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We are Ancestors

or

The Age of Responsibility

by

Rudolf Jordan



CAPE TIMES LIMITED
CAPE TOWN
1941

PREFACE

THIS treatise outlines the Philosophy of Responsibility. It is a sketch rather than a final elaboration. I would not have thought of publishing it in this form, if the emergencies of our troubled times did not call upon every one of us to offer here and now whatever contribution he can make towards the solution of the present problems.

I hope that the Philosophy of Responsibility, which has been in my mind for many years, will help to create and to stimulate the conscious knowledge that we are responsible ancestors and that we have to act accordingly. This result would be valuable enough and would amply justify the publication of this somewhat fragmentary treatise.

Dr. R. JORDAN.

Johannesburg.

May, 1941.

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PROLOGUE

Whoever to-day wants to get any clear idea about himself, the world, the past and the future, whoever wants to know, where actually he stands and what he is supposed to do, finds himself in great difficulties. Turning to religion, he finds that it does not stand up to the test of his intelligence, however much he may agree with its moral teachings. Turning to philosophy, he finds it practised mostly by specialists, who use a pedantic and often rather obscure language, who know something about morals, but who generally do not possess the moral will which would be necessary to raise philosophy up to an equal standard with religion. Turning in despair to science, he finds a still higher degree of specialisation, which more often than not leads to the disturbance rather than to the enlightenment of anybody who tries to find out something by the mere application of common sense.

If he is not too particular, he might find, on the other hand, quite a number of publications written just for the average intelligent reader with common sense, many of them very good in the field of popular science. Most of these publications, however, are at the same time sophisticated and prejudiced, giving the impression that much more is known than is actually the case and that quite a number of problems could be solved, if only some more common sense were applied.

Now it still holds good what Descartes said, namely, that nothing in the world is so well distributed as common sense, since with this faculty at least everybody believes himself well and sufficiently provided, whatever other shortcomings he may admit. However, all this well distributed common sense has not helped mankind very much in the past. Common sense alone, therefore, is not enough. Moreover, all these popular publications lack the necessary unprejudiced moral will, and any enlightenment which does not lead up to an answer to the most

urgent question "What shall we do?" is not very valuable for our actual life. In fact, it leaves us more perplexed than before.

In this dilemma most people to-day have given up the struggle and just carry on without any definite ideas at all. Without religion or philosophy, they are satisfied with a very nebulous thought of doing good, and they are completely confused the moment they have to make up their minds on any problem which goes beyond the limits of the most simple common sense. Even such relatively plain questions as confront the jurymen in court or the citizen on election day are often beyond the average man's so-called common sense judgment. Common sense is extremely valuable in private life and in simple situations, but in many other and slightly more complicated cases it has proved and still proves to be just a screen for ignorance.

In this our contemporary state of affairs, the intellectual élite seems to despair of ever again acquiring real standards of

moral conduct, compatible with and founded upon the development of knowledge. The less intellectual classes, including usually those privileged by tradition, cling with all their might and influence to hypocritical religious or philosophical remnants, trying to save their mistaken interests and to hide their bad conscience. The ignorant masses, in dire need of some moral standards and less prejudiced by vested interests, follow anybody who has some sort of moral will and who offers any standards at all, be it only his personal and arbitrary whim in some pseudo-scientific or pseudo-philosophical disguise.

We propose to alter this state of affairs by preaching the Philosophy of Responsibility.

Philosophy cannot be taught like science, it has to be preached like religion. Unlike religion, however, it has to be preached to the intellect. The Philosophy of Responsibility looks towards the future, and it postulates a set of moral values for

our will, based upon knowledge derived from the past. It expects more from us than common sense. It demands from us moral action. It is concentrated in the 40 Theses of the second part. These Theses need some introductory explanations and they will be followed by a short discussion of some of their effects in practice.

Mutual understanding between men has its limits, and nowhere else are these limits felt more than in philosophy. True, all our brains are built after the same pattern. But the inherited individual thresholds are very variable. Every personality, composed of intellectual as well as emotional and purely physiological forces, selects and assimilates different parts of knowledge in its own way. Though the facilities of education may be the same, the growing range of knowledge serves rather to increase these differences. This is particularly important for philosophy, where we endeavour to go right down to the roots of our being and our actions.

One manifestation of this difficulty is the experience of language as an obstacle

to mutual understanding. Language is an instrument of practical usefulness in daily life and evolved for this purpose. With philosophy we must have recourse over and over again to dead languages, a sure sign of the fact that there is often very little actual understanding. Even so, we frequently cannot express what we want to convey in any language. Considering this difficulty we would rather prefer simple expressions, even if not absolutely accurate, to long and pedantic circumscriptions, which prevent clearness and lucidity and still leave some margin of accurateness unfulfilled. As far as language is concerned, much has to be done still and we must have patience with each other. Too much intellectual energy has been wasted upon words, energy which could have been applied elsewhere with far greater benefit.

Another difficulty of understanding in philosophy arises from the fact, that many of the results of science are not yet definite and not yet universally accepted by the experts. In this respect the sciences concerned with the forces comprising the

nervous centre in man are perhaps the most important. Far from providing a firm and safe ground on which to build the lofty speculations of tentative philosophy, science to-day is undergoing a certain process of dissolution and disintegration with no solid ground left at all, and it becomes much rather the task of philosophy to establish its values firmly upon the indisputable facts of human social relations and to set the practical ends, for which science ought to be employed, on this basis. The days of the scientist trying his hand at philosophy are past. They have led to disaster, as could have been foreseen. Knowledge as such has no value at all, and men, who have devoted their lives to the acquisition of knowledge, have by this very disposition of their personality not the temperament and not the moral will to set up values, which must be preached and cannot just be taught. On the other hand, the philosopher, by the very temperament of his personality, cannot any more to-day comprise the sum total of scientific know-

ledge. If he tries to do that—and many philosophers have succumbed to this temptation—he may become a scientist, but at the same time he will cease to be a philosopher. The results of science have to be taken into consideration broadly, but in every dispute of theories philosophy cannot and need not participate.

There are very few true philosophers to be found in the last generations. Nearly all publications of philosophical interest deal with the history of philosophy and are in so far science, like all history. Even works which promise to say something new, always turn out to be mostly historical and perhaps contain some pedantical and pompous controversies about things which are of no interest to anybody. We shall try to evade these faults. We shall introduce very little history and we shall not go to any extent into controversies.

We intend to state our case as briefly as possible. Many things, which we are going to say, have been thought and said before. But thoughts and words have little value, if they are dead. They must

become alive, they must be put to work, they must produce results.

Precise, comprehensible, stimulating formulations are necessary to bring philosophy to life, and it is of little importance, whether their contents are new or not. Very few problems exist which have escaped the attention of Aristotle, but his moral influence upon men in our times is nil. Philosophers have at all times expended too much time and energy on unimportant controversies. Our age needs philosophy, and we intend to concentrate on that. Our purpose is to make philosophy the stimulant it ought to be.

How has the present unsatisfactory situation come about? A very brief and abridged historical survey seems inevitable, though we must take the more detailed knowledge of the facts mentioned for granted.

Thoughts about the future, based mainly upon fear, have developed more and more with the increasing capacity for reflection in the nervous centre of man and with the growing number of mankind

in its present phase of evolution. Ever further and further, his reflective thoughts have tried to penetrate into the future. Magic, religion, philosophy, these are the evolutionary steps of man's attempts to master the world by assimilating it to his nervous centre. Whether we call it projection of his brain upon the world or conquest of the world by his brain, it is a case of mutual assimilation. This mutual assimilation has assumed successively different forms, according to the growing capacity of the brain, the increasing number of men and the changing social conditions.

The ideas within a tribe are different from those within a large population or from those of potential universal value. The tribe assimilates, *i.e.* explains, everything within the narrow range of its domain and its needs. The seasonal changes in nature, the rhythmical events of life around it and within it are measured and valued against each other and symbolised so as to make them assimilable to the least intelligent member.

Assimilations between the nervous centre and the environment have always to conform somehow to the intellectual capacity of the least gifted members of a community; the intellectual élite will always be somewhat ahead of what in their opinion has become superstition.

The growing intellect and growing numbers of populations—mutually interconnected phenomena, by way of improvements in husbandry and agriculture—have produced as assimilations, *i.e.* explanations, religions of increasing abstraction, though symbols continue to be used. Most religions retain the in-group character from the tribal stage, right up to the Jewish faith with its very high degree of abstraction. At the same time other religions, though retaining their symbols, claim a universal sphere of value. These potentially universal religions with perhaps hundreds of millions of adherents must necessarily be rather elastic and adaptable, offering concrete symbols—be they only names and words—to the simple minds, while at the same time satisfying the needs

of the more intelligent minds with their aptitude for further abstraction.

Besides these universal religions, which all retain the accent on the emotional forces in man, there developed a new way of assimilation—philosophy, a predominantly intellectual approach to the world, at first necessarily confined to a few, but growing in influence with the general increase of intelligence. The further development of philosophy is closely connected with the next step in the evolution of the intellect—the mastery of more and more forces on earth, as a result of which mankind has become a single unit and the existence of different religions with universal claims an anachronism.

We are in the middle of this process. While the emotional pattern in populations depends largely on inherited racial qualities and local traditional customs, the intellectual pattern is the same throughout mankind and accessible in the same way everywhere, though in different degrees. The philosophical way of assimilating the world will gain in importance with the

inevitable equalisation of thinking on this globe. The growing number of mankind no longer permits the continued preponderance of emotional forces in the general character of populations without grave risks to their survival. At the same time, the facilities of intercommunication are welding mankind into one family, so that all fights and dissensions become influenced by emotions and assume the character of family quarrels with all their avoidable and particularly disastrous consequences. Even now, at the present stage of intellectual development, there should be no room for misunderstandings and lack of insight resulting in wars and revolutions. As religions can no longer stand up to the test of the intellect and are therefore failing in their task to balance man, philosophy has to stand this test and at the same time to give those values, which assure mankind a balanced existence.

The origin and evolution of philosophy have taken place in the era of the great religions, all of which have been influenced by it. In turn, philosophy has assumed

many characteristics of the great religions. These religions, developed as in-group faiths of nations or races, retained, even under universal symbols, the old way of assimilation, namely abstraction up to an apex. Their image of the world, closely fitted to the social organisations of their time, resembled a pyramid or a cone, based on the variety of phenomena and progressing through increasing abstractions of less and less contents up to a point with no extension, an extreme abstraction, some word with or without a symbol. Philosophy has attempted an intellectual assimilation of the world in the same way, and, of course, without success, because the facts are against this doctrine, and if the facts are disregarded, then religions, with the accent on emotions, achieve this end much better. All images of the world, all ways of assimilation of this world with our nervous centre, which present the world as some cone or pyramid, are actually religious and based on emotions, whether they admit it or not. All philosophies, which lead up to some final apex, must be re-

garded with great suspicion. The facts do not show any apex.

Philosophy has to free itself from these traditional chains. At the same time it has to avoid the danger of being confused with science. Science deals with the past, philosophy, like religion, with the future. In science everything is expressed and measured in and on something else and everything therefore appears to be relative. Philosophy wants to direct our actions through the establishment of moral values. Values must be based upon some fixed standard. Nothing has done more harm to philosophy than the application of scientific terms and thoughts where they do not belong. The conception of relativity has nothing to do with values and morals. Its erroneous application has led to a lamentable state of affairs. Philosophy must cast away this misconception and insist upon true values and absolute moral commands. Talk about relativity must no longer be allowed to cover inexcusable lack of moral standards or conscious disregard of duties. Moral commands are

based upon actual social facts and they are absolute, not relative, in their all-embracing authority.

So much for the history of philosophy. There is, however, yet another difficulty to overcome, if we free ourselves from historical prejudices. The problem is: where to start? Philosophy wants to tell us what to do, and if this is supposed to be based on knowledge, then it has to find out, first, where we stand. Speculations about the future must be based upon knowledge. Here we have already to face this problem. We are anticipating things, which we have to state in our Theses. Once we recognise and admit, that there is no such cone or pyramid as presumed in religious thoughts, then the world with us in it can be compared roughly to a circle. Now it is quite unimportant at what point we start drawing our circle, as long as it will be a circle in the end. Each part is equally important, each is interconnected with all the others, but does not stand upon them.

Wherever we start, we are using language and other means to make ourselves understood. This alone implies the most complicated effects of the most highly organised forces upon each other, involving the whole sphere of psychology on the basis of not yet finally explored physiological facts, it involves a very advanced social organisation, in short, it involves the whole circle in one moment. This simply cannot be helped.

Subjects can be discussed only successively, though they may be interconnected most closely and though they may present themselves simultaneously. This fact cannot be emphasised strongly enough. Objections to single Theses or single arguments should, therefore, be postponed until the full circle is rounded. At the same time, objections to any one Thesis need not necessarily affect the other Theses. They are not all built one upon the other. The kind of system, which shows the world as a beautiful logical construction, must, as we have mentioned already, necessarily be wrong. There is no logic in the world.

Logic is a social phenomenon, a set of practical rules to establish mutual understanding, like language and as often mis-used as language. The world consists of many and varied facts and forces without logical interdependence.

To master the world intellectually, to keep our mind in balance, or to understand the world, as we may call it, we have to take a firm stand somewhere ; otherwise we lose the balance. This fixed point is our own existence ; not as a fact of the past—there would be no fixed point, no system, only mutual inter-relations of the forces in the universe—but as a value for the future. Man as the absolute standard value is the firm hold to which we have to cling ; not as the supreme value, but as the standard for the measurement of values. From this fixed point we can and must grasp and realise the fact, that there is no system in the forces of the world. Even science to-day is still too much affected by religious ideas of social origin and wastes too much time and energy on establishing some unity, some system with an apex, where there is

none. From our fixed point we can appreciate and enjoy the variety in nature. The ultimate aims and ends of science need to be thoroughly reconsidered in the light of philosophy.

Philosophy deals with what is most important for man to-day. We shall include in the circle of our Theses only the most necessary facts and demands in concentrated form. We shall take the results of contemporary science, as far as they go, for granted, *i.e.* for known. All the progress in the sciences of the inorganic world, enormous as it is, does not present any serious new problem for philosophy. The facts brought about indirectly through this progress, however, have profoundly shaken the sciences concerned with all the forms of organic life, like biology, ecology, psychology, sociology, economics and many others. Some of these sciences are of very recent date and still in their infancy. But the investigations stimulated by psycho-analysis are more important for philosophy than the theory of relativity. The steam engine as such is

of no importance for philosophy, but the sociological changes brought about by its use are not to be overlooked. Scientific progress and social development are very closely inter-connected.

It is the task of philosophy to select what is important and of value, to reject what is not. Only then can proper values for the future be set up. In the world of facts we have, therefore, disregarded everything that bore no immediate significance for the human will as the basis of moral commands. The intrinsic nature of the human will as a system of organised forces must, however, be demonstrated, before these commands, themselves based upon social and evolutionary facts, can be addressed to this will. Meanwhile—such is the nature of this circle—all these same facts within the demonstrator have just to be pre-supposed and taken for granted. There is no way out of this circle.

Philosophers have always been greatly tempted to show how much they knew, how much they had studied, how much they had striven for their opinions, and

in particular how much better their own ideas were as compared with rival theories. We shall try to avoid that, to say no more than necessary and to say that as precisely as possible.

Theses

1. THESIS.

Time and Space are the forms of every possible experience.

Time and Space are empirical realities. They are the inner and outer forms of our senses and, therefore, of every possible experience. There is no experience except through our senses. There is no experience except in Time and Space. There is no Time and Space except in experience.

The words "forms" and "contents" do not quite bring out the intimacy of this relationship. There is no word to describe fully the position of Time and Space, for any comparison would have to be taken from the contents of experience. The word "form" serves, however, as an approximate guide, a practical meta-

phor. The notion of form usually implies the possibility that other forms with the same material could at least be imagined. With Time and Space, however, it is different. They are the forms of experience absolutely and universally. It is absolutely impossible to imagine them alone without contents, and it is equally absolutely impossible to imagine anything except in Time and Space.

It follows that no qualities, no ideas, no words derived from the contents of our experience can be used in describing these forms. We cannot, therefore, call Time or Space themselves big or small, long or short, with or without end. To ask after the beginning or the end of Time, the finiteness or infinity of Space, is nonsense and shows lack of proper consideration. Time and Space are the forms of our experience and they go, therefore, as far as our potential experience. How far this is, is quite another matter, subject to physical limits and evolutionary tendencies. In themselves, Time and Space are mere forms of experience, nothing more.

NOTE I.

To call this description of Time and Space subjective and to ask for an objective Time and Space, is a grave mistake. The difference between subjective and objective is a social phenomenon. Any possible statement about Time and Space must be in connection with some experience. Experience, as we shall see, includes every possible imagination concerning the past as well as the future. If Time and Space are supposed to be something outside potential experience, then they are empty words without meaning. If it is perhaps suggested that the world has existed and will exist again without a human mind or without life altogether and that therefore there must be some Time and Space independent of potential experience, then the answer is, that the premise was right but the conclusion wrong. Past and future do not exist except in our experiences and Time and Space are their forms.

NOTE II.

We compare the contents of our experience with each other in order to arrange our experiences for practical purposes. This is the reason for measurements and standards. They are all arbitrary. Here we distinguish certain standards agreed upon socially, which we might call objective, for example the foot and meter in Space or the year in Time. Naturally the subjective experience of any one of these standard comparisons is different with every observer. We need not go into this matter more deeply here. It is enough to state, that extension and duration mean comparisons of some contents of experience. Both duration and extension are therefore no help in characterising the forms of all experience, Time and Space; they are experienced in Time and Space.

NOTE III.

The relation of Time and Space to each other is most intimate. So intimate, in fact, that we may as well express this by connecting them with a hyphen into Space-Time, if we like. This is merely a matter of practical expression and might become general use, if certain new ways of measurements proposed by physicists become more widely accepted. From the point of view of the physicist it is a question of how to proceed when comparing certain events in Space and Time with each other, *i.e.* measuring certain contents of experience as regards their extension and duration. He is perfectly justified to do that in whatever way promises to give the best results, *e.g.* by connecting the measurements of Time and Space much more closely than was hitherto usual. However, this does not affect in any way the character of Time and Space (or Space-Time) as the forms (or form) of our experience.

NOTE IV.

Whether there is any Time or Space with regard to anything outside our potential experience, we cannot say. To talk about it is in any case mere play with words, misuse of language without sense, waste of energy.

2. THESIS.

The Present is the form of reality.

Reality is being lived, is being experienced, is being, is. Nothing else is. The Present is its form and its form exclusively. Only the Present is. And everything is as Present. No more can be said about it. It has to be lived, to be experienced.

All attempts to describe the Present more accurately are futile. All description, all definition is based upon reflection. Reflection can deal only with the past, reflecting something that has happened. The Present, therefore, cannot be reflected as such, but immediately becomes past to the reflecting intellect. It is consequently absolutely impossible to define the Present any further, except that it is the form of reality. The contents of reality are we

and the world around us. Reality is experienced as Present exclusively, and all present experience is reality.

Past and Future do not exist for themselves. The Past has been, the Future will be. They are not. They exist only in our imagination, which itself is something present and therefore real. The way we deal with Past and Future is a matter of physiology, psychology and practical considerations. They most certainly do not exist except through us. Everything is real as Present only. The Present, however, has to be experienced and cannot be further described.

NOTE I.

Reality comprises the whole world as experienced Present. There is nothing else. To talk about any other world as not real but existing is to play with words without any possible meaning. On the other hand, the ways and means our nervous centre uses to bring order into the numerous experiences do belong to

the world and are experienced realities. All physiological as well as psychological facts belong to reality. Every thought is not less real than any other bodily experience. The activity of the brain is perhaps the experience most difficult to understand and to explore. However, there is no doubt that it does, not less than anything else, exist as present reality only and exclusively. This statement is not a limitation, but quite on the contrary opens up every possible psychological experience as part of reality. There are no contents of any possible experience imaginable which are not real.

How to bring order into reality becomes a much easier task as soon as we have discarded all nebulous words about unreal worlds.

NOTE II.

Past and Future belong to the contents of reality. They can be explored. There are special ways of exploring them, with which we shall deal. The world has been and will be. This is a matter of practical

consideration. But reality is the Present only and the world is the contents of the Present.

In physics time is often represented as a line, sometimes as a line from the Past to the Future with the Present as a point on this line. This representation is well justified as a means in physical calculations. But it must not be taken for more than that. It is a consciously used fiction, like all mathematics. As far as reality is concerned, the Present is fundamentally different from Past and Future, which are both existing only as contents of the Present.

NOTE III.

The Present as the form of reality cannot be further described. It has no extension or duration, both of which would imply comparisons taken from the contents of reality. There is no way to come to any description from this side.

We may speak sometimes about the specious Present, extended over a small

amount of time. This is, however, a matter of practical psychology, it belongs to the contents of our experience and is actually nothing but a very intensive feeling of memory and anticipation. It does not alter anything as far as the character of the Present as the form of reality is concerned.

Concentrated introspection may lead to new sensations with regard to the rhythm of our body, but this, too, is a matter for psychology and does not alter the fundamental truth expressed in our Thesis.

NOTE IV.

Past and Future are contents of reality. Reality is being lived. All differences between subjective and objective views about Past and Future are based upon social phenomena. The thoughts about Past and Future are experienced individually as a subjective reality. For practical social purposes, however, certain agreements are generally accepted by all the

members of the society. These agreements extend to standard measurements of time and space and to a few other points. "Objective" does not mean "apart from human experience," but means "without regard to personal peculiarities." It is the outcome of social agreement.

In dealing with Past and Future we proceed as we always do when dealing with the contents of experience: we compare ourselves with other phenomena and phenomena with each other. Every explanation is a comparison. There would be no Past and Future for phenomena which could not be compared with each other. The ways of comparison are subject to alterations. It is a matter of physics on the one hand, psychology on the other hand, both sciences dealing with the contents of experience. A very practical aspect is, for instance, the rôle of consciousness in this regard. We lose the sense for Past and Future when asleep and we have to re-adjust ourselves when waking up, while dreams seem to be somewhat outside our conscious thoughts of Past and Future.

Dreams often are Present without Past or Future, but in other instances there is some sort of memory and anticipation in dreams, too.

3. THESIS.

The contents of our experiences are called Reality.

All our experiences are either impressions upon our body or actions within our body. Both are equally real. The difference is a matter of values. We shall therefore use the word "real" not as the contrary to "imaginary," as we consider imagination to be something real. We shall instead use the word "actual" as opposed to "imagined," in order to distinguish between impressions upon our body and actions within our body. The lack of proper distinction between real and actual has led to many mistakes. Therefore, it appears justifiable to modify the language and to establish this new and somewhat wider use of the expression *r e a l*, while constricting the meaning of actual. It will serve to avoid much possible ambiguity.

This Thesis in its universality removes many disturbing influences from our discussions and is of special importance in a negative sense. It proclaims as real the total of all our inner and outer experiences. All the imaginations of the human brain are not less real than the sense impressions. We are now in a position to disregard anything, which is being claimed to exist, but not as reality. We are able to examine this world of our experiences, including the activities of our nervous centre, as a real sum of experiences. We can now take the world as reality without having to mention every time, that reality means the sum total of all the contents of experience. We need not repeat continually, that mental experiences are not less real than others.

NOTE I.

The relation of inner to outer experiences belongs for us to the world, to reality, it is experienced. It can therefore be explained, described, compared, explored.

We shall see, that in this relationship a certain measure of equilibrium seems to be of vital importance, and that the upsetting of this equilibrium, if too vigorous, may lead to serious disturbances in the organism.

All inner experiences are derived from outer experiences. This is a fact, which we find in the world. We have to take it and cannot alter it.

NOTE II.

Reality is being lived as present, and all parts of it are equally real. The difference between a look out of the window and a day dream, an actual house and an imagined house, is a matter of difference in the contents of reality, but not in reality itself. Both are equally real. This is a point of particularly frequent misunderstandings. All mental experiences are equally real, whether the contents of the experiences are sense impressions or imaginations derived from sense impressions. The difference is only a comparison within the contents of experience, within reality. This

comparison very often shows quite different results according to social or individual standards or agreements. It is even proverbial, that day dreams are more enjoyable than their fulfilment. The day dream as action of the brain is definitely not less a reality than any other experience. Its value as compared with other experiences is quite a different matter. Here we wanted to state, that all parts of the present are equally real, that every experience is lived as present reality.

4. THESIS.

The world is experienced as consisting of forces.

Science confirms that everything we experience in the world consists of forces exclusively, so that what we call matter is actually only a form of forces. Though this may perhaps sound absurd, it is not so at all, as any example will show. Ice, of course, we believe to be matter. We may have some doubts already about water and still more about steam, and these are always the same molecules under different conditions. But let us dissolve the molecule into its components and then succeed in bursting the Hydrogen atom, and we will be at a loss to know, whether we still have any right to speak about matter. In the end nothing remains but forces and matter as a form of forces.

Now this point has always led to great difficulties, because it seemed to be im-

possible to describe how forces were experienced. The error was always introduced by taking the present for something explainable, and, of course, forces work, but "are" not. We have seen here already, that the present is only the form of reality, that nothing is but the present, and that nothing more can be said about the present. Finding the world, the contents of reality, consisting of forces, we consequently do not ask, what forces "are," as this would be asking after the nature of the present, which would be nonsense. The present is being lived and cannot be explained any further. The forces of the world, or better, the world as forces, is being experienced, being lived. But to ask what the world "is," or what forces "are," is misuse of the language and has no sense at all. We are part of the world, of these forces, ourselves. So the question appears to be still more silly and futile.

The way we match our inner with our outer experiences is to ask after the relations of these forces to each other, their measurement, their comparison, their

directions and tendencies with regard to each other.

The world, consisting of forces including ourselves, is lived and experienced as reality in the form of the present and can, as reality, not be explained any further. The forces of our brain, however, interact with other forces by imagining their working as past and future. In this way they master the world as far as experience permits. Every imagination is reflection and therefore relates to something which is not actually present. Every reflection is a comparison of forces in Space-Time. So it comes about that we experience the world as forces and continually compare these forces with each other, but cannot explain any further, what these forces are. It is the solution of an old dispute. The world "is" as present, being lived, being experienced; but the world cannot be caught "being" by the reflecting mind. On the other hand, the mind, being itself a force in Space-Time, can well understand, explain, compare, what other forces do and how they work and how they are related

to each other. But to ask, what they "are," is nonsense. It is, furthermore, incomprehensible, what good any answer to this question would serve.

The nervous centre of man is an extremely complicated system of forces, the most complicated we know. But it is only the conscious part of these forces that we have been able so far to explore properly. These conscious forces in our brain experience other forces. "Experience" is the word we use to describe their relations to these other forces. These relations occur in Time and Space. Anything we can notice about some forces—a friend walking in the street, a stone, a star in the sky—always and exclusively marks some relation to the forces that are "we," because we observe it.

5. THESIS.

The world as reflected in the conscious mind of man is divided into Past and Future.

This is the way we experience the world. We cannot say anything about what might be outside our potential experience. Past and Future are real as contents of our experience. Therefore, we cannot say what they are. But reflecting upon them we can describe them as relations of experienced forces. They are notions of practical experience, used and developed by the conscious mind. There "is" no Past or Future except as a present reality in the reflecting conscious mind.

Past and Future mark relations between forces. They are eminently relative notions. They are comparisons of the forces in us with other forces. The world, as we saw, consists of forces. Past and future rela-

tions can be imagined between any of these forces. This is done from our experiences by a number of psychological processes. Past we call the relation to all forces actually experienced, including all imaginations about actual experiences. Future we call the relation to all possible experience. The Future is necessarily always imagination about not actually experienced relations of forces. It is, however, always based upon actual experience. This is a physiological and psychological fact, which we have to take as such.

Both these kinds of imaginations are equally real. Whether any imaginations relate to actually experienced events or are only based upon some such facts, whether they are Past or Future, is very often not by far as clear as it would appear at first sight. It depends to a large extent on the working of the forces within our brain, whether certain imaginations have the one or the other character. This is a matter for psychology. Past actual events may be experienced as future ones, and the Future may appear as the Past. The judg-

ment about it is a matter of social agreement, as there is no Past or Future except as experienced present reality. The orientation of events on the relative movements of the sun and earth is pure convention, practical social regulation, and has nothing to do with the experience of Past and Future. There is, however, sufficient agreement possible as to this distinction, sufficient for our daily practical needs; but it remains an agreement of a social character with regard to the comparison of experienced forces.

NOTE I.

Border cases are quite frequent, where it appears uncertain, whether imaginations deal with past or future events. Dreams are a good example. But even when awake and trying to think most clearly, we are able to get "mixed up" and to confuse Past with Future. This is a very common experience. Children and primitive people cannot distinguish at all. Certain psycho-

logical phenomena, based upon physiological processes, perplex even the most able observer.

NOTE II.

A c t u a l experience is here meant to comprise any sort of sensual experience. This is not limited to the five senses usually counted, but admits any sort of sensual experience so far not yet properly classified. It refers to telepathic experiences and to experiences caused by electric and other forces, which do not immediately affect the nervous connections so far explored as related to our senses. These experiences are as real as any other ones, but whether their contents belong to the Past or to the Future, might be sometimes as difficult to decide as it is with dreams.

NOTE III.

Past and Future are relative notions of subjective experience. Their objectivity is a matter of social convention. The

Theory of Relativity as proposed by contemporary physicists is therefore without any consequence as far as our fundamental statement is concerned. It may lead to the alteration of those social conventions in certain cases, which for the time being, however, are fairly removed from everyday life. But any such alteration is quite within the legitimate limits of social convention.

NOTE IV.

Special agreements of this kind are possible, because the forces organised as human brains are all built after a common pattern. This brings about the possibility of understanding and agreements. However, only the general pattern is common. No two brains are identical. Agreements therefore are possible only within certain limits. These limits are sometimes narrow. With regard to Past and Future they allow a large amount of mutual agreement between men of the same cultural standard and the same education. That is all.

6. THESIS.

The world is reflected in us as a relationship between the forces composing our nervous centre and other forces. This relationship is marked by limits and by definite characteristics.

The contents of our experience are reflected as Past and Future. This is done by forces in our nervous centre. These forces of the reflecting intellect are very special and complicated forces. They can be compared with each other and with other forces outside the nervous centre regarding their extension and duration, their tendencies and directions, their intensities and qualities, their increase and decrease. The forces of our nervous centre are closely connected with other forces composing our body and influenced by these forces. They

are subject to and participating in the many rhythms of life.

All these forces in us are limited by the sum total of the forces comprising our whole personality. They can, therefore, be compared only with other limited forces ; they cannot be compared with unlimited forces and for this reason alone infinity and eternity are just empty words. The extent of the individual limits is different with every personality, but largely influenced by the special development of the nervous centre through the social environment. Education, culture, temperament, training, influence only the extent of these limits. Limits there must be, if only for physiological reasons.

We are here at the root of a seemingly puzzling discrepancy. The world is being experienced, being lived, as present reality apparently without limits. The reflecting forces in our brain, however, are capable of comparisons only and therefore limited. These limits are marked in extension and duration by mere physiological reasons. The nervous centre is a limited organisa-

tion of forces within the isolated system of the personality. The desire to attain, to understand, to comprise limitlessness in extension and duration does not arise in us from any positive imagination of it—which is impossible and would be no comparison of forces any more at all—but is caused by an evolutionary impulse in us to extend our limits. It is only this evolutionary impulse to widen the boundaries of possible comparisons, that is expressed in words like “limitlessness” or “infinity.” No positive imagination can possibly correspond with these words.

The relationship between the forces composing our nervous centre and other forces is furthermore marked by a number of definite characteristics. These result from the common pattern of the human brain as well as from personal peculiarities. The general state of our personality influences the activities of the nervous centre. On the other hand, the general pattern of these forces exhibits similar corresponding tendencies in every human brain. This enables us to understand each other and to discuss

our experiences with a reasonable chance of being understood by our fellow men. It is with these common ways of the human mind, that we have chiefly to deal in philosophy.

One of the main common characteristics of our nervous centre is the simplification, which all other forces undergo, when reflected in consciousness. Another characteristic is isolation, which is quite peculiar to the mind and at the same time the proper expression of its limitation. Only an arbitrarily isolated amount of other forces can be experienced and compared by the human nervous centre. Still another characteristic is the selection of certain other forces as practically important. Lastly there is a frequent change in these relationships, conditioned by changes in the forces comprising the human body.

All these characteristics reveal the limited capacity of the nervous centre. There are more characteristics, as we shall see. From now on, we shall often use the word "we" instead of "our nervous centre."

NOTE.

In every discussion of fundamental aspects of life and world, language can be used only with a certain amount of mutual tolerance. It is always more a help to approach these subjects than a precise expression of what we actually want to convey. It has been developed for practical reasons and purposes, and in very precise investigations there is a danger of the style becoming pedantic and unreadable.

Thus we continually use the present tense to express the fact that the relationship of certain forces has not undergone any practically noticeable change and is not likely to undergo any such change for some time. If we say : this paper is white, we actually mean : this paper exists as a white one up till just now and is likely to continue like that. All this is shortly expressed in four words. Language is not made and need not be made for painstaking investigations. We have, therefore,

to risk an occasional inexactitude through language difficulties, but we want to risk this rather than to remain obscure, unintelligible or over-pedantic.

7. THESIS.

Our relation to the forces of the Past we call knowledge.

Forces in the Past are events as well as things. Things actually are events. They only happen in a rhythm so different from the one of our life, that we do not usually notice it and so treat them practically as if they were unchanging. In all the living things around us we can feel the rhythm of change and that they are events, *i.e.* forces. The non-living things often defy our imagination ; others appear very much as forces, like wind or electricity.

As far as all these forces have been actually experienced they belong to the Past. Our relation to them is knowledge, marked in different degrees according to whether this relationship is a close one or not. Every past event, which came into relation with our nervous centre,

leaves an actual physiological impression there. Things or events, with which we have been very much impressed, modify certain nerve connections in our brain. Of the many millions of possible nerve connections only a limited amount is being used. The degree of the impression marks the closeness of the relationship. The details are a matter of psychology. Things and events of little importance are only slightly marked. Which things are practically important, is a matter of the individual personality and its environment. Of many things we have no proper knowledge, but only a vague remembrance. Things and events, which we have found important and marked definitely, become fixed as knowledge. Precise and exact knowledge we call science. Science deals with the Past exclusively. It is a particularly strong degree of knowledge, a very close relationship to past events. Science is not concerned immediately with the Future, its sphere is the Past, it marks the best possible relation of man in our times to the Past. Past comprises the

total of the contents of our actual experience as reflected and brought into relation to our conscious nervous centre. There is no Past except as reflected from actual experience.

Science is the best possible approach to the Past, the most exact knowledge. The degree of possible exactitude changes at different times and so does science. More exact explanations, better comparisons, sharper definitions replace each other in turn. Where knowledge is insufficient, hypotheses are proposed, until more material is collected, more facts are explored. The limit to science lies in the human brain.

As far as the Past is concerned, there is no place for the speculations of religion and philosophy. Our best approach to the Past is science. Where science ends, where knowledge does not even allow hypotheses, there our relationship to the Past is finished, the limit of our brain-capacity has been reached. This limit is constantly being widened. Beyond it remains a play with words, misuse of the language, the fool's paradise.

8. THESIS.

Our relation to the forces of the Future we call speculation.

The Future comprises all imaginable forces, which have not been actually experienced. They are real only as imaginations. Our relation to them is called speculation. It is the sphere of ideas, of phantasy, of religion, of philosophy.

There is absolutely no knowledge about the Future, consequently there is no science about the Future, both knowledge and science being ways of our approach to the Past. Our approach to the Future is entirely different. We do not so much want to know the Future, we want to make it. We look for means to achieve ends, for guides to direct us, we demand and postulate, we consider probabilities. As far as these forces of the Future seem to be

unimportant to us, we are content with a vague guessing ; where they are more important, we study their probabilities closely ; where they are vitally important, there we demand and enforce them within and without us with all the power of our will.

All our imaginations concerning the Future are based upon experience, as well as our imaginations concerning the Past. But our relationship is an entirely different one. As there is no knowledge about the Future, there is no science about it. There is, on the other hand, no religion, no philosophy about the Past. Our relationship to Past and Future is characterised by different attitudes, both being practical and marking the way our nervous centre relates itself to other forces.

Both relationships belong to the contents of our experience. They are experienced as present. They are real as such.

Any kind of approach to the Future is speculation, as opposed to knowledge. Both kinds of imaginations are based upon

the same actual and past experiences. But our nervous centre is able to reflect these past impressions, to compare them with other, future, forces, and to compare them with each other at the same time, as anticipations, projects, phantasies and any other ways of speculation. All science works for the Future, though it deals with the Past only.

One particular way of speculation is what we call fiction. In this way events, which have not actually happened, are projected or rather rejected into the Past or the Past is projected into the Future. We can look at past events as if they were just happening, so considering their working as if we were dealing with the Future. On the other hand, we can deal with future events as if they were past. Both attitudes are equally to be characterised as speculation. This kind of hypothetical constructions is a late acquisition of the human brain. Its exploration belongs to psychology and related branches of science.

Hypothetical constructions are the basis of all connections between Past and Future.

“ If we transfer ourselves back to such and such situation of forces,” this is the way to view the Past under the aspect of Future. “ If these forces continue to work so and so,” this is the way to look at the Future as Past. Both ways are speculation ; they do not deal with actual facts, but with purely imagined hypothetical situations.

The extent to which we make use of hypotheses is determined by practical considerations.

NOTE.

The speculative character of our relations to the Future is often obscured by the fact, that many experiences of our daily life occur with very regular uniformity. However, very little reflection shows that every thought about the Future is speculation and that only the degrees of probability are different and a matter of practical consideration. All sciences are only pursued in order to make these probabilities more and more accurate so as to enable us to employ our will in the optimal direction.

9. THESIS.

All knowledge is important only as a basis of speculation.

Any knowledge which is not of importance for speculation is a waste of energy from the practical point of view. This relation need not be an immediate one. Actually all science serves to allow better practical speculation. This needs no further comment for all the branches of science connected with knowledge about the ways of animate and inanimate forces in general. But it holds good also for history and all investigations into special events. These latter, too, may serve as a basis for possible speculation, for instance about the evolution of mankind, and they are in so far important.

Knowledge in man as part of his intellect is characterised by consciousness, as opposed to the unconscious instinct

found with other forms of life. Intellect and instinct represent two ways of selecting other forces as practically valuable. It appears to be very difficult to judge the respective merits of both these ways, but we have to take the facts as they are. In man, both knowledge and speculation belong to the sphere of consciousness.

All speculation is based upon knowledge, upon reflected past experiences. Speculation, therefore, depends on the amount of knowledge available. With expanding knowledge, speculations are discarded and replaced. This is a matter of the individual equilibrium. Man has the capacity to speculate on the basis of his own personal knowledge. Speculation without this basis we call phantasy, speculation against this basis we call superstition.

NOTE.

Knowledge for knowledge's sake may acquire an indirect practical value by training the intellect or occupying the

leisure of the persons concerned. An immediate value for the community may not be evident, and it might be called a luxury so far. However, many luxuries have their indirect values and they often gain immediate importance in the course of events.

10. THESIS.

Speculation aims at the direction of forces in the Future. The will is one of these forces.

Knowledge states; speculation aims; both within the limits of our brain. Our relationship to the forces of the Future is modified by the experience that we are bundles of forces ourselves. The relation to these future forces is therefore to some degree dependent on our own forces, including our own conscious will. What our will "is," we cannot say, as we cannot say anything about any forces as present; but reflecting about it, we can describe and explain the will by comparisons with other forces.

All forces, including ourselves and our will, are real as present experiences only, but can as such not be further investigated. All investigation is reflection and as such

deals with the Past. All our relations to future forces are not investigations in order to know, but speculations aiming by means at some end. As we have seen, all speculation is based on knowledge and all knowledge is gained for speculation. It is our attitude which makes the difference.

Forces show tendencies towards certain directions with regard to certain other forces. Science investigates these tendencies and directions in the Past. Speculation aims at directing these forces in the Future, thereby making use of all available knowledge. Conscious will is one of these forces. The way the conscious will is directed depends partly on intellectual speculation. This speculation is called philosophy or religion, as far as the general directions of the will are concerned ; politics and policies in more special directions ; single purposes and intentions in particular affairs and private life. Apart from intellectual speculation, the will depends on many other forces, notably those within our body and those of our environment.

NOTE I.

There is no problem as to determinism or indeterminism of the will. Any past will is treated like any other past force. The way we relate ourselves to the Past—knowledge—looks upon events as determined by other events. This is a practical process and brings order into the events of the Past. The will as an event of the Past is no exception. Any future will is the object of speculation like all future events. Speculation is never determined, it is a different relationship to forces. It aims at directing them. To explore the possibilities of directing the will is the task of philosophy based on scientific knowledge.

Past will and future will are as different as any past and future forces, as any Past and Future. The mistake, which leads up to the wrong question of determinism or indeterminism, is based on the erroneous presumption that the will "is" something definable, while in reality it is experienced like any other force. All past forces are mentally arranged as determined (know-

ledge). All future forces are mentally arranged as indetermined (speculation). The differences between different forces are only rhythmical. The will is no exception.

NOTE II.

All speculation aims at directing the will somehow ; how far, that is a matter of the available knowledge. Limits are set by the limited energies of our body and of the nervous centre in particular. We experience these limits, but at the same time experience them as extensible with regard to certain other forces. These limits are relative and changing. We can measure the changes for practical purposes. There seems to be a certain limit, e.g., for the speed of our running body, compared in extension and duration with other forces. There seems to be a certain limit for our intellectual development, measured on the equilibrium of the body total. A very important limit is set by the restriction

of possible inter-communications through language ; this limit is experienced particularly in philosophy. All limits are elastic.

11. THESIS.

There are many different forces in the world. Different forces are distinguished from each other by different rhythms.

We have now to examine a number of facts in order to be able to speculate. We experience the forces in and around us as manifold and varied. We try to arrange them in groups so as to be able to manage our knowledge better. This must not lead to the mistake, that this arrangement should mean anything else but a device to create order in our brain. The fact, for instance, that we comprise many thousands or even millions of different varieties of animals under the name of Insects, does not alter the fact, that there actually are thousands or millions of varieties. Abstraction and language are means of mastering the world, but they are not the world itself. Simplifi-

cation is a very marked tendency in our relations to other forces, made necessary by the limitations and the construction of our brain. This tendency towards simplification has gone so far, that again and again efforts have been made to relate all forces to some common denominator. To-day, this is an unnecessary exaggeration of simplification. While it is quite impossible to comprise all the different forces in the world consciously, it is on the other hand not justifiable for the philosopher to invent or use some word and to say that all the different forces are its modifications. This cheap and easy procedure actually does not help us any further, it leaves the forces as different as they are and obscures the facts. A far better way of approach is to study the tendencies of these different forces in their relations to each other. This way allows for quite sufficient simplifications and does not need emotional help to cover up intellectual deficiencies.

The study of the mutual relationships of different forces in the past is the field of science proper. Wherever general ten-

dencies are discovered, there laws are proposed for practical speculation. These laws change, of course, with the amount of knowledge available. A very good example is presented by the law of gravitation, postulated only a few hundred years ago and already being discarded in favour of new laws, which cover still more relations of forces and are based upon new and recent discoveries.

All forces are the objects of science. The forces comprising our nervous centre are being explored, too, and this important branch of science is only at its beginning. All past events in the brain are the objects of psychology, based on physiology, anthropology and many other branches of science. The division of the past into different fields of exploration is a mere practical one, connected with our intellectual limits and compulsory isolations. The synthesis of knowledge becomes more and more difficult as our limits are being extended. The eventual limit of potential knowledge is to be found in the equilibrium of the human body.

Different forces are distinguished by different rhythms ; this statement holds good for very great differences as well as for very small ones, for very large groups of forces as well as for any two single ones. There is a very definite difference between the rhythms of the forces which we call matter and the rhythms of the forces which we call electricity and the rhythms of the forces which we call life, though all these forces may be transformed into one another and may change their rhythms. In each group there are again great differences, e.g. between the rhythm of life in a microbe and in man. Even within the same species of life there are rhythmical differences between the individual organisations and again between different groups of forces within those organisations. The nervous centre, the digestive system, the endocrine and reproductive glands are all parts of the same organisation, but forces of different rhythms, competing with and influencing each other.

Rhythm can be described as the oscillation of a force around an average line of

direction. There are quantitative limits to these oscillations. Within these limits the forces are in rhythmical equilibrium. Transgressing these limits, forces tend to alter their rhythm qualitatively, i.e. to change into forces with a different rhythm. For example, some of the forces of the sun are intercepted by the earth with its atmosphere and surface and turned into life with its different rhythm. The forces of life are continually changed again into the forces of matter. All forces keep—for the mental order in our brain—their identity within the limits of their equilibrium. Within these limits there is again a quantitatively smaller limit, which marks their optimal balance. Forces flourish within these optimal limits ; if they are disturbed by other forces, they are elastic and adaptable within the wider limits of the vital equilibrium. Beyond that they change qualitatively, as we call it, for instance from animate into inanimate matter.

The experience and description of forces is their assimilation to the forces of our

nervous centre. This assimilation becomes ever more intimate with more similar rhythms in other forces. That is why we experience all forms of life as more closely related than inorganic forces. Matter still near to life, like wood or leather, stands nearer to us rhythmically than iron or stone, with coal as an intermediate. All matter is in its rhythm nearer to us than electricity and other forces not organised as atoms. This produces the feeling that we know little about these forces, while we feel to know more about rhythmically related forces. On the other hand, the less complicated forces have a much narrower sphere of equilibrium and are therefore more rigid in their directions and easier to anticipate and to influence. It is consequently much simpler for man to manipulate the forces of matter and even electricity and related forces than to handle the forms of life. This latter range of forces is rhythmically nearer to him, but much more complicated and existing within wider limits of equilibrium ; it includes the

realm of man himself, of social life and of moral values.

NOTE.

The common denominator of all the forces in the world is the relationship to our nervous centre. However, this does not explain anything and does not help us any further. To say that the world is one force manifested in many ways, this statement is either wrong or perfectly empty and useless.

12. THESIS.

The forces of the world vary in their importance for man. This importance is measured in values. Most values are social.

Any measurements express the relations of forces to each other. Values are the measurements of events in terms of importance for man. The surface of the earth is of greater importance to us than certain very far removed stars. The climate in our town is of greater importance to us than the climate at the South Pole. That we get enough to eat and drink, is usually more important than luxuries.

This importance is a relationship. Values express relationships. They are changeable and changing. There is, however, a standard measurement. Like the standard measurements of extension and duration, there is a standard value for man,

namely the balance of his own life. Everything else is measured as a value against this standard. However much this fact may be obscured in daily life, however indirect the ways of comparisons may be, it all and always comes down to this standard value. Certain things, certain events, may appear to us to be more important than our life, others less important. As far as these relations are imaginable between a single individual and other forces, they are individual values. As far as they are only imaginable in an individual living socially together with other individuals, they are social values. The great majority of values is social.

NOTE.

To commit suicide is to value the cessation of some pain more than life. It may be physical or psychical pain. The pain is always real, though it need not be actual. Pain through imaginations is sufficient.

13. THESIS.

Forces exhibit tendencies.
Life is a system of forces.

Having drawn the life of man into the centre of our discussion, we have to look for some more information about it.

The great majority of forces known to us are inanimate. They are being examined by physics, chemistry, astronomy and many other special branches of science. They show very definite tendencies, expressed as general laws or rules by these sciences. All tendencies and directions are relations between these forces.

A small minority of forces are what we call animate. Even the total of all those within our knowledge forms only a thin film on the surface of our globe. It is rather unimportant from the point of view of the globe. It is extremely important from our point of view, as we belong to it and need the other forces of life to live.

Life in general exhibits very definite tendencies, and their examination is of the greatest importance to us. The difference between life and other forces is not measurable in terms of extension and duration. Life is distinguished from other forces by its different rhythm and by the way its forces are organised, i.e. related to each other.

NOTE I.

We need not here go into the matter of the origin of life on earth. This belongs to science. Certain phenomena seem to indicate its rise from inanimate nature. Certain forms of inanimate nature border very near on life. It might, on the other hand, possibly have come to the earth from outside. In any case, there are many facts and events in nature important for life. There are first of all the astronomical facts and events: changes in the sun, changes in the eccentricity of the earth's elliptical circuit around the sun, changes in the earth's obliquity, changes in the

movements of the moon, they all have had and still have the greatest influence upon life on earth. Then we have to consider changes in the earth's atmosphere, changes on the surface of the earth in the distribution of land and sea, the position and form of the land masses, the climate, and finally, though very important, changes in the radio-activity of the earth's crust.

All these events cause fundamental changes in the conditions for life on the earth's surface and are the arch-stimulants for all the evolutionary development of life on this globe.

NOTE II.

The tendencies of inorganic matter are far from being sufficiently explored. Very important discoveries will still be made in future. Many laws, accepted as such now, are actually quite unsatisfactory and only a stop-gap of hypothetical character. We mention as an example the Second Law of Thermo Dynamics (Entropy), a generalisation from the behaviour of gases,

which cannot be accepted as final. If true, it would contradict all possibilities of rhythm in nature. All evidence is against that. It must be realised, that inorganic nature is not yet very well known, in spite of the tremendous extension of science. We are only just beginning to learn and have every reason to be modest and careful in our statements. Inorganic matter may be easier to handle, but organic matter is easier to understand, being much closer to our own rhythm.

NOTE III.

We treat knowledge here only as a means to our own end—philosophy ; we shall not go into any matters of science more than necessary. We are, therefore, content to state that life, even in its most primitive forms, is a very complicated system of forces, forces closely connected with each other into an interdependent whole. This is a fact and open to scientific exploration. The distinction from inanimate nature lies in the different rhythm.

14. THESIS.

The forces of life exhibit definite tendencies, depending on astronomical events and subject to the law of inertia.

We shall examine a number of these tendencies more closely. Here, however, we want to point out as very important, that life shares with all other forces the tendency not to alter its direction except when influenced sufficiently by other forces (law of inertia). This is a very general rule for all forms of life from bacteria to men. The most important other forces, which propel the forces of life into different directions, are astronomical and are experienced on earth as changes within the globe and on its surface. They have affected life again and again, stimulating changes in adaptation to different conditions. Life forms only a very thin layer

on the surface of the earth and exists only by continually adjusting itself to the changing state of the earth. In the course of this assimilation we find what we call evolution. Evolution is still rather insufficiently explored.

NOTE.

The tendency expressed by the law of inertia becomes manifest in the fact that, while with changing conditions better adapted forms of life come into being, the old forms do not disappear as a rule, but only if they cannot adjust themselves any more. It so happens that the very oldest forms of life, most universally adaptable, still exist and probably will exist as long as there is any life at all on earth. It is a temptation to imagine a speculative curve of life in this way.

15. THESIS.

Apart from inertia, the most important tendencies of life on earth point towards more complicated structures, towards variation, towards specialisation.

All this is still science. All these tendencies are based upon and stimulated by astronomical and geophysical forces.

The tendency towards more complicated structures is called evolution. Apart from its connection with astronomical events by way of adaptation, we have not been able so far to discover any more reason in evolution. The first unicellular or perhaps even precellular creatures on earth were as well or even better accomplished than any later ones, they probably existed alone by themselves much longer than all the later forms of life together, and they still exist and will

continue to exist. All evolution has to be stated as facts at present. The ways of evolution have been strange to our minds. To explore the facts is the task of the sciences concerned. The available facts show that, even with some phantasy, evolution can by no means be compared with an ascending line. It depends too much on the earth's condition, this planet existing in a certain rhythm with regard to other celestial bodies and to its own radio-activity. Neither in the size of living organisms nor in their perfection or adaptability or internal organisation is there anything like a straight line possible to describe this evolution. The usual botanical and zoological arrangements follow the order of appearance on earth and the relations of the different forms of life to each other, compared to man as the standard.

Complication is an obvious tendency in life on earth ; there is no intrinsic value in it.

Life shows a tendency towards variation . This tendency is very

definite even on the same level of complication. Ever new and different forms are adopted on the same plane. Within each form individual organisms display great variations. For all we know, this may already be the case with unicellular proto-creatures. There is at present no further explanation of this tendency. The need for adaptation is of great influence, but not sufficient reason for the enormous multitude of variations.

Life shows a tendency towards specialisations in its structures. The important point here is that specialisations cannot be reverted. Once they are adopted, they cannot again be discarded. Any new adaptation can be achieved only in the way of further perfection of the specialisations. If they have reached their limit or if the earth undergoes another change, these forms of life are discarded and disappear. Specialisations make the forms of life appear interesting and colourful, they lead to the complicated ecology of different forms of life, depending upon each other, specialised for mutual intercourse. It is

obvious that new specialisations must always arise from general, unspecialised forms of life. The ways of evolution are not by far as simple as they appeared to be some generations ago.

NOTE I.

The tendencies described in this Thesis are all a mixed blessing to the creatures concerned, and we should definitely get rid of the primitive ideas which the 19th Century held about them. Scientists then were so thrilled by their new discoveries, that they were liable to lose their heads when it came to questions of valuation. The dangerous process of specialisation, which man is undergoing at present, was completely overlooked. Evolution is not so simple at all.

NOTE II.

The tendencies towards complication, variation, specialisation are actual forces, stimulated mostly by forces from the sun

and the earth, competing with the tendency of inertia in determining the way of life on earth. Their mutual relationship changes continually. Great restraint should therefore be exercised with generalisations as to their relations. All sciences of life are only part of the history of the earth.

16. THESIS.

A special tendency of life points towards regeneration and the establishment of two different sexes for this purpose within the same species of organisms.

The rhythm of life is different from the rhythm in inorganic nature. This fact comes out clearly in the change of generations in life. To use a somewhat poetical metaphor: generations mark the rhythmical beat in the continuous flow of life. First there are regenerations through division, where we find it difficult to see which part is new and which is old. Later on this distinction becomes more marked and still later in the history of life on earth the two sexes appear. From then onwards organisms are not quite complete any more, if they exhibit only the qualities of one of the sexes. This goes to show the ambiguous

value of specialisation. Sex makes creatures imperfect, debars them from complete wholeness. The tendency has, however, pointed very definitely in this direction, showing us many forms of life, particularly in plants, still exhibiting both sexes, but so constructed as to make completeness impossible and intercourse with other individuals of the same species necessary for regeneration.

The establishment of the two sexes is a step towards specialisation in nature. Like all specialisations it has advantages and disadvantages. It makes regeneration more complicated and it is in itself due to the necessity of regenerating ever more complicated structures and in so far an expression of the tendency towards complication.

The laws of heredity are based upon the forces of inertia.

17. THESIS.

On the changing earth the forms of life show a tendency towards an optimal balance within their vital equilibrium. There are limits to life's capacity for adaptation.

This is still science, chiefly biology and ecology. Within their own organisation, the forms of life exist in continuous change within the limits of a certain equilibrium. These limits are somewhat elastic but nevertheless definite for every particular form of life. Beyond these limits the organisation is dissolved. The same phenomenon occurs in the relations to the forces outside the organisation, particularly with regard to ecological events. Many species of living beings can exist only if other species exist within definite limits or proportion. Disturbances of this

equilibrium are possible only to a certain degree, beyond which the species cannot exist any more.

Within the limits of the equilibrium the optimal existence is marked by rhythmical fluctuations around an average line. This is a very important phenomenon. The optimal climate for man, e.g., is not to be found in the constant maintenance of the optimal average with regard to all climatical factors, but in a rhythmical pulsation around this optimal average, with a certain amount of irregularity, variety and surprise being vitally necessary stimulants for many of man's activities. Within his body man is subject to the rhythmical alterations of being asleep and being awake, of the intake and the digestion of food, of many glandular activities and other changes, all of which occur within a certain equilibrium and all of which should be experienced in a certain fluctuation around the optimal balance.

The same phenomenon, quite typical of life and its rhythm, is found in the mutual relations of the different forms of

life. As far as they depend on each other as food or help to get food or to assimilate food, the optimal state is a fluctuation around the pivotal average. If the limits of the equilibrium are reached and overstepped, the respective forms of life cannot exist any longer. The processes involved in these ecological phenomena are often not less complicated than the phenomena experienced within individual bodies. All these phenomena are dependent on and influenced by changes in the earth and astronomical events.

The tendency towards adaptation to changes within and without, marked by the limits of the equilibrium, is the most important in the practical life of man. To explore the possible limits of adaptation for every form of life is the great task of contemporary science.

NOTE I.

The tendency towards specialisation results in the limits of equilibrium being very much narrowed for the species in-

volved. This is the practical disadvantage of specialisation. Then, species cannot exist any more if the surrounding conditions are only slightly altered. It is therefore the more general forms of life, which are better able to withstand greater changes, which have a wider range of equilibrium, and it is from these forms that always new and different forms of specialisations originate. The most un-specialised and most primitive creatures have the widest range, have existed before all the others and will probably exist after all the others have disappeared again.

NOTE II.

The tendency to maintain the existing equilibrium depends on the forces of inertia, which are directed towards the continuance of existing relations between forces. In particular, the tendency towards the conservation of the species is due to the forces of inertia.

18. THESIS.

Man is distinguished from other forms of life by the special development of his nervous centre.

There are other features of distinction, notably the very special development of the foot and the erect carriage, but in most other anatomical points man is distinguished from other forms of life by degrees rather than by fundamental specialisations. The difference between quantitative and qualitative comparisons is an arbitrary and practical one. All qualitative differences can be reduced to quantitative relationships, but they mark the point, roughly at least, where evolutionary development becomes irreversible specialisation. In so far, e.g., man's foot has acquired a new quality compared with other known feet and represents a case of definite, irreversible specialisation.

The facts about man's nervous centre are being explored by several branches of science, including psychology. With all other creatures the ways in which the nervous centre works are largely dictated by what we call *i n s t i n c t*. This means that certain associations of vital importance are definitely fixed in the nervous centre. This entails a narrowing of the limits of equilibrium. The instincts work successfully only within narrow limits. They are often very much specialised, for instance with migrating birds or social insects or hibernating animals. Adaptation is possible only in the inverse ratio of the special instinct's degree of fixation. Instincts are propagated through inheritance, i.e. through the conservative forces of inertia.

With more highly organised creatures we find increasing use of the intellect. Intellect is expression of consciousness. Consciousness is a phenomenon in the relations of forces in the nervous centre, which psychology tries to describe and to explore. Intellect means less closely knitted

associations within the brain. It makes necessary and possible wider selections of means and ends than instinct. There are many stages of mixed intellect and instinct to be found. While instinct is inherited through the forces of inertia, intellect has to be trained and developed with each individual. This by itself is neither progress nor regress. It narrows the equilibrium of the species concerned and widens it in different directions at the same time.

With man, intellect has found its greatest extension, while the instincts have been lost to a great extent in this process. Man's intellect is distinguished by a high degree of reflection. Most of our mental activities are reflections. Reflection has to be learned laboriously by each new individual. The propagation of reflective intellect is a definite point of specialisation and as such irreversible. It is the most important point of specialisation in man.

19. THESIS.

Within the limits of the vital equilibrium the sum total of intellectual and instinctive activities in the nervous centre is the same with each species.

There is some sort of nervous centre within every living being, including unicellular proto-creatures. This nervous centre becomes manifest in the maintenance of the rhythm of life, particularly in the selection of food and in propagation. Its activities are either instinctive or intellectual. Both, combined or not, must be able to maintain the species. The sum total consequently amounts always to the same, subject to fluctuations within the limits of the vital equilibrium of the species. If this sum is not attained any more, the species ceases to exist. Species with predominant instincts are more affected by

external changes and adaptable in so far only to a certain degree. Species with more or predominantly intellectual activity are more affected by changes within their body and by changes in their social relationships. This is the reverse of the greater range of choice.

Plants and primitive animals propagate sexually without special choice of partners. With developing and increasing intellect the choice of partners becomes more and more important, until with certain races of man we find the phenomenon, that an increasing number of individuals cannot make up their minds any more at all about this choice or about propagation. Here we see clearly the sum of intellect and instinct to have fallen below the amount necessary for the vital equilibrium. In the process of specialisation the instinct has been weakened or lost and the intellect not quite sufficiently developed or transmitted. The effect is suicidal sterility.

As all specialisations in nature are irreversible, this problem cannot be tackled

successfully by the attempt to repress the intellect. Instincts cannot be regained, once they are lost. The only possible way is to transmit and to develop the intellect so that the vital equilibrium is restored. There are no problems—personal or economical or political—which could not be solved by bold and determined use of the intellect.

20. THESIS.

Man at present is undergoing an evolutionary disturbance in his vital equilibrium, connected with astronomical changes and changes in the earth. There is no reason apparent, why man should not go on to exist for very long ages to come.

These facts still belong to science, chiefly anthropology, palaeontology and related branches. Man has existed with his foot, his brain, some sort of language, through very long ages. Fundamental changes in the forms of life are all connected ultimately with astronomical changes and changes within the earth, particularly the crust's radio-activity. These changes have their own rhythm. Life reacts in due course. This appears to be the reason why man existed through very long ages

more like an animal, though already very much specialised. During all this time, however, and through changing climates and environments, the instincts continued to be much stronger and could be relied upon much more. The intellect and its transmission through education were more quantitatively distinguished from corresponding forces with other forms of life.

Then, about 15,000 years ago, a new development began, which is still in progress. The astronomical and geophysical reasons are not yet sufficiently known, but are explorable by science. In connection with these yet unknown stimulants a further step is now being taken in the direction of intellectual specialisation. The value of this step depends to a great extent on the forms of social life introduced in the course of this development, and we shall deal with this aspect presently.

Here we want to state that not more than 500 or perhaps at most 1,000 generations have passed since the beginning of this new evolutionary development. All our knowledge to-day does not show any

reason, why man should not be able to go on existing on earth for very long periods to come. No notable cooling of the earth has taken place for millions of years. All events on the surface of the earth seem to be explainable by the earth's own radio-activity within the surface-layer. Man can apparently continue to exist as a species for millions of years to come, if he succeeds in maintaining his powers of instinct and intellect at the level necessary for his vital equilibrium.

NOTE I.

The origin of this new development can even be localised. It seems to have started somewhere on the Continent of Asia, and at least one rhythmical beat can be traced with some precision in extension and duration around the Aegean Sea.

In its potential capacity the nervous centre was evolved before this new development set in. This is quite a frequent phenomenon with different forms of life, where we find the nervous centre developed

far ahead of actual requirements. This evolution of the nervous centre may be the first reaction of living beings to certain events within inorganic nature, though we are not yet able to recognise the true connections. The fact is that, for instance, children of very primitive tribes have the capacity to learn nearly everything we can teach them. We must face the fact, that all the sciences dealing with life are still in their infancy, and that many phenomena, which to-day appear rather puzzling, will be explained more clearly in times to come.

NOTE II.

Man recapitulates certain phases of his evolution in the early stages of his existence as embryo. This happens in a very abbreviated form and seems to point to a development in rather sudden steps, as we are witnessing one in the last thousand generations. All heredity stops at birth at the latest. The use of the intellectual capacity is left to education. That is where most of our problems originate.

The fact that the development of the intellect has not only started upon a new phase about 15,000 years ago, but has been accelerated ever since in a rhythmical way, points to a true case of physical evolution. Disturbances in the equilibrium of the species are to be expected. They do not constitute any danger to the existence of the species, as long as they occur within certain limits. Man's capacity for conscious reflection belongs to the general pattern of his organisation, but it makes him a definitely different and irreversibly specialised system of forces within life.

21. THESIS.

The most important forces in man are his intellect and his emotions. The balance between these forces determines his personality.

Man is a system of forces. A living system of forces we call an organism. In the human organism the nervous centre is of decisive influence. Every part of the body, every single cell, every part of each cell is vitally connected with the nervous centre, either directly or indirectly. All the parts of the body and the nervous centre are mutually dependent. Any events in our body—the flow of the blood, the digestion of food, the activities of many glands—influence the nervous centre. On the other hand, the activity of the nervous centre influences all parts of the body. Bad digestion tends to let us become angry easily, and being angry for intellectual

reasons tends to make the digestion bad. There are many similar inter-relations, in most of which the endocrine glands play their part. All the conscious relations between the forces of the body apart from the intellect we call emotions. To be more precise, we call the uniformly repeated emotions of the daily life "feelings," like hunger, tiredness, indifference, reserving the word "emotion" for the more unusual states of the body. We shall here call all non-intellectual relations of forces within the body emotions, in order to contrast them in one expression with the intellectual activity of conscious reflection. The relation between these two determines our personality.

Emotions are inherited. The intellect is the product of education. Both work together in forming our will. The relations of emotions to each other are different with every individual. Education of the intellect is often the same with whole groups of mankind.

The relation between emotions and the intellect fluctuates within the vital equi-

librium around an optimal pivot in each individual. Over-indulgence in emotions at the cost of the intellect often leads up finally to a state of ill-humour and bad conscience. One-sided emphasis upon the intellect cripples emotions and may lead to sterility or sickness. The proper balance between these forces marks the value of the personality. Goethe is perhaps the best example of the optimal balance.

NOTE I.

All instinctive activity of the nervous centre is fixed and belongs to the emotions. Only animals with intellect have some sort of personality and only as far as this intellect goes. We often use the word "character" with regard to purely emotional patterns, e.g. for whole species of animals or nations of men. The word "personality" emphasises the individual balance of intellect and emotions, particularly in man.

The so-called sub-conscious activities of the nervous centre belong to the intellect

and are the product of education. They may be the cause of many and sometimes violent emotions, but they are not emotions in themselves. These subconscious activities may be brought into consciousness, as practised in psycho-analytical therapeutics, in order to influence the emotions caused by them.

NOTE II.

The mutual relations of emotions and intellect in forming our will are experienced by us as what we call freedom of the will. We have very different emotions, we experience, in particular, tendencies towards variation of our activities and towards inertia, towards specialisation and generalisation. Intellect and temperament, brain and glands work together in an intertwined fashion to produce the will. In this way they determine the limits of our personality, which are usually more elastic than we would like to believe ourselves.

22. THESIS.

Man in his new phase of evolution is a social being.

There are many kinds of social ties between living beings. To explore them is the task of botany, zoology, ecology, sociology. The line begins with unicellular creatures. The split into two sexes leads to the rise of the family. Many species of the more complicated creatures live together in large numbers, forming colonies, woods, packs, herds, some of them with very typical organisations. Man in former phases lived in families or in clans. This way of life does not present much of a social problem. All the available forces—with the nervous centre not yet developed very much—are used for the maintenance of life against other species or against the difficulties of inorganic nature. In this way, man existed within the general equilibrium of forms of life, with its ups and

downs between the limits of possible existence. There was no special problem in that; he matched his brain against other parts of the body in other creatures.

With the beginning of the new phase of evolution man develops into a social being and at the same time loses his balance between intellect and emotions, moving quickly to and fro between the extreme limits of his vital equilibrium. His brain develops rapidly, until he gradually becomes master of the surrounding forces of life and nature. He succeeds in taming plants and animals and finally in overcoming many of the obstacles presented by inanimate nature. Multiplying enormously, he grows into nations of thousands and millions. He continues to subjugate nature around him. At the same time he has lost himself, i.e. his balance, in this new social development.

All our present problems are social or derived from the fact that we are social beings. The absolute individual is a fiction. Everything we know, we do, we feel, is socially conditioned. Without social inter-

course we would die after birth, and if it is withheld except for food, we do not even have a notion of language and remain a completely helpless organism with insufficient instincts. Moreover, most of our values are determined by the fact of our social existence.

This new phase in evolution has profoundly altered every ecological relation on this globe. Man as master of the surrounding forces of life has formed them to his will. Flora and Fauna on earth are very much changed, and even the inorganic surface of the planet has been largely formed and altered. All these relations have been fundamentally affected by man's development into a social being in his new evolutionary phase.

The nearest approach to human organised society are the social insects. They represent the greatest known specialisation in this direction by way of instinct. This organisation offers no problem to the individuals concerned.

Problems express a disturbance in the balance of intellect and emotions. In-

instincts experience obstacles. Problems arise only where there is any intellect. Social insects for example have some intellect and tackle problems in reaching and transporting food. But their social life does not present any problem to them.

With man, the disturbance of his balance through the new phase of evolution as a social being has gone so far, that men kill each other in the desperate struggle to find a solution to this problem, to regain equilibrium. This is extremely unusual in life and points to the existence of a very singular and puzzling situation.

NOTE.

It is a grave mistake to project this struggle, this symptom of lost balance, into nature and to speak generally of the "struggle for existence." No such struggle actually exists. No species of living beings has ever been wiped out altogether by another species before the advent of social man in his new phase of evolution. On the contrary, all species depend on each

other ; there is incomparably more co-operation than competition between species. Even the preying of species upon species is no struggle at all, but a case of mutual interdependence. The general ecological pattern depends on astronomical and geophysical conditions and tends towards the optimal equilibrium under these continually changing conditions. It is a matter of ever new and recurring adaptation, and the notion of struggle is quite misplaced in the mutual inter-relations of different forms of life, which so often arouse our amazement and admiration. Species become extinct, if they can no longer adjust themselves sufficiently to changing conditions on earth ; in this process of extinction, other forms of life—mostly microbes—may play their executive part, or else it may occur by way of increasing sterility.

The natural selection within the different species, too, does not take place in the way of what might be called a struggle. Sexual selection is a matter of the intellect, restricted to relatively few species and of

very minor importance. For all plants, and for all animal species with fructification through water, there is no sexual selection at all. All the events of evolution depend chiefly on quite different factors. The ways of natural selection are only symptoms of minor adjustments.

The evolution of life on earth is just beginning to be explored and we have at present to be content with stating the tendencies which we can observe. In that, we must avoid any misplaced anthropomorphism. Struggle, fight, will—they all play a very small rôle in nature apart from man; the “will for power” in particular does not exist elsewhere and is only a symptom of the lost balance in social man.

23. THESIS.

Human life being social and its balance being the standard value, all mental activities are valued according to their contribution towards this balance of life within the social environment.

The standard value is the balance of every man's individual life. Even where other phenomena are valued more highly than our life, this balance of our life is always used as the standard of value measurements. This balance of our life depends on our social environment. It is a fact, whether we like it or not. We depend on our fellow men from the beginning till the end of our existence. Our organism is, however, not yet fully adapted to this new phase of evolution. It is a new way of specialisation, and our organs

for it are still growing and adjusting themselves. Some organs are in a state of regression or atrophy, like all our senses. Other organs, particularly the brain, grow and take over new duties.

Life within a social community brings about many new and strong emotions. At the same time, the growing activity of the intellect more or less holds the balance against these emotions. In the "more or less" the whole problem can be found. As long as the balance is kept within the vital equilibrium, adjustments can take place. When the balance becomes still more disturbed, the species becomes extinct.

All intellectual activity is valued according to its part in the adjustment of this vital equilibrium. The highest value belongs to the mental activity aiming consciously at the optimal balance within this vital equilibrium throughout mankind. This optimal balance of mankind is the supreme good. The most important question is: What shall we do?, namely, to attain this supreme good.

NOTE I.

There is no doubt that the balance of the individual life is the one and only standard of values. The social organisation is a means to attain this end, the optimal individual balance throughout mankind. This does not so far imply any values for specific social systems. It may be sufficient to point to the fact, that every individual has his own emotional pattern. The optimal balance is, therefore, not the same with everybody. It is the individual balance as such, as something individual, not as an average, which forms the standard of values.

NOTE II.

All knowledge is only a means for the mental activity which is concerned with the future and aims at the maintenance of life. All speculation is concerned with two things: probabilities of other forces and direction of our own force or will. The first activity, derived from knowledge,

is used in the second one. This last kind of speculation is most important, it aims potentially at the supreme good and should aim at it.

NOTE III.

The supreme good of social man is not an abstraction and does not need a symbol. It is a very practical and absolutely necessary goal. It may seem to be rather far removed at times, but it can be reached. Men are neither angels nor robots, which means about the same, but, in spite of their varied and complicated mental organisations, an optimal balance of social men throughout mankind can and must be reached. There is nothing else that could be desired.

24. THESIS.

Speculation aiming at the supreme good for man as a social being takes the form of moral commands.

Religion and philosophy are social phenomena. Man before the beginning of the new evolutionary phase had neither. He did not need them to maintain his vital equilibrium. He used his brain to speculate about probabilities by way of magic and similar devices. Magic is the use of knowledge by projecting the past into the future. Insufficient knowledge leads to superstition. Sufficient knowledge develops into science. All magic moves between those two poles. The degree of probability varies accordingly. For the part which the will plays in forming the future, it is unimportant whether probabilities are the result of science or superstition, as long as they are believed.

. There were no vitally important social problems for man in his former phase. Being well balanced within the forces of his own body and his environment, he did not fear death. It was as unproblematic for him as any other event in nature, occurring periodically and with apparent necessity. His powers of reflection were not yet developed ; he did not speculate much further into the future than the other more intelligent animals. To-day, even contemporary primitive people are all affected somewhat by the new development.

The new phase is marked by the development of reflection and the separation of the mental activities from the rest of the forces comprising the body. This separation marks the disturbance in the vital balance. All the contrast of body and soul originates here : their imaginary separate existence, their fancied fight with each other, their respective value. All these problems and ideas are based upon the new phase of intellectual evolution and social existence. It is not that man had not had time to

think about them before, or that there had been too many natural obstacles for him to multiply. We have to look for special stimulants in the history of the earth, but do not know them yet. The fact remains, that these as yet unknown stimulants drove man into this new phase of intellectual development and made him multiply beyond all bounds. This in turn led to new ways of social organisation and stimulated the further development of language and all intellectual activity. The intellect is pushed not by leisure, but rather by the stimulating value of social and natural environment. In this way, the optimal balance of former phases was lost and disturbances have led mankind nearer to the extreme limits of possible existence.

The recognition of this state of affairs is expressed in the commands of religion and philosophy. Both are forms or ways of aiming at the supreme good, the regaining of the optimal balance of life throughout mankind. Both are factors in the formation of our will.

25. THESIS.

Quantitative multiplication leads to qualitative changes and to the most serious disturbances of any existing equilibrium in nature.

We have only to think, e.g., of the rapid increase in numbers of small forms of life after long rains in order to see these disturbances. It quickly leads to qualitative changes in the ecological pattern of any area, small or large. We can study the same phenomenon with man. The rapid increase in numbers has upset any former equilibrium in the relations between men, between man and his environment, and within man himself.

The relations between the new large numbers of men in the past are the subject of history. The importance of these relations for the future results from the

fact, that they have left us with many races and nations of millions of men in certain organisations, and so contribute towards the problems which confront us.

Very important are the changed relations between man and nature. Man has influenced the surface of the earth, animate and inanimate, to an increasing degree in quantity and thereby in quality. For example, the extractions from the soil by way of agriculture and husbandry are measurable in quantities ; after some time, through their combined total, they alter the quality of the surface. All parts of the earth inhabited by large numbers of men are altered in their quality and show a completely new ecological situation. The development of technics and machines is a phenomenon intimately connected with the increase in numbers in man's new evolutionary phase, so that it is quite impossible to say, which is the cause of the other.

It is, however, within man himself, that the rapid development of the new phase, with its great numbers, has upset

the equilibrium between the different forces most. A very large number of new nerve-connections in his brain have been taken into use. It has led him to count and mark in language numbers, which he actually cannot imagine any more. We are to-day continually using numbers which we cannot imagine physically at all. The nerves serving our senses are limited in their capacity, and our imagination is very much hampered thereby as well as by the physical state of every nerve connection within our brain. We have tried to overcome this by many devices, which enable us to handle large numbers and general abstractions for practical purposes. This process, however, has upset the balance in us very much. Whether these large numbers are concerned with men or money or astronomical distance or scientific figures, it is a race between our nervous centre and the big numbers every time, and we are destined to lose from the start. This is one way in which the great number has upset us ; " great " being always measured on the physical capacity of the individual

brain as standard. Another way is the number of known facts, the extent of science. To know everything even of general importance only, has become impossible, i.e. to know it with the degree of knowledge called science.

The struggle of man with numbers has led to many experiments as to a possible solution of this serious problem. The impossibility, at present, even of imagining numbers, which in time can be counted, has led to the longing for the unlimited, the endless, the everlasting, the eternal. All these words express an emotion, an impetus, not an imagination of the reflecting intellect. This emotion has been evolved in the same process as the increasing numbers. The stages of this evolution can be studied.

This last named emotion may be connected in more than one way with the new phase in evolution which man is undergoing. The reflecting intellect, limited by nature, has tried to keep up with this development in order to maintain the vital equilibrium between intellect and emotions.

Where no further imaginations were possible, he has at least substituted words, which always offer some pseudo-security and thereby contribute towards maintaining the balance. Words have always proved at least a temporary remedy against the upsetting of the balance by emotions. It is a daily experience. The emotional, qualitative character of large numbers cannot be too much emphasised.

NOTE.

The evolutionary character of the notions "infinity" and "eternity" can be shown easily through their historical development. For primitive man everything beyond three or ten may be "infinite" and everything beyond one month may be "eternal." Even western man, not so many generations ago, had only to deal with a world rather small in extension and duration. Everything bigger than that—for him an emotion and not an imagination—was infinite and eternal. The boundaries of our imaginations have been

widened very much since then and they include much of what used to be beyond imagination in former times. The words infinity and eternity, however, still retain their emotional and evolutionary character.

26. THESIS.

Isolation and simplification mark the way of the intellect in dealing with this new world of large numbers.

All mental activity can deal with isolated events only. This results from the physical nature of our nervous centre. All scientific research isolates certain facts for closer investigation. All speculation, too, must necessarily isolate some complex of events. Even our emotions are limited in their reactions by selecting certain isolated facts.

The more we try to escape this limitation and to connect our thoughts and emotions with more and more different forces simultaneously, the emptier our imaginations become, until abstraction becomes a play with words without meaning. Our faculty for experience is limited

by the physical forces of our own system ; it is the evolutionary impetus to widen these limits which upsets us.

Another means of the intellect is simplification. All forms of simplifying generalisations help us to master the large numbers of different forces which we experience. Like isolation, simplification actually enables us to maintain our balance. To-day the feeling of mastering large numbers in some way or other is vital for our balance.

NOTE I.

Isolation and simplification are cases of intellectual untruthfulness, of fiction. This does not matter as long as they are recognised as such consciously, as a means to achieve an end. This is, however, often forgotten or neglected, and then the impression is created, as if things actually were simple and isolated. This again may not matter much in daily life, but it becomes an important error in philosophy or religion. There it should not be enough to

substitute a mere word, where abstraction becomes more and more empty, or to isolate certain forces, e.g. in man, as if they existed just alone by themselves.

NOTE II.

Mathematics, particularly in their advanced forms, are always fictitious abstraction and simplification.

27. THESIS.

The will is formed by forces. One of these forces is the conscious intellect. The will of man as a social being needs a set of values.

Many different forces go into the formation of the will. This statement is already an isolation. We are accustomed to isolate further and to take only the forces of our body into consideration. And then we isolate still further and choose the forces supplied by the nervous centre as particularly important. The conscious intellect is the socially most easily affected force or, at least, is the force most easily affectable. All brains are built to the same pattern. Education tends to develop corresponding connections. While the emotional pattern, the temperament, is very different with different individuals, the conscious intellect shows more affinities.

. To direct his will, social man needs a set of values. It is possible to make these values generally accepted and understood. A fixed set of values is actually of vital importance for social man in his new phase, in order to maintain or restore the equilibrium of his forces. The absence of a set of values is experienced as sickness, like any other disturbance within the forces of our body, e.g. through absence of certain vitamins ; it leads to ill-humour, to the loss of the impulse to propagate, to indifference and apathy, resulting finally in the increase of certain physiological changes within the nervous system or other physical kinds of illness. All these symptoms are very common to-day.

Values are stimulants in the formation of the will. All values have our life as standard. Some values appear strange to other people ; there is, however, usually some historical explanation of these values available.

Values point at ends to be achieved. Their recognition influences our will. They are set by the conscious intellect. It is

therefore through the setting and teaching of values, that we can most influence the formation of the will in us and in others. The words "ought," "should," are expressions of this influence. They denote the relation between the individual and a set of values.

28. THESIS.

Religion and philosophy offer complete sets of values.

Values are measurements of our relations to other forces in units of importance with our life as standard. Social man in his new phase of evolution needs a complete set of values to stimulate his will and so to keep the vital balance within the possible limits of his existence.

Some special values are supplied by special stimulants. In his infancy, recapitulating the preceding stage of evolution, he sets himself individual values. This play stage lasts for some time, while simultaneously the sphere of social values widens and extends. From youth onwards, man needs a set of general social values.

Religion and philosophy of social man each define some supreme good, some value higher than life, something more important than the individual. The difference between

religion and philosophy is a matter of the personal temperament. The same set of values may become religion, wherever the emotional forces are predominant, and philosophy, wherever the intellectual forces prevail. Every religion can become philosophy to the man of contemplative character, and every philosophy can become religion to the man of action. Religion which cannot stand this test, is easily proved to be mere superstition, while philosophy in the same case is proved to be an empty play with words.

The supreme good, defined by religion or philosophy as more important than the individual, must necessarily be something derived from social life. It often takes the form of some symbol for the people, the nation, the race or humanity. The relation between the standard—individual life—and this supreme good varies. All deities are symbolised social values. Here, too, the numerical growth of populations tends to increase correspondingly the degree of abstraction in the symbols. The Fetish of a tribe is a very limited abstraction, repre-

sented by some actual matter, treated like something actual. The Gods of nations with expanding populations lose more and more of their personality and develop into more general abstractions, like the roman Jupiter or the God of the Jews. The final stage is reached when abstraction is completed and only a word is left. The God of Christianity does not represent any value to-day. It is an empty word. The values of Christianity to-day are derived from the moral preaching of Christ. The churches should therefore concentrate on the imitation of Christ as a clear symbol of humanity ; unfortunately they do not do it.

Not all religions have a symbol for the supreme good. Whether they have it or not, is a question of the emotional or intellectual prevalence within men and races and at different times. The symbol is an emotional phenomenon and offers great difficulties to the intellect. Symbolised religions have to be clearly recognised as such, if their values are to be transmitted into philosophy. With the

ebbing away of the underlying emotion, the majority of men, with the intellect not yet sufficiently developed, are left stranded without values, only to be taken up by some new wave of emotional values, e.g. by a creed which again proclaims the nation or race as the supreme value and puts forward something or somebody new to symbolise it.

Religions without a symbol for the supreme good mark the intermediate stage between religion and philosophy. They base their set of values clearly on the intellect ; the supreme good is social and universal ; but at the same time they offer certain minor symbols to give some hold to the imagination. The Chinese religions represent this type.

Philosophy is based on the intellect alone. Its influence is naturally limited by the number of men with sufficient powers of intellect and the necessary temperament. But in certain places and periods a larger number of men is able to use philosophy in order to restore the balance in themselves and others through the setting

of values. The greatest number of men always need symbols and emotions, whatever the trend of the time may be, and only a minority of men is able to impose a set of values intellectually through philosophy.

Even in times and places where emotions prevail, there will always be some men of intellect; taking a stand against the emotion, they perish; going with it, they become its "theorists"; in both cases their influence is small. On the other hand, in times and places where the intellect prevails, some sort of symbol always has to be provided for the great mass of the people, be it only a slogan or a catch-word.

Religion and philosophy offer sets of values for man in his new social phase of evolution. This is expressed in the form of moral commands. As this new phase of evolution enters upon new periods of its rhythm, new adaptations of philosophy and religion, new forms of moral commands become necessary in order to maintain the balance of forces in man within the limits of the vital equilibrium.

To-day, nationalism and racialism are genuine religions, trying to restore the balance of mind by the setting up of antiquated values, and having all the disastrous consequences of a true malady, because they fail in their task and must fail. The proper restoration of the balance of mind in our days has to be philosophy, because our intellect is too far developed. The forces of the intellect, if spurred on by moral commands based mainly upon emotions, have catastrophic power and effect, and clearly lead beyond the limits of possible existence within the vital equilibrium. The forces of the intellect must set the values themselves and by imposing moral commands induce the emotional forces to activity compatible with the continued existence of mankind.

This philosophy is the Philosophy of Responsibility.

29. THESIS.

The Philosophy of Responsibility is based upon knowledge.

Philosophy is a social phenomenon. It is an attempt to keep the balance of mind and body, of intellect and emotions within the vital equilibrium. The optimal balance throughout mankind is its supreme good. Philosophy need not be based upon any *a priori* notions. It can be based upon actual knowledge. This knowledge is derived from all possible experiences, including the experiences of the forces comprising our own body and our nervous centre in particular. Knowledge shows us the tendencies prevalent within the forces of the world and within life in particular: the general rule of inertia, the tendencies towards complication, variation, specialisation. All this knowledge has to be used in forming the future.

Very important is all knowledge concerning the facts of evolution in life ; e.g. the general experience that specialisations are irreversible ; or that the upsetting of the vital balance leads to the extinction of special forms of life. Death may result from mere emotions, while one-sided development in the intellectual field may lead to sterility. Similar phenomena may occur with whole populations or classes of populations. Philosophy must be based upon the contemporary state of knowledge. It is subject to changes like any other social phenomenon.

NOTE.

Nothing has been left around social man that could be called " natural " as opposed to " influenced by man." It is erroneous to call anything natural in this sense. Man as a social being and his brain belong to nature not less than any other forces in this world. There is no " natural " food or healing or right or philosophy. Knowledge and science of social man are

equal parts of nature. The intellect is not less natural than emotions. Social man may be liable to make mistakes. Then it is a practical question of results and of different opinions. But the use of the word "natural" as opposed to "intellectual" has led to regrettable confusions. The non-intellectual forces concerned should be specified. Nature includes the intellect.

30. THESIS.

The Philosophy of Responsibility aims at directing the will of social man towards the supreme good. It takes the form of moral commands.

Man is a social being. Any set of values must take the life of social man as its standard. All the activities of man take place within society. Even the most private events in life are dependent on and connected with society, directly or indirectly. This interdependence of men becomes manifest as mores. In the attempt to direct these mores, philosophy evolves moral commands. These commands are most urgent speculations, based upon knowledge. The form "you should, you ought, you must" is nothing else but the expression of a hypothesis: if you do not, you will perish. It is knowledge projected

into the future with the greatest urgency. Moral commands must be followed, because otherwise the vital equilibrium of social man will become lost or will remain lost. This is the intellectual way of philosophy, where religions offer emotional symbols. Moral commands are expressions of the forces of the intellect, contributing towards the direction of the will.

NOTE.

The direction of the will according to moral commands is called man's duty. To follow this intellectual guide, positively produces a pleasant feeling of satisfaction.

The failure of the forces of the intellect to direct the will results in the feeling of ill-humour called bad conscience.

31. THESIS.

Social man is responsible to society.

This is the central dogma of the Philosophy of Responsibility. It postulates the responsibility of man towards society as the most important fact in his life, more important than his life.

To be responsible means to be answerable. Man is a social being. Man without society is to-day a fiction and of no practical interest. Man is born a social being. This is not an original sin, but an original fact, whether we like it or not. He is fed and clothed and educated for many years by his family and his people. This constitutes the basis for his relationship to society for all his life.

The fundamental fact is that man as a social being is the product not so much of heredity as of education. Apart from his intellectual capacity, man does not inherit

any one of the qualities that make him a social being. Contrary to the social instincts of certain animals, which are inherited, the social intellect of man has in its contents to be transmitted to each individual after birth. It is acquired and not hereditary. The emotional pattern is inherited. For the intellect, inheritance provides, in the way of the luxurious variation and specialisation often found in nature, a vast capacity and no contents ; it does not provide sufficient instincts.

It needed particular stimulants to reach this new phase in man's evolution, this new intensive use of the brain, with its over-emphasis on the reflective intellect. All intellectual capacities have to be trained and educated, as we can observe already with many animals. Man as a social being has suffered the loss of his instincts to a large degree and has undergone a great change in his emotions, at the same time experiencing an enormous development of the reflective parts of his nervous centre. He is now fully dependent on these parts for the maintenance of his

life. Their effective functioning, however, is not inheritable. The new way of adaptive natural selection is education. Contrary to inheritance, all education goes against the forces of inertia. Something has to be done. This fundamental knowledge forms the basis of the Philosophy of Responsibility.

If social man is to continue to exist in his new evolutionary phase, then children have to be taught and educated and the vital equilibrium throughout mankind has to be maintained with a adequate adaptability. Otherwise, if the intellectual capacity is not used properly, this race of living beings with its stunted, insufficient instincts will become extinct. This most urgent speculation is expressed as moral commands in the following Theses.

32. THESIS.

I. MORAL COMMAND.

Live responsible to society and mankind, responsible for aiming at the supreme good: the optimal balance of life within yourself, your society, mankind.

You owe your existence and all your intelligence to your society. It begins with food and language and leads up to all you own. You do not owe it as a debt, you do not have to repay it. But you are responsible for it; responsible for keeping it and for passing it on; responsible for aiming at the supreme good as the

vital condition of mankind's existence. This is your duty. If you fail, bad conscience will not leave you.

We have put society between the individual and mankind, because to-day it is still society which is chiefly active in our education. The interdependence of the whole of mankind on this globe is already a fact, but we still have great difficulties in imagining relations of this magnitude and complication. Society, a more restricted form of community, from the village up to the state, is a notion easier to grasp and to handle. Many of the relations between the individual and mankind are loose and indirect, while his relations to society up to the state are direct and near. We must, however, not forget, that in the Philosophy of Responsibility society only represents mankind as a more easily imaginable organisation of men. If we say "society," we mean actually "mankind represented by society." Religious emotion tends to put symbols in the place of society and mankind.

.There are two frequent objections against this command to be answered. Firstly, it may be asked, how we come to postulate the continuance of mankind as desirable. "Let it go to the devil!" This objection is not a serious one. It is the sign of a vitally disturbed mind, which has lost its balance completely. If this opinion becomes general, it leads to suicidal sterility. It is an apparently nihilistic attitude. Actually some values are always recognised as such, thus upsetting the pretended statement and showing that the whole attitude is only based upon insufficient use of the intellect. Values are relations and the continuance of mankind has value only as compared with our own life as standard. It must have some value as long as we live. By mere living, depending on society as we do, we prove the value of mankind and of its continuance.

The other objection is: if this is a mutual give-and-take relation, then there must be a corresponding responsibility of society and mankind towards the indi-

vidual. The answer is, that this is certainly the case. However, the organisations of society and mankind are only a means of men to obtain their ends, and moral commands can be addressed only to the individuals concerned. Moral commands are a matter of the intellect. Society or mankind has no intellect for itself. No state has ever had a conscience, but the men who govern it, or all its citizens, have. The responsibility, therefore, is mutual, but moral commands can be addressed only to men.

The fact that moral commands cannot be addressed to the state or any other form of social organisation as such, proves clearly that all these organisations are only man's means to achieve his ends. The issues are often consciously obliterated by men who have seized or obtained some power and who want to hide their bad conscience behind the screen of an organisation which cannot be attacked. The state has no conscience, because it has no intellect. The men, who form and direct

the state, have intellect and therefore conscience. They are responsible. The same holds good for any kind of organisation within society.

33. THESIS.

What you have got from society and mankind determines the extent of the moral command for you. Giving more, you live virtuously; giving less, you live viciously.

The moral commands express the mutual responsibility of social men. They depend on the intellect. No man can be expected by his fellow men to give more than he was taught, subject to the emotional factors of his personality. Responsibility is limited by intelligence and its potential capacity of development. To give more is virtue, to give less is vice.

This Thesis deals with degrees only, not with the contents of the moral will. A man with little or no higher education of his intelligence fulfils his responsibility by acting within the limits of his personality according to the moral commands taught to him. In acquiring more knowledge and actively participating in the development of the moral commands he acts virtuously. By neglecting even what he has been taught, he acts viciously. A man with the best education and every opportunity to improve his knowledge has a much heavier task to live up to the moral standard required from him. He has to work hard to fulfil even his responsibility; having got so much from society, it is difficult for him to become virtuous. Most rich and privileged men live a vicious life, the vice consisting in the various expressions of inertia. Very few ever fulfil even their social responsibility, not to speak of virtue. All religions have clearly understood and expressed this fact. Philosophy has often neglected it. Men are not equal before the moral commands. The extent of the moral

commands depends on intelligence and education. Decisive is the actual education, the actual environment. Therefore, the greatest responsibility rests with the intellectually leading classes of the population. It is difficult for them to become virtuous, because they would have to strain themselves so very much in order to give their best to society. They mostly become vicious by selling themselves to the forces of inertia in some form.

We have to state this quite clearly. Virtue and vice are social phenomena. They are not so much to be looked for in the poorly educated men and women before the judge or the priest, but in the judge and the priest, the lawyer and banker, the politician, the professor, the scientist. It is they who mostly fall short of their responsibility and therefore live viciously. And they certainly do know it often enough and do suffer from bad conscience. But they should know it still better. The viciousness of the gifted, who do not respond by using these gifts for the benefit of society and mankind to the utmost of

their ability, has seriously hampered social evolution so far. Philosophy points to the necessity to change this unfortunate state of affairs. The first step is to use the expressions virtue and vice where they belong.

34. THESIS.

II. MORAL COMMAND.

Use your intelligence.

You live as social man. We all live through our intelligence. Your intelligence has been trained. You must respond by using your intelligence. If you do not, mankind will not be able to exist any longer. In some way, of course, you do use your intelligence continually; but that is not enough. By the mere fact of your existence you belong to society and mankind. It is therefore your duty to use your intelligence according to the standard of your edu-

cation. Otherwise you live viciously. If you do more, if you improve your intelligence and use it, you will become virtuous.

Knowledge not used is dead and of no moral value at all. Knowledge is only the means to achieve an end: the direction of the will through intelligence towards the supreme good.

The optimal use of his intelligence is the duty of social man. It is the general use made of the knowledge available that marks the character of historical periods. The amount of available and assimilable knowledge changes with the evolution of man. It extends and contracts in certain rhythmical beats. In the use of it every individual is concerned.

All the symptoms which the sciences of sociology, economics, politics, etc., describe as constituting a state of affairs called a crisis, are reducible to the insufficient use of the intellect by men, i.e. by all men. It means that the available knowledge is not used. It shows the lack of

moral will to overcome the forces of inertia. In this vice most men participate in varying degrees. Philosophy is not concerned with the critical situations of the day, but with the task of keeping before our eyes the fact that most defects can be remedied and ought to be remedied by the use of intelligence and will against inertia.

The aim of philosophy is the maintenance of the optimal balance in man within the vital equilibrium of his existence. For social man this can be achieved only through the use of his intelligence. Therefore he must use it.

35. THESIS.

III. MORAL COMMAND.

Be true and insist upon truth in social relations.

Truth is a social value. Alone by himself, man can imagine what he likes. As far as the balance of the individual life is concerned, in its actually private sphere, the individual standard has to be applied, and truth may be less important or even sometimes dangerous.

In all social relations, however, truthfulness is most important in maintaining society and mankind. All contrary opinions can be traced down to lies for individual personal gain and are therefore vicious. To insist upon truth in social relations is a moral duty. It can be done, for this moral command is so generally accepted by the intellect, that its neglect, particularly in the form of broken promises,

always produces the feeling of bad conscience.

The ways of the intellect are not the same ones with every man. Though the pattern of the brain is the same throughout the species, the actual nerve connections are slightly different with every individual and furthermore affected by the emotional make-up of the personality. We cannot, therefore, expect our fellow men to think precisely as we do. We might call each other fools. But we must insist upon each of us using his intelligence. This should already lead to some mutual advance in any case. Furthermore, we must mutually insist upon being true to ourselves, i.e. upon each acting or being prepared to act according to his principles. There may be different ways for different men according to their inherited emotions, their intelligence, their education. There is nothing wrong with that, as long as they feel and act responsible to society and mankind. Men are not equal; but they ought to be true in their social relationships.

.Nearly all priests of all religions in the world do not adhere to the moral rules they profess, and in so far they live viciously. It is the duty of every man to point this out. Nearly all capitalists do not keep to their rules in many ways. Through just taking them at their word and showing their untruthfulness, sufficient bad conscience can be created. This, too, is everybody's duty. Nearly all politicians of every creed are untrue to their own professed systems. It is every man's duty to do all he can to point this out.

The lack of truth in social relations is closely connected with the upsetting of the vital balance in man, though it may be difficult to say which is the cause of the other. Certainly the improvement of truth in social relations can be achieved and must be demanded in order to regain our balance. Different ways of social organisation within society and mankind may be possible. Whether they represent our own or somebody else's idea, we must insist upon the full game being played.

All abuses are based upon general indifference and general neglect of duty. There would be no abuses, if every man did his duty in using his intellect and insisting upon truth. Even the greatest misdeeds in history can all be traced to the vice of general laziness and lack of responsible action.

Here again we come face to face with the factor already mentioned as being very important : the large number. Many relations within organised society alter qualitatively with high numbers. The influence of men upon each other is different among hundreds and among millions. It is, however, more a difference of means than of ends. In fact, the more far-reaching influence of the administrative will in large communities makes truth in public relations still more necessary.

The lack of truth has poisoned the history of mankind long enough. It is time that man made an effort to do away with cant and hypocrisy in social relations. It is his duty to do so.

NOTE I.

To insist upon truth means to recognise the results of science, whether they are welcome or not. This includes the results of psychology and all the sciences of life. Due to the tendency towards variation or to the forces of inertia, we find everywhere a certain percentage of freakish forms of life, representing the extremes of the possible equilibrium. They have to be dealt with in special ways within society, using their best qualities and neutralising their destructive influences; but they should not be disowned or neglected.

NOTE II.

The question of truthfulness between the sexes may be raised. This is, however, no problem for philosophy. The relations between man and woman are private and not social and should be left as such. Philosophy aims at keeping man within the vital balance of his existence and in so doing conserves and promotes his propa-

gative impulses. As a rule, the importance of the choice of a partner is inversely related to the force of the instinct of propagation. This is why people of little intelligence or education have or used to have large families. Complication and specialisation evolved in the brain as a high degree of intelligence tend, if not properly counter-balanced or directed, to diminish the instinct of propagation. This is the reason for the decline of the birth rate among the intellectual classes. Fastidiousness in the choice of the partner is only one of several symptoms. Philosophy wants to re-establish the fundamental balance.

Matrimony, too, presents no special problem for philosophy. It can be arranged successfully in many ways at different times and places. It belongs to the sphere of social responsibility as far as the maintenance of the partner, the care and the education of the children are concerned.

To use the words "moral, virtuous, vicious" mainly for sex relations, is sheer hypocrisy and employed in order to obliterate the actual and much more inconvenient

meaning of these words, which is social and not private. Private life is outside the sphere of morality. General observations about private lives offer only symptoms for the state of social life within a community. With regard to private life, the lack of universal standards points to the appropriateness of tolerance.

36. THESIS.

IV. MORAL COMMAND.

Aim at active wisdom, the optimal balance of the forces composing your personality. Insist upon a social organisation, which enables every man to do so.

Both parts of this command are closely connected. They are social duties. Social man depends for his existence on stimulating vibrations around the optimal average of all his forces. This average may change with changes in the earth, which temporarily throw man out to the limits of possible equilibrium. To aim at the optimal balance is, however, his social duty at any time. Moral commands can only be addressed to men. Man himself must be wise, if mankind shall continue.

To aim at the optimal balance is to aim at wisdom. The optimal balance is determined by all the forces in man, including those of his nervous centre. This optimal balance in social man is a social value. This being so, the importance of the intellect depends largely on its contents being transmissible. Private intelligence has no moral value. In order to be transmissible, the forces of the intellect have to keep within the general pattern of possible understanding. To do so, they have to be balanced by healthy forces in the rest of the body. Freakish and abnormal bodies rarely produce generally acceptable ways of intelligence. Philosophies and politics of bachelors and other freakish men should, as a rule, be profoundly mistrusted. In most cases, their mind cannot produce transmissible wisdom. What may be necessary to balance their own personality, often becomes top-heavy in the minds of men with healthy constitutions. We cannot blame them for this effect ; but here we are dealing with social values. What may be morally indifferent as a private affair,

may become a vicious danger when projected into social life. Most pseudo-values can be traced to this source. In small doses they provide a certain stimulus, but in large doses they are real poison.

Wisdom is first of all self-recognition and self-regulation. Where the emotions are found to be too strong, the intellect has to be trained, until it holds its own against these forces. Where the intellect is too much or exclusively stressed, there the rest of the body has to be trained relatively more. The pattern of emotions is hereditary and cannot be changed. It can, however, be influenced from the side of the intellect as well as from other somatic stimulants. The Greeks had a word for this wisdom, and they still remain outstanding for what they have achieved in the few generations of their classical culture.

Personality as such has no social value ; but the optimal balance of the personality is of great social value. To aim at it is moral, to neglect it vicious, to excel in it virtuous. All moral values depend on

what has been given by society. A balanced, healthy personality cannot be expected where the forces of the body or the intellect have not been sufficiently trained or are hereditarily weak, or where the inherited emotional forces are too strong or too weak, or where freakish conditions prevail. Genius, too, is often some sort of freakish distribution of the forces composing the body.

Private wisdom is not moral. It is only the basis of moral action. Wisdom must be active to acquire moral value, it must become social wisdom. There is yet another group of men, whom we must accuse of viciousness through inertia: inactive wise men. Social man has the duty to act as social man. It is his duty to act within society, within mankind, on the basis of his wisdom. Wisdom is a matter of balance. It depends on intelligence, but it can be attained with many different grades and shades of intelligence. It must be used and we must insist upon its being used. This is a moral command. If the wisdom of the wise is not active, then the un-

balanced temperaments and the freakish individuals succeed in directing the social organisations. Active wisdom needs courage and this courage has moral value ; courage as such has no moral value. The moral activity of wisdom is directed towards the promotion of responsibility and moral conduct of all men within society and mankind. It is not concerned with private life. It is based upon knowledge, particularly the knowledge that men are different. It does not demand and does not work for intolerant equalisations. But it demands and expects from every man, that he lives responsible, that he uses his intelligence, that he is true in social relations and that he aims at social wisdom—the maintenance of the optimal balance within himself and within the social organisation. These demands have to be put forward again and again, and to achieve this end, active wisdom has to be concerned with social organisation. To be active in directing the social organisation towards this end is a moral duty. Wisdom, by itself already more valuable than pure knowledge, is

not enough ; it must become active, otherwise humanity is again and again pushed to the extreme limits of its existence. This can certainly be avoided and a better balanced way of evolution can be found, if men of intelligence and wisdom do their duty. The details are matters of politics, economics and related branches of science. Philosophy has to demand action, where action is moral duty.

37. THESIS.

V. MORAL COMMAND.

Form and educate the next generation as well as you possibly can.

This is your duty, whether you have children of your own or not. It is part of your responsibility as social man and it is a moral command. It implies that you yourself follow the moral commands.

It is often not yet clearly understood, that the intellect as evolved in man has its own way of heredity. Its capacity only, not its contents, is transmitted through germ cells. The capacity alone is not sufficient for existence. It needs contents. Contents are transmitted after

birth through education. The instincts are stunted or have disappeared altogether. So this form of transmission, necessary for the continuance of mankind, is a genuine specialisation, which cannot be reversed. Man is still adaptable to changes in so far as certain senses can be trained or can even take over additional work. But instincts, once replaced by intellect, cannot be revived. And, contrary to instinct, intellect does not transmit its contents through inheritance. In its contents intellect is much more flexible and adaptable than instincts, but it has to be trained. Every social man, i.e. every one of us, has by his very existence the moral duty to do his best in passing on his knowledge, in forming and educating the next generation. This fact, properly recognised, is a true stimulant to have children of one's own.

How this transmission can be effected, is the subject of sciences based on experience. Philosophy shows that it is a moral command. It is based upon knowledge of our responsibility and it is ad-

dressed to social man, who aims at fulfilling the preceding four moral commands. It implies, negatively, that only moral man in this sense is capable of education and that vicious men must be prevented from propagating their inertia or insufficient balance. This is the true meaning of natural selection in the propagation of the human race. The instincts and other non-intellectual forces have no longer the power to achieve the natural selection necessary for the retention of the species within its vital equilibrium. In the course of evolution the intellect has taken over this function. If this function is insufficiently exercised, i.e. if freakish minds are permitted to have social and educational influence, the consequences are disastrous for mankind. To achieve natural selection by intellectual education is therefore the moral duty of every man. Not only intellect, but also wisdom is necessary to educate the next generation into well-balanced human beings and to recognise and eliminate those elements, which, through inherited emotional qualities, are not capable

of achieving this balance. With all due consideration for their private life, these latter elements should be kept away from social influence. Nobody should be passed into public life unconditionally, who does not aim at fulfilling the moral commands with all they imply.

NOTE I.

To recognise the intellectual and moral way of natural selection in mankind is to find the proper place for genius in the social organisation. Genius usually marks a type of unbalanced and unbalanceable personality, due to the hereditary emotional pattern, often connected with abnormal functions of certain glands in the body. The genius achieves social and moral values through private expressions and is in so far morally good. His private life is of no moral significance ; the expressions of his genius may be a very strong stimulant for many men in fulfilling their moral duties. The intellect needs stimulants to keep within the vitally important

rhythm of activity. Inertia is its greatest foe. From the sphere of direct social influence, however, the genius must be kept away. Here his lack of balance is absolutely misplaced. What we call genial in a statesman is usually not genius at all, but wisdom. The genius in the rôle of statesman always produces, by his very lack of balance, evil results in the end.

NOTE II.

In order to educate the next generation on the basis of knowledge, due attention has to be paid to the tendencies in the evolution of life, which have to be applied to the intellect by way of analogy. Complication, variation, specialisation, inertia were the main tendencies in life, which we have mentioned. The first three work in different directions away from the fourth. They are all of equal importance. The intellectual pattern tends to further complication, but has to be kept in vital balance with the rest of the body. Men should be

varied to provide the stimulants necessary for the intellect, but not in too great a degree, lest the possibility of mutual understanding may be lost. Intelligence should be specialised, as the existence of social men in large numbers depends on it ; but not too much, lest they lose the balance of their personality. Inertia in the form of tradition may be very valuable in keeping our mental balance, but may upset this balance if unduly emphasised. In short, wisdom has to use all available knowledge to achieve its end, namely active wisdom in the next generation. It is the way of natural selection in man.

NOTE III.

The duty of education affects matrimony and introduces a moral duty with regard to the children. The moral duty is to give the children the best possible education. This need not necessarily be education by the parents. Parental affection is, however, a very important factor. Mutual affection is a social value and is

best learnt within the family. The absence of this valuable emotion may have serious effects upon the balance of forces in man. In so far as it becomes necessary for education, matrimony is social and must be valued by moral standards.

38. THESIS.

Neglect of moral duties must be intellectually recognised to create bad conscience. Bad conscience is an unpleasant emotion based upon intellectual deficiencies.

Bad conscience is a social phenomenon within the conscious intellect. It can be observed already in the more intellectual animals. A vague unpleasant feeling based upon subconscious activities of the intellect is not yet bad conscience. Bad conscience is caused by knowledge of immoral behaviour. It can only be aroused by training the intellect, it can be changed with changing ways and degrees in the working of the intellect. There is no instinctive bad conscience. There is only regret and no bad conscience in the sphere

of purely private activities, too. To have eaten something indigestible produces emotions of self-reproach, anger, melancholy, but not bad conscience. Even when unable to return the feelings of sexual partners man does not feel bad conscience. Bad conscience is a social phenomenon. To have injured one's own health can produce bad conscience in so far as it prevents us from fulfilling our social duties.

Morality is a social phenomenon. Bad conscience after the neglect of moral duties through insufficient use of the intellect is felt only with regard to social relations. It is felt when the demand for truthfulness is disregarded in social relations, for instance through broken promises. It is felt when the intellect has not been used to balance the emotions, i.e. if either the intellect has been too lazy and the emotions have carried us away without proper patience and consideration, or if the intellect has worked the wrong way and has kept back the emotions from their duty. Altogether much more is sinned through non-doing than through wrong-doing.

The fact that bad conscience is based on the intellect and therefore on education, points again to the great importance of the fifth command. The greatest care has to be taken in education, not to upset the mental balance through the imparting of too much knowledge at a time. This is particularly important with regard to the education of populations with a less developed intellectual capacity.

NOTE.

Neglect of the laws of the state creates bad conscience only in so far as these laws are intellectually accepted as the expression of moral commands. Beyond that there is no bad conscience. In fact, the disregard of laws may be a moral duty, wherever laws are based upon insufficient use of the intellect or other neglect of moral duties by the law-giving authorities.

39. THESIS.

If there appears to be a conflict of duties, the First Command is decisive.

Any conflict of duties can arise only from the fact that the intellect has not been used properly to ascertain which way of action complies with the First Command. The responsibility to society and to mankind for the maintenance of the vital equilibrium in us and others is the supreme duty. All private values are of moral significance only indirectly, in so far as they influence men of moral value. As we all tend by reason of inertia to overrate our own value, we have to be very careful indeed in assigning any moral value at all to our private values. It is only with men of particular social eminence, that their private values may become indirectly of moral significance.

, There can be no hard and fast rule as to the inter-relations of the other moral commands, which all are based on the first one. In every situation which demands a decision with regard to moral values, it is the duty of the intellect to do its best in measuring the different values and then to act. Here, too, laziness and inertia are the most fateful sources of moral vice. To do even the second best is nearly always incomparably better than to do nothing.

40. THESIS.

In fulfilling the moral commands, we have to keep in our minds that we are the ancestors of many generations to come.

Knowledge gives us the basis for the speculative probability, that man will go on living on this earth for many hundreds of thousands of years. He will be able to do so as a social being with the vital accent on the intellect. He will have to maintain the balance between his intellect and the other forces of his body. He will have to find a much better balance than he has to-day. He will have to find better means of transmitting his balance and his knowledge in the rhythm of generations. He will be better able to do that when he acquires the feeling of responsibility, the feeling of being an ancestor. We are in the process of evolution from one race of

man into another race of man. We have dwelt long enough upon the past and felt ourselves as descendants, longing enviously back to happier times of better balance in man, and at the same time not without contempt for them on account of our greater knowledge and mightier problems. It is time that we tried to make use of our knowledge. Just as the discovery that the earth was not the gravitational centre of the universe profoundly altered the outlook on life and its problems in man, so the new knowledge of being a responsible ancestor must alter human behaviour fundamentally.¹ It is an irreversible process of specialisation which is taking place in us. We have to take it as such and to do our best in this process. Knowledge shows us that over-specialisation in races leads to extinction in one way or another. So we have to preserve adaptability and alertness as much as possible. The feeling of responsibility and of being an ancestor will help in this direction more than all the religions practised at present. It makes every man responsible and at the same time

shows him his place in the rhythm of generations. Death is at present still unnecessarily unpleasant, on account of insufficient knowledge. With pain alleviated or removed, it will be easier to overcome the forces of inertia in us, which still keep us alive when there is not much value any more in preserving our individual personality. Fear of death will diminish with the pain of dying, aided by the feeling, that one has done one's duty as the responsible ancestor of future generations, that one can leave it to them now to carry on, and that in this rhythm of generations the individual personality is, after all, not so very important.

The philosopher, speculating into the future, has on certain points to turn prophet. There seems to be no doubt that, within a relatively short time, the races of this earth will all be comprised in one single intellectual unit. All local and tribal moments in religions and philosophies will disappear. Only universal values of mankind will survive. There will be enough opportunity for variation, and new and

better ways will be found to organise mankind in units which do not contain too large numbers and which will be able to work with the active participation of all members. The new feeling of being ancestors will produce a better balance in men, who, through active wisdom, will keep unbalanced individuals away from social influence, and who through this same active wisdom will be able to use and direct science and through science the mastery of nature in a way beneficent for the balance in man.

It is not a way of progress which lies before us. This very much misused word has been practically excluded by our very first Thesis. It is a tendency towards a better balance in man, which we have recognised as vitally important for his continuance and which it is our moral duty to promote. The future does not belong to a Superman, but to our descendants, towards whose better balance it is our duty to work.

The Philosophy of Responsibility looks into the future, as is the task of philosophy.

It tells us what to do. It emphasises that it is our duty to be active, to think and then to do, and that the vice of laziness eclipses by far all other vices. It wants us to live responsible and to feel as ancestors. We shall then, anyway, be free from the unpleasant feeling of bad conscience. To be active and to be without bad conscience is all we need to feel happy. To achieve this end throughout mankind is the supreme task. There is no purely private happiness with a bad social conscience. Where the latter does not exist through lack of knowledge, it is our duty to bring it into existence. But there is this happiness through moral activity, a feeling of having done one's duty, of a slight tiredness from virtuous exertion, which finally merges, without fear, into death as a fulfilment.

EPILOGUE

Philosophy is speculation into the future and it lays down the principles of moral conduct for social man. It should not endeavour to lay down more specified rules for social life. It should try to influence politicians, not politics; economists, not economics; men, not matters. Conditions and situations change continually, and the attempts to establish fixed laws for complicated events, which are so very much affected by influences outside our powers, e.g. astronomical and geophysical events, has always proved to be futile. Utopian dreams of philosophers have always been somewhat ridiculous. The sphere of private activities is left to common sense altogether. In the sphere of social activities, philosophy works towards the direction of the human will according to the moral commands. More it cannot do. Its means are preaching, enlighten-

ment, education. Its weapon is the word, its ally the bad conscience.

There are, however, many aspects of social life, which indirectly reflect the Philosophy of Responsibility, and we shall try to deal with some of these special phenomena from our point of view. There cannot, of course, be any system in these aphorisms, as we disclaim the existence of any logical system in this world altogether. But we may be able to give some hints as to the effects of our philosophy in practical life. We shall be as brief and concentrated as possible.

I.

The Philosophy of Responsibility emphasises the necessity of certain activities as conditional for the existence of mankind in a state of vital equilibrium. The contrary of these necessary activities are unnecessary activities. Philosophy deals only with the notion of the unnecessary in social life. In private life most unnecessary trouble could

be avoided by the application of common sense. It does not need philosophy to show that. But the energy wasted upon unnecessary activities in social life is of moral importance. Much too much time is lost through perfectly unnecessary quarrels, through private rivalries, through irresponsible talk, through absolutely useless discussions. In the sphere of social activities this is all outright vice. Any unnecessary waste of time and energy in matters of urgent social importance, particularly when caused by personal ambition or laziness, is vicious, and it becomes the moral duty of everybody to call it so and to prevent it. Most of the pains suffered by mankind through wars, party-strife, illness, famine, catastrophies, accidents, are perfectly unnecessary and avoidable.

II.

There is one period in man's life, which lies altogether outside the sphere of philosophy. This is the pre-social childhood. The intellectual capacity

grows slowly. Meanwhile the child occupies its spare energies in play. Play is not aimless. The child has always a very definite end in mind. But it cannot yet concentrate very long on it. And it is not yet a socially responsible being. It is completely self-centred and should be like that in this period. It regards itself as the one and only person, the focus of all the rest of the world. This pre-social period, possibly recapitulating former phases of evolution, lasts a longer or shorter time, often according to the size of the family. Older and particularly younger brothers or sisters influence this state of affairs. At an early age the child begins to grow into a social being. The process is slow and the sphere of play—not without problems, but apart from social problems—this purely private sphere continues to exist or even to be predominant for quite some time. A little later games with other children begin. Games are socially organised plays and they help to develop the child into a social being. While plays are still purely private activities, games are a social experience.

From then onwards, all is a matter of the growth of the intellect. By far the best means of introducing the child into social life is the family. There is no doubt, that many grave symptoms of loss of balance in later life are due to the small size of families.

III.

The need for p r i v a c y , for a sphere of purely private activities outside the sphere of moral commands, continues during the whole life of man. It is indirectly very important for society not to overlook this want, because it is necessary for the maintenance of the vital balance in man. With a view to the past, it may be explained in terms of evolution, as a remnant from the pre-social phase. With regard to the future, philosophy has to point out that man needs such a sphere in order to keep himself fit for his moral duties. The lack of private relaxation leads to over-strain and collapse. His social duties done, man should have time for purely private in-

terests and activities. These interests and activities should counterbalance the weight of social duties and accentuate those parts of the personality which cannot find an outlet in social relations.

IV.

This accent upon the balance of the personality will bring about a more intellectual approach, a better conscience for personal peculiarities. The life of social man will become more colourful and more serene at the same time. Man, conscious of his social responsibilities, will know the balancing value of tastes and whims in private life better. Private life should be individual, may even be eccentric, but should not be uniform and stereotyped. Polymorphism of intellects keeps mankind adaptable, uniformity develops into fixed specialisations, which flourish and disappear. Too much specialisation in the individual upsets his balance, makes him over-serious and prejudiced. Specialisations should be temporary and often inter-

rupted by completely different occupations and diversions, in order to keep the balance of mind, which the specialist tends to lose so easily. The specialist, who forgets the moral commands over his activities, is not better than anybody else, who forgets them for different reasons. The same holds good for the business man and for any economic activities. There is no escape from duty into morally indifferent work, it is not less vicious than any other escape from duties. The increase of leisure with all men, which will be a characteristic of the future, will help to oust the pseudo-value of work, an invention of interested men in the last century, and will help towards more brightness and more colour in life without bad conscience.

V.

It should be more clearly understood, that work as such has no moral value. To work against the moral commands is positively vicious. To work for work's sake, to deafen oneself with the noise of work

against the voice of the moral commands, is vicious, too. It is a very frequent form of viciousness, particularly in the contemporary and so very temporary state of economics; it is usually confined to the privileged and the intellectually leading classes of the population. Parents who neglect the personal education of their children for the sake of work or its monetary results, do not follow the moral commands. All their arguments are lame excuses due to bad conscience. Philosophy is here in full accord with all the great religions, who without exception do not attribute any moral value to work or any other economic phenomena as such. It was left to pseudo-philosophical tendencies in the last few generations to greatly overvalue material goods and work as the creator of material goods. This is a very temporary and evolutionary phenomenon, which shows clearly the loss of balance in man through his recent development. Work and goods as such have no moral value. Future generations, with more than sufficient goods and less work to do, will smile at these

exaggerations and will again care for moral values. We should become conscious of being their responsible ancestors.

VI.

The great number of men and their unbalanced education and unbalanced life have brought about the problem of their occupation in times of leisure. All men will have more leisure in future, and their balance is the most urgent issue. Whoever follows the commands of the Philosophy of Responsibility will attain that balance of mind which makes any problems in leisure disappear. Firstly, the fulfilment of his extended social duties will take quite some time, and secondly, his more enlightened intellect will react better to the stimulants of the private sphere of activities. The balanced personality, the wise man, can even enjoy idleness without being bored. To feel bored when alone is often the symptom of an irregularly developed personality, accompanied usually by bad conscience on

account of the neglect of moral duties. To make men fit for leisure means to educate ourselves and them into well-balanced personalities. This is our moral duty. It may take time, but it can be done.

VII.

Different forces have different effects upon each other. If forces of apparently relatively small volume affect forces of much bigger volume strongly, we speak of *stimulants*. The rhythm of life depends very much on stimulants. Very small amounts of the products of certain glands, for example, profoundly influence the large human body. We find similar phenomena everywhere in nature and particularly in life. We find corresponding phenomena, too, in events of social importance. The mental balance of man depends very much on stimulants from within and without. The work of the nervous centre is at once affected by meals and by certain kinds of food and drink in particular. The whole body is im-

mediately affected by stimulants conveyed to the nervous centre through the senses. It is not a matter of quantity at all. Some very small events may have a much more stimulating force than more extended or continuous influences. It is therefore an implausible excuse for the lack of moral action to say, that one's own power is too small from the start ; the stimulating effect upon other forces cannot be foreseen in most cases.

Surprise and shock are perhaps the extreme forms of mental stimulants, and in this way they usually upset the mental balance. But a certain amount of stimulation is necessary for man, as regards climate as well as his social environment and his activities. The lack of stimulation—an ever clear sky, the same limited work every day, the same food, the same monotonous outlook—has disastrous consequences for man in his new phase of evolution, destroys his mental balance, makes him unfit to follow the moral commands and an easy prey for the preachers of pseudo-values. The uniform short-

sightedness in this respect of privileged classes throughout the world is quite amazing. To prevent this state of affairs should be the duty of all those who have the opportunity to do something about it.

It is a grave error to think that a well-balanced life is possible in the midst of badly-balanced fellow men. The existence of these fellow men serves to show, that the own moral duty has not been fulfilled, and bad conscience at once spoils the own personal balance. There is no happiness in the midst of unhappiness.

VIII.

Attempts to base moral rules upon man's striving for happiness must fail, simply because there are two kinds of happiness, private happiness and social happiness. His inherited emotions drive man only towards private happiness, while his intellect—as the result of education—commands him to work for social happiness. Both ends may be, or may seem to be, very much opposed to each other, and this

is the source of many tragical conflicts. Happiness is a pleasant state of emotions, which accompanies certain events or situations. To strive straight for happiness as such, is not possible, since it is a future relationship of many and often very uncertain forces, about which there is no knowledge, but only speculation. We can strive only for certain events or situations, which, we believe, will probably in their train bring about a feeling of happiness. Private happiness is found in the pre-social life of children, in the very private experience of love and mating, in the activities of the healthy body. Private happiness usually goes better with a certain amount of contentment and moderation prevailing in the make-up of the personality. Frugal and modest wants are easier to satisfy, and for the intensity of happiness the scale of needs as such is quite irrelevant. Nobody is happier than the child. Absence of private happiness becomes manifest as unpleasant emotions, gloom, sorrow, depression, indifference, melancholy.

Social happiness comes to man as the result of efforts in the directions shown by the moral commands. The impulse is not inherited, but is the result of intellectual activity and, indirectly, of education, transmitted in the new way of social man. Social happiness accompanies the knowledge of having done one's duty. Absence of social happiness becomes manifest as bad conscience.

Social and private happiness can serve as a substitute for each other in the balance of the individual personality. Disappointed in private experiences, men find happiness in fulfilling their social duties. Men who fail in their social duties may try to forget their bad conscience in private happiness. This substitution is a purely individual affair. From the point of view of mankind and the moral commands it may be—though it need not always be—desirable or even indispensable to keep the disappointed lover or the cripple away from social influence on account of their often unbalanced or freakish state of mind, while on the other hand happy family

life is no distinction or excuse for the man who behaves viciously in social life.

IX.

The most essential point in the Philosophy of Responsibility is the call for more activity, the creation of the new conscience. However, at the same time the accent on education and on the use of the intellect brings out the value of tradition. In fact, all moral commands are based upon man's new quality as a social being and the necessity of transmitting the intellectual property of the species in the rhythm of generations. Tradition, however, in the more restricted sense of the word as commonly used, means the maintenance of a fixed set of values in the course of generations, and this tradition is of special moral significance. It represents a positive advantage in so far as any set of values is better for the balance of the human mind than no set at all. It is, therefore, irresponsible and vicious to rob men of their belief in traditions without

being able to replace them with a new and better set of values. It is, for instance, wrong to deprive men with emotionally accentuated personalities of their religious creeds, while at the same time it might be our duty to educate the next generation with more accent on the intellect. Moral traditions are an advantage as long as they are truly observed by those who preach them. They become a serious disadvantage when they develop into hypocritical formalism. It is then time to replace them with a new set of values, because they are dead. Living, lived traditions are always valuable and can only be replaced by a new set of values, which conforms better with the general trend in human evolution at the period. Dead traditions are a mere hindrance and any set of values is better than that. To give an example from economics, let us take a society with a capitalistic tradition. This tradition may be alive in some place, where a family of capitalists actually represents the best possible administration, fully aware of its social duties and ful-

filling them in the best if somewhat patriarchal way. To replace this living tradition a definitely better economic system is needed, which will maintain the old advantages augmented by considerable new ones, otherwise it may not be justifiable to destroy the existing equilibrium. Such a better economic system may be possible, but it has to be thought over carefully ; usually some solution would have to be found, which would preserve the best parts of the tradition. On the other hand, some other family of capitalists may live in complete disregard of the social duties corresponding to its position in a capitalistic society. Then the tradition is dead, and any new set of values will be better. The same example can easily be repeated in the religious and political sphere ; the details do not belong to philosophy. Men must be true and men must act, and moral tradition means as much and as little as that a set of values has in the past been accepted and working.

X.

Social tradition becomes fossilised as law. The sum total of all laws forms the skeleton of any human society. It is accordingly the most rigid and unelastic part of this organisation. Laws as such have no moral value. They may serve to consolidate a very vicious system or person. They are merely the form of expression of the administrative will in the society and they depend very much on the way this administrative will is formed. It follows that it is everybody's duty to scrutinize the existing laws and to do all he can to alter them, if he finds that they do not conform with the moral commands.

It will appear that, from the point of view of philosophy, law as such is less important than laws, and that the different contents of laws call for special discussions. But the contents of laws belong to practical life and have to be valued each according to the moral commands. Very different views are held even about apparently fundamental social issues at dif-

ferent times in different places in the world. It is a matter of the relationship of many different forces. The strongest force is inertia. The advantage of laws is the confidence and security they provide in social life. This security, if it exists, may occasionally have some moral value in that it helps to keep the mental balance in men. In so far, even bad laws are sometimes better than no laws, though only temporarily. Without absolute security, i.e. if the extension and duration or the enforcement of a law depend on tyrannical whims, there is not even a trace of moral value left in laws.

Laws are only a means to an end, namely the existence of organised society. As such they are necessary. But there is one point about them, which the philosopher must emphasise: they must be true. Laws which cannot be enforced, laws which are not being enforced, laws which are completely obsolete and dead, are all equally pernicious and involve hypocrisy and untruthfulness.

Philosophy in the past has stood too much in the awe of laws, very often owing to the personal interests of philosophers. The task of philosophy is not to preach the respect for laws as such, but to make men fit to enforce good laws and to insist upon good laws and their enforcement. In this respect, philosophy demands more than most religions.

XI.

Similar is the relationship between philosophy and the state. There have always been enough mercenary philosophers, ready to build up systems with the state as the triumphal apex, and they have always reaped their harvest of honours. The state is only a means to an end, the organisation of society within some region. It has been said that the state is more than the sum total of its members. Nobody has ever seen this "more." It is a complete distortion of the facts. The state is much less than the sum total of its members. It is an organisation of forces, in which,

like in other similar relationships, very small forces stimulate and direct much bigger ones. These facts are aggravated by the growing number of men. A necessarily small number of men stimulate and direct very large numbers of men by many different means, including mercenary philosophy. The result is, that in many cases far too few of the available forces in society find expression in the direction of the state, and that vicious men may exercise decisive influence. The viciousness of statesmen often consists of their hypocritical untruthfulness and their inertia.

Philosophy is not concerned directly with the form of states. To work for the best possible form at different times and places is everybody's moral duty in fulfilment of the moral commands and with unprejudiced regard for traditions. The best possible political and economic way of organisation must be found in every case according to the moral commands. But possessions and rights do not make men good or virtuous. Important is the fourth command, demanding the chance of active

wisdom for everybody. This implies many favourable conditions and particularly the absence of many unnecessary strains upon men.

The state of to-day is a transitory phenomenon : an organisation between the family and mankind. It may disappear in its present form altogether, and it will have to be modified very soon in accordance with the growing number of men. The state as a very insufficient means of organisation for these large numbers of men is the cause of many present calamities. Still larger and at the same time much smaller units, simultaneously, will be the means of organisation in the future. This again will show how completely wrong every philosophy must be, which overrates this temporary institution.

XII.

As we have pointed out already, man in future will have more leisure. Only the balanced mind can enjoy leisure. The unbalanced mind is bored and endeavours

either to kill the time by amusements or to avoid leisure by escape into work, two ways of shirking one's moral duty. To enjoy leisure, men must educate themselves and others. Aesthetics must be learned. Art is a social phenomenon in origin and character. It is produced by men educated in society, and it is produced to be enjoyed by society. Contrary to other social phenomena, however, art is directed towards the evocation of private emotions. Means and ends of this evocation change with periods and regions. But the aesthetical effect is always a private one, caused by a social act—art. The particulars and transitions do not belong to philosophy proper. The enjoyment of art has to be learned, as is the case with all social phenomena, but the effect is a private one and serves to develop and balance the individual personality. It is particularly important as a stimulant, towards more activity for the lazy person, towards more introspection for the reckless man.

In many instances art has not this one-sided character, but is combined with

intellectual purposes in many different ways, from magic sculptures to advertisements. In all these cases two different elements, two groups of forces are combined within one and the same manifestation. As far as private emotions are stirred up, it is art ; as far as social emotions or intellectual forces are involved, it is not art. It is sometimes difficult to separate the two elements within the same work of art. Their relation does not involve the aesthetic value of the work of art in question.

XIII.

A similar mixture of private and social reaction to a social phenomenon, predominantly emotional, but with some intellectual admixtures, we find in religion. And actually art and religion have always been closely related, helping and stimulating each other. However, while the emotions produced by art are mostly of a serene and joyous character, religion is mainly based upon the emotion

of fear. Religion is the attempt to counter-balance this emotion of fear partly by intellectual, partly by emotional, forces. Philosophy is the attempt to eliminate it by intellectual forces only; there is consequently no affinity between philosophy and art.

The Philosophy of Responsibility does not reproach or ridicule any of the universal out-group religions, though it deplores the untruthfulness and hypocrisy of many of their adherents. It regards, however, in-group religions of national and racial character as fossilized anachronisms, not compatible at all with the development in number and intellect of man to-day. The universal out-group religions postulate sets of values, which have had their merits, but which are also not quite sufficient any more to-day. The most important, Christianity, is in its original form the most socially minded of the universal religions. However, it still overrates greatly the moral value of the individual and considers social duties only as accessories. Its metaphysical teachings

have been left behind by the evolutionary development of the intellect. Its moral teachings do not go far enough any more in the new phase of man as a social being. It is not enough any more to-day to love our fellow men as we do ourselves, though it may have seemed enough in a time, which expected the end of its very limited world in the near future. We as ancestors have the duty to work upon ourselves and our fellow men in order to direct mankind towards its optimal balance. We have to ask for more and different activity. The Philosophy of Responsibility emphasises man's duties as a social being and regards the private sphere as of secondary importance only. The commands addressed to the individual are not made for his private welfare or salvation, but based upon his responsibility, and if their fulfilment brings about happiness and the disappearance of fear for him, then this is an additional effect and not the end, just like the pleasures of love are an additional effect of the necessary function of mating. In this new phase of evolution

we ask more and promise less ; we can do that, because a new and important evolutionary development of the human intellect has taken place in the last hundred generations.

XIV.

To fulfil their task, religions need a heavy load of emotions, and as they are using the intellect only partly, they must try hard to exclude the full force of the intellect and to concentrate on this pile of emotions. Religions in this sense include many contemporary total world views rather than some of the older ways of thinking which go by this name. True religion must therefore be intolerant. Full use of the intellect, the admission that other ways are possible, distraction from the one and only preached direction of the emotional forces, would bring these religions to an end and have done so in the past often, though dead traditions may linger on. Philosophy does not experience this trouble. It is based upon the intellect.

Therefore it can and must be t o l e r a n t . The human intellect in all its variety and polymorphism is a part of nature. There is no nature as opposed to the intellect. It is the duty of the intellect to discover and to explore the forces around and within man. If it goes astray, it can always be brought back. It has to find its own balance within the individual personality of social man. For this purpose it must have as much scope and free room as possible. Men should be as tolerant as possible with each other as far as the necessities of social organisations permit. The moral commands extend our duties to activities concerned with our contemporaries and descendants. But it is their balance, their equilibrium, which we have to consider. While doing our best to help them, we can never know their future balance, only speculate about it, and as so many forces are involved in that, we must exercise tolerance with individual expressions, where the moral will exists ; tolerance towards men of good will, though they may be very different from us, but no tolerance

towards ill will, towards neglect of the moral commands, towards untruthfulness, towards immoral inertia, towards unbalanced fanaticism, which is always based upon insufficient use of the intellect, if not upon freakish conditions.

XV.

It may sometimes appear difficult to decide, whether the balance in man is upset through too much or too little use of the intellect. However, this view is only superficial. Not the maximal, but the optimal use of the intellect is being demanded. The new evolutionary phase of man as a social being with moral duties and the importance of his well-balanced equilibrium must be grasped, understood, appreciated by the intellect. The over-specialisations of men towards very restricted ends actually show insufficient use of the intellect. Scientific research without clear ideas about its social ends neglects moral duties and shows inadequate use of the intellect. To claim scientific

discoveries as progress for their own sake, postulates a value, where there is no value at all.

XVI.

Of all the emotions, which upset the balance of mind in man, fear is the most important, and nearly all other socially important emotions can be analytically reduced to fear, however much they might appear to be the contrary at first sight. It is an evolutionary phenomenon, which we must try to overcome by the forces of the intellect. It can be done and it must be done. It is the only way open to us to restore and maintain our balance and to aim at its optimal state throughout mankind: the supreme good.

