now most vocal, with its teachings that "the war has lasted too long"; that democracy's aims must be revised so as to placate the Germans; that the way to gain peace is not to fight for it, but to talk about it, and that the time to appeal to "moderate opinion" in Germany is when the people there are exulting in fresh successes of militarism. No interpretation can make the Lansdowne proposal, in view of the circumstances under which it was made, anything but a bleat of despair and a direct incitement to fiercer war by Germany; it is so regarded by most of the American press. Yet in England there is a considerable minority of public men and newspapers openly supporting it. Here are quotations from influential journals:

Lansdowne's letter is merely a mild request for sanity. The ferment of free thought is visible behind the timid grouping of our press.

We have suffered too long from reluctance to face facts and declare in clear terms the purposes of our policy.

The letter is as conspicuous for its courage as for its largeness and sanity of vision. It does immeasurable service to humanity in setting before all the nations the duty of a will to peace.

It expresses a great body of public opinion, which has been so far inarticulate in order not to embarrass the government. The opinion was there, and it will pluck up courage.

The last is, of course, the most important comment.

It shows that British peace sentiment, or rather a modification of the old war spirit, is making itself felt in circles far different from the labor and Socialist gatherings where alone it was once apparent. And its effect upon the judgment is revealed in the astonishing fallacies that are propounded with impressive gravity by so intelligent a journal as the Manchester Guardian. "As for the time chosen for the letter," it says, "any time is a good time for rational action and for the clearing up of error." This theory has strong support, of course, in Germany, where the Lansdowne controversy is hailed as the direct result of the Allied disasters in Russia and Italy. But infatuation reaches its limit in this observation by the same paper:

If Germany took an attempt to make our position clear as a sign of weakness, she would soon find out her mistake, for our armies would fight the better and our people would go forward with clearer resolution.

Trotsky, of the Bolsheviki, stated the same thing more tersely. The Russian troops, he said, demanded an offer of peace to Germany. "If she refuses," he added airily, "they will fight like lions." And just as the Bolsheviki looked for the German proletariat to rise in response to their offer, so the British "moderates" predict that their plea will "stimulate the peace party in Germany." No adequate idea of the evolution of war opinion in Europe can be derived, however, from an assumption that existing conditions signify merely a spread of pacifism. That is but one symptom of a widespread change of thought which might be termed moral unrest. Among the peoples there are multitudes, silent for the most part, who are in a questioning, critical, uneasy mood. Their hearts are heavy with suspense and their nerves are raw with suffering. Despite their faith in their cause and their will to endure, their state

of mind leads them to listen eagerly to the purveyors of nostrums for the cure of the terrible disease of war. Two months ago an observant American writer declared "it is the growing feeling in every country here that peace will come thru understanding rather than force of arms," and now he gives, in the New York Tribune, this outline of conditions of unrest:

The rising tide of radical opinion cannot be ignored. In Great Britain, by far the strongest of the European belligerents, the railway men are unsettled, a considerable number of airplane builders have gone on strike, the Welsh miners are dissatisfied, the mood of Ireland is threatening. All the moderates are uniting in an attack upon the government's action in censoring leaflets dealing with the peace plans of the Labor party Socialists, who are considering the advisability of launching an immediate campaign for a Stockholm conference. Separately none of these things might cause alarm, but collectively they indicate the restlessness and dissatisfaction which are spreading. What is true in Great Britain is true also in France and Italy; the comfort is that in Germany it is worse. All European neutrals are working for peace.

It would be miraculous, of course, if the agony which the Allies are suffering did not produce among the peoples in some degree a longing for peace at any price; before we condemn them let us remember that it was American statesmanship which bade them be content with "peace without victory," and represented the German people as a kindly folk victimized by an autocracy wholly foreign to their instincts. These admonitions pervade every European utterance of pacifism and compromise with Prussianism. The pope, too, set in motion a powerful force when he urged "mutual condonation" and deplored the war as "useless massacre." But most potent in creating the spirit of unrest has been the German propaganda, which ceaselessly spreads the whisper of peace by "understanding," and, while autoc-

racy pursues its aims of conquest and enslavement, preaches the seductive doctrines of universal brotherhood and an ending of the war by world union of the proletariats. The campaign is, of course, hideously false, but it makes subtle use of the abnormal economic conditions and the social unrest which everywhere prevails; thus it seduces ignorance in Russia, while leaving to other influences the creation of intellectual Bolshevism in Britain. No justification is needed for the emphasis we have attempted to give to conditions in Europe which many Americans do not realize. For what these things mean is that the people of the United States must contribute henceforth more than money and men and munitions—they must supply firmness of will and vigor of spirit to the democratic alliance. They must put new moral fiber into the cause of liberty. They must, by unity of thought and energy of action, stimulate the courage of those who so long bore the burden for us, and renew in them the realization that the overthrow of Prussianism, whatever the cost, is the one hope of restoring peace and security to this troubled world.

## THE ULTIMATUM OF DEMOCRACY

*December 6, 1917.*

IT HAS long been recognized thruout the world that President Wilson has exerted a greater influence upon the thought of mankind in this war, and therefore upon the development of the conflict, than has any other statesman. For two years and a half he was the spokesman for the most powerful neutral, and for eight months has been the leader of that nation as a belligerent; and at all times—altho not always with reason—his utterances have been accepted by the peoples of the earth as the judgments of America, the great stronghold of freedom and idealism. History alone will be able to measure the harm he wrought by his earlier misinterpretations of events and issues, and his service to mankind since enlightened conviction gave him undisputed moral leadership of the cause of justice and liberty. Never, assuredly, was error so potent for evil as that which dwelt in the false doctrines he so long maintained; but never was truth more manifest or more powerful for good than in his declarations as the spokesman for militant democracy. Three times it has been his high task to express the decision and purpose, not of his countrymen alone, but of free peoples everywhere, respecting the most fateful issue that has ever confronted the nations of the world; and thrice he has fulfilled that momentous mission by an utterance of masterful force and inspiration. But neither in his memorable address to congress last April, nor in his reply to the Vatican's proposal for a premature peace, did he achieve the clarity

of thought, the inexorable logic of statement and the finality of judgment of his declaration of last Tuesday.

The opportunity was the greatest, the demand the most weighty, that has faced any leader in the war. Craft and violence, intrigue and force, had brought the cause of civilization to a crisis of perilous uncertainty. It was not alone that military and political disasters had created new problems of menace, but that there was the threat of a moral collapse among the forces of democracy. Their statesmanship was groping for light in the darkest hour of the world's trial; their peoples, wearied by burdens well-nigh insupportable, had begun to question the future uneasily, to wonder whether their sacrifices would avail, even to doubt the victory of justice. Above all, their will was being weakened and their energies distracted by futile speculation concerning issues remote or non-essential. The urgent need was for a clear, candid and authoritative statement, which should not only express concretely the fundamental purposes of the allied democracies, but should pronounce irrevocable sentence upon autocracy and define the limits of the adjustment for which civilization fights. With what mastery of word and reasoning this difficult undertaking was met, the electrifying effect may testify. Every loyal American, every human being of intelligence, will study with attention the commanding utterance, which carries in every line its own interpretation. But even the clearest understanding will be helped by a regrouping of the vital expressions. The first outstanding feature is the declaration of America's unalterable purpose to prosecute the war until the world is made safe for democracy, to contemplate or accept no compromise upon that fundamental aim. Thus the president speaks of "the objects we shall always hold in view," "our objectives

and the measures by which we mean to attain them." Again he says, with searching emphasis :

Our action must move straight toward definite ends. Our object is, of course, to win the war, and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. \* \* \* Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished.

There could not be a more necessary warning and stimulant for Americans and their allies. Too much of their thoughts and energy has been diverted to consideration of issues relatively unsubstantial and remote—vain yearnings for peace, sterile discussions of terms, vague projects for the future elimination of strife. For unless and until the war is won, in these matters the desires of democracy will have no weight whatsoever. Yet President Wilson rightly holds it necessary to meet the obvious query, "When shall we consider the war won?" Much of the interminable questioning on this point is due to pro-Germanism and pacifism, which alike seek to hamper the prosecution of the war. Altho Germany dare not avow her own aggressive ambitions, she instigates ceaseless harassment of the Entente governments as to their aims; the object is, of course, to stir up dissensions among them by eliciting from one or another statements which will seem to oppose or minimize the desires of allied nations. And in this campaign she has the assistance of such well-meant moves as that of Lord Lansdowne, who provoked an acrimonious controversy over the purposes of Germany's enemies. There will be no honest doubts concerning the objects of the free nations, after the president's words:—

The American people desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt the peace and render it impossible.

This intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, and if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations.

When this Thing and its power are indeed defeated, when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe, and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace.

We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, thru properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done.

This statement is unmistakable in meaning and comprehensive in outline. But the president goes further—he sets out certain distinct terms as a minimum demand:

They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan states, over Turkey and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

The world will no longer permit to be established military and political domination by arms. The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

Yet in thus freeing the world from the shadow of an arrogant and rapacious despotism there must be no infliction of vengeful punishment, no attempt to extort



profit for the victors—"full, impartial justice" must be done to "our enemies as well as our friends":

The voices of humanity insist that this war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have done deep and abominable wrong. \* \* \* We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

In one matter President Wilson distinctly rejects an undertaking that has been strongly supported—liberation of the subject races in Austria-Hungary. The promoters of independence for the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs will be disappointed by the assertion that "it is no affair of ours what the people of Austria-Hungary do with their own life, either industrially or politically." On the other hand, he as distinctly modifies his former declaration against any form of "economic blockade" after the war. He tells the German people that if they refuse to break the power of their autocracy, "it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace," and he adds this stern warning:

It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace.

Of equal importance and of more immediate concern is the direct recommendation that congress declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Readers of this newspaper are familiar with the reasons urging such action. The dual monarchy, as President Wilson says, is "simply the vassal of the German government," and a relation of official neutrality toward that country is a fiction not only dishonest but dangerous.

Necessarily, the president's declaration deals largely with facts and considerations familiar to every rational mind, but to one vital thought he gives such emphasis that never again will it be possible candidly to obscure it. This is the absolute requirement of Germany's defeat as a preliminary to a just and lasting peace. It is just here that pro-Germanism and pacifism and Bolshevism find their means of seduction or self-deceit. Their advocates argue that the peace must be generous, must eradicate causes of future strife, must not forbid the just development of any nation; but, in dishonesty or delusion, they urge that this implies the immediate acquittal of Prussianism, with its crimes unpunished and its power unimpaired. President Wilson leaves no doubt of the fallacy of this idea, which aims at "a premature peace before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson." "Let it be said again," he adds, "that autocracy must be shown the utter futility of its claim to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command."

This is the answer to the Von Hertlings, the Trotskys, the Lansdownes and all the variegated schemers and dreamers of a present "peace by understanding." There can be no understanding with Prussianism, because it lies, because no treaty of itself would hold it an hour, because it is "a Thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace." But once its defeat and overthrow are accomplished, then justice and generosity shall be invoked. Then, and not until then, will it be possible for mankind to deal in strict equity with past wrongs, to re-establish the community of nations, and to build upon the sure foundations of democratic honor the structure of an enduring peace.

## “DEMOCRACY” IN GERMANY

*December 7, 1917.*

SOME members of congress, it seems, were disappointed with President Wilson's address. They felt that he was not sufficiently explicit concerning the "war aims" of the United States. What these implacable critics wanted we do not know, unless it was a specification of the exact reparation due to Belgium, in francs, and a statement of the precise measures which must free Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey from Prussian domination. But in our judgment the president's statement of our position was not only adequately clear, but was as exhaustive as justice and expediency require. It is a singular fact that many ardent supporters of the Allied cause persistently demand a minutely detailed program, when it is obvious, first, that a rigid declaration of terms at this stage of the conflict would be an absurdity, and second, that Germany wants nothing so much as to entangle her opponents in such a controversial problem. Certainly there was no equivocation in the president's statements that Germany's power "must be crushed," that her dominion over her vassal allies "must be relinquished," and that wrongs done to Belgium and France "must be repaired." In any event the paramount aim, the overshadowing and all-inclusive necessity, is to encompass the defeat of Germany; and congress and the American people and the entire Entente alliance will find that task enough to preoccupy all their energies, without worrying

prematurely as to specific readjustments which that result will enable them to undertake.

After all, tho the president's address was conspicuously eloquent, forceful and enlightening, the vital demands remain as they were stated months ago by Mr. Balfour—that Germany must be made “powerless or free.” The fundamental requirement for a lasting peace is that Prussianism shall be overthrown, either by the force of military and economic siege or by democratization of the German government. In that event, and in that alone, a safe settlement will be possible. Only then will the precise “war aims” of Germany's adversaries become of concrete importance. There is no danger that they will be too moderate; and the power of democratic opinion, in America and thruout the world, is sufficient guarantee that they will not be vindictive, and that none provocative of future wars will be tolerated. Upon this point President Wilson put strong emphasis. Thruout his whole address, indeed, it was apparent that he was choosing his words for their effect upon the German people no less than upon his own countrymen and their allies. While uncompromising in demanding Germany's defeat, he was careful to suggest the alternative way to peace—thru the substitution in the empire of a responsible government. Thus he charges the war to “the sinister masters of Germany,” whose power, compounded of “intrigue and force,” he insists “must be crushed.” But peace will come “when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe.” It is the German autocracy which must be “taught its final and convincing lesson,” which “must be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world.” We shall end the war “when the German people say to us, thru properly accredited representatives,” that they are ready to agree to our terms. Also “we intend

no wrong against the German empire, no interference with her internal affairs”; and friendly intercourse with other nations after the war will be forbidden to the German people only “if they should still continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters.”

All this is too transparently plain to be misunderstood—peace will be restored when Germany’s autocracy is overthrown, by the united democratic nations or by the Germans themselves. That the result will be accomplished, if necessary, by force of arms, is the president’s solemn pledge, tho the task manifestly will test to the uttermost our resources and our endurance. Meanwhile, what are the prospects of a change in Germany herself that would satisfy the condition? Are the German people more inclined toward democracy, or less, than they were eight months ago, when America declared war upon their autocratic government? That action, it will be recalled, served at first to strengthen kaiserism; the attempt to differentiate between the autocracy and the people was hotly resented, and for many weeks the empire was aflame with stimulated loyalty. Yet by midsummer there was open discussion of the need for reformed institutions. Even the Socialist promoter of the Stockholm conference declared that “peace cannot be achieved without the sweeping democratization of Germany.” A noted scholar, author of a eulogistic “History of the Hohenzollerns,” caused a shock by writing:

We must accustom ourselves to the thought that a decisive step to the democratization of our State has become an inevitable necessity. We Prussians cannot alone offer resistance to the great tide of the times flowing toward democracy in the midst of the German empire, yes, of the European continent and of the whole world.

Statesmen like Zimmermann and intellectual leaders like Delbrueck were as outspoken as the Socialists in

predicting that Germany was about to liberalize her government, and the kaiser himself piously but vaguely identified himself with the movement. There were to be drastic reforms in the electoral laws, closer co-operation between the chancellor and the reichstag and a general liberation of thought and action. For a time the world was hopefully agitated by these maneuvers and their accompanying "crises"; but the net result was the withdrawal of one personal chancellor and the substitution of another. The advent of Michaelis, a Prussian reactionary, was hailed as a step toward democratization, and optimists were astonished—for no discoverable reason—when he proved to be more intensely a kaiserist than his predecessor. He graciously intimated that party leaders might be called to executive places, but only upon the understanding that "the constitutional right of the imperial administration to conduct our policy must not be narrowed." Still the feeble forces of what the Germans call democracy pursued their campaign, and were enraptured when the autocracy permitted the reichstag to name a committee to "confer" with the chancellor upon the reply to the pope's peace note. This was an unheard-of concession; but its value may be judged from the fact that the committee was limited to that single matter, and explicit disavowal was made of any intent to set up a "parliamentary institution."

Discontent with Michaelis led later to demonstrations and results equally meaningless. After prodigious excitement a party coalition was formed, controlling a reichstag majority, and it timorously, with many genuflexions before the dread figure of kaiserism, ventured the audacious suggestion that there should be a change in the chancellorship, and that the kaiser's appointee should, if not inconsistent with imperial policy, promote reform of the Prussian electoral laws and subscribe to

the reichstag's "peace resolution." Even the Socialist organ hastened to say that there was "no desire to interfere in any way with the crown's right of appointing the head of the government." And, at his convenience, the kaiser named as his chancellor Count von Hertling, a fine old Bavarian Tory of the irreconcilable school, whose political principles are about as liberal as those of Von Hindenburg, and whose conception of foreign affairs may be judged from his remark that "it is not yet time for Germany to make any declaration with regard to her pawn, Belgium." Yet will it be believed that his elevation was proclaimed as a triumph of Germany's virile democracy? Because he had gone thru the formality of "conferring" with party leaders before his appointment, and had promised them some offices, a Berlin paper exclaimed: "Within a few days we have achieved a political development which in almost all other countries took years of fighting, sometimes attended by serious convulsions and even revolutionary deeds." And Erzberger, the Centrist leader, sang this paean of praise:

While the troops of the Central Allies were forcing their way across the Tagliamento, Germany at home quietly crossed the political Rubicon, and in the space of five days changed from an autocracy to a democracy. This has been the most momentous week since the founding of the empire.

It is clear that either the Germans are utterly incapable of perceiving what democracy is, or believe that other people have the same disability; perhaps both explanations are true. At any rate, the progress of political emancipation in Germany amounts today to the total as estimated by the disillusioned Berliner Tageblatt last July, and that was "exactly nothing." Democracy consists in more than casual conversations between party leaders and autocratic chancellors. Even liberalized electoral laws mean nothing so long as the government remains irresponsible. What counts is not the manner

in which lawmakers are elected, but the power they possess after election; and the reichstag today is as impotent to control German policy as it was in 1914. And beyond all this, of course, the feeble yearnings of a few Germans toward democracy have been stifled by the weight of military successes. The collapse of Russia is accepted as at once a warning against questioning the sanctity of divine right, and a means of discrediting those who dare to raise their voices against the rule of militarism. And from Italy autocracy brings home further victories to awe the proletariat and confound believers in the heresy of democratic institutions. President Wilson did well to renew the invitation to the German people to free themselves from bondage, but he will do exceedingly ill if he counts upon its acceptance. For not by a word or an act do they yet show a sign of comprehending, much less desiring, a "world made safe for democracy."



## VICTORY FIRST, THEN JUSTICE

*December 11, 1917.*

THE moral leadership of America in the war has its final recognition in the acclaim with which this nation's allies—and neutrals, too—received the recent address of President Wilson to congress. In Great Britain, in France, in Italy, thruout all Europe that is arrayed against kaiserism, it is hailed as the supreme declaration of democracy's aims. The London Times sums up the judgment in the phrase that the utterance "is the most important contribution to the understanding of the war that has been made." What qualities gave it such commanding force and almost universal appeal? Why did a statement which directed to the policies of the Entente alliance as much censure as approval awaken grateful enthusiasm? First, we think, was the terse, uncompromising pledge that the uttermost resources of the United States would be employed to gain the victory, to liberate the world from "this intolerable Thing, the menace of combined intrigue and force, which we now see so clearly as the German power." The overburdened nations yonder could not but take fresh courage from this stirring message. But the overwhelming feature, in our judgment, was that the speaker formulated, for the first time, a comprehensive and inspiring platform of democracy in the world war; that he set forth the cause in terms to which all the governments must subscribe and which gave utterance to the fundamental desires of mankind. Whether this achievement was due to pure genius or groping instinct,

or to both, it stands as a triumph of constructive statement. For the address had this singular power, that it gave to a drifting statesmanship a clear chart to safety, and at the same time interpreted the deep tho inarticulate convictions and longing of all peoples. The vital passages, after the all-important assurance of unrelenting war upon Prussianism, were these:

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have done deep and abominable wrong. \* \* \* We shall be free to do an unprecedented thing—to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors. \* \* \*

The wrongs committed in this war will have to be righted. But they cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. The opinion of the world fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere thruout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. The congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides. \* \* \* Because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, that we feel ourselves constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends.

This is by no means the first time that President Wilson has assumed to speak the sentiments of mankind, and one's first careless impression might be that in the passages quoted he was indulging in one of those meaningless rhetorical flights which made his earlier utterances on the war so futile. But those observant of the movements of world thought know that when he speaks now of "the voices of humanity" and "the consciences of free men everywhere" he speaks of a force as concrete as cannon and more powerful than all the purposes of statesmanship. For what President Wilson caught from the air and sent forth with his ringing message was the muttering of peoples who are becoming conscious of a threat of disillusion and misrepresentation. Suffering has made them abnormally sensitive. They are, as we said the other day, in a questioning, critical, uneasy mood; and the one suggestion most maddening to them is that their idealistic passion in the war might be mocked, and their sacrifices commercialized by being made an instrument of sordid aims.

Political and spiritual unrest is everywhere manifest. The old standards of international conduct no longer satisfy. The president recognized the vital fact that the thought of the whole world has been enlightened by the war; that the peoples reject the old, cynical doctrines of action, and are vigilant, even distrustful, in their attitude toward their political leaders. Democratization of thought has produced monstrous absurdities in Russia, of course; but there is no nation in which it is not gathering force and seeking expression. The sober truth is that even in the democratic countries with which we are allied the masses are beginning to doubt the disinterestedness and integrity of their statesmanship. For three years and more they have borne immeasurable burdens because of a faith that they were fight-

ing for the highest ideals—to preserve human liberty, to overcome projects of aggression, to make secure the rights of nations. And then they discover that behind the protestations of unselfish aims were secret treaties parceling out territories and peoples by arbitrary agreement, making lands and human beings the pawns in just such a game of diplomatic barter as democracy had united to smash—assigning Constantinople to Russia and Austrian provinces to Italy, dividing regions of Africa and Asia, giving to Germany's enemies the definition of her future frontiers. The effect on public opinion even in England is candidly avowed in a London dispatch to the New York Tribune:

Everybody must now realize that a lot of formal treaties and understandings have got to be scrapped. The Bolshevik exposures indicate how profoundly the situation is now changed. Events right down to the last month have been fully covered in these documents, and it cannot be said that secret diplomacy has emerged from the exposure with much honor.

This does not mean that the action of the Russian anarchists was anything less than infamous. A government has no more right to betray and repudiate solemn engagements of this nature than it would have to dishonor debts contracted by a predecessor. It was on the basis of these compacts that Russia's allies for three years gave her unlimited support. Moreover, at the time they were made they expressed the recognized relationships between nations; there was then no practicable foundation for an alliance except the customary diplomatic agreements of give and take. But the old standards of conduct will no longer serve. There is among the free peoples a purpose just as firm as ever to destroy Prussianism, to exact redress for its crimes, to make secure the institutions of law and liberty. But that man is blind who imagines that they are willing

to suffer and die in order that this government or that may enlarge its power or prestige, may wrest territory from a foe, or establish new "spheres of influence" in distant continents. Every rational mind knows that the plea for "no annexations and no indemnities" was an impudent invention of Prussianism; that without the defeat of Germany it would be a wretched fraud, a world disaster. Yet, as President Wilson says, "this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to the right of plain men everywhere"; with victory for democracy implied, mankind stands for a peace "based upon generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims." It was the insistence upon the defeat of Prussianism that gave to the president's stern admonitions their moral value. It was this fact that made his utterance the very antithesis of the pleas of Lansdowne, of the Vatican, of the German Socialists, of the Bolshevik madmen. When he talked of "the principles of justice and humanity" while urging that we should be "neutral even in thought" and that there must be "peace without victory," he affronted reason; when he invokes them as the leader of a democracy resolved upon the overthrow of despotism, he voices the aspirations of free men throughout all the world.

Defeat of Prussianism, reparation for wrongs, then justice for all—these are the demands of the "voices of humanity." And they will prevail, whether against the ambitions of German autocracy or the misguided designs of opposing statesmanship to commercialize the sufferings of mankind.

## THE BETRAYAL OF RUMANIA

*December 14, 1917.*

**I**N THE record of the great war, no one can doubt, the martyrdom of Belgium will stand out as pre-eminent in tragedy and heroism. It is inconceivable that any other nation will endure such anguish, or suffer so innocently. Yet the world may well spare sympathy for another little victim of the Prussian scourge—for Rumania, now lying helpless between the ruthless power of Germany and the treacherous forces of Russia. Even in her woe, Belgium has the consolation of knowing that she was sacrificed to the brute force of an enemy, and not to the perfidy of friends. But the despair of Rumania is embittered by the consciousness that she was victimized by the weaknesses of those whom she joined against the Central Powers, was betrayed by her strongest ally, and finally has been delivered by that same ally into the hands of merciless foes. It was the government of the czar that induced Rumania to enter the war; it was the Prussianized bureaucracy of Petrograd which treacherously withheld or diverted promised aid, and so made possible the conquest of four-fifths of the country; and it is Bolshevism which has surpassed that dishonor by corrupting the Russian forces in Rumania and leaving the nation no recourse but to seek terms with the enemy. There is a grim irony in the fact that it is only as Rumania passes from the war that she gains recognition for her courageous part in it. President Wilson's recent message of sympathy and cheer to that little

nation was a belated expression of the sentiments of all who admire gallantry and fidelity.

As one of the Balkan states, lying in the pathway of Germany's ambitions for an eastern empire, Rumania had no chance to avoid conflict; soon or late she must have faced the choice of submitting to Prussian domination or fighting for her national integrity. At the outbreak of the war the sympathies of her people instantly turned to the Entente alliance—to England and France because of admiration for their institutions, to Italy because of racial kinship, the Rumanians being ardently proud of their descent from Roman colonists. Toward her great eastern neighbor her feelings were complex; she felt Russian protection to be desirable, yet did not wholly trust it, and had never forgiven czarism for having annexed Bessarabia under the sordid deal made by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The dominating motive of her policy, however, was the consuming desire to "redeem" the 3,000,000 Rumanians in Transylvania from Austro-Hungarian oppression. Sympathy and nationalism, therefore, would have ranged her from the beginning against the Central Powers; but there were two circumstances to inspire caution. First, the country was economically, financially and industrially a dependent of Germany and Austria-Hungary; and, second, intervention would be a manifest folly unless the Allies could guarantee effective co-operation. Tho the king is a Hohenzollern, he is not, like his kinsman on the throne of Bulgaria, a mere creature of Prussianism, and from the beginning he faithfully executed a policy designed to serve the nation he led, even against the demands and threats of the kaiser. Thus for two years Rumania clung to a precarious neutrality, awaiting the fateful summons to fulfill her national aspirations, and when

the decision was taken, government and people were united in patriotic ardor.

The neutral world watched the action with a good deal of cynicism. Nations untouched by the war and remote from the entanglements of European politics saw little inspiring in the spectacle of a country deliberately joining the sanguinary conflict, seemingly for no other reasons than territorial ambition and calculating self-interest. Yet we know now that in these respects little Rumania need not fear comparison with some of her great and powerful allies. Moreover, she has displayed qualities that challenge genuine admiration. Certainly it required high courage for her to defy the might of the Teutonic Powers, backed by the force of her implacable enemy, Bulgaria. When the United States entered the war, it knew that British control of the sea guaranteed time for preparation in safety; but Rumania was aware that from the hour of her declaration she must face savage foes on frontiers aggregating nearly 1200 miles. Yet she made her choice intrepidly, and backed it with fortitude. She was faithful to every engagement, and even the bitterness of betrayal and conquest has not wrung from her a whimper of regret. After fifteen months of fighting, her army is reduced by one-half, the invaders hold all but a fifth of her lands, and her people are suffering the extremities of privation. Yet she faces a dread necessity with no outcry, and lays down her sword with dignity.

Rumania declared war late in August, 1916. The Allies had pledged the fullest co-operation, and the strategical situation seemed highly favorable. German losses at Verdun and in the Somme campaign, with the Austrian rout by Russia in Galicia, led to a decision that the time had arrived to strike in the Balkans. It was agreed that Rumania should put all her strength into



an attack on Austria-Hungary thru the passes leading to Transylvania, while her allies conducted three supporting operations—a drive northward from Saloniki, engaging the Bulgar-Turkish forces and protecting the Rumanian flank on the Danube; a Russian offensive thru Bukowina toward the Hungarian plains, and a Russian movement southward thru Rumania against the Bulgarians and Turks. The Transylvanian campaign was a triumph, tho a brief one; within thirty days the Rumanians had conquered the mountain passes and were pressing the Austrians back fifty miles beyond the frontier. But all the co-operating movements failed. The Allied drive from the south was delayed for weeks, and when it was undertaken was so weak that it interposed no obstacle whatever to the deadly thrust of Mackensen, with Austrian and Bulgarian forces, into southern Rumania. The Russian reinforcements were proved powerless, and with almost incredible rapidity the enemy overran the territory below the Danube and threatened to cross that river and move on the capital. Moreover, tremendous Teuton counter-attacks in Galicia had made it impossible for the Russian commander-in-chief to save the situation; he sent what aid he could spare, but it was too little and too late. Besides, the treachery of Petrograd was already making itself felt in the non-arrival of promised munitions and supplies. There was no hope except in a swift withdrawal from Transylvania. But by the time this was under way, Falkenhayn struck from the north; and the remnants of the Rumanian armies were driven steadily beyond their capital until they were able at last to make a stand in the far eastern part of their territory.

The reasons for the disaster were threefold. First was the betrayal by the Russian autocracy. Major Washburn, an American observer, testifies that Brus-

siloff, the Russian commander, faithfully tried to succor his ally; but the perfidious attitude of the government is recorded in one of the secret documents made public the other day. The czar's minister of war wrote, at the time the alliance was made, that in the event of Rumania's success she would become "a powerful country, with a population of 13,000,000," and that "in view of this the collapse of greater Rumania is an idea not against the interests of Russia." The second reason was the ineffectiveness of the co-operating campaigns. And the third was the Allies' disastrous miscalculation as to the reinforcements Germany could send to Austria—they had counted upon fifteen or sixteen divisions as the most she could divert to the Rumanian front, and she sent at least thirty; and these were rapidly concentrated by express, while the Russians could be moved only slowly by their meager railroad system, and were, besides, miserably equipped and supplied, because of the treason in Petrograd. Yet even after this tragic experience the Rumanians held faithfully to their national aims and to the terms of their alliance. The government, moved to Jassy, near the Russian frontier, continued to direct the army and the nation, and it has maintained a fighting force of more than 300,000 men, despite inadequate supplies of every description, from shoes to food and hospital supplies. With them have been large detachments of Russian troops, helping to hold the last free fragment of Rumanian territory until German defeat elsewhere would liberate the country. The Russian upheaval awakened hope that the nation which had overthrown czarism would undo the wrongs of the old régime and give Rumania honorable and effective support. But never was trust more vain. Revolutionary Russia perverted the idea of liberty, and substituted for the rule of autocracy the tyranny of insensate radi-

calism. It was not enough that Bolshevism should seek to make terms with Prussianism; it actually carried its perfidious campaign into Rumania, and seduced the Russian forces there with its campaign of sedition and imbecile reliance upon a German peace. Rumania was left isolated and helpless. The inevitable end came a few weeks ago, as announced in this official statement:

The Russian command having proposed an armistice to the enemy and to the Rumanian troops forming part of this front, it was decided that the Rumanian troops should associate themselves with this proposition. The enemy's troops loudly manifested their satisfaction and endeavored to approach the Rumanian network system, but the Rumanian troops rejected every attempt at fraternization.

If anything could be more revolting than the arrogance of the treacherous forces in control in Russia, it is their hypocrisy. Their boast is that they are serving the cause of the proletariat not only in that country but in all belligerent nations, whereas their shameless traffic with Prussianism means the laying of immeasurable new burdens of sacrifice upon every people fighting for democracy. And not the least of the crimes of Bolshevism is this revolting betrayal of the government, the army and the proletariat of hapless Rumania.

## JERUSALEM FREED

*December 15, 1917.*

**A** PHILADELPHIAN of high scholarly attainments was asked the other day what significance he saw in the capture of the capital of the ancient kingdom of his race. "I am more interested in the battle of Cambrai than in the Palestine campaign," he answered. There must have been, we think, a little affectation in the response of our eminent friend. For what mind can fail to be thrilled by the fate of this shrine of the world's three great religions—the heart of Judaism, of Mohammedanism and of Christianity, and the scene of the most tragic, most tremendous event in human history? To the Jews, dispersed from their land for weary centuries, Jerusalem is the city of David, the city of the great king, "beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth"; the ancient seat of Israel's power and the long-foretold scene of his restoration. To the followers of the Arabian prophet it is El-Khuds, "the holy," venerated alike for the sake of Abraham and Moses and as the place whence Mohammed was caught in a vision into heaven. To the myriads of Christians it is the blessed city, birthplace of their faith; that heard the accents which were to echo thruout all time, that saw the martyrdom of the Founder, that holds His tomb, that was told to await His return; Jerusalem the golden, source of the mightiest influence ever manifested in the earth, symbol of the Creator's kingship over men and of the believer's paradise beyond the grave.

The very utterance of the name opens vistas of

antiquity immeasurable, where forgotten civilizations lie buried beneath the dust of time and history itself stands baffled in the silence of the unknown. For Melchizedek was king in Jerusalem when Abraham journeyed forth from far Chaldea to receive for his posterity the inheritance of Canaan, and behind its known record are ages which even conjecture cannot illuminate. To all this, mystery adds its lure; for it is an astonishing fact that there does not remain in all Palestine a single edifice, or a fragmentary ruin, to record the life of the race that possessed it for so many centuries. The outlines of the civilizations of Babylonia and Assyria and Egypt can be traced from the monuments and tumbled masonry of cities exhumed from drifting sands; we can learn from innumerable relics how races extinct for ages lived and thought and died. But of the glory and the teeming life of ancient Israel not a tangible memorial remains except a few coins, not so much as a broken vessel or a weapon or a metal ornament to illustrate the manner of that civilization which has left so deep an impress upon mankind. After it came the sway of Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Saracens and Turks, with brief interludes of rule by Crusaders. And it is here, in the region ravished by a score of conquests, the scene of majesties and miseries beyond imagining, that a swirling eddy of the great twentieth century conflict starts a new current in the stream of world history. The city of the Prince of Peace is once again a prize of war, and its long captivity to alien power ends in a liberation which will profoundly affect the future of humanity. In this event and its effects men may find new testimony of the truth that ideas alone are indestructible. Of that city hallowed by Law, Koran and Gospel there remains only a huddle of buildings, which are saturated thru and thru with

false legends and the memory of centuries of doctrinal strife. Of its numberless shrines and holy places there is not one whose authenticity is not scornfully repudiated by factionalism or is accepted by science, and about them all rages interminable dissension, which often in the past has produced violence and bloodshed. But the spirit of sanctity broods over it nevertheless, and of all the cities of the earth it is the only one whose name stirs the souls of adherents of all three faiths.

No student of the war needs to be reminded, at this late day, of the significance of Palestine in the conflict. Its possession by the Turk, vassal of the kaiser, made the region a part of the great project of Pan-Germanism, which would make Prussia dominant in Central Europe and the Balkan peninsula, with political suzerainty over Asia Minor, the Holy Land and all the Moslem territory down to the Persian gulf. And beyond that, its proximity to Egypt, Great Britain's gateway to the East, meant infallibly that the great rivals must battle there. One of the early enterprises of the war was a Turkish invasion of Egypt, led by German strategists. It failed, altho for a time the Suez canal, the most vital link in the British chain of empire, was in peril. A second attempt, in 1916, was likewise unsuccessful. Thereupon Great Britain determined that the danger must be removed once for all by the expulsion of the Turk from Palestine. The policy was candidly avowed in a semi-official statement:

From the earliest times the Syrian plateau has been rightly regarded as the strategic portal into Egypt, and no ruler of the latter country has felt safe with that portal in the hands of an enemy. Were Turkey to survive the war, she would remain the vassal of Germany, and Egypt and the canal would be in constant danger. The Palestine plateau, once we have occupied it, will be easy to defend. It is flanked on one side by the desert, untraversable by troops, and on the

other side by the sea, our natural highway. This long, narrow and secure corridor has an average width of only forty to fifty miles, and could be held with ease by a comparatively small force.

The invasion, following the route taken by Napoleon a century ago, required extraordinary preparations, the completeness of which accounts for the rapid success of the campaign. Across the desert lying between the canal and the Palestine frontier the British built a railroad, linked up the oases by automobile trails, and laid a pipe line which delivered water from Egypt to the columns operating in the distant Holy Land. Vast supplies were concentrated near the front, and the line of advance was kept near the coast, so that the troops had the reinforcement of warships and uninterrupted communication by sea. Germany never displayed higher efficiency, and the result was that the campaign, when it was finally pushed, moved with amazing celerity. Within a little more than a fortnight all southern Palestine was conquered, and Jerusalem fell just forty days after the advance began. The first engagement of note was on October 31, when the Turks were routed at Beersheba, at the southern boundary of ancient Canaan—the city of Abraham's well, where the dying Isaac gave to Jacob his blessing and the inheritance of Esau. On November 7 fell Gaza, on the seacoast, one of the five strongholds of the Philistines. It was here that Samson played his prodigious prank of carrying the gates of the city to the top of "a hill looking toward Hebron," and here Philip the apostle converted the eunuch of the Ethiopian queen, as he sat in his chariot reading Esaias the prophet. On November 9 the invaders took Ascalon, a few miles up the coast, another Philistine city that saw savage fighting during the crusades, and with it went Gath, some distance inland, birthplace of Goliath whom David slew.

Speeding north from Beersheba, the right flank of the British next day enveloped Hebron, that old, old city where Abraham "built an altar unto the Lord" and received the covenant of all the land, to him and to his seed forever. There he bought a cave for his tomb for 400 shekels, and there, beneath a great mosque, the devout Mohammedan swears the patriarch rests, with Sarah his wife and Ishmael his firstborn but disinherited son, progenitor of the roaming Arab tribes. Nearby stands the oldest oak in Palestine—so old is it, say the faithful Moslems, that it shaded the three Strangers who appeared to Abraham as he sat in his tent-door in the heat of the day, and foretold to him the birth of Isaac. But the main advance was along the shore, and on November 17 the British took Jaffa, or Joppa, the port of Jerusalem since the days of Solomon and the place whence Jonah fled to escape divine command. From Jaffa the forces moved southeastward along the railroad toward Jerusalem, and rapidly invested the city. When they were astride the road to Jericho and the road to Shechem—where the Master talked with the woman of Samaria at the curb of Jacob's well—the rearguard of the retiring Turks agreed to surrender the city, and on December 10 the British commander and his staff took possession, entering on foot to signify their pacific intentions and their respect for the triple sanctity of the place.

By the standards of devastation and slaughter, this campaign cannot compare with the operations around Cambrai, nor is it likely to have a decisive result on the war. It has far-reaching importance, nevertheless, despite studied depreciation by German critics. Strategically, capture of Jerusalem strengthens the British in Mesopotamia as well as Palestine. In the former region the forces are within 100 miles of Mosul, a Turkish base above Bagdad. At Aleppo, 300 miles north of Jerusalem



by rail, the Germans and Turks have concentrated an army for a campaign to recover Bagdad. But if they now move in that direction the British can strike north from Jerusalem to cut the line at Aleppo, while if they move against Jerusalem the British can take Mosul. A more decisive result is that Egypt has been fully protected from invasion. Politically, the effects are tremendous, for Turkish prestige has been irreparably damaged. Moreover, close to Jerusalem runs the Damascus-Medina railroad, the cutting of which will sever the last link between Constantinople and the Mohammedan holy places; already the Arabs have repudiated the sultan's religious headship, and when he loses control of Mecca and Medina the whole structure of Turkish authority over the followers of the Prophet collapses, and the dream of Pan-Germanism is shattered.

But there is in the capture of Jerusalem a psychological influence of immeasurable weight. To those intent upon military strategy the struggle at Cambrai seems to obscure the other; yet to uncounted millions the liberation of the Holy City is an event which gives the war a new spiritual significance. For they know that German triumph would mean that the shrine of their faith would pass again into the defiling possession of the Moslem. Thus the episode creates for myriads of human beings a new issue, and will inspire them with a new purpose to carry on the conflict until the world is freed from the menace of rule by a soulless force that is at war with the very principles of Christianity.

## THIS DARK HOUR

*December 18, 1917.*

**I**F THE newspapers of the United States were to record some day soon a devastating raid in American waters by a squadron of submarines; or even the bombardment of "an American Atlantic port," the news would be highly disconcerting and deplorable. Yet the event would not be without its compensations, since it would serve to awaken the people and the government of this country to the fact that the war in which we are engaged not only is a grim reality, but carries for this nation possibilities of defeat; that the trifling costs and discomforts we are now grumbling about do not even faintly foreshadow what we may have to endure to gain safety; that all our vast expenditures of money and effort thus far have had no military effect, and conceivably might be too late to avert disaster. To exaggerate danger is as foolish and unpatriotic as to underrate it, and it is with no sense of despair that we intend to set down some impressions of the situation. Yet that observer must be singularly uninformed or careless who does not discern that this is the darkest hour for the cause of civilization since autocracy began its audacious war to subjugate Europe and the world.

The outstanding fact is that, after being held for nearly two years to an exhausting defensive, entailing a deadly drain upon their human and material resources, Germany and her allies today are in a relatively stronger position than ever before, and are capable of conducting a savage and prolonged war of offense. Not only that,

but in the opposing alliance there are revealed ominous signs of indecision, unreadiness and weakness, in both the military and political fields. To every well-balanced mind this shifting of the preponderant power from one side to the other was unerringly foreshadowed from the day when the ignorant masses of Russia succumbed to the drugging of Bolshevism. Yet indolence, heedlessness and senseless optimism led statesmanship to count as an ally a nation which had lost its equilibrium, its sense of nationhood and its very soul, and was stumbling distractedly thru infatuation to perfidy and self-betrayal. Not six weeks ago a great financial institution issued an impressive computation measuring the fighting strength of the two groups, showing in man power 91,000,000 on the side of the Allies, and only 25,000,000 on the side of the Central Powers. And the former figure included 10,000,000 Japanese, none of whom is available for European fronts; 22,000,000 Americans, of whom a few hundred thousand may possibly reach the battle-line within the next year, and 30,000,000 Russians, a force which has completely evaporated. The reader may do his own subtracting. When he has studied the actual comparison, let him take a mental flight over the wide-flung battle-fronts.

Eastward first. Brilliant work has eclipsed German power in Mesopotamia and wrested Bagdad from the Turk; part of Palestine, too, has been conquered. But these facts alone do not appreciably enhance the safety of the world for democracy. The Teutonic rampart across the Balkan peninsula is unbroken, unthreatened, and half a million Allied troops are encamped along a 350-mile front in Macedonia, inert and seemingly powerless. Rumania, caught between two enemies and betrayed by her neighboring ally, has been destroyed, and an army of 300,000 brave men eliminated. Russia,

paralyzed by ignorance and treachery, is but a sodden thing from which Germany turns in contempt, to fling against those who befriended Russia the armies released by her betrayal. With some of these troops she delivered a blow that sent victorious forces of Italy reeling and pinned them to a doubtful defensive far within their own territory; with others she has turned a British success into a defeat, strikes viciously at France, and spreads uneasiness, if not alarm, among her opponents along the whole western front. It is there that all well-informed experts foresee German assaults of unparalleled fury within the next few months. A newspaper owned by the French premier predicts "a supreme attack in February," with attempts to resume advances against Verdun, Paris, Calais. All reports indicate tremendous concentrations behind the German front—scores of divisions brought from the eastern line, rested and refreshed by months of inactivity; enormous supplies of guns and ammunition captured from the disorganized Russians and the beaten Italians. Experts in London declare that Russia's peace treason will release 1,000,000 soldiers to smite the Allies in Belgium and France, and leaders in Paris give warning that an ordeal surpassing in agony that of Verdun faces the republic. "Never," says Gustave Herve, "shall we have more need of national unity and discipline than in the three coming months; never will our men in the trenches have greater need of valor and the spirit of sacrifice." Some observers predict that Germany will not wait for the passing of winter, but will strike with all her force at once. Even Washington, which at first dismissed the Italian disaster with the remark that "Italy is having a difficult moment," gives warning of an impending blow. "We must recognize plainly," says the secretary of war, "that the situation in the eastern theater has

brought about a very decided change in the strategic possibilities of the military situation in the west." As the change has been recognizable for six months, the observation will not be challenged.

No such formidable alliance ever existed as that arrayed against Germany, but we must face the fact that its strength has been tremendously reduced. Belgium, Montenegro and Servia are crippled. Rumania is a suppliant for peace. Once mighty Russia is out of the war, and may even serve autocracy by yielding to it urgently needed supplies. Italy not only has lost her striking power, but has become a liability to her allies, needing the support of great French and British forces drawn from the imperiled western front. France has no appreciable reserve of strength upon which to draw. Great Britain, her toll of killed and wounded mounting at the rate of 25,000 to 30,000 weekly, faces the probability of having to draft every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 50. The demands upon her industrial capacity are staggering, and her wealth is being expended at the incredible rate of \$35,000,000 a day. Facing these conditions, Allied statesmen and military leaders bluntly avow that victory over Germany depends absolutely upon the United States. Germany's palpable design is to make a supreme effort to smash the western line before America can put substantial forces in the field; the most sanguine among her opponents, whether French, British or Italian, dare express no higher hope than that they can withstand the assaults and endure the sacrifices for a few months longer, until this country shall be able to take over part of the burden and put behind the Allied cause enough additional power to strike a decisive blow.

The plain truth is, therefore, that Germany, by reason of the defection of Russia, has regained the

initiative which she lost fifteen months ago at the battle of the Somme. She has survived the ordeal of a prolonged defensive, she has attained a temporary superiority of men and armament, and is now in a position to take the aggressive, with all the stimulating results which that will have upon the spirit of her people. How long she will be able to wage offensive war, and how much she will accomplish, depends upon the power of resistance that remains in her overtaxed adversaries, and upon the time which will be necessary for the United States to bear a part in the fighting. And the United States is palpably, appallingly unready. It is unlikely that American troops in large numbers will be able to participate before spring, and no expert will risk a prediction that this country will exert decisive military effect during 1918.

Nor is the military factor alone to be considered. "Modern war," said Ludendorff the other day, with perfect truth, "is a war of peoples, not of armies, and a war ends now when an enemy people is defeated. There are no decisive battles, as in former wars. The battles merely have an indirect influence on the whole national system, inducing decay and collapse." One must concede that the conquest of Russia is a German victory as well as a Russian shame; Bolshevism would never have gained its sordid sway if military defeat had not broken the spirit of the masses. If Italy falls, it will be from the undermining of her national morale by disaster in the field. And the same forces are at work elsewhere. "Within her frontiers," says Premier Clemenceau's paper, "France is threatened by an insidious propaganda designed to weaken her armies and destroy the morale of her people." Some in Britain, cries Lloyd George, "are organizing a nervous breakdown of the nation," and another minister warns that

the country is in danger from advocates of a premature peace, while an eminent churchman declares publicly that "we cannot even destroy the German army, and if we could, we should not thereby destroy German militarism: that program was always hopeless and now we see it is absurd."

That is the situation today—Germany reinforced by hordes of fresh troops and ready to launch a tremendous assault against her last powerful antagonists, Great Britain and France; among her people new confidence and strength of will, among the others the beginning of a feeling of weariness and uncertainty, manifested in profitless wrangling over "war aims" and unconcealed dependence upon American aid; and in this country a backwardness in preparation which is ominously suggested in the revelations now being made by the congressional inquiry into our military affairs. The North American Review offers a plausible theory to account for the last-mentioned condition. "The whole difficulty," it suggests, "is to be found in the secret hope, even anticipation, both in Washington and in London, that when this country, with its 'boundless resources,' should have been in the war long enough to make a tremendous showing by way of preparation, Germany would 'crumple' and the war would come to an end." If that was the design, it was not only unsound in principle but lamentably faulty in execution; for the showing which seems to us prodigious is still so far from being complete that it does not discourage Germany's effort nor mitigate its force in the remotest degree, and conceivably may be too late to counteract its effects and avert the world disaster of a Prussian peace.

## GERMANY'S OFFER

*December 31, 1917.*

WITH an air of revealing acute discoveries, observers in Washington and other capitals dramatically announce that the peace offer made thru Austria-Hungary to the Russian anarchists is really directed by Germany to the opposing alliance, and that its purpose is to embarrass the kaiser's enemies. No one will challenge facts so obvious; but they lead some mistakenly to flout the whole proceeding. It is, they say, but another evidence of Prussian arrogance, insincerity and guile; a desperate maneuver to hide despair; an utterly baseless and irrational bluff deserving only contempt. The move is, on the contrary, an event of profound significance. It is as concrete and menacing an offensive as tho it were conducted with massed troops and cannon instead of with studied phrases, and requires a defense as alert and well planned. For we find in it, in addition to the palpable meanings, testimony as to four vital things—first, that Germany is as determined to force peace as she was in 1914 to force war; second, that her desire, however subtle its design, is fundamentally sincere; third, that the terms she proffers are as liberal as her military situation makes it possible for her government to state; and fourth, that they cannot be entertained even as a basis of negotiations. The first point hardly needs emphasis. Defeated, as regards her complete plan, at the battle of the Marne, Germany later snatched, and still holds, the prize for which she drenched a continent with blood.



Ever since her conquest of the Balkans and her political absorption of Turkey, peace has been her aim, and it has been to force peace, not to acquire further territory, that she has battled so desperately.

But is she sincere? Can Prussianism be honest in disavowing annexations and conceding the right of occupied countries to regain their independence? Even so. Two considerations dictate this attitude—the manifest impossibility of overpowering the world at this time by arms, and the establishment of Teutonic domination thruout Central Europe, needing only a negotiated peace to make it secure. Germany's sincerity in offering a settlement upon the terms outlined need not be doubted. And as a matter of cold logic—to come to the third point—what more could be offered by a government which justifies itself by victories? The Balkans firmly held, Russia reduced to impotence, Italy paralyzed, France and Great Britain unable to strike a decisive blow, the United States still unready—how many days would autocracy last if it told its subjects that these facts required not only abandonment of conquest and a victor's spoils, but also surrender of every gain and the payment of staggering indemnities? Morally, Germany's terms are infamous; on the basis of the "war map" they are almost generous. As to the last consideration—the impossibility of their acceptance—the answer is found in the fact that the free nations are fighting to destroy Prussianism, not to moderate its demands; not to find means of living with it, but to achieve the certainty of living without it.

The proposal itself differs from others, of course, in two essential respects. That of December, 1916, was embodied in an exultant and defiant proclamation of victory; its acceptance by the Allies would have been an abject acknowledgment of defeat and they would have

entered the negotiations shackled by an admission that Germany had won the right to dictate the settlement. That of December, 1917, on the contrary, studiously avoids the controversial subject of the military situation; it scrupulously respects the susceptibilities of the enemy, and virtually suggests recognition of "peace without victory." Still more marked is the other variation—this is the first time that Germany has even approached a definite avowal of the terms upon which she would end the war. Only a year ago she peremptorily refused even to outline her views; now she states, with striking clearness, her attitude upon several vital issues. To say that her utterance is adroit and incomplete is to state only the obvious; but to denounce it offhand as ambiguous and spurious seems to us puerile. Let us glance rapidly at the various items. The Central Powers "are agreed immediately to conclude a general peace without forcible annexations and indemnities"; they disavow "forcible annexations of territories seized during the war." These words are incapable of misinterpretation. They mean that under the treaty Servia, Montenegro, Rumania, Russia, Belgium, northern France and Italy shall be evacuated; that there shall be no extension of the frontiers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey, which are the only countries now occupying enemy territory in Europe, except France, which holds a small strip in German Alsace. They do not intend "to deprive of political independence those nations which lost it during the war." This, again, is explicit—the independence of Servia, Montenegro, Rumania and Belgium shall be restored. Nor is there anything ambiguous in the stipulation that the question of subject nationalities "must be solved by each government, with its peoples, in a manner established by the constitution." This means that the political status

of Czechs and Jugo-Slavs and Lithuanians and Armenians and Poles shall be determined by the nations of which they were a part before the war; there is to be no dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or Turkey; and, while Poland is now in German possession, it would be returned to Russia under the "no annexation" clause, and its fate, therefore, would be bound up with that of Russia. The proposal regarding indemnities is sufficiently clear:


Every belligerent Power would have only to make indemnification for expenditures for its nationals who have become prisoners of war, as well as for damage done in its own territory by illegal acts of force committed against civilian nationals belonging to the enemy.

Finally, return of Germany's colonies is "essential," and this demand "Germany cannot renounce under any circumstances." The program, of course, gives the pacifist a foothold. Those who see no difference in political ideals and purposes between Germany and the United States, between Turkey and France, will point triumphantly to the moderation of Germany's terms. Here, they will say, is the nation which was described as lusting for world conquest and the overthrow of liberty, offering to surrender every foot of occupied territory and to recognize the independence of all the countries it has subjugated, asking nothing save "mutual condonation" and an agreement that each belligerent nation shall bear its own losses from the unhappy strife. Germany, they will argue, neither proclaims her victory, nor asserts domination, nor demands spoils; she seeks a peace, as she says, "equally just to all belligerents without exception." With such a settlement immediately possible, they will ask, what can justify further slaughter?

But the only way to judge the value of these attractive terms is to apply them to actual conditions as they exist. Let us see the results. "No forcible annexations" implies the return to its former sovereignty of all occupied territory. Servia and Belgium and France and other victims are to be freed of invaders, as the whole world demands. Likewise, Palestine's liberation is to be mocked, and Jerusalem, free after centuries of misrule, is to be thrust back under the hideous tyranny of the Turk. The "political independence" of nations conquered during the war is to be restored. But just how much would this fiction be worth to Servia, with the Central European alliance supreme in the Balkans, or to Belgium, terrorized and impoverished, cowering in the shadow of an unbeaten Germany? Those who yearn for peace at any price profess a large indifference to the aspirations for freedom that disturb the subject races under Austrian tyranny; but beyond that, they would be content that the remnant of the Armenians should be doomed to remain at the mercy of their Turkish despoilers and butchers—"in a manner established by the constitution"—and that Alsace-Lorraine should suffer henceforth the rigors of that same Prussianism that has made the existence of the stolen province hideous for half a century. But it is in reference to indemnities that the German terms best reveal their character. There are to be no indemnities at all, in the usual meaning of that term. Germany would pay for illegal damage done on her own soil to enemy civilians or their rights, but nothing whatever for the criminal depredations and systematic devastation wrought in Servia and Belgium and France. And, while she returns to those nations territories wasted by plunder and rapine and sheer bestial fury, she is to recover her vast colonies intact and is to

be guaranteed against any economic restrictions on the part of those she has wronged!

The terms upon which the world democracies will discuss peace with Germany have been reduced to three words—restitution, reparation, guarantees. The first one Germany concedes, for she has more to gain than to lose by its application. The second she repudiates—she would not even pay for the calculated havoc committed in defiance not only of law and humanity, but of the harsh rules of sanguinary war. And the third she ignores, putting forth the pretense that the government which perjured itself in Belgium, and is bankrupt in honor for all time, can give pledges the world will accept. And yet something has been gained, some progress made. Despite momentous German victories and ominous Allied defeats, the events of the year have so changed the Prussian view that conquest can be openly renounced and explicit terms avowed. So sincere, so irrepressible, is the longing for peace among those who still flourish the "iron fist," that autocracy is willing to go thru the mummery of negotiating with a parcel of scatter-brained fanatics masquerading as a government, and exchange with them hollow aspirations for a "democratic peace." Prussianism is not yet beaten in the field, but it will be—either there or in Germany. For it has lost that which counts more than a hundred battles; it has lost the capacity to make the nations of the world believe its word, or trust to its good faith, or endure its existence.






















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