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
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WHY AMERICANS  
DISLIKE ❁ ❁ ❁ ❁ ❁  
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HENRY ALTEMUS

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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

HENRY ALTEMUS, MANUFACTURER,  
PHILADELPHIA.



## WHY AMERICANS DISLIKE ENGLAND.\*

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S message on the Venezuelan boundary dispute revealed, like a flash light, the existence of a widespread popular dislike—it would hardly be too strong to say hatred—of England in this country. There is no other country in the world against which there could have been excited by a similar message on a similar issue so sudden and apparently universal a passion. Fortunately the reaction came almost as quickly, and, while it revealed the existence of an even stronger public opinion against war, it revealed also a feeling of love for England and a recognition of the essential unity between us. Whether the feeling of hostility or of kinship is really the stronger with us, no man can say with certainty. But it must be regarded as proved beyond all doubt that there is in the minds of a large proportion of our people, very probably of a majority of them, a peculiar feeling of dislike towards England, which they cherish towards no other country, and a peculiar quickness to flame up into open opposition to her whenever she seems to be

\* This essay is the expansion of an article which appeared in the New York *Independent* of January 2d, 1896, and some paragraphs have been transferred directly from that article with the kind permission of the editor.

threatening the slightest encroachment upon our interests.

It is foolish to attempt to deny the existence of this feeling, as some have done since the advent of a calmer mood. There are, no doubt, some parts of the land in which it is less strong than in others, and some circles in which it is scarcely felt at all. There are many thousands of us who recognize as among the strongest of ties—those of common interest and relationship which bind us to the mother land. But it is possible to find in every part of the country and in every class in the community evidences enough of an almost inborn dislike of England. Men of the highest intelligence, of the widest knowledge of affairs, of the most judicial calmness, of cosmopolitan sympathies, men of some or all of these traits, may be found in numbers who are profoundly in earnest in believing that we must be constantly on our guard against the designs of England, and who hold it practically certain, though they would regard a war with England as the greatest of misfortunes, that such a war is inevitable at some not distant date in the future. These men are no doubt a small minority only of their class, but as we go down towards the level of the average man, we may easily make sure that those who hold such opinions rapidly increase in numbers, and the fact is undeniable that the mass of Americans look upon England alone among all the nations of the world as the one which is naturally unfriendly to us, and which we must always regard with suspicion.

To those of us who stop to consider what the next century is likely to witness in the history of the world, these feelings seem fraught with possibilities of the greatest disaster to our nation, as well as to our race, but if we would avoid these consequences, the first necessity is to recognize the existence and to find out the sources of the feelings which would lead to them.

In the first place, and lying at the foundation of all else, is the fact that for more than a hundred years we have been trained in this feeling by an almost uninterrupted series of events. We may date the beginning of it, for the present purpose, from the war of the Revolution, though its roots lie much further back in a sense of injustice which had long been growing, and that, too, out of events entirely unconnected with the questions of taxation which led to the Revolution.

So far as our first war with England has any influence upon feeling at present, it is of the old sort. Americans pay far less attention than they ought to the fact that English people now nearly all regard the cause of the thirteen colonies as that of Englishmen everywhere, and are inclined to say—as one of them did to me not long ago—that the American Revolution brought to an end the last attempt at personal government on the part of the sovereign in violation of the spirit of the English constitution.

The feeling which the Revolutionary war left was deepened by the retention of the Western posts, and by the belief, whether right or wrong, that England was plotting to turn loose upon our frontier settlers

the horrors of Indian warfare. Recent careful investigations in the British official correspondence of the period, preserved in the Canadian archives, have shown that the worst of the charges, made at the time and since, were unfounded, but that still there was some ground for the suspicion that England had other motives for the retention of the posts than those which she stated to our government, and that very likely she intended, in the event of another war with us, to make sure at least that the Indians would not be among her enemies. For our present purpose, however, the important fact is that these horrible charges against England were implicitly believed a hundred years ago, and passed into our view of the history of the period. They have been repeated in book after book, and are still taught and believed, though without the special passion which they once aroused. They stand now merely as a part of the general indictment.

We have lately celebrated, with general approval, the centennial of the conclusion of Jay's treaty, which put our relations with England on a better footing than before. In 1795, however, the conditions of that treaty, though they were in general acceptable to the commercial interests of the country, seemed to the mass of the people to surrender far more than was gained, and were greeted with a storm of popular indignation which in several places resulted in mob violence. This feeling affected even the popularity of Washington, and aided in the overthrow of the Federalist party. The advantages which the treaty

secured were not so quickly recognized, and its temporary influence was to keep alive the bitterness and hostility which the Revolution had created.

It was but a short time from this to the hostility which was created by the English misuse of the right of search, by the impressment of American seamen, and by the violent disregard of American commercial rights, followed by the war of 1812. It is very true that "the war of 1812 was waged by one free people against another free people in the interest of Napoleon, the real enemy of them both. It diverted England's strength at a time when it was sorely needed in Europe, and it might have been prevented at any time before 1812 by a few conciliatory words followed by conciliatory deeds."\* It is very true also that England regarded the war as a mere episode of the larger struggle, and that Englishmen hardly remember it now. But it is just as true, on the other hand, that the war forms another stage in our history of continuous disagreement with England, and serves to confirm the belief that her permanent attitude towards us is unfriendly. Its events also feed the confidence in our ability to give the mother land the sound drubbing it is thought she needs—a confidence which is a very important consideration in its bearing on our attitude towards her.

England experienced the evil results of her misuse of the right of search when she began her earnest efforts to suppress the slave trade, and, however much

\* Channing: *The United States of America*. 1765-1865. p. 189.

Americans may have sympathized with her purpose, their dislike of England was not lessened by her efforts to carry it out. The various boundary disputes in the middle of the century served to keep the feeling alive, and if the "baked beans" or "Aroostook" war was ridiculous, there was some spirit behind it, and the excitement of the "fifty-four forty, or fight" period was, in some respects, like that which followed the President's Venezuelan message.

So much for the history which preceded the civil war. What has been here said on the facts of this period must not be understood to imply that England's action, or what was supposed to be England's action, in these cases, still rankles in our hearts, and contributes directly to the feeling which so many now cherish. It would be very difficult, I think, to find a man who now cares very much about any of these things, or who looks at any of them in the light in which his grandfather regarded them. If there were nothing more than this to be said of the causes of the attitude of the majority of Americans towards England, there would be nothing to be said. There would be no active feeling of dislike to account for.

But there is a way in which these events of somewhat ancient history do have an important bearing on the present attitude of our people. They lie, as has been said above, at the foundation of all the rest. They may not lead any one now to an actual desire for revenge, but they have created a hereditary method of judgment. They have a strong influence on the

belief that England is always our enemy, and they are the material out of which the traditional feeling has been formed that we must always look upon the designs of the British government with suspicion.

This feeling has lately been very concisely put in a public address by Senator Hawley of Connecticut, whose words are better evidence on this point than those of some others, because he can hardly be classed among the blatant and demagogic jingoes who declaim for popular effect. He says: "The English people are a very good people, but they are not the British government. That is another thing; and in every emergency with which the United States has been confronted, the British government has been our enemy." Now whether this is true historically or not true—and no doubt much could be said upon the other side—the point with which we are here concerned is that it is popularly believed. It represents the *a priori* attitude of the average American with regard to every question which concerns our relations with Great Britain. For this condition of mind these facts of our past history are mainly responsible.

In the discussions of this subject which have recently taken place, many writers and speakers have been disposed to lay the blame for the continued influence of these historical events upon the teaching of United States history in our public schools, especially upon the partial presentation of the facts in the text-books in use, and upon the attitude of the teacher in the class-room. Something of the result,

which the public schools unquestionably produce, is very probably due to these conditions. Many school histories do convey wrong impressions to the prejudice of England, and probably no one, not even the very best yet written, has told the whole truth as it will one day be told. But if we will look a little below the surface, I think we shall see at once that it makes comparatively little difference in what form the particular text-book in use presents the facts. Mr. Goldwin Smith has recently pointed out in an English journal that some of our most widely used school histories display no hostility to England in their forms of statement. This is certainly as it should be, and it is to be hoped that these books may set the fashion for the future. But this does not cover the whole case. It is not possible for an American boy, at the impressionable public school age, to read the bare facts of the Revolutionary war, of the war of 1812 and its prelude, and of our civil war, without a feeling that England is our hereditary enemy, or without a wish, boy-fashion, for another war with her to settle old scores. This at least is the result in most cases. The fact is easy enough of confirmation. In the war plays of our boys, the enemy's army, if it is a foreign war, is always the British army. I was greatly amused recently to find, in the course of some inquiries in regard to this matter, certain small but violent enemies of England in the family of a friend whose own views are very strongly of the opposite kind. In many such cases the boyish feeling will be speedily



outgrown when a more reflective study of our history becomes possible. But in many more it is not outgrown and forms a strong antecedent prejudice under the influence of which every later opinion takes its shape.

The attitude of the teacher in the class-room is of much greater importance than the attitude of the text-book. The real interpretation of the facts which the child carries away with him is far more likely to be that which the teacher presents, certainly that which the skillful teacher presents, than that of the book. Here I may be allowed, perhaps, to point out in passing that no class among us possesses a better opportunity, probably none so good, to create a right feeling towards England for the future as the public school teachers of the country. This cannot be done by changing the facts of our history. It is to be done partly by putting them in their right light, and partly by showing how deeply and in how many ways we are in the debt of England, especially for our institutions, and how greatly she is like us, and how many interests we have in common.

With the civil war period of our history, we come to facts which not merely serve as an additional count in the historical indictment, but which are also an active cause of bitter feeling at the present time; indeed, the attitude of England during that struggle towards the government of the North has far more direct influence in creating a feeling of dislike to-day than all the earlier incidents of our history to-

gether. Thousands of men who can forgive everything else cannot forgive that. The feeling towards the rebels has practically disappeared, even that towards the "copperheads" has ceased to show itself; but one can hear on every hand still, and from the best of men, expression of the old feeling in regard to England; many, who felt it strongly at the time, hold it almost or quite as strongly now, and it has become the traditional feeling with the second generation.

It is easy enough to show historically,—and it ought to be done repeatedly,—that only a small minority of the people of England were hostile to the Union. The words of our great and influential friends in that country we cannot read even after this lapse of time without a thrill of gratitude. The noble self-renunciation of the suffering cotton operatives in declaring that they were ready to starve rather than to be used as a pretext for any action which would lead to the perpetuation of slavery, we recognize as equal in its spirit to any act of our own citizens. But notwithstanding the recognition of these facts, the majority of Americans agree with the words of Senator Hawley just quoted. The English people may be our very good friends, but they have not been able to control their government, and it is with the government that we have had to reckon and shall have to reckon in the future.

The simple fact is that feeling during the war was so intense and bitter—a feeling deepened by the belief that the British government, out of dislike or

hostility towards the Union, stood ready to prove itself untrue to all its professions on the subject of slavery—and this feeling survives still in the breasts of so many then living and engaged with all that they held dear in the desperate struggle, and has passed as an immediate and living belief to so many of their children that no amount of argument will serve to destroy it.

Another feeling which the civil war period produced in regard to our foreign relations is complementary to this and equally significant. The events of that time are responsible for the popular belief that Russia is our only firm friend among the European nations, and that in any future contest with England she is our natural ally, as well as for the further belief that in any future struggle between Russia and England our natural place is on the side of Russia. Whether in this latter case the feeling would be strong enough to lead to any direct action may be doubtful, but that it is cherished by a considerable number of our people is certain. It is merely the fact that during the time of our supreme danger Russia was the only great Power that showed an actively friendly disposition towards the government of the North, which is the source of this feeling.

It would have been just as easy, it would indeed have been far easier, for England to have gained this advantage for herself. The civil war offered her the opportunity to wipe the past entirely away, and to secure the most cordial friendship and support of the

American people for all the future. We hardly state the case too strongly when we assert that it is the greatest mistake of England's foreign policy during the century that she chose to do the opposite. This is certainly true if the not distant future is to witness, as many signs seem to indicate that it will, a great struggle of races for the virtual control of the world. If such a struggle should come on in any form, of physical force or of peaceful competition, the best and almost the only hope of victory for the scattered and exposed Anglo-Saxon race lies in the cordial union of all its parts in support of their common interests.

If the mass of the English people had controlled the foreign policy of their government thirty years ago, this mistake would not have been committed. But they did not, and the small minority who ruled England then were actuated partly, in all probability, by a desire to see the Union divided, but perhaps even more by a kind of hereditary feeling of contempt for Americans, the supercilious air of superiority which England has so often assumed towards America, and certain classes of Englishmen towards Americans. The latest writer on the history of the United States has referred to this as among the circumstances which aided in bringing about the war of 1812.\* That the remembrance of such things enters as a frequent, though minor element on our side, into the popular feeling towards England is probably true. Mr. James Bryce, indeed, in a

\* Channing: *The United States of America.* p. 188.

recent article, disavows this attitude for the English of the present generation. He says: "English travellers and writers used no doubt formerly to assume airs of supercilious condescension which must have been offensive to Americans. But these airs were dropped twenty or thirty years ago." Mr. Bryce is hardly correct in this statement, if numerous stories afloat in this country are to be trusted; indeed, there seems to be something of this character ineradicably fixed in the nature of the Englishman, for it is this attitude of insular superiority and contempt for everything foreign that makes the British traveller most cordially detested everywhere on the face of the earth. There has been certainly a great change in this regard in the last thirty years so far as America is concerned, but fully half the change has been in the feelings of Americans about these British weaknesses. They no longer touch us, as they once did, on a sore spot, but rather on the humorous side, and would scarcely be worth notice in this connection but for the probability of their influence in determining England's position in the civil war period, and for completeness' sake, since it is likely that they do still influence the feeling of individuals.

It is more profitable to turn to another of the complex causes of the popular feeling towards England, —the belief in the domineering and monopolizing character of England's policy everywhere in the world. In its most general form, as it is held by

the majority of Americans, this belief is probably the influence which has more to do than all others in creating the current prejudice. England is thoroughly selfish. She stands ready to take every advantage, with no scruples of conscience, of weaker races. She would not hesitate to destroy the industry or commerce of any foreign state if she could profit by the result. She is trying to annex everything for which she can advance a plausible pretext, or, in a somewhat literal sense of the slang phrase, she "wants the earth," and she will stick at nothing in her efforts to get it. This is the sum of the indictment, and the majority of Americans believe it.

The history of the last two hundred years, as it is interpreted this side the Atlantic, goes far to sustain this belief. But more important as immediate causes of it, are two matters in which most Americans have a present interest, and which serve at least to keep the feeling alive.

The first of these is the case of Ireland. Of course, I leave entirely out of this account the illegitimate influence of the large Irish vote upon politicians who do not care for the results of their words or acts if they can gain a present success. We are concerned here not with an artificial jingo sentiment which may be manufactured to order to influence an election, but with the real sentiment which lies back of it, and which alone renders such abuses possible. Entirely independent of this artificial sentiment, there is a large and legitimate influence of the Irish question upon the general current of our feeling in

regard to England. This is partly due to the share which numerous Irishmen and men of Irish descent, who have risen to great and deserved influence in hundreds of communities throughout the country, have had in shaping public opinion. It is also partly due to the almost universal belief in this country that Ireland has been very unjustly treated by England, and is so still; for Americans find it very hard to understand the English fear of Home Rule. They do not appreciate the grounds of the conviction that Home Rule would bring about the dissolution of the Empire, nor the failure of the Englishman to understand the way in which a federal system of government works in practice. No other single case has had anything like so much to do with creating the general opinion among us that England is the oppressor of feeble races, as her conduct in Ireland.

This opinion in regard to the general character of England's policy is reinforced by other recent cases, like that of the treatment of Portugal a half dozen years ago, and it will be often found cherished by men who have no other reason to give you for their dislike of England.

In the second place, the teaching of the protectionist party has had, beyond all doubt, a very decided influence in this same direction. This fact is entirely independent of the question whether the protectionist doctrine is right or wrong. Orators and newspapers have labored to teach the people that England is the decided foe of our industries, seeking by every means, open and secret, to destroy

them, and with no slight effect. Any one, who has not taken the pains to examine the fact, would be greatly surprised at the number of persons who would be very angry if they were called ignorant, or easily gulled, who nevertheless implicitly believe in the donations of gold by the Cobden Club to aid in the war upon American manufactures. The circulation of pamphlets in favor of free trade, bearing the imprint of the Cobden Club, whatever good it may have done in individual cases, has probably on the whole done more harm than good, especially in helping to sustain the belief that the English commercial classes are the active allies of our own free traders in their supposed war on American manufactures.

These arguments of the protectionist orators have a double interest in this connection. They serve, unquestionably, to keep alive a feeling of antipathy to England in a portion of the nation; but on the other hand they draw their support and gain their credence from the previously existing common judgment of the people of the thoroughly selfish character of England's general policy. It is merely one way in which this opinion manifests itself, though it also acts in a reflex way to keep the parent feeling alive.\*

\*It is interesting to notice that the advocates of free coinage of silver make spasmodic efforts every now and then to enlist the same belief in the service of their cause. During the present writing, I have had sent me a copy of a doggerel, "Song for Free Silver in a Free Nation," to be sung to the



I think it is not wrong to say that this feeling of opposition to what is thought to be England's monopolizing tendency is the most universally cherished of all the elements which go to make up the popular dislike which is felt towards her. I have been surprised to see the forms which this belief has taken in the case of men who have had, as I have said, nothing else to urge against her, and who might have been expected, from their position and opportunities for information, to have a more correct knowledge of the policy which England is at present really following. For there is no question but that a distinction should be made between the present and the past in this matter, though the mass of Americans fail to make it. Those who are endeavoring to make clear to us the methods and results of British rule in India and in Egypt are doing a very useful piece of work. The argument that many of the annexations of the past have been really forced upon the Empire has very little weight with us, though it

tune of Marching Through Georgia, which contains the following:

There's a conflict with Old England, boys, again on Western shores,  
There's a battle with a nation that our fathers fought of yore,  
And we'll sweep her and her Tories, as our fathers did before,  
Off the land bordered easterly by Georgia.

Ye men of Northern firmness and ye men of Southern fire,  
Ye men of Western daring—all ye Nation's sons and sires,  
Let us once again teach England not to rouse a Nation's ire,  
From the West to the further coast of Georgia.

is certainly true. No great Empire has ever existed which has not been compelled to follow this policy, and in the case of the Empire which presents the nearest parallel in history to the British Empire, the Roman, it was because of its inability to follow this policy any further that it was in the end overthrown. Nor do we generally make the distinction which ought to be clear to us, between the passion for expansion in the colonies themselves and that in the mother country. The cases which illustrate this are, however, numerous enough in the last thirty years. The Fiji Islands and New Guinea are directly to the point, and the cases in South Africa still more so, because there the home government never yielded to the pressure of the colonies—unfortunately, we are tempted to say, for if it had, the dangers which now threaten the Anglo-Saxon occupation of that part of the world would never have arisen.

But these considerations, however true they may be, have as yet but little weight with us, and, as has been said, it is this belief in England's thorough selfishness that has more to do than all else with sustaining the popular judgment behind the policy which passes to-day as the Monroe Doctrine, and it largely explains why we seem to have one doctrine for England and another for other nations. There is a fixed determination in the will of the people of this country that on the American continents this selfish policy of England shall find no field for its exercise. If the premises on which this judgment rests were correct,

there is no one who would not be ready to defend the conclusion with all his might.

There is another tendency among us in recent times which must be noticed because it is directly connected with this last, and has much to do, though as yet unconsciously, with the influence which the feeling just spoken of is likely to have on our future action.

No one can have watched carefully the currents of popular sentiment among us for the past quarter of a century without being aware that there is a steadily growing interest on the part of the mass of Americans in questions of foreign affairs, not merely our own, but those of other people, and that there is with this an increasing tendency to believe that we have a right, and that, in certain contingencies, we ought to interfere in affairs that are not primarily our own. Samoa and Hawaii, Armenia and Cuba—and these are not the only cases—have not claimed so much of the public attention merely because of the claptrap of jingo politicians, however much of this there may have been about the actual steps taken. They have had behind them all a common sentiment and a real public feeling which rendered possible the noise of the jingoes, and they are signs of a current which is beginning to run steadily in our national life. If we analyze these cases we can find easily what this common sentiment is. It is the feeling that justice ought to be done, that the weak should be protected, that there should be somewhere in the world a nation able and willing to call the oppressor to a halt in the selfish encroachments on the rights of others which his

power allows him, and finally that the United States is of all nations called to this mission. This feeling may be as yet half unconscious, it may be ignorant and often mistaken in its facts, and subject to great abuse by the designing politician and trader, but it would be a great mistake not to see that it has begun to form, and that it is sure to grow. It is in the main a right sentiment and its influence is likely to be for the good of the world, where the facts are rightly understood. If it is easily misled as to the facts, there is all the more necessity that the real conditions of every case should be clearly and fully set forth by those who know them. However this may be, it seems to me clear that this sentiment, whether well instructed or ignorant, is going to have an increasing influence on our foreign policy in the future, and that it must be reckoned with by any nation which is immediately interested in that policy.

Its bearing on the present subject is direct. Here is the root of the most living and active of all the elements which go to create the suspicion which is popularly entertained of England's intentions. Could the mass of Americans be convinced that England's policy is the reverse of selfish, that she is as willing to be fair and just as we fondly imagine we are ourselves, that she is ready to assist in protecting the weak, and that, so far from being an oppressor, she is willing to aid in bringing the oppression of others to an end, could Americans be convinced of these things, there would be a far stronger tide of popular feeling in her favor and towards active friendship

with her than there is at present. Nor would the work of conviction be a difficult one.\*

Here, then, is the conclusion of the matter.

In the first place, our people have behind them a hundred years of training by the uninterrupted facts of our experience in a certain habit of judgment in regard to England's attitude towards us. It has become, we may say, a kind of hereditary tendency. This is the interpretation of things which is presented to the schoolboy when he gets his first impressions of our history, and the citizen, in the majority of cases, begins to form his opinions on public questions with

\* In this connection the following quotation is interesting. It is from a distinguished English writer on colonial subjects, who is disposed to criticise the tendency which he believes to exist among his countrymen.

"In England the present age is one in which the spirit of humanity is carried almost to an extreme. Generous sympathy with weakness and suffering in any form goes out so far that it is almost considered a virtue to be weak and a crime to be strong. Whenever there is a point at issue between a small community and a great one, it seems to be assumed that the latter must be in the wrong; and, as their own nation is strong, Englishmen are inclined to take it for granted, that, whenever friction arises between Great Britain and a small foreign power or between the mother country and one of her colonies or dependencies, the fault must be on the side of the British government. They do not consider that strength in a race or nation implies merit, physical, moral, or intellectual; and that a mode of reasoning which invariably condemns the stronger party, may be generous, but is certainly untrue alike to history and to common sense."—C. P. Lucas: Introduction to Lewis's *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, p. xxxviii.

a natural bias of this sort. In the second place, this antecedent prejudice is reinforced and in many cases turned into a positive belief by certain present causes, partly acts or supposed acts of England or the general idea entertained of her policy, and partly acts of our own politicians.

The result is two fold.

There is on the part of many a positive dislike of England, a readiness to accept the worst interpretation of any act of hers, a belief that she is particularly our enemy and would do anything that she could to embarrass or injure us, and consequently a readiness to break out into open hostility whenever she seems inclined to encroach upon our interests even in the slightest way. On the part of many more, probably a much larger number, who do not feel this positive dislike or actual hostility, there is still a feeling of suspicion, a conviction that England is capable of much evil, that she is not kindly disposed towards us, and that she must be carefully watched. This is a kind of latent feeling, which might not have much influence in beginning a quarrel, but which could be easily swept over into active hostility after a disagreement had begun.

In a general conclusion the other side must not be overlooked. There is certainly on the part of many a very strong liking for England, a real feeling of the tie of kinship, and a more just recognition of the true identity of interest between the two halves of the Anglo-Saxon race. This feeling is undoubtedly stronger in the East than in the West, and

is perhaps strongest within the limits of the original thirteen colonies. It is certainly an especially strong feeling with many who are proud of their colonial descent. It is to be found everywhere, however, among the more intelligent and educated classes of the nation, and it is happily an increasing feeling.

This is reinforced by the opinion of the commercial classes of the large cities—an opinion which had much to do with the reaction which followed so quickly upon the first emotion excited by President Cleveland's message. This opinion is no doubt somewhat determined by the interests of the individuals which make up the class, but it is also true that they are in a position to realize most clearly the conditions of essential unity in the race.

If one asks which of these two tendencies is the stronger, the answer must be, as was said at the outset, that no one can tell. The probability is, however, that the feeling of dislike is still the stronger, that the friends of England are still in the minority, and, though they may be relatively stronger than at the beginning of the war of 1812, that the conditions of that war would be virtually repeated in the isolation and powerlessness of this class, if hostilities should every begin again between the two countries. That this is probably the case is indicated by the fact that a very considerable number of persons can be found, belonging to the classes in which the feeling is most favorable to England, who argue with some skill and often with much vehemence in support of the popular view in regard to England.

The practical conclusion is that the prevailing feeling in this country is still unfavorable to England, and she must take the fact into account in her reckonings. If she counts upon a sense of race relationship and kinship, a kind of mother-and-daughter feeling, she is counting upon something which exists in thousands of individual cases, but which does not exist as a general public feeling, and which would have scarcely an appreciable influence in determining our action in times of great excitement.

The attempt has been made in this essay to show that the common feeling in this country towards England has a foundation in our past history and in active contemporary causes, but it is hardly possible that any one, who can think clearly and who will look out calmly upon the probable future of the world, can avoid the belief that it is in the main a really mistaken feeling, and that it is in every regard to be deplored.

Some of the consequences to which it might easily lead us are horrible to contemplate. Here are two of them which have recently been discussed as certainties in case of a war with England. The first is the adoption, as our chief reliance in such a war, of a means of injuring enemies which nearly all civilized nations agreed, forty years ago, to abandon as too barbarous for longer use—that is, privateering, or legalized piracy. The second is an alliance with Russia in a common war upon the British Empire. This means an alliance with the one most dangerous



Power which represents everything, and which is most zealously engaged in spreading everything, in government and civilization to which we are firmly opposed—an alliance to make war upon the Power which is most actively engaged in every quarter of the globe in advancing the ideas in which we ourselves thoroughly believe.

For we ought to remember that England stands for the same things throughout the world for which we stand. Her faults are great and not to be denied; but we should not forget that they are our faults as well. She may be arrogant and overbearing; but we have not to go so very far back in our history to find the same traits displayed in our own public utterances. She may have borne hard upon barbarous races under her rule; but what have we to say of our own Indian policy? She may browbeat weaker nations and may be greedy of land; but with the crime of the Mexican war to our account, we have not many stones to throw at England. These very faults carry with them the proof of our kinship, and, when all is said, England stands for far more of the things that we believe to be of the highest good for men, for far more of the things on which we pride ourselves, than does any other nation in the world. If we wish to make these things prevail in the world and to give men liberty and justice and the power to rule themselves, our place is on the side of England. If we wish to do our best to help despotism to prevail and to turn men back from the goal which they are even now nearing to struggle through

another eighteenth century of darkness and revolutions to come up to it again, then we ought to be on the side of Russia to help her destroy the British Empire.

And now I may be pardoned, perhaps, a word to the other side.

Very many among us recognize the incompleteness and the mistaken grounds of the popular indictment of England, and feel strongly on the other hand the bonds of common interest between us. Some of us consider it, too, almost as great a misfortune that we should have been taught by events to believe Russia our natural ally, as that we should learn to look upon England as our hereditary enemy. But however true it may be that the popular feeling towards England is to be deplored, it is nevertheless a fact, and it cannot easily be changed. The voice of moderation may make itself heard in crises like that through which we have just passed with good effect, but the feeling will remain and argument can do but little to modify it. The responsibility for bringing about a change must rest very largely with England. All that could be done in this country taken together would have far less influence in this direction than a single clear and unmistakable act to show that England, not the English people, but the British government as well, regards the United States as its nearest friend, and is disposed to consider our interests its own. It might very easily have done this during our civil war, as has been said; opportunities to do it will not be wanting in the future.

It can hardly be doubted that it is altogether worth the while of the British government to do this. As we look forward to the next century, it seems the height of folly for England to face the new difficulties and far-reaching changes which are coming on, with this great chasm in the Anglo-Saxon world unclosed, when it would be such a simple matter for her to close it completely. The way is largely prepared in advance. The events of the past winter will themselves serve as a preparation, and it is not unlikely that the response to any such action of England would surprise us all.

As for ourselves, in the narrower sense, it is no doubt true that, in any possible future, our position is far more secure than that of England, and yet it is certain that our own best and highest interests, and those of all men everywhere, demand the unity and common action of the Anglo-Saxon race.





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