

WARLIKE
ENGLAND
AS SEEN BY HERSELF

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FERDINAND TÖNNIES

PAUL K. HATT

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WARLIKE ENGLAND

As Seen by Herself

BY
FERDINAND TÖNNIES

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Journal of Sociology; President of the German
Sociological Society*

Mere cant, however seriously put forth in official statements, no longer blinds educated public opinion as to the facts in these acts of international brigandage.—W. MORGAN SHUSTER, ex-Treasurer-General of Persia, *The Strangling of Persia*, (1912), p. 222.



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Warlike England

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"Be the Government Liberal or Tory, much the same thing happens—war with all its horrors and miseries and crimes and cost. Talkers and writers being mostly in favor of it, and the multitude approving or consenting to the wickedness in high places." (John Bright to a friend, 1885 Ct. Trevelyan, "Life of John Bright," p. 437.)

"The English nation is the most estimable agglomeration of human beings, considered in its relation to each other. But as a state in its relations with other states it is the most pernicious, the most violent, the greediest for power and the most bellicose of all."—(Immanuel Kant.)

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FOREWORD

This book has been written in the cause of truth.

The testimony of the most respected English authors cannot be controverted. It throws the best light upon the existing European crisis.

This book has not been written to stir up national hatred. The author distinguishes sharply between the English people and the English world-policy. Even the leaders of this policy have for the most part only an incomplete knowledge of the driving forces behind it.

The English folk is made up of elements differing greatly from one another. Besides the real Englishmen are Scots, Welshmen, Irishmen and the manifold mixtures of these races; thereto are to be reckoned descendants of Germans, Flemings, Frenchmen, Scandinavians, and others. Furthermore, character and habits of thought vary greatly with different occupations, callings and social position. That is to say, they are manifold and complex.

In England, however, more than in other lands, the upper classes are looked up to and imitated by the lower.

The real ruling power in Great Britain and Ireland has for centuries been in the hands of the "squirearchy," as it is often termed in modern days. This "squirearchy" permits the leaders of the commercial and monied aristocracy to flourish alongside it, and even takes them into its ranks—a procedure not synonymous with the much more frequent "raising to the peerage." The relation is based upon the tacit understanding that it is England's destiny to rule and exploit the earth for the enrichment of these classes.

In the last fifty years the real body of the people, especially the laboring class, has, through the press and through its parliamentary representation, won a growing influence over these its masters, but only in affairs of *domestic* policy. The foreign policy has remained the domain of the oligarchy. The people have only the right and the opportunity to sit by as spectators, to applaud—and to hiss when the play is over.

And ever anew the people of Great Britain permit themselves to listen to—and to be moved to applaud—the assertion that ethical motives govern the conduct of English world-

policy and the incitements of wars for which this policy is responsible.

Let us see how it stands with these ethical motives.

THE AUTHOR.



INTRODUCTION

Why did England declare war on the German Empire?

The King and his ministers, writers of every kind, in newspapers, magazines and books, have replied to the question with the ringing answer: For ethical reasons. "We fight Prussia in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness of the state—to the doctrine that the means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or at least, of European comity of nations, within which all States stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which all States are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are "in the state and posture of gladiators" in their relations one with another; we stand for the reign of law. . . . We are a peo-

ple in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element.”¹

Thus speak the six members of the Oxford faculty of modern history, men who have the right to expect that their voice shall be heard. They are the spokesmen of a public opinion which is widespread in Great Britain. It may be wondered whether it is widespread in Ireland. Does Ireland, too, believe that the cause of law is the vital element in the blood of the Englishman? That England assumes with tenderness, out of the courage of nobility, the protection of small nations? That it battles for them against militarism for the cause of justice?

“England did her best to annihilate Irish commerce and to ruin Irish agriculture. Statutes passed by the jealousy of English land-owners forbade the export of Irish cattle or sheep to English ports. The export of wool was forbidden, lest it might interfere with the profits of English wool-growers. Poverty was thus added to the curse of misgovernment, and poverty deepened with the rapid growth of the native population, till famine turned the country into a hell.” . . .

“The murders and riots which sprang from

¹“Why We Are at War; Great Britain’s Case.” By members of the Oxford faculty of modern history, pp. 115, 116.

time to time out of the general misery and discontent were roughly repressed by the ruling class." . . .

"For a while, however, the Protestant landowners, banded together in 'Orange Societies,' held the country down by sheer terror and bloodshed. . . . Ireland was in fact driven into rebellion by the lawless cruelty of the Orange yeomanry and the English troops."

The references are to the period preceding the Union (1800). Are the quotations perhaps taken from a handbook for Irish agitators? No, they are statements employed by an English historian of general repute, T. R. Green, M. A., one-time examiner in the school for modern history at Oxford.¹

"For an Irishman it is no moral offence to deny the moral authority of the Act of Union. In my opinion the Englishman has far more cause to blush for the means by which that act was obtained." These are the words of "the Grand Old Man," William Ewart Gladstone, before a committee of Parliament in 1890. The reference was to the fact that the Union had been achieved only through monstrous bribery.

¹"A Short History of the English People." London, 1875, pp. 786-788. More than a half million copies of the book have been circulated in England.

And what of Ireland after the Union? Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth century? The history of her people speaks a plain language. Ireland had in 1841 about 8,200,000 inhabitants, or about 97 to the square kilometer (247.1 acres), no very dense population for the fruitful green island, that being about the same population per kilometer as that of Austria now. In the year 1911, however, 70 years later, the population of Ireland had sunk to about 4,400,000, a decrease of nearly one-half. In these 70 years the population of all other European lands increased steadily; in many it doubled or more than doubled. In Ireland it was halved. The density of population fell from 97 to 52 per square kilometer.

Will England, with its "Union of Nations," operate upon the other European nations as it has operated upon neighboring Ireland through its union with that country?

What do the other nations think of the blessings of this "European society," which is to be headed by England as the representative of justice?

"Justice for Ireland" was Gladstone's pathetic demand. A contest of thirty years' duration was necessary to secure a safe majority for a law designed to give back to the Irish nation the right of self-government. The

law was finally passed—and the King of Great Britain and Ireland had to declare (in June, 1914) that the country stood on the threshold of civil war. The Government was compelled to stand by and observe how the rebellion was being systematically prepared, how the indignation against an imperial law was nourished, furthered and conducted, how it received the approval and support of a party whose electoral strength in Great Britain is nearly equal to that of the party in power. . . . “We stand for the reign of law,” say the educators, who presumably belong to this party. And what was the meaning of this indignation? The meaning was and is that Ireland is not to obtain its rights, that it is to suffer further under the servitude which has crushed and suffocated it for centuries.

Whether the moral argument—for thus we may term the putting forth of ethical and legal grounds as the basis for the English world policy—will work convincingly upon Irish minds may fairly be doubted. Where people have not become acquainted with this policy in such a direct manner, or where they have forgotten their impressions, this argument will still find credence. It finds credence because it is good, and when men are not angry or embittered they are readier to believe that

the motives of others are good than that they are bad, in like degree as they are readier to impute good than bad motives to themselves.

For this reason the moral argument is especially designed for feminine intelligences and finds a responsive chord there most readily, in part because women gladly sympathize with and become enthusiastic for noble motives, in part because even educated women seldom possess an exact knowledge of diplomatic conditions and still more seldom a profound knowledge of history. But both these branches of knowledge are necessary to a right judgment of the moral argument.

The soul of a folk resembles the soul of a woman. It is always difficult to penetrate and lay bare the facts beneath the surface of things. For this tools and apparatus are needed which are not at the disposal of every one.

Hamlet wonders that "one may smile and smile and be a villain," but Hamlet's stepfather and uncle only keeps on smiling. Nay more, he also makes solemn speeches. He speaks of his dead brother, whom he has poisoned, "with wisest sorrow." His thoughts have contended with his emotions. Statecraft demanded that he take the widowed queen as

his wife—"with one auspicious and one dropping eye."

Shakespeare more than once pictures with classic lines the hypocrite, with the honeycomb of upright thoughts and ethical motives upon his lips.

Hypocrisy has often been termed the national vice of the English. A noted English author of the most modern times, Bernard Shaw, says in his article on the present war:

"We know that even in circles that are most friendly to the English nation an opinion is going abroad that our excellent qualities are being disfigured by an *incorrigible hypocrisy*."

He is of the opinion that this reputation cannot have arisen entirely without ground. In particular, he considers it to be founded on the attitude of English statesmen. As a type in this connection he names *Sir Edward Grey*.

In reality, the conscious, shameless hypocrite, who deliberately and continuously plays a comedy, is a rare figure. The rôle of an honorable man is so hard for a base man, that of a severely moral man is so hard for a Tartuffe, that, in life as well as on the stage, he is usually very speedily unmasked.

Much more frequent, because much easier,

is the half-conscious or even the quarter-conscious hypocrisy, the conduct of the man governed not by very evil, but by mediocre, common and unbeautiful motives, and who understands how to disguise these motives with glittering finery and adorn them with pious and virtuous speeches. The basis of this is frequently a mixture of praiseworthy shame with reprehensible dissimulation, for, as Lord Bacon fittingly remarks in one of his essays, nakedness of mind, like nakedness of body, is unseemly. One may add to this that even in the case of clothes designed to conceal thoughts, more weight is laid upon their pleasing other people than upon their being genuine and worthy. In like manner the wise man imposes holy and apparently natural wrinkles upon his face, which can so easily betray his real thoughts, rather than to tie before it an uncomfortable mask which can deceive only from afar. Practice makes perfect here also, and habit becomes second nature.

This remarkable mixture of shame and hypocrisy is entirely alien to no individual, certainly to no nation. But it is a noteworthy fact that precisely in the English nation, which is not without strength and greatness in evil as well as in good, there is to be found a marked inclination and talent for it, and that

English politicians, who may be upright and honorable men in private life, show themselves in state affairs to be masters of that art which Socrates branded as the particular art of the Sophists—that of making the bad cause appear the better by devious, involved speeches.

It is hardly an accident that the English language has found a special, untranslatable word for this peculiar attitude of mind, which finds its purest expression in twisted but high-sounding words, designed to disguise motives. This is the word "cant," which philologists derive from the Latin *cantus* (song), as if a singsong manner of delivery favored this manner of speaking, which is essentially so deeply insincere, and yet half believed by the speaker himself. For cant possesses also this peculiar attribute: The oftener it is repeated, or the louder it is proclaimed, by so much more is it not only believed and enthusiastically accepted, but even those who first gave it currency believe it themselves, and continue to assert it with greater assurance and, therefore, with greater effect.

The English themselves, among whom the truth-loving man is by no means rare, have not lacked a realization of this shamefaced hypocrisy (as one may perhaps translate cant).

Lord Byron repeatedly expressed himself with repugnance and bitterness concerning it.¹ A special treatise concerning cant, published in 1887 by Sidney Whitman,² gave occasion for much comment. Even the most zealous advo-

¹ Countess of Blessington. Conversations with Lord Byron, *passim*.

² "Conventional Cant, Its Result and Remedy." London, 1887. The title and the name of the author had escaped my memory. After I had finished this work I found both in Moritz Busch's "Leaves From My Diary," III, p. 221. Busch wrote—at Prince Bismarck's orders, as ever—two articles in the *Grenzboten*, entitled "An Evil Spirit in the England of To-day." (*Grenzboten*, 1888, p. 377 et seq., p. 533 et seq.) I find therein (p. 534) the following sentence, which is in perfect agreement with my own conception: "The expression *cant* means, then, untruthfulness, but joined to the feeling that one is truthful or is telling the truth; the deceiving of others which is at the same time a self-deception." I learn also that Carlyle described cant as the art of making things appear to be what they are not, "an art of such deadly nature that it deadens the very soul of those who employ it by leading them beyond the stage of conscious falsehood to a point where they believe in their own mad representations, and brings them down to the most miserable condition conceivable, where one is honestly dishonest." Carlyle is reported to have exclaimed on one occasion (the exact passage is not given): "Cant, thou curse of our nation!" I have thus far been unable to get hold of Whitman's book. But I just discover an admirable article upon "Cant" in the *New Statesman* of January 23, 1915 (vol. iv, No. 94). Cant is defined therein as "the singsong of the self-righteous." "It is praise and prayer from the nose instead of from the heart. . . . It enables us to cut a presentable figure before our neighbors, and not only to deceive ourselves, but to deceive ourselves into the belief that we are deceiving others. England is supposed by many people to be the world's factory of cant, and her annual production of the article certainly reaches a creditable figure." The writer believes, however, that if Germany should win the war, she would become the leading exporter of cant among the nations of Europe.

cates of the English claims to be the first nation of the world must confess that a peculiar condition exists in regard to cant. But no one believes that cant can be exterminated. It has always flourished in foreign politics and in war. Lord Cromer, one of the most respected men of the country (although of German descent, from the Baring family), only recently referred to the phrase, "the British spirit of fair play," as "the cant phrase of the day."¹

That the storms of the present war (1914) are throwing up whole mountains of cant on the strand of the literature of the day cannot in the least be wondered at. The book of the six Oxford scholars has already been mentioned. Even as earnest and able a weekly magazine as *The New Statesman* (conducted by Mr. Sidney Webb and Mrs. Beatrice Webb-Potter) published on October 24th an extended article on the question: "Why did we embark on the war?" and the answer was: "Because of Belgium and out of moral reasons," whereupon a correspondent (Mr. Sadler) raised objections in the following number and remarked: "The answer savors of hypocrisy."

Of course it does. Cant always savors of

¹ Lord Cromer, *Essays*, p. 9.

hypocrisy, even if it is not intended to be utter, shameless hypocrisy. But the article referred to was quite right in declaring that Sir Edward Grey's cant concerning the breach of Belgian neutrality and England's sacred duty to intervene on Belgium's behalf won public opinion for the war. Public opinion in England is wonderfully responsive to cant. It is like a musical automat—one needs only to throw a cant phrase into the slot and the instrument begins to grind out a highly moral melody.

“In the political literature of Europe four qualities are ascribed to England. It is asserted that England is, in the highest questions of public policy, fickle, proud, selfish and quarrelsome.”¹ Thus declares a modern English author, the descendant of a famous family of politicians. He ought not to have forgotten the fifth quality which rounds out the character drawing of England's world policy—the habitual cant, the peculiar spice of those other qualities so aptly described.

A single sentiment lies at the bottom of all these qualities. It is fear—the English statesmen call it foresight and watchfulness—the fear of thieves or beggars that forms a psy-

¹ The Honorable George Peel: “The Enemies of England,” London, 1902, pp. 8, 9.

chological weakness of many rich people, the fear of being outdone by competitors, so well known to every business-man.

But are our judgments not determined by partisanship? Is it not hostility that pictures English policy in such a light? Does not history show that England has battled for justice and freedom, that, with the bravery of a lion, it has made the cause of the small and weak states of the earth its own cause? And that, therefore, its world policy has been dictated by ethical motives?

To answer these questions we will open the books of history. We will not call as witnesses historians who might possibly be open to suspicion, we will not call foreign historians, who might be infected with the hatred against political England, but we will call English historians, and by preference men whose authoritativeness is not denied in England, men who hold the first rank as investigators and thinkers.

In line with this, I place at the head of these witnesses the author of the works concerning "The Expansion of England," and "The Growth of British Policy," Sir J. R. Seeley. The former of these two works shall serve us as the basis for judging the motives of the English world policy. Seeley was knighted for

his services as a scholar and was otherwise the recipient of the highest distinctions.

Not that Seeley fought against the foreseeing militaristic tendencies—popularly termed Jingoism—of the last decades. Quite the contrary. A prominent Swedish historian (Harald Hjärne) terms him “the Herald of Imperialism,” and thinks that he can be considered as an English Treitschke. His authority in his own land, however, is much higher than is the authority of Treitschke in the German countries. Lord Cromer, “the Egyptian,” for instance, calls Seeley, Gibbon, Guizot, Mommsen and Milman “the most able writers and thinkers the world has produced.” In like manner Joseph Chamberlain, in one of his speeches in Parliament, asserted that “our greatest thinkers and writers have put this problem (of Greater Britain) before us,” and named as such Seeley, Froude and Lecky.

In English writings — statements by Treitschke are cited and joined in absurd manner with quotations from Nietzsche and Bernhardt in order to demonstrate how bellicose (or “chauvanistic” or “militaristic”) the sentiment of the Germans is to-day.

It is not in this sense that we will adduce statements of Seeley and other distinguished authors. The sentiments of our authorities

are matters of indifference to us. It is only to banish the suspicion that we have sought out such men as are unfriendly to England and its policies that we call attention to the fact that Seeley is an *imperialistic* historian. The same is true of W. H. Lecky, to whom we have several times referred. His name is favorably known in the United States, in Germany, indeed, everywhere, as that of one of the most learned and prominent writers.

A somewhat different significance attaches to Justin McCarthy, who, next to Seeley, will be most frequently called as a witness. This is necessary because of the fact that for the period covered by the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1900) there is no other work that enjoys such great popularity and such regard in England as the "History of Our Own Times," with its three divisions, (1) up to 1880, (2) 1880-1897, (3) 1897-1900. "Easily and delightfully written and on the whole eminently sane and moderate, these volumes form a brilliant piece of narrative from a Liberal standpoint." This is the characterization of this history in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. xvii, p. 201.

The other witnesses speak for themselves. In addition to historians (in whose number are reckoned also the authors of works on cus-

toms of living), other witnesses will occasionally be called for the better characterization of criticisms that deserve to be made better known, either because of their general circulation or because of the authoritative standing of the critics.

It suffices here to name Richard Price, Herbert Spencer, Gladstone, John Morley (Gladstone's biographer), John Bright, G. M. Trevelyan (Bright's biographer), Lord Cromer, and V. S. Blunt; among the historians, James Mill (also known as a philosopher), Kaye, Malleon, G. O. Trevelyan and Holland Rose.

All these authorities are ornaments of the English nation or of its literature and scholarship.

Use has been made in other places of the Dictionary of National Biography and the last edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. The articles cited from these monumental works are from the pens of the best authorities in their subjects.

PART I

THE ENGLISH WORLD POLICY UP TO THE FALL OF NAPOLEON

FIRST DIVISION: WARS AGAINST SPAIN,
AGAINST HOLLAND, AND AGAINST FRANCE,
FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY

CHAPTER I

THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND. ELIZABETH,
CROMWELL, THE RESTORATION. BUCCANEERS

“Between the Revolution and the Battle of Waterloo it may be reckoned that we waged seven great wars, of which the shortest lasted seven years, and the longest about twelve. Out of a hundred and twenty-six years, sixty-four years, or more than half, were spent in war.”
(Seeley, p. 24.)

Of the seven wars of this period, “five are wars with France from the beginning, and

both the other two, though the belligerent at the outset was in the first Spain and in the second our own colonies, yet became in a short time and ended as wars with France.” (p. 28.)

After the seven-year pause that followed the War of the Spanish Succession the following wars can almost be regarded as a single conflict. “I say these wars make one grand and decisive struggle between England and France.” (p. 31.)

“The expansion of England in the New World and in Asia is the formula which sums up for England the history of the eighteenth century. . . . The great triple war of the middle of that century (1744-1763) is neither more nor less than the great decisive duel between England and France for the possession of the New World.” (p. 33.) “We had a competitor in the work of settlement, a com-

petitor who in some respects had got the start of us, namely France." (p. 35.)

"The statement that expansion is the chief character of English history in the eighteenth century . . . means that the European policy and the colonial policy are but different aspects of the same great national development." (p. 42.)

Seeley also occasionally glances backward to the history of the time preceding this period, to the British *ancien régime*.

"It seems to us clear that we are the great wandering, working, colonizing race, descended from sea-rovers and Vikings. The sea, we think, is ours by nature's decree, and on this highway we travel to subdue the earth and to people it." (p. 94.) In reality, "the maritime greatness of England is of much more modern growth than most of us imagine. It dates from the civil wars of the seventeenth

century and from the career of Robert Blake.” (p. 95.)

“There are no doubt naval heroes older than Blake. There is Francis Drake and Richard Grenville and John Hawkins. But the navy of Elizabeth was only the English navy in infancy, and the heroes themselves are not far removed from buccaneers.” (p. 96.)

“From this point of view from which we here regard English history, the great occurrence of the seventeenth century before 1688 is not the Civil War or the execution of the King, but the intervention of Cromwell in the European War. This act may almost be regarded as the foundation of the English World Empire.” (p. 130.) The first Stuarts directed their gaze more upon the Old World than upon the New. “But the reaction comes to an end with the accession to power of the party of the Commonwealth. *A policy now*

begins which is not, to be sure, very scrupulous, but is able, resolute and successful. It is oceanic and looks westward, like the policy of the latter years of Elizabeth." (p. 131.) The colonial policy of Cromwell is chiefly interesting because Charles II was guided by it in the direction of his own course. "*Moral rectitude is hardly a characteristic of it, and if it is religious, this perhaps would have appeared, had the protectorate lasted longer, to have been its most dangerous feature. Nothing is more dangerous than imperialism marching with an idea on its banner, and Protestantism was to our Emperor Oliver what the ideas of the Revolution were to Napoleon and his nephew.*" (p. 133.) "We may well, I think, shudder at the thought of the danger which was removed by the fall of the protectorate." (p. 134.)

This imperialist policy developed princi-

pally in regard to the New World. "Here, indeed, Cromwell's policy . . . has a peculiarly absolute and unscrupulous tinge. Of his own pure will, without consulting directly or indirectly the people, and in spite of opposition in his council, he plunges the country into a war with Spain. This war is commenced after the manner of the old Elizabethan by a sudden descent, without previous quarrel or declaration of war, upon San Domingo." (p. 134.) Sir J. Stephen once told his auditors that "if they had a taste for iconoclasm he could recommend them to employ it upon the buccaneering Cromwell." (ibid.) It was not, however, the war with Spain that was most characteristic of this period and the period following, but the war with Holland. "If Cromwell's breach with Spain shows most strikingly by its violent suddenness the spirit of the new commercial policy, yet it is capable

of being misinterpreted." (p. 135.) It might be thought it had been directed against Spain as the great Catholic power. "It is the great proof that this cause is fast giving way to the other, viz., the great trade-rivalry produced by the New World, that all through the middle of the seventeenth century England and Holland wage great naval wars of a character such as had never been seen before." (ibid.)

Charles II is often condemned for the boundless unprincipledness of his foreign policy. In reality, however, he was only following the examples set by the Republic and by Cromwell. Because of this his Government was supported by some people who had inherited the traditions of the Republic. "Anthony Ashley Cooper, a man of Cromwellian ideas, supported it by quoting the old words, *delenda est Carthago*. In other words: 'Holland is our great rival in trade, on the ocean

and in the New World. Let us destroy her, though she be a Protestant power; let us destroy her with the help of a Catholic power.'” (p. 136.) “Those were the maxims of the Commonwealth and of the Protector, who, though Puritans, had understood that the rivalry of the maritime powers for trade and empire in the New World was taking the place of the struggle of the churches as the question of the day.” (ibid.)

The result was conquest. Thus, under Cromwell, Jamaica was won from Spain, and Bombay was taken from Portugal and New York from Holland under Charles.

One sees that this historian, who does not conceal his enthusiasm for a “Greater Britain” (as much as he endeavors to judge objectively), ascribes the foundation of the empire to men whom he describes as “buc-

caneers." This comparison does not appear here for the first time. Thus, for instance, in a booklet¹ written in 1837, glorifying voyages of exploration, appears this passage: "Although the name (buccaneers), linked to one virtue and a thousand crimes, is of much later date than the era of Drake and his daring follower Oxenham, yet is there no violation of truth in ascribing to them the character which it signified, of indiscriminate plunder by sea and land, in peace and in war."

The real buccaneers, "a designation too soon stained with every species of crime and excess," belong to the seventeenth century. They are also known under the name of "filibusters," and called themselves "brothers of the coast."

The conduct of English warships towards

¹"Lives and Voyages of Drake, Cavendish and Dampier, Including a View of the History of the Buccaneers," London, 1837, p. 183.

neutral trading vessels, from that day to the present time, has successfully carried on the traditions of the "brothers of the coast." An admission of this, even though not in so many words, is to be found in Seeley's writings.

This rule of conduct led to war with Denmark in 1800, to war with the United States in 1812 and to a sharp conflict with the same country in 1841. The English policy has thus far held it incompatible with its interests to respect private property in time of war.

CHAPTER II

COMMERCE AND WAR. THE ETHICAL MOTIVES

More and more, then, the expeditions of the freebooters were succeeded by naval warfare; at first the war against Holland, then the great contest with France for the New World. The climax of Seeley's descriptions is the emphasizing of the significance of the latter contest. He considered it as affording a clearly visible example of the fact "that the expansion of England has been neither a tranquil process nor yet belonging purely to the most recent times; that throughout the eighteenth century that expansion was an active principle of disturbance, a cause of wars unparalleled both in magnitude and number." (p. 125.)

Of what sort were the causes and the motives

of these wars? Let us hear the answer of the philosophic historian to this question.

“It seems to me to be the principal characteristic of this phase of England that she is at once commercial and warlike.” (p. 127.)

“The wars of the eighteenth century were incomparably greater and more burdensome than those of the Middle Ages. In a lesser degree those of the seventeenth century were also great. These are precisely the centuries in which England grew more and more a commercial country. England indeed *grew ever more warlike at that time as she grew more commercial*. And it is not difficult to show that a cause was at work to make war and commerce increase together. This cause is the old colonial system” (p. 128), the essential feature of which is “that it placed the colony in the position, not so much of a state in federation, as of a conquered state.” (p. 77.) “Com-

merce in itself may favor peace, but when commerce is artificially shut out by a decree of government from some promising territory, then commerce just as naturally favors war. We know this by our own recent experience with China.”¹ (p. 128.) The old colonial system “carved out the New World into territories, which were regarded as estates, to be enjoyed in each case by the colonizing nation. The hope of obtaining such splendid estates and of enjoying the profits that were reaped from them constituted the greatest stimulus to commerce that had ever been known, and it was a stimulus which acted without intermission for centuries. . . . But inseparable from the commercial stimulus was the stimulus of international rivalry. The object of each nation was now to increase its trade, not

¹This, of course, refers to the Opium War, and the troubles that followed it. (See Chap. X.)

by waiting upon the wants of mankind, but by a wholly different method, namely, by getting exclusive possession of some rich tract in the New World. Now whatever may be the natural opposition between the spirit of trade and the spirit of war, *trade pursued in this method is almost identical with war, and can hardly fail to lead to war.* What is conquest but appropriation of territory? Now appropriation of territory under the old colonial system became the first national object. The five nations of the West were launched into an eager competition for territory—that is, they were put into a relation with each other in which the pursuit of wealth naturally led to quarrels, a relation in which, as I said, commerce and war were inseparably entangled together, so that commerce led to war and war fostered commerce. The character of the new period which was thus opened showed itself very

early. Consider the nature of that long, desultory war of England with Spain, of which the expedition of the Armada was the most striking incident. I have said that the English sea captains were very like buccaneers, and indeed to *England the war was throughout an industry, a way to wealth, the most thriving business, the most profitable investment, of the time.* That Spanish war is, in fact, the infancy of English foreign trade. The first generation of Englishmen that invested capital, put it into that war. 'As now we put our money into railways, or what not, so then the keen men of business took shares in the new ship which John Oxenham or Francis Drake was fitting out at Plymouth and which was intended to lie in wait for the treasure galleons, or make raids upon the Spanish towns upon the Gulf of Mexico. And yet the two countries were formally not even at war with each other. It

was thus that the system of monopoly in the New World *made trade and war indistinguishable from each other*. The prosperity of Holland was the next and a still more startling illustration of the same law. What more ruinous, you say, than a long war, especially to a small state? And yet Holland made her fortune in the world by a war of some eighty years with Spain. How was this? It was because war threw open to her attack the whole boundless possessions of her antagonist in the New World, which would have been closed to her in peace. By conquest she made for herself an empire, and this empire made her rich.” (pp. 128-130.)

England followed in Holland's footsteps. The alliance followed the war against Holland. Both states made common cause against the newly developing colonial power of France. Colbert's ministry meant the delib-

erate entrance of France into the competition of the western states for the New World. The union of the two sea powers, which made William of Orange King of England, was apparently dictated by the common Protestant interests as opposed to the Catholic reaction which had reached its climax in the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This motive also made itself felt directly at the very outset. A backward glance at the events culminating in the Peace of Utrecht (1713) furnishes the correct point of view of the more powerful and deeper lying motives, for in the draft of this treaty of peace the Spanish War of Succession betrays "its intensely commercial character." (p. 151.)

"In reality *it is the most businesslike of all our wars*, and it was waged in the interest of English and Dutch merchants whose trade and livelihood were at stake." (p. 152.) The

threatened union of the Spanish Empire with France would have closed nearly the whole New World to England and Holland. The French began to explore the Mississippi and to make settlements. "Behind all the courtly foppery of the *grand siècle*, commercial considerations now ruled the world as they had never ruled it before, and as they continued to rule it through much of the prosaic century that was then opening." (p. 152.) The Peace of Utrecht denotes one of the greatest epochs in the history of England's expansion. England was now the greatest state in the world, and remained for many years without a rival. Holland's decline became noticeable. France was lamed for a time. England's actual gain was, in addition to Gibraltar, Minorca, New Scotland and Newfoundland, and the notorious *Assiento*, that treaty of state which conferred upon the English

merchant a monopoly of the slave trade in Spanish America. England's colonial empire was, in extent, unimportant in comparison with that of France, and even with that of Portugal. France was also superior in many respects. Her colonial policy appeared to be more successful. England's rivalry now directs itself against Spain *and* France, but chiefly against France, England's neighbor in America and India.

The decisive event in the great duel between England and France is the Seven Years' War, and the new attitude which England assumes as a consequence of the Paris Peace of 1762. "Here is the culminating point of English power in the eighteenth century; nay, relatively to other states, England has never since been so great." (p. 160.) "In this culminating phase England becomes an object of jealousy and dread to all

Europe, as Spain and afterwards France had been in the seventeenth century." (p. 161.)

We have seen that this culminating point had been reached by a long series of wars. All these were wars of aggression. No matter of what nature the pretexts or the immediate external causes which led England to carry on these wars, no matter how these pretexts and causes differed one from the other, they are all of the same nature—commercial interests, desire for commercial gain, commercial jealousy, envy and mistrust of competitors.

This is shown us by the dispassionate judgment of Sir. J. R. Seeley, which assuredly is not colored to the disadvantage of his own fatherland. On the whole, he refrains from proposing moral judgments. He seeks not to praise or to judge, but to comprehend. Since, however, he speaks continually of England's power and greatness, he expressly asserts that

it is no part of his intention "either to glorify the conquests made, or to justify the means adopted by our countrymen." (p. 155.) He shows how England defeated her four rivals in the contest for the New World, but he has not the smallest intention of claiming for England superior ability or bravery because of these victories. He does not wish to encourage his readers to admire Drake or Hawkins, the Republic under Cromwell, or even the government of Charles II. "Indeed, it is not easy to approve the conduct of those who built up Greater Britain, though there is plenty to admire in their achievements, and much less certainly to blame or to shudder at than in the deeds of the Spanish adventurers." (p. 156.) He considers the matter "in order to discover the laws by which States rise, expand and prosper or fall in this world." (ibid.) He desires also to throw light upon the question

of whether the Greater Britain, now that it exists, is likely to continue to flourish and endure or fall into decay. "Perhaps you may ask (the teacher is addressing his students) whether we can expect or wish it to prosper, *if crime has gone to the making of it.*" (ibid.) But God, he says, as He has revealed Himself in history, does not usually judge in this way. Out of illegal acquisitions of territory by a state does not arise the probability that such territory will again be lost." If we compare the British Empire with other empires in respect of its origin, we shall see that it has arisen in the same way; that its founders have had the same motives, and these not mainly noble; that they have displayed much fierce covetousness, mixed with heroism; *that they have not been much troubled by moral scruples*, at least in their dealings with enemies and rivals, though they have often displayed vir-

tuous self-denial in their dealings among themselves." (p. 157.) He believes that, in comparison with other empires, a good rather than a bad testimonial can be given the English; the Spanish, especially, are incomparably more stained with cruelty and covetousness. One finds noble traits also in the history of the British Conquistadores. "Their crimes, on the other hand, are such as have been almost universal in colonization." (p. 157.)

It is probable that the Spaniards, French and Dutch will reach a somewhat different conclusion as the result of a consideration of these mutual crimes.

CHAPTER III

THE GLORIES OF PITT, THE ELDER. TRIUMPH OVER FRANCE

At this period the elder Pitt, since 1766 Earl of Chatham, had reached the height of success and influence, albeit the popularity consequent thereon did not survive his elevation to the peerage. He had carried through the war against France, against continuous and powerful opposition and despite initial failures in America and in Germany, where he had the most gifted military leader of the age (Frederick the Great) fighting for him. His declaration that he would conquer America in Germany, is generally known. "Not content therefore, to have almost annihilated the fleets of France, he desired to deprive her of

all her colonial empire, and also of all participation in that Newfoundland fishery which he described as the great nursery of her sailors. Some time ago he (Pitt) said in the midst of his triumphs: 'I would have been content to bring France to her knees; now I will not rest till I have laid her on her back.' He once confessed, with a startling frankness, that he loved 'an honorable war.' He never appears to have had any adequate sense of the misery it produces."¹

Lecky emphasizes the fact that Pitt, in his love of war, was in full accord with the wishes of his people. He had made it his aim to consider patriotism as signifying an increase of power as opposed to "the inevitable and natural enemy" (France), and the putting of an end to the weakness, anarchy and corruption of which, according to his opinion, recent Eng-

¹ Lecky, "A History of the Eighteenth Century," II, p. 512.

lish politics was full. "He considered the selfishness, incapacity, intrigues and jealousies of the great nobles as being the main cause of those evils."¹ To crown his fatherland with the glory of war was his aim and his accomplishment. With complete deliberation he made his policy serve the interests of trade. "British policy is British trade," was his motto.

¹Lecky, III, p. 111. After the fall of Pitt his successor, Lord Bute, left Prussia in the lurch (1762). Pitt characterized this as deceitful, dishonest and treacherous. Bute and his King at the same time offered East Prussia to the Tsarina and Silesia to the Kaiserin as the price of peace. J. R. Green calls this "shameless indifference toward our national honor," and declares that only by fortunate accidents was England preserved from this debasement. ("Short History," p. 743.)

CHAPTER IV

THE LOSS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES

The splendid and victorious development of the British colonial empire in the eighteenth century did not, however, proceed without interruption. There came a setback, a sudden convulsion, whose far-reaching consequences were not comprehended when it occurred—the loss of the American colonies, which constituted nearly the entire colonial empire at that time. “Like a bubble, Greater Britain expanded rapidly and then burst. It has since been expanding again. Can we avoid the obvious inference?” (Seeley, p. 176.)

Seeley rejects this deduction, for the reason that the old colonial system, which treated a colony as a slave, was responsible for the

American Revolution. No new, well thought out system has as yet taken its place, according to Seeley. He declares the only correct system to be one which makes the colonies *parts* of England, as opposed to the former method of considering them *possessions* of England and treating them as such.

In the words of Edmund Burke (in his famous speech concerning American taxation, on April 19, 1774), the colonial policy was from the beginning exclusively commercial, and the commercial system was the system of a monopoly. "No trade was let loose from that constraint but merely to enable the colonists to dispose of what, in the course of your trade, you could not take, or to enable them to dispose of such articles as are forced upon them, and for which, without some degree of liberty, they could not pay. . . . This principle of commercial monopoly runs through no

less than twenty-nine Acts of Parliament from the year 1660 to the unfortunate period of 1764." Burke terms America's condition during this period one of civil liberty and commercial servitude.

At the same time Richard Price wrote his "Observations on the nature of civil liberty, the principles of government, and the justice and policy of the war with America." (7th ed., London, 1776.) The booklet went into many editions, was translated into nearly all European languages, and evoked more than sixty replies. It is a flaming arraignment of the English world policy of that period.

"The disgrace to which a kingdom must submit by making concessions is nothing to that of being the aggressor in an unrighteous quarrel.

"The quarrel with America is disgraceful to us because inconsistent with our feeling in

similar cases. . . . This war is disgraceful on account of the persuasion which led to it, and under which it has been undertaken: the general cry was last winter that the people of New England were a body of cowards, who could at once be reduced to submission by a hostile look from our troops. . . . The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted renders it still more disgraceful. English valor being thought insufficient to subdue the colonies, the laws and religion of France were established in Canada on purpose to obtain the power of bringing upon them from thence an army of French Papists. The wild Indians and their own slaves have been instigated to attack them, and attempts have been made to gain the assistance of a large body of Russians. With like views German troops have been hired; and the defence of our forts and garrisons trusted in their hands.”

The modern English historians, in complete accord with Price, depict the traffic in soldiers, which has been rightly regarded as the disgrace of German princes, as a disgrace which fell in no less degree upon Great Britain and strongly embittered the feelings of the colonists.¹

¹Lecky: "A History of England in the Eighteenth Century," ch. 12. Sir G. O. Trevelyan: "The American Revolution," Part II, vol. i, pp. 34-56.

CHAPTER V.

THE SLAVE TRADE AS THE PILLAR OF THE EMPIRE

Seeley deals with the slave trade in connection with his consideration of the "crimes" with which the English colonial empire (like the Spanish and other colonial empires) was built up. He calls it "the greatest of these crimes." "England had taken some share in the slave trade as early as Elizabeth's age, when John Hawkins distinguished himself as the first Englishman who stained his hands with its atrocity. You will find in Hakluyt¹ his own narrative, how he came in 1567 upon an African town, of which the huts were cov-

¹"Hakluyt: The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Made by Sea or on Land," London, 1598; 2 vols.

ered with dry palm leaves, how he set fire to it, and out of '8,000 inhabitants succeeded in seizing 250 persons, men, women and children.' ” (p. 158.) . . . “Like our colonial empire itself, our participation in the slave trade was the gradual growth of the seventeenth century. By the Treaty of Utrecht it was, as it were, established, and became ‘a central object of English policy’.¹ *From this date I am afraid we took the leading share, and stained ourselves beyond other nations in the monstrous and enormous atrocities of the slave trade.*” (ib.) This sin was somewhat mitigated by the fact “that we published our own guilt, repented of it, and did at last renounce it.” (p. 159.) On the whole, however, this epoch (the first half of the eighteenth century) secularized and materialized the English peo-

¹ The phrase is borrowed from Lecky. See “History of England in the Eighteenth Century,” II, p. 13.

ple as nothing had done before, not even the period of the frivolous King of the Restoration Charles II; never had "sordid motives" occupied such high place. (Seeley is referring to the period up to 1883.)

Indeed, the conclusion is inescapable that the effect which the slave trade—which was ever united with slave hunting and slave stealing—had upon the moral qualities of that part of the well-to-do citizens of the English nation enriched thereby could not have been exactly favorable; and if in this land, in greater degree and earlier than in other countries, complaints of humanitarians and philosophers against the brutalities of the possessing classes grew loud, one must, in order to understand the basis for such complaints, recall the manner in which these classes obtained a great part of their wealth.

In the year 1750 Parliament enacted a law

against the kidnapping of negro children, but it exhibited itself as "quite ineffective." Twenty years later the elder Pitt (the Earl of Chatham) boasted that it was due to his conquests in Africa during the Seven Years' War that almost the entire slave trade had come into British hands. And the great majority looked upon this trade as upon a "pillar of the Empire and derided its few opponents as lunatics."¹

¹Rose: "Pitt and the National Revival," London, 1912, p. 455. The harbor of Liverpool owes its rise chiefly to the slave trade, for of all businesses which had their seat there, this business was "by far the most lucrative." "It has been computed that in the decade 1783-1793 Liverpool's slave-ships made 878 round voyages (i. e., from Liverpool to the Guinea Coast, thence to the West Indies, and back to the Mersey), carried 303,737 slaves and sold them for £15,186,850" (nearly \$76,000,000). In view of this it can be realized what indignation was aroused by the idea of forbidding this trade. "Bristol, though it had only eighteen ships in the trade, was also up in arms, for it depended largely on the refining of sugar and the manufacture of rum. . . . Persons of a rhetorical turn depicted in lurid colors the decay of Britain's mercantile marine, the decline of her wealth and the miseries of a sugar famine." (Rose, p. 463.)

CHAPTER VI

THE CONQUEST OF INDIA

'As to the conquest of India let us hear first the philosopher, James Mill, author of the first great history of India, himself an official of the company that carried out the greatest part of this conquest. He says: "The two important discoveries for conquering India were, first, the weakness of the native armies against European discipline; secondly, the facility of imparting that discipline to the natives in the European service. . . . Both discoveries were made by the French." Seeley, who quotes this passage (p. 233), adds that it is utterly incorrect to talk of the English nation as having "conquered" the nations of India. They were subjugated by an army of which

only the fifth part consisted of Englishmen. The other four-fifths were composed of the natives. One can thus rather say that India conquered itself. In reality there never was a national state of India. In reality, too, what took place was not so much a conquest as an internal revolution, the result of battles designed to set a limit to anarchy. The talisman which enabled the East India Company to put an end to the empire of the Grand Mogul "was not some incommunicable physical or moral superiority, as we love to imagine, but a superior discipline and military system, which *could* be communicated to the natives of India." (p. 245.)

Whether or not it can be called conquest, certain it is that naked might—"blood and iron"—was what first enabled the East India Company and then the British state to acquire dominion over the greater part of India

proper. The leaders in the decisive conflicts were two men who distinguished themselves through strong willpower and no small intelligence—Lord Clive and Warren Hastings.

Clive (1725-1774) is described in the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Cambridge, 1910) as “the first of a century’s brilliant succession of those ‘soldier-politicals,’ as they are called in the East, to whom Great Britain owes the conquest and consolidation of its greatest dependency.”¹

After his definite return to England, the House of Commons adopted a resolution (with 155 votes against 95), declaring that Lord Clive “obtained and possessed himself of £230,000 during his first administration of Bengal”; following this, however, a resolution was passed unanimously, giving recognition to his great services in connection

¹ *Encyc. Brit.*, xi ed., Clive.

with that country. The case of Omichund was not referred to.

Omichund was a treasonable Hindu who was grossly defrauded by Lord Clive by means of a forgery, and who, as a result, became mad. The author of Clive's biography in the Encyclopedia calls this case the only one "of questionable honesty." Obviously the matter of the £230,000 was not questionable. Lord Clive committed suicide before he reached his fiftieth year. That a troubled conscience impelled him to this is not probable, even though he knew "that a good part of his fellow-countrymen regarded him as a cruel and perfidious tyrant." He suffered from attacks of melancholy, and had made two attempts at suicide while he was yet a young clerk in Madras. Later he became passionately addicted to the opium habit.

Warren Hastings, who was a bookkeeper in

Calcutta in his youth, became when 39 years old (1771) Governor of Bengal, and a few years later Governor General of East India. His conduct in these two offices gave rise to the greatest state process known in history. This process, which the House of Commons conducted against him before the House of Lords, lasted from February 13, 1788, to April 23, 1795. The chief prosecutor was no less a person than Edmund Burke. The trial dragged, but it must be considered that there was an immense amount of material to be dealt with. It ended with acquittal of the grave crimes against the state with which Hastings was charged, but he was condemned to pay the costs, £80,000. The judgment of posterity—at least in his own country—has more and more swung around in his favor. Even Macaulay's renowned article, which throws a bright light upon the most important charac-

teristics of the man, is to-day considered partisan and inexact. Hastings is to-day looked upon as the hero who first worked out a system of civil government for India and who put an end to the worst corruption among its officials, and to the systematic and wholesale plundering of the natives. It is, nevertheless, admitted that he did irregular things, violated the letter of the law, broke contractual promises, and robbed widows, and that he was anything but a conscientious politician.

The scene of the cruelties which he felt himself justified in committing was in those days vastly more remote in space from the homeland than to-day. But India is now, in point of time, still remote. It is likely that among the Mohammedans of to-day the memory of that time persists in a somewhat different aspect than among the fellow-countrymen of Warren Hastings, despite the

fact that the latter assure us that the natives "honor" his name.¹

As long as six years before the Hastings trial began, on April 9, 1782, Henry Dundas, then the newly appointed Treasurer of the Admiralty, and later, as Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, unfolded in the House of Commons, in a speech of nearly three hours' length, "the causes and extent of the national calamities in the East. He expatiated on the misconduct of the Indian presidencies and of the Court of Directors (of the East India Company); of the former, because they plunged the nation into wars for the sake of conquest, condemned and violated the engagement of treaties, and plundered and oppressed the people of India; of the latter, because they blamed misconduct only when it was un-

¹ Cf. *Enc. Brit.*, xi ed., s.v., and *Dictionary National Biography*, art. Warren Hastings.

attended with profit, but exercised a very constant forbearance towards the greatest delinquency, as often as it was productive of a temporary gain." The speech was followed up by a number of propositions which he moved in the shape of resolutions. The resolutions were solemnly voted.¹

The poet Cowper complained at the same time of his country

That she is rigid in denouncing death
On petty robbers, and indulges life
And liberty, and oft times honor too,
To peculators of the public gold.
That thieves at home must hang, but he that puts
Into his overgorged and bloated purse
The wealth of India's provinces, escapes.

The loss of the Thirteen Colonies was compensated for by the winning of India. In the continuous changing of fortunes marking the

¹ James Mill: "A History of the British India" (Book V, Chap 9).

conflict with France, the loss of the colonies signified a defeat, the gaining of India a victory. The result more than evened up the situation. "In India, indeed, they had the start of us much more decidedly than in North America; in India we had at the outset a sense of inferiority in comparison with them, and fought in a spirit of hopeless self-defence." (Seeley, p. 35.) Fear of the French was the deciding motive. "Behind every movement of the native powers we saw French intrigue, French gold, French ambition, and never, until we were masters of the whole country, got rid of that feeling that the French were driving us out of it." (p. 36.) Here, then, lay also the reason for "the competition of the Western states for the wealth of the regions discovered in the fifteenth century." (p. 305.) Hence the forcing of France out of America as well as out of India was the

condition precedent to dominion over the Hindus and Mohammedans in India. "This fact, combined with the other fact, equally striking, of the great trade which now exists between England and India, leads very naturally to a theory that our Indian Empire has grown up from first to last out of the spirit of trade. We may imagine that after having established our settlements on the coast and defended these settlements both from the native powers and from the envy of the French, we then conceived the ambition of extending our commerce further inland; that perhaps we met with new States, such as Mysore or the Marhatta Confederacy, which at first were unwilling to trade with us, but that *in our eager avarice* we had recourse to force, let loose our armies upon them, broke down their custom-houses and flooded their territories in turn with our commodities; that in this way we

gradually advanced our Indian trade, which at first was insignificant, until it became considerable, and at last, when we had not only intimidated but actually overthrown every great native government, . . . then, all restraint having been removed, our trade became enormous." (pp. 305-306.) Seeley is not disposed to accept this view out of hand. The relation of the various events to each other is, he thinks, more complex. The advance of business was independent of the advance of conquest. Commerce had been insignificant up to 1813, despite the vast annexations that had gone before; it had not developed after the monopoly of the East India Company had been taken away by law and the company as good as dissolved. The periods of the advance of commerce and those of the advance of conquest do not, in Seeley's opinion, correspond with each other. The world empire began

with the protection and defense of the factors. "In the period which immediately followed, the revolutionary and corrupt period of British India, it is undeniable that we were hurried on *by mere rapacity*. The violent proceedings of Warren Hastings at Benares, in Oudh and Rohilcund, *were of the nature of money-speculations.*" (p. 313.)

Seeley thinks that the later history of British India was of different nature. The clear perception of the historian fails him here. His statements can only show that the connection between trade and conquest was less apparent in more recent times. An end was put to the monstrous abuses of administration—abuses through which the East India Company erected for itself a monument of enduring shame—by a law of Pitt of 1784 and by the reforms of Lord Cornwallis, who was the Governor General from 1786 to 1793. From

this time on there was no longer any connection between the governors and the chiefs of the mercantile brigands. When, however, Lord Wellesley as Governor General in 1798 elevated intervention and annexation to a principle, and his successors really first began to deal according to this principle, it is safe to say that they not only feathered their own nests; undoubtedly they well knew that they were opening up a source of incomputable wealth through commerce. The acts of Lord Dalhousie, who ruled India from 1847 to 1856 and who took possession in 1856 of the Kingdom of Oudh, without a shadow of right, as he had previously (1851-52) forcibly taken Pegu away from the Birmans, may possibly not have been the *direct* outcome of greed—Seeley is of the opinion that if these were crimes, they were crimes of ambition (p. 315) and it was, in any event, only the commercial inter-

ests of the homeland and its Government that indulged and supported him. In the earlier period the commercial motive was partially concealed in the greater love for and convenience of direct robbery, in the later period through the ostensibly purely military policy of the Government. But without the motive of greed the conquest of India by Great Britain is not to be understood. For it has not only cost much blood—even if it was chiefly the blood of native mercenaries—but also much money. The stake here was also a national investment of grandiose proportions. It was reckoned to Warren Hastings as a great merit that he increased from three to five million pounds the receipts of the State, of which the East India Company was the immediate beneficiary.

Even before Warren Hastings's deeds and misdeeds were known in detail, Richard Price,

already referred to, wrote (p. 103): "Turn your eyes to India. There more has been done than is now attempted in America. There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the spirit of conquest, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions of innocent people by the most infamous oppression and rapacity. The justice of the nation has slept over these enormities. Will the justice of Heaven sleep? Are we not now execrated on both sides of the globe?"

SECOND DIVISION: WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND AGAINST NAPOLEON

CHAPTER VII

ATTACK UPON THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER

In his enumeration of the seven great wars which England undertook from 1688 to 1815, Seeley names the last two, "Wars against revolutionary France." In reality these were a single great war, even though interrupted by the Peace of Amiens (1802), whose conditions England did not observe. This great war is pictured by Seeley as the continuation and close of the conflict for the New World and India. "As in the American War (the American Revolution), France avenges on England

her expulsion from the New World (through the Paris Treaty of 1763), so under Napoleon she makes titanic efforts to recover her lost place there." (p. 39.) A continental question furnished the first cause of the war. The French National Convention had decided, on November 16, 1792, that the mouth of the Scheldt should be free to all shipping. The convention thereupon gave notice to England that it would not be bound by the treaties—there were no less than five of these since the Peace of Utrecht—which England had compelled the old monarchy to enter into. In these treaties France had acknowledged the right granted to the Dutch in the Treaty of Westphalia to exclude foreigners from the mouth of the Scheldt. England had, in addition, through the treaty of alliance of 1788, guaranteed this and other rights of the Netherlands. "It had long been a maxim at White-

hall (the street of the English Government buildings in London) that the *Pays Bas* must never go to France. To prevent such a disaster England had poured forth blood and treasure for more than a century.”¹

The execution of Louis XVI ostensibly furnished the impulse. An ostensible moral motive was at hand, that of putting an end to the doings of the Jacobins. The most modern English historian of this epoch does not believe in the least in this motive. “The execution was in no sense the cause of the war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France towards our Dutch allies.” (Rose, “Pitt and the Great War,” p. 117). “For Pitt and Grenville the war was not a war of opinion—Monarchy versus Republic. It was a struggle to preserve the *Balance of Power* which in all ages our statesmen have seen to be

¹ Holland Rose: “Pitt and the Great War,” p. 83.

incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries." (ibid., p. 100.) The European balance of power is another formula for the unconditional subjugation, brought about by any method preferred, of every European power which threatens to become or appears to be dangerous to the English World Power, and for the alliance with every European power which, in like manner, be the causes what they may, also finds itself in opposition to the rival great power. Hence the maintaining of the European balance of power by England is constantly equivalent, in practice, to a *disturbance* of the European balance of power, and means, therefore, European war. For, if the other powers are so grouped that they maintain among themselves the balance of power or would again find themselves in such a status after a short war, England invariably casts its weight into the scales against

its opponent, and by doing so it incites and stirs up wars or lengthens them, in order to humble, weaken and rob its opponents. In this manner English world policy acquired the nimbus of having freed Europe from the tyrant Bonaparte. One may picture for himself what the fate of France and of Europe would have been if England had not considered it necessary to put down the French Republic. Perhaps Napoleon's military genius would have never had an opportunity to develop itself against Austria and Prussia. But these are idle musings. The subjugation of France (and of Spain, since 1713 a dependency of France) was the consistent and important motive of the English world policy. Here, if anywhere, we see the tremendous drama of a clash of world powers whose courses had been so laid out that they simply *must* meet and come into collision with one another; for a

tendency to world-domination lay in their beginnings in the French Revolution, just as it had lain in the old French Monarchy, and it was by helping this tendency to prevail that "the Little Corporal" made himself the executor of the Revolution.

It is highly fascinating to follow the twists and turns of the English policy in this contest, a contest which was finally victorious with the help of the German powers. One of the principal war methods of England has always been the capture of its enemy's merchantmen at sea and the searching of neutral vessels. It was against this that the union of "armed neutrality" was established by Catherine II in 1779, and renewed in 1800.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PIRATICAL EXPEDITION AGAINST DENMARK

The arbitrary interpretation of international law through which England had earlier stirred up the neutral sea powers against itself was soon thrown into the shade by an action which filled all Europe with discontent and horror. This was the sudden attack upon the absolutely neutral and peaceable Danish empire—the bombardment and burning of Copenhagen.

The Peace of Tilsit was concluded on July 7, 1807. On July 21st Canning received a confidential report concerning Napoleon's intentions in regard to Denmark, and concerning the secret articles of the Tilsit Treaty. Neither

letters nor persons could at that time reach London from Tilsit in fourteen days. (As a matter of fact, the report dealt with an alleged conversation between Napoleon and the Tsar of June 25th).¹ On July 26th Admiral Gambier received orders to sail into the Baltic. "On August 3d the English Minister Taylor declared to Count Bernstorff at Copenhagen in a ministerial conference that the English Government had received the most definite and indubitable information that Russia, through secret articles of the Tilsit Treaty, had made itself party to an agreement with France directed against England, and that Denmark had already joined in this agreement. And in the middle of August, Canning, the State Secretary, declared officially that the English Government now possessed authentic information that the Duchies of Schleswig and

¹ Eng. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1901, p. 717.

Holstein were actually occupied by French troops.”¹

These Duchies have never been occupied by French troops. It is true that a secret treaty, which followed that of Tilsit did, under certain conditions, contemplate putting pressure upon Denmark. When, however, Canning, speaking in the House of Commons, desired to justify the attack by the alleged knowledge of these articles, and was taken to task, he had to admit that “the ministers have not said that they had in their possession any one secret

¹This is the report of one versed in the matter, set forth in an anonymous German publication which appeared the same year (1807), bearing the title: “*Has England succeeded in justifying its piratical expedition against Denmark? An inquiry inspired by the English declaration of September 25, 1807.*” (Kiel, Akademische Buchhandlung, 1807, 157 pages.) The author was Councilor of Legation Joh. Daniel Timotheus *Manthey*. The correctness of his point of view (except for the fact that he took Napoleon too lightly) is established by the modern thorough investigations of Erik Möller in the *Dansk Historisk Tidsskrift*, 1910-12, pp. 309-422. Möller establishes also that the real contents of the secret treaty were entirely different from those suspected and asserted in London.

article, but that the substance of such secret article had been confidentially communicated to His Majesty's Government, and that such communication had been made a long time previous to the date alluded to by the honorable gentleman,"¹ (Attention had been directed to the fact that it was not until August 8th that the news of the conclusion of peace and the text of the treaty had reached England's shores.) Canning nowhere mentions this date. In the "Declaration" given at Westminster on September 25, 1807, the English Government also maintains that it had "received the most positive information of the determination of the present ruler of France to occupy, with a military force, the territory of Holstein—for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from all her accustomed channels of communication; of inducing or compelling the

¹ Jan. 22, Commons, p. 70.

court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against the British commerce and navigation; and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine for the invasion of Great Britain and of Ireland." These (supposed) plans were to be anticipated.

A modern English historian,¹ who eulogizes Canning's genius and ascribes intuitive intellectual powers to him, is at the same time compelled to admit: "It may now be regarded as almost proven that the information on which he at first based was extremely meagre. In part . . . it was absolutely false; but Canning did not know of its falsity until August 10th." (The bombardment began on September 2d!)

The action began with the instructing of the British Minister at Copenhagen "to reassure the Danish Minister as to the presence of the

¹ Anon., in the *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1906, pp. 345-361. I assume that the writer is a historian from the fact that he has drawn his material from the archives.

British fleet in the Baltic, *that it was not intended as a menace to Denmark*, but merely needful to coöperate with the King of Sweden and protect British reinforcements" (which had been brought to Stralsund). These instructions bore date of July 16th. On July 28th a special Minister (Jackson) was appointed to the Danish Crown Prince (and the Regent), and on July 29th he received "special and very confidential" instructions (in Canning's own handwriting) in which appeared the following: "You will carefully bear in mind *that the possession of the Danish fleet is the one main and indispensable object* to which the whole of your negotiations is to be directed, and without which no other stipulation or concession can be considered as of any value or importance. In the event, therefore, of the Danish Government even consenting to enter into a treaty of alliance as pro-

posed in the project with which you are furnished, it will be necessary that a secret article should be added to this treaty, by which the delivery of the Danish fleet must be stipended to take place forthwith, and without waiting for the formality of the ratification of the treaty. (Signed) G. Canning.”¹ Jackson first brought his ultimatum to Minister Bernstorff, then (on August 9th) he was received at Kiel by the Danish Crown Prince. The negotiations were resultless. On August 16th the British soldiers landed at Vibek (between Helsingör and Copenhagen). Attempts were still made by the admirals to compel a peaceful delivery. The bombardment of Copenhagen began on September 2d, and from September 5th on it had terrible effect. The beautiful cathedral (Fruekirke), several buildings belonging to the university and 305

¹ Rose, in *Eng. Hist. Review*, Jan., 1896, p. 86.

houses were burned. Capitulation and the forcible taking away of the whole Danish fleet followed.

An idea of the depth of the moral indignation which this action aroused in Denmark and the duchies can be gained from the long list of published protests that appeared, attacking the "tiger-policy against neutral Denmark" and calling down the vengeance of Heaven upon the despoiler. The most meritorious of these publications is that of Ministerial Councilor Manthey, already referred to, of which the most modern Danish commentator of these events (Möller, referred to above) says that it "vindicates with great power the traditional Danish view of those occurrences," and this view is confirmed to the fullest extent by the most recent investigations of the archives.

Manthey says, among other things (p. 104) :

“To-day, when the veil is rent which hitherto concealed from princes and peoples England’s selfishness and ambition, let us consider whether so many a crown would have been brought low and so many a flourishing land devastated if England’s policy, England’s gold and England’s secret crimes had not been the great ferment by which, in our remarkable generation, the excited masses were brought to revolt, and by which dissolutions, separations and new alliances were brought about and everything tended toward an altered state of affairs whose eventual realization was to cost mankind much blood and many tears.” The booklet characterizes (p. 8) the Westminster “Declaration” (*supra*) as “in its entirety weak, in places malicious, but always a web of hypocrisy, knavery and ignorance.”

In England, too, the general horror found a strong echo. In the *Political Review* for Sep-

tember, 1807, the affair is termed "a scene of complicated iniquity," and, after pouring out its whole indignation over the principle—Might makes Right—with which the proceeding was sought to be defended, the *Review* says: "If anything could add to that disgust, that horror we feel whenever we contemplate the subject, it is the language of *humanity* and piety affected by our commanders-in-chief employed in this expedition."¹ The debates upon the address from the throne in the session of Parliament beginning in January, 1808, occupied themselves chiefly with this matter. While the address itself praised this glorious deed, six Lords submitted a protest, "because no proof of hostile intention on the part of Denmark has been adduced, nor any case of necessity made out to justify the attack upon

¹"Reflections on the War with Denmark," etc., extracted from Flower's Political Review.

Copenhagen, without which the measure is, in our conception, discreditable to the character and injurious to the interests of this country." Lord Erskine's individual protest takes more than four pages of the Register. It says "that no speculation of the probable fall of the Danish fleet into the possession, or power, of France would justify its hostile seizure by Great Britain; that such a seizure would be subversive of the first elements of public law, and that until this attack upon Copenhagen shall receive vindication by proof of its justice, *Great Britain has lost her moral situation in the world.*"¹

In the Lower House also the opposition made itself heard. William Windham, himself until shortly before that time a member of the Ministry, declared "that the only way left of effacing the stains thus brought upon the

¹The Parliamentary Register, 1808, vol. i, 2. i.

country was the public avowal of their atrocity; and he accused ministers of having sacrificed the national reputation. The ruins of Copenhagen were the monument of their disgrace.”¹ On another occasion the same renowned orator expressed the opinion that the Government had openly disavowed the principle that honesty is the best policy, and that when people began to make their theories fit their evil practices, it was a condition of most hopeless depravity; this new system of morality would prove a lasting injury to the world. Several other members of Parliament termed attempts at justification “contradictory and inconsistent chatter.” One did not know, they said, which of the stories dished up by the Government one was to believe. “It was, to use a coarse expression, to be sure, but one that was extremely applicable, it was something

¹ Parl. Reg., Feb. 4, 1808.

like swindling the house out of its opinion.”¹ One member called the taking away of the Danish fleet plain “theft.” “Dishonest as the expedition to Copenhagen” became a proverb in London.

As long afterward as 1822 the poet Thomas Campbell spoke, in verses dedicated to a Danish friend, of the “scandalous matter.”

That attack, I allow, was a scandalous matter;
It was a deed of our merciless Tories,
Whom we hate, though they rule us, and I can assure
you
They had swung for it if England had sat as their
jury.

Modern English historians consider the matter coolly. H. W. Wilson (Trinity College, Oxford) says: “That the attack was necessary no one will now deny. England was fighting for her existence; and however disagreeable was the task of striking a weak

¹ (Windham) Parl. Reg., p. 289.

neutral, she risked her own safety if she left in Napoleon's hand a fleet of such proportions." ¹ Somewhat different is the judgment of J. Holland Rose (Cambridge) in the same volume of the "Cambridge Modern History." He writes: "Great Britain suffered a loss of moral reputation, which partly outweighed the gain brought by the accession of material strength to her navy and the added sense of security. The peoples of the Continent, unaware of the reasons that prompted the action of Great Britain, regarded it as little better than piratical. Only by degrees did this bad impression fade away. . . ." ²

There is an outward resemblance between this action and the course of the German Empire towards Belgium in 1914. In both cases it was a matter of anticipating the enemy; in

¹ Cambridge Modern History, vol. ix, p. 236.

² Cambridge Modern History, vol. ix, p. 299.

both cases there existed the opinion that the enemy would not observe neutrality. But there were these tremendous differences: (1) In 1807 this opinion was an assumption based solely upon rumors; in 1914 it was based on facts; (2) In 1807 Denmark itself had scrupulously observed neutrality, and the Regent of the country was even personally inclined towards England; in 1914 Belgium had grossly violated its neutrality by a military convention into which it had entered with England; (3) Denmark when assailed had no allies, and even if Napoleon had desired to assist, he was utterly unable to do so. Furthermore, the greater part of the Danish land forces was in Holstein, and the Government was so unsuspecting that it did not even bring these to Seeland. Belgium, on the contrary, had, when it was attacked, the secretly allied great powers, England and France, behind it, and

both were in a position to render aid; (4) England offered Denmark the choice between war and alliance; as a pledge for this alliance it demanded the delivering up of the Danish fleet, which was the sole object for which it was working. The German Empire offered a choice between war and a neutrality which should simply permit the passage of troops, for which full indemnity was solemnly pledged. Many authorities on international law have maintained the existence of a right of passage through neutral lands, especially in the case where one belligerent cannot get at the other without going through neutral territory. This situation plainly existed here as a result of the French fortifications on the Meuse.

PART II

THE ENGLISH WORLD POLICY IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

THIRD DIVISION: QUARRELS IN THREE PARTS OF THE EARTH

The array of great wars—in Seeley's opinion—not only begins with this period (1688-1815), but appears also to end there. He says: "Since 1815 we have had local wars in India and some of our colonies"—and in China! and in Persia!—"but of struggles against great European Powers, such as this period saw seven times, we have only seen one (the Crimean War) in a period more than half as long (1816-1882), and it lasted but two years." (p. 25.) There is no presentiment

here of what the twentieth century has revealed to us. The able scholar forgets here also that the wars against France in the eighteenth century were carried on in good part on colonial soil (in North America), and that, in analogy therewith, most of the conflicts that arose in Asia during the nineteenth century composed a latent war against Russia; to say nothing of wars of the Turks and Japanese, back of which stood the British world power. For in this whole period the British foreign policy never rested nor altered its nature. Its field and object, however, no longer lay chiefly in the New World, but in the Old, no longer in America, but in Asia, and Africa is the bridge to Asia. This is the tendency for which the path was prepared in the last half of the eighteenth century. To widen, retain and make certain the possession of India appears as the most important among the great

tasks that were imposed when France was forced to withdraw from the rivalry for the mastery of the seas. There the fear of France had formerly—for more than a hundred years—been a constant goad, there comes now the fear of Russia. A further factor is naturally commercial interests, which demand an extension of spheres of interest and dominion. Fiscal interests go hand in hand with this factor.

And thus the agitations and warlike disturbances through which the territory of ancient civilizations is opened to the wares of industry, persist throughout nearly the entire nineteenth century. Parallel with the gradual elimination of the domination of the East India Company—which, since 1784, had already been strongly restricted, being first deprived of its monopoly (1815, except as to China, which lasted until 1833), then of its commercial functions, and finally of its exist-

ence (1858)—goes not only thorough and successful reform of administration, but also systematic conquest. It finds its climax in the erection of the so-called Indian Empire (1876).

And the modern paths of English foreign policy, like the old ones, have been cut through crag and thicket with iron mattocks and axes, and rivers of blood have been shed in the work.

CHAPTER IX

AFGHANISTAN

The first important conflict into which Great Britain was brought in following out these aims with accustomed energy and unscrupulousness was the war with Afghanistan.

Feuds among this empire, the Indian Sikhs and the neighboring Persia were at the bottom of the trouble. English and Russian influences were everywhere opposed to one another. Both, for instance, carried on a long rivalry for the favors of the ruler of the eastern territory, Dost Mohammed, who lived in Kabul. The Russians had the advantage. Together with Persia they attacked Herat, the capital of the western district. Lord Auckland, who had been appointed in 1836 Governor General

of India, considered the time ripe for participation. He allied himself with the Sikhs and deposed Dost Mohammed. On his throne he set an unpopular pretender, who, despite better title to the crown, lived in exile (August 7, 1839). The English Government approved and supported this *coup d'état*. For a time all seemed to be going well, and there was rejoicing in London over the splendid issue. In November, 1841, the Afghans revolted against the prince imposed upon them. The result was a complete and shameful defeat of the English frontier troops. They were compelled hastily to evacuate the territory, and to surrender all their cannons except six, which they were permitted to retain for the march back. Dost Mohammed, who had been carried captive to India, returned home. His son, Akhbar Khan, had been the leader of the revolt. The retreat of the English through the

Koord Kabul Pass reminds one of the great retreat of 1812, but its results were much worse. As in 1812, the winter was severe. The situation was made worse by the fact that many women and children were with the retiring army. Akhbar Khan, who followed the retreat, eventually took the women and children under his protection. General Elphinstone, the commander-in-chief, also had to surrender to him. The army itself was continuously attacked by the fanatical mountain tribes. After thousands had fallen, the remnant found itself trapped in the Jugdulluk Pass. An indiscriminate massacre followed. Of the entire army, which had numbered more than 16,000 men at the beginning of the expedition, *a single man* survived, who had taken refuge under the walls of Diellabad, in which city an English garrison was maintained. The fortress was besieged by Akhbar Khan, but in

vain. English auxiliary troops under General Pollock appeared and the siege was raised. The English pressed on to Kabul and liberated the women and children, but they held it advisable, despite this success, to evacuate the land and reinstate Dost Mohammed.

Auckland's successor, Lord Ellenborough, issued on October 1, 1842, a proclamation, in which he declared that the Government of India would remain "content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire," and that "to force a sovereign upon a reluctant people would be inconsistent with the policy as it is with the principles of the British Government." The noble lord appears to have looked upon the preceding conquests in India as "natural," and upon the English domination there as an object of the eager aspiration of the Indians.

A glance into the literature of that time

gives one an idea of the stupefaction and embitterment evoked in the "Motherland" by the frightful catastrophe. An author who criticized the British foreign policy of that time with unusual acumen and brilliancy was the Scotchman, David Urquhart. In his polemic against the *Edinburgh Review*, which, as organ of the Whig party, then in the saddle, had the boldness to defend the war, he seeks to make the madness of the defeat clear by an imaginary dialogue between Lord Palmerston, both then and often thereafter the spirit of the British world policy, and a privy councillor. The dialogue follows:

Lord Palmerston—We must march to Kabul, dethrone his ruler and set up another.

Privy Councillor—Are we attacked by the Afghans? Are treaties violated, etc.?

Lord P.—No, none of these things. But

Dost Mohammed is friendly to Persia, and Persia is friendly to Russia; and therefore we must destroy him.

Councilor—But what do you propose to do with Persia?

Lord P.—Oh, Persia is beaten back, the siege of Herat is raised, and we have nothing to fear from her.

Councilor—What do you propose to do with Russia?

Lord P.—Oh, Russia has sent to us the most satisfactory assurances and we have nothing to fear from her; quite the contrary; indeed, she can do nothing, for her missions and expeditions have utterly failed.

Councilor—The danger is over, you are satisfied with the power whence it sprang, and after that you go to send armies into the territories of friendly people!

The Privy Councilor and the Monarch,

says Urquhart, must at once have said: "This is a case for Bedlam."

In another passage he contrasts the conduct of England with that of Mongolians, of whom an Arab historian wrote that they systematically ravage and murder, but "without hatred and vengeance." He continues:

"Into Central Asia we march an army among a people so friendly as to be ready even to accept our government—we set up a pretender—we support the perpetration of every internal folly and crime—we do everything that can arouse a people already subject to us through good will and respect into hatred alike and contempt. Our army is destroyed. We make up our minds that we shall have nothing to do with the country, and yet we send an army there again to ravish and destroy without even the thought of retaining possession; so that the contrast between the Mongols

and the British is this—that the first destroyed and ravished by calculation, and without either hatred or vengeance, and that our troops, composed of so-called citizens and Christians, and sent forth from a country honoring itself with the name of Britain, esteeming itself enlightened, philanthropic and religious, appear there without any calculation, to devastate and destroy, moved only by hatred and vengeance. 'As to the pretext that we marched to regain the prisoners, however it might have served for the cry of the moment, it is too hollow and absurd to refer to now. The prisoners could have been endangered only by the step which we took; and for them to be returned to us it required that we should cease to re-perpetrate crime, and to hold as a slave the Prince whom we had so cruelly dethroned.'

These atrocities brought a tragic fate for an

admirable and talented young man, Captain Burnes, an authority on Afghanistan, who, entrusted with an official mission, warned in vain against the Government's mistaken measures. Sir T. W. Kaye, who is to be thanked for the best history of this war, remarks that "it should never be forgotten . . . by those who would form a correct estimate of the character and career of Alexander Burnes, that both have been misrepresented in those collections of state papers which are supposed to furnish the best materials of history, but which are often in reality only one-sided compilations of garbled documents—counterfeits, which the ministerial stamp forces into currency, defrauding a present generation, and handing down to posterity a chain of dangerous lies." Justin McCarthy, who cites this passage, says that not until years after Burnes met his fearful end (he was murdered in the riots of

November 21, 1841) did it become known that the reports which he had sent in had been laid before the House of Commons by the English Government in such a mutilated and perverted form that it was made to appear as if he had approved and recommended the policy against which he had felt himself impelled to issue a warning.

McCarthy terms the history of these years (1839-42) "a tale of such misfortune, blunder, and humiliation as the annals of England do not anywhere else present. Blunders which were, indeed, worse than crimes, and a principle of action which it is a crime in any ruler to sanction, brought things to such a pass that in a few years from the accession of the Queen we had in Afghanistan soldiers who were positively afraid to fight the enemy, and some English officials who were not ashamed to treat for the removal of our most formidable foes

by purchased assassination. . . . This chapter will teach us how vain is a policy founded on evil and ignoble principles. . . . We had gone completely out of our way for the purpose of meeting mere speculative dangers.”¹

Grown wiser through misfortune, England did, indeed, refrain for four decades from interfering with the affairs of Afghanistan. In the meanwhile the Russian peril increased. There were renewed and bitter conflicts. There was again a revolt in Kabul. The entire personnel of the British Legation was slain (September 3, 1879). Entrance into the country had been refused the legation in the preceding year, but the Afghans, yielding to force, had withdrawn their opposition. After repeated battles England was compelled to abandon its demand to maintain a permanent

¹ Justin McCarthy: "A History of Our Own Times," vol. i, pp. 174-5, 205. Tauchnitz edition.

legation, and promised once more to evacuate the land. Since then the Foreign Office has wooed the favor of the Emir. In the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907, England renounced any purpose of altering political conditions in Afghanistan, of mixing in its administration or of annexing its territory, and pledged itself not to exert its influence in any manner menacing to Russia. Russia acknowledged Afghanistan as lying outside the sphere of its influence.

CHAPTER X

THE OPIUM WAR

Upon the Afghans English policy tried to impose a hated ruler; upon the Chinese, at about the same period, a hated commodity.

As is well known, China opposed for many years the entrance of all European traders and their wares. After the way had been finally opened, John Company—as the East India Company was called in England—reaped the chief successes. Its main article of commerce was opium, won from poppies cultivated in India. The growing of poppies was exclusively under Government control (*en régie*). After the company lost its monopoly, the trade assumed much greater proportions. It was nothing but smuggling, for all commerce with

opium was strictly forbidden by Chinese laws. The fearful moral and physical effects of the indulgence in opium formed the express ground for this prohibition.

But the Chinese authorities were unable to check the smuggling in the face of the English Government's systematic furtherance of it. The smugglers became bolder and more unscrupulous, the complaints of the Chinese authorities louder. The English Government declared that it had no intention of placing British subjects in a position to disregard the laws of the land with which they were carrying on trade. No one took this declaration seriously. Nevertheless, the Emperor Suan-Tsung believed himself in a position to venture a decisive step. Through Governor Ling in Canton he issued a demand for the delivering up of all contraband stores of opium. Twenty thousand cases of the valuable product

were given to the flames. The English agent "charged with the oversight of the commerce with China" turned to the Governor General of India with a plea for support. He declared that the life and property of British subjects had been attacked and were in danger, and begged the Governor General to send as many warships as he could spare. The Opium War had begun. The hostilities on land and sea lasted from February, 1840, until August, 1841. England and opium won a "glorious" victory. China was compelled to open five harbors, to cede Hongkong, and to pay \$22,500,000 (£4,500,000) as a war indemnity and an additional \$6,250,000 (£1,250,000) for the opium burned.

The conscience of the nation did not remain mute. A flood of articles, filled with expressions of shame and moral indignation, was poured out throughout the land. In the House

of Commons William Ewart Gladstone made one of his earliest important speeches. "I am not competent," he said, "to judge how long this war may last . . . but this I can say, that a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with disgrace, I do not know and I have not read of."¹

After the conclusion of hostilities the venerable Duke of Wellington was charged with the duty of moving in the House of Lords a vote of thanks for the army and navy—"the victor in years of warfare against soldiers unsurpassed in history"—comments McCarthy

¹ J. Morley, the biographer of Gladstone, says on this point ("The Life of William Ewart Gladstone," vol. i, p. 226): "This transaction began to make Mr. Gladstone uneasy, as was indeed to be expected in anybody who held that a state should have a conscience." This Morley is the same man who, as Viscount Morley, represented the present Government in the Upper House. He withdrew from the Cabinet on account of England's participation in the War of 1914, of which he disapproved.

(vol. i, p. 140)—“to the fleet and army which triumphed over the unarmed, helpless, child-like Chinese.”

The opium question was not settled by the war. The import of opium from India to China, which in 1810-11 amounted to hardly more than 4,000 cases (so-called *piculs*, each containing 133 pounds), had in 1835-36 reached a yearly average of 35,500 cases. The imports continued to increase, in the face of every protest, and in 1855 more than 78,000 cases were brought across the border. The English Government put pressure upon China to legalize a trade which it was powerless to suppress, and thus to make of it a regular source of fiscal income. This was finally done by a commercial treaty of 1858.

“Concurrently there was in England a revival of the movement against the policy of forcing opium on China. Even in the time of

the East India Company's monopoly, prior to 1833, some voices had been raised in favor of actively assisting the Chinese Government in enforcing its prohibition of the foreign import; and quite apart from the parliamentary opposition to the Government of the day, a formidable body of public opinion had gathered force and enlisted the support of the leaders of religious and philanthropic work on the side of the movement. This feeling was encouraged and its utterance strengthened by the almost unanimous expression of opinion by the Protestant missionaries, both English and American, working in the China field, that opium smoking was a great moral evil which seriously impeded their efforts to bring the Chinese to recognize the truths of Christianity, and that it was incumbent on all Christian nations to dissociate themselves from a trade which brought disrepute upon the for-

ign, i. e., the Christian name. The movement culminated in a memorial (Papers relating to opium, p. 77), presented in August, 1855, by Lord Shaftesbury as chairman of a committee formed to sever all connection of the English people and its Government with the opium trade. . . .¹

“Public opinion in America was pronounced against the opium trade. Of the Protestant missionaries in China during the years 1834 to 1860, it may be said generally that the Americans outnumbered the English in the proportion of two to one; and their reports to the home societies produced a marked effect on the deeply religious sense of the American people.”²

The repugnance against the business was stronger in America than in England. The

¹Morse: “The International Relations of the Chinese Empire” (London, 1910), p. 550.

²Id., p. 551.

representative of the United States, moreover, was the only one who, in the negotiations of the years 1832-44, expressly supported the Chinese prohibition of the trade in opium, and many American merchants in China are said to have abstained from the trade before that period on moral grounds. It was the American Government, in the Philippines, too, which brought about the opium conference which met at Shanghai on February 1, 1909, and which declared that it was the duty of the Government to prevent the export of opium to every country which had forbidden its import.

The trade flourished without interruption (in 1880 the importations amounted to some 97,000 piculs, about 6,600 tons) until only recently, when, under the influence of the revolutionary movement in China, renewed efforts were made to suppress it. Even the cultiva-

tion of the opium poppy, which had steadily increased in China itself, has been forbidden.

The opium trade continued to be a severe burden upon the English conscience—whether from religious or ethical-philosophical grounds. Finally, in 1907, the British Government announced its willingness gradually to reduce the export of opium from India to China, so that it should cease entirely in ten years. It will be interesting to see whether this will really be done.

During all this period China, as is well known, suffered from deep and serious disturbances. Along with the curious Taiping Rebellion, which lasted more than a decade (1855-1866), came gradually attacks from the side of England, which, as had earlier been the case in the Crimean War and in all questions affecting the Near and Far East, had France in its train.

The case of the lorcha (river-boat) *Arrow* furnished the ground for this war. The *Arrow* was a Chinese vessel which at the time was sailing under the British flag, quite without right. A Chinese watch had, on October 8, 1855, arrested twelve men from this boat on a charge of piracy. The English consul in Canton demanded the surrender of the prisoners upon the ground that the vessel was an English ship. (As a matter of fact, it had for a time sailed as an English vessel, but the registry period had expired). Upon the refusal by the Chinese of his demand, the consul appealed to the envoy plenipotentiary in Hongkong. The latter demanded not only the surrender of the arrested men, but also an apology and the promise of the Chinese officials not to repeat such an offense. The Chinese replied with further representations, and Canton was immediately bombarded. The

operations on land and water lasted twenty-two days.

In England the people were not altogether pleased with this course. Its illegality was only too apparent. In the Upper House the venerable Lord Lyndhurst declared that neither law nor common-sense could justify it. It was, he declared, impossible to place a Chinese boat in Chinese waters outside the pale of Chinese law. "A lorcha owned by a Chinese purchased a British flag; did that make her a British vessel?" had been the query of the Chinese governor. "Indeed," said Lord Lyndhurst, "when we are talking of treaty transactions with Eastern nations, we have a kind of loose law and loose notion of morality in regard to them." A motion to disavow the proceeding was lost in the House of Lords, by a vote of 110 to 146. In the Lower House, however, Cobden procured the

passage of a vote of censure by a small majority. It was a blow to Lord Palmerston's cabinet and came in part from some of his former adherents. Audacious and confident as always, Lord Palmerston dissolved Parliament. He gave out the parole: "An insolent barbarian violated the British flag, broke the engagements of treaties," etc. The parole worked. Palmerston won a brilliant victory at the polls.

But had the case of the piratical vessel and the bombardment of Canton triumphed? McCarthy gave this judgment: "*The truth is that there has seldom been so flagrant and inexcusable an example of high-handed lawlessness in the dealings of a strong with a weak nation.*" And G. M. Trevelyan, writing as recently as 1913, says: "It is probable that every man, even the most hearty imperialist, who to-day studies the treatment of China by

Palmerston in the affair of the *Arrow*, will arrive at the conclusion that he abused the strength of Britain and *brought on a war originating from an unworthy quarrel.*"¹

It was a tedious war that was thus begun and that was gladly supported by Louis Napoleon. Not until the autumn of 1860 did it reach its end, after the summer palace at Peking had been looted for three days by English and French officers. That a deep hatred for Europeans has been nourished among the Chinese by such methods has made itself apparent in later occurrences of far-reaching consequences.

¹Trevelyan, "Life of John Bright," p. 258.

CHAPTER XI

THE CRIMEAN WAR

After Napoleon had been crushed and the conflict of more than a century against France's rivalry at land and sea had been closed, the eyes of the English policy were, until nearly the close of the nineteenth century, directed anxiously toward Russia. But only a single European war in which England was directly interested resulted therefrom. The Crimean War was the work of Lord Palmerston, who had the ambition to accomplish for his native land what the elder Pitt had accomplished a hundred years earlier. What France had been to Pitt, Russia was to Palmerston. To Palmerston, as to Pitt, war was an object of inclination, although both

were anything except military leaders. Fear lay at the root of the actions of both. Fear of the growing strength of the rival, and the conviction that the utmost watchfulness was the duty of the state made war appear a necessity to them in that moment when they believed that they could thus render futile the enemy's plans. At such a time war appeared to them no less "lovable" than it had appeared to Napoleon the Great.

"He (Palmerston) believed from the first that the pretensions of Russia would have to be put down by force of arms, and could not be put down in any other way; he believed that the danger to England from the aggrandizement of Russia was a capital danger calling for any extent of national sacrifice to avert it. He believed that a war with Russia was inevitable, and he preferred taking it sooner to taking it later. . . . He understood better

than any one else the prevailing temper of the English people.”¹

The war was undertaken, in alliance with Louis Napoleon for the support of Turkey, by an invasion of the Peninsula of Crimea in September, 1854. The participation of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whose policy was directed by Cavour, improved the chances of the allies. After Sebastopol had fallen (September 9, 1855), and Tsar Nicholas had died, the war began to die down in the face of a general unwillingness to carry it on, and Napoleon III brought about peace, which was confirmed in his capital city in March, 1856, and added to his glory. In England the Crimean War was remembered unpleasantly, among other reasons because it brought to light the serious defects of the army's organization, especially on the sanitary side. At

¹ McCarthy, II, Chap. 2, p. 208. (Tauchnitz ed.)

the outset the war had been popular, especially since it was a reaction from the pacifism connected with the liberal tendencies of that time. Soon, however, impatience and disappointment became general; "everybody" declared that the campaign was a disreputable affair.¹ Even after peace was made, public opinion remained dissatisfied with the manner in which the war was conducted, as well as with its political consequences. It had to be admitted that those farseeing men who had warned strongly against the campaign were right. At the head of these stood a man whose genius and character no one in

¹ In November, 1854, there were 2,000 wounded and sick in the hospital at Scutari, and in this whole month only six received clean shirts. (Trevelyan, "Life of John Bright," p. 242.) A leading article of the *Times*, which in those days was still written by able and occasionally also by morally earnest men, complained, on December 23, 1854, of "the incompetency, lethargy, aristocratic hauteur, official indifference, favor, routine, perverseness and stupidity which revel and riot in the camp before Sebastopol." (Ibid., p. 236.)

Great Britain would to-day venture to call in question: John Bright. His opponent, Lord Salisbury, termed him the greatest English orator of his century. Immediately after the breaking out of the war, in a series of splendid orations in Parliament, Bright attacked the principle of waging war in order to preserve the balance of power, and the system of alliances connected with such a course. His reference to the Angel of Death going through the land became famous during the peace negotiations in Vienna. "The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings," he exclaimed. The Vienna negotiations came to grief over the question of the neutralizing of the Black Sea; to win this point, Palmerston carried on the war for another year. Fourteen years later (1870) Russia declared that it would not longer be bound

by this declaration; it tore up the declaration, like so much waste paper, and England was frustrated.¹ A conference of the powers in London (January, 1871) declared this clause of the treaty null and void.

Gladstone, who belonged to the cabinet responsible for the war, declared afterward that it had been more sentiment than reason that had made the war popular, but that it was more reason than sentiment that had cast him into "the abyss of odium."²

We may accept these verdicts. No thoughtful man of English nationality could be found to-day who would be inclined to attempt to justify the Crimean War.

¹ The verdict is Trevelyan's. See "Life of John Bright," p. 247.

² Morley, "Life of Gladstone," I, p. 495.

CHAPTER XII

THE IONIAN ISLANDS

Great Britain had secured for itself a strange legacy out of the ruins of the Napoleonic bankruptcy. Under the name of "the United States of the Ionian Islands," Corfu, Cephalonia, Zakynthos, Paxos, Ithaca and Cythera had been created a "free and independent state" by means of a special treaty between Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and had been placed under the protection of the power first named. A Lord High Commissioner was to assume legislative and executive functions. "A constitutional charter of 1817 formed a system of government that soon became despotic enough to satisfy Metternich

himself.”¹ The Lord High Commissioner could simply do whatever he wished up to 1848, when changes were made.

There had before that been no lack of unrest, and in this troubled year there was an uprising in Cephalonia, “which the Lord High Commissioner suppressed with cruel rigor. Twenty-two people had been hanged, three hundred or more had been flogged, most of them without any species of judicial investigation. The fire-raising and destruction of houses and vineyards were of a fierce brutality to match.” A régime of terror followed which extended to the other islands. By virtue of his “power of high police” the Lord High Commissioner was able to put an end to the activities of any one, that is, “to tear him from his home, his business and his livelihood. This high police power was princi-

¹ Morley, “Life of Gladstone,” I, p. 598.

pally invoked against editors of newspapers. A distasteful editorial was not infrequently punished by deportation to some deserted, rocky island, inhabited only by a handful of fisher folk." It is a characteristic fact that a special report concerning this method of government, made by Gladstone, who was sent to the islands on a special mission in 1858 to introduce reforms, still lay in the archives of the Colonial Office as late as the year 1903 ("still existed in the archives of the Colonial Office . . . a separate report which everybody afterwards agreed that it was not expedient to publish").

First among the reasons for the dissatisfaction was the wish to become a part of the new Kingdom of Greece; next to this came the natural opposition to the tyranny of the British governor. At the basis, however, lay also sociologic conditions of land-ownership and

of agriculture, since the land-owners were mainly foreigners (Italians).

The conflict between the Assembly and the vice-royalty gradually became chronic and steadily more unpleasant for the central government in London. Despite the fact that Gladstone, in terms of the most utter cant, had declared in May, 1861, that the abandonment of the undertaking would be "a crime against the safety of Europe," it nevertheless came to pass on March 29, 1864. Thus there came to an end a British protectorate which is characterized by all commentators and historians as a chapter of the most extreme despotism.

England contented itself in the Mediterranean with retaining the island of Malta, which it took from the French; the French, for their part, had no legal title whatever to the possession of the island.

CHAPTER XIII

JAMAICA

In a more striking manner than in the Ionian Islands did English misrule make itself noticeable in the most important of the crown colonies of the West Indies. In Jamaica, it is true, slavery had been abolished in 1838, but the oppression of the negroes had grown heavier, not lighter. In October, 1865, the unrest eventuated in disturbances of a nature more serious than usual, disturbances in which the well founded complaints of the negroes found expression. And yet the whole affair was hardly more than an ordinary riot. "So evanescent was the whole movement that it is to this day a matter of dispute whether there was any rebellion at all . . . or whether

the disturbances were not the extemporaneous work of a discontented and turbulent mob.”¹ The governor proclaimed military law over the whole district with the exception of the city of Kingston. In Kingston lived a negro named Gordon, who had a small business establishment and was a member of the House of Deputies of the colony. He had made himself prominent there as an advocate of the rights of the negroes, both in and out of the House of Deputies, in an energetic but thoroughly lawful manner. He was soon arrested, and, since martial law did not prevail in Kingston and it would have been necessary to bring him before an ordinary civil court, he was taken to another district and brought before a court-martial composed of two young marine officers and a subaltern of infantry. Gordon was accused of high treason, found

¹ McCarthy, IV, p. 117 (Tauchnitz ed.).

guilty and sentenced to death. As the following day was Sunday, the judgment was not carried out until Monday.

“The whole of the proceedings connected with the trial of Gordon were absolutely illegal; they were illegal from first to last. . . . Every step in it was a separate outrage on law. But for its tragic end the whole affair would seem to belong to the domain of burlesque rather than to that of sober history.”¹ McCarthy goes into details to prove this and supports his statements by reference to the criticism of Presiding Justice Cockburn, who later declared that nine-tenths of the testimony admitted should have been rejected under all rules of the procedure not only of civil but of military courts.

“Meanwhile the carnival of repression was going on. The insurrection, or whatever the

¹ McCarthy, IV, p. 121.

movement was which broke out on October 11th, was over long before. It never offered the slightest resistance to the soldiers. . . . An armed insurgent was never seen by them. Nevertheless, for weeks after, the hangings, the floggings, the burnings of houses were kept up. Men were hanged, women were flogged merely 'suspect of being suspect.'"¹ Four hundred and thirty-nine persons were killed, more than 600 flogged, a thousand houses went up in flames. Especially effective whips were made from piano-wire. A commission appointed later declared that "it is painful to think that any man should have used such an instrument for the torturing of his fellow-creatures."² The report of the commission was given out in April, 1866. The recall of the governor followed, although public opin-

¹ *Id.*, p. 123.

² McCarthy, IV, pp. 123-4.

ion was divided. Committees for and against the methods used against the Jamaicans were formed. On both sides appear the best known names of the period (the mid-Victorian era). Supporting the governor were Disraeli, Tenyson, Kingsley, Carlyle, Dickens, Ruskin; cudgels were taken up for the negroes by John Bright, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Goldwin Smith. The leader of this group was John Stuart Mill. Even the governor's party was not inclined to justify the cruelties and the judicial murder of Gordon—at least, a great many would not go so far—but they brought all reasons to bear that seemed to demand the relentless suppression of the uprising. The governor's opponents, on the other hand, laid special stress upon the assertion that the uprising was insignificant and had already been fully put down when the reign of terror began. Their adversaries replied by exalting

the moral qualities of the governor and attacking the character of Gordon. The renowned naturalist, Huxley, "made concerning this affair the quiet remark that he knew of no law authorizing virtuous persons as such to put to death less virtuous persons as such."¹

¹ Id., pp. 127-8.

CHAPTER XIV,

THE WAR OF THE SLAVE-OWNERS IN AMERICA

The traffic in negroes, in which English sea-traders had "earned" so many millions, was, as is well known, an issue of the North American Civil War, even though this phase of the conflict did not at first occupy the chief place.

The English Government was more than once upon the point of taking sides on behalf of the slave-owners of the South. Public opinion—at least among the upper classes, who are always in the best position to make their opinions prevail—was decidedly on the side of the Confederates. This was partly due to aristocratic, partly to liberal and free-trade grounds. The ethical repulsion to slavery, whose most eloquent advocate was the fearless

John Bright, found only a weak response or no response at all in these circles. The *Times* pointed out that the Bible nowhere expressly prohibits slavery. It was confidently believed that the North would suffer a crushing defeat. "The influential classes were heart and soul with the South." In like manner, Napoleon III had not the slightest doubt that the cause of the South would triumph and that all was over forever with the Union. He desired also, jointly with the English Government, to support the Confederacy through recognition. "It is well to bear in mind that there were only two European states which entertained this feeling and allowed it to be everywhere understood."¹ These were England and France. Lincoln and his friends had reckoned upon the sympathy of the English people and the English Government. They were bitterly dis-

¹ McCarthy, III, p. 253.

appointed when they learned that their temporary misfortune was mocked at by English statesmen, journalists and clergymen, and generally by the "best society," and that all these circles openly desired the success of their enemies. A serious conflict arose from the case of the English merchantman *Trent*, which was searched by a cruiser of the United States. It had envoys of the Southern States on board, whom the captain of the cruiser made prisoners. There was great excitement in London over the fact that the plebeians of the Northern States had dared to imitate the practice followed by the English aristocracy for centuries—a practice that had led to the system of armed neutrality in Europe and to the War of 1812 with the United States. It makes a difference whose ox is gored. President Lincoln soon yielded and released the prisoners, but the affair left much bitterness, chiefly—

according to McCarthy's judgment—as a result of the overbearing way in which the English Government had conducted itself.

Even granting that England played here the rôle of a defender of the rights of nations, there soon came an affair which gave the United States grounds for complaint. The cruiser *Alabama*, sailing under the flag of the Confederacy, captured one merchant ship after another of the North. In doing so, it regularly used the English flag to deceive its victims. That was its right, under the rules of naval warfare. But the *Alabama* was, as a matter of fact, more an English than an American ship, and the same was true of several other "Confederate" cruisers. They were built in an English shipyard; their crews were almost exclusively English; the cannons and the cannoneers were English, and the latter belonged to the royal naval reserve and

were in the pay of the British Government. The British Government had no ears for the representations of the Union's envoy, so long, at least, as it was believed that the Union would be defeated. And this belief persisted until the victories of Grant and Meade could no longer be kept secret. Reports of these victories were received in London with great displeasure. "In some of the clubs there was positive indignation that such things should even be reported."¹ When the victory of the North became all too apparent, there was a reversal of opinion. The laboring class, under the influence of John Bright and certain other friends of the Union's cause, had been on the side of the North since the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation by Lincoln (September 22, 1862).

The *Alabama* affair was for years a subject

¹ McCarthy, III, p. 277.

of dispute. It was finally submitted to a court of arbitration which met in Geneva. The verdict of this court (September 15, 1872) held England liable for the losses occasioned by the *Alabama* and two other privateers. England was forced to pay the United States an indemnity amounting, with interest, to \$15,500,000, for breach of neutrality.

Thus ended the participation—for such it was—of the English Government on behalf of the slave-owners of America.

CHAPTER XV

THE INDIAN MUTINY

All these affairs were, in respect of their direct significance for the British World Empire, not to be compared with the rebellion in India of the years 1857-1859, which, under the name of "the Indian Mutiny," is described as a simple revolt of mercenaries, despite the fact that it was, or at least became, much more than that. It meant the collapse of the rule of the East India Company.

It is still disputed in England whether the annexations of Dalhousie and his governmental methods were the cause of the uprising or not. Most striking was the manner in which, in gross violation of treaties solemnly concluded, he destroyed the Kingdom of Oudh,

whence the Bengalese army was mainly recruited. It is considered certain that this contributed to an important degree to make the British domination hated. Everywhere the English had disregarded the religious feelings of Hindus as well as of Mohammedans, and had done violence to the prejudices of caste. Mutinies of the native mercenaries were as old as the institution of paid armies itself. The fear that they might be employed outside the country and thus lose caste worked with particular force upon these caste-feelings. The petty war which England carried on in 1856 in Persia added to this fear. There existed, moreover, the widespread belief that British domination in India was to last for a hundred years, and it was in 1757, just 100 years earlier, that the great victory in the battle by Plessy had given Clive domination over India.

The history of the mutiny is a history of

gruesome atrocities on both sides. Its final suppression left an especially deep and terrible impression upon the feelings of Europe because of the English method of carrying out the death sentence by binding the victims to the muzzles of cannons, which were then fired. This humane method of execution had already been employed upon the Lipaki in 1764.¹

After the mutiny had been suppressed, the question as to its causes became a burning one. Colonel Malleon, who, supplementing Kaye's work, has given us the most thorough historical account of the events, answers the question by declaring that the principal cause was the bad faith of the English Government toward the Sepoys. "The Government punished the Sepoys for declining to fulfil a con-

¹ As early as 1764 it became necessary to stamp out mutiny by blowing thirty Sepoys from the cannon's mouth. Enc. Brit., XIV, p. 446.

tract which the Government had broken," he said. This occurred in 1843, and in 1853 "the Government most unadvisedly again attempted another breach of contract." Lord Dalhousie was here the guilty person. His "high-handed measures" were crowned by the annexation of Oudh. "Of these acts, of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations, the mutiny was the too certain consequence."¹

¹ Malleon, "History of the Indian Mutiny," vol. III, pp. 472-476; preface, p. viii.

FOURTH DIVISION : THE NEWER IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER XVI

EGYPT

The land of the Pharaohs has been an apple of discord between English and French aspirations for conquest since the French Revolution. These aspirations have served directly the ends of economic and financial exploitation. Neither because of this nor for the sake of the colonies themselves has it come to war between the two powers since 1815. The English policy, however, succeeded without war in making France more and more dependent upon England. It had tamed the once so powerful and so feared nation, and threw as much fodder into its manger as seemed necessary to mollify its thirst for blood.

French genius and French technic had planned and built the Suez Canal. When, in 1864, Ferdinand de Lesseps appealed to Lord Palmerston to stop the opposition which English diplomacy in Constantinople had organized against the project, the Minister declared "that in the opinion of the British Government the canal was a physical impossibility, that if it was made it would injure British maritime supremacy, and that the project was merely a device for French interference in the East." Assuredly a fine example of the farsightedness and broadmindedness of British statesmanship, which still sees in Palmerston its typical representative!

Confirmation by the Sultan of the concession was not obtained until 1866. In the meantime de Lesseps had organized a stock company for the building of the canal, which was opened in November, 1869. In 1875 Dis-

raeli, in whom the financier and the statesman were admirably joined, bought the Khedive's 176,602 shares of Suez Canal stock. This marks the beginning of the financial and accompanying territorial conquest of Egypt by England. The state stood at the door of bankruptcy. To avert it the incubus of Anglo-French financial control (the Dual Control) was laid upon the land. In the year 1881 came an uprising, which was also directed against the Turks, under the leadership of the Egyptian officer Ahmed Arabi. In the words of Lord Cromer, who had been in 1878 a member of a French commission and who became later (1884) consul-general and *de facto* governor, it was "a genuine revolt against misgovernment." The movement was successful; Arabi became Minister of War. This did not suit the incubus. English and French ships appeared in Alexandria to protect the inter-

ests of the creditor states; a revolt in that city, in which British subjects lost their lives, furnished the pretext for the bombardment of the weak outer forts on July 11, 1882, which resulted in increasing the anarchy.

The English admiral did not act entirely upon his own responsibility. He did not concern himself about the law of nations, but back of him stood his Government, which now held it to be its task to put down the "rebellion." The occupation of the land of the Nile followed, which, although the subjugation of the Sudan did not come until much later (1898), soon amounted to political annexation. France, whose Government for years insisted that Egypt must be evacuated, was eliminated by the *entente*, and by the treaty of 1904, which was equivalent to a partition of Northern Africa. "We retain Egypt, you seize Morocco. The other Powers have no

business either here or there. If Germany should perchance concern itself about its commercial interests in Morocco, Great Britain will protect France.”

That was the real meaning of this treaty. That a shadow of “right” came into the question neither of the contracting parties has dared to assert. The only right was that which Shylock claims.

The statesman Gladstone had written as long ago as 1877: “Our first site in Egypt, be it by larceny or be it by emption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African empire that will grow and grow . . . till we finally join hands across the equator with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and the Orange River on the south, or of Abyssinia or Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of viaticum on our journey.”¹

¹ Gladstone’s “Gleanings,” IV, p. 357.

This same Gladstone had, as Prime Minister, the task of defending the bombardment of Alexandria. John Bright, who was a member of his cabinet, resigned because of the affair. Goldwin Smith (from 1858 to 1866 professor of modern history at Oxford, later a resident of Canada) wrote to him: "This is a war of bondholders." That was also Bright's conception. As a member of the cabinet he had authorized the bombardment, and the thought oppressed him greatly. The impulse had come from Joseph Chamberlain, at that time still a Radical. A fearless and tireless advocate of decent and upright treatment of the Egyptians was Wilfrid Scaven Blunt, who had long lived in Egypt and was at the center-point of the occurrences of 1882. He enjoyed the complete confidence of Arabi, whom he describes as a noble enthusiast and a true Moslem believer. Bismarck termed

Arabi a powerful factor with whom one must reckon. General Gordon, whose tragic fate in Khartoum was a consequence of the complications in the Sudan that followed the occupation of Egypt, wrote a letter of approval to Blunt from Cape Town on August 3, 1882, at the height of the publicistic excitement of the year. The letter makes merry over the secrecy of the then Secretary of State, Sir Charles Dilke, and says: "Could things have ended worse if he had said everything? I think not. No more control, no more employees drawing £373,000 a year—no more influence of consuls-general, a nation hating us—no more Tewfik—no more interest—a bombarded town, Alexandria—these are the results of the grand secret diplomacy. . . . 'As for Arabi, whatever may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the people. They will never become 'your obedient servants'

again.”¹ Blunt considered it necessary, twenty-five years after the occurrences, to supplement the earlier justifications of his course by writing a book, which at the outset contains many interesting documents, among them several letters from Ahmed Arabi. In a preface to the book, written in 1895, Blunt says: “It may be also that the Egyptian question, though now quiescent, will reassert itself unexpectedly in some urgent form hereafter, requiring of Englishmen a new examination of their position there, political and moral.” It was to this end that he desired to contribute the material he had collected. In a later “Foreword,” written in 1907, he declares that for this purpose “it is necessary that they should first have set before them the past as it really was, and not as it has been presented to

¹ Wilfrid Scaven Blunt, “Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt” (1907), p. 28.

them so long by the fallacious documents of their official Blue Books." He refers to the fact that Lord Cromer was in Cairo during a part of the revolutionary period. He sets for himself the task, "to give a complete exposure in detail of the whole drama of financial intrigue and political weakness as it was at the time revealed to me." A part of the book is made up of entries in the author's diary. These are very gloomy over the future of his country. "England's decay rests upon causes far more general than any one man or party of men can be responsible for. We fail because we are no longer honest, no longer just, no longer gentlemen."¹ Blunt evidently believes also that at that time the honesty and justice of the English policy, even if not perfect, nevertheless stood much higher at an earlier period.

¹ Blunt, p. 92.

His views have naturally been severely attacked. The acknowledged authority concerning modern Egypt and the English conquest is the two-volume work of Lord Cromer, "Modern Egypt." With all appreciation of this excellent work, however, one must do blunt the justice of saying that Cromer is at a disadvantage insofar as he did not live in Egypt during the critical period. Lord Cromer brings into the discussion the words of Professor Sayce, the renowned authority on Semitic languages: "Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle with the native population know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another, but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream, and finds

himself in the presence of a mind which is as strange to him as would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn.”¹

Perhaps for the observation of certain occurrences the rule will also apply that it is exactly in the Orient that one must have experienced these things in order to understand them. Furthermore, Blunt, a wealthy man, lived in Egypt as a private gentleman, while Cromer (formerly Sir Evelyn Baring) was there only under commission of the English Government.

Meanwhile, let us rather reserve our judgment. We can, however, accept as correct those things wherein Cromer and Blunt agree. Even Cromer confirms, at the close of his work, with respect to Egypt, what was said of India soon after the annexation of the Punjab:

¹ Prof. Sayce, “The Higher Criticism and the Monuments,” p. 558.

"We are nowhere beloved." He terms it a "lack of gratitude of a foreign nation for foreign benefices," but says that such ingratitude is almost as old as history. In another place¹ Cromer himself refers to Seeley's assertion that "it were very rash to assume that any gratitude which may here and there have been awakened by our Government can be more than sufficient to offset the dissatisfaction which we have caused among those whom we have deprived of respect and influence."

But dissatisfaction fills not only the former rules, but also the rulers. Foreign rule is in itself oppressive. It is felt as a burden, even when it brings welcome reforms. The dissatisfaction is increased and sharpened through occurrences showing that the foreign rulers unite a lack of understanding of native

¹ *Edinb. Review*, Jan., 1908, reprinted in "Political and Literary Essays" (1913), p. 13.

customs with a severity toward crimes growing out of an attempt to observe these customs. Such an occurrence in Egypt was the case of Denishwai. Pigeons may be shot in the Nile Land only with the permission of the village "omdeh," or head man, for the inhabitants look upon their half-tame pigeons as valuable property and care for them with great assiduity. The English officers enjoy shooting pigeons. Thus it came to pass that a party of fifty English officers, on a march through the delta of the Nile, was found shooting pigeons and detained. Their weapons were taken away from them, a shotgun was discharged and wounded several persons, among them a woman. A panic followed and the Englishmen were badly beaten. One died later of sunstroke, but his death was ascribed to his injuries. An extraordinary court, which existed for such cases, immediately con-

demned four Egyptians to death, several to long terms of imprisonment and seven to receive fifty lashes each. The executions and lashings were carried out forthwith.

Sir Edward Grey had just become Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new Liberal government. He not only defended the drastic verdict, but on July 6th issued a warning against further outbreaks of *fanaticism* in Egypt, which might possibly make extreme measures necessary. To this warning Mustapha Pasha Kamel, the new leader of the Egyptian National party, replied that he, in common with his fellow-countrymen, believed that Sir Edward Grey had spoken in Parliament for no other purpose than to choke off the discussion of the dreadful reality of Denishwai. But, he asked, is it worthy of England, of the land that desires to be the representative of humanity, justice and civilization, to approve and

adopt as its own the acts of those who give to the world the melancholy and frightful drama of barbarism—the executions of Denishwai?

The further history of the English usurpation in Egypt will perhaps furnish a sharp answer to this question. There has been no lack of strong opposition and relentless criticism of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons and in his own party.

A word may here be said of the conflicts for the Sudan, which formed a part of the conquest of Egypt. The tragic fate of the noted General Gordon made a deep impression upon his contemporaries, and also outside of England. How far his Government was responsible for his death does not concern us here. For the rest, however, it suffices to quote a striking sentence of the great philosopher, Herbert Spencer, written by him not long before his death in 1903. He said: "Love

of country is not fostered in me on remembering that when, after our Prime Minister had declared that we were bound in honor to the Khedive to reconquer the Sudan, we, after the reconquest, forthwith began to administer it in the name of the Queen and the Khedive, practically annexing it." In the same short article we find the sentence: "Contemplation of the acts by which England has acquired over eighty possessions—settlements, colonies, protectorates, etc.—does not arouse feelings of satisfaction."¹

¹ Article on "Patriotism," in "Facts and Comments," pp. 88-89.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BOER WAR

The conquest of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State was for the Boers, who were thus robbed of the last abiding places of their political independence, the conclusion of a "Century of Wrong." (This was the title of a pamphlet issued by the former Secretary of State, F. W. Reitz.)

The Cape Colony, the center-point of British dominion in South Africa, was part of the booty secured on the occasion of the battles against the French Republic and later against Napoleon. At first in 1795, then in 1806 and finally in 1814 Great Britain laid hand upon the old Dutch settlement. "The British title to Cape Colony is based upon conquest, treaty and purchase. The wishes

of the inhabitants were not consulted and among them resentment was felt at the way in which their future was thus disposed of," reports the Englishman Frank R. Cana.¹ He knows perfectly that it was only conquest that grounded a real "legal title."

The repugnance to the English rule, which in this case holds in subjection not Asiatics, not negroes nor colonists of English descent, but descendants of a neighboring European land, has increased in proportion as the rule has been extended. The events contributing thereto are still fresh in the memory. They include the defeat of the English at Majuba Hill (1881); the organization of the African-der League (1882); the discovery of the diamond fields and gold mines; the systematic procedure of Cecil Rhodes and his Chartered Company; the policy of President Kruger;

¹ Encyc. Brit., article "South Africa," XXV, p. 470.

the complaints of the Uitlander in the Transvaal; the forcible invasion of Dr. Jameson (the Jameson raid), which Cecil Rhodes, then Minister in the Cape Colony, had instigated; and the lasting, fearful results of this crime. "It cannot be denied that the events accompanying this raid greatly embittered the Dutch element in the Cape Colony and influenced its later attitude against the Transvaal Boers."¹ In the year 1897 Sir Alfred Milner, a passionately ruthless imperialist, was appointed Viceroy for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony. This meant that the policy of force, which had for a time been in desuetude, was to be taken up again, for back of Milner stood Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary of State. From the very beginning he handled the Transvaal Republic as a state bound to obedience, al-

¹ Encyc. Brit., *ibid.*

though, under the treaty of 1884, the Transvaal's standing in international law was only in a limited degree one of dependence, after it had freed itself from its incorporation in 1877 into the British Empire. The three-year war (1899-1902) followed, with the final subjection and regulation of the new colonies, the introduction of Chinese mine laborers under conditions which had the effect of making slaves of them, and, finally, the granting of self-government and the constitution of the South African Union as one of the members of the British Empire.

The war itself brought at first severe defeats for the British army. Later the army was able to report victories. "England sent during the whole course of the war nearly 450,000 men to South Africa. Of these, about 340,000 came from the mother country, the rest from India, the colonies and South Africa

itself. The entire fighting force brought into the field by the Boers was considerably less than 75,000 men.”¹ McCarthy is of the opinion that in view of the relative strength of the forces (6 to 1), it were impossible for any poet to grow enthusiastic about the victory, and that if it had been a war between two foreign powers, the sympathy of the English folk would most certainly have been on the side of the weaker.

The sympathy of the entire non-English civilized world was on the side of the weaker to a degree that signified a severe moral defeat for the English world-policy. The cant phrases with which the war of conquest was launched had no currency outside the English borders; no one accepted them; they were cast back into the faces of Chamberlain, Milner and their lieutenants.

¹ McCarthy, "History of Our Own Times," VII, p. 126.

As long ago as 1850 Queen Victoria "acquainted the Prime Minister that she could not observe without pain that England was generally detested." Fifty years later, after she had celebrated her diamond jubilee, she would have found much more reason for this pain. In her place spoke the great men of the land, men belonging as well to the Government as to the opposition, although the latter did not dare more than a weak protest against the war.

On October 31st, 1900, the Earl of Kimberley referred to the fact that "we are very generally hated by foreigners."

On December 16, 1901, the Earl of Rosebery, Prime Minister in 1895-6, testified that "there is no parallel to the hatred and ill-will with which we are regarded almost unanimously by the peoples of Europe."

Lord Salisbury himself, the head of the

Government, declared on May 9, 1900, "that this country has been cast out with reproach in almost every literature of Europe." And in a later speech (on June 5, 1902), he raised the question "whether the root of bitterness against England, which he was wholly unable to explain, might not indicate some deep-set feeling with which at a later date we shall have to reckon."

In the year 1902 there appeared also the interesting work of the Honorable George Peel, "The Enemies of England," from which the foregoing citations are taken. He thinks "that this feeling has been prevalent as a general factor in Europe since the latter half of the eighteenth century."

He is assuredly right, for this hostility has always had its seat in France. From the saying of Minister Cardinal Bernis (about 1750), "England will become the despot of the uni-

verse," down to the book of Jean de la Poulaine (1902), "The Colossus with Feet of Clay," what a record of expressions of French repugnance, French ridicule and French hatred towards England could be adduced!

Peel recognized quite correctly the cause and kernel of the "profound, widespread and old standing" hostile feeling which England has brought upon itself on the Continent. He saw it in the fact that England's policy, "at a certain stage of its progress" had regularly opposed itself to every power "that aspired to the primacy of the world." "Apart from all bitterness," he said, "this remains the real matter between us and our Continental critics, and to the question whether this resistance of ours was justified we must content ourselves to stand or fall upon the answer given by the views of impartial minds."

When he answers then that "our statesmen

have continuously sought our *safety*, which in every important epoch of European affairs has been identical with the safety of Europe," this is not cant (to which this author is not addicted), but an undependable generalization from the affairs of Louis XIV and Napoleon, of whom the latter in reality fought more against the supremacy of England than for the supremacy of France.

To return to the Boer War, this conflict was decided upon solely because of the imperialistic interests of England, and behind these stood, as always, the powerful commercial interests.

W. H. Lecky, the historian, politically Conservative and Unionist, wrote in 1900 a pamphlet entitled "Moral Aspects of the South African War." It is throughout a defense of the English policy and a severe attack upon the government of the Transvaal. Yet Lecky

finds himself compelled to make the following admissions:

“I am far from contending that our conduct in other respects was impeccable. There are several pages in the history of the early English dealings in the Transvaal which are by no means to our credit. A mining population like that which had its center in Johannesburg is never of the most desirable order, and in the present generation financial speculation has mixed far too much, both in England and in Africa, with South African politics. Party spirit runs violently at the Cape, and if there was a Dutch party aiming at complete ascendancy, there was also an English party which was violent, arrogant and unscrupulous. The raid, though it was undoubtedly preceded by gross misgovernment, was both a great folly and a great crime. Our Government had nothing to say to it, and the men

who took part in it were tried and punished; but a section of the British public—shamefully misled by a very important part of the British press—adopted an attitude towards it which added largely and most naturally to the deep distrust of England that prevailed in the Transvaal.”

Lecky declares it is undoubtedly true that Rhodes prepared and planned the raid.

Herbert Spencer's verdict is short and sharp. He says: “After promising, through the mouths of two colonial ministers, not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, we proceeded to insist on certain electoral arrangements, and made resistance the excuse for a desolating war.”¹

But the sharpest criticism of those responsible for the Boer War came from the British nation itself, when, three years after the end

¹ “Facts and Comments,” p. 89.

of the war, it placed the reins of government by a mighty majority in the hands of those men who, like Campbell Bannerman, Lloyd George and 'Asquith, had protested loudly against the war and against the manner in which it was carried on. At the time they were abused and ridiculed as "Little Englanders" and "Pro-Boers."

Whether it was in accordance with the will of this majority that Sir Edward Grey became Foreign Minister in the new Liberal cabinet may be doubted with good reason.

CHAPTER XVIII

PERSIA

Under the title, "The Strangling of Persia," a distinguished American public man has pictured the modern history of this country. Mr. Morgan Shuster was as no other man in a position to give an impartial and faithful report of the events which he characterizes concisely in this title.

In the endeavors to subjugate and exploit Persia, and to these ends to throw it into confusion and anarchy, Russia played the leading rôle throughout almost the entire nineteenth century. Great Britain, drawn into Afghanistan through its rule of might over India, was in turn compelled to direct its eyes toward Persia. Violent points of friction developed

as early as 1839, and came to a declaration of war on November 1, 1856. The question at issue was the possession of Herat (in Afghanistan), which England denied to the Shah. From this time on, England—after a quickly won victory—above all laid claim to the exclusive commercial supremacy over the Persian Gulf. At the beginning of the new century (1902-1907) the rivalry between England and Russia first became acute, but a compromise followed during the confusion of the Persian revolution, which was immediately followed by the proclamation of a modern constitution. On August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Russian convention was signed, which in nature and effect amounted to a partition of Persia.

Sir Edward Grey advocated this treaty of compromise in the House of Commons. A London periodical, which enjoys great respect

because of its genius and frank courage in openly criticizing any action of the government, had this to say of the affair:

“Sir Edward Grey has not merely gone out of his way to make a wholly gratuitous defense of the action which Russia is now taking; he has explicitly sanctioned and adopted the stealthy extension of the Anglo-Russian compact which underlies the whole of the Russian aggression. So far as the wording of that treaty goes, it provides for the division of Persia into economic spheres, within which each power binds itself not to compete with the other for concessions. We have never thought that arrangement compatible with the integrity and independence of Persia, and we have always argued that it would be stretched, and must be stretched, into a political partition. At length the avowal has been made, and made apparently without any consciousness

that the terms of the compact have been left behind. The word 'political' has been subtly introduced by Sir Edward Grey to describe the character of the particular interests which each power reserves to itself in its own sphere. When once that word is used, the independence of Persia is gone and its partition virtually accomplished.

"But if a little country may be invaded by a great power because a foreign official in its service has ventured to write a reasoned and temperate letter to the *Times*, in reply to editorial attacks of semi-official British and Russian newspapers, we must revise all our conceptions of international intercourse. . . . It is a case of the wolf and the lamb, so flagrant and so cynical that one is hardly tempted to analyze it further."

And in a second article the same publicist makes the following observations concerning

the affair, which are to-day of most especial interest:

“Disastrous and foolish though we believe this policy to be, we do not call it unintelligible. It is a consequence, and one of the worst consequences, of *Sir Edward Grey’s European policy*. One simple and elementary principle has governed it from the first—his dread lest this or the other power might be drawn into what he has called ‘the orbit’ of German diplomacy. Year in, year out, we have been paying, chiefly in other people’s goods, for the satisfaction of keeping certain powers from coming to any intimate understanding with Germany. The French side of the account is represented by the Moroccan transaction and its sequels. To Russia we have given a free hand over the greater part of Persia. It was a large price to pay for anything.”

The author sums up his opinion of the English foreign policy in the following sentences:

“We are playing a continental rôle without continental resources, and from a great ambition based on unsuitable means there must issue in the end either the humiliation of a surrender or the disaster of a defeat.”¹

¹ The Nation.

CHAPTER XIX

THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

On the evening of August 2d the Belgian Government faced the necessity of deciding whether it would take sides with Germany or France. But Belgium's decision had been made long before. Belgium was a member of the *entente cordiale* between France and Great Britain.¹ This *entente* ostensibly meant an assurance of English support for France. In reality it meant that *France* and *Belgium* had become tools of the English policy. Belgium was, in the words of a Swedish military writer, "the United Kingdom's

¹The documents showing that Belgium had long ceased to be a neutral State have now (January, 1915) been published in a pamphlet which bears the title, "Die belgische Neutralität" (The Belgian Neutrality, published by George Stilke, Berlin).

outpost on the Continent.”¹ It played this rôle in the guise of an independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed in 1839 by the European concert, a concert in which Great Britain played first violin.

Trusting to English and French support, the Belgian Government placed itself in opposition to the request of the German Government that it assume a friendly neutrality and permit the entry into Belgian territory of German troops.

The border was crossed on August 4th. The German Government had in its possession dependable reports over the projected advance of French troops along the Meuse, in the district of Givet-Namur—reports that left room for no doubts concerning France’s intention to advance through Belgian territory against Germany. The German Empire was

¹ Svenska Dagblad, October 15, 1914.

at war with Russia and France, and its ally, Austria-Hungary, also had Serbia as an opponent. In Petersburg—according to a report of the *Belgian* chargé d'affaires to the *Belgian* Minister of Foreign Affairs—there was a firm conviction even before July 30th—indeed, the assurance had been received—that England would stand by France. “This support”—writes the Belgian envoy—“is of extraordinary weight and has contributed not a little to give the war party the upper hand.”

Of all the documents concerning the cause of the war that have become known, this is the one that illuminates the situation the most sharply.

England's participation in the World War was assured in all circumstances. Indeed, it was a matter of course, for even though England was, in the *sequence* of events, the last factor, it was the first factor in *bringing these*

events about. No other State had such a tremendous material interest as England in trampling the German power down through a European coalition. For this reason the *neutrality* of England could have been secured through no concession, not even through the concession not to violate the *Belgian* neutrality.

Only when it is willing to injure itself does a belligerent power make concessions to a power whose hostility is assured.

For this reason it was surely, in the words of the message of the Secretary of State on August 2d, "a requirement of self-preservation for Germany to anticipate an attack by France." As strongly as moral grounds demanded that Belgium's neutrality be not violated, the position of self-defense against a mighty coalition of powers in which Germany found itself not only justified, but demanded

the breach of an international treaty which was nothing but a weapon in the hands of an enemy who would have been an *enemy under all circumstances*.

This breach was followed immediately by the English declaration of war. The British Ambassador was "instructed to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." (Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, Cd. 7467, No. 159.)

That England was in all circumstances the enemy of the German Empire is proved by the memorandum which Sir Edward Grey on August 2d—that is to say, before any decision concerning Belgium—handed to the French Ambassador. (Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, No. 148.) In this it is

said: "I am authorized to give you an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

In the telegram in which Sir Edward Grey communicated this declaration to the British Ambassador in Paris it is said:

"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them

this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.”

Undoubtedly it would have suited Sir Edward Grey and his friends better if they could have been sure of the defeat of Germany without risking a single British ship or British cannon. If they could have so prescribed for Germany the manner in which it should carry on war, if they could have so inspired it with fear that the failure of its campaign was *certain*, then, of course, England would have been glad to remain neutral, and would have filled its mouth with still more beautiful cant phrases than it now does over freedom and justice, over its mission to protect the smaller nations—phrases calculated for those who are

simple enough to mistake the disguised wolf for a pious sheep.

The true state of affairs will not always remain concealed even in England.

Nor has it ever been wholly concealed. Before the cabinet reached its decision, the voices of the most important men had been raised against a war on behalf of Servia and Russia against the German Empire and Austria. One needs only to recall flaming articles of the *Manchester Guardian*, the *New Statesman*, and even of the ministerial *Westminster Gazette*. One recalls the declaration of the Oxford professors, who termed such a war a crime against culture; above all may be recalled the withdrawal of the three cabinet members, Morley, Trevelyan and Burns, each a name whose weight would outbalance a dozen Churchills and Greys if genius and political highmindedness could be weighed.

One can recall the manifesto of the Independent Labor Party, which declared in clear and true words: "England is not at war for oppressed nations or on behalf of the Belgian neutrality." One recalls the courageous intervention of the upright Scotch labor leader, Keir Hardie, in the House of Commons. One recalls further the proclamation of the former leader of the Labor Party, Ramsay Macdonald, and the manifesto, already referred to, of Bernard Shaw (*Common Sense 'About the War*). And finally, H. N. Brailsford has but recently directed attention to the fact that the report of the Belgian *chargé d'affaires* in St. Petersburg, of which we have already remarked that it throws the clearest light upon the situation, has been utterly suppressed in England. Brailsford says: "A word could have been spoken which would have preserved peace, England's word to Russia—'If you mo-

bilize against Germany before all resources of diplomacy have been exhausted, we shall consider you as the assailant and will not use a man or a ship to help you.' Sir Edward Grey did not say this word."

Sir Edward Grey could not say this word because it was his secret wish that Germany should be forced into war, even though it would have pleased him better if Germany could have suffered a severe defeat without British help. Because he and his associates believed that only British help could make this defeat certain, he promised it, and he was not in the position to state a condition under which Germany could have been assured of Britain's neutrality.

Our consideration of modern English history teaches us to look upon the English people as a genuine Epimetheus. There is never

a time when it cannot say to itself: "Sad delusion vanished like mist."¹ Shame and repentance took its place. The cultured Englishman thinks with shame of the piracy, murder and arson that have established his colonial empire. He recalls with shame and repentance the slave trade, once praised as a pillar of the empire. He knows that the conquest of India proceeded along ways paved with treachery and broken promises, with cruelties of every variety; he knows that systematic mistreatment caused the loss of the Thirteen Colonies, which grouped themselves around the Stars and Stripes, and that the same narrow commercial spirit caused his ancestors to take the part of the emigrants against the French Republic. Even the six professors of modern history at Oxford, with their feeble knowledge of history, know that

¹ Epimetheus, in Goethe's "Pandora."

England did Denmark a great injustice in 1807. Only with the bitterest regret does every informed man in England remember the catastrophe in Afghanistan in 1837-41; the very name of the Opium War recalls shame and lasting reproach. And the Crimean War? We have seen that no intelligent person now defends it, no matter how greatly it was rejoiced at in the beginning, and that it has been plunged into the depths of odium. Only a few know of the despotism with which the small states of the Ionian Islands and Jamaica were kept in check, but no one familiar with the facts will dare to assert that England there defended right, or even freedom. Only with repugnance does the Englishman of today permit himself to be reminded that his fathers and grandfathers were on the side of the slave-owners against Lincoln, while all Germany—which then included Austria—

never for a moment wavered in its sympathies, and in the States themselves many thousands of German men and youth enthusiastically took up arms against the institution of slavery. That the Indian Mutiny was due to the grave guilt of the East India Company and of the governor who ruled it is a historical fact which is proved by the dissolution of this company which immediately followed.

The records of the events of more modern times—of the conquest of Egypt, the bombardment of Alexandria, the bloody verdict against the peasants of Denishwai, the Boer War and the strangling of Persia—are not yet closed. But even now it requires a great assurance to assert that these events, so far as they have become known, inure to the honor of the English world-policy. One may say that, in respect also of these machinations and campaigns, a feeling of shame and penitence

has become almost universal among right-thinking people of the United Kingdom.

There is, therefore, adequate reason for believing that this feeling in regard to the causes of the present World War will continue to increase and gradually reach a height consonant with the terrible magnitude of these events.

From all that has been here presented in unprejudiced manner, based upon the testimony of important and noted English authors, we may draw the conclusion that the conscience of the English people, when it is challenged to give a verdict on the English world-policy and its motives, will not be able to avoid finding them guilty and sentencing them to everlasting condemnation.

CONCLUSION

When Theseus came to Crete, the Minotaur was brought before him.

“You have devoured little children and youths,” said Theseus.

The Minotaur trembled.

“I devoured the little children out of love,” he answered.

“And the youths?” asked Theseus.

“The youths out of ethical motives.”

Theseus drew his sword and struck off the monster’s head.

The Minotaur of modern times is the British world policy.

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