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
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WITH WHAT RIGHT IS KANT'S CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON CALLED
A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE?

INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION

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Ever since the first appearance of Cohen's „Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung“, the subject of this paper might very properly have received formal treatment. As a matter of fact, the substance of what belongs in the discussion of the question has found its way to a greater or less extent into recent Kantian literature, especially that in which the problem of the Critique as such receives distinct consideration. That which has given rise to the discussion of the question in the present instance is the article of E. Adickes in the „Kant Studien“ (Bd. I. 1897): „Die bewegenden Kräfte in Kants philosophischer Entwicklung und die beiden Pole seines Systems.“ In this article, S. 47 ff., Adickes combats the interpretation of Cohen, Caird and Vaihinger, in particular, and maintains the view which, while conceding that the problem of experience as such occupies an important place in the Critique, is far from recognizing that the Critique itself can be legitimately regarded as a theory of experience.

The aim of this paper will therefore be, first (I), to present an review of the works of Cohen, Caird and Vaihinger, so far as the subject under consideration is concerned; second (II), to do the same as regards the attitude of Adickes toward the works just mentioned; and third (III), to draw a few independent conclusions from the general controversy. We proceed at once to the review of Cohen, where the chief interest will be to observe how he

comes to assume the position from which the Critique presents itself to him in the form of a „Theorie der Erfahrung.“

I.

1. „Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung“, Hermann Cohen. I. Aufl., Berlin 1871 (S. 270): II. Aufl., Berlin 1885 (S. 616). We shall confine ourselves to the second edition of this work, for the large increase of matter, as will be seen, is due to the fact that Cohen seeks, (1) to lay more broadly the foundation of his interpretation and (2) to develop a greater systematic accuracy, and is not due to any radical alteration in the author's grasp of the Critique. In the preface to the second edition, after stating how he had endeavored to relate himself as objectively as possible to the first edition of his work in order thus to be made the better able in a second edition to improve it both systematically and historically, Cohen proceeds: „Diese Verbesserung musste in systematischer und in historischer Hinsicht angestrebt werden, und diese beiden Rücksichten mussten verbunden wirken, wie die Vorrede zur ersten Auflage solches gefordert hat. Die systematische Verbesserung musste im Gebiet der Erfahrungslehre versucht, zugleich aber auch nach den Grenzen der Ethik gerichtet werden. Es war demgemäss die Ideenlehre in die Erfahrungslehre aufzunehmen, etc.“ The term „Erfahrungslehre“ stands for the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, the term „Ideenlehre,“ for the Transcendental Dialectic, although it is to be observed that it was the author's purpose the latter in the former „aufzunehmen,“ so that, methodically considered, they are related as the two sides or phases of the one Theorie der Erfahrung. Even this statement hardly represents the true relation of the parts. The preponderating interest centers in the Erfahrungslehre which occupies at least four fifths of the book. (Chaps. I—XII). The last chapter (XVI) is a general characterization under six hea-

ings of the method and spirit of the Kantian system throughout, while the intervening three chapters (XIII—XV) cover the *Ideenlehre*.

The „*Verbesserung in historischer Hinsicht*“ which Cohen sought after in his second edition is incorporated in the Introduction to which we now turn our attention.

Cohen maintains that in order to comprehend Kant one must know both the material and the historical data which lie at the basis of the Kantian system. The material data „*lassen sich in dem Einen Namen Newton zusammenfassen und bestimmen*,“ and with special reference to Newton's scientific method rather than to his results. The historical data are of two classes, first, that relation to predecessors and contemporaries of which Kant was not only conscious but which he himself in the case of the Englishmen and especially of Hume exaggerated; second, that real relation of which Kant was not so conscious, that order of historical succession in which he truly belongs, and is alone determined by the character and spirit of his work. From this latter standpoint, Kant belongs in the circle of Plato, Descartes, Galileo, Newton and Leibniz by reason of that which distinguishes them from Aristotle in ancient philosophy, and the English school of Locke in the modern period. The characteristic feature of the first named is their interest in the worth, the certainty, the validity of knowledge. Plato was the founder of „*Erkenntnisskritik*.“ In that his interest lay in knowledge as to the measure of its validity of which mathematics represented the highest degree, and in that he distinguished between reason and sensibility not on the basis of an original distinction of faculties but on the basis of their respective contributions to the quality and worth of knowledge, is he closely related to Kant. Plato's successors in the modern period are they who recognize the close relation between philosophy and mathematics and mathematical physics, they who recognized the problem of philosophy to be the deter-

mination of the principles of the certainty and validity of scientific truth. To a very special degree Galileo and Newton were the „Erzeuger der Wissenschaft“ while Descartes and Leibniz surpassed them in its philosophical relation and determination. Descartes' use of the term "innate" does not indicate a psychological but an epistemological interest. It is for him the criterion of certainty. To be sure this is inadmissible and involves him in confusion and contradiction, but this does not alter the fact of the main tendency of his thought. Leibniz is a kindred spirit. As Descartes began with mathematics so also Leibniz. As Descartes was the „Erfinder der analytischen Geometrie,“ so was Leibniz der Erfinder der Infinitesimalrechnung. Leibniz however took umbrage both at Descartes' conception of substance, and at his conception of thinking, and though he grasped both ideas more sharply and keenly than Descartes yet in the development of his Monadology he discarded the epistemological for a dogmatical interest, and thus laid himself open to Kant's later criticism. The point to be observed and emphasized in his Monadology, however, is that he bases matter upon thought and grounds therein the principle of its determination and so of its production. His great blunder, however, was his reduction of mathematics to logic as the basis of all truth. Nevertheless, in that he regarded the problem of philosophy to be the criticism and proof of science he stands as a true as he is the immediate predecessor of Kant.

As to the other list who do not represent the true spirit of the Kantian undertaking, Cohen remarks how Aristotle's interest was chiefly psychological. He laid stress upon sense-perception and experience, and so gave rise to the idealistic-sensationistic controversy. His service to the progress of thought consists in the fact that he emphasized the importance of the inquiry concerning the origin of the various stages or degrees of knowledge in psychical life. His achievement in this regard may be

characterized as biological, but, in that he estimated lightly mathematics and failed to recognize the connection between it and philosophy therefore is it clear that he „die Philosophie von der rechten Bahn abgelenkt hat.“ Aristotle's successors in the modern period are the "Sensualisten" Locke and Hume who had no sense for science as such, whose service is to be regarded rather as a protest against the disregard of sensation on the part of the "Intellektualisten" in the knowledge of nature. Locke's psychological analysis of consciousness is important although his distinction between Sensation and Reflection is not clearly or consistently carried through, and his use of the term experience exhibits the superficiality of the entire system. Hume appears to have taken up Leibniz's distinction of *vérités de fait* and *vérités de raison*, modified "truth" into "object of thought", and in so far at least identified "matter-of-fact" with "truth", as to deny any necessary connection in thought. Thus the principle of causality is reduced to a product of experience or indeed of custom. Hume appealed to experience because the intellectuallists onesidedly held the formal, logical principle of sufficient reason as adequate for the explanation of nature. In his opposition to them Hume went to the opposite extreme and reduced all ideas even that of causality to sense-impression. The following utterance of Cohen with which he closes his historical sketch is important as touching the use of the term experience before Kant. „Enthält nun schon in Humes Analyse die in derjenigen Lockes der Ausdruck der Erfahrung eine bestechende Zweideutigkeit für die Erklärung des Ursprungs der Begriffe, so ist für die Geltung derselben, für den Wert ihres Inhaltes, das Wort Erfahrung ein vollständiges Räthsel. Newton will Erfahrung lehren; bedarf aber zu derselben der Speculation. Leibniz will die Thatsachen schlechterdings auf Vernunft-Wahrheiten gründen; verallgemeinert dieselben aber auf logische Gesetzmässigkeiten, unter denen jene alles ihres speziellen Inhalts und Characters

endledigt werden. Und Hume endlich reisst die Kluft auf zwischen den Relationen unter unsern Ideen und den That-
sachen; glaubt sie aber verengern und schliessen zu können durch Reduction der Ideen auf Impressionen, als welche uns auch die That-
sachen liefern. Also ist auch die Causa-
lität eine Impression oder aber ein unklarer Begriff bei dem sich nichts vorstellen lasse. Bei dieser Aufklärung jedoch löst sich der Newtonische Begriff der Kraft in populäre Muskel-Empfindung auf; wie die Spekulation, auf welcher Newtons Erfahrung mitberuht, in Impressionen untergehen muss.“ S. 54.

The material data upon which Kant built is the fact of the Newtonian science. Unlike his predecessors Kant proceeds to distinguish and specify the conception of science and to limit it to knowledge in the sense of mathematics and mathematical physics. He distinguishes first theoretical and practical knowledge, but that is not sufficient. „So einfach liegt die Frage der Wissenschaft nicht.“ The conception of theoretical knowledge must be at least so far enlarged as to cover the various branches of the „beschreibende Naturwissenschaften“ which also perform their part in constituting nature. Where now is there a term to cover this enlarged sphere? „Da bot sich ihm nun zwar nicht ein scharfer Begriff, aber ein populärer Name dar, den die Alten schon philosophisch geprägt hatten, den die Neueren, und zumal die Zeitgenossen zu einem Alles erklärenden Schlagwort machen. Erfahrung ist der vielversprechende Name, der sowohl die Methode wie das Objekt bezeichnet, und in beiderlei Sinn vorzugsweise auf die Naturgeschichte passt, aber doch selbst von Newton und seinen Anhängern für die Mechanik angerufen wird. So fasst Kant das Problem der Philosophie zunächst bei diesem Namen, indem er alle theoretischen Beziehungen der philosophischen Frage auf die Legitimation der Erfahrung richtet.“ S. 58, 59. Kant's next step after the introduction of this general term was its distinct determination in the specific

sciences. Thus in its particular stipulation, he distinguishes not only mathematical and pure physics but he separates and isolates mathematics from pure physics, and he did so because of the uncertainty and confusion which had prevailed concerning the distinctions between one form of science and another not only with reference to their general character but also their worth as knowledge. Besides which by the separate treatment of these two spheres, the work of reason and the factor of sensation would receive their legitimate recognition and determination. The method by which Kant separated and tested these spheres of science is the transcendental method.

Thus we come to Kant's task which Cohen thus defines: „Kant's Aufgabe ist also zunächst die Prüfung und Kennzeichnung des Erkenntnisswerthes und des Gewissheitsgrundes der Newtonschen Naturwissenschaft, welche er bei dem Drohwort der Erfahrung fasste.“ He will defeat the “Sensualisten” with their own weapons and also improve upon intellectualism by the „Anerkennung des guten Kernes der Empfindung.“ The transcendental method arose from Kant's reflection upon Newton's Principia, but the conceptions there employed were not simply taken up and philosophically established. The task of philosophy was seen to be a profounder one, namely, the derivation of the fundamental conceptions of science out of consciousness itself. But here lay the danger of reducing the critical undertaking to a psychological analysis. They are indeed closely related, but the latter is dependent upon the former, for when psychology traces back to sensation then is her limit reached. If the inquiry is pursued further to impressions and things, „ist das aber noch Psychologie? Sind nicht vielmehr Dinge und deren Eindrücke Begriffe, die den Inhalt und Werth der Erkenntniss angehen, nicht aber die Beschreibung der Vorgänge des Erkennens? So sehen wir, dass das angeblich psychologische Interesse einen kritischen Unterschleif macht, der verhängnissvoll und typisch ist.“ S. 71. The psycho-

logist must recognize that there are insolvable elements of consciousness and the epistemologist must maintain that recognition. Such irreducible elements are the a priori, and, the investigation which establishes these elemental facts of consciousness, Kant termed the metaphysical preparatory treatment (*metaphysisches Vorverfahren*), and recognized it to be a „notwendige Vorbedingung des transcendentalen.“ One might be lead to ask, why this concern to show that the fundamental basis of science exists in the form of these elements of consciousness? Because the surrender of science to arbitrary combinations and the overthrow of all power to unite and control sense-perception in its accidental character, would follow if there were no ultimate factors of consciousness which correspond to the ground principles of science. However, the assumption of these a priori elements must not only be controlled but must be recognized as of provisional character. They are shown to be effectual and characterized as the fundamental features of the knowing consciousness, in that the metaphysical a priori rises into the transcendental a priori.

At this point, Cohen takes up the consideration of the Transcendental Aesthetic. It is of methodological interest at least to observe that no chapter is devoted to Kant's Introduction. Its content so far as the explanation of the Kantian terminology is concerned is incorporated for the most part with the opening chapter on Space and Time.

We have, however to hold clearly in mind how Cohen develops the thought that Kant's task is to be viewed as a theory of experience. It is therefore to be remembered that, according to Cohen, (1) Kant's interest throughout was a scientific interest. The fact from which he started and the basis upon which he built was the Newtonian science. (2) His special task was to prove and vindicate science in the matter of its certainty and validity as knowledge. (3) Although he found no „scharfen Begriff“ to cover the whole field of science in the form of

Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft whose inalienable rights he was to establish yet the „Stichwort“ of modern philosophy, „das unklarste und unbestimmteste Wort, bei dem sich alles Rechte wie das Verkehrteste denken lässt —“ this word, „Erfahrung“ commended itself to him. By his adoption of it, Kant fixed its meaning and determined its scope and sphere. (4) Yet it was in harmony with the transcendental method, or rather, this constituted the transcendental method, to reduce or transform (aufzulösen) experience into its two constituent forms pure mathematics and pure physics, and separately investigate each.

From this point on, the deciding feature of Cohen's interpretation of the Critique is that he regards Kant's aim to have been the explanation of the possibility of experience. This term, experience, is the, „eigentlicher Terminus, um den sich das ganze Unternehmen negativ wie positiv dreht, . . . in der Erfahrung vereinigt Kant beide Erkenntnisquellen, die er abgesondert untersucht, um den Beitrag einer jeden für das Ganze dieser Erkenntnis von dem der andern zu scheiden und jeden Beitragswerth für den Bestand des Ganzen zu bestimmen.“ S. 354. Moreover, the errors which Cohen attacks in the false interpretations of those who will distort the „rein erkenntniskritische“ character of the Critique into a psychological character — chiefly those of Schopenhauer — are traced to a disregard or a misappreciation of the principle of the possibility of experience which for Cohen is the central feature of the Critique. Space and Time like the categories are viewed as the „formale Bedingungen“ of experience and the „Grundsätze,“ as its constitutive principles — that is, the principles upon which its possibility rests. The thing-in-itself finds its legitimate place in the Kantian system, for it is nothing less than experience itself taken as a whole. „Blosser Begriff kann dieser Gegenstand nicht sein sollen, vielmehr bezieht er sich auf die Erfahrung, dieweil er die Zufälligkeit derselben aufheben möchte. Anderseits aber kann das Ding dieses

Denkens nicht der Erfahrung als einer ihrer Gegenstände angehören; denn dann bliebe es zufällig. Indessen muss sich doch die Erfahrung selbst als ganzes und somit als Ding denken lassen: das ist das Ding an sich, nicht als Ding des analytischen Denkens, noch als Gegenstand der Erfahrung, sondern Erfahrung selbst als Gegenstand gedacht.“ S. 503. The thing-in-itself attains its transcendental importance through the ideas of reason which as unconditioned correspond to and limit the conditioned — that is — the particular content of experience. They stand for the systematic unity as distinct from the categories which represent the synthetic unity of experience. They are limitative and regulative while that which contributes the synthetic unity of experience is constitutive. The function of the “Idee” is this, namely, that it is the principle of formal purposiveness — the purpose being to free experience from its purely accidental character, or rather give legitimacy to this its character, and so give to it the completeness of a system of nature.

From this point we may look back over the “theory of experience” and term it in reality the theory or system of nature — the theory of nature to which Kant from the very start consciously applied the term experience, and then determined its character according to the fundamental and unimpeachable factors of the knowing consciousness.

2. The next work that comes under review is “The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant”, 2 vols., Edward Caird. Glasgow, 1889. (pp. 1300). This work can scarcely be termed a second edition, though surely a continuation, of Caird’s earlier work, “A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant”. Glasgow 1877. (pp. 675). This latter work “except in a few passages” is not reproduced in the former, consists of but one volume, bears, as we see, a different title, and is devoted exclusively, so far as the critical philosophy is concerned, to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the preface, however, Caird expressed his hope

of some time following the work with a similar treatment of the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment. This intention he carries out, and also adds a discussion of Kant's treatise on "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason" in the course of his second work. The arrangement of matter in this later work is as follows: the first volume and five chapters in the second are devoted to the Critique of Pure Reason. [Book I, (Vol. I, pp. 1 — 654, Vol. II., pp. 1--145)]. The remaining portion of the second volume relates to the other two Critiques and to the Treatise (Books II, III, and IV).

It is, of course, with Caird's later work that we are chiefly concerned and with the part of it which relates to the Critique of Pure Reason. This particular part is indeed in every sense a second edition of Caird's earlier work. Among the differences in style and arrangement in the one as distinguished from the other, we observe, first, that though the Introduction in the second work is somewhat longer than that in the first, yet it loses both its name and its character as distinctively "historical". More space is given to Kant's own individual development, and less to the general development of philosophy at large. There is but one chapter which is concerned with the development of philosophy before Kant. The aim seems to be to transform the extensive consideration of the whole field of philosophy into intensive concentration upon Kant's own life and work.

Then, in the presentation of the work itself beyond the introduction, we find that Caird has considerably modified the method of his earlier book. In his first work since he "found it impossible to separate the substance of the Critical Philosophy from Kant's method of presenting it, I have thought it advisable in the first place to state what I believed to be the meaning of each considerable section of the Critique, and then to add such comments and criticisms as seemed to be necessary". This simple

and, for the reader most favorable, method Caird does not follow in his second work, but combines in the one chapter both his interpretation and his criticism of the matter under consideration. It may be said, however, that Caird's masterly style, his richness of resource so far as the fine distinctions of philosophical expression are concerned, together with his frequent "surveys" more than make up for what might seem like the rejection of a most advantageous method. On the whole, the arrangement and style of this second work seem to us an improvement on the first.

A word deserves to be said concerning the aim of Caird's work for, unlike that of Cohen, its title conveys no suggestion as to what is the principle of the author's interpretation or what, his ultimate aim. In the first edition, Caird's aim was clearly defined — first, explanation, second, criticism and reconstruction. Now while these features appear quite as prominently in the second edition and characterize the special form of his manner of treatment, yet the fact, already alluded to, of the more thorough study of Kant in the whole round of his philosophical productions is seen to have enlarged or developed Caird's purpose. The same effect was further promoted by the effort to present and expound the other two Critiques, thus emphasizing the connection of Kant's thought throughout the entire critical philosophy. So powerfully did this influence Caird that he finds it difficult to justify the recognition of any particular problem in the Critique of Pure Reason apart from the other Critiques. He states that it would be "nearly as legitimate" to seek for the problem of the Aesthetic or the Analytic separately, as "to take the Critique of Pure Reason itself as a whole." (Vol. I p. 232, Note). His aim may therefore be said to be this, namely, that, having determined the nature of Kant's philosophical development, to the time of the critical period, he seeks to discover and present the real thread of connection which binds together the three Critiques, to show just how the Critiques are to be viewed

as successive stages in the development of Kant's thought. Not only is the effect of this very evident in the standpoint from which Caird views and criticizes the *Dialectic*, but is appreciable in the earlier portions of the *Critique* as well, even to his labored effort to find a formula in which he can allow himself to regard the aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as being rightly expressed.

From the matter of Caird's general method and aim we turn now to consider, first, how in fact he regards the problem of the *Critique*, and second, how he interprets Kant's conception of experience.

(1). As to the problem of the *Critique*. In Caird's first work, he began by assigning to the critical problem such a wide range and reach that he found no difficulty even in the start in actually identifying the two questions the distinctions between which is the chief concern of this paper, a ground of distinction being its provisional presupposition. "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? The meaning of this question", says Caird, "is simply this, How can the individual mind get beyond itself? How can we know? . . . How is what we call experience possible?" Now the underlying feature of Caird's view of the problem of the *Critique* in this first work is the fact that consciously or unconsciously he abides by the inseparableness of the problem of the validity of a priori knowledge from that of experience. They seem nowhere in his work to be disjoined and set over against each other, the one as representing "a rational interest" and the other an "empirical interest". They are to him not two problems but one and the same problem. For, he says: "Kant seeks to discover our a priori ideas not for their own sake but as the ground of our knowledge of objects. He endeavors to show that knowledge is possible only through a priori synthesis, etc." (p. 220) There would have been no object, according to Caird, in the effort to discover these a priori forms, if it had not been to show that they are required

in order to solve the problem of common knowledge. The truth is, Caird regards the fact of experience as the presupposition of the Critique — “the fixed basis of ascertained truth” the a priori principles involved in which it is the object of the Critique to determine.

When now we take up the second work, it is not difficult to discover with reference to his new view of the problem of the Critique, the effect of those influences to which we have already referred and to which Caird calls attention in the preface. The two features which characterize in general his putting of the problem in the later work are, first, that it is viewed strictly in its relation to the entire connection of Kant's thought especially as expressed in the three Critiques, and second, that it is viewed as requiring a primary and then afterward a more developed formulation. So far as the first feature is concerned, Caird lays emphasis upon the necessity of the Critique of Practical Reason “to give the right interpretation to the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason”, and further along he maintains quite the same view with reference to the relation of the Critique of Judgment to the Critique of Practical Reason and so to the entire critical philosophy. Throughout the whole system “Kant advances in a sort of alternation of movement between scepticism and dogmatism; but his ultimate aim and purpose is to put the fundamental truths of Metaphysic on an immovable basis by removing them from all appearance of collision with the principles of empirical knowledge; or, looking at it from the opposite side, it is to show that the principles of empirical knowledge imply a consciousness that is not limited to experience, but rather itself limits experience; and that that consciousness, while incapable of giving us the kind of knowledge which we have of the objects of experience, is yet in itself the source of a rational certitude as to those things which can neither be seen with the eye nor heard with the ear, and which it is beyond the

power of our, imagination to picture or of our understanding to determine, i. e., to comprehend as objects of knowledge". (Vol I, p. 232.) And then, when Caird gives the formula in which he believes the "first form" of the problem to be best expressed, he immediately qualifies it by saying that such statement is "too simple, if we do not add that, in showing this limitation of knowledge, Kant at the same time shows the necessity of the thought of objects beyond experience, and leaves open the question as to their reality and as to the possibility of proving it". (Vol. I, p 232—3) Throughout his discussion of the problem Caird lays emphasis upon the positive element of what might be termed the negative side of the Critique, (i. e., the Dialectic) an emphasis which is, of course, to be traced to his view of the Critique in its relation to the succeeding portions of the critical system. Kant did not deny, says Caird, the certitude of that which lies beyond experience "but rather the opposite" His determination of the conditions of a priori knowledge must be viewed as well in the light that it frees "that which is beyond sense experience from the determination to which all empirical objects are subjected". Nature and necessity do not include everything, and the determination of the Critique amounts to an assertion that self which limits experience is beyond that limit and possesses a principle in "its consciousness of itself by which it can determine its own activity independent of nature. When, therefore, it is alleged, as it has been alleged by some, that the Critique of Practical Reason, is an afterthought, the object of which is to undue the negative results of the Critique of Pure Reason, this is not only a mistake as to the way in which Kant conceived his own system, but it involves the separation of two elements which in it are essentially related, viz., the limitation of experience and the assertion of that which limits experience as being itself beyond the limit". (Ib. p. 240).

As to the successive forms which the problem of the Critique is regarded as assuming, Caird gives the first form as follows: "Turning now to the special question of the Critique of Pure Reason we must undoubtedly say that, taking that treatise as a whole, and without reference to any of Kant's other works, it is a proof of the limitation of a priori knowledge to experience, based upon an examination of the conditions of the knowledge which is thus limited". (Ib. p. 232.) By showing how the conditions of a priori knowledge restrict it to the objects of experience, the Critique explains the impossibility of its application in relation to objects beyond experience. "Hence in the Introduction to the Critique, where he formulates the general question, Kant does not ask how experience, or knowledge of phenomenal objects in general, is possible (a question which rises upon him subsequently in the course of thought into which he is led in answering the first question,) but simply how a priori knowledge of such objects is possible. For it seemed obvious to him that it is only by an a priori synthesis that we can go beyond the region experience, and, primarily at least, it was with reference to this 'beyond' that the question of the conditions of knowledge within experience interested him". (Ib. p. 233). Resting upon the fact of the presence of a priori knowledge within experience, Kant is represented as interested to know whether there might be such knowledge reaching beyond experience. In order, therefore, to satisfy this interest and to answer this question Kant sets to work, according to Caird, in the only way open to him, namely, to investigate and determine the conditions of knowledge within experience. But then, says Caird, "the problem of the Critique has an essentially dialectical character, it changes its form as Kant advances from one stage of its solution to another". So that "as Kant advances", Caird remarks a twofold change in the undertaking which Kant sets before himself: "In the first place, instead of an explanation of the conditions

of an a priori knowledge which is assumed to exist, we find Kant giving us the proof that it does exist; and in the second place, instead of an account of the conditions under which one kind of knowledge, namely, a priori knowledge, of empirical objects is possible, we find him giving us an explanation of the possibility of knowledge or experience in general". (Ib. p. 246.) Caird designates these changes as "confusing" but "inevitable", and gives as the reason for their appearance the fact that Kant did not state the problem of the Critique rightly in the first place. What he assumed in the beginning became afterwards subjected to doubt, and from calling into question the account of a priori science given by the Leibnizian school, "he became conscious that science itself needed a vindication". In this connection, Caird remarks that Kant regarded Hume's denial of the validity of the causal relation (one form of a priori knowledge) to have been due to the fact that Hume did not distinguish between things-in-themselves and objects of experience. "The universal scepticism", therefore, rising from such a sweeping denial, Kant will refute. "Hence", says Caird, "that a priori knowledge of the things of experience, which at first was assumed as a fact that needed no proof but only an explanation, comes to be regarded as itself requiring a 'deduction' or vindication." (Ib. p. 248.) But this involved the establishment of the truth of a priori knowledge "on the ground of the previously ascertained truth of something else." Hence Kant makes ordinary experience his starting point and basis, and argues from it to the truth of the a priori principles, without which it could not exist. This conception of Kant's task involves one further modification of the problem, according to Caird. Whereas in the beginning of the Critique a contrast was drawn between empirical or a posteriori and a priori knowledge, it is now found that in fact the a posteriori cannot exist apart from the a priori. In other words "even

particular experiences of objects, as such, become impossible, unless we are able to transcend them. A priori principles are necessary to experience as a consciousness of objects, and the denial of a priori knowledge of objects means the denial of all knowledge. Hence arises a necessity for a further statement of the problem of the Critique. Kant began by asking for the conditions of the a priori knowledge of empirical objects, taking that as one species of knowledge, which can be set alongside of a posteriori or empirical knowledge: but now he finds that a posteriori is impossible without a priori knowledge. From this point of view he declares that 'the highest problem of transcendental philosophy is, How experience is possible?' in other words, particular experience is taken as a fact, and the a priori principles as conditions which are necessary to explain it, and which are 'deduced' or vindicated by showing that they are so necessary". (Ib. p. 249, 250.)

It is evident therefore that, though Caird's interpretation of the Problem in this his later work is developed with greater painstaking and in fuller detail, yet essentially it is one with his interpretation in his earlier work — first, in that he regards the conception of a priori knowledge and that of experience as necessarily bound up in the one process of reasoning, and second, with this understanding, in that he identifies the real aim and interest of the Critique with the problem of experience. Both these features will be clearly seen as we proceed to the following.

(2) Kant's unfolding of the conception of experience, as interpreted by Caird. The question of experience brings us at first and at once to the consideration of the categories. For Kant's "Entdeckung" of the categories, Caird following Kant's latter designation makes use of the expression, the "Metaphysical Deduction". Under this head he not only points out the fundamental error in Kant's method as he himself regarded it, but the real principle of the Kantian undertaking. As a main feature of Caird's interpretation

is this to be mentioned, namely, that he rejects Kant's assumed obtainment of the transcendental out of the logical, the conceptions with their synthetic force out of a function which is declared to be purely analytical. Kant, he says, "points out that the categories are forms of the a priori synthesis by which objects are determined as such, and, as we shall see, he carries them back to 'pure apperception' as the unity out of which they spring. But instead of showing directly how they spring from that unity he has taken the roundabout method of basing his list of the pure conceptions that rule the synthetic judgment upon the aspects or modes of analytic judgment, and he has simply adopted the list of these modes from formal logic. But, if he had realized his own ideal, he would have been obliged, first of all, to show how it follows from the ideal of the analytic judgment that the list should contain just these and no other forms. And, even after he had used the logical system so derived as a clue for the discovery of the categories, he would not have considered himself free from the obligation of showing from the nature of the synthetic judgment itself that they form a complete system of a priori conceptions." (Ib. p. 334—335.) The truth is, according to Caird, that Kant misconceived his own method. That method was not one of pure abstraction, but one of real "regressive" (and just therefore progressive) movement back to existing principles and elements, which were and are always and essentially involved in experience. There is strictly speaking no such thing as pure analytic thought, and "Kant's advance to the new Logic was simply a disguised refutation of the old, a restoration to Logic of elements which, guided by a false principle, it had been led to reject". (Ib. p. 338.) The categories if valid must be traced back not to the functions of unity in the analytic judgment, but on the contrary to the primary principle of synthetic judgments.

Caird, of course, traces this error of Kant over into the Transcendental Deduction. Here the first and chief task is to show that the categories as forms of syntheses are necessary to the unity of self-consciousness in relation to the manifold of sense, without which forms, there could be no real unified consciousness of the world of objects, that is, no conceivable experience. So far as the first part of the Transcendental Deduction is concerned, Caird points out the defect which he characterizes as "the main defect", to be that, while Kant "spoke of judgment as essentially that determination of objects through which they are at the same time brought into relation to the self, and while it was just for this reason that he regarded the 'functions of unity' in judgment as supplying the categories by which objects as such are determined, he yet based his list of the categories upon a different view of judgment as the expression of the analytic, and therefore the merely subjective, unity of consciousness". (Ib. p. 426.) It is true that the so-called analytic judgment of selfconsciousness reveals the principle of all objective synthesis, but this is because it is not really an analytic judgment but rather a judgment in which "the difference has become transparent".

A similar movement of thought Caird finds in the second part of the Transcendental Deduction, where Kant distinguishes between inner and outer experience. That which has worth in Kant's determination of this relation is that he recognizes the mutual dependence of the consciousness of self and the consciousness of the world of objects. The defect, however, of predicating a synthesis of the manifold of sense prior to and independent of the synthesis through the categories, the specially subjective view with which he regards the latter at this point, Caird brings prominently into view.

The feature last referred to formed for Kant the ground of necessity for the Schematism of the categories.

The unschematized categories, says Caird, "are in Kant's view the conception of the laws which must control and regulate all finite minds in the formation of images of sensible perception, in so far as these are to be capable of being brought into relation to a self". (428.) Being derived from the analytic judgment, they shrink into the mere form for possible conceptions, whereas the categories schematized are the "forms of these conceptions which must guide us as men — i. e., as beings whose inner sense is conditioned by time — in combining our perceptions with our consciousness of self". Caird further describes the process of schematism as "a kind of realization in relation to space and time of conceptions which, in pure thought, are apprehended without regard to space and time". However, Caird finds no justification for the process, and reduces its appearance in the Kantian system to the necessity which Kant laid upon himself of determining the special use of the categories, after he had once predicated the actual existence of perceptions already, before the categories were applied to the matter of sense. Caird rejects the assumed distinction between pure thought and schematized thought, and emphasizes once more Kant's fundamental error of assuming an actual dualism of the "without" and of the "within", between which the schematism is made to serve as an external means of union. There is no perception, that is, no objective determination of the world, according to Caird, no matter how primitive its form where the so-called subsumption of perception under conception has not already taken place. The distinction of "sense-perception judgments" and "experience judgments" is therefore no more possible of justification than the false dualism upon which it is based. Caird, however, finds a suggestive value in the Schematism of the categories, in that it "points to the conditions of the application of the categories as principles of knowledge. For as I have already said, the unity-in-difference of pure self-consciousness

in itself is different from the unity-in-difference of self-consciousness and the consciousness of the world of objects in space and time. The categories may, therefore, be regarded as the predicates in the primary judgments of knowledge or experience, by which objects are determined in relation to the self, and so, as the judgments that are implied in all other judgments. But this means that the determination of these objects by the categories is presupposed in all other determinations of them, though it may not need to be explicitly recognized in such determination." (Vol. I. p. 470.) The Schematism emphasizes the distinction between the "unity-in-difference of pure self-consciousness in itself," and "the unity-in-difference of self-consciousness and the consciousness of the world of objects in space and time", since this distinction determines the conditions of the use of the categories as ultimate principles of all knowledge of objects. The next step, according to Caird, was to consider these ultimate principles from the standpoint of perception, that is, from the standpoint of the objects themselves, and to show that "objects must be subsumed under the categories in order to be determined as objects".

We are thus led to the Principles of Pure Understanding, which Caird defines as follows: "The principles of the pure understanding are the universal judgments in relation to objects of experience which it becomes possible to make, if we are authorized to apply the schematized categories to the data of perception." (Ib. p. 471.) Caird first indicates the error under this head which is to be reckoned as one with that discovered in connection with the discussion of the Schematism. Just as was the case with the Schematism, so the Principles are viewed as an external bond of union, between elements, which if a real separation is recognized cannot be so united. Together Schematism and Principles form the "mediation" between the perception on the one side, and the conception on the

other, whose separation Kant by the peculiarity of his method has effected, only to be required to bring them together again by such external means. With reference to the special function of the principles, "it is shown that the manifold of perception must be combined into images, which are capable of being brought under the principles of the pure understanding and so determined in relation to objects." (Ib. 474.) And "that the manifold of perception must be brought together in a synthetic unity which is conformable to the system of categories; since otherwise it cannot be made to yield a consciousness of objects which can be united with the consciousness of self". (Ib. 475.) In relation to the deduction of the principles, Caird declares that Kant at this point "reconstitutes" the premises of his argument, and in a citation from the Critique, he quotes Kant as declaring that the peculiarity of the principles consists in the fact that they make possible the very experience which furnishes the basis for their and therefore for its own proof, and that in such experience they must always be presupposed. In answer to the question, How can experience be the basis of a deduction of the principles of its own possibility? Caird points out that there is an ambiguity in Kant's language, due in part to his confusion of two things, first, the use of those principles in ordinary experience, and second, the conscious use of them in science. In fact however, says Caird, "Kant's deduction of the principles of pure understanding as conditions of possible experience means simply that he calls our attention to the elements presupposed in such experience. In doing so, however, he shows that our previous experience was not what we had supposed it to be, a consciousness of the particular as given in sense without any determination by the universal. He shows, in fact, that an experience which takes such a view of itself, is imperfectly self-conscious and that it could not have been even that consciousness

of the particular which it knows itself to be, if it had not been more". (Ib. 477—78.) And that "more" is just the application of the universal under which the particular is determined. Notwithstanding the ambiguity already referred to, Caird maintains that Kant makes himself clear as to that which exists and must exist in all experience, and as to the consciousness of those essential elements determined alone through scientific reflection. Kant is simply contending "that the consciousness that separates the categories from experience, will find in them and in the conceptions based on them, not means for the discovery of another world of things in themselves, but only principles by which the experience from which they have been abstracted may be tested, corrected, and raised into the form of science. Science, in fact, differs from the ordinary consciousness just in this, that it uses the principles presupposed in experience to transform and reconstitute experience". (Ib. 479—80.)

The results of Caird's investigation of Kant's method throughout may be summed up as follows: 1. Caird seeks to lay bare Kant's confusion of the transcendental "regress" by which the fundamental principles of knowledge are discovered, with "a psychological account of the genesis of experience out of independent factors", and 2. he seeks to show that the result of the deduction of the principles is to make plain how that "if we take away the principles, we reduce experience to a chaos of sensations: if we reflect on them we raise experience to the form of science". (Ib. 485.)

Since the special interest of this paper is now met, the review will be no further pursued. As was suggested in the beginning, Caird's work appears in the form of a general exposition of the critical philosophy. As such its aim is the simple explanation of, and the expression of judgment concerning that remarkable system. The establishment of a particular theory of interpretation is by its

very nature shut out from the plan and purpose of such a work, and special questions, like that under consideration receive only the answer which can be gathered from the exposition as it advances from point to point. Besides which, there is this to be regarded. Caird is influenced throughout by the significance of the critical philosophy for the thought of to-day. The conviction therefore that there is an abiding worth in the system leads him in the interest of this conviction to bring to full expression what he conceives to be the elements of permanent value, even though his mode of procedure must be viewed as a constant attack on the Kantian form and method of presentation. More particularly it is clear, first, that Caird finds in Kant's unfolding of the conception of experience the central feature of the Critique, second, that he regards the discussion of the Categories as well as that of the Principles as alike contributing to this end. It is true as has been pointed out that Caird remarks a "reconstruction" of Kant's premises in the deduction of the Principles. But this has no such meaning for Caird as that Kant begins at this point the solution of a new problem. It is a "turning movement" which has to do simply with Kant's method. The problem remains one and the same throughout. And yet Caird cannot be regarded as justifying the change of title for the Critique suggested by our question. And for the very reason that he cannot regard the Critique as a complete whole in itself, but rather as one phase of a system of thought — a phase it is true in which the problem of experience is for Caird of leading interest. But it is just because he views the Critique from the standpoint of the problem of experience that he sees its purely relative and incomplete character and is enabled to say, "the ultimate object of the Critique is not empirical".

3. Our attention is next directed to the „Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,“ H. Vaihinger. Bde. I, II, Stuttgart, 1881, — 1893. From the nature of

this comprehensive work our task is manifestly of much more limited range than was the case with the two already considered. Especially is this manifest, since Vaihinger has set forth with great clearness the position which he holds with reference to the question at issue. Already on pages 7—8 may be found in outline the view which he has adopted: Kant nannte sein Werk: „Kritik der reinen Vernunft.“ Dieser Titel berücksichtigt eigentlich nur die erste Frage und ist somit nur gegen den Dogmatismus gerichtet. Mit vollem Recht hat man aber auch einer Darstellung der Kritik d. r. V. den Titel gegeben: Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung. Denn dieser Titel berücksichtigt auch Kant's zweite Grundfrage, welche allerdings in der Anlage seines Werks nicht so stark hervortritt wie die erste. Der Titel „Kritik der Vernunft“ ist zu ergänzen durch den Zusatz: „Theorie der Erfahrung“. Nur so hat man den vollen und ganzen Kant, der, indem er sowohl Vernunft als Erfahrung untersucht, die Einseitigkeiten der beiden vorkantischen Richtungen vermeidet, deren eine die Erfahrung ignoriert, deren andere die Vernunft geleugnet hatte. Indem K. so den sensuellen und den logischen Faktor der Erkenntniss, also die ganze Maschinerie des Erkennens untersucht, macht er zum Gegenstand seiner Forschung nicht wie man im Allgemeinen vor ihm that, die Gegenstände, die Gründe des Seins und die Ursachen des Geschehens, sondern er fragt nach den Bedingungen des Erkennens. Vor ihm hätte man vermittelt der Vernunft oder der Erfahrung als Organen die Gründe der objektiven Welt erforscht, er dagegen macht jene Organe selbst zum Gegenstand der Forschung und fragt nach den Gründen des Wissens.“

There are then according to Vaihinger not one but two distinct subjects under discussion in the Critique, not one main problem but two coordinated problems which Kant is represented as seeking to solve, namely, that of reason (broadly considered) and that of experience. And only as one takes cognizance of these problems in this

way „hat man den ganzen Kant.“ To this view Vaihinger adheres with indisputable fidelity throughout his *Commentar*, and in some places, particularly pp. 433—450, he enters fully into the explanation and justification of his view. We cannot therefore endorse the following statement of Schurman (“Kant’s Critical Problem”. *The Philosophical Review* 1893, Vol. II, p. 147); “Vaihinger seems at the outset to accept this (the problem of the Introduction) as the main problem: then he rightly enough correlates it with the problem of experience: next, on insufficient grounds he coordinates the two: and, lastly, subordinates the original to the derivative problem”. What Schurman calls “the outset” we infer to be the beginning of the *Commentar*. But Vaihinger’s words which we have just quoted are sufficient to indicate that he accepts “at the outset” no single main problem. The fact is, Vaihinger adopts a principle for his interpretation which excludes on the face of it the possibility of that which Schurman attributes to him. He says: Jede Darstellung, welche zur Einleitung Kant’s eigene Darstellung wiedergiebt, ist sonach principiell unvollständig, genau aus demselben Grunde, warum Kant’s eigene Darstellung es ist“. So too when we examine the utterances of Vaihinger on the pages mentioned by Schurman in confirmation of his statement, we find Schurman absolutely in error. Take for example p. 189 — the first page mentioned. In the paragraph which begins on p. 186 and ends on p. 189, Vaihinger discusses under the general head, Abschnitt I, Einleitung B, the relation of the problem of experience to that of a priori knowledge. He complains that in Abschnitten I, II, and III, Einl. B, Kant does not keep sufficiently separate and distinct these two questions, and hence his procedure „ist verhängnissvoll gewesen für das Verständniss der ganzen Einleitung und damit der ganzen Kritik“. Vaihinger maintains however, that as a matter of fact both in the Aesthetic and the Analytic there are respectively two distinct parts which are

in reality addressed each in its place to the solution of these two ever-to-be-kept-separate questions, (1). „Wie sind ganz reine Erkenntnisse a priori möglich? (Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?) und (2), Wie ist Erfahrung möglich?“ On p. 189, Vaihinger remarks that, already before Cohen, Villiers had come to regard the Kr. d. r. V. as a theory of experience, that this view has an important confirmation in Kant's famous statement in the „Fortschritte der Metaphysik“: Die höchste Aufgabe der Transsc. Phil. ist „Wie ist Erfahrung möglich?“, that Kant himself after completing his work came, in the „Fortschritte“, to the clear consciousness that the Kr. d. r. V. was also in reality a theory of experience. Finally says Vaihinger: „Die ganze Tragweite der Kritik kann aber nur erfasst werden, wenn der Leser derselben dieses Problem neben dem vom Kant selbst factisch im Abschn. VI — der Einl. B. aufgestellten, welches nur die absolut reine Erkenntniss betrifft, scharf ins Auge fasst“. Certainly, there is no shadow of wavering here from the stand taken in the beginning of the Commentar. The remaining references quoted by Schurman, to show that Vaihinger modifies his view of the problem of the Critique, all belong in that portion of the Commentar already referred to, and to which we will now direct our attention; namely, pp. 433 to 450.

In the section of the Commentar just referred to, under the title, Das Problem der Erfahrung, Vaihinger first examines that view which conceives of experience and a priori knowledge as simply the correlated factors in the one single subject and problem of the Kritik: second, he attempts to distinguish his own view from this and to justify it.

(1). Vaihinger asks, if then (as his analysis and investigation have shown him) experience — Erfahrung im prägnanten Sinne — on the one hand appears as the problem in the Kritik, and then, right along side of that, as basis upon which in part at least the Kritik rests — if

this situation exists, does it not involve a contradiction, a methodological impossibility, a *circulus vitiosus*? He reviews his previous analysis by which it was found that experience was brought by Kant into connection with problem of synthetic a priori knowledge, and not only so but used by him for the solution of that problem in that synthetic conceptions and judgments were shown to be the absolutely necessary conditions of experience. This result Vaihinger goes on to show may be reached by approaching the relation of these two factors from the opposite correlative point, that is, by asking, How is experience possible? Since Kant rejects the idea that experience arises through the simple combination of sensations, he is of necessity brought to the discovery of a priori elements in experience. Thus the ground covered is the same in both instances, though we start from opposite points of view. Now Vaihinger claims that, when by reason of this last-mentioned fact, the one problem is substituted for the other, then follows — which he claims did follow with Kant both historically and methodically — a “problem-conversion”. In the *Prolegomena* especially, Vaihinger observes this problem-conversion. In that Kant announces the question, “How is nature possible” (since nature and experience are essentially one and the same) therefore his procedure must be „von unten aus“, whereas the question concerning the possibility of a priori conceptions and propositions involves the opposite mode of procedure namely, „von oben aus“. Vaihinger maintains, however, that Kant himself distorted this relation of things in that he used the word ‘nature’ in a double sense, making it stand now for synthetic laws of nature and now for the legitimate connection of phenomena in experience — in other words, in that he gave himself room to substitute the one problem (that of the synthetic laws of nature) for the other (that of the legitimate connection of phenomena in experience) whereas according to Vaihinger the problem cannot be so substituted the one for the other: Wer die

erste Frage stellt, hat ein Interesse an der synthetischen Erkenntniss a priori, dem Inhalt der vornehmen Vernunftwissenschaft; er will sie retten, indem er sie erklärt und erweist. Die zweite Fragestellung aber findet in der alltäglichen Erfahrung ein Problem: seine Lösung führt auf jene synthetischen Functionen a priori als conditiones sine quibus non. Beide Fragestellungen dürfen somit nicht vertauscht werden, so wenig „oben“ und „unten“ identisch sind. (p. 436)

A consideration of the vacillation which Vaihinger finds in Cohen's idea of what the actual task of the "Theory of Experience" is, leads him to observe that there is really present in Kant a three-fold problem touching experience, or rather, that the problem of experience by Kant is a three-fold one, (1), experience must be explained, for it is problematical how experience comes to be possessed of the predicates of necessity and universality. (2), experience as such cannot ohne Weiteres be assumed. It must be proved that there is such experience. (3), the method by which „aus dem Mehl der Wahrnehmung das tägliche Brod der Erfahrung zu backen ist“ must also be made clear. These separate features of the problem of experience are present in Kant, says Vaihinger, but only in rudimentary form, only in such form that they have but led to much vacillation and confusion in the secondary literature concerning Kant.

At this point Vaihinger repeats how, on the one hand, experience is employed by Kant as a means of explanation and then presented as a subject for explanation, after which in the following language Vaihinger concludes his investigation of what may be called the correlative theory and introduces his own theory of the coordination of the two problems under consideration: Ehe wir weiter gehen, sei folgende Zwischenbemerkungen eingeschoben: wenn sich das alles so verhält — und es verhält sich so — ist denn dann das Verfahren der Kr. d. r. V. nicht ein — circulus vitiosus? es will ja die Möglichkeit a priorischer Erkenntniss

auf den Begriff der „Erfahrung“ basiert. Dieser archimedischer Punkt wird aber selbst wieder gestützt und worauf? eben auf das Apriori, das ja erst durch ihn erwiesen werden sollte. Ist dies somit nicht ein Cirkel? . . . Sollte es vielleicht einen solchen berechtigten, ja am Ende notwendigen Cirkel geben? Und hat das Kant etwa andeuten wollen, wenn er Kritik 737 sagt, der Grundsatz der Causalität (den er daselbst als Beispiel für die synthetischen Sätze a priori anführt) habe „die besondere Eigenschaft, dass er seinen Beweisgrund, nämlich Erfahrung, selbst zuerst möglich macht und bei dieser immer vorausgesetzt werden muss“? (p. 440, 441.)

In calling attention to his view of “coordination”, Vaihinger is careful to emphasize the fact that coordination is to be clearly distinguished from correlation in that with reference to the latter alone „beide Probleme für einander vicariren können, weil sie dieselbe Gedankenlinie, nur von den beiden entgegengesetzten Endpunkten aus beschreiben“. The theory of coordination is based ultimately on the distinction which Vaihinger makes between “Causalurteile” and the general “Causalgesetz”. He had previously maintained that these two must be kept distinct, that they are „himmelweit verschieden“, that „es handelt sich beidemal um ein ganz anderes „Hinausgehen“, um eine ganz andere „Notwendigkeit“, ganz andere Apriori, ganz andere Synthese“. With this distinction now Vaihinger identifies the distinction between the problem of experience and that of synthetic a priori judgments. Kant, says Vaihinger, inquires in the Introduction to the Kritik concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The answer to the inquiry is that they are possible because and in so far as they make experience — or the unity of experience — possible. Thus far Vaihinger admits the correlation of the two problems and the legitimacy of their conversion. But in his previous analysis, unity of experience was found to be reducible to, tangible only in, the form of “experience

judgments". Now experience judgments require for their possibility only the categories of the pure understanding. The principles of the pure understanding are not called into requisition at all. On the other hand the question concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the discussion of the categories is not required. It is best to illustrate this procedure of *Vaihinger*, by means of which illustration the distinction between these two problems will be seen to be identified with or rather based upon the distinction of *Causalurteil* and *Causalgesetz*. The judgment, "the sun warms the stone", is an experience judgment, and as such, according to *Vaihinger*, it requires nothing more than the employment of the category of causality. On the contrary, the general principle, "every event has a cause", is an instance of synthetic a priori judgment in the proper sense of the term to which the discussion entitled "the principles of the pure understanding" is directed. Here then are two species of judgments whose distinction Kant is represented as having actually made though formally he confused them. Whence it follows that there are two equally coordinated problems in the *Kritik* — that of experience, or of experience judgments, and that of synthetic judgments a priori. Viewing the whole subject once more *Vaihinger* remarks: *Das Problem der Kr. d. r. V. sind die synthetischen Urteile überhaupt, oder kürzer: die Erkenntniss. Es giebt zwei Hauptarten der Erkenntniss: synthetische Urteile a priori (— Erkenntnisse aus reiner Vernunft) und synthetische Urteile a posteriori (— „Erfahrungsurteile“). Beide Arten werden zum Gegenstand der kritischen Untersuchung gemacht.*

II.

Against the interpretation of *Cohen* and *Caird*, on the one side, and that of *Vaihinger* on the other, *E. Adickes* takes his stand in the interest of what he considers the integrity both of the form and of the chief aim of the *Kritik*. The article of *Adickes* has already been mentioned: *Die*

bewegenden Kräfte in Kants philosophischer Entwicklung und die beiden Pole seines Systems. Kant Studien, Erster Band, 1897.

Except to note in passing the main feature of difference between the two views which he combats Adickes considers them together. The objections which he raises are such as apply equally both to the "onesidedness" of Cohen and Caird, and to the unsuccessful attempt of Vaihinger to avoid that onesidedness. Before adducing his general arguments however, Adickes makes two important statements with reference to the two forms of interpretation respectively. First, with respect to Cohen and Caird — that according to them, the problem as stated by Kant in the Introduction to the Kritik is not only incomplete but is positively calculated to mislead, and that the true problem is not how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? but, how are synthetic a posteriori judgments possible? Second, with respect to Vaihinger, the distinction between judgments of experience and judgments of perception in the Prolegomena to which Vaihinger attaches value, Adickes rejects absolutely. „Diese Unterscheidung widerspricht den Konsequenzen des kantischen Systems durchaus und ist nach meiner Ansicht in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik von Kant völlig bei Seite gelegt.“ S. 48.

The first general objection which Adickes raises against the interpretations of his opponents, is the difficulty — which he considers insurmountable for them — presented by Kant's own putting of the problem of the Kritik in the Introduction. If the problem of experience alone was the matter of concern, or if it were one of the two chief subjects of discussion, how does it come about that Kant took no notice of it in the Introduction? Adickes dwells upon the fact the Introduction was written when „ein grosser Teil der Kritik schon fertig gestellt und die eigentlich neuen Untersuchungen vollständig abgeschlossen waren.“ He emphasizes how not only in the first edition,

but in the Prolegomena, and in the second edition, the problem remains the same. Indeed in the latter two as compared with the first „wird die Frage nach der Möglichkeit synthetischer Erkenntnisse a priori noch viel geflissentlicher in den Vordergrund gestellt.“ Adickes does not question the fact that the „Zustandekommen“ of experience was a subordinate problem in the course of Kant's work: he sees in this fact however the very reason why it should have been excluded from special mention in the Introduction.

The following observation of Kant found in his personal copy of the Kritik, at the head of the Analytik, and brought to public notice by B. Erdmann in 1881, Adickes considers in part next. Kant's observation reads thus: Wir haben oben angemerkt, dass Erfahrung aus synthetischen Sätzen bestehe, und wie synthetische Sätze a posteriori möglich seien, nicht als eine der Auflösung bedürfende Frage angesehen, weil sie Factum ist. Jetzt lässt sich fragen, wie dieses Factum möglich sey. Adickes remarks on this utterance of Kant's, that it relates essentially to the Deduction of the Categories where — as he will afterward seek to show — the problem of experience obtained independent recognition by Kant. He maintains that the statement must be explained thus in connection with that portion of the Kritik in the midst of which it appears, and with whose line of thought it forms a part.

The consideration of Kant's statement in the Schrift „Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik etc.“ next follows — „Die höchste Aufgabe der Transcendentalphilosophie ist: wie ist Erfahrung möglich?“ Adickes regards the entire section in which this declaration of Kant's is to be found as „unklar und verworren“ so far as the main purpose of the Kritik is concerned. He finds by a comparison of this section with the preceding a „Stellungswechsel“ in Kant's statement of the main object of his work. In the preceding brief section is transcendental philosophy declared to be identical with the doctrine of the possibility of all a

priori knowledge and its aim is set down as that of laying the foundation of metaphysics. In the immediate section however from which the above-quoted citation is taken — as is to be seen from the title of the section „von dem Umfange des theoretisch-dogmatischen Gebrauchs der reinen Vernunft“ — the great aim is the limitation of a priori knowledge and its exclusive application to experience. The proof however that reason, as the faculty of the a priori knowledge of things, reaches to objects of sense must precede the “limitation”. This proof in its turn must be preceded by a discussion of the question as to how a priori knowledge of the objects of sense is possible. It is in this discussion, according to Adickes’ arrangement, that the declaration of Kant under our consideration was made. As he looks over the whole situation, Adickes concludes that the problem of experience far from obtaining an absolutely independent or preeminent place plays only the part of means to end; that is, of means to the end of solving the problem of rational or a priori knowledge. That Kant in this particular instance should have used such sweeping language touching the problem of experience is explained by Adickes in the following manner, Er will sagen: in dem Problem „wie ist Erfahrung möglich?“ kulminieren alle Fragen welche beantwortet werden müssen, bevor eine Theorie der rationalen Erkenntniss aufgestellt werden kann; in ihm laufen alle Fäden zusammen; ohne seine Lösung kein Heil; weil es bisher nicht begriffen war, darum das Scheitern, aller früheren Versuche; daher seine Bedeutung, daher die Schwierigkeit der Lösung, daher aber auch die Bedeutung der Lösung: es ist die Pforte zur neu aufzurichtenden Metaphysik und darum ist seine Lösung die höchste Aufgabe der Transcendentalphilosophie. Die Neubegründung der rationalen Erkenntniss mit gegenständlicher Gültigkeit ist die eigentliche höchste Aufgabe der Transcendentalphilosophie, but the solving of the problem of experience can also be so called, „weil sie das einzige notwendige

Mittel zur Erledigung jener ist.“ In this connection, Adickes announces the form in which he believes the problem of the Kritik to be best expressed, namely, „giebt es apriorische Erkenntniss von gegenständlicher Gültigkeit und wie wird sie möglich?“ If one sees here an enlargement upon the question as stated by Kant himself in the Introduction, it is to be set down to the fact that Adickes is pronounced in his view that the proof of the existence of valid synthetic a priori knowledge is as necessary a part of Kant's investigation as the explanation of the manner and form of its actual coherence and validity. Indeed Adickes maintains (S. 40 ff.) that the chief factor in the Kantian problem is just this proof and moreover, that the proof carries with it the explanation. This then being his view of the case, he maintains that Kant felt the necessity of a unifying principle in relation to this double form of the problem, and that principle he found in the „Beziehung der Erkenntnisse auf mögliche Erfahrung. Die Gültigkeit jener hing davon ab ob sie einen notwendigen, unentbehrlichen Beitrag zum Zustandekommen der letzteren leisteten.“ Thus experience came to occupy a most important place. Its possibility became the „Beweisgrund“ of the validity of a priori knowledge, „die Bedingungen der Erfahrung erkennen“ came to mean the same as „die Gültigkeit syntetischer Erkenntniss a priori erkennen und beweisen.“ So then, Adickes claims, as soon in the course of his investigation as the conception „possibility of experience“ became for Kant of such importance, and following a speculative trend in his nature, he made it for the time being the sole object of his consideration — no longer as means to an end, but as an end in itself. Further, in view of the correlative relation in which experience and a priori knowledge are thus seen to stand to each other, Adickes shows how Kant could approach the consideration of his problem from opposite directions. — So konnte er vor allen Dingen entweder von dem Problem der rationalen Erkenntniss ausgehen und

getrieben vom Wunsche, ihre Gültigkeit zu beweisen und zu erklären, sich nach einer festen Operationsbasis umsehen; hatte er diese in ihrer Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung gefunden, so musste er die letztere analysieren und die apriorischen Elemente feststellen, welche allein im Stande sind, ihr eine sichere Grundlage und einen festen Halt zu geben. Das war der eine mögliche Weg, der, welchen er ursprünglich ging. Oder aber er schlug die entgegengesetzte Strasse ein und ging von dem Factum der Erfahrung aus. Dann erhob sich zunächst die Frage: wie wird Erfahrung möglich? welche sind ihre Bedingungen? Die Antwort wurde durch Entdeckung der apriorischen Elemente in ihr gefunden. Zugleich brachte sie die Lösung des Problems der rationalen Erkenntniss. Diesen umgekehrten Weg ist Kant sicher bei demjenigen Teil seiner Untersuchungen, welche er später als transcendente Deduction der Kategorien bezeichnete. Though incidentally for the purpose of the mastery of his subject Kant might pursue the second course, yet, Adickes claims, when Kant came to the framing of the Kritik the only possible course for him to pursue was the first. Moreover, though Adickes finds much to condemn in Kant's methods in general — in his „Nachgiebigkeit gegen seine Privatansichten“, his „Nachlässigkeit gegen die Form seiner Schriften“, and especially in that one inconsistent act in which he „nahm von jenen Untersuchungen bedeutend mehr auf als unbedingt nötig war“ — yet he abides in the belief that Kant was true throughout to the main purpose of his work.

One further point, Adickes urges against the view which exalts the problem of experience in the Kritik, namely, that it brings with it the danger of giving a psychological character to the Kritik rather than that of a critique of knowledge. Adickes does not question the fact that Kant's so-called transcendental method was in reality psychological, and that his proofs were in substance composed of nothing but psychological explanations and hy-

potheses. But he emphasizes the fact of how Kant denied any comparison between the nature of his work and that of empirical psychology, and attached little weight to that which some have called his "Transcendentalpsychologie". He points out how it is not to explain those subjective factors which are occupied with the bringing into being of synthetic a priori knowledge, with which the Kritik is concerned, but rather to prove and explain the validity of such knowledge.

At the close of this section of his article, Adickes groups together the results of his investigations as follows: On the basis of Kant's Introduction he designates the main interest of the Kritik as rationalistic, and declares its chief task to have been the proof of the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. Under this main task, Adickes groups three subordinate tasks, namely, (1) the discovery and enumeration of the various forms of a priori knowledge, (2) the explanation of the fact of their objective validity, (3) the determination of the limit of this validity. The entire task he views as the „Neubegründung der apriorischen Wissenschaft.“

III.

In order to reach a satisfactory decision with reference to the question at issue, it seems necessary first and most of all to distinguish between an exposition of the Critique based upon a strict regard for its historic setting and a judgment of it rendered from the point of view of modern scientific thought. We use the term "exposition" in the first instance and "judgment" in the second for the reason that there can be no unalloyed interpretation or simple exposition under the latter conditions but only under the former. Historical fidelity, that return from the mind of to-day to the mind of the earlier time, whenever that time may have been, a thoroughly "disinterested interest" — these are the indispensable requisites of a reliable reconstruction and revival of past achievements whether of thought or of action. That this has not been kept clearly in mind with

regard to the matter in hand seems evident. That the tracing of Kant's „historische Voraussetzungen“ may have been undertaken is no proof that the distinction emphasized has been duly recognized. One may carry his subjectivism and eclecticism into the ‘historische Voraussetzungen’ themselves.

However that may be, the historical sense and the present material interest must be kept apart. Is there, for example, sufficient recognition of the distinction here made if what Adickes says of Vaihinger is true, namely, that the latter's interpretation took its character from the effort to avoid “the onesidedness” of those who push the principle of the possibility of experience into the foreground? It is also fruitful to consider in this connection the influence of the origin of Cohen's work, as set forth in the Vorrede zur ersten Auflage, upon the character of his interpretation of Kant. More especially, however, the following utterance of the Vorrede: „Um Kant nach seinem Wortlaute zu verstehen, ist es unumgänglich, die von einander verschiedenen Auffassungen, welche derselbe möglich gemacht hat, auf ihren Werth für die Theorie der Erkenntniss eigens zu prüfen: die systematische Parteinahme ist unvermeidlich. Denn es sind nicht die äusseren Thatsachen von Worten, welche festgestellt werden sollen, sondern die Zusammenhänge geschlossener Gedanken, deren Sinn die historische Forschung gegenüber von Auffassungen und Deutungen zu erhellen hat, welche nicht minder aus der gesammten Weltansicht der Urtheilenden fliessen. Man kann kein Urtheil über Kant abgeben, ohne in jeder Zeile zu verrathen, welche Welt man im eigenen Kopfe trägt.“ At any rate, historical fidelity is alone what is sought after here.

One chief difficulty in the way of fixing upon a title for the Critique if that of its author be set aside, of establishing one chief standpoint from which at the same time a wider view can be obtained than from any other, and a truer insight into the vital principle of its thought-movement, is the fact that so many intellectual interests of Kant

of longer or of shorter standing come together in it. So many streams of thought, so to speak, form their confluence here. After which of them shall the united body be named? We trace, e. g., the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic to the Dissertation of 1770 and further back to the Schrift of 1768, „vom ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes etc.“ So, the Transcendental Deduction to the Letter of Kant to Herz of Feb. 21, 1772. So, the Rational Theology to the Schrift of 1763, „Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund etc.“ The Antinomies are an instance of a practice which commended itself to Kant very early in his philosophical career, and to which he bears approving testimony, Reflection 5. Now from these and the remaining thought-centers which are grouped together in the compass of the Critique, it is asked whether or not their logical connection is more clearly seen and more naturally established when the Critique as a whole is viewed as a theory of experience. That our interest to-day centers for the most part in Kant's "new conception of experience", there can be little doubt. But our inquiry is not directed along this line. If, as one critic has said, Kant's obtainment of this conception of experience through the discussion of the Critique is like the man who went out to search asses and found a kingdom, then it is not to be wondered at that the finding of the kingdom should come to be viewed as the chief event of the search. The question is, however, not as to the result of the search but as to the conscious motive and aim in it. There seems to be no doubt that at least in the Transcendental Deduction the question of "the possibility of experience" assumes an unusually distinct and profoundly important place — so important indeed that the transcendental deduction of the categories is declared to be dependent upon it. Here at length, we recognize the force of Kant's remark in the second paragraph of the Introduction (B): „Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntniss mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben

alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es konnte wohl sein, dass selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntniss ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke empfangen und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnissvermögen (durch sinnliche Eindrücke bloss veranlasst) aus sich selbst hergiebt.“ And also in Introduction (Absch. II): „Auch könnte man, ohne dergleichen Beispiele“ (die Sätze der Mathematik) „zum Beweise der Wirklichkeit reiner Grundsätze a priori in unserem Erkenntnisse zu bedürfen, dieser ihre Unentbehrlichkeit zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung selbst, mithin a priori darthun.“ It ought to be emphasized that these significant statements are to be found side by side with the formulation of the problem of the Critique. When Kant said: „Auch konnte man — dieser ihre Unentbehrlichkeit zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung selbst — darthun,“ if he had added something like this: “and it will be the main purpose of this work to explain thus the possibility of experience”, then were the case clear. However, he did not do so but on the contrary expressed the purpose of his work in such form as to lead his reader to look for its achievement from another standpoint, namely, the standpoint of a priori knowledge, or knowledge independent of all experience. That this latter sense also corresponds with that of the author of the Critique when he had completed the argument of the Aesthetic is clear from the following: „Hier haben wir nun eines von den erforderlichen Stücken zur Auflösung der allgemeinen Aufgabe der Transcendentalphilosophie: wie sind synthetische Sätze a priori möglich? nämlich reine Anschauungen a priori, Raum und Zeit, in welchen wir im Urtheile a priori über den gegebenen Begriff hinausgehen wollen, dasjenige antreffen, was nicht im Begriffe, wohl aber in der Anschauung, die ihm entspricht, a priori entdeckt werden und mit jenem synthetisch verbunden werden kann,“ and then he adds as a closing word that which follows necessarily out of what has been already established, „welche

Urtheile aber aus diesem Grunde nie weiter, als auf Gegenstände der Sinne reichen, und nur für Objecte möglicher Erfahrung gelten können.“

The question now arises, is there sufficient evidence that Kant was conscious of the same ultimate purpose in the development of the Transcendental Deduction? In reply, we quote the following. Under section 14 Kant refers to the achievement of the Aesthetic by which it was found that „die erste Bedingung, nämlich die, unter der allein Gegenstände angeschaut werden können, in der That den Objecten der Form nach a priori im Gemüth zum Grunde liegt.“ From this Kant approaches the question „ob nicht auch Begriffe a priori vorausgehen, als Bedingungen, unter denen allein etwas, wenn gleich nicht angeschauet, dennoch als Gegenstand überhaupt gedacht wird.“ He answers this question in the affirmative, and then continues: „Demnach werden Begriffe von Gegenständen überhaupt, als Bedingungen a priori aller Erfahrungserkenntniss zu Grunde liegen: folglich wird die objective Gültigkeit der Categorien als Begriffe a priori, darauf beruhen, dass durch sie allein Erfahrung, (der Form des Denkens nach) möglich sei.“ Compare with this the following statement from the first edition at the close of the Transcendental Deduction: „Der reine Verstand ist also in den Categorien das Gesetz der synthetischen Einheit aller Erscheinung, und macht dadurch Erfahrung ihrer Form nach allererst und ursprünglich möglich. Mehr aber hatten wir in der transcendentalen Deduction der Categorien nicht zu leisten, als dieses Verhältniss des Verstandes zur Sinnlichkeit, und mittelst derselben zu allen Gegenständen der Erfahrung, mithin die objective Gültigkeit seiner reinen Begriffe a priori begreiflich zu machen und dadurch ihren Ursprung und Wahrheit festzusetzen.“ In the same sense is the following Reil. 942: „Wenn gewisse Begriffe in uns nichts anderes enthalten als das wodurch alle Erfahrungen von unserer Seite möglich sind, so

können sie vor der Erfahrung und doch mit völliger Gültigkeit für alles was uns jemals vorkommen mag, a priori gesagt werden. Sie gelten alsdann zwar nicht von den Dingen überhaupt, aber doch von allem was uns jemals durch Erfahrung kann gegeben werden, weil sie die Bedingungen enthalten wodurch diese Erfahrungen möglich sind. Solche Sätze werden also die Bedingung der Möglichkeit nicht der Dinge, sondern der Erfahrung enthalten.

. . . . Um nun auszumachen, was das für Begriffe sind, die notwendig vor allen Erfahrungen vorhergehen müssen, und durch welche diese nur möglich sind, die also a priori gegeben sind und auch den Grund zu den Urtheilen a priori enthalten, müssen wir die Erfahrung überhaupt zergliedern.“

Thus it appears that the objective validity of the categories is the final end sought by this direct appeal to experience. We cite these statements of Kant not in any sense as though he had foreseen the present controversy and provided against it, but simply to show that in the original development of this part, the connectional feature of his entire work was not lost out of sight. So again under section 14: „Die transcendente Deduction aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Principium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muss, nämlich dieses: dass sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen (es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig.“ So further along, there Kant points out the errors of Locke, on the one hand, in that he opened the door to rationalistic „Schwärmerei,“ and of Hume, on the other hand, in his „empirische Ableitung“ of pure conceptions, Kant proceeds: „Wir sind jetzt im Begriffe einen Versuch zu machen, ob man nicht die menschliche Vernunft zwischen diesen beiden Klippen glücklich durchbringen, ihr bestimmte Grenzen anweisen,

und dennoch das ganze Feld ihrer zweckmässigen Thätigkeit für sie geöffnet erhalten könne.“ The transcendental deduction of the categories was not undertaken in order to prove something else, but on the contrary in its place is in itself the end sought. It forms the second „Stück“ in the general task of transcendental philosophy as it was set forth and as it was evidently intended to be set forth in the Critique.

Now, „die transcendente Deduction hat ein Principium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muss, nämlich dieses: dass sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen abgeben.“ If one will undertake to show the objective validity of the categories then is he of necessity referred to that principle according to which they are seen to be the a priori conditions of experience. Kant does not reason in a circle, nor does he first construct experience and then base upon that construction the proof either of the existence or of the validity of a priori knowledge. On the contrary, he announces the principle of the possibility of experience — of which he takes account in this place in so far as he is essentially required so to do, in order to determine the objective validity of the categories. Thus, without having assumed anything of which it is his task to furnish the proof, he proceeds to set forth the constitutive elements of experience (sei es der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird oder des Denkens), and the basis of their connection in the unity of self-consciousness.

From this standpoint, it is at least quite comprehensible how, in the transition to the „Analytik der Grundsätze,“ though Kant is through with the explanation of how the categories „auf Gegenstände sich beziehen,“ he is not through with the principle of the possibility of experience — this, whether one follows the explanation of the first or of the second edition. The explanation of how conceptions are related a priori to objects is not yet the

explanation of what and how a priori judgments determine and must determine the unity of pure perception and pure conception in the knowledge of objects. This latter expresses the complete formula of experience, as it embodies its full content. But the ultimate purpose of Kant's thought in this second explanation is again not the explanation of the possibility of experience, but the vindication of these „höhere Grundsätze.“ He appeals to the principle of the possibility of experience just as he did in the preceding case, and just because „die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung ist das, was allen unseren Erkenntnissen a priori objective Realität giebt.“ It is that by which Kant alone maintains his communication with the outside world in his investigation of the character and worth of this inner and original contribution to knowledge. Indeed the character and worth of this contribution depend upon the maintenance of that communication. To illustrate, Hume, in his effort to overthrow the claims of a priori knowledge, endeavored to show that the conception of causality was obtained through experience or rather through custom in experience. Kant “carries out Hume's problem” and shows that experience itself is inconceivable except on the basis of certain original principles, one of which is „alles, was geschieht (anhebt zu sein) setzt etwas voraus worauf es nach einer Regel folgt.“ But that which experience presupposes and upon which its very conceivability rests, cannot be obtained through experience. Consequently, this principle of causality is necessary, and universally valid. But that which has the „Kennzeichen“ of necessity and universality is a priori. Thus the character and worth of a priori knowledge which Hume had endeavored to destroy are restored. While this represents the true course of Kant's thought, nevertheless the explanation of the possibility of experience cannot well be viewed as merely a „dienendes Glied“ in the argument of the Critique. Its explanation and that of the objective validity of a priori knowledge are essentially

bound up together — they are in fact one and the same. Only as regards the interest and order of the argument, in no sense however, as regards its constituent factors, its content, may the unfolding of these two conceptions be said to differ. As there can be no experience without a priori knowledge, so can there be no synthetic a priori knowledge, apart from experience. A real separation between them can in the nature of the case never occur. This, however, does not prevent their being thought of separately, of being made separately the object of scientific reflection.

When we recognize the order of Kant's argument to be such that the point of interest is the legitimate sphere, that is the objective ground of a priori knowledge, then is the place and purpose of the Dialectic readily determined. The character of the Dialectic is negative and destructive as against that of the Aesthetic and Analytic which is positive and constructive. The aim there is to „abfertigen alle grundlose Anmassungen“ of pure reason or knowledge, while in the previous portion was to secure the same „bei ihren gerechten Ansprüchen.“ The attempt to give a positive character to the Dialectic, as for example, that the systematic completeness of experience is established through the examination of the ideas of reason seems strained and artificial. The denial of the right of transcendent metaphysics to claim for itself the „sure course of science,“ the exposure of the ungrounded and illegitimate exercise of a priori knowledge — this is what gives character to the Dialectic, as its very name implies. It has often been remarked that the critique of reason begins first with the Dialectic, and this is at least in general in so far correct as one identifies the function of a critique to be exclusively negative, and in particular in so far as one distinguishes between the critique of reason in this restricted sense of the term, and, for example, transcendental philosophy. How much of Kant's interest lay in the Dialectic may be gathered not alone from his letter to

Garve, of Sept. 21, 1798, and from his prefaces and introductions to both editions of the Critique, but from certain significant statements chiefly from the Prolegomena, as for example: „Reine Mathematik und reine Naturwissenschaft hätten zum Behuf ihrer eigenen Sicherheit und Gewissheit keiner dergleichen Deduction bedurft, als wir bisher von beiden zu Stande gebracht haben; denn die erstere stützt sich auf ihre eigene Evidenz, die zweite aber, obgleich aus reinen Quellen des Verstandes entsprungen, dennoch auf Erfahrung und deren durchgängige Bestätigung, welcher letzteren Zeugniß sie darum nicht gänzlich ausschlagen und entbehren kann, weil sie mit aller ihrer Gewissheit dennoch als Philosophie es der Mathematik niemals gleich thun kann. Beide Wissenschaften hatten also die gedachte Untersuchung nicht für sich, sondern für eine andere Wissenschaft nämlich, Metaphysik, nöthig.“ (Sect. 40). So also the following: „Indessen würde doch unsere mühsame Analytik des Verstandes, wenn unsere Absicht auf nichts anderes als bloße Naturerkenntniß, so wie sie in der Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, gerichtet wäre, auch ganz überflüssig sein; denn Vernunft verrichtet ihr Geschäft sowohl in der Mathematik als in der Naturwissenschaft auch ohne alle diese subtile Deduction ganz sicher und gut.“ (Sect. 44).

Since it is true that the argument of the Aesthetic and Analytic is in its character positive, and in its purpose the determination of the justifiable exercise of a priori knowledge; and since the principle of this determination is that upon which the conditions as well as the fundamental laws of experience are established, therefore from the opposite standpoint and without modifying the character of Kant's reasoning, this portion of the Critique may be viewed as embodying a theory of experience. It is by no means asserted that Kant assumed this reverse standpoint when he gave expression to that oft-quoted statement of the Schrift „Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik etc.“: „Die höchste Aufgabe der Transcendental-

philosophie ist also: wie ist Erfahrung möglich?“ But it is at least evident that he fully appreciated the correspondence upon which emphasis has been laid. It is to be remembered that the subject of the section in question of Kant's *Schrift* differs no less in its form from the form of his task as set forth in the *Critique* than do the respective standpoints from which the common content of his argument may be viewed. Only, therefore, in so far as the assertion is limited to the positive side of the *Critique*, and only because, aside from his original interest, the course of Kant's argument may be viewed as the explanation of the possibility of experience, can the *Critique* be said to contain a theory of experience.


Vita.

Natus sum Joannes Henricus Bell in urbe New York in America septentrionali die XVIII mensis Februarii a. h. s. LXVIII, patre Joanni architecto, matre Anna e gente Caine; fidei addictus sum Evangelicae.

Litterarum elementis in scholis publicis inbutus ad collegium urbis Novi Eboraci, cui nomen anglicanum "The College Of The City Of New York" est, me contuli, atque quinque post annos titulo artium liberalium baccalaurei condecoratus sum. Deinde studia theologica in "Drew Theological Seminary" secutus sum. Tres post annos titulo divinitatis baccalaurei et simul titulo artium liberalium magistri condecoratus sum. Quo facto, vere anni XCVII in Germaniam transii ut me studiis philosophicis et theologiacis Berolini darem. Vere proximi anni Halas Saxonum me contuli.

Scholis interfui virorum doctissimorum Newcomb, Roemer, Draper, Strong, Miley, Crooks, Paulsen, Harnack, Pfeleiderer, Haym, Riehl, Vaihinger, Droysen, Wagner, quibus omnibus gratias ago quam maximas.





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