


+ ZP 1637 972 11

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

PERMANENT
[Illegible text]

1972

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES



Volume XI

June, 1972

GEORGIA DIPLOMATS
AND
NINETEENTH CENTURY
TRADE EXPANSION



Published by
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
A Division of the University System of Georgia
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XI

June, 1972

GEORGIA DIPLOMATS
AND
NINETEENTH CENTURY
TRADE EXPANSION

- Robert Sellen*
National Interests and the Diplomat's Role
in Nineteenth Century United States Foreign Policy 1
- Thomas A. Bryson*
William Brown Hodgson's Mission to Egypt 10
- James E. Southerland*
John Forsyth and the Frustrated 1857 Mexican Loan
and Land Grab 18
- William M. Gabard*
John Elliott Ward and the Treaty of Tientsin. 26
- Osmos Lanier, Jr.*
'Paramount' Blount: Special Commissioner
to Investigate the Hawaiian Coup, 1893 45

Copyright © 1972
Division of Social Sciences
West Georgia College
Carrollton, Georgia 30117

Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

With the exception of the essay by Dr. Osmos Lanier, Jr., the papers herein printed were read before the annual meeting of the Georgia Historical Society at West Georgia College on October 30, 1971. The theme and arrangements were coordinated by professors Thomas A. Bryson as committee chairman, Mollie Davis, T.B. Fitz-Simmons and J. David Griffin, all of the Department of History at West Georgia College. President Ward B. Pafford welcomed members and visitors to the day-long proceedings.

The *Studies in the Social Sciences* is an organ of the Division of Social Sciences at West Georgia College. Upon request, copies of this journal are provided free of charge to institutions of higher learning throughout the United States and abroad. The regular distribution is to all institutions of higher learning in Georgia, the five largest universities in each southern state, and approximately one hundred high schools throughout Georgia.

Eugene R. Huck, *Editor*
Roald Mykkeltvedt,
Assistant Editor

NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE DIPLOMAT'S ROLE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

By ROBERT W. SELLEN*

Four articles dealing with nineteenth century American diplomacy leave one with a thought which would be horrifying to traditional historians: William Appleman Williams may be right about something.

Williams, mentor of many of the "New Left" historians now teaching and writing, has written of America's combination of aggressiveness and *noblesse oblige*, its "mission to defend and extend democracy" while simultaneously seeking new markets,¹ and *expansion* (Williams' italics) as central to American history and expressed in agrarian zeal for new markets. This agrarian zeal, says Williams, gave us an imperialist outlook that carried us even to the present Vietnamese crisis in foreign affairs.² Williams' message is clear: examine the motives behind our deeds and examine the implications of those deeds. It is also clear that most Americans in every generation since the "founding fathers" have avoided such self scrutiny.

But what is so strange about Americans having "sordid" economic drives along with nobler goals? European statesmen and savants of the eighteenth century understood the concept of national interest and explained that such interest arose from a state's geographic position, size, character of its people, mercantile or agrarian economy and the condition of neighboring states. Motives in foreign affairs might be as much the expansion of trade as purely political. Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole asserted in the House of Commons in 1739, "This is a trading nation, and the prosperity of her trade is what ought to be principally in the eye of every gentleman in this House."³

"Diplomacy," says Charles Thayer, an American professional, "mediates not between right and wrong but between conflicting interests

*Professor of History, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.

¹ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962), pp. 162-72.

² William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York, 1969), pp. xii-xxiv and passim.

³ Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 23, 89-104.

⁴ Charles W. Thayer, *Diplomat* (New York, 1959), p. 252.

[and] . . . national aspirations.”⁴ Hans Morgenthau, patron of the “realist” school among political scientists and historians, puts it this way:

Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available. . . . Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially available. . . . Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible with each other. Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives. Failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardize the success of foreign policy. . . .⁵

If one considers the United States between the War of 1812 and the Civil War one comprehends some of the changes in its foreign policy. It was a nation of phenomenal growth; population rose from 8,419,000 to 31,513,000, the labor force from two and a half million to ten and a half million; the number of farm workers quadrupled, but non-farm workers increased almost nine-fold; the nation built 30,000 miles of railroads; ships in foreign trade went from 854,000 tons to 2,379,000 tons; exports rose from \$53 million to \$400 million; exports of manufactured goods, including manufactured foodstuffs, rose from \$18 million in 1820 to \$88 million in 1860; banking assets rose from \$400 million in the early 1830’s to \$1 billion by 1860;⁶ foreigners held, in the early 1850’s, some \$200 million of American securities—corporation and government stocks and bonds, but Americans themselves held another \$900 million worth.⁷ The United States was on its way to becoming a modern nation.

It is not strange that the United States behaved as a nation becoming modern. It had great pride in itself, paraded its nationalism on holidays and all other possible occasions, sought more territory as ravenously as any nation has done in recorded history, acquiring half the Republic of Mexico within a dozen years, and ventured abroad to claim such spots as Midway Island and to find commerce to assist an already rising national wealth and standard of living.

The elitist press in North and South had commented for generations on “advantages of opening a trade to Japan,”⁸ on a railroad across the continent or one across the Isthmus of Panama to increase our advantages in Pacific trade, for, after all,

A thrifty, trading people are the Yankees. . . . We, ourselves, have “put a girdle round about the earth,” and we have never

⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, 1960), pp. 539-40.

⁶ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, 1961), pp. 7, 72, 427, 445, 545, 624.

⁷ Reginald C. McGrane, *The Economic Development of the American Nation* (Boston, 1950), p. 279.

⁸ *The American Museum* (Philadelphia), IX (April, 1791), 186-89; I (March, 1787), 194-97; VII (March, 1790), 126-28.

sailed on any sea, nor visited any people . . . where there was not to be found some enterprising, trading son of brother Jonathan's, with his ships, his schemes, or his *notions*.⁹

There were 600 million people living on the shores of the Pacific and the opportunities for America in Asia were enormous:

The islander will cease to go naked—the Chinaman will give up his chopsticks . . . the moment they shall find that they can exchange the productions of their climate and labor for that which is more pleasing to the taste of fancy.

Do you suppose that the laboring classes of China would live and die on the unchanged diet of rice if they could obtain meat and bread?¹⁰

One would expect that in *De Bow's Review*, but one finds it in the *Southern Literary Messenger*.

At the end of the century, John W. Foster, grandfather of the late John Foster Dulles and a slightly stuffy specialist in international law rather than a Marxist-revisionist, began his book on our relations with Asia by commenting on our "notable spirit of commercial and maritime adventure."¹¹

Combined with this commercial motive was an American attitude of superiority to other peoples. In the era of Manifest Destiny we branded Mexicans as degenerate, vice-ridden, superstitious, filled with banditry and people too lazy to use the resources around them.¹² At the time of our war with Mexico an American army officer described that country's condition as the result of "an unscrupulous love of gain; and bigotry, superstition, and most arbitrary tyranny. . . ."¹³ Egypt was not only poor but full of indolent, ugly and malodorous people.¹⁴

As to China, rare indeed was the missionary who could be as realistic as President George B. Smyth of Foochow College:

It must always be remembered that China is a civilized country with a history and tradition of its own, with a national life of unexampled length, and all based on the teachings of a sage whom the whole nation honors. . . . Preaching the gospel in such a country as this is a very different thing from preaching it . . .

⁹ *The Southern Literary Messenger* (Richmond), XV (May, 1849), 259-66; XV (August, 1849), 441-57; V (January, 1839), 26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, XIV (April, 1848), 246-54.

¹¹ John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (Boston, 1903), p. 1.

¹² *Southern Literary Messenger*, I (February, 1835), 276; II (December, 1835), 10-11; XII (December, 1846), 755-62; VII (May and June, 1841), 398-421.

¹³ Roswell S. Ripley, *The War with Mexico* (New York, 1849), I, 27.

¹⁴ *Southern Literary Messenger*, XX (February, 1854), 106-108.

among South Sea savages where there are no obstacles of an old civilization. . . . All prophecies, therefore, including those of our globe-trotting Bishops, are utterly worthless.¹⁵

Americans before 1860 generally dismissed China as a land in which “the mind itself has been at a dead stand-still during a thousand years and more” and whose people were “curious, cunning, demi-civilized. . . .” Very often, travellers’ accounts of China dwelt upon the curious: tea-tasting, the rules of begging, Buddhist temples and harems.¹⁶

Even S. Wells Williams, labeled “an astute and knowledgeable China expert,” wrote harshly about the Chinese. His book, *The Middle Kingdom*, went through many editions between 1847 and 1900 and probably shaped American views of China more than any other book. It included this description of Chinese character:

With a general regard for outward decency, they are vile and polluted in a shocking degree, their conversation is full of filthy expressions and their lives of impure acts.

By pictures, songs, and aphrodisiacs, they excite their sensuality. . . . As long as they love to wallow in this filth they cannot advance. . . .

More uneradicable than the sins of the flesh is the falsity of the Chinese, and its attendant sin of base ingratitude; their disregard of truth has perhaps done more to lower their character in the eyes of Christendom than any other fault.¹⁷

This passage remained substantially the same in all editions, though, as Williams wrote in his preface, China had changed greatly since his book’s first edition.¹⁸

Such missionaries’ views fitted basic American perceptions of foreign lands. We know something of these perceptions from the press and something more from an exhaustive study of nineteenth century American schoolbooks. The mode of instruction in that day of less learned teachers was “letter-perfect memorization” without any critical faculties being brought to bear. American children learned and recited that Mexicans were cheerful, indolent and “averse to serious thought. . . .” China’s civilization might be ancient, but, as a geography book published in 1897 put it, “. . . we cannot say that the Chinese are a civilized people according to our standard, for they are not progressive . . . [and] their way

¹⁵ George B. Smyth to Rev. George T. Lemmon, May 11, 1898; Albert Shaw MSS, New York Public Library.

¹⁶ *Southern Literary Messenger*, XVIII (July, 1852), 403; XIX (July, September, October, 1853), 419, 425-28, 532-33, 615.

¹⁷ S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (New York, 1879), II, 96.

¹⁸ S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom* (New York, 1895), I, ix, 834.

of doing things and thinking about things is to-day just as we find it . . . to have been 2,500 years ago."¹⁹

American attitudes toward the rest of the world are crucial to understanding our diplomacy, especially its tendency to reach beyond reasonable goals. Theodore Geiger, in his recent study, *The Conflicted Relationship*, points to the United States as the extreme case of western man in relations between "civilized" nations and the "third world" or whatever one wishes to call the region of Africa-Asia-Latin America, which includes the countries dealt with by Hodgson, Forsyth, Ward, and Blount.

Says Geiger, "One of the most widely held convictions in the United States is that American society is a unique creation significant not only for the American people but also for all mankind." This notion is derived from "the Puritan conception that America's mission was to serve as a moral paradigm for the rest of the world" and from our belief that our political, economic and technological successes made America "a model that others naturally aspire to imitate." Many Americans have believed that the lack of progress by Asians, Africans or Latin Americans toward our "American way of life" stems from their inadequate efforts rather than inadequate American teaching or aid or flaws in us as a model. Our history has also "fostered an overly rationalistic and voluntaristic view of the nature of social change" and Americans believe that "individual and local group initiative and cooperation . . . can be readily adopted and applied in any society once their merits have been rationally explained." Because Americans do not study "third world" societies they do not understand the kind or magnitude of problems there, or why change is so slow. Frustrated in dealing with Asians, Africans and Latin Americans, we have tended "to dismiss them as morally deficient and incompetent and hence not likely to accomplish very much."²⁰

American diplomacy in the nineteenth century bore the burden of such attitudes. Small wonder that the Buchanan administration could assume that Mexico would sell us part of itself, for neither Presidents Pierce and Buchanan nor Secretaries of State William Marcy and Lewis Cass understood Mexican feelings toward the United States.

American diplomacy between 1820 and 1890 also bore the burden of American attitudes toward diplomacy itself. There was decreasing concern with international politics, decreasing grasp of national interest, decreasing levels of skill among our diplomats, increasing use of diplomatic posts in playing the patronage game, and no general attempt to professionalize the foreign service. America may have agreed with Euro-

¹⁹ Ruth Miller Elson, *Guardians of Tradition: American School Books of the Nineteenth Century* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1964), pp. 1-11, 156-65.

²⁰ Theodore Geiger, *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America* (New York, 1967), pp. 35-43.

peans in believing that the United States was not a great power but failed to grasp important European beliefs: the great powers were responsible for peace among the small nations, a professional diplomatic service was essential, and "sound negotiation must be continuous and confidential."²¹

Consider how most men entered the foreign service in the nineteenth century. Though some wanted to pursue a career in diplomacy, most were political appointees and Warren Ilchman says, bluntly, "The one qualification in force throughout the period was a 'connection' . . . with the party in power."²² Hodgson alone of the men in this volume was chosen for his linguistic expertise; the others had a partisan connection. This was hardly unusual. Indeed, two of our later professional diplomats began in similar ways. John W. Foster as a young lawyer in Indiana assisted so effectively in the election campaign of 1872 that Senator Oliver P. Morton told him, in effect, to pick any federal job that he wanted. Foster and his wife thought it would be nice to give their children experience abroad and he asked for the legation at Bern, Switzerland. He was offered Mexico and took the post, somewhat to his own surprise.²³ Joseph C. Grew, of a wealthy Boston family, having graduated from Harvard and travelled widely, did not want to enter business, thought diplomacy a pleasant life and applied for an appointment. He almost failed to be appointed until Alford Cooley, Assistant Attorney General and a close friend of the Grew family, told President Theodore Roosevelt of Grew's having shot and killed a tiger in south China. Said Roosevelt, "By Jove, I'll have to do something for that young man," and the next day named Grew Third Secretary of the Embassy in Mexico City.²⁴ If Foster and Grew did well despite their political or felicitous entry into diplomacy, many others served us ill. One thinks of Pierre Soulé, who as Minister to Spain behaved more like a matador than a diplomat, wounding the French ambassador in a duel.²⁵

What makes a good diplomat? Francois de Callieres, a renowned French envoy of Louis XIV's era, explained it all in *De la manière de négocier avec les Souverains*, published in 1716, which we may call, "how to deal with princes." The diplomat, he wrote,

should remember that open dealing is the basis of confidence; he . . . will never rely for the success of his mission either on bad faith or on promises that he cannot execute.

²¹ Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomacy* (New York, 1966), pp. 100-103.

²² Warren F. Ilchman, *Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939* (Chicago, 1961), pp. 3, 11, 41-42, 50-51.

²³ John W. Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs* (Boston, 1909), I, 3-5.

²⁴ Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era* (Boston, 1952), I, 12-13.

²⁵ William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, *The Foreign Service of the United States* (Washington, 1961), pp. 94-95.

The use of deceit in diplomacy is by its very nature limited, since there is no curse that comes quicker to roost than a lie that has been found out.

Menaces always do harm to negotiation, since they often push a party to extremes to which they would not have resorted but for provocation.

The good diplomatist must have an observant mind, a gift of application . . . , a sound judgment which takes the measure of things as they are. . . .

The good negotiator must have the gift of penetration such as will enable him to discern the thoughts of men and to deduce from the least movement of their features which passions are stirring within.

The good diplomatist must be quick, resourceful, a good listener, courteous and agreeable.

Above all [he] must possess enough self-control to resist the longing to speak before he has thought out what he intends to say.

He must be able to simulate dignity even if he does not possess it. . . . Courage also is an essential quality, since no timid man can hope to bring a confidential negotiation to success. The negotiator must possess the patience of a watch-maker, and be devoid of personal prejudices. He must have a calm nature, be able to suffer fools gladly, and should not be given to drink, gambling, women, irritability, or any other wayward humors. . . . [He] should study history and memoirs, be acquainted with foreign institutions and habits, and be able to tell where, in any foreign country, the real sovereignty lies.

Everyone who enters the profession . . . should know the German, Italian and Spanish languages. . . . also have some knowledge of literature, science, mathematics, and law. Finally he should entertain handsomely. A good cook is often an excellent conciliator.²⁶

Charles Thayer lists a good diplomat's qualities as: honesty, avoiding "localitis" or the belief that his spot is the center of all world affairs, political sensitivity, the ability to remain calm, acceptance of foreign peoples' ways, discretion, courage, wit if it is well controlled, and training in history, geography, economics and languages.²⁷

Applying these criteria to our four diplomats insofar as we know them and their abilities, how do they measure up? Hodgson was obvious-

²⁶ Quoted in Nicolson, *Evolution of Diplomacy*, pp. 88-90; for the full text see A.F. Whyte, trans., *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes* (Notre Dame, 1963).

²⁷ Thayer, *Diplomat*, pp. 240-49.

ly the best prepared of the four in languages and study of the region he dealt with; he had an observant mind, worked hard at his job, had political sense, accepted foreign ways, and was uncommonly successful in his mission in that he provided solid information upon which policy could be based.

Forsyth had political sense and knew Mexico, but he knew it as a hostile army officer and as one who wished the United States to dominate it. He had too little self control, far too much personal prejudice and inadequate background for his mission. Overreaching what his own government wished and then instructed to ask what Mexico would never do, he failed in his mission.

Ward had no specific preparation for his diplomatic task, knew no Chinese, knew little of Asian culture or history, but was evidently a superb negotiator in general. He possessed an observant mind, applied himself to his job, had dignity, self-control, patience, courage, calmness; and was willing to accept foreign ways up to a point. He was evidently prejudiced in that he shared the usual American attitude of superiority to Chinese. He accomplished the one specific requirement of his mission, exchanging ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin, and did write reports somewhat inferior in quality to those of Hodgson on the Near East. By nineteenth century diplomatic standards he was over-sensitive about kneeling to an enthroned sovereign.

Blount was honest, calm, observant, patient and a hard worker in accululating evidence, courteous and agreeable to both sides of the Hawaiian annexation question without accepting favors from either, wrote a report which affected presidential policy making, and handled himself with dignity and courage before a hostile Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While his recommendation to restore the Hawaiian monarchy did not ultimately prevail, he was one of few nineteenth century Americans who had respect for "native" governments. His attitude was noticeably more enlightened than that of Allan Nevins, who fifty years later dealt with Hawaii in his biography of Grover Cleveland and dismissed its culture in these words: "What civilization existed there was Anglo-American in origin."²⁸

Forsyth's experience is a microcosm of nineteenth century American diplomacy. The Buchanan administration, in seeking to acquire more Mexican territory, aroused lively suspicions toward the United States, souring relations which had been improving. Forsyth's own treaty went beyond what Mexicans would have preferred in American influence, and he appears to have had so much concern for American interests that he neglected Mexican feelings and interests. Thwarted, Forsyth took out his frustrations on the Mexican foreign minister.

²⁸ Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland* (New York, 1941), p. 551.

The United States has too often looked only at its own interests and desires, has sought only those and has sent agents abroad who had too little knowledge of and sensitivity toward other nations and peoples. Too often, it had ignored the limits of our power to achieve our goals and has failed to estimate the strength of opponents. Our often bitter relations with Mexico, our dogged support of Chiang Kai-shek in the face of Chinese realities, and our embittered attitude toward Mao's China are but a few examples of the results.

At least, in the cases dealt with in this volume, our nineteenth century political appointees served the United States better, on the whole, than one had any right to expect.

WILLIAM BROWN HODGSON'S MISSION TO EGYPT, 1834

By THOMAS A. BRYSON*

Scholars of United States diplomatic history have long been concerned with the westward thrust of pioneers to fill out the continental limits of the United States and with the subsequent push across the Pacific Ocean in pursuit of the lucrative China trade. But recently some historians have turned their attention to the pioneers making up the procession of American merchants, missionaries, and mariners who ventured into the Near East in the nineteenth century.¹ Indeed, James Field has observed that Frederick Jackson Turner's standing at Cumberland Gap in 1893, looking west as American settlers pushed the frontier toward the Pacific, gave a definite direction to the writing of American history. Field suggests that had Turner stood instead at Gibraltar looking east, he would have observed an "equally distinguished procession" of American pioneers making their way toward the Levant. The American penetration of the Middle East, Field asserts, has been an almost forgotten saga in the annals of United States history.² William Brown Hodgson was one of the early American pioneers who made his way to the Middle East in the early nineteenth century.

During the period following the War of 1812, many Americans turned from shipping to industry. This departure, brought on by British maritime policy during the war, required that the government provide a high tariff for the protection of infant industries and search out new markets for American merchants. Although Jacksonians eschewed the high tariff, a primary goal of National Republicans, they did look out-

*Associate Professor of History, West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia.

¹ See Roy F. Nichols, *Advance Agents of American Destiny* (Philadelphia, 1956); A.L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford, 1966); James A. Field, Jr., *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton, 1969); L.C. Wright, *United States Policy toward Egypt, 1830-1914* (New York, 1969); Robert L. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960* (Athens, O., 1970); and Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis, 1971). For a survey of work in progress in American-Middle Eastern relations, see John A. DeNovo, "Researching American Relations with the Middle East: The State of the Art, 1970," a paper delivered on June 17, 1969, at the National Archives Conference on the Archives of the United States Foreign Relations and soon to be published by the Ohio University Press.

² Field, *Mediterranean World*, 422-23.

ward in quest of new markets. In pursuing a policy of overseas commercial expansion, Jackson's Department of State was able to negotiate trade treaties with the British and Turks in 1830 and with Russia in 1832. Some Jacksonians even considered the possibility of obtaining the right to dig a canal through Nicaragua. While the latter was only a fond dream, diplomats during the Jacksonian era did push into the Far East and obtain the right to trade with Muscat and Siam.

Unfortunately, the American passion for overseas commercial expansion did not bear fruit in the Near East in the years following the negotiation of the Turco-American Treaty of 1830. In 1833 the Department of State decided to explore the possibility of opening new avenues of trade with Egypt.

Egypt had long been an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, but by 1833 her position in the Empire was doubtful. Mehemet Ali, the Turkish Pasha or viceroy in the Land of the Nile, had established himself as virtual dictator in the early 1830's. Although the American treaty of 1830 with Turkey gave American merchants the right to trade in Egypt, Mehemet Ali's defiance of the Sublime Porte made it questionable whether the right to trade still held good. Desiring to ascertain the relationship between the Pasha and the Porte, and hopeful of finding new commercial opportunities in Egypt, the Department of State decided to send William Brown Hodgson to Egypt as a secret agent.

Hodgson was born in Georgetown, District of Columbia, on September 1, 1801, the eldest son of Joseph and Rebecca Hodgson. He attended the Georgetown School of the Reverend James Carnahan, a Presbyterian clergyman who later became president of Princeton. Young Hodgson, taking the classical course, had liberal doses of Latin and Greek. Although he never attended the university, Princeton awarded him an honorary A.M. in 1824.³

In that same year of 1824 Hodgson made application on April 29 to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams for a position in the Department of State. His application carried the endorsement of Francis Scott Key, who said that he had known Hodgson since boyhood and that he possessed "excellent talents and an uncommon faculty in acquiring languages. . . ." ⁴ In 1825, Adams, now President, appointed Hodgson

³ See *Dictionary of American Biography*, (1st Supplement), 412-13 and Leonard L. Mackall, "William Brown Hodgson," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, XV (December, 1931), 324-45.

⁴ Department of State, Letters of Application and Recommendation, Monroe Administration, 1817-25, File of Wm. B. Hodgson, No. 0073, Record Group 59, National Archives.

as the Department of State's first language officer⁵ for the purpose of acquiring training in Oriental languages in order to facilitate the conduct of the nation's diplomacy with states in the Middle East. Henry Clay, Adams' Secretary of State, duly assigned Hodgson to William Shaler, the American Consul-General near the Barbary States at Algiers.⁶

A brief survey of Hodgson's diplomatic career prior to his departure for Egypt indicates that he achieved the high degree of professional expertise that John Quincy Adams had attempted to infuse into the Department of State during his tenure as Secretary of State. Hodgson served faithfully at Algiers between 1826 and 1829. Working under Shaler, he made admirable progress in the study of Arabic and Turkish. Ultimately, he was able to use the latter tongue to translate the 1816-Algerian-American treaty from Turkish into English. Following Shaler's departure from Algiers, Hodgson served as Chargé d'Affaires, 1827-29. While so serving, he submitted a number of excellent reports to the Department of State on the French blockade of Algiers, precursory to French conquest of that state in 1830.⁷

The young diplomat returned in late 1829 to Washington, where he took a post with the Department as a clerk. But in 1831, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren ordered him to proceed to Constantinople, there to deliver dispatches to Commodore David Porter, the new American Chargé d'Affaires and to assist in the exchange of the ratification of the 1830 treaty between Turkey and the United States. Hodgson returned from his mission in the winter of 1832, but not for long; spring found him returning to the Turkish capital to assume the position of dragoman* in the legation. He arrived in June and all went well until December when he began to complain about the unprofessional conduct of Commodore Porter. Hodgson lamented his superior's practice of nepotism, reporting to the Secretary of State that Porter had virtually excluded him from his duties in order to make place in the Legation for Porter's two nephews. For the remainder of his stay at Constantinople, the young career diplomat plied the Department with complaints about the Commodore's conduct, and begged for a transfer to some other

⁵ Charles Francis Adams, ed., *Memoris of John Quincy Adams: Comprising Portions of his Diary from 1795-1845* (New York, 1969), VIII, 170-71.

⁶ Adams, ed., *Memoirs*, VII, 106-07.

⁷ With respect to Hodgson's career at Algiers, I have consulted Department of State Dispatches, Algiers, RG 59, NA; the William Shaler MSS, Historical Society of Penna., Philadelphia; the Peter Force MSS, Library of Congress; Barbary," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXIV (January, 1950), 113-41.

*Interpreter. This term is commonly used in the Middle East.

post, preferably one of those on the Barbary coast. The feud culminated with Midshipman David Dixon Porter, the Commodore's son, giving Hodgson a beating.⁸

Unknown to Hodgson or Porter, word was on the way ordering the former detached from the post at Constantinople. The detachment came about in this manner. In June, 1833, Captain David Patterson, U.S. Navy, advised Secretary of State Edward Livingston that Mehemet Ali was virtually independent of Turkey and quite willing to make a commercial treaty with the United States. Patterson expressed the wish that he be given the task.⁹ This note apparently stimulated the Department's interest in Egypt, because on October 10, 1833, Secretary of State Louis McLane, successor to Livingston, advised Hodgson that he was withdrawn from the legation at Constantinople and was to proceed immediately to Egypt as a "confidential agent" to determine if Mehemet Ali of Egypt were free to make commercial treaties with foreign powers. The Secretary also requested Hodgson to "ascertain the Pasha's disposition towards the United States," to estimate the extent of commercial intercourse between Egypt and the other powers, to furnish an evaluation of the state of the European consulates in Egypt, to collect data that might be useful to American merchants in trading with Egypt, and to discover the best means for improving commercial relations between Egypt and the United States.¹⁰ Needless to say, Hodgson was overjoyed, because he had feared that Porter's malice toward him, as expressed in frequent recriminations to the Department of State, had wrecked his promising diplomatic career. Writing to McLane, the young dragoman acknowledged his gratitude "for this expression of the undiminished confidence of my government. . . ."¹¹

Hodgson kept the Department informed of conditions in the Near East and on the course of the progress of his mission. He wrote an excellent summary of events in the Levant, indicating a keen grasp of the complicated facets of the Near Eastern Question that had plagued European chancelleries for many years.¹² With respect to relations between

⁸ For Hodgson's career at Constantinople, I have consulted Department of State Dispatches, Turkey, RG 59, NA; the David Porter MSS, Library of Congress; David Porter, *Constantinople and its Environs, by an American* (2 vols., New York, 1835); David Dixon Porter, *Memoir of Commodore David Porter of the United States Navy* (Albany, N.Y., 1875); James E. DeKay, *Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and 1832, by an American* (New York, 1833); Archibald D. Turnbull, *Commodore David Porter*, (New York, 1929); and Finnie, *Pioneers East and Field, Mediterranean World*.

⁹ Patterson to Livingston, June 19, 1833, DSD, Turkey.

¹⁰ Dept. of State, Special Missions, Inst., #1 to W.B. Hodgson, October 10, 1833, 103.

¹¹ Hodgson to McLane, June 4, 1834, DSD, Turkey.

¹² Hodgson to McLane, June 10, 1834, *Ibid*.

Mehemet Ali and the Porte, he advised that "opinion is entertained here that a rupture . . . is as inevitable as is his independence sure."¹³ In another note, the young diplomat wrote that he had read in the *Alexandria Arabic Gazette* that Mehemet Ali was defiant and making warlike preparations.¹⁴ With regard to his mission, Hodgson, aware that he must keep his purpose confidential so as not to engender the ill will of the Turks, advised McLane that he would depart Constantinople on July 7 and travel as a "private gentleman." He said he would communicate with the Department by means of cipher when necessary. He told of his intention to travel to Syria, recently brought under Egyptian hegemony by force of arms, and also to the agricultural regions of Egypt. So as not to arouse Turkish suspicions, he said that he planned to travel overland to Smyrna where he hoped to charter a small vessel to carry him to Egypt.

Hodgson's journey to Egypt was uneventful. He arrived at Alexandria on July 21, having touched at the islands of Stanchio, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and made a brief visit to Beirut, the Syrian port of entry. At Alexandria, Egyptian authorities compelled him to endure a rigorous 21-day quarantine.

In the process of fulfilling his instructions, Hodgson submitted a preliminary report and two intelligence reports. In these he dealt, in large measure, with the relationship between the Egyptian Pasha and the Turkish Sultan, but he also provided a profile of the Egyptian economic picture, giving some emphasis to the development of an Egyptian-American trade. He advised that the Pasha was still viable, had only recently put down a revolt in Palestine, and was then awaiting an attack by the Sultan's forces on Aleppo with a view to restoring Syria to the Ottoman Empire. Hodgson observed that "Mehemet Ali presents the phenomenon, not uncommon in the Ottoman annals, of a prince *de facto* independent, and *de nomine* subject, to the Sublime Porte, paying no assessed tribute, and yet making large voluntary presents."¹⁵ He advised that the condition of quasi independence that now obtained would soon become full independence whenever the Pasha asserted himself to the fullest.

Hodgson also devoted considerable space in his reports to Egyptian economic production. In fact, he devoted himself almost wholly to commerce in the preliminary report. He noted that interviews with Mehemet Ali and Boghos Bey, director of external commerce, disclosed "that a more intimate connection might in future subsist between the two coun-

¹³ Hodgson to McLane, July 7, 1834, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hodgson to McLane, July 7, 1834, *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Hodgson to McLane, August 25, 1834, *Ibid.*

tries." Hodgson also interviewed Habib Effendi, the Lieutenant Governor, who gave him a thorough survey of the resources of Egypt. The American agent concluded that Egyptian produce was very similar to that of the United States. He compared that country to the plantation South, saying that it was a land of "agricultural wealth beyond measure." He stated that the Pasha, as in Pharaonic times, took responsibility for seeding the crops and inspecting their progress. Despite Egyptian economic similarities, Hodgson suggested that the modest, existing commerce might be augmented. He stressed that a number of Egyptian products could be exported to meet American demands, and listed such items as opium, gum Arabic, henna, incense, salt, saltpetre, flax-seed, dates, sesame, linen, and ostrich feathers as examples. Hodgson recommended that American merchants make their purchases in the winter, because this was the season when Arabs conveyed their products to market. In return, he suggested that the United States might export to Egypt such items as coal, tar and pitch, resin, turpentine, mahogany, lignum vita, dyes, rum, tobacco, pepper, pimento, cloves, sugar, candles, cotton goods, copper, lead, iron, lumber, staves and oars.¹⁶

Having inspected the important agricultural regions, talked to high government officials, studied the country's customs records, Hodgson departed Egypt in early November. He traveled via Malta and reached the United States in late February, 1835. He promptly filed his report to Secretary of State John Forsyth on March 2.¹⁷

Hodgson first addressed himself to Mehemet Ali's treaty-making power. He pointed out that the Pasha "exercised all the attributes of sovereignty" but that he had never "asserted his independence" and still acknowledged himself as a "vassal" of the Sultan. Hodgson stated that the Pasha's condition vis-a-vis the Sultan was one of "de facto independence and nominal subjection," a fact disclosed in an earlier report. He observed, however, that Mehemet Ali had neither exercised his treaty-making power nor had he entered into any commercial arrangements with any of them. He indicated that Britain and France, pursuing their respective national interests, were encouraging Mehemet Ali to assert his independence of the Sultan.

Regarding the second subject of his inquiry, a description of consular activities in Egypt, Hodgson furnished the Department with a remarkable account of diplomatic usage in the Near East. After listing the various consuls, he delineated the organization of the British consular organization, maintaining that it was the standard of diplomatic excellence and efficiency in the Near East. He declared that several of the

¹⁶ Hodgson to McLane, August 25, 1834 and September 28, 1834; Hodgson to Forsyth, December 2 and 13, 1834, *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Hodgson to Forsyth, March 2, 1834, *Ibid.*

powers employed students to study Oriental languages with a view to becoming trained for the office of dragoman. Recalling Commodore Porter's replacing him with two totally unprepared nephews, Hodgson warned that language students should not be chosen from among the "nephews and relatives of consuls" but rather from among university graduates, well versed in language study. Moreover, he stated that all legations employed a chancellor, because the capitulatory regime allowed the legations the right of extraterritoriality over its subjects, a right requiring the services of a man trained in the law. He cautioned that Mehemet Ali hoped to end the capitulations and bring Europeans under an Egyptian law code modeled on the Code Napoleon.

The third topic of his report, an assessment of Egyptian commerce and industry, Hodgson had covered partially in his previous communications. He declared that Egyptian commerce amounted to approximately \$17 million in 1832. The United States enjoyed no direct commerce with Egypt at that time, although some indirect trade was carried on by American merchants in the Red Sea. He said that the Pasha respected all treaties existing between the Sublime Porte and foreign powers and that the commercial regulations of Turkey obtained in Egypt. He said that trade between Egypt and other lands was based on the most-favored-nation principle with all paying 3% import tax.

Finally, Hodgson suggested that in order to facilitate trade it would be necessary for the Department to appoint a Consul-General in Cairo to protect American interests. In all probability, Hodgson asserted, such an official would have strength and prestige to further the sale of American ships, naval stores, and military supplies, which the Pasha badly needed. He concluded with the admonition that a treaty between the United States and Egypt would not be necessary because the Pasha accepted the 1830 Turco-American treaty as having the force of law in Egypt. But even though a treaty was not desirable, Hodgson advised that the Pasha very definitely wanted to further commercial and diplomatic relations.

Inasmuch as Hodgson's mission resulted in no treaty with Egypt and produced no marked increase in trade, what can be concluded about the mission? During the 1830's the United States was still a young nation, no longer enjoying the benefits of the British Empire with its far-flung commercial and diplomatic network. It was necessary to dispatch agents to the remote corners of the earth to advance American commercial and diplomatic interests and bring back vitally needed information. In this respect Hodgson provided a valuable service—because like John Ledyard, Luther Bradish, William Shaler, and a host of merchants, missionaries, and naval officers—he provided a fund of knowledge concerning commercial practice and diplomatic usage in the Middle East. Subsequently, Hodgson wrote a lengthy "Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Ali, Pacha [sic] of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia," which Peter Force published in 1837.

The Department did follow Hodgson's advice and elevate the American consular agent at Alexandria to the rank of Consul-General. Hodgson's mission also served as a model for other such missions sent out later in the century. To the extent that he created a feeling of amity and respect between the Pasha and the United States, he laid the foundation for closer relations and greater trade between the two nations in the post-Civil War era.

Hodgson's Egyptian mission ended on a happy note for both himself and for his former superior Commodore Porter. As the Commodore wrote his wife, "my mind is more at ease, for I have not that puppy Hodgson to vex me."¹⁸ Hodgson was greatly relieved to know that Secretary of State Forsyth quashed the Commodore's request for the Department to censure Hodgson.¹⁹ The young diplomat continued in the Foreign Service for about seven more years. The Department sent him on a mission to Tangier in 1835. In 1836 he was posted to London, to Washington in 1837, and finally to Tunisia as Consul-General in 1841. He resigned from the service in 1842 when he married Miss Margaret Telfair in London, and settled down in Savannah, Georgia to a life of scholarship and business.²⁰

¹⁸ Porter to Evelina Porter, March 20, 1835, David Porter MSS

¹⁹ Forsyth to Porter, September 10, 1835, Dept. of St. Instr.

²⁰ Following his death in 1871, his wife donated to the Georgia Historical Society the building known as Hodgson Hall. The building was dedicated in 1876 and has served since that time as the Society's archive. Hodgson's manuscript collection is held in this archive.

JOHN FORSYTH AND THE FRUSTRATED 1857 MEXICAN LOAN AND LAND GRAB

By JAMES E. SOUTHERLAND*

Traditionally, historians have distinguished between American expansion before the Civil War and that which emerged in the decades following that great American struggle. Professor Albert K. Weinberg refers to the former as agricultural Manifest Destiny, and the latter as commercial Manifest Destiny. The first type of expansion involves the direct acquisition of new territory for agriculture, while the second involves trade expansion.¹ This traditional interpretation of American expansion was challenged in the 1950's by such revisionist historians as William Appleman Williams and Norman Graebner who feel that the expansion prior to the Civil War was due to demands for increased trade and commerce as well as agriculture.² John Forsyth, Minister to Mexico in the late 1850's, espoused a policy designed to dominate that country economically and commercially. Unwittingly, he was a precursor of the brand of expansion that became increasingly noticeable after 1865. Forsyth's project also helps document the view of the revisionists and is the more remarkable because the South was supposed to be the center of land acquisition while the North espoused commercial expansion.

Forsyth, a native Georgian, was the son of the distinguished politician, John Forsyth senior, who was Minister to Spain, member of Congress, Secretary of State under Jackson and Van Buren, and Governor of Georgia. The younger Forsyth displayed an early talent in editorial writing, serving as editor of the *Columbus (Georgia) Times* and the *Mobile (Alabama) Register*. His editorials were dedicated to preserving the Southern institutions and way of life. Forsyth, throughout most of his career, was a staunch supporter of the Democratic Party since he felt the Northern Democrats were the true allies of the South. As a result of this support, Forsyth assumed a responsible role in the Alabama delegation to the 1856 Democratic nominating convention in Cincinnati. He and the Alabama delegation favored Franklin Pierce and continued

*Assistant Professor of History, Brenau College, Gainesville, Georgia.

¹ See Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Chicago, 1935).

² See William A. Williams, "The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of American Political Economy, 1783-1828," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, XV, 1958, 419-437, and *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962), pp. 18-19; Norman A. Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific* (New York, 1955), and his other writings on expansion.

to vote for the incumbent after his chances were hopeless. Six weeks later, Pierce appointed Forsyth Minister to Mexico in recognition of his support at the convention.³

Forsyth had served in the Mexican War and was a rabid disciple of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny and southern expansion at the expense of Mexico. The following statement indicates his views on expansion and White supremacy:

I am of course a believer in what . . . is termed "Manifest Destiny." In other words I believe in the teachings of experience and history, and that our race—I hope our institutions—are to spread over this continent and that the hybrid races of the West, must succumb to, and fade away before the superior energies of the the white man.⁴

Despite his open espousal of expansion, there was to occur in the first months of Forsyth's term a change in the character of American policy toward Mexico. The American Minister attempted to de-emphasize the territorial aspects of Manifest Destiny while stressing a United States policy of the 1900's in the Caribbean known as "Dollar Diplomacy."⁵

Affairs in Mexico were in the usual state of disarray when Forsyth arrived in October, 1856. Two years earlier, the Liberals had ousted the egotistical dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna. They hoped to build a new economic and social order in Mexico by curtailing the traditional power and privileges of the Church, army, and aristocracy. But the moderate Liberal Ignacio Comonfort, provisional president, found it a difficult task to carry out this program because of internal and external difficulties. On the domestic scene, Comonfort was constantly harassed by the Conservatives and radical Liberals—the eternal dilemma faced by politicians who occupy the middle way. British economic and diplomatic pressures were the source of his external problems.⁶

³ David R. Chesnutt, "John Forsyth: A Southern Partisan (1865-1867)" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Auburn University, 1967), pp. iv-vi, 6-11.

⁴ John Forsyth to William L. Marcy, April 4, 1857, No. 29, Dispatches from the U.S. Ministers in Mexico to the U.S. Secretary of State, 1823-1906, Vols. 21-22, Records of the Department of State, Washington, National Archives. (Hereafter, Dispatches).

⁵ J. Fred Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1931, pp. 212-213; Donathan C. Olliff, "John Forsyth's Ministership to Mexico, 1856-1859" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Auburn University, 1966), p. 20.

⁶ José M. Vigil, *La Reforma*, Vol. V of *México a Traves de los Siglos*, ed., Vicente Riva Palacio (5 Vols.; Mexico, 1962), pp. 56-62; Walter V. Scholes, *Mexican Politics during the Juárez Regime, 1855-1872* (Columbia, Missouri, 1969), p. 3.

Forsyth noted with chagrin the British domination of Mexico and the relatively weak position occupied by the United States. In view of this, the new Minister felt his instructions from Secretary of State William L. Marcy were innocuous. He was primarily supposed to allay the impression that the United States had "sinister views" regarding Mexico and stress the "friendly regards and fair purposes of the United States." He was also to work toward the betterment of American commercial relations with Mexico, particularly in the direction of more favorable tariffs.⁷

Forsyth immediately learned that there were radical Liberals in the Mexican government, notably the Minister of Finance, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, who favored an alliance with the United States which in effect would amount to a protectorate. These officials felt that only the intervention or guarantee of the United States could secure a stable government in Mexico and preclude European intervention.⁸ The radicals, no doubt, wished to use their neighbor to the North to enhance their own power and entrench themselves in office.

According to the contemporary Mexican historian José Fuentes Mares, Miguel Lerdo, prompted by the fact that Mexico was financially destitute, initiated the idea of Mexico becoming an economic protectorate of the United States. Fuentes Mares further contends that Forsyth was greatly influenced by Lerdo's thinking.⁹ Whether this is true or not is a matter of conjecture. The evidence seems to indicate that both men contributed to the formulation of the economic protectorate concept. Each saw it in view of his own individual interests.

Regardless of who initiated the idea, Forsyth was anxious to negotiate a treaty which would effect an American economic protectorate. He was very optimistic in mid-November 1856 when his good friend Lerdo was named Minister of Relations. Forsyth looked on the change as fortunate for the interests of the United States. Almost immediately upon assuming his new office, Lerdo formally opened the question of an American protectorate with the American Minister. Lerdo asked that a treaty with provisions for a loan and for the settlement of all outstanding questions be concluded as quickly as possible, "owing to the frequent changes of cabinet officers" in Mexico.¹⁰

⁷ Forsyth to Marcy, November 8, 1856, No. 5, Dispatches; Marcy to Forsyth, August 16, 1856, No. 2, Instructions of the U.S. Secretary of State to the American Minister in Mexico, 1823-1906. Vol. 16, General Records of the Department of State. Washington, National Archives. (Hereafter, Instructions).

⁸ Forsyth to Marcy, November 8, 1856, No. 5, Dispatches.

⁹ José Fuentes Mares, *Juárez y los Estados Unidos* (México, 1964), pp. 58-59.

¹⁰ Forsyth to Marcy, November 14, 1856, No. 6, Dispatches; Copy of the Report of an interview between Forsyth and Lerdo, National Palace, December 16, 1856, enclosed with Forsyth to Marcy, December 19, 1856, No. 14, Dispatches.

President Comonfort initially opposed the proposed treaty but in early February, 1857, driven by "hard necessities", he directed Lerdo to resume negotiations. In Forsyth's opinion, the "hard necessities" were of a financial nature. The rumor that a British fleet was on its way to Veracruz to enforce payment of debts by intervention undoubtedly influenced Comonfort.¹¹

The result was that agreements, consisting of three treaties and two conventions, were signed on February 10, 1857. The first was a routine postal convention; the second, a reciprocity treaty based upon that between Great Britain and Canada and providing for free trade in certain commodities between the two countries across land and river frontiers; the third, a treaty for the adjustment of outstanding claims; the fourth, a treaty under which the United States would lend Mexico \$15,000,000 in return for trade concessions; while the fifth was a general convention which stipulated that rejection of one involved the rejection of the whole. With the exception of the loan treaty, all the agreements signed by Forsyth were covered by his instructions. In this he acted entirely on his own initiative. He had earlier requested instructions on the loan possibility but the situation in Mexico, however, forced him to act before they arrived. Forsyth justified his independent action on political and economic considerations. There were constant rumors that warships were arriving at Veracruz, and it seemed that such intervention would result in the establishment of a puppet government in Mexico. He felt that the United States should help the Liberal government meet such a challenge.¹²

The American Minister further felt that the loan would be of great economic benefit to the United States. Forsyth had been greatly disturbed by the fact that Great Britain controlled such a large share of Mexico's trade. The loan would mean that this situation would be altered with the United States replacing Great Britain as the leader in Mexico's foreign trade.¹³

By the terms of the loan treaty, the United States would lend Mexico fifteen million dollars. Three million dollars would be kept by the United States Treasury to be used to settle American claims against Mexico. Four million dollars would be used to liquidate Mexico's debt to Great

¹¹ Alberto María Carreño, *La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre México y los Estados Unidos, 1789-1947* (2 Vols; México, 1951), II, 142-44; Forsyth to Marcy, February 2, 1857, No. 23, Dispatches.

¹² *Ibid.*, February 10, 1857, No. 24.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Britain.¹⁴ These seven million dollars would be repaid with four per cent interest.¹⁵ The remaining eight million dollars would go directly to the Mexican government, and would be repaid indirectly thru a rebate. This money would purchase commercial advantages, thus enabling the United States to dominate Mexico's economy.¹⁶

The rebate would apply to all American goods and to all European goods imported via the United States or in American vessels with the exception of cotton textiles. Only American manufactured cotton textiles would enjoy the rebate; French printed calico and English clothes would thus be excluded from the Mexican market. Mexican goods exported via the United States or in its ships would also be subject to rebates. Forsyth predicted that the loan would more than double American commerce with Mexico and would turn the major portion of the Mexican-European trade through the United States. American manufacturers of cotton fabrics would be able to compete with those of Great Britain "for a series of years to come, instead of being, as now absolutely excluded from the Mexican markets." The combined treaties, in Forsyth's opinion, would increase the United States' share of Mexico's foreign trade almost ten-fold.¹⁷

In one of his many later statements justifying the loan, Forsyth said that he considered the loan as a purchase of commercial advantage to support a "political end—that being to sustain Mexico and keep her from falling to pieces, perhaps into the hands of Foreign Powers, until such time as we were ready to 'Americanize' her." He looked on the loan as a "species of floating mortgage upon the territory of a poor neighbor, useless to her of great value to us," which in the end could be repaid by a "peaceful foreclosure with her [Mexico's] consent."¹⁸

The United States State Department and President Pierce did not see the treaties in the same light as did Forsyth. Partly because of the

¹⁴ This would prevent any British excuse for intervention and eliminate the "greatest lever of British political influence" on the Mexican government. Forsyth to Marcy, February 10, 1857, No. 24, Dispatches.

¹⁵ As a guarantee of repayment, thirteen per cent of all revenues taken from Mexican import duties would be assigned to the United States. *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Article 6 of the loan treaty specified a rebate of twenty per cent on all customs duties levied on trade between Mexico and the United States until such time as the total of the rebates equalled the eight million dollars plus four per cent interest.

¹⁷ Forsyth to Marcy, February 18, 1857, No. 28, Dispatches; *New York Times*, March 11, 1857.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, April 4, 1857, No. 29.

unorthodox method employed by Forsyth in negotiating the treaties; they were never submitted to the Senate for ratification. Forsyth had acted outside of the usual procedure by introducing a new element into American diplomacy with his novel loan treaty. The treaties reached Washington on February 26, 1857, just seven days before the expiration of Pierce's term as President. The outgoing President expressed "weighty objections" to some of the treaties, primarily the unique loan treaty, and decided to take no action on them.¹⁹ He simply left the matter to his successor, James Buchanan.

Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian with pro-Southern leanings, had been Secretary of State under President Polk during the hey-day of American expansion. He was a firm believer in further American expansion into Latin America as attested to by the fact that he had helped draw up the Ostend Manifesto which recommended the acquisition of Cuba by force.

The new President, however, disagreed with the reasoning behind the proposed treaties. Adhering to the more traditional forms of Manifest Destiny, he favored the acquisition by purchase of all or part of the northern Mexican states and territories of Baja California, Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. To Buchanan, Forsyth's treaty was a radical and dangerous departure from traditional American commercial policy based on reciprocity and the most-favored-nation principle.²⁰

Forsyth felt that he had not risked any great responsibility in meeting the situation as he did. He had simply taken advantage of the "golden opportunity" offered to him. He knew of the general feeling of many Americans who favored the further acquisition of territory in Mexico. But he expressed confidence that his government did not desire the gratification of this "public appetite" at the expense of the honor, dignity, and justice of her neighbor. Forsyth admitted that when he had begun negotiations the subject of territory had been fully in his thoughts; but it was one that could not have been broached directly to Mexico with any show of prudence. In the plan of Ayutla which brought the Comonfort government into power, the alienation of national territory was depreciated as an act little short of treasonable. Comonfort pledged against ever consenting to it and publicly stated that he would sooner die than alienate a foot of Mexican soil. In short, Forsyth found it impossible to acquire territory immediately and so he did the next best thing, which was to "pave the way for the acquisition hereafter of Mexico"²¹

¹⁹ Marcy to Forsyth, March 3, 1857, No. 11, Instructions.

²⁰ *Ibid.* Cass to Forsyth, July 17, 1857, Nos. 27 and 28, and March 11, 1857, No. 12; James M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (New York, 1967), pp. 245-46.

²¹ Forsyth to Cass, April 4, 1857, No. 29, Dispatches.

Ignoring Forsyth's arguments, the Buchanan administration instructed him to begin negotiations for an outright purchase of the provinces of Baja California, Sonora and the portion of Chihuahua north of the thirtieth parallel. He was also directed to reaffirm by treaty the United States' transit rights in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Buchanan was influenced in this by two Southern friends, Judah P. Benjamin, the former Whig senator from Louisiana, and Robert Toombs, senator from Georgia. Both men had a special interest in the Tehuantepec transit route, and also in plans for a charter of a railroad from the Rio Grande to Tiburon preparatory to the purchase of Sonora. Toombs recommended Benjamin as a replacement for the Mexican mission, but Buchanan, despite his disagreement with Forsyth, decided to retain the latter as Minister provided he forget about the February 10 treaties.²²

Impeded by the domestic upheaval in Mexico, Forsyth was unsuccessful in carrying out these instructions and was severely reprimanded by Secretary of State Lewis Cass in November for his failure. The American Minister was in the process of negotiating with Mexican authorities at the time of the reprimand, and these talks continued until the spring of 1858. In March, President Félix Zuloaga, the Conservative general who had ousted Comonfort a few months earlier, agreed to sell the desired territory. Shortly thereafter, however, there was a reversal of this decision. The exasperated Forsyth urged his government to use force to induce Mexico to meet her obligations, and incidentally to enable the United States to secure territory: "You want Sonora? The American blood spilled near its line would justify you in seizing it . . . You want other territory? Send me power to make ultimate demand for the settlement of the several millions Mexico owes our people . . ."²³

Shortly after this dispatch to Washington, Forsyth engaged in heated correspondence with Luis Cuevas, the Mexican Minister of Relations, ostensibly over Americans being compelled to pay a tax which in Forsyth's view amounted to a "forced loan." The real reason for Forsyth's

²² Cass to Forsyth, July 17, 1857, Nos. 27 and 28, Instructions; Robert Toombs to W.W. Burwell, March 30, 1857, in U.B. Phillips, ed., "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens and Howell Cobb," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1911* (2 Vols; Washington, 1913), II, 399.

²³ Cass to Forsyth, November 17, 1857, No. 33, Instructions; Forsyth to Cass, April 8, 1858, No. 73, and April 15, 1858, private letter, Dispatches. According to Buchanan's most recent biographer, this undiplomatic language reflected American reaction to the execution of the Henry A. Crabb expedition, the slaying by Mexicans of a group of Americans [allegedly] inside the United States border, and a "host of less spectacular executions, arrests, property seizures, and studied insults to official American agents." Philip S. Klein, *President James Buchanan: A Biography* (University Park, Pa., 1962), p. 322.

undiplomatic stance toward Cuevas was the former's disappointment at the failure of his negotiations for territory. This friction culminated in suspension of diplomatic relations by Forsyth on June 21, 1858. The Administration sanctioned Forsyth's actions and ordered the embittered Minister home²⁴—an ignoble end to a frustrating term in Mexico.

The February 10 treaties and Forsyth's other ideas for an American protectorate signalled the approach of a new type of imperialism which was to be prevalent in the United States' foreign relations after the Civil War. Forsyth was unaware of his role as a pioneer in the field of foreign affairs. He was a dyed-in-the-wool Southerner, as evidenced by his editorials in the 1840's and 1850's, who had an unyielding faith in "King Cotton" and the Southern way of life. Agriculture, not trade and commerce, was important to him and his beloved South. He did, however, understand the realities of political power in the United States and how this power was shifting and following the commercial North. It is highly probable that Forsyth wanted the United States to dominate Mexico much the same way as he saw the North increasingly dominating the South.²⁵

Forsyth also understood the realities of Mexican politics, and therefore was thoroughly convinced that no Mexican President would sell territory to the United States. The only choice left was an economic protectorate. Through this indirect device, the United States could dominate Mexico's trade and commerce without exerting formal political control, thus avoiding the responsibilities that are concomitant with annexation. This latter idea, rather than being farsighted, was no doubt a mere reflection of Forsyth's often-expressed sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority.

Regardless of his motives, Forsyth unwittingly was in tune with the tenor of the times. The United States was in the midst of a great change from an agrarian to an industrial nation in the decades just prior to the Civil War, and Forsyth's actions in Mexico were a reflection of this change.

²⁴ Forsyth to Cass, June 1, 1858, No. 77 and June 25, 1858, No. 49, Dispatches: Chesnutt, "Southern Partisan," p. 15.

²⁵ See Olliff, "Forsyth," pp. 121-22.

JOHN ELLIOTT WARD AND THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN

By WILLIAM M. GABARD*

Expansionism was a way of life to Americans of the mid-nineteenth century who had pushed their frontier to the Pacific Ocean. The China Trade, inaugurated in 1784 and popularized by the sleek Yankee Clippers, excited the imagination of Americans of vision. Protection for and development of this Asian commerce, along with other considerations, prompted America's Treaty of Wanghia with China in 1844. The astute Yankee Caleb P. Cushing negotiated the treaty which followed China's humiliating defeat by England in the First Opium War. Cushing insisted on the "most favored nation" principle, thereby obtaining all privileges for the United States granted to the British and other powers and, in addition, the right of extraterritoriality.¹

Missionaries, naval personnel, merchants, and politicians soon made Americans aware of the Celestial Kingdom; some argued for a more forceful and imaginative policy toward China. For example, a South Carolinian in 1849 believed that "the future history of the world must be achieved in the East. . . . The United States," he wrote, "are upon the coast of the Pacific, looking over the ocean with all the recklessness of adventure and thirst for gold."² America, he contended, was as much concerned with Asia as any nation in Europe; its Eastern commerce and Pacific settlements gave it the "privilege of neighborhood."³

In the Congress Northerners and Southerners were joined by the Californians in seeking improved commerce and communication with the East. Most Americans hoped for a transcontinental railroad and expansion in the Pacific area; all agreed that the United States had an excellent chance to challenge England's supremacy in China.⁴

*Professor and Head Department of History, Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Georgia.

¹ See John King Fairbank, *et al.*, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston, 1965), p. 146; Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, (8th ed., New York, 1969), pp. 299-305; Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East: A History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response, 1830-1970* (5th ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), chap. 6, *passim*.

² William Henry Trescott, *Thoughts on the Foreign Policy of the United States* (Charleston, 1849), p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.

⁴ Huan Ma Wen, *American Policy Between China and America as Revealed in the Debates in Congress* (Shanghai, n.d.), pp. 22-37.

Embroided in domestic questions of the gravest concern during the decade of the 1850's, the United States nonetheless followed a surprisingly active, if erratic, foreign policy which included a growing interest in the Far East. In 1854, Commodore Matthew H. Perry "opened" Japan where he established American preeminence. When the British and French in 1856 became engaged in the Second Opium War with China, the United States refused to participate because of her long policy of nonentanglement. President James Buchanan, himself once Secretary of State, formulated a China policy largely predicated upon a neutrality during the Taiping Rebellion which shook the very foundations of the Celestial Empire; a refusal to join the Anglo-French expedition and, consequently, a cooperation with Russia; and a settlement of America's diplomatic and consular problems arising from increased trade and involvement.⁵

Buchanan sent William Bradford Reed as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to China in 1857 as a political reward. Reed showed diplomatic skill in obtaining from the Chinese further concessions in the Treaty of Tientsin of June 18, 1858, a liberal extension and revision of the 1844 treaty. In sum, the treaty, along with those granted the European nations following the Second Chinese War, eventually opened China to the West. Particularly significant were those articles which granted toleration and protection of Protestantism and its converts, legalization of the opium trade, free access to China's interior, settlement of American claims, the reduction of tariff rates, and the right to maintain in Peking a diplomatic residence.⁶

Against the background of America's interest and involvement in China, a prominent Georgian, John Elliott Ward, served a term as American envoy from December 15, 1858, to December 15, 1860. Born in 1814 in Liberty County, Ward studied at Amherst College. A Democratic Unionist, he became a resident of Savannah and was admitted to the bar. He served as Solicitor-General for the Eastern District of Georgia, United States District Attorney, member and Speaker of Georgia's House of Representatives, and Mayor of Savannah. The Democratic National Convention which met in Cincinnati in 1856 selected him as

⁵ See the appropriate selections on Lewis Cass in Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (18 vols., New York, 1963-), VI, 297-304, 305-23, and 369-75; Philip Gerald Auchampaugh, *James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve of Secession* (Lancaster, Pa., 1926), pp. 11-12.

⁶ For the complete text of the treaty see Document No. 198 in Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States*, VII, (Washington, 1942), pp. 793-805.

its presiding officer.⁷ Ward's selection suggested "the connecting link between the past and the present," one newspaper observed; the same journal later reported that a "dozen outbursts of applause" welcomed Ward when he spoke at a party rally in New York, attesting to his general popularity among Democrats, North and South.⁸ Ward's enthusiastic support endeared him to Buchanan, elected President in 1856. Although Ward enjoyed political success on a national level, his talent did not go unnoticed by his constituents in Georgia.

Ward had been elected in 1857 to the Georgia Senate, which body elected him president.⁹ While serving in that position in 1858, he accepted President Buchanan's offer of the American Mission to China, which a Savannah newspaper called "the beginning of a new era in the history of American commerce."¹⁰ He resigned his Georgia Senate post in late November, 1858, and on December 15 the United States Senate confirmed his appointment.¹¹ In general, Ward's selection for the China mission met with approval. Although he had not held a national office, he was widely known as a moderate and as a conciliator between North and South. Ward's "wonderful tact. . . wonted sagacity, . . . kindness and conciliation" broke down, a state historian believed, the traditional antagonism between coastal and up-country Georgians.¹² One newspaper praised Ward's "dignity, courtesy, and ability, alike just and creditable" in his legislative leadership and noted with apparent pleasure that a "Southern man, from a cotton State" who was "deservedly esteemed, . . . a public servant, honest, faithful, and well qualified" was selected to head the China mission. Another state newspaper observed that, "His deeds, his worthy deeds alone, have rendered him immortal."¹³ When the *New York Journal of Commerce* endorsed Ward, it noted that he enjoyed a "reputation extending far beyond the borders of his own State."¹⁴ A few weeks before his appointment, Ward par-

⁷ For information on Ward, see "John Elliott Ward," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., *Dictionary of American Biography* (22 vols., New York, 1928-1958), XIX, 426-27, and *United States Diplomatic Officers, 1789-1939* (3 vols.) I, p. 1027.

⁸ *Louisville Courier*, June 4, 1856; *ibid.*, June 18, 1856.

⁹ W.W. Gordon to Nelly Kinzie, October 5, 1857, in Gordon Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; *Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia . . .* (Columbus, 1857), p. 6.

¹⁰ *Savannah Daily Morning News*, November 5, 1858.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, November 28, 1858; *Boston Daily Evening Transcript*, December 16, 1858.

¹² I.W. Avery, *The History of the State of Georgia from 1851 to 1881, . . .* (New York, 1881), p. 51.

¹³ *Federal Union*, January 5, November 9, 1858; *Savannah Daily Morning News*, November 30, 1858.

¹⁴ As quoted in the *Federal Union*, December 7, 1858.

participated in the Atlantic Cable Celebration in New York. Significantly and prophetically, he responded to the toast to "Woman", when he said, "Great as were the binding ties of the cable, there was a greater tie between men of two hemispheres—Woman."¹⁵

Although he had not been abroad, much less to the Orient, Ward had some familiarity with China. He was a friend of Bishop Stephen Elliott of Savannah, whose sister married Bishop John W. Boone, Episcopal bishop of China; he was on close terms with John McIntosh Kell, who cruised along the China coast in 1844-54; and he was a friend of Commodore Josiah Tattnall, a Savannahian who had commanded the *Powhatan* in the China Seas.¹⁶ Moreover, his marriage into a prominent Boston family, his vacations in Newport, and his residence in Savannah—all cities in the "China trade"—must have made him aware of its significance.

John Elliott Ward then appeared to be an admirable selection for the China mission in 1858. The Treaty of Tientsin had been ratified by the United States on December 21, 1858, and Ward's principal duty was to exchange ratifications in Peking. Commissioner William B. Reed, scheduled to leave China, urged President Buchanan to send a "first-rate man" for the Peking post, "a most delicate and interesting one."¹⁷ Reed warned that China's government was where "temporary expediency" often supplanted "what is understood as law and authoritative precedent," and that its officials were guilty of "mendacity . . . and treacherous habits." Reed added that until Ward arrived in China, Dr. S. Wells Williams, an American missionary in China since 1833, would serve as charge d'affaires.¹⁸ In the United States the President's Asiatic policy was "an extension of his program to achieve rapid, safe, transcontinental transit and looked to the fulfillment of Asa Whitney's dream of the United States as the funnel of Oriental trade to Europe."¹⁹ Buchanan believed that California's "peculiar geographical" position and the recent conclusion of treaties with China and Japan, two "rich

¹⁵ New York Times, September 3, 1858.

¹⁶ Stephen Elliott to R.W.B. Elliott, January 7, 1858, in W.R.B. Elliott Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.; John McIntosh Kell, *Recollections of a Naval Life*, . . . (Washington, 1900), p. 65; Charles C. Jones, Jr., *The Life and Services of Commodore Josiah Tattnall* (Savannah, 1878), pp. 74-78.

¹⁷ W.B. Reed to President James Buchanan, September 2, 1858, in U.S. Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter cited as Despatches, China.)

¹⁸ W.B. Reed to Secretary of State Lewis Cass, September 4, October 21, and December 8, 1858, in Despatches, China.

¹⁹ Philip Shriver Klein, *President James Buchanan: A Biography* (University Park, Pa., 1962), p. 326.

and populous empires," would entice "American capital and enterprise into the fruitful field." The President observed that the nation which dominated trade with Eastern Asia had "always become wealthy and powerful."²⁰

While others supported China policies, John Elliott Ward made personal preparations for his diplomatic mission. He had married the former Olivia Buckminster Sullivan, of Boston, who had never liked Savannah. Since she could not go to China, Ward arranged for her to live in Florence, Italy, and he accompanied her and the children there.²¹

In mid-January, 1859, as Ward and his family left Savannah aboard the *Augusta* for New York, "the Chatham Artillery fired a salute . . . in honor of their late commander," as a "large concourse of citizens" watched their "distinguished fellow townsman" depart.²² By the end of January, Ward at the New York Hotel reported his plans to leave for Liverpool on February 2, 1859 on the *Arago*, accompanied by his wife, children, brother, and a cousin, Maria McIntosh, the author.²³ His predecessor, William B. Reed, was enroute home, and there was hope that he and Ward could meet.²⁴ The new minister was in London by February 23, where Benjamin Moran, secretary of the American legation, visited them. Moran wrote that amid the confusion of baggage, porters, and waiters surrounding the Wards he found Ward "extremely agreeable" and "a refined gentleman" who had "a good head and excellent manners."²⁵ The new American minister received attention from George M. Dallas, United States Minister to England, who attended

²⁰ President Buchanan's 2nd Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1858, in John Bassett Moore, ed., *The Works of James Buchanan* (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1909), I, 273.

²¹ Laura B. Locke to Louisa Bulloch, November 1, 1858, in Bulloch Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Hereafter cited as Bulloch Papers). Ward, who was to receive \$12,000 annually as minister to China, chose as the secretary of his legation his brother, W. Wallace Ward, whose salary would be \$3,000. Dr. S. Wells Williams, serving in the interim period as charge d'affaires, was to be interpreter for the mission at a salary of \$5,000. See *Register of Officers and Agents, Civil, Military and Naval, in the Service of the United States on the Thirteenth September, 1859*. (Washington, 1859, p. 9.

²² Savannah *Daily Morning News*, January 17, 1859.

²³ J.E. Ward to A.H. Derrick, January 29, 1859, in Despatches, China.

²⁴ George M. Dallas, *A Series of Letters from London. . . .*, ed. by Julia Dallas (Philadelphia, 1869), pp. 93-94.

²⁵ Sarah Agnes Wallace and Frances Elma Gillespie, eds., *The Journal of Benjamin Moran, 1856-1865* (2 vols., Chicago, 1949), I, 510.

dinners for the Wards given by Lord Lyndhurst and Mr. T. Baring.²⁶ On March 2, 1859, Moran, a constant critic of Dallas, went to a levee at St. James' Palace, and bitterly recorded the failure of the minister to present John E. Ward at court while instead he presented the young son of an Episcopal bishop.²⁷

By mid-March Ward was in Paris where he was presented to Emperor Napoleon III and had a "long interview with Count Walewski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in relation to China." He also announced his plans to meet Reed, who was returning from China. In Lyons, on March 25, Ward had a "satisfactory" interview "for which the President was so anxious, and which was very important to the success of the Missions." Reed was apprehensive, Ward reported, that he would have "some difficulty" in reaching Peking and "much trouble" in enforcing the collection of American claims against China. Ward then wrote of his intention to proceed to Marseilles and Alexandria, from which he would travel overland to Port Said, where he would board a steamer for Aden, and thence to Bombay.²⁸

Dr. Williams, who managed the American legation's affairs for five months, had been a resident of China for twenty-five years. He condemned the coolie traffic from China and the participation of Americans in the trade as worse than black slavery and called upon Christendom to suppress the iniquitous practice. The charge d'affaires earlier warned that the Chinese disliked all Western nations and if they appeared friendly to America it was because they feared England and Russia more. Williams hoped that the Treaty of Tientsin's provision for interior travel in China would remove from the Chinese officials their "ignorant hauteur", and that the ratification of the treaty would bring "lasting benefits to the Chinese as well as to our own countrymen."²⁹

Although China was disrupted by civil war, the European Allies took no part but waited for the arrival of the ratification of the Treaties of Tientsin. Lord Elgin's brother, Frederick W.A. Bruce, represented the British; A. de Bourboulon, France. In addition to his principal duty of exchanging at Peking the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin, Ward also was adminished to carry on peaceful negotiations regarding trade and American claims, and to be neutral toward England and France. He

²⁶ Susan Dallas, ed., *Diary of George Mifflin Dallas While United States Minister to Russia, 1837 to 1839, and to England, 1856 to 1861*, (Philadelphia, 1892), pp. 311-13.

²⁷ *The Journal of Benjamin Moran*, I, 512.

²⁸ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, March 17 and 26, 1859, in Despatches, China.

²⁹ S.W. Williams to O.H. Perry, April 27, 1859, and S.W. Williams to Lewis Cass, January 1, 1859, and March 12, 1859, in Despatches, China.

also was urged to cooperate with the Russians, who had promised assistance to him.³⁰

Ward proceeded from Italy, where he left his family, to Aden and thence to Georgetown, Penang. There he was met by the U.S.S. *Powhatan* which had been sent to convey Ward and his party to China. Commanding the ship was Commodore Josiah Tattnall, a fellow Georgian and personal friend. The American party spent several days at Georgetown where British officials offered lavish entertainment.³¹

The new minister soon had his diplomatic qualifications tested. Reportedly the Russians already had established a legation at Peking, and the British and French ministers were due to arrive at Hong Kong which Ward reached on May 10. There Ward was "for several days busily engaged in receiving and returning visits from all the foreign, diplomatic, and naval dignitaries in the city and harbor."³² But Ward did not remain long in Hong Kong; he had been advised by Reed in Lyons to avoid that city if possible and to proceed "as quickly as possible to Shanghai."³³

In late May, Ward and his party were in Shanghai where Williams and the Reverend W.A.P. Martin, the American mission's interpreter who had been taken aboard in Ningpo, communicated to the Imperial Chinese commissioners the minister's desire to call upon them. "It was evident that they had no objections," Williams recorded, "to our going to Peking." The Chinese appeared willing to exchange ratifications "on the spot," if such were desired. "Nothing seemed further from their minds . . . than the possibility of any trouble in our negotiations this year."³⁴ Indeed, Ward met the commissioners twice in Shanghai, once at the yamen (Haggate, official headquarters of a mandarin) occupied by the Chinese officials, and at the residence where he stayed. A party of twelve officers and a guard of sixty marines escorted Ward and sev-

³⁰ Lewis Cass to J.E. Ward, January 18, 1859, *Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801-1906, China*, National Archives, Washington, D.C., January 18, January 22, and February 21, 1859; *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, XVIII (January, 1859), 254.

³¹ For details of Ward's voyage to China, see Lieut. James D. Johnston, USN, *China and Japan: Being a Narrative of the Cruise of the U.S. Steam-Frigate Powhatan, in the Years 1857, '58, '59 and '60, . . .* (Baltimore, 1861), p. 192, 208-11, (hereafter cited as James D. Johnston, *Narrative*); *Singapore Straits Times and Journal of Commerce*, April 16, May 7, 1859; and Donald Davies, *Old Penang* (Singapore, 1956), p. 34.

³² *Singapore Straits Times and Journal of Commerce*, April 23, 1859; and Charles C. Jones, *The Life and Services of Commodore Josiah Tattnall*, p. 80.

³³ W.B. Reed to S.W. Williams, March 26, 1859 in Frederick Wells Williams, *The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, L.L.D., Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue* (New York and London, 1889), pp. 294-95. (Hereafter cited as S.W. Williams, *Life and Letters*.)

³⁴ S.W. Williams's Journal, May 31, 1859, in *ibid.*, p. 297.

eral members of the mission, all in sedan chairs, to call upon the Chinese. Lt. Johnston recorded that the "greasy populace" stared in "admiring curiosity" at the colorful procession which received "the usual three-gun salute." Then came "fulsome compliments to the guests, painful self-detractions from the hosts . . . , and, finally, a grand collation of the gastronomic abominations in which Mandarins delight, and from which *human* nature revolts." When the Chinese returned the call, the commissioners decided in the course of the interview to go to Peking, a long journey, to prepare for Ward's arrival. No obstacles impeded the exchange of ratifications. The Chinese first wished to confer with the British and French ministers who reached Shanghai June 6; however, the Europeans refused to see the Chinese and on June 13 started for the Peiho River, preparatory to the trip to Peking.³⁵ Within three days Ward's entourage left for the north aboard the *Powhatan*, with the *Toeywan*, a 175-ton chartered steamer, in tow. Dr. Williams expressed the hope that the French and British (the latter able to land 4,000 troops at the Peiho should the need arise) would not find it necessary to fight their way to Peking for fear of reopening the war concluded by the Treaties of Tientsin. "But God has His plans," he wrote prophetically, "in this part of Asia as elsewhere, breaking down barriers and furthering His truth by many agencies that missionary societies could hardly practice or afford."³⁶

John Elliott Ward earlier had written to Secretary of State Lewis Cass that he hoped to proceed to Peking as soon as possible and exchange the treaty ratifications.³⁷ But the delaying tactics of the Chinese and the Allied show of force were destined to thwart his aims. The problem of the Celestial Kingdom granting such vast concessions as was done at Tientsin in 1858; the necessity to maintain honor when more than twenty "barbarian" gunboats lay at anchor only eighty miles from the Emperor's palace; the rebuilding, reputedly with Russian help, of the forts at Taku that had been destroyed one year earlier; and the impatience of the British and the French when they discovered no officials waiting to conduct them to Peking—all led to the opening of hostilities that disrupted the delicate negotiations for the exchange of treaty ratifications. The Allies decided to force their way to Tientsin, to pass through the iron stakes positioned by the Chinese and to prevent entrance to the Peiho River past the Taku forts.³⁸

Aboard the *Toeywan* with Commodore Tattnall on June 24, Ward attempted to approach the fort as near as the stakes would permit. A

³⁵ James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, pp. 224-27.

³⁶ S.W. Williams to Rev. W.F. Williams, June 13, 1859, in S.W. Williams, *Life and Letters*, pp. 298-99.

³⁷ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, May 3, 1859, in Despatches, China.

³⁸ See L.N. Wheeler, *The Foreigner in China* (Chicago, 1881), p. 108, and W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay* . . . (New York, 1896), pp. 190-92.

representative of the Chinese assured a landing party that the Emperor had issued orders to conduct the ministers to Peking. The Emperor, however, desired that they go to Pehtang, a town a few miles north of the river entrance leading to Tientsin which was not open to Western powers. On June 24 the British began to remove the obstructions which prevented advance past the forts and on the following day they bombarded the forts. The Chinese batteries responded in a fierce battle which caused the Allies losses of more than 400 men. During the hostilities, Commodore Tattnall, who required Ward to leave the *Toey-wan*, violated American neutrality by towing British launches containing soldiers into the battle scene and by ordering Lieutenant Johnston to have 200 men prepared to join in the Allied assault. Martin and Johnston reported that the Commodore, in going to the aid of the Allies, exclaimed that "blood is thicker than water."³⁹ Official despatches did not allude to Tattnall's statement.⁴⁰ One historian alleges that Tattnall, who had Ward's consent to help the Western nations, represented Southern prejudice in favor of white men against colored (yellow) opponents. Williams believed that Tattnall's action "compromised the Americans with the Chinese." Johnston commended Ward's approbation of his fellow Georgian's help, which he called a "generous and noble impulse." Lord Lyons, the British minister in Washington, commended to Secretary Cass the "friendly feeling manifested" and the assistance given by Ward and Tattnall. To Lord John Russell he wrote that President Buchanan, in reporting one newspaper's criticism of the Georgian's "improper departure" from neutrality, believed that the assistance rendered Britain "had met with the hearty approbation of the great majority of the people of the United States."⁴¹

Whatever the consequences of Tattnall's action, the Peiho hostilities complicated and delayed Ward's principal mission to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin. The *Toey-wan* went north on June 29 to explore the shore off Pehtang. There a landing party from the American mission was able to establish contact with the Chinese and discuss arrangements for Ward's journey to Peking.⁴² The British feared that the American was attempting to be the first to obtain an audience with

³⁹ S.W. Williams, "Narrative of the American Embassy to Peking in July, 1859," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1, 1859, 7-9. (Hereafter cited as S.W. Williams, "Narrative"). See also James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, pp. 229-35, and W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 192.

⁴⁰ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, July 4, 1859, in Despatches, China.

⁴¹ Tyler Dennett, *Americans in East Asia . . .* (New York, 1922), p. 370 n.; S.W. Williams, *Life and Letters*, p. 304; James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 233; Lord Lyons to Lewis Cass, October 17, 1859, and Lord Lyons to Lord Russell, October 17, 1859, as quoted in Charles C. Jones, *The Life and Services of Commodore Josiah Tattnall*, pp. 107-8.

⁴² James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, pp. 240-42.

the Emperor and suspected Russo-American cooperation.⁴³

John Elliott Ward and his suite went ashore July 8 at Pehtang and proceeded to the residence of Heng-fu, the Governor-General of Chili province. Noting that the Imperial Commissioners had not reached Peking, Ward returned via the *Toey-wan* to the *Powhatan* where he and the legation remained until July 10. Meanwhile, an American steamer with two Russian officials aboard anchored near the *Powhatan*; the Russians and Americans exchanged visits and salutes and established the "most friendly relations."

On July 20, John E. Ward, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, selected a party of thirty, including his brother Wallace, S. Wells Williams, W.A.P. Martin, Lt. Alex W. Habersham, a surgeon, a chaplain, a parson, an engineer, two attaches, three marines, and ten Chinese servants and prepared to leave on an historic journey to Peking.⁴⁴ Because the Americans' route to the Celestial Capital was somewhat circuitous, many critics, especially the British and the French, condemned the Americans for consenting to the trip. But Chinese officials, compelled by the Treaties of Tientsin to receive "outer barbarians" as equals, were alarmed. One of the Imperial Commissioners wondered why the Allies brought more than twenty warships to the mouth of the Peiho for an exchange of treaties. The barbarians' "unreasonableness and defeat at Taku," he wrote to the Emperor, had made them "full of revenge," but he hoped for peace. Referring to the Emperor's directive of July 11 to conduct Ward to Peking, Sengkolinstsin, a Chinese official, suggested a route to avoid Tientsin, where the inhabitants, "because of the recent war may verbally offer some offense" to the "barbarian ambassador."⁴⁵ Another official feared that Ward, who had denied complicity in the Peiho affair, might act as a mediator for the "barbarian" English and French and possibly create trouble by corresponding with the Russians, already in Peking. Reports represented Ward as "very respectful and compliant" but "very impatient" about going to Peking.⁴⁶ Concerned over the Peiho hostilities, the Emperor warned, "Let there not be the least carelessness." Since Article Five of the treaty stipulated that the American minister's passage to Peking be prepared by local officials along the route, the Emperor gave Ward permission to ride from the Pehtang landing overland in a sedan chair. From Tung-chau, Peking's

⁴³ Ernest J. Eitel, *Europe in China* . . . (London, 1895), p. 355.

⁴⁴ James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, pp. 246-49; and S.W. Williams, "Narrative," pp. 11-12.

⁴⁵ Memorial of Sengkolintsin to Emperor, July 14, 1859, in T.F. Tsiang, "Documents: China After the Victory at Taku," *American Historical Review*, XXXV (October, 1930), 80-82.

⁴⁶ Memorial of Heng-fu to Emperor, July 11, 1859, in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, With Documents* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 585-88.

port on the Peiho, he could use a cart or mule litter, but it was "virtually impossible" to permit him to use a chair in Peking.⁴⁷ When Heng-fu met with Ward, the latter agreed to go by cart when assured that the Russians, already established in Peking, never rode in chairs.⁴⁸

Since Taku and Pehtang were equi-distant from Peking, Ward's party did not protest the latter route which it followed, departing July 20. Heng-fu told Ward that the Emperor treated men with "sincerity, profound grace, and generous favor," and Ward promised to intercede with Britain and France in behalf of China.⁴⁹ Thus began an epochal journey, colorful but controversial. When Ward and his party agreed to go in carts, critics contended that he assumed the same role as tribute-bearing nations such as Korea. Ward's interpreter wrote that it "was a mistake for Mr. Ward to accept a cart in the first instance." Martin called the action Ward's "only weakness," unless his consent to Tattnall's unneutral action at Taku be counted.⁵⁰ S. Wells Williams, in his official "Narrative" of the mission to Peking, defended the use of the carts, which he called "carriages" and described as vehicles without springs or seats, "covered with canvas and oiled cloth," and drawn by one horse or driven tandem. Williams argued that sedan chairs could have been used, but he pointed out that coolies could not carry chairs over the muddy plains. By July 21, the party reached Pehtang, ten miles above Tientsin on the river. There the legation boarded five boats and reached Tung-chau, the port of Peking, on July 27. Although "carriages" were available for the overland trip, the group "preferred horseback or walking," because of the terrible conditions of the road to the capital. The arrival in Peking on July 28 was "dissappointing," for the avenue through the wall's entrance was a quagmire. The party found lodging in a nineteen-room house formerly occupied by a disgraced prime minister. On the next day began the negotiations with the Imperial Commissioners, assisted by Judge Sieh of Kiangsu. The latter hinted that, because of Ward's role at Taku, the Emperor doubted the "sincerity of the peaceful professions of the Americans; . . ." On the following day Ward and three of his group went by horseback outside the Forbidden City where he was met by the commissioners attended by one hundred officials. The Emperor reportedly wished to honor Ward, not only as a personal gesture but as a mark of his respect for the President of the United States.⁵¹

Then arose the issue of an audience with the Emperor, which was not mentioned in the treaty. The Chinese argued that the audience should precede the exchange of ratifications. Since Ward was not from

⁴⁷ Imperial Edict, July 14, 1859, in *ibid.*, pp. 593-94.

⁴⁸ Memorial of Heng-fu to Emperor, July 17, 1859, in *ibid.*, pp. 597-98.

⁴⁹ Memorial of Heng-fu to Emperor, July 23, 1859, in *ibid.*, pp. 603-05.

⁵⁰ W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 198.

⁵¹ S.W. Williams, "Narrative," pp. 12-16.

a tribute-bearing state, he would be required only to perform "one kneeling and thrice knocking," instead of the traditional thrice kneeling and nine knockings required in the kowtow. Ward refused to perform the abbreviated kowtow because, according to Williams, "to kneel was . . . a religious act and he did so only in the presence of God."⁵² But others who knew Ward as a devout Episcopalian and a chivalrous Southern gentleman believed that he refused to perform the kowtow by declaring, "I kneel only to God and woman."⁵³ Ward, in reporting to Cass about the audience question, declared simply that he "would neither kneel nor prostrate my person before his Majesty."⁵⁴

Finally, the commissioners, negotiating on hot days when a cloud of fine dust covered Peking "like a lurid pall," proposed that the Emperor, in a special conciliation, would permit Ward to bend his knee and touch the floor with his finger. Ward countered by offering to stand with head uncovered, to bow several times, and not to turn his back on the Emperor. This offer of obeisance also was unacceptable to the Chinese, who devised a clever way to save face for the Emperor, accustomed to abject homage. Ward would pretend to begin to prostrate himself, but be raised up by chamberlains; the minister would then present the letter of credence from President Buchanan to a courtier who, while on his knees, would present it to the Emperor. Ward's adamant refusal even to this compromise ended the audience discussions. Williams defended the Chinese against the charge that they were "insincere and dogmatic." He argued that they genuinely wanted an audience as a demonstration of friendship, but custom and tradition could not be ignored before members of the court.⁵⁵

Since Ward was in Peking but could not see the Emperor, he decided to present the President's letter to the commissioners who could then offer it to the Emperor. As there were no instructions requiring him to see the Emperor, the American legation would return to Peh-tang where the treaty ratifications would be exchanged with Heng-fu. Although the Emperor preferred that Ward return to Shanghai far from the Imperial capital, for the ratification ceremony, "We, mindful that he braved the seas and came from afar . . .," permitted him to perform exchanges at Peh-tang.⁵⁶ On August 16, 1859, Ward completed his major duty at Peh-tang without significant ceremony when he exchanged ratifications of

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

⁵³ J.W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* (New York, 1904), p. 250; and W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 200.

⁵⁴ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, August 20, 1859, as quoted in *U.S. Senate Executive Document*, No. 30, 36th Congress, 1st sess., p. 595.

⁵⁵ S.W. Williams, "Narrative," pp. 20-23.

⁵⁶ Imperial Edict of August 9, 1859, in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians*, p. 617.

the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858. Heng-fu observed that Ward's "speech was entirely respectful and compliant" and that the legation was "grateful for Imperial benevolence and pleased no end."⁵⁷ Ward reported that he was received in Pehtang "with every mark of respect."⁵⁸ After more than three months in China, Ward completed his principal mission.

The treatment of the American legation had been courteous but not cordial. Hence Ward was ridiculed unmercifully because of his journey to Peking in carts and the restrictions placed upon him there. "The newspapers at Hongkong have generally thrown discredit on the visit of the American ministers to Peking," S. Wells Williams noted, "ridiculing some things, doubting what they pleased, and showing their proficiency in vituperation. It is sad to see the bitterness of these papers against the Chinese." W.A.P. Martin felt that Ward had "displayed courage" in a difficult situation. On the other hand, Lt. Johnston believed that "all were gratified" by Ward's perseverance in completing the exchange of ratifications, "although it had been accomplished at some little sacrifice of national and ministerial pride."⁵⁹ To some historians, Ward reached Peking ". . . but both on his journey and in the capital he was treated with great ignominy . . . as a tribute-bearer from one of the neighboring countries."⁶⁰ Although the English and French regarded Ward's mission as a fiasco, others observed that, while the former withdrew from the Peiho in discomfort, the American and Russian ministers "gained all the advantages sought or expected of them."⁶¹ Another view held that Ward had acted entirely in conformity with his instructions and the treaty provisions.⁶² Ward's completion of the chief purpose of his mission at Pehtang permitted him to board the *Powhatan*, anchored for one month in the outer harbor, and to sail on August 18 for Shanghai.⁶³

The minister's departure for the south did not, however, allay the controversy surrounding his trip to Peking, especially his mode of transportation in a country where ceremony and form were paramount.

⁵⁷ Memorial by Heng-fu to Emperor, August 20, 1859, in *ibid.*, pp. 619-20. Heng-fu's interpreter was a former pupil and namesake of Bishop John W. Boone; see W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 202.

⁵⁸ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, August 20, 1859, in *U.S. Senate Executive Document*, No. 30, 36th Congress, 1st sess., p. 598.

⁵⁹ S.W. Williams, *Life and Letters*, p. 323; W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 201; and James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 270.

⁶⁰ D. Bonner-Smith and E.W.R. Lumby, eds., *The Second China War, 1856-1860* (London, 1954), p. 391.

⁶¹ L.N. Wheeler, *The Foreigner in China*, p. 109.

⁶² En-Sai Tai, *Treaty Ports in China: A Study in Diplomacy* (New York, 1918), p. 50.

⁶³ James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 271.

"Jonathan's Ride to Peking," an eight-stanza verse to the tune of "Yan-kee Doodle" was published in *Punch*. The concluding stanzas concerning Ward's mission delivered a stinging rebuke and malicious ridicule:

 Their mission ended, from their cage
 Politely liberated,
They were, in that same equipage
 They came in, re-located,
And brought, with care particular,
 To where they first intruded,
Like blacks inside a nigger-car,
 As snug, and more secluded.
I reckon that's the way to treat
 Our great and glorious nation,
And offer humble pie to eat
 To them as flogs creation!
But we must swaller down our pride,
 When dollars we are seekin'
And be content, old hoss, to ride
 In a hoss box up to Pekin.⁶⁴

Another English publication told of Ward's ride to Peking in vehicles "not unlike horse-boxes" and confinement in the capital. "The whole affair seems to have been humiliating," the *Illustrated London News* noted, "and not in accordance with the dignity of a great nation." But in a later issue, the *News* reported that New York newspapers expressed "satisfaction" with Ward's treatment and called English accounts of the mission "unwarranted." Within two years, the *News* carried sketches and a detailed account of the type of cart used by Ward. It described some as "beautifully finished" and "much patronized by the fair ones of Peking."⁶⁵

S. Wells Williams wrote that "a ridiculous rumor, illustrated by appropriate pictures" about Ward's travel in a "box," circulated in Paris. He attributed the *jeux d'esprit* to "the popular sentiment in France of what was expected from the Chinese, . . ."⁶⁶ In response to a critical review by *The Times* of Ward's mission, the American minister to England reported that news from the Russians in St. Petersburg confirmed his belief that Ward was well received in China. "The truth is," he observed, "that the contrast between peaceful and bullying diplomacy is becoming painfully clear, and must be obscured by *canards*." Dallas bitterly condemned English journals and statesmen who took "special pleasure in trying to make Mr. Ward ridiculous." Ward's "manly and

⁶⁴ *Punch*, XXXVII (October 5, 1859), 152.

⁶⁵ *The Illustrated London News*, XXXV (November 9, 1859), 432, XXXV (December 3, 1859), 520, and *ibid.*, XXXVII (February 23, 1861), 159.

⁶⁶ S.W. Williams, *History of China*, p. 317.

glorious impulses" during the "critical moment" of the fight at Taku saved the life of the British admiral." The "inconsistencies of false pride know no end," he concluded.⁶⁷ In the United States his mission to the Celestial Empire had been dramatized by the celebrated Dan Rice Great Show. Ward had been "equestrianized" by the theatrical group in Philadelphia, according to a Georgia newspaper.⁶⁸

Ward's wife, Olivia, living in Italy suffered keenly the absence and reported treatment of her husband. "It has been a half year of incessant anxiety," she wrote, "It is paying very dear for honors . . ." Mrs. Ward described in detail the caricatures which had appeared in *Punch*: "Just what one would expect from the English . . . They are the most arrogant people on the face of the earth."⁶⁹

While the world discussed the controversial American mission, John Elliott Ward left Pehtang, site of the treaty ratifications, and reached Shanghai August 22, 1859. During his month's stay in the latter city, he received "with great pomp and ceremony" the Emperor's reply to President Buchanan's letter presented in Peking. Lt. Johnston described the Imperial document as "enveloped in a cumbrous roll of yellow silk, the shape and dimensions of which gave it very much the appearance of a fat baby in swathing bands."⁷⁰ Ward also received and began negotiations for the conventions—one for the revision of tonnage duties and the other for the opening of two additional ports—stipulated in the recently-ratified Sino-American treaty. Suspicious that Ward, brooding over English ridicule of his mission, might be in collusion with the British, prompted the Chinese to conclude that he was "unusually cunning. This is his basic nature."⁷¹

Ward found the atmosphere in Shanghai drastically changed since his stay there three months earlier. "The disastrous result of the battle of Peiho has done much to unsettle the conditions of things in China," he wrote. He noted the change in the "whole manner and bearing" of the Chinese toward foreigners. Westerners in Shanghai were "under the painful apprehension" of an attack on the foreign settlement.⁷² While Ward awaited further negotiations with the Chinese, he left with his suite on board the *Powhatan* September 18 for a visit to Japan. One

⁶⁷ G.M. Dallas to Lewis Cass, October 28, 1859, and G.M. Dallas to W.B. Reed, November 4, 1859, in George M. Dallas, *A Series of Letters from London, . . .* pp. 163-65, 166.

⁶⁸ *Savannah Daily Morning News*, March 27, 1860.

⁶⁹ Olivia S. Ward to Louisa Bulloch, October 13, 1859, in Bulloch Papers.

⁷⁰ James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, p. 297.

⁷¹ Memorials to the Emperor, September 5, 18, and October 4, 1859, in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians*, pp. 625-32.

⁷² J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, September 1, 1859, in *Despatches, China*.

month later, after a visit to Japan,⁷³ Ward sought to resolve with the Chinese the two supplemental conventions relating to two new ports and tonnage dues. After lengthy negotiations, an Imperial Edict of November 15, 1859, officially authorized the opening of two additional harbors, Swatow and Taiwan, where a brisk American trade already was in progress.⁷⁴ Ward appointed a committee to settle American claims against the Chinese. By November 19 he could write to Cass that he had issued a proclamation on November 8, 1859, regarding the publication of the Treaty of Tientsin "for the general guidance of all to whom it may concern." The ports of Swatow and Taiwan, he announced, would be opened to American commerce and residence in January.⁷⁵

John Elliott Ward and his suite left Shanghai, arrived November 21 at Hong Kong, and later went to Canton where he had an interview with Imperial Commissioner Ho. The latter wrote that Ward declared he "had abundantly received His Imperial Majesty's extraordinary Heavenly Favor and the people of his entire nation were grateful." Ho believed that Ward's demeanor reflected his "respectfulness and compliance . . . [as] expressions of complete sincerity."⁷⁶ Ward then went to Macao where he remained several weeks and supported the suppression of the iniquitous coolie trade, a practice which the California gold rush had fostered. Ward allowed Chinese authorities to remove 317 coolies from an American ship to ascertain whether any were detained against their will. None returned to the vessel. He also recommended that the State Department urge Congressional action on the coolie trade, which grieved him deeply.⁷⁷

As early as July 4, 1859, shortly before going to Peking, Ward had expressed to Cass his desire to leave China in March of 1860 and to return home by way of Europe to visit his family. Later Ward reported that the Treaty of Tientsin was in full force and that claims of Americans in China had been adjudicated. He wished to leave his post in the fall and travel through Europe to Washington, there "to give an account

⁷³ While in Nagasaki Ward purchased a Japanese suit of armor which he gave to Commodore Tattnall. The latter presented the armor to the Georgia Historical Society where it remains today. In Edo, Ward also called upon Townsend Harris, the American minister, who presented his visitor to the Shogun. See James D. Johnston, *Narrative*, pp. 278-303, *passim*; J.E. Ward to Josiah Tattnall, October 20, 1859, in Josiah Tattnall, Jr., Letters, Manuscript Department, Duke University Library, Durham, N.C.

⁷⁴ As cited in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians*, p. 638.

⁷⁵ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, November 19, 1859, in Despatches, China.

⁷⁶ Memorial of Ho to Emperor, January 6, 1860, in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians*, pp. 643-44.

⁷⁷ S. Wells Williams, *History of China*, p. 311; J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, February 24, 1860, in Despatches, China.

of my Stewardship and to surrender up my Trust to the present Administration." Ward was anxious to leave, but he wrote that the "present condition of China is such that my departure might be commented upon by the enemies of the Administration and regretted by its friends." In a later dispatch, he also requested a six-months leave of absence from the date of his departure from China. He then promised to remain until the end of the year "by which time the difficulties between China and the Allied Powers will either have been adjusted or become chronic. . . ."78

In May, Ward returned from Macao to Shanghai where he met the Russian minister, General Nikolai P. Ignatieff. Soon Baron de Gros and Lord Elgin arrived in Shanghai. In July, the Allies sailed north with warships, some 17,500 troops, and a coolie corps of 2,500. With all aspects of the Sino-American treaty settled, the Chinese were apprehensive of Ward's desire to come to Tientsin, fearing collusion between the Americans on the one hand and the Allies and the Russians on the other. To forestall such an eventuality, the Emperor encouraged his Grand Councillors "to cause Russia and America and England and France all to suspect one another; . . ." In desperation before the formidable barbarian force threatening China, His Celestial Majesty authorized his officials to urge Ward to mediate with England and France; the only stipulation in their coming to Peking was that Ward's route of 1859 be used.⁷⁹ The Chinese presented food to the Americans who, in return, gave Heng-fu, the negotiating official, "two cases of foreign wine."⁸⁰ In spite of Ward's conciliation efforts, he was compelled to write Heng-fu that, because of America's neutrality, he could not discuss "the crooked and straight, right or wrong" differences between China and the Allies. In brief, his role as mediator was a failure.⁸¹ Instead, the Allies marched on Peking in October, the Emperor fled to Jehol, and the invaders, in a dastardly crime, sacked and burned the Summer Palace, an area more than six miles in length. By 1860 China was fully opened to the West and made significant cessions of land east of the Ussuri River to the Russians.⁸²

As the Allies advanced upon Peking, John Elliott Ward returned to Shanghai which, although under attack from the Taiping rebels, he de-

⁷⁸ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, July 4, 1859, and February 13, 24, and March 26, 1860, in *ibid.*

⁷⁹ Memorial of Hsueh Huan to Emperor, July 13, 1860, and Imperial Edicts of July 30, 31, in Earl Swisher, *China's Management of the American Barbarians*, pp. 651, 652, 662-63, 667-68.

⁸⁰ Memorial of Prince Seng to Emperor, August 3, 1860, in *ibid.*, pp. 670-71.

⁸¹ J.E. Ward to Heng-fu, August 4, 1860, in *ibid.*, p. 675.

⁸² Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, *The Far East*, pp. 94-95; John King Fairbank, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation*, pp. 170-73.

scribed "as perfectly quiet, and no apprehension felt on account of the Rebels." He then announced his intention to visit the "open ports."⁸³ Ward eventually reached Hong Kong where he informed Cass that he was availing himself of the leave of absence granted by President Buchanan May 8. He left for Aden aboard the steam-frigate *Niagara* on December 15, 1860, two years after his appointment to the American post. From Aden he went to Italy to rejoin his family.⁸⁴ By the time of his arrival in Europe, Ward found the American Union dissolved. He then decided to leave his family in Italy, was in New York by late March, and proceeded to Washington to report on his mission to the State Department. From the capital of the Union he was able to cross on the last ferry boat leaving for Alexandria. By April 23, 1861, Ward was back home in Savannah. There he would follow an interesting, if enigmatic, career during the Civil War.⁸⁵

John Elliott Ward spent two and one-half years as minister to China. His major assignments were to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858, to adjudicate American claims against Chinese, and to maintain the neutrality of his country. President Buchanan believed that Ward, "in obedience to his instructions," proved "fully equal to the delicate, trying, and responsible" position in which he was placed. "The friendly and peaceful policy" of the United States toward China was eminently satisfactory.⁸⁶ The native Georgian had served his country well; indeed, an English journal observed that the ministers of the United States and Russia, "whose management of Chinese peculiarities we should do well to imitate," succeeded where England failed.⁸⁷

It is difficult to assess the impact of Ward's mission on the China trade. In the 1850's Karl Marx believed that the "wild views" on the possibilities of trade with China, once the Celestial Empire was "opened" to Western nations, were "high flown anticipations [which] had no solid ground to stand on." Marx concluded that, "after a careful survey of the history of Chinese commerce, . . . the consuming and paying powers of the Celestials have been greatly overestimated."⁸⁸ On the other hand, an American commercial journal contended that the Chinese had been

⁸³ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, September 20, 1860, in Despatches, China.

⁸⁴ J.E. Ward to Lewis Cass, December 14, 1860, in *ibid.*; Winfield Scott Schley, *Forty-five Years Under the Flag* (New York, 1904), p. 20.

⁸⁵ W.M. Gabard, "The Confederate Career of John Elliott Ward," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, LV (Summer, 1971), 177-207, *passim*.

⁸⁶ President Buchanan's 4th Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1860, in John Bassett Moore, ed., *The Worlds of James Buchanan*, XI, 29-30.

⁸⁷ *The Illustrated London News*, XXXVII (July 21, 1860), 48.

⁸⁸ *Marx on China, 1833-1860: Articles from the New York Daily Tribune* (with an Introduction and Notes by Dona Torr) (London, 1951), pp. 64, 87.

“galvanized into human intercourse by two potent agents”—Christianity and California gold. The Taiping Rebellion caused a significant shift of the tea trade from Canton to Shanghai; by 1860 the American trade with Shanghai had been growing in a “two-fold” ratio for many years. The emigration of Chinese to California after the gold rush ultimately resulted in an investment by Chinese businessmen of America of \$2 million in the San Francisco-China trade. Gold, lumber, and cotton goods constituted the major American exports to China; tea and silk were the chief commodities sought in China. Sino-American trade certainly increased after the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin, but two rebellions, the Taiping in China and the Civil War in the United States, prevented an immediate upsurge of the legendary China Trade. But the prospect of 420 million Chinese who might purchase American cotton goods was still tantalizing.⁸⁹

W.A.P. Martin, an early “China hand,” believed that America, “so remote as to exclude suspicion of a design on Chinese,” free from entanglements, and “sufficiently powerful and sufficiently enlightened to command respect . . .” would be a good Samaritan to China.⁹⁰

From 1844 to 1945, the United States generally sought to trade with China, to Christianize her, to insure her territorial integrity, and to bring her into the community of nations. The United States developed a vigorous foreign policy based on these principles, and John Elliott Ward was an early architect of that policy. That those policies failed by 1949 is well known; that the United States is today attempting to establish some sort of *detente* with China is incontrovertible. In 1859 John Elliott Ward refused to kowtow to the Chinese Emperor; ironically, President Richard B. Nixon went to China in 1972 to bow to Mao.

⁸⁹ “China,” *The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*, XLVII (August, 1862), 129-37.

⁹⁰ W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay*, p. 406.

“PARAMOUNT’ BLOUNT: SPECIAL COMMISSIONER TO INVESTIGATE THE HAWAIIAN *COUP*, 1893”

By OSMOS LANIER, JR.*

Twenty years of meritorious service as a United States Congressman was recognized on March 11, 1893, when James Henderson Blount of Macon, Georgia was appointed as special commissioner to the Hawaiian Islands by President Grover Cleveland. Congressman Blount had retired from his position in the House on March 4, after twenty consecutive years as a representative of his native state of Georgia. Only two days after his retirement Blount had informed Secretary of State Walter A. Gresham that some form of honorable recognition from the President, such as a temporary assignment as a delegate to some international monetary conference, would be gratifying to himself and his family.¹ Rather than an assignment of minor importance, Blount was appointed as an executive agent to the Hawaiian Islands to investigate the recent overthrow of the monarchy on January 17, 1893. As a result of so much controversy during the investigation concerning the power given to Blount over the diplomatic and naval forces, he became popularly known as “Paramount” Blount.

Prior to the 1890’s the United States enjoyed a firm hold on the economic affairs of the Hawaiian Islands stemming from an 1875 reciprocity treaty that admitted duty free, to each country, the principal products of the other.² Between 1890 and 1893 this close relationship suffered severe blows. First, the McKinley tariff of 1890 put raw sugar on the free list and also compensated American producers with a bounty of two cents a pound, thus hurting American-born Hawaiian sugar growers. Second, a native-supported, anti-American political party, the National Reform Party, won control of the Islands’ legislature in 1890. Third, in 1891 the hold of anti-American factions was strengthened when Queen Liliuokalani’s anti-planter government came to power.

*Associate Professor of History, Armstrong State College, Savannah, Georgia.

¹ James Henderson Blount to Walter A. Gresham, March 6, 1893: Copy in the Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress.

² W.M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909*. Senate Document No. 357, 61st Congress, 2d session (Washington, 1910), I, 915-920. An 1887 extension gave the United States the right to use Pearl Harbor as a coaling and repair station for its ships.

The Queen's notions of sovereign authority were reported to the State Department of the United States by the American Minister to the Islands, John L. Stevens, who had been appointed to this position by an old friend, Secretary of State James G. Blaine. Since Blaine shared his expansionist views, Stevens expressed his fears of the Queen's actions and urged his friend to develop a closer relationship between the United States and the Islands, to utilize Pearl Harbor better, and to construct a transoceanic cable to improve communication between the two countries.

An attempt on the part of Queen Liliuokalani on January 14, 1893, to revise the constitution of the Islands, giving almost absolute power to the monarch, confirmed Steven's fears. On the advice of her ministers the Queen repudiated this attempt two days later, but too late. An Annexation Club, formed a year earlier, now appealed to the American Minister to land American sailors and marines from the *U.S.S. Boston* to protect American property. Minister Stevens complied, and the revolutionaries occupied the government building without opposition on January 17, and completed a successful *coup*.

The new Provisional Government immediately sent a commission of five to negotiate a treaty of union with the United States. The commissioners arrived at San Francisco on January 28 and left for Washington the following day to begin negotiations with Secretary of State John W. Foster.³

The Republican Administration of Benjamin Harrison wasted no time in agreeing to proposals by the Hawaiian Commissioners for annexation. Within twelve days a treaty of annexation had been signed and sent to Congress on February 15 by President Harrison with a message urging prompt and favorable action.⁴

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations promptly approved the treaty and reported its decision to the Senate.⁵ The Republicans were worried that the Democrats would offer strong opposition to approval of the treaty. However, Senate Democratic leaders John Tyler Morgan, a known expansionist from Alabama, and Arthur P. Gorman of

³ Secretary Blaine had resigned in June, 1892, to seek the Republican nomination for President and was replaced by Foster. See Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Baltimore, 1936), 34-111, William A. Russ, Jr., *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893-94* (Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania, 1959), and Osmos Lanier, Jr., "Anti-Annexationists of the 1890's" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1965).

⁴ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, 1895), Appendix II, 197-205. Hereafter cited as *For. Rels.*

⁵ *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, 52d Congress (Washington, 1909), 398.

Maryland assured Secretary of State Foster there would be no serious trouble in getting the measure passed.⁶ But other Democrats looked to the incoming administration for guidance.

The Hawaiian treaty was awaiting action in the Senate when President-elect Cleveland was inaugurated on March 4. Five days later Cleveland requested that the Senate return the treaty to him for re-examination.⁷ On March 11 Secretary of State Gresham gave newly appointed Commissioner Blount his instructions:

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and in general, all that can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfill this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other government of the islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.⁸

At the time of the appointment, few persons opposed the selection of former Congressman Blount for this task. The *New York Times* gave a representative view of this feeling in an editorial on March 30: "It is fortunate that the Government has sent out a man so level-headed and self-possessed as ex-Congressman Blount of Georgia to investigate the situation in Hawaii and the circumstances and influence that brought

⁶ John W. Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs* (Boston, 1909), II, 168. Also see August Carl Radke, Jr., "John Tyler Morgan, An Expansionist Senator, 1877-1907" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1953) and John R. Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman* (Baton Rouge, 1953). There is dispute among historians as to whether Harrison and Foster were confirmed expansionists or not but it is important to note that Harrison later became a vice-president of an Anti-Imperialist League in the latter part of the 1890's and wrote two articles in the *North American Review* in 1901 against the retention of the Philippine Islands by the United States. Benjamin Harrison, "Status of Annexed Territory," *North American Review*, CLXXII (January, 1901), 1-22, and "Musing Upon Current Topics," *Ibid.* (February, 1901), 177-90.

⁷ James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, 1896-1899), IX, 393. Hereafter cited as Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*.

⁸ *For. Rels.*, 1894, App. II, 1185.

it about."⁹ Even the Hawaiian Commissioners trusted that Blount with his Southern background would sympathize with their position of trying to establish a white man's government where there was an ignorant majority in the electorate.¹⁰

Blount had been a popular, respected and influential man during his stay in the House. On retiring, he was the recipient of many glowing speeches from both Republicans and Democrats, as well as a standing ovation that lasted for several minutes. There was little doubt of his honesty and integrity among his colleagues.¹¹ He had served on important committees including Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Foreign Affairs. The experience Blount gained as Chairman of this latter committee along with his honesty and integrity were the major factors considered by the Cleveland Administration in selecting him as Commissioner.¹²

When Blount arrived in Honolulu he found the opposing parties anxious to influence his decision in their favor. Minister Stevens and a committee of the Annexation Club boarded the ship to offer him accommodations, including a house, servants, carriage and horses. Blount declined the offer and chose to stay in the Hawaiian Hotel. He also declined the offer of the Queen's carriage to convey him to the hotel.

Blount used his "paramount" authority in his first official act terminating the limited protectorate instituted by Stevens. Blount felt a fair investigation could not be conducted until the American flag and troops had been removed since some persons might be intimidated or fear testifying because of their presence.

While conducting the investigation, Commissioner Blount heard many opinions while expressing none. He held interviews, received letters and affidavits and listened to memorials read from interested parties. He refused all offers of hospitality from both sides and made few

⁹ New York *Times*, March 30, 1893, 4.

¹⁰ Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, 128. Blount had fought for the Confederacy and his family had owned slaves. For the best source of information on Commissioner Blount see (Mrs.) W.D. Lamar, *When All Is Said and Done* (Athens, Georgia, 1952). Mrs. Lamar was one of Blount's daughters. Although not a biography, the book does cover a great deal of his life and career as Congressman.

¹¹ *Congressional Record*, 52d Congress, 2d session (Washington, 1893), 1207-1208. Hereafter cited as *Cong. Rec.*

¹² Hoke Smith of Georgia, serving as Secretary of the Interior in the Cleveland Administration, was influential in getting the appointment for Blount. See John H.T. McPherson, "James Henderson Blount," *Dictionary of American Biography*, II, 388-89. Also *Senate Report*, No. 227, 53d Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1895), 386.

public appearances. He did preside at the July 4th celebration where the Royal Hawaiian Band played "Marching Through Georgia" in his honor, not realizing its meaning.¹³

On April 26, Blount informed Secretary Gresham: "I can see no advantage in my remaining here longer than the month of May. I trust you will consent to my return at such time during the month of June as I may choose." Blount wanted to wait until he returned to Washington to write his report because as he explained: "Interruptions on the part of the people who are constantly seeking my attention make this preferable."¹⁴

On May 17, Blount received notice that he had been appointed Minister to replace Stevens. This action was distasteful to Blount as he had sought only a temporary assignment. He dutifully took the oath but sent his resignation in the same despatch to Secretary Gresham which contained a copy of his oath.¹⁵

During the next few weeks Blount wrote his report, at the request of Secretary Gresham, finishing it on July 17. After narrating in some detail the story of the rise to power of the Annexation group in the Islands, Blount proceeded to answer the two chief questions which had been committed to him—the part played by Minister Stevens and the armed forces from the *U.S.S. Boston* in the revolution and the attitude of the people in the Islands toward annexation.

In his answer to the first question, Blount reported that Minister Stevens had consulted freely with the leaders of the revolutionary movement and they had disclosed all of their plans to him. Because they feared arrest and punishment, Stevens had promised them protection and had also agreed to furnish the troops needed to overawe the Queen's supporters and Government. By way of an arrangement with Minister Stevens the proclamation, dethroning the Queen and organizing a provisional government, would be read from the Government building and would be followed by a speedy recognition. Blount concluded:

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it (coup) but for Mr. Steven's promise to protect

¹³ *Senate Report*, No. 227, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 401, 414.

¹⁴ *For. Rels.*, 1894, App. II, 490.

¹⁵ Later when questioned about this action Blount stated:

"I sent my resignation by the vessel that brought the appointment. I expected to leave when I got through the investigation. My private business was not satisfactory, and I wanted to get home. I was worried about it. I thought it might be childish in me to send an absolute resignation, and I did not put it in that form; but I did take occasion in some correspondence to assure the Secretary that I did not want the place at all."
Senate Report No. 227, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 412.

them against any danger from the Government. But for this their mass meeting would not have been held. But for this no request to land the troops would have been made. Had the troops not been landed no measure for the organization of a new Government would have been taken.

The American minister and the revolutionary leaders had determined on annexation to the United States, and had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.¹⁶

In regard to the native attitude toward annexation, Blount reported that the great preponderance of opinion was adverse. He believed that if the annexation issue could have been put to the test of a secret ballot, with the suffrage qualifications as under the Constitution of 1887, it would have been defeated by at least two to one; if persons owing allegiance to foreign countries were excluded, the adverse majority would have been more than five to one. Only a majority of the whites, especially Americans, were for annexation, and nearly all the Portuguese and a majority of the whites of European or American origin who had signed annexation petitions were subjects or citizens of the countries of their origin, the Commissioner explained. The Queen had only surrendered to the Provisional Government on the conviction that the American minister and the American troops were promoters and supporters of the revolution, and that she could only appeal to the Government of the United States to render justice to her. As far as Blount was concerned the Queen's "uniform conduct and the prevailing sentiment amongst the natives point to her belief as well as theirs that the spirit of justice on the part of the President would restore her crown."¹⁷

The Commissioner's conclusion concerning conditions in the Islands was as follows:

The condition of parties in the islands is one of quiescence. The action of the United States is awaited by all as a matter of necessity. This condition, it can be assumed, will remain until the proposition to annex is accepted or rejected. In the latter contingency no sudden movement is likely to occur. The present Government can only rest on the use of military force, possessed of most of the arms in the islands, with a small white population to draw from to strengthen it. Ultimately it will fall without fail. It may preserve its existence for a year or two, but not longer.¹⁸

Having already resigned as Minister, Blount gave to Secretary Gresham, on July 31, formal notice of his intention to leave: "I assume that

¹⁶ *For. Rels.*, 1894. App. II, 594.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 598-99.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 630.

neither you nor the President under existing circumstances could urge my further continuance here. . . . I have discharged my duty the best I could considering I was surrounded by persons interested in misleading me, and in my inability to compel answers from witnesses." With this Blount took his departure from Honolulu on August 8.¹⁹

In a report to President Cleveland dated October 18, Secretary Gresham summarized Blount's findings and endorsed his conclusions. Gresham, opposed to resubmitting the treaty to the Senate, recommended that Queen Liliuokalani be restored to her throne.²⁰

When this announcement and Blount's report were made public in November the interest of the public, which had been rather quiescent during the summer and early fall, was revived. Republican newspapers, as was to be expected, condemned Gresham's proposal. Some Democratic newspapers warned the Administration that they would not support a restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy: others supported the proposal. "Nothing", said the *New York Times*, could strengthen the Administration in the confidence of fair-minded and right-thinking men than the act of justice to Hawaii which is announced in the letter of Secretary Gresham." The *Times* also felt the Republicans were inconsistent for wanting to annex a race problem after having recently condemned white rule in the South over the Negro. The Republicans, according to the *Times*, now considered "honesty, justice, fair dealing, and regard for the rights of others as un-American" and believed the highest achievement of American statesmanship was the "Christian civilization" process of stealing islands from converted heathens and putting them under an oligarchy of wealth and intelligence.²¹

The Administration finally decided on a policy. In his regular message to Congress on December 4, President Cleveland announced his decision to restore the Queen to her throne.²² Republican senators struck back immediately under the leadership of Senator George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts. On December 5 Hoar introduced a resolution requesting the President to send to the Senate copies of instructions given to any representative of the United States or any naval officer in regard to Hawaiian affairs since March 4, 1893.²³ A few days later Senator Hoar, in another resolution, questioned the legality of Cleveland's appointment of Blount without the advice and consent of the Senate.²⁴

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 459-463.

²¹ *New York Times*, November 11, 28, and December 1, 1893, 4.

²² Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IX, 441-42.

²³ *Cong. Rec.*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 19.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 127.

In a special message to Congress on December 18, Cleveland restated the history of the revolution and referred to the landing of troops by Stevens as an act of war. He also told Congress that attempts to restore the Queen upon conditions that would secure the safety of the revolutionists had failed. The Queen refused to agree to the stipulated conditions because she felt the death penalty was the punishment revolutionaries deserved. Thus, the President, in effect, washed his hands of the affair and commended the subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of Congress. Cleveland assured the Congressmen of his willingness to co-operate in any legislative measure "consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality," which would solve the problem.²⁵

Following this message, Senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, proposed that the President's message be referred to his committee with authorization to inquire into and report any irregularities in diplomatic or other intercourse between the United States and Hawaii in relation to the revolution in the Islands. This proposal was promptly adopted.²⁶

During the committee's investigation Commissioner Blount was called upon to testify. One of the things the committee was interested in was whether Blount had been prejudiced for or against the Queen before or during his investigation. In response to this question Blount replied:

I was impressed when I came to the investigation with the conviction that I had very much at stake. I had confidence in the integrity and high purposes of the President, and felt that I could give him no higher offense than to misinform him. I felt that any other than a truthful, an exhaustive, and impartial examination would bring about the contempt of the American people. I was therefore, timid—over cautious, perhaps, in all my conduct in reference to it. I kept from their social life. I did not intimate any opinion to these people one way or the other. When I left those islands nobody had any idea, so far as I could gather, what my report was.²⁷

When the pro-Annexation senators on the committee tried to get Blount to admit that Cleveland had already prejudged the Hawaiian situation before he sent the Commissioner, Blount replied that the President had asked only for information and had said nothing about what he thought on the matter. When charged with desiring restoration of the monarchy before he departed from the United States, Blount re-

²⁵ *For. Rels.*, 1894, App. II, 445-48.

²⁶ *Cong. Rec.*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 434.

²⁷ *Senate Report No. 227*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 389.

torted: "I never dreamed of such a thing as the reinstatement of Liliuokalani; I never heard it suggested until my return to the United States."²⁸

Two reports, a majority and a minority, came out of the Senate committee's investigation. The minority report was written by Cleveland's opponents: John Sherman, William P. Frye, J.N. Dolph, and Cushman K. Davis. They made the following assertions: (1) Blount's appointment as Commissioner was unconstitutional; (2) Cleveland's orders placing the naval forces of the United States under Blount were illegal; (3) Blount's order to haul down the flag was unlawful and the interview of Blount with the Queen was a violation of international law; (4) Since recognition had been accorded the Provisional Government, President Cleveland had no right to reopen the question.

The majority report was written by Chairman Morgan and signed by the other committee members who supported the President: M.C. Butler, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, and George Gray. They stated that they could neither censure Blount's actions as illegal nor his appointment as irregular. Senator Morgan pointed out that many precedents could be quoted to show that such power had been exercised on various occasions in the past without dissent on the part of Congress or the people of the United States. He believed the employment of executive agents was a necessary part of the proper exercise of the diplomatic power which was "entrusted by the Constitution with the President." According to Morgan these precedents also showed that the Senate, though in session, did not have to be consulted on the appointment of such agents or the instructions the President might give them. This latter group, with the exception of Chairman Morgan, did condemn Stevens for his participation in the events leading up to the revolution and concluded that he deserved public censure.²⁹ The reports were accompanied by neither resolutions nor proposals for a course of action.

While the committee carried on its investigation, several resolutions regarding Hawaii were introduced and discussed in the Senate. For the most part the discussion followed partisan lines. The bulk of it consisted of denunciation and defense of the main persons involved—Stevens, Cleveland, Gresham, and Blount. Republican senators followed Hoar's lead in accusing Cleveland of over-stepping the limits of his constitutional power in appointing Blount without the consent of the Senate. Powers conferred upon Blount, they claimed, surpassed those of regularly appointed diplomatic and naval offices. Also in their attempt to restore

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 387-408.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 33-36. The legal aspects of Blount's appointment are discussed in Henry M. Wriston, *Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, 1929), 157-58, 207, 292-303, 817-19.

the Queen to the throne, Cleveland and Gresham had virtually assumed the power to make war without the consent of Congress.³⁰

Meanwhile, Democratic senators, in defense of the Administration, turned their wrath on ex-Minister Stevens. Most of the speeches analyzed the evidence taken by Blount and argued that Stevens had improperly aided the revolutionaries. Therefore, according to his defenders, Cleveland could do nothing else but try to correct the wrong.³¹

During the period of Senate discussion on the annexation attempt, the House of Representatives decided to participate in the deliberations. Its discussion of the Hawaiian situation, like that of the Senate, was conducted along partisan lines—most Republicans condemned Cleveland and Gresham while most Democrats criticized Stevens and defended the Administration. On February 7, 1893, the House adopted, by vote of 177 to 78, a set of resolutions introduced on January 23 by Representative James B. McCreary of Kentucky, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The resolutions condemned the actions of Stevens but also approved the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent nation. They condemned annexation of Hawaii as uncalled for and inexpedient but warned that foreign intervention in the political affairs of the Islands would not be regarded with indifference by the Government of the United States.³²

In the Senate a resolution, declaring that further consideration of any project of annexation at that time was unwise and inexpedient, was introduced by Senator Turpie of Indiana. It advocated a policy of letting the Provisional Government remain free to pursue its own line of policy, and it emphasized that any foreign interference would be regarded as unfriendly to the United States. This resolution was not approved because of disagreement over the clause which seemingly endorsed recognition of the Provisional Government.³³

On May 31 Senator Turpie brought in a substitute resolution. It read as follows:

Resolved, That of right it belongs wholly to the people of the Hawaiian Islands to establish and maintain their own form of government and domestic policy; that the United States ought in nowise to interfere therewith, and that any intervention in the political affairs of these islands by any other government will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States.

³⁰ *Cong. Rec.*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 61-73, 128-32, 189-99, 621-28, 694-702, 1231, 1237.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 204, 702-07, 2080-93, 2120-30, 2280-91, 3128-39.

³² *Cong. Rec.*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 2001-08.

³³ *Ibid.*, 1220.

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 55 to 0 with thirty Senators not voting.³⁴

Thus Congress passed the "political football" back to the Cleveland Administration. There would be, so far as Congress was concerned, neither restoration of the Queen nor interference with the Provisional Government nor—for the time being at least—annexation of the Islands.

As a result, the Cleveland Administration enjoyed the luxury of preserving and even tightening America's hold on the Islands while at the same time righteously rejecting the burdens of governing a polyglot population located two thousand miles from the mainland. This outcome established the broad features of what ultimately became known as the "open door" policy—a policy designed to allow America's preponderant economic power to extend the American system throughout the world without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism.³⁵


Although the anti-annexationists seemingly won the first round of the so-called "great debate" of the 1890's, the annexationists' desire for the Hawaiian Islands did not die but only became quiescent. In a few years it was actively expressed again under a Republican Administration that reintroduced the annexation question.

Following the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings "Paramount" Blount, feeling that he had once again served his country well, returned to Macon, Georgia. He was content to practice law and supervise the cotton fields, peach orchards, and timber lands on his Jones County property for another decade. He continued to keep up with national and world affairs until his death on March 8, 1903.³⁶

³⁴ The resolution and all proceedings in connection with it are found in *Cong. Rec.*, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 5499-5500.

³⁵ See William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962) for a study of the "open door" thesis from 1890-1961.

³⁶ It is interesting to note that one of Commissioner Blount's sons, Jim, was, like his father, a graduate of the University of Georgia. He enlisted in the Army as a volunteer in the Spanish-American War. President McKinley later appointed him Judge of the First Instance in the Judiciary set up by the United States as a part of the civil government in the Philippines. He became an authority on Philippine affairs and wrote a book entitled *American Occupation in the Philippines, 1898-1912*. In the political tradition of his father's view of the rights of another island people, Jim Blount believed the Filipinos should be left in freedom to run their own affairs. As a result of this he became a vice-president of the Boston Anti-Imperialist League in the early 1900's. Lamar, *When All Is Said and Done*, 32-33, 98-99: Also see *Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League* (Boston, 1906), 15.







75

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XII

June, 1973

GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON
SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT



Published By
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
A Division of the University System of Georgia
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA



WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XII

June, 1973

GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON
SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT

CONTENTS

An Introduction to Land Survey Systems in the Southeast	<i>Sam B. Hilliard</i>	1
The South Carolina Economy of the Middle Eighteenth Century: A View from Philadelphia <i>Joseph A. Ernst and Harry Roy Merrens</i>		16
The North Carolina Piedmont: An Island of Religious Diversity	<i>W. Frank Ainsley and John W. Florin</i>	30
The Geographic Base of Urban Retardation in Mississippi, 1800-1840	<i>Howard G. Adkins</i>	35
Home Manufactures as an Indication of an Emerging Appalachian Subculture, 1840-1870	<i>Leonard W. Brinkman</i>	50
The Historic Spas of Florida	<i>Burke G. Vanderhill</i>	59
Sugar Plantations in Louisiana: Origin, Dispersal, and Responsible Location Factors	<i>John B. Rehder</i>	78

Copyright © 1973, West Georgia College

Printed in U.S.A.

Thomasson Printing Co., Carrollton, Georgia 30117

FIRST PRINTING

Price \$3.00

CONTRIBUTORS

SAM B. HILLIARD holds baccalaureate and masters degrees from the University of Georgia and the Ph.D. degree in Geography from the University of Wisconsin (Madison). Dr. Hilliard's research interests center around aspects of the historical geography of the U.S. South. His writings have appeared in such journals as *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* and *Annals, Association of American Geographers*. He is the author of *Hog Meat and Hoecake: Food Supply in the Old South 1840-1850*. Dr. Hilliard is currently Associate Professor of Geography, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

JOSEPH A. ERNST was graduated from Brooklyn College and completed the Ph.D. degree in History at the University of Wisconsin (Madison). He has published in several journals, and his most recent work is *Money and Politics in America, 1755-1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution* (to be published in late 1973). Dr. Ernst is currently Professor of History York University, Toronto.

H. ROY MERRENS received the B.A. degree from University College, London, the M.A. degree from the University of Maryland and the Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin (Madison). He is presently engaged in research on the eighteenth-century geography of the Southern Colonies in general, and colonial South Carolina in particular. Dr. Merrens is the author of *Colonial North Carolina in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Historical Geography* and is editor of *The Colonial South Carolina Scene: Contemporary Views, 1697-1774* (forthcoming). He is currently Professor of Geography at York University, Downsview, Ontario.

W. FRANK AINSLEY holds a Master of Divinity degree from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary and an M.A. degree in Geography from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His research interests center around historical trends in population and social conditions in the United States, particularly as they relate to urban development. Mr. Ainsley is presently a Ph.D. candidate in Geography at the University of North Carolina.

JOHN W. FLORIN holds the Ph.D. degree in Geography from the Pennsylvania State University. His teaching and research focus on population dynamics and social change in the United States. He is the author of *Death in New England: Regional Variations in Mortality*. Other published research has centered on aspects of school integration in the Southeast. Dr. Florin is presently Assistant Professor of Geography, University of North Carolina, at Chapel Hill.

HOWARD G. ADKINS received degrees from the University of Southern Mississippi and the Ph.D. degree in Geography from the University of Tennessee (Knoxville). His research interests focus on historical geography of the U.S. South. Dr. Adkins has read papers at various conferences and has published in *Annals*, Association of American Geographers. At present, he is Associate Professor of Geography at Marshall University, Huntington, West Virginia.

LEONARD W. BRINKMAN received the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Geography from the University of Wisconsin (Madison). He has done research in Australia and taught at the University of Melbourne. Dr. Brinkman's teaching and research interests include the historical geography of Appalachia and agricultural geography. He is currently Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Tennessee (Knoxville).

BURKE G. VANDERHILL is the recipient of degrees from Michigan State University, the University of Nebraska, and holds the Ph.D. degree in Geography from the University of Michigan. Dr. Vanderhill's research interests have focused on agricultural settlement and historical geography. He has contributed numerous articles to American and foreign professional journals, many of which have dealt with the northern frontiers of Canada. Dr. Vanderhill is presently Professor of Geography at the Florida State University, Tallahassee.

JOHN B. REHDER received the B.A. degree from East Carolina University, and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Louisiana State University. His teaching and research interests include cultural geography, rural settlement geography, and remote sensing. He is currently director and principal investigator for the NASA-ERTS Geography Remote Sensing Project: "Geographic Applications of ERTS-A Imagery to Rural Landscape Change." Dr. Rehder is presently Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of Tennessee (Knoxville).

FOREWORD

This volume represents a departure from the preceding issues of *The Studies in The Social Sciences* in that the services of two volume editors were used under the loose supervision of a general editor. The bulk of the work was done by them including the selection of a topic, the solicitation of papers, the protracted correspondence connected with the completion of the individual articles, and the initial editorial refinement. The general editor's role was limited to broad consultation, final editing, and liaison with the printer.

In past issues volume topics have been rotated among the various social sciences, and this year the choice devolved on geography. It coincided with the 69th annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers which was held in Atlanta, Georgia, on April 15-18, 1973. The West Georgia Department of Geography served as one of the sponsoring institutions for the meeting.

As in the past, this journal is financed by the University System of Georgia and is distributed free of charge to the libraries of colleges and universities in Georgia, both public and private; to the five largest institutions of higher learning in each of the ten southern states; and to selected Georgia high schools. Interested individuals or other libraries may purchase copies for \$3.00 to cover costs. This printing includes several hundred extra copies to accommodate a wider market.

It is with pleasure that we submit to you this volume on historical geography.

Eugene R. Huck
Professor of History
General Editor

PREFACE

No area of the United States has received more attention in terms of its general historical evolution than the Southeast. Literature on the subject is voluminous and continues to be amassed. Topics such as the colonial occupation, the Civil War, and the New South provide, as they have traditionally done, fertile fields for historical scholarship. However, the focus of analysis in the majority of these studies is placed almost entirely on basic social and political themes, and particularly on subjects such as slavery, the plantation, the Confederacy, and the lives of prominent political leaders. All of these subjects of course occupy an important place in the history of Southeastern regional development, but further study along traditional lines does not seem to promise sufficient explanation of the profound economic changes which have characterized the region over the last 200 years.

By comparison relatively little attention has been devoted to the Southeast's economic development, even though historians have long stressed the importance of changing economic patterns in explaining the emergence of new political or social structures. The actual processes of regional economic development and their spatial expressions have been particularly ignored. The main reason for this seems to be one of purpose. Generally historians have not been interested in the Southeast's economic development as a problem in itself but rather for the light which it sheds on certain significant changes in other aspects of the region's society. Thus the general impact of economic activity is often deemed important and given proper consideration while the process by which it occurred remains somewhat outside the main area of interest of most investigators.

Historians, of course, are not the only social scientists interested in the regional evolution of the Southeast. There are a number of other viewpoints concerning the process and structure of social and economic development. These include (1) the economists' consideration of changes in supply and demand and their effect on the allocation of resources; (2) the sociologists' view of the mores of society as the conditioners of economic action; (3) the geographers' concept of place and spatial relationships as important forces governing social and economic arrangements. The object of the papers contained in this volume is to attempt to interpret parts of the story of Southeastern social and economic development from the geographic perspective.

John C. Upchurch
Associate Professor and Chairman,
Department of Geography

David C. Weaver
Assistant Professor of Geography
Volume Editors

AN INTRODUCTION TO LAND SURVEY SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTHEAST

By Sam B. Hilliard

A fundamental yet often neglected element of the cultural landscape is the system of land subdivision or survey. It is inherent in any organized society where individual land ownership or soil rights exists and was part and parcel of the "invasion" of North America by Europeans. A number of survey systems were used in the United States ranging in complexity from the simple delineation of a single headright grant to the elaborate and much publicized rectilinear "township and range" system employed by the Federal government. The latter was the most widespread survey system in the United States and is the one usually identified with the nineteenth century frontier.

The Gulf South provides us with a number of examples of survey systems. Eastern Georgia mirrors the irregular pattern characteristic of most of Colonial America (usually called "metes and bounds") while Alabama and Mississippi were surveyed into square townships under the Federal Land Office system. Western Georgia was surveyed by the state into square lots though lot size varied considerably. Most of Louisiana was surveyed under the Federal system, but the long French and Spanish tenure with their characteristic surveys added ever greater variety. The existence of these survey systems is not unknown to persons who have delved deeply into southern history, but the distribution and details of each seem not as well known as they should be. This paper is a brief introduction to the subject; it outlines the areas in which each survey type was used, describes them in some detail, and provides a number of notable examples.

The survey system commonly identified with the southern colonies was the ancient method of "metes and bounds." It was used both in Europe and the New World and was the system under which land in Eastern Georgia was surveyed. The procedure for land acquisition and survey in Georgia was similar to that of other southern colonies. Both "headright" and "bounty" grants were available to prospective settlers, and survey usually came after the grant was made. Grants varied in size depending upon the grantee's family size and economic well-being, but usually ranged between 200 and 1,000 acres. Headright grants were made to heads of families while bounty grants were made in reward for service during the Revolution. Each grantee chose the county in which he wished land and obtained a survey warrant stating the amount of land he was to receive but not specific location nor shape. The metes and bounds survey for both types of grants often resulted in irregular-shaped lots.¹ The resulting landscape was one of an apparently haphazard arrangement of fields, roads, and forests. Due to irregular plot

shapes the system sometimes resulted in incomplete coverage and overlapping claims. Its chief advantage lay in its simplicity, ease of application, and freedom of choice in site selection. The grantee, particularly during the early stages of settlement, was free to seek out the best land and arrange his plot shape to contain very little undesirable land. Frequently he chose tracts some distance from known settlement to avoid conflicting claims. The system had been in operation in the New World for generations and was the most common method of land survey in the colonies.

In Georgia the metes and bounds system was extended to cover the Creek cession of 1790 (west to the Oconee River and north to the foot of the Blue Ridge) with Washington and Franklin counties being created out of this huge cession (Figure 1). Revolutionary War bounties were especially important in this area, and settlement was rapid with Georgia's population doubling during the subsequent decade. Despite the rapid expansion immediately following the Revolution approximately two-thirds of Georgia remained in Indian hands until after the turn of the century when a drastic change in land survey and disposal was initiated. From 1805 to 1832 the state of Georgia conducted the biggest land extravaganza the nation had yet seen. In a series of six land lotteries, the entire western two-thirds of the state was surveyed and passed into private hands. It was a unique system of land disposal and a unique survey system was devised to accomplish its purpose. The procedure of survey and disposal was a simple one, and though no two lotteries were identical, all were carried out in essentially the same fashion.

Each eligible person registered in his county of residence and all names were sent to the state capitol. At the same time the prospective lands were surveyed into lots and the lot numbers also sent to the state capitol where the lottery commissioners drew the names and lot numbers from two separate containers after which names and lot numbers were matched. In cases where there were fewer lots than applicants, blank tickets were added to the land lot tickets to make them equal the number of applicant names. Persons drawing lots took out grants, paid the specified fee, and received title to the land. If he failed to take out a grant the lot reverted to the state. There were no residency or improvement requirements.

Instructions for setting up the land districts and individual lot dimensions were spelled out in detail in the individual acts creating the lotteries. Each county was divided into numbered land districts with each district subdivided into numbered square lots. The following instructions are taken from the Act creating the first land lottery; they refer to Baldwin, Wilkinson, and Wayne counties.

And be it further enacted . . . that the lands contained in the several districts shall be divided by lines running parallel with the dividing lines of districts, and by others crossing them at right




Figure 1

Survey systems in Georgia. Shading patterns show lot size in acres. Subdivisions of the shaded counties are land districts which are divided into lots. County boundaries and names are shown as they were at the time of their creation. Many were subdivided quickly thereafter.

angles, so as to form tracts of forty-five chains square, containing two hundred and two and a half acres each . . . except the county of Wayne, which shall be laid off into tracts of seventy chains square, and to contain four hundred and ninety acres each . . .²

Most districts were surveyed with their boundaries roughly north-south

and east-west except for those of Baldwin, Gwinnett, Walton, Wayne, Wilkinson, and parts of Habersham and Hall counties (Figure 1). Lot size varied from the 40 acre "gold" lot of Cherokee County (northwest Georgia) to the 490 acre lot of the Piney Woods in the southeast. Rationale for the different lot sizes is not explicit in any of the acts. Presumably, lot size reflected the prevailing attitudes toward land value. The discovery of gold on the Cherokee lands accounted for the small size of the "gold lots." Elsewhere, lot size increased toward the pine forests to the south except for the 250 and 490 acre lots near the Appalachians where, we can presume, lower value land was found.

The Georgia survey was unique in two ways. First, it was the only large-scale land lottery ever attempted in the United States and, if its purpose was to dispose of state-owned land quickly, it was eminently successful. Second, it represented an early large-scale attempt at *prior survey* into like-sized square lots, a distinct departure from the systems used to survey headright and bounty lands.

There was ample precedent for surveying into square or rectangular lots. The ordinance creating the Federal township and range system predated the Georgia lotteries by two decades. In fact, lots in most of Cherokee County were 160 acres, corresponding to a quarter section of the Federal township. There were numerous European precedents, too, but we must not overlook the fact that many so-called "metes and bounds" tracts were square, rectangular or rectilinear (see below, figures 8, 9, and 10). There were basic differences, though, between the Georgia and Federal systems. Georgia's lottery lands lacked the coordinate system of meridians and base lines. The Federal system started where the base line and principal meridian intersected at right angles and worked from that point, while the Georgia system started with square or rectangular "boxes" and created lots within them. Though both lots and land districts were numbered, the numbering system lacked uniformity, a fact not particularly surprising since a number of different surveyors were appointed and no uniform system was imposed by law. Figure 2 shows portions of Early and Irwin counties immediately north of the Georgia-Florida boundary (present-day Thomas County). It illustrates the relative size of the 250 and 490 acre lots as well as the variation in lot numbering.

The Georgia lottery surveys terminated abruptly at the Georgia-Alabama boundary, for Georgia had relinquished her claims to territory west of this line after the Yazoo land scandals, and from these lands were created the states of Alabama and Mississippi.³ It was in this area that the Federal township and range system was used, and except for a few areas where "prior grants" were recognized, the Federal system prevailed. The basic principles of the Federal system are simple and, except where local conditions or attitudes dictated modification, were standardized for the entire nation.⁴ Its basic elements

273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	3	44	49	90	95	136	141
288	287	286	285	284	283	282	281	IRWIN COUNTY						
EARLY COUNTY								2	45	48	91	94	137	140
313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	DISTRICT 13						
328	327	326	325	324	323	322	321	1	46	47	92	93	138	139
353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	DISTRICT 18						
368	367	366	365	364	363	362	361	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	46	45	44	43	42	41	40
8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	47	48	49	50	51	52	53
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	DISTRICT 14						
DISTRICT 23								92	91	90	89	88	87	86
48	47	46	45	44	43	42	41	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	138	137	136	135	134	133	132
88	87	86	85	84	83	82	81	141	142	143	144	145		

Figure 2

Portions of Early and Irwin counties on the Georgia-Florida boundary. Note the different numbering systems. District 23 in Early County starts with number 1 in the northeast corner while district 14 in Irwin County starts in the northwest corner. District 13 of Irwin County starts with number one in the southwest corner but it numbers south to north.

were: (1) measurement from a base line and a principal meridian and (2) creation of 36 square mile townships. Though simple in principle, survey under the Federal system was somewhat more elaborate than other surveys since it involved an accurate survey of both the base line and the principal meridian. Once these were surveyed and marked, townships six miles square were laid out and numbered from the intersection of these lines. Townships were numbered in tiers north and south of the base line (e.g., T1N, T3N, T17S). Location east and west of the principal meridian was accomplished by numbering "Ranges" in tiers east and west from the meridian (e.g. R1E, R3W, R12E). Thus each township was identified by its location relative to the intersection of the principal meridian and base line (Figure 3). Townships were subdivided further into 36 sections of one square mile each numbered 1 through 36. Further subdivision of the sections into quarter sections and sixteenth sections was done, though not necessarily by the original surveyors. Virtually all of Alabama and Mississippi and most of Louisiana was surveyed under the township and range system and Figure 4 illustrates the location of meridians and base lines as well as survey districts. It shows the directions in which townships and ranges were

numbered from the meridians and base lines.

Although the Federal system was extended to encompass virtually all of the three states, a substantial portion of Louisiana and small parts of Alabama and Mississippi had been granted to individuals under previous governments, and one of the tenets under which the United





Figure 3

Hypothetical view of the Federal survey systems. It shows the method of laying out and numbering townships along the base line and principal meridian. Expanded views of townships and sections illustrate ideal subdivision, though in Louisiana and parts of Mississippi and Alabama the existence of long lots and prior claims necessitated considerable modification.

States survey operated was that *bona fide* prior grants would be honored. Perhaps the most renowned of these was the French long lot, a system of granting plots alongside streams. Its characteristic patterns on the landscape and its orientation toward streams gave an identity that is unique. Sometimes referred to as the *arpent* system (from the French unit of measure), the long lot survey system is prevalent throughout southern Louisiana where large streams are found.⁵ It was extremely well suited to conditions in Louisiana and had been used in Europe for centuries. Its counterpart in the New World was the seigneurial system in New France (Quebec) but the two were by no means identical. In New France the basic survey was the seigneurie or large feudal estate while in Louisiana plots were granted directly to individuals. Although the long lot should not be viewed as an adjustment to the New World environment, there was much to recommend it in Louisiana. From the very early years, Louisiana settlers recognized a basic fact of alluvial morphology—the best-drained land on a river floodplain is the “natural levee” immediately adjacent to the river. Early French settlement was along the Mississippi upriver from New Orleans, but with the arrival of large numbers of settlers in the 1700’s the increased




Figure 4

Base lines and principal meridians in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Arrows indicate directions in which townships and ranges are numbered in each district. Individual townships are too small to be shown at this scale.

demand for land pushed settlement onto other available streams and bayous with favorite sites being the natural levees. Levees varied in size and height but most extended from a few hundred yards to more than a mile from the river terminating in poorly drained "backswamp." It was along these natural levees that settlement occurred and this preference was shown in the early surveys. Both roads and buildings were located along levee crests making river frontage very desirable. Lots were surveyed with their long axes at right angles to the river; their widths varied depending upon lot shape. Due to the prevalence of stream meanders, few lots were true rectangles though many were parallelograms (Figure 5). Along the inside of stream meanders the




Figure 5

A part of Ascension Parish in Louisiana near Donaldsonville. Numbered plots represent individual tracts. Since it was surveyed under the Federal system, section numbers are provided, but the large number of "prior" grants prohibited the typical 36 section survey.

lot tapered in width from front to back, while along the outside it tapered from back to front. The ideal width/length ratio was 5 x 40 *arpents*. The 40 *arpent* length came to be the standard, and often the back boundary is marked by the existence of a 40 *arpent* road running parallel to the streams (Figure 5).

The method of land acquisition was similar to that of Eastern Georgia, though the process was more complicated. Instead of a survey warrant the prospective settler submitted a request for land, and several steps were involved before title was issued. It appears also that a major effort was made to ensure contiguous tract settlement while little more than lip service was paid to such orderliness in Eastern Georgia. Survey was by no means elaborate, though, since many surveyors simply surveyed the river line and marked the width leaving back lines unsurveyed for years.⁶ Complete survey did not come until after the Louisiana Purchase when the United States' rectangular survey was extended into Louisiana.

Spanish control in Louisiana resulted in some departure from the French system. A number of grants were made in interior Louisiana which did not conform to the long lot pattern. Many small tracts were granted, but in areas especially well-suited to cattle ranching, huge tracts containing several thousand acres were made. Many Spanish grants were made in West Florida and in shape and size are scarcely distinguishable from the typical English or American irregular tract. Despite the introduction of the Spanish *sitio* grants, they differed little from those of the previous administration, since the Spanish adopted the *arpent* system.

Despite the existence of many early grants in Louisiana, adoption of the Federal system had a significant impact on the land system. It provided a relatively accurate survey of existing land grants, it surveyed the previously unsettled part of the state, and it continued the process of surveying long lots, though the procedure was somewhat different from that employed by the French and Spanish.

In areas where prior grants had been made, the Federal survey superimposed a grid of township and range lines at six mile intervals thereby creating townships, but instead of subdividing into square mile sections the prior grants were treated as sections and numbered accordingly. Where townships were not covered by existing grants, which included much of the backswamp areas, surveyors marked off square mile sections surveying and numbering unclaimed land surveyed along with previously-made grants (Figure 6).

The attractiveness of the long lot was well known to Louisiana settlers, and considerable resistance was encountered when the township and range system was proposed. As a consequence, the Federal system was modified to allow survey of long lots, and along the bayous north of Vicksburg, a number of such lots were surveyed. They were a part of the Federal system and bore township and section numbers

as well as additional numbers due to further subdivision into eighths (Figure 7).

In the western part of the Natchez District of Mississippi and the Florida Parishes of Louisiana, much of the land was granted prior to the Federal survey. Consequently, township and range lines were superimposed over existing plots. In some cases only one or two small prior claims existed but in other townships most, in some cases all, of the land had been granted previously. Figures 8, 9, and 10 illustrate the kaleidoscopic patterns created in some of the townships. Figure 8 shows a number of irregular grants but most of the township was unclaimed at the time of survey. Figure 9 is a map of T5N, R1W which shows approximately one half of it in prior claims, some quite large; for ex-




Figure 6

Parts of two townships in Assumption Parish on Bayou Lafourche showing long lots and square mile sections. Note that two tiers of long lots were laid out, thus the two lines running roughly parallel to Bayou Lafourche are 40 and 80 arpent lines. In some cases surveyors used the numbers 1 through 36 for square mile sections only, starting long lots with number 37. However, in many areas all lots were numbered consecutively. Shading indicates complex area of lots too small to show at this scale.




Figure 7

Townships T21N, R9W, and T21N, R10W in the Natchez District of Mississippi. Most long lot sections contained from 600 to 700 acres and the individual strips contained from 75 to 125 acres. Note the rectangular sections in the southeastern sector. The subdivision of sections into long lots and the special numbering of these sub-sections is a feature of the American long lot system. Note the parallel lots in section 10 and the fantail shapes in section 9 and 2 (2 is part of R10W).

ample, the surveyor lists the size of section 20 as 3,444 acres. Figure 10 is a map of T7N, R2W, the township immediately east of Natchez, which contained no unclaimed land at the time of survey. A total of 95 plots were claimed with most being irregular in size and shape.



Figure 8

T1N, R1W in the Natchez District of Mississippi. Shaded plots are prior claims. Overlapped shading indicates conflicting claims. In such cases both were surveyed leaving litigation up to other authorities. Although this map does not show drainage, the elongated rectangles were laid out along streams indicating some preference for such sites.




Figure 9

T5N, R1W, in the Natchez District of Mississippi. Shading indicates prior claim. Overlapped patterns show conflicting claims. Note that streams are sometimes used as boundaries, but the most common type is a straight line. Unlike some townships in Louisiana where the numbers 1 through 36 were reserved for regular square mile sections, these sections are numbered consecutively.




Figure 10

T7N, R2W in the Natchez District of Mississippi. All land was taken up by prior claims. A total of nine such townships were near the city of Natchez, but in Louisiana approximately 100 townships were completely taken up by prior claims, of which about a third were in the Florida parishes.




Figure 11

Major survey systems used in the Gulf South.

These examples should serve to point out the complexity of land subdivision in the Gulf South. Virtually every major type of land survey ever used in the United States was employed. Figure 11 is a generalized outline of the distribution of the major survey systems. Due to the map scale considerable detail has been omitted, but it does give a generalized picture and should whet our appetites for further study. Clearly, it is a topic rich in promise to the prospective researcher.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Proper terminology is elusive when we talk about such surveys. The old term "metes and bounds" refers to a plot of land bounded by natural (and presumably somewhat permanent) features such as streams. Almost by definition it implies an irregular-shaped plot of no specific size or configuration. The term is used commonly in the United States to refer to any survey resulting in irregular-shaped plots, though "metes and bounds" are no longer used exclusively. In fact, most plots surveyed in eastern Georgia were irregular in shape but not necessarily bounded by natural features. Most were surveyed by chain and compass resulting in straight boundaries, either square or rectangular in shape.

² Augustin S. Clayton, *A Compilation of the Laws of the State of Georgia...* (Augusta, 1812), p. 101.

³ Samuel G. McLendon, *History of the Public Domain in Georgia* (Atlanta, 1924).

⁴ For discussions of the Public Domain, its survey, and disposal see Benjamin H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (New York, 1939); William D. Pattison, *Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System, 1784-1800* (Chicago, 1957); Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936* (Lincoln, 1962); and Norman J.W. Thrower, *Original Survey and Land Subdivision: A Comparative Study of the Form and Effect of Contrasting Cadastral Surveys* (Chicago, 1966).

⁵ An excellent source for Louisiana is John W. Hall, "Louisiana Survey Systems: Their Antecedents, Distribution, and Characteristics," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1970.

⁶ Hall, p. 44. For a similar situation in New France see Richard C. Harris, *The Seigneurial System in Early Canada* (Madison, 1966), p. 24.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A VIEW FROM PHILADELPHIA

By Joseph A. Ernst and H. Roy Merrens*

We do not have a full-scale study of the colonial South Carolina economy. But when that work comes to be written, its major theme will likely be the central importance of Charleston. The tradition is already well-established. The few histories of the early South Carolina economy that have appeared invariably present Charleston as "the hub" or the focus of the economic life of the province. And not without reason. Much economic activity did take place in Charleston. Moreover, the city's past proves especially interesting to scholars both because of the inherent importance of old Charleston—as the fourth largest urban centre in early America, it enjoyed a unique position among the Southern colonies—and because of the charms of the townscape that survive from the past.¹

Nonetheless, the fact remains that despite the significance and attractiveness of Charleston, any account of South Carolina's economy as viewed from the metropolitan centre, fails to confront a number of basic issues. Existing Charleston-based studies, for instance, tell us virtually nothing about the structure, function, and operation of the rice or indigo trade—to mention but two of the most important commodities that were funnelled through the Charleston market. Nor do they reveal very much about the regional patterns of agricultural production, distribution, and consumption; the provincial system of currency and credit; or the distribution of British goods.² In a word, the difficulty with restricting one's view to Charleston is that much too much of the economic landscape remains hidden. It may be argued, then, that a necessary first step in the effort to describe and analyze the economic life of South Carolina during the mid-eighteenth century is to shift the focus of attention away from Charleston.

An appropriate viewpoint for the study of South Carolina's economy remains necessary, of course, and ours is Philadelphia. For one thing, the eccentric whereabouts of that city relative to South Carolina underscores the fact that the local economy—or better, economies—encompassed not only all of South Carolina but to some extent the Mainland Colonies, the West Indies, the British Isles, Southern Europe, and

* The authors are grateful for the financial assistance that has supported their individual projects and has been generously granted by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Faculty of Arts of York University, and Mr. George Townes, of Greenville, South Carolina.

Africa. Clearly, then, what is needed is a series of studies of the regional economies of South Carolina as viewed from places as diverse as Newport, Rhode Island; Liverpool, England; Kingston, Jamaica; Oporto, Portugal; and Dahomey, West Africa. In the second place, the view from Philadelphia throws new light on old problems. More specifically, this view helps to analyze and relate a number of the inter-dependent and dynamic factors that give meaning and form to the over-all provincial economy, namely, the movement of people, of goods, of information, and, finally, of capital.

Typically, the movement of people from Philadelphia to South Carolina remained an anonymous process, but a few of those who moved are readily identifiable. The economic implications of their re-settlement in South Carolina are not too difficult to discern, because most of those who came from Philadelphia came either to farm or to engage in mercantile activities.

Farmers presumably arrived in greater numbers than did merchants, and even if most of the farmers went unrecorded, the information bearing on the few who left a record of their move is revealing. Some of the settlers came in groups and their arrival in the 1730's played an important part in the establishment of the townships, a mode of settlement peculiar to South Carolina. Thus one group of over two dozen immigrants arrived in Philadelphia in the spring of 1735 to settle in the new township of Queensborough.³ Similarly, Welshmen moving from Philadelphia in the 1730's contributed to the settlement of the distinctively Welsh region of colonial South Carolina, known as the Welsh Tract and later as Welsh Neck.⁴ Immigration continued throughout the next decade but by then was less oriented towards townships. An entry in the Journal of The Council for March 16, 1748/49, for example, records about three or four dozen petitions for land made by new settlers. Few of these petitions reveal where the applicants came from, but of these few, no less than three specified Philadelphia. One, William Leonard, was granted 150 acres located on a major road in the backcountry; another, Peter Renfro, received 500 acres in the fork of the Broad and Saludy Rivers; and the third, George Ebener, a coppersmith, successfully petitioned for 400 acres and a town lot in Saxe Gotha Township.⁵

A final point with regard to the migrants who came from, or via, Philadelphia warrants further and deeper analysis than we can give it here. This involves the question of the onset of crop specialization and the commercialization of farming in the mid-eighteenth century. The subject has received scant attention thus far, but the testimony of newcomers from Philadelphia provides some clues to the emergence of one form of commercial specialization. Andrew Holman, for instance, reported in March, 1750, that after leaving Philadelphia to re-settle in the South Carolina backcountry he "planted three sorts of Wheat

to carry on the Flour Trade.”⁶ Similarly, Nicholas Boater, who moved into the same area at about the same time and who also came from Philadelphia, stated that his aim was to carry on wheat planting “which [he] hath been Bred to.”⁷ Certainly the pertinent evidence remains fragmentary and tenuous; it is equally certain, however, that such developments represent the expansion southwards of the colonial wheat belt, which, by mid-eighteenth century, extended through western North Carolina via parts of Maryland and Virginia through the Middle Colonies to the Hudson Valley.⁸

Far fewer in number were the Philadelphia merchants who got to South Carolina. And generally they came as visitors rather than would-be residents. Nevertheless, they appear more conspicuous in the contemporary record primarily because they invariably kept a journal of their trip. Their purpose in coming was to spy out the land, to evaluate prospects for trade, and to establish useful personal contacts. Often they combined pleasure with business, happily exchanging the cold Northern winter and the slack season in Philadelphia for the mild southern climate and busy trading times in South Carolina. One such visitor was Pelatiah Webster, a Philadelphia merchant, who arrived in Charleston in 1765. During his stay, he appears to have had more success in dining and wining with some of the affluent merchants and planters than he had in selling his Philadelphia flour, seemingly because he had failed to allow for the diminished prospects for this item in South Carolina at the time.⁹ Another visitor, Philadelphia merchant William Pollard, made only a brief stopover in Charleston during the winter of 1774, but his sojourn lasted long enough to enable him to evaluate the major mercantile houses and to send his English connections a list of the seventeen safest and strongest firms, ranked according to their reputed stability.¹⁰

A somewhat different group of visiting Philadelphia merchants were the Quakers. Quaker merchants interested themselves not only in economic conditions in Charleston but also in religious conditions among the little Society of Friends in the town.¹¹ Two representative figures who arrived in the 1740's were William Logan and James Pember-ton, both agents of important Quaker houses in Philadelphia.¹² A later Quaker coming on a more protracted visit was William Dillwyn, who remained in South Carolina in 1772 and 1773. Dillwyn, it seems, left Philadelphia to set himself up in business with a South Carolinian, drawing upon knowledge and ties acquired in earlier ventures in South Carolina and leaning upon his continuing connections with major Quaker houses in Philadelphia. That he did not stay longer appears to be related to certain non-economic conditions in Charleston. Specifically, Dillwyn feared for the loss of his soul in a place where he found a “low State of Things in a religious Sense and Fewness of number in the same religious Profession.”¹³

A related if more intricate movement was the flow of goods between Philadelphia and South Carolina. Items and amounts of Pennsylvania products shipped from Philadelphia to South Carolina varied considerably, reflecting the fact that during the mid-eighteenth century Philadelphia merchants, such as Pollard, were groping to find lucrative exports at the same time as the developing South Carolina economy offered steadily diminishing prospects for continuing formerly profitable kinds of traffic. Trade in flour, bread, and beer best illustrates this point.¹⁴ It is worth noting, however, that Philadelphia also shipped sizeable quantities of British goods to Charleston from time to time. It might even be argued that the Philadelphia merchants occasionally served as secondary suppliers of such goods in the Southern market.¹⁵

Flour and bread constituted the major export items of the Philadelphia merchants, and by the 1730's they regularly earmarked substantial shipments for the South Carolina market. The trade continued through the next decade as reflected in the attempt by the Philadelphia house of Samuel Powel and Son to ship to South Carolina merchants the sizeable quantities of flour and bread they regularly requested. Thus Gabriel Manigault, the Charleston merchant, received several hundred barrels of flour and bread per year from the Powels in the mid-40's. Even so Manigault did not obtain all he wanted, and by 1748 seriously contemplated operating a small vessel of his own to ply regularly between Charleston and Philadelphia in order to get the amounts he desired.¹⁶ But this traffic in flour and bread continued to be a viable enterprise only until wheat production spread to South Carolina, a development that elicited from Governor James Glen in 1749 the remark that New York and Pennsylvania:

... used to drain us of all the little Money and Bills we could gain upon our Trade with other Places, in Payment for the great Quantities of Bread, Flour, Beer, Hams, Bacon and other Commodities of their Produce wherewith they then supplied us: all which, excepting Beer, our new Townships, inhabited by Germans, began to supply us with.¹⁷

Glen's remarks were contained in a report to the Board of Trade and a note of official optimism may have led to some exaggeration. Nonetheless, within a decade of the Revolution wheat cultivation had engaged the attention of a sufficient number of South Carolina settlers so that Philadelphia merchants could no longer be certain of profitable exports, as Pelatiah Webster discovered in 1765.

A dependency on Philadelphia beer survived a little longer, as Governor Glen also noted in his 1749 report. Patterns of trade in barrelled and bottled beer, however, were in any case more complex and more responsive to fads and fancies. Beer, which then as now constituted something of a seasonal item, certainly arrived from Philadelphia as early as the 1730's and 1740's, presumably destined for a small and

fastidious Carolina market comprising those who either did not relish or could not be seen drinking crude home brews. For example, accompanying the bread and flour Philadelphia merchant John Reynell sent to South Carolina in February 1743, were 27 barrels of strong beer and seven barrels of best beer—and Reynell was only one of several Philadelphia merchants regularly shipping to Charleston a variety of beers including two particularly desirable kinds, Matlock's Best Beer and Reben Haynes' Best Double Beer.¹⁸ Imported beers had names and auras that undoubtedly enabled hosts to have them brought to table with some flourish, or more casually and modestly served with but a slight and passing mention of their reputable and far away origins. Even so the Carolinians seem to have increasingly preferred beer and ale from England and Scotland to the Philadelphia product. Perhaps this development reflected the growing affluence of the elite who constituted the beer market; perhaps the longer sea voyage gave British beer something extra; or perhaps imports from Britain were simply viewed with special favour.

In any event, Charlestonians continued to import beer from England while the market for the Philadelphia product sharply contracted. An English visitor to South Carolina in 1774, for instance, after saying a few derogatory words about the inferiority of local brews, noted with some satisfaction that fortunately:

Charles Town is very well supplied with Porter from England at 9 Shillings per dozen Bottles, which is commonly Drank by most People of Property at Meals . . .¹⁹

It seems that domestic beer production, which began on a systematic basis possibly as early as mid-century, always supplemented Philadelphia beer to some extent. But the prospects of that trade were greatly diminished with the establishment of Mr. Edmund Egan's brewery in Charleston, a brewery said by 1774 to be: "Now in such a State as to rival our Northern Neighbours, and retain in this Province near 20,000 pounds a Year."²⁰ With the successful establishment of a reputable local brewery there was less need than ever to resort to Philadelphia beer—although presumably the inveterate and inflexible Anglophiles were still preferring to buy British.

Movement of products in the opposite direction, from South Carolina to Philadelphia, is perhaps even more revealing of the changing economy of South Carolina at mid-century. Again, this movement would require an extended treatment to do it justice but we will resort to only five illustrations, centering around naval stores, livestock, citrus fruits, rice, and cloth, and we will simply make one or two points about each of the five.

Trade in naval stores is of special interest, because it points to an early instance of regional specialization in South Carolina's economy. Production of naval stores took place largely in the northeastern part

of the colony and was concentrated north and west of the town of Georgetown, the centre of the trade. This specialization is clearly revealed by the activities of Philadelphia merchant Robert Ellis in the 1730's and 1740's.²¹ Much involved in business with all of the Southern Colonies as well as the West Indies, Ellis regularly visited South Carolina for a spell during the winter in order to further his interests. In his dealings with several of the most important merchants in Georgetown, Ellis diligently sought to purchase the locally-produced tar, pitch, and turpentine. Whether this regional emphasis persisted during subsequent decades remains unclear. Nor are we certain just why this emphasis developed in this particular region. Certainly by the end of the colonial period it must have been relatively much less significant; by then large-scale production of tar, pitch, and turpentine in North Carolina eclipsed the production of naval stores elsewhere along the Seaboard.²²

Movements of livestock from colonial South Carolina to Philadelphia have been obfuscated by legends and so little studied that it is best to approach the contemporary record with a bare minimum of assumptions. The evidence for such movements is meagre. But the little there is indicates that by the late 1760's drovers were moving cattle overland from South Carolina to Philadelphia. This movement is almost incredible, given the quality of colonial stock, the distance that had to be covered, and the nature of the terrain traversed. That it really did take place, however, is evident from the record,²³ although from where in South Carolina, how frequently, and when the drives began are questions on which the record is at best obscure. Inventories of estates clearly demonstrate that commercial livestock raising was less a small sideline of many farmers than a major emphasis of a small number of large planters.²⁴ The large-scale raisers of livestock maintained constantly-growing herds with animals numbering in the hundreds and even thousands. In 1761, Thomas Elliot's estate, to take an extreme example, listed almost five thousand head of cattle, distributed among four different locations.²⁵

The full story of the livestock industry warrants monographic attention. Here we can only suggest a few hypotheses regarding this activity. An emphasis on livestock must have functioned as a profitable low-capital investment form of land-use for large planters who had reached some sort of limit in rice and indigo planting, a limit presumably set not by land but by capital available for investing in slave-holdings. For such planters, livestock raising probably presented an attractive way of utilizing land. It required a minimal investment in labour yet afforded the prospect of furnishing a desirable source of income, which was probably usually supplemental, but occasionally might have constituted a crucial tide-over source of profits when rice prices or harvests were down. Evidence for the concentration of this activity in particular sections of coastal South Carolina is also revealing. It suggests localization in response to a number of factors—and a regionalization which

bears little relationship to Turnerian formulations or to environmental conditions. Big-time cattle raising became concentrated in the area between Georgia and, roughly, the Combahee River, apparently because of the prevalence of somewhat larger land-holdings in this area. In turn, this critical difference in size of holding was probably a result of land engrossment during the first decades of the eighteenth century.²⁶

This by no means reveals the whole story of large-scale livestock raising. Perhaps it provides the essence of it, however. If these hypotheses prove valid, then the overland drives to Philadelphia make some sense in terms of a quest for outlets that could be reached at minimal cost by planters who produced more stock than could be absorbed by South Carolina markets and who simply hired drovers to dispose of the animals in Philadelphia, or, presumably, at any good market they came across en route to the Pennsylvania city.

No less interesting was the trade in oranges. In the long run, Carolina experiments with citrus and other exotic fruit came to little. For a time, however, the production of oranges held out some hope of commercial success. By the 1740's, the planting of orange trees, especially in the town of Charleston, had reached the point where production out-stripped local consumption. In 1744, for instance, local merchants prepared considerable quantities of oranges for shipment to Philadelphia and some of the large cities of the north. The industry nevertheless failed to live up to its promises. Winter weather took its inevitable toll of the trees, and trade contracted. Crates of Charleston oranges still reaching Philadelphia by the 1760's came more often as favours to friends and business correspondents than as merchandise. In addition, it should be noted that the citrus trade between the two cities proved to be a two-way street. Years before oranges found their way north, barrels of limes and casks of lime juice from southern Europe regularly left Philadelphia for Charleston, both for private use in the form of presents and for public sale. In the Charleston market they competed with limes from the West Indies, although limes and lime juice turned out to be dispensable fare. The appearance of oranges and orange juice soon drove the rival fruit from local shelves.²⁷

Two final items of trade between Charleston and Philadelphia were dry goods and rice. Because of the larger northern outlets, Charleston's wholesale merchants who conducted the major part of the import business with Britain ordinarily sent their surplus dry goods to Philadelphia rather than dispose of them at a loss at Vendue, or public auction, in South Carolina—though resorting to Vendue became a familiar practice in the mid-1760's when cloth of all kinds often choked the Philadelphia market as well.²⁸ This general increase in Vendue sales in the period was an aspect of a larger structural development, which not only altered the patterns of trade between South Carolina and Philadelphia but also threatened the continuance of the existing commercial system in all the colonial ports and helped shape the gathering revolutionary

movement. After the French and Indian War, Vendue masters in the great ports, who had heretofore provided the local merchant communities with an outlet for their surplus, damaged, or obsolete goods, now began importing heavily on their own account directly from British merchant suppliers. The end result was a continuing glut in the dry goods sector throughout the 1760's and an even greater dependency on the Vendue.²⁹

Trade in rice, on the other hand, responded to a somewhat different set of economic factors. One certainly was the local demand for rice in the regional trade area serviced by Philadelphia. That market remained relatively small as compared with the demand for wheat and other grains which though more expensive were nevertheless preferred. Another factor was the demand in Charleston for products from the Middle Colonies. Since Philadelphia ships rarely, if ever, made an empty run, favourable markets in the Charleston area would at times attract more than enough ships to supply the northern city's rice needs. Under these circumstances Philadelphia shippers would take rice directly to Europe or the West Indies.³⁰ Likewise high freight rates in the rice trade would also draw additional sail from Philadelphia, although in such cases the rich would more likely be carried directly to foreign ports.³¹

The other two movements, of information and of capital, we will treat much more briefly and slightly differently. Colonial business correspondents regularly carried current news about crop conditions, commodity prices, sterling exchange rates, the market for British goods, freight rates, and the like.³² But the flow of information between Philadelphia merchants and South Carolina revealed a special character which we have already touched upon incidentally, that is, the particular usefulness to Philadelphia merchants of news sent back to them by colleagues, partners, or family members who visited South Carolina. In this connection we have noted earlier the activities of Robert Ellis, William Pollard, and Pelatiah Webster, all of whom learned much about local trade and business conditions during their stay in South Carolina. Clearly some Charlestonians also made the trek in the opposite direction, for reasons of business as well as pleasure, and served their correspondents at home in much the same way. Nevertheless, the record suggests that this kind of movement largely operated from north to south. This is possibly both a witness to the entrepreneurial abilities and aggressiveness of the Philadelphians and a reflection of the somewhat different structure of trade and thus of mercantile functions in the Middle and Southern Colonies. In any event, especially impressive is the extent to which visiting merchants, Quakers in particular, kept their counterparts back in Philadelphia informed of what was happening in South Carolina and of what opportunities prospects seemed to offer.

Quaker merchant William Dillwyn serves as a case in point. When Dillwyn sailed from Philadelphia for a visit to South Carolina in October, 1772, his fellow passengers included several South Carolinians (as well as two Philadelphians heading south for the sake of the mild winter and of their health). Contact with them seems to have led to later business dealings and ventures. During his visit, Dillwyn kept a detailed diary of what he had observed, and of whom he met, and while in South Carolina he corresponded with Quaker merchants both in Philadelphia and in New Jersey, including the important Philadelphia house of Pemberton.³³

The Pemberton connection is significant in a somewhat different context, and it will serve as an introduction to the subject of the movement of capital at the time. An important development in South Carolina at mid-century was the rapid emergence of Camden (about 125 miles northwest of Charleston) as an interior urban centre, based on functions revolving around trading and milling activities, and closely resembling urban growth taking place at about the same time in North Carolina and even further north.³⁴ Camden differed from the other urban centres in its Quaker origins. Hence, given the strength and role of Quaker mercantile ties between Philadelphia and South Carolina, it would not be surprising if Camden's emergence was both another expression of the kind of axis we have been describing and, more to the point, of substantial Philadelphia investments. On the other hand, the fact that the Quakers who originally settled the Camden area around 1750 came from Ireland suggests that the Philadelphia Quaker houses were largely irrelevant to Camden's early growth.³⁵ But the rapid and boom-like growth of the town during the two decades prior to the Revolution was another matter.

During this period of Camden's development the leading figure was Joseph Kershaw. Kershaw certainly played a major part in establishing the flour mills, sawmills, stores, and taverns that together with a couple of public buildings constituted the essential urban nucleus of Camden.³⁶ When Dr. James Clitherall passed through the town in 1776 (incidentally on a trip escorting two Charleston ladies going to Philadelphia), he saw much of Camden and its vicinity, and of Mr. Kershaw. After several days in the town he wrote that:

Mr. Kershaw who originally planned, and was the Proprietor of Camden, seemed much respected and beloved. I believe [he] had much influence among the people and is their Representative in Assembly. Everyone seemed glad to see him and ready to serve him . . . Camden is a well laid out Town, has some large Houses in it among which are the Court House and Gaol.³⁷

Unlike Clitherall, William Dillwyn had not got to Camden during his South Carolina visit a few years before. But he had made a point of meeting Kershaw several times while Kershaw was wintering in Charleston. Dillwyn not only appreciated Kershaw's affluence, his popularity, and his large business activities but also took note of just

one fact about Kershaw's wife: though Kershaw was not a Quaker, his wife was related to the Pemberton family of Philadelphia Quaker merchants.³⁸ Admittedly while the marital tie may be of no particular import, Kershaw's business connections with a Philadelphia Quaker merchant, John Reynell, through the partnership of John Chestnut, William Ancrum, Aaron Loocock, Ely Kershaw and Joseph Kershaw, are a matter of record.³⁹

Whatever might be the precise role of the Quaker merchants as investors in Camden, or in the South Carolina economy as a whole, it is clear that the movement of capital from Philadelphia to Charleston, and vice versa, took the usual form of the sale of goods and commodities on short credit, although a certain amount of money-capital was sent either as drafts or sterling bills of exchange. In addition, money as a means of payment, whether as coin, promissory notes, drafts, inland or sterling bills of exchange, moved freely, in the ordinary course of business, in both directions.⁴⁰ On those occasions when it did not move quickly enough—quick payment being held essential for the life of trade—it had to be coaxed or forced. Then as now the debt collector played a familiar role on the business scene, and anything was fair in dunning for debts. Thus when Philip Abraham and his family “Sneaked off” to Philadelphia, without clearing up their debts in Charleston, one of their creditors, Lionel Chalmers, wrote to Israel Pemberton, the great Philadelphia merchant, to “apply to their Synagogue, who perhaps would compel him to do Justice; the Method however I leave to yourself.”⁴¹

* * *

There is a tendency in some quarters to look down on those students of the colonial past who still retain an interest in description and particularism—that is, in describing and detailing the intricacies of the provincial economies. But the fact remains that the “new” economic approaches, like the “old,” have failed to tell us very much about the shape or functioning of the whole of economic life in seventeenth and eighteenth-century America. Admittedly, our own approach has not been radical. We have simply looked at the economy of the whole colony from the vantage point of a well-known big city. Our point of departure has been the eccentric location of that city and our emphasis on the relationships among the movement of people, goods, information, and capital. The argument here is that what is required is a series of studies of the South Carolina economy as seen from numerous places, widely separated in both time and space, such as from Barbados in the late seventeenth century or from Bristol in the mid-eighteenth century.

In sum, perhaps the time has come to forget new fashions and old modes, to get on with the task of seeing the changing colonial economies as a functional whole, and to use whatever conceptual tools prove necessary to do the job.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Two notable examples of this interest are: Leila Sellers, *Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1934); and George C. Rogers, Jr., *Charleston in the Age of the Pinckneys* (Norman, Okla., 1969).

² Despite its obvious importance, the colonial economy of South Carolina has received far less scholarly attention than have the economies of the other Mainland Colonies (with the possible exceptions of North Carolina and Georgia). A recent bibliographical assessment appears in M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1966), pp. 374-75. The most relevant recent study, Converse D. Clowse, *Economic Beginnings in Colonial South Carolina, 1670-1730* (Columbia, S.C., 1971), does not concern itself with the basic issues identified above.

³ South Carolina Council Journal, Mar. 7, 1734/35, and Mar. 29, 1735. (These manuscript journals, hereinafter identified as SCCJ, are located in the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, S.C.)

⁴ The story of this Welsh migration and settlement can be pieced together from clues in the records of land petitions and dispositions in the Council Journals for the late 1730's: see, for examples, SCCJ, Aug. 13, 1736, Jul. 29, 1737, Dec. 14, 1737, Jan. 20, 1737/38, May 11, 1739, and Jul. 7, 1739.

⁵ SCCJ, Mar. 16, 1748/49.

⁶ SCCJ, Mar. 6, 1749/50.

⁷ SCCJ, Mar. 6, 1749/50.

⁸ For more on the character of this wheat belt and on evidence pertaining to it, see H. Roy Merrens, *Colonial North Carolina in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Historical Geography* (Chapel Hill, N.C. 1964), p. 118, and fn. 52 on p. 239.

⁹ Webster's account is presented in T.P. Harrison (ed.), "Journal of a Voyage to Charlestown in So. Carolina by Pelatiah Webster in 1765," *Publications of the Southern History Association*, II (Apr., 1898), 131-48. The original manuscript is in the South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, S.C.

¹⁰ Letter of William Pollard to Messrs. B. and J. Bower, Feb. 1, 1774, which is the manuscript William Pollard Letter Book, 1772-1774, in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

¹¹ The bare bones of the story of the Quakers in Charleston, and of their links with the Friends in Philadelphia, appear in some printed records: Mabel L. Webber (ed.), "The Records of the Quakers in Charles Town," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, XXVIII (Jan., 1927), 22-43; (Apr., 1927), 94-107; (Jul., 1927), 176-97.

¹² The visits of Logan and Pemberton are recorded in their accounts: the Diary and Journal of James Pemberton is in the Division of Manuscripts of the Library of Congress; "William Logan's Journal of a Journey to Georgia, 1745" is printed in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, XXXVI (Jan., 1912), 1-16; (Apr., 1912), 162-86.

¹³ Letter from William Dillwyn to James Pemberton, Jan. 27, 1773, in Pemberton Papers, vol. 24, 1772-1773 (manuscripts in the Historical Society of Pennsyl-

vania). The visit is described in A.S. Salley (ed.), "Diary of William Dillwyn During a Visit to Charles Town in 1772," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, XXXVI (Jan., 1935), 1-6; (Apr., 1935), 28-35; (Jul., 1935), 73-8; (Oct., 1935), 107-10.

¹⁴ Quantitative data on trade between South Carolina and Philadelphia for the two decades after 1750 was compiled from two principal sources: the Naval Office Records for South Carolina; and American Board of Customs, Exports and Imports, America, 1768-1773 (manuscripts in the British Public Record Office, also known as Customs 16/1). For the period after 1750, the Naval Office Records cover the years 1752, 1753, 1758, 1759, 1760, 1762, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1767. Customs 16/1 covers the years 1768-1772. These two sources are not altogether compatible. Even more unfortunate, however, was the recognition that the compilations do not constitute adequate foundations for an acceptably rigorous analysis.

¹⁵ See, for example, Henry Laurens to William Fisher, Jan. 9, May 29, 1764, and to George Morgan, Aug. 26, 1767, in Reel 3 of the microfilm edition of the Papers of Henry Laurens (microfilmed by the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, produced by Micro Photo, Inc., 1966, for the South Carolina Historical Society, and hereinafter cited as Laurens Papers).

¹⁶ The story of the trading relationship between Samuel Powel and Gabriel Manigault is revealed in communications between them, which are found in two collections of manuscripts in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania: Samuel Powel Letter Books, 1727-1747 (3 vols.); Samuel Powel, Commercial Correspondence, 1683-1749 (2 boxes).

¹⁷ The words quoted appear in a version of Glen's report that has been printed: Chapman J. Milling (ed.), *Colonial South Carolina: Two Contemporary Descriptions by Governor James Glen and Doctor George Milligen-Johnston* (Columbia, S.C., 1951), p. 45. That the change was just getting underway at this time is underlined by the fact that when Glen first drafted the report, he wrote that the townships were supplying the commodities, and it was when the Commons House of Assembly objected that this was rather inaccurate that he modified the report so that it read they "begin to supply us" with these items. The reaction of the Commons House of Assembly to Glen's original text appears in J.H. Easterby and Ruth S. Green (eds.), *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: The Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, March 28, 1749-March 19, 1750* (Columbia, S.C., 1962), pp. 56-7; there are about a half-dozen slightly different extant versions of Glen's report, and these are identified in fn. 21 on p. xiv of this same volume.

¹⁸ The activities of Reynell, and others, are illustrated in the manuscript John Reynell Letter Books, 1729-1774 (12 vols., in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania). Brands of beer (and flour) are identified in the correspondence of Samuel Powel (see fn. 16, above), and other merchants.

¹⁹ "Charleston, S.C., in 1774 as described by an English Traveler," *Historical Magazine*, IX (Nov., 1865), 344.

²⁰ *South Carolina Gazette*, Feb. 21, 1774. More information on Egan's brewery is presented in Walter W. Walsh, "Edmund Egan: Charleston's Rebel Brewer," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, LVI (Oct., 1955), 200-04.

²¹ Robert Ellis Letter Book, 1736-1748 (manuscript, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). See also several letters of Charleston merchant John Guerard in the manuscript John Guerard Letter Book, 1752-1754 (South Carolina Historical Society), such as, for example, the letter from Guerard to William Jolliff, May 6, 1754.

²² On the production of naval stores in North Carolina, see Merrens, *Colonial North Carolina*, pp. 85-92.

²³ See letter of Alice Blanchfield to [John Rudolph], Mar. 20, 1768, in Hollingsworth Manuscripts, Correspondence, Jun., 1761-Dec., 1777 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania). Also relevant is a letter from Warwick Miller of Chester County, printed in the *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), Sept. 22, 1768.

²⁴ This conclusion is based on a study of the manuscript inventories of estates, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.

²⁵ Inventory of Thomas Elliot, Senr., dated 25 Jul., 1761, in Inventories, T, 1758-1761.

²⁶ These interpretations of the livestock industry will be elaborated and substantiated in forthcoming publications on colonial South Carolina's geography by Merrens.

²⁷ The production of oranges in colonial South Carolina was of minor importance, which is probably why historians have accorded it so little attention. The above summary interpretation of the production of, and trade in, oranges is based on a number of scattered references to oranges in the contemporary record, including the following: "Charleston, S.C. in 1774, as described by an English Traveler," *Historical Magazine*, IX (Nov., 1865), 344; letter from Thomas Lamboll in Charleston to John Bartram in Philadelphia, Nov. 11, 1763, and editorial comments, in Elise Pinckney (ed.), *Thomas and Elizabeth Lamboll: Early Charleston Gardeners* ("Charleston Museum Leaflet," No. 28: Charleston, S.C., Nov., 1969), pp. 19-20; account of Joseph Summers and Charles Pinckney, Jul. 8, 1747, in the manuscript Pinckney Papers, 1694-1782 (Library of Congress); letter of Henry Laurens to Felix Warley, Sept. 5, 1771, in Laurens Papers, Reel 4.

²⁸ See, for example, Henry Laurens to William Fisher, Apr. 26, 1763, and to Grubb and Watson, May 21, 1763, in Laurens Papers, Reel 2.

²⁹ See the discussion in Marc Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of the Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XXIX (Jan., 1972), 15-6. See also Henry Laurens to Isaac King, Apr. 3, 1764, in Laurens Papers, Reel 3.

³⁰ See, for example, Henry Laurens to William Fisher, May 29, 1764, in Laurens Papers, Reel 2.

³¹ See Henry Laurens to Coxe and Furman, Aug. 27, 1763, in Laurens Papers, Reel 2, and Laurens to William Fisher, Oct. 12, 1771, in Laurens Papers, Reel 4.

³² See Egnal and Ernst, "Economic Interpretation . . .," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XXIX (Jan., 1972), 12-3.

³³ The printed version of Dillwyn's diary is identified in fn. 13, above.

³⁴ Merrens, *Colonial North Carolina*, pp. 116-17. A case study of Camden is presented in a forthcoming article by the present authors, to appear in the

William and Mary Quarterly entitled "'Camden's turrets pierce the skies!': The Urban Process in the Southern Colonies during the Eighteenth Century."

³⁵ The Quaker settlers can be identified in the records of the South Carolina Council sessions, where they are named when they petitioned for land. For examples of such petitions by Quakers, see SCCJ, Oct. 25, 1751. The Quaker phase of settlement is reviewed in Thomas J. Kirkland and Robert M. Kennedy, *Historic Camden: Part I, Colonial and Revolutionary* (Columbia, S.C., 1905), pp. 73-7.

³⁶ No one has yet pieced together a coherent picture of Kershaw's political and economic activities, but assorted scraps of evidence suggest he was one of the leading members of a trading partnership that had its headquarters in Charleston, relied upon Kershaw to provide it with a crucial interior base of operations through his diverse trading ventures in Camden, and sought to enlarge its operations by promoting trade at two or three other focal points in the interior. An informative source is a memorandum of agreement made between Kershaw and four others, which was to take effect on Jan. 1, 1764. This manuscript is among the Chestnut-Miller-Manning Papers, 1744-1900, in the South Carolina Historical Society. A little more information on Kershaw's activities can be gathered from a few of the early items in the Joseph Brevard Kershaw Papers, 1766-1888, in the South Caroliniana Collection of the University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., and from the letter from Henry Laurens to Joseph Kershaw, Jul. 23, 1766, in the Henry Laurens Letter Book, 1762-1766, in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

³⁷ James Clitherall Diary, 1776, in the Southern Historical Collection of the University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, N.C.

³⁸ Salley (ed.), "Diary of William Dillwyn . . .," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, XXXVI (Apr., 1935), 33.

³⁹ See memorandum of agreement cited in fn. 36, above.

⁴⁰ These problems are the subject of a forthcoming monograph, *Money and Politics in America 1755-1775, A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution*, by Joseph A. Ernst, to be published by the Institute of Early American History and Culture.

⁴¹ Lionel Chalmers to Israel Pemberton, Oct. 10, 1769, in Pemberton Papers, vol. 21, 1767-1770.

THE NORTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT: AN ISLAND OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

By W. Frank Ainsley and John W. Florin

... A sub-region of peculiar interest is that located in the Carolina Piedmont, an area whose cultural distinctiveness has not been fully appreciated in the geographical literature. This sub-region is decidedly a portion of the South; but the significance of Presbyterians, Friends, Congregationalists, and various Teutonic groups suggests a divergence in general demographic, cultural, and historical development from, say Virginia or South Carolina that even the casual student would have little trouble in detecting.¹

The above observation was offered by Wilbur Zelinsky after a cartographic analysis of religious data collected by the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. in 1952. He was sufficiently struck by the religious anomaly that he identified the Piedmont section of North Carolina as a distinct sub-region in an otherwise strikingly homogeneous Southeast. In this article we hope to examine whether, within the context of spatial variations of religious affiliation in North Carolina, this is a valid identification, and if this is true, to delimit the actual sub-region according to the counties in the Piedmont which compose it. Furthermore, we will utilize religious data collected by the Bureau of the Census in 1890 and 1916, as well as the 1952 data, to see if any substantial changes have occurred in this apparent island of religious diversity over a 62 year period of profound economic and demographic alteration in the Piedmont.

To simplify the data matrix—12 denominations were included in the 1890 data, 11 in 1916, and 13 in 1952—a principal components analysis using orthogonal rotation was applied to each of the data matrices. We realize that the statistical validity of these solutions must remain suspect because of the lack of any possible test of significance for the results. However, we felt that the reduction of the original data matrices into a smaller number of key dimensions offered the hope of an improved spatial comprehension that was worth the obvious statistical risk. Component scores, which measure the relative importance of each component dimension for each data unit (or county), were generated and mapped. In most cases each county was assigned to the religious category or dimension on which it had the highest positive loading. In some instances, when a dimension was identified by a low negative loading, the counties with the lowest negative scores were assigned to that dimension.

One evident aspect of all three of the rotated component matrices is the degree to which only a single denomination is associated with most

of the components. Only the Baptists, with a negative association with Methodists on the first dimension in 1890 and 1916, and the Disciples of Christ on the first dimension and the Methodists on the eighth in 1952, invariably load as high as the .3 level with any other denomination. In fact, the only other clusterings that can be considered to be even moderately strong are the positive association between Lutherans and Reformed groups in 1890 and 1916. A lack of similarity in the distributional patterns of the various groups is obvious here.

The Piedmont section of the state stands out as an area of considerable internal diversity on the composite map of religious groups (Figure 1). Only one of the seven dimensions that constitute the high scores for all of the counties is not represented in the sub-region as defined by Zelinsky, and four of the seven are concentrated in that region. Only 31 of North Carolina's 100 counties fall within this region. The western third of the state is a homogeneous representation of the dominant Baptist-Methodist dimension, while the Coastal Plain section is of intermediate complexity. The Disciples of Christ load heavily on the component that dominates much of the middle coastal plain. This native American religious group developed indigenously in the region and seems to have competed strongly with the Baptist for a common constituency.




Figure 1

Composite map of highest positive or lowest negative rotated component score for religious denominations in each North Carolina county, 1890.

The 1916 components mapping reflects a continuation of the basic pattern that was present in 1890 (Figure 2). The Piedmont is still the area of greatest diversity while the Mountains are again identified by their homogeneity. The diversity of the Coastal Plain has been decreased through the absence of the Disciples of Christ from the 1916 census enumeration. The Lutheran-Reformed dimension continues to dominate much of the western Piedmont, the Moravian influence still centers on Forsythe County, the Friends are significant in the central Piedmont, and the Congregationalists appear strongest to the north and east. The Presbyterian foothold in the Scotch Highlander settlement area in the south-central area has expanded noticeably.




Figure 2

Composite map of highest positive or lowest negative rotated component score for religious denominations in each North Carolina county, 1916.

The apparent importance of the Disciples of Christ in the Coastal Plain is substantiated by its reappearance with the 1952 National Council of Churches statistics (Figure 3). Still, the Piedmont's existence as an island of religious diversity continues to be evident. To the south and west this island has expanded into four additional counties, while in the northeast one has been lost. The Coastal Plain has lost representation of all but the Baptist and Disciples of Christ dimensions. The Presbyterian component has made slight inroads into the Baptist-Methodist domination in the Mountains. Five of the seven dimensions are again represented in the central parts of the state.




Figure 3

Composite map of highest positive or lowest negative rotated component score for religious denominations in each North Carolina county, 1952.

The prime purpose of the research reported in this article was to statistically test the hypothesis that the "exotic" religious groups of Piedmont North Carolina composed an "island of religious diversity" within the state. The composite maps derived from principal components analyses run on the three data matrices indicate that this basic hypothesis is true. Some additional findings are also revealed by the composite maps.

First, within the Piedmont region, the dominant religious groups are spatially separated into different sub-regional clusters. The Congregationalists dominate the northeast Piedmont. The Friends are located in a band of counties running from the northwestern section of the Piedmont to the central Piedmont. This band of Friends is bisected by the Moravians. The southwestern quarter of the Piedmont is dominated by a sub-region composed of Lutheran and Reformed Churches; this sub-region is split into two halves by a North-South strip of Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism. Sitting astride the physiological boundary between the southeastern Piedmont and the adjacent Coastal Plain are the Scotch Highlander Presbyterians.

Secondly, these clusters of exotic religious groups in the Piedmont have remained fairly stable since 1890. While a few counties have shifted through time from one exotic dimension to another, most of the clusters are clearly recognizable. With increasing urbanization, it seems that the counties of the Piedmont which are influenced by the Baptist-Methodist components have been decreasing.

Also, in addition to the island of religious diversity in the Piedmont, there exists one major and several minor islands within the Coastal Plain. The east central Coastal Plain is clearly dominated by the

Disciples of Christ. The area around Cumberland is a stronghold of Scotch Highlander Presbyterianism. By 1952, the Presbyterian influence is also beginning to dominate a strip running from North to South from Duplin through Pender to New Hanover County.

Finally, the Piedmont island of religious diversity is closely associated with the major area of urban and industrial development in North Carolina. This includes the familiar Piedmont Crescent and its extensions via the major transportation routes to the other urban areas of the Piedmont. However, the existence of this diversity clearly preceded the period of urbanization. Virtually all of the denominational groups that together lend this region its peculiar character settled in the Piedmont well before the time of the American Revolution, with the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and the Lutheran and Reformed German groups, both found in the western portion of the area, the last to arrive in substantial numbers. The rise of the urban, industrial arc of the Piedmont Crescent, then, has not been the creator of this island of diversity. Rather, its influence appears to have been to strengthen and expand an already clearly established religious region.

FOOTNOTE

¹ Wilbur Zelinsky, "An Approach to the Religious Geography of the United States: Patterns of Church Membership in 1952," *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, LI (1961), 164.

THE GEOGRAPHIC BASE OF URBAN RETARDATION IN MISSISSIPPI, 1800-1840

By Howard G. Adkins

The state of Mississippi is characterized by a significantly low level of urbanization when compared with the great majority of other states in the Union. This is not a recent phenomenon but has existed since the earliest days of European settlement in eastern North America. The main circumstances affecting the size and spacing of cities in Mississippi have been a combination of physical, economic, demographic, and historical factors peculiar to the region. This study examines several such factors which were operative before 1840 when the state had a population of almost 375,000, only one percent of which was urban compared with eleven percent for the United States.

The first white settlement in what is today Mississippi was established by the French at Old Biloxi, a coastal location, in 1699. It was followed by Fort Rosalie, founded in the midst of the Natchez Indians, in 1716, and by Fort St. Peter, built along the Yazoo River, three years later. Of these early settlements, only the Fort Rosalie (Natchez) location seemed favorably disposed for large-scale settlement attempts, and by 1729 a population count indicated 200 male colonists, 80 female colonists, 150 children, 280 Negro slaves, and a garrison of 28 soldiers.¹ This attempt at settlement was cut short by the 1729 Natchez Massacre, after which much French time and energy were taken up in military expeditions against the Natchez and Chickasaw Indians. Thus, other than selecting the sites of Natchez and Biloxi, the French had almost no effect on town building in Mississippi.

In 1763, as a result of the Treaty of Paris ending the Seven Years' War, the British acquired all French territory east of the Mississippi River except for New Orleans. The new owners seem to have had little interest in colonizing the acquired territory but were mainly concerned with the establishment of a buffer between their Atlantic Seaboard colonies and Spanish settlements west of the Mississippi River. Natchez, which had partially been rebuilt after the massacre, persisted as an embryonic urban place, but its growth was slow. In 1776, for example, it consisted of

... only ten log houses and two frame houses, all situated under the bluff.... About seventy-eight families, scattered in different settlements, constituted the whole population of the district, few of which had immigrated to the country previous to 1772. There were four small stores in the town.²

Biloxi was equally non-descript, and no other towns were founded prior to 1781 when the area was surrendered to the Spanish.

Spaniards were the first Europeans to have an active town policy in the Mississippi Territory, but the results can best be characterized as unsuccessful. Part of the problem was that the Spanish Crown encouraged settlement around a church, a guardhouse, or near a military commandant's residence. Such sites, often chosen for military reasons, were not always favorable for agriculture and thus could not support a large colony. Also, the region was being slowly settled from the east by self-reliant people of predominantly Anglo-Saxon extraction. Therefore, when Spain relinquished control of the Mississippi area to the United States in 1798, she had made no measurable contribution to its urban fabric.³

Even in the decade or so following 1798, settlement in Mississippi can only be characterized as slow. Two main factors seem responsible for this. First, the region was a fringe area on America's westward moving settlement frontier, which lay south of the main paths of migration. Moreover, much of it was Indian country, which helped to concentrate most immigrants within twenty-five miles of the Mississippi River in locales linked by four public roads of doubtful quality.⁴ A second factor was that land sales were delayed until 1807 in order to clear up conflicting claims stemming from colonial land grants. As an example, between 1800 and 1810, Tennessee's population increased by 156,125, Kentucky's by 185,516, and Mississippi's by only 31,502.⁵

However, once claims were settled and clear titles offered, immigration slowly gained momentum. Settlers recognized four broad subdivisions of Mississippi based mainly upon differences in soil fertility, topography, vegetation, and drainage. These regions were the Delta, the Piney Woods, the Hills, and the Natchez District (Figure 1).⁶ It is obvious from Table 1, listing the population of each region, that the easily-worked soils of the Natchez District and the Hills were preferred by settlers. Because of the expense of clearing land and the threat of flooding, the Delta remained unsettled except for choice riverine sites until the 1870's and 1880's.⁷ The Piney Woods was the second most populous subdivision in 1830, but its infertile soils caused it to increase in population least among the four zones between 1830 and 1840.

Unlike settlers in the Middle West who went in "search of promising towns" and "opportunities in infant cities," immigrants entering Mississippi after 1800 were predominantly interested in land.⁸ Most were southerners familiar with cotton cultivation, a commodity of great profit potential, who were anxious to convert the virgin Mississippi landscape into cotton fields. Some established large plantations, others small farms. In a relative sense, size mattered little for "cotton was adapted to cultivation on any scale and one-horse farmers and hundred-slave planters competed on fairly even terms, acre for acre."⁹

Cotton was not the only crop produced commercially in Mississippi after 1800, but it was the one which attracted settlers and dominated the economy. During a good year, when cotton prices averaged fifteen




Figure 1

cents a pound at New Orleans, net profits to a farmer averaged 20 to 35 percent.¹⁰ With this profit possibility, settlers were more interested in acquiring land and establishing plantations than in purchasing town lots and pursuing an urban-related economy. This interest in land to cultivate cotton attracted settlers in greater numbers after statehood in 1817.

Cotton, slavery, and plantations thus became dominant elements in the Mississippi economy up to 1840. In that census year 52 percent of

TABLE 1
MISSISSIPPI POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1784-1840

Year	Natchez District	Piney Woods	Hills	Delta	Total	Slave
1840	88,461	52,092	210,878	24,219	375,650	195,211
1830	66,582	38,715	22,735	8,526	136,621	65,659
1820	47,946	24,781	2,721		75,448	32,814
1810	30,053	1,253			31,306	17,088
1800	7,600				7,600	2,995
1792*	4,346				4,346	1,993
1784*	1,619				1,619	498

Source: *United States Census of Population*, "Mississippi," 1800-1840.

* Jack D.L. Holmes, *Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799* (Baton Rouge, 1965), pp. 114-15.

the inhabitants were slaves, which not only deprived the nascent towns of population but also of trade. Most large plantations tended to be economic units maintaining cotton gins, blacksmith shops and gristmills, and employing carpenters, masons, tanners, and mechanics. Cotton was marketed by factors. Also, for a commission, a factor would purchase supplies and furnish planters with funds and credit. Commission merchants serving Mississippi planters tended to concentrate in Mobile, New Orleans, and Memphis, and to a lesser extent at Natchez and Vicksburg (Table 2). With the possible exception of the latter two places, the plantation system did not stimulate the growth of regional market towns with their many complementary amenities.¹¹

In 1842 the *Mississippi Free Trader* made the following comparison between the planter class and small farmers:

They [the small farmers] would crowd our streets [Natchez] with fresh and healthy supplies of home productions, and proceeds would be expended here among our merchants, grocers, and

TABLE 2
MISSISSIPPI: COMMISSION MERCHANT HOUSES, STORES
AND CAPITAL INVESTED BY REGIONS IN 1840

Region	Commission Merchant Houses	Number	Stores
			Capital Invested
Natchez District	54	332	\$2,432,559
Piney Woods	0	81	366,116
Hills	8	317	2,021,129
Delta	<u>12</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>184,616</u>
Totals	74	755	\$5,004,420

Source: *United States Census, 1840 Compendium*, pp. 230-37.

artisans. The large planters—the one-thousand-bale planters—do not contribute most to the prosperity of Natchez. They, for the most part, sell their cotton in Liverpool; buy their wines in London or Le Harve; their negro clothing in Boston; their plantation implements and fancy articles in New Orleans. The small planter has not the credit nor the business connections to do this; he requires the proceeds of his crop as soon as it can be sold; and he purchases and pays for, cash in hand, almost every necessary wanted during the year, in the same market where he sells his cotton. The small planter hoards no money in these times, he lends none at usurious rates of interest; he buys up the property of no unfortunate debtor for a few dollars; but he lays it all out for the purchase of supplies, and thus directly contributes his mite to the prosperity of our city.¹²

Trade, which is the basic support of towns in any agricultural area, was seasonal in early nineteenth century Mississippi, and geared directly to the production of cotton. Except for Natchez and a few other towns possessing similar situations, inland trade centers were viable units only during cotton marketing seasons. With no adequate or readily available funds, merchants, farmers, and planters were forced to purchase two-thirds to three-fourths of their merchandise on credit.¹³ Both the credit and factorage systems were highly sensitive to the market and instrumental in concentrating commerce at Natchez, Vicksburg, and Port Gibson while shifting trade from the inland towns.¹⁴

The largest inland trade towns seldom exceeded 150 to 300 inhabitants, and usually consisted of two or three general stores, a saloon or two, and a livery stable. In time, a post office, gristmill, cotton gin, blacksmith, tan-yard, and possibly a bank might be added.¹⁵ More stores were in the Natchez District than in any other region (Table 2),

but 80 percent of these were located in Adams (Natchez), Warren (Vicksburg), and Claiborne (Port Gibson) counties. Stores in other regions were more evenly distributed among counties. Nevertheless, the semi-colonial economy of the plantation-factorage system deprived inland towns of retail trade and hampered the rise of local manufacturing.¹⁶

As indicated in Figure 2, town development in less fertile regions was particularly hindered. Between 1830 and 1840, for example, the population in the Piney Woods increased by only 13,377 persons (Table 1), while the overall increase in state population in the same period was 249,030 persons. Obviously settlers here were not satisfied with soil conditions, which often restricted cultivation to small tracts of easily-inundated second-river bottoms. After 1820, the Piney Woods counties of Greene, Jones, Perry, and Wayne experienced a net population loss to the more fertile soils of new purchase areas in the Hills region.¹⁷ Illustrative of the problem was the fact that the Augusta land office offered 9,628,675 acres east of the Pearl River for sale during the period 1811 to 1847, but sold only 950,713 acres.¹⁸

Towns which did emerge in the Piney Woods were small, unimpressive, and generally declined as people relocated in northern Mississippi. Traveling through the Piney Woods in 1841, Claiborne observed that Monticello, Columbia and Ellisville were in an advanced state of decay.¹⁹ Augusta, possibly the most important town in the eastern Piney Woods in the early 1800's was similarly described as

... an extensive parallelogram garnished round with some eight or ten miserable tenements... the wrecks of better times... We never before saw such a picture of desolation. The vestiges of numerous and extensive buildings were still to be seen; the town itself had been planned on an imposing scale; the landing on the Leaf River where formerly barge and bateau deposited their rich cargoes, was pointed out; the courthouse... once thronged with suitors and defendants... but now all was silence and solitude.²⁰

It is probable in fact that as a result of the cotton economy very few towns would have developed in any of the inland areas had it not been for the need for area administration, for places where records could be kept, taxes paid, and courts held. Counties and county seats were created by individual enabling acts of the state legislature to serve as administrative units. In unsurveyed and unsettled territory the acts authorized a commission to select a site for the courthouse within five miles of the geographic center of an areally defined county if possible. After selecting the site, the commission was authorized to acquire land on which to build the town. Generally a central one-acre square was reserved for the courthouse which served as the nucleus of the new settlement. The first courthouse, constructed with proceeds from

MISSISSIPPI

TOWNS IN
1840




Figure 2

the sale of lots, was most frequently a log or rough-hewn lumber building containing a small courtroom and jury room.²¹ To this early nucleus was added a jail, boarding house or hotel, two or three workshops, several stores, and houses. "Each courthouse town had one or more taverns which did their best business during court."²² By 1840 there were fifty-six county seat towns in the state. Thus many towns were started at sites decided by politics.

County seat towns, because of their centrality and accessibility, logically functioned as trade and social centers. The town of Gallatin, Copeiah County, for example, contained two banks, a newspaper, several workshops making guns, shoes, carriages and cabinets, a large warehouse, a drug store, and several general merchandise and dry goods stores. Two hotels, a theater, a masonic lodge, Baptist and Presbyterian churches, a female seminary, an academy for boys, a grog shop, and race track were additional amenities. At least one small freight line operated between Gallatin and the river.²³ The population of the town was estimated at 800 in 1836 but had declined to 203 by 1854.²⁴ Apparently the Panic of 1837 had a decided influence on Gallatin, for in December properties listed for sale in the *Southern Star* included household items, farm equipment, two cotton gins, two gristmills, one sawmill, cattle, sheep, oxen, hogs, and corn.²⁵ Four months later the sheriff advertised for sale two lots and buildings, and Planter's Bank offered for sale eight lots, the Mansion House, a tavern, and several other buildings. The same issue noted that twenty slaves and 7,652 acres of land in tracts exceeding 20 acres were offered for sale. Almost half of the land was listed by twenty-six individuals.²⁶ Gallatin never recovered from the Panic of 1837, and when the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad was surveyed three and one-half miles to the east, the town's trade was taken over by Hazlehurst.²⁷

Although trade and commerce was the basic economic function of most towns in their early years of growth, manufacturing was almost always the mainstay of growth. The average settler in Mississippi was apparently willing to leave the manufacture of all but the basic domestic and farm implement needs to Europe and states in the north, and invested in the capital goods of farming—land, equipment, and frequently slaves. Wagons, cultivating tools, gins, presses, and other basic farm equipment were fabricated in local shops and by plantation blacksmiths. By 1840 Mississippi did not lag far behind other states in the farm implement industry, but with the possible exception of lumbering there was no industry in the state that depended on markets elsewhere.

A manufacturing industry first appeared in the Natchez District in 1795 when mechanics began to improve the Whitney gin and to fabricate new cotton gins. This, however, was pernicious to manufacturing because by 1801 improvements had been made to the extent that Natchez cotton was not injured in the ginning process and commanded a considerable premium on the market. Furthermore, the fact that

Eleazer Carver was forced to transfer his gin manufacturing firm to Massachusetts to take advantage of skilled workmen and improvements in the design and manufacture of machine tools is indicative of the problems encountered in manufacturing.²⁸

In the Mississippi Territory in 1810 there were twenty-two textile establishments containing 807 spindles and 1,330 looms producing over 342,400 yards of linen, and 7,890 yards of woolen goods valued at \$419,073. There were also ten tanneries, six distilleries, one tinshop, and one hat manufacturer.²⁹ But insufficient capital and competition as well as inadequate machinery, shortage of skilled laborers, and the lack of coal for fuel were key factors retarding this industrial beginning.³⁰

Table 3 is indicative of the degree of manufacturing in the state in 1840, and of the fact that it was geared to a domestic market. The general practice at that time was for manufacturing to locate outside the towns. At Gallatin several urban-related activities were dispersed about the countryside rather than concentrated within the city limits. An advertisement in the *Southern Star* in 1837 noted that a shop had opened two miles from Gallatin and was prepared to execute all orders for farm implements on short notice. Wool was carded at eight cents per pound,

TABLE 3
MISSISSIPPI: SELECTED ELEMENTS OF
MANUFACTURING BY REGIONS IN 1840

	Natchez District	Piney Woods	Hills	Delta	Total
Employment:					
Machinery	90	0	183	1	274
Wagons & Carriages	45	15	72	0	132
Number of:					
Tanneries	6	40	81	1	128
Cotton Manufacturies	0	8	45	0	53
Flour Mills	0	4	12	0	16
Gristmills	373	94	330	9	806
Sawmills	50	67	185	7	309
Capital Invested	\$702,985	\$285,142	\$780,095	\$29,505	\$1,797,727

Source: *United States Census, 1840 Compendium*, pp. 230-37.

or was received in payment if it was not convenient to pay cash, at a wool carding machine one and one half miles from Gallatin.³¹ Perhaps equally as significant was the fact that industrial inertia did not evolve in any locality within the state.

A final important factor affecting the location and development of towns in Mississippi before 1840 was transportation. The first towns in Mississippi were accessible by water. Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Rodney, Natchez, Port Gibson, and Fort Adams owed their early existence to the movement of traffic along the Mississippi River and each served as ports through which cotton was shipped. The general situation of smaller river towns like Gravesport, Port Royal, Chocchuma, Nashville, and Amsterdam was similar to that of Vicksburg and Natchez. Both large and small towns were dependent upon a river frontage and a supporting hinterland, but because of spacing, early start, and hinterland size, the growth potential of Vicksburg, Natchez, Port Gibson, and Grand Gulf was more favorable.³²

Towns tended to grow to some extent around landings in fertile areas but a great deal of commerce in the early cotton era was transacted on flatboats moving down the Mississippi River which accepted produce in exchange for goods and services. Many such boats, outfitted with shelves and counters, carried groceries, dry goods, hardware and liquors, and stopped wherever there was a landing and a chance for a sale. Occasionally they were fitted with gristmills operated by the force of the current and would grind meal and flour for settlers. Some carried tinsmiths, blacksmiths, and toolmakers willing to ply their trade. It was calculated that mercantile flatboats accounted for about eighty-five percent of the total commerce on the lower Mississippi, in the late 1700's.³³ By 1830 steamboats were operating on the Mississippi, the lower Yazoo, the Big Black to Amsterdam, and the Tombigbee to Columbus. As a general rule steamboats would stop to deposit or take aboard freight, passengers, and wood for fuel at any landing serving three or more families.³⁴ The trade carried on by these so-called errand-running steamers and peddling boats had a diminishing effect on towns by diverting their business.³⁵

Roads became an increasingly important factor in town development as choice riverine sites were taken and as the interior was settled, but they received relatively little public attention for a variety of reasons: (1) Capital and labor were not available for large-scale construction. (2) Planters located along navigable streams had little desire to support internal improvement programs. (3) Hauling of cotton was performed during the slack season, and supplies were brought in on the return trips. Speed was not essential because the major commercial items were nonperishable. (4) The seasonal nature of traffic allowed planters and farmers to act independently of freight companies, which no doubt retarded the development of professional wagoners. Had freight companies operated in the state, there would have been at least one element actively advocating a road building program. (5) In typical Anglo-Saxon tradition, citizens worked off road taxes by laboring on the roads for two or three days in the year. This sometimes resulted in little more than filling in ruts or clearing a path through the forest.³⁶

Most early roads in the state therefore were either cross-state thoroughways or feeder roads to the rivers. Towns were a rarity along the Natchez Trace, Three Chopped Way, Gainey's Trace, the Robinson




Figure 3

Road, and Jackson's Military Road because the roads passed through Indian territory, crossed soil areas uninviting to settlers, or experienced traffic that was unidirectional (Figure 3).³⁷ For example, the Natchez Trace, perhaps the most traveled road in the Old Southwest, was used primarily by riverboat men returning northward after depositing their cargo at New Orleans, whereas the Robinson Road provided an access routeway into the state.

A system of local roads although slow to develop, was essential if settlers were to market their produce and carry on necessary governmental functions. The first local roads sometimes followed Indian trails, but since this seldom led to settled areas new roads had to be constructed. Actually intercounty roads were more coincidental than planned, and official recognition consisted largely of a record of their establishment.³⁸ A public road was defined by the state legislature in 1824, and by 1830 twenty-four state roads and six turnpikes were authorized; however, this proposed system did not advance beyond the paper stage.³⁹

The result of high-cost surface transportation was a host of "general store" type service centers which never developed into real towns, and which were protected from competition with each other by the friction of distance. How much larger such commercial centers would have become had good roads existed is a matter of conjecture. Presumably the number of trading points would have been fewer, larger, had a wider variety of specialized functions, and been economically more viable had they been more accessible. Also, had good roads existed lower freight costs might have led to a concentration of retail trade in fewer towns. It is a fact, however, that almost no positive change occurred in the road system until the Federal Highway Act was passed in 1916.

The few railroads constructed in Mississippi between 1831 and 1840, did not for the most part affect inland urban development because they arose less from the demands of the rural population for better transportation, than from the desire of river and coastal towns to tap interior markets. Merchants and factors had argued that railroads were a more direct form of transportation and would bring prosperity to the state by opening up new areas of commercial cotton production.⁴⁰ By 1840 charters had been granted to twenty-four railroads. Many of the legislative acts under which railroads were chartered made it clear they were to transport cotton and other products from the interior to the Mississippi River for shipment.⁴¹ The Jackson-Vicksburg road is a good example. It formed an outlet to the Mississippi River for the rich cotton district between the Pearl and Big Black Rivers. This road also assured Vicksburg's future growth and position of supremacy over Natchez. The Panic of 1837, however, brought an end to most of the ambitious schemes of the initial period and the real effects of the railroad on the spatial disposition of commercial centers came after 1840.

In 1840, Mississippi's urban hierarchy was composed of several easily discernible classes of towns. Bay St. Louis and other Mississippi coastal sites possessed adequate harbors but were cut off from a productive hinterland by the Piney Woods. Hence the seaport towns of Mobile and New Orleans were factorage centers which profited from the trade of Mississippi planters. Towns were established along the Mississippi River at Vicksburg, Natchez, Grand Gulf, and other less strategic points. Not one location on the Tombigbee River north of Columbus had a strong advantage over another, so conditions were unfavorable for the growth and development of large towns. Competition for cargo increased as the number of steamboats increased, and captains were willing to call at almost any hastily constructed landing to pick up and deposit freight. The close spacing of such stops opposed the centralization of wholesale and retail trade in towns.

State law required each county to have a county seat and to fix its location. Towns usually developed at these sites. Early courthouse communities had only superficial advantages over those depending entirely on trade, but as the system of local roads began to develop, the increased nodality of the county towns made them focal points of economic activity. Perhaps it is significant to note that in 1920, four years after the Federal Highway Act was passed, 91 percent of the urban population lived in county seat towns.⁴²

Another group of towns owed their origin and growth to the patterns of trade of farmers and small planters. Like the county seats this class of towns was mainly interior and accessible to their trade constituents by poorly developed and maintained roads. Before 1840 these minor trade centers and county seats constituted almost the entire urban fabric of Mississippi. The economic base of these towns depended almost entirely on the seasonal cotton trade of small planters and yeoman farmers. The annual net income of these farmers amounted to only a few hundred dollars, and was certainly not enough to stimulate significant urban-related activities. Furthermore their cultural heritage was agrarian and they saw little future in towns. The role of larger planters, the money class in urban growth in Mississippi before 1840, was largely negative. In fact for more than a century cotton would continue to dominate the economy, and the base of Mississippi's urban pyramid would continue to expand in relation to the apex.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "D'Artaguetto to Maurepas," March 20, 1730, *Mississippi Provincial Archives, 1704-1743, French Dominion*, II, pp. 541-45.
- ² Quoted in F.L. Riley, *School History of Mississippi* (Richmond, Virginia, 1900), p. 60.
- ³ J.F.H. Clairborne, *Mississippi as a Province, Territory, and State* (Jackson, Mississippi, 1880), p. 529.
- ⁴ J.D.L. Holmes, *Gayoso: The Life of A Spanish Governor in the Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799* (Baton Rouge, 1965) pp. 46-7.
- ⁵ *U.S. Census, 1800, 1810*.
- ⁶ N.M. Fenneman, *Physiography of Eastern United States* (New York, 1938), pp. 65-99.
- ⁷ A. Kelley, "Levee Building and the Settlement of the Yazoo Basin," *The Southern Quarterly*, I (1963), 285-308; *Laws of Mississippi*, 1819, p. 78.
- ⁸ R.C. Wade, *The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 1-34.
- ⁹ U.B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (Boston, 1931), pp. 127-28.
- ¹⁰ Claiborne to Madison, December 20, 1801 in Dunbar Rowland, ed., *Letter Books of Claiborne*, I, 28; T. Bromme, *Mississippi: A Geographic-Statistics-Typography Sketch for Immigrants and Friends of Geography and Ethnology* (C. Scheld and Co., 1837), republished in the *Journal of Mississippi History*, IV (1942), 105.
- ¹¹ Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South*, pp. 140-44.
- ¹² *Mississippi Free Trader*. Natchez, April 14, 1842.
- ¹³ L.E. Atherton, "The Problems of Credit Rating in the Ante-Bellum South," *Journal of Southern History*. XII (1946), 534-35.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*; T.P. Abernethy "Social Relations and Political Control in the Old Southwest," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XVI (1929-1930), 530.
- ¹⁵ "Madisonville," W.P.A. Federal Writers' Project, Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi.
- ¹⁶ A.H. Stone, "The Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States," *American Historical Review*, XX (1915), 557-69; Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South*, p. 142.
- ¹⁷ L.A. Besancon, *Besancon's Annual Register of the State of Mississippi* (Natchez, 1838), p. 190; J.M. Wilkins, "Early Times in Wayne County," *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, VI (1902), 265-72.
- ¹⁸ *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury*, 1848, 30th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Executive Document 2 (1848), p. 247.
- ¹⁹ J.F.H. Claiborne, "A Trip Through the Piney Woods," *Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society*, IX (1906), 510-16.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 518-19.

- ²¹ See *Minutes of the Board of Police* of those counties for which records are available; A.J. Brown, *History of Newton County from 1834 to 1894* (Jackson, 1894), pp. 2-3.
- ²² W.H. Sparks, *The Memories of Fifty Years* (Macon, Georgia, 1872), p. 482.
- ²³ *Laws of Mississippi, 1836*, pp. 475, 389-90; 1840, p. 66; H.S. Fulkerson, *Random Recollection of Early Days in Mississippi* (Vicksburg, 1885), p. 30.
- ²⁴ *Southern Star*, Gallatin, Mississippi, April 7, 1838; J.D.B. DeBow, *Statistical View of the United States* (Washington, 1854), p. 385.
- ²⁵ *Southern Star*, Gallatin, Mississippi, December 23, 1837.
- ²⁶ *Southern Star*, Gallatin, Mississippi, April 7, 1838.
- ²⁷ H.G. Adkins, "The Historical Geography of Extinct Towns in Mississippi" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1972), pp. 101-02.
- ²⁸ J.H. Moore, *Agriculture in Ante-Bellum Mississippi* (New York, 1958), p. 23.
- ²⁹ T. Coxe, *Tabular Statement of the Several Branches of American Manufacturing in the Autumn of 1810*, prepared for the Treasury Department (Philadelphia, 1813), pp. 2, 38, 139.
- ³⁰ D.C. James, *Antebellum Natchez* (Baton Rouge, 1968), pp. 204-05.
- ³¹ *Southern Star*, Gallatin, Mississippi, December 23, 1837; April 7, 1838.
- ³² H.S. Tanner, *A Map of Mississippi with Its Roads and Distance*, ca. 1836; W.A. Evans, "Steamboats on the Upper Tombigbee in the Early Days," *Journal of Mississippi History*, IV (1942), 216-24; Fulkerson, *Random Recollections of Early Days in Mississippi*, p. 20.
- ³³ L.D. Baldwin, *The Keelboat Age on Western Waters* (Pittsburgh, 1941), pp. 9, 186-87.
- ³⁴ *Hunt's Merchant Magazine*, I (1840), 449.
- ³⁵ *Daily Tropic*, New Orleans, October 2, 1845.
- ³⁶ B.H. Meyer, *History of Transportation in the United States Before 1860* (Washington, 1948), pp. 249-50; G.R. Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution: 1815-1960* (New York, 1951), pp. 15-7. Studies of professional wagoners in Mississippi are to this writer's knowledge non-existent.
- ³⁷ Tanner, *A Map of Mississippi with its Roads and Distance*.
- ³⁸ *Revised Status of Mississippi*, 1857, pp. 171-72.
- ³⁹ *Hutchinson's Code of Mississippi, 1798-1848*, pp. 137-56, 254.
- ⁴⁰ *DeBow's Commercial Review*, XII (1853), 435-54.
- ⁴¹ See individual Acts of Incorporation for Railroads in *Laws of Mississippi, 1836, 1838, 1840*.
- ⁴² *U.S. Census. 1920*.

HOME MANUFACTURES AS AN INDICATION OF AN EMERGING APPALACHIAN SUBCULTURE, 1840-1870

By Leonard W. Brinkman

Dependence on goods manufactured in the home was widespread in eastern North America during the colonial period, and persisted well into the nineteenth century in some parts of the United States. Poor transportation facilities, especially in frontier or rugged areas, made it difficult to market agricultural produce, and the settler had to invest time and effort in the production of essentials or wants which he did not have the opportunity or means to purchase.

In one of the few published works on the subject, Tryon emphasizes the importance of home manufacturing during the colonial period and its decline in the nineteenth century.¹ He concludes that the transfer of the manufacturing process from the home to the shop and factory was generally complete by 1830,² certainly by 1860, and recognizes the difficulty inherent in making generalizations for any large section of the country.³ Data published in United States census materials from 1840 to 1860 is included in great detail in tabular form,⁴ but little use is made of it in assessing the changing distribution of household manufactures, and similar data published in 1870 is not included.

By 1840, when nationwide data on the value of home-manufactured goods first appears in the census, the process was characteristic of rural areas and was reported as a part of the agricultural returns. Material explaining the census schedule was included in the instructions to the federal marshals and their assistants, who were responsible for taking the census in their own districts. Under the heading of value of home-made manufactures, enumerators were instructed to include the value of all articles manufactured in the year preceding June 1, in or by the family for their own use or for sale. The value of purchased raw materials was not to be included, since the object of the census inquiry was to find the value of the manufactured goods made by the family from their own raw materials, or the value of labor used to process raw materials produced outside the family.⁵ Apparently any product made in the home could be included under this definition, although Tryon found that in practice there were three main categories of home-manufactured goods: (1) wearing apparel and household textile supplies, which were the most important and most generally produced items; (2) household implements, utensils, furniture, necessities, and comforts, which were purchased whenever possible, although maple syrup and sugar (and sorghum products in the South), cider and soap tended to remain as home products; and (3) farming implements, building materials and general supplies, which remained as home products only


under conditions of dire necessity.⁶

Although the importance of home-made manufactures was no doubt declining at the time they were first reported by the United States Census in 1840, their distribution (Figure 1) still tended to reflect the general distribution and density of the rural population.⁷ Areas with population densities between 45 and 90 persons per square mile, as was the case in western New York, eastern Ohio, the Bluegrass Region of Kentucky and the Nashville Basin of Tennessee, were also areas which produced high total values of home manufactures. The southern Piedmont, from Virginia to west central Georgia, had intermediate population densities (18 to 45 persons per square mile) with a considerable production of home (or plantation) manufactured items. In contrast, rugged areas of western North Carolina, eastern Kentucky and western Virginia had lower population densities, including some areas with fewer than six persons per square mile, and lesser total values for home-made manufactures, although they were equal to other areas in production per capita.⁸ Settlers in these rather empty areas, which today are in the heart of Appalachia, do not seem to have been exceptionally different, or relatively more isolated, than were their contemporaries in other parts of the country in 1840.⁹

The distribution of the value of home manufactures in 1850 (Figure 2) retained many of the characteristics of the pattern a decade earlier, especially in the interior and the South, areas that still lacked good land transportation facilities. There was a noticeable decline in the output of home manufactures in the northeast, where scattered rail lines were tied into a network, although not as yet into a rail system.¹⁰ Some increases in the value of home manufactures can be noted in the southern uplands, where population was increasing and where sections of the mountainous country were beginning to be shut off from the surrounding areas.¹¹

By 1860 (Figure 3), the decline in production of home-made goods had spread to other parts of the interior, especially Ohio, and the beginnings of decline can be noted in the Piedmont in Virginia and Georgia, served by rail lines based on Richmond and Atlanta. The Bluegrass Region and the Nashville Basin continue to show high aggregate values for home-manufactured products, perhaps because these areas, engaged in supplying a variety of commodities to plantations in the deep South, also found outlets for home-manufactured products in that area. Population continued to increase in western North Carolina, eastern Kentucky and western Virginia, with resulting increases in the value of home manufactures. This southern Appalachian area was becoming increasingly isolated, with rail lines all around it, especially to the east and north, but only a single rail line from Richmond to Chattanooga via the valleys of southwestern Virginia and eastern Tennessee passing anywhere near its heart.

VALUE OF HOME MANUFACTURES, 1840



Source: U. S. Census, 1840

Figure 1

VALUE OF HOME MANUFACTURES, 1850




Figure 2

VALUE OF HOME MANUFACTURES, 1860





Figure 3

VALUE OF HOME MANUFACTURES, 1870



Source: U.S. Census, 1870

Figure 4

After a brief revival in some areas during the Civil War, the production of home-made goods again declined in most parts of the country by 1870 (Figure 4), the last date at which the census reports the value of home-made manufactures. In contrast to the national situation, a definite concentration on home manufactures is evident in the rugged areas of the upper South, where there is a growing population, now relatively more isolated than ever before, with little to sell or barter for factory-made goods. Thus between 1840 and 1870 there was an almost complete reversal of the distribution of the production of home-made goods in the United States, with former concentrations declining and other areas, notably those in the upper South, becoming the areas of concentration.

The divergence of the upper South or the southern Appalachians from the mainstream of cultural development in the United States occurred mainly because of increasing isolation. As early as 1867 the *North American Review* hailed the railroad as an agent of economic and social change, removing class distinctions, changing dress and manners, and making the nation more cosmopolitan.¹² Appalachia lagged behind other parts of the nation in the development of transportation facilities. It had few miles of railway until the twentieth century, when lines were constructed to tap the timber and coal resources of the region. It had few paved roads until other developments called for them, or until they were built by outsiders.¹³ Thus physical isolation became mental and cultural isolation.¹⁴

The concentration of production of home-made goods which emerged in the southern Appalachians between 1840 and 1870 can be taken as a demonstration of the survival of a way of life (or perhaps the reversion to a way of life) which was increasingly different from that of other parts of the nation.¹⁵ The emphasis on home manufactures is representative of the self-sufficient aspect of this subculture, which was also characterized by independence and conservatism.¹⁶ It is also an aspect of Appalachian life which was once part of a popular culture, but which increasingly became folk—that is, came to be a non-popular tradition which contrasted with the new popular tradition characterizing areas around it.¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹ Rolla M. Tryon, *Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860*, Volume V in *Reprints of Economic Classics* (New York, 1966). First published in 1917.

² *Ibid.*, p. 268.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 312-69.

⁵ *Seventh Census of the United States, 1850*, p. xxiv. It was requested that the cost of purchased raw materials be subtracted from the value of the product, so the census was attempting to report *value added* by the manufacturing process. No doubt there were inconsistencies in reporting, since value of production was based on estimates by the householder, but it is not felt that the magnitude of error is such that it would negate the use of the data in establishing the general patterns of home manufacturing.

⁶ Tryon, *Household Manufactures*, pp. 188, 241. Tryon also excluded certain types of goods and goods manufactured under certain conditions from his study. There is no way of ascertaining whether or not respondents to census inquiries did the same.

⁷ For maps showing the density of population see Charles Paullin and John K. Wright, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, (New York and Washington, 1932), Plates 76 and 77.

⁸ Tryon, *Household Manufactures*, pp. 312-69.

⁹ There is some debate in regard to the quality of the early settlers in Appalachia. Fiske stated that original settlers of the isolated mountain areas were inferior to pioneer settlers in other areas, a view recently reiterated by Caudill. See John Fiske, *Old Virginia and Her Neighbors*, vol. II (Boston, 1898), p. 311 ff. and Harry M. Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlandands* (Boston, 1963), pp. 6-7. A more widely accepted view of the settlement of Appalachia can be found in John C. Campbell, *The Southern Highlander and His Homeland* (New York, 1921), pp. 22-71.

¹⁰ For maps showing the United States railroads see Paullin and Wright, *Atlas of Historical Geography*, Plates 138-40.

¹¹ Campbell, *The Southern Highlander*, p. 49.

¹² "The Railroad System," *North American Review*, CIV (1867), 476-511.

¹³ Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlandands*, pp. 75-6, 93-8, 123-24.

¹⁴ Rupert Vance, "An Introductory Note", p. viii in Jack E. Weller, *Yesterday's People, Life in Contemporary Appalachia* (Lexington, 1965).

¹⁵ This is not intended to imply that there was no decline in the output of home-made items in Appalachia in the late nineteenth century. Apparently such a decline took place, and outside agencies attempted to revive crafts and fireside industries. Campbell, *The Southern Highlander*, p. 129; Bernice A. Stevens, "The Revival of Handicrafts", Chapter 18, pp. 279-88 in Thomas R. Ford, (ed.) *The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey* (Lexington, 1962). On the other hand, there are numerous references to continued use of home-made

goods, and in 1913 Kephart referred to the area as "... the land of make-it-yourself-or-do-without," Horace Kephart, *Our Southern Highlander* (New York, 1922), p. 325. First published in 1913.

¹⁶ The Appalachian way of life seems to have come to the attention of writers, both popular and scholarly, about 1900. Much of this early writing contains strong elements of nostalgia and romanticism, presenting a society which had retained the characteristics of an earlier and more widespread American frontier. Examples are: Mary N. Murfree, (using the pseudonym of Charles Egbert Craddock), *In the Tennessee Mountains* (Boston, 1898); William G. Frost, "Our Contemporary Ancestors in the Southern Mountains", *Atlantic Monthly* (March, 1899), 311-19; Ellen Semple, "The Anglo Saxons of the Kentucky Mountains: A Study in Anthropogeography," *Geographical Journal*, XVI (1901), 588-623. More recent works retain traces of the nostalgia, but stress characteristics such as poverty, mental and cultural isolation, and exploitation by outside interests. Examples are: Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, and Weller, *Yesterday's People*.

¹⁷ Henry Glassie, *Pattern in the Material Folk Culture of the Eastern United States*, (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 6ff.; 16ff.; 34ff.

THE HISTORIC SPAS OF FLORIDA

by

Burke G. Vanderhill

Among the multitude of springs occurring in the state of Florida, dozens have been identified as mineral springs, although the nature and degree of mineralization varies widely. Man, in seeking cures for his afflictions, has long attributed miraculous properties to mineral waters, and those of Florida did not escape his attention.¹ Bottles and jugs have been lowered into Florida's mineral springs at least from the time of the first American settlement; and persons suffering from rheumatism, arthritis, and a host of other chronic disorders early came to immerse themselves in the healing waters and sometimes to camp for extended periods. The intersection of Indian trails at some of the springs and the location of ancient mounds nearby seem to point to a much older tradition of therapeutic use.

Shortly after 1840, roughly coincident with Florida's transition to statehood, health resorts began to develop around certain of the mineral springs, and such spas constituted a significant feature of the social and economic landscape of Florida for about three quarters of a century. All but one of these has now ceased to function, and that in a modern transformation. It is valid, therefore, to speak of them as a group as the "historic spas."

Florida's historic spas have been overlooked as a focus of scholarly inquiry, despite the long time span involved and the recknown that some of them enjoyed during their heyday. Nor is there any organized body of information concerning them.² Reference to one or more of the resorts is encountered in personal narratives and promotional literature of the period and occasionally in old newspapers filed away or preserved on microfilm. Some useful information has been made available by local or county historical societies. It is the purpose of the present study to assemble, collate, and carefully analyze such diverse and fragmented data, supplemented by the product of field investigation, in order first to identify the historic spas of Florida and secondly to arrive at an understanding of the spatial and temporal patterns of their development.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE SPAS

One might assume that a spa is a spa and that no question of identity should arise. The standard definition—a resort based upon a mineral spring—seems straightforward. The problem stems in part from the fact that spas were health resorts and watering places, but the reverse was not necessarily the case. Also, since all waters have a measurable mineral component, the term "mineral spring" has been applied incon-

sistently. Contemporary references are not always discriminating.

The key to the identification of the Florida spas rests in the meaning *implicit* in the word "spa": that it involves improvement of a spring and the provision of facilities for therapeutic bathing and the drinking of mineral waters.³ These constitute the common denominator, and if a mineral spring does not offer at least minimum facilities for the invalid, it is not functioning as a spa. Adhering to this definition, the contradictions of the record can be fairly well reconciled, particularly with the support of field evidence. Thus it has been possible to identify a total of nine historic spas in the state of Florida, not necessarily co-existent, and the mineral springs with which they were associated (Figure 1).




Figure 1

The spas of Florida were established to meet certain perceived human needs at a particular time in our cultural evolution when alternatives were more limited and may appear to have been components in a system. In reality, although they shared a number of features, and sometimes customers as well, they developed quite independently and were functionally isolated from one another. Let us then examine the circumstances in the case of each of the nine historic spas.

WHITE SPRINGS

The best known and most highly developed of the ante-bellum spas of Florida was White Sulphur Springs, after 1900 called White Springs, on the upper Suwannee River. The spring boil is located a few feet from the river's edge, and settlers from Georgia at the beginning of the territorial period were drawn to it along well-marked Indian trails. While informal use of the waters for therapeutic purposes came with settlement, facilities were not developed until after the Seminole War. A community was established in 1843⁴ and by 1845 it was said to be "offering the attractions of regular spas."⁵ White Sulphur Springs was within a then prosperous and expanding plantation region and accessible to nearby areas by stage routes. By 1860, a railroad had been pushed west to Lake City from Jacksonville, and within a year another line reached Lake City from Tallahassee and the Panhandle area.⁶ Thus the territory from which the spa could attract visitors was greatly increased. Most of them detoured at Wellborn, eight miles by stage from White Sulphur Springs. By the outbreak of the Civil War, the spa had gained a reputation as a "fashionable" resort as well as a source of curative waters.⁷

After the hiatus of the war years, there was an attempt to recapture the resort trade of earlier times. During the summer of 1866, for example, a Tallahassee newspaper carried an advertisement for White Sulphur Springs in every issue.⁸ These efforts were only partially successful in a region economically and socially shattered and undergoing military occupation. Nevertheless, most personal narratives and guidebooks of the 1870's recognize White Sulphur Springs among several well-known Florida health resorts and note its efficacy in the cure of rheumatism.⁹ Sometime prior to 1880, however, the resort fell into disuse, an event undoubtedly related to the continuing economic crisis of the area from which it drew its trade.

The spa was reopened under new management in 1883,¹⁰ and several stimuli to growth appeared within the next few years. In 1889 a railroad line was completed through White Sulphur Springs from Valdosta, Georgia, to Lake City, and by linking existing lines, service was developed from Macon in central Georgia to Palatka on the St. Johns River. Further, Jacksonville was accessible via the Lake City inter-

change.¹¹ Then in 1898, the lumber industry arrived, and in its wake came a rapid expansion of facilities. A retaining wall was constructed around the spring and a bathhouse was installed before 1900, and shortly thereafter a pavilion of unique four-level design was built encircling the pool. A bottling works was opened nearby, and diverse attractions including dance halls and a bowling alley were introduced. Such was the momentum that by 1907 four hotels had been constructed. There were Sunday excursion trains during the summer season, bringing throngs of visitors from Georgia points or from Jacksonville and Palatka. In the winter, however, the health resort function was paramount, and improved facilities induced invalids to remain in White Springs for longer periods of time.¹²

The boom ended with a great fire in 1911, and, while the pavilion escaped damage, the resort economy never completely recovered. The curative waters were advertised at least as late as 1950, but the numbers who came to partake of them dwindled sharply after the mid-twenties.¹³ The pool was finally closed after 1950. Today the pavilion stands abandoned and dilapidated; across the street is the vast hulk of what was once a luxury hotel, and it is the Stephen Collins Foster Memorial which attracts traffic to White Springs.

SUWANNEE SPRINGS

Another of Florida's early spas developed on the banks of the Suwannee River only a dozen miles below White (Sulphur) Springs and at about the same time. This was variously called Lower Sulphur Springs, Lower Mineral Springs, and Suwannee Sulphur Springs, later simplified to Suwannee Springs. A mineral spring arose a few feet from the river's edge and spilled over a rocky ledge to the river below. Suwannee Springs developed in association with the existing center of Live Oak seven miles distant, and no community grew up around the spa facilities for a number of years.

It is probable that facilities were introduced near the spring as early as 1845.¹⁴ By 1851 it was reported that there were accommodations for about a hundred visitors, although the spring itself remained unimproved.¹⁵ Through the ante-bellum period Suwannee Springs became a popular summer watering place as well as the resort of invalids and competed with its upstream counterpart for trade.¹⁶ Live Oak was reached by rail from the west in 1859, and its linkage to the east was completed in 1861, thus making it much more convenient to reach Suwannee Springs.

The record is silent on the years of war and Reconstruction, but Suwannee Springs was able to benefit from a rail line constructed as a war measure from Live Oak to Dupont, Georgia, an interchange point.¹⁷ The line passed within two miles of the spring, and following the war a station was established to serve the resort, reached by a two-

mile tram road. Invalids were returning to Suwannee Springs at least by the mid-seventies,¹⁸ and facilities for them were undergoing expansion in the early 1880's.¹⁹ Further rail construction was significant to the fortunes of Suwannee Springs. The so-called "Waycross Short Line", completed to Jacksonville in 1881, gave improved access from Savannah and the Atlantic Seaboard, while the Dupont-Live Oak line was extended south to Gainesville by 1884, thus becoming a trunk route.²⁰ Suwannee Springs reached its peak from the mid-1880's to about 1910, and through this period it was developed as a year-around resort.²¹ It supported a large hotel with a separate annex for overflow, a double row of cottages, a bottling works, and the spring pool and bathhouse. The spring had been encircled by a heavy masonry wall sometime prior to 1890. The sulphur waters had gained a reputation, either earned or promoted, for their curative qualities.²²

Much of the spa activity at Suwannee Springs was brought to an abrupt halt by the destruction of the hotel by fire just before World War I. The cottages remained and were used on into the 1950's, but the visitors seldom came for therapeutic purposes.²³ Several cottages were demolished in 1948 to make way for a new highway, and today most of the remainder are abandoned and falling apart. Two of them have been refurbished as dwellings, and the former hotel annex has been converted to a grocery store. Twisted pipes and broken masonry mark the site of the hotel, and the base of the old bathhouse remains near the spring. The spring boil still rises within the walled enclosure at the river's edge, and the odor of sulphur is strong.

ORANGE SPRINGS

A contemporary of the two spas just discussed was Orange Springs, located near the left bank of the Oklawaha River about 25 miles above its confluence with the St. Johns. The lands around the sulphur spring passed into private hands in 1843, and soon thereafter a boarding house was erected nearby.²⁴ By 1851 it was reported to be filled with "bronchial and consumptive patients" and invalids.²⁵ Patrons arrived either by stage over the Palatka-Ocala mail route or by steamboat up the Oklawaha to a landing a mile or so from the spring. Orange Springs derived advantage from its proximity to the valley of the St. Johns, which was the prime focus of Florida's winter trade at that time, and became a stop-over on many of the excursion trips up the Oklawaha to Silver Springs. With increasing familiarity its reputation for healing waters grew.²⁶ During the summer season a resort trade was attracted from the plantation areas of east Florida for reasons of both "health and society," while northerners frequented Orange Springs during the winter months. Undoubtedly it was on the seasonal circuit for some of them. Until the Civil War, Orange Springs was a small but well-established spa.²⁷

Resort activities at Orange Springs ended with the war, and apparently there was no meaningful development for over twenty years. All standard commentaries of the 1870's and early 1880's describe it as a "former" resort of invalids.²⁸ With the return of prosperity in the mid-1880's and a revival of steamboating on the St. Johns and the Oklawaha, Orange Springs came back to life. Several modest hotels were opened, and a wharf was built along a little bayou at the river's edge. Unfortunately, during this period of great railroad expansion in Florida, Orange Springs was by-passed. The line from Palatka to Ocala was routed through Gainesville, and Orange Springs was left largely dependent upon steamboats on a river which after 1890 rapidly lost its utility as a water route. At the same time, South Florida was being opened up to the winter trade. Visitors slowed to a trickle, and when a branch rail line finally reached Orange Springs in 1912, it was really too late as far as the spa was concerned. Some invalids, mainly arthritics, continued to come until 1925, when the branch was abandoned.²⁹

Since that time the spring has had only local use and has recently been converted to a kidney-shaped public swimming pool. Orange Springs is a tiny community presently rejoicing in their location near Lake Oklawaha, which was created in connection with the ill-starred Cross-Florida Barge Canal and whose waters have covered the steamboat landings of the past.

NEWPORT

The shortest lived of the four ante-bellum spas of Florida was Newport, sometimes called Newport Springs, on the St. Marks River about three miles above its confluence with the Wakulla, and approximately twenty miles south of the state capital, Tallahassee. Newport had been established as a small cotton shipping port in 1844. Not far upstream was a good-sized sulphur spring which must have been familiar to many of the first settlers, for it lay very near the remnants of an earlier town, Magnolia, from which they had moved some years before. Resort activity developed in connection with the spring at least by 1846, and in 1850 there were two hotels in operation, one at the big spring and a second thought to have been across the river near a smaller spring then running.³⁰

In the years prior to the Civil War, Newport became a convenient health resort for the Middle Florida area, where much of the state's early development had been focussed. Reportedly it drew additional trade from beyond the South, perhaps stimulated through the port's commercial linkages with the Eastern Seaboard.³¹ It offered facilities for bathing and drinking at the spring, but in addition it provided dancing and other social benefits, plus the opportunity for inlanders to enjoy fish and oysters in season. It functioned primarily as a summer resort.³² There was no railroad to Newport, but the distance by stage

from Oil Station on the Tallahassee-St. Marks line was less than four miles. Visitors from the capital came by way of mule-drawn cars over that railroad until 1859, when it was converted to steam. Meanwhile, after the mid-1850's a plank road led directly to Newport from Tallahassee, and Jefferson County areas east of Tallahassee were served by a branch of this wooden roadway. Arrivals by sea could not have been very significant to the spa activity of Newport, for it was far upstream and handled small cargo vessels brought up on the incoming tide.

Newport was sacked by Federal troops during the Civil War, and by war's end the spring was described as "neglected and forsaken." The hotels were gone, and the bathhouse was abandoned and dilapidated.³³ Never again were facilities to be provided for invalids. Newport the town revived in a small way, but the spring was used only by those who came to camp nearby for short periods.³⁴ Many visitors during the last thirty years of the 19th century lamented the disuse of a spring whose waters were known to have marvelous curative properties.³⁵

Since the turn of the century the spring has seen little more than recreational use. A private bathhouse and several cottages were erected near the spring about 1910 for such purposes.³⁶ Only one of the cottages survives today, but the spring pool remains, its wooden walls rotting away. Occasionally used as a swimming hole, it lies on private property.

GREEN COVE SPRINGS

The most highly touted and fashionable of Florida's spas was Green Cove Springs, developed just following the Civil War on the west bank of the St. Johns River north of Palatka. A small settlement had been made here as early as 1830, and the sulphur spring, visible from the river, became well-known prior to the war. No facilities were provided at the spring, apparently because of opposition of the owners to development. By the close of the war period, several private dressing houses had been constructed along the spring run, which is about a quarter mile in length.

The first report of a hotel and boarding house near the spring appeared in 1869, indicating that they must have opened a year or so previously. The spa function was developing rapidly, for there were also rooms available for guests in private homes. While the spring itself remained unimproved, its waters had already gained a reputation as a curative agent.³⁷ The main growth of Green Cove Springs came after the end of Reconstruction. The location of the spring on the St. Johns was advantageous to its development, for the river was at that time the principal highway of Florida. Suitable docking was soon constructed on the waterfront, and Green Cove Springs became a regular stop on the steamship schedules up and down the river. A total of ten

hotels were constructed here during the seventies and eighties, some of them open only during the winter, others the year around.³⁸ Most of them offered therapeutic bathing, but their real base was the winter resort trade. Green Cove Springs drew its clientele almost entirely from beyond the borders of Florida and was the only Florida spa that could be said to have had a national reputation.³⁹ The supporting features, such as band concerts, horse racing, dancing, and other amusements, led some to call this the "Saratoga of the St. Johns."

Magnolia Springs, a smaller but also fashionable resort three miles north of Green Cove Springs, was in a real sense an adjunct of the larger center. Its small spring was replaced by a driven well in 1882, and its patrons walked or rode to bathe in the mineral pools of Green Cove Springs.⁴⁰

Green Cove Springs was at its peak during the period 1875-1895. By its end the steamboat era was beginning to pass under competition from the railroads, and in turn the new rail lines were transporting winter visitors in larger numbers well south of Green Cove Springs as peninsular Florida entered its boom. Hotels began to close and decay by the turn of the century, and the northern trade was about over when steamboat traffic into Green Cove Springs was terminated in 1917.⁴¹ A small in-state patronage kept the spa function alive until the Depression.

The spring today is an attractive feature of a city park, complete with municipal swimming and wading pools. No therapeutic use of its waters has been made for forty years, but one of the smaller hotels of the 1880's still stands and accepts paying guests.

WORTHINGTON SPRINGS

One of three Florida spas developed during the decade of the 1890's was Worthington Springs, on the north side of the Santa Fe River about seventeen miles north of Gainesville. It was based upon a very small sulphur spring discovered and enlarged by the original owner of the property in the early 1840's and used from time to time by invalids for fifty years before any facilities were constructed. A reference to a visit in 1854 suggests that the curative properties of the spring had been recognized prior to that date.⁴² Such occasional use of the mineral waters seemingly continued throughout the years following the Civil War.⁴³ One might surmise that the location of the spring at the base of the valley slope made it possible for visitors to camp nearby unobtrusively. The lack of accommodations during this long period may have reflected the personal desires of the landowners, but whether or not this was the case, it is certainly true that Worthington Springs was relatively isolated, for a rail line did not reach this point until the turn of the century.

Rail construction was extended as far as Lake Butler, a few miles to the north, in 1889, and the Jacksonville-Gainesville line was completed through Worthington Springs in 1900. The spa dates from 1895, when the first shelter was constructed over the spring and a dressing room was built, while the pool was divided into two parts, one for men and one for women.⁴⁴ A hotel was built in the village, also in 1895, and before 1900 two others appeared. With the establishment of railroad service, people also began to come to Worthington Springs for Sunday outings, some from Gainesville, but most of them from Jacksonville. Excursion trains ran during the summer season and poured thousands of merrymakers into the spa. Few among them were interested in hydrotherapy. However, retired people came to settle in Worthington Springs to be close to the mineral waters, and bottled water was widely marketed.

About 1906 the pool was enlarged, surrounded by a heavy concrete wall, and re-covered; and a two-story pavilion was built adjacent to it, equipped with dressing rooms and a dance hall. Cottages were built on the slope above the spring, while another hotel was constructed in town. Despite a disastrous fire in 1906 in which the older hotels were destroyed, and a later fire in 1910, the spa remained a popular recreation spot until the Depression. The number of invalids among the visitors was always very small, and they ceased entirely with the destruction by fire of the last of the hotels in 1937.⁴⁵

The recreational functions of the spring and its facilities continued on a more and more local basis until abandoned in the mid-1950's. The structures were later torn down. Today the wall remains around the spring pool but is deteriorating, and the spring boil is difficult to detect. Two abandoned cottages still stand on the adjacent slope, but only the footings may be seen of the structures which rose beside the spring.

SAFETY HARBOR

The most southerly of the historic spas and the only one of them still functioning is Safety Harbor, on the western shore of Old Tampa Bay. Although it is advertised as "Florida's first spa," the springs having been visited by DeSoto in 1539, its initial development came in the decade of the 1890's after railroad construction had opened up the Tampa Bay area. It was first known as Green Springs, and was based upon an unusual clustering of four springs within a radius of twenty-five feet, each offering a somewhat different mineral content.

The few pioneer settlers along the eastern side of the Pinellas Peninsula knew the springs and made some use of them from the 1820's. After the Seminole War, visitors began to come across the bay from Fort Brooke, which became the nucleus of Tampa, to spend varying lengths of time at the springs. This practice continued in the years following the Civil War, and groups camped along the bay shore near

the springs, sometimes erecting palmetto-thatched huts for shelter. Several houses had been built in the vicinity by 1890, some of which were offered for rent. This informal grouping of dwellings was named Green Springs in 1892, although it had no post office, or even a store at that time. Shortly thereafter, the year not of record, a Tampa physician established a sanitorium under canvas near the springs, and his patients formed a small tent city around it. This was a winter phenomenon and was a feature of Green Springs for several years.⁴⁶ Thus a spa of sorts developed in the mid 1890's.

About at the turn of the century a less ephemeral type of health resort appeared at Green Springs. The springs property had changed hands, and the new owner erected a hotel and bathing pavilion, a shelter at the springs, and a plant for bottling the mineral waters. Pumps were installed in each of the four springs. On the bayfront, a dock a half mile in length was constructed, and to it began to come excursion boats from Tampa on weekends and holidays.⁴⁷ The long pier was a response to the tidal range over a gently shelving shore. Access was of necessity by water, for while all patrons came from or by way of Tampa, no rail had yet reached the Pinellas Peninsula; and the road from Tampa to Green Springs was a sandy trail around the rim of the bay. The community grew with the resort trade, and in 1910 a post office was established and named Safety Harbor, after an earlier center several miles to the north. A rail line being extended to St. Petersburg reached Safety Harbor in 1914, but the benefits were shortlived. In the following year a fire destroyed much of the town including the hotel and bathhouse, and for the next eight years there was no spa at Safety Harbor.

A new cycle of development was initiated in 1923, when a new resort hotel was built over the springs, and the commercial bottling of mineral waters was resumed.⁴⁸ It is the basic structure of these facilities which underlies the much enlarged spa of 1973. Redevelopment occurred during the Florida Boom and, compared to the other historic spas of the state, Safety Harbor was more favorably located with reference to the principal growth centers of the time. The Depression and changing habits, however, struck hard at Safety Harbor, and unfortunately the inferior bay shoreline did not serve as a compensatory factor.

It was a very limited operation that new management took over in 1945. Since that time the historic spa has been converted to a luxury winter resort, with 75% of its clientele drawn from the New York-Boston area, and much of the remainder from eastern Canada.⁴⁹ The four historic springs, fitted with glass covers, constitute part of the decor in the main dining room of the hotel, while their waters are piped to each room, where fountains numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 identify the individual sources. Water from one of them is still bottled and sold commercially. A fifth spring recently tapped, feeds a therapeutic pool. Safety Harbor

is promoted as a health resort based upon mineral springs—a spa—and a limited use of the mineral waters is continuing. However, much of the treatment involves a regimen of exercise and diet, and few of its patrons could be classified as invalids.

PANACEA

The third of the spas of 1890's origin is Panacea, located about 35 miles south of Tallahassee on an arm of Apalachee Bay. It was developed upon a concentration of small sulphurous springs, about twenty in number, of which several were at times put to use. An Indian mound less than a mile away suggests an ancient congregation at these springs, and in the years prior to the Civil War local people came seeking curative waters from time to time.⁵⁰ Such limited use of the springs, then called Smith Springs, continued through the long post-war years, and development of the property was discouraged by its relative isolation. In 1893, however, a railroad was completed from Tallahassee to Carrabelle on the Gulf, and this line passed within seven miles of Smith Springs at the community of Sopchoppy.⁵¹ Also in 1893, the springs property was acquired by northern interests, who gave to it the name Panacea Springs. The stage was thus set for development.

The Panacea Springs spa dates from 1898, when the first hotel was opened for business. Patrons arrived from or through Tallahassee and detrained at Sopchoppy, thence by stage to the springs. After 1902, through rail service was available from Georgia points over the Tallahassee-Bainbridge line, and visitors could conveniently reach the springs from a greater distance. Excursion trains were operated during the summer resort season from Cuthbert, Georgia, to Carrabelle, and one of the connecting trips was to Panacea Springs from the station at Sopchoppy. The intervening seven miles was covered by a tram line using horses or mules for motive power. The tram line was abandoned about 1917, and subsequently visitors to the spa came by buggy or the rare automobile over oystershell roads leading from the stations at Sopchoppy or Arran. Panacea Springs was described as a "watering place of considerable repute," and it offered the additional attractions of boating and fishing.⁵² The medicinal waters remained the focal point. A Bathing pool was built, with wooden sides and a roof, and the public was allowed free access to it. Some people came mainly to drink the waters. For those who could not come, mineral waters were bottled under label and marketed in north Florida and adjacent south Georgia.⁵³

Despite a fire in 1924 in which a hotel was destroyed, Panacea Springs prospered, and in 1925 two additional hotels opened. Also during that year a pier was built with a dancing pavilion at the end. The years 1925-1928 were the peak period of spa activity here. A more

direct connection with Tallahassee by way of improved roads converted Panacea Springs to a playground for the region, and the role of the mineral springs became less important. While the summer resort trade remained characteristic, an important winter season of fishing and hunting activities developed, particularly drawing upon a Georgia clientele. Many seasonal homes were built in the Panacea Springs area, and several subdivisions were developed. Invalids were rarely encountered. The boom survived a hurricane in 1928, in which two hotels were badly damaged, but came to an end with the Depression. Reports of the time indicated great optimism for Panacea even late in 1929, well into the national crisis.⁵⁴ By the mid 1930's, however, the remaining hotels and the pavilion were closed, and the springs property had fallen into neglect.⁵⁵

Today Panacea is primarily noted for commercial and sports fishing, but evidences of its past may be seen. A community park has been developed on the springs land, and some of the improvements made to the springs at various times have been protected. The bathing pool remains, but its concrete wall is crumbling. One spring fitted out for drinking is still used to some extent. Two of the shelters standing are reputed to have been built during the boom period. While there is no indication of the alignment of the old tram line, and all of the hotels are now gone, a double row of weathered pilings mark the former position of the amusement pier.

HAMPTON SPRINGS

Last of the historic spas to develop was Hampton Springs, built around a long-used sulphur spring in the pine flatwoods five miles southwest of Perry, in Taylor County. Although the family for whom the spring was named came here before the Civil War, purportedly directed by an Indian medicine man, the healing power of its waters became more widely known only after the war, and the first references to it appear in the 1870's and 1880's.⁵⁶ Those who journeyed here for the cure made camp nearby. The mainstream of Florida's economic growth had by-passed Perry to this time, and the sulphur spring was far from any travelled route.

The first development of the spring came after Perry had become a lumber center and rail connections had been established. In 1908 a small hotel and a bathhouse were built at Hampton Springs. While the resort centered upon the mineral waters, the hunting and fishing possibilities in the area gave it a wider appeal.⁵⁷ Water from the spring was bottled and sold commercially.⁵⁸ Railroad interests acquired the property in 1915 and extended a spur line from Perry. By the end of World War I, a new and larger hotel had been constructed, a nine-hole golf course had been added, and the winter resort was being promoted vigorously. Excursion trains arrived from Georgia points on

weekends, and the road from Perry was improved.⁵⁹ After 1920, however, business declined, and the hotel was closed by the mid-1920's. A new cycle of development began in 1927 with the leasing of the springs properties by a Chicago-based organization. In addition to benefitting from improvements in the road system of the Southeast, Hampton Springs was accessible to the Mid-west by through rail routes, utilizing an interchange at Adel, Georgia. Many of the spa's guests during the late twenties came from the Chicago area. The resort offered sulphur baths, either steam, tub, or shower, and boasted of the efficacy of its waters in a myriad of ailments. It also played up its recreational features and the attractions of the Gulf coast region.⁶⁰ Winter was its busy season.

The third cycle of development at Hampton Springs was a short one, for the Depression eliminated most of its clientele. By 1937 the hotel was operating only on a part-time basis.⁶¹ A last attempt to revive the resort was made in 1946, in the boom days after World War II, and the hotel was renovated.⁶² This was unsuccessful, and by 1950 the hotel had closed its doors, bringing the spa era here to an end. The building was used as a boarding house until its destruction by fire in 1954.

Today the springs property is fenced and the gates are chained shut, while the railroad spur has been torn up beyond the outer limits of Perry. Of the facilities at the spring, only concrete slabs and remnants of masonry mark the position of the hotel, which in its prime stretched for a length of 300 feet; and the foundations of the bathhouse and bottling works can be seen. The spring boil is still confined within walls constructed years ago, and the paved driveway and some of the ornamental plantings remain. A village was never established around the spring, but a small grocery store nearby continues to serve residents dispersed through the area, and the name Hampton Springs is used for this loosely structured community.

THE SPAS IN RETROSPECT

The historic spas of Florida developed far from the major concentrations of the nation's population at a time when few people possessed the means by which to travel such distances and well after mineral springs more advantageously located had been developed. That several spas did arise within Florida is a reflection of a rather universal demand at the time for the benefits presumed to derive from the use of mineral waters and of a growing population within Florida and adjacent Georgia as the immediate source of that demand. Only in the case of Green Cove Springs was a clientele from afar an initial factor. It is significant to note that it was customary for the local trade to take the waters only during the summer months. Conversely, visitors from outside the area came almost without exception in the winter. It becomes obvious, then, that from the start the spas were at least as much vacation spots as health

resorts. It is appropriate that this was the case, for the benefits gained from a visit to a spa came largely from fresh air, balanced diet, cleanliness, relaxation, and pleasant companionship, rather than from some miraculous quality of the water.⁶³

Analysis of the development cycles of the Florida spas has revealed that they were responsive to changing economic and social conditions; and that while the resources upon which they were based—the mineral springs—could be considered as a constant and differed little in utility from one spa to another, their relative location and accessibility were critical variables subject to modification over time. Each spa was an independent entity in a functional sense, although its trade territory might overlap with that of another, and its time span was determined by its own unique set of controls; yet there were certain striking parallels, evidence that some factors operated across the board. A composite view of the era of the spas in Florida is provided by Figure 2, which permits a quick inspection of the general trends of development over a 130 year period. Noteworthy are the effects of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the revival and expansion of the spas after 1870, the peaking of activity in the years 1910-1915, and the dramatic decline after 1930.

Several pervasive factors may be recognized. The ante-bellum spas all drew their trade from the plantation belt and were therefore similarly affected by the economic and social disruptions of the Civil War and its aftermath. They languished until a new class of patron appeared on the scene, either the townsman or the wintering northerner. Both the old and the newer spas benefitted to varying degrees from the expansion of railroad mileage across the state and the general return of prosperity. The crest of the wave of spa activity was reached about 1910, when well developed public transportation influenced a concentration of people at certain playgrounds and vacation spots, and most of the Florida spas had provided attractive diversions in addition to the basic bathing and drinking facilities.

The rather precipitous decline of the spas came largely in response to a set of external factors. The introduction and popularization of the automobile was one of these, and from the time of the first World War, the private auto had fostered the search for and use of alternative resort and recreational opportunities. Medical knowledge, both professional and lay, was discouraging reliance upon mineral springs as curative agents, and hydrotherapy itself was moving toward more sophisticated treatment which did not require water with natural mineral content. Many of the old ailments had stemmed from poor diets, limited sanitation, and drafty homes, and were no longer prevalent. The rapid closing of Florida spas after 1930, however, was most immediately the result of the Crash of 1929 and the Depression which followed. Adjustment to most of these external factors was possible through a further emphasis on the broader resort functions, but it was difficult to compensate for a nearly complete loss of customers.

ACTIVE SPAS IN FLORIDA




Figure 2

It is probably fruitless to speculate about what might have been the fate of the Florida spas had there not been an economic crisis of major proportions, although one might suspect that obsolescence would have caught up with them eventually. The fact remains that the spa function did not survive the Depression in any meaningful way. Thus the Florida spas became features of historic interest.

FOOTNOTES

¹ John Lee Williams, *The Territory of Florida*, facsimile reproduction of 1837 edition (Gainesville, Fla., 1962), pp. 134, 147-48.

² The only comprehensive survey of Florida springs provides useful information on chemical analysis of their waters and on fluctuations in level. Minimal reference is made to use, and there is no emphasis on mineral springs. See G.E. Ferguson, C.W. Lingham, S.K. Love, and R.O. Vernon, *The Springs of Florida*. Florida Geological Survey, Bull. No 31, Tallahassee, 1947.

³ This is clearly the interpretation in both American and European references. See, for example, J.J. Moorman, *Mineral Springs of North America: How to Reach, and How to Use Them* (Philadelphia, 1873); S.L. Bensusan, *Some German Spas* (London, 1926).

⁴ Stephen Foster Music Club of White Springs, *A Brief History of White Springs, Florida*, First Ed., (Live Oak, Florida, 1950), p. 1.

⁵ Dorothy Dodd, "Florida in 1845," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXIV (July, 1945), 26.

⁶ George W. Pettengill, Jr., *The Story of the Florida Railroads, 1834-1903*, Bull. No. 86, The Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Boston, July 1952, pp. 21-6.

⁷ Charles L. Norton, *A Handbook of Florida* (New York, 1895), pp. 337-38.

⁸ *The Semi-Weekly Floridian*, Tallahassee, May 18, 1866; Aug. 20, 1866. Presumably the period corresponded closely to the resort season of the time.

⁹ For example, see Sidney Lanier, *Florida: Its Scenery, Climate, and History* (Philadelphia, 1876), p. 146. Unfortunately most writers of such volumes did not visit White Springs and depended upon older reports for their information, as Lanier seems to have done.

¹⁰ *Hamilton County Times*, Jasper, Florida, 1883, n.d. (Photocopy of advertisement.) Special Collections, Strozier Library, Florida State University. This item noted the past reknown of the spring for the cure of rheumatism, dyspepsia, neuralgia, scrofula, syphilis, general debility, kidney diseases, and "female troubles."

¹¹ Pettengill, *The Story of Florida Railroads*, p. 109.

¹² Stephen Foster Music Club, *A Brief History of White Springs*, p. 2.

¹³ Herman Gunter, "Statistics of Mineral Production in Florida in 1928 and 1929," *21st-22nd Annual Report, 1928-1930*, Florida Geological Survey, Tallahassee, 1931, p. 37.

- ¹⁴ Dodd, "Florida in 1845," p. 26.
- ¹⁵ C.C. Clay, "Letters from Florida in 1851," edited by Olin Norwood, *Florida Historical Quarterly*. XXIX (April 1951), 279.
- ¹⁶ *The Floridian and Journal*, Tallahassee, June 18, 1859, p. 3.
- ¹⁷ Pettengill, *The Story of Florida Railroads*, p. 64.
- ¹⁸ *The Suwannee Springs*, New York, n.d. This was a promotional brochure which included testimonial letters revealing evidence of use of the waters by invalids at least from the mid-1870's. The latest testimonial was dated July 1893, pointing to possible publication in the period 1893-1895. Seventy percent of the letters were from Georgia, including many from Savannah.
- ¹⁹ A.A. Robinson, *Florida—Its Climate, Soil, and Productions* (Tallahassee, 1882), p. 180. He reports that a number of new cottages were added in 1881 and that the spring was yearly gaining a reputation for its medical qualities.
- ²⁰ Pettengill, *The Story of Florida Railroads*, pp. 65-8.
- ²¹ William E. Arnold, *Summer in the Winter Time* (Philadelphia, 1892), p. 102.
- ²² W.H. Morse, *Suwannee Springs* (Westfield, N.J., 1896). This was a promotional pamphlet identified as a "voluntary opinion" which extolled the virtues of the "Saratoga of the South," and "the American Mecca," whose mineral water was an infallible cure for an incredible number of ailments. "Kidneys cannot be out of order in Eden."
- ²³ Interview with Mr. Virgil Jones, a long-time resident, at Suwannee Springs, Florida, January 25, 1973.
- ²⁴ Eloise R. Ott and Louis H. Chazal, *Ocala Country* (Ocala, Florida, 1966), p. 51.
- ²⁵ Clay, "Letters from Florida in 1851," pp. 641-42.
- ²⁶ *The Floridian and Journal*, Tallahassee, May 30, 1857, p. 4.
- ²⁷ "Florida," *DeBow's Review*, XXX (June 1861), 641-42.
- ²⁸ Lanier, *Florida: Its Scenery, Climate, and History*, p. 328; Robinson, *Florida—Its Climate, Soil, and Productions*, p. 155.
- ²⁹ Interview with Mr. Don V. Chapman, Postmaster, Orange Springs, January 20, 1973.
- ³⁰ Elizabeth Smith, "Life Along the Newport Road," Chapter II, *Magnolia Monthly* (February 1972), n.p.; Chapter III (March 1972), n.p.
- ³¹ H.C. Rippey, "Middle Florida," *The Semi-Tropical*, II (February 1876), p. 97.
- ³² Editorial comment, however, bewailed the tendency to frequent such resorts as Montvale Springs, Tennessee, rather than "their own watering places." *The Floridian and Journal*, Tallahassee, June 19, 1858, p. 2.
- ³³ *The Semi-Weekly Floridian*, Tallahassee, June 15, 1866, p. 2.
- ³⁴ Rippey, "Middle Florida," p. 92.
- ³⁵ See A Sojourner in Tallahassee, *His Letters from Tallahassee* (Tallahassee, 1885), p. 15; Mrs. H.W. Beecher, *Letters from Florida* (New York, 1879), p. 26. Newport is referred to as "once deemed the Saratoga of Florida," but almost entirely destroyed during the war.

- ³⁶ George C. Matson and Samuel Sanford, *Geology and Ground Waters of Florida*, Water Supply Paper 319, United States Geological Survey Washington, D.C., 1913, p. 442.
- ³⁷ Ledyard Bill, *A Winter in Florida* (New York, 1869), pp. 96-100.
- ³⁸ Daniel F. Tyler, *Where to Go in Florida* (New York, 1880), p. 43.
- ³⁹ Bushrod W. James, *American Resorts, with Notes Upon Their Climate* (Philadelphia, 1889), p. 131.
- ⁴⁰ Joseph W. Howe, *Winter Homes for Invalids* (New York, 1875), p. 46.
- ⁴¹ Interview with Mr. C.A. Geiger, Clay County Historical Society, Magnolia Springs, January 20, 1973.
- ⁴² Rebecca Phillips (ed.), "A Diary of Jesse Talbot Bernard, 1847-1857," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (October 1939), 121.
- ⁴³ Robinson, *Florida—Its Climate, Soil, and Productions*, p. 86.
- ⁴⁴ Mrs. Albert Miller, "Worthington Springs History," in *History of Union County Florida, 1921-1971* (Lake Butler, Florida, 1971), p. 36.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.
- ⁴⁶ Gladys B. Tucker, *Pioneer Life in Safety Harbor and Events in the Life of Dr. Odet Philippe*, Ms. 1958, n.p. (Collection of Pinellas County Historical Museum, Clearwater, Florida.) These were personal reminiscences after many years and dating of events were imprecise.
- ⁴⁷ W.L. Straub, *History of Pinellas County, Florida* (St. Augustine, Florida, 1929), p. 116.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.
- ⁴⁹ Interview with Mr. Salu Devanani, Managing Director, Safety Harbor Spa, Safety Harbor, Florida, January 18, 1973.
- ⁵⁰ *Florida Highways*, March 1951, p. 31.
- ⁵¹ Pettengill, *The Story of Florida Railroads*, p. 125.
- ⁵² Roland M. Harper, "Geography and Vegetation of Northern Florida," *Sixth Annual Report*, Florida State Geological Survey, Tallahassee, 1914, p. 301.
- ⁵³ E.H. Sellards, "Geology Between the Ochlockonee and Aucilla Rivers in Florida," *Ninth Annual Report*, Florida State Geological Survey, Tallahassee, 1917, p. 114.
- ⁵⁴ *Tallahassee Daily Democrat*, Tallahassee, Florida, November 22, 1929, p. 7. This also constitutes a refutation of an oft-repeated story that Panacea Springs was swept by fire in 1929. A careful review of all issues of this newspaper for the year 1929 revealed that the disastrous fire was in the village of Woodville, just south of Tallahassee, rather than in Panacea Springs.
- ⁵⁵ *Kim's Guide to Florida* (St. Augustine, 1935), p. 40.
- ⁵⁶ See Lanier, *Florida: Its Scenery, Climate, and History*, p. 333; Robinson, *Florida—Its Climate, Soil, and Productions*, p. 56.
- ⁵⁷ Louise Childers, "The Hampton Springs Hotel, 1908-1954," *The Magnolia Monthly* (September 1968), n.p.
- ⁵⁸ Matson and Sanford, *Geology and Ground Waters of Florida*, p. 415.

⁵⁹ Childers, "The Hampton Springs Hotel."

⁶⁰ *Hampton Springs* (Chicago, 1927), p. 11.

⁶¹ Childers, "The Hampton Springs Hotel."

⁶² Ferguson, et al., *The Springs of Florida*, p. 161.

⁶³ None of the historic spas were based upon thermal springs. Only since 1957 has a warm spring (87° F.) been opened to the public in Florida. This is a salt spring located 12 miles south of Venice along the lower Gulf coast, named Warm Mineral Springs. It has no accommodations, but offers a pool and water for drinking, and is the center of a residential development.

SUGAR PLANTATIONS IN LOUISIANA: ORIGIN, DISPERSAL, AND RESPONSIBLE LOCATION FACTORS

By John B. Rehder

For over 200 years, planters have experimented with sugarcane cultivation on plantations in Louisiana. Their success or failure, and their location of enterprise and product are all related to a variety of location factors. The purpose of this paper is to analyze both present and past plantation distributions and to relate the physical, cultural, and economic factors which have contributed to the localization of sugar plantations in Louisiana. The sugar plantation which forms the basis of this study is an agricultural enterprise exhibiting a landscape complex of distinctive visual settlement features.¹ Towering over the cane fields, the sugarhouse chimneys denote the location of a sugar factory—an agricultural factory in the field.² A cluster of barns and sheds usually surrounds the sugarhouse forming a centrally located outbuilding complex. Nearby is the quarters, a village grouping of nearly identical laborers' dwellings which is either centered upon a single road in a linear pattern or grouped in a block pattern based on a grid of streets. In a location separate and exclusive from the other buildings in the settlement complex, the big house, a prominent structure, is set usually amid moss-draped oaks. On larger plantation enterprises, a company store and sometimes a church are located on or near the plantation holdings. Extensive fields covering hundreds, even thousands, of acres unbroken by fences stretch long and narrow from levee crests at the stream banks to backswamps downslope from the streams. Long, straight ditches divide the fields and give them a characteristic linear appearance. Other cultural appurtenances related to the plantation landscape include artificial levees—long protective dikes which line the banks of flood-prone streams—and “levee roads” which parallel the streams just inside the levees and connect plantation landings. Although now constructed and maintained by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, levees once were the responsibility of the individual landowner.

Louisiana's sugar-plantation landscape is situated in a well-defined sugarcane growing region concentrated in the Mississippi River Floodplain in south-central Louisiana (Figures 1 and 2). The region encompasses nearly 12,000 square miles in 20 parishes where 318,177 acres are utilized for sugarcane cultivation (Figure 1).³

Within the area, sugar plantations extend northward as far as Meeker and southward, 150 airline miles, to Ashland and Valentine. The eastern limit of the plantation area follows the east bank of the Mississippi River




Figure 1

Distribution index map showing parishes, rivers, bayous, and towns of southern Louisiana.

from a point 15 miles south of New Orleans northward to Baton Rouge. At its widest point, the region extends 120 miles between New Orleans and Lafayette. The western limit follows a line from Meeker to the Vermilion River.

Sugar plantations are confined to the better-drained portions of natural levees of certain streams within the alluvial floodplain. The Mississippi River, Bayou Lafourche, Bayou Teche, Bayou Sale, Bayou Cypremort, the bayous of Terrebonne Parish, the upper Atchafalaya Basin and a small part of the lower Red River Valley on Bayou Boeuf are specific areas of plantation locations (Figure 2).

Historically, sugar plantations first appeared in the vicinity of New Orleans between 1742 and 1795.⁴ Agriculture in the area was organized in the early 1700's with plantations of indigo and tobacco,⁵ and thus formed a plantation base upon which sugarcane could be commercially produced.⁶ New Orleans, the political, economic, and cultural center of colonial Louisiana served as a focal point for incoming ships from France and the French West Indies. The latter French area contributed significantly to the initiation of the sugar industry by supplying the New Orleans area with sugar makers, sugar technology, and above all the




Figure 2

Distribution of Louisiana sugar plantations in 1969.

sugarcane plant itself. Thus, in 1742 New Orleans was the point of reception and initial cultivation for the first canes introduced by Jesuit priests from St. Domingue.⁷ Also in the New Orleans area Louisiana's first sugar planter, Dubreuil, experimented with sugarcane cultivation in 1752⁸ and DeBoré later in 1795 produced granulated sugar on a commercial plantation scale.⁹ Prior to these significant events, other plantation crops declined and thus enabled sugarcane to become the primary plantation crop of southern Louisiana after 1795.¹⁰

Little is known of the distribution of plantations before 1802, but by that year, 75 sugar-enterprises of various sizes were distributed along both banks of the Mississippi River north and south of New Orleans.¹¹ The northward expansion of contiguous sugar plantations by 1806 was probably no farther than St. John-the-Baptist Parish, 35 miles north of New Orleans. Even there, sugar was being planted less than cotton. Sugar cultivation was intermittently extended northward to Pointe Coupee Parish where an outpost of former tobacco enterprises was described by William Darby in 1806 as "... one of the most and best cultivated settlements on the Mississippi." Here commercially produced commodities were "... cotton, lumber and sugar; the latter yet in very small quantity."¹² Whereas the frontier of cane cultivation had reached

Pointe Coupee by 1806, sugar plantations had not yet become a part of the landscape in the bayou regions to the west (Lafourche, Terrebonne, and the Teche) at this time.

The plantation landscapes of the sugar region west of the Mississippi did not develop until after 1812 when planters, the majority of whom were from the Upland Anglo-American South, began to arrive in Louisiana.¹³ The region was made attractive by several writers who had traveled the area and told of a land of opportunity. Perhaps the most significant and far-reaching account was that of William Darby, who described Louisiana's lands as "... the most extensive unbroken, continuous body of productive soil on the globe."¹⁴

Attracted by the cheap, public lands of Terrebonne Parish, the lower Teche regions, and the backlands of the upper Lafourche, the Anglos came, some as land speculators, others as would-be planters.¹⁵ Between 1812 and 1850 they entered southern Louisiana by water, traveling on the Mississippi and on the western bayous. The rich, arable lands which they found available along portions of these waterways thus became the initial plantation sites where Anglo planters settled.

These migrations of Anglo-Americans were of fundamental importance to both the distributions and the internal character of plantations on the landscape. Borrowing from the French along the Mississippi, Anglo planters learned the techniques of sugar culture.¹⁶ Yet, they introduced their own ideas of the constituent parts of a plantation in terms of settlement patterns, buildings, dwelling types, and some agricultural practices. By 1844, a date by which most initial-occupance plantation patterns had been established, certain cultural patterns were evident. As indicated in Figure 3, French-owned plantations (shown with the open symbol) were then concentrated along the Mississippi River; whereas, Anglo plantations (closed black symbol), whose arrival came later, appear on the extremities of the distributional pattern.

The westward expansion of the sugar-plantation landscape reached only as far as the natural levees of Bayou Teche and the two lower distributary bayous of the Teche, Bayou Sale and Bayou Cypremort. A further westward expansion was discontinued because lands west of the Teche were not included in the Louisiana Purchase. Until 1819, they were still in the possession of Spain and later remained as a no-man's land buffer area between the United States territory and Spanish holdings farther west.¹⁷ Also, the drainable portions of southwest Louisiana, physiographically composed of Pleistocene terraces, were not well suited for sugarcane because of the poorer organic composition and hardpan character of the soils (Figure 4).¹⁸ Other factors, such as the limited navigability of streams, the lack of good alluvial flood-plain soils, and distance from the New Orleans market, would have been additional limiting factors even if the territory had been included in the Louisiana Purchase. Furthermore, it was not until 1880 that the regions west of the Teche were effectively settled, and even then settle-

ment was by midwestern grain farmers who adopted the growing of rice—the present dominant cultivation west of the Teche.¹⁹

The southern extent of effective sugar-plantation settlement in the Lafourche, Terrebonne, and Teche areas was restricted by the extent of drainable lands, all of which are characterized by a progressive




Figure 3

French and Anglo-American sugar plantations in southern Louisiana in 1844. Compiled from: P.A. Champomier, *Statement of Sugar Made in Louisiana in 1844* (New Orleans, 1844).

narrowing of natural levees averaging a quarter mile wide, or less, as compared to those of the Mississippi and upper Lafourche which are nearly three miles wide. Thus at points of extreme levee narrowing, sugar cultivation terminated.

In the Teche area below New Iberia, plantation settlement was achieved in the first half of the 19th century by incoming Anglo-American planters.²⁰ After 1812, planters found available public lands in the sparsely settled Lower Teche, Bayou Cypremort, and Bayou Sale areas.²¹ By 1844, sugar plantations had extended southward to Berwick. Today, however, the lower limit of sugar plantations on the Teche is




Figure 4

The physical landscape of southern Louisiana showing the distribution of natural levees as sites for sugar plantations.

at Patterson, five miles upstream. The lands north of St. Martinville were settled during the late 18th century by French Acadian and Spanish small-farming groups; consequently, plantations were never numerous.

Economic factors were also responsible for the development of the sugar plantation and its specific localization in Louisiana. Under the French and Spanish domination sugar-producing areas were located elsewhere in Central America and the Caribbean, and each had its own European market. When acquired by the United States in 1803, however, Louisiana had sugarcane as an attractive product which could be marketed in the United States.²² In addition, the market was improved by the protection of a revenue duty of 2 1/2¢ per pound on brown sugar. In 1812, the duty was raised to 5¢ as a war measure, but fell to 3¢ in 1816. Sugar selling for 8 1/2¢ in 1815 included a duty of from 3 to 5¢ per pound. With increasingly higher sugar prices potential planters were drawn into the sugar industry in southern Louisiana.²³

Besides the national market of consumers in the United States, Louisiana sugar planters had the advantage of the local selling market of New Orleans, the primary outlet for products of the Mississippi Valley.²⁴ Although by 1806 sugar plantations had expanded as far north as Pointe Coupee, they were, at best, meager secondary enterprises. Cotton as a primary staple had been cultivated as far south as St. John-the-Baptist

Parish in 1806 and even westward on small farms in the Lafourche and Teche region,²⁵ simply because cotton prices were good and sugar was still a rather new and developing crop. Besides, few individuals among the *petits habitants* of German, Spanish, and Acadian small-farmers possessed the necessary capital of \$40,000 for a 50-hand enterprise for developing the sugar plantation in their respective parishes.²⁶

The sugar-plantation expansion north of Pointe Coupee to the Red River area and the conversion from cotton to sugar for plantations between Donaldsonville and Pointe Coupee came in the 1830's and 40's with the fall of cotton prices.²⁷ The northernmost sugar parishes and lower portion of the cotton region evolved into a transition zone where fluctuations in prices could cause one crop to advance and the other to retreat. Before 1825, cotton prices had remained relatively high; consequently, sugar was held back by the "high-price tide" of the cotton crops. Between 1826 and 1832, however, cotton prices fluctuated downward giving way to the slight northward expansion of sugarcane. Further expansion of the sugarcane industry came in the 1840's when cotton prices fell from 15¢ to 5¢ per pound (1835-1842).²⁸

The expansion of sugarcane was encouraged more when a stronger protective tariff was applied to sugar in 1842.²⁹ Former cotton plantations converted to sugarcane in the parishes of East and West Feliciana, Avoyelles, and Rapides. The acceptance of cane was such that in 1845 more than 60 new sugar plantations emerged in Louisiana; the majority of which were in these northern margins of sugar production.³⁰ The agricultural writer, Solon Robinson, in 1848 said of the area:

Short crops and low prices of cotton combined with the fact of several planters in the hill lands between Woodville and Bayou Sara [Wilkinson County, Mississippi and West Feliciana Parish], having been very successful in the cultivation of cane the past season or two, is creating considerable excitement about making sugar in a region that it would have been considered only a few years since, madness to talk about.³¹

Although new and converted sugar plantations developed northward deep into the cotton parishes of Rapides, Avoyelles, and even Concordia, Catahoula, and East and West Feliciana, in the 1850's the inevitable was to happen—a northern limitation of the expansion.

Sugarcane, a tropical crop, requires 12 to 15 months of growing season to reach full maturity. Louisiana, at best, provides a ten-month growing season in its southernmost parishes; therefore, the northern areas are extremely marginal for sugar plantations.³² Exceedingly critical is the first frost and freeze which, if too early, can bring devastation to the cane crop. Freezing causes sucrose contents to diminish, even sour, while an unseasonably warm period after a freeze (a not uncommon occurrence), produces a sour, almost useless product. Although molasses can be made from some frost-damaged cane, granulated raw sugar has always been the product desired by the planter.³³




Figure 5

Northern limits of the Louisiana sugar region as indicated by climatic boundaries.
 Source: G.W. Cry, *Freeze Probabilities in Louisiana*, Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service (Baton Rouge, 1968) pp. 12,15.

In the early 19th century, planters had not ascertained the northern limits for successful production; consequently, some sugar cultivation extended beyond the critical frost limits.³⁴ The northern expansion of the sugar plantation ended abruptly in 1856 when a severe early frost devastated the entire sugar region. The plantations along the northern fringes later reverted to cotton, a safer, more conducive crop for the northern margins of sugar cultivation.³⁵ Today, the northern climatic boundary is fairly well established along the 250-day isarithm, although it is more effectively delimited by the average first-frost date of November 16 (Figure 5).

Another factor important to the northern distribution was the nature of soils, particularly in the Red River Valley. In the vicinity of Meeker, the soils of Recent alluvium are rich, fertile, and well drained on natural levee slopes.³⁶ Beyond the Red River Valley alluvium, other soils have formed on Pleistocene terraces and Tertiary deposits and thus are not as conducive to the drainage which sugarcane requires. Furthermore,

the fertility levels of the terrace soils especially in phosphorus content, are not as high as those in the Red River and Mississippi floodplain alluvium.³⁷ Variables in soil conditions thus contributed to a localized concentration of plantations in the Red River Valley.

Very little expansion, dispersal, or otherwise significant movement of the sugar plantation went very far east of the Mississippi. In only one small area, in the parishes of East Baton Rouge and East and West Feliciana, did the sugar industry expand, and even then the movement was short-lived. Plantations above Bayou Manchac on the east bank of the Mississippi were limited by several factors. Primary limitations were poor Pleistocene terrace soils, early frosts, an economy long based on cotton, and an early cultural separation from southern sugar areas.

Deficient soils have constituted one of the more significant and continuous limitations in the eastern margins of the sugar region (see Figure 4). Pleistocene terrace soils form the primary surfaces where drainage is inadequate and oxidation has significantly weakened the soils so that fertility levels have been unsuitable for sugarcane.³⁸

The crucial isostade of November 16 for the first freeze passes southward and across the center of West Feliciana Parish and down through the eastern part of East Baton Rouge Parish (see Figure 5). This climatic limitation places the parishes northeast of that line beyond the limits of effective sugar cultivation for expected granulated sugar.

Historically, during Louisiana's experimental period of sugar cultivation (1750-1705), the eastern area above Bayou Manchac was under British and later Anglo-American domination.³⁹ Furthermore, its economy was already successfully based upon cotton.⁴⁰ Anglo planters, experienced with cotton cultivation, were reluctant to attempt sugar cultivation particularly when cotton prices were high. Moreover, when sugarcane cultivation began to spread northward after 1812, the new crop was not widely accepted because it was anomalous to the area, expensive to process, and a common belief was maintained that sugarcane could not be successfully cultivated beyond Bayou Manchac.⁴¹

With the collapse of the cotton prices in the 1840's,⁴² however, commercial cane cultivation temporarily extended to the terrace soils north of Baton Rouge. Here a number of cotton planters attempted the culture and manufacture of sugar, doing so with a view that sugar was to be their financial salvation. Some degree of success was achieved because in 1855 the Feliciana parishes together produced 10,793 hogsheads of sugar.⁴³ The years following 1855 were marked by damaging frosts, the Civil War, the planters' realization of inadequate soils, and an agricultural reversion to cotton; all of which were detrimental to the perpetuation of the sugar industry northeast of Baton Rouge.

Technology has been an important factor in the development and perpetuation of the sugar plantation and its industry. Of all the technological improvements, four elements: cane varieties, sugar mills, boil-

ing apparatus, and mechanical-harvesting improvements, emerge as the more significant factors which allowed the perpetuation of the sugar industry.

The earliest known sugarcane grown in Louisiana was the Creole variety. Its cultivation continued from the time of introduction in the 1740's until the 1830's, but because of the soft stalk's susceptibility to frost and insects, Creole cane declined in use.⁴⁴ Another variety, the Otaheite cane, was introduced to Louisiana in 1797⁴⁵ as a companion cane to the Creole, but it also diminished in use as a result of its susceptibility to frost and failure to annually regenerate, or ratoon. Both canes, though soft and easily milled by animal-powered grinding apparatus common at the time,⁴⁶ did little towards the northern expansion of sugar plantations because the canes lacked cold-weather resistance.

The introduction of other more useful varieties of cane came in 1824. Because of their hard outer rinds, the Purple (Cheribon) and Striped (Ribbon or Striped Preanger) varieties were significant to the sugar industry because they could be cultivated farther north.⁴⁷ The protective rinds were detrimental at first because they could not be easily milled by animal-powered equipment. However, the milling problem was overcome in 1825 when the steam-powered sugar mill entered Louisiana.⁴⁸

Besides being more effective at milling the hard Ribbon and Purple cane varieties, the steam engine was far faster than the cattle-and-horse-powered mills.⁴⁹ Speed in milling at grinding time constituted a significant step in stabilizing the industry and its plantations. Planters could allow the canes to reach a greater degree of maturation by delaying harvest because they could grind more quickly with the steam mill.

Refinements came to the plantation in the 1840's and 50's when a change from the crude, open-kettle boiling method to the sealed vacuum-pan processing of cane juices began.⁵⁰ Plantations with vacuum-pan equipment in the sugarhouse could process more cane juice, faster, and with better quality control. This technical improvement not only accelerated sugar processing but also contributed to the stability of the industry.

Although most of these improvements occurred during the 19th century, one of the more important innovations has been the mechanical cane harvester, invented in 1935.⁵¹ The harvester has allowed for greater speed and efficiency in harvesting the cane crop than was formerly achieved with hand labor. With this improvement, planters have been able to delay the cane harvest and thus benefit from the greater sucrose in the more mature crop.

Except for the Ribbon and Purple canes (which were replaced in the 1920's by mosaic-resistant hybrids imported from Java),⁵² steam-powered mills, vacuum boiling apparatus, and mechanized harvesters continue to operate today as technological elements upon which the

sugar industry and its plantations vitally depend.

Although the Civil War dealt the sugar industry a severe economic blow, by 1870 the industry was approaching recovery.⁵³ The sugar area diminished somewhat in size after 1860, but it did not shrink to any smaller area than its 1844 pattern of distribution (Figure 3). More importantly, the post-war plantation maintained the same morphologic character that it had in antebellum times. The same settlement patterns, identical field patterns, and undoubtedly many of the same plantation buildings remained on the landscape. Unlike the Upland cotton plantations where the quarter houses were dispersed when freed slaves and other laborers became sharecroppers and tenants,⁵⁴ the compact settlement of the sugar plantation remained the same in post-war times.




Figure 6

The place of origin and routes of dispersal of sugar plantations in southern Louisiana.

In summary, Louisiana sugar plantations and their distinctive landscapes originated with French-Creole planters in the New Orleans vicinity and dispersed northward along the banks of the Mississippi River. Incoming Anglo-Americans later stimulated a dispersal of sugar plantations into the western bayous of the Lafourche, Terrebonne,

and Teche regions. By the mid-19th century, sugar plantations had expanded up to and beyond the limits of successful sugarcane cultivation. Throughout the period of initial sugar-plantation origin and dispersal, the routes followed the lines of current travel via streams and bayous. Specific sites for plantation location were on the banks of these streams, on the natural-levee crests and back-slopes (Figure 6).

The distribution of Louisiana's sugar plantations has been influenced by several location factors. Physical factors operated in southern Louisiana in setting particular distributions and locations of sugar plantations. Among the more important factors have been: climate—as expressed in the first-frost date for the northern extent of sugarcane grown for granulated sugar; landforms—which provided natural-levee sites for sugar-plantation settlement; waterways—which served as routeways for the arrival and dispersal of planters as well as for the transport of sugar products; and soils—which differed between the more fertile soils of the Mississippi Floodplain and the weaker and harder-to-drain Pleistocene terrace soils.

Particularly significant are the historical factors, such as the demise of other plantation crops and the introduction of sugarcane. Early contacts between the French colony of Louisiana and the French West Indies sugar industry resulted in the arrival from the French Caribbean of sugar mills, sugar makers, immigrants from St. Domingue, dwelling traits, and even the sugarcane plant itself.

Cultural factors were instrumental in the origin, dispersal, and distributions of plantations in the area. The initiation of sugar plantations near New Orleans followed by a dispersal along both banks of the Mississippi were precipitated by French Creoles. Anglo-Americans, with their former experience with cotton, carried the plantation system based on sugarcane into the western and northernmost margins of the sugar region. Peasant farmers, such as the Acadians, Germans, and Spaniards, hindered the expansion of sugar plantations by their occupation of potential plantation lands, and thus influenced incoming planters to seek lands elsewhere.

Political factors also affected the early sugar industry and its plantation localization. The Louisiana Purchase opened the Louisiana Territory to waves of incoming Anglo-American planters. Conversely, territorial boundary disputes hindered land settlement and plantation expansion west of the Teche region. The differing policies of Louisiana's colonial possessors affected origins and dispersals of sugar enterprises. France and Spain discouraged the development of sugar and indigo as commercial crops in Louisiana. After 1803, Louisiana's budding sugar industry was encouraged by government support. Today plantations are politically and economically supported and controlled by United States government subsidies, tariffs, and quota systems which effectively perpetuate the plantation and its sugar industry.⁵⁵

In addition, economic factors have played a role historically in the development of sugar plantations in Louisiana. The initial establishment of an American market for Louisiana sugar and protective tariffs, although a result of political policies, were basically economic factors which encouraged the spread of sugarcane plantations. Also significant was the fluctuation of sugar and cotton prices which were partially responsible for dispersing the sugar plantation northward into the cotton kingdom.

Perhaps the silent factor of inertia is the real reason that sugarcane plantations persist as they do in Louisiana today. With all economics and politics aside, inertia has fostered a traditional continuation of a plantation landscape and its product to the present time.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ John Burkhardt Rehder, "Sugar Plantation Settlements of Southern Louisiana: A Cultural Geography" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971), pp. 10-2.
- ² Today only one out of every four plantations has a sugarhouse because of a centralization of sugarhouses and milling functions. During the 19th century, however, every sugar plantation maintained some semblance of a mill (either steam or horse-powered) and a boiling facility collectively called a sugarhouse.
- ³ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Agriculture: 1964*, Vol. I, *State and County Statistics*, pt. 35, Louisiana, p. 400.
- ⁴ Avequin, "Sugarcane in Louisiana," *DeBow's Review*, XXII (1857), 616.
- ⁵ Nancy M. Miller Surrey, *The Commerce of Louisiana During the French Regime 1699-1763*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LXXI (1916), pp. 157-59.
- ⁶ Lewis C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, 2 vols. (Gloucester, Mass., 1958), I, 302.
- ⁷ C.C. Robin, *Voyage to Louisiana*, trans. and abridged by Stuart O. Landry, Jr. (New Orleans, 1966), pp. 108-09; Jean Delangles, *The French Jesuits in Lower Louisiana 1700-1763* (Washington, 1935), p. 390.
- ⁸ Henry P. Dart, "The Career of Dubreuil in French Louisiana," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (1935), 286.
- ⁹ Charles Gayarre, "A Louisiana Sugar Plantation in the Old Regime," *Harper's Magazine*, LXXIV (1889), 607.
- ¹⁰ Avequin, "Sugarcane in Louisiana," pp. 615-19.
- ¹¹ Robin, *Voyage to Louisiana*, p. 109.
- ¹² William Darby, *A Geographical Description of the State of Louisiana* (2nd. ed.; New York, 1817), p. 143.
- ¹³ American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States, Class III, *Public Lands* (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1843), Vol. III, pp. 119-21, 67-77; and in Pierre A. Degalos, "Statement

of Sugar Made in 1828 and 1829," *Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer*, IX (July 23, 1892), 67.

¹⁴ Darby, *Louisiana*, p. 45.

¹⁵ W.W. Pugh, "Bayou Lafourche from 1840-1850: Its Inhabitants, Customs, Pursuits," *Louisiana Planter and Sugar Manufacturer*, I (1888), 143-67.

¹⁶ Pugh, "Bayou Lafourche," p. 167; *American State Papers*, III, pp. 119-21.

¹⁷ Frank Bond, *Historical Sketch of "Louisiana" and the Louisiana Purchase*, General Land Office U.S. Department of Interior (Washington, 1912), pp. 3-12; Charles Wilson Hackett, ed. and trans., *Picardo's Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas*, 4 vols. (Austin, 1946), IV, pp. ix, 214.

¹⁸ This fact was recognized by Darby in 1806, *Louisiana*, p. 103.

¹⁹ Mildred Kelly Ginn, "A History of Rice Production in Louisiana to 1897," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XXIII (1940), 559-60.

²⁰ E.D. Richardson, "The Teche Country Fifty Years Ago," *Southern Bivouac*, IV (1886), 593.

²¹ *American State Papers*, III, pp. 119-21.

²² Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-1763* (London, 1963), pp. 327-28, 506; J. Carlyle Sitterson, *Sugar Country* (Lexington, 1953), pp. 188-93; J.D.B. DeBow, "Louisiana and Her Industry," *DeBow's Review*, VIII (1850), 35.

²³ Gray, *History of Agriculture*, II, 744; February 1815-8-1/2¢ per lb.; December 1815-13¢; May 1816-16¢. By comparison when sugar was selling at 4-1/2¢ per lb. and cotton at 6¢ per lb. the profits were considered about equal.

²⁴ "Commerce of American Cities: New Orleans," *DeBow's Review*, IV (1847), 391-400; "The Present and Future of New Orleans," *DeBow's Review*, XIX (1855), 688-93; Sitterson, *Sugar Country*, pp. 169-70, 188-93.

²⁵ Darby, *Louisiana*, p. 78; William O. Scroggs, "Rural Life in the Lower Mississippi Valley about 1803," *Mississippi Valley Historical Association*, VIII (1914), 268.

²⁶ *An Account of Louisiana*, Being an abstract of documents in offices of the Departments of State and Treasury (Washington, 1803), pp. 6-7; Robin, *Voyage to Louisiana*, pp. 114-15; Darby, *Louisiana*, p. 222.

²⁷ "Extension of the Louisiana Sugar Region," *DeBow's Review*, II (1846), 442; Gray, *History of Agriculture*, II, 748-1027.

²⁸ Gray, *History of Agriculture*, II, 697, 715, 1027.

²⁹ I. Smith Homans and William B. Danna, eds., "Tariffs of the United States for 1842, 1846, 1857, and 1861," *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*, XLIV (1861), 511.

³⁰ P.A. Champomier, *Statement of Sugar Made in Louisiana in 1844* (New Orleans, 1844), p. 10.

³¹ Herbert Anthony Kellar, ed., *Solon Robinson, Pioneer and Agriculturalist: Selected Writings*, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 1936), II, 146.

³² L.P. Herbert, *Culture of Sugarcane for Sugar Production in Louisiana*, Agriculture Handbook No. 262, Agriculture Research Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (Washington, 1964), pp. 2-4.

- ³³ R.E. Coleman, "Studies on Keeping Quality of Sugarcane Damaged by Freezing Temperatures During the Harvest Season, 1951-52," *Sugar Bulletin*, XXX, 342-43, 377-80.
- ³⁴ "Extension of the Louisiana Sugar Region," p. 442.
- ³⁵ Champomier, *Statement of Sugar Made in Louisiana in 1856* (New Orleans, 1856).
- ³⁶ S.A. Lytle, *The Morphological Characteristics and Relief Relationships of Representative Soils in Louisiana*, Louisiana State University Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 631, November 1968, pp. 17-8.
- ³⁷ D.S. Byrnside and J.B. Sturgis, *Soil Phosphorus and its Fractions as Related to Response of Sugar Cane to Fertilizer Phosphorus*, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 513 (Baton Rouge, 1958), pp. 13-6; W.J. Peevy and R.H. Brupbacker, "Fertility Status of Louisiana Soils: No. 3: Phosphorus," *Louisiana Agriculture*, V (1962), No. 4, pp. 12-3.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*; Lytle, "Soils in Louisiana," pp. 17-8.
- ³⁹ Judge Carrigan, "Statistical and Historical Sketches of Louisiana: Baton Rouge," *DeBow's Review*, XI (1851), 616; Cecil Johnson, "The Distribution of Land in British West Florida," *Louisiana Historical Review*, XVI (1933), 539-53.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; Berquin-Duvallon, *Travels in Louisiana and the Floridas in the Year 1802*, trans. by John Davis, (New York, 1806), p. 166.
- ⁴¹ "Extension of the Louisiana Sugar Region," p. 442.
- ⁴² Gray, *History of Agriculture*, II, 687, 748, 1027.
- ⁴³ One hogshead = 1000 lbs. of sugar; Louisiana's total sugar production for that year was 346-635 hogsheads. Champomier, *Statement of Sugar*, 1860, p. 3.
- ⁴⁴ J.D.B. DeBow, *The Southern States* (Washington, D.C. and New Orleans, 1856), pp. 196, 275; Noel Doerr, "The Identity of the Creole Cane of the West Indies," *International Sugar Journal*, XXX (1928), pp. 11-2.
- ⁴⁵ Avequin, "Sugarcane in Louisiana," p. 618.
- ⁴⁶ F.S. Earle, *Sugar Cane and Its Culture* (New York, 1928), pp. 62-3.
- ⁴⁷ Avequin, "Sugarcane in Louisiana," p. 619.
- ⁴⁸ DeBow, *The Southern States*, p. 275.
- ⁴⁹ J.D.B. DeBow, ed., "Sugar, Its Cultivation, Manufacture and Commerce," *DeBow's Review*, V (1849), 157-59.
- ⁵⁰ J.P. Benjamin, "Louisiana Sugar," *DeBow's Review*, II (1946), pp. 334-43; Norbert Rillieux, "Sugarmaking in Louisiana," *DeBow's Review*, V (1848), 285-88, 291-93.
- ⁵¹ F.A. Vought, "Windrowing and Harvesting Machines," *Gilmore's Louisiana Sugar Manual, 1940-1941* (New Orleans, 1941), p. IX.
- ⁵² Herbert, *Culture of Sugarcane*, p. 8.
- ⁵³ Walter Prichard, "The Effects of the Civil War on the Louisiana Sugar Industry," *Journal of Southern History*, V (1939), 318-32.

⁵⁴ Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition from Slave to Free Agricultural Labor in the Southern United States," *Agricultural History*, XIII (1939), 22-32; David C. Barrow, "A Georgia Plantation," *Scribner's Monthly*, XXI (1880-1881), 832-33.

⁵⁵ Marcel Voorhies and W.M. Grayson, "An Outline of Recent Sugar Control Programs and their Effect on the Louisiana Sugar Industry," *International Society of Sugarcane Technologists Proceedings of the Sixth Congress* (Baton Rouge, 1938), pp. 514-23.





1974

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XIII

June, 1974

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY:
ISSUES AND METHODS

RECEIVED
DEC - 1974
PERIODICALS DEPARTMENT
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE LIBRARY
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA



Published By
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
A Division of the University System of Georgia
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XIII

June, 1974

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY:
ISSUES AND METHODS

CONTENTS

Introduction	<i>Robert W. Sellen and Thomas A. Bryson</i>	1
Isolationists of the 1930s and 1940s: An Historiographical Essay	<i>Justus D. Doenecke</i>	5
The Resurgence of Isolationism at the End of World War II	<i>Thomas M. Campbell</i>	41
Untapped Resources for American Diplomatic History in the National Archives	<i>Milton O. Gustafson</i>	57
Texts and Teaching: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972	<i>Sandra C. Thomson and Clayton A. Coppin, Jr.</i>	65

Copyright © 1974, West Georgia College

Printed in U.S.A.

Thomasson Printing Co., Carrollton, Georgia 30117

FIRST PRINTING

Price \$2.00

CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT W. SELLEN received the B.A. degree from Washburn University, and the A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Chicago. His teaching and research interests are in American foreign relations. Dr. Sellen has contributed numerous articles to American and foreign journals, including *Mid-America*, *International Journal*, *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, and *Il Politico*. He is the author of *Myths and Misperceptions: American Images of China and Japan* and (with Paul S. Holbo) *The Eisenhower Era*. Dr. Sellen is Professor of History at Georgia State University, Atlanta.

THOMAS A. BRYSON received the B.A. degree from Georgia Southern College and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Georgia. His teaching and research interests are in the field of American foreign relations, especially in the area of American diplomacy with the Middle East. Dr. Bryson has published widely, contributing articles to *Muslim World*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, *Records of the American Catholic Historical Society*, and other journals. He is the author of *American-Middle Eastern Diplomacy, 1945-1973* and *The Philadelphia Lawyer: Walter George Smith*. Dr. Bryson is Associate Professor of History at West Georgia College.

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE received the B.A. degree from Colgate University and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton. His teaching and research interests have focused on American isolationism, an area of American foreign relations on which he has published widely. Dr. Doenecke is the author of *The Literature of Isolationism*, and his latest essay, a brief history of the No Foreign War Committee, will appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal of Contemporary History*. He is Associate Professor of History, New College, Sarasota, Florida.

THOMAS M. CAMPBELL received the B.A. degree from Randolph-Macon College and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Virginia. His teaching and research interests have broadly focused on American foreign relations. Dr. Campbell is the author of several journal articles published in *International Organization* and *The Masquerade Peace: America's U.N. Policy, 1944-45*. He is presently editing the papers of Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Dr. Campbell is Associate Professor of History at Florida State University, Tallahassee.

MILTON O. GUSTAFSON received the B.A. degree from Gustavus Adolphus College and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Nebraska. His research interests include U.S. foreign relations since

World War II, the administrative history of the Department of State, and archival topics. He has edited *The National Archives and Foreign Relations Research* (forthcoming), which represents the proceedings of a recent National Archives Conference. Dr. Gustafson is Chief of the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives of the United States, Washington.

SANDRA C. THOMSON received the B.A. degree from Stanford and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Colorado. Her teaching and research interests center on American-East Asian relations. Dr. Thomson has published in the *Pacific Historical Review* and the *Journal of Religious History*. She is Associate Professor of History, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.

CLAYTON A. COPPIN, JR. received the B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Utah and is presently a doctoral candidate at the same institution. His principal area of academic interest is twentieth century American diplomatic history. Mr. Coppin is an instructor at the University Extension Branch, University of Utah, Woods Cross.

FOREWORD

This volume continues the precedent of utilizing the services of two volume editors working under the loose supervision of a general editor, a policy which began with last year's issue of *The Studies in the Social Sciences*. The volume editors were responsible for selecting the theme and papers herein included, and initial editorial refinement. The general editor's role was limited to broad consultation, final editing, and liaison with the printer.

The journal is financed by the University System of Georgia and is distributed gratis to libraries of colleges and universities in Georgia, and to the larger institutions of higher learning in each of the southern states. Interested individuals or other libraries may purchase copies for \$2.00 to help defray printing costs.

It is with pleasure that we submit to you this volume on American diplomatic history.

John C. Upchurch
Associate Professor and Chairman
Department of Geography
General Editor

PREFACE

The essays in this volume were presented before a regional meeting of members of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held at Georgia State University on February 24, 1973. All have been edited for purposes of publication, but Justus Doenecke and Thomas Campbell revised their essays extensively.

The conference consisted of two sessions, one on the tensions between American involvement and non-involvement abroad and one on "what are the boundaries of American diplomatic history?" The two themes were chosen because a majority of the members of the society in the Southeast considered them to be the most pressing topics for discussion.

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations was founded in 1967, has several hundred members, and for several years has held sessions at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, and the Southern Historical Association. It is now moving to its own independent meetings, and the conference in Atlanta was the first such among members of the society.

The volume editors, who were co-chairmen of the conference, express their thanks to the Departments of History at West Georgia College and Georgia State University, which sponsored the meeting, and to the Georgia State University Foundation for financial aid. Appreciation is also extended to West Georgia College for its publication of this volume.

Robert W. Sellen
Professor of History
Georgia State University

Thomas A. Bryson
Associate Professor of History
West Georgia College

Volume Editors

INTRODUCTION

Louis J. Halle, former State Department official and now Professor of International Relations in the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, has identified a constant theme in American foreign relations from the founding of the republic to the present. It has dominated almost every debate and decision in foreign policy, he writes, and

takes the form of a tension, a polarity in our thinking, a conflict in our national desires or attitudes which at critical moments in history has divided our people, sometimes bitterly.

The tension is that between participation in world politics and withdrawal or aloofness or abstinence; between involvement and isolation, between alignment and neutrality.¹

Halle's words of 15 years ago remain valid. Though World War II supposedly made the United States a permanent participant in world affairs, even a dominant one, the war in Vietnam revived the tension between involvement and withdrawal. "Hawks" argued that such involvement was necessary to American interests as well as future peace, while "doves" demonstrated against the war's unsavory aspects and argued that America could not do everything, everywhere.

Not only have scholars begun to rethink the question,² but Richard Nixon, who in 1954 had urged American intervention in then French Indochina, as President promulgated in 1969 the "Nixon Doctrine" of selective involvement instead of world-wide commitment.

A fourth Arab-Israeli war and an Arab oil embargo have made the Middle East another region which causes Americans to be ambivalent about involvement. To remain aloof and heedless of Israel's fate would cost Americans emotionally, for there is a sentimental attachment to Israel. Perhaps this arises in part from American guilt over the fate of millions of European Jews during World War II, a time when anti-semitism was widespread in the United States and when government officials discouraged migration to America. Yet there is real economic pain in being deprived of oil from the Arab countries, along with personal discomfort.

Sentiment thus opposes national interest, leading many Americans to wish to escape such a dilemma by non-involvement. One senses an emotional atmosphere similar to that of previous times of crisis, when Americans were torn between sentimental attachments and what they conceived to be the national interest.

Justus Doenecke returns to the most famous period of ambivalence, the years preceding, during and after World War II. Examining the people known as "isolationists," he summarizes their reputation, new revisionist analyses of events which the isolationists criticized (especially U.S. entry into World War II), and summarizes what we know about isolationism.

His paper is of value to students of American history generally, and especially to diplomatic historians in explaining what remains to

be studied in American isolationism. His analysis ranges from isolationist groups not yet studied through isolationism's intellectual roots and sociological aspects, isolationists' activities during World War II and the Cold War, and, most intriguing of all, areas of agreement between isolationists and interventionists. Some of the latter, he suggests, include defeating the Axis and promoting free enterprise capitalism.

Few if any historians have seen any blurred edges where isolationism and interventionism could meet. Thomas Campbell finds a startling one in his study of the last years of World War II. Seeking to learn what happened to isolationism during the war and what Americans thought about involvement abroad after the war, he reveals that many looked to the new United Nations as "an inexpensive means of keeping peace" and of avoiding the burden of large armies or direct involvement overseas. When these hopes proved futile and faith in the UN at least partially misplaced, many "reacted initially by a growing hostility to Russia and communism" and America experienced the "red scare" of the late 1940s and early 1950s.³

Campbell's study of American attitudes toward the nascent UN reveals the tensions within the government and in the public between isolation and involvement in world affairs. It challenges historians' previous assumptions about American acceptance of a world role.

There are tensions, too, within the community of American diplomatic historians. A "generation gap" may exist, for at least three groups are active. There are those who began their careers as early as the 1920s or before, the depression-war group of the 1930s and early 1940s, and the Cold War generation,⁴ which might be subdivided into those now becoming "middle Turks" and those who began their careers in the late 1960s and since.

More than age is involved. Norman Graebner, in his presidential address to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in December 1972, raised the question of a relationship between knowledge of history and effective democratic government. Would deeper knowledge of history safeguard us against future Vietnam type wars? Did we, in 1964, "lack information which might have predicted the consequences of a major United States involvement in Vietnam?" Or was the problem "inertia of established policies" within the government and "the inertia of apathy" in the public? Since a majority of Americans were "hawks" the "educational system was either performing heroic service on behalf of United States policy or education in foreign affairs was quite properly uncritical, irrelevant, or nonexistent on American college and university campuses."⁵

Is the teaching of American diplomatic history effective? How is it done? On what, if anything, do diplomatic historians agree?

There is yet another division among diplomatic historians. A committee of Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations members, charged with exploring the possibility of a new bibliographical guide to the history of American diplomacy, reported that in the guide published in 1935,⁶ Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin

defined diplomatic history narrowly, as the execution of or implementation of the U.S. government's foreign policy. This was the traditional definition, accepted then by most diplomatic historians. As the committee pointed out, however, diplomatic history has changed radically since 1935, and now includes studies of pressure groups, international economics, cultural-social relations, and other such topics.⁷

Apropos of changing diplomatic history, Milton Gustafson explains the kinds of material available in the National Archives, how they are arranged, how they can be used, and what sorts of material have never been used or are little used. His essay is thus of deep interest to established historians as well as beginning students.

Even by the traditional definition of diplomatic history, Gustafson points out, historians have not dealt with all the interesting tales of American diplomacy. But certain files outside the traditional area have been ignored, such as those of the Division of Defense Materials, crucial in World War II logistics, or the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, which "prepared reports for informational and intelligence purposes on cultural, economic, military, political, and social matters of most areas of the world."⁸

Other untapped records include those of the consular courts in countries where the United States had extraterritoriality, which reveal the quality of justice in such courts and what kinds of difficulty Americans got into abroad. At a higher level, records of American participation in international conferences contain much unpublished and unused material, including private remarks by Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt at Yalta.

Historians differ in their definition of diplomatic history, in their use of materials and also in attitudes. A deep division exists among "traditionalists" (who accept American successes such as the acquisition of territory during the 19th century), "realists" (who seek to analyze power relationships and other such factors), and the "New Left" (whose members generally "tend to measure success, not by the policy's relationship to the national welfare, broadly defined, but by its capacity to achieve the specific objectives of governing elites").⁹

Sandra Thomson and Clayton Coppin explore these divisions through historians' views of themselves and their field. By means of a questionnaire sent to all members of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, they ascertained diplomatic historians' age groups, choice of teaching materials, political attitudes, and interpretations of American foreign relations. They also discovered in what ways diplomatic historians have changed their views and, perhaps, to what extent the war in Vietnam is responsible for such changes. Their essay reveals something of a "generation gap" but an even larger attitudinal gap (the split among radicals, moderates and traditionalists), and also the fact that most make at least some attempt to keep their own political views out of the classroom.

Campuses in general are quieter now than in the 1960s, when everything was open to question from scholarly topics to life styles. Deepen-

ing war in Vietnam, inconclusive and frustrating as it was, radicalized many American academicians. One wonders if the combination of American withdrawal from Vietnam and the crisis of energy supply will bring the study of American foreign relations back to an emphasis on realism and national interest.

Robert W. Sellen
Thomas A. Bryson

FOOTNOTES

¹ Louis J. Halle, *Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1959), p. 1.

² One example is Robert W. Tucker, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York, 1972).

³ See p. 43 below.

⁴ Robert H. Ferrell, "Three Generations of Diplomatic Historians," *The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter*, III (May 1972), 1-8.

⁵ Norman A. Graebner, "The State of Diplomatic History," *The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter*, IV (March 1973), 2-3.

⁶ Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, *Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States* (Washington, 1935).

⁷ Bibliographical Planning Committee of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, *The Case for a New Bibliography in American Foreign Relations* (mimeographed), pp. 1-7.

⁸ See p. 61 below.

⁹ Graebner, "State of Diplomatic History," pp. 4-7.

ISOLATIONISTS OF THE 1930s and 1940s: AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

By JUSTUS D. DOENECKE*

Isolationists have seldom had a good press. Perhaps the first battle they lost was the battle over definition. The very label "isolationist," at least by the 1940s, connotes an ostrich-type mentality, oblivious to impending threats. Like those religious groups whose popular identity originally came from the epithets of critics—Mormons, Quakers, "the people sometime called Methodists"—isolationists have been given a name they do not want and yet cannot change.

Whenever possible they would contest the name. Professor Edwin Borchard of Yale, for example, said that the term was "essentially dishonest," an effort to vilify those "who preferred not to enter a European or Asiatic war" whose aims could only lie "in visions." Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, declared, "Every traitor calls every patriot an isolationist."¹ His newspaper would refer to kindred spirits as "nationalists," while historian Charles A. Beard called his policies "continentalist." The commentator Lawrence Dennis often used the term "neutralist."

Yet careful scholars are also troubled. Professor Wayne S. Cole finds the term "isolationist" misleading. The people to whom it usually applied, he declares, believed in America's unilateral freedom of action. While opposing binding alliances, particularly in Europe, they differed from pacifists in favoring strong military preparations and at times certain forms of imperialism. Says Cole, referring to their opposition to conflict with the Axis, "It was just that they opposed American involvement in that particular war at that particular time." Manfred Jonas concurs, writing that the isolationists of the 1930s sought only to avoid long-term political commitments. They opposed economic autarchy and did not want "literal isolation of the United States from the rest of the world."² Yet this inaccurate and misleading term, which has muddled meaningful political dialogue from the days of Roosevelt to the days of Nixon, will probably remain with us, perhaps one more example of man's continued insistence upon irrationality.

The Pearl Harbor attack at once cast the isolationists in the role of poor prophets, with the supposed wartime "repudiation" of isolationism setting the tone for the history books. The classic account of

*The author wishes to express thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Institute for Humane Studies for aid in research through such collections as the America First Committee manuscripts and the papers of such isolationists as John T. Flynn, Herbert Hoover, Harry Elmer Barnes, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Frederick J. Libby. He is also much indebted to Harriet Schwar and Joan Lee for varied bibliographical suggestions and to James J. Martin for editorial ones. All viewpoints remain the author's own.

American diplomacy during the late 1930s tells how most Americans "beguiled themselves" with a dual belief: first, that war was inherently evil, and second, that "the first duty of Americans is to maintain their unique civilization." The most widely quoted of the war memoirs even claimed that isolationists who opposed draft extension in 1941 had placed political expediency ahead of the nation's security (the author perhaps forgetting his own role in the drafting of Roosevelt's "again and again" speech). The first comprehensive history of anti-interventionism, Selig Adler's *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction*, possessed—as Wayne S. Cole noted—"all the detached objectivity of a trained historian who was at the same time a crusading prohibitionist writing a history of the liquor industry." The title alone connotes irrationality, for Adler described a movement which in 1940 "might have destroyed the fighting will of those nations still resisting the Axis," and which, during the Cold War, had become "antithetical to national survival." At the same time, the first general essay on American pacifism asserted that such doctrines as universal disarmament and neutrality merely revealed that the peace movement was "intellectually incapable of fitting its ideas to the facts of international life after 1918."³

Hence if the isolationists ever received compliments, they were usually backhanded. Respected historians went so far as to say that the nation's predominantly non-interventionist sentiments justified presidential duplicity. Professor Thomas A. Bailey might well have spoken for many war-time intellectuals when he said that "because the masses are notoriously shortsighted, and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their long-run interests."⁴

Throughout the 1950s few professional historians dissented, or—for that matter—offered less impassioned treatment. George F. Kennan's classic *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, intimated that a less dogmatic policy could have at least avoided the Pacific war. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., in a critique of war involvements, elaborated upon Charles A. Beard's comment that "in actual truth, internationalism may be a covering ideology for the aggressive nationalism of one or more countries." Wayne S. Cole's monograph of *America First*, showing that its leadership was by no means sympathetic to fascism, offered a marked contrast to Walter Johnson's strident account of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. But aside from a school of revisionism led by Harry Elmer Barnes, which claimed that Roosevelt had plotted the Pearl Harbor attack, few scholars attacked America's interventionist diplomacy.⁵

Within the last fifteen years, however, the whole meaning of World War II has been called into question. The assault came in several areas. First, a historian of modern Europe, applying Metternichian "realism" to American-Japanese relations, found the United States provoking a needless war with Japan. Paul Schroeder's prize-winning study of Japanese-American relations before Pearl Harbor claims that the United States unrealistically insisted upon Japan's total evacuation from China,

when wisdom would have at least demanded a temporary accommodation with Japan on the China issue. By giving way, if only for a brief time, the United States could have focused upon the defeat of Germany. Second, the "Wisconsin school" of diplomatic history has found America's participation in the conflict rooted primarily in the effort to maintain Open Door capitalism at home and abroad. It was, in the words of William Appleman Williams, "the war for the American frontier," an effort to dissolve the closed economic blocs of the Axis. Arguing in a similar vein, Noam Chomsky, noted linguist and Cold War critic, finds America's waging of the Pacific war hypocritical, for Japan's suppression of Chinese nationalism—and the rationale for it—differed little from later efforts by the United States in Vietnam.⁶ Now, with the publication of Bruce M. Russett's *No Clear and Present Danger*, a third stage has been reached. The Yale political scientist claims forthrightly that the United States should have remained aloof from the entire conflict. Without American participation, the European war would have resulted in mutual exhaustion on the Eastern front, while Japan would have been bogged down on the Asian mainland. "Just possibly," he writes, "the isolationists were right in their essential perspective."⁷

At the same time the conduct of the war itself has undergone radical re-examination. While only obscure neo-Nazi tracts attempt to justify Hitler, new monographs from Western scholars find little to defend either in the way the Allies waged the war or in the material goals that they apparently sought. First, while Administration spokesmen often defined the conflict in humanitarian terms, recent research discloses official indifference toward those whom Nazism claimed as its greatest victims. An entire spate of monographs has found Roosevelt timid, and his State Department hostile, toward relief efforts for Europe's doomed Jews.⁸ Second, the callousness of Allied war methods is now stressed, with British historians A.J.P. Taylor and B.H. Liddell-Hart offering scathing commentary upon the saturation bombing of Germany. In the words of Professor Taylor, "The British outdid German frightfulness first in theory, later in practice, and a nation which claimed to be fighting for a moral cause gloried in the extent of its immoral acts."⁹

Third, Allied diplomacy is coming under a many-sided attack. Liddell-Hart calls the conflict "the unnecessary war," triggered by a foolish guarantee to Poland and prolonged by the folly of the unconditional surrender policy. The war, he writes, "proved of profit only to Stalin—by opening the way for Communist domination of central Europe." Roosevelt's latest biographer, James MacGregor Burns, by no means unsympathetic to the man he considers the war's leading "soldier of freedom," declares that the President's cloudy rhetoric and expedient diplomacy not only led to cynicism at home, but "helped sow the seeds of the Cold War." At the same time, writing in an entirely different vein, some of the newer revisionists portray the Allies as a counter-revolutionary coalition. Gabriel Kolko, for example, claims that the United States supported forces of reaction everywhere, while Stalin (described in terms that a Trotskyite would relish) made continued efforts to sup-

press national liberation movements in both Europe and Asia.¹⁰ Although some of these critiques originated before the Vietnam crisis was well underway, events in Southeast Asia have led to renewed attention to such topics as terror bombing and supposed Soviet compliance with Western counter-insurgency.

Revisionists of the "Wisconsin School" believe that American Open Door imperialism—strengthened immeasurably by World War II victories—led inevitably into confrontation with Russia. Of course, not all historians of this persuasion go as far as Gar Alperovitz in claiming that the atomic bomb was deliberately dropped upon cowed Japanese in order to prevent Russian control of Eastern Europe and Manchuria. However, the broader sweep of Cold War revisionism—with its stress upon America's own responsibility—is well under way, finding evidence of a United States bid for world hegemony in such issues as postwar credits, access to Eastern Europe and an atomic monopoly.¹¹

Such diverse but hardhitting attacks upon New and Fair Deal diplomacy were bound to lead to wholesale reevaluation of isolationists and pacifists. Several new students have pioneered. Manfred Jonas, examining the non-interventionists in the years immediately before Pearl Harbor, finds more to their views than "simple obstructionism based on ignorance and folly." Contrary to myth, the isolationists had "a positive view of the world and of the role that should be played in it by the United States." While other historians should elaborate upon his study to differentiate further between isolationists and pacifists, his lucid work places all subsequent historians in his debt. Thomas G. Paterson uses Jonas' findings—among others—to declare that impassioned politicians and academicians, by maligning isolationism, have distorted "a useful heritage." According to Paterson, such liberal isolationists as Gerald P. Nye and William E. Borah offered trenchant critiques of a burgeoning military-industrial complex, opposed United States armed intervention in Latin America, and predicted the "garrison" nature of a warfare state. While Paterson's interpretation is still by no means the dominant one, such a universally respected scholar as Otis L. Graham, Jr., questions whether "Roosevelt was a wiser liberal than those few old reforms that went from a domestic liberalism that was considerably warmer than his own to the America First Committee."

Pacifism, too, has been reexamined. Charles Chatfield's sensitive history of interwar pacifism, written with an unmatched grasp of the sources, reveals its often penetrating analysis of global power rivalries as well as early experimentation with direct action and radical non-violence. Similarly, Lawrence Wittner's organizational study of World War II and Cold War pacifism finds its proponents often more "realistic" than its critics, for they saw through the shams of wartime hysteria and predicted the destructive impact of total conflict.¹² There has, however, been no similar survey of Cold War isolationists.

It would, however, be unfortunate if the more recent interpretations simply led to a refighting of the old battles of "isolation" versus "intervention," a return to what William Appleman Williams used to call

the “era of violent partisanship.” The historical task requires far more than simplistic polemics over who—in the long run—was “right.” Rather, it involves examining the entire ethos of a society in order better to gain perspective on our own.

Wayne S. Cole suggested, as far back as 1957, that historians devote far more attention to the ideological and emotional factors leading to American participation in World War II. Much of the energy then going into the debate between “revisionists” and “court historians” could—according to Cole—have been better spent attempting to understand the foreign policy perceptions of an entire generation of Americans.

There was, he said, special need for investigation into biography, ethnic and religious groups, and economic and psychological influences.¹³ Since the time that Cole issued his call for a less polemicized and more comprehensive pattern of research, there has been an abundance of specialized studies, at times showing new patterns of looking at the relatively recent past, at times opening entirely new fields for further investigation.

Such detailed studies, shedding light on more narrow topics, avoid one pitfall of the generalist: the danger that broad unqualified interpretation can lead to serious distortion. Both Roosevelt’s defenders and detractors are still sometimes guilty of not qualifying their conclusions, which at times more resemble legal indictments than cogent analysis. Robert H. Ferrell has wisely said, “It is possible to plunge into the morass of research materials and come out with something resembling support of almost any thesis.” George Dangerfield commented that “any young historian who has a gift for research, who doesn’t cook his evidence, and who keeps his hypotheses within reasonably scientific limits can ‘overthrow’ any earlier interpretation.”¹⁴ No serious historian today can afford to call a halt to the continued revision of accepted tenets. Yet more accurate revision, leading to fresher ways of viewing the past, might better be discerned by building upon smaller blocs of research. Wholesale (and often preconceived) assaults upon major interpretations usually end up eventually in equally sweeping retaliation. Progress is of course made, but often at a disproportionate cost.

At long last there are significant public opinion studies for the 1930s. If carried through with sensitivity and thoroughness, they can greatly aid in a study of American isolationism. While mass sentiment was not measured systematically until public opinion polls were collected in 1935, few could argue with Gabriel Almond’s longtime focus upon a relatively small group of “opinion elites.” It is this “attentive public,” he claims, whose editorials and mass organizations articulate the sentiments and offer the proposals which determine the boundaries in which policy-makers must operate.¹⁵

Newer studies of both diplomacy and public opinion reveal much initial reluctance to check what later became the Axis. Arnold A. Offner has traced Roosevelt’s appeasement of Hitler, while Dorothy Borg shows America’s continued reluctance to engage the Japanese.¹⁶ Richard W. Alfeld notes that the American public found little conflict be-

tween its hatred of the Nazi regime and its desire for non-involvement in Europe. Daniel S. Day shows that American business was not overtly hostile towards Hitler until 1936, when Germany adopted a "socialistic" four year plan. Frederick I. Murphy reveals that much of the denominational press, determined not to repeat the anti-German excesses committed by religious spokesmen during World War I, bent over backwards in an effort to be fair to the Third Reich. While of course deploring the Nazi dictatorship, it blamed Versailles and harsh Allied policies for Hitler's rise. Donald McIlvenna asserts that immediately after Pearl Harbor the isolationists were still reluctant to fight Germany, hoping that the conflict could be limited to Japan.¹⁷ Yet even more research is necessary, for while there is an abundance of sources showing America's reaction to the Spanish Civil War, there are as yet no full-scale treatments of such crises as the Rhineland, Austria, Munich, and Danzig.¹⁸

American reaction to Italy and Japan has been sporadically covered. John P. Diggins observes that much American public opinion approved of Italian fascism until the Abyssinian venture.¹⁹ Justus D. Doenecke notes that most opinion leaders were outraged by Japan's invasion of Manchuria and hoped for her immediate withdrawal from the area. Yet, as in the case of Germany, proposals for economic coercion met with firm resistance, with many Americans believing that internal economic pressures alone would cause Japan's downfall. While older studies by John W. Masland, Ernest B. Bader, Eleanor Tupper, and George E. McReynolds trace many of the various elements at work in the forming of public response to events in the Pacific, only Manny T. Koginos, in passing, shows public reaction to a single crisis. Justin H. Libby, however, has taken advantage of recently opened Congressional manuscripts to note the growing erosion of any pro-Japanese sentiment within Congress.²⁰ A systematic survey of American public opinion from 1933 to 1941, focusing upon Asian events after the Marco Polo Bridge attack, would prove most fruitful.

Studies concerning American reaction to Russia are fairly plentiful. The opening of new manuscripts would probably cause considerable expansion of Ira S. Cohen's 1955 study of Congressional attitudes.²¹ James J. Martin describes liberal hostility towards Nazi Germany and diverse liberal reactions to Stalin's purges and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Frank A. Warren III stresses great diversity of opinion among the Left, which was by no means unanimously sympathetic (particularly after the Hitler-Stalin Pact) either to the cause of Russia or to domestic Communism. Raymond H. Dawson shows how strongly isolationists opposed lend-lease aid to Russia, even during the crucial battles of autumn, 1941.²² Still needed is a thorough account of America's response to the Finnish war, for both the French and British Right considered extensive intervention on Finland's behalf.²³

It has also been argued—though not always with success—that anti-Bolshevism had been the prime impetus in western appeasement of Hitler.²⁴ Hence, it might be helpful to discover the degree to which

“isolationism” was ever transformed into latent containment of Russia. Surely Lindbergh was not alone in feeling that continuation of the European war could only result in a Communist-dominated Europe, for even the pacifist leader Frederick J. Libby shared similar sentiments. Nor was Herbert Hoover alone in predicting that unsettling social change at home would invariably result from American intervention.

New studies now cover the entire range of American “fascism.” During the 1940s popular tracts had tried to link the isolationists with both Axis espionage and domestic forms of ‘subversion.’²⁵ In the 1950s efforts to search the American past in order to account for the supposed mass base of McCarthyism also led scholars to portray homegrown “fascist” movements as demented forms of Populism.²⁶ Such interpretations of the extremist forms of non-interventionism have been answered in a number of ways. First, Manfred Jonas claims that many Congressional isolationists—far from applauding the rise of dictatorships—sympathized with such besieged groups as Ethiopians, Spanish Loyalists, Chinese, and, in 1940, the British.²⁷ Second, recent research on the German-American Bund portrays it as a foundering organization, never a serious threat to American institutions and even an embarrassment to the Wilhelmstrasse.²⁸ Third, fresh examinations of domestic “fascism” reveal that any American brand had little in common with Europe. Both James Shenton and Charles J. Tull deny that Father Coughlin—who combined his inflationary panaceas with anti-Semitism and isolationism—was ever a fascist, while David H. Bennett and David O. Powell find the Coughlin-backed Union Party of 1936 essentially an effort to restore rural and frontier values.²⁹

There is additional research. Geoffrey S. Smith claims that the inept ideologies of Bundist Fritz Kuhn, Coughlin, and Silver Shirt leader William Dudley Pelley were linked to the broader isolationist movement by its enemies in order to create support for Roosevelt’s interventionism. Victor K. Ferkiss’ “Populist” explanation for American “fascism” has been challenged by Paul S. Holbo, while Leo Ribuffo stresses discontinuity between European and American brands of extremism. Ribuffo claims, for example, that Lawrence Dennis (branded as a European-type fascist by those who never read his *Coming American Fascism*) was motivated primarily by a vision of a corporatist economy which would keep the nation aloof from world embroilments. Similarly, the Reverend Gerald Winrod (sometimes called the “Jayhawk Nazi”) can only be understood in light of the premillennial theology he adopted.³⁰

Such claims are supplemented by biographies of those long considered fascists. Albert E. Stone, Jr. shows that Seward Collins’ *American Review* was primarily concerned with the economics of distributionalism—an economic system centering around the restoration of a rural-based society—and values of neo-scholasticism and Humanism. Collins preferred G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, Irving Babbitt, and T.S. Eliot to such Nazi sages as Gottfried Feder, Alfred Rosenberg, and Dietrich Eckart. Victor Ferkiss’ claim that Ezra Pound was essentially a populist, flailing out at the “money power,” is placed in a far wider

context by Noel Stock. Niel M. Johnson's study of George Sylvester Viereck denies that the German propagandist acted simply as a tool of the Third Reich or that his isolationism was merely expediential.³¹ However, broader studies are needed of Axis propaganda.³²

There is no question that the America First Committee has been the victim of many a false stereotype. Wayne S. Cole has shown that most AFC leaders did not want a British defeat, endorsed strong continental military defense, made efforts to purge anti-Semites from their ranks, and forced Roosevelt to temper his interventionism. Students, however, could supplement Cole by detailed accounts of local chapters whose leadership was at times less responsible. Once Harriet Schwar's forthcoming study of the interventionists is ready, one might be able to compare their doctrines and techniques to those of America First.³³

Despite the plethora of recent research, there is still far more to be done. *First*, studies could be made of several other isolationist groups. Textbooks are extremely misleading when they associate isolationism *per se* with the activities of the America First Committee. Justus Doenecke has briefly surveyed Verne Marshall's No Foreign War Committee, showing why it could never hope to rival America First's activities. Yet more could still be done on this group, as well as on the activities of Norman Thomas. Thomas' Socialist Party spearheaded such groups as the Keep America Out of War Congress, the Labor Anti-War Council, and the Youth Committee Against War (whose national chairman was a young black named James Farmer).³⁴ One also looks for studies of both Communist and Trotskyite opposition to intervention.

Second, systematic investigation of the isolationist press is in order. So far we have studies of Father Coughlin's *Social Justice*, Colonel McCormick's *Chicago Tribune*, Garet Garrett's editorials in the *Saturday Evening Post* (which fatalistically accepted the inevitability of intervention by 1941), the LaFollette house organ the *Progressive*, and Alfred M. Bingham's *Common Sense*.³⁵ Research, however, is still needed for such isolationist journals as the *Socialist Call*, the rightist *Scribner's Commentator*, Porter Sargent's *Bulletin*, the Writer's Anti-War Bureau newsletter *Uncensored*, George Seldes' *In Fact* (which became interventionist with the invasion of Russia), and the rural conservative weekly *Pathfinder*. While we have some popular accounts of the McCormick dynasty, namely the Colonel and his sister "Cissy",³⁶ good studies are still needed of Captain Joe Patterson of the *New York Daily News*, Frank E. Gannett of the up-state New York newspaper chain, Joseph Pulitzer, Jr. of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, and William Randolph Hearst.³⁷

Radio is finally coming under study. David H. Culbert notes that by 1941 almost all news commentators were so pro-interventionist they "were no longer fulfilling their function as an independent critic." Isolationist Boake Carter, possessing a "zoot suit voice" and given to such banalities as "The ferment in Europe continues to gurgle and bubble," was taken off the air by 1938. Thereafter the only remaining anti-inter-

ventionists were Fulton Lewis, Jr., and Quincy Howe.³⁸

Isolationist groups and publications active during both World War II and the Cold War still need research, as do organizations which strongly attacked the isolationists. Such groups as Edward Rumely's Committee for Constitutional Government, Merwin K. Hart's National Economic Council, Joseph Kamps' Constitutional Educational League, Stanley Burke's American Defense Society, John B. Trevor's Coalition of Patriotic Societies, and Catherine Curtis' Women Investors of America await fuller investigation, as do such post-World War II groups as American Action, America's Future, Spiritual Mobilization. We, the People, the Congress of Freedom, the Committee of Endorsers, the Mansion Forum, For America, and Students for America.⁴⁰ Most studies available of the American Legion do not delve deeply into the internal politics of that organization, nor are there good studies of such Legion wheel-horses as General Hanford MacNider. There have been no major discussions of such periodicals as Felix Morley and Frank Hanighen's *Human Events*, Frank Chodorov's *analysis* (even manifesting its individualism by use of the lower case in its title), Garet Garrett's *American Affairs*, Spiritual Mobilization's *Faith and Freedom*, J. Russell Maguire's *American Mercury*, and John Chamberlain's *Freeman*. Only recently has an historian examined the absolutist isolationism of Lawrence Dennis, editor of the *Weekly Foreign Letter* and later the *Appeal to Reason*, and leading defendant in the Sedition Case of 1944.⁴¹ By the same token, one should look at such opponents of isolationism and political extremism as Henry R. Luce's Council for Democracy, the journal *The Hour*, the Reverend L.M. Birkhead's Friends of Democracy, Rex Stout's Society for the Prevention of World War III, the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights, James Loeb, Jr.'s Union for Democratic Action, the Council Against Intolerance in America, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Committee for National Morale, the American Council on Public Affairs, Freedom House, the Institute for Living Law, Joseph P. Lash's International Student Service, United Youth for Defense, and Student Defenders of Democracy (the latter three opposing Communist influences in the American Youth Congress and the American Student Union).

A *third* category of investigation concerns the agrarian roots of isolationism. While this factor is most heavily stressed in Wayne S. Cole's life of Gerald P. Nye, other biographies—Alfalfa Bill Murray, George N. Peek, William Langer, and William Lemke—all note the Populist roots of non-interventionism.⁴² Yet one should realize that in prosperous farm areas—such as Senator Hugh Butler's Nebraska or Congressman John Taber's upstate New York—farm grievances were not at the root of isolationism.⁴³ Yet even as the agrarian backbone to Populist non-interventionism grew more conservative as it became more prosperous, it could scarcely empathize with those advocates of a "large policy" who saw America's interest tied to French and British hegemony in Europe or to the survival of an independent China.

This naturally leads to a *fourth* area of investigation, geography. Many Gordian knots could be cut if, instead of continually referring to

Midwestern isolationism, historians spoke more in terms of an urban/rural split.⁴⁴ Ralph Smuckler, for example, shows that during much of the 1930s Congressmen from northern New England were relatively more isolationist than those from any other region. While not completely denying the "Mid-western hypothesis," Smuckler stresses that distance from the oceans is not an accurate gauge. Similarly, David L. Porter notes that Pacific Coast Senators and New England Congressmen voted interventionist far less than one would expect, while George Grassmuck emphasizes the general factor of party affiliation.⁴⁵ Such explanations might account for such eastern rural legislators as Daniel Reed, George Aiken, Robert Rich, and Joseph W. Martin, Jr.

The South still deserves another look. Wayne S. Cole, in attempting to discern why America First did not take strong hold south of the Mason-Dixon line, notes the region's militaristic background, Democratic Party leanings, almost pure Anglo-Saxon stock among whites, and dependence upon federal relief and defense spending.⁴⁶ Julian M. Pleasants offers a lengthy life of "Buncombe Bob" Reynolds (the only senator to kiss Jean Harlow on the Capitol steps), and William E. Coffey has analyzed "The Boy Senator" Rush Holt.⁴⁷ Yet a wider framework is necessary. Attention is needed for such isolationist-leaning solons as Hugh Peterson, John Rankin, Allen Ellender, and "Cotton Ed" Smith. In addition, southern foreign policy attitudes need to be seen more in the light of the section's economic and social changes during the 1930s and 1940s.

A *fifth* area for research involves American business. While both William A. Weinrich and Roland N. Stromberg have examined the business press, individual editors deserve focus. John H. Bunzel's analysis of the isolationist perception of the small businessman could also apply to certain larger firms, particularly if they are family-owned and self-financing. Lloyd C. Gardner's study of New Deal diplomacy needs a counterpart dealing with the critics of Roosevelt and Hull. It is probably no accident, for example, that defenders of the economic autarchy promoted during the First New Deal—George Peek, Hugh Johnson, Charles A. Beard, and Raymond Moley—moved to the isolationist camp by 1940. Wayne S. Cole has noted that the Nye Committee itself offered a broad economic interpretation for American entry into World War I, an explanation perhaps similar to Open Door arguments advanced more recently by the "Wisconsin School" of historians.⁴⁸

Other investigations are being made. Justus D. Doenecke, surveying lists of leading America First contributors and the committee's economic pronouncements, claims that the isolationist productive orbit—based upon the union of "wheat" and "steel," spanning an area ranging from the Chicago stockyards and Duluth grain elevators to Gary steel mills and River Rouge auto plants—permitted the isolationists to remain firm believers in economic self-sufficiency. Yet, while acquiescent to Axis domination of the Old World, non-interventionist businessmen often saw Latin America as their natural "frontier." Such a claim is buttressed by Gabriel Kolko, who stresses industrial ties to Axis cartels.⁴⁹

Biographies of isolationist business leaders are still needed. While both hostile and friendly accounts exist of Henry Ford, such individuals as General Robert E. Wood of Sears, Ernest Weir of National Steel, Sterling Morton of the salt company bearing his name, and Edward L. Ryerson of Inland Steel are not covered. Sidney Hyman's life of liberal businessman William Benton notes his enthusiasm for America First. However, Benton's advertising partner, a man named Chester Bowles, conveniently begins his autobiography with Pearl Harbor, hence skirting his deep involvement in that isolationist lobby.⁵⁰

Sixth, the whole role of American labor needs study. Maxwell C. Raddock has given us a biography of "Big Bill" Hutcheson, the carpenters' leader who served on the national committee of America First, and Henry W. Berger has just offered a picture of John L. Lewis' isolationism. Lewis, represented on the America First Committee by his daughter Kathryn, endorsed non-intervention in Europe while hoping to preserve Latin America for United States economic penetration.⁵¹ Treatment is also needed of the Labor Anti-War Council, as well as the isolationism of various railroad brotherhood leaders.

Seventh, research dealing with Congressional issues and parties remains spotty. While there has been prodigious research on the Nye Committee⁵² and the Ludlow Amendment,⁵³ one must wait until Wayne S. Cole finishes his general study of Roosevelt and the isolationists before one has a survey-in-depth. In the meantime, Thomas N. Guinsberg promises an exciting book on Senatorial isolationism from 1919 to 1941. Denying that most Americans during the inter-war period were rigid isolationists or that there was a large and cohesive Senate bloc, Guinsberg plays down ethnic, sectional, and party factors to stress the ideological dedication of such men as Borah and Johnson. David L. Porter has surveyed Congress at the outbreak of the European war, while Robert A. Divine has offered an extensive account of the neutrality debates. As yet there has been no indication of the role that isolationism might have played in the Democratic speculation concerning the short-lived 1940 Presidential candidacies of Burton K. Wheeler and James A. Farley, or in the Republican bids made before the 1940 convention by Robert A. Taft, Herbert Hoover, Arthur Vandenberg, publisher Frank Gannett, Iowa businessman Hanford MacNider, Governor Harlan Bushfield of South Dakota, or Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas. Even though the Herbert Hoover papers are now open, we do not yet have a full account of Hoover's post-presidential years nor biographies of such Hoover stalwarts as William R. Castle or J. Reuben Clark. While full-scale studies exist of Alf Landon, Frank Lowden, and the Wilkie movement and its opponents, much could be learned by examining such party wheelhorses as national chairman John M. Hamilton and Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio.⁵⁴

The record for Senatorial and Congressional biographies is also sketchy. James T. Patterson's new life of Robert A. Taft stresses the Ohio Senator's partisanship and fervent anti-Communism, which—Patterson claims—led him easily into McCarthyism and an Asia-first

strategy. Henry Berger, on the other hand, emphasizes Taft's principles of non-intervention, while Russell Kirk focuses upon Taft's anxiety over global Communism.⁵⁵ C. David Tompkins has surveyed Arthur Vandenberg's career to 1945, but one must depend upon those excerpts included in his published diary to cover his Cold War career. Hopefully, future historians will ask more pointedly if Vandenberg's so-called conversion to internationalism in January, 1945, was not simply a more sophisticated form of his militant nationalism.⁵⁶ The influence of both Taft and Vandenberg has yet to be appraised. Did Taft really lead the "Taftites" into slightly more accommodating positions, and was Vandenberg doing anything more than speaking to a mere handful of the already converted?

A few other isolationist senators have been surveyed. The opening of the Hiram Johnson papers has resulted in two new studies, with Peter G. Boyle finding Johnson's isolationism a well-reasoned manifestation of his progressivism, and Howard A. DeWitt claiming that the California Senator has greater insight than either his rhetoric or voting record might suggest.⁵⁷ "The Lion of Idaho," William E. Borah, remains as much a subject of controversy as he did during his lifetime. While the New Left finds Borah a prophet against global anti-communism and a garrison state at home, other monographs still stress his agrarian provincialism.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, Burton K. Wheeler's autobiography and the one dissertation devoted to the Montana Senator do little with his isolationism, and biographies of such senators as Henry Cabot Lodge, David I. Walsh, and Arthur Capper are hardly more helpful.⁵⁹ Henrik Shipstead's biographer merely stresses the courage of his dogged non-interventionism, offering no real explanation. More thorough accounts have appeared of the LaFollette brothers—Phil and "Young Bob"—and also of the "merry mortician," Senator Kenneth Wherry.⁶⁰ Yet most isolationist senators, including C. Wayland Brooks, Edwin C. Johnson, Charles W. Tobey, and Bennett Champ Clark, are still unstudied.

There are even greater gaps in our knowledge of the House isolationists. The published memoirs of Joe Martin, Jr. are singularly unrevealing, as is a biography of Charlie Halleck. Richard K. Hanks' study of Hamilton Fish might be a model for further research in his area. Hanks finds the Hudson Valley congressman as wisely neutralist in Asia, and unfairly branded as pro-Nazi for a mistaken isolationism in Europe.⁶¹ While the left seems to hold major interest for academicians—as in recent studies of Vito Marcantonio⁶²—such colorful rightwing isolationists as Dewey Short, Clare Hoffman, Lawrence Smith, Howard Buffett, and Frederick C. Smith are still neglected.

Eighth, ethnic and religious factors need closer examination. While few historians wholeheartedly support Samuel Lubell's claim that isolationism is fundamentally rooted in pro-German and anti-British sentiment,⁶³ many groups deserve another look. For example, while there are several studies of American Catholicism and the New Deal, only J. David Valaik's survey of Catholic responses to the Spanish Civil War

offers a detailed study of foreign policy attitudes.⁶⁴ While it is common knowledge that most Catholics were strong isolationists,⁶⁵ the very fact that opinion was so overwhelming shows that more must have been at work than mere Irish-American Anglophobia and fear of Russian expansion. An examination of the Catholic press—ranging from such rightist periodicals as Father James Gillis' *Catholic World* and Patrick Scanlon's *Brooklyn Tablet* to such liberal journals as Dorothy Day's *Catholic Worker*—is needed, as is a discussion of such influential clergy as Fathers Robert I. Gannon and Fulton J. Sheen.

Historians are beginning to note non-interventionism among black Americans. Richard M. Dalfiume discovered that many militant Afro-American spokesmen opposed intervention, remaining suspicious even during the war itself. At the same time, a conservative stratum of black lawyers, doctors, and fraternal leaders was affiliated with America First.⁶⁶

As yet, however, there is no study concerning Jewish foreign policy attitudes. While most American Jews espoused some degree of interventionism, it would be helpful to examine more closely those Jews who opposed intervention.⁶⁷ Ill-informed and sensationalist critics focus upon the anti-Semitism of such isolationists as Congressman John Rankin, Merwin K. Hart, and Father Coughlin, forgetting that the number of Congressional non-interventionists who backed Zionism was extremely large. Even as staunch an isolationist as Hamilton Fish, who had introduced a Zionist resolution twenty years earlier, said in 1944, "I was a Zionist back in 1922, I am a Zionist today. . . ."⁶⁸ Not only did Senator Taft co-sponsor a resolution calling for a Palestinian homeland for American Jews, but the American Committee for a Free Palestine was headed by the Conservative isolationist and former senator from Iowa, Guy Gillette. The Emergency Conference to Save the Jewish People of Europe listed Herbert Hoover among its honorary chairmen.

Historians of American Protestantism have generally glorified the "Christian realists," centering around Reinhold Niebuhr and the faculty of Union Theological Seminary, at the expense of the pacifist-leaning "utopians," who found their spokesman in Charles Clayton Morrison's *Christian Century*.⁶⁹ Irritated by such bias, Robert Moats Miller writes, "To fairly judge a debate it is necessary to hear the arguments of both sides and not many scholars have troubled to listen carefully to what the pacifists were saying." Miller uses his biography of the Methodist peace leader, Ernest Fremont Tittle, to claim that the "idealists" were "the true realists," as they best understood "the demonic nature of modern war."⁷⁰

While we have autobiographies of such Protestant pacifist leaders as John Haynes Holmes and Harry Emerson Fosdick, church history remains neglected. Moral Rearmament, whose head—the Reverend Frank N. Buchman—was rumored to be friendly to Hitler, is finally being studied, yet biographies are needed of such isolationist and theologically-conservative clergymen as Baptist William Ward Ayer and Walter A. Maier of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, as well as

the pacifist E. Stanley Jones. Also deserving coverage are such isolationist-leaning groups as the Latter-Day Saints; the denominational press; and inter-denominational journals aimed at fundamentalist Protestants.⁷¹

A *ninth* topic, and one which is related, concerns research in the area of pacifism. While Charles Chatfield has written thorough and analytical history, and John K. Nelson has offered a survey of major debates, surprisingly few pacifist organizations have found their historians. Allen A. Kuusisto covers the National Council for the Prevention of War only from 1935 to 1939, and Frederick J. Libby has briefly told of his own experience in heading this movement. Yet there is no scholarly account covering its life from 1921 efforts to promote the Washington Disarmament Conference to activities on behalf of rebuilding Germany after World War II.⁷² Nor are good histories available of such prominent pacifist organizations as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,⁷³ the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the War Resisters League, and the American Friends Service Committee.

Few studies have been made of prominent pacifist leaders. Ronald Schaffer has placed Jeanette Rankin in the general framework of American progressivism, and Jo Ann Robinson has analyzed the thought of A.J. Muste.⁷⁴ Penina M. Glazer has surveyed such radical pacifist spokesmen as Dwight MacDonald.⁷⁵ Chatfield promises a life of Devere Allen as does William McKee of Edmund Chafee and Robert Moats Miller of Harry Emerson Fosdick. However, there are still no biographies of such prominent peace leaders as Kirby Page, Bishop Paul Jones, Charles Clayton Morrison, Albert Palmer, and a host of others.

Tenth, the intellectual roots of isolationism deserve far more examination. Revisionists are now coming under renewed examination, though one needs the kind of thorough syntheses of World War II revisionism which Warren Cohen has given to that of the Great War. Arthur Goddard has edited a rich anthology concerning the multidimensional work of Harry Elmer Barnes. However, an extensive life of the "learned crusader"—based upon the rich collection of his papers at the University of Wyoming—is much needed. Justus D. Doenecke, for example, has brought together new material on the Barnes' efforts to challenge orthodoxies of Nazi war guilt and atrocities.⁷⁶ Of all the studies of Charles A. Beard, Richard Hofstadter's is the most rich and perceptive. A life of Charles C. Tansill has just been written. As the major publishers of World War II revisionism had all been non-interventionists before Pearl Harbor, an examination of Devin Garrity's Devin-Adair Company of New York, the Henry Regnery Company of Chicago, and James Gipson's Caxton Printers of Caldwell, Idaho, would be helpful.⁷⁷

Revisionism, however, is just one aspect of the intellectual roots of isolationism. Richard Kendall's study of Edwin Borchard's doctrines of neutrality (a position also adopted by such international scholars as Philip Jessup and John Bassett Moore) could serve as a model for the study of other anti-war intellectuals. The anti-war posture of Harvard

philosopher William Ernest Hocking has also been examined, as well as have such iconoclastic isolationists as Edmund Wilson, Stuart Chase, John Chamberlain, and H.L. Mencken.⁷⁸ Autobiographies are the only source available for several opponents of Roosevelt whose World War II isolationism was rooted in their hatred of Russia.⁷⁹ Similarly, studies have now been made of such libertarian isolationists as John T. Flynn, Albert Jay Nock and Garet Garrett, but material is still needed on playwright Francis Neilson and editors Frank Chodorov, Felix Morley, and Frank Hanighen.⁸⁰

There are other questions. To what degree were both students⁸¹ and faculty⁸² non-interventionists? A study of student newspapers during the 1939-1941 period would be helpful, as would a survey of those intellectuals⁸³ and entertainers⁸⁴ who opposed intervention. To what degree were isolationist spokesmen muffled?⁸⁵ Conversions, usually from isolationism to interventionism, should also be studied.⁸⁶ While Joseph P. Kennedy's role as ambassador to England has been heavily researched,⁸⁷ the role of John Cudahy, the isolationist ambassador to Belgium, has not yet been covered. And while the recently published Lindbergh diaries add much revealing information concerning the "lone eagle," many questions concerning Lindbergh's ideology remain unresolved.⁸⁸ One still wonders, given Lindbergh's continental imperialism, if Lindbergh was longing for a world in which one hemisphere might be policed by the United States, the other by Germany. One also wonders the degree to which Democratic Party affiliation prevented such people as James A. Farley and Harry Woodring from taking a more active isolationist role?⁸⁹

An *eleventh* area takes us into the realm of sociological investigation. Here we run into expected troubles, perhaps revealing the truth of Professor John Roche's comment that such disciplines had best be limited to consenting adults only. Isolationists on the right are explained in terms of upward mobility if they are Catholic and moderate in income; downwardly mobile if they are wealthy, Protestant, or old stock. On the surface, it appears to be a "heads we win, tails you lose" approach to scholarship. Similarly, examinations of the "authoritarian personality" at times involve more in the way of sophisticated polemic than objective analysis. Fortunately, such investigations are being challenged by newer research.⁹⁰

A *twelfth* area for research is most intriguing. Several historians have found that so-called partisans possess more consensus than one might first think. Robert E. Gamer stresses that both isolationists and interventionists desired ultimate defeat of the Axis, while William M. Tuttle, Jr. traces William Allen White's break from the more extreme interventionists. Robert Freeman Smith claims that both groups merely differed over "the kind of foreign policy tactics best suited to promote the prosperity of private-enterprise capitalism in the United States." Clifton E. Hart and Charles Sanford assert that both wings found the United States a superior nation with a unique, world-redeeming mission. Could not one then argue that both groups saw the nation as "the world's

last, best hope," and that both ultimately longed for a Wilsonian world where traditional spheres of influence would be at end? The immediate issue then becomes the best means for preserving what Henry Nash Smith calls "the Garden of the World": by building the Chinese Wall, or by defeating the enemy without? In turn, the long-range issue becomes the best vehicle for the world's "Americanization": by example alone or by conscious expansion?⁹¹

The *thirteenth* area of investigation concerns the wartime activities of the isolationists. Robert A. Divine has shown the support of many isolationists for mild forms of international organization. As was noted by Senator David Walsh (who was not writing with tongue-in-cheek): "A nation which does not pursue peace will find soon enough that it is involved in the wars of other nations." Yet not all isolationists were enthusiastic about the San Francisco conference, Senator Alexander Wiley commenting that "international music could do more for spiritual values and international peace" than the "bunkum" of the United Nations sessions.⁹² More serious criticism of the United Nations Charter came from such isolationists as William Henry Chamberlin and Felix Morley, who both feared that the Security Council committed America to a new Holy Alliance, insuring the supremacy of the Old World power blocs of Russia and England, and thereby preventing any fruition of the Wilsonian dream of self-determination.

Other areas need exploration. Since the Republicans made surprising gains in the 1942 Congressional elections, with such strong isolationists as Hamilton Fish and Stephen A. Day being returned to office, this election in particular deserves study. The forthcoming sequel to D. Clayton James' first volume of General MacArthur's life should have material on the MacArthur-for-President booms of 1944 and 1948, efforts backed by such America First leaders as General Robert E. Wood, Philip LaFollette, and Hanford MacNider. The role of the isolationist press (which often advocated an Asia-first strategy) remains untapped, as does the suppression of Father Coughlin's *Social Justice*, wild charges against "fifth columnists," and Administration consideration of legal action against the *Chicago Tribune* and *New York Daily News*.⁹³ Good histories are needed of the Sedition Case of 1944,⁹⁴ as well as the Peace Now Movement of 1943, led by the socialist and pacifist professor George Hartmann. Such topics as conscientious objection,⁹⁵ reactions to area bombing,⁹⁶ unconditional surrender, and alleged atrocities committed by American troops in the Pacific⁹⁷ need study.

World War II pacifism needs more study. Lawrence Wittner offers a sensitive if brief treatment of wartime passions, indicating the possibility of far more research, but Ray Abrams' short essay on the wartime clergy hardly approaches the possibilities of this topic.⁹⁸ Probably not all clergymen agreed with the stormy Texas preacher Frank Norris, who opened his service by telling the congregation to rise, say "To Hell with Hitler," and sing "Amazing Grace." Nor were all laymen like the person who wrote the *Tampa Morning Tribune*, declaring, "I

am glad that I believe that God is against any nation that starts a war on Sunday, as Japan is guilty of doing.”⁹⁹ Indeed the whole topic of organized religion at war needs systematic coverage.

Some recent research indicates that those liberals among the isolationists were—at least on some issues—more humanitarian than their interventionist counterparts. Thomas McDaid, for example, has shown that former isolationists on the national committee of the American Civil Liberties Union called for far stronger protests against the Nisei internment than did such interventionists as Max Lerner, Stephen Vincent Benet, and Corliss Lamont.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, such non-interventionist authors as Alfred Kazin and Lenore Marshall protested vehemently when Rex Stout, mystery writer and chairman of the Writer’s War Board, used the rhetoric of anti-racist racism to make such comments as “I hate Germans, and am not ashamed of it.”¹⁰¹ Similarly, one finds the strongest objection to the atomic bombing of Japan coming from such humane isolationists as Haverford president Felix Morley, while Norman Thomas went so far as to refer to the entire Pacific war as “an organized race riot.” Yet, many anti-interventionists must have sided with the call of their kinsman Senator Bennett Champ Clark, who, upon hearing of the Bataan Death March, called for bombing the Japanese people out of existence, or with isolationist Senator Edwin Johnson who simply noted, “God Almighty in his infinite wisdom has dropped the atomic bomb in our laps.”¹⁰²

The *fourteenth* and last topic concerns the Cold War activities of the isolationists. Did, as Manfred Jonas claims, the years 1935 to 1941 mark the “swan song” of genuine isolationism? Was there, as is maintained by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Norman Graebner, a “new isolationism,” adopting a warlike stance in order to “make the world safe for American retreat from it”?¹⁰³ Were the isolationists “seeking an inexpensive way to impose America’s will on the world while re-establishing the pre-1933 America?” Did the Congressional elections after Pearl Harbor mark any repudiation of isolationism? To what degree did the isolationist coalition break up over Cold War issues? Here perhaps a study similar to that made by Otis J. Graham, Jr., concerning the Progressive response to the New Deal might be appropriate. Might not economic changes in Michigan and New England have helped account for the shift of Vandenberg, Lodge, and Charles Tobey toward bipartisanship?¹⁰⁴ How much was continued non-interventionism simply a matter of Republican opposition to Truman’s program? One notes that once Eisenhower was president, such isolationists as George Bender and John Taber usually followed his lead.

One thing appears certain: if the isolationists harbored secret doubts about their position immediately after Pearl Harbor, the advent of the Cold War quickly removed them. The spread of communism was blamed upon the nation’s war-time diplomacy, occasionally upon participation in the war itself.¹⁰⁵ Not only did most anti-interventionists fail to follow Vandenberg in his supposed change of heart, but they pressed with renewed vigor against foreign commitments. Ideo-

logical hatred of communism was coupled with a reluctance to engage in further land ventures. As isolationism became somewhat more of a right-wing phenomenon,¹⁰⁶ it was argued that the rest of the world was so far on the road to socialism (almost indistinguishable from communism) that only by domestic retrenchment and a Fortress America could the nation survive. And if the Republic herself faced physical peril, air supremacy made possible decisive and crippling strikes to the heart of the enemy.¹⁰⁷

Other Cold War topics need investigation. While the pre-World War II activities of the revisionists are well covered, the opening of new archival sources can add to our knowledge of their financial backing, their penchant for conspiracies, their supposed lack of access to archival sources,¹⁰⁸ and the possibility of a "historical blackout."¹⁰⁹ Wayne S. Cole's excellent survey of revisionist literature, published in 1957, needs to be brought up to the 1970s, and histories of the varied Pearl Harbor investigations and the controversy of American coding clerk Tyler Kent need to be written.¹¹⁰ Also demanding study is the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, established in 1945 by pacifist Frederick J. Libby and financed by the Regnery family of Chicago. While never meeting the hopes of its original founders, the organization was founded to counteract the interventionist influences of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Domestic market concerns also deserve exploration. While Thomas G. Paterson has shown that many businessmen supported the Marshall Plan and Point Four in an effort to avoid postwar recession and expand American markets, other investigators—such as John P. Mallen, Walter S. Poole, and Robert J. Chasteen—note those forces within business and the Republican Party which remained suspicious of such expansion.¹¹¹

Germany and Asia deserve special treatment. Isolationist opposition to Truman's Atlantic policies must be put in the wider context of continual concern for the recovery and integration of Germany. Although Herbert Hoover was perhaps the most respected spokesman for German advancement, many other isolationists called for food relief, protested against denazification and war trials, and desired an end to the dismantling of factories. With Germany and Spain (another area demanding investigation) serving as linchpins of Western defense, one could avoid such costly multilateral alliances as NATO.¹¹²

Then there is Asia. Before Pearl Harbor, the Chiang regime found many more partisans within the Roosevelt administration than among the isolationists.¹¹³ Probably few isolationists then agreed with Douglas MacArthur, who claimed in 1945 that "the history of the world will be written in the Pacific for the next ten thousand years." Indeed, studies show isolationist apathy until the fall of 1949, when it suddenly became the "greatest disaster in American history."¹¹⁴ Similarly, most isolationists were mildly acquiescent concerning United States entry into the Korean War. Yet, once the Chinese entered, they vacillated between

calls for withdrawal from the Korean peninsula and adopting MacArthur's strategies (which might possibly have been aimed not merely at Korean victory but at ousting the Communists from China itself).¹¹⁵ Still to be explored is the degree to which the "China Lobby" and pro-Chiang sentiment shifted isolationist opinion from extreme caution to Pacific policies involving equally extreme risk. Russell Buhite's biography of Patrick Hurley sheds light on some of the dynamics behind the growing isolationist concern with China.¹¹⁶

The whole issue of McCarthyism is being reevaluated. With several historians now stressing how much paranoia was rooted in Truman's own rhetoric and policies, it is perhaps time to note that liberals were not above red-baiting isolationists. For example, in 1952 Averell Harriman called Taft "the Kremlin's candidate," while in 1950 the *Nation* had declared that Hoover's plea for global withdrawal "should set the bells ringing in the Kremlin as nothing since the triumph of Stalin-grad."¹¹⁷ As some isolationists had been branded as Nazi dupes themselves ten years before, it might have seemed sweet revenge to try to even up the score. While McCarthy himself began his senatorial career as a Vandenberg internationalist,¹¹⁸ his conspiracy theses well fit the thought-patterns of those isolationists already infuriated by Yalta and Pearl Harbor "intrigues," and who were hence ripe for new revelations.

Yet neither the "New Conservatives" of the 1950s nor the "Radical Right" of the 1960s are necessarily descendants of the old isolationists. True, both Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, and William F. Buckley, Jr., editor-in-chief of *National Review*, boasted of their early support for America First, but Barry Goldwater himself was pledged to Eisenhower, not Taft, in the crucial Republican convention of 1952. Going back earlier, columnists David Lawrence and Westbrook Pegler were moderate interventionists by 1941, as were Republican leaders Styles Bridges and William F. Knowland. As the 1950s revealed fresh involvements in Formosa and Indochina, it was hard for such veteran isolationists as Frank Chodorov and John T. Flynn to reconcile themselves to the unilateral globalism preached by the chief editors of the *Freeman* and *National Review*.¹¹⁹

* * * *

It would be relatively simple to stress, by a skillful use of quotations, the "prophetic insight" found in those isolationists and pacifists who have been unjustly maligned by a previous generation of historians and partisans. It is far more fruitful, however, to place such groups within the context of their own time and, hopefully, to gain some perspective upon our own era. After all, we—like they—are people whose choices are equally tentative and equally colored by our environment. If we miss the confidence accorded to Clio's more fervent polemicists, we can sympathize with Ranke's claim that "Every epoch stands in immediate relationship with God and its value rests not upon what results from it, but rather in its own existence, in its own self." Reference to the Deity, particularly coming from one who tended at times to confuse Divine

will with Prussian advancement, might grate on some modern ears. Yet surely his general point—the necessity of judging leaders and movements within their own era, rather than looking for heroes, villains, or “the lessons of history”—can only prove fruitful. If some still argue that the isolationists do not deserve more favorable treatment, they still deserve a more accurate one. From the research carried out thus far, the task seems well in hand.

FOOTNOTES

¹ E.S. Borchard to Frederick J. Libby, July 31, 1942, Libby Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection; *Chicago Tribune*, November 22, 1950.

² Wayne S. Cole, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations* (Minneapolis, 1962), pp. 4-5; letter from Wayne S. Cole to the author, August 27, 1972; Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), pp. 4-5.

³ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1952), p. 13; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1950), pp. 191, 367-368; Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction* (New York, 1957), pp. 280, 393; Wayne S. Cole, review of Adler, *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLV (1958), 162; Robert H. Ferrell, “The Peace Movement,” in Alexander DeConde, (ed.), *Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C., 1957), p. 106.

⁴ Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man on the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York, 1948), p. 13. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. paraphrased Bailey with approval, declaring that the “realities of democratic politics” gave Roosevelt “no choice but to trick them [the people] into acting for what he conceived to be their best interests.” See his review of Bailey in *New York Times*, May 9, 1948, pp. 1, 18. Selig Adler wrote, “Reasons of state, especially in time of crises, force even democratic statesmen to resort to Machiavellian conduct.” See p. 281.

⁵ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., *The Decline of American Liberalism* (New York, 1967); Wayne S. Cole, *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison, Wis., 1953); Walter Johnson, *The Battle Against Isolation* (Chicago, 1944). The arguments of many in Barnes’ school can be found in Harry Elmer Barnes, (ed.), *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953). Not all historians who were occasionally affiliated with Barnes were as extreme as he was in their conclusions. Note, for example, Richard N. Current, *Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1954), and William L. Neumann, *America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur* (Baltimore, 1963). Both offer trenchant critiques of American diplomacy without adopting Barnes’ conspiratorial tone.

⁶ Paul Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), pp. 177-178, 215. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York, 1962), pp. 183-184; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison, Wis., 1964); Noam Chomsky, “The Revolutionary Pacifism of A.J. Muste: On the Backgrounds of the Pacific War”, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York, 1969).

- ⁷ Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry Into World War II* (New York, 1972), 30, 62-63.
- ⁸ Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy* (New York, 1967); David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941* (Amherst, Mass., 1968); and Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970). Wyman promises to continue his research through World War II. One should also note two doctoral dissertations: Shlomo Shafir, "The Impact of the Jewish Crisis on American-German Relations, 1933-1939" (Georgetown University, 1971) and Barbara M. Stewart, "United States Government Policy on Refugees From Nazism, 1933-1940" (Columbia University, 1969).
- ⁹ A.J.P. Taylor, *English History 1914-1945* (Oxford, 1965), p. 518; B.H. Liddell-Hart, *A History of the Second World War* (New York, 1971), Chapter 33.
- ¹⁰ Liddell-Hart, p. 713; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945* (New York, 1970), p. 609; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968).
- ¹¹ The most thorough revisionist accounts include Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971* (2nd ed.; New York, 1972); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (New York, 1967); Kolko, *The Politics of War*; and Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York, 1972). For critiques of these and similar works, see Robert W. Sellen, "Origins of the Cold War: A Historiographical Survey," *West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences*, IX (1970), 57-98; Davis S. McClellan and John W. Reuss, "Foreign and Military Policies," in Richard S. Kirkendall, (ed.), *The Truman Period as a Research Field* (Columbia, Mo., 1967); the doctoral dissertation by Joseph M. Siracusa, "New Left Diplomatic Historians and Histories: A Critical Analysis of Recent Trends in American Diplomatic Historiography, 1960-1970" (University of Colorado, 1971); Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1971); Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," in *Perspectives in American History*, IV (1970), 313-347. Siracusa's dissertation is published as *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1973).
- ¹² Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism*, pp. viii, 3; Thomas G. Paterson, "Isolationism Revisited," *Nation*, CCIX (Sept. 1, 1969), 166-169; Otis L. Graham, Jr., *An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal* (New York, 1967), p. 34; Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941* (Knoxville, 1971), p. 343; Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York, 1969), pp. 285-286.
- ¹³ Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry Into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIII (1957), 595-617.
- ¹⁴ For the comments of Ferrell and Dangerfield, see John A. Garraty, (ed.), *Conversations with Historians* (New York, 1970), Vol. I, p. 240; Vol. II, p. 221.
- ¹⁵ Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), pp. 137-143. For initial surveys, see Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk, (eds.), *Public Opinion: 1935-1946* (Princeton, N.J., 1951). Harwood Childs began editing the *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1937.
- ¹⁶ Arnold A. Offner, *American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

¹⁷ Doctoral dissertations include Richard W. Alfeld, "American Opinion of National Socialism, 1933-1939" (Brown University, 1970); Daniel S. Day, "American Opinion of German National Socialism, 1937-1938" (University of California at Los Angeles, 1958); Frederick I. Murphy, "The American Christian Press and Pre-War Hitler's Germany, 1933-1939" (University of Florida, 1970); Donald McIlvanna, "The Anti-Interventionists, the Administration, and a Two-Front War," in William Appleman Williams, (ed.), *The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations*, Vol. II (2nd ed.; Chicago, 1970), pp. 253-257. One should also note Margaret K. Norden, "American Editorial Responses to the Rise of Adolf Hitler: A Preliminary Consideration," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LIX (1970), 290-301.

¹⁸ Opinion studies include Allen Guttman, *The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War* (New York, 1962); Stanley Weintraub, *The Last Great Cause: The Intellectuals and the Spanish Civil War* (New York, 1968); Hugh J. Parry's doctoral thesis, "The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939: A Study in American Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Pressure Groups" (University of Southern California, 1949). See also two general surveys: Richard P. Traina, *American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War* (Bloomington, Ind., 1968), and F. Jay Taylor, *The United States and the Spanish Civil War* (New York, 1956).

¹⁹ John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton, N.J., 1972). See also the doctoral thesis by John Booth Carter, "American Reactions to Italian Fascism, 1919-1933" (Columbia University, 1953) and John Norman, "Influence of Pro-Fascist Propaganda on American Neutrality, 1935-1936" in Dwight E. Lee and George E. McReynolds, (eds.), *Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee* (Worcester, Mass., 1949), 193-214.

²⁰ Justus D. Doenecke, "American Public Opinion and the Manchurian Crisis" (Ph.D. thesis; Princeton University, 1966); John W. Masland, "Group Interests in American Relations with Japan" (Ph.D. thesis; Princeton University, 1938); Masland, "Commercial Influence upon American Far Eastern Policy, 1937-1941," *Pacific Historical Review*, XI (1942), 281-299; Masland, "Missionary Influence upon Far Eastern Policy," *ibid.*, X (1941), 664-673; Ernest B. Bader, "Some American Public Reactions to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Japanese Policy, 1933-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Nebraska, 1957); Eleanor Tupper and George McReynolds, *Japan in American Public Opinion* (New York, 1937); Manny T. Koginos, *The Panay Incident: Prelude to War* (Lafayette, Ind., 1967); Justin H. Libby, "The Irresolute Years: American Congressional Opinion Towards Japan, 1937-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; Michigan State University, 1971).

²¹ Doctoral dissertations on American public opinion and Russia include Ira S. Cohen, "Congressional Attitudes Towards the Soviet Union" (University of Chicago, 1955); Robert C. McClelland, "The Soviet Union in American Opinion, 1933-1942" (University of West Virginia, 1951); Ronald E. Magden, "Attitudes of the American Religious Press Towards the Soviet Union, 1939-1941" (University of Washington, 1964); and Lee E. Lowenfish, "American Radicals and Soviet Russia, 1917-1940" (University of Wisconsin, 1968).

²² James J. Martin, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941* (2 vols.; New York, 1964); Frank A. Warren III, *Liberals and Communism: The 'Red Decade' Revisited* (Bloomington, Ind., 1966); Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959).

²³ General surveys include Andrew J. Schwartz, *America and the Russo-Finnish*

War (Washington, 1960), and Robert Sobel, *The Origins of Interventionism: The United States and the Russo-Finnish War* (New York, 1961). Sobel notes how some—but not all—isolationists favored an emergency loan to Finland.

²⁴ The debate may be followed in A.L. Rowse, *Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939* (New York, 1961), and Donald N. Lammers, *Explaining Munich: The Search for Motive in British Policy* (Palo Alto, Calif., 1966). Martin Gilbert's *The Roots of Appeasement* (New York, 1966) is more balanced than either.

²⁵ Examples of such McCarthyism of the Left include John Roy Carlson [pseud. Avedis Derounian] *Under Cover* (New York, 1943) and *The Plotters* (New York, 1946); and Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, *Sabotage: The Secret War Against America* (New York, 1942). Morris Schoenbach's lengthy doctoral dissertation, "Native Fascism During the 1930's and 1940's: A Study of Its Roots, Its Growth, and Its Decline" (University of California at Los Angeles, 1958), is by no means of this category, but still stresses the "subversive" forces at work.

²⁶ Victor Ferkiss, "The Populist Influences on American Fascism," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (1957), 350-373, and his "The Political and Economic Philosophy of American Fascism" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Illinois, 1954).

²⁷ Manfred Jonas, "Pro-Axis Sentiment and American Isolationism," *The Historian*, XXIX (1967), 221-237. Jonas' denial that anti-British feelings were primary to isolationist thinking is disputed in Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsettling Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore, 1969).

²⁸ Studies of the Bund and other para-military groups include Neil R. McMillen, "Pro-Nazi Sentiment in the United States, March, 1933-March, 1934," *Southern Quarterly*, II (1963), 48-70; Leland V. Bell, "The Failure of Nazism in America: The German-American Bund, 1936-1941," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXV (1970), 585-599; Joachim Remak, "'Friends of New Germany': The Bund and German-American Relations," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIV (1957), 38-41; and Sander Diamond's forthcoming book, based upon his doctoral dissertation (State University of New York at Binghamton, 1971). For some of Diamond's preliminary findings, see "The Years of Waiting: National Socialism in the United States, 1922-1933," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LIX (March, 1970).

²⁹ James Shenton, "Fascism and Father Coughlin," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, XLIV (1960), 6-11; Charles J. Tull, *Father Coughlin and the New Deal* (Syracuse, 1965); David H. Bennett, *Demagogues in the Depression: American Radicals and the Union Party, 1932-1936* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969); and David O. Powell, "The Union Party of 1936," *Mid-America*, XLVI (1964), 126-141. One should also note Philip V. Cannistraro and Theodore P. Kovoleff, "Father Coughlin and Mussolini: Impossible Allies," *Journal of Church and State*, XIII (1971), 427-443. The authors claim that while Father Coughlin made frequent and favorable mention of Italian fascism, the Italian government found the Royal Oak priest too controversial to support openly. Students should also note the recent study by John M. Werly, "The Millenarian Right: William Dudley Pelley and the Silver Legion of America," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LXXI (Summer, 1972), 410-423, based upon a doctoral dissertation at Syracuse University.

³⁰ Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save A Nation: American Counter-Subversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York, 1972); Paul S. Holbo,

"Wheat or What? Populism and American Fascism," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVI (1961), 727-736; Leo Ribuffo's forthcoming doctoral dissertation at Yale is previewed in his critical review of Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Rabb, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970* (New York, 1970, located in "Pluralism and American History," *Dissent*, XVIII (1971), 272-277.

³¹ Albert E. Stone, Jr., "Seward Collins and The American Review: Experiment in Pro-Fascism, 1933-1937," *American Quarterly*, XII (1960), 4-19; Victor Ferkiss, "Ezra Pound and American Fascism," *Journal of Politics*, XVII (1955), 173-197; Noel Stock, *The Life of Ezra Pound* (New York, 1972); Niel M. Johnson, *George Sylvester Viereck: German-American Propagandist* (Urbana, Ill., 1971). See also the Freudian study of Phyllis Keller, "George Sylvester Viereck: The Psychology of a German-American Militant," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, II (1971), 59-108.

³² Harold Lavine and James Wechsler's *War Propaganda and the United States* (New Haven, Conn., 1940) is still useful. Leonard Liggio's introduction to the 1972 edition notes the work of Clyde Miller's Institute for Propaganda Analysis, but a detailed study of this organization and its bulletin *Propaganda Analysis* is still much needed.

³³ Cole, *America First, passim*. For a discussion of the Fight for Freedom Committee, see Mark L. Chadwin, *The Hawks of World War II* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968).

³⁴ Doenecke, "Verne Marshal's Leadership of the No Foreign War Committee, 1940," *Annals of Iowa*, XLVI (Winter, 1973), 1153-1172, and Doenecke, "Non-Interventionism of the Left: The Keep America Out of War Congress, 1938-1941" (paper presented before Conference on World War II sponsored in 1973 by the American Committee on the History of the Second World War; available at cost of photoduplication from the author). For additional material on the KAOWC, see Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice*, chapters 11 and 12; Howard R. Penniman, "The Socialist Party in Action: The 1940 Campaign" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Minnesota, 1942); Bernard K. Johnpoll, *Pacifist's Progress: Norman Thomas and the Decline of American Socialism* (Chicago, 1970), chapter 7.

³⁵ Sheldon Marcus, "Social Justice: The History of a Weekly Journal" (D.Ed. thesis; Yeshiva University, 1970); Jerome E. Edwards, *The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormick's Tribune* (Reno, 1971); Carl G. Ryant, "From Isolation to Intervention: *The Saturday Evening Post*, 1939-42," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLIII (1971); John A. Ziegler, "The Progressive's Views on Foreign Affairs, 1909-1941: A Case Study of Liberal Economic Isolationism" (Ph.D. thesis; Syracuse University, 1970); Donald L. Miller, "Alfred M. Bingham and *Common Sense*: Study of Non-Marxian Radicals in the New Deal Era" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Maryland, 1972); and Frank A. Warren III, "Alfred Bingham and the Paradox of Liberalism," *The Historian*, XXVIII (1966), 255-267.

³⁶ Frank Waldrop's impressionistic *McCormick of Chicago: An Unconventional Portrait of a Controversial Figure* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) comes the closest to understanding the Colonel, though John Tebbel's hostile *An American Dynasty: The Story of the McCormicks, Medills and Pattersons* (Garden City, N.Y., 1947) surveys the intricate family network. Both Alice A. Hoge, *Cissy Patterson* (New York, 1970), and Paul F. Healy, *Cissy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1966) touch upon the isolationism of the editor of the *Washington Times-Herald*.

- ³⁷ W.A. Swanberg's *Citizen Hearst* (New York, 1961) hardly touches upon Hearst's World War II and Cold War views.
- ³⁸ David H. Culbert, "Tantalus' Dilemma: Public Opinion, Six Radio Commentators and Foreign Affairs, 1935-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; Northwestern University, 1970), p. 233. Culbert covers Carter and Lewis but the most vehement radio commentator of all, Upton Close [pseudo. Josef Washington Hall], who also published an anti-Semitic newsletter *Closer-Ups*, remains unresearched.
- ³⁹ Richard Polenberg, "The National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, 1937-1941," *Journal of American History*, LII (1965), 582-598, tells of the group's early life but its Cold War career remains untapped.
- ⁴⁰ See Eckard V. Toy, Jr.'s doctoral dissertation, "Ideology and Conflict in American Ultra-Conservatism, 1945-1960" (University of Oregon, 1965).
- ⁴¹ Justus D. Doenecke, "Lawrence Dennis: Cold War Revisionist," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, LV (Summer, 1972), 275-286.
- ⁴² Glenn H. Smith, "Senator William Langer: A Study in Isolationism" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Iowa, 1968); Keith L. Bryant, Jr., *Alfalfa Bill Murray* (Norman, Okla., 1968); Gilbert C. Fite, *George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity* (Norman, Okla., 1954); Edward C. Blackorby, *Prairie Rebel: The Public Career of William Lemke* (Lincoln, Neb., 1963); and Blackorby, "William Lemke: Agrarian Radical and Union Party Presidential Candidate," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIX (1962), 67-84. See also George W. Garlid, "Politics in Minnesota and American Foreign Relations, 1921-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Minnesota, 1967); Garlid, "The Anti-war Dilemma of the Farmer-Labor Party," *Minnesota History*, XL (1967), 365-374; Robert P. Wilkins, "The Non-Ethnic Roots of North Dakota Isolationism," *Nebraska History*, XLIV (1963), 205-211; and Wilkins, "The Non-Partisan League and Upper Midwest Isolationism," *Agricultural History*, XXXIX (1965), 102-109.
- ⁴³ Justus F. Paul, "The Political Career of Senator Hugh Butler" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Nebraska, 1966); Gary S. Henderson, "Congressman John Taber: Guardian of the People's Money" (Ph.D. thesis; Duke University, 1954).
- ⁴⁴ Ray Allen Billington offers a sectional explanation in his "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," *Political Science Quarterly*, LX (1945), 44-64, as does Jeanette P. Nichols, "The Middle West and the Coming of the World War II," *Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, LXII (1953), 122-145. Such reasoning is challenged by William G. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIII (1945), 377-390. Both Billington and Carleton find the area interventionist through the Spanish-American War. Yet Billington claims that the free silver issue promoted hatred of England and the East, while Carleton asserts that the Republican-oriented section remained imperialist down to World War I. Carleton stresses political partisanship in accounting for area opposition to World War II, a factor also emphasized by Nichols as well as by LeRoy N. Reiselbach, "The Basis of Isolationist Behavior," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (1960), 645-657. It should be emphasized that all essays noted in this footnote and the one immediately below offer multicausal explanations.
- ⁴⁵ Ralph Smuckler, "The Region of Isolationism," *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (1953), 377-390; David L. Porter, "Congress and the Coming of War" (Ph.D. thesis; Pennsylvania State University, 1970); George Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Relations* (Baltimore, 1951).
- ⁴⁶ Cole, "America First and the South, 1940-1941," *Journal of Southern History*, XLIV (1956), 36-47. For other material on the South, see also Alexander

DeConde, "The South and Isolationism," *ibid.*, XXIV 332-346; Marion D. Irish, "Foreign Policy in the South," *Journal of Politics*, X (1948), 308-326; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Uncertain South* (Chicago, 1964); and Arthur O. Hero, *The Southerner and World Affairs* (Baton Rouge, 1965). See also two doctoral dissertations, Irving Howard, "The Influence of Southern Senators on American Foreign Policy from 1939 to 1950" (University of Wisconsin, 1955), and Elmo Roberds, "The South and United States Foreign Policy, 1933-1952" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Chicago, 1955).

⁴⁷ Julian M. Pleasants, "The Senatorial Career of Robert Rice Reynolds" (Ph.D. thesis; University of North Carolina, 1971); William E. Coffey, "Rush Dew Holt: The Boy Senator, 1905-1942" (Ph.D. thesis; University of West Virginia, 1970). Other studies of southern senators with isolationist leanings are Seth S. McKay, *W. Lee O'Daniel and Texas Politics, 1938-1942* (Lubbock, Texas, 1944), and J. Harvey Wilkinson, *Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966* (Charlottesville, Va., 1969).

⁴⁸ William A. Weinrich, "Business and Foreign Affairs: The Roosevelt Defense Program, 1937-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Oklahoma, 1972); Roland N. Stromberg, "American Business and the Approach of War, 1935-1941," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (1962), 713-728; John H. Bunzel, *The American Small Businessman* (New York, 1962), 214-228; Gardner, *Economic Aspects . . .*; Cole, *Nye*, pp. 95-96. It should be noted, however, that most pacifists opposed high tariffs and autarchy. Oswald Garrison Villard, for example, endorsed Hull's reciprocity and called for even lower economic barriers. See his *Free Trade, Free World* (New York, 1949).

⁴⁹ Justus D. Doenecke, "The Isolationist World View" (paper presented at the symposium on New Deal Foreign Policy sponsored in 1971 by the Institute for Humane Studies; available at cost of photoduplication from the author); Gabriel Kolko, "American Business and Germany, 1930-1941," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (1962), 713-728.

⁵⁰ See Allen Nevins and Ernest Hill, *Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962* (New York, 1963), for a friendly account, and Keith Sward, *The Legend of Henry Ford* (New York, 1948), for a hostile one. Note also George Davidson, "Henry Ford: The Formation and Course of a Public Figure" (Ph.D. thesis; Columbia University, 1966). Sidney Hyman, *The Lives of William Benton* (Chicago, 1969). Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York, 1971).

⁵¹ Maxwell C. Raddock, *Portrait of an American Labor Leader: William L. Hucheson* (New York, 1958); Henry W. Berger, "Crisis Diplomacy," in William Appleman Williams, (ed.), *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1972), pp. 293-336.

⁵² Cole, *Nye*, chapters 5-7; John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934-36* (Baton Rouge, 1963); Wiltz, "The Nye Committee Revisited," *The Historian*, XXIII (1961), 211-233; Paul A.C. Koistinen, "The 'Industrial-Military Complex' in Historical Perspective: The Inter War Years," *Journal of American History*, LVI (1970), 819-839; Agnes A. Trotter, "The Development of the Merchants of Death Theory for World War I" (Ph.D. thesis; Duke University, 1966).

⁵³ Richard Burns and W.A. Dixon, "Foreign Policy and the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," *Mid-America*, XLVII (1965), 288-306; Walter L. Griffin, "Louis Ludlow and the War Referendum Crusade, 1935-1941," *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXIV (1968), 267-288; Harold W. Holtz-

claw, "The American War Referendum Movement, 1914-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Denver, 1965); and Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., "The War Referendum Approach to Peace in the Twentieth Century" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Georgia, 1965).

⁵⁴ Thomas W. Guinsburg, "Senatorial Isolationism in America, 1919-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; Columbia University, 1969); Porter, *loc. cit.*; Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago, 1962); Donald McCoy, *Landon of Kansas* (Lincoln, Neb., 1966); William T. Hutchinson, *Lowden of Illinois* (Chicago, 1957); and Donald Bruce Johnson, *The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie* (Urbana, Ill., 1960).

⁵⁵ James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston, 1972); Henry Berger, "Senator Taft Dissents From Military Escalation," in Thomas G. Patterson, (ed.), *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago, 1971); Berger, "A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early Cold War Program," in David Horowitz, (ed.), *Containment and Revolution* (Boston, 1967); and Russell Kirk and James McClellan, *The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft* (New York, 1967). Patterson offers a thorough Taft bibliography.

⁵⁶ C. David Tompkins, *Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican, 1884-1945* (East Lansing, Mich., 1970); Tompkins, "Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: Middle Western Isolationist," *Michigan History*, XLIV (1960), 39-58; *Vandenberg* (Boston, 1952). For other literature on Vandenberg, see Justus D. Doenecke, *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1940-1972* (Colorado Springs, 1972), pp. 30-31; hereafter cited as Doenecke, *Literature*.

⁵⁷ Peter G. Boyle, "The Study of an Isolationist: Hiram Johnson," (Ph.D. thesis; University of California and Los Angeles, 1970); Boyle, "The Roots of Isolationism: A Case Study," *Journal of American Studies*, VI (1972), 41-50; and Howard A. DeWitt, "Hiram Johnson and American Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Arizona, 1972).

⁵⁸ Revisionist interpretations of Borah include William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (rev. ed.; New York, 1962), pp. 118-123; Orde S. Pinckney, "William E. Borah: Critic of American Foreign Policy," *Studies on the Left*, I (1960), 48-61. For other material on Borah, see Marian McKenna, *Borah* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961); Charles W. Toth, "Isolationism and Emergence of Borah: An Appeal to the American Tradition," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIV (1961), 555-568; James E. Hewes, Jr., "William E. Borah and the Image of Isolation" (Ph.D. thesis; Yale University, 1955); Averill Berman, "Senator William Edgar Borah: A Study in Historical Agreements and Contradiction" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Southern California, 1955).

⁵⁹ Burton K. Wheeler, *Yankee From the West* (Garden City, N.Y., 1962); Richard R. Reutten, "Burton K. Wheeler of Montana: A Progressive Between the Wars" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Oregon, 1961); William J. Miller, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York, 1967); William J. Grattan, "David I. Walsh and His Associates: A Study in Political Theory" (Ph.D. thesis; Harvard University, 1957); Dorothy G. Wayman, *David I. Walsh: Citizen Patriot* (Milwaukee, 1952); Homer E. Socolofsky, *Arthur Capper: Publisher, Politician and Philanthropist* (Lawrence, Kan., 1962).

⁶⁰ Sister Mary R. Lorentz, "Henrik Shipstead: Minnesota Independent, 1923-1946" (Ph.D. thesis; Catholic University, 1963); Alan E. Kent, Jr., "Portrait in

Isolationism: The LaFollettes and Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Wisconsin, 1957); Harl A. Dalstrom, "Kenneth S. Wherry" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Nebraska, 1965); Marvin E. Stromer, *The Making of a Political Leader: Kenneth S. Wherry and the United States Senate* (Lincoln, Neb., 1969). For other sources on the LaFollettes and the Progressive Party of Wisconsin, see Doenecke, *Literature*, pp. 33-34.

⁶¹ Joe Martin, Jr., *My First Fifty Years in Politics* (New York, 1960); Henry Z. Scheele, *Charlie Halleck* (New York, 1966); Richard K. Hanks, "Hamilton Fish and American Isolationism" (Ph.D. thesis; University of California at Riverside, 1971).

⁶² The best work on the stormy East Harlem Congressmen is found in Alan Schaffer, *Vito Marcantonio: Radical in Congress* (Syracuse, 1966), and Norman J. Kaner, "Vito Marcantonio and American Foreign Policy" (Ph.D. thesis; Rutgers University, 1968). For other sources, see Doenecke, *Literature*, p. 36.

⁶³ Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952). For a study of eastern Nebraska which stresses German-American opposition to Roosevelt's foreign policy, see Robert W. Cherney, "Isolationist Voting in 1940: A Statistical Analysis," *Nebraska History*, LII (1971), 293-310.

⁶⁴ J. David Valaik, "American Catholics and the Spanish Civil War" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Rochester, 1964); "Catholics, Neutrality, and the Spanish Embargo, 1937-1939," *Journal of American History*, LIV (1967), 73-85; "American Catholic Dissenters and the Spanish Civil War," *Catholic Historical Review*, LIII (1968), 537-555; "American Catholics and the Spanish Republic," *Journal of Church and State*, X (1968), 13-28; "In the Days Before Ecumenicism: American Catholics, Anti-Semitism, and the Spanish Civil War," *ibid.*, XIII (1971), 465-477. Valaik differs with Guttman, *loc. cit.*, in emphasizing the genuine isolationism of Roman Catholic opinion. Contrary to Guttman, Valaik sees more than pro-Franco sympathy at work. For studies of Catholics and Roosevelt's domestic policies, see David J. O'Brien, *American Catholics and Social Reform: The New Deal Years* (New York, 1968), and George Q. Flynn, *American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 1932-1936* (Lexington, Ky., 1968). The dissertation by Robert B. Clements, "The Commonweal, 1924-1938: The Williams-Schuster Years" (Notre Dame, 1972), reveals the possibilities of more intensive work in the entire area of the religious press.

⁶⁵ The interventionist minority included Major General "Wild Bill" Donovan, ex-governor Al Smith, Monsignor John Ryan, historian Carleton J.H. Hayes, educator William Agar, Cardinal Francis Spellman, and poet Theodore Maynard.

⁶⁶ Richard M. Dalfiume, "The 'Forgotten' Years of the Negro Revolution," *Journal of American History*, LV (1968), 90-116; Ruth Sarles, "A Story of America First" (manuscript on deposit at the Hoover Library of War, Peace, and Revolution, Palo Alto, California; undated), p. 90.

⁶⁷ Such a survey might include philanthropist Julius Rosenwald, journalists George E. Sokolsky, Charles Fleischer, and Morris Rubin, industrialist Philip Liebman, professor Edwin M. Borchard, Congresswoman Florence Prather Kahn, merchant Ira A. Hirschmann, socialist leaders Harry Fleishmann and Sidney Hertzberg, labor leader Will Herberg, and songwriter Morris Ryskind. Pacifists would include Milton Mayer, Abraham Kaufman, Rabbi Isador B. Hoffman, Rabbi David de Sola Poole and Dr. Henry Newmann.

⁶⁸ For a full listing of pro-Zionist Congressmen, as well as their public statements, see Reuben Fink, (ed.), *America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official*

America and of the American People Toward the Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth (New York, 1944). Further material on Zionism and Israel may be found in Samuel Halperin, *The Political World of American Zionism* (Detroit, 1961), Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and Foreign Policy, 1942-1947* (New York, 1962), and John G. Snetinger, "Truman and the Creation of Israel" (Ph.D. thesis; Stanford University, 1970).

⁶⁹ See, for example, Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941* (Berkeley, Calif., 1960).

⁷⁰ Miller continues, "The Niebuhrians extolled stouthearted resistance to tyranny but neglected to spell out this noble phrase in terms of hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, and Japanese old men, pregnant women, youths and infants whom we blinded, scalded, boiled, flayed, buried alive, disembowed, eviscerated." Robert Moats Miller, *How Shall They Hear Without a Preacher? The Life of Earnest Fremont Tittle* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1971), pp. 452, 456.

⁷¹ John Haynes Holmes, *I Speak for Myself* (New York, 1959); Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Living of These Days* (New York, 1956); Elston J. Hill, "Buchman and Buchmanism" (Ph.D. thesis; University of North Carolina, 1972). For an excellent bibliography of research in religion, which includes many doctoral dissertations, see James W. Smith and A. Leland Jamison, (eds.), *Religion in American Life* (4 vols.; Princeton, N.J., 1961).

⁷² Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice*, loc. cit.; Chatfield, "Alternative Antiwar Strategies of the Thirties," *American Studies*, XIII (Spring, 1972), 81-93; Allan A. Kuusisto, "The Influence of the National Council for the Prevention of War on United States Foreign Policy, 1935-1939" (Ph.D. thesis; Harvard University, 1950); Frederick J. Libby, *To End War: The Story of the National Council for the Prevention of War* (Nyack, N.Y., 1969).

⁷³ Dorothy Detzer tells of some of her own experiences as EIL lobbyist in *Appointment on the Hill* (New York, 1948).

⁷⁴ Ronald Schaffer, "Jeanette Rankin, Progressive-Isolationist" (Ph.D. thesis; Princeton University, 1959); Jo Ann Robinson, "A.J. Muste and Ways to Peace," *American Studies*, XIII (Spring, 1972), 95-108. For a journalistic account of Muste's life, see Nat Hentoff, *Peace Agitator: The Story of A.J. Muste* (New York, 1963). Sketches from Muste's own autobiography appear in Hentoff, (ed.), *The Essays of A.J. Muste* (New York, 1970).

⁷⁵ Penina M. Glazer, "A Decade of Transition: A Study of Radical Journals of the 1940s" (Ph.D. thesis; Rutgers University, 1970).

⁷⁶ Warren Cohen, *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I* (Chicago, 1967); Arthur Goddard, (ed.), *Harry Elmer Barnes: Learned Crusader* (Colorado Springs, 1968); Justus D. Doenecke, "Harry Elmer Barnes" (unpublished paper presented before the Conference on Peace Research in History, 1972 session of the Organization of American Historians; available at cost of photoduplication from the author). The extreme revisionism promoted by Barnes includes David L. Hoggan, *Der Erzwungene Krieg* (Tubingen, 1963), and Paul Rassiner, *Le Mensonge d'Ulysse* (Paris, 1950). The former book claims that the British—not the Germans—bear the brunt of war guilt in 1939, the latter asserts that only between one and two million Jews died in 1939, and denies that German concentration camps possessed gas chambers. For a modified form of the Hoggan argument, see Kurt Glaser, "World War II and the War Guilt Question," *Modern Age*, XV (Winter, 1971), 57-69.

⁷⁷ Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington*

(New York, 1968); Frederick L. Honhart III, "Charles Callan Tansill: American Diplomatic Historian" (Ph.D. thesis; Case Western Reserve University, 1972). For material on Garrity and Regnery, see Cleveland Amory, "Trade Winds," *Saturday Review of Literature*, XXXVII (Sept. 25, 1954), 6-8. Note also Thomas D. Parrish. "How Henry Regnery Got That Way," *The Reporter*, XII (April 7, 1955), 41-44; "Henry Regnery: A Conservative Publisher in a Liberal World," *The Alternative* (October, 1971).

⁷⁸ Richard Kendall, "Edward M. Borchard and the Defense of Traditional American Neutrality, 1931-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; Yale University, 1965); Douglas W. French, "William Ernest Hocking and Twentieth Century International Tensions, 1914-1966" (Ph.D. thesis; State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970); Paul H. Mattingly, "Journey Without Baedeker: Edmund Wilson in the Twenties and Thirties" (M.A. thesis; University of Washington, 1964); James C. Lanier, "Stuart Chase: An Intellectual Autobiography, 1888-1940" (Ph.D. thesis; Emory University, 1970); Douglas Stenerson, *H.L. Mencken, Iconclast From Baltimore* (Chicago, 1971). John Chamberlain is one of the figures studied in Frank A. Annunziata, "The Attack on the Welfare State: Patterns of Anti-Statism from the New Deal to the New Left" (Ph.D. thesis; Ohio State University, 1968).

⁷⁹ Freda Utey, *Odyssey of a Liberal* (Washington, 1970); William Henry Chamberlin, *The Confessions of an Individualist* (New York, 1940). Both authors need full-scale studies.

⁸⁰ Richard C. Frey, Jr., "John T. Flynn and the United States in Crisis, 1928-1950" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Oregon, 1969); Michael Wretzin, *Superflous Anarchist: Albert Jay Nock* (Providence, 1972); Robert M. Crunden, *The Mind and Art of Albert Jay Nock* (Chicago, 1964); J. Sandor Cziraky, "The Evolution of the Social Philosophy of Albert Jay Nock" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Pennsylvania, 1959); Carl G. Ryant, "Garet Garrett's America" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Wisconsin, 1968). Neilson offers an autobiography, *My Life in Two Worlds* (Appleton, Wis., 1940-46). Chodorov offers a playful account, *Out of Step: The Autobiography of an Individualist* (New York, 1962). Joseph Stromberg has chapters on Morley's and Chodorov's opposition to the Cold War in his "The Cold War and the Transformation of the American Right: The Decline of Right Wing Liberalism" (M.A. thesis; Florida Atlantic University, 1971).

⁸¹ For a preliminary survey of student antiwar opposition, see Patti McGill Peterson, "Student Organizations and the Antiwar Movement in America, 1900-1960," *American Studies*, XIII (Spring, 1972), 131-147. James Wechsler, *The Revolt on Campus* (New York, 1935) is a lively primary account. Far different were those students involved in America First. From Yale alone they included R. Sargent Shriver, Gerald Ford (who quit when informed this would interfere with his duties as a football coach), Potter Stewart, and Kingman Brewster. John F. Kennedy contributed \$100 (on behalf of his father, though there is no reason to believe he did not favor their aims). Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. and Robert A. Taft, Jr. were with the Harvard Committee Against Military Intervention. See the papers of the America First Committee, Hoover Library of War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford University; hereafter cited as AFC Papers.

⁸² The presidents of Vassar, Michigan, Stanford, the University of Chicago (Robert Maynard Hutchins), Earlham, Louisville, and Rochester opposed intervention, as did such intellectuals as Alexander Meiklejohn, George Lundberg, John Dewey, Harlow Shapley, Anton J. Carlson, George H. Whipple, William F. Ogburn, P.A. Sorokin, Daniel Gregory Mason, and Will Durant. Historians and political scientists included Arthur May, Edward C. Kirkland, Joseph H. Moody,

Leonard Larrabee, Bernhard Knollenberg, Eugene P. Chase, E.C. Helmreich, William B. Hesseltine, Henry F. May, Jr., Howard K. Beale, William G. Carleton, William A. Orton, Brocks Emeny, Edward S. Corwin, Arthur N. Holcombe, Broadus Mitchell, and Burton B. Kendrick. AFC Papers contain references to many of the above. The Papers of John T. Flynn at the University of Oregon contain a masterlist of all members of America First, organized by state and chapter.

⁸³ Here one should note Sinclair Lewis, Frank Lloyd Wright, Edmund Wilson, H.L. Mencken, John P. Marquand, William Saroyan, Margaret Sanger, Kenneth Roberts, Irving S. Cobb, Kathleen Norris, Kenneth Rexroth, James T. Farrell, Selden Rodman, and Samuel Hopkins Adams. AFC Papers plus debates in the liberal press.

⁸⁴ Among those supporting America First were Irene Castle, Lillian Gish, Mary Pickford, Edward Arnold, Michael Strange, and Geraldine Farrar. Gary Cooper and Fred MacMurray were rumored to favor isolationism. AFC Papers.

⁸⁵ Both Chester Bowles and Quincy Howe felt they could speak with less than openness. Ernest L. Meyer and Dorothy Dunbar Bromley were dropped from the interventionist *New York Post*, as was Harry Barnes from the Scripps-Howard chain.

⁸⁶ Here one might note such converts to interventionism as legislators Maury Maverick, George Norris, John M. Coffee, Everett Dirksen, George Bender, and Arthur Capper, as well as labor organizer A. Philip Randolph, socialist Paul Porter, *New Republic* editor Bruce Bliven, radio commentator Elmer Davis, Rabbi Sidney E. Bernstein, and writer Max Eastman. The one convert to a more isolationist position was Harry Noble MacCracken, president of Vassar College.

⁸⁷ Robert C. Bjerk, "Kennedy at the Court of St. James: The Diplomatic Career of Joseph P. Kennedy, 1938-1940" (Ph.D. thesis; Washington State University, 1972); Richard J. Whalen, *The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy* (New York, 1964); and William M. Kaufman, "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, N.J., 1953), pp. 649-681.

⁸⁸ *The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh* (New York, 1970); Justus D. Doenecke, "The Lone Eagle," review essay in *Libertarian Forum*, IV (March, 1972), 6-8. The best works on Lindbergh to date include Lowell C. Fleischer, "Charles A. Lindbergh and Isolationism, 1939-1941" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Connecticut, 1963); Paul Seabury, "Charles A. Lindbergh: The Politics of Nostalgia," *History*, II (1960), 123-144; Kenneth S. Davis, *The Hero: Charles A. Lindbergh and the American Dream* (Garden City, N.Y., 1959).

⁸⁹ Hints may be found in James A. Farley, *Jim's Farley's Story* (New York, 1948); Keith McFarland, "Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring and the Problems of Readiness, Rearmament and Neutrality, 1936-1940" (Ph.D. thesis; Ohio State University, 1969).

⁹⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right,'" in Daniel Bell, (ed.), *The Radical Right* (New York, 1964); T.W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950); Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in James N. Rosenau, (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1967), 51-104. Such hypotheses are challenged in R. Christie and Marie Johoda, (ed.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of the 'Authoritarian Personality'* (New York, 1954); and Robert A. Schoenberger, (ed.), *The American Right Wing: Readings in Political Behavior* (New York, 1969).

⁹¹ Robert E. Gamer, "Consensus: Poland to Pearl Harbor" (Ph.D. thesis; Brown

University, 1965); William M. Tuttle, Jr., "Aid-to-the-Allies Short-of-War versus American Intervention: A Re-appraisal of William Allen White's Leadership," *Journal of American History*, LVI (1970), 841-858; Robert Freeman Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942," in Barton J. Bernstein, (ed.), *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York, 1968), p. 248; Clifton E. Hart, "The Minor Premise of American Nationalist Thought" (Ph.D. thesis; University of Minnesota, 1962); Charles Sanford, *The Quest for Paradise: Europe and American Moral Imagination* (Urbana, Ill., 1961); Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

⁹² Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During the Second World War* (New York, 1967); Walsh, in *Nation*, CLIX (Sept 9, 1944), 291; Wiley, in *New Republic*, CXII (June 4, 1945), 792.

⁹³ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Volume I: 1880-1941* (Boston, 1970); "The 'Fifth Column,'" *Propaganda Analysis*, III (July 8, 1940); Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (New York, 1972), pp. 44-47.

⁹⁴ For a debate on the Sedition Case, see defendant Lawrence Dennis and Maximilian St. George, *A Trial on Trial: The Great Sedition Case of 1944* (Chicago, 1946), and prosecutor O. John Rogge, *The Official German Report* (New York, 1961).

⁹⁵ While Mulford Q. Sibley and Philip E. Jacob, *Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1952) remains definitive, Wittner, *loc. cit.*, has used enough manuscripts to command a fresh look.

⁹⁶ Press reaction to both area bombing and Peace Now are covered in James J. Martin, "The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions—in 1944," in Martin's *Revisionist Viewpoints: Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition* (Colorado Springs, 1971). For the rationale behind American bombing, see Gary J. Shandroff, "The Evolution of Area Bombing in American Doctrine and Practice" (Ph.D. thesis; New York University, 1972).

⁹⁷ For one protest against such atrocities, see the Lindbergh Journals, *loc. cit.*, pp. 812, 853-854, 875, 880-881, 883-884, 902-903.

⁹⁸ Wittner, chapter IV; Ray Abrams, "The Churches and Clergy in World War II," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCLVI (1948), 110-119. See also the suggestive essay, George E. Hopkins, "Bombing and the American Conscience During World War II," *The Historian*, XXVIII (1966), 451-473.

⁹⁹ Norris in *New Republic*, CVII (August 3, 1942), 144; letter noted in *ibid.*, CVI (May 4, 1942), 308.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas M. McDaid, "The Response of the American Civil Liberties Union to the Japanese-American Internment" (M.A. essay; Columbia University, 1969). The myth that Senator Taft opposed the internment itself, rather than merely the sloppy wording of the bill, is disposed of in Jacobus ten Broek, et. al., *Prejudice, War and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Japanese-Americans in Wild War II* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), p. 115.

¹⁰¹ Rex Stout, "We Shall Hate, or We Shall Fail," *New York Times*, January 17, 1943; "American Writers on Germany," *Common Sense*, XIII (June, 1944), 206-212; Robert T. Howell, "The Writer's War Board: Writers and World War II" (Ph.D. thesis; Louisiana State University, 1971).

¹⁰² Public response to atomic warfare is ably covered in Michael J. Yavendetti,

"American Reactions to the Use of Atomic Bombs on Japan, 1945-1947" (Ph.D. thesis; University of California at Berkeley, 1970). Isolationists are noted on pp. 408-409. Yavendetti notes that while Roman Catholic and liberal Protestants tended to oppose such bombing, the Niebuhrian *Christianity and Society* remained equivocal. See also Norman Thomas, "Our War With Japan," *Commonweal*, XLII (April 20, 1945), 8-10; Clark quoted in Yavendetti, p. 15; Johnson quoted in *New Republic*, CXIII (December 17, 1945), 838.

¹⁰³ Jonas, *Isolationism in America*, p. 287; Norman Graebner, *The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950* (New York, 1956); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," *Atlantic*, CLXXXIX (June, 1952), 34-38. Quotation is from Wilkins, "Non-Partisan League . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴ Graham, *loc. cit.*; for possible role of General Motors in causing a shift in Vandenberg's position, see Cole, *Nye*, p. 71. I might be reading more into this than Cole intends. For general coverage of the response of isolationist senators to Truman's foreign policy—written by a student of Professor Cole—see the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Joan Lee (University of Maryland, 1972).

¹⁰⁵ In January, 1970, I sent a questionnaire to about forty people active in non-interventionism from 1939 to 1941 who were still alive. About twenty-five responded. The overwhelming majority did not regret their activity. Said one of the more articulate, a newspaper editor, "The tangible result of the war was to install the Soviet Union over much of Europe and to replace the friendly Nationalists in China with another communist regime. Only communism profited."

¹⁰⁶ Direct continuity with liberal prewar isolationism can be seen in many stands taken by *The Progressive*, Norman Thomas and the Socialist Party, Senator William Langer, Congressman Usher Burdick, Harry Elmer Barnes, William L. Neumann, and Oswald Garrison Villard. Michael Wretzin's *Oswald Garrison Villard: Pacifist at War* (Bloomington, Ind., 1965) unfortunately omits Villard's comments concerning the conduct of World War II and the initial years of the Cold War.

¹⁰⁷ The isolationists have always been enamored of air power. Boake Carter promoted it in his broadcasts, and such air leaders as Colonel Lindbergh, Major Al Williams, Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, and Igor Sikorski were active in America First. During the Cold War isolationists often cited the writings of General Bonner Fellers, author of *Wings for Peace* (Chicago, 1953) and once a friend of America First, and of Major Alexander P. De Seversky, who had been critical of Lindbergh's isolationism in 1941. Air power was cheaper, avoided unpopular conscription, and could be used without entangling alliances. One might note in passing that John M. Swomley, Jr., former director of the National Council Against Conscription, informed me that "There was more opposition to Roosevelt and Truman by Republicans who feared indoctrination of troops with liberalism than those who ever thought of isolationism." Letter to author, January 29, 1970. But for Swomley's cooperation with the isolationists, see his *The Military Establishment* (Boston, 1964). For the whole issue of air versus ground forces, see William W. Cover, "Neo-Isolationism and Type of Military" (M.A. thesis; Iowa State University, 1956). Yet far fuller investigation is needed.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas C. Kennedy, "Charles A. Beard and the 'Court Historians,'" *The Historian*, XXV (1963), 439-450, claims that Beard exaggerated in his accusation that the State Department would deny him access to crucial papers. In my own research, which involves reading many Beard letters, I find that Beard

firmly believed he could never have obtained the access to official and unofficial sources secured by Langer and Gleason.

¹⁰⁹ Richard T. Reutten, "Harry Elmer Barnes and the 'Historical Blackout,'" *The Historian*, XXXIII (1971), 202-214. While declaring that Barnes exaggerated the suppression of revisionism, Reutten claims that revisionists raised necessary questions about presidential warmaking powers, and that pro-Roosevelt historians seemed all too anxious to defend the actions of their Commander-in-Chief.

¹¹⁰ Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II," *loc. cit.* Kent was an American coding clerk in the American embassy in London who supposedly saw secret messages from Roosevelt to Churchill committing the United States to the European war. Because of the wartime emergency, the Kent documents were closed and now still remain so. The isolationists tried to turn the Kent case into a cause célèbre in 1946, but the government forbade Kent to testify. For some information, see Whalen's life of Joseph P. Kennedy, *loc. cit.*, pp. 309-320.

¹¹¹ Paterson's research is found in his "The Economic Cold War: American Business and Economic Foreign Policy, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. thesis; University of California at Berkeley, 1968), and in his essay, "The Quest for Peace and Prosperity: International Trade, Communism, and the Marshall Plan," in Barton J. Bernstein, (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), 78-112. Other research includes John P. Mallen, "Conservative Attitudes Toward American Foreign Policy: With Special Reference to American Business, 1945-1952" (Ph.D. thesis; Harvard University, 1964); Robert J. Chasteen, "American Foreign Aid and Public Opinion, 1945-1952" (Ph.D. thesis; University of North Carolina, 1957).

¹¹² Louis Lochner, *Herbert Hoover and Germany* (New York, 1960). William J. Bosch's balanced study of the debate over the international war tribunal could extend to America's entire German policy. See Bosch, *Judgment on Nuremberg: American Attitudes Toward the Major German War-Crime Trials* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1970).

¹¹³ Freda Utley, who wrote *Japan's Feet of Clay* (New York, 1937) and *China at War* (New York, 1939), is a marked exception.

¹¹⁴ See doctoral theses by Virginia M. Kemp, "Congress and China" (University of Pittsburgh, 1966); John R. Skettering, "Republican Attitudes Towards the Administration's China Policy, 1945-1949" (State University of Iowa, 1952); James A. Fetzer, "Congress and China, 1941-1950" (Michigan State University, 1964). Poole's dissertation, *loc. cit.*, stresses Republican anger from the time of the Marshall mission. The MacArthur quotation is found in Walter Millis, (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), p. 18.

¹¹⁵ Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia, 1968) is limited to the Senate. One should also note a new work, James R. Riggs, "Congress and the Conduct of the Korean War" (Ph.D. thesis; Purdue University, 1972).

¹¹⁶ Debate over the "China Lobby" can be followed in Joseph Keeley, *The China Lobby Man: The Story of Alfred Kohlberg* (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1969), and Ross T. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York, 1960). Though the Koen volume is hard to find, as pressures upon the publisher caused its withdrawal soon after circulation, one may find much of Koen's argument in his doctoral thesis, "The China Lobby and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy" (University of Florida, 1958). For the argument of linkage be-

tween the China Lobby and the isolationists, see Leonard Liggio, "Isolationism. Old and New," *Left and Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought*, II (Winter, 1966), 28-31. One should note Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, 1973).

¹¹⁷ For revisionist accounts of McCarthyism, see Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago, 1971), and Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York, 1971). Harriman in *New York Times*, July 11, 1952, p. 5; "Hoover's Folly," *Nation*, CLXXI (December 30, 1950), 688-689.

¹¹⁸ Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington, Ky., 1970), p. 13. Richard Rovere, *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York, 1950), p. 141, denies that the Wisconsin senator was ever an isolationist, or, for that matter, a reactionary.

¹¹⁹ Frank Chodorov, "The New Imperialism," *Freeman*, V (November, 1954), 162; Chodorov, "A War To Communize America," *ibid.*, V (November, 1954), 171-174; William F. Buckley to John T. Flynn, October 22, 1956 and J.T. Flynn to W.F. Buckley, October 23, 1956, the Papers of J.T. Flynn, University of Oregon. See also Murray Rothbard, "The Transformation of the American Right," *Continuum*, II (1964), 220-231, and "Confessions of a Right Wing Liberal," *Ramparts*, VI (June 15, 1968), 47-52.

THE RESURGENCE OF ISOLATIONISM AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II

By THOMAS M. CAMPBELL

The trauma of Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into its second world war in a quarter century. Japan by her audacious attack achieved what a public declaration of war might not have done; she unified the contentious Americans in a flash. So dastardly was her deed that she must be punished, along with her Nazi ally, Germany. The Americans were united, but we might ask, what on? Aside from their anger and lust for revenge, the evidence of the wartime years makes abundantly clear that the country never settled on clearly defined goals.

This is not to say that there was any lack of consensus on abstract war aims: peace, justice, freedom—there was the noble language of the Atlantic Charter. The nation also had major economic ambitions, which, while not always clearly grasped by the man on Main Street, were assiduously pursued by the government: a broader system of free trade, such as breaking down the British system of imperial preferences, and securing a stronger position in controlling raw materials areas in the oil rich Middle East, and the markets of Asia. There were highly publicized government plans to fulfill these aims: the Bretton Woods agreements for a new international money system and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which charted a course toward a new international peace organization.

Despite the work and publicity attending these efforts, Americans never achieved consensus on how their postwar foreign policy should be implemented. It is thus misleading to look at expressions of involvement in world affairs, to examine the feverish activity associated with Bretton Woods and the United Nations and conclude that the spirit of internationalism triumphed in America during the war. Historians have accepted the wartime idea that isolationism died with the sinking of the *Arizona* at Pearl Harbor. During the war years it seemed to many people that America must not again turn its back on the world, as it had in 1919. They took as proof of their new maturity in world affairs the highly publicized campaigns for postwar involvement in the United Nations, but, as William H. McNeill astutely observed, the UN was too easily seen as a talisman possessing inherent power to settle disputes among nations.¹

In fact, there remained throughout the war a strong cross current of opinions about the nature of America's postwar involvement. Despite its great effort through lend-lease to supply our allies with the economic sinews of war, there were doubts that Congress would provide large scale postwar aid to Russia and Britain. Despite all of the attention on the UN, the nation failed to resolve the crucial question of how American forces would be committed to action under the new postwar

security arrangements. The U.S. also accepted a more extensive veto power than either the government or the public really wanted. The public and government seemed fickle about wartime political and territorial problems.

Based on the public record alone, we can see that the expectations the American people placed in the UN to assure peace almost immediately proved a vain hope. From its opening sessions in 1946, when the former wartime allies clashed over Iran, the UN was primarily a battleground for the emerging Cold War. I contend that the disillusionment of the American people in the years from 1945 to 1950, the period which Herbert Feis aptly called "From Trust to Terror," was greater than they experienced after World War I.

In the context of the theme of this session, "tensions between involvement and non-involvement," the entire decade of the 1940s saw many examples that show conclusively how Americans agonized over this problem. It may be that isolationism was not the pre-eminent motif in the orchestration of foreign policy. I believe, however, that its influence was present to an extent most historians have missed. Its major ramification was negative—the ways in which it impeded strong, clear, affirmative actions in foreign policy. Like the spectre of Christmas Past torturing Dickens' Scrooge for a mean life, isolationism haunted Americans in the form of Wilson's tragic experience.

To see its full impact in World War II requires consideration of the term itself. I raise the question of whether isolationism is a term that assumes a somewhat different form in the forties. That is, it was not a matter of the nation shutting itself off from the world by adopting neutrality laws and burying its head in international sands. Isolationism in a world conflict and in the uncertain period immediately thereafter needs to be defined in terms of what was meant by world involvement in a half destroyed world—particularly a planet thrust suddenly into the atomic era. The times demanded vision on questions involving colonialism, nationalism, re-thinking of accepted political ideologies, sovereignty, race, and population growth, as well as resource use and allocation, to say nothing of controlling arms technology. Facing up to these matters would have necessitated embracing the kind of program espoused by Wendell Wilkie, Henry Wallace, and other exponents of "one world" ideas.

Most American leaders and the public at large shied away from advanced commitments in international relations. While embracing with naive enthusiasm American participation in an international organization, the people within a short time after the end of the war were advocating a strongly nationalist program. Recently, historians have pointed out that Truman's anti-communist rhetoric, from the time of the Truman Doctrine speech on, contributed to the rise of McCarthyism. It should be stressed more, I think, that it was the public that expressed greater fear and hostility to Russia and communism while Truman's public statements were more conciliatory in the period between VJ Day and March 1947.²

What occurred was that the public's enthusiasm for the UN was more an infatuation than a commitment. The American people looked to the UN as an easy means of security. By placing faith in an international organization they could achieve an inexpensive means of keeping peace. It would not be necessary to maintain large armed forces. As was their traditional bent, Americans wanted only to end the war, demobilize, and return to their individual domestic pursuits. When international realities showed this to be impossible, the people reacted initially by a growing hostility to Russia and communism—for there had always been a solid one-third of the people who distrusted Russia even at the high tide of wartime cooperation—and began taking out their fear and frustration in the postwar "Red Scare."³ Here it is important to note that McCarthy was a relative latecomer to the movement, the tide of which began running by 1946. This anti-communist hysteria, which peaked in the early fifties, contains strong overtones of isolationism: an uncritical assumption of the superiority of domestic institutions; demands for conformity; super-patriotism; the search for scapegoats, blaming international ills on foreign countries; immigration restrictions; obsession with foreign subversion; exorcising of past mistakes in foreign policy. In short, by the later 1940s the nation had swung from support of international organization to a mood of paranoid self-purification. This condition precluded rational examination of crisis situations. During this time of national myopia the government moved the country solidly into its role as world policeman, with all of the tragic ramifications that have since become apparent.

Perhaps the peak of optimistic internationalism in the decade occurred in the months after the Teheran conference of November 1943. Congressional resolutions had buoyed public confidence; polls showed strong support for international organization; and Hull secured Roosevelt's unenthusiastic acquiescence to his more advanced views of a powerful league, as outlined by the State Department's draft plan of December 1943.⁴ Erosion set in by the time the major powers⁵ gathered in Washington for the Dumbarton Oaks conference on August 21, 1944. Numerous fissures had appeared by then in the earlier unity of public and governmental support.

Among the first such fissures was critics' charge that the conference represented nothing more than an attempt by the great allied powers to impose their will on the postwar world. Some claimed that Dumbarton Oaks would result in a twentieth century Holy Alliance. The powerful nations would plan the future of the smaller countries without consulting them: Dumbarton Oaks would confront the world with a *fait accompli* in the dark art of power politics. The most prominent person expressing this fear was New York governor Thomas E. Dewey, that year's Republican presidential candidate. The theme was quickly picked up by the isolationist press, notably the Patterson, McCormick, and Hearst newspaper chains. It also sparked debate in Congress.⁶ As evidence that it touched a deep-seated popular fear, the great power dominance theme received serious discussion in many middle of the road

and liberal papers and journals during the early phase of the Dumbarton Oaks talks.⁷

The Roosevelt administration, already extremely sensitive about dredging up old isolationist shibboleths, went into a private frenzy as Roosevelt, Hull, and Stettinius became certain that they were about to share Wilson's dreadful fate. Dewey's barrage threatened to make foreign policy a major campaign issue; the administration feared that this course would plunge the entire question of international organization into a thicket of partisan debate, as had occurred in 1919-1920. To prevent this, Hull brought the Republicans into the administration tent by holding several lengthy discussions with John Foster Dulles, Dewey's adviser on foreign policy matters. Contact with the Dewey campaign continued quietly through the liaison work of Hugh R. Wilson, a Republican and former ambassador. Promised consideration of their views and reassured about the administration's commitment to a genuinely democratic UN, Republican leaders conducted a low key and generally uncritical campaign on foreign policy. Much has been made of this bi-partisan cooperation and its success. In fact, it was an understanding honored more by the GOP than the Democrats. Late in the campaign Roosevelt resorted to partisan tactics himself when he lambasted the Republicans as spokesmen of isolationism in American life and captured much of the internationalist vote by his emphatic endorsement of granting the US representative on the Security Council the power to commit American troops.⁸

Perhaps because foreign policy questions were not candidly discussed, there was an even stronger protest against the secrecy surrounding the Dumbarton Oaks conference than might have occurred otherwise. The government was partly to blame. Having heralded the gathering of the powers then meeting in the capital to prepare the UN blueprint and having opened the proceedings amid loud fanfare, the delegations proceeded to operate in close to absolute secrecy. Undersecretary Edward R. Stettinius, who headed the American group, handled the publicity matter badly from the outset. The irritation of capital correspondents, who had anticipated a freer flow of information, soon was reflected in stinging editorials attacking "Dumb Oaks" and asserting the public's right to know what was happening. Thus, another isolationist characteristic—dislike of secret diplomacy—reentered the picture.⁹

The private negotiations produced significant agreement, yet this success should not blind us to problems the diplomats postponed. One example was the future of dependent peoples. The British opposed discussion of the topic, and the Americans agreed, because of bureaucratic conflicts between the State Department and military leaders in the Pentagon over postwar bases.¹⁰ Although this problem involved not so much isolationist elements as it did the security question, the whole issue of postwar security via the UN did pose a dilemma, which at its root was tied in with fears of isolationism. This was the issue of the procedure by which the government would commit American troops to action under the UN. Would the representative on the Security Coun-

cil hold this power; would Congress, in effect, turn over its war declaring power to the executive branch? Or would Congress insist that this authority remain in its own hands, with Congress having to approve in advance each authorization of force via the UN?

No more serious constitutional issue faced the Americans as they forged ahead with the UN. Why was it not satisfactorily resolved? The problem was certainly recognized; it received considerable treatment at the time, ranging from scholarly treatises to popular radio forums. Despite this public attention, in which the preponderant theme was recognition that some standing authorization from Congress should be given to allow for rapid action in light of changes in military technology, the administration preferred to allow the matter to drift. Even though the president later came out for placing power in the hands of the executive branch, neither he nor the State Department pushed Congress for a commitment to this change. As had been the case in dealing with Congress in the thirties, the administration did not exert as much pressure on Congress as might have been justified by public support, out of fear of a head-on clash over the direction of foreign policy.

Hull and his successor, Stettinius, carefully courted congressional leaders on all UN questions. By this means the administration knew how sensitive and reluctant Congress was to diminish its control over war declaratory powers. The outcome was really a conspiracy of silence, in which the problem was postponed to be faced after the Senate had approved the yet to be written UN charter.¹¹ The entire episode was reminiscent of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches during 1919-1920. Even though less open than the bitter confrontations of the Wilson years, the issue at the time of Dumbarton Oaks was more significant. The Constitution's allocation of the power to declare war to Congress and the power to make war to the executive branch was one of the most important checks against the misuse of national power built into the federal system. The question was not squarely faced in the forties owing to fear both within the Roosevelt administration and among congressional UN supporters that it would raise antagonisms that might undercut the whole UN movement. Inherent in this failure was fear of isolationist opposition building around the question once it was faced. The pattern of the postwar years, in which presidents have resorted to police actions and waged war by gaining congressional support in a crisis situation, has created a condition in which the original provisions of the constitution have been twisted almost beyond recognition. That the question was not frankly broached during the war illustrates the problem inherent in the tension between involvement and non-involvement.

The administration's sensitivity over isolationism also possibly resulted in its failing to stand by an initial demand for veto free voting procedures in the UN in cases where a permanent power was party to a dispute. There were strong differences in the American delegation at Dumbarton Oaks over the extent of the veto, with the military repre-

sentatives and Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, favoring a more complete veto to mollify the Russians.¹² Roosevelt, Hull and Stettinius favored the more limited veto. Even after compromise on this issue at Yalta, the US delegation to the San Francisco conference wished there were some way to go back to the original US position. Truman shared this view, but at no time did the Americans press their private views. Partly this was out of concern that Russia would not accept it, but doubts that Congress would agree to any diminution of sovereignty were significant in the picture.¹³

As with the war declaring jurisdiction, the executive branch had no wish for confrontation with Congress. In both cases part of the motivation was to cooperate with Congress to assure smooth Senate approval of the UN Charter. There was also the real fear that these controversial questions would stir an isolationist reaction. Thus, relations between Congress and the executive branch were clearly limited. Interestingly, during the period when these important issues were being considered, there occurred an alarming weakening in public confidence about the future course of international relations. This coincided with the government's campaign to educate the public about the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, October 1944 to June 1945. In looking at this period historians have emphasized the overwhelming support for membership in the UN, pointing to the successful completion of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco as proof of the pudding. Indeed, one can cite impressive evidence: certain opinion polls; the overwhelming approval of the Senate; the warm support of newspaper editorials, speeches, and official statements.¹⁴ Closer examination reveals, I think, that some reappraisal is in order.

What occurred to crack the public optimism is primarily tied in with the events of the war in Europe. There was widespread anticipation in September and October 1944 that Germany would surrender soon, perhaps before the end of the year. Hitler's counter offensive on the western front in December shocked many Americans, who were surprised at this apparent evidence that Germany was stronger than previously believed. Public estimates of the length of the war shifted sharply, with most people thinking the war would continue as long as another full year.¹⁵

To this depressing circumstance was added a more significant one—the jockeying of Russia and Britain for advantage in Europe. Evidence of this developing struggle had accumulated in the form of reports from Harriman and other ambassadors on the President's and Secretary of State's desks for some months prior to December, when the Anglo-Soviet rivalry hit the American people fully for the first time.¹⁶ Having been led down the primrose path marked by government statements lauding Allied closeness and cooperation, the public was shocked to discover that out of the horror of war the old European depravities (as Americans saw them) of the balance of power, interference in internal affairs, and power politics seemed to be emerging once again.

The unpleasant truths first surfaced in Italy where the Bonomi

government grew steadily weaker in the fall and collapsed at the end of November. The emerging leadership of Count Carlo Sforza as possible premier or foreign minister signaled a leftward move. Churchill regarded Sforza as a Communist puppet and charged that he was violating an earlier pledge to abstain from political involvement. In December Churchill announced that Britain would withhold support of any Italian government which included Sforza in the cabinet.¹⁷

From London, Ambassador John G. Winant reported that Churchill was acting capriciously out of personal pique. Winant contended that Sforza's presence in the government did not portend a Communist takeover and that no vital British interests would be threatened by Sforza becoming foreign minister. Rather, the real culprit was Churchill who wanted an Italian government completely subject to British will.

The American press roundly criticized Churchill, arguing that the British were forgetting the Atlantic Charter and lapsing into their familiar style of power politics. Reporters besieged the State Department with inquiries as to the government's position on the Italian question. Secretary Stettinius responded personally by reading a statement on December 5:

The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair. . . . This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. . . . We have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from the outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regards to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories.¹⁸

Newspapers blazoned the American statement and by December 6 millions of people were reading about an Anglo-American split.

News from Greece compounded the Anglo-American crisis. A civil war erupted in Athens in early December in which British backed royalist forces were pitted against the Communist guerrilla National Liberation Front (EAM). American press coverage portrayed the guerrillas as freedom fighters, making light of their communist connections, while reporters' accounts and editorials painted the British as imperialists. The struggle in Greece raged throughout December with British military units in a conspicuous role. Finally Churchill and Foreign Minister Eden visited Athens and emerged with a truce.¹⁹

Much of the American anger with Britain represented a deep-seated distrust of British motives, harkening back to World War I and earlier, a feeling that the British were trying to use the Americans to keep their empire intact. Editors and commentators welcomed the State Department statement as proof that the United States was upholding the Atlantic Charter and telling Britain that Washington would not tolerate a return to imperialism. Statements of righteous indignation

came from Congress. In the Senate Allen Ellender (D.-La.) castigated Britain for "taking the lead in causing the disunity among the Allies." He charged that the British hoped to expand their already vast empire by forming power blocs "here and there all over the world." Stettinius reported to the President that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were "considerably aroused" by British actions in the Mediterranean. The committee had expressed itself as wanting the peoples to have complete freedom in choosing their government.²⁰

During this same period American alarm over Russian actions in Europe reached a new high. Russia's conduct in the earlier Warsaw uprising and the harsh armistice terms imposed on Rumania and Bulgaria created public uneasiness in America as to what the future held for Eastern Europe. By mid-December Stalin had concluded a twenty year alliance with the DeGaulle regime in France and seemed ready to recognize a separate Moscow dominated government for Poland. Hoping to forestall this last action, Roosevelt and Churchill had urged Stalin to wait until they could discuss Poland at the forthcoming Yalta meeting. Additionally, the two western allies issued statements indicating willingness to approve territorial changes mutually agreed upon between Russia and Poland.²¹

These European developments upset many Americans. They regarded Russia as generally preparing the ground for domination of Eastern Europe, while the British scrambled to control governments in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. There was particular sensitivity on Poland. Many citizens, notably the large ethnic groups of other eastern European nations, feared that the State Department was conniving at the political dissembling of the great powers and abandoning the promises of the Atlantic Charter. The President of the American-Polish Congress sent a wire to Roosevelt denouncing the British "abandonment of the Atlantic Charter" and claimed that both Russia and Britain were pursuing their own national interests at the expense of the common war aims of the United Nations.²² National concern over the erosion of American war aims was expressed with growing alarm as the month passed. The Catholic bishops of the United States, mindful of the fate of millions of the Church's faithful in Europe and the influence of their American descendents in the United States, issued a peace manifesto in early December condemning allied actions in Europe. "If public opinion is indifferent or uninformed, we shall run the risk of a bad peace and perhaps return to the tragedy of 'power politics', which in the past divided nations and sowed the seeds of war. . . . We have no confidence in a peace which does not carry into effect, without reservations or equivocations, the principles of the Atlantic Charter."²³

Roosevelt returned to the capital on December 19 from a three week vacation at the Little White House in Georgia. He immediately added to the furor over the Atlantic Charter when he responded to a reporter's question with the off-hand remark that neither he nor Churchill had ever signed an agreement at their Atlantic Conference

meeting in August 1941. He explained that the Charter was put out in the form of a press release and not a state paper. When the newspapers reported this remark as evidence that the administration was discarding the principles of the Charter, Roosevelt, at a press conference on December 22, tried to close the proverbial barn door by asserting that the goals of the Atlantic Charter still represented his views and that he stood squarely behind them.²⁴

To those in the Department of State who advocated the early establishment of an international organization, the most disturbing impact of the crisis in Allied relations was the damage to the people's faith in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The energetic campaign by the Department and private internationalist groups to sell the proposals to the people had stimulated wide discussion. There had been hundreds of suggestions for modification, all of which was healthy enough until the analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements got entangled in the disillusionment with events in Europe. Reports coming across Stettinius' desk by December 21 plainly showed that dangerous development.

A State Department survey of leading newspaper editors from all over the Midwest indicated that, while they supported the *idea* of a postwar organization, recent developments in eastern Europe and the Balkans had led them to conclude that a substantial reappraisal of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was necessary. Stettinius warned the President that unless the chief European Allies altered their policies in the liberated areas, "favorable action on the world security organization may be jeopardized," and the United States might retreat into isolationism.²⁵ Despite efforts to publicize the proposals, opinion polls indicated that ignorance of the structure and functions of the projected organization was widespread. The superficial knowledge thus demonstrated was ominous, for it indicated that national devotion to the cause of international organization might be artificial and turn toward isolationism.²⁶

Stettinius worked to elicit a vigorous, clarifying statement from the President on the goals and directions in United States foreign policy. At the first meeting of his Staff Committee Stettinius dwelt on the need to have the White House issue a strong statement, and Assistant Secretary Archibald MacLeish added that there was real danger that the presidential silence on foreign policy might make the public angry over what it deemed attempts to keep them in ignorance. Stettinius directed MacLeish to work with presidential speech writer Sam Rosenman on including a positive, forthright declaration of American goals in the forthcoming State of the Union message. When the Secretary of State met with Roosevelt, however, on December 30 he found the President inclined to avoid such a clear statement. Roosevelt believed that State Department recommendations "went a bit far at this time" and preferred to keep the State of the Union message confined to generalities, "that he should primarily say we had gone to war because we had been attacked by aggressors and that it was our desire to end the war and bring our troops home as soon as possible." Stettinius was distressed at Roosevelt's inclination to avoid asserting strong leadership

over developments in Allied relations. He pressed his point by showing Roosevelt public opinion polls gathered by the State Department which reflected increasing discontent among the people. He also noted privately of the President, "He did not show in his discussion with me the keen grasp I had hoped he would get from the memorandum we had sent to him." But Stettinius had no alternative under orders from the President except to have MacLeish and Matthews re-draft the foreign policy section of the State of the Union message.²⁷

Reports from public opinion expert Hadley Cantril emphasized the importance of Stettinius' effort to obtain a strong presidential statement on foreign policy. Cantril reported to the White House and State Department a deterioration in public confidence regarding the conduct of foreign policy. While Americans backed the UN concept, their attitudes were disjointed. There was no clear, deep commitment:

With opinion uncrystallized and with people generally disinterested in the mechanics needed to achieve lasting peace, there is little doubt that they expect and desire strong leadership and would support the policies and mechanics the President felt necessary to achieve the ideals he has expressed. . . .²⁸

With the President relying too much on his own influence over Stalin and Churchill, the State Department, which had taken charge of building public support for the UN, was left to look at the gloomy harvest of public attitudes in the difficult period of the winter of 1944-1945. On January 3, the Division of Public Liaison reported to Secretary Stettinius that the public "continues to feel a marked deterioration" in international relations. Experts attributed this to distaste for British and Russian power politics and efforts to carve out spheres of influence. Polls showed the people suffering "basic conflicts"; idealists were pressing for a greater sense of moral purpose and adherence to the Atlantic Charter; nationalists questioning the magnitude of sacrifice and thinking the US had better pull out of European affairs altogether; realists wanting to continue prosecuting the war and fearing a trend toward isolationism. The report indicated deepening pessimism as to whether Congress would back membership in the UN and concluded:

In view of the *volatile* character of American opinion—its excessive sensitivity to specific events frequently oversimplified and inadequately understood—a heavy responsibility devolves on those who can, in their day-to-day writings, do much to establish a valid *frame of reference* for the public judgment.²⁹

Simultaneously, Archibald MacLeish told the top-level Staff Committee that the people were confused over the purpose of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and could not tell if the proposals were simply a trial balloon or constituted an actual basis for negotiations. In a special report to Roosevelt the State Department had to admit that after three months of publicity only 43% of the people had even heard of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Of those who knew of them half "have no opinion as to whether the Proposals provide a 'real and practical' basis

for setting up an international organization to maintain world peace.”³⁰

Further deterioration in support of the UN policy resulted from recent events in Europe. A mid-January analysis of opinion, prepared for Roosevelt, found that 52% of the public disapproved of Britain's military role in Greece, yet people opposed the US taking a more active role in direct aid to liberated nations. The number of Americans discontented over relations with Britain and Russia had nearly doubled during December, rising from 28% to 44%. Most significant, half of the people believed that European developments would make it harder for the UN to succeed, six percent thought the UN could not possibly succeed now, while only 20% thought European events would have little impact on it.³¹

At the heart of the problem was the dilemma between the idealism expressed in world cooperation through the UN and the self-interests of the great powers. State Department officials clearly recognized it. In a Secretary's Staff Committee meeting on February 9 top officials considered a report which warned that government spokesmen had misrepresented the UN by claiming it could stop war by force. Perhaps because many Americans continued to lack understanding of the essential nature of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, they had grasped this unreal concept of the UN's powers. Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson warned that the government must make clear that the UN's success depended upon great power cooperation. This unity, in turn, rested on the powers' reaching accommodation among themselves outside of the UN framework regarding wartime political and territorial problems. Nelson Rockefeller added, “if we should follow this policy of candor the American people would probably feel at first a sense of shock, but . . . this would be followed by a feeling of much greater realism.” MacLeish concurred that unless the administration made the public aware of the differences between disputes of the smaller nations, which the UN could handle, and the differences among great powers, which they must settle among themselves, “. . . the disillusionment of the American people will be greater than after the last war.”³²

Roosevelt counted on personal diplomacy at the summit and the agreements he reached as sufficient to bolster flagging public support and divert congressional criticism. For a brief period after publication of the Yalta communique public confidence did revive; the mood might even be called euphoric. Events in Europe, deadlocks among the powers over Poland, and other issues soon showed that Yalta had simply raised false hopes. If anything, Roosevelt misled the people about the depth of Allied unity, thus contributing to the public disillusionment after the war.

Although State Department spokesmen were anxious to correct errors in public thinking, they never succeeded. This was largely because the President persisted in believing that he could provide sufficient public guidance through his summit diplomacy, reports to the nation, and news conferences. Roosevelt never acknowledged that the gap perceived by the State Department existed. Secretary Stettinius,

abroad at the Mexico City conference and then preoccupied with preparing the American delegation for the UN conference, neglected to urge a more candid policy on the President. Thus, although public opinion continued by a large majority to support US participation in the UN, Americans remained ignorant of how the UN would actually work and what limitations existed in its powers. The State Department's Division of Public Liaison concluded on the eve of the San Francisco Conference that:

The significant increase in popular support for American participation in an international peace organization has not been accompanied by widespread familiarity with the facts about America's record of international cooperation. Despite public discussion of the League of Nations and other international organizations; the general public remains largely uninformed as to whether the United States had participated in the most outstanding international organizations.³³

This lack of public comprehension raised questions in the State Department about the stability of American commitment to the UN policy. In fact, events showed that public commitment was shallow. The war conditioned Americans to think in black and white terms. In the shock of the early cold war the public easily transferred its antipathy from fascism to communism, thereby missing almost completely the noncommunist force of revolutionary nationalism that was at work.

In the spring of 1945, the UN policy was becoming increasingly illusory. To most people it offered an easy means of avoiding hard thinking about foreign problems. It was easy to support the general idea without knowing what responsibilities membership would entail. The UN promised a maximum of security for a minimum American military investment, and in its idealistic cloak, it appealed to the utopian streak in Americans.

The administration continued to rely on the UN policy, but was now using it to cover its secret review of Soviet relations. This review was undermining the UN policy, though government simultaneously assured the public that all was well. Thus in the spring of 1945 the gap between official rhetoric and official fears grew ever wider.

Recurring signs of isolationism can be found, of course, in areas other than America's UN policy. There was a greater preoccupation among Americans with post-war domestic matters than with foreign policy. Roosevelt had continually been concerned that the American people would not support any long-range troop presence overseas; and the pressure for rapid demobilization after the war backs up his perception as accurate. Americans were manifesting their time honored penchant for winning the war, then returning to their primary concerns with opportunities at home. People were more interested in and anxious about jobs, staving off a new depression, and higher wages, than the shape of postwar foreign policy. Public attitudes after the war, at least to the point of the Truman Doctrine message, reflected a war weariness and a wariness toward overseas involvement. For example, a ma-

jority of people believed that allied nations should repay lend-lease aid, and 60% of the people opposed postwar loans to Britain and Russia. The Truman administration had doubts about its ability to persuade the public to assume the burdens of confronting the Russian challenge, and not until after a strong presidential and government propaganda campaign did it succeed in winning support for the Marshall program in 1947.³⁴

The opposition of Ohio's Robert Taft toward the Marshall plan and later on committing US troops in Europe's NATO defense is well known. Contemporary observers even saw in the early 1950s a "new isolationism" in America.³⁵

Was isolationism in this period influential? Yes, in that it reinforced the tendency of spokesmen in both the second Truman administration and Eisenhower's administration to make promises in Congressional hearings on proposed defense treaties which understated the possibilities of committing US forces overseas.³⁶ Its influence was not critical in that the American government had earlier adopted the course of building a western entente and making the US the bulwark of the free world's struggle against communist expansionism. The point at which isolationism exerted a policy changing influence came in 1944-1945. The Roosevelt administration approached the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations on international organization in the grip of the fear of the havoc isolationism had wrought in past years. In fact, numerous isolationist elements surfaced between August 1944 and June 1945. Wise and determined presidential leadership during this critical period, I contend, could have put to rest the fears of many Americans. Despite their misgivings, most people looked with hope toward international organization and would have supported a stronger charter than was written by the San Francisco conference. The people cried out for greater candor from the White House.

Why did Roosevelt fail to exercise the needed initiative? Was it because of his deteriorating health? In part, perhaps, for the time in question coincides with the president's steady physical decline. It could be argued that he no longer had the resources required for bold leadership.³⁷ Yet he rose to the occasion during the 1944 election and at Yalta he maintained a demanding schedule and seemed able to make numerous major decisions. Roosevelt bowed to isolationist pressures less out of reasons of health than because it went against his political nature to be fully honest with the American people. Perhaps Roosevelt's guile is best understood when we realize that he was never as fully committed to internationalist thinking as Wilson.³⁸

To what degree was the President a realist? A realistic policy in 1945 required that he frankly inform the public about the security interests of Russia and Britain and utilize government agencies to educate the people about limitations in the principle of self-determination for regions such as eastern Europe. Secondly, Roosevelt would need to have pushed harder for a stronger UN. It may not be too far-fetched to envision Russian agreement to a more limited veto in exchange for Ameri-

can support of the Soviet proposed UN air force and a genuine role for Russia as a trustee nation.

These alternatives to Roosevelt's actual course of action should not ignore the problem of Russia's motives and policies. Given Stalin's situation in 1944-1945, serious postwar tensions were probably unavoidable. This still does not absolve Roosevelt of missing a great opportunity—perhaps the only chance—of avoiding the bitterness of the Cold War. For whatever reasons, Roosevelt did miss his chance. The impact of isolationism at the end of World War II left the people confused and fearful as they moved into the postwar years. It was the seedbed of disillusionment and the turn toward nationalism and reliance on military force in the following years.

FOOTNOTES

¹ William H. McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, 1953), p. 501.

² Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945-1950," in Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 196-206.

³ Warren B. Walsh, "American Attitudes toward Russia," *The Antioch Review*, 7 (1947-1948), 185.

⁴ Robert A. Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II* (Baltimore, 1969), pp. 65-66.

⁵ The United States, Russia, Britain, with China replacing Russia for a second phase of the conversations.

⁶ *The New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1944; *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 21, 1944; *New York Herald-Tribune*, Aug. 22, 1944; *Brooklyn Eagle*, Aug. 22, 1944; *New York Journal-American*, Aug. 28, 1944; *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 6, pp. 7334-7336.

⁷ *New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1944; *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 21, 1944; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Aug. 21, 1944; *New Republic*, 111 (Aug. 28, 1944), pp. 237, 247.

⁸ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., calendar notes, Aug. 21 and Aug. 22, 1944; Stettinius-Hull, transcript of telephone conversation, Aug. 20, 1944, The Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Papers, Charlottesville, Va.; Josephus Daniels to Hull, Sept. 12, 1944, The Papers of Cordell Hull, Library of Congress; Stettinius, Dumbarton Oaks Diary, Sept. 17, 1944, Stettinius Papers; Hugh R. Wilson to Dulles, Oct. 14, 1944, The John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library; Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York, 1967), pp. 237-242.

⁹ *Washington Star*, Aug. 21, 1944; *New York Herald-Tribune*, Aug. 21, 1944; *Chicago Tribune*, Aug. 22, 1944; *Washington Post*, Aug. 23, 1944; *Brooklyn*

Eagle, Aug. 24, 1944; *New York Sun*, Aug. 24, 1944; *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 2 and Sept. 13, 1944; Dept. of State, Press and Radio News Conferences, transcript, Sept. 4, 1944; Stettinius, Dumbarton Oaks Diary, Sept. 4, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

¹⁰ Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereafter, *FRUS*), 1944, vol. 1, *General*, pp. 699-705; Ruth Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1941-1945* (Washington, 1958), pp. 175-177.

¹¹ Examples of important works in 1944 include Dexter Perkins, *America and Two Wars* (Boston, 1944); Edward S. Corwin, *The Constitution and World Organization* (Princeton, 1944); Kenneth Colegrove, *The American Senate and World Peace* (New York, 1944); Stettinius, Dumbarton Oaks Diary, Sept. 17, 1944; S. Shephard Jones to Breckinridge Long, Nov. 22, 1944; Stettinius-Connally, transcript of telephone conversation, Mar. 15, 1945, Stettinius Papers. Significant insight into why the Republicans did not push for a decision on the use of force issue is provided by correspondence in the Dulles Papers: letters between Vandenberg and Dulles, Sept. 6, 9, and 11, 1944, July 3, 1945; Dulles to Hugh R. Wilson with enclosure, Sept. 21, 1944; Wilson to Dulles, Sept. 23, 1944, Dulles Papers.

¹² Thomas M. Campbell, *The Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-1945* (Tallahassee, 1973), pp. 38-40, 53-55.

¹³ Stettinius calendar notes, May 23, 1945, Stettinius Papers.

¹⁴ Dorothy B. Robins, *Experiment in Democracy: The Story of U.S. Citizens Organizations in Forging the Charter of the United Nations* (New York, 1971), pp. 62-72, 79-80, 82-84, 91-99.

¹⁵ *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 9 (Spring, 1945), 91.

¹⁶ *FRUS*, 1944, IV, *Europe*, pp. 233-289, 855, 883-884, 908-911, 1372, 1415-1416.

¹⁷ Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning* (Boston, 1968), pp. 574-582; Stettinius Record, vol. 1, pp. 7-10, Stettinius Papers.

¹⁸ *Washington Times-Herald*, Dec. 7, 1944; *New Republic*, 111 (Dec. 11, 1944), 783-784; *Dept. of State Bulletin*, 11 (Dec. 10, 1944), 722.

¹⁹ *FRUS*, 1944, vol. 5, *The Near East, South Asia, Africa, the Far East*, pp. 141-161; Eden, *The Reckoning*, pp. 574-582.

²⁰ Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York, 1968), pp. 99, 96-98; *Time*, 44 (Dec. 18, 1944), 17; *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pt. 7, pp. 8975-8976.

²¹ *House of Commons Debates*, Dec. 14, 1944, 5th ser., vol. 406, col. 1481; *New York Post*, Dec. 18, 1944; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, pp. 150-151.

²² *Chicago Polish Daily News*, Dec. 15, 1944; *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pt 7, pp. 9662-9663.

²³ *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 1944, pt. 11, pp. A4643-A4644.

²⁴ *New York Times*, Dec. 20 and Dec. 23, 1944.

²⁵ Stettinius to Roosevelt, Memorandum with enclosed "Observations from the Midwest," Dec. 21, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

²⁶ Dept. of State, "Fortnightly Surveys of American Opinion on International Affairs, December: Last Half," No. 18, Jan. 6, 1945, Stettinius Papers.

²⁷ Secretary's Staff Committee, minutes, Dec. 20, 1944; Stettinius calendar notes, Dec. 30, 1944, Stettinius Papers.

- ²⁸ James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970), p. 559.
- ²⁹ Dept. of State, Div. of Public Liaison, "The Present Climate of Opinion in the U.S. on International Developments," Jan. 3, 1945, Stettinius Papers.
- ³⁰ Secretary's Staff Committee, minutes, Jan. 3, 1945; memorandum for the President, "Latest Opinions in the U.S.A.," Jan. 6, 1945, Stettinius Papers.
- ³¹ Hayden Raynor, memorandum for the President, "American Opinion on Selected Questions," Jan. 16, 1945, Stettinius Papers.
- ³² Secretary's Staff Committee, minutes, Feb. 9, 1945; Staff Committee Document #48, "Information Program with Respect to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals," Feb. 6, 1945, Stettinius Papers.
- ³³ Dept. of State, Div. of Public Liaison, "Latest Opinion Trends," Feb. 23 and Mar. 10, 1945, and "Public Reaction to the Voting Formula for the Proposed Security Council," Mar. 27, 1945, Stettinius Papers. A poll by the American Institute of Public Opinion on April 24, 1945 bears out the worry of government leaders. While 67% of the people claimed to have read or heard about the UN Conference in San Francisco, only 34% of this group correctly knew its actual function. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 9 (Summer, 1945), 248.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 9 (Winter, 1945-1946), 532-533; John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), pp. 337-338, 341-346. One of the best analyses of Roosevelt's leadership dilemma is in Burns, *Soldier of Freedom*, pp. 548-552, 590-593.
- ³⁵ E.g., Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," *Atlantic Monthly*, 189 (May, 1952), 34-38.
- ³⁶ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York, 1967), pp. 77, 166-167.
- ³⁷ On various stages of Roosevelt's health during his last year see Burns, *Soldier of Freedom*, pp. 447-450, 498, 533, 573, 581-582. A good earlier summary was done by Henry E. Bateman, "Observations on President Roosevelt's Health during World War II," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 46 (June, 1956), 82-102.
- ³⁸ Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II*, pp. 56-71.

UNTAPPED RESOURCES FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By MILTON O. GUSTAFSON

My subject is untapped resources for American diplomatic history. Not everything I am going to mention is really untapped—although some of it is—but these resources all have not and are not being fully exploited. I will discuss the records resources in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service, and, more specifically, those in the custody of the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives.

The first step to understand the untapped resources of the National Archives and Records Service is to know what NARS is and does. Since 1950 NARS has been one of the constituent services of the General Services Administration, the independent agency that provides building, equipment, supply, communication, and other services to all other federal agencies. NARS provides records service.

One office in NARS, the Office of Records Management, helps agencies, when asked, to solve problems in the creation and filing of current records, in reducing paperwork, and cutting red tape. Last year their studies resulted in a saving to the taxpayer of \$31 million.

Another office is in charge of the fourteen federal records centers located throughout the country. Each year these centers receive over one million cubic feet of records no longer needed in offices, thus avoiding about \$10 million in storage and filing costs.

When the records of a federal agency are deemed worthy of permanent value, they are transferred to a third office—the Office of the National Archives. Our job is to preserve these records and make them available for use. To do so, we must arrange and describe them, and, increasingly, declassify them.

A fourth office has charge of presidential libraries. The papers of the President, and the records of the White House during his presidency, belong to him and are not legally federal records to be deposited in the National Archives. Recent Presidents have chosen to preserve those documents and make them available for use in their own buildings. Although the presidential library is built privately, it is administered by NARS.

A fifth office of NARS provides resources through its publications. The Office of the Federal Register publishes the administrative rules and regulations of federal agencies in the daily *Federal Register* and the periodic compilations in the *Code of Federal Regulations*. It publishes laws in the Statutes at Large. And it publishes what the President says and does in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* and the annual *Public Papers of the President*.

Now that I have explained what NARS is and does, we can turn to a discussion of those untapped records resources in the National Ar-

chives and how you can find out more about them.

Unfortunately, the only comprehensive guide to the records in the National Archives was published in 1948. It is out of date and out of print. A new *Guide* has been written, and will be published as soon as it can move successfully from the hands of computer technicians to the printed page. But there are numerous other guides and finding aids that are currently available.

There are guides to materials relating to the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Latin America, and reference information papers on materials relating to Russia, the Middle East, the Independence of Latin American Nations, and Rumania. In addition, there are preliminary inventories or special lists that describe specific groups of records.

Another good way to find out what is available is to read *Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives*. Most of the articles are based on records in NARS and illustrate how they can be used. One of the best examples is the article by Thomas A. Bryson, "The Federal Career of Walter George Smith," in the Fall 1972 issue. There is also a section in *Prologue* that provides information about new accessions of records in the National Archives, the Presidential Libraries, and the Federal Records Centers.

The best means to determine the availability of NARS material related to your topic is to write a letter to NARS, Washington, D.C. 20408. That letter will be opened and sent to all of the offices that might have information necessary for a reply. The reply might well indicate that records of interest to the pertinent topic are available on microfilm through our microfilm publication program.

At the present time there are approximately 100,000 rolls of microfilm containing about 100 million pages of documentary materials available. Included are practically all of the correspondence files of the State Department through 1906, and many of the most important subject files for the 1910-29 period. The next edition of the National Archives Catalog of microfilm publications—when *it* can successfully move from the hands of the computer technicians to the printed page—will provide a roll-by-roll breakdown of all of these microfilm publications.

The reply to your letter might indicate that there are certain specific documents or files that relate to your topic, and these can be microfilmed or xeroxed and sent to you. Or, the reply might state that the records of interest to you have not been microfilmed, or that there are no single documents and files that can be reproduced, and that there is no alternative for you except to come to the National Archives, find your own records, and do your own research. And that does not have to be the terrifying experience that many people think it will be.

The National Archives Building is located at 8th and Pennsylvania Avenue and opens at 8:45 a.m. The first step is to get a research card and talk to a reference specialist who will direct you to offices and archivists who will provide specific assistance. The records you choose

to examine will be sent to a central research room, and they will be kept there as long as you want them. That room is open until 10 p.m. Monday through Friday, and 8:45 to 5:00 on Saturday.

The historical researchers who use our resources, either by mail or in person, can be divided into three main categories. The first are those who have comprehensive topics, such as U.S. relations with Japan from 1937-1941, and who must examine a vast amount of material among the holdings of several different offices. The second are those who wish to examine a small and specific body of records relating to a specific topic, usually for a master's thesis or article or perhaps a dissertation. The third are those who want to examine only a few isolated documents that relate in some way to a larger theme or topic. Researchers in this third category usually know exactly what they want, and it is a relatively easy job for us to assist them. For those in the first or second categories, it would probably be helpful if they knew a little about the way the records of the State Department are arranged.

The National Archives has organized the records of the State Department into eleven different record groups. Record Group 59 is the General Records of the Department of State. The 19,000 cubic feet of records in this record group are divided into two large sub-groups called central file records, which have been the ones most used by diplomatic historians, and non-central file records. It is helpful to know that the central file records are divided into three main time periods (1789-1906, 1906-10, 1910-49) because of the way the State Department originally filed its records.

The records in the central file dated before 1906 consist primarily of correspondence—instructions, despatches, notes, and letters—filed by country or city in chronological order. Because of this arrangement, it is much easier to use records of this period for biographical topics or general topics relating to U.S. relations with a specific country. All of the reports or despatches that our first Minister to China, Caleb Cushing, sent to the State Department are filed together in chronological order in two bound volumes, and there are 131 bound volumes of despatches from the U.S. Minister in China to the State Department for the period from 1843 to 1906.

There are countless stories reported in these letters that could be retold by historians. For example, there was the incident at Toulon on May 1, 1834, when the frigate *United States* fired a 21-gun salute in honor of the birthday of the French King. Unfortunately, three cannon were armed with shot. A direct hit was scored on a French battleship, killing two and wounding four. The speed with which Congress voted pensions for the widows tells us something about U.S.-French relations during the age of Jackson.

The central file for the 1906-10 period is a subject file called the Numerical File. That filing system lasted less than five years because it was impossible to determine what was a subject. There was no way to determine, for example, if a despatch from the U.S. Minister in Cuba should be the first document in a new subject file previously created.

As the number of different subject files approached 29,000, the State Department switched to a more complex subject filing system—the Decimal File.

In the Decimal File, each subject has a predetermined decimal file number, like 763.72119 for documents relating to the ending of World War I, or 862.20212 for German military activities in Mexico, or 393.1163 for protection of American religious missions in China. There are literally thousands of separate subject files in the Decimal File that have never been used. Decimal file 800.6232, for example, relates to international protection of migratory birds and the conflicts between treaties and state hunting laws. There are other environmental and ecological subjects that are waiting to be studied.

The Numerical File and the Decimal File are more valuable for historical research than the earlier files because they also contain internal memorandums of the State Department as well as correspondence. Some of these memorandums are formal position papers, but more often they are simply chits or notes attached to the correspondence. The need to write and file memorandums reflected the growth of the diplomatic bureaucracy in the twentieth century. The geometric growth of that bureaucracy during World War II resulted in a breakdown in the record-keeping system. Since action offices could no longer depend on finding important documents in the central file, they began to establish their own office files.

For example, anyone working on postwar planning must use the Harley Notter files. Notter, who later wrote a State Department publication on postwar foreign policy planning, gathered together during the war a master file of documentation of the various committees involved in postwar planning. Leo Pasvolsky, a special assistant to Cordell Hull, also kept his own file of records relating to his activities. Documentation relating to the Office of European Affairs during the war may be found among the files of H. Freeman Matthews and John D. Hickerson. While he was Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius kept a diary or record of notes and summaries of events written from his vantage point.

There are other records in Record Group 59, not in the central file, that are untapped resources. Some 350 feet of letters relate to applications and recommendations for positions in the foreign service and other offices for the period 1789-1901. Who were these people, what were their qualifications, why did they apply, and what differences are there between those who received appointments and those who did not? The significance of a single letter, such as A. Lincoln's letter to Daniel Webster in 1849 recommending a "tired printer" for a consular post in Scotland because his wife was Scotch and wanted to visit Scotland, has to be judged in relationship to other letters in the file. They do tell us a lot about local politics.

There is a small quantity of records relating to the activities of John A. Kasson, the Reciprocity Commissioner from 1897 to 1907. This

office had full powers to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with foreign governments.

Although the State Department established a War History Branch to draft studies and compile a history of the Department's activities during World War II, the office was abolished before its work was completed. Nevertheless, anyone working on World War II ought to examine these records to gain a better understanding of the administrative history of the Department during the war.

One of these wartime offices was the Division of Defense Materials, established in 1941 to assist in developing policies and programs for procurement, shipping, and supplying of strategic materials for the war effort. No one has used these records.

Also during World War II, the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, which moved to the State Department after the abolition of the OSS, prepared reports for informational and intelligence purposes on cultural, economic, military, political, and social matters of most areas of the world. Topics of these reports range from a study of the importance of salt in a country's economy to a strategic survey of Pitcairn's Island.

Another untapped resource are the records relating to General George Marshall's mission to China, 1945-47. Many of these documents have been published in several volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series, but the original records have not been used because of declassification problems. Although the State Department documents in this file have been declassified, the military documents have not. Until the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues guidelines to our newly-functioning Declassification Division, there is nothing that it can do.

My final example from Record Group 59 is a small body of records dated 1960-62 relating to activities of the United States Citizens Commission on NATO, established to meet with similar citizens commissions in the other NATO countries "to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed to the end that democratic freedom may be promoted by economic and political means."

The second record group for State Department records is Record Group 84, the records of the Foreign Service posts of the Department of State. These are the records created, received, and filed at the U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates all over the world. Most researchers prefer to use State Department records for correspondence between the Department and the post, but the post records do have some unique documentation. The records of the diplomatic missions, for example, include correspondence with subordinate consular offices and the notes exchanged with the foreign office of the host country. The most valuable part of the records of the consular posts is the miscellaneous correspondence—correspondence with American businessmen or local officials not otherwise referred to Washington.

It is not easy to use the post records for research. Records from many posts have been lost or disarranged, and record-keeping practices were not uniform. In general, before 1912 the records are arranged

by series, similar to the Department's filing system for records dated before 1906; after 1912 the posts used the same decimal filing system as the State Department, but the files were broken yearly.

An example of untapped resources in this record group are those records that relate to the work of the consular courts established in those countries in which the United States had extraterritorial jurisdiction. For the period 1927-47 there are 20 boxes of Casablanca Consular Court records containing 333 civil case files and 182 criminal case files. What was the quality of justice provided by the American Consul in Casablanca? One American, charged and convicted for assault and battery in 1935, was fined 10 francs and costs. Since court costs were 32 francs, the total fine was 42 francs, or \$1.63.

Records relating to American participation in international conferences and commissions are in Record Group 43. For the most part these are the conference documents and records maintained at the site of the conference, and there are related records in the central file in Record Group 59. Included in Record Group 43 are the records of the European Advisory Commission, established in 1943 and superceded by the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1946. There are also separate series of records for the World War II conferences at Moscow, Teheran, Cairo, Alexandria, Bretton Woods, Yalta, and Potsdam. Much of this material has been printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, but some of the items that were not printed may also be useful. For example, omitted from the printed account in the *Yalta* volume of the dinner of the heads of states on February 10, 1945, is the following: "The Prime Minister in an aside to the President said he did not have a very high opinion of Ernest Bevin who he felt had merely been waiting during the war for the worst catastrophes to happen."

There are four other State Department record groups that relate to the history of the World War II period. Record Group 353 has records of intra- and inter-departmental committees, such as the State-War-Navy and State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committees. There are also separate record groups for the records of the Office of War Information, the Office of Inter-American Affairs, and the Foreign Economic Administration.

For the World War I period, there is a separate record group for the records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Besides a large subject file of records relating to the work of the conference, this record group also contains the reports and correspondence of the American Inquiry that preceded the peace conference.

Very few people use the records in Record Group 76 relating to boundary commissions, claims commissions, and American participation in internal arbitrations. For example, the boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua was set by treaty in 1858, but questions of interpretation were submitted to President Grover Cleveland as the arbitrator, and the United States was also represented on the boundary commission which marked the boundary in 1900.

Another area of research that is little used is that relating to the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. These agreements have all been printed, but David Hunter Miller's multi-volume scholarly analysis of these documents—that rank with the Constitution and laws as the supreme law of the land—ends in 1863. Practically nothing has been done with the unperfected treaties, those treaties that have been signed but have not gone into effect for a variety of reasons—the refusal of the Senate to approve them, or the President to ratify them, or a failure of ratification in the other country. One of these unperfected treaties, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925, has been formally withdrawn from the unperfected treaty file and is now (February 1973) before the Senate.

The earliest records in the custody of the Diplomatic Branch are the papers of the Continental and Confederation Congresses. In 1971 NARS established a Center for the Documentary Study of the American Revolution to provide assistance for scholars working in the 1774-1789 period. The records of this period have never been satisfactorily indexed. With the aid of a two-year \$150,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, the Center is preparing a computer-assisted index to these records.

Diplomatic historians of the American Revolution and the Confederation period have relied on the printed compilations of documents, but some of this reliance may be misplaced. Jared Sparks first published *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution*, but his carelessness and obvious errors of omission and commission led to the publication of a new edition by Francis Wharton. But Wharton's edition also has its defects. A comparison of the originals of six Adams letters with the Wharton versions reveals at least 30 errors of omission and commission.

Although no comparison has been made, to my knowledge, between the printed diplomatic correspondence for the 1783-1789 period and the originals, it would be very surprising if there are not gaps as well as numerous transcription errors in these as well. The materials were compiled under the direction of a State Department clerk, William A. Weaver, who prepared the seven volumes for publication in only two years.

The printed diplomatic correspondence by itself, of course, tells only part of the story of our diplomacy. When using the microfilm copy of the original records, researchers have available to them the committee reports, journals, drafts and proposals for treaties and agreements, as well as other pertinent documentation that is not included in the Wharton and Weaver publications.

I wish to emphasize that researchers need to recognize the limitations of federal records in the National Archives. The people who write the papers that get filed in federal agencies do so for a bureaucratic

reason, and that reason is sometimes not related to history as it really happened. It is not “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” With a seal and a ribbon I can authenticate copies of documents in my custody, but I cannot authenticate the accuracy of what is stated in the document—only that it is a true copy. It is the task of the researcher, the historian, to evaluate the authenticity of the documents he examines.

TEXTS AND TEACHING: A PROFILE OF HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1972

By SANDRA CARUTHERS THOMSON
and
CLAYTON A. COPPIN, JR.

How do teachers of the history of American foreign relations see themselves and their discipline? What teaching methods do they use, what strengths and weaknesses do they identify in the field, and how have recent events affected their outlook? Probably every diplomatic historian has his own opinions on these matters, gathered as our own were from informal talks with colleagues, ideas exchanged at professional meetings, and from the media. For more than idle speculation, however, some concrete data was required. After some thought, the authors of this paper decided to compose a questionnaire, to acquire factual data about age, training, personal opinions about approach to the subject, and to look at the effect of certain events on one's outlook. In order to obtain a sample which would include most of those teaching diplomatic history in colleges and universities in the United States, we mailed the questions (see Appendix) to those on the current membership list of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Of the 450 we mailed out, 197 were returned and of those, 182 were usable, a relatively large response. Our tacit assumption (unfortunately untested), was that the great majority of the SHAFR membership were historians trained in, and teaching American diplomatic history.

The areas of interest we addressed ourselves to were several. First, we sought some data on those who are teaching courses on the history of American diplomacy or American foreign relations. We wished to learn the ages of the recipients, where they had been educated, and how they taught the subject—what texts, problems and documentary collections and monographs were used. Second, we were curious as to their particular interpretation of the subject matter. Did the “labels” applied in problems books correspond to the self-perceptions of those teaching the subject? Third, we wished to determine the effect of current and controversial events on the respondents. Few events in American history have provoked such agonizing and soul-searching as the American involvement in Vietnam. Since 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson chose not to seek reelection rather than to risk repudiation for his war policies, Americans in all walks of life have sought answers to the many problems posed by our continuing involvement in the war. Several years ago, Daniel Ellsberg reached his private verdict against further implication in a policy he could no longer support, and began the unauthorized publication of the famed *Pentagon Papers*.

The popular debate over the war, of course, has helped stimulate the revision of American history being undertaken by the scholars gen-

erally termed the "New Left." It was apparent that some American diplomatic historians, concerned about the war itself, were perceiving implications for earlier periods of American foreign policy from their conclusions about Vietnam and the Cold War. Judging from the endless variety of problems books and readers pouring from the presses, diplomatic historians were as disturbed as the general public by the Vietnam debate, and questions asked about the war were leading some to a re-examination of long held assumptions about the wisdom of formerly unchallenged decisions in foreign affairs.

How many in the field of American foreign relations were so moved? Was the "New Left" just a strident and vocal minority among the conservative or moderate majority? We sought to quantify the data about the effect of the war, the publication of the *Pentagon Papers* and political preferences and to compare these data to reach some conclusions. The results of the study have been gratifying, enlightening, and frustrating, for we discovered some of the limitations of the questionnaire approach and the difficulties in analyzing the information we had obtained.

Before explaining the outcome of the project, we must identify some of the problems encountered. One respondent remarked, "You will learn less than you think," which was, thanks to the computer, quite untrue. We learned much more than can be presented in this brief paper. However, composing a questionnaire is in the same league with wording a true-false test. The gap between what the questioner seeks to learn and the way in which the respondent reacts to the words used is hard to perceive in advance, and thus poses problems very difficult to overcome. A few, perhaps a half-dozen of the recipients, were so offended by the questions that they not only refused to answer but also sent us hostile communications heaping opprobrium on our heads, damning our motives, and even suspecting our source of funds (which came largely from our own pockets). Others raised quite legitimate complaints about our use of a 1-7 rating scale (which, for purposes of computerizing the results, was far too broad, allowing too many choices). They also castigated our use of such undefined terms as "traditional" and "radical." A number objected to our limiting their response to the Vietnam War to a simplistic continuum from "immediate withdrawal" to "indefinite presence." Some felt that, despite our guarantees of their anonymity, questions about their political behavior were, to quote, "none of your damned business." Some of these complaints we had anticipated but had decided to ignore because of another consideration: The desire to make the questionnaire short enough to tempt more people to take the time to answer it. In this day of the deluge of paper, brevity and simplicity are sometimes greater virtues than absolute accuracy of detail. And, after all, we are all called upon to make choices between less-than-optimal alternatives and denied the opportunity to make our feelings "perfectly clear" by means of a position paper. Since we wished to computerize the results, we had also to keep the questions simple so the results could be transferred to punch cards.

Having perused the responses rather thoroughly, we can now make

some further criticisms of the approach. The wording did lead to ambiguity, although for some questions that was probably unavoidable. The profession itself cannot agree on whether to call those interpretations of American foreign policy that are generally supportive of past administrative decisions as nationalist, "establishment," traditional, consensus, or by the more obviously offensive label, "court historians." The term traditional seemed to us to be a fairly neutral one. An item we had not expected to be so controversial was the phrase "diplomatic history." A number of respondents felt the subject matter should properly be designated foreign relations, and from some of their criticisms it was apparent that the Association's membership is split among historians, some of whom took the opportunity to castigate the "social scientists" for infringing on their "turf," and political scientists and international relations specialists, some of whom felt that any association with the word "history" was contaminating; others wished in addition to avoid the narrowness implied by the original phrase. It was obvious that we should have asked the respondents to identify the specific area of their own training.

The nature of the sample also can be open to some criticism. From the data on age groups, it will be seen that the respondents covered the spectrum well. However, it was impossible to determine, since the questionnaire specified anonymity, just who answered; did we hear primarily from the younger or less-well-known members of the group? We can state only that the respondents were all members of SHAFR; not all of them are currently teaching diplomatic history, although most are. About a dozen recipients returned unanswered questionnaires because they were not now teaching the subject. However, we did use responses from teachers trained in foreign relations who were not currently teaching it, including a few from graduate teaching assistants, and historians working in research positions for the federal government. And, of course, we did not solicit responses from the many teachers of diplomatic history who are not members of SHAFR.

A further limitation in the usefulness of this project is the necessarily "dated" nature of the response. Political questions were exciting and very relevant in October 1972, but are perhaps less so now. With the end of the Vietnam War, the highly emotional effect it had on the study and teaching of American foreign relations will perhaps be lessened. The publication of the *Pentagon Papers* was replaced as an emotional issue by the Ellsberg-Russo trial, but the larger issue surrounding the extensive classification of government documents still remains. One respondent urged us to "applaud Nixon (if he wins) for dropping the majority of the restrictions on World War II documents and encourage him to drop the ban on material up through 1960. It might even make *him* look good." On this sensitive issue the views of the SHAFR membership can still be of considerable utility.

Since we were previously inexperienced in the use of the computer, we neglected to ask as many questions of it as we might have. We also found ourselves with far more data than we had imagined, and further

analysis seems to be merited along several lines. The project was itself a "learning experience," and the results have, in our minds, only confirmed the need for continuing self-evaluation of this branch of the academic profession.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

The average age of the respondents was 40.85 years. Those who answered the questionnaire ranged in age from 22 to 75. The regional location of the institutions where the respondents obtained their terminal degrees can be seen from Table 1. The mid-west produced 34.1% of the highest degrees (overwhelmingly Ph.D.'s). It was further apparent that no one school dominates in the production of doctorates in the history of American foreign relations. U.C. Berkeley, Wisconsin, and Harvard led with 10, 9, and 8 respectively, followed by Yale, Stanford, and the University of Virginia, but 130 were graduates of schools other than those. 79.7% said that U.S. Diplomatic was their primary area of interest, and they were apparently historians by and large.

TABLE I
Regional Location of Terminal Degrees

Region	Number of Responses	Percent of Responses
Northeast	31	17.0
Mid Atlantic	27	14.8
Southeast	17	9.3
Midwest	62	34.1
South	12	6.6
Rocky Mt. West	3	1.6
Pacific West	24	13.2
Other	5	2.7
No response	1	.5
Total	182	100.0

The average enrollment of the institutions where the respondents taught was between 7,500 and 10,000; however, 59% taught in schools with enrollments less than 5,000. 79% of the institutions were secular. 22.5% teach in the midwest, which produced more Ph.D.'s than are employed there. (See Table 2 for regional location of teaching institutions.) 125 of the respondents taught in universities, as opposed to colleges

(47) and junior colleges (5), but the universities were small (indicating that the more well-known of the diplomatic historians from the major state and private universities probably did not reply.) 62.1% of the institutions were urban. There were an average of two classes in diplomatic history per department, and class size ranged as large as 500 students, with the average 41.6. Over one-half the classes are smaller than 29 students.

TABLE 2
Regional Location of Teaching Institutions

Region	Number of Responses	Percent of Responses ^a
Northeast	38	20.9+
Mid Atlantic	22	12.1—
Southeast	16	8.8—
Midwest	41	22.5—
South	16	8.8+
Rocky Mt. West	5	2.7+
Southwest	12	6.6+
Pacific West	24	13.2 same
Other	5	2.7
No Response	3	1.6
Total	182	100.0

^aIn the percentage column, regions marked + employ more than they educate, while those marked — educate more than they employ.

Of the respondents, 70.9% indicated that they usually used a textbook. Table 3 shows the preferences named. Some did indicate that they switched materials yearly in an attempt to “keep up to date.” The heavy preference for the text by Thomas A. Bailey would seem to indicate that a sizeable number prefer to stick with this well-known and established work. 10% favored Wayne Cole’s work, which does represent a different approach, an “interpretive” history. 20% selected the texts by Daniel Smith and Alexander DeConde, indicating, aside from stylistic and content preference, perhaps a desire to use works available in paperback, and thus cheaper for the student, enabling the instructor to combine them more readily with other materials.

TABLE 3
Textbooks Used in Courses in History
of American Foreign Relations

Author	Number of Respondents	Percent of Replies
Bailey	36	34.6
Bemis	2	1.9
Ferrell	16	15.4
DeConde	15	14.4
Leopold	3	2.9
Smith	6	5.8
Cole	11	10.6
Pratt	4	3.8
Other	11	10.6
No Response	78	42.9
Total	182	100.0

69 of the 182 respondents reported using a problems book, while 63 used a documents collection (Table 4). The most-used titles can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. Great variation emerged when we attempted to assess the combination of materials used. While the figures were not fully analyzed, a study of the questionnaires indicated that about 36 respondents used both text and problems, about 15 used text, problems and documents as well, while about 25 used text and documents. A smaller number, less than 20, indicated they used problems or documents without a text. 88.6% reported using monographs, either entirely or in combination with a text or other materials. This no doubt reflects the success of the "paperback revolution," as well as the diligence of book salesmen.

TABLE 4
Useage of Textbooks, Problems Books, and Documents

	Yes	Percent	No	Percent
Using Textbook	124	70.9	51	29.1
Using Problems	69	40.6	101	59.4
Using Documents	63	47.0	71	53.0

TABLE 5
Most Used Problems Books

Editor	Number	Percent
Williams	12	21.1
Rappaport	18	31.6
Gelfand	1	1.8
Heath Series	2	3.5
Combs	7	12.3
Graebner	4	7.0
Paterson	2	3.5
Smith	5	8.8
Other	6	10.5
Total	57	100.0

TABLE 6
Most Used Documents Collections

Editor	Number	Percent
Williams	13	31.7
Smith	1	2.4
Graebner	7	17.1
Bartlett	6	14.6
Rappaport	1	2.4
Total	41	100.0

The question as to which monographs have had the greatest influence on the respondent's teaching (see #11, Appendix) lent itself to several interpretations. Younger scholars and graduate students often named works that had influenced their own development as teachers, while older historians also saw the question in terms of the works that were most effective as teaching devices, even if they themselves did not agree with the interpretation. Many did not answer the question, and one irritated (or irritable) respondent replied sharply, "How the hell should I know?" Of the works mentioned, however, those by the

radical historians led the field. 38 respondents mentioned William Appleman Williams, usually his *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, occasionally his *Roots of the Modern American Empire*. Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire* was mentioned by 29, and works by Gabriel Kolko by 12. It should be noted that a number of those who named works by radicals specifically disclaimed agreement with the viewpoint presented, however. Other influential authors were also named: George F. Kennan by 19, and the following scholars by 5 to 13 respondents each: Samuel F. Bemis, T.A. Bailey, Hans Morgenthau, Norman Graebner, Robert Osgood, and Albert Weinberg.

The item concerning the interpretations of foreign policy stressed by the academician in his courses produced some interesting data as well as many complaints (see Table 7). Since the great majority of respondents checked more than one interpretation, and the interpretations listed were not perceived by most as mutually exclusive, it is not possible to separate out economic determinists on an absolute basis. A rough calculation of the number that chose only one or two interpretations showed, for example, that only six selected economic motivation by itself; about 20 chose it in combination with special interests, an intellectual approach, or politics. About 12 chose intellectual alone, while 15 selected national security by itself (several wrote in national interest as well). The great majority of historians stressed their attempt to follow a multi-causal approach, or at least to present various interpretations in contrast to each other. Many other ideas were written in, such as psychological, social, ideological, balance of power or "real-politik," options and alternatives, peace studies, public opinion, and realist. Only two respondents condemned the question itself as "silly;" most seemed to understand what we were interested in. Our aim was to determine if historians did attach ideological labels to their approach to foreign relations, especially since so many of the problems books do so identify them. We found, however, that most teachers try to avoid this.

TABLE 7
Interpretations of American Foreign Relations

Item	Total number checking that item	Number choosing that item alone
National security	83	15
Economic	79	6
Polit. leaders, politics	74	6
Special interests	32	2
Intellectual	68	12
Other	50	---

As to the method of presentation, approximately 54.2% favored a topical over a chronological approach, although some expressed preference for a combination of the two. The average time spent lecturing was 62.14%. 55% spent between 50-75% of their class time in lectures, which would tend to confirm the rather prevalent view of history as an essentially conservative discipline in terms of teaching technique. Several respondents did, however, mention elsewhere on the questionnaire their interest in the use of audio-visual, media materials, and oral history or outside lecturers in an attempt to be innovative, and some decried the large classes that made the lecture format obligatory.

How much have historians changed their interpretation of American foreign policy in the last five years? On a scale of 1 to 7, the mean score was 3.7 (1 corresponded to a significant change.) The data would appear to confirm that in the last five years there has been, on the average, a moderate change in approach. However, we might have had more conclusive data if we had asked how long the respondent had been teaching. The results of the next question asked, as to how much the Vietnam War had affected interpretation, showed that the war had had a moderate overall effect. However, because this question was subjected to a more thorough computer analysis, we will save further comment on it for later in the paper.

The item on classification of government documents produced a more dramatic tabulation. 72.7% felt that classification procedures are too strict, while some 3.9% of the respondents indicated that they believed classification policies are not strict enough. This response is in line with the next item, the publication of the *Pentagon Papers*. 57.5% agreed with the way in which the *Papers* were released to the press; 36.3% thought they should have been published, but in a different manner; while 6.1% denied that they should have been published at all (see Table 8 for the data.)

VIETNAM, TEACHING OBJECTIVITY, AND CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

On the interrelated questions of the effects of the Vietnam War on interpretation, political preferences, teaching objectivity, and changing approaches to diplomatic history, computer analysis provided us with the most interesting results of the study. The data are shown in Table 9, which lists first the attitudes on the Vietnam War and then political preference. A majority of the respondents favored withdrawal from the war over a so-called "neutral" position, while very few favored maintaining an indefinite presence in that country. This would appear to be highly related to their political persuasions in past presidential elections. In 1964, when the country was presumably offered a clear choice on the war in the candidacies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, diplomatic historians favored the Democratic candidate by an overwhelming margin—87.8%. They still remained with the Democrats, though by a less impressive (69.4% margin, in the 1968 Humphrey-

Nixon contest. However, the 1972 election showed them somewhat more split, with a 66.5% margin for McGovern (with many written comments indicating much soul-searching over the choices offered). However, since the academicians were still 2 to 1 for McGovern, what is more striking is how different their preferences were from the nation's as a whole.

TABLE 8
Government Documents and Pentagon Papers

Opinion on Classification of Government Documents		
Number checked on scale	Number of Responses	Percent
- 2 (Much too strict)	130	72
- 4 (Somewhat strict)	41	22
- 7 (Classification not strict enough)	8	3
Total	179	100
Opinion on Publication of the Pentagon Papers		
Number approving of publication	103	50
Favoring a different method of publication	65	33
Opposed to any publication at all	11	6
No opinion	3	1
Total	182	100

TABLE 9
Vietnam and Voting Patterns

Opinion on Vietnam						
	Number of Responses	Percent				
Favoring immediate withdrawal (1-2) ^a	119	68				
No strong response (3-5) ^a	38	25				
Favored prolonged presence there (6-7) ^a	10	5				
Total	167	100				
Voting Patterns						
	1964		1968		1972	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Republican	17	11.5	25	13.9	31	18.4
Democratic	130	87.8	125	69.4	109	66.3
Other	1	.7	1	1.1	21	12.3

An additional comparison was made of the respondent's personal interpretations of American foreign relations with their self-evaluations of political persuasion. The results, which are not surprising, appear in Table 10. By a large margin they preferred to avoid ideological extremes. This is further confirmed by their reluctance to identify themselves with only one or two overall interpretations of America's foreign relations (question 12).

TABLE 10

Political Persuasion and Classroom Interpretation

	Personal interpretation of American foreign relations	Personal political evaluation
Radical (1-2 on scale)	15.6%	24.5%
Moderate (3-5)	69.3%	66.9%
Conservative/traditional (6-7 on scale)	15.0%	8.6%

The age of the respondents showed a predictable relationship to their feelings about the war. Of those most affected by the Indochina conflict (checking item 1 on question 16), the average age was 32.6. Those who indicated a moderate effect (checking 3-5 on the scale) averaged 40.5 years of age, while those unaffected (checking 7) were an average of 45.5. The age relationship was even more pronounced on the question involving classification of government documents; those favoring a more liberal policy were 39.5, while those taking the most opposed stance averaged 60. Likewise, the age of the respondents seemed to affect their personal political evaluation in a predictable fashion: the radicals (1-2) averaged 35 years old, the moderates (3-5) 41.8, while the conservatives (6-7) averaged 44.8.

A variety of further relationships were examined in the data involving Vietnam. Those who felt that the conflict had had a pronounced effect on their interpretation of foreign policy reported a marked change in their approach in the last five years, while those who denied any effect on their views professed a moderate to negligible change in

years, while the radicals professed a great deal. A similar picture emerged in comparing personal political identification (radical vs. conservative) with the amount of change. The degree of change also showed a high parallel to the effect of the Vietnam War; those who reported pronounced change in approach were also those who indicated the greatest effect of the war on their perspective.

A further analysis revealed that those who thought the classification of government documents was too strict (124 of 173 responses on that item) were at least rather strongly affected by Vietnam (3.8 on the 1-7 scale). Those few who felt classification was not strict enough were virtually unaffected by the war.

The item on teaching objectivity did not lend itself to easy analysis; those who admitted mixing personal political beliefs into their classroom presentation are to be found across the spectrum of viewpoints (Table 11). One's response to this question is probably more likely related to one's philosophy of teaching and conceptions about the possibility or desirability of injecting or omitting bias from presentation than to the other factors studied. Many radicals admitted that they did not separate their own opinions from their classroom analyses, although they often claimed to label them as such. The conservatives, on the other hand, usually claimed to separate totally their beliefs from classroom presentation, although they generally identified their interpretation as moderate or traditional in approach. The question of objectivity does, in effect, involve a value judgement as well as a self-evaluation, and thus it would not seem to relate strictly along lines of political persuasion. Perhaps there is a better relationship to be drawn along age lines; younger scholars, having been more exposed to newer ideas in educational and social psychology, are perhaps more able to recognize that racial and ethnic biases are implicit in virtually all standard teaching materials as well as in personal attitudes, thus making total objectivity impossible. Further study on this item seems desirable.

TABLE 11

Classroom Objectivity

	Number of Responses	Percent
Total separation of own political beliefs from classroom interpretation (1-2 on scale)	72	40.7
Moderate separation of own beliefs (3-5 on scale)	80	45.2
Little or no separation of own beliefs (6-7 on scale)	25	14.1
Total	177	100.0

ERRATUM

The following is a printing omission at the end of page 75:

their classroom interpretation. Age may well have had a bearing here, too. The great number favoring immediate withdrawal from Vietnam (checking 1 - 2 on the scale), who numbered 112 of the 163 replying to that question (#21), reported a moderate amount of change in their approach to foreign policy. The mean response was 3.5. Interesting is the picture that emerges as one considers how much change in interpretation has been made by those who see themselves as radicals or traditionalists. The latter had changed very little in outlook in the last five

One further comment on the issue of objectivity. Those who said that they totally separated their personal beliefs from their classroom interpretations were far less affected by the Vietnam War than those who admitted that their beliefs emerged in their teaching. The parallel here seems logical to anyone who became emotionally involved in the war issue; it was very hard to keep one's own feelings from entering into the discussion. In fact, here the reverse would not follow; "no comment" or no criticism of the war was itself a strong statement about it. In further comparisons it was seen that the "traditionalists" were less moved to change their interpretation of past foreign policies by the war than were the radicals.

Those who approved the manner of publication of the *Pentagon Papers* agreed that the classification of government documents is too strict, while those who disagreed on the first count also strongly disputed the second. Radicals agreed, as one might expect, that classification of documents is overly extensive and rigid, but they were joined in that assessment by the vast majority who could be termed moderates. Only the four self-proclaimed conservatives disagreed sharply, indicating a preference for even stricter classification. A similar trend was evident in comparing those who felt classification was too strict with those favoring immediate withdrawal from Vietnam; only a similar handful disagreed with both propositions.

Attitudes about the war and its effect on interpretation of diplomatic history seemed to have little bearing on the way respondents voted. This may have resulted from the heavy preference of these academicians for the Democratic candidates, presumably often for reasons unrelated to the war issue, on which there was no simple choice. The data did indicate that those who reported that the war had profoundly affected their interpretation of diplomatic history tended much more to see themselves as radical politically (5.67 on the 7-point scale). Those who reported little effect from Vietnam were generally moderates (3.6). This also makes sense; the war has, to most observers, been responsible for radicalizing the political beliefs of a significant segment of the academic world (see Table 12 for data). However, there was no such dichotomy on the issue of classification of government documents; the vast majority of respondents agreed that classification was too strict, regardless of their political persuasions.

Those who termed themselves radicals differed from moderates and conservatives in several other particulars. Radicals reported a much stronger degree of change in their classroom interpretations in the last five years; other data indicated that the war had affected them much more than the moderates. Conservatives were more critical of the publication of the *Pentagon Papers*, while moderates preferred the "yes, but . . ." choice. Again, on the sticky issue of the separation of personal belief from classroom interpretation, it was much more difficult to separate out the ideologies.

The way in which the respondents intended to vote in November,

TABLE 12
Effects of Vietnam on Personal Interpretation

Item checked on 1-7 scale (One=very strong effect of war, seven=war had minimal effect)	Number of Responses	Average response (one=conservative; seven=radical)
One	9	5.67
Two	34	4.35
Three	28	4.00
Four	31	4.38
Five	17	3.41
Six	25	3.68
Seven	23	3.61
Total	167	Average 4.16

1972, likewise was seemingly little affected by their attitudes on the war and the documents. Some academicians in the field of foreign relations may well have had the same problems with the McGovern candidacy as the public at large; they were troubled about his domestic policy and often grudgingly praiseworthy of Nixon's policy toward China and the Soviet Union. Others tended to vote Democratic anyway, probably through long preference for the party. Those who favored an indefinite presence in Vietnam were voting Republican; the radicals favored the candidacy of Benjamin Spock or McGovern, while traditionalists and moderates were more split between Nixon and McGovern. Despite the great preference for the Democratic party, the McGovern candidacy clearly did not command as great a hold over diplomatic historians as had Lyndon Johnson's.

The Vietnam War was closely related to the amount of interpretation change which these teachers reported for the last five years. The data indicated that the more one was affected by the war, the greater the amount of change in interpretation of the history of America's foreign relations. Those who were least affected by the protracted conflict were least likely to have changed their approach to the subject. Those showing the greatest change were also likely to be those who also favored withdrawal from Vietnam. On that question, 85 of 163 respondents favored immediate withdrawal from the war. In a cross-tabulation of those 85 it was clear that the more affected by the war, the more likely the respondent was to have changed his interpretation of American foreign relations. Among those 85, the war had had a predictably strong effect. However, there was a great spread in response to the question about changes in interpretation, probably because some of the younger and more radical scholars had always been radical in their approach to American foreign policy and thus did not modify their interpretation because of Vietnam.

Although much further work remains to be done with the data, some conclusions are already apparent. Among historians of American foreign relations there is a perceptible difference in opinion and outlook which is in part attributable to age—the “generation gap.” On the issues of Vietnam and the publication of government documents relating to our involvement in that conflict, their reactions are mixed, but substantially in favor of an end to the conflict and greater access to the evidence concerning policy decisions about it. They showed a very strong preference for the Democratic party, although support for its presidential candidate has been declining since the Johnson landslide of 1964. However, most placed themselves as moderates politically, and that general attitude seemed to carry over to their approaches to the history of American foreign relations. Most favored a multi-causal approach and hesitated to identify with any single “label.” They try to be objective in their portrayal of their subject matter, but a strong minority admitted that some of their own beliefs filtered in, whether identified as such or not. The overall picture that emerged from this study, then, is of a group, (perhaps better described as a subgroup of the larger discipline of history), basically moderate in approach but strongly moved by the controversies of the last decade.

MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS

One of the most informative areas of this questionnaire was not subject to computer analysis; these were the personal comments about the field of history of American foreign relations. There was a wide variation of opinion on the “state of the discipline.” Thirty-five replied that they saw nothing wrong with the teaching of diplomatic history today, or that they couldn’t comment without more knowledge of what others were doing. However, many did have complaints. A narrow, parochial approach was criticized by 35, who felt the subject was presented with too ethnocentric a view. A similar number condemned what they called a polemical, “true believer” approach, which they often linked to the New Left. About 20 criticized the so-called “Establishment,” the “old boys” who they saw as having too great a tendency to “snuggle up to the national government.” A dozen or more condemned what they felt was an excessively presentist attitude, while others noted the tendency toward outmoded approaches—excessive lecturing, narrative history, an obsession with names and dates, and dull writing, which filled the journals with masses of unread articles. Most of those complaining tended to mention several of these themes.

While many did find areas to praise, such as the generally high quality of textbooks, monographs and journal articles, and the wide diversity of viewpoints debated, there were many suggestions for improvement. About ten noted the historians’ general lack of training in social science methodology and asked that these techniques be made more available. An equal number specifically requested a journal for articles dealing with the history of American foreign relations. There were several suggestions for more general get-togethers, especially for

informal sessions dealing with new approaches in teaching diplomatic history. There were very few specific suggestions as to what new methods might be tried, though some suggested a broader approach, placing more emphasis on the domestic influences on foreign policy, and a multi-national way of looking at the topic. Others urged narrowing topics for study so that the student could become more aware of the difficulties of choice among the various options open on a problem. Some suggested the use of outside speakers who could explain the way in which policy is actually formulated by the government.

In sum, the questionnaire indicated a wide interest in a continuing self-analysis, an awareness of some general problems in the field such as is indicated by those loaded words, "lack of relevance." Respondents noted declining numbers of students as well as a lack of jobs and an oversupply of applicants. They seemed to be aware of the tendency toward a narrow, parochial approach but were not too clear on ways to modernize teaching methods to overcome this. The continuing exchange of ideas about the field itself as well as its content seemed to many to be one of the most encouraging prospects of all.

FOOTNOTE

¹ Percentage totals in the tables accompanying this article are rounded off to 100.0 where necessary.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

All responses are confidential

1. Age _____.
2. Where did you receive your academic training _____.
3. Is U.S. Diplomatic your primary area? Yes _____; No _____.
4. Enrollment of institution where you teach _____.
5. Regional location _____.
6. Secular _____; Protestant _____; Catholic _____; Other _____.
7. Junior college _____; College _____; University _____.
8. Rural _____; Urban _____.
9. Do you usually use a textbook? Yes _____; No _____; Author _____.
10. Do you usually use a problems book? Yes _____; No _____; Editor _____.
Selected documents? Yes _____; No _____; Editor _____.
Monographs? Yes _____; No _____.
11. What monographs do you feel have had the greatest influence on your teaching? a) _____; b) _____; c) _____.
12. Which of the following interpretations do you usually use: (a) National security _____; (b) Economic _____; (c) Political leaders & partisan politics _____; (d) special interests _____; (e) intellectual _____; (f) other _____.
13. Do you prefer a topical approach? Yes _____; No _____.
14. What per cent of time do you lecture in your teaching? _____.
15. How much have you changed your classroom interpretation in the last five years? Significantly _____ Not at All.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. How much has the Vietnam War affected your interpretation? Significantly _____ Not at All.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Do you feel that the government classification of documents is Too strict _____ Not Strict Enough.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Do you believe the Pentagon Papers should have been published? Yes _____; Yes, but in a different manner _____; No _____.
19. What is your average enrollment in diplomatic history courses? _____.
20. How many different courses does your department offer in U.S. Diplomatic history? _____.
21. How do you feel about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War? Immediate withdrawal _____ Indefinite Presence.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22. How much do you separate your personal political beliefs from your classroom interpretations? Significantly _____ Not at All. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. How did you vote in: 1964 _____; 1968 _____.
24. How do you see your personal diplomatic history interpretations? Traditional _____ Radical. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. How do you see yourself politically? Radical _____ Conservative. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. What do you feel is wrong with the teaching of diplomatic history today?
27. What do you feel is wrong with the profession of diplomatic history today?
28. What do you feel is done best in the field of U.S. diplomatic history today?
29. What changes would you like to see in the way graduates and undergraduates are taught U.S. diplomatic history?
30. What are the most challenging new areas or subjects in diplomatic history today?
31. What is your political preference in the 1972 presidential election?
_____.

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES


Volume XIV

June, 1975

POLITICAL MORALITY,
RESPONSIVENESS, AND
REFORM IN AMERICA



Published By
WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
A Division of the University System of Georgia
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA



WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume XIV

June, 1975

POLITICAL MORALITY, RESPONSIVENESS,
AND REFORM IN AMERICA

CONTENTS

Causes and Cures of Political Corruption	<i>George C. S. Benson</i>	1
Politics, Corruption, and Power	<i>S. J. Makielski, Jr.</i>	21
The Interlocking of Power and Morality: C. Wright Mills' <i>The Power Elite</i>	<i>Mark Stern</i>	31
Frameworks for Democratic Reform	<i>Gerald M. Henson</i>	41
The Quest for the American Public Orthodoxy: An Assessment	<i>Gerald De Maio</i>	49
Existentialism and Liberal Democratic Values: Reflections on Individualism and Corruption in American Politics	<i>Kenneth L. Deutsch</i>	67

TITLES IN PRINT

Vol. II, 1963, *Georgia in Transition*.

Vol. III, 1964, *The New Europe*.

Vol. IV, 1965, *The Changing Role of Government*.

Vol. V, 1966, *Issues in the Cold War*.

Vol. VII, 1968, *Social Scientists Speak on Community Development*.

Vol. VIII, 1969, *Some Aspects of Black Culture*.

Vol. XI, 1972, *Georgia Diplomats and Nineteenth Century Trade Expansion*.

Vol. XII, 1973, *Geographic Perspectives on Southern Development*.

Vol. XIII, 1973, *American Diplomatic History: Issues and Methods*.

Price, each title, \$2.00

Copyright © , West Georgia College

Printed in U.S.A.

Darby Printing Co., Atlanta, Georgia

Price, \$3.00

CONTRIBUTORS

GEORGE C. S. BENSON received the M.A. degree from the University of Illinois and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from Harvard University. He is President Emeritus of Claremont Men's College, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Education), former Director of the Administrative Division of the Office of Price Administration, and has served as president of the Independent Colleges of California, the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, and the Town Hall of Los Angeles. He has served as editor of *State Government* magazine and has published numerous articles on intergovernmental relations and ethics in American life. Dr. Benson is the author of *The Politics of Urbanism*, *The New Centralization*, *Financial Control and Integration*, *Civil Service in Michigan*, and *The State Administrative Board in Michigan*. Dr. Benson is presently Director of the Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom in the World.

S. J. MAKIELSKI, JR., received the Ph.D. degree in Political Science from Columbia University. He taught at the University of Virginia from 1964 to 1971, where he was also Research Associate in the Institute of Government. His publications include *Beleaguered Minorities: Cultural Politics in America*. Dr. Makielski is presently Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, New Orleans.

MARK STERN received the Ph.D. degree in Political Science from the University of Rochester. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the fields of American politics, political socialization, parties, and political behavior and methodology. He is the author of "Measuring Interparty Competition," which appeared in the *Journal of Politics*, and "The Pro-Civil Rights Congressional Districts of the South," in *Politics 1974*. Dr. Stern is presently Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Technological University.

GERALD M. HENSON received the M.A. degree from East Carolina University and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Maryland. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the fields of empirical theory and methodology. Dr. Henson is presently Assistant Professor of Political Science at Western Illinois University.

GERALD DE MAIO received his undergraduate degree from Manhattan College, the M.A. degree in Political Science from New York University, and is presently a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at

New York University. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the field of political theory. He is co-author with Robert Burrowes of "Domestic External Linkage: Syria, 1961-1967," in *Comparative Political Studies*. His dissertation topic is "American Conservatism: A Viable Public Orthodoxy?"

KENNETH L. DEUTSCH received the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the fields of normative political philosophy, epistemology and political science, political ideologies and political culture. He is the author of *Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience*. Dr. Deutsch is presently Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Genesco.

FOREWORD

This volume continues the precedent of utilizing the services of a volume editor working under the loose supervision of a general editor, a policy which began with the 1973 issue of *Studies in the Social Sciences*. Responsibility for selecting the theme and papers herein included, and initial editorial refinement, was that of the volume editor. The role of the general editor was limited to broad consultation, final editing, and liaison with the printer.

In past issues, volume topics have been selected from various social sciences, and this year the choice devolved on political science. It was a propitious occurrence because of the effects on American political life engendered by the Watergate scandals and our nation's Southeast Asia policies. Clearly Americans are assessing and evaluating their political institutions, the processes leading to political decision-making, and politicians. Questions emerging from the debate ensure the timeliness of this issue.

As in the past, the journal is partially financed by The University System of Georgia. It is distributed gratis to libraries of colleges and universities in Georgia, and to selected institutions of higher learning in each southern state. Interested individuals or other libraries may purchase copies for \$3.00 to help defray printing and mailing costs. Standing orders for the series are available at reduced rates.

It is with considerable pleasure that we submit to you this volume on political morality, responsiveness, and reform in America.

John C. Upchurch
Associate Professor and Chairman
Department of Geography
General Editor

New York University. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the field of political theory. He is co-author with Robert Burrowes of "Domestic External Linkage: Syria, 1961-1967," in *Comparative Political Studies*. His dissertation topic is "American Conservatism: A Viable Public Orthodoxy?"

KENNETH L. DEUTSCH received the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts. His primary teaching and research interests lie in the fields of normative political philosophy, epistemology and political science, political ideologies and political culture. He is the author of *Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience*. Dr. Deutsch is presently Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Genesco.

FOREWORD

This volume continues the precedent of utilizing the services of a volume editor working under the loose supervision of a general editor, a policy which began with the 1973 issue of *Studies in the Social Sciences*. Responsibility for selecting the theme and papers herein included, and initial editorial refinement, was that of the volume editor. The role of the general editor was limited to broad consultation, final editing, and liaison with the printer.

In past issues, volume topics have been selected from various social sciences, and this year the choice devolved on political science. It was a propitious occurrence because of the effects on American political life engendered by the Watergate scandals and our nation's Southeast Asia policies. Clearly Americans are assessing and evaluating their political institutions, the processes leading to political decision-making, and politicians. Questions emerging from the debate ensure the timeliness of this issue.

As in the past, the journal is partially financed by The University System of Georgia. It is distributed gratis to libraries of colleges and universities in Georgia, and to selected institutions of higher learning in each southern state. Interested individuals or other libraries may purchase copies for \$3.00 to help defray printing and mailing costs. Standing orders for the series are available at reduced rates.

It is with considerable pleasure that we submit to you this volume on political morality, responsiveness, and reform in America.

John C. Upchurch
Associate Professor and Chairman
Department of Geography
General Editor

PREFACE

Seldom in the history of America have questions of political morality, governmental responsiveness, and political reform been of greater moment than during the period of the Watergate scandals and our withdrawal from the Vietnam conflict. Seldom in our national history have Americans questioned with greater intensity and concern the morality of those in public life and the degree to which political practices in America comport with the democratic values so fundamental to our political system. The political environment of the years since 1972 has constituted a strong influence upon the theme for this issue: "Political Morality, Responsiveness, and Reform in America."

The articles which appear in this issue approach this theme from either an historical or a theoretical perspective, instead of focusing upon specific proposals for political reform, as have so many recent essays prompted by Watergate and Vietnam. In the first article, George C.S. Benson considers the history of political corruption in the United States, compares political corruption here to that in other political systems, argues that the facts of American history only partially support Huntington's modernization and functional theory, and concludes that American corruption stems from an over-emphasis upon the values of business or free enterprise. He further concludes that American political corruption is a result of the heritage of the political machine, oft-corrupt law enforcement machinery, and failure to teach adequately moral standards.

S.J. Makielski, Jr., contends that corruption in politics is tied to power, that power without limits of responsibility tends toward self-magnification and political corruption, and that meaningful proposals for reform must come to terms with this basic relationship. Mark Stern focuses upon the relationship between political power and political morality posited by C. Wright Mills, contending that Mills' analysis is synthesized within his moral framework, constitutes the basis of his perception of the American polity as one governed by a "higher morality," and should be given greater consideration in analyses of contemporary American politics.

The focus of the articles by Gerald Henson, Gerald De Maio, and Kenneth Deutsch is essentially theoretical. Henson considers the theoretical frameworks of *praxis* democracy and *poiesis* democracy, suggests that possible areas of reform follow from each, and concludes that debate on reform should carefully distinguish between the two. De Maio explores some of the literature which attempts to explain

the American political experience and which introduces into the continuing debate over the American political experience the classical concept of the *politeia* or public orthodoxy. It is his contention that the documents of the American political experience are grounded in Hobbesian assumptions and thus reveal a liberal public orthodoxy. He concludes that the failure to recognize the philosophical assumptions contained in America's public orthodoxy has, for the most part, resulted in prescriptions which merely restate those assumptions and keep the discourse within the parameters defined by the prevailing public orthodoxy. The final article by Kenneth Deutsch presents a critical analysis of American liberalism and political morality from the perspective of existentialism. He argues that existentialism provides a more effective justification of liberal democratic values than do the other major philosophies of recent years by focusing upon the individual and upon problems of moral choice and by speaking directly to issues of individualism and public interest in American politics.

The object of this issue is the consideration of broad questions of political morality, political responsiveness, and political reform in America as the nation approaches her bicentennial. The trauma of Watergate and Vietnam, with the attendant intense public and private debate and assessment of the broad philosophical questions posited by those events, emphasizes the timeliness of a reconsideration of these fundamental concerns. Hence, the focus of this issue is upon historical and philosophical considerations, rather than upon proposals for specific reforms of institutions and political practices in America, as we approach our two-hundredth national anniversary.

Dudley McClain
Assistant Professor
of Political Science
Volume Editor

CAUSES AND CURES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

By
George C. S. Benson

This article briefly summarizes the record of political corruption in the United States, on the assumption that most readers are aware of the historical background. It then reviews a number of reasons advanced for corruption by writers and other observers, primarily over the past decade. Finally, the article advances the reasons for corruption which seem most important to the author, including one which has been adumbrated by several distinguished writers, but which has not been fully stated before.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Leonard White, in his series on administrative history of the United States, has suggested that the first third of the century of the Republic was relatively free of corruption. The "leading citizens," whom both Federalists and Republicans tended to appoint to office, were likely to be fairly honest. We were still largely an agricultural country, which reduced the chances for corruption, and we still had a degree of revolutionary pride in our democratic institutions.

With the election of President Andrew Jackson in 1828 and the widespread acceptance of the theory of rotation in office, the level of appointees to office began to decline rapidly. Almost at the same time the movement of masses of immigrants who were unused to American institutions of democracy, and the irresponsible type of city charters adopted in the nineteenth century, made possible the rise of the urban political machine.¹ The machine almost invariably brought with it a high degree of political corruption. There were occasional reform mayors, but cities like New York and Philadelphia have probably had substantial on-going corruption, especially in their police departments, from 1850 to date. The political power of the machines made it possible to extend some of this corruption to state governments and to a limited extent to the federal government. The latter had perhaps its worst scandals in the Grant Administration (1869-1877), but serious scandals also appeared in the Cleveland, Harding, Truman, and Nixon administrations.

Reform tendencies have often appeared. At the turn of the century, for example, under the prodding of the muckrakers, there were signs of a general reform movement. Cities like Milwaukee, reformed by Socialists, Cincinnati and Kansas City, reformed by upper-middle

class citizen groups, and Los Angeles, where a major machine was never formed, have had continuous records of relative honesty. Some states, such as California since 1910 (except for the Samish regime in the state legislature), Wisconsin since LaFollette's time, and New York since 1920, have had excellent records. Virginia has been an interesting example of a machine-run state which has furnished honest if not inspired government for several decades.

The writer, judging the corruption situation for the benefit of his own course in Municipal Government in 1932, predicted that political machines and corruption were on their way out. Except in Chicago the machine has indeed lost power, and it shows signs of tottering there. Universal education has made many people independent of machine help. Ethnic groups have found their places in American life. Federally sponsored welfare programs have made the machine, with its sham benevolence, less useful.

What the writer did not foresee, however, was the continuation of large amounts of corruption after the political machine disappeared. Mayor Lindsay, one of the long line of reform mayors, was forced in 1970 to investigate the New York City police department, which was still over half corrupt, in spite of Tammany Hall's loss of political power. In a study of Boston, Chicago, and Washington, it was noted that "Excluding any participation in syndicated crime, roughly 1 in 5 officers was observed in criminal violation of the law. This observation was made by persons who had little time to be acquainted with the policemen. The lawbreaking was almost always acceptance of money or merchandise."²

A. J. Reichley writes in *Fortune*:

The last two years alone have seen: the conviction of Federal Judge Otto Kerner for taking a bribe in the form of race track stock while he was Governor of Illinois; the conviction of Attorney General of Louisiana Jack Gremillion for perjury; the conviction of Gus Mutscher, former Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, for participation in a stock swindle; the conviction of former U. S. Senator Daniel Brewster for taking a bribe; the indictment of close associates of Governor William Cahill of New Jersey for promoting a scheme to evade income tax laws covering campaign contributions. None of these deeds approached Watergate in seriousness, but all are evidences of the low level to which ethical standards have fallen in many areas of government.³

Undoubtedly the most publicity ever given to political corruption in this country is that given the Watergate episodes, in which a President of the United States quite deliberately assisted in the cover-up of two illegal burglaries. It will probably be a long time before the complex of causes leading to President Nixon's breakdown in admin-

istrative integrity will be fully explained. Of more importance to this article is the question of what the intense publicity on Watergate will do to political corruption in this country. At present it has led to federal and state laws on campaign financing sponsored by Common Cause. If this is the only result, there may be little beneficial effect upon some of the on-going types of corruption described herein. It is even possible that limits on campaign spending and/or public financing will help incumbent legislators stay in power, and thus increase the possibility of corrupt action. We cannot tell until we have had a chance to observe the results of such legislation.

Today it is probably fair to say that America has more corruption, both absolutely and proportionately, than any other modern democracy. Corruption, for example, occurs very seldom in the modern British national government and infrequently in British local government. Of course, Britain did have a great deal of corruption in the first quarter of the last century—probably more than occurred in the U.S.A.; but what Professor Friedrich describes as a “miraculous” reform movement overcame this corruption and incompetence.⁴ Later in the century, the British central government succeeded in helping local government eliminate most of its corruption. The late Hiram Stout, in *British Government*, states that “On the score of integrity, no major scandal has touched the Civil Service in recent years.”⁵ A 1972 *New York Times* article corroborated this by indicating that corruption is negligible in the British judiciary, as well as being low in France and West Germany.⁶

Roland Huntford, on the other hand, is sharply critical of Swedish governmental policies, but comments: “It is vital for an understanding of Swedish society to realize that public corruption, in the form of personal bribery, does not exist.”⁷ Professor Heidenheimer tells us that the German Civil Service had a minor wave of corruption in the fifties, but the German public official is still widely admired.⁸ Hans Rosenberg gives us some background of the more-than-century-old Prussian bureaucratic efforts to maintain honesty.⁹ Holland, moreover, after a good deal of effort, has succeeded in setting high standards against corruption of government officials;¹⁰ and Switzerland seems to maintain high standards of honesty in its government.¹¹ In fact, the only modern democracy which may have had amounts of corruption parallel to ours was France under the Third Republic.¹² Despite this it is our impression that France now has less corruption than the United States.

It is, of course, clear to all that political corruption has become a serious liability to American life. One acute observer believes that trade union corruption, which Senator McClelland and Counsel Rob-

ert Kennedy valiantly tried to explore, could have been cured if government had been honest.¹³ It is hard to know how much union corruption has added to costs of production or reduced benefits to workers. The Watergate aberration of the Nixon Administration clearly cost the country a good deal in the loss of progress in foreign policy formulation and implementation and in domestic legislation.¹⁴ Corruption is also essential to organized crime and is probably an important cause of on-going crime (in which America also unfortunately leads advanced modern democracies), at great cost to our economy.¹⁵ But the financial losses of corruption may well be outweighed by what Professor Friedrich calls the damage to our "ideatic core."¹⁶

Following this brief introduction to the history and extent of the corruption problem, it will be appropriate to analyze the causes of corruption suggested by various political observers. This analysis will include "modernization" and the "functional" theory of corruption suggested for developing countries by Professor Samuel P. Huntington. Another explanation revolves around the lack of a social or bureaucratic "class" structure in America. A third explanation is our over-emphasis on business or free enterprise, which is complemented by the obverse suggestion of Senator Paul Douglas that corruption comes from too *much* government regulation of business. Dominance of party machines is also offered as a reason, with Civil Service and stronger city charters given as control mechanisms. Weakness of national moral standards has been suggested by other observers.

After discussing each of these theories, the writer will present his own view of the cause of on-going corruption. It involves a complex of factors, including the corrupt tradition set by decades of machine rule, the decentralization and poor administration of law enforcement machinery, and the failure of most American institutions to pay attention to ethical standards.

As these theories of the causes of corruption are analyzed, the reader will naturally be thinking of the "cure" for each cause. Accordingly, remedies will be discussed with causes. The reader is cautioned, however, that there may be different kinds of corruption which require different kinds of remedies. There is little similarity, aside from moral disapprobrium, between the act of the New York police detective who demands protection money from a brothel and the actions of the giant milk cooperatives which finance campaigns of both national political parties in order to secure support for a milk price increase.

The second warning to the reader is that we Americans—thinking in constitutional, legal terms—probably have too much confidence in purely legal reforms. Our belief in checks and balances has led us to

seek a change in the law or the charter or the constitution on numerous occasions, when the election of better people to the office is the only real answer.

MODERNIZATION AND FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF CORRUPTION

Political scientists have written much in recent years about a “functional” theory of corruption. One of the principal statements of this is in Professor Samuel Huntington’s book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, in which he argues that corruption comes with “rapid social and economic organization.”¹⁷ New sources of wealth and power make new demands on government and resort to bribery or other forms of corruption if their demands are not met legitimately. Modernization has changed the values of society toward “universalistic and achievement-based norms.” It also creates new sources of power and wealth. It increases the laws and regulations operating over society, sometimes establishing “unreasonable puritanical standards.” Reducing corruption may involve scaling down of norms for officials, as well as leading the behavior of those officials toward the norms.

Corruption, says Huntington, is also lessened in a highly stratified society which has a highly developed system of norms. Since corruption involves exchange of political action for economic wealth, the form of corruption depends upon whether wealth or political power is easier to gain. “In the United States, wealth has more commonly been a road to political influence than political office has been a road to wealth.”¹⁸ In societies which have fairly strong national political institutions, the incidence of corruption is likely to be greater in the lower levels of government.

Huntington’s “functional” theory of corruption is best given by a quotation:

Just as the corruption produced by the expansion of political participation helps to integrate new groups into the political system, so also the corruption produced by the expansion of governmental regulation may help stimulate economic development. Corruption may be one way of surmounting traditional laws of bureaucratic regulations which hamper economic expansion. In the United States during the 1870s and 1880s corruption of state legislatures and city councils by railroad, utility, and industrial corporations undoubtedly speeded the growth of the American economy.¹⁹

Huntington grants that corruption weakens a governmental bureaucracy. However, he believes that corruption may help party organization, which in the long run helps to overcome corruption.

Huntington's theses have been followed by several other writers. Even the usually hard-headed C. J. Friedrich has paid a fair amount of deference to the "functional" theory of corruption in his *Pathology of Politics*.²⁰

The thesis that corruption comes with rapid social and economic organization is valid for nineteenth century America, where an economy was expanding, cities were developing, and new immigrant groups were entering communities. During most of the nineteenth century, many American cities, some states, and at times the national government became very corrupt. "Modernization" was not creating new norms, as Huntington suggests (perhaps he was discussing only developing countries), but there were new forms of wealth and power. The third effect of modernization, creation of new laws and regulations, was not very notable in the U.S.A.; in fact, we were probably as busy shedding old regulations as we were adopting new ones. However, the whole problem of the application of the Huntington theory of corruption in nineteenth century America deserves close historical analysis.

If two of Huntington's three reasons for the creation of corruption by modernization did not apply in nineteenth century America, the theory is probably not an adequate explanation of the extent of our corruption. It certainly does not explain the surprising amount of ongoing corruption in twentieth century America; in fact, Huntington probably would not maintain that it does. His observation that class stratification may help save a country from corruption, however, seems to be borne out of our experience. It is generally granted that America has not had a class structure comparable to that of the Northwestern European countries, and it is probable that their class structure did help those countries establish traditions of governmental honesty. Class structure is more fully discussed in the next section.

The theory of the functional uses of corruption seems to be one of Huntington's positions which is least applicable to America. It does not explain a large fraction of American nineteenth century corruption or the preponderant fraction of our continued twentieth century corruption. The histories of Tammany Hall show a great amount of looting of the New York City treasury, which had no significant connection with advancement of economic life. Exorbitant prices paid for city purchases, "kickbacks" on city contracts, and large paychecks to non-working people are simply methods of stealing. The Tweed Ring's activities were largely of this simple type of plundering. The granting of franchises for operating street cars and for selling gasoline may be interpreted as "functional," though it is also possible

that the bribes used to secure these franchises were extorted from the utility and its customers rather than spent for a functional activity. If these are to be regarded as normal economic activities, corruption hindered rather than helped them.

Examination of municipal corruption in twentieth century America also leaves little place for the "functional" theory. Most utilities are now regulated at the state or federal level. The continued corruption evidenced by fraudulent contracts, police exactions, and protection payments for organized crime is not "functional."

Nevertheless, some elements of "functional" corruption do continue at the federal and state level, where regulations regarding prices, rates, types of service, amount of imports, and other controls do affect economic groups, which in turn sometimes try to influence government action corruptly. It is quite possible that there should be careful consideration of such regulations to see if the amount of regulation could not be reduced or the process of regulation made more impersonal and automatic to reduce the possibility of corruption. But elimination of all such "functional" corruption would leave intact the great mass of on-going local government corruption, which is much more personal exploitation than economic functionalism.

CLASS AGAINST CORRUPTION

Several discerning observers have noted that the lack of rigid class structures in America has facilitated the development of political corruption in this country. Ernest Griffith has stated this theory in terms of respect for officials rather than class, but since high office in Britain (of which he was writing) went to members of the upper or upper-middle class at that time, he was addressing himself to the same phenomenon:

A respect for office-holding that surrounds the official with a kind of political halo has a profound effect on the official himself. It postulates *noblesse oblige*. In America this respect passed with the entry of the new democracy. Rotation in office and the spoils system destroyed well nigh completely any feeling that office-holding involved obligations. Office-holding had come to be looked upon not as a privilege but as a reward or even as a right. *Noblesse oblige* is impossible in such an attitude. *This was and is the root of American corruption; its converse is the reason for the high British standard.*²¹

Other observers have put the same point differently, that other modern democracies have a ruling class or an upper class which has more responsibility for governing honestly than do the constantly changing groups which find themselves in charge of government in a less class-minded America. Huntington, in developing the theories

referred to above, comments:

The degree of corruption which modernization produces in a society is, of course, a function of the nature of the traditional society as well as the nature of the modernizing process. The presence of several competing value systems or cultures in a traditional society will, in itself, encourage corruption in that society. Given a relatively homogeneous culture, however, the amount of corruption likely to develop during modernization would appear to be inversely related to the degree of social stratification in the traditional society. A highly articulated class or caste structure means a highly developed system of norms regulating behavior between individuals of different status.²²

Britain is today so little concerned with political corruption that the writer has not been able to discover contemporary studies of the relationship of the class structure (now becoming a "meritocracy" of intellectual rather than hereditary choice) to the lack of corruption. But there are two comparative studies of practice regarding corruption in the House of Commons and in Congress which indicate that the British desire to treat M.P.s as "gentlemen" has resulted in higher ethical requirements for membership in the legislative body than exist in America.²³

A sociological variation of the class theory has come from the fertile pen of Seymour Martin Lipset. Comparing the United States with Canada, he concludes that Canadians are less motivated by equality and individual achievement than Americans, but value an educational "elite" more. Canadians stress moral values more in education, where Americans emphasize "citizenship, patriotism, social skills, and family living." Not surprisingly, there is substantial evidence that Canadians have more respect for law, for Canada is more "collectively oriented" and less "business" oriented than the United States.²⁴

This writer does not presume to pass judgement on the validity of Lipset's interesting generalizations. For our purposes his comments may be viewed as an illustration and extension of the theory that class stratification may help resist corruption. Lipset extends the theory to indicate that the citizen frame of mind which accepts an elite also accepts government, authority, and honest procedures.

How valid is this theory of social class versus corruption? A strong objection is that classes in some societies, for example the aristocratic class in Czarist Russia, were to some extent carriers of a tradition of corruption. The corrupt Britain of 1800 was probably more socially stratified than the more nearly honest Britain of 1900. Caste-ridden India has been much bothered with corruption; and upper classes in Italy have not been a group favoring honest conduct of government.

Nevertheless, the writer believes that there is some truth in the theory that the lack of an hereditarily or educationally determined upper group in American life since 1829 has been a contributing factor to political corruption; or, perhaps more accurately, it has meant that we lack one possible piece of sociological machinery to work against corruption.

However, it does not follow that we should undertake to establish an elite in America as a method of controlling political corruption. The vertical mobility of American society has many advantages which most Americans would not like to lose. It provides the opportunity to achieve in all areas of human endeavor. It means that no one group needs to feel that it is kept at a lower level of American society. Indeed, vertical mobility is part of an egalitarian objective to which we have long been committed.

The real lesson to be drawn from the class-against-corruption theory is that America should try to eliminate corruption without taking on the disadvantages of rigid class stratification. One way is by the process of indoctrinating most members of the society with the sense of public responsibility which class stratified societies have given only to the elite. How this may be done is explained more fully toward the end of this article.

The other possibility is that we educate those citizens who are going to have special responsibilities in the public obligations of their future jobs. The American armed forces have certainly been able to produce disciplined, patriotic, courageous, and honest leaders through a long process of education, both in institutions and on the job. The civil service and foreign service have been a bit less successful in inculcating ideas on the job, but their final product has generally been able, conscientious, and honest. Individual state and local governments have also produced incorruptible public servants.

But this piecemeal way of producing *noblesse oblige* can be only partly successful. It is nearly impossible to prescribe it to legislators, whether federal, state, or local. There are many governmental tasks for which it is not possible to educate a meritocracy. The very freedom of upward mobility in American life makes it difficult to plan out education in ethical responsibilities for small groups.

OVEREMPHASIS ON BUSINESS OR FREE ENTERPRISE

Another reason which is often cited for continuing corruption in American life is our emphasis on business or on free enterprise. The theory as advanced by Lincoln Steffens was that most of the bribes came from business; the problem was to get business under control. It was on this theory that prosecutors of the Ruef-Schmitz machine

in San Francisco turned loose most of the bribe receivers. The goal was to convict the bribers.²⁵ An elaboration of this view is that American emphasis on success in business encourages efforts to "get mine" regardless of ethical scruples.

An important reverse twist to the "business system" explanation of political corruption was advanced by Senator (also Professor) Paul Douglas of Illinois. In a thoughtful book, he suggested that elimination of a number of statutes by which government tried to control business would reduce the occasion for political corruption.²⁶

At first sight, the theory of business fault sounds quite plausible. Who, indeed, but the briber starts the corruption? If the Southern Pacific Railroad had not wished to secure a monopoly of transportation, would California have had to bear the Octopus? Was not the Gas Ring the source of Philadelphia's corruption problems? The theory is especially attractive because it gives us the involved corporation to oppose.

Another element of truth in the "business" explanation of America's on-going political corruption is to be found in the mistakes made by a number of businessmen when appointed to public office. A large fraction of the aberrations of political executives in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations were a result of carrying over into government a lax business practice of accepting gifts or weekend vacations.²⁷ If some businesses make a habit of giving expensive presents to purchasing agents, it may not wreak great havoc in a competitive market where the purchasing agent presumably makes the best buy regardless of gifts. But if the practice of accepting gifts is carried over into government, which has a monopoly of control, it may be very bad indeed.

More careful reflection tells us that "business" has not always been the major source of corruption in America. Some of the examples used against the "functional" theory of corruption are applicable here. Most of Tammany Hall's exploitation of citizens was not at the behest of business but was governmental exploitation of brothel owners, saloon keepers, gamblers, and their clients. The unhappy situation of many big city police forces today is not a result of business corruption; in fact, the business leaders of most of those cities would probably welcome more honest urban government. As Henry Jones Ford points out in his article on "The Shame of the Cities," Steffens himself states that "Several companies which refused to pay black-mail had to leave."²⁸

If we look at other countries, we can see that the free operation of business need not bring political corruption. Sweden and Switzerland rival America in per capita income, based on business enterprise,

with little political corruption. West Germany, revived by a free economic system, rigidly enforces laws which send bribers of officials to jail. Britain, original home of the Industrial Revolution, keeps its businesses from corrupting its government.

An answer to the above suggestions may be that America emphasizes business and free enterprise more than these other nations. This answer may or may not be true. We talk of free enterprise but we regulate some businesses which are not regulated elsewhere. We probably make more speeches for free enterprise than do other nations, but we make more speeches on other topics, too.

The conclusion which the writer cannot avoid is that businessmen, like other groups in society, will work for and support honest government if the intellectual leaders of society persuade them that honest government is best for everyone. No one has made great effort to persuade them of this fact in recent decades.

The reverse twist of this "business causes corruption" argument, raised by Paul Douglas, deserves careful consideration. A good many of our economic control statutes should be carefully reviewed. Why does the President of the United States have to set the price of milk?

THE PARTY DOMINANCE THEORY

A fourth reason advanced for corruption, especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century, was the dominance of party machines. Direct primary elections, the right of voting referenda on legislation, and recall of public officials were mechanisms intended to reduce the dominance of party leaders. White cites Charles Francis Adams, who put the blame for corruption on party organization "bred in the gutter of New York politics."²⁹

The obvious difficulty with this theory is that other nations have learned to operate non-corrupt politics through party machinery. Huntington assumes, probably correctly, that party organization will end corruption. Adams' theory was an example of a frequent American mistake: the assumption that mechanical changes would eliminate our political difficulties. A current example of a similar effort to reform by mechanics is the Common Cause effort to limit the size of campaign funds. As already noted, this reform may or may not make for more moral campaigns; it is unlikely to result in any serious reduction of the amount of corruption of government in this country.

CHANGE IN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

In the tradition of the Founding Fathers, Americans have long

sought changes in statutes or ordinances or charters or state constitutions which would presumably eliminate corrupt practices. A few examples follow:

Civil Service

From the Civil War to the middle of this century, it has been assumed that civil service, protecting government workers from spoils politics, was a reform which would help eliminate political corruption. In some ways this has been an echo of the theory of class against corruption—the difference being that members of the class are chosen by competitive examination instead of aristocratic birth.

In the second half of the last century, civil service reform groups existed in most large cities. Many of their members undoubtedly believed that civil service was a major cure for corruption, perhaps because it was a part of Britain's major reform.³⁰

Unfortunately, civil service proved to be only a partial answer to our problems. It certainly helped pull the federal administration out of some third-class political traditions and helped produce the relatively honest federal administration of today. It has helped states like California, New York, and Wisconsin and cities like Los Angeles and Milwaukee do creditable administrative jobs. But it has not kept cities like Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia from a great deal of on-going corruption. Civil service may help the administration of a city or state through one four-year term of a bad mayor or governor; but it will not help much if many bad top executives are elected.

Stronger Chief Executives

Another legal reform which has frequently been advanced for reform is the concentration of political responsibility in a strong chief executive. In the middle of the last century, many city charters and state constitutions, perhaps following the Jacksonian rotation in office theory, provided for election of many department heads, judges, and boards of control. In the words of Ernest Griffith:

. . . in the hodge podge of elected officials in America, in the indefinite relationship between the council and the executive, and between both and the state, and in lack of any sort of statutory budgetary procedure, some coordinating force was needed. In fact, some such force was inevitable if the government was to function at all. The boss was a necessary evil.³¹

Accordingly, reform groups worked for city manager or strong mayor charters for cities and for state constitutions which gave governors more power. In general these changes have been good. Mayors, man-

agers, or governors have functioned better. In some cities and states the reform has remained permanent.

But the strong chief executive is no panacea. Substantial amounts of state and local corruption have continued under strong mayors in New York and Chicago, and under strong governors in Illinois and Maryland. This reform is helpful but not enough.

Give Up Separation of Powers

American observers have not missed the fact that American federal and state government is unique in its doctrine of separation of powers, as well as its corruption. Henry Jones Ford has written an article indicating that the separation of the executive and legislative function encourages efforts of special interests to capture individual legislators. Walter Bagehot had a similar thought.³² The City Manager Plan is itself closer to British responsible government than to our separation of powers. Recent Watergate difficulties have led many people to wonder if we do not need some system by which the executive branch of the national government is more responsive to the legislative branch.

However, we have no certainty that this particular legal change would improve our position. As a panel of public administrators pointed out in commenting on Watergate, a series of episodes like Watergate could easily have occurred under a responsible system of government.³³ Separation of powers has served American well for almost two centuries and is likely to continue, at least at state and national levels of government.

IMPROVE ETHICAL STANDARDS

Several acute observers have commented on the possibility that weakness in American ethical standards lay behind the on-going problem of corruption. Ostrogorski believed that the "Caucus" was diminishing America's moral reserve.³⁴ Senator Paul Douglas wrote in 1952:

. . . more important than the institutional improvements which I have suggested is our need for a deeper set of moral values. . . . The faults which we see in governments are all too often the reflection of our own moral failures. All this may dawn upon us, so that we will not only help to reform government but also to reform ourselves.³⁵

Professor and former Civil Service Commissioner Leonard D. White, writing in 1957 about the period 1869 to 1901, was concerned about general moral standards but believed that improvement was coming.

He commented that "vigilance was still necessary," a remark which is still true almost twenty years later.

This writer believes that Ostrogorski and both of his highly-esteemed former colleagues did not go quite far enough in recognizing that America does have an underlying problem of inadequate ethical education. Elsewhere, the writer and his colleague, Dr. Thomas S. Engeman, have developed this position more fully.³⁶ America's high rates of crimes of violence as well as political corruption seem to us to be related to our failure to teach ethics consistently in schools, churches, and other media of instruction.

CAUSES OF CORRUPTION

The writer would welcome further research, but is inclined at the moment to regard the main causes of on-going political corruption in this country as the following:

(1) Although the political machine is dying, the traditions of ethnic voting, of semi-corrupt police forces, and of bribe-offering contractors continue strongly in many American cities, especially those with large poverty areas. As an example, New York City's mayoral election in 1969 was one of the most ethnic in its history.³⁷ Police Commissioner Murphy, serving under a reform mayor, commented that he had vastly underestimated the difficulty of developing an honest police force in New York. The writer's guess is that New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Boston have rarely had honest police forces—reform mayors and police chiefs or commissioners not having time to root out or change the habits of all the dishonest men on the force.

If corruption continues in large cities, some of it is almost certain to spread to state governments and to some portions of the federal government. For example, organized crime is most strongly rooted in a few cities like New York and Chicago, which are still influenced by political machine traditions; but organized crime spreads itself to control state legislators, judges, prosecutors, or congressmen, as may be needed for its tasks. New York State has held this extension to a minimum; Illinois has been less successful.

(2) A second fundamental difficulty with ensuring rectitude of American political life is our slow, clumsy, and ineffective law enforcement machinery. Our extensive decentralization is an especially difficult problem. All the other modern democracies retain some degree of supervision of law enforcement machinery by central government agencies. If a British city police force becomes corrupt, the inspector of the national government makes suggestions to the appropriate local authorities. In France the Ministry of Interior would order

corrections. But in the United States the badly run city or county is usually left to wallow in its own corruption, with federal assistance limited to sporadic income tax prosecutions.

(3) The third underlying reason for America's on-going political corruption relates to ineffective teaching of moral standards. This problem may arise from the great variety of religions in America, or from the failure of any religion to prepare its youth for the complex ethical problems of our society, from the almost complete elimination of ethical education in the public schools to the amorality of television, or both.

It may be true that the churches, traditional purveyors of ethics, have tried from time to time to stem the tide of corruption. White, in discussing the worst corruption of the Grant era, says: "The churches did not waver in holding man's duty to his fellowman before him. . . ." ³⁸ And clearly individual clergymen have led movements against corrupt political machines.

But the instruction given by most churches to youth involves almost nothing which would lead a young man or woman to avoid corrupt political action. The nineteenth century teaching of Biblical texts opposed corruption only indirectly; the twentieth century teaching of social ethics does not oppose corruption at all. Professor Clebsch, after noting that denominations have concerned themselves with their own ritual and dogma, queried: "What American denomination has developed moral norms that are at once realistic and genuinely religious to guide persons who are perplexed by a welter of new problems such as abortion, divorce, euthanasia, extra-marital sexual intercourse, financial manipulation. . . ?" ³⁹ He might have added political corruption and ordinary crime as items that are ignored.

The schools have largely eliminated ethical instruction from their programs, perhaps because of fear that teaching ethics was as unconstitutional as teaching of religion, perhaps because certain intellectual attitudes, like those of John Dewey and Sigmund Freud, were antagonistic to teaching ethics. ⁴⁰ There is now a slow change in educational attitudes toward ethics, but there is still a long way to go before young people will enter political life with firm ethical convictions.

The media are, with some exceptions, apathetic toward moral standards. Newspapers are more responsible than television, but neither one views ethical education as part of its responsibility.

CURES FOR CORRUPTION

What is needed to reduce corruption in American life? The following suggestions are made with the belief that they are not ultimate answers; rather, they are devices worth trying.

First, America needs better ethical instruction by mechanisms of society. The present system of relying on parents for almost all ethical instruction is grossly inadequate, as the experiences of Watergate, Governor Kerner, Equity Funding, and large amounts of local corruption tell us.

Schools need to restore some study of the responsibility of the individual for honesty, truth, courage, and helping others. Case studies are probably the best means of doing this at the secondary level, but other methods are available.⁴¹ Schools have not always been successful in teaching civics, but this may be partly because their textbooks have avoided the real ethical problems in government.⁴² Their work in race relations has been better, but it, too, would probably be helped by more careful study of individual ethics.

The churches, like the schools, need to pay greater attention to instruction in individual ethics. Sunday School instruction could be greatly improved.⁴³

Television and the newspapers have great possibilities for curing political corruption if they would work on the problem. If one-quarter of the television time and newspaper space devoted to Watergate were spent on state and local corruption, we would soon have better government in the United States. But it is unlikely that the media will turn major attention to such an appetizing diet as local corruption.⁴⁴

Second, we need an effort to establish enough central supervision of law enforcement machinery, so that no jurisdiction can continuously operate a corrupt regime. Only by continuous raising of the standards of law enforcement agencies can we help people learn to be law-abiding themselves. Grants-in-aid to local law enforcement units should be conditioned on honest conduct of affairs.

Third, we need continuing and more intelligent efforts to cure the "poverty pockets" which continue to be a blemish on American life and a place for corruption to gain special footholds. We need especially better schools, better housing, better police protection, and better jobs for the people living in those areas.

Clearly by addressing ourselves with vigor and purposefulness, to each of these possible "cures," we might begin to lessen the stranglehold of corruption on the many aspects of American life. It is, after all, a battle worth waging.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Leonard D. White, *The Federalists* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956); Leonard D. White, *The Jacksonians* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954); Ernest S. Griffith, *The Modern Development of City Government*, 2 vols. (Lon-

don: Oxford University Press, 1927), vol. 1.

² Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *The Police and the Public* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 156-163.

³ A. James Reichley, "Getting at the Roots of Watergate," *Fortune* (July, 1973), p. 91.

⁴ Carl J. Friedrich, *The Pathology of Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 136. See also Sidney D. Bailey, *British Parliamentary Democracy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 98-103 and 166-172; and Alexis de Tocqueville, *Letter to Henry Hallam*, May 29, 1835.

⁵ New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 278.

⁶ Alvin Schuster, "Graft Charges Rare in Western Europe's Judiciary," *New York Times*, 8 October 1972.

⁷ Roland Huntford, *The New Totalitarians* (New York: Stein and Day, 1972), p. 129.

⁸ Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), pp. 210-216.

⁹ Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

¹⁰ H. A. Brasy, "Administrative Corruption in Theory and Dutch Practice," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., *Political Corruption* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970).

¹¹ Denis de Rougement, *La Suisse* (Paris: Hachette, 1965), p. 120; G. A. Chevallaz, *La Suisse on Le Sommeil Du Juste* (Lausanne: Payot, 1967), chapter 12.

¹² William L. Shirer, *The Collapse of the Third Republic* (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), pp. 57, 187.

¹³ John Hutchinson, *The Imperfect Union* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), pp. 380-385.

¹⁴ Frederick C. Mosher et al., *Watergate: Implications for Responsible Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 9-10.

¹⁵ Donald R. Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

¹⁶ Friedrich, *The Pathology of Politics*, Part III.

¹⁷ New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 59.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

²⁰ Part III.

²¹ Griffith, *The Modern Development of City Government*, vol. 2, p. 614.

²² Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 64.

²³ H. R. Wilson, *Congress: Corruption and Compromise* (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1951); Robert S. Getz, *Congressional Ethics* (Princeton: Van Nos-

trand, 1966).

²⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

²⁵ Walter Bean, *Boss Ruef's San Francisco* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957), p. 3.

²⁶ Paul H. Douglas, *Ethics in Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

²⁷ David A. Frier, *Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1969).

²⁸ Henry Jones Ford, "Municipal Corruption," *Political Science Quarterly*, 19 (1904), pp. 673-686, reprinted in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Political Corruption* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970).

²⁹ Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1958; Free Press paperback, 1965), p. 366.

³⁰ Art Hoogenboom, *Outlawing the Spoils* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968).

³¹ Griffith, *The Modern Development of City Government*, vol. 1, p. 27.

³² Henry Jones Ford, "Municipal Corruption," in Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (New York: D. Appleton, 1908), p. 87.

³³ Mosher, *Implications for Responsible Government*, pp. 16-18.

³⁴ M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and Political Parties* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1902), vol. 1, pp. 598-599.

³⁵ Douglas, *Ethics in Government*, pp. 102-103.

³⁶ George C. S. Benson and Thomas S. Engeman, *Amoral America*, forthcoming, 1975.

³⁷ Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970).

³⁸ White, *The Republican Era*, p. 380.

³⁹ William A. Clebsch, "American Religion and the Cure of Souls," in McLaughlin and Bella, *Religion in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 255.

⁴⁰ George C. S. Benson and Thomas S. Engeman, "Dewey, Freud, and American Morality," *The Political Science Reviewer*, 4 (Fall 1974).

⁴¹ George C. S. Benson and Joseph Forcinelli, "Individual Ethics in the High School," *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals*, forthcoming (1975).

⁴² Richard M. Merelman, *Political Socialization and Educational Climate* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), pp. 6-7.

⁴³ George C. S. Benson and Thomas S. Engeman, "Ethical Instruction and the Churches," *Religious Education*, 69 (September-October 1974), pp.

568-578.

⁴⁴ Bill and Nancy Boyarsky, *Backroom Politics* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1974), Chapter 11.

POLITICS, CORRUPTION, AND POWER

By
S. J. Makielski, Jr.

James Q. Wilson, writing well before Watergate, suggested that one of the problems of corruption is the "Problem of Corruption,"¹ that is, generally decent, potentially effective politicians are deprived of their capability to act because of public attitudes toward any signs or symptoms of corrupt behavior. Thus, the political leader, in his effort to avoid the appearance of corruption, will often fail to act, appoint advisors who are inexperienced but look "clean," and spend more time on image than on getting on with the business of governing. Underlying this argument is an important assumption: the task of the public man is to act, and as long as he acts so that public benefits substantially outweigh public costs, it is hardly fair to quibble over any private "leakage" that might occur.

It is necessary to give some thought to this assumption because it has appeared elsewhere,² and, adopting as it does the posture of modern "realistic" political science, it stands to influence the thinking of many political scientists. In turn, this means that those who are equipped to offer the best-reasoned and most knowledgeable suggestions for reform, as well as being the most attentive audience for reform proposals, perhaps will be tempted to assume that a little corruption is not a serious problem but perhaps even a good thing.³

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship among power, corruption, and moral behavior in public life, assuming that our understanding of the relationship shapes our thinking about the behavior of public officials, and, one hopes, ultimately that very behavior itself.

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

As A. A. Berle has argued, power must be a central feature in any society: it is the means by which chaos is held back.⁴ Put more positively, we can think of power for our purposes as the ability to act or to cause others to act.⁵ As such, it can be viewed as distinct but not necessarily separate from authority, that is, the legal or customary right to act or to cause others to act.⁶ Those with authority often possess power, as we shall see, but they may on occasion be powerless. Significantly, authority is one of the more useful tools or bases of power, giving the power-holder the legal sanction and often public deference to act as he chooses.

In American society, we have striven to make power and authority coterminous, on the logical democratic premiss that power should be sanctioned by authority, thus subjecting the power-holder to the restraints that go with authority, restraints usually summarized in the term "responsibility." Thus, power without responsibility becomes a feared and fearful object, as can be seen by the contemporary literature on the "the corporations" and "organized crime," and the older literature on "the bosses" and "the interests." In each case, the threat is seen to be an institution, interest, or set of interests that is free of the restraints of authority and thereby able to make its own rules of political behavior without suffering the consequences inherent in democratic processes.

It goes without saying that the struggle to mesh power, authority, and responsibility has not always been successful. Even the bitterest critics of the "power elite" interpretation of American society must admit that there are at least times and places where individuals or organized interests exercise power without confronting the limits imposed by authority.

As troubling as this problem is (and it will no doubt continue to vex us), there is another side to the power-authority-responsibility combination which is at least as troublesome, perhaps as dangerous, and which raises some of the more serious questions of the morality of politics. It regards authority and responsibility-laden positions which give their holders power, and with that power the opportunity to exploit their positions in immoral ways. This serves, in effect, to give the powerful an opportunity that they would not otherwise possess.

The simplest, and perhaps most familiar example concerns the policeman, usually a relatively ordinary citizen, who is given a brief screening, a short period of training, sworn in, supplied with a badge, a uniform, a set of weapons, and assigned a duty area. He carries with him an awesome authority embodied in "the police power" when he steps or drives onto the streets.

The policeman also carries substantial power as an extension of that authority: to use his weapons, to use his power to correct, intimidate, detain, bully, arrest, with the relatively confident knowledge that he is supported by his fellow policemen and, more than likely, by the judicial process. It must be granted that he experiences some degree of formal supervision through the police hierarchy and some degree of informal supervision through the possibility of citizen complaints. Even granting this, however, we must also recognize that he is nonetheless placed in a situation of power that reaches beyond his authority and responsibility and yet is simultaneously protected by

his position of authority. It is little wonder that some policemen will occasionally enforce the law with their fists, clubs, or blackjacks; that they will not infrequently be found "on the pad"; that some will choose to ignore certain classes of law-breakers while bullying categories of other people, or that some, once in a while, will engage in larceny themselves.

To say as much is not to explain or excuse the corrupt policeman as much as it is to restate the essential quality that made Watergate so traumatic. Men possessing authority, and with it great power, used those positions of presumed responsibility with utter disregard for responsibility. That is, the carefully constructed triad of power-authority-responsibility was broken; and when the disposable items were shed, it came down to a matter of the exercise of power alone. To press the problem one step further, it must be recognized that it was by virtue of access to authority that the opportunity to wield the power came into being. Authority made the FBI and CIA subject to intense pressures to provide a cover for the "top men," those holding greater positions of authority. Authority clearly provided the successive lines of retreat from "executive privilege" to "national security" to "preserving the Presidency."

Although Watergate is very much in the forefront of the people's awareness today, it must not be assumed that it is a special case, aside from its cast of characters. There is no *essential* difference between those who covered up the Watergate crimes and the crooked cop, the county official who accepts construction company bribes, the zoning official who accepts a developer's Christmas present, the building inspector who "overlooks" violations of the code, or the purchasing officer who writes specifications so they can be met by only one firm. Each is in a position of authority which has been granted a degree of power; each chooses to break the triad to rely on power to act and authority to conceal.

The important element here is that the very nature of authority provides certain power situations which can then be turned to individual, partisan, or special-interest advantage. What we confront is a syllogism: (1) power is a necessary social force; (2) power is in theory restrained and sanctioned by authority in order to grant the necessary power for social action; (3) but these positions of authority in turn create power situations in which power may act outside the realm of or contrary to the dictates of responsibility.

It does not follow, of course, that all persons in positions of authority will use them to extend their power and to violate the precepts of responsibility; but the incentives to do so are strong indeed.

One final aspect of the power-authority-responsibility triad must

be discussed. Aside from the political advantages of wedding power and authority (that is, making the power-holder subject to public controls), responsibility acts as a reasonable substitute for a political code of morality. The responsibilities of public office are established by constitutions, charters, and statutes in the first instance. These are usually enlarged upon by common and equity law practice — mandamus, injunction, and the doctrine of *ultra vires*, for example.

Further, a body of social conscience usually surrounds a public office: a collection of attitudes transmitted by predecessors, customary modes of behavior, and anticipated attitudes of public performances.⁸ Therefore, a public office is a role — a bundle of expectations — shaped by law and attitude, assumed to be larger and more permanent than its transient holder. There are, of course, broad ranges of interpretation for acting out the role. A policeman catching a 10-year-old shooting out the windows in the public school building swats him on the behind and confiscates the air rifle. Is the policeman engaged in brutality? Illegal seizure of property? Should he turn the child over to the juvenile authorities? A good argument can be made for both lines of behavior. Yet we can detect an underlying theme: the obligation of the duties of office and an intent to perform those duties in a manner appropriate to the authority given and to the public trust that granted that authority.

This, however, raises a major problem. Responsibility does imply a responsibility to someone or something. A moral code implies a system in which it is anchored. It has been suggested, obviously, that responsibility finds its anchor in the role it establishes; but the meshing of power and responsibility creates serious problems, for power has its own internal logic.

THE MORAL CODE OF POWER

Power is the ability to act. Power and authority mean the ability to act in a way that tradition, law, and custom establish for the public good. Without power, much injustice would exist without a chance for correction; many wrongs would be endured without hope of righting them. In the absence of some other totally unknown and totally untested social system, power is essential to the day-to-day and the long-term welfare of most humans.

If power is necessary, then, what forces impel the power-holder to use it to good ends? As already discussed, it can be hoped that the doctrine of responsibility works to this effect. In the event that responsibility is not clear, due to ambiguities or because it is too confining to be “realistic,” what other forces, if any, may be relied upon to

leash power?

In the abstract, the answer is "very few." Power implies, indeed means, mastery. The greater the power, the greater the mastery over others and the circumstances surrounding the power-holder. As a consequence, the power-holder has fewer constraints on him and his behavior than the man with no power. Power is dominance: the capacity to impose one's ego on the world around the individual. Thus, power is subservient only to greater power.

Given its nature, the moral code of power is that one must have it to act; one must keep it to act; one must have more to act unchecked by a greater power. To the extent freedom to act is good, power is good. For the public official, the politician, power is good in itself because it is the capacity to act more forcefully and with greater binding power than others.⁹ The public official who cannot act is not only pathetic but a waste of public resources and personal opportunities.

Stated in these bald terms, such a description seems to stretch the concept of a moral code beyond a breaking point. In the world of human affairs, however, where the struggle to act is often frustrated, power occasionally means more than what immediately appears. The laborious process of gaining the agreement of tens or even hundreds of individuals, the slow process of building the endless physical and human blocks to action, all are real enough that the power-holder is apt to find himself eagerly seeking more power, not merely to entrench himself or even to empire-build, but to be able to do more—to achieve those things that others block or have failed to do.

This does not necessarily establish any relationship between power and corruption, however. Neither power itself nor the power-holder establish conditions of corruption in and of themselves. It is rather the situation of power, a situation already briefly discussed in relation to authority.

All power situations give the power-holder a scope of formal authority and power over a number of other people and their actions. The population of this formal scope may be quite small: the power of the head of the typists' pool, for example, or that of the warden of the county jail. On the other hand, it may be enormously large—that of the President of the United States.

Power situations also usually include a degree of informal scope, most clearly seen in those who tie their own political hopes to the success of the power-holder or who depend on him in other ways. Thus, the power-holder and those who fall within his scope are linked in a situation in which the former can more or less directly affect the actions or opportunities of those within his scope.

It seems safe to assert that in almost all power situations there will be some people whose preference is to have the power-holder use his position to their explicit advantage. That is, the power situation creates a pattern of interaction, and within that interactional pattern will be those who hope to enlarge their opportunities, wealth, or own power through a skewing of the actions of the public official. In short, the power situation makes it possible to bring together corrupter and corrupted.

To so argue appears to relocate the moral decision onto the shoulders of those who fall within the scope of power rather than to focus on the power-holder, the public official, himself. But it must be kept in mind that the power-holder also lies within the scope of power. He is playing a power and authority role. But two more serious points need to be made. First is the impact of power on those who come near to it: "Lord Acton stopped on a half truth; and that, the less important half. Power corrupts all right. If you have enough of it, it may, in the end, absolutely corrupt *you*, but you only need the least little bit . . . to do a good job corrupting other people."¹⁰ The hypothesis can be offered that the broader the scope of power, the greater the number of those who will be tempted to use it to corrupt purposes as, sadly, Watergate and the role of "lower officials" in the White House hierarchy seem to indicate.

Second, the moral code of power does not establish any standard for the interactions between power-holder and those who would seek special-interest uses of that power, except for the criterion: Will it increase my power? Power tends to try to maximize itself. If it is accomplished by corruption, there is nothing in tradition, practice, or the "hard-nosed" realities of power that inherently discourages corruption. We have tended to assume that responsibility would undertake that task.

What of simple greed, however? That is, the public official who has chosen politics as a means of attaining small or large wealth by whatever means possible? At first glance, greed would seem to invalidate our foregoing argument. One can point out that politics as an economic investment is both a long-standing American practice and also a case in which power is not the central concern but simply a means of making a prosperous living. It appears that money is too closely tied to power in America to separate the two except in unusual cases. Some men of power choose to forego wealth; some wealthy men do not choose to become involved in the exercise of power. But there has been and continues to be a close meshing of the two. The corrupt official who grows wealthy because of his corruption often extends and amplifies his power at the same time; and his motives may be a

mystery even to himself.

The model of power suggested here closely follows the aphorism laid down by Thucydides: "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."¹¹ Power is both means — to wealth, fame, achievement, more power — and end. But it must be kept in mind that its influence is not limited to the formal power-holder but includes those within its scope. The latter are rarely burdened with any of the dictates of responsibility and may become instrumental in helping or causing the power-holder to break the power-authority-responsibility triad.

Thus, while power can be said to have a moral code, it is one which bears little resemblance to morality in the deeper sense of that word. Rather, the moral code of power is capable of tolerating corruption if corruption will give to those who lie within power's scope what they want.

In realistic terms, then, it seems unwise to attempt to attribute corruption in politics to "rhythmic effects" in a nation's moral climate, or to relativistic attitudes toward politics that may shift with the next public opinion poll, or to such simple correlations as poverty engendering greedy politicians, and so forth. Corruption is potentially a permanent companion of power; it is a "logical" one in the sense that where there are greater and lesser degrees of power there will always be those who want more, who want to share in it, and who want to benefit personally from the use of it.

The puzzle we confront is that society requires power; but power unchecked by responsibility is a breeding ground for corruption. Any effort at reform must begin with this puzzle and must attempt to solve it.

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

The Sheriff of Alpha County has held office for twenty years. In the last three elections he has not been challenged either in the primaries or the general election. Although his duties are formally limited to law enforcement and maintenance and operation of the county jail, those who do business with the county have long been accustomed to "clear it first with the Sheriff." In consultation with members of the school board, a separately elected body, he determines who will be the vendor for all school supplies, who will get the maintenance contract for school buildings and grounds, and who will be the prime contractor for new school buildings. Of the five members of the school board, one is his brother, one is his wife's uncle, and one owes him a large sum of money.

He is a silent partner in the Alpha Building and Supply Company, the same company that wins the bids on five out of six proposals for the county road work. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Second National Bank of Alpha. All the county's idle funds are on deposit at that bank, and no interest is paid to the county.

He is regularly consulted by the Governor on matters that affect his county. Those planning to run for governor routinely come to visit him at least two or three times during the campaign or in the pre-campaign jockeying. Although the county represents only a third of his U. S. Congressional district, it has received more than \$5,000,000 in federal funds for public works in the last eight years. He can call both U. S. Senators from his state and know that his calls will be answered by the senators, in person, within the hour. His annual salary has never been more than \$12,000 per year, but when he dies, his estate will be valued at over a half-million dollars.

The Sheriff of Alpha County is hypothetical, but he and others like him are familiar enough in every state. They are the "professionals" of American politics, professionals as politicians and as office-holders. They also demonstrate vividly what has been referred to as the scope of power in this paper.

Any proposals for reform must be addressed less to the Water-gates, Teapot Domes, or Credit Mobiliers, than to the on-going linkage of authority and power without responsibility, which so often appears to be the skeleton and musculature of "the system." But what reforms are appropriate to this power system? If one keeps the Sheriff of Alpha County in mind, it becomes clear that election commissions, campaign finance laws, and voluntary declarations by candidates on the sources of their financial support are attractive nostrums, but they have very little relation to the problem of corruption in American politics. Although it is possible that a person seeking office will barter his future behavior in return for a campaign contribution, the more serious problem is his scope of power once in office: the gradual build-up of promises, favors, connections, commitments, threats, and friendships that consolidate power, that increase it, that expand its scope beyond its limits of authority and responsibility.

It would seem that we have very few if any proposals for reform that address themselves to the Sheriff of Alpha County, or to those like him in state government, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, or wherever men and women hold power. It is probably true that the scarcity of proposals is directly related to our rather dim understanding of how these men and women use their offices, what they feel are their real obligations, and whether they seek to create their scope of

power or have it thrust upon them.

It would appear that the first and most urgent concern is to reform our own modes of thinking. As social scientists and socially attentive persons, we have been quick to admire the "politically skilled" man and slow to wonder if technique is the end of the politics. Perhaps we have also been too willing to accept a "little" corruption as "functional to the system," without asking what it is the system is doing or why it does what it does. What is being suggested here is that any valid reforms must come from a valid assessment of the realities of power and a commitment to understanding why so much powerful action is only to enhance power at the cost of responsibility.

Until we are willing to come to terms with our analytical standards and to question why we have been willing to ignore what is easily apparent around us, the prospects for reform will continue to rest upon "tinkering," rather than upon deep-seated and lasting change.

FOOTNOTES

¹ James Q. Wilson, "Corruption is Not Always Scandalous," in John A. Gardiner and David J. Olson, eds., *Theft of the City* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) p. 29.

² Daniel Elazar, "The New Federalism," *The Public Interest*, 35 (Spring, 1974), pp. 96-97.

³ It is worth recalling that at least from the turn of the century until well into the 1930s, political scientists were commonly activists in various reform movements.

⁴ A. A. Berle, *Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), pp. 6-7.

⁵ There is, of course, no commonly accepted "operational" definition of power. The one used here is only one of many and as subject to analytical criticism as any other.

⁶ The distinction made here between "power" and "authority" is a common one. See Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 101.

⁷ Parallel lines of retreat tend to appear in police corruption investigations: first, that the investigation is "destroying the morale" of the force; then, "it will give the police a bad name"; and finally, "we will be prevented from protecting the citizen from the real criminals."

⁸ During the course of a lengthy interview, a local treasurer commented to the author, "Sure, my job is political in the elections sense of the word. You'd better believe it. But I'm also obliged to do a good job, to be efficient, keep good records, and so forth. And I take that seriously."

⁹ Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York*

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), traces this evolution in a vivid and fascinating account.

¹⁰ James Gould Cozzens, *Guard of Honor* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948), p. 434.

¹¹ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Book V, Section 89, trans. by Richard Crawley (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 505.

THE INTERLOCKING OF POWER AND MORALITY: C. WRIGHT MILLS' *THE POWER ELITE*

By
Mark Stern

The plural elite-single debate in political science often centers on the question of "Who holds power?"¹ The implications of this debate for political ethics and the moral basis of a polity are seldom made explicit. Perhaps the single most important study in which morality and ethics follow from a given power structure is C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*, a work which sets forth a hypothesis of power that has probably received more critical attention than any other contemporary theory.² Moreover, Mills himself has been called "one of the intellectual precursors of the New Left movement of the 1960s."³

This essay focuses upon the connection between the theory of political power expressed by Mills in *The Power Elite* and his conception of political morality resulting from such power relationships in the United States. Mills' theory of power and morality is applied in a case study using the trans-Alaska oil pipeline controversy.⁴

MILLS' THESIS

Mills' theory of power stems from his ideas of what man ought to be. To Mills, to have control over decisions which affect one's life, or at least to participate meaningfully in the making of such decisions, is the essence of self-respect and power for one's self in democratic society.⁵ This is precisely what the average man does not have in contemporary society, and it is what sets the elite apart from the non-elite in society. The first words in Mills' work are:

The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family, and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. "Great changes" are beyond their control . . . [They] feel that they are without purpose in an epoch in which they are without power.

The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having consequences.⁶

To Mills, the ordinary man "ought" to be able to control his immediate environment, his immediate situation, in order to have a

modicum of self-respect and autonomy. But the ordinary man is but a powerless part of a powerless mass, even within the immediate institutions which surround him. Churches, schools, families are all shaped and molded to fit the needs of those who run the major institutions in society: the giant corporations, the national political executive, and the military.⁷

The power elite thesis put forth by Mills is more than just a description of decision-making in the United States; it is a picture of the process of power and "it is a conception of who is involved in the process" and of the result of the process.⁸ Historical determinism is not a component of this process, as elucidated by Mills. Responsibility for what happens in society rests on human decisions, not on some immutable laws of history, biology, or God-given forces. What can be done by men at any given point in history is dependent upon what has happened in prior times. The past, however, serves only to define the present, not to determine it. In the contemporary period the limits placed upon elites are fewer than ever before, and the means of power are more enormous than ever. Thus, how the powerful members of society handle power is a question more important today than ever before.

Power in contemporary society is vertically organized. Those at the top, the power elite, control what happens in society and do so through a systematically organized, interlocked, and overlapped series of groups.⁹ The power elite is not existent in one realm, but rather in the three most powerful realms simultaneously: the major corporations, the national political executive, and the military.

The top members of these powerful institutions share a common set of objectives, generally common origins, educational backgrounds and socio-psychological orientations, common career patterns, and common social and business interests. Individuals in the "middle level of power," a level exemplified by Congress, deal with secondary issues and are secondary bargainers in the political process. They may be involved in a balance of power among their coequals, but the power they balance is of secondary nature. The decisions made at the middle level of power are either those not deemed important enough for the most powerful to deal with, or are severely constrained by those in the most powerful institutions. The power elite make the decisions related to "slump, war, and boom." The Presidency is part of the power elite in American society, and the executive branch of government is involved in resolving the fundamental political issues of society.

At the bottom of the power pyramid is the public, which is increasingly a "mass public,"¹⁰ one manipulated by the elite through

mass media. Political candidates are sold to the public much as any other product for mass consumption, and political decisions are presented to the public as givens. The public is provided an education, not for knowledge and citizen responsibility, but for economic training so as better to serve corporations. The public is a mass used by elite-dominated institutions from which they have less and less autonomy.

To Mills, the United States has a vertically-structured, elite-dominated political and social system in which the mass public is manipulated for the private ends of those at the top. It therefore cannot be a moral society, for a moral society must allow for individual autonomy within the democratic framework and self-direction without overt manipulation by others. Though much may be done in the name of "public interest," it is not the public's interest that is really considered in the making of public policy, but rather the interests of "the higher immorality."

The pursuit of success as measured by money is the real determinant of public policy. Old values disappear. Absolute codes of right and wrong are irrelevant. Success as measured by the accumulation of wealth is the mark of virtue. "The higher immorality" is "a systematic feature of the American elite, and its general acceptance is an essential feature of the mass society."¹¹ Anything is permissible in the pursuit of success, and anything is to be expected from those at the top, for after all they are the most successful. "As news of higher immoralities breaks, they [the public] often say, 'Well, another one got caught today,' thereby implying that the cases disclosed are not odd events involving occasional characters but symptoms of a widespread condition."¹²

A society which lacks an elite with any firm moral sense is believed to be comprised of a network of small rackets, producing the "sharp operator" and the shady deal at all levels. The best operators rise to the top, and knowledge is neither a prerequisite to nor necessary corequisite of power. And as knowledge grows ever more divorced from power, those in power seek a substitute in the "expert."¹³ The leadership thus has its experts and knows what is best, and the public is to follow for the national good. Action, not bound by reason nor exposed to the realm of public debate, then becomes mindless and capricious. "America . . . appears now before the world a naked and arbitrary power as, in the name of realism, its men of decision enforce their . . . definitions upon world reality."¹⁴ To Mills, power and morality are clearly interlocked, and a socio-political system which operates from the premise of the "higher immorality" is a "system of organized irresponsibility."¹⁵

MILLS' THESIS APPLIED

One cannot help but shudder at Mills' uncanny sense of prophecy when reflecting upon the Watergate and Vietnam tragedies. But it may be argued that Watergate and Vietnam are but isolated episodes, not typical of most of the events of our time; and while they may help define our time, they are not all that is our time. The remainder of this essay, therefore, examines a controversy that is rather typical of our time, the trans-Alaska oil pipeline question, and does so in the light of C. Wright Mills' analysis of power and morality in the contemporary era. Although no claim is made that this controversy is the same as all others which involve major economic consequences for the United States, it is used here as a case study which might help provide a clearer answer to whether or not Mills' model of power and politics in the United States is operative.

The controversy over the trans-Alaska oil pipeline began in 1967 with the discovery of oil beneath the north slope of the Brooks Range.¹⁶ One of the primary difficulties which had to be overcome before the oil could be marketed was that of developing a method of transporting it from Prudhoe Bay, near the Arctic Ocean, to the continental United States. The oil companies involved in the project decided almost immediately that a hot oil pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to the warm water port of Valdez, augmented by tankers which could then carry the oil southward to our west coastal states, would be the most economical method of delivering it to the marketplace.

The oil companies holding leases on the north slope—Atlantic Richfield, British Petroleum, and Humble Oil (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey)—formed a group called the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System to construct the proposed line. After completion of the 1969 Alaskan land-lease auction, held by the State of Alaska to raise revenues and promote further oil company exploration and production, the original north slope developers merged with new lease holders in the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.¹⁷ However, the three original lease-holders retained control of 95 percent of the proven reserves in the north slope area and maintained control over the consortium involved in the over-all project.¹⁸

The path of the pipeline, as proposed by the Alyeska group, crossed federal lands, and thus its construction could not begin until a permit had been obtained from the Department of Interior. The Interior Department was inclined to issue quickly the necessary permit, but environmental groups obtained an injunction halting its issuance until the Department satisfied the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 by undertaking an environ-

mental impact study. In March 1972, the court-ordered construction ban was lifted when the Interior Department completed the environmental impact statement, which showed the project to be in conformance with the Environmental Policy Act. In May of the same year, Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton announced the intention of his department to issue the necessary permit forthwith.¹⁹

Within a year, environmental groups again brought the project to a halt by a court ordered injunction based on the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act. The basis for the granting of the injunction was that the 1920 Act limited rights-of-way to twenty-five feet on either side of a pipeline: but the north slope line had to have a much wider right-of-way in order to be constructed. The Supreme Court upheld the district court decision, and the ban on construction of the pipeline was continued. On November 13, 1973 the Senate passed S 1081, which had been approved the previous day by the House of Representatives. This bill sealed the fate of the environmentalist opposition to the Alaska oil pipeline by lifting the earlier limitations on widths of federal rights-of-way so that the pipeline could be constructed. The bill prohibited further court actions based on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and directed the Secretary of Interior to issue immediately the necessary authorizations so that pipeline construction could begin.²⁰

In his discussion of the mass society, Mills posits two important factors related to the oil pipeline question: the decline of the voluntary organization as an effective instrument of the public, and the transformation of the public into a mass media market.²¹ Both factors figure significantly. First, the only effective opposition to the project was organizational. Environmental groups twice brought the pipeline to a halt. When the Department of Interior submitted its pro-pipeline environmental impact statement, The Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Defense Fund issued a thirteen-hundred page rebuttal.²² Mills argues that the effective political organization in modern society is the large organization, and the large organization is "inaccessible to the individual who would shape by discussion the policies of the organization to which he belongs." The individual thus loses contact with the voluntary organization to the extent that it is effective. The organization becomes mass in scale as the individual becomes more dependent upon it and less able to have access to it.²³

Second, the public was subjected to a major media campaign on the pipeline issue. There is little question, however, that the media campaign was dominated by those favoring its construction.²⁴ Not only did the private corporations carry on an extensive media cam-

paign directed at the mass public, but from the beginning of the controversy the executive branch of government was also carrying on its media campaign aimed at generating public support for the project. The Interior Department even published a booklet, *Special Report to the People: The Potential and the Promise*, in which the virtues of the pipeline project were extolled while minimizing the environmental dangers.²⁵ The publication was issued before the department had undertaken its environmental impact study. Moreover, the President publicly called for construction of the pipeline and, after the Arab oil boycott, stressed the need for it to help meet the crisis.²⁶

The media battle and the administration's push for the pipeline were essentially public battles to justify decisions already made in private. The pipeline was going to be built; the investment had been made and agreement reached between government and the private sector to secure a return on the investment. Mills maintains that the giant corporations in tandem with the political executive would dominate in any decision of this magnitude and would, through an interlocking of personnel and perspective, be in common agreement.²⁷

By late 1969, private industry had invested millions in the Prudhoe Bay-Valdez pipeline and had orders not subject to cancellation for pipe and equipment worth additional millions.²⁸ Shortly before becoming Secretary of Interior, Walter Hickel, as Governor of Alaska, had the state government financially committed to the project by ordering construction of an access highway to the north slope.²⁹ In 1969 the State of Alaska also auctioned off new leases for further development of oil production in the north slope area.³⁰ In 1970, as Secretary of Interior, Hickel assured Alyeska officials "the pipeline will be built."³¹ In 1969, President Nixon appointed a federal task force to develop plans for the exploitation of Alaskan oil. Later in the same year the Interior Department lifted a federal lands freeze in Alaska to allow the construction of a service road for the pipeline. The freeze had been imposed to protect the claims of native Alaskans.³²

Instances of the interlocking of personnel between the private corporate sector affected by the pipeline decision and the public officials involved in making the decisions are numerous. Walter Hickel was the sole owner and President of the Hickel Investment of Anchorage, a director of the Alaska Pipeline Company, board member of the Anchorage Natural Gas Company, and a member of the Petroleum Club of Anchorage.³³ Robert O. Anderson, Chairman of the board of Atlantic Richfield, was a member of Richard M. Nixon's presidential finance committee,³⁴ and was identified as "the kingmaker who influ-

enced Nixon to choose Hickel . . . as his Secretary of Interior.”³⁵ Frank N. Ikard, a former Congressman appointed to presidential committees by Mr. Nixon, is president of the American Petroleum Institute, which has lobbied for the Alaska pipeline.³⁶ The National Petroleum Council advises the Secretary of Interior on fuel and oil matters; its membership includes, among others, Anderson, Ikard, and also John K. Jamieson, president of Standard Oil of New Jersey, whose subsidiary is a major participant in the Alyeska group.³⁷

Mills asserts that the balance of power and the center of initiative on major political decisions has shifted increasingly from the Congress to the Executive branch during the twentieth century. Congressional debate is structured to limit the consideration of a host of fundamental issues; and their prerogatives have been further weakened by readily granting emergency powers to the Executive.³⁸ And as noted above, the Executive played a prominent role in defining the public debate early in the development of the pipeline controversy.

Only a scattering of articles were inserted into the *Congressional Record* by Congressmen discussing the problems of oil shortages and environmental dangers. However, Congress was forced by private corporations and the Executive branch of government to confront the issue, in order to nullify the efforts of environmental organizations to block the project. The major sections of S 1386 were all geared to ending the construction stalemate, which had been based upon court decisions involving earlier laws.

Representative Morris K. Udall, a member of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, complained that the pipeline bill had been considered in an “atmosphere of confusion, controversy and urgency, real and imagined. . . .” Representative John P. Saylor, the ranking Republican member of the committee, felt this was “an outstanding example of ‘pressure’ legislation . . . hasty and ill advised, far-reaching and precedent setting.” Many other members of the committee voiced concern over the lack of debate and the short-circuiting of the National Environmental Policy Act.³⁹ Representative Michael J. Harrington, in words further reminiscent of Mills’ work, charged that “Congress was not asked to formulate a policy but rather to rubber-stamp a fait accompli.”⁴⁰ The President and his aides, in cooperation with the executives of the major oil corporations, had structured the public debate from the start and determined the nature of the congressional debate at the conclusion of the political decision-making process.

CONCLUSIONS

Morality and power are interlocked in Mills’ *The Power Elite*.

Power is linked to position in the contemporary polity, but is devoid of any firm base of morality. Getting what one wants regardless of the consequences for the public realm is the watchword of the successful. The masses are the powerless recipients of decisions made by the elites; the masses are manipulated by the elites. Whether in terms of the private ends of the elites or the new realpolitik so prized by them, a moral vision of the public realm does not enter into the public or private debates of those who are in control.

The Alaska oil pipeline controversy, as a case study, lends support to Mills' view of the relationship between power structure and morality in the United States the early 1970s. The public debate was circumscribed and weighted heavily in favor of oil interests. Both the private sector giants and the national political Executive took much the same public stance on the issue. Many of the national administrative actors had private interests in the oil companies involved in the controversy. Moreover, Congress's role in the resolution of the issue was limited by constraints imposed by the national political Executive and the private corporate interests. Congress entered the controversy under the pressure of an "emergency" and basically enacted the agenda set before it by the Executive branch.

The trans-Alaska oil pipeline issue is but one among many in the public realm. It is only a single case and therefore not conclusive, merely suggestive of the relationship between power elites and the public. But clearly the public debate over the public realm was muted in the case of the Alaska pipeline in deference to private power and private need. In this sense there may be an analogy between this issue and the old English commons or land set aside for public use. In our day the "common" is likely to gain in importance as it becomes less bountiful and as other alternatives become more costly.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The literature in this area is voluminous, but no single piece of work has caused as much debate among contemporary political scientists as has C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

² There are several critiques of Mills writings. See, for example, Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, *The Ruling Elites* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* (New York: Random House, 1970); Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

³ Prewitt and Stone, *The Ruling Elites*, p. 83.

⁴ Other case studies utilizing a single-elitist approach may be found in G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles*. Case studies utilizing a plural-elitist

approach may be found in Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure*.

⁵ This theme is more eloquently stated in Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁶ Mills, *The Power Elite*, pp. 3-4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 198, 235, 265, 269-297.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 303-304.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 343-344.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 347.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 361.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ The general synopsis of events presented in this section is drawn from: "Laying it on the Line for Alaskan Oil," *Business Week* (November 29, 1969), p. 31.; and *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1969-1973), vols. 24-29. The most comprehensive summary of the pipeline controversy may be found in volume 29, pp. 596-614. See also Charles J. Cicchetti, *Alaskan Oil* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

¹⁷ Robert Sherrill, *Nation*, 216 (June 22, 1973), p. 746.

¹⁸ Muriel Allen and Richard Levey, "Whose Alaskan Oil?," *New Republic*, 168 (July 28, 1973), p. 73.

¹⁹ Sherrill, *Nation*, p. 748.

²⁰ *Congressional Quarterly*, (1973), p. 597.

²¹ Mills, *The Power Elite*, p. 307.

²² Sherrill, *Nation*, p. 748.

²³ Mills, *The Power Elite*, pp. 306-307.

²⁴ *Congressional Quarterly* (1973), p. 604.

²⁵ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970.

²⁶ See the "Energy Message" sent by President Nixon to the Congress, reported in *Congressional Quarterly* (1973), p. 50-A.

²⁷ Mills, *The Power Elite*, pp. 274-277.

²⁸ *Business Week* (November 29, 1969), p. 31.

²⁹ Tom Brown, *Oil on Ice* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1971), p. 42.

³⁰ Sherrill, *Nation*, p. 747.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Business Week* (November 29, 1969), p. 31.

³³ Paul A. Theis and Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., eds., *Who's Who in American*

Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1971), p. 464.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁵ Sherrill, *Nation*, p. 747.

³⁶ *Who's Who in Finance and Industry* 17th ed. (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, 1971), p. 473.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 473, 481.

³⁸ Mills, *The Power Elite*, p. 255.

³⁹ *Congressional Quarterly* (1973), p. 607.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 614.

FRAMEWORKS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM

By
Gerald M. Henson

Ideas of political morality and ethics are very closely connected with the perceived need in the minds of many for political reform. However, the political frameworks to which people adhere demonstrably affect their selection of what is in need of reform. To many, politically moral man is a product of the institutional devices which he creates, and therefore they believe that the improvement or reform of political mechanisms will achieve a more ethical citizenry. Others feel that a totalistic environmental manipulation of the citizenry is necessary to achieve the desired end.

Even so widely accepted a regime as democracy has adherents of both these outlooks. Often the arguments concerning political reform in a democracy compose a debate that is not joined due to the failure on the part of many to distinguish analytically differing frameworks of democratic thought. Indeed, even some political scientists appear to ignore, or to be unaware of, the differing frameworks. For instance, Thomas R. Dye, after concluding that few linkages exist between the forms of democracy in the fifty American states and their policy outputs, states:

The legitimacy of the democratic form of government has never really depended upon the policy outcomes which it is expected to produce: rather, it is based upon the assertion that this mode of decision-making maximizes opportunities for the individual's participation in formation of public policy.¹

With this statement Dye sweeps aside an entire school of democratic thought, one which judges the legitimacy of democracy not only by its form but also by the *effects* policy outputs have upon the maximization of individual participation, the improvement of public welfare, and the enhancement of the total cultural milieu of society.

The purpose of this essay is to distinguish analytically these two modes of democratic political thought with the expectation that the reform debate may be joined in a form more closely resembling a dialogue. A less ambitious purpose is to correct the historical inaccuracies of statements such as that of Dye.² To accomplish this, one needs to consider some of the theories of democracy.

DEMOCRACY

Conceptualizing democracy is quite difficult, and differing mean-

ings are expected. According to Zoll, the number of definitions is equal to the number of writers on the subject.³ Salvadori estimates that there are about two hundred different definitions of democracy.⁴ Clearly this great variation in definition poses problems for analysis. The concept must be further demarcated.

Aristotle stated that constitutions may be classified by (1) "the nature of the end for which the state exists," and (2) "the various kinds of authority to which men and their associations are subject."⁵ In *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle defines that which has an end other than itself as art or production (*poiesis*) and that which is good in itself as science or action (*praxis*).⁶ These are typologies of governments in general and need to be transferred to the concept of democracy.

Ranney and Kendall distinguish between the identification of democracy as a "way of life" and its understanding as a "form of government."⁷ The "way of life" school views democratic government as having an end other than itself and its legitimacy rests upon the quality of its decisions. Advocates of democracy as a "form of government," on the other hand, are concerned only with the process by which ordinary citizens control their leaders and participate in the decisions made by their government. Hereafter democracy as a "way of life" will be referred to as *poiesis* democracy and democracy as a "form of government" will be termed *praxis* democracy.⁸

PRAXIS DEMOCRACY

The *praxis* school of democracy stresses the mechanisms for making political decisions, and *praxis* advocates can be identified by their definitions of democracy. Lord Bryce, for example, defines democratic government as one in which at least three quarters of the inhabitants are qualified to vote, regardless of class status. He stresses numbers and form.⁹

Another *praxis* theorist is Schumpeter, who views democracy as a form of government unassociated with any particular ideals. Democratic theory is a theory of means, not of means *and* ends. Schumpeter stresses method, institutional arrangements, competition, and participation by citizens.¹⁰ Unlike Bryce, however, the number of participants is not so important to Schumpeter. Indeed, he fears high levels of participation, insisting: "The electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede."¹¹

Giovanni Sartori shares Schumpeter's fear of high levels of mass participation and warns that such levels lead to totalitarianism.¹²

Sartori's criticism of *poiesis* democratic theory places him, by negation, in the *praxis* school: ". . . the ingratitude typical of the man in our time and his disillusionment with democracy are the reaction to promised goals that cannot possibly be reached."¹³

Recent empirical studies have suggested that the individual does not satisfy the "requirements for a democratic citizen."¹⁴ The authors of *The American Voter* describe "the electorate's slight involvement in politics and limited awareness of public affairs. . . ."¹⁵ Democratic theorists of the "realist" school, like Carl Cohen, having taken note of these findings, have tried to define democracy as something that exists empirically.¹⁶

For the *praxis* adherent, the reform question is clearly institutional. Schumpeter and Sartori would set up restrictions to enable only the "qualified" to participate in decision-making. Most contemporary *praxis* adherents, however, probably agree with Bryce and Cohen that some ideal of democratic participation is imperative. Therefore, they would stress mechanistic reforms that would facilitate procedurally citizen participation. Some of these reforms might include: shorter residency requirements for voting, a national policy for lengthening the period that voting polls stay open, easier procedures for obtaining absentee ballots, permanent and facilitative voter registration policies, more safeguards to assure equal apportionment of legislatures, etc. Institutional reforms to facilitate participation are intended, in the mind of the *praxis* adherent, to make a political system democratic and, hence, more ethical. Democracy demonstrates, on the part of the ruling forces, an expression of trust in the people. Indeed, it presumes that *all* may participate, and it "deteriorates when minorities within it are arbitrarily excluded by law . . . from participation."¹⁷

For the *praxis* adherent, therefore, participation is the most important element in judging a democracy. And most contemporary *praxis* adherents probably agree with Cohen when he stresses the importance of participation to the democratic character of a community.

POIESIS DEMOCRACY

The *poiesis* school of democratic thought stresses not only a particular form of government but also goals for democracy. It is a theory of means and ends. In twentieth century America, *poiesis* democracy can be broadly classified along a conservative-liberal dimension. To a conservative, the goal of democracy is to assure individual liberty. The question of liberty is conceived as one in which the individual

and government are separate. Governmental intervention in the social activity of the individual is regarded as a violation of one's inherent possession of liberty. The proper sphere of governmental action—and therefore the goal of conservative *poiesis* democracy—is to prevent an individual in the exercise of his liberty from infringing upon the liberty of another. Failing this, the role of government is to secure redress for the individual whose liberty has been infringed.¹⁸

To a liberal, individual liberty is not inherent, but achieved. The individual and government are not separate, but are joined as partners in a search for the attainment of liberty. Liberty can be restricted by the social conditions in which the individual (through no fault of his own) finds himself. The role of government, the end for which it exists, is to reconstruct or at least to alter dramatically the environment in a manner allowing the individual to achieve liberty.¹⁹ The *poiesis* theory of democracy is a highly value-laden one.²⁰

There is no way to prove which view is the proper end of democracy. Choice is necessary, however, and this essay next considers one school of *poiesis* democracy. Since the liberal view is the one most studied, continuity of presentation suggests it should be the one discussed here.

LIBERAL-POIESIS DEMOCRACY

Zevedei Barbu sees democracy as a frame of mind which has the basic traits of a feeling of change, a belief that man has the capacity to direct and control this change, and confidence in human reason.²¹ This outlook is shared by liberals (although not confined to them), given their definition of reasonable change. To this school, democracy as a way of life involves the belief “that if man creates the proper institutions, then his better possibilities will actualize themselves.”²² This school sees democracy as an “overarching moral idea,” not merely as a form of government.²³

Perhaps the best expression of this ideal has been stated by John Dewey, who defined liberal democracy as the “intelligent use of modern technology in behalf of the broadest public welfare.”²⁴ The democratic conception of the general welfare involves participation mechanisms such as the ballot (with no disfranchisement for any group of the population), the use of direct primaries in choosing candidates, and other political factors deemed democratic. Again, the central political ideal is participation: intelligent, responsible participation. In theory, educational systems advance the necessary rationality.²⁵

Further, there must be a level of economic development, coupled with relative economic equality, whereby the goods of modern tech-

nology are available to as many people as possible.²⁶ In addition, democracy is the "belief in the capacity of every person to lead his own life free from coercion and imposition by others *provided right conditions* are supplied."²⁷ The right conditions include a good education, the absence of poverty and social misery, and the presence of democratic political structures.²⁸

Dewey views the state as a "causal agency having power to produce action," and it is therefore the duty of the state to supply the right conditions.²⁹ He rejects the notion that democracy is merely a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, a conjoint communicated experience."³⁰ This mode of living, moreover, is a state which does not yet exist; but the purpose of a democratic form of government is to attain such a condition.³¹

Barbu and Dewey are rather vague concerning just what programs a democratic state is to implement so that men may become more democratic. Two liberal-*poiesis* thinkers who are more specific concerning what a democratic government must do are Charles Beard and Walter Lippman. The former indicated that the policies of a democratic state are legitimate if they make the ordinary citizen wealthier,³² while the latter implied that policies are legitimate only if they make the citizenry wealthier and healthier.³³

Dewey, Lippman, and Beard all suggest that policies of government are legitimate only if they are intended to make citizens "healthy, wealthy, and wise." These are at least some of the "right conditions" which must be supplied if the citizenry is to participate wisely. Moreover, the more citizens participate wisely, the more these types of policies should be implemented. The democratic process is ongoing and reciprocal.³⁴

For the liberal-*poiesis* adherent, the areas in need of reform are not merely institutional. The total environmental milieu, *including* political institutions, is subject to manipulation. This faith in the ability of man to improve his entire society stems from the philosophy of pragmatism and its adjunct epistemology of empirical experimentation. Society is the laboratory and government the experimenter. Such a conception presupposes not only that the ruling forces trust the people, but that the rulers themselves can be trusted to have high standards of ethics and morals. Recent political events, however, might well lead to opposite conclusions concerning leaders. What is needed is a dialogue that not only takes moral and ethical standards into consideration, but one that also helps to determine just what is meant by democracy. If the latter question is debated vigorously, perhaps we can decide what role we wish to government to play in our lives and what sorts of reforms are necessary for that role.

Whether the role of government is considered to be narrow-gauged (*praxis*) or broad-gauged (*poiesis*) appears crucial in focusing that debate.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 300.

² A critique of Dye's model and a reconsideration of his data findings will be presented in a forthcoming paper.

³ Donald A. Zoll, *Reason and Rebellion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 20.

⁴ Massimo Salvadori, *Liberal Democracy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1957), p. 110.

⁵ Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 110.

⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J. E. C. Welldon, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902), p. 184.

⁷ Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956), pp. 12-14.

⁸ For a discussion of the two schools of thought see Donald J. Devine, *The Attentive Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), chapter 1. This delineation between *poiesis* and *praxis* democracy suggests two opposing schools of thought which are mutually exclusive. Such, of course, is not the case. These are ideal types and it is probably impossible to find anyone who would be a *poiesis* or *praxis* adherent under every conceivable condition.

⁹ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 20, 22.

¹⁰ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 262-269.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹² Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), p. 90.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁴ B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. W. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 312.

¹⁵ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969), p. 290.

¹⁶ Carl Cohen, *Democracy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971). p. 31.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁸ See Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), Chapter 9.

¹⁹ John Dewey, "Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us," in Carl Cohen, ed., *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy*, pp. 683-689.

²⁰ See Devine, *The Attentive Public*, p. 4.

²¹ Zevedei Barbu, "Democracy as a Frame of Mind," in Carl Cohen, ed., *Communism, Fascism, and Democracy* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 683-689.

²² Jerome Nathanson, *John Dewey: The Reconstruction of the Democratic Life* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1951), p. 83.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-95.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-100.

²⁷ John Dewey, "Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us," in *The Philosopher of the Common Man* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 224. Emphasis added.

²⁸ George Geiger, "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy," in Paul Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of John Dewey* (Chicago: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 350.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

³⁰ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 87

³¹ John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 173, and *The Public and Its Problems* (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1927), p. 143.

³² Saul K. Padover, ed., "Essentials of Democracy," in *The Meaning of Democracy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 80.

³³ Walter Lippman, *Drift and Mastery* (London: T. F. Unwin, 1914), p. 254.

³⁴ Dewey, "Creative Democracy," p. 227.

THE QUEST FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ORTHODOXY: AN ASSESSMENT

By
Gerald De Maio

The American political tradition has been the subject of a continuing debate among American academicians, especially since the era of the Progressivist historians. The differing interpretations of the American political experience all implicitly attempt to discern the political ethos of the American people, that is, the operative political values by which the American polity constitutes itself as a political society acting in history. The objective of this essay is two-fold: First, we assess the revisionist interpretation of the American political experience offered by Kendall and Carey, an interpretation which is organized around the concept of the public orthodoxy. It is the writer's contention that while this revisionist interpretation fails, it nevertheless raises important questions about the core symbols and documents which embody the nation's operative political ideals. Second, we argue that only by taking into account the nation's public orthodoxy can discourse concerning political morality and reform be meaningful.

THE CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC ORTHODOXY

The methodological premise from which this essay proceeds is that a public orthodoxy is a requisite for any viable society. It is therefore incumbent upon us to make as perspicuous as possible the idea of a public orthodoxy before we undertake an examination of the American public orthodoxy.

Although this concept and its use as a technical term in contemporary political science is associated with Willmoore Kendall, the theoretical groundwork was laid by Eric Voegelin in *The New Science of Politics*, which has become a contemporary classic, and his subsequent writings.¹ Voegelin speaks of the articulation of political societies which render them "capable of representing themselves for action."² He conceives of political society as a *cosmion*, a little world illuminated from within by the use of symbols and myths which aid its members in the internal self-interpretation of the society. To be politically viable or—to use Voegelin's terminology "in form for action"—requires an internal structure by which those in authority are capable of eliciting response from the populace.

Building upon the theoretical explorations of Voegelin, Kendall

and Wilhelmsen define the public orthodoxy as:

that tissue of judgments, defining the good life and indicating the meaning of human existence, which is held commonly by the members of any given society, who see in it the charter of their way of life and the ultimate justification of their society. . . . What we "point to," in a word, is that matrix of convictions, usually enshrined in custom and "folkways," often articulated formally and solemnly in charter and constitution, occasionally summed up in the creed of a church or the testament of a philosopher, that makes a society The Thing it is and that divides it from other societies as, in human thought, one thing is divided always from another.³

They are stating a concept which includes a legal orthodoxy as a constituent element, which provides the political instruments used to govern a community, and much more. The concept of a public orthodoxy may be equated with the Greek term *politeia*, which Barker defined as a "system of social ethics," or with Strauss' characterization of the term *regime*.⁴ The public orthodoxy is a definitive way of life; it is those public truths which give a society its character and tone and enable it to be an acting unit in history.

Although the term public *orthodoxy* connotes rather traditionally oriented or closed societies, with perhaps an official civil religion, its use as a theoretical term need not be limited to such societies.

Not only can society not avoid having a public orthodoxy; even when it rejects an old orthodoxy in the name of "enlightenment," "progress," "the pluralist society," "the open society" and the like, it invents, however subtly, a new orthodoxy with which to replace the old one . . . theoretically orthodoxy refers to any public doctrine accepted unconditionally by a community, even if the orthodoxy in question is somebody else's heresy.⁵

The public orthodoxy points to the undergirding set of operative values which make possible communal interaction. For without this overarching set of values, communication among members of a society becomes impossible. The public orthodoxy makes political life possible. Its use as a technical concept in political science enables us "to get inside" a society and discern the means by which a people understands itself and the modes of participation of its political life.

Other political scientists, operating from a philosophical perspective quite different from that of the aforementioned theorists, have developed a conceptual framework which is analogous to the concept of the public orthodoxy. An example is Sheldon Wolin's adaptation of Thomas Kuhn's depiction of conflicting paradigms within academic disciplines. From Wolin's perspective, political society "would be envisaged as a coherent whole in the sense of its customary politi-

cal practices, institutions, laws, structure of authority and citizenship, and operative beliefs organized and interrelated.”⁶ The congruence of these definitions should not surprise us, since the public orthodoxy is essentially a societal paradigm which focuses on a people’s attempt at self-understanding.

Wolin borrows Kuhn’s terminology and draws the distinction between a paradigm creator and a paradigm worker. A striking example of paradigm creation, one directly relevant to this essay, is Hobbes’ debunking of the archetectonic pretensions of classical political philosophy and substitution of a nominalist and profoundly skeptical philosophy appropriate to the emerging bourgeois man. The paradigm creator who articulates the public orthodoxy for his society is a giant; yet work remains to be done in order to solve what Kuhn calls *puzzles*. Locke may be conceived of as a problem solver or paradigm worker. He was to make Hobbes’ paradigm for a society premised on transactional relations among men palatable, as the studies of Strauss and MacPherson have demonstrated. One might add that American political theorists who have generally been regarded as second-rate political philosophers might be more appropriately conceived of as paradigm workers within a liberal public orthodoxy, whose roots can be traced ultimately to Hobbes.

A major task Kendall set for himself was to ferret out the American public orthodoxy from its basic symbols and documents. His conclusion was that “the American political tradition *is* clearly understood as such by those who live the American way of life and love it. . . .”⁷ This statement, in effect, challenges the standard interpretations of the American political experience. It directly challenges Hartz’s assertion that Americans live by a truncated form of Lockeanism, and therefore liberalism.

THE TWO TRADITION THESIS

The quest for the American public orthodoxy by intellectuals perhaps reached its apogee during the 1950s when American Studies as an academic discipline experienced its most fertile period. It was a decade which produced several classics purporting to explain the American political experience. Today we still go back to the books of this era, such as Boorstin’s *Genius of American Politics* (1953) and Hartz’s *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955). The field is not closed, however, as evidenced by a statement from Kendall and Carey’s *Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition* (1970): “Up to a recent moment—just what moment we need not say precisely—the American political tradition did not constitute a problem

whereas today it does.”⁸ The intervening decade and a half between the Boorstin and Hartz books and the 1970s witnessed several notable political assassinations, Vietnam, racial unrest, and the impending impeachment of a President, which led to his forced resignation. It is indeed time again to ask: “What is the American public orthodoxy?”

Kendall’s thesis, in sum, is that there have been two political traditions in America, one conservative and one liberal, which have been vying as the legitimate embodiment of the public orthodoxy. Kendall states the problem thusly: “. . . the American political tradition is a Conservative tradition, and to a very considerable extent the great political decisions of recent decades have reflected Liberal ideas.”⁹ The tradition which embodies the public orthodoxy, Kendall maintains, has been derailed. He sought to recover this older, “conservative” tradition. In order to do so, however, Kendall had to take on the “official custodians” of the heritage who have written the “official literature” by which the liberal or “new” tradition finds expression.

The prevalence of a liberal way of life or orthodoxy in America has been noted by a number of commentators. We focus on Hartz simply because his work is generally credited with being methodologically the most sophisticated of the genre of books which underscore the basic consensual and liberal nature of American values. Hartz’s book is superior for the reason that unlike most of the other books emphasizing America’s uniqueness, *The Liberal Tradition in America* attempts to present a comparative view of the American experience from the vantage point of European intellectual history. This perspective affords an explanation for the consensus Hartz and others see with respect to the nation’s operative political values. America lacked a feudal past and with that the intellectual adversaries of eighteenth century liberalism. Locke could assume a Filmer and “the myriad associations of class, church, guild and place. . . .”¹⁰ Americans were, to use Hartz’s phraseology, “born free,” thereby lacking the tradition of classical political philosophy which Locke could presume as a counterpoise to his articulations. An orthodoxy necessarily becomes petrified when it has merely one vocabulary with which to conceptualize politics. “The ironic flaw in American liberalism lies in the fact that we have never had a real conservative tradition.”¹¹

Kendall’s revisionist thesis directly confronts the prevalent academic view exemplified by Hartz. Guided by the concept of a public orthodoxy, Kendall argues that American society has a set of shared values which identifies it as an acting unit in history. In short, there

is a basic consensus about the American Way of Life. But Kendall views this consensus differently than Hartz, stipulating that *conservative* values are reflected by the basic documents of the tradition. He asks us to go back to the founding fathers to re-educate ourselves as to the meaning of the American political heritage. The two core documents which embody the nation's public orthodoxy, Kendall maintains, are the Constitution and the *Federalist Papers*. These documents, he asserts, are (to use Voegelian terminology) in differentiated form.¹²

Public orthodoxies, as we have mentioned previously, embody a people's understanding of the way politics should be conducted in their society. Discerning which documents reveal a nation's orthodoxy can be a difficult methodological task for scholars. However, students of American political thought have often noted that antagonists throughout the nation's history have gone to much the same sources, namely the Constitution and, to a lesser extent, the *Federalist*. The controversy arises over the interpretation of the documents. It can be demonstrated (convincingly we think) that the basic documents of the American public orthodoxy rest upon Hobbesian assumptions, which are fundamentally liberal. These assumptions have operative consequences which strike at the heart of the nation's political life and which must be considered in any discussion concerning political morality and reform.

The ensuing sections focus upon the core documents of the American political tradition, which proponents of differing interpretations of the American political experience agree embody the nation's public orthodoxy. The philosophical assumptions underlying the *Federalist Papers*, which Kendall and Carey remind us are essential for understanding the Constitution, are considered first. Next, consideration is given the negativity of the Constitution, which underscores its basically liberal nature. Finally, we consider the implications that the core documents of the American public orthodoxy have for political reform. The primary thesis is that the Kendall-Carey reading of the Constitution and the *Federalist* obfuscates the Hobbesian character of these documents. The questions Kendall raises are particularly crucial, for we must understand the nature of a nation's public orthodoxy before we can talk meaningfully about that nation's politics.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE *FEDERALIST*

Kendall and Carey contend that "To treat the Constitution and *The Federalist* separately is difficult. The two documents are closely

associated in most people's minds, as well they should be" They also insist that "*The Federalist* is a 'must' for anyone who seeks an 'intellectual' understanding of our tradition and of the political system under which we have governed ourselves. . . ." ¹³ No student of American political thought would find much to disagree with in these statements, although this was not the case before the recognition of the *Federalist* as a classic in political theory. The primary credit for this intellectual rescue operation, which commenced some fifteen years ago, belongs to Martin Diamond and Gottfried Dietze, as well as to Kendall and Carey. The controversy arises when Kendall and Carey try to rescue the *Federalist Papers* from their ideational affinity to Hobbes and Locke.

Kendall was no stranger to the expositors of the liberal orthodoxy and was fully aware that to read an authentic conservatism into the *Federalist*, he would have to show an ideational break with Hobbes and Locke. It is the writer's contention that his revisionist reading fails, and that Hobbes and Locke are indeed the theoretical progenitors of the liberal way of life permeating American society.

The *Leviathan* and *Second Treatise* articulate a public orthodoxy which is premised upon the absolute will of the individual. Rights derived from this principle, foremost among which is the right of self-preservation, lack corresponding or correlative duties. The classics of the liberal orthodoxy make little provision for the fostering of community on the part of the state. This role is relegated to the private sphere. The function of the state is primarily that of maintaining the *rights* of individuals.

Kendall tried to show that the *Federalist* and the Constitution are divorced from the *Leviathan* and *Second Treatise*. He saw the expression of the American public orthodoxy embodied in the Constitution and *Federalist Papers* more closely akin to the classical conception of an harmonious relationship between the good of individuals and the good of society in which rights and duties are correlative. Kendall maintains that in the American context, this concern for community is symbolized by a representative assembly attempting to ascertain a deliberate sense of the community. In this respect, he stated:

the false myths produce fanatics amongst us. They are misrepresentations and distortions of the American political tradition and its basic symbols which are, let us remind you, the representative assembly *deliberating* under God; the virtuous people, virtuous because deeply religious and thus committed to the *process* of searching for the transcendent Truth. And these are, we believe, symbols we can be proud of without going before a fall.¹⁴

Americans, Kendall asserts, live under a *Federalist Papers* Con-

stitution "which lays down for us a constitutional morality, a political ethos that is as natural to us as the air we breathe."¹⁵ This morality, he argues, fosters a politics of discussion and dialogue among representatives of a virtuous people.

Kendall fully agrees with other political scientists who argue that the Constitution grants weapons to the three branches, especially the legislative branch, which could conceivably stymie the functioning of government. He further argues that this possible "war of all against all" among the several branches has not occurred because the *Federalist* instructs the various branches that "they must act merely as equal and co-ordinate branches and not throw *their* weight around."¹⁶ In short, the constitutional morality urges upon the several branches a sense of restraint and cooperation for the good of the community, thus forestalling a breakdown. And as an embodiment of the nation's public orthodoxy, this morality is internalized and lived by.

There are several problems with Kendall's reading of the *Federalist*. First, cooperation and self-restraint among the separate branches might be antagonistic cooperation and not the harmonious state of affairs he sees. Second, the reading rests upon the core symbol of the virtuous people, deeply religious, whose representative assembly seeks to ascertain the common good. Yet he admits that neither Publius nor the Constitution made any provision for keeping the people virtuous; there is no conception of character formation through education conveyed by the Greek term *paideia* in these documents. Furthermore, the deeply religious people, through their representative assembly in Virginia and later in Philadelphia, consciously chose to drive a wedge between the public and spiritual orders. Also, given a different set of assumptions, say liberal ones, the protection afforded to minorities by the *Federalist* to thwart irredentism could readily translate into the Calhoun doctrine of concurrent majorities disavowed by Kendall.

It seems advisable, therefore, to take another look at the philosophical assumptions underlying the *Federalist*, which lay down the political ethos for the American regime. This political ethos is thoroughly grounded in the liberal orthodoxy, which is premised upon the absolute will of the individual who seeks to secure his inalienable rights through the institution of the office of the sovereign. The function of the sovereign is to enforce the system of rules for conflict resolution; he is to be an umpire, to use Locke's description of his office. Publius emerges as a paradigm worker who labors within the parameters of the liberal orthodoxy. A cardinal tenet of the liberal orthodoxy expounded by Hobbes and Locke is the assumption of

individualism and of its corollary, self-interestedness. In the very first *Federalist Paper*, Publius explicitly states he will discuss the proposed Constitution with reference to “The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity . . . and . . . the additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of government, to liberty and to property.”¹⁷

Self-interest is the main encapsulator of the *Federalist*, not the sense of community of a virtuous people, which Kendall and Carey read into the work. The fostering of community has been historically a conservative project, but the *Federalist* fails in this respect. As such, it cannot be construed as a conservative document. Publius is notably silent with respect to the promotion of communal sentiments and virtue in the classical sense, as Martin Diamond aptly notes:

Other political theories had ranked highly, as objects of government, the nurturing of a particular religion, education, military courage, civic-spiritedness, moderation, individual excellence in the virtues, etc. On all of these the *Federalist* is either silent, or has in mind only pallid versions of the originals, or even seems to speak with contempt.¹⁸

This is quite logically so because the document the *Federalist* celebrates is an extremely negative one whose affinity to Hobbes’ societal paradigm has been well documented.¹⁹ Publius emerges as a paradigm worker who accepts the basic assumptions of the liberal orthodoxy and from them seeks to fashion a solution appropriate to the problems of governing a large commercial republic.

The liberal societal paradigm or orthodoxy assumes fragmentation and conflictual behavior among men resulting from their transactional relations. The function of public authority is to secure for private men their individual rights by providing rules and mechanisms for conflict resolution. Publius’ central concern is “this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities. . . .”²⁰ This concern, clearly Hobbesean, necessitates a politics geared “to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim”²¹ This stark affinity to Hobbes led Diamond to write “the primary fears of the *Federalist* are Hobbesean, that is, fears of ‘foreign war and domestic convulsion’.”²²

Publius addresses himself in the tenth paper to the fear of domestic convulsion, which expresses itself through the violence of faction. He pessimistically reminds us that nothing can be done about the causes of faction, since these are sown in the nature of man and are occasioned by opining, passions, and the unequal distribution of

property. He seeks rather to offer a solution to control the effects of faction. As a paradigm worker, he adapts the Hobbesean statement of the problem to a new situation, that is, to a large commercial republic. The *largeness* or *extensiveness* of the republic affords the solution. He is arguing for a society in which individuals' self-interests are subjected to cross-cutting cleavages, so celebrated by contemporary political scientists, thus preventing a potential cohesive and tyrannical majority faction from arising.

The tenth paper is revealing in a number of other ways. It renders extremely tenuous the Kendall-Carey reading of the *Federalist* as embodying a symbol of a virtuous and deeply religious people. Consider Publius' stipulation that "neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control" for the violence of faction.²³ These are hardly sentiments befitting a virtuous people who seek to arrive at a sense of community through discussion and dialogue. Some of the language is even very suggestive, as when Publius speaks of the "aggregate interests of the community." Society conceived of as an aggregation conveys the image of atomistically related political actors, a core liberal symbol. Aggregation of interests does not make a community of virtuous people. The conservative ideal Kendall and Carey hint at in these papers is clearly rejected by Publius.

The Hobbesean assumptions of individualism and societal fragmentation are carried over by Publius in his exegetical treatment of the type of government provided by the Constitution. Publius continually stresses the need for mechanisms to thwart the "encroaching spirit of power" or the "ambitious intrigues" of executive magistrates which render difficult the Hobbesean task of "providing some practical security for each, against the invasion of others."²⁴ This potential "war of all against all" among the branches of government is rooted, Publius reminds us, in the "degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust."²⁵ He boldly states his general solution to the problem in *Federalist 51*: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."²⁶ After all, Publius reminds us, government is but a reflection on human nature. More appropriately, one might say that assumptions about human nature have resulting consequences in the way one thinks about the functioning of government. Publius clearly demonstrates his acceptance of the liberal paradigm articulated by Hobbes and Locke. His goal is Hobbesean, for he states that the primary function of government is to provide security for the individual against the invasion of his rights by others. The proposed Constitution, Publius maintains, succeeds in doing this.

Publius therefore states the mechanisms by which the Constitu-

tion provides the stability requisite for accomplishing this goal through separation of powers and checks and balances. The intellectual backdrop for separation of powers was, of course, provided by the classical theory of mixed government. The Constitution's framers learned their lesson well, Publius states in *Federalist 9*, for they improved over the prescriptions of the classical masters.

It is interesting to note that when Publius acknowledges classical writers, he focuses upon their pessimistic side. For instance, the communal ideas contained in Book III of Aristotle's *Politics* are given little, if any, play. Instead, the founding fathers borrow from Aristotle's cycle of decay and fashion a solution which will "cage the whole of the cycle within the framework of a single constitutional structure."²⁷ But they parted from the classical formula which called for combining into one governmental structure an executive or monarchical office, a patrician upper house, and a plebian lower house. Rather, Publius' new science seeks to improve on the classical prescription. The Constitution, the *Federalist* tells us, thwarts the potential "war of all against all" among the branches by giving each branch partial agency or control over the others so that "their mutual relations [will] be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."²⁸ In order to exercise power, the political actors of one branch must be able to compromise with political actors of other branches, resulting in a politics of negotiation.

Publius' analysis of the Constitution is premised upon the assumptions of self-interestedness, fragmentation, individualism, and an incessant craving for power which must be countered in kind. A case in point is the *Federalist's* depiction of the legislature as an "impetuous vortex" against which "the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions."²⁹ Publius is quite emphatic in telling us that we must *fear* legislatures. This language is rather incongruous with Kendall and Carey's depiction of the legislature as a representative assembly deliberating under God to ascertain a sense of the community. Rather, what comes across is the Hobbesean assumption of an incessant quest for power and the necessity to check it. In number 48, Publius goes on to tell us that political corruption in the form of pecuniary rewards or bribes is to be expected and that the legislature is most apt to exercise this form of influence. Again one sees the maxim of self-interestedness enshrined by the framers and Publius as a philosophy of government. In short, they are operating within the theoretical paradigm constructed by Hobbes and Locke. They are paradigm workers within the liberal orthodoxy.

At this point, we may summarize by stating that the *Federalist*,

which embodies the public morality of the American polity, rests upon Hobbesian, and hence fundamentally liberal, assumptions about political society. The Constitution, as a document within the parameters of the liberal orthodoxy, conceives of the functions of government narrowly and negatively. Having located the philosophical underpinnings of the *Federalist*, one may well ask, as Martin Diamond does of Publius Madison, "Whether his remedy for one disease has not had some unfortunate collateral consequences."³⁰ We now turn to a discussion of the Constitution to discern the translation of Publius' theoretical arguments into operative orthodoxy by which the nation lives.

THE CONSTITUTION AS A LIBERAL DOCUMENT

The Constitution is fully consonant with liberal orthodoxy in that it evidences a negative concept of the role of government, displaying this negativity in two major respects. First, as the so-called enabling or delegated powers section of the Constitution lays bare, the document addresses itself to economic matters—to the minimum necessary conditions by which a large commercial republic can be a going concern. Second, and perhaps most crucial, the document has little to say about other things, such as fostering a sense of community, promotion of virtue, and civic responsibility. It is the omission of these other objects of government which renders untenable the Kendall-Carey reading of the Constitution and *Federalist Papers* as embodying the symbols of a virtuous people. The basic flaw is that no provision is made for keeping this presumably virtuous people virtuous. Rather, the document is concerned with avoiding the horrors Hobbes so poignantly described in that famous passage in Chapter 13 of the *Leviathan* in which he speaks of the inconveniences of war and domestic convulsion.³¹

The Constitution's affinity to the Hobbesian paradigm is best illustrated by Article I, Section 8, the so-called "enabling" or "delegated powers" clause, which Jacobson dubbed a (Hobbesian) "demonology of politics, foreign and domestic."³² What does one find upon reading it? He finds that the interests of liberal men are protected, and the Hobbesian fears are thwarted. Jacobson emphasizes that the accent of this crucial article is definitely on the negative or coercive functions of government.³³ And this article is not an exception; negative spirit permeates the Constitution. Sections 5 and 6 of this article make provision for the expulsion of members guilty of disorderly behavior, and explicitly mention illicit emoluments as though the framers expected these to be more than occasional occur-

rences. In the same manner, Section 4 of the second article deals with the impeachment of the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States. Fear of legislative power translates into Section 9 of Article I, which are not provisions to promote a sense of community. Rather, they deal with the central Hobbesian tenet—that public peace is to be maintained so that private happiness may be pursued. The key assumption upon which the nation’s public orthodoxy is constructed is expressed by Jacobson: “Venality and recalcitrance are as natural to men as the air they breathe.”³⁴

With such a philosophy of government and human nature embodied in the nation’s fundamental law, it is difficult, almost impossible, to make good on the stipulation made by Publius in *Federalist 57*: “the aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society.”³⁵ It is with respect to this question—“how to keep the people virtuous”—that the Constitution’s negativity is most clearly manifest and damning. It is more what the Constitution does not include than what it does, which renders it a document fully within the paradigm constructed by Hobbes and Locke.

Character formation was not to be the business of the nation’s fundamental law. The primary function of a liberal state is to thwart the Hobbesian horrors. Freedom in such a state is conceived of as *freedom from*. Anything not proscribed by law is generally permitted, or, as Hobbes aptly put it: “in all kinds of actions by the laws praetermitted men have the liberty of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves.”³⁶

In *Federalist 30*, Publius states quite boldly that “Money is, with propriety, considered the vital principle of the body politic.”³⁷ This concern is reiterated in number 53, in which Publius enumerates the principal tasks of legislation: interstate commerce, foreign trade, taxes, and the militia. This had led Diamond to write that: “What is striking is the apparent exclusion from the functions of government of a wide range of non-economic tasks traditionally considered the decisive business of government.”³⁸ And Publius in *Federalist 84* tells us that “a Constitution like that under consideration is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, [and not] a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns.”³⁹ Public and private spheres are separated as they necessarily must be in order to be consonant with the liberal societal paradigm.

The promotion of non-economic tasks such as the fostering of community and civic virtue is relegated in a liberal order to the

private sphere. Churches, and charitable and civic associations, are expected to fill the void left by the nation's fundamental law. This sort of communalism, typified by the church supper, is not allowed to penetrate the public order. In fact, Kendall and Carey tell us that both the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Philadelphia Constitution drive "a wedge between politics and religion."⁴⁰ Still, they argue, the secularistic government which is provided for in these documents is not to be antagonistic toward religion.

But Publius did not have a vision of religious sects acting in concord, each in its own way promoting civic virtue. Rather, his vision is starkly Hobbesian: religious sects promote discord which must be thwarted. "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."⁴¹ Publius here articulates a negative civil theology whose theoretical groundwork can be traced to the liberal theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and Spinoza. Religion clearly must not intrude upon the public sphere.

This renders almost meaningless the seemingly endless controversy over just how much religious penetration into the public order is permitted by the First Amendment. Francis Wilson has written with respect to our civil theology that Americans today "have much in common with Hobbes."⁴² But Americans have been operating within Hobbesian parameters all along; and the negative civil theology Wilson sees in contemporary America was not laid by Justices Holmes, Black, or Douglas. It can be traced to the documents which embody the nation's public orthodoxy, since they separate the public and spiritual orders. A negative civil theology merely complements the negativity which suffuses the Constitution in other respects.

A public order grounded in Hobbesian presuppositions does not rely upon religious or moral motives to promote the common good. That solution, Publius told us in *Federalist 10*, is visionary. The Constitution's solution, which Publius articulates in his famous maxim in number 51, is to let "ambition counteract ambition." This is possible because the nation's fundamental law provides for a number of power centers which can be relied upon to guard jealously their respective prerogatives. This in turn gives rise to a style of politics which places a premium on compromise and stability.

This style of politics has, of course, had its defenders among professional political scientists. The pluralist school dominated the study of American politics for many years. The existence of multiple access points occasioned by rival power centers has led pluralists such as Robert Dahl to write optimistically that "few groups in the United

States who are determined to influence the government—certainly few if any groups who are *organized, active, and persistent*—lack the capacity and opportunity to influence some officials somewhere in the political system to obtain at least some of their goals.”⁴³ Of course, this celebration of the American style of politics has been decried in recent years, and consequently we are subjected to calls for reform.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL REFORM

Given the American political system’s ills, it is not surprising that within the last decade or so a number of perceptive critiques have emerged questioning the celebration of the American system. Invariably, they pinpoint methodological shortcomings of the behavioral (chiefly pluralist) approach to American politics, such as its concentration upon safe, visible issues and not upon *nondecisions*; its focus upon legitimate and strongly organized pressure groups, neglecting latent groups and the powerless, making stability the key value, and implicitly acting as apologists for the regime while maintaining a value-free posture.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, too few of these critiques trace these ills to the roots of the nation’s public orthodoxy. And although such critiques are written from differing philosophical perspectives, there seems to be a yearning for a sense of community, for a public interest, for a common good that the nation’s operative political style does not foster and which this essay has contended it cannot foster because of the public orthodoxy by which the nation organizes its political life. The call to introduce normative considerations into American political discourse emerges, in part, as a response to the behavioral persuasion in American political science. But the behavioral persuasion is only symptomatic and rose in response to the operative political style occasioned by the nation’s liberal public orthodoxy. The concerns of today’s behavioralists can be traced to Madison and Calhoun, as has been done by some political scientists, and ultimately to Hobbes and Locke.⁴⁵ The debate over various reforms and the disputes between contemporary American conservatives and liberals tend to fall within the basic parameters of the liberal orthodoxy, which is premised upon the assumptions of societal fragmentation and conflict.

Hobbesean assumptions loom large in American political thought, and it is no accident that Kendall and Carey, despite their symbol of Americans as a virtuous and deeply religious people, describe the operative style of American politics in transactional terms. The American style of politics, they and so many other commentators tell us, is consensual politics. The function of the political process is to

“strike ‘deals’ that render . . . programs palatable to a greater number within society.”⁴⁶ Kendall and Carey also note that a political system, such as the American system, requires “rules and procedures, analogous to those of a poker game”⁴⁷ Their analysis is replete with images of deception and potential conflict, which are precisely the images Publius assumes in the *Federalist*.

The assumptions (Hobbesean) of communal fragmentation, conflict, individualism, and self-interestedness, which are part of the American public orthodoxy, are so much a part of our political discourse that they subtly reappear in the *reformist* literature which seeks to effectuate more responsibility in American government. Often the prescriptions of reform-minded political scientists tend to be palliatives which can be encompassed within the parameters of the nation’s public orthodoxy and which do not really challenge it. In fact, the recommendations tend to take on the familiar ring of “more of the same,” which only goes to further strengthen the assertion of a monistic liberal orthodoxy permeating the political community. For example, Ted Lowi wants the “restoration of the Federalist No. 10 ideology in which ‘factions’ are necessary evils that require regulation, not accommodation,” and Vincent Ostrom suggests “extending the principle of self-government to wider and wider realms, each with limited jurisdiction . . . to create new political structures—new political artifices.”⁴⁸ The familiar liberal fear of accumulation of power and the assumption of a fragmented community continually reappear; and the discourse is carried on within very narrow parameters.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to discuss meaningfully political morality and the feasibility of reform, we must begin with an examination of the nation’s public orthodoxy. In doing this, it is necessary to start with a people’s attempt at self-understanding as it actualizes itself as an acting unit in history. The concept of a public orthodoxy helps us discern the way a people organizes its political life. The style of politics reform-minded political scientists want to change is premised upon assumptions embedded in the nation’s public orthodoxy. Failure to recognize this leads those advocating reform to propose measures which are either doomed to failure or are merely calls to resuscitate the operative mechanisms the framers have set in motion. An example of the latter is Lowi’s call for the restoration of the *Federalist 10* ideology. We must learn to reintroduce the conception of the *politeia*, or public orthodoxy, to our political vocabulary and not merely relegate it to the study of classical political philosophy as if it has no meaning for us.

The application by Kendall and Carey of Voegelian methodology to the American polity reveals that the nation's public orthodoxy is embodied in the Constitution and *Federalist Papers*. In this essay, we have parted from them by tracing the American public orthodoxy to Hobbesean, hence fundamentally liberal, premises. Our reading of these documents largely supports Hartz's thesis that American public life is permeated with a monistic liberal ideology. Any realistic assessment of the American political system must start with a discussion of the core documents which embody the nation's public orthodoxy and with the philosophical assumptions contained therein.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); *Order and History*, 3 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956).

Voegelin *The New Science of Politics*, p. 38.

³ Frederick Wilhelmsen and Willmoore Kendall, "Cicero and the Politics of The Public Orthodoxy," *The Intercollegiate Review*, 5 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 84-85.

⁴ Ernest Barker, *The Politics of Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. lxvi; Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 136-137.

⁵ Wilhelmsen and Kendall, "Cicero," p. 88.

⁶ Sheldon S. Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," *Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott*, P. King and B. C. Parekh, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 149; see also Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁷ Willmoore Kendall, "Three on the Line," *National Review* (August 31, 1957), p. 180.

⁸ Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, *The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 3.

⁹ Kendall, "Three on the Line," p. 180.

¹⁰ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), p. 60.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹² Voegelin distinguishes between *compact* and *differentiated* symbols. Compact symbols contain potentiality for development in diverse, and perhaps contradictory, directions. Differentiated symbols, on the other hand, are sufficiently developed to contain political principles. See Voegelin, *Order and*

History, vol. I, p. 5; Kendall and Carey, *Basic Symbols*, pp. 17-29.

¹³ Kendall and Carey, *Basic Symbols*, p. 96; Kendall and Carey, "How to Read 'The Federalist'," *Contra Mundum*, Nellie D. Kendall, ed. (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1971), p. 403. Kendall and Carey adopt the methodological stricture of treating *The Federalist* as the work of Publius representing a consensus or common ground on which Madison, Hamilton, and Jay could argue for the proposed Constitution. We will abide by their stricture, agreeing that there does exist a commonality of views.

¹⁴ Kendall and Carey, *Basic Symbols*, p. 154.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Federalist 1*, p. 36. The edition of the *Federalist* used is *The Federalist Papers*, intro. by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961).

¹⁸ Martin Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (March 1959), p. 64.

¹⁹ See, for example, Frank M. Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis of American Constitutionalism," *Polity*, 7 (Fall 1974), pp. 57-89.

²⁰ *Federalist 10*, p. 79.

²¹ *Federalist 43*, p. 279.

²² Diamond, "Democracy and the Federalist," p. 62.

²³ *Federalist 10*, p. 81.

²⁴ *Federalist 48*, p. 308.

²⁵ *Federalist 55*, p. 346.

²⁶ *Federalist 51*, p. 322.

²⁷ H. Mark Roelofs, *The Language of Modern Politics* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 235. Roelofs develops at some length the theme of Aristotelian bias in American constitutional arrangements in pages 229-235 of this work. For a discussion distinguishing Publius' solution from the classical theory of mixed government, consult Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herbert Garfinkel, *The Democratic Republic* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), ch. 3.

²⁸ *Federalist 51*, p. 320.

²⁹ *Federalist 48*, p. 309.

³⁰ Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist," p. 67; Mark Roelofs cogently develops this theme in "The Adequacy of America's Dominant Ideology," *Bucknell Review*, 18 (Fall 1970), pp. 3-15. He is much more critical of the founding fathers and what we have called the nation's liberal orthodoxy embodied in the *Federalist* than is Diamond, whose view is that it is a second-best regime and therefore worthy of celebration.

³¹ *Leviathan*, ch. 13, p. 82. The references to the *Leviathan* are from *Hobbes'*

- Leviathan*, intro. by Michael Oakeshoot (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960).
- ³² Norman Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (September 1963), p. 562.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ *Federalist* 57, p. 350.
- ³⁶ *Leviathan*, ch. 21, p. 138.
- ³⁷ *Federalist* 30, p. 188.
- ³⁸ Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist," p. 63.
- ³⁹ *Federalist* 84, p. 513.
- ⁴⁰ Kendall and Carey, *Basic Symbols*, p. 149.
- ⁴¹ *Federalist* 51, p. 324.
- ⁴² Francis Wilson, "The Supreme Court's Civil Theology," *Modern Age*, 13 (Summer 1969), p. 251.
- ⁴³ Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in The United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 386.
- ⁴⁴ Two representative collections of essays which critique the behavioral persuasion in political science, and by implication the American style of politics, written from what may be described as left and right perspectives, respectively, are: Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., *Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967); and Herbert J. Storing, ed., *Essays in the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962).
- ⁴⁵ See, for example, Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education," pp. 566-68; Ralph Lerner, "Calhoun's New Science of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (December 1963), pp. 918-932; and Coleman, "The Hobbesian Basis," pp. 57-89.
- ⁴⁶ Kendall and Carey, *Basic Symbols*, p. 111.
- ⁴⁷ Willmoore Kendall and George Carey, "The 'Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March 1968), p. 19.
- ⁴⁸ Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March 1967), p. 23; Vincent Ostrom, *The Political Theory of a Compound Republic* (Blacksburg: Center for the Study of Public Choice, 1971), p. 125.

EXISTENTIALISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES: REFLECTIONS ON INDIVIDUALISM AND CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS

By

Kenneth L. Deutsch

“Crisis” is a term much used to reflect the contemporary human condition. Wherever we look, the mood of crisis and malaise is about us. During the past half century the expectation of inexorable progress and human perfection has been tragically refuted by crises such as world wars, superpower intervention into the affairs of small nations, bloody civil wars, bureaucratic manipulation, and political corruption. The philosopher Eliseo Vivas has commented that “it is one of the marks of human decency to be ashamed of having been born into the twentieth century.”¹ Perhaps on subtler grounds, we cannot deny the fact that though technology has produced material abundance for some persons, our epoch is characterized by mass unrest, social and political alienation, and continued skepticism toward our unifying political myths.

By the onset of the twentieth century, the “Grand Designs” of Western intellectual life began to collapse. The Enlightenment *weltanschauung* of science and education, which promised so much in terms of “rational man” and technological panaceas, have not reduced political conflict and despair. Empirical science alone no longer provides us with an unshakeable faith in resolving socio-political problems. Environmental problems and the “irrationality” of an extensively educated voter place into question absolute faith in science and education as the foundations of liberal democracy. The scientific rationality of August Comte or the utilitarian educational faith of John Stuart Mill or the re-establishment of community through social reconstruction of John Dewey have been placed into severe doubt.

Likewise, faith in Natural Law and the essential dignity of man has been shaken by positivist and linguistic analysis, as well as by the secularization of our political life. John Locke’s theory of Natural Law as the absolute and objective standard of political legitimacy, which claimed for man *a priori* natural rights of life, liberty, and estates, no longer has the efficacy of creating political unity (not even the Supreme Court utilizes this approach in interpreting law). Nor

does the intellectual community (with some exceptions) continue to show fidelity to the precepts of Natural Law as an adequate justification of liberal democratic values.

Given the severity of contemporary crises, the *weltanschauungen* of Empiricism and Natural Law have been substantially weakened as explanatory designs for comprehending our predicament or as unifying myths for concerted human action for resolving those crises. It is the purpose of this essay to show that Empiricism and Natural Law are not the only political philosophies available as explanatory or normative theory for democratic practice. It is the author's position that the philosophical themes and exemplary human image of Existentialism offer a more efficacious outlook in dealing with political problems of bureaucratic manipulation, authoritarianism, corruption, apathy, and support for liberal democratic values.

THE EXISTENTIALIST ALTERNATIVE

The Existentialist position emerged as a result of the concrete problems of freedom facing Western man during the past three decades. Existentialism is the philosophical response to the "unauthentic" arguments of those who practiced or accepted brutality with the following claims: "I was only following orders"; "Everyone was doing it"; "You cannot fight the bureaucrats"; "Politics is always lying"; "One person cannot make a difference"; "The leadership must protect national security."

Existentialism is a philosophical outlook concerned with the submergence of the individual to overwhelming political, military, and ideological *structures*, which serve to reduce the individual to a manipulated thing rather than an *authentic* person capable of exercising freedom of choice. The Existentialist claims that human beings can freely choose not to obey inhumane orders; we can refuse to submerge ourselves within the social group; we can choose to disobey an unjust law; we can choose to fight a bureaucratic decision. Authentic existence, then, is accepting one's freedom to *choose* and recognizing the limitations and restrictive attempts of other philosophical and socio-political positions which attempt to define *human nature* according to predefined and essential categories (whether it is the category of "natural law," dialectical materialism, nationalism, or that of the physical needs of utilitarianism). We are capable of transcending the confining and unauthentic thought systems that reduce human behavior to the definitions of humanity proffered by the ideologue, the scientist, the technician, or the abstract philosopher.

For the Existentialist, man is the basic point of departure. His

concrete existence and the realization that he alone originates his interests must be our central concern. As Ernst Breisach indicates in his survey of Existentialist thought, there are recurring themes that characterize this posture: (1) the hostility to closed systems of thought and to all attempts to view "truth" from the outside, as an absolute; (2) the radical and personal questioning of the purposes of life, designed to "keep one's soul on tiptoe"; (3) the fervent appeal to every person to live life as an adventure; and (4) the search for an "authentic existence."² Although it is correct that Existentialists have taken diverse normative political postures, they all share one dominant theme, namely that existence precedes essence; man is what he chooses and, by choosing, man is *determined* by his free or voluntary choices rather than by external manipulation. As is argued below, some Existentialists apply this position consistently and consequently defend a reformulated liberal democracy as the best means of realizing their values of authentic existence and a sense of completeness and fulfillment.

EXISTENTIALIST POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

It is very easy to misunderstand Existentialism. It does not rest its case with trembling, with anxiety, or all the other dreary metaphors of human existence—alienation and absurdity—notwithstanding the importance of these notions to the philosophy. Existentialism does not ask us, with the onset of the awareness of death as finality and the absurdity of existence, to lapse into a psychological depression. Rather as a philosophical posture, it summons us to act beyond these initial psychic states to a new level of awareness: of self, of freedom of choice, of human responsibility, of authenticity. It summons us to take charge of our own condition, to take personal control over our anxiety to act and to choose; in other words, to make it the occasion for achieving an authentic life. Miguel de Unamuno, in his poignant book *The Tragic Sense of Life*, stated the intense message of Existentialism when he quoted Etienne de Senancour: "Man is perishable. That may be; but let us perish resisting, and if it is nothingness that awaits us," let us so act that that would be an unjust fate.³ To confront nothingness and absurdity, to deny it by filling it up with a life that ought never to be lost or annihilated, to live one's life in such a way as to be something better than nothingness and human destruction, is the key to the Existentialist political ethic of the reaffirmation of human social and political action.

At first glance, there would seem to be little reason to expect a close relationship between the themes of Existentialism and the political commitment of liberal democratic theory. The general thrust of Existentialism has been toward individual experience, toward our awareness of our subjective condition. But as Henry Kariel has said of Existentialists:

They support skepticism regarding ultimate values, self-determination as an individual right, and whatever practical arrangements are likely to reconcile the individual to his defeats as he struggles to make his values prevail. To be sure, these writers do not address themselves to the specific problem of making a constitutional political order a durable and workable one. But . . . they do clarify the imposing psychological demands on those who, in constitutional regimes, are empowered to govern. They stress, moreover, the agonizing choices men must make in public life, revealing the moral burden of all political arrangements. Under the pressures of recent European history and politics, they trimmed the theory of constitutionalism to essentials, depriving it of all tinges of Platonism, natural law and idealism. Without explicitly attempting it, they developed the basis for a cogent political doctrine.⁴

Before one examines the Existentialist justification of liberal democratic values, we should explicate the pivotal values of liberal democracy. To be sure, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive model of modern liberal democratic values to which all of us would subscribe. However, a core set of political values can be identified, which come under the general rubric of modern liberal democracy, ones that most of us would agree are essential to this political posture. The central political values are:

- (1) the postulate that the idea of freedom is central to the development and realization of the human personality;
- (2) the peaceful voluntary adjustment of disputes;
- (3) the insurance of peaceful change in a changing society,
- (4) the orderly and honest succession of rulers;
- (5) a minimum use of coercion;
- (6) a recognition of diversity and pluralism;
- (7) effective competition for the reins of power;
- (8) popular and responsive control of policy-makers, asserted through periodic elections, parties and pressure groups;
- (9) popular control requires freedoms of speech, assembly, press, petition and association, and political opposition is tolerated and accepted, and minorities are free to criticize and agitate, and;
- (10) modern liberal democracy stresses "fraternity" by treating others not simply as atoms or objects, but with the concern for their welfare, what John Stuart Mill termed "benevolence" and the "social feelings of mankind" rather than the atomism and "possessive

individualism” more characteristic of the “older” or classical liberal theory.⁵

Albert Camus best represents those Existentialists who have consistently applied their concepts of Absurdity, freedom of choice, and human responsibility to concrete problems of democratic politics. Camus, and particularly American Existentialists, confront us with a wide-ranging yet unified vision of man’s situation and condition, which is articulated with a total critique of authoritarian and totalitarian ideological postures and an affirmation and justification of the liberal democratic values discussed above. By justification of liberal democracy, the author is referring to the prudential reasons or arguments that the Existentialists like Camus offer for liberal democratic values that have been or can conceivably be challenged.

THE POLITICAL ETHIC OF ABSURDITY AND REBELLION

The esteem in which Albert Camus is held in France and in Europe is due primarily to his attempt to surpass the contradictions in post-war Existentialist thought and found a positive political ethic. As the French intellectual historian Pierre-Henri Simon put it, “Camus has not only sought for, but he has found the evidences of a way of salvation, he has set up the land-marks for a positive humanism.”⁶ The basis for Camus’ positive political ethic and his justification of liberal democratic values is his concept of the Absurd line of reasoning.

In providing arguments for the logic of the “absurd,” Camus states that nature or the world is distinct from and foreign to the understanding of man, but is still his home where he is fascinated, suppressed and finally conquered. The second argument is that death is the final and inescapable destiny of all men, and that we must adjust our lives and behavior to this inescapable destiny. The other four arguments are the hopelessness of life, the need to refuse the world without renouncing it (revolt), purity of heart (accepting ourselves for what we are and demanding others to accept this fact), and a happiness which is the reaffirmation of the dignity and unique value of human life in a world which does not call man his own. As Camus puts it:

But what is happiness if not the simple accord between a being and the existence which he leads? And what more legitimate accord can unite man to life than the double consciousness of his desire for duration and his destiny of death? In this way *one at least learns to count on nothing* and to consider *the present as the only truth* given us by “grace.”⁷

When Camus argues that all human life is led in exile, that man is a stranger in his world, his connection with Existentialism becomes quite clear. Central to Camus' thought is man's experience with the Absurd; and it is the description and discussion of the Absurd which is undertaken in *The Myth of Sisyphus*. For Camus, the foundation for this philosophical essay is the type of experience which has become the profound personal event in our times: the breakdown of our normal, habitual rhythm of intercourse with the world and the consequent discovery of the meaningless, cyclical pattern of these habitual activities, a pattern which once appeared to us as progress but now appears to be a purposeless, never-completed circle about which the individual turns until the inevitable moment of death ends his turning. Camus states:

This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the *confrontation* of this irrational [existence] and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on the world. For the moment it is all that links them together. It binds them one to another as only hatred can weld two creatures together. This is all I can discern clearly in this meaningless universe where my adventure takes place.⁸

The experience of the Absurd is the undeniable datum of modern social life. From the Homeric tales, Camus has chosen Sisyphus to represent Absurd Man, the person who was condemned to the most terrible of punishments: the eternally futile and hopeless labor of rolling a boulder up a hill only to see it topple down and then be required to roll it up again and again in his endless torment. Sisyphus is clearly conscious of the extent of his own misery. Yet it is in the recognition of his destiny for what it is that Sisyphus has become his own master. Since the Absurd cannot be conquered completely, the problem for man is how to deal with this basic aspect of our condition. Once the individual has discovered the Absurdity of the habits, obligations, and necessities which his social and political role forces upon him, then the question must be faced: Is life still worth living, is suicide the only honest action, or do we have good reason to hope? If the Absurd is the *contradiction* between the anguished demand of our consciousness and the indifferent silence of the world, can we be prevented from committing "philosophical suicide" or surrendering ourselves to the Absurd by renouncing not only physical action but also mental action and thereby rejecting the independence of the mental act? Should we reconcile ourselves to this Absurdity by embracing God's mystery or by immersing ourselves wholly in ideological movements?

In responding to the Absurd, Camus enjoins us in *The Plague* to adopt a positive concern for mankind. He rejects suicide or capitulation as "human" ways of dealing with the Absurd. Only life makes possible the "encounter between human inquiry and the silence of the universe," and hence Camus affirms the value of life. He rejects suicide because although it eliminates the problem, it does not solve it. He rejects "faith" (or hope) because it is an attempt to solve the problems of the Absurd with "knowledge" that is beyond man (such as "God" or "History" or "Reason"). The only proper posture toward Absurd existence is to live with it and rebel against those forces which reduce the prospect for saving human life and authentic existence.

Professor Maurice Friedman clearly states Camus' concept of rebellion against the Absurd when he analyzes Camus' prototype of the rebel:

It is Doctor Rieux who recognizes the plague, who organizes resistance to it, who patiently fights it. . . . It is through his unsentimental, day by day fight against the plague in a community of men pushed to the limits of their humanity that he is able at the end to "bear witness in favor of those plague stricken people" and, while leaving a memorial "of injustice and outrage done them," to "state quite simply that we learn in a time of pestilence: that there are more things to admire in man than to despise. . . ." His affirmation at the end of the book . . . is a witness to humanity wrested from the absurd. Ricux's *dialogue with the absurd* implies a trust that, though the absurd will never be anything but absurd, meaning may emerger from man's meeting with it.⁹

While Doctor Rieux accepts the unremitting, endless struggle with "the plague" as an inescapable part of the human condition, he also affirms that meaning and value in life may arise from that struggle—if one rebels against the Absurd and meets the Absurd rather than assuming it does not exist. By supporting life for others and assuming a responsibility for the condition of man in the "plagues" we experience in common, the rebel affirms life and gives *meaning* to his own existence. For the Absurd man (the man who lives with and resists unauthentic existence) suffering is individual, but in rebelling he views suffering as a common experience, "a mass plague." Rebellion then affirms our existence. "Within the human condition," as Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., has expressed Camus' position, "revolt assumes the same place as Descartes *cogito ergo sum* in the realm of abstract thought; rebellion reveals the initial certainty luring the individual from his solitude."¹⁰ And as Camus has put it, rebellion "founds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore *we* exist."¹¹

By rebelling for authentic existence, the rebel must respect the limit he discovers in himself—a limit where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist. This meeting Camus views as a *dialogue*, not just in the sense of people talking to each other, but a sustained effort at mutual understanding, mutual acknowledgment, and mutual respect. It is dialogue that is Camus' highest value in interpersonal relationships. It is the highest value in the sense in which men have created their life together, in their co-operation and in their struggles for existence. Rebellion which promotes dialogue will “deny servitude, falsehood and terror.”¹² This is Camus' persistent desire to say NO to injustice, affirm his own existence, and encourage civility among men in promoting a common authentic life.

Existentialism does not invent values, nor create them as an expression of power from Above; it discovers them in the concrete existence of life. Man creates his essence only after he has existed. Man can deny the injustice of servitude, falsehood, and terror only through the civility of the dialogue. As Camus expresses it:

If injustice is bad for the rebel, it is not because it contradicts an eternal idea of justice, but because it perpetuates the silent hostility that separates the oppressor from the oppressed. It kills the small part of existence that can be realized on earth through the mutual understanding of men. In the same way, since the man who lies shuts himself off from other men, falsehood is therefore proscribed The mutual understanding and communication discovered by rebellion can survive only in the free exchange of conversation.¹³

Camus specifically rejects the “conspiracy of silence” in which the terror of ideological thinking or physical coercion takes the place of persuasion. He rejects those revolutionary ideologies which want to submerge man in dialectical materialism or national myths. He rejects, in effect, those acts of rebellion which coerce others, which reduce the prospect of dialogue, which place man into predefined categories and roles. Therefore, rebellion is limited. The revolutionary ideologue and the authoritarian ruler both try to place us into a Procrustean bed.

We live in a world of abstractions, of bureaus and machines, of absolute ideas and of crude messianism. We suffocate among people who think they are absolutely right, whether in their machines or in their ideas.¹⁴ We must reject the rebellion of the ideologue. We must go beyond ideology to the concreteness of human problems of existence. We must meet the real “plagues” facing us and respond to them by rebelling in a way which maximizes dialogue and human freedom when faced with human slavery, manipulation, injustice and lies. Camus' precept of rebellion requests that we must, to use Ernst

Breisach's felicitous phrase, try to "keep one's soul on tiptoe"; we thereby respect humanity, intelligence, and mutual understanding. If we lose this, we capitulate to the Absurd and thereby become more likely to invite dictatorship with its trappings of physical and mental coercion—the unauthentic political life.

Camus' concepts of the "plague" and "rebellion" certainly bring to mind the past ten years of political manipulation, deception, and injustice which this nation has witnessed. In responding to our "political plague," Camus would most probably have supported Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's diagnosis and remedy of the "Vietnam War Plague," which was the result of the systems analysts, game theorists, and exponents of "national prestige" who had placed us into ten long years of war. It was Dr. Ellsberg's expressed purpose to rebel against these systems of thought by making clear the necessity for dialogue on the war and providing the public with the "Pentagon Papers," which were to expose the political deceptions and dangerous abstractions which were part of the executive decision-making process. For Ellsberg, as for Camus, the essence of liberal democracy is an informed populace which is capable of making the governmental structure truthful and responsive. Likewise, Camus' position on "plague" and "rebellion" would give support to the *Washington Post* investigative reporting of the "Watergate Affair" and its consequent political and legal cover-up. A free and untrammelled press, too, is essential to the life of political dialogue. Finally, Camus' position would also be sympathetic to the *non-violent* civil disobedience campaigns of Dr. Martin Luther King as they stimulated a dialogue on the subject of Black repression and rebelled against the unauthentic life of the Black man who could not live in a "civil" and peaceful manner.

CAMUS' JUSTIFICATION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS

Albert Camus' political ethic, exemplified in his concepts of "Absurdity," "plague," "rebellion," and "dialogue," provide our age of political pathology with the most meaningful justification of the liberal democratic values of individual integrity, fraternity, civil liberties, and peaceful resolution of disputes that has been proffered in our epoch of "mass man." Camus enjoins us to recapture the Athenian concept of measure, to reject utopian schemes of human perfection, whether of the Left or the Right. Liberty is essential to a meaningful or authentic human existence, yet Camus' "rebel" must act in lucid cognizance of his responsibility for dialogue and "for finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems."¹⁵ This approach to political life is a reaffirmation of the value of political openness, political

debate, political compromise as a result of dialogue and social justice for all elements of the polity. Liberal democracy without "rebellion" is an impossibility. The Hobbesian conception of aggressive man and the utopian conception of man's perfectibility must be replaced with the image of the fraternal man of dialogue. This can be achieved only by "true" and "responsible" rebellion which rejects nihilism and utopianism.

Albert Camus was quite aware of the failure of many so-called "liberal" democratic regimes to correct political, economic, and social injustices (such as the Black problem in the United States). However, he was forced to conclude that: "Perhaps there is no good type of political regime, but democracy is assuredly the least bad one."¹⁶ Pure participatory democracy is impossible, since unlike the Athenians with their slave labor, contemporary man must work and does not have the leisure necessary to contemplate daily political problems.¹⁷

Camus, the man of political measure and prudence, saw our only real hope for a free and limited political system in the *absolute* protection of freedom of expression and in a competitive political party system. The pluralism of political parties is the basic hallmark of liberal democracy, since "it alone allows one to denounce, hence to correct, injustice and crime. It alone today allows one to denounce torture, disgraceful torture, as contemptible in Algiers as in Budapest."¹⁸ Freedom of speech, press, and association is defended not in John Stuart Mill's terms as the empirical verification of an increasing quantity of propositions which may have part of the truth, but because political freedom of expression brings us to realize our common problems, helps to create a *vita activa*, solidarity, and the communal dialogue. As Camus puts it, "Liberty is the ability to defend what I do not think, even in a regime or world that I approve. It is the ability to admit that the adversary is right."¹⁹

In addition to the "liberty" of individuals and the plurality of parties, it is necessary that institutional checks exist which protect us from the abuse of power. Camus agrees completely with Lord Acton's dictum that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely." Camus reiterates Acton's words when he states that "nowhere in the world has there been a party or a man with absolute power who did not use it absolutely."²⁰

In addition to the conventional liberal checks on the abuses of power, Camus was very much concerned with incorporating social and economic justice as part of his justification of the liberal democratic outlook. The oppressed do not only seek political freedoms. This is not adequate to a life of solidarity and dialogue. Freedom to

speak with an empty stomach and an unjust wage will not produce solidarity and a *civilisation du dialogue*. Camus' sympathy for the common working man is patent when he states that "The oppressed do not want simply to be liberated from their hunger, they also desire to be freed from their masters."²¹ For Camus the polity must provide not only negative freedom, or the absence of government restraints, but it also must provide positive freedom, positive acts which bring all parts of the polity to a level of well-being where all can participate in the *civilisation du dialogue*. The sense of human compassion for all segments of the polity is basic to the continuation of liberal democratic values. Liberal democracy without fraternity is impossible.

Finally, the Existentialist shares the liberal democrats' hostility to the unresponsiveness and impersonality of modern bureaucratic life. To Camus, organizational societies tend to perceive people in terms of their adaptability instead of their personal uniqueness, their productivity rather than the quality of their action. One can be certain that Camus would look with disdain on our cost/benefit analysts and the Planned Program Budget Systems used for gauging national priorities. Large bureaucratic structures also reduce the prospect for dignity and meaning of work. "When work is a degradation, it is not life, even though it occupies every moment of a life. Who, despite the pretensions of this society, can sleep in it in peace when they know that it derives its mediocre pleasures from the work of millions of dead souls."²² Albert Camus would certainly agree with another liberal, John Stuart Mill, who viewed the bureaucratic life as a regularized structuring of human life, which if not checked would limit severely the prospect for creativity and self-direction.²³ And as Mill stated, our self-expressive faculties like "perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preferences are exercised only in making a choice," and therefore can be developed only by being exercised.²⁴ It is at this juncture that the liberal and Existentialist themes of individual spontaneity and human political action merge. If liberal democracy is to be viable, we cannot have one without the other.

In short, the link between Existentialism and the political posture of liberal democracy is in the shared optimistic view of man's potential for political rebellion against tyranny, the relationship of political dialogue, the prospect of fraternity and the *maximization* of human choice. Camus has provided us with an approach to responsible political action which could help us achieve many of the liberal democratic values which have yet to be realized. With the diminution of the prestige of Empiricism and Natural Law as the conventional methods of political reasoning in liberal democracy, perhaps our edu-

cational system and the political socialization process in this nation could become more sensitive to the experiential validity and usefulness of the "Absurd" and "measured" reasoning of Albert Camus. He has provided us with a new political language that can channel our thought into a new organ of conduct.

"BEING AND DOING": CONTEMPORARY EXISTENTIALIST POLITICAL REFORMS

Contemporary Existentialists in this nation have suggested reforms of American "liberal democracy" on four levels: the attack on the "pyramidal prism" in which underdeveloped or unauthentic individuals have become "colonists" in an overdeveloped nation; the need for a peaceful political process which will replace authoritarianism with more political participation; a redefined socio-political ethic; and an educational and political socialization process which will resist training automatons and begin educating individuals willing to accept the tensions of human freedom. Only by solving these basic problems within our own polity can our so-called "liberal" democracy begin to realize the rhetorical values we have so long espoused. As Marcus Raskin has put it, the task of a philosophy of reconstruction of American "democracy" requires us "to break the bounds of absurdity—an absurdity created by institutions, expressed in official ideologies and reflected in much of man's inner life. The reconstructive aspect of a philosophy that overcomes absurdity concerns itself with the shared associative authority and a politics beyond violence and "magic."²⁵ Certainly these themes are Existentialist in mood and criticism. But what specifically have been offered within this tradition as concrete reforms? We can only suggest and sketchily outline some of the more provocative attempts of contemporary American Existentialists to apply these themes to democratic institutional forms.

MARCUS RASKIN'S REFORMS OF THE PYRAMIDAL STATE

Marcus Raskin, of the Institute for Policy Studies and possible "think tank" chairman for a "new Establishment," has provided an Existentialist analysis of the American pyramidal State and of our colonized reality. His thesis, found in *Being and Doing*, is that the American socio-political order is dominated by a "colonized reality," where a new citizenship has emerged which shapes the individual to accept exploitation. Consciousness and the colonized State become one. The United States, according to Raskin's theoretical analysis, is in the thrall of this colonialism, the American Revolution notwith-

standing. Specifically there are four internal colonies that frequently overlap. There is the *Violence Colony* or the nation-state itself, which uses its citizens as hostages in wars in which hardly anyone believes. Commerce and industry compose the *Plantation Colony*, in which jobs are parceled out by huge corporations beyond the reach of democratic control and where the workers are locked into a rhythm of working at meaningless jobs. Raskin sees our schools as a *Channeling Colony* in which youngsters are graded and conditioned for the organization life. What is learned in schools is the specialization which buttresses the pyramidal authority structure. Finally, there is the *Dream Colony*, which provides the masses with an opiate of fantasies concocted by the mass media for the purpose of cultivating the popular taste for the *Plantation* and *Violence Colonies*.²⁶

These colonies constitute a pyramidal structure which justifies the authority of the colonies, and their authority provides a basis for insuring that the pyramidal structure does not become dismantled. Each colony arises as a result of the expression of the bureaucratized society, and each is a result of a highly rationalized process by which society can create people who are merely agents for its support.

The purpose of relating Raskin's analysis is to provide us with a theoretical construct which will help reformists to "reconstruct" the vertical oppression of this pyramidal system and indicate how the ego must undergo a conversion from its submission to the depersonalizing "beside-himself" which becomes "the outer layer by which the individual is characterized by our roles in the pyramidal state."²⁷ In effect, "our senses are dulled by a language/thought process which stems from the social structures that create our problems."²⁸

The reconstruction of our pyramidal State can only occur when men feel free. They must learn to accept their instinctive feeling for freedom or they cannot act independently of their pyramidal role. Raskin's concept of the "colony" is not only to be used as an explanatory theoretical construct useful in examining exploitation and potential reconstruction, but it also helps us to identify the kind of power that is behind various types of superficially voluntary political action.

Since any comprehensive analysis of Raskin's Existentialist reforms is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to suggest some of the reforms that can aid in political reconstruction. In addition to an absolute concept of First Amendment liberties, Raskin claims that consciousness-seeking projects (like the People's Park project in Berkeley), communities that operate by contract (the "communal" movement), and social units that are not coordinated by central policies can aid man in rejecting the "hierarchic other," can help us to resist being "characterized" and resist playing the

“role” that the pyramidal State either seduces, coerces, or implores us to play.

Raskin’s reforms also find a role for certain modes of political power. The general thrust of his political recommendations include the decentralization of authority and the democratization of political power. Among the reforms he recommends “neighborhood sovereignty” and worker assemblies within unions to indicate the importance of “being and doing,” of thinking independently and acting in Raskin’s Existentialist political posture. Raskin’s treatise makes a major Existentialist contribution to dismantling the unauthentic colonies of pyramidal paternalism.

THE EXISTENTIALIST EXECUTIVE: HONOR AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE BUREAUCRATIC LIFE

The Existentialist ideal for modern organizations requires the kind of leadership which assumes the responsibility of changing organizations through action and which provides for the welfare of society by being cognizant of the purposes and behavior of others. “Man is responsible for what he is, and determines what he is by his actions.”²⁹ As the landmark Nuremberg Tribunal indicated:

The official position of Defendants, whether as heads of State, or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility, of mitigating punishment. . . . The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility. . . .³⁰

Certainly this is the very point that the Existentialist posture makes about the relationship between *doing* and *being*.

In addition to the problem of the degradation of irresponsible bureaucrats, the Existentialists “decry the bureaucratization of life and the loss by individuals of the ability to see others as persons.”³¹ They do not want to see men treated as the “agglomeration of functions” or reduced to “apparatus.”

As has been indicated, one theme which is dominant throughout Existentialist literature is choice. Failure to act is choice as well as deciding to act. By choosing, we become what we are. As Anders Richter has put it, “It is no good for Eichmann to say that he was not responsible, for if he is passive it is because he has chosen passivity. The confrontation with choice is a never-ending existential process. Choice and consciousness are one and the same thing.”³²

If we are to resist viewing man as the “agglomeration of functions,” the responsible bureaucrat must be openminded. He must be

ready to alter his choices as he receives new information from his many sources. Making choices based on changing information gives the executive a sense of personal commitment and may produce higher or more efficient output. A behavior of choice requires the executive to take risks. This is, of course, made difficult by the problem of job security. Job security alone may create passivity, and passivity is a choice. By frustrating policy by passivity an executive still makes policy. His problem of risk-taking and job security remains problematic.

Authenticity is another persistent theme of Existentialist political thinkers. The organization and management analysts, Beatrice and Sydney Rome, have offered a description of the authentic executive and organization:

A hierarchical organization, in short, like an individual person, is "authentic" to the extent that, throughout its leadership, it accepts its finitude, uncertainty, and contingency; realizes its capacity for responsibility and choice; acknowledges guilt and errors; fulfills its creative management potential for flexible planning, growth and . . . policy formation; and responsibly participates in the wider community.³³

The Existentialist executive must also be sensitive to what Jean Paul Sartre has stated "in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours. . . ." ³⁴ The Existentialist recommendation, then, is to be sensitive to the conditions of others in making decisions, to be aware of our common plague. The Existentialist would then be most concerned about the "terrible isolation" of the presidency, and would recommend that at least some of his advisors should be generalists who are capable of "widening the agenda of attention to encompass a new basis for the solution" of pressing problems facing the populace.³⁵

Since it remains difficult to curtail government power in our society, it becomes necessary for the Existentialist to try to tame the "bureaucratic beast" and to foster authentic interpersonal relationships by making the bureaucracy politically responsible, efficient, and sensitive to the needs of *persons*. Although institutional checks are basic to responsible and authentic government, a fundamental question remains for any fully developed Existentialist liberal democratic political outlook: how can the spirit of Existentialist reconstruction be injected into a population that is still the product of pyramidal paternalism?

EXISTENTIALISM AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

Plato in his ideal State, discussed in *The Republic*, made it quite

clear that education was the basic channel by which individuals would be socialized into the State and a means by which we could determine their “just” role in society. To the Existentialist, on the other hand, education for the individual must help the person unravel the mystery of existence in the face of his cognitive comprehension of the fact that it cannot be unraveled. It is in this inquisitive expedition that the person marks out the particular zone which he creates for himself and makes the person human, the zone where values are created in the act of an individual living a life. To encourage the youth of this nation to invade this zone and stake out their own social and political plots—this is an Existentialist education. As Professor Van Cleve Morris has put it, the role of the teacher is to arrange the learning situation in such a way as to make clear for the student the importance of the following three propositions:

- (1) I am a choosing agent, unable to avoid choosing my way through life.
- (2) I am a free agent, absolutely free to set the goals of my own life.
- (3) I am a responsible agent, personally accountable for my free choices as they are revealed in how I live my life.³⁶

The basic method of the teacher must be one of asking questions to which no one knows *the* perfect answer. This requires both imagination and insight. But only the dialogue of questioning will yield an awakened student who is aware of choice, freedom, and responsibility. Teaching in the Existentialist mode begins and ends in paradox. Freedom in education creates the possibility of communion between teacher and student. This means reducing the hierarchy of authority in the school, no external standards of achievement or success visited upon the young. The students must be aware they are establishing their own standards, in terms of which they choose to learn. When they select their mode of evaluation, they then must be made responsible for that selection. Finally, the teacher has encouraged learning when the student has come to hold something to be true only when the student has come to this truth without imitating the teacher. The student must be brought to his own ideas. As Ralph Harper has put it, the Existentialist teacher “aims to produce, not replicas, but men and women who stand apart from him even more distinctly than when he first met them”³⁷

What might an Existentialist curriculum look like in fostering authentic political man?³⁸

(1) *Literature and the Humanities*—The Existentialist educator would seek to intensify the normative aspect of all subject matter. This is where personal judgment can be particularly encouraged. Literature is not just syntax, it is the attempt of an author to arouse

feeling to an intense level of awareness. Let the student have the opportunity to empathize with the author.

(2) *The Arts*—The student must be encouraged to feel his own experience; then later he might become more familiar with technique. The “copying” phase of art instruction should be rejected.

(3) *The Social Sciences*—History and the social sciences are not to be viewed as something to be *used*. Rather the past and social analysis is something we create. We create the past and set up methods to understand that creation. What man creates, he can also re-create. Any major contemporary topic could be discussed in this way. An example would be the question of our law enforcement system. Questions such as the need for jails, the causes of crime, which disputes get solved in courts, the protections needed for a citizen in the courts, the ways a police force can operate, the possibility of some disputes being resolved at the neighborhood level, etc., can all serve to indicate the problematic quality of social and political questions and the realization that the present situation is a result of what humanity has created and chosen, and consequently can be re-created and another choice be made.³⁹

This kind of education by the use of Absurd reasoning can create a new political man, an authentic-responsible man that stresses Camus' aims of self-identification, acceptance of others as they are, proficiency in the technique of moderation, dialogue between isolated persons, and the development of values based on the human variables present in each immediate context.⁴⁰

AUTHENTICITY AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: INDIVIDUALISM AND PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION IN POLITICS

Authenticity is the ultimate yardstick for evaluating an individual life. Unauthenticity, to lose oneself, is the supreme evil. “There are those who choose in awareness of their responsibility, freedom and risk, and there are the others who say what [external] norms demand.” A political system must be organized in such a manner that the authentic individual can create his “dialogue” with his fellow men vis-a-vis their common problems. As we have indicated, Camus' Existentialism recommends liberal democracy as that form of organization which creates its ideal of individualism, restraint, moderation, and dialogue. Camus readily admitted that there is no simple key to history, no objective ethic which will satisfy all men and foster freedom. Therefore we will be constantly struggling to achieve a true communication with other existences. Tolerance and humility be-

come necessary and prudential norms when seen in this light.

The most profound concept of the Existentialist justification of liberal democratic values is individualism. Such a concept of the free and responsible person will continue to prove the most secure foundation of liberal democratic life. Without the "authentic individual," the liberal democratic posture will be mere rhetoric at best and political manipulation at worst.

The basic principle of liberalism has always been the worth of the individual; it has been the politics of personal dignity. There have been two broad strands of theory within Liberalism as to what constitutes "the idea that the highest reality and value is the person."⁴² One approach finds the person as basically hostile to society and the world. The most important role of political organization comes to be the protection of the person from hostile surroundings; the world must be made to accept persons. The second approach is founded on a more optimistic perspective. Its hope is to transform the world to make it more compatible to the person—the personalization of the environment.

Liberalism in its stress on the privacy of the individual and the need for constitutional limitations on political power has traditionally viewed the political world as a jungle that has to be tamed and restrained; the "world" itself cannot be changed in any fundamental way. The liberal atomistic conception of the State has consequently contributed in some areas to social fragmentation and depersonalized environment by fostering the ruthless independence of economic groups and a bureaucratic apparatus which views individuals as isolated atoms rather than persons.⁴³

The dominance of liberal atomism in the American polity with its attempt to provide a justification for the limitation of political power, group competition, and the civil liberties of the populace has been criticized by Sheldon Wolin for its "sublimation of the political." Its supporters, "the pluralists," argue that by fragmenting political power and then treating the fragments, individuals and their interests, we have the essence of politics. "Politics," for the "pluralist liberals," then becomes the reconciliation of the conflict of interest. Any attempt to develop a sense of community or public interest is sublimated or eclipsed by the concept of "politics" as that realm of action when atomized and discrete individual and group interests create demands which are to be dealt with by clearly defined processes and transformed into public policies. These interests are not viewed as "rational" in the sense of reflecting real social needs. Rather they are viewed as mere psychological facts—as demands,

desires, and preferences. They are idiosyncratic desires that play their role in the political process. Politics is nothing more than the competitive, atomized interaction of these desires or interests.

Although the advocates of the politics of interest state their conception of politics in terms of groups, the basic "political space" is usually reducible to discrete individuals pursuing their own personal desires or interests. The notions of community and public interest are sublimated if not denied; there can be no genuine "public" separated from the aggregate of individuals who form a majority or dominant coalition. There exists no public interest which cannot be reduced to individual and group interests as they compete and are processed by the political system.⁴⁴

The politics of interest in America, or what Theodore J. Lowi has called the concept of "politics"-interest-groups liberalism, reflects a dominant normative paradigm which isolates certain phenomena and calls this the totality of "politics." This conception of politics claims that power can be checked by atomization and competition. Corruption can be checked by a plurality of groups presenting contrasting aspects of political information and a political process which represents plural constituencies and coalitions.

Corruption, in interest-group liberal terms, is an act of deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense (the dominant group coalition). The private gain does not have to be a monetary one. It could include rapid promotion, family gain, or the status of a particular group. Implicit in this concept of corruption is the view that there is gain for corrupter and corrupted, and a disadvantageous position for the majority coalition of groups. The conventional interest-group liberal shares Lord Acton's explanation for corruption in his famous dictum that all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. This deep suspicion of unchecked power and the prospect for corruption has deep roots in the liberal atomists' (or interest-group liberals') view that unbridled power will not be used in the interest of the majority coalition at any given time. "Corruption" from this perspective is the political situation in which individuals are given unchecked power and subsequently act with expediency and for personal gain.

For the "interest-group liberal," then, corruption as part of politics is merely viewed as the buying and selling of public office. Any notion of corruption as being endemic to interest-group politics, given its neglect of crime, pollution, urban decay and the special interest politics of "milk pricing," "grain deals" and capitulation to the "monopolistic" desires of I.T.T., is alien to their political world

view. Robert Paul Wolff has stated this point well:

To deal with such problems, there must be some way of constituting the whole society, a genuine group with a group purpose and a conception of the common good. Pluralism rules this out in theory by portraying society as an aggregate of human communities rather than as itself a human community; and it equally rules out a concern for the general good in practice by encouraging a politics of interest group pressures in which there is no mechanism for the discovery and expression of the common good.⁴⁶

Politics, then, is a mechanical process for balancing power; it is an artificial contrivance rather than an activity in the pursuit of public virtue and over-arching public need. Corruption in these terms is limited to a discussion of overt acts of the selling and purchase of political office. Social injustice, "special interest" influence on decision-makers, and campaign contributions used to extract future benefits have therefore not been conceived as *corruption* in the interest-group liberal perspective.

"Interest-group liberal" advocates have devoted much attention to political power; to its sources, nature and limits; to its corruptions (in the limited sense of the term we have discussed), uses, and effects. The "interest-group liberals," though, have neglected the converse of the focus, namely powerlessness. The normative focus of the interest-group liberals has been primarily concerned with the limitation of power of the State, particularly in the area where threats to personal liberty were perceived. The foremost targets of normative indignation were (and are) the abuses and excesses of power. The essence of normative reality in politics is to be concerned with power, not powerlessness. The intellectual and political price for this identification of power with the totality of normative discourse has been to view the unfortunate in this society, the poor and the racial minorities, as victimized by the power-holders of the political system or its elites. This view of the victimized stresses piecemeal amelioration of their plight by a governmental bureaucracy which will "protect" them. Viewing the unfortunate from the perspective of powerlessness and the unequal distribution of power in the political system represents a radical transformation in the American political paradigms of both political norm and political knowledge. By expanding political reality, the Existentialist perspective reveals new dimensions of a real politics of dialogue which might be useful to the powerless in acting out their demands and making them manifest to a larger public. The concept of powerlessness opens up a broader analytical universe which not only includes the decision-making process with its stress on power, but additionally incorporates the concept of "non-decision-

making.”⁴⁶

The “decision-making” process in American politics focuses upon “safe” issues which concern those with power. “Non-decision-making” sheds light upon the political system’s ignorance and rejection of those groups whose needs have not been articulated by the use of political power, as well as exposing the blinders to inveterate social problems that are not in the specific interest of the holders of political power. Corruption as a political phenomenon is a political plague which transcends the interest-group liberal perspective of the use of public power for personal profit, preferment, or prestige. Corruption, from the Existentialist perspective, also includes that public situation which fails to recognize the full dimensions of socio-political injustice and the basic social problems of a community.

Existentialism has retained some of the features of the above themes of liberalism, namely the need for personal freedom and constitutional restraints on political power. However, Camus’ Existentialist position also calls for the reformulation of the liberal outlook. Contemporary industrial and bureaucratic conditions make it manifest that the protection of the individual against manipulation is not enough. The isolated and atomized individual’s freedom, the concept of “negative freedom,” is also not adequate. The liberal concept of individual freedom and dignity must additionally incorporate a view of the social environment that is fully personal, responsible, and dialogic, and thereby sustains the individual’s desire to be “authentic.” The “positive freedom” concept of the Existentialist involves the use of political power in new ways to reduce organizational manipulation and enhance individual political participation and efficacy by creating the kind of educational mode and political experiments (such as neighborhood government or citizen participation committees) which will foster authentic personal existence and reduce corruption in the fullest sense.

* * *

Perhaps a growing awareness of our political and social “plagues” will create a willingness to use the dialogical method and to reconstruct our polity employing the perspective of Albert Camus’ Existentialism. Camus enjoins us to choose, in open recognition of the Absurdity of our existence, and to be aware that good always presents itself as a provisional disposition of human energies for the creation of a new and better—though not perfect—humanity. The awareness of the Absurd is a necessary control on man’s aspiration to meaning in a universe that lacks meaning; it is a recognition of the notion that because man is alone and capable of becoming whatever he wills, he is capable of tremendous evil as well as goodness. The true *rebel*

shows a truly generous attitude to a living present. In so doing, the *rebel* provides "the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die, and in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god."⁴⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹ Donald Atwell Zoll, *The Twentieth Century Mind: Essays on Contemporary Thought* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 119.

² Ernst Breisach, *Introduction to Modern Existentialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1962), pp. 4-7.

³ Miguel de Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, trans. by J. E. Crawford Fritch (New York: Dover Press, 1954), p. 263.

⁴ Henry Kariel, *In Search of Authority* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 167-168.

⁵ For an exposition of liberal democratic principles that have been considered seminal, see the following: Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956), pp. 18-39; H. Mark Roelofs, *The Language of Politics* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), chapter 5.

⁶ Cited in Thomas Hanna, *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway edition, 1958), p. xiii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

⁸ Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. by J. O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1959), p. 21.

⁹ Maurice Friedman, *Problematic Rebel* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 437.

¹⁰ Fred H. Willhoite, *Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus's Contributions to Political Thought* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p. 75.

¹¹ Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, trans. by Anthony Bonner (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1956), p. 22.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Albert Camus, "Neither Victims Nor Executioners," trans. by Dwight MacDonald, in Paul Goodman, ed., *Seeds of Liberation* (New York: George Braziller, 1964), p. 27.

¹⁵ Willhoite, *Beyond Nihilism*, p. 175.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁷ Albert Camus, *Notebooks 1942-1951*, trans. by J. O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 161.

¹⁸ Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death*, trans. by J. O'Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 161.

- ¹⁹ Camus, *Notebooks 1942-1951*, p. 105.
- ²⁰ Willhoite, *Beyond Nihilism*, p. 176.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.
- ²² Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 209.
- ²³ Michael P. Smith, "Alienation and Bureaucracy: The Role of Participatory Administration," *The Public Administration Review*, XXI (Nov.-Dec., 1971), p. 659.
- ²⁴ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), p. 71.
- ²⁵ Marcus Raskin, *Being and Doing* (New York: Beacon Press paperback, 1973), pp. xi, xii.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, chapters 2-5.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.* p. 7.
- ²⁹ Anders Richter, "The Existentialist Executive," *The Public Administration Review*, XXX (1970), p. 416.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 417.
- ³¹ Lewis C. Mainzer, *Political Bureaucracy* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1973), p. 2.
- ³² Richter, "The Existentialist Executive," p. 417.
- ³³ Beatrice and Sydney Rome, "Humanistic Research on Large Social Organizations," in James T. Bugental (ed.), *Challenges of Humanistic Psychology* (New York: McGraw Hill and Co., 1967), p. 185.
- ³⁴ Richter, "The Existentialist Executive," p. 421.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ Van Cleve Morris, *Existentialism in Education* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 135.
- ³⁷ Ralph Harper, "Significance of Existence and Recognition for Education," chapter VII in N. B. Henry, (ed.) *Modern Philosophies and Education*, Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: Published by the Society, 1955), p. 245.
- ³⁸ Morris, *Existentialism in Education*, pp. 137-147.
- ³⁹ Raskin, *Being and Doing*, p. 351.
- ⁴⁰ David E. Denton, "Albert Camus: Philosopher of Moral Concern," *Educational Theory*, XV (April, 1964), pp. 99-103.
- ⁴¹ Breisach, *Introduction to Modern Existentialism*, p. 22.
- ⁴² Glen Tinder, *The Crisis of Political Imagination* (New York: Scribners, 1964), p. 120.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-125.
- ⁴⁴ Clark E. Cochran, "The Politics of Interest: Metaphysics and the Limita-

tions of the Science of Politics,” paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, 1971, pp. 1-8.

⁴⁵ Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 159.

⁴⁶ Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 39-51.

⁴⁷ Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 237.





