THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

WAS GENERAL THOMAS

' SLOW AT NASHVILLE?

WITH A DESCRIPTION OF

Tbe Greatest Cavalry Movement
oftbe War

GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON'S CAVALRY OPERATIONS
IN TENNESSEE, ALABAMA, AND GEORGIA

HENRY V. BOYNTON

Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. V.; Historian Chickamauga.
and Chattanooga National Park Commission

NEW YORK

FRANCIS P. HARPER
1896

COPYRIGHTED, 1896,

BY

FRANCIS P. HARPER.

EDITION LIMITED TO
45o COPIES.

PREFACE.

A RECENT revival of the venerable

oa charge that General George H.

Thomas was slow at Nashville led to

§! the publication, in the New York Sun

w of August 9, 1896, of the article which

>

•i is here reproduced by the permission

of that journal. A few brief additions

d have been made to the original text.

o

^ It seemed the more important to

0 some of the veterans of the Army of
OQ

01 the Cumberland that this charge in its
S renewed form should be met, because
< 3

447938

4 Preface.

it was put forth with a show of official
authority which would naturally give
it weight with readers who were not
familiar with the war records.

The discussion of the subject also
afforded an opportunity to present,
though in very concise form, the out-
lines of those magnificent cavalry
operations under General James H.
Wilson in the battle of Nashville, and
in his subsequent independent cam-
paign through Alabama and Georgia,
all of which were without parallel in
our war.

Though these movements constitute
one of the most brilliant chapters in
our war history, — in fact, in the his-
tory of cavalry in any war, — the
country really knows little about

Preface. 5

them, because they were performed
out of sight in Alabama and Georgia,
while the attention of the country was
fixed upon the fall of Richmond and
the great events immediately follow-
ing it. For this reason it is believed
that the brief story here presented
will not be without interest.

H. V. B.

WASHINGTON, D. CM September, 1896.

WAS GENERAL THOMAS SLOW
AT NASHVILLE?

NEW generation has come
upon the stage since our
civil war. It has its own
writers on the events of
that struggle. Some of these, careful
students as they are, make proper
and effective use of the stores of
material which the Government has
collected and published. Others,
stumbling upon interesting dispatches
7

8 General George H. Thomas

of notable campaigns, read them in
connection with the ill-considered and
hasty criticisms of the hot times which
brought them forth, and, finding ques-
tions settled twenty years ago, but en-
tirely new to themselves, they proceed
to reveal them as new things to the
new generation. By this process it has
recently been announced that General
Thomas was slow at Nashville. To
give this echo of thirty-two years ago
sufficient voice, several columns of
dispatches — which a quarter of a
century since formed the basis of
discussions that demolished the
theory they are now brought forward
to sustain — are gravely presented as
something new.

Nothing better illustrates this situa-

At Nashville. 9

tion than the very familiar story of
the Irishman who assaulted the Jew
for the part he took in the Crucifixion,
and upon being remonstrated with
upon the ground that the event
occurred eighteen hundred years ago,
replied that it was nevertheless new
to him, as he had only heard of it the
day before.

That General Thomas was not slow
at Nashville is ancient history. Gen-
eral Grant, who was the first to
charge it, was also the first to with-
draw the imputation, by declaring in
his official report that at the time he
had been very impatient over what
appeared as unnecessary delay on the
part of Thomas, "but his final defeat
of Hood was so complete that it will

io General George H. Thomas

be accepted as a vindication of that
distinguished officer's judgment."

The ostensible reason for heralding
Thomas as slow — so slow, indeed, as
to require his removal and lead to an
order for it — was that he insisted upon
concentrating his infantry force and
remounting his cavalry. Secretary
Stanton declared that the delay would
be till doomsday if Thomas waited for
the latter.

A consideration of this most impor-
tant, underlying, and controlling fac-
tor in General Thomas's preparations
brings up one of the most brilliant
chapters in our war history, and alto-
gether the most brilliant in the annals
of cavalry operations.

In touching upon General Thomas's

At Nashv ille. 1 1

persistence in getting his cavalry
ready, it would be very natural for a
surface student to quote Secretary
Stanton: "If he waits for Wilson to
get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his
last horn," and treat it as conclusive
proof of Thomas's dilatoriness and
Stanton's final opinion. But just far
enough under the surface to escape
the eyes of historical amateurs, lies
the splendid and unparalleled fact that
in eight winter days after the date of
that dispatch General James H. Wil-
son, Thomas's chief of cavalry, had
impressed horses enough, with those
furnished on previous requisitions, to
raise the effective mounted force at
Nashville from 5500 to 13,500, and
that on the eighth day General Wilson

12 General George H. Thomas

went into action with 12,000 mounted
men, and had besides one brigade of
1500 men engaged in an independent
movement.

At this point a moment's considera-
tion of the real reasons which caused
the outbreak against General Thomas,
on the ground that he was slow, will
not be out of place. At City Point it
was the perfectly natural but sicken-
ing anxiety lest it should turn out that
a great mistake had been made in let-
ting Sherman march away to the sea,
thus possibly opening the way for
Hood to the Ohio. At Savannah it
was the same fear, intensified by the
consciousness that Thomas had been
left with unprepared forces to con-
tend against a veteran army which

At Nashville. 13

had stubbornly resisted both Thomas
and Sherman during the hundred days
from Dalton to Atlanta.

And so, while Thomas, as all who
were on the ground knew, was mak-
ing superhuman exertions to prepare
fully for the task in hand, he was
advised to fight, pressed to fight,
ordered to fight, threatened with re-
moval if he did not fight, and his
successor dispatched to relieve him.
And the underlying cause of it all was
the demoralizing fear that Hood
might elude or overthrow Thomas and
strike for the Ohio, and the country
rise in wrath to inquire why Sher-
man, with 62,000 thoroughly equipped
veterans, including a larger force of
mounted men than he left behind,

14 General George H. Thomas

had been allowed to march away from
the central theater of war. So great
was this fear at Savannah that even
after receiving Thomas's dispatch
giving an account of the first day's
battle at Nashville, which resulted in
driving Hood's left eight miles (which
movement General Grant character-
ized as a "splendid success"), Sher-
man telegraphed that this attack on
Hood "was successful but not com-
plete": that he awaited further ac-
counts "with anxiety," as Thomas's
complete success was necessary to
vindicate his own plan for this cam-
paign.

Throughout all this inside panic in
high official circles, only Thomas and
the trusted officers who supported

At Nashville. 15

him at Nashville were cool and un-
moved in the memorable crisis.

THOMAS ORGANIZING HIS ARMY.

The concentration and organiza-
tion of the fragments which finally
made up the force with which he
practically annihilated his enemy was
one of the most remarkable accom-
plishments of the war. It was pros-
ecuted and consummated in the
immediate presence of the enemy,
and a large portion of the work was
performed during the continued
movement, constant skirmishing, fre-
quent affairs, and one great battle of
an active campaign.

Arriving at Nashville, the first point

1 6 General George H. Thomas

of concentration, General Thomas,
after careful study of the situation,
decided upon his plan of battle. It
included, as one of its essentials, the
remounting of an effective force of
cavalry. From the moment his plans
were formed the utmost energy was
put forth to prepare for their execu-
tion. Greater or more effective ac-
tivity was never exerted in the Union
army than was manifest at Nashville
throughout this period. Every stroke
of effort was directed toward the pre-
determined end, with the result which
the country knows.

Naturally, the part played by the
cavalry in our great battles was often
concealed or minimized, while the
infantry operations filled the public

At Nashville. 17

eye and for the time dimmed the
credit due to the cavalry arm. The
history of the war does not afford
another case where the cavalry
formed the determining factor, and,
notwithstanding this, where it was so
largely overlooked in the distribution
of the honors.

It is necessary to a full understand-
ing of the brilliancy, efficiency, and
completeness of Thomas's final move-
ments to have in mind the situation
after General Sherman had marched
away from Hood and left Thomas in
Tennessee to stand between that vet-
eran Confederate army and the Ohio.

Preparatory to the march to the
sea the great army about Atlanta had
been carefully inspected both as to

1 8 General George H. Tbomas

men and equipments. Every weak
man, all convalescents, those whose
terms of service were expiring — in
short, all the ''trash," as General
Sherman expressed it — were sent to
the rear, that is, to Thomas. All
equipments of infantry, artillery, and
cavalry were examined, and every
weak or worn piece replaced by new,
and all the "trash" either destroyed
or "sent to Thomas." The entire
cavalry force was dismounted for
close inspection and for the perfect
remounting of Kilpatrick's column.
Of the sound men whom Thomas re-
ceived he lost 15,000 by expiration
of terms of service and previous fur-
loughs to vote, within a week after
Hood's movement began.

At Nashville. 19

After this sifting of the armies
General Sherman started for the sea
with 62,000 veterans, of whom he
wrote that "all on this exhibit may
be assumed to have been able-bodied,
experienced soldiers, well armed, well
equipped and provided, so far as
human foresight could, with all the
essentials of life, strength, and vigor-
ous action." With this force was in-
cluded the entire equipment of trains,
pontoons, and similar essentials which
Thomas, with great care, had per-
fected for the army of the Cumber-
land. Thomas's request that he
might have his old corps which he
had organized, which had fought
under him so long, was refused, and,
instead, two small corps were sent him.

20 Central George H. Thomas

The nucleus around which General
Thomas was to organize an army to
take care of Hood — who from May
till November had taxed the offensive
resources of Sherman's three armies —
was, the Fourth Corps, General
Stanley, with an effective force of
J3>9°7> ar>d the Twenty-third, General
Schofield, with 10,358 effectives.

The means of holding Chattanooga
are indicated by the instructions from
Sherman to Steedman, whose troops
had almost dwindled away by expira-
tion of service: "You must organize
and systematize the hospitals and
men sent back to Chattanooga. You
could use some of them for your
forts," and it was suggested to
Thomas: "To make things sure, you

At Nashille. 21

might call upon the Governors of
Kentucky and Indiana for some
militia, cautioning them against a
stampede." Thomas was so short of
men that when Steedman asked for
enough for a small but important
garrison, he was obliged to reply:
"You might send a force from the
organization of convalescents now
being made up by General Cruft at
Chattanooga." To which Steedman
replied, "So far, all such detach-
ments reported from the front [Sher-
man] are with furloughs, and are
waiting transportation home."

In place of the 15,000 veterans
whose terms had expired, Thomas
received 12,000 newly enlisted re-
cruits. General A. J. Smith's vet-

22 General George H. Thomas

eran corps had been ordered from
Missouri, and a great parade has been
made of this fact by those whose
interest it was to show that Thomas
had been left with a competent
force. But the fact that it did
not arrive at Nashville till after the
battle of Franklin, and that Thomas
was waiting for it as well as to re-
mount the cavalry, was not so loudly
proclaimed.

However, when Sherman was ready
to start for the sea, with Hood's
veteran army concentrated behind
him, and Thomas, with the above
mentioned elements of an army scat-
tered over a territory as large as
France, had been assigned to take
care of Hood, General Sherman

At Nastimlle. «3

telegraphed Halleck: "I therefore
feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee,
and have ordered Thomas to assume
the offensive in the direction of
Selma, Ala." And General Grant,
after receiving some inflated figures
of a great force left with Thomas,
telegraphed Sherman: "With the
force you have left with Thomas, he
must be able to take care of Hood
and destroy him." Later, when the
anxiety at City Point referred to in
the opening of this paper had become
intense, the margin of force with
which General Thomas was really
operating was found to be so small
that General Grant suggested that he
should " arm and put in the trenches
your quartermaster employees, citi-

24 General George H. Thomas

zens, etc.," and again, a few hours
later, he was suggesting what he
could do "with your citizen em-
ployees armed."

CONCENTRATING IN FRONT OF HOOD.

It was under such circumstances
and conditions which, after all, are
but faintly shadowed forth by the
facts here stated, that General
Thomas began to concentrate his
conglomerate forces in Hood's front,
and begin under fire the work of or-
ganizing and refitting an army. With
superhuman effort, and such loyal
assistance and energy from officers
and soldiers as were not elsewhere
exhibited during the war, because not
previously required, General Thomas

At Nashville. 25

set about the task of preparing the
means of overthrowing Hood. De-
liberate action and the extreme of
prudence were essentials of the situa-
tion. The objective of Hood's cam-
paign, under suggestions from
President Davis, was the Ohio River.
There was no reserve force in sight
or within summoning distance, or
immediately available anywhere in
case of reverses. Thomas could not
afford to take the slightest risks so
long as his own position was not im-
perilled. It was not alone the imme-
diate interests confided to his keeping
and defense which hinged upon his
success or failure, but both Grant and
Sherman and possibly the Union itself
were to stand or fall with such sue-

26 General George H. Thomas

cess or failure. Had Hood suc-
ceeded, as at the first he might have
succeeded without fault of Thomas,
or even fair ground for reflection
upon him, what would have been said
of Sherman for marching off to the
sea, leaving the central West without
sufficient protection, or of General
Grant for having allowed him to go ?

And because the deliberate, pru-
dent, imperturbable, and always sue-
cessful Thomas appreciated the
situation, and determined to be ready
to annihilate his enemy before he
struck, he was hastily declared to be
slow by those he was preparing to save.

All of General Thomas's troubles
at Nashville arose from his adhering,
in the face of threatened removal, to

Ai Nashville. 27

plans of action which made General
Wilson's cavalry an essential factor
in the attack on Hood for which he
was energetically preparing. He was
looking not only to attack, but to
crushing pursuit. In view of the
great preponderance of the enemy's
cavalry, which was then double his
own, and led by Forrest, one of the
ablest cavalry generals on either side,
effective pursuit without a strong
mounted force would be impossible.
The correspondence with Grant —
which grew until an order was issued
for General Thomas's relief by Gen-
eral Schofield, and, when this was
held in abeyance, until a second order
for superseding him with General
Logan — began with an order from

28 General George H. Thomas

Grant not to "let Forrest get off
without punishment." As Forrest's
mounted force was double Wilson's,
this was easier to write than to
execute. General Thomas therefore
explained the situation fully, showing
that the cavalry of Hatch and Grier-
son, which were all the reinforcements
he had to depend upon at first, had been
turned in at Memphis; that half his
own cavalry had been dismounted to
equip Kilpatrick's column for Sherman;
that his dismounted force, which he had
sent to Louisville for horses and arms,
was detained there waiting for both,
and that as he was greatly outnum-
bered both in infantry and cavalry he
would be compelled to act on the
defensive. But he added, in closing:

At Nashville. 29

" The moment I can get my cavalry,
I will march against Hood, and if
Forrest can be reached he shall be
punished."

The day after General Schofield's
brilliant and effective battle at Frank-
lin, Thomas made known to Halleck
his confidence that Hood could not
cross the Cumberland, and therefore
thought it best to wait until Wilson
could equip his cavalry, as he then
felt certain he could whip Hood.
Next, the President, through Sec-
retary Stanton, stirred General Grant
up by a telegram stating that Mr.
Lincoln felt "solicitous about the
disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifi-
cations for an indefinite period, ' until
Wilson gets equipments.' "

3° General George H. Thomas

THE PANIC AT WASHINGTON.

In spite of the plainest statements
of the situation, of the great dis-
parity of forces, of the dictates of
prudence to remain on the defensive
until he could strike an effective blow,
which he expected to deliver in a few
days, Thomas was prodded and nagged
from City Point and Washington as
no officer in command of an army had
been before, and treated day by day
as if he needed tutelage. In the last
dispatch of the series of clear explana-
tions,— which under other circum-
stances than the seething of that inside
panic which a full appreciation of the
complications that Sherman's march
to the sea had caused would doubt-

At Nashville. 31

less have been accepted, — General
Thomas was peremptorily ordered to
"attack Hood at once without waiting
for a remount of your cavalry. There
is great danger in delay resulting in
a campaign back to the Ohio." This
was sent in reply to a telegram of
Thomas showing that there was the
greatest activity in getting the cav-
alry ready, and he hoped to have it
remounted "in three days from this
time." To this Thomas replied that
he would make all dispositions and
attack according to orders, adding,
" though I believe it will be hazardous
with the small force of cavalry now at
my service." Orders to prepare for
attack were immediately sent out, and
dispositions for the attack began.

32 General George H. Thomas

Meantime a sleet storm came on
which covered the country with a
glaze of ice over which neither horses,
men, nor artillery could move even on
level ground, to say nothing of assault-
ing an enemy intrenched on the hills.
The same day Halleck telegraphed:
" If you wait till General Wilson
mounts all his cavalry you will wait till
doomsday, for the waste equals the
supply." And General Grant tele-
graphed orders relieving Thomas.
The latter telegraphed Halleck that he
was conscious of having done every-
thing possible to prepare the troops
to attack, and if he was removed he
would submit without a murmur.

The order of relief was suspended.
The sleet storm continued. All of

At Nasbville. 33

General Thomas's officers agreed that
it was impracticable to attack. Some
of them even found it impossible to
ride to headquarters because of the
ice, and in the midst of it came an
order from Grant: " I am in hopes of
receiving a dispatch from you to-day
announcing you have moved. Delay no
longer for weather or reinforcements. "

Thomas replied:

" I will obey the order as promptly
as possible, however much I regret it,
as the attack will have to be made
under every disadvantage. The whole
country is covered with a perfect sheet
of ice and sleet, and it is with diffi-
culty the troops are able to move
about on level ground."

To Halleck, Thomas replied:

34 General George H. Thomas

"I have the troops ready to make
the attack on the enemy as soon as
the sleet which now covers the ground
has melted sufficiently to enable the
men to march, as the whole country
is now covered with a sheet of ice so
hard and slippery that it is utterly
impossible for troops to ascend the
slopes, or even move upon level
ground in anything like order. Under
these circumstances I believe an at-
tack at this time would only result
in a useless sacrifice of life."

The reply to this, unquestionably
born of the panic to which allusion
has been made, was an order sending
General Logan to relieve Thomas.
Grant himself then started from City
Point for Nashville to assume general

At Nashville. 35

command. But the ice having melted,
he was met at Washington by the news
of Thomas's victory.

The delay that Thomas had insisted
upon, in the face of orders twice
given for his relief, gave him the
cavalry force he required for the de-
cisive blow he intended to strike.

While the official inside at City
Point and Washington bordered on
panic, everything at Nashville was
being pressed forward with activity
and vigilance, and at the same time
with deliberation, prudence, and the
utmost imperturbability. At length,
and at the first moment possible con-
sistent with a reasonable expectation
of success, the attack began.

36 General George H. Thomas

THE ATTACK ON HOOD.

The developments of the battle, the
energy and success of the pursuit, and
the marvelous results of the whole,
namely, the virtual destruction of a
veteran army, reveal at every step
what General Thomas had in mind
when he insisted upon waiting till he
could remount his cavalry.

In no other battle of the war did
cavalry play such a prominent part
as in that of Nashville. In no other
pursuit did it so distinguish itself.
Students of the movement will find
themselves constantly questioning, as
their investigations proceed, whether,
with the force of infantry which
General Thomas had been able to

At Nashville. 37

gather, Hood could have been driven
from his position in front of Nash-
ville without the co-operation of the
cavalry. Had Thomas been obliged
to fight without it, as the authorities
at City Point and Washington tried to
compel him to do, it is no reflection
upon his infantry to say that there is
ground for serious doubt as to the re-
sult. Hood was intrenched on strong
ground. His positions were com-
manding. The infantry force against
him was not sufficient in numbers and
experience to make up for the usual
difference due to field works placed as
Hood's were and manned by veterans.
Unquestionably Wilson's cavalry was
the dominating and controlling ele-
ment of the battle. To say this does

447938

38 General George H. Thomas

not detract from the distinguished in-
fantry generals or their excellent and
brilliant work. But General Thomas's
plan turned on cavalry work as its
directrix. His consultations with
General Wilson had been exhaustive.
That officer was charged with re-
organizing, remounting, and refitting
a great cavalry force, even as Thomas
was organizing a new army — under
fire. There had been nothing like
either of those herculean tasks in any
campaign.

Many officers have organized and
built up an effective cavalry force in
times of rest and peace, but no one
except General Wilson ever did it in
the heat and hurry of a desperate mid-
winter campaign. And he could not

At Nashville. 39

have succeeded, nor could any man
have accomplished it, in the face
of the interferences which were at-
tempted, but for the protection and
support of the peerless and imper-
turbable Thomas.

When General Thomas felt himself
to be ready, or so nearly ready that
he believed success attainable, he de-
livered the battle of Nashville. In
his whole career he had never struck
a blow till he felt himself ready. He
looked upon the lives of his soldiers
as a sacred trust, not to be carelessly
imperiled. Whenever he moved to
battle, it was certain that everything
had been done that prudence, deliber-
ation, thought, and cool judgment
could do under surrounding circum-

4° General George H. Tbomas

stances to insure success commensu-
rate with the cost of the lives of men.
And so it came to pass that when the
war ended it could be truthfully
written of Thomas alone that he never
lost a movement or a battle.

It was an unprecedented array for
attack. The inner lines about the
city were held by quartermasters'
employees. Half the outer, or main
line, was manned mostly by convales-
cents and new troops; the other, or
right of this line, was occupied by
General A. J. Smith's division. Steed-
man's provisional division and his two
colored brigades were on the extreme
left of the front, and opened the
battle. The order of infantry in the
line from right to left was Smith's

At Nashville. 41

Corps (Thirteenth), Wood's Corps
(Fourth), Schofield's Corps (Twenty-
third), and Steedman's troops.

THE CAVALRY IN THE BATTLE.

Wilson's cavalry was massed behind
the extreme right. Steedman, on the
left, early December 15, delivered a
vigorous and successful attack. It
was in the nature of a feint. Mean-
time the grand play with the cavalry
began. Its part was the imposing
swinging movement of 12,000 mounted
men against and around the Con-
federate left. Before the short, lower-
ing winter day had closed, this force
had overrun several redoubts on the
enemy's left, capturing them and their
artillery by assaults, swept for eight

42 General George H. Tbotnas

miles over ground of formidable
natural difficulties, and forced itself
to the immediate flank and rear of
Hood's main line of works. It rode
to its firing lines and fought dis-
mounted.

The enemy's left being thus effect,
ually turned, the infantry attack in
front was delivered with success, and
Hood fell back to a new line, and
early the second day withdrew still
further, establishing his right on the
Overton Hills.

The second day was a repetition of
the first. Wilson again swung his
cavalry by a wide detour to the
enemy's left and rear, and from the
rear assaulted and carried a portion
of his main line, capturing both works

At Nashville. 43

and guns. Thereupon the infantry
corps again advanced on the front;
the enemy was everywhere forced
back in confused retreat, and in-
stantly the most vigorous pursuit
began, and was kept up that night till
midnight, the cavalry leading. It was
resumed at daylight and continued
night and day in winter weather, — rain,
slush, snow, and ice, — over a soggy
country and mud roads which were
well-nigh impassable, leading through a
region which both armies had gleaned
bare with their foraging parties. But
even under these conditions, by hercu-
lean efforts, the most vigorous pursuit
was prosecuted to the Tennessee River.
The determined character of this pur-
suit is well illustrated by the fact that

44 General George H. Thomas

6000 cavalry horses were disabled, so
rapid and exhaustive was the work
they performed. At the close Hood's
army was practically destroyed. It
opened the campaign 55,000 strong.
It lost nearly all its guns and equip-
ments, about 15,000 killed and
wounded, and the same number of
prisoners. About 13,000 men of all
arms were finally assembled at Tupelo.
Starting toward North Carolina it
continued to disintegrate, and reached
the southern line of that State not
over 6000 strong. It had practically
disappeared as an army. When it
reached Bentonville in Sherman's
front it went into action with only
3953 officers and men of all arms.
For the first time in the war one of

At Nashville. 45

the leading veteran armies of the
enemy operating in the open field
had been destroyed. This was the
direct result of Thomas's blow at
Nashville, and the pursuit which fol-
lowed.

Thomas was very deeply pained and
indignant at the treatment he received
while making the most vigorous prep-
arations for battle which it was pos-
sible to carry forward. He called his
officers together during the sleet
storm to tell them of the peremptory
order to attack without regard to
weather, and of his reply that the
conditions were unfavorable for at-
tack, that it would be made at the
first possible moment, and that if
removed, as threatened, he would sub-

46 General George H. Thomas

mit without a murmur. He found
himself fully supported by all of them.
After this meeting was over he called
General Wilson aside and said: " Wil-
son, they treat me at Washington and
at Grant's headquarters as though I
were a boy! They do not seem to
think that I have sense enough to plan
a campaign or fight a battle, but if
they will only let me alone a few days
I will show them that they are mis-
taken. I am sure we will whip Hood
and destroy his army, if we go at them
under favorable instead of unfavorable
conditions."

Later, and in spite of his brilliant
and complete victory, and the further
fact that such vigorous pursuit as had
never before been made by a Union

At Nashville. 47

army was in progress, in midwinter
and under more unfavorable circum-
stances, too, than a pursuing army
had encountered during the war, this
nagging from Washington and City
Point continued.

Secretary Stanton alone was im-
mediate, wholesouled, and continuing
in his congratulations and praises.
Grant tempered his message over
the "splendid success" with the in-
formation that he had reached Wash-
ington on his way to relieve him,
but now would not proceed, and con-
tinued: "Push the enemy now and
give him no rest until he is entirely
destroyed. Much is now expected."
Mr. Lincoln added to his thanks:
"You made a magnificent beginning.

4^ Central George H. Thomas

A grand consummation is within your
easy reach. Do not let it slip."

In the midst of these proddings,
Secretary Stanton suggested to Grant
that Thomas be made a Major-
General. Grant replied: "I think
Thomas has won the Major-Gen-
eralcy, but I would wait a few days
before giving it, to see the extent
of damage done."

Next came Halleck, in the midst of
the almost superhuman efforts of the
pursuit:

" Permit me, General, to urge the
vast importance of a hot pursuit of
Hood's army. Every possible sacri-
fice should be made, and your men for
a few days will submit to any hard-
ship and privation to accomplish the

At Nashville. 49

great result. A most vigorous pur-
suit on your part is therefore of vital
importance to Sherman's plans. No
sacrifice must be spared to attain so
important an object."

THOMAS TURNS ON HIS NAGGERS.

There was one thing in which Gen-
eral Thomas was slow. He was not
swift to give expression to indigna-
tion over wrong treatment. To this
latter, as the culmination of the series,
he at last responded with this crush-
ing statement:

" General Hood's army is being pur-
sued as rapidly and as vigorously as
it is possible for one army to pursue
another. We cannot control the ele-
ments, and you must remember that

5° General George H. Thomas

to resist Hood's advance into Tennes-
see I had to reorganize and almost
thoroughly equip the force now under
my command. I fought the battles
of the i5th and i6th inst. with the
troops but partially equipped, and
notwithstanding the inclemency of
the weather and the partial equipment,
have been enabled to drive the enemy
beyond Duck River, crossing the two
streams with my troops, and driving
the enemy from position to position,
without the aid of pontoons, and with
but little transportation to bring up
supplies and ammunition.

" I am doing all in my power to
crush Hood's army, and, if it be pos-
sible, will destroy it, but pursuing an
enemy through an exhausted country,

At Nashville. 51

over mud roads, completely sogged
with heavy rains, is no child's play,
and cannot be accomplished as quickly
as thought of. I hope, in urging me
to push the enemy, the department
remembers that General Sherman took
with him the complete organizations
of the Military Division of the Missis-
sippi, well equipped in every respect
as regards ammunition, supplies, and
transportation, leaving me only two
corps — partially stripped of their trans-
portation to accommodate the force
taken with him — to oppose the advance
into Tennessee of that army which
had resisted the advance of the army
of the Military Division of the Mis-
sissippi on Atlanta from the com-
mencement of the campaign until its

52 General George H. Thomas

close, and which is now, in addition,
aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although
my progress may appear slow, I feel
assured that Hood's army can be
driven from Tennessee, and eventu-
ally driven to the wall, by the force
under my command, but too much
must not be expected of troops which
have to be reorganized, especially
when they have the task of destroying
a force in a winter campaign which
was able to make an obstinate resist-
ance to twice its numbers in spring
and summer. In conclusion, I can
safely state that this army is will-
ing to submit to any sacrifice to oust
Hood's army, or to strike any other
blow which would contribute to the
destruction of the rebellion."

At Nashville. 53

The next day Stanton thus again
extended his steady support:

"I have seen to-day General Hal-
leek's dispatch of yesterday and your
reply. It is proper for me to assure
you that this department has the
most unbounded confidence in your
skill, vigor, and determination to
employ to the best advantage all the
means in your power to pursue and
destroy the enemy. No department
could be inspired with more profound
admiration and thankfulness for the
great deeds you have already per-
formed, or more confiding faith that
human effort could accomplish no
more than will be done by you and
the gallant officers and soldiers of
your command."

54 General George H. Tbomas

To this Thomas responded in terms
which show his deep appreciation of
the only unqualifiedly friendly voice
that had reached his ear from those
in high authority:

" I am profoundly thankful for the
hearty expression of your confidence
in my determination and desire to do
all in my power to destroy the enemy
and put down the rebellion."

As pertinent to this history it is well
to recall two facts: First, Sherman
reached Savannah, having avoided
all fortified places, had encountered
no enemy in force during his march,
sat down before the city, and awoke
one morning to find that Hardee with
his 10,000 men had slipped out of the
city over the river and escaped.

At Nasbville. 55

Second, the Army of the Potomac,
which had 87,000 present for duty
equipped, and which was not obliged
to depend upon quartermasters' em-
ployees, citizens, and convalescents
for its reserves, remained quietly in
its camps in front of City Point and
in sight of the enemy from November
to April, giving plenty of leisure for
complaining that the Army of the
Cumberland did not attack at the
dropping of a handkerchief.

With the dispersion of Hood's army
General Thomas set about preparing
for a spring campaign which should
open at the earliest possible day.
His plan contemplated the assembling
and putting in thorough condition
an army of cavalry to penetrate the

5 ^ General George H. Thomas

South under his trusted commander,
General James H. Wilson.

THE CAVALRY AFTER NASHVILLE.

Six divisions of the cavalry corps
were put in camp, extending for
twelve miles along the north bank of
the Tennessee from Gravelly Springs
to Waterloo Landing. A winter cam-
paign was laid out at army head-
quarters for Thomas's army, to begin
without rest or refitting — the resting
to be done by proxy in the vicinity of
City Point. But owing to rains and
unusual floods this plan for Thomas
could not be pursued, and the time
was improved for a vigorous and
rapid refitting of his forces.

Early in March a cavalry corps of

At Nashville. 57

27,000 had been gathered. The men
were veterans. The new equipment
collected was excellent, but, with all
that the Cavalry Bureau could do,
only 17,000 horses could be provided.
This force was raised, by drills and
every form of perfecting an organiza-
tion, to a high state of efficiency.
While vigorous efforts were in prog-
ress to equip Hatch's veteran division
of 10,000, the orders from Washing-
ton and City Point for forward move-
ment began to pour in on Thomas.
While no other national army was
moving, the nine weeks of midwinter
which Thomas was using in most
active measures for beginning a crush-
ing campaign were begrudged him,
and he was again prodded to move

5 8 General George H. Thomas

before he was ready. Next, the
breaking up of the cavalry force
which had been assembled and pre-
pared with such great labor began.
One division, 5000 strong, was or-
dered off to Canby at Mobile, where
its operations proved of little conse-
quence, and Thomas was ordered with
5000 more to make a demonstration
on Tuscaloosa and Selma.

General Wilson then urged with
great ability and power that the cav-
alry should go as a body, with the
purpose of destroying the various
factories of war material and breaking
the interior lines of communication
and supply. Grant, who had great
confidence in Wilson from his long
service on his staff, consented, and the

At Nashville. 59

plan, warmly approved by Thomas,
was adopted, and Wilson was started
with all the powers of an independent
commander.

On the 22d of March Wilson had
crossed the Tennessee and started
toward Selma. He had three di-
visions, Upton's, Long's, and E. M.
McCook's. The aggregate strength
was 12,500 mounted, and 1500 dis-
mounted to follow till they could
be furnished with captured horses.
It was in every sense a command
thoroughly equipped and fully sup-
plied. The divisions marched on dif-
ferent roads, but the objective of
each was Selma. The direct distance
was 180 miles, and the average march
of each division to reach it was 250

60 General George H. Thomas

miles. The streams were still flooded
in all directions, and the roads deep
and difficult. The vigor and skill
with which all these obstacles were
overcome form a brilliant chapter,
not exceeded in kind during the war.
At Montevallo, forty-five miles from
Selma, a portion of Forrest's com-
mand was encountered, and, after a
dashing fight, forced to retreat. The
Southern leader had not been able, as
yet, to concentrate his command.
The capture of a courier with dis-
patches to Forrest showed Wilson
how several columns were moving to
join Forrest, and forces were sent in
various directions to check them,
while Wilson's main column rode
direct for Selma. It was an exciting

At Nashville. 61

and successful play. Forrest, when
reached, was found to have made the
best disposition possible for an in-
ferior force, and maintained a stub-
born resistance. But the Union
troopers charged at all points. For-
rest himself fought hand to hand,
and received several saber strokes.
After the lines were carried Wilson's
column advanced in pursuit twenty-
five miles, and bivouacked at night
only twenty miles from Selma.

Selma contained a gun foundry,
arsenal, and important manufactories
of war material. The place had been
sufficiently fortified, as was believed,
against any possible cavalry attack.
General Wilson had succeeded in ob-
taining accurate plans of these works

62 General George H. Thomas

and of the grounds in front of them.
During the day's advance, which was
not retarded by Forrest, these sketches
were shown to all general officers and
a plan of attack explained. As a
result, upon reaching the vicinity of
the works, the various brigades went
into position with precision and celer-
ity, and the storming of the in-
trenchments began at once. Just as
darkness was gathering they were
carried at every point. The resist-
ance was stubborn, but numbers, effi-
cient organization, equipment, and
dash won the day and the city.

The capture of Selma was one of
the most remarkable feats in the
cavalry annals of any land. The
works contained 24 bastions and a

At Nashville. 63

number of strong redans with deep
ditches, while the curtains of the four-
mile line were generally stockaded
rifle pits. There was besides an in-
terior line of 4 detached forts. The
artillery armament of these works
was 30 field guns and two thirty-
pounder Parrotts. Wilson's attack-
ing force was 8000. Forrest, for
the defense, had half that force of
veteran cavalry, and some 2000 militia,
home-guards, and citizens. The cap-
tures were 2700 prisoners, nearly 2000
horses, 32 guns in service, 26 field
guns mounted complete in arsenal,
46 siege guns in the foundry, 66,000
rounds of artillery ammunition, and
100,000 rounds for small arms. Gen-
eral Wilson destroyed the Selma arse-

64 General George H. Tbomas

nal, with 44 buildings covering 13
acres, filled with machinery and
munitions; powder works comprising
7 buildings, with 14,000 pounds of
powder; niter works, with 18 buildings
equipped, 3 gun foundries, 3 rolling
mills, and several machine shops, all
equipped and turning out material
of war, and vast accumulations of
quartermaster and commissary stores.
It was a crushing blow to the Con-
federacy— this capture of Selma with
its enormous military plant on Sunday,
April 2. The same day Grant, at the
other end of the line a thousand miles
away, had broken the lines at Peters-
burg, and the evacuation of Rich-
mond began.

At Nashville. 65

THE CAPTURE OF MONTGOMERY.

General Wilson's command re-
mained at Selma about a week, making
active preparations for its next stroke,
which was to be against Montgomery,
the former capital of the Confeder-
acy. It was necessary to prepare a
thousand feet of bridging to cross the
Alabama River, then at flood tide and
filled with floating debris. Equip-
ments of every kind were looked after
and the most careful refitting of the
whole command took place, the Con-
federate stores taken offering abund-
ant facilities for such important work.
There had been horses enough cap-
tured to mount the whole command,
together with a very considerable

66 General George H. Thomas

force of negroes for fatigue purposes.
With Croxton's brigade detached
and moving by a circuitous route
from central Alabama, through north-
ern Georgia toward Macon, the final
objective, the force of the main col-
umn was reduced to 11,000 men.

Upon reaching the outskirts of
Montgomery they were met by the
officials of the town and leading
citizens, offering surrender without
conditions. Then followed an aston-
ishment for the people of this capital.
The whole force, marching in close
column, with its flags unfurled and
music playing, made its way into and
through the city without a marauder
leaving its column or a soldier entering
a private house in any quarter unin-

At Nashville. 67

vited. And, so far as information
came to the officers of the command,
not an insulting word was spoken. The
main portion of the command camped
in the vicinity of the city, while its
advance continued rapidly toward
Columbus, skirmishing with the re-
treating enemy. There was a very
considerable capture of steamboats
loaded with military supplies at Mont-
gomery. The halt there, however, was
only for the night, and the next day the
main column moved with the greatest
celerity so as to secure a bridge for
crossing the Chattahoochee either at
Columbus on the direct road to Macon,
or at West Point, further up the river.
By rapid movements, and bold and
most brilliant fighting, both the

68 General George H. Thomas

bridge at Columbus and that at West
Point were captured. Though both
were prepared for burning and pro-
tected by heavy fortifications well
manned by a defending force, the
attacks against these were pushed so
vigorously as to make it impossible
for the enemy to fire them.

The bridge-head at West Point was
protected by a strong redoubt with a
deep ditch mounting two guns, one
a thirty-two pounder, and the work
manned by 265 men. This was twice
attacked by direct assault, and carried
the second time. The captures were
3 guns, 500 stands of small arms, 19
locomotive engines, and 240 cars
loaded with army supplies, but the
greatest importance of securing a

At Nasboille. 69

crossing at West Point was that it
opened a way direct to Macon, which
could be used for the entire cavalry
corps in case the attack at Columbus
should fail.

The main column arrived at Girard,
a small town opposite Columbus,
early in the afternoon, finding a heavy
line of fortifications protecting three
bridges across the Chattahoochee.
Under a vigorous attack upon the
lower bridge the Confederates found
it impossible to save it from capture
unless it was destroyed, and set fire
to the cotton and turpentine with
which it had been prepared for
burning.

It was then decided to make a night
attack upon the central bridge, and

7° General George H. Thomas

the troops were arranged for this des-
perate work. The lines were very
quietly formed, and moved up to
within range of the intrenchments,
and at a signal the assault began.
The works were found to be strong
and thoroughly protected with ditches
and slashed timber. The enemy,
while watchful, was not expecting a
night assault from troops that had
not reconnoitered the fortifications by
daylight. They opened fire upon the
charging columns, but in the dark-
ness it was necessarily wild and un-
certain.

The Union troops went over the
works at many points, and all rushed
in haste toward the bridge, which was
the objective point of the attack. It

At Nashville. 7 1

was one of the most desperate and
persistent night fights of the war, but
so thoroughly organized was the at-
tacking force that in spite of the dark-
ness and confusion it was able to
move with sufficient unity to preserve
its columns and formations. Upon
the penetration of the works both
Union and Confederate soldiers swept
over the bridge toward Columbus,
and this was so crowded with the men
of both forces that the enemy hold-
ing the works at the east end of the
bridge, and commanding it with artil-
lery, were restrained from firing till
the Union forces made a rush upon
them and gained possession, and
Columbus was in full possession of
General Wilson's forces.

72 General George H. Thomas

The next morning it was ascer-
tained that the works had been
manned and defended by 3000 Geor-
gia militia under Generals How-
ell Cobb and Toombs. The capture
of the city resulted in the de-
struction of a great quantity of war
material, over 60 guns, the ram
Jackson, mounting 6 guns, a large
number of small arms, 125,000 bales
of cotton, 15 locomotives, 250 cars, a
navy yard and armory, 2 rolling mills,
i arsenal and nitre works, 2 pow-
der magazines, 2 iron works, 3
foundries, 10 mills and factories turn-
ing out war material, 100,000 rounds
of artillery ammunition, and a great
quantity of machinery used in the
manufacture of war material.

At Nashville. 73

THE CAVALRY AT COLUMBUS.

Columbus was the great manufac-
turing center of the Confederacy, and
this destruction inflicted irreparable
damage. While little was known at
the North of this sweep of Wilson's
columns through the industrial cen-
ters and military storehouses of the
Confederacy, it is easy to understand
that these fatal blows at vital points
of interior military supply added to
the demoralization and discourage-
ment attending the evacuation of
Richmond and the gathering storm
about the armies of Lee and Johnson.

The column moved swiftly for
Macon, and about eighteen miles
out from it the officer in advance

74 General George H. Thomas

was met with a flag of truce carry-
ing a note from General Beaure-
gard notifying the commander of
the forces of General Sherman's
truce with General Johnston, stating
that an agreement had been entered
upon that the contending forces were
to occupy their present positions till
forty-eight hours' notice had been
given of the resumption of hostilities.
As General Wilson was eight or ten
miles in the rear with his main com-
mand, the note was sent to him, and
the officer in the advance pushed to and
into Macon, taking possession of the
city. When General Wilson arrived in
the city he went at once to the city hall,
where Generals Howell Cobb, Gus-
tavus W. Smith, and others had been

At Nashville. 75

confined. General Cobb demanded
that he and his command should be
released, and that General Wilson
should retire to where the flag of
truce had met his advance. General
Wilson declared that after receiving
the note he had lost no time in push-
ing on to the head of his column, and
found it in full possession of the city.
He could not accept notification of a
truce through the Confederate author-
ities, as they were not his channel of
communication with General Sher-
man, and ended the conference by a
positive refusal to acknowledge the
armistice, to retire from the town, or
to release his prisoners. When he
announced this decision he said to
General Cobb that he could conceive

76 General George H. Thomas

of but one adequate reason for the
truce, and that was that Lee's army
had surrendered. Cobb, however,
declined to give any information, but
General Smith, to whom Wilson ad-
dressed the same remark, answered
that Lee had surrendered, and that
peace would soon follow. Thereupon
General Wilson announced his deci-
sion to remain at Macon and conduct
his future operations upon the prin-
ciple that every man killed thereafter
was a man murdered.

This interview was held on the 2oth
of April just before midnight, and was
the first definite knowledge which
Wilson's column had obtained of the
events which had occurred in Virginia.

The surrender at Macon included

At Nashville. ^^

a large number of small guns and
a great quantity of military stores
and supplies. The next day the Con-
federate authorities opened communi-
cation over their own telegraph lines
between Wilson and Sherman, and the
former received orders from the lat-
ter to desist from hostilities pending
an armistice. Soon after he re-
ceived orders from the Secretary of
War, through Thomas, to disregard
this armistice and resume operations,
but before this order reached him he
learned that Johnston had surren-
dered all the Confederate forces east
of the Mississippi, and that peace
was assured.

The closing act of General Wilson's
campaign was the capture of Jefferson

?8 General George H. Thomas

Davis by regiments from his com-
mand. Thus ended the most noted
cavalry movement of the war.

The above is of necessity a very
concise presentation of the salient
points of General Wilson's remarka-
ble campaign, conducted alone by
mounted troops. It is not claimed
that the account is new. I have pub-
lished it heretofore in extended form,
though not in the press. This briefer
story cannot but be a repetition of
the facts and a synopsis of the fuller
statement of them. It is a chapter
in our war history than which no
other is more replete with thrilling
and brilliant incident, with skillful
planning, and bold and successful ex-
ecution. No purely cavalry campaign

At Nashville. 79

in our war approached it in these
features. It is doubtful whether its
parallel can be found in the cavalry
annals of any modern nation. And to
this general statement should be added
that the officer who commanded it,
who was its organizer and its con-
trolling spirit, the one upon whom
General George H. Thomas leaned as
one of his most trusted lieutenants
and advisers, was only twenty-seven
years old.

It is not strange that Lee's and
Johnston's surrender fixed the atten-
tion of the country and turned it
away from General Wilson's campaign.
Had these two events been delayed a
month the land would have rung with
Wilson's praises and with new honors

&° General George H. Thomas

for General Thomas. Indeed, had
the withdrawal from Richmond and
the events which so quickly followed
it been only delayed in their begin-
ning by a few days necessary to have
informed the country of Wilson's mar-
velous successes, it is certain that his
breaking up of these interior store-
houses of military material, and the
destruction of these many plants for
producing more, would have insepa-
rably and largely connected them-
selves in the minds of the people with
the eastern surrender as cause and
effect.

It was a campaign whose success
would have been the same had Lee
been able to hold on to Richmond,
and had Johnston so eluded Sherman

At Nashville. 81

as to prolong the contest in Virginia
and North Carolina.

THOMAS'S PLAN THOUGHT OUT AND
FOLLOWED.

From the first this cavalry cam-
paign had proceeded according to a
clearly formed plan. It was made
after full conference with General
Wilson. First, it was decided that to
render an attack upon Hood's line
certain of success a sufficient cavalry
force must be in hand to turn his
flank. The next requirement, that
of pursuing so effectively as to break
up Hood, could not be met with-
out sufficient cavalry. So General
Thomas held on in the face of what
has been related till he was so nearly

82 General George H. Thomas

ready to strike that he felt certain
of success. As a result, the ends in
view were attained. The cavalry
flanking circuits made possible the
driving of the enemy from his ex-
tended position. The pursuit by a
thoroughly equipped cavalry force
made possible and secured the virtual
destruction of Hood's army.

The next campaign, urged by Wil-
son and approved by Thomas, had for
its objective the destruction of the
military storehouses and manufac-
tories, and the fatal crippling of the
Confederacy. How complete was
the success of this second campaign
the outlines already presented suffi-
ciently attest.

In summarizing this attempt to

At Nashville. 83

again direct attention to this wonder-
ful cavalry campaign, it may be per-
missible to repeat the form in which
I have heretofore set it forth in
a volume (the concluding chapters
of Colonel Bonn Piatt's "Life of
Thomas ") covering the ground of
this article at much greater length:

It should be remembered forever in
the annals of war that Thomas insisted
upon waiting to remount a portion of
the (cavalry) corps before he would
consent to deliver battle, and that
when he did march forth against the
veteran and almost invincible infantry
of Hood, strongly intrenched in his
front, it was the cavalry corps which
broke through his left, and wheeling
grandly in the same direction, cap-

84 General George H. Thomas

tured twenty-seven guns from their
redoubts on the first day, and which,
continuing its movement on the sec-
ond day, enveloped and took in re-
verse the left and left center of the
Confederate intrench'ments, and so
shook their entire line as to make it
a walkover for the infantry which
Thomas finally hurled against them.
It was the harrassing pursuit of Hood
by the cavalry corps which, notwith-
standing the rains and sleet of mid-
winter and the swollen rivers, broke
up and scattered the host which had
so confidently invaded Middle Ten-
nessee only a month before. Pausing
on the banks of the Tennessee till the
rough edge of winter had passed, to
gather in the distant detachments, to

At Nashville. 85

procure remounts, clothing, and equip-
ments, and to weld the growing force
into a compact and irresistible army
corps of horsemen, the cavalry com-
mander, with the full concurrence of
Thomas, the beau ideal of American
soldiers, began his final and most glori-
ous campaign. No historian or mili-
tary critic can read the story of the
operations which followed without
coming to the conclusion that they
were characterized by the most re-
markable series of successes ever
gained by cavalry in modern warfare.
They illustrate, first, the importance
of concentrating that arm in compact
masses under one competent com-
mander, and in operations of the first
importance; second, the tremendous

86 General George H. Thomas

advantage of celerity of movement,
especially in modern warfare, where
improved firearms play such a decisive
part; third, that the chief use of
horses, notwithstanding that they may
in exceptional cases add to the shock
of the charge, is to transport fighting
men rapidly to the vital point of a
battlefield, and especially to the flank
and rear of the enemy's position, or
deeply into the interior of the enemy's
country against his lines of supply
and communication, and also his arse-
nals, armories, and factories; fourth,
that the best infantry armed with the
best magazine carbines or rifles make
the best mounted troops, irrespective
of whether they be called cavalry,
dragoons, or mounted infantry.

At Nashville. 87

When the fact is recalled that the
seven divisions of this corps at the
close of the war mustered about
35,000 men for duty with the colors,
and that had the war lasted sixty days
longer they could, and probably
would, have been concentrated in
Virginia, it will be seen to what a
high degree of perfection the organi-
zation had been brought, and that it
fully justified Sherman's declaration
that it was by far the largest, most
efficient, and most powerful body of
horse that had ever come under his
command. But when the captures of
the strongly fortified towns of Selma,
West Point, and Columbus are con-
sidered, with all the romantic inci-
dents of night fighting, together with

88 General George H. Thomas

the surrender of the no less strongly
fortified cities and towns of Mont-
gomery, Macon, and West Point, car-
rying with them the destruction of the
last and only remaining arsenals,
armories, factories, storehouses, and
military munitions and supplies, and
also the destruction of the railways
connecting those places with their
bridges and rolling stock, it will be
seen that Johnston and his generals
had nothing else left them but to
lay down their arms and surrender.
It was no longer possible for them
to concentrate an army, or to sup-
ply it with food, or to keep it armed
and equipped. With those places
and the manufacturing plants which
they contained still in their pos-

At Nashville. 89

session, and with the railways con-
necting them still unbroken, they
might have collected together in the
Carolinas a force amply able to cope
with Sherman, and possibly to over-
whelm him before reinforcements
could reach him. That brilliant but
erratic leader, with his splendid army,
it will be remembered, had avoided
Macon on the one hand and Augusta
on the other, both the seats of im-
portant military industries, and by an
eccentric and unnecessary movement
from his true line of operations, had
gone to Savannah, leaving the direct
railroads and highways behind him
open and free for the use of the rem-
nants of Hood's army and of the
other scattered detachments which

9° General George H. Thomas

were hastening to form a junction
with Johnston, now the sole hope of
the Confederacy.

Had it not been for Wilson's wide
swath of victory and destruction
through and not around the impor-
tant cities in his way, during which
he captured 8500 prisoners and 280
guns, and afterward paroled 59,000
rebel soldiers belonging to the armies
of Lee, Johnston, and Beauregard,
it would have been easy for John-
ston and Beauregard, had they
been so minded, to continue the
war indefinitely. As it was, to con-
tinue it was simply impossible, and
for this the country is indebted, first,
to Wilson and his gallant troopers,
and second, to Thomas, who insisted

At Nashville. 91

that they should have time to re-
mount and prepare for the work be-
fore them. Neither the army nor the
country ever appreciated that invinci-
ble body of horsemen, or their divi-
sion, brigade, regimental, and company
commanders, or the high character of
the enlisted men, or the performances
of the whole at their real worth.
There were officers among them fit
for any command that could have been
given them, and as a body they were
as gallant and capable soldiers as ever
drew saber or wore uniform. Had
the war lasted a few months longer
their fame would have been a house-
hold word. The leaders, though
young in years, were old in war.
Wilson himself was at the close not

92 General George H. Thomas

yet twenty-eight. Kilpatrick was
about the same age. Upton was
several months younger. Winslow,
Alexander, Croxton, La Grange,
Watkins, Atkins, Murray, Palmer,
Noble, Kitchell, Benteen, Cooper,
Young, Bacon, and Weston were of the
younger set, while McCook, Minty,
Long, Hatch, R. W. Johnson, Knipe,
Kelly, Hammond, Coon, G. M. L.
Johnson, Spalding, Pritchard, Miller,
Harrison, Biggs, Vail, Israel Garrard,
McCormick, Pierce, and Frank White
were somewhat older, though none of
them had reached middle life. Harn-
den, as sturdy as Balfour of Burleigh,
and Eggleston, the type of those who
rode with Cromwell at Marston Moor,
were graybeards, but were full of

At Nashville. 93

activity and courage. Ross Hill and
Taylor, although captains, were mere
boys, but full of experienced valor.

The men in the ranks were mostly
from the Western and Northwestern
and upper slave States, and of them
it may be truthfully averred that their
superiors for endurance, self-reliance,
and pluck could nowhere be found.
After they were massed at Nashville
they believed themselves to be in-
vincible, and it was their boast that
they had never come in sight of a
hostile gun or fortification that they
did not capture. Armed with Spen-
cers, it was their conviction that
elbow to elbow, dismounted, in single
line, nothing could withstand their
charge. " Only cover our flanks,"

94 General George H. Thomas

said Miller to Wilson, as they were
approaching Selma, " and nothing can
stop us ! " In conclusion, it may be
safely said that no man ever saw one
of them in the closing campaign of
the war skulking before battle or
sneaking to the rear after the action
began. They seemed to know by
instinct when and where the enemy
might be encountered, and then the
only strife among them was to see
who should be first in the onset.
With a corps of such men, properly
mounted and armed, and with such
organization and discipline as pre-
vailed among them during their last
great campaign, no hazard of war can
be regarded as too great for them
to undertake, and nothing should

At Nashville. 95

be counted as impossible except
defeat.

When the " records " are all pub-
lished and the story properly written,
it will show that no corps in the army,
whether cavalry or infantry, ever in-
flicted greater injury upon the "Lost
Cause," or did more useful service
toward the re-establishment of the
Union under the Constitution and the
laws, than was done by the cavalry
corps of the Military Division of the
Mississippi.

THE END.

TVASION OF TENNESSEE.

601

still at Duck River. Thus night closed down
upon the solitary division, on whose boldness of
action devolved the safety of the whole force
which Sherman had spared from his march to
the sea to breast the tide of Hood's invasion.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. J. SMITH. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.)

is driven When night came, the danger rather increased
'himself than diminished. A single Confederate bri-
lying his gade, like Adams's or Cockrell's or Maney's, —