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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
SERIES

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WARS OF THE CENTURY.

AND THE

Development of Military Science

BY

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PREFACE.

No account of the Nineteenth Century would be complete without a narrative of its wars which are not inferior in interest to any which History records. The campaigns of Napoleon are not only replete with instruction for the military student, but are full of striking dramatic incidents, and from the marvellous personality of the principal actor in them exercise a fascination over the mind of the reader independent of his sympathies. The War of Secession in America touches us nearly both from the science and heroism displayed in it, and from the fact that the two combatants were of the same race and language, while the great War of 1870 must remain for many years the classical example of every branch of the military art.

It is humiliating to reflect that after so many centuries of civilisation war should still hold so large a place in the annals of a nation, but although war is the cause of incalculable suffering and the product of passion and folly, yet it gives abundant opportunity for endurance and self-devotion, and is the parent of many of the noblest qualities of man. In the nineteenth century we may at least comfort ourselves with the contemplation of long periods of peace. The present work contains the history of no war

between 1815 and 1854, and there is a long stretch of peace between 1878 and 1898. Undoubtedly, also, in the progress of military science wars tend to become short, and a Thirty Years' War, or even a Seven Years' War, is hardly possible in our time.

The present writer has had to cover a large field in a small compass. He has endeavoured to make his book intelligible to those unfamiliar with professional military phraseology, and for this reason he has preferred to indicate the progress of military science rather by what is implied in the narrative than by a special treatment which could hardly fail to become unduly technical. His qualifications for the task he has undertaken are, mainly, that for many years he has given great attention to the campaigns of Napoleon, and that the later wars which he has described have fallen within his own recollection. Schoolfellows of his own fought in the Crimea, and the succeeding struggles of the century recall to him many personal details with an acute vividness. Without pretending to original research, he has endeavoured to follow the best authorities with judgment and impartiality. The greater part of the book was written at Berne, which possesses one of the best military libraries in Switzerland, that of the General Staff, and the warmest thanks of the author are due to the Federal authorities by whose courtesy he was allowed to borrow books from its shelves.

OSCAR BROWNING.

KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

CONTENTS.

PART ONE.

THE WARS OF THE CONSULATE. 1800-1801.

CHAPTER I.

THE PASSAGE OF THE GREAT ST. BERNARD.

PAGE

Bonaparte as First Consul.—His Letter to King George III. of England.—Bonaparte's March on Italy.—The Difficulties Encountered during the March.—Arrival of the French Troops at the Hospice.—The Condition of the Troops.—Napoleon's Advance Stopped by the Fort of Bard.—Bernkopf Tricked..... 1

CHAPTER II.

THE PREPARATION FOR MARENGO.

Bonaparte's Entrance into Milan and How he was Received.—Genoa Captured by the Austrians and their Subsequent Defeat.—The Battle of Montebello and Results.—Afraid Melas would Escape Him..... 9

CHAPTER III.

THE BATTLE OF MARENGO.

Melas Explains the Condition of Affairs to his Brother Generals.—How the Austrian Army was Composed.—The French Driven Back.—Where the Hardest Struggle Took Place.—The Austrians Gain Marengo.—The Ap-

	PAGE
pearance of Bonaparte.—The French Again Driven Back. —The Arrival of Desaix and Subsequent Defeat of the Austrians.—Death of Desaix.—Bonaparte's grief.....	13

CHAPTER IV.

MOREAU.

French Success in Small Engagements.—How Moreau Drove Kray North.—The Meeting of Joseph Bonaparte and Cobentzl at Lunéville.—Bonaparte's Conditions of Peace.—The Austrians Reject the Terms.....	20
--	----

CHAPTER V.

HOHENLINDEN.

The War Renewed.—Where Bonaparte's Armies were Posted.—Disastrous Retreat.—A Fight in the Woods.— The Danube Valley and the Tyrol Surrendered to the French.—Macdonald's Marvellous Passage of the Splü- gen.....	24
---	----

PART TWO.

THE WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION.
1805-1807.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.

Napoleon Crowned Emperor.—His Scheme for the Inva- sion of England.—How it Failed.—How the French Soldiers were Exercised for the Purpose of Invading.— Avenging the Disgrace of Six Hundred Years.—Cowar- dice of a French Admiral and its Effect.....	29
---	----

CHAPTER VII.

THE CAMPAIGN OF ULM.

Napoleon's Anger.—His Plan of the Campaign of 1805 Against the Austrians and the Russians.—The Plan of	
---	--

	PAGE
the Allies.—How the French Army was Mobilized.—The Austrians' Mistake and Weakness.—How the French Deceived their Enemy.—Like the Rabbit Before the Cobra.—The Battle of Elchingen.—A Triumph of Military Skill.—How Pitt Received the News of the Defeat of the Austrians at Ulm.....	35

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MARCH TO AUSTERLITZ.

Napoleon's March on Vienna.—The Dangers and Difficulties to be Encountered.—French Success.—How Napoleon Acted.—His Plan for the Entering of Vienna Spoilt by Murat's Impatience.—The French Suffer Heavy Losses.—Napoleon's Delight at their Defence.—His Anger with Murat.—How the Tabor Bridge was Won.—What Proved Kutusov's Ruin.—The Russians Determine to Attack the French.....	46
---	----

CHAPTER IX.

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

Napoleon's Position.—How he Invigorated the Courage of the Army.—Before the Battle.—The Austrian General's Elaborate Plan of Battle.—Its Failure.—How the Battle of Austerlitz was Fought.—Napoleon Surveys the Enemy's Movements.—The Tactics of the Allied Forces.—Napoleon's Counter Moves.—How the Allied Army was Cut in Two.—The Composition of the French Army and How it was Armed.	53
--	----

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLES OF JENA AND AUERSTÄDT.

Napoleon's Aim and What he Did.—The Mobilization of the Prussian Army and What it was Composed of.—A Contrast.—An Ultimatum to France.—French Victories—Napoleon's Plan.—The French Defend Bravely.—Withstood the Assault of a Thousand Cavalry.—Destruction of the Prussian Army.—Napoleon Enters Berlin...	60
--	----

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLES OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND.

PAGE

Napoleon Threatens to Extinguish Prussia.—Prussia Raises Another Army.—Summoning the Poles to Freedom.—Napoleon Enters Warsaw.—Benningsen's Bold Move.—Napoleon Determines to Fight a Decisive Battle.—The Position of the Rival Armies.—Napoleon's Situation Critical.—The King of Prussia Refuses Napoleon's Offer of Peace.—Determines to Crush the Enemy.....	69
---	----

PART THREE.

THE WAR OF 1809.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FIVE DAYS' CAMPAIGN IN BAVARIA.

Austria's Desire to Wipe out the Disgrace of the Treaty of Pressburg.—Reorganization of the Austrian Army.—The Austrians Surprise Napoleon.—What Napoleon Did to Raise Troops.—Napoleon's Scheme.—Archduke Charles Crosses the Isar and his Plan of Campaign.—The Battle of Abensberg and its Object.—The Battle of Landshut.—The French Gain Ratisbon.....	75
---	----

CHAPTER XIII.

ASPERN AND ESSLINGEN.

Napoleon Drives the Austrian Troops Before Him.—The Battle of Ebelsberg.—A Useless Sacrifice.—The Situation of the Invaders.—Napoleon Crosses the Danube.—The French Suffer a Heavy Defeat at Aspern.—Napoleon Worsted for the Second Time—His Retreat Across the Danube.....	82
---	----

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ISLAND OF LOBAU.

Napoleon's Plan of Defence.—An Impregnable Citadel.—	
--	--

CONTENTS.

xi

	PAGE
The Austrians' Opinion of Napoleon's Intentions.—His Preparation for a Big Battle.—How he Crossed the River.....	89

CHAPTER XV.

THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM.

The French once more Cross the River.—How the French Advanced on Enzersdorf.—The Position of the Austrians.—The Two Generals before the Battle.—How Napoleon Surveyed the Battle.—The Peace of Vienna and End of the Campaign.....	93
--	----

CHAPTER XVI.

TACTICS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.

The Different Branches of the Military Service of the World and How they Fought.—The Different Methods of Fighting.....	98
---	----

PART FOUR.

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA.

1812.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ADVANCE TO SMOLENSK.

Napoleon's Desire to Force Russia into a Closer Observation of the Continental System.—Napoleon Wishes to Call Back into Life Italy and Spain.—The Greatest Military Enterprise of the World.—Emperor Alexander Issues a Proclamation.—Napoleon's Entrance into Vilna.—The Effect of Russian Weather on the French Army.—Balashov and Napoleon.—Napoleon's Movements.—The Russians Retire, Devastating the Country.—Failure of Napoleon's Plan.—His Entrance into Smolensk.—The Successes of his Generals.....	104
--	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE BORODINO.

	PAGE
The March upon Moscow.—The French Suffer through Lack of Food and Water.—Kutusov Commands the Russians.—What the French Saw when they Arrived at the Kolotza.—The Simple Plans.—Heavy Losses, 70,000 Dead and Wounded.....	113

CHAPTER XIX.

MOSCOW.

The Goal of their Wanderings.—How the French Found Moscow.—The Burning of Moscow.—Why Alexander Refused to Negotiate for Peace.—Napoleon Determines to Leave Moscow.—The Battle of Maloyaroslavetz as the Turning Point of Napoleon's Career.—Napoleon Abandons the Project of Retreating by Kaluga.—How Napoleon Found Borodino.—The State of the French Army.—Soldiers Dying from Fatigue.—The Retreat on Smolensk.—The Hardships Encountered.—The Disasters to Napoleon's Armies.....	117
--	-----

CHAPTER XX.

THE BEREZINA.

The Russians Determined to Intercept the Retreat of the Great Army.—How Eugène Reached Krasnoe.—A Needless Act of Barbarity.—The Condition of the French.—What the Remnant of Invaders had to Deal with.—Working Up to their Shoulders in Icy Water.—The French Attacked on Both Sides of the Stream.—A Panic.....	123
--	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

THE CLOSE.

The Cold Intense.—The Destruction of Life Terribly Rapid.—Napoleon Determines to Leave the Army and Hasten to Paris.—He Narrowly Escapes Capture.—Not Recognizable.—The Soldiers Reduced to Despair.—	
---	--

Killed by the Cossacks and Peasants.—Nothing Comparable to the Catastrophe of this Campaign.—The Disappearance of Half a Million Human Beings.—Attempted the Impossible and Failed.....	128
---	-----

PART FIVE.

THE WAR OF 1813.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN.

Napoleon Works with as Great Energy as Ever.—Had to Drain the Resources of his Empire Even to Exhaustion.—How he Raised his Army.—Lacking in Material Resources.—The Patriotic Zeal of the Prussians.—Murmurs of Revolt from the Rhine to the Elbe.—What Napoleon Lost through the Russian Campaign.—The Advance of the Allies.—Napoleon's Strength and his Design.—Blücher Retakes Rahna.—Blücher Forced to Retire.—Both Sides Claim the Victory.....	131
--	-----

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN.

Napoleon Follows the Allied Armies to Dresden.—His Entrance and Presentation with the Keys.—Feared Assassination.—The German Elbe in the Hands of Napoleon.—To Deal a Fresh Blow on the Allies.—The Headquarters of the Three Chiefs.—The Battle Becomes General.—The Position of the Rival Armies.—Ney does not Carry out Napoleon's Orders.—The Armistice of Plei-switz	139
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN.

Napoleon Superintends the Armies of his Dominions.—What Napoleon Possessed upon the Elbe and his	
--	--

PAGE

Strength.—His Plan to Recover his Former Position.—
The Force of the Allies and their Plan.—Napoleon's
Forces.—He Receives News of an Attack on Dresden.—
Unheard-of Rapidity.—The Cry of Anguish Loud and
Bitter.—How the Battle was Fought.—Napoleon Sur-
veys the Ground from a Tower.—A Colossal Figure.... 144

CHAPTER XXV.

DEFEATS.

The Allies' Successful Plan.—The Emperor's Mistake.—
Blücher's Victory.—Disastrous French Retreat.—Napo-
leon's Dreaded Attack.—Failure of his Design to Seize
Berlin.—The Grand Army Reduced to One-half.—Con-
tents Himself with a Defensive Position.—How He
Placed his Forces.—The Plan of the Allied Forces.—
Napoleon Forced to Quit Dresden..... 151

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG.

A Six Days' Battle.—Called the Battle of the Nations.—
Napoleon's Arrival at Leipzig.—A Violent Cavalry En-
gagement.—Preparation for the Main Conflict.—Napo-
leon's Plan of Attack.—A French Cavalry Charge.—A
Russian Regiment Absolutely Annihilated.—The Main
Charge Ineffective.—Napoleon's Pride would not Allow
Him to Make this Confession of Failure.—A Furious
Salvo of Artillery.—The King of Saxony Declared a Pris-
oner of War.—The Empire of Napoleon at an End.... 156

PART SIX.

THE PENINSULAR WAR.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

To Subdue England.—To Form a Confederation of Latin
Races under the Leadership of France.—What was

CONTENTS.

XV

PAGE

Necessary.—What Napoleon Called upon the Government of Lisbon to do.—Not Unwilling so Long as their Co-operation did not Imply a Breach with England.—How Portugal was to be Partitioned.—The House of Braganza Ceases to Reign.—A Revolution Breaks Out.—Napoleon Throws off the Mask.—Insurrection in Madrid.—Napoleon's first Great Check.—The Battle of Vimiero.....	161
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVIII.

NAPOLEON IN SPAIN.

Napoleon Determines to Take the Affairs of the Peninsula into his Own Hands.—He Crosses the Frontier.—Ney to Follow Castaños and Not to Leave a Man of his Army Alive.—Napoleon's Orders.—He Attacks the Enemy's Position.—A Panic Seizes the Spanish Troops.—Austria Arming.—Napoleon's Resolution.—The English Retreat.—Death of Sir John Moore.....	168
--	-----

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOULT IN PORTUGAL.

The War was not of Such a Nature that it Could be Terminated by Victories.—The French Harassed by the Continual Attacks of the Guerilleros.—The Siege of Saragossa.—The Corpses Filled the Cellars and Choked the Streets.—Capitulation a Matter of Necessity.—The French Moved by Pity.—French Generals Unable to Act Together.—Their Ambition.—The Duty Imposed upon Soutl by Napoleon.—Why Victories Meant but Little..	173
--	-----

CHAPTER XXX.

TALAVERA.

Soutl's Dream of Perfect Security.—The English Surprise Soutl.—His Retreat Disastrous.—Wellesley Determines to Carry the War to Spain.—Wellesley's March on Talavera.—Assailed by the United French Armies.—A Fierce Bayonet Charge Hurls the Enemy Down the Hill.—	
---	--

	PAGE
Raised the Military Reputation of England to a Height Which it had Never Reached Since the Campaign of Marlborough.—Wellington's Warning Unheeded and the Result.—The Tactics of the French Generals.—Napoleon Changes his System in Spain.....	178

CHAPTER XXXI.

MASSÉNA.

Wellington Retires Before Masséna.—The Position Wellington Took up Behind Coimbra.—How the French Attacked the English Position.—How they were Met by the Defenders.—The English Forced to Retreat.—The Celebrated Lines of Torres Vedras.—What they Consisted of.—Hoped to have Driven the English to their Ships.—Masséna Obligated to Retreat.—Masséna Once More Attacks Wellington.—The English Made a Gallant Resistance.—Masséna Returns to France in Disgrace.—The Battle of Albuera.....	183
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXII.

SALAMANCA.

Marshal Marmont Keeps Guard over the Frontier.—Wellington Driven from Badajoz.—Wellington Retires into Portugal.—A Note of Ill Omen.—Mortal Hatred between Soult and Marmont.—The Fortress of Badajoz.—Extremely Formidable.—One of the Most Thrilling Chapters in Military History.—The Assault on the Breaches.—Belched Forth its Hideous Artillery.—How the Broken Parapets had been Retrenched.—The English Obtain the Fortress.—In Front of Salamanca.—How Wellington was Received.—The Position of the Battle-field and the Fight.....	187
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXIII.

VITTORIA.

Wellington Pursues Clausel.—Wellington's Efforts to Capture Burgos Castle Unsuccessful.—The Blame of Failure	
--	--

	PAGE
Laid on Soult.—Obliged to Recall a Number of Officers and Seasoned Soldiers.—How the Battle of Vittoria was Fought.—Joseph Recalled to France in Disgrace and Placed under Arrest.—Wellington Narrowly Escapes Capture.—Pamplona Surrenders to Wellington.—The End of the Peninsular War.....	194

PART SEVEN.

THE WAR OF 1814.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE LION AT BAY.

Napoleon's Position after the Battle of Leipzig.—No Energy to Resist these Invasions.—Lost the Power of Initiative.—The Object of the Armies of Bohemia and Silesia.—Napoleon Worked with all the Resources of his Energy.—Defending the Soil of his Country Against the Pollution of an Invading Foe.—How Napoleon Thought to Supply the Deficiency.—The Design of Schwarzenberg and Blücher.—Strength of the Imperial Army.—Napoleon's Plan of Attack.—Forced to Retreat.—The Invaders Determine to March on Paris.—How Napoleon Defeated Blücher's Troops.—Cut them Down and Huddled them up in Confusion.—Napoleon's Intentions.—The Allies' Grand Army Arranged in Order of Battle.—The General Position of the Armies..... 199

CHAPTER XXXV.

SOISSONS AND LAON.

The Position of Affairs.—The Allies Form Important Resolutions.—Blücher's March on Paris.—Desisted from the Pursuit of the Austrians.—Blücher's Soldiers

in the Worst Extremity of Fatigue and Misery.— Marched Barefooted and in Rags.—All the Fruits of Napoleon's Brilliant Manceuvres Lost.—The Rage of the Emperor.—The Battle of Craonne.—Blücher Establishes Himself at Laon and is Attacked by Napoleon.—The French Dispersed Looking for Food.—Paralyzed by Cold and Slept like Sheep in a Pen.—Cut to Pieces in their First Sleep.—Gunnery Killed at their Post.—Napoleon Defeats the Russians at Rheims.....	208
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ARCIS-SUR-AUBE.

Napoleon's Whole Scheme Rendered Impossible and How. —Napoleon Decides to March to Troyes.—The Allies in Confusion and Embarrassment.—Schwarzenberg Passed from the Heights of Confidence to the Depths of Pusil- lanimity.—The French Driven Back in Confusion.—Na- poleon Restores Order.—The French Hold their Ground under a Terrible Fire of Artillery.—Continued with More Boldness than Prudence.—An Intercepted Des- patch Gives Allies the Light they Desired.—To March on Châlons to Approach the Army of Blücher.—A Fatal Suggestion.....	215
--	-----

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE CAPTURE OF PARIS.

The March on Paris.—The National Guards Defended Them- selves with Heroic Courage and were Destroyed to a Man.—Napoleon Ignorant of the Allies' Movements.— The Sceptre and Sword were Trembling in his Hands.— Orders Issued for an Advance on the Capital.—Paris Not Fortified.—Its Position.—The French Evacuate the City. —Napoleon Receives Bad News at Every Post-house.— Napoleon Signs his Abdication and Accepts the Sov- ereignty of the Island of Elba.....	221
--	-----

PART EIGHT.

THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.

1815.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE RETURN FROM ELBA.

PAGE

The Restoration of the Bourbons.—Looked upon the Ancien Régime with Horror.—The Mistakes of the Bourbons on their Return to Paris.—Took Every Pains to Obliterate the Memory of the Revolution and the Empire.—The Strength of the Army Reduced.—The Longing for the Return of the Emperor.—Napoleon Follows the Movements with a Watchful Eye.—Reasons Why he should not Remain where he was.—Napoleon Leaves Elba.—Napoleon's Boastful Prophecy Fulfilled.—Ney's Promise to Bring Back Napoleon in an Iron Cage.—Sang a Different Note..... 225

CHAPTER XXXIX.

CHARLEROI.

At the Congress of Vienna Napoleon Declared an Outlaw.—Strength of Napoleon's Army.—What Wellington Proposed.—Six Armies to Invade France Simultaneously.—Napoleon Hesitates.—Napoleon's Plan to Conquer the English and the Prussians.—Felt Confident One Decisive Victory would Destroy the Coalition.—To Aim Straight at the Point of the Juncture of the Two Armies.—Napoleon Addresses his Soldiers.—How the French Army was Concentrated.—The Allies did not Believe Napoleon would Begin the Attack.—General Bourmont Deserts on the Morning of the Battle.—Prussians Visible in Force at Gosselies.—What Napoleon Decided upon.—One of the Chief Causes of his Ill-success..... 230

CHAPTER XL.

THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.

Napoleon Throws Himself into the Centre of the Allied Position.—His Orders to Grouchy and Ney.—Blücher

	PAGE
Full of Ardor.—Wellington at the Duchess of Richmond's Ball.—Wellington and Blucher View the Position from a Windmill.—What Wellington Arranged.—The Battle-field of Ligny.—Napoleon's Plan.—The Prussians Lose, but Regain St. Amand.—The Prussian Army Mutilated, but not Destroyed.....	238

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS.

Had Ney Acted with Promptitude he would have been in a Position to Attack Quatre-Bras.—What Quatre-Bras Consisted of.—The Centre of the Enemy Forced.—The Allies Began to Yield.—Death of Duke Frederick William.—The English Retire Gallantly.—How Picton Rallied the 28th Regiment.—D'Erlon Misreads his Order.—Ney Prays that he may be Killed by an English Bullet.—Kellermann's Charge Paralleled by the Charge of the Light Brigade.—Ney's Face Suffused with Blood, Brandishing his Sword Like a Madman.—Napoleon's Orders.—Wellington Retreats.—Like a Fox Hunt.—Napoleon's Hatred for the English.—He Felt Certain of Victory...	244
---	-----

CHAPTER XLII.

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

Position of the Battle-field at Waterloo.—The British Position.—The Morning of the Battle.—Wellington Employs Special Tactics to Resist the French.—The First Occasion in which Napoleon had Come in Conflict with English Troops.—Napoleon's Opinion of the English.—Gave False Information.—Napoleon's Troops Pass in Review.—Never Greater Enthusiasm Exhibited.—The Battle Commenced by an Artillery Duel.—Preparing to Make his Main Attack.—The Order to Attack.—Descended into the Valley under an Arch of Bullets.—Wellington Watches the Fight from the Foot of a Large Elm.—Picton Fell in the Moment of Success.—Slaughtered like Sheep.—The Objects of Wellington and Napoleon.—The British Fire Rattled upon the Cuirasses of the Enemy	
--	--

like Hail on a Slated Roof.—Unable to Break the Squares.—Wellington Becomes Anxious.—The Defeat of the French Made Almost Certain.—The Guards of Maitland Stood like a Red Brick Wall.—The French Guard Gives Way.—A General Rout.—The Old French Guards Unable to Make Headway Against the English Cavalry.....	253
--	-----

PART NINE.

THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

The Allied Armies of English and French Land at Gallipoli.—A Council of War.—Best Method of Annihilating the Naval Powers of Russia.—Strength of the Allied Armies.—How the Armies Advanced.—The Russians' Position.—Showed a Want of Tactical Skill.—The Fire of the Russian Batteries Cause Much Loss.—The Advance of the Guards and Highlanders Decided the Battle.—A Flank March Determined upon.—A Fruitful Cause of Disaster.....	266
---	-----

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE BALACLAVA CHARGE.

Position of Sebastopol Harbor.—Where the Allied Armies were Posted.—The Historical Famous Redan.—The Defence of Sebastopol, How it was Built up.—Sir John Burgoyne Directs the Siege Operations of the English.—The French Batteries Silenced.—The English Fire More successful.—The Bombardment of Canrobert's Hill.—The Russian Mass Gave Way and Fled Behind the Hill.—The Two Orders Sent to Lord Lucan.—The Famous Charge.—Although they Knew the Charge to be Desperate, they did not Hesitate.—Rode Back Singly or in Twos and Threes.....	271
---	-----

CHAPTER XLV.

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

	PAGE
A Russian Force Marches against the Camp of the Second Division—The Sand-Bag Battery.—A Crisis Impending.—Menchikoff's Plan.—How the Battle was Started.—15,000 Russians Repulsed by Less than a Fourth of their Number.—Captured and Spiked some English Guns....	277

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE WINTER—THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

To Winter in the Crimea.—Sick and Wounded left Bare of Protection.—Twenty-one Vessels Dashed to Pieces.—The Sick and Wounded Reposed in Mud.—Nearly 8,000 Men in Hospital.—Condition of the Hospital.—Great Efforts Made to Remedy these Disasters.—The French in Better Condition.—Arrival of Miss Florence Nightingale.—Refused the Conditions of Peace.—The Russians Repulsed at Eupatoria.—Death of the Emperor Nicholas.—The French Repulsed.—A Truce Agreed upon.—The Hillside Crowded with Spectators.—The Cannonade Begins.—The Suffering in Sebastopol Terrible.—Destruction of Provisions and Supplies.—Canrobert Resigns the Command of the French.—A Fresh Bombardment Commenced as Never Seen Before.—The Allies Make an Assault on the Russians.—The Enemy Driven from all their Outworks.—Death of Lord Raglan.—The Russians' Attack Repulsed with Great Slaughter.—The Last Hope Taken Away.—The Bombardment Assumes still Greater Proportions.—Every Traverse Taken, Retaken and Taken Again.—The End of the Crimean War.....	282
--	-----

PART TEN.

THE FRANCO-ITALIAN WAR OF 1859.

CHAPTER XLVII.

MONTEBELLO.

Austria Presents an Ultimatum to Sardinia.—What the

Austrian Forces in Italy Consisted of.—How they Advanced.—The Sardinian Army.—Its Strength.—The Force of the French.—The Conduct of the Austrians Regarded as Inexplicable.—The First Meeting of the Enemies.—The Austrians Occupy Genestrello.—Conditions of the Battle Changed.—The Austrians Fall Back on Montebello.—The French Advance.—Obliged to Fight Hand to Hand.—The Austrians Retreat.—What General Forey had Accomplished..... 294

CHAPTER XLVIII.

PALESTRO AND MAGENTA.

The Attack on Palestro.—The Austrians Prepare to Make an Assault.—The Battalion of Jägers Compelled to Yield.—Austrians Drowned in the Canal.—The Result of the Battle in Favour of the Allies.—The Austrians in Full Retreat.—Disheartened by Retreat.—The Position of Magenta.—A Formidable Defensive Position.—Before the Battle.—The French Driven Back across the Canal.—The Battle Swayed Backwards and Forwards.—The Rush of Picard's Columns Irresistible.—The Emperor's Position.—How the Austrians met MacMahon's Attack.—The Fight at Magenta..... 300

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.

The Emperor's Plan to Impede Giulay's Withdrawal to the Mincio.—Position of the Battlefield of Solferino.—The Military Importance of Guidizzolo.—The Strength of the Allied Army.—The Austrians' Intentions.—The Plan of the French.—Description of the Battle.—The Austrian Cavalry Driven Back.—The Movements of Niel and Canrobert.—The Operations of the Sardinians.—Struggle on Either Side Terrific.—The Austrians Retreat in all Directions.—The Losses at the Battle of Solferino.—The End of the War..... 309

PART ELEVEN.

THE WAR OF SECESSION IN AMERICA.

CHAPTER L.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

	PAGE
How the War Started.—Seven States Declare their Union with the Other States Dissolved.—The Formation of a Confederate Government.—The Capture of Fort Sumter.—The First Blood was Shed at Baltimore.—How Ellsworth Became the Hero of the National Movement.—To Increase the Strength of the Federal Army.—The Plans of the Opposing Generals.—The Federal Army Drive the Confederates Back.—A Rout and a Race for Washington.—One of Prince Consort's Last Public Acts.....	320

CHAPTER LI.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

The Blockade of the Southern Ports.—Grant's Reply to Buckner's Application for Terms of Capitulation.—The Foundation of Grant's Reputation.—The Strategic Value of New Orleans.—The Confederates Prepare Fire Ships.—Farragut's Important Victory.—One of the Bloodiest Battles of the War.—General Grant's Position.—How Grant Described One Part of the Field.—General Johnston Bleeds to Death.....	327
--	-----

CHAPTER LII.

RICHMOND—POPE AND LEE.

General McClellan to Fortify the Capital and Organise the Army.—McClellan's Movements.—The Fight at Williamsburg.—The Cost of the Battle of Fair Oaks.—The Commander of the Confederate Army and his Plan.—The Battle of Richmond Rages Seven Days.—The Battle of Gaines Mills.—The Federals Retire.—The Battle of Frazier's Farm.—How McClellan's Army Made its Final Stand.—Banks Engages Jackson at Cedar Mountain.—Pope Orders a Retrograde Movement.—The Second Bat-	
---	--

tle of Bull Run.—General Lee Pushed into Maryland.— McClellan's March to Cover Washington and Baltimore. —The Battle of Antietam.—The Confederate Army Ought to have been Annihilated.—Burnside Succeeds McClellan in Command.—Burnside Aims at Richmond. —The Attack on the Heights Held by Lee.—Nearly Half of the Attacking Force Shot Down.—The End of the Campaign.....	332
---	-----

CHAPTER LIII.

HOOKER AND LEE.

President Lincoln's Letter to General Hooker on his Suc- ceeding Burnside in Command.—Hooker begins by Re- storing the Discipline of the Army of the Potomac.— His Move on Richmond.—Lee's Movements.—Death of "Stonewall" Jackson.—Hooker Driven Back.—The Fed- eral Army Recross the Rappahannock.—Admirable Gen- eralship <i>versus</i> Superior Numbers.—The South Demands the Invasion of the North.—Hooker Resigns his Com- mand.—The Enemies Meet.—The Position of the Battle- field.—Both Sides Fight with Determination.—The Federals Driven Back by Superior Forces.—A Murderous Struggle for the Possession of Little Round Top.—Ewell's Troops Driven out of Culp's Hill.—Lee Determined to Pierce the Centre of Meade's Line.—An Artillery Duel. —Lee's Famous Attack.—Stuart's Cavalry Unable to Co- operate with the Movement.—A General Advance of the Federal Line brings the Battle to a Close.—Lee's Retreat a Pitiful One.—The Loss of the Federals and the Con- federates.—Vicksburg Capitulates.....	345
--	-----

CHAPTER LIV.

THE WILDERNESS.

General Rosecrans Proceeds in Pursuit of Bragg.—The Struggle between Bragg and Rosecrans.—The Battle Re- garded as a Confederate Victory.—The Federal Forces Re-organised.—Grant's Plan to Attack Bragg.—The Battle above the Clouds.—Bragg's Army Completely

	PAGE
Defeated.—Grant Given the Title of Lieutenant-General. —What the Confederate Army Consisted of.—Lee At- tacks Grant in the Wilderness.—A Hand-to-Hand En- gagement.—No Decisive Advantage Gained on Either Side.—The Battle Resumed.—The Federals Retire.—The Assault on the Confederates' Entrenchments.—Lee's Attempt to Recapture the Salient Angle.—The Two Armies Opposed to Each Other at Cold Harbour.— Grant's Reputation Suffers.—Grant's Movements to In- vest Richmond and Gain Petersburg.....	353

CHAPTER LV.

SHERMAN'S MARCH.

To Capture Atlanta.—Sherman's Force Comes into Con- tact with that of Johnston at New Hope Church.— Sherman Gradually Drawing Nearer to Atlanta.—His Attempt to Capture Johnston's Position in the Battle of Kenesaw a Failure.—The Battle of Atlanta.—Atlanta Won by Hard Fighting and Clever Strategy.—Sherman Sends Away all the Civil Inhabitants of the City.—His Great March from Atlanta to Savannah.—The Number of Troops at Sherman's Disposal.—The Negroes Swarmed after the Army Believing the Day of Jubilee had Come. —Sherman Occupies Savannah.—His March towards Columbia.—Sherman's Last Battle Fought at Benton- ville.—The Terms under which Lee and Johnston Sur- rendered.—The End of the War.....	368
--	-----

PART TWELVE.

THE WAR OF 1866.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE INVASION OF SAXONY.

The Comparative Strength of the Belligerents.—How Prussia Commenced her Preparations for War.—The
--

Austrian Army.—The Strength of the Italian Army.— What the Saxony Army Consisted of.—Prussia Declares War against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony.—The Elector made Prisoner of War.—The Invasion of Saxony. —How the Prussian Troops were Received by the Pop- ulation.—Benedek's Scheme to Strike a Deadly Blow to the Heart of the Prussian Kingdom Rendered Impos- sible.....	377
---	-----

CHAPTER LVII.

THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

The March of Prince Frederick Charles.—The Battle at Podol.—The Prussians Victorious.—A Combat Takes Place at Münchengrätz.—Prince Frederick Charles with the Loss of only 100 Men Gains 12 Miles of Country and Captures 1,000 Prisoners.—A More Serious Battle at Gitschin.—The Strategic Object of the Movements of the Two Prussian Armies Achieved.—The Prussians Cap- ture Königshof after a Hot Contest.—The Result of the Battles of Skalitz and Schweinschädel.—Benedek Retires Towards Königgrätz.—Severe Actions Fought by Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince.—How the Prussians Attacked Benedek.—The Austrian Batteries Attacked and the Austrians Forced to Retire.—Benedek Retired to Königgrätz with the Fragments of his Beaten Army.—The Losses of the Two Armies Engaged.....	383
---	-----

CHAPTER LVIII.

THE WAR IN ITALY.

Where the Strength of the Austrians Lay in Italy.—What La Marmora Determined.—The Two Armies Meet.—The Austrians Gain a Brilliant Victory at Custozza.—Gari- baldi Twice Worsted in Small Engagements.—Cialdini Succeeds La Marmora in Command of the Italians.—The Position of the Troops.—The Italians Aimed at Occupying all Territories in which the Italian Language was Spoken.—Their Ardour Checked by the Result of the
--

	PAGE
Naval Battle of Lissa.—The Austrians Ceded Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who Made it Over to the Italians.....	390

CHAPTER LIX.

THE END OF THE WAR.

The Efficiency of the Bavarian Army was Spoiled by the Vacillation of Prince Charles.—A Want of Energy in the Leaders on Both Sides.—The Battle of Langensalza.—The Prussians Retreat.—The Hanoverians Masters of the Field.—King of Hanover Hemmed in by an Army of 40,000 Enemies.—Determines not to Sacrifice his Soldiers and Accepts the Terms Previously Proposed by Prussia.—The Position of General Vogel von Falckenstein after the Capitulation of the Hanoverians.—The Cause of the Unity of the Federals not being Attained.—The Plan Conceived by Falckenstein.—The Battle of Dombach had no Decisive Conclusion.—The Prussians Gain the Passage of the Saale at Hammelburg.—The Prussians Surprise the Bavarians.—Prince Alexander's Action to Hold Back the Prussians.—Prince Alexander Forced to Retire.—Falckenstein Establishes his Headquarters in the Old Imperial City.—Terror Reigned in Vienna.—Archduke Albert's Orders to Field Marshal Benedek... 394

 PART THIRTEEN.

THE WAR OF 1870.

 CHAPTER LX.

THE CONTENDING FORCES.

The French Army Looked upon as a Pattern for all European Armies.—The Principle of Liability to Military Service Acknowledged by French Law.—Creation of a Mobile National Guard.—The Military Organisation of

Prussia.—The Contrast between the Organisation of the Two Armies More Apparent in their Mobilisation.—King William of Prussia Arrives at Berlin and Sanctions the Orders Prepared by General Moltke.—The Operation of Bringing a Great Army from a Peace to a War Footing Carried Out in the Short Period of Eighteen days.—The German Army Rested on Solid Foundation and Nothing Left to Chance.—The French Army Loosely put together.—The Disposition of the Two Armies.—The Mobilisation of the French Army an Entire Contrast to that of its Antagonist..... 403

CHAPTER LXI.

WEISSENBURG, WÖRTH AND SAARBRÜCKEN.

The Emperor Leaves St. Cloud.—The Empress Radiant with Joy and Hope.—It is my War, She Proudly Claimed.—The French Plan.—The First Engagement.—The General Abel Douay Occupies Weissenburg.—The Prussian Force.—The Town of Weissenburg Stormed and Taken after a Gallant Resistance.—The First Victory gained by German Troops on French Soil.—The Battle of Worth.—The Superiority of the Prussian Artillery had Become Evident.—Worth Carried by Storm.—The Storming of the Heights East of Froschweiler.—The French Fought with Passionate Courage.—The Prussians Gain Possession of the Coveted Ground.—The French Broke and Fled after the Loss of Froschweiler.—The Germans Gain a Victory at Saarbrücken.—Two Attacks of the Prussians Repulsed.—With Reinforcements the Prussians Make Another Attack.—The French Driven Back.—General von Goltz Takes the Kaninchenberg.—Marshal Bazaine Offers his Co-operation to Frossard but it is Declined.—How the Battle was Won..... 412

CHAPTER LXII.

VIONVILLE.

The Gate of France Opened to the German Armies without Further Struggle.—General Consternation Felt at

Paris.—General MacMahon Entrusted with the Formation of a New Cabinet.—The Prussian Army March into Lorraine and Take Possession of Nancy.—The King Issues a Proclamation to the French People.—The War Rapidly Assumed an Internecine Character.—German Governors Appointed in Alsace and Lorraine.—General von der Goltz's Aim and Movements.—His Advance Brought to a Check at Colombey.—The Prussians in a very Critical Position.—General Kameke Turned the Fortune of the Day.—The French Withdrew to Metz.—The French Army Set Out from Metz towards Verdun.—The Positions of Tronville, Mars-la-Tour and Vionville Reached.—Alvensleben Determines to Attack the French.—A Terrible Struggle.—The French Compelled to Retreat.—Bazaine Nearly Taken Prisoner.—The Brilliant Charge of Bredow's Corps.—The Losses in the Battle.—The Result not so Much a Tactical as a Moral Victory.—The French Ordered to Retire towards Metz.—Bazaine Announces to his Government the Battle of Vionville as a French Victory.—Why he Withdrew.... 419

CHAPTER LXIII.

GRAVELOTTE.

The French Army had Entirely Changed its Method of Fighting from the Days of Napoleon.—Bazaine Determined to Engage in a Decisive Battle.—Where the French were Posted.—How the King of Prussia Drew up his Own Army.—The French Opened the Battle with a Murderous Fire.—Marshal Bazaine had Sound Reasons for Believing that the Battle was Already Decided in his Favour.—The Germans Became Masters of St. Privat.—Ladmirault Evacuates his Position—General Fransecky's Orders to Carry the Plateau of the Moscou Farm.—Necessary to Pass through the Terrible Defile of Gravelotte.—How the Orders were Carried out.—The Losses of the Opposing Forces.—The Line of the Moselle the Objective of the German Army..... 428

CHAPTER LXIV.

THE MARCH TO SEDAN.

PAGE

Bazaine Definitely Shut up in Metz.—The German Army's Difficult Task.—The King's Plan.—The Crown Prince to March upon Paris.—The Army of the Siege Invests the City on Both Sides of the Moselle.—The Whole Length of the Line of Investment about Thirty Miles.—Bazaine's Object to get Possession of Thionville.—After a Few Attempts Became Convinced that the Prussian General was his Master.—Bazaine Makes a Powerful Sortie.—Succeeded in Driving the Germans out of their Position.—Repulsed by a Night Attack.—The Surrender of the Army in Metz only a Matter of Time.—The Emperor to Proceed to Paris and Resume the Reins of Government.—MacMahon's Army to March on Paris and Accept a Battle there if Necessary.—The Opposition of the Empress and the Ministry to Both.—It was Insisted upon that MacMahon should Make an Offensive Advance in the Direction of Verdun.—MacMahon's March to Montmédy.—The Army of Châlons Gradually Lost Confidence in their Leaders.—Dejection and Insubordination Became Rife.—The Manceuvres of the Germans to Destroy MacMahon never been Equalled in the History of War.—The French Forced to Accept Battle under Most Unfavourable Circumstances.—The French Troops were Enjoying their Ease when Shells Fell into the Camp.—The Battle of Beaumont had a Decisive Effect.—The Emperor of the French Refused to Leave the Army.—To Escape Being Surrounded a Night March Necessary.—MacMahon's Design Rendered Nugatory by the Swift Advance of the German Troops.—The French Entangled in a Snare without any Chance of Escape... 437

CHAPTER LXV.

SEDAN.

The French Army at Sedan Confined within a Space of Four and a Half Miles from North to South and Two

Miles from East to West.—The Battle Began before Day-break.—The Bavarians Attack Bazeilles.—Captured after a Hard Struggle.—Marshal MacMahon Severely Wounded.—He Appoints Ducrot as Commander.—Wimpffen Claims the Position.—The Bavarians Become Masters of Bazeilles after Six Hours' Fighting.—The Prussians Direct a Terrible Artillery Fire on the French Division Defending Floing and Illy.—The French had only Two Means of Escape.—The Boldest General might well Hesitate before Accepting Either Course.—Broken Bodies of the French Flying in all Directions.—The Prussians Succeed in Cutting off the Retreat from a Number of French Detachments.—General Ducrot's Entrance into the Town.—The Streets and Squares Blocked with Guns.—Nothing before him but a Chaotic Mob.—Found the Emperor in a State of Deep Dejection and Perfectly Hopeless.—King of Prussia Calls on the French Commandant to Capitulate.—The Emperor Delivers his Sword to the King.—The King Deeply Moved.—The Capitulation Signed.—The French Prisoners of War Taken to a Tongue of Land at Iges.—Bivouacked in Mud.—No Further Obstacle to the Advance of the Third and Fourth Armies on Paris.—The German Losses 9,860 ; French Losses 41,000..... 447

CHAPTER LXVI.

THE WAR IN THE PROVINCES.

General Vinoy Returns to Paris.—The Agitation in Paris Became More Riotous.—The City Being Gradually Invested.—The Number of Forces Occupied in this Investment was 250,000.—Paris a Fortress of the First Rank.—The Germans Placed their Confidence in Famine.—Toul Capitulated after a Terrible Bombardment.—Strasburg Falls into the Hands of the Germans.—Incidents of the Siege.—Léon Gambetta Leaves Paris in a Balloon.—He Used every Effort to Rouse the Country against the Invaders.—The French Succeeded in Driving the Germans from Le Bourget.—Eventually Driven Back after

an Obstinate Resistance.—Communications between the Capital and the Provinces Supplied by Carrier-Pigeons and Balloons.—Bazaine Capitulates.—General von Werder has to Deal with a Guerilla Warfare.—Prince William of Baden Captures Dijon.—Gambetta Succeeds in Involving the Whole of the French Nation.—Making the Annihilation of the Enemy a National Duty.—The French Compelled to Fight in the Forest of Orleans.—Mottorouge Deprived of his Command.—A Severe Battle at Coulmiers.—The French Successful.—The Indecisive Battle of Beaune la Rolande.—The Battle of Loigny.—The French Compelled to Retreat.....	456
---	-----

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

Trochu Tried to Second the Efforts Made to Relieve Paris by Repeated Sorties.—The French Compelled to Retire to the South.—The Germans Enter Orleans.—The Passionate Efforts of the French.—Resembled the Struggles of a Victim in the Arms of the Murderer who was Strangling him.—The Seat of Government Removed from Tours to Bordeaux.—French Successes.—Chanzy Gradually Driven Back.—All Hopes of Relieving Paris Disappeared.—Energetic Sorties from Within Paris.—General Ducrot Compels the Germans to Evacuate Brie and Champagne.—But were Recovered the Next Day.—Faidherbe Suffers a Heavy Defeat at St. Quentin.—The Bombardment of Paris Begun.—Trochu Makes one Last Effort.—Vinoy's Column Gains Possession of the German Entrenchments at Montretout.—Gambetta Forms a Plan for the Destruction of the Germans.—The French Surrender.—An Army of 85,000 in the Most Miserable Condition Lay down their Arms.—The Preliminaries of Peace Signed at Versailles between Bismarck and Jules Favre.—One of the Most Remarkable Wars in History.—Never before had such Large Masses of Men been seen in Conflict.....	467
---	-----

PART FOURTEEN.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.

	PAGE
The Emperor Alexander II. Issues a Proclamation.—To Secure for his Suffering Fellow-Christians on Turkish Soil the Safeguards Necessary for their Future Welfare.—Prince Charles of Roumania Assists the Russians.—The Russians Cross the Danube at Galatz with but Little Difficulty.—The Important Fortress of Nicopolis Falls into their Hands.—England Offered to the Porte to Send Men of War into the Bosphorus.—The Turks Superior to the Russians in Armaments.—Two Attempts of the Russians to Capture Plevna Fail.—The Russian Advance Brought to a Standstill.—The Russians had Underestimated their Enemy.—The Russians Act on the Defensive.—The Three Turkish Commanders all Independent of Each Other.—Suleiman Determines to Attack the Shipka Pass.—The Position of the Russians Critical.—Their Artillery Ammunition Exhausted.—Reinforcements Save the Situation.—The Turks Driven Back.—For Three Days Less than 8,000 Russians Hold the Army of Suleiman in Check, their Only Food being the Biscuits they had in their Pockets when they Began.—Mehemet Ali Drives the Russians Back.—Mehemet Defeated and Compelled to Retreat Along his Whole Line.—He is Superseded by Suleiman Pasha.....	476

CHAPTER LXIX.

PLEVNA.

The Attention of the Russians Directed towards Plevna.—

The Grand Duke Attacked by Osman.—The Russians Capture Lootcha.—Dead and Wounded Piled up Six Feet deep around its Approach.—Osman Fortifies Plevna.—The Russians Attack and Bombard the Redoubts.—A Great Disaster for the Russian Army.—In Armenia the Turks Force the Russians to Evacuate Bajazid.—The Army of the Caucasus Redress this Defeat.—Suleiman Pasha Drives General Gourko Back to the Shipka Pass.—Osman Pasha Refuses to Surrender Plevna.—A Third of his Army Sick and Wounded.—Desertion Increasing every Day.—His Army Defeated.—Nothing Left but to Surrender.—The Turks Retreat Towards the Vid.—The Retreat Turned into a Rout.—Osman Pasha Credited with a Brilliant Defence.—Ought to have Retreated to Radonitz.—Could have Saved his Country from an Irreparable Disaster,.....	484
--	-----

CHAPTER LXX.

THE SHIPKA PASS.

The Turkish Cause Far from being Hopeless.—War Declared against the Turks by Servia.—The Grand Duke Nicholas Determines to Cross the Balkans before the Turks had Time to Recover themselves.—The Attack on Sophia.—The Turks Evacuate the City.—To Retire with Safety across the Mountains of Rhodope the Turks Forced to Accept a Battle.—Suleiman Runs Away before the Battle.—The Russians Successful.—The Turks Climb up the Mountains through the Snow.—Gourko had Succeeded in Entirely Destroying Suleiman's Army.—Suleiman was Arrested and Tried by Court-Martial.—The Passage of the Shipka Pass.—The Turkish Redoubts Carried in a Brilliant Manner.—Surrender of the Whole Turkish Force of 36,000.—The Defence of the Balkans Entirely Collapsed.—The Ancient Capital of Turkey Fell without a Blow,.....	490
---	-----

PART FIFTEEN.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898.

CHAPTER LXXI.

MANILLA AND SANTIAGO.

	PAGE
The News of War between Spain and America Received with Great Joy in New York.—The Northern Coast of Cuba Blockaded.—Spanish Gunboats Succeed in Breaking through the Blockade of Havana.—A Squadron Left Cadiz under Admiral Cervera.—Castle Morro at Havana Bombarded by the American Fleet.—Cervera might Attack the East Coast of North America.—Mines Laid as a Precautionary Measure in the Harbour of New York.—Admiral Dewey Ordered to Sail for the Philippine Islands.—He Destroys the Spanish Fleet Lying in the Bay of Manilla.—The Spaniards Defend themselves with Heroic Courage.—Consternation in Madrid.—The Ministry Reconstructed.—The Arrival of Cervera at Martinique.—The Situation of Santiago.—The Bombardment.—The Americans Joined by the Insurgents.—The Battle of Guasimos a Victory for the Americans.—The Main Burden of the Fighting Fell upon the Regiment of "Rough Riders."—Attacked and Vanquished a Force of over Four Times their Number.....	496

CHAPTER LXXII.

CUBA AND PUERTO RICO.

The Battle of San Juan.—Caney Held by 500 Spanish Soldiers.—The Americans Attack and Take the Village.—Their Loss Greatest at the San Juan River.—They Assault the Hill on which were the Spanish Blockhouse and Fort of San Juan.—Madness to Assault this without Artillery.—They Flooded the Ridges and Swarmed in the Blockhouse.—An Unexpected Incident Supervened.—Cervera's Fleet Sails out of the Harbour and in Three-

quarters of an Hour is Entirely Destroyed.—The American Fleet Three Times Superior in Number and Armed with Excellent Artillery.—Cervera Taken Prisoner.—The Town and Province of Santiago de Cuba Surrendered.—Marshal Blanco Refused to Recognise the Capitulation of Santiago.—The Spanish Troops in Ripa, Caimanera and Guantanamo Lay Down their Arms.—Great Dejection in Spain.—Might have Conquered if they had Sent 4,000 Men to Florida.—Governor-General Augusti's Proposition to the German Vice-Admiral von Diedrichs at Manilla, that the Neutral Powers should Take Manilla under their Protection.—The Offer Refused.—The American Flag Hoisted in the Ladrone Islands.—The Surrender of Manilla Demanded by Admiral Dewey.—The Summons Rejected.—The Capture of the Island of Puerto Rico.—A Striking Contrast to the Operations in Cuba.—A Protest against the Attack of the Americans on Puerto Rico.—The Army in Puerto Rico Advanced with the Precision of a Set of Chessmen.—The Spanish Government Declares itself Beaten and Asks for Conditions of Peace.—The Definite Treaty Signed.....	503
---	-----

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WARS OF THE CENTURY.

PART ONE.

THE WARS OF THE CONSULATE. 1800-1801.

CHAPTER I.

THE PASSAGE OF THE GREAT ST. BERNARD.

BONAPARTE left Egypt on August 24, 1799, and landed in France on October 8. By the events of November 9 of the same year, better known as Brumaire 18, the government of the Directory was overthrown and Bonaparte became First Consul, with Cambacérès and Lebrun as his colleagues. His first act was to address on Christmas Day, 1799, a letter written in his own hand to George III., King of England, in the following terms:

“Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first magistracy of the republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your majesty. The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, must it be eternal—are there no means of coming to an understanding?

“How can the two most enlightened nations of

Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as of the first glory?

“These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the sole view of rendering it happy. Your majesty will only see in this overture my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, entirely of confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of weak states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other.

“France and England, by the abuse of their strength, may still for a brief time, to the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted. But, I will venture to say, the fate of all civilised nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.”

This letter was met by a chilling official answer from Lord Grenville, as Secretary of State, and the war begun in 1793 went on, notwithstanding strong opposition in the English Parliament. A similar letter was addressed by Bonaparte to the Emperor Francis II., reminding him of the relations which had previously existed between them, and offering to renew the peace of Campo-Formio. But Austria had regained so much lost ground during the absence of Napoleon in Egypt that the offers of the First Consul were rejected. The cold and insulting replies of Pitt and Thugut increased the popularity of Bonaparte in

France, and the country armed itself with enthusiasm to extort by force the settlement which it could not obtain by persuasion. General Moreau, who was occupying the valley of the Rhine from Strasburg to Bâle, received orders to cross the stream and to advance against the army of the Black Forest under the command of Kray. Masséna and Suchet were charged to protect the sea-coast of Nice and Genoa and to prevent the Austrian General Melas from crossing the Apennines. In the centre General Lecourbe, with his headquarters at Schaffhausen, was to maintain his connection with both armies and to lend his assistance either to the North or South, according to circumstances. An army of reserves was formed at Dijon.

On May 6, 1800, Bonaparte, enveloped in a long gray coat, left his apartments in the Tuilleries, jumped into a travelling carriage and passed through Paris at a gallop accompanied by Bourrienne. Duroc had left the capital two days before to prepare relays. At half-past seven in the evening the First Consul reached Avallon, having travelled about one hundred and thirty miles in fifteen hours. He worked till midnight, left before dawn and reached Dijon at midday. In the afternoon he held a review and spoke to the several soldiers about their terms of service. He found many of them badly clothed and shod, but promised them abundance of everything in the paradise of Italy. At midnight he entered Geneva, gay and in high spirits. He examined his maps, and finally determined to invade Italy by the Great St. Bernard.

His arrangements were rapidly made. The Italian legion was to proceed by passes now familiar to tourists, from Sion up the valley of Saas, over the Monte

Moro to Ponte Grande, and then by the Col de Ranzola to Gressonay, distracting the attention of the Austrians, and facilitating the passage of the St. Gothard by General Moncey. For the army of reserve the route was traced from Villeneuve, at the end of the Lake of Geneva, to Aosta, in Piedmont, the principal halts being Martigny, twenty-five miles; Saint Pierre, twenty miles; Etroubles, twenty miles, which is ten miles distant from Aosta. Out of the whole distance ten miles was across a mountain track. The first corps was placed under Lannes, the second corps under Duhesme; the cavalry was committed to Murat, the artillery to Marmont.

On May 23 Bonaparte reviewed his troops at Villeneuve. Here he received bad news from Genoa, in which city Masséna was blockaded by Melas, while the English fleet prevented all relief by sea. Bonaparte answered the message: "Report to Masséna that you have seen me close to the Great St. Bernard. In a short time Italy will be reconquered and Genoa delivered." Two hours later the First Consul received the welcome announcement that Moreau had beaten Kray at Stokach. The rain fell in torrents. The new shoes delivered at Dijon were soon worn out. "Bare-foot" battalions were formed by soldiers, who sang gaily as they marched, and promised to provide themselves with shoes from the bodies of those killed in the first battle. Bonaparte now returned to Lausanne, and finally reached Martigny on Saturday, May 27.

The advanced guard under Lannes marched merrily on. They replied to a heavy thunderstorm by sounding the charge; when up to their knees in a marsh they sang the "Marseillaise." The houses were for the most part deserted by their inhabitants.

At last St. Pierre was reached, where a large camp had been formed.

Great difficulties were found in the transport of the artillery. The road between Martigny and Orsières had to be made afresh. In some places no stone was to be found and the trunks of trees were used instead. Each cannon was taken to pieces and the parts were numbered in legible figures in yellow ochre. A number of pine trees were cut down, sawn asunder and hollowed out. The gun itself was deposited in the hollow tree, the carriage was secured between planks of wood six inches thick, the ramrods, sponges and other implements were placed in another hollow tree, and the wheels were carried by themselves. The whole mass was lashed to the backs of mules and thus transported in safety. Twenty-four pounds were paid for the portage of an entire cannon to the Great St. Bernard, and the peasants did their best in hope of reward. The transit from St. Pierre to the Hospice, a distance of less than eight miles, occupied nine hours. The artillery was drawn up in order on the other side of the lake, on the road to St. Pierre.

Unfortunately some of the peasants who were engaged in hauling the artillery were frostbitten. This deterred others from following their example and assistance was difficult to procure. At last all obstacles were surmounted. Although the line of march occupied three miles, and progress was impeded by snowstorms and avalanches, the advanced guard under Lannes at length reached the Hospice with cries of "Vive Bonaparte!" "Vive la Republique!" The first French troops had arrived at the Hospice on May 15, at ten o'clock in the evening, after just escaping destruction by an avalanche. The monks assisted the

wounded, and the soldiers slept along the corridors on straw. Lannes and the advanced guard made their appearance on May 16. The brethren recruited the troops with bread, cheese and white wine, gave fresh shoes to the soldiers whose feet were bleeding, and bandaged the wounded. The passage of fifty thousand men occupied, as may be imagined, many days. Sixteen large tables were spread out before the Hospice at which the soldiers could refresh themselves, and wood fires were lighted which burned day and night. Bonaparte himself crossed before the rear-guard. His countenance was sombre, his voice harsh, his every word sounded like a command; he rode on immersed in thought. The expense of the passage to the monks was nearly a thousand pounds, and the debt was not paid till several years had passed.

At the Hospice Bonaparte had visited the library and asked for a copy of Livy in order that he might study the description of Hannibal's passage of the Alps, the only enterprise in history similar to his own. On May 21 he arrived at Aosta at the foot of the pass, on the other side. The march of the army had been stopped for some days by the little fort of Bard, which commanded the road to Ivrea and the plains of Italy, being about thirty miles distant from Aosta. It was only possible to turn it by climbing the steep hill of Albaredo, which was impassable for artillery. Fifteen hundred sappers were employed in making a passage. In the more difficult places stairs were cut in the rock, walls were built to mask the precipice which bordered the road, bridges were thrown across ravines, and at length the cavalry were able to march over the obstacle. If the hill had been occupied in force by the Austrians the French army would have been completely stopped. The little town

was soon wrested from the enemy, but the fort still resisted and the commandant refused to capitulate.

Bonaparte, reaching Bard on May 24, found that if he began a regular siege, he could only reduce the place by famine, and the garrison was provided with food and water for six months. At the same time he determined to attack the fort from three sides: from Sonnaz lower down the river, from the town itself, and from the other side of the stream. All branches of the assault were repulsed, two hundred men were lost, and a raft which was crossing the river was sunk by the explosion of a shell. It was absolutely necessary to send on the artillery to Lannes, who commanded the van-guard. For this purpose the wheels of the gun carriages were enveloped in hay and straw, the road along the river was covered with a thick layer of dung, and fifty trumpeters were sent to the summit of Albaredo to divert attention. Sixty men were harnessed to each cannon, and a reward of twenty-four pounds was promised for each gun which reached Sonnaz in safety. A terrible thunder-storm deluged the town with rain; the river rose in flood, the drums and trumpets sounded from Albaredo and caused an additional bewilderment to the garrison. The men dragging the guns advanced steadily and in good order. When it was too late, Bernkopf, the commandant, discovered the trick, but the four-pounders and the eight-pounders were already out of range, and his muskets only inflicted a slight loss on the rear-guard. On the following morning the hill of Albaredo was passed by three thousand cavalry. Lannes succeeded in entering Ivrea and reviewed his artillery. In the middle of the succeeding night Bonaparte crossed the Albaredo on foot. The fort of Bard, after this heroic resistance, eventually

capitulated on June 3. Bonaparte had already entered Milan on the evening of the previous day. Thus had the difficulty been overcome of marching an army across the Alps, when the enemy was not even aware of its existence, and when that army was stopped by the resistance of an obstinate fortress in a narrow pass, of conveying the artillery secretly to the advanced guard, and eventually securing the passage of the troops.

CHAPTER II.

THE PREPARATION FOR MARENGO.

THE First Consul had wished to enter Milan in triumph, but the elements were opposed to him. At Turbigo he mounted a golden coach, drawn by six white horses, but on the way a terrible storm of rain broke through the roof of the vehicle and deluged the occupants; not till half-past six did the procession reach the gate. The streets were filled with people who maintained a stubborn silence; they believed that the real Bonaparte was dead or was a prisoner of the English, and they were anxious to know who had taken his name. He found in the streets caricatures of the army of reserve, which was now conquering Lombardy, representing the cavalry as mounted on asses, and the infantry composed of decrepit old men and children playing with bayonets. Bonaparte reported to Paris that Milan had greeted him with a manifestation spontaneous and touching. One of his first public acts was to order the completion of the cathedral, the marble shrine which still recalls his genius and his glory.

On June 5 Bonaparte announced the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic and his own devotion to the Roman Catholic religion; but on the day before Genoa, defended by Masséna and besieged by Melas, had capitulated through famine, after terrible sufferings. It has been said that Bonaparte might have relieved Genoa by simpler methods, and that in fol-

lowing the course which he pursued he had thought more of his own aggrandisement than of anything else. A little examination will show that this charge was unfounded, and that Bonaparte in the plan of his campaign not only followed the dictates of prudence, but left an example to all students of the art of war.

His plan was that while Moreau, operating from the Rhine, attacked the Austrians on the Danube, the First Consul should assail them in Italy. The Austrians were at this time besieging Genoa; they were occupying all the passes of the western Alps, and they had a force ready to cross the Var into France, which was defended by Suchet with inferior numbers. Bonaparte had two objects in view: to relieve Genoa and to deal the Austrians a decisive blow. He saw, with marvellous sagacity, that if he occupied the roads between Milan and Piacenza, he would cut the Austrians from their base of operations, deliver Genoa and force them to a decisive action. To effect this purpose he could not advance along the sea-coast because he would only drive the Austrians before him. If he had marched to Turin across the Mont Cenis, he would have attacked the centre of the Austrian line, which could have been easily reinforced from either side. In each of these two cases the Austrians would interpose between himself and his object. Moreover, he had formed a plan that a part of Moreau's army, after effecting its object in Germany, should recruit his somewhat scanty forces in Italy, and to meet these fresh troops he must not separate himself too far from the northern passes of the Alps. By crossing the St. Bernard he reached Milan by the shortest route and under the most favourable conditions. The fact that the passage was difficult and

considered impossible favoured his designs. He arrived at Milan before the Austrians knew that he was in Italy at all. He was joined in the capital of Lombardy by the detachments which he had expected; he guarded the passes of the Ticino with half his forces, and with the rest occupied the road to Piacenza. He lost Genoa, but the capture of that city had delayed the Austrians so as to deprive them of their one chance of escape. Their communications were cut off, they were forced to fight at Marengo with their faces to their line of retreat, and when they were defeated nothing remained for them but to capitulate.

On June 12 General Moncey arrived from Como. Having waited until the army of Moreau was on the point of forcing the Austrian General Kray as far as Ulm, he had crossed the St. Gothard in storms of rain and had driven the enemy from the castle of Bellinzona. He brought to Bonaparte a reinforcement of well-seasoned soldiers, fifteen thousand in number. Bonaparte left Milan on June 9, at eight o'clock in the morning, and proceeded to Pavia. On his road towards the Po he heard the sound of artillery from morning to evening. Not knowing what had occurred, he hastened to Stradella, and found the fortress full of wounded soldiers. It was Lannes, who had been fighting the battle of Montebello against the Austrian General Ott, who had commanded in the blockade of Genoa. Lannes had crossed the Po in spite of considerable resistance and had encamped opposite the Austrian army which occupied Montebello and Casteggio. Lannes had not intended to attack, and was waiting for reinforcements, but Ott began the battle at daybreak with a force of at least fifteen thousand men. Lannes had only half that number,

but he fought splendidly and was aided by Victor, who had crossed the river in another place. The Austrians struggled with desperation to regain their communications and to open the road to Mantua. When Bonaparte arrived the battle was already won. The enemy had lost three thousand killed and six thousand taken prisoners. Lannes himself was dripping with blood.

The next three days Bonaparte remained at Stradella, in a strong position. His right rested on the Po and the marshy flats in its neighbourhood; his centre blocked the great highway, supported by large villages and solid farmhouses built of stone; while his left was posted on the gentle elevations which make the defile of Stradella famous in military history. On the 11th Desaix, who was returning from Egypt, and who had lost a week in quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with Savary and Rapp as his aides-de-camp. He and the First Consul dined together and spent the night in talking over the affairs of Egypt. Desaix was burning to distinguish himself and to avenge himself for the insults which he had suffered from Admiral Keith at Leghorn. He was placed in command of the second division. At the same time Bonaparte had the presentiment of death. He said to Eugène Beauharnais: "The Austrian balls knew me once, but I am afraid that they will recognise me no more."

Bonaparte was determined to advance. He was only afraid lest Melas should escape him. He reached Voghera early on the morning of June 12. The Scivia was crossed on the following day. On the same morning Bonaparte arrived at San Giuliano and saw before him the plains of Marengo.

CHAPTER III.

THE BATTLE OF MARENGO.

BONAPARTE had expected to find the whole of the Austrian army ranged in battle array before him. When no one came to oppose him he supposed that Melas had retreated to Genoa, and gave orders to Desaix to proceed to Rivalta, to send scouts as far as Novi, and to watch the communications of the enemy with the southern coast. At last he discovered the Austrian advanced guard at Marengo, and gave Victor orders to attack and to drive the Austrians across the Bormida.

Melas had held a council of war in Alessandria on June 12, in which he explained the condition of affairs to his brother generals. He said that the Austrian cavalry was excellent, their artillery superior to that of the enemy; that the plain between the Bormida and the Scrivia was exactly suited for an engagement under these conditions, and that they had every chance of victory. The Austrians numbered 30,837 men, of whom 7,343 were cavalry, and they had 92 guns in reserve, besides the ordinary artillery of the line. Ott, in command of the left, was to attack the French at Salé, the centre was to advance first to Marengo and then to San Giuliano, then to move towards the left and to press the French at Salé both in flank and rear. If these operations succeeded the enemy would be driven back upon the Po and the Austrians might recover their communica-

tions. If Ott found the force opposed to him too strong he was to retire behind the Bormida. A strong bridge-head was formed on the Bormida, and two bridges of boats were thrown across the stream. Everything was done to rouse the spirits of the Austrian army and to supply their material needs.

The decisive battle of Marengo was fought on June 14, 1800. At eight in the morning the Austrians crossed the Bormida by their two bridges in excellent order. O'Reilly drove back the French advanced guard under Gardanne into the valley of Marengo, and there waited until Haddick and Keim had been able to come up. But the passage through the bridge-head was narrow and the Austrians were compelled to move slowly. General Ott, according to the plan which had been arranged, moved on the left towards Ceriolo with the view of outflanking the French. General Victor did his best to maintain possession of Marengo, and informed the First Consul that the whole of the Austrian army was before him.

In front of Marengo flows a deep and marshy brook, the Fontanone, which, after many windings, pours its waters into the Tanaro. The hardest struggles took place upon the banks of this stream, between Rivaud and Haddick, who was severely wounded. Melas sent reinforcements to the relief of Haddick, and the Austrians attacked a second time, but were again repulsed. An attempt was made by Piladi to cross the brook further to the south, but he was driven back by Kellermann, the hero of Valmy, with great loss. Melas now put forth all his strength. Lattermann was able to traverse the brook with his grenadiers and to maintain himself upon the right bank. After a murderous conflict

the village of Marengo came into the possession of the Austrians. They had met with equal success upon the left. Ott had been able to reach Castel Ceriolo, his point of attack, and had outflanked the corps of Lannes, who had been compelled to retreat. It was now ten in the morning. After a two hours' struggle the Austrians had conquered and the French had given way. The battle-field was strewn with dead and wounded.

At this juncture Bonaparte appeared upon the field with his consular guard, composed of eight hundred grenadiers on foot and two hundred on horseback, distinguished by lofty bearskins, encircling the man whose presence alone was worth an army. Early in the morning he had sent an order to Desaix to return as soon as possible, and had received an answer that he would collect the division of Boudet, and be at San Giuliano by four in the afternoon. Bonaparte in the meantime, surrendering the high-road between Marengo and San Giuliano, drew his troops off to the right, so as to secure his retreat upon Pavia, and be on the flank of the Austrians should they attack. He refused to acknowledge defeat and prepared for the possibility of victory.

The grenadiers of the consular guard held firm countenance against the dragoons of Lobkowitz, and the division of Monnier was sent to retake Castel Ceriolo. The division of Victor, shattered in the first engagement, was re-formed anew, and ordered to press forward on the left wing. The battle began with fresh fury, and again with advantage to the Austrians. The French were again driven out of Castel Ceriolo; all efforts to capture Marengo were fruitless. In the general confusion the consular guard, with their lofty bearskins, stood like a fortress amidst

the shocks of the cavalry. But Melas made a desperate sortie from Marengo, and the French columns could no longer stand before him. The only hope of Bonaparte lay in the arrival of Desaix, and until he arrived there was no resource but in retreat.

Melas now thought that the victory was sure. He was wounded in two places, and two horses had been shot under him, so he retired into the fortress of Alessandria, leaving to General Zach, the chief of his staff, the duty of pursuing the French. He next sent couriers in all directions to announce his victory and the defeat of Napoleon. Zach formed his troops in a single column, with two regiments of infantry in the van, then the grenadiers, and the baggage in the rear. He marched along the high-road from Marengo to San Giuliano, believing himself secure from further attack, his left protected by O'Reilly, his right by Keim and Haddick.

About five o'clock in the afternoon, or, according to Bonaparte, about three, Desaix arrived. He had turned back at the sound of the cannon, even before the orderlies despatched by the First Consul had reached him, and had marched all day in the direction of Marengo. As soon as he reached San Giuliano he rushed to his commander-in-chief, while the guards formed a circle around them. Bonaparte explained the position of things. Desaix gazed upon the field covered with dead and wounded, and said, "Yes, the battle is certainly lost, but it is only just five o'clock and there is time to win another." Desaix' body of six thousand fresh troops was drawn up on the Marengo road to oppose the Austrians, who were prevented from seeing them by the sinuosities of the ground. Bonaparte massed his own troops on the left in order to attack the Austrian flank.

The Austrians were marching, in all the confidence of victory, with bands playing and colours flying, when Marmont received them unexpectedly with a hail of bullets from a battery of twelve guns. At the same moment Desaix' soldiers fired a volley which was vigorously returned. A ball struck Desaix in the back of the head and killed him immediately. He fell without a word. The Austrians, disordered by this unexpected onslaught, wavered and retreated on the second line. The grenadiers of Lattermann attempted to make a stand, but were thrown into disorder by Kellermann on the left. The column was cut in two, and two thousand Austrians were taken prisoners, amongst them General Zach, who was now chief in command. There was no one to give orders, as Melas remained in Alessandria, believing that he had gained a victory. The defeat of the Austrians was consummated by Lannes, and the whole line of the French advanced victoriously forward. Saint Cyr retook Ceriolo; the Austrians were seized with a panic; Ott had great difficulty in gaining the bridge over the Bormida. The troops of Keim and Haddick were swept away, first over the Fontanone, then across the Bormida.

Melas, roused from his dream by the thunder of the cannon, which came nearer and nearer to his city of refuge, rode to the banks of the stream and beheld with astonishment his glorious victory turned into a terrible defeat. The Austrians had the greatest difficulty in making any resistance. The bridge across the river was very narrow, and guns, cavalry, infantry, waggons, were all mixed in inextricable confusion. Many pieces of artillery were lost in the muddy bed of the stream. The pursuit of the French was only put an end to by the darkness. It was

night before Ott crossed the Bormida to his camp.

The Austrians lost eight thousand dead and wounded and four thousand prisoners; the French, six thousand dead and wounded and one thousand prisoners. But the death of Desaix outweighed all the rest to Bonaparte. Savary was sent to find him in order that Bonaparte might embrace him on the battle-field, but he only found his corpse, stripped of the uniform, but recognisable by the long hair and the wounds. It was brought on a horse's back to headquarters, and Bonaparte wept over it. Orders were given that his body should be embalmed. Next day at daybreak it was sent to Milan in a peasant's cart, and was buried in the convent of Sant' Angelo. In June, 1806, his remains were transferred to the monastery of the Great St. Bernard, where they still repose. At his funeral Berthier said: "Here is the man whom the East saluted by the name of Just, his country by the name of Brave, his generation by the name of Wise, and whom Napoleon now honours with a monument."

At daybreak on the following morning Melas sent to propose a suspension of arms, and a convention was signed by which the French obtained possession of the whole of North Italy as far as the Mincio, including the fortresses of Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardy and the Legations, Melas being permitted to retire to Mantua.

On June 16 Bonaparte reviewed his troops at San Giuliano, the soldiers being decorated with oak leaves. On the following day he returned to Milan, and on June 18, just fifteen years before the battle of Waterloo, his triumph was celebrated by a solemn Te Deum in the Cathedral. Ten days later he

arrived at Paris, having in the meantime declared the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic.

There are certain similarities between the battle of Marengo and the battle of Waterloo. Just as Wellington waited anxiously for the arrival of Blücher to give him the victory, so Bonaparte waited for the coming of Desaix, and just as Wellington was surprised by the sudden inroad of Napoleon at Charleroi, so Bonaparte was surprised to find the whole Austrian army arrayed against him on the Bormida. At the same time, if Grouchy had possessed the qualities of Desaix and, instead of partly misinterpreting and partly obeying too strictly somewhat dubious orders, had marched to the sound of the cannon, the issue of that momentous field might have been different and the course of the world's history have been changed.

CHAPTER IV.

MOREAU.

WE must now consider with what success Moreau was conducting his part of the operations. Bonaparte naturally desired for the success of his own plans that the attack against Kray in Germany should be made in the most decisive manner. He wished to concentrate the French army between Schaffhausen and the Lake of Constance, and to break the Austrian communications at Ulm. But Moreau was afraid of so bold a scheme and adopted a more timid course. He dreaded the possibility of having to cross the Rhine in the face of a large body of the enemy and adopted various devices to deceive the Austrians as to the real motive of his plans. Bonaparte did not insist upon his own views, thinking it unwise to force upon a general charged with the conduct of a campaign a plan different from that which the general had himself originated, even though it should be decidedly superior.

Moreau crossed the Rhine at several points, joined with the army of Lecourbe, and defeating Kray in a number of engagements at Engen, Stockach and Mösskirch, drove him towards the Danube. The famous fortress of Hohentwiel, which had held out for so many years in the Thirty Years' War, was now surrendered by the incompetence of the commandant and razed by the French to the ground. There was much jealousy between Moreau

and his subordinate St. Cyr, and the effect of this was that the battle of Mösskirch was less decisive than it would otherwise have been. But St. Cyr regained his reputation by his conduct at Biberach and on the Mettenberg, where he induced Kray to believe that he was opposed by the whole of the French army and frightened him into a retreat to the Iller and to the lines of Ulm. The Austrians lost so many men in these continued engagements that their numbers were very little superior to those of the French, although Moreau had, as we have already seen, detached a body of fifteen thousand troops under Moncey to assist Bonaparte.

Moreau put into action every device to allure Kray from his defensive position before Ulm, but without effect. At last marching down the Danube, he crossed it at Donauwörth, and occupying the famous battle-fields of Blenheim and Höchstädt, threatened the communications of Kray with his own country. The effect of this was to drive Kray towards the north. In the battle of Neuburg, fought on June 28, the brave Latour d'Auvergne, who had been called by Bonaparte the first grenadier of France, was fatally pierced by the lance of an Austrian Uhlan. The whole army wore mourning for three days in his honour. Every soldier contributed a day's wage to provide a silver urn in which his heart might be enshrined. When the roll of his regiment was called the name of Latour d'Auvergne was always recited first, and a sergeant answered for him, "Fallen on the field of honour," a practice which lasted down to 1814. Moreau erected a monument on the place where he fell which he placed under the protection of "The Brave of every Nation." In July the French reached the line of the Isar, and spread themselves

over Bavaria, while Kray occupied the line of the Inn. Both armies needed repose. The armistice of Parsdorf was signed on July 15, the effect of which was to leave Southern Germany in the hands of the French for an indefinite period. The armistice of Alessandria had been signed just a month before.

Bonaparte used this breathing space to strengthen his forces both in Italy and Southern Germany. He formed a second army of reserve under Macdonald, which was to operate in Eastern Switzerland, and to leave Moreau free to employ his whole strength upon the Isar and the Inn. The government of Vienna did not, on their side, neglect their opportunities. They restored confidence to the troops by recalling the incompetent Generals Kray and Melas. The Emperor went in person to the army of the Inn, and after encouraging his soldiers, left his brother Archduke John in command.

The operations of the Austrians were slower than those of the French, and the English subsidies were grudgingly contributed; negotiations for peace between Austria and France had no effect, even if they were seriously meant, and there was no resource for the Emperor but to purchase a breathing space by further sacrifices. On September 20 the convention of Hohenlinden prolonged the convention of Parsdorf for a few weeks by the surrender of the fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. The court of Vienna was anxious for peace. The opinion prevailed that they were dragged at the wheels of England and were prevented from concluding a peace with France which would make for their interests. Thugut, who was the founder and the sustainer of the coalition, had to bear the brunt of this obloquy. He was allowed to resign his office, but Cobentzl and

Lehnbach who succeeded him pursued a similar policy. Still, negotiations were begun at Lunéville, which had been chosen as the seat of a new congress.

Joseph Bonaparte and Cobentzl met at Lunéville on November 9, and the French plenipotentiary asked the following questions: Are you empowered to make a treaty? Are you empowered to do so without the co-operation of England? Are you acting only for the Emperor personally and for his Austrian possessions, or are you representing the German Empire? Cobentzl replied that he could sign no treaty except with the intervention of an English envoy. But he went on to ask whether the secrecy of the French government could be trusted, and was assured that it could be. He then said that Austria would be prepared to make a separate peace without England if the negotiations could be kept secret till February 1, 1807, and if an English envoy might be present at Lunéville to cover the negotiations. Bonaparte replied that he would have no Englishman at Lunéville, that Austria had the choice either of war within forty-eight hours, or of peace on the following conditions: (1) The Rhine to be the frontier of France. (2) The Mincio to be the frontier of Austria and Italy, but Mantua to be surrendered to the Cisalpine Republic. (3) The Milanese, the Valtelline, Parma and Modena to belong to the Cisalpine Republic. (4) The Legations to go to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. (5) Piedmont, Switzerland and Genoa to be independent. If these conditions were accepted the whole negotiation should be kept secret till the time named, and the armistice should continue. The Austrians rejected these terms and hostilities were renewed on November 28.

CHAPTER V.

H O H E N L I N D E N .

WHEN the war broke out again, after the determination of the armistice, Bonaparte had four hundred thousand men under arms, including the forces in Egypt. Twelve thousand French and eight thousand Dutch were posted under command of Augereau between the Rhine and the Main, to protect the left flank of Moreau's army, who lay with one hundred and ten thousand men between the Inn and the Isar, having his headquarters in Munich. Macdonald commanded fifteen thousand men in the Grisons, Brune eighty thousand on the Mincio. Besides this there were eight thousand French soldiers in Tuscany, and twelve thousand in the north of Italy. The Austrian army was inferior to the French both in numbers and in quality. It was not till November 17 that Moreau announced that hostilities would recommence on the 28th. This left no time to draw troops from Hungary and Bohemia. It is probable that, all told, the forces of the Emperor did not exceed three hundred thousand men.

The fortune of war was to be decided between the Inn and the Isar. The line of the Inn was easy to defend, but the Austrians conceived the unlucky scheme of leaving their safe position, turning the left flank of the French and attacking them in the rear, in order to drive Moreau back upon the Lech. In answer to this, he commanded an advance from Rosen-

heim to Mühldorf, in order to discover the plans of his adversary. On the two last days of November the two armies came into conflict. Moreau pushed his right wing under Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre to Wasserburg, and his left to Ampfing. The Austrians, who were further in advance with their right wing, at first determined to give battle, but, frightened by the difficulties of the roads, by the heavy rain and the news of Moreau's advance, they altered their plans and marched through the valley of the Isar towards Hohenlinden. This compelled the left wing of the French to retreat, an operation in which Ney greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and bravery.

As soon as Moreau became fully aware of the designs of the enemy he led his army on December 2 into the broad forests which surround Hohenlinden, where they were safe from observation. On the following day the Austrians were marching up the valley of the Isar and were on the road from Mühldorf to Hohenlinden. It was on this memorable scene, an open space in the middle of thick woods, that the decisive struggle must be fought. Moreau gave orders, the night before, to Richepanse and Decaen to march by side-paths through the forest of Ebersberg and to fall upon the Austrians at Mattenbött, as they were approaching Hohenlinden in a long thin line through the wood. The Austrians had very imperfect knowledge of the country in which they were engaged, and were still more ignorant of the position of the French. It was the middle of winter. A heavy snowstorm blinded their eyes, and hid everything from them even at a short distance. The roads, bad at the best of times, were rendered impassable by melting sleet, and by a combination of snow and rain. The Austrian

columns were separated from each other in the forest, and reached Hohenlinden without the slightest idea that they would find the French ready to meet them in battle array.

The battle soon raged with fury. The Austrians, as soon as they had disengaged themselves from the toils of the forest, attacked with vigour. Moreau watched the struggle with the eye of a master, and when he saw the Austrian line wavering he cried, "Now is the time to advance; Richepanse and Decaen must be harassing their rear." The Austrians were driven back into the wood, and the attack of Richepanse and Decaen was as unexpected as his own. Indeed the cuirassiers had dismounted and were leading their horses by the bridle. Owing to the state of the roads the artillery could not be brought into action. Infantry and cavalry were mingled in hideous confusion. Some detachments fought heroically to the death, others offered no resistance and surrendered themselves as prisoners; they threw their arms away and fled into the wood for safety. Ney and Richepanse, pressing in from different sides, at length met and embraced each other, beside themselves with joy. The left wing of the French was not less successful, and the victory was complete. Seven thousand men had fallen, twelve thousand were taken prisoners. Such was the battle of Hohenlinden, immortalised by the verse of Campbell.

The Austrians found it more difficult to get out of the wood than they had to enter it. Their first resting-place was the Inn, which however was crossed by the French on December 9. They were now obliged to retire to the line of the Salzach, which was incapable of defence. The retreat was disastrous, prisoners were made, and gunpowder and guns captured at

every step. On December 20 the French army was preparing to cross the Enns, and Vienna itself seemed to be in danger.

The Archduke Charles now hastened to save the defeated army from destruction. He wept when he saw the extent of the disaster. He sent to demand an armistice, and Moreau accorded one for forty-eight hours. Moreau was pressed by his generals to advance to Vienna, but he replied: "It is better to conquer peace than the capital. I have no news from Macdonald or Brune. I do not know whether the one has succeeded in marching into the Tyrol, or whether the other has crossed the Mincio. Augereau is a long way off and is entirely undefended. I do not wish to humiliate the Austrians or to drive them to despair. It is better to rest now and to content ourselves with the peace which is the object of every war."

The result was the conclusion of an armistice, which included Macdonald and Brune. The whole of the Danube valley and the Tyrol was surrendered to the French, as well as the fortresses of Braunau, Würzburg, Scharnitz and Kufstein. The Austrian magazines were placed at the disposal of the conquerors. No reinforcements were to be sent to Italy unless the generals commanding there refused to accept the armistice. The convention was signed on Christmas Day.

Before hostilities came to an end in Italy Macdonald had accomplished his marvellous passage of the Splügen, an exploit even more extraordinary than the passage of the Great St. Bernard by Bonaparte, because it was undertaken in the middle of winter over a far more difficult pass. Macdonald was posted in the Grisons with fifteen thousand men

and received orders to threaten the rear of the Imperial army on the Mincio while Brune attacked in front. He was ordered to pass the Splügen for this purpose, and was so impressed with the difficulty and danger that he sent Mathieu Dumas to Paris to ask the opinion of Bonaparte. He replied that the passage was absolutely necessary for the success of his plans, and that an army could move anywhere at any season of the year—wherever, indeed, two men could place their feet. Macdonald nerved himself for the effort. Setting out from Thusis on November 21, the rear-guard reached the village of Splügen in five days. The guns were conveyed on sledges (it is needless to say that the present magnificent road across the pass did not exist), the munitions of war on mules. Every soldier had to carry provisions and ammunition for five days.

The day after their arrival at Splügen a terrible blizzard broke over the pass and lasted for three days. To go forward meant death by avalanche; to remain, death by starvation. The poles, which mark the road, had been blown down, but Macdonald, staff in hand, led the way. At length they reached the Hospice. More than a hundred soldiers and as many mules lay buried in the snow, and many of those who survived were frost-bitten. Chiavenna was at last attained on December 6. The march was pursued partly by the Valtelline over the passes of Aprica and Touale to Trent, and partly by the Engadine into the Austrian valley of the Inn. The operations were closed by the armistice of Treviso, signed on January 16, 1801, which immediately preceded the peace of Lunéville, signed on February 9.

PART TWO.

THE WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION.

1805-1807.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INVASION OF ENGLAND.

NAPOLEON was crowned Emperor on December 2, 1804. The answer to this new assumption of power was the armed rising of Europe against him, under the leadership of England, which is generally known as the Third Coalition. Napoleon hoped to anticipate the military measures of the continent by striking a fatal blow at the power of England. He said to Cambacérès: "Put confidence in me, put confidence in my activity. I shall astonish Europe by the fury and swiftness of my attacks."

Napoleon had collected one hundred and fifty thousand chosen troops on the French shores of the Channel. For two years and a half he had practised them in embarkation and disembarkation, and had taught them how to manœuvre, steer and work their guns under every condition of the changing sea. The spirit of the soldiers was excellent and they had full confidence in their commander. They were constantly employed in exercises either by sea or land, in digging trenches, fortifying the shore, or beautifying their camps. Special boats or barges were as-

signed to each battalion and company, and every man, down to the smallest drummer, knew his own craft and his place in it. As soon as the signal was given, the different arms—infantry, cavalry and artillery—were immediately in readiness and marched straight to their ships. At the sound of a warning gun all the officers dismounted and placed themselves at the head of their troops, a second gun ordered them to prepare for embarkation, a third was fired for the placing of non-commissioned officers, a fourth for the march. In this manner twenty-five thousand men could be embarked in ten minutes and a half. The army was full of enthusiasm; they thought that the decisive moment had come at last, but a fifth report bade them leave their ships. In thirteen minutes they again stood upon the shore in battle array.

For the success of the scheme it was necessary to lure the English fleet away from the Channel. Napoleon in after years was accustomed to talk of this mighty enterprise, and to declare that with better luck it would have succeeded. He said that he had determined to collect forty or fifty line-of-battle ships in the harbour of Martinique, drawn from the ports of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol and Brest, to bring them back with all speed to Boulogne, and then to be master of the sea for fourteen days. His further plan was to collect one hundred and sixty thousand men at Boulogne, with four thousand ships of transport and a huge material of war, to embark with men and munition without the enemy suspecting his real object. He imagined that he could do this by using rafts and gunboats instead of ordinary transports. Had he collected some thousands of unarmed transports in the Channel the enemy would have known that he must wait for the arrival of his fleet. But

when they saw him building gunboats and floating batteries, they would imagine that no escort was necessary and would pay less attention to the whereabouts of the French fleet. In this way he imagined that he had entirely deceived the watchful English; but it may be doubted whether he did not rather deceive himself.

Let us see how the plot worked out. Admiral Musiessy reached the Antilles on February 5, 1805, drawing the English after him. Villeneuve managed to escape from Toulon. He sailed first to the east, then turning round passed the Straits of Gibraltar on March 30 and joined Gravina in Cadiz, who had about six Spanish line-of-battle ships under his command. Gantheaume was in a similar fashion to sail forth from Brest, join Villeneuve, Musiessy and Gravina at Martinique, sail back with them to Boulogne and hold the Channel whilst the fleet of England was dispersed all over the globe. But Nelson was too formidable an antagonist. He followed close on Villeneuve's track as swiftly as was possible with contrary winds. He at first thought that Villeneuve was aiming at Ireland; not till May 5 did he learn that his objective was Jamaica. The French had thirty days' start of him; but he hastened to Jamaica. He said to his captains: "You may each of you take a Frenchman, but leave all the Spaniards to me. Strike your flag when I strike mine, but not before." On June 4 Nelson arrived at Barbadoes, but found no trace of the French, nor were they visible at Trinidad. He sought them at the mouth of the Orinoco and heard that they had sailed northwards. The French fleet had received orders to return to Europe, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, to set free Gantheaume from Brest, and with these united forces to appear in

the Channel. Villeneuve was to avoid all engagements which were not absolutely necessary, and to come as close to Brest as possible in order that Gantheaume might co-operate with him. He was told that if he could only be master of the Channel for forty-eight hours the great scheme would be accomplished. Napoleon was informed that Villeneuve had reached the Azores on June 23, and waited impatiently for his appearance off the French coast.

But by this time Nelson began to discover what Napoleon's plan was. He had visited all the West Indian islands in seventy-eight days. When he heard that the French were returning to Europe he sent some of his swiftest sailers to Portsmouth and Lisbon to inform the English government. Nelson was back again at Gibraltar on July 18. Collingwood also began to suspect the truth. He knew that Napoleon would never risk his fleet without some great end in view: that his object must be to lure away the English fleet in preparation for some important enterprise, probably the capture of Ireland. The English government gave orders to Admiral Stirling, who was blockading Rochefort, to join Sir Robert Calder at Ferrol and to arrive in the neighbourhood of Cape Finisterre in order to intercept the French fleet on their return to Brest. These manœuvres were accomplished by June 15, and Calder went to meet the French with fifteen ships.

The two fleets came in sight of each other off Cape Finisterre on July 21. The weather was so hazy that they could see nothing of each other until they were quite close. Villeneuve was disheartened, and his men were sick with fever. He was therefore reluctant to engage and delayed the commencement of the battle from eleven to one. It lasted for four

hours. The battle was not very decisive, but it ruined Napoleon's plans. Neither party renewed the conflict on the following day, although both of them might have done so. On August 2 Gravina sailed to Ferrol and Villeneuve to Corunna. In this port he received the most positive orders from Napoleon to sail to Brest and to set Gantheaume free from blockade even at the risk of his own destruction.

Villeneuve left Corunna on August 14, with forebodings of misfortune. It is possible that if he had shown sufficient energy he might have executed the commands of his master, because Calder and Nelson had not as yet united their forces. Napoleon was at the height of expectation. The troops were embarked, the artillery and the cavalry were on board, watch was kept on the heights to give the first warning of the approaching fleet. Lauriston, who was with Villeneuve, wrote to Napoleon: "We are sailing to Brest," and the Emperor wrote to Gantheaume: "I reckon upon your abilities, your steadfastness, your character. Set sail and come hither—we are avenging the disgrace of six hundred years; never have my soldiers risked their lives for a greater object." To Villeneuve he said: "Lose not a moment, England is ours! We are prepared; everything is on board."

But Villeneuve had not the stomach for such a crisis. Hearing from some Danish ships that the British fleet was at hand, twenty-five strong, he turned back and reached Cadiz on the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Gantheaume had ventured out, and was drawn up in battle array in the roads of B ethune. Cornwallis fired at him from a distance. All eyes were turned towards the horizon in the hope of sighting Villeneuve, but not a sail was visible, and

Gantheaume was obliged to seek his old anchorage in the evening.

Napoleon's wrath was terrible. It fell first upon Decrès, the Minister of Marine, for having recommended to him so worthless a sailor. "Your Villeneuve," he said, "is not even fit to lose a battle. What can one say of a man who when a few sailors are sick, when he has lost a few masts, or received bad news, loses his head and disobeys his orders? If Nelson and Calder had joined, they would be in the Bay of Ferrol and not on the open sea. That is quite simple and obvious to every one who is not blinded by fear." He ordered that the command of the fleet should be given to Gantheaume.

Decrès had the courage to reply that Napoleon's enterprise was impossible, and that by retiring to Cadiz Villeneuve had saved his country from a great disaster. The only safe plan, he said, was gradually to build up a fleet which should contend with the English. Thus the great scheme for the invasion of England came to a sorry end, but Napoleon till the day of his death maintained that it was possible.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CAMPAIGN OF ULM.

NAPOLEON revealed the key-note of his character when he said, "I may lose a battle, but I will never lose a minute." When he heard that his plans for the invasion of England were shattered he summoned Daru into his cabinet. Daru found him walking up and down like a caged lion, breaking a gloomy silence with passionate exclamations: "What a fleet! What sacrifices for nothing! What an admiral! All hope is lost! This wretch Villeneuve, instead of sailing into the Channel, retreats to Cadiz. All is over; he will be blockaded!" Then, after a few moments' pause, he cried, "Sit down and write." He then dictated without a moment's hesitation the plan of the wonderful Campaign of 1805 against the Austrians and the Russians. He prescribed in detail the march of the troops, the very spots where battles would be fought, the gigantic movements of a whole army over a space of a thousand miles. On September 23 he wrote to Talleyrand: "My resolution is firm. My fleets were sighted on August 14 at the level of Cape Ortegal; if they come into the Channel, then I shall have time to cut the knot of this Coalition in London. But if my admirals are too weak for such an enterprise, then I shall break up my camp, invade Germany with two hundred thousand men and not stop until I reach Vienna, and have driven the Austrians from Italy and the Bourbons from Naples. I shall

beat the Austrians and Russians before they have time to unite. When the Continent is appeased I shall return to the shores of the ocean to secure peace at sea."

The plan of the allies had been drawn up in the following manner: Five thousand English and twenty-five thousand Russian troops were to land in Naples from Malta and Corfu, drive out the French, and advance into Lombardy. An Austrian army of one hundred and forty-two thousand men under the command of the Archduke Charles was to conquer Mantua and Peschiera, expelling the French, and then entering Switzerland. Another Austrian army of fifty-three thousand men under Archduke John was to be posted in the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg to maintain communications between the army in Lombardy and the forces under Mack. This general at the head of eighty-three thousand was awaiting on the Lech the arrival of ninety thousand Russians. With this united strength he was to march into Switzerland and press on into Franche-Comté. Besides this, twenty thousand Russians were to sail from Reval to Stralsund, to join there with twelve thousand Swedes and a few thousand English and to proceed to the reconquest of Hanover. If, as was probable, Prussia joined the Coalition, her armies were to be directed against Holland on the middle Rhine. Such was the scheme of a great concentric attack, the success of which depended on the exactness with which it was carried out.

The mistakes and weaknesses of the Austrians will appear in the sequel, but in the designs of Napoleon there were no weaknesses and no mistakes. He afterwards spoke of his plan of campaign as "Granite of which no envy can contest the glory." He showed

himself a general worthy to rank with Cæsar, simple and grandiose in conception, unwearying in minuteness of detail, swift and exact in execution. Europe was struck dumb with admiration and amazement.

The Austrians had sent their best generals and their most trustworthy troops to Italy, thinking that Napoleon was sure to command there in person, in the scene of his youthful triumphs. But the Emperor had determined to leave the defence of Italy to Masséna, whose tenacity could be trusted, and who could support himself on the Adige and the Mincio as he had before held out in Genoa. He reckoned that with fifty thousand seasoned troops Masséna could keep head against the Archduke Charles for a month and give Napoleon time to strike such decisive blows that it would be necessary to recall the Archduke into Germany; Masséna could then follow him and join Napoleon on the Danube.

Napoleon determined that he would himself advance with all speed to the Danube, and defeat first the Austrians and then the Russians before they had time to unite. This could only be done if his plan were carried out with the utmost celerity and the strictest secrecy. The army of England was to be moved with incredible rapidity to the banks of the Danube, the Russians to be surrounded before they were aware of the approach of an enemy, the Russians defeated and peace enforced in Vienna. This was the plan which Napoleon dictated in five hours to Daru. Finally, he said: "Travel to Paris, but give out that you are going to Ostend. Prepare all orders for mobilisation, for marching, and for the commissariat in such a way that they only need my signature. Do all this yourself, let no one else have a hand in it."

Bernadotte was now in Hanover with twenty thousand men; he was to collect half of these in Göttingen and the other half in Hanover. He was to send six thousand men to Hameln and to provision their fortress for a year. After twelve marches he was to reach Würzburg on September 20, and then take command of twenty thousand Bavarians. He was to pay for everything in ready money and preserve the strictest discipline. In a similar manner Marmont, who was posted at Nijmegen with twenty thousand men and forty well-equipped guns, was to set out on September 1, and follow the course of the Rhine until he reached Mainz. From that point he was to arrive at Würzburg on September 23.

The army of England was to break up on August 25. The camp of Ambleuse, under the command of Davout, was to proceed by Lille, Namur, Luxembourg and Deux Ponts to Mannheim; that of Boulogne, under Soult, by Saint Omer, Douay, Verdun, and Metz to Spire; that of Montreuil, under Lannes, by Arras, Rheims, Nancy and Saverne to Strasburg. Ney was to march to Weissenburg. Each of these camps was to march in three divisions, with one day between their movements. By September 24 the whole of the troops would be in the neighbourhood of the Rhine. The cavalry were spread about over Alsace; the Imperial Guard marched from Paris to Strasburg. These movements were so little known to the enemy that the Austrian government heard nothing of the plan till the end of September. The spirit of the soldiers was excellent. They marched with bands playing, singing patriotic songs, and shouting, "Vive l'Empereur!" When they reached the Rhine each soldier received an overcoat and two pairs of shoes. In order the better to conceal his

plans Napoleon remained for six days in Boulogne, which he did not leave till September 2. He reached Malmaison on September 3. He stayed at Paris exactly three weeks, working all the time with inexhaustible energy. On September 24 he left the capital for Strasburg, commissioning his brother Joseph to preside over the Senate, Louis to raise troops and form a National Guard, and Cambacérès to take charge of the Council of State. All matters were to be communicated to him in his absence and the final decision was to rest with the Emperor. A courier was despatched to headquarters every day, and, if it was absolutely necessary for a Minister to do anything on his own account, he was held personally responsible for his actions. Napoleon remained the ruler of Paris and of France even in the midst of his army. General Brune was left in Boulogne to defend the sea-coast, Lefebvre was in Mainz, and Kellermann in Strasburg. Josephine desired to accompany her husband in the campaign, but she was only allowed to go as far as Strasburg. Talleyrand was also to remain in that frontier fortress for the present, while Maret attended the Emperor in the capacity of Minister.

On October 1, 1805, Napoleon crossed the Rhine and set foot on German soil. He was greeted by the Elector Palatine, and Baden promised a contribution of three thousand troops to the Grand Army as well as transport and provisions. Würtemberg followed this example and contributed about six thousand men. This country remained faithful to the alliance till the catastrophe of 1813. The motive in each of these cases was on the one hand the difficulty of neutrality and on the other the desire for an enlargement of territory and an advancement in rank. These

hopes were not disappointed—Württemberg became a Kingdom, and Baden a Grand Duchy.

Meanwhile Napoleon's generals were advancing with the utmost speed along the routes marked out for them. The cavalry under Murat, supported by a part of Lannes' corps, entered the depths of the Black Forest, and, passing by what are now magnificent roads through the hills, advanced to the highest point at Freudenstadt, and then down to Rottweil and Neustadt. Lannes' main body, crossing the Rhine at Strasburg, moved to the north through Stuttgart to Neresheim, and was followed along the same road by Napoleon with the Guard. His plan was to make Mack believe that the main attack would be in front, and to induce him to preserve his position on the Iller between Ulm and Memmingen. In the meantime he would push on with his left wing towards the Danube, cross it at Donauwörth and Ingolstadt, and occupy Mack's rear in such a manner that he should not be able to retreat to the Lech or the Isar. Mack would then be compelled to surrender, and Napoleon with his collected army would meet the Russians whom Mack was expecting.

Napoleon used every art to deceive Mack's vigilance, which was not very great. He sent a spy into his camp to persuade him that the French were attacking from Freiburg along the old road by the Hölenthal. He also induced him to believe that a revolution had broken out in Paris and that the French were in retreat. In the meantime Napoleon's troops moved from point to point as accurately as if they were machines. The decisive moment arrived at the end of the first week of October. Soult occupied the important bridge at Donauwörth, Murat another bridge a few miles higher up. On the evening of Oc-

tober 7, sixty-five thousand French were posted on the right bank of the Danube, and soon occupied the ground between the Iller and the Lech. On the same day Napoleon reached Donauwörth and made arrangements for meeting the Russians and for cutting off Mack's retreat to Munich. Murat and Lannes took a post between Ulm and Augsburg, which was occupied by Soult. Davout crossed the river at Neuburg, below Donauwörth, and Bernadotte with his Bavarian troops at Ingolstadt. On October 12 the Bavarians regained possession of their capital.

The toils were gradually closing round the unhappy Mack, and the process of investing his army was left mainly to Murat and Ney. Napoleon himself reached Augsburg on October 9. Mack's only chance of safety would have been to retreat southwards towards the Tyrol, which he could have reached in two or three days. He would have joined the army there and united himself with the Austrian army in Italy, which would have been a serious blow to Napoleon's plans. But Mack remained paralysed and unable to move, like the rabbit before the cobra. On October 9 there was a serious engagement at Günzburg for the possession of three bridges. The Austrians fought bravely and the French suffered heavy losses, but they obtained possession of one of the bridges and the Austrians were compelled to retreat, with the loss of two thousand men. On the following day they returned to Ulm, tired, disheartened and without confidence in their general.

The Archduke Ferdinand has the credit of having foreseen the inevitable disaster. After the battle of Günzburg he told Mack that he should hold him responsible for all the consequences of his actions, that the only hope of safety lay in a speedy march to

Nordlingen, where an opening was still left in the iron ring of investment. In this way it would be possible to reach Bohemia and act in the rear of the French army. This plan might have been possible on October 10, but every day and every hour made it less likely to succeed. At last on October 13 Mack gave way to the pressure of his colleagues and prepared for a retreat to Nordlingen. But no sooner were the orders given than they were recalled. Mack was informed that the English had landed at Boulogne and were marching towards Paris, that the French army was in retreat, and that in two days there would not be a single French soldier in the neighbourhood of Ulm.

Napoleon, on the other hand, was preparing for a decisive battle. He issued a manifesto to his soldiers in the following words: "Except for this army which stands in your way we should now be in London, and should have avenged the insults of six hundred years, and given freedom to the seas. To-morrow you will fight against the allies of England. The day which dawns to-morrow will be a hundred times more important than Marengo. You will be the marvel of the future. It is not enough to conquer the enemy. No! not a single man of the enemy's army must escape us."

On October 14 was fought the battle of Elchingen, in which the large abbey of that name was bravely defended by the Austrians. But after three hours' conflict the Austrians were driven back with the loss of three thousand men, and that evening Napoleon slept in the abbey. Ney, who was the hero of the day, received at a later period the title of the Duke of Elchingen. On the same evening the French stood round Ulm in a half circle, but retreat was still

possible either to Bohemia or the Tyrol. A council of war was held, in which the danger of the whole army becoming prisoners was insisted upon. But Mack's sole idea was to attack Napoleon. He declared that it was the French who were in a desperate condition; that the recent assaults were only made with a view of covering their retreat. He said that a revolution had broken out in Brabant and France, that Napoleon was hastening to the Rhine and that the retreat would begin on the following day. After many hard words, in which Mack threatened to cut off the Archduke's head, a retreat was decided upon. But it was too late.

Napoleon now determined to make an end, and the storming of Ulm was fixed for October 15, and committed to the charge of Ney and Lannes. The Austrians offered but little resistance and the Michelsberg and the Frauenberg were captured, and Ségur was sent to demand the capitulation of the garrison. Mack was beside himself with rage. "You see men before you," he cried, "who are ready to shed their last drop of blood in self-defence." Ségur pointed out that he was surrounded by more than one hundred thousand French troops, that the Russians were far away, that the line of the Inn was occupied by sixty thousand French, and that Archduke Charles was detained on the Adige by Masséna and could not possibly come to his assistance. Two days later Mack had an interview with Napoleon himself, the result of which was a capitulation. The French were to enter Ulm on the following day. If before midnight on October 25 no Austrian army came to their rescue, the whole of the troops in Ulm were to lay down their arms, declare themselves prisoners of war and be conveyed to France. The

officers were to return to their country under a pledge not to fight against France during the remainder of the campaign; their arms and all munitions of war were to remain the property of the French.

Napoleon succeeded in shortening the delay. On October 20 twenty-seven thousand Austrians surrendered to the conqueror. Napoleon stood at the foot of the Michelsberg, his infantry in a semicircle behind him, his cavalry in a line before him; and between the two marched the Austrians in pairs and laid their arms at his feet.

To have enforced the capitulation of Ulm was a triumph of military skill. The Third Coalition between England, Austria, Russia and Prussia was entirely broken. The Austrians were crushed before any of their allies had time to assist them, and before they were able to collect their own forces together. This disaster was a terrible blow to Pitt. In the autumn of 1805 he was standing in a house at Bath, looking at a portrait of Quin, the actor, when suddenly the noise of rattling hoofs was heard along the pavement. He looked out of the window and saw a mounted courier carrying a post-bag galloping up the street. "Those despatches are for me," he cried. He stopped the messenger, read the despatches and fell into a swoon from which it needed a strong draught of brandy to revive him. He regained his senses, but his face never recovered its natural hue, and the ashy paleness then impressed upon his features remained till his death. No wonder that a few days before that event he perceived a map of Europe hanging on the wall, and said, "Roll up that map, we shall never want it more."

On October 21 Napoleon issued a proclamation to his army in which he boasted that in fourteen days

they had finished a campaign, they had driven the troops of the House of Austria from Bavaria, and replaced the allies of France in the government of their States. "Of one hundred thousand men which formed this army," he continued, "sixty thousand are our prisoners; they will replace in agricultural labour the soldiers whom we have summoned to arms. Two hundred guns, ninety banners, all the generals are in our power; only fifteen thousand of the enemy have escaped." On the very day that these proud words were spoken was fought the battle of Trafalgar, which it is not within our province to narrate, which annihilated the navies of France and Spain, and dealt them a blow from which they have not recovered at the present day.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MARCH TO AUSTERLITZ.

AFTER the destruction of Mack's army at Ulm, Napoleon hastened to Vienna. He had nothing to oppose him excepting an army of fifty thousand men, commanded by Kutusov and the Austrians who had been saved from the capitulation by Kienmayer and Meerveldt. Having ordered the fortifications of Ulm and Memmingen to be destroyed, Napoleon marched to Augsburg, making the Lech the line of his operations instead of the Danube. His safety now lay in the speed of his operations. The longer the line of his communications, the greater were the dangers to which he was exposed. He had to cross many rivers, to run the gauntlet of the remains of the Austrian army and the reinforcements which were pouring in from the eastern provinces and from Russia. It was possible that Archduke Charles, hastening up from Italy, might reach Vienna before him; that Prussia might take up arms and assail him in the flank; that the Archduke Ferdinand, who was collecting an army in Bohemia, might cut his line of operations in two; that the combined army of Russians, Swedes, and English might press forward with rapidity; and that another allied force of Russians, English, and Neapolitans might attack Lombardy. These dangers and difficulties would have dismayed any ordinary man, but the greater his peril the more remarkable became the clearness of his vision and

the intrepidity of his soul. On October 24, 1805, three days after the proclamation of Ulm, Napoleon was received in Munich with enthusiasm. On the following day the French army moved towards the Inn. Ney received orders to march into the Tyrol and to give his hand to Augereau, who was bringing a force of twenty-five thousand men from Bordeaux by way of the Arlberg. Bernadotte and Marmont were despatched to cross the Inn in its upper waters and to distract the attention of the enemy from the main advance. Napoleon himself, with the divisions of Davout, Soult, and Lannes, with the guard and the reserve cavalry, were to cross the Inn in the neighbourhood of Braunau. In the meantime Dupont was to make himself master of Passau.

These movements were carried out with marvellous rapidity and exactness. The Austrians were too much astonished to resist. The fortress of Braunau fell into the hands of the French, without a struggle, well supplied with all munitions of war. Napoleon made it the headquarters of supply to his army in its future operations, and confided it to the care of Lauriston. Napoleon remained for a few days in Linz, and from this place despatched a division along the left bank of the Danube, partly to hinder the operations of the Archduke John, who was collecting troops in Bohemia, and partly to provide against the second army which the Emperor Alexander was collecting in Moravia. He also formed a flotilla, for the purpose of conveying supplies, artillery and ammunition down the Danube, and also of affording rest to foot-weary soldiers. The flotilla also served the purpose of a floating bridge, as by its means ten thousand men could be conveyed from bank to bank in the course of an hour.

Mortier was placed in command of the left bank column, and Napoleon's wish was that both columns should advance upon Vienna in parallel lines, keeping as nearly opposite to each other as possible. This plan was spoiled by the impatience of Murat, whose vanity led him to desire to enter Vienna as speedily as possible. Thus on November 11 Murat was, with his cavalry at Burkersdorf, close to Vienna, when Mortier had not advanced further than Dürrenstein, the castle in which Richard, King of England, was confined on his return from the Crusades, and where it is said that he was discovered by the song of the faithful Blondel. Here he came in conflict with the Russians, some of whom also crossed to the left bank. The French divisions were divided by a day's march, and the flotilla was not in sight. The French were in considerable danger and suffered heavy losses. The Russians took two thousand prisoners, including a whole regiment of dragoons; the division of Grazan was almost destroyed. Napoleon was much delighted with the gallant defence made by the French; he praised Mortier, recalled him to the right bank and placed Bernadotte in charge of the left division. All the more severe was the wrath and contempt which he poured on the head of Murat, who had caused the disaster. He wrote: "I cannot approve of the manner in which you haste ahead; you run like a fool, and pay no attention to the commands which I send to you. Instead of covering Vienna, the Russians have marched over the bridge of Krems, you have lost me two days, and have had nothing before your eyes except the vain glory of being the first to enter Vienna. There is no glory where there is no danger, and there is no danger in entering a capital which is not defended."

Murat was the first to enter Vienna. His soldiers marched into the town at midday on November 17; they hurried through the streets with all haste, as they were anxious to get possession of the Tabor bridge over the Danube as soon as possible. This important bridge was won by a trick. It was only built of wood, and every preparation had been made to destroy it as soon as the French appeared in force. Cannon were posted on the left bank, the bridge had been carefully mined, and a single spark would set it in flames. Murat and Lannes, spreading the report that an armistice had been signed, held the Austrian commander in conversation while their soldiers gradually approached the bridge and threw the materials which were ready for its destruction into the stream. The Austrian soldiers saw that they were being cheated, and a sergeant urged the general to give orders for firing the train; but Lannes exclaimed, with much presence of mind, "How can you allow a soldier to address you thus? Where is the Austrian discipline so famous throughout Europe?" The soldier was arrested for his boldness of speech, the bridge was occupied by the French, the guns removed and their gunners captured. The seizure of the bridge over the Danube had an important influence over the course of the campaign. The decisive battle would otherwise have been fought in Hungary instead of Moravia, and the result might have been very different.

As soon as Kutusov heard that the bridge over the Danube had been captured by the French he began a retreat into Moravia, preferring that to Bohemia because he was aware that a second Russian army was on the march towards Olmütz. Napoleon gave orders for the union of the divisions of Soult, Lannes and

Murat in order that they might cut off the retreat of Kutusov by reaching Hollabrunn before him. Kutusov despatched Prince Bagration with seven thousand men to Hollabrunn, which he succeeded in reaching on November 15, while Kutusov was able to give his troops some much-needed repose. Murat imagined that he had the whole of the Russian army before him, and was therefore willing to listen to Kutusov's deceitful proposals for an armistice, being beguiled by the flattering suggestion that he should be the first to make peace as he had before been the first to enter the capital of the Kaiser. When Napoleon heard of the armistice he refused to ratify it and ordered an immediate attack. This was made with success, but Kutusov had been able by his trick to reach Olmütz with his army, where he knew that he should meet his Emperor, Alexander I. The plans of Napoleon for annihilating the army of Kutusov before he could be reinforced had entirely failed, owing partly to the impetuosity of Murat, and partly to the admirable strategy of the Russian general.

Kutusov pitched his camp in a favourable position at Olschan, close to Olmütz, on November 22, and two days later the advanced guard of the second Russian army under the command of the Grand Duke Constantine was able to join him. They were in a splendid position, commanding a plain in their front, their rear protected by earthworks, a marsh on their right, and a river before their lines. Kutusov had carefully selected this position, and would have had a good chance of protecting it even against the onslaughts of Napoleon. But the young military party induced him to desert it and to attack Napoleon on the way to Brünn, and this proved his ruin.

The two Emperors, Francis II. of Austria and

THE MARCH TO AUSTERLITZ.

Alexander I. of Russia, had their headquarters at Olmütz. Francis was confined to his bed with the result of continual diseases. He was strongly in favour of deferring an engagement until the Archduke Charles had arrived from Italy, who was marching at the head of an army of eighty thousand men. Napoleon could not maintain his position at Brünn, the camp at Olschan was unassailable, and when the new army arrived and had occupied the passage of the Danube the French Emperor would be between two fires. Seldom have such momentous results depended upon such narrow issues.

Everything depended upon the decision of Alexander. He had at first been in favour of delay, but on November 24 a review was held, to celebrate the arrival of the guard, in which the young Emperor was received by the troops with the wildest enthusiasm. The Russian army had been victorious at Dürrenstein and Hollabrunn: what might not be expected when they had their sovereign in their midst? Alexander was young, inexperienced, greedy of glory, open to flattery. He was inclined to believe that the French could not resist him. On the following day Savary arrived in the Russian camp bearing a letter from Napoleon, asking for a personal interview. The Tzar sent Prince Dolgoruki with Savary to Napoleon, and a conversation took place between them on possible conditions of peace. Dolgoruki, who, although at the head of the Young Party, was probably not a very experienced politician, produced an unfavourable effect on Napoleon, and received himself the impression that the French army was on the verge of a precipice.

The impression was deepened by a cavalry engagement which took place on November 28, in which

the Russians were victorious. Dolgoruki commanded, and Alexander was present. They believed that under the eyes of their sovereign the Russian army could do anything. The policy of waiting for the Archduke Charles and for the Prussians was given up, and an advance against Napoleon resolved upon. Czartoryski argued in vain that they were marching into the jaws of a hero of a hundred fights, and that in three weeks the Prussians would join them with one hundred and fifty thousand. They had only to wait and all would be well. These words were spoken to the wind. The advance was determined upon. Alexander undertook the command of the troops, Kutusov remaining general-in-chief, but without the main responsibility. The advice of the Emperor Francis was not asked, as it was feared that he might oppose the operations.

CHAPTER IX.

THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.

NAPOLEON had been established at Brünn since November 19 in an admirable position, at the juncture of the roads which lead to Vienna on the one side and to Olmütz on the other. He now summoned Bernadotte and Davout to his assistance. He invigorated the courage of the army by promising large sums of money to them and pensions to all who should be wounded. On December 1 the two hosts were within gunshot of each other. With proud confidence he announced to his soldiers that the morrow would put an end to the campaign, and that they would then retire into winter quarters, while the reinforcements which were being collected in France would compel the enemy to a worthy peace. He told Haugwitz, who had been sent by the Prussians to give Napoleon some good advice, that he would speak with him after the battle, unless he was himself killed by a cannon-ball. The soldiers were in the highest state of enthusiasm and devotion. The following day, the day of the battle, was the anniversary of the Imperial coronation. Napoleon drank a glass of "punch" with his marshals and explained his plans. He then slept for a few hours in an armchair. At four o'clock in the morning he was at the outposts, listening to the noise which arose from the enemy's camp, for the thick mist prevented anything from being seen.

The Austrian General Weyrother had, after studying the maps, made an elaborate plan of battle which he felt certain would result in the defeat of Napoleon. Langeron, a French *émigré*, on hearing it, asked Weyrother if he really thought that matters would turn out as he expected, and Bagration on reading the plan expressed his opinion that the battle was already won. The scheme consisted of a design to outflank the French and to drive them into Bohemia, but Napoleon by his last dispositions had made the design useless, even before it was attempted.

It is difficult for one who visits the field of Austerlitz at the present day to understand the features of the fight, because the ground has been so completely changed by modern conditions of agriculture. We will do our best to make it intelligible. Whilst Napoleon stood at the outposts in the early morning the French camp was silent, but that of the allies was full of motion. The sentries could hardly see each other at ten paces, but the great commander witnessed the bivouac fires gradually paling towards the north and torches moved towards the south. They were leaving Pratzen and marching towards Tellnitz, with the proud idea of surrounding the French. Napoleon knew that to do this would be to weaken their centre. He would shift his troops towards the north, fall like an avalanche upon their disorderly columns and scatter them to the wind. He returned cheerfully to his tent posted upon a height. One by one his marshals came and spoke to him. He gave them all the same advice: to remain quiet, to restrain their enthusiasm, and to await until the enemy had incurred all the consequences of their error.

Owing to the mist the allied army marched on

within cannon-shot of Napoleon and his marshals, without an idea that they were in the neighbourhood. It had been arranged that the columns should pass the defile of the Goldbach in different places, the first at Tellnitz, the second between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz, the third at Sokolnitz itself, while the Austrian cavalry were to seize the monastery of Raigern. They were to keep in parallel order, and take care that the head of one column should not get before the head of another.

Suddenly the battle burst when the allies least expected it. The Austrian hussars were assailed at Tellnitz by the French sharpshooters. Tellnitz was, however, captured by the first column, which now waited for the advance of the second. Davout, who had been posted in the monastery of Raigern, advanced and attempted to drive the allies out of Tellnitz, but at this point the French were defeated. Similarly the second column was able to drive the French from the village of Sokolnitz, and the third to occupy the castle of the same name, although Davout displayed marvels of energy in their defence; for the moment the allies were victorious on their left wing.

But the master of the fight, Napoleon, remained quiet in the centre. He had forbidden any advance till nine o'clock. Then, on that winter's morning, arose the sun of Austerlitz, blood-red and majestic, a presage of slaughter and victory. The mist was split asunder, the heights became visible, like islands in a sea; at length a gust of wind dispersed the fog, and the battle array of the French became visible to all. It was then seen that the heights of Pratzen were but feebly held, while the Austrian army was engaged in the depths of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz,

Napoleon said to Soult, "How long would it take you to occupy the heights of Pratzen?" "Less than twenty minutes," was the reply. "Then we will wait twenty minutes," said the Emperor, "and not disturb the enemy in their false movement." At last he drew his glove from that soft, tiny right hand which Heine has described so well, and said, "Now is the time." Napoleon rode at the head of his marshals, and cried, "The enemy have delivered themselves to us by their folly, we will now end the war with one shock of thunder."

The two Emperors were with the fourth division, commanded by Kutusov; Alexander in black uniform, Francis in white. Kutusov was just beginning to advance when the mist lifted, and he saw with horror the centre of the French army in battle array before him in front of the defiles, whereas he imagined that it was behind them. One of the first shots fired struck Kutusov in the cheek. He said, "It is not mortal, but *there* is the mortal wound," pointing to the heights of Pratzen. Vandamme and Saint Hilaire, Murat and Soult stormed the heights on which the Russians were posted. A wild scene of confusion ensued. The two Emperors were lost in the surging throng; no one knew what had become of Kutusov. The mass of the allies retreated towards Austerlitz. In two hours the heights of Pratzen, the key of the allied position, were completely conquered, and the allied army was cut into two parts.

Such were the operations on the left and in the centre of the allies; their fortunes fared no better upon the right. Lannes and Murat were opposed to Lichtenstein and Bagration. In accordance with Weyrother's plan, Prince Lichtenstein was to seize a

position which was already in the hands of the French. The Grand Duke Constantine, posted on his left, performed prodigies of valour, and exhibited the greatest steadfastness and endurance. The battle on this side raged round Blasiowitz, which had been occupied by the French Guard before the arrival of Lichtenstein. Constantine attacked with the bayonet, and the French line began to waver, when Napoleon, who was posted at Blasiowitz, sent the cavalry of the Guard to their assistance. Guard struggled against Guard, and the Russians captured an eagle. Napoleon sent also reinforcements under Rapp, which compelled the Russians to retreat. A similar struggle was raging on the Olmütz road between Lannes and Bagration. The Russians were at length defeated and retreated towards Austerlitz. The baggage of the allies fell into the hands of the French. The result of the battle on the right wing was that two thousand dead and wounded covered the field, and that Lannes had made four thousand prisoners.

When Napoleon had severed the centre of the enemy he left Bernadotte in possession of Pratzen, and with the divisions of Soult and Oudinot followed the same line of march which the left of the allies had taken in the morning. His design was to fall upon their rear and destroy them entirely. The remainder of the battle is a tale of flight and slaughter. The allies were attacked in the same positions which they had captured so valiantly in the early hours of the day. In this part of the field were a number of ponds, at this time of the year covered with ice. In these the Russians took refuge, but the French artillery was turned upon the frozen surface, and many Russians were drowned. Imagination has busied it-

self with the creation of frozen lakes, their treacherous surface crushed by the red-hot bullets of the French, thousands of the enemy perishing in the last rays of the winter sun, but historic truth will not admit this exaggeration. The ponds are now dried up and it is difficult to estimate their extent, but it is probable that the number who perished in them did not exceed a hundred. At any rate the victory was complete. Those who escaped death or capture fled to Austerlitz, and the French occupied the ground which the Russians had taken.

The night came on early and quickly. After the fog of the morning had lifted the day was cold and clear; clouds rose in the afternoon, and snow and rain now began to fall. But all through the winter night such Russians as survived retreated from their terrible foe. The allies had struggled bravely, but they were entirely defeated. The Austrians lost about six thousand men; the Russians acknowledged their loss to be twenty-one thousand, but it more probably reached thirty-three thousand. Two-thirds of their artillery were captured. The loss of the French must also have been great, but they prided themselves on the possession of one hundred and thirty-six captured guns.

Such was the battle of Austerlitz, one of the greatest monuments of Napoleon's military genius. He infused a new spirit into the use of troops, although he made but little changes in military organisation, and confined himself to the improvement of the machine which he had received from the Revolution. Still his plans had certain necessities for their execution which could only be provided by new expedients. He required large masses which he could manœuvre rapidly, a numerous cavalry, both heavy and light, for

the purpose of combat and of exploration, and a powerful reserve. For the old divisions he substituted *corps d'armée*, equal in number to two or three divisions, with a staff, an artillery and a light cavalry of their own. He placed Murat at the head of a cavalry of reserve—hussars, dragoons, cuirassiers—who would go anywhere and dare everything. As a final reserve the Emperor kept in his own hands the Imperial Guard, a select army of fifty thousand men, all seasoned veterans, attached to the fortunes of the Empire and to the glory of their master. He also largely increased the number of the artillery. But, curiously enough, he made few changes in the armaments of his troops. They were armed to the end with flint muskets, and with old-fashioned cannon.

After the battle Napoleon placed his headquarters in the castle of Austerlitz, from which he dated his bulletins, and which he selected to give the name of his victory, although the village itself had scarcely been included in his sphere of operations. Peace with Austria was concluded at Pressburg before the end of the year, but the conditions of that pacification belong rather to political than to military history.

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLES OF JENA AND AUERSTÄDT.

THE battle of Austerlitz and the peace of Pressburg were followed by great changes in Germany. It was Napoleon's object to weaken Austria as much as possible and to destroy the German Empire of which she was the head. He was the consolidator of the principles of the French Revolution, the enemy of feudality and of the old state of things, the "Ancien Régime." In gratitude for their neutrality he raised the Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg to the rank of Kings, a position which they still maintain. He formed the Confederation of the Rhine from these two States and others in the south and west of Germany, and became himself the Protector of it. The Holy Roman Empire, which had existed for a thousand years, came to an end on August 6, 1806, and the Emperor Francis II., who had assumed the title of Francis II., Emperor of Austria, two years before, now laid down his superior title in obedience to his conqueror. A number of small princes were "mediatised," as it was called, losing their sovereign power, but keeping their property and patrimonial rights.

Prussia had seen the defeat of Austria, and the subjection of Southern and Western Germany to the power of Napoleon, without being aware to what extent her own safety was endangered. In November, 1805, she had attempted to desert the position of neutrality which she had taken up two years before,

and, as we have seen, had despatched Haugwitz to the headquarters of Napoleon just before the battle of Austerlitz. She then committed the serious fault of irritating the conqueror to the utmost without affording the slightest assistance to his enemies. The result of this was the humiliating treaty of Schönbrunn signed by Haugwitz with Napoleon a fortnight after the battle, by which Prussia surrendered to France the portion of the Duchy of Cleve which lay on the right bank of the Rhine, the fortress of Wesel, and the principality of Neufchatel; to Bavaria the Margravate of Ansbach, receiving in exchange Hanover, with the duty of excluding the English from the harbours of the North Sea. To escape the wrath of France she incurred the hostility of England. The conditions of the treaty of Schönbrunn were made more degrading and exacting by the treaty of Paris signed in February, 1806, and Prussia actually went so far as to declare war against England, without improving her relations with Napoleon. He could only regard such vacillation and meanness with contempt.

It now came to the ears of the Prussian government that Napoleon in his negotiations for peace with England had offered the restoration of Hanover, which he had already given to Prussia. He had also held out to Russia the tempting bait of Prussian Poland, and had talked of recompensing the Neapolitan Bourbons by the gift of the Hanse towns. This was more than their patience could bear, and the mobilisation of the Prussian army was ordered on August 9. That army was indeed little fitted to cope with an antagonist like Napoleon. It depended upon the reputation of Frederick the Great, but it had not advanced since his time. It had been

brought up in the aristocratic ideas of the old *régime* and had no conception of the strength of a democratic host. The officers had grown old in their stiff uniforms and their pride of rank. The machine moved slowly and with effort, and had nothing of the efficiency and hardiness of the French. Arms, clothing and commissariat were all of an obsolete pattern, more suited for the parade ground than for the field. If they could march with regularity and precision their arms were too often of no use whatever. An enormous amount of baggage followed their movements. It is said that a certain lieutenant even took a pianoforte with him on the march. Where the French were content to bivouac in the open field the Prussians could not dispense with their tents. The French drew their supplies from the enemy's country; the Prussians carried their magazines with them. It was an army whose strength existed only on paper. It was composed largely of foreigners; desertions were frequent; the severest punishments were ineffectual to maintain discipline, and the troops were as miserably paid as they were contemptibly organised.

Moreover, the position of Prussia was isolated, as might be expected from her wavering and uncertain policy. Austria was exhausted, England was but half-hearted in her cause, and the question of Hanover was an apple of discord between them. On the other hand, the French were in admirable order, posted on the Prussian and Saxon frontiers, ready to strike. The best of Napoleon's marshals, Soult, Ney, Berthier, Davout, Bernadotte, Augereau, Lannes, and Murat, were posted in Bavaria, Franconia and Würtemberg with two hundred thousand men. The Prussian army was inferior in numbers,

and its divisions were scattered. No adequate preparations had been made; at headquarters there was no unity of plan, no energy or decision. The generals were advanced in years; the Duke of Brunswick numbered seventy-one; Field-Marshal Mollendorf, who had fought under Frederick the Great in Silesia, eighty-one years. Notwithstanding this an ultimatum was addressed to Napoleon on September 25, 1806, which could only receive one answer, and the war was immediately begun.

The mass of the French army was posted in the valley of the Main, six *corps d'armée* being concentrated between Würzburg and Bamberg. Napoleon reached Mainz on September 28. The Prussian army was established in the forest of Thuringia on the main road between the Rhine and the heart of Germany. Napoleon's plan was to advance by the upper waters of the Saale, to turn the Prussian left, and to march on to Berlin. For this purpose three roads lay at his disposal, all passing through Franconia; one from Coburg to Saalfeld, another from Kronach to Schleitz, and a third from Bayreuth to Hof. He determined to utilise all three, to concentrate in the valley of the Saale, where the roads debouched, and to march on to Berlin with a united force of two hundred thousand men. Brunswick, whose troops were at Erfurt and Weimar, determined to await the development of Napoleon's plans, whilst Hohenlohe, who was on the right bank of the upper Saale, considered himself sufficiently protected by detachments placed at Schleitz and at Saalfeld, where the roads from the Franconian forest find their issue.

The French crossed the frontier of Saxony on October 8. The central road of the three above

enumerated was taken by the cavalry of Murat, who also kept an eye on the other two. With the assistance of Bernadotte he occupied Saalburg, and attacked on October 9 at Schleitz ten thousand Prussians under General Tauenzien. Surprised and dispersed, they were driven back in disorder on the army of Hohenlohe. Soult, following the easternmost road, reached Hof without meeting an enemy, but on October 10 the division of Prince Louis Ferdinand, posted at the end of the westernmost road, was attacked by Lannes. The Prussians were driven back and Prince Louis, refusing to surrender, found the death which he so earnestly desired. The upper waters of the Saale were now entirely in the hands of the French, and Napoleon, keeping strictly in view his objective, Berlin, moved on to Gera, believing that on his side Hohenlohe would march rapidly down the Saale and reach the valley of the Elbe.

Hohenlohe, on the contrary, crossed the Saale at Jena, in order to join the army of Brunswick. The Prussians were now concentrated in a compact mass between Erfurt, Weimar and Jena, and Napoleon determined to attack them there. He made preparations to guard the outlets of the river, and with this object despatched Bernadotte and Davout to occupy the bridges of Dornburg and Naumburg. By these manœuvres, the Prussian army, which was on the left bank of the Saale, was cut off from Berlin by the French, who occupied the right bank. Napoleon thought that he had succeeded in forcing the enemy to a battle, but Brunswick, being afraid lest he should be cut off from the Elbe and should suffer the fate of Mack, determined to escape by the defile of Kösen, leaving Hohenlohe to watch the valley of the Saale. Hohenlohe, thinking that the French

were pressing on towards the Elbe, thought that he had but little to fear on this side of Jena, so he posted his troops on the heights which extend from Jena in the direction of Weimar, but neglected to occupy the town and the passage which lead to the heights.

Napoleon reached Jena on October 13, where he met Lannes, and determined to attack on the following day. He sent his troops up the narrow approaches which lead to the high ground, but had some difficulty with his artillery. The roads had to be enlarged by torchlight under Napoleon's supervision. It needed twelve horses to drag a cannon up the hill. The Emperor's tent was pitched in the middle of his guard, but few fires were lighted. On the other hand, the numerous watch-fires of Hohenlohe blazed forth on the road to Weimar, while those of the retreating Brunswick glimmered towards the north.

The cold bright night was succeeded by a misty morning, recalling the great day of Austerlitz. Napoleon, lighted by torches, visited the troops, and advised them to be on their guard against the Prussian cavalry and to form themselves into squares. He said that the Prussians were already cut off from the Elbe and the Oder. The battle was engaged before the mist had lifted. By nine o'clock Napoleon had gained space for the development of his army; Augereau came to his assistance from the left, Soult from the right; Ney and Murat hurried to the scene of conflict. After a short rest Napoleon began a second attack with fresh troops. Augereau and Soult had some difficulty in reaching the plateau up the steep paths which led to it, and Ney, who was repelling the Prussian cavalry with his squares, was in danger of being captured. But the issue was soon

decided by the advance of Napoleon's guard. The army of Hohenlohe wavered, broke and fled along the road to Weimar. Rüchel, whom he had summoned from that city, came too late to help and was involved in the disaster.

The victory was complete. Murat followed the fugitives far beyond Weimar. The field was covered with corpses and abandoned arms. The Germans had lost twelve thousand dead and wounded and two hundred guns. The poet Goethe feared for his life in Weimar. Jena was plundered and burnt. It is said that Hegel continued writing his treatise of *Phænomenology* during the progress of the battle, and that when his house was plundered he stuffed it into his pocket and fled to Nüremberg.

On the day of the battle of Jena, October 14, 1806, Davout won the battle of Auerstädt, which completed the destruction of the Prussian army. The King of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick had retreated along the road from Weimar to Naumburg in five divisions, and had halted in Auerstädt, intending to pass the bridge of Kösen on the following day. On the evening of October 13 Davout was informed at Naumburg that the King's army was approaching. On that he sent a detachment to occupy the bridge of Kösen, and went in person to Bernadotte to ask for his assistance. Bernadotte refused, alleging the order of Napoleon that they should observe the bridge at Naumburg. Nevertheless Davout determined with twenty-six thousand men to oppose the royal army, which was sixty-six thousand men strong, and occupied the bridge of Kösen during the night with three divisions.

At six o'clock on the morning of October 14 he occupied a height which commands the hollow of Has-

senhausen, and in this place the battle was actually fought. Scarcely had he done this when the heads of the Prussian columns advanced. The field was covered with thick mist, so that the Prussians had no idea of the presence of the enemy. Blücher, who was in command of the rear-guard, found himself unexpectedly engaged with the French cavalry. Davout, finding that the engagement had begun, brought up his artillery and fired into the masses of the enemy. The battle raged round Hassenhausen, which was bravely defended by the French. In their attempts to capture it Schmettau was killed, the aged Mollendorf was mortally wounded, and the King had a horse killed under him. Brunswick, whilst he was urging his soldiers to the attack, was struck by a shot which deprived him of the sight of both eyes, and he was led from the field, his face covered with a cloth. The French, formed into squares, withstood the assault of ten thousand cavalry, and none of the squares were broken. At last they changed into a column of attack and drove the Prussians from the village. Blücher strongly urged the renewal of the engagement, and was supported by the King, but the opinion prevailed that they should await the arrival of Hohenlohe and Rüchel, not knowing that they had been already beaten in the battle of Jena.

They therefore began the retreat, leaving ten thousand dead and wounded on the field and one hundred and fifteen guns in the hands of the enemy. The French had also suffered severely. Out of Davout's twenty-six thousand men seven thousand were dead or wounded and the rest were so exhausted that pursuit was impossible. General Kalkreuth was ordered to lead the reserve to Weimar, and to collect the stragglers in that town. But at Apolda, half-way between

Jena and Weimar, he heard that Hohenlohe and Rüchel were defeated and that Weimar was in the hands of the French; he was therefore obliged to take another route. All hope was at an end, all discipline was lost. The soldiers wandered in the woods, throwing away their arms and knapsacks, which hindered their flight. Not only were the battles of Jena and Auerstädt lost, but the whole army was destroyed. It was difficult for any one to believe that Prussia could continue to exist as a kingdom. Napoleon resumed his march to Berlin, which he entered on October 27.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLES OF EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND.

THE disastrous defeats of Jena and Auerstädt did not immediately put an end to the war. The King of Prussia fled to Königsberg, and the Ministers whom he left behind at Berlin were ready to make almost every possible sacrifice for peace. But Napoleon demanded more than they could give. The Russians were still in arms, as they had not been included in the treaty of Pressburg, and Napoleon gave the Prussians to understand that if he should once more defeat the Emperor of Russia, the kingdom of Prussia would soon cease to exist.

When the war began anew the only Prussian army consisted of twenty-five thousand men posted on the farthest north-east corner of the monarchy, from the bank of the Vistula to the frontiers of Russia. In the middle of November the divisions of Davout, Lannes and Augereau were established upon this river, and at the end of the month Murat, Ney, Soult and Bernadotte moved in the same direction. Napoleon entered Posen, the capital of Prussian Poland, on November 27, 1806. From this city he issued his famous proclamation to the Poles, summoning them to freedom. They replied with enthusiasm and formed themselves into battalions and regiments which were placed under the command of the conqueror. On the second of January, 1807, Napo-

leon entered Warsaw amidst the universal joy of the people.

Russia, who was the only effective ally of Prussia at this moment, had sent two armies into that country, and the combined Russian and Prussian forces were placed under the command of Benningsen. But his operations were marked with uncertainty, and could lead only to disaster. He first determined to retreat from the line of the Vistula, and deserted the fortress of Thorn, which had been bravely defended by L'Estocq. His plans were then changed and it was determined to meet Napoleon. The great battle of Preussich Eylau, one of the most murderous of these wars, was fought on February 7 and 8, 1807. Benningsen had determined to march towards the sea-coast by Marienburg, Elbing, and Danzig, hoping to find there plenty of supplies, to surprise the French left, crumple up Bernadotte and compel Napoleon to leave Warsaw in order to defend the lower Vistula. The scheme was a bold one, and it was so well carried out that he reached Heilsberg on January 22, without the French being aware of his approach. Napoleon soon divined the plans of Benningsen. He determined to pass round the Russian army in a curve, and, if his left wing could only hold their ground, to attack them on two sides and to drive them towards the sea. The town of Allenstein was designated as the place of concentration; and Davout, Soult, Augereau and Ney were to march thither. Bernadotte was to retreat slowly towards the Vistula so as to entice the Russians to that river, and then by forced marches to join the left wing of the main army in order to drive the Russians towards the sea. Frost had now set in, which facilitated the movements of the troops. The

Russians were being gradually entangled in a net from which it was impossible for them to escape.

Luckily for them a Cossack was taken prisoner, who bore a letter from the Emperor to Bernadotte which gave a full account of Napoleon's plans. Benningsen became aware of his danger and retired to Allenstein. But Napoleon was determined upon fighting a decisive battle, and moving with great rapidity succeeded in intercepting the Russians. Benningsen could only get as far as Eylau, which he reached on February 7. That evening a serious engagement took place, the result of which was that the Russians were first driven back into Eylau, and then, after a hardly contested struggle, carried on from street to street, from the town to the churchyard and from the churchyard to the heights. Here Benningsen determined to make a final stand.

Napoleon had sent orders to Davout and Ney to march with all haste to his support. He spent the night in the post-house of Eylau, sleeping for two hours in an armchair. The Russians were superior to the French in artillery and infantry, but the French outnumbered the Russians in cavalry.

In the early morning of that fatal day Napoleon mounted his horse to survey the position of the enemy. The Russians were drawn up in solid masses, protected by a very numerous artillery. Another division of artillery, scarcely inferior in number, was posted in the rear of the main body. The Russian cavalry was placed partly on the flank and partly with the reserve. Their whole army formed a massive wall, pouring forth a deadly fire from its embrasures. Napoleon hesitated to attack the enemy in front and determined to operate upon their flank. He placed his guard and cavalry in the

rear where they would not be exposed to the Russian fire.

At daybreak the Russians began the struggle with a terrible cannonade, which was answered by the French. The earth shook with the thunder of the artillery. But the French suffered but little, being protected by houses, whereas the Russian ranks were mowed down. Davoust now appeared upon the scene and was able to hold his ground. At ten o'clock Napoleon began an attack upon the left Russian wing, which he attempted to force upon their centre. This attack was hindered by a violent storm of snow, which drove in the faces of the soldiers and prevented them from following their proper directions. The Russians had the snow in their backs, and they were able to cut the French line of advance in two. The Russian centre now began to move forwards in its turn, and the situation of Napoleon became critical. He ordered Murat to extricate him, and to attack the Russians with eighty squadrons. He succeeded in breaking the first three lines, but was then relieved with a heavy fire of artillery. During this part of the conflict a mass of four thousand Russian grenadiers pressed on towards the churchyard where Napoleon was standing with his staff, and he was with difficulty saved by the devotion of the guard. At this decisive moment L'Estocq appeared upon the field with eight thousand Prussians, anticipating the advance of Ney by two hours. His arrival gave new vigour to the Russians, and they again attacked the French under Davoust. The man of iron will and iron courage was not to be driven from his ground. He passed through the ranks crying, "The cowards will die in Siberia, the brave will fall here as men of honour," and the village which he held was never taken.

Night was coming on. Both sides were tired out and they had no provisions. Benningsen thought of renewing the conflict, but hearing that Ney was not far off, determined upon a retreat. The next day he retired to Königsberg. The French remained in possession of the field of battle, but they had lost at least ten thousand men and the Russians fifteen thousand. Napoleon now made serious offers of a separate peace to the King of Prussia, who had taken refuge in Memel, but he refused to desert his Russian ally and would hear of no terms in which he was not included. The war was at last put an end to by the battle of Friedland, situated a short distance to the east of Eylau. It was fought on June 14, the anniversary of Marengo. At one o'clock in the morning Lannes, who had reached the table-land of Posthnenen on the road from Eylau, observed large masses of troops before him. In those northern latitudes it was already light at 2 A.M., and Lannes was confirmed in his opinion. He had only ten thousand men with him, whereas the Russians were threefold his strength. They were under the command of Benningsen, who was advancing to the relief of Königsberg. The Russians threw three bridges over the Alle, one above and two below the town. It is said that his whole forces amounted at this moment to seventy-five thousand and two hundred guns. Lannes gradually received reinforcements and was able to hold his ground, but he was in hard straits, and sent orderly after orderly to Napoleon for assistance.

The Emperor came riding up with joy. "It is the day of Marengo," he cried, "for us a day of good fortune." Resisting all advice to defer the battle, he determined to crush the enemy while they were crossing the river, but in order to do this he must get pos-

session of Friedland in order to cut off their retreat. He sent Ney forward to seize the town and the bridges at all hazards. "The man is a lion," said Napoleon when he witnessed his prowess. He pressed forward with incredible energy, seized the bridges and burnt them. The Russians had now no power of retreat. They were entirely at the mercy of the conqueror, and the battle raged during the whole of that long day till ten o'clock at night. A third of the Russian army was dead or wounded, and the victor slept on the field of battle. Napoleon wrote to Josephine that Friedland was a worthy sister to Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. The result of the battle of Friedland was the peace of Tilsit, the details of which belong to the history of European politics.

PART THREE.

THE WAR OF 1809.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FIVE DAYS' CAMPAIGN IN BAVARIA.

THE war undertaken by Austria against Napoleon in 1809 was the fruit of a long-cherished desire to wipe out the disgrace of the treaty of Pressburg. When the French first declared war against her in 1792 she was crystallised in the torpor of an immovable routine, and the disasters of two unsuccessful campaigns were not sufficient to arouse her. It required the campaign of 1805, the catastrophes of Ulm and Austerlitz and the capture of Vienna itself to galvanise her into life. Convinced of her military inferiority, she committed the care of her reorganization to the Archduke Charles, whose presence before Napoleon in the campaign of 1805 would perhaps have prevented the disastrous defeat of Austerlitz. He created an active army of three hundred thousand men and a reserve of two hundred thousand. Encouraged by the awakening of national feeling in Germany, by the insurrection in the Tyrol, and by the ill-success of the French arms in Spain, the Emperor determined to hazard a great stroke for independence,

and he issued an appeal to his country dated March 27, 1809.

Archduke Charles crossed the Inn on April 10, and at the head of the principal army invaded Bavaria. Archduke John, setting out from Carinthia, crossed the Karawankas Alps in a snowstorm and attacked the army of the Viceroy Eugène, composed of a mixture of French and Italians, which was advancing towards the Tagliamento. At the same time he stirred the fire of patriotism in the mountains of the Tyrol. Archduke Ferdinand was posted on the Vistula to oppose the Polish army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which, under Prince Joseph Poniatowsky, was threatening Austrian Galicia, and an army of thirty-two thousand Russians who were nominally allies of France but were only lukewarm in the cause. The Austrians had been careful not to repeat their errors of the previous campaign. They made up their minds that the principal struggle would be in Germany, and they collected an army of two hundred thousand men in the valley of the Danube.

This action of the Austrians came upon Napoleon as a surprise, and he had only the first three months of 1809 to prepare for the blow. He had removed the seasoned soldiers stationed in the other parts of Europe in order to supply the requirements of Spain. Napoleon did his utmost to raise troops. He made new demands upon the four previous conscriptions and called up in advance the conscripts of 1809, but there was a wide difference between these raw levies and the veterans of the Grand Armée. He was able, however, to get together two hundred thousand men, to which he added one hundred thousand more, composed of Saxons, Bavarians, Würtembergers and

Hessians. But it was difficult to estimate the exact value of these auxiliary troops, and the extent to which they were to be trusted.

Napoleon, having decided to march upon Vienna, gave orders for his army to assemble according to the following scheme. The corps of Davout was to march on Ratisbon, that of Lannes on Augsburg, and that of Masséna on Ulm. In their rear was formed the reserve of the cavalry and the guard. The auxiliary forces were posted thus: The Saxons under Bernadotte at Würzburg, the Württembergers between Würzburg and Ulm, and the Bavarians between Munich and Landshut. The main centre of concentration was to be Ratisbon, and the Emperor sent Berthier to that place to make preparations. Judging from previous experience, he thought that Austria would not commence hostilities till the end of April.

Archduke Charles crossed the Isar at Landshut on April 16, and, advancing in a westerly direction, drove the Bavarians back upon Neustadt. He was imperfectly informed as to the position of the French and believed them to be divided into two masses, one at Augsburg, the other at Ratisbon. His plan was to penetrate between them, to cut them in two, and then to double round upon Ratisbon and crush the French between his own army and the army of Bohemia. On April 17 he reached the river Abens, in pursuance of his scheme, and only sent a weak body towards Ratisbon to reconnoitre. On April 18, leaving the troops of General Hiller and the Archduke Ludwig at Abensberg, he prepared to march by his right towards Ratisbon with seventy thousand men.

If the Archduke had been a day or two earlier in

his movements he would have accomplished his design, and perhaps annihilated the corps of Davout. Napoleon was far from the scene of conflict, and Berthier, bewildered without the presence of his master, did not know what to do. He was so accustomed to act under orders that he was paralysed by responsibility. By the rapidity of the Austrian advance the original plan of concentration at Ratisbon had become impossible, and it was difficult, under these new circumstances, for the Emperor to give precise orders, or for Berthier to carry them into effect.

But Napoleon, if he was late in entering upon the campaign, now lost no time. He set out from Paris on April 14, reached Strasburg on the following day, and travelling post-haste, arrived at Donauwörth at eight o'clock in the evening of April 17, without his guard or his field equipage, without horses or staff. He addressed his troops in trumpet tones: "I have come here with the speed of lightning. You were with me when the sovereign of Austria came to my bivouac in Moravia; you heard how he begged for my clemency and swore eternal friendship. We have been conquerors in three wars; Austria owes everything to our magnanimity; three times has she broken her oath. Our previous successes are a sure guarantee of the victory that awaits us. Forward, then, so that the enemy when he sees us may recognise his conquerors."

Concentration at Ratisbon having become impossible, Napoleon determined to concentrate at Neustadt, and ordered Davout and Masséna to advance thither, Masséna leaving only two German regiments at Augsburg, and Davout only one regiment at Ratisbon. Davout was to march towards the mouth of

the Abens, between the Danube and the army of the Archduke, with the utmost secrecy and rapidity; Napoleon would advance as far as Ingolstadt to meet him. Davout performed this difficult task with foresight, cleverness, tenacity and courage, passing by country roads, through a woody and hilly country, and arrived at Abensberg on April 19, unperceived by the Austrians.

Napoleon now felt himself in a position to strike a decisive blow. On April 20 he fought the battle of Abensberg, the object of which was to cut the Austrian army into two, in which operation he was completely successful. When the battle was over he did not take off his clothes and only slept for a few hours in an armchair. He mounted his horse at daybreak to pursue the enemy to Landshut. Here on April 21 a furious engagement took place, as the Austrians had made this town a depot for their munitions of war, their provisions, their artillery and their pontoon train. The struggle was mainly directed towards the possession of the bridge. Masséna arrived with three divisions at a critical moment of the fight. The Austrians were compelled to retreat and abandoned to the French the whole of their war material and seven thousand wounded, sick, and prisoners.

The next day, April 22, witnessed the battle of Eckmühl. The Archduke had kept his army during these two days between Tengen and Eckmühl, but he had also made himself master of Ratisbon in order to secure his retreat across the Danube. After this he determined to await a decisive battle on the river Gross-Laber. Napoleon, when he heard of the capture of Ratisbon, knew that the troops whom he had defeated at Landshut could not be the main body

of the Austrian army, so he determined to seek his adversary farther towards the north. He ordered Davout to hold his ground and promised that he would soon come up to his assistance. Leaving Landsbut in the early morning with Masséna he reached Eckmühl at two in the afternoon. The Archduke had committed the error of marching with the bulk of his army towards the Abach, to cut off the French communications; so that Eckmühl was only defended by a small detachment. Even before Napoleon arrived Davout attacked the Austrians' right with impetuosity. There was no question of Charles being able to turn the flank of the French; he had enough to do to protect himself. Davout wrested from the enemy the two villages of Oberleichting and Unterleichting, driving them with the bayonet from house to house, while Napoleon, commanding in the centre, swept the high-road and the banks of the Laber. The ground beyond Eckmühl rises towards the north, and here the Austrians were able for some time to make a stand. But on Napoleon threatening their left, as their right was already threatened by Davout, they were afraid of being surrounded, and retreated towards the plain of Ratisbon with the loss of ten thousand men. Darkness put an end to the battle at about seven o'clock, and the pursuit was not continued after nightfall. In this murderous conflict the French lost two thousand five hundred men and the Austrians about four times that number. Davout received the title of "Prince of Eckmühl."

The Archduke retreated to Ratisbon, and during the night his best troops crossed the stream to the left bank. The French were again in movement at daybreak on April 23. At Ratisbon they engaged

with the Austrian cavalry, who for some time prevented them from seeing the pontoons which had been thrown across the river. As soon as Lannes observed the pontoons he opened fire upon them and set them in flames. The town was surrounded by a simple wall defended by towers and a ditch. Napoleon, who desired to sleep that night in the town, ordered a breach to be made. As the Emperor rode up to watch the operations through his field-glass, he was wounded in the foot, but very slightly, and was soon able to mount his horse again. After some delay the wall was climbed by the aid of scaling-ladders; a gate was opened and the French became masters of the town.

Thus ended this marvellous campaign of five days, each day of which was marked by a battle. The glorious successes which Napoleon had achieved might console him for his delay in beginning the war, for the insurrection of the Tyrol, for the indifference of the Russians, and for the reverses of Prince Eugène in Italy. Even his detractors admit that his military genius never showed itself in greater perfection, and the mixture of calculation and daring with which these results were brought about have never been surpassed in the annals of war. The Emperor could with truth make the proud boast to his soldiers that they had exemplified the difference between the trained veterans of Cæsar and the armed hordes of Xerxes, that in less than a week they had been victorious in three pitched battles and in three engagements, and that they had captured one hundred guns, forty standards, and fifty thousand prisoners.

CHAPTER XIII.

ASPERN AND ESSLINGEN.

NAPOLEON now marched upon Vienna by the right bank of the Danube, driving before him both the troops of Archduke Ludwig and those of Hiller. Archduke Charles, even after the battle of Eckmühl, might have disputed the advance of the enemy upon the capital, by crossing himself to the right bank of the river either at Linz or at Krems. But this would have been a dangerous undertaking and the Archduke did not feel himself strong enough to adopt it. He therefore took up a position at Cham, on the frontiers of Bohemia, whilst Masséna pushed on rapidly towards Linz. A battle took place at the village of Ebelsberg, which commands the passage of the Traun, dominated by a castle full of troops and well provided with cannon. The place was hard to capture, and it would have been better to wait for reinforcements, but Masséna was always inclined to take the bull by the horns and gave orders for the assault. The village which lies before the bridge was speedily mastered, the Austrians being killed or dispersed in flight. General Coehorn pressed over the bridge with his light troops, mounted the steep heights on the other side and penetrated to the market-place, over which the castle towered. To save Coehorn Masséna bombarded the castle, and sent two brigades across the bridge, which was encumbered with dead and wounded. Thrice was the bridge

taken and retaken, and only in the fourth attack did the French succeed.

The town soon burst into flames. The castle was defended with heroic valour, the doors were hewn down and the fortress was disputed room by room, and won by cold steel. The Austrians now retired, having lost one hundred and sixteen officers and four thousand five hundred men, but having taken three eagles and fourteen hundred prisoners. Attracted by the cannonade, Napoleon now rode up to the scene of battle. He was enraged at what he saw, because he knew the sacrifice to be useless. The Traun had already been crossed in two or three places, and the Austrians, when they recognised the superiority of the enemy, would not have attempted resistance. It is probable that if the offender had been any other than Masséna he would have been driven from the army; as it was, Napoleon contented himself with a severe rebuke.

On May 7 Napoleon reached the great monastery of M \ddot{o} lk, and on May 9 the headquarters of the French were at St. P \ddot{o} lten. On May 10, at nine o'clock in the morning, Napoleon rode into the Park of Sch \ddot{o} nbrunn, just a month after the beginning of the war. Vienna, commanded by the Archduke Maximilian, attempted to resist. But the French threw some three thousand bombs into the town, and caused some damage and more terror. In the middle of the night the Archduke withdrew over the Danube bridge, which he destroyed, giving orders to General Bubna to hold out for two days longer. This, however, was impossible, and on May 13 the city was occupied by the French.

The situation of the invaders was now less favourable than in 1805, because their communications

with the left bank of the Danube had been cut off by the destruction of the Tabor bridge, which on the previous occasion they had taken by a stratagem. Napoleon therefore took precautions against attack, especially on the part of the Archduke John, and of the Austrian army in Italy. He formed a vast network of cavalry along all the roads by which the enemy could advance. He ordered Prince Eugène to follow the Archduke John, and Marmont to leave the Illyrian provinces. Archduke John had crossed the Isonzo on May 11, closely followed by Eugène and Macdonald. The Austrians now divided themselves into two armies, one advancing to Laibach in Carinthia, and the other to Graz in Styria. Eugène was compelled to make a similar partition of his forces, but his strategy was successful, for the Archduke was compelled to make a long détour, and could not appear on the battle-fields of the Marchfeld in time to be of any use.

Napoleon was relieved from this danger, but he had still to deal with the Archduke Charles, who had drawn up his army in front of Vienna on the plain of the Marchfeld. In order to attack him it was necessary to cross the Danube, a river broad, deep, and rapid. The enterprise was not impossible, but it was very difficult. It required much time and mature preparation. But the genius of Napoleon took no account either of difficulties or of time. From his first arrival at Vienna he had collected with the utmost vigour everything that could serve for his passage of the stream. He, however, soon discovered that they were insufficient for an army of eighty thousand men and for the crossing of a river like the Danube, subject to continual floods from the melting of the mountain snows. He deter-

mined to effect his passage at the point where the stream is divided into two parts by the island of Lobau, which is about eight miles long and five broad. It was wooded in the centre, and could conceal and protect an army. On one side it is only about sixty yards from the left bank, but in order to reach it from the village of Ebersdorf two branches of the Danube had to be crossed, the first of which was two hundred and forty and the other one hundred and twenty yards wide, divided by a sand-bank in the centre. It was necessary, therefore, to build three bridges, the last in sight of the enemy. For this purpose seventy or eighty large barges would be required, and the Austrians had been careful to destroy or to remove everything of the kind. All preparations, therefore, had to be made afresh— pontoons, cables, and anchors. As these last would take much time to forge, Napoleon used heavy cannon instead, five hundred of which he had found in Vienna, and chests full of cannon-balls. Masséna conducted the work with such speed, under the supervision of Napoleon, that in six days the bridges were ready without the Austrians knowing anything that was going on.

On May 18 the Emperor removed his headquarters from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf, and at ten o'clock on the evening of the following day the first French boat left the shore. The Austrians, who held the island, were surprised and driven back, and the centre of Lobau was occupied, the troops wading through water. The construction of the third bridge offered the greatest difficulties, but it was completed in three hours. Lasalle was the first to occupy the left bank with four cavalry regiments, followed by skirmishers. The villages of Aspern and Esslingen were seized

without much difficulty. Aspern was occupied by Molitor, and Esslingen by Boudet. Both villages possessed wide streets and stone houses, Aspern a church with a walled churchyard, and Esslingen a huge corn magazine built of stone. These features were of importance in the battles which ensued.

Before the two villages was a small wood in which the cavalry of Lasalle bivouacked. Here also Napoleon slept, surrounded by a detachment of his guard, without taking off his clothes. The advance of the army continued through the whole night, infantry, artillery and cavalry, the last consisting of fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, under the command of Espagne. The army debouched into a wide plain, consisting of meadows and corn-fields.

About midday Berthier, looking out from the church-tower of Esslingen, saw a cloud of cavalry, and the army of the Archduke Charles coming down into the plain in battle array. Napoleon said to the priest of Aspern, "In an hour Austria will be at my feet." Many hours, however, had to pass before that end could be accomplished. Lannes was now ordered to advance from Esslingen on the right wing, and Masséna from Aspern on the left wing; the space between being occupied by cavalry and artillery. The numbers on each side are not certain. The best authorities say that one hundred and five thousand Austrians were opposed to one hundred and ten thousand French, although the official records of the time make the numbers seventy-five thousand and eighty thousand respectively.

The battle began at two in the afternoon on May 21, by the attack of Hiller upon Aspern. Every house was hotly disputed, and the village was set in flames; it was taken and retaken six times, Masséna

directing the fight from the churchyard with great coolness, but at the seventh charge he was forced to retire, and at eleven at night the Austrians were in possession of Aspern. Not less violent were the attacks on Esslingen and on the centre, but neither of them proved successful, and at night Esslingen still remained in the possession of the French. Napoleon spent the night at the side of the bridge, watching over the passage of his troops. Twice or more news was brought to him that the great bridge had been broken down, but each time it was restored.

The battle was renewed on the following day. Napoleon, having received reinforcements of twenty-two thousand men during the night, felt certain of victory. His plan was that Masséna should retake Aspern, Lannes should defend Esslingen against all attacks, and then force himself like a wedge through the Austrian centre, and cut the army of the enemy in two. Davout, who had been left on the right bank of the river, was now to support Lannes.

The battle raged for many hours round the two villages. Masséna captured Aspern nine times and succeeded in becoming master of the churchyard, but each time he was driven back. Napoleon took advantage of the mist to attack with his cavalry the Hungarian regiments of General Hiller, but he also was repulsed. In the meantime Lannes formed the wedge consisting of twenty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry which was to penetrate the centre of the Austrians. The charge was at first successful, and some fugitives declared that the battle was lost; but by the bravery and steadfastness of the Archduke and Prince John of Lichtenstein order was restored. Their whole line moved forward, and Esslingen was nearly recaptured. Lannes

sat down disheartened on the edge of the canal which united Aspern with Esslingen and covered his face with his hands. A spent ball struck him on both knees. "I am wounded," he cried to his adjutant; "give me your hand and help me to rise." But he was unable to stand. He was carried from the field of battle, but died on May 30, the cherished friend of his master and the hero of the French army.

The onslaught of the Austrians had failed, but the French had suffered a heavy defeat. They had probably lost seven thousand dead and thirty-four thousand wounded, while the loss of the Austrians was four thousand two hundred and eighty dead and sixteen thousand wounded. This was the second great battle in which Napoleon had been worsted. The belief in his invincibility was on the wane, but he was now to show that his genius shone forth as highly in adversity as in success. Esslingen and what remained of Aspern were still in the possession of the French and covered their retreat across the Danube.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ISLAND OF LOBAU.

NAPOLEON returned to the island of Lobau and summoned his marshals Masséna, Berthier, and Lannes to a conference. Davout arrived somewhat later. The Emperor now formed the plan of converting the island of Lobau into a place of arms, in order that he might cross into the Marchfeld a month later when the waters were lower, and the bridge was in greater security. The generals were in favour of a speedy retreat to Vienna, leaving behind them their wounded, their artillery, and their horses; but Napoleon pointed out that this meant nothing less than a retreat to Strasburg, and possibly the destruction of the Empire of France. It was better that Masséna should continue to hold Aspern till midnight, and then retire into the island and hold it against all comers. Davout promised, on his part, to defend Vienna against the Archduke.

Napoleon, on his side, crossed the island of Lobau with Berthier, Davout and Savary, and reached the right bank in a small boat shortly before midnight. From Ebersdorf he ordered supplies of all kinds to be carried into the island, biscuits, wine, brandy and ammunition. He sat for some time in thought with tears in his eyes; he then fell into a deep sleep which lasted for thirty hours, his staff doubting whether he would ever wake. The forty days which

intervened between the battles of Aspern and Wagram were spent by Napoleon in converting Lobau into a fortress, an impregnable citadel. He was present every day in person directing all kinds of work. The island was occupied by forty-five thousand picked troops, commanded by Masséna. In the space of three weeks sixty piles had been driven into the river-bed, reaching far above the highest known high-water mark. On these was laid a perfectly firm road, capable of being used by any number of artillery and cavalry. Twenty yards lower down the stream lay the old pontoon bridge, for the use of the infantry, strengthened, enlarged and held firm by strong cables and anchors. The upper bridge, while it protected the bridge of boats, was itself protected by a stockade, built in an oblique direction, across the stream. A guard of sailors was formed to watch the upper waters and to intercept anything which was likely to interfere with the security of the bridges.

In this manner Lobau was transformed into a fortified camp, in every respect fit for the sojourn of a large army, spacious, secure, and healthy. Lofty causeways afforded a dry passage free from all danger of floods. Bridges were built across all the water-courses. A powder-magazine was erected, bakehouses and kitchens were established, and places were marked out for washing. Large quantities of meal were stored in the island; thousands of horned cattle from Hungary were collected there. There was abundance of rich Austrian wine in casks and bottles, the whole place was lighted up like a town, and the place of each regiment was legibly marked. Thus Lobau formed not only a safe and secure passage into the Marchfeld, but a means of retreat to Vienna in case of disaster.

There was little doubt that Napoleon would again seek the Archduke Charles in his old position, but there was grave doubt as to where he would cross. The Austrians were of opinion that out of sheer obstinacy he would again attack Aspern and Esslingen, which were consequently most carefully fortified by the Archduke. Napoleon, however, had other plans in view. He determined to cross from the east side of the island, to throw a mass of French troops into Marchfeld over four bridges in two hours, to march round the Austrians and to make their present position useless, to roll them up from the left flank and to compel the Archduke to retreat. He therefore had four bridges secretly prepared in a retired bay surrounded by woods. One of them was constructed in a single piece, so as to swing across the stream. The channel was comparatively narrow in that part, and it was quite the best place for the crossing, although it had been overlooked by the Austrians. As the decisive day approached Napoleon's visits became more frequent and longer, and the works were continued day and night. He practised sailing up the Danube in all weathers. In the principal branch of the Danube he had twenty-two rafts, twenty-one pontoons and many boats of different sizes. Captain Baste of the Imperial navy anchored with a flotilla above the island. Enzersdorf was well defended by a battery. Munition and supplies of every kind were most abundant. On July 1 Napoleon left Schönbrunn and established his headquarters in Lobau. Archduke Charles could observe from his position regiment after regiment marching into the island, but he could not see what was inside, as it was protected by lofty trees. Spies were altogether absent, because any one found in the island who was not a

French soldier was immediately hanged. War correspondents were not thought of in those days!

On June 30 Masséna set his troops in motion and built a pontoon bridge in the very spot where Napoleon had crossed on the previous occasion. Three days afterwards he occupied another large island and protected it by an earthwork. This also pointed to a passage opposite Esslingen. These two bridges enabled him to advance against the right and left of the Austrians. Sailors summoned from Holland and from Brest sailed up and down the Danube, apparently with the object of finding a landing-place.

CHAPTER XV.

THE BATTLE OF WAGRAM.

ON the afternoon of July 4, 1809, Napoleon observed that the point at which he intended to cross was only guarded by small detachments of the enemy. The day was extremely hot and a storm seemed to be imminent. At eight o'clock in the evening three guns were fired as a signal. All the bands and trumpets played the air of Queen Hortense, "Partant pour la Syrie," and a cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" broke from a thousand voices. In the midst of the pouring rain and blinding hail General Couroux occupied the Shoemakers' Island with fifteen hundred sharpshooters. He drove before him the weak Austrian outposts, while Captain Baste commanded the left bank from his flotilla. In two hours the first bridge was ready, and Oudinot crossed at midnight. The other three bridges were soon fit for use. The darkness was lit up by the lightnings of the sky, the flight of the red-hot cannon-balls, and the burning houses of Enzersdorf. Napoleon superintended the construction of each bridge himself, giving counsel and urging the men to haste. The storm was in his favour as it had been in his first enterprise, the capture of Toulon. In twelve hours one hundred and sixty thousand men made their way into the Marchfeld full of confidence in their leader. The plan had been carefully thought out, and every general knew what he had to do. The French were ready for the attack before

the Austrians had taken up their position. 'About eight o'clock in the morning Napoleon threw two other bridges across the Danube for the third and fourth army corps, which consisted of one hundred and fifty thousand men, five hundred and fifty guns, and forty thousand horses. He crossed himself a little before ten, with the joy of victory in his face.

Wednesday, July 5, 1809, broke a lovely summer's morning, fresh and invigorating after the storm of the previous night. Napoleon's first action was to occupy Enzersdorf. The French advance was in the shape of a fan. In the first line Masséna occupied the extreme left in the neighbourhood of Esslingen, then came Bernadotte with his Saxons, then Oudinot, and then Davout. In the second line the army of Prince Eugène, which had come up from Italy, formed the left, and the corps of Marmont the right. The Guard formed the reserve. The artillery and the cavalry were massed on the flanks. Regnier was left behind with seven battalions to defend Lobau.

The Archduke Charles had dispersed his army in a wide sweeping curve. His left, covered by the Russbach, occupied the plateau of Neusiedel and Wagram, his right rested on the Danube. Napoleon met with few obstacles as he advanced; Davout was able to seize the villages opposed to him; Bernadotte reached Aderklaa; the left under Masséna took possession of Esslingen and Aspern. Napoleon made an attempt to capture Wagram, but he met with an obstinate resistance, and it became evident that the Archduke was prepared for a mortal struggle, which the following day would decide.

Napoleon's order of battle for July 6 formed an

obtuse-angled triangle. Napoleon slept in his own field-tent surrounded by his guard. His marshals received no written orders; they only knew that his scheme was to pierce the centre with a wedge and to surround the left flank of the enemy, to break through the Austrian line and then to roll it up. The Archduke in vain tried to sleep. Anxiety and labour banished sleep from his eyes, and he suffered on the day of battle from this want of repose. At break of day a thick mist covered the field. The Austrians began the battle with an attack upon Davout who held his ground with his accustomed tenacity. The fire then extended along the whole line from Glinzendorf to the Danube. On the previous day Bernadotte had occupied Aderklaa, which formed the apex of the French triangle, but he was violently attacked by the Austrians and driven out. Masséna, who, unable to sit on horseback, was driven in a carriage, attempted to stop the flight by firing on the fugitives, and Napoleon riding up, cried, "Why can I not be master of Aderklaa only for a few hours?"

Encouraged by this success, the Archduke attempted to extend his attack towards Aspern and Esslingen on his right. He desired to weaken the centre of the French and to press on towards the river. However, the centre was protected by the artillery of the reserve and by Macdonald's infantry. Davout now received orders to attack the heights of Neusiedel. This was a serious task, as it meant an advance over steep ground under a plunging fire. After two repulses Davout was successful, and the heights were won. This was the decisive moment of the battle, and even if Archduke John had now appeared upon the scene he would have been too late. The whole of the Austrian position, behind the Russbach, was

enfiladed, and at one o'clock the Archduke ordered the retreat of the fourth corps.

During all these hours Napoleon was watching the battle with eagerness. He had covered his simple uniform with a gray overcoat, rode a small Arabian horse, white in colour, and carried a little riding-whip in his hand. He was surrounded by a numerous staff, including about a dozen orderlies who were ranged in lines one behind the other. His countenance betrayed no emotion, his expression was serious, and in his face nothing stirred but his fiery eyes. He listened quietly to all the advices brought to him, and if he had to give an order he called out, "Officier d'ordonnance," and an orderly rode up. He dictated the order to him slowly and clearly, and then said, "Répétez," upon which the officer repeated the order word by word. If he made a mistake the Emperor showed no annoyance, but repeated the order again, and again said, "Répétez." When the order had been completely understood the Emperor said, "Allez," and the orderly shot forth like an arrow from the string. From the hill on which he was placed Napoleon could survey the whole battle-field, but he seemed to pay little attention to what was immediately in his neighbourhood. He showed no emotion at bad news; once only, when his orders were not immediately obeyed, he took an additional pinch of snuff. When he heard by the sound of his cannon that Davout had taken Neusiedel his countenance lit up with joy, and turning to Berthier, he said, "The battle is won."

At this moment he determined to give the enemy the *coup-de-grâce*. He ordered Oudinot to attack Wagram and gave Macdonald the command of the column which was to pierce the enemy's centre.

More than a hundred guns were to begin the attack, and the column consisted of thirty-one thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. Napoleon in person brought up the reserve. The charge was successful. Wagram was conquered, and the possession of this, together with that of Neusiedel, delivered the whole of the plateau behind the Russbach into the hands of the French. At about two o'clock in the afternoon the Archduke saw that all resistance was hopeless and began the retreat. He had lost thirty thousand men and the French eighteen thousand. Napoleon, who had been nearly forty hours in the saddle, gave up the pursuit and retired to his tent to rest. The Archduke John, who had been so anxiously expected, reached the field of battle at seven in the evening. After some hesitation he determined to retreat and the French were left unmolested.

The army of the Archduke Charles retired towards Bohemia, pursued by the corps of Marmont, who captured many prisoners and stragglers. The Archduke concluding the armistice of Znaim on July 11, and the peace of Vienna, signed on October 14, 1809, put an end to the campaign.

CHAPTER XVI.

TACTICS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.

IT may be useful in relating the history of campaigns, such as those of Napoleon, in which almost all nations of Europe were engaged, to give some account of the tactics employed by them, and of the systems of discipline which were suited to their individual character; and in this there can be no better authority than Colonel George Cathcart, who was himself present in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813. He tells us that in the eighteenth century all the warlike nations of Europe brought their armies into the field on nearly the same system, which perhaps took a consistent form in the time of Gustavus Adolphus and attained its perfection under Frederick the Great. This system had the formation of general lines and movements in line for its chief characteristics, and although the evolutions calculated to lead to that object were generally in open columns, and slower and more formal than those adopted in recent times, yet they continue even to our own day to form the basis of tactics.

A new system of tactics became necessary when the armies of the French Revolution began to overrun Europe. The ranks were mainly composed of raw lines of youths, brought up in revolutionary principles, and not calculated to submit to the methodical theories previously practised. A new system was re-

quired to enable superior numbers to prevail over superior discipline. Napoleon found this system in operation and followed it, but improved it by his genius. He trusted mainly to the influence of large concentrated masses of troops placed in reserve and concealed from the enemy as much as possible. When he had arranged these with great skill, he began operations with numerous light troops along his whole front, supported by artillery at various points. His object often was to deceive the enemy as to his real intentions, and to induce them to compromise their whole force along an extensive front. At last the decisive moment was seized for bringing up an overwhelming mass of troops, preceded by a swarm of light infantry, and covered by concentrated power of artillery, to attack the weakest or most unguarded point of the enemy's position, and to secure the victory which was completed by cavalry. Under these circumstances grand line movements of the whole army, after the manner of Frederick the Great, were never used, and would not have been practicable amongst troops of that time. Occasional deployments into line were used for special purposes by single battalions or brigades, or even by larger bodies; but nothing like the old "order of battle" was ever thought of in that mode of warfare.

This new system, introduced by necessity, had two great advantages—celerity of movement in the field and the right use of reserves. The armies of the eighteenth century were active on the march, but were slow and pompous in their preparation for attack, and they underrated the importance of reserves. Wellington appears to have combined the best parts of both these systems and to have adopted a quickness of movement without hurry and con-

fusion, and a judicious use of reserves without abandoning line formation.

Napoleon, having been educated as an artillery officer, always made good use of that arm, and placed great reliance on it, often concentrating batteries to the amount of one hundred guns to support an attack or strengthen a weak position. His light artillery was also efficient, but from carelessness in its use he often exposed his guns to capture. But artillery, although it may intimidate inexperienced troops, is generally less destructive than musketry at close range, or the bayonet if applied with vigour. It certainly was so in the battles which we are narrating.

The nations who were opposed to and were beaten by Napoleon generally learnt to imitate his methods and gave up many of their old traditions. In the campaign of 1806 the Russians were very steady in the ranks and capable of line movements, but having been beaten by Napoleon, they changed their system in 1812 and 1813, apparently without any great advantage. The Russian artillery, also, were better able to pull through and surmount obstacles than any other in the field; they arrived sooner in position, and could remain there longer. This is greatly due to their experience of the bad roads of their own country and of Poland, which are almost impassable in spring and autumn. The Russian cavalry of reserve was most splendid and efficient in respect to horses, appointments and discipline, but the Emperor was too much inclined to husband their strength and to keep them out of danger. The Russian light cavalry was also very good and steady. Cathcart is of opinion that the Cossacks were neither so terrible nor so useful as has been generally rep-

resented. They had little efficiency in a general action, or when opposed to regular cavalry forces at all equal to their own. On outpost duty they saved much fatigue to the regular cavalry, but were never entirely entrusted with that service. Cathcart tells us that he once heard Prince Eugène say that the Cossacks did more good than harm to their enemies, especially in the retreat to Moscow, and he is inclined to give his adhesion to this judgment.

At the time of the battle of Jena the Prussians possessed a fine army composed largely of veteran soldiers, and drilled in the tactics of Frederick the Great. It was consequently beaten by Napoleon, who brought concentrated masses to bear upon it with a celerity not hitherto considered practicable. After the peace of Tilsit the numbers of the Prussian regular army were reduced to very small dimensions, but the outburst of national feeling which followed the humiliation of that epoch called into existence a national army, while the genius of Scharnhorst converted the oppression of the conqueror into a machinery for giving raw recruits the solidity and efficiency of practical soldiers.

The ordinances of August, 1808, gave the Prussian army an entirely new organisation. They provided that foreign recruiting should be abolished, and that promotion should no longer be determined by advantages of birth or mere length of service, but that professional knowledge, education and bravery should take their place. Dishonourable punishments were done away with, the articles of war made more lenient, and improvements effected in dress and equipment, in the formation and organisation of the army, and in the comparative strength of the various arms. By the treaty of Tilsit the strength

of the Prussian army was reduced to forty-five thousand men, but it was arranged that the component parts of this force should be changed every three months. New recruits were admitted to the army, and those who passed out were formed into a reserve. Even those who had received no military training were formed into a National Militia. Besides the standing army, all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty were to arm, clothe, and exercise themselves at their own cost. The schools also received a military organisation, so that boys and young men might gain experience of soldierly discipline and training.

It is evident that there was not time for these new levies of the Prussian army to arrive at tactical efficiency, and there were good reasons for assimilating the use made of them in war to that employed by the enemy, and although at a later period the Prussian army revived the old system of line movements, yet in 1813 this was not the case. The system then adopted was that of concentrated masses, and the employment of light infantry supported by columns of attack. Cathcart considers that the Prussian artillery was efficient in every respect, but inferior to the Russian in cases of difficulty and even on the line of march. The Prussian cavalry was extremely good, which is partly owing to the fact that Blücher was brought up as a cavalry officer.

Similarly the Austrian army was in a high state of systematic discipline, and was accustomed to the tactics dependent on line movement; but it had not the good fortune of being schooled in adversity to the same degree as the Prussians. It never adopted a democratic or a national system. The new Bohemian and other levies which were summoned to its ranks

were a source rather of danger than of strength. The Austrian artillery, also, was old-fashioned and slow to move, but when it did arrive in position was scientifically served. Their ambulance, also, was cumbrous and expensive, and too slow for the modern rapidity of movement. The Austrian cavalry was perhaps superior on the whole to that of any other Power in the field; their light cavalry was composed of Hungarian hussars and Polish Uhlans, which received from other nations the sincere flattery of imitation.

It may be remarked, in conclusion, that in all continental armies the order of battalions when formed in line was invariably three deep, the English being the only nation which could trust the stability of a line only two deep. In the days of Marlborough the formation of the British army was also three deep.

PART FOUR.

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA, 1812.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ADVANCE TO SMOLENSK.

IT is no part of the scope of this work to discuss the causes of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, amongst the outward reasons for which, perhaps, the most intelligible was the desire to force Russia into a closer observance of the Continental System, that is of the continental blockade against English commerce. But it must be remembered that the main object of Napoleon's policy, after the regeneration of France, was the calling back into life the two other Latin nations, Italy and Spain, placing them under strong governments, instinct with the modern spirit, and forming them into a confederation under the supremacy of France to resist the great military despotisms of the North. It must have been obvious to Napoleon, as it is clear to any one at the opening of the present century, that unless some heroic effort were made to preserve them, the Latin nations were doomed to political disintegration, and that England and Russia must become the eventual masters of the world. Napoleon, at St. Helena, deeply as he regretted the folly of the Russian campaign, also foresaw the gigantic

development of that country in the future and the danger which it might cause to Europe. It is probable therefore that, even if events had turned out very differently to what they actually did, Napoleon could not have completed his career without a struggle against Russia of some kind. The re-establishment of the independence of Poland, which may be compared to the creation of the Italian kingdom, was an insult and a menace to Russia, and it is not likely that the renaissance of a Polish Nation would have been more tolerable to Alexander than it had been to his predecessors.

However this may be, the expedition into Russia is the greatest military enterprise the world has ever seen, and it will be sufficient if we confine ourselves to its military aspects. Napoleon began to cross the Niemen on June 24. To those who know the later history of the campaign it is difficult to understand why he commenced operations so late in the year. Napoleon had originally intended to open the campaign towards the close of May, at which time the grass would be grown and there would be fodder for the horses. He also apparently designed to attack St. Petersburg and to begin with the siege of Riga and Düna-burg. He probably hoped to bring the Russians to a decisive engagement somewhere in Lithuania, and it is fairly certain that, if at the outset of the campaign he had contemplated the march to Moscow, he would not have lost so important a month as June.

The Emperor was for some time in the dark as to the Russian plans, but when he heard that two Russian armies had been formed, one of one hundred and fifty thousand men under Barclay de Tolly, and the other of one hundred thousand men under Prince

Bagration; that the first was to advance in the direction from Vilna to Kowno, and the second from Minsk to Grodno, he determined to cross the Niemen at Kowno, to march quickly on to Vilna, to place himself between the two armies and to keep them separated during the remainder of the campaign. Napoleon had with him the corps of Davout, Oudinot, Ney, and the Imperial Guard. Macdonald was to cross the Niemen (or, as it is there called, the Memel) at Tilsit, occupy both sides of the stream and march into Courland. He had with him thirty thousand Prussians and two divisions of Poles, and these formed the left wing. Prince Eugène was to command the right wing, eighty thousand strong, consisting of Italians and Bavarians, and was to cross the Niemen at Prenn. Still further to the right King Jerome was to pass over the stream with the Poles, Saxons and Westphalians and the fourth corps of the reserve artillery. Besides there was a reserve of one hundred and fifty thousand men and sixty thousand soldiers who had been disabled by the heavy marching. The whole army which traversed the frontier of Russia at midsummer is reckoned by the best authorities at 630,058 men, consisting of 533,479 foot and 96,579 horse—the largest body of men which ever obeyed a single commander in historical times.

This mighty host stood on the banks of the Niemen on the eve of St. John's Day, 1812. Nothing was heard of the movement of the Russian armies, but some squadrons of Cossacks were seen riding over the plain on the other side of the stream. The Emperor passed the night in a peasant's hut on the left bank, having traversed the river, driven away the Cossacks, and chosen the best spot for crossing.

Three bridges were constructed. Napoleon stood at their head at daybreak and witnessed the march of the invading columns. He was saluted by the youth of Europe, an army drawn from every portion of his vast dominions, with the cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" and a joyous enthusiasm which showed no foreboding of future disaster.

During the whole of two days the vast masses were defiling across the bridge, and, as soon as they had crossed, pressed on to Vilna. The distance is sixty miles, and it was covered by many of the troops in three days. During this time the Emperor Alexander was at Vilna, which he did not leave till June 27. Before doing so he issued a proclamation to his army saying that he had no wish for war, that he had refrained from arming until repeated insults compelled him to do so, and that the attack of Napoleon was unprovoked. On the same day he addressed a letter to the Governor of St. Petersburg, by way of a manifesto to the nation, which ended with the declaration that he would not lay down his arms so long as a single hostile soldier remained on the soil of Russia. He also sent his aide-de-camp, Balashov, to Napoleon, with offers to negotiate if the French would recross the Niemen. The messenger was by the Emperor's orders detained by Davout until Napoleon was installed in Vilna in the quarters which Alexander had only just quitted.

When the heads of the first French column reached Vilna the Lithuanians were prepared to give them a welcome reception. But the troops were weary with their forced march, hungry and thirsty; they threw themselves like beasts of prey upon the bakers' shops and the wine-shops and consumed everything that they could lay their hands upon. The inhabitants

were frightened; they shut up their houses and concealed themselves. The consequence of this was that when Napoleon rode into the town on the morning of June 28, he found closed windows instead of triumphal arches. No officers came out to meet him. Vilna seemed a city of the dead. He rode through the town to the bridge, which the Russians had fired before their retreat. On the other side of the stream he saw the magazines blazing which the Russians had spent eighteen months in collecting. He then retired to the Palace, which Alexander had left the evening before, and sent for the authorities, by whom he was well received.

On the following day there was a violent storm, the precursor of five days' heavy rain. The temperature fell and the heat of summer was turned into the frost of winter. The soldiers had their first experience of Russian weather. Its principal effect was to disorganise the vast trains of supplies which were following the ranks of the army. The roads broke up, the horses failed, the waggons stuck fast in the ruts unable to move, and the soldiers had no food except what they could obtain by pillage.

On July 1 Balashov was admitted by the Emperor to an audience. The conversation lasted a long time. Amongst other things Napoleon asked for information about Moscow. "How many inhabitants has Moscow?" "Three hundred thousand, Sire." "How many houses?" "Ten thousand, Sire." "And how many churches?" "More than three hundred and fifty." "Why so many?" "They are much frequented by our people." "How is that?" "It is because our people are very religious." "Bah! no one is religious nowadays." "Pardon, Sire, that is not the case everywhere.

People are no longer religious in Germany and Italy, but they are still religious in Spain and Russia." "What is the road to Moscow?" "Sire, your question is embarrassing. The Russians say as the French do, 'All roads lead to Rome.' Many roads lead to Moscow; Charles XII. chose the road by Poltava." The negotiations came to nothing. The two Emperors, who had been so friendly at Tilsit, never saw each other again, yet Alexander always retained kindly feelings towards him, and he was, perhaps, the only European sovereign who felt compassion for the prisoner of St. Helena.

On July 17 Napoleon left Vilna to begin the march to Moscow. Competent judges are of opinion that if he had not delayed there so long the Russian armies might have been destroyed. Their forces consisted at this time of one hundred and seventy thousand ordinary soldiers and ten thousand Cossacks. Their whole strength was calculated at six hundred thousand, but of these only four hundred thousand were ready, and not more than one hundred and eighty thousand were actually available to oppose the French. Barclay de Tolly retired slowly towards the Dwina; Bagration remained in the province of Minsk. Napoleon's design was to crush Barclay himself, whilst Davout and Jerome disposed of Bagration. The Emperor began by marching towards the Dwina as if he wished to join Macdonald, who was advancing on Mitau and Riga; he then turned suddenly to the east and reached Glubokoie on July 18. But he found no Russians there. Barclay was determined not to be cut off from Smolensk. He placed his safety in retreat, and with this object in view sacrificed the camp of Drissa, which it had been intended to de-

fend in imitation of the lines of Torres Vedras, the citadel of Wellington in Portugal, and the possession of the valley of the Dwina. For these reasons he withdrew to Vitebsk, followed at a considerable distance by Murat's cavalry.

Napoleon had no other course open to him but to pursue Barclay on the road to Vitebsk, hoping to bring him to a general action. But the Russian general vanished before him. A cavalry engagement took place at Ostrovno on July 26, in which the Russians lost some two thousand five hundred men. Two days later Napoleon entered Vitebsk, but he found it as deserted as he had found Vilna, Barclay being in full march for Smolensk. He was much disappointed, as he had hoped to engage the enemy before he arrived at Vilna, and certainly before he reached Vitebsk, but the Russians retired before him, devastating the country in their march, pursuing the same policy as the Tartars had employed with such success against Peter the Great.

Nor had the efforts of his subordinates been more successful. Davout was marching against Bagration, having Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, King of Westphalia, under his orders. Jerome's forces did not arrive at the specified time, whether by his own fault or not is a matter of dispute, but Napoleon thought he was to blame and placed the whole of his army on the right under the command of Davout. Jerome retired in disgust to Cassel, the capital of his Westphalian kingdom. In consequence of these errors, for which Napoleon himself may have been partly responsible, Bagration was able to retreat to Smolensk. Davout intercepted him at Mohilev on July 23, and the Russians suffered a defeat. But they were able to cross the Dnieper

lower down and to continue their march. On August 3 the two armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were united at Smolensk, so that plan of Napoleon had completely failed.

Napoleon was not a man to be disconcerted by the failure of his first plan, nor was he long in forming another. He determined to march southwards towards the Dnieper, to join the army of Davout, and then to proceed up the left bank of the stream towards Smolensk. Having occupied this important town, he would cross over to the right bank and force the Russians to a decisive battle, even if they did not come out to meet him before, in order to preserve one of their sacred cities from violation. He left Vitebsk on August 8, crossed the Dnieper at Orsha, and effected a junction with Davout. He found the left bank defended only by bodies of Cossacks who were easily disposed of. Marching with extreme rapidity, he arrived at Smolensk on August 16, where the Russians were already assembled.

After a considerable struggle the conqueror entered the town, but he found little either to gratify his ambition or to further his designs. Barclay, who now had command of both Russian armies, was able to retreat from Smolensk as he had retreated from Vilna and Vitebsk, and to cover his march fifteen thousand Russians sacrificed themselves on the walls and in the streets of their holy city. A council of war was held and the advance upon Moscow resolved upon. It is said that Murat and Prince Eugène were opposed to this plan, but the will of their master was inflexible and the majority voted with him. Before this final resolution was adopted was fought the battle of Valutino or Lubino, in which Ney and Murat attacked the rear-guard of the Russian army

on August 19. The loss on both sides was very heavy, but the engagement had no influence in checking the Russian retreat. There is reason to believe that Napoleon originally intended his first campaign to have ended at Smolensk. But matters had not turned out according to his expectations. To arrest his march at Smolensk under present circumstances would have been to acknowledge defeat, and defeat meant the destruction of his empire.

The successes of Napoleon's generals had in the meantime been greater than his own. Macdonald had occupied Mitau and was now blockading Riga. Oudinot occupied the valley of the Dwina and captured Polotsk. St. Cyr, who succeeded him in his command, defeated Wittgenstein on August 18. On the right the Austrians under Schwarzenberg obtained advantages over the enemy and were able to hold the Russians of Tormasov in check. It is possible that these successes encouraged the Emperor on his advance, as they seemed to show that his communications were assured.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE BORODINO.

THE march upon Moscow began on August 25, 1812, Napoleon having with him a force of one hundred and fifty thousand men, which was perhaps sufficient to conquer the armies opposed to him. The rest of the Grand Army was scattered either between Vilna and Smolensk or on the wings. The condition of the ordinary troops became worse than ever. After leaving Smolensk the country was found to be a barren desert, from which the peasants had fled after burning their villages. The towns, themselves of no importance, were abandoned. The harvest of 1812 was scanty. The latest historian of this campaign, Mr. George, tells us that between Smolensk and Moscow the operations were of extreme simplicity. The Russian army, he says, retreated directly on their base, from time to time threatening to give battle and once doing so, the French following them, ready to accept battle if it were offered, but unable to compel it. The Russians suffered but little, as they had ample magazines on the road; on the other hand, they destroyed all the stores which they could not carry off. The French suffered considerably, as they had to live by marauding, and spread themselves many miles on each side of the road in search of food. Still worse was the lack of water. When the army reached the Borodino it only numbered five-eighths of what it had been on arriving at Smolensk.

The French passed through Dorogobuzh, Viasma, and Gzhatsk. At Viasma reinforcements were received of fifteen thousand men. Barclay had made up his mind that the time had now come for a decisive engagement, and was preparing a position between the two last-mentioned towns, when on the evening of August 29 Prince Kutusov appeared to take over the supreme command.

Russian public opinion had been excited by these continual retreats, the more so that they were directed by Barclay, who was a German by origin. The Russians became ashamed of giving up their country to the enemy, without a struggle. It seemed as if Moscow would in its turn suffer the fate of Smolensk. The result of this was that Barclay was superseded by Kutusov, whose name is familiar to us from the battle of Austerlitz. He was not a more capable general than Barclay, being over seventy years of age and too stout to mount on horseback. Nor was his mind much more active than his body. But he was supposed to represent the fighting traditions of Suvorov, and he possessed the confidence of the nation. He declined to engage in the position chosen by Barclay, and after a few days' march selected another, ever after famous in history as the Borodino.

On September 5 the French army arrived on the banks of the Kolotza, a stream nearly dry in summer, flowing north-eastwards into the Moskva, by which name the French call the battle. They found the heights on the other side of the river fortified by earthworks, a large redoubt on the south and three small batteries. The left of the Russians rested on Utitza and the right on the Kolotza. In front was the redoubt of Shevardino which Napoleon was able to occupy immediately. The numbers engaged were about

one hundred and twenty-five thousand on the French side and one hundred thousand on the Russian. The plan of Kutusov was to remain firm in his position, and to rest entirely on the defensive. Napoleon's plan was also simple—to mass guns at points convenient for commanding the Russian defences, and under cover of their fire to take them by assault with infantry, Poniatowski at the same time turning the enemy's left. Davout was posted on the right, in front of the Shevardino redoubt; Ney, with Junot to support him, prolonged the line to the Kolotza and was to attack towards Semenovskoie; Eugène commanded the left; he was to gain possession of Borodino, and at the due time attack the great redoubt. Behind the centre was posted the guard, which had, however, sent part of its artillery to the front. Thus one hundred and fifteen thousand men were drawn up in a line not much more than two miles in length.

The battle began on September 7 at six o'clock in the morning, and by eight o'clock Davout and Ney had captured the works opposed to them. By this time also Poniatowski had reached Utitza and Eugène had taken Borodino. In order to complete the victory Murat and Ney asked Napoleon to send the guard into action, but he refused, saying that the time had not yet come. After a slight pause the battle began anew, the principal point of attack being the great redoubt. Ney and Murat crossed the ravine and captured Semenovskoie. This enabled them to attack the great redoubt in the rear, whilst Eugène assailed it in front. After a considerable struggle it came into the possession of the French. This was the turning-point of the battle, but success was dearly purchased, for in the *mêlée* Caulaincourt was killed.

It was now three o'clock in the afternoon, but the victory was not complete. It is said that Napoleon was suffering from a severe cold, and that he was without his usual energy, but Mr. George dismisses this as a legend. It is certain that Ney and Murat again asked for the guard to defeat the Russians, but Napoleon refused, and the best judges are of opinion that he was right in his refusal. He said, "If my guard is destroyed to-day and I have to fight another battle to-morrow, how shall I gain it?" He therefore contented himself with cannonading the Russian position with the whole of his artillery. The Russians held their ground with obstinacy and Kutusov did not retire from the field till the following day. The loss was very heavy on both sides. At least seventy thousand dead and wounded strewed the battle-field. The Russians retreated easily and kept at bay the languid pursuit of the French. The army of Kutusov could not prevent the French from entering Moscow, but it remained organised and formed the kernel of future vengeance, and around it was grouped in October the levy of the Russian nation which eventually accomplished the destruction of the invaders.

CHAPTER XIX.

MOSCOW.

THE French entered Moscow with Murat at their head on September 14, 1812, just a week after the battle of Borodino. They had reached the holy city, the goal of their wanderings, with its fortified Kremlin and its gilded cupolas. But they found the capital deserted. The nobles and the well-to-do citizens had left the town; the palaces, well stored with supplies, were empty of inhabitants, and the streets were given up to the common people and to some prisoners who had been released from gaol. The first sight of Moscow had worked upon the French army like that of Jerusalem upon the Crusaders, but when they entered the deserted streets they were seized with a grim horror. In all the capitals which Napoleon had entered he had been met by deputations from the municipality begging for grace and mercy. Here there was nothing of the kind; he was received by no one. The detachments which first entered suspected treachery and moved along the streets with caution, but they soon saw that the city was indeed abandoned and that the signs of desolation were real.

Napoleon had hardly established himself in the Kremlin before a fire broke out in a large store containing spirits belonging to the Government. This had been extinguished with difficulty, when it was discovered that the great bazaar lying north-east of

the Kremlin was on fire. The wind blowing from the east carried the conflagration across the finest streets of the city, and then a change in the wind brought the flames back till the Kremlin itself was in imminent danger and Napoleon was obliged to leave it. The fire raged for three days entirely beyond all control.

When Napoleon was at St. Helena he began to ask Betsy Balcombe, the little English girl who treated him with such scant ceremony, some questions in geography, and on her giving him the information that Moscow was the capital of Russia, he fixed his eyes upon her with a terrible expression and said in a solemn voice, "Who burnt it?" The poor child did not comprehend the significance of the question, which has been indeed a puzzle ever since. But there can be little doubt that it was the work of the governor Rostophchin, acting on his own responsibility, without communicating his design to the Emperor. Wolzogen tells us that when he was leaving Moscow with Barclay de Tolly and his suite Rostophchin joined them. He saw on the road some waggons guarded by soldiers, and on coming up with them discovered that they were the Moscow fire engines. He naturally asked Rostophchin why he had removed them from the capital, and received the reply that he had his good reasons; "But," he added, "I have taken for myself only the horse on which I ride and the dress which I wear." Then turning to his son Sergius, a boy of sixteen, he said, "Take leave of Moscow for the last time; in half an hour it will be in flames."

Napoleon employed the month which he spent at Moscow in active correspondence. He first formed a plan for marching upon St. Petersburg, but Prince

Eugène was the only one of his generals who supported it and the rest clamoured for repose and finality. He also sent, more than once, overtures to Alexander to make peace, but the Tsar, according to his settled resolution, refused to negotiate so long as a single foreign soldier remained on Russian soil. It is not known why Napoleon stayed at Moscow so long or why he left when he did. He formed day after day the most inconsistent projects; he claimed that he was giving the army repose whilst the cavalry was rapidly perishing from want of forage, and whilst Kutusov, who was posted to the south of Moscow at Tarutino, received constant reinforcements and patiently waited for the winter.

At last, on October 19, Napoleon suddenly determined to leave Moscow. He marched in a southerly direction towards the army of Kutusov, with the view of dispersing it and of living in the provinces of Kaluga and Orel, from which he hoped to penetrate into Poland. The numbers of the French army leaving Moscow were ninety thousand infantry, in good condition after their long rest, fourteen thousand cavalry in a wretched state, and other arms numbering twelve thousand.

The advanced guard commanded by Eugène on reaching the town of Maloyaroslavetz found a body of Russian troops drawn up to intercept them. There was a hotly-contested struggle for the bridge, and Eugène, with his Italians, succeeded in capturing the bridge and in taking the town, which was abandoned by the Russians. Napoleon arrived about one o'clock, but he saw that it would be useless to bring any large number of forces across the bridge, which was commanded by Russian guns, and that the whole Russian army would be in position to meet him, be-

fore he could reinforce Eugène. He therefore had to give up all hope of advancing in that direction. It is said that Maloyaroslavetz, although it was a battle on a small scale, was the turning-point of Napoleon's career, and may therefore be reckoned as one of the decisive battles of the world. Mr. George says that it showed for the first time that his expedition had substantially failed. "This day converted fortune into destruction and made his ultimate overthrow a certainty when his enemies combined against him." After the battle he sent for Berthier, Murat, and Bessières. After discussing the state of affairs he put his elbows on the table, and sat for an hour gazing at the map, with his head between his hands, without uttering a word. "In that bitter moment," says Mr. George, "he perhaps realised for the first time that he had failed irretrievably." On the following day he was nearly captured by a body of Cossacks.

Napoleon now abandoned the project of retreating by Kaluga, and determined to regain, by a cross passage at Mozhaisk, the road to Smolensk, which he had followed on his advance. We now know that, if he had persisted in his first designs, he would have been successful. Kutusov had made up his mind to retreat to Kaluga, if Napoleon should show any signs of seriously attacking him, and his troops had already begun to move with that object. If the Emperor had made one more effort he might have gained his purpose of returning through a fertile and inhabited country.

Napoleon reached Borodino on October 28 and found many thousands of corpses still unburied. On the last day of the month he arrived at Viasma. The soldiers had by this time no bread and no brandy;

they had nothing to eat but the flesh of the horses, which were constantly dying from fatigue. The weather was still fine and bright, but the cold at night was severe. The soldiers who wandered away in search of food never came back; they either perished of hunger, were taken by the Cossacks, or were killed by the peasantry. Hundreds threw away their arms, and hundreds more died by the wayside. The first attack of the Russians upon the retreating army was made at Viasma on November 3. Apparently it might have resulted in a terrible disaster for the French if Kutusov had displayed a reasonable amount of energy. The French had only thirty-seven thousand men on the field, so seriously had they been weakened by the causes which have been enumerated.

The retreat on Smolensk was continued, Ney commanding the rear-guard and performing prodigies of valour and endurance, fighting like a common soldier. The winter now began in earnest. On November 6 there was a heavy fall of snow, accompanied by a cold wind. The horses died like flies. It was impossible to discover food for them beneath the snow, and they were helpless on the frozen ground. Hour by hour vehicles had to be abandoned and the number of stragglers enormously increased. In the passage of the River Vop Eugène's corps was reduced from twelve thousand to six thousand, and only twelve guns were left out of the ninety with which it started from Moscow.

On November 9 Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, his advanced guard having already passed it, not having been allowed to enter the town. Here bad news awaited him. Baraguay d'Hilliers had lost a brigade of two thousand men, and Vitebsk had fallen into the hands of the Russians notwithstanding the

efforts of Marshal Victor to defend it. It was obviously impossible to make a long halt at Smolensk, still less to make it a nucleus of winter quarters. Napoleon left Smolensk accompanied by the guard on November 14. His fighting troops were now reduced to thirty thousand, and detachments of the army came up at considerable intervals. He made an arrangement for the purpose of resting the soldiers that they should leave the city in detachments, Eugène on November 15, Davout on November 16, and Ney with the rear-guard on November 17. But these arrangements, conceived in the interests of the soldiers, proved disastrous for them and for their general.

CHAPTER XX.

THE BEREZINA.

THE Russians now determined to intercept the retreat of the Grand Army, and for that purpose Kutusov took up a position in the neighbourhood of Krasnoe, half-way between Smolensk and Orsha. He allowed Napoleon to pass unmolested, but when Eugène arrived he found the way barred. He attacked vigorously in three columns, but was repulsed. Profiting by the darkness, he made a circuit and reached Krasnoe during the night with three thousand five hundred men out of the six thousand with whom he had left Smolensk. Davout, who followed, escaped with some difficulty, the attention of the enemy having been diverted by the action of Napoleon and Eugène; but Ney met with terrible difficulties. The corps which he commanded had been made up at Smolensk to the strength of six thousand men. He left the town before daylight on November 17, having previously blown up the ancient walls and other buildings—a needless act of barbarity. On the afternoon of the day following, when not far from Krasnoe, Ney found a reserve force posted across the road. The day being foggy, he was unable to see the numbers of the enemy and attacked without hesitation. The struggle only lasted a quarter of an hour; the French were repulsed, and nothing was left to him but to reach the main army by a circuit. Starting as soon as it was quite dark, he reached the Dnie-

per, which was covered with a thin coating of ice broken at the edges. Neither guns or carriages could be got across, and in their march they were constantly attacked by Cossacks. They ultimately reached the road which leads from Orsha to Vitebsk at midnight on November 21, and here they met some of Eugène's troops. Ney was saved, but only brought with him to the end nine hundred men out of the six thousand with which he set out.

Napoleon arrived at Orsha on November 19, and found considerable magazines from which it was possible to supply both food and ammunition. The vehicles and baggage waggons were destroyed and the horses set free for the service of the artillery. The Emperor even destroyed his own papers, and by error of judgment the pontoon train was also abandoned, which might have been useful at the Berezina. The Russians were concentrating to dispute the passage of the Berezina at Borisov. The army of Finland, commanded by Wittgenstein, had defeated the corps of Oudinot on October 19, and was pressing the French marshal towards that river. Towards the south the army of Chichagov passed in front of the army of Schwarzenberg, who made no attempt to stop it, and marched up the Berezina by the right bank, whilst Wittgenstein was passing down the river by the left. Thus the small remnant of invaders who had escaped from Moscow had to deal with three armies, those of Kutusov, Chichagov and Wittgenstein. Kutusov for some reason lingered behind at the bridge of Orsha.

On November 23 Napoleon placed his headquarters at Bobr, rather more than half-way between Orsha and Borisov; here he learned that Oudinot had driven the Russians from Borisov, but had

failed to seize the bridge. He knew, therefore, that Berezina must be bridged afresh, and sent forward Eblé the engineer for the purpose. A suitable place for crossing had been found at Studianka, about ten miles above Borisov, and the construction of the bridges began in the early morning of November 26. It had been originally intended to make three bridges, but it was found that the material available was only sufficient for two. These were built about two hundred yards from each other, the lower bridge being intended for infantry and cavalry, the upper bridge, which was of a more solid description, for artillery and vehicles. The sappers had to work up to their shoulders in the icy water, and few of them survived the ordeal. General Eblé, although he was advanced in years, never quitted the spot day or night till the passage was complete. If the pontoon train had not been destroyed at Orsha the bridge could have been laid much more quickly and with much less expenditure of life.

The lower bridge was finished by midday, and Napoleon immediately sent Oudinot's corps across, which was seven thousand strong. The Russians whom he found on the opposite bank he drove back to Borisov. The second bridge was not completed till four o'clock in the afternoon, when it was already dusk. The artillery of the second corps and the guard were sent across at once, and the troops under Ney's command traversed the river during the night. Thus on the morning of November 27 a body of eleven thousand troops was established on the right bank. In the course of that day the remainder of the French army reached Studianka, and Napoleon in person, followed by his guard, crossed about midday. He had personally superintended the construc-

tion of the bridges, assisted by Murat and Berthier. It was fortunate that during this time Chichagov had been absent from Russia by the orders of Kutusov, and that he did not return until the bridges were completed and the bulk of the army had crossed.

Wittgenstein reached Borisov on the left bank on the evening of November 27. He repaired the bridge across the river and opened communications with Chichagov, the result of which was the French were to be attacked on the following morning on both sides of the stream. On the right bank the fighting began early in the morning and continued during the whole day without the Russians making any impression on the French, who were far inferior in number to their enemies. The engagement on the left bank was similar in character, Marshal Victor not having more than five thousand men, chiefly Germans, under his command. The Russians attacked at 10 A.M., and tried to cut off Victor from the bridges. At the first sound of the cannon the non-combatants thronged towards the river, forming a confused mass of men, horses and vehicles, extending a thousand yards along the river bank and two hundred yards deep. The Russians now turned their guns upon the huddled throng, and a panic naturally ensued. Many were pushed into the river and drowned. The space in front of the bridges was covered by a thick mass of broken carriages and heaped bodies of men and horses through which the engineers had eventually to make a regular cutting.

Victor held his ground with heroic tenacity, the Russians being three times his number. At 9 P.M. he received orders to retire, but he did not succeed in effecting his crossing till after midnight. On the following morning the bridges were set on fire,

leaving of course many to perish. Some tried to rush through the fire, others to cross over the ice which broke under their weight, and others to swim or wade across the icy stream. It is not known how many died, but thousands of non-combatants were made prisoners. Very few guns, however, and no soldiers were captured.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE CLOSE.

It is not known how many of Napoleon's troops were lost at the Berezina, but the army which before the passage was numbered by a competent authority at thirty-one thousand, was estimated at nine thousand after it. On December 3 the cold became intense, and continued so until the last French soldiers had quitted Russian soil. The thermometer is said to have fallen as low as 35 degrees below the zero of Fahrenheit, and it seldom or never rose above zero. The destruction of life became terribly rapid. In two days the division of Loison which marched out of Vilna to meet the remains of the Grand Army was reduced by the effect of cold from ten thousand men to three thousand. Ney performed prodigies of valour with the rear-guard, although it was reduced to only a few hundred men. At Molodetschno there was a serious encounter with the Russians on December 4, the cold being intense. On the following day Napoleon arriving at Smorgoni, determined to leave the army and to hasten to Paris in order to mitigate the consequences of his defeat, and to provide means of saving the remnants of his army. This action, which had been stigmatised as cowardly and heartless, was in reality both wise and courageous. He could do nothing more by remaining with his soldiers; he was a sovereign as well as a general, and his presence at the seat of government was indispensable. He took

with him only Caulaincourt (the brother of the diplomatist who had been killed at Borodino), Duroc and Mouton, and had only a handful of horsemen as an escort; indeed, he narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. He reached Warsaw on December 10, and Dresden a few days later, where the sledge in which he travelled is still preserved. He crossed the Rhine at Mainz with considerable difficulty, and at eleven o'clock at night on December 18 entered the Tuilleries. He was at first refused admission, as he was not recognised. Suddenly two men in fur clothing burst into the room of the lady-in-waiting. One made for the Emperor's door; the lady attempted to stop him and uttered a cry which awoke the Empress. She opened the door, recognised her husband and rushed into his arms.

Although the departure of Napoleon was absolutely necessary, it reduced the soldiers to despair. Murat, as of royal rank, was left in command, but he had no other orders except to maintain his ground between the Niemen and the Vistula and to wait for Napoleon's return. On December 9 a few thousands of tattered stragglers reached Vilna. The magazines were pillaged, and the Cossacks soon made their appearance. Those who did not escape quickly enough were killed by them and by the peasants. It is supposed that from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand were left behind in the town. A body of only four thousand three hundred resumed the march to Kowno. Ney recrossed the Niemen almost alone on December 13. About eighteen thousand men were eventually able to reach Königsberg, which before long became hostile to them. Murat returned to his kingdom of Naples in January, 1813.

Military history contains nothing comparable to

the catastrophe of this campaign, and it is difficult to estimate its extent. Of the 630,058 troops which entered Russia, none returned in fighting order except the two wings of Macdonald and Schwarzenberg, numbering about ten thousand. From the main army escaped about eighteen thousand or more, entirely disorganised and consisting largely of officers. These were of great use in consolidating Napoleon's levies for the campaign of 1813. Thus about half a million human beings had disappeared; how many of them were made prisoners and how many died, it is impossible to say. The Russian loss in dead is placed at one hundred and fifty thousand. It is useless to discuss the cause of this disaster. We have seen that on several occasions the French army narrowly escaped destruction, as Napoleon himself narrowly escaped capture. On the other hand, the winter was abnormally severe, and with better fortune the loss might have been less disastrous. But the enterprise could never have succeeded unless Alexander could have been persuaded to give in. Napoleon attempted the impossible and failed. The only chance of his realising his desires would have lain in the limitation of their scope.

PART FIVE.
THE WAR OF 1813.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN.

DURING the winter of 1812 Napoleon worked with as great energy as he had ever shown during any portion of his career. He possessed sufficient resources in men and in money to defend France, even up to the frontiers of the Rhine. But that did not satisfy him. His pride, or perhaps wiser considerations of policy, forbade him to surrender any portion of the dominions which had been declared to be integral portions of the Empire by decrees of the Senate. He answered to Francis I., who urged him to make peace, that he considered Rome, Piedmont, Tuscany, Holland, and the Hanseatic Departments inseparable from the Empire. Rome and Hamburg must remain French Prefectures. In order to fulfil the arduous task of defending this enormous territory against a hostile Europe, he had to drain the resources of his Empire even to exhaustion, and to depend upon allies whose fidelity was more than doubtful.

He had in his dépôts the conscripts of 1813 who had been summoned to arms in October, 1812, and in the departments what were called the cohorts, that

is, a hundred well-drilled battalions of national guards. He doubled these battalions; he called up conscripts from classes which had been hitherto spared, going as far back as the year 1809. The Senate voted the raising of one hundred and forty thousand men from the conscription of 1814, and he withdrew his depôts from Spain. The officers who straggled back from the defeat of Moscow were found extremely useful in training and instructing the new recruits and in inspiring them with the traditions of the Imperial army.

These measures provided him with a force very similar in its composition to the armies of the Revolution, but very different in its spirit. It was undoubtedly courageous, and was devoted to the person of Napoleon, but it was drawn from a country desolated by continual wars and weary of exertion. It had no power of keeping itself together or of reforming itself after a check. It was easily discouraged and difficult to reanimate anew: it had none of that political fervour which distinguished the conquering hosts of 1793.

The French army was also lacking in material resources. It was possible to furnish artillery to supply what had been lost in Russia; but it was not easy to procure sufficient horses to mount a powerful cavalry, and the inferiority of that arm was felt during the whole campaign. After three months of incredible labour Napoleon was able to despatch across the Rhine an army of two hundred thousand men, of whom however, only twenty-four thousand were cavalry. During the course of the summer these numbers were increased to three hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom sixty thousand were cavalry, while the artillery numbered six hundred.

This army was strong enough to resist the first efforts of the Coalition, which at present comprehended only Russia and Prussia. Russia, exhausted by the last campaign, was only able to send one hundred thousand men across the Vistula. Bernadotte, who had been elected Crown Prince of Sweden with the consent of Napoleon, now deserted his former master and joined Russia against him; but he did not take any share in the early part of the campaign. Prussia was in a condition to furnish a large number of troops, thanks to the admirable policy which she had adopted since 1808, and to the wisdom and skill with which she had turned to her own advantage the harsh restrictions which were designed for her destruction. Her population were inflamed by such a patriotic zeal that nearly the whole of her able-bodied inhabitants served either among the volunteers or in the reserve. Austria, although ostensibly arming, held herself aloof, and waited to see in what direction the fortune of war would declare itself. Thus, regarded as mere numbers, the enemies of Napoleon were not more formidable in the spring of 1813 than those whom he had previously vanquished. But his task was rendered especially difficult by the passionate enthusiasm of the Germans, by the general murmurs of revolt which extended from the Rhine to the Elbe, and by the inexperience of the French army, which had been hastily organised to support a cause in which they could feel but little interest.

The Russian campaign had lost Napoleon the half of Germany. Prince Eugène had been driven back from point to point until he reached the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe. The Emperor had promised his stepson that as soon as he had organised some new

regiments he would send sufficient reinforcements to maintain him on the Saale. In the month of April Prince Eugène occupied on that river some good defensive positions at the head of sixty thousand men.

The advance of the allies had begun at the end of March. Blücher came from Silesia with twenty-five thousand men and crossed the Elbe on April 3, preceded by Winzingerode with an advance guard of thirteen thousand men. Wittgenstein, Yorck and Borstedt commanded twenty-five thousand men before Magdeburg, and in the neighbourhood of that fortress were some Russian divisions, six thousand or seven thousand strong. The principal Russian army was posted at Kalisch and on the Silesian frontier. The fortresses of Danzig, Thorn, Stettin, Glogau, and Spandau were either besieged or blockaded. The allies had about seventy thousand soldiers on the Elbe, but the French possessed on that river the important fortresses of Magdeburg and Wittenberg, the first occupied by a garrison of about fifty thousand French troops.

Napoleon, leaving Paris on April 15, spent a few days at Mainz for the purpose of organising his forces. He proceeded in a carriage to Weimar, which he reached on April 28, and then mounted his horse. His forces amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry and three hundred and fifty guns, the allies being superior to him in cavalry and artillery. The Russian forces may be reckoned at fifty thousand, the Prussian at forty-six thousand. They were both older and better seasoned than the French; indeed, many of the French soldiers were mere boys. Napoleon had taken great pains to exercise them in forming squares to resist the numerous cavalry of the enemy. He

doubted their powers of endurance, but Ney wrote to him after the first engagement, "These children are heroes; with them I can carry out anything that you may command."

Napoleon divided his army into four corps; the three first were commanded by Ney, Marmont, and Bertrand, the Guard formed the fourth. The design of Napoleon was to recapture Dresden and the line of the Elbe. For this purpose he descended the course of the Saale while Eugène marched up the stream to meet him. When the junction of their forces was once effected, they would cross the river together, seize Leipzig, and from that point fall on the right flank of the allies. Ney crossed the Saale on April 29 and advanced on the road to Lützen. The youthful conscripts, whom Ney commanded, came into conflict with the Russian cavalry, formed into squares, and having received the enemy bravely at the point of their bayonets, attacked them at the charge and captured Weissenfels. The advance was then continued towards Lützen, which lies on the main road between Weissenfels and Leipzig.

The battle of Lützen, the first of the campaign, was remarkable for the confusion which prevailed in it, the bravery displayed by the armies engaged, and the manner in which Napoleon gained the victory. The allies were far superior in cavalry, but they were badly handled and remained for a considerable time doing nothing at Rahna, when they might have decided the fate of the conflict. It was long before Napoleon could discover where the main body of the enemy lay, because his feeble force of cavalry had to be kept in hand, and could not be used for reconnoitring. But when he had learnt what he desired to know, by the sound of the cannon, and had

come to a conclusion as to where the decisive blow should be struck, he wheeled his forces round and attacked the enemy with such energy that he compelled them to retreat.

The battle of Lützen was indeed the result of an accident. Napoleon had reached Leipzig on May 21, after having on the previous day had a successful skirmish with the enemy at Rippach, where Marshal Bessières met his death, and having left Ney at Lützen to protect his right flank, Napoleon had little difficulty in seizing Leipzig; but whilst he was engaged in the capture of that city, the battle of Lützen was being fought in his rear. As Napoleon supposed, the allies to the number of eighty thousand were marching from the Elster to the upper waters of the Saale, on the right flank of the French army, when the sight of Ney's columns advancing upon Leipzig suggested the idea of a sudden attack. The two sovereigns, who were present in person, determined to risk a battle, and the allies wheeling round to the right charged the troops before them, imagining them to be much weaker than they really were.

The French occupied in front of Lützen five villages which formed strong points of defence. These were Gross-Görschen, Rahna, Klein-Görschen, Starsiedel, and Kaja. The first of these was much exposed; it was violently attacked by the Prussians under Blücher and captured. The allies then advanced against the villages which formed the second line. Starsiedel was defended by the corps of Marmont, who arrived just in time and repulsed the enemy, but the French were driven from Rahna and Klein-Görschen. Ney was at this moment with the Emperor and Souham had been left in command, but Ney soon arrived to take charge of his divisions and

the villages were again recovered after a severe struggle.

Napoleon heard the thunder of the cannonade about midday and immediately hurried up, knowing that the Russians and Prussians must have joined their forces. He gave orders that Macdonald should advance on the left, Bertrand on the right, while he occupied the centre with his guard. There was considerable danger in the centre before the guard arrived on the field, as Napoleon could only oppose to the main body of the allies the young levies of Ney's corps who were already exhausted by their labours. Blücher was therefore able to retake Rahna, the last post of the French in front of Lützen. The battle continued with uncertain fortune till six o'clock in the evening. Wherever Napoleon appeared he stimulated his soldiers to new efforts. At last sixteen battalions of the young guard were in a position to attack under the command of Lobau, while Drouot collected sixty pieces of artillery and opened a murderous fire between Kaja and Starsiedel. Eugène also captured the villages opposed to him. Wittgenstein advanced with the Russian guard and the grenadiers, not for a new onslaught but to cover the retreat. The daylight was at an end, and the close of evening terminated the conflict. The French were then surrounding the allies in a half circle. Blücher made one more desperate attempt to reach Kaja, but he found it protected by the guard and by a formidable artillery and was forced to retire. The allies retreated, much to the disgust of Blücher, and we may imagine also to the disappointment of Napoleon himself, as he had lost an opportunity of crushing the allied army in a pitched battle, and he had no cavalry with which to continue

the pursuit. Thirty-five thousand killed and wounded covered the field; Blücher was wounded in the arm, and at the close of the fight Napoleon himself disappeared in the confusion for a few minutes, some thinking that he had been killed. The French troops were obliged to remain the whole night through in their squares for fear of being attacked. Both sides claimed the victory.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN.

AFTER the battle of Lützen the allied armies marched towards Dresden, followed by Napoleon at the head of one hundred and twenty thousand troops. The Emperor now despatched Ney to Torgau with the idea that he should eventually march on Berlin. The allies crossed the Elbe and took up a position in the New Town of Dresden, on the right bank of the river, whilst Napoleon entered the Old Town. The keys of the city were presented to the conqueror, but he declared that he only received them as a deposit for their King. In a few days King Frederick Augustus, who had fled to Prague, returned to his capital and was received by Napoleon with signs of exuberant affection. Napoleon took up his abode in the Marcolini Palace just outside the town, and the rooms which he occupied existed unchanged a few years ago. It may be remarked that Napoleon almost from the outset of his career preferred to live outside of the towns which he had conquered, and he generally chose rooms on the ground floor looking into a garden. This may be attributed to his love of nature and the necessity of quiet, but it is more likely that he derived the habit from his Corsican days. Accustomed from his youth to treachery and deeds of violence, he naturally feared assassination, and therefore hesitated to trust himself in a town, where he could be captured or per-

haps killed in a popular rising, and preferred a spot which could be easily defended and from which there was a ready escape.

The whole of the German Elbe was now in the hands of Napoleon, with the exception of its lower waters. He despatched Davout to these regions to regain possession of Hamburg, while the Grand Army established itself firmly in Saxony. He also gave orders to Murat to leave his kingdom of Naples in order to take command of the cavalry, and he sent Prince Eugène to Italy to levy an army and to form a barrier against a possible invasion of that country by Austria. After a week's sojourn he quitted Dresden to deal, if possible, a fresh blow upon the allies.

The armies of Wittgenstein and Blücher, defeated but not destroyed, instead of covering Berlin, retreated along the Austrian frontier through Lusatia, thinking it more important to secure the co-operation of the Austrians than to protect the Prussian capital against a sudden attack. They took up a position at Bautzen, near Hochkirch, which had witnessed the defeat of Frederick the Great by Marshal Daun. They strengthened their ground with trenches well furnished with cannon, and awaited the attack of Napoleon with one hundred thousand men.

Napoleon sent against Bautzen the four corps of Macdonald, Bertrand, Oudinot, and Marmont. He ordered Ney, who had arrived at Torgau, to return with sixty thousand men and threaten the right of the allies. The battle-field of Bautzen extended about fifteen miles, and was much too large for the number of the troops employed. The Emperor of Russia had his headquarters in Neu-Burschwiz, the King of Prussia was in Wurschen, and Napoleon in Klein Forstgen. At midday on May 20, 1813, Na-

oleon, after reconnoitring the position of the enemy, gave orders for the attack, and by five in the afternoon the battle became general. The River Spree, which passes through Bautzen, formed the first line of the defence of the allies, who had their left supported by the mountains of Bohemia. Behind the Spree, the parallel stream of Blöser-Wasser formed a second line to the centre and the left, while the right was defended by a rising ground between the Blöser-Wasser and the Spree. In the judgment of Napoleon the capture of these two lines of defence would require two battles, and he determined to devote the first day to the capture of the line of the Spree. The fortified town of Bautzen was directly in front of him; the Russians on his right, and the Prussians, commanded by Blücher, on his left.

The Emperor sent Oudinot against the Russians. The marshal crossed the river and obtained possession of the commanding heights of the Dohnberg. In the centre the walls of Bautzen resisted for some time, but the bridge across the Spree was at length occupied, the defences forced, and the French hastened from all sides into the town. On the left Marmont and Bertrand similarly crossed the Spree, and drove Blücher back to the hills on which his line rested. By nine o'clock in the evening the whole line of the river was taken and Napoleon removed his headquarters to Bautzen. Ney, in the meantime, had arrived at the position appointed to him and was ready to take part in the battle of the succeeding day. Napoleon gave him orders to move in such a manner that he would fall upon the rear of the allied army whilst he himself attacked them in front. This would drive them towards the frontiers of Bohemia, and compel them either to capitulate or to

take refuge in the territory of Austria which was at this time in alliance with Napoleon.

On the following day, May 21, 1813, Napoleon delayed the attack until he was certain that the movements of Ney were effected. The result fulfilled all his expectations. Ney advanced against the extreme right of the allies, dispersed the troops with which he came into contact, and threatened the communications of Blücher. Here, unfortunately, he stopped, and did not carry out his master's orders by marching upon Hochkirch. He was separated from Napoleon by an interval of nine miles, and did not know how the battle was progressing in that quarter. Blücher, seeing the danger which threatened him, communicated with Wittgenstein and commenced a retreat. Napoleon on his side had pushed Bertrand and Oudinot across the stream of the Blöser-Wasser and had taken the village of Baschutz. The allies retreated to Görlitz in Silesia, having lost fifteen thousand men; and but for the hesitation of Ney, who showed a similar weakness at Waterloo, they would have been annihilated. As at Lützen, Napoleon was unable to follow up his advantages with cavalry, and as at Lützen the battle was not altogether decisive, although it may be fairly regarded as a defeat for the allies.

Napoleon followed the retreating Russians and Prussians into Silesia, gradually driving them before him. He thrust them successively from Görlitz and Liegnitz; he crossed the bridge of Glogau, and was within one day's march of Breslau, the capital of Silesia. The fortunes of Napoleon were in the ascendant. Oudinot received orders to march with twenty-five thousand men on Berlin, and on May 29 Davout entered Hamburg. At this moment Austria

interposed with the offer of an armistice which was eventually signed on June 14, 1813, bearing the name of the Armistice of Pleiswitz. Most writers are agreed that it was against the interests of Napoleon to accept it, and that the delay was in every respect favourable to the allies. He was imposed upon by the astute policy of Metternich, and should never have consented to it unless he had intended that it should be the preliminary of a peace. The allies were able to utilise the breathing-space given to them far better than he was, for they were less well prepared, whereas Napoleon had exhausted all the available resources of his country. By this armistice the success of Lützen and Bautzen seemed to be annulled. The line of demarcation between the two armies was fixed first by the Katzbach, then by the Oder, then by the old frontiers of Saxony and Prussia, and onward by the Elbe from Wittenberg to the sea.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN.

NAPOLEON had really no idea of making peace. From his headquarters in Dresden he superintended the arming of his dominions. Eugène was to form a large army in Italy to threaten the Austrians if they should join the Coalition. He hoped by the beginning of September to be at the head of five hundred thousand men and one thousand cannon. He possessed upon the Elbe the strong places of Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, Verden and Hamburg. He was secure against an attack either from Silesia or from Bohemia. To the Grand Army were added the corps of Victor, Vandamme and Gouvion de St. Cyr, as well as the Poles of Poniatowski, who joined him in Dresden, and the corps of Augereau, whom he had left in Bavaria. He had under his command at the expiration of the armistice on August 16 not less than three hundred and fifty-six thousand men.

His plan was to send a large force against Berlin under Oudinot, who was to be supported by Davout advancing from Hamburg. The corps of Gouvion de St. Cyr and of Vandamme were to guard the approaches from Bohemia, the first on the left, the second on the right bank of the Elbe. Four divisions under the command of Ney were placed on the Bober, to manœuvre against the allies in Silesia. Napoleon was to take up a position with his guard at

Bautzen, in a condition to succour either of the Elbe armies or the army of Ney, according as events should dictate. He aimed at nothing less than the recovery of his former position and the power of dictating peace to Europe after gaining a brilliant victory.

There is scarcely any scene in history more moving or more picturesque than the interview which took place between Napoleon and Metternich in the Marcolini Palace on June 26, 1813. The memory of it lived until his death in the mind of the aged diplomatist, and a short time before his decease he conducted his son to those same rooms in order to show him the spot in which Napoleon rejected the last offers of safety and in which he formed a decision of fateful import both to himself and to the world.

When midnight struck on August 10, 1813, the representatives of Prussia and Russia at Prague declared the armistice at an end, and Austria announced that she had joined the Coalition. The allies had a formidable mass of troops at their disposal. In Bohemia Schwarzenberg commanded an army of about two hundred and fifty thousand men composed almost entirely of Austrians. The army of Silesia, composed of Prussians and Russians, comprised one hundred and twenty thousand troops under the orders of Blücher. The army of the North under Bernadotte, made up of Prussians, Russians, and Swedes, numbered one hundred and thirty thousand. These three armies threatened the position of Napoleon in Saxony. But the plan of the Coalition was to avoid as far as possible attacking Napoleon himself, whose presence with the army they knew to be worth one hundred thousand men, but to confine

their attention to his lieutenants, and if possible to destroy them in detail. This was not a very heroic course, but it was the best for them under the circumstances. Time was on their side. As the campaign went on the masses of the allies must necessarily increase, as whole nations were engaged in the struggle, whereas the forces of Napoleon must naturally diminish. The army of Napoleon consisted of fourteen *corps d'armée*, each under an experienced marshal. They formed forty-four complete divisions. The whole number engaged is estimated at four hundred thousand, including seventy thousand cavalry, an arm of which the Emperor stood so much in need. Dresden was the centre of his operations, and there were his magazines and dépôts.

At the outbreak of hostilities Napoleon expected to be attacked by the army of Bohemia, an event which he ardently desired, and consequently advanced to meet them, but finding no trace of them, he turned his attention to the army of Silesia, believing that the fortifications of Pirna and Dresden would oppose a sufficient obstacle to Schwarzenberg to delay him until Blücher had been satisfactorily dealt with. The Emperor reached the Bober on August 21, threw bridges across the river, crossed the stream at mid-day, marched hastily forward and drove the army of York before him. Blücher, knowing from the manner of the attack that he had to do with Napoleon in person, in accordance with his instructions, retired behind the Katzbach with the loss of two or three thousand men.

In the evening a courier reached Napoleon from Dresden to say that the city was being attacked by large numbers, and that apparently the grand army,

of the allies was marching from Peterswalde, with the design of capturing either Dresden or Leipzig. The fact was that the army of Bohemia had entered Saxony in four columns, the Russians marching along the road which follows the Elbe by Pirna, the Prussians by Teplitz and Dippoldswalde, the Austrians, some by Chemnitz and some by Zwickau. They were accompanied by Moreau, the former subordinate, and Jomini, the former friend of Napoleon. The Emperor turned back to crush these new foes and hastened on with unheard-of rapidity, his guard marching nearly sixty miles in three days. Napoleon's first plan was to take up a position in Pirna, so as to intercept the road from Peterswalde, and then to attack the allies in the rear as they approached Dresden, and enclose them between his own army and the Elbe. But the cry of anguish from the city was so loud and bitter that he was forced to surrender this scheme. He gave way to entreaties and determined to occupy Dresden with one hundred thousand men and to meet the allies under its walls. In the meantime he gave orders to Macdonald and Lauriston to drive the Prussians beyond the Katzbach.

After posting Vandamme in Pirna with orders to close the road to Peterswalde, Napoleon rode into Dresden at nine o'clock on the morning of August 26, the allies having appeared on the western heights on the previous day. The battle had already begun; the Russians attacked the redoubts on the right, but could not wrest them from the French; the Prussians tried to obtain possession of the Great Garden, so well known to all visitors to Dresden; the Austrians fought in the centre, but were repulsed by the young guard. The day ended as a success for the

French, who had killed four thousand of the enemy and had taken two thousand prisoners. Napoleon was in a very cheerful mood that evening at supper in the Royal Palace.

In the afternoon Napoleon had ascended a tower to survey the ground and had perceived that the position of the Austrians was divided into two parts by a deep ravine, the Plauensche Grund, through which flows the stream of the Weisseritz. He saw that if the left half of the Austrians were driven into this ravine, the right would be unable to assist them and they would be forced to surrender, and that this attack could be carried out by Murat with his numerous cavalry supported by infantry, without exciting the attention of the allies in other parts of the field. Napoleon trusted also to drive the allies from their position and force them to retreat along the road to Peterswalde, where they would be met by Vandamme with a force of forty thousand men.

On August 27 Napoleon took command in the centre, Ney on the right, Murat and Victor on the left. He had a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, whereas the allies numbered two hundred thousand, twenty thousand of which were posted at Pirna under the command of Prince Eugen of Würtemberg. The morning was misty and rainy; the battle raged round the Great Garden and the village of Strehlen. At eleven o'clock Murat and Victor began their operations against the ravine of Plauen. The Austrians fought like heroes, but the rain rendered their muskets useless, and they could only use their bayonets. By two o'clock Murat had killed two thousand Austrians and taken twelve thousand prisoners. In the centre Napoleon himself directed the firing of the artillery, and it is said that

one of the shots discharged under his orders broke the legs of Moreau, passing through the body of his horse, and caused his death. A fitting monument of granite still marks the place where he fell.

At six o'clock the battle was over and the allies had suffered a crushing defeat; they had lost forty cannon, ten thousand men dead and wounded and sixteen thousand men taken prisoners. The French loss was considerably less. It seemed at first as if Napoleon would make full use of his victory. He ordered an energetic pursuit and expected that Vandamme, posted on the road to Peterswalde, would be able to give a good account of the routed fugitives. But for some reason he suddenly gave up the chase and returned to Dresden. It is said that he suffered from a physical breakdown, and that for several days was incapable of the slightest exertion. It is possible that even his iron frame refused any longer to answer to the demands which he made upon it; some have even attributed his illness to poison, given to him when he was taking his midday meal at Pirna.

The cessation of the pursuit had deplorable consequences for the French. Vandamme, who had not been able to stop the retreating armies on the road to Peterswalde, followed them with what speed he could. He hoped to capture the allied monarchs and to destroy their armies. On August 29 he overtook them in the valley of Kulm, from which he could threaten Teplitz, the central point of the roads necessary for their retreat. The allies, discovering that Vandamme was isolated, determined to attack him on the following day. The battle was contested on both sides with great vigour, but the superior forces of the allies secured them the victory. Vandamme had hoped for reinforcements, but instead of this the

Prussian army of Kleist, which had crossed the chain of the Erzgebirge, with great difficulty, attacked the rear of the French at Nollendorf and enclosed them between two fires. Vandamme with heroic courage tried to cut his way through, but only a small number succeeded in escaping. The French had seven generals killed and two wounded, and the whole *corps d'armée* was nearly annihilated. They lost eighty-two guns, twenty eagles, and two hundred baggage waggons; about ten thousand of them were taken prisoners, amongst whom was Vandamme himself,—a colossal figure led into the sovereign's presence without hat or sword. He was left in the hands of the Russians, and was sent a prisoner to the frontier of Siberia.

CHAPTER XXV.

DEFEATS.

THE plan of the allies, which consisted in avoiding a battle with Napoleon whilst defeating his generals in detail, was extremely successful. The Emperor had despatched Oudinot to Berlin with a force of sixty-five thousand men, thinking that this was sufficient to deal with the army of Bernadotte, which he regarded merely as a motley collection of ill-assorted forces. Bernadotte was, however, a general of great merit, trained in the school of Napoleon, and being at first at the head of ninety thousand men, he had increased the number to one hundred and thirty thousand. Oudinot came close to the gates of Berlin, but he was beaten at Gross-Beeren on August 23, and driven back upon the Elbe, Davout, who was at Hamburg, having been unable to support him. Three days later a new misfortune befel the hard-pressed Emperor. As we have seen he had left Macdonald to continue his advance against the army of Silesia with an army of eighty thousand men. As soon as Blücher discovered that Napoleon had gone to the defence of Dresden and was no longer present against him in person, he determined to resume the offensive, and advanced towards the Katzbach. The weather was terrible. There had been a heavy rain for three days and the approaches to the Katzbach were impassable from mud, so that a large part of the Prussian recruits lost their shoes. A strong

north-west wind drove the rain into the faces of the French, and it was so dark that nothing was visible at the distance of a hundred yards. The two armies were ignorant of each other's position. When the French succeeded in crossing the river and reaching the plateau on the other side, Blücher determined that the moment for the attack had arrived. He cried, "Now you have got enough French before you, Forwards!" The name clung to him, and he was ever afterwards known as "Marshal Forwards." Blücher gained a complete victory; the waters of the Katzbach and of the "Raging" Neisse rose higher and higher in the storm; all the bridges were carried away; some tried to save themselves by swimming, but that was impossible in the furious torrent. The battle lasted till nightfall, but the retreat was as disastrous as the defeat, and Macdonald was driven back, first upon the Bober, then upon Görlitz, and then upon Bautzen.

As soon as Napoleon heard of this disaster he hastened to Bautzen to support Macdonald. He did his utmost to conceal the fact of his presence, but he was amongst a nation of spies, and Blücher was never without accurate information of his movements. As soon as "Marshal Forwards" heard of Napoleon's approach he left Görlitz and retired upon the Neisse, and was soon out of range of Napoleon's dreaded attack. No sooner had the great conqueror left for Silesia than the heads of the Bohemian army began to show themselves in the defiles of Peterswalde. As soon as they heard of Napoleon's return to the camp at Pirna they stood still, and when he made a demonstration against them they retired into Bohemia. The fears of his prowess which they thus exhibited might be flattering to the

Emperor's pride, but these continual marches and countermarches sapped the strength of the French army.

A still worse catastrophe was imminent. It had been part of Napoleon's design to seize Berlin, and we have already narrated the failure of Oudinot to achieve this enterprise. After the battle of Gross-Beeren, Oudinot had retired to Wittenberg. He was joined here on September 3 by Ney, who had now under his command a force of sixty-five thousand men opposed to a Prussian army of forty thousand. On September 6 Ney prepared to advance to Berlin, but he was attacked on the flank at Dennewitz and entirely defeated. The battle occupied four hours of the afternoon and was over by six o'clock. The French suffered severely; they lost ten thousand killed and wounded and thirteen thousand five hundred prisoners. Ney, who had not been vanquished by the snows of Russia, now lost heart, and must be added to the number of the marshals who were weary of the continuance of the war and longed for peace.

By this succession of misfortunes the Grand Army of Napoleon was reduced from four hundred thousand to about two hundred thousand men, and the plans which he had formed were incapable of realisation. Doubtless this was greatly due to the fact that his troops consisted largely of very youthful levies who had not yet been seasoned to fire. The Emperor was forced to content himself with a defensive position. Instead of conquering Berlin, or invading Bohemia, or recovering the fortresses of the Vistula, he had enough to do to maintain his position in Saxony. He therefore concentrated his troops around Dresden in a quadrilateral formed by Torgau, Stolpen, Pirna and Freiberg. He was con-

demned to a forced inaction, and to be the witness of the gradual disintegration of his army, which was in a condition of great distress. Since the opening of the campaign the soldiers had been placed upon half rations, and in September they had no bread whatever.

The allies on the other hand received continual reinforcements, and gradually nerved themselves for decisive action. On September 23 they were reinforced by fifty thousand Russians under Benning-sen. They now determined to give up the idea of attacking Napoleon directly in his position at Dresden, and to cut off his communications with France, concentrating their forces in the neighbourhood of Leipzig. For this purpose the army of Bohemia was to advance by way of Chemnitz, the army of Silesia was to march down the right bank of the Elbe, without exciting observation, and to effect a junction with the army of the north. It was to cross the Elbe in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg and to follow the course of the Mulda to Leipzig. They expected in this manner to crush Napoleon between two forces each of equal strength to his own.

These movements began on September 25, and were quickly perceived by Napoleon, who indeed expected them. He occupied Leipzig with twelve thousand men; he despatched Ney towards the north to watch the movements of Bernadotte and Blücher, placing Marmont also under his command; he collected four *corps d'armée* at Freiberg to oppose the army of Bohemia. For himself, he remained at Dresden to watch events and to render assistance whenever it might be required.

At the beginning of October Blücher crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, and Bernadotte at Dessau, and

Ney was forced to retire before these superior forces. These movements made it impossible for Napoleon to remain at Dresden, and he left it with the King on October 7, leaving Saint Cyr in command of the city with a force of twenty thousand men. While the King of Saxony established himself in Leipzig, Napoleon marched northwards to meet Bernadotte and Blücher. His design was to collect the large garrisons which were still remaining in the Elbe fortresses and to destroy the army of the North, whilst Murat kept the Austrians in check and retreated slowly to Leipzig. He placed his headquarters in an old castle at Düben, where he remained for three days uncertain of his plans. Those who were with him say that they never forgot those days of uncertainty and inaction: the wind howling in the trees and the old timbers of the castle creaking with every blast. At last, finding that his generals would not support plans which were worthy of his genius, he determined to fight at Leipzig. Indeed, delay had made any other decision impossible, if he wished to prevent his enemies from concentrating the whole of their forces and cutting off his retreat from France.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG.

THE battle of Leipzig, the "Battle of the Nations," as it is sometimes called, is one of the greatest as well as one of the most important in history. It lasted for six days, from October 14 to October 19; but during this week of conflict there were two days of comparative rest. On October 14 the fighting was confined to an engagement of cavalry. On October 16 the real battle took place, and it might more fitly be called the battle of Wachau. Napoleon actually won it, and slept on the field of battle, but whilst he was engaged on one side of Leipzig, Marmont was attacked on the other at Möckern, and could not send him the reinforcements he needed to complete the victory. By October 18 his cause had become hopeless, because the allies had concentrated in overwhelming numbers, and the battle fought on that day was engaged merely for the purpose of masking his disaster and covering his retreat. That night he slept in Leipzig in the Hotel de Prusse, and the next morning he evacuated the town in good order, the allies entering it immediately afterwards. The battle is indeed rightly called the "Battle of the Nations." There fought under the eagles of France, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, Swiss, Poles, and Germans. On the other hand, Napoleon was opposed by Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, North Germans, Swedes, and English, and

it is said that Bashkirs and Calmucks, armed with bows and arrows, fought in the Russian ranks. It is reckoned that in this battle Napoleon commanded a force of two hundred thousand men, but the allies were certainly superior in numbers.

Let us briefly follow the main points of the engagement. Napoleon arrived at Leipzig on October 14 and posted Murat at Wachau, on some heights commanding a plain suitable in every way for the evolutions of cavalry; Schwarzenberg reached the place of conflict on the same day. Murat attacked the Austrians, and a violent cavalry engagement ensued, in which the King of Naples displayed great dash and bravery. The struggle was mainly for the possession of Liebertwolkwitz, which eventually remained in possession of the allies. The battle came to an end at nightfall owing to heavy rain. The French had lost six hundred dead and wounded, the Austrians about the same number.

The following day was spent in preparation for the main conflict. Napoleon took his stand on the heights of Wachau, and was surrounded by names famous in history: Murat, Oudinot, Mortier, Lauriston, Macdonald, Augereau and Poniatowski. The allies attacked in three columns directed against the three villages of Liebertwolkwitz, Wachau and Markkleeberg. Napoleon attacked them with the fire of three hundred guns, and then his infantry made a furious onslaught on Wachau. The centre of the allies was weak and it began to waver, and the Emperor now prepared to give the *coup-de-grâce*. It was one o'clock in the afternoon; the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia were watching the progress of the fight from a neighbouring eminence. For this purpose Napoleon collected a body of twelve

thousand cavalry divided into two masses, one commanded by Murat, the other by Kellermann. This huge body moved forwards; the earth groaned under its advance, and the soil shook beneath the hoofs of the horses. A Russian regiment which stood in their path was absolutely annihilated. Success seemed to be imminent, and Napoleon sent to apprise the King of Saxony of the result, with orders to ring the bells of the town. The allied sovereigns, who were sitting on a hill on Windsor chairs, were in considerable danger. But just in front of the hill on which they stood ran a ditch which checked the onslaught of the cavalry and made the charge ineffective. Murat, as was his wont, had ridden too fast and the infantry were too far off to lend the necessary assistance, nor had he arranged his reserves with due prudence. Just at the critical moment the weapon broke in Napoleon's hand. He was, however, able to hold his own, and, as has before been said, slept on the field of battle. In the meantime Blücher and Bernadotte had attacked the corps of Marmont which was securely posted amongst the houses of Möckern to the north of the town. Just at the moment when his master most urgently needed his assistance he was unable to give it, as his position had been forced by "Marshal Forwards," who was able to sleep in the village which he had captured.

The following day, which was Sunday, was spent in repose on either side, preparing for the final conflict of the morrow. An attempt was made to open negotiations with the Austrians by means of General Meereveld, who had been taken prisoner, but it led to no result. On the same day also Bernadotte arrived on the scene of action, and the reinforcements of Russians were brought up by Benningsen. Thus

on October 18 the allies had under their command three hundred thousand men, whereas the French could only meet them with one hundred and sixty-five thousand. If he had followed the dictates of prudence, Napoleon should have retreated from the field on the night of October 17, but his pride would not allow him to make this confession of failure. He strengthened his position round the town, drawing up his forces in a semicircle with a smaller radius than that of the previous day. He omitted to throw bridges across the Elster, and reserved for his retreat only the road through Lindenau.

The villages which were prominent on the third day of the battle were Dölitze, Probstheida and Stötteritz, the second of these forming the salient point. It was defended stubbornly by Victor and Lauriston. On the other hand, Dölitze to the right of the French upon the Pleisse was taken, and the French line was moved back to Connewitz. In the meantime Bernadotte was advancing on the east. The Saxon troops were posted in this part of the field, and when the Swedish Crown Prince approached they passed over to his side and began firing upon the French, of whom they had just now been the allies. This left a terrible gap in the French line, and the cavalry and artillery of the guard brought up by Napoleon himself had a difficulty in filling it up. At about six o'clock in the evening Napoleon, feeling much exhausted, ordered his page to place a carpet upon the ground, upon which he slept peacefully for some time. The battle, which had been hopeless for Napoleon from the beginning, was terminated by a furious salvo of artillery, in which it is said that two thousand pieces of cannon took part.

The retreat went on during the night, over the

bridge of Lindenau, the only one which was available for guns, carriages, horses and men. As soon as the fog lifted on October 19 the allies made a combined attack, which was resisted to the best of their power by Macdonald, Marmont, Poniatowski, and Lauriston. Napoleon took leave of the King of Saxony about eleven o'clock, and an hour later the allied sovereigns met him at the door of his palace in the market-place and declared him a prisoner of war. The Emperor then crossed the bridge of Lindenau and remained at a mill on the other side until nearly the whole of the army had departed. He then rode slowly along the road to Mainz. The empire of Napoleon was at an end; more than one hundred thousand men had fallen in this supreme struggle, of which forty thousand were French. Further, one hundred and seventy thousand troops were locked up in German fortresses.

The Bavarians, with base ingratitude, tried to intercept the French army in their retreat at Hanau on October 30, but they were entirely crushed by the artillery of Davout. On November 4 the French army recrossed the Rhine in a terrible condition; the retreat from Leipzig had been almost as fatal as the retreat from Moscow. Napoleon himself reached St. Cloud on November 9 to prepare for a final effort, the results of which will be narrated in succeeding chapters.

PART SIX.

THE PENINSULAR WAR.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

THE peace of Tilsit and the intimate communications which took place in that town between the two Emperors of France and Russia may be regarded as the culmination of the first part of Napoleon's sovereign care. We do not know, nor shall probably ever know, what passed between the two rulers of the world during these confidences, still less what plans were seething in the mind of Napoleon. We may however conclude from a general survey of his work that he had two ends in view, one by subduing England to force her to make peace, and the other to form that confederation of the Latin races under the leadership of France which was undoubtedly the main object of his political activity. In order to effect these objects it was necessary first to compel Portugal, which had been for more than a hundred years the commercial vassal of England, to break with her old connections, and to join the system of continental blockade which Napoleon inaugurated in the Berlin decrees; and secondly, to drive the

Bourbon family from the throne of Spain and replace them by some dynasty more in accordance with modern ideas of progress.

It is probable, however, that Napoleon in conceiving these plans had a very inadequate idea of the magnitude of the task he was undertaking. He may have thought that it would be as easy, or nearly so, to deal with Spain as he had found it to deal with Naples. But he discovered to his cost that when the government of Spain was crushed and the rulers of Portugal put to flight, the task of subduing these countries was by no means accomplished, and that there remained to confront the Grand Army a whole people in arms favoured by its chains of mountains, its rocks, the rigour of its climate and the barrenness of its soil. He discovered, also, when it was too late, that in Spain and Portugal the English had found a means of combating on land the great military power which they never could have met upon the Continent in the open field.

On August 12, 1807, Napoleon sent a summons to the government of Lisbon calling upon them to close their harbours to English ships, to join the league of the continental powers, and to confiscate all British property in their country. Notwithstanding the friendly treaties which existed between the two powers of the Iberian peninsula, Spain now stood on the side of France and supported her demands, whilst an army of observation of twenty thousand men under Junot was posted at Bayonne in order to give effect to the Emperor's demands. The government of Portugal was greatly embarrassed; she was not unwilling to co-operate with France so far as this co-operation did not imply a breach with England. But that was impossible. The army of Junot

crossed the Bidassoa on October 18, and four days later the Prince Regent of Portugal signed a treaty with England by which that country bound herself to assist Portugal in transferring the monarchy, in case of need, to Brazil.

On October 27 two treaties were signed at Fontainebleau between Duroc representing France and Isquierdo representing Spain, by which Portugal was to be partitioned, so that the northern part, with the town of Oporto, should be formed into a kingdom, called North Lusitania, to be given to the King of Etruria in exchange for Tuscany, while the southern portion became a principality to be held by Godoy with the title of Prince of the Algarves; both these dominions were to be under the protection of Spain; the centre of Portugal, with a population of two millions, was to remain in sequestration, that is, in the possession of the French, until the general peace, when it could be exchanged for Gibraltar, Trinidad or other colonies. The sovereign of this third division, whoever he might be, was also to be under the protectorate of Spain, and the King of Spain was to assume, with Napoleon's approval, the title of "Emperor of both the Indies." The transatlantic possessions of Portugal were to be similarly divided between France and Spain. It was also arranged that a French army should enter Portugal, and that whilst the general commanding this army occupied the sequestered portions of the monarchy, the northern and southern divisions should be similarly occupied by Spanish troops.

Junot, marching rapidly through Spain, crossed the frontier of Portugal on November 12. Two days later the Ministers announced that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign, and that the Prince

Regent of Portugal had lost his throne because he had listened to English intrigues, and because he had refused to confiscate English property in Lisbon. "The fate of the House of Braganza," they said, "is a new indication that no one can escape destruction who allies himself with the English." Junot had orders to make no concession to the Prince Regent, even if he promised to declare war against England, and that he was to march with all speed to Lisbon and seize ships and docks.

On November 27 the royal family set sail for Brazil, the advanced guard of Junot's army being then only a few miles from the city. Three days later he entered the capital with a force of twenty-six thousand men, and the day following the arms of Braganza were supplanted on all public buildings by the Imperial eagle. Under pretext of covering the army of Portugal several French corps successively entered Spain. First came Dupont, then Moncey, and then Duhesme, so that in a time of peace and in an allied country eighty thousand French troops had occupied the north of Spain without striking a blow.

The gradual extension of French power, the great unpopularity of Godoy, Prince of the Peace, and the domestic quarrels of the royal family, all contributed to throw the Spanish people into a fever of excitement. On March 19, 1808, a revolution broke out at Aranjuez, in which the Prince of the Peace nearly lost his life. The King, Charles IV., was compelled to abdicate, and the Prince of the Asturias was set up in his place with the title of Ferdinand VII. While these events were proceeding, the French army was gradually advancing towards the centre of Spain, and Murat entered Madrid on March 23. Na-

oleon now determined to throw off the mask. He summoned to Bayonne on April 2, first the young King Ferdinand VII. and then the old King Charles IV., under the pretext of arranging their disputes. When he got them both into his power, he persuaded Charles IV. to abdicate in favour of his son, and his son to abdicate in favour of Napoleon; he then gave the crown of Spain to his brother Joseph, who had previously been King of Naples.

The answer to this was the outbreak of a formidable insurrection in Madrid, which was put down by Murat with terrible severity. But the example of the capital was followed by the whole country. Every province, every district, every town and nearly every village established its junta for the maintenance of independence. The movement was naturally supported by the Church, and priest and monk were formidable opponents. In a short time from the Asturias to Cadiz the whole of the population was in arms for King Ferdinand VII., and the French armies wherever they might be had to struggle for their existence. In the meantime Joseph could only be conveyed from Bayonne to Madrid by force of arms. Entering Spain on July 9, he found himself opposed by an army of his pretended subjects, composed of twenty-five thousand men and commanded by Blake and Don Gregorio de la Cuesta. It was easily crushed by Marshal Bessières at Medina del Rio Seco, and on July 20 Joseph was able to take up his quarters in the capital.

Scarcely had he been there a week, when he was compelled to withdraw at the news of the capitulation of Baylen. Whilst Bessières was advancing upon Madrid, the other divisions of the French army were occupied in different parts of Spain in reducing the

provinces under the authority of King Joseph. The division of Dupont, composed of twenty thousand men, was employed for this purpose in Andalusia. Dupont obtained possession of Cordova and plundered it, but at Seville, the capital of the province, was established the central junta, which directed the operations of the country against the French and the army of Castaños, which was composed of the best troops of Spain. Dupont now retired to Andujar, which was soon invested by an army of thirty-five thousand Spaniards. They closed the defiles behind the army of Dupont and cut him off from his subordinate, General Vedel. His force being reduced to eleven thousand and left without food or ammunition, he signed a capitulation at Baylen on July 21. When the pen was in his hand he nearly threw it down at the sound of the guns of Vedel, who was in the full tide of success, and there is little doubt that Vedel could have cut a way for him through the opposing forces. But Dupont had included Vedel in the capitulation, as well as other French troops in the villages of La Mancha. This was the first great check which Napoleon had experienced. King Joseph had to leave Madrid more quickly than he had entered it. The various French armies retired towards the Ebro, and the patriotic insurrection recovered possession of three-quarters of their country.

This disaster in Spain was followed by a similar collapse in Portugal. At the beginning of August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards known as the famous Duke of Wellington, disembarked with an army of twelve thousand men at the estuary of the River Mondego. His first engagement with the French took place at Roliça, but a much more important battle was fought at Vimiero on August 21.

The English occupied a position on commanding heights, while their left flank was protected by a deep ravine, invisible to the enemy. Junot attacked in two columns; his right hand column came upon the ravine above mentioned, and giving the English time to strengthen the defence, was eventually repulsed with heavy loss, including several guns. But the main attack was in the centre, where the French scaled the heights, sweeping the English skirmishers before them, but they had to face a crushing artillery fire, followed up by charges with the bayonet. They were driven back faster than they had climbed, but rallied again and returned to the attack. The copses, vineyards and ravines were filled with dead and wounded; guns were taken, retaken and taken again. At last Junot, when he had brought his last man into action, realised that his enterprise had failed. The result of this was the Convention of Cintra, signed on August 30, by which the French agreed to evacuate Portugal with the honours of war. The troops of Junot were faithfully conveyed back to France in English vessels.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

NAPOLEON IN SPAIN.

AFTER these two crushing reverses Napoleon determined to take the affairs of the Peninsula into his own hands. After having, for a time at least, ensured the tranquillity of Central Europe by the Congress of Erfurt, he directed the best troops of the Grand Army and the Imperial Guard upon Bayonne. The army of Spain, as it was called, consisted of two hundred thousand of Napoleon's chosen troops, and was divided into eight *corps d'armée*. The Emperor assumed command of it at Bayonne on November 3. He immediately crossed the frontier and joined King Joseph at Miranda on the Ebro. There stretched before him in a long line the tumultuary levies which the Spaniards honoured by the name of armies: Blake with thirty-two thousand men to the north, Belvedere with twelve thousand men at Burgos, Castaños and Palafox with forty thousand men on the Ebro at Tudela. Sir John Moore had been placed by the English government in command of thirty-one thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry on October 6, but at this time he had scarcely entered Spain from Portugal.

Napoleon, having despatched Marshals Lefebvre and Victor to deal with Blake upon his right, marched upon the centre of the Spanish line at Burgos, which was very weak. Blake was entirely defeated at Espinosa on November 11, and on the same day

Napoleon entered Burgos and made it his headquarters. Unfortunately the Spanish troops were very good at running away, and it was more easy to defeat them than to destroy them. Napoleon now turned his attention to his left, where he was opposed by Castaños and Palafox. They were defeated by Lannes at Tudela on November 27; they lost about four thousand dead and wounded and all their artillery. Thus by the end of the month Old Castile and the whole of the line of the Ebro was in the possession of the French and the road to Madrid was open.

Napoleon now gave orders to Ney to follow Castaños and not leave a man of his army alive; Monecy was to undertake the siege of Saragossa; St. Cyr was to march through Catalonia and relieve Barcelona; Lefebvre was to occupy Valladolid and Segovia. Soult was to meet Sir John Moore in Old Castile and drive him back to Portugal. Mortier was to take up a position at Burgos. In the meantime Napoleon was to march upon the capital with forty thousand men before the Spaniards had been able to recover from their consternation. The road to Madrid was barred by a pass of the Guadarama Mountains, which was carefully defended by the Junta. They placed three thousand men in the little town of Sepulveda and nine thousand on the summit of Somo-Sierra, disposing them along the winding road, which was also defended by cannon. Napoleon resolved to attack their position and, as often happened, his operations were favoured by the morning mist. The neighbouring heights were occupied without the enemy perceiving it, and as soon as the clouds lifted the assault began. Napoleon ordered a detachment of Polish cavalry to charge up

the road against the battery which defended it. Thirty-seven horsemen were killed by the first discharge, but the Poles re-formed themselves, killed the gunners, and captured the guns. A panic seized the rest of the Spanish troops; they threw their muskets away and fled up the hill and down the opposite slope. Napoleon took all the guns, all the standards, two hundred munition waggons, and almost all the officers.

The effect which this brilliant passage of arms had upon the Junta in Madrid may be imagined, for they had deemed this pass to be invincible. They first fled to Badajoz and then to Toledo. The inhabitants desired to defend Madrid to the utmost and to make it a second Saragossa, but milder counsels prevailed. The town capitulated after a short bombardment and the French troops entered it on December 4.

It now remained to deal with the army of Sir John Moore. He had reached Salamanca on November 13, too late to intercept the advance of Napoleon on Madrid. When he heard of the capture of the capital he retired towards the Asturias with twenty-five thousand men in order to engage Soult in the Asturias. Napoleon left Madrid in pursuit of him on December 22, and on the following day at Tordesillas received a despatch from Soult saying that he had with him twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry and that Moore was approaching Sahagun. The Emperor charged him to hold out, as, if the English remained a single day longer in that position, they would be annihilated. Moore, however, who was well informed as to the condition of affairs, determined to retreat towards Corunna.

Napoleon pursued the English with such ardour

that he came up with their rear-guard, and at the River Esla he lost one of his cavalry generals, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, who was taken prisoner. He was received by Moore with great courtesy, who asked him to dinner and presented him with an Indian sabre. New Year's Day of the momentous year 1809 was spent in Astorga, where Napoleon remained to collect his troops. Here he received important news, which informed him that Austria was arming for war, which would break out in the spring, that he could no longer depend upon the co-operation of Russia, and that Germany was becoming disturbed. The chances were, therefore, that he would have to fight alone against Austria, Germany, and England, and possibly Russia. His resolution was quickly taken. He left the pursuit of the English to Soult and set out for Valladolid. He rode at full gallop, finding everywhere a change of horses, until he reached Bayonne and then returned to Paris to prepare for that extraordinary campaign, the history of which has been related in our third book.

Moore continued his retreat to Corunna. He checked the pursuers at Benavente and at Lugo, and having rallied his army on the heights for two days, vainly offered battle. The troops were demoralised; the transport animals failed and could not be replaced; guns and ammunition waggons were abandoned; barrels of dollars were broached and rolled down the rocks, the soldiers endangering their lives in their attempt to fill their pockets.

At last Sir John Moore reached Corunna with fourteen thousand men; he looked anxiously out to sea, but could descry no fleet in the roadstead or the offing, the ships that were expected from Vigo having been detained by adverse winds. The French

were able to occupy the heights which commanded the harbour, but the fleet had, at last, come into sight. At two in the afternoon of January 16 Soult ordered an advance. Moore defended his ground with energy, and it may be said that the French attack was not a success. The principal stand was made by Baird at Elvas. But whilst Moore was watching the fight at this place he was struck from his horse by a cannon-shot, and was buried by torchlight in the ramparts. The rest of the English army was now embarked without difficulty, two divisions before day-break and the garrison of the citadel in the afternoon.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOULT IN PORTUGAL.

NAPOLÉON might have believed that he had placed his possession of Spain on a permanent basis, by restoring his brother to Madrid and by driving an English army into the sea. But the war in the Peninsula was not of such a nature that it could be terminated by victories. There was no difficulty in routing and dispersing the Spanish forces; they fled at the first attack like mist driven by the wind. The very rapidity of their discomfiture preserved them from complete destruction, and permitted them to re-form anew, to be again beaten and dispersed. With such adversaries to contend with, the French troops had no difficulty in marching from one end of Spain to the other, but ever victorious in front, they were harassed in their flank and in their rear, by the continual attacks of the guerilleros.

These were collected in small bands, composed of adroit and hardy men, who could hide in ditches or behind rocks, and wait for the opportunity of surprising the isolated, cutting off the stragglers, robbing the post or intercepting supplies. If they happened to come in contact with a superior force, they quickly dispersed to re-form anew. If they were in sufficient numbers, they killed every one opposed to them—soldiers, both sick and wounded, and civilians. They delighted in the robbery of munitions and sup-

plies. All the inhabitants of the country were their accomplices and their spies, whereas the French never knew anything that was going on a hundred yards from their outposts. A body of French troops only commanded the actual ground which it occupied; it might be compared to a movable fortress in a perpetual condition of blockade. The Spaniards, who were worthless and despicable in a pitched battle, were extremely formidable in the changing vicissitudes of their guerilla warfare.

The Spaniards also displayed great tenacity of courage when fighting behind walls, whether they were the walls of a convent or the ramparts of a town. The culminating point of this stubborn heroism was reached in the defence of Saragossa, the capital of Aragon, which lasted from December, 1808, to February, 1809. The army of Palafox, vanquished at Tudela, had taken refuge within its walls. The town was besieged by Lannes, who had little difficulty in making himself master of the outer circle of walls. But this was only the beginning of trouble both for besiegers and besieged. Each house had become a separate fortress; each street could only be crossed by subterraneous thoroughfares; every roof and steeple was occupied by deadly marksmen; mine met mine, and explosions were of hourly occurrence. The convents, enormous cubic masses of stone, pierced with embrasures, offered excellent centres of resistance. The folios from the monkish libraries were piled up as breastworks, the pictures from churches or chapels formed a protection against the rain, and the parchment leaves torn from precious manuscripts defended the sleepers from the damp ground. Lannes had great difficulty in sustaining the courage of his men, and they were on the verge of mutiny.

Typhus raged in the town; the corpses filled the cellars and choked the streets.

Capitulation at last became a matter of necessity. After the sacrifice of fifty thousand lives the brave defender of Saragossa surrendered the ruins of the town. The French were moved by pity when they saw some twelve thousand sickly and starving tattered demalions, survivors of a force four times that number, limp painfully out of the city to lay down their arms. The sieges of Gerona and Tarragona, though less well known in history, offer similar examples of tenacity and courage.

The patriotism and devotion of the Spaniards were conspicuous in other ways, and a noble example of these qualities was exhibited by the Marquis de la Romana. He had been sent by Napoleon to the north of Denmark with the express purpose of separating him as far as possible from his country; but at the news of the rising of Spain he embarked with fourteen thousand men in English vessels and landed in Galicia, where he was able to assist the insurgents and to give valuable aid to the English.

When Napoleon left the Peninsula he committed the charge of finishing the war to his generals, but it was characteristic of them that they could never act together. King Joseph, who possessed excellent moral qualities, was incapable of commanding. Jourdan, whom Napoleon had attached to him as major-general, was old, and was despised by the young generation of marshals and generals. They gradually acquired the habit of paying no attention to their superior officers, and of not co-operating with each other. They received, it is true, orders and directions from Paris from the Emperor, who claimed to regulate their conduct; but at so great a

distance it was necessary to leave much to their own initiative. By degrees the same generals, who in other parts of Europe would carry out with humble docility the orders transmitted by Berthier, began in Spain to act independently. They conquered and occupied territory; they issued edicts and collected taxes, just as if they were no longer military chiefs, but had become kings in their own departments. Soult, especially, conceived the ambition of creating for himself a kingdom and becoming the equal of Murat. In many ways they anticipated the privileges of royalty and created a system of plunder. Napoleon was perpetually reproaching them with their rapacity, but his remonstrances produced no effect.

Such was the character of the war in the Peninsula from the year 1808. It thus came to pass that a pitched battle, which in any other part of Europe would, with a commander like Napoleon, have decided a campaign, had no significance in Spain. The war was a chronic disease which it was impossible to bring to a head. All the more credit is due to the genius and patience of Wellington, who contrived to combine all the forces which were opposed to him and to bend them to his will, so as to make them eventually the instrument by which the power of Napoleon was crushed.

On leaving Valladolid Napoleon had imposed upon Soult the duty of reconquering Portugal, in his eye a task of the utmost importance, because it would deprive the English of the power of influencing the insurrection. Soult, after disposing of Moore's army, was to march with twenty-five thousand men upon Oporto and Lisbon, and was to be supported by the corps of Victor who was descending the valley of

the Tagus. The French passed the Minho and obtained possession of Chaves on March 13. Soult advanced upon Oporto, by way of Braga, and took it by storm on March 29. Victor left Talavera on the Tagus, and scattered the guerilla bands of Estremadura at Medellin on March 28, but he stopped short at Merida on the Guadiana. Sebastiani, leaving Madrid for La Mancha, won the victory of Ciudad Real on March 27, and established himself in that province. If these generals had combined to press their successes the cause of the Spanish patriots might have become hopeless.

But all these victories meant but little, because behind the advance of the French armies the routed Spanish troops formed themselves again, and the guerilleros blocked the advance of the conquerors, impeded their progress and held them in check. This was especially the case with Soult, who lingered in Oporto when he ought to have marched on Lisbon, hoping that he should be able to create for himself the kingdom of Northern Lusitania. When Napoleon heard of his conduct he said that he could only remember Austerlitz.

CHAPTER XXX.

TALAVERA.

A NEW complexion was given to affairs by the disembarkation of Sir Arthur Wellesley, with an army of twenty-five thousand English at Lisbon, on April 22, 1809. He determined immediately to attack Soult and to drive him from Oporto, and for this purpose collected his army at Coimbra, and, while he advanced along the direct road with the bulk of his army, despatched General Hill along the coast road to turn the right flank of the French. Soult was living at Oporto in a dream of perfect security, believing his position assured. Far before him rolled the broad and bridgeless river in flood, and every boat upon it had been carefully secured. A barber evading the sentries had crossed to the southern side in a skiff; Colonel Waters, a brave officer, offered to go across, and soon arrived with some capacious barges from the other bank. The men embarked, Soult was surprised, and there was nothing left for him but to retreat. The dusk found the British in possession of the French quarters with the incredibly slight loss of twenty killed and a hundred wounded. So was Oporto conquered on May 12.

Soult made a disastrous retreat and was obliged to throw his cannon and baggage down the ravines. On May 18 the *corps d'armée* which had been detained for the conquest of Portugal entered Orense in the most miserable condition, without shoes, and in tat-

tered clothes. Instead of summoning to his aid the corps of Ney, who was defending North-west Spain against the forces of La Romana, and again advancing with renewed strength, he turned his back upon the mountains of Galicia, and retreated first to Zamorra and then to Astorga, without informing Ney of his movements or plans, and this although Napoleon had expressly ordered from Schönbrunn that the three corps of Soult, Ney and Mortier were to be joined into one, the command of which was to be given to Soult.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, being master of Portugal, now determined to carry the war into Spain, following the valley of the Tagus. He found thirty-five thousand Spanish troops under the command of Cuesta, who had been routed at Medellin by Victor, but had since re-formed. Joining Cuesta, whom with great difficulty he persuaded to action, he marched straight on Talavera, the headquarters of Marshal Victor, with an army of sixty thousand men. This threatened Madrid, and King Joseph exerted himself to repel the enemy. They both made appeal to Soult, who from Zamorra might easily have attacked the English on their left flank. But instead of waiting for the arrival of Soult, Joseph and Victor attacked the English position on July 27. For two days Wellesley was assailed by the united French armies, the English having eighteen thousand men and the French forty-eight thousand, not including the army of Cuesta, for the English bore the whole brunt of the fighting. The battle lasted two days. On the first the most important attack was made by Jourdan on the left; on the second Victor ordered a simultaneous charge along the whole of his front. The British line was nearly

broken at the centre when a fierce bayonet charge hurled the enemy down the hill. The English loss was very heavy,—killed, wounded and missing numbered nearly six thousand,—but its moral effect was great, and it is generally regarded as an English victory. When, on August 3, Soult appeared with a large force in the neighbourhood of Plasencia, Wellesley evacuated Talavera and recrossed the Tagus, returning to the fortress of Badajoz. He had, however, with impunity braved the French in the very heart of Spain which Napoleon believed that he had conquered. Lord Liverpool wrote to him that he had raised the military reputation of England to a height which it had never reached since the campaigns of Marlborough. As a reward he was raised to the peerage as Viscount Wellington of Talavera and of Wellington in Somersetshire.

Napoleon held Jourdan responsible for the ill-success of Talavera. He recalled him to France and placed Soult at the head of King Joseph's staff, a step which was not likely to appease discords. Instead of bending all their efforts to the reconquest of Portugal, the French continued what they were pleased to consider the occupation of the province of Spain. St. Cyr laid methodical siege to the strong places of Catalonia, and Victor and Sebastiani, in the south, penetrated as far as the Sierra Morena and kept guard over the outlets from that range of mountains. The Central Junta of Seville continued to make mistakes which made them an easy prey to the French. The capture of Oporto and the success of Talavera, with both of which they had so little to do, swelled their pride in 1809 as the capitulation of Baylen had done in 1808. Under the advice of La Romana they insisted that the brave but

youthful and inexperienced General Areizaga should march into the plains of La Mancha in order to reconquer Madrid. In vain did Wellington warn them not to venture into a country which offered so favourable a field for the enemy's cavalry, and recommended them to confine themselves to the defence of the forces of the Sierra Morena. All the regular troops of Spain to the number of fifty thousand were placed under the command of Areizaga, who with them crossed the Sierra Morena and marched upon the capital.

He neglected all reasonable precautions, and only realised the consequences of his rashness when from the church tower of Ocaña he saw the French armies closing round him under the command of Soult. After a combat of three hours he was entirely defeated, losing five thousand dead and wounded and fifteen thousand prisoners. Guns, baggage, horses, and thirty-two standards fell into the hands of the French. The result of this was that the French were again free to threaten Portugal either by Ciudad Rodrigo or by Badajoz, and Wellington was forced to retire from that fortress and take up a position on the Portuguese Tagus.

It would have been better for the French generals in Spain if, after this victory, they had turned their attention to the defeat of the English, but instead of this Joseph and Soult undertook the invasion of Andalusia. With an army of seventy thousand men they invaded that province and entered Cordova and Granada in triumph. If they had acted with promptness they might have surprised Cadiz, but Soult preferred to occupy Seville, and Joseph made his entry into that important city on February 1, 1810. The Central Junta took refuge in the im-

pregnable position of Cadiz, from which they directed an energetic war against the Marshals of France.

After the battle of Talavera Napoleon determined to change the system which he had hitherto followed in Spain. He became convinced that the cause of his misfortunes lay in the dispersion of his forces and in having given too much power to Joseph, who was not a man of war. He had also become convinced that it was for his interests to concentrate his attack upon the English. By a decree dated February 8, 1810, he took away from Joseph the provinces situated to the north of the Ebro and formed them into separate military commands. Three great armies were created. The first was the army of Portugal, whose duty it was to attack the English. Masséna was placed at its head. Then came the army of the centre, left to Joseph to support his royalty and to pursue the guerilleros. The third was the army of Andalusia, commanded by Soult. These measures may have been wise from a military point of view, but they reduced Joseph to the position of a phantom-king and placed the greater part of Spain under military command. The project of uniting Spain under a sovereign of the Napoleon family was abandoned for the present.

CHAPTER XXXI.

MASSÉNA.

THE army of Portugal, seventy thousand men strong, divided into three bodies, came together at Salamanca under the command of Masséna, Ney, Junot, and Reynier being assigned to him as subordinate. Masséna prepared immediately to march upon Lisbon, but he began by taking possession of the frontier fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. Masséna crossed the frontier of Portugal on September 16, 1810, Wellington retiring before him and methodically devastating the valley of Mondego, so that the French army had to subsist upon the bread which they had brought with them from Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington now took up a position behind Coimbra on the heights of Busaco. This is a range of precipitous hills, eight miles in length, sloping down on the south to a ford on the Mondego and connected on the north with another sierra by a rugged and impracticable country. The allied forces, crossing the Mondego, were in the act of taking up their position when the French under Ney and Reynier approached the base of the mountains. Ney, with his military instinct, saw that the English had not completed their preparations; he therefore urged Masséna to attack immediately. But Masséna was ten miles in the rear and did not reach the scene of operations till midday. The battle began on September 27 before daybreak. The French formed

in five columns of attack, and showed the most remarkable courage and agility in scaling the iron ridges. But each column, as it arrived breathless, was shattered by a withering musketry fire or hurled downwards by fierce bayonet charges. The scaling columns were also enfiladed by storms of grape which drove along the face of the cliffs. The dogged courage of Ney at last succumbed, and in the afternoon the French withdrew. They had lost five thousand men and the allies thirteen hundred.

On the following day Masséna discovered a path across the mountains to the right which enabled him to turn Wellington's position. The English general was forced to retreat and the French entered Coimbra. On October 10 he was approaching Lisbon, when to his great surprise he was stopped by a formidable line of earthworks behind which the English army had entirely disappeared. These were the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras, which Wellington had been carefully constructing for a whole year. They stretched from the Atlantic to the Tagus and completely enclosed the peninsula on which Lisbon is situated. They consisted of three parallel lines of entrenchments, of which all were strong, and the second was the strongest. Sixty-nine works had been constructed along the line and they were armed with three hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Where there seemed a possibility of the fortifications being forced, redoubts at right angles were thrown up to the rear to sweep the advancing columns with a flanking fire. The length of the lines as the crow flies was twenty-five miles. Hills had been scarped, streams had been diverted to swamp the low-lying country, bridges had been broken down or mined and signalling could be conducted by a system of

telegraphs. It is strange that the French, with their many friends and partisans in Lisbon, were left in absolute ignorance of these preparations, and that nothing should have been known about them at Paris. Masséna only heard accidentally of their existence from a peasant.

Masséna waited before the lines for a fortnight, and then made up his mind for the assault, but Ney refused to obey both his verbal and his written orders. Even if these fortifications could have been captured at first, each day added to their strength. Masséna was deeply disappointed. He had made a rapid march to Lisbon, which he hoped would have driven the English to their ships, but he found himself in front of a fortified camp, impregnable to storm, and never to be reduced by blockade. He was also suffering from hunger, as he had wasted the stores taken at Coimbra and Leiria. Trant had seized on Coimbra with the sick and wounded in the hospitals and the garrison left for their protection. Masséna was obliged to retreat and retired to Santarem on the Tagus, where he established his headquarters. The army of Portugal was reduced to forty thousand men.

Soult was for a long time ignorant of the position of Masséna, but it is possible that he might have assisted him if he had been so disposed. He contented himself with covering the frontiers of Andalusia, by besieging Badajoz, which he took on March 12, 1811. Wellington now retired to the frontier of Spain and laid siege to Almeida, while he sent Beresford to the south, towards Badajoz, to hold Soult in check. Masséna was not willing to sacrifice Almeida without a struggle; he therefore returned and attacked Wellington on May 3 at Fuentes d'Oñoro.

This village lies in a valley with hills on either side, and the road to Ciudad Rodrigo passes through the main street. On one side was a morass and a wood, which prevented approach, and the village afforded many opportunities of cover. The attack on May 3 was repulsed, but on the following day Masséna came up in person. The French were greatly superior in numbers, but the English made a gallant resistance. The carnage went on till darkness put an end to the conflict, and both sides claimed a victory. But there is little doubt that the English were very glad not to be attacked for the third time, which would probably have been the case if Masséna had not been superseded at this critical moment by Marmont. Masséna returned to France in disgrace.

Almeida now surrendered, and the army of Portugal retired to Salamanca. In the meantime Beresford was advancing to the relief of Badajoz. Soult advanced to drive him back into Portugal, and a battle between them took place at Albuera on May 11. Beresford's position was a ridge four miles in length traversing the Seville road, with the river of Albuera in front and the ravines of a hill torrent behind. Soult attacked with great energy and the Spanish allies of Beresford were of more hindrance than use. The entire defeat of the English was prevented by the daring action of Colonel Hardinge, who on his own responsibility ordered up a division and a brigade which had not yet been brought into action, and redeemed the fortunes of the day. Out of six thousand English all but two thousand had been killed or wounded. Wellington wrote to Beresford privately: "Such another battle would ruin us. I am labouring to set all right again."

CHAPTER XXXII.

SALAMANCA.

MARSHAL MARMONT on arriving to take command of the army of Portugal found it in a very bad condition. He recognised that it would be useless to attempt the reconquest of Portugal or to make an attack upon Lisbon. He therefore contented himself with keeping guard over the frontier, to preserve Spanish territory from the invasion of Wellington and his lieutenants. His first success was in preserving the frontier fortress of Badajoz from the onslaught of Wellington and Beresford, and he showed his good sense by hastening to the assistance of Soult. The result of this unwonted co-operation between two marshals was that the siege of Badajoz was raised and that communication between the two armies of Andalusia and Portugal was secured by the fortified post of Almaraz on the Tagus. Driven from Badajoz, Wellington attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, but Marmont effected a junction between his own army and the army of the North, that is, the divisions of Galicia and the Asturias. Wellington surrendered the enterprise for the moment and retired into Portugal without accepting battle. The Portuguese frontier was defended by French cavalry. Although Marmont had not shown much energy in attack he had at least conducted a gallant and successful defence.

The best results in the Peninsula had up to the

present been obtained by Marshal Suchet in the East. Alone of Napoleon's marshals he succeeded in establishing a real domination over the regions he had conquered. Having reduced Catalonia, he undertook the subjection of the kingdom of Valencia. Napoleon, not unnaturally, favoured his enterprise and withdrew troops from Andalusia and Portugal for the war in Valencia, though it would have been undoubtedly wiser to have directed all his efforts to the defeat of Wellington. The important city of Valencia fell into Suchet's hands on January 9, 1812.

This last date strikes a note of ill-omen for France. The year 1812 witnessed the expedition to Russia in which the resources of the Empire were strained to the utmost. Napoleon was obliged to recall from Spain some of his best troops and some entire depôts. In consequence of this he was obliged to change the position of his *corps d'armée* and to assign to them new duties. Wellington profited by these circumstances to the full in order to recommence his attacks. Besides this there was a condition of mortal hatred between Soult and Marmont which prevented them from acting together. Inexcusable as is the invasion of Russia from all points of view, to undertake it until the English army had been forced to retreat from the Peninsula was an act of incredible rashness.

Wellington laid siege to Ciudad Rodrigo on January 8, 1812, and captured it on January 19. He then turned his attention to Badajoz. He had hoped to have invested it in the early days of March, when the flooding of the northern rivers would have assisted him, but no means of transport were available to move the siege trains and supplies from

Elvas to Badajoz. The fortress in the meantime had been made extremely formidable. Redoubts and earthworks had been thrown up and heavily armed, there was abundance of provisions, but the ammunition was scanty. Ground was broken on March 17, and the work was carried on with great difficulty and heavy losses. On the morning of April 5 the breaches were pronounced practicable, and there was great excitement as to the result, for Soult was known to be approaching.

The storm of Badajoz on April 6 forms one of the most thrilling chapters in military history. The commandant, Phillipon, had strengthened the fortress in every manner which skill and ingenuity could suggest. As the clock struck ten at night the assault on the breaches began. The stormers crowded to the edge of the glacis and lowered their ladders into the ditch. When they had descended the silence was broken by a solitary shot from the ramparts. In an instant the whole glacis, which had been mined, was exploded, and the ditch, which had been paved with shells, belched forth its hideous artillery. The heads of the storming columns were absolutely annihilated, and the French stood on the breaches watching the deadly scene. But the alarm of the stormers changed to frenzied anger, and they swarmed up the breaches. Here they found that the broken parapets had been strengthened with sandbags and fascines and that the breach had been closed up by *chevaux de frise* of sword-plates, socketed in solid oak and secured by chains. Those who were first impaled on these deadly weapons made a path for the rest. At the same time the breaches were defended by a storm of shot, both in front and on the flank. The stormers, repelled by the pitiless cross-fire, retired to the ditch

and refused to renew the assault. In the meantime, however, Picton had been able to take the castle by escalade, and Walker had stormed a bastion at the other extremity of the town; the garrison therefore abandoned the defence of the breaches. The English obtained the fortress, but at a loss of five thousand dead and wounded.

This double success, so easily obtained, revealed to Wellington the weakness of the French. He therefore determined, for the first time since 1809, to attempt a direct invasion of Spain. He advanced by the basin of the Douro, having the Pyrenees for his objective, and for his purpose the severing of the Spanish armies from their base of operations. The French army in the Peninsula still consisted of two hundred thousand men, and in command of this large force Napoleon placed his brother Joseph, who again received Jourdan as an adviser. Still, the French armies were scattered in Castile, in Valencia and in Andalusia, and it was hardly to be expected that the marshals who had so long enjoyed an independent position would suddenly obey a King whom their Emperor had so often treated with contempt. Marmont, who was posted in Leon, with Salamanca as his base of operations, with fifty thousand men to guard the country between the Douro and the Tagus, was the only marshal who preserved cordial relations with the King; whereas Soult in Seville and Suchet in Valencia paid no attention to commands coming from Madrid. Caffarelli, who commanded in the Basque provinces, openly declared that he should obey no orders except those which were sent from Paris. These differences were accentuated by the astuteness of the English commander-in-chief, who succeeded in making Soult believe that Andalusia

was the object of attack, whereas his efforts were directed to the isolation of Marmont.

Wellington crossed the Agueda and entered Spain on June 13, 1812, with an army of fifty-five thousand men, composed of English, Spaniards and Portuguese. After several days' march, in the highest spirits, through a delightful country, the allies lit their bivouac fires in front of Salamanca, Marmont having evacuated the city on the previous day. Wellington was welcomed in the town with passionate demonstrations of devotion. The streets and squares were decorated with flags and flowers and illuminated after nightfall. The general rode to his quarters, with the crowd cheering and the women falling on their knees and kissing his stirrups. The dread of surrendering again this grateful city to the enemy may have induced him to offer immediate battle. But having possession of the town it was necessary that he should take the forts and hold them, for his position was extremely precarious, as, if he had been beaten and thrown back upon Eastern Castile, he would have been crushed between the armies of Marmont and Joseph. Marmont had apparently no desire to fight a pitched battle, but did his best to manœuvre Wellington into a retreat.

The forts held out for ten days, and every day Marmont was raising reinforcements. After a month's wearisome delay Wellington heard at last on July 16 that Marmont had suddenly marched upon the Douro and was forming troops across the river. He rejoiced at the news, but he was in a dangerous position; his left was turned and Marmont had got a fair start for Salamanca. If he could reach it before the allies he would seize upon the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Although both armies must fight in a flank

position, everything was staked upon the battle, and defeat to either would be irretrievable disaster. Marmont, however, changed his plans and the issues became less critical.

At last the battle which we call Salamanca and the French Arapiles was fought on July 23. The Arapiles are two isolated hills rising from the high upland of the battle-field, one of which was in the possession of the English and the other of the French. Marmont had been manœuvring all the morning, and had, in attempting to reach the road which led to Ciudad Rodrigo, separated his left from his centre. Wellington threw his columns into the gap; Marmont tried to retrieve the error, but did not see the third division of the English which was advancing amongst the hills. Just at the critical moment Marmont was struck down by a shell which shattered his arm and inflicted other grievous wounds, Bonnet, who succeeded him, suffered a similar fate, and the command devolved on Clausel, one of the youngest marshals. He made heroic efforts to redeem the day, which were nearly successful, and withdrew his army after the defeat with consummate skill. The effects of the battle were decisive, for the French had lost six thousand men, and they were felt elsewhere than in Spain. The news of the defeat of Salamanca reached Napoleon on the Moskva, the night before the battle of Borodino, and this to some measure accounts for his inertness during its continuance and his sluggishness in following it up.

After the battle of Salamanca the army of Portugal retreated on Burgos, and it is possible that if Wellington had pursued it with energy he might have driven it into the Pyrenees. But, under the influence of political motives, he turned aside to enter

Madrid as conqueror. He was received rather as a god than as a mortal: he was created a Grandee of Spain of the first class, Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, and was invested with the command of the Spanish armies. While Wellington had made this triumphal entry on August 12, King Joseph had taken refuge in Valencia amongst the soldiers of Suchet. But Soult, urged at last to action, left Andalusia and joined the forces of King Joseph and Suchet. The French were now in sufficient strength to recover possession of the capital.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

VITTORIA.

ON September 1 Wellington left Madrid to pursue the army of Clausel, which was retiring on the line of the Ebro. Clausel exhibited remarkable capacity in his retreat, and Wellington did not care to attack him. Burgos was occupied on September 17, Marmont having only left it a few days before, but this also had to be evacuated. Although the city was abandoned, the castle was garrisoned by eighteen hundred soldiers under Dubreton, a general of rare skill and determination. Wellington thought that it could not hold out long, for it was a fortress of the third order, and was commanded by some heights to the eastward within short gun-range, but it eventually succeeded in baffling all his efforts. Four assaults were successively delivered upon it, but they were all fruitless. Officers and men began to feel that they were engaged in a hopeless task, and they even lost confidence in their general. The rain had fallen in torrents, swamping the trenches and parallels; the garrison also had been extremely active, breaking out into furious sorties, which were only repulsed with severe loss. After the defences had been breached in a third place, a fifth and final assault was delivered, but was as disastrous as the others had been. Wellington therefore determined to retreat, and retired first on the Douro and then to Salamanca.

On November 2 King Joseph again entered his

capital. He formed the army of Portugal by the valley of the Douro, and was now in command of an army of eighty-five thousand men. He advanced with this force against Wellington, whom he found on the battle-field of Arapiles, where the fortunes of the previous disaster might have been retrieved. The blame of failure is rightly or wrongly laid on Soult, who is said to have lost a day by his sluggishness and timidity. It is possible that he had no desire to hazard an engagement. However that may be, at the moment of projected attack thick fog and heavy rain threw a curtain between the French and English armies, and when the veil was lifted Wellington was nowhere to be seen. His retreat was full of miseries, but he safely reached the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The catastrophe of Napoleon in Russia, which has been narrated in previous chapters, deprived the armies of Spain of all hope of reinforcement, and the Emperor was also obliged to recall a large number of officers and seasoned soldiers to fill up the gaps which had been made in his armies in Germany. He ordered the concentration of his forces, which remained in the Peninsula, in the North and the Centre, the evacuation of Madrid and the transference of the capital to Valladolid. He recalled Soult, entrusting future operations to King Joseph and to Jourdan as chief of the staff. These measures were the best that could be adopted under the circumstances, but unfortunately Clausel was detached with a considerable force to put down the guerilla bands in the north of Spain. Wellington took full advantage of these circumstances. In May, 1813, the whole number of combatants for the Spanish cause under arms amounted to two hundred thousand men, and the force directly under Wellington himself con-

sisted of seventy thousand English and Portuguese, while the flank of the land forces was covered by English fleets. The effective fighting forces of the French armies may be estimated at one hundred and ten thousand. Wellington crossed the Spanish frontier on May 20, and marched first on Salamanca and then on Valladolid.

Joseph considered himself, without the aid of Clausel's division, too weak to oppose Wellington at Valladolid, and therefore retired first to Burgos and then to Miranda, finally taking up a position on the plain of Vittoria. At this town converge the three great roads leading from Bilbao, Pamplona, and Bayonne. Here, too, were crowded together the army trains and stores, the wounded, the women and children and all the plunder. The French were formed in three lines behind the Zadora, Clausel was at Logroño, about thirty miles distant, and King Joseph sent him urgent messages to come up, but before he could arrive the battle was over and lost.

The battle began at daybreak on June 21, like so many of the battles which we have narrated, in a dense mist. Hill on the English right stormed the heights of Puebla and occupied them; Wellington took charge of the centre, and on the left Graham was advancing by the road from Bilbao and was opposed by Reille. When Wellington saw that the French centre was weakened by their having detached troops to oppose Hill, he made a vigorous attack in the centre with Picton and the third division. The French made a stubborn resistance, but their position was turned on the left and they were obliged to fall back, crowding together in confusion. A panic ensued and gun after gun was lost; Reille still held his own, but he was isolated and in great

danger. The road to Irun and Bayonne was blocked by waggons and fugitives and the flight was directed towards Pamplona. The victory was complete and the French lost about five thousand killed and wounded and eight thousand prisoners. Clausel, marching up too late towards the scene of conflict, nearly fell a prey to the victorious army. He was, however, able to escape and retired into Catalonia to cover the retreat of Suchet. This general was compelled to evacuate Valencia, which he had conquered with such distinction, and after garrisoning the fortress to withdraw his troops gradually across the Ebro.

Spain was now entirely recovered from the French. Joseph was recalled to France in disgrace and placed under arrest in his country-house of Morfontaine, whilst Soult was despatched to the South to reorganise the defeated armies. He took up a position along the River Nive, from St. Jean Pied-de-Port to Bayonne. Wellington was in no hurry to cross the French frontier, but undertook the siege of St. Sebastian, which was one of the most important operations of the war. He did not gain possession of it till the last day of August. Then ensued a series of struggles between Soult and Wellington in the defiles of the Pyrenees which are too complicated to be described in detail. One incident, however, is too picturesque to be omitted. Soult was advancing to relieve Pamplona, when Wellington galloped into the village of Sauroren. The French cavalry followed him into the village, and he had scarcely time to save himself and to reach his troops. The two armies were confronted on opposing heights, and the generals were so near to each other that Wellington could distinguish the figure

and even the features of his opponent. When the soldiers knew that their commander was on the field, loud cheers, taken up by regiment after regiment, rang along the line. Wellington said: "Soult is a great commander, but a cautious one, and he will delay his attack to ascertain the meaning of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to come up and I shall beat him." The event justified the prophecy; Pamplona surrendered to Wellington on the last day of October.

Before this date Wellington had crossed the Bidassoa, and on the evening of October 9 the allied armies were established in cantonments in France; the Nivelle was traversed about a month later. Wellington now advanced into France and fought the battle of Orthez on February 27, 1814, and thus commanded the road to Bordeaux, which was entered by the English on March 12. Ten days later King Ferdinand VII., restored by Napoleon to the throne of his ancestors, set his foot once more upon Spanish soil and the Peninsular war was at an end.

PART SEVEN.

THE WAR OF 1814.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE LION AT BAY.

AFTER the disastrous campaign of Russia Napoleon had still great resources left, and he was only contending against one-half of Europe, but after the battle of Leipzig he could only depend upon himself, and the whole of Europe was in arms against him. Nothing was left of the Grand Army except a few fragments, mere phantoms of *corps d'armée* and divisions, which made no attempt to defend the frontier of the Rhine. Along the course of that river, between Basle and Cologne, were posted Marmont with twelve thousand men, Macdonald with twelve thousand, Victor with seven thousand, Ney with seven thousand, as well as about nine thousand cavalry. Belgium was held by a body of fifteen thousand troops. The frontier of the Jura was undefended and was falling a prey to the allied forces. In Italy Prince Eugène had quite enough to do in defending himself against the attacks of the Austrians; Soult, as we have seen, was being pressed

back by Wellington into the south of France. Not only had the gigantic empire of Napoleon vanished like a dream, but the frontiers which France had acquired after the Revolution were being assaulted by half a million enemies.

France had no energy to resist these invasions. She had not only been exhausted by the demands so incessantly made upon her, but the iron will of her sovereign had broken her own resolution, she had lost the power of initiative, and could no longer oppose to attack the fire of patriotism or the stubborn spirit of independence. The only moral quality which remained to her was that of resignation. It is possible that the allies still overrated the strength of their great antagonist, or it may be that they hoped for the conclusion of peace on the basis of France retaining her natural frontiers of the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees, and giving up all claims to influence in Germany, Holland, Italy and Spain. At any rate their forces advanced very slowly after the battle of Leipzig, and it was not till December 21, 1813, that the army of Schwarzenberg crossed the Rhine by the bridge of Bâle, nor till January 1, 1814, that the army of Blücher passed the same river between Mainz and Cologne. The object of the armies of Bohemia and Silesia was to march upon the capital of France. The strength of the two united was two hundred and fifty thousand men.

After his return to Paris Napoleon had worked with all the resources of his energy and his genius to repel this invasion. He had called up all the soldiers he could lay his hands upon as far back as the conscription of 1805, and had anticipated the conscription of 1815. He had established new

“cohorts” of national guards, had recalled troops from Spain, and thus had collected together a force which showed on paper as five hundred thousand. But he could hardly expect that his orders would be literally carried out. The two months’ breathing-space allowed him after Leipzig was not sufficient to drill these conscripts, nor even to collect them together. He was badly supplied with money, clothing, arms and all material of war. The conscripts, when they arrived at the depôts, had but scanty uniforms or none at all, many were dressed in blouses and wooden shoes, and these poor children, inexperienced and uninstructed, merely food for the enemy’s cannon, in spite of the courage and devotion which they often exhibited, went by the name of “Marie-Louises.”

In the darkness of all these difficulties flamed the bright star of the genius of Napoleon himself. As he had been before led from victory to victory by his good fortune, so now did the greatest qualities of his mind and character seem to derive strength from the presence of ill fortune, stimulated to greater efforts by the ever-present feeling that he was defending the soil of his country against the pollution of an invading foe. Commanding a few veterans and a few recruits, he thought to supply the deficiency by his personal qualities, by the rapidity of his movements, by the wise application of means to ends, by readiness to profit by the smallest division amongst the enemy and by the discovery of new resources. Thus the campaign of 1814 is scarcely less brilliant than the campaign of 1796; his setting like his rising sun was attended by the gorgeous hues of victory. But the forces of nature, which are more powerful than those of war, which were on

his side in Italy, were now opposed to him in France; it was impossible to contend successfully against an overwhelming fate.

The army of Schwarzenberg, two hundred thousand strong, marched into France by Besançon, Langres and Chaumont; Blücher, with fifty thousand men, advanced through Lorraine to Vassy and St. Dizier. Their design was to join their forces and then to march upon Paris by the valleys of the Marne and the Seine. They had gradually driven back before them the small armies of Victor, Ney, and Marmont, and on January 27 Blücher reached Brienne with thirty thousand men in order to join Schwarzenberg, who had arrived at Bar-sur-Aube, about ten miles distant. To protect Paris Mortier was stationed at Troyes with fifteen thousand men, while at Châlons were collected about forty thousand under the command of Victor, Ney, Marmont, and Macdonald. Thus when Napoleon arrived at Châlons he found himself at the head of fifty-five thousand men. The Marie-Louises, who came in gradually afterwards, did not double the number, and the Imperial army never at any time contained more than ninety thousand combatants.

The plan of Napoleon was to attack Blücher, who had the smaller army, before he could join Schwarzenberg, and for this purpose marched from Châlons to Saint Dizier, and from Saint Dizier to Brienne, in the valley of the Aube, where he came up with the Prussian marshal. After a spirited engagement he drove the Prussians from Brienne, but they retreated towards Bar-sur-Aube, where Schwarzenberg was posted, so that he would have to fight against both armies united, which together quadrupled his own. Instead of retiring he established

himself at La Rothière and on the hills surrounding Brienne. The Austrian army had already moved forward to meet Blücher, and on February 1 the small forces of Napoleon were attacked by at least one hundred and fifty thousand of the enemy, who outflanked him on both sides, and tried to thrust him into the Aube. After a struggle of eight hours La Rothière remained in the hands of the allies. Napoleon had lost six thousand men and fifty-four guns, and was obliged to retreat, first to Troyes and afterwards to Nogent-sur-Seine. The allies thought that the campaign was at an end and the officers expected to be dining in a week's time in the garden of the Palais Royal.

In a council of war held in the château of Brienne on February 2 the invaders determined to march immediately on Paris, and for this purpose divided their forces into two parts, Blücher advancing to Châlons, where he was to receive reinforcements, and then by the valley of the Marne; Schwarzenberg by Troyes and the valley of the Seine. Blücher showed that he well merited the name of "Marshal Forwards." He pressed on with all speed, hoping to arrive at Paris before Schwarzenberg. The consequence of this was that his troops were distributed over a very long line. On February 9 Yorck was at Château Thierry with eighteen thousand men, Sacken at Montmirail with twenty thousand, Olsuvief at Champaubert with six thousand, whereas Blücher with his eighteen thousand men had not got further than Etoges.

Napoleon was carefully following from Nogent-sur-Seine the movements of the army of Silesia, and on February 7 he despatched Marmont to Sézanne and joined him there two days later. As he had

left the corps of Victor and Oudinot on the Seine he had with him only a body of twenty-five thousand men. He marched by the road from Sézanne to Epernay, which passes by Champaubert and would bring him right upon the flank of the Russians. He attacked them on the following day and almost entirely annihilated them, only fifteen hundred escaping. By this action the army of Blücher was cut completely in two, and Napoleon had the choice of turning to the right on Blücher himself or to left upon his lieutenants. He determined upon the latter course. He left Marmont at Champaubert to keep Blücher in check, and marched upon the corps of Sacken at Montmirail. Sacken fought bravely, but was entirely defeated with the loss of four thousand men. Napoleon then on February 12 marched against the division of York at Château Thierry. This in its turn was beaten and driven behind the Ourcq with the loss of three thousand men. Thus in three days the Emperor had scattered the greater number of Blücher's troops to the winds and had reopened his communications with Paris. He now turned upon Blücher himself, who was ignorant of what had occurred. He was advancing from Etoges to Montmirail, and Marmont was retiring slowly before him. Suddenly Marmont turned round and attacked him as he came out of Vauchamps. Then behind the troops of Marmont, Blücher saw the Imperial guard advancing and the cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" uttered by ten thousand throats came upon him like a clap of thunder. Obedient to his old caution he determined to retreat and did so at first in good order. But Grouchy made a desperate charge upon this mass of men with three thousand five hundred cavalry, cut them down, and huddled them

up in confusion. Blücher retired in disorder with the loss of six thousand men, the French loss being only six hundred.

The intention of Napoleon had been to pursue Blücher to Châlons, complete the destruction of his army, and then move backwards to Vitry, thus threatening the rear of the army of Bohemia. But he heard that Schwarzenberg had driven back the forces of Victor and of Oudinot, and was threatening Paris. Jomini had indeed advised the allies to march on Paris, but, disconcerted by the fate of Blücher, they determined to "wait for the development of the manœuvres of the Emperor Napoleon." The plan of these manœuvres was formed on the battle-field of Vauchamps. On February 14 the army of Bohemia was much scattered, Wittgenstein was at Provins, Wrede at Nangis, the Würtembergers at Montereau, and the reserve between Bray and Nogent. Napoleon on February 14 and 15 marched first back towards Meaux and then south to Guignes, where he joined his two marshals, Victor and Oudinot, and brought his numbers up to sixty thousand men. On February 17 he fell upon the enemy and drove them first on Mornant and then on Nangis; he then sent Oudinot, Macdonald, and Victor in three directions to push the enemy before them, ordering the last to occupy the bridge of Montereau, which however he failed to do. On February 18 Napoleon hastened to repair this error and forced the Würtembergers into Montereau, occupying the famous bridge, by which he hoped to reach the army of Schwarzenberg. The Austrians, however, thought it prudent to retire to Troyes.

On February 22 the grand army of the allies was arranged in order of battle, its right on the Seine,

its left on the village of St. Germain. It was too late for the Emperor to attack it, because all his troops had not arrived, but he had great hopes for the morrow. True, the allies were one hundred and fifty thousand and the French seventy thousand, but they were demoralised by their defeat and had a river at their back. Blücher could not come up in less than twenty-four hours, and in that time Schwarzenberg would have been beaten. Unfortunately for Napoleon the Austrians were of the same opinion, and did not care to sacrifice a magnificent army to the glory of France. So on the following day, at five o'clock in the morning, they retreated to Bar-sur-Aube, sending propositions for an armistice. On February 24 Napoleon entered Troyes, where he was received with the greatest enthusiasm. On February 26 the general position of the armies was as follows: Napoleon at Troyes commanded between the Seine and the Aube a force of seventy-four thousand men and three hundred and forty guns; the great army of the allies, reduced to two hundred and thirty thousand men, was retiring before him to Chaumont and Langres. On his left Blücher with forty-eight thousand men was undertaking a dangerous flank march, being held in check by Marshals Marmont and Mortier with sixteen thousand men, with the risk of being attacked in his rear by the Emperor himself. On the right of Napoleon, General Allix defended the line of the Yonne with two thousand soldiers, and was raising the peasants of the surrounding country. Every day Paris sent fresh supplies both of men and guns; the national guards were organising themselves in the provinces, and the peasants were beginning a guerilla warfare. In the South Augereau with twenty-seven

thousand men had begun to take the offensive against the twenty thousand men of Bubna and Lichtenstein. Augereau had express orders to occupy a position between Bâle and Langres so as to cut off Schwarzenberg's retreat. The possibility of this catastrophe caused continual disquiet to the Austrian general, and made him fear that the situation of affairs might at any time undergo a sudden change.

CHAPTER XXXV.

SOISSONS AND LAON.

THE success of the French arms at this time was confined to Champagne, and the enemy was slowly advancing on other points of the frontier. In Belgium General Maison with his small body of fifteen thousand men was obliged to retire before the Duke of Saxe-Weimar with thirty thousand, supported by the army of the North under Bernadotte. Antwerp, commanded by the famous Carnot, was besieged. In the Pyrenees, Marshal Soult, with fifty thousand conscripts, was no match for the eighty thousand soldiers of Wellington. His gradual retreat has already been narrated. In Italy, Prince Eugène was holding his own with difficulty against the Austrians on the Adige. After La Rothière the Emperor thought of recalling him, but his subsequent victories made him change his determination and Eugène remained in Italy. On the other hand, Marshal Suchet was in command of fifteen thousand men in Spain; who, after the ratification of the treaty of Valençay, would be available for service in France.

Under the pressure of the victories of Napoleon the allies formed some important resolutions at Bar-sur-Aube on February 25. They determined that Blücher should resume his march on Paris by way of Meaux, and that he should be supported by

the corps of Bülow and Winzingerode, both of them forming part of the army of the North, which now began to enter upon the scene. Also to support Bubna they gave orders for a new corps to enter Switzerland under the command of the Prince of Hesse, to neutralise the efforts of Augereau. These two determinations were of the utmost importance, and indeed eventually decided the issue of the campaign in favour of the allies.

As soon as the plan of action had been decided upon Blücher put himself in motion to proceed from the Aube to the Marne, inclining slightly towards the north to meet the reinforcements which he had been told to expect. Marmont and Mortier did their best to hold him in check, but they were forced to retire. On February 28 he crossed the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, while the two French marshals retired behind the Ourcq, which they held against the advancing Prussians. Blücher on reaching the right bank of the Marne found no traces either of Bülow or of Winzingerode, and he soon learnt that he would be attacked by Napoleon in person.

The Emperor had desisted from the pursuit of the Austrians on February 26, leaving forty thousand men on the Aube under the command of Oudinot and Macdonald. Setting out from Troyes on February 27, he reached Sézanne on the following day and arrived at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre on March 2, with an army of thirty-five thousand fighting men. If Blücher had not taken the precaution to destroy the bridge across the Marne, the army of Silesia would have been destroyed. But he was now able during the next two days to cross the Ourcq and to retire upon the Aisne. His soldiers were in the

worst extremity of fatigue and misery. In seventy-two hours they had fought three battles and made three night marches; they had received no regular supply of provisions for a week. Some of the cavalry had not unsaddled for ten days, the horses were in a terrible condition, the artillery stuck hopelessly in the muddy roads, and quantities of ammunition had to be abandoned. The infantry marched barefooted and in rags, carrying rusty muskets, grumbling against their generals.

There were two bridges across the Aisne in these parts, one at Soissons and one at Berry-au-Bac, but the fortified town of Soissons was held by a French garrison. Napoleon moved in the direction of Fismes, hoping to intercept the passage at Berry-au-Bac, that of Soissons being already closed. If he could succeed, Blücher would have to fight a battle under the worst possible conditions, which could only result in complete disaster. But the unexpected happened. Winzingerode, instead of marching to Oulchy to join Blücher, had undertaken the siege of Soissons with the hope of gaining possession of that important bridge. There was but little chance of the town surrendering. Indeed, the siege was on the point of being raised, when suddenly the commandant of the place, an old soldier without energy, lost his head at the first sound of the enemy's guns and capitulated after twenty-four hours' investment. Hardly was the ink of the convention dry when the cannon of the Emperor were heard on the banks of the Oureq. Thus was all the fruit of Napoleon's brilliant manœuvres lost. Blücher crossed the Aisne safely on March 5 and retreated towards Laon.

The rage of the Emperor at this cowardly act of

treason may well be imagined. He wrote to Clarke, the Minister of War: "The enemy was in the greatest embarrassment, and we were hoping to reap the fruit of several days of labour, when the treason or stupidity of the commandant of Soissons delivered this fortress to him. Arrest this miserable wretch, and the members of the council of defence, bring them before a court-martial composed of generals, and, in God's name, have them shot in the Place de Grève in twenty-four hours. It is time that example should be made."

Napoleon now crossed the Aisne by the bridge of Berry-au-Bac, hoping to reach Laon before Blücher. The Prussian Marshal, wishing to attack the Emperor on the march, occupied the plateau of Craonne with thirty thousand men, and it was necessary for Napoleon to dislodge them before he marched on to the city. This gave occasion to the battle of Craonne, fought on March 7, 1814. The Russians were drawn up in three lines on the grand plateau, which could only be reached by difficult defiles. During several hours' conflict the French troops were not able to attain the plateau, until at length the Russian lines were broken by the artillery of Davout. Blücher now perceived that a cavalry charge, which he had prepared with the design of dealing the French a decisive blow, could not be made with success, and he ordered the retreat of the Russians from the plateau. The battle was therefore undecided, and was certainly not a victory for Napoleon, because the allies were able to carry out their original intention of retiring to Laon.

The city of Laon, crowned by its cathedral, is a natural fortress which dominates the surrounding plain. Blücher established himself there strongly,

and Napoleon endeavoured to dislodge him, hoping in this way to prevent the advance to Paris. He therefore attacked the advance posts of the army of Silesia, towards the south, on March 9, and ordered Marmont to make a similar attack upon the east. Marmont did not arrive on the ground till late in the day, and with some difficulty established himself at Athies. He left his troops there for the night, going himself to sleep at the château of Eppes, some three miles off.

In the evening the best soldiers of Marmont, wearied by eight hours of march and four of battle, were dispersed looking for food in the neighbouring farms, while the larger number, paralysed by cold and weakened by hunger, were sleeping like sheep in a pen, round the bivouac fires. At seven o'clock the Prussians penetrated into the village, and finding the troops in their first sleep cut them to pieces without resistance. In the meantime Kleist attacked in another direction with cries of "Hurrah! Hurrah!" Gunners were killed at their posts, and the guns were carried off already loaded. Simultaneously there was a third attack of seven thousand Prussian cavalry. Marmont, aroused from his sleeping-place, arrived on the scene, but could do nothing, and it was only by the heroic efforts of Colonel Fabier that the rout was converted into a retreat. On the following day the corps of Marmont reached Berry-au-Bac, but only one-third of his troops answered to the roll-call; seven hundred had been killed or wounded, and two thousand five hundred had been made prisoners. Only eight pieces of artillery escaped capture.

Notwithstanding the destruction of Marmont's corps, which made his plan impossible to execute,

Napoleon still continued to threaten Laon, hoping to intimidate Blücher into a retreat; but the marshal was too sure of his position to be frightened in this manner. All the attempts of the French to dislodge a vastly superior body of the enemy from extremely strong ground proved fruitless, and they at length retired to Soissons, having lost, altogether, more than six thousand men, killed, wounded and taken prisoners, while the loss of the allies had only been about half that number. The check of Napoleon at Laon was the first consequence of the council of war at Bar-sur-Aube. Augereau had been compelled to stop his movements from Lyons towards the Jura, because the army of the Prince of Hesse had beaten the French at Poligny on March 4, and Augereau had withdrawn his forces in the direction of Lyons.

It will be remembered that when Napoleon set out in pursuit of the army of Blücher he had left behind him the corps of Macdonald and Oudinot. These were immediately attacked by Schwarzenberg, and were beaten at Vernonfays, upon which they retired to Troyes. They did not stay there long, but retreated first to Nogent and then to Provins, so that Schwarzenberg was again upon the Seine. The important town of Rheims also had been captured by a body of Russians under the command of Saint Priest, a lieutenant of Langeron. As soon as Napoleon heard of this he gave orders for Marmont to advance upon Rheims. He sent Ney there also, and left Soissons in person for the same place at day-break on March 13. Saint Priest could hardly believe that he was being attacked by the French, whom he supposed to be a long way off. The Emperor arrived at Rheims at four o'clock in the afternoon, and immediately gave orders for the assault. Saint

Priest soon recognised by the number of the enemy and by the vigour of the attack that Napoleon was present in person. He immediately began to give orders for the retreat, but was mortally wounded by a fragment of shell which shattered his shoulder. The battle continued during the night, but the Russians were eventually defeated and Napoleon gained possession of the town, thus establishing himself on the lines of communication of both the hostile armies.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ARCIS-SUR-AUBE.

WHEN Napoleon set out to follow Blücher on February 27, he had formed the whole plan of campaign in his mind. He intended to crush the army of Silesia, and to drive it beyond the upper waters of the Oise, then to collect the garrisons of the fortresses in the north-east, and to return with ten thousand sabres and forty thousand bayonets to the rear of the Grand Army of the allies, which was opposed in front by Macdonald, and harassed on its left flank by Augereau. But everything had turned against him. Blücher had been saved by the capitulation of Soissons, and the stubborn resistance of the army of Silesia at Craonne, and at Laon, as well as the retreat of Macdonald on Provins, and of Augereau on Lyons, rendered this whole scheme impossible. But the capture of Rheims brought his original project to the mind of the Emperor. He thought that it would be possible to surprise Schwarzenberg in his operations, defeat one or two of his divisions, and, when the Grand Army was in retreat, march upon Lorraine.

Between March 11 and 16 Schwarzenberg had driven the troops of Macdonald from Nogent to Provins and from Provins to Nangis, but when he heard of the capture of Rheims he had stopped his advance and begun his retreat anew, being afraid of a movement of Napoleon on his communications. He

wrote on March 12: "I have no news, and I must confess that I tremble. If Blücher is defeated, can I risk a battle myself? for if I am conquered, what a triumph for Napoleon, and what humiliation for the sovereigns to have to recross the Rhine at the head of a conquered army!" On March 17 Napoleon was still hesitating as to whether he should join Macdonald and meet the enemy face to face, or whether he should march to Troyes in order to fall upon the flank or rear of the allies. The first plan was in his opinion the safer, but he chose the second because it was the bolder. Before setting out he sent orders to Marmont and Mortier to use every effort to keep Blücher behind the Aisne; if he did not succeed in this they were to retire towards Paris, disputing every position on the road. They had with them a force of twenty-five thousand men; Mortier was invested with the command, but the Emperor had more confidence in Marmont.

On Thursday, March 17, the Emperor left Rheims with his old guard, that moving citadel, as Houssaye calls it, which was always attached to his steps, and on the evening of the same day he slept at Epernay. The next morning starting early, he continued his march southwards, towards Fère-Champenoise, whilst Ney was proceeding from Châlons to Mailly, along a parallel road to the east. The headquarters of the allies was now at Troyes, and they were in great confusion and embarrassment. Schwarzenberg was divided between two objects, to hold back Macdonald on his front, and to engage Napoleon on his flank; he consequently spread his army over a semicircle of eighty miles. The Emperor Alexander, seeing the danger of this arrangement, insisted on an alteration, and gave orders

which implied a retreat upon Bar-sur-Aube. Schwarzenberg passed from the heights of confidence to the depths of pusillanimity. At 1 P.M. he was holding Macdonald behind the Seine, and fighting a battle with Napoleon between the Marne and the Aube; at 8 P.M. he left all this ground open to his adversaries, and retreated thirty miles with an army of one hundred thousand before an army of fifty thousand.

Napoleon was, not unnaturally, ill-informed of the situation. He believed that the great army was on the right bank of the Seine fighting with Macdonald; he therefore determined to march straight on to Arcis-sur-Aube and to traverse its rear. But arriving at Fère-Champenoise, he heard of Schwarzenberg's retreat and, changing his plans, prepared to cross the Aube at Boulages and the Seine at Méry, Ney at the same time making a parallel march. Napoleon met with so little resistance at the passage of these rivers that he became convinced that the Grand Army was retiring by forced marches on Brienne or Bar-sur-Aube. This confirmed his opinion that the safest plan he could adopt would be to march towards the garrisons of Lorraine and, collecting all available troops, throw himself on the rear of the allies with an army of ninety thousand men. For this purpose he determined to march on Vitry-le-François and to close the road which passed by Arcis-sur-Aube. On the morning of March 20 he wrote to the Minister of War: "My movement has been perfectly successful. I shall neglect Troyes and march with all haste upon my fortresses;" and again: "I am starting for Vitry." He contemplated as a possibility the capture of Paris, feeling that all measures of security had been taken, and that wherever his head-

quarters were, there was the capital of the Empire.

It happened, from some reason which has not been sufficiently explained, that Schwarzenberg was on March 19 seized with an access of energy, and suddenly determined to stop his retreat and to engage Napoleon. Consequently on the following day the first columns of the allies fell unexpectedly on the French positions at Arcis and Torcy, situated on either side of the Aube, and drove them back in great confusion. Napoleon, galloping up, restored order at great personal risk. Finding that his troops were fleeing pell-mell over the bridge, he rode to the end of it, faced the fugitives, and cried in a voice of thunder: "Who will dare to cross the bridge before me?" At another time when even the firmness of the guard seemed to waver, he rode his horse close up to a shell and remained till it exploded. The horse was killed, but the Emperor was uninjured. None of the "bearskins" could show terror after that.

Night put an end to the conflict. For the space of eight hours the French had held their ground, under a terrible fire of artillery, first seven thousand five hundred against fourteen thousand, then thirteen thousand against twenty thousand, and at last sixteen thousand against twenty-five thousand, and they had not lost an inch of ground. During the whole of this time Napoleon believed that he was engaged only with a detachment of the Grand Army, and therefore determined to continue the battle on the following day. But he very soon discovered that the whole of the army of Bohemia was before him, and that it was no good to struggle any longer with twenty-seven thousand men against one hundred thousand. He therefore retired by the bridge of

Arcis. The allies attacked the town, but every street and every house was defended, and by the time they gained possession of it the passage of the Aube was secured.

After the two battles of Arcis-sur-Aube Napoleon continued, with more boldness than prudence, his march towards the fortresses of Lorraine and upon the communications of the allied armies. On the afternoon of March 23 he entered St. Dizier, which lies between the two routes which the armies of Blücher and Schwarzenberg had followed from Strasburg and Bâle. He had no doubt that the Grand Army would return and fight him, but until he knew which route it would follow, he was reduced to inaction. Schwarzenberg was equally ignorant of the direction of Napoleon's march, and also waited for information. Suddenly an intercepted despatch gave the allies the light which they desired. A council of war was held at Pougy on March 23, and opinions were much divided. Some were in favour of a retreat, others were in favour of abandoning the communication with Switzerland and marching on Châlons to approach the army of Blücher. This important resolution was eventually adopted, although Schwarzenberg stigmatised it as rash.

Intercepted despatches had determined the march on Châlons; information of a similar character was to produce even more important results. This was contained in letters from high functionaries of the Empire, describing the exhaustion of the treasury, the arsenal and the magazines and the growing discontent of the population. Schwarzenberg had not paid much attention to these despatches, and having opened communications with Blücher, was now preparing to pursue Napoleon with the two armies unit-

ed. But the letters made a great impression on the mind of the Emperor Alexander, and he spent a sleepless night in their contemplation. The King of Prussia and Schwarzenberg had already left in pursuit of Napoleon, but Alexander remained behind at Somme puis. He summoned his Russian generals to his presence and asked them: "Now that our communications with Blücher are re-established, ought we to continue the pursuit of Napoleon, or should we march directly on Paris?" Barclay de Tolly was strongly in favour of continuing the pursuit; Diebitsch was in favour of dividing the army into two portions, one to pursue Napoleon, the other to march on Paris—a fatal suggestion. At hearing this Barclay cried: "There is only one thing to be done under our present circumstances—to march on Paris as quickly as possible with all our forces, and to send ten thousand cavalry against Napoleon to mask our movement." Diebitsch then followed on the same side. Barclay was at length convinced, and the Tsar mounted his horse to join Schwarzenberg. After an hour's ride he came up with him between Somme puis and Vitry. The sovereigns and the generals held an improvised council of war at the side of the road. Alexander having explained his scheme, the King of Prussia strongly approved of it, but the Austrians still vigorously opposed. At length, with great reluctance, Schwarzenberg gave his adhesion to this new plan of campaign, and it was agreed that on the following day, Friday, March 25, the two united armies should begin their advance upon the capital, whilst Winzingerode should follow Napoleon in the direction of St. Dizier, and do his best to make him believe that he was being pursued by the whole army of the Coalition.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE CAPTURE OF PARIS.

ON March 25 the two armies began their march on Paris with a body of two hundred thousand men. On the same day they came into conflict with the troops of Marshals Marmont and Mortier at Fère-Champenoise, which they drove back after some resistance. On the same day also, a little to the north, some thousands of national guards, who were escorted by a large convoy of a hundred artillery waggons and eighty other vehicles, with munitions of war and two hundred thousand rations of bread and brandy, were attacked by the army of Silesia, defended themselves with heroic courage, and rather than surrender suffered themselves to be destroyed to a man. The Emperor of Russia, who witnessed the close of the engagement, never forgot the lesson which it taught. The two marshals continued their retreat towards Paris, making a long detour by Provins, in order to avoid their advancing foes. The allies marched up to the outskirts of the capital without meeting any resistance except that of a small body commanded by Compans, who disputed their ground foot by foot for three days from Meaux to Pantin. On the evening of March 29 the allies encamped before Paris.

We left Napoleon at St. Dizier, waiting for news of the march of his enemies. On March 25, being still ignorant of their advance upon Paris, but hear-

ing that Bar-sur-Aube and Troyes had been evacuated, he decided to occupy these towns, in order more effectually to intercept their communications, and moved for that purpose to Doulevant, some twelve miles to the south; but hearing that some Austrian cavalry, the one hundred thousand men of Winzingerode, had shown themselves in the direction of St. Dizier, he returned and dispersed them. They left in his hands two thousand prisoners and eighteen guns, and lost five hundred men killed or wounded. The victory, however, brought great confusion to the mind of the Emperor: he believed that he was engaged with the army of Schwarzenberg, and found that he was fighting the army of Blücher. How could Blücher, who a few days ago was threatening Soissons, be now on the frontiers of Lorraine? and how could Schwarzenberg, who was marching on Vitry, have disappeared so suddenly? At length, on the afternoon of Sunday, March 27, when before Vitry, he learnt the undoubted news that the allies were marching on Paris. He immediately mounted his horse, rode off to St. Dizier and buried himself in his reports, his maps, and his plans. He knew that the sceptre and the sword were trembling in his hands.

There is little doubt that if left to himself he would have abandoned Paris to her fate and have continued his operations, but he was overruled by the opinion of his generals, and at eleven at night orders were issued for an advance on the capital by way of Bar-sur-Aube, Troyes and Fontainebleau. He reached Troyes on the night of March 29, and after a few hours' sleep left again at break of day, committing the charge of the army to Berthier, who was ordered to lead it to Fontainebleau. He intended

to sleep at Villeneuve-sur-Vanne, but his impatience overcame him. He threw himself into a post-chaise with Caulaincourt, and galloped at full speed on the road to Paris.

On that very day, Wednesday, March 30, 1814, the decisive battle was being fought under the walls of the capital. Paris, at that time, was not fortified, and during the two months of the campaign nothing had been done either by Clarke, the Minister of War, or by King Joseph, who was President of the Council of Regency, to place it in a condition of defence. Napoleon himself had given no positive orders with regard to it. Putting things at their very best, not more than forty-three thousand soldiers and militia could be got together to oppose the vast forces of the allies. Under these circumstances honour might be preserved, but victory was impossible. To make this last effort, Marmont established himself on the plateau of Romainville, and in front of Pantin; Mortier was to the north in front of La Villete and La Chapelle. The soldiers of Marmont defended their ground with the utmost heroism, but the plateau was captured by force of numbers, and he withdrew to Belleville and Ménilmontant, where he held out for several hours. But the allies occupied Charonne and drove Mortier back to the very gates of the city, capturing Montmartre and assaulting the barrier of Clichy, which was defended by the aged Marshal Moncey. At four o'clock in the afternoon Marmont, using the power which Joseph had given to him, began negotiations for a capitulation. The French evacuated the city during the night and the allies made their triumphal entry on the following day.

Meanwhile Napoleon, hastening with all speed

towards the capital, was receiving bad news at every post-house. At Sens he heard that the enemy were approaching Paris; at Fontainebleau, that the Empress had left for Blois; at Essonnes, that a battle was being fought. At last, at eleven o'clock at night, he reached the post-house of Fromenteau, called Cour-de-France, about fourteen miles from Paris. Here he learnt the news of the capitulation from General Belliard. He refused to yield to circumstances: he would go to Paris, sound the tocsin, illuminate the town, call the whole population to arms, and he drove on to Athis two miles further. From this point he saw the bivouac fires of the enemy on the left bank of the Seine and met the advanced guard of Mortier. He returned to La Cour-de-France, despatched Caulaincourt to Paris with full power to treat for peace, shut himself up in a room and busied himself with his maps.

At daybreak he received a messenger from Caulaincourt, and shortly afterwards a letter from Marmont. He now knew that everything was lost, and, wearied out with fatigue, returned to Fontainebleau, which he reached at six o'clock in the morning. He was joined here in the succeeding days by the remains of his army. On April 2 the Senate, who had hitherto been his humble slaves, now carried a vote depriving him of the crown, and a provisional government was established which proposed the return of the Bourbons. On April 5 Marmont passed over to the side of the enemy with all his troops and robbed Napoleon of one of his armies. On the following day he signed his abdication and afterwards accepted the sovereignty of the island of Elba.

PART EIGHT.

THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO, 1815.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE RETURN FROM ELBA.

IT is impossible to write an account of the campaign of Waterloo without saying something of the political occurrences which led to it, the return of Napoleon from Elba, and the rising of united Europe for his destruction. The restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of France inevitably carried with it the re-establishment of the *Ancien Régime*. Under any circumstances it would have been extremely difficult to reconcile the new and the old—the ideas of the Revolution with the system which it displaced. But a task of this nature, easy at no time, had been rendered impossible by the twenty years of war which had succeeded the Revolution. The partisans of the Bourbons regarded everything that had been done since the abolition of monarchy as a usurpation, and were impatiently waiting for the time when they were to enjoy their own again. The adherents of the new state of things, however much they might desire a condition of peace and settled government, looked upon the *Ancien Régime* with horror, as the embodiment of tyranny and injustice, and its

restoration as a return to barbarism. Napoleon said frequently at St. Helena that the Bourbons would never again be able to reign in France, and experience has shown that he was right.

Therefore to recount the mistakes of the Bourbons on their return to Paris is merely to narrate the inevitable. A reasonable settlement was impossible, and measures more or less erroneous could not appease or exasperate the inherent antagonism of the situation. It was soon seen that they had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. They took every pains to obliterate the memory of the Revolution and the Empire; the tri-coloured cockade was abolished and the white cockade put in its place; the palace of the Tuilleries was filled with the old aristocracy, who treated those who had supplanted them with scorn and contempt, and drove them from the court which was dominated by the Comte d'Artois and his daughter-in-law, the Duchesse d'Angoulême, who had indeed suffered bitterly in the Revolution, but could never forget her wrongs. The luxury of the court was great and the taxes of the people heavy. The clergy and the returned *émigrés* demanded their lands back again, as well as their tithes and their feudal rights, although the property which had formerly belonged to them had changed hands by purchase. There was a proposition to declare null all the proprietary arrangements of the last twenty-five years. But perhaps more disastrous than anything else to the new state of things was the reconstruction of the army.

The infantry was reduced from 206 regiments to 107, the cavalry from 99 regiments to 61, the artillery from 339 companies to 184, the horse artillery from 32 squadrons to 8, the engineers from 60 com-

panies to 30. While these reductions were enforced a number of officers were admitted into the army who had received their military education either in the army of Condé or in the service of Austria or England. The old royal household troops came back with all their privileges; a large number of officers were placed upon half-pay, which formed a solid nucleus for discontent. The two Ministers of War—Dupont, who was tainted with the disgrace of the capitulation of Baylen, and Soult, who had all the zeal of a convert—opened wide the gates of promotion to the *émigrés* and closed them to the children of the Revolution. On the other hand, the worship of the Emperor, the memory of his triumphs and the longing for his return grew every day more passionate from one end of France to the other.

Napoleon, from the island of Elba, followed these movements with a watchful eye. He noted the mistakes of the Bourbons, and the growing desire of the people and the army for his return. There were other reasons why he should not remain where he was. The treaty of Fontainebleau had promised him a revenue of two million francs a year and proportionate donations to his mother and other members of his family. Not one penny of this had ever been paid, and while the allied sovereigns might urge that it would be madness to place the weapon of money into his hands, Napoleon was aware that his resources were nearly exhausted and were not sufficient to provide for his army or his household. Schemes were also formed at Vienna for kidnapping Napoleon and conveying him to the island of St. Helena, or to some other safe place of custody, so that if he felt it to be for his interests to land in France there was no

reason why sentiments of honour should hold him back.

Animated by these motives and encouraged by messages which he received from Paris, Napoleon left Elba on February 26, 1815, and reached Golfe-Juan at one o'clock in the afternoon on March 1. He had with him about eleven hundred men, consisting of about six hundred grenadiers and chasseurs of the old guard, about one hundred light Polish cavalry, of course without horses, a certain number of gunners, four hundred Corsican chasseurs, and a few unattached officers who had come to Elba to enter his service. It is not necessary to relate the details of the march to Paris. Napoleon had said that his eagles would fly from steeple to steeple until they reached the towers of Nôtre Dame, and this boastful prophecy was fulfilled. His advance was a triumph in which the people and the army vied together to do him honour. Everywhere the white cockade was discarded for the tri-coloured. The most critical point of his advance was at Le Mur on March 7, when a battalion of the fifth regiment of the line, with some artillery and engineers, seemed inclined to offer resistance. Napoleon walked up to them and cried: "Soldiers of the fifth regiment, do you recognise me?" "Yes, yes," was replied by hundreds of voices. Then he opened his coat, laid bare his breast and said: "Who is there amongst you who will fire at his Emperor?" There was a general shout of "Vive l'Empereur!" and Napoleon, turning to his companions, said: "It is all settled; in ten days we shall be in Paris."

At Grenoble and at Lyons the people and the soldiers by an irresistible impulse acknowledged their Emperor. Marshal Ney, having promised to

Louis XVIII. to bring him back in an iron cage, now declared that the cause of the Bourbons was lost for ever. Napoleon entered Paris on March 20, Louis XVIII. having left it the night before, flying first to Lille and then to Ghent. The whole of France accepted the restored empire; the high dignitaries of the army, who had welcomed the Bourbons in 1814, now sang a different note. If a sovereign has any right to his crown by a people's vote, Napoleon could, after the return from Elba, feel himself to be the chosen monarch of France.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

CHARLEROI.

EASY as it was to rally France around the Imperial *régime*, it was impossible that it should be accepted by Europe. By declarations signed on March 13, the sovereigns at the Congress of Vienna had declared Napoleon an outlaw, and a fortnight afterwards they had formed a new Coalition. Not less than eight hundred thousand men were advancing against the frontier of France; no representations were listened to; it was necessary to prepare for a terrible struggle. When Napoleon entered the Tuilleries on March 20 the armies of France did not exceed one hundred and eighty thousand men. He boasted that by the first of October he would have eight hundred thousand men under arms, and competent judges are of opinion that he might have justified this boast. On beginning the campaign he had 28,238 of the guard and more than two hundred and fifty thousand troops of the line, making a total of two hundred and eighty-four thousand men, and he had beside this an auxiliary army of 222,624, forming a grand total of over five hundred thousand men, and in a month their number would have been increased by at least one hundred thousand. The allies began to prepare for war at the beginning of April. Several plans of campaign were proposed. Wellington desired to commence hostilities before the arrival of the Russian army and before the allied

troops had completed their concentration. He wrote on April 10 that it would be sufficient to move sixty thousand Anglo-Dutch, sixty thousand Prussians and one hundred and forty thousand Austro-Bavarians into the country between the Sambre and the Meuse in order to occupy France with forces superior to the enemy and to be able to manœuvre in the direction of Paris. He was anxious above everything for the restoration of Louis XVIII., and thought that delay would give Napoleon strength. Schwarzenberg was characteristically anxious for delay. Eventually it was agreed that six armies should invade France simultaneously : Wellington with the army of the Low Countries, ninety-three thousand strong, between Maubeuge and Beaumont; Blücher with the Prussian army, one hundred and seventeen thousand strong, between Philippeville and Givet; the Russian cavalry under Barclay de Tolly, with one hundred and fifty thousand men, between Saardories and Saarbruch; Schwarzenberg with two hundred and ten thousand Austrians and South Germans, partly by Sarreguimines and partly by Bâle. These four armies were to march concentrically on Paris, by Péronne, Laon, Nancy and Langres respectively. On the extreme left the army of North Italy and the army of Naples were to cross the Alps and to advance, one on Lyons and the other on Provence, the latter to be supported in its operations by the English fleet.

To meet this attack, Napoleon, as he has himself related, hesitated for a long time between two plans. The first was to collect a large body of troops near Paris, to concentrate the army of the Alps and the corps of the Jura at Lyons, to let the allies march against the fortresses, which were well provisioned

and garrisoned by one hundred and fifty thousand men. As the campaign was not intended to commence till July 1, the enemy could not reach Lyons till July 25, or Paris till July 25. By that time the fortifications of the capital would be completed, and would be well furnished with defenders. The army of Paris would amount to two hundred thousand men, and there would be eighty thousand men in the depôts and one hundred and fifty-eight thousand recruits. Of the six hundred and fifty-four thousand allied troops who entered France seventy-five thousand would be engaged in Provence and in the territory of Lyons, and not less than one hundred and fifty thousand would be left behind to protect their communications, so that the four grand armies on reaching the Oise and the Seine would not number more than four hundred and twenty thousand combatants. To these Napoleon would oppose two hundred thousand soldiers capable of movement, besides others in the intrenched camp of Paris. He would undertake a campaign similar to that of 1814, with two hundred thousand soldiers instead of ninety thousand, with the capital protected by eighty thousand men under the capable command of Davout.

The second plan, which was bolder but much more hazardous, was to attack the enemy before his forces were collected. He calculated that by June 15 he could concentrate on the frontier of the North an army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men. He would then march into Belgium, conquer the English and the Prussians by attacking them one after the other, and then after receiving reinforcements join the corps of Rapp and go to meet the combined army of Austrians and Russians. He was led to adopt the second plan, partly by the character

of his genius and partly by political considerations. He did not think it safe to expose the country again to the strain which had been put on it in the previous year. Besides, he felt confident that one decisive victory would destroy the Coalition; the Belgians would join the French, and if the Whigs came into power in England they would make peace. On the other hand, if his army were compelled to retreat, he could retire on Paris and take up the first plan; at the same time he did not conceal from himself the disastrous consequences of a signal defeat such as he trusted was not likely to happen to him.

Having decided on the second plan, he next had to determine at what point he should make his attack. If he moved by Lille on Wellington's right, he would drive the English army into the arms of the Prussians and would soon have to fight them both united; if he debouched by Givet and the valley of the Meuse, he would drive the Prussian army into the arms of the English. He therefore determined to aim straight at the point of juncture of the two armies and to commence the campaign from Charleroi.

Napoleon left Paris on the night of June 10 and reached Laon, that town of ill-omen, at midday on June 11. On June 13 he slept at Avesnes, and on the evening of June 14 moved his headquarters to Beaumont, about thirty miles distant. The next day he addressed his men thus: "Soldiers, this day is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, battles which have twice decided the destiny of the Empire. Then, as after Austerlitz and after Wagram, we were too generous. To-day, in a coalition against us, the princes, whom we have left upon their thrones, are attacking the independence and the most sacred rights of France. They have begun the most un-

just aggressions. They and ourselves, are we no longer the same men?" The French army was now concentrated in a line extending from Solre-sur-Sambre to Philippeville, a distance of about ten miles, with Beaumont for its centre, each corps having not more than about fifteen or twenty miles to march to reach its objective, Charleroi.

By these operations, in ten days, a body of one hundred and twenty-four thousand men, considerably scattered, had been brought to the frontier, within cannon-range of the enemy's outposts, without the allies having adopted any measures of defence. Never had such a manœuvre been better conceived, and, with some exceptions, better carried out. On June 14 the headquarters of Blücher were at Namur, and those of Wellington at Brussels; each of these armies would require three days to concentrate on their point of contact, and twice that time to concentrate either on the English right or the Prussian left. Wellington defended his action by the difficulty of obtaining subsistence for his troops and the necessity of guarding every point. The truth was that it was not intended by the allies that the invasion of France should begin till the end of June, and neither he nor Blücher believed that Napoleon would begin the attack.

The advanced guard of the French army crossed the Belgian frontier at half-past three on the morning of June 15, and the whole army was to proceed in three columns to Charleroi, the regulations for the march having been carefully considered in every particular. Unfortunately some of the generals were late in executing their orders, and the corps of Gerard was thrown into confusion by the desertion of General Bourmont, who rode over to the enemy.

To his honour be it said, Blücher, disgusted at seeing a soldier dressed in the uniform of a general of division deserting his colours on the morning of battle, would scarcely speak to him. Notwithstanding these checks the advanced posts of Ziethen were driven back to the Sambre, and the French became masters of the two bridges over the river, one at Marchienne-au-Pont and the other at Charleroi. At midday Napoleon rode through the town of Charleroi and, sitting in a chair before a small tavern, saw the troops defile before him. Tradition says that he fell asleep, which is perhaps not to be wondered at on a hot day in the middle of June after seven or eight hours in the saddle.

After Charleroi the road branches into two, that to the right leading to Fleurus and Sombreffe, that to the left to Gosselies, Quatre-Bras and Genappe, the first being the road to Namur, the second the road to Brussels. At 2 P.M. General Gourgaud brought the news that the Prussians were visible in force at Gosselies, that is, on the Brussels road. Napoleon at once ordered General Reille to march on Gosselies, and, besides taking other measures, sent D'Erlon to support Reille. He was naturally disturbed, because the presence of Prussians on the Brussels road seemed to indicate a juncture between Blücher and Wellington.

At a little after three o'clock in the afternoon Ney suddenly arrived upon the scene, to the great delight of the troops. The Emperor said to him: "Good day, Ney; I am very glad to see you. You will take command of the first and second corps. I give you also the light cavalry of the guard, but do not use them. To-morrow you will be joined by the cuirassiers of Kellermann. Go and drive the enemy

along the road to Brussels and take up a position at Quatre-Bras." This place, so famous in history, lies at the spot where the road from Namur to Nivelles crosses the road from Charleroi to Brussels. It is about eleven miles from Charleroi, a little more than a mile from Genappe, and about nine miles from the battle-field of Waterloo. Napoleon had now good reason to believe that his plan had succeeded beyond his expectations. He would be able to place his left wing at Quatre-Bras to meet the English, his right wing at Sombrefe to meet the Prussians, while, taking his position at Fleurus, the apex of the triangle, he would be able on the following day to throw himself with decisive effect on whichever of the enemies was the first to show himself.

As Napoleon was giving his instructions to Ney, Grouchy came up, who was destined to take charge of the right wing. He had found that the Prussians were posted in force at Gilly, about two miles and a half from Charleroi. The Emperor rode forward with him and ordered him to disperse the Prussians, and to drive them to Sombrefe, where he was to take up his position, but unfortunately the Emperor did not wait to see this done, and returned to Charleroi. The consequence was that the attack was delayed, Vandamme and Grouchy quarrelled, and the French did not even occupy Fleurus, much less Sombrefe. On the left, Ney, after driving the enemy from Gosselies, left the bulk of his troops there, and only took with him on the road to Quatre-Bras the lancers and the chasseurs of the guard. He arrived at Frasnes, a village about three miles south of Quatre-Bras, at half-past five, and found it occupied by some Nassau troops. They halted just

before Quatre-Bras and were joined by reinforcements under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. Ney came to the conclusion that he could not successfully attack this body of four thousand five hundred men with his seventeen hundred cavalry and a single battalion of infantry. Therefore a little before 8 P.M. he recalled his cavalry to Frasnes and went himself to sleep at Gosselies.

No doubt the failure of Ney to occupy Quatre-Bras on June 15 was one of the chief causes of Napoleon's ill success. If, when he arrived at Gosselies at 5 P.M., instead of stopping Reille's corps, he had taken with him only part of the troops which the Emperor had placed under his orders, he might have crushed the forces of Prince Bernard and placed himself between the positions of Blücher and Wellington, but for once "the bravest of the brave" preferred caution to hardihood.

CHAPTER XL.

THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.

ON the morning of June 16, although Sombreffe and Quatre-Bras had not been occupied, the French army was in a good position. Napoleon had thrown himself into the centre of the allied position, and had one hundred and twenty-four thousand men encamped in a triangle measuring about nine miles each way. During the whole day not an English uniform had been seen, and the Prussians had nowhere shown any large number of troops. The Emperor therefore had some reason for supposing that both armies had retired on their lines of operation, the Prussians towards Liège and Maestricht, the English to Ostend and Antwerp. The further they were separated, the more easy would it be to beat them. With these ideas in his head Napoleon sent orders in the early morning for Grouchy to march on Sombreffe and Gembloux, driving before him any Prussians he might meet with; he was then to summon the reserve from Fleurus to Sombreffe, and march with it to join Ney at Quatre Bras; they could then march on together at night and reach Brussels at 7 A.M. on the morning of June 17.

Just as these orders were being sent out a letter arrived from Grouchy saying that a large body of Prussians was advancing from the Namur road towards Brye and St. Amand. This showed the Emperor that Blücher, instead of retreating, was prepar-

ing to fight a battle, but he saw no reason to alter the orders already given. Just as he was leaving for Fleurus news came from the left wing that the enemy was appearing in force on the side of Quatre Bras, upon which Napoleon sent to Ney the following order: "Blücher having been yesterday at Namur, it is not probable that he has led his troops to Quatre Bras; therefore you have only to deal with those which come from Brussels, join together the corps of Comtes Reille and D'Erlon, and that of the Comte de Valmy (Kellermann). With these forces you will be able to beat and destroy all the strength of the enemy which may appear before you." Lobau was ordered to remain at Charleroi to assist Ney if necessary. Having given these orders, the Emperor set out for Fleurus, which he reached a little before 11 A.M. He found to his surprise that Grouchy had not yet started for Sombreffe, but that general gave as his reason the fact that large masses of the enemy were to be seen a little to the north of Fleurus, which he had only occupied that morning. Hearing this, Napoleon took up his position in a brick windmill which commands the plain, having made a breach in its wooden cowl for purposes of observation.

Blücher, as soon as he heard of Napoleon's attack, had hastened from Namur to Sombreffe, which he reached on June 15 at 4 P.M. He immediately took steps to put his troops on the brook of Ligny, a position which he had previously selected as a field of battle if the French should debouch by Charleroi. He was full of ardour and had written to his wife: "With one hundred and twenty thousand Prussians I would bind myself to take Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers if I had not got to pass the sea." But he had some difficulty in concentrating his forces, which

were much dispersed. At 11 A.M. only the corps of Ziethen was in line, the corps of Pirch did not arrive till midday, followed by that of Thielmann, while the fourth corps, under Bülow, was much behind. Still, he determined to fight, hoping for the co-operation of Wellington, of which he had received a conditional promise.

Wellington, who was at Brussels, had been informed at 8 A.M. on the morning of June 15, by Ziethen, that his outposts had been attacked, but not being certain that this was not a feint, hesitated to concentrate all his troops on his left. That night the famous ball of the Duchess of Richmond was given at Brussels. Wellington went to it, probably that he might not alarm the somewhat doubtful courage of the Belgians, and left it after supper at 3 A.M. He set out at 6 A.M. and reached Quatre Bras at 10 A.M., a distance of a little over twenty miles; he then rode towards Frasnes to observe the French outposts. About 1 P.M. he joined Marshal Blücher on the heights of Brye, and ascended with him a windmill in front of that village, which gave a better view than the windmill of Fleurus. They saw the French columns advancing, and recognised the Emperor in person surrounded by his staff. Gneisenau urged that the Duke should bring up his forces to support the Prussians at Brye, which would certainly not have been wise, because it would have uncovered the road to Brussels. Wellington eventually arranged that he would first cut to pieces the French troops at Frasnes and push on to Gosselies, and that he would come to the assistance of Blücher if he were not attacked himself.

The battle-field of Ligny is traversed by the brook La Ligne which runs between deep banks. In

the centre is the village of Ligny with its two large farms, the ancient castle of the Counts of Loos, and a church with a graveyard enclosed by a wall. By the villages which border the stream, the position of the Prussians may be described as a continuous ditch with ten bastions, some in front of and some behind the ditch, the most important, Ligny, being traversed throughout its whole length by the brook. From the mill at Fleurus Napoleon could not see the whole strength of the position, because the ravine of the Ligny was hidden from him. The ground looked like a vast corn-field, sloping down towards the centre and gradually rising towards the horizon.

We have seen that Blücher was only able to assemble his troops gradually, therefore the Emperor had at first only a *corps d'armée* before him. It was plain also that the Prussians were looking for a junction with the English army on their right. This fact induced Napoleon to write to Ney at 2 P.M. that after having attacked the enemy vigorously at Quatre Bras he was to retire towards the Emperor's position to take the Prussians on the right flank. A copy of this order was also sent to D'Erlon, who was under Ney's command. Napoleon soon became aware that he had before him the whole of the Prussian army and he was proportionately delighted. In a few hours, if Ney appeared on the heights of Brye, Blücher would be destroyed. He said to Gerard: "It is possible that in three hours the fate of the war will be decided. If Ney carries out his orders well, not a gun of the army will escape." At 3.15 P.M. a more pressing order was sent to Ney. He is told that the Prussians are lost if he acts vigorously—that the fate of France is in his hands; but just at this moment the Emperor heard that Ney had twenty

thousand of the enemy before him. He therefore came to the conclusion that he must content himself with the division of D'Erlon, and sent orders to that general to march on the right of the Prussian army, the order to be communicated to Ney.

The battle began at 3 P.M. Vandamme advanced through the corn-fields upon St. Amand, and Gerard upon Ligny. The French succeeded in capturing St. Amand, but it was recovered by the Prussians. Only half of the village of Ligny was taken, the Prussians still holding their own on the other side of the stream. They also took particular pains to defend their right, by which they could communicate with the English. At last, at 5.30 P. M., Napoleon made preparations for the advance of his reserve against the Prussian centre. He expected Ney to arrive at 6 P.M., and the defeat of Blücher would then be complete. As the attack was forming news was brought that a body of the enemy's troops, twenty or thirty thousand strong, was visible on the French left and that Gerard was giving way in consequence. The Emperor was much disturbed at this information, which he could not understand, and he suspended the attack until he had further information. At about 6.20 P.M. he received certain information that the supposed body of the enemy was in reality the corps of D'Erlon, which he had summoned to his assistance; he also heard that the division had again retired. Feeling now certain that he could receive no assistance either from Ney or D'Erlon, he determined to advance with his reserve on Ligny. This movement, made at 7 P.M., decided the fate of the battle. The centre of the enemy was completely driven in. Blücher was thrown from his horse and was very nearly taken prisoner. But the

two wings of the Prussian army were able to retreat in good order, although they suffered much loss. The whole loss of the Prussians amounted to fifteen thousand, that of the French to about nine thousand.

The battle of Ligny was a great success, but the victory was not complete. The Prussian army was mutilated, but not destroyed, and the plans elaborated for its annihilation by Napoleon had failed.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE BATTLE OF QUATRE-BRAS.

DURING the course of June 16 the Emperor had sent nine successive orders to Marshal Ney, the first at five o'clock in the morning, the last at five o'clock in the evening. It is the opinion of military experts that, if Ney had acted with promptitude, he might have been in a position to attack Quatre-Bras at 9 A.M. with a force of nineteen thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry and sixty-four guns, and a reserve of twenty thousand five hundred men. Reille also, who was under his orders, was very slow in his movements. Quatre-Bras was at this time held by the Prince of Orange with seven thousand eight hundred infantry and fourteen guns, but he was fully convinced of the strategical importance of the position, and was determined to defend it to the utmost. The hamlet of Quatre-Bras consisted at this time of two houses and three large farms, each forming admirable points of defence, one to the left of the allied position, one in the centre and one to the right, this last being further strengthened by the wood of Bossu.

Reille joined Ney at Frasnes at 1.30 P.M., but the attack did not begin till 2 P.M. The left and centre of the enemy were forced and the Prince of Orange was nearly taken prisoner, but the troops of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar on the right had

not been attacked. About 3 P.M. Wellington arrived on the field, after his interview with Blücher, and considered the situation to be critical; but he soon received reinforcements, Picton with eight English battalions and four Hanoverian, and Van Merlin with some Dutch and Belgian cavalry. Picton, with Kempt and Pack under him, marched to re-establish the broken left. In the meantime the Prince of Orange defended his centre against Foy, who was pressing the attack, but was with Wellington driven into confusion along the Brussels road. About the same time the farm on the allied right was captured, and the wood of Bossu attacked.

About 4 P.M. Ney received the Emperor's order to press the enemy vigorously and then to attack the flank of the Prussian army at Brye. He therefore made a general movement in advance. The allies began to yield on their right and centre; the Black Brunswickers were driven back by Foy; they charged once more, led by their Duke Frederick William in person, but he was shot in the stomach and was carried into a house at Quatre-Bras, where he died in the evening. His troops were dressed in black, with a badge of a skull and crossed bones in memory of the Duke, his father, who had been mortally wounded at Auerstädt. On the allied left the French column of attack was met by the fire of Picton's troops, hidden by the standing corn; it was then charged with the bayonet by Kempt's brigade and driven back to the farm. The English could not hold his advanced position and retired, gallantly followed by the French. The 28th regiment formed into square to resist the French cavalry, and when they seemed likely to break Picton called out to them, "Twenty-eighth, remember Egypt." Pack's

brigade was less fortunate, and the French opposed to them advanced as far as the Namur road.

For the success of his attack Ney had reckoned on the twenty thousand men forming the corps of D'Erlon, who formed the reserve, but by a strange fatality this body was to prove equally useless to himself and to his master. D'Erlon had, from various reasons, been retarded in his march, and at 4 P.M. was still about five miles from Quatre-Bras, when the order came from Napoleon ordering him to march to the heights of St. Amand and fall upon Ligny. Unfortunately he misread the order, and instead of taking the direction of Brye and Ligny to attack the Prussians in the rear, he marched towards St. Amand and Fleurus, which merely had the effect of prolonging Napoleon's left, first sending a message to Ney to inform him of what he was doing. Ney on receiving the news was beside himself with rage, especially when he received the despatch of Soult a few minutes afterwards telling him that the fate of France was in his hands. He entirely lost his self-command and prayed that he might be speedily killed by an English bullet. In this condition it is hardly strange if he sent an imperative order to D'Erlon to return at once, although he must have been aware that he could be of no use. Animated by the same feeling of desperation, he ordered Kellermann to charge the allied forces with his single brigade. In this attack, which was afterwards paralleled by the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, the cuirassiers actually reached Quatre-Bras, but they then found themselves in the middle of Wellington's army, swept by the fire of the Dutch from the wood of Bossu, of the English from the causeway of the Namur road, of the Bruns-

wickers from the houses of Quatre-Bras, and of other Germans from the Brussels road. Kellermann's horse was killed, and his soldiers broke and fled.

At this moment Ney, having had two horses killed under him, was standing in the most exposed position, transported with rage, his face suffused with blood, brandishing his sword like a madman. An orderly sent by Napoleon found him in this condition, and expressed the Emperor's wish that D'Erlon should support him at all hazards, so that he might make an end of the Prussian army. Ney admitted that he had just sent D'Erlon an imperative order to return, and it was impossible to make him recall it. Wellington received reinforcements between six and seven in the evening, but the battle continued till nine o'clock, the two armies continuing to occupy the positions which they had held in the morning. Just at this moment D'Erlon advanced from Frasnes along the Brussels road. In this bloody but indecisive battle the French had lost four thousand three hundred men, and the allies four thousand seven hundred.

As we have already narrated, although the centre of the Prussians had been broken at Ligny, the two wings were able to retreat in good order, and therefore the Emperor did not at first think of pursuing them beyond Sombreffe. Also he was anxious about his left wing, as during the whole of the day he had not received a single despatch from Ney. So when Grouchy came to him at Fleurus at 11 P.M. to ask for orders, he told him to pursue the enemy at day-break with the cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans. Whilst Napoleon was at breakfast about seven o'clock in the morning of June 17, he received a report of the battle of Quatre-Bras, and also a despatch

from Pajol, reporting that the Prussians were retreating in the direction of Liège and Namur, and that he had already made a number of prisoners. At the same time Grouchy came for orders and was told to accompany the Emperor to the mill of Brye; Soult also wrote to Ney about the same time, that he was to send accurate information about his position. If the English army was at Quatre-Bras, the Emperor would attack it from the Namur road, but if there was only a rear-guard, Ney was to attack it and take possession. A little before 9 A.M. Napoleon left Fleurus to visit the field of battle. Arriving at the mill of Bussy, he passed his troops in review, and the shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" were heard by the enemy two miles off. He then had a long discussion with Grouchy about politics, apparently adjourning the moment of decisive military action.

About 11 A.M. he received three pieces of information, one from Ney that the English were holding Quatre-Bras in force, another from Pajol that he had captured guns and carriages on the Namur road, and a third from Exelmans that the enemy was massing at Gembloux. Thereupon he sent Lobau and Drouot to support Ney at Quatre-Bras, while he gave the following order to Grouchy: "Whilst I am marching against the English, you will pursue the Prussians; you will have under your orders the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, the division of Teste and the cavalry of Pajol, Exelmans, and Milhaud." On second thoughts, however, he transferred some of Grouchy's cavalry to himself. A short time afterwards he expanded in writing the verbal orders given to Grouchy, commanding him to concentrate all his forces at Gembloux, which was a

middle point between Namur, Liège, and Wavre; to send scouts in the direction of Namur and Maestricht to ascertain the line of the enemy's retreat; to follow the Prussians and to discover their plans in the pursuit; to ascertain whether Blücher is intending to join the English. He also stated that his headquarters would be at Quatre-Bras, about ten miles distant from Gembloux, and that Grouchy was to communicate with him by the Namur road.

It will be remembered that in the battle of Ligny Blücher was thrown from his horse and nearly made prisoner. He was carried into a cottage, bruised and fainting, and his staff did not know whether he was a prisoner or free, dead or alive. The command devolved upon Gneisenau, and the responsibility of determining the line of retreat depended upon him. On horseback, in the middle of the road from Brye, he consulted his map by the light of the moon, and gave the order that the retreat would be on Tilly and Wavre. Wellington wrote a few days afterwards to the King of Holland that this was "the decisive moment of the generation." Following the letter of his instructions but not the spirit, Grouchy occupied Gembloux on the night of June 17, and prepared to follow the Prussians, partly on the road to Wavre, and partly on that to Liège on the morning of June 18.

At Quatre-Bras French and English remained in their positions during the morning of June 17. Wellington had slept at Genappe, but returned to Quatre-Bras early in the morning. He sent a messenger who heard from Ziethen that the Prussian army had been beaten and was retiring on Wavre, and delivered the information to Wellington about 7.30 A.M. Wellington now knew that he

must retreat, to avoid being attacked by Ney in front and Napoleon in the flank, and he determined to take up a position on the plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean which he had carefully reconnoitred in the preceding year, but was obliged to delay the retreat till 10 A.M. At this moment a Prussian officer arrived, sent by Gneisenau to inform Wellington that it was intended to concentrate the whole Prussian army at Wavre. The Duke replied: "I am going to take up a position at Mont-Saint-Jean, and shall there await Napoleon and engage a battle, if I have the hope of being supported by a single Prussian corps. But if this support fails me, I shall be compelled to sacrifice Brussels and to retreat behind the Scheldt."

The English now retired from the position of Quatre-Bras, leaving the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge to cover their retreat. About 1 P.M. Napoleon arrived at Marbais, about three miles from Quatre-Bras, expecting to hear the sound of Ney's guns. When he heard nothing he determined to push on to Quatre-Bras, and formed his troops in order of battle; but he soon received information that no troops remained in that position except the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge. It was now 2 P.M. and a heavy storm was coming up. Suddenly Lord Uxbridge saw appear on a ridge of rising ground a horseman, followed by a small escort, who stood out against the sky like a statue. Lord Uxbridge recognised Napoleon and cried, "Fire, and aim well." The English guns were replied to by the artillery of the guard. Then the lightning flashed and the rain began to fall in torrents. The English galloped away, the French following like a fox-hunt, hussars and artillery going like mad, blinded by the lightning

and lashed by the rain. Lord Uxbridge rode by the side of his troops crying, "Faster, faster, for the love of God, gallop or you will be taken," the French lancers following quickly at their heels.

The English arrived at Genappe, crossed the Dyle, and took up a position to the north. A combat ensued in the streets of the village, and the English were slowly driven back. Napoleon arrived upon the scene, dripping wet, and, placing a battery in position, called out to the gunners in accents of rage and hatred, "Fire! fire! they are English." After passing Genappe the pace slackened considerably and the roads became almost impassable from the rain. Napoleon arrived at an inn called the "Belle Alliance," so named because the old and ugly innkeeper had married a young and pretty peasant. At 6.30 P.M. the French hussars were pursuing the Brunswick infantry down the hollow, when they were brought up by the firing of the English artillery. The rain had ceased, but a damp fog enveloped the plain. The Emperor at last became certain that he had the whole of Wellington's army before him and determined to halt.

After marking out the bivouacs for the different divisions the Emperor retired to sleep at the farm of Le Caillou, where the rooms which he occupied are still to be seen. The French passed a terrible night in the wet corn-fields; the English were better off because the bulk of their army had reached their position before the rain began. The cavalry of Lord Uxbridge suffered most. Both commanders spent the night in anxiety; Napoleon felt certain that he could destroy the English, provided that they did not retreat, and if the Prussians did not come up in force to assist them. Wellington scarcely dared to

fight unless he was sure of Prussian co-operation, but he received a letter from Blücher at his headquarters in the village of Waterloo about 2 A.M. saying that he should be able to give the English some assistance. Napoleon slept but little; at about 1 A.M. he visited the outposts with Bertrand, the rain falling in torrents. The army of the allies was plunged in sleep, but red fires gleamed on the horizon. There was no sign of retreat, and the Emperor knew that the day would witness a decisive battle. He felt certain of victory, and that the pale sun which now began to pierce the clouds would witness the destruction of the English, but his patience was sorely tried by having to delay the attack. The rain had ceased, but the ground was extremely heavy; orders, however, were given to be ready for the battle at nine o'clock.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

THE battle of Waterloo was fought between two heights, each rising to the elevation of about sixty or eighty feet, running parallel to each other from west to east. They are separated by two valleys, traversed by the high-road from Charleroi to Brussels, the valley of Smohain to the east, and that of Braine-l'Alleud to the west; the distance between Belle Alliance and Mont St. Jean is about three-quarters of a mile as the crow flies. The British position was well protected by hedges and a deep road; there were two outlying natural fortresses, the château of Hougomont in front of the British right, and La Haye Sainte in front of their centre; behind their position the ground sloped considerably, so that neither the position nor the movement of troops in their rear could be observed by the enemy.

The British troops woke at break of day, lighted their fires, prepared their breakfast, cleaned their uniforms and their arms, and at about 6 A.M. took up their position for the battle. The first line was drawn up behind the road to Ohain, deep and lined by hedges, the guards of Byng and Maitland, then Colin Halkett and Kielmansegge, and Ompteda, stretching from the Nivelles road to the Brussels road. On the other side of the road followed Kempt, Pack and Picton, the Dutch of Bylandt and the Hanoverians of Best. These nine brigades formed the

front of the allied army, which was drawn up with a right and left centre and two wings. The right wing, consisting of the troops of Adams, Mitchell, Williams, Halkett, and Duplat, was drawn up at right angles on the other side of the Nivelles road, the Belgians of Chassé being at the extreme right in front of Braine l'Alleud. The left consisted of the Nassau brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, and the Hanoverian brigade of Wincke, flanked by the cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian. There were also two lines of reserve, the composition of which we need not particularise.

Wellington, who had experienced in Spain the impetuosity of the French attacks, employed special tactics to resist them. He placed his first line of infantry behind a ridge, so that it might be invisible before the attack and during the attack itself. Not till the assailants had actually gained the summit of the ridge, confused by the fire of skirmishers and of artillery, did the line of soldiers discover itself, firing point-blank at a short distance, and following up with a bayonet charge. This manœuvre was used with special persistence at Waterloo, and the English troops were all drawn up a hundred or two hundred yards behind the road which constituted their front. By this means they, as well as the reserves, were completely concealed from view. Hougoumont was strongly occupied by seven companies of the guards and other troops. The Duke commanded seventeen thousand men and one hundred and eighty-four cannon, having left seventeen thousand men and thirty guns at Hal to protect his right. He rode that day his favourite horse "Copenhagen," who died at a good old age in the paddocks of Strathfieldsaye.

This was the first occasion on which Napoleon had ever come into direct conflict with English troops, and the confidence which he felt was not shared by those of his generals who had had experience of them. Soult deeply regretted the separation of thirty thousand men under Grouchy and pressed Napoleon to recall them, but the Emperor replied with temper: "Because you have been beaten by Wellington you consider him a good general, but I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that it will all be over before dinner." "I only hope so," replied Soult. Soon afterwards General Reille, who had so often fought against the English in Spain, entered the room, and Napoleon asked him his opinion about the English army. He said: "Well posted, according to Wellington's usual manner, and attacked in front I consider the English infantry as invincible, on account of their calm tenacity, and the superiority of their fire; before charging with the bayonet, you will have to wait till half the attacking party is killed. But the English army is less agile, less supple and less able to manœuvre than our own; if it cannot be conquered by a direct attack, it might be by manœuvring." Napoleon seemed to be irritated by these remarks and refused to believe them.

Napoleon now rode forward in front of La Belle Alliance; he employed as guide a man named Decoster, who was tied upon a horse, which was itself attached to the saddle of one of the escort. It is said that he purposely gave false information. He then took up his position on a little hill, about a mile to the rear of La Belle Alliance, where he had chairs placed and a table upon which he could spread his maps. Jerome Bonaparte about this time told his brother

that a junction was expected between the English and the Prussians arriving from Wavre, but the Emperor said that they were certain to be stopped by Grouchy. Napoleon now proceeded to pass his troops in review; the drums beat, the trumpets brayed, the bands played a patriotic air; as they passed their commander the ensigns dipped their colours, the cavalry brandished their sabres, the infantry hoisted their caps on the point of their bayonets; while cries of "Vive l'Empereur" drowned all other sounds. Never was greater enthusiasm exhibited than in this last review, and far away in the distance was seen the dark red line of the English troops. Napoleon had under his command seventy-four thousand men and two hundred and forty-six guns against the sixty-seven thousand soldiers of Wellington. Never up to that time had so large a number of combatants been confined in so small a space; the distance from the last reserve of Wellington to the position of the Emperor's baggage was only about two miles and a half, and the front of each army did not exceed two miles in length.

The battle began at 11.30 A.M. by an artillery duel and by an attack on the Château of Hougoumont made by Jerome Bonaparte. It had been intended that this should be merely a feint to cover the main attack upon the centre of the allied position, but Hougoumont had been strongly garrisoned and the walls were pierced for musketry, so that it offered serious resistance. Jerome, contrary to orders, persisted in the attack, but was at last forced to retire, partly into the wood, and partly on the Nivelles road. About 1 P.M. Napoleon was preparing to make his main attack, which he hoped would speedily finish the battle, but just at this moment he perceived a dark

mass appearing about six miles to the north-east, and at the same time an intercepted letter from Bülow to Wellington was brought in which he announced the arrival of his corps. Napoleon also heard that the whole Prussian army had passed the night at Wavre. Upon this the Emperor sent fresh instructions to Grouchy, telling him to manœuvre in his direction, and to lose no time in attacking Bülow's corps. He was not much put out by this unwelcome news, but said to Soult: "This morning we had ninety chances out of a hundred in our favour, we now have sixty, and if Grouchy repairs his errors, we shall gain a still more decisive victory, because Bülow's corps will be entirely destroyed." At the same time he detached some divisions to protect his right flank.

It was not till 1.30 P.M. that Napoleon gave Ney the order to attack, and after half an hour's cannonade, the assault on the English position began. The soldiers descended into the valley under an arch of bullets which passed over their heads. Allix attacked the farm of La Haye Sainte, which like Hougoumont was strongly defended. Wellington watched the fight from the foot of a large elm tree, which grew in the angle between the Ohain and the Brussels roads. At first everything seemed to go well for the French, and if they could only reach the ridge and hold it long enough for the cavalry to come up the battle would be over. But, as we have said, the English troops were withdrawn a hundred yards from the ridge and were lying down in the corn to avoid the bullets. At the critical moment Picton called on his men to rise; they fired at forty paces, the French wavered; Picton cried, "Charge! Charge! Hurrah!" and drove the French back, but fell in the moment of success, pierced by a ball

in the temple. In a similar manner the third column was repulsed by the Highlanders of Pack. At the same instant Somerset's cavalry, consisting of the first and second Life Guards, the Blues and the Royal Dragoons, chased the French cuirassiers and drove the brigade of Travers down the valley. Ponsonby's brigade also fell upon the column of Donzalot, the Highlanders and the Scots Greys exchanging shouts of "Scotland for ever!" The French troops, much too thickly massed, were slaughtered like sheep, till at last not a single Frenchman was left standing on the slopes of Mont St. Jean. The English now galloped down the valley and up the opposite slope, but they were received by the French reserve and repulsed with considerable loss, the gallant Ponsonby being killed by a lancer. The slopes of the hill, lately instinct with vigorous life, were now covered with corpses, as they would be on the day after a battle, although the battle was only just beginning. Hougomont was set on fire, but without much advantage to either party.

The object of Wellington was to hold his position until the Prussians could come up; that of Napoleon was to finish with the English before he had to deal with Blücher. About 3.30 P.M. the Emperor ordered Ney to attack La Haye Sainte a second time, hoping to use this post as a point of support for a general assault. The onslaught was accompanied by a violent cannonade, the like of which had not been heard by the oldest soldiers. The English, to avoid it, retired behind the slope, and Ney, thinking that they were retreating, ordered the cavalry to advance, a movement of which it is possible that Napoleon was ignorant. Wellington was much relieved when he saw the French cavalry advancing

to attack his troops, which were waiting, perfectly fresh, behind the ridge. The men were formed into squares, cannon placed before them with orders to fire, and then leaving their guns, to retire into the squares. The cavalry rode against the artillery, exposed to a murderous fire upon their flank, as they laboriously mounted the slope. The guns were for the moment captured, but the French had no means of spiking them or carrying them off. Twenty battalions of the allies were thus formed into squares, their fire rattled upon the cuirasses of the enemy like hail on a slated roof, but no efforts of the French cavalry could break the British squares. They were at last driven from the plateau by a charge of Uxbridge's horse, and the gunners recovering their pieces turned them with murderous effect against the fugitives.

Once more the brave cavalry of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnouettes, re-forming in the hollow, resumed the charge, once more they laboriously climbed the heights and captured the guns. Some of the English thought the day was lost. The Emperor, when at last he saw what had occurred, remarked to Soult that this premature attack might lose the battle; it should have been made an hour later, still it was necessary to support what had been done. He gave orders to Kellermann to charge with his heavy brigade, but at this very time he was being attacked by the Prussians on his right flank.

Blücher joined Bülow about 1 P.M. and the two generals marched in the direction of Plancenoit, arriving within three miles of it at 4 P.M. The village was defended by Lobau, but he was compelled to evacuate it just as the direct attacks on Mont St. Jean were seen to be a failure. At about 5.30 P.M.

more than sixty squadrons of cavalry were mounting the slopes, eight or nine thousand horsemen in a space only large enough for one thousand to deploy in; they covered the whole ground between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, and their files were so close that the horses were pushed upwards by the pressure. The mass of cuirasses, helmets, and sabres resembled a sea of steel. They were met by the same tactics as before—abandonment of the guns, and formation into squares upon which the French produced no effect, although some squares were charged as many as thirteen times. Ney, after having three horses killed under him, stood close to the side of an abandoned battery, striking the mouth of an English gun with the flat of his sword. At last Wellington, having left the square of the 73d regiment in which he had sought refuge, urged his cavalry once more upon the broken French, and they were driven down the slope for the third time. Once more they charged again, with Ney at their head shouting, "Vive l'Empereur!"—a charge as fruitless as those which had preceded it. They crossed the line of guns, threw themselves against the rampart of corpses by which each square was protected, and retired of their own accord to the bottom of the valley. In these furious attacks Ney had forgotten his principal duty, which was to capture La Haye Sainte, and he was now at 6 P.M. ordered by Napoleon to take it at all hazards. The task was at length achieved when the ammunition of the garrison who held it was exhausted, and Baring led back to the presence of his chief only forty-two men out of his nine companies.

The centre of the allies was holding firm, but on the left the line was wavering. Wellington became

anxious; he saw the Prussians on the French flank but received no support himself; when asked for orders he replied, "I have no orders to give but to resist till the last man." Ney saw the opportunity, but he had no troops at his disposal. He sent an orderly to the Emperor to ask for some infantry, but Napoleon replied: "Soldiers! where do you think I can get them from? Do you wish me to make them?" It is true that Napoleon had at his disposal at this moment eight battalions of the old guard and six of the middle guard, and it is possible that if he had used them just at that moment, the English line might have been forced. But, having no reserve of cavalry, he needed them to defend his own position. The Prussian artillery were already playing upon the heights of La Belle Alliance, and the guard was needed to drive the Prussians out of Plancenoit, which they had just captured from Lobau.

It was now past 7 P.M., but there were still two hours more of daylight, and the cannon of Grouchy were heard seven miles to the right. It was natural to suppose that he was engaged with the Prussians and would be able to prevent them from effectively helping the English. The Emperor imagined that Wellington had engaged the whole of his troops, while he still held in his hand the old guard, that army of invincibles. He gave orders to Drouot to advance with nine battalions of the guard, formed into squares, leaving two at Plancenoit and three on the ridge. Napoleon put himself at the head of the first square and descended the slope down to La Haye Sainte. It is just possible that the attack might have succeeded if undertaken half an hour earlier, but the decisive moment was now past, and dur-

ing the recapture of Plancenoit and the preparations for the final attack Wellington had been able to strengthen his position.

Just at this moment a fresh body of Prussians was seen to be approaching the field of battle on the English left at Smohain, and the first effect of their arrival was to set free the cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian which were covering that side of the British army. Ziethen, whose corps it was, had arrived at Ohain, with his van-guard, at 6 P.M. Here Colonel Freemantle came to him, sent by Wellington, and begged him to send his chief three thousand men without delay. Ziethen was unwilling to run the risk of having his army beaten in detail, and he was not persuaded until Müffling, a Prussian general attached to the English army, had pressed the request in person. The Prussians were marching over Smohain just as the guard was descending to La Haye Sainte. The troops began to waver at the sight of this new enemy, appearing in the most critical quarter; but the Emperor addressed them and they moved forward again. The arrival of these fresh forces made the defeat of the French almost certain; but it is doubtful whether Napoleon could at this moment have broken off the battle, and it was probably wiser to make a last supreme effort than to anticipate a rout, which could hardly be worse if it followed a defeat.

The effect of Ziethen's arrival was to precipitate the Emperor's attack. When six battalions of the guard had reached La Haye Sainte, he placed one of them on a little hill between that farm and Hougomont, and gave the command of the rest to Ney, ordering him to attack the right centre of the English. At the same time he commanded the artillery to

quicken their fire and the cavalry to support the advance of the guard. He also charged La Bédoyère to pass among the soldiers and to announce the speedy arrival of Grouchy. The troops were encouraged by this news and reiterated cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" whilst the wounded made way for the march of the columns. Wellington made full preparations to meet the attack. He brought up his reserve artillery and charged the gunners not to reply to the French cannon, but to concentrate their fire on the columns of attack.

The five battalions of the guard, formed into squares, marched in échelons with the right foremost, an oblique formation which has been blamed by military critics. The consequence of this was that they attacked the English line at five different points, and at each of these points, except one, the attack was at the first moment successful, although the guard was speedily overpowered by the steadiness of their opponents and the deadly artillery fire. The third échelon reached the ridge without meeting any infantry, and they were approaching the Ohain road, when suddenly at twenty paces the guards of Maitland stood up in the corn, four deep, like a red brick wall. Their first volley killed three hundred men; the French hesitated and wavered, then the English guards were ordered to advance, and they drove the enemy victoriously down the slope to Hougoumont, French and English being in such confusion that firing became impossible.

The cry which was raised of "The guard gives way" sounded the knell of the Grand Army. The cavalry of the guard who were to support the attack were paralysed. There was a shout of "Sauve qui peut," "We are betrayed," and a general rout began.

The Prussians pressed on to the pursuit, and on the east of the great road there was the wildest confusion. There was the moment for which Wellington had waited so long. He rode to the edge of the ridge, took off his hat and waved it in the air. Immediately the whole British line advanced just as they happened to stand, passing over dead and wounded alike, forty thousand men, of all arms and many nations, marching to the sound of drums, trumpets, and bagpipes in the first shades of the evening twilight. The French made no resistance. La Haye Sainte was abandoned, so was Hougomont and its wood. The cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur cut the fugitives to pieces with cries of "No quarter!"

The Emperor was forming his best troops in columns of attack when he saw his line of battle suddenly collapse. He knew that he was irremediably defeated, but he still had hope of organising the retreat, and for this purpose he formed three squares of the old guard, placing them about a hundred yards above La Haye Sainte, but they were not able to make head against the English cavalry. Ney was standing near the road, his head bare, his face blue with powder, his uniform in tatters, his epaulettes cut in two, and the fragment of a sword in his hand. He had done marvels that day, but he could not find the death which he was so anxious to meet.

The Imperial Guard, now at the end of its existence, signalised itself by one final act of bravery and endeavour. The two battalions of the first grenadiers, commanded by General Petit, were posted in squares on either side of the wood, near the house of Decoster. They were the chosen troops of all, a living and moving fortress, and with them

it might still be possible to cover the retreat. The Emperor was seated on horseback in the centre of the square of the first battalion, and for some time they held their own against all attacks. At length they were compelled to give way, and the Emperor rode before them, accompanied by Soult, Drouot, Bertrand and Lobau. At the farm of Le Caillou he found that his baggage had been sent on to Genappe.

At 9.15 P.M., when it was already dusk, Wellington and Blücher met outside the tavern of La Belle Alliance, and it was decided that the pursuit should be continued throughout the night. The English were worn out with ten hours of fighting, and the Prussians had marched fifteen miles over bad roads. Nevertheless Blücher ordered his cavalry to pursue the enemy so long as they had a man or a horse able to stand. Wellington's troops stood still, and as the Prussians marched past them saluted them with a "Hip! Hip! Hurrah!" The pursuit continued past Genappe, past Frasnes, the remains of the old guard alone preserving any order, and at five o'clock on the following morning Napoleon reached Charleroi, from which he had set out with such high hopes three days before.

PART NINE.

THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

THE causes of the Crimean War, and the strange series of events which brought into close alliance the two European powers whose hatreds and struggles have been the subject of the preceding book, belong to political history, and even if it fell within our purpose to narrate them, it may be doubted whether material for a true account or for an impartial judgment is yet available. It is enough to say that in April, 1854, twenty thousand English troops, under the command of Lord Raglan, who as Lord Fitzroy Somerset had been the intimate friend of Wellington and had lost an arm at Waterloo, and a French army of more than twice that strength under Marshal St. Arnaud, landed at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles and eventually bombarded Odessa. A council of war was held in Varna to decide upon further operations. Ferkat Pasha recommended a landing in Asia with the purpose of driving the Russians from the Caucasus, a proposition which met with favour from the English; but St. Arnaud was in favour of an attack upon Sebastopol, and Lord Rag-

Ian agreed with him, as being the best method of annihilating the naval powers of Russia in the Black Sea. Fifteen hundred men of the allied armies had already perished in the pestilential swamps of the Dobrudsha, but the remaining forces, to the number of fifty-five thousand with seven thousand Turks, landed on September 14 at a short distance from Eupatoria, on the west coast of the Peninsula.

This point had been chosen because there was sufficient space for the two armies to land together and because the troops would be protected by the fire of the ships. It was four days before the whole of the forces were disembarked and in a condition to advance. The British force numbered about twenty-six thousand infantry, sixty guns, and the Light Brigade of cavalry about one thousand strong. The French had twenty-eight thousand infantry and the Turks seven thousand, with sixty-eight guns, but no cavalry.

The advance of the armies began on September 19, the French being on the right, next the sea. They were moving straight for Sebastopol, about twenty-five miles distant. Through their front ran the post-road to Eupatoria, but the ground was such that the army could move anywhere and roads were needless. The cattle, sheep, carriages and pack-mules were in the rear, and the cavalry still further behind kept everything moving. Early in the afternoon the Bulganak was reached, and it was here that the enemy was first seen. After a few shots had been interchanged, the army bivouacked on the stream and passed the night unmolested. On the next morning the army moved onward, crossing a succession of grassy ridges, and about noon from the top of a ridge they looked down upon the valley of

the Alma, on the opposite side of which the Russians had taken up a defensive position, their army of thirty-three thousand infantry, three thousand four hundred cavalry and one hundred and twenty guns being commanded by Prince Menchikoff. The allies halted for some time on coming in sight of the enemy, whilst Lord Raglan and St. Arnaud arranged the general order of attack. The position before them was, according to General Hamley, very difficult of access on the right, very advantageous for defence in the centre, and with open and undefended ground on their left. It would probably therefore have been better to have neglected the part near the sea, to have carried their whole line inland until their right was across the post-road, and their left extended beyond the Russian right, in which case a defeat would have been destructive to the Russians. Menchikoff, on the other hand, could with advantage have formed across the English left upon the road to Simpheropol, and thus made up for his deficiency in numbers. But the battle showed a want of tactical skill on both sides.

As the allied columns advanced towards the stream the enemy retired, first setting fire to the village of Burliuk; unfortunately, as they proceeded, the ground was too much restricted to deploy with advantage, and the efficiency of the troops was spoilt by crowding. The stream was in most places shallow, with occasional deep pools in which the soldiers stood up to their necks in water. As the troops climbed up the slope on the other side they suffered much loss from the fire of the Russian batteries, especially one of heavy guns, which plunged into Codrington's division. But strangely enough, just as Codrington's men were touching the earthwork

in front of this battery, the guns were withdrawn, excepting two which were captured. Notwithstanding this, the first onset failed, for Codrington's troops, being without support, surrounded by fresh masses of the enemy and threatened by a large body of cavalry, gave way and descended the hill. On the other hand, the Grenadier Guards and the Coldstreams continued to advance in lines absolutely unbroken, except when they were struck by the enemy's shot, their advance producing a great effect on the minds of the French. The Highlanders also climbed the hill to the left of the Guards and the whole of the English army began to close upon the enemy. This advance of the Guards and the Highlanders finally decided the battle, and the Russian forces soon began to retreat all over the ground. In the meantime Canrobert's division of the French had occupied the Telegraph Hill, and the allied forces which had been separated in the engagement were now connected again. Lord Raglan would have liked to have pursued the enemy in their retreat, but St. Arnaud objected that the men could not march without their knapsacks, which they had left behind them. In the battle the English lost two thousand and two killed and wounded; the French, probably a much smaller number. The Russian losses amounted to nearly six thousand.

The next two days were passed on the Alma, and the advance was resumed on September 23, and on the following day the army crossed the Belbek. They had now reached the point from which the town and fortifications of Sebastopol could be seen at no great distance, and the question arose whether the city should be attacked at once from the north side. The best authorities were strongly opposed

to such an attempt. The harbour of Sebastopol is over a thousand yards wide, and the city and all the principal fortifications were to the south, while the harbour was full of war-ships, and was protected by seven line-of-battle ships sent by Menchikoff on his arrival from the Alma. So, on the afternoon of September 24, a flank march was determined upon. The march began at noon on the following day, the army passing Mackenzie's farm and the Traktir bridge, where the road to Balaclava crosses the Tchernaiia. The next day from a high ground was seen the harbour of Balaclava, a deep pool, lying between enclosing cliffs, crowned with walls and towers. An English steamer soon made its appearance in the port, showing that the harbour had been captured, and communication with the fleet established. Only four shots had been fired by the garrison, and the commandant being asked why he had fired at all, said that he thought he was bound to do so until summoned to surrender; no one was wounded on either side. The French crossed the Tchernaiia on the same day. It was soon seen that Balaclava was very different to what the map represented it to be, and was little worth having. But as the English were in possession of it the French gave up their position on the right, which was occupied by the English, together with the harbour, an arrangement which proved a fruitful cause of disaster. The armies now took up the positions which they were to occupy till the end of the war. Above them was the broad plateau of the Tauric Chersonesus, on which for nearly a year their lives were to be passed and upon which many were to die.

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE BALACLAVA CHARGE.

THE outer harbour of Sebastopol is about four miles long from its entrance up to the point where the River Tchernaiia flows into it. It is extremely deep even close to the shore. It was at this time defended at its entrance by two stone forts, named Constantine and Alexander, by the quarantine fort outside, and the artillery fort inside. There was also an inner harbour, running at about a mile from the entrance into the southern shore for a mile and a half, defended also at its mouth by two forts, Nicholas and Paul. On the western shore of this inner creek stood the city of Sebastopol, and on the eastern shore the Karabelnaia suburb which contained the garrison barracks. There was also on this side a creek on which the dock-yards were built, and about a mile from the inner harbour, on the same side, ran Careenage Bay, terminated by Careenage Creek. The plateau on which the allied armies were posted was cut off from the valley of the Tchernaiia by a wall of cliff, which eventually formed the boundary of the valley of Balaclava. The plateau is channelled by many chasms and ravines, and is reached by elevations which afterwards became historically famous as the Malakoff, the Redan, and other names. The extreme point of the Chersonesus in this direction has the name of Cape

Cherson, and just to the north of it lie the two inlets of Kazatch and Kamiesch which were used by the French for their harbour base and were in every respect superior to Balaclava, which was assigned to the English. These two harbours were connected with the French positions by the paved road. A great ravine continues the depression of the inner harbour, and this for some time formed the line of separation between the French and the English armies.

Another feature of importance was the so-called Woronzoff road, which connected the Woronzoff estate at Yalta with Sebastopol, crossing the valley of Balaclava; a branch of this road crossed the Tchernaiia and went along the heights by Mackenzie's farm to Bakshisherai. The effect of this was that the Russians could approach Balaclava out of range of our guns posted on the plateau.

The defence of Sebastopol was directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Todleben, then thirty-six years old, having 35,850 men under his command. Besides building the Star fort on the north side, he quickly completed the defences on the south side, which had been traced years before. They consisted of the Redan, the Little Redan, batteries at Bastion No. 1 on Careenage Bay, and the semi-circular Malakoff Tower, built of stone, five feet thick, fifty feet across and twenty-eight feet high. On September 26 the place was armed with one hundred and seventy-two pieces of ordnance. On October 2, before the siege began, all non-combatants were sent out of the town, and the works were strengthened every day; while a ship of eighty-four guns was moored at the head of the inner harbour.

The siege operations of the English were directed by Sir John Burgoyne, who had seen much service

in the Peninsular War, and he was in favour of employing the siege trains before commencing the assault. The system of fortification perfected by Vauban in the reign of Louis XIV. was still in vogue at the time of the Crimean War. It had been modified to meet the altered range of artillery and musketry fire, and it prescribed that the first parallel should be traced at six hundred yards from the enemy's works, but for special reasons our first battery was at a much greater distance.

At 6.30 A.M. on October 17, 1854, the signal being given by three French shells, the allied batteries opened, the Russian works replied, and the most tremendous conflict of artillery which up to that time the world had ever witnessed began. It continued unabated for four hours, with no obvious result. About ten o'clock an explosion took place on Mont Rodolph, held by the French, which blew up the principal magazine, killed about fifty men, and in half an hour silenced the fire of the French battery. The consequence of this was that the French were put out of the fighting, and the hope of delivering a general assault had disappeared. The English fire was more successful. At 11.30 A.M. Admiral Kozniloff was mortally wounded in the Malakoff, and the batteries in the surrounding earthworks gradually ceased fire. By 3 P.M. a third of the guns in the Redan were silenced, and a magazine then was blown up, which did much damage. Todleben, in his history of the siege, admits that in that part of the line the defence was completely paralysed, and that an assault was expected. The English fire continued till dusk, and then the cannonade entirely ceased. If the French had been as successful as ourselves the allies might thus early

have secured a lodgment on the main works of the enemy.

The bombardment was renewed by the English on the following day, but the Russian position had been enormously strengthened, and the principal damage repaired by the energy of Todleben. The loss on the English side was slight. Up to October 25 the number of killed and wounded did not average more than seventeen a day, whereas the Russian loss up to that time amounted to 3,834 men.

The valley between Balaclava and the Tchernaiia is crossed by a line of low hills, and along their course lies the Woronzoff road. Four of these hills had been crowned with earthworks of a very slight description, armed with nine 12-pounder guns, the garrison having but very slight support. On October 25, the Russians, whose force now amounted to twenty-two thousand infantry, three thousand four hundred cavalry and seventy-eight guns, crossed the Tchernaiia, and began to bombard what was called Canrobert's Hill, named from the general who had succeeded to the command of the French army on the death of St. Arnaud. The fire was returned by the forts, and afterwards by two batteries of artillery supported by the Scots Greys.

When it was seen that the attack was more formidable than appeared at first, two English divisions and a French brigade were sent to the scene of action, but instead of descending into the valley, they marched along the heights. They saw the Russians storm Canrobert's Hill, killing one hundred and seventy Turks who were occupying the forts. These events gave rise to the famous charges of Balaclava, of the Heavy Brigade, and of the Light Brigade. These two brigades were moving on different sides of the ridge, the Light Brigade on the

side towards the Tchernaiia, numbering six hundred and seventy men, and the Heavy Brigade on the side towards Balacava, numbering nine hundred. Suddenly a large body of Russian cavalry attacked the Heavy Brigade, leaving the Light Brigade unnoticed, but, checked by the fire of a Turkish fort, wavered, some halting and galloping back. The English regiments charged in succession. The Russians were far superior in number, and the event of the combat appeared doubtful until the 4th Dragoon Guards charged the Russian flank, and the whole of the English troops came up. Then suddenly the complete Russian mass gave way and fled behind the hill, disappearing beyond the slope some four or five minutes after they were first seen upon it.

The Heavy Brigade of cavalry was under the command of General Scarlett, the Light Brigade under Lord Cardigan, while the whole cavalry division was commanded by Lord Lucan, to whom Lord Raglan now sent the following order: "Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two fronts." On receiving this order Lord Lucan moved the Heavy Brigade to the other side of the ridge, to await the promised support of the infantry. As it was seen that the Russians were attempting to carry off the guns they had captured, a second order was sent to Lord Lucan in the following words: "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troops of artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate." The order was carried by Captain Nolan, who found Lord Lucan between his two brigades, divided by the Woronzoff road.

Lord Raglan had intended the charge to be made against the defeated Russian cavalry who had retreated down the valley towards the Tchernaiia; but Lord Lucan, strengthened in his opinion by some blunder of Nolan's, understood it to be directed against a large body of Russians posted right in front, supported on either side by large numbers of artillery. Although both Lord Cardigan and Lord Lucan knew the charge to be desperate they did not hesitate, and the order was given for the brigade to advance. They moved at a steady trot, and in a minute came within the range of fire. After five minutes they came under the fire of twelve guns in front, and the pace was increased, but when they reached the battery more than half the brigade were dead or wounded, the rest were now lost to view in the smoke of the guns. The Heavy Brigade moved in support, but soon had to retire with heavy loss; a brilliant diversion was effected by a regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, sent by the French General Morris, whose well-directed charge saved many English lives. Behind the smoke of the guns, the light cavalry drove the gunners off, and charged parties of Russian cavalry who retreated, but they soon had to retreat themselves. They rode back, as Hamley says, singly or in twos and threes, some wounded, some supporting wounded comrades. But when the Russian lancers drew up across the valley to cut off the retreat of the English, the 8th Hussars and some of the 17th Lancers scattered them right and left. The brigade had lost two hundred and forty-seven men killed and wounded, while four hundred and seventy-five horses were killed and forty-two wounded. The Russians were left in undisturbed possession of the three hills they had captured with their seven guns.

CHAPTER XLV.

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

THE plateau above Sebastopol was accessible to the Russians at many points, but especially by the Careenage Ravine, which was a continuation of the Careenage Harbour. At noon on October 26 a Russian force of six battalions and four light field-guns came out of the town, and ascended the ravine and the slope which led to the camp of the Second Division. In a short time both the artillery and the infantry were swept back into the walls of Sebastopol. It is probable that their intention was to establish a redoubt on Shell Hill, in order to cover a more serious attack to be made at a future time. In order to prevent a similar movement on the part of the Russians, the English built a battery on an advanced ridge, armed with two eighteen-pounders, and called the "Sand-bag Battery." When it had done its work of alarming the Russians, the guns were removed, but the point afterwards became important in the history of the battle.

On November 4 it was known on both sides that a crisis was impending. The allied infantry before Sebastopol consisted of thirty-one thousand French, sixteen thousand English, and eleven thousand Turks. The French siege corps was retrieving its disaster of the previous months. The English were strengthening their batteries and replenishing their

magazines, and the daily Russian loss far exceeded theirs. A meeting of the allied commanders had been arranged for November 5 to concert measures for delivering the final assault. The total of Menchikoff's forces in and around Sebastopol were not less than one hundred thousand men, without counting the seamen, so that about one hundred and fifteen thousand men were opposed to sixty-five thousand.

In the early dawn of Sunday, November 5, the bells of the Sebastopol churches were celebrating the arrival in the town of the young Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas. Menchikoff's plan was to make a combined attack upon the English position on the plateau, by Soimonoff moving up the Careenage Ravine with a force of nineteen thousand infantry and thirty-eight guns, and Pauloff advancing across the causeway and bridge of the Tchernaiia with sixteen thousand infantry and ninety-six guns. Gortschakoff in the valley was to support the general attack by a diversion, and an attempt to seize one of the heights, and the garrison of Sebastopol was to cover the right flank of the attacking force with its artillery fire. As soon as the two bodies had effected their juncture they were to be under the command of General Dannenberg.

The ground chiefly threatened was occupied by about three thousand men of the Second Division, and three-quarters of a mile behind was the brigade of Guards numbering thirteen hundred and thirty men. Two miles in the rear of the Second Division were the nearest troops of Bosquet's army corps. Soimonoff left Sebastopol in the middle of the night, and passing up the Careenage Ravine, began to form the order of battle on the heights at about 6 A.M. He did not wait for Pauloff, but at once began

the attack. He posted twenty-two heavy guns on Shell Hill and opened fire, and attacked with his columns at about 7 A.M. The pickets of the Second Division were at once driven back, but the main body was pushed forwards to support the pickets, the crest only being held by twelve nine-pounder guns. The morning was foggy and the ground muddy; the mist was very partial, but sufficient to conceal from the Russians the fact that the troops attacked had no immediate support.

The first attack took place on the English left. Luckily the strength of the Russian forces was not known, and the troops fought in ignorance of the enormous odds against them. By extraordinary acts of individual prowess and daring seven of Soimonoff's fourteen battalions were repulsed and Soimonoff himself was killed. Of the seven which remained, one joined the forces of Pauloff, and six advancing against the English centre were also defeated. Pauloff advanced by what was called the Quarry Ravine, leading up from the Tchernaiia. When a regiment on the right reached a wall of stones placed across the head of the road, called the Barrier, a wing of the 30th regiment, two hundred strong, leapt over it and charged the two leading battalions with the bayonet. The charge proved decisive and the whole body were swept off the field. Against the remaining five battalions which numbered four thousand, the 41st regiment, in number five hundred and twenty-five, descended in extended order, drove the Russians down the hill until they reached the banks of the Tchernaiia. "Thus," says Hamley, "in open ground, affording to the defenders none of the defensive advantages, walls, hedges or enclosures of any kind which most battle-fields have been found to offer,

these fifteen thousand Russians had been repulsed by less than a fourth of their number."

A new action commenced with the arrival of General Dannenberg. He had under his command about nineteen thousand infantry and ninety guns. He directed his main attack against the centre and right of the English position in order the better to co-operate with Gortschakoff. By this time the English had received reinforcements, the Guard had turned out at the sound of battle, and others were coming up. The battle raged furiously about the Sand-bag Battery, the Russian troops now fighting better than they had done earlier in the day. The Russians repulsed returned again and again to the encounter, until the two lines were separated by a rampart of fallen men. At last Cathcart arrived with about four hundred men of the Fourth Division, and descended the slope beyond the English right; but he was suddenly assailed by a body of Russians coming down the heights from which he had himself descended; his troops suffered heavily and he was shot dead. The unfortunate example of Cathcart was followed by others, and our right was in considerable danger when a French regiment, which happened to be posted there, took the Russians in flank and drove them back into the place from which they had come.

The Russians now made a third attack with a body of six thousand men, the allies having increased their numbers to five thousand, the Russian artillery, however, still having the predominance. Issuing from the Quarry Ravine the columns attacked the English centre and left, and met with greater success than any other which they attempted. They penetrated as far as the Careenage Ravine, drove back the troops

there, and captured and spiked some English guns. This attack was finally repulsed by the combined efforts of the French and English. It was by this time eleven o'clock, and the fortunes of the day were turning decidedly in favour of the allies, as none of their artillery had come up and the French were taking an important share in the battle; Bosquet having been before held back from fear of being attacked by Gortschakoff.

This ended the battle of Inkerman with no apparent decisive results on either side; the English had not the numbers nor the French the desire to turn the defeat into a rout. The gloom of the November evening descended upon the gloomy hosts. The Russian losses in the battle were twelve thousand, of whom the greater number were killed. The English lost 597 killed and 1,760 wounded; the French, 143 killed and 786 wounded. The battle, however, had a great moral effect, and the Russians lost all hope of driving the allies from the plateau which they had occupied.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE WINTER—THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

THREE days after the battle of Inkerman it was determined that the allied armies should winter in the Crimea. Up to this time the troops had undergone no great privation. "The weather," Hamley, who was present, tells us, "had been mild and sunny with cool nights; the tents stood on dry and level spaces of turf. The surface of the plains had been good for transit, and rations for men and horses had been supplied with sufficient regularity." But on November 14 arose a fearful storm, which dispersed whole camps and scattered them over the plain, so that there was no shelter for men returning from the trenches. The sick and wounded were left bare of protection, quantities of food and forage were spoiled, and the communication with Balaclava was stopped by the wind. Twenty-one vessels in or near the harbour of Balaclava were dashed to pieces, and eight others disabled, among them the Prince, a magnificent steamer which contained stores of every kind which the Government could design for the comfort of the troops. Twenty days' hay for the horses was destroyed by the tempest. The French lost the *Henri IV.*, the most beautiful vessel in their navy, and the garrison of Sebastopol was also grievously afflicted.

After the storm came the snow; the sick or wounded reposed in mud; the trenches were often

deep in water; the soldiers feared to draw off their boots lest they should not be able to put them on again. The difficulty of cooking made the men eat their food raw, and this largely increased the number of the sick. There was generally a sufficient supply of salt meat, biscuits, and rum, but the fare was monotonous, and means for preparing it were wanting. The most painful reflection was that there was stored at Balaclava plenty of fuel, rice, flour, vegetables, and tea, supplies which might have made the condition of the army happy, but which were not available from the absence of an army corps. The sufferings of the animals were frightful, they died all round the camp and on the road to Balaclava, and, when dead, lay unburied. The labour of toiling through the muddy roads to Balaclava to fetch their own forage killed many horses on each journey.

The result of all this was that at the end of November the English had nearly eight thousand men in hospital. The journey to the great hospital at Scutari was the death of many. The hospital itself was "crammed with misery, overflowing with despair." Thousands of brave men lay in the wards and corridors, crowded in a manner to increase their misery. Great efforts were made both at home and on the spot to remedy these disasters, and on January 13 Lord Raglan was able to write, "I believe I may assert that every man in this army has received a second blanket, a jersey frock, flannel drawers and socks, and some kind of winter coat in addition to his ordinary great coat;" but still the number of sick mounted up till it reached fourteen thousand.

During this time the French had been better off because their harbours were more convenient, they had made a paved road from the shore to their camp,

their transport was well organised, while the English was not, and they were at a shorter distance from their naval ports. On the other hand, their tents were a very imperfect protection against the weather, and their rations were hardly sufficient to keep them in good health during severe labour. For these reasons they lost many men from sickness, especially from frostbite. The strength of their army went on increasing from forty-five thousand in October to fifty-six thousand in November, sixty-five thousand in December and seventy-eight thousand in January. In this month England had only eleven thousand men fit to bear arms on the plateau, and Lord Raglan estimated the strength of the French army to be four times that of his own. General Canrobert in consequence relieved the English troops from the duty of guarding part of their ground, and thus set free fifteen hundred men.

The narrative of these sufferings would not be complete without some account of the efforts made in England to relieve them. One of these was the Crimean Army Fund, by whose energy not only necessaries but luxuries were poured into the camps, and another was the provision of Mr. Sidney Herbert, the Secretary of War, to obtain a staff of ladies and paid nurses who should introduce a better system into the hospitals at Constantinople. Miss Florence Nightingale, whose name must ever be held in reverence by English-speaking people, arrived at her sphere of labour on November 4, 1854, accompanied by eighteen Protestant sisters and nurses and twenty trained nurses. She especially devoted her attention to organising relief and the management of the hospital, and she was shortly after assisted by the *Times* Crimean Fund, which was established by that

journal, to its great credit, for the benefit of the sick and wounded. Improvements, however, were slow to take effect, and in the four winter months nearly nine thousand soldiers died in the hospitals, while at the end of February 13 six hundred men were lying sick there.

Meanwhile the business of the siege was proceeding slowly; the transports, which ought to have been used for bringing up guns and munitions of war, were employed in conveying food, clothing and shelter. In the trenches the men stood ankle- or knee-deep in mud and snow; there was great deficiency of fuel, the brushwood and the roots of vines having been exhausted. The consequence was that the men used the gabions and fascines of the parapets to boil their coffee with, which they ground with portions of the enemy's shells, and roasted in their mess tins.

The slow progress of the siege encouraged the Emperor of Russia to a more obstinate resistance. He rejected the four points which were offered to him as conditions of peace, although they were supported by Austria and Prussia. In consequence of this Austria joined the allies at the beginning of December, although she did not send any troops. A few weeks later the kingdom of Sardinia made an alliance with France and England and sent General La Marmora to the Crimea with an army of fifteen thousand men. Prussia remained steadfast in her neutrality. In England Lord Aberdeen, who had been known as the friend of the Emperor Nicholas and peace, left the Ministry, giving place to Lord Palmerston, whose energy and capacity were well known. France nerved herself to new exertions under the direction of Prince Napoleon, and Russia strained every nerve to meet the activity of her ene-

mies. There was a general levy of troops throughout the Russian Empire, but the allies had rightly calculated the results of an attack upon so distant a territory as the Crimea, which was at the same time extremely difficult to defend and impossible to surrender. In order to reach the scene of action the new levies had to march over the long stretches of southern Russia covered with snow, and countless numbers found their grave upon the march. On February 10, 1855, the Russians made an attack upon Eupatoria, which was repulsed by the bravery of the Turkish garrison under Omar Pasha, assisted by excellent earthworks by which the place was strengthened. The Emperor Nicholas had long been suffering from the demands made upon him by the difficulty of defending the Crimea and of meeting the new enemies who were arising against him. It is thought that the defeat of Eupatoria gave the final blow, felt more keenly by that proud spirit as it was a victory of the Turks over Russians. His strength suddenly collapsed as he was reviewing his troops. He returned from the parade ground on February 27, extremely ill, and died on March 2, leaving his crown to his son Alexander II., a less stubborn and more peaceful character.

Russia had by this time lost twenty-five thousand men in this terrible war, and was sincerely desirous of peace, but the honour of the nation, and the respect due to the departed Emperor and to public opinion in Russia, demanded that the war should continue for the present. The new Emperor in an address to the diplomatic body declared that he, like his father, was sincerely desirous of peace, but if no honourable conclusion was forthcoming he would march forth into the struggle with his beloved Russia, and

prefer to perish than to yield. In a similar manner the honour of France, especially of the Napoleonic Empire, required a creditable and dignified termination of this murderous conflict, and it was felt that peace would be impossible until after the fall of Sebastopol.

In January, 1855, the Emperor Napoleon III. despatched General Niel to the Crimea, an experienced and well-instructed engineer, with orders to investigate the condition of things, and to report to his master. Niel soon came to a conclusion as to the right spot upon which to direct the principal attack, and recommended the besiegers to advance their parallels and batteries in the direction of the Karabelnaia, the southern suburb of the city. In the meantime Todleben gave additional strength to the fortifications on his side. In the front of the Malakhof, about five hundred yards from it, was a conical hill known as the Mamelon. The English would have undoubtedly occupied it if their numbers had been sufficient, and the allies now prepared two batteries, with the object of placing it under a new fire. But on February 22 the French saw that new works had been erected on a part of Mount Inkerman, which flanked the approaches to the Malakhof and the Mamelon, and was itself powerfully protected. A vigorous attack was made on this new work by the French, but it was repulsed with considerable loss. Todleben, therefore, was left to arm and complete this work, and another not far from it, the two being known as the "white works," from the chalky soil on which they were constructed.

On the night of March 22 a great sortie was made against the French, between five and six thousand men attacking the French trenches before the Mame-

lon and for a time entering them, driving in the guards and working parties. A simultaneous attack was made upon the British right, which was, however, easily repulsed, and another of less importance upon the left. The object of these attacks was, probably, to obtain an opportunity for executing further works, and on the following night they connected their rifle-pits in front of the Mamelon by a trench, thus forming or occupying an entrenched line within eighty yards of the French, covering and at the same time supported by the Mamelon.

On February 24 a truce was agreed upon for burying the slain, of which Hamley, who was an eye-witness, gives an interesting account. White flags were floating from the Mamelon and the works of the allies, while the hillside was crowded with spectators. Hundreds of Russians came from behind the Mamelon, and the soldiers of both parties mingled on friendly terms. The Russians looked dirty and shabby, but healthy and well-fed. The parapet of the Mamelon was crowded with curious groups, the Malakhof rose at the distance of eight hundred yards, and between it and the Redan could be seen the city, with people walking in the streets, the gardens and the line of sunken ships. In two hours the truce was over, the flags were lowered and the fire recommenced.

By this time the condition of the allied armies had greatly improved. With the advance of spring the plains were covered with grass; the men were well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed; the horses were recovering their condition and were brought up to their proper strength; the plateau was covered with huts; supplies were forwarded by railway, and an efficient land transport had been erected. Vast stores of ordnance and ammunition had been col-

lected, and both sides were expecting a bombardment and an assault. The cannonade began on Easter Monday, April 9; the Russians were so much unprepared that they did not reply for twenty minutes, while the wind carried the smoke of the allied batteries over the enemy and impeded their fire. At sunset the guns were silent, but all through the night the mortars continued to play, and their huge shells were seen cleaving the sky.

This terrific fire continued for ten days, the Russian troops suffering severely as they were massed in the trenches expecting an immediate assault. During this time they lost more than six thousand men in killed and wounded, whereas the French lost only 1,585 men and the English 265. The suffering in Sebastopol was terrible, and heartrending scenes have been described by eyewitnesses. Nor was the state of things outside of the walls any better, as the route from Simpheropol to Sebastopol was so encumbered with dead bodies, dead horses and dead cattle, that no vehicle could pass, while the air was infected with pestilential vapours.

At this time a portion of the allied fleet sailed to the Sea of Azoff with the purpose of destroying the provisions and supplies which were collected in the towns of Kertsch, Yenikale, Mariopol, Taganrog, and Anapa, an enterprise successfully carried out, but it is said with unnecessary cruelty and barbarity. Plans were also formed for the investment of Sebastopol and cutting off its communications with the rest of Russia, and also for the journey of the Emperor Napoleon to the Crimea to take command of his army in person. This last idea was prevented by the strong opposition of the English, and as these schemes were never carried to a conclusion they need not receive

further attention in our narrative. It was, however, thought that Marshal Canrobert, who had hitherto conducted the operations of the allies in conjunction with Lord Raglan, was not of that hard, uncompromising nature which could secure success in the face of the difficulties which we have described, nor was he on the best of terms with his English colleagues. Therefore the resignation of his command was accepted, and General Pelissier, who had acquired a great but a not altogether enviable reputation in Africa, was sent out to take his place, Canrobert, with admirable self-denial, placing himself under the orders of his new chief.

After changes had been made consequent upon the new command, a fresh bombardment began on June 6, 1855, the English guns being mainly directed on the Redan and the Malakhof, the French upon the Mamelon; another important object of attack being the so-called Quarries in front of the Redan. The fire of the siege batteries was such as had never been seen before. On the side of the allies 544 great guns bore on the Russian works, and were opposed by nearly an equal number. On the second day the Mamelon was reduced to absolute silence, and in two hours the Malakhof was no longer in a condition to support it, whilst by 6 P.M. the White works were ruined and the parapets destroyed. The time for the assault had been fixed at 6.30 P.M., and at the appointed hour Bosquet captured the White works; soon afterwards the Mamelon was taken by storm and the tricolour flag waved over it, its defenders retiring to the Malakhof; but after a time the Russians returned and drove the French out, who, however, strengthened by reinforcements, recaptured and held it. At the same time the English assaulted the

Quarries, and drove out the defenders, but could not hold them, as they were open to the fire of the Russian batteries. It was found in the morning that Pelissier had succeeded in driving the enemy from all their outworks, and restricting them to their main line of defence, and that the siege works had been advanced by the ground which had thus been gained. These advantages had been won with the loss of 5,440 French, 693 English and 5,000 Russians.

A new assault was prepared for June 18, the anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, but it ended in disastrous failure, and all the attacking troops were recalled to the trenches, after suffering heavy loss. However, on this day Todleben, who was the soul of the Russian defence, was slightly wounded, and two days later was disabled by a shot through the leg and had to be removed from Sebastopol. The failure of this attack, from which so much had been expected, also cost the life of Lord Raglan. Five days after the event an officer of the Staff wrote: "I fear it has affected Lord Raglan's health; he looks far from well, and has aged very much latterly." On June 26 he was seized with cholera and died without much suffering two days afterwards. The next morning General Pelissier, who greatly respected his colleague, stood by the side of the bed on which the corpse was laid for upwards of an hour, crying like a child.

The defenders of Sebastopol, under Prince Gortschakoff, now determined to attack the allies in the field, and on August 16 they advanced against the upper Tchernaiia, which was defended by about sixty thousand men, consisting of Sardinians, Turks and a certain number of French. The Sardinian outposts were driven back, and an attack was launched

on the heights held by the French. This attack reached the French lines, but could proceed no further. It was driven down the hill and across the river with great slaughter. Assaults in other parts of the position were equally fruitless, and early in the afternoon Gortschakoff left the field. His losses had been very heavy—2,369 men killed, and 4,160 wounded, a large number having also disappeared. The French loss of killed and wounded amounted to one thousand five hundred; that of the Sardinians who conducted themselves with credit, two hundred. This defeat took away from the Russians the last hope they had of redeeming their misfortune. Their losses in the war had been enormous and were estimated from official sources at two hundred and forty thousand. It is said that in the six months from March to August eighty-one thousand men had been killed and wounded in and around Sebastopol.

From this moment the bombardment went on continuously, the defenders having no time to repair their defences, and the garrison being subject to perpetual devastation from the hail of cannon-balls. On September 5, in preparation for the intended storm, the bombardment assumed still greater proportions, about five thousand Russians being killed in the trenches and in the town. The storm began at midday on September 8, that hour having been chosen because it was the Russian habit to relieve guard at that time, and because they were accustomed to march the old troops out before the new came in. The heaviest share of the work fell to the French, who were to attack the Malakhof tower, whereas the assault of the English was directed against the Redan. The storm columns of Bosquet and MacMahon climbed the heights without much difficulty

and planted the tricolour on the walls, but inside the struggle was most obstinate, and every traverse was taken, retaken, and taken again; nor could the works be considered as captured until the attack upon the eastern face had been successful. The Malakhof fell at 4 P.M. with a loss of 3,026 killed and wounded. The English attack on the Redan failed, and the less said about it the better, as, although the troops fought bravely, their efforts were neutralised by a series of blunders. In their final efforts which brought about the capture of Sebastopol, the French lost in all 7,567, the English 2,271, and the Russians as many as 12,913.

With the fall of the Malakhof tower the fate of Sebastopol was decided. During the night Gortschakoff blew up all the fortifications which still remained uncaptured on the south side, and sunk in the harbour the remaining ships of the Russian fleet. He then led the remnants of his army across the harbour to the north side, destroying the bridge of boats by which he had crossed. Thus ended the Crimean War, which, although it was a death struggle between some of the most powerful nations in the world, was yet confined almost entirely to a conflict in a distant and obscure part of Europe, a comparatively late acquisition of the Russian Empire, and to the capture of a single fortress to the defence and attack of which the resources of that mighty Empire were ungrudgingly devoted.

PART TEN.

THE FRANCO-ITALIAN WAR OF 1859.

CHAPTER XLVII.

MONTEBELLO.

OMITTING, for reasons which we have already given, the political causes which produced the war between France and Sardinia on the one side and Austria on the other, it will be sufficient to say that Austria had presented an ultimatum to Sardinia requiring her to disarm, and that the final date fixed for the answer was on the evening of April 26, 1859. At this time the Sardinian army was concentrated around Alessandria, and the French troops were entering Piedmont, partly by Genoa, and partly by the passes of the Mont Cenis and the Mont Genève. It might have been expected that hostilities would have commenced on the Austrian side as soon as a negative answer had been received from Sardinia, that is, on the night of April 26-27, but the Austrian army did not pass the frontier river, the Ticino, until the afternoon of April 29.

At this time the Austrian forces in Italy consisted of five *corps d'armée*, the permanent or normal army posted in Lombardy and Venetia, called the second army, consisting of three *corps d'armée* under the

command of Stadion, Zobel, and Benedek respectively, the corps of Schwarzenberg which had arrived from Vienna in the first days of January, and that of Lichtenstein in the middle of April; Weigl's corps was just reaching Venetia, and that of Clam Gallas, coming from Bohemia, was not expected till the end of May. These five corps gave a force amounting in all to two hundred thousand men, of which sixty thousand or eighty thousand were employed in garrisons and detachments, leaving one hundred and twenty thousand or one hundred and forty thousand for the operations in Piedmont. All these troops were under the general command of Field-Marshal Giulay. They advanced in four columns by Pavia, Bereguardo, Vigevano and Buffalora; a detached column to the right passing by Sesto Calende, and another to the left crossing the Po at Piacenza.

The Austrians did not reach the line of the Sesia and the Po till May 1, and by this time the French had occupied the two points of Genoa and Susa in strength and had made them their base. Three divisions of French infantry, with their accompanying artillery, were at Alessandria, having the whole of the Piedmontese army on their left; every day added from Susa and Genoa some twenty thousand men more, and it is difficult to understand why the Austrians moved so slowly.

The Sardinian army consisted at this time of seventy-six thousand infantry, five thousand four hundred cavalry and two thousand seven hundred artillery, making a total of eighty-four thousand men; but this strength was not really present in the field, and after making the necessary deduction, the forces of the Sub-Alpine kingdom cannot be placed higher than 62,332 men with ninety guns. Be-

sides these we must reckon three regiments of Free Corps under Garibaldi, and a National Guard of twenty-six thousand. The French troops consisted of the Guard and five army corps, the component parts of which, as well as their generals, had been very carefully chosen. The Emperor assumed the chief command, with Marshal Vaillant as chief of the staff, and the other generals were Regnaud de St. Jean d'Angely, who had served in the Russian Campaign of 1812; Baraguay d'Hilliers, who had also fought under Napoleon I.; MacMahon, who had distinguished himself in Algiers and in the Crimea; Marshal Canrobert, a soldier of great merit, and General Niel. The force of the French may be reckoned at 107,656 infantry, 9,708 cavalry, 10,000 artillery and 362 guns. Thus the allies together numbered not less than one hundred and eighty-seven thousand, considerably more than the Austrians.

On May 14 the Emperor Napoleon arrived at Alessandria, where General Frossard was employed in strengthening the fortress. The French army may now be considered to have joined the Piedmontese, and the object of their strategical advance to have been attained. The conduct of the Austrians during this period is blamed by every writer and is indeed regarded as inexplicable. Instead of attacking the right wing of the Sardinian army or hindering the march of the French, they did nothing but threaten the left wing of the Sardinians, and condemned themselves to remain henceforth on the defensive. It would have been better if they had never crossed the Ticino, but spent the time in completing their own preparations. The only advantage which they had gained was that they were established

in the enemy's country and were living at the enemy's expense. On the other hand, the enemy obtained full knowledge of their movements, whereas their own information was very defective, and the headquarters were frequently better informed by the newspapers than by their own agents. At first they had spent their spare time in healthy exercise, but on the evening of May 14 it began to rain and they withdrew into their camps.

As the Austrians were almost entirely without information as to the movements of the allies, Count Stadion was sent forward with eighteen thousand men to reconnoitre. This led to the first encounter between the two armies on May 20, an affair which is generally known as the Battle of Montebello. The Austrians reached Casteggio about midday and found the place entirely deserted, with windows and doors shut as if no one were living in it. The infantry took possession of it, and the hussars of the advanced guard went on to Genestrello. When the hussars reported that the village was held by the enemy's infantry, Count Schaffgotsche determined to drive them out, although contrary to orders, that he might not be attacked himself. Genestrello was occupied without difficulty, when Schaffgotsche observed that he had a strong body of the enemy in front of him. He therefore began a new attack at about 1 P.M. These were the troops of General Forey, who had marched up from Voghera to defend his outposts. The first French cannon-shot was fired at 1.15 P.M., and the Austrians, up to this time superior in numbers to the French, continued to advance, but by 2 P.M. the rest of General Forey's division had arrived on the field and the conditions of the battle were changed.

At 3 P.M. Schaffgotsche was compelled to retire from Genestrello, and an hour later the Austrians had taken up their position at Montebello, situated on a hill of considerable strength. The strength of the two opposing forces was now about equal at Montebello, but the Austrian troops were fresh, and they were able to support themselves by several walled country-houses in the south, and a walled graveyard to the north. Forey, however, did not hesitate to attack this formidable place. The cavalry, artillery and two battalions of foot-soldiers advanced along the main road, while the bulk of the infantry, leaving their knapsacks behind them, climbed the precipitous and wooded slope to the southern point of Montebello, from which the village descends into one long street towards the high-road. As the ridge is too steep for flank movements, the French were obliged to capture house after house, to fight hand to hand in narrow streets with great loss of life. Little assistance could be given from the troops in the place, and the artillery took scarcely any part in the engagement. At last the village was won and the churchyard reached which overhangs the high-road, and at 6 P.M. the Austrians retreated to Casteggio.

General Forey had thus in four hours driven back, first a brigade of three thousand, and then one of four thousand men. But Count Stadion had eighteen thousand men at his disposal, and even if some of his forces were too far from the battle-field to be of use, still at least four or five thousand fresh troops were standing on the flank of those who were engaged and might have been employed. It is true that Stadion had given orders to halt after reaching Casteggio, because he did not desire to encounter the

enemy with troops tired with a hot and weary march; but the battle once begun, Schaffgotsche should have been supported at all hazards, and not to do this was to court defeat. The loss of the Austrians on this occasion was 1,293 men, that of the French 723.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

PALESTRO AND MAGENTA.

GIULAY had in the beginning confined his attention to the north side of the Po, but the affair of Montebello made him imagine that the main attack of the French would be directed towards the south, in the direction of Piacenza, and he began to concentrate under that impression. Napoleon had, however, determined to march towards the north, to attack the right wing of the Austrians and to advance upon Milan. The orders for the march of the French army on the left flank were issued on May 27; this movement was to be masked by the Sardinian army, who, for their purpose, were to push on towards Robbio, by way of Palestro. The object was to deceive the Austrians as to the real movements of the French army, and the greatest secrecy was observed with regard to the operations. On May 30 a detachment of Austrians under Colonel Ceschi was posted in Novara in order to cover the road to Milan, while other portions of the Austrian army occupied Robbio and Palestro.

The valley of the Sesia is in this part of its course so covered with forest and brushwood that the Austrians were entirely unable to see what was being done on the opposite bank. On the Austrian side the roads, bordered by lofty trees, alone gave a passage to cavalry and artillery, while the infantry were

little better off, as it was almost impossible to traverse the rice-fields cut up by ditches and canals. Only a few raised points offered a view over the plain, one of which is the village of Palestro, which rises about ten feet above the ordinary level. It appeared to the Sardinian attack a somewhat steep elevation to the south-west, but sank into the level plain on the north-east. Palestro is about six miles distant from Vercelli, on the other side of the River Sesia. It happened at this time that the Sesia, which is usually dry, was very full of water, and a bridge was constructed with some difficulty about a mile below the railway bridge of Vercelli which had been destroyed.

Although the bridge had been very badly constructed, King Victor Emmanuel would wait no longer, and for several hours, until another bridge had been formed lower down the stream, the Sardinian army defiled across it. The passage continued during the whole morning without attracting the attention of the Austrians. The passing having been effected, shortly after midday the King made an attack on Palestro. At first all assaults were repulsed, the Austrians being greatly assisted by the nature of the ground, and not until, by the bridging of the Cavo del Lago, an attack on the north side of the village as well as on the south became possible did the Austrians retire. An attempt was made to retake it, but this was repulsed by Cialdini, who advanced with superior forces, and the Austrians retreated to Robbio; the Austrians having lost 460 men and the Sardinians 140. Simultaneously with this attack another Austrian division was driven out of Vinzaglio, and a third out of Borgo Vercelli, all the troops retiring to Robbio, so that in the night of May

30 the Sardinian army occupied a strong position behind the Busca.

The King, however, did not feel himself comfortable in this position, and knowing that Palestro was the key of the situation, asked for reinforcements from the French. His request was granted and Palestro was soon occupied by fourteen thousand men. On the following day the French were to cross the river; if Palestro were taken the passage became impossible. The Austrians, at last realising the importance of the crisis, prepared to make the assault with a force of about seventeen thousand, the reserves remaining in Robbio. The first gun was fired at 10.30 A.M., and the battalion of Jägers rushed to storm the village. Although the Sardinians had thrown up earthworks in the night, the Jägers penetrated to the first houses of the village, but they could not become masters of them or of the churchyard. They were compelled to yield ground and drew with them the other battalions, the Sardinians pursuing them as they fled. While this was the fate of the centre column, that on the left met with no better success in an attack on Confienza. The left column under General Szabo reached a point from which he could see the bridges thrown across the Sesia by the French, and their passage of the river. He was able to assail the crossing troops with a battery of artillery, and they suffered some loss. The main conflict, however, took place on the Cavo Scotti, and a large number of Austrians were drowned in this canal and in the Sesia itself, and Szabo was compelled to retire with great loss. Zobel had no better fortune in storming Palestro, but had to give way to superior numbers. The result of the battle was entirely in favour of the allies, and the Austrians had in the two days lost more than two thousand men.

In the meantime Garibaldi, who had been made a general in the Sardinian army, assembled his troops in Varese, repulsed an attack made upon him by the Austrian general, Urban, occupied Como, and threatened Monza; failing, however, in an assault upon the strong frontier of Laveno on the shores of the Lago Maggiore. The Austrians were now in full retreat towards the Ticino. Their circumstances were in no way better than if, without declaring war, they had passively waited to be attacked. They might in that case have completed their arrangements and met the allies with seven full army corps at the passages either of the Po or of the Ticino. As it was, they were dispersed in a long line from Varese to Piacenza; these troops were weary with marching, weakened by fighting and disheartened by retreat.

The decisive battle of Magenta took place on June 4, the day on which the Emperor had determined to cross the Ticino. Magenta is a small town of about four thousand inhabitants, situated on the high-road between Novara and Milan, about four miles from the left bank of the Ticino. About half-way between it and the river runs the canal of the Naviglio Grande which carries the waters of the Ticino to Milan. The canal is deep and runs between high banks so as to be very difficult to cross. The canal in this part of its course is crossed by six bridges, that of Bernato in the north, Buffalora about a mile below, and Ponte Nuovo di Magenta on the high-road; by the railway bridge about a third of a mile below, by Ponte Vecchio di Magenta and Robecco to the south. All these bridges had been mined and placed in a condition of defence; a strong redoubt having been built at the railway bridge. Buffalora and Ponte Nuovo

had also special defences. From the bridge of St. Martino on the Ticino four roads diverge: in the middle the right road to Milan by Magenta, to the left the road to Buffalora, to the right the railway and still further to the right the road to Ponte Vecchio and Robecco.

Magenta thus formed a formidable defensive position. Giulay had intended to concentrate the whole of his forces there; but he was not able from various circumstances to get together more than a third of them, but at the same time the French were not able to dispose of more than a quarter of their entire strength for the attack. The morning of June 4 was passed by the Austrian army in perfect peace. The troops cooked their food without interruption and had finished eating it when news came that the heads of the French column were advancing upon Buffalora. A brigade was immediately sent to protect the two bridges which had not been destroyed, those of the high-road and of the railway. The execution of these orders was rendered possible by the tardy advance of the French.

The heads of the French column advanced at 10.30 A.M. The first shots were fired on the roads which lead from the bridge over the Ticino to that over the Naviglio. Wimpffen led his troops partly by the Buffalora road and partly by the railway, while the Zouaves with two pieces of artillery marched along the central causeway. The Austrians fired at the advancing troops, gradually retiring at the same time on the railway. The French skirmishers were stopped by a heavy fire, and Wimpffen found the Naviglio well defended. But Canrobert had not arrived and nothing had been heard of MacMahon, so the Emperor suspended the attack and withdrew

Wimpffen to a position five hundred yards in advance of the Ticino.

At midday MacMahon's firing was heard on the left, and Wimpffen resumed his advance. Buffalora was attacked with such spirit that the French were driven back across the Canal, without having time to explode the mines which were designed to blow up the bridge. Attacks in other directions were repelled by the arrival of Austrian reinforcements, again the French assault was invigorated by similar aid, and again the allies found themselves overpowered by superior numbers. The battle swayed backwards and forwards as the forces were relatively greater or smaller on either side. At 2 P.M. two important points on the Naviglio, the redoubt of Monte Rotondo and the Ponte Nuovo were in the possession of Mellinet's division. But that division contained only five thousand men and had no reserve to support it. Nothing had been heard of Canrobert or Niel and the advance of MacMahon had been arrested.

Giulay coming up from Abbiategrasso now sent two divisions against Mellinet at Buffalora and Ponte Nuovo, and drove them back with great loss; indeed the guard lost one of its guns. The houses on the left bank of the Naviglio were retaken, those on the right were steadily held by the Zouaves and the grenadiers. At this critical moment the fortunes of the French were restored by the arrival of Picard's brigade, forming a part of Canrobert's corps. Arriving at full speed, they reached the bridge of St. Martino at 2 P.M., and immediately supported Wimpffen, who was in great difficulties. The rush of Picard's columns was irresistible, and they had credit which seldom falls to the lot of a French regi-

ment, that of saving the guard. They succeeded in getting possession of the village of Ponte Vecchio, making numerous prisoners, but they could not penetrate to the left bank. It was now about 3.30 P.M., and the aspect of affairs had undergone much alteration in the last hour and a half.

At the same time the position of the Emperor was very serious. The Austrians threatened to force the passages both of Ponte Nuovo and of the railway. The Emperor, when asked for reinforcements, replied, "I have no one to send. Bar the passage, keep your ground." The French columns on the Ponte Nuovo bridge were visibly thinning; they could not advance and would not retreat. For hours nothing had been heard of MacMahon on the left, and the enemy was pressing with terrible force on the right. Just at this moment MacMahon's cannon was heard again on the left, and Canrobert came up in person to announce that reinforcements were at hand. The fact was that MacMahon, who had crossed both the Sesia and the Naviglio higher up at Turbigo and was to attack the right flank of the Austrians at Robecchetto and Cuggiono, had met with great difficulties. Leaving Turbigo at about 9.30 A.M., he advanced towards Buffalora and Magenta in two columns, the right column under La Motterouge and Camou, the left under Espinasse. The right column met the enemy on coming out of Cuggiono, and drove them to Casate, after capturing which they advanced on Buffalora. But they met with considerable resistance in the shape of the main Austrian reserves. Lebrun, the chief of the staff, climbing the steeple of Cuggiono, perceived that the country around Buffalora was full of troops and that columns were moving in the direction of Cuggiono,

which the division of Motterouge would not be strong enough to resist. He also saw that the right and left divisions were getting too far separated and that Camou's division was in the rear. He therefore ordered Motterouge to retreat towards Cuggiono, and orders were sent to Camou to hasten his march and to Espinasse to advance quickly upon Marcello. The division of Motterouge remained in their position for two hours, isolated and exposed to an attack on the left flank.

The Austrians had indeed met MacMahon's attack by proceeding from Magenta in three columns, one directed against Motterouge, one against Espinasse, and a third in the centre between the two. The situation was critical until Camou's division coming up filled up the gap between the two columns of the French attack. But MacMahon could do nothing until Espinasse had reached his objective; he perfectly understood the situation, and was as anxious to reach the Emperor as the Emperor was to receive his assistance. He and his staff had to remain still in a condition of feverish impatience whilst the musketry and cannon fire sounded fiercely from the Naviglio and the south wind brought the smell of powder to their nostrils.

MacMahon rode in search of Espinasse, to whom he explained the situation, ordering him to take a firm position with his left at Marcello, to extend his right in the direction of Buffalora, and to march towards the steeple of Magenta. Motterouge received similar orders, and at Buffalora joined some French troops who had crossed at St. Martino. Uniting with them, La Motterouge advanced upon Magenta. There was heavy fighting at Cassino Nuovo and at a brickfield in the rear. Espinasse accomplished the

task allotted to him with great difficulty and considerable loss; and it was not till 5 P.M. that the junction of the two columns was effected.

MacMahon now reformed his line and, placing Camou in reserve, gave the order to advance from all sides on the steeple of Magenta. His troops marched forward with drums beating and colours flying. Little resistance was made until Magenta itself was reached, but here every house was pierced for musketry; the streets were barred by barricades, the gardens were turned into redoubts, the churchyard and even the spire were armed with artillery and riflemen. The battle raged with especial fury at the open space of the railway station, and Espinasse was killed. The struggle was maintained with equal rigour on the Naviglio canal, and no essential progress was made until the arrival of Trochu at the Ponte Vecchio at 7 P.M. It was not till 9 P.M. that the field of battle was completely in the possession of the French, who encamped upon the ground which they had so bravely won. In this hotly contested battle the allies lost four thousand five hundred men, of whom a hundred were taken prisoners, and the Austrians ten thousand men, of whom five thousand were prisoners. MacMahon received the title of Duke of Magenta, which he richly deserved for his boldness in helping to unite his two divisions, and his sagacity in concentrating on Marcello rather than on Buffalora, thus attacking the Austrian reserve and taking many prisoners.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.

ON June 5 the Austrian army began its retreat without much interference from the French, who on their side expected to be attacked. But on June 6 it was evident that the Austrians were intending to sacrifice Lombardy without further struggle, and on this day the Emperor moved his headquarters to Magenta. On June 7 a French *corps d'armée* marched rapidly through Milan, and on the following morning the allied sovereigns entered the capital of Lombardy in triumph amidst the enthusiastic joy of the population. It was now evident that Giulay intended to withdraw to the Mincio, where he would be protected by the famous quadrilateral of fortresses, Mantua, Verona, Peschiera, and Legnago. To impede this movement the Emperor despatched the first and second corps in the direction of Lodi, hoping that they would reach the Adda before the rear-guard of the enemy and would then cut them in two. This operation was entrusted to Baraguay d'Hilliers, under whose orders MacMahon was placed, both of these generals having been created marshals after the battle of Magenta. This movement failed; Giulay's rear-guard passed the Lambro a few hours before the French reached that river, and a brigade which he left there encountered the French at Melegnano in the evening of June 8, and by their firm countenance

stopped the march of the allies, and allowed the Austrians to continue their retreat in peace.

No other event of military importance occurred till the battle of Solferino, fought on June 24, 1859, which put an end to the war. This was fought in a space bounded to the north by the Lake of Garda and the railway, to the south by the Oglio, to the west by the Chiese and the east by the Mincio; being about twenty miles in depth and twelve miles in length. South of the Lake of Garda run three parallel chains of hills, in the southernmost of which, overhanging the plain, are the heights of Valsana, Monte Fenile, Solferino and Cavriana, which played an important part in the battle. On the central chain are the heights of Castel-venzago and Madonna della Scoperta, and on the northern line of hills, San Martino, Ostaglio and Feniletto, which lay in the sphere of the operations of the Sardinian army. The culminating point of the field is the tower of Solferino, from which there is an extensive view over the Lombard-Venetian plain, and which is therefore called by the natives the Spia d'Italia.

The plain is traversed by the high-road which leads from Castiglione to Mantua by way of Guidizzolo and Goito. The traveller proceeding along this road sees first the hamlet of Le Fontane, then the village of Le Grote, half hidden under a fold of Monte Fenile, then some of the houses of Cavriana, in the mountains, and then Volta, with a conspicuous campanile, at some distance. Bye-roads lead to three various villages, and the fields are planted with rice, mulberries and maize. The large village of Guidizzolo is then reached, a place of military importance, because from it issue three carriageable roads, one to Cavriana, one to Volta and one to Cenesara in the

south. On the right of the high-road lie the villages of Carpenedolo, to the south-west of Castiglione, Medole, to the west of Guidizzolo and Cenesara before mentioned. The ground between Guidizzolo and Medole is covered with many houses, whose red-tiled roofs are visible through the trees, the hamlet of Rebecco forming the principal group. Still further to the right are situated Acqua Fredda, the walls and towers of Castel Goffredo, due east of Acqua Fredda, and south of Medole and other villages. We should also mention the Strada Lugina, which leaves the Lake of Garda east of Rivoltelle, passes the railway and reaches Pozzolengo by San Martino, the ordinary road from Rivoltelle to Pozzolengo, and the road from Lonato to the same place.

The forces on either side were as follows: The French army consisted of five *corps d'armée*, as before, with the Guard, and five Sardinian divisions, the losses in previous operations having been made up. Thus the allied army contained seventeen divisions of infantry and five of cavalry with a large number of cannon, making a total of one hundred and sixty thousand men. The Austrian army had been entirely reorganised. It possessed now eight corps of infantry besides a detached brigade, and one corps of cavalry, forming one hundred and twenty-four battalions of infantry, and sixty squadrons of cavalry, amounting altogether to about the same number of one hundred and sixty thousand, under the command of the Emperor Francis Joseph in person. On the morning of June 23 the headquarters of the Emperor of Austria were at Villafranca; those of the first army, under Wimpffen, were at Mantua; and those of the second army, under Schlick, were

at Custozza. The eighth corps, under Benedek, forming the extreme right, was at Peschiera, and the second, under Lichtenstein, forming the extreme left, at Mantua.

It was intended that, on the morning of June 23, the Austrians should advance from these positions to surprise the allies, falling on their right flank and driving them towards the Alps; it was hoped that the decisive battle would be fought on June 24. Therefore on that day the army crossed the Mincio at six different points, and occupied on the evening the line of Pozzolengo, Solferino, Cavriana, Guidizzolo, Rebecco and Medole, their advanced posts being at Madonna della Scoperta, Le Grote, Camarino, Medole and Castel Goffredo, the reserves at Foresto and Castel Grimaldo. On the following morning at 9 A.M. the army was to advance to the Chiese.

But before that could be done the Chiese had been passed by the great bulk of the allied troops, the intention of the Emperor of the French being to occupy the hilly regions of which we have just given a description and to force a passage across the Mincio, where the corps of Prince Napoleon had arrived, and the flotilla could act upon the Lake of Garda. His headquarters on the evening of June 23 were at Montechiaro. It was intended that on the following day the French army should reach the banks of the Mincio, the headquarters being removed to Castiglione. The army was to commence its march at 2 A.M. in order to avoid the great heat of the sun. It thus happened that the two armies came into collision while they were both preparing to make an offensive attack in opposite directions, neither having the intention of fighting a decisive battle on that

particular day. The victory would be likely to rest with that army who could most rapidly transform its line of march into a line of battle.

The battle of Solferino may be divided into two principal periods, the first of which contains the engagement resulting from the fortuitous shock of two hosts neither of whom expected to meet the other, and before the orders given for the march on either side had been modified. The second period begins when the action of the battle becomes general and concentrated, and may again be divided into two smaller periods, the attack of the French on the centre, and that of the Austrians on the left. The Sardinians and the eighth Austrian corps had as it were a battle to themselves. To describe the battle shortly we may say that the two armies, nearly equal in strength, marching towards each on a front of equal depth, without knowing each other's position, met on the line of San Martino, Solferino, Guidizzolo and Medole. The Austrian army tried at first to execute its original plan of turning the French right. The army of the allies concentrated towards its centre, a movement which was hastened and emphasised by the Emperor. Thus it happened that the positions of Solferino and San Casciano were attacked by three French corps, and were also defended by three Austrian corps. The French succeeded in piercing the centre of the Austrian army, because their three corps attacked simultaneously, whereas the Austrian corps only came up to the defence in succession. At the same time the four Austrian corps which acted on the left wing were defeated by two French corps, because they could not manage to act together, and one corps, which was intended to strike a decisive blow, was never engaged

at all. On the Austrian right the eighth corps succeeded in holding back the Sardinians till nightfall, but this could not redress their failure in other parts of the field. The capture of Cavriana finally put an end to the battle and the Austrians retired behind the Mincio.

Let us now amplify this sketch more in detail. The allies began their march in the early morning of June 24. By the orders issued the night before, the Sardinians were to march on Pozzolengo, Baraguay d'Hilliers on Solferino, MacMahon on Cavriana, Niel on Guidizzolo, Canrobert on Medole, the Imperial Guard on Castiglione, while the cavalry were to act in the plains between Solferino and Medole. Setting out at 3 A.M. the French encountered no serious opposition till 5 A.M., when MacMahon saw that the situation was more serious than he had expected. He therefore halted and waited for the arrival of the French troops at Medole, remaining inactive for the space of two hours. About 7 A.M. MacMahon was informed that Niel had arrived before Medole, and that he would concentrate on his left as soon as he had captured that village, and that he would take measures for Canrobert concentrating in the same direction. MacMahon therefore, at about 8.30 A.M., took possession of Casa Marino on the high-road to Mantua commanding the lower ground of Guidizzolo, and thus gained a better front for the second corps. He was here immediately assailed by a strong Austrian column advancing from Guidizzolo, which caused him considerable loss, but did not succeed in driving him back. It was not till 11 A.M. that the Duc de Magenta was informed that Niel's corps was in a position to join him and was therefore able to advance in the direc-

tion of Solferino, where a vigorous battle had been for some time proceeding. It had thus taken six hours in this part of the field for the order of march to be changed to an order of battle.

What had been the fate in the meantime of the corps of Niel and Canrobert? Niel had set out for Medole at 3 A.M. in a single column. He met the Austrian cavalry just in front of Medole at about 6 A.M., and drove them back to the village. Medole itself was taken at 7 A.M., and the Austrians retired to Guidizzolo. Niel then succeeded in advancing as far as a farm called Casa Nuova, a short distance from Guidizzolo. From this point he could see the difficulties in which MacMahon was placed and the forces against which he had to contend, and he made preparations for joining him. But he was obliged to wait for his artillery and for the division of Faily which was marching in its rear. There was therefore a long delay before he could make a forward movement. Canrobert, in command of the third corps, had started at 2.30 A.M., also for Medole. He had passed the Chiese at Visano, but the march was a difficult one, and it was 7 A.M. before his first columns reached Castel Goffredo, a small town defended by walls. Medole was not reached till 9.15 A.M. Canrobert had then great difficulty in determining whether he should be justified in diverging towards the left when his instructions specially ordered him to give his chief attention to his right. Eventually he despatched General Renault with five battalions on the road to Cenesara and with the remainder of his force gave support to Niel. These movements took place at about 10.30 A.M., so that before 11 A.M. Niel could announce to MacMahon that he was able to follow the second corps in its movement towards the left.

The Sardinians, on the extreme left, under the command of the King, were charged with an independent operation. Four divisions were to take possession of Pozzolengo and the environs of Peschiera, whilst the division of Cialdini and the chasseurs of Garibaldi were to watch the passages of the Alps. In the early morning of June 24 the first division set out by various mountain roads, and met the Austrians first at La Madonna della Scoperta, and at the farm of Casellino Nuovo. The Emperor summoned them to Solferino, but it was necessary first to get possession of La Madonna, and many lives were lost in the attempt to do so. The divisions who marched on Pozzolengo were engaged with the Austrians at about 7.30 A.M., and the struggle then initiated lasted for thirteen or fourteen hours, the Sardinians being eventually repulsed.

We have thus seen that at 10 A.M. the battle was engaged along the whole front of the allies, from the Lake of Garda to Castel Goffredo. As early as 7 A.M. the Emperor of the French could observe, from a height in the neighbourhood of Castiglione, that his troops had found themselves in the presence of the enemy and were seriously fighting. It was important for him to know in what part of the field the Austrians were in greatest force, and whether he should concentrate his army on the centre, the right or the left. He determined that it should be on the centre, and he determined rightly. He therefore took measures for directing the efforts of his army against the heights of Solferino and Cavriana. This gave rise to the orders which we have already mentioned given to Niel and Canrobert to move towards their left, and to the King Victor Emmanuel to move towards his right.

At this moment Baraguay d'Hilliers was assaulting the strong position of Solferino held by Count Stadion, the hill covered with cypresses, the graveyard and the castle dominated by the well-known tower, the Spy of Italy, all important points, being in excellent condition of defence and well supplied with artillery. The walls of the cemetery defended in flank by the cypress hill defied all efforts, and the Austrians were able to act with energy on the offensive. The struggle on either side was terrific and it was not till 3 P.M. that the French could place their victorious flags on the tower and on the cypress hill. The Austrians were then driven from Solferino and an important point had been gained.

There still remained the heights of Cavriana to the east, a village furnished with ancient walls, and strengthened by a castle. The French arrived at this point at 4 P.M., and the struggle of Solferino could be here renewed. Fortunately the Duc de Magenta was engaged in assaulting this strong position from another side, from the farm of San Cassiano. In consequence of this double attack Cavriana was taken at about 4.30 P.M., and the Austrians were in full retreat towards Volta. In spite of the vigorous defence made by the rear-guard under Zobel they would have been relentlessly pursued, if a very violent storm had not burst upon the combatants, as often happens in seriously contested battles, and stopped further operations. At about 6.30 P.M. the Austrians began to retreat in all directions, and their centre was entirely in the power of the French.

In the meantime important conflicts had been taking place on the two wings. Niel, on the right, trying to force his way from Medole to Guidizzolo, was attacked in force by Schwarzenberg, and the

Austrians retained possession of this place till 10 P.M. Victor Emmanuel on the left was fighting for his life at San Martino, situated on the Strada Lugone, between Rivoltella and Pozzolengo. This was not taken until sunset, after the capture of Solferino had become already known. Cannon were immediately placed on the San Martino heights, and at night-fall the Austrians resigned the whole plateau to the Piedmontese. At those towns the Sardinian divisions, which had been engaged at Madonna della Scoperta, joined with those who had just conquered at San Martino, having had great difficulties to encounter from the opposition of the enemy and the nature of the ground. The Sardinians had thus achieved the conquest and were able to maintain the possession of the high plateau at which they had arrived, but they had lost six thousand men, considerably more than their opponents. Indeed both sides claimed the credit of the victory.

The general retreat of the left of the Austrian army began at a little after 5 P.M., just at the moment when the storm burst; Benedek on the right had been able to hold out against the Sardinians for two hours longer. Driven from San Martino he occupied Pozzolengo till 7 P.M. and covered the retreat of the Austrians during the night. Neither here nor in the centre was there any pursuit; the Emperor of the French occupied the quarters in which the Emperor of Austria had slept the night before. On June 25 the headquarters of Francis Joseph were at Villafranca, and on June 27 at Verona, and on that day the French occupied the line of the Mincio. In the battle of Solferino the Austrians lost a total of 21,500 men; the allies a total of 18,500, made up of 13,000 French and 5,300 Sardinians.

We need not pursue the history of this campaign any further. Sufficient to say that for reasons partly political and partly military the Emperor Napoleon determined not to proceed to the reduction of the Quadrilateral, or with the conquest of Venetia. An armistice was signed between the French and Austrians on July 8, 1859, by which Victor Emmanuel obtained possession of the Milanese.

PART ELEVEN.

THE WAR OF SECESSION IN AMERICA.

CHAPTER L.

THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

It has been said on several occasions that it is not within the province of this work to deal with political history except so far as it cannot be distinguished from military history. This rule must be specially observed in narrating the War of Secession in America, where fundamental principles were called into question, as to the right of a State seceding or withdrawing from the Union, about which opinions are still divided. Suffice it to say that the Presidential Election of 1860 turned upon the question of Slavery, and that when it was known that Abraham Lincoln, the Republican candidate, was elected, South Carolina called a convention to consider the question of secession, and that on December 20, 1860, the convention passed an ordinance declaring that the union between South Carolina and the other States was dissolved. Six other States passed ordinances of a similar character within two months, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. All these were cotton States, in which cotton was grown with the assistance of slaves.

These ordinances were followed by the seizure of forts, arsenals and custom-houses, belonging to the Federal or Central Government, by the formation of a Confederate Government, and by the permanent election of Jefferson Davis to be President. The Confederacy then formed was afterwards joined by Virginia, Arkansas and North Carolina, Kentucky refusing to secede. For the adhesion of Tennessee and Missouri to the secession, there was a prolonged struggle.

The first action of the Civil War was the capture of Fort Sumter, situated on an island in Charleston Harbour, and belonging to the Federal Government. Its surrender was demanded, and when this was refused the Confederate batteries opened fire upon it on April 12, 1861. The bombardment continued for two days, and on Sunday morning, April 14, the fort surrendered, the garrison being allowed to march out with the honours of war. No life was lost on either side, but the flames of civil war were kindled.

At the beginning of the war the Confederates stood upon the defensive; this attitude was not chosen from weakness, as is shown by the successes which they met with in their earlier operations. But in separating from the Union they had declared that their object was to gain their own independence and not to effect the subjugation of other States. Had they made war in the Northern States, as the Federals made war in Virginia, Louisiana and Georgia, they would have falsified the principles for which they took up arms. Therefore their defensive attitude is to be attributed rather to political than to military considerations.

On the day after the fall of Fort Sumter

President Lincoln called out the militia to the number of seventy-five thousand from the several States of the Union, and appealed to all loyal citizens to favour the Federal cause. The response to this appeal was much stronger and more unanimous than could have been expected; recruiting offices were opened in every town, men of all sorts and conditions left their business to step into the ranks, and in a few days the Government was offered several times as many troops as had been called for. All kinds of buildings, even churches, were turned into temporary barracks; village greens and city squares were occupied by drilling soldiers, but there was a great scarcity of arms.

The first blood was shed at Baltimore, where four companies of a Pennsylvanian regiment, who were attempting to march across the city, met a riotous procession following a Secession flag. After some provocation had been given, orders were issued to fire into the mob, and many of the victims fell. Three militiamen were killed, and their bodies were sent home to their native State, the first-fruits of a long course of sacrifices. On the night of May 24 four regiments of Northern troops crossed the Potomac, and took possession of Arlington Heights, which commanded Washington. One regiment commanded by Ellsworth, who had distinguished himself by teaching a Chicago company the Zouave drill, marched to Alexandria, where a secessionist flag was flying over the principal hotel. Accompanied by two soldiers he went to the top of the house and seized the flag, but as he was returning with it, he was shot by the hotel-keeper on the stairs. Ellsworth became the hero of the national movement.

The first troops called for by President Lincoln

had only been engaged for three months; but on May 3 another proclamation called out forty-two thousand volunteers for three years, and assumed power to raise ten new regiments for the regular army, as well as for eighteen thousand volunteer seamen for the navy. When Congress met on July 4 the President asked for four hundred thousand men and four hundred million dollars, and received five hundred thousand men and five hundred million dollars. By this time Richmond in Virginia had been made the capital of the Confederacy. A cry was immediately raised of "On to Richmond." Some experienced generals were opposed to undertaking an offensive movement with raw troops, and advised that they should only be used to protect Washington and keep Maryland from seceding; but political considerations determined an onward course, and the first result was the battle of Bull Run, which was fought on July 21, 1861.

A Confederate army commanded by General Beauregard had been sent to occupy Manassas Junction, which was the railroad centre of northern Virginia, but he determined, for tactical reasons, to move forward to the stream of Bull Run. There are six passages over this river from Union Mills, which is on the Alexandrian railway, to Stone Bridge, which is on the high-road from Alexandria to Warrentown through Centreville. On July 17 the Confederate army was distributed along this space, seven or eight miles in extent, a brigade being posted at each point of passage and two held behind in reserve. The plan of General Scott, who commanded the Federal army, was to turn Beauregard's right flank, to seize the railroads in rear of his position, and defeat him. It was important that he should not be assisted by

the army of nine thousand men commanded by General Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, and General Patterson had been told off to prevent this junction. The Federal army was under the immediate command of General McDowell, and the number which advanced against Beauregard was twenty-eight thousand infantry with forty-nine guns and a battalion of cavalry.

McDowell reached Bull Run on July 18, and the first engagement took place at Blackburn's Ford, where about sixty men perished on either side. Finding that Beauregard was strongly entrenched to his right, McDowell determined to attack on the left wing; he also wished to seize a point on the Manassas Gap railway, which would prevent the junction of Johnston and Beauregard. Two days were spent in reconnoitring and searching for a ford higher up the stream. Such a passage was discovered called Sudley's Ford, and on Sunday, July 21, the Federal army advanced, one division towards Mitchell's Ford, another to the Stone Bridge, and a third to the newly-discovered ford, the reserve remaining at Centreville. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily evaded Patterson, and with part of his forces had joined Beauregard on the previous day.

Two of the brigades of the Confederate Reserve were in the rear of the right and the right centre of their line; Jackson's brigade, which had arrived from Johnston's army the night before, was posted in rear of the central at Mitchell's Ford; and Bee's brigade was in the rear of Bell's Ford, between Mitchell's Ford and Stone Bridge. Part of McDowell's force marched to the Stone Bridge, but a heavy column turned to the right and crossed at Sudley's Ford,

two miles and a half further up the stream. The Federals passed the ford without opposition, but were soon met by the Confederates, arriving from Stone Bridge. The rear of the Federal column tried to cross at Red House between Stone Bridge and Sudley's, but were opposed by Bee's reserve, and eventually the Federal army, driving the Confederates back, took up a position on the left bank of the stream.

As the Confederate line fell back it was able to reach better ground, more capable of defence, and it received reinforcements from the right; on the other hand, the Federal army, from want of experience, became separated and fought in detachments. At this critical moment Kirby Smith's brigade, numbering five thousand, arrived near the field, brought by the railway. As soon as they detrained they went round to the left to form at right angles to the Federal right and fell upon them, the movement being completed at about 4 P.M. The Federals broke and fled over Bull Run, and the Confederate reserves, crossing the river at McLean's Ford and Union Mills, on the right, advanced upon Centreville and threatened the reserves posted there and the line of retreat, so that the retreat became a rout and a race for Washington. Arms and accoutrements were thrown away, drivers of army waggons cut the traces, leapt upon the backs of horses and rode through the crowd of fugitives, abandoning guns and trains. The loss of the Confederates was about nineteen hundred, and that of the Federals about fifteen hundred killed and wounded, and as many more taken prisoners. The Confederates remained in possession of the battle-field for weeks.

We need not enter upon the details of the struggle

which took place for the co-operation of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee. Virginia came to be divided into two parts, as the inhabitants of the mountainous western districts, having but little interest in slavery and great interest in iron, coal, and timber, held firm to the Union. In consequence of this a new State of West Virginia was formed and admitted into the Union in May, 1862. France and England had recognised the Confederates as belligerents, and there was great fear of their also acknowledging their independence. Indeed England was very nearly taking the side of the South from the capture by the Federals of Mason and Slidell, accredited Ministers from the South to London and Paris, while on board the Trent, an English vessel. War was averted by the intervention of the American Government and by the statesmanlike advice of the Prince Consort, whose participation in the English Privy Council which settled this matter was one of his last public acts before his death.

CHAPTER LI.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

ONE of the first actions of the Federal Government was to complete the blockade of the Southern ports. Vessels could at all times pass through, but blockade-running became more and more dangerous. At the same time in the battle of Paintville, in Kentucky, Colonel James A. Garfield, afterwards President, with eighteen hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, drove Humphry Marshall out of that town, although he was in command of a much larger force; a stubborn battle also took place at Mill Springs, in which the Federals lost 246 and the Confederates 471. Another important action was the capture of Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, in January, 1862, and that of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, both these being effected by General Grant, one of the most celebrated of the American Presidents. Buckner, who commanded Fort Donelson, asked for terms of capitulation, but Grant replied: "No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner at once surrendered the fort with the garrison of fourteen thousand men. These successes formed the foundation of Grant's reputation.

The city of New Orleans was by far the largest and richest in the Confederacy; and its strategic value in the war was greater than that of any other

point in the Southern States. Its possession by the Federals would cut the Confederacy in two, and make it difficult to bring supplies from Texas and Arkansas to feed the armies in Tennessee and Virginia. New Orleans was defended towards the sea by two forts, St. Philip and Fort Jackson, now garrisoned by fifteen hundred Confederate soldiers. There was also a fleet of fifteen vessels, including an iron ram and a large floating battery, and below the fort a heavy chain was hung across the river. A large fleet was fitted out under the command of Captain Farragut, then about sixty years of age. He was a Southerner by birth, but from conscientious reasons took the side of the North. A bombardment was opened on April 18 and continued for six days and six nights. Six thousand shells fell in and around the forts, a shell falling about every minute and a half, but the forts were not rendered untenable nor were their guns silenced; not more than fifty men were killed and wounded inside the forts.

In the meantime the Confederates prepared fire-ships, flat-bottomed boats loaded with dry wood saturated with tar and turpentine, which they set fire to and sent down the stream. Farragut, however, intercepted them and got rid of them without suffering damage. Farragut now formed the plan of running by the forts, destroying and capturing the Confederate fleets and bringing the city within range of his guns. He started at 3.30 A.M. on April 24, just before the sun rose, an opening having been made in the chain to let him through. After passing the forts he found himself engaged with eleven American vessels. The details of the battle need not detain us. New Orleans was captured and in a few days

both Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrendered. This victory was of the greatest importance and it set the name of Farragut beside that of Grant.

On April 7, 1862, was fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war, that of Shiloh, called after a little log church in the south-west of Tennessee. The Memphis and Charleston railway crosses the Mobile and Ohio railway at Corinth in northern Mississippi, which, being at that time a point of great strategic importance, was fortified and held by a large Confederate force commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston. General Grant with forty thousand men under his command advanced to capture Corinth, expecting to be joined by reinforcements from Nashville of equal number. On April 6 Grant's main force was at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the broad Tennessee River, about twenty miles north of Corinth, and a subordinate force was at Crump's Landing, five miles further north; the army from Nashville had just reached the shore opposite the Landings. On that morning Grant was suddenly attacked by Johnston, his line being about two miles long between Lick Creek and Owl Creek. The ground was undulating, and on a ridge stood Shiloh church, which was an important point in the battlefield. Grant, on hearing the firing, hurried up to the scene of action. He had expected to be attacked at Crump's Landing, and now ordered the troops posted there to march towards Shiloh, but they did not arrive till after dark, nor did any of the Nashville army cross the river till the evening. The attack was extremely violent, but the Federal troops held their ground; at least they never surrendered the road and the bridge by which the troops from Crump's Landing would advance. Grant described one part

of the field in these words: "It was so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. On one side National and Confederate troops were mingled together in nearly equal proportions, but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. Not one of them was left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all cut down." In the battle General Sherman greatly distinguished himself; one bullet struck him in the hand, another grazed his shoulder, another went through his boot, and several horses were killed under him. At about 2.30 P.M. General Johnston was struck in the leg by a rifle-ball, and refusing to leave the field, bled to death. The command devolved upon General Beauregard. Beauregard discontinued the attack at nightfall, intending to renew it and finish the victory in the morning.

During the night the troops from Nashville, commanded by General Buell, crossed the river, and at daylight Grant resumed the offensive. Beauregard must have known that resistance was hopeless, but he did his best to hold the road which passes by Shiloh church, in order to secure his retreat. Sherman advanced and recaptured his camp, which had been taken by the enemy on the previous day. Shiloh church was the centre round which the battle raged with the greatest fury. At last Beauregard withdrew his army, leaving his dead on the field; there was no attempt at pursuit. The total losses on the Federal side were 10,699, and those on the side of the Confederates must have been much larger. After the

battle General Halleck laid siege to Corinth, which was defended by Beauregard, and it was not evacuated till May 29. By some the battle of Shiloh is considered to be the critical struggle of the Confederacy, as it opened the way for the Federals to the sea. There was nothing now to prevent an army from marching to the rear and cutting off the supplies of the troops that held Richmond and compel their surrender. Some partisans of the South are of opinion that if General Johnston had lived the result of the war might have been different.

CHAPTER LII.

RICHMOND—POPE AND LEE.

AFTER the disastrous battle of Bull Run the Federal administration summoned General McClellan to Washington with the duty of fortifying the capital and organising the army. He took command of fifty thousand men without uniforms, and in three months was at the head of an army of more than one hundred thousand, fully organised, equipped and furnished with every necessary. On November 1 General Scott retired and McClellan succeeded him as General-in-Chief of all the armies. For reasons which may have been good, but which were much censured at the time, McClellan made no movement till the middle of March, when he marched to Monroe and proceeded to attack Yorktown, the place where Cornwallis had surrendered eighty years before. Here he remained for a month, and when he was at last ready to open fire with his siege guns, he found that the enemy had departed, leaving dummy guns in the embrasures.

He followed the Confederate army and came up with it at Williamsburg, about twelve miles distant, and a battle took place on May 5. After a stubborn engagement the Confederates retired, the Federal loss having been about twenty-two hundred and the Confederate about eighteen hundred. Another battle was fought at Fair Oaks on May 31, which cost the

Federals over five thousand men and the Confederates nearly seven thousand. After this, heavy rain prevented both armies from making any serious movement on Richmond. At the beginning of June the command of the Confederate army in Virginia devolved upon General Robert E. Lee, a position which he held till the close of the war. He adopted the plan of bringing large bodies of troops from North Carolina, Georgia, and the Shenandoah Valley, so as to form a massive army and fall upon McClellan. The number of fighting men under him was estimated at 80,760, but his total effective force drawing pay was 92,500.

Lee's ablest lieutenant was "Stonewall" Jackson, so called from an incident in the battle of Bull Run, when General Bee, of South Carolina, who was killed later in the day, rallied his wavering men by appealing to them to follow the example of Jackson's brigade, "standing there like a stone wall." He moved very swiftly and astonished his adversaries by his marvellous rapidity and his appearance in unexpected places.

The beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, which lies between the Blue and the Alleghany Mountains, was favourable to an army threatening Washington and unfavourable to one advancing on Richmond. The Confederates as they marched down the valley came at every step nearer to the Federal capital, whereas a Federal army marching up the valley was gradually carried to a further distance from Richmond. Lee now began to make preparations for driving McClellan from the peninsula, and wrote to Jackson that unless McClellan could be driven out of his entrenchments he would come so near to Richmond that he could bombard it. All pains were

taken to conceal from the Federals the fact that Jackson's army was to be joined to Lee's.

There now ensued the seven days' battle of Richmond (June 26—July 3), which ended in the retreat of McClellan. On June 25 McClellan had advanced his outposts to within four miles from Richmond. But before this, Lee, leaving about thirty thousand men to defend Richmond, crossed the Chickahominy with about thirty-five thousand, intending to join Jackson's twenty-five thousand, and with this overwhelming force to make a sudden attack on the twenty thousand Federals who were posted on the north side of the river, and destroying them before help could reach them to seize McClellan's base. The inhabitants of Richmond were expecting that the city would be taken, and consequently the archives of the Confederate Government were packed. Jackson, for once in his life, was late, and all that the Confederates could do was to drive a Federal force out of Mechanicsville and attack McColl's strong position on Beaver Down Creek. In this they lost three thousand men, whereas McColl maintained his position and only lost three hundred.

The next day followed the battle of Gaines Mills, in which General Porter had eighteen thousand infantry, twenty-five hundred artillery, and a small force of cavalry, to meet the attack of at least fifty-five thousand. The fighting began about two o'clock in the afternoon, and was at first in favour of the Federals; but after Jackson's arrival a more vigorous assault was made; the Federal line was broken at the left centre and the whole gave way and slowly retired. Two Federal regiments were made prisoners and two guns were captured. This battle is also

called the battle of Chickahominy, or the first battle of Cold Harbour. McClellan now changed his base from the Chickahominy to the James River, where it was attacked by General Magruder, who had been left behind to defend Richmond, first at Allen's Farm and then at Savage's Station. However, the attack failed and he suffered severely, the Federal generals being able to defend the road which leads through White Oak Swamp.

Jackson now crossed the Chickahominy and attempted to follow McClellan's rear-guard through White Oak Swamp, but was unable to do so. Hill and Longstreet, however, had crossed the river further up the stream and marched round the swamp, striking the retreating army near Charles City Cross Roads on June 30. There was terrific fighting all the afternoon, but the Federals held their ground. General McColl, however, was captured and carried off to Richmond. Darkness put an end to the fighting, and McClellan retreated to Malvern Hill. This battle is now generally called by the name of Frazier's Farm. McClellan lost ten guns, and the other losses must have been very severe.

The last battle of this series was fought at Malvern Hill, where McClellan made his final stand. It is a plateau on the side of the James River, about eighty feet high, a mile and a half long and a mile broad. It is only approachable by its north-western face. McClellan's army was arranged in a semicircle with his right wing thrown back so as to reach Haxall's Landing on the James River. His position was strongly defended by artillery. Lee was not in a position to make the assault till July 1. It began with an artillery duel, which was not very effective on the Confederate side. The infantry attack was

made with too little regard to concentration, and broke up into a number of separate charges; and although fighting was kept up till 9 P.M., the line was never broken nor were the guns in danger. The battle cost Lee five thousand men, and after it he desisted from the pursuit. McClellan was able in the night to retire to Harrison's Landing on the James River, where he was protected by gunboats, and where he collected his supplies. The losses during those seven days' fighting are estimated at 15,249 on the Federal and over 19,000 on the Confederate side.

The troops of Sigel, Fremont, Banks, and McDowell were now united in an army under General Pope, whose instructions were to advance southwards on Gordonville and take the pressure off McClellan with a force of thirty-eight thousand men. It was soon found that these two commanders could not act in harmony together, and the President summoned General Halleck, the well-known writer on International Law, to Washington to command them both, but his abilities were better suited for the study than for the field. Pope's object in marching to Gordonville was to cut off Lee's connection with the Shenandoah Valley. On July 18 he got as far as Orange Court House, but, being opposed by Confederate troops, he halted. In the meantime McClellan had been fortifying his position on the James, and was meditating another advance by that river on Richmond, which was still covered by the main Confederate army. On August 5 Jackson's force, which had been detached by Lee, approached Pope's front. On August 8 he crossed the Rapidan and moved towards Culpeper, where Pope attempted to concentrate the corps of Banks and Sigel. On July 9 Banks engaged Jackson at Cedar Mountain, but was

not supported by Sigel. He first struck the right wing, then furiously attacked the left, opened fire in the rear and threw the whole of Jackson's line into confusion. But the Confederates were much stronger, and Banks was not able to maintain his advantage, and both armies fell back, Jackson with the loss of thirteen hundred men and Banks with a loss of eighteen hundred.

On August 17 Lee, setting out for Richmond, arrived on the Rapidan. McClellan in the meantime was leaving the Peninsula and embarking his troops for Alexandria. Lee and Jackson had now together a force of seventy thousand men, and Pope, who had only fifty thousand, retired beyond the Rappahannock.

On August 25 Jackson with a body of eighteen thousand men moved up the Rappahannock, and then along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge by Orleans and Salem, covered by the hills of Bull Run. Having completed his circle round Pope's right, he passed through Thoroughfare Gap, on the Bull Run Mountains, on July 26, and destroyed Bristol Station on the Orange and Alexandria railroad in the rear of the Federals. Pope, thus threatened, advanced by the Worcester Road and the railway upon Jackson to clear the line to Alexandria, but at his approach Jackson retired along the railway to Manassas Junction, where he took a large number of prisoners and commissariat stores.

Pope was now reinforced by two of McClellan's brigades from Alexandria, and on July 27 he sent McDowell with forty thousand men towards Thoroughfare Gap to occupy the road by which Lee with Longstreet's division was marching to join Jackson, and at the same time moved with the remainder of his

army to fall upon Jackson at Bristol Station. Here his advance-guard had an engagement with Jackson's rear-guard, while the main body of Jackson's army retired to Manassas Junction. On July 28 Pope ordered McDowell to make a retrograde movement, saying, "If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn upon Manassas Junction we shall bag the whole crowd." This gave an opportunity for Jackson to march to meet Lee, and he placed himself on the high ground near Groveton, near the battle-field of Bull Run. Here a division of McDowell's army came into contact with him, and a battle ensued with severe loss on either side. Jackson was now in possession of the Worcester turnpike, the road by which Longstreet was to join him. Here on July 29 took place an indecisive action which is called the battle of Groveton.

On the following day Lee's army, having defiled through Thoroughfare Gap, formed line on Jackson's right, reaching beyond Pope's left, while Pope formed his right wing obliquely across the Alexandria Road at Centreville. Lee attacked Pope and defeated him with heavy loss, thus gaining what is called the Second Battle of Bull Run. After dark Pope's army crossed the Stone Bridge near Bull Run and encamped upon the heights round Centreville. At the same time two other corps of McClellan's army, numbering twenty thousand men, under Generals Sumner and Franklin, joined Pope, and the whole army fell back still further, taking up a position round Fairfax Court House and Germantown. Lee now ordered Jackson to make a flank march, with a view of striking Pope's right and attempting to interrupt his communications with Washington, and on the evening of September 1 he fell heavily on

Pope's flank, who resumed his retreat, till at last on September 2 Halleck ordered him to withdraw to the fortifications of Washington, where his army was merged with that of the Potomac. The exact losses in this campaign are not known. Lee claimed that he had captured nine thousand prisoners and thirty guns, and it is probable that Pope's killed and wounded did not fall short of ten thousand men.

After the retirement of Pope's army to the defences of Washington, General Lee pushed northward into Maryland with his whole force. He reached Frederick, on a level with Baltimore, on September 8, and issued a proclamation urging the people of Maryland to join the Confederation; but the appeal was without result; indeed all the Marylanders who intended to join the South had done so already. The President now called upon General McClellan and asked him to take command of the army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had been merged. As soon as he heard of the invasion of Maryland McClellan marched his army to the North, to cover Washington and Baltimore, and, if possible, to fight a decisive battle. He arrived at Frederick on September 12, Lee's army having left the town two days before. Here also he was fortunate enough to find a sketch of the campaign which Lee had carefully prepared. Jackson was to cross the Potomac, capture the Federal force at Martinsburg, and to assist in the attack upon the troops at Harper's Ferry; McLaws was to march to Harper's Ferry and take it; Walker was to approach from the other side and assist McLaws; Hill's division was to form the rearguard. After these operations all the forces were to unite together again at Hagerstown.

On the approach of Jackson's corps General White

evacuated Martinsburg, and joined Miles at Harper's Ferry with two thousand men. The place was speedily taken and about eleven thousand men were included in the capitulation, with seventy-three guns and much camp equipage. Jackson now hurried on to join Lee and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of September 16. McClellan on the other hand, being cognisant of Lee's plans, endeavoured to thwart them to the best of his ability. North of the Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, runs a range of hills, about one thousand feet high, and known as the South Mountains. They are crossed by two passes, Crampton's Gap to the south, and Turner's Gap to the north. The general ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap, to relieve Harper's Ferry, and Burnside's troops to cross Turner's Gap. He did not arrive at these Gaps till September 14, when Lee had taken measures for their defence. The actions which ensued are called the battle of South Mountain, fought on September 14, 1862, and the result of it was doubtful. McClellan held the passes, but Lee had delayed the advance of the enemy.

Three days later, followed the battle of Antietam. Lee had his army concentrated, but it did not number more than forty thousand men, as it had been much diminished by stragglers. He occupied a strong position, both wings resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam Creek flowing in front. The Creek was passed by four stone bridges and a ford, and all, except the northernmost bridge, were strongly guarded. McClellan determined to throw his right wing across the unguarded bridge, and assail the Confederate left, and when this had succeeded to force the remaining bridges with his left and centre. This movement was begun on the afternoon of Sep-

tember 16, and the bridge was crossed by Hooker. The next morning Hooker's advance was violently opposed by Jackson, and the struggle between the Federal right and the Confederate left went on during the whole day without any decisive result. About 1 P.M. Burnside carried the bridge opposite to him and attacked the Confederate right, and two hours later he had made himself master of the ridge commanding Sharpsburg and had captured the Confederate battery there. Lee, however, came up with fresh forces, drove Burnside from his position and retook the battery. The battle of Antietam is generally regarded as a decisive victory for McClellan, but Mr. Rossiter Johnston, whose authority has been principally followed in this narrative, says that the battle ended, not because the day was closed, or because any apparent victory had been achieved, but because both sides had suffered so severely that neither was inclined to resume the struggle. He is of opinion that the Confederate army ought to have been annihilated or captured, and that while every man of Lee's force had been actively engaged, not more than two-thirds of McClellan's were in action. Making the attack in dribbles had neutralised the advantage which McClellan had of being double his adversary in numbers. McClellan reported his entire loss at 12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed, and 2,700 Confederate corpses were counted and buried upon the battle-field.

After the battle of Antietam Lee withdrew to Winchester, and at the end of a month found himself at the head of sixty-eight thousand men; while McClellan took up his quarters on the Potomac. Here, at the beginning of October, he was visited by the President, who ordered him to cross the river, give battle to

the enemy, or drive him south. He went on to say: "Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced with thirty thousand men." McClellan, however, remained inactive, alleging that his army was in want of shoes and clothing.

At last on October 26, 1862, McClellan crossed the Potomac, leaving a corps at Harper's Ferry and marching southward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, while Lee moved parallel to him on the western side.

On November 7 the President, losing patience, relieved him of his command and sent up General Ambrose E. Burnside in his place. At this time the right wing of Lee's army, under Longstreet, was at Culpeper, and the left wing under Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley, being distant from each other about two days' march. McClellan said that he intended either to get between them and to beat them separately, or to prevent their union further north than Gordonville. Burnside, on the other hand, after reorganising his army into three great divisions, under Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin, aimed directly at the city of Richmond and set out for that place by way of the north bank of the Rappahannock and the city of Fredericksburg. He left Worcester on November 15, and by November 20 had collected his whole army at Falmouth.

Lee immediately marched to cover the Confederate capital and placed his army on the heights south and west of Fredericksburg, which he began to fortify. His line was five miles and a half long and very strongly defended. Lee could not prevent Burnside from crossing the river, because the left bank is

commanded by heights on which Burnside had placed 147 guns. Not until December 10 was Burnside ready to cross the Rappahannock. His plan was to lay down five bridges, three opposite the city, and two some distance below, the workmen being protected by artillery. He began to lay the pontoons in the early morning of December 11, when the river was concealed by a thick fog, but before the work was half completed the fog lifted and revealed the operations to the enemy. Lee had posted his riflemen in the streets and houses of Fredericksburg in such a way that the engineers had found it impossible to carry on the work owing to their heavy losses. Meanwhile the two lower bridges were completed by noon. Burnside, unable to complete his bridges, bombarded the town and set it on fire, but the attack of the sharpshooters on the engineers still continued. At last three regiments, who volunteered for the service, crossed the river in pontoon boats, and drove the riflemen out of their hiding-places, capturing a hundred of them. The bridges were then completed and the crossing was begun, but the entire army was not on the Fredericksburg side of the river till the evening of December 12.

The attack upon the heights held by Lee was undertaken on the following morning. Here the whole of the Confederate army was concentrated, Longstreet being on the left, and Jackson on the right, with every gun in position. The weak point of the line was on the right where the elevation of the heights was not so great, and here the principal attack ought to have been made; but Burnside weakened his forces in this spot, and when his advancing troops had pierced the Confederate line and taken many prisoners, they came face to face with the second line of

the enemy and were driven back. Other columns fared even worse. In one place there was a broken road, and the Confederates were here so numerous that each man posted at the stone wall, which flanked the road, had two or three men behind him to load his muskets, and all he had to do was to lay them in turn upon the wall and fire them rapidly without exposing himself. At this point nearly half the attacking force was shot down, and the remainder fell back. The other divisions did not fare much better.

Burnside was beside himself with wrath at this continued ill-success, and he ordered Hooker to advance with the reserve; but that general assured him that the attempt was useless. Upon the commander insisting, four thousand troops rushed forward with fixed bayonets, but soon returned with the loss of seventeen hundred dead or wounded. The Federal loss in this fearful struggle was 12,353 killed, wounded, or missing, although some of the missing afterwards regained their colours. The Confederate loss was 5,309. Burnside was anxious to make a further attempt next day, but he was dissuaded by General Sumner. During the night of December 15, in the midst of a storm, the army crossed to the right bank of the Rappahannock, and the campaign was at an end. As a memorial of this fight the great National Cemetery on Mayne's Hill contains fifteen thousand graves.

CHAPTER LIII.

HOOKER AND LEE.

GENERAL BURNSIDE was superseded after his defeat at Fredericksburg, and on January 25, 1863, General Joseph Hooker was given the command of the army of the Potomac in his place. On this occasion President Lincoln wrote to him in the following terms: "I have placed you at the head of the army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does rather good than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes

can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for its commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have assisted to infuse into the army of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you, as far as I can, to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, were he alive again, could get any good out of any army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness! But with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories."

Hooker began by restoring the discipline of the army of the Potomac, which had been greatly relaxed, and opened the spring campaign with every promise of success. His army was between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, having Aquia as its base. He determined to aim again at Richmond and broke up his camp. He moved his right wing, consisting of Meade, Howard, and Slocum, up the Rappahannock to cross that stream and the Rapidan, which runs into it, and to turn the Confederate left. At the same time Sedgwick, with the corps of Sickles and Reynolds, besides his own, was to cross below Fredericksburg and menace Lee's front. On April 28 and 29 the right wing, having crossed the Rappahannock, passed the Rapidan almost unopposed, Howard and Slocum at Germanna Ford above, and Meade at Ely's Ford below, all moving on Chancellorsville, where Hooker soon had forty-six thousand men collected; and at the same time Sedgwick crossed below Fredericksburg. On April 30 Couch's corps from the reserve crossed at Banks' Ford

just above Fredericksburg, and Sickles from Falmouth, which is opposite Fredericksburg, at United States Ford, a short distance higher up, both proceeding to Chancellorsville.

On May 1 Hooker formed his line and entrenched it, placing Howard on the right as outward flank, Slocum and Couch in the centre, and Meade next the river, while the corps of Sickles was held in reserve. On the same day Lee moved towards Hooker with all his army, and attacked at various points with the object of discovering Hooker's position. On May 2 Lee sent General Jackson twenty-six thousand men to make a long detour, to pass into the "Wilderness," a great thicket which lay to the west of Chancellorsville, and coming out of it to take Howard by surprise. Jackson's men were seen and counted whilst they were passing over a hill, and Howard was warned to take precautions, but he neglected to do this, and in the afternoon the enemy came down upon him preceded by a rush of frightened wild animals. Howard's corps was thrown into confusion and completely routed.

During this engagement the Confederates suffered a severe loss. At the close of the evening General "Stonewall" Jackson went to the front to reconnoitre, and as he rode back again with his staff, some of his own men, mistaking the horsemen for Federal cavalry, fired a volley at them by which several were killed. A second volley inflicted three wounds on Jackson, and as his horse dashed into the wood, he was thrown violently against the limb of a tree and injured more. Whilst his men were bearing him off severely wounded on a litter, a Federal battery opened fire down the roads and struck one of the men who was bearing him, upon which he fell heavily to

the ground. He finally reached the hospital where his arm was amputated, but he died within the week.

On the following day, May 3, Lee attacked the angle and left face of the Federal line, and drove Hooker entirely back upon the river, his right below Ely's Ford, his left below United States Ford. This success was partly due to the fact that General Hooker had been rendered insensible by a shot striking the pillar of the Chancellorsville house, against which he was leaning, so that all proper command of the Federal troops was lost. In the meantime Sedgwick had attacked the Fredericksburg heights, of which we have heard so much, carried them and advanced along the road to Richmond, thus threatening the Confederate rear. On the following day Lee drew off a large detachment of his army and turned upon Sedgwick, who after a heavy fight was stopped, and driven over Banks' Ford, being able, however, to rejoin Hooker by the United States Ford. On the night of May 5 the Federal army all recrossed the Rappahannock, leaving on the field fourteen guns, thousands of small arms, all their dead and many of their wounded.

In this series of battles the Federals lost about seventeen thousand men, the Confederates thirteen thousand. Hooker had commanded altogether about one hundred and thirteen thousand five hundred men and Lee sixty-two thousand, but the generalship of the Confederates was so admirable that they contrived in every engagement to be superior in numbers at the particular point where the attack was made. Hamley remarks that in this war, as at Bull Run, the forces which had succeeded in crossing a river beyond the enemy's flank, and which thereupon aimed at his rear, advanced on a front perpen-

dicular to the course of the river, thus exposing their outward flank, and that they only escaped destruction because they contrived to hold, at the time of the attack, certain points of passage. He says: "Had the Federals at Bull Run let go their hold of Stone Bridge, by a continued advance, without gaining Mitchell's Ford, or had Hooker, moving down the stream, passed by United States Ford without gaining Banks' Ford, they would in either case have been in great peril of being driven not across but into the river."

After these successes public opinion in the South began to demand that Lee should invade the North, or at least threaten Washington. His army had received a heavy reinforcement by the arrival of Longstreet's corps. Losses had been supplied by a universal levy of conscripts, which called even boys of sixteen from school, and the army had unbounded confidence in itself. Vicksburg was being besieged by Grant, and its fall would deal a deadly blow to the Confederacy unless it were neutralised by a victory in the East. Finally, there was a hope that if a great battle were won by the Confederates they would receive recognition, if not active assistance, from England and France.

Lee collected a body of ninety thousand men at Culpeper, including General Stuart's body of cavalry, which was ten thousand strong, while Hooker was still posted on the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. Lee crossed the Potomac between June 22 and 25, and marched to the North. Hooker was somewhat late in hearing of the movement, but followed him after a few days. He desired to add to his army the body of eleven thousand men under French, who were lying useless at Harper's Ferry,

but Halleck would not consent to this, the consequence of which was that he resigned his command and his place was taken by General Meade. His first step was to order the evacuation of Harper's Ferry and remove its garrison to the city of Frederick as a reserve.

The Confederates concentrated themselves in Hagerstown, and spread over the whole country as far as the Susquehanna, while the advanced guard under Ewell pushed on to Carlisle and threatened Harrisburg, the main part of Lee's army remaining at Chambersburg, or between that place and Gettysburg. Lee seems to have expected that the Federal army would have stayed on the south side of the Potomac, but when he heard that the Federal army was marching he determined to get before it and ordered the concentration of all his forces at Gettysburg. Meade was also directing his advance towards the same city, to which many different roads converge. Meade's advanced cavalry guard under the command of Buford reached Gettysburg on June 30, whilst the rest of Meade's army was extended sixty miles to the rear as far back as the Potomac. Meade's first design was to concentrate his army in a strong position on the Pipe Creek Hills in Maryland, about fifteen miles south of Gettysburg.

The battle began on July 1, by the first corps under Reynolds meeting the advance-guard of the enemy who were advancing through the passes of the South Mountains. Lee had about seventy-three thousand five hundred infantry and artillery and Meade about eighty-two thousand, while the cavalry numbered about eleven thousand on each side. The battle-field is about twenty-five square miles in ex-

tent, and lies for the most part to the south and west of the town. About a mile from the town stretches the long Seminary Ridge, so called from a theological seminary which stood upon it. About a mile from this is another ridge, named Cemetery Ridge, separated from the first ridge by a valley. This second ridge bends a little towards the east, and at the point where the curve begins lies the town cemetery. The eastern point of this is called Culp's Hill, and at the other end of the ridge, about three miles from Gettysburg, lie two little rounded hills called respectively Little Round Top and Big Round Top. The stress of the battle was most felt on these two hills and in the valleys lying between them.

It is doubtful whether either commander intended to bring on a battle on July 1, but when the engagement first began both sides were heavily reinforced, and both fought with determination. There was an obstinate struggle for the possession of the Chambersburg road, especially after the Confederates had planted several guns to sweep it. The Federals were at first successful, but they were soon driven back by superior forces, and were driven through the town to the Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill. When Meade heard of the defeat of his troops under Reynolds and of that general's death, he transferred the command to Hancock, who determined to take up his position on the Cemetery Ridge. Ewell had in the meantime extended his left wing to the east of Culp's Hill and occupied Gettysburg, but no further engagement took place that evening, and the night was occupied by both parties taking up their positions.

On July 2 both armies stood in order of battle, the Federal troops along the Cemetery Ridge, and

the Confederates on the Seminary Ridge and beyond it to the other side of Gettysburg. Lee opened the attack by ordering Longstreet, who was on his right, to attack both the isolated hills. There was a murderous struggle for the possession of Little Round Top, bayonets, clubbed muskets, and even stones being used, officers joining in the *melée*; but at length the Texans who were attacking it were repulsed and the position was secured. Sickles, wishing to improve his position, advanced for about half a mile against the Seminary Hill, but was attacked both in front and rear in the "Peach orchard," and was driven back, himself badly wounded, with the loss of a large number of his men. Just at dusk Ewell made an attack from Gettysburg on the Cemetery and Culp's Hill with the so-called Louisiana Tigers and other troops. The Tigers had the reputation of having never failed in a charge, and in spite of the frightful losses caused by the artillery and by volleys of musketry they kept on till they reached the guns and fought for them hand to hand. Carroll's brigade now came to the rescue, and the remains of the Confederate column fled down the hill in the darkness, twelve hundred of the seventeen hundred Tigers having been struck down, and the existence of the corps annihilated. The battle now came to an end, but Lee determined to renew the attack on the following morning.

On July 3 Meade began the battle in the early morning by driving Ewell's troops out of Culp's Hill. Lee was not aware of this, but was under the impression that the centre and right wing of the Union troops had been considerably weakened by the engagements of the previous day. He determined therefore to attempt to pierce the centre of Meade's

line and to support his attack by a cavalry charge made by Stuart in the rear. In order to give this general time to get round to the right wing of the Federals the attack was put off till the afternoon. A large number of cannon had been placed in position on both sides during the morning. Lee had one hundred and twenty along the Seminary Ridge and Meade eighty on the Cemetery Ridge and along a low irregular stone wall which lies on the road from Gettysburg to Toney Town. The Confederates opened fire at 1 P.M., and the artillery duel commenced. There was a continuous and deafening roar which was heard fifty miles away. The shot and shells ploughed up the ground, shattered gravestones in the cemetery, sent their fragments flying among the troops, exploded caissons, and dismounted guns.

At the end of two hours Meade's chief of artillery ordered the firing to cease, with the object of cooling the guns, and to save ammunition for future use in repelling the infantry charge. Lee now organised his famous attack, and with fourteen thousand of his best troops, including Pickett's division, which had not arrived in time for the previous day's fighting, came out of the wood, formed in heavy columns, and moved forward to the charge. They were obliged to pass a mile of ground at full speed, but before they had got half-way the Federal artillery was directed against them. Their ranks were ploughed through and through, but the gaps were closed up and the column did not halt. As they drew nearer, the batteries used grape and canister, and some infantry posted in front of the main line rose to its feet and fired volleys of musketry into their right flank. The attack was directed towards a clump of trees on a depression in the Cemetery Ridge where a stone

wall made an angle with its point outwards. This has been always known since as "Bloody Angle," and it represents the only point in the Federal line which was penetrated by the Confederates. About one hundred and fifty of General Armistead's soldiers sprung over the stone wall in order to capture the Federal guns. A murderous conflict ensued in which Armistead fell. Webb and Hancock were wounded and the result was the entire defeat of the Confederates. Of the magnificent column, only a broken fragment returned, nearly every officer in it, except Pickett, having been killed or wounded.

Stuart's cavalry, which had been intended to co-operate with the movement in the centre, was unable to effect anything, because he met a force of Federal cavalry about four miles east of Gettysburg and was unable to make his attack at the proper time. After Pickett's defeat there was, as at Waterloo, which this battle in some respects resembles, a general advance of the whole Federal line which brought the struggle to a close. Lee gave orders for a retreat during the night, and on the following day, July 4, the Confederates, favoured by the heavy rain which so often accompanies a battle, retired through the mountain passes to Hagerstown and then across the Potomac. It is said that the retreat was very pitiful, as the roads were in bad condition. Few of the wounded had been properly cared for, and as they were jolted along in agony, they were groaning, cursing, babbling of their homes, and calling upon their friends to put them out of their misery; while they were in constant apprehension of an attack in the rear. The loss of the Federals was 3,072 dead, 14,497 wounded, and 5,434 prisoners, making a total of 23,003 men; that of the Confederates was 23,761 men, composed of

2,592 dead, 12,702 wounded, and 7,467 prisoners. Lee left seven thousand of his wounded amongst the unburied dead, and twenty-seven thousand muskets were picked up on the field.

On the very day of Lee's retreat Vicksburg, on the Mississippi, the largest town of the Mississippi State, capitulated. It is situated on a high bluff overlooking the river where it makes a sharp bend ending in a long narrow peninsula. It is about forty-five miles distant from Jackson, the capital of the State. About one hundred miles below Vicksburg is Port Hudson, and between these two points the great Red River, which drains Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, flows into the Mississippi. Vicksburg was of great importance to the Confederates because they drew a large portion of their supplies from Texas and the Red River basin; especially as they had lost New Orleans, Bâton Rouge, and Memphis. The first attempt to capture Vicksburg for the Federals was when after taking New Orleans in April, 1862, Admiral Farragut had gone up the river in the following month and demanded its surrender; the demand was refused and he could not capture the city without a land force.

The attack was only renewed at the close of 1862 by the united operations of Grant and Sherman. Grant established his depôt of supplies at Holly Springs, but on December 2 Van Dorn made a dash at this place, which was held by fifteen hundred men, and captured it with its garrison. Grant was obliged to give up his plan and retire to Memphis. Sherman had reached Vicksburg, but when he heard of the disaster was obliged to surrender his enterprise. Operations were resumed in the spring of 1863, and the battle of Champion Hill, the bloodiest

of the campaign, was fought on May 15. Grant found Pemberton with twenty-three thousand men on high ground well selected for defence, covering the three roads which led westward. After a struggle of four hours Pemberton retreated to the crossing of the Big Black River, leaving his dead and wounded and thirty guns on the field. Grant lost in killed and wounded and missing 2,441, Pemberton over three thousand killed and wounded and as many taken prisoners.

Shortly after this Sherman came up and Grant ordered the building of three bridges over the Big Black River; one was a floating or raft bridge, one was made by felling trees on both sides of the stream and letting them fall so that their boughs would interlace over the channel, the trunks not being entirely cut through and so hanging to the stumps; planks were laid crosswise on these trees and a good roadway was formed. In the third bridge cotton bales were used for pontoons. Sherman made a fourth bridge higher up the stream, and during that night he and Grant sat on a log together and saw the long procession of blue-coated men pass over by the light of torches. The next day, May 18, the whole army was west of the river.

Pemberton marched straight into Vicksburg and shut himself up there, followed closely by Grant, who invested the town on May 19, Sherman being placed on the right at Haines' Bluff. Grant had now with him about thirty thousand men. The line of defences before him was eight miles long, and it was likely that he would be attacked in the rear. He therefore ordered an assault on May 22, hoping to carry the place by storm; but this was found impossible, and the assault ended with a loss of two

thousand five hundred men. He now settled down to a regular siege. Thousands of shells were thrown into the city, the inhabitants finding refuge in caves. Provisions became scarce, and mules were used for food. At last the besiegers brought their trenches so close to the defences that the soldiers bandied jests with each other across the narrow space. After forty-seven days spent in this manner, when a grand assault was imminent, Pemberton unconditionally surrendered both the city and his army of thirty-one thousand six hundred men on July 4, 1863. By the capture of this city the Mississippi was open to the Federals and the forces of the Confederates were cut completely in two.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE WILDERNESS.

THE vicissitudes of the war now carry us into another region. Chattanooga is in Tennessee, not far from the frontiers of Alabama and Georgia, and General Rosecrans was manœuvring to get possession of it, being opposed by the Confederate General Bragg. Rosecrans obtained possession of the town, and proceeded in pursuit of Bragg. After a week's manœuvring the two armies came up with each other, and there was fought on September 19 and 20, 1863, a great battle on the banks of the Chickamauga Creek. Rosecrans had about fifty-five thousand men, and Bragg after being reinforced by Longstreet, about seventy thousand. Bragg took the offensive, and his plan was to make a feigned attack on the Federal right, while he directed his main strength towards the left with the intention of crushing it and seizing the roads which led to Chattanooga. The first day's battle began at 10 A.M. and lasted all day. The projected attack upon the left failed, and although the Federal positions were for a time forced back, they were recovered before night and the situation was unchanged by the day's fighting.

The night was spent by both sides in preparation for a renewal of the struggle, and Bragg's design was to carry out the plan of the day before, but the fighting did not begin till the day was well advanced,

and the Confederates could make no permanent impression. At last, apparently through an accident, the centre of the Federal line was weakened by the removal of troops to the rear, and Longstreet seizing his opportunity pressed six divisions of his men through the gap. Rosecrans believed himself to be defeated and rode back to Chattanooga, but Thomas on the left wing held his ground and the Confederates were entirely unable to shake him. At the same time the battle must be regarded as a Confederate victory. The Federal loss was sixteen hundred, that of the other side perhaps slightly more.

A month later the Federal forces in the West were reorganised and a Military Division of the Mississippi was created, at the head of which was placed General Grant. Grant arrived to take up his command on October 23, and found the army in a very bad condition, Chattanooga being seriously threatened by Bragg's army. In the middle of November Grant was joined by Sherman, their united forces amounting to eighty thousand men. Bragg's army occupied a position twelve miles long, the flank being on the northern ends of Look-out Mountain and Missionary Ridge, while the centre stretched across the Chattanooga Valley. The greater part of the line was well entrenched. Grant placed Sherman on his left, on the north side of the Tennessee, opposite the bend of Missionary Ridge, Thomas in the centre across the Chattanooga Valley, and Hooker on his right at the base of Look-out Mountain. His plan was to attack Bragg's right with Sherman's forces, to capture the heights of Missionary Ridge, while Thomas and Hooker should occupy the attention of the centre and left so as to prevent them from sending any reinforcements against Sherman. Mis-

sionary Ridge was the key of the position, and if that were taken his whole army would be compelled to retreat.

Sherman met with unexpected difficulties and was only partially successful. Hooker advanced to the base of Look-out Mountain, a lofty hill more than two thousand feet high, from which there is a magnificent view extending over seven States. Disregarding, or rather going beyond his orders, he climbed the steep heights in the rain, and his soldiers disappeared in a thick mist which hung round the mountain. At the very summit he routed the enemy and captured many guns and prisoners. This is known as "The battle above the clouds."

The plan for the next day was that Hooker should descend the Look-out Mountain on the eastern side and arrive at the left of Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge; but the destruction of a bridge delayed him, and Grant saw that Bragg was weakening his centre to strengthen his right against Sherman's attack. He therefore ordered the centre to advance. They crossed the valley, reached the summit of the ridge and swept everything before them. Bragg's army was completely defeated and his captured guns were turned against his troops as they fled. In this series of battles the loss of the Federals was nearly six thousand men, that of the Confederates ten thousand, of whom six thousand were taken prisoners, and forty-two guns.

In February, 1864, a new complexion was given to the war by Grant being given the title of Lieutenant-General, with the command of all the armies, of course under the supreme command of the President—a rank which had only been held previously by Washington and Scott. Grant took up his head-

quarters with the army of the Potomac. For the purposes of the campaign he considered that army as his centre, the army of the James River under Butler as his left wing, the western armies under Sherman as his right wing, and the army of Banks in Louisiana as a force to operate in the enemy's rear. His design was that all the armies should move simultaneously: Butler against Petersburg, to cut off the communications of Richmond with the South; Sherman against the army of Johnston in Georgia, with the view of capturing Atlanta; Banks to take Mobile and to close its harbour to blockade-runners; Sigel to drive back the Confederates from the Shenandoah Valley and to wrest that fertile region from them; while the army of the Potomac should follow Lee's army and fight it wherever it went.

The principal scene of the war is now laid in the Wilderness, a district about twelve or fifteen miles square, south of the River Rapidan. The ground was formerly the site of numerous iron-works, mines having been opened to dig the ore, and the woods cut down to supply fuel for smelting. When the mines were abandoned a tangled growth of under-wood made its appearance, and the whole region was deserted excepting a few open spots, and a few roadside taverns. In May, 1864, the main body of Lee's army lay upon the western edge of the Wilderness, with a line of observation along the Rapidan, and headquarters at Orange Court House. The army of the Potomac was north of the Rapidan, opposite the Wilderness; it consisted of three infantry corps under Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick, and a cavalry corps commanded by Sheridan, Meade being in command of the whole. Burnside with twenty

thousand men was at Annapolis. The Confederate army was under the command of Lee and consisted of the infantry corps of Ewell and Hill and the cavalry of Stuart, Longstreet's force being at no great distance. Lee's force was reckoned at about sixty-five thousand men, Grant's at about one hundred and sixteen thousand.

At midnight on May 3 the army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan on five pontoon bridges and plunged into the Wilderness. Through this forest two roads run north and south, which are crossed by two others running east and west, the Orangeturnpike road and the Orange plank road. There are also numerous cross roads and wood paths. The army by itself could have passed through these woods in a few hours and have reached the open country beyond; but there was a train of four thousand wagons for commissariat and ammunition, and reserve artillery of more than one hundred guns, so that the army remained in the Wilderness during the whole of May 4. Grant slept that night at the Wilderness Tavern, situated where the Germania plank road crosses the Orange turnpike road. As Lee had not disputed the passage of the Rapidan, Grant believed that he would not fight in the Wilderness at all.

However, on the morning of May 5, his lines were attacked, and it was evident that Lee had formed the plan of sending his whole army down the two parallel roads, and attacking the army of the Potomac whilst it was engaged on this difficult ground. Grant immediately recalled Hancock's corps, which had gained the open ground, and hurried up Burnside from the rear. Neither artillery nor cavalry could be used in the thick wood, and the battle assumed the form of a hand-to-hand engagement be-

tween individuals; when night fell no decisive advantage had been gained on either side. Lee had succeeded better on the left than on the right, and Longstreet's corps had not arrived in time to take part in the engagement. The night was spent in cutting down trees, piling up logs for breastworks, and digging trenches.

On the morning of May 6 Hancock attacked the enemy's right, and at first drove the enemy before him, but on Longstreet coming up, the Federals were obliged to retire, Longstreet being seriously wounded in exactly the same way as "Stonewall" Jackson had been, a year before. As he was riding with his staff some of his own men mistook them for Federal troops and fired upon them; he was wounded in the head and neck and had to be carried from the field. The conflict continued throughout the day with no very tangible result; the losses on each side had been severe, numbering about fifteen thousand.

On the afternoon of May 7 Grant gave the order for the army to move forward by the left flank towards Spottsylvania, wishing to place his army between the Confederates and the capital. Spottsylvania Court House is fifteen miles south-east of the battle-field of the Wilderness and about twelve miles south-west of Fredericksburg. On the morning of Sunday, May 8, the Federal cavalry reached Spottsylvania Court House and easily dispersed the small force of the enemy's cavalry which they found there, but on Anderson's force coming up they were compelled to retire, and when Warren reached the same spot he found the Confederates entrenched in his front. Owing to other circumstances the whole of Lee's forces took possession of the ground before Grant's army could reach it.

On the same day Grant despatched Sheridan with his cavalry to ride round the Confederate army, tearing up railroads, destroying bridges and depôts, and capturing trains. He succeeded in destroying ten miles of railroad and several railway trains, cutting all the telegraph wires, and recovering four hundred Federal prisoners who were being conducted to Richmond. This last engagement took place at Yellow Tavern, seven miles north of the capital, and in it General Stuart, the famous cavalry officer, was mortally wounded. He went so far as to break into the defences of Richmond and capture some prisoners; he then crossed the Chickahominy and rejoined the main army on May 25.

The Federal troops were now posted in such a manner that Hancock was on the extreme right, then came Warren, then Sedgwick, and then Burnside on the left. The western part of the Confederate entrenchments was the salient angle at the extreme northern point. It was determined to assault this, but in spite of vigorous attacks it was not carried till May 12, when Hancock made an assault upon it in the early morning. Johnston's entire division of nearly four thousand men were taken prisoners, as well as twenty guns, thousands of small arms, and thirty standards. The guns were immediately turned against their previous possessors, who were chased through the woods towards Spottsylvania Court House, until they gained safety in another line of earthworks. Simultaneously with Hancock's attack, the two sides of the entrenchments had been assailed by Warren and Burnside, but with less success.

Lee made vigorous attempts to recapture the salient angle, and the fight was kept up till past

midnight, when he was compelled to retire to his interior line. The carnage was terrible. The dead were not only piled in heaps, but their bodies were torn and mangled by the shots which continued to be fired; every tree or bush was cut down or riddled by the balls. The Federal loss amounted to thirteen thousand six hundred and the Confederate loss was about equal in number.

After this Grant again determined to move by his left, and to reach the North Anna River. He wished to engage the enemy without their having the great advantage of entrenchments. He therefore sent Hancock's corps towards Richmond, hoping that Lee would attack it with his whole army, upon which the other corps would come up and fall upon the enemy before they had time to entrench. Hancock's corps marched on the night of May 20, followed by Warren's corps twelve hours later, and by the corps of Burnside and Wright at a similar interval of time. The Confederates were, however, able to defend their capital by moving in a shorter line. Having effected this they took up a very strong position. Their line extended for a mile and a half from Little River to the North Anna River at Oxford, then down stream for three-quarters of a mile, and then in a straight line to Hanover Junction. The Confederate line, forming itself in a curve, touched the North Anna where it also makes a curve in such a way that the two curves met at a point from which they both receded in opposite directions. This critical position was assailed by Burnside, who endeavoured to force a passage, but he was prevented from doing so by very strong entrenchments. Further advances were made by the left flank, and at last the two armies were opposed to

each other at Cold Harbour, about eight or ten miles from Richmond. An attack was planned for June 3, but the enemy's artillery was skilfully placed, and it was impossible to proceed further than the first line. The struggle continued in and about Cold Harbour during the first twelve days of June, and the Federal loss amounted to 10,058, the Confederate loss being much smaller.

Once more Grant determined to move by his left flank and to pass his army across the James River and invest Richmond from the south, attempting to gain possession of Petersburg, which was the centre of its railway communication.

Grant, whose reputation had suffered from the fatal attack of June 3, performed this difficult operation with masterly skill, having to withdraw his army from the front of the enemy, march it fifty miles, cross two rivers and bring it into a new position. As a preparation for the movement he made a demonstration with his cavalry on the James River above Richmond, constructed a line of entrenchments from his position at Cold Harbour close to the point where he expected to cross, and sunk vessels loaded with stone in the stream of the James River in order to prevent Confederate gunboats from hindering the passage.

Grant left Cold Harbour on June 12, and at noon on the following day a pontoon bridge was thrown across the Chickahominy, fifteen miles away, by which Wilson's cavalry crossed. On June 14 the whole army had reached the James River. A pontoon bridge was then thrown across the wide stream, and by June 17 the whole of Grant's army was on the other side. Thus an army of more than one hundred thousand men had been removed from trenches

which were only a few yards from the enemy, carried with all its baggage across two rivers, and placed in a position to threaten the enemy's capital from the other side without any mishap. There were some who thought that after this feat of generalship and the substantial advantages gained by it the Confederate cause was hopeless and that peace ought to be made.

CHAPTER LV.

SHERMAN'S MARCH.

WE have said above that it was part of Grant's plan, when he assumed command of the United States army, that Sherman should move southwards from Chattanooga, and capture Atlanta, thus striking at the Confederacy in a direction where it had never been assailed, and taking a city important as a railway centre and as a manufacturing place of military supplies. The distance between these two points, in a straight line, is a hundred miles, and the road was defended by General Johnston at Dalton with an army of about 43,150 infantry, cavalry, and artillery. To meet this Sherman had a force of about one hundred thousand men.

Sherman left Chattanooga on May 5, the very day that Grant entered the Wilderness, and followed the line of railway to Atlanta. Johnston had fortified a position on the railway, called Tunnel Hill, so Sherman was unable to march straight to Dalton, but was obliged to detach a force to his right to pass through the hills and strike at Resaca, thus cutting the railway over which Johnston drew his supplies. McPherson, who commanded this detachment, found Resaca fortified and was afraid to attack, and when Sherman came up he discovered that Johnston had retired from Dalton to Resaca and was established there in a strong position. Sherman eventually gained possession of Resaca without

a battle, and five days later reached Kingston, where he halted to get his army well together, supply it with provisions, and repair the railroad in his rear. Advancing further south, but bending towards the right, his forces came into conflict with those of Johnston at New Hope Church, where there was continuous fighting for six days, the general advantage being with Sherman. When the month of May came to an end it was found that with the loss of ten thousand men on each side, Sherman had successively stormed strong positions and was gradually drawing nearer to Atlanta.

For the first fortnight of June the two armies remained opposite to each other at Pine Mountain, crossing the railway above Marietta. Here General Polk was killed, who had passed through a strange career. He had been educated for a soldier at West Point, but afterwards studied theology, and at the outbreak of the war was Protestant Bishop of Louisiana. On June 27 Sherman made a vigorous attempt to capture Johnston's position in the battle of Kenesaw, but it ended in failure and the loss of twenty-five hundred men, while the loss on the other side was only a little over eight hundred. He therefore determined to sacrifice his communications, to leave the railway, taking ten days' provisions in waggons, and move his whole army southward to attack below Marietta. This would compel Johnston either to retire to Atlanta or to come out to battle. By this manœuvre Johnston was eventually forced behind Chattahoochee, and was superseded by Hood, who was a far less formidable antagonist.

The result of this was the battle of Atlanta, which consisted chiefly of vigorous assaults bravely repulsed, but without any decisive result. Eventually,

after trying the effect of cavalry raids, which were not very successful, Sherman succeeded in swinging his army into a position south of Atlanta, where they tore up the railroad, rendering it useless, and then advanced to the city, which eventually fell on September 2, 1864, having cost four months of hard fighting and clever strategy to win.

Sherman remained at Atlanta for some time, and whilst he was there Lincoln was re-elected President by a large majority, being opposed by General McClellan. There are many reasons why this election should have been the wisest course, but perhaps the best of them was given by Lincoln himself, who a day or two after his nomination replied to the address of a delegation in the following words: "I have not permitted myself to conclude that I am the best man in the country, but I am reminded in this connection of the story of an old Dutch farmer who once remarked to a companion that it was not best to swap horses when crossing streams."

Before Sherman had been a week in Atlanta he determined to send away all the civil inhabitants of the city, offering them the choice of proceeding either north or south, and furnishing means of transport for a certain distance. He gave a reason for this rather severe measure that he was resolved to make Atlanta a purely military garrison or depôt, with no civil population to influence military measures. By the beginning of November Sherman had, in council with the President and General Grant, determined upon his great march through Georgia, from Atlanta to Savannah on the sea, which eventually put an end to the war. Sherman was at this time threatened by the Confederate General Hood, who was on the south of Atlanta, and who might at

any time attack the railway and sever Sherman's communications with Chattanooga. Indeed, Grant was of opinion that the march should not be undertaken until Hood's army had been destroyed, but he eventually came to agree with the opinion of Sherman, and the care of defending Tennessee against Hood was committed to General Thomas. Sherman made careful preparations for his enterprise, and sent to the north all the sick and disabled men and all baggage that could be spared. When the last train had passed over the railroad to Chattanooga, the rails were pulled up and destroyed, the bridges burned, the electric wires pulled down, and all remaining troops concentrated in Atlanta. On November 2 Sherman left Atlanta, and nothing was heard of him for six weeks.

Sherman had now at his disposal 55,329 infantry, 5,063 cavalry, 1,812 artillery and 68 guns. There were four teams of horses to each gun, with its caisson and forage, six hundred ambulances, each drawn by two horses, twenty-five hundred waggons with six mules to each. Every soldier carried forty rounds of ammunition, and a plentiful supply of wheat was carried in the waggons, as well as 1,200,000 rations with oats and corn enough to last five days. The army was chiefly composed of veteran troops and each of them had confidence in the abilities of "Uncle Billy," their leader. The march began on November 15, and the goal was nearly three hundred miles distant. The infantry consisted of four corps, two to each wing. The right wing was commanded by General Howard, and the left by General Slocum, the cavalry being under the command of General Kirkpatrick. The two wings marched by parallel routes, generally a few miles

apart, each corps having its own proportion of cavalry and trains.

Minute orders were given for the conduct of the troops during the march. "The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A.M. and make about fifteen miles a day. Behind each regiment should follow one waggon and one ambulance. Army commanders should practise the habit of giving the artillery and waggons the road, marching the troops on one side. To this end each brigade commander will organise a good and sufficient foraging party, who will gather corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn, meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the waggons at least ten days' provisions. Soldiers must not enter dwellings or commit any trespass; but during a halt or camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton, guns, etc. When the army is unmolested no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, the army commanders should make and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. As for horses, mules, and waggons belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit, discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. In all forag-

ing, the parties engaged will endeavour to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance."

Following these instructions, the army marched from day to day, occupying a space from forty to sixty miles wide. The wealthier inhabitants, generally, made their escape, but the negroes swarmed after the army, believing that the day of Jubilee had come. The foraging parties went out for miles on each side, gathering large quantities of provisions and bringing them to the line of march, where each stood guard over his pile till his own brigade came along; flankers were thrown out on either side, passing through the woods to prevent any surprise by the enemy. There was scarcely any fighting except within a few miles of Savannah and at the city itself, in the capture of Fort McAlister. The city was occupied on December 21, and Sherman wrote to the President: "I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton." Sherman's entire loss during the march was only 764 men.

Sherman's successful march may be regarded as the beginning of the end, if indeed it was not the end itself. Grant's first idea had been to remove the victorious army by sea to the James River, and place it where it could act in connection with the army of the Potomac against Petersburg and Richmond, but it was considered better, on second thought, to organise a march through the Carolinas. The Confederate army was suffering severely from want of supplies: the region across the Mississippi had been cut off; the seaports were strongly blockaded; the

Shenandoah Valley had been desolated by Sheridan, and Georgia by Sherman. If the Carolinas were treated in the same way Lee's position before Richmond would become unbearable.

The march northwards towards Columbia was begun on February 1, 1865; it was more difficult and dangerous than the previous march and required more military skill. Many rivers had to be crossed, and there was danger of being attacked both by Hood and Lee. Sherman took measures for securing the co-operation of the fleet along the coast, which watched his progress, established points where supplies could be obtained and offered a place of refuge if it were needed. Columbia was captured on February 17 without opposition, and Charleston was evacuated on the following day.

Leaving Columbia on February 20, Sherman's army marched for Fayetteville, the right wing passing through Cheraw, where a great deal of property was destroyed and much arms and munition captured. Reaching Fayetteville on March 11, Sherman was able to open communication with General Terry, who had captured Fort Fisher below Wilmington in January and afterwards the city itself. The last battle engaged by this army was fought at Bentonville on the way to Goldsboro', where the Confederates were entrenched across the road and were commanded by General Johnston. The battle was won by the Federals with a loss of 1,604 men, the loss of the other side being 2,342, and Sherman reached Goldsboro' on the direct road to Petersburg and Richmond. He was joined by Schofield's corps, which had been transferred from the army commanded by General Thomas.

In the meantime the other portions of Grant's plan

were being gradually carried out. Late in February Sheridan with ten thousand cavalry moved up the Shenandoah Valley and defeated General Early, capturing eighteen hundred men, all his guns and trains, and then joined Grant on the James River. Grant at the head of the army of the Potomac was opposed to Lee, who was defending Richmond and Petersburg. The decisive battle was fought on the two first days of April, 1865. Sheridan, who was posted at Dinwiddie Court House, was ordered by Grant to attack the Confederate right at Five Forks. The movement was at first unsuccessful, but after receiving reinforcements Sheridan was able to take Five Forks, with a loss of one thousand men, five thousand prisoners being captured.

On Sunday, April 2, Grant made an attack upon Lee's centre with two corps, and broke through the Confederate lines. Sheridan moved up on the left, and consequently the outer defences of Petersburg were in the possession of the Federal forces, who completely encircled the city. Petersburg is only twenty-three miles from Richmond, and Lee now sent a telegraphic despatch to the capital saying that both cities must be evacuated. The news reached Richmond at the hour of the morning service, and the greatest confusion prevailed. All the liquor on which hands could be laid was poured into the gutter, the great tobacco warehouses were set on fire, and the iron-clad rams in the river were blown up. The next morning the city was taken possession of by a detachment of black troops belonging to the Federal army.

Lee now retreated to the west, Grant following in close pursuit, and moving to the south in a parallel line, during which many engagements took place, in one of which Ewell and the whole of his corps was

captured. After a week of this warfare Lee reached Appomatox Court House, and here his further progress was stopped by a large Federal force. On April 9, 1865, Grant and Lee arranged the surrender of the army of Virginia, the terms being that the men were to lay down their arms and return to their homes, and that they should not be molested so long as they did not again take up arms against the United States. They were even permitted to take their horses with them for the reason that they would need them for the ploughing. The number of officers and men included in the surrender was 28,365. General Johnston, who was opposed to Sherman in North Carolina, surrendered in a similar manner at Durham Station near Raleigh on April 26, receiving the same terms which had been granted to Lee, the number included in the capitulation being greater than those under Lee, reaching the amount of 36,817, besides 52,453 who were in Georgia and Florida. The surrender of the remaining Confederate armies was completed by the end of May, Jefferson Davis, who had been President of the Confederate Republic, having himself been taken prisoner on May 11.

The war was now at an end, but before the final triumph was consummated, the man to whom more than to any one else victory had been due was basely murdered on April 15, 1865. He had lived to enter the captured city of Richmond, to see the authority of the United States extended again over the whole country, but at the moment when, by the inscrutable designs of Providence, he was removed from the scene of his labours, the people were in need of his genius as much as ever for the solution of the new problems, caused by the war and by the victory, which continued to press for settlement.

PART TWELVE.

THE WAR OF 1866.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE INVASION OF SAXONY.

THE comparative strength of the belligerents at the outbreak of the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria has been estimated by a competent observer in the following manner. The Prussian army consisted of eight *corps d'armée* of troops of the line, and of the *corps d'armée* of the guard, each *corps d'armée* consisting of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a military train. Each division of infantry was composed of two brigades, each brigade of two regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. Further, each division had a regiment of cavalry, consisting of four squadrons, and a division of artillery of four batteries, so that every infantry general commanding a division had under his command twelve battalions, four squadrons and four batteries. A cavalry division consisted of two brigades, each containing two regiments, and every regiment four squadrons; it had also attached to it two batteries of horse artillery. The reserve of artillery consisted of one division of field artillery,

forming four batteries, and of two batteries of horse artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of ammunition. Thus a *corps d'armée* had twenty-four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons of cavalry and sixteen batteries of artillery, besides a battalion of rifles and one of engineers, and pontoon trains, and a large military train for the purpose of hospital service and of commissariat.

A *corps d'armée* might thus be reckoned as consisting of 26,000 infantry and about 3,300 cavalry, together with 2,300 artillery, in all 31,000. The *corps d'armée* of the guard was larger by about 5,000 men. Thus, at the beginning of the war, the total infantry consisted of 253,506 men, the total cavalry 30,000 men, and the total of field artillery 864 guns, together with 9,018 pioneers and 11,034 of military trains. To these must be added the dépôt troops numbering 100,512 with 228 guns and 13,000 dépôt officers, making a total of 473,600 men with 100,000 horses and 1,092 guns.

The Austrian army at the outbreak of the war consisted of 80 infantry regiments of the line and 1 Imperial regiment, 32 battalions of field Jägers, 14 Border infantry regiments, 1 Border infantry battalion; the cavalry comprised 12 regiments of Cuirassiers, 29 of Dragoons, 14 of Hussars and 13 of Uhlans; the artillery, 12 regiments, besides one for coast defences; besides these there were 2 regiments of Engineers, 6 battalions of Pioneers, 10 Sanitary companies and 48 Transport squadrons, not counting troops for provincial defence. The whole number of available infantry was 321,410; of cavalry, 26,621; of artillery, 24,600, with 1,036 guns; and of special troops, 11,194, making a total of 383,556 men. We will defer the consideration of the strength

of the other German States and of Italy until they respectively enter on the scene of action.

Prussia commenced her preparations for war on March 27, 1866, by placing five divisions upon a war footing, strengthening five brigades of artillery, and arming the fortresses in Silesia and the province of Saxony. The mobilisation of the whole army was decreed on May 7, and on May 19 troops were concentrated in Silesia, Thuringia, and Lusatia. On June 1 the *corps d'armée* of the guard was sent to Silesia, and other troops to Halle, a reserve corps being formed at Berlin. There were three main Prussian armies, besides the reserve at Berlin; the First army under Prince Frederick Charles, which was posted at Hoyerswerda and Görlitz in Lusatia, the Second army under the Crown Prince of Prussia, posted in Silesia, and the army of the Elbe. By June 15 Prussia had prepared troops for the invasion of Saxony, Hanover, and Cassel.

On May 18 the command of the Austrian army of the north was assumed by Field-Marshal Benedek, the seven *corps d'armée* and five divisions of which it was composed being spread between Cracow and the Elbe, along the principal lines of railway. The Austrian army of the south consisted of three *corps d'armée*, under the command of Archduke Albrecht, part of it being in eastern Venetia and Istria and part holding the Quadrilateral formed by the four great fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua, Verona and Legnano. A third Austrian *corps d'armée* under Archduke Ernest was to be used as a general reserve which might be directed against Italy or sent into Bohemia as circumstances required.

The total strength of the Italian army in the field consisted of 202,720 infantry, 25,120 Bersaglieri

with 480 guns and 13,000 cavalry. It was divided into four *corps d'armée*, the first under the command of Durando being at Lodi, the second under Cuchiari at Cremona, the third under Della Rocca at Piacenza and the fourth under Cialdini at Bologna. As Italy did not declare war against Austria till June 20 we may neglect the operations of the Italian army for the present.

The army of Saxony had been mobilised and was by the end of the first fortnight of June ready to take the field. Its main strength was in Dresden and Pirna. It consisted of 19,752 infantry, 3,217 cavalry, and 70 guns, as well as a company of engineers and two of pioneers. The army of Hanover, which contained eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, was totally unprepared for war, and was garrisoned, for the most part, in the neighbourhood of Hanover.

On the evening of June 15 Prussia declared war against Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. This event caused great excitement in Hanover, and it was determined to save the army by a movement towards the south, so that it might unite with the Bavarians. The blind King of Hanover collected his troops round Göttingen, but it was unable to move from want of organisation. If preparations had been made in time it might have pushed on to Cassel and then to the south, but it had to submit to a catastrophe which will be related in its proper place. On receiving the same news the army of Hesse-Cassel retreated, reaching Hanau on June 19 and securing its communication with the eighth corps of the Federal army at Frankfort. This corps, under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse, consisted of fifty-three thousand infantry, thirty-three squadrons

of cavalry, and one hundred and fourteen guns. It was composed of troops from Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau, as well as an Austrian division of twelve thousand men.

General Bayer invaded Hesse-Cassel at 2 A.M. on June 16, with seventeen thousand men. At Giessen he issued a proclamation saying that Prussia had been compelled to declare war against the Elector, and that his operations were not directed against the country. He reached Cassel on June 19, and found the Elector in the Palace of Wilhelmshöhe. The Elector was made a prisoner of war and was confined in the Prussian fortress of Stettin.

It had been arranged that Saxony should be invaded by two corps, the army of the Elbe and the First army, one advancing from the north, the other from the east. The Saxon army began its retreat on the evening of June 1, proceeding towards Bohemia by way of Bodenbach in order to join the Austrians. The two Prussian armies converging on the capital entered it without opposition on the afternoon of June 18, and in two days the whole country was occupied, with the exception of the fortress of Königstein. We are told by an eyewitness that the Prussian troops were well received by the population, and that had it not been for the swords and bayonets of patrols which glittered in the sun along every road, the scene would have been one of perfect peace. The soldiers helped the peasants to carry the hay harvest, worked in the cottage gardens, spent money in the village shops; the bare-legged country urchins got rides on the cavalry or artillery horses as they went to be watered, or were invited to peep into the muzzle of a rifled gun, and only if some adventurous child ventured to place a handful of corn-

flowers in the mouth of a cannon was he warned off the battery by the sentry. Passenger traffic on the railways was soon resumed, and telegraphic messages were regularly delivered.

The occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave the Prussians very great advantage. They were able to attack the Austrians on a narrow front if they came out of the mountains and an invasion of Bohemia became possible. This step naturally caused a declaration of war on the part of Austria, which had not been prepared for the celerity of the Prussian movements. Benedek had concentrated his army in such a way as to be able to strike a deadly blow at the heart of the Prussian kingdom, while he was supported on the flank by the Bavarians and the other troops of the federation. But this scheme had now been rendered impossible. Instead of setting Saxony free by a rapid march and dictating peace in Berlin, the Austrian Field-Marshal saw three Prussian armies march through the passes of the mountains into north-eastern Bohemia. The Austrian preparations were not pushed forward with that speed and energy which characterised the Prussians and the commanders were without any clear plans and were insufficiently equipped. At the same time the northern army of the allies was nearly equal in strength to the united forces of Prussia, and the whole strength of the confederation was visibly superior to them. The confederation had been further strengthened by the adhesion of the Grand Duchy of Baden, so that fifteen thousand fresh troops were added to the eighth corps, which, as we have said, was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse.

CHAPTER LVII.

THE BATTLE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ.

ON June 22 Prince Frederick Charles broke up his quarters at Görlitz and marched towards the Austrian frontier by the two roads leading through Zittau and Seidenberg, the frontier being crossed on the following day. At the same time General Herwarth von Bitterfeld, in command of the army of the Elbe, marched by the high-road from Schluchheim to Rumburg. Reichenberg was occupied on June 24, and the possession of this place enabled Prince Frederick Charles to open communications with the Silesian and Saxon lines of railway, which were of great importance for the commissariat. The first action of any importance took place at Podol upon the Iser, which is here about one hundred yards wide. It did not begin till 8 P.M., when the evening was closing in, and it continued into the night, every house in the village being obstinately disputed. At last both the town bridge and the railway bridge were captured by the Prussians, and the Austrians drew off sullenly on the road to Münchengrätz. The last dropping shots did not cease till 4 A.M., when there were no Austrian soldiers within three miles of the bridges, except the wounded and the prisoners. No artillery was engaged on either side, and the Prussians owed much of their success to their breech-loading rifles.

By the retreat of the Austrians to Münchengrätz

full communication was opened between the army of Prince Frederick Charles and that of the Elbe, and the two armies were able on the following day to take possession of the whole line of the Iser. A combat took place at Münchengrätz, but Prince Frederick Charles, by a series of tactical movements, and the loss of only one hundred men, gained twelve miles of country, captured one thousand prisoners, and effected his second juncture with the corps of Bitterfeld, the headquarters of both armies being established in the same town. A more serious battle took place at Gitschin on June 29, about twenty miles distant from Münchengrätz. The Austrians were strongly posted, their artillery and sharpshooters being carefully placed. It consisted in the steady driving back of the young Austrian soldiers, by the heavier and more mature troops of their opponents. It began at 5 P.M., and it was not till near midnight that General von Werder occupied Gitschin. Another struggle took place on the same evening on the northern side of the town, between the Austrians and the Prussians who were advancing from the direction of Türrau. In this part of the fight the loss of the Saxons was very heavy, and the Prussians also suffered severely, for they had to carry a strong position held by a superior force, the Prussians numbering sixteen thousand men, the allies thirty thousand. The Prussian headquarters were now moved to Gitschin, and on the afternoon of June 30 the strategic object of the movements of the two Prussian armies was achieved by communications being opened in Bohemia between Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince, who was advancing by Arnau.

The army of the Crown Prince had crossed the Austrian frontier on the evening of June 26, his

first action taking place at Trautenau on the following day, in which the Prussians lost 63 officers and 1,214 men, the Austrians 196 officers and 5,530 men. The Austrians gained the victory, which was, however, of but little use to them, the balance being redeemed by an action at Soor, which allowed the two portions of the Prussian army to unite whilst Goblentz, the Austrian general, retired to Königinhof. This town was captured on June 29 after a hot contest, each yard of every street and each window of every house being stoutly defended. In the meantime the left column of the army had to advance from Glatz to Nachod, along a narrow road, through a difficult defile, forming a column of march twenty miles long. This defile was defended by the Austrians in front of Skalitz, but after an obstinate struggle they were driven back by General Steinmetz, the Crown Prince being also present in person. Another battle took place at Skalitz itself on June 28, and another at Schweinschädel on the following day, so that the Crown Prince was able to concentrate his army on the left bank of the Elbe, and on the last day of the month, as we have seen above, communications between the two commanders were opened.

By this time King William of Prussia had arrived at Reichenberg and assumed the chief command of his armies in person. The Prussian armies were now united at Horsitz and Jaromierz, and the King moved his quarters first to Sichrow and then to Gitschin. Benedek after vainly attempting to prevent the issue of the army of the Crown Prince from the mountains by his resistance at Soor and Skalitz determined to take up a strong position on the right bank of the upper Elbe in order to prevent the army

of Silesia from crossing that stream. On the afternoon of June 30 he issued orders for the whole army to retire towards Königgrätz and to concentrate in front of that fortress; but it was not till the night of July 2 that his whole force was assembled there, when it took up a position between that town and the River Bistritz. Of the armies opposed to him that of Prince Frederick Charles had fought five severe combats without a reverse and had secured a favourable position in which to engage a great battle; that of the Crown Prince had fought severe actions on June 27, 28 and 29, and had now secured his juncture with the other army, bringing with him as trophies of his victories fifteen thousand prisoners, twenty-four captured guns, six stands of colours and two standards. The position of Benedek was protected by the wooded hills of Chlum and Lipa, and by the marshy valley of the Bistritz.

On July 3, 1866, the position of Benedek was attacked by the united forces of Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bitterfeld. The troops were all in motion long before midnight, and at 1.30 A.M. the staff left Kammeritz. With the dawn of day a drizzling rain came on which lasted till late in the afternoon, while a keen wind blew sharply upon the soldiers, who were short both of sleep and food. At 6 A.M. the army had reached the hill of Dub, but it was not allowed to mount the summit of the slope which had hitherto concealed its movements from the Austrians. From this point the ground slopes gently down to the Bistritz and the road crosses it at the village of Sadowa, a mile and a quarter from Dub. The ground then rises until it reaches the village of Chlum, which is a mile and a quarter from Sadowa. About a mile and a

half from Sadowa down the Bistritz stood the village of Mokrovous, and a little way above it on a knoll the church of Doholicka. Above this church was the village of Dohalitz, and between it and Sadowa a large thick wood, difficult to pass.

At 7 A.M. Prince Frederick Charles pushed over the hill with some of his cavalry and horse artillery, and at 7.30 A.M. the first shot was fired. The Prussian horse artillery, close down to the river, replied to the Austrian guns, but neither side fired heavily, and for half an hour the cannonade consisted of single shots. At 7.45 A.M. the King of Prussia appeared upon the scene and the battle became more vigorous on both sides. While the cannonade had been going on the infantry had been moved down towards the river, and at 10 A.M. they were ordered to attack Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Mokrovous. They had to contest every inch of the way, as the Austrians fired fast upon them as they approached. In and around the villages the fighting continued for nearly an hour and but little progress was made. One of the sharpest engagements was between the seventh division under Franzesky and the Austrians in the wood above Benatek. By 11 A.M. the Prussian infantry had taken Sadowa, Dohalitz, and Doholicka, and efforts were now made against the wood which ran along the sides of the Sadowa and Lipa roads, but the struggle became stationary and remained so for about two hours.

News now came to Benedek that the Crown Prince was threatening his right flank, he therefore did his utmost to inflict a severe blow on Prince Frederick Charles, before the Crown Prince could come up. At about 1 P.M. the whole battle line of the Prussians could gain no more ground and was obliged to fight

hard to retain the position it had won. Indeed the battle appeared to be lost, for Prussian guns had been dismounted by Austrian fire, and in the wooded ground the needle-gun was of little effect. Herwarth also was checked on the right, and things were not going much better for the Prussians in the centre. The Prussians were becoming very uneasy and were preparing for a disaster.

The night before the Crown Prince had promised Prince Frederick Charles that he would be on the field at 2 P.M., but was engaged with the Austrian right as early as 12.30 P.M. The army of the Crown Prince was occupying a position with regard to the First army, similar to that which the Prussian troops held towards Wellington on the day of Waterloo. By 1 P.M. he obtained possession of the villages of Hovenarves and Rasitz, the Austrians offering but little resistance, because they were engaged with the corps of Franzesky, who was carrying the village of Benatek. The Prussian guards then proceeded to attack the strong position of Chlum, and when they arrived on the pursuit they saw between themselves and the fortress of Königgrätz the whole of the Austrian reserves to the number of forty thousand men, while between them and their comrades of the First army were the Austrians engaged near Lipa and in the Sadowa wood. There were only twelve battalions of the Prussian guard to hold the key of the battle against the whole reserve of the enemy. It was at 2.55 that Benedek, who was between Chlum and Lipa, heard that the Prussians had occupied Chlum. He could not believe the news, but on moving up to ascertain its truth was received by a withering volley which told severely on his staff.

The position of the Prussian guard became more

critical every moment, but at last a reserve of fifty thousand fresh troops arrived, and the main body of the second division of the guards attacked the wood of Lipa and the batteries of Chlum. During this time the Prussian guards at Sadowa were in ignorance of the progress of the Crown Prince, because his movements could be only imperfectly seen; but they at last became aware of the attack of his infantry upon the wood of Lipa.

The First army then sprang forward and with loud cheers and drum-beating went at full speed up the hill. The Sadowa road was cleared, and the Austrian batteries were attacked, the summit of the hill was gained, and they saw the white uniforms running before them. The Crown Prince's soldiers took the fugitives in flank and raked them as they fled. The Prussian artillery opened fire from the summit of the ridge upon the retreating Austrians, who, notwithstanding the odds against them, succeeding in preserving good order. Benedek saw that the battle was lost and that nothing remained but to retire to Königgrätz with the fragments of his beaten armies, but the pursuit continued, and safety was sought on both sides of the Elbe, till at last the Austrian cavalry reached Pardubitz, and the army got across the river during the night without severe loss. In this battle the Prussians captured 174 guns, 20,000 prisoners and 11 standards, their loss being 10,000 men, whereas that of the Austrians was nearly 40,000. The *morale* of the Austrian army was destroyed, and they had to acknowledge that they could not stand against the better-armed Prussians. The number of the Austrians engaged was 200,000 men with 600 guns, that of the Prussians 261,000 with 816 guns.

CHAPTER LVIII.

THE WAR IN ITALY.

THE melancholy news which arrived from the field of Königgrätz caused the greatest dismay in Vienna, because they had shortly before received favourable accounts from the scene of war in Italy. We must now give an account of the struggle which had in the meantime been raging on the banks of the Mincio. On June 20 General La Marmora sent an intimation to the Austrians in Mantua that hostilities would commence on June 23, and Archduke Albrecht prepared to receive the attack. The strength of the Austrian position in Italy lay in what was called the Quadrilateral, that is, the square enclosed by the strongly entrenched camp on the Adige, in the neighbourhood of Verona, the smaller and less important fortress of Legnano, on the same river, the fortifications of Peschiera, at the point where the River Mincio issues from the Lago di Garda, and the strong fortress of Mantua lower down the Mincio. The Italians had the choice either of attacking the Quadrilateral in front, or of advancing by the Lower Po and cutting the communications with Vienna. La Marmora determined that the main army should advance against the Mincio and the Adige under the personal command of King Victor Emmanuel—the army numbering 146,000 men, with 228 guns. He believed that the Archduke would await the Italian attack behind the Adige, so that

his troops could cross the Mincio and enter the Quadrilateral without resistance. His intention was after having thus separated the fortresses, to combine with General Cialdini, who was to cross the Lower Po in the direction of Ferrara. Garibaldi, with his mountain troops, was to attack the passes which led from Lombardy into the Tyrol.

On June 23 the headquarters of the King were at Goito, and early in the morning the passage of the Mincio commenced, very few signs of the Austrians being apparent. The Italians, confirmed in their opinion that the Archduke was not contemplating resistance on the west side of the Adige, proceeded to occupy the heights between Valeggio, Castelnuovo, and Somma Campagna. La Marmora employed no scouts, his troops did not breakfast before starting, proper rations were not served out to them, and no preparations seemed to have been made for combat. In the meantime the Archduke was also moving towards Somma Campagna with the view of attacking the Italians on the flank, whom he imagined to be marching towards Albaredo on the Adige. Thus a collision between the two armies was imminent.

The two armies met on the morning of June 24. Custozza and Somma Campagna are situated on the south-eastern slopes of the chain of hills which stretch between Verona and Peschiera, and the Italian army was marching towards Villa Franca in the plain without securing possession of these hills. The Austrians were well acquainted with the ground from their constant use of it in manœuvres, and the Archduke Albert was a worthy son of the Archduke Charles who had beaten Napoleon at Aspern. The hills consist of deep ravines and isolated summits

and are drained by the little River Ticino. The battle of Custoza was fought during the greater part of the hot midsummer day and ended in a brilliant victory for the Austrians. The Italians did their utmost to sustain the fight under the eyes of their sovereign until 3 P.M., when the Austrians stormed Monte Vento and the chapel of Santa Lucia on the right bank of the Tione. In the evening they were driven back across the Mincio; but the conquerors were so much exhausted that they could not continue the pursuit. The loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners was on the Austrian side about five thousand, and on the Italian side about eight thousand.

The Italian army was now withdrawn behind the Oglio, and Cialdini, on hearing of the battle of Custoza, gave up his intention of crossing the Lower Po and moved towards his left, posting his troops near Mirandola and Modena so as to be in close communication with the King's army. The Archduke had no intention of invading Lombardy.

Garibaldi's force consisted of about six thousand men, divided into three bodies, one of which occupied Rocca d'Anfo on the Lake of Idro, a second Edolo on the Tonale road, and a third Bormio in the Stelvio pass. His operations were unimportant, and he found the population of the so-called Italian Tyrol not inclined to desert the Austrian cause. He was twice worsted in small engagements, in the second of which he was wounded.

The Italians rested for some time after the battle of Custoza, but having promised to support the armies of Prussia they crossed the Lower Po and advanced against the Tyrol and the eastern part of

Venetia, under the command of Cialdini, who had succeeded to La Marmora. Cialdini effected these operations on July 9, and five days afterward reached Padua. For political reasons the Italians were anxious to occupy as much of the Austrian territory as possible. His army consisted of seventy thousand men and he was expecting reinforcements which would double its numbers, whereas the Austrians could not place more than thirty thousand men in the field. The troops were extended from Vicenza on the left to Mestre, not far from Venice, on the right, while his centre threatened the communications of the Austrians with Friuli. At Cialdini's advance the Austrians gradually evacuated the Quadrilateral and retired beyond the Isonzo, and on July 24 the Italians occupied Udine.

In the meantime General Medici was advancing against Bassano, and Garibaldi was attempting the conquest of the Italian Tyrol. It was obvious that the Italians were not willing to content themselves with Venetia, but aimed at occupying all territories in which the Italian language was spoken. Their ardour was checked by the result of the naval battle of Lissa in which the Italian fleet under Persano was entirely destroyed by the Austrian Admiral Tegethoff on July 20, 1866. Five days later Victor Emmanuel agreed to an armistice, and the Austrians ceded Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who made it over to the Italians, and thus completed the promise which he had left unredeemed in 1859.

CHAPTER LIX.

THE END OF THE WAR.

WE must now pursue the fortunes of the war in other parts of Germany. We have already seen the forced retreat of the Hanoverian army to Göttingen. Much was expected from the co-operation of the Bavarian army, but its efficiency was spoiled by the vacillation of its commander, Prince Charles, who had opposed to him a most competent general in the person of Vogel von Falckenstein, while the eighth corps, made up of a motley collection of contingents from different States, lacked that unity and enthusiasm which are the first conditions of success. The Hanoverian army had lost the opportunity of uniting successfully with the Bavarians by the necessity which it felt of rest and refreshment, and it was forced to effect that union by passing through the Thuringian forest. Even then there was a want of energy in the leaders on both sides. There is little doubt that if the King of Hanover had marched vigorously on Gotha on June 24 he could not have been opposed with any success by the Coburg army which was on the side of the Prussians; but instead of this he entered into negotiations which led to no satisfactory result.

The decisive battle took place at Langensalza on June 27. The Hanoverians occupied a position on the gently sloping hills which rise from the left bank

of the River Unstrut. They had, however, detachments on the other side of the stream, notably in Langensalza, from which the battle derives its name. Their troops were gradually driven across the river and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before 10 A.M. Shortly after this the signal for the battle was given by the Hanoverians, and in a few minutes the whole of the Prussian and the greater part of the Hanoverian forces were engaged. In the attack upon the Hanoverian position the Prussian line had become very widely extended, and the King determined to take advantage of this fault. The advance was made at midday, but was impeded by the steep banks of the river. The Prussians, however, retreated and many prisoners were taken, but owing to the nature of the river, flowing deeply through high banks, the Hanoverian cavalry were not able to follow up the victory. Therefore at 5 P.M. the pursuit came to an end and the Hanoverians remained masters of the field of battle. Their loss in killed and wounded was 1,372. The Prussians lost about the same number and nearly a thousand prisoners.

This victory was, however, soon found to be of no use. On the following day the King of Hanover discovered that he was hemmed in on all sides by an army of forty thousand enemies. He determined therefore not to sacrifice his soldiers, and accepted the terms which had been previously proposed by Prussia. Arms, carriages, and military stores were handed over to the Prussians, the Hanoverian soldiers were dismissed to their homes, the officers engaged not to serve against Prussia during the war, while the King and the Crown Prince were permitted to go where they pleased so long as they did not remain in the territories of their former kingdom.

After the capitulation of the Hanoverians General Vogel von Falckenstein was in a position to unite the several bodies of troops which had been led to his assistance by Generals Goeben, Manteuffel, and Beyer, into a single force, called the army of the Main, and to attack the Federal troops composed of the seventh and eighth army corps. The first, as we have already seen, was composed of the Bavarians, who were fifty thousand strong under the command of Prince Charles, who had served in the Napoleonic wars, and in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign of 1848. The second, made up from contingents from Würtemberg, Darmstadt, Baden, and Nassau, and strengthened by Austrian troops drawn from different garrisons, was commanded by Prince Alexander of Hesse, brother of the Empress of Russia and the father of the Princes of Battenberg, but in order to gain the advantage of greater unity the supreme control of the whole was committed to the hands of Prince Charles. This unity, however, was not attained. The blight which had marred the national strength throughout a long series of years, the canker of the old German Empire, was now potent to destroy the efficiency of these motley groups. Local jealousies and local interests could not be forgotten, and the superior numbers of these combined forces could not prevail against the more scanty but better disciplined and more enthusiastic legions of the Prussians.

The Federal army was not in a position to take the field till the beginning of July. The Bavarians were posted in northern Franconia between the Rhön and the Thuringian forests, while the eighth army corps occupied the Wetterau to the north of

Frankfort, and contented itself with taking possession of Giessen and the Prussian enclave of Wetzlar. A plan which had been originally formed for a concentration in Hersfeld was not carried out, as the several combatants were reluctant to sever connection with the countries to which they belonged.

Falckenstein conceived the plan of pushing a wedge between these two armies in such a manner that they would be prevented from undertaking any action in combination. For this purpose he despatched Goeben's divisions in an easterly direction against the Bavarians, who had advanced from Coburg and Meiningen as far as Kaltennordheim and had occupied Reinhardtshausen and Rorsdorf in the valley of the Fulda. The two armies came into collision on July 4 in the battle of Dombach or Wiesenthal, as it is variously called, and the field was obstinately contested with great bravery on either side. Although the Bavarians were superior in numbers the conflict had no decisive conclusion, and the losses sustained by the combatants on either side were nearly equal. The result was that Prince Charles gave up the idea of uniting with the eighth army corps in this direction and marched southwards towards the Franconian Saale, followed by the Prussian army, which advanced along the Fulda valley towards Hanau, so that after several days' marching in parallel lines both sides reached the valley of the Main. Falckenstein's object had been so far attained that while on July 5 the Bavarians and the eighth Federal corps were only thirty miles distant, on July 7 seventy lay between them.

After a difficult march through the Rhön mountains the Prussian army came up with the Bavarians

in the valley of the Saale, and on July 10 fought the battles of Kissingen and Hammelburg. In the first the town was bravely defended by the Bavarians, who stood their ground bravely on the bridge which crosses the Saale, notwithstanding the burning houses and the heavy cannonade. The position was at last stormed by the advance of the Jägers, and the defenders could not withstand the vigour of the assault and the quick firing of the needle-gun. The Bavarians drew off to the south-east and the Prussians gained the passage of the Saale at Hammelburg. In the second the fashionable watering-place was taken by surprise; the visitors and the inhabitants had no opportunity of retiring, although those lodging in the Hotel Sauner, which is situated on the right bank of the Saale, were allowed to remove to a less dangerous position; otherwise none were permitted to quit the place for fear of their giving intelligence to the enemy. The Prussians made their appearance in the early morning of July 10, and the Saale was crossed without serious loss. After the passage of the stream the invaders pushed forward into the heart of the town, but met with a stout resistance. The Kurgarten, the centre of the social life of the place, was only carried after a fourth assault, and a little after 3 p.m. the whole of the town was in the possession of the Prussians. Even then the Bavarians continued the contest on the hills and the fight lasted till the evening.

There is no doubt that the Bavarians were surprised on the Saale, and that they had not expected an attack till the following day, and consequently had not concentrated their forces on the river. The troops which held Kissingen and Hammelburg were unsupported, and the reserves were too far off to be

of any service; indeed they did not arrive till their comrades had been defeated, and then, naturally, shared their fate. The Bavarian staff was unprepared and had no proper maps of the country, whereas the movements of the Prussians had been extremely rapid.

Falckenstein now turned his attention to the eighth army corps, which was placed in entrenched positions on the Fulda. When the news of the Austrian defeat reached the headquarters at Bornheim it appeared of the first importance to defend Frankfurt. Prince Alexander therefore sent a Hessian and Austrian division under General Neipperg to Aschaffenburg to hold back the Prussians who were advancing from Gemünden, and at the same time occupied the passes at Gelnhausen. This, however, resulted in the victory of Goeben at Lauffach on July 13 and the capture of Aschaffenburg on the following day, and Prince Alexander was compelled to surrender Frankfurt, which was occupied by the Prussians on July 16, and to retire with his whole army southwards to the Odenwald. Falckenstein had thus in a space of fourteen days defeated two armies, each of which was as strong as his own, in two great and several minor actions. He was now able to report to the King that all lands north of the Main were in the possession of the Prussians. Falckenstein established his headquarters in the old Imperial city and issued a proclamation announcing that he had temporarily assumed the government of the duchy of Nassau, of the town and territory of Frankfurt, and of the portions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt which his troops had occupied.

After the victory of Königgrätz the main Prussian army rested for a few days and then advanced

by the railway to Pardubitz, leaving a corps of observation before the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt, and pursuing the beaten Austrians in their retreat to Olmütz. In the meantime the important city of Prague, the capital of Bohemia, had been occupied, without a conflict, on July 8. At the news of these events terror reigned in Vienna, and there was a movement to summon the whole nation to arms. On July 13 Archduke Albert took command of the whole forces of the Empire; he brought a portion of the army of the south to the capital and united it with the remains of the army of the north. In the meantime the Crown Prince was holding Benedek and his troops fast in Olmütz, whilst the armies of the Elbe and of Prince Frederick Charles advanced towards the capital by the shortest road. The Emperor demanded an armistice, but this was refused because he insisted on the conditions that the Federal States should also be included in it, and that no obstacle should be placed to the movements of the army of the south.

The Prussians were not able to take up positions which would threaten an interruption of the communications between Vienna and Olmütz. Archduke Albert, therefore, issued orders to Field-Marshal Benedek to send his six army corps by railway to Vienna. But before half of them were despatched the railroad was broken up and Benedek had to retire with the remainder on the road to Presburg, which he only reached after fighting with considerable loss. An eyewitness, Mr. Hozier, gives an interesting account of the incident, telling us that when the leading horsemen came within sight of the railway at Göding they saw two trains, one close behind the other, with engines puffing and snorting violently, as

if drawing a heavy load, steaming slowly in the direction of Lindenburg, carrying Austrian troops from Olmütz to Vienna. It was immediately resolved to break up the line. Pickaxes and spades were found in the neighbouring cottages, and the men set to work on foot whilst others held their horses. Soon the rails were wrenched out of their places, thrown on one side, and in a few minutes the line was useless for railway traffic. Scarcely was the work complete before another train came up, but when the engine-driver saw the Prussian cavalry he reversed his engine and backed slowly in the direction from which he had come.

The same authority also remarks that railways in an enemy's country are of no use for the troops of an invader during his advance, as the army of the defence always breaks them up and they cannot be repaired quickly enough to allow of troops being moved by them. But for the carriage of provisions and stores they are invaluable, the line of railway being the great artery which, leading from the heart, supplies the extremities of the army with means of life and motion. At the same time a broken bridge, even a few yards wide, would cause a dead stoppage, and the time lost in shifting stores from one side to the other would be very great. An engineer, he says, who would find means of rapidly constructing field-bridges which would bear the weight of a railway train would cause an advance in the art of war.

On July 18, 1866, King William took up his quarters in the little Moravian town of Nikolsburg, and slept in the very room which Napoleon had occupied before the battle of Austerlitz. At this time the advanced guard of the invaders saw the Imperial city, conspicuous by the spire of St. Stephen's church and the tower of the palace of Schönbrunn,

while before them lay the Marchfeld with the villages of Aspern, Esslingen, and Wagram, the scenes of Napoleon's defeat and of his ultimate victory. They were situated, Hozier tells us, in the midst of rich corn-land and fields of bright poppies, which from a distance looked like pieces of dazzling mosaic let into a golden pavement, fringed by the silver band of the Danube, studded with emerald islets. In the distance the dark blue Carpathian mountains bounded the view towards Hungary. No Prussian army, not even that of the Great Frederick, had ever gazed upon this view before. Floridsdorf and Presburg were the only strong places which the Austrians now had in their possession on the north bank of the Danube. This last-named fortress, which is the key of the passage between Austria and Hungary, was on the point of being captured on July 23, when a few moments after midday an Austrian came out from Blumenau, and advanced with a flag of truce to the Prussian lines. He reported to a Prussian officer who went out to meet him that an armistice had been agreed upon to date from midday and that the hour was already past. The signal to cease firing sounded along the Prussian ranks, and then ensued a sudden stillness, a hum of conversation from the astonished soldiers taking the place of the roar of artillery and the patter of small arms.

This was the end of the war. The Emperor of the French had offered his mediation and had sent M. Benedetti, his ambassador at Paris, to the King's headquarters at Nikolsburg to propose terms of peace. The cessation of hostilities agreed upon for July 23 was changed into a definite truce on July 26, which included the settlement of preliminaries of peace, the definite Peace of Prague being signed four weeks later on August 23, 1866.

PART THIRTEEN.

THE WAR OF 1870.

CHAPTER LX.

THE CONTENDING FORCES.

WE must again remind our readers that it is no part of the object of this volume to deal with political history. We must, therefore, omit all discussion as to the origin of the war of 1870, and proceed directly to the war itself, giving, however, such an account of the composition and mobilisation of the two armies as may throw light upon the development of military science as compared with its condition in the other campaigns which we have described. The French army had been for a long time looked upon as a pattern for all European armies; its organisation was carefully studied in other countries. An idea prevailed that the French had a genius for warfare which was the backbone of their strength, whereas Prussia was frequently held up to ridicule from its supposed pedantry in time of war. No one, either in France or outside of it, had any idea that the core of this magnificent growth was hollow, and that when opposed to a better organised adversary would crumble into fragments.

In 1870 the principle of liability to military service was acknowledged by French law just as fully as in Germany, but in France any one was allowed to procure a substitute who could afford to pay for it, whereas in Germany personal service was insisted upon. The result of this was that the French army, being recruited from the poorer and more ignorant classes of society, lacked the elements of intelligence and culture which entered so largely into the German armies. Further, in France pains were taken to keep the soldiers from contact with the citizens, to isolate them in barracks and camps, and to avoid billeting them upon the inhabitants, so that the army gradually became a military caste. The German army, on the other hand, remained in close contact with the classes of society from which it was recruited. France had undoubtedly learnt something from the wars of 1859 and 1866. She had found in 1859 that whereas the French army consisted on paper of not less than four hundred thousand men, and although not more than one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry had been employed in the Italian campaign, still it was impossible to march an army on to the Rhine when Prussia mobilised her army and threatened France in favour of Austria. Therefore in 1861 the French determined to create such a reserve as would raise the army from four hundred thousand to six hundred thousand. The war of 1866 showed that an army of six hundred thousand men would be quite inadequate to face the Prussian and North German armies, including the Landwehr. It was, therefore, resolved to increase the war establishment to eight hundred thousand men, and to create a mobile National Guard.

It being impossible to increase the peace establishment of the army, this was effected by reducing the period of military service from seven to five years, and by providing that all men who had hitherto received a final discharge at the end of seven years should in future be liable to four years' reserve obligation on furlough after the expiration of five years. This, it was reckoned, would provide about two hundred and forty thousand well-trained reserves. There was also a second class who were liable as reserves for nine years, and these would add an additional body of one hundred thousand, less carefully trained, which would bring up the whole reserve to a total of three hundred and forty thousand men.

The Mobile National Guard was created in 1862. It consisted of all persons who for one reason or another had not been enrolled in the active army or the reserve or who had paid for substitutes. They were liable for five years with fifteen days' annual training in time of peace, which gives a force of four hundred and twenty-five thousand men. Their duty was to be auxiliary to the active army, especially in garrisoning fortresses, in the defence of coasts and frontiers and in the maintenance of internal order. This new organisation was at first popular with the nation, but popular zeal cooled down as soon as the necessity of sacrifice became apparent, and the Mobiles were of little use in the war.

The military organisation of Prussia, which dates from 1861, had been proved to be sound in the war against Denmark in 1863 and Austria in 1866. After the latter war it had been extended to the North German States, and was gradually introduced into the South German States as well. Its main principle was to secure that in time of peace all those

who are liable to field service should also be fit for it; so that the soldiers sent to meet the enemy should be perfectly trained and instructed. For this purpose a twelve years' period of service was imposed upon the nation, consisting of three years in the standing army, four years in the Reserve and five in the Landwehr, the Reserve having in the four years two terms of training of eight weeks each, and the Landwehr during their five years two periods of shorter duration, from eight to fourteen days.

The contrast between the organisation of the two armies was still more apparent in their mobilisation. In Germany the plan which had been formed for placing a maximum force under arms at a given time, originally excellent, had been improved from day to day and brought down to the last moment. It depended upon the most elaborate decentralisation, each unit of the German military system being organised by itself, but yet with due subordination to the whole. Whenever a branch or section of a railway line was open for traffic the entire series of time-tables were altered, if need be, to include this new facility for transport. The same diligence was exhibited in the attainment of information; the German Staff maps of France, especially east of Paris, laid down roads which in July, 1870, had not been marked upon any map issued by the French War Office; yet although the central departments in Berlin exercised an active supervision, they did not meddle with the local military authorities, who had large discretionary powers.

In 1870 the army of the North German Confederation, with a peace establishment of about twelve thousand officers, two hundred and eight-five thousand men and seventy-three thousand horses, had

to be augmented in the short space of from eight to ten days to a war establishment of twenty-two thousand officers, nine hundred and thirty-two thousand combatants, and one hundred and ninety-two thousand horses, equipped with everything which an army requires on the field. This gigantic task could never have been performed unless every component part had performed its share of the work with the greatest diligence and rapidity, each wheel working into its fellow with punctuality and precision, nor could this be effected without decentralisation of the military administration, division and repartition of labour, and constant conscientious provision in peace for the exigencies of war.

When King William of Prussia arrived at Berlin on the evening of June 15, 1870, he at once sanctioned the orders prepared by General Moltke, and they were immediately transmitted to the officers commanding the several army corps. By regular stages each corps was gradually but swiftly developed into its full proportions and ready to start for the frontier as a finished product. The reserves and, if necessary, the landwehr men filled out the battalions, squadrons and batteries to the fixed strength, and they were provided with the arms, clothing and equipments which were stored in the local depôts. Horses were called in, requisitioned or bought and transport was obtained. All the wants of a complete army corps were easily supplied, as they had been ascertained and provided for beforehand. Thus the whole operation of bringing a great army from a peace to a war footing, in absolute readiness to meet an enemy advancing on his own soil, was carried out with unparalleled order and quickness in the short period of eighteen days. This included the transport

of men, guns, horses, carriages, chiefly by railway, from all parts of the country to the Rhine and the Moselle; indeed more than three hundred thousand combatants with all their appurtenances were conveyed to the places on the days specified, in fulfilment of a scheme reasoned, specified and drawn out two years before.

The mobilisation of the French army was an entire contrast to that of its antagonist. In France the minute territorial organisation of the army, which prevailed in Germany, did not exist. A peasant residing in Provence might be summoned to join a regiment quartered in Brittany, or a workman employed in Bordeaux called up to the Pas de Calais; when they arrived they might discover that their regiments had marched to Alsace or to Lorraine. During the first fortnight after the declaration of war thousands of reserve men were travelling to and fro over France in search of their comrades. Before war was declared Marshal Lebœuf, the War Minister, declared in the Council of Ministers that the army was perfectly prepared for war, and when asked to explain himself he said: "I mean that the army is perfectly equipped in every respect, that it will not require even the purchase of a single gaiter button for a year to come. *Elle est archiprête.*" This boast was soon discovered to be completely unfounded. At the opening of the war the French only possessed one completely formed *corps d'armée*; a second, stationed in the camp of Châlons, was commanded by General Frossard; all the other corps had to be made out of garrison troops and the entire staff had to be provided in haste. The armament of Strasburg was not commenced till August 4; on July 20 there was no food in the fortresses of Metz and

Thionville, and a million rations had to be sent from Paris. On July 25 there was neither biscuit nor salt meat in the fortresses of Mézières and Sedan. All the regiments were hundreds short of their proper strength.

There was also great deficiency of ready money; General de Failly at Bitsch had no coin wherewith to pay his troops. The German soldiers were adequately supplied with first-rate maps of France; the French only had maps of Germany intended for the invasion of that country. The German officers had a far more intimate knowledge of the country through which they were marching than had the French inhabitants themselves. On July 21 General Michel sent the following telegram to Paris: "Have arrived at Belfort; cannot find my brigade; cannot find the General of Division; what shall I do?" The German army rested on solid foundations, and nothing was left to chance; the French army was loosely put together. It consisted of uncertain elements, was not easily collected, and was never in formed bodies, and yet the national character of the French is perhaps better suited for minute and careful organisation than that of the Germans.

Let us now consider the disposition of the two armies at the end of July. The main French army, two hundred thousand strong, was placed in and around Metz under Marshals Bazaine and Canrobert and under General Bourbaki, who commanded the Imperial Guard. It was called the Army of the Rhine, but it had little to do with that river. On July 27 it was joined by the Emperor and his son and by Marshal Lebœuf, the too confident Minister of War. To the east was the Army of the South under MacMahon, Duke of Magenta, about one hundred thou-

sand strong. To this army were attached the African troops and the Zouaves, who were mainly of Parisian origin. This army was thrown forward towards Alsace, and its advanced guard under General Douay was on the Rhine. In the camp at Châlons was a third army consisting of reservists and mobiles, who were not completely collected and were very imperfectly drilled. Besides these armies a well-manned and equipped fleet was sailing from Cherbourg through the Channel with the object of cruising in the North Sea and the Baltic, to blockade the harbours and to land on the coasts.

The German forces were also divided into three great sections. The first under General Steinmetz, sixty-one thousand strong, contained the first, seventh and eighth army corps, under Manteuffel, Zastrow, and Goeben respectively, and formed the right wing. The second, under Prince Frederick Charles, with a strength of two hundred and six thousand men and 534 guns, together with the third, numbering one hundred and eighty thousand men and 480 guns, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, with Blumenthal as head of the staff, formed the left wing. The Central army, under the command of the King himself, with Moltke as head of the staff, contained the second army corps under Fransecky, the third and fourth each commanded by an Alvensleben, the ninth under Manstein, and the tenth under Voigts-Rhetz, and the twelfth, composed of Saxons, under the Crown Prince of that country, Albert. With the Central army also marched Count Bismarck, and Roon, the Minister of War. General Vogel von Falckenstein directed from Hanover the defence of the German coasts against the hostile fleet. It has been calculated that the whole of the troops of the North Ger-

man Confederates amounted to nine hundred and eighty-four thousand five hundred men, and that of the French to seven hundred and ninety-eight thousand men; but the numbers actually brought into the field were considerably smaller.

CHAPTER LXI.

WEISSENBURG, WÖRTH, AND SAARBRÜCKEN.

THE Emperor left St. Cloud to join the army on the morning of July 28, 1870, taking the Prince Imperial with him. It has been reported by an eyewitness that he was silent and out of spirits, seeming to anticipate disaster. As he picked up various well-loved trinkets to place them in his travelling-bag his eyes were full of tears. On the other hand, the Empress was radiant with joy and hope, and did her best to rouse him by reading extracts from the last English papers. She was passionate for the war. "It is my war," she proudly claimed, but she had little to be proud of in the sequel. The French plan was to separate North from South Germany by a rapid passage of the Rhine, and by winning a decisive battle to induce Austria and Italy to abandon their neutrality and to take part with France. For this purpose one hundred thousand men were to be concentrated at Strasburg, and one hundred and fifty thousand at Metz, and these united armies were to cross the Rhine at Maxau, between Rastadt and Gernersheim and occupy the Grand Duchy of Baden. Meanwhile Marshal Canrobert was to assemble fifty thousand men at Châlons, to bring this force to Metz, and to protect the north-western frontier of France while the so-called Rhine army advanced into Germany. These operations could only be carried out under conditions of the greatest rapidity and the

fullest preparation, but Napoleon found at Metz, that not only were supplies of all kinds deficient, but that Metz was short of its complement by fifty thousand men and Strasburg by sixty thousand, whereas Canrobert's troops not having been concentrated at Châlons were unable to march to Metz.

The first engagement took place on August 2 at Saarbrücken, a small German commercial frontier town, defended by a Prussian detachment fifteen hundred strong. To attack this place General Frosard advanced with the whole of the second army corps. The small Prussian force under Lieutenant-Colonel Pestel skirmished with this overwhelming force for two hours, and kept it in check for half a day. It then retired, in perfect order, over the bridges at 12.30 P.M. The town of Saarbrücken was then occupied; and the open town and railway station of St. Johann, on the opposite side of the river, was furiously shelled. Less than a hundred men were killed or wounded on either side, but the French papers boasted, "Saarbrücken has once more become a French city, the splendid coal district on the Saar is French property; Saarbrücken is the first station, we shall soon reach the last one, Berlin." The Emperor wrote to his wife that the Prince Imperial had received his baptism of fire, and that the first shots from the mitrailleuses had produced a wonderful effect. The French made no further advance, but fortified their position on the left bank of the Saar, the Emperor returning to Metz.

The next engagement was of a very different character. A division of MacMahon's army under General Abel Douay had advanced to the frontiers of Rhenish Bavaria, and had occupied the fortified town of Weissenburg, which lies in the centre of the

Weissenburg lines, traces of which may still be seen from the railway, so celebrated as a place of combat between the French and Germans in the War of the Spanish Succession, and in the Revolutionary War of 1793. General Douay placed two battalions, consisting one of his infantry and the other of Turcos, in the town and occupied, with the remaining nine battalions of his division, a camp with tents on the heights to the south of Weissenburg. The third army, under the command of the Crown Prince, had pressed forward to the River Lauter, and was advancing southwards between Weissenburg and Lauterburg. The troops of Douay's division were employed in preparing their coffee at 9 A.M. in their camp, when intelligence came that the enemy was advancing in great masses and were close at hand; upon which, the troops, leaving their tents standing, moved forward to occupy the river. The Prussian force consisted of Bavarians under Von der Tann, as well as Silesians, Poles, Hessians, Thuringians, and troops of Nassau, so that by midday the French were threatened by far superior forces, and Douay ought to have retreated, having learned by this time that he could not expect assistance from Ducrot, who was posted at Wörth, twelve miles distant. At noon the town of Weissenburg was stormed and taken after a gallant resistance. An attack was then made upon the heights of the Gaisberg, which dominated the surrounding country and was crowned by a strong castle. Eventually the French lines were broken and the neighbouring heights stormed, a French gun, the first trophy of the war, being captured by the Silesian Jägers. General Douay was killed and the French sullenly retired from their camp, and the remaining companies who were posted in the castle

were compelled to surrender at 2 P.M., having lost seventy-four men killed and wounded in defence of it; seven hundred men were taken prisoners. This was the first victory gained by the German troops on French soil.

Two days later, on August 6, 1870, was fought the important battle of Wörth, when MacMahon, having concentrated all his troops on the main line of communication leading by Bitsch and Saargemünd to Metz, determined to accept a battle, although by doing so he abandoned possession of Alsace. The position chosen was a strong one, as the chain of steep hills, partly wooded, completely dominates the ground on the left bank of the Sauer, which is a deep rivulet with steep banks, offering a considerable obstacle to the advance of an enemy and only passable by the bridges at Görsdorff, Wörth, and Gunstett. The position was strengthened by rifle-pits, trenches, abattis, field-works, batteries, and wire fences. MacMahon had no information as to the line of the enemy's approach; however, he took up the following positions on the morning of August 6. He placed Ducrot on the left wing with the first division, Raoul with the third division in the centre, holding the village of Wörth at the passage over the Sauer, strongly occupied. The fourth division, under De L'Artigue was on the right, holding the lower wood, with a flank formed *en potence* opposite to the village of Morsbrunn. He had at first intended to fight a purely defensive battle and had ordered the bridges over the Sauer to be destroyed, but he changed his mind and left them standing.

The Crown Prince held the heights on the left bank of the Sauer, from Wörth to Gunstett, having ninety thousand men opposed to forty thousand. The

attack on Wörth began soon after 8 A.M. By 11 A.M. the superiority of the Prussian artillery had become evident, and orders were given to storm the village. In the meantime the French made an attack upon Gunstett, which was, however, repulsed. Soon after noon Wörth was carried by storm, after an obstinate resistance, and was subsequently held against two vigorous attempts to recover it. The Crown Prince had at first intended to defer the main battle till August 7, but at 1.30 P.M. he gave orders to continue the fighting. The hardest part of the fight, after crossing the stream, was in storming the heights east of Froschweiler, which were strongly occupied and partly fortified. The third French division, whose commandant, General Raoult, was killed, fought with passionate courage, and only at the fourth onslaught did the Prussians gain possession of the coveted ground. On the French side a desperate attempt was made to retake Elsasshausen, but the village remained in the hands of the Prussians. It now became possible to make a concentric attack on Froschweiler, which was the last strong point of the centre which remained in the hands of the French. Although the French fought with the fury of despair, the village was stormed at 3.30 P.M. and several thousand prisoners were taken in it. After the loss of Froschweiler further resistance became impossible. The French army broke up and fled in two directions, some to Reichshofen and some to Jägerthal. The Prussians bivouacked on the field of battle, the cavalry being pushed forward to Reichshofen. The troops which fled to Hagenau were forwarded by rail to Strasburg, where they produced the utmost consternation. The remainder of the defeated army was concentrated at Saverne, which is situated on the main passage over the Vosges.

On the same day that the Crown Prince of Prussia gained the victory of Wörth with the left wing of the German armies, August 6, 1870, the right wing also gained at Saarbrücken a victory which eventually had the most decisive consequences. The army corps of General Frossard had evacuated Saarbrücken as well as the exercise-ground of the place, which lies upon a height, and had taken up a position further to the south in the wooded range of Spicheren and Forbach. The position, naturally strong, was also fortified by walls and entrenchments, and was thought to be impregnable. Frossard had placed concealed batteries down the slope as far as the valley, which divides the exercise-ground from the heights. For the space of several hours the advanced guard of the first Prussian army under Zastrow and Kameke attempted to scale the heights in front and flank; two attacks were repulsed, and the German losses were severe. But at 5 P.M. General von Alvensleben came up with some troops from the second army, so that Goeben could now order a fresh attack upon the enemy's position.

The day was extremely hot and the new troops were exhausted by their long march, but they climbed the steep heights with shouts of Hurrah! until they reached the Plateau. The French made extraordinary exertions, combining infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in their resistance, and fought with the courage of despair to recover the position they had lost, and it became necessary to bring up the Prussian cavalry and artillery to the Plateau, which was effected by means of steep paths through wooded hills. On both wings new bodies of troops came up, directed by the sound of the cannon. The French were driven back in the direction of Spicheren and Es-

lingen, and being quite exhausted, began to give way along the whole line. Finally, at about 9 P.M., they withdrew in a southerly direction to Saargemünd.

In the evening of the same day General von Golz attacked the Kaninchenberg, a hill which overlooks the town of Forbach, and took it, being then able to fire some rounds of shot upon the town of Forbach and the retreating masses of the enemy, who subsequently abandoned the town. Night, however, put an end to the engagement. Marshal Bazaine was posted with the third corps about six miles from Spicheren, with the purpose of supporting Frossard. He offered his co-operation, but it was declined as being unnecessary. This indifference and want of judgment on the part of the French is in strong contrast to the energy of their opponents. The battle was won, by the rapid concentration on the scene of action of bodies of troops belonging to a great variety of corps and divisions. If every leader in the Prussian army had not been zealous to hurry forward without hesitation on hearing the roar of the cannonade the achievements of August 6 could never have been accomplished, and the day might have marked a defeat in the Prussian annals. It is also remarkable that the command in the battle was four times changed, and was held successively by Kameke, Stülpnagel, Goeben, and Zastrow; there was, however, the most perfect unity and harmony in the conduct of the fighting, showing the absence of jealousy and the uniformity of tactical system.

CHAPTER LXII.

VIONVILLE.

THE crushing defeats of Wörth and Saarbrücken opened the north-eastern gate of France to the German armies without any further struggle. From August 6 the movements of the invading hosts were exclusively on French soil and all danger of an invasion from the west, either in North or South Germany, was at an end. General consternation was felt at Paris. The movements of the victorious troops who occupied the passes of the Vosges, and who, after the capture of the little fortress of Lützelstein, pressed even to the Moselle, were so swift and irresistible that it became necessary to take measures for the security of the capital itself. The investment of the frontier city of Strasburg by General Beyer added to the terror. On August 7 and 8 the Emperor and the Ministry issued proclamations calling for a general rallying of the people under the national banner to save the national honour. At the same time the Chambers were summoned, and so strong an opposition was displayed towards the Government that Ollivier and Gramont were forced to resign, and the Empress entrusted General MacMahon with the formation of a new Cabinet, whose principal task should be to conduct the national defence against the invasion of the enemy.

The new Ministry displayed great celerity in performing the task which they had undertaken. All

unmarried men between twenty-five and thirty-five years of age, who had hitherto been legally dispensed from military service, and widowers without children, were called in to the colours, excepting those who had been previously enrolled in the National Guard. Volunteers were accepted up to the age of forty-five. Free Corps were formed throughout the country, which created a guerilla warfare, and gave the struggle a character of inhumanity and cruelty which was unnecessary and useless. At the same time all German families were expelled from France. The Emperor laid down his command in chief and transferred the care of the Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. Lebœuf was removed from his post of Minister of War. Bazaine recalled the beaten army of Frossard to Metz, whilst MacMahon retired with the remains of the Vosges army to Châlons, where fresh troops were being assembled. The original "Army of the Rhine" was divided into two parts. With Bazaine in Metz were Changarnier, Canrobert, Bourbaki, Ladmirault, and Decaen; with MacMahon, whose army now began to be called the Army of Paris, were De Failly, Felix Douay, Ducrot, and Lebrun. The organisation of the Garde Mobile, neglected for so many years, was now taken up in a hurry, but with little result; all the old soldiers between twenty-five and thirty-eight years of age, whose legal term of service had expired, were recalled to their regiments; the project of invading the sea-coast of Germany was given up, and a division of twelve thousand marines was incorporated in the army, the marine artillery being sent to man the Paris forts.

The Prussian army, together with the troops from the North German States and from Hesse-Darm-

stadt, now marched into Lorraine and took possession of Nancy and the whole of the flat country. When the King entered upon French territory at St. Avold he issued a proclamation to the French people, in which he said that he was fighting against the French army and not against French citizens. They would continue to enjoy full security for their persons and their property, so long as they did not undertake any hostile proceedings against the German troops, and so deprive the King of the power of giving them his protection. These intentions were rendered nugatory by the creation of the Free Corps throughout France. Perhaps it was inevitable, under the circumstances, that every passion should be roused to deal vengeance and destruction on the invaders. But the war rapidly assumed an internecine character, and very few "peaceable" inhabitants, as defined by the Emperor's proclamation, could be found in the country.

The Crown Prince entered Nancy on August 12, and, in possession of the capital, he could consider Lorraine as a conquered country, although Metz, Thionville, and some smaller frontier fortresses lay in the possession of the enemy. German governors were appointed in Alsace and Lorraine which seemed to point to a design already formed for revindicating these ancient German provinces for the Prussian Crown. The world looked on with amazement at the success of the German arms and the breaking-up of the Napoleonic system which had dazzled the eyes of Europe for twenty years.

The portion of the Army of the Rhine concentrated in and about Metz since August 11 amounted at least to one hundred and seventy thousand men. It remained inactive for several days, but, at the

moment when Bazaine assumed the command, the steady advance of the German armies along the whole line demanded energetic action. It had to be decided whether this army should await an attack on Metz or, avoiding a battle, withdraw to Châlons or Paris in order to defend the capital. Unfortunately the French had omitted to protect their flank, so that the first course had become impossible, and Bazaine was compelled to carry his army across the Moselle and lead it towards Verdun. On the night of August 13 the army was still encamped on the right bank of the Moselle in a wide semicircle round Metz, the corps of Canrobert being on the right, those of Frossard and Decaen in the centre, and Ladmirault's on the left; Bourbaki's guards were posted at Remy, Forton's reserve cavalry at Montigny, and Barral's reserve cavalry on the island of Chambière. The guards had apparently no idea that the first army of the Germans was only about four miles distant, concentrated in divisions.

The Emperor left Metz at noon on August 14 and proceeded to the Moselle, intending to witness the passage of the river by the army and then to precede it to Verdun and Châlons. After organising at Châlons the army destined for the defence of the capital, he would return to Paris and resume the reins of government. General von der Goltz had received intelligence in the morning that the second army under Prince Frederick Charles had crossed the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, and came to the conclusion that if he could manage to detain the French a little longer on the right bank, their plans might be disconcerted, and their passage of the river rendered impossible. He therefore advanced, under his own responsibility, at 3.30 P.M., but was brought to

a check at Colombey. The French were not only superior in numbers, but were strongly posted behind trenches, abattis, and other field-works, and the Prussians found themselves in a very critical position; but at 6 P.M. reinforcements came up. General Zastrow arrived about 5 P.M. and assumed command of his corps, but did not produce much effect, till at 7 P.M. General Kameke brought up four battalions on the left wing, and turned the fortune of the day. The French fell back upon Remy, and were forced out of their strong positions. Darkness ended the battle about 8 P.M., and the Prussians maintained the ground they had conquered, while the French withdrew to Metz. The object of keeping part of the French army on the right bank and preventing it from joining the troops which had already passed had been attained, so that the French had lost a day, whilst the second German army was able to continue its turning movement without interruption. The losses on both sides were considerable.

On the following day, August 15, the great festival of the Napoleon dynasty, the birthday of its founder, the day which the sanguine Imperialists had destined for the entry into Berlin, the whole French army set out from Metz towards Verdun, marching by the two southern roads, one of which passes by Rezonville, Vionville, and Mars-la-Tour, the other by Doncourt, Jarny, and Étain. The Emperor and his son accompanied the march, and spent the night in Gravelotte, but on the following morning set out by bye-roads for the camp at Châlons. But Bazaine could only move slowly with his enormous train, and by the evening of that day the advanced guard of the second army, which had crossed the flooded Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and other points, reached, after

forced marches, the positions of Tronville, Mars-la-Tour, and Vionville. As it was part of Moltke's plan to detain the French army between the Meuse and the Moselle and to force them to a decisive battle, this advanced guard, weary as they were, were compelled to take the field at daybreak on the following morning, August 16.

The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the villages of Rezonville, Vionville, and Mars-la-Tour, through an open and undulating country, dotted with small woods. Suddenly the cavalry brigade which was encamped west of Vionville were struck by shells fired from a battery close in their neighbourhood. More batteries followed suit, and the dragoons broke and fled, galloping off to Rezonville. The infantry camps were soon attacked in a similar manner, but Frossard's corps replied with great and successful vigour. The artillery which caused this panic belonged to the advanced guard of the army of Prince Frederick Charles, who did not anticipate a battle, but hoped to fall in with the rearguard of the French, or to compel the French army to halt and fight before it reached the Meuse. The sound of the cannonade startled Lebœuf at Vernéville and Marshal Bazaine in his headquarters at Gravelotte.

By this time Alvensleben had ascertained that the French outposts were at Trouville and Vionville and that great encampments were visible behind these two villages. Having thus learnt that the French had not begun their march to Verdun, he determined to attack them with the third corps and the sixth cavalry division in order to hold them fast. A terrible struggle ensued, the right wing under Stülpnagel advanced from the south, the left wing under

Alvensleben himself from the south-west, while Von Bülow attacked in the centre. Vionville and Flavigny were carried, and the French were compelled to retreat towards Rezonville. Stülpnagel's division had the greatest difficulty in maintaining its position to the west of the wood of Vionville, continuing the combat without being relieved, and suffering heavy losses from the enemy's long-range fire. But it was a combat for life or death, and every Prussian soldier felt convinced of the necessity of not yielding an inch of ground.

Just as Frossard's infantry was retreating behind Rezonville, Bazaine appeared upon the scene and rode into the thick of the battle. He sent a line regiment to charge and check the pursuers; but they were decimated by the fire of the infantry. Bazaine himself was nearly taken prisoner, being separated for a moment from his staff, and compelled to defend himself. The crisis of the battle came about 2 P.M., when every man and gun upon the German side was engaged and the greater part of the tenth corps was still distant from the field. Luckily for the Germans Bazaine began to fear lest he might be turned on his left flank and detached troops to prevent it. At this time Alvensleben directed the brilliant charge of Bredow's corps, with the view of gaining time and relieving the infantry and the artillery. The charge effected its object, but with the terrible loss of 14 officers and 363 men; indeed the French bulletins asserted that the cuirassier regiment of Count Bismarck had been annihilated. During the next three hours the struggle on the German right and centre remained stationary, as they were unable to win ground from the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard.

About 4 P.M. Prince Frederick Charles arrived on

the field, having ridden straight from Pont-à-Mousson. He soon saw that the stress of the battle was on the left wing, where the tenth corps had appeared just in time to meet the fresh troops which were under the command of Lebœuf and Ladmiraault. The artillery took the lead, then the infantry went into the wood and drove out the French. Ladmiraault was driven back. Another cavalry charge took place in which Count Bismarck's two sons rode as privates; one of them was wounded, and the other lifted a wounded comrade on to his horse and carried him from the field. The last event of the battle was a great combat of cavalry.

It was now past 7 P.M., and both sides were exhausted by the tremendous strain to which they had been subjected, but the contest continued until darkness fell. At the very last moment a violent cannonade, the origin of which is still uncertain, burst forth on both sides. The French slept on the ground they held, that is in the village of Rezonville or on the heights to the south of it, and on the ridge on the north overlooking the upper road to Verdun. In the battle the French had lost seventeen thousand men and the Germans sixteen thousand, there being one hundred and twenty-five thousand French engaged in the battle against seventy-seven thousand of their antagonists. The result was not so much a tactical as a moral victory. At the close of the fight neither party was able to move a step further towards the enemy. But during the night the French army was ordered to retire towards Metz. This was a surprise to the French, because they imagined that they had gained a great victory; but Bazaine had no confidence in the supplies either of ammunition or of food.

Bazaine now took up a purely defensive position, with his front towards the west. But he had not given up the idea of retiring to Châlons, because he reported to the Emperor on August 17 that he would, if it were possible, in two days, after the army had been supplied with victuals and ammunition, march towards Verdun by the northern road. As a matter of fact, if he had begun this march in the morning or even the night of August 17, the Germans would not have been able to oppose the movement, but only to harass his flank, whereas his remaining inactive at Metz during the whole of that day enabled his enemies to concentrate a superior force against him and eventually to cut him off from retreat altogether. The reason for this delay was, apparently, as we have before said, the deficiency of food and ammunition.

CHAPTER LXIII.

GRAVELOTTE.

WE have already mentioned that Bazaine announced to his Government the battle of Vionville, or, as the Germans call it, Mars-la-Tour, as a victory, and that his withdrawal under the walls of Metz after its conclusion had merely been for the reasons we have described. The day of August 17, which was wasted by the French, was employed by the Prussians in bringing up all available troops, whether from the first or from the second army. We have seen that the French army had entirely changed its method of fighting. In the days of Napoleon and after, it was chiefly distinguished for its vigorous attacks and firm undaunted courage in assault, but in all the battles which we have described, its object was to stand upon the defensive in well-protected positions. We have seen how the natural features of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Spicheren were used for this purpose, and the hilly region around Metz was not less adapted to this end. Bazaine therefore determined to engage in a decisive battle on this spot before he commenced his retreat to Verdun.

One of the reasons for adopting this method of fighting, the adoption of which is to be attributed to Marshal Niel, was the fact that the French army was equipped with chassepot guns of long range and with mitrailleuses. For that reason it was not con-

sidered wise to place French troops in a position where they would have a wide expanse before them and great difficulty of approach, so that they might await the onslaught of the enemy in their entrenchments, overwhelm them with their fire, and then disperse them with a vigorous charge. The defeats of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Spicheren ought to have given the French a warning that these tactics were not suited to the genius of their army, but they attributed these disasters rather to superior numbers or to surprise. At Remy and at Vionville they had been able, at least, to hold their own, why should not Bazaine make a third attempt, which might scatter, if not annihilate, the enemy and open the road to western France? There were many things in his favour—the courage of the French troops was unbroken, and their spirit had rather been excited than crushed by their previous misfortunes. He had with him an army of one hundred and sixty thousand to one hundred and eighty thousand men, scarcely inferior in number to the Germans, and had the advantage of their being already in hand, whereas the enemy would not be able to assemble for some time. He also flattered himself that he could hold before Metz a position which was regarded not only as impregnable but as one which it would be madness to attack.

The left bank of the Moselle rises suddenly to the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville, and from the summit of these heights falls gradually towards the west, the ground being very uneven and partly covered with wood. Two narrow valleys or gorges penetrate this inclined slope, one on the east, leading from St. Privat by Amanvillers and Châtel St. Germain to the Moselle, and the other on the

west, formed by the rivulet of La Mance, beginning at Vernéville, and also reaching the Moselle. The French army was posted on the heights lying between these two ravines; the high-road from Gravelotte to Metz passes through this position in many windings, which form a species of defile. The ground was of such a nature that it was possible for the defending party to fire in tiers, one above the other, also to occupy a number of sheltered positions behind the heights, whereas the assailants were compelled to advance over ground which offered no cover whatever.

The corps of Canrobert was placed on the right, occupying the village of St. Privat la Montagne, which, as its name implies, stands upon a height, is surrounded by a wall, and consisted at that time largely of massive stone houses which had been strongly fortified. The corps of Lebœuf was in the centre, occupying the farmhouses of La Folie, Leipzig, Moscou, and the Bois de Geniveaux. This position was defended by a triple row of rifle-pits, one over the other. The corps of Ladmirault was on the left wing, and that of Frossard on the extreme left, especially favoured by the formation of the ground, and defended also by rifle-pits. The Imperial Guards were in reserve behind the left wing, and the artillery was drawn up on the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville. On these heights Marshal Bazaine took up his position and retained it throughout the battle. The extent of the French line altogether was about seven miles.

In the battle of Gravelotte, which ensued, the King of Prussia took command of his own army. He drew up his line of battle by placing his *corps d'armée* in the following order, beginning with the right; the

seventh, eighth and ninth corps, the corps of the Guard, the twelfth corps, holding the third and tenth corps, which had suffered severely on August 16 in reserve. The most difficult part of the struggle had been committed to the Guard and the twelfth corps, because they were in the freshest condition; but as they had been compelled to make a considerable march from Mars-la-Tour it was ordered that until they could take part in the battle the fight on the centre and the right should be confined to an artillery fire.

The French opened the battle at midday with a murderous fire. The eighth German corps then occupied Gravelotte and deployed its artillery on the heights on the east and the south, and at 12.45 fifty guns opened their fire. They kept up the artillery combat most resolutely, notwithstanding the losses they suffered from the French guns and mitrailleuses for many hours. At 4 P.M. fifteen of these guns had been disabled, and it became necessary to obtain fresh supplies of ammunition from the rear. The French, however, had been entirely unable to drive them back. At this time the Germans gained an advantage on the left wing. Prince Hohenlohe advanced towards St. Privat, till his batteries got within chassepot range and succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery, not only at St. Privat, but at Amanvillers and Montigny. The ninth corps maintained its position, although it was deluged with the enemy's projectiles, and the brave Hessians never yielded a foot of ground. St. Marie aux Chênes was also taken about 4 P.M., and the Saxon artillery was able to take a position north of the village, directing its fire on St. Privat and Roncourt.

As Marshal Bazaine surveyed the field of battle

from the heights of Plappeville at about 5 P.M., he had sound reason for believing that the battle was already decided in his favour, and that victory was certain. At that time the French army held unflinchingly all its main positions along the whole line and had only lost a few small advanced posts. Canrobert still remained perfectly intact in the position of St. Privat and Roncourt, although his corps had been driven back at St. Marie, and was engaged in a serious artillery combat; Ladmirault also held his ground at Amanvillers and at Montigny. Lebœuf had been compelled to evacuate the Bois de Geniveaux, but had warded off the enemy's attack against its main position on the heights of Moscou; Frossard was still holding his fortified positions at Point du Jour and Rozerieulles, although St. Hubert had been lost. The Imperial Guard, in reserve, had not as yet taken any part in the engagement. It must, however, be remembered that on the side of the Germans only about half the disposable forces had been actively employed, and that powerful efforts were possible with fresh troops, both on the right and left wing.

The battle had now been raging for five hours without intermission; there were signs that evening was coming on, and if anything decisive was to be done that day, it was necessary that the Guards should take part in the engagement. Therefore soon after 5 P.M. orders were given to three brigades of the Guards to advance to the attack of St. Privat. As they advanced they were received with a heavy fire, but they continued to press steadily forward. Indeed nearly all the generals, field-officers and adjutants who remained on horseback were either dismounted or killed. The loss was so great that orders were given

to suspend the attack and to await the arrival of the Saxons. Those troops, forming the twelfth corps, reached Roncourt at 6.30 P.M. and proposed to attack St. Privat on the north, and at this moment the three brigades of the Guards received orders to continue their advance. At 6.45 they forced their way into the village from the south and west, and at the same moment some of the Saxon troops entered from the north. A street fight ensued in which the houses of the village had to be stormed one after the other, and just as darkness set in the united German troops became masters of the village.

The attack of the Guards upon St. Privat made it possible for the Hessian division and the third brigade of Guards to advance upon Amanvillers, but the French forces at this spot were so much superior in numbers that the attack did not succeed. However, the defeat of the French at St. Privat carried with it the abandonment of Amanvillers. Ladmirault, fearing to be taken on flank, evacuated his positions and retreated through the wood of Lorry to Plappeville, the retreat being so precipitous that a large encampment of huts fell into the hands of the Prussians, together with much other booty. When the news of the defeat of the French right wing reached headquarters General Bourbaki, commander of the Imperial Guard, issued orders to march through the forest to its support, but they arrived too late to be of any advantage.

At the other extremity of the field General Fransecky, commanding the second corps, received orders from the King at 5.30 P.M. to carry the plateau of the Moscou farm. For this purpose it was necessary to pass through the terrible defile of Gravelotte, which can never be forgotten by any one

who has seen it, as it appears almost impregnable. The pass, formed by the steep banks of the River Mance, is only twelve yards wide. After passing the bridge the road to Metz is bordered for about five hundred yards by a wall of precipitous rocks, thirty or forty feet high, and on the right by a ravine in some places twenty feet deep. After passing St. Hubert the road reaches the level of the plateau. Along this road the infantry had to advance unsupported, until they reached St. Hubert. The progress was watched by Moltke and by the King himself until Von Roon forced him away from his dangerous position.

Fransecky's orders were that the troops were to climb the eastern bank of the Mance, and move along the road until they came in front of Point du Jour, they were then to storm that important position, which is the highest point of the road. These orders were carried out, the troops pressing forward in one continuous close column, every file closing up to the next one, and each rank calling to the other, "Close up well forwards, shoulder to shoulder." The drummers beat the charge, the bugles sounded the advance, and the soldiers responded with an hurrah! They were received on the plateau by a storm of mitrailleuses and chassepots, while the solid mass of soldiers moving forward on the high-road were ploughed into with projectiles, which found their victims on the other side of the defile. In the meantime the artillery of the corps kept up a continuous fire against the plateau over the heads of the storming columns.

The attack was not without its special feature of disaster. Some Prussian troops were driven back to the rear along the same road and hindered these advancing invaders; guns also moving out of fire

caused still more confusion. Something like a panic occurred, and it required all the efforts of the leaders to restore order; a considerable number of soldiers were thrown forcibly down the deep ravine which borders the other side of the road. The sun had now gone down, and it was found that in the confusion Prussian troops who had reached the heights were firing upon their advancing comrades. Fransecky therefore ordered the bugle to sound "cease firing," and a general cessation of fire occurred for a moment on both sides. The storming column, which had been temporarily stopped, now got under weigh again and reached St. Hubert, but beyond that village it was again exposed to a murderous hail. At last Point du Jour was carried. About 10.30 P.M. the enemy delivered a terrible fire of mitrailleuses and chassépots upon the Germans, the last great volley which formed a closing scene to the whole battle. On the next morning it was found that the enemy had evacuated all his positions, the road being thickly strewed with arms and knapsacks thrown away in flight. The King passed the night on a field-bed in a small room at Rezonville, not having changed his clothes for thirty hours, and having no covering during the night except his military cloak. On the following day, finding that no attempts were being made to renew the conflict, he moved his headquarters to Pont-à-Mousson.

In this battle the French lost 609 officers and 11,705 men, the Germans 904 officers and 19,058 men. Besides this six thousand French were made prisoners.

Let us now consider the operations we have described in their general aspect. After the battles of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Saarbrücken, the German

army formed a line obliquely directed towards the Moselle, so that the right wing was fifty miles and the left wing a hundred and ten miles distant from the stream. The line of the Moselle now became the objective, and the whole army eventually came into a position parallel to its course, the right wing holding back and the left wing pressing towards the river. The centre, under Prince Frederick Charles, now moved round the right wing under Steinmetz and crossed the river at Pont-à-Mousson, so that when it took up its position at Mars-la-Tour and Doncourt, it had described a half-circle. At Mars-la-Tour the former Prussian centre was posted with its face to the Rhine and its back towards Paris, and the French army against which it had fought had its face towards Paris, and its back to the Rhine—a position similar to that of the French and the allies in the battle of the Valmy. These movements had been carried out with perfect precision and without any confusion, as was the movement which after Mars-la-Tour united the two armies placed on different sides of the Moselle. These remarkable manoeuvres would have been disastrous failures if they had not been executed in the most perfect manner; and the conception and development of them were both due to the astounding genius of Moltke.

CHAPTER LXIV.

THE MARCH TO SEDAN.

BAZAINE was now definitely shut up in Metz. The battle of August 16 had cut him off from the southern road by Mars-la-Tour, the march on August 18 had closed the road by Conflans, the storming of St. Privat had shut up the third and last avenue of safety by way of Briey and Etain. The German army was now to undertake the difficult task of keeping the general and his army strictly confined in the fortress while the remainder of their strength was employed in action on the field. For the purpose of carrying out these two objects, the King separated three corps from the united army, the twelfth corps composed of Saxons, the corps of the Guards, and the fourth corps, as well as the greater part of the cavalry. This army was placed under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony and received the name of the Army of the Meuse, being destined to march upon Paris and to act on the right wing of the third army. The remaining parts of the first and second armies were formed into a Siege Army—preserving their original names but placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles.

The Army of the Siege, gradually strengthened by the arrival of reservists and other soldiers, attained at best the number of one hundred and fifty

thousand combatants. It invested the city on both sides of the Moselle and was stationed in trenches, batteries and parallels, often double or three-fold in depth, together with the use of the villages lying within the region of the lines. The foreposts were pushed as far forward as the fire of the forts permitted; indeed they were generally within the range of the heavy ordnance, and only the reserves were entirely out of range. The whole length of the line of investment was about thirty miles. Observatories were erected on all lofty points, connected by telegraph with each other or with the different headquarters, so that any weakness in any portion of the blockade could be immediately redressed. The fortress was well supplied with ammunition, but less well with provisions, as the city contained, besides the army of Bazaine, its own inhabitants and those of much of the surrounding country.

Considering the difficulties which stood in his way, it is creditable to Bazaine that he was already prepared to make a sortie on August 26, when MacMahon's army was marching from Rheims to Réthel. His object was to get possession of Thionville, and to force his way to Châlons by the fortresses of the north; but, after a few attempts made in the direction of Noiseville and Colombey, he became convinced that the Prussian general was his master. Holding a council of war, he deferred any further attempt until the ground should have hardened after the copious storms of rain. At this council of war General Soleille made a report on the supplies of munition remaining in Metz, and Bazaine sent a telegram to the Minister of War in these words: "Still in Metz, artillery ammunition only sufficient

for one battle. Impossible under these circumstances to break through the entrenched lines of the besiegers. It would be a good thing if attacks from the interior could compel the blockading army to retreat." A few days after this he was informed that the second and third corps of the besieging army had withdrawn in the direction of Stenay and Dun, in order to strengthen the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, which was threatened by MacMahon. Therefore on August 31, 1870, he made a powerful sortie, with the object either of driving the Prussians back and regaining his freedom of action, or of replenishing his commissariat and thus being able to hold out longer.

He chose for this attempt the right bank of the Moselle, where the defences of the enemy were less strong and where his enterprise could be supported by some advanced forts. He hoped to be able to reach Saarlouis and Thionville, and from thence to restore his communication with the army of Châlons. He did indeed succeed, towards evening, in driving the Germans out of their position at Noiseville and Montey, and of occupying new ground even as far as Colombey; but he was eventually repulsed in a night attack by the first army corps and a division of the Landwehr, together with forty thousand men, under General Manteuffel. Soon afterwards the detached portion of the army returned and Bazaine could have no further hope of executing his plan. By September 1 the French were at last at Metz again. It is clear from this that by the victories of the middle of the month the *morale* of the German army had been strengthened and that of the French army had been weakened. The surrender of the army in Metz was now only a matter of time, provisions were becoming

scarce, and the day after the great sortie the besieged began to slaughter their horses.

The Emperor Napoleon, leaving Bazaine's army at Metz on the morning of August 16, arrived the same evening at the camp of Châlons where Marshal MacMahon was posted with the first and twelfth corps of his army, the fifth and seventh corps having not yet arrived. The camp was situated in a large plain, supposed to be identical with the Catalaunian Fields, which once witnessed the defeat of the Huns. Between the camp of Châlons and the fortress of Metz stretches a table-land diversified with hills, a part of the Ardennes; the road from Châlons to Metz passes by Valmy and St. Ménéhould, famous for the defeat of the French monarchy in the flight to Varennes and the triumph of the Republic in the cannonade of Kellermann. This line of hills, called the Argonne, is pierced by the Meuse and the Marne, which rises in the heights of Langres, and by the Aisne, a tributary of the Oise. A row of fortresses of the second and third rank protect the valley of the Meuse and its eastern tributary the Chiers, towards the east and the north, the principal of them being Verdun, Montmédy, Sedan, Mezières, Langwy, and Givet. This territory is the scene of the military operations of September, which began with the battles of Beaumont and Sedan, and ended with the siege of Paris.

MacMahon's army, concentrated at Châlons, consisted of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. He had under him Generals Ducrot, De Failly, Douay, and other leaders of the former Army of the Rhine, which now bore the name of the Army of Paris. Shortly

afterwards General Wimpffen arrived with reinforcements from Algiers. General Trochu was originally in the camp, but being appointed by Napoleon to be Governor of Paris, and to the command of the forces destined for the defence of the capital, he soon left to take up his new duties. At the council of war held at Châlons on August 17 it had been determined that the Emperor should proceed to Paris and resume the reins of government; also that MacMahon's army should march on Paris and accept a battle there if necessary. However the Empress and the Ministry were afraid that if the Emperor returned to the Tuileries, both his life and his dynasty would be in danger; they were also opposed to the retreat of MacMahon's army. This brought about a most unsatisfactory state of things. The Emperor virtually abdicated just at the time when his authority was most required, and MacMahon was not left to his own devices in the command of his army, but was constantly interfered with both by the Empress Regent and by the Ministers.

The Emperor and MacMahon both adhered to the original plan of leading the Army of Châlons back to Paris, or at least to the neighbourhood of the capital; but in Paris it was insisted upon that MacMahon should make an offensive advance in the direction of Verdun, so as to co-operate with Bazaine and effect a junction with him. MacMahon had grave doubts as to the success of this bold enterprise, which could only produce its effect if Bazaine could succeed at the same time in breaking through the iron embrace of the Prussian armies. He adopted a compromise of marching to Rheims and evacuated the camp on the morning of August 21. The store of food, forage and clothing collected there was des-

troyed and the camp burned down, measures which were dictated by fear and which were quite unnecessary. MacMahon remained at Rheims two days, and on August 23, in obedience to stringent orders from Paris, commenced his march to Montmédy, having with him an army of one hundred and forty thousand men. He passed by way of Réthel, Chêne le Populeux, and Mouzon to the Meuse, the heads of his columns reaching this latter place on August 28. The Army of Châlons gradually lost confidence in their leaders. Dejection and insubordination became rife, and the rations were so defective that the soldiers had to resort to plunder. Great masses of stragglers followed the army, and wandered over the country.

To meet this unexpected move on the part of the French, an entirely new disposition of the Prussian forces was required, all previous arrangements having been made on the supposition of a march to Paris. The fourth German army, called the Army of the Meuse, had reached the range of the Argonne, and occupied the road between Clermont and Ste. Ménéhould, but it was not of itself strong enough to oppose MacMahon if he should operate in the direction of Metz. The third army had established communication with the fourth, but the two armies together formed a line of forty-six miles, broken at a right angle. But it was necessary, in order to effect MacMahon's destruction, to require from the third army long marches to the east, whilst the fourth army had to detain the enemy and obstruct his progress. These complicated operations were carried out with such precision that in no single case did a crossing of columns occur, and this rapid wheel to the right of an army of more than two hundred thou-

sand men and its concentration at the determined point has probably never been equalled in the history of war. Even the great difficulty of procuring subsistence in a new line of advance was met by the zeal and resource of the commissariat.

Orders for the march of the army on the Meuse were issued by the King on the evening of August 25. The movements of the German armies were of such a nature that two days later MacMahon must have seen that it would be impossible for him to continue his march on Metz. He therefore wished to abandon the attempt and to retreat with the army of Châlons to Mezières. But he was overruled by the most positive commands from Paris and had no alternative but to obey. He made preparations for crossing the Meuse on August 29, with his left wing at Mouzon and his right at Stenay, but in consequence of an engagement at Nouart he was obliged to abandon the advance on Stenay and to retreat to Beaumont. By the evening of August 29 the net was spread out in all directions, by means of which the French army was forced to operate in a narrow field and at last compelled to accept a battle under the most unfavourable circumstances.

By this time the army of the Crown Prince had reached the right bank of the Aisne, after coming into conflict with the enemy at Buzancy and Chêne le Populeux, while the reinforced fourth army had, after the engagement at Nouart, occupied the line of the Meuse from Dun to Stenay. The King of Prussia had fixed his headquarters, first at Clermont and then at Varennes, whilst the Emperor and MacMahon were established in Mouzon. Here the news reached them that on August 30 the corps of De Failly had been attacked in the town of Beau-

mont by the Bavarians under General von der Tann, and the Saxons, and had been forced to retreat hastily to Carignan and Sedan.

We have seen that De Faily had encamped with the fifth corps on the heights to the north of Beaumont. He had called together the commandants of the several divisions at 9 A.M., and their reports all agreed that the enemy were not pursuing. The march on Mouzon was therefore deferred till 11 A.M., but no efforts were made to reconnoitre the wooded country south of Beaumont. The French troops were enjoying their ease, the men employed in cooking, and the horses being taken to water, when all of a sudden shells fell into the camp and every one rushed to take up arms. But the Prussian infantry had in the meantime reached the camp, and overmastered its defenders. The artillery had no time to harness the horses and to put them to the guns; all the tents, the baggage and the stores fell into the hands of the enemy. The troops which had been encamped to the north of the town were able to offer resistance, but De Faily was at last compelled to retreat. The battle of Beaumont had a decisive effect, the fifth corps of the French army being decimated. It lost eighteen hundred men killed and wounded and had to leave nineteen guns, eight mitrailleuses, and three thousand prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

After the battle the Emperor of the French might even then have escaped to Mezières and have secured the safety of his person, but he refused to leave the army. He arrived at Carignan at 4 P.M. on August 30, and sent a reassuring despatch to the Empress. MacMahon was now aware that the army of Châlons had been overtaken by the forces of the enemy in

far greater numbers than his own. It had become necessary to abandon the march of the army on Montmédy and the attempt to relieve Bazaine at Metz. The choice remained between accepting a battle at Mouzon and retreating to the west without fighting in order to prevent the army if possible from being surrounded by the enemy. The Marshal therefore determined to concentrate his forces at Sedan, which could only be effected by a night march. Every preparation had been made for the Emperor passing the night at Carignan, but at 8 P.M. he left unexpectedly by the railway for Sedan, which is about twelve miles off. The troops marching through the night reached their encampments at Sedan on the morning of August 31, some as late as 9 A.M.

Whatever designs MacMahon may have had in retreating to Sedan were rendered nugatory by the swift advance of the German troops. When the fourth army marched up the right bank of the Meuse and, crossing the Chiers at Douzy, occupied the east of Sedan, the third army, composed of North Germans, Bavarians and Würtembergers, and provided with excellent artillery, was marching along the left bank by Roncourt and Remilly. An attempt made by the Bavarians to pass the river at Bazeilles was at first repulsed, but in the night they were able to cross at two places above Sedan, whilst the eleventh North German corps crossed the river at Donchery, and the Würtembergers lower down, whilst the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony gained the heights to the east and north of the town. Thus were the French enveloped in a snare from which there was no escape. It is said that when Moltke received the last report which completed the intelligence that his plans for the investment of the French army had

been duly carried out, he made a note in his pocket-book and uttered the words, "Es stimmt," which may be somewhat feebly translated by the English expression, "All right"—an eloquent exclamation from the famous strategist whose distinction was to be silent in seven languages.

CHAPTER LXV.

SEDAN.

ON September 1, 1870, the French army at Sedan was confined within a space of four and a half miles from north to south, and two miles from east to west. Sedan, a small fortress, lies on the right bank of the Meuse, and on the left bank is a suburb called Torcy, defended by a *tête-du-pont*. The village of Bazeilles, and Balan, a suburb of Sedan, are on the right bank of the river, above the town; on the east are the villages of Givonne, Daigny, and Moncelle, and on the north-west those of Illy and Floing. The space between Sedan and Bazeilles on the right bank is low, whereas on the opposite bank the high ground comes down to the bank of the river, between Remilly and Wadelincourt. The wood of Garenne, which played an important part in the battle, lies to the north of the town. Sedan is seven miles distant from the Belgian frontier. The right wing of the French held Balan and Bazeilles and was opposed by the Bavarians; then came the first French corps at Givonne and Daigny, opposed by the Prussian Guards and the Saxons of the twelfth corps. The positions of Illy and Floing to the north of Sedan were defended by the seventh French corps and two cavalry divisions, and was attacked by the eleventh and fifth corps, together with some cavalry. The

fifth French corps was posted just outside Sedan to act as a general reserve. In this manner the attack upon the three main points of the French position Bazeilles, the valley of Givonne, and the position of Floing and Illy, superior forces of the German troops were everywhere available.

The battle began before daylight at 4 A.M. by the Bavarians under General von der Tann advancing to attack Bazeilles, which had been half burnt down on the day before. It was most obstinately defended in the streets, houses, and gardens both by soldiers and citizens and was only captured after a hard struggle. Unfortunately for the French, Marshal MacMahon, who had ridden into the foremost line of combat, was so severely wounded in the very beginning of the battle from the splinters of a shell, that he had to surrender the command and was carried back into Sedan, meeting the Emperor on his way, who then rode into the battle. The command would naturally pass to General Wimpffen, who had just arrived from Algiers, but MacMahon passed him over and entrusted the army to Ducrot. These generals differed very much in their views of military matters, and neither had any knowledge of what the plans of MacMahon had been.

Ducrot assumed the command at 7.30 A.M., and immediately gave commands for the army to retire to the plateau of Illy, in order that they might force the way out to Mezières; Bazeilles was to be evacuated first and Givonne last. When General Wimpffen heard of this he disapproved so highly of Ducrot's tactics that he determined to make use of a power which had been given him to assume the com-

mand under certain circumstances, and therefore at 9 A.M. wrote to Ducrot saying that he had been authorised by the Minister of War to assume the chief command in case of any accident happening to Mac-Mahon, and that he disapproved of the evacuation of Bazeilles and Givonne. But when the Saxons had, after tremendous efforts, obtained possession of the north-eastern ridge of Villers and Cernay, Daigny and Givonne, and had given the hand to the Bavarians, who after similar efforts had become masters of Bazeilles and were now able to seize the heights of La Moncelle, and when these two streams of conquerors united to drive the French out of Balan the issue of the day was no longer doubtful.

During the battle the Crown Prince took his stand on a hill a little south of the village of Donchery, and the King of Prussia established himself at a point a little further to the east from which the whole field was visible. This stationary position of the two commanders throughout the day was of great assistance both in receiving reports and in sending orders, and as we have seen a similar course was almost always adopted by the Great Napoleon in his battles. The Bavarians became masters of Bazeilles at about 10 A.M. after six hours' fighting. Similar attacks were made by the Saxons on the other side, and shortly after this the whole valley of the Givonne with all the villages in it as far as Daigny was held by the soldiers of these two great German races. The French artillery had been compelled to retreat to a new position at Balan, and all possibility of the French being able to break through on their side was at an end. At this juncture the Emperor rode back

to Sedan, passing through Balan, finding that he was neglected on the field of battle and that his physical powers were exhausted. He had to force his way through crowds of runaway troops, who were taking refuge in the fortress; shells were falling in the streets, and as the Emperor rode into the town a shell exploded just in front of him, killing his horse.

In the meantime, to the north-west, the Prussian troops had occupied St. Menges and Fleigneux, and were directing a terrible artillery fire on the French divisions who were defending Floing and Illy. At midday the French were so completely surrounded that only two means of escape remained to them, either to break out between Givonne and Fleigneux and reach the Belgian frontier, or to cross the Meuse into the suburbs of Torcy and fight their way through the enemy to Rheims. The boldest general might well hesitate before adopting either of these courses, as the result, even if successful, could only be accomplished after very heavy loss. Not long after this Illy was taken by the advance of the Prussian Guards, the iron ring closed more and more pitilessly around the fortress, and at last the position of Floing had also to be given up.

When Wimpffen saw that the state of the army was hopeless he determined to make the desperate attempt of cutting his way out towards the east, so as to reach Montmédy with the Emperor and what he could rescue of the army. So at 1.15 P.M. he invited the Emperor to place himself at the head of his troops, who would think it an honour to provide for his personal safety. The Emperor received this letter at 2 P.M., but declined to accede to the proposi-

tion. After waiting an hour for an answer Wimpffen rode first to Givonne and then to Balan, but found that in both places his troops had retreated. Alone and without a staff, and having no troops to command, there was nothing left for him but to retire into the fortress of Sedan as others had done before him. It was now 3 P.M.; broken bodies of the French were flying in all directions, some to the wood of Garenne, some to Sedan. The Prussians advanced against the wood and took many prisoners; some even pressed up to Sedan, where they were exposed to the fire of the fortress, but they succeeded in cutting off the retreat from a number of French detachments.

Half an hour later General Ducrot rode into the town, and everything which met his gaze induced him to abandon hope. The streets and squares were blocked with guns, and with waggons of every description, hordes of soldiers who had thrown away their arms and knapsacks rushed into the houses in search of food and to the churches for shelter. There was nothing before him but a chaotic mob, calling out "Treachery" and threatening to kill their officers. Ducrot found the Emperor at the Sous-Préfecture in a state of deep dejection and perfectly hopeless. He had already hoisted a white flag on the citadel, but it had been taken down by the orders of General Faure, chief of the staff. Another flag of truce was sent and Wimpffen received the Emperor's orders to cease firing and to open negotiations, but being determined to make another attempt to break through the lines he positively refused to obey. He managed to get together a force

of about two thousand men, and, accompanied by two guns, got as far as Balan, but soon afterwards, as he was riding at the head of the column, he looked round and found that all his men had disappeared, so that he was forced to retire to Sedan.

At about 5.30 P.M. the King of Prussia sent Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf to Sedan with a flag of truce, to summon the French commandant to capitulate. On entering the Prefecture, to his great astonishment he found himself face to face with the Emperor, whom he did not know to be in the fortress. The Emperor had apparently just written a letter to the King in the following terms: "Not having been able to find death in the midst of my soldiers, nothing remains for me but to deliver my sword into the hands of your majesty." This letter was carried by the Emperor's own aide-de-camp, General Reille, who handed it to the King of Prussia shortly after 7 P.M. The King was deeply moved; he first rendered thanks to God, and then informed the German princes of what had occurred, thanking them for their assistance, without which his success would have been impossible. He replied to the Emperor that he regretted the manner of their meeting, that he accepted his sword, and he requested him to send some person with full power to conclude the capitulation.

The King, having committed the care of military matters to Count Moltke and of political matters to Count Bismarck, left the field of battle and drove fourteen miles to his headquarters at Vendresse which he reached at 11 P.M. At Sedan a violent quarrel broke out between Ducrot and Wimpffen in

the Emperor's presence, which was ended by the Emperor commanding Wimpffen to proceed to Donchery and discuss the details of the surrender, an armistice having been previously concluded which was to last till 4 A.M. on September 2. The discussion with regard to the terms of the capitulation lasted throughout the night. Wimpffen asked that his army might be allowed to retreat with arms and baggage, promising not to serve against the German armies again till the end of the war; Moltke insisted upon the unconditional surrender of the whole army as prisoners of war. When Wimpffen threatened to renew the struggle he was reminded that his army was decimated, that he had food only for forty-eight hours, and that, if he did not consent, a fire of three hundred guns should be opened upon the city and the troops as soon as the armistice expired.

The next morning the council of war which assembled at Sedan at 7 A.M. agreed that no other course was possible except to sign the capitulation on the terms proposed, and it was only by the personal intervention of the Emperor that in consideration of the brave defence made by the French army, the generals, officers and military employés holding the rank of officer were excepted from the capitulation on condition of giving their word of honour in writing not to serve during the present war, or to act in any way contrary to the interests of Germany. The Emperor met the King of Prussia at the Château of Belleville, and it was arranged that he should reside at the Palace of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, so long as he remained a prisoner of war. On the following day he drove to the Belgian town

of Bouillon, and when he entered his quarters was crying bitterly.

The French prisoners of war, after laying down their arms, were taken to a tongue of land at Iges, which is surrounded on three sides by the Meuse, there to await their removal to Germany. Unfortunately they underwent great sufferings, as the rain converted the ground on which they bivouacked into mud. There was also a deficiency of food, as the French had none whatever, and the Germans were hardly able to produce eighty thousand more rations than they required for themselves. A strange feature of the capitulation was formed by the French cavalry horses, which had been let to run loose. Ten thousand of them forming into one or two large bodies, galloped wildly over the country like a hurricane, doing much damage in their course. Many of them fought together with their hoofs and teeth and were drowned in the Meuse. The numbers which took part in the battle of Sedan were, on the German side, one hundred and twenty-one thousand infantry and six hundred and eighteen guns, no cavalry having been employed; on the French side between sixty and seventy thousand, with three hundred and twenty guns and seventy mitrailleuses. The battle was one of the longest in duration of the great battles of modern times, having lasted without intermission from 6 A.M. till 4 P.M. The reason of this was that no time had to be spent on the deploying of the attacking army. The losses on the German side amounted altogether to 9,860, and on the French to thirteen thousand; besides this there were taken in the battle twenty-five thousand unwounded French

prisoners, besides seven thousand men and five hundred horses which escaped into Belgium, making the total French losses in September forty-one thousand men, considerably more than half their entire force. By the capitulation of September 2 eighty-three thousand men surrendered as prisoners of war, including the wounded and the non-combatants. Among the prisoners were 2,866 officers, including Marshal MacMahon and forty generals.

As one portion of the French army was shut up in Metz and the other had been compelled to capitulate at Sedan, there was no further obstacle to the advance of the third and fourth armies on Paris. Indeed the orders for the advance were signed within an hour after the conclusion of the capitulation and the troops commenced their march on September 3. It was thought by many and hoped by more that the war might now be considered at an end, but this was not to be the case. The Empire was overthrown on September 4; the government of the Regency was compelled to fly and the Republic was proclaimed, taking as its motto, "La Guerre à outrance!"—a war which lasted for six months, until it ended favourably for the German armies by the defeat of the republican forces and the capture of Paris.

CHAPTER LXVI.

THE WAR IN THE PROVINCES.

THE new Republican government proclaimed by the mouth of Jules Favre its programme to be, "Not a foot of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses." When the battle of Sedan took place General Vinoy was on his way from Châlons to Mezières with Mac-Mahon; but on hearing of the defeat he returned to Paris, collecting a certain number of stragglers on his way. His troops formed the kernel of the army of defence with which Trochu expected to protect the forts and the capital from the advancing enemy. Besides this were collected all arm-bearing people who could be of any kind of use—marines, custom-house officers, fire brigades, gamekeepers, policemen both horse and foot, discharged soldiers—so that the whole number amounted to four hundred thousand. In the meantime the two armies which had fought at Sedan were on the march to Paris under the command of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony. On September 5 General Tümping concentrated the whole of the sixth army corps in Rheims, and on September 15 the King visited the same city before establishing his headquarters at Meaux.

The agitation in Paris became more riotous as the population saw that the city was being gradually

invested, the Crown Prince of Saxony occupying the right bank of the Seine and the lower Marne on the line from Argenteuil by Montmagny and Blanc Menil, and through the wood of Bondy to Gournay; and the Crown Prince of Prussia with the third army the left bank of the Seine from Gournay to Bonneuil, Choisy-le-Roi, Thiais, Chevilly, Sceaux, Meudon, Sèvres, and Bougival. The two armies touched each other at the peninsula of Argenteuil. The forces occupied in this investment, which eventually by reinforcements reached the number of two hundred and fifty thousand, were divided in such a way that the Prussians occupied the north and west, the Bavarians the south, the Saxons the east, while the Würtembergers watched the line of fortresses. After the combats of Petit-Bicêtre and Châtillon on September 19 the investment was complete, six army corps occupying a space of fifty miles, and standing in some places within the fire of the fortifications.

Under the reigns of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III. Paris had been converted into a fortress of the first rank, its river line of defences being composed of ninety-four armed bastions, its second line by a circle of advanced forts, well provided with garrisons and guns, one of which, Mont Valerien, was regarded as impregnable; and besides the double row of defences, the hills surrounding Paris were furnished with entrenchments and redoubts, all connected with each other. The Germans placed their confidence in famine, and believed that if they carefully cut off all supplies of food, a population of two millions, many of whom were accustomed to luxury and self-

indulgence, could not hold out for very long. Great pains were therefore taken to make the lines of investment impenetrable.

Paris and Metz were not the only cities which were being besieged by the German armies. On September 23 Toul, an ancient city of Lorraine, which formed with Metz and Verdun the "three bishoprics" which were the first territory transferred from the Teutons to the French, capitulated after a terrible bombardment. The possession of this city opened for the Germans direct railway communications with the Rhine, and a few days later, on September 27, Strasburg, the great frontier city of the Rhine, the most important acquisition of Louis XVI., fell into the hands of the Germans, having held out since August 10. It is not our purpose to relate the details of these sieges, which resemble each other in the endurance and the suffering of the defenders and the tenacity of the assailants. In the bombardment which preceded the regular siege, which may be dated from August 29, great pains were taken to spare the cathedral, and it was only slightly injured. On the other hand, the public library, consisting of three hundred thousand volumes, many of great value, was entirely destroyed, although the French might have preserved it by concealing it in the ample cellars which formed the basement of the building. Some novelties which distinguished the siege ought to be mentioned: first, the use of rifled short twenty-four pounders and rifled twenty-six centimetre mortars, weighing each seven tons; secondly, the construction of batteries beyond the second parallel; and thirdly, the use of indirect fire

for breaching. This was done by curved fire at a thousand yards' distance, when the wall to be breached could not be seen, but only ascertained by careful measurement. Also the enemy's mines were unloaded and then used for the careful observation of the enemy's works.

After Strasburg had fallen General von Werder was sent with the fourteenth army corps to reduce the southern part of Alsatia from Schlettstadt to Belfort, and to clear out the Mobiles and the Free Corps from the passes of the Vosges. On October 5 King William transferred his headquarters from Ferrières, the luxurious château of the Rothschilds, to Versailles, the ancient palace of the Bourbon kings, and from this centre the siege of Paris was conducted. On October 13, 1870, the Château of St. Cloud, so notable in French history, was set on fire by the projectiles of the French themselves, and the Germans had the greatest difficulty in preserving the valuable objects and the works of art contained in the rooms. A few days later the Imperial Palace of Malmaison, with all its treasures, was destroyed in a sortie.

A new character was given to the struggle on October 7, 1870, by Léon Gambetta, a man of genius and remarkable energy, who had left Paris in a balloon, joining the Provisional Government at Tours; he used every effort to rouse the country against the invaders, and to compel the retirement of the besieging army. For this purpose France, with the exception of Paris, was divided into four governments, that of the north under Bourbaki with Lille for its capital, that of the south under Fiéreck

in Le Mans, that of the centre under Pohlès in Bourges, and that of the east under Cambriels in Besancon, and that eleven camps of instruction and defence should be formed for resistance against the enemy. Also two armies named respectively from the Loire and the Somme were to advance upon Paris and be assisted by sorties made under the direction of Trochu, who was military commandant of the capital. This policy gave rise to the sorties of October 13 and October 21, the first in the south and the second in the west, and the more important attack on Le Bourget to the north-east which took place on October 28. The French succeeded in driving the Germans from Le Bourget and holding it for two days, but they were eventually driven back after an obstinate engagement. There were great difficulties in keeping up communications between the capital and the provinces, because the invaders had destroyed all the telegraph wires; but this want was supplied to some extent by carrier-pigeons and balloons.

In forming his plans for the relief of Paris Gambetta had counted upon the co-operation of Bazaine and his army, who were shut up in Metz; but before the organisation of the Seine army was complete this fortress capitulated. On October 11 Bazaine sent one of his adjutants, General Boyer, to the headquarters at Versailles to propose terms. He demanded for his army a free departure with arms and baggage with the obligation not to take part in the war for three months, whilst Metz preserved the right of defending herself. At the same time private negotiations were conducted between Bazaine and the Empress Eugénie in England with the object

of employing the army of Metz for the restoration of the Empire; but the history of these is imperfectly known. These negotiations led to no result, and Bazaine was at last compelled to capitulate on similar terms to the French army in Sedan, when his troops had been brought to the verge of starvation, and his available troops had been reduced in numbers by sickness to seventy thousand. General Changarnier arranged the terms by which Metz and its fortifications, with arms, munitions of war, and provisions, were delivered to the enemy, and the whole army, including three marshals, Bazaine, Canrobert, and Lebœuf, six thousand officers, and more than one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, became prisoners of war. The disarmament took place on October 26 and 27 in a meadow on the road between Jarny and Metz. In recognition of this crowning mercy the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia were made Field-m Marshals, and Moltke was created a Count.

In the last month of 1870 the northern half of France from the Jura to the English Channel, from the frontier of Belgium to the Loire, was one broad battlefield. Of the forces set free by the fall of Metz, part remained behind as a garrison under General von Zastrow, with the additional object of attacking Thionville, and part marched to the north under the command of Manteuffel to occupy Picardy and Normandy and to prevent the army of General Bourbaki from approaching Paris. A third division joined the second army, whose commander Prince Frederick Charles had his headquarters in Troyes, and, supported on the right by the troops of Von

der Tann, and the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and on the left by the forces of General Werder, made head on the one side against the French army of the Loire, and on the other against the free corps of Garibaldi in the east. A fourth contingent went to strengthen the besieging forces around Paris; and other detachments were sent against the fortresses of the north.

In consequence of these movements, Soissons surrendered on October 16, Verdun on November 8, Thionville on November 24, Ham on December 10, Phalzburg on December 12, and Montmédy on December 14. Mezières fell on January 2, 1871. The garrisons of all these fortresses were sent as prisoners to Germany, and the spoil which they contained went to swell the possessions of the conquerors. The little mountainous fortress of Bitsch was never taken, and did not come into the possession of the Germans till the peace.

We have seen that General von Werder, after the fall of Strasburg, proceeded to the conquest of Schlettstadt, Neu-Breisach, and Belfort, and to the occupation of the mountain districts of the Vosges and the Jura. He had here to deal with a guerilla warfare, which depended for its support on the fortress of Langres, and his forces were hardly sufficient for the task which he was expected to accomplish. By the end of October Schlettstadt and Neu-Breisach were reduced, but the last army, which had been first formed at Lyons under Cambriels, was now joined by Garibaldi and his two sons, Ricciotti and Menotti, bringing with them a motley crew of republicans of all nationalities, Italians,

Spaniards, and Poles. With considerable difficulty Dijon, the ancient capital of Burgundy, was captured on October 31, 1870, and was occupied by Prince William of Baden with the view of preventing the Germans from being interfered with in their prosecution of the important fortress of Belfort. But he was several times compelled to evacuate it by the pressure of the army of the East, and the attack on Châtillon-sur-Seine, made by Ricciotti Garibaldi on the night of November 20, showed to what dangers the invading army were exposed.

Gambetta had now to succeed in involving the whole French nation in the struggle against the Germans and in making the annihilation of the enemy a national duty. This added very largely to the cruel nature of the war, and the outrages against German troops had to be put down by severe reprisals. The cavalry regiments, which were sent in the month of October in a southerly direction to examine the country between the Seine and the Loire, and to make requisitions, fell in with the rear-guard of the army of the Loire, under General de la Motterouge, who was marching to the relief of Paris. The Crown Prince, hearing that they were in Toury, between Orléans and Étampes, sent against them General von der Tann with the first Bavarian army corps and some North German troops. They came up with the rear of the retreating French at Artenay on October 10, and compelled them to fight in the forest of Orléans, and on the following day took possession of the town. Motterouge was deprived of his command by Gambetta, who transferred it to Aulrelles de Paladines, who had served in Africa, the Crimea, and Italy.

The new commander got together the various contingents, which had been formed and practised in the several camps of instruction, and set himself not only to recover the line of the Loire, but to cross the stream at various points, and to carry out the original plan of a march on Paris. Although great pains were taken to conceal these movements, they came to the ears of Von der Tann. In order that his flank might not be turned he evacuated Orleans on November 8, leaving his sick behind him in the charge of the municipality, as he hoped to return. General Wittich also, who had captured Châteaudun with great sacrifice on October 18, was ordered to retreat to Chartres. A severe battle took place at Coulmiers on November 10, in which the French were much superior in numbers, and Von der Tann had some difficulty in effecting his retreat to Toury, where he was joined by General Wittich. The battle lasted from 7 A.M. till 5 P.M., from daybreak till dusk, and caused the French a loss of two thousand dead and wounded, whereas the German loss did not much exceed the half, marking the difference between seasoned troops and brave but inexperienced levies.

This success was the occasion of great rejoicing to the French and of great discouragement to the Germans. Gambetta, to whose energy and genius it was greatly due, did everything in his power to increase the forces at his disposal and to unite the whole power of the south and west in a common action. He summoned up, as it were from the soil, new forces from the south; he hastened in person to the camp of Conlie in Brittany to reunite the two generals, Charette and Keratry, who had quarrelled.

But his principal hope for the salvation of France and the deliverance of Paris from the iron ring which enclosed her was in the Army of the Loire, and the energetic leadership of Aurelles de Paladines. But as before enthusiasm and zeal were no match for discipline and experience. The German troops in the neighbourhood of the Loire were united in a single army under the command of the Grand Duke Frederick Francis of Schwerin. A week after the disastrous retreat of Toury he inflicted such defeats at Dreux, at Châteauneuf, at Bigny, and in the forest of St. Jean, upon the bodies of the Gardes Mobiles, who under General Fiéreck were attempting to join the army of the Loire, that he not only prevented the threatened junction, but created such dismay amongst the lines that Keratry laid down his command and Fiéreck had to be superseded.

The Grand Duke now received orders to move further to the east and to join the Second Army under Prince Frederick Charles. The result of this was the indecisive battle of Beaune la Rolande, fought on November 28, 1870, north-east of the forest of Orléans, in which the French were as numerous as the Germans. Both sides were fully aware of the great importance of the battle, and of the influence it would have in the progress of the war. It was therefore contested with the utmost energy, and the losses on either side were proportionately great. The Germans, however, gained the victory and the French were foiled in this design of penetrating to Paris by way of Fontainebleau. Further attempts to push through to the west were repelled by a number of engagements fought by the Grand Duke

of Mecklenburg-Schwerin between Artenay and Châteaudun, the most important of which was the battle of Loigny fought on December 2, the great day of the fallen Empire. The French were compelled to retreat with great loss, but the losses on the German side had also been considerable, and their difficulties were increased by the endless exertions caused by the nature of the marshy soil, now thoroughly soaked with rain, and by the cold of winter which now began to make itself felt.

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

TROCHU, who commanded at Paris, was not ignorant of the efforts which were being made to relieve him. He did his best to second them by repeated sorties, to the south and the west. But the possibility of relief from the side of the Loire was gradually coming to an end. The day after the battle of Loigny the French were driven back from Poupry, and the result of four days' fighting on the banks of the Loire and the edge of the thick forest which protects the city was that the French were driven from the centre which they had held so long, were compelled to retire to the south, and that the Germans entered Orléans on December 4. The attempts made by Trochu at the same time to break through the lines of investment and to join the army of the Loire in the forest of Fontainebleau were also repulsed. It is impossible to contemplate without a deep feeling of pathos the result of these passionate efforts of the French, everywhere crushed by the iron hand of their relentless foe, which resemble the struggles of a victim in the arms of the murderer who is strangling him.

By the capture of Orléans a large number of prisoners and much booty fell into the hands of the Germans, and the remains of the army of the Loire

retired down the river to Blois. Bishop Dupanloup, who had made himself conspicuous by the energy of his patriotism, was made a prisoner in his palace, and his cathedral was turned into a receptacle for French prisoners. Gambetta was nearly taken prisoner on his way from Tours to the field of battle. He was dissatisfied with the manner in which Aurelle de Paladines had conducted the campaign and relieved him from his command. Gambetta now conceived the plan of forming his lines in two divisions, one of which should operate towards the east, under the command of Bourbaki, who had surrendered the charge of the Army of the North to General Faidherbe, while the other under Chanzy should undertake the duty of expelling the enemy from the lower and middle Loire. For the purpose of conducting these operations with greater freedom the seat of government was removed on December 10 from Tours to Bordeaux.

The immediate result of this change was to give fortune to the French, and Chanzy was enabled to gain considerable successes in the second week of December over the troops of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg at Meung, Beaugency, Marchénoir, and other places. But the arrival on the scene of Prince Frederick Charles inclined the scale in the other direction. Having first driven back the Army of Bourbaki to Vierzon and Bourges, he hastened to Orléans and was soon able to gain possession both of Blois and of Tours. The second army of the French under Chanzy was not able to maintain its first success, but was gradually driven back, until all hope of relieving Paris had disappeared. In the early days of

January the united armies of Prince Frederick Charles and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, numbering more than seventy thousand men, advanced against Chanzy's army of the west. In the midst of the paralysing cold of an unusually severe winter the Germans pursued the French over swelling fields, whose surface was covered with snow and slippery ice, shot down by the francs-tireurs who lay in ambush behind every hedge and every wall, winning slowly, by patient efforts, hill after hill and field after field. It would be useless to repeat the names of the places lying between the Loire and the south, made memorable by their engagements. The decisive battle took place at the gates of Le Mans on January 11 and 12, and the Camp of Conlie was captured on January 15. Chanzy was compelled to retire to Laval, where he attempted to reorganise the relics of his army, and the Germans pressed forward to Alençon.

It was an essential part of the French plan that the attempts to break through the line of investment from without should be seconded by energetic sorties from within. In order to effect this object they had erected on the heights of Mont Avron, to the east of Paris, in front of the forts of Nogent and Rosny, some batteries armed with heavy pieces of siege ordnance in order to bombard the villages occupied by the Saxons and Würtembergers. General Ducrot had selected this region as best adapted for a successful outbreak, and he declared in a proclamation that he would return from the attack either as conqueror or a corpse. He directed feigned assaults on the German positions to the south and to the north in

order to divert the attention of the enemy, while he pressed beyond Vincennes with his main force in ironclad railway trains, armed with cannon, in order to reach unobserved the objective on which his designs were directed. Under the protection of a terrible cannonade from Mont Avron and the forts of Charenton and Nogent he threw eight bridges across the Marne, and with largely superior numbers fell upon the villages of Brie, Champigny, Villiers and Noisy. On November 30 the Germans defended their position for a whole day, but at approach of evening were compelled to evacuate Brie and Champigny, which, however, were recovered on the following day with the assistance of the Pomeranians under Fransecky. In these engagements and in other combats which ensued on December 2 and 3 the Germans lost six thousand two hundred men, and the French enjoyed the triumph of marching a number of German prisoners through the streets of Paris, but they had lost on their side twelve thousand men and more than four hundred officers.

Disappointed of relief from the south, the beleaguered city looked for help from the north and north-west, from Normandy, Artois and Picardy, as well as from the Free Corps of French Flanders. The army of the north, first, as we have seen, under the command of Bourbaki and then of Faidherbe, was supported by the fortresses of Lille and Amiens, while those of La Fère, St. Quentin and Péronne were also in the possession of the French. Amiens was captured after a great battle on November 27, and from it the Germans proceeded to the conquest of Normandy. Rouen fell on December 6, and three

days later, by the capture of Dieppe, the Germans reached the shores of the English Channel, the French army taking refuge in Le Havre. Ten days later the repulse of a great sortie organised by Trochu at Le Bourget, already the scene of murderous conflicts, gave the Germans an opportunity of celebrating their Christmas in comparative peace; but Christmas Eve witnessed the long contested and sanguinary battle of Hallue. At Bapaume after two days' fighting, on January 2 and 3, 1871, the victory remained uncertain, the French retreating to the north and the Germans to the south. The departure of Manteuffel for the army of the east inspired Faidherbe with new courage. Reinforced by fresh arrivals of marines and gardes mobiles, he determined to make an attack on the lines of investment. He suffered, however, a serious defeat at St. Quentin on January 19, and that important fortress was lost to the French.

The bombardment of Paris, which had been so long deferred, was now begun on the day after Christmas Day, and increased ten-fold the distress of the besieged citizens. The Parisians had believed that an effectual bombardment at so great a distance was impossible to carry out, but when shells were seen to fall in the heart of Paris, in the Luxembourg, the church of Saint Sulpice and the Pantheon, and when persons were killed by them in the Rue du Bois and the Faubourg St. Germain, there was a general outcry against the barbarians who had the audacity to destroy the metropolis of civilisation. Trochu was now driven against his better judgment

to make one last effort. On January 19, the day after the King of Prussia had been proclaimed Emperor in the palace of Versailles, the whole of the available French forces, one hundred thousand strong, marched in the direction of Meudon, Sèvres, and St. Cloud for the final struggle. Vinoy commanded on the left, Ducrot on the right, whilst Trochu directed the whole advance from the commanding position of the observatory. Vinoy's column succeeded in gaining possession of the German entrenchments at Montretout; but Ducrot was hindered in his advance by the barricades which had been erected in the streets of Paris and was unable to give support at the proper time. After an obstinate fight of seven hours' duration the French were driven back into their capital with a loss of seven thousand men, and on the following day Trochu demanded an armistice for the purpose of burying his dead. After long discussions a convention was signed which provided for a suspension of arms to last from January 28 to February 19. It was confidently stated at Berlin in the following winter, on the authority of Moltke, that until this last sortie had been made and failed, the investment of Paris was still regarded as uncertain, and that the King's baggage stood ready packed at Versailles in order that a departure might take place at any moment.

The line of demarcation established by the convention cut through the departments of Calvados and Orne, and left in the power of the Germans the departments of Sarthe, Indre-et-Loire, Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, Yonne, and thence to the north-east with the

exception of Pas-de-Calais and Nord. The cessation of arms in the departments of the Cote-d'Or, Doubs, Jura, and at Belfort was deferred for the present, for reasons which will soon be apparent. Arrangements were made for the election of a National Assembly which was to decide on the question of war and peace, and which was to meet at Bordeaux. The whole of the Paris forts were to be immediately surrendered, and the fortifications were to be deprived of their means of defence. All the French troops in Paris were to be considered prisoners, with the exception of twelve thousand which were left for the security of the capital. They were to remain for the present within the walls of the town, their arms being surrendered. The National Guard and the gendarmes were allowed to retain their arms for purposes of police; but all the Free Corps were disbanded. Measures were taken for the provisioning of Paris. No one might leave the capital without the joint permission of the French and Germans; and the municipality of Paris was to pay a contribution of two hundred million francs within fourteen days. All German prisoners were to be immediately exchanged for a corresponding number of French prisoners.

This lengthy but momentous story is now nearly at an end. Gambetta formed a plan by which Bourbaki, perhaps the most competent of the French generals, should with that portion of the Army of the Loire, which after the second conquest of Orléans had retired to Bourges, move eastwards towards Nevers, and gathering to itself what reinforcements it could command, throw himself on the German

communications, set free Belfort and the district of the Upper Rhine, and carry fire and sword into the mountains of Baden, and the valleys of the Black Forest. Telegraph wires were to be cut, railways broken up and bridges destroyed, so that the retreat of the Germans towards the Rhine might be cut off. In pursuance of these plans the bridge over the Moselle at Fontenoy was broken down on January 22, 1871, so that railway communications were interrupted for ten days.

To frustrate these plans General Werder was posted at Dijon with twenty-eight thousand men, whilst Bourbaki was hastening with one hundred and fifty thousand by way of Besançon and Montbelaird, to raise the siege of Belfort, and to invade Alsace. Werder was compelled to abandon Dijon, which was immediately occupied by Garibaldi. After a forced march of three days he engaged the troops of Bourbaki on January 9, at Villersexel on the Oignon, and then arrested his advance at Héricourt. Three days' struggle, on January 15, 16, and 17, gave Manteuffel time to come up, and the victory of Werder at Héricourt and Goeben at St. Quentin were the first gifts of honour which the newly-proclaimed Emperor received at Versailles. Kettler compelled Garibaldi to evacuate Dijon, and Bourbaki was surrounded by the German armies in such a manner that he had no alternative but to surrender or to retreat into the neutral territory of Switzerland. This final step was taken on February 1, General Clinchant having succeeded Bourbaki in the command, who had been wounded and taken to Lyons. Thus an army of eighty-five thousand in the most miserable con-

dition, half-starved and scarcely like human beings, crossed the frontier and laid down their arms, the Swiss doing their utmost to supply their wants. This was the fourth French army, the other three being those of Sedan, Metz, and Paris, which had been rendered useless for further combat since the German invasion in the previous August.

Belfort, which had been so nobly defended by its commandant Treskow, capitulated by the orders of the French Government on February 16, under the condition that the garrison should march out with the honours of war. Ten days later the preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles between Bismarck and Jules Favre. Thus ended one of the most remarkable wars in history, marked by twenty-three battles and an endless number of lesser engagements. Never before had such large masses of men been seen in conflict. At Gravelotte the numbers were 270,000 against 210,000, at Sedan 210,000 against 150,000. The losses of the Germans were calculated at 5,254 officers and 112,000 men; those of the French in killed, wounded, and prisoners almost defy enumeration. The number of German prisoners captured by the French did not exceed 10,000; whereas at least 400,000 unarmed Frenchmen crossed the Rhine as captives.

PART FOURTEEN.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE.

THE Emperor Alexander II., having determined, for reasons which seemed sufficient to himself, to make war on Turkey, left St. Petersburg for the army and arrived at Kisheneff, the capital of Russian Bessarabia, on April 23, 1877. On the following day he issued a proclamation in which he stated that he was taking up arms for the purpose of securing to his suffering fellow-Christians on Turkish soil the safeguards which were necessary for their future welfare. In the same night large Russian forces crossed the Pruth at three different places with the object of marching to the Danube, the passage through Roumania, which was then tributary to Turkey, having been secured by a convention. The Emperor was present with the army in person, not with the view of assuming command of it, which was left in the hands of the Grand Duke Nicholas, but to inspire the troops with confidence and courage. He fixed his headquarters at Plojesti.

On May 22 Prince Charles of Roumania now asserted himself to be independent of the Porte, and marched at the head of an army into the field in order to assist the Russians in fighting against the Sultan, his former suzerain. At the same time other Russian armies crossed the Turkish frontier in Asia, taking Bojazid without striking a blow, and storming Ardahan on the upper Kur. The flotilla which the Turks were keeping on the Danube was hampered by batteries along the shore, and still more by torpedoes, which were employed with great effect in this war; and two ironclad vessels were blown up.

Owing to the negligence of the Turkish general, Abdul Kerim, the Russians had little difficulty in crossing the Danube at Galatz, and in occupying the strong places of Matshin, Isaktcha, Tulcha, Babadagh, and Hirsova, whilst the Turks withdrew to the line between Chernavoda and Kustendji, while the main army crossed the same river at various points between Simnitza and Sistova, and compelled the Turks to retreat partly to Nicopolis and partly to Tirnova. The Emperor placed his headquarters at Sistova, and from this place issued on June 27 a manifesto to the Bulgarian Christians announcing that he had come to set them free from Mussulman tyranny.

Thus in ten weeks from the opening of hostilities the Russians had established themselves on the southern bank of the Danube, with a loss which was entirely insignificant in proportion to the magnitude of their success. In the first days of July they were in possession of all the country from Sistova

to Gabrova, which lies at the foot of the Shipka Pass over the Balkans, and Prince Cherhesky was entrusted with the government of the province of Bulgaria. On July 16, four days after the entry of the Russian army into Tirnova, the important fortress of Nicopolis fell into Russian hands, six thousand men and two pashas being made prisoners, and forty guns being captured. Soon after this the towns of Selvi and Levatz were occupied, while General Gourko and Prince Mirski made themselves masters of the Shipka and the Hankoi Passes. On reaching the southern slope of the Balkans the Russian cavalry pressed on by way of Eshi-Sagra, Karabunar and Jamboli as far as Harmanli, which lies between Adrianople and Philippopolis and encamped in the valley of the Maritza. These rapid successes seemed to point to the probability that in a few weeks the Russians would be in Constantinople and the war would be at an end.

The party which was now in power in England was most discouraged by these remarkable successes. They strengthened the British squadron in Besika Bay, and made an offer to the Porte to send men-of-war into the Bosphorus, or to occupy Gallipoli. The Porte refused to accept these offers except under the condition of an offensive and defensive alliance, and the English Government were disinclined to take so important a step without the co-operation of Austria, who was unwilling to do violence to the union which had existed for some time between the three Emperors.

The Porte at last woke up to the gravity of the

crisis, and began to understand how much her interests had been sacrificed by the generals she had employed. Abdul Kerim, the Commander-in-Chief, and Redif Pasha, the Minister of War, were deprived of their positions and were banished to Lemnos; Mehemet Ali Pasha, of European origin, was invested with the command of the army of the Danube, and Osman Pasha, the Commandant of Widdin, occupied the town of Plevna with thirty thousand men, and fortified it in such a manner as to make it a centre of serious resistance. Osman Pasha's army was soon increased by reinforcements to the number of fifty thousand; and besides this the Turks were superior to the Russians in armaments. Two attempts of the Russians to capture Plevna failed, one on July 20 and the other ten days later. The first defeat was due to the fault of the Russian general, who, having no accurate knowledge of the strength or position of the enemy, and without any reserves in store, led his troops to the assault along two lines which had no communication with each other, against an enemy which he afterwards discovered to be more than four times his strength. The second attack under Krüdener also ended in complete failure. The Russian loss in the second battle of July 30 was little less than eight thousand, of whom two thousand four hundred were left dead upon the field; the loss in the first battle had been scarcely three thousand.

On hearing of these defeats the Grand Duke Nicholas removed his headquarters from Tirnova to Biela, and from thence to Gourji-Studen, whither he was soon followed by the Emperor.

The decisive defeat at Plevna on July 30 brought the Russian advance to a standstill. The Russians at this time occupied a position nearly elliptical in shape, from Nicopolis on the Danube to a point on the same river near Rustchuk, the major axis of the ellipse being about eighty miles, the minor axis about sixty. The six corps occupying this space had lost about fifteen thousand men, killed and wounded, since the opening of the campaign, their total strength was therefore about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry and six hundred and forty-eight guns. Besides this there was a detachment under Zimmermann, on the Dobrudja, numbering about twenty-five thousand men. The Turks were posted outside of this ellipse and occupied three points in force, Plevna, Yeni-Zagra and Rasgrad, situated nearly at the angles of an equilateral triangle whose sides were from seventy to ninety miles long. Osman Pasha commanded at Plevna with fifty thousand men, Suleiman at Yeni-Zagra with forty thousand, Mehemet Ali at Rasgrad with sixty-five thousand. The total force of the Turks in the field numbered one hundred and ninety-five thousand. There is no doubt that the Russians had under-estimated their enemy and began the war with an inadequate force.

The Russians determined to leave their troops on the defensive in their present position and to await the arrival of reinforcements. At the beginning of August the guard, the grenadiers, and two divisions of the line were mobilised, giving a reinforcement of one hundred and twenty thousand men and twenty-four guns; besides this, the first line of

the militia was called out, amounting to one hundred and eighty thousand men; they were to replace the losses already suffered in battle and to be ready to replace others which might afterwards occur. The Prince of Roumania was called upon to put his army in the field, which consisted of thirty-two thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and eighty-four guns. It was now the moment for the Turks to strike a vigorous blow, but the three commanders, Mehemet Ali, Suleiman, and Osman, were all independent of each other, and were directed by means of telegraphic despatches by a War Council sitting at Constantinople. The best plan would have been for Suleiman to have united himself with Mehemet Ali, gathering up the garrisons of Shumla and Varna on his way. They would then have been able to attack the Russian left wing with one hundred and twenty-five thousand men and compelled them to release their hold of the Shipka Pass. Suleiman, however, determined instead to attack the Shipka Pass directly in front, and in this he was supported by the War Council in the capital. He began this attack on August 20, and continued it for about four months, with the sole result that he sacrificed the best parts of his army.

It seemed at the beginning as if his attack were likely to succeed. On August 23 the Russian positions in the pass were nearly surrounded by the Turks. The struggle continued during the whole day, with seven thousand five hundred Russians against twenty-eight thousand Turks. In the afternoon the position of the Russians became most critical, their artillery ammunition was exhausted, and their losses were enormous. If the Turks could have established themselves in the rear of the Rus-

sians and cut off their one line of communication, a disastrous retreat or possibly a surrender was inevitable. But reinforcements came up just at the critical moment and the Turks were driven back. On the following days further assistance arrived and the Turks were compelled to retreat still further; so after five days of nearly uninterrupted fighting both sides were much in the same position as they were at the beginning. For three days less than eight thousand Russians and Bulgarians had held the army of Suleiman in check, their only food being the biscuits which they had in their pockets when they began. The heat was intense and the nearest spring was three or four miles in the rear. When the firing slackened they lay down on the ground and obtained a little sleep, but, as the moon was full, the night brought no cessation of the firing. Reinforcements arrived just as the men had reached the extreme limit of human endurance.

Mehemet Ali, after some preliminary skirmishing, attacked the army of the Tsarevitch on the left wing and drove it back from the Lom to the Yantra. He then suddenly stopped, and a few days later, towards the end of September, returned to his former position. The Tsarevitch had under his command about forty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and two hundred guns; Mehemet Ali, about fifty thousand infantry, sixty guns and a certain number of cavalry. In fifteen days Mehemet Ali drove the Russians back with a loss of between three and four thousand men. He then should have concentrated his forces, which now amounted in all to sixty thousand, and have delivered a decisive battle in the neighbourhood of Biela. But apparently he had no such

design in view ; possibly from the incompetence of his officers. On September 28, however, he attacked the Russian position near Cerkovico, but was entirely defeated, and was compelled to retreat along his whole line, so that at the end of his offensive movement he had lost more men than the enemy and had not diverted a single Russian soldier either from Plevna or from Shipka. On October 2 he was superseded and Suleiman Pasha put in his place.

CHAPTER LXIX.

PLEVNA.

THE chief attention of the Russians was naturally directed towards Plevna, in which neighbourhood, at the end of August, they had assembled about one hundred and five thousand men. As no more Russian troops could be expected before the end of September and as the season was advancing the Grand Duke determined to attack at once. He was, however, anticipated by Osman, who on August 31 attacked him with about twenty-five thousand men. This sortie had no result except the sacrifice of one thousand Russians and three hundred Turks, so that the Grand Duke went on with his original design, his object being first to capture Lootcha, and then to close round Plevna with one hundred thousand men. Lootcha is about twenty miles from Plevna, and might be regarded as the extended right flank of the Turkish position. The attack took place on September 3, under the command of Skobelev on the left and Dubovolsky on the right. The battle lasted the whole day, and the main redoubt, the most important feature in the position, was not captured till 7 P.M., at which time the bodies of dead and wounded, Russians and Turks, lay piled up in a mass six feet deep around its approach.

The Russians could now give their undivided attention to Plevna, having in the field 74,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, 24 siege guns, 364 fieldguns,

and 54 horse artillery, to which Osman could oppose a force of 56,000 men, together with 2,500 cavalry and 80 guns. Plevna is a little town of about 7,000 inhabitants, lying in a hollow surrounded by hills of moderate height. It is the meeting-place of the roads leading to Widdin, Sophia, Shipka, Biela, Zimnitsa, and Nicopolis, and therefore could not be neglected with safety by an invading army. Osman had occupied his time by carefully fortifying the town, and at the beginning of September it was protected by eighteen redoubts and several lines of trenches, the Grivitza redoubt being the key of the position in the north, and the Kischni redoubt in the south. The Russian attack was made on September 6, the redoubts were bombarded till September 11, when a general assault was ordered. The result of this third battle of Plevna, as it may be called, was a terrible and murderous repulse, the Russian losses amounting to eighteen thousand men. It was a great disaster for the Russian army, but, as the sequel will show, was not irreparable; the cause of it was, probably, a lack of unity in the command of the army.

It was now determined to make no more assaults upon the works of Plevna, but to proceed to a regular investment. For this purpose the famous General Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, was summoned from St. Petersburg, arriving at Plevna on September 28. The investment was completed by the end of October, being effected chiefly by the energy and skill of General Gourko, who after the hardly fought battle of Gorni Dubnik drove back the Turks into the entrenchments, Osman Pasha being prevented by simultaneous attacks from coming to the assistance of his countrymen.

During these autumn months the war was raging

in other parts of the Turkish Empire. In Armenia the Turks succeeded in defending the fortresses of Kars and Batoum, and even forced the Russians to evacuate Bajazid, while General Tergakasoff was compelled to retreat to the Russian frontier. This defeat was, however, redressed in the middle of November when the Army of the Caucasus, in a second advance, after having fought a series of murderous battles, before the gates of Erzeroum, stormed the fortress of Kars, capturing seventeen thousand prisoners, including two pashas and eight hundred officers, as well as three hundred guns and twenty standards. In Montenegro Mehemet Ali and Suleiman Pasha had attacked Prince Nikita from three sides, and endeavoured to put down the insurrection which had broken out there with a strong hand. But the Prince captured the fortress of Nikish on September 8, and then made himself master of the port of Spizza and the suburbs of Antivari. In Bulgaria events were more favourable for the Turkish arms. Suleiman Pasha, having left Montenegro, pressed into the valleys of the Tundja and the Maritza, and drove General Gourko back, first to Kasanlik, and then to the Shipka Pass. These successes were accomplished by great cruelty. Eski-Sagra and Kasanlik were burned down and their inhabitants massacred. Suleiman took up a position at the foot of the Shipka Pass and barred the progress of the enemy, but he could not expel the Russians from the entrenchments or win the summit of the pass. The struggle continued for weeks with great losses on either side; but the Russians remained masters of the summit of the pass till the end of the year.

At Plevna there was no fighting along the lines,

with the exception of desultory artillery and picket firing, till December 10, but on both sides the work of fortifications continued without intermission till the last moment. On November 17 the Grand Duke sent a flag of truce to Osman Pasha, summoning him to surrender, but he replied that his military honour would not allow him to do so. However, his provisions had now reached their last limit, a third of his army lay sick and wounded, rain and snow alternating for six weeks had made his trenches untenable, and desertions were increasing every day. He therefore determined to make an effort to break through the Russian lines with the object of reaching either Widdin or Sophia. During the nights of December 9-10 he abandoned the Kischni and Grivitza redoubts, left a force of ten thousand men in two other redoubts, built two pontoon bridges by the side of the regular bridge over the Vid, distributed about six days' rations of bread and rice to his army, and with about forty thousand made a furious attack upon the position held by the grenadiers on the Widdin road. He succeeded in carrying the first line of the Russian works, but by noon his army was defeated and he was himself wounded, so that there was nothing left for him but to surrender at discretion.

The struggle between the Russian and the Turkish troops began at daybreak under the eyes of the Emperor; the advanced Russian lines were taken by the Turks at about 8.30 A.M. At about 11 A.M. the Turks were driven out again, and about noon they began to retreat towards the Vid, keeping up a strong fire against the enemy. The Turkish captured guns were now turned against their former owners. The Russian troops advanced and turned

the Turkish retreat into a rout; they were driven down to the Vid, huddled up with the carts of the baggage train which had left Plevna in the morning to the number of a thousand. About an hour later the Turks could no longer continue the struggle and sent a flag of truce. General Ganetzky demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole Turkish army, to which Osman Pasha agreed. The Turks had lost in the battle about 6,000 men; the numbers now surrendered were 10 pashas, 130 field officers, 2,000 ordinary officers, 40,000 foot soldiers and 1,200 cavalry, 77 guns, and large quantities of ammunition also fell into the possession of the conquerors.

Lieutenant Greene, whose authority has been largely followed in the preceding narrative, says that Osman Pasha must be credited with a brilliant defence, because he succeeded in arresting the Russian advance, and completely paralysed their whole plan of campaign and all their movements for five months, causing them to summon large reinforcements from Russia and to invoke the aid of Roumania, disabling forty thousand of his enemies and detaining the Emperor from the capital during half a year. Up to the middle of October he made no mistakes, but when he knew that the Russian guard had arrived in Bulgaria, that he was gradually being enclosed, he ought to have abandoned Plevna and retreated to Radonitza instead of allowing the guard to cross the Vid and attack Gorni Dubnik. Radonitza is about forty-five miles from Plevna and could have been reached in two long days. It was a position of much greater natural strength than Plevna, and its fortifications were considerably advanced. Even if he had failed to hold it he could have retreated behind the Balkans with his army intact, and he

then could have saved his country from an irreparable disaster. Whatever reasons Osman may have given for not taking this course, the probability is that he had received the most positive orders from the War Council at Constantinople not to abandon Plevna, and that he did not dare to disobey them.

CHAPTER LXX.

THE SHIPKA PASS.

AFTER the fall of Plevna the Turkish cause was far from being hopeless. They possessed one hundred thousand men in the neighbourhood of their principal fortresses, thirty thousand at Shipka, twenty thousand around Sophia, and fifteen thousand at Constantinople, besides a number of reserves in Asia. Their enemy had double their numbers, but the Russian lines of communication were five hundred miles long, cut into two portions by the Danube; much snow had already fallen, and the only good roads available for the Russian advance were those from Sistova to Shipka, and from Plevna to Sophia. Unfortunately their only general was Suleiman, who had already proved his incompetence. He was summoned to Constantinople in the middle of December, and was given the chief command in Roumelia, with special orders to defend the line of the Balkans. Greene is of opinion that the proper course for him to have pursued would have been to have placed small bodies of men at the various points of passage, keeping a large body at Adrianople, to which all the roads converge, in order to act whenever it might be necessary. Instead of this he left only ten thousand men in that important city, and dispersed the rest of his forces over the different points of possible attack.

Turning to the side of the Russians, the fall of

Plevna had set free one hundred and ten thousand men. Serbia had declared war against the Turks immediately after the fall of Plevna, and had brought about twenty-five thousand soldiers into the field. General Todleben advised that the troops should be put into winter quarters to the north of the Balkans and the siege of Rustchuk proceeded with; when that important place had fallen the armies could cross the Balkans in the spring and advance upon Constantinople. The Grand Duke Nicholas, however, supported by Skobelev and Gourko, determined to cross the Balkans at once before the Turks had had time to recover themselves. His plan was that Gourko should force the Araba-Konab Pass, capture Sophia, and march by way of Philippopolis to Adrianople, whilst Radetsky was to cross the Shipka Pass, defeating the Turks who were defending it, and join Gourko. In the meantime the Tsarevitch was to remain north of the Balkans, protect the Russian communications, and prosecute the siege of Rustchuk with the help of Todleben.

Gourko began his task with a force of sixty-five thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and two hundred and eighty guns, having opposed to him a Turkish army consisting of thirty-five thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and about forty guns. His plan was to use his main force to turn the left flank of the Turkish position across the high-road, leaving smaller bodies of troops in front of each of the Turkish positions. The lines of column were to march thirty-two miles in thirty-six hours over a pass eighteen hundred feet above the valley. When he made these arrangements he believed that the road was practicable for artillery, but it was found that the guns could not be dragged by horses, they were

therefore taken to pieces and transported by hand, the operation being something similar to the passage of the Great St. Bernard by Napoleon. By December 30 all the guns had arrived in the Curish valley, put together for action and harnessed; the left column, however, had in its descent met with so terrible a storm that it was obliged to return to Etropol, having lost eighty-three men killed and eight hundred and ten permanently disabled by the frost.

The attack on Sophia was begun on the last day of the year, and Sophia was evacuated during the night of January 3, 1878, the Turks abandoning all their tents, an immense quantity of ammunition, and about sixteen hundred sick and wounded. They also left behind them a sufficient amount of provisions to feed General Gourko's force for a month. This was a very brilliant enterprise, and its success was largely due to the Turks being ignorant of the existence of the road through which Gourko advanced. The main road from Sophia to Philippopolis and Adrianople is by the watershed and the pass of Ichtiman, passing through a deep gorge called Trojan's Gate. This road, which is easy to defend, can be turned by other roads leading through the valleys on either side of it. These passes were defended by Suleiman and attacked by Gourko, who reached the neighbourhood of Philippopolis on January 15.

The Turks now saw that they could no longer retreat in the direction of Adrianople, but that they must accept a battle in their present position in order to be able to retire with safety across the mountains of Rhodope in the south. Suleiman had with him about sixty thousand men, but he thought it better to provide for his personal safety by run-

ning away before the battle with a considerable number of troops, leaving the brunt of the engagement to be sustained by Fuad Pasha. After a series of engagements in which the Russians were successful, the main battle was fought on January 17, Fuad Pasha having his back to the mountains. The battle was over at about 3 P.M., and the Turks abandoned everything, climbing up the mountains through the snow. Gourko had thus succeeded in his march from Sophia to Philippopolis in entirely destroying Suleiman's army, capturing one hundred and fourteen guns and about two thousand prisoners.

The miserable remnants of the Turkish army made their ways to the shores of the Ægean near Enos, whence they were conveyed in transports to the number of about forty thousand to Gallipoli and Constantinople. Suleiman was arrested and tried by court-martial about a year afterwards.

Another portion of the Grand Duke's plan was the passage of the Shipka Pass. For this purpose Radetsky divided his troops into three columns, the centre of which, under his own command, was to remain at the summit of the pass, while the other two were to cross the mountains on either flank and attack the main pass from the south, while Radetsky forced it from the north. The right column was placed under the command of Skobelev, and the left under Prince Mirsky; the movement was to begin on January 5, and it was calculated that the columns would arrive in the valley on the evening of January 7 and attack on the morning of January 8. The snow was in many places ten feet deep; it was found therefore that the guns could not be drawn in sledges, and had to be left behind, excepting the mountain

guns which accompanied the columns. From his position on Mount St. Nicholas Radetsky could see the villages by which the columns were to debouch.

Mirsky reached his objective on January 7, but Skobelev was detained in the mountains by the Turks, and Mirsky was compelled to attack the pass alone. Skobelev was not in a position to attack the pass until 10 A.M. on January 9, and was able to co-operate with Mirsky. The Turkish redoubts were carried in a brilliant manner, and the Turks began to run away. Just as Skobelev was preparing to follow them a Turkish officer arrived with orders to surrender the whole force. Twelve thousand men laid down their arms immediately, and by midnight the disarmament of the rest of the Turkish force was complete, the whole number who surrendered being thirty-six thousand men, of whom six thousand were sick and wounded. The Russian losses, however, were considerable. Greene considers that Skobelev's energetic attack, after he had got all his men together in the valley, was one of the most splendid assaults ever made, and seems to show that the carrying of earthworks defended by modern breechloaders is not impossible. The Turks seem to have relied on the opinion that the intense cold, the deep snow, and the impassable nature of the mountains would render such flank attacks as actually took place absolutely impossible.

In this manner the Turkish defence of the Balkans had entirely collapsed, an army of thirty-six thousand men having been captured at Shipka, and another army of fifty thousand men having been routed and dispersed. The Grand Duke now made preparations for the advance to Adrianople, but the armistice of January 31 was signed before

the troops had made much progress in their movements. The Russian cavalry, however, entered that city on January 20, and Skobelev himself two days afterwards. Then the ancient capital of Turkey and the second city of the Empire fell without a blow.

We need not pursue this narrative further, or show how the Russians, having won every right to the occupation of Constantinople and the exaction of such terms as they pleased from the Turks, were deprived of their advantages by the action of the British Government, who only waited for the conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3 to tear it up and substitute for it the less wise and statesmanlike Treaty of Berlin. Whatever we may think of their political defeat the Russian armies had certainly covered themselves with glory. Between December 10, 1877, and January 31, 1878, fifty-one days, they had marched over four hundred miles, had crossed a lofty range of mountains deep in snow, and had fought three series of battles resulting in the capture or destruction of two Turkish armies. This had been accomplished with the loss of less than twenty thousand men, of whom half fell in battle and the rest succumbed to the rigour of the climate. Greene attributes these results to the "almost boundless patience and endurance of the Russian soldiers. Without knapsacks, which were left on the other side of the Balkans, they marched, fought and slept in snow and ice, and forded rivers with the thermometer at zero. They had very little food and a heavy pack to carry, yet there was not a single case of insubordination, the men were in excellent spirits, and the stragglers were few."

PART FIFTEEN.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898.

CHAPTER LXXI.

MANILLA AND SANTIAGO.

WAR may be said to have broken out between the Spanish and American Governments on April 21, 1898. The news was received with great joy in New York; the Stars and Stripes were hung everywhere across the streets and from the windows. Everywhere was seen the motto "Remember the Maine." Steps were taken to meet the crisis. The American army, which, on a peace footing, consists of twenty-five thousand men, was now raised to seventy-one thousand, while the President called for a volunteer force of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men. The first shot of the war was fired on April 23 at Key West, when the Spanish merchant ship Buena Ventura was captured by the Nashville. This was followed by the capture of the Vedro and other vessels who were not aware that war had been declared. President McKinley now announced a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahiafonda as well as of the harbour of Cienfuegos upon the south coast. This was carried out by a squadron of twenty-three men-of-war, under

the command of Admiral Sampson, in the New York, who started from the Key West Islands, which are only eighty miles distant from Havana, the capital of Cuba.

The Spaniards, considering that they had sufficient troops in Cuba, paid chief attention to the operations of their fleet and attempted to break the blockade by the use of their smaller men-of-war in the West Indian waters. On April 25 a sea engagement off Cadenas resulted in the injury of an American torpedo destroyer, three Spanish gunboats succeeded on April 26 in breaking through the blockade of Havana, and on the following day an American merchant ship was taken, Spain having reserved the right of issuing letters of marque to merchant vessels as privateers. On the same day a Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera left Cadiz, and after touching at the Cape Verde Islands pursued its way to the West Indies. No important operations were possible before its arrival, because the sending of an American army to Cuba could not take place for some time. The United States militia was gradually concentrating itself in the National Park of Chickamauga, Tennessee, and the force destined for the conquest of Cuba, of which General Shafter was given command, was being prepared at Tampa, a harbour on the west coast of Florida.

The American fleet now began the bombardment of Castel Morro at Havana on April 25, and of Matanzas on the two following days. An eye-witness tells us that the shots fell fairly in the ramparts, throwing the earthworks fifty feet in the air and cutting them level with the ground. Only three shots from the enemy's batteries struck the New York, and none of them came closer than a

hundred yards, although the engagement lasted fifteen minutes. Admiral Sampson's fleet could not sail out to intercept the fleet of Admiral Cervera, because it would be difficult to discover their whereabouts in the broad expanse of the Atlantic, and because two American warships, which were expected from Brazil, could not be left off the coast of Cuba without protection. On the other hand, if Cervera's fleet were left unmolested it might attack the east coast of North America without being materially prevented by the flying squadron commanded by Admiral Schley. Consequently some apprehension was felt in the towns of the sea-coast, and mines were laid, as a precautionary measure, in the harbour of New York.

Whilst in the West Indies every one was on the tiptoe of expectation with regard to the coming of Cervera's fleet, news of momentous import arrived from the far East. Admiral Dewey, who was commanding an American squadron of eight ships-of-war in the harbour of Hong-Kong, sailed on April 25 for the Philippine Islands, with orders to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet that was lying there. This squadron consisting of thirteen ships under the command of Admiral Montojo y Pasaron, went out to meet him, but soon came back again with the intention of awaiting the attack in the Bay of Canacao, near Cavité, in the Bay of Manilla. By doing this he would be supported by the land batteries, and a bombardment of Manilla during the sea-fight would be impossible. Dewey, who had anchored in the Bay of Mirs, left on April 27, and on May 1 sailed into the Bay of Manilla, without being stopped by the armies and batteries of the Corregidor Islands which lie at the entrance, and laid his ships alongside

of the Spanish fleet, at the extremity of the Peninsula of Cavité. His fleet was armed with 122 guns of modern construction, some of which were of enormous size, and in seven hours, after a terrible struggle, he succeeded in completely destroying the whole of the Spanish ships.

The Spaniards defended themselves with heroic courage, but the strength of the two combatants was unequally matched. Of the Spanish cruisers, armed with ninety-six guns, only five were fit for battle, while the American ordnance, which consisted mainly of long eight-inch guns of the newest construction, had a longer range and never missed their mark. Consequently the Spanish vessels, which had no similar resources, were at once set on fire, and others were sunk. The Spaniards lost several hundred men; the Americans had none killed and only a few wounded. It had never occurred to the Spanish Government that a number of antiquated vessels which might be quite sufficient for the local needs of the far distant but extensive group of islands and for the maintenance of Spanish sovereignty would be of no use whatever to meet an external enemy armed with serviceable vessels.

The news of this disaster caused great consternation in Madrid, and the Ministry of Sagasta was attacked for the insufficiency of its preparations. On May 2 a state of siege was proclaimed in the capital, and eventually the Ministry was reconstructed. In America the victory of Admiral Dewey was received with corresponding enthusiasm, and on receiving a report from him that he had not sufficient troops to take possession of Manilla, it was determined that an army should be sent to his support.

The offensive operations of the Americans in the West Indies were continued at the beginning of May. Several attempts at landing were made in the Cuban province of Pinar del Rio and Santa Clara, at Caracon, Hermandura, Icotorá, and Cienfuegos. Attacks were also made on Spanish gunboats in the Bay of Cardenas, on the northern coast of the province of Matangos. Matanzas was subjected to another bombardment, as was also Cabana in the north, and Cienfuegos in the south of Cuba, as well as San Juan in the island of Puerto Rico; but all these operations remained without result.

At length on May 2 the fleet of Admiral Cervera, consisting of four armour-plated cruisers, three torpedo-boats, and three torpedo-boat destroyers, was sighted at Fort de France, in the Island of Martinique. It appears to have been his intention to discover as soon as possible one of the two American squadrons which had not as yet been able to unite, to engage with them, and to do them so much damage that they would be powerless to protect the transports which had left Tampa on May 11 with the troops destined for action in Cuba.

Cervera was forbidden to land at Martinique, which belonged to the French, and proceeded to the harbour of Santiago de Cuba, situated on the south coast of the island. The town of Santiago is situated in a large bay, surrounded by the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, which has space for the evolutions of any number of large ships-of-war. The entrance to the bay is narrow and difficult, and is defended by the castles of Morro and Estrella. Cervera thought that from this basis he would be able to defend the neighbouring coast, and he was the more confident of success because the squadron of Admiral

Sampson, who had been misinformed with regard to Cervera's movements, was crossing to the north of Hayti, and was proceeding in the direction of Key West, where there happened to be a great scarcity of fresh water for drinking.

Sampson's fleet reached Santiago on May 19 and was joined here on the last day of the month by the flying squadron of Schley. The two admirals then undertook to bombard the forts, whose defective armaments had to be strengthened by cannons from Cervera's ships. The attack was renewed on June 3, and on this occasion the American schooner *Merrimac* was sunk in the entrance of the harbour, but not in such a manner as to render the exit impossible, although it increased the difficulties of entrance. A third attempt was made on the following day, June 4, but an assault on the forts of La Sorapa and Puertegrande was repelled, and it now seemed as if Cervera intended to break out and to sacrifice his fleet in preventing the arrival of an invading army. He still, however, remained in the vicinity, and on June 6 five thousand American infantry were landed at Punto Cabrera under the protection of a heavy bombardment, and on the following day six hundred at Carminanera. *-st camp pr*

The Bay of Santiago is so deep that even Sampson's heavy guns could barely reach the town, which lies at its furthest extremity, or even Cervera's fleet. At the same time the Admiral did not feel justified in forcing an entrance. He therefore sent a message to the American Government on June 17, with a pressing request for further reinforcements on a considerable scale. Some detachments which had landed at Guantanamo on June 8 had a few days later serious engagements with the Spanish troops. The

Spaniards began to congratulate themselves on their successes, as the American fleet had not been able to effect anything, and the only loss which they had suffered had been the sinking of the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* by the American line-of-battle ship *Oregon*.

At length the army which had been so anxiously expected sailed from Tampa on June 8, under the command of General Shafter, who had served in the War of Secession, and landed on June 23 at Baiguire, a harbour half-way between Santiago and Guantanamo, an operation in which only two men were drowned. After landing they were assisted by three thousand insurgents under the command of Calixto Garcia, who speedily united himself with Shafter. But on the following day, June 24, was fought the battle of Guasimos, which, after a vigorous resistance on the part of the Spaniards, ended with the victory of the Americans. The main burden of the fight fell upon the regiment of "Rough Riders" commanded by Colonel Roosevelt. It had been intended at first to recruit it mainly from cowboys, picked up from the ranches, but there enlisted in it fashionable young men from New York clubs, undergraduates and graduates from the Universities, and athletes from schools and colleges, and it certainly covered itself with glory. In the battle of Guasimos the enemy numbered at least four thousand, whereas the Rough Riders were only 354, and General Young's force 464. Of the first there were eight killed and thirty-four wounded, and of the second eight killed and eighteen wounded. The Americans had thus attacked and vanquished a force over four times their number, entrenched behind rifle-pits and bushes in a mountain pass.

CHAPTER LXXII.

CUBA AND PUERTO RICO.

AFTER the battle of Guasimos on June 24, the army was advanced along the single track which leads from Siboney to Santiago. Two streams of excellent water run parallel with this track for short distances, and some eight miles from the coast crossed it in two places. The American outposts were stationed at the first of these fords, and the Cuban outposts a mile and a half further on at the second ford nearer Santiago. The stream made a sharp turn at a place called El Poso, and the track extended another mile and a half from El Poso to the trenches of San Juan. For six days the army was encamped on either side of the track for three miles back from the outposts. The track was an ordinary waggon-road, with banks three or four feet high, which when it rained became a huge drain with sides of mud and a bottom of liquid mud a foot deep. All day long the pack trains passed up and down this track, carrying the day's rations; it was possible in some places for two waggons to pass at one time, but frequently there was only room for a single waggon.

On June 25 fighting began for the possession of Sevilla, south of Santiago, which was taken on June 28. Then took place the battle of San Juan, for the possession of the entrenchments in that place, which

were the outer defences of Santiago. The advance began on the afternoon of June 30, "twelve thousand men with their eyes fixed on a balloon, treading on each other's heels in three inches of mud." At El Poso the trail forked, the right-hand road leading to El Caney, and the left to Santiago. The troops slept in the mist, seeing the street lamps of Santiago shining over the San Juan hills. Before the moon rose again every sixth man who had slept in the mist that night was either killed or wounded. Caney is about four miles to the east of Santiago and was held by five hundred Spanish soldiers; it was thought that the Americans would take it without difficulty. The idea was that the right division should attack towards the north, and after the capture of Caney turn south-west and join the left division for the attack on Santiago. But the village was strongly defended and Caney was not taken till late in the afternoon, the Americans having lost 377 killed and wounded.

The battle on the left was far more serious. The greatest loss took place at the San Juan River, where the Americans were fired into, with orders not to return the fire, but to lie still and wait for further orders. For a whole hour they lay on their rifles while the bullets drove past incessantly, sharpshooters and guerillas being hid in the trees above the stream and above the track. They spared no one, neither the wounded, nor the surgeons and attendants carrying the litters. The balloon, intended as a point of observation, was a great failure, as it was of no use, and directed the fire of the enemy. At last the division came within sight of the hill on the top of which was the Spanish blockhouse and fort of San Juan. They were intended to take it, although it was almost impregnable. It was madness to as-

sault this hill without artillery, but it was done. Luckily the Spanish trenches on the top were built so far back on the brow, that unless the Spaniards lay actually on the breastworks or outside them, they could not depress their rifles enough to fire down the hill. Thus the fire was hotter in the rear than it was in the actual assault. At last the Americans flooded the ridges and swarmed in the blockhouse, and the army halted, gazing at the city beneath them. It is reckoned that the loss on both American wings did not fall short of two thousand men. On the side of the Spaniards General Linares was severely wounded, 467 men were killed, and half their force was disabled.

An unexpected incident now supervened. The moment had arrived when Cervera's fleet could be of great service, although up to the present it had done but little good. But to the surprise of all, at 9.30 A.M. on Sunday, July 3, it came out of the harbour under full steam, and in three-quarters of an hour was entirely destroyed by the American fleet, which was three times superior in number and was armed with excellent artillery. The Spanish ships were set on fire and driven on to the coast, where they blew up. Field-Marshal Blanco had sent him repeated orders to come out, and he had at last obeyed because his supply of coal was nearly exhausted, and because, seeing that Santiago was now closely invested; he did not wish to be caught like Montojo at Cavité, but preferred to perish in the open sea. Unfortunately he was misinformed as to the position or number of the American fleet, and sailed in the wrong direction. As the engagement took place at fifteen hundred yards' distance not a single Spanish shot could touch the American ships,

although the flagship, the *Vizcaya*, continued to fire after she was in flames. This Spanish fleet was not ten years old, but the armour-plates were thin; it carried six heavy, forty-six medium, and ninety-six light guns, whereas the American fleet had sixty-seven heavy, thirty-six medium, and one hundred and ninety-six light guns. *Cervera* was taken prisoner and with his companions honourably treated.

Before Santiago an armistice was concluded from July 2 to July 9, during which period many discussions were held about surrender, although Marshal Blanco talked about making the place a second Saragossa. Both parties were really desirous of peace, because the position of the Americans was anything but secure, while the garrison of Santiago, which had been reinforced with eighteen thousand men under General Pondo from Seilobo, was gradually running short of provisions and ammunition. At length on July 15 the town and province of Santiago de Cuba was surrendered to the United States, under the condition that the garrison, amounting to 22,780 men, should be sent back to Spain unarmed. Sampson's fleet now entered the harbour, and on July 17 President McKinley issued orders for the government of the Province.

The struggle for the possession of the island still continued. Manzanilla was bombarded on July 29. Marshal Blanco refused to recognise the capitulation of Santiago, which he declared to be strategically unimportant, and was burning to meet the Americans in conflict; but soon afterwards the Spanish troops in Ripa on the north coast as well as in Caimanera and Guantanamo on the south coast laid down their arms. These events caused great dejection in Spain. On July 13 a member of the Spanish

Parliament said that Spain might have conquered in the war if they had sent four thousand men to Florida, but that now the responsibility of its continuance would rest with the Government. But the cup of disaster was not yet full. A third or reserve squadron, which had been formed at Cadiz under the command of Admiral Camara, sailed on June 15 for the Philippine Islands, where it was doomed to certain destruction, whereas it might have been of some use in the West Indies. On reaching Port Said it was prevented by the Egyptian Government on June 30 from coaling from its own transport vessels, and was recalled on July 9 to protect the Spanish coast towns from a possible bombardment.

In the Philippine Islands Admiral Dewey was still waiting for a force to commence operations on land, but meanwhile the Spanish troops were hardly pressed by the insurgents. At the end of June the Governor-General Augusti proposed to the German Vice-Admiral Von Diedrichs, who was at Manilla for the purpose of protecting German commerce, that the Admirals of the neutral powers should take Manilla under their protection. This offer was refused in consequence of the American blockade. On the other side Aguinaldo, who commanded the insurgents, and who on June 12 had proclaimed the independence of the islands, made a declaration to the same Admiral, that any claim made to the islands by America was excluded by the convention which had been signed by him and Admiral Dewey on April 24, and agreed to by President McKinley, England, and Japan, by which the insurgents should join the Americans in making war upon Spain with the object of establishing in the Philippines an independent Federal Republic under American protection.

The American land forces were still detained at sea. On their way they had hoisted the American flag in the Ladrones Islands, which belonged to Spain, and carried off the garrison, which had heard nothing of the outbreak of the war. On July 17 they eventually arrived at the island of Luzon, and engaged the Spanish troops on July 31. This enabled Admiral Dewey to demand the surrender of Manilla on August 1. The summons, however, was rejected and he did not become master of the city till August 13, after it had suffered a bombardment.

The capture of the island of Puerto Rico forms a striking contrast to the operations in Cuba, the difference being attributed by the Americans to the incompetence of the commanders in the one case, and their competence in the other. General Miles had assumed the command of the American army in Cuba on July 23, and immediately turned his attention to Puerto Rico, where the feeling of the inhabitants was strongly Spanish. The island had been declared independent on February 9, and a Parliament assembled on July 24, which protested against the attack of America on the freedom of the country. We are told by an eye-witness that the army in Puerto Rico advanced with the precision of a set of chessmen; its moves were carefully considered and followed by success; its generals acting independently and yet along routes reconnoitred by Generals Ray Stone and Major Flagler, and selected by General Miles, never missed a point, nor needlessly lost a man, nor retreated from a foot of ground over which they had advanced. The consequence of this was that eight cities or towns, with seven hundred thousand inhabitants, were won over to the United States at the cost of very few men killed. General Miles landed at Geronimo on July

25, and the reduction of the island was completed by the surrender of Ponce on July 28.

Although only a small portion of Cuba had surrendered to the Americans, and the Spaniards still had eighty thousand men on the island, the Spaniards could not continue the war any longer, which had cost Spain about five thousand million pesetas in six months, and was likely to cost twelve or fifteen million a month in the future. Also the destruction of the Spanish fleet made it impossible to raise the blockade. Therefore on July 27, by the friendly offices of the French Ambassador, Cambon, in Washington, the Spanish Government declared itself to be beaten, and asked for conditions of peace.

On August 12 preliminaries were signed by which Spain surrendered all the Antilles, except Cuba, the town, bay, and harbour of Manilla, and a coaling station on the Ladronez to America; it further renounced its sovereignty over Cuba. America on her side declined to take over the debt of Cuba and Puerto Rico and gave up any claim to a war indemnity. A commission to settle the details of the treaty was to be appointed on the understanding that Spanish troops should be immediately withdrawn from Puerto Rico and the remaining provinces of Cuba. The definite treaty was signed on December 12, by which Spain renounced her sovereignty and every claim to possession with regard to Cuba, and made over to the United States Puerto Rico and the rest of her West Indian possessions, the island of Guam, the most southerly of the Ladrone group, and the Philippine Archipelago, on the condition that for ten years Spanish ships should be allowed to have access to them on the same conditions as the ships of the United States. America was to

pay twenty million dollars to Spain within three months, who thus by the loss of some three hundred square miles of territory and some twelve million of inhabitants gave up all claim to be a colonial country and had to content herself with the recollections of the past.

INDEX.

A.

- Abach, The, 80.
Abbiategrosso, 305.
Abens river, 77, 79.
Abensberg, 77; Battle, 20 April, 1809, 79.
Aberdeen, Lord, 285.
Acqua Fredda, 311.
Adams, at Waterloo, 254.
Adda river, 309.
Aderklaa, 94, 95.
Adige river, 37, 43, 208, 390, 391.
Adrianople, 478, 490, 491, 492, 494.
Ægean shores, 493.
African troops, 410.
Aguelda river, 191.
Aguinaldo, proclaims independence of Philippine Islands, 507.
Aisne river, 209, 210, 211, 216, 440, 443.
Alabama State, 320, 358.
Albaredo, 6, 7, 391.
Albert, Crown Prince of Saxony, 410; Army under his command, 437; threatened by MacMahon, 439; at Sedan, 445; march to Paris, 456; on banks of Seine, 457.
Albrecht, Archduke, commands Army of South in Venetia and Istria, 379; in Italy, 390-392; orders to F. M. Benedek, 400.
Albuera battle, 11 May, 1811, 186.
Alençon, 469.
Alessandria, 18, 16, 17; armistice, 15th June, 1800, 22; Sardinian army around, 294; French army and Emperor Napoleon at, 295, 296.
Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, Collects army in Moravia, 47; at Olmütz, 50; at Battle of Austerlitz, 52, 56; renaissance of Polish nation intolerable, 105; at Vilna, 107, 108; kindly feelings towards Napoleon, 109; not giving in to Napoleon, 130; head-quarters at Neu-Burschwiz, 140; Peace of Tilsit, 161; at Troyes, 216; advance to Paris, 220, 221.
Alexander II., Emperor of Russia, succeeds Emperor Nicholas, 2d March, 1855; Address to diplomatic body, 286; makes war on Turkey, and leaves St. Petersburg to assume command, 476; at Gourji-Studen, 479; at Plevna, 487.
Alexander, Prince of Hesse: commands new corps to enter Switzerland, 209; beats French at Poligny, 213; Prussian declaration of war against Hesse, in command of corps, 380, 382; surrenders Frankfort and retires to Odenwald, 399.
Alexandria (U.S.A.), Ellsworth marches with his regiment to, 322; railway, 323; Pope advances upon Jackson to clear the line to, 337.
Algiers, 239; troops from, 441, 448.
Alle river, 73.
Alleghany mountains, 333.
Allenstein, 70.
Allix, Gen., Defends the Yonne, 206; attacks farm of La Haye Sainte, 257.
Alma, Battle of the, 19 Sept. 1854, 266-270.
Almaraz, 187.
Almeida fortress, 183, 185; surrendered, 186.
Alps, Austrians in possession of western, 10; France and her frontier of, 200; Army of N. Italy and Naples to cross, 231; Austrians to drive allies towards, 295; Cialdini to watch the passes, 316.
Alps, Army of the, 231.
Alsace, Cavalry in, 38; French army in, 410; abandoned by MacMahon, 415; a conquered country, 421; Gen. Werder intends invading, 474.
Alsatia, 459.
Alvensleben, Gen. von. Corps under, 410; at Saarbrücken, 417; attacks the French at Trouville and Vionville, 424, 425.
Amanvillers, 420, 431, 432; abandoned, 433.
Ambleteuse camp, 38.
America, War of secession, 1861-65, 320-376; Presidential Election of 1860, 320; war with Spain, 1898, 496-510.
Amiens fort, 470.
Ampfing, 25.
Anapa, 289.
Andalusia, Dupont reduces provinces, 66; K. Joseph and Soult's invasion, 181, 182; Soult covering

- frontiers, 185, 187; troops withdrawn, 188; French armies in, 190; Soult leaves, 193.
- Anderson's force at Spottsylvania, 363.
- Andujar, 166.
- Angely, Gen. Regnaud de St. Jean d', 296.
- Angoulême, Duchesse d', 226.
- Annapolis, 362.
- Ansbach, Margravate of, given to Bavaria, 61.
- Antietam, Battle of, 17 Sept. 1862, 340, 341.
- Antilles, The, Admiral Musiessy at 31; Surrendered to America by Spain, 12 Aug 1898, 509.
- Antivari, 486.
- Antwerp besieged, 208; English retire to, 238.
- Aosta, 4, 6.
- Apennines, The, 3.
- Apolda, 67.
- Appomatox Court House, 376.
- Aprica pass, 28.
- Aquia, 346.
- Araba-Konah pass, 491.
- Aragon, 174.
- Aranjuez revolution, 19 March, 1808, 164.
- Arapiles battle, 23 July 1812, 192, 195.
- Arcis-sur-Aube, 217, 218, 219.
- Ardahan stormed, 477.
- Areizaga, Gen., fails to reconquer Madrid, 181.
- Argenteuil, 457.
- Argonne hills, 440, 442.
- Arkansas, 321, 328, 355.
- Arlberg, The, 47.
- Arlington Heights, 322.
- Armistead, Gen., falls at "Bloody Ingle," 354.
- Arnau, 384.
- Arras, 38.
- Artenay, 463, 466.
- Artois, Comte d', 226.
- Artois, 470.
- Aschaffenburg, 399.
- Aspern, 94, 95, 402. Battle of, 21 May, 1809, 85-91, 391.
- Astorga, 171, 179.
- Asturias, Prince of the (Ferdinand VII. of Spain), 164.
- Asturias, 165, 170, 187.
- Athies, 212.
- Athis, 224.
- Atlanta, Sherman to capture, 361, 368, battle, 369, Fall, 2 Sept. 1864, 370; Sherman leaves, 371.
- Atlantic, Lines of Torres Vedras from the Tagus to the, 184.
- Aube river, 202, 203, 206, 209, 217, 218, 219.
- Auerstädt battle, 16 Oct. 1806, 66, 69; Troops of Duke Frederick William dressed in black in memory of the Duke, mortally wounded in, 245.
- Augereau, Marshal, 24, 27, 47, 62, 65, 69, 70, 144, 157, 206, 207, 209, 213, 215.
- Augsburg, 41, 46, 77, 78.
- Augusti, Gov.-Gen., 507.
- Austerlitz, battle of, 2 Dec. 1806, 55-60, 65, 75, 114, 177, 233.
- Austria, Peace negotiations with France, 9 Nov. 1800; rejected, 22-23; Napoleon's plan of 1805 campaign, 35; Treaty of Pressburg, 59; war of 1809 to wipe out treaty of Pressburg, 75; arming for war, 171; army in war of 1814, 199, 203-209; advance to Paris, 221; officers educated in, 227; joined a new coalition against Napoleon, 230; strength of army, 231, 232; joined allies at Sebastopol, 285; war with France and Sardinia, 1859, 294-319; war with Prussia, 1866, 377-402; French plan to induce A. and Italy to abandon their neutrality, 412; English disinclined to an alliance with the Porte without co-operation of, 478.
- Avallon, 3.
- Avesnes, 233.
- Azoff, Sea of, 289.
- Azores, Villeneuve at the, 32.

B.

- Babadagh, 477.
- Badajoz, Junta fled to, 170; Wellington at, 180; retires, 181; taken by Soult, 185; Beresford advancing to its relief, 186; defeated by Marmont, 187; taken by Wellington, 188-190.
- Baden, promised contribution to the Grand Army, 39; made a Grand Duchy, 40; Troops from, 381-2, 396; French troops to occupy, 412, 474.
- Bagratiou, Prince, despatched to Hollabrunn, 50; on Plan of Austerlitz battle, 54; opposed by Lannes and Murat, 56, 57; in command against French invasion of Russia, 106; in province of Minsk, 109; retreat to Smolensk intercepted by Davoust, 110; reaches Smolensk, 111.
- Bahiafonda, 496.
- Baiguire, 502.
- Baird, stand at Elvas, 172.
- Bakshisheraï, 272.
- Balacava Charge, The, 25 Oct. 1854, 271-276; parallel to the charge of the Light Brigade, 246.
- Balacava, Stores in, 283; harbour, 270, 282.
- Balan, 447, 449, 450, 451, 452.
- Balashov, aide-de-camp to Alexander I., 107, 108.

- Balcombe, Betsy, and Napoleon, 118.
 Bâle, 3, 199, 200, 207, 219, 231.
 Bulganak, The, 267.
 Balkans, The, 478, 488, 490, 491, 494, 495.
 Baltic, The, 410.
 Baltimore, 322, 339.
 Bamberg, 63.
 Banks, Gen. N. P. at Culpeper, 336 ;
 engagement at Cedar Mountains
 and retreats, 337 ; to take Mobile,
 361.
 Banks' Ford, 346, 348, 349.
 Barbadoes, Nelson at, 31.
 Barcelona, 169.
 Bard fort, 6 ; attacked and capit-
 ulated, 7.
 "Bare-foot" battalions, 4.
 Baring at Waterloo, 260.
 Barral's reserve cavalry, 422.
 Bar-sur-Aube, 202, 206, 208, 217, 222.
 Baschutz, 142.
 Basque provinces, 190.
 Bassano, 393.
 Baste, Capt., 91, 93.
 Bath, 44.
 Bâton Rouge, 355.
 Batoum, 486.
 Battle above the clouds, 360.
 Bautzen, 145, 152 ; Battle of, 20-21
 May, 1813, 139-143.
 Bavaria, Elector of, raised to rank of
 King, 60.
 Bavaria, French in, 22 ; Bernadotte
 to command Bavarians, 38 ; Aus-
 tria driven from, 45 ; Margrave of
 Ansbach receives, 61 ; Napo-
 leon's Marshals in, 62 ; men from,
 76 ; Augereau's corps in, 144 ;
 troops intercept retreating
 French army and are crushed,
 169 ; supports Benedek against
 Prussia, 332, 394 ; under Prince
 Charles, 396, 397 ; troops defend
 Kissingen, 398 ; surprised on the
 Saale, 398 ; Falckenstein assumes
 government of portions of, 399 ;
 troops with Prussia, 414 ; march
 with Germans after Sedan, 445 ;
 at Argenteuil, 457.
 Baylen, Capitulation of, 165, 166, 180,
 227.
 Bayonne, 162, 165, 168, 171, 196, 197.
 Bazaine, Marshall. In command at
 Metz, 409 ; near Spicheren, 418 ;
 commands Rhine army, recalls
 Frossard to Metz, 420 ; retires
 from Metz to Verdun, 422 ; crosses
 the Moselle, 423 ; at Gravelotte,
 424 ; battle of Vionville, 425-29 ;
 shut up in Metz, 437-40 ; attempts
 to relieve him, 445 ; Gambetta
 counting upon his co-operation,
 460 ; capitulation of Metz, 460-61.
 Bazeilles, 445, 447, 448, 449.
 Beauharnais, Eugène, Prince of
 Leuchtenberg, Napoleon's saying
 to, 12 ; reverses in Italy, 81 ; im-
 peding Archduke John, 84 ; at
 Wagram, 94 ; saying concerning
 the Cossacks, 101 ; in the advance
 to Smolensk, 106 ; opposed to the
 advance to Moscow, 111 ; at Battle
 of Borodino, 115 ; captures Ma-
 loyarslavetz, 119, 120 ; retreat
 from Smolensk, 121, 122 ; at-
 tacked, 123, 124 ; at Battle of
 Lützen, 133-137 ; sent to Italy to
 levy an army, 140, 144 ; defence
 against Austrians in Italy, 199,
 208 ; Viceroy, 76.
 Beaumont, 231, 233, 234, 235, 440, 443,
 444.
 Beaune la Rolande battle, 28 Nov.
 1870, 465.
 Beauregard, Gen., commands Con-
 federate Army, 323, 324, 330, 331.
 Beaver Down Creek, 334.
 Bee, Gen., at Bell's Ford, 325, 326 ;
 death, 333.
 Béthune roads, 33.
 Belbek river, 269.
 Belfort, 409, 459, 462, 463, 473, 474, 475.
 Belgium held by French troops, 199 ;
 Maison retires before Duke of
 Saxe-Weimar, 208 ; Napoleon's
 plan to conquer English and
 Prussians in, 232 ; probably join-
 ing France, 233 ; French advance
 to frontier, 234 ; Belgians of
 Chassé at Waterloo, 254 ; French
 after Sedan escape into, 455 ;
 frontier to the Loire one broad
 battlefield, 461.
 Bell's ford, 324.
 Belle Alliance, 253.
 Belleville, 223, 453.
 Belliard, Gen., 224.
 Bellizona Castle, 11.
 Belvedere, 168.
 Benavente, 171.
 Benedek, Field-Marshal, commands
 Austrian forces in Italy, 295 ; at
 Peschiera, 312 ; retires after Battle
 of Solferino, 318 ; assumes com-
 mand of Austrian army, 379 ; oc-
 cupation of Saxony, 382 ; Battle
 of Königgrätz, 383-389 ; ordered
 to send his troops to Vienna, 400.
 Benedetti, 402.
 Benatek, 387, 388.
 Benningsen, Gen., commands com-
 bined forces of Russia and Prus-
 sia : Battle of Eylau, 70-74 ; Re-
 inforced the allies against Napo-
 leon in Saxony, 154 ; at Battle of
 Leipzig, 158.
 Bentonville, 375.
 Bereguardo, 295.
 Beresford, Gen. Lord, sent to relief
 of Badajos, 185 ; battle at Al-
 buera : Wellington's remarks,
 186 ; Badajos preserved from, 187.

- Berezina river, 124, 125, 128.
- Berlin, Napoleon's plan to march to, 63, 64; entry of Napoleon, 27 Oct. 1806, 68; ministers left behind in, 69; Napoleon's idea to eventually march to, 139; Wittgenstein and Blücher's armies not covering, 140; Oudinot to march to, 142, 144, 151; beaten and driven back, 151, 153; Reserve forces in, 379; Benedek not dictating peace in, 382; King William in, 407; We shall soon reach Berlin, 413; the 15th of August destined for the French entry into, 423; Treaty of Berlin, 495.
- Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden. In Hanover, his plan, 38; at Ingolstadt, 41; crosses the Inn, 47, 48; summoned to Napoleon at Brünn, 53; in Pratzen, 57; in Bavaria, 62; occupies Saalburg, 64; refuses to assist Davoust, 66; moves to the Vistula, 69; Battle of Eylau, 70, 71; at Würzburg, 77; at Enzersdorf, 94; occupies Aderklaa and retreats, 95; elected Crown Prince of Sweden, deserts Napoleon, and joins Russia, 133; commands Army of North, 145; Oudinot despatched to Berlin to deal with, 151; crosses the Elbe at Dessau, 154; Napoleon to meet, 155; attacks Marmont, 158; successful engagement with French, 159; supports Duke of Saxe-Weimar, 208.
- Bernard, Prince, of Saxe-Weimar, 237, 244.
- Bernato bridge, 303.
- Bernkopf, commandant at Bard, 7.
- Berry-au-Bac, 210, 211, 212, 213.
- Berthier, Marshal, opinion of Desaix, 18; in Bavaria, 62; sent to Ratisbon, 77; paralysed by responsibility, 78; at Esslingen, 86; conference at Island of Loban, 89; with Napoleon at Wagram, 96; at Moscow, 120; at the Berezina, 126; orders transmitted by, 176; to lead army to Fontainebleau, 222.
- Bertrand, Gen. at Battle of Lützen, 135, 137; Battle of Bautzen, 140-142; visits outposts with Napoleon before Battle of Waterloo, 252; retreat with Napoleon after Waterloo, 265.
- Besançon, 202, 460, 474.
- Besika Bay, 478.
- Bessarabia, Russian, 476.
- Bessières, Marshal, with Napoleon after Battle of Moscow, 120; death at Rippach, 136.
- Bessières, advance on Madrid, 165.
- Best, Hanoverians of, 253.
- Beyer, Gen. invades Hesse-Cassel, 381; united with the Army of the Main, 396; invests Strasburg, 419.
- Biberach, 21.
- Bidassoa river, 163, 183, 198.
- Biela, 479, 482, 485.
- Big Black river, 356.
- Big Round Top, 357.
- Bigny, 465.
- Bilbao, 196.
- Bismarck, Prince, in German Army, 410; cuirassier regiment annihilated at Vionville, 425; two sons in cavalry charge, 426; political matters after Sedan committed to him, 452; signed preliminaries of Peace at Versailles, 475.
- Bistritz river, 386, 387.
- Bitsch, 409, 415, 462.
- Bitterfeld, Gen. Herwarth von, commands army of Elbe, 383; at Battle of Königgrätz, 384-8.
- Black Brunswickers, 245, 246, 251.
- Black Forest, Army of, 3, 40.
- Black Forest valley, 474.
- Black Sea, 267.
- Blackburn's Fort, 324.
- Blake, Gen., opposes King Joseph in Spain, 165; Napoleon sends troops against, 168.
- Blanc Menil, 457.
- Blanco, Field-Marshal, 505, 506.
- Blasiowitz, 57.
- Blenheim battle-field, 21.
- Blöser-Wasser stream, 141, 142.
- Blois, 224, 468.
- Blondel's song discovers King Richard, 48.
- "Bloody Angle" 354.
- Blue Mountains, 333, 337, 342.
- Blücher, Field-Marshal, at Jena, in command of rear-guard; urges renewal of conflict, 67; brought up as a cavalry officer, 102; from Silesia crosses the Elbe, 134; captures Gross-Görschen, 136; fails to reach Kaja; allies retreat to his disgust, 137; wounded, 138; Battle of Bautzen, 140-143; Dresden, 145, 146; advance to Katzbach, 151, 152; "Marshal Forwards," 152, 203; crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, 154, 155; attacks Marmont at Möckern, and captures, 158; crossed the Rhine, Jan. 1 1814, 200; advance to Vassy and St. Dizier; design to march to Paris, 202; attacked by Napoleon and retreat to Barsur-Aube, 202, 203; at La Rothière: advance to Paris, 203; attacked at Vau-champs, 203, 204; resumes march, 208; Battle of Craonne, 211; at Laon, 211-213, 215, 216; communications re-established 220; on

- frontiers of Lorraine 222; invasion of France, 232; at Namur, 234; disgusted at a soldier deserting his colors, 235; Battle of Ligny, 233-243; at Quatre-Bras, 243, 249, 252; arrived at Waterloo, 253, 259; pursuit of the French after Waterloo, 265.
- Blumenau, 402.
- Blumenthal, 410.
- Bober, The, 144, 146, 152.
- Bobr, 124.
- Bodenbach, 381.
- Bohemia, troops from, 24; Archduke Ferdinand's plan to reach, 42, 43; collecting army in, 46; hindered by Napoleon, 47, 49; Austrians to drive French into, 54; Archduke Charles to crush French between his army and that of, 77; Archduke Charles on the frontiers, 82; retreats towards, 97; Napoleon secure from attack from, 144; approaches guarded, 144; expected attack of French, 146; army enters Saxony, 147; in defiles of Peterswalde: retire, 152; army at Freiberg to oppose, 154; to march to Paris, 200; rear threatened by Napoleon, 205; at Aube, 218; communications opened, 384; mountains, 141, 382.
- Bois de Geniveaux, farmhouse, 430, 432.
- Bojazid, 477, 486.
- Bologna, 380.
- Bonaparte. See Napoleon.
- Bonaparte, Jerome, King of Westphalia, at the Niemen, 106; to dispose of Bagration, 109; marching under Davoust, 110; attacks Château of Hougomont, 256.
- Bonaparte, Joseph, meets Cobenzl at Lunéville; conditions of peace, rejected, 23; President of the Senate, Paris, 39; Crown of Spain given to, 165; French army reducing his provinces, 166; joined by Napoleon at the Miranda, 168; incapable of commanding in Peninsula, 175; threatened invasion of Madrid, 179; Soult displaces Jourdan on his staff, 180; enters Seville, 181; his command reduced: a phantom king, 182; commanding French army in Peninsula, 190; takes refuge in Valencia, 193; enters Madrid, Nov. 2, 1812; formed army of Portugal; defeated by Wellington at Arapiles: retires to Ciudad Rodrigo, 195; in command, 195; too weak to oppose Wellington at Valladolid, defeated at Victoria, June 21, 1813, 196; recalled to France in disgrace, 197; President of Court of Regency at Paris, 223.
- Bonaparte, Louis, to raise troops and form a National Guard, 39.
- Bondy wood, 457.
- Bonnet, succeeds Marmont, 192.
- Bonneuil, 457.
- Bordeaux, troops from, 47; entered by English, 198; Government removed to, 468; National Assembly to meet at, 473.
- Borgo Vercelli, 301.
- Borisor, 124, 125, 126.
- Bormida, The, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19.
- Bormio, 392.
- Bornheim, 399.
- Borodino, 120, 192; Battle of the, 113-116.
- Borstedt, 134.
- Bosphorus, The, 478.
- Bosquet, Marshal, at Inkerman, 273, 281; Sebastopol, 290, 292.
- Bossu wood, 246.
- Boudet occupies Esslingen, 86.
- Bougival, 457.
- Bouillon, 454.
- Boulogne, 217.
- Boulogne, French ships for, 30; plan, 31; camp of army, 38; Napoleon at, 39; English landed at, 42.
- Bourbaki, Gen., command in Army of the Rhine at Metz, 409, 420; at Remy, 422; news of defeat at St. Privat, 433; government of North of France under, 459; prevented from approaching Paris, 461; operating in East of France, 468; moves to Nevers to attack Germans, 473; to destroy Germans' retreat to the Rhine, 474; surrounded and retreats to Switzerland, 474.
- Bourbons, Napoleon, to drive them from Naples, 35; from the throne of Spain, 162; return to Paris, April, 1814, 224, 225, 226; changes, 226-227; Napoleon's saying at St. Helena, 225; cause lost forever, 229.
- Bourges, 460, 468, 473.
- Bourmont, Gen., desertion from French army, 231.
- Bourrienne, 3.
- Boyer, Gen., 460.
- Brabant, 43.
- Braga, 177.
- Braganza, House of, ceased to reign, 163, 164; arms supplanted, 164.
- Bragg, Gen., 358, 359, 360.
- Braine-l'Alleud, 253, 254.
- Brannan Fort, 27, 47.
- Bray, 205.
- Brazil, Spanish monarchy transferred to, 163, 164; Spanish fleet expected from, 493.

- Bredow's corps, 425.
 Breslau, 142.
 Brest, 30, 31, 32, 33, 92.
 Brie, 470.
 Brienne, 202, 203, 217.
 Briey, 437.
 Bristol Station, 337, 338.
 Brittany, 408.
 Brünn, 50, 51, 53.
 Brune, Gen., with troops in the Mincio, 24, 27, 28; at Boulogne defending sea-coast, 39.
 Brunswick, Duke of, 63; attacked by Napoleon, escapes by Kösen, 64; watch-fires, 65; retreat from Weimar to Naumburg, 66; blinded, 67; death, 245.
 Brussels, Wellington at, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 245, 247, 250; Duchess of Richmond's Ball, 240.
 Bvye, 238, 240, 241, 245, 246, 248, 249.
 Bubna, Gen., 83, 207, 209.
 Buckner, 327.
 Buell, Gen., 330.
 Bülow, Gen. von, with Army of North, 209; at Ligny, 240; Waterloo, 257, 259; at Vionville, 425.
 Bueno Ventura, The, 496.
 Buffalora, 295, 303-308.
 Bulgaria, Prince Cherhesky, governor of, 478; Bulgarians with Russian army, 482; Russian guard in, 488.
 Bull Run, battle (July 21, 1861), 323, 325, 332, 333, 337, 338, 348, 349.
 Burford, 350.
 Burgos, 163, 169, 192, 196.
 Burgoyne, Sir John, 272.
 Burgundy, 463.
 Burkensdorf, 48.
 Burluk, 268.
 Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., to cross Turner's Gap, 340; driven from his post by Lee, 341; replaces McClellan in command and re-organises army, 342; crosses the Rappahannock, 343; driven back from Fredericksburg, 344; superseded, 345; at Annapolis, 361, 362; Battle of The Wilderness, 364, 365.
 Busaco heights, 183.
 Busca, 302.
 Bussy, 248.
 Butler, Gen., 361.
 Buzancy, 443.
 Bylandt, 253.
 Byng, Guards of, 253.
- C.
- Cabano, 500.
 Cadiz, Ships from, 30, 31; British fleet reaching, 33; Villeneuve at, 33, 34, 35; Population in arms, 165; might have been surprised by Joseph and Soult, 181; Central Junta in refuge in, 182; Cervera leaves, 497; reserve force under Camara starts from, 507.
 Cæsar, 81.
 Caffarelli, commandant in Basque provinces, 190.
 Caimanera, 506.
 Calais, Pas de, 408.
 Calder, Sir Robert, against French fleet, 32, 33, 34.
 Calvados, 472.
 Camarino, 312.
 Camaro, Admiral, 507.
 Cambacères, Consul, 1, 29, 39.
 Cambon, French ambassador in Washington, 509.
 Cambriels, 460, 462.
 Camou, 306, 307, 308.
 Campbell, Thos., on the Battle of Hohenlinden, 26.
 Campo-Formio, Peace of, 2.
 Canacao Bay, 498.
 Canrobert, Marshal, at Sebastopol, 284; resigned his command, 290; with troops, 296; at Magenta, 304-306; marches on Medole, 314-316; at Metz, 409; to assemble at Châlons for Metz, 412, 413; at Metz, 420, 422; at village of St. Privat la Montagne, 430; prisoner of war, 462.
 Canrobert's hill, 269, 274.
 Cape Finisterre, 32.
 Cape Verde Islands, 497.
 Caracon, 500.
 Cardenas, 496, 497, 500.
 Cardigan, Lord, leads charge of Light Brigade at Balaclava, 275, 276.
 Careenage bay, 271, 272.
 Careenage creek, 271.
 Careenage harbour, 277.
 Careenage ravine, 277, 278, 280.
 Carignan, 444, 445.
 Carinthia, 76.
 Carlisle, U.S.A., 350.
 Carminanera, 501.
 Carnot, 208.
 Carolina, North, 321, 333, 373, 374, 376.
 Carolina, South, 320, 321, 333, 373, 374.
 Carpathian mountains, 402.
 Carpenedolo, 311.
 Carroll's brigade, 352.
 Casa Marino, 314.
 Casa Nuova, 315.
 Casate, 306.
 Casellino Nuovo, 316.
 Cassel, 110, 379, 380, 381, 453.
 Cassino Nuovo, 307.
 Castanos, 166, 168, 169.
 Casteggio, 11, 297, 298.
 Castel Ceriolo, 15.
 Castel Goffredo, 311, 312, 315, 316.
 Castel Grimaldo, 312.
 Castel Venzago, 310.
 Castelnuovo, 391.
 Castiglione, 310, 312, 314, 316.

- Castile, Old, 169, 190, 191.
 Catalonia, 169, 180, 188, 197.
 Catalaunian fields, 440.
 Cathcart, Col. Geo., on European Tactics, 98.
 Cathcart, Gen. Sir Geo., killed at Inkerman, 280.
 Caucasus, Army of the, 266, 486.
 Caulaincourt, Gen. August, killed in Battle of the Borodino, 115.
 Caulaincourt, Armand August, Duke of Vicenza, accompanes Napoleon to Paris, 129, 223; despatched to Paris with full power to treat for peace, 224.
 Cavite, 498, 499, 505.
 Cavo del Lago, 301.
 Cavo Scotti, 302.
 Cavriana, 310, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317.
 Cedar mountains, 336.
 Cemetery Ridge, 351, 352, 353.
 Cenesara, 310, 311, 315.
 Centreville, 323, 324, 325, 338.
 Cerlo, 14, 17.
 Cerkovico, 483.
 Cernay, 449.
 Cervera, Admiral, leaves Cadiz, 497; Dewey in search of his fleet, 498; fleet sighted at Fort de France; forbidden to land at Martinique, proceeds to Santiago, 500; comes out of harbour and is destroyed, 505; prisoner, 506.
 Ceschi, Col., 300.
 Chalons, 202, 203, 204, 205, 216, 219, 408, 410, 412, 413, 420, 422, 423, 427-429, 440, 441-443, 456.
 Cham, 82.
 Chambersburg, 350, 351.
 Chambièrre, Island of, 422.
 Champagne, 208.
 Champaubert, 203, 204.
 Champigny, 470.
 Champion Hill battle, May 15, 1863, 355.
 Chancellorsville, 346, 347, 348.
 Changarnier, General, at Metz, 420; terms for capitulation of Metz, 461.
 Chanzy, 468, 469.
 Charenton, 470.
 Charette, Gen., 464.
 Charleroi, 19, 233-236, 239, 253, 265.
 Charles XII. chose the road by Poltava, 109.
 Charles IV. of Spain, compelled to abdicate, 164.
 Charles, Archduke. Armistice with Moreau, 27; with Austrian army to conquer Mantua and Peschiera, and enter Switzerland, 36; Massena to keep head against him, 37; hurries from Italy to Vienna, 46, 51, 52; re-organises Austrian army, 75; campaign in Bavaria, 76-81; Aspern and Esslingen, 81-87; Battle of Wagram; retreat, 91-97; Archduke Albert a worthy son of, 391.
 Charles, Prince, of Bavaria, commanding Bavarian army, 394; in supreme command of the Army of the Main, 396; army divided by Falckenstein, 397.
 Charles, Prince, of Roumania, independent of the Porte, assists the Russians, 477.
 Charles City Cross Road, 335.
 Charleston, 329, 374, 321.
 Charonne, 223.
 Chartres, 464.
 Chassé, Belgians of, 254.
 Chasseurs d'Afrique, 276.
 Château Thierry, 203, 204.
 Châteaudun, 464, 466.
 Châteauneuf, 365.
 Châtel St. Germain, 429.
 Châtillon, 457, 463.
 Chattahoochee, 369.
 Chattanooga, 358, 359, 368, 371.
 Chaumont, 202, 206.
 Chaves, 177.
 Chemnitz, 147, 154.
 Chêne le Populeux, 442.
 Cheraw, 374.
 Cherbourg, 410.
 Chernesky, Prince, 478.
 Chernavoda, 477.
 Cherson, Cape, 272.
 Chersonesus, 271.
 Chevilly, 457.
 Chiavenna, 28.
 Chicago, 322.
 Chichagov, 124, 126.
 Chickahominy, 334, 335, 364, 366.
 Chickamauga, 358, 497.
 Chiers river, 440, 445.
 Chlum hills, 386, 388, 389.
 Choisy-le-Roi, 457.
 Cialdini, Gen., capture of Palestro, 301; watching passes of the Alps, 316; at Bologna, 380; La Mamora with, 391; near Mirandola and Modena, 392; succeeds La Mamora: crosses Lower Po and reaches Padua: occupies Udine, 393.
 Cienfuegos, 496, 500.
 Cintra Convention, Aug. 30, 1808, 167.
 Ciudad Real, 177.
 Ciudad Rodrigo, 181, 183, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 195.
 Ciudad Rodrigo, Duke of Wellington at, 193.
 Cisalpine Republic re-established, June 5, 1800, 9, 17, 23.
 Clarke, French Minister of War, 211, 223.
 Clausel, Marshal, succeeds Marmont and Bonnet at Salamanca, 192; pursued by Wellington to Burgos, 194; against guerilla bands in N.

- Spain, 195; wanted by K. Joseph, 296; arrives at Vittoria and retreats into Catalonia, 197.
- Clermont, 442, 443.
- Cleve, Duchy of, 61.
- Clichy barrier, 223.
- Clinchant, Gen., 474.
- Cobentzl, 22, 23.
- Coburg, 63, 394, 397.
- Codrington's division, 268, 269.
- Coehorn, Gen., 82.
- Coimbra, 178, 183, 184, 185.
- Col de Ranzola, 4.
- Cold Harbour, 335, 366.
- Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 32.
- Cologne, 199, 200.
- Colombey, 423, 438, 439.
- Columbia, 374.
- Como, 303.
- Compans, 221.
- Condé, 227.
- Confederation of the Rhine, 60.
- Confianza, 302.
- Conflans, 437.
- Conlie, 464, 469.
- Conneurtz, 159.
- Consort, Prince, 326.
- Constance, Lake of, 20.
- Constantine, Grand Duke, 50, 57.
- Constantinople, Hospital system at, 284; Russia to be in, 478; Turks directed from, 481, 489; Turkish army at, 490; Suleiman summoned to, 490; Servia to advance to, 491; remnants of Turkish army conveyed to, 493; Russia's right to occupation, 495.
- Copenhagen, Wellington's horse, 254.
- Cordova, 166, 181.
- Corfu, 36.
- Corinth, U.S.A., 329, 331.
- Cornwallis, Admiral, at Cadiz, 33.
- Cornwallis, Lord, surrenders at Yorktown, 332.
- Corregidor Islands, 498.
- Corsican chasseurs with Napoleon, 228.
- Corunna, 33, 170, 171.
- Cote-d'Or, 473.
- Couch's corps, 346, 347.
- Coulmiers, 464.
- Courland, 106.
- Couroux, Gen., 93.
- Cracow, 379.
- Crampton's Gap, 340.
- Craonne, 211, 215.
- Cremona, 380.
- Crimean War, 1854, 266-293.
- Crimean Army Fund, 234.
- Crump's landing, 329.
- Cuba, 496, 497, 500, 508, 509.
- Curish Valley, 492.
- Cuchiari, 380.
- Cuggiono, 303, 306, 307.
- Culp's Hill, 351, 352.
- Culpeper, 336, 342, 349.
- Cumberland, 327.
- Custoza, 312, 391, 392.
- Czartoryski, 52.

D.

- Daigny, 447, 449.
- Dalton, 368.
- Dannenberg, Gen., at Inkerman, 278, 280.
- Danube river, 10, 20, 21, 27, 37, 40, 41, 46, 47, 49, 51, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 88, 91, 94, 95, 402, 476, 477, 479, 480, 490.
- Danzig, 70, 134.
- Dardanelles, 266.
- Darmstadt, 396.
- Daru, Count, Napoleon dictates plan of campaign of 1805 to, 35, 37.
- Daun, Marshal, 140.
- Davis, Jefferson, President of Confederate Republic, 321; taken prisoner, 376.
- Davout, Marshal, commands camp of Ambleuse, 38; crossed the Danube at Neuburg, 41; with Napoleon to cross the Inn, 47; summoned to Brünn, 53; at Raigern Monastery, 55; Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, 62-68; Eylau and Friedland, 69-72; to march to Ratisbon, 77; to Neustadt, 78; at Abensberg, 80; battle of Eckmühl, 80; "Prince of Eckmühl," 80; at Battle of Aspern, 87; to defend Vienna, 89; at Esslingen, 94; successfully attacks heights of Neusiedel, 95, 96; corps with Napoleon, 106; detains Emperor of Russia's aide-de-camp, 107; to dispose of Bagration, 109; marching with Jerome, King of Westphalia, 110; object failed; joined by Napoleon at Orsha, 111; at the Borodino, 115; to leave Smolensk, 122; attacked, but escapes with difficulty, 123; despatched to regain Hamburg, 140; enters Hamburg, 142; crushed Bavarians intercepting French retreat, 160; at battle of Craonne, 211; defender of Paris, 232.
- Decaen, Gen., attacks Austrians at Mattenblött, 25, 26; in Metz, 420, 422.
- Decoster, guide, 255, 264.
- Decrès, Minister of Marine, 34.
- Denneuritz, 153.
- Desaix, General, arrives at Stradella from Egypt; presentiment of death, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17; killed, 17; buried in convent of Sant' Angelo, remains transferred to monastery of the Great St. Bernard, 18, 19.
- Dessau, 154.
- Dewey, Admiral, commanding Ameri-

- can Squadron in Hong Kong, sails for Philippine Islands, 498; destroys Spanish Fleet in Bay of Manila, 499; blockades Manila, 507; demands its surrender: bombarded, 508.
- Diebitsch, Gen., 220.
- Diedrichs, Vice-Admiral von, 507.
- Dieppe, 471.
- Dijon, 3, 4, 43, 474.
- Dinwiddie Court House, 375.
- Dippoldswalde, 147.
- Dnieper river, 110, 111, 123.
- Dobrudja, 480.
- Dobrudsha, 267.
- Döhlitz, 159.
- Dohalitz, 387.
- Doholicka, 387.
- Dolgoruki, Prince, 51, 53.
- Dombach battle, 397.
- Domburg, 64.
- Donauwörth, 21, 40, 41, 78.
- Donchery, 445, 449, 453.
- Doncourt, 423, 436.
- Donelson, Fort, 327.
- Donzelot, Gen., 258.
- Dorogobuzh, 114.
- Douay, General Abel, with Army of South, on the Rhine, 410; killed in Battle of Weissenburg, 413, 414.
- Douay, Felix, with the Army of Paris, 420; at Châlons, 440.
- Douay, 38.
- Doubs, department of, 473.
- Doulevant, 222.
- Douro river, 190, 191, 194, 195.
- Douzy, 445.
- Dresden, Napoleon reaches, 129; his plan to re-capture, 135; allied armies at, 139, 140; Battle of Dresden, Aug. 26, 1813, 144-150; Napoleon's troops round, 153, 154; Army of Saxony's main strength in, 380.
- Drissa, 109.
- Drohnberg, 141.
- Drouot, Gen., at Lützen, 137; at Quatre-Bras, 248; at Waterloo, 261; retreats with Napoleon, 265.
- Dub, Hill of, 386.
- Dubovolsky, 484.
- Dubretton, Gen., 194.
- Ducrot, Gen., at Battle of Wörth, 414, 415; with Army of Paris, 420; at Châlons, 440; succeeds MacMahon, 498; retires to the Illy; letter from Gen. Wimpffen, 448, 449; at Sedan, 451, 452; on heights of Avron, 469; hindered in Paris, 472.
- Düben, 155.
- Dünaburg, 105.
- Dürrenstein, 48, 51.
- Duhesme, 4.
- Dumas, Mathieu, 28.
- Dun, 439, 443.
- Dupanloup, Bishop, prisoner in Orleans, 468.
- Duplat's troops, 254.
- Dupont, Minister of War, 227.
- Dupont, Gen., obtains possession of Cordova, retires to Andujar and capitulates, 166.
- Durando, 380.
- Durham Station, 376.
- Duroc, Gen., leaves Paris, 3; returns with Napoleon to Paris after the Russian Campaign, 129; signed treaties between France and Spain, 163.
- Dwina river, 109, 110, 112.
- Dyle river, 251.
- E.
- Early, Gen., 375.
- Ebelsberg, 82.
- Ebersberg forest, 25.
- Ebersdorf, 85, 89.
- Ebro river, 166, 168, 182, 194, 197.
- Eckmühl, Prince of (Davout), 80.
- Eckmühl, 79. Battle, April 22, 1809, 80-82.
- Edolo, 392.
- Egypt, Bonaparte leaves, Aug. 24, 1799, 1; Desaix returns from, 12; forces in, 24; Picton at Quatre-Bras: "Twenty-eighth remember Egypt," 245; Government prevent Spanish Fleet from coaling in, 507.
- Elba, Sovereignty accepted by Napoleon, 1814, 224; Return of Napoleon from, 1815, 225; Napoleon at, 227, 229.
- Elbe, Gen., building of bridge at Studianka, 125.
- Elbe river, 64, 65, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 143 to 145, 147, 151, 154, 155, 379, 385, 389.
- Elbe, Army of the, 379, 381, 383, 384, 400.
- Elbing, 70.
- El Caney, 504.
- Elchingen, Duke of (Ney), 42.
- Elchingen, Battle of, Oct. 14, 1805, 42.
- Ellsworth, teaches the Zouave drill to a Chicago Company, 322.
- El Poso, 503, 504.
- Elsasshausen, 416.
- Elster, 136, 159.
- Elvas, 172, 189.
- Ely's ford, 346, 348.
- Engadine, 28.
- Engen, 20.
- England, Fleet at Genoa, 4; subsidies to Austria, 22; Napoleon's intended invasion, 29-34; Napoleon to subdue, 161; English in Spain, 1813, 142; Treaty with Portugal, Oct. 22, 1807, 163; officers educated in, 227; in the American War,

- 326; offer to the Porte, 478;
Treaty of Berlin, 495.
- Enns, 27.
Enos, 493.
Enzersdorf, 91, 94.
Epernay, 204, 216.
Eppes, Château of, 212.
Erfurt, 63, 64.
Erfurt, Congress of, 168.
Erlon, Gen. d', with Reille at Charle-
roi, 235, 239; at Ligny, 241, 242;
at Quatre-Bras, 246, 247.
Ernest, Archduke, 379.
Erzbirge mountains, 150.
Erzeroum, 486.
Eski-Sagra, 486.
Esla river, 171.
Eslü-Sagra, 478.
Espagne, 86.
Espinasse, Gen., at Marcella, 306, 307;
killed at Magenta, 308.
Espinosa, 168.
Esslingen, 85-88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 402, 417.
Essonnes, 224.
Estremadura, 177.
Estretta Castle, 500.
Etain, 423, 437.
Etampes, 463.
Etoges, 203, 204.
Etropol, 492.
Etroubles, 4.
Etruria, King of, 163.
Eugen, Prince, of Württemberg, 143.
Eugene, Empress of the French,
Franco-German War of 1870: "It
is my war," 412; entrusts Mac-
Mahon with formation of New
Cabinet, 419; afraid of Emperor's
return to Tuilleries, 441; Em-
peror's despatch to, after Beau-
mont defeat, 444; negotiations
with Bazaine, 460.
Eupatoria, 267, 286.
Europe, Map of, Pitt and the, 44.
Ewell, Gen. R. S., 350-352, 362, 375.
Exelmans, 247, 248.
Eylau, Battle of, Feb. 7 and 8, 1807,
70-73.
- F.
- Fabier, Col., 212.
Faidherbe, Gen., with Army of the
North, 468, 470, 471.
Faily, Gen. de, Niel waiting at Casa
Nuova for, 815; at Bitsch, with
no money, 409; in Metz, 420; at
Châlons, 440; attacked at Beau-
mont, and retreats, 443, 444.
Fair Oaks, 332.
Fairfax Court House, 338.
Falckenstein, Gen. Vogel von, 394;
capitulation of the Hanoverians,
396; Battle of Dombach, 397;
reports all lands north of the
Main in possession of Prussia;
assumes government of duchy of
Nassau, 399; at Hanover defends
German coasts, 410.
Falmouth, U.S.A., 342, 347.
Farragut, Capt., bombards and cap-
tures New Orleans, 328, 329; tries
to capture Vicksburg, 355.
Faure, Gen., 451.
Favre, Jules, proclaims Republican
government, 1870, 456; signed
preliminaries of peace at Ver-
sailles, Feb. 26, 1871, 475.
Fayetteville, 374.
Feniletto, 310.
Ferdinand VII. (Prince of Asturias)
of Spain, succeeds Charles IV.,
1808, 164; summoned to Bayonne
by Napoleon; population in arms
for, 165; restored to his throne
by Napoleon, March 22, 1814, 193.
Ferdinand, Archduke, 41, 46, 76.
Ferdinand, Prince Louis, 64.
Fère-Champenoise, 216, 217, 221.
Ferkat Pasha, 266.
Ferrara, 391.
Ferrières, 459.
Ferrol, 30-34.
Fiancoura, 396.
Fiéreck, Gen., 459, 465.
Finland, Army of, 124.
Fisher Fort, 374.
Fismes, 210.
Five Forks, 375.
Flagler, Major, 508.
Flanders, Free Corps of French, 470.
Flavigny, 425.
Fleigneux, 450.
Fleurus, 235, 236, 238-241, 246-248.
Floing, 447, 448, 450.
Florida, 320, 376, 497, 507.
Floridsdorf, 402.
Fontainebleau. Treaties signed at,
Oct. 27, 1807, 163; Napoleon's ad-
vance on the capital by, 222;
Napoleon at, 224; Treaty of, 227;
French failed in advance to Paris,
465, 467.
Fontanone brook, 14, 17.
Fontenoy, 474.
Forbach, 417, 418.
Foresto, 312.
Forey, Gen., 297, 298.
Fort de France (Martinique), 500.
Forton, 422.
Foy, 245.
France, Bonaparte returns from
Egypt, Oct. 8, 1799; Government
of the Directory overthrown, 1;
Rhine to be the frontier, 23;
revolution in, 43; Napoleon's
policy, the regeneration of, 104;
Treaties with Spain, 1807, 163;
condition, 1814, 200-202; advance
to the frontier, 1815, 230; to be
invaded by six armies, 231; in-
vasion to begin in June, 234;

- French troops in Paris, 267, 281, 293 ; Franco-Italian War of 1859, 294 ; army at Solferino, 311 ; war with Prussia, 1870, 403 ; liability to military service acknowledged, 404 ; German invasion : army organisation, 420.
- Franche-Comte, 36.
- Francis I., Napoleon's answer to, 131.
- Francis II., Emperor of Germany, Bonaparte's letter to, 2 ; at Battle of Austerlitz, 50-56 ; laid down his title of Emperor of Austria, 1806, 60.
- Francis Joseph, Emperor, commands Austrian army : at Villafranca, 311, 318.
- Franconia, 62, 63.
- Frankfort, 380, 397, 399.
- Franklin, Gen., 338, 340, 342.
- Franzesky, Gen., 387, 388, 410, 433, 434, 435, 470.
- Frasnes, 236, 237, 240, 244, 247, 265.
- Frauenberg, 43.
- Frazier's farm, 355.
- Frederick the Great, 61, 63, 98, 101, 140.
- Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, with Napoleon at Berlin, 139.
- Frederick William III., King of Prussia, at battle round Hassenhausen, 67 ; flies to Königsberg, 69 ; Napoleon offers peace to : refused, 73 ; at Battle of Bautzen, 140 ; following Napoleon, 230.
- Frederick, Crown Prince of Prussia, with Prussian army in Silesia, 379 ; at Battle of Königgrätz, 384-389 ; holding Benedek in Olmütz, 400 ; Wörth and Saarbrücken, 414-417 ; Vionville, 421 ; his army on the Aisne, 448 ; at Sedan, 449 ; march to Paris, 456, 459, 461, 463.
- Frederick Charles, Prince of Prussia, with Prussian army at Hoyerswerda, 379 ; at Battle of Königgrätz, 383-388 ; advance to Prague, 400 ; commands section of German forces, 410 ; Battle of Vionville, 422-425 ; at the Moselle, 436 ; siege army under his command, 437 ; made Field-Marshal, 461 ; Battle of Beanne la Rolande, 465 ; drives back the Army of Bourbaki, goes to Orleans and gains possession of Blois and Tours, 468 ; Battle of Le Mans, 469.
- Frederick Francis of Schwerin, Grand Duke, commands German troops at the Loire, 465.
- Frederick, 339.
- Fredericksburg, 342, 343, 345-350, 363.
- Freemantle, Col., 262.
- Freiberg, 40, 153, 154.
- Fremont, 336.
- Freudenstadt, 40.
- Friedland, Battle of, June 14, 1807, 73, 74, 233.
- Friuli, 393.
- Froschweiler, 416.
- Frossard, Gen., strengthens fortress at Alexandria, 296 ; in command at Châlons, 408 ; attacks Saarbrücken, 418 ; evacuates Saarbrücken, 417 ; at Battle of Vionville, 420, 422, 424, 425, 430, 432.
- Fuad Pasha, 493.
- Fuentes d'Onoro, 185.
- Fulda, 397, 399.
- G.
- Gabrova, 478.
- Gaines Mills, 334.
- Gaisberg, 414.
- Galatz, 477.
- Galiccia, 175, 179, 187.
- Gallipoli, 266, 478, 493.
- Gambetta, Leon, leaves Paris in a balloon for Tours ; to rouse country against the invaders for the relief of Paris, 459, 460 ; succeeds in rousing the nation, 463, 464 ; nearly taken prisoner ; plans, 468, 473, 474.
- Ganetzky, Gen., 488.
- Gantheaume, Admiral, orders for sailing, to hold the channel, 31 ; Villeneuve to co-operate with, 32 ; to be freed from blockade at Brest ; Letter from Napoleon ; leaves Brest, 33 ; returns to Brest, 34.
- Garcia, Catixto, 302.
- Garda, Lake of, 310, 311, 312, 316, 390.
- Gardanne, Gen., French advance guard under, 14.
- Garenne woods, 447, 450.
- Garfield, President, 327.
- Garibaldi, Guiseppe, Free corps under, 296 ; General in Sardinian army, 303 ; his chasseurs, 316 ; to attack passes from Lombardy, 391 ; his force, 392 ; attempting conquest of the Italian Tyrol, 393 ; at Neu-Breisach, 462 ; occupies Dijon, 474.
- Garibaldi, Menotti, 462.
- Garibaldi, Ricciotti, 462, 463.
- Gembloux, 238, 243, 249.
- Gemünden, 399.
- Genappe, 235, 236, 249, 251, 265.
- Genestrello, 297, 298.
- Geneva, Napoleon enters, May 7, 1800, 3.
- Geneva, Lake of, 4.
- Geneva, Massena to protect sea-coast, 3 ; Massena blockaded, 4, 37 ; capitulated June 4, 1800, 9, 11 ; besieged by Austrians, 10 ; Melas' supposed retreat to, 13 ; to be independent, 23 ; French troops enter and occupy, 1859, 294, 295.

- George III., Bonaparte's letter to, Dec. 25, 1799, 1.
- George, Mr., quoted, 113, 116, 120.
- Georgia, 320, 321, 333, 358, 361, 370, 374, 376.
- Gera, 64.
- Gerard, Gen., his corps in confusion, 234; Napoleon's saying to, 241; advance on Ligny, repulsed, 242; at Quatre-Bras, 248.
- Germania plank road, 362.
- Germana Ford, 346.
- Germanstown, 338.
- Germany, Moreau's army in, 10; South, in hands of French, 22; to be invaded, 35; Napoleon's object to destroy the Empire, 60; people no longer religious, 109; France to give up all claims in, 200; South Germans with Schwarzenberg, 231; military service in, 404; German families expelled from Paris, 420. See also, Prussia.
- Germersheim, 412.
- Gerona, Siege of, 175.
- Geronimo, 508.
- Gettysburg, 350, 354.
- Ghent, Louis XVIII., flies to, 229.
- Gibraltar, Straits, 31; Nelson at, 32; to be exchanged for Portugal, 163.
- Giessen, 381, 397.
- Gilly, 236.
- Gitschin, 384, 385.
- Giulay, Field-Marshal, commands Austrian forces in Italy, 295, 300, 304, 305, 309.
- Givet, 231, 440.
- Givonne, 447-451.
- Glatz, 385.
- Glinzendorf, 95.
- Glogau fort, 134, 142.
- Glubokoie, 109.
- Gneisenau, Gen. A., 240; succeeds Blücher and determines line of retreat, 249; concentrates Russian army at Wavre, 250.
- Goblenz, Gen., 385.
- Godoy, Prince of the Algarves, 163; Prince of the Peace: unpopularity: nearly lost his life, 164.
- Göben, Gen., 396-399, 410, 417, 418, 474.
- Göding, 490.
- Görlitz, 142, 152, 379, 385.
- Görsdorf, 415.
- Goethe in Weimar, 66.
- Göttingen, 38, 380, 394.
- Goits, 310, 391.
- Goldbach defile, 55.
- Goldsboro', 374.
- Golfe-Juan, 228.
- Golz, Gen. von, 418, 422.
- Gordonville, 336, 342.
- Gorni Dubnik, 485, 488.
- Gortschakoff, Prince, at Battle of Inkerman, 278, 280, 281; defends Sebastopol, 291; Fall of Sebastopol, 292; destroys fortifications, 293.
- Gosselies, 235, 236, 237, 240.
- Gotha, 394.
- Gourgaud, Gen., 235.
- Gourji-Studen, 479.
- Gourko, Gen., Shipka and Hankoi Passes, 478; at Plevna, 485, 486; at the Shipka Pass, 491-493.
- Gournay, 459.
- Graham, Gen., at Vittoria, 196.
- Gramont, 419.
- Granada entered by the French, 181.
- Grant, Gen., capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, 327; Battle of Shiloh, 329, 330; besieging Vicksburg, 349, 355, 356; head of military division of Mississippi, 359; Battle of the Wilderness, 359-367, 368; made Lieutenant-General, 360; on Sherman's march through Georgia, 370, 371, 372-376.
- Gravelotte, 423, 424, 430, 431, 433, 475.
- Gravina, Admiral, in Cadiz, 31; sailed to Ferrol, 33.
- Graz in Styria, 84.
- Grazau's division almost destroyed, 48.
- Great St. Bernard, Bonaparte's passage of the, 3-8; Desaix's remains in the monastery, 18.
- Greene, Lieut., 488, 490, 494.
- Grenoble, 228.
- Grenville, Lord, Secretary of State. Reply to Bonaparte, 2.
- Gressonay, 4.
- Grison, The, 24, 27.
- Grivitza, 485, 487.
- Grodno, 106.
- Gross-Beerdan, 151, 153.
- Gross-Görschen, 136.
- Grouchy, Gen. E., remarks on, 19; at Vauchamps, 204; quarrel with Vandamme, attack delayed, 236; to march on Sombrefe, letter to Napoleon, 238, 239; to pursue enemy, 247; accompanied Napoleon to Mill of Brye: to concentrate at Gembloux, 248, 249; at Waterloo, 255, 256, 257, 261, 263.
- Groveton, Battle at, 338.
- Guadarama mountains, 169.
- Guadiana river, 177.
- Guam Island, 509.
- Guantanamo, 501, 502, 506.
- Guasimos, battle, June 24, 1898, 502, 503.
- Guerilleros, 173, 177, 182, 195.
- Guidizzolo, 310, 312-315, 317.
- Guignes, 205.
- Gunstett, 415, 416.
- Günzburg, 41.
- Gustavus Adolphus, Tactics of, 98.
- Gzhatsk, 114,

H.

- Haddick, Gen.**, at Marengo, 14, 16, 17.
Hagenau, 416.
Hagerstown, 339, 350, 354.
Haines' Bluff, 356.
Hal, 254.
Halkett, Colin, 253, 254.
Halle, 379.
Halleck, Gen., 331, 336, 339, 350.
Hallue, 471.
Ham, 462.
Hamburg, a French Prefecture, 131 ; Davout despatched to regain possession of, 140 ; regained, May 29, 1813, 142, 144 ; Davout at, 151.
Hameln, 38.
Hamley, Gen., 268, 276, 279, 282, 288, 348.
Hammelburg, 398.
Hanan, 160, 380, 397.
Hancock, W. S., on Cemetery Ridge, 351 ; wounded at Bloody Angle, 354 ; with Army of Potomac at Battle of the Wilderness, 361-365.
Hankol pass, 478.
Hannibal's passage over the Alps studied by Bonaparte, 6.
Hanover, King of, 380, 394 ; accepts Prussian terms, 395.
Hanover, Crown Prince of, 395.
Hanover, reconquest of, 1805, 36 ; Bernadotte at, 33 ; exchanged to Prussia, 61 ; an apple of discord between Austria and England, 62 ; troops at Waterloo, 253, 254 ; Prussia prepares troops for invasion of, 1866, 379 ; army unprepared, 380 ; war declared, June 15, 380 ; army returns to Göttingen ; not uniting with Bavarians, 394 ; Battle of Langensalza, 394, 395.
Hanover Junction, 365.
Hanse towns, Neapolitan Bourbons recompensed by gift of, 61.
Hanseatic Departments unseparable from France, 131.
Hardinge, Col., prevents defeat of English at Albuera, 186.
Harmanli, 478.
Harper's Ferry, 339, 340, 342, 349, 350.
Harrisburg, 350.
Harrison's Landing, 336.
Hassenhausen, 66, 67.
Haugwitz, Count, sent by Prussians to Napoleon, 53, 61.
Havana, 497.
Haxall, 335.
Hayti, 501.
Hegel writing Phœnomenology during Battle of Jena : flies to Nüremberg, 66.
Heilsberg, 70.
Heine, description of Napoleon's hand, 56.
Henry, Fort, 327.
Herbert, Sidney, Secretary of War, 384.
Héricourt, 474.
Hermandura, 509.
Hersfeld, 397.
Hesse-Cassel, Prussia declares war against, June 15, 1866, 380 ; invaded, 381.
Hesse-Darmstadt, troops from, 381 ; Falckenstein assumes government of portion of, 399.
Hessian troops with Prussia, 414 ; in Battle of Gravelotte, 431-433.
Hill, Gen., at Coimbra, 178 ; stormed heights of Puebla, 196.
Hill's division, rearguard of Gen. Lee, 339 ; at Battle of the Wilderness, 362.
Hiller, Gen., at Abensberg, 77 ; driven before Napoleon, 82 ; attack upon Aspern, 86, 87.
Hilliers, Marshal Baraguay d', lost a brigade, 121 ; with Napoleon, 296 ; despatched to the Adda, 309 ; march on Solferino, 314 ; Battle of Solferino, 317.
Hirsora, 477.
Hochkirch, 140 ; entered by Blücher, 142.
Hochstädt battlefield, 21.
Höllenthal, The, 40.
Hof, 63, 64.
Hohenlinden, Convention of, Sept. 20, 1800, 22 ; Battle of, Dec. 3, 1800, 26 ; immortalised by Campbell, 26.
Hohenlohe, Prince, on banks of the Saale, 63, 64 ; on road to Weimar, 65 ; defeated at Jena, 66, 67, 68, at Gravelotte, 431.
Hohentwiel fortress surrendered, 20.
Hollabrunn, 50 ; Russians victorious at, 57.
Holland, King of, Wellington's letter to, 249.
Holland, armies of Prussia to be directed against, 36 ; sailors in the Danube, 92 ; inseparable from the French Empire, 131 ; France to give up all claims to, 200.
Holly Springs, 355.
Hong-Kong, 498.
Hood, Gen., supersedes Johnston at Chattanooga, 369 ; threatens Sherman on South of Atlanta, 371 ; no danger of attack from, 374.
Hooker, Gen. Jos., at Battle of Antietam, 340, 341 ; Fredericksburg, 344 ; supersedes Burnside to command of Army of the Potomac, President Lincoln's letter to, 346 ; in command, 346-349 ; with Gen. Grant, 359, 360.
Horsitz, 385.
Hortense, Queen, Bands playing air of "Partant pour la Syrie," 93.

- Hougoumont, Chateau of, 253, 254, 256, 258, 260, 262-264.
 Houssaye quoted, 216.
 Howard, Gen., 346, 347, 371.
 Hoyerswerda, 379.
 Hozier quoted, 400, 402.
 Hudson, Port, 355.
 Hungary, Troops from, 24; probable battle in, 49, 402.
 Huns, 440.
- I.
- Iberian peninsula, 162.
 Ichtiman pass, 492.
 Icotora, 500.
 Idro, Lake of, 392.
 Iges, 454.
 Iller, River, 21, 40, 41.
 Illy, 447, 448, 450.
 Illyrian provinces, 84.
 Imperial, Prince (France), 412, 413, 423, 468.
 Indies, Emperor of both the, King of Spain to assume the title, 163.
 Indre-et-Loire, 472.
 Ingolstadt, 22, 40, 41, 79.
 Inkerman, 277; Battle of Nov. 5, 1854, 277-281, 282.
 Inkerman, Mount, 287.
 Inn river, 22, 24, 26, 28, 43, 47, 76.
 Iran, 197.
 Ireland, Bonaparte thought to be aiming at, 31.
 Isaktcha, 477.
 Isar, River, 21, 22, 24, 25, 40, 77, 333, 384.
 Isonzo, 393.
 Isquierdo represents Spain at signing of Treaty with France, 163.
 Istria, 379.
 Italy, Bonaparte promises Army abundance of everything in, 3; reports Italy will be reconquered, 4; to attack Austrians in, 10; Convention by which France obtained North, June 15, 1800, 18; Bonaparte strengthens forces in, 22; the Mincio to be the frontier, 23; French soldiers in North 24; reinforcements to be sent, 27; Napoleon's plan to drive Austrians from, 35; Austria's best Generals in, 37; Mack united with Austrian army, 41; Archduke Charles hastening from, 46; Napoleon's policy, the calling back into life of, 104; Re-establishment of independence of Poland, compared with creation of, 105; people no longer religious, 109; Prince Eugene sent to, 140; allies hopes for France giving up claims in, 200; forces of nature on Napoleon's side in, 202; Eugene holds his own in, 208; Army of North, 231; Franco-Italian war of 1856, 294-319; strength of Italian army, 1866, 379; war declared against Austria, June 20, 1866, 380; French plan to induce Italy to abandon neutrality, 412.
 Ivrea, Lannes enters, 7.
- J.
- Jackson, Stonewall, with Confederate Reserve at Mitchell's ford, 324; Battle of Richmond, 333-343; passed into the Wilderness; injured, 347; death, 348.
 Jackson, 355.
 Jägers, 302.
 Jägerthal, 416.
 Jamaica, Bonaparte's objective, 31.
 Jamboli, 478.
 James river, 335, 336, 361, 366, 373, 375.
 Japan, 507.
 Jaromierz, 385.
 Jarny, 423, 461.
 Jena, 68; Battle of, Oct. 18, 1806, 64-66, 69, 101.
 Jerusalem and the Crusaders, 117.
 John, Archduke, in command at Vienna, 22; with Austrian Army in the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, 36; collecting troops in Bohemia, 47; to Carinthia to attack Eugene, 76; Napoleon's precautions against, 84; crossed the Isonzo followed by Eugene and Macdonald, 84; not at Battle of Wagram, 95; reached battlefield and retired, 97.
 Johnson, Gen., 324.
 Johnston, Gen. Alb. Sidney, at Battle of Shiloh, 329-331; Battle of the Wilderness, 361, 364; defends road for Sherman's march, 368, 369, 374; surrenders at Durham station, 376.
 Johnston, Rossiter, quoted, 341.
 Jomini, H., 145, 205.
 Josephine, Empress, 39, 74.
 Josephstadt, 410.
 Jourdan, Major-Gen., attached to King Joseph, 175; at Talavera, 179; held responsible for ill-success of Talavera and recalled, 180; again attached to King Joseph, 190, 195.
 Junot, Gen. Andoche, at the Bordino, 115; with army of observation at Bayonne, 162; in Spain and Portugal, 163, 164; defeated at Vimiero, returns to France, 167; with army in Portugal, 183.
 Jura, 199, 213, 461, 462, 473.
 Jura, Corps of the, 231.

K.

Kaja, 136, 137.
 Kalisch, 134.
 Kalkreuth, Gen., 67.
 Kaltennordheim, 397.
 Kaluga, 119, 120.
 Kameke, Gen., 417, 418, 423.
 Kamiesch inlet, 272.
 Kammeritz, 386.
 Kaninchenberg, 418.
 Karabunar, 478.
 Karawankas Alps, 76.
 Kars, 486.
 Kasanlik, 486.
 Katzbach, 143, 146, 147, 151, 152.
 Kazatch inlet, 272.
 Keim, at Marengo, 14, 16, 17.
 Keith, Admiral, 12.
 Kellermann, Gen., the hero of Valmy, at Marengo, 14, 17; at Strasburg, 39; at Battle of Leipzig, 158; Cuirassiers of, 235; at Quatre-Bras, 246; Comte de Valmy, 239, 460.
 Kempt, Sir Jas., 245, 253.
 Kenesaw, 369.
 Kentucky, 321, 326, 327.
 Keratry, Gen., 464, 465.
 Kerim, Abdul, 477, 479.
 Kertsch, 289.
 Kettler, compels Garibaldi to evacuate Dijon, 474.
 Key West, 496, 497, 501.
 Kielmansegge, 253.
 Kienmayer, Gen., 46.
 Kingston, 369.
 Kirkpatrick, Gen., 371.
 Kischni redoubt, 485, 487.
 Kisheneff, 476.
 Kissingen, 398.
 Klein Forstgen, 140.
 Klein-Görschen, 136.
 Kleist, Gen., 150, 212.
 Königsberg, King of Prussia at, 169; Benningsen retires to, 73; French reaching, 129.
 Königgratz, 386, 388, 389, 390, 399, 400.
 Königshof, 385.
 Königstein, belonging to the French, 144; not occupied by the Prussians, 381.
 Kösen, 64, 66.
 Kolotza river, 114, 115.
 Kowno, 106, 129.
 Kozniloff, Admiral, killed, 273.
 Krasnoe, 123.
 Kray, Gen., army of Black Forest under, 3; defeated at Stokach, 4; defeated and driven to the Danube, 20, 21, 22; re-called, 22.
 Krems, Bridge of, 48, 82.
 Kronach, 63.
 Krüdener, 472.
 Kufstein fort, 27.
 Kulm valley, 149.

Kur river, 477.

Kutusov, Prince, commanding army, 46; retreat to Moravia, 49; sends men to Hallabrunn: proposals to Napoleon for armistice: reaches Olmütz: failure of Napoleon's plans for annihilating his army: at Olmütz: induced to attack Napoleon at Brünn, 50; General-in-Chief under Emperor Alexander, 52; in supreme command of Russian army, 1812: selects the Borodino, 114; plan for the battle, 115; defeated Sept. 5, 116; at Tarutino, attacked by Napoleon, 119; attacks French Army at Viasma, 121; follows Grand Army of France, 123-126.

L.

L'Artigue, De, 415.
 La Bédoyère, 263.
 La Belle Alliance, 255, 261, 265.
 Laber river, 79, 80.
 La Chapelle, 223.
 La Chêne Populeux, 443.
 La Cuesta, don Gregoire de, 165, 179.
 L'Admirault, at Metz, 420, 422; at Vionville, 426; Gravelotte, 430, 432, 433.
 Ladrone Islands, 508, 509.
 La Fère, 470.
 La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, 209.
 La Folie Farmhouse, 430.
 La Havre, 471.
 La Haye Sainte, Farm, 253, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 264.
 Laibach, 84.
 La Mancha, 166, 177, 181, 430.
 La Marmora, Gen., 285, 390, 391, 393.
 Lambro river, 309.
 La Moncelle, 449.
 La Motterouge, Gen., 306, 463.
 Landshut, 77, 79, 80.
 Landwehr, 439.
 Langensalza battle, 394, 395.
 Langeron, 54, 213.
 Langres, 202, 206, 207, 231, 440, 462.
 Langwy, 440.
 Lannes, Gen. Jean, in the passage of the Great St. Bernard, 4-7; crossed the Po, and battle, 11, 12, retreat, 15; at Marengo, 17; Montreuil camp, 38; Ulm campaign, 40-43; march to Austerlitz, 47, 49; Battle of Austerlitz, 56, 57; in Bavaria, 62; at Jena, 64, 65; on the Vistula, 69; Battle of Friedland, 73; marches on Augsburg, 77; Ratisbon captured, 81; advances from Esslingen, 86, 87; defeats Spanish at Tudela 169; besieges Tudela, 174; death May 30, 1809, 88.
 Laon, 190, 210, 211, 213, 215, 233.

- La Rocca, de, 380.
 La Romana, Marquis de, in Denmark: enters Spain, 175, 179, 180.
 La Rothière, 203, 208.
 Lasalle, 85, 86.
 La Sorada, 501.
 Latour d'Auvergne, killed at Neuberger, 21; Monument erected, 21.
 Lattermann, at Battle of Marengo, 14, 17.
 Lauffacho, 399.
 Lauriston, Gen. A. J., sailing with Villeneuve, 33; at fortress of Braunan, 47; drives Prussians beyond the Katzbach, 147; at Battle of Leipzig, 157, 159, 160.
 Lausanne, 4.
 Lauter river, 414.
 Lauterburg, 414.
 Laval, 469.
 Laverno, 303.
 La Villete, 223.
 Lebœuf, Marshal, war minister, statement as to French army, 408; with Army of Rhine at Metz, 409; removed from post of minister of war, 420; at Vernéville, 424; at Battle of Vionville, 426; Battle of Gravelotte, 430, 432; prisoner of war, 461.
 Le Bourget, 460, 471.
 Lebrun, consul, 1; chief of staff, at Cuggiono, 306; with Army of the Rhine at Metz, 420.
 Le Caillon, farm, 251, 265.
 Lech river, 24, 36, 40, 41, 46.
 Lecourbe, Gen., 3, 20, 25.
 Lee, Gen. R. E., commands Confederate Army in Virginia, 333; Battle of Richmond, 333-343; opposed by Hooker, 346-348; to invade the North, 349; collects army at Culpeper and crosses the Potomac, 349; to Hagerstown; concentrates at Gettysburg, 350; at Seminary Ridge, 352, 353; defeat at Bloody Angle, 354; retreat: then loss, 354, 355; Battle of the Wilderness, 361 to 365; attacking Sherman, 374; centre attacked by Grant 375; defeated at Petersburg, and retreats, 375; surrenders, 376.
 Lefebvre, Marshal, in Mainz, 39; at Burgos, 168, 169.
 Lefebvre-Desnouelles, Gen., taken prisoner at the Elsa, 171; at Waterloo, 259.
 Le Fontane hamlet, 310.
 Legations, 18, 23.
 Leghorn, 12.
 Legnago, 309.
 Legnano, 379, 390.
 Le Grote, 310, 312.
 Lehnbach, 23.
 Leipzig, Napoleon to seize, 135; reached, May 21, 1813, 136; allies design to capture, 147; concentrating, 154, 155; Battle of Leipzig, Oct. 14-19, 1813, 156-160, 199, 200, 201.
 Leipzig farmhouse, 430.
 Leiria, 185.
 Le Mans, 460, 469.
 Lemnos, 479.
 Le Mur, 228.
 L'Estocq, Gen., 70, 72.
 Levatz, 478.
 Lichtenstein, Prince, 56, 57, 87, 207, 295, 312.
 Lick creek, 329.
 Liebertwolkwitz, 157.
 Liege, 238, 243, 249.
 Liegnitz, 142.
 Ligny, 239; Battle, June 16, 1815, 240-242, 246, 247.
 Liguria fortress, 18.
 Lille, 38, 229, 233, 459, 470.
 Linares, Gen., 505.
 Lincoln, Abraham, President of U. S., elected, 320; calls out militia, 322; letter to Gen. Hooker, 345; re-elected president, 370; murdered, 376.
 Lindenau, 159, 160.
 Lindenburg, 401.
 Linz, 47, 82.
 Lipa hills, 386, 388, 389.
 Lisbon, 32, 162, 164, 176-178, 183-185, 187.
 Lissa, 393.
 Lithuania, 105.
 Little River, 365.
 Little Round Top, 351, 352.
 Liverpool, Lord, 180.
 Livy studied by Napoleon, 6.
 Lobau, Island of, 85, 89, 90, 91, 94, 137, 239, 248, 259, 261, 265.
 Lobkowitz's dragoons, 15.
 Lodi, 309, 330.
 Logroño, 196.
 Loigny, Battle, 466, 467.
 Loire, 460-465, 467-469, 473.
 Loire-et-Cher, 472.
 Loiret, 472.
 Loison, 128.
 Lom, 482.
 Lombardy, 9, 18, 35, 46, 294, 309, 391, 392.
 Lonato, 311.
 Longstreet's division, 337, 338, 342, 349, 352, 353, 359, 362, 363.
 Look-out Mountains, 359, 360.
 Lootcha, 484.
 Looz, Counts of, 241.
 Lorraine, Blücher advances through, 202; Napoleon advances upon, 215, 217, 219; Blücher on frontiers, 222; Prussian army marches into, 421; Prussians in, 453.
 Lorry wood, 433.
 Louis XVIII., 229; flies to Lille and Ghent, 229; Wellington anxious for restoration of, 231.

- Louis Philippe, 457.
Louisiana, 330, 321, 361.
Louisiana Tigers, 352.
Louisiana, Polk, Protestant bishop of, 369.
Louisville, 355.
Low Countries, Army of, 231.
Lubino or Valutino, Battle of, 111.
Lucan, Lord, 275, 276.
Ludwig, Archduke, 77, 82.
Lützelstein, 419.
Lützen, 135; Battle of, May 2, 1813, 135, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143.
Lugo, 171.
Lunéville, Negotiations at, 23; Peace of, Feb. 9, 1801, 23.
Lusatia, 140, 379.
Lusitania, North, Kingdom of, 163; to be given to King of Etruria, 177.
Luxemburg, 38.
Luzon, 508.
Lyons, 213, 215, 231, 232, 462, 474.
- M.
- McAlister, fort, 373.
McClellan, Gen., fortifies Washington and organising the army: General-in-chief of all armies: attacks Yorktown: Battle of Williamsburg: Fair Oaks, 332; Richmond, 332-342; opposes Lincoln for presidency, 370.
McColl, Gen., 334, 335.
Macdonald, Gen., E. J. J. A., Army of reserve under, 22, 24, 27; passage of the Splügen, 27; follows Archduke John over the Isonzo, 84; at Wagram, 95, 96; to cross the Niemen, 106; advancing on Milan, 109; at Milan, 112; return from Russia, 130; at Battle of Lützen, 137; Bautzen, 140; Dresden, 147; advance against army of Silesia, 157; driven back, 152; Battle of Leipzig, 157, 160; on the Rhine, 199, 202; at Guignes, 205; at the Aube, 209; beaten at Ver-nonfays and retreats, 213, 215, 216, 217.
McDowell, Gen., 324, 336, 337, 338.
Mack, Gen., with Austrian army on the Lech to march into Switzerland, 36; Battle of Ulm: Army destroyed, 40-43, 46, 64.
Mackenzie's farm, 270, 272.
McKinley, President, announces blockade of North coast of Cuba, 496; orders for Government of Santiago, 506, 507.
McLaws, at Harper's Ferry, 339.
McLean's fort, 325.
MacMahon, Gen., at fall of Sebastopol, 292; with Napoleon, 296; opposed by Austrians, 304-7; Magenta gained, receives title of Duke of Magenta, 308; fails to stop Austrians at the Adda, 309; Battle of Solferino, 309-317; with Army of the South at Metz, 409; Battle of Weissenburg, 413-415; forms a new Cabinet at Paris, 419, 420; the march to Sedan, 438-445; at Sedan, 448, 449; prisoner, 455.
McPherson, 368.
Madonna della Scoperta height, 310, 312, 316, 318.
Madrid, Murat enters, March 23, 1808, 164; puts down insurrection, 165; Joseph King of Spain enters, July 20: compelled to withdraw, 166; Napoleon marches to, and town capitulated, 169, 170; King Joseph restored, 173; Wellington threatens, 179; Gen. Areizaga tries to re-conquer, 181; Wellington enters, August 12, 193; Wellington leaves, and King Joseph returns, but retreats, 194, 195; Dewey's destruction of Spanish Fleet received at, 1896, 499.
Maestricht, 238, 249.
Magdeburg, 134, 144.
Magenta, Duke of. See MacMahon.
Magenta, Battle, June 4, 1859, 303, 304, 306-309.
Maggiore, Lago, 203.
Magruder, Gen., 335.
Maily, 216.
Main river, 24, 399.
Main, Army of the, 396, 397.
Maine, Remember the, 496.
Mainz, 38, 39, 63, 129, 134, 160, 200.
Maison, Gen., 208.
Maitland's guards, 253, 263.
Malakoff, 271, 272, 273, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293.
Malmaison, 39, 459.
Maloyaroslavetz, 119, 120.
Malta, 36.
Malvern hill, 335.
Mamelon, 287, 288, 290.
Manassas, Junction, 323, 337, 338; gap railway, 324.
Mance river, 434.
Manilla, 498, 499, 507-509.
Mannheim, 38.
Manstein, 410.
Manteuffel, Gen., 396, 410, 439, 461, 471, 474.
Mantua, 12, 13, 23, 36, 309, 311, 312, 314, 379, 390.
Manzanilla, 506.
Marbars, 250.
Marcello, 307, 308.
Marchenoir, 468.
Marchfeld, 84, 89, 90, 91, 93.
Marchienne-au-Pont, 235.
Marengo, 11; Napoleon sees plains of, 12; Battle, June 14, 1800, 13-19;

- Marengo and Waterloo, 19; anniversary of, 233.
 Maret, 39.
 "Marie-Louises," The, 201.
 Marienburg, 70.
 Marietta, 369.
 Mariopol, 289.
 Maritza Valley, 478, 486.
 Markkleeberg, 157.
 Marlborough, 103, 180.
 Marmont, Marshal, at the passage of the Great St. Bernard, 4; at Marengo, 17; to set out for Mainz, 38; moved to the Inn, 47; leaves the Illyrian provinces, 84; at Wagram, 94, 97; Lützen, 135, 136; Bautzen, 140, 141; with Ney, 154; Battle of Leipzig, 156-160; supersedes Masséna, 186; takes command of the Army of Portugal, 187; Battle of Salamanca, 187-192; on the Rhine, 197; driven before the Prussians; at Châlons, 202; to Sézanne, 203; at Champaubert; retiring before Blücher, but turn, 204; holds Blücher in check, 206; forced to retire, 209; attacks army of Silesia: routed, 212; to keep Blücher behind the Aisne, 216; in contact with armies marching to Paris, 221; defeated at Romainville, capitulates, 223; letter to Napoleon, 224.
 Marne river, 202, 203, 209, 217, 440, 457, 470.
 Mars-la-Tour, 423, 424, 428, 431, 436, 437.
 Marshall, Humphry, 327.
 Martigny, 4, 5.
 Martinique, 30, 31, 500.
 Martinsburg, 339, 340.
 Maryland, 323, 326, 339, 350.
 Mason captures Federals, 326.
 Massena, Gen. A., protects sea-coasts of Nice and Genoa, 3; blockaded at Genoa, 4; capitulated, 9; defence of Italy, 37; detains Archduke Charles on the Adige, 43; to march on Ulm, Battles of Abensberg, Eckmühl, 77-80; Battle of Ebelsburg, 82; Aspern and Esslingen, 85-87; at Island of Lobau, 89-92; Wagram, 94, 95; at head of Army of Portugal, 183; attacks Wellington at Fuentes d'Onoro, 185; superseded and returns to France, 186.
 Matshin, 477.
 Mattenbött, 25.
 Maubeuge, 231.
 Maxau, 412.
 Maximilian, Archduke, 83.
 Mayne's Hill, 344.
 Meade, Gen., 346, 347, 349, 351, 352, 353, 361.
 Meaux, 205, 208, 221, 457, 472.
 Mechanicsville, 334.
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke of, 462, 465, 466, 468, 469.
 Medellin, 177, 179.
 Medici, Gen., 393.
 Medina del Rio Seco, 165.
 Medole, 311-315, 317.
 Meerveld, Gen., 158.
 Meerveldt, 46.
 Mehemet Ali Pasha, commands Army of the Danube, 479; at Rasgrad, 480; directed from Constantinople, 481; drove Russians back, 482; superseded, 483; at Montenegro, 486.
 Meiningen, 337.
 Melas, Gen., prevented from crossing the Apennines, 3; blockades Masséna in Genoa, 4; Genoa capitulates, 9; at Marengo, 12, 13, 14, 16-18; wounded, 16; permitted to retire to Mantua, 18; recalled, 22.
 Melegnano, 309.
 Mellinet, 305.
 Memel, 73.
 Memmingen, 40, 46.
 Memphis, 329, 355.
 Menchikoff, Prince, 268, 270, 278.
 Ménilmontant, 223.
 Merida, 177.
 Merlin, Van, 245.
 Merrimac, sunk, 501.
 Méry, 217.
 Mestre, 393.
 Metangos, 500.
 Mettenberg, 21.
 Metternich's policy, 143; interview with Napoleon, 145.
 Metz, 38, 408; French army round, 409, 412, 413, 415; in Metz, 420-423, 426, 428, 430, 434; Bazaine shut up in, 438-440, 442, 443, 445, 455, 458, 460, 461, 475.
 Meuden, 457, 472.
 Meung, 468.
 Meuse River, 231, 424, 440, 442, 445, 447, 450, 454.
 Meuse, Army of the, 437, 442, 443.
 Mézières, 409, 440, 443, 444, 448, 456.
 Michael, Grand Duke, 278.
 Michel, Gen., 409.
 Michelsberg, 43, 46.
 Milan, entered by Bonaparte, June 2, 1800, 8, 9; Cisalpine Republic re-established, 9, 10; Bonaparte leaves, 11, 18, 23; Napoleon to advance upon, 300, 302, 303, 309.
 Milanese, Victor Emmanuel, obtains possession of the, 319.
 Miles, Gen., 340, 508.
 Milhaud's cavalry, 248, 259.
 Mill Springs, 327.
 Mincio river, 18, 23, 24, 27, 28, 37, 309, 310, 312, 314, 318, 330, 391, 392.
 Minho, 177.

- Minsk, 106, 109.
 Miranda, 168, 196.
 Mirandola, 392.
 Mirs Bay, 498.
 Mirsky, Prince, 478, 493.
 Missionary Ridge, 360.
 Mississippi, 320, 329, 355, 357, 359, 373.
 Missouri, 321, 326.
 Mitau, 109, 112.
 Mitchell's troops, 254.
 Mitchell's ford, 324, 349.
 Mobile, 361; railway, 329.
 Möckern, 156, 158.
 Modena, 392.
 Molk monastery, 83.
 Mösskirch, 20, 21.
 Mohilev, 110.
 Mokrovous, 387.
 Molitor, Gen., 86.
 Mollendorf, Field-Marshal, 63;
 wounded, 67.
 Molodetschno, 123.
 Moltke, Gen., orders to Prussian
 army, 407; head of staff, 410;
 plan to detain French army, 424;
 at Battle of Gravelotte, 434, 436;
 plan for enveloping the French
 succeeds, 445; at Sedan, 452, 453;
 created a Count, 461, 472.
 Moncelle, 447.
 Moncey, Gen., 4, 11, 21, 169, 223.
 Mondego river, 166, 183.
 Monnier's division, 15.
 Monroe, 332.
 Mont Avron, 469, 470.
 Mont Genevre, 294.
 Mont-Saint-Jean, 250, 253, 258, 259.
 Mont Valerien, 457.
 Monte Cenis, 10, 294.
 Monte Fenile, 310.
 Monte Moro, 4.
 Monte Rotondo, 305.
 Monte Vento, 392.
 Montbelaird, 474.
 Montebello, Battle of, May 20, 1859, 11,
 297, 298, 300.
 Montenegro, 486.
 Montereau, 205.
 Montey, 439.
 Montigny, 422, 431, 432.
 Montmagny, 457.
 Montmedy, 440, 442, 445, 450, 462.
 Montmartre, 223.
 Montmirail, 203, 204.
 Montojo, 505.
 Montretout, 472.
 Montreuil, 38.
 Monza, 303.
 Moore, Sir John, with Napoleon in
 Spain, 168-172; killed, 172.
 Moravia, 47, 49, 78.
 Moreau, Gen., 3; beats Kray at
 Stokach, 4, 10, 11, 20-23; Battle of
 Hohenlinden, 24-27; at Dresden,
 147; killed, 149.
 Morfontaine, 197.
 Mornant, 205.
 Morris, Gen., 276.
 Morro castle, 500.
 Morsbrunn, 415.
 Mortier, Gen., 48, 157, 169, 179, 202, 206,
 209, 216, 221, 223, 224.
 Moscow farmhouse, 430, 432, 433.
 Moscow, Napoleon's march to, 101,
 108-116; enters, Sept. 14, 1812,
 117-122; retreat, 123, 124, 132, 160.
 Moselle, The, 408, 419, 422, 423, 424,
 429, 430, 436, 438, 439, 474.
 Moskva, 114, 192.
 Motterouge, 307, 463.
 Mount St. Nicholas, 494.
 Mouton, 129.
 Mouzon, 442-445.
 Mozhaisk, 120.
 Müfling, Gen., 262.
 Mühlendorf, 25.
 Münchengrätz, 383, 384.
 Mulda, 154.
 Munich, 24, 41, 47, 77.
 Murat, Gen., cavalry committed to,
 4; at campaign of Ulm, 40, 41;
 march to Austerlitz, 48-50; at
 Austerlitz, 56, 59; in Bavaria, 62;
 in Saxony, 64; Jena, 65, 66; on
 the Vistula, 69; at Eylau, 72;
 march to Smolensk, 110, 111; at
 the Borodino, 115, 116; Moscow,
 117, 120; Berezina, 129; returned
 to his kingdom of Naples, Jan.,
 1813, 129; Battle of Bautzen, 140;
 Dresden, 148; keeping Austrians
 in check, and retreats to Leipzig,
 155; Battle of Leipzig, 157, 158;
 enters Madrid, 164; insurrection
 put down, 165; Soult's ambition
 to be his equal, 176.
 Musiessy, Admiral, 31.

N.

- Nachod, 385.
 Namar, 38.
 Namur, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 246, 248,
 249.
 Nancy, 88, 231, 421.
 Nangis, 205, 215.
 Naples, Bourbons to be driven from,
 35; English and Russian troops
 to land in, 36; Murat returns to,
 129; ordered to leave, 140, 162.
 Naples, Army of, 231.
 Napoleon Bonaparte, leaves Egypt,
 Aug. 24, 1799; lands in France,
 Oct. 8: First Consul, Nov. 9:
 Letter to George III., Dec. 25, 1;
 Letter to Emperor Francis II., 2;
 Leaves Paris for Geneva, May 6,
 1800: to invade Italy by the Great
 St. Bernard, 3; the passage of
 the Great St. Bernard, 3-7; en-
 tered Milan, June 2; re-estab-

- lished the Cisalpine Republic, 9; preparation for Marengo, 9-12; Battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800, 13-19; victory celebrated in Milan: returns to Paris, June 28, 18; strengthens his forces in Italy and South Germany, 22; Battle of Hohenlinden, Dec. 2, 1800, 24-28; proclaimed Emperor, Dec. 2, 1804, 29; intended invasion of England, 1805, 29-34; the campaign of Ulm, 1805, 35-45; the march to Austerlitz, 46-52; Battle of Austerlitz, Dec. 2, 1805, 53-59; Battles of Jena and Auerstädt, Oct. 14, 1806, 60-68; entered Berlin, Oct. 27, 1806, 68; Battles of Eylau and Friedland, Oct. 7, 8, 1807, 69-74; campaign in Bavaria, 1809, 74-81; Aspern and Esslingen, May 21, 22, 1809, 82-88; the Island of Lobau, 89-92; Battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809, 93-97; his tactics, 100; Invasion of Russia: advance to Smolensk, 104-112; Battle of the Borodino, Sept. 7, 1812, 113-116; entered Moscow, Sep. 14, 1812, 117; leaves Oct. 19: to Smolensk, 119-122; Battle of the Berezina, Nov. 27, 1812, 123-127; retreats, and returns to Paris, Dec. 18, 128, 129; History on the Russian campaign, 129; leaves Paris, April 15, 1813, 134; Battle of Lützen, May 2, 131-138; enters Dresden, 139; Battle of Bautzen, May 20, 21, 1813, 139-143; Battle of Dresden, Aug. 27, 1813, 144-150; Battle of Gross-Beeren, August 23, 151, 152; Wittenberg, Sept. 6, 153; at Dresden, 154, 155; Battle of Leipzig "Battle of the Nations," October 14-19, 1813, 156-160; Summons to Spain to close their harbours to English ships, etc., August 12, 1807, 162; Convention of Cintra, August 30, 1808, 161-167; in Spain, 1808, 168-172; after Russian campaign, 199, 200; at Paris, 1814, 200, 201; 1814, drove Prussians from Brienne, 202; La Rothière, 203; Epernay, 203, 204; Montmirail, Château Thierry, Vauchamps, 204; Guignes, 205; at Troyes, 206; Soissons and Laon, 208-214; Arcis-sur-Aube, 215-220; retreats, 220; at St. Dizier, 221, 222; advances to defence of Paris, 222-224; at Fontainebleau, 224; abdicates, March 6, 1814, and accepts sovereignty of the island of Elba, 224; return from Elba, 225; leaves February 26, 1815, and marches to Paris, 228; enters Paris, March 20, 229; Battle of Charleroi, June 15, 230-237; Ligny, June 16, 238-243; Quatre-Bras, June 16, 244-252; Waterloo, June 18, 253-265; retreat to Charleroi, 265.
- Napoleon III., despatched Gen. Niel to Crimea, 287; contemplates journey to the Crimea, 289; in command in war against Sardinia, 295; Palestro and Magenta, 300-308; Solferino, 309-319; Venetia ceded to, 393; offers mediation, 402; joins Army of the Rhine at Metz, 409, 412, 413; at Vionville, 419-427; the March to Sedan, 440-445; at Sedan, 449-453; prisoner of war, 453, 457.
- Napoleon, Prince, 285, 286.
- Nashville, 329, 330, 496.
- Nassau, 236, 254, 381, 396, 399, 414.
- Naumburg, 64, 66.
- Naviglio Grande, canal, 303-306, 308.
- Neipperg, Gen., 399.
- Neisse river, 152.
- Nelson, Lord, searching for French fleet, prevention of Napoleon's projected invasion of England, 31-34.
- Neresheim, 40.
- Neu-Breisach, 462.
- Neu-Burschwiz, 140.
- Neuburg, 41; Battle of, June 28, 1800, 21.
- Neufchâtel principality, 61.
- Neusiedel, 94-97.
- Neustadt, 40, 77, 78.
- Nevers, 473.
- New Hope Church, 369.
- New Orleans, 327, 328, 355.
- New York, 496, 498.
- New York, The, 497.
- Ney, Marshal, at Battle of Hohenlinden, 25, 26; Ulm, 38, 41, 43; Duke of Elchingen, 42; Jena and Auerstädt, 62, 65; Eylau and Friedland, 69-74; in the advance to Smolensk, 106, 111; Battle of the Borodino, 115, 116; Moscow, 122; the Berezina, 123-126, 128; Lützen, 135-137; Bautzen, 139-142; Dresden, 144, 145, 148; advance to Berlin defeated, 153; at North of Leipzig; retires, 154, 155; in Spain, 169; at Talavera, 179; Massena, 183-185, 199, 202; Soissons, 213; Arcis-sur-Aube, 216, 217; promises Louis XVIII. to bring Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage, 228; at Charleroi, 235-237; "the bravest of the brave," 237; Ligny, 238-242; Quatre-Bras, 244-250; Waterloo, 257-264.
- Nice, 3.
- Nicholas, Emperor, 285.
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, at Sebastopol, 278; command in Russo-Turkish

- war, 476, 479; at Plevna, 484, 487; Shipka Pass, 491, 493, 494.
 Nicopolis, 477, 478, 480, 485.
 Niel, Marshal, despatched to the Crimea, 287, 296, 305; Battle of Solferino, 314-317.
 Niemen (Memel), 105-107, 129.
 Nightingale, Florence, 234.
 Nijmegen, 88.
 Nikish, 486.
 Nikita, Prince, 486.
 Nikolsburg, 401, 402.
 Nive river, 197.
 Nivelle river, 198.
 Nivelles, 235, 253-256.
 Nogent fort, 469, 470.
 Nogent-sur-Seine, 203, 205, 213, 215.
 Noiseville, 438, 439.
 Noisy, 470.
 Nolan, Capt., 275, 276.
 Nollendorf, 150.
 Nord, 473.
 Norlingen, 42.
 Normandy, 461, 470.
 North Anna river, 365.
 North Sea, 410.
 Nouart, 443.
 Novara, 300, 303.
 Novi, 13.
 Nüremberg, 66.
 Nuovo, Ponte, 305, 306.
- O.
- Oberleichting, 80.
 Ocana, 181.
 Odenwald, 399.
 Oder, River, 65, 141.
 Odessa, 266.
 Oglio, 310, 392.
 Ohain, 253, 257, 262, 263.
 Ohio railway, 279.
 Oignon river, 474.
 Oise, 215, 232, 440.
 Olmütz, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 400, 401.
 Olschan, 50, 51.
 Olsuvief, 203.
 Omar Pasha, 286.
 Ompeda, 253.
 Oporto, 163, 176, 177, 178, 180.
 Orange, Prince of, 244, 245.
 Orange, 362.
 Orange Court House, 336, 361.
 Orange and Alexandria Railway, 337.
 Oregon, 502.
 O'Reilly, at Marengo, 14, 16.
 Orel, 119.
 Ornese, 178.
 Orinoco river, 31.
 Orleans, 337, 462-465, 467, 468, 473.
 Orne, 472.
 Orsha, 111, 123-125.
 Orsières, 5.
 Ortegal, Cape, 85.
 Orthez, Battle of, Feb. 27, 1814, 198.
 Osman Pasha, 477, 481, 484, 485, 487, 488; Ostaglio heights, 310.
 Ostend, 37, 238.
 Ott, Gen., 11; at Marengo, 13-15, 17, 18.
 Oudinot, Gen., at Austerlitz, 57; Wagram, 93, 94, 96; advance to Smolensk, 106, 112; the Berezina, 124, 125; Bautzen, 140-142; advance to Berlin, 144, 151, 153; Battle of Leipzig, 157; on the Seine, 204, 205; Soissons and Laon, 209, 213.
 Oulchy, 210.
 Ourcq, 204, 209, 210.
 Owl Creek, 329.
 Oxford, U.S.A., 365.
- P.
- Pack, at Quatre-Bras, 245; Waterloo, 253, 258.
 Padua, 393.
 Paintville, Battle of, 327.
 Pajol's cavalry, 247, 248.
 Paladines, Aurelles de, 463, 465, 468.
 Palestro, 300-302.
 Palmerston, Lord, 285.
 Pamplona, 196-198.
 Pantin, 221, 223.
 Pardubitz, 389, 400.
 Paris, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 57; Napoleon's return from Russian campaign, Dec. 18, 1812, 129, 185; Napoleon in, 1814, 200; Prussians marching to Paris, 1814, 203-206, 208, 212, 216, 217, 220; capture of, 221-224; Bourbons return, 226; messages to Napoleon, 228; Napoleon's return, 228; enters March 20, 1815, 229; allies to march on, 231-233, 408; consternation in; government resigns, MacMahon forms new cabinet; national defence, 4, 19, 420, 422, 436, 437, 440-443; advance to Paris: empire overthrown, 455; New Republican Government proclaimed, 456; Germans advance, 1870, 456-66; Siege, 467-475.
 Paris, Army of, 420, 440.
 Parma, 23.
 Parsdorf, convention of, 22; armistice, 22.
 Pas-de-Calais, 473.
 Pasaron, Admiral Montojo y, 498.
 Passau, 47.
 Patterson, Gen., 324.
 Pougy, 219.
 Pauloff, at Inkerman, 278, 279.
 Pavia, 11, 15, 295.
 Pellissier, Gen., 290, 291.
 Pemberton, Gen., 356, 357.
 Peninsula, 267, 337; war in the, 161-198.
 Pennsylvania regiment, 322.

- Péronne, 231, 470.
 Persano, 393.
 Peschiera, 36, 309, 312, 316, 379, 390, 391.
 Pestel, Lt.-Col., 213.
 Peter the Great, 110.
 Petersburg, 361, 373, 374, 375.
 Peterswalde, 147-149, 152.
 Petit, Gen., 264.
 Petit-Bicêtre, 457.
 Phalzbourg, 462.
 Philippeville, 231, 234.
 Philippine Islands, 493, 507, 509.
 Philippopolis, 473, 491-493.
 Phillipsburg fortress, 22.
 Phillipon, 189.
 Piacenza, 10, 11, 295, 300, 303, 330.
 Picard, 305.
 Picardy, 461, 470.
 Pickett's division, 353.
 Picton, Sir T., 190, 196, 245, 253; death, 257.
 Piedmont, 4, 18, 23, 131, 294, 295.
 Piedmontese army, 295, 296, 318.
 Piladi, 14.
 Pinar del Rio, 500.
 Pine Mountains, 369.
 Pipe Creek Hills, 350.
 Pirch's corps, 240.
 Pirna, 146-149, 152, 153, 380.
 Pitt, Rt. Hon. Wm., 2, 44.
 Pittsburg landing, 329.
 Placenoit, 259, 261, 262.
 Plappeville, 429, 430, 432, 433.
 Plasencia, 180.
 Plauen ravine, 148.
 Pleiswitz armistice, 143.
 Plevna, Osman Pasha occupies, 479;
 Russian attempts to capture, 479;
 480, 483; Battle and fall, Dec. 10,
 1877, 484-489, 490, 491.
 Plojesti, 476.
 Po, 11-13, 295, 300, 303, 390-392.
 Podol, 383.
 Pohlès, 460.
 Poland, 62, 105, 119.
 Poles, Napoleon's proclamation to the,
 69; with Prussian army, 414;
 with Garibaldi, 462.
 Poligny, 213.
 Polish cavalry, 169, 170, 228.
 Polk, Gen., killed, 369.
 Polotsk, 112.
 Poltava, 109.
 Pomeranians, 470.
 Ponce, surrendered, July 28, 1896,
 509.
 Pondo, Gen., 506.
 Poniatowski, 115, 144, 157, 160.
 Poniatowsky, Prince Jos., 76.
 Ponsonby, Sir Wm., killed at Water-
 loo, 258.
 Pont-à-Mousson, 422, 423, 426, 435, 436.
 Pont du Jour, 432, 434, 435.
 Ponte Grande, 4.
 Pope, Gen., 336-339.
 Porter, Gen., 334.
 Portsmouth, 32.
 Portugal, Prince Regent of, 163, 164.
 Portugal, 110, 161; commercial vassal
 of England, 61, 62; to be parti-
 tioned, 163, 164, 166, 167.
 Portugal, Army of, 182, 183, 185, 186,
 187, 195.
 Posen, 69.
 Posthenen, 73.
 Potomac, 322, 339-342, 345, 346, 347, 350,
 354, 361, 362, 373, 375.
 Poupry, 467.
 Pozzolengo, 311, 312, 314, 316, 318.
 Prague, 139, 145, 400, 402.
 Prätzen, 54-57.
 Prenn, 106.
 Presburg, 400, 402.
 Pressburg, 59, 60; Treaty of, 69, 75.
 Probstheida, 159.
 Provence, 231, 232, 408.
 Provins, 205, 213, 215, 221.
 Prussia, attempts to desert the posi-
 tion of neutrality, 60; Treaty of
 Schonbrunn: Treaty of Paris,
 February, 1806: Army mobilised,
 61; to soon cease to exist, 69; still
 neutral, 285; war with Austria,
 1866, 377-402; war with France,
 1870, 403-475. See also, Germany.
 Prussian army, 209, 212, 231-233, 235,
 236, 238, 240-2, 245, 247-249, 251, 253,
 261, 264, 381, 382, 392, 404, 405.
 Pruth, 476.
 Puebla heights, 196.
 Puertegrande, 501.
 Puerto Rico, 500, 508, 509.
 Punto Cabrera, 501.
 Pyrenees, 190, 192, 197, 200, 208.
- Q.
- Quadrilateral, 379, 390, 391, 393.
 Quarry Ravine, 279, 280.
 Quatre-Bras, 235-241; Battle, June
 16, 1815, 244-252.
 Quin, the actor, 44.
- R.
- Radetsky, Count, at Shipka Pass,
 491, 493, 494.
 Radonitz, 488.
 Raglan, Lord, commands English
 troops in the Crimea, 266, 268, 269,
 275, 276, 283, 290; death, 291.
 Rahna, 135-137.
 Raigern monastery, 55.
 Raleigh, 376.
 Raolt, Gen., 415; killed, 416.
 Rapidan river, 336, 337, 346, 361, 362.
 Rapp, Count, aide-de-camp to Bona-
 parte, 12, 57, 232.
 Rappahannock, 237, 242, 243, 244, 246,
 248, 249.
 Rasgrad, 480.

- Rasitz, 388.
 Ratisbon, 77-80.
 Ray, Gen., 508.
 Rebecco, 311, 312.
 Red River, 355.
 Redan, The, 271-273, 288, 290, 292, 293.
 Redib Pasha, 479.
 Regnier, 94.
 Reichenberg, 383, 385.
 Reichshofen, 416.
 Reille, Gen., at Vittoria, 196; Char-
 leroi, 235, 237; Quatre-Bras, 244;
 Waterloo, 255; Aide-de-camp to
 Napoleon, 452.
 Reinhardtshausen, 397.
 Remilly, 445, 447.
 Remy, 422, 423, 429.
 Renault, Gen., 315.
 Resaco, 368.
 Réthel, 438.
 Reval, 36.
 Reynier, 183.
 Reynolds, crossed the Rappahannock,
 346; Gettysburg battle, 350;
 death, 351.
 Rézonsville, 423-426, 435.
 Rheims, 38, 213, 215, 216, 438, 441, 442.
 Rhine, 3, 10, 20, 23, 24, 36, 38-40, 43, 61,
 63, 129, 131-133, 160, 199, 200, 216,
 404, 408, 410, 412, 436, 450, 456, 458,
 474, 475.
 Rhine, Army of the, 409, 420, 421, 440.
 Rhodope mountains, 492.
 Rhön, 396, 397.
 Richard, King of England, 48.
 Richepanse, 25, 26.
 Richmond, Duchess of, Ball at Brus-
 seis, 240.
 Richmond, 323, 331, 333-337, 342, 346,
 348, 361, 364-366, 373-375.
 Riga, 105, 109, 112.
 Ripa, 506.
 Rippach, 136.
 Rivalta, 13.
 Rivaud, 14.
 Rivoltelle, 311, 318.
 Robecchetto, 306.
 Robeco bridge, 303, 304.
 Robbio, 300-302.
 Rocca d'Aufo, 392.
 Rochefort, 32.
 Rodolph mount, 273.
 Roliça, 166.
 Romainville, 223.
 Roncourt, 431-433, 445.
 Roon, Van, 410, 434.
 Roosevelt, Col., 502.
 Rosecrans, Gen., 358, 359.
 Rosenheim, 24, 25.
 Rosny fort, 469.
 Rostophchin, 118.
 Rostophchin, Sergius, 118.
 Rothschilds, 459.
 Rottweil, 40.
 Roumelia, 490.
 Roumania, Prince of, 481.
 Roumania, 476, 488.
 Rozerieulles, 432.
 Rùchel, Gen., 66-68.
 Rumburg, 383.
 Russbach, 94, 97.
 Russia, Napoleon's plan of campaign
 of 1805, 35; Russian Poland held
 out to, 61; Napoleon's invasi-
 on, 1812, 104-130, 188; Troops at Sois-
 sons and Laon, 211-214; Army
 with the allies, 1815, 230-232;
 Crimean War, 1854-55, 266-293;
 War with Turkey, 1877-78, 476-
 495.
 Rustchuk, 480, 491.
- S.
- Saalburg, 64.
 Saale, 63, 64, 133-136, 397, 398.
 Saalfeld, 63.
 Saar, 418.
 Saarbruch, 231.
 Saarbrücken, 413, 417, 419, 435.
 Saargemünd, 415, 418.
 Saarlouis, 439.
 Saas, 3, 63, 64.
 Sacken, 203, 204.
 Sadova, 386-389.
 Sagasta ministry, 429.
 Sahagun, 170.
 Said, Port, 507.
 St. Amand, 238, 242, 246.
 St. Arnaud, Marshal, at Alma, 266,
 268, 269; death, 274.
 St. Avold, 421.
 Saint Cyr, Gen., at Marengo, 17;
 Moreau, 21; succeeds Oudinot,
 112.
 St. Cyr, Gouvion de, at Battle of
 Dresden, 144, 145; in Spain, 169;
 Catalonia Sieges, 180.
 St. Cloud, 160, 413, 419, 472.
 St. Dizier, 202, 219-221.
 St. Germain, 203.
 St. Gothard, 4.
 St. Helena, 104, 109, 118, 226, 227.
 Saint Hilaire, 56.
 St. Hubert, 432.
 St. John Pied-de-Port, 197.
 St. Marie aux Chènes, 431, 432.
 St. Martino bridge, 305, 307.
 St. Ménéhould, 440, 442.
 St. Menges, 450.
 Saint Omer, 38.
 St. Petersburg, Napoleon to attack,
 105; Emperor's letter to the Gov-
 ernor, 107; Napoleon's plan for
 marching on, 118, 476, 485.
 Saint Pierre, 4, 5.
 St. Pölten, 83.
 Saint Priest, Gen., under Russians at
 Rheims, 213; killed, 214.
 St. Privat, 423, 431-433, 437.
 St. Privat la Montagne, 430.
 St. Quentin, 429, 430, 470, 471, 474.

- St. Sebastian, 197.
 Salamanca, 170, 186; Battle, 189-193
 194, 196.
 Sale, 13.
 Salem, 337.
 Salzach, 26.
 Sambre, 231, 235.
 Sampson, Admiral, sails for Key
 West Islands, 497, 498; at Santi-
 ago: bombardment, 501.
 San Casciano, 313.
 San Cassiano, 317.
 San Guiliamo, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18.
 San Juan, 500, 503, 504.
 San Martino heights, 310, 311, 313, 318,
 San Stefano, 495.
 Santa Clara, 500.
 Santarem, 185.
 Santa Lucia Chapel, 392.
 Santiago, 500-506.
 Saragossa, 169, 170, 174, 175.
 Sardinia, Alliance with France and
 England, 285; with France, in
 Franco-Italian War, 1859, 294-319.
 Sarreguimines, 231.
 Sarth, 472.
 Sauer river, 415.
 Sauroren, 197.
 Savage's station, 335.
 Savannah, 370, 373.
 Savary, Gen., aide-de-camp to Napo-
 leon, 12, 18; with letter from
 Napoleon to Emperor of Russia,
 51; Island of Lobau, 89.
 Saverne, 33, 416.
 Saxe-Weimar, Duke of, 208.
 Saxe-Weimar, Prince of, 254.
 Saxony, King of, established in Leip-
 zig, 155.
 Saxony, frontier crossed by the
 French, 63; French established
 in 1813, 140, 143; Napoleon's posi-
 tion threatened in, 145, 153; Prus-
 sians arming in, 379; invasion of
 1866, 377-382; loss at Gitschin,
 384.
 Scarlett, Gen., 275.
 Sceaux, 457.
 Schaffgotsche, Count, 297-299.
 Schaffhausen, 3, 20.
 Scharnhorst, 101.
 Scharnitz fortress, 27.
 Scheldt, 250.
 Schellendorf, Col. Bronsart von., 452.
 Schleitz, 63, 64.
 Schlettstadt, 459, 462.
 Schley, Admiral, 498, 501.
 Schlick, 311.
 Schluchheim, 383.
 Schönbrunn, Treaty, 61, 83, 85, 91, 179,
 401.
 Schofield's corps, 374.
 Schwarzenberg, Prince, with Aus-
 trians, 112; at the Berezina, 124;
 entering Russia, 130; commands
 in Bohemia, 145, 146; at Leipzig,
 157; crossed the Rhine, 200; by
 Troyes, 203; threatened Paris,
 205, 206, 207; beats Macdonald and
 Oudinot at Vernonfays, 213; at
 Arcis-sur-Aube, 215-220, 222.
 Schweinschädel, 385.
 "Scotland for ever," 258.
 Scott, Gen., commanding Federal
 Army, 323, 332, 360.
 Scrivia, 12, 13.
 Scutari Hospital, 283.
 Sebastiani, 177, 180.
 Sebastopol, attack on, 1854, 267-281;
 Fall, Sept. 5, 282-294.
 Sedan, 409; march to, 437-446; battle,
 Sept. 1, 1870, 447-455; men en-
 gaged in the battle, 475.
 Sedgwick, Major-Gen., 346, 348, 361,
 364.
 Segovia, 169.
 Seidenberg, 383.
 Seine river, 202, 203, 205, 206, 213, 217,
 224, 232, 457, 463.
 Ségur, 43.
 Selvi, 478.
 Semenovskore, 115.
 Seminary Ridge, 351-353.
 Sens, 224.
 Sepulveda, 169.
 Serlobo, 506.
 Servia, 491.
 Sesia, 295, 300, 202, 306.
 Sesto Calende, 295.
 Sevilla, 503.
 Seville, 166, 180, 181, 186, 190.
 Sèvres, 457, 472.
 Sézanne, 203, 204, 209.
 Shafter, Gen., 497, 502.
 Sharpsburg, 340, 341.
 Shenandoah Valley, 324, 333, 336, 342,
 361, 374, 375.
 Sheridan, Gen. P. H., 361, 364, 374, 375.
 Sherman, Gen., at Battle of Shiloh,
 330; at Vicksburg, 356; Battle of
 the Wilderness, 359-366; march
 from Chattanooga to Atlanta,
 368-376.
 Shevardino, 114, 115.
 Shiloh, Battle of, April 7, 1862, 327-331.
 Shipka Pass, 478, 481, 483, 485, 486;
 battle, 490-495.
 Shoemaker's Island, 293.
 Shumla, 481.
 Siberia, 72, 150.
 Siboney, 503.
 Sichrow, 385.
 Sickles, 346, 347, 352.
 Siege, Army of the, 437.
 Sierra Maestra mountains, 500.
 Sierra Morena, 180, 181.
 Sigil, 336, 337, 361.
 Silesia, 134, 142, 144-147, 151, 152, 154,
 200, 203, 209, 212, 215, 221, 379, 383,
 386, 413.
 Simnitza, 477.
 Simpheropol, 238, 239.

- Slon, 3.
 Sistova, 477, 490.
 Skalitz, 385.
 Skobeleff, Gen., decides to close round Plevna, 484.
 Slavery, Question of, 320.
 Slidell, 326.
 Slocum, Gen., 346, 347, 371.
 Smith, Kirby, 325.
 Smohain, 253, 262.
 Smolensk, 109-114, 120-123.
 Smorgoni, 128.
 Soimonoff, 278; killed, 279.
 Soissons, 210, 211, 213, 215, 222, 462.
 Sokolnitz, 55.
 Soleille, Gen., 438.
 Solferino, Battle of, 309-319.
 Solre-sur-Sambre, 234.
 Sombreffe, 235, 236, 238, 239, 247.
 Somerset's cavalry at Waterloo, 258.
 Somma Compagne, 391.
 Somme, 460.
 Sommepuis, 220.
 Somo-Sierra, 169.
 Sonnaz, 7.
 Soor, 385.
 Sophia, 485, 487, 490-493.
 Souham, 136.
 Soult, Marshal at Camp of Ambleteuse, 38; Ulm, 40, 41; march to Austerlitz, 47, 49; Battle of Austerlitz, 56, 57; Jena and Auerstädt, 62, 64, 65; Eylau and Friedland, 69, 70; with Napoleon in Spain, 169-172; in Portugal, 173-177; Talavera, 178, 180-182; with Mas-sena, 185, 186; Salamanca, 187-193; Vittoria, 195, 197, 198, 199; in the Pyrenees, 208; Minister of War, 227; at Quatre-Bras, 246, 248; Waterloo, 255, 257, 259, 265.
 South Mountain, 340; battle, July 1, 350.
 Spain, ill-success of French arms in, 75, 76; Napoleon's plan the calling back into life of, 104; people no longer religious, 109; Napoleon withdraws his depôts from, 1812, 132; Treaties with France, Oct. 27, 1807, 163, 164; French army in, 164-7; Napoleon in, 168-172; Wel-lington enters, June 13, 1812, 191; France to give up all influence in, 200; Napoleon calls troops from, 201; Marshal Suchet in, 208; war of Spanish Succession, 414; Spaniards with Garibaldi, 463; War with America, 1898, 496-510.
 Spain, King of, to be Emperor of both the Indies, 163.
 Spandau, 134.
 Spia d'Italia, 310, 317.
 Spicheren, 417, 418, 428, 429.
 Spires, 38.
 Spizza, 486.
 Splügen, 27, 28.
 Spottsylvania, 363, 364.
 Spree river, 140.
 Stadion, Count, 295, 297, 298, 317.
 Starsiedel, 136, 137.
 Steinmetz, Gen., 385, 410, 436.
 Stelvio pass, 332.
 Stenay, 439, 443.
 Stettin, 134, 381.
 Stirling, Admiral, 32.
 Stockach, 4, 20.
 Stötteritz, 159.
 Stolpen, 153.
 Stone, Gen., 508.
 Stone Bridge, 324, 325, 349.
 Strada Lugiana, 311.
 Strada Lugone, 318.
 Stradella, 11, 12.
 Stralsund, 36.
 Strasburg, 3, 38, 39; Napoleon at, 40, 78, 89, 219; armament of, 408; French army concentrated at, 412, 413, 416; invested by Prus-sians, 1870, 419, 459, 462.
 Strathfieldsaye, 254.
 Strehlen, 48.
 Stuart, Gen., 349, 353, 354, 362; wounded, 364.
 Studianka, 125.
 Stülpnagel, 413, 424, 425.
 Stuttgart, 40.
 Suchet, Marshal, 3, 10, 188, 190, 193, 197, 208.
 Sudley's fort, 324, 325.
 Suleiman, at Shipka Pass, 481, 482; at Plevna, 486; Plevna, 490-493.
 Sumner, Gen., 333, 342, 344.
 Sumter Fort, 321.
 Susa, 295.
 Susquehanna, 350.
 Suvorov, 114.
 Switzerland, Macdonald to operate in eastern, 22; to be independent, 23; Archduke Charles to expel French and enter, 36; new corps to enter, 209, 219; retreat of the French to, 474, 475.
 Szabo, Gen., 302.
- T.
- Tabor bridge, 49, 84.
 Tactics of European Nations, 98.
 Taganrog, 280.
 Tagliamento, 76.
 Tagus river, 177, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187, 190.
 Talavera, 177, 179, 180, 182.
 Talleyrand, Napoleon's letter to, 35; at Strasburg, 39.
 Tampa harbour, 497, 500, 502.
 Tanaro river, 14.
 Tann, Gen. von der, 414, 444, 448, 461, 463, 464.
 Tarragona, 175.
 Tarutino, 119.

- Tauenzien, Gen., 64.
 Tauric Chersonesus, 270.
 Tchernaiia river, 270-272, 274-276, 278, 279, 291.
 Tegethoff, Admiral, 393.
 Tellnitz, 54, 55.
 Tengen, 79.
 Tennessee, 321, 326, 328, 358, 371, 497.
 Tennessee river, 327, 329.
 Teplitz, 147, 149.
 Tergakasoff, Gen., 486.
Terror, The, 502.
 Terry, Gen., 374.
 Teste, 248.
 Texans, 352.
 Texas, 220, 355, 428.
 Thiais, 459.
 Thielmann, 240.
 Thionville, 409, 421, 438, 439, 461, 462.
 Thomas, Gen., 359, 371, 374.
 Thorn fortress, 70, 134.
 Thoroughfare gap, 337, 338.
 Thugut, 2, 22.
 Thuringia, 63, 379, 394, 396, 413.
 Thusis, 28.
 Ticino river, 11, 294, 296, 303-305, 392.
 Tilly, 249.
 Tilsit, Peace of, 74, 101, 106, 109.
Times Crimean fund, 284.
 Tione, 392.
 Tirnovi, 477, 479.
 Todleben, Lt.-Col., defence of Sebastopol, 272, 273, 274, 287; wounded and removed from Sebastopol, 291; at Plevna, 485, 491.
 Toledo, 170.
 Tolly, Barclay de, Russians under, 105; opposes Napoleon's advance to Smolensk, 109-111; Battle of the Borodino, 114, 118; march to Paris, 220; at Charleroi, 231.
 Tonale Road, 392.
 Toney Town, 353.
 Tonlon, 12, 30, 31.
 Torcy, 218, 447, 450.
 Tordesillas, 170.
 Torgau, 139, 140, 144, 153.
 Tormasov, 112.
 Torres Vedras, 110, 184.
 Touale, 28.
 Toul, 458.
 Tours, 459, 468.
 Toury, 463-465.
 Trafalgar, Battle of, Oct. 21, 1805, 45.
 Traktir bridge, 270.
 Trant, 185.
 Traun, 82, 83.
 Trautenau, 385.
 Travers' brigade at Waterloo, 258.
 Trent, 28.
 "Trent," The, 326.
 Treskow, 475.
 Treviso, Armistice of, Jan. 16, 1801, 28.
 Trinidad, 163.
 Tripoli, 239.
 Trochu, Gen., 308, 441, 456, 460, 467, 471, 472.
 Trojans' Gate, 492.
 Trouville, 424.
 Troyes, 202, 203, 205, 206, 209, 213, 216, 217, 222, 461.
 Tudela, 163, 169, 174.
 Tümping, Gen., 456.
 Tulcha, 477.
 Tundja valley, 486.
 Tunis, 239.
 Tunnel Hill, 368.
 Turbigio, 9, 306.
 Turcos, 414.
 Turin, 10.
 Turkey, war with Russia, 1877-78, 476-495; Turks in Crimean War, 267, 274, 275, 277, 286, 291.
 Türrnau, 384.
 Turner's Gap, 340.
 Tuscany, Grand Duke of, 23.
 Tuscany, 24, 131, 163.
 Tyrol, 27; surrendered to the French, Dec., 1800, 27, 36, 41, 43, 47; insurrection in, 75, 81, 391-393.
- U.
- Udine, 393.
 Ulm, 11, 20, 21, 22; campaign, 1905, 35-45, 46, 47, 75, 77.
 Union Mills, 325.
 United States Ford, 347-349.
 Unstrut river, 395.
 Unterleighting, 180.
 Urban, 303.
 Utitza, 114, 115.
 Uxbridge, Lord, 250, 251, 259.
- V.
- Vaillant, Marshal, 296.
 Valeggio, 391.
 Valençay, treaty of, 208.
 Valencia, 188, 190, 193, 197.
 Valladolid, 169, 171, 176, 195, 196.
 Valmy, 14, 436, 440.
 Valmy, Comte (Kellerman), 239.
 Valsana heights, 310.
 Valtelline, 23, 28.
 Valutino or Lubino, Battle, 111.
 Van Dorn, Gen., 355.
 Vandamme, Gen., at Austerlitz, 56; Dresden, 144, 147, 148, 149; taken prisoner and sent to Siberia, 150; at Charleroi, 236; Ligny, 242; Quatre-Bras, 248.
 Vandeleur, Gen., 254, 262, 264.
 Var river, 10.
 Varennes, 440, 443.
 Varese, 303.
 Varna, 266, 481.
 Vassy, 202.
 Vauban, 273.
 Vauchamps, 204, 205.
 Vecchio Ponte, 304, 306, 308.

- Vedel, Gen., 166.
 Vedro, The, 496.
 Vendresse, 452.
 Venetia, 294, 295, 319, 379, 393.
 Venice, 393.
 Vercelli, 301.
 Verden, 144.
 Verdun, 88, 422-426, 440, 441, 458, 462.
 Vernéville, 424, 430.
 Vernonfays, 213.
 Verona, 309, 318, 379, 390, 391.
 Versailles, King of Prussia at, 1870, 459; Bazaine sent to make terms, 460; King of Prussia proclaimed Emperor at, Jan. 18, 1871, 472, 474; Preliminaries of Peace signed at, Feb. 26, 1871, 475.
 Viasma, 114, 120, 121.
 Vicenza, 393.
 Vicksburg, 349, 355, 356.
 Victor, Marshal, at Casteggio, 12; Marengo, 13-15; fall of Vitebsk, 122; at the Berezina, 126; Dresden, 148; Leipzig, 159; with Napoleon into Spain, 168, 176, 177; Talavera, 179, 180; on the Rhine, 199; driven back, 202; on the Seine, 204, 205.
 Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, attacks Palestro, 307; Battle of Solferino, 316-319; attacks the Quadrilateral, 390-393.
 Vid river, 487, 488.
 Vienna, Government, recalls Kray and Melas, 1800, 22; in danger, 27; Napoleon's plan to go to, 35; hastens to, 46, 48; entered, Nov. 17, 1805, 49, 53; Napoleon to march upon, 77, 82, 83; occupied by the French, May 13, 1809, 83, 84; retreat to, 89, 90; Peace of, Oct. 14, 1809, 97; schemes at, for kidnapping Napoleon, 227, 390, 400, 401.
 Vienna, Congress of, declares Napoleon an outlaw, 230.
 Vierzon, 468.
 Vigevano, 295.
 Vigo, 171.
 Villafranca, 311, 318, 391.
 Villeneuve, Admiral, escapes from Toulon, reaches Cadiz, 31; Battle of Cape Finisterre, 32; sails to Corunna and Brest, but returns to Cadiz, 33; Napoleon's wrath, 34, 35.
 Villeneuve, 4.
 Villeneuve-sur-Vanne, 223.
 Villers, 449.
 Villersexel, 474.
 Villiers, 470.
 Vilna, 106-113, 128, 129.
 Vimiero, 166.
 Vincennes, 470.
 Vinoy, Gen., 456, 472.
 Vinzaglio, 301, 302.
 Vionville, 423-425, 428.
 Virginia, 321, 323, 326, 333.
 Virginia, Army of, surrenders, 376.
 Visano, 315.
 Vistula, 69, 70, 76, 120, 133, 153
 Vitebsk, 110, 111, 121, 124.
 Vitry, 205, 220.
 Vitry-le-François, 217, 222.
 Vittoria, Battle of, June 21, 1813, 194-198.
 Vivian, Gen., at Waterloo, 254, 262, 264.
 Vizcaya, 506.
 Voghera, 12, 297.
 Voigts-Rhetz, 410.
 Volta, 810, 317.
 Vop river, 121.
 Vorarlberg, 36.
 Vosges river, 416, 419, 420, 425, 459, 462.
- W.
- Wachau, 156, 157.
 Wadelincourt, 447.
 Wagram, Battle of, July 6, 1809, 90, 93-97, 233, 402.
 Walker, Gen. Sir G. T., at Salamanca, 190.
 Walker, at Harper's Ferry, 339.
 Warren, Gen., at Battle of the Wilderness, 361, 363-365.
 Warrentown, 323.
 Warsaw, 70, 76, 129.
 Washington, 322, 323, 332, 333, 336, 338, 339, 342, 349, 509.
 Wasserburg, 25.
 Waterloo, 251, 252.
 Waterloo, Battle of, June 18, 1815, 18, 19, 142, 225, 236, 253-265, 354, 388.
 Waters, Col., 178.
 Wavre, 249, 250, 256, 257.
 Webb, wounded at "Bloody Angle," 354.
 Weigl, 295.
 Weimar, 63-68, 134.
 Weissenburg, 38, 413, 414, 428, 435.
 Weissenfels, 135.
 Weisseritz, 148.
 Wellington, Duke of, disembarked, Aug., 1808; engagements at Rolicca, Vimiero, 166; patience and combination of forces, 176; disembarked at Lisbon, April 22, 1809, 178; Battle of Talavera, July 27, 28, 178-182; opposing Massena, 183-187; Salamanca, July 23, 1812, 187-193; Vittoria, June 21, 1813, 194-198; army in the Pyrenees, 208; campaign of Waterloo, 1815, 225-265; Battles of Charleroi, June 15, 230-237; Ligny, June 16, 238-243; Quatre-Bras, June 16, 244-252; Waterloo, June 18, 253-265, 19, 99.
 Werder, Gen von, 384, 459, 462, 474.
 Wesel fortress, 61.

- West Indian Islands, 32, 497.
 West Indies, 497, 498, 500, 507, 509.
 West Point, 369.
 Wetterau, 396.
 Wetzlar, 397.
 Weyrother, General, 54, 56.
 White, Gen., 339.
 White Oak Swamp, 335.
 Widdin, 479, 485, 489.
 Wiesenthal, 397.
 Wilderness, Battle of the, May and June, 1864, 358-367.
 Wilhelmshöhe, Palace of, 453.
 William, King of Prussia, and Emperor of Germany, Königgratz, 385, 387; at Nikolsburg, June 18, 1866, 401; War of 1870: at Berlin, 407; his forces, 410; proclamation to the French, 421; commands in Battle of Gravelotte, 430, 435; plan for confining Bazaine in Metz, 437, 443; at Sedan, 449, 452, 453, 455; at Meaux, 456; at Versailles, 459; proclaimed Emperor of Germany at Versailles, Jan. 19, 1871, 472.
 William of Baden, Prince, 463.
 Williams's troops at Waterloo, 254.
 Williamsburg, 332.
 Wilmington, 374.
 Wilson's cavalry crosses the Chickahominy, 366.
 Wimpffen, Gen., 304, 305, 311, 441, 448, 450-453.
 Winchester, 341.
 Wincke's, Hanoverian brigade at Waterloo, 254.
 Winzingerode, 134, 209, 210, 220, 222.
 Wittenberg, 134, 143, 144, 153, 154.
 Wittgenstein, 112, 124, 126, 134, 137, 140, 142, 205.
 Wittich, Gen., 464.
 Wörth, Battle of, Aug. 6, 1870, 414-17, 419, 428, 429, 435.
 Wolzogen, 118.
 Worcester, U.S.A., 337, 338, 342.
 Woronzoff Road, 272, 274.
 Wrede, 205.
 Wright, at Battle of the Wilderness, 365.
 Würtemberg, 39, 40, 60, 62, 381, 396.
 Württembergers, 77, 205, 445, 447, 469.
 Würzburg, 27, 38, 63, 77.
 Wurschen, 140.
- X.
- Xerxes, 81.
- Y.
- Yalta, 273.
 Yantra, 482.
 Yellow Tavern, 364.
 Yenikale, 289.
 Yeni-Zagra, 480.
 Yonne river, 206, 472.
 Yorck, Gen., before Magdeburg, 134; retreat from Napoleon, 146; at Château Thierry, 203; attacked and defeated by Napoleon, 204.
 Yorktown, attacked and abandoned, 332.
 Young, Gen., at Battle of Guasimos, 502.
- Z.
- Zach, Gen., follows French army from Marengo, 16; taken prisoner, 17.
 Zadora, 196.
 Zamorra, 179.
 Zastrow, Gen. Von, 410; at Spicheren and Forbach, 417; in command of Prussian army, 418; at Colombey, 423; at Metz, 461.
 Ziethen, Gen., driven back to the Sambre, 235; at Battle of Ligny, 240, 249; at Waterloo, 262.
 Zimmermann, with Russian army on the Dabrudja, 430.
 Zimnitsa, 485.
 Zittau, 383.
 Znaim, Armistice of, July 11, 1809, 97.
 Zobel, General, commanding Austrian forces in Italy, 295; repulsed at Palestro, 302; at retreat to Volta, 317.
 Zouave drill, 322.
 Zouaves, The, 304, 305, 410.
 Zwickau, 147.



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