

BOOKS BY ROBERT T. OLIVER

KOREA: FORGOTTEN NATION

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AND PITT

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(WITH H. W. ROBBINS)

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DIVIDED KOREA: ITS ECONOMIC RESOURCES,
POTENTIALS AND NEEDS

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA LOOKS AHEAD

WHY WAR CAME IN KOREA

ROBERT T. OLIVER



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DEDICATED
to the development
of those
"exceptional Americans"
called for so wisely and urgently
by
DWIGHT EISENHOWER

FOREWORD

I HAVE LIVED WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION on intimate terms since 1942. During all that period it has been my unfortunate position to warn of dangers which were not realized and to suggest remedies which were not accepted. In view of the war which has broken out, there may be some pertinence in quoting from some of the articles I have written during this period, as a means of illustrating the successive stages through which the Korean situation has ad-

vanced, and in order to permit the readers to judge for themselves whether the suggested programs would have been able to have averted the Communist attack:

From the Washington (D.C.) *Post*, Sunday, March 7, 1943:

“The Korean national program, as presented by its commission in Washington, is forthright and simple. Korea asks: (1) Immediate admittance to the United Nations. [In those days there was no Russian veto.] (2) Military supplies and aid under the lend-lease agreement at once. (3) The recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea now.” [At that time the United States was free to take such action, unilaterally, as the one nation bearing the brunt of the Pacific war.]

From *Asia and the Americas*, March, 1943:

“In this global war Korea takes on new significance . . . It is an ideal base from which attacks could be launched upon the industrial areas of Nippon.”

From *World Affairs*, June, 1943:

“Why, one may ask, should the State Department treat Korea differently from the other gov-

ernments-in-exile? . . . The answer which any impartial examiner will find is—Russia.

“Does Russia want Korea incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? The London correspondent of the *Chicago Sun* reported that that was precisely the solution of the Korean question which Anthony Eden and President Roosevelt discussed. Whatever his sources of information may have been, his conclusion was doubtless correct. It is inevitable that the topic must have come up. Present Russian policy unquestionably is to ‘secure her borders’ by the absorption of strategically important neighboring states. And Korea is one of these.

“The question is whether it is good politics, good statesmanship, or good sense for the State Department to play this power politics game by continuing to maintain a ‘hands off’ policy regarding Korea. Shall the situation be allowed to drift along to what appears now the inevitable solution? Are we ready to junk the Atlantic Charter, to drop the whole idea of collective security, and to reconstruct the world on a balance-of-power basis? Can we hope for peace by taking the power away from the Fascist nations and giving it to their chief foes? Or—if we hope to salvage a system of collective security at the end of the war—can we do so by letting such

problems as the Korean question drift dangerously onto the shoals of power politics with the hope of rescuing it at the peace conference? Aren't we shaping the future world by our attitudes and policies right now?"

From *The Case for Korea*, a pamphlet published by the Korean American Council, April 5, 1945:

"The purpose of this pamphlet is to call the attention of the American public to a grave and puzzling paradox in our own handling of the case of Korea. This is a problem that is peculiarly our own. We are able to settle it on our initiative, much as Russia is determining the basis for settlement of the disputed Baltic and Eastern European problems, and as England is asserting leadership in fixing the postwar pattern in the areas bordering the Mediterranean . . . The geographical position of Korea makes her inevitably a vital factor in the future of the Orient. We should make sure that in shaping her future we shall have a friendly and welcome part. It is not too late, but the time for decision is now!"

From *The New Leader*, August 18, 1945:

"Our policy in regard to Korea has drifted aimlessly for so long that we cannot rectify it

now without great boldness and decision. Every day that passes makes any action at all to forestall Russian control of Korea more difficult to take. The one thing that would work would be for us to seize the initiative and recognize the Korean Provisional Government while it is still possible to do so without deliberately affronting Russia. *If we should take that step the trump cards would all be in our hands.* Russia would surely think twice before trying to push us violently from a position we had deliberately assumed. If we wish to see an independent Korea in the future (not for her sake, not even for the sake of the pledges we have made, but—as Sumner Welles has pointed out—for the sake of future peace in the Orient) that is the one effective step we can take. And it is a step that cannot succeed unless it is taken soon. Every day that passes brings the possibility that Russian recognition of the Yenan Korean Communists may come first.”

From *The New Leader*, December 1, 1945:

“Since the Korean question is relegated to the inside pages of our newspapers, it ought to be placed, in all decency, in the classified ad section, under the heading: ‘Lost: an opportunity for statesmanship’ . . . If this seems overly blunt,

the purpose is simply to ask our policy-makers: 'Gentlemen, tell us what you are about! If you have plans unrevealed to the public, what are they? If you face difficulties of which we laymen are unaware, what are they? If your intentions are of the best, what are they? In the name of humanity and the future welfare of the United States in the tinder-box of Asia, come clean!' "

From *The New Leader*, December 21 and 28, 1946:

"Korea, according to the Russian army and diplomatic textbooks, has committed two major crimes. One of them is to be located at a key strategic spot. The other crime is that of being too weak to defend itself . . . To let Korea slip into Russian hands would be to invite Russian domination of Asia."

From the Syracuse University *Alumni News*, March, 1947:

"In the Korean situation the moral issues are clearer than in any other portion of the world where international issues are pending . . .

"And, most important of all in Oriental eyes, will the United States, despite its tremendous power and prestige, abjectly back down before the bold tactics and the sweeping demands of Russia?"

“The Orient, and I believe the rest of the world as well, is hungry for moral leadership. After the cat-and-mouse game England and the United States played with China and after the cynical attempt to picture war-time Russia as a ‘democracy,’ the plain people around the globe have hoped that at least a decent peace might be achieved at the price of the enormous slaughter of the most cold-blooded war in all history.

“The United States has at this moment an opportunity greater than any other people has ever had to rally world support behind its leadership. All it needs to do is to implement with positive action the noble words our statesmen so frequently utter. Let us convince the disillusioned peoples of the world that a great power such as we are believes that justice is the one safe basis on which to erect the peace, and the response is certain to be overwhelming.”

From *Plain Talk*, May, 1947:

“Korea is the chief testing spot in the Far East—perhaps in the whole world—of the new Truman Doctrine of supporting native democratic regimes against Communist infiltration and destruction. The crucial test of Russian-American ability to solve their difficulties peacefully will come in Korea. And it is coming very soon.”

From The London, *Spectator*, May 23, 1947:

“The paramount question of whether we are to have one world or two will receive a partial answer in the negotiations by which Russia and the United States are attempting to solve the Korean question. Korea is the area where the Russian policy of achieving security through extension of her borders and the new American doctrine of erecting democratic bulwarks against the further spread of Communism will meet their first avowed and direct test.”

From *The Army and Navy Union News*, June, 1947:

“The conference now being held in Korea is widely regarded as a vital test of Russian-American relations . . . The evidence unhappily indicates that the Truman Doctrine has not been able to meet this first test with the Soviets . . . After 20 months Koreans are still not allowed a voice of their own in deciding their country’s fate. When will acts replace words to make our advertised benevolence in foreign affairs become real?”

From *World Affairs*, Spring 1947:

“The solution for the tragic mess we have gotten into in Korea is simple.

“We should at once relieve Korea from the restrictions that are applied against Japan. We should actively help to build up the democratic forces by making educational resources available to them, and by helping to rehabilitate their exhausted economy. We should try to aid, not smother, the pro-American sentiment that still exists.

“Our Military Government should be summarily dissolved, and a native Korean government established in its place. A token body of American troops should be left in position along the 38th Parallel line, to ensure that Russia will not move down to take over the southern part of the country.

“Every diplomatic pressure should be exerted upon Russia to live up to her Moscow pledge to reunite the dissevered halves of Korea and to withdraw her own troops. Korea should be admitted to the United Nations where she can plead her own cause before the united nations of the world. Her currency should be freed so she can use her own resources in her own defense.

“None of these recommended steps is difficult. None is opposed to expressed and reiterated American aims. All are clearly supported by considerations of both justice and expediency.”

From *Freedom and Union*, June, 1947:

“The whole Orient has its eyes on our actions in Korea. The commitments we and Russia have made are clear. The treatment of the two zones is well known. Communism and democracy are on trial. If the Orient had its own choice, on the record it would have reason to reject both. But in the present world balance of power it must choose between the two. It is of tremendous consequence that the U.S. so act that the free choice of over a billion Asians will be the American way. This is the real stake in this tug of war in which Korea finds itself the nation in the middle between the Soviet Union and the United States.”

From *The Progressive*, October 6, 1947:

“The Korean question is one of the sorest spots in Russian-American relations. It is a major danger spot that must be handled properly if the peace is to be safeguarded.”

From *The Philadelphia Forum*, October, 1947:

“A spokesman for the American delegation to the Joint Russian American Commission explained to me the failure of the meetings in this way: ‘The Russian delegates had full authority

to accept any concessions the Americans would make. But they had no authority whatsoever to make any concessions in return.”

From *The Standard*, November, 1947:

“What happens to Korea may well be the best indication of whether or not we are destined to endure another world war.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, January 28, 1948:

“Developments in Korea are making that country an inevitable scene for a show-down between the United Nations and Russia.”

From *The Christian Century*, February 25, 1948:

“At the very time the Truman Doctrine was stressing our support of any free people striving to resist Communism, we were trying to win an agreement with Russia in Korea by fostering pro-Communist forces in south Korea through an American-appointed ‘coalition’ in which the dominant nationalist parties had no part. Although every American instinct was to help the Korean people, we have been forced by hastily formulated commitments to keep them in a straitjacket which has hampered their political

and economic development. Even Germany and Japan have not been so straitened. Handing over the responsibility to the U.N. was by far the simplest, and perhaps the only, solution for the impasse into which our country has slipped.”

From *The New Leader*, February 28, 1948:

“Economically and militarily, a government in south Korea would certainly need some kind of external support. This necessity is caused by the 38th Parallel division.”

From *Church Management*, May, 1948:

“The widening chasm between Russia and the United States calls for basic reconsiderations of the foundations upon which international relations are based . . . The methods of power politics that have dictated Western policies in Asia have proved barren.”

From the Baltimore (Md.) *Sun*, May 10, 1948:

“Today’s election in Korea is the immediate battleground of the Communist war to submerge all Asia. Dr. Syngman Rhee’s National Democratic Unity Federation is the Asian counterpart of the Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, striving to hold back the Soviet flood.”

From *The Far Eastern Survey*, June 2, 1948:

“Dr. Syngman Rhee has reiterated his intention to implement his announced liberal program to the fullest possible extent. The key to how well he may be able to do so rests squarely with the United States. If American support is weak, the government will naturally have to bolster its anti-Communist defences with the help of the conservative ‘landlord class.’ But if American support is adequate to hold off the Communist (or Soviet) menace, the new government will develop programs designed to strengthen the lower and middle classes and to establish its strength through the welfare of the whole people. The problem in Korea is essentially the same as in France or Italy: danger from the left naturally pushes the government further toward the right.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, August 10, 1948:

“Both the nature of American policy in Asia and the reasons for it have been clarified in recent weeks, as events have moved swiftly toward a showdown with Russia over Korea on one side of the world and Germany on the other. Neither issue is isolated; each one is the key to control of a continent; and, more largely, to the nature of the world of the future . . .

“Uninformed observers have been freely predicting in recent weeks that the United States is ‘withdrawing’ from Korea . . . Actually, what is happening is not in any sense an abandonment of Korea by the United States. What is occurring is the shift of American policy in Korea to the only foundation upon which it can be maintained successfully—that is, to firm American support of Korean independence.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, November 18, 1948:

“Communist armies of the East are sending advance forces into strategic Korea. Forty northern Chinese Communists have been reported by Republic of Korea officials to be now operating in south Korea, with 1,000 more awaiting a chance to slip across the 38th Parallel line. Previously, Chiang Kai-shek has reported that 60,000 north Korean Communists have participated in the fighting in Manchuria.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, June 10, 1949:

“In naming Molotov to head its drive through Asia, the Politburo has undeniably underlined the fact that conquest of the Far East is now the Number One item on its agenda.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, July 15, 1949:

“Events in Korea seem rushing toward a climax that may determine the relative position of the United States and Russia in all the vast strategic and valuable area of Asia and the Far East.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, September 2, 1949:

“Korea will stand in the annals of the twentieth century as the place in which Communism was finally halted and turned back in Asia.”

From *United Asia*, October, 1949:

“Events clearly show that the Communists flood-tide in Asia will not simply die down; it must be stopped. A line somewhere must be held. The Republic of Korea is striving to hold it, and in this struggle it feels itself an ally with freedom-loving peoples in every part of the world.”

From *The Periscope on Asia*, January 23, 1950:

“It is still in Korea itself that the major struggle must be made. It is there that the sacrifices must be undertaken. But the evidence indicates that American support for this foremost

outpost of freedom in Asia will not falter in the months ahead.”

From *The New Leader*, February 4, 1950:

“The cold war is essentially a war of nerves. In every country threatened by Communist aggression, the courage or weakness of its leaders has swung the balance. Finland’s tough leadership kept its nerve—and an amazing degree of independence; Norway, Denmark and Italy, all on the front line of the Communist advance, had the nerve to say ‘No’ and make it stick. But in Czechoslovakia the weary Benes and Masaryk gave in without a struggle, and one of the tragedies of China was the weakness of generals who refused to fight. . . .

“I have lived with the Korean question on intimate terms for eight years—as an adviser in Washington, in Seoul, and at the United Nations. I think it can be said without qualification that the men who lead the Republic of Korea will scorn every communist threat and resist every communist attack. So long as flesh and blood can hold back Stalin’s Asian juggernaut, Korea will stand firm.”

It is out of the background of thinking and observation represented by these citations that

this book has been written. If facts may be reasonably depended upon as a basis for forming conclusions, we should, it seems to me, have learned from the Korean situation that the way to deal with Russia is not weakness and hesitation, not willingness to sacrifice morality for what may seem to be expediency, and not neglect of what we know should be done for fear of giving the Soviets offence. Such methods did not prevent the crisis in Korea; it is doubtful if they can work better elsewhere.

Our dealings with Korea leave us confronted with a series of "ifs". *If* we had recognized the Provisional Government prior to the Yalta Conference, Korea might never have been divided. *If* we had instantly matched Soviet actions in north Korea by establishing a government and an army in the south, Russia might have agreed to unification back in 1946 or 1947. *If* we had equipped the Republic with heavy weapons and had refrained from giving the impression we would never support it militarily, the attack of June 25 might never have been launched.

It seems apparent that the time has come to try strength, since weakness has failed. Provided the outbreak of world-wide war does not again postpone a Korean solution, it is to be hoped that the present "United Nations police action"

in Korea will reunite the nation and supervise an election in the northern part, to supply the missing third of representatives for the National Assembly. In all conscience, considerable economic and technical help will be required to rebuild the destroyed cities, industries and transportation systems. With such aid, democracy in Korea is capable of setting an effective example for the billion Asians. When the time for rebuilding in Korea comes, let us not muff the opportunities of the future as we have those of the past.

ROBERT T. OLIVER

August, 1950

**WHY WAR CAME
IN KOREA**

1

THE COMMUNIST EMPIRE STRIKES

WHEN I WAS LAST IN KAESONG, A CITY OF 100,000 located just three miles south of Korea's fateful 38th Parallel line, one of the merchants said to me: "We go to bed with fear and we live through the days with our eyes on the hills." This was in May, 1949. Just over a year later, the horse-shoe bend of rugged hills encircling Kaesong on the north erupted a vicious attack. It was four o'clock on a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, when powerful lines of Soviet-made

tanks, supported by fighter planes and heavy artillery, poured into and around the city. The rifle-armed troops of the Republic of Korea were crushed and the attack rolled on toward Seoul, thirty-five miles farther south.

That date brought the Communist Empire and the free world of the democracies to grips for the first time. Always before, a clash had been avoided. When Finland was invaded, the democracies stood aside. The Soviet engulfment of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was deplored, but, occurring as it did as part of a general war movement, it met no further obstacle than an official reminder by the Western powers that the status of these Baltic States must be reviewed as part of the eventual peace settlement. The crass division of Poland between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, however hotly debated and denounced in the United States, was a sin presumed to be partially expiated by later Russian resistance to the German invasion. As for the impressive extension of the Communist Empire in Eastern Europe, in Mongolia, and in China, so long as the means were internal subversion the Western democracies had neither the will nor the method to deal with the veiled and indirect aggression.

The case of Korea, however, was different.

The Communist Empire made it different by launching a direct attack. The challenge had taken a form the democracies could and must meet.

To answer the question why Korea became the testing ground requires a long and hard look at that relatively remote peninsula, particularly during the years of Russian and American interest in it. Prior to any detailed examination, however, the most striking and easily identifiable reasons may be summarized to provide a sort of stylized pattern for the chapters to follow. Of one thing there need be no doubt: the selection of Korea as the area in which the cold war of subversion was converted into open military attack was no accident. The explanation lies deeply rooted in history—some remote and some immediate. The more obvious reasons are as follows:

(1) Traditionally and historically, Korea occupies the heart of the strategic triangle of north Asia, with Siberia on one side, China on another, and Japan on a third. When Korea has been independent, north Asia has been at peace. When Korea has been held by a dominant military power, that same power has been able to subjugate all north Asia. The Mongol hordes first demonstrated this fact in the 13th

century (being restrained then from conquering Japan only by just such a catastrophe to their fleet as happened to the Spanish Armada in the storm off England's coast in the 16th century). Hideyoshi, the great Japanese warlord, sought to conquer Korea in 1592-97, as a prelude to overrunning all Asia, and was beaten back through the invention of the first ironclad warship by Korean Admiral Yi Soon-Sin. Japan and China fought over Korea's position in 1894-95. Then, in a crucial test of strength, Japan and Russia fought the war of 1904-05 to determine which should gain the strategic Korea peninsula. After Japan won, she was able to build rail lines and bases in Korea and proceed on to the conquest of Manchuria in 1931, the attack on China in 1937, and the descent on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

(2) Russia has made possession of Korea a prime aim of its foreign policy for at least 75 years. In 1896, in 1903, and again in 1910, Russia and Japan engaged in secret negotiations regarding a possible division of Korea between them, along either the 38th or 39th Parallels. Prior to the Russo-Japanese war, Czar Nicholas II wrote to his foreign minister: "Russia absolutely needs a port free and open throughout the whole year. This port must be located on

the mainland (southeast Korea) and must certainly be connected with our possessions by a strip of land." Pursuing this same goal, Russia demanded admittance to Korea as part of its price for entering the war against Japan in August, 1945. This demand led to the "temporary" division of Korea along the 38th Parallel, supposedly merely to permit disarming of Japanese troops north of that line by Russia and south of the line by United States troops.

(3) Russia proceeded instantly to build a militarily and politically strong puppet regime in north Korea. She brought back to north Korea some 300,000 Koreans who had fled into Siberia from Japanese tyranny (during the period 1905-1945 while Japan ruled Korea) and who had there been communized. She also brought back another two million who had fled into Manchuria and north China, and who there had allied themselves with Communist guerrillas in fighting Japanese troops. With this large nucleus, Russia established a Communist "People's Republic" and started building an army of upwards of 200,000 men. This army was equipped with tanks, artillery and planes, and some 100,000 of its troops were battle-hardened in warfare against the Nationalist forces in China. With a strict iron curtain around north Korea,

Russia subjected the north Korean populace to five solid years of propaganda, along the basic line that "American imperialism was preventing the reunification of Korea for the purpose of maintaining a military base in south Korea." The fact that the United Nations voted in November, 1947, for an election in all Korea to reunite the country under a government of its own choice did not, of course, result in any qualification of this propaganda barrage. Consequently, the Soviet had in north Korea a dependable totalitarian puppet regime, with a strong army indoctrinated to believe it was fighting for the reunification of its homeland, and well trained and equipped for battle.

(4) In contrast to the north Korean strength, the Republic of Korea was militarily weak. This weakness was no accident, but was deliberately planned. United States policy in Korea consisted in part of "proving" to both Soviet Russia and the peoples of Asia that our government had no colonial or military designs of any sort upon south Korea. To the contrary, all we wished to do was to withdraw at the earliest possible moment. For two and a half years, until September, 1947, the United States held south Korea under military occupation, refraining from building any Korean army and

refusing to permit establishment of any Korean government, while we sought a joint agreement with Russia for withdrawal. This failing, the question was turned over to the United Nations. After the Republic of Korea was inaugurated, American policy again was to keep the Republic so weak that there would be no possibility of charges that we were attempting to build through it a military base from which to attack Russia. The Republic was warned that any movement north of the 38th Parallel, even to repel attacks, would lead instantly to a cessation of all American aid. The only weapons supplied to the army of the Republic were light arms sufficient to put down guerrilla uprisings within the country. Repeated pleas of President Syngman Rhee for tanks, artillery, and fighting planes were brushed aside. Thus, confronting the formidable fighting machine of north Korea was only an ill-armed force in south Korea. The last American troops (except for a 500-man military advisory force) were withdrawn on June 29, 1949.

(5) The weakness of the position of the Republic of Korea was accentuated by official and unofficial indications from the United States that our government did not intend to defend the Republic. In January and February, 1950,

Secretary Acheson informed Congressional committees that there was “no moral obligation” and “no commitment” to support Korea. Authoritative spokesmen—including Secretary Acheson in his January 12, 1950, speech to the National Press Club—made it clear that the American “defense line” in the Pacific ran down through the main islands of Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines—leaving Korea outside. Underscoring this apparent fact was President Truman’s decision in January of this same year not to defend Formosa. To the Kremlin it must have appeared that the Republic of Korea was not only hopelessly weak militarily but also had been diplomatically abandoned.

(6) Paradoxically, it was not only the weakness but also the strength of the Republic of Korea which led to the attack upon it. The Communist propaganda line in Asia has been that imperialistic, capitalistic democracy is dedicated to the enslavement of the masses for the benefit of a ruling class; whereas the people’s democracy (Communism) is dedicated to overthrowing the master class for the benefit of the farmers and workers. To this propaganda the remarkable democratic success achieved by the Republic of Korea was an effective and unanswerable refutation. The Republic of Korea,

accordingly, had to be destroyed because it was (in Soviet opinion) intolerably successful. It was this success which led Paul Hoffman, Director of the ECA, in December, 1948, to call the Republic "a bastion of democracy in Asia"; and which led John Foster Dulles, in his speech on July 4, 1950, to explain the Communist attack by saying: "The society was so wholesome that it could not be overthrown from within."

The clearest fact in relation to the democratic-Communist struggle over Korea is that in five years of strenuous effort the Communists were not able to make any headway in winning over the twenty millions of south Koreans. Despite the mountainous terrain, the Communists were not even able to stir up any considerable amount of guerrilla opposition to the Government. Never did Communist guerrillas hold any large area in south Korea, as, for example, they were so notably able to do in Greece. The loyalty of the masses of south Koreans to their own elected democracy was never shaken.

Politically, south Koreans confounded even their friendly critics, many of whom had feared that a full generation of Japanese domination had sapped their ability for self-government. In their first election—on May 10, 1948—92.5% of all eligible voters took part in selecting mem-

bers for their 200-man National Assembly. In the election of May 30, 1950, some 86% of all eligible voters selected 210 assemblymen from a list of 2,052 candidates. Ray Richards, correspondent for INS, who lost his life in the first wave of the Communist attack, sent back a dispatch estimating that some 150 members of the new Assembly were supporters of President Rhee. Rhee's chief opponents, the Democratic Nationalist Party, suffered a reduction from 70 members in the first Assembly to 27 in the second. And all of Rhee's bitterest opponents in the first Assembly (Paik Nam-Whoon, Kim Jun-Nyun, Suk Sang-II, and Ra Yong-Kyun) were defeated. By the test of the polls (democracy's fundamental test) the new Republic of Korea was shown to have the strong allegiance of its people.

Other achievements of the Republic are equally impressive. The estimated 70% of adult illiteracy left by the Japanese was reduced to about 30%, despite the facts that the former Japanese teachers had to be replaced by new Korean trainees and that the old Japanese school books had to be replaced with newly written and published Korean books. Women were granted full legal equality with men. The Associated Press, in semi-annual reviews of

world-wide censorship conditions granted to the Republic of Korea the treasured accolade of being among the select half-dozen nations granting freest access to the news and fullest freedom in reporting it. The Republic's police have been damned by some critics on the grounds that "fully half of them are men who served under the Japanese and retain the old methods of dealing with the populace;" but perhaps it is even more significant that in its two short years of opportunity the Republic recruited and trained enough policemen in western ways and psychology to replace half its old police force with new men indued with the spirit of public service. From my personal knowledge of Lee Ho, the 35-year-old lawyer who headed the national police, I know that he was doing his best to thoroughly democratize the police force.

Economically, the Republic steadily continued to fight its way out of the difficulties caused by the 38th Parallel division (which cut the industrial north off from the agricultural south) and by the three-year stagnation resulting from military occupation and consequent freezing of most normal economic processes. With the "pump-priming" effects of \$140,000,000 in ECA funds through June 30, 1950, Korean administrators and industrialists, with ECA advice,

were able to achieve a food surplus to export 100,000 tons of rice; to step up manufacturing output 92% higher in December, 1949, than it was in December, 1948; to reduce the excess of imports over exports from a quarterly average of \$47,319,000 in 1947 to \$23,037,000 in the fourth quarter of 1949; and to counter inflationary trends sufficiently so that the Won in circulation fell from its all-time high of 73 billions in February, 1950, to a low of 57 billions four months later. For the fiscal year 1951, Congress appropriated \$100 million, which was to be used largely to finance long-term basic industrial developments.

Perhaps the greatest single achievement of the Republic was its land-reform program. Some American proponents of Asian land reform appear to forget all about democracy when they discuss this subject. These critics "demanded" instant abolition of the landlord-tenant system as "the price of continued American support," as though the President of the Republic should arrogate to himself dictatorial power, seize the land from its owners, and distribute it to tenant farmers. As a matter of fact, the Republic of Korea, being a democracy, dealt with the problem just as our American Congress deals with similar problems. As might be expected,

the first National Assembly contained a majority of landlords and their sympathizers—for these men comprised the educated, articulate, and accustomed leadership of the villages. Land reform meant simply that these legislators would have to vote away the property which had been their families' chief props for generations. Despite this fact, they worked away in committees on the problem for over a year, and in May, 1950, passed a land reform bill which provided for the sale of all lands owned by absentee landlords to their present tenant occupants for a portion of the annual crop, payable over a period of five years. Sale of these lands, which had already started, would have reduced farm tenantry in Korea far below the percentage figure for many states of the United States.

In summation, then, the Red army struck in force against the Republic of Korea for the following reasons: (1) Korea is of great strategic military value in north Asia, providing a good base from which to launch an attack upon Japan and southeast Asia; (2) Russian foreign policy long has aimed to secure possession of Korea; (3) the puppet regime in north Korea was militarily strong and well propagandized; (4) the Republic of Korea seemed too weak militarily to be able to resist an attack; (5)

American authoritative statements indicated that we would not defend Korea; and (6) the success of democracy in south Korea constituted an intolerable refutation of the Communist propaganda line in Asia.

In view of American failure to arm south Korea adequately and considering that our defense line excluded the Republic of Korea, why did President Truman so promptly and decisively order all-out American resistance to the Communist attack? The question mystified the Kremlin so much that its propaganda mills were silent for a full 36 hours after the President's announcement. The answer lies in the nature of the attack itself and in the delicately balanced political and military position of all Asia.

The attack of June 25, 1950, will be recorded by historians as the great crystallizing event of these postwar years. This is the first time in its 30-year history that the Communist Empire has deliberately challenged the free world by an armed assault. Since the Republic of Korea had been established under United Nations auspices, it was peculiarly a ward of the democratic world, and the attack could only be interpreted as a decisive test of the ability and will of the democracies to unite in resistance to armed aggression. The shock caused by the attack is illus-

trated by the fact that within 24 hours after it occurred the Security Council of the United Nations was able to convene and its members already had instructions from their Governments as to how to vote. The Communist Empire (by the same kind of miscalculation that marked the Japanese and Nazi dictatorships) had issued a challenge which could not be ignored.

Aside from the world-wide implications of this appeal to force, the effect in Asia was crucial. The United States has been exercising moral suasion upon the peoples of Asia to resist Communism and accept democracy. The big unanswered question was the degree to which the United States would help them to fend off Communism if a crisis arose. The issuance of the White Paper on China, and the subsequent collapse of the Nationalist Government, were disturbing indications to Asian peoples that perhaps the United States would resist Communist aggression only with complaints and excuses. When eleven members of Congress traveled through the Far East in October and November, 1949, they found political leaders everywhere asking them: "What will the United States do about Korea?" In Asian eyes, the United States was clearly committed to support the Republic of Korea, and, if we had not done so, faith in

our willingness or ability to check Communist expansion would have dissolved. The defense of Korea became directly a defense of democracy in all Asia and indirectly a defense of freedom all over the world. Faced with such conditions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department could not but advise President Truman that this was the time and place for a decisive stand.

From less influential quarters, this advice had been given over and over before. Senators William Knowland, Styles Bridges and Alexander Smith, and Congressman Walter Judd, had repeatedly pleaded for realistic aid for the endangered democracies that lay in the path of Russia's Asian advance. More specifically, in the September 2, 1949, issue of *Periscope on Asia*, I wrote: "Korea will stand in the annals of the twentieth century as the place in which Communism was finally halted and turned back in Asia—just as in the sixteenth century it was the place in which Japan's all-out bid for world conquest was defeated."

In order to indicate the trend of thinking of those who deprecated the "wait till the dust settles" type of foreign policy for the Far East, the *Periscope on Asia* issue of October 14, 1949, may be quoted extensively. This, then, is how

the Korean situation appeared in informed circles eight months before the Communist attack:

How close is war in Korea? This is a question receiving increasingly serious consideration from many quarters.

The United Nations *ad hoc* committee on October 3 adopted a resolution (by a vote of 44 to 6, with 5 abstentions) favoring a continuance of the U. N. Commission on Korea, and defining its first duty as follows: "(a) observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea. . ."

The Chinese Ambassador to Korea, Shao Yu-lin, in an October 10 statement, warned: "A great many Korean Communist troops, under Moscow's orders, have been and still are taking part in the Communist rebellion against the Chinese Government. It is not at all impossible that the Chinese Communists may in the foreseeable future extend in return their cooperation to their comrades in Northern Korea in a common attempt to invade southern Korea."

And President Syngman Rhee, in a United Press interview on October 7, said: "People in the north urged me to give them a radio broadcast message asking the loyal Koreans in the north to arise and overthrow the Communist regime. Then they would expect us to join them. I am sure that we could take Pyongyang, the northern capital, in three days. And an all-Korean border with Manchuria would be easier to defend than the 38th Parallel. Then why not? Because the United Nations and United States have warned that we might in a hot-headed foolish way start a world war. So we are still trying to be patient and get our Communist problem settled with the world problem."

To Koreans in Korea, the situation looks like this: After the Communist victory in China is fully consolidated, it will be but a matter of time until the Chinese and Korean Communists, coordinated under Moscow's orders, launch a full-scale attack against the Republic. When that attack comes it will probably prove irresistible unless definite help should be provided by the United States.

Will the United States extend such help? Koreans wonder. They cite the abandonment of China, made explicit in the White Paper. They worry about the slowness of Congress to pass the Korean aid bill. They are aware of the recurrence of statements by American public spokesmen indicating that the American defense line extends from Japan, through Okinawa, down to the Philippines, thus leaving Korea in Russian hands.

Looking at China, if no further, it is evident that Communist power in Asia is still growing. American help, then, to the anti-Communist democratic forces must also increase. Unless added help does come, the Republic of Korea can see no advantage in waiting passively for the inevitable end.

While this line of reasoning leads to but one conclusion, there is another set of considerations that counsel caution—and it is these factors which led President Rhee to conclude that his government is “still trying to be patient.”

(1) The United Nations has overwhelmingly reiterated its full support of the Republic of Korea for three successive years. In view of this fact, Russia may fear to launch an attack across the 38th Parallel lest it might prove “the straw that breaks the camel's back” and precipitate war.

(2) The United States is slowly but surely crystalliz-

ing a policy of preventing any further Communist conquests in the Far East.

(3) Despite the economic hardships and military dangers of division, the Republic of Korea has demonstrated its ability to survive and even to improve its position, while waiting for the world's democracies to unite in hurling back the Soviet tide of aggression.

Despite the horror of atomic warfare and the desperate eagerness of the world's peoples for peace, it may be that the situation in Asia has already advanced so far as to make World War III inevitable. Consider these factors:

(1) Russia has already gained so much in Asia (just as Japan had by 1941) that it simply cannot yield its vast gains without fighting to try to preserve them.

(2) These gains by Russia are already so great that the area of freedom in Asia and around the world cannot be defended unless Soviet power is dislodged from its more advanced bastions.

(3) If these two premises are true, Russia cannot retreat and we cannot permit her to stay where she is (let alone advance further), so that war is inevitable.

This is essentially the situation, in regard to Japanese conquests, that existed in 1941 and caused the impasse in the Washington conferences that were still going on when Pearl Harbor was attacked. The parallel between 1941 and 1949 is dismally apparent from a study of Asia's map.

The gravity of the problem was stressed by Secretary Dean Acheson in his Letter of Transmittal of the White Paper on China, in which he wrote:

"One point, however, is clear. Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's neighbors . . . international peace and security" would

be endangered. The language is closely parallel to Cordell Hull's warnings to Japan.

The decision on whether to retreat still further or finally to hold firm cannot be much longer delayed.

To many American newspaper readers, it may have seemed that war broke out suddenly on June 25, with only loud words and distant rumblings before that date. Actually, there had been almost countless skirmishes, reminiscent of the raids on the American frontier in pioneer days. A brief list of guerrilla attacks across the 38th Parallel during a period of three weeks in January-February, 1950, will indicate clearly the state of terror that prevailed.

Jan. 19: Seven groups of north Korea guerrillas attacked Republic troops at Chiarimi, fighting continuing from 8:00 P.M. until 6:00 the following morning.

Jan. 20: At 9:30 A.M., some 50 north Korean guerrillas attacked Limjai Myun and were repulsed after they suffered one killed.

Jan. 21: At 2:00 A.M., 40 raiders armed with M-1 and M-G rifles invaded Chipum Myun.

Jan. 22: Republic forces attacked a rebel stronghold at Sukbo Myun, killing ten guerrillas with a loss of one dead and one wounded.

Jan. 22: Twelve Communist raiders swept

into Rokchun Myun at 1:00 A.M., stealing a store of polished rice.

Jan. 22: Just before dawn, about 100 Communists swooped down upon the town of Chungpyungri and fired the headquarters of the Chungpyung army unit. In an hour of fighting, three guerrillas and six Republic troops were killed, with six more captured.

Jan. 22: In a 40-minute action just past noon, 20 Communist rebels who attacked across the 38th Parallel line at Madapri were driven back. Three of the guerrillas were killed and one southern Korean policeman was wounded.

Jan. 22: An attack with light machine guns upon Republic Army positions on Mt. Eunpa, launched at 11:00 P.M., was repulsed without loss.

Jan. 30: Republic troops attacked a rebel stronghold in Chayang Myun at 3:00 P.M., killing two Communists and capturing ten. According to one of the prisoners, Communist guerrillas in the area numbered 160.

Jan. 30: At 11:30 P.M., a group of 20 Communists set fire to the town hall in Tanyang Myun, then fled, pursued by troops of the 23rd Regiment.

Jan. 31: Some 70 Communists swept into Yungil Myun at 2:00 A.M., burned 20 houses,

killed 18 townsmen, and captured two more before being driven off.

Jan. 31: North Korean guerrillas attacked Chiam Ri at 6:00 P.M., in considerable force; five were killed before they retired.

Feb. 4: At 10:10 P.M., 40 armed raiders swept into Namchung Myun and set fire to houses.

Feb. 4: At Songra Myun, 50 Communist rebels attacked at 9:40 P.M., burning 50 houses and killing 13 townsmen before they were driven off.

Feb. 4: Approximately a company of north Korean guerrillas invaded Changsoo Myun and were repulsed, with one Communist killed.

Feb. 7: 17 Communist rebels were killed in fighting with the 25th Regiment, Republic of Korea, around Changsoo Myun.

Feb. 8: 25 Communist raiders invaded Chaisan Myun and killed two civilians.

This catalog of attacks is but a sample of the raids against the Republic of Korea—some with forces as large as 4,000 men—which continued right up to the June 25th assault.

2

FERMENT IN ASIA

THE SIX REASONS FOR THE COMMUNIST ATTACK upon Korea, previously summarized, represent, of course, a simplification of many complex factors. As these are discussed in more detail in successive chapters, the postwar situation of all Asia needs to be viewed as a backdrop. For the Korean issue can never be considered properly in isolation. Far from existing in a vacuum, Korea has been in a very real sense the cross-roads of Asia.

The diversity of Far Eastern peoples and the differences dividing them are as great as in other sections of the world, yet the interrelationships are of basic importance. Whether one looks at the cultural patterns of the past or at the dangerous unrest of the present, the destinies of the billion inhabitants of the Orient are closely intertwined. This fact, together with much else about Asia, has not been sufficiently taken into account in the formation and administration of American Far Eastern policy.

The surrender of Japan, sealed on the *Missouri* in Yokohama Harbor on September 2, 1945, presented to the United States and our allies a situation we were sadly unready to meet. First Western colonialism and then Japanese conquest had fastened upon the Asian peoples patterns of external control beneath which seethed a swirling ferment of ill-defined but dangerous discontent. Nationalist leaders all the way from Korea in north Asia to India and Indonesia in the south were determined upon independence. Upon this foundation fact, however, the structure of government was not yet ready to be erected. The leaders had been schooled in agitation and rebellion, not in administration. When Japan collapsed, they had not yet worked out the programs (and in some instances not

even the policies) of the free governments they expected to head.

The masses of the people—largely illiterate and without experience in nation-wide cooperation—wanted food, freedom, and the fullness of life which they dimly realized the new technologies of the West made possible. To a very considerable extent the mind of Asia was set in a negative mold: anti-Japanese, anti-colonial, and anti-landlord. It was far easier for them to know what they were against than it was for them to spell out in any detail what they were for.

The defeat of Japanese militarism removed the lid. Discontent boiled into revolt: against still identifiable and detested masters such as the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indochina; against presumed internal oppressors, as reflected in the rebellions in China, the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya; against new patterns that failed (at least immediately) to solve old problems, as in India and Pakistan; and (most frustrating of all) against international agreements that still postponed independence, as in Korea.

The United States, as the power which had carried the brunt of the war against Japan and which as postwar ruler of Japan inevitably be-

came the custodian of the new order in Asia, was ill equipped to deal with the many problems which suddenly demanded immediate solution. This was partly because our attention was primarily fixed upon Europe, where Washington felt the peace must be won first, as the war had been. Partly it was because neither our policy-makers nor our people had ever had extensive, detailed or intimate knowledge of or interest in the Far East. And, in part, the reason for our unpreparedness in Asia was our failure at the end of the war to realize that the Soviet Union was an enemy to be contained rather than a friendly ally with which we could negotiate frankly and confidently. Even more basic, however, was the fact that Asian discontent was the result of over a century of exploitative policies which had created problems and attitudes we had neither the wisdom nor the power to eliminate. Far from having a clean slate on which we could write new policies for the Far East, we had to deal with deep-seated conditions of suspicion and ill will.

The Soviet Union was far more free to deal with the situation in Asia than was the United States. The basic reason is that Russia's policy was the simple one of stimulating and increasing the discontent, whereas ours was the prob-

lem of solving it. The purposes of the Soviet Union could best be achieved by accentuating the hatred of Western colonial powers, of landlords, and of those native leaders whose instincts and education inclined them to favor democratic free enterprise. The negative-mindedness of the Asian masses played directly into Russian hands, for this negativism could be directed to destruction of old colonialism, old landlordism, and newly created democratic governments. Communist organizers quickly gathered their forces to take advantage of the increasing disorganization.

Another reason for impressive Soviet victories should not be overlooked. Appalled critics of the democratic failure to contain postwar Communism sometimes assert that the Kremlin clique is "smarter" than the more prosaic diplomats of the West. Actually, the reason is not that the Muscovites are more intelligent; it is because they are less moral. Communist successes have been accomplished by deceit and ruthlessness which the *mores* of the United States, Great Britain and France cannot encompass. We could make agreements with the Russians at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam without our leaders being aware that to the Soviets an agreement was merely a tactical maneuver to be

regarded precisely as military men regard an advance by a tank corps camouflaged as haystacks. In this view, deceitfulness itself becomes moral, since it hastens and eases the accomplishment of a desirable goal. Similarly, Communists in eastern Europe and China could and did woo popular favor by murdering landowners and turning their property over to the tenant farmers. This ruthless mass murder was not only not regarded as shameful; it was, to the contrary, acclaimed proudly (sometimes even by apologists in our own country) as praiseworthy "land reform." By such methods of deceit and cruelty the Communist Empire was able to provide immediate, if illusory, "benefits" which the morals of democratic nations could not so expeditiously produce.

The greater morality of the Western powers, however, has been more superficial and formal than we like to recall. We could not brutally order the starvation of millions, as was done in Russia's Ukraine and in Red China's northern provinces. Nevertheless, we could and did participate in a type of chauvinistic racism which has produced results we long shall have cause to regret. We could and did practice the softer forms of deception, which consist of looking the other way to avoid seeing unpleasant facts

(which has characterized most of our dealings with Asia); of telling only conveniently selected segments of the truth (as in the White Paper on China); of seeking a profit even at the patent cost of the welfare of our own and other countries (as in the pre-Pearl Harbor trade with Japan and in much of the trade with Russia during the semi-truce of the cold war); and of trading off the rights of other peoples on the presumption that “the greatest good of the greatest number” would be served (as in the Yalta concessions of Chinese territory, railways, and ports).

As a result of many factors, including the American, Australian, and British South African Oriental Exclusion Acts, the extraterritoriality and colonial policies of Western powers, and the internal and external conditions that helped to slow the industrialization of Asia, the Far East developed through the twentieth century a dangerous and unstable regional inferiority complex. So many tourists, businessmen and GIs have taken to and brought back reinforced the stereotype of Asian peoples as inherently inferior that we may have forgotten the pride that all through the nineteenth century led the Oriental peoples to regard themselves as the custodians of civilization, and we Westerners as a new incursion of barbarians. As a reminder,

we might glance at this reaction of a Chinese when the first white men appeared in his country:

These "Ocean Men," as they are called, are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses. The lower part of their faces, the backs of their hands, and, I understand, their entire bodies are covered with a mat of curly hair, much as are the monkeys of the southern forests. But the strangest thing about them is that, although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men. The most bestial of peasants is far more human, although these Ocean Men go from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of scholarship and are in some respects remarkably clever. It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being.

However, under the humiliating regime of colonialism, and as the Orient came to be aware of how greatly the West excelled in material developments, the pride in ancient culture gave way to a gnawing fear that the old Asian civilization had decayed from dry rot. Like other politico-psychological tensions, this self-questioning expressed itself alternately in fierce assertiveness and in spells of national abnegation. Japan in defeat has offered a prime example of the latter reaction. The Korean and Indonesian independence movements well illustrated the former. China and the Philippines have fluctu-

ated nervously between the two states of mind.

This psychological condition in Asia became an explosive threat more damaging than our diplomats realized. More than an ECA or Point Four program of aid to underdeveloped areas was required to deal with such a situation. What the postwar ferment in Asia required was a depth of understanding based upon an honest realization and frank admission of past mistakes, coupled with an intelligent respect for the humanity and culture of the East. Instead, the tensions were compounded by the Administration's reiteration that "Europe is more important," "Europe must come first," and "The issues in Asia are far from clear." Only hesitantly, and then only in a dribble, was even the ECA extended to Asia, and Point Four, arising late as a topic of discussion, was not seriously invoked.

At the Baguio Economic Conference of eleven Asian nations, held in November-December, 1947, President Manual Roxas of the Philippines sharply raised the "persistent and intriguing question—whether a one world concept is limited to the nations of Europe and the Western Hemisphere." As though in answer, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, addressing the Columbia Law School alumni, charged: "The

free world is now in the desperate position of a man who has gangrene in both legs—in western Europe and in Asia. As a doctor, our government is telling the world we have a very good cure for gangrene but we will apply it to one leg only, while the other leg destroys the patient.”

This was the condition under which Communism and democracy confronted one another in the Far East. It may be stated flatly that Asian peoples are not attracted to Communism. This is partly because their values are spiritual, not material; partly because they are farmers, and Communism was tailored particularly for industrial workers; and partly because, being farmers, they are far too individualistic to welcome a totalitarian mold. Neither, however, could they be ready, overnight, to adopt Western-style democracy. Far from having been bred on Lockian concepts of equality, their Confucian teaching was respect for authority, for wealth, for position, for learning, and for age. Moreover, they lacked the literacy and means of communication upon which an informed electorate depends. Yet, caught as they were in the middle of a colossal struggle between democracy and Communism, they were forced to choose. And confronted as they were

by Russian strength and determination on the one hand and American weakness and indecision on the other, many of them through the postwar years began to reason: "Since we cannot withstand Russia without American help, and since the United States seems unwilling to aid us, we shall probably fall under Russian control sooner or later. Perhaps it would be better for us to go in now, willingly, rather than wait to be knocked down and dragged in later." The White Paper on China, painfully spelling out American abandonment of an anti-Communist government which we nevertheless continued to recognize, greatly accentuated this trend of thought.

So illogical are the postwar dealings with the Far East, and so desirable is it that we American people understand the feelings of the Asian peoples caught in their dilemma between alien powers, that it seems worth while to present the issue in the only form adequate to explain it—in the topsy-turvey logic invented by Lewis Carroll for his inverted world of Wonderland. Let us then, listen for a moment at the rabbit hole:

"The truth is," said Alice firmly, "that people 'go Communist' simply because they are pulled so hard they cannot help themselves."

"Pish and tush!" exclaimed Humpty-Dumpty. "Pushing and pulling is no way for adults to behave. If they have feet, their feet are for standing; and if they have understanding, there are some things they cannot be pushed into even if there is too little of pulling the other way on the part of someone else." Humpty-Dumpty looked very proud, as though he had said more in one sentence to explain China, and Korea, and Greece, and Czechoslovakia and Finland than Alice had been able to do in the last half-hour.

The Red Queen snored happily in one corner, and the White Queen stirred uneasily in another. The Mad Hatter looked more bewildered than ever, and the March Hare helped himself guiltily to another cup of tea.

"The situation on Earth," Alice said, now thankful indeed that her rabbit hole had led her so far and so safely underground, "is not at all like that here in Wonderland. On Earth there are Big Powers and Little Nations. And the Little Nations have had their feet stepped on so hard and so often that now they are quite, quite too tender for standing on. They must be kept constantly in warm water to ease their pain, and sometimes, you must know, the water gets very hot."

"Unless a Nation has feet," said Humpty-Dumpty disdainfully, "it is no Nation at all. Let it stand, and understand, and stand alone. Or else it may as well crawl into the pocket of a Big Power where it can sit and light."

"Satellite, you mean," said Alice wisely, "and that is just what many of them have become. But being pocketed, you know, deprives one dreadfully of the power to move about at one's own free will."

The White Queen perspired and the Red Queen smiled in her sleep, while the Mad Hatter and the

March Hare gazed vacantly into one another's eyes.

"The trouble is," said Alice, before Humpty-Dumpty could think of what to say next, "the Big Powers control the channels of trade, and own the raw materials and the manufacturing plants, and have the armies and the navies and the airplanes. That," she explained, "is why they are Big. It has very little, really, to do with size."

"I know," said Humpty-Dumpty. "There used to be several of them, but now there are only two and a half. And half a Power is really uncertain as to whether it is actually a Power or only a pow."

"I see you are learning," said Alice, while the Red Queen stirred uneasily in her sleep. "And the next lesson is to understand what happens when one of the Big Powers acts like a Power, and the other one begins to act as though it, too, were getting tender feet."

"You mean," asked Humpty-Dumpty, "that its understanding seems to be weak?"

"Yes," said Alice, "but also that it seems uncertain whether it can stand alone, or sometimes whether it can even stand. Then, no matter how Big it is, it begins to act like a Little Nation. And that, you know, makes the Little Nations in its pockets begin to feel very confined and confused."

"And the next thing that happens," Humpty-Dumpty added, "is that the Little Nations begin to clamber out and climb into the pockets of the Big Power that acts as though it is Big."

"Actually," explained Alice, "they are pulled so hard that they cannot help going unless the other Big Power is willing to pull back."

"But why," the White Queen asked shakily, "does not the other Big Power begin to pull back?"

"Because," said Alice, "it would have to take its feet

out of the warm water and stand firmly on solid ground, in order to make a hard pull. And the warm water feels so good, and the firm ground is so hard, that it seems quite unwilling to make the change."

"But," said the Mad Hatter, rolling his eyes, "the Little Nations will soon all be in the pockets of the Big Power that knows it is Big!"

"Yes," cried the March Hare, spilling his tea, "and the feet of the uncertain Big Power will soon be so tender that it cannot stand at all."

"And then," Humpty-Dumpty added sadly, "it will actually be a Little Nation, too, and there will only be one Big Power left. And all the other Nations will be so crowded in its pockets that they will scarcely be able to breathe."

"And that," said Alice, "is why I have decided to stay right here in the rabbit hole, at least until the tender-footed Big Power gets back on its own feet, and begins to take a Firm Stand. It could really do quite a job of pulling if it would only try."

At this the Red Queen yawned and stood up. "If you will pardon me," she said, "I will go now and turn up the heat. You know, I have to keep the water attractively warm until the time comes to make it really hot."

Sadly enough, the Red Queen continued to heat the water until it came to a boil in Korea, and the White Queen continued to keep her feet in her own comfortably warm water, until (as we learned in the Korean fighting) they were almost too tender to permit a firm stand. Actually, what the United States had painfully to achieve was to grow out of the concept of itself

as an island located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. We had to outgrow the habit of dabbling absent-mindedly in Asia with our left hand while our main attention and endeavors were centered elsewhere. While our commitments in Europe and our domestic political problems proved far more interesting both to our government officials and our people at large, this shift of view came slowly and late. As a nation, however, we have had far more to do with the Far East than the hypothetical man-in-the-street readily realizes.

3

PATTERNS OF "COLONIALISM"

THE INTEREST OF AMERICANS IN THE ORIENT antedates the birth of our nation. Before the Constitution was drawn, at least nine voyages had been made to the Far East. Before Washington gave his "farewell" advice to avoid entangling alliances, American ships were enriching their New England owners by trade with China, Java, Sumatra, Siam, India, the Philippines, and the Iles de France.

The first treaty between the United States

and China, negotiated by Caleb Cushing, and signed in 1844, set the pattern for our later general policies in the Orient. The treaty followed the "Opium War" of 1839-42, by which England forced the Chinese government to legalize the sale of opium, to give up Hong Kong, and to open various ports to English ships. The United States had no military bases in the Far East, nor could it take any military action without the difficult task of securing prior approval from Congress. Hence, there was improvised for securing peacefully whatever advantages other nations were able to extort by threats or force a device called the most-favored-nation doctrine. Cushing persuaded the Chinese Emperor to accept a clause in the treaty providing that the United States would be freely granted whatever concessions were yielded to any other power. Armed with this proviso, the United States was able thereafter to deal with China on a basis of conciliation and friendship, merely accepting as our just due our share of privileges resulting from the aggressive policies of more assertive nations.

This policy of passively waiting for spoils to drop into our laps was not consolidated, however, until after a struggle with the more forceful of the merchant princes who were reaping

rich harvests from the unprotected Chinese. An American trading company seized the principal port of Formosa and secured the protection of a detachment of Marines. Washington thereupon warned them that Congress would not approve of this action, and the seizure was balked.

China reacted to pressure from the West with an agrarian revolution, establishing a new Taiping Government that abolished slavery, redistributed the land among the peasants, and promised: "All shall eat food, all shall have clothes, money shall be shared, in all things shall there be equality." In the face of this movement, which started in 1848, the Manchu Dynasty collapsed, and during a period of twelve years the Taipings extended their rule over most of China. The possibilities for democratic progress, elevation of the Chinese standard of living, and consequently for development of a genuinely healthy trade with the West, were enormous. But the immediate threat to the slave and opium trade was of more concern to British and American traders. American and French forces, uniting with the British navy, put down the rebellion and restored the pliant Manchus to power. The price for this assistance was an additional surrender of Chinese sovereignty to

the West. The four major concessions wrung from the Chinese by their "benefactors" were (1) acceptance of the principle of extraterritoriality; (2) restriction of Chinese customs duties to 5% *ad valorem*; (3) control of Chinese customs revenues by the foreign powers; and (4) legalization of the opium trade.

The opening of Japan to the West in 1854 by Admiral Perry was followed by the garrisoning of Western troops in Japanese cities and control of Japan's tariffs by the Western powers. In 1868 the foreigners, led by the British, fomented and supported the revolution that restored the Meiji dynasty from its seclusion in Kyoto, re-instituted Emperor worship, subordinated the 200 feudal principalities to the throne, and placed the Samurai warrior class in power. This was done in the interests of providing a single central government with which the trading powers could deal. They did not realize they had unleashed a dragon they would soon be unable to control.

Continuing their advances, Americans in 1882 opened Korea, "The Hermit Kingdom," to Western penetration, and in return for the isolationism they had destroyed signed a treaty (in 1883) with the King of Korea, providing for mutual aid in case either country should be un-

justly treated by another. By this action the United States unwittingly placed itself in the middle of a rivalry that was soon to dominate all north Asia—the struggle for power between Japan and Russia. In Japan, the Samurais were rapidly developing their military power and reviving their centuries-old dream of world-wide conquest. Meanwhile, Russia had extorted from China the largest single prize secured by any Western power, the Siberian maritime provinces. Both Russia and Japan realized that the Korean peninsula was the military key to control of north Asia, and commenced maneuvering for it. The first blows were struck by the Japanese, who in 1895 murdered the Korean patriot, Queen Min, and in a whirlwind war forced China to withdraw its support from Korea.

The gathering strength of both Japan and Russia was causing increasing concern to the British. Their first move was to encourage the hesitant United States to attack Spain and to take over the Philippine Islands, thus irretrievably involving American interests in the Far East. The effects of this action were almost immediately demonstrated. A new nationalist revolutionary movement in China, led by the Boxers, threatened Western privileges, and the United States, with its armed forces now in the

Philippines, was induced to supply the troops needed to cut through to Peking and smash the rebellion. England's next move was negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, in 1902. Since she had to face Russia in both Europe and Asia, and Japan only in the latter area, it seemed wise to encourage Japanese expansion at Russian expense. Theodore Roosevelt added his support, and the Japanese launched a surprise attack against Russia in 1904. Roosevelt then sent his Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, to Tokio to reach a secret agreement with Katsura, the Foreign Minister, offering American concurrence in the seizure of Korea in return for a Japanese promise not to attack the Philippine Islands. Not only was the treaty of 1883 forgotten, but Roosevelt in effect told the Korean King that the matter was "none of his business" when he sought to send emissaries to the treaty session in Portsmouth that formalized the Japanese acquisition of a Protectorate over Korea.

The impracticality of this type of power-politics log-rolling was soon demonstrated. By 1907 the Japanese and Russians had signed an agreement in which each recognized the position of the other in their respective spheres, and united in blocking the efforts of American railroad in-

terests to buy a controlling interest in the South Manchurian Railroad. By this sequence of events, the dominant position established by the United States in Manchurian and Korean trade was ended.

The final disillusionment with America's whole course in north Asia up to this time was expressed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1910: "I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards Manchuria, if the Japanese insist on following a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England plus an army as good as that of Germany. The Open Door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future . . . but as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and Japan, the Open Door Policy . . . completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it and is willing to go to war rather than forgo its intention."

Two world wars, and the events leading up to them, subjected our Asiatic policies to considerable strain. Having remitted our share of the indemnities exacted from China following

the Boxer rebellion, we were committed to an amorphous friendship with that tortured land. Yet, we were inextricably a part of the power system based on special privileges there. Once again a people's revolution broke out in China, this time in 1911, and once again we were forced by prior commitments to stand aside from it. Women were unbinding their feet, and in 1912, seven years before the 19th Amendment was adopted in the United States, were demanding equal suffrage. Enthusiasm spread for modern education. Chinese nationalists decided that, instead of resisting the West, they would join it. Then came World War I, and Japan joined the Allies. Japan's main endeavors were devoted to taking for herself the extensive German holdings in China, and to presenting China with the Twenty-one Demands that would have made her a Japanese satellite. Woodrow Wilson was beguiled into supporting Japanese claims at Versailles, in the vain hope that once the League of Nations was established all wrongs could be righted and old pledges redeemed.

The major American counter-attack against the Japanese was led by Charles Evans Hughes, then Secretary of State, through the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22. Japan was forced to accept the short end of a 5-5-3

naval ratio with England and the United States. It was also forced to give up some of its territorial gains in China and to sign the Nine Power Pact guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China. But the effects of this diplomatic offensive were undermined by American businessmen, who developed a profitable trade with Japan that gave that country precisely what it needed to build up its military machine. And the benefits of the naval ratio agreement were nullified by an American promise not to fortify bases in the Pacific area from which Japan might be attacked—or a Japanese attack repelled.

By 1931 the Japanese were ready and struck in Manchuria, violating the Nine Power Pact, the Kellogg-Briand Anti-War Treaty of 1928, and its obligations under the League of Nations Charter. The League, however, was dominated by England and France, both of whom were delighted to see a new threat developing against Russia's eastern border. But little as the League was willing to do, the United States would do even less. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, declared that "reports from China do not offer grounds for noting any violation of the Kellogg Pact." When a League fact-finding mission was suggested, Secretary Stimson opposed it, italicizing his reason: "I deprecated

the proposal of sending by the League at that time an investigating commission to Manchuria *over and against the objection of Japan.*”* The strongest action he would take was “non-recognition” of the puppet state of Manchukuo.

Japan’s attack upon China in 1937 was strongly criticized in the United States, but during 1938 we provided Japan with 90.9% of her copper imports, 90.4% of her scrap iron and steel, 76.9% of her aircraft and plane parts imports, 65.6% of her petroleum needs, and many of her other sinews of war. This trade continued to the very eve of Pearl Harbor.

The outbreak of World War II brought a tremendous wave of new hope to the down-trodden peoples of all Asia. The war was manifestly a crusade on behalf of subject peoples, and the billion inhabitants of Asia regarded the United States as a prince in shining armor awakened from his long slumbers to rescue them at last. Smuggled copies of the Atlantic Charter and of Roosevelt’s promise of the Four Freedoms for all were passed about in remote villages. The first smashing successes of the Japanese persuaded only Aung San, the nationalist leader of Burma, Soekarno of Indonesia, Phibul Song-

* Henry L. Stimson, *Far Eastern Crisis*, 1936.

gram of Siam, and Subhas Chandra Bose of India to throw in their lot with the architects of the "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." The rest were confident that American strength would win the war, and that American idealism, as re-expressed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, would help them cast off the old status as colonials.

The wave of disillusionment that swept through Asia following the defeat of Japan has scarcely been paralleled in history. Every colonial people in the Far East—except the Filipinos, whose freedom was pledged—had demonstrated their complete separation from their rulers by standing aside as neutrals while the war went on. A brief glance at the various colonial areas will show why.

In Indochina the French colonial rulers had frankly sided with the Japanese invaders. French concern for their subjects is indicated in the fact that during 1943 they spent five times as much for opium to sell through the government monopoly as the total budget for schools, hospitals, and libraries. During forty years of French rule, 31 hospitals were built in Indochina and 81 prisons; while elementary education was provided for only 2% of the population.

The Dutch East Indies were successfully represented in official propaganda as "model

colonies.” During 300 years of Dutch rule, the Dutch East India Company averaged dividends at the rate of 18 per cent a year. In 1936, the European population of the colony constituted 0.5% of the population, but received 65% of the total income. Adults in Indonesia were 93% illiterate. While 70,000,000 Indonesians lived in squalid poverty, the income from the rich oil and rubber resources of the islands supported fully one-fifth of the population of Holland.

The story of English rule in Sumatra, Malaya, Borneo, Burma, and India parallels the French and Dutch exploitation, but was even more thorough. India, for instance, is a rich country of high cultural achievements. Yet the mass of its 390,000,000 people live in a depth of poverty unmatched elsewhere in the world. India’s high-grade iron-ore reserves are third in size among the nations of the world; its hydro-electric potential is second only to that of the United States; and its manganese production ranks third in the world. Indian cotton production is second among all nations, and it has a virtual monopoly in jute. Yet these resources have been drained off to England under a policy of blocking industrial development in India. England’s profits from India have been estimated at £150,000,000 annually, while, in 1931,

74% of the population of Bombay was living in one-room tenement apartments, under conditions so vile that half the babies died before they were one year old.

Japan, in its forty-year rule of Korea, systematically took over more than 80% of all industrial and commercial properties, and over 50% of all agricultural lands. Although Korea is one of the world's richest peninsulas, and in 1939 was third among all nations in its fisheries production, the Japanese drained off the wealth into their own coffers. To control the nationalist fervor of 4,000-year old Korea, the Japanese disarmed the people and established a police force numbering one to every 1000 inhabitants.

By contrast with these other colonial possessions, the American record in the Philippines was excellent. On July 4, 1946, our 48-year rule of the islands was ended with the establishment of complete independence. If we overlook the cruel three-year war in which we destroyed the Philippine independence movement led by Aguinaldo at the turn of the century, our record is one of consistent development under the guidance of superior administrators. Without being cynical, however, it is only fair to point out that there is a vast difference between the basic relationship of the huge and

wealthy United States with the tiny island group containing only 19,000,000 people and the relationship of little England and Holland with their vast and rich colonial empires. The United States had less temptation to resist. What the Philippines could produce was principally sugar, and this competed with the profitable sugar industries controlled by Americans in Hawaii, Cuba, and in our own West. Whereas there was every inducement of self-interest for English, French, Dutch, and Japanese to exploit their subject peoples, the chief advocates of Philippine independence included the American sugar trusts. Whatever ethical factors are involved here might be summarized in the fact that the interests of Filipino nationalists happily coincided with the interests of American capital.

Nevertheless, the billion inhabitants of Asia could and did compare the American rule of the Philippines with the record of European countries in the rest of the Far East. They could and did listen to reiterated American expressions of support for freedom and justice everywhere in the world. The result was the development of a legend of American benevolence that led to the highest expectations as American strength relentlessly pushed the Japanese out of the areas they had overrun.

The end of the war against Japan was the signal for the commencement of a series of local wars all through the Far East. In India the war was merely diplomatic, and was soon capped by success for the nationalists. On August 15, 1947, two Indian states formally assumed their independence, as full-fledged members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In determining why there are two, it is necessary to look back to the aftermath of World War I, when the nationalist movement in India achieved a notable Hindu and Moslem unity. At that time the English encouraged a fanatical Moslem named M. A. Jinnah, who led a determined movement for "Pakistan," or separation of the Moslems from the Hindus. Whatever the future fruits of this division may prove to be, it became an established fact, with Mr. Jinnah as Prime Minister of the two widely separated areas comprised in the new Moslem state.

In Indonesia, before the Dutch returned, the nationalists led by Soekarno (who had collaborated with the Japanese and refused to be apologetic about it) set up the Republic of Indonesia. The Queen agreed that this government should have complete independence internally, with Dutch guidance in its external

relations. After Dutch soldiers were back in the islands, however, armed with American equipment, disputes multiplied and quickly flared into savage fighting. British troops using American equipment spearheaded the Dutch attacks. Indonesians appealed to the United Nations and to the State Department, but the first response they got was a request by the State Department for the British to remove the "USA" insignia from their equipment. Even now, with the Indonesian Republic established, these facts are not forgotten.

The story in Indochina is somewhat similar. As a sop to the Chinese, Indochina was split in two along the 16th Parallel, with Chinese troops to accept the Japanese surrender in the north, and French and English troops in the south. The French administration, collaborating with the Japanese, had remained in office until March 9, 1945, at which time the Japanese took over. The Viet Minh, a Communist-controlled independence party established in 1939, proclaimed the Viet Nam Republic in the Chinese-occupied zone the week of the Japanese collapse, and by September 2, 1945, it was solidly in control, north and south. British troops began arriving in large numbers by September 12 and at once proceeded to destroy

the new government. By September 23 they were able to hand over the government buildings and at least nominal authority to the French. Instead of disarming the Japanese troops in Indochina, the British-French combination used them to fight the guerrilla soldiers of the Viet Nam Republic. The Chinese agreed to turn the northern zone back to the French in return for a French surrender of all extraterritorial rights in China, and for special privileges in shipping Chinese goods to the port of Haiphong. Meanwhile, the Viet Nam Communist forces, led by Ho Chi-minh (also called Nguyen Ai Quoc) continues its fight from the inland hills, as the United States helps France to maintain the anti-Communist government of the restored monarch, Bao Dai.

The situation of China is at the lowest ebb since its penetration by the West began. It was bled by twelve years of continuous warfare. At Yalta, with China not even represented, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin agreed that Russia would get Port Arthur and control of the South Manchurian Railway. After the collapse of Japan, Russian troops removed much of the machinery from the Manchurian factories, and turned key positions and captured Japanese arms over to the Chinese Communists. Then,

General George C. Marshall spent thirteen months in China, trying to force Chiang Kai-shek to yield to the Communist forces their basic demands, in order that a coalition government might be established. The United States offered China a \$500,000,000 loan if certain "reforms" were made in its government, but by July, 1947, the conditions were not met and the loan offer was withdrawn. Ruinous inflation, graft, internal strife, and continued Communist control would appear to be China's fate for the indeterminate future.

The occupation of Japan is often cited as an outstanding American success. MacArthur insisted that it be conducted by the Americans alone, keeping out the English and Australians in order to have a plausible excuse for keeping the Russians out, too. Emperor worship has been abolished, a democratic constitution adopted, and several general elections have been held. American experts and money are rehabilitating Japanese industry and working at the problem of restoring its proper share of world trade. War criminals were punished. Order and apparently good relations between the population and the army of occupation are maintained. The military caste and the business monopolies are systematically being liquidated. Except for

their ruined cities and loss of colonies, the Japanese people may be said to have won the war. How deep the reforms have gone and how thoroughly the old dream of conquest has been eradicated, only the future can reveal.

The Zaibatsu monopolies have been broken up, and their securities, valued at \$200,000,000, are currently held by the Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission. But a dilemma exists in that these securities must either be resold to the leading families of Japan (the War Lords) or else the properties will have to be nationalized, thus instituting an economic system that could easily become Communistic. A strong attack against measures leading toward economic democracy is being led by the conservative financier, Tanzan Ishibashi, with results that threaten the democratic gains made in Japan since the war's end. In the schools, despite the official banning of certain textbooks, there is actually very little supervision and much of the old-style education goes on. Politically, the backward trend is even more striking. The two parties that are making most rapid gains are the Liberal and Democratic Parties—both utilizing attractive names, but in fact, dominated by members of the old ruling order. These are all factors that are causing considerable concern

over the future of Japan and her role in Far Eastern politics.

Communist propaganda and Communist agents have made fruitful use of the distraught conditions in each of these Asian countries. To a dangerous extent they have been enabled to identify themselves with genuine nationalist movements, while the United States and its allies have been pictured as imperialistic forces of reaction. How deep this feeling has gone was revealed to me shockingly when I talked with a "liberal" Japanese school teacher from the northern Japanese provinces. "Many of our people believe," he said, "that the real reason you Americans oppose Communism is because you are afraid Russian industrialism will become a damaging competitor for world markets." In the face of this kind of reasoning among the one Oriental people subjected most closely to American supervision, it is apparent that we have a long way to go to rectify the grievous errors of the past.

4

OUR AILING DIPLOMACY

PEOPLES ALL OVER THE WORLD HAVE BEEN BEWILDERED by our diplomacy—our defeated enemies as well as our disillusioned friends. This country equipped and spearheaded the drive to win the war, but didn't know what to do with the peace. We rushed forth like St. George to slay the dragon of evil, but we came back more like a paunchy suburbanite, desirous of comfort and power but unwilling to keep in fighting trim. If the peoples of Asia emerged from the

war largely negative-minded, we came out of it with the vague affirmative hopefulness that much of the *status quo* could be maintained if only we would surrender those portions of it which the Communist Empire most vociferously demanded. This type of affirmation was not enough.

In my attendance at the United Nations I have felt an enormous pride in the United States because of the feelings of delegates from all parts of the free world that we Americans fundamentally stand for human decency and fair play. Despite dollar diplomacy, tariff barriers, and the growing concentration in our country of most of the world's gold and most technological consumer's goods, the representatives of the non-Communist nations freely indicate in smoking-room conversations their faith that the United States wants world stability based on justice more than it wants any special privileges for itself. It is this conviction (rather than the preponderant industrial and potential military strength of our country) which accounts for what the Soviet has called "the automatic majority" of the democracies in the United Nations. The achievement of unity among the free nations is partly a natural reaction against Russian aggression but also partly a tribute to

American intentions. If the little peoples of the world felt there were no real choice between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., the “automatic majority” in the General Assembly would never have been formed. But while we Americans may well feel proud of this confidence, we need in full humility to examine the reasons why we have not done more to fulfill the faith.

Even a hasty review of the nature and effects of American policies in Asia indicates that ethics have not been the lode star by which our national course has been guided. For this, however, our policy-makers can scarcely be blamed. Perhaps civilization has not yet developed to the point where ethics may be expected to have governance in the relations of nations. This stage can hardly be reached so long as insistence upon national sovereignty prevents the development of an effective body of international law. American global power emerged late in a world devoted to power politics. Perhaps duty to our country’s welfare demanded that our diplomats try to learn to play the same game. A review of the diplomatic history of the West in the East clearly shows, at any rate, that the United States has been but one among many (and certainly not the worst) in preferring “realism” to “idealism.”

When, however, we turn from the ethical approach and inquire simply whether American diplomacy has furthered the long-term interests of the United States in Asia, our responsible statesmen must submit to the charge of having failed even to exercise an enlightened selfishness. They failed in the long-held dream of creating a vast market for our exportable surplus; in 1935, for example, our entire trade with the billion Asiatics was less than with the eleven million Canadians. They did not secure special military advantages, for, as Pearl Harbor proved, our Pacific bastions were merely false facades. They did, for a time, create enormous prestige for the United States, based upon a belief in our special benevolence as a nation, but this belief crumbled in Asia under the hammering of Communist pressure while Washington waited passively for the dust to settle.

Consequently, our Asian policies had the effect of participation in the destruction of the age-old stability by a rapacious colonialism. We helped bring the East out of its old apathy and isolationism, but supported the system by which it has been looted and victimized. And when European colonialism was threatened by the far worse totalitarian aggression of Communism, we had neither policies nor effective

will to prevent these new deprivations. On the part of the American people as a whole and most of our officials, this has all been done in a spirit of blundering good will; the mistakes have largely been of the head rather than of the heart. But ignorance of life, like ignorance of the law, is not a very satisfactory excuse.

The American people are entitled to know why our diplomacy has blundered. Indeed, we must know, if the errors of the past are not to be carried forward into the future. One of the most disturbing reasons has proved to be the actual presence of treason in the very inner sanctuaries where our policies are formed. The trial and conviction of Alger Hiss (who was so important a figure that the organizational meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco was entrusted to him; and who was so intimately trusted that Supreme Court Justices testified for him and a Secretary of State "refused to turn his back" on him even after his conviction) greatly shook the confidence of the American people. The revelation that our topmost Atomic Research Council was penetrated by a Soviet spy was a debilitating shock. The close friendliness and association of John Carter Vincent, while Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, with Owen Lattimore—

whose defeatism concerning the future of anti-Communism in Asia became widely distilled through influential publications—is merely symptomatic of the point of view which led the State Department into one retreat after another in the face of Communist advances in the Far East.

One evening in Seoul, in the summer of 1946, I had a long conversation with the ranking State Department official in Korea, during which the current thinking of our State Department policy-makers was clearly set forth. “Naturally we shall have to stand against Russian advancement at some time and in some place,” he told me, “but this [1946] is not the time, and Korea is not the place.” He went on to explain that the Russians were a great and vigorous people who for centuries had sought to extend their borders; now, after having paid with twenty million lives for their part in the victory over Nazism, it was wholly to be expected that they would seek tangible fruits of victory. He reasoned that the Soviet Union was like a jellied mass dropped on a tabletop: it would spread out until it reached its natural limits of expansion, after which a lasting peace could be negotiated. When I reminded him that Nazi and Japanese expansion had grown

by what it fed upon and that one advance simply led to another, he asked sharply: "What do you want? War?" And when I stated my conviction that Soviet policy really was world domination, he dismissed further discussion as though I had revealed a shallowness of thinking that made further talk useless.

This was in 1946. In late 1947, General Albert C. Wedemeyer was sent to Korea and China to make a survey and bring back recommendations as to what American policy should be. While in the Orient, Wedemeyer sent back word to the then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, that his investigation would lead to a recommendation for considerably increased American aid to the anti-Communist parties in Korea and to Chiang Kai-shek in China. Wedemeyer was informed that such a report would prove embarrassing in view of American denunciations of those very anti-Communist leaders. Accordingly, in order to soften the blow to our policy-makers, Wedemeyer issued a newspaper release in Nanking denouncing the Kuomintang for various shortcomings which must be rectified. Chiang Kai-shek immediately went before the Legislative Yuan and admitted that Wedemeyer's charges were true and demanded full unity in accomplishing the reforms. Wede-

meyer flew to Hawaii for a few days of rest and to put into final shape his report recommending aid for Nationalist China. When he arrived in Washington, he was informed that his report would have to go unpublished into the files. The decision to abandon China had already been made.

The inability of the Department of State to deal with the postwar problems had been developing for many years. Cordell Hull was too convinced of the isolationist determination of American public opinion to present sound policies before the war, and too ill by war's end to face the problems. Stettinius was too inexperienced. Byrnes and Marshall, both also inexperienced in international affairs, were kept fully occupied in attending international conferences, in which they could do nothing but adhere to the policy directives drawn up by their career specialists. Acheson served as Under-Secretary of State long enough to gain the needed education, but he was beset by a mass of unsolved problems and hounded by decisions made long before he took office. So, in the very years when the Department of State was most desperately called upon for leadership, it was least able to serve. What, then, was wrong?

The commonest diagnosis of the ailment is

poor personnel. In the final analysis this may be correct, but the problem is not a simple one. Thirty years ago Charles Evans Hughes pleaded and fought for a change from the ingrained system of seniority in the department. The Hoover Commission has recently reopened this same battle. But the fight is a hard one to win. During my own two years in the federal service I came to the reluctant conclusion that for the ordinary career man in any division of the government, astute caution is the chief virtue. Federal employees, like other individuals, desire to hold their jobs and win promotions. They soon learn that the best way to do both is to say and do as little as possible.

If a federal official makes a good decision, he is likely to be assailed by the heads of other departments as having infringed on their authority. If he makes a bad decision, he is overwhelmed with obloquy from all sides. The easiest and safest thing to do is to make no decisions at all. Keep the problems "under study"; report "progress" from time to time; "consult" with every other agency involved; request more funds from time to time, and, when they are not granted, point out how the work is being handicapped; defer any decision until "joint action" can be taken, thus simultaneously spreading the

responsibility and winning a reputation for careful thinking and cooperation. These are the office-holder's success formulas, known collectively to the citizenry as "red tape." No real improvement in the Department of States's working echelons nor in other governmental agencies can be expected until these formulas have been eliminated.

One thing people forget when they try to discover what ails the State Department is that its employees are individuals pretty much like everyone else. They range in ability from clerks able to earn \$1,800 a year to administrators who can command \$10,000 or more. They have their prejudices and special interests and their own quota of ignorance. Most of them are not supermen afire with zeal to reform the world (and some who are have drunk their draught of inspiration from the wrong bottles), but simple family men who want security and a living wage. Some are industrious and some are lazy. Most of them do their assigned work with a decent conscientiousness. Some work their hearts out and ruin their health to serve the needs of this tragic time, and others (like the great bulk of the rest of the citizenry) want to close up their desks when the clock strikes five and go home to their hobbies and their families.

Physicians soon acquire an impersonal and detached attitude toward suffering and disease. State Department officials develop this same professional immunity to international crises. Cases of stomach ulcers are no more frequent among its seasoned functionaries than in any other critical segment of the population. They know from long experience that one crisis will pass and another will come to the fore. They know that there will be newspaper editorials and excited deputations demanding action upon Peron's regime in Argentina or the recognition of Franco's Spain or the situation that dragged on for years in Korea. And they know that, if they sit tight and assert stoutly that "the situation is being carefully studied," the crisis will probably either dissolve or pass out of the public's attention.

Beyond and aside from personnel problems, however, the system by which international relations is conducted has itself been much at fault, especially since December 7, 1941. By definition, our Department of State is presumed to have control over our relations with other nations. But this has never been wholly true in fact and in recent years has not been even half-true. Pearl Harbor placed direct control of our most important foreign relations in the hands of the

Departments of War and Navy. Presidential and Congressional decisions placed other important international functions in such newly-created agencies as the Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Strategic Services, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the various bodies associated with the United Nations. In theory, these diverse bodies were all to work together toward the same ends, but coordination has always been difficult even on basic policies and non-existent on details.

The confusion and inefficiency caused by overlapping and ill-defined spheres of authority were well illustrated by the postwar developments in Korea. Lt. General John R. Hodge was named late in August, 1945, as commander of all American forces of occupation. He declared that the Department of State had full authority in all policy matters, but spokesmen for the Department of State repeatedly asserted that, as field commander, Hodge was fully responsible for all decisions affected by local conditions. General Hodge was assigned the function of negotiating directly with Guard Col. Chistiakov, commander of the Russian forces in northern Korea, to attempt to reach an agreement for the reunification of the divided zones of occupation.

Chistiakov had no authority except to carry out explicit orders from Moscow, yet the State Department failed for over two years to open direct consultation on Korea with the Kremlin.

On all matters pertaining to his military force and supplies, General Hodge was obliged to report to MacArthur in Tokio. Yet MacArthur refused to accept responsibility for Korea, so that the reports had to be forwarded through his office for decision in the Pentagon. As military ruler of southern Korea, Hodge was subject to the "advice" of the State Department, but the personnel and equipment with which he operated had to be secured from the Department of Defense. The Far Eastern Division of the State Department continually urged Hodge to secure or train personnel able to deal effectively with Korean problems, but the Pentagon kept recalling his officers home and replacing them with raw recruits.

Because Korea's basic economy had been ruined by the 38th Parallel line drawn between the industrial north and the agricultural south, the Department of Commerce was given authority to "study" remedial measures. The former Japanese-owned plants in south Korea (comprising over 80% of the total number) were held in trust by the United States Army of

Occupation to be turned over later to a Korean government; but Congress refrained from voting either the funds or authority required to keep the plants in operation. Under the stress of general economic deterioration, the Korean currency steadily lost value, and the Department of the Treasury was charged with responsibility for recommending reform measures and to work out a plan by which the currency could be readmitted to international exchange. Since food shortages were severe, the Department of Agriculture was called in to study and apply a program of improved land utilization.

With so many hands trying to spin the wheel, and no one having authority to call the turn, the result was stagnation, confusion, and increasing misunderstanding. Korea was part of the dust that was left not so much to settle as to accumulate. And the Korean people—along with the rest of the Orient—were left in puzzled bewilderment as to why our foreign policy was so confused.

Of course the American public wondered, too. Sometimes, citizen groups in Oshkosh or Peoria got strongly enough worked up over a problem to send deputations to Washington. A State Department official would always courteously give them time to state their case. Then he

would smoothly—and accurately—inform them that due consideration would be given to their point of view, but that he himself had no authority to pass upon it. Only when persistent individuals tried to thread their way through the maze to discover (if they ever could) just where the decisions are made did they learn how cumbersome and far removed from the people our representative democracy often is.

What the delegations from Oshkosh and Peoria are less likely to conclude, however, is that a large measure of blame for the mistakes and futilities of our foreign policy is their own fault—theirs, and their friends back home. This is not only true in the sense that the elective officials are there because our ballots put them there. Much more significant, even, is that they must formulate and apply policies within a climate of national opinion. Washington does not easily forget such lessons as the storm of denunciation that poured upon President Franklin D. Roosevelt after his premature appeal in Chicago, in 1938, for a “quarantine” of aggressor nations. Nor should Washington forget. So long as democracy is to exist, it must and in fact can take its actions only in accord with prevailing public opinion. When we denounce the President and the State Department for having

neglected the Orient, we should recall that the American people—the newspapers, the radio commentators, and the community discussion groups—also largely ignored that part of the world. When we impugn the Department of Defense for permitting our defenses to decay, we should in all realism remember the nation-wide cry to “Bring the boys home!” and the vociferous demands for lower taxes, fewer controls, and more consumer goods. In large part, the mistakes in American foreign policy are traceable directly to the fact that the whole of our people have had to learn slowly that what affects the rest of the world also affects us.

We Americans are in a sense aware that in international diplomacy the role of the United States is a difficult one. Our deep-seated instincts and natural habits are to disavow any responsibilities beyond our own borders. We have been isolationists, in the main, for 150 years, and old habits of thinking and acting are difficult to shed. It is hard for us to step onto the stage of world affairs and act now as though every quarter of the globe is a matter of our intimate concern. We know that we are a world power. We fully realize our armed forces are on every continent and every ocean. We are aware that our decisions and intentions are studied in

every capital of the world. We understand that we have exercised influence in shaping the destinies of many peoples who know little of the United States except our reputed fabulous wealth and power. And we are somewhat dimly aware that with this influence goes also the responsibility of following through to see that it does the maximum of good and the minimum of harm.

All of these things we do at least partly understand—we who live in Oshkosh and Peoria, our representatives in Congress, and our officials in the Administration. Yet the fact of our world responsibility is so new that we exercise it cautiously, uncertainly and at times capriciously. We can take a bold and effective stand in Greece and Turkey, but then, as though frightened by our own temerity, we must balance it by taking a weak stand in Asia. We can vote ECA aid as a frankly recognized necessity if our allies are to win back to a position where they can help us defend the free way of life, but we must satisfy both old habits and the dissident voters in divided constituencies by insisting that this aid is precarious and may at any time be withdrawn. Because of such factors as these we often appear harsh or muddle-headed to peoples we intend to befriend. Slowly we are gaining the sureness of

experience as a world power, but the process is not a lovely one to watch.

The collective responsibility of all the people for our foreign policy, and also the fact that many governmental agencies are involved in its planning and execution, is readily ignored in a time of crisis. Then the State Department takes all the blame. A Senator McCarthy, understanding the ways of politics, picks up a dead fish and slaps it across the face of the Administration, well knowing that any less gentle method would result only in murmured protestations and a few brief newspaper stories buried on page eight. The public becomes aroused, and the problem becomes one of focusing that indignation into channels where it can do some good.

The situation in Korea prior to the Communist attack illustrated all the factors reviewed in this chapter. The public was uninformed and indifferent. The so-called "Korean experts" in the Departments of State and Defense had either never known Korea at all or had known it under Japanese rule, and many of them acquired the Japanese view that Koreans are second-class citizens. There is not a single Congressman who has any considerable bloc of Korean-Americans in his constituency, so there

was no prodding at the ballot box to demand attention. As has already been illustrated, the responsibility for Korean decisions was so complexly intertwined and ill-defined among many agencies that it was far easier to take no action at all than it could have been for any forthright officials to devise and secure adoption for any one consistent policy. With its attention attracted elsewhere (and in any event with far more to be done than human beings can accomplish), the top Administration made no effort to educate the citizens regarding the problems in Korea—not, at least, until after the ECA moved into Korea, and by then it was too late.

We may say, then, that the malady of the State Department stems from two sources. One is the cumbersome, overlapping and ill-defined division of authority among too many agencies and departments. The other is that the tremendous problems of a world that has suddenly become one must be dealt with by men whose limitations are very much like our own.

Secretary Acheson has no medicine to cure this ailment. The remedy must fit the dual nature of the disease. There must be, first, a drastic reorganization of the executive branches of the government to bring all international authority under one head or at least into close

working cooperation. The President and the Congress together could do this, but the Secretary of State cannot. And, second, there must be better salaries, more attractive circumstances, and a pressure of public demand which together may bring wiser and more devoted men into the service of the Department of State.

An observer of the Washington scene can discern little reason to hope that either of these remedies will soon be applied. The failure to do them may already have cost us the opportunity we won in the crucible of war to help remake the world along democratic lines. It is still costing us the respect and confidence of bewildered people everywhere, who probably couldn't do better themselves but who assuredly expect better of us. And as we watch the crumbling of democratic defenses before the onward march of Communism, we are forced to conclude that this failure may cost us the necessity of waging an atomic war.

5

LAND OF THE MORNING CALM

KOREA HAS ALWAYS BEEN HIGHLY REGARDED BY its Asian neighbors. The Chinese historians call it "The Land of Scholars and Gentlemen." Japan got its Buddhist religion and most of its cultural developments from Korea. Combining a ruggedly independent spirit with a taste for art and a respect for individuality, Koreans received from China and India (and developed in their own way) significant elements of the broad cultural-philosophical character that stamps the

varied peoples of the Orient. It is both creature and creator of the Asian mind of the past, just as it is both victim and key opponent of the crushing power of Communist ideology and might in our own time of flux.

During its long history, Korean cultural achievements were considerable. The oldest existing brass, iron-work and pottery show exquisite workmanship. The mariner's compass is thought to have been invented in Korea and there is evidence that metal movable type was used in Korea earlier than in China. While Europe was just emerging from the Crusades, the first Korean encyclopedia, in 112 quarto volumes, was published. In the fifteenth century the great King Sei-Chong built a public hall where the classics were expounded (a forerunner of the American Chautauqua system), established four colleges in the four corners of the kingdom, reformed the penal system, edited significant books, and stimulated the mechanical arts.

Culturally, Korea fits into the general patterns found elsewhere in north Asia and has made its own share of significant contributions. Andreas Eckhardt, author of *A History of Korean Art*, felt it "no exaggeration to aver that Korea is responsible for the production of by far the most

beautiful, or rather, the most classical works of art in the Far East." W. B. Honey, Keeper of the Department of Ceramics of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, thought the Korean ceramics of the Koryu period "unsurpassed for beauty of form. They have," he explained, "an easeful serenity and grace, flowing and seemingly effortless, yet never lapsing into facility or trivial prettiness. Like the Korean people, even today, they have strength and dignity, as well as great charm."

In Korea, as in other Oriental countries, the family is the most important social unit. GIs stationed in Korea during our period of occupation found to their disappointment that there could be no "fraternization" with Korean girls. The few girls who broke this strict moral code were beaten by their friends or families and their bodies thrown in the Han River. After marriage, the sons continue to live at home, so that family establishments may be large. Males outnumber females by 104 to 100 and spinsterhood is almost unheard of.

Marriages in Korea are arranged not in heaven but by the parents—in former days with the assistance of professional "go-betweens." Even at the present day, public courting is unheard of. Many times I was asked by wondering

Korean boys whether it was true that in the United States the men and women kiss one another. The Japanese had said it was so—but the Japs told them so many falsehoods! When I responded by asking the Korean youths why they didn't marry girls of their own choice, they looked at me gravely and answered: "In the United States you marry the girl you love. In Korea we love the girl we marry." Whatever one may think of the system, their divorce rate is much lower than ours!

The fertility ratio is higher for every province and every city of Korea than for any part of Japan. Available figures show the birth rate in Korea was 42.3 per thousand in 1925, 45.5 in 1930, and 45.8 in 1935. This is below the rate for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Salvador, and Palestine, and approximately the same as for Egypt, Argentina, and Bulgaria. The high birth rate of Korea is directly traceable to early marriages, social pressures for large families, and lack of any tradition or methodology for birth regulation. Neither abortion nor infanticide has been culturally admissible in Korea, as they were in the late Tokugawa period in Japan.

According to the 1930 census, 66% of the women aged 15 to 19, and 96% of all women from 20 to 24, were married. Only one fifth of

1% of women above 50 were unmarried. The average number of children per family in the decade between 1925 and 1935 was seven. During this period, however, only 60% of the males and 63% of the females survived to the age of six. A sharp commentary on conditions in Korea under Japanese rule is the fact that the life expectancy at birth for males was 32.4 years for Koreans in Korea, 38.8 for the Chinese in Formosa, and 44.8 for Japanese in Japan, during the period 1926-30. The death rate for boys aged 4 to 12 was three times as high in Korea as in Japan.

Mark Twain once wrote that the test of any civilization is the way the people treat their children. By this test, Korea is one of the most highly civilized nations in the world. For there is no country in which children are more loved, and none in which the children are happier. The sound of children's laughter is the dominant sound in city or country wherever Koreans live.

"Child psychology" in Korea is a very simple matter. The parents lavish love on their children, spoil them outrageously, and enjoy them fully. Girls are fully as much loved as boys, and the normal family welcomes many of both. No matter how poor a family may be, the first matter upon which the parents pride themselves

is to have their children well-fed and well-clothed. Visitors in the countryside have been struck repeatedly by the neatness of the children's dress, however hard the living conditions may be.

With many children on the street, it is easy to get acquainted with them. Since they don't expect to be mistreated, they are very friendly and will crowd around a stranger at the slightest show of interest on his part. Even with a language barrier to overcome, it is easy to engage them in a conversation compounded of three parts sign language and one part Koreanized English, such as, *Hello! Hubba hubba!* and *O. K.*

Even five and six-year-old youngsters are likely to have on their backs a baby brother or sister whom they watch over solicitously. Thus a sense of responsibility and family affection is early induced.

The games they play are similar to those of American children without ready-made toys: tag, hide-and-seek, hop scotch, and teeter-tottering on miscellaneous pieces of boards. They are very fond of a game with a handful of pebbles, tossing them in the air and catching them as they fall, on the backs of their hands. And they have many athletic games, such as jumping rope,

high-jumping, wrestling, and a kind of boxing. Since marathon running is one of Korea's leading sports, this explains why a Korean set a new record for the Boston Marathon in 1948 and why the three Korean entrants placed first, second and third in 1950.

Following Confucian principles, respect for age is very marked. When you meet a Korean who is obviously older than you are, it is considered polite to ask his age, and then to bow slightly and murmur, "*Sung sannim*," "My elder one." Traditionally, the mother is ruler of the household, with the sons' wives as her assistants. The men of the family have separate quarters in which they entertain male guests. All sit cross-legged on the floor before small tables, drink saki, and eat prodigiously of rice, fish or meat, and *kim-chi*, a very popular and tasty mixture of pickled vegetables. The women work endlessly, at keeping the houses clean, preparing the food with infinite attention to detail, and washing and sewing the white garments which are the national costume. The men work the rice paddies cooperatively, all assisting each other in preparing the ground, planting, cultivating, and harvesting the crop. But each owns his own field (or rents it) and takes his own crop.

One of Korea's strongest ties with the West

has been religion, for Korea has been among all Oriental countries the most receptive to Christianity. After the opening of Korea by treaty with the United States, the first Protestant missionary to take up regular work there was Dr. Horace U. Allen, who arrived in September, 1884, under the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. He was followed in April, 1885, by Dr. Horace G. Underwood, whose family is now in its third generation of devoted service to the Korean people. The Methodist Board opened work at almost the same time, H. D. Appenzeller arriving in Seoul in the summer of 1885. Catholics, Episcopalians, Seventh Day Adventists, the Salvation Army, and the Y. M. C. A. have been the other principal mission groups.

Catholic efforts in Korea have been directed by Maryknoll missionaries, with headquarters in New York, and by St. Columban's Foreign Mission Society, with headquarters in Nebraska. Maryknoll priests and sisters operated particularly in the Pengyang district in the north. After the occupation, many remained to work underground, in cooperation with the native clergy. At last report, Monsignor Patrick J. Byrne of Maryknoll, Apostolic Visitor to Korea, stationed at Seoul, was a prisoner of the Communist forces.

At one time there were at least 2,000 and

probably 3,000 Korean Christian churches. The Korean people went a long way toward accepting Christianity as their predominant religion and as such they built their own churches and supported their own pastors. Japan always opposed the Christianizing of Korea, just as it frowned upon Christian efforts in its own country. As Japan's anti-Occidental program became more and more apparent, it imposed ever-sterner restrictions upon the Korean Christians. By 1940, all but a handful of missionaries had been driven out. The rest were subsequently interned. Church worship was practically prohibited and Shinto shrines were erected before which the worship of the Japanese Emperor was decreed.

Following the defeat of Japan, the missionaries returned to south Korea and their work has been accelerated. The President of the Korean Republic, about half his cabinet, and well over half the National Assembly members are Christians. Soviet occupation of northern Korea, on the contrary, maintained much the same conditions the Japanese had imposed. Missionaries were not allowed to return. Many churches were taken over for use as Communist meeting halls. Korean preachers and their congregations have been subjected to special surveillance and restrictions. As rapidly as possible, Christian lead-

ership amenable to full Communist control has been recruited and placed in charge of the remaining congregations in the north.

The Korean national character is based in part upon a sense of humor which seldom fails. The sound of laughter is endemic in Korean villages. It was Kim Kwang Je, President of the Korean Cultural Association, who told me the best mother-in-law story I have ever heard. "A husband and wife," he said, "who always quarreled about each other's relatives were sitting quietly in their home one evening when the husband took his long-stemmed pipe from his mouth and said thoughtfully, 'Wife, I have decided I will say something good about your relatives this evening.' 'Yes?' his wife asked expectantly. 'Yes, indeed,' he replied soberly. 'I have decided that I like your mother-in-law better than my mother-in-law.'" When I visited Yun Po Sung, then Mayor of Seoul, he showed me two huge cranes stalking about gravely in his garden. "How long does a crane live?" I asked him, for I knew that to Koreans the crane is a symbol of longevity. "Oh," he replied, dead-pan, "a thousand years, so they say. For myself, I don't expect ever to learn the truth." A third story reflects the pride which never lets a Korean gentleman complain. A poor but proud

old scholar was sitting in thin and worn clothes on the floor of his hut, with no fire, and with a cold winter wind blowing through the broken windows. An opulent stranger passing by spied the old man and called out to him in a cheerily sympathetic voice, "Ah, my poor old one, how cold you must be!" "Not at all, Sir," the old man replied in disdain, "Do you not observe how the cold air passes out of one hole as soon as it enters by another?" With a sense of humor like this, the Koreans are able to take a lot of punishment and keep coming back for more.

No outsider can possibly phrase the essence of the Korean spirit as well as they have done it for themselves. Most meaningful of any folk-expressions are the proverbs which gain currency as epigrammatic summations of the philosophy of the workaday people. Any attempt to depict the Korean character should include a representative selection of Korean proverbs:

Pinch yourself and you will know the pain another feels when pinched.

Don't draw a sword to kill a mosquito.

A room easily warmed is also easily cooled.

The water downstream will not be clear if the water upstream is muddied.

Beware of a sword hidden behind a smile.

Blame yourself, not the stream, when you fall in the water.

A virtuous character is necessary even in driving a cow.

If you love your own children, love also those of others.

The darkest spot is just below a candle.

A man who has burned his tongue on hot soup is likely to blow on cold water.

You cannot carry a stone up the mountain without getting red in the face.

You cannot catch even one rabbit if you chase two at once.

Don't try to cut water with a sword.

You cannot eat the picture of a loaf of bread.

Where there are no tigers, wildcats will be very self-important.

It is useless to pour instruction into a sow's ear.

Don't kill a bullock for a feast when a hen would suffice.

To make a mountain, you must carry every load of earth.

A finger prick will demand attention, though the worms be eating the heart unknown.

What looked like blossoms on the dead tree turned out to be only the white mold of decay.

You cannot sit in the valley and see the new moon set.

The flower that blooms in the morning is withered by noon.

You can mend with a trowel today what it will take a spade to mend tomorrow.

Seeking to formulate the unbeatable spirit of this often-tried people, I put my faith and admiration for them in the following words:

STEADFAST

Koreans are not Chinese-men,
Russian or American;
Koreans are not Japanese,
Never Japanese!

Koreans are a prideful race,
An ancient and a gracious race;
Korean kings have ruled for aye,
Koryu, Silla, Yi.

Watch Koreans' careworn faces,
Calm, impassive, knowing faces;
Eyes alight with spirit bold,
Stirred by tales oft-told.

The old South Gate is standing still,
The ancient wall winds o'er the hill;
Korean strength still works the land
They staunchly understand.

Though now the dawn with troubled skies
O'er Seoul and rice paddy lies,
When yet ten thousand years have passed
Korean faith will last.

6

HISTORY OF A "PROBLEM"

THE KOREAN PROBLEM GOES BACK IN A WAY TO the United Nations agreement of November, 1947, to assume responsibility for holding elections and to wipe out the 38th Parallel division. Or to the Russian-American agreement to divide the country into two zones. Or to 1919, when Korean patriots arose in peaceful revolution and established their Republic-in-exile. Or to 1910, when Korea was formally annexed by Japan. Or to 1905, when, by the Treaty of

Portsmouth, Korea was placed under Japanese "protection." Or to 1882, when the Hermit Kingdom, as Korea was then known, was opened to the West by the American Commodore Schufeldt and was assured of fair treatment by a "mutual assistance" pact with our country. Or to 1835, when the first Occidental missionary—a French Catholic priest, Pierre Maubant—entered the peninsula. Or to 1597, when Korea, after a seven-year war costing hundreds of thousands of lives and virtual destruction of the nation's cultural and productive resources, defeated and turned back Japan's first attempt to conquer the Asian mainland. Or to some 2,000 years B. C. when Western civilization was commencing to stir and Korea, too, was becoming a nation.

Although Koreans date the origin of their nation from the supposed advent of Dan-goon, 4,283 years ago, the structure of their society is believed to have been developed from the scantily recorded flight to northern Korea of the Chinese noble, Ki-ja, Counsellor to the last of the Shang Emperors. When the Chou Dynasty seized power in China in 1122 B. C., Ki-ja is thought to have fled for sanctuary to the Everwhite Mountains in northern Korea, taking with him a following of 5,000 poets, musicians,

traders, and doctors, there to promulgate the "Eight Laws" of right relationships and to found the kingdom of Chao-hsien (or Chosen). Thus commenced the influx of Chinese culture which the Korean people adapted as the basis of their own homogeneous civilization.

The earliest detailed historic records of undoubted authenticity tell of the Chinese refugees who came to Chin-han about 255 B. C., at the time of the building of the Great Wall. Subsequently, there flourished the great period of Silla civilization, lasting for 1,000 years, with its capital in the southeastern city of Kyongju, where still stands the oldest existing solar observatory in the world, and ruins of the great seven-story pagoda and other evidences of a magnificent city that then contained over a million enlightened inhabitants. Following the fall of Silla, the capital was moved to Kaesong, just south of the 38th Parallel line, and from the new ruling dynasty, Koryu, came the modern name Korea. In 1392, General Yi T'aejo revolted and established his own family as ruling monarchs, in the present capital city of Seoul. His descendants continued to reign for 518 years, until the nation was annexed by Japan.

A brief chronology of Korean history comprises the following periods:

Dan-goon (traditional)	2333 to 1122 B. C.
Ki-ja (quasi-historical)	1122 to 193 B. C.
The Three Kingdoms	
Kokuryu (north)	73 B. C. to 668 A. D.
Paikche (southwest)	18 B. C. to 660 A. D.
Silla (southeast)	57 B. C. to 935 A. D.
Koryu (capital at Kaesong)	918 to 1392
Yi Dynasty (capital at Seoul)	1392 to 1910
Japanese rule	1910 to 1945
Russian-American division and occupation	1945 to 1948
Republic of Korea inaugurated	August 15, 1948
(With area north of 38th Parallel held by a Communist regime)	

Before the Russian-American occupation there existed the economic dislocation caused by the harshness of Japanese rule in Korea. The avowed intent of the rulers was to "Japanize" Koreans. Economically, this meant a draining off of Korean wealth to Japanese use. As Hazumi, Chief of the Japanese Department of Industry, admitted: "After the annexation of Korea its industrial development was consciously checked." By devious means, Japanese rapidly gathered into their own hands almost all the property of value. A study of Ikson County in southern Korea, published in 1926, showed that by then 68% of all property was owned by the 8,000 Japanese residents, with the remaining 32% shared among the 120,000 Koreans. By 1938, 81.9% of all Korean farmers were full or

part tenants, with 58% owning no land at all and only 13.7% owning all the land they farmed. By the close of Japanese rule of Korea, Japanese ownership extended to over 90% of all incorporated wealth. These Japanese holdings were taken over as the Japanese residents in Korea were repatriated to their own country, and were turned over to the Republic of Korea upon inauguration of the new government in 1948.

Socially and politically, the effects of Japanese rule were similar. The schools were taught in the Japanese language and only Japanese-language newspapers could be published during the latter years. Freedom of assembly and freedom of speech ceased to exist. Almost all the teachers, professional workers, and government officials were Japanese. In 1920, for example, when Japanese made up 25% of the population of municipalities, they elected 203 of the total of 268 members of municipal councils. The year 1920 is a significant one, for at that time Baron Saito was appointed Governor General to reform the administration of Korea (or Chosen, as the Japanese called it) and to insure to the Koreans the full rights of Japanese citizenship. As part of his "reform" he increased the police force by 45%, from 14,358 to 20,771. Before his "reform," Japanese comprised 42% of the police

force; after it, 58.6%. And the proportion of Japanese police officers rose from 58.7% to 73.3%. As an unintended tribute to the Korean people, it was felt necessary by the Japanese (despite their large police force) to disarm the population so completely that only one kitchen knife was permitted to every four families!

Against this Japanese rule occurred one of the most remarkable revolutions in history. During the spring of 1919, under the inspiration of Woodrow Wilson's promise of "the self-determination of peoples," Korean patriots planned a passive demonstration against Japanese rule—over two years before Gandhi's celebrated "march to the salt marshes" in India. Under the leadership of Pastor Kil and Yi Sang-jai in Korea and Syngman Rhee in America, they printed from carved wooden blocks a declaration of independence, and circulated it around Korea, tucked in the sleeves of school girls. To all their followers they also sent strict instructions: "Whatever you do, do not insult the Japanese. Do not throw stones. Do not hit with your fists. For these are the acts of barbarians."

For perhaps the first time in history, this was a revolution not *against* but *for*; not to destroy Japanese rule but to offer so convincing a testimony of united Korean will for freedom that the

peace-makers in Paris would be moved to make Korean independence a part of the peace settlement. With this in mind, on Saturday, March 1, 1919, 33 men met for lunch in Seoul, signed the declaration of independence, and sent for the police. Simultaneously, in villages and cities all over Korea, more than two million demonstrators drew forth home-made and forbidden Korean flags, marched down the streets shouting "*Mansei!*" ("May Korea live ten thousand years"), and gathered to hear the declaration of independence read. In response to this peaceful demonstration, the Japanese, hysterical with fear, fell upon the crowds with swords, firehooks and guns, killing some 7,000 and leaving many more cruelly wounded and beaten. As for the peace-makers in Paris, they looked the other way.

What this date of March 1 means to Korean patriots is well illustrated in the opening paragraphs of President Syngman Rhee's speech in Seoul on March 1, 1950. So aptly does it echo the sentiments of Korean determination for freedom that it is well worth reading in connection with the tragic events in Korea today. The first part of the address is as follows:

"There are days in the lives of men and of nations that carry a significance none of us wish to minimize or

ignore. Today—March the first—is such a day in the living history of Korea. It was on a Saturday at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon in 1919—thirty-one years ago—when the great spirit of the Korean people rose out of the chains cast upon them by force and by treachery, and reasserted the dignity and the eternal being of our ancient nation.

“The world has had few occasions to observe such an example of simple heroism as the people of Korea performed on that day. Let us review the circumstances and refresh our souls by contemplation of the courage and the devotion to freedom demonstrated on that brave day.

“In 1919 the world had recently emerged from a shattering and destructive world war. The evil military power of aggression had been smashed and the democracies had won a war that, it was hoped, would end for all time the selfish ambitions of imperialistic powers. In Paris the statesmen of the world, led by America's immortal Woodrow Wilson, were gathered to insure the right of self-determination to all liberty-loving peoples in every land. This was their ideal, proclaimed in ringing words for all the world to hear.

“Korea was far from Paris. The eyes and the ears of our people were shuttered by Japanese military power. The words of the statesmen in Paris were not directed to us, for Japan, our ruthless oppressor, had been their war-time ally. Yet, in our cities and on our farms those words were heard. In the fall of Germany our people read the lesson of tyranny's defeat. In the depths of their own hearts the patriots of 1919 heard whispering echoes of freedom's promise. And they determined that, come suffering or come death, they would cast off their chains and stand before the forum of the democratic world as free men and women.

"In January and February of 1919 a thrill of renewed hope and courage ran through our oppressed land. Daring men met in cellars to print in secret a declaration of independence that had been hewed by hand on wooden blocks. School girls trudged from village to village, carrying copies of the declaration hidden in their sleeves. In hundreds of communities from the Straits of Korea to the Tumen and Yalu Rivers, men and women met in hidden council to plan the day of liberation.

"The soldiers and police and spies of the enemy dwelt in our midst, watching alertly for any signs of revolt. Tens of thousands of our people joined in planning and preparing for the day of liberation, yet no sign was given to betray their purpose to our oppressors.

"Then the fateful day arrived. At the Bright Moon Restaurant in Seoul, thirty-three leaders met calmly for a last meal together. Then they read the Declaration of Korean Independence, signed their names to it, and called in the police. All over Korea, at the same hour, huge crowds gathered to hear the same brave words.

"After the Declaration was read, the millions of patriots in every district of our land brought out our forbidden flag and marched peacefully and joyously down hundreds of village streets. There was no violence, no hatred, no lashing at the oppressors in our midst. With dignity and restraint, the people of Korea proclaimed the inalienable truth that they were and would remain free and independent. Here in our homeland those patriots swore eternal allegiance to the bold sentiments uttered by the peace-makers in Paris. We, too, a nation over four thousand two hundred years old, were and of right ought to be, the masters of our own destiny—despite the bayonets and the bullets of the Japanese who had seized and who ruled our land.

“Such was the spirit of that first day of March, thirty-one years ago. Thousands of our people died in the following weeks to seal with their blood the living truth that Koreans will not and cannot be enslaved. This was the heritage they have left to us. This is the faith—theirs and ours—in which our Republic was born and in which it lives.

“Today we meet in the aftermath of another war which was fought in order that tyranny might not prevail. Once again the right of freedom was proclaimed and the aggressors were struck down. And once again we in Korea find the hard-won peace marred by foreign despots in our land.

“This time, however, we have powerful friends. This time half our country and two-thirds of our people are free. This time we exercise our own government in at least a part of our ancient nation.

“May this day be in our hearts a time of reverence for the past, of courage for the present, and of dedication for the future. The seeds planted in 1919 have not yet come to full harvest, but they have proved of hardy growth. Doubters and traitors have sought to trample down the tender growth of national freedom, but the great mass of our people have sturdily cultivated and nurtured the precious planting of March the first. Never shall we falter or fail until the harvest of a reunited and independent Korean nation is secure.”

Congressman Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey has said that the cold war could best be understood by a study of Russian-American relations in Korea. More broadly, it may be asserted that a study of Korea will serve as an excellent introduction to the complicated patterns of Oriental

history, culture, and psychology. For, all through its history, Korea has been a crossroads of civilization in the Far East. Its period of "hermitage" did not begin until after the 1592-97 war with Japan and even then close contacts with China were maintained.

Korea is a "buffer state" located in the heart of the strategic triangle of North Asia, bounded by China, Siberia, and Japan. Its people are a distinctive race, called by the late Smithsonian anthropologist, Ales Hrdlicka, "the best people of the Orient." Larger, stockier and more individualistic than the Japanese, they resemble most closely the Manchurians—who for centuries were under Korean rule. Unified in race, language, religion and culture, the Korean people were and are one, despite the postwar division forced upon them. Their language is a unique achievement in the Orient, consisting in its written form of twelve vowels and fourteen consonants, as contrasted with the complexity of the ideographs in the Chinese and Japanese languages. Over 75% of them earn their living as farmers, tending plots of ground averaging about two acres. Life in Korea has always been hard by American standards, but, before the Japanese seizure and exploitation of the country,

the Korean standard of living was the highest in the Orient.

In peacetime, the country is as attractive as its poetic name, "The Land of Morning Calm," indicates. It is a mountainous peninsula about the size of New England, with New York and New Jersey added; and Korea has about the same population (30,000,000) and the same climate as that area of the United States. The average annual temperature, Fahrenheit, in Mokpo, on the southwest coast, is 55.6°; in Seoul, the capital, 51.6°, and in the northern city of Heijo, 48.6°. These temperatures may be compared with the annual average of 55.4° in Baltimore, Maryland. Along with the balmy climate (unpleasant only during the June to August rainy season), the beauty of the mountainous scenery (with 36 mountain peaks above 7,000 feet and 62 above 6,000 feet) has led some to call Korea "The Switzerland of Asia." The peninsula is cut across by five rivers: the Yalu and Tumen, running along the Korean-Manchurian border, and the Han, Naktong, and Taidong, further south. These rivers run east and west, across the peninsula, and average from near 500 to 250 miles in length—as compared to the 306-mile length of the Hudson and the 475-mile extent of the Seine. An almost unbroken

wall of cliffs along the east coast contrasts with the deeply indented and rolling coastlines of the south and west. Near its 5,400 miles of coastline are clustered 3,479 islands. It is no wonder that ancient Korea was the seafaring nation of the Far East and the greatest ship-building country of the old Pacific Basin.

The major Korean cities (Seoul, Kaesong, Taejon, Taegu, Mokpo and Pusan, in south Korea) have westernized business districts not unlike those in our less prosperous towns. Seoul was the first city in the Orient to have an electric streetcar system—built by Americans. Even in remote farming villages, the clay-walled, straw-thatched farmers huts have electric lights. The heating system of Korean homes is actually superior to ours, for their heat vents go from the kitchen stove under the floors of the living quarters, and thus put all the heat where it is most needed. Their garbage disposal and water supply systems, however, are primitive indeed. One of the things Americans in Korea soon learn is to “breathe with the wind” when the “honey carts” go by, hauling out scrapings of city toilets and garbage cans for use as fertilizer in the rice paddies.

When reunited, Korea will represent the most hopeful potential of any nation in Asia. It is

one of the rich areas of the earth's surface. Korea normally produced some of the best rice grown in the Far East. It has more coal and mineral resources than any other part of the Far East except Manchuria. Its anthracite coal reserves were estimated in 1939 at 1,340 million tons and its soft coal at 410 million tons, with an annual consumption rate at that time of only 2 million tons. Its gold production through the thirties averaged \$36 million a year, and rose as high as \$50 million. The importance of its minerals lies less in their quantity than in their variety. The known existence of coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, lithium, mica, nickel, barytes, molybdenum, magnesite, alum, shale graphite, fluorspar, and kaolin, together with its forest lands, provides a foundation for extensive industrialization. Prior to World War II, Korea produced 3% of the world's gold, 30% of its graphite, and provided half of Japan's tungsten needs.

An official estimate of a potential hydroelectric capacity of 5 million kilowatts provides a power capacity exceeding the electricity generated in either Italy or France in 1937.

In 1939, Korean fisheries' production was third among the nations of the world. With a 6,000-mile coastline, along which warm and

cold sea currents meet, Korean waters contain 75 kinds of edible fish, 20 kinds of edible shellfish, and 25 other commercial sea animals and plants. Chief need for development of this industry on a world market is for additional canning resources.

With 75% of its population on farms, Korean agriculture is the most important factor in its economic life. Rice comprises 58.9% of its total farm production, making prewar Korea the world's fourth largest rice producer. Considering all food crops, in terms of yield per acre, A. J. Grajdanzev has estimated that "if the average figure for the United States is taken as 100, the average is 92 for Korea." Greatest development can come from increased irrigation of existing and new fields, and from more diversification, particularly to increase vegetable and livestock production.

The southern zone comprised approximately 36,00 square miles; north Korea, about 48,300 miles. A 1944 estimate by the Natural Resources Section of SCAP indicated that 85% of all minerals mined in Korea were produced north of the 38th Parallel. Over 50% of the gold production was from north of the line. Grajdanzev's survey of Korea's mineral and power resources concludes that "only the northern and east cen-

tral part of Korea have rich coal deposits. These regions also possess great waterpower and iron-ore reserves, and so are destined to become the seat of Korea's heavy industry." In 1944, 22 coal mines in all Korea produced 1,556,468 metric tons of coal, while in May, 1946, five mines in all south Korea produced 24,161 tons. Of seven factories producing inorganic fertilizers during 1940-44, only two were located south of the 38th Parallel. Korea's seven major cement plants, with an annual capacity of 1,500,000 tons, were all in the north.

It should not be assumed that the northern zone was wealthy and the southern poor. Two-thirds of the population did not deliberately choose to crowd into the 44% of the area lying south of the 38th Parallel because that was the least desirable section. The contrary may be assumed. South Korea not only had the best farm lands, but the best climate, the best fisheries' outlets, and a respectable amount of small industries' development. Both north and south suffered grievously from the division. The Korean peninsula was destined both by nature and by its historic development to be one nation. And as the Korean people have abundantly proved, they feel themselves destined to rule their own destinies.

7

PLEA FOR RECOGNITION

KICHISABURO NOMURA WILL ALWAYS BE REMEMBERED as the two-faced Japanese Ambassador who kept Secretary of State Cordell Hull busied with negotiations for a peace settlement up to the very minute Pearl Harbor was bombed—two-faced, but one-eyed. And therein is a part of the story of how Korea came to be remembered.

Leaders of the passive revolution in 1919 met secretly in Seoul and organized a Provisional

Republic. Then they fled to Shanghai and elected Syngman Rhee as their President. This new paper government was destined to become the world's longest-lived Republic-in-exile and to set a pattern for the exile governments of World War II. With little more than the faith of a handful of patriots to support it, the Provisional Republic set out to organize an administration, raise an army, wage war, and seek diplomatic recognition.

The effort was naturally divided into two parts—one military, the other diplomatic. A group of soldiers and guerillas, led by Kim Koo, Kim Yak San, and Li Chung Chun, set up successive bases in Shanghai, Nanking, and Chungking—moving always just ahead of the Japanese—from which to carry on a war of exasperation against Japan. The *Annual Report* for 1936-37 of the Governor General of Chosen admits that 16,000 Korean guerrillas were harrying the border guards. The Provisional Government itself claimed an active field force of 30,000. Whatever the number, it was enough so that General Li Chung Chun could ambush and annihilate the crack Japanese Ihitsuka regiment. This fighting continued for twenty-five years, with some aid from Chiang Kai-shek and with

annual budgets running as high as half a million dollars.

Nomura's eye represents another phase of the running war. Assassination of high Japanese officials was considered a legitimate part of the battle for independence. From among the Korean "suicide squad," young Li Bong Chang made a daring attempt in Tokio, on January 8, 1932, to assassinate the Emperor himself. He succeeded in tossing a bomb into the imperial procession and killed several officers, but the Mikado was riding in another car. On April 29, 1932, an unusual assemblage of high-ranking Japanese gathered in Honkew Park, Shanghai, to celebrate the conquest of Manchuria. Yun Bong Kil was the Korean selected to make the most of this opportunity. With a huge hand grenade concealed in a bandage on his arm, he squirmed his way close to the reviewing platform and tossed. Nomura's eye was not the only casualty. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who stumped aboard the *Missouri* on September 2, 1945, to sign the surrender papers, lost a leg. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief Sirakawa and General Kawahara lost their lives, and several other top officials were wounded.

Thus, in China, along the Siberian border, in Manchuria, and within Korea itself the fight

for independence continued. Never powerful enough even to approach a decisive action, Korean guerrilla bands at least kept both the Japanese and the captive Korean population aware that the Provisional Republic had never surrendered.

Within the Provisional Government splits and divergent parties arose, as happens in all exile groups. But as war tension increased in Europe, all the Korean elements in China except the Communists reunited in one National Assembly in January, 1939. And after the German attack on Russia, the Korean Communists also came back into the fold, "because," as their Manifesto of 1942 read, "the democratic countries of the world have now formed an anti-Fascist bloc and gone to war with the Fascist powers."

The diplomatic phase of the independence movement was directed by President Syngman Rhee. He went to Shanghai in 1920 to meet with his cabinet and the Assembly, but immediately returned to the United States. A scholar rather than a militarist, he placed his faith in an appeal to the conscience and good will of the democratic peoples. Since he had earned a doctorate at Princeton under Woodrow Wilson—and had been invited to the White House for the wedding of Wilson's daughter—he felt some

confidence that the force of moral sentiments which Wilson had organized and enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations might yet provide a channel through which Korean pleas for independence could be heard.

As a first step, on June 18, 1919, he wrote directly to the Emperor of Japan—"To give the Japanese a chance" as he said in a spirit of grim humor. Since his letter both fulfills the spirit of the peaceful demonstration of March 1 and also embodies the determination which kept Korean nationalism alive, it is worthy of note:

"Permit me at once to assure your Majesty, and the people of Japan, of our sincere intent to establish perpetual peace, good will and cooperation between the Peoples of Japan and Korea.

"We first address Japan, with the hope and may we not say with the expectation, that our differences may be explained and done away with, avoiding outside intervention. May we not now bespeak from Japan her aid and cooperation, appealing to her generous impulses, for the welfare of a sister State?

"I am impelled by my duty to my People to officially inform you, and without anger, animosity or offensive intent, that on April 23rd, 1919, Korea became a completely organized, self-governed State. All formalities were strictly followed and adhered to. A call and declaration that had been prepared by consent and will of the People of Korea, was publicly read and proclaimed in over three hundred places in Korea, simultaneously, on March 1st, 1919.

“Complying with that declaration and call, Delegates were elected by the people from each of the thirteen Provinces. These Delegates convened at Seoul, Korea, on April 23rd, 1919, and there and then organized and created the Korean National Council, a representative legislative body, to govern Korea. The Korean National Council, at the same session, honored me, by electing me President of the Republic of Korea, and also elected other executive officers.

“Other Powers, especially those with whom Korea has Treaty covenants, calling for their good offices, have been officially notified of these facts. No doubt you have already been fully advised of them through other channels.

“Korea is now in a position to govern herself, and in her own way. She has chosen the representative form of government, of and by the people, in regular, orderly manner.

“It is my duty, and the desire of the People of Korea, that in the name and by the authority of the Republic of Korea I now ask Japan to withdraw all armed and military forces from Korea, and all Japanese officials, civilian and otherwise, of every description, with the exception of the usual diplomatic envoys and consuls. It is our desire that you, in regular form, recognize the Republic of Korea as a distinct, independent, sovereign State, and that all supposed Treaty covenants inconsistent with these objects be acknowledged to be void.

“Let past differences and disputes be now adjusted and eliminated, and let us enter upon a new era of perpetual peace and good will between our two nations.”

Of course, the letter was never answered. Rhee sought a passport to France so that he could appeal in person to the Paris Peace Con-

ference, but Wilson personally asked the State Department not to issue it, in order to avoid agitating the Japanese—who were presumed to form the keystone of the arch of perpetual peace in the Pacific. When the Disarmament Conference was held in Washington in 1921-22, elaborate efforts were made to get the Korean case on the agenda, but all that resulted was a spate of speeches in the Senate. Rhee's next major effort was a visit to Geneva in 1933 to appeal to the League of Nations. But the League even avoided condemning Japan's aggression in Manchuria and all that Korea gained was some sympathetic consideration by a few delegates. During all these years, and for many more to come, Rhee kept the Korean Commission alive in Washington as the unofficial representation of his unrecognized government.

Then came Pearl Harbor. The United States was at war with Japan. The spirits of Korean nationalists revived. Cho-sowang, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Republic, cabled to Secretary Hull from Chungking, pledging the support of the Korean people in the fight against Japan. In effect, he asked for recognition of Korea as a co-belligerent. This cable was ignored. When Rhee followed it up in person, he met rebuff after rebuff. Whatever the real

reasons may have been, the State Department felt it was still "unwise to agitate the question of Korean independence." The Korean Commission files for the subsequent war years bulge with the many communications addressed to the Department of State ("May I have the honor of an interview . . ." and "May I bring to your attention the facts . . .") and the replies ("The Secretary regrets . . ." and "The Secretary cannot see . . ."). Efforts to secure Lend-Lease aid to train and arm Korean guerrillas and pleas that the Korean underground movement be integrated with the plans of the Allied High Command similarly were rejected.

The refusal during the war years to recognize any Korean government was paradoxically tempered by a "recognition" of the Korean people. Even though the State Department continued to insist that Korea was, and must be considered as, merely another province of Japan, the Korean aliens resident in this country were in general accorded the same treatment granted to "friendly aliens" from other lands. On March 1, 1943, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle wrote to Dr. Rhee:

"It may be recalled that various steps have been taken by various agencies of the United States Government whereby Korean aliens are now treated as distinct from

Japanese aliens. These steps include the action of the Department of Justice in allowing Korean aliens to register as Koreans rather than as Japanese subjects, under the Alien Registration Act of 1940, the action of the Department of Justice in exempting Korean aliens from applying for certificates of identification as enemy nationals, the exemption by the Department of Justice of Koreans from compliance with regulations controlling travel and other conduct of aliens of enemy nationalities, and the action of the Governor of Hawaii, in connection with Executive Order No. 8832 amending Executive Order No. 8389 ('Freezing order'), whereby the position of Korean aliens in Hawaii was ameliorated."

Despite the recognition of Korean nationality implied in this letter from Mr. Berle, no government for these Korean nationals was recognized. The reasons were, prior to Pearl Harbor, to avoid antagonizing Japan, and thereafter, to avoid antagonizing Russia. In view of the anxiety in many quarters to get Russia into the Asiatic war, withholding any decision regarding Korea's future status seemed necessary until Russian intentions toward Korea were clarified. To the extent that this was the view of the State Department, however, it represented either a willingness to trade off the independence of a small nation to win the favor of a large one, or else it demonstrated a fear of developing any foreign policy that might have offended a powerful ally.

It is conceivable, although it seems unlikely, that State Department officials knew so little of Asian history as to be unaware of any special Russian interest in Korea. If this could have been the case, they may simply have felt that, inasmuch as Koreans had not had a government of their own since 1910—brushing aside the government-in-exile—they surely could wait another few years until after the defeat of Japan made possible the holding of an election. It seems hardly possible, however, that the experts in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State could have combined so much ignorance of Russia's consistent Far Eastern policies during the past seventy-five years as to have reached so naive a conclusion.

Sumner Welles expressed his view of the treatment the Koreans were receiving by writing: "With the restoration of Korean independence, one of the great crimes of the twentieth century will have been rectified, and another stabilizing factor will have been added to the new international system which must be constructed in the Pacific." Franklin D. Roosevelt (who thought far more highly of Welles than did Cordell Hull) came to the same conclusion, and, at the Cairo Conference of November-December, 1943, he, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek re-

solved that: "Mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people, the aforesaid three great powers are agreed that, in due course, Korea shall be free and independent." Russian agreement was secured at Potsdam and was incorporated in the Russian statement of aims upon entering the Pacific war.

Meantime, the Yalta Conference had been held. It was there that the price of Soviet help against Japan was demanded and paid. Besides what turned out to be a free hand in Eastern Europe, Russia asked and gained control of the South Manchurian Railway and of the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. Dr. Rhee, at the time of the San Francisco organizational meeting of the United Nations, charged that Russia had also won an agreement for control over Korea. This the State Department denied. When the same question was asked Winston Churchill during a debate in the House of Commons, he replied that there was no secret agreement at Yalta—but that many things had been talked over and basic understandings had been reached. This statement of Churchill's is the most candid ever officially revealed for the origin of the 38th Parallel division of Korea. It was not until the issuance of General Douglas MacArthur's General Order No. I, following the defeat of Japan,

that the line was publicly avowed. Russian troops were to enter north Korea (as they did on August 10, 1945) to receive the surrender of Japanese troops in that area, while American troops went into southern Korea a month later for the same purpose. After the Japanese were disarmed, Korea was to be reunited under a government of its own choice. Thus, at least, the agreement ran.

Within a few days it became apparent that the Russians, far from planning a withdrawal from Korea, were hastily organizing a "People's Committee" in their zone. Byrnes, Molotov, and Bevin considered the problem at Moscow in December of 1945 and there agreed to a four-power trusteeship (with Great Britain and China to join the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.) to rule Korea for five years. Korean nationalists immediately protested and nation-wide demonstrations took place in Korea. Rhee and his associates objected that trusteeship was an insult to a nation that had been self-governing for over 4,000 years. They pointed out that trusteeship was not in accord with the Cairo pledge. And they argued that a trusteeship council representing four nations (with Russia among them) never could agree. They further prophesied that the five-year period would be only a beginning. Communist

agitators could and would stir up so much trouble that internal conditions could plausibly be cited by the Soviet Union as a reason for continuing the trusteeship as long as might prove necessary to fasten a Communist grip on the entire peninsula.

As it turned out, Soviet obduracy itself made trusteeship a dead issue. When two joint Russian-American conferences were held in 1946 to devise means of reuniting the country, Soviet delegates took the stand that all Koreans who opposed trusteeship must be eliminated from any administration that would be set up—thus assuring that only Communists would be eligible. The United States insisted that all Koreans be given full and free consideration. Endless hours of discussion failed to even make a dent in the impasse. In June, 1946, the Russians retired to the 38th Parallel and the stalemate was solidified.

Syngman Rhee had returned to Korea in October, 1945, and in his first address to a gathering of 200,000 in Seoul Stadium he set forth clearly the Korean demand for reunification of the country and complete independence. "Through the years of Japanese oppression," he said, "we remained unconquered and undivided. We intend to remain so, even at the cost of our

lives. The Allied Powers might as well know that now." A year later, on the anniversary of Japan's defeat, he re-emphasized the same theme:

"I have a word or two for the world statesmen—the men who have the destinies of the human race in the hollow of their hands. In their efforts to establish peace upon earth they should forego the mistaken policy of expediency and appeasement and stick to the principles of justice and law. A patched up peace—a peace purchased at the sacrifice of human rights—is not a lasting peace. No nation can guarantee its own safety and security by allowing an injustice to be done to its weak neighbor. The history of the last forty years proved this fact. Had the great powers joined hands and stopped the international gangsterism in time, they might have saved themselves and the world from this horrible war. Justice and liberty to all is the only foundation of peace among men and nations. We demand justice and no more or no less."

The Korean nationalists' concept of justice was an immediate election in south Korea, since Russia would not agree to reunion of the whole country. Before yielding to any such half-measure, however, George Marshall, who then was Secretary of State, made one more attempt to either win an agreement from Russia or

secure so positive a repudiation that the United States might feel free to deal as it wished with southern Korea. Consequently, while he was in Moscow in March, 1947, he handed Molotov a note requesting a revival of the Joint Russian-American Commission of Korea, with the proviso that all Koreans who agreed to let trusteeship be discussed in the Commission should be considered eligible for election to a free Korean government. To Marshall's surprise, Molotov promptly agreed to what on the surface appeared a major retreat from the previous Soviet position. In order to make assurance doubly sure, Marshall repeated his proviso in a second note, and again Molotov agreed. Much as the State Department had learned about Russia since 1945, it still had not fully learned that agreements are considered by the Kremlin merely as tactical maneuvers to gain time or other advantages. An additional lesson on this theme was taught to our diplomats when the Russian-American conference convened in Seoul. The daily meetings dragged along through June, July, and August, and never got beyond the point of argument over what the proviso really meant. The Soviets argued that it meant only Communists could be admitted to the government, for only Communists were "sincere" in

agreeing to a discussion of the trusteeship question. On this rock the discussions finally split and foundered.

Rhee was already on record with a program which he had presented in anticipation of the failure of the conference. In essence, it was as follows:

(1) An interim government should be elected for southern Korea, to serve until the two halves of Korea could be reunited, with a general election to be held immediately thereafter.

(2) Without disturbing the direct Russian-American consultations on Korea, this interim government should be allowed to negotiate directly with Russia and the United States concerning the occupation of Korea and on other outstanding questions.

(3) This interim government should be admitted to the United Nations.

(4) Korean claims for reparations from Japan should be given early consideration, to aid in the rehabilitation of Korean economy.

(5) Full commercial rights should be granted to Korea, on a basis of equality with other nations, and with no favoritism extended to any nation.

(6) Korean currency should be stabilized and established on the international exchange.

(7) United States troops should remain in southern Korea until the two foreign armies of occupation should simultaneously withdraw.

Secretary Marshall had ready a proposal of his own, which on August 26, 1947, he submitted to Molotov, for discussion in a conference among representatives of Russia, the United States, China, and Great Britain. This proposal consisted of the following parts:

(1) In both the U. S. S. R. and U. S. zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

(2) These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea.

(3) The resulting Provisional Government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with

them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

(4) During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

(5) The Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn.

(6) The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea.

(7) Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.

These proposals were flatly rejected by the

Soviets, and the Korean question was then presented by the United States to the United Nations. A new chapter of the Korea story thus commenced. Before examining it, however, we shall, in the succeeding chapter, describe conditions inside Korea as they existed during the period of military occupation. And both as a preparation for this and as a summary here, it seems pertinent to present the complete text of a speech delivered by Syngman Rhee in Seoul, on August 27, 1947, in which the aims and the tragic dilemma confronting the Korean nationalists are revealed:

“The policy of the United States toward Korea during the period since the defeat of Japan has been to select the best available choice among three possible alternatives:

“(1) To establish a coalition government for Korea in agreement with Soviet Russia.

“(2) To establish a government in south Korea which for a number of years would be controlled politically and economically by the United States, during which time the Korean people would gain experience in the administration of their own affairs and thus be prepared for eventual complete independence.

“(3) To hold a general election and establish a national congress and a national government in accordance with the sovereign will of the people.

“Among these three alternatives, the first has finally been eliminated because of the deadlock that developed between the delegates of the United States and Soviet Russia in the Joint Commission. Therefore, the choice now rests between the remaining two possibilities.

The plan for a partial government, limited and controlled by the United States, seems at present to be receiving the most attention by American policy makers. Advocates of this policy declare that, since the Korean people were under Japanese rule during the past forty years, they necessarily lack political experience. They incline naturally to party factionalism and indulge needlessly in individual struggles for power. Such being the case, they contend, independence would not only confuse the Koreans in their domestic affairs, but would also cloud international relations. Therefore, they conclude, the United States will have to continue its control over south Korea for some time.

“We, however, irrevocably demand the acceptance of alternative number three. There are several reasons why we take this stand.

“The basic reason is that we do as a people unquestionably possess the ability for self-control and self-government. When we recover our political government we shall be able to solve our many pressing problems, both internal and international, better than any foreigners could solve them for us. This we absolutely understand and believe.

“Equally as important, if limitations and controls are placed upon us, under the theory that we are unable to govern ourselves, such controls may well last for several decades before a condition is achieved that would appear satisfactory in the eyes of those who now urge such external controls. We are deeply concerned by such reasoning. Our people are resolved for immediate independence and demand it. A long period of foreign control would not be tolerated. The result would be the sacrifice of many Korean lives, the useless expenditure by the United States of great sums of money, and a tragic weakening of the traditional friendship between Korea and America. Consequently, the adoption of the

second alternative would be a great disaster for both Korea and the United States.

"We who live in the midst of these conditions and who see these dangers must do our best to explain the reasons for the inapplicability of continued external control to the great statesmen and leaders of public opinion in the United States. Our job is to make them understand what is involved. The results of bad publicity carried on by the Japanese against Korea for forty years have implanted the idea in the world that Koreans are unable to govern themselves. Many people who influence world opinion and actions have that hazy idea in their heads, and we must help them get rid of it. In doing so, the best approach we can use is to show the world that our country is one—united and homogeneous.

"National unity does not mean that we should dissolve all our political and social organizations, and in name and principle become one party. But if we have the same purpose and have spiritual unity, we shall be able to agree upon common procedures for the accomplishment of our common goal. Since our entire people, including those of the north (in the Russian-occupied zone), do have the same objective, our spiritual unity has already been demonstrated.

"On the other hand, among those who advocate the second alternative, there are certain ones who emphasize the idea of disunity among the Korean people and point toward the divided rule of our country. We who see and know what is the purpose of this propaganda must work to make it useless. We must prove to the world that this propaganda is false. Let us forget about political and factional differences and rise to a higher level of common friendship. That is the only way by which such propaganda may be destroyed.

"Still others among us say that if we want real in-

dependence we must not cooperate with any other countries. This is empty talk, in view of the realities of our situation. At the present time, even the largest and richest countries, especially when they face a threat of war, must have the cooperation of other nations to strengthen them for such a venture. With empty hands, if we stand alone, with no one to give us sympathy and hope, how could we possibly clear avowed enemies of our independence from our land? To talk of not wanting help from other nations is misleading.

“The main stream of public opinion among our people is that, in order to restore our independence, we must hold an election and establish a government. But there are certain politicians among the Americans who differ with us, saying that it is their purpose to help the Korean people to work toward independence, but that at the present time independence is impossible. Under such circumstances, we must do everything to consolidate our unity in order to break up that idea and to achieve complete independence as soon as possible. We must get the sympathy and understanding of the American public in combatting this charge of incapacity to rule ourselves. If we should take the position of not cooperating with the Americans who want to help us, we shall lose a powerful supporting force. At the same time, we must keep in mind that there are some who have ulterior motives. By ourselves, how could we combat those ambitious men and achieve our goal of freedom?

“We want to cooperate with the United States. What must be clearly understood is that we shall not sacrifice our basic principles in an attempt to buy friendship. Therefore, our cooperation is directed along every line that brings us closer to our objective.

“There is a faction of public opinion in the United States that asserts Koreans do not want American

troops stationed in our country. They declare, then, that American troops may be withdrawn, regardless of what Russia may do in the north. They urge that an American withdrawal will save occupation expenses, and will remove one possibility of war. Any representation of that as a Korean desire is simply not true and is the result of either misunderstanding or the instigation of those who hope to gain by it. We must realize that there are certain groups among Americans who would gladly see Korea lose her independence. They are the ones who advocate withdrawal of American troops, while the Russians remain.

“We have never demanded that Americans alone withdraw, and we do not do so now. What the United States may decide to do about it is its own business. However, the division of Korea into two zones was brought about by a Russian-American agreement. The simple act of withdrawing could not relieve the Americans of their responsibilities. If certain Americans wished to withdraw their troops, the American people, who take seriously the principles of justice and responsibility, would not permit them to do so. There is, therefore, a real need for basic and mutual cooperation between Korea and the United States to solve the problem of the 38th parallel division.

“There are certain people who contend that, as long as American troops remain in Korea, our country cannot possibly be independent. This may be true theoretically, but it is not true actually. After the war ended, American troops remained in China for several months, but that did not interfere with Chinese independence. Many other countries in which troops were stationed retained their independence. This is a special arrangement necessitated by the war. At the present time, we are still in the midst of conditions born out of the war. We are enduring a division of our country that was a

war measure. There will simply be a retention of a small number of soldiers here to help us maintain peace and order, due to those war-born conditions. They will not interfere with our national rights nor with our sovereignty. Therefore, to say that it is impossible to have independence with occupation troops is not reasonable.

“In America the view is being expressed that sooner or later a conflict between the United States and Russia will come. Therefore, many believe they should settle their differences now, before the atomic bomb ceases to be an American monopoly. This view is not expressed by responsible officials, so that it cannot be said to be an official policy. It would be difficult for anyone to say when or whether the storm might break. But, if the situation darkens, the whole world would be dragged into it, and we alone could not avoid it. Since we are necessarily involved in the world struggle, we must have our own plans to govern our own actions on the international stage, not only for the sake of self-preservation, but also to fulfill our responsibilities as a member of the world family of nations. We cannot have a place in the world except through fulfillment of our duties and responsibilities.

“Regardless of how or when the next war might come, we could not draw aside from it, for if we did, when it concluded we should again be in the sad, miserable situation we are in today. After Pearl Harbor, we tried to get belligerent status by every means in our power, but certain officials in the State Department blocked our every attempt. Because of this opposition, we were never able to exert our full force toward the defeat of our enemy.

“If, at that time, the American State Department had heeded our pleas, we should have avoided this disaster of the North and South division of our

country. The United States would not have this headache today, caused by the troublesome Korean problem. At that time, in the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State, there were some officials who believed in the past Japanese propaganda, and did not pay any attention to Korea. As a result, we are now treated much worse than a defeated enemy nation. Such a lesson teaches that we must do everything possible to recover our sovereignty. We must rush every preparation for national defense. And we must solve the international and domestic problems confronting us in order that we may hold our rightful place among nations.

“As the essential element in solving all these international and domestic problems, we must establish our own government ourselves.

“In order to do our duty towards our own people, we must help them in their economic difficulties, restore our national sovereignty, and bear our part in the construction of world peace. We must hold our general election as soon as possible. We must recognize this as the first step in the reconstruction of our national life.”

8

DIVIDED AND OCCUPIED

THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN MEANT TO THE PEOPLE of Korea the realization of a dream they had treasured in their hearts for more than a full generation. At last they would be able to bring out of hiding their own flags. At last they could give up their enforced Japanized names and tear down the hated Shinto shrines. They could speak their own language. They could organize their own government and live under their own laws. At last they were to be free. At least, so they believed. It was in this spirit

that they joyously welcomed the arrival of the Russian and American troops.

The shock of disillusionment was not long delayed. They found to their incredulous amazement that the defeat of Japan meant they were losing one master in order to acquire two. By a secret agreement of which the origin has never been explained to them, their country was slashed in half, along the 38th Parallel. Their "liberators" wore a strange guise. The Russians in the north commenced at once upon a ruthless program aimed at destroying the professional, business and land-owning classes, at stamping out all independent nationalism, and at bringing the populace under the iron rule of a police state. In the south, the United States fumbled, having no program at all except the one based on the agreement with Russia, namely, to disarm the Japanese troops, send them home, and reunite the country under a government of its own choice (or, following the "trusteeship agreement" of December, under a four-power trusteeship). Since the State Department continued to hope for Russian concurrence in the plan to reunite Korea, our occupation of the south continued for three years on a basis of improvisation and day-by-day expediency.

The dilemma confronting Korean nationalists was tragic. In the north, from Cho Mansik, the great popular leader, on down to the headmen of the villages, the independence leaders were either jailed or escaped across the 38th Parallel. In the south, the nationalists found that their demand for independence brought them into sharp and direct conflict with the nation of all nations they realized was fundamentally their friend—the United States.

The tragically curious situation that developed in the American occupation zone was that the Korean nationalists stood for the American principle of democracy, free elections, and self-rule, whereas, the United States (attempting to honor its agreements with Russia) refused elections, denied independence, and found itself allied with Communist elements—which also opposed independence and favored trusteeship—in direct conflict with the nationalists.

This was only part of the dilemma. Even more maddening to the Americans in Korea and increasingly bewildering to the Koreans themselves was the fact that the American Military Government was never able to do even an elementary job of governing. The reasons for our failure were many, although they all stemmed from the fundamental fact that it

never was American policy to “govern” Korea. Our aim never evolved beyond the simple one of “preventing disease and unrest,” while we awaited Soviet concurrence in the plan for a joint withdrawal.

No attempt was made to provide personnel that knew the Korean language or even understood its history and the psychology of the people; the American occupation force always remained far removed from any sympathetic accord with the Korean people.

Our national genius for economic and technological development was never brought to bear; on the contrary, a State Department report for August, 1947, frankly admitted that factory production in south Korea was only 20% of normal, and it subsequently got even worse.

Nor was any progress made, beyond “study of the problems” in Washington, toward solving the increasingly dangerous problem of inflation; indeed, during the summer of 1946, Major General Archer Lerch, serving under Hodge as Military Governor, told a Korean news conference that “inflation is a Korean problem, to be solved by Koreans”—which, of course, was impossible until a Korean government was formed.

Aside from these basic omissions, the policies which General Hodge did put into effect were anathema to American feelings and contrary to the gradually evolving world-wide foreign policy of our country—the policy of seeking to contain further Communist advances while granting positive encouragement and help to independent democracy.

Charged as he was with attempting to reach an agreement with Russia, Hodge sought to expedite the possibility of reaching an accord by tolerating Communism in the American zone of occupation. In the fall of 1945 he organized the “Representative Democratic Council,” with 21 members, to serve as an advisory body. Dr. Rhee was appointed Chairman, and the membership was overwhelmingly nationalist. Shortly, the “leftists,” led by Lyuh Woon Heung (who favored coalition with the Communist north) withdrew from the Council, protesting that it was not “representative.” Since the Council could not be shaken from its demands for an election to set up a Korean government, Hodge disbanded it.

His next move was to appoint a “Coalition Committee” on which “rightist” (that is, anti-Communist) and “leftist” membership should be balanced. Dr. Rhee and Kim Koo refused

to participate, on the grounds that the Korean people were overwhelmingly anti-Communist and that to enforce "coalition" would be in effect to deliver the country over to Russia. This abstention left Hodge with a plan for coalition in which all anti-Communists refused to take part. Nevertheless, he went ahead with his plan and appointed as co-chairmen Lyuh Woon Heung and Kimm Kiusic, both of whom were denounced by Dr. Rhee and other nationalists as being Communists. Both Lyuh and Kimm Kiusic won the confidence of the Military Government by their suavity, genial good humor, and general concurrence with the trusteeship and coalition plans. Neither of them, however, had any large amount of popular support.

With the cooperation of the one-sided "Coalition Committee" Hodge moved, in the fall of 1946, to establish an Interim Legislature. This body was to have no authority to deal with international problems, nor with food, nor with the disposition of expropriated Japanese properties—and it was to be subject to an absolute veto by the Military Governor. Still further to insure that it could not get out of control, half its membership was to be appointed. The election of 45 members was held in

October, 1946, and resulted in the choice of 43 members of the nationalist federation and two Communists. Thereupon, General Hodge consulted the "Coalition Committee" and appointed 45 more members, one of whom was a follower of Dr. Rhee, 28 of whom were avowed "leftists" (the euphemism used in the Military Government to designate Communists) and 16 of whom were "independents." Kimm Kiusic was appointed by Hodge as President of the Interim Legislature.

The result was a legislative body with no powers and with a membership deliberately loaded against the expressed will of the electorate. This legislature organized itself and on January 20, 1947, passed its first bill—a denunciation of the plan of trusteeship! It was immediately informed that this bill was in the field of international relations and therefore outside its legal jurisdiction. Moreover, Ahn Jai Hong, the only member to vote against the bill, was immediately rewarded by the Military Governor by appointment as Chairman of a new administrative set-up designated as "The South Korean Interim Government." This interim "government" was given various administrative chores and was supposed to be a training ground for later self-government.

Actually, with its appointed head being selected because of his opposition to the will of the people, it never won the confidence of the masses. As a matter of fact, the acceptance of appointments within it came to be regarded as a form of treason, with the result that most of the Koreans whom the Americans hand-picked as the best available leadership were subsequently left out of the structure of the Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, the Interim Legislature became embroiled in a series of brawls, from which it finally emerged on June 30, 1947, with a law calling for a general election to be held at some early date to be specified by the Military Governor.

The feelings of the Korean people, meanwhile, were never in doubt. Despite all the persuasion and intimidation directed against them, all except the Communists refused to accept the trusteeship plan. In a survey conducted in March, 1947, by the Military Government, in the county of Kim Chun Pukto (which was believed to be representative) 23,343 families were queried. Only 1.9% favored trusteeship and 92.3% opposed it, with the rest not registering an opinion. This poll was taken just a few weeks before the last Russian-American Commission met to see whether some basis

might be found for reuniting Korea which the Soviet Union would accept. With such facts before it, the American delegation in this conference refused to budge from the position that all Koreans, regardless of their political views, must have a fair chance of participation in any all-Korea government.

If the American Military Government was bumbling in its lack of planning and in its curiously twisted policies, the Soviet occupation of the north was ruthless in its totalitarian "efficiency." Politically, north Korea was organized as a police state for the benefit of Russia, operating through the medium of a puppet state. To front for the Russians, a 35-year old expatriate was picked up and given the name of Kim Il-sung (a defunct patriot who had been famed in Korea for his guerrilla exploits against the Japanese). Wearing this proud name, and also a chestful of Soviet medals, Kim Il-sung was pictured all over north Korea on big posters, along side of that other "liberator of the masses," Joseph Stalin. On November 3, 1946, an "election" was held in north Korea (while the Americans were refusing any election on the grounds that to do so would violate the agreement with Russia). This "election" consisted of presenting voters

with a slate of 41 candidates to fill 41 positions on the Interim Peoples Committee of north Korea. With 96% of all adults herded to the polls, they were presented with the slate and confronted by two tables. On one table rested a white box, on the other a black box. The voter was to march up, under the supervision of Communist guards, and place a stone in the white box to vote for the slate, in the black box to vote against it. The result was a vote of 92.2% for the slate. Kim Il-sung declared with undoubted sincerity: "Although I won the election, I will not forget the Red Army!" The radio station in Pyongyang, the north Korean capital, boasted: "Yesterday's election in North Korea was really democratic for the first time in human history." The people of north Korea were in for a five-year period of constant propaganda, in which a new terminology had to be learned.

"Democratic" was to mean only "Communistic." The so-called democracy advocated by the United States and practised south of the 38th Parallel was really "decadent, capitalistic, imperialistic exploitation of the masses." Absolute Soviet control of northern Korea was "comradely assistance." American aid to south Korea was "colonialism, viciously

intent upon establishing a base from which to attack the free areas of Communism in Asia." The Russian refusal to permit the reunification of Korea was represented as "Soviet insistence that Korea be reunited according to the will of the people." The efforts by the United States and the United Nations to reunite Korea upon the basis of a free election was "the hypocritical mask of imperialism, seeking to enslave the free Korean people under the ruthless rule of the bloated American Wall Street capitalists." The single-slate elections of north Korea (three of which have by now been held) were "democratic." The secret-ballot elections in south Korea, with (on May 10, 1950) 2,052 candidates for 210 Assembly seats, held under the observation of the United Nations Commission and of foreign newsmen alert to discover any sensationalism they could report, were to the Communist propagandists "fake elections imposed on the people of south Korea by bloody-handed police power." Kim Il-sung, minion of the Soviets, was "a national hero leading his people in freedom to unity and prosperity." Syngman Rhee, the life-long fighter for Korean independence, who had battled both Communism and American reluctance to secure the final establishment of a truly independent

Republic, was tagged as “a blood-thirsty dictator,” “a tool of American imperialism,” “oppressor of the people,” and called many other less printable names. Thus ran the new lexicography of the Communist north. What we should not forget, however, was that this line of propaganda was poured upon the eyes and ears and minds of the people for five full years, with truth from the outside rigorously excluded. Many of the soldiers in the army that attacked south Korea were mere children when the Communist barrage was first loosed upon them, and never had any opportunity to view world conditions except as Moscow chose to present them.

Militarily, north Korea was subjected at once to conscription of its young men into an army that soon reached a force of 200,000 men (this while any army at all was denied to south Korea on the grounds that to have one would violate the Russian-American agreement). This army was armed at first with Japanese weapons, then with Soviet and German weapons—with tanks, planes, and heavy artillery. It was rigorously trained by Soviet officers. It was given battle experience by frequent incursions across the 38th Parallel in attacks against the south, and by heavy mass fighting

with the Chinese Reds against the Nationalist Government of China.

The military situation in south Korea, meanwhile, was deliberately kept weak. It was in part the American intention to prove beyond the shadow of any doubt that the United States was not building any military base from which to threaten Vladivostok. In part, the weakness stemmed from American fears that a strong south Korean army would be tempted to seek reunification of the country by an attack upon the north—thereby risking precipitation of World War III. There was, of course, some legitimate grounds for this fear. No Koreans, either north or south, ever accepted the fact of division of their country as anything but a temporary, foreign-imposed interruption of the 4,000-year-old Korean unity. Both the northern “Peoples Republic” and the Republic of Korea always claimed sovereignty over the entire nation. It would have been both politically impossible and morally inadmissible for the Republic of Korea not to maintain the determination that sometime, by whatever means might be required, the north should be brought back into union with the rest of the Korean people. President Syngman Rhee always hoped that this might be accomplished

by international agreement. But he consistently refused to admit that the Republic would rest satisfied for the division to continue. As he declared over and over again, however, so long as the United States and the United Nations retained responsibility for achieving the reunification of Korea, he would not violate the trust they placed in him by any attack across the 38th Parallel.

The military situation that existed in Korea during the past two years was extremely irregular and difficult. As the price for providing light arms to the troops of the Republic, the United States exacted a solemn promise that under no provocation whatsoever would the Republic troops ever set foot upon the northern side of the 38th Parallel. To minimize any possibility of clashes, they were to hold defensive positions from one to three miles south of the line. They could, of course, repel attacks, but could never attack the bases from which the attacks were launched.

In May, 1949, just thirteen months before the Communist assault against the Republic, I visited the city of Kaesong, lying just three miles south of the 38th Parallel. The bridge in the south of the city, streets, and walls were torn and scared by mortar shells and rifle bul-

lets, from a Communist attack launched just a few days before. Children and women were still trembling with the horror of a night-long rain of shells upon their homes, and from the dread of when the next foray would come.

Rising above Kaesong and dominating the city is a hill designated on military charts as Hill No. 291. It lies south of the 38th Parallel, yet was in no-man's-land, because of the agreement made by the Republic to keep its troops well back from the Communist-held line. On a height rising in the very center of the city, the Republic troops had erected a network of trenches and barbed wire entanglements, from which the city's defenses were to be maintained. When the Communist troops swooped down in an attack, they occupied Hill No. 291 without resistance, and swept on to capture another ridge flanking the city on the east. A counter attack by Republic troops a few hours later drove them back, where they enjoyed safe sanctuary behind the 38th Parallel. On that particular occasion, the government of the Republic was severely reprimanded by American officials because the southern troops did, for a few hours, occupy Hill No. 291.

This was the situation which occurred all along the 38th Parallel for the past two years.

The Communist forces could choose their own time and place of attack, at their own convenience—and hundreds of such attacks were made. They could choose any objective they wished, and attack in whatever force they pleased. And when their mission was accomplished, they could retreat to the 38th Parallel and there laugh at the hapless south Korean troops. This was the situation when, on June 29, 1949, the last 7,500 American troops in Korea were withdrawn, leaving only a 500-man military training mission behind.

When the army of the Republic of Korea was first recruited in the summer of 1948, American officials were determined that it should not be a “political army,” with allegiance to any particular individuals or parties. They had had their fill of such armies in China. Consequently, no tests of recruits were permitted except physical examinations. No screening to keep out Communists was allowed. If a volunteer had good teeth and a sound physique, he was in. As a direct result of this policy, infiltrated Communists organized a revolt within the Republic army in October, 1948, and seized the towns of Yosu and Sunchon in the south, bloodily slaughtering hundreds of the inhabitants. Cleaning up these rebellious troops

took a year of fighting; but cleaning out all Communists from the army was a continuing job which the Republic never could be sure was completed.

The army of the Republic of Korea was armed with equipment left behind by the United States, with an estimated original value of \$110,000,000. This equipment consisted primarily of rifles, machine guns, and light bazookas. It was intended to serve for police action within south Korea, and did serve that need adequately. It never was intended to serve as a defense against an attack in force from outside; when the test came, it was, of course, wholly inadequate to the need.

The boast of American military advisers that this south Korean army was "the best fighting force of its size in all Asia" sounded hollow indeed during the first weeks of the fighting, while the northern tank-led battalions were sweeping south. Many American commentators rushed to the conclusion that the force was weak in morale and in fighting spirit. Some went on to conclude that the Republic must have been a bad government or the troops would fight better to preserve it. Then American troops went into action, armed very much as the Korean army was. The same retreats

continued. When the Republic of Korea was reorganized further south, it was repeatedly commended in MacArthur's communiques for its fine fighting spirit and for notable success in holding its designated portions of the line.

The military disparity between northern and southern Korea was only one of the many differences between the two areas. The Communist north hastened to put into effect its widely advertised "land-reform" program—a program for which many half-informed American apologists had nothing but praise. Since this Communist type of "land reform" is presumed to be the greatest single appeal of Communist rule for the landlord-oppressed masses of Asia (and Eastern Europe, too) it is well to consider it in some detail.

In truth, the masses were landlord-ridden. The annual rental on the farm plots ran from 50% to 60% and even 70% of the total crop. There is little good that can or should be said for the system. When the Communists entered northern Korea they seized the land and imprisoned, drove out, or killed the landlords. Then they set up Communist committees in each of the "goons" or districts. These committees "distributed" the land to the farmers who proved to be "cooperative." They neither

gave nor sold them the land. The farmers received no title to it. They could not sell it, leave it to their children, or even be assured that they would have it for their own use from month to month. All was to be as the Communist committees should decide. This is "land reform." No rentals were collected from the land, but "taxes" did have to be paid. Moreover, the taxation was set up on a basis of assessment. Instead of arbitrarily taking a certain proportion of the crop, Communist assessors would determine how much rice or other produce the land should produce. The tax fixed was a given percentage of this "proposed yield." Once again, the farmers who were most "cooperative" could expect a low assessment, whereas all those whose loyalties to the new regime were suspect were subjected to impossibly high quotas. "Land reform" thus became a major weapon for holding the masses under subjection.

The north Korean regime also made an agreement with the Soviet Union to supply an annual labor force of 50,000 young men. This, again, was not only a drain upon the resources of the north, but proved a very potent means of subjecting the populace. The Communist rulers could always use the threat of conscript-

ing the sons of a family as a means of ensuring absolute obedience.

South Korea, under American occupation, was relieved of all such totalitarian economic measures. However, the situation in the south was even more desperate economically than in the north. The reasons were many.

In the first place, some two million north Koreans fled from the supposedly beneficial rule of the "land-reforming" Communists to seek sanctuary south of the 38th Parallel. Another two million repatriates from Japan and China returned to the south. These four million people constituted a tremendous problem. There were no houses for them, no clothing for them, far too little of consumers goods, and not even enough food. South Korea is the agricultural part of the peninsula. Normally, Korea produced so much food that the Japanese, during their 40-year rule, were accustomed to taking from 40 to 50% of the annual rice crop. But, during the war years, the fields had not been fertilized. Food production was further hampered by the fact that Japanese fleeing from Korea at the end of the war took with them all the fishing boats that were large enough to cross the 125-mile Straits of Korea to Japan. Restoring the productivity

of the fields was a major part of the American task in Korea, and succeeded so notably that, in 1950, 100,000 tons of rice were allocated for export.

Factory and mining productivity did not fare so well, however. Some 90% of all incorporated wealth in Korea had been taken over by the Japanese. The Oriental Development Company was a huge, sprawling organization which owned most of the richest farm lands, the mines, the factories, and held the fishing rights. The American Military Government assumed a trusteeship over this property, until it could be turned over to a Korean government. However, with no intention or program to rule south Korea, no provision was ever made for development of these productive resources. The Administration in Washington never asked, and Congress never appropriated, funds for providing the necessary machinery, repair parts, or raw materials. Consequently, factories could be operated only on a basis of "cannibalism;" that is, as various factories fell into disrepair, parts were interchanged so that one or more of them could be kept running.

Three years of "liberation" left Korea worse off, physically, than it had been even under the harsh rule of the Japanese. When I was in

Seoul in the summer of 1946, 10,000 families were sleeping in the streets. In the second largest city, Pusan, the Military Governor estimated that 35,000 individuals were homeless. General MacArthur's summation of conditions in Korea in the late fall of 1946 cited 2 million families without homes. The first of June, 1946, rice was selling on the black market for 2,400 Won a bushel. By mid-August, it was 4,500 Won. By 1950 the price had multiplied by ten. In the restaurants, a simple "blue-plate special" businessmen's lunch for three cost 375 Won. College professors were being paid 2,000 Won a month. Since that time, prices multiplied eight and ten times and salary incomes for "white collar" workers more than doubled.

Meanwhile, the majority of former Japanese-owned plants were either closed entirely, or operating at only 30 to 40% of capacity. Less than 20% of total productive facilities were being utilized. Unemployment ranged as high as 30% in some provinces.

Acute shortages of raw materials, replacements, and machine tools were among the basic causes of the factory closures. Another cause was the lack of any adequate policy, pending establishment of a Korean government, by

which ownership of the expropriated factories could be transferred to Koreans. Other factors were shortages of enterprise capital and skilled management.

The difficulties confronting Korean businessmen are illustrated in the experience of one of them, who had served for twenty years as an aviator for Japanese companies. At the close of the war, he paid two million Won for 24 Japanese army planes, with which he expected to start an aviation school on the outskirts of Seoul. Then, by order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, all Japanese army planes had to be dismantled or destroyed. His planes were dismantled, and held for him by the Military Government. He was granted permission to buy United States army surplus planes, but would have to pay for them in American money. This he could not do, for no exchange of Korean currency to American dollars was permitted. His two million Won were tied up, and he had no recourse except to wait until it should be possible for him to get the planes with which he might open his school.

Statistically, the currency situation is highlighted in the facts that during the decade 1937-48 the amount of money in circulation

increased 300 times, prices of some items as much as 533 times, and wages for manual labor about 151 times. The Bank of Chosen paper Won in circulation in 1937 amounted to 280 million. By the time the Republic was inaugurated, it was well over 30 billion. Some 3.2 billion of this excess currency resulted from the Japanese printing of this amount just prior to their defeat, to pay as "separation bonuses" to their employees. A large amount of it was promptly remitted to Japan, but remained a charge against the Bank of Chosen. Another one and a half billion sifted down from the Russian zone, where a military currency was substituted for the Bank of Chosen notes. The remainder of the postwar increase, about twenty-two billion in paper Won was printed during the American occupation to use for meeting the governmental operating deficits, and for governmental purchases of rice.

At the beginning of the occupation, the official rate for internal exchange, to finance purchases by the Military Government from Koreans, was set at 15 to 1. Later it was raised to 50 to 1. Black-market operations reportedly have been conducted on the basis of from 1,000 to 4,000 to 1.

Meanwhile, the Korean Won was not ad-

mitted to international circulation, a restriction applied otherwise only to Japan and Germany. One reason was the difficulty of finding an exchange ratio fair to Koreans and one that presumably would remain stable. Another difficulty lay in the zonal division of Korea, and the lack of any over-all government.

The best American record in south Korea was made in connection with the judiciary. Shortly after arrival of the American troops in Korea, a plan was put into operation that accorded the Korean courts practical autonomy. Cases involving Koreans alone were all tried before Korean judges, without American supervision, and, before the occupation ended, even cases involving American offenses against Koreans were heard in Korean courts, subject to American Military Government review. Rapid progress was made in eliminating the evils of the Japanese "thought-control" legal processes. Jails were improved and the police system thoroughly reorganized. A Police Academy was established in Seoul, in which thousands of officers were trained in Western methods and psychology.

Necessarily, many of the details of administration of governmental departments and of expropriated Japanese properties were entrusted-

ed to Koreans. The Military Governor announced a "Koreanization" program, through which he declared the intention of reducing himself and his men to mere rubber stamps, with Koreans doing the work, carrying the responsibilities, and exercising the authority. Unquestionably, a great deal of good was accomplished under this system. Many Koreans received practical experience they could not get under the Japanese. In many instances Korean judgment prevented grievous errors that would have been made through sheer ignorance of the country had the whole administration been left in the hands of the soldiers.

The program of "Koreanization" suffered, however, from two vital weaknesses. In the first place, authority, while the Military Government remained, could not in reality be transferred to the Koreans. Only confusion, misunderstanding, and a succession of personal feuds resulted from the pretense that to some degree it had been. Final authority simply is not divisible. It rests, and must rest, with those who really rule. In the second place, the Koreans in administrative positions were there by appointment of the Military Government. They included many able and self-sacrificing men. But they also included many self-seeking

opportunists who were willing to be completely “cooperative” with the Military Government—and who did what they could to insure its continuance at the expense of Korean independence—for their own personal advantage. At the best, such an appointive system could only fill the gap until an election should be held.

Many Koreans told me during the period of American occupation of south Korea that actually they were worse off than they had been even under the hated Japanese. Their nation was divided. The 38th Parallel cut off the normal exchanges of goods and persons which ordinarily flowed freely and of course regularly. Even mail could be exchanged between the north and the south only once a week, and then it was heavily censored. The street cars in the cities did not operate as well as they had before the occupation. With factories and mines closed down, unemployment was serious. As one Korean explained to me: “Under the Japanese we worked very hard for very low wages. But now we have no work and no wages at all.” The Japanese had always taken the best houses and the best of all available facilities for themselves. But so (quite understandably) did the Americans. One young

American soldier explained to me how heart-breaking his assignment was. His duty was to stand guard for six hours a day over the huge pile of firewood with which his barracks was heated. Inside, were roaring fires; outside, the winter was as cold as it is in New England. Crowds of Koreans gathered around, many dressed in rags and blue with cold, staring at the pile of firewood. Those who could speak a few words of English begged him to step around the corner for a moment so that they could snatch a piece and run. Of course, no American and few Koreans wanted our troops of occupation to sink to the living level the Koreans themselves were then forced to endure. But the notable disparity of living conditions between the "liberators" and the "liberated" nevertheless added to the difficulties of adjustment.

Accompanying the political and economic disruption there was an inevitable weakening of the moral tone. A people without direction of their own affairs, and without a chance to feed and clothe their families by honest endeavor became understandably tolerant of the means they had been able to use. Black-market activities, beggary, or theft were the only alternative expedients for some. Homeless, un-

employed refugees, without money and removed from their friends, created a specially heavy problem. Bribery proved as expeditious in some instances under the Military Government as it was necessary under the Japanese. Mob terrorism seemed to some the only available substitute for the lawful self-determination that, as a people, they had been denied.

But the Communist attack upon the Republic of Korea has ended all speculation about the imposed differences between south and north. Now that the battle has been joined, there seems no reason to doubt that the ancient boundaries, newly pledged by the United Nations, will be restored.

9

THE UNITED NATIONS APPROVE

THE UNITED NATIONS REACHED A DRAMATIC climax in its sponsorship of the Republic of Korea when the Security Council voted 9-0 (with Yugoslavia abstaining) to condemn the Communist invasion of south Korea and to call for an end to hostilities. This vote—which perhaps meant fully as much to the United Nations as it did to Korea—occurred just twenty-four hours after the attack was launched. These certainly were the twenty-four most important

hours in the ages-long struggle to achieve collective security for peace. It is doubtful if their full significance even yet has been assessed.

The promptness with which the action was taken was no less remarkable than it was crucial in setting the stage for the eventual Communist defeat. When the north Korean Communist army first rolled across the 38th Parallel, it was believed to be merely another of the many "forays in force" by which the border had been violated. It was several hours before the full extent of the attack could be realized. The news reached the Department of State in Washington near midnight Saturday. By 3 A. M., Secretary Acheson had checked with President Truman (who was in Independence, Missouri) by phone and the decision had been reached to appeal to the United Nations. Secretary General Trygve Lie was called out of bed. He immediately informed the Security Council delegates of his intention to summon an emergency meeting for that (Sunday) afternoon. Within the next few hours, the delegates were able to get in touch with their home governments where every one of them settled the difficult policy question of how to vote on an issue so vital that it might cast the balance between war and peace. Within a few hours, the United Nations Commission in

Korea was able to get a report through to Lake Success, certifying that the attack was indeed an aggressive breach of the peace by the Communist regime. The fear of many that any international organization must of necessity prove too slow and cumbersome ever to meet an emergency was happily proved to be unfounded. And the United Nations itself, which had been floundering hopelessly and in helpless frustration because of Soviet obstructionism and boycott, found to its own amazement and relief that it could act quickly, decisively, and (in Russia's absence) practically unanimously. The vote that saved Korea also may prove to have been the decisive factor in saving the United Nations.

The action of the United Nations—followed promptly by the independent approval of 53 sovereign nations—proved another fact which had been slowly crystallizing: namely, that outside of the U. N., but parallel to it, another unorganized but potent force had been developing—the community of the free world. It had no officers, no charter, no schedule of meetings. But under the pressure of Soviet imperialism and obstructionism in the United Nations, the free nations of the world had been discovering a depth of unity of purpose and kinship of feelings far deeper and more significant than they had

hoped or expected. In reality, it was this amorphous "union of the free" (operating partly within and partly outside the U. N. structure) which affirmed and supported the action on Korea. Regardless of what Russia may hereafter do or try to do to block collective world action, this community of democracies has now discovered its will and ability to act in concert. Nothing can prevent its further growth of unity.

The first movement by the United Nations to deal with the Korean question was cautious and gingerly. It was on September 17, 1947, that the State Department, "finally convinced of the futility of further negotiations with the Soviet Union," asked the U.N. to place the question on the agenda of the second regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet Government promptly objected and countered with a proposal that all occupation troops be withdrawn, leaving the Korean people to settle the problem by themselves—with an army of 200,000 in the northern zone and none in the south. Many delegates to the United Nations were reluctant to take up the question. They felt that the United States had a "hot potato" on its hands which it desired to get rid of by saddling responsibility on the U. N. Many conversations had to be held to convince the delegations that

the United States fully intended to continue its aid and special responsibilities in Korea, before the British Commonwealth, the South American republics, the Arabian League and other regional associations were convinced of the desirability of making Korea a U. N. charge. After these initial fears had been resolved, the General Assembly voted on November 14, by 43-0, with the Soviet bloc abstaining, that elections should be held in all Korea under U. N. observation and that as a result of the elections a Korean government should be organized.

A U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea convened in Seoul in the following January and sought entry into northern Korea. The only reply was a reminder by Andrei Gromyko of the "negative attitude" of the Soviet Union toward U. N. jurisdiction in Korea. Unable to carry out its directive, the Temporary Commission appealed back to its parent body, and in February the Interim Committee of the U. N. voted by 31-2 that the Commission should proceed to observe elections "in all parts of Korea accessible to" it. The debate in general dealt with the problem of whether setting up a separate government in south Korea might not have the effect of perpetuating the division of the country. The conclusion of the great majority of the dele-

gates was that such a freely elected government was the inalienable right of the Korean people and might serve as a rallying point around which eventual unity could be achieved.

The election date was set for May 10, and a vigorous and extensive campaign was conducted. The Communists ostentatiously “boycotted” the election, as did Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic, leading some foreign commentators to mourn that the election could have little real significance when such influential factions took no part in it. Actually, the boycott had the primary effect of showing how little influence these dissident factions actually had, for over 86% of all eligible adults (men and women) registered, and on election day 92.5% of all those registered went to the polls and cast their ballots.

Specifically, the election was to choose 200 members for a National Assembly, with an additional 100 seats being held vacant to be filled when possible by a supervised election in north Korea. This Assembly was to be charged with the duty of preparing a constitution and organizing a government. Many delegates to the U. N. still felt that this “government” should have little more than advisory functions, under full U. N. supervision, until union of the north and south could be effected. However, the election

was won overwhelmingly by Korean nationalists under the leadership of Dr. Rhee, and no such temporizing with the Korean determination for independence proved possible.

The Communists did their best to disrupt the election. In February they called a general strike (which never materialized) and instigated rioting in which 48 persons were killed. During the election they engaged in more terrorism, during which 100 voters were slain. Nothing, however, could keep the Korean people from the polls. For all of them it was their first free election. But they lined up at the polling places early in the morning and patiently took their turns in the closeted polling booths. When the day ended, the determination of the people for a government of their own was manifest to the world.

The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea withdrew to Shanghai to study the reports of its observers, and on June 25 issued a report that "a reasonable degree of free atmosphere wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected" had prevailed during the elections, and that the results of the balloting constituted "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the

inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." Many Americans who were in Korea at the time, and of whom a considerable portion had been opposed to Rhee because of his opposition to the program of the Military Government, declared that the election was conducted with a fairness and a fullness of free discussion which surpassed all their expectations.

After the election, the Assembly convened and proceeded rapidly to establish the machinery of government. Observers were pleased (and surprised) that this body of men, whom many had doubted were yet capable of self-government, "carried on its activities in extremely orderly and democratic fashion and with intense enthusiasm and purposefulness." On June 12 the Assembly addressed an appeal to the people of north Korea to permit a free election and through it to join in the establishment of an independent nation. The Communist regime refused to listen.

With no solidly organized political parties, 85 members of the new Assembly classed themselves as "independents." Another 48 classed themselves as followers of Dr. Rhee, and 30 listed membership in the Democratic party, with the remainder scattered into various splinter parties.

When the Assembly first convened on May 31,

it elected Rhee as chairman by a vote of 189 to 8. On July 19, by a vote of 180 to 16, Dr. Rhee was elected President of the Republic. President Rhee's appointee as Prime Minister, Lee Bum Suk, was confirmed on August 3 by a vote of 110 to 84, thus giving evidence of a sound working majority and also of the existence of a healthful "watch dog" minority. During the succeeding two years the Assembly behaved very much as democratic legislative bodies always do. It was dilatory in voting new taxes, it was comparatively lavish in its budgetary provisions, and it voted with the Government on some issues and against it on others. There was no sign of the disciplined executive control which marks Communist legislatures!

By the time the Korean question came up on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations, meeting in Paris, in December, 1948, the U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea had ample opportunity to study and report on the workings of this new government. The Republic had been inaugurated in Seoul with impressive ceremonies on August 15. As though nature intended to symbolize the course of the struggle for independence, the day was heavy with rain clouds, but just as President Rhee stepped to the rostrum to read his in-

augural address, the sun broke through with a warm stream of propitious light. Flanked by Generals Hodge and MacArthur on one side and members of the United Nations Commission on the other, President Rhee presented his message: "We must plan and work for the future."

Promising that "Liberalism must be understood, respected, and protected," he declared: "Liberals, certain intellectuals, and progressive-minded youth are often critical of the necessary processes of establishing an organized State. Many patriots, judging too quickly of their words and deeds, have condemned such critics as dangerous and destructive. Actually, freedom of thought is the basic foundation of a democratic State. Such people must be protected in their right to disagree. If we seek to overwhelm them, it must be with embarrassment from the fullness of our respect and tolerance for their views. In the eternal struggle between right and wrong, we must stand firm in the faith that truth eventually will prevail."

On the crucial issue of the continued division of the country, President Rhee said: "We await with hope and determination the missing third of our representatives from the north. The 38th Parallel division is no part of our choice and is wholly foreign to our destiny. Nothing must be

neglected to keep wide open the door to reunion of the whole nation. The Everwhite Mountains are as surely our boundary to the north as are the Straits of Korea to the south. No temporary international situation can obscure what has been established through the centuries as historic fact.”

The address concluded with a realistic appraisal of the problems to be faced: “We realize that, without the good will and assistance of free nations, the many problems before us might be insuperable. But we know we have their good will and we feel we can count on their assistance. Above all, we need and we count upon the loyalty, the devotion to duty, and the determination of all Korean citizens. With hopeful hearts and minds alert, we take into our own hands today a sovereign republican government that will long endure.”

When the General Assembly of the U. N. in Paris heard the report of its Korean Commission, it voted 48-6 to approve the Republic of Korea as “the only lawful government” in Korea. It also voted to send back to Korea a U. N. Commission charged with the following duties:

“(1) Lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the

principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November, 1947;

“(2) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea;

“(3) Be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people;

“(4) Observe the actual withdrawal of the occupying forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred; and for this purpose, if it so desires, request the assistance of military experts of the two occupying Powers.”

The Temporary Commission to Korea had consisted of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, and Syria. The Ukraine had been appointed to membership, but refrained without even bothering formally to decline. The succeeding Commission consisted of representatives of the same governments, with the exception of Canada.

The Commission spent an extremely frustrating year in Korea, during which time it sought repeatedly to get into communication with the Communist regime in north Korea, but it never succeeded. It observed several by-elections held

in the Republic of Korea and from time to time offered suggestions regarding the further implementation of democracy. But, faced by the stubborn obstructionism of the Soviet Union, it never was able to carry out its basic function of observing elections in the north.

Meanwhile, acting within the framework of the United Nations sponsorship of the Republic of Korea, and in accord with general American policies of assisting free governments that were resisting Communist subversion, the United States extended its program of ECA aid to the Republic. On January 1, 1949, the former Military Government program of economic assistance was transferred to the ECA, with funds for the remainder of the fiscal year amounting to \$60,000,000. Mr. Arthur Bunce was appointed ECA Administrator in Korea, and Dr. Edgar A. J. Johnson as Director of the Korea program in Washington. Both men had served under the Military Government in Korea, and were aware of the needs of the country. Within the limits of the time, personnel, and funds available, substantial and most encouraging progress was made by the ECA and the Korean government, working in close harmony, toward the improvement of economic conditions.

Appearing before Congressional committees

in January and February, 1950, Paul Hoffman, Director of the ECA, and Secretary Acheson testified to the steady and rapid progress of the Republic. Hoffman described it as "nothing less than spectacular," and reminded his hearers that "Korea had been a very sick country at the close of the war. Trade outlets to Japan were broken. Important commercial relations with Manchuria and other yen-block areas were cut off. And vital domestic trade with north Korea was completely blocked by the 'iron curtain' which left south Korea desperately short of coal, fertilizer and electric power." Secretary Acheson praised the political stability achieved by the Rhee government, and went on: "Despite the problems with which the Republic of Korea is beset, both internally and externally, and despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of stability and public order have continued to improve, and the threat of communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained."

In a Puckish spirit of irresponsibility, the House of Representatives in January defeated further economic aid to Korea by one vote, then, a few weeks later, reversed itself by a substantial majority and voted \$100,000,000 for the next

fiscal year. This was subsequently ratified by the Senate.

President Rhee, meanwhile, was having trouble with the National Assembly that is somewhat reminiscent of the problems which from time to time confront American Presidents. Under the leadership of Speaker Shin Icky, a group of Assemblymen sought to shear the Presidency of its executive powers and to make the cabinet responsible directly to the Assembly. After weeks of debate and considerable excitement, this proposed constitutional amendment was defeated. The Assembly, also, mindful of the fact that new elections were due in May, 1950, showed a not unnatural reluctance to vote higher taxes. Since it concurrently yielded to the requests of cabinet members for larger and larger appropriations, the budget became badly unbalanced. With no system for selling government bonds, the only recourse was the printing of more paper money. Thus, the amount of Won in circulation continued to increase until it reached the dangerous height of 73 billions. The salient fact was that the nation faced far more urgent demands for services than it had resources with which to pay for them. Because of all the factors reviewed in earlier chapters, arising in part from the division of the country, in part from the

post-war confusion, in part from the presence in the south of over 4,000,000 repatriates, and in part from the heavy and continuous Communist pressure from across the 38th Parallel, the various ministries (Social Welfare, Education, Defense, and Commerce and Industry, in particular) needed far more funds than were properly available in order to perform the basic functions with which they were charged. Denying these essential demands was something few responsible legislators could do. Especially with an election coming up, their tendency was to vote funds, avoid taxes, and hope the gathering economic and fiscal problems could be left to their successors in office. In order to impel them to face, rather than escape from, these problems, President Rhee proposed that, if need be, the election be postponed from May to September. In any event, he insisted, a balanced budget must be adopted. Secretary Acheson and ECA Director Hoffman both dispatched notes to the Republic, urging that continued American aid depended upon sound fiscal policies and holding of the election on the scheduled date. The Assembly responded by quickly adopting the budget and approving the date of May 30 for the election.

The U. N. Commission to Korea found at last

in the election a specific project in accord with its instructions. Observing the campaigning of the 2,052 candidates for 210 seats in the Assembly, it certified that the campaigning was free and vigorous and that the election of May 30 was "fair and free." Despite the presumed difficulties of developing democracy among an Asian people, and in the face of steady Communist pressure, democracy worked in the Republic of Korea. Following the pattern of the 1948 election, 140 of the new Assemblymen were listed as "independents." The number of Assemblymen avowedly opposing Rhee's leadership was reduced from 70 to 27. Rhee's personal followers in the second Assembly numbered 48. The Communist attack of June 25 came too soon after the election to permit the new Assembly to organize and indicate in voting tests the precise strength of the pro- and anti-government groupings. Ray Richards, of INS, a newsman of considerable experience in observing Korean politics, estimated, however, that about 150 of the new Assemblymen would support the general tenor of the Rhee program. This estimate is widely at variance with opinions expressed by some American commentators who (knowing little or nothing of the Korean penchant for running as "independents") had leaped to the

conclusion that the preponderant number of independents in the new Assembly amounted to “repudiation” of President Rhee’s government.

A *New York Times* editorial of June 2, 1950, expressed a conclusion of genuine significance when it said: “The character of the election that has just been held in the independent republic that is functioning in the southern half of Korea is probably more important than its outcome. Under the conditions of extreme pressure that existed, it is remarkable that an election could be held at all. Candid, objective comment has been to the effect that it was genuinely ‘free,’ a real opportunity for the voters to express themselves. . . . Democracy is being learned the hard way and from the ground up, but the Koreans are certainly showing a praiseworthy determination to learn it.”

The Communist attack against the Republic has confronted the United Nations with both a challenge and an opportunity to end at last the disastrous division of the country along the 38th Parallel. This division never has had any legal sanction, beyond a merely temporary line to effect the surrender of Japanese armies. Neither the Republic of Korea nor the “People’s Democratic Republic” established by the Soviets in the north recognized it as permanent. The United

Nations explicitly demanded the end of the division in its vote of November 14, 1947, for an election in all Korea, and through the subsequent efforts of the U. N. Commission in Korea to achieve an all-Korea election. President Truman and the Department of State have repeatedly declared that the United States "never" intended the dividing line to be more than a temporary expedient. As a result of the Security Council demand of June 27, 1950, for police action to restore "peace and security" in Korea, it should be expected that one outcome of the fighting in Korea will be the reunification of the country, with a U. N.-observed election in the north to choose the "missing one-third" of the nation's representatives. Out of evil there thus may emerge at least that amount of good.

10

CONSTITUTIONAL HOPES

KOREA OFFERS AN ADMIRABLE ILLUSTRATION OF the interdependency of the "one world" which this globe has become. Theoretically, a sovereign government should be able to evolve its own national pattern in its own way. Actually, Korea has been subject to severe external pressures that drastically limited and shaped the kind of decisions it has been able to make. The status of Korea is a simple example of the futilities and tensions of the post-Yalta world.

The assets of the new Republic were impres-

sive. In the first place, it was being formed after a full generation of Japanese rule, separating it from its 40-century history of monarchial and feudal control. Painful as was the period of Japanese domination, it provided at least a complete break with anachronistic elements of Korea's past. The monarchial tradition was too distant to be a factor in today's thinking. In this sense, the new Republic started with a clean slate, enabled to think forward rather than back; free to draw at will from the world's stock of fresh economic and political formulations.

In the second place, Korea had a strongly-knit homogeneity. Foreign power could draw an iron curtain across its middle, but no power can separate the loyalties and destinies of a people whose geographic boundaries have remained unchanged for a thousand years. The thirteen provinces of Korea are a closely integrated union. The oceans and the mountains that enclose them are natural boundaries that have encouraged unity. In language, customs, history, and psychology, the Koreans are one people; their common struggle for freedom has sealed indissolubly the union of their hearts and minds.

In the third place, the people of Korea, untrained in technology and large-scale administration, are industrious, intelligent, and adapt-

able. Moreover they retained an indomitable will to self-determination, which they have proved as few peoples are called upon to do, eager to meet the opportunity and to bear the burdens of the freedom they sought so long.

What is the Korean political pattern? Not the old monarchy, for that is completely gone. Not the Japanese governmental system, for that was bitterly hated, and, besides, almost no Koreans had a large enough part in it to be able to continue it. Neither, we must recognize, is the ancient way either Communism or the present Western-style democracy. Korean political traditions are almost as remote from present American political organization on the one hand as they are from Karl Marx on the other. Sheer military power was able to impose one alien pattern in the north, and real democracy had begun to take root in the south. But the masses of the people have been only slowly affected by either in their ways of living and thinking.

The actual political roots of the Korean people are twofold. The first fundamental fact is that their government has always been chiefly local in character. The second is that their system of political ethics has always been Confucian. Upon these two bases the structure of their new government could be firmly and safely built.

Korean political units have from time immemorial had their roots in city blocks and villages. Each base unit consists of several hundred families. The block leader or village mayor is the top government official with whom the people were in close contact. It is through him that laws were administered and taxes collected. The Japanese police power was a centralized force imposed upon this system, but it was an alien and hated innovation. To the average Korean the local "head man" was the source of authority and the repository of governmental responsibility.

As in American cities, these head men gained their power by devious means, usually independently of the people's direct choice. They were, however, subject to the public opinion of communities at once individualistic and unusually stable. Korean families normally occupy the same homesteads for many generations. The local units are bound together by intermarriage and by bonds of common interest that transcend personal ambitions. Everyone in the block or village knows what basic policies are in the long run good for them, and what are bad. The head man is close to the pressure of his constituents' opinion, and, moreover, his own welfare is bound in with that of the community. The general

tendency is for responsible government that operates for the good of all.

County government traditionally has been conducted by the collective consent of the head men, and provincial government by the county leaders. Thus, in the days of the absolute monarchy this system operated so inexorably that provincial governors were always removed when the people protested against their rule. In China, a somewhat similar system failed to operate effectively because the country was so large and heterogeneous that it tended to break up into feudal fiefs, with absolute power seized by provincial governors. In Japan, there was never this strong base of local self-determination. Korea evolved a pyramidal system of political controls that made the local community the strongest element in the entire governmental structure. Thus, a kind of democracy evolved that is completely indigenous, and independent of the mass communication and education systems that make Western democracy possible.

The second major characteristic of Korean political life is its adherence to Confucian ethics. Whereas Lockian traditions have given to every American the inbred conviction that he is as good as anyone else, and perhaps better, Koreans are steeped in a tradition of respect for age, position

and authority. Subordination and order, rather than equality and contention, have been their watchwords. To expect all Korean adults to exercise the suffrage with complete self-assertion is to expect the impossible. Young men have been taught not to argue with their elders, not to profess to know as much, and many do not even smoke in their presence. When they are accused of often letting their head men influence their political judgments, the answer is that they have always done so.

Critics of Korean democracy have been amazed by the response of the people to the elections of 1948 and 1950. For the first time, women were eligible to vote. Farmers and poorly educated laborers were given the opportunity to express themselves without fear through a secret ballot. The reaction of the people was shown in a mass rush to the polls by some 90% of all eligible voters—about 30% more than a hotly contested presidential election brings out in the United States. In such an atmosphere, the essentials of democracy, at least, are safe.

The new government of Korea had to be erected upon the two bases of local controls and Confucian ethics. As close communication with the Western world is established, and as educational facilities are provided for all the people, a

new basis of information and independent judgment will be provided. A prime responsibility of the new government was to establish these facilities as rapidly as possible. As an indication of how seriously and well this responsibility was assumed, adult illiteracy already was reduced by over 50%. Under such conditions, the evolution of democracy can continue—if it is allowed to do so.

A realistic appraisal of the Korean Constitution—still a living document—requires that it be viewed in the light of the circumstances affecting it. Like a battle plan, a Constitution is drawn up not in a vacuum, but in a fluid political situation and accordingly must take its character in part from existing conditions, as well as in part from historic attitudes and immutable political theories. In the attempt to transcend the limitations of current problems, every written Constitution must be to some extent a declaration of good intentions.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea is notable not only for the good intentions it proclaims, but also for the hampering limitations within which it, perforce, has had to operate and for the flexible provisions it contains for dealing with unforeseeable emergencies. Considering the document itself, its most noteworthy fea-

tures are its explicit guarantees of civil and individual rights and its emphasis upon a balance of powers while yet insuring to the executive ability to meet emergencies. Beyond and behind the text of the document, however, factors vitally affecting its operation have been the continued division of the nation into two parts, Communist aggression, and the relations of the new Republic to the United States and the United Nations.

The Korean Constitution is no accidental or transient production. It has roots deeply sunk into the Korean past, just as it unquestionably has been basically influenced by the political traditions of the democratic West. As a beacon light of the future, it indicates the direction in which the Korean people hope to chart their national progress. It also commemorates the suffering and sacrifice and devotion by which their ideals of individual liberty and dignity have come into being.

Before considering the Constitution in detail it would be well to examine the circumstances under which it must operate. The Republic of Korea come into being by international agreement; its basis does not rest upon a forcible arrogation of sovereignty, but upon the almost unprecedented fact of international sponsorship.

This is the first factor determining the character and operation of its Constitution.

Secondly, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea was adopted while the nation was forcibly and unlawfully divided and under conditions of division that posed a constant threat against the security and well-being of the Republic.

And thirdly, as a result of this division, the Constitution had to operate under circumstances of international intervention never contemplated in the basic legal structure of a sovereign nation.

Adopted by the National Assembly on July 12, 1948, and formally proclaimed on July 17, the Korean Constitution states in its Preamble that its authority derives from the independence of Korea "from time immemorial" and from the reassertion of sovereignty in the 1919 movement. Determining "to consolidate national unity," it emphasizes that "The sovereignty of the Korean Republic shall reside in the people as a whole." The National Assembly, composed of 200 members elected from southern Korea, reserved 100 seats to be filled as soon as circumstances permit by free elections in northern Korea, each member to be chosen from a district comprising 100,000 people.

The cardinal principle expressed in the Constitution and maintained by the Government is

that the Republic of Korea comprises the entire nation, and not merely the area south of the 38th Parallel. This view of the Government is supported by the U.N. resolution of December 12, 1948, approving of the Republic as the "only lawful government" in Korea. It is also supported by the formal recognition accorded by the U.S., France, England, and 50 other nations with no reservations concerning the present forcible detention of the northern area from the Republic's jurisdiction. The U.N. Commission in Korea observed this juridical right of the Republic by carefully refraining from any formal recognition of the regime established by the Soviet Union in northern Korea.

In its general structure, the Korean Constitution resembles that of the United States in that it centers executive authority in a President elected for a four-year term (limited to one consecutive re-election) and establishes a "balance of power" among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The means by which these ends are accomplished differ somewhat from the American method.

The Presidency has even more authority in Korea than in the U.S. in several respects. In Korea, the President has very large appointive powers. He appoints the mayors of cities and

the governors of the provinces. His appointment of cabinet members and diplomatic representatives is not subject to approval by the legislative body, except in the case of the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Constitution specifically gives to the Korean President wartime emergency powers to be assumed at his own discretion, similar to those that traditionally have been voted for American Presidents after an emergency occurs. To show the extent of these powers, and also the care with which they are safeguarded, Article 57 may be quoted:

“When in time of civil war, or in a dangerous situation arising from foreign relations, or in case of a natural calamity, or on account of a grave economic or financial crisis it is necessary to take urgent measures for the maintenance of public order and security, the President shall have the right to issue orders having the effect of law or to make necessary financial dispositions, provided, however, that the President shall exercise such powers exclusively if time is lacking for the convocation of the National Assembly.

“Such orders or dispositions shall be reported without delay to the National Assembly for confirmation. If confirmation of the National Assembly is not obtained such orders or dispositions shall lose their effect thereupon, and the President shall announce it without delay.”

A major check by the National Assembly upon the President lies in the fact that he is

elected by the full Assembly rather than by popular vote. In case of vacancy in the office of President, his successor will be elected "without delay." Another check not contained in the American Constitution is the provision that governmental functions (13 of which are specifically noted) shall be decided by majority vote of the State Council or Cabinet, the President having "the right to vote and to break a tie vote." He also has the right to dismiss any member of the Cabinet.

Still another potent check upon the President is the fact that the budget must be approved and funds appropriated by the National Assembly. Vetoes by the President may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of members present, provided they constitute two-thirds of all duly elected members.

The National Assembly is a unicameral body, with each member elected from a district containing approximately 100,000 population. There is no need for a two-chamber legislature, for there is no aristocratic class, and the 13 Korean provinces do not constitute a federal union, but are merely administrative divisions.

The first National Assembly, elected May 10, 1948, served for only two years, but successive bodies have a four-year term.

The judiciary is not clearly defined, Article 76 reading, "The organization of the Supreme Court and the lower courts shall be determined by law." Independence of the judiciary is sought in the provisions that judges shall be appointed for ten years, subject to reappointment; shall "judge independently in accordance with the Constitution and the laws;" and "shall not be dismissed, suspended from office or have their salaries reduced except by impeachment or criminal or disciplinary punishment."

A notable difference from the United States Constitution lies in the provision for a Constitution Committee to have jurisdiction over all cases involving constitutionality of a law. "The Vice President shall be the Chairman of the Constitution Committee and five justices of the Supreme Court and five members of the National Assembly shall serve as members of the Constitution Committee." A two-thirds vote by the Committee is required to find a law unconstitutional. How the Assembly members are selected "shall be determined by the law" (Art. 81).

In considering the "checks and balances" provisions of a constitution, attention is usually focused upon the means by which one branch

of the government may serve as a brake upon other branches. It is even more important to provide adequate methods for fruitful interaction among them. So far as the judiciary is concerned, its virtual independence of the executive and legislature is stressed. The President appoints the judges, and the Assembly must confirm the Chief Justice. The Constitution Committee constitutes the one point of mutual action among the three branches.

Between the executive and legislative branches the Constitution contains various provisions designed to minimize tension, preserve the independence of each, and facilitate cooperation. So long as each is independent of the other, some conflict, of course, is inevitable. To the makers of the Korean Constitution this seemed more desirable than the English system of dissolving the government whenever a division occurs.

Under the Korean Constitution, members of the Cabinet are eligible to sit in the Assembly and to present their views to it. They must appear to answer questions of Assemblymen upon request. They may or may not be elected members with full voting rights. They have the same right as any Assembly member to present bills, so that in Korea the executive

branch need not go through the pretense of having its measures introduced by a legislator.

The President, being elected by the Assembly, is assured, at least initially, of majority support for his major policies. He may at any time appear before the Assembly to present his views. The President and other public officials are subject to impeachment by a Court composed of five justices of the Supreme Court and five members of the National Assembly, with a two-thirds vote required to convict.

The Jefferson philosophy that "that government is best which governs least" has been generally renounced around the world, with increasing regulation of individual "freedom" in order to insure "equality" and "justice." The Korean Constitution avows (Art. 84) that "The principles of the economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be to realize social justice, to meet the basic demands of all citizens and to encourage the development of a balanced economy." Hence, "Mines and other important . . . resources . . . shall be owned by the State . . . Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling farmers"—thus outlawing absentee landlordism. "Important transportation and communication enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas and any

enterprises having public character, shall be managed by the government . . . Foreign trade shall be under the control of the government.”

Within this framework of broad governmental responsibilities, the rights of individuals are safeguarded by a detailed and explicit “bill of rights” comprising Articles 8-28. Along with freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, the Constitution seeks also to safeguard the citizens from fear, want, and inequality of opportunity.

“All citizens shall be equal before the law,” declares Article 8, with “no discrimination derived from sex, religion, or social position.” Article 9 guarantees the citizens against arbitrary arrest. “The right of property shall be guaranteed” (Art. 15). Art. 16 provides “equal opportunity for education” and that “At least elementary education shall be compulsory and free of charge.

“All citizens shall have the right and duty to work” (Art. 17) and both “collective bargaining” and profit-sharing are provided for in Art. 18. “Citizens who are incapable of making a living because of old age, infirmity or incapacity to work shall be entitled to protection by the state.” Recognizing that such provisions constitute a heavy drain upon governmental resources that at present are inadequate to the

demands upon them, the Constitution labels its welfare sections as “good intentions” rather than as actual assurances by adding the qualifying phrase “in accordance with the provisions of law.”

The rights of public trial, freedom from double jeopardy, freedom from *ex post facto* arrest, and the assistance of counsel are guaranteed. In addition, “When a defendant in a criminal case who has been detained is found not guilty he may in accordance with the provisions of law request compensation from the government.”

Besides the very explicit rights indicated in the Constitution, Articles 27 and 28 add sweeping generalizations: “Public officials shall be the trustees of the sovereign people and shall at all times be responsible to the people;” and “Liberties and rights of the people shall not be ignored for the reason that they are not enumerated in this Constitution.”

In two years of operation, the Constitution proved adequate to its purposes despite the very heavy pressures exerted upon it.

11

STATESMAN OF THE NEW KOREA

IT HAS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO PRESENT THE story of Korea's struggle for freedom without frequent reference to its long-time leader, Syngman Rhee. Before turning to a detailed treatment of the problems and progress of the Republic of Korea, a fuller picture of the Republic's President is required. I have known him intimately for eight years.

Spokesmen for the great powers capture the headlines and occupy public attention. But

big statesmen are not the exclusive property of big nations. In the chess game of international politics, where power counts, the leaders of small nations must be shrewd if they expect their countries to be anything more than helpless pawns. On the record, one of the clearest-visioned statesmen of our times is the indomitable Syngman Rhee.

Few heads in international politics have been battered longer or harder than his. During a political career that began in 1894, Dr. Rhee has spent seven years in prison, seven months under daily torture, and forty-one years in exile with a price on his head. He has directed a revolution, served as President of the world's longest-lived government-in-exile, has knocked vainly at the portals of international conferences, and finally shepherded his cause to success—only to see his nation torn asunder by a Communist invasion.

As President of the Republic of Korea, he entered a new phase of his active political career. Instead of quietly enjoying the fruits of success, however, he has had to lead a continuing fight against the ambitions of Russia, just as for fifty years he led the movement for independence from Japan.

Before the submission of the Korean question

to the United Nations, Dr. Rhee's situation was admirably summed up in a one-sentence characterization by a high-ranking officer in the American occupation force in Korea: "Dr. Rhee is so much the greatest of Korean statesmen that he might be said to be the only one; but he has made himself so objectionable to Russia that he can never have a part in any American-sponsored government of southern Korea." That was said in the summer of 1946, when the American Military Government was trying to bend the stiff Korean necks into a Communist-Coalition collar. When this thankless effort was abandoned, Dr. Rhee came once again into American favor. Now he is fighting on our side, with no effort to "straddle the fence" even before the cold war in that area became hot.

Violent Korean nationalist factions long denounced his forbearance with American policy in south Korea during the period of military occupation. Communists and their sympathizers pronounced him unfit for public life because of his charge that Russia used the Communist party as a means of trying to secure control of all Korea. The American Military Government squirmed under his adamant refusal to enter into its dream solution of a "Left

and Right Coalition.” The State Department trained its guns on his refusal to accept the plan for trusteeship of Korea agreed to by Byrnes, Bevin, and Molotov in December, 1945. He has been at various times called anti-Japanese, anti-Russian and even anti-American, though the more accurate term in each instance is the simple one of pro-Korean. Through all the struggles, Dr. Rhee has found that, in a power-politics world, an advocate of small-nation independence has to walk a steep and rocky road.

Dr. Rhee’s life falls naturally into four periods. From 1894 to 1905 he fought for reform of the old Dynasty and for the democratic modernization of Korea. From 1905 to 1945 he struggled for the freedom of his country from Japan. From 1945 to 1948 he stood inflexibly for Korean reunification and independence. And since August 15, 1948, he headed the Republic of Korea in its continued efforts to regain the Communist-held north and to establish economic, political and military stability.

Syngman Rhee was born on March 26, 1875. He was educated in the Chinese classical tradition, but sought also Western education in the Pai Jai Mission School.

From his twentieth year he became a leader

of democratic forces in Korea. He founded and edited the first daily newspaper ever published in Korea. He organized student and youth groups to protest the corruption of the court and the surrender to Japanese and Russian pressure-groups. When the Japanese murdered the great Korean Queen Min in 1895, young Rhee declared personal warfare against them. Two years later, he was arrested for his political insurgence, and spent the next seven years in the Kamoksu prison in Seoul.

For the first seven months of his imprisonment he was subjected to daily tortures, including beatings with three-cornered bamboo rods, and the burning of oiled paper wrapped around his arms. His fingers were so horribly mashed that even today, in time of stress, he blows upon them. He wore constantly around his neck a 20-pound wooden cangue, and sat with his feet locked in stocks and his hands handcuffed.

After his imprisonment was eased, Dr. Rhee wrote a book called *The Spirit of Independence*, which is still widely read by Koreans and has served as the chief guide of the independence movement. It has been reprinted several times since Japan's defeat in 1945.

While attending the Mission School, Rhee

learned English, and was converted to Christianity. After his release from prison, in August, 1904, Japanese influence was so strong in Korea that he could not remain unless he would abandon his struggle for Korean independence. Consequently, he made the hard decision to leave his country and carry on the fight abroad.

Arriving in this country on the eve of the Portsmouth Conference, Rhee made strenuous efforts to secure the representation of his country at that meeting. President Theodore Roosevelt received him cordially at Oyster Bay, but informed him Korea could not attend the Russian-Japanese meeting. The first article of the Portsmouth treaty provided for turning Korea over to Japan.

Since nothing could be done at this point for Korea, Rhee laid the basis for his later work by attending George Washington, Harvard, and Princeton Universities. In 1910, he received the Ph.D. degree from Woodrow Wilson's own hands, for a dissertation written on United States neutrality policies.

For the next fifteen months Dr. Rhee carried on Y.M.C.A. work and supervised a Methodist Mission School in Korea. Then he was warned that the Japanese were about to arrest him for his dangerous "political thoughts" and once

again he returned to the United States. This was the last he was to see of his country until after the defeat of Japan in 1945.

From 1912 until 1932, and again from 1934 to 1938, he maintained a school in Hawaii. Then he came to Washington, D. C., to take personal charge of the Korean Commission, through which he had appealed continually to the State Department ever since 1919 for the recognition of the Korean provisional government.

In 1919, on March 1, under the direction of Dr. Rhee and other nationalist leaders, the Koreans staged their country-wide passive revolution against the Japanese. Representatives of the new Provisional Republic elected Dr. Rhee President, and then fled to China where the provisional government was enabled to function in Shanghai.

The Japanese government placed a large price upon Dr. Rhee's head. Nevertheless, he went to Shanghai to meet the members of the revolutionary government. After he had supervised the organization of the Korean exiled Republic in Shanghai, Dr. Rhee returned to the United States to carry on the fight for recognition.

In 1920 he sought a passport to go to Paris to present a plea for Korea to the Peace Conference, and in 1922 Dr. Rhee led a Korean

delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference.

Through the 1920s, when United States relations with Japan were close and friendly, Dr. Rhee was often called a "radical" who sought to engage this country in war with Japan for the sake of effecting Korea's liberation. In 1933, when the League of Nations was cautiously refusing to consider Japan's seizure of Manchuria, Dr. Rhee went to Geneva and unsuccessfully sought to secure consideration of Korea's claim to freedom.

It was in Geneva that he met Miss Francesca Donner, daughter of an ancient Viennese family, who subsequently, in 1935, became his wife.

In 1940, Dr. Rhee published his book, *Japan Inside Out*, which warned that Japan was planning to extend its empire by attacking the United States.

After Pearl Harbor, Dr. Rhee hoped briefly that his long fight was won. He immediately offered to the State Department the full support of Korean guerrillas, organized by the exiled Korean Provisional Republic, and asked that the government at last be recognized. He urged that recognition would make possible the effective organization of guerrilla attacks upon Japan's supply line in Korea, and would prevent a pos-

sible seizure of Korea by Russia. But his request was refused.

During the war years, Dr. Rhee held the Provisional Government together, and sought by every means in his power to inform the American public of the facts of Korea's plight. The Cairo pledge of independence for Korea was the first ray of real light in his 50-year fight, but even that was dimmed by the phrase "in due course."

Dr. Rhee offered his services to the Office of War Information, and through its facilities made several broadcasts to the Koreans, urging them to prepare for the day when they could profitably arise to strike the Jap army from behind its lines.

After the surrender of Japan, Dr. Rhee returned to Korea. He and other members of the exiled Provisional Government promised to return "as private persons" and to assist the American Military Government of South Korea in working out plans for the rapid realization of independence.

Upon Dr. Rhee's return to Korea he was greeted with wild enthusiasm by his countrymen, to whom his name symbolized their determination to be free. Crowds of 200,000 and more gathered when he spoke. Every political party in

Korea, including even the Communist-dominated People's Republic Party, offered him its chairmanship. But Dr. Rhee decided against affiliating himself with any specific parties, and instead established the Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence, of which he became chairman, and to which all political parties except the Communists pledged their support. This was the time when Dr. Rhee publicly declared that Korea could never accept the Moscow decision imposing a trusteeship on Korea.

The story of the years of struggle during the military occupation, and of the eventual establishment of the Republic of Korea under United Nations auspices in the southern half of the country has been told in other chapters. Through this entire period Rhee was under continual attack as "stubborn and uncooperative." During the latter part of 1947 (following his four-month visit in Washington, D. C., protesting the policies of the Military Government) he was held under virtual house arrest. But his leadership won the fight for independence and he was the only candidate considered for presidency of the new Republic.

The problems to which President Rhee addressed himself fall into three major categories:

(1) to provide for the defense of his nation; (2) to develop both the forms and the spirit of a real democracy; and (3) to restore a badly shattered economy and lay a basis for sound economic progress. The three problems were interwoven and, together or singly, beset with heaviest difficulties. Besides, there was a lack of trained and experienced personnel. Many friendly critics feared that the new government would collapse in disorder, but, despite the handicaps, substantial progress soon became apparent in each of the three major areas of endeavor.

Since this fourth period of President Rhee's life is continuing to unfold, it cannot be summarized as conclusively as could the preceding ones. A word or two, however, may be said about each of the major problems with which he has dealt.

(1) An army had to be built from the ground up, since no Korean army had been permitted before inauguration of the new Republic. At the same time, a north Korean Communist force estimated at around 200,000 men had been recruited, trained and armed. As rapidly as possible a Korean armed force of about 100,000 was put into training and armed with American weapons. One of the questions involved in its development has been the extent to which it

should be allowed to become a real army, equipped for full-scale war. Should it have tanks, planes, naval ships and heavy artillery? Should it be allowed to stockpile ammunition and equipment? President Rhee argued insistently for equipment adequate to defend his nation against a full-scale attack from the north. American officials opposed this view on two grounds: that such a development might encourage the Republic to launch an attack against north Korea, thereby incurring the danger of a world-wide war; and that stock-piled weapons might be captured by the northern Communists and subsequently be used against the United States.

(2) Democracy had good soil in Korea in which to grow, because of the natural sturdy individualism of the Korean character, and because of the tradition of local government on matters most intimately affecting the people. However, there were tremendous obstacles to be overcome: fear engendered by a full generation of the totalitarian and ruthless Japanese rule; and ignorance caused by lack of schools and lack of radio, newspaper, magazine and motion picture facilities for widespread adult education. However, under the new Constitution, full legal equality was granted to women; an explicit bill of rights was included; and free public education

was guaranteed. Critics from the left condemned the Republic for its failure to achieve overnight all the characteristics of schoolbook democracy, but in any long view it seems remarkable that so much of the libertarian spirit developed so quickly. The foreign press was allowed full freedom to find and report whatever news and views it wished; educational facilities were vastly and rapidly expanded; foreign critics (including groups of American Congressmen) were welcomed and shown everything they had time to see, with their reactions normally ranging from "well satisfied" to "amazed at the rapid progress." Several by-elections have been held in addition to the general elections of 1948 and 1950, with observers all agreed that the voters acted in complete freedom and with a dignified and mature understanding of the democratic process.

(3) Economic rehabilitation consisted of two major problems: to rebuild an economy shattered by three years of neglect and bleeding to death from its artificial division along the 38th Parallel; and to rectify the injustices of a land-tenure system. The latter was the easier to remedy, and the requisite steps were promptly taken.

Restoration of Korean industry would have

been difficult enough at best, with the coal, minerals, heavy industries and hydro-electric power of the north cut off from the agriculture and fabrication industries of the south. It was rendered much harder by the Communist action of cutting off the flow of electricity from north Korea immediately after the May 10, 1948, election. During the subsequent period, south Korea opened up its own coal mines, increased its own production of electricity, restored its fisheries, developed its manufacturing—all to the point of sheer incredibility.

The name of Syngman Rhee will bulk larger as the history of our time emerges in perspective. He has consistently foreseen developing forces and movements far in advance of the events themselves. He has stood foursquare for international justice, for the right of self-determination of peoples, for national and individual democratic freedom. Against massive odds and in the face of repeated rebuffs, he fought on for fifty years for the reform and redemption of the Korean people. Long before the eyes of the West saw the dangers, he warned first of the threat of Japanese militarism and then of the canker of Russian Communism. Though his warnings were unheeded, he kept his courage and his optimistic determination. Seeing needless problems piled

up by the blindness of the men in power, he pleaded the cause of enlightenment, but when his pleas failed he buckled down to the heavy task of remedying the accumulated evils. History, in assessing his role, must conclude: Here was a man who represented the twentieth century at its best.

TWO YEARS OF PROGRESS

THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT APPROACHED the challenges and opportunities of independence very much in the spirit of an impoverished but hopeful young married couple just setting up housekeeping. Like many a young couple in such circumstances, the Korean independence leaders were warned by various comfortably established friends that starting out on their own with such slender resources was dangerous and ill advised, that it would have been better to put off the independence for a time

longer in order to enjoy the advantages of a protective dependence, and that they were too inexperienced and young in the ways of democracy to manage successfully the complicated demands of nationhood. Starry-eyed young couples have heard—and ignored—just such advice through the centuries. And it is probable that no new nation ever was founded without the older countries being sure that these brash upstarts were wholly unfit as yet to organize and conduct a nation. Yet, like the American colonies in 1775, the Korean people were determined to try.

My own first view of the experiment in independence came in March, 1949, when I returned to Korea after an absence of two and a half years. The physical impressions of progress and improvement were startling. Many streets which had been honeycombed with deep chuck holes were paved and clean. Buildings which had been crumbling and unattended were repaired and in use. The people on the streets were better clothed and better fed. Wood lots, food shops, and stores handling products of the handicraft industries (which had been all but bare in 1946) were actually filled. It was an astonishing sight (in view of the serious fuel shortages of the winters of 1945-46 and

1946-47, to see the fuel lots (in March!) piled high with firewood. It was no less surprisingly gratifying to see the shops selling kitchenware displaying piles of kettles, reaching clear to the ceilings, whereas in 1946 only two or three patched pots were on display.

Further inquiry revealed that not all the physical needs of the people were satisfied. Despite the successive good crops and the production quota for 1950 of surplus rice for export, speculators and smugglers had forced the price of rice to the enormously high price of around 1,800 Won per small mal (4.76 gallons). Within another year it was to go on up to 2,030 Won per mal, despite every effort by the government, which changed Ministers of Agriculture three times and engaged in extensive purchases of rice in the harvest season and sale at a controlled price of around 300 Won per mal during the spring. Textiles were another group of commodities so short in supply that prices reached impossible heights. A woman's dress or a man's suit, for example, cost roughly from three to six month's of a laboring man's wages. Housing continued to be the most serious shortage of all, with three and four families sometimes living in one small house, and with some of the refugees still living

in hillside dugouts. Beggars, who were so scarce in 1946 that I was able to find only five in all Seoul during the course of the summer, were now comparatively numerous. There was no magic in independence which could eliminate the very great discrepancies between demand and supply of basic commodities. But the progress that had been made was nonetheless startling.

Even more striking than the material improvements was the change in the spirit of the people. Replacing the cynicism and discouragement of 1946 and 1947 (when independence seemed throttled by international agreements enforced by the American Democracy which they knew was their last great hope), there was in 1949 an atmosphere of hopefulness and resolution manifest everywhere. Businessmen who had suffered from black frustration while the factories deteriorated during the occupation were now astir with the opportunity for free enterprise. I sat in on many discussions where plans were being discussed much like those pursued in American communities—for expansion of plants, introduction of more efficient methods of production, evaluation of new inventions, and considerations of proposed new raw materials (such as the substitution of peat

for wood and coal as household fuel). Here again, the picture was not all favorable. Many of the government-owned plants (expropriated from the Japanese) were run inefficiently by untrained (and sometimes dishonest) managers. Profits were sometimes regarded as of more importance than production. Self-service was sometimes more important than public-service. But these were faults with which free-enterprise systems in every part of the world have to contend. The essential fact was a very notable stirring and development of the productive and constructive spirit of the people.

Under the able administration of Mayor Yun Po Sung, the external face of Seoul had brightened considerably. Policemen on guard before public buildings were using their free time to plant and tend flowerbeds. High-school students were taking turns getting out at 7:00 A. M. each morning to sweep the streets. Garbage collections were far more thorough and systematic. Some public buildings (notably the Census Bureau) were still in a state of disorganization and disrepair, but most of them were clean, orderly, and abuzz with activity. The chief criticism heard of the government bureaus was that (partly to offset the serious unemployment) there were far too many employees, many of

whom apparently didn't know what they should be doing. "Boon-doggling" unquestionably existed in the Republic of Korea as it did in the United States during the depression of the 'thirties. Untrained and inexperienced administrators were making mistakes. President Rhee juggled the eleven Ministries like a circus juggler trying to keep eleven balls in the air at once. Minor graft (much resembling the under-the-counter deals in the United States during the years of war scarcities and rationing) was all too evident. But these faults, again, were inevitable and thoroughly to be expected. What was far beyond any reasonable expectation was the amount of efficiency and the magnitude of the achievements.

With fertilizer pouring in through the ECA program, farmers were producing the best crops in Korean history. Textile mills tripled their 1947-48 output of silk and cotton goods. Over 200 rubber-goods plants were turning out all-time record productions, and rubber shoes (the everyday wear of farmers and city people alike) were actually in surplus. The 18-mile industrial corridor between Seoul and Inchon was coming to life. Out in the Youngwol-Samchok area the vital problem of increasing the output of steam-generated electricity was

being solved. Since this was the basic requirement for sound economic development, it merits close examination.

Following the U. N.-sponsored election of May 10, 1948, the Communist regime in north Korea pulled the switches and cut off the flow of electricity into south Korea from the great northern hydro-electric plants. Fully 80% of all south Korea's electricity came from the north. Since all the manufacturing of south Korea depended upon electricity as its source of power, this act was intended as a death-blow to throw the economy of south Korea into chaos and thus prepare the way for Communist subversion. The United States rushed several power barges to Inchon and Pusan to provide what help they could. Several small hydro-electric power plants in south Korea were put into maximum production. However, the major effort necessarily centered around the steam-generating plant at Youngwol. This plant had a generating capacity of 97,000 kw. and was powered by coal produced in mines sprawling around it in a 30-mile arc.

During the three years of Military Government control, very little was done either to mine the coal or to operate the electric generating plant. There were two reasons. In the

first place, electricity was not needed because the supply of cheaper electricity from the north was sufficient to operate the small number of manufacturing plants which were in production. More basically, before the establishment of the Republic of Korea there was no clear authority by which anyone could take the responsibility for developing the mines and power plant.

When the northern source of electricity was cut off, the power available in south Korea dropped from 120,000 kw. to less than 30,000. By the spring of 1949 it had been pushed up to 59,000 kw. With more and more manufacturing plants being rehabilitated, electric power was the major bottleneck to greatly expanded production.

The excellent steam-generating plant at Youngwol had been restored to good operating efficiency. Its generators were capable of producing 100,000 kw. of electricity, and to do so required 1,500 tons of coal daily with an ash content of around 17 per cent, or 2,000 tons of the poorer coal with a 50% ash content. The chief coal supply came from the Machari Mines, a network of 150 shafts and tunnels covering about 30 square miles, and connected to Youngwol by a seven-mile aerial tramway, equipped with 300 half-ton buckets traveling

on two parallel steel cables. The problems were to mine more coal and to get it delivered to the tramway for transport.

In charge of the operation was a 35-year-old lawyer, Tai Wan Son, who before his appointment had never so much as seen a coal mine. When he went to Machari, the daily production was only 100 tons. Shafts and tunnels were in disrepair. The roads over which the coal had to be hauled had solid roadbeds, but with no asphalt binder available the surface was cut into deep ruts by the heavy coal trucks. The few rail lines that existed had 20-gauge tracks, but the old Japanese rail cars were worn out and new American cars required 24-gauge tracks. Tai had been given "full authority," but funds for payment of his crews were normally from six weeks to two months late in arriving. Nevertheless, he was doing a phenomenal job.

When I visited the mines in April, 1949, production was already up from the low of 100 tons daily to a daily average of 800 tons. Moreover, this was being done "with the left hand only," for major effort was concentrated on digging new tunnels, clearing out old ones, and spreading the rail tracks to 24-gauge. The goal of 1,500 tons a day seemed reasonably sure

of achievement. The chief difficulty, and one that continued to plague the operation, was with labor. The miners had many legitimate grievances which had not properly been resolved. Housing had to be constructed hastily and was inadequate. Wages were low (around 6,000 Won a month) and, because of government difficulties with financing, were always late. Only elementary schools were available. Mr. Tai told me that the most urgent need in the whole mining operation was for a vocational high school. "The men can forget their families for eight hours a day," he said, "while they work in the mines. But when they go home at night their hearts are sick. For their boys and girls have no schools beyond the primary grades. And they are too poor to support them at boarding schools in the nearby cities." Neither Mr. Tai nor the government in Seoul possessed the magic by which something could be created out of nothing, and such basic grievances, left largely unsatisfied, resulted in lowered morale and in consequent lowered productivity. The Communist sympathizers, naturally, took full advantage of this opportunity to stir up discontent.

In another area, 19 mines from Youngwol, at Hamhaing, are coal deposits which Japanese

surveyers had estimated at 200 million tons. Five tunnels were being cut, and the coal brought out had an ash content of only 17 per cent, equal to the anthracite coal mined in the Pittsburgh area. Korean contractors achieved the tremendous feat of putting in a seven-mile road to connect these mines with the Youngwol highway in only three months. The roadbeds were excellent, but, lacking asphalt, the surface was so bad that trucks were constantly breaking down. When I was there, only 23 trucks of the 52 available were in operation, the remainder being in repair shops.

Mr. R. D. Woolley, of Doylston, Pennsylvania, who was the ECA advisor at Youngwol, declared that the most essential factor in the whole production effort was the rare fact that "I have never seen a lazy Korean!" The tasks were being faced, and the job was being done. The Youngwol Power Plant and the coal mines which supplied it were among the early sites captured by the Communist invaders, however.

Aside from coal mining and electric power production, other basic economic conditions also showed the progress that was being made. Production of 23 of the 28 principal industrial products of south Korea showed substantial in-

creases in the first six months of 1949 over the comparable period in 1948. Over-all mining and manufacturing production was 92% higher in December, 1949, than in December, 1948. Newly established employment offices in the major cities found jobs, during 1949, for 9,619 men (out of 15,472 registrants) and for 2,322 women (out of 2,859 who applied). Greatest increases in production (and matching extension of employment opportunities) were in electrical insulators, up 685% in 1949 over 1948; paper and cotton cloth, up 100%; cotton yarn 93%; coal briquettes, 86%; porcelain pottery, 307%; and other items of lesser importance, such as pencils, bicycle tires and tubes, car and truck tires, etc., showing increases of from 74 to 345%.

However impressive such figures may be, a specific example of what was done to reduce the cost of unloading shiploads of American ECA supplies will make clearer what the Republic of Korea was accomplishing and how it was done. Prior to assumption of authority by the Republic, the average time for unloading a ship at Pusan was one month, and demurrage charges averaged \$2,000 a day. Republic officials determined to save as much as possible of this money, in order to have more

with which to buy basic commodities. Through the cooperation of the Office of Supply and the Stevedoring Association, the average unloading time was cut to one week. At Inchon, where the tide of 33 feet makes it necessary to unload ships on lighters, what is believed to be a world's record was achieved when a shipload of ammoniated sulphate fertilizer was unloaded in 23 hours. Achievements such as these augured well for the future.

As might be expected, however, improvement in the general welfare of the Korean people during the brief period since the founding of the Republic has been more largely psychological and prospective than material and immediate. The picture can be painted in either gray or rosy colors, depending on the point of view. The economic problems were far too serious, and the resources far too slender, to make possible an early establishment of even reasonable prosperity. But, prior to the attack of June 25, the situation was already greatly ameliorated.

What the Korean people want out of life is pretty much what any other people want: jobs that pay a living wage, food to eat, fuel to burn, and a few additional comforts and luxuries to keep life interesting. They want schools to which they can send their children and hope for better

times to come. As in any other country, some get more of these things than others. In Korea there are almost no really wealthy families, but the other end of the social scale shows too many in desperate want. In between, the farmers (who constitute some 75% of the population) were relatively well off, and the city dwellers suffered most.

The basic problem in Korea has been shortages, and the chief symptom was inflation. During the last two years, production of essential supplies and services increased, and inflation showed real promise of leveling off. The Won in circulation dropped from 73 billion in February, 1950, to 57 billion in May. The gap between what the people needed and what they were able to buy was still painfully wide. A very intelligent and hard-working Korean professional man whom I know managed, by holding two jobs simultaneously, to earn 30,000 Won a month—between five and six times the earnings of a miner, truck driver, or semi-skilled factory worker. He told me that this fell 10,000 Won short of being enough to maintain his family on a modest living scale. A dress for his wife cost 15,000 to 25,000 Won; a suit for himself twice that; a pair of leather shoes cost a week's labor at his relatively high pay. The

greatest inflation was in the price of the rice and other foodstuffs that the farmers grew and sold. But the farmers felt the hard pinch of many higher costs: in clothing, in household supplies, in bullocks and farm equipment, and in fuel. A pencil, for instance, that cost half a Won in 1940 sold for 500 Won in 1949. The Korean housewives, who had the responsibility of paying the bills with what their husbands can provide, faced an impossible task.

The capital city of Seoul represented the worst hardships. A city with housing, transportation, schools, and utility facilities for 500,000, by 1950 it had a population swollen to over a million and a half. The 123 streetcars, the water, telephone, and electric light systems, the stores, the repair shops, the schools all were used by three times as many people as they were meant to serve. Long lines of waiting people were customary; so were shortages and high prices. But so were patience and cooperation, and the willingness to do without and to share. Typical is the spirit of an old man from the country who finally got on a crowded streetcar after waiting patiently in a long line. When he handed the conductor a 10-Won note and got back five Won in change, his face lighted up and he exclaimed, "So, the price of transportation

has not gone up!" Even in overcrowded Seoul, complaints were rare.

Since few Koreans were allowed to teach under the Japanese, getting decently trained teachers has been one of the major problems. All the Japanese textbooks had to be discarded—for they were mostly propaganda—and new ones written.

With tremendous energy directed to what the government recognizes as one of its primary tasks, textbooks for all the elementary and Middle School grades have been written and printed. They were sold to the students at an average cost of five cents each.

One of the greatest worries of Korean parents has been the shortage of schools. There were too few teachers, too few books, too few school buildings, too few pencils, and too little paper. With an influx of some four million refugees into southern Korea since the end of the war, the housing shortage made doubly difficult the task of finding extra buildings for school rooms. As a result, more than a third of the children were playing on the streets when they ought to have been in school. In order to offer a little learning to them all, a rotation system was adopted, with many pupils having only three months of schooling at a time.

What was accomplished to improve education in Korea may be indicated by these figures:

(1) An expansion of primary school enrollment from about 1½ million in 1945 to 2½ million in 1948; an increase in primary school teachers from 13,782 in 1945 to 34,757 in 1948; and an increase in the number of primary schools from 2,694 in 1945 to 3,442 in 1948.

(2) An increase in the number of Middle Schools from 252 in 1945 to 423 in 1948; with Korean enrollment increasing from 62,136 in 1945 to 226,960 in 1948, and of Korean Middle School teachers from 833 to 8,238.

(3) Expansion of collegiate-grade institutions from 19 in 1945 to 29 in 1948, with Korean enrollment increasing from 3,039 to 21,250.

(4) An adult education program that increased the proportion of the adult population able to read the Korean script, *Hangul*, from about one-third in 1945 to an estimated 83% in 1948.

(5) Inauguration of an on-the-job and technological training program operated in most industries and government bureaus, with results difficult to measure but widely praised by administrators as productive of excellent efficiency.

One additional sound measure of general wel-

fare was the people's health. Through the concerted efforts of Koreans and Americans, the general level of health in southern Korea was raised to such an extent that it became probably the best in the Orient. In the summer of 1946, there were 15,746 known cases of cholera in southern Korea, with 10,191 deaths reported. By the following year the number of reported cases had dropped to 34, with only 10 deaths. Similarly, the control of smallpox resulted in a decline from 20,674 cases in 1946 to 1,197 cases in 1948. Malaria, on the other hand, increased from 49,185 recorded cases in 1947 to 71,064 in 1948. Diphtheria cases also either increased or were recorded better, with a 1948 figure of 2,231 cases, compared to 864 in 1946.

Under the Japanese regime in Korea, nurses were regarded as mere servants, performing only the most menial of duties. Nursing rapidly rose, however, to the status of a profession. Doctors have been educated to permit nurses to take temperatures, administer medicines, give injections, assist with blood transfusions, and keep daily records of patients' conditions. As a result, girls from good families have taken up the study of nursing, and the standards have approached those enforced in the United States.

The Korean National Nurses Association,

founded in September, 1947, reached a membership of over 1,000. There were 17 schools for nurses, of which 13 were fully accredited by the Department of Public Health and Welfare, and three more provisionally. During 1947, 245 girls graduated from a two-year nursing course, with 60 more graduates in 1948. A new three-year nursing curriculum was adopted, comparing favorably with that in American institutions.

In addition to private hospitals maintained by each of 1,500 doctors, there were 59 medical institutions in southern Korea. These included 4 leprosaria (caring for only 8,660 of the 25,000 lepers), one tuberculosis sanatorium (although from 10 to 20% of Koreans were estimated to be suffering from tuberculosis), and 45 general hospitals, with a total of 3,600 in-patients. There were in Seoul three mental hospitals with a total capacity of 200 patients.

Infant mortality remained very high. With 22 live births per 1,000 of the population, the mortality rate was 48.8 in the first year, with three maternal deaths each year per 1,000 of the population.

General health conditions are, necessarily, closely integrated with problems of education, employment, and living conditions. A survey of

south Korea, completed in July, 1946, showed that the number of doctors varied from 27 per 100,000 of the population, in Kyonggi Do Province, to 1.7 per 100,000 in Chung Chong Namdo. Hospitals, clinics, doctors, and medical supplies are all far below minimum safety levels. Extensive malnutrition is another related problem.

Public health officials accustomed to conditions in the United States will find such figures indicative of a crying need for improvement. The most significant thing about the public health situation in southern Korea, however, is the tremendous advancement that was made, both in curative and in preventive medicine.

Hope not only for advancement, but even for day-by-day security, always seemed pretty slim in the Republic as long as the 38th Parallel continued to cut through the middle of the nation's resources and to present an armed threat of imminent attack. President Rhee boldly proclaimed the program of his government when he said: "We shall become both strong and prosperous: strong because we must, and prosperous because we won't be satisfied with less than a decent standard of living for every Korean." President Rhee's sights were set higher than those of most Orientals, because

he had spent most of his mature life in the United States. But he fully realized the difficulties of transition.

It was at the great naval base in south Korea, Chinhae, that President Rhee told a group of us as we went together on a day's fishing trip: "In my time I have seen many changes as the East becomes more like the West, but the differences still run deep. Knock a Chinese down and he will get up, brush himself off, and walk away. Why? Because he is afraid? No—because he believes a civilized man should live at peace with his fellow men; he must not fight. If a dog bites you, you do not bite him back again. But this is sometime hard for Americans to understand. In the United States, if a bully knocks you down, you get up fighting. It doesn't matter whether you win or lose, but it is necessary that you fight."

President Rhee paused a long moment as he gazed out across Chinhae's waters, then he said: "Someday, I think, the West will become more like the East. But we cannot wait for that day to come. Meanwhile, we Orientals are rapidly changing into Westerners. We have to if we are to continue to live."

The story of how and why the Republic of Korea was forced to maintain only a small

and lightly armed force, intended merely for internal police protection, has already been told. I was in Seoul in May, 1949, when the decision was reached in Washington to withdraw the last American security troops, now reduced to 7,500 men, and this decision was transmitted to President Rhee by Ambassador John Muccio. President Rhee's reaction was a practical one. "The question is not when or whether American troops are withdrawn," he said. "The question is: What are the policies of the United States in regard to Korea." President Rhee pleaded for a statement from the White House that would serve as definitely to warn the Soviet Union against encroachment as the "Truman Doctrine" had served in Greece and Turkey. The Republic of Korea had "bet its life on Uncle Sam." In view of the Communist threat, it was evident that only an American guarantee could prevent overthrow of the Republic by force anytime the Kremlin might give the word. Instead of such a guarantee, however, the spokesmen in Washington announced that the "American defense line" lay on the other side of the Straits of Korea, in Japan. What the results of the guarantee might have been can now never be known. But the results of troop withdrawal without any explicit pledge of as-

sistance are now being reaped in bloody battlefields through south Korea.

Despite disappointments such as the withdrawal of the troops, the Republic of Korea realized fully that it owed both its inception and its continued existence to American understanding and aid. In the spring of 1949 I accompanied President Rhee on an 8-day swing through south Korea, where earnestly and patiently he spoke four and five times a day to huge crowds assembled in every town.

“Without American aid,” he told the crowds, “we could never hope to revive our divided and blasted economy. United States military aid is helping us to build the army that has already subdued the guerrillas on Cheju Island, in the Chiri Mountains, and around Taegu. American technicians are helping us to organize the coal mining and electricity generating programs upon which our hope of industrialization is based. American fertilizers are providing the basis for the best crop year in our history.”

And every speech ended with the admonition, “American money can accomplish very little unless it is matched by Korean labor and patriotic devotion. Don’t dream of Heaven on earth, but work for the practical realities. We shall have to work for longer hours, we may

have to eat less and do without all but the barest necessities. It is the future of our nation we are building, to make a better life for our children.”

This was the dream and the goal which the attack by the Communist Empire sought to smash. It remains the goal of Korea for the reconstruction job that lies ahead.

13

KOREA AND JAPAN

IN COMMON WITH THE REST OF ASIA, KOREA has watched with acute interest and general disappointment the American dilemma in Japan. Our task there has basically been to restore to the 80 millions of Japanese an opportunity to earn their own way (thus relieving the American taxpayer of the burden), despite the loss of such profitable prewar possessions as Korea and Formosa. In effect, this goal could be achieved only by providing in Japan an even better in-

dustrial economy than it had before the war. But this, in turn, could only be accomplished as the other areas of Asia played the precise role Japan had assigned to them in the spurious "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" program. That is, they must supply raw materials and buy the finished product, while Japan does the manufacturing. The inevitable result, in the eyes of Koreans and of many other Asians as well, must be to establish the Japanese standard of living well above that of other Asian peoples, and also to place them economically at the mercy of Japan's industrial policies. Naturally, this prospect has been resented and feared.

No clearer statement of the American dilemma in Japan has ever been made than that offered by Kenneth C. Royall, while he was Secretary of the Army, to the San Francisco Commonwealth Club, in January, 1948. After repeating earlier pledges that our policies will "prevent Japan from again waging unprovoked and aggressive and cruel war against any nation," Royall added: "We hold to an equally definite purpose of building in Japan a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough and stable enough to support itself and at the same time to serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian war threats which might hereafter arise in the

Far East.” Here is the problem in clearest essence: to keep Japan weak enough to avoid arousing the fear and resentment of the peoples of Asia whose help and trust we badly need, and at the same time to make Japan strong enough to help hold off the now desperately imminent threat of Soviet invasion.

In Korea, where relations with Japan have been inimical for centuries, the fear has been that Japanese leaders may now be repeating to themselves what the Foreign Minister, Count Tadasu Hayashi, wrote frankly in 1895: “What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient.”

Such suspicions were scarcely lulled by official statements of American policy in Japan. What this policy has meant was set forth in hearings before the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in June, 1948, when General Daniel Noce was questioned by Representative Clarence Cannon.

Mr. Cannon: “Japan is, in the Orient, what Germany was in middle Europe, the processing nation. They brought in raw materials and fab-

ricated them and exchanged them with surrounding nations for food and other supplies.”

General Noce: “Japan was the workshop of the Far East industrially; yes, sir.”

Mr. Cannon: “And you are endeavoring to rehabilitate Japanese industry?”

General Noce: “Yes, sir, that is the purpose for which I appear.”

General Noce was just back from a mission to China and the Philippines to try to secure acceptance for this kind of program, and he frankly told the Committee: “We must face the fact that these countries that were enemies of Japan still have very much in their minds the Japanese domination before the war of trade areas, and it is slow business getting them to accept the Japanese to come to their countries.”

In Korea, where the exploitation of the country and the people for the benefit of Japanese had been severest, suspicion and dislike of Japan persist. The feelings have been accentuated by ill treatment of the 600,000 Koreans who still reside in Japan. They have neither been accorded the special privileges granted to “Allied nationals” resident in Japan since the war, nor the same basic rights as Japanese citizens. This has continued to be a point of sharp dissention during the past five years. President

Rhee has made it one of his prime objects to try to solve the difficulties. Korea's first trade treaty was a \$90-million-dollar trade agreement with Japan, negotiated in 1949 through SCAP.

This attempt to build a future of cooperative understanding was most clearly formalized by President Rhee in a statement he issued in Tokio, on February 16, 1950, as he arrived there for conferences with General MacArthur:

"I myself have never been known as a friend of Japan. Nevertheless, the present situation requires reaching a common understanding between the Korean and Japanese people for their common safety in facing their common danger arising from the growing Communist expansion directed chiefly toward the Pacific areas. Instead of quarreling over the unhappy past, if the Japanese realize their danger as we do and are willing to cooperate with us in fighting for life and liberty not only of Japan and Korea but of all Pacific nations, we certainly can solve any problems existing between us."

The problems which President Rhee had primarily in mind are three-fold:

(1) *Rights of Korean residents in Japan.* At the conclusion of the war, approximately a million and a half Korean residents in Japan, most of whom had been taken there unwillingly for

war service, were repatriated. The remaining 600,000 have property or other interests in Japan which make them desirous, for the time being at least, of remaining. The Japanese charge that many of these Koreans are black marketeers, trouble makers, and Communists. The Korean government points out that their language schools have been closed, their properties hedged by unique restrictions, and their status remains largely undefined.

(2) *Trade relations.* While entirely agreeable to selling surplus rice, fisheries products, graphite, iron, magnesium, and other raw materials to Japan, Korea has insisted that the trade be established on a basis of equality which will also permit the full and free industrial development of Korea itself. Like Japan, the population pressures in Korea are so great that a high standard of living is impossible without considerable industrialization. Even more truly than in Japan, the necessary requisites for industrialization (except petroleum products) are all present within Korea. One example to which the government has already devoted some attention is the presence in Korea of the only large supply of good silicate sand in the Far East. The Republic naturally prefers to manufacture glass, rather than to sell the sand to Japan and then

buy the glass back again. The problem is definitely one of American concern, for our aid programs to both Korea and Japan give us the right and the responsibility of deciding in large measure for what purposes the aid funds shall be spent. What Korea wants, stated in simplest terms, is that the international economic situation of the Far East shall be of a nature to benefit all of the peoples concerned equally, rather than to favor one nation at the expense of the others. The American dilemma lies in the fact that only by favoring Japan can we escape from the necessity of bolstering that country's economy at the expense of American taxpayers.

(3) *Korean claims for indemnity from Japan.* The eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission which for five years has been studying the basis of an eventual reparations settlement with Japan does not include any representation from Korea. Unofficially, the view in Washington officialdom has been expressed that Japanese assets turned over to the Korean government constitute all the reparations Korea is likely to receive. The Korean view is that these assets were simply Korean properties which had been seized and exploited by Japanese, and that they are far from adequate, in any event, to repay the considerable sums of money and quantities of goods which

the Japanese removed from Korea during the 40-year occupation.

The Korean case is set forth explicitly in a balance sheet prepared partly by Korean economists and partly by Americans, who served together upon the Special Economic Committee appointed by the American Military Government, with Lee Soon Taik serving as chairman. Dr. Chey Soon Ju, the American-educated Director of the Bank of Korea, has organized the findings of this Committee in the following tables:

KOREAN CLAIMS UPON JAPAN

I. Actual transfer of funds to Japanese Treasury account:	
A. Army expenditures transferred in cash from Korean Budget to Japanese Army Budget, 1937-1944	1,599,806,000 Yen
B. Transfer of Annuity Funds (1908-1944) from Korean Postal Savings Account to Japanese Treasury	1,465,579,000 Yen
C. Transfer of Life Insurance Premium Account to Japanese Treasury	70,000,000 Yen
D. Transfer of Postal Life Insurance Premium Account to Japanese Treasury	12,973,000 Yen
II. Debit balance through trade relations:	
A. Debit balance of Bank of Chosun to Bank of Japan, as of August 15, 1945	8,500,000,000 Yen
B. Debit balance of gold and silver bullion	1,500,000,000 Yen
C. Debit balance of Korean banks other than Bank of Chosun to Japanese banks	3,000,000,000 Yen
D. Debit balance of Postal money transfer	428,000,000 Yen
E. Debit balance of Postal Savings Giro System	887,920,000 Yen
III. Investment in Japan of Koreans in Korea:	
A. Japanese Government Bonds and guaranteed debentures held by Koreans	800,000,000 Yen
B. Bank of Japan notes (currency) held by Korean banks	1,000,000,000 Yen
IV. Other issue notes held by the Bank of Chosun:	
A. Japanese National Bonds	5,800,000,000 Yen
B. Japanese debentures	500,000,000 Yen
C. Commercial bills	4,400,000,000 Yen
V. Other unsettled Korean claims:	
A. Investments by Koreans in Japanese-held Manchuria, China, and South Sea Islands	10,000,000,000 Yen
B. Investments in Japan by Koreans in Japan	10,000,000,000 Yen

VI. Unestimated claims yet to be investigated:

- A. Properties and investments abroad by old Korean government, confiscated by Japan at time of annexation, 1910.
 - B. Personal properties of Koreans confiscated by Japan on charges of anti-Japanese activities, 1910-1945.
 - C. Art treasures, curios, and historical documents removed to Japanese libraries and museums, 1910-1945.
- Grand Total: in excess of 49,254,288,000 Yen

JAPANESE CLAIMS UPON KOREA

I. Japanese investments in Korea:

- A. Industrial plants and organizations, equivalent to 90.73% of the total paid capital of such organizations in Korea
- B. Finance, banking, etc., equivalent to 88.8% of the total banking capital in Korea
- C. Commercial organizations, etc., equivalent to 73.7% of the total commercial investment in Korea
- D. Fisheries, mining, and other primitive industries, equivalent to 93.5% of such investment in Korea
- E. Land (1944 figures)
 - (1) 318,997 acres of upland, at 22.7 Yen per acre
 - (2) 745,790 acres of paddy land at 65.1 Yen per acre
 - (3) 12,899 acres of town lots at 41.2 Yen per acre
 - (4) 578,546 acres of forest lands, valued at

2,207,720,276 Yen
441,691,467 Yen
603,157,115 Yen
579,171,031 Yen

7,265,773 Yen
48,674,199 Yen
532,722 Yen
1,178,665 Yen

II. Japanese-owned residences and ships left in Korea:

- A. About 200,000 Japanese-owned residences in Korea valued at approximately 20,000 Yen apiece
 - B. Boats and ships with estimated valuation of
- Grand Total: 8,889,399,420 Yen

4,000,000,000 Yen
1,000,000,000 Yen

This compilation shows an outstanding debt owed by Japan to Korea of over 40 billion Yen (the equivalent of the Korean Won), figured in 1945 values of the currency. Even if repaid in the inflated values of 1950, this sum would be sufficient to aid vastly in the development of Korean industrialization. Efforts to write off these sums as of no consequence can never be regarded as acceptable by the Republic of Korea.

Whatever the differences that exist between the two countries, Korea and Japan are both confronted by the fact of aggressive Communist imperialism, and as such are inevitably drawn closer together for common defense. The aggression which was launched upon Korea was unquestionably intended in part to bring the Communist Empire closer to the main Japanese islands. The common enemy looming upon their northern and eastern borders will render far easier the solution of problems that otherwise might defy negotiation.

The Communist attack has submerged all other problems and differences for the moment, but, in the long struggle of rehabilitation and reconstruction that lies ahead, a prime question will be the relations of Japan with Korea and with the other peoples of the Far East. Such

questions may now be postponed, but they should not be ignored. When the time for settlement does arrive, it should be our hope and our determination to build the peace structure this time on sounder foundations than those laid at Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam. In the long view of what lies ahead for Asia, a prime consideration is to solve the difficulties existing between Japan and the other countries she has dominated and ravished. A way of friendship may and must be found. That way does not lie through restoration of Japan to the pre-eminence in Asia which it has so tragically abused.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

WAR CAME IN KOREA. AT THIS DATE THE probability is that it will spread (rapidly or gradually) into world-wide destruction. Whether the Soviet Union now chooses to launch into the terrible undertaking of another global war, or whether it and we may be drawn in willy-nilly by the impossibility of turning back from the struggle in Korea and from other challenges already drawn up in Formosa, Indochina, Tibet, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Western Europe, will shortly become evident. At the best, if large-scale war is avoided, we are already started on a program of mobilization which, for the sake of survival, will have to be continued and expanded. The fighting in Korea is the fuse; Soviet imperialism is the explosive charge; the threat of imminent explosion hangs over our heads.

The question of what American policies may now be adopted to help avert the general war, or to win it and to attempt to profit by it if it comes, is now the crucial consideration.

Personally, I do not believe that peace can be made secure by any mere juggling of outworn techniques of statesmanship. The development of the atomic bomb and of all the other technological advances which it so dramatically symbolizes have cut to the very roots of traditional international relationships. New alliances, fresh alignments of power, frenzied bargaining to gain new allies, will not serve.

The whole concept of power politics, of playing one nation against another, must go. England is the most successful proponent of the old technique and is near the end of her strength. Russia is the most belligerent present-day advocate of this method and has succeeded in arousing world-wide resentment and fear. The United States has never been very successful at it, for it runs contrary to the very instincts of our people. This is not because we are better than other peoples (we are simply an amalgam of them), but because we have been more fortunate. A century and a half of living in a rich continent relatively safe from attack made it unnecessary for us to develop skill in international log-rolling

and gave us an opportunity to develop a kind of disgust with the whole proceeding. Wilson's Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and Atlantic Charter are simply expressions of sentiments that run deep through American life.

Out of our feelings of decency, however, we have not yet developed the practical realism to see the world as it has become. It is scarcely an exaggeration to aver that the American people have developed two deep-seated cardinal international political faiths, both of which are false, and which together led us unprepared into the present crisis.

The first of these faiths is that, when a world war breaks out, our allies will fight it for us while we have time to get ready. This happened in 1914-17 and again in 1939-41. Such experiences lulled us into a deceptive belief that instant readiness for defense was not required by a nation as sheltered as ours.

The second faith has been the childlike conviction that the horrors of global war could not come oftener than once every 25 years. For young men to be placed twice in jeopardy of military service simply is not fair! Every major conflict requires a period of rehabilitation, forgiveness, and recovery. But, in holding such faith, we were blind to the nature of the totali-

tarian menace inherent in the strong and brutal dictatorships that thus far have marked our century.

Twice during the last thirty-five years the United States has appeared as a sort of prophet to the frightened peoples of the world by our forthright advocacy of simple ethical principles. In both world wars, however, these principles were used as slogans for war rather than as programs on which to build the peace. Consequently, after both wars a wave of cynical disillusionment swept around the world. Rightly or wrongly, the United States was the chief victim of that reaction during the 'twenties. Russia has shouldered us out of that position now by her tactics of overt aggression. In this sense, at least, we should be grateful to the Kremlin masters for having rescued us from responsibility in the eyes of the world for abandonment of the Atlantic Charter-Four Freedoms idealism.

The menace with which the world is confronted today is similar in essential respects to the turmoil and terror of the early nineteenth century in Europe. Now, as then, the struggle was directed not only across national boundary lines but also across class lines. The democratic political revolution instigated by the equalitarian doctrines of John Locke brought some

benefits of freedom, but largely to Englishmen and Americans. Leaders in France demanded similar benefits and the same natural determination spread through Europe. Then Napoleon seized power and diverted this energy to serve the imperialistic interests of the France he dominated. England organized a European alliance for his defeat. But, after that defeat was accomplished, the deep-rooted demands continued to be heard in Europe, and in good time a wave of revolutions brought changes in most of the Western world.

Similarly, the later technological revolution brought economic benefits to industrialized areas—again primarily to England and the United States, with western Europe also benefitting substantially. For a combination of reasons, the benefits of this technological revolution failed to penetrate deeply into Russia, South America or Eastern Europe, and scarcely touched Asia and Africa. Karl Marx offered one attractively phrased denunciation of this limitation of the benefits of the technological revolution, and once again deprived peoples around the world were stirred to rebellion. And once again an imperialist-minded nation—this time Russia—has attempted to organize the deep-seated unrest for her own advantage. So urgent is the danger

that the United States has been impelled to organize a world-wide alliance to contain or defeat the aggressor. This defensive measure is fully as necessary now as it was when Europe shuddered under the threat of Napoleon's legions.

But when the military phase of this new revolution is defeated, the end will not have been reached. The discontent is real and is based upon tangible and striking differences in living standards in various areas of the earth. The time has passed when certain large populations will remain content to live without the material comforts and opportunities which they know are possessed by others—and which they know, too, it should be practical to produce for them. Once Russia has been defeated, contained, or reawakened, the rebellion still will go on, by whatever means prove effective, until all the peoples of the world have full and free access to the machinery of large-scale industrial production. This is a fact of the present world condition which must not be overlooked in planning for the future.

The lexicon of international relations has been too freely used—and abused—in the numerous apologia of imperialistic adventurers. Thus, three centuries of British colonialism become

transmuted into "the white man's burden." Japanese expansion marched under the banner of "Asia for the Asiatics." French, Dutch, German, and Russian seizures in the Orient were all dedicated to "the advance of civilization." Treaties have often been expressions by sovereign states of their intention to limit their own actions, so far as they desire to do so, and for so long as they may choose, in return for what concessions they are able to exact. Such treaties are no more than promises made to one another by brigands who recognize no law; they are holding actions or rear-guard defences erected in one area while advances are being attempted elsewhere. Even the right of defining specific terms has remained individualistic. To cite but a single illustration, "democracy," with its many variants, is currently used with opposite meanings by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Golden Rule itself is often debased into David Harum's cynical paraphrase: "Do others, as they would like to do you, only do them first."

Father LaFarge, writing in *America*, August 19, 1950, well explained the alternative:

"If we do not succeed during the next two or three years in making a tremendous step forward on the spiritual front in this country, if we do not use the opportunity that *now presents itself*, we shall have set the clock for an ultimate

collapse in the spiritual field that must inevitably bring disaster to those heroically defending our country in all the little wars, and in "the" war, if and when it should come.

"To quote from the words which Korea's Ambassador to the United States, Dr. John M. Chang, wrote recently for NC News Service:

" 'I have been awesomely conscious that here is no fight to be won by man alone. It is a fight to be won by the prayers and faith of all men, if it is to be won at all . . . I can do no less as a man, as a Catholic and as a Korean than to bespeak your attention. We need many prayers, many more prayers than we need bullets. We need a vast voice, rising to heaven, reaffirming our faith in God and entrusting to Him our most sacred hopes . . . '

"Such a view must be obvious from the very nature of the fighting we are now engaged in. Behind North Korean tactics is a world strategy, and inspiring that world strategy is a fanatical anti-God and anti-religious ideology. The essence of that ideology is to make the ultimate terminus of man's history identical with that of the material, brute nature from which Karl Marx declares man originally sprang. It is to effect the complete brutalizing and de-spiritualizing of the human race, the destruction of all the ideas, tendencies, aspirations which in any way nourish or give life to man's spirit and move him to the knowledge and love of God."

A mere sketch of present circumstances in the Far East indicates that there has been little gain for anyone, and much loss for all, from the policies that have been pursued. These circumstances revolve around the three problems of Communism, colonialism, and racism. Divergent as they are in some respects, they all spring from a common root: the failure of the West to understand the East.

Communism, which is Asia's greatest danger, is an imported problem. It has little attraction for the Oriental mind. Marxism was tailored for an industrial civilization, in which regimented activities and collective interests predominate. It has no more basic applicability to the highly individualistic farmers of the Orient than it had for the farming class which was forced to accept it in Russia. Even more fundamentally, the materialism and economic determinism of the Communist credo are distinctly at odds with the essential religiosity of the Asian mind. That part of the world would never willingly surrender to an ideology that starts with a denial of spiritual values.

Colonialism was supposed to have ended with the second of the world wars. Both Western and Asian statesmen declared freely that the old principles of extraterritoriality and im-

perialism must end. In partial fulfillment of this determination India and Burma are free, Ceylon has been granted Dominion status, and the Republic of the Philippines is established. However, Indochina is still forcibly held under Western rule and Indonesia is still torn by dissension. And China and Korea have been permitted to be overrun.

Underlying both Communism and colonialism is the more difficult and disagreeable question of racism. Until the democratic nations learn to regard the Orientals with respect and equality, rather than with disdain or, what is little better, with tolerance, the question of racism will continue to operate in favor of Russia and against the West. It may be recalled that Kipling's ballad which began with the assertion that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet" concluded with the discovery that, where equality is recognized and respect is generated, the fancied differences disappear. "For there is neither East nor West, border nor breed nor birth, when two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth." As among individuals, so among nations, the eventual elimination of strife and injustice depends to a great extent upon the mutual recognition of equal rights and

the mutual acceptance of equal responsibilities.

Asia has had all that man required to make him healthy, wealthy, and wise. Its people have had imagination, intuition, and the gift of appreciative meditation. In poetry, philosophy, art, and family morals, the Orient became great. It proved through long centuries to be a most stable portion of the globe.

In one significant respect, however, the West left Asia far behind. Science is the domination of matter by the practical mind. Political science extends the domination from material resources to men. The practical mind of the West has excelled in its mastery over matter and men. When science became king, the Orientals were reduced to a secondary role. The subordination of the Orient began when Western man turned from the philosopher's lecture halls to the scientist's laboratories. The Oriental contemplation of what man *is* was rudely shaken by the Occidental stress on what man could *do*.

Perhaps one day the wheel will come full circle once again. Already, loud complaints are heard that science has outstripped morals. The energetic inventiveness of the West has given man tools that he is not wise enough to know how to use. The old fable of the Frankenstein monster is being whispered again. Humanity has hurled itself into the atomic age with a rule

book written in terms of individualism, self-expression, and freedom, only to find that it must seek, instead, for a philosophy of cooperation, restraint, and devotion if it hopes to survive.

The development of individual and social ethics has brought us incalculable advantages in the past. But now we face the fact that the greatest threat to human security lies in the monstrous striking capacity of the sole agencies that remain above and beyond any ethical laws—the sovereign and therefore lawless States. Unless we can quickly either bring them into the moral realm or else confront them with the overwhelming power of nations that are so organized, we are lost.

On the vital question of what to do next, my suggestion would be that, along with our necessary mobilization of military power, the Administration and Congressional spokesmen should also make every effort to mobilize the moral power of mankind. They should follow up the excellent start already made with the Truman Doctrine, the E.C.A., the North Atlantic Military Alliance, the Point Four program of aid to underdeveloped areas, and the pointed hints that the United Nations may have to be reorganized without the Soviet Union. They should lay the basis for lasting unity of the democratic world through speeches which stress the need for an

ethical approach to international relations, and which denounce the whole concept of national sovereignty for the reason that it is directly contrary to such an ethical approach.

And they should conclude these educational efforts by inviting the free nations of the world into a new constitutional convention for the purpose of drawing up a federal constitution to succeed the present Charter of the United Nations. The key consideration in such a constitution would be a provision for direct election of representatives to the constituent assembly by peoples, rather than their appointments by governments. Only then could the new government exercise the necessary power over the relationship of its member states. Once this step were taken, the assembly could be expected gradually to extend its authority as necessity requires.

Many will reject such a suggestion as too "radical" or "idealistic." But "at my back I always hear time's winged chariot drawing near." The echoes of destructive war are already reaching our shores from Korea and may soon be multiplied elsewhere. Scientists of every nation are hard at work unraveling the secrets of ever-greater destruction.

The human race simply does not have much more time.

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