

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 00383449 6

THE WORKS OF

38

ORESTES A. BROWNSON,

COLLECTED AND ARRANGED

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

VOLUME XIV.

CONTAINING THE WRITINGS ON DEVELOPMENT, AND ON MORALS, AND
SOME MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS.

DETROIT:

THORNDIKE NOURSE, PUBLISHER.

1884.


B

902

B6

1882

v. 14



CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
NEWMAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE	1
NEWMAN'S THEORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE	28
THE DUBLIN REVIEW ON DEVELOPMENTS	75
THE DUBLIN REVIEW AND OURSELVES	116
DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS	126
MORRIS ON THE INCARNATION	141
THE MERCERSBURG HYPOTHESIS	183
SAINT-BONNET ON SOCIAL RESTORATION	197
HILDRETH'S THEORY OF MORALS	236
HILDRETH'S JOINT LETTER	255
JOUFFROY'S ETHICAL SYSTEM	266
RIGHTS AND DUTIES	290
J. V. H. ON BROWNSON'S REVIEW	317
WARD'S PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION	348
LECKY ON MORALS, ARTICLE I	379
“ “ ARTICLE II	395
MADNESS OF ANTICHRISTIANS	414
CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY	428
THE REFORMATION NOT CONSERVATIVE	447
BISHOP FENWICK	470
ARCHBISHOP HUGHES	485
ARCHBISHOP SPALDING	500
COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT	515
QUESTIONS OF THE SOUL	538
ASPIRATIONS OF NATURE	548
MEDITATIONS OF ST. IGNATIUS	577

NEWMAN'S DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1846.]

OUR readers do not need to be informed that the distinguished author of this work on the development of Christian doctrine, has, within the last year, been admitted to the communion of the holy Catholic Church; for who has not heard of the event, and what Catholic heart has it not filled with devout joy and gratitude? Mr. Newman has stood for several years before the public as a man of rare gifts and acquirements; he was at the head of a very influential party in the Anglican communion, and appears to have enjoyed a personal esteem, and exerted a personal influence, which seldom fall to the lot of any but the master minds of their age or country. We may well, then, look upon his conversion with more than ordinary gratitude to the great Head of the church, and as an event of more than ordinary significance.

Mr. Newman appears, from all we know of his history, to have commenced his career with sincere attachment to the schismatical communion in which he was born and reared, and to have felt that he owed it all his genius, talents, attainments, labors, and affections; but almost from the first it was seen by close observers that he cherished aspirations and tendencies which, if faithfully followed, must ultimately lead him out of that communion, or destroy the communion itself by absorbing it in the Catholic Church. Hence the great importance which has been attached to his movements, and the lively interest with which his various publications have been read. Some almost flattered themselves that he and his friends would so far *catholicize* the establishment as to render its restoration to Catholic unity feasible and certain; others, looking upon this as improbable, since it would find an insuperable obstacle in English politics, thought it more likely that his movement would end in his own individual conversion, and that of a considerable number of his

**An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. New York: 1845.

friends and followers; others, again, among whom were we ourselves, thought it still more likely that he would stop short in his course, and make up his mind to live and die an Anglican. We felt, on reading the famous Tract 90, that the man who could write such a tract would never want ingenious reasons to justify to himself any course he might choose to adopt. But we did not take sufficiently into the account the difficulties of the position of one standing, like Mr. Newman, outside of the church, nor make sufficient allowance for the dimness and indistinctness with which Catholic truth ordinarily at first dawns on the Protestant mind, and for the length of time it usually requires to ascertain how much of our past life we may retain, and how much we must give up, in order to place the several parts of our new belief in harmony with each other. We humbly and devoutly thank Almighty God that we were wrong; that we relied too little on the power of divine grace; and that, contrary to our expectations, Mr. Newman, and a large number of his friends, have already been permitted to enter that communion, out of which it is madness to suppose we can please God, or secure the salvation of our souls.

We have no disposition to speculate on the probable effect of the recent conversions in England. It may be that Almighty God is about to visit, in the riches of his mercy, the deeply sinning land of our forefathers, and, for his own greater glory, to restore her, contrary to her deserts, to the bosom of Catholic unity. Appearances everywhere indicate that our good God is at present interposing in a special manner in behalf of his church, and by a thousand ways preparing the return of the misguided children of the so-called reformation to their allegiance, to the love and embrace of their holy mother, who has never ceased to weep over their folly and madness, and to beseech her heavenly Spouse to save them from themselves. But, whatever may be the ulterior purposes of Him who orders all things well, the conversion of even one soul is sufficient to warrant the fullest joy and gratitude the heart of man can entertain; and we have superabundant cause of devout thanksgiving in what he has already effected. It is enough for us to trust ourselves, and all, lovingly to him, and to pray unceasingly that his will may be done in all and in each.

The book before us appears to have been designed to indicate, to some extent, the process by which its gifted author passed in his own mind from Anglicanism to Catholicity,

and to remove the principal objections to the Catholic Church, which he himself had raised in his previous publications. As the production of a strong, active, acute, and cultivated mind, enriched with various but not always well digested erudition, brought up in the bosom of heresy and schism, nurtured with false learning, false philosophy, vague and empty theories, gradually, under divine grace, working its way to the truth which gleams from afar, but which the intervening darkness renders fitful and uncertain; it is a work of more than ordinary interest, and one which the enlightened and philosophic few, fond of psychological researches, and of tracing the operations of sectarian or individual idiosyncrasies, may read perhaps with profit. A Protestant, ignorant, as Protestants usually are, of Catholicity, may even fancy the work substantially Catholic, and regard its theory as a convenient one for the church, and one which she may, without prejudice to any of her claims, if not accept, at least tolerate. It is evident, from the first page of the work, that the author has made up his mind; that he is writing under the full conviction that he must seek admission into the Roman Catholic communion; and that, in his judgment, the theory he is putting forth in justification of the step he has resolved to take is, to say the least, perfectly compatible with Catholic authority and infallibility. He frankly accepts, and in some instances elaborately defends, the principal dogmas and usages of the Catholic Church, and especially those which are in general the most offensive to Protestants; and so little suspicion has he of the unsoundness of his work, so orthodox does he hold it, that he does not scruple, even after his conversion, to publish it to the world. And yet we presume he himself is now prepared to concede, that, when he was writing this book, he was still in the bonds of Protestantism; that he had not as yet set his foot on Catholic ground; that he had not crossed the Jordan, had not even surveyed the promised land from the top of Mount Pisgah, and that he knew it only by vague rumor and uncertain report. All, to his vision, is dim and confused. He stumbles at every step and stammers at every word. He puts forth a giant's strength, but only to wrestle with phantoms; and gives us learned and elaborate theories to explain facts which he himself shows are no facts,—ingenious and subtle speculations, where all that is needed, or is admissible, is a plain yes or no. From first to last, he labors with a genius, a talent, a

learning, a sincerity, an earnestness, which no one can refuse to admire, to develop Protestantism into Catholicity. Vain effort! As well attempt to develop the poisonous sumnach into the cedar of Lebanon.

Whatever may have been Mr. Newman's estimation of his work when writing or consenting to publish it, we cannot doubt that he now judges it as we do. He has now a practical and a filial acquaintance with the church. He has been permitted to approach her holy sacraments; he has eaten the "food of angels"; his heart has been elevated and his vision purged. He is now not an alien, but a son, and a son who can have no will but that of his holy mother. No foolish pride of opinion, or mistaken notions of self-respect, can make him cling now to past utterances, because they were his, and labor to defend views which he could have entertained only while yet in ignorance, or, at best, seeing "men only as trees walking." His glory is in getting rid of the old Protestant leaven, and in receiving on the authority of God in the church, all the sacred truths which she believes and teaches, and as she believes and teaches them. He cannot feel that it derogates from true dignity and consistency of character to give up falsehood for truth, or to abandon a once cherished theory, when once seen to be both unnecessary and inadmissible. It implies no reproach to him that he was not able, at the time and under the circumstances, from the position in which his Protestantism had placed him, with the training he had received, and the little recourse he had had to the authorized living teacher, to produce a work less uncatholic, and less open to grave objections. The work is all that he could have reasonably expected it to be; and in refusing to accept it as Catholic, we imply no distrust of the sincerity of his conversion, or of his present orthodoxy.

It is but simple justice to Mr. Newman to say, that it is not for his sake that we are about to point out some objections to his theory of developments. The circumstances under which he wrote, his acknowledged learning and ability, the presumption that he had thoroughly surveyed his ground, and the *apparent* favor with which his essay has been received by the Catholic press in England, are not unlikely to convey to Protestant, and perhaps to some partially instructed and speculative Catholic minds, the impression, that, if the theory set forth is not exactly Catholic, it at least contains nothing which a Catholic may not accept.

The fact, that the author—whether legitimately or not—comes to Catholic conclusions, that he ends by entering the Catholic communion, that he puts forth his theory expressly for the purpose of removing the obstacles which others may find in following his example, and with this view publishes it to the world even after his conversion, can hardly fail to produce in many minds the conviction that the theory and conclusions are necessarily or at least legitimately connected. And several Protestant reviewers seem actually to entertain this conviction; and they, therefore, hold the theory up to condemnation as the “Romanist” theory; or, as they express themselves, “as the ground on which modern Rome seeks to defend her manifest corruptions of Christian doctrine.” It is therefore due both to the church and to Protestants to say, expressly,—and we do so with the highest respect for Mr. Newman, and with warm admiration for the truth, beauty, and force of many of the details of his work,—that his peculiar theory is essentially anticatholic and Protestant. It not only is not necessary to the defence of the church, but is utterly repugnant to her claims to be the authoritative and infallible church of God. A brief examination of some of the principal features of the theory will justify this strong and apparently severe assertion.

Mr. Newman so mixes up in the same category Christian doctrine, theology, and discipline,—matters in their nature distinct, and never confounded by Catholic doctors,—that it is difficult by express quotations to determine his exact meaning, and those of our readers who have not read his book must rely somewhat on our judgment and fidelity in representing it. But we are familiar with his subject; we have travelled, under circumstances similar to his own, over the greater part of the ground he brings to view; we embraced, and for years publicly advocated, a theory substantially identical with his own; we have studied his book thoroughly and conscientiously; we have, and, as Catholics, can have, no motive for misrepresenting it; and we think the statements we are about to give are such as Mr. Newman himself will concede to be strictly just. As we understand Mr. Newman, the problem he has written his book to solve is, How to explain, in accordance with Christian truth, the variations or differences of doctrine and discipline which the Roman Catholic Church presents to-day, from the doctrine and discipline presented by the primitive church. He does not anywhere draw up a list or give us a

formal statement of these variations and differences; but important variations, not only in discipline, but also in doctrine, he takes it for granted, there have been. Some hypothesis for their explanation, he thinks, is necessary; and the hypothesis he suggests he calls "the Theory of Developments." It is the purpose of his essay, 1. To explain this theory; 2. To furnish the tests by which development may be distinguished from corruption; 3. To establish the probability, *a priori*, of developments in Christianity; and 4. By an elaborate historical application of the theory to the successive ages of the church, to show that it meets and explains the principal facts in the case. Such is the general design of his work.

We waive, here, all considerations of this theory so far as it is intended to apply to Christian discipline and theology, and confine ourselves to it solely as applied to Christian doctrine. Under this last point of view, we object to the theory that it is a theory, and not a revealed fact. The truth of an hypothesis can never be inferred from the fact that it meets and explains the facts it is invented to meet and explain; and therefore the admission of any hypothesis into Christian doctrine would vitiate the doctrine itself. Mr. Newman begins his work by telling us that "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. *It may legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories*: what is its moral and political excellence, what its place in the range of ideas or of facts which we possess, *whether it be divine or human*, whether it be original or eclectic or both at once, how far favorable to civilization or to literature, whether a religion for all ages or for a particular state of society,—these are questions upon the fact or professed solutions of the fact, and *belong to the province of opinion*." But in this he must be mistaken. Whether Christianity be divine or human is not a question of opinion, but a question of fact, and so is it with all the questions he enumerates. Christianity is a fact in the world's history; this is a fact. But is Christianity what it professes to be? Is this a question of opinion, to be answered only by a theory? or is it a question of fact, to be taken up and settled, one way or the other, as a fact? If it is a matter of opinion, and if it is answerable only by a theory, what foundation is there or can there be for faith! Christianity is a fact, not only in the world's history, but in itself, or it

is not. If it is, it cannot legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories, any more than may be the fact that it is a fact in the world's history. Christianity, if received at all, must be received, not as a theory, but as a revealed fact; and when we have established it as a revealed fact, no theory is needed or admissible, for we must then believe the fact precisely as it proposes itself.

But even if a theory might be introduced, Mr. Newman's would not satisfy us. We are not satisfied with his tests of a true development. He gives seven tests:—1. Preservation of type or idea; 2. Continuity of principles; 3. Power of assimilation; 4. Early anticipation; 5. Logical sequence; 6. Preservative additions; 7. Chronic continuance. The sixth, second, and first are all resolvable into one, the simple preservation of the original type or idea. The third, which implies development by assimilation or accretion, is fatal to the sufficiency of the original revelation, by necessarily implying that the developed idea contains what was not in the idea as originally given. The fifth, logical sequence, in itself is no proof of development. The fourth, early anticipation, as far as it goes, is proof positive against development. And the seventh, chronic continuance, is as applicable to corruptions as to true developments; for Mr. Newman fails entirely to show that corruptions are short-lived and transitory, as he alleges. Some writers date the origin of the Pelagian heresy, which is as rife as ever it was, as far back as the garden of Eden; and Mr. Newman himself admits that it remains to be seen "whether Mahometanism external to Christendom and the Greek Church within it" are not yet living, and capable of chronic continuance and activity.

Furthermore, before we can proceed to apply tests to determine whether this or that is a development or a corruption of Christian doctrine, we must have a clear, distinct, and adequate knowledge of Christian doctrine itself; for how can we say the original type or idea is preserved, if we do not know what it is? If we do know what it is, what is the use of the tests or their application? The whole process of the historical application of the tests is, then, at best, regarded as an argument, a mere parallogism. We need all the knowledge of Christian doctrine as the condition of concluding any thing from the application of the tests, which their successful application can give us; for there can be nothing in the conclusion not previ-

ously in the premises. Mr. Newman, like professors of natural science, has been misled by what in these times is called "Inductive Philosophy,"—a philosophy which had never had "a local habitation or a name," more than other "airy nothings," if it had been borne in mind that we have no logic by which we can conclude the unknown from the known. When your conclusions go beyond what you have established in the premises, they may, indeed, sometimes be a guide to observation, but they have in themselves no scientific validity.

But, waiving these considerations, we object to Mr. Newman's theory, that it is an hypothesis brought forward to explain facts which are not facts. His problem is no problem; for it presupposes what no Catholic can concede, and what there is no warrant in the facts of the case for conceding. Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that there have been real variations in Christian doctrine. "On various grounds, then, it is certain," he says, "that portions of the church system were held back in primitive times; and of course this fact goes some way to account for that apparent variation and *growth* of doctrine, which embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of Christianity; yet it is not the key to the whole difficulty, for the obvious reason, that the variations continue beyond the time when it is conceivable the discipline (*disciplina arcani*) was in force." And the view on which his book is written, he adds, is,—

"That the *increase* and expansion of the Christian *Creed* and Ritual, and the *variations* which have attended the process in the case of individuals and churches, are *necessary* attendants on any philosophy or policy which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from the nature of the human mind, *time* is necessary for the full comprehension and *perfection* of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated once for all to the world by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as received by minds not inspired, and through *media* which were human, have required only the longer time and the deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the *Theory of Developments*." "We shall find ourselves unable," he says again, "to fix an historical point at which the *growth* of doctrine ceased. Not on the day of Pentecost, for St. Peter had still to learn at Joppa about the baptism of Cornelius; not at Joppa and Cæsarea, for St. Paul had to write his Epistles; not on the death of the last apostle, for St. Ignatius *had to establish the doctrine of Episcopacy*, not

then, nor for many years after, for the canon of the New Testament was still undetermined; *not in the Creed*, which is no collection of definitions, but a summary of certain *credenda*, an incomplete summary, and, like the Lord's Prayer or the Decalogue, *a mere sample* of divine truths, especially of the more elementary. No one doctrine can be named which starts *omnibus numeris*, at first, and gains nothing from the investigations of faith and the attacks of heresy. The church went forth from the world *in haste*, as the Israelites from Egypt, 'with their dough before it was leavened, their kneading-troughs being bound up in their clothes upon their shoulders.'" "Butler of course was not contemplating the case of *new articles of faith*, or developments imperative on our acceptance, but he surely bears witness to the probability of developments in Christian doctrine considered in themselves, which is at present the point in question."

"Thus we see how, as time went on, the doctrine of Purgatory *was opened upon the apprehension of the church*, as a portion or form of penance due for sins committed after baptism; and thus the *belief* in this doctrine and the *practice* of infant baptism would *grow* into general reception together."

These passages do not appear in their full strength, detached, as they are, from the context; but we think there is no mistaking the doctrine they inculcate. They prove clearly that Mr. Newman does not mean simply that there has been a growth in theological *science*, a variation or expansion of outward discipline, but that there have been in the teachings of the church herself real variations of *doctrine*, an increase and expansion of the Christian creed,—a real progress of the church in her own apprehension and understanding of the sacred deposit of faith committed to her charge, and which she received the command to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. She went forth in haste, her "dough unleavened," her creed incomplete, her understanding of her faith imperfect, ignorant, in part at least, in regard to every article of faith, of the precise truth she was authorized to teach. New definitions are new developments, and indicate that more of Christian truth is opened upon the apprehension of the church. Before she defines the article, she herself does not clearly and distinctly apprehend what, on the point defined, is the revelation she originally received. As if she had only a confused notion, an intense feeling, and no distinct apprehension of the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father when she drew up the symbol, and not till she defined it against Arius at Nicæa; and when she defined the "two natures in

one person" against Nestorius, she had not yet fully learned the "one person in two distinct natures," which she asserted shortly after against Eutyches. All may have been implied in the original revelation, but she knew it not; and it is only as time goes on, as mind acts on mind, as controversies arise, as urgent necessities press, that she gradually develops it, and fixes it in her definitions. Thus in her understanding there is a perpetual growth, or a continued increase and expansion of Christian doctrine. The decision of the rule of faith, he tells us, "has been left to time, to the influence of mind upon mind, the issues of controversy and the growth of opinion," and remains, he supposes, even to this day, "more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined by the church." Infant baptism was "unprovided for by the revelation, as originally given." It is left undecided, "unless by development or growth" of revelation, what is the resource of those who sin after baptism, and the doctrine of Purgatory appears to have been a late development.*

Now, in regard to all this, we simply ask, Does the church herself take this view? Does she teach that she at first received no formal revelation,—that the revelation was given as "unleavened dough," to be leavened, kneaded, made up into loaves of convenient size, baked and prepared for use by her, after her mission began, and she had commenced the work of evangelizing the nations? Does she admit her original creed was incomplete, that it has increased and ex-

*We cannot resist, here, the temptation to quote a passage from a recent Protestant work published in this country,—*The Principle of Protestantism in its relation to the Present State of the Church*, by Professor Schaff, of the German Reform Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pa.,—a German, lately from Berlin, and in part attached, we believe, to the school of Neander. He is a young man of very superior abilities. His work has many remarkable affinities with Mr. Newman's. Both works adopt very nearly the same fundamental principles; but one concludes in favor of Protestantism, the other of Catholicity. The passage we quote seems to us a clear and distinct statement of Mr. Newman's leading doctrine, and a much better statement than Mr. Newman himself has anywhere formally given.

"It must be remarked, that, when we speak of advance or progress, we do so with reference only to the *previous apprehension* of Christianity in the church, and not to *Christianity* itself, as exhibited in its original, and for all times absolutely normal character, in the writings of the New Testament. In its own nature, as a new order of life, Christianity has been complete from the beginning; and there is no room to conceive that any more perfect order can take its place, or that it may be so improved as, in the end, to outgrow entirely its own original sphere.

panded, that there have been variation and progress in her understanding of the revelation she originally received, and that she now understands it better, and can more readily define what it is than she could at first? Most assuredly not. She asserts that there has been no progress, no increase, no variation of faith; that what she believes and teaches now is precisely what she has always and everywhere believed and taught from the first. She denies that she has ever added a new article to the primitive creed; and affirms, as Mr. Newman himself proves in his account of the Council of Chalcedon, that the new definition is not a new development, a better understanding of the faith, but simply a new definition, against the "novel expressions" invented by the enemies of religion, of what, on the point defined, had always and everywhere been her precise faith. In this she is right, or she is wrong. If right you must abandon your theory of developments; if wrong, she is a false witness for God, and your theory of developments cannot make her worthy of confidence. If you believe her you cannot assert developments in your sense of the term; if you do not believe her, you are no Catholic. This is sufficient to show that Mr. Newman cannot urge his theory as a Catholic, whatever he might do as a Protestant.

Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that the revelation committed to the charge of the church was not a distinct, formal revelation, but a vague, loose, obscure revelation, which she at first only imperfectly apprehended. This is evident from the extracts we have made, and also

But notwithstanding this, we are authorized to speak of advance or progress in the case of the church itself, and on the part of the Christianized world; and of this not merely as extensive, in the spread of the Gospel among pagans, Mohammedans, and Jews, but as intensive, also, *in the continually growing cultivation and improvement of those four great interests of the church, doctrine, life, constitution, and worship.* The church, not less than every one of its members, has its periods of infancy, youth, manhood, and old age. This involves no contradiction to the absolute character of Christianity; for the progress of the church, outward or inward, is never in the strict sense creative, but in the way only of reception, organic assimilation, and expansion. In other words, all historical development in the church, theoretical and practical, consists in an *apprehension, always more and more profound, of the life and doctrine of Christ and his apostles: an appropriation, more full and transforming always, of their distinctive spirit, both as to its contents and its form.* Only so far as a doctrine or ordinance of the church bears this character may it be allowed to have formative and enduring force."

This is bold, manly, and consistent in a Protestant; it is something else in a Catholic.

from what he says when pointing out an error in a passage which he quotes from one of his previous publications. "The writer considers the growth of the doctrine [of Purgatory] an instance of the action of private judgment; whereas I should now call it an instance of *the mind of the church working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings*, under secret supernatural guidance." This is a pregnant passage, and may be regarded as a key to Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and also to his view of the teaching authority of the church. The development, as is evident from the context, is not the formal definition of the faith against a novel error, but is a slow, painful, and laborious working out, by the church herself, of dogmatic truth from implicit feelings,—though what kind of feeling an *implicit* feeling is, we are unable to say. "Thus St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested idea of Purgatory, or Original Sin, yet have an *intense feeling*, which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and of the liabilities of our nature regenerate." It is obvious from the whole course of Mr. Newman's reasoning, that he would predicate of the church, in their time, what he here predicates of St. Justin and St. Irenæus. The church had a vague yet intense feeling of the truth, but had not digested it into formal propositions or definite articles. She had a blind instinct, which, under secret supernatural guidance, enabled her to avoid error and to pursue the regular course of development. She had a secret feeling of the truth, as one may say, a natural taste for it, and a distaste for error; yet not that clear and distinct understanding which would have enabled her at any moment, on any given point, to define her faith. She only knew enough of truth to preserve the original idea, and to elaborate from her intense feelings, slowly and painfully as time went on, now one dogma and now another. What in one age is feeling in a succeeding age becomes opinion, and an article of faith in a still later age. This new article gives rise to a new intense feeling, which, in its turn, in a subsequent age becomes opinion, to be finally, in a later age yet, imposed as dogmatic truth. This is, so far as we can understand it, Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and what he means by "working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings."

By the "mind" of the church which works out this dogmatic truth, Mr. Newman does not mean, strictly speaking,

the constituted authority of the church, but the internal sense, very nearly what Moehler calls the "internal tradition," of the collective body of the faithful. When he speaks of the recipients of the revelation, he seems always to have in his mind the *ecclesia credens*, and to forget the *ecclesia docens*. He does not appear to have ever heard that Almighty God gave his revelation to pastors and teachers qualified from the first to teach it in its purity and integrity, clearly and distinctly, but that he threw it upon the great concourse of believers for them to receive and make the most of. "The time at length came when these recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments." This view, if followed out, would suppress entirely the proper teaching authority of the church, competent at any moment to declare infallibly what is the precise truth revealed; or, at least, would raise the *ecclesia credens* above the *ecclesia docens*, and reduce the office of the church teaching to that of defining, from time to time, the dogmatic truth which the church believing has gradually and slowly worked out from her implicit feelings. The secret supernatural assistance would then attach to the church believing, and superintend the elaboration, rather than to the church teaching; and if to the church teaching at all, only so far as to enable it faithfully to collect and truly define what the church believing elaborates; the very doctrine we ourselves set forth in the first number of this *Review*,* and insisted on, not as a reason for going into the Roman Catholic Church, but as a reason for *not* going into it, and for staying where we were.

Mr. Newman evidently proceeds on the assumption, that Christianity can be abstracted from the church, and considered apart from the institution which concretes it, as if the church were accidental and not essential in our holy religion. "Christianity," he says, "though spoken of in prophecy as a kingdom, came into the world as an *idea* rather than an institution, and has had to wrap itself in clothing, and fit itself with armor of its own providing, and form the instruments and methods of its own prosperity and warfare." If he does not so consider it, all he says on the development of ideas in general has and can have no relation to his subject.

**The Church Question*, Brownson's Works, Vol. IV., p. 461.

"The more claim," he says, "an idea has to be considered living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political is its nature, the more complicated and subtile will be its developments, and the larger and the more eventful will be its course. *Such is Christianity*; and whatever has been said about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development." Its divine Author then sent Christianity into the world a naked and unarmed idea. By its action on us, and ours on it, it gradually develops itself into an institution, which, feeble at first, as time and events roll on, strengthens and fortifies itself, now on this side, and now on that, pushes deep its roots into the heart of humanity, sends out its branches, now in one direction and now in another, till at length it grows up and expands into that all-embracing authority, those profound and comprehensive dogmas, those pure and sublime precepts, and that rich and touching ritual, which together make up what we to-day call the Roman Catholic and Apostolical Church. Hence the significance of what the author told us in his introduction: "Christianity has, from the first, . . . thrown itself upon the great concourse of men. Its home is in the world; and to know what it is we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it."*

We meet here an old, familiar acquaintance,—a doctrine which we embraced for years before we became a Catholic, and which for years kept us out of the Catholic Church, as it now keeps out the greater part of our former friends and associates. Assuming that Christianity came into the world originally as an idea, and not as an institution, that it was thrown upon the great concourse of men, to be developed and embodied by the action of their minds, stimulated and directed by it, we held that, by seizing it anew, abstracting it from the institutions with which it has thus far clothed itself, and proclaiming it as eighteen hundred years of intense moral and intellectual activity have developed it, we might organize through it a new institution, a new church, in advance of the old by all the developments which these eighteen hundred years have effected; and we see not, even now, wherein we were wrong, if it be assumed that Christianity was originally given us as a naked and unarmed idea.

*"He [*Ego sum vobiscum*] was in the world, and the world knew him not."—St. John i. 10.

This doctrine rests on the assumption, that ideas, in themselves considered, are active and potent, and that they may, as our old friend, the author of *Orphic Sayings*, would express himself, "take unto themselves hands, build the temple, erect the altar, and inaugurate the worship of God." This is not only bad theology, but false philosophy, as we attempted to show in an article entitled *No Church, No Reform*, published in April, 1844.* Ideas, not concreated, not instituted, are not potencies, are not active, but are really to us as if they were not. The ideal must become actual, before it can be operative. If Christianity had come into the world as an idea, it would have left the world as it found it. Moreover, if you assume it to have come as an idea, and to have been developed only by the action of the human mind on it, the institutions with which it is subsequently clothed, the authorities established in its name, the dogmas imposed, the precepts enjoined, and the rites prescribed are all really the products of the human mind; and instead of governing the mind, may be governed, modified, enlarged, or contracted by it at its pleasure. The church would be divine only in the sense philosophy or civil government is divine. If Mr. Newman had not been so preoccupied with the solution of the problem which his Anglicanism proposed, it seems to us he must have seen this, and shrunk from advancing his theory of developments.†

*Brownson's Works, Vol. IV., p 496.

† Yet Mr. Newman seems to have had some suspicion of this conclusion. "Nor can it fairly be made a difficulty, that thus to treat Christianity is to level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man. Certainly it is a degradation of a divine work to consider it under an earthly form; but it is no irreverence, since the Lord himself, its author and owner, bore one also. Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies in what it has in addition to them; not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics; being informed and quickened by what is more than intellect, by a divine Spirit. It is externally what the apostle calls an 'earthly vessel,' *being the religion of men*. And considered as such, it grows 'in wisdom and stature'; but the powers which it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its miraculous nativity."

Mr. Newman mistakes the analogy on which he relies. Undoubtedly the church has its human side as well as its divine side; but it is not a correct view of Christianity to assume that its whole body, including its doctrines and institutions, is human, is a production of man, simply quickened and informed by the divine Spirit. In Christianity, doctrine represents the divine, not the human,—is not the "earthly vessel," but that which was deposited in the vessel; for nothing can be regarded as Christian doctrine but what was originally revealed. Christian doctrine

A little reflection on a somewhat popular German theory, of which Neander is perhaps the best living exponent, might have led Mr. Newman to suspect the soundness of his own, which is very nearly identical with it. Neander assumes that Christianity came into the world as a life, or the principle of a new and higher life; which, it strikes us, is only another form of words for saying it came as an idea. The German, assuming it to be life, or the principle of life, or a living "idea," placed by its author in the world uninstituted, concludes that Christianity needs no formal institution, was never intended to be clothed with a formal institution, and that it can subsist, diffuse and propagate itself, and fulfil its mission, without any other association or organization than that of general society. This also was Schleiermacher's view, as set forth in his *Ueber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*. The Englishman, from virtually the same premises, argues, it is true, to a better conclusion, but not, it seems to us, with a better nor even with so good a logic. Certain it is, we ourselves could never obtain his Catholic conclusions from his premises; and it was not till we had been forced to abandon them, that we presented ourselves at the door of the church, and begged permission to enter.

Our difficulties do not diminish when we take up Mr. Newman's definition of *idea*. An idea, according to him, is the habitual judgment which the mind forms of that which comes before it; and in this sense, he tells us, the term is used in his *Essay*. Christianity came into the world as an idea, therefore as an habitual judgment formed by the mind. This, if construed strictly, makes Christianity purely human; for, if it be an habitual judgment formed by the human mind, it has no existence out of the mind, and could have had none before being formed in it. This is a conclusion from which every believer must recoil with horror. But, at any rate we must say, according to the author, that Christianity came into the world as an habitual judgment, for it came as an idea. Then it is nothing but an habitual judgment which the world forms. This must be admitted, because he says expressly, "To know what it is, we must seek it in the

is the revelation itself, not the view which men take of that revelation. Hence the necessity of the infallible *ecclesia docens* to keep and propound it. And here is the grand error Mr. Newman commits. He is still, while writing, a decided Protestant, mistaking our notions of Christianity for Christianity itself.

world, and hear the world's witness of it." But it is an habitual judgment which the world forms of—what? Of Christian doctrine, of the revelation supernaturally made and committed to the church? Mr. Newman cannot say this, because this would make Christianity the *object* of the judgment, whereas he tells us that it is the judgment itself. Of what, then, is Christianity the habitual judgment which the world forms? We can conceive no answer Mr. Newman can give which will not involve naked deism, or, at best, mere Quakerism.

Mr. Newman tells us again that ideas sometimes represent facts, and sometimes do not. Does Christianity represent a fact, or does it not? He doubtless intends to teach that it does. But what is the evidence? What is the criterion by which to distinguish an idea which represents a fact from one which does not? He answers:—

"When one and the same idea is held by persons who are independent of each other, and variously circumstanced, and have possessed themselves of it by different ways under very different aspects, without losing its substantial unity and its identity, and when it is thus variously presented, and yet recommended to persons similarly circumstanced; and when it is presented to persons variously circumstanced, under aspects discordant at first sight, but reconcilable after such explanations as their respective states of mind require; then it seems to have a claim to be considered the representative of objective truth."

This is pure *Lamennaisism* which makes the *consensus hominum* the criterion of truth. It would also authorize us to infer, that, if Christianity, as at its first promulgation, be embraced only by a few, and these mutually connected and similarly circumstanced, and if, at the same time these all receive it by the same way and under the same aspect, or agree among themselves in their views of it, it would have no "claim to be considered the representative of objective truth." The faith of the Blessed Virgin, the twelve apostles, and the seventy disciples, must, then, have labored under very serious disadvantages. Moreover, if all the world should be converted, all gathered into the same communion, become of "one mind," as well as of "one heart," there would be room to question whether Christianity represents a fact or a no-fact. Is this Catholic teaching?

Nor are we better satisfied with what Mr. Newman says of the process of development. Christianity came into the world as an idea, an habitual judgment; and we may say

of it in particular all he says of development in ideas in general. Ideas, we are told, "are not ordinarily brought home to the mind, except through the medium of a variety of aspects; like bodily substances, which are not seen except under the clothing of their properties and influences, and can be walked round and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights." Let an idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind of any particular set of persons, and it is not difficult to understand the effects which will ensue.

"There will be a general agitation of thought, and an action of mind, both upon itself and upon other minds. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original idea, aspects will multiply, and judgments will accumulate. There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict; and it is uncertain whether any thing is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. After a while, some definite form of doctrine emerges; and, as time proceeds, one view of it will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third, till the idea in which they centre will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together. It will be surveyed, too, in its relation to other doctrines or facts, to other natural laws or established rules, to the varying circumstances of times and places, to other religions, politics, philosophies, as the case may be. How it stands affected towards other systems, how it affects them, how far it coalesces with them, how far it tolerates when it interferes with them, will be gradually wrought out. It will be questioned and criticised by enemies, and explained by well-wishers. The multitude of opinions formed concerning it, in these respects and many others, will be collected, compared, sorted, sifted, selected, or rejected, and gradually attached to it or separated from it, in the minds of individuals and of the community Thus, in time, it has grown into an ethical code, or into a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, according to its capabilities; and this system or body of thought, theoretical and practical, thus laboriously gained, will, after all, be only the adequate representation of the original idea, being nothing else than what the very idea *meant* from the first,—its exact image as seen in a combination of the most diversified aspects; with the suggestions and corrections of many minds, and the illustrations of many trials. This process of thought is called the development of an idea."

That this is intended to be a description of the process of development, which takes place in Christian *doctrine*, is evident from the title of the book, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, and from what he says expressly.

“ If Christianity be a fact, and can be made the subject-matter of exercises of the reason, and impress an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will, in the course of time, develop in a series of ideas. . . . It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is presented to it, simply and integrally. It conceives by means of definition or description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and, with more or less exactness, approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach, except by aspects or views which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.* . . . And the more claim an idea has to be considered as living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political its nature, the more complicated and subtle will be its developments, and the longer and more eventful will be its course. SUCH IS CHRISTIANITY; and whatever has been said . . . about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development. . . . Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration did for the first recipients of the revelation what the divine fiat did for herbs and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first *vaguely* and *generally*, and would afterwards be completed by developments.”

It is plain from this that Mr. Newman means to teach that the church, in order to attain to an adequate expression of the Christian idea or of Christian doctrine, must institute and carry on the precise process of development which he has predicated of ideas generally; for he contends, and he told us as much in the beginning, that she is forced to do so by the nature of the human mind itself. The revelation is not and cannot be taken in all at once. The church can neither learn nor teach it, except under particular aspects, none of which, he says, can go the depth of the idea,—that is, we presume, of the fact or no-fact which the idea represents; for it is hardly to be supposed that a judgment cannot go the depth of itself; and it is only by collecting and adjusting these particular aspects, that she can attain to an adequate expression of Christian doctrine. This is naked eclecticism, not in philosophy only, but even in faith.

But this development is effected only gradually, and “after a sufficient time.” Some centuries elapse, and the doctrine of purgatory is “opened upon the apprehension of the church.” She at first cannot take in all revealed

truth. She has it all stowed away somewhere, but she only partially apprehends it. As time goes on, as individuals differently circumstanced view it under different particular aspects and from opposite poles, as new controversies arise, bold and obstinate heretics start up, some clamorous for one particular aspect, and some for another, she is able to enlarge her view, to augment the number of her dogmas, and tell us more truly what is the revelation she has received. And this we are to say of a church we are defending as authoritative and infallible, and which we hold has received the formal commission to teach all nations all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his apostles! In plain words, was the church able to teach truly and infallibly in the age of Saints Clement and Polycarp, or of Saints Justin and Irenæus, the whole Catholic faith, and the precise Catholic faith, on any and every point which could be made,—or was she not? If she was, there can have been no development of doctrine; if she was not, she was not then competent to discharge the commission she received? Was what she then taught the faithful sufficient for salvation? Is not what was then sufficient all that is really necessary now? If so, and if she teaches doctrines now which she did not then, or insists on our believing now what she did not then, how will you exonerate her from the charge brought by Protestants, that she has added to the primitive faith, and teaches as of necessity to salvation what is not necessary, and therefore imposes a burden on men's shoulders they ought not to be required to bear? Moreover, where are these developments to stop? Have we reached the end? Has the church finally brought out the whole body of dogmatic truth, or are we, like the Puritan Robinson, "to look for new light" to break in upon her vision? Mr. Newman seems to think new developments are needed; for he mentions several fundamental matters, which he says he supposes "remain more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined, by the church."

Mr. Newman, after Leibnitz, represents heresy as consisting in taking and following out a partial view of Christian truth. Will he permit us to ask him to tell us how, at that period, when the church apprehended the truth only under particular aspects, heresy was distinguishable from orthodoxy? Moreover, if there ever was a time when the church did not teach the whole faith, how he can maintain her catholicity; since to her catholicity, as we learn from the

catechism, it is not only essential that she subsist through all ages, and teach all nations, but that she teach all truth?

Whoever glances at Mr. Newman's application of his "tests" cannot fail to perceive that he regards heresies as having been of essential service to the church in enabling her to develop and fully understand the sacred deposit of faith; and that he sees no peculiar sin in them, but in their anticipating the church, and bringing out and insisting upon a particular aspect of truth, before her hour has come, before she has reached it in the regular course of development. They are too impatient; they cannot wait the slow course of time, but would precipitate the growth of the church. "Montanism is a remarkable anticipation or presage of developments which soon began to show themselves in the church, though they were not perfected for centuries after." "The doctrinal determinations and ecclesiastical usages of the middle ages are only the true fulfilment of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the church." "While the prophets of the Montanists prefigure the church's doctors, and their inspiration her infallibility, and their revelations her developments, and the heresiarch himself is the unsightly anticipation of St. Francis, in Novatian again we see the aspiration of nature after such creations of grace as St. Benedict or St. Bruno." This requires no comment. But, if heretics go before the church, and develop truth before she is ready for it, and yet a truth she subsequently accepts, we think she should treat them with a little more indulgence, and that we should rather lament her tardiness than censure their precipitancy. Mr. Newman, strange as it may seem, regards the heretic as generally in advance of the orthodox doctor, and appears to maintain that orthodoxy is formed out of the "raw material" supplied by heretics. "The theology of the church," he says, "is the diligent, patient working out of one doctrine from many materials. The conduct of popes, councils, fathers, betokens the slow, painful, *anxious* taking up of *new elements* into an existing body of *belief*." It is singular that it never occurred to Mr. Newman, that possibly the heretical views which he seems to admire so much were simply corruptions of doctrines which the church had taught before them, and that heresy is the corruption of orthodoxy, and not its raw material. As a matter of fact, we suspect, in all cases of coincidence, the orthodox doctor is older than the heretical teacher, as the church is older than any of the sects.

After all, it is clear that Mr. Newman's *προῶτον ψεῦδος*, his mother error, is in assuming that the Christian doctrine was given originally and exclusively through the medium of the written word. How far he assumes this absolutely for himself, or how far his assumption is intended to be a concession to his Anglican friends, it is impossible for us to say; and we confess, that, on reading and re-reading the book, we are at a loss to determine whether he is really putting forth a theory which he holds to be true, or only a theory which he thinks may remove, on Anglican premises, the difficulties which the Anglican finds in the way of Catholicity. But this much is certain,—his theory is framed on the supposition, that the revelation was first given in the written word exclusively, and that the church has herself had to learn it from written documents. Hence, as the doctrine in these is evidently not drawn out and stated in formal propositions or digested articles of faith, but is given only generally, vaguely, obscurely, in detached portions and loose hints, developments have been absolutely indispensable, and must have been foreseen and intended by the Author of our religion. This is what he labors to prove in the chapter entitled, *On the Development of Christian ideas antecedently considered*. But this is sheer Protestantism, not Catholicity, and is never to be assumed or conceded by a Catholic, in an argument for the church. Catholicity teaches that the whole revelation was made to the church, irrespective of written documents, and there never was a time when Christianity was confined to “the letter of documents and the reasonings of individual minds,” as Mr. Newman presupposes. The depository of the revelation is not the Holy Scriptures, *plus* tradition. The divine traditions cover the *whole* revelation, and not merely that portion of it not found in the Holy Scriptures; and it is because the church has the whole faith in these divine traditions, which, by supernatural assistance, she faithfully keeps and transmits, and infallibly interprets, that she can establish the rule of Scriptural interpretation, and say what doctrines may and what may not be drawn from the written word. The greater part of her teachings are found in the Holy Scriptures, and she for the most part teaches through them, but was never under the necessity of learning her faith from them, as any one might infer from the very face of the sacred books themselves, which were all addressed to *believers*, and therefore necessarily imply that the faith had been revealed, pro-

pounded, and embraced before they were written. The church must precede the Scriptures; for it is only on her authority that their inspiration can be affirmed. They are a part of her divine teaching, not the sources whence she learns what she is commanded to teach. If Mr. Newman had borne this in mind, he would hardly have insisted so strongly on his theory of developments, and would have spared himself the rather serious error of maintaining that the church appeals to the mystical sense of Scripture in *proof* of her doctrines. The source of heresy is not in the literal interpretation of Scripture, as he imagines, but in attempting to deduce the faith from Scripture by private judgment, independently of the church. The doctors of the church are accustomed to adduce the mystical sense of Scripture in *illustration* of Christian doctrine, but never in *proof*, except where the mystical sense is affirmed and defined by positive revelation.

We have been forcibly struck, in reading this essay, with the wisdom of the plan of instructing by the living teacher, which our Lord has adopted. If any man could have learned Catholicity from books or documentary teaching, we should have said that man was John Henry Newman. He had every qualification for the task which could be demanded,—genius, talent, learning, acuteness, patience of research, and all the books necessary at his hand; and yet, with the best intentions, in a work designed expressly to justify his change of religion to the world, and to open an easy passage-way for others to follow him, he has mistaken Catholicity in its most essential points, and, in fact, written a book which will prove one of the hardest books *for him*, as a Catholic, to answer, he will be likely to find. If, instead of ransacking the libraries of all ages and nations, and amassing an erudition which he was not in the condition to digest, and for the interpretation of which he had no certain guide, he had gone to the first Catholic priest within his reach, and asked him to teach him the catechism, and to explain to him the creed of Pius IV., he would in one week have learned more of genuine Catholicity than he learned in the years he spent in the preparation of this work. No man should ever persuade himself that he knows any thing really and truly of Catholicity, till he has listened patiently and reverently to the living teacher authorized by Almighty God to teach him. The faith is learned by *hearing* not by *reading*.

Mr. Newman says his theory “has been recently illu-

trated by several distinguished writers on the continent, such as De Maistre and Moehler." We are not aware of any *Catholic* writer on the continent, or elsewhere, who has broached a theory bearing any resemblance to Mr. Newman's; and, so far as our own judgment goes, backed by high authority, he totally misapprehends both De Maistre and Moehler, if he supposes they in the least countenance his theory of development. Moehler's method, and some of his forms of expression, may lead, as at one moment they led us, to suppose he did, in some respects, favor a theory of development; but it was as we read him in the pages of his Protestant reviewers, rather than in his own pages, that we were led to do him so great injustice. A closer inspection of his work has satisfied us that it is not so. What Moehler really means is not historical developments, but logical sequence and coherence. His design was, in part, to show Protestants that they are illogical, and under the relation of logical sequence and coherence, to contrast their teachings with those of the church. In Protestantism we find a given doctrine which logically implies another as its complement, but this other doctrine is wanting. In Catholicity, whenever we find a doctrine which logically implies another, we are sure to find the latter as an article of faith. All this is very true, and may well be said, without saying one word in favor of developments. De Maistre, so far as we understand him, allows development only in the exercise or application of the divine powers of the church. If in the early ages less power was actually exercised by the sovereign pontiffs than in some subsequent ages, it was not because their authority was less, their rights less positive and divine, or because their authority was less clearly recognized as a substantive power in the church, but because there was less occasion for its exercise; the external discipline of the church, which may vary from age to age, and from place to place, bringing fewer cases immediately before them. The growth or expansion is never of the authority, but simply of its exercise. It is so we understand De Maistre, and Catholic writers generally. Mr. Newman will hardly find a Catholic writer of any note who will sustain his position, that the church developed itself first as Catholic, and then as papal. This is doctrine for Oxford, not for Rome.

But enough. It is plain to the Catholic reader, that Mr. Newman errs in consequence of his neglect to distinguish in his own mind,—or, if not in his own mind, in his book,

—on the one hand, between Christian doctrine, that is, divine revelation, and Christian theology and discipline; and, on the other, between what the church teaches as of divine revelation, and the speculations of individual fathers and doctors. Take the whole history of the Christian world, so called, from the time of our blessed Lord down to the present moment, including the sects as well as the church, and considering all that has been going on with all who have borne the Christian name, and in every department of life, there is no doubt but such developments and processes as Mr. Newman describes have to some extent taken place. But he seems to have studied his theory chiefly in the history of the sects, where it is unquestionably applicable, and to have concluded that the church in its life in the world must be governed by a law analogous to the one by which they are governed, and that his theory may apply to her as well as to them. He forgets that she sprung into existence full grown, and armed at all points, as Minerva from the brain of Jupiter; and that she is withdrawn from the ordinary law of human systems and institutions by her supernatural origin, nature, character, and protection. If he had left out the church, and entitled his book, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, when withdrawn from the Authority and Supervision of the Church*, he would have written, with slight modifications, a great and valuable book. It would then have been a sort of natural history of sectarianism, and been substantially true. But applying his theory to the church, and thus subjecting her to the law which presides over all human systems and institutions, he has, unintentionally, struck at her divine and supernatural character. The church has no natural history, for she is not in the order of nature, but of grace. Or, if he had simply distinguished between Christian doctrine, in which there is no development, which is always and everywhere the same, and in which not the least shadow of a variation can be admitted, and confined his remarks to theology as a human science deduced from supernatural principles, to the variations of external discipline and worship, and to the greater or less predominance of this or that Christian principle in the practice of individual Christians in different ages of the church, much that he has said might be accepted, and no very grave error would be taught.

From what we have said it is easy to infer that we do not think Mr. Newman judged wisely in sending this book forth

to the public. He did well, on his conversion, to offer it to the proper authorities for revision ; but he must pardon us for saying that we think he would also have done well, if, when they declined to revise, he had declined to publish. Until we know enough of Catholicity to know when and where to doubt the accuracy of our knowledge, it is a great hardship to be obliged to go to press on our own responsibility. For our own sakes, as well as for the sake of others, we should take every precaution in our power against error. There is error enough in the world, without our being in haste to augment the quantity.

The church is not of yesterday, nor are we who live now the first enlightened defenders she has had. The best method of defence has hardly been reserved for us to discover ; and perhaps it is a sufficient reason for distrusting any method, that it is new, that it is a discovery of our own. The church is not here to follow the spirit of the age, but to control and direct it, often to struggle against it. They do her the greatest disservice who seek to disown her glorious past, and to modify her as far as possible, so as to adapt her to prevailing methods of thought and feeling. It is her zealous but mistaken friends, who, guided by a short-sighted policy, and taking counsel of the world around them, seek, as they express it, to *liberalize* her, to bring her more into harmony with the spirit of the age, from whom we, as good Catholics, should always pray, *Libera nos, Domine!* The best service we can render the church, in our age and country, is to surrender ourselves to her, all that we have and are, and pray Almighty God that we may always have the grace to do her bidding. She is the representative of God on earth ; and we can never do wrong, if we do what, and only what, she bids us. O, it is blessed to feel that we have not to take care of the church, but she is able and willing to take care of us !

Most of us who have been brought up Protestants, and have had some literary reputation, when we become converts, in the fervor of the moment, have an almost irresistible impulse to relate our *experience*, and detail the process by which we have been translated from death unto life. Nothing seems easier to us than to bridge over the gulf which divides the Protestant world from the Catholic, and open an easy passage-way for those whom we have reluctantly left behind. But, alas ! few of us can detail the process of our conversion, if we try. We are led by a way we know

not, by a hand we see not. *Spiritus ubi vult spirat; et vocem ejus audis, sed nescis unde veniat, aut quo vadat: sic est omnis, qui natus est ex Spiritu.* The most we can say is, "This one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, I now see." We believe before we reason, and are often carried onward not only without reasoning, but even in spite of it. The reasoning we should subsequently give would be as likely to mislead others as to aid them. The grounds of our faith are catholic, not individual; and the less use we make of what is individual or peculiar to ourselves in defending it, the better. We did not convert ourselves; God did it, and his be the praise and the glory.

But we say not this for Mr. Newman's sake. He is no longer outside of the church, seeking to find reasons to justify him in asking admission into her communion. His doubts and misgivings, his advances and his retreats, have given way to firm faith and filial confidence. He does not now, as in his book, believe the church because by private reason he has convinced himself of the truth of her teachings; but he believes what she teaches because he believes *her*, and he believes her because she has received the formal commission from Almighty God to teach all nations to observe whatsoever Christ commanded his apostles, and because he has received, through divine grace, the virtue of faith. He has broken with the past, and sees that his present is not a continuation of his former life; for he now understands that Catholicity is not Protestantism developed. His present and his past are separated by a gulf which grace alone can bridge over; and he needs not that we tell him he can more effectually serve those he has left behind by his prayers than by his hypotheses, however ingenious or elaborate. We take our leave of him with the assurance, that, if we have criticised his book somewhat severely, it has been with no improper feeling towards him; and that, when he shall be disposed to address the public again, and from his new position, he will find us among the most willing, the most eager, and the most respectful of his listeners. This elaborate essay belongs to his past life; let it go with all that Protestantism he abjured before he was permitted to put on the livery of Christ. It belongs not to his Catholic life, and is only accidentally connected with it, either in his own mind or in that of others. The essay he will write hereafter, out of the fulness of his Catholic heart, will breathe a different tone, and fetch another echo. It will refresh the

Catholic soul, strengthen his faith, confirm his hope, and warm his charity. A noble career opens before him. May God give him grace to run it with success!

NEWMAN'S THEORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1847.]

THIS is an American reprint of a recent work by one of the distinguished converts from Anglicanism, and is one of the most interesting and valuable popular works on the Anglican controversy with which we are acquainted. Its tone is earnest and sincere, gentle and strong. It is written in a clear, chaste, and eloquent style, out from the very heart and soul of the author, with a deep sense of the magnitude of the question it discusses, and of the perilous state of those who remain attached to an heretical communion, reject the church of God, and daily crucify their Lord anew. It gives one a favorable impression of the talents, learning, and Catholic spirit of its author, and, indeed, of the men in general, who have recently had the happiness of being received from Anglicanism into the holy Catholic Church. It does ample justice to its subject, and, where dispassionately and candidly read, cannot fail to be regarded as a sufficient refutation of the pretensions of Anglicanism, and an unanswerable defence of the Catholic Church as the church brought to our view in the Nicene creed.

The plan of the work is simple and natural. The Anglican pretends that his communion is at least a branch of the Catholic Church. He professes to believe,—if he is of the high church party,—that our Lord founded a church, one and catholic, out of which, in the ordinary course of God's gracious providence, salvation is not attainable. But is his communion this church, or at least a living branch of it; or is this church the one in communion with the see of Rome? This is the question. How shall it be answered?

**The Fourfold Difficulty of Anglicanism, or the Church of England tested by the Nicene Creed, in a Series of Letters.* By J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE. Philadelphia: 1846.

There are certain marks or notes by which the church of Christ may be recognized and distinguished from all other bodies or pretended churches. These notes are enumerated in the Nicene creed, which the Anglican professes to believe and to hold authoritative, and are Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity,—*Credo unam sanctam, Catholicam, et Apostolicam Ecclesiam*. If all these notes are united in the Anglican establishment, she is the church of the Nicene creed, the church of God, and spouse of the lamb; but if she want any one of them, and certainly if she want them all, she is not that church, is no part or branch of it, and, properly speaking, no church at all. On the other hand, if they are all united in the Roman Church, then she is the church of the Nicene creed, the church of God, and only those in communion with her are in communion with Christ or in the way of salvation. The object of the book is to show that none of these notes are the possession of Anglicanism, and that they are each and all the *exclusive* possession of the church in communion with the successor of St. Peter, the supreme and visible head of the church and vicar of our Lord on earth. It shows this in a pleasing and convincing manner, and leaves little to be desired.

The author *proves* very clearly that Anglicanism is neither one nor holy, neither catholic nor apostolic, but he seems partially to *concede* at least some degree of *sanctity* to individual members of its communion. "In claiming," he says, "this note of sanctity as the *exclusive* possession of the Roman Church, I do not of course mean that there is nothing which might be called by the name to be found in the Church of England; sanctity, unlike unity, admits of degrees, and I should suppose there is no body of Christians, I had almost said, no body of worshippers of any religion whatever, among whom there does not exist something which at least seems akin to it." This is rather loosely expressed, and may mean simply, that, though sanctity, truly and properly so called, belongs exclusively to the church, yet it is not denied that there is that to be found in other communions which has many of its external characteristics, and may be sometimes supposed to be it, but which, in fact, is only its counterfeit; and so understood, it expresses nothing objectionable. But it may also be construed to mean, that, though sanctity, indeed, in its higher degree, in its *heroic* form, is found only in the Roman Church, yet it is not denied but it may in some of its lower forms, in its ele-

ments at least, be found in communions external and hostile to her. That this last is the meaning of the author is probable, since he asserts that sanctity admits of degrees, which he would have had no occasion to do, if he had intended to concede no degree of sanctity to individuals in the Anglican communion. If this be his real meaning, it needs some qualification.

It is no reproach to the author, that he should mistake the Catholic faith or theology on this or that point, or sometimes fail to express himself with strict verbal accuracy. The recent convert—and we speak a good word for ourselves—cannot be expected to be always rigidly exact either in thought or language, and his mistakes, or blunders even, should be regarded with Christian forbearance. But sanctity, though it admit of degrees, is sanctity even in its lowest degree, and, if Mr. Northcote admits that it can in any degree be possessed by persons who adhere to the Anglican communion, he cannot claim it as the *exclusive* possession of the Roman Church. The difference between the two communions in respect of sanctity would, in such a case, be merely a difference of more or less,—a difference simply in degree, not in kind. Moreover, sanctity and salvation go together and are inseparable. Where there is no sanctity, there can be no salvation; and where there is sanctity, there can be no condemnation. This must be true of sanctity in general, in any and every degree in which it is sanctity; for no one can pretend that none are saved but those who have attained to that *heroic* form of sanctity which we honor in the saints canonized by the church. If, then, the author concedes sanctity in any degree to individuals living in and adhering to the Anglican communion, he must concede salvation to be attainable in that communion; which is *contra fidem*, for it is *de fide* that there is no salvation out of the church. It should also be borne in mind, that the church has excommunicated and excommunicates every Protestant body, the Anglican as well as the Presbyterian or the Socinian, and we can hardly suppose that she allows us to concede sanctity to those who are under the ban of her excommunication, as heretics, cut off from communion with Christ; especially since sanctity is the end to be attained to, the end for which she, with all her sacraments and ministries, was instituted and exists through all time. We have consulted the authorities within our reach, and we find none of them making the concession in question, but all unanimously con-

tending that sanctity, properly so called, can be predicated only of the church, whether reference be had to doctrines or to persons.

The author seems to us, also, to be not quite exact in the following passages :

“All Catholic doctrine, as held by the Roman Church, has been the result of one continued law of growth, and has therefore the unity of nature and of life : its development has been like that of the church itself, ‘the least of all seeds, but when it is grown the greatest among herbs’; or, like the growth of grace in each individual soul, ‘first the blade, then the ear, and after that the full corn in the ear.’” “The Gospel, it is true, is a divine message. Yet, as the language in which it is made is human, questions may naturally suggest themselves, almost without end, as to the real import of that language ; as, for instance, from the brief and mysterious announcement, ‘the Word became flesh,’ three wide questions, as it has been well said [Newman *On Development*, p. 50, Amer. edition], at once open upon us; what is meant by ‘the Word,’ what by ‘flesh,’ and what by ‘became’; and inquiries of this kind have, as you know, from time to time arisen in the church, more or less supported by Scriptural and traditional evidence. These have gradually gained ground and attracted notice, until the church has felt herself obliged to pronounce judgment upon them, and thenceforward, according to her seal of sanction or anathema, such *opinions* have either been incorporated into the *Catholic creed*, or denounced as contrary to it; and those bodies which, spite of such anathema, have still clung to the proscribed opinions, have *gradually* become external and hostile to the church.”

This seems to us to teach or necessarily imply,—1, that Christian doctrine grows by virtue of human effort; 2, that a revelation cannot be made through the medium of human language, which shall reach the minds of its recipients in the full and exact sense intended by its author; 3, that heresies arise, as to their matter, from the incompleteness, *quoad se* or *quoad nos*, of the original revelation, and the honest and necessary endeavours of individuals to complete it; and, 4, that opinions may be and are made by the church articles of faith. There can, it seems to us, be no question that the passages quoted express or imply at least these four propositions, and we should suppose there can be just as little as to their objectionable character.

The recent conversion of the author, his evident Catholic intentions, and general soundness of doctrine, would lead us to pass over these points, all uncatholic as they are, with a

simple remark calling the attention of our readers to their evident heterodoxy, were they the solitary opinions of Mr. Northcote; but they are the doctrines of a school,—of a school formed, indeed, at first outside of the church, but by the conversion of its distinguished founder, Mr. Newman, and his more eminent disciples, now brought within her communion. Mr. Northcote was one of Mr. Newman's disciples, and the fact that he continues to be one, even within the bosom of the church, leads us to fear the same may be the case with many others. He gives, in the extracts we have made, what we understand, and what we presume he understands, to be substantially Mr. Newman's doctrine of development. If that doctrine is entertained by the great body of those who have recently abandoned Anglicanism for the church, the question becomes somewhat grave, and we may have, if we are not on our guard, before we are aware of it, a new school springing up in our midst, as dangerous as the Hermesian or that of La Mennais. These individuals, from their well known talents, learning, and zeal, cannot fail to have a wide and commanding influence on our Catholic literature, and, if they adhere to Mr. Newman's doctrine it will be diffused beyond the circle of those who now entertain it, and do no little harm to portions even of our Catholic population. The age has a strong tendency to theorizing and innovation, which Catholics themselves do not wholly escape. Let there be brought forward a theory which promises to them an opportunity of combining the love of speculation and novelty with reverence for their religion and zeal for the salvation of their neighbour, and the temptation will be too strong to be in all cases successfully resisted. In this view of the question, it becomes important to examine thoroughly Mr. Newman's *Theory of Developments*, and to lay open to all its real character. If it really authorize doctrines like those Mr. Northcote sets forth, no Catholic can for a moment, after discovering the fact, entertain it either as true or as harmless.

It is with sincere reluctance we recur once more to Mr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. We cannot do so without exposing ourselves to much misconstruction and odium, especially since we are a layman and only a recent convert ourselves, a mere novice in Catholic faith and theology. But, occupying the post we do, and which we occupy by the request of those whose requests are commands for us, we are obliged to consult, not what may

seem most appropriate to the neophyte or the layman, but what is most befitting the Catholic reviewer. And, after all, there may be less arrogance and dogmatism in speaking, under the supervision of the church, what and only what she teaches us, and commands us to speak, if we speak at all, than those who are accustomed to speak only from their own heads may imagine. But personal considerations must not be suffered to enter into the account. The man, who, when the purity and integrity of the Catholic faith is attacked by an insidious theory, will remain silent lest his own motives should be misconstrued, or offer an apology for speaking out in clear and energetic tones against the advancing error, has little reason to glory in his Catholicity.

Mr. Newman's book should have been exempt from Catholic criticism, and would have been, if it had been suffered to pass for what it is and professes to be,—the speculations of a man who at best is merely *in transitu* from error to truth. So regarded,—as it was on its first appearance, and still is by the great body of Catholics at home and abroad, whether of the clergy or the laity,—it deserves no censure, and may be read with no inconsiderable interest; for what it contains that is unsound may be justly attributed to the author's former Protestantism, and what is sound may be taken as the concessions of a great and earnest mind to Catholic truth. So regarded, we read the book as it should be read,—to find what it contains which we may as Catholics accept, not what it contains which we must reject. But we are compelled to regard it in a different light. Some few within contend the book must needs be orthodox, while those without insist that it is a work from which Catholic faith and theology are to be learned. The very eminence of the author gives weight to the conclusions of both. We are therefore compelled, willing or not, to bring the book to the Catholic standard, and try it by Catholic principles.

They who, among ourselves, differ from us in our estimate of Mr. Newman's theory, do not, so far as we are informed, differ from us as to the doctrine we oppose to it; but they think that we do not rightly understand it, and ascribe to the author doctrines he would at once repudiate. What Mr. Newman would or would not repudiate, or what he did or did not intend to teach, is not the question we raise; for we review not him, but his book. What esoteric meaning he may have had, we do not inquire. We simply inquire. What does his book, in the obvious and natural sense of its lan-

guage, actually teach to plain and unsophisticated readers? If we have misinterpreted or misrepresented what in this sense it actually teaches, let us be set right or condemned; but if it actually, in the obvious and natural sense of the words used, means what we allege, let it be condemned, whatever hypothesis may or may not be invented to excuse its author. But we trust we may, without offence, entreat those who may be disposed to accuse us of misunderstanding the book, before so accusing us, to take the trouble to read the book themselves, and to be certain that they themselves do not misunderstand it.

Mr. Newman, as is well known, wrote, and in part printed, his essay before he became a Catholic, and, as he personally informed a distinguished friend of ours,—if the eminent prelate who is our informant will allow us to call him our friend, who has more than once proved himself to be really so,—that he wrote the principal part of it nearly ten years before his conversion. It is not strange, then, nor incredible, that it should not be thoroughly orthodox. Never yet was a Protestant book written that could be converted into a Catholic book; for, with all deference to Mr. Newman, who maintains the contrary, conversion is not simply taking something in addition to what we before had, but consists in putting off, as well as putting on, in “being *unclothed*, as well as clothed upon.” It is not likely the work was commenced with the design with which it was completed; and it requires no very profound examination to discover, that, while the main theory is consistently enough set forth, the book is not all of a piece; and the hand of the author, retouching it here and there for the press, and striving to give it a more Catholic coloring and expression, is visible enough. That he considered the theory set forth in his book as intimately connected with his own conversion, that he honestly believed it contained a solid ground on which a man could justify himself in abandoning a sect and seeking the communion of the church, and that it would or might aid others, especially Anglicans, in removing the obstacles they imagined to communion with Rome, we have no doubt, and it seems to us but natural that he should have so believed. We see in the fact that he so believed, even on the supposition that the book is what we regard it, nothing to induce us to withdraw our high esteem for him as a man and a scholar, or to check the full flow of our gratitude to Almighty God for having, in his great mercy, brought him into the way of salvation.

The *Theory of Developments* is professedly put forth as an hypothesis, as an expedient for removing or getting rid of a difficulty. What is this difficulty, and what is suggested as the means of removing it? The difficulty is presented in two forms, special and general. In the first part of the book, the special difficulty is sunk in the general; in the last part, the general is sunk in the special;—so that, really, the book is written to remove a special difficulty; which is, the obstacle to seeking communion with the church of Rome, pointed out by the author in one of the earlier numbers of the *Tracts for the Times*, and consists in the assumption that Rome has introduced new gods, new doctrines, or, in simple terms, corrupted the primitive faith.

This difficulty rests on the assumption of differences or variations between the faith presented to us by the history of the early ages of the church, and the faith as held by the present Roman Catholic Church. But the real difficulty the author appears to hold does not end there, but resolves itself into a more general difficulty. The variations and differences have not occurred in one form of Christianity alone, but have extended to all; so that it is impossible to find any form of Christianity extant which is precisely that which we meet with in the primitive church. If variation and difference of external form are solid reasons for refusing to seek communion with Rome, they are equally so for refusing communion with any pretended church now in existence. We must, then, conclude, either that Christianity has failed, died out, or that it can exist under certain variations or differences of external representation. The first alternative is inadmissible. Consequently the great inquiry must be, to ascertain how Christianity may continue perfect and unchanged under a variation and difference of external representation, and to obtain certain *criteria* by which to distinguish historically what is true Christianity from what is not. For the explication or accounting for the variations, the author brings forward his theory of developments; for determining which or what is the real Christianity of history, and the actual continuation of the apostolic church, he introduces his seven tests of a true development, and applies them to ecclesiastical history, more especially of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries.

The variations and difficulties are predicated in the essay alike of doctrine, discipline, and worship. We confine ourselves, as we did before, to his theory so far only as it affects

Christian doctrine, or the *credenda* of the Christian Church, to be received by all with divine and Catholic faith; for we readily concede that much he says is true, if restricted to discipline and worship; and we have no doubt, that, if the author had been acquainted with the proper distinctions made by Catholic theologians between the former and the latter, he would have avoided the more serious errors of his book,—very likely would not have written it at all.

To proceed to more precise and formal statements; we may say the author affirms,—1. That Christianity is a fact in the world's history, and therefore falls itself within the province of history. 2. It must, then, have a history, and be susceptible of an historical representation and verification. 3. But such are the variations and apparent inconsistencies of the historical representation it has received, that, while history enables us to say with ease what Christianity is not,—as, for instance, that it is not Protestantism,—yet it does not, without difficulty, enable us to say precisely what it is. Hence the problem:—

Given, the variations and apparent inconsistencies in the historical representations, how to explain or account for them, so as to be able to use history, our natural informant, in successfully determining, with completeness and exactness, what Christianity, historically considered, really is.—*Essay*, pp. 11–13.

If Mr. Newman had been a Catholic at the time of proposing this problem, he would not have proposed it; for no Catholic concedes that there is or can be the difficulty he implies. The only variations in respect of Christian doctrine the Catholic admits are, as Father Perrone says, new modes of expression adopted on the occasion of novel errors. But this is the problem proposed. For its solution, the author assumes a theory or hypothesis is necessary. Several hypotheses have heretofore been suggested.

1. The *quod ubique, quod semper, et quod ab omnibus* of Vincent of Lerins, that Christianity is what has been held everywhere, always, and by all. This rule appears reasonable on its face; is true in the abstract, when fairly applied in the Roman sense; but it is impracticable, especially as understood by English divines; for it admits of a laxer and a stricter application. If enlarged so as to suit the purposes of Anglicans, it includes the present Roman Catholic Church; if contracted so as to exclude the creed of Pius IV., it will exclude that of St. Athanasius, and certain doctrines which Anglicans profess to hold sacred.

2. The second hypothesis is, that Christianity was early corrupted from oriental, Platonic, and polytheistic sources ; but this, however possible in itself, plausible, or sufficient, is *unavailable* ; because we must know what the original evangelical message was, before we can say what has been a corruption of it.

3. The discipline of the secret,—*disciplina arcani* ; sufficient as far as it goes, but does not meet the whole difficulty, because the variations continue after this discipline has ceased to be in force.

4. The theory of developments, which assumes the fact of variations and apparent inconsistencies, but defends them on the ground that they are legitimate developments, not corruptions of primitive doctrines. Or, to state it with more rigid accuracy, it assumes two classes of variations, one false and destructive, the other true and preservative ; the former are false developments, and to be rejected as incompatible with the continued existence of Christianity ; the latter are true developments, and necessary to its preservation and influence.

The subject matter of the essay is the *Development of Christian Doctrine*, and *Christian doctrine*, is the subject of the developments, as the very title of the work informs us. What, then, is to be understood by *Christian doctrine* ? This is our first question ; and we answer, evidently, according to Mr. Newman, the view taken or the idea formed by the human mind. He connects the developments of Christian doctrine and the developments of ideas in general, supposes a parity between them, and from the fact and necessity of the latter concludes, at least, the antecedent probability of the former ; which he could not do, if he did not hold Christian doctrine to be an idea. All he says of ideas in general, all the analogies he draws from them to elucidate and establish his doctrine of development, would be irrelevant and unmeaning, if he did not hold Christian doctrine itself to be an idea.

But is the idea the revealed truth itself, or is it the view which the mind takes of the revealed truth ? In some passages, the author seems to teach the former. Thus he says,—"Christianity came into the world as an idea rather than an institution" ; and he quotes with approbation a passage from Guizot, a Protestant, which teaches that Christianity, as an institution, as a government, has been the natural and necessary result of the action of the idea on its recipients.

But, according to Mr. Newman, the idea is not something given to the mind, *ab extra*, already formed, but is itself formed by the mind; for he defines it to be an habitual judgment of the mind, formed by comparing, contrasting, abstracting, generalizing, adjusting, classifying. If, then, he takes the first alternative suggested, he must hold, as we showed in our former article, that the revelation itself is an idea formed by the human mind, which is the evident denial of revelation itself.

Mr. Newman, though some passages in his essay certainly warrant it, will of course shrink from this view. Then he must take the other alternative, and say that Christian doctrine is not the revealed truth itself, but the view taken, or the idea which the mind forms of it. This is clearly taught in the essay, as a passage which we shall soon quote fully and conclusively proves; it is supposed to be the view most favorable to Mr. Newman, and we have been accused of doing him injustice in alleging that in some passages of his essay he implies the other; it is evidently Mr. Northcote's understanding of his doctrine, and Mr. Northcote is good authority in the case; and, finally, we have been assured personally by an English gentleman, an acquaintance and friend of Mr. Newman, one who was with him at Littlemore, one of his warm admirers and disciples, and like him a convert,—a man of superior worth and intelligence,—that this is really Mr. Newman's doctrine, and that it never occurred to him that any one could understand him otherwise, or that anybody did or could understand any thing else by Christian doctrine. Conceding or assuming, as the case may be, this to be actually what Mr. Newman understands by Christian doctrine, we can without much difficulty seize the more prominent features of his theory. 1. The revealed truth or divine message communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, and consigned to the letter of documents, say the Holy Scriptures; 2. The view taken or idea formed of it by the human mind operating on it; 3. The struggles or efforts of the human mind to realize its idea, or to make it an adequate mental representation of the external revealed truth; and, 4. The developments which result from these efforts or struggles, and of which some are legitimate and tend to preserve, and others are illegitimate and tend to corrupt or destroy, the original idea. Hence, says the author:—

“If Christianity is a fact, and can be made the subject-matter of exercises of the reason, and impresses an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will in the course of time develop in a series of ideas, connected and harmonious with one another, and unchangeable and complete, as is the external fact itself which is thus represented. *It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is submitted to it, simply and integrally.* It conceives by means of definition and description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself which we are teaching.* It may be objected, that inspired documents, such as the Holy Scriptures, at once determine its doctrine without further trouble. But they were intended to create an idea, and that idea is not in the sacred text, *but in the mind of the reader*; and the question is, whether that idea is communicated to him in its completeness and minute accuracy, on its first apprehension, or expands in his heart and intellect, and comes to perfection in the course of time. Nor could it be maintained without extravagance that the letter of the New Testament, or of any assignable number of books, comprises a delineation of all possible forms which a divine message may assume when submitted to a multitude of minds. Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration did for the first recipients of the revelation what the divine fiat did for herbs and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments.”

This is to the purpose, and establishes what we have thus far said. Christian doctrine is the idea the mind forms of the revealed truth. But the idea is at first incomplete, vague, and general, and constitutes no adequate mental representation of its object. Hence the occasion and need of development. But the process of development is not a process carried on by authority for the mind, but a human process, carried on by the human mind itself. In this process the mind may err, run off into extravagances, and effect false developments which tend to corrupt and destroy the original idea. Hence the necessity of an infallible authority to decide between true and false developments, to say what of that which the mind has worked out may be retained, and what must be rejected. What is permitted to be retained is incorporated into the creed, and is henceforth *de*

fide; what it is determined must be rejected degenerates into heresy, and, as Mr. Northcote says, "gradually becomes external and hostile to the church." Since developments are inevitable and necessary, from the very nature of the human mind, and, to say the least, antecedently probable from the character of the revelation itself, they must have been designed and provided for by the Author of the revelation. Then he must have established the infallible authority proved to be necessary. This infallible authority can be predicated of no other body than the Roman church. Therefore, the Roman church is infallible. Then she is the true church, the church of God, in whose communion alone salvation is to be sought. Here is the theory of developments from the point of view we have taken it up, and here is the argument of the essay. The argument is no novelty, and if, instead of saying developments are necessary and must be provided for, we say, such is the perversity of the human intellect and will, that men will not be simple believers, but will strive to comprehend the faith, master it by subjecting it to human forms, as Mr. Newman's main endeavour is to show it should be, and therefore *errors* do and will arise, and must be guarded against, it is the argument used by every Catholic theologian from the first, and suggests itself naturally to every man of ordinary intellectual cultivation. It was hardly necessary to go so far, and to run such risks, to obtain an argument which might have been obtained without any journeying or risk at all. But we are most of us like the Syrian who came to the prophet to be cured of his leprosy, greatly scandalized if the prophet merely tells us,—“Go wash in the Jordan seven times, and be clean.” But, letting the argument go for what it is worth, we object to the theory of Christian doctrine as set forth.

1. It degrades Christianity to the level of human and heretical doctrines, and denies all *differentia generis* between them. This follows necessarily from its assumption of a parity between Christianity and philosophy, human polity and ideas in general. The author everywhere illustrates and confirms his doctrine of developments by what he terms “parallel instances,” taken from philosophy, politics, and heresy, and, after describing the state into which the Nestorian and monophysite communions have fallen, adds,—“Such might have been the condition of Christianity, had it been absorbed by the feudalism of the middle ages.” He takes the developments of Methodism, an

heretical sect, and subject, to say the least, to the simple natural laws of the human mind, as illustrative of those he contends for in Christian doctrine. But all this would be absurd, if he supposed Christian doctrine, as doctrine, belonged to a different order. Moreover, he expressly admits the objection. "Nor can it," he says, "fairly be made a difficulty, that thus to treat Christianity is to level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man." This is sufficient, for it concedes that the author's manner of treating Christianity does degrade it to the level of human and heretical doctrines, and imputes to it the imperfections which characterize whatever is human.

The author, indeed, tells us that the divine message was, or may have been, communicated to the world once for all; but this makes no difference; for, as we understand him, it was not communicated as *materia formata*, but simply as *materia informis*, on which the mind may operate, and to which, by operating, it gives form or idea. The doctrine is the form which the human mind gives to the *materia informis*. As to this informal matter, it is indeed divine, but as reduced to form, made doctrine, it is human. But this must also be said of all heresies, for they are only the form which sectarians give to the revealed facts on or about which they exercise their reason. They, then, are not essentially or generically distinguishable from Christian doctrine itself, and it is clear from Mr. Newman throughout, that he does not distinguish them from it, except in the fact that they are less adequate mental representations of their object; that is, use up or reduce to form a less quantity of the informal matter revealed, are less successful in reducing the wild chaos to order. Hence,—

"The Catholic creed is for the most part the combination of separate truths, which heretics have divided among themselves, and err in dividing. So that, as a matter of fact, if a religious mind were educated in some form of heathenism or error, and then were brought under the light of truth, it would be drawn off from error into truth, not by losing what it had, but by gaining what it had not; not by being unclothed, but by being clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up in life."

Nor does the case essentially alter when we come to philosophy, or human doctrines formed for the explication of nature. Nature here is the *materia informis*; but nature

is divine as well as grace, and philosophies, though human as doctrines, are yet divine as to their matter. The only difference between philosophy and Christian doctrine, then, is, that philosophy is the human form of divine matter naturally supplied, while Christianity is the human form of divine matter supernaturally supplied. The one, then, *in quantum est doctrina*, does not differ, generically, from the other. Hence the author says, very consistently with this view,—“Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies in what it has in addition to them, not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics.” It is true the author says this cannot be fairly made a difficulty; but, with his leave, we think it a very grave difficulty to degrade Christianity “to the level of sects [heresies] and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man.”

2. The doctrine Mr. Newman sets forth denies that there is, properly speaking, any such thing as Christian *doctrine*. It is a contradiction in terms to call that the doctrine which is not the thing taught, but the view, or idea, or judgment, which the mind forms of it. Doctrine means, by the very force of the word itself, that which is *taught*, and *formally* taught too; for all teaching is necessarily formal, and can never be made to mean either the *materia informis* submitted to the mind, or the form the mind gives to it, or judgment it forms of it. Hence, in representing the Christian revelation, objectively considered, as the mere informal matter of doctrine, and making the doctrine the form which the mind gives it, Mr. Newman denies that there is or can be a Christian doctrine. This he might have suspected when he was reducing Christianity to the level of the sects; for, properly speaking, the sects have no doctrine, since what each believes is merely his own view of what is submitted to his mind.

3. The theory excludes the *ecclesia docens*, or teaching authority of the church. The Catholic holds that the faith is what, and only what, God reveals and the church teaches or proposes. The faith is everywhere and always in the church. Hence, there must be everywhere at every moment of time a teaching authority in the church, everywhere and always, from the apostles to the consummation of the world, actively proposing the faith. This is what we call the church teaching, and is composed of all pastors and

teachers in communion with the successor of St. Peter,—all of whom teach with infallible authority, when teaching what, and only what, they have been taught and commissioned to teach. Individuals here and there may err through ignorance or perversity; but our Lord is himself supernaturally present with the church, universally and permanently, and by his gracious providence takes care that the whole do not err, and that no considerable number do, from one cause or the other, or from any cause whatever; and if individuals, through the pride of their own reason, seek to bring in profane novelties, the *ecclesia judicans*, passive except on such occasions, declares infallibly what is the law which, on the points in litigation, has been promulgated from the beginning, and condemns the errors and their adherents and abettors. Thus has the faith been infallibly taught and preserved from the apostles to us, and thus it will be from us to the consummation of the world; for He who can neither deceive nor be deceived has said it. But this universal, indefectible, and permanently active teaching church Mr. Newman's theory denies. Of course, the teacher is denied in the denial of the doctrine; for there can no more be a teacher without doctrine than there can be doctrine without a teacher; since teacher [doctor] and doctrine are correlatives.

If there be a church teaching, she must teach Christian doctrine, and Christian doctrine must be what and only what she teaches. But Christian doctrine must be either the revealed truth itself, or the idea the mind forms of it. Then the church must, if she teach at all, teach either the one or the other of these. But not the revealed truth itself, because that would make it the doctrine, and not merely the *materia informis* of doctrine; not the idea, for that would deny that it is formed by the mind operating on the revealed truth. In either case, then, the supposition of the church teaching contradicts the theory. Consequently, the theory contradicts the church teaching, or, as we say, excludes the *ecclesia docens*.

4. It excludes the *ecclesia credens*, or denies that there is any faith believed. This follows from the denial of the church teaching. The faith is what, and only what, God reveals and the church proposes. If there be no church teaching, there is no faith proposed; and if none is proposed, none can be believed. But the theory denies the church teaching, therefore denies that any faith is taught;

therefore that any is believed. So there can be no church believing. *Fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Christi. . . . Quomodo credent ei, quem non audierunt? Quomodo autem audient sine predicante? Quomodo vero prædicabunt nisi mittantur?*

5. It excludes the *ecclesia judicans*. Mr. Newman, in words, asserts the infallible authority of the church, and on this fact founds his claim to Catholicity. But the church is infallible in three distinct, though inseparable, functions,—believing, teaching, and judging. The first two Mr. Newman's theory denies, and he nowhere even in words asserts them. In their place he substitutes an *ecclesia discens*, or, in plain English, a church learning, which likens the faithful to those whom the blessed apostle characterizes as *semper discentes, et nunquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes*. But to stop here would be obviously absurd; for the church, in learning or developing the faith, *in quantum est ecclesia discens* or *evolvens*, is not infallible, may err, run off into extravagances, effect false developments as well as true, and therefore lose, instead of preserving, the deposit of faith. Hence the necessity of an infallible authority. But this infallible authority can, after the exclusion of the church teaching and believing, be only the church judging, or deciding between true and false developments,—what of that which the church learning has worked out is to be retained as dogmatic truth, and what is to be rejected as refuse and suffered to degenerate into heresy; and it is only in this sense that we find the author asserting the infallibility of the church, or arguing its necessity; for—and the point is capital—the authority does not precede the fallible action of the mind of the church, effect and authoritatively *propose* the development, but follows that action, and gives to the developments effected, as Mr. Northcote expresses it, “her seal of sanction or anathema.” The truth to be sanctioned is elicited by the controversy which precedes the decision of authority; and consequently the action of authority, as such, must consist in opposing the truth so elicited to the contradictory error; that is, determining which of the litigants is the faithful development. Obviously, then, the infallible authority can be only the judicial authority, that is, the *ecclesia judicans*.

But no *ecclesia judicans* can be legitimately asserted where there is no church teaching; for the church teaching is the *conditio sine qua non* of the church judging. The

office of the judge is to judge of the infractions of law. But where there is no law, there are no infractions of law, and there is no law where none has been promulgated. The judge, therefore, necessarily presupposes the promulgation of the law as the condition of his own existence. But where there is no teacher, there is no promulgation of the law. The judge, *in quantum est judex*, does not promulgate the law, but simply declares what, on the points in litigation, is the law which has already been promulgated. Consequently, where there has been no teacher to promulgate the law, or simply where there is no teacher preceding the judge, there can be no judge. Therefore the theory excludes the church judging.

Again. The judge, *in quantum est judex*, does not *promulgate* the law; he only *declares* a law previously promulgated. Now, on the points in litigation, which the judge is called upon to decide, he either declares the law truly or he does not. If he does not, he is not infallible, and the assertion of a judge avails the author nothing. If he does, then it is infallibly certain that on those points there had been a law previously promulgated. If so, the alleged development is no development, but the simple declaration or application of the preëxisting law. In point of fact, this last is what the church always alleges when deciding a controversy of faith. She uniformly alleges, that she is only opposing to the novel error what is and has been the faith taught and believed, or law promulgated, from the first. From the first, then, she assumes the law on the point litigated to have been formal, for it is absurd to say an informal law, in so far as informal, is a law promulgated. But if the law or the faith from the first has been formal, of course it can have had no developments. But the church, in declaring the law, which she applies to the point litigated, has been promulgated from the first, is either fallible or infallible. If fallible, Mr. Newman has no infallible church. If infallible, he cannot assert developments. But he does assert developments. Therefore, he can assert no infallible church. So both his theory of Christian doctrine and his theory of developments alike exclude the infallible church judging, and reduce his theory to that of mere *private judgment*.

6. It excludes even the possibility of faith, by denying, *quoad nos*, the possibility of an infallible revelation. This we saw in the beginning was Mr. Northcote's understand-

ing of Mr. Newman's theory. Mr. Newman says,—“It is the peculiarity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is submitted to it, simply and integrally. . . . Whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas; but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.*” This is clear and conclusive, if words are allowed to have their ordinary meaning; for it is assigned as the reason why we cannot, on its first apprehension, form to ourselves an adequate mental representation of the revealed truth, and are able to complete it only in the course of time by developments. But what is thus affirmed of the communication and reception of the original divine message may and must be affirmed, for the same reason, of the decisions of the infallible authority,—supposing it to exist. “Whole objects do not create whole ideas in the intellect.” But the decision or definition of an objective authority is a whole object, and therefore cannot create a whole idea, be taken in simply and integrally, but must be “thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image.” Suppose a new decision, and the same process must be repeated, and so on *ad infinitum*. “We cannot teach except by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.” If not identical with it, in so far as not identical, they must be diverse from it. Then, if the thing itself be truth, they must be more or less untrue; consequently, it is impossible to teach the truth without some admixture of error. Then no infallible revelation can be made to the human mind, as we inferred from Mr. Northcote; if no infallible revelation, then no infallible faith; and if no infallible faith, then none at all; or, if no *infallible* revelation, then no revelation, for God cannot teach error, *quoad se* or *quoad nos*; and if no revelation, then of course no faith. Consequently, faith is impossible.

These are some of the grave objections to which Mr. Newman's theory of Christian doctrine is exposed, if, as we have conceded, it assumes Christian doctrine to be not the

revealed truth itself, but the mind's idea of it. But, if it be denied that it does so assume, and contended that it assumes the doctrine to be the revealed truth itself, it becomes, if possible, still more objectionable; for it is undeniable that it assumes the doctrine to be *idea*, and idea to be, not something already formed communicated to the mind *ab extra*, but an habitual judgment formed by the mind itself. This would reduce Christianity, in respect both of its matter and of its form, to the level of philosophy, and be an absolute denial of the supernatural revelation even of its matter, that is, of supernatural revelation altogether. The moment Christian doctrine is assumed to be an idea formed by the mind, an habitual judgment, whatever is assumed to be its object, Christianity, in any sense in which a Catholic can recognize it, is absolutely denied. No man can be a Catholic, who does not hold that Christian doctrine is the revealed truth itself, and that this truth is infallibly proposed to the mind, and infallibly received by it. If the revealed truth cannot be so proposed and so received, it is idle to talk of faith or of a divine message. The real question Mr. Newman raises is, not the possibility of developments, but the possibility of revelation.

Thus far we have confined ourselves chiefly to Mr. Newman's view of Christian doctrine; we proceed now to his view of developments. It will not be difficult to determine what he means by developments, for they are determined by his view of the doctrine, not the doctrine by them. His view of the doctrine is the basis of the developments, the principle from which they are deduced, and they therefore are to be understood in that sense only in which it is the ground on which they may be logically accounted for and justified.

The historical facts assumed to be developments,—except in the few instances in which the author is not historically exact,—we readily admit *as facts*, but not as *developments*. The Catholic Church to-day, whether regarded as a government, as a body of doctrine, or as a *cultus*, Mr. Newman says, is the *development* of the apostolic church, and, being such, is the true church. But is the present Catholic Church, *under the relation of doctrine*, the development of the apostolic church, or is it identically it, without any development or shadow of variation? We say, *under the relation of doctrine*, by which we mean the faith objectively considered and formally proposed; for there is a broad dis-

inction to be marked between the faith and the church under the relation of government and worship. In government, or discipline, and *cultus exterior*, we have no difficulty in conceding developments. When the church was confined to the apostles, and a small company of believers at Jerusalem, she could hardly present the same appearance externally, or exercise all the governmental faculties, at least in their varied applications, as when she included all nations under her dominion; and all the capabilities of her worship could hardly be developed when the faithful were few, without temples, unable to worship in open day, and obliged to conceal themselves in private chambers, in caves, and in catacombs, any more than they can be with us in a hostile community, in the midst of poverty and destitution. Yet in both of these respects her faculties must always be the same, and it is necessary, in order to establish her identity and fidelity, to show that she has always exercised her faculties according to their normal intent, and that she has exercised no faculties but those with which she has been endowed from the beginning. But if this be done, all is done that is necessary for her complete vindication under the respective heads of government and of external worship. Thus far we have no controversy with Mr. Newman.

But with regard to doctrine the case is different. The doctrine is the *revelata* or *credenda*, which God reveals and the church proposes, and is the fundamental law of the church. In this, developments are not admissible, for they would imply a growth of doctrine, which in its turn would argue either a deficiency in the apostolic doctrine as formally taught, or an excess in the doctrine formally proposed by the church now. Developments of the law must be understood either in the sense of new enactments, or in the sense of new applications, or applications of the law to new cases which arise in the course of time and the progress of events. In the first sense, they cannot be admitted without assuming a progress in the law itself, which is only another form of saying it was imperfect in the beginning, contrary to the uniform teaching of Catholic theologians, who are all agreed that the law was perfect from the first, and can neither be enlarged nor diminished. In the second sense mentioned, what are called developments are not developments. *All development implies a change of some sort*; but the application of the law to a new case implies no change in the law, either in respect of its matter or in

respect of its form. If you mean only these new applications by developments, you have no right to call them developments of doctrine. The identity of the doctrine materially and formally remains ever unaffected, whatever the variation of the cases to which it is applied.

This is so obvious, that it can escape no one of ordinary intelligence, and, in principle, it has not escaped Mr. Newman. But he does not—and the point must not be overlooked—hold the doctrine to be the law. The law of the church, he admits, must be identical, unchanged, and unchangeable, both as to space and time. The law, properly speaking, according to him, develops, but is not developed. But he means by the law not law in the forensic sense, but in the animal or vegetable sense,—a subjective inherent law of growth, like that in the acorn, which develops it into the oak,—the law of the animal in the embryo, which develops it into the full-grown animal of its species,—the *forma*, or *idea*, of the Platonists. This law is the informative or informing power of the church, and, just in proportion to its life, vigor, activity, pushes out branches and foliage in all directions, effects new developments in doctrine, in discipline, and worship, till the church, under all these aspects, and under every possible particular aspect of these general aspects, has in the course of time come to maturity, or the perfection of its species. These are Mr. Newman's own illustrations, and this is his theory of development. Evidently, then, the faith, objectively considered, is not, in his view, the law which the church obeys, and which determines her developments, as the law of the animal economy determines the developments and growth of the animal.

This is further evident from his use of the word development. Sometimes he means by developments the process of development, sometimes the result; sometimes the practical effects of faith and worship on the life of individuals, communities, societies at large, sometimes the reaction of these effects on faith and worship themselves; sometimes the simple application of the recognized law to new cases which occur, sometimes the evolution of new dogmas from the original divine message as embodied in Scripture or as latent in the undefined consciousness of the church; sometimes true developments, sometimes false developments; sometimes developments *of* Christian doctrine, and sometimes developments *by* it. Yet all these several classes of facts, so diverse and heterogeneous to the Catholic theo-

gian, he throws into the same category, traces to one and the same generic principle, and calls by the same common name. This is a singular fact. Hear what he himself says :—"The word is commonly used, and *is here used*, in three senses indiscriminately, from defect of our language ; on the one hand, for the process of development, on the other for the result ; and again, either generally for a development true or not true, or exclusively for a development deserving the name." What more perplexing to the reader ? What scientific writer ever before defined his terms so as to make "confusion worse confounded" ? With all respect for Mr. Newman, this confusion does not arise "from the defect of our language," but from his own ideas. These things are confounded in his theory, and according to that theory are to be regarded as homogeneous. If his theory be true, his classification is rigidly scientific.

Christian doctrine—and by Christian doctrine he means Christianity, whether regarded as government, as dogma, as ethics, or as worship—is the human form of the revealed truth or divine message submitted to the action of reason. Hence, the formative power or informing law of the church is not in the Revealer, is not in the revelation, but in the mind of the recipient. It is simply the human intellect and heart operating on and with the idea formed of the revelation submitted to them. The developments predicated are all the results of this operation. Consequently, whether they be developments in doctrine, in discipline, or in worship, true or false, they all have the same generic principle, and fall of themselves into the same category, and are rightly and scientifically called by the same common name. The defect of language is nothing but its inability to supply common names which, implying a whole class, yet imply only a part of it,—a defect, we apprehend, common to most languages.

Mr. Newman's whole theory of developments, as a theory, rests on the assumption, that our holy religion under all and each of its aspects, is divine matter under a human form ; that is, it is efficacious *ex opere recipientis*, not, as we are taught, *ex opere operato* ; or that Divinity is the matter, humanity the form,—the divine the passivity, the human the activity. "Certainly," he says, "it is a degradation to consider a divine work under an earthly form ; but it is no irreverence, since the Lord himself, its author and owner, bore one also." Christianity is "externally what the apos-

tle calls an 'earthen vessel,' being the religion of men. And, considered as such, it grows in wisdom and in stature; but the powers which it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its miraculous nativity." Yes, as to its matter, but not as to its form,—to say nothing of the doctrine implied, that the Incarnation was the simple exhibition of the Divinity under an earthly form, which, if we understand by the form idea, and by idea an habitual judgment, as the author defines it, implies the assumption of the divine by the human, and not of the human by the divine, if the analogy relied on be illustrative of the doctrine in question.

We by no means assert or believe that Mr. Newman would now, or when writing his book, maintain consciously, intentionally, this abominable formula to which his essay is reducible; but his theory rests upon it, necessarily implies it, if we are not utterly incapable of understanding our mother tongue on a subject with which we are not unfamiliar; or if it does not, it is either unintelligible except to the few who may have the word of the enigma, or it is a splendid illustration of the *ignorantia elenchi*. From beginning to end, it seems to us to rest on the assumption, that Christianity is nothing to us but mere words, save so far as we realize it in our intellect and heart. To *realize*, if applied to ideas, means to make the ideal real; if to matter, to make that which is informal and potential, formal and actual, as the seal impressed gives form to the wax, or as the sculptor brings out the figure from the block of marble. View it in what light you will, the formative power is the human agent, and therefore what in Christianity is divine must be regarded as the matter on and with which the human agent operates,—the precise doctrine we ascribed in our former article to Mr. Newman, and identified with Neander's, and which is readily developed into Socinianism on the one hand, and, perhaps, into justification by faith alone on the other, according to the special point of view under which it is taken up. This doctrine makes the divine passive; and the only exceptions to the universal passivity of the divine in our religion and its effects, which Mr. Newman seems to us to recognize, are exceptions as to the original revelation itself, and in deciding, when the mind of the church has worked them out from her implicit feelings, what are to be retained as true developments, and what are to be rejected as false. But this occasional active

interference of the divine militates nothing against the formula in the sense we give to it. It is true, in applying, though not in stating and establishing, his theory, the author speaks of "the mind of the church," where we say the *human mind*. But by the mind of the church he can mean only the collection of individual minds, operating on and with the original idea of the divine message submitted to them. This idea is the human form of the divine message, and, though divine as to its matter, or as to its passive element, is yet human as to its form or active element; and therefore, whether we say the human mind or the mind of the church, the meaning is one and the same. It is true, also, that he speaks of the mind of the church working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings, under secret supernatural guidance. But this amounts to nothing, in any sense in which, as a Catholic, he is at liberty to understand it. To amount to any thing, this secret supernatural guidance must be *gratia inspirationis*, and that would imply that the church is inspired, and that each of her members is inspired, which, in both of its parts, is untrue; for the church is not inspired, but assisted. If he means by this secret supernatural guidance only *gratia assistentiæ*, it is not to his purpose. This, in the sense of Catholic theologians, must be either assistance in keeping and proposing what has been taught and believed from the first, or it must be the *donum fidei*, or supernatural assistance to believe what the church proposes. He cannot say the former, because he does not mean by the mind of the church the *ecclesia docens*; not the latter, because it is only assistance to believe what is formally proposed. Let him mean by the supernatural guidance what he will, he must assume it either as teacher or as believer. As believer he cannot, for the object must be proposed before it can be believed, and the object is not proposed, for the very supposition is, that it is to be evolved or worked out. If as teacher, it can, according to the formal doctrine of the author, teach only in so far as that which it teaches is subjected to a human form,—its teachings must be subject to the condition of all teaching, no less than the original divine message itself. Whatever, then, he may mean by secret supernatural guidance, unless he either contradicts himself or the uniform teaching of all Catholic theologians and asserts that the church is inspired, he can mean nothing which militates against the doctrine we have ascribed to him.

Assuming now what we have sufficiently established to be Mr. Newman's doctrine, express or necessarily implied, consciously or unconsciously on his part put forth, it follows, that the idea which the human mind formed, on the submission of the divine message to its action, is the inherent or subjective law of the church, and the whole life and action of the church consists in the full and perfect realization of this idea under all and each of its aspects, in each and all of its capabilities, in the intellect and heart of individuals and of nations; that is, if we may so speak, the full and perfect reproduction of the divine message under a human form, or rendering the human idea the full and complete representation of the divine idea. This idea being that with which she starts, she must obey it, preserve it, as the acorn obeys and preserves its law in becoming the oak. We must, then, conceive the church to have been in its beginning the embryo or the germ of what she now is. Nothing can be in her in maturity but what was in the germ, or has been assimilated in the process of growth. But if the germ of all is in the beginning, it is only the germ. Every doctrine, every discipline, every rite, every observance, we now find in the church was in the church in the apostolic age, but only as the oak is in the acorn, the chicken in the egg. All is there, but there in an embryonic state.

The process of growth includes, like all growth, a process of evolution and a process of assimilation. "The idea," says the author, "never was that throve and lasted, yet, like mathematical truth, *incorporated nothing from external sources*. So far from the fact of such incorporation implying corruption, as is sometimes supposed, *development implies incorporation*." This is decisive; and the only question we need now ask is as to the fact, whether Mr. Newman does predicate growth, development in this general sense, of doctrine properly so called. That he does in other respects, and in all other respects, no one will deny; but does he of doctrine in the specific sense in which we use the word?

In answer, we remark,—1. The developments are predicated generally of Christian doctrine, in the very title of the book, and are throughout the whole essay predicated of Christianity in general, without any note or mark of distinction. 2. The problem the author set out to solve includes doctrine, as well as discipline and worship. 3. He concludes

the antecedent probability of developments in Christianity from the developments of doctrine effected by divine inspiration under the old law. 4. His theory requires him to assert development of doctrine in like manner as other developments. 5. He expressly asserts development and growth of doctrine, whether regard be had to the original revelation or to our idea of it. Out of the multitude of passages we might quote to prove this, which, by the way, needs no proof, after what we have established, the following will suffice:

“When we turn to the consideration of particular *doctrines* on which Scripture lays the greatest stress, we shall see that it is absolutely impossible for them to remain in the mere letter of Scripture, if they are to be more than mere words or to convey a definite idea to the mind of the recipient. When it is declared that ‘the Word became flesh,’ three wide questions open upon us on the very announcement,—what is meant by ‘Word,’ what by ‘flesh,’ and what by ‘became.’ The answers to these involve a PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION, and are *developments*. Moreover, when they have been made, they will suggest a *series of secondary questions*; and thus at length a multitude of propositions will gather round the inspired sentence of which they come, giving it externally the *form of doctrine*, and creating or deepening the idea of it in the mind.”

This of itself is decisive. Revelation does not tell us what is meant by “the Word,” what by “flesh,” nor what by “became,” and we can answer these questions only by a process of investigation! Was Christianity a revelation only for men who have the ability and the leisure to undertake and carry on processes of investigation; or will not the faith of the poor servant-girl or the poor slave suffice for the scholar and the philosopher? But the author goes on, and after enumerating several particulars in which, he says, so far as we know, the original revelation, on matters of great and pressing moment, is incomplete, adds:—

“As far as the letter goes of the inspired message, there is not one of us but has exceeded by transgression its *revealed provisions*, and finds himself in consequence thrown upon those infinite resources of divine love which are stored in Christ, *but have not been drawn out into form in its appointments*. Since, then, Scripture needs COMPLETION, the question is brought to this issue,—WHETHER DEFECT OR INCHOATENESS IN ITS DOCTRINES BE OR BE NOT AN ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY OF A DEVELOPMENT OF THEM.”

Can any man ask any thing more than this? Here is a plain assertion, if taken in connection with what immediate-

ly precedes, that the sacrament of penance was not included in the formal appointments of the inspired message; which corresponds with what the author elsewhere says, namely, that penance is a development of baptism, as purgatory was a later development as a form of penance due for post-baptismal sins. But here is another passage:—

“In whatever sense the need and its supply are a proof of design in the visible creation, in the same do the *gaps*, if the word may be used, which occur in the structure of the original *creed* of the church, make it probable that those developments, which grow out of the truths which lie around them, were intended to complete it.”

One more extract will suffice on this branch of the subject:—

“And it is plain that what the Christians of the first ages anathematized included *deductions* from the articles of faith, that is, developments, as well as those articles of faith themselves. For, since the reason they commonly gave for using the anathema was that the doctrine was strange and startling, it follows that *the truth which was its contradictory had also been unknown to them hitherto*; which is also shown by their temporary perplexity, and their difficulty of meeting heresy, in particular cases.”

These extracts settle the fact that Mr. Newman does assert positive developments of Christian doctrine in the sense alleged. But can a Catholic admit them? Certainly not. Christian doctrine is simply and exclusively the revealed truth proposed by the church to be believed. We have consulted as high living authorities on the subject as there are in this country, and they all concur in saying that the church can propose only what was revealed, and that the revelation committed to the church was perfect. If there be any thing in which Catholic theologians are agreed, it is in these two points,—that the revelation in the beginning was perfect, and that nothing can be proposed by the church to be believed, *fide divina*, not revealed from the beginning. Developments of doctrine, then, are possible only on condition that the church has neglected her mission as a teacher, which cannot be assumed, even by way of hypothesis. Her commission was,—“Going, teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” It is essential to Catholic faith to believe that she faithfully, at all times and in all places discharges this commission. Then she must always and everywhere teach

the whole faith, and then developments are inconceivable; for though there may be implicit believing, there is, properly speaking, no implicit or informal teaching.

To this effect we quote the illustrious Bossuet, who is, at least, as high authority in regard to Catholic faith and theology as Mr. Newman. Bossuet, in his *History of the Variations of Protestantism*, assumed, as the basis of his argument, that the truth, divinely revealed, has its perfection at once, and never varies, and that variation in doctrine is a proof of error. Thus he says in the preface:—

“When in the expositions of faith, variations were seen among Christians, they were ever considered as a mark of falsehood, an inconsequence, so to speak, in the doctrine propounded. Faith speaks with simplicity; the Holy Ghost sheds pure light, and the truth he speaks has a language always uniform. Whoever is but the least conversant with the history of the church must know she opposed to each heresy appropriate and precise expositions, which she never altered; and if we attend to the expressions by which she condemned heretics, it will appear that they always proceed by the shortest and most direct route to attack the error in its source. She acts thus, because all that varies, all that is overlaid with doubtful or studiously ambiguous terms has always appeared suspicious, and not only fraudulent, but even absolutely false, because it betrays embarrassment, with which truth is unacquainted But whilst heresies, always varying, agree not with themselves, and are continually introducing new rules, that is to say, new symbols of faith, Tertullian says, that ‘in the church the rule of faith is unalterable, and never to be reformed.’ It is so, because the church, which professes to speak and to teach nothing but what she has received, does not vary; and, on the contrary, heresy, which began by innovating, daily innovates, and changes not its nature. *The Catholic truth, proceeding from God, has its perfection at once*; heresy, the feeble offspring of the human mind, can be formed only by ill-fitting patches.”

This, of itself, is conclusive, so far as the authority of Bossuet goes; but he does not stop here. The Protestant minister Jurieu attacked the principle laid down, and undertook to prove, as does Mr. Newman, that the truth comes to perfection only gradually and in the course of time. Bossuet replies in his *Premier Avertissement aux Protestants sur les Lettres du Ministre Jurieu contre l'Histoire des Variations*, which, by a change of name, might serve in many respects as an appropriate *admonition* to the admirers of the *Essay on Developments*, and from which we will make a few quotations:—

"What," says Bossuet, "your minister finds insupportable is, that I dared assert that faith in the true church never varies, and that *the truth, proceeding from God, has its perfection at once*. He affects to be astonished, as if I had invented some novel prodigy, instead of faithfully repeating what our fathers have said, that the Catholic doctrine is that which is, everywhere and always, *quod ubique, quod semper*. This is what says the learned Vincent of Lerins, one of the lights of the fifth century, what he lays down as the principle of his celebrated *Admonition*, in which he gives the true character of heresy, and a general method of distinguishing true doctrine from false. The orthodox had always reasoned on this sound principle; heretics had never dared openly reject it, and had obscured rather than denied it; but when I advance it, M. Jurieu cannot endure it. 'I am tempted,' he says, 'to believe that M. Bossuet has never even cast his eyes over the history of the first four ages.' It is the doctrine of the first four ages, the most beautiful period of Christianity, he undertakes to show was uncertain and variable. 'How,' he continues, 'could a learned man be able to exhibit such profound ignorance?' I am not only grossly ignorant, but my temerity is a prodigy, and goes even to impiety. 'We know not,' he says, 'whether we are disputing with a Christian or with a pagan; for precisely thus might reason the greatest enemy of Christianity.' He accuses me of delivering Christianity, bound hand and foot, over to infidels, because I have dared to say that the truth proceeding from God has its perfection at once,—that is to say, was well understood and *happily explained in the beginning*. 'It is,' he continues, 'precisely the contrary that is true, and one must have a brazen front, or be grossly and surprisingly ignorant, to deny it.' Then, according to your minister, in order to speak truly, one must say that the truth was neither well known nor happily explained in the beginning. 'The truth of God,' he adds, 'has been known only by *parcels*' [only by *particular aspects*, says Mr. Newman]. Christian doctrine has been composed piecemeal; it has had all the changes, and the most essential of all the defects, of human sects; and to give it, as I have done, this beautiful character of having its perfection at once, as pertains to a work proceeding from a divine hand, is not only not to understand it well, but it is a prodigy of rashness, a most extraordinary error, the lowest degree of ignorance, a manifest impiety."

This is pretty strong. But Bossuet proceeds to establish his thesis, and quotes Vincent of Lerins still further:—

"But this father not only establishes, as fundamental, the truth I have laid down, but he does it by the same principle, namely, that the truth proceeding from God, as a divine work, has its perfection at once. 'I cannot,' he says, 'be enough astonished that men can be so carried away, so blind, so impious, so prone to error, as not to be content with the rule of faith once given to the faithful and received from all an-

tiquity, but must every day seek novelties, be always changing something in religion, adding something to it, or taking something from it; as if it were not a *celestial dogma* which once revealed is *sufficient* for us, but a *human institution*, to be brought to perfection only in being reformed, or rather, by detecting in it each day some new defect.* Here is an astonishment very different from that of the minister. This holy doctor is astonished that men can even think of varying in the faith; the minister is astonished that they can say the faith has never varied. The holy doctor treats as blind and impious those who will not acknowledge that religion is a thing from which nothing can be taken away, to which nothing can be added [it grows by incorporating, says Mr. Newman], and in which nothing can be changed, in any time whatever. The minister, on the contrary, imputes to blindness and impiety the unwillingness to acknowledge either *change* or *progress*."

Mr. Newman's friends may say that his thesis and Jurieu's are not the same. Be it so. Nevertheless, this shows Bossuet's general doctrine on the subject. But on one point at least, the two do actually maintain one and the same thesis. Mr. Newman says (p. 82),—"There was no *formal* acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Trinity till the fourth century"; and again (p. 166),—"So the effort of Sabellius to *complete* the mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity failed; it became a heresy; grace would not be constrained; the course of thought could not be forced;—*at length it was realized in the true Unitarianism of St. Augustine*." The minister Jurieu, speaking of this same mystery, says, as quoted by Bossuet,—"This mystery is of the last importance, and essential to Christianity; yet everybody knows how *unformed* [*informis*] it remained till the first Council of Nice, and even till that of Constantinople." Here Mr. Newman and the minister, undeniably, assert one and the same thesis. Let us hear Bossuet's indignant reply:—

"The mystery of the Trinity, my brethren, *unformed*! Could you have believed it possible ever to have heard that word from any mouth but that of a Socinian? If from the beginning one only God was distinctly adored in three equal and coeternal persons, the mystery of the Trinity was not unformed. But according to your minister, it was unformed, not only till 325, when the Council of Nice was held, but even fifty years later, till the first Council of Constantinople, held in 381. Then the first Christians, in the greatest fervor of religion and when the church brought forth so many martyrs, did not adore distinctly one God in three equal and coeternal persons; St. Atha-

* Vinc. Lirin. *Commonit.*, I., c. 21.

nasius himself, the fathers of Nice, did not well understand this worship,—the Council of Constantinople has given to the worship of Christians its *form*. Even till the end of the fourth century, Christianity was not formed, since the Trinity, so essential to Christianity, was not. Christians shed their blood for a religion not yet formed, and knew not whether they adored three Gods or only one !”

Bossuet continues, goes over much of the ground traversed by Mr. Newman in the application of his “Tests,” and proves from the express testimony of fathers and councils, that the uniform doctrine of the church is, that the faith cannot vary, that what is taught is always that which has been taught from the first. He goes further still, and, in answer to the Protestant minister, proves historically that the faith on the principal points on which Mr. Newman asserts developments was clearly and explicitly taught from the beginning. Mr. Newman undertakes to show historically, that the doctrine opposed by the Council of Chalcedon to the Eutychian heresy was, till the council defined it, generally unknown through all the East, and that its adoption was forced upon the church by St. Leo, aided by the civil power. He also assumes throughout his essay, that the faith remains unformed, vague, and general, till authority defines it against the opposing heresy. “There was,” he says, as we have seen, “no formal acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Trinity till the fourth century. No doctrine is defined till it is violated.” And again,—“It follows that the truth which was its contradictory had been unknown to them hitherto,” that is, prior to the rise of the heresy anathematized. On these two points, let us listen to the illustrious Catholic bishop of Meaux :

“Can there be, my brethren, a greater illusion than wishing to make you believe that the faith of the church has been *formed* only on occasions of heresies which arise and make express decisions necessary ? *So far from this, decisions have been made only by proposing the faith of past ages.* For instance, your minister tells you, that the faith of the Incarnation was formed only after the disputes of the Nestorians and Eutychians had occurred [Mr. Newman implies as much], that is to say at Chalcedon; but this is not what the council itself thought. From what point did this venerable assembly set out ? From what point did its conductor, St. Leo, set out ? Perhaps by saying, that this mystery, hitherto, had not been well understood; that the sense of Scripture had not been sufficiently explored ? God forbid ! They began by making it appear that the holy doctors had always understood it as they understood it, and that Eutyches had rejected the doctrine of the fathers.

There St. Leo began, as you may see by his divine letters, which the council admired; there the council itself began, and it approved St. Leo's letter, only because it conformed to St. Athanasius, St. Hilary, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Augustine, St. Cyril, and the others whom St. Leo cites.

"But perhaps the fathers of Chalcedon thought they would add to it the perfection which the preceding councils had not given it? Not at all. For they begin by reporting them at length, and taking them as their foundation. 'This holy assembly embraces and follows the rule of faith established at Nice, that which was confirmed at Constantinople, that which has been set forth at Ephesus, that which St. Leo follows, an apostolic man and pope of the universal church, and it will neither add nor diminish.' The faith was *perfect*, and if any one had taken it into his head to say to these fathers, as your minister does, that it was *unformed* before their decision, they would have cried out against his rash speech as against a blasphemy. Hence they begin their definition by saying,—‘We repeat the infallible faith of our fathers at Nice, at Constantinople, at Ephesus, under Celestine and Cyril.’ Why, then, have they themselves made a new definition? Because that of the preceding councils was not sufficient? On the contrary, they continue,—‘It is sufficient for a FULL declaration of the truth; for in them is shown the PERFECTION of the Trinity and the incarnation of the Son of God. But because the enemies of the truth, in dealing out their heresies, have invented novel expressions, some in denying the Holy Virgin to be the mother of God, and others in introducing a prodigious confusion in the two natures of Jesus Christ, this great and holy council, teaching that the preaching of the faith from the beginning is always immutable, has ordained that the faith of the fathers REMAIN FIRM, and that nothing be added to it, as if any thing were wanting to its perfection.’ Thus the definition of the council was nothing new, except a new declaration of the faith of the fathers and preceding councils applied to new heresies."

If language has its ordinary meaning, or any meaning at all, this is decisive proof that Bossuet knew the theory of developments only to condemn it. He has, as we have seen, quoted Vincent of Lerins, whom we venture to quote again as express to our purpose. The holy doctor is commenting on the text of the blessed apostle,—*O Timothee, depositum custodi, devitans profanas vocum novitates.*

"Quis est hodie *Timotheus*," he asks, "nisi vel generaliter universa ecclesia, vel specialiter totum corpus præpositorum, qui integram divini cultus scientiam vel habere ipsi debent vel aliis infundere? . . . Quid est *depositum*? id est quod tibi creditum est, non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii, sed doctrinæ, non usurpationis privatæ, sed publicæ traditionis; rem ad te productam,

non a te probatam ; in qua non auctor debes esse, sed custos ; non institutor, sed sectator ; non ducens, sed sequens. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi* ; Catholicæ fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. Quod tibi creditum, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. . . . Eadem tamen quæ didicisti doce, *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova.*"—*Comm.*, I., c. 22.

Language can hardly be more precise and express against developments. But this learned doctor continues :—

"Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plene, et maximus. Nam quis ille est tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectus pertinet ut in semetipsum unaquæque res amplificetur ; ad permutationem vero, aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius ecclesiæ, ætatum ac sæculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum : quæ licet annorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent, eadem quæ erant permanent. Multum interest inter pueritiæ florem et senectutis maturitatem, sed iidem tamen ipsi fiunt senes qui fuerant adolescentes ; ut quamvis unius ejusdemque hominis status habitusque mutantur, una tamen nihilominus eademque natura, una eademque persona sit. Parva lactantium membra, magna juvenum, eadem ipsa sunt tamen. Quot parvulorum artus, tot virorum ; et si qua illa sunt quæ ævi maturioris ætate pariuntur jam in seminis ratione proserta sunt ; ut nihil novum postea proferatur in senibus quod non in pueris jam ante latitaverit. Unde non dubium est hanc esse legitimam et rectam proficiendi regulam, hunc ratum atque pulcherrimum crescendi ordinem, si eas semper in grandioribus partes ac formas numerus detexat ætatis quas in parvulis Creatoris sapientia præformaverat. Quod si humana species in aliquam deinceps non sui generis vertatur effigiem, aut certe addatur quippiam membrorum numero vel detrahatur, necesse est ut totum corpus vel intercidat, vel prodigiosum fiat, vel certe debilitetur ; ita Christianæ religionis dogma sequatur has decet profectuum leges, ut annis scilicet consolidetur, dilatetur tempore, sublimetur ætate, incorruptum tamen illibatumque permaneat, et universis partium suarum mensuris cunctisque quasi membris ac sensibus propriis plenum atque perfectum sit, quod nihil præterea permutationis admittat, nulla proprietatis dispendia, nullam definitionis sustineat varietatem."—*Ib.*, c. 23.

Mr. Newman has himself quoted a part of this passage, and evidently had the whole passage in his mind when framing his theory, which at first view may seem to be sup-

ported by it; but we find it sustaining us rather than him, for it evidently does not concede that the dogma, *in quantum est dogma*, gains something in the course of time, but contends the contrary. The dogma is as one of the arteries or properties, which must be the same in the old man as in the child, and the gain is in a clearer understanding not of what it is, but of what it is not, in its relations to what is not of faith, as the language used may be understood, and must be, unless we make the holy doctor inconsistent with himself. Bossuet is here again our authority, and in the *Avertissement*, from which we have already quoted, fully sustains us.

"If it be asked with the minister, How, then, can it be true to say that the church has profited by heresies? St. Augustine replies for us, that 'each heresy introduces into the church a new doubt, against which the Scriptures are defended with more care and exactitude than they might have been without such necessity.' Observe, are defended with *more care*, not that they are better understood at bottom. The celebrated Vincent of Lerins also takes our cause in hand, when he says — 'The gain of religion consists in gaining in the faith, not in changing it'; that 'we may add to it intelligence, science, wisdom, but always in its own kind,' that is to say, '*in the same dogma, in the same sense, in the same sentiment*'; and, what settles the whole dispute, that dogmas may receive, with time, 'light, evidence, distinction, but must *preserve always THEIR PLENITUDE, INTEGRITY, AND PROPERTIES.*'* That is, as he explains it, 'the church changes nothing, diminishes nothing, adds nothing, loses nothing of her own, receives nothing from abroad.' Who, after this, will tell us the faith varies?

"But, if we are still pressed to say in what new decisions have profited the church, the same doctor answers for us, — 'The decisions of councils have done nothing but transmit by writing to posterity what the ancients believed by tradition alone; include in a few words the principle and the substance of the faith; and often, to facilitate the understanding of it, express by some new but proper and precise term the doctrine which had never been new.' Or, as he had just explained, that, in sometimes saying things in a new manner, nothing new is ever to be said, — *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova.*"†

* "Fas est etenim prisca illa cœlestis philosophiæ dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur : sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncantur, aut mutilentur. Accipiant licet evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem, sed retineant necesse est *plenitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem.*" — *Ubi supra.*

† "Christi vero ecclesia sedula et cauta depositorum apud se dogmatum custos, nihil in his unquam permutat, nihil minuit, nihil addit, non amputat necessaria, non apponit superflua, non amittit sua, non usurpat

This is amply sufficient to show, that, whatever Vincent of Lerins may have meant by the gain religion acquires in the course of time, he cannot have meant any thing corresponding to the view of developments to which we have objected. His whole meaning seems to us to be comprised in these few words of St. Augustine:—*Multa quippe ad fidem Catholicam pertinentia, dum hereticorum calida inquietudine exagitantur, ut adversus eos defendi possint, et considerantur diligentius, et intelliguntur clarius, et instantius prædicantur; et ab adversario mota questio, discendi existit occasio.** “Many things pertaining to the Catholic faith, being agitated by the feverish uneasiness of heretics, in order that they may be defended against them, are considered more attentively, understood more clearly, and inculcated more earnestly, so that the mooted of the question by the enemy becomes the occasion of learning.”

But the occasion of learning what? The faith, as to what it is in itself considered? Assuredly this thought never entered into the head of St. Augustine or of a single father of the church. It is precisely here where Mr. Newman seems to us to have mistaken the sense of the fathers. He supposes them to teach that there is a growth in the understanding, not merely of what is not the faith, but of what is the faith,—not merely of what it is in relation to what it is not, but of what it is in relation to itself. No one can have read his essay without having perceived that he holds large portions, at least, of the faith may and do lie latent in the Scriptures, or in the undefined traditions or vague consciousness of the church, till the occasion calls them forth, and reduces them by the decisions and definitions of authority to formal and dogmatic statements. The faith is virtual

aliena; sed omni industria hoc unum studet, ut vetera fideliter sapienterque tractando, si qua sunt illa antiquitus informata et inchoata, accuret et poliat; si qua jam expressa et enucleata, consolidet, firmet; si qua jam confirmata et definita, custodiat; denique quid unquam aliud conciliorum decretis enisa est, nisi ut quod antea simpliciter credebatur, hoc idem postea diligentius crederetur, quod antea lentius prædicabatur, hoc idem postea instantius prædicaretur, quod antea securius colebatur, hoc idem postea sollicitius excoleretur? Hoc inquam semper, necque quicquam præterea hereticorum novitatibus excitata, conciliorum suorum decretis Catholica perfecit ecclesia, nisi ut quod prius a majoribus sola traditione susceperat, hoc deinde posteris etiam per Scripturæ chirographum consignaret, magnam rerum summam paucis literis comprehendendo, et plerumque, propter intelligentiæ lucem, non novum fidei sensum, novæ appellationis proprietate signando.”—Vinc. Lirin., *ubi supra*.

* *De Civitate Dei*, Lib. 16, c. 2.

but not actual ; and development is the process of reducing it from its virtuality to actuality,—from vague and undefined sentiment, from intense or implicit feeling, to formal dogmas.

"Thus," he says, "the apostles would know *without words* all the high doctrines of theology, which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced to formulæ, and developed through argument. Thus, St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested ideas of purgatory or original sin, yet have an intense feeling, which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and the liabilities of our nature regenerate." "So far may be granted, that *even principles* were not *so well understood* and so carefully handled at first as they were afterwards. In the early period, we see traces of a conflict, as well as of a *variety*, in theological elements, which were in the course of combination, but which required adjustment and management before they could be used with precision as one. In a thousand instances of a minor character, the statements of the early fathers are but tokens of the multiplicity of *openings which the mind of the church was making into the treasure-house of truth*,—real openings, but incomplete or irregular. Nay, the doctrines even of the heretical bodies are indices and anticipations of the mind of the church. As the *first step in settling a point of doctrine is to raise and debate it*, so heresies in every age may be taken as the measure of the existing state of thought in the church, and of the movement of her theology; they determine in what way the current is setting, and the rate at which it flows." "The deep meditation which seems to have been exercised by the fathers on points of doctrine, the debate and turbulence, yet lucid determination, of councils, the *indecision* of popes, are all in different ways, at least when viewed together, portions and indications of the same process. The theology of the church is no random combination of various opinions, but a diligent, patient *working out* of one doctrine out of many materials. The conduct of popes, councils, fathers, betokens the slow, painful, anxious *taking up of new elements into an existing body of belief*." "Evidently the position of baptism in the received system was not the same in the first ages as in later times; and still less was it *clearly ascertained* in the first three centuries." "Here a serious question presented itself to the minds of Christians, *which was now to be wrought out*." "Thus we see how, as time went on, the doctrine of purgatory *was opened upon the apprehension of the church*, as a portion or form of penance due for sins committed after baptism. And thus the belief of this doctrine and the practice of infant baptism would grow into general reception together."

We might multiply similar quotations from Mr. Newman's essay to almost any extent, and they all show that he regards portions, at least, of the faith as remaining at first,

so far as concerned either the formal teaching, or the formal belief of the church, in a merely latent or virtual state, and that it has been subsequently, or is still to be, realized by developments. Unquestionably he does not mean to assert that there is any thing in the developed doctrine not *meant* or promised by the doctrine as it was in the beginning, any more than there is that in the chicken which was not meant or promised by the egg; but he does mean that the faith is developed by the spontaneous process carried on by the mind of the church herself, under the influence of what he calls the sacramental principle, and which he misapprehends, and also by fierce and protracted controversies, and developed in reference to what it is as positive dogma, as well as in reference to what it is not, in its positive aspect, as well as in its negative aspect. And here is precisely his error. When the fathers speak of attaining to a more clear understanding, to more explicit and distinct apprehensions of the faith, and to the consolidation of doctrine, it is always as it is opposed to or opposed by heresies. The new explications and definitions do not make it more clear and explicit in what it is as matter to be positively believed, but simply as the contradictory of the errors those new explications and definitions condemn. It is only in this sense that the assertion of the Council of Chalcedon, that the faith was already sufficiently explained, can be reconciled with its act of giving a new definition,—or with the uniform declaration of the church, in defining the faith against novel errors, that she simply opposes to the error the faith which has been taught and believed from the beginning. Moreover, this is the express assertion of St. Thomas:—"In doctrina Christi et apostolorum veritas fidei est sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines apostolicam doctrinam, et cæteras doctrinas, et Scripturas, pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, ideo necessaria fuit temporibus procedentibus explicatio fidei contra insurgentes errores."* Certainly St. Thomas understands no developments of Christian doctrine, except new explications *contra insurgentes errores*; that is, clearer expositions, not of what it is, but of what it is not. He does not, save in this negative sense, allow us to say that "no doctrine is defined till it is violated"; or that it is latent in Scripture or tradition till a heresy arises to controvert it; for his sense evidently is, that the whole doctrine

**Summa*, 2, 2, Q. 1, a. 10.

was *sufficiently explained* in the beginning. No doctrine is defined as the contradictory of an error before the error has arisen, it is true; but that it is not explicitly taught and believed before, as to all that it is as a positive dogma or a revealed truth, is not true; and we fall back on Bossuet, St. Thomas, St. Leo, the Council of Chalcedon, the Council of Ephesus, all the fathers and all the popes, uniformly declaring that the new definition is only the express application of the preëxisting faith to a novel error for our authority.

If there be any thing uniformly taught by our theologians, it is that the faith of the fathers was perfect, that the revelation committed to the church was complete and entire, and that the church has, from the first, faithfully, infallibly, taught or proposed it. If this be true, as it would at least be temerity to question, there can be, there can have been, no latent or merely virtual doctrine waiting for heresy and controversy to call it forth, and to render it formal and actual. There is implicit belief,—for individuals may be ignorant, some on one point, and some on another; but there is, save in a very restrictive sense indeed, no implicit teaching. All teaching is formal, and what is not formally proposed is not proposed at all. Revelation, *in quantum est revelatio*, must be formal. Each revealed dogma may imply more than appears or is apprehended; but the truth implied, if not formally revealed in the truth explicitly revealed, is not a *revealed* truth, and therefore is not and cannot be a portion of the Catholic faith, unless we assume for the church *gratia inspirationis*, which she has not, and does not claim. Her commission was not, to reveal truth, but to keep, believe, and teach the truth already revealed,—“Going, teach all nations to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” Under the old law there was development, and Christianity itself is, in some sense, a development of Judaism, but not a development effected by human agency. In the one case it was a development effected by the immediate agency of our Lord and inspired apostles, and in the other by inspired prophets, inspired to *reveal* truth, not merely to keep, teach, or believe it. Here is an important fact which Mr. Newman has undeniably overlooked, and which vitiates all his arguments drawn from the fact of developments under the old law, in favor of the antecedent probability of developments under the new law. There is no parity in the case; for under the old law there

was *gratia inspirationis*, but under the new law there is only *gratia assistentiæ*. St. Thomas expressly denies developments under the new law similar to those which took place under the old law. He objects to the necessity of a new edition of the symbol:—"Nova enim editio symboli necessaria est propter explicationem articulorum fidei. Sed in veteri testamento articuli fidei magis ac magis explicabantur secundum temporum successionem, propter hoc quod veritas fidei magis manifestabatur secundum maiorem propinquitatem ad Christum. Cessante ergo tali causa in nova lege, non debet fieri major ac major explicatio articulorum fidei." To which the holy doctor replies, in the body of the article:—"Respondeo dicendum, quod nova editio symboli necessaria est *ad vitandum insurgentes errores*"; and specially to the objection, what we have already quoted:—"Dicendum, quod in doctrina Christi et apostolorum veritas fidei est sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines apostolicam doctrinam, et cæteras doctrinas, et Scripturas pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, ideo necessaria fuit temporibus procedentibus explicatio fidei contra insurgentes errores." Here, the principle of the objection is conceded, and the reason assigned for the new explication is not that the faith may be more and more explicit, but that errors which arise may be avoided. Mr. Newman has evidently fallen into the error into which we ourselves fell, when, in the first number of this journal, we wrote as follows:—

"The true *theory* of the church is, I believe, that, through all the successive stages of its existence, it is apostolic, retaining always and everywhere the same authority over faith and discipline which the apostles themselves had; and that its mission is not merely to preserve the *memory* of a work done, *completed*, but to *continue* and carry on to perfection a work *commenced*. It has indeed received the *law* from which it can in no wise depart, but a law which it is to *develop* and apply, by virtue of its own *continuous inspiration*,—received from the indwelling Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth,—to all new questions that come up, and to all old questions coming up under new forms or under new relations. ITS MISSION IS THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION AND REALIZATION IN LIFE OF THE TRUTH CONTAINED IN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION, which evolution and realization constitute the continued progress of mankind. Now I am far from pretending that the church, in point of fact, has altogether overlooked this theory;but she seems to me to have asserted it with too much feebleness and timidity, and with numerous and almost suicidal concessions to the spirit which finally broke out in the Protestant schism. Instead of bold-

ly asserting her high prerogatives as the body of our Lord, and maintaining her right and duty to *develop* and apply the truth, according to the exigencies of time and place, she has left to be believed, that the Gospel, *instead of being given her merely in germ*, to be subsequently developed and applied, was given her as a perfect code, drawn out in all the minuteness of detail, and that her sole mission is to preserve the original deposit unaltered, unenlarged, undiminished."

We confess we are unable to discover any essential difference between the theory here stated and the one developed in Mr. Newman's essay. Even the problems are virtually the same, with this difference only:—Mr. Newman wished to be able to accept past developments, and we wished to secure the right to future developments. But we, at least, knew that our doctrine was repugnant to the formal teaching of the church. Therefore we wrote, very consistently,—“I am free to confess that I accept the general theory of that church [the Roman Catholic] as the true theory of the church of Christ; but that theory itself prevents me, in the present state of the religious world, from seeking to unite myself with the Roman Catholic communion.”

No Catholic can defend the theory we put forth; for all our theologians unanimously agree that the church does not and cannot propose as Catholic faith any thing not either explicitly revealed, or at least *formally* contained in what is explicitly revealed; as, *Christ died for me*, is formally contained in the revealed proposition, *Christ died for all men*. What is revealed only as the effect in the cause, or as the property in the essence, though true theologically, and its denial would be *erroneous*, is yet no part of that which the church teaches as revealed truth, to be believed *fide divina et catholica*. When the contradictory is condemned by the church, its assertion is indeed heresy, not because it is itself matter of faith, but because its assertion involves the denial of the infallibility of the church, which is of faith, because formally revealed. Assuming this, the church may *apply* the truth, according to the exigencies of time and place, to the condemnation of all new errors which come up, and to all old errors appearing under new forms or under new relations; but it must be the truth deposited with her, not deductions discursively drawn from it, if she condemns them as opposed to the faith.

We cannot understand why it should be more correct to assert a growth in Christian doctrine than in the science of

morals. If there are developments in Christian doctrine, there is a growth of doctrine, and it could be better learned from the moderns than from the ancients. But that morals can be better learned from the moderns than from the ancients is a condemned proposition. Morals are simply practical theology, and theology finds its principles or *data* in faith, or Christian doctrine. A progress in either Christian doctrine or theology would imply the possibility of progress in the science of morals. Why, then, should not a denial of the possibility of the latter be equally the denial of the possibility of the former?

But the point is sufficiently clear. Christians always believed that our Lord was not only true God, but a real man, and had a real body; but before the rise of the error of the Docetæ, which asserted that his body was a body only in appearance, they may not have considered what they believed, distinctly, in the light of the contradictory of that error. They believed, as explicitly before as afterwards, all that the faith asserted, but did not consider so attentively, nor perceive so distinctly, all it denied. The same may be said of all other points of faith, and their contradictory errors. The faith was known, but all that could or could not oppose it was not clearly and distinctly known and considered. But whenever the error appeared, it was seen to be repugnant to the faith, and there was a universal outcry against it; the whole church looked with horror on the impious wretch who dared broach it, and compelled him instantly to retract it, or to go out from her communion, under the ban of her anathema. This is evident from the whole history of the church, and from the fact that it is always the error that is new and startling, and never the contradictory truth the church opposes to it. The cities are illuminated, triumphal processions await the fathers, and all the world rejoices, from Ephesus to Alexandria, when it is known that the council has condemned the Nestorian heresy, and declared the Holy Virgin to be the mother of God, as all were conscious of having always believed.

In the sense of this distinction between positive and negative developments, we understand the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; the uniform declaration of the church in every age, that she does but oppose the faith already believed to the errors which arise; St. Augustine, St. Vincent of Lerins, St. Thomas, Bossuet, and all our theologians, whenever they speak of the faith as gaining clearness, evidence,

distinctness by the condemnation of new errors and heresies. In this sense we understand the learned author of *Symbolism*, when he speaks of Catholic theology as having gained in clearness and precision by the controversies with the early reformers. Catholic theology, in so far as it is the explicit negative of those errors of Protestants which were new or which appeared under new forms or in new combinations, has gained in clearness and precision by those controversies; but in other respects we are sure it has not. So of the language of the early fathers, which Mr. Newman regards as often careless and inexact. That it is often inexact, regarded solely as excluding what is not of faith, may be conceded; regarded as including what is of faith, it is not.

What we have said is sufficient to establish the fact that Catholic theology is a stranger to positive developments; but some, presuming Mr. Newman must have been substantially orthodox, and judging from what he ought to have said rather than from what he actually has said, may be disposed to think, that, after all, he may really mean by developments in Christian doctrine only those negative developments which all Catholic theologians admit. There are, we own, portions of his book which may be understood in this sense; but, as far as language can go, we have proved, that, though he may mean these, he also means positive developments. If he intended only the ordinary Catholic doctrine on the subject, why did he not say so in plain words? If this was all he meant, what was the need or bearing on his conclusion of his theory of Christian doctrine? Why did he lay down, and with great care and labor establish, a theory of development, which authorizes positive developments on the largest scale, as well as negative developments? Why did he allege the positive developments under the old law as rendering similar developments under the new law antecedently probable, if he did not contend for similar developments under the new law? How could he have supposed the positive developments in philosophy, in human polity, in sects, in ideas generally, could be illustrations of those he was contending for in Christianity, if he was contending only for negative developments? How, if this was all he meant, could he have felt it necessary to degrade Christianity to the level of sects and doctrines of the world, to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man, and to go into an elaborate, ingenious, and profound defence of error and heresy? Could

he have ever dreamed that an all but successful defence of error and heresy is the only defence of the church in condemning them? The supposition is absurd. Mr. Newman may err, and in our judgment has erred gravely, but his errors are those of a fullgrown man, of a ripe scholar, and a disciplined mind, not those of the schoolboy who has hardly completed his humanities. But whatever the view he may take of the actual developments he contends for, his view of Christian doctrine is sufficient to condemn his essay as essentially repugnant to Catholic faith and theology. This last we recommend to the consideration of those who are disposed to regard the theory as *extra fidem* and indifferent, —a theory which a Catholic may or may not hold, according to his own individual convictions.

As for the problem the author set out to solve, it was a problem only in his Protestant prejudice. If it were a real problem, there could be no solution of it but in the rejection of the church; and just so far as the author assumes it to be real, he yields the whole question to the Protestant. The church of God never varies, and the only variation a Catholic can concede in Christian doctrine is the greater clearness and distinctness as to what it is not, which results from presenting it so as explicitly to condemn novel errors as they arise; which is no variation in the substance or in the form of the doctrine, and at most only a variation in the expression or mode of presenting it as the contradictory of the error. The variation is *apparent*, not real; and the solution of the difficulty, if difficulty it be, is not in a theory of developments which assumes the variation to be real and undertakes to defend it, but in showing by historical criticism, as our theologians have always done, that the alleged variation is only in appearance, and in reality is no variation at all; or, in other words, in showing, not that it is a development, as Mr. Newman contends, nor a corruption, as Protestants allege, but a simple primitive doctrine merely defined against a novel error, as the church alleges, and all our theologians maintain. There are, in point of fact, no variations in doctrine presented by the history of the church; and the variations, defects, and apparent inconsistencies in the historical representation, which Mr. Newman undertakes to account for, were all in his Protestant spectacles, and he will look in vain for them when he comes to read the history of the church with the eyes of a Catholic. We say this on the authority of the church herself, which

is sufficient for a Catholic; on the authority of the fact, that the most learned Protestants, deeply interested in the question, have been trying these three hundred years to find an instance of real historical variation of doctrine and have not succeeded, which is sufficient for a Protestant; and, finally, on the authority of the essay we are criticising, which contains conclusive evidence that the developments alleged are not developments, but simple primitive doctrines, and this is sufficient for Mr. Newman.

But we must bring our remarks to a close. We own we have subjected Mr. Newman's essay to what many will regard as a severe criticism; but, in our own estimation, we have treated it with great forbearance, and might have made out even a stronger case against the author than we have. Yet we have said enough, we trust, to put the faithful on their guard against a work which, under the guise of a defence of our religion, is one of the most insidious attacks, though not so intended by its author, on religion, which we remember ever to have read, and that is saying much. In fact, the author himself, in his closing paragraph, pronounces, if it be considered, as severe a judgment on the work as our own. "Such," he says, "were the thoughts concerning the 'blessed vision of peace,' of one, while as yet his eye was dim, his breast laden, and he could but employ reason in the things of faith." What nonsense, to suppose a man, while his eye is dim, his breast laden, and he has nothing but reason to work with, can write an orthodox book! The sentence is the condemnation of the book by a competent judge,—unless it contains the germ of a school not many years since condemned at Rome.

It will most likely be alleged, as it has been, that we have misunderstood Mr. Newman,—as is commonly alleged against all who reject a novel theory. So said the Jansenists, when the doctrines of their master were condemned; so said the Hermesians, when the speculations of *their* master were condemned. We never yet heard of a novelty that was rightly apprehended by its opponents, if its adherents were to be believed. But it is possible that the very reason why new doctrines are embraced by the one class is because they are *not* understood, and why the other class oppose them is because they *are* understood. It is possible that we have misapprehended Mr. Newman; but if so, it is not our fault, for we have done our best to understand him. His theory, if words may be trusted, is substantially what was at one time

our own theory, and which, though not in our writings, was in our own mind as fully and as scientifically developed as it is in the essay. We gathered the theory in part from philosophers, in part from Mr. Newman's school of tractarians, and in part from our own excogitations. We understood it well, and had renounced it as a thing to be abhorred, before the appearance of this essay. We therefore had some preparation for understanding Mr. Newman, and it is not very probable that we have misunderstood him. If, however, we have, the man who sets us right, in whatever tone or temper he may do it, shall have our hearty thanks, and we will lose no time in making all the atonement in our power.

It may be that we have shown ourselves over-zealous, for a recent convert, and have taken too much upon ourselves. If so, let our offence receive its merited punishment. We have had some experience in theorizing, and still suffer from the wounds received from it. We remember with some vividness the injury we have done to thousands who placed confidence in us, by our vain and impious speculations; and, while we have no lack of charity for others who may in like manner speculate, we have no toleration for their speculations. Our zeal, if culpable, is not unaccountable. We cannot but feel deeply on a subject which is associated in our minds with recollections of the most painful character.

But we could not accept Mr. Newman's essay, even if its theory were susceptible of a satisfactory explanation. It deserves to be excluded from every Catholic library for its unorthodox forms of expression, as scandalous, even if not as heretical, erroneous, or rash. Words are things, and used improperly by men of eminence, or with inexactitude, become the occasion of error and heresy in others. Not a few of the errors which have afflicted the church have come in under shelter of loose or inexact expressions, which great and sometimes even saintly men have suffered to escape them. The vain, the restless, the proud, the disobedient, seize on them, ascribe to them a sense they will bear, but not the one intended by their authors, and lay the foundation for "sects of perdition." Sometimes even better men are deceived and misled, as we see in the case of Fénelon. One cannot be too careful to be exact in expression, or to guard against innovation in word as well as in thought, especially in this age, in which there is such a decided tendency to abandon the scholastic method for the rhetorical. The

scandalous phraseology of the essay is no charge against its author, writing when and where he did, but is a grave charge against the essay itself.

Finally, we repeat, from our former article, that we object to the theory of developments the very fact that it is a theory. We see no call and no room for theories in the Catholic Church,—least of all, for theories concocted outside of her by men whose eyes are dim, and who have nothing but their own reason to work with. From the nature of the case, they are theories, not for the conversion of their authors, but for the conversion of the church,—framed to bring her to them, not them to her. They can do no good, and may do much harm. It is natural for us to concoct them when out of the church, for then we have, and can have, nothing but theories, and can do nothing but theorize; but, if we are wise, we shall not attempt to bring them into the church with us. The more empty-handed we come to the church, the better; and the more affectionately will she embrace us, and the more freely and liberally will she dispense to us her graces. She needs nothing, and the greatest and best of us can offer her nothing but our sins and uncleanness. Naked, or all-defiled with the filth in which we wallowed while away from her maternal care, must we come, and implore her to be our mother, to cleanse us in the laver of regeneration, and to cover our nakedness with the white robe of charity. So we must come, or we come not at all; and when we have so come, when we have reposed the wearied head on our MOTHER'S bosom, we feel she is our true, our own blessed MOTHER, and all we ask is to believe, love, obey.

THE DUBLIN REVIEW ON DEVELOPMENTS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1847.]

THE June number of the *Dublin Review* contains an article, by one of the recent converts from Oxford, on *Doctrinal Developments*, professedly in reply to some remarks of ours on the same subject. For the obliging terms in which the writer speaks of ourselves personally, he will accept of our grateful acknowledgments; but he must permit us to say that his article, regarded either as a reply to our remarks, or as a defence of the theory of development, has struck us as singularly deficient, and as exhibiting by no means that extensive and accurate acquaintance with Catholic theology which we naturally look for in a contributor to so respectable a periodical as the *Dublin Review*, the leading Catholic periodical in our language.

We must remark by the way,—and we do so with no disrespect to the distinguished author of the article,—that we regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to the hands of some learned Catholic doctor, instead of one who, however able and well disposed, can speak on the general subject with no more authority than ourselves, and, from the defect of professional training, is not less likely, perhaps, to mistake the sense of the authorities which must be cited than we are. But our friends in England have the right to select their own champion, and we must, with divine assistance, which we implore, manage our side of the controversy as well as we can.

The article, however, has the advantage of being from a personal friend of Mr. Newman, and a hearty admirer of that gentleman's theory, who is not likely to misunderstand or misstate it. We may, therefore, take it as a good proof of the correctness of our own statement, that it does not in any respect whatever object to it; but reasserts the theory, both in regard to Christian doctrine and development, substantially as we ourselves understood it. We trust that this will satisfy our friends on this side of the water, that we have not, as some of them have supposed, either misunderstood or misrepresented Mr. Newman.

We understand the writer to concede the correctness of

our representation of the theory of developments. If he does, he is bound either to abandon it, or to show that the consequences we deduced from it are not legitimate; for those consequences, if warranted, prove that it is subversive of Christianity. Unhappily, he does neither. He has left our statement of the theory, our objections to it, and the arguments by which we sustained them, standing in all their force. He has not even pleaded to them. Yet he cannot be unaware that he is held to concede every count in our declaration to which he does not plead, and that we have the right in reasoning with him to assume its truth. This consideration alone sets aside his whole reply.

The theory of development is a special theory, resting for its logical basis on a certain view of Christian doctrine, namely, that Christian doctrine is not the revealed truth itself, but the mind's idea of it; or that inspiration supplies only the *materia informis* of doctrine, which is rendered *doctrina formata* only by the action of the uninspired intellect,—thus degrading Christianity, by Mr. Newman's own confession, to the level of human sects and philosophies, which is, of course, to deny it. Our main objection was to this view of Christian doctrine, from which developments of doctrine are only a logical deduction; and we objected to this, not because it authorizes developments, but *because it subverts Christianity*. The reviewer by neglecting to plead to this charge concedes its truth, gives us the right to assume it against him, and thus throws himself out of court, or debars himself from the right to enter. He cannot introduce testimony to prove developments in the sense of his theory, because that would be to introduce testimony to disprove Christianity, which is not lawful; and to introduce it to prove developments in some other sense would be to undertake to prove what is not in question,—an instance of what logicians call *ignorantia elenchi*.

If held to strict logic, or to the rules of legal pleading recognized by the common-law courts, both in his country and in ours, the reviewer is estopped, and cannot proceed till he gets permission to plead to the charges against the basis of his theory. Till then, his authorities are of no avail; for we have only to reply, your theory is anti-Christian, and you are not at liberty to introduce testimony to prove any thing which is not Christian. If he rejoins, his authorities are Christian; we reply, again, then they must be understood in a Christian sense, and therefore cannot be

understood in the sense of your theory, for your theory is anti-Christian. In any and every possible case, it is more reasonable to suppose that he misinterprets his authorities than that they authorize any thing against our holy religion.

We insist on this for two reasons :—1, because, if there is to be a controversy on this subject, it must be conducted on strict logical principles, or it will be interminable ; and, 2, because it is precisely in their view of Christian doctrine antecedently to developments, that, in our judgment, the chief error of the developmentists lies, and it is especially to this point we wish to call their attention. We object to the developments themselves, but because they imply the false view of Christianity entertained by Mr. Newman and his school, rather than to their view of Christianity, because it authorizes the developments. The developments are bad enough ; but their view of Christianity leaves us no Christianity to develop. What we mean is, that, though we object to all developments of doctrine properly so called, when they mean any thing more than new or fuller explanations of the faith *propter errores insurgentes*, we are not so scandalized by them, regarded simply as developments, as we are at the view of Christian doctrine which is set forth as their logical basis. In other words, it is less to the developments than to the *theory* of developments that we object, and we demand that the controversy turn, as it should, on the theory itself, which we have the right to do, because it was against that we directed our principal attack.

We complain of the reviewer that he has neglected entirely the logical basis of his theory, and proceeds as if no objections were made to it. We regard a theory as refuted, if refuted in its principles ; for we do not comprehend how a superstructure can stand, when its foundation is taken away. When the foundation of a theory is attacked, we have always supposed that it is that which is to be defended, in order to defend the theory. Now we feel confident that very few can examine the foundation of Mr. Newman's theory without rejecting it ; and we wish especially to call the attention of his friends to its defence, because we think the moment they seriously attempt its defence they will abandon the theory in despair, perhaps in disgust.

But waiving this preliminary objection to the consideration of the theory at all, yet reserving our right to fall

back on it whenever we choose, we will, lest the reviewer conclude that we are objecting to the form of his argument because we are unable to reply to its matter, proceed to consider what he has actually attempted to allege in his defence. He proposes to do three things: 1. Make as precise a statement as may be of the general principle which seems understood in the language of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote; 2. Bring together a sample of the high Catholic authority on which that principle rests; and, 3. Offer some brief remarks on the testimony we adduced against it.

Our readers will perceive that the names of Mr. Thompson, Mr. Lewis, and Mr. Northcote are substituted for Mr. Newman's. Why, we must ask, is this? The article is professedly a reply to us, and our attack was directed against Mr. Newman, not against these gentlemen, save so far as they may choose to indorse and defend him. Is their theory essentially different from his? Then we have not assailed it. Is it substantially the same? Then why defend it under their name rather than his? Would they appropriate to themselves the honor that is his? Or have they too profound a respect for him to mention his name? Or is such their estimation of the theory of development, that they would shield him from its responsibilities? Our article was directed against his doctrine, as we gathered it from his essay; yet the reviewer, in replying to it, does not once mention even his name. Does he suppose that by suppressing Mr. Newman's name he can deprive him of the glory, or relieve him from the shame, of being the founder and chief of the school of development? However unwilling his friends may be, either for his sake or their own, that he should appear before the world as the leader of a school, he does so appear, and will, till he either obtains for his theory the sanction of authority or abandons it; and they, however great their repugnance to be called a school, will be so called, so long as the theory remains unsanctioned, and they are understood to adhere to it. The thing is so and cannot be helped, and they need not seek to disguise it; for it is not to be presumed that anybody supposes, that, if, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Newman, the church should decide the theory to be not "coincident" with her judgment on the subject, their Catholic faith would be shaken, or they would withhold their submission. We own, their present attitude towards the church is exceedingly awkward,

for they are endeavouring to persuade her to accept a theory which she has not taught, but which they devised for themselves, when *in transitu* from heresy and schism to truth and unity, and when, according to Mr. Newman, they could use "only reason in the things of faith": but it is an attitude of their own choosing, and are they the men to shrink from its responsibility?

It would have been only simple civility to us, if the reviewer, in making his statement of the principle of his theory, had referred to our statement of it, and either acknowledged its correctness or pointed out its inaccuracies. By doing so, he would have at once put us in possession of his precise thought, and have saved himself from the liability of being misunderstood, and us from that of being found fighting a man of straw. For ourselves, we have supposed, in replying to an opponent, that it is at least civil to pay some attention to what he says,—to his words, instead of being wholly engrossed with our own. But the reviewer appears to think differently, and we must submit. We have, however, examined his statement with what ability we have, and, supposing him to use language according to its ordinary import, and not, as Mr. Ward said of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles in a "non-natural sense," we must understand his doctrine to be substantially the same that we ascribed to Mr. Newman, and in what follows we shall assume that it is so. Since, then, all that we have heretofore objected to it stands good, inasmuch as no exception has been taken to it, nothing more is necessary to be added now for the purpose of proving its anti-Christian character. We have already refuted it, and need not to refute it again; for certainly to *ignore* an objection is not to remove it. We proceed, therefore, at once to the authorities cited.*

* There is one point, however, in his statement, to which we take the liberty of directing the reviewer's attention. In treating the subject of inspiration, and throughout his article, he distinguishes the *intellect* from the *spiritual nature*, and proceeds on the assumption, that the truth may be impressed on one's spiritual nature, and the individual nevertheless remain intellectually ignorant of it. We are at some loss to understand this psychology. What does the reviewer mean by *spiritual nature*? The inferior nature, which is the seat of concupiscence? Of course not. The rational nature? But the rational nature, if distinguished from intellect or understanding, is simply *the will*. If he means by spiritual nature the will, he adopts the Socinian view of inspiration, namely, that it is not the revelation of the truth to the intellect, but a disposing of the will to seek truth, and to embrace and obey it, when found. That is, inspiration is ethical rather than intellectual. We cannot suppose this to

The reviewer cites in support of his theory, Petavius, Bellarmine, Vasquez, Suarez, Cano, Cardinal Fisher, St. Vincent of Lerins, St. Augustine, Moehler, Döllinger, and the Count de Maistre,—authorities enough to establish it, if they were really authorities for it, we are willing to concede. But,—

1. The reviewer proposes by these authorities to prove developments in the sense of his theory. But these authorities are Christian, and therefore it is to be presumed that they cannot be understood in the sense of his theory, for his theory is to be presumed to be anti-Christian.

2. The theory is confessedly a novelty in Catholic theology; for the reviewer says expressly, that he has given his own view because none of his authorities have drawn out a distinct and systematic statement of it. But the presumption is against every novelty, and the *onus probandi* rests upon its advocates. Consequently the reviewer must prove, not only that his authorities *may*, but that they *must*, be understood in the sense of his theory, and cannot possibly be understood otherwise.

3. Since the theory is a novelty, and, as a theory, confessedly not drawn out by the authorities themselves, the reviewer is not at liberty to conclude it from what they say, even if what they say should seem to imply it. In understanding Catholic authorities, when the point to be proved is a novelty, and for which we have no express authority, the rule of strict construction obtains, and the authorities are to be restricted to what they explicitly assert; for it may be that the author did not foresee the consequences we deduce from his premises; that, if he foresaw them, he denied their legitimacy, or that, if he had foreseen them, and believed them to be legitimate, he would have modified his premises so as to have escaped them. This rule is itself conclusive against the theory; for it confessedly rests on the *explicit* authority of no Catholic theologian.

4. Since the theory is confessedly a novelty, and the principal authorities adduced in its support all flourished before the close of the seventeenth century, and some of

be his doctrine, and therefore are unable to imagine what it is he means by the spiritual nature, when distinguished from the intellect. We shall be obliged to him, if he will be so kind as to inform us. Catholic theology can hardly accept the sentimentalism of Jacobi, or the transcendentalism of Schelling, Cousin, or Coleridge, and perhaps the reviewer will find it is not useless to revise his psychology.

them before the close of the fifth, without its having been hitherto deduced from them, the *presumption* is that they do not warrant it; for if they did, we may reasonably conclude that it would have been drawn from them before now. It is true, the reviewer says, that "it is in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the principle he contends for, that development should be developed"; but the *petitio principii* is not a respectable figure of logic, and it is not allowable to assume development as the medium of proving development.

5. It is a still further *presumption* against the supposition that the authorities cited warrant the theory, that no *Catholic* has ever so held. The theory is not only a novelty,—in Catholic theology, we mean, for in Protestantism it is no novelty,—but a novelty that comes to us from without; and it cannot be supposed for a moment that an Anglican minister, as Mr. Newman was, though *in transitu* from heresy and schism to truth and unity, however great his abilities, deep his religious feelings, extensive his learning, or sincere and honest his intentions, yet destitute of the graces of the sacraments, and uninitiated into the science of Catholic theology, should better understand Catholic theologians than they understand, or have hitherto understood, one another.

6. The more especially is this to be said, when the theory is confessedly adopted as an hypothesis, as an expedient for getting rid of a difficulty which cannot, without heresy, be assumed to be a difficulty at all. We are bound, as Catholics to take our reading of history and philosophy from the church, and not our reading of the church from history and philosophy. The theory implies that the teaching of the church is to be taken from history and philosophy, and says so and so the church must have believed, because so and so history and philosophy, as we understand them, teach,—the very error broached by Abelard in his *Introductio ad Theologiam*, for which St. Bernard so sharply censures him, and which is at least the seminal principle of rationalism.

7. We insist on these presumptions, themselves in fact conclusive, not because we propose to avail ourselves of them to much extent in solving the difficulties suggested by the authorities cited, but because we wish the developmentists to perceive their exact position and its responsibilities. It would not surprise us, if, in ranging through the long catalogue of Catholic theologians, who have discussed

all manner of subjects, in every possible point of view, and, first or last, emitted many singular opinions, some half a dozen should be found who have said things which an ingenious fancy or a subtle speculator may, when taken from their connection, detached from the special purpose of the writer, and from the general principles of theological science which must restrict their meaning and application, develop into a sense not absolutely unfavorable to the theory in question. But this, if so, is nothing to the purpose. Single doctors are not to be interpreted by a theory invented especially for their interpretation, but by a rule drawn from the general current of theology. What they say which appears exceptional, must, as far as possible, be reduced to the rule, and what cannot be so reduced must be regarded as a private opinion, at best as a *sententia in ecclesia*, not as *sententia ecclesiæ*, and therefore as unauthoritative, on which we can never venture to build any thing to be put forth as the doctrine of the church. Nothing is more unscientific, nothing theologically more reprehensible, than to rove through the multitude of doctors, seize upon their private opinions, their incidental expressions, their *obiter dicta*, their special solutions of special problems, as primitive *data*, and generalize them into a theory to be henceforth taken as the sense of Catholic doctors, and the recognized doctrine of the church of God. And yet this is an exact description of what is done, or attempted to be done, by Mr. Newman and his school; and their theory is at best, in its most innocent statement, simply a theory for proving that the *sententiæ in ecclesia* are the true and proper *sententiæ ecclesiæ*, as they themselves virtually, if not expressly maintain. What else is the meaning of such a sentence as this? "In fact, it is only in accordance with, it is only an instance of, the very principle we have been contending for, that development should be developed; that a principle on which the church has ever proceeded [unconsciously for the most part], and which her greatest doctors have *from time to time* recognized and fully allowed, should at *last*, by the progress of controversy, have to be drawn forth into a *consistent and systematic theory*."

But, in addition to this, we must remark that the reviewer has enumerated in his article six classes of developments, and confessedly cites authorities for only the last two. Why is this? Do these two include the other four? If so, his classification is unscientific. If not, if the six classes are

mutually distinguishable, *per differentiam*, how conclude the truth of the four from the proof of the two? Is this accidental, the result of a loose manner of thinking, and of an unscientific manner of writing? or is it designed, and intended to enable the reviewer, in case his proofs should turn out to be insufficient to prove the developments in the special sense to which he adduces them, to insist that he has nevertheless sustained his theory, if they are found sufficient to prove them in *some* other sense which he has recognized?

The first class of developments described, but taken for granted, are those which scandalize us the most, because they strike at the mystery of the Trinity, the foundation of the Christian profession, are those on which Mr. Newman places the greatest reliance, and from which he draws the principal illustrations of his theory; and, also, because they are those on which the weight of authority is overwhelming against him. To assume, as the reviewer does, that the doctrine of the Trinity was only imperfectly understood and believed before the Nicene Council, to assert of the ante-Nicene fathers generally, that in treating this holy mystery they erred in thought and expression, held opinions subsequently condemned by the church, and yet were far from "doctrinal error," and to assume such a horrible doctrine as a matter of course, as a thing which will be admitted without controversy, is presuming a little too much on the ignorance, stupidity, or indifference of the Catholic public. It is not less scandalous than the reason the reviewer assigns, near the close of his article, why his theory, as some have objected, will not impair the evidences of Christianity; namely, that the argument it impairs can affect only a limited class of persons; that is, the ignorant may have as good evidence as they had before! But waiving this, we come without further preface to the two kinds of developments which the reviewer does attempt to prove, and to the authorities he cites in their support. These are what he calls *ethical* developments and *logical* developments. We begin with the ethical.

1. An ethical development, according to the reviewer, "arises from the gradual action of the Christian mind upon revealed truths or principles," is "the gradual growth of an idea under the influence of pious meditation and practical realization." As an instance of what he means, he cites the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the ever-blessed Virgin. His positions with regard to this doctrine are two:—1. The doctrine is an ethical development; 2. It can be

defined to be of faith. His conclusion is, if this can be, then the whole class of ethical developments. To prove his two positions he cites Petavius, Vasquez, and Suarez.

But what are these ethical developments? Whence originates the idea which gradually grows under the influence of pious meditation? Is it the *revelatum* itself? No; for if it were, it would not be a development. Is it an idea implicitly contained in the *revelatum*? No; for if it were, it would be a *logical* development, not ethical, since it is by a logical and not an ethical process that we draw forth from one truth another which it implicitly contains. What is it, then? It can be nothing but an idea, a pious thought, which springs up in the Christian mind on the occasion of meditating on the revealed truth or principle. Then it is either a special revelation to the pious mind, or it is an idea furnished by the pious mind itself. In either case, it is not a doctrine contained in the word of God, written or unwritten, but something which the Christian mind, by natural or supernatural means, *adds* to it. This is what the writer must mean, if he distinguishes, *per differentiam*, ethical from logical developments. The simple point for the reviewer to prove, then, is, that an idea of this sort, after having floated for a while in the minds of the faithful, and become a prevailing opinion, may be defined *de fide*. The simple statement is sufficient to prove the contrary.

Such being an ethical development, it will be seen at a glance that the reviewer, by assuming the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception to be an ethical development, denies it to be an apostolic tradition, and supposes it to be a mere pious thought which some day sprang up in some devout mind while meditating on the glorious privileges of the Blessed Virgin, or at best a private revelation made subsequently to the time of the apostles, and therefore in either case incapable of being defined *de fide*, because it has not and cannot have the formal reason of divine and *catholic* faith. This is a bold denial to begin with,—a formal decision, on private authority, of a question which many people have supposed could be decided only by the public and infallible authority of the church. Many of the faithful have cherished the hope that the church would one day decide the doctrine to be of faith; for they have believed it to be a *doctrine of apostolic tradition*, though less explicitly recognized by the early fathers in their writings than it is now; for, as Suarez says, they were engaged in matters of

more pressing moment, having to defend the very foundation of the Christian profession of faith. Perhaps these will not agree with the reviewer in his decision, which, if sustained, cuts off the hope they have cherished.

But do the authorities sustain the reviewer? In order to do so, they must prove two points:—1. That the doctrine is an ethical development; 2. That it can, being such, be defined of faith. Petavius gives it as his *private* opinion, that the doctrine is not of faith, that is, is not an apostolic tradition,—and he may have considered it to be something approaching what the reviewer calls an ethical development, or rather he in fact held it to be supernatural, and a posterior revelation, by ordinary or extraordinary means, to individuals; but he says nothing as to its capacity to be defined of faith. This was not his problem. His problem was, how to account for a belief so extended and so firmly held, not taken from the Scriptures, not known to be a doctrine of tradition, which has never been defined by the church, and has been denied or doubted by many eminent doctors and saints. And he attempts to solve it by representing the belief to be revealed in the sense recognized by St. Augustine in the passage he cites from him, and which he contends is sufficient to produce in individuals, without a decision of the church, “what the Greeks call *πληροφορίαν* and the Latins *firmam persuasionem*.” The presumption is, that Petavius did not imply or believe that the church could decide it to be of faith.* The authorities Petavius cites are cited to prove this view, and, as it is not a view we now controvert, they are not against us.

Vasquez, in the passage cited, does not represent the doctrine as an ethical development; he only maintains that an argument not light *for its truth* may be collected from private revelations, miracles, and the common consent of the faithful, since the time of St. Thomas, who doubted the doctrine,—a fact which we have never heard questioned. Suarez says the doctrine may be defined of faith, but denies it to be an *ethical* development; for he says expressly, that to such a definition “some supernatural truth contained implicitly in tradition or Scripture” is necessary, as we read in the place cited by the reviewer. Here is all the proof of ethical developments which the reviewer has adduced, and it amounts to nothing. But, even if his authorities were ex-

* Petavius, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 14, cap. 2, sec. 8-11.

press to the points to which he adduces them, they would avail him nothing, for he would have even then only an *opinion in the church*, which is not authoritative for doctrine.

The reviewer should have selected an instance of unquestionable ethical development, already defined to be of faith. One such instance would have decided the question at once and for ever. Perhaps he had no such instance to adduce, and therefore is not to be blamed. As to the question, whether the Immaculate Conception can be defined of faith, we have nothing to say ; for it is not the question before us. The question before us is, whether, if it be a mere ethical development, it can be so defined. This the reviewer asserts, but fails to prove. For ourselves, we are content to await the action of the church, and not to take it upon us to advise her what she ought to do, or what we wish her to do. It is hers to teach, ours to believe ; and we have no wishes but hers on the subject. With these, when made known to us, we will do our best, grace assisting us, to comply.

2. So much for *ethical* developments ; we pass now to the *logical* developments. "The various kinds of development already mentioned," says the reviewer, "by bringing consciously before the mind propositions which before were there only unconsciously or even only potentially or in germ, lead to a last kind, viz., *logical deductions from themselves*." Logical developments are, then, logical deductions from developments, that is, developments of developments. A slight objection occurs *in limine* to these logical developments, namely, the reality of the developments from which they are logical deductions does not appear to be proved. The first four are confessedly left without proof, affirmed, in so far as developments, gratuitously ; and the fifth, we have just seen, is not sustained by the authorities. But let this pass ; for we assure our Anglican friends that it is not the only instance in which they seem to us to imagine that substantial conclusions may be drawn from unsubstantial premises.

For this class of developments the reviewer cites Melchior Cano, Vasquez, Bellarmine, and Suarez. The point he wishes to establish by these authorities is, as we understand it, that logical deductions from developments, *interveniente ecclesiæ definitione*, are *de fide divina et catholica*. Do these high authorities prove this point ? We begin with Melchior

Cano, the writer who, in the judgment of the reviewer, has come nearer than any other named to giving a distinct and systematic theory of developments. He is the principal witness introduced, and the reviewer says,—“The fact of his having taken part in the Council of Trent gives of course an especial weight to his judgment on points such as these.” Let us examine his testimony.

The reviewer has two points to make out :—1. That, *interveniente ecclesiæ definitione*, logical deductions from developments are *de fide* ; and, 2. That, the definition of the church intervening, the developments from which they are deductions are also *de fide*. His doctrine must be, that theological conclusions may be defined of faith, and when they are, they become the principles of new conclusions, and these again of another series, and so on, for aught that appears, *ad infinitum*. Does Cano say this ? He shall answer in a passage the reviewer has himself cited. Cano, we must premise, is discussing the formal reason of faith and theology, and defining what are the proper principles of the *science* of theology, or from which, by the natural light of reason, theological conclusions may be deduced. These, he says, are not so diffuse and ample as some people imagine ; and, after excluding every thing the *ratio formalis* of which is not *prima veritas revelans et ecclesia Catholica proponens*, he says, “They are all those things which are divinely revealed through the sacred authors.” He then proceeds to define who are sacred authors, and restricts them, in a word, to our Lord himself, and to the prophets and apostles. Then follows immediately the passage cited, the precise purpose of which is to show that councils, pontiffs, and doctors are not sacred authors. Thus he says,—“Although the authority of councils and of the apostolic see, as well as the concert and one accord of the saints, makes the faith of the Catholic dogma certain, *we do not therefore accumulate principles of theology or extend its formal reason*. *Because*, as I have often elsewhere said, neither the council, nor the sovereign pontiff, nor the saints, interpreters of the Scriptures, put forth for the faithful new revelations ; but either hand down to posterity integral and untarnished those which the church has received from the apostles, or express and interpret them ; or at least collect (*colligunt*) their consequences and things connected with them, and manifest the things which are adverse and repugnant to them.”*

**De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, cap. 2.

This is a faithful and exact translation of the passage the reviewer cites; and this, unless we are altogether mistaken, is so far from sustaining his doctrine, that it is point blank against it. A better text against development we could not have wished. It certainly denies absolutely the first point, deductions from developments, for it denies all accumulation of principles of theology, or extension of its formal reason.

The reviewer, however, we infer from his italics and his comment, fancies that he finds his developments asserted in the third thing specified which Cano says is or may be done by the council, the pontiff, or the saints. He reads *colligant* where we read *colligunt*, and seems to translate, mentally, *colligare consequentia*, to *deduce consequences*. Or, be it that he understands it to bind up or connect with the apostolic revelations their *consectaria et connexa*, we do not see how that favors development. Who ever denied to the church the right to draw inferences, or even in her definitions to condemn the denial of the certain deductions from the faith? But to do either is a different thing from defining the *consequentia et connexa*, or *annexa*, as the reviewer reads, to be of faith,—the point we deny, and which was to be proved.

But this passage itself proves, that, in the view of Cano, they could not be defined of faith, properly so called; because, if they could be, they would, since they would then be portions of the Catholic faith, be principles of theology, and then by their definition there would be an accumulation of the principles of theology, or an extension of its formal reason, which is what Cano expressly denies. If the reviewer had analyzed the passage, he would have seen that it condemns his whole theory of development under any and every possible aspect. There cannot be development without new *credibilia*, as the reviewer himself cites Suarez to prove; and there cannot be new *credibilia* without an accumulation of principles of theology or an extension of its formal reason; for each new *credibile* becomes a new *principium theologiæ*. If no new *principium theologiæ*, then no new *credibile*, and then no development. It is the reviewer's own witness that authorizes this conclusion so express against him.

But we will not rest on mere reasoning, however certain and conclusive. The reviewer would persuade us that Melchior Cano held that theological conclusions, or deductions

from the faith by the light of reason, are *de fide*. Now Cano has discussed this question *ex professo* in the fourth chapter of his *De Locis Theologicis*, the chapter immediately preceding the one from which the reviewer cited three passages to prove his position. The title of the chapter is *Quæ sint Quæstiones, seu Conclusiones Theologicae*. Near the close of the chapter he says :—

“Fidei porro quæstio *bifariam* intelligitur: una, quæ immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, quæ Deus ecclesiæ suæ verbo edidit, aut scripto; altera, quæ mediate fidei est, cujusmodi sunt omnes conclusiones, *quas ordine disciplinæ ex illis prioribus* colligere et definire possumus. Quæ, quoniam non *in se ipsis*, sed in aliis tamquam principiis revelatæ a Deo sunt, *mediate fidei* dicuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare *hoc modo* dicitur. Atque equidem illud etiam animadverto, eas non abs re *forsitan* quæstiones fidei vocari, quæ vehementer ad ecclesiæ doctrinam pertinent, fideique sunt propter affinitatem appendices; *non quod aut ex iis pendeat fides, aut iis sublati funditus illa tollatur*, sed quod affecta ægraque sit, si harum rerum veritas labefiat, quæ illi hærent et *adjunguntur*. Oportet nempe in ecclesia sanam doctrinam esse et verbum sanum, ut apostolus ait, 1. ad Tim. 1. 10, et alibi passim. Quemadmodum autem morbi quidam lethales sunt; alii vero non interficiunt quidem hominem, sed afficiunt tamen valetudinem; sic errores quidam non fidem extinguunt, sed obscurant; non evertunt, sed infirmant; morbumque afferunt, non exitium. Sicut ergo quod saluti est noxium, vitæ id quoque noxium est, ita quodcumque sanæ doctrinæ adversatur, hoc fidei est etiam *quodam modo* adversum. Ex quo intelligitur, *quæstiones illas quæ doctrinæ ecclesiasticæ sanitatem spectant, ad fidem in suo quodam modo spectare, sed nos hujus generis controversias NON IN FIDE PROPRIE, sed propter fidem esse dicimus; nec qui in his errant, eos in fide, sed præter fidem errare existimamus.*”

And again, at the conclusion of one, and just preceding another passage cited by the reviewer, and which must have been under his eyes,—“Nec enim sic fidei adhærescunt, ut separari ab illa non queant. *Ægrotat sane, ut ita dicam, in eorum errore fides, non perit.*”

This is sufficient; for it cannot be necessary to add, that to deny any proposition of faith is mortal, and does not merely obscure or weaken the faith, but kills it outright. The reviewer's witness is decidedly against him; yet we agree that “the fact of the author having taken part in the Council of Trent of course gives an especial weight to his judgment on such points as these.”

It is easy to understand the reviewer's mistake. He ap

parently, at least, confounds in his own mind Christian doctrine and theology. If he had distinguished between *faith* and the *science* of theology, between the *sources* of the former, and the *sources* of the latter, and borne in mind that Cano was professedly treating *de Locis Theologicis*, whence arguments may be drawn to elucidate and defend the faith, or to refute its adversaries, he would have understood what is said of *initii*s and *seminibus* not of the *beginnings* or *seminal* principles of the faith, or what is revealed only seminally or potentially, but of the science of theology, and not have claimed him as an authority for developments of which he was, as we had supposed was well known, one of the sturdiest opponents.

Vasquez we must reluctantly pass over, for we have not access to his works, and it is impossible to determine, from the brief citation the reviewer has made, whether the theological conclusions he asserts may be defined *de fide* are of the class which we admit may be so defined, or of the class which we assert cannot be. From what we know of him, however, we presume his doctrine on the point to be that of Suarez, and, if so, it will be answered in what we say of Suarez himself. Bellarmine will by and by explain himself. The only point to which he is cited is, that *evident deductions* from the word of God, written or unwritten, are of faith, which in one sense we concede, and nothing proves that this is not Bellarmine's sense. If the reviewer contends to the contrary, he must prove it; for the *onus probandi* is upon him, since all the presumptions are against him. We proceed, therefore, at once to Suarez, the reviewer's chief witness after Melchior Cano.

Suarez is not an author for a novice like ourselves to grapple with. He was a great man, and, since the schoolmen, none have surpassed him, although his opinions on school questions may sometimes be disputed, and we have been more accustomed to see them cited to be controverted than as authority. As an authority he is no doubt high, but by no means so high as St. Thomas, nor on a question of Catholic doctrine, higher than Bossuet. Nevertheless, we have no reason to be dissatisfied, and we hope the reviewer will continue to be satisfied, with him. We shall, in what we say, confine ourselves to the citations of the reviewer, and assume that they are correctly made. In the place cited, Suarez asks, "whether, in the church of Christ, as to *some* propositions to be believed *de fide*, in later times, which before

were not explicitly believed as of faith, the faith has grown," and answers:—

"From what has been said the negative appears to follow; for the infused wisdom in this church cannot increase even *extensive*, otherwise the later pastors of the church might surpass in this wisdom the apostles. Also, there are in this church no new revelations, and therefore no new credibles. And, finally, so the scholastics above cited appear to think, saying that the faith of the church is not augmented as to the number of credibles, but is only further explained. St. Thomas also says on this question, that nothing is taught by the church not contained in the doctrine of the apostles, but the faith is further explained and proposed to the faithful on account of heretics [St. Thomas says, *contra errores insurgentes*]; whence also Waldens says, the church explains the ancient faith, but cannot found a new article; so also teach Castro and CANO."

Thus far Suarez gives the reason and authorities for denying that there can be any increase of the faith in the lapse of time, even in the restricted sense of his question; and, what we wish our readers to bear in mind, for a reason which will by and by appear, he understands St. Thomas in the very sense we ourselves did. Is Suarez about to deny what is here adduced? Or is he about to introduce something which will essentially modify the plain and natural sense of what is here said? If he is, here are strong reasons and fearful odds against him. But after referring us to the part of his work in which he treats the subject *ex professo*, he continues:—

"I say, therefore, briefly, that it is to be simply asserted, indeed, that the church *never gives a new faith, but always confirms and explains the ancient*; and so also teach the ancient fathers, St. Vincent of Lerins, *Contr. Profan. Voc. Novit.* c. 7, &c., St. Irenæus, *Contr. Hæres.*, and St. Jerome on that Psalm, *Dominus narrabit in Scripturis populorum, et principum horum, qui fuerunt in ea* where he explains this word *fuerunt* so as to show that those princes were the apostles."

This is express. For there cannot be development without new credibles, and new credibles, cannot be proposed without the proposition of new faith. Whatever modification of this Suarez may contend for, he can contend for nothing corresponding to the developments in question, without contradicting himself. But let us read on.

"Yet notwithstanding this, it is still true that there is *some* proposition—*aliquam propositionem*—now explicitly believed of faith, which was not formerly explicitly believed by the church, although implicitly

contained in the ancient doctrine. The examples above cited prove this; and it is best proved by that of baptism given by a heretic in the form of the church: Whether is it valid, or to be repeated? For in the time of St. Cyprian neither was of faith, and therefore, although he himself, and the pope, St. Stephen, held opposite opinions, they nevertheless remained in the union of the same faith, for St. Stephen defined nothing. But afterwards it was delivered of faith, that such baptism is valid and not to be repeated; and many similar instances may be adduced; and this unquestionably relates to the *defining* power of the church. Nor is a new revelation necessary for this, but the infallible *assistance* of the Holy Ghost suffices for explicitly defining and proposing what was already implicitly contained in revelation,—*revelatis*. And so the authors are to be explained. For the explication, they say, the church can make [*subintellige, propter errores insurgentes*], is *sometimes* by the explication of a new proposition contained in the ancient. But this proposition is never a new article, *because* it does not pertain *ad materiam veluti substantialem* of the faith to be explicitly believed by all,—for that was always sufficiently explained in the symbol,—but it often pertains to the doctrine of faith, which it behooves the doctors of the church to know according to the varieties and the necessities of the times.”

Here the reviewer fancies that he finds his theory of developments; but he is mistaken. Suarez asserts here only two things:—1. The faith may be further explained and proposed *contra errores insurgentes*, according to the authorities,—as was the validity of baptism in the form of the church by a heretic, against the error of St. Cyprian,—as was the doctrine, that “in Christ there are two natural wills and two natural operations,” against the heresy of the monothelites,—or as the doctrine, that “the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration,” against the Berengarians and the consubstantialists, and others of a like kind;—and, 2. That this explication is *sometimes*, not always, but sometimes, by the *explication* of a new proposition contained in the ancient. Here is all that Suarez asserts. The whole question between us and the reviewer turns on this *new proposition*, by the explication of which the explication of the faith is sometimes made *contra errores insurgentes*. What is this new proposition? First, it is not a *proposition* of faith, properly so called, for Suarez expressly places it within the province, not of the *ecclesia docens* or *proponens*, but of the *ecclesia definiens*, for he says, it without any doubt relates to the defining power of the church. It is, then, necessarily, not something new *proposed* by the church, but a new proposition *defined* by the church.

Secondly, it is never *a new article*, because it does not pertain *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*, to be explicitly believed by all, since that was *always sufficiently explained*. It cannot, then, be a development; for it is undeniable that the development in the sense of the theory is a new article, proposes new faith, if not *quoad materiam*, at least *quoad formam*, and it is precisely of formal faith Suarez is speaking. This is decisive against the reviewer. And lastly, it often pertains to the doctrine of the faith, which it behooves the doctors of the church to know. Yet not these at all times, but only *juxta varietatem et necessitatem temporum*. But, as the faith to be believed by all was always sufficiently explained, the doctors can need this, not to propose or to explain the faith *propter fideles*, but only for the avoiding of error, or the defending of the faith against *errores insurgentes*. Make what you will of it, then, its explication can be only the application of the faith held from the beginning to the definition of some new proposition which the church, in the discharge of her mission, in space and time, encounters; and therefore is only what we ourselves, under the head of negative developments, admitted in our article against Mr. Newman. Thus far, Suarez not only does not recognize the reviewer's developments, but clearly condemns them; for all the explication of the faith, which he thus far admits, is *propter errores insurgentes*, and such explications of new propositions of the faith held from the beginning, as are necessary for the avoidance or the condemnation of these errors. Such explications we of course admit the church can make, and is bound to make. But Suarez concludes:—

“In fine, as to what relates to the apostles, we may distinguish a two-fold order of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time; for some pertain, as it were, to the substance of the mysteries,—as in the mystery of the Incarnation, *Christ has two wills*,—and in that of the Eucharist, *the substance of the bread does not remain after consecration*, &c.; and we must believe *those of this kind* were known by the apostles not only implicitly, but explicitly; because they had the fullest understanding of the Scriptures and all the mysteries which pertain to the tradition of faith. But the others are *contingent propositions of what in the time of the apostles had not yet happened*,—such as *this man* (Pius IX., for instance) is pope, *this council* is a true council, &c.; and it was not necessary that the apostles should have known these explicitly, it sufficed to know them in the universal; for it was not necessary that all future things should be revealed to them. And in this way, perhaps,

they were not explicitly instructed on the day of Pentecost in all the mysteries, *as to all their circumstances*, such as the manner of calling the gentiles, and of the cessation of the Jewish legal rites, as may be plainly collected from Acts x. and xv. And thus also St. John, in the Apocalypse, understood many things of the future not revealed to the others, and perhaps many of them will not be certainly and explicitly known till they come to pass. Thus *in the knowledge of these things the church may make progress*, even with the certitude of faith, by the intervention of the definition of the church, which, because of the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, has the force of revelation, or infallibly applies the revelation of the universal to the particular object.”*

Here is the whole text cited by the reviewer, and which we have taken the liberty to translate for the purpose of more easily marking the sense in which we understand it; we find it a clear and express statement of the doctrine we hold, and an equally clear and express condemnation of the reviewer's. Suarez asserts distinctly two orders of propositions which are explicitly believed in the lapse of time:—1. Certain propositions which pertain *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum*; and 2. Certain contingent propositions of things, which in the time of the apostles had not yet happened. The first order includes the propositions which Mr. Newman and his friends rank under the head of developments. This is undeniable, for they expressly teach that the doctrine of the two natural wills was a development, and Suarez expressly cites this as an instance of the first order of propositions which, he contends, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time. This being evident, they claim Suarez as authority for developments; this being evident, we claim him as express authority against them. The explicitness acquired in the lapse of time by this whole order of propositions must be understood, not *quoad fideles*, but *quoad hæreticos* or *errores insurgentes*; because, 1, Suarez asserts that these propositions—therefore the reviewer's developments—pertain *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum*, and from that fact argues that they must have been explicitly known by the apostles; 2, Because he has just said that what pertains *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*, which we understand to be the same thing, was *always* sufficiently explained, that is, *quoad fideles*; and, 3, Because he denies that the new proposition—by the explication of which *that* explication is sometimes made which the

* Suarez, *De Fide*, Disput. 2, sec. 6, as cited by the *Dublin Review*.

authorities say the church can make *propter hæreticos*—is ever a new article, and does so on the ground that it never pertains *ad materiam veluti substantialem fidei*. Either, then, Suarez contradicts himself, which it will not do to suppose, or the first order of propositions explicitly believed in the lapse of time, and which include what Mr. Newman and his friends call developments, belong *veluti ad substantiam mysteriorum*, and were explicitly known by the apostles and always sufficiently explained, *quoad fideles*. Then the explicitness acquired in the lapse of time, which he predicates of them, can be explicitness only *contra errores insurgentes*, which is the express doctrine of St. Thomas, and which we maintain. Mr. Newman and his friends evidently cannot assert developments on the authority of Suarez, for the doctrines they term developments he asserts positively were explicitly known by the apostles, and always sufficiently explained, and, moreover, excludes from these the *new proposition* by the explication of which the faith is sometimes further explained on account of errors which spring up.*

Moreover, we are compelled so to understand Suarez, not from his own words only, but in order to save him from contradicting the express testimony of Scripture, of Pope Agatho, and the sixth œcumenical council. He gives as an example of his first order of propositions, the doctrine that *Christ has two wills*. If we suppose him to maintain that this was only implicitly believed at first, and has been explicitly believed only in the lapse of time, we must suppose him to maintain that it was not *de fide* prior to its definition against the monothelites, and then that before that definition the dogma of the monothelites was not a heresy,—a proposition which we cannot persuade ourselves Suarez was the man to maintain; for we say with Tournely,—“*Contendimus cum Scrutinii doctrinarum auctore* [Antonio de Panormo] *antecedenter ad sextum concilium œcumenicum*

*This is conclusive against the reviewer. He must say, either that his developments are included in the first order of propositions defined by Suarez, or that they are not. If he says the latter, he must concede at once that Suarez is against him, because he excludes them from the number of propositions which, Suarez says, are explicitly believed in the lapse of time; if he says the former, which he does and must, if he pretends to cite the authority of Suarez in his favor, he must also concede that Suarez is against him, for then he expressly says they were explicitly known by the apostles, and always sufficiently explained.

hæreticum monothelistarum dogma. Id clare demonstrant Scripturæ et sanctorum patrum testimonia, quibus duas in Christo voluntates probant sextæ synodi patres: *Non mea sed tua voluntas fiat*, Luc. xxii. 24; *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu*, Matt. xxvi. 39;—unde in epistola synodica Agathonis ad præfatam synodum directa habetur: *Juxta quod prophetæ olim de Christo, et ipse nos erudit, et sanctorum patrum nobis tradidit symbolum, duas naturales voluntates in eo, et duas naturales operationes prædicamus.*”^{*} We must, therefore, understand the explicitness predicated to be not of the doctrine considered in its relation to the faithful, but considered in relation to the errors which contradict or impugn it. In regard to the first order, then, Suarez asserts nothing that we have denied, or which we did not expressly admit; consequently, again, he does not assert the developments the reviewer maintains, otherwise the reviewer would not have undertaken to prove any thing against us; but instead of smiling at what he calls our *stationariness* of doctrine, he would have shown us that we concede all that he and his school contend for.

There remains, now, only the second order of propositions. Suarez unquestionably means to maintain that there is besides the new explication of the faith which is made *propter hæreticos*, as he says,—*propter errores insurgentes*, as we say after St. Thomas, for a reason obvious to every theologian,—there is another sort of explication which may be made with the certitude of faith *propter fideles*, and without a new revelation, in regard to which the church may be said to make progress. These are the second order he describes,—including the new propositions, by the explication of which he says the faith is further explained and proposed on account of errors which from time to time are encountered by the church,—and which are expressly defined to be “contingent propositions of what in the time of the apostles had not yet happened.” These he contends the church may define with the certitude of faith, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, without a new revelation, because in defining them she only *applies* the revelation of the universal, which she has received from the apostles, to the particular object. The positive progress, or development, if you choose, of the faith which he admits

^{*}*De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris*, art. 2. Vide etiam Perrone, *De Incarnatione*, p. 2, cap. 4, propositio.

is, then, restricted to this class of propositions, which pertain rather to the mission of the church in space and time, than to her faith, strictly so called, and are, therefore, propositions of *facts* rather than of *law*. The reviewer will find them discussed at great length under the head of *Dogmatic Facts* by almost any of our modern theologians; and if he attends to the controversy which grew out of the condemnation of the five propositions from the book of Jansenius, he will find much to satisfy him that his doctrine of development cannot be admitted by Catholic theology. So far as concerns ourselves, we admit the doctrine of Suarez with regard to these contingent propositions, for it is only the application of the revelation of the universal to the particular, which, in our last article, we conceded might be made with the certainty of faith; for what is revealed as the particular in the universal, or as the part in the whole, we concede, being formally revealed, is *accedente ecclesie definitione, de fide*.

If the reviewer had attended to the sense of Suarez, he would have seen that what Suarez contends for is nothing but his own *third* class of developments, namely, the authoritative application of old principles to new cases, which even the reviewer himself seems to doubt can be made with the certainty of faith; for he represents it as only "the opinion of many theologians." Is the reviewer turning against himself? But, by the way, who before ever regarded the application of the faith to the definition of a new question as a development of doctrine? In making such application there is no development of the faith, for the decision requires only the application of the standard which the church has had from the beginning in Scripture and tradition. Suppose the church knows the faith beforehand; she then knows all that she needs to know in order to decide in relation to any question what the faith is, or what it is not. The question is always one of identity. She knows always what is not faith by knowing what is faith, as God knows evil by knowing its opposite, good.

But we have almost lost sight of logical developments in following Suarez, who was cited to prove them. As logical deductions from developments we may dismiss them without further comment, for the reviewer has cited no authority for them, and his own witness, Cano, positively denies them. One word, however, on logical conclusions, properly so called, and we will conclude this part of the discussion.

The reviewer has cited Bellarmine in a passage which we shall cite at length, in a moment, against his conclusion, to prove that what is *evidently deduced* from the word of God, written or unwritten, or what is revealed only *mediately* in Scripture or tradition, is *de fide*, which appears at first view to be at variance with the doctrine we maintain, and for the reviewer. But it is admitted by all that there is a class of deductions which are *de fide*, such as are evidently deduced from premises, *both of which are revealed truths*. With regard to these there is no dispute with the reviewer. Besides these there are what are called “theological conclusions,” or conclusions evidently deduced from premises, one of which is *de fide*, the other certain by the natural light of reason. These, again, are divided into two classes,—those in which the conclusion is revealed as the part in the whole, or the singular in the universal, as *Christ died for me* is revealed in the proposition, *Christ died for all men*; and those which are revealed only as the effect in the cause, or the property in the essence, as *Christus est risibilis* is revealed in the proposition, *Christus est homo*. The first of these two classes, it will be seen, are the contingent propositions of which Suarez speaks, and which he contends, *interveniēte ecclesiæ definitione*, are *de fide*. With regard to these, again, we have no controversy with the reviewer; for though they are not explicitly revealed *quoad nos*, they are *formally* revealed, and have the *ratio formalis fidei*. The controversy turns on this second class. These we deny to be of faith, because they are not *revelata*. Thus, *Omnis homo est risibilis*; *atqui Christus est homo*; *ergo, Christus est risibilis*. Here the conclusion is evidently *not* revealed; for the fact on which it depends for its cause, namely, that risibility is a property of human nature, is not a revealed truth, and is certain only with the certainty of natural reason; consequently, the conclusion is certain only with the certainty of natural reason. It is revealed that Christ is a man, but the truth we apply to him, for the reason that he is a man, is not revealed, nor made more certain by the truth that is revealed. That conclusions of this class are not *de fide*, prior to the definition of the church, is certain. Thus Tournely, *ubi supra*:—“Conclusiones *mere et vere* theologicas ex duabus præmissis, quarum una est de fide, altera vero lumine naturali nota, certo et evidenter deductas, non esse de fide. . . . Ita Gregorius, Major, Gabriel, Cajetanus, et Thomistæ, Salamanticenses, Cardinalis de Lu-

go, Lorca, Valentia, Molina, Antonius de Panormo, et alii passim, quos refert et sequitur *Suarez, Disput. 3, de Fide*, sect. 11, nu. 3, 7, et 10." Here is the authority of Suarez himself, and we have already had that of Cano, that theological conclusions are not *de fide*, at least prior to the definition of the church, and we have found no theologian who contends that they are.

But if they are not revealed truths,—if they are truths certain only with the certainty of natural reason,—they cannot, without *gratia inspirationis*, be defined *de fide*; for the *ratio formalis fidei* is, as St. Thomas teaches, *prima veritas revelans*, and, as all agree, of divine and *Catholic* faith, *prima veritas revelans et ecclesia proponens*. But these, not being revealed truths, want the first essential condition, the *prima veritas* or *Deus revelans*, and therefore cannot be of faith. In proof of our conclusion we cite a passage from Bellarmine, a part of which the reviewer has cited to prove the contradictory.

"Prima igitur regula est, Quando universa ecclesia aliquid tamquam fidei dogma amplectitur, quod non invenimus in divinis litteris, necesse est dicere, ex apostolorum traditione id haberi. Ratio hujus est, quia cum ecclesia universa errare non possit, cum sit *columna et firmamentum veritatis*, 1 Tim. 3, et cum de ea dictum sit a Domino, Matt. 16, *Portæ inferi non prævalebunt adversus eam*; certe quod ecclesia *de fide esse credit*, *sine dubio est de fide*; at nihil est de fide, nisi quod Deus per apostolos aut prophetas revelavit, aut quod evidenter inde deducitur. Non enim novis revelationibus nunc regitur ecclesia, sed in iis permanet quæ tradiderunt illi, qui ministri fuerunt sermonis, et propterea dicitur, Eph. 2. *Ædificata supra fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum*. Igitur illa omnia, quæ ecclesia fide tenet, tradita sunt ab apostolis, aut prophetis, aut scripto, aut verbo. Talis est perpetua virginitas beatæ Mariæ, numerous librorum canonicorum, et similia." *De Verbo Dei*, Lib. 4, cap. 9.

This, if we understand it, is conclusive. The church cannot define that to be of faith which she does not believe to be of faith; for her definition is only the solemn profession of her faith on the point defined. She cannot believe that to be of faith which is not of faith. These conclusions are confessedly not of faith before she defines them, and therefore she cannot define them to be of faith; otherwise she could solemnly profess to believe what, at the time, she does not and cannot believe. Thus, again, Tournely. *ubi supra*.

"Sententiam hanc exponit et probat *Scrutini* auctor, cap. 3, art. 5, nu. 19-22, et pro hac citat Waldensem, Alphonsum a Castro, Loricam, Canum, et Thomistas communiter, Molinam, Valentiam, Hurtadum, Tannerum, &c. In hanc sententiam coincidit opinio illustrissimi Tutelensis episcopi, in suo de elementis theologicis tractatu, ubi docet, *id numquam committere posse ecclesiam, ut meras conclusiones theologicas tamquam ad fidem Catholicam pertineant, declaret.*"

To the same effect Veronius, in his *De Regula Fidei Catholicæ*, cap. 1, sect. 1 et 2. "Illud omne et solum est de fide catholica, quod est revelatum in verbo Dei, et propositum omnibus ab ecclesia Catholica."—"Duo debent conjunctim adesse, quo doctrina aliqua sit fidei catholicæ. Alterum, ut sit revelata a Deo, per prophetas, apostolos, seu auctores canonicos. Alterum, ut sit proposita ab ecclesia. Si utrumque adsit alieni doctrinæ, illa fide divina et catholica est credenda; si alterum desit, seu revelatio, seu propositio ecclesiæ, non est fide divina et catholica credenda." This tract of Veronius was so highly esteemed by the Brothers Walenburch, that they adopted it in place of one of their own. To the same effect also we may refer to Melchior Cano,—already cited through Antonius de Panormo, an acute and learned author, who was Consultor to the Congregation of the Index, and *Qualificator Inquisitionis Romæ*,—*De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, cap. 2, a good authority in the estimation of our friend the developmentist. Silvius, also, a passable authority, may be adduced, *Summa*, 2, 2, Quæst. 1, art. 7:—"Erat quidem fidei, priusquam definitur ab ecclesia, et consequenter oppositum tenentes jam tum errabant in fide, sed inculpabiliter; quia non errabant in fide definita et declarata." We may also cite St. Thomas, although the reviewer does not appear to esteem him very highly:—"Sic igitur in fide si consideremus formalem rationem objecti, nihil est aliud quam *veritas prima*. Non enim fides de qua loquimur, assentit alicui, nisi quia est a Deo revelatum. *Summa*, 2, 2, Quæst. 1, art. 1. And, finally, we cite the following from St. Augustine, which we find in Bellarmine:—"Si quis sive de Christo, sive de ejus ecclesia, sive de quacunque alia re, quæ pertinet ad fidem, vitamque nostram [vestram, ed. Maur.], non dicam, si nos, sed quod Paulus adjecit, *Si angelus de cælo vobis annuntiaverit, præterquam quod in Scripturis legalibus, et Evangelicis accepistis, anathema sit.*" St. Aug., lib. 3, *Contr. Litt. Petil.*, cap. 6.

We might multiply authorities on this point to any ex-

tent, but these must suffice for the present. If theological conclusions themselves, for the reason that they are such conclusions, are not *de fide*, do not pertain to the *objectum materiale fidei*, then *a fortiori* not logical deductions from them. Consequently our friend's class of logical developments dissolve, and,

“ Like the baseless fabric of a vision,
Leave not a wrack behind.”

We have said *for the reason that they are such conclusions*: for nobody questions, that propositions, dogmas, articles, which are *a parte rei* logical conclusions from others, may be proposed and defined *de fide*; or that the fact that they are logical conclusions may be appealed to by the church and by doctors, as evidence of their truth, and as a conclusive reason why they must be believed, and cannot be denied without injury to the faith; but the church can never appeal to this fact as the motive of her decision, since the faith can never be discursive, and the Holy Ghost does not need syllogisms. The conclusions are defined, *ex parte definientis*, to be of faith, not *because* they are conclusions, but *because* they are *revelata*, and have the formal reason of faith, *Deus revelans*. The church often prefaces her decisions by arguments, drawn sometimes from reason, sometimes from tradition, more frequently from the Scriptures; but she does so in respect of those who are to receive her decision, not to set forth her own motives, for the motive of her decision is always *visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis*. Strange as it may seem, it can hardly be doubted that neglect to consider this very obvious fact is one of the most active causes of the mistakes and false reasoning of the developmentists in regard to theological conclusions.

We have but brief space to remark on the other authorities cited, and who are cited, not to prove any particular point, but developments in general. Moehler was a distinguished theologian, but needs to be read with care, and to be cited with caution, not so much because he is not sound, as because he deviates much—at least in the English translation, and we have not read him in the original—from the usual mode of presenting Catholic truth, and from the ordinary language of theologians. The passage cited, however, confirms our doctrine. Thus he says,—“One doctrine of faith hath subsisted, and must subsist, through the whole history of the church. *We will not and cannot believe*

otherwise than as our fathers have believed." We can conceive nothing more express against development than this. What follows speaks only of the progress that is made, not in the *faith*, but in *science*, in the scientific view which the mind takes of the several articles of faith in their mutual relations, in their connections, and general bearings,—that is, as we said, a progress not in the faith, but in that which is not it; and in this very sense, Moehler, the reviewer's own witness, understands St. Vincent of Lerins, as appears from the citation itself. That by this the faith gains in clearness, light, evidence,—in its relations, not *in se*,—we suppose few have been disposed to deny.

The reviewer cites anew a passage from St. Vincent of Lerins, which we ourselves cited, *Comm.* 1, cap. 23, but wholly disregards what precedes and follows it, and which must be taken into the account, if we wish to determine its sense. St. Vincent of Lerins most certainly does speak of a *gain, profit*, or increase [*profectus fidei*] of the faith in the process of time. Nobody denies this. But what does he mean? He himself tells us, in the clauses which the reviewer discreetly suppresses, and in what immediately follows:—"Fas est etenim prisca illa cœlestis philosophiæ dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur; sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncantur, aut mutilentur. Accipiant licet *evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem*, sed retineant necesse est plenitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem." Here the holy doctor defines what the faith gains, namely, *evidence, light, distinction*. Does the reviewer maintain that the evidence, light, distinction, furnished to the faith by science and study, are a progress in the faith, or *sapientia infusa* itself? Are they not evidently a progress, a development, not in it, but in that which is not it, and which is clearly distinguishable from it? If so, were we deserving the reviewer's sneer for representing the gain of the faith to be only in relation to that which is not faith?

Of De Maistre we have little to say. He is neither a father nor a doctor of the church, he writes as a statesman and politician, not as a theologian; and is always more commendable for the rectitude of his heart, and for his erudition, than for the critical exactness of either his thought or expression. The passage cited, when the motive with which it was written is taken into the account, may be easily harmonized with the doctrine we set forth, but, as we should

never think of citing the distinguished author as a theological authority, there is no necessity of doing it. Cardinal Fisher, if correctly cited, which we very much doubt, was wrong in his facts, and his opinion only goes to the point, that every portion of the faith may not be equally known at all times by every individual teacher, nor in all times and places set forth in the same special prominence,—a fact of which we need not go far to find an illustration. The citation from St. Augustine is only to the same effect; or, at most, to the effect, that, in some portion of the church, some things, more immediately connected with the practice than with the *dogmata* of the church, may become obscured, and so obscured that a man who errs in respect to them may be inculpable, till the matter is investigated, thoroughly sifted, or an authoritative decision on the subject is had. St. Augustine brings forward this as a ground on which to excuse St. Cyprian, and Bossuet takes the same view in his correspondence with Leibnitz; but it is easy to see that the holy doctor does not depend much upon this, and that he relies at last almost entirely on St. Cyprian's martyrdom as washing out his fault in his blood. We have found in St. Augustine no hint that the baptism in question was not, in St. Cyprian's time, *de fide*. The passage from Döllinger says nothing more than we have ourselves said in both of our previous articles against developments.

We here close our comments on the sample of the Catholic authority on which the principle of development rests. Of the authorities cited, not one is express for the reviewer; De Maistre is not himself authority, and as he cites no authority for his opinion, it is of no avail, even if it must be understood in the sense of the reviewer, which we deny. Vasquez, as cited, *may* be interpreted to favor a collateral point, but nothing proves that he *must*. Döllinger, Cardinal Fisher, and Petavius are not for him; St. Augustine, St. Vincent of Lerins, Suarez, Bellarmine, and Melchior Cano are decidedly against him; and yet this is a *sample* of the high Catholic authority on which the principle rests! In this we are happy to agree with the reviewer.

A few words will suffice to dispose of the remarks which the reviewer offers on the testimonies we introduced. He can find only three: a condemned proposition, a citation from St. Thomas, and another from Bossuet. So he counts for nothing the express testimony of St. Vincent of Lerins, who lays down the rule, *ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova*;

for nothing, the testimony of holy fathers and councils cited by Bossuet. But let this pass. In regard to the first, he "desiderates a reference," which he shall have, if he will inform us in how many different senses the term *science* of morals, taken strictly, may be used, or is used by Catholic theologians.

To the citation from St. Thomas, express to our purpose, he replies:—"The passage from St. Thomas, it will have been seen, is quoted also by Suarez in the passage above cited; and *he* says it must be understood in that very sense to which Mr. Brownson regards it as the contradictory." It will have been seen, as we requested our readers to bear in mind, that Suarez says no such thing, but cites St. Thomas in the very sense we did. The assertion of the reviewer we must regard as a—development.

As to Bossuet, the reviewer says his testimony is suspicious. He was a Gallican, had a case to make out,—that of "preserving a merely external and hollow similarity with earlier times,"—was at issue with the profoundly learned Petavius, and actually joined in a vote of thanks to Bull, an Anglican schismatic, for his defence of the Nicene creed. This, it strikes us, has been said inconsiderately. Bossuet is high Catholic authority, and, on a point of faith which he has treated *ex professo*, second to none in modern times. He was eminent among the most eminent; he was the unwearied and successful defender of the faith against enemies within and enemies without, and the whole Catholic world has been eager to acknowledge the services he rendered to his religion; he has never been convicted, and, so far as our knowledge extends, never accused, of a single error on a point of Catholic faith; and his works are a vast treasure-house of profound and varied erudition,—of philosophy, history, eloquence, and piety. It will not be to the reviewer's credit to call the testimony of such a man *suspicious*; for most people will be inclined to regard him as a better authority, on any point of Catholic faith and theology, than our recent converts from Oxford; and if they are found maintaining, as they are, by the concession of the reviewer, a doctrine contradictory to his, suspicion will be more likely to light on them than on him.

But the reviewer is apparently mistaken as to the affair of Petavius. We have before us, in his first *Admonition to Protestants*, Bossuet's defence of Petavius, where he vindicates him, in the words of Petavius himself, from ever

holding or countenancing the doctrine he was accused of holding, and for which the reviewer would by implication claim him as authority. Petavius never held the doctrine of development, but has given, in his *Preface* to his *De Trinitate*, a most masterly refutation of it. Besides, he retracted, as Father Zaccaria, in a little apologetic appendix to the *Preface*, just mentioned, informs us, the chapters—third, fourth, and fifth of the first book, *De Trinitate*—in which he had cast some suspicion on the orthodoxy in thought or expression of a very few of the ante-Nicene fathers; and those very fathers Zaccaria, in his notes to those chapters, has successfully vindicated from all suspicion. We refer the reviewer to the Works of Petavius, folio edition, Vol. II., Venetiis, 1757.

That Bossuet joined in a vote of thanks to Bull for his defence of the Nicene creed we have no authority for denying; but Bull in that work was simply defending a Catholic dogma—the foundation of the profession of the Christian faith—and Catholic fathers with Catholic arguments, not his Anglicanism. Does the reviewer think Bossuet could not with a good conscience, thank him for this? Be it so. The reviewer rejects the testimony of Bossuet. Then Bossuet was wrong. Then the Protestant minister, Jurieu, who maintained the opposite doctrine, was right. The reviewer, then, sides with the Protestant, whose purpose was to overthrow Catholicity, against the Catholic bishop who was defending it. Again; Bossuet in his correspondence with Leibnitz on the *Project of Union*, asserts in still clearer and more distinct terms the same doctrine as that of the Catholic Church: Leibnitz, for the purpose of obtaining an argument against the infallibility of the church, denies that it is the doctrine on which she has proceeded, and cites the very instances the reviewer cites against us, to prove it. But Bossuet was wrong; therefore Leibnitz was right, and the reviewer sides with the rationalistic Leibnitz opposing, against the Catholic bishop defending, the church! This is no scandal. The scandal, it appears, is only in thanking the schismatic or the heretic, when he is defending a Catholic dogma and Catholic fathers with Catholic arguments.

As to Bossuet's Gallicanism we have nothing to say, for it does not relate to a question of faith. We are ourselves ultramontane, of the extreme right; but Gallicans are Catholics as well as we, and have the same right to maintain

their opinion that we have to maintain ours. We have no right to condemn a man whom the church does not condemn; and certainly we shall not coincide with the reviewer in the doctrine, that a man who has, as we believe, erred in a matter of opinion can never be cited as authority on a question of faith in which it has never been pretended that he has erred. The allegations of the reviewer are not sufficient to impeach the testimony of Bossuet.

But it was not, as the reviewer leaves his readers to infer, simply as authority that we introduced Bossuet. We introduced him as one who had discussed the question of development *ex professo*, and for the facts, arguments, and authorities he adduced against the reviewer's doctrine. These spoke for themselves, and were conclusive, without taking Bossuet's personal authority into the account. It was the duty of the reviewer to reply to these; for even if he could have impeached Bossuet, these would still remain to be answered. The reviewer does not seem to us to be aware that he is not at liberty to treat objections to his theory, when gravely urged and well put from respectable sources, with disdain. To do so smacks of Oxford rather than Rome; for among Catholic theologians it is a point of honor and of conscience to meet objections fairly, and to respond to authority by authority, and to solid reasoning by solid reasoning.

Here we might close, but we make a few additional remarks in hopes they may save us from the necessity of recurring to this painful subject again. The Catholic doctrine on the subject under discussion, as it has been taught us, is, that our Lord has made a full and perfect revelation of all that is, or is to be, received *de fide*, and that he has instituted his church, and committed to her this revelation as a sacred deposit, to be preserved and transmitted without addition, diminution, or alteration, and that with regard to it, *assistente Spiritu Sancto*, she exercises the functions of an infallible *witness* and *teacher*, and an infallible judge of all controversies which arise respecting it in space and time. *Testis, magistra, judex* comprehend the whole of her functions in regard to the faith, so far as relates to the question before us. She bears witness to the deposit and its faithful preservation; she proposes what she has received to the faithful; and she decides every dispute which may relate to it, and infallibly; for he who commissioned her abides with her, and she has at all times, in each of her functions, the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost.

As *testis* and *magistra*, she certainly does not develop. This is evident from the force of the word *witness*, from the terms of the commission, "Teach all nations . . . to observe *all things whatsoever* I have commanded you," and from the promise of the Holy Ghost, namely, "who will bring *all things to your mind whatsoever I may have said to you.*" Also in what St. Paul says to St. Timothy:—"O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane novelties of words, and oppositions of knowledge falsely so called"; as St. Vincent of Lerins teaches. "Quis est hodie *Timotheus*," asks this holy doctor, "nisi vel generaliter universa ecclesia, vel specialiter totum corpus præpositorum, qui integram divini cultus scientiam vel habere ipsi debent vel aliis infundere? Quid est *depositum custodi*? *Custodi*, inquit, propter fures, propter inimicos, ne dormientibus hominibus, superseminent zizania super illud tritici bonum semen, quod seminauerat Filius hominis in agro suo. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi*. Quid est *depositum*? Id est, *quod tibi creditum est*, non quod a te inventum; quod accepisti, non quod excogitasti; rem non ingenii, sed doctrinæ, non usurpationis privatæ, sed publicæ traditionis; rem ad te perductam, non a te prolatam; in qua non auctor debes esse, sed custos; non institutor, sed sectator; non ducens, sed sequens. *Depositum*, inquit, *custodi*; Catholicæ fidei talentum inviolatum illibatumque conserva. *Quod tibi creditum*, hoc penes te maneat, hoc a te tradatur. Aurum accepisti, aurum redde. . . . Eadem tamen quæ didicisti doce, ut cum dicas nove, non dicas nova." *Comm.* 1, cap. 22.

It is not possible for language to be more explicit, and on this point we have found no disagreement among our theologians, and their uniform doctrine is admirably summed up and set forth by our own theologian, the learned and venerable bishop of Philadelphia, in his excellent *Theologia Dogmatica*, Vol. I., pp. 221–228, where he gives, in establishing *the perpetuity of the faith*, as conclusive a refutation of the theory of development as any one can desire. Father Perrone clearly sustains the doctrine we set forth; so does the learned and scientific Dr. Wiseman. Indeed, the point is of faith, and not debatable; for the holy Council of Trent, session 4, in the decree on the canon, expressly declares that those things, and those only, can be held of faith, which are contained "in libris scriptis, aut sine scripto traditionibus, quæ ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ, et ab ipsis apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante, *quasi per manus traditæ, ad*

nos usque pervenerunt." No ingenuity can possibly develop transmitting a doctrine from the apostles to us, as it were by hand, into development. *Handing* down a doctrine can never be *developing* it.

This point settled, it is determined that there can be no positive developments, for the church as *judex* does not propose faith, but simply defines it. If, as witness and teacher, she is restricted to the *depositum*, so must she be as judge of controversies. The limitation of that which she can witness to having received is the limitation of that which she can propose, and the limitation of that which she can propose is the limitation of that which she can define *de fide*.

Such is the Catholic doctrine as it has been taught to us. The church *witnesses* infallibly to the deposit, *proposes* infallibly what she has received, and when controversies arise, when innovators, men fond of the profane novelties of words, or only partially instructed, bring in errors which obscure, undermine, or in any way impugn it, she infallibly *declares* it and condemns them. Such explications of the faith as are necessary for its preservation, and for the clear and distinct application of it to the condemnation of whatever opposes it, she can of course make; for this comes within the province of the judge who applies the law. That by these explications the faith becomes more definite, that is, its boundaries are more clearly and distinctly marked, and it is better understood in relation to what is not faith and to what cannot be maintained without directly or indirectly impugning the faith, nobody, to our knowledge, disputes. The only point disputed is, that the faith opposed to the novel error is a new *proposition* of faith *quoad fideles*. The faithful knew it before its application, and explicitly believed it; only they did not know explicitly that it condemned the error, because they did not know explicitly the error itself. As faith, it was explicitly believed before the application; as explicitly condemning the error, it was only implicit. So in the application, there is no change, no development, no advancement of the faith, no extending the faith over new territory, or taking up new elements into it, but simply its explicit application to the definition of points which it was not before explicitly known that it condemned. The analogy to the civil judge in the application of the law is perfect. The judge has no *legislative* function, and can only define and apply the law. So with the church in her judicial character.

The developmentists appear to us to have fallen into their error by not keeping these several functions of the church distinct, or rather by supposing that the church *witnesses* and *proposes* only in *defining*. They sink the *ecclesia docens* in the *ecclesia definiens*, and hold that nothing is authoritatively proposed of faith, except in its authoritative definition. Thus the reviewer says, "Indeed, our doctrine is implied of necessity in the language so universally held by Catholics, as to the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility; without which, we always say, there would be a series of endless and hopeless controversies. For how would this be the case, if the church always held *explicitly and consciously* the contradictory to a heresy before that heresy sprang up? *What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy?*" While this passage makes us thrill with horror, we are glad that it is written; for it will show our Catholic friends that we do not mistake the theory of development. Here it is plainly asserted, or necessarily implied, that the essential importance of the attribute of infallibility is for the determination of controversies; that the church does not explicitly and consciously hold the contradictory of a heresy till that heresy springs up; and that, if she did, there would be no more necessity of an infallible church to propose the faith, than to declare that Rome is in Italy. It is clear, then, that the theory maintains that the attribute of infallibility comes into play only in the act of defining the faith; therefore, that the church *infallibly* proposes the faith only in defining it. But since the church never defines a point before it is controverted, it follows necessarily that there is infallible proposition of the faith only after it has been controverted, and only in proportion as it is controverted and defined! Do our friends now understand the theory of development? And after this will they censure us for opposing it?

Hence it follows necessarily, since the authoritative proposition of the faith is in its authoritative definition, the contradictory of a heresy cannot be held explicitly and consciously till the heresy has arisen,—the second point the reviewer asserts. So the church did not and could not explicitly and consciously hold the doctrine of the Trinity before the contradictory heresy sprang up; the consubstantiality of the Son, before Arius; the one person in two natures, before Nestorius; the two for ever distinct natures in one person, before the Eutychians; the two natural wills

and two natural operations, before the monothelites; and so of all the points which have in the lapse of time been defined. Do not accuse us of misrepresentation. Read the article in the *Dublin Review*, read Mr. Newman's essay, and you will find not only that this follows as a consequence, but that it is explicitly asserted; and, in Mr. Newman, attempted to be demonstrated philosophically, and historically verified. Hold this for certain, that the developmentists found their theory on the assumption, that the first formal proposition of the faith, saving a few elementary ideas, is in its first formal definition. If, then, it had so happened that there had been no resistance to the faith, not a single article, even to this day, could have been completely, distinctly, and consciously held by the church. On their principles, the church has attained to a consciousness of her faith by means of the successive errors which have controverted it.

There is something in the doctrine of the reviewer which strikes us with more horror than even this. He asks, "What need is there of infallibility to declare that Rome is in Italy?" None, if you are to believe the fact with only human faith. But if you are to believe it with Catholic faith? This is the question. Has the reviewer ever made an act of faith? May we ask him what is the *objectum formale quo seu sub quo fidei divinæ et catholicæ*? Has he studied his *Tractatus de Fide*? If he has, he knows that the *objectum formale quo* or the *ratio formalis fidei divinæ et catholicæ* is the *prima veritas revelans et Ecclesia Catholica proponens*, and therefore that he cannot make an act of faith except in that which God reveals and the Catholic Church infallibly proposes. We could hardly have supposed it could be necessary to remind even a Catholic child, who has been taught his catechism, of this fact. It follows from this that the attribute of infallibility is as necessary to propose what is explicit and consciously held, as it is to define the faith on the points which are controverted. The question of the reviewer marks the character of his theory, and betrays an ignorance of the simple conditions of Catholic faith which we should not have marvelled at in a Protestant, but which in a Catholic is as astonishing as it is deplorable.

After this, it is easy to comprehend the theory of development. God has made his revelation once for all, and, as Mr. Newman says, "thrown it upon the concourse of men." On a few essential or seminal points it is clear and explicit

from the first; all the rest is preserved in the Scriptures, and unconscious traditions of this concourse of men. As time rolls on, a portion so preserved, which makes no part of the explicit or conscious teaching or belief of the church at the time, is detached, floats in the minds of the faithful for a while, in the state of opinion. Some maintain that it is of faith; others that it is not; gradually a controversy arises on the point, and waxes warm; authority then intervenes, and defines and proposes the point, and what was opinion is now *de fide*. Here is a development. Soon another portion is detached, floats for a while as opinion, is controverted, then defined, then proposed, and is another development. Then another, and then another; and the process may continue, for aught we know, and the whole revelation not be all developed, defined, and proposed, till the consummation of the world. Here is the theory in a nutshell. It satisfies the condition of the perpetuity of the faith, as it is supposed, by asserting that nothing is defined and proposed not contained in the original revelation; and the demand of the age for a progressive faith, by assuming that it is only according to the progress of controversy, and the advance of the age, that it is developed, defined, and proposed as *de fide*. We entreat our Anglican friends either to deny or to confirm this. How they can deny it we do not see, for it is really nothing but the statement the reviewer himself makes officially in the article before us, reproduced from the Catholic point of view. If they acknowledge it, will they oblige us by drawing up a complete list of the articles and dogmas, or parts of articles and dogmas, now taught, which they class under the head of developments, and maintain were not explicitly and consciously held by the church in the primitive age? We have ourselves prepared a list for them, but we withhold it, preferring, if more must be said on the subject, to be furnished with one from themselves.

Taking the theory as we understand it, the developmentists fall into this error by overlooking the fact that the church *infallibly proposes the faith before she infallibly defines it*. The Catholic says, *Testis, magistra, judex*.—the church witnesses, proposes, defines; the developmentists say the church *develops, defines, proposes*; but as she defines only on the occasion of controversy, she proposes nothing to be believed till it has been controverted. Trace, then, the history of the controversies respecting the faith, and you will trace the history of the church's formal or authori-

tative teaching, and ascertain the exact order and progress of development. The assumption here is that the date of the controversy is the date of the formal or explicit admission of the article into the creed. Thus, purgatory, though held by many as opinion, was not of faith till after Aërius denied it in the fourth century. Here is the common Protestant assumption, and that of Anglicans in particular.

It is easy now to comprehend why some Catholics have mistaken the real character of this theory. There are two things which Catholics always keep distinct,—the church's *teaching*, and the *historical evidence* of her teaching. The church herself is the only competent witness to the former. She is one in time as well as in space. Knowing what she teaches to-day, we know what the apostles taught,—what she has taught in every age since, and will continue to teach till the consummation of the world. It never occurs to us to resort to history to find what she taught in this or that age, for, to determine that, we have only to ask what she teaches now. In her *teaching* there is no progress, no variation, no development.

But in the *historical evidence* of her teaching, which is a matter of no moment to the faithful, the case is different; for the evidence *follows not the teaching, but the controversies* respecting it, and in it there is a progress or development; because the several articles of the creed, as an historical fact, have been, prior to our day, not all controverted at once, but successively. Now, if you predicate developments of the teaching, you unquestionably err; but if you predicate them of the historical evidence of the teaching, you may be substantially correct. The former is so gross an error, that very few Catholics have been able to believe that such men as Mr. Newman and his friends could possibly fall into it; and therefore, making liberal allowances for their inaccuracies of language and frequent confusion of thought, not unaccountable in men trained in an erroneous system of philosophy and theology, and not yet fully instructed in the truth, have supposed they must really mean the latter, in which sense the greater part of what they say can be suffered to pass. So supposing, although regarding the theory with no especial favor, they have not believed it necessary to make any outcry against it, and have looked upon our attacks upon it as uncalled for, and, in fact, unjust, because we take the theory in a sense—authorized, indeed, by some few passages—which is not the sense really in-

tended by its authors. In this view of the case they are right, and we are inexcusable, and deserving severer censures than we have received.

Now we frankly concede that a very considerable portion of Mr. Newman's essay *may* be interpreted on this hypothesis; but if it *should* be, why has not the reviewer told us so? If the subject of the developments be not *Christian doctrine*, but the *historical evidence* of Christian doctrine, why, since the distinction has been suggested to the friends of Mr. Newman more than once, have they not said so? We have good authority for saying it is not so. The fact is, they do not make or admit this distinction, save in a very few cases. They begin with the assumption, that what is not explicitly recognized in the history of the church's teaching in a given age was not, as a general rule, in that age explicitly taught, and therefore they conclude that they must predicate generally of the church's teaching what they find to be true of the historical evidence of her teaching. We shall do these gentlemen essential injustice, if we interpret their theory from the Catholic, instead of the Protestant, point of view. They assume in the outset that all which Protestants allege as to *Roman additions to the primitive creed* is TRUE, only what Protestants call *additions* should be called *developments*. They agree precisely with their former Anglican friends on the main point, that there are doctrines to be found in the church's teaching to-day which were not in her primitive teaching. *Their theory is an expedient for asserting the Anglican antecedent and escaping the Anglican consequent.* On the main point controverted between Protestants and Catholics, for these three hundred years, as to these pretended additions, they take, as they always did, the Anglican side, and are, as before, at issue with all our Catholic divines. Here, say they, are the facts. The *stationariness* of doctrine contended for by Roman divines cannot be maintained with truth; and you must either call these facts additions with Anglicans or developments with us. If you call them additions, you must renounce your church. If you will not admit them to be developments, you cannot maintain your church. The evidence of history is overwhelming against you. It is either our theory, or no Catholicity. This is the alternative these modest gentlemen present to the Catholic Church.* Let

* We find a confirmation of what we here state, in another article in the number of the review before us. The reviewer says, p. 307,—“Va-
Vol. XIV—8

them deny it, if they can. Would to God they could deny it, and prove us to have misrepresented them. We demand of them an explicit statement on this point, whether we state the case correctly, or whether we misrepresent them. That we do not misrepresent the *Dublin Review* is certain. The reviewer writes with much *finesse*, and, like every member of the school, makes a statement, then qualifies it away, and then qualifies away his qualification. But he plainly intimates to us, that, even if we should refute his *theory*, the facts which have suggested it, and, as he maintains, are recognized by the theologians he has cited, will remain to be disposed of. He evidently believes that history presents an obstacle, as Mr. Newman expresses it, to communion with Rome, which cannot be removed without some theory or hypothesis; and this obstacle is precisely, in his mind, the discrepancy or difference which Protestants say history presents between the actual church and the church of the primitive age. He will not take the testimony of the church herself, that she has never varied; for he thinks he finds historical evidence to the contrary. Now this variation, difference, discrepancy, between the actual church and the primitive, he says, virtually, remains to be explained, and

rious Anglican writers have lately maintained or implied that the historical arguments, adduced by writers of their school, have driven Catholics to the necessity of devising a new theory." Now these Anglican writers referred to distinctly state the theory to be precisely what we state it to be; and they do pretend that Catholics have been forced to abandon the doctrine we oppose to it. But how does the reviewer meet this? By showing that they misunderstand or misrepresent the theory? Not at all,—but by denying the theory to be a novelty, and maintaining "that the said theory was fully recognized by doctors of the highest repute in the church centuries before they or their arguments were heard of."—*Ibid.*

We will add here, that, in speaking of the developmentists, we do not include in their number all the recent converts from Anglicanism. How large a number embrace the theory we know not; but we have authority for including none but Mr. Newman and six others; yet these are all whose publications, since their conversion, we have seen, and they now evidently have the *Dublin Review* for their organ. We will state still further, that we have proceeded in examining the theory on the assumption that it is a well defined theory, distinctly and systematically drawn out, and with regard to which there is no difference of opinion among the developmentists; but in reality this is not the case. They do not, as we have authority for asserting, agree among themselves; and we suppose the truth to be, that none of them have any clear, distinct, and precise views of what it is they are contending for; and if they could for a moment forget their theory, they would no doubt readily admit that it was never in reality for them more than "much ado about nothing."

that it devolves on Catholics to explain it. We answer him very briefly with the Catholic formula,—the church is infallible, and is in each age the continuation and *witness* of the church in the age next preceding; and by it we are placed in communion with the apostles and they with us. We have no difficulties to explain. We deny your assumption, on her infallible authority, and assert, that, if you undertake to maintain it, you will find yourself, *ipso facto*, a heretic. O my brother, are you a Catholic, and have not yet learned that the church is higher than history and philosophy? Have you not yet learned that the difficulties are for those who do not believe, and not for those who do? Let all the objections from history and philosophy, which schismatics, heretics, infidels, wicked men on earth, or devils in hell can bring, be brought against any poor servant girl, who cannot read a word, and she has but to say *credo*, and they melt and vanish into vacuity. O, do not ask us for theories, for we *believe*; and when we have faith, we are done with theories. Make your act of faith, be contented with what contented those who endured reproach for the church, and shared her consolations, when you and we were wallowing in the filth of our heresy and schism and infidelity, and you will behold the immaculate spouse herself, and draw milk from her breasts, and your heart will be too full of love and gratitude to be thinking of theories. As yet you dream not how glorious, how lovely, how rich in graces, how full of truth and sanctity, is this dear mother who has taken us to her bosom, spread her own robe over our nakedness, and called us her children. Tear away the bandage your theory binds over your eyes, and lo! a vision of loveliness, of purity, of truth, of majesty, stands before you, that infinitely surpasses all you have yet imagined,—your heart and mind are filled, your soul is entranced, and you exclaim, “O my God, what am I, that this blessedness should be for me?”

We here close what we have to say on this subject for the present. We need not say how bitterly we regret the necessity of taking part in so painful a controversy, or that we should shrink from it, if we were not encouraged and sustained by those who have authority to teach. We have endeavoured to treat the gentlemen who advocate this horrible theory, personally, with forbearance and respect; for we regard their error as resulting from the mistake they made of fancying their form of Anglicanism to be simple schism, not heresy, which prevented them, on their acces-

sion to the communion of the church, from attending as they otherwise would have done to what they had to learn and to unlearn. They have, unhappily, given the devil an opportunity to take his revenge for their defection. But for Catholics no evil is irreparable. They will most likely be obliged at last to abandon their theory; and if they are not yet convinced that they must do so, they yet will do well to desist for a time from urging it upon the public. We have spoken to them plainly, but not unkindly, if seemingly uncourteously. If in any thing we have wronged them, we ask their pardon in advance, and shall only need to have the wrong pointed out to retract it, and to make all the amends for it in our power.

THE DUBLIN REVIEW AND OURSELVES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1848.]

THIS is the first part of an attempted reply to the papers we have published against Mr. Newman's theory, especially to the article entitled *The Dublin Review on Developments*. We have read it, as far as it goes, with attention, and as little prejudice as possible; but we have found it exceedingly unsatisfactory. It is written after the manner of an Oxford student or an Anglican controversialist, rather than after the manner we are accustomed to in Catholic theologians. The author evades the real questions in debate, and seeks to make up a foreign issue, not necessarily involving either the truth or the falsehood of the theory to which we have objected. He evidently wishes to abandon the defence of the theory to itself, and to make the whole controversy turn on the exactness or inexactness of our statement of Catholic teaching; in other words, to abandon the defensive and assume the offensive. This undoubtedly is creditable to him as a strategist, but it can be of little avail. It is not difficult either to see through his manœuvring, or to meet and thwart it. Too much art sometimes defeats it-

**The Dublin Review*, No. XLVI., Art. VI. London: January, 1848.

self, and fails, when a simple and natural method would lead on to victory.

As far as proving us to have been inexact in proving the truth of the theory of development, the method of the reviewer is legitimate enough, but no further. Perhaps we might be inexact in our statement of Catholic teaching, and yet that theory not be true; and if so, proving us in the wrong would not be proving the reviewer in the right. If we are right in our statement of that teaching, the theory is most unquestionably false; but we are much mistaken, if we may not be decidedly in the wrong on the points on which the reviewer labors to prove us so, and yet the theory be wholly inadmissible. To all he alleges against us, possibly we could reply, *Concedo, quid inde?*

But it is necessary to bear in mind that the doctrine which the reviewer ascribes to us, and against which alone he brings his heavy artillery to bear, does not happen to be ours or anybody's we ever heard of. It is his own invention, and he has the exclusive right to it. If we understand him, he asserts that we maintain, or would persuade his readers that we maintain, that the whole Christian doctrine has been *explicitly* believed from the first, not only by the church, but also by all the faithful, and that nothing can be defined of faith which has not been so believed from the beginning by every one, whether simple or learned, a rustic or a doctor. But this is a grave mistake. We hold no such doctrine; we have said nothing, fairly interpreted, to authorize the supposition that we do, but enough to warrant the assertion that we do not, as the reviewer cannot be unaware, if he has done us the honor to read the articles on which he professes to comment. We are exceedingly humbled that any one should suppose us either so ignorant or so disingenuous as to deny what every Catholic of ordinary intelligence knows, that large portions of Christian doctrine are believed by the rude and simple only *implicitly*, or that there are many things not explicitly believed at all times and in all places, by every one of the learned even. To say that we do not deny this would seem to us very much like saying that we do not deny that a triangle is not a circle.

The doctrine we have opposed to the theory of developments is, that the revelation made to and through the apostles was an explicit and perfect revelation of the whole Christian faith,—save, as Suarez maintains, certain things which in the times of the apostles had not yet happened,

and which were formally revealed in the explicit revelation, as the particular in the universal, or the part in the whole, —and that this revelation was explicitly and completely delivered over by the apostles to their successors, and has been at all times explicitly held and believed by the church. This is the doctrine we have set forth as that of all our theologians, and this is the precise doctrine to be disproved, before we can be convicted of inexactness in our statement of Catholic teaching. But, thus far, the reviewer has not disproved this doctrine, nor has he succeeded in adducing a single authority, respectable or otherwise, against it. Some of the authorities he cites, undoubtedly, disprove the doctrine he is pleased to tell his readers is ours; but to disprove what we do not hold is not precisely to disprove what we do hold. Nevertheless, the reviewer must disprove this doctrine before his offensive operations can begin to avail him any thing. Not as yet having done this, he has as yet made no advance in the argument, either against us or for himself.

It is clear now what the reviewer must do in order to place us in the wrong; let us see what he must do in order to place himself in the right, or to defend the theory of development in the sense in which we have set it forth and objected to it. He must maintain,—1. The original revelation committed to the apostles, and through them to the church, was imperfect, inchoate, containing gaps to be filled up in the process of time by the uninspired action of the human mind; 2. It is impossible to make a revelation which the uninspired human mind can take in or apprehend, except through long and laborious processes of thought, which can go on only successively, and be completed only after a considerable lapse of time; 3. Christian doctrine, or the object embraced in the act of believing, is not the revealed fact, but the mind's idea of it, always more or less inadequate, or the form which the mind by its own uninspired action imposes upon it; 4. It is no objection to a theory, that it degrades Christianity to the level of sects and human philosophy; 5. No provision was made in the apostolic revelation, as originally delivered to the church, for infant baptism, or post-baptismal sins; 6. The sacrament of penance was not an original apostolic institution, but a development effected after the establishment of the church, and after the faithful had become corrupt; 7. Purgatory was a development effected subsequently to the first ages, as a form of

penance due for sins committed after baptism ; 8. The doctrine of the Trinity was only imperfectly understood by the ante-Nicene fathers, and not fully *formed* till the fourth century, and that of the Incarnation remained imperfect till the sixth ; 9. Excepting some of the elements of the principal mysteries, nothing is formally of faith till controverted, and judicially defined and declared by the church. These and many other propositions hardly less startling to the Christian are contained in that theory of development which we have opposed, and these, or the theory in the sense of these, the reviewer must defend, or he does not defend that to which we have objected. To defend developments in some other sense, or some other theory of developments, is nothing to the purpose ; for it is only this theory, or developments in the sense of this theory, that we have opposed.

We regret to perceive that the reviewer overlooks this fact, and proceeds as if the question turned on developments in general, and as if he could conclude against us in case he should prove developments anywhere, in any sense, and on no matter what ground. But this is a grave error. We object to developments in a specific subject, in a specific sense, asserted on a specific ground, and to certain particular developments. If he shows that we misapprehend the theory, that it does not assert the particular developments to which we object, nor developments in the subject, in the sense, and on the ground to which we take exceptions, well and good ; we have nothing more to say ; for then he shows that the theory contended for is something which we have not opposed, and to prove it is to prove nothing against us. He must take one of two courses. He may disavow the theory in the sense in which we oppose it, or he may attempt to defend it from the objections we bring against it ; but he must do the one or the other. He cannot prove it in one sense, and conclude its truth in another. If he will not disavow it in the sense objected to, he must defend it in that sense. No evasion, no manœuvring, will avail him. He must come at last to one or the other, or forfeit all claims to be considered a fair and honest controversialist.

And why should he hesitate to do it ? He either holds the theory in the sense of the propositions we have given, or he does not. If he does, is it necessary to tell him that he must defend it in that sense, and that to defend it, as he seeks to do, in some other sense is nothing to his purpose ? If he

does not, can he not say so, and tell us precisely what it is he does mean to defend under the head of developments? Why not meet the question directly, fairly, honestly, like a good Christian? Is not truth his object? Would it be just to conclude that he loves his theory more than truth, or that he would rather play the sophist than acknowledge that he has erred? Is there any hardship or humiliation in saying that we have been in the wrong? Who is there that has not erred? and what more manly, when convinced that we have erred, than to say so, frankly, and without a wry face? Out upon the contemptible pride that would make us blush to confess our errors! It is a privilege, a precious privilege, to be allowed to confess our errors; for by doing so we may make some reparation for the injury they may have done.

In looking over the reviewer's article, we cannot perceive that he has made the least advance, either in proving what we objected to, or in disproving what we asserted to be the Catholic doctrine. He remains where we placed him in our last article. He introduces no additional authorities, adduces no new arguments, and fails utterly to vindicate to himself those of his own authorities which we turned against him. In the very few instances in which he may appear to some of our readers who are not also our readers to have done something, his apparent success is due solely to his keeping the true issue out of sight, to his misrepresenting our doctrine, and his representing what we adduced to prove one point as adduced to prove another, to prove which we did not adduce it or rely on it. This is especially true of his reply to our exposition of the long extract from Suarez. Some of his assertions are so extraordinary as to transcend the bounds of sophistry, and, unless he retains the old tractarian habit of using words in "a non-natural sense," are downright—misstatements. His boldness, not to say unscrupulousness, surprises us not a little. If he believes he has truth on his side, how can he believe it necessary to resort to sophistry, to misrepresentation, and misstatement? All men of ordinary morality prefer, when they can, to maintain their cause by fair and honorable means; and whenever one resorts to other means, he raises a suspicion that his cause is weak, and that he feels it to be so.

Thus far we have simply stated what the reviewer must do in order either to refute what we maintain or to defend what we oppose, and given our estimate of the character and value of his reply as far as it has proceeded. A more par-

ticular examination we reserve till we receive the concluding portion of his article, in which we shall rejoice to find something definite and to the purpose. We hope in that we shall find what it is he really wishes to defend, and be relieved of our present uncertainty, whether it is the theory we oppose, or something else, to which we may or may not object.

There are, however, a few incidental topics introduced by the reviewer, of no great importance in themselves, indeed, which we wish to dispose of now, that we may have nothing to divert our attention hereafter from the main issue. The reviewer represents us as mistaken in regarding his former article as intended to be a reply to us. He did not profess, he says, to reply to us. That he did not profess to do so in just so many words is true; that he did substantially, we thought, and we still think, we had reason for supposing. He placed our article at the head of his, and gave as his reason for doing so his "wish to offer a few comments on" it, which, according to our understanding of editorial usage, is equivalent to expressing an intention "to offer a reply." Moreover, he assigned as his reason for commenting on our article at all, the fact that we had included in the censure we bestowed certain gentlemen besides Mr. Newman, and "these had a right to be heard in their own defence." This either was a reason, or it was not. It would not be respectful to say it was not. If it was, the purpose of the reviewer was to defend these gentlemen from the censure in which we had included them. But we had included them in no censure except that which we bestowed upon Mr. Newman's theory, and in that only so far as they embraced it. The only possible way of defending them from that censure was either to show that they did not embrace the theory in the sense in which we censured it, or by defending the theory itself against us. The reviewer did not defend or attempt to defend them in the former way, and therefore must have attempted to do it in the latter way; which was to attempt a reply to us. That he waived Mr. Newman's essay and Mr. Newman's name is true, but this amounted to nothing; because what we objected to in Mr. Newman was not his name or his book, as a mere book, but the theory we found in a book bearing his name. That he did not undertake to defend that theory as Mr. Newman's, we grant; but he either did undertake to defend it against us as the theory of certain other gentlemen, and therefore to reply to us, or

he made an unwarrantable use of our name. If he proposed simply to defend some other theory, a theory we had not assailed, and against other opponents, what in the world had we to do with the matter, and by what right did he make an article of ours the subject of his comments?

The reviewer complains that we expressed a regret that the task of replying to us had not been committed to some learned Catholic doctor, and adds, rather tartly,—“Surely, what a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to write, a layman and a recent convert is at liberty to answer.” Unquestionably; yet a certain layman and a recent convert may be *competent* to write what another may not be competent to answer. The question is not as to the liberty, but as to the competency. But the reviewer mistakes the source of our regret. We did not wish for a Catholic doctor because we thought ourselves entitled to an opponent of a higher grade than the reviewer; we did not dream of instituting a comparison between him and ourselves, for we have long been of Dogberry’s opinion, that “comparisons are odorous.” We wished the doctor in the place of the recent convert, because we wished the truth to be elicited and the controversy brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination; because the learned Catholic doctor would have studied, not to darken, but to elucidate, the subject; because he would have understood his authorities, perceived the precise points on which the controversy turns, and have spoken to them directly and logically; because it was error, not defeat, we dreaded,—truth, not victory, we desired. The reviewer’s second article, we are sorry to say, has served only to justify and increase the regret we expressed.

The reviewer complains, also, of the tone in which we wrote, and thinks we too frequently and too severely referred to his various disqualifications for the task he had undertaken. He may be right in this. We are subject to infirmity as well as other men, and are neither infallible nor impeccable. But we speak plainly without reticence or circumlocution, on principle. We write usually with earnestness, but if with severity, it is the severity of truth and argument, never that of passion. We may have expressed too frequently our conviction of the reviewer’s disqualification for his task, but we certainly expressed it far less frequently than we felt it. The reviewer, we can believe, is an amiable, and in some respects a learned, man; but, if we may judge from his articles against us, he is a stranger

to severe mental discipline, and has failed to digest the materials collected from his various reading. He has looked over, perhaps through, some valuable tracts on Catholic theology, but he does not appear to have mastered them. As a writer, he seems to us to retain the principle said to have been avowed by the tractarian school to which he formerly belonged, of seeing how much one may say in a given direction, so plainly that every reader shall be morally certain of his meaning, yet so adroitly as never, in express words to commit himself, or render it possible to reproduce his meaning without changing his phraseology,—a principle of writing very necessary to men occupying the position of tractarians, seeking to reform or essentially modify a church whose authority they acknowledge, but as unnecessary as disingenuous in a Catholic. We had no unkind feelings towards him, and we aimed to be respectful; but we could not always feel respect, and we are poorly skilled in the art of expressing what we do not feel. Moreover, we regarded ourselves as defending Catholicity against a novel theory, which, if admitted, would subvert it, and we did not and could not treat him as we would and should have done, if the subject in dispute had been only one of those scholastic questions on which Catholics are free to differ. When the foundations of the faith are attacked, we cannot stop to consult the delicate sensibilities of those who attack them, however unconscious they may be of what they are doing.

The reviewer, again, accuses us of unfairness; but as we are not conscious of having treated him unfairly, and as he points out, as we can see, no instance of unfairness on our part, we must consider this charge—a development. We aimed to be fair, and we had no motive for being otherwise. We did, indeed, take the liberty of giving to the points he made a little more precision than he had given them, and of holding him to the strict logic of the case; but in this there was no unfairness, and we did it for his sake much more than for our own. We thought then, and we still think, that if he and his friends would define their views to themselves, study to give precision to their statements, and adhere to the strict rules of logic in developing them, or, in other words, if they would adopt the rigid scholastic method of our theologians, instead of retaining the loose rhetorical method they learned at Oxford, they would immediately abjure their theory, and wonder how they could ever

have entertained it. But a charge of unfairness from the reviewer is rather amusing. He has himself no fairness; he does not treat us, in a single instance, with common justice. We have discovered no instance in which he states our doctrine correctly, no instance in which he reproduces one of our arguments without perverting it, none in which he has treated with ordinary civility a single authority we have introduced. He meets fairly not a single point we have made, treats all our arguments with contempt or with silence, and his own citations are frequently made with an unfairness which would surprise us even in a Protestant controversialist. Yet he talks of our unfairness, and takes great credit to himself because he presumes it to be *unintentional* unfairness.

The reviewer thinks he has detected a contradiction in our assertions with regard to the developmentists. We denominate them a school, and yet represent them as disagreeing among themselves. Therefore we assert them to be a school and not a school,—a flat contradiction. We deny the consequence. A school is where a certain number of persons adopt the peculiar principles of some master, and is not destroyed by their disagreeing among themselves as to certain matters which do not involve the truth or falsity of those principles. We call the developmentists a school because they adopt the principles as to development set forth by Mr. Newman. And this they can be, we should suppose, although they may differ among themselves as to the fact whether this or that particular dogma is to be considered a development, or as a dogma explicitly contained in the apostolic revelation. If the reviewer thinks otherwise, he is welcome to his opinion; the matter is not worth disputing about.

We were not quite exact, it seems, in our references. The reviewer complains of two of them,—one to Tournely, the other to Melchior Cano. The one to Tournely is correct. The reviewer will find it *De Locis Theologicis, De Censuris*, Art. 2, where we referred him. The edition is that of Paris and Venice, Pezzana, 1765. The reference to Cano, the reviewer says, is wrong as to the chapter, and omits the book. The first part of the charge is not true, according to our edition of the *De Locis Theologicis*. The second part is true. By an inexcusable blunder in transcribing for the press, we omitted to specify the book, and did not discover it till it was too late to rectify it. We of

course were mortified, but our regret was not so great as it might have been, for we had given the title of the chapter, and so accurately marked the position of the passage cited, that the reviewer could have had no serious difficulty in finding it, if he knew where to look for his own citations from the same author.

But the reviewer himself is not immaculate in this matter of references. He referred us to Moehler, Vol. I. pp. 66, 67, Robertson's Translation, without specifying the edition: and having only the American edition, in one volume, we had no little difficulty in verifying the citation. He referred us to Bellarmine, *De Purgatorio*, I. 15, meaning, we suppose, Book I. and chapter 15; but, unhappily, that book, in our edition of Bellarmine, contains only eleven chapters in all! * Of his references to Cano, more than one half were incorrect, according to our edition of the work referred to, and he did not name the edition he used. These errors will offset our blunder. They were all in his former article, yet we did not think it worth our while to point them out. Part of them, we presumed, came from his using a different edition of the works cited from the one we used, and the remainder were pardonable oversights in a periodical writer. In such matters it is well for every one to practise generosity, for every one in turn may need it. After all, these are small matters. We have never doubted the ability of our contemporary to make quotations, and we always presume that he makes them at first hand, unless he informs us to the contrary. Whether he can or cannot say as much of us is a matter of no moment. Having never set up to be a scholar, making no pretensions to learning in any department whatever, we are free from the ambition of acquiring, and from the fear of losing, the

* My edition of Bellarmine's Works (L. Vivès, Paris: 1870), corresponds with the Dublin reviewer's in respect of the passage cited. It is in complete accord with the author's argument, as follows:

"Dogmata fidei quatuor modis probari solent . . . Quarto per evidentem deductionem ex verbo Dei tradito; quomodo B. Augustinus passim probat, peccatum originale esse in pueris necessario credendum, etiamsi in Scripturis non haberetur, quia deducitur evidenter ex traditione apostolica de baptismo parvulorum. Sufficientia horum quatuor modorum inde patet, quia id solum est de fide quod est a Deo revelatum mediate, vel immediate; revelationes autem Dei partim scriptæ sunt, partim non scriptæ. Itaque decreta conciliorum et pontificum, et doctorum consensus, et alia omnia ad ista quatuor reducuntur, tunc nim solum faciunt rem de fide; cum explicant verbum Dei aut inde aliquid deducunt."—ED.

reputation of scholarship. Indeed, all these incidental topics we have touched upon look to us as mere trifles, and unfit to engage the attention of two grave reviews, and we assure the Dublin reviewer that we can waste no more time upon similar topics, and if he continues to introduce them, he must pardon us if we pass them over in silence.

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1848.]

PRESUMING, from the fact that two numbers of the *Dublin Review* have appeared without containing the remainder of its promised reply to us, that it is disposed, silently, to drop the controversy on *doctrinal developments*, we shall offer no formal answer to its last article on the subject, but content ourselves with a few statements and explanations which may serve to set in a clear and distinct light the principal points we have denied, and the doctrine we have opposed to them. With this, we shall take our leave of the controversy, till something new comes up to demand our attention or our animadversion.

The controversy which has, no doubt, been painful to all our readers, and which can have had no attractions for ourselves, has not been one of our own seeking or provoking. It was occasioned by the publication of Mr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. The manifest favor with which some of our friends received it, and the use which our adversaries might make, and, in England and this country, were actually making of it, the high character of its author, the time and occasion of its publication, and the purpose for which it was presumed to have been written and published, combined to render it a work of more than ordinary importance; the analogy of its peculiar theory with the popular doctrine of progress now so generally held by the sects naturally gave it many attractions for such Catholics as are strongly infected with the spirit of the age, and sigh to bring the literature of the church into harmony with that of the world; and its evident abandonment of the ground hitherto occupied by our theo-

logians in their controversies with Protestants, and assumption of a new and doubtful ground, which gives the opponents of Catholicity an immense advantage over us, made our adversaries anxious to represent it, and to have it treated, as a work of authority on the real, if not avowed, sentiments of modern Rome. Was it likely, said they, that Mr. Newman, a man of various, rare, and profound erudition, of an acute, subtile, and highly cultivated intellect,—confessedly one of the master minds of the age, pious, humble, conscientious,—should, in a work apparently intended to be his *compte rendu* of the reasons of his conversion, write in ignorance or in contempt of the real sentiments of the church, into whose communion he had evidently made up his mind to seek admission? Indeed, the reasonable presumptions in the case were strong in favor of the view our adversaries wished to take of the doctrine of the essay. How, then, was the evil it might do, and actually was doing, to be counteracted, but by subjecting it to the test of well-known and settled principles of Catholic theology, exposing to the public its general unsoundness, and showing clearly that its theory is not Catholic, and cannot be entertained by Catholics? As all others seemed to shrink from the disagreeable task of doing this, we, with great reluctance, attempted it, and should, as Catholic reviewers, have been remiss in our duty, if we had not. Let not, then, those who regret the controversy censure us, who have only sought to resist a novelty, and to maintain the purity of Catholic doctrine; let them blame, if they must blame somebody, those who made the controversy necessary. We take no blame to ourselves.

What we have done would not have been called for, if neither those without nor some of those within had been disposed to regard Mr. Newman's essay as a Catholic work. This we said in the outset, and we have all along conceded that it was never intended to be such a work, or a work from which Catholic teaching could be gathered. The author does not profess to be a Catholic, to write as a Catholic, or to present Catholic doctrine. He writes, not from the Catholic point of view, but professedly from the point of view of private reason,—as a man standing outside of the church, and exercising his private reason on the phenomena exhibited by Christianity, regarded solely as a fact in the world's history. He does not profess to take his theory from Catholic theology, he does not attempt to support it

by Catholic authority, or to propose it to be held by any one after he has come to the church. It is solely the view which private reason takes of the phenomena in the case, and for those who, as yet, can use only "reason in things of faith." The general design of the author is to show that reason, taking Christianity as a fact in the world's history, which it must do, and exercising itself fairly and candidly on the phenomena presented by its history, must, on the principles of the inductive philosophy, come to the conclusion that the Roman Catholic Church of to-day is the true historical development, continuation, or representative of the church of the apostles, and therefore, in her communion, if anywhere, genuine Christianity is to be sought and found. But his Oxford friends, though prepared to admit that this conclusion seems warranted by the general historical phenomena in the case, yet contend that there are certain special phenomena which are, after all, irreconcilable with it. The special theory is designed to be an explanation of these special phenomena, and to show that they do not militate against the conclusion warranted by the general phenomena presented, confessedly in favor of communion with Rome. It is a theory, therefore, specially intended for and adapted to these Oxford friends, Puseyites, or tractarians, as they are denominated, that is, specially intended to prepare the members of the school within the bosom of Anglicanism, which the author had founded, to follow him into the Roman Catholic Church, into which he had resolved to enter.

Christianity is a fact in the world's history. This fact is to be met and accounted for in some way, all the general phenomena exhibited by it, and all the general reasons and presumptions in the case, prove that it is divine, and point us to the Roman Catholic Church as its true historical representation. But there are persons out of the Catholic communion who, while they admit this, find, nevertheless, certain variations and discrepancies of doctrine, discipline, and worship in the history of that church, which, in their view, are insuperable obstacles to entering her communion. Here is the special difficulty to be solved. Now, grant the fact of the variations and discrepancies; but suppose the church, suppose her to be placed in the world, suppose her to be placed there to be active, to exert a controlling influence, and to subject to herself the minds and hearts of men, individuals and nations, religion and politics, science and art,

public and private life; suppose her designed to do this, with a divine energy indeed, but after a human mode, in accordance with the present constitution of human nature, and without altering or changing any of its essential laws;—suppose this, and these variations and discrepancies are but the necessary incidents of the process she must institute and carry on, are only what we should naturally have anticipated, only what we must suppose the Founder, if we suppose him to have been divine, must have contemplated and provided for, and therefore, instead of being objections to entering the communion of Rome, they are really only so many arguments in favor of her being the true Christian communion.

Here is the special argument of the book, and, if allowable, it is certainly an argument not to be treated as of slight importance. Supposing it to be admissible, it is not only ingenious, not only profound, but is really a discovery of great value,—one of the most important contributions to polemical theology that can be conceived. It not only solves the objections of our adversaries, but converts their very objections into conclusive arguments against them,—vanquishes them on their own ground and with their own weapons. But whether admissible or not, it would have been no special affair of ours, if it had been regarded only as the argument of a man outside of the church, addressed to his companions; for then it would have been solely a matter between him and them, to be disposed of by themselves without our interference. But when the argument, as was the fact, is charged upon us as one which Catholics use or intend to use, or when it is assumed by some Catholics themselves as one we may use, the aspect of the case changes, and we are compelled to inquire, whether it be or be not compatible with Catholicity; for we cannot use an argument for Catholicity which involves the denial of Catholicity. Neither Mr. Newman nor his friends deny or wish to deny this. Mr. Newman did not feel himself bound to teach Catholic theology, but he did understand very well that his theory would be inadmissible for the purpose he urged it, if it was incompatible with that theology, and hence he refers to Moehler, De Maistre, and some other recent continental writers,—men, by the way, of no high authority,—who he supposes have asserted it, or something similar to it. Is the theory, then, which supplies this new argument compatible with Catholic teaching? This ques-

tion forces itself upon us, and, under the circumstances, we are as much bound to entertain and answer it as we should have been if the essay on development had been the work of a Catholic doctor.

It is evident that the argument presupposes not merely the fact of developments,—Mr. Newman's name for the variations and discrepancies alleged,—but their necessity in the nature of the case. Hence, in his essay, he spends his principal force in proving this necessity. Two questions, then, arise:—1. Have there actually occurred the variations and discrepancies of *doctrine*,—for we waive discipline and worship,—as alleged by Protestants and conceded by Mr. Newman? 2. Is the assertion of the necessity *a priori* of developments, that is, variations and discrepancies of doctrine, compatible with Catholic faith and theology? Unless both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the author is not at liberty to suggest his theory, his argument is fallacious, and can only mislead those who are without,—give them, at best, only a spurious Catholicity. We have answered both questions in the negative; we have denied the fact of the developments or variations alleged, as not historically proved or provable, as not acknowledged by approved Catholic doctors, and as contradicted by the church, who uniformly through her councils and sovereign pontiffs asserts the invariability of the faith; and we have denied the second, because it contradicts the assertion of the invariability of doctrine, because it is in opposition to the ground hitherto uniformly assumed by our divines in their controversies with Protestants, and because it makes Christian doctrine, not the revealed truth, but simply a human view of it, thus reducing, by Mr. Newman's own confession, Christian doctrine to the level of heresy and human philosophy. No answer has been given, nobody, as far as we have seen, has attempted to give an answer, to these reasons, and, till answered, they are undeniably conclusive.

But in denying both the fact and the necessity of development, what is it we have denied? *Development* is a word of vague and uncertain import. It may be the predicate of many subjects,—true of some, false of others; and it may be used, and by Mr. Newman and his friends actually is used, in several very different senses. We have not denied it of every thing pertaining to Christianity; we have denied it only of Christian doctrine, that is, of the material object of faith, and we have not denied it even of this in every

possible sense. We have not denied or thought of denying the power of the church to make new definitions of the faith, new explications of doctrine, as occasion demands, nor, in the sense of raising to the rank of formal faith what has heretofore been only material faith, have we denied, nor could we without asserting a condemned proposition deny, her power to establish even new articles of faith. What we have denied is the power of the church to *found* or institute new articles of faith, or to define as of faith any thing which has not always been *materially* of faith, and the denial of which has not always been, at least, material heresy, although not always, for all persons, culpable heresy. This we have done on the ground that the church does not make the law, does not create the obligation to believe, but simply declares it. What we have asserted is, that the material object of faith is all the *revelata* deposited by our Lord through his apostles with the church, and nothing else; and what we have denied is, simply, that any thing can be defined of faith, or become of faith, not *formally* included in the number of those *revelata*, that is, not in the *depositum*. We have denied what we understand Mr. Newman and his friends to maintain, that doctrines not included in the *depositum*, not originally revealed, but springing up from the pious feeling or meditation of the faithful, or from the speculations of human reason about revealed truths, may be defined *de fide*, although previously to being defined they are mere speculations, opinions, pious thoughts or feelings.

The Dublin Review reasons against us as if we denied that any thing can be defined of faith which has not always been *formally* of faith, or which it was not always formal heresy to deny; and objects, that our doctrine denies that the church can, for instance, rule the pious belief of the immaculate conception of the ever-blessed Virgin, entertained now by all the faithful, to be of faith; but it has no right to do this. All we say is, the church can define to be of faith nothing which has not been materially of faith from the beginning; for she is infallible, and nothing is materially of faith which is not of divine revelation and handed down to us as such from the apostles. The only question with regard to the pious belief of the immaculate conception, in our view of the case, is, whether it is or is not an apostolic tradition, and included in the *depositum*? If it is, the church can define it to be of faith; if it is not an apostolic tradition, she cannot. Which is the fact we know not, and

cannot know till the church herself informs us. This she will do when she judges it necessary or proper, and that is enough for us. In the mean time, we take the belief as we find it, and hope we are behind none of our brethren in cherishing it in the sense and within the limits permitted. We are too young a Catholic to take it upon us to instruct the church, to tell her what we do or do not wish her to do. We are satisfied to await her commands, and, in the mean time, to pray, as she permits us,—*Regina sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis!*

But things may be immediately or mediately, explicitly or implicitly, formally or only virtually, revealed, and *The Dublin Review* reasons against us as if we maintained that nothing can be of faith which is not immediately and explicitly revealed. This is not correct. We have maintained no such doctrine. We have simply denied that what is only *virtually* revealed, as the property in the essence, is of faith or can be of faith, because it is easy to conceive that Almighty God could reveal the one without revealing the other, and one may deny the property without intending to deny the essence. Hence, with the generality of our theologians we have denied that mere theological conclusions are of faith, and must do so, or else deny all distinction between faith and the science of theology. Theological conclusions are discursively obtained from the premises, one of which is certain by the supernatural light of faith, the other by the natural light of reason. It is a principle of logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise,—

“Pejorem sequitur semper conclusio partem.”

Consequently, these conclusions follow the premise from reason and are simply truths of reason, not revealed truths; therefore neither are nor can be of faith,—for they want the formal reason of faith,—*prima veritas revelans*.

Yet among theological conclusions, commonly so called, we may distinguish between those in regard to which the premise from reason is causative, and those in regard to which it is merely applicative or interpretative. The latter we have conceded may be of faith, which is as much as we can gather from Vasquez, Suarez, and others who are supposed to maintain the contrary opinion. But even the admission, that the first class of theological conclusions, theological conclusions strictly taken, are of faith, concedes nothing in favor of the development we have denied. If

such conclusions are not of faith, then, certainly, no developments; but if they are of faith, it does not necessarily follow that there are developments. We lose, indeed, an argument against developments, but our friends obtain no argument for them. The number of such conclusions is limited by the nature of the case, and they all may have been known by the apostles and explicitly handed over to their successors. If they are of faith, or, in the language of the developmentists, can be "ruled of faith," it is some evidence that they were so,—that there is no one of which we can say that it was unknown in the age immediately succeeding the apostolic, or which, for the simple reason that it is such conclusion, can be said to have been formally defined to be of faith by the church.

But we are supposed to maintain that the whole faith has always been explicit, and that the church can declare nothing to be of faith which has not been explicitly believed from the beginning by all the faithful. But this statement is too strong. A large portion of the faith is never explicitly believed by all persons, and even with many who are not ranked with the simple, much of it is believed only implicitly. Also dogmatic facts and things which had not yet happened in the time of the apostles are to be excepted. It is of faith that Christ died for me, because I am included in all men, and that Christ died for all men is explicitly revealed. But that he died for me could not have been explicitly believed before I was born. Hence, in the application of the faith to new facts which come up in the church's history, there is, as Suarez maintains, a growth of faith, in the sense of some things becoming explicit which were at first only implicit. But, save what is included in these exceptions, we have maintained that the whole faith has been from the first explicitly held, believed, and taught by the church.

The Dublin Review concedes this to be true as far as regards the *deposit* of faith; but it maintains that the *deposit* did not include the whole faith, or, in other words, the apostles did not hand over to their successors the whole material object of faith which they themselves had received. It will search long before it finds any respectable authority for so singular an opinion. The apostles were commanded to teach all things whatsoever our Lord had committed to them, and we are not at liberty to believe that they proved recreant to their trust. We must have the express testi-

mony of the church herself, before we can permit ourselves to believe that the deposit of faith was incomplete, and left by the apostles to be completed by development. If it is conceded that what was handed over as the faith by the apostles to their successors has always been explicitly held, believed, and taught by the church, all is conceded, we apprehend, that is objected to only.

We have, as Catholics, something more to maintain than the infallibility of the church in defining propositions of faith, or judicially declaring the faith on obscure or disputed points, that is, her authority and infallibility as judge in controversies of faith. We must also maintain her fidelity to her solemn trust to teach all things whatsoever have been committed to her. To be unfaithful or to fail here would be as incompatible with her indefectibility as it would be to err in deciding a matter of faith or morals. She cannot wrap up in a napkin the treasure she has received, and bury it in the earth; for she has received it not merely to preserve, but to use for her Master's glory. Her office is to teach, and to teach the whole; and how in the world could she transmit the whole faith down to us, if she should neglect to teach certain portions of it? Where would remain that portion of the faith not taught? How could she be said to retain it? Where could she find it, nay, how could she find it, without a new revelation, when needed to condemn new errors and heresies? She must teach the whole, or not preserve the whole, and there is no *implicit* teaching. Whatever is taught is and must be explicitly taught.

But we do not maintain, as is evident from what we have said, that the whole faith is explicitly taught to every one of the faithful; nor, indeed, that the whole is explicitly known by every one even of the pastors of the church. There may be a point on which this pastor is imperfectly instructed, or even misinformed; another on which that pastor is not fully or rightly instructed; but there can be no one on which all the pastors, or the pastors taken as a body, are at any time imperfectly instructed or misinstructed. Otherwise, the infallibility of the *ecclesia dispersa* could not be asserted. It may often happen, too, that in particular localities, owing to causes which it is not necessary here to specify, the tradition of faith on certain points may, for a time, become obscure, or even lost, but it never can become so for the whole church, or the church as one teaching body,—especially for the church of Rome, mistress and mother of all the churches. Thus,

the African churches seem, in the time of St. Cyprian, to have lost the tradition of the validity of baptism conferred by a heretic. But the church retained it, not implicitly only, but explicitly, as we know from St. Stephen. In this way are to be explained most of the phenomena relied on by the developmentists. The facts in the case prove always, that, though unknown in this particular locality or by this particular individual, misapprehended here or by this one, the truth is never unknown or misapprehended in the church as a whole, and therefore the church, in order to make it known or to present it truly, has not to develop and elaborate it, —has only to define anew what she has always held and proposed.

Again, in contending that the whole faith has always been *explicitly* held, believed, and taught, we do not contend that every point has always been *distinctly* held, believed, and taught. Faith may be explicit, and yet not distinct; that is, the whole faith may be immediately apprehended by the mind, and explicitly known to be faith, without its several propositions being distinguished, or apprehended in their distinction from and relation to each other. Hence the definitions which the church makes *contra errores insurgentes*, though they do not render explicit the faith which was before implicit, may often render distinct what before was indistinct. Implicit faith is faith which, though implied in what is immediately apprehended, is not itself thus apprehended; but indistinct faith is immediately apprehended, is the immediate object of mental apprehension, as truly so as that which is distinct; but it is not distinguished from other propositions also immediately apprehended. When we stand on the beach and listen to the roar of the ocean, we actually hear the sound of each particular wave which goes to make up the total sound; but we do not distinguish the sound of each from the sound of the others. So is it with the faith. Heresies and errors which arise from time to time draw the attention of the church to particular points, and, in proposing the truth against them, the church renders the faith more distinct and definite on those points than it was before, and, no doubt, the faithful can more clearly and *distinctly* apprehend it afterwards than they did or could previously. It is thus that faith gains, in process of time, as St. Vincent of Lerins says, in evidence, clearness, and distinctness, and to this gain heresies and errors, no doubt, contribute. Development of the faith in this sense we do not deny.

But even here we must be on our guard lest we go too far. The obscurity and indistinctness cleared up or removed by the new explications or definitions which the church from time to time makes through her sovereign pontiffs and general councils must not be lightly assumed to have existed from the beginning, nor can we always affirm that the faith on the points defined had never, previously to the definition, been clearly and distinctly apprehended. The obscurity and indistinctness may have been occasioned by errors which have arisen on matters not immediately pertaining to faith, and darkened the minds of many, rendered the faith, which was before clear, obscure, which was before distinct, confused, and the definition only restores the faith to its former clearness and distinctness. Thus, Pallavicini tells us that "all the holy Council of Trent proposed to itself was to restore the faith which had become obscure by error to its pristine splendor," and the holy council itself says as much. Indeed, we have met with no instance, in our theological reading, of a new definition by the church, which was demanded for any other reason than to remove error and obscurity on points which had once been clearly and distinctly apprehended.

It seems to us that there is at the present time among many, from whom we should expect better things, a disposition to underrate the attainments in sacred science of the early fathers; that the popular doctrine of progress has affected too many minds that should have been proof against it, and able to detect its falsity. The early fathers were not the weak and ignorant creatures we moderns are too apt to fancy them. They were, even humanly speaking, the great men of their times, and their times were remarkable for great and even excessive intellectual cultivation. They lived, too, near the sources; they had been instructed by apostles, or apostolic men; and no man can read the fragments of their works which time has spared without feeling how much clearer, more vivid, and more loving were their views of divine truth than are ours. We are, till we recall the wonders of grace, astonished at the grandeur, at the breadth and depth, of their views, the richness, variety, and precision of their statements. We feel how little we are in comparison with them, and that we become great simply in learning even a small portion of what they knew.

Undoubtedly, we may detect in the ante-Nicene fathers

expressions not safe or proper to be used after the Arian and other controversies arose; but this is no evidence that their views were inexact and their apprehension of the divine mysteries was imperfect. Their language, at the time they used it, and in relation to the persons to whom they addressed it, may have been the best fitted to instruct and edify, on the topics they were treating, of any they could have chosen. Every age, as well as every nation has its own language, which, though perfectly adapted to its own wants, becomes inappropriate and liable to mislead when transported to another. *Consubstantial* was an unsafe word when the Sabellian controversy raged; it became the appropriate symbol of the faith when the Arian controversy came up. It becomes again, not unsafe, but inadequate, now, when we have, as the rising error, the old Eutychian heresy, under a novel form, and are obliged to defend, not the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father, but the radical distinction between the human and the divine. The novel heresy concedes that "the Son is consubstantial to the Father," but adds, "and so are all men." There can be no doubt of the faith of the church on this point, but we should look in vain in the symbol for a precise and formal condemnation of this blasphemous heresy, or the exact and formal statement of its precise contradictory. Hence it is that the church has often to vary her expressions and to adopt novel terms to condemn novel errors; but who from this concludes that she opposes to the error a novel faith, or that she only imperfectly apprehended her own faith before the error appeared?

It may often happen, also, that learned and saintly men may continue to use the terms to which they have been accustomed a long time after, by the rise of novel errors, they have ceased to be accurate, and that, too, without any impeachment of the completeness, soundness, or exactness of their knowledge of the sacred mysteries. Such men are, in general, more engaged in the practice of truth than in the detection of errors of which they have not heard, and it may well happen that an error has stolen in unawares, has spread, and exerted no little influence, before they are fully apprised of its existence, or judge it worthy of attention. The great theologians of the church, the learned and heroic souls, whom after ages are to venerate as saints, to whom it belongs in the providence of God to defeat Satan and his legions, and to triumph over error, are seldom the first to

detect the approach of the error, and to sound the alarm. Men of smaller minds, less learning, less piety, less charity it may be, are the ones to do this, and they may be these, not because they better know the faith, but simply because they have had more familiarity with error, and live habitually nearer its confines. We could easily illustrate what we assert by examples which have come under our observation, but it is unnecessary.

Considerations like these are amply sufficient to account for the inaccuracies of language charged against some few of the ante-Nicene fathers, and which are adduced as proofs that the sacred mysteries, during the ante-Nicene period, were only imperfectly developed and only imperfectly apprehended. The notion, that the faith, save in the respects we have expressly excepted, is better understood by us moderns than it was by the Christians of the martyr-age,—those Christians who lived so near the time when our Lord himself tabernacled among men in the flesh, who had such rich abundance of grace, who were so firm in their faith, so fervent in their piety, so heroic in their constancy, who bore the cross in triumph over pagan art, philosophy, refinement, and superstition, and planted it on the capitol of the world,—seems to us a gross insult to the memory of the saints, and to proceed from an overweening conceit of ourselves, and base ingratitude to those to whom, under God, we owe it that we are not now ruthless barbarians, quaffing the blood of our enemies in honor of Wodin or Thor. Far more to the purpose, than to propagate such a notion, would it be for us to study to know our faith as well as they knew it, and to ask them to pray to God for us, that we may have the grace at least to try to imitate their heroic virtues. They who rate highest the sacred science possessed by the fathers will show the most gratitude and come nearest to the truth.

That the apostles could not have communicated the whole faith explicitly to their successors without these successors being specially inspired to receive it, as is pretended by the developmentists, is a position which cannot be seriously defended for a moment by any one who does not confound faith with the *gnosis* of the Alexandrians, or with the theological science of the schoolmen. The apostles had the whole clearly and distinctly in their own minds, and could far more easily and in a much shorter time communicate it to their hearers, than our modern professors of theology can

to their seminarians. It was far less labor for their people to receive it, and treasure it up in their memories, than it is for us to learn it now, when we have to spend far more time and thought in refuting error, in examining false systems, and meeting the objections of adversaries, than in learning the faith itself,—what is not to be believed, than in learning what is to be believed. This is sufficient; for we have never pretended that the faith, as the contradictory of error, was as well known in the beginning as it is now, or that the apostles instructed their successors how to refute all the objections which the craft, the ingenuity, or the malice of men might raise through all coming time against their faith. Yet even here, in what is not faith, but theology, perhaps, were we to inquire, or if we had the means of inquiring, we should find that we have made, save as to method, but small progress since the apostolic age. But does anybody pretend that the answers of theology to objections, or the solutions of difficulties and illustrations of obscure points offered by theologians, are inspired? Do the developmentists ask us to prove that these are not and cannot be “ruled” of faith?

These remarks are all we wish to add to what we have before said. It would not be difficult to account for the error of our English friends, if that entered into our purpose. They have neglected to draw a sharp line of distinction between faith and theology, and seem to us to confound what the ancients called the *gnosis*, or science of God, built up by speculation and meditation on the foundation of faith, with faith itself. In this science there may have been, for aught we know, developments, and certain it is that most of the errors and heresies which disturbed the church for centuries originated in the attempt to construct it, and to know more of God than he has chosen to reveal. But of this we have had nothing to say. Whether, in the way the Christian Alexandrians attempted to complete their science of God, any advance was or was not made, we leave without the expression of an opinion; for all that was developed or added in this way is evidently distinguishable from faith. It was never, as Moehler, in his essay on *The Unity of the Church*, tells us, included in the symbol, and by it the Christian perfects, not Christianity, but himself.*

* “It is, then, true to say that the Christian seeks not to perfect Christianity, but by Christianity to perfect himself; he who will do the one

But, in conclusion, we will say, in justice to Mr. Newman and his friends, that the whole responsibility of this unsound and uncatholic theory, as we hold it, does not belong to them. It has for some time been floating about in the minds, and showing now and then a feature of itself in the writings, of some Catholics, for several years; and we had observed decided tendencies towards it in more than one quarter, and had even expressed ourselves in our *Review* against it, before the appearance of Mr. Newman's essay. It was this tendency to the theory already existing in many minds, no doubt, that prevented a general reclamation against the essay on development, and, we may add, which made it peculiarly dangerous. If we have made the essay the occasion of discussing the theory of development, it has been solely because in it the theory has for the first time assumed a definite shape, a tangible form, in which it could be seized and handled. Yet the fact that it was already floating about in Catholic quarters, or that some Catholics were indicating a tendency towards it, must be taken as no slight excuse for our Oxford friends; and since this fact already existed, it was well that Mr. Newman published his essay. It has brought the matter to a head, and placed the

must renounce the other."—*De l' Unité de l' Église*, Bruxelles, 1839, chap. 4, p. 124. We cite the French translation of this work, for we have been unable to procure it in the original German. This, we believe, was the first work published by the learned author of *Symbolism*. It is not regarded as orthodox, which is the reason, perhaps, why *The Dublin Review* does not cite it; but it is clear to us that it is the work which has contributed more than any other to the theory of development; and it should be read by every one who would understand Mr. Newman's essay. It is precisely the work, half speculative and half mystical, to captivate an erudite and philosophical mind *in transitu* from Protestantism to Catholicity. Yet even in this work, in which the author goes decidedly for development, and seems to hold it essential to the perfect Christian, he takes care not to confound the developed with the revealed truth, or the perfection effected by the developments with the perfection of Christianity itself. He nowhere holds, with Mr. Newman, that development is necessary to complete the faith, to fill up its gaps, or to provide us with additional dogmas; but contents himself with representing it as necessary to complete the *life* of the Christian, or to realize subjectively the complete life of faith,—a doctrine to which we do not object, for it means, in plain English, only the practical application of faith to our entire life, or the conformity of our entire life to the faith. Under the strange disguises in which our German friends delight, we often find only an old and familiar acquaintance, and sometimes an old and valued friend. We have cited this work of Moehler as good authority for us against the theory of development; but it cannot, from its acknowledged unsoundness, be cited as authority against us.

theory fairly before the Catholic public. We have given our views of it, and the grounds on which we justify them. It is for the proper authorities to decide who is right, who is wrong. We have no fears that the decision will be against ourselves; but, if it is, we have nothing to do but to retract, to give up error for truth, to say we have been wrong and are sorry for it; which is no great hardship.

MORRIS ON THE INCARNATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1852.]

THIS is a work professedly written to conciliate a certain class of Protestants, and to bring them into the church by removing the obstacle to their conversion which they are supposed to find in the worship which we pay to the blessed mother of God. It attempts to do this by showing that, since Protestants concede that "the Word was made flesh," and that Mary, the mother of our Lord, "was a good woman," they must concede that this worship is proper; or, in other words, they must concede that this worship is in perfect accordance with the statements of the fathers, and the definitions of the church in regard to the Incarnation, and therefore that they cannot reject it as improper without falling into Nestorianism and Pelagianism. In working out his design, the author shows ability, zeal, and learning; he brings together valuable materials very much to his purpose, and which must be new and striking to most of his Protestant readers.

With all deference, however, we must be permitted to express some doubts as to the utility of such works. Works, written in a proper spirit, against Protestants, for the purpose of showing them the utter untenableness of any form of Protestantism, cannot be reasonably objected to; but

**Jesus the Son of Mary, or the Doctrine of the Catholic Church upon the Incarnation of God the Son, considered in its Bearings upon the Reverence shown by Catholics to his Blessed Mother.* By the REV. JOHN BRANDE MORRIS, M. A., sometime Petrean Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford; and now one of the Professors at Prior Park. London: 1851.

works written for Protestants, for the purpose of vindicating to them particular dogmas or practices of our church, can hardly be of much use. To Protestants individually, when they manifest a serious, candid, and inquiring mind, when they show themselves really desirous of knowing and embracing the truth, and perfectly willing to be taught it, we should exhibit all patience, and do our best to answer all their objections, however frivolous; but in our public addresses to Protestants collectively, as a body or aggregation of bodies outside of the church, it is never well to apologize, in the modern sense, for our religion, or to assume the attitude of defence. Our proper method is always to attack, and compel them to act on the defensive. The party which acts on the defensive only, which suffers itself to be attacked in its lines, and seeks only to prevent them from being broken, in some sense confesses its own weakness, and declares that it has no expectation of conquering, and seeks merely to save itself from defeat, which seldom fails to dispirit its own forces and to embolden and invigorate those of the enemy. Whatever apparent advantages Protestants have ever gained in their controversies with Catholics, they have gained by acting on the offensive; by simply throwing out objections, and keeping us busy with refuting them. Once put them on their defence, and compel them to state and defend their own thesis, and you have already vanquished them, for they have no defensible thesis.

There is no Catholic dogma, taken apart from the authority of the church, that is defensible. Deny or waive the commission of the church from God to teach, therefore her presence as infallible teacher, and there is nothing that she teaches us of faith that a wise man will undertake either to deny or to defend. To waive that authority, and to descend into the arena to combat with Protestants, is to concede them in the outset all they contend for, namely, the possibility of determining what is Christian faith without an infallible church. We can then combat only with arms borrowed from the Scriptures and the fathers, and if with such arms we combat them successfully, the victory inures to them, not to us. We defeat ourselves by our very success, for our doctrine is, that, without the infallible authority of the church, Christian faith is not determinable. We can in our controversies with Protestants appeal to the Scriptures and to the fathers only to prove what the church has always believed and taught as Christian faith; but unless the church

is already conceded to be infallible in believing and teaching, this does nothing to settle the question as to what really is Christian faith. There are very few Protestants who will be favorably affected by such an argument, for there are very few, if any, who hold themselves bound to believe a doctrine because the church has always believed and taught it. The great majority of them, at least as we have known them, would regard that as an excellent reason, not for believing, but for disbelieving a doctrine. How often do we find Protestants alleging as a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine, that it is a doctrine believed and taught by the church,—popish doctrine!

Protestantism is not merely a protest against this or that Catholic doctrine, but primarily and essentially against all church authority,—against believing any thing because the Catholic or any other body called a church believes and teaches it. The best method of dealing with it is, in our judgment, not to stand up and ward off its blows, but to summon it to the bar and compel it to answer for itself. It is of little use to define and defend our particular doctrines against it; we should rather compel it to define and defend the doctrines it professes to oppose to us. Let our controversialists with one accord, resolutely and perseveringly attack Protestantism in its principle, or want of principle, and show that it has no positive character, nothing but negation, nothing positive to oppose to the authority it denies, for a dozen years or so, and very few Protestants would be found to pay it the least reverence. They would themselves be forced to see that Protestantism has in reality no principle, no bottom, and nothing but sheer negation, which is sheer falsehood, to oppose to Catholic faith. It is really nothing but negation, and what passes for its principle is really nothing but the denial of all principle. It is a mere system of negations, leading to universal negation, that is, universal falsehood. We ordinarily treat it—not Protestants, but Protestantism—with quite too much tenderness and respect. In itself it is absolutely nothing, and is intelligible only by the truth it denies. It has no being in itself, no substantive existence of its own, and consequently, the moment that it is thrown back upon itself, and compelled to maintain for itself an affirmative existence, it fails, melts into thin air, and vanishes in vacuity.

Take any so-called Protestant doctrine you please, analyze it, and you will find that it consists of two parts, one affirm-

ative, the other negative. The affirmative part will in all cases be found to be, as far as it goes, the Catholic doctrine, —what the church believes and teaches, and always has believed and taught. Take, as an instance, the doctrine of justification by faith alone. If there is any doctrine which can be called Protestant, it is this. But this doctrine is affirmative and negative. Its affirmative part is justification by faith; but this is Catholic doctrine, not Protestant. It is, and always has been, the doctrine of the church, and is hers as much as is any other doctrine. The distinctively Protestant element is expressed, not in the words *justification by faith*, but in the little word “alone,” which Luther added in his version of the Scriptures. This little word is strictly negative, and serves only to deny the necessity of good works to justification, that is, the necessity of intrinsic justice to justification, as the church teaches. As God is a God of strict justice and infinite veracity, and cannot declare, pronounce, or repute one just who is not just, it follows that without intrinsic justice there is and can be no justification, and therefore the Protestant opposes to the doctrine of the necessity of intrinsic justice, not something positive, not a substantive doctrine, but a sheer denial, that is, sheer falsehood. The same conclusion may be obtained by analysis in the case of all the so-called Protestant doctrines. What they have that is positive or affirmative is Catholic doctrine, and therefore not distinctively Protestant; what they have that is distinctively Protestant is purely negative, and therefore false.

We must bear in mind, that of contradictories one is always necessarily false, and the other necessarily true, for truth can never contradict truth, nor falsehood contradict falsehood. Truth is always in being, and all being is true; falsehood is in not-being, and all not-being is false. All false assertion is in asserting that not-being is being, or that being is not-being. If to the Catholic faith there is and can be opposed nothing but simple denial, the truth of that faith and the falsity of the denial, or simple negation opposed to it, follow necessarily. If, then, Protestantism as the contradictory of Catholicity be proved to be purely negative in its character, it is proved by that alone to be false, and Catholicity is proved to be true. The Protestant by simply denying Catholicity has not therefore done enough to put the church on her defence. He has as yet done nothing to his purpose, and before she can be required

even to plead to his allegations, he must oppose to her some affirmative doctrine, some truth, which he has, but which she denies.

Now what we contend is, that our Catholic controversialists should waive all direct defence of Catholicity, and compel the Protestant to state and define this affirmative doctrine, this truth, which he thinks he has to oppose to her teaching. We insist on this, because it is a fact well known, infallibly known, by every Catholic, that the Protestant has, and can have, no such doctrine, no such truth,—that he has, and can have, only pure negation. He sustains himself now by attacking us on the strength of some fragments of Christian doctrine which he has stolen from the church. When he is let alone he denies, and denies only; when hard pressed, he defends himself by abandoning his distinctive Protestantism, and resorting to these fragments of Catholicity. We must deprive him of this subterfuge, by showing that these fragments are not his, that the truth of which they are fragments is held by the church in its unity and integrity, and that he must confine himself to his denials. The moment we force him so to confine himself, his aggressive power is gone, and he has more than he can do to take care of himself. He is then forced to comprehend that the positive elements on which he has been accustomed to rely, and which have served to keep him in countenance with himself, are not his, and that he as a Protestant has never had any right to claim them. He will then understand that, reduced to his distinctive Protestantism, he is reduced to pure negation, which is only another name for pure falsehood, and then that he must either escape to the church, or sink into universal nihilism.

Everybody knows that Protestants never state and defend any thesis of their own against us. Their method is to attack every thing and to defend nothing. They throw out their objections without any inquiry, not only whether they are really objections to the church, if sustained, but whether the principles which they must imply, if urged at all, are or are not sound. Nothing is more common with them than to urge contradictory objections, or to object to the church for reasons which mutually destroy one another. The objections they usually urge, if objections, are so only by virtue of a principle from the logical consequences of which they would themselves recoil with hardly less horror than we. Now, what we ask is, that our controversialists, instead

of laboring to prove that the objections urged do not lie against the church, should attack these objections themselves, and show Protestants what it really is they must maintain, if they persist in urging them. At first, Protestants will pay no heed to what we tell them; they will continue for some time their old course, and reply to us only by a few sneers, a little personal abuse, or silly anecdotes against a pope, a cardinal, or an individual Catholic. No matter. If we keep on, if we persevere unitedly in carrying the war into their country and attacking them in their camp, they will soon be obliged to heed us, if they would not lose all their followers, and be forced to engage in earnest in the work of defending themselves. This is all that we want, for the moment we can compel them to act on the defensive, we have vanquished them.

Mr. Morris understands this, and to some extent acts on it. He aims to refute the Protestant objections to the worship we pay to our Lady, by showing what they imply, and what would be the consequences of admitting them. This is very well as far as it goes; but in the first place, it is objections to a particular Catholic doctrine or Catholic practice that he analyzes and refutes, not objections to the authority of the church, without which we could not ourselves defend the doctrine or practice objected to; and in the second place, the consequences which he shows must follow from admitting the objections urged are such as most Protestants can very easily accept, and from which very few except Catholics recoil. To show to a Catholic that the worship he pays to the blessed mother of God is in perfect harmony with the doctrine of the Incarnation, as set forth by the fathers and defined by the early councils, and that to deny its propriety is to fall into Nestorianism and Pelagianism, is enough, all that can be necessary in his case; but it is just nothing at all to the great body of Protestants, or if something, it is only a good reason to them for being Nestorians and Pelagians. Who among Protestants are to-day any thing but Nestorians and Pelagians? Who is there to recoil from Nestorianism because it denies the Incarnation, or from denying the Incarnation because to deny it is to deny grace and to fall into Pelagianism? The author assumes too much when he assumes that Protestants hold that "the Word was made flesh." Some of them profess thus much, but very few of them hold it with sufficient firmness to feel themselves bound by any logical inference you can draw from it, while

the immense majority of them do not even hold it in words, and glory in denying it. We are acquainted with no Protestants who rise above Nestorianism, and Pelagianism is the grand heresy of the age. All Protestants who are not Manicheans are Pelagians. It is of no use to appeal to the symbols and formulas of the Protestant sects, for these are no longer believed, and are kept only for the purposes of controversy. There may be a few thousands of individual Protestants in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States who really intend to believe the doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation as held by the church in the early ages, and who would consider it a sufficient reason for rejecting a doctrine that it evidently contradicted them; but the great mass, whether they know it or not, are ingrained unbelievers, and can be convinced by no *ratio theologica*, no theological reason, or arguments drawn from the analogies of faith.

Mr. Morris is unquestionably an able and learned man, but he was a tractarian, and in spite of himself he judges Protestants generally by what he found to be true of the tractarians. He may, perhaps, be disposed to retort upon us that we were Unitarian, and judge the Protestant world by what we found to be true of Unitarians. But we were Presbyterian and well acquainted with Anglicanism before we became Unitarian. Moreover, when we were a Unitarian our principal study was of the non-Unitarian sects. The Unitarians with whom we associated were not a mere clique with a peculiar language and profession of their own, living and conversing only among themselves, and hardly deigning to notice any thing occurring out of their own "set." In this they differed essentially from the tractarians. These were a clique in the bosom of the establishment, living, to a great extent, solely among themselves, with very little intercourse with any but persons of their own stamp. They all had the same mark, and it was as easy at a glance to say of one of them, He is a Puseyite, as it is to say of this man, He is a Quaker, or of that man, He is a Methodist minister, or a Presbyterian parson. Even when converted and received into the communion of the church, nay, when carried through a course of theology and raised to the priesthood, the Puseyite is as unmistakable as before. No man of the least discernment could mistake the production of a converted tractarian for that of one who had been brought up a Catholic from his childhood. At every page

the peculiar habit of thought and mode of expression of the "set" are apparent. Besides, you have but to look into the natural heart, abroad upon the Protestant world, and to observe the tendencies of the Protestant mind everywhere, to find conclusive proof that our judgment, by whatever it may have been influenced, is far more conformable to fact than that of the converted tractarians. It is far more unfavorable, we grant; but whoever considers the nature, tendencies, and effects of heresy will for that very reason conclude that it is the more likely to be the true judgment. In judging the Catholic world our rule is, The more favorable, the truer the judgment; in judging the uncatholic it is, The more unfavorable, the truer the judgment. The presumption is always in favor of the Catholic, and we can believe no evil of him till it is proved; on the other hand, the presumption is always against the heretic, and we can believe no good of him till it is proved. We require proof to believe evil of a Catholic, or to believe good of a heretic. The most favorable construction must be presumed to be the true one in case of the former, the least favorable the true one in case of the latter.

The tractarians, in the judgment of Protestants, are virtually papists, and Father Newman has proved, in his own inimitable way, and by a perfectly legitimate application of his doctrine of development, that tractarianism is repugnant to genuine Anglicanism, and, we may add, then *a fortiori* to all other forms of Protestantism. It will not do, then, to take tractarians as in any sense the representatives of the Protestant world. They represent nobody but themselves, and are merely Protestants struggling to get out of Protestantism into Catholicity, without disowning the Anglican establishment or going to Rome. They have much in them that we like, but, logically considered, they can command no respect. They are neither fish nor flesh, nor yet good red herring. They are nice men, but shockingly bad logicians. In the general movements of our age they are a fact, but a fact of no great significance, and becoming less and less significant every day. *The Westminster Review*, under its new management, is a far better index to the tendencies of the Protestant mind even in England than *The Christian Remembrancer*, and *The Weekly Despatch* than *The Guardian*. Divine grace may be operating in this or that locality in an extraordinary way for the conversion of Protestants, but the Protestant

world, as such, pursues its natural course towards the denial of all Christian doctrine, and therefore of all truth. Nothing is more evident than this to every one who has looked out from his own clique, and accustomed himself to take broad and continental, instead of narrow and insular views. England is not all the world, nor are converted and unconverted tractarians all England. If the author could, to use his own favorite word,—which, as he and his school use it, we detest,—*realize* this, he would write a work much better adapted to the state of men's minds than is the very elaborate treatise before us.

Even under a purely literary and logical point of view, we are far from being able to commend the author's learned volumes as warmly as we could wish. It is unpleasant to have to find fault with every work that comes to us from a converted Puseyite. We exceedingly regret it. We wish some of the school would write and publish a work strictly Catholic in thought and expression, so that we could prove to them that we have no personal dislike to them, and are as willing to commend the true and the good coming from them as from any other source. We do not like the attitude we have been obliged to assume towards them; but it is not our fault. These gentlemen were a clique, a peculiar school, before their conversion, and, unhappily, they remain so since, though no doubt unintentionally, and without suspecting it. The only difference we can detect in mental and moral characteristics between a converted and an unconverted Puseyite is, that the former believes a little more, and the latter a little less. We have just read a pleasant though not a very able work, entitled, *A Tour in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, &c.*, by James Laird Patterson. The author commenced his travels as a Puseyite, but had the happiness to be converted in Holy Week, at Jerusalem, where he was reconciled to the church. According to his account, he was conditionally baptized, and afterwards read his abjuration of Protestantism. Here it is the custom, we believe, for the convert to read his abjuration before receiving the sacrament,—to put off Protestantism before being clothed upon with Catholicity. But it has struck us that the account given by Mr. Patterson is significant, and may explain many things which have puzzled us in the converted tractarians, especially of the development school. They appear not to have been required to abjure their heresies before being reconciled to the church; at least they

seem never to have comprehended that such a requirement was made, or at all necessary, in their case.

It would seem from all that we can learn respecting them, that these excellent converts never came to the church because oppressed with the burden of sin,—because they wished to have quenched the flames of hell already kindled in their bosoms. They were not children of wrath as others, but were already good pious Christians in a degree, and needed not to have the Christian life begotten in them, but helps, which they could not find in the Anglican establishment, to live that life in its perfection. They came to the church, not to obtain sanctity, for that they already possessed, but to attain to *heroic* sanctity, the sanctity of canonized saints, which they became convinced that they could not have outside of the Roman Catholic Church. They had nothing to put off, no old life to reject, to anathematize, for the life they had lived was, as far as it went, the true Christian life, and what they wanted was something more than they already had,—not something radically different. Here, we apprehend, is the source of whatever misunderstanding there is between them and us. They retain their belief in the sanctity of the life they lived in the establishment, and look upon conversion, at least in their case, as a putting on of Catholicity without any putting off of Puseyism, and their Catholic life as a continuation of their Puseyite life under circumstances and conditions far more favorable to its development and growth. If they had been forced, as we were, to feel that we must come to the church that we might have life, not merely that we might have it more abundantly, and that conversion and reception into the bosom of the church were the commencement, not merely the continuation, of the Christian life, we suppose we should have found little in them with which we could not have sympathized. They would then have distrusted their past life, intellectually as well as morally, and would have set themselves to learn as little children. They would have relied on none of their past historical reading or patristic learning, nor paraded it before us till they had reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. They would then have disturbed us with no novel speculations, and insisted upon no novel theories for the explanation of facts which have no existence out of the darkened understandings of heretics.

We have no wish to disparage in any respect whatever

the merits of the illustrious author, to whose ability, learning, zeal, and piety we pay a willing tribute ; but he seems to us to lack artistic taste, scientific method, and sound didactics. He is deficient in grasp and vigor of thought, in clearness and force of expression. His work has, properly speaking, no beginning, middle, or end, and he himself tells us that we may begin to read either with the first or the second part, as we choose. He has brought together a rich mass of materials, collected with great pains and labor, but he has not melted them down, and cast them into a uniform and consistent whole. His style is dry, hard, involved, and obscure. Without being verbose, it is needlessly diffuse, accumulating proofs, which do nothing to strengthen each other, on points where very little proof is required, and leaving the points most in need of proof unsustained by a single authority,—overloading with commentaries points which were originally clear and certain, and passing over with scarcely a remark those which were doubtful and in need of being elucidated. Indeed, we are at a loss to understand the author's state of mind, or to form any conception of the class of persons for whom he writes. He fails from first to last to win our confidence in his own judgment, and he very seldom enables us to determine the principle on which it rests, or the relation of that principle to the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology. For the most part, his conclusions, we presume, are orthodox ; but we feel very often that the processes by which he obtains them are exceedingly heterodox. His mental tastes and habits, his style and manner of writing, are to a great extent Protestant, or those of a man to whom truth has been presented piecemeal. He does not march straight to the heart of his subject, and lay open its central principle, from which all that appertains to it may be explained in its unity and real order. He proceeds, even when his intention is the reverse, from facts to principles, from particulars to universals, from multiplicity to unity, in the true Protestant style. He does not appear to have learned that principles are before facts, the universal or general, the generic, before the particular, and unity before multiplicity, or that, if the general is never obtainable without the particular, it is never obtainable from the particular ; that unity is no induction from multiplicity, ontology from psychology, nor principles from facts. Hence he is seldom, if ever, truly logical. The Catholic has truth as a whole, in its

unity and integrity, and therefore his method is to descend from the general to the particular, from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, and therefore a strictly logical method. He, when faithful to his privileges, borrows his light from the Creator, not the creature, enlightens facts by principles, not principles by facts, and particulars by the general, without which they are unintelligible, not the general by particulars. But the Protestant, having at best only some faint and broken reflections of truth; can only proceed by way of induction, which never leads to the truth, but the further from it. And hence it is that Protestants, whatever their learning and ability, are always illogical and sophistical.

Logic, as an art, is the intellectual application of principles, and is determined, not by the human mind itself, but by the real or intelligible order which exists and operates independently of the human mind. Its office is not to discover principles, but to apply them; not to invent truth, but to demonstrate it. It always presupposes the mind that is to use it is already in possession of the principles to be applied, or of the truth to be demonstrated or proved. Truth is being, or that which is or exists independently of the perceiving or reasoning mind, and principles are simply the ontological truth, either originally or by participation. Logic, therefore, depends on the real order, as much as does intuition itself, and consequently must proceed from, not to, the ontological truth or principle. It is then and must be deductive, and consequently all induction, not resolvable into deduction, is illogical, a mere sophistry. The peculiar Protestant philosophy, it is confessed on all hands, is the inductive, or, as it is sometimes called, the *Baconian* philosophy. This philosophy starts avowedly with the assumption that the general, the universal in the language of the schoolmen, or, as we may say, the principle, is unknown, and that nothing is immediately apprehended by the mind but particulars, or simple facts. Its pretence is to rise from facts to the principle, from particulars to the general, from multiplicity to unity, from psychology to ontology, from man and the universe to God. But as the essence of logic is the application of principles to facts, not of facts to principles, &c., thus imitating in its own order, faintly, very faintly assuredly, the creative act of God by which he produces existences from nothing, (for facts without principles, particulars without the general, are unintelligible, and to

the mind as if they were not), it follows of necessity that no inductive philosopher is or can be a good logician, and if he ever reasons logically at all, it is only on condition of reasoning illogically. If a Protestant is ever logical, it is only by denying while he affirms his own system, which is supremely illogical.

Now it seems to us that the learned author has not sufficiently distrusted his Oxford logic, which has for its basis the inductive philosophy. There is no doubt, that, to most of us who are converts from Protestantism, the truth has been presented, as he says, "piecemeal," and that we came to it in its unity and integrity only by successive steps, or rather by successive illuminations. This has been owing in part to the disadvantage of our position and training. But when a Protestant has once been really converted, he is inexcusable if he then finds it necessary to continue the Protestant method. His Protestant method never brought him to the church; he was brought in spite of that method, by the power of divine grace, his will coöperating therewith, and, so far as reasoning entered for any thing into the process, by his unconsciously in some cases, consciously in others, adopting and pursuing the Catholic method. Moreover, once converted and instructed in his faith, he has the truth in its unity and integrity. He can now seize it in its central principle, see the universe, natural and supernatural, from the point of view of its Creator, and descend from God to creature. He holds, so to speak, in his hand the principle of all things, from which all facts, all particular questions, are solvable. To proceed now as an inductive philosopher, as a Protestant who has truth only as reflected in faint and broken rays from the creature, is to forego his high privilege as a Catholic, and to derive, as to his manner or mode of thinking and writing, no advantage from his conversion. This is, as it seems to us, the precise case with our author. His conversion appears to have been a putting on of Catholicity without a putting off of Protestantism, or the grafting of certain Catholic truths into his Oxfordism. Hence he attempts to explain and vindicate Catholicity by Oxford logic and philosophy. All this was natural, considering that the converts of his school regarded their Oxford life as sinning only by defect, as faulty only in respect to what it lacked, not in respect to any thing it professed to have. Still, if the author had reviewed his Oxford logic and philosophy, and freed himself from their trammels, we

should not have had occasion to accuse him, as we have done, of lacking grasp and vigor of thought, clearness and force of expression. If on becoming a Catholic he had taken the pains to adjust his philosophy to the ontology of the catechism, he would have given us no occasion to complain of the diffuseness and obscurity of his work; and he would have compressed it within a third of its present dimensions, and made it far more complete, intelligible, and conclusive. As the case now stands, we are often at a loss to determine what he really means, and as we see he has an unsound philosophy, we dare not rely on his judgment, when we can determine his meaning, unless we can justify it from other sources. Whether it be Catholic or not, he gives us no means of knowing, for he does not connect the principle on which it rests with, or show its relation to, the well-known principles of Catholic faith and theology, although this is precisely what he proposes to do, and would have done, if he had followed Catholic instead of Protestant logic.

The author divides his work into three parts. In the first part he labors to prove, from the admission that "the Word was made flesh," that our Lord was perfect God and perfect man, and therefore we can predicate of him in his human nature all that we can predicate of a perfect man,—or of any man, sin excepted. In his human nature, he has the proper faculties, affections, and duties of humanity, and therefore owed to his virgin mother submission, the love and obedience due from a son to his mother. All this is true, and the author has admirably developed and proved it. In this respect we can warmly commend his work. In his second part he undertakes to prove from the admission which Protestants must make, that "Mary was a good woman," that our Lord, from the first moment of his conception in her womb, enriched her with all communicable graces, and especially with full and complete knowledge of his own person and character, and of the whole mystery of redemption. Now, as Mary was at the least a good woman, she would naturally wish to know what manner of child it was that the angel had announced should be born of her, and which was conceived by the Holy Ghost in her womb. This wish would be known to the child as soon as formed, for all knowledge was infused into his human soul, by virtue of the hypostatic union, from the moment of conception. He knew the wish as soon as formed, and could

comply with it, for he had all power. Thus as a dutiful and loving son he was bound to do so, and of course did so. But it may be said that he owed a duty to his Father as well as to his mother, and it may not have been the will of God, his Father, that he should have communicated this knowledge to his mother so soon and at once. Very true, it *may* have been so, but it is for you to prove that it was so. Therefore it was not so, and therefore he did communicate it! This is a tolerably fair specimen of the author's logic, when he is not assisted by the Catholic author he chances to cite. There are many things very proper in pious meditation, which are, nevertheless, of no value as arguments, and which are very unsuitable to be proposed to those who are without; for some things may be very edifying to the pious believer, that are by no means convincing to the unbeliever. We say nothing of the conclusion at which the author arrives, for we do not know what is the current teaching of our divines on the subject. We have had, in the little time we have been in the church, as much as we could do to learn what is of faith, without making ourselves acquainted with all the remote consequences which theologians have drawn from admitted theological principles. We know that our Lady had the grace of humility, and that if it was the will of God that she should for a time remain in ignorance of some things pertaining to the mystery of redemption, or the person and character of her Son, which we can conceive might have been the case, she would have had no wish to be enriched all at once with the knowledge supposed, for she had no will not in accordance with the divine will. We must, then, know by positive revelation what was the will of God in the premises, before we can conclude any thing as certain on the subject, one way or the other. Consequently, to us, the whole fabric of doctrine which the author has constructed on the supposed Protestant admission that "Mary was a good woman," even if true, has no solid foundation in any thing he has advanced. We do not, let it be understood, dispute his conclusions; we only question the process by which he professes to obtain them.

The author starts with a false principle, namely, that moral evidence can never give certainty, or any thing more than probability. The certainty of the believer, he supposes, is due not to evidence at all, but solely to the gift of faith, *donum fidei*, received in the sacrament of baptism. But

the gift of faith adds nothing to the objective certainty, or the certainty of the matter of faith. What it gives is subjective certainty. It gives us a clearer view and a stronger hold of the objective certainty, but does not create or in any manner affect that certainty in itself. It consists in a supernatural illustration of the understanding, and a supernatural inclination of the will; but for this very reason it gives us a supernatural facility, not only to believe the truth proposed, but also to detect error and uncertainty, and consequently, instead of facilitating our belief of what is not objectively certain, or what is merely probable, it renders it all the more difficult for us to believe it; and hence, of all people in the world, Catholics are the least credulous. To deny all objective certainty, or to allow only an objective probability, is simply to declare all faith, except as an infused habit, absolutely impossible. Overlooking this fact, denying all objective certainty, the author does not even aim in his logic to establish the objective certainty of his conclusions, and appears to suppose that he has done all that can be required of him when he has rendered it probable that they are not improbable, or incredible. He concludes *a posse ad esse*, and seldom asks any thing better than the argument *de congruo*,—and what is worse, he contends that we can have nothing better. This proceeds from his false philosophy. He and his school are genuine psychologists. They do not, perhaps, intend to deny all objective truth; but they all contend that the form under which it is apprehended depends on the human mind itself, and that the truth apprehended by us would appear very different, if our minds were differently constituted, as we may suppose it actually does to superior beings. If this be so, there can be no objective certainty, and then no demonstration, and no absolute proof, moral or metaphysical, as has been shown over and over again by those who have so fully refuted the Kantian philosophy, whether as taught by Kant himself, or as modified by Coleridge, the metaphysician of the tractarian school. The doctrine refutes itself; for if the *nexus* between the premises and the conclusion be not necessary, there is no objective certainty; and if no objective certainty, how can you affirm fitness or congruity, or even probability? But if there is, why start with the assumption that there is not, and that the form of the object depends, either in whole or in part, on the subject? No doubt some Catholics have been trained up psychologists, which we regard as their misfortune, but

no Catholic is ever a psychologist in his theology. Truth is properly defined by St. Augustine to be being, that which really is or exists, and either we are unintelligent beings, or we apprehend it, as far as we apprehend it at all, as it is or exists independent of our minds; for it is of the essence of intellect to apprehend truth, as St. Thomas himself teaches, in teaching that truth is the object of the intellect, as good is the object of the will. Superior beings see further than we do, and know truths that we do not; but truth, as far as we see and know it, wears to us the same form that it does to them. We regret, therefore, that the author has retained his Oxford logic and metaphysics. It is not well to set out by denying in principle all objective certainty, then to proceed to prove a thing, for aught we know, may be, and thence to conclude that it is fit to be, and if fit to be therefore it is, and may be taken as the principle from which Catholic doctrine may be concluded or vindicated. The fabrics we thus erect are simply castles in the air.

The author, we are sorry to see, is not careful to mark the distinction between opinions in the church and the opinions of the church. He places the opinions in the church, which he is not forbidden to hold, on the same line with doctrines of the church, which he is not permitted to deny, and concludes indifferently from either, what is to be received as "the mind of the church." This is inexcusable. He has the right, when contrary opinions are held by respectable theologians, to adopt which opinion he chooses; but he can hold it only as an opinion, not as faith. Where there are contrary opinions, both of which it is lawful to hold, either may be held as an opinion, but neither can be held as Catholic doctrine, or as a principle from which positive arguments in defence of Catholic doctrine may be drawn; for the opinion that could be so taken it would not be lawful to dispute. It would in fact cease to be opinion, and become faith. The author must remember that he is avowedly writing for Protestants, and in his arguments with Protestants for Catholicity he cannot conclude from what are mere opinions amongst our own theologians. He may refer to these opinions for the purpose of warding off Protestant objections, but he cannot make them the basis of an argument to prove that a given doctrine is Catholic doctrine, and ought to be believed as such. Among the *loci theologici*, or theological topics, we do not recollect ever to have seen opinions in the church enumerated. We do not say that

the opinion of the author is not generally the sounder opinion, but we do say that he often treats opinion as if it were faith, and erects on it a fabric which he will find very apt to excite the derision or the blasphemy of those for whom he professes to write. We hold the worship which we pay to our blessed Lady too sacred and too tender to be exposed, as the author exposes it, to the rude scoffs of an unbelieving world, and we think that, if he chose to defend it at all, he should have done so with more reserve, or at least with arguments, and from principles, which are able to stand the test of the most rigid logical criticism, not with principles which are perhaps questionable, and arguments which are at best ridiculous.

We are told that the first two sections of the work "may be said to be little more than an expansion of meditations, which mainly contributed to the author's own conversion." This is obvious enough on their very face, and no doubt accounts for much in them of which we are obliged to complain. As the meditations of an Anglican, working his way to the light, of which he catches partial glimpses from afar, whose rays now and then reach and cheer him with their warmth and brightness, and render visible without dissipating the darkness which surrounds him, they are most admirable, and not unworthy of being studied. But why publish them, with all their necessary crudeness and inaccuracies? Why not correct them by subsequent Catholic study and experience? In them we see too plainly the Oxford student, who has as yet no clear and distinct perception of the truth, stumbling over difficulties which a more thorough knowledge of Catholic theology would prove to be no difficulties at all. The author appears here with all his Oxford prejudices, with full confidence in his Oxford historical and patristic reading, and that lofty contempt which Oxford students always affect for the learning and judgment of Catholics. He disparages the edition of the fathers by the learned Benedictines of St. Maur, and seems never to have thought it possible for a Catholic divine, not a graduate of a Protestant university, to instruct him, or in any manner to aid him in his researches after truth. Even the Angel of the Schools is too common an authority among Catholic students to command his respect. If he consults a Catholic author it must be an ancient father whose sense is uncertain, or a modern doctor whose language is not always clear and definite, or whose speculations do not enter into the current theology

of the church. All this is perfectly natural in an Anglican in the process of his conversion to Catholicity, but we must be pardoned for saying, that it is not precisely what we look for in a professor in a Catholic college.

The author makes a great display of learning. He amends the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, with wonderful facility, if not felicity,—corrects the text of a father wherever the received reading does not happen to be to his purpose, and settles the genuineness or spuriousness of works attributed to ancient authors, without the least hesitation, deciding against all Christian antiquity without the slightest misgiving. He gives up arguments and historical readings, on which the ablest of our divines have uniformly insisted, and does it not to win the confidence of Protestants, but to save Catholics from the reproach of ignorance and credulity, or their criticism from the derision of their learned adversaries. Now in all this, for aught we know, he may be right. We are not learned enough to pass judgment on the solidity and accuracy of his learning. But the lofty airs he assumes, and his low appreciation of all Catholic intelligence and scholarship are not precisely fitted to win our confidence. It would be well for us who are converts to learn what Catholics really know, before we take it upon us to treat them as mere scio-lists and pious fools, or for granted that we have brought into the church an invaluable treasure in our Protestant cultivation and learning. The church, perhaps, could have contrived, with the blessing of God, to get along without us, much better than we without her. After all, we brought her nothing to boast of, nothing but our sins, our ignorance, and our infirmities. Our conversion is not likely to create a new epoch in her history. And for us to suppose that we can throw new light on the sacred mysteries, and clear up in a new and more satisfactory way the abstruse points of theology which Catholic theologians have not yet settled, would, were it not presumptuous, be simply ridiculous. We ought to consider ourselves as knowing nothing except what we have learned since our reconciliation to the church, at the feet of her teachers and pastors.

For ourselves, we confide in no judgments we formed prior to our conversion, and trust no historical or patristic reading we had then made, save so far as we have since reviewed it in the light of Catholic faith and theology. We have felt it necessary to learn all anew under the direction

of Catholic teachers, who happen never to have been schismatics or heretics, and whom we have found abundantly able to instruct us in every branch of science and erudition. We know no reason why this should have been more necessary in the case of a converted Unitarian, than in that of a converted Puseyite. Indeed, it strikes us as less necessary, because the line of demarcation between Unitarianism and Catholicity is so broad and distinct, that no one of ordinary discernment can mistake it ; while Puseyism runs so near to Catholicity on so many points, so successfully counterfeits Catholic doctrines and practices, that, if we are not on our guard, we may easily mistake the one for the other. Human nature in the absence of satanic temptation can go far, and with satanic aid may go much further, in counterfeiting Catholic faith and sanctity, and it is not always easy to distinguish the asceticism of the Stoic, which springs from pride, from the asceticism of the Christian, which springs from humility, or the sanctity of Littlemore, for instance, so praised by Father Dominic, from the supernatural sanctity of the Catholic. It requires an extraordinary grace to be a discerner of spirits. The same counterfeit is often effected in doctrine, and the resemblance of the counterfeit to the genuine is often so close, as to be most difficult even for well-informed persons to detect. The Oxford converts themselves were deceived, for the sanctity which they believed they possessed, of which they were accustomed to boast, and to which for a long time they referred as a full justification of their remaining in the Anglican establishment, they held to be true Christian sanctity, when in reality it was no more Christian sanctity than is that exhibited by some Moravians, Methodists, and Quakers, or even some of the ancient or modern pagans. The closer the resemblance of one's life to Catholicity before, the more liable is he to err after, his conversion ; and the further removed one's heresy from orthodoxy before his conversion, the less liable is he to retain it afterwards. The tractarian converts, from the peculiarity of their doctrine and practice prior to their reconciliation to the church, are, of all classes of English and American converts, precisely those who are the most likely to originate a new heresy among us, or to fail to apprehend and maintain Catholic doctrine in its integrity. Their writings must always be read with the presumption against them. Therefore, of all should they be the most careful to rely in nothing on their past life, save as

they review it in the light of what they have learned since their conversion, not under instructors who, like themselves, are but recent converts, of their own class, but under such as have been Catholics from their youth. These hints and suggestions may not be called for, and our impression with regard to the tractarian converts may be wholly unauthorized; but we fear that what we have said, ungracious as it may seem, is not misplaced or mistimed. We sincerely wish, therefore, that, instead of giving us the meditations which mainly contributed to his own conversion, the author had given us meditations and arguments that originated in his Catholic faith and study, and therefore such as ought to convince those without of the truth of Catholicity. He would then have written, not as a convert from Puseyism, but as a Catholic.

Our limits do not permit us to give a full analysis of the author's work. The great body of his work is undoubtedly Catholic, sound, and really meritorious. But aside from the faults we have already found with its style, logic, and philosophy, and aside from the fault we shall soon have to find with the theory on which it is confessedly written, there are one or two points on which the author, in his direct teaching, is undeniably heterodox. In his table of contents we find this startling proposition: "Even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility." Here is his illustration and proof of it:—

"It has been shown by Butler, in his admirable Analogy, that, if the opinion of a necessity or fate could be proved, it would do little to influence practice with any reasonable man. Whatever excuse can be made for the man who murders, or the child who steals upon the score of necessity, will also serve as an excuse for the magistrate who excuses the one, or the parent who punishes the latter. And this among other considerations shows, that however intoxicated with fatalism men might be at the first draught of it, still after a while men would be treated as if they were free, and forced against themselves to believe it. The very words for 'fate' imply a speaker or distributor who made the fatum to exist. Now if it be true that that fatalism which puts this reflection out of sight would leave moral obligations where they are, then predestinarianism itself would not destroy them, the Catholic doctrine of predestination far less."

This is wretched sophistry, as well as bad theology. Butler is no great authority with us, but as cited by the author he does not attempt to prove that fatalism is compatible with

moral responsibility; he simply contends that men, if they held it, would be *practically* obliged to act as if they held it not, and to distribute rewards and punishments as they do now,—a mere truism. He does not assert, and far less does he prove, that, if fatalism were true, they would be *morally* responsible agents, and therefore subjects of moral praise and blame. Because men would do as they do now in their practical conduct, through an irresistible fate, even assuming fate to be the decree of God, it would not follow that predestinarianism itself would not take away moral responsibility. Fate, whether taken in the old heathen sense, or as the author explains it, stands opposed to free will; and does the author mean to say that without free will we should or could be morally responsible? Predestination, in the Calvinistic sense, is repugnant, and always held by Catholic divines to be repugnant, to moral responsibility, because it destroys free will. It is simple fate, and renders its author, or him who spoke the *fatum*, the real actor in all the acts of man. And hence Calvin makes God the author of sin. Predestination, in the Catholic sense, does not take away moral responsibility, most assuredly, simply because it does not take away free will; because it is not *fate*, or a predestination that executes itself without the free concurrence of the will of the predestinated, that is, the free concurrence of a will intrinsically free not to have concurred. How predestination, which is certain and infallible, can coexist with the freedom of the will, is a mystery which human reason cannot explain. But if the word *fate* has any meaning in our language, it denies free will, and if there is any thing certain in theology or philosophy, it is that the denial of free will is the denial of all moral obligation, of all merit and all demerit. It is therefore false, and, reference had to the definitions of the church condemning Calvinism and Jansenism, even heretical, to say that “even fatalism would not exempt from moral responsibility.” The author, in his whole chapter on predestination, from which we have taken the passage cited above, seems to us either to use language very loosely, or else to be writing on a subject which he has by no means mastered. We can gather very little that is definite from what he says. This, however, may be owing to our own ignorance and dulness of apprehension.

But here is another passage which, with all respect, we would recommend to the notice of his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, to whom these volumes are dedicated by the author:—

"Now suppose a state of things in which it was an acknowledged principle, not only that Christ did every thing as an example to us, but also that it was a clear case that he on several occasions disguised his real meaning, though he knew people in general would draw a conclusion from his words just the opposite of that meaning. If this was the state of things in which the fathers lived, it is plain that they might treat heretics as our Lord did the impertinent thoughts of his disciples, when he answered them by this wise but evasive *climax*. [St. Mark xiii. 32.] Hence it is clear, that if a number of passages can be quoted from the fathers, in which the ignorance is ascribed to Christ's human nature without more ado, such passages may be nothing more than a convenient answer to present difficulties, and not in the least a statement of their real doctrine upon the subject. Until the reverse of this can be distinctly proved, it will not avail to quote these passages in defence of the Ignorantists [Agnoetæ]. There is no Catholic divine now-a-days, probably, who would not admit that such evasive answers were not only no lies, but absolutely allowable when impertinent questions were put. There are a very few, if any, Protestants, who would not practically use this principle in real life, however indignantly they may at first sight repudiate it. It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way; as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself; but there are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask. Hence it was lawful for our Lord and Master, the absolute ruler of his creatures, to answer impertinent thoughts in this manner. And, by parallel reasoning, it was lawful for the fathers to answer heretics in a way which, while it disguised their own sentiments probably, nevertheless did the heretics good. For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less: thus nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupify himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery mutually agreed upon. If any body would deny it, it must be simply because he had never given the question a thought, or else because he was so dull of conscience as to prefer the ruin of two souls to the temporary suspension of the powers of one. Now if the fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory."

The doctrine which the ordinary reader will draw from this language is, that it is sometimes lawful to lie for the interests of truth, and to do evil for a good end; in other words, that "the end justifies the means,"—the very doctrine which is so generally, and so falsely, laid to the charge

of Catholic theologians, especially the learned fathers of the Society of Jesus. The author himself seems to warrant this interpretation of his language, for he says expressly, "Jesus would be condemned of jesuitry by those out of the church, if he lived in our days." The author is not writing for Catholics, who may be presumed to know their own doctrine, but avowedly for Protestants, who are supposed to be ignorant of it, and who expect, as he must know, that a Catholic writing on this subject, which has been so much controverted, so foully misrepresented, and made the occasion of so much scandal, will state the Catholic doctrine in a form as little likely to be mistaken for the one commonly charged against us as the truth will possibly permit. It is fair, then, to presume, if he not only does not disclaim expressly the doctrine charged, of which he clearly is not ignorant, but uses language which seems to warrant it, and in some respects certainly does warrant it, that he really holds and intends to teach it; for, under such circumstances, an author's doctrine is to be inferred fully as much from what he refrains from denying as from what he actually asserts, and the rule for interpreting his language is to put upon it, not the most favorable, but the least favorable construction that it will bear,—especially when, as in the case before us, he is *ex professo* explaining and defending *œconomia* in presenting the truth, that is, the presenting it so as to avoid as much as possible the giving of scandal, or leading people into error and sin. If the author holds that what is called jesuitry, the doctrine that it is lawful to lie for the truth, and to do evil for a good end, is really reprehensible, why does he use language that may, without violence, be understood to imply it? Or why does he not take special pains to frame his language so as to guard against it, by marking clearly the distinction between it and the true Catholic doctrine?

What the author in the secrets of his own heart intends, we know not, and judge not, for we are treating of the author, not the man. We presume he means right, but he evidently thinks loosely, and expresses himself carelessly, almost wantonly. He neglects to distinguish between not telling truth, and telling what is not truth. No doubt it is sometimes lawful, nay, sometimes our duty, to conceal or not disclose the truth we may happen to know, but it is never lawful to do so by telling that which is not true. When we are questioned by those who have no right, or on

matters on which they have no right, to question us, and when the truth, if told, would scandalize or lead men into error and sin, as sometimes happens, we are free to practise what the fathers called *œconomia*, or prudently to withhold it, and to evade the questions put; but never are we free to withhold it or to evade the questions put by answering what is false, or what, in a sense the hearers may not with due diligence ascertain, is not true. If the hearers are misled by the answers given, it must be by their own fault, not ours,—by the inferences which they unnecessarily draw from our words. If the answers we give, in order to escape telling the truth we are either not bound to tell or bound not to tell, are false, in every sense, according to ordinary usage of language in like cases, or are true only by virtue of some mental restriction or reservation, or some peculiar sense of our own which the hearer has no natural means of ascertaining, they are inadmissible, for then they are literally lies, and it is never lawful, under any circumstances whatever, to lie. Such, briefly stated, is the doctrine of our theologians, as we could easily prove by citations, were they necessary for any other purpose than to show our learning, and within this doctrine can be brought all the examples from our Lord and the fathers which the author refers to.

“It is lawful in some cases for inferiors to answer superiors in this way; as, for instance, if you asked a servant if he had been ever guilty of theft, for no one is obliged to criminate himself.” In case the superior has no right to the true answer to the question, conceded; but if he has, the case is not so clear; for it is not certain that no one is ever bound to criminate himself, or rather, when juridically interrogated, to confess an act which may criminate him. Under the common law, which obtains in England and most of our states, no man is bound to criminate himself; and it is understood on both sides that the state must convict the criminal by other testimony than his own, unless that is voluntarily given, or else not convict him at all. But this is not, as it seems to us, necessarily a principle of universal law. The good of the republic requires that crimes should be detected and punished, and the criminal, in his quality of citizen or subject, may be obliged, for aught we can see, if the republic chooses, to testify as a witness against himself, as well as against another; and if so, he must be bound to give true and faithful answers as much as any other witness. But be this as it may, and even conceding the right of the

servant, in the case supposed, to give an evasive or equivocal answer, he certainly has no right to answer what is not true, or what, without any regard to his own mental restriction or mental reservation, of which his master can know nothing, is necessarily false. "There are far more cases, where it is lawful for superiors to evade questions which inferiors have no right to ask." Undoubtedly, within the limits of the rule we have laid down; but there are none in which they have a right to evade even such questions by direct, plain, and necessary falsehood, or by an answer which must necessarily imply, in the ordinary usage of words in such case, what is not true.

"For it is always lawful to lead a man away from a greater sin by leading him to a less." The author here shows that he holds that the alleged evasions of our Lord and the fathers, of which he has just spoken, did lead men into sin, though a less sin than that which they led them from. We deny both the fact here supposed, and the principle on which the author attempts to justify it. The so-called evasive answers of our Lord and the fathers, or *œconomia*, as it is termed, which they on some occasions practised, did not of themselves lead men to any sin at all, and it is nothing short of blasphemy, at least in the case of our Lord, to allege that they did. The principle alleged in justification is false. Sin is never lawful, for by its very definition it is the transgression of the law, and therefore it can never be lawful to lead a man to commit sin, since to lead a man to commit a sin is to participate of its guilt. Otherwise there would be gross injustice in punishing the accessory to a crime, whether before or after the fact. It is lawful to lead a man from a greater sin, though in doing so you do not, cannot, and know you cannot, prevent him, if you do so, from committing a less sin; but never is it lawful to lead him from it by leading him to commit the less: for in the former case the direct and only positive influence of your action is to prevent sin, which is always not only lawful, but laudable, and all that can be said is, that you were not able to prevent all the sin the man was determined to commit; but in the latter case the direct tendency of your action is to lead a man to commit sin, which is never lawful. "Nobody in his sane senses would deny that it was a virtuous deed to induce a man to stupify himself by drink, who would only use his wits to avail himself of a solitary opportunity for murder of a man in mortal sin, or adultery

mutually agreed upon." If stupefying himself with drink in the case supposed is sin on the part of the man himself, we deny it; for we may never do evil that good may come. If you say the stupefaction is not a sin on the part of the man himself, we concede your conclusion, but then it is nothing to your purpose; for then it only implies that it is a virtuous act by lawful means, or means not unlawful, to lead men from sin, which, indeed, nobody in his sane senses will deny, whether the sin be great or little. The case is to your purpose only on condition that stupefying one's self with drink is always in itself sin, and if it be so, it is undeniable that you cannot, without sin, for any purpose whatever, induce a person so to stupify himself. Whether it would in the case supposed be or be not a sin, we are not called upon to decide.

"If the fathers could lead the heretics to blaspheme the human nature of Christ, to do so was to lead them to a less sin than blaspheming his divine nature, which blasphemy might never be forgiven, neither in this world nor in purgatory." Certainly, if blaspheming our Lord in his human is indeed a less sin than blaspheming him in his divine nature; but to blaspheme the human nature of Christ is unquestionably a sin, and therefore the fathers could not lawfully lead the heretics to commit it even for the purpose of preventing them from committing the greater sin of blaspheming his divine nature. What the author might have said, all he needed to say, and perhaps all that he thought he was saying, is, that it was lawful for the fathers to prevent, if they could, the heretics from blaspheming the divine nature of Christ, though they suffered them, since they could not prevent them from doing the one or the other, to blaspheme the human nature, and that in doing so they would have been performing a virtuous action, because they would have prevented, if not all sin, at least the greater sin. If he had said this, nobody could have objected, or pretended that he favored, what is popularly called jesuitry,—a doctrine which he ought to know, if he does not know, is no Catholic doctrine, and is falsely and calumniously laid to the charge of the illustrious Society of Jesús.

What the author really intends may or may not be orthodox, but his doctrine as he develops and sets it forth is certainly false and scandalous, for his language is well fitted to confirm the calumnious accusations of Protestants against us. This is not the first time we have encountered this de-

testable doctrine among the tractarian converts. We found it in Dr. Newman's essay on development; we have found it in some of their contributions to *The Dublin Review*, and it seems to have been adopted by the whole school, both before and since their conversion. The tractarians in the Anglican establishment were, as they felt, in a false position. They held doctrines and observed practices which that establishment repudiated, while they asserted its full authority to teach, and their duty of unreserved submission to its teaching. Their study was to advocate what their church condemned without compromising themselves, or saying any thing which could be made the ground of convicting them of positively departing from her standards. The most disingenuous publication we recollect ever to have read was the famous Tract No. 90, written by Dr. Newman before his conversion. The position of the whole school was a practical lie, and its more distinguished members were laboring with all their might to teach their church, while they confessed her right to teach them, and made as if they learned only from her. They thus contracted a habit of disingenuous writing, which, while it suggested their meaning so plainly that nobody could really mistake it, yet did not often positively commit them to any thing for which their church could call them to an account. They were aware of this, even boasted of it, and they justified it on the ground that the end they had in view was a good end, and that they were laboring in the interests of Catholic truth and piety,—the precise ground assumed by our author in defense of the fathers, and even of our Lord himself. When the excellent Father Glover sent Dr. Newman, then at Rome, by the hands of the lamented Father Shaw, our first article against his essay on development, with the request that he would read it, he replied, as Mr. Shaw informed us, "that he had heard of the article, but he had no time nor wish to read it. He had no hard feelings against the writer personally for having written it, but he was sorry that he had done so, for he had reason to believe that the essay was doing great good in England." So he looked only at the effects his theory was producing, or supposed to be producing, in a particular locality, without at all troubling himself with the question whether it was true or false; that is, he was willing that the theory, even if false and mischievous, should go uncontradicted, if for the moment it *per accidens* facilitated the conversion of

a few Anglicans. This is the only principle we can deduce from the reason he assigns for regretting the publication of our article against his essay, and this is identically the principle Mr. Morris generalizes and sets forth in the work before us, or what is improperly termed jesuitry.

We find it, in consequence of this tractarian habit of expressing more on some occasions than is professed, exceedingly difficult to hold the writers who have come to us from the tractarian school to any fixed or definite statements. They are vague and uncertain, loose and vacillating. They do not distinctly state a thesis and abide by it. They are developmentists. Their thesis grows or changes as they proceed, expands or contracts, becomes now this, or now that, according to the exigencies of the argument. Father Newman, in his *Lectures on the Difficulties of Anglicans*, has occasion to touch his theory of development. He approaches it with great modesty, and with statements perfectly unexceptionable. You begin to feel that he has renounced it, or that after all he has never really meant any thing more by it than is warranted by the received theology of the church. His first statement is perfectly satisfactory, and if we stop with it, we have no objection to offer. But we read on, and what in an ordinary writer would be only a logical development, or an illustration of his thesis, becomes unexpectedly an increase or growth of the thesis itself. The development, instead of a logical or an illustrative development, which merely enables us to see the original statement in its true light, and in its logical contents and relations, turns out to be a development by accretion, and takes in other and additional statements, which entirely change the character of the original thesis, although a careless reader might not observe it. This is, we suppose, an illustration of what he means by growth of doctrine. Just so is it with the author before us. His first simple statement of Catholic morality is unexceptionable; but as he proceeds to develop it he takes up new principles,—accumulates a series of illustrations which develop his doctrine into another, almost totally the reverse of the one with which he set out. You see this, you feel it, you know it; yet, if you accuse him of holding the doctrine with which he ends, you will have no little difficulty in convicting him of doing so; for he has so expressed himself that, if hard pressed, he can contract his doctrine to his first simple statement, and, when the pressure is removed, expand it to any

dimensions he pleases. The great body of Catholic readers will, in consequence of their own logical training, be disposed to interpret him always in accordance with his primitive statements; Protestants, for whom he writes, and who better understand his method of writing, since it is very much their own method, will much more truly interpret him by his last statements, and take his developed as his real doctrine. It is singular that complaints of the sort we here bring are precisely the complaints which the fathers and all our modern controversialists uniformly bring against the heretics they are opposing. Our author and his school, if free from heresy, have at least the usual arts of heresy, and a most heretical manner of writing.

The author is a developmentist, and along with his main design has evidently wished to show, on the one hand, that Protestants can make nothing of the fathers without the infallible church as living interpreter of them, and on the other, that Catholics can make just as little of them without the theory of development. The former is done to show Protestants why he is a Catholic, the latter to show us why he was an Anglican, or not sooner converted,—how he can be a Catholic now without blaming himself for having been so long an Anglican, notwithstanding his profound knowledge of the fathers. He could not remain an Anglican, because he could not without the church determine fully what is Christian doctrine; he could not become a Catholic before the invention of the theory of development, because such are the omissions and contradictions of the fathers, and such the discrepancies between their teachings and those of the present church of Rome, that it was impossible, without a theory which Roman divines had never recognized, or at least never made use of, to reconcile the church with the fathers, and the fathers with one another, or a given father with himself. He does not say all this in just so many words, but he seems to us to imply it throughout his book. Catholics may, he says, reconcile the difficulties presented by St. John Chrysostom without the theory of development if they can; he cannot, and does not attempt to do it. He does not, we own, bring the theory prominently forward, but he presupposes it, and confessedly attempts to explain only those difficulties which would be difficulties in case the theory were received as true. There can be no reasonable doubt that he holds it, nor is there known to us any reason for supposing that it is not still held by Father Newman

and all the converts of his school, or that they do not still consider its invention or its statement and regular development as an important contribution to Catholic theology.

We have no intention of entering anew, at any great length, into the discussion of Dr. Newman's theory of development. We have heretofore discussed it sufficiently. We have taken great pains to reëxamine the question within the last three or four years, and have been only the more confirmed in the judgment of it, which we have already expressed over and over again. We think the theory uncalled for, unauthorized by a single Catholic writer of the least note, and also false and pernicious. *The Dublin Review* had the temerity, indeed, to cite Suarez in support of it; it might as well have cited our own pages, for the statement of Catholic doctrine which we opposed to it was given in almost the very words of Suarez literally translated, although we had not read him at the time on the subject. We have since read him, and we must tell *The Dublin Review* that its charge, that we, in commenting on its citation from him, took his statement of a theory he was combating for his own, is not well founded. From that citation alone, we had collected the doctrine of Suarez correctly, notwithstanding the reviewer had cited him very unfairly.

We do not ourselves lay claim to any extensive or profound knowledge of the fathers; we have neither read them all, nor all the works of any one of the more voluminous of them. But we have at least looked into some of them, and ascertained enough to be able to assert, without rashness, that they present no difficulties which require for their explication the development theory; and we can easily prove as much from the pages of Mr. Newman's essay and the book before us. Both Mr. Newman and his disciple, Mr. Morris, afford ample evidence that all the doctrines which they call developments, in so far as they specify them, were believed and held by the church from the earliest ages. That the faith in the course of time has, in some respects, gained in evidence, light, and distinctness, as says St. Vincent of Lerins, no man who knows any thing of the subject doubts; but that the church has in process of time taken up or evolved new doctrines, implied in or required by the original *depositum*, unknown to her or to her fathers in the first ages, we do most unequivocally deny. That we can in all cases sustain this denial without appeal to the decisions of popes and councils, we do not assert; but in

arguing with a Catholic, or one who professes to be a Catholic, that is no objection. We are not obliged, in order to sustain it to a Catholic, to prove by an authority independent of popes and councils, that a given doctrine was known and believed at a given time, for if that authority has decided that it has always been the faith of the church from the first, the question is settled, and no Catholic can open his mouth.

Here is where, we apprehend, the developmentists are principally at fault. They probably do not always consider their theory as absolutely necessary to remove any difficulties the Catholic may encounter in explaining and vindicating the faith to Catholics; they more frequently consider, most likely, their theory as chiefly necessary in the case of those without, or more especially in the case of learned Anglicans. These, not accepting the authority of the church, cannot, without such theory, get over the difficulties presented to their minds by the fathers, nor can we without it satisfactorily explain those difficulties to them. But the theory is either true or false. If true, it is as true for us as for them; if it is false, we have no right to propose it to them. Do our developmentists hold that their theory is false, or, as Mr. Newman calls it, only "an expedient," and simply make use of it to remove the unfounded prejudices of Protestants, justifying themselves in doing so on the ground that it is lawful to use falsehood in the interests of truth? This, we have seen, they are not free to do. Either we need the theory to explain the alleged difficulties to ourselves, in case we are to explain them at all, or we do not. If we do not, the difficulties are themselves unreal, imaginary, and the theory of development itself is false; for there has been no development in the sense it alleges. If we cannot explain to Protestants the difficulties they find, or imagine they find, without it, we must let them go unexplained. We are anxious for their conversion, but we would not knowingly advocate a false theory, even if by so doing we could convert the whole world. God could save all the world, if he would; indeed, he wills all to be saved, and provides all with sufficient means; but he will save no one at the expense of truth, or without the voluntary concurrence of the subject, or in any other way than the one he has established. It will not do, as we have observed is sometimes the case with the converted tractarians, to understand what St. Paul says about beguiling as if it authorized us to deceive or cheat people into a belief of the truth.

Certain it is, that the theory cannot be accepted or used if it be false, or not true. To use it as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of certain alleged facts, whether true or false, will not answer, because it is itself only an induction from those facts, and therefore a fact or a no-fact itself. To allege it, in case it is false, is not simply to allege a false explication of a fact, but a false fact. It depends for its truth on the facts it is to explain, and cannot be conceived as true if those facts, in the character alleged, are themselves unreal or do not exist. If, as commonly believed, the faith has come down to us from the first in its purity and integrity, without diminution or addition, the facts alleged do not exist, there has been no development, in the sense of the theory, and therefore the theory, which must presuppose those facts, is false and in direct contradiction to the truth; consequently, inadmissible even as an hypothesis or expedient. The developmentists should, then, first of all establish the necessity of the theory, by establishing the existence of an order of facts which demand it. What we ask of them, then, first of all, is to give us a precise statement, with full evidence of their reality, of the facts which they propose to explain by their theory, or of what they call developments, or proofs of development. Regarded as an hypothesis or expedient for the explication of facts, nobody objects to it, in case the facts themselves exist; for it is then only a general or scientific statement of them, since those facts must themselves be developments. Under this point of view, the objection is not that it does not explain the facts, but that the facts do not themselves exist, and cannot be said to exist without denying the whole Christian religion.

Now, we respectfully request the developmentists, in the first place, to establish the fact, not that there has been development in some sense; or that there have been from time to time, and even may be hereafter, new definitions of faith on the occasion of new errors or heresies; or that certain points of faith, originally formally proposed indeed, but *in globo*, as we may say, have, in the course of time, as they have been controverted and made the subject of special study, been more distinctly drawn out and precisely stated than they were at first,—for this no Catholic denies, or dreams of denying; but that there has been the order of facts they contend for, or actual development in the sense their theory presupposes,—that is, that, as time has rolled

on, new doctrines have been evolved from the original *depositum*, or assimilated to it, which were unknown to the primitive believers and not formally, though indistinctly, believed by them,—for their theory means this, or it means nothing; and in the second place, to draw up a complete and authenticated list of the doctrines, dogmas, or propositions of faith, which they hold to have been obtained by development, together with the exact date of the time when they respectively first became known to the church, and were adopted as part and parcel of her creed. Till they do thus much, all controversy with them on their theory, save as to its metaphysics, must be carried on in the dark, and be incapable of being brought to any definite issue. Surely this request is reasonable, and we hope they will not refuse to comply with it. We make the request far more for their sake than for our own. We think that they have taken up their theory without any thorough examination of the real character of the facts which they propose to explain by it, and that they continue to hold it, because they have never seriously undertaken to define it even to themselves, and have never settled in their own minds, with exactness and precision, what they do or do not mean by it. We have found all the advocates of the theory with whom we have conversed, however clear and definite on other subjects, no sooner touching upon it, than they become all at once vague and uncertain in their views, vacillating in their expressions, and unable to hit upon any statement which seems exactly to express what they mean. This comes, we apprehend, from the fact that what they mean is neither defined in their minds nor capable of being defined, and that any statement they can frame will either express too much or too little to satisfy them. If the developmentists should undertake to comply with our request, they would most likely discover this, and find that they either mean no more than their opponents concede, or else that they mean what no Catholic can hold, and therefore come to the conclusion, either that they have been making a great ado about nothing, or that they have unwittingly fallen into a most grave error, which it imports them to lose no time in abandoning. Their theory would either vanish in smoke, or be found untenable and pernicious, as hateful to them as it is to us. We do them no injustice when we say, that they are not only inexact writers, but loose thinkers. The attempt to write with a little more exactness and precision would soon compel them to think with more exactness and precision.

No doubt, many will think that remarks like these cannot, without injustice, be applied to Dr. Newman. Dr. Newman is in some respects, we grant, clear and acute as a thinker, and choice and exact as a writer ; but he is a man of a sharp rather than a broad and comprehensive intellect. He has little faculty of grasping a subject in its unity and integrity, and he never masters a subject by first seizing it in its central principle, and thence descending to its several details. To use a form of expression borrowed from himself, he takes in an idea, not as a whole, but by viewing it successively under a variety of separate aspects,—by walking all around it, and viewing it successively under all its aspects. He thus attains only to particular views, never to unity of view, or to the comprehension of the idea as a whole. No man has, within the range of these particular views, a clearer or a keener sight than he, and no man can more clearly, vividly, distinctly, accurately, or forcibly express what he thus apprehends. But nevertheless, whenever he attempts to mould his particular views into a systematic whole, he becomes confused, obscure, vague, and vacillating. His mind is a purely inductive mind, the impersonation of the inductive philosophy, and proceeds not from unity to multiplicity, from principles to facts, but the reverse. He will seize on a particular fact, and generalize it into the basis of a universe. In consequence of the narrowness and unphilosophical character of his mind, his attention is fixed for the time being always on one particular aspect of a subject, which he necessarily treats provisionally, as if it were the entire subject in its unity. His language, chosen for the expression of that particular aspect, lacks breadth, comprehensiveness, and becomes inappropriate, obscure, and false as the representative of the truth not merely as he views it, but as it really is in itself, independent of him. So we cannot, with all his particular merits, which are very great, exempt him from the common complaint which we make of his whole school.

The greater part of the offence we take at what the developmentists inculcate is not to what they openly, distinctly, and formally state ; but to what they hint, insinuate, or bring in incidentally, or as it were by way of illustration, or development. The direct thesis, when they have a direct thesis, which they profess to maintain, we can in most cases accept ; but they no sooner state it, than they bring in surreptitiously, as if in illustration or support of it, matter

which we are obliged to reject with horror. Incidentally Mr. Morris tells us that St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination and grace was in his time a novelty, that is, we suppose, a development, and that it was not generally accepted in the East. This grave charge against the great doctor of grace, if it could be sustained, since it is undeniable that the doctrine taught by St. Augustine in his latest writings on this subject is that of the church, would go far towards sustaining the theory of development. But there is not a word of truth in it. It is no new charge; it was made by the old Pelagians, and especially the semi-Pelagians, and their successors in modern times have never ceased to repeat it. Suarez* takes it up *ex professo*, and refutes it; and the great Bossuet, in his *Défense de la Tradition et des Saints Pères†* against M. Simon, who had insisted upon it in his *Histoire Critique des principaux Commentateurs du Nouveau Testament depuis le Commencement du Christianisme jusqu'à Notre Temps, &c.*, replies to it at great length, completely refuting it in both its parts, and, what is more to our present purpose, expressly denying and refuting the theory of development at the same time. Mr. Morris is found in bad company when he brings this charge, and we advise him in the next edition of his work to cancel it. It is true, he brings it for a very different purpose from that of M. Simon, Grotius, and other Pelagians or semi-Pelagians, and without looking upon it as a charge at all; but Suarez terms it "a calumny," *calumniā*, and Bossuet treats it as virtually heretical, and we cannot look upon it as any more true when alleged by a developmentist than when alleged by a Pelagian, when for a good than when for a bad purpose. Bossuet and Suarez, on a question of this nature, are very respectable authorities, and, besides, they sustain themselves by a most formidable list of fathers, both eastern and western, among whom in the East we find St. Gregory Nazianzen, and our author's favorite, St. Ephrem, both of whom teach the same doctrine as St. Augustine. But after all, it is possible that the testimony of Catholic divines who have never had the advantage of being brought up in heresy will not weigh much with our author, when opposed to his favorite theory, and hence we will spare ourselves the trouble of citing some decisive passages

*De Divina Gratia, Prolegomenon VI. cap. 6.

†Livres V. chap. 5 *et seq.*

bearing on the theory, from so decidedly a Catholic doctor, and therefore so inconsiderable an authority, as St. Thomas of Aquin.

In the third part of his work, the author undertakes to prove the immaculate conception of our Lady, or her perfect immunity from all stain of original sin. We have only glanced at this part, for it carries on a discussion in which we have no wish to engage. We believe as firmly in the immaculate conception as any one can believe a point which has been questioned, and on which the church has not as yet formally pronounced, and we always avail ourselves of the privilege allowed us when we say the Litany of our blessed Lady, our own dear mother, to add, "*Regina, sine labe concepta, ora pro nobis.*" We know no reason why, if it be of faith, the church cannot so declare it, and whether it be so or not she is the judge, not we. Whether it is or is not desirable that she should decide the case which has for so many years been pending in her court, it is not for us to say. She does not need our consent, or our counsel, and we have not the impertinence to tell her what we do or do not wish. We look to her to instruct us, and we trust we need but to hear her voice to be ready to obey it, whether it commands what we have or have not wished. But there is little doubt in our mind, that the doctrine of development is favored by many, because they wish the church to define the immaculate conception to be of faith, and that those who wish to advocate the theory are extremely solicitous to have this decision made. The former think the doctrine would much facilitate, if not the definition itself, at least its reception; the latter, that the definition would give the seal of the church to their theory. A learned friend of ours, in a conversation the other day, after conceding that Mr. Newman's theory of development was wrong, yet would have some theory of the kind allowed, because of the general desire to have this question defined. We see no need of any theory of development in the case. The simple question to be decided is, not whether the immunity of our Lady from all stain of original sin is or is not sufficiently developed to be ruled an article of faith, but whether it be or be not an apostolic and divine tradition. If it is, the church can declare it to be so; if not, she cannot define it to be of faith, for to define a point to be of faith is neither more nor less than to declare it to be an apostolic and divine tradition. The definition demands no doctrine of development, either

to be made or defended, and in defining it the church will give no more countenance to such a doctrine than she does in deciding any litigated point of faith. We see nothing in our theology to change in case the definition should be made. We should not, unless the church expressly so decided, regard the definition either as a development or as the result of development; for the fact that it has not hitherto been made would count for nothing, since the case is not now taken up anew, but has really been in court ever since a serious controversy first arose on the subject, and the action has been continued without being decided. Why the church has not decided it sooner, or why, having delayed it so long, she should decide it now, is no affair of ours. She is the legitimate judge, not only of what is the faith, but of the time when it is proper to define it.

But it is time to draw our remarks to a close. We cannot expect that all we have said will be acceptable to the Oxford converts and their friends. We expect to be censured, and censured severely; but we have said nothing in wantonness, or from any personal motive. The author and his friends have never crossed our path, and are not likely to do so. Their line in life runs remote from ours. They have done us personally no injury, and conferred on us no benefits. Personally there is no reason in the world why we should be opposed to them, or should not in all respects sympathize with them. We have no prejudices against them because they are converts, and can have none, for we are a convert ourselves, and only a year older as a convert than Dr. Newman himself. In learning, cultivation, piety, and fervor, we are not worthy to be compared with the meanest of them. Why, then, should we attack them? Sure enough, why should we? Certain it is, the odds are against us, and most people will presume that, in a controversy between them and us, they must be in the right and we in the wrong. If they are as wrong as we pretend, how happens it that there is nobody in England to show it?

Then, again, it may be said, these converts against whom you are writing are learned and peaceable men, men who have left all to follow Christ, for the most part priests of the church, devoting themselves without reserve to the glorious work of training souls for heaven, and of winning back England, their native country, to the faith. Why attack them? Why disturb them in their sacred work? Why throw obstacles in their way? All this and much more we

have said to ourselves, and it has not been without a full sense of the responsibility we incur, nor without a painful struggle, that we have written what we have. It has been from no private motive, it has been from no indifference to the work in which they are engaged, that we have undertaken the ungracious and most unpleasant task of criticising their writings. We have done what we have, because we fear, and not we alone, that they are originating or reviving a destructive heresy, from which both England and this country may receive great harm. Neither learning nor talents, nor zeal nor piety, are perfect safeguards against heresy. Jansenius, for aught we ever understood, was a really learned man, a great man, and an exemplary bishop; and yet he originated a most pestilent heresy. Gioberti is a man of talents, genius, and learning, and he was so scrupulous in the outset that he said his office on his knees; and yet has he made shipwreck of his faith, and, as we are told, is living now in Paris without a single exterior or interior mark of the sacerdotal character. God may be doing a great work in England, and bestowing freely his grace for the conversion of those who have been so long estranged from his church, and we certainly have no disposition to interrupt the work, even if it were in our power, or to increase the difficulties of those engaged in it. But England is not all the world to us, and the present moment is not all the time we consider. Erroneous or heretical writings do not all their mischief at the moment of their publication, nor in the country of their authors. The language of England and the United States is the same, and works written and published there find their way here, and exert here hardly, if any, less influence for good or for evil, than if originally written and published here. They may, owing to peculiar circumstances, exert there, for the moment, a good, or not a bad influence, and yet exert here an influence only decidedly bad, and both here and there, hereafter, a most pernicious influence. We have a right to look, under our pastors, to the interests of truth in our own country, and to condemn any books which come under our notice that are likely to do grave injury here, although circumstances may counteract their evil tendency elsewhere. But in reality we believe the writings of the school in question are doing great harm even in England, and we judge so from what we see in the anti-Catholic periodicals of that country, all of which charge, without any qualification, the doctrine of development upon

the church, and tell us that Rome, having failed in her attempts for three hundred years to vindicate her corruptions by denying that she has added to the faith, now concedes that she has made additions, and hopes to defend them by calling them *developments*. It is because we have honestly believed, whether mistaken or not, that the writings of this school are filled with many grave errors, and cannot but be deeply prejudicial to orthodoxy, both here and in England, both now and hereafter, that we have written against them. What we have done we have done conscientiously and not without seeking guidance from the Source of all light, and receiving instructions from those from whom it is our duty to learn in all docility. We have written with great plainness and directness, because the case seems to require it; with earnestness and decision, because we could not write otherwise if we would; but we have written nothing in pride or in anger, and if any thing has escaped us that is contrary either to Christian truth or to Christian charity, we wish to retract and condemn it in advance. We have nothing to say as to why the task of exposing them has been left to us, yet it is easy to see, by a reference to existing facts, why the task could be better performed here than in England.

Let not our readers, however, suppose for a moment that we are blind or insensible to the many merits of the men in question. The greater part even of the work before us is truly excellent, and it contains upon the whole a masterly discussion of the subject it professes to treat. What is objectionable, though it pervades in some sense the whole work, really takes up but a very little of its space, and probably would not be noticed by a majority of readers, or, if noticed, would be set down not to an unsound theory adopted by the learned author, but to his want of accurate information on some points, and to the inexactness and carelessness of his language. This is probably the case with most of his English Catholic readers. We cannot so set it down, for the reasons we have given in the course of this article; yet let no one so wrong us as to imagine that we question the good faith of the author, or doubt his determination to be a true Catholic believer. He is, we do not question, an excellent professor, a faithful and zealous priest, who would give his life for the faith, or for a flock intrusted to his charge. In all these converts of whom we speak, there is much to command our warm admiration. They are free from much of the timidity and compromising spirit hereto-

fore not unfrequently encountered in English Catholics. They are no slaves to public opinion; they are open and fearless in the profession of their faith. They are, and that in our estimation atones for much, no Gallicans, that is, no favorers of the doctrines usually termed Gallican, though by no means peculiar to Frenchmen. They are for the most part, as far as we have been able to discover, in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and temporal orders, genuine papists. They show no desire to reduce the primacy of Peter to a mere primacy of order, nor, with all their Anglican prejudices, any wish to make Catholicity as near like Anglicanism as possible. On all questions of this nature they are honorably distinguished, and nobly maintain the ground which we in our humble way and with our feeble abilities attempt also to maintain. They exhibit much of the robustness and sturdy independence which we admire in the English character. They also appear to have a deep and tender devotion to the blessed mother of God, with which we should be sorry not to sympathize with all our heart. In a word, were it not for the tractarian habits they still retain, their low estimate of Catholic learning and talent, their bad logic and false philosophy, and their abominable theory of development, we would cut our right hand off sooner than write, and pull out our tongue by the roots sooner than speak, one word against them.

The principal errors which we detect in our author and his school appear to us to have originated very innocently, and we are far from intending any moral blame in indicating them. These writers seem to us to have begun their study of Catholic theology where they should have ended. They appear to have begun with the fathers instead of the modern theologians, or the great scholastic doctors. In the correspondence we have had with some of them, they have sneered at contemporary theologians for studying compendiums. Now we believe, with all deference, that all study of Catholic faith and theology should commence with compendiums, and first of all with that admirable compendium, the catechism. From the catechism we would proceed to the next briefest and simplest compendium, and from that we would proceed to St. Thomas and his commentators. When we had well mastered scholastic theology, we would proceed to the fathers, but not till then, because to us the key to the fathers is in the scholastic theology. We prize the fathers above all price, and when once one is pre-

pared to read them, there is no reading, after the Holy Scriptures, more or equally profitable. But without such preparation, without the key which unlocks their sense, one is almost as liable to misapprehend and wrest them to his own hurt as he is the sacred text itself. They were written at a remote period, with special reference to the peculiar controversies, states of mind, and modes of thought at the time, and the reader who alights on them without a previous accurate knowledge of the chief points of Catholic theology will find them filled with obscurities, and bristling with difficulties, which he will hardly be able to solve or clear up.

Our tractarian friends, brought up to look upon contemporary Catholics as an ignorant, feeble, cunning, credulous, and superstitious set of mortals, far inferior in learning, talent, and morals to themselves, and accustomed to regard the scholastics as dealing mainly in vain subtleties and distinctions without a difference, very naturally passed from the study of their jejune Anglican theology to the study of the fathers, whom they were forced to read through the spectacles of their more famous Anglican divines. They thus not only had not the requisite preparation for studying them, but had views and habits which wholly unfitted them for studying them, with even passable success. They have come from the fathers down to the scholastics, whom they have studied not profoundly, and have interpreted them by the fathers, instead of interpreting the fathers by them. Hence their theory of development, and other errors, adopted to reconcile the fathers and the later theologians. Nothing was more natural, and we ourselves fell into kindred errors, partially for the same reason; and had we not been put to the study of a brief compendium, and from that upon a rigid course of scholastic theology in one of the commentators on St. Thomas, we might and most likely should have continued in them to this day. Having, to some extent, made ourselves acquainted with Catholic theology, the fathers became somewhat intelligible to us, and we cannot now find the difficulties in them with which they formerly seemed filled. St. Augustine is now by preference our master in theology and philosophy. Our friends on the other side of the water will understand from these remarks, that it is not themselves personally that we censure, but solely what we regard as their errors.

THE MERCERSBURG HYPOTHESIS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1854.]

THE revival of Catholicity in Germany and Great Britain, and its diffusion by means of immigration and conversion in this country, together with its partial emancipation from the state in France, Austria, and Spain, have produced no little effect on the Protestant mind, and no little commotion in the Protestant camp. It is evident that there has been, since the commencement of the present century, a decided reaction in favor of Catholicity, and large numbers in all countries have felt that the only refuge from infidelity, anarchy, and licentiousness is in a hearty and speedy return to the bosom of the Catholic Church. Intelligent and earnest-minded Protestants have become convinced, that, unless they can find, outside of the present Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, some ground on which they can stand different from that of vulgar Protestantism, they have no alternative but either to become Catholics or to rush forward into absolute infidelity. Some have sought this ground in a further development and extension of the principle of private judgment; some have sought it in a further limitation of that principle, and in the assertion along with it of the authority of tradition; and others have sought it in the assertion of what may be called historical development. The first class are rationalists, and deny all religion as distinguished from simple human philosophy, such as Unitarians, German neologists, and the American transcendentalists. The second class follow what is called a "romanizing tendency," and are best known under the name of Puseyites. The last accept the Catholic Church down to the sixteenth century, and assert Protestantism as its legitimate historical development and continuation. With these are to be ranked the later German and our own Mercersburg Protestant theologians.

The first and second classes have been sufficiently refuted in our own pages and elsewhere. The rationalists are really rejecters of Christianity, and cannot with any justice claim

* *Mercersburg Quarterly Review*. Chambersburg, Pa.: January, 1854.

to be regarded as Christians. They have fallen below the ancient pagan philosophers. The Puseyites approach too near to the church to be good Protestants, and yet not near enough to be even so much as bad Catholics. They are inconsistent and double-tongued, theologically considered, and need not detain us a moment. But the third class have not yet, at least in this country, been formally met and refuted. A few remarks, therefore, on their distinctive principle will perhaps not be ill-timed, or unacceptable to our readers.

The chiefs of this school in the United States are Dr. John W. Nevin and Dr. Philip Schaff, the former a native American, the latter a native of Germany. Both are members of the German Reformed Church, both are men of rare attainments, and Dr. Nevin, especially, is a man of great ability and earnestness, and as a scholar, as a logician, and as an original and vigorous writer, inferior to no Protestant divine in the country. His papers in the *Mercersburg Review* on *Early Christianity* and *St. Cyprian* are masterpieces of their kind, and indicate a mind of the first order. For both of these gentlemen we entertain a very high personal esteem, and shall very much regret if, in what we may say of their peculiar hypothesis, there should be any thing to wound their feelings, or to give them in any degree personal offence.

The hypothesis they put forward as the only ground on which Protestantism can be defended as a religion is, that it is the historical development and vital continuation of the church of the ages preceding the so-called reformation. The following, from an article by Dr. Nevin in the last number of the *Mercersburg Review*, will place our readers in possession of the general position of the school.

"The whole case is plain enough. The Christianity of the second, third, and fourth centuries, we say, was progressively of the same general order throughout the entire Christian world, and in this character it differed altogether from modern Protestantism, and led fairly and directly towards the Roman Catholic system of the middle ages. In proof of this simply historical assertion, we point to facts. It is purely a question of history in the first place, to be either granted or denied as the truth of facts may seem to require. Is the general proposition true as a historical fact, or is it not? If not, let this be shown by proper evidence. But if it be true, what then? Must it be ignored or overlooked? No honest Protestant certainly will say that. We are bound to look it firmly in the face; and when the question is then asked, *How is this fact to be construed over against the claims of Protestantism?* it should be felt to be one that is en-

titled to some open and manly answer. There are now but two general ways in which to dispose of the matter consistently with these claims. We may treat the church of the first ages after the time of the apostles as a wholesale falsification of Christianity in its proper apostolical form, and so make the truth of Protestantism to consist in its being a new edition altogether of what was then so short lived in the beginning; or we may allow a true continuation of the primitive life of Christianity in the early church, according to the article in the creed, and make Protestantism then to agree with it in some way of historical derivation, answerable to the law of growth in the natural world, by which all differences shall be resolved into outward accident and form merely, whilst the inward substance is taken to be always the same. One or the other of these methods we must adopt for the solution of the question in hand, or else fall into downright obscurantism of the most pitiful sort. The first method, however, is only another name for infidelity, denying as it does practically the existence of the church and the authority of the creed. The case then shuts the cause of Protestantism up to the other view, as the only one by which its pretensions can be consistently maintained without treason to Christianity. This is the general conclusion of our argument in the articles of the 'Mercersburg Review' on the Early Church. The argument itself proposes no particular theory or scheme for the construction of such a historical genesis as the case is shown to demand. It merely urges the necessity of some scheme of the sort, if Protestantism is to be upheld at all. That, however, is at once much. It implies, in the first place, a true succession of Christianity in the Catholic Church, in spite of all corruptions, not only from the first century to the sixth, but from the sixth century also to the sixteenth. This makes the church an object of respect through all ages. And in the second place, it requires that Protestantism shall not be taken to be such a rupture with the Catholic Church, as excludes the idea of a strictly historical continuity of being between what Christianity is now in the one form and what it was before in the other. When it comes to such wholesale negation and contradiction, the true idea of Protestantism is gone, and we have only unhistorical radicalism in its place. Protestantism *must* be historical, to be true. To say that it is not the continuation of the previous life of the church, of one substance though not of one form with what this was in all past ages, is at once to pronounce it anti-Christian and false."

How Protestantism can be a true historical development and continuation of the Catholicity of the ages preceding that of the reformers, Dr. Nevin, unhappily, does not tell us. On this point no member of the school, whether in this country or in Germany, affords us any light. The school prove, and beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil, that Protestantism, if Christian, must be such development and

continuation ; but that it is or that it can be justly so regarded, they do not prove, or even attempt to prove. But if they mean to continue Protestants, or to maintain Protestantism in any respect as a form of Christianity, this is precisely the point they must prove ; and unless they do prove it, they cannot safely remain in their present position. As they acknowledge the church in communion with the see of Rome was, prior to the reformation, the Christian church, in which circulated the true Christian life, and as they confess that Protestantism, as to its form at least, is something different from that church, it is incumbent on them to prove that it is identical in substance, in order to justify themselves in remaining outside of the present Catholic Church, which as to form, if in no other respect, is undeniably the continuation of the primitive and mediæval church. The Catholic Church, or church in communion with the see of Rome, is presumptively, at least, the true continuation of the Christian church that preceded Luther. It is identically that church in polity, in organization, in constitution, in name, in doctrine, in orders, and in general discipline. It has maintained the succession unbroken, and is now, as Dr. Nevin has unanswerably proved, what the Christian church was in the time of Cyprian, and in the apostolic age. The presumption, then, certainly is, that she is the true historical continuation of the Christian church, and that it is in her communion, not outside of it, that continues to circulate the true Christian life. The presumption, then, is against Protestantism, and before one can justify himself in remaining a Protestant, he must overcome that presumption by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the current of Christian life has ceased to circulate in that church, and now actually flows in Protestant channels. The question is momentous, and must press with terrible weight upon every serious-minded Protestant, who is really in earnest to be united by a living union to Christ as his living head.

We suppose it will be conceded that the life of Christ is one and indivisible, and therefore unites all who live it in one living and compact body ; and as men in this life are not disembodied spirits, but spirit united to body, it must unite all who live it in one external as well as internal communion. Undoubtedly, a man may be in the external communion of the church without living the life of Christ, but all philosophy and theology impugn the notion that one can live his life out of that communion. To suppose it would

lead us back to the heresy of the Docetæ, or at least render the assumption of a real body by our Lord quite unnecessary and without motive. One of two things, then: either we must assume that Protestantism is the true continuation of the Christian life, and thus deny that life to the Catholic communion, or we must assert it for the Catholic Church and deny it to the Protestant sects. No doubt it seems a hard case to unchristianize all the Protestant sects, and to deny to Protestants all Christian life, or real union through that life with Christ, the only Redeemer and Saviour; but it is a still harder case to deny it to the Catholic communion, for the number of individuals to be declared out of the pale of the Christian church, or to be unchristianized in the latter case, is immensely greater than in the former. It will not do to divide Christ, or to pretend that his life flows alike in the Catholic communion and in the Protestant. To pretend the latter would be fatal to the very hypothesis in question, for Protestantism would, in that case, be no more a development and continuation of it than Catholicity. The life would continue to flow on in the Catholic Church as before, and the most that could be said would be that Protestantism as well as Catholicity continues the Christian life, not that it is its true historical development and continuation, as the hypothesis asserts.

Moreover, the general theory of development that underlies the hypothesis, stands greatly in need of being proved. It assumes that the human race is in a state of continuous development or progress; that human life is simply evolution; thus confounding first and final causes, or rather, losing sight of proper final causes altogether, which at bottom conceals a purely pantheistic thought. With this general theory of human progress or evolution the school connects that of a continuous development or evolution of Christianity. Always does it regard Christianity as something to be developed and perfected, never simply as a law to be accepted and obeyed. Through all Protestantism, as it is now developed, runs the conception, either that Christianity was imperfect as originally given, and needs to be perfected, completed, by human thought and virtue, or else that it ought to vary and adapt itself to the variations and changes of time and place. In the latter case, Protestantism will not have Christianity introduce a fixed and permanent, therefore a divine, element into human affairs, but insists that the law shall be itself variable, and vary ac-

according to the ever-varying notions, passions, and caprices of those placed under it. In the former case, it confounds making and promulgating the law with knowledge of the law and obedience to it, or the perfection of the law with the perfection that results to individual life and character from knowing and obeying it. The fundamental error is in the assumption of legislative power by the creature, which involves the seminal principle of atheism, as we have so often labored to demonstrate. There may be development and progress in our individual knowledge of the Christian religion, and conformity to it; but there can be none, effected by second causes, in that religion itself, for it is wholly a divine creation, and wholly a divine law. It can be changed, modified, developed, only by God himself. We therefore cannot accept the Mercersburg theory of development. All historical development, be it more or less, is in relation to the final cause, not to the first cause, and is a progress in attaining to the end for which man has been created, not a progress in his own being or powers as a creature, as a second cause, or in the divinely instituted means of gaining that end.

But waiving all this, we cannot concede that Protestantism is in any sense the historical development and continuation of the Catholic Church which preceded it. Development must continue and unfold the subject developed. What is in the development must have been previously in the subject, as the blossom is in the bud, as the bud in the germ, or the germ in the seed, otherwise it is not, as Dr. Newman has well shown, a development, but a corruption. Now take the Catholic system as presented by the church in any age prior to the sixteenth century, and tell us of what in that system Protestantism is the development and continuation. Do you say it is the development and continuation of the hidden life of Christ? That is a simple assertion, which is neither proved nor susceptible of proof. But if there is any one thing that indicates the presence of the life of Christ, it is unity. The natural and invariable tendency of that life is to unite all who live it in one body. It is undeniably charity, and charity is love and all love is unitive, and therefore whoever truly loves seeks by that fact to become one with the object of his love. Charity unites all who have it with Christ their head, and with one another as members of his body. If Protestantism were a development and continuation of the divine life

of Christ, we should see it tending everywhere to unity, as governed by the unitive spirit of love or charity. But instead of this we see the very reverse. The whole history of Protestantism, from the first, proves that its innate tendency is to diversity, to disunion, to separation. Hence, hardly had it begun its career before it split into hostile sects, and the number of its sects has been constantly increasing through every period of its duration. Dr. Nevin has in the *Mercersburg Review* shown conclusively the incompatibility of the "sect system" with Christianity. But this system is clearly inseparable from Protestantism. How, then, pretend for a moment that Protestantism develops and continues the life of Christ?

Protestantism does not, assuredly, develop and continue the Catholic Church of preceding ages as a polity, for it was avowedly in this respect a complete rupture with it, and that church as a polity is certainly continued by the present Catholic Church. Protestantism separated from the Catholic polity, denied and shook off its authority. It denounced the pope as Antichrist, the church as the whore of Babylon, and formed, or organized as it could, new ecclesiastical polities, after diverse and contradictory models, for itself. It certainly, then, was no development and continuation of the old Christian church as a polity, and is undeniably a multitude of separate and diverse external bodies. This, if the church of Christ be a polity at all, is fatal to the hypothesis under consideration.

Will you tell us that it is a development and continuation of the church as doctrine? A denial is a rupture, not a development and continuation, and under the head of doctrine Protestantism simply denies doctrines previously held by the church. There is not a single doctrine or dogma of the old church that it has developed, or continued, in so far as it has any thing peculiar to itself. In so far as it differs from the primitive, the mediæval, or the present church in doctrine, it differs solely by denial, that is, by an open rupture with the acknowledged Christian church. The Christian church taught and teaches that man is justified by faith, that is, faith perfected by charity, *fides formata*, and therefore by faith and works, not by faith alone, without works. Has Protestantism developed and continued this doctrine? Not at all. It has simply denied the necessity of good works, and asserted that we are justified by faith alone—the *fides informis* of the schoolmen. Here is a

rupture, not a development; for there is no doctrine or principle ever held by the church of which justification by faith alone, without charity or good works, is or can be an element or seminal principle, and a doctrine which had not its element or seminal principle in the preceding church can in no sense be called a development or continuation of it.

Take the sacramental principle. Has Protestantism developed and continued that? Everybody knows that it began by denying five sacraments out of seven, mutilated the two it professed to retain, and obscured, if it did not expressly deny, the sacramental principle itself. Here, if any thing, it was a rupture with the old church, not its development or continuance. So of penitential works, indulgences, purgatory, prayers for the dead, invocation of the saints, worship of Mary, &c. Protestantism simply broke with the past, and failed entirely to develop and continue it. So we might go on to the end of the chapter, but it is unnecessary. Some things held by the old church, Protestantism did not at first reject, but in no case has it developed and continued under a developed form any principle or tendency of the Christian church which preceded it. In point of fact, it never professed to do any thing of the sort. It did not profess to be a development and continuation of the church subsisting from the apostles down to the sixteenth century. It avowedly broke with that church, and assumed that it had apostatized, and for eight hundred years, some said a thousand, and others twelve hundred years, had been an adulterous church, the synagogue of Satan, and no true church of Christ at all. It professed to go back of that church, and to revive primitive Christianity free from what it called papal corruptions.

Nothing is more certain, than that what Dr. Nevin stigmatizes and refutes as *Puritanism* is true and genuine Protestantism; and nothing is more evident to us, than that, if Protestantism can be sustained only on the Mercersburg hypothesis, it cannot be sustained at all. Protestants themselves see it, and hence the charge of *romanizing* which they bring against its advocates. If you concede that the true historical continuation of Christianity down to the sixteenth century was in the church in communion with the see of Rome, you must concede that it is so down to the present moment. Never after such a concession will you be able to oust the Catholic Church, or put your Protestantism in possession.

We suspect this hypothesis is seized upon mainly as an expedient, and as the only conceivable one, to save the Christian character of Protestantism. Its authors or inventors think the reformers must have had some good reason for their rupture with Rome, and feel that they ought not to pronounce a sentence of condemnation on their fathers by deserting the reformation and returning to the church it sought to destroy. They therefore seek some expedient for justifying the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. It is no easy matter for men who have been brought up Protestants, and have been accustomed from their childhood to hear the reformation spoken of as the most glorious event in the annals of the human race, to make up their minds to pronounce it entirely wrong from the beginning, without a single excuse or palliation. Then to look upon our own friends and relations, the many eminent men and amiable people who at least have displayed many noble qualities and lofty virtues in the natural order, whom we have associated with or from infancy been taught to love and revere, as strangers to the supernatural life of Christ, aliens from the Christian commonwealth, is painful and revolting to our natural sympathies and affections, and naturally leads us, though far enough from being satisfied with Protestantism as it is, to seek out some hypothesis which will save us from this painful necessity. Moreover, we have heard so much said against the church of Rome, we find so much that is inexplicable in her history, and so much among her children that is scandalous, that we feel a strong aversion to recognizing her as the church of Christ, and are prepared to grasp eagerly at any plausible pretext for not accepting her. Most, if not all of us, who have come from Protestantism into the church have taken the step with reluctance, have delayed taking it as long as we could, and have wished that we could feel ourselves justified in not taking it at all. It is an unknown land to us, and we fear that we shall encounter terrible monsters there; and without the grace of God overcoming our prejudices, and giving us more than a natural courage, we never could take the resolution to sever ourselves from our whole past, and form new and untried relations. All these considerations no doubt weigh with the chiefs of the school, conceal from their eyes the unsoundness of their hypothesis, and lead them to attach a weight to it which it certainly does not possess, and which, if they were less anxious to find it true, they certainly could not attach to it.

Our Mercersburg friends seem to us also to deceive themselves by taking certain principles and tendencies which they find among Catholics in the middle ages, for principles and tendencies of the Christian church herself, or, if they prefer, the Christian religion. There is no question that Protestantism is a development and continuation of principles and tendencies which may be detected in mediæval history. The reformers invented nothing; they only developed and continued a movement which had commenced long before them. But the question to be settled is, Were these true Christian principles and tendencies? In reading Dr. Schaff's work on the *Protestant Principle*, we find him assuming throughout that every principle and tendency subsequently accepted, developed, and continued by Protestantism was a sound Christian principle and a good tendency. But this begs the question. Nay, this is an inconsistency, for he concedes that the mediæval church was the true Christian church, and these principles and tendencies were undeniably repudiated by her; and therefore to develop and continue them was any thing but to develop and continue the Catholic church or the Christian religion.

Over against the city of God stands, and from the fall has stood, the city of the world, of which Satan is the prince. Between these two cities there is, has been, and to the end of time will be, unrelenting war. This war on the part of Satan is not prosecuted on fair and honorable principles, but is carried on by stratagem, by cunning, and by fraud. In open warfare he knows perfectly well that he can gain only a shameful defeat. He can hope for a temporary success only by gaining, through deception, partizans within the church herself. Hence, he has always labored to insinuate into the minds of Catholics the principles and maxims of the city of the world; and hence, we find always among Catholics a larger or smaller number of individuals governed by uncatholic principles and tendencies. As time goes on, these principles and tendencies are developed and become heresies, which the church anathematizes, expelling at the same time from her communion those persons who are mad enough obstinately to adhere to them. Now it is certain, historically, that the principles and tendencies of which Protestantism is the development and continuation are of this sort, not by any means the development and continuation of the principles and tendencies of the Christian religion, or of such as were approved by the Christian church, or pertain

to the city of God. The church, which it is conceded represented Christianity, always opposed them, and they may all be proved to have their seat in the corrupt or fallen nature of man. If, then, we accept the Catholic Church down to the sixteenth century as the historical expression and continuation of Christianity, we are precluded from maintaining that Protestantism is the historical development and continuation of the Christian religion. It should be regarded rather as the development and realization of the corrupt nature of man, of the maxims, principles, and tendencies of the world, than of Christianity or the city of God.

We insist on this point, because it is precisely in mistaking the developments of human nature, or the principles and tendencies of human nature, struggling against the principles and maxims of the city of God, that our Mercersburg friends seem to themselves to obtain some sort of support for their hypothesis. Regarding these developments as the natural and proper developments of Christianity, or as the developments effected in Christians by Christianity, they call them Christian, and pronounce whatever they find in the church at any time opposed to them, antichristian, or a corruption. Nothing can be more false or injurious to the Gospel. Yet they are led to it by their theory of development, which supposes that Christianity, though in some sense objectively given to man, was given only in germ, imperfect, incomplete, to be perfected, completed by a development, and not so much by a development of it as an objective system as a development of human nature, or rather of human life, effected by it. They are thus able to assert developments in a good sense, and are led, whenever they see dawning among Christians a principle or tendency not hitherto generally received and acted on as Christian, instead of suspecting or rejecting it as the principle of a new, or the revival of the principle of an old heresy, to hail it as the commencement of a new and important progress in Christian truth. But as this principle has not its root in the preëxisting Christian system, it can be no development of Christian truth, nor of Christian life, and can, at best, be only a development of our natural life as withdrawn from the influence of the Christian religion, and therefore of human life as under the dominion of Satan. Men do not, in this world, live a purely natural life, or a life of pure and simple nature. We are under a supernatural providence, and either through grace rise to God by supernatural virtue, or through the malice of

the devil sink to hell by a more than natural wickedness. In other words, man in this life is habitually under the dominion, either, through grace, of Christ, or, through fallen nature, of Satan. All those principles or tendencies followed by us, which are repugnant to Christianity as at any time received, are, properly speaking, satanic, and consequently their development can in no sense be regarded either as a development of Christian truth or of Christian life, either as a development of Christian doctrine or as a development effected by it.

The great error of the German developmentists lies in their not drawing a clear and distinct line between the divine activity and the human, and in their blending the two activities in some degree into one. They do not properly distinguish between subjective and objective. Their aim is, no doubt to assert the supremacy of God and the autonomy of man, but they attempt to assert human autonomy and the divine supremacy in a sense in which one necessarily denies the other. The autonomy of man is in his free will, to which no violence is ever suffered to be done; but the divine Legislator imposes the law to which man is morally bound to conform, and in accordance with which man is morally obliged, not physically forced, to exercise his own autonomy. Our friends overlook this fact, and while they do not deny the law imposed by Almighty God, they seek to find the reason of its obligation in human autonomy, and not in God himself, and thus confound acceptance of law and obedience to it by a free moral agent, with making and enjoining the law itself, claiming thus what is properly the office of God, the sovereign legislator, for man himself. They shrink from saying in just so many words, let God command and man obey, or, Thy will, O God, be done, not mine. Always, unconsciously to themselves, no doubt, are they more or less under the influence of the Satanic temptation, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," that is, ye shall be your own masters, and the law unto yourselves, and not bound to receive it from a superior, or, at least, not till you have, *proprio motu*, assented to it, and enacted it for yourselves.

Further back still lies in their minds an error with regard to creation. We do not accuse them of formally denying the creative act of God, but they regard it rather as the act of the divine intellect and essence than of the divine will. Creation is in their system rather the evolution of the eternal

being according to the laws of his own infinite intelligence, than an act of the free will of God,—a clean production by his infinite liberty from nothing. In order to assert creation at all, in any proper sense of the term, it is necessary to assert it as the free act of God, and therefore as an act of will, free not only from coaction, but also from intrinsic necessity. But referring creation to God as being and intelligence, rather than to God as will, or free activity, they naturally regard—nay, are compelled to regard—human life as an evolution of the human being and as a development of human intelligence. It is always a becoming, *das Werden*, and consequently ceases in so far as it ceases to be progressive. The end of human living is therefore progress, or the continuous development of intelligence and growth or evolution of being. The human being is like one of our American cities, never finished. Nature is not completed in the original act of creation, but tends always to complete itself. This is the grand error of nearly all the later German and French philosophy. It supposes that our legitimate activity consists in developing and augmenting and completing our nature or our being, or in growing into God, instead of making it consist in the exercise of our activity in fulfilment of a moral law. Man's work is to make man, to complete his own being and faculties, instead of using the being and faculties God has given him to fulfil the purpose for which he has been created. Thus the end of man is to carry on and complete his own creation, that is, carry on and complete the creative work of the Almighty.

The same principle, or a parallel principle, is applied to Christianity. The work of man in regard to it is to develop and complete it, to finish the work commenced by the Almighty of making a religion, not the work of believing and obeying or practising the religion which God has given him. All Protestant thought, not devoted to the destruction of all religion, is employed in making, constructing, or completing religion, and so busy are Protestants in this work, that they have no leisure or heart to practise religion. The error lies in claiming for man a share in creation, or, as we have often said, placing the activity of man on the same line and in the cycle with the creative activity of God. Let our friends understand this; let them understand that in the first place nature is not a *becoming*, but is become, is completed, and that religion objectively considered is finished, and Christianity perfected, by the Author and Finisher of our

faith, and they will at once see that their doctrine of development is no better than a blasphemous dream. They will then understand that the Christian religion is not a product of human life, but is the element of that life, and must be possessed in its perfection as the condition of living that life; for the Christian life is not a life developed in us or evolved from us, but a life generated or begotten in us by Christ our Redeemer.

We would suggest also to our friends of the Mercersburg school to inquire into their present tendency. They see, admit, and prove the present unsatisfactory state of Protestantism. They believe or profess to believe that the Protestant reformation was necessary to carry on the legitimate development of the Christianity of the preceding ages; but they regard the present as a transitional state. They do not believe that Protestantism as a dogmatic religion was in its origin, or is now in any of its forms, an adequate statement of Christian faith and theology. They look upon themselves, not as having found, but as about to find, what they want. Now there are two things to which we would call attention. First, following the anti-Catholic impulse originally given to the reformation, Protestants have fallen into the sect system and vulgar Protestantism, which the Mercersburg school is resolute to condemn as unchristian; and, second, just in proportion as they follow the tendency they contend for, and recede from this vulgar Protestantism, do they approach, not a new form of Christianity, but that old Catholic form against which the reformers protested. These are two pregnant facts. They should, it seems to us, excite a doubt whether there is any middle ground, and create a suspicion that the form they are seeking, and the higher theology they are craving, are identically the Catholic religion, and not to be realized out of it. Dr. Nevin, in his war against what he calls Puritanism, has found himself, no doubt to his surprise and alarm, approaching what he still persists in calling Romanism. In a less degree, or at a greater distance, the same is true of Dr. Schaff. Both seem to have confidence in the catholicizing school of Germany, but can either of them deny that all they call progress in this school consists precisely in its approach to Catholicity, to our own church? Is it not probable, then, that their progress, continued till it has attained the last results of the new movement, would carry them into the bosom of that church? They may, indeed, deny their own doctrine, and

suddenly and violently interrupt their progress; but if they concede, as they do, that they have not arrived at the goal, and if they are going, as they contend, in the right direction, and if they continue on, we see not well how they can avoid entering the Catholic communion. They might, then, it seems to us, very reasonably conclude that their labor is unnecessary, that the higher and truer theology which they seek, and which they concede that they have not as yet found, is already constructed for them, and they have nothing to do but humbly submit to it.

We beg the serious attention of our friends to these few considerations, which we have made in no captious or controversial spirit. We know how hard it is for a man who has been bred a Protestant, and has been accustomed to look for the truth in some development of Protestantism, to change, and bring himself to look for it in that church which he has hitherto despised or hated. But we hope they will continue on, and that our Catholic friends will not forget to besiege heaven with prayers for their conversion.

SAINT-BONNET ON SOCIAL RESTORATION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1851.]

THIS is certainly an able and interesting work, opportune, and well fitted to exert a great, and upon the whole a salutary influence, in the present crisis of European thought. Its author is evidently a man of faith and conscience, who has studied the social problems of the age long and profoundly, with deep earnestness and rare intelligence. He has characterized our moral, social, and economical wounds, probed them to the bottom, traced them to their origin, and prescribed the only possible remedy, namely, a hearty return of the age to Christian faith, and the practical observance in every department of life of Christian principles and maxims.

The remote cause of the present frightful state of the civilized world is, no doubt, to be looked for in the prevarica-

* *De la Restauration Française. Mémoire présentée au Clergé et à l'Aristocratie.* Par B. SAINT-BONNET. Paris: 1851.

tion of Adam, in which man sought to substitute himself for God, and to make himself his own final cause ; but the more proximate cause is the revolution effected in European thought and practice at the epoch of the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the revival of Greek studies and literature in western Europe. The prevailing opinion of the world has been, and is, that the four centuries then commencing have been centuries of unequalled progress, and that the revolution then effected was entirely in the interests of true civilization. These centuries are applauded, are boasted as the most glorious in the annals of our race, those in which mankind have best understood their true destiny, and most successfully accomplished it ; and whoever should venture to set himself against them, or to hint that the progress effected in them has been in a downward direction, or more specious than real, would be almost universally branded as an enemy to his kind, as a barbarian, or as a lunatic.

This should create no surprise. Men of the world always judge with the world's judgment,—according to the principles and maxims of their age ; and seldom incorrectly, if their standard of judgment be conceded. The human race may be now and then afflicted with lunacy, but it is never an idiot. An idiot is one who has just premises, but cannot draw from them just conclusions, that is, one who cannot reason ; a lunatic is one who has false premises, but who is, nevertheless, able to draw logical conclusions from them. His insanity is precisely in his inability to seize and hold true premises. He binds a wisp of straw around his hat and calls it a crown, picks up a mullen-stalk and calls it a sceptre, ascends a mole-hill and calls it a throne, and proceeds to issue commands and proclamations coherent and proper, if he were, as he assumes he is, a real king. Assuming the principles or premises asserted by the revolution of which we speak, mankind reason coherently, and even sanely, in concluding that they have really been advancing in true civilization with unprecedented rapidity for the last four centuries ; for it is undeniable that these centuries have been remarkably successful in reducing those principles to practice, and in drawing from them their last logical consequences.

But it is undeniable, and now conceded by many, that the revolution effected in the middle of the fifteenth century was a reaction, in every department of life, of ancient pa-

ganism against Christianity. and the progress since effected has been simply a progress in the restoration of the ancient heathen order. The reaction commenced in philosophy, literature and art, and passed into the political order under Louis XI. and Louis XII, of France, Henry VII. of England, and Maximilian I. and Charles V. of Germany. From the political order it passed into the religious order, under Luther and Calvin, and the paganized princes and nobles who protected them; and it now, under the modern industrial system, triumphs in the economical order. The modern world, in philosophy, literature, arts, politics, religion, morals, and economy, is in principle nothing but the reproduction of ancient heathendom. The simple question, then, to be settled, in order to determine whether the world in applauding or we in condemning it are to be counted the lunatic, is whether Christianity or paganism is the true social and religious order. If paganism is from God and the true civilization, we are the lunatic, and unquestionably ought to be shut up in bedlam; but if Christianity be true civilization, be from God, and the Gospel is not a cheat, nor our blessed Lord an imposter, but what he professed to be, then the world is the lunatic, and they who glory in it are laboring under a most deplorable hallucination.

One thing is now certain: The revolution in favor of heathenism has been sufficiently developed to enable all who retain any portion of their wits to see its real character and tendency. Enough has been already experienced to prove that the happy results originally counted on are not likely to follow. The world expected on returning to paganism to recover in some form the Eden lost by the prevarication of Adam, and at every successive step in its progress it has exulted as if on the very eve of recovering it. The restoration of paganism was at first complete only in principle, and it has been only gradually, after successive struggles, that it has been practically realized. Christian civilization, the growth of fourteen centuries, effected by the labors and heroic sufferings of so many saints and martyrs, was not to be uprooted in a moment, especially as the church remained to inspire and defend it. A direct attack on the Christian order in its totality would in the beginning have been imprudent, and defeated itself. It was necessary to divide in order to conquer, to begin by detaching the secular from the spiritual, the human from the divine. This has been now in a great measure accomplished, and the revolution

has finally passed from the order of ideas to the order of facts, and in Catholic nations as well as in Protestant. Philosophy has been disengaged from Christian theology; literature and art have been sundered from Christian faith and piety; religion from the church; morals from religion; politics from morals; industry from virtue; earth from heaven; man from God. The whole secular order is divorced from the spiritual, and civilization is shaped to man simply as an inhabitant of this world and a creature of mere animal wants and instincts. Nevertheless, the lost Eden has not been recovered, and to all appearance, no advance has been made towards its recovery. The separation of politics from morals, and the assertion of the strictly human origin of power, and the absolute independence of the state, have resulted only in anarchy and despotism, not in establishing liberty, as paganized statesmen madly dreamed: philosophy disengaged from Christian theology has become miserable psychology, and results in pantheism or atheism, scepticism or absolute nihilism; literature and art, disengaged from Catholic faith and piety, remain sterile, or bring forth only monstrous births, watery sentimentalism, or gross sensuality; morals sundered from religion become dull routine, heartless conventionalism, all-absorbing selfishness, flimsy sentiment, or unrestrained licentiousness; religion declared independent of the church sinks into a matter of private reason and mere private caprice, and disappears in gross superstition, wild fanaticism, or cold indifference; and the emancipation of industry from morality, and moulding the whole economical order to the satisfaction of man's sensual wants, have resulted in impoverishing modern nations, and reducing the great mass of the people to the most abject misery.*

The divorce of the secular order from the spiritual, the human from the divine, the boasted achievement of modern

*The apparent exceptions to this statement are this country and England. In this country the full effects in the economical order of the heathen reaction have not yet been fully experienced by the *free* population of the United States, but it is owing to accidental and temporary causes fast disappearing, such as the youth of the nation, and the vast extent of rich lands unoccupied, and capable of being procured and rendered productive at comparatively a trifling expense. In England herself there may have been no real decrease of capital, but in considering her economically she includes Ireland and India, in both of which the poverty and destitution of the people are such as were unknown, except with the slave population, if even with them, in the ancient heathen world.

progress, has undeniably resulted in the dissolution of society itself. There is absolutely, except the church, no society now existing, no social order now standing; for that is not society which is sustained only by chicanery and armed force, or which like ours is only a huge mob, acknowledging no law but its own arbitrary will. Disband your great European standing-armies, and there is not a single European state that could maintain even the semblance of social order for a single week. Our gain in substituting heathenism for Christianity has been the loss of all spiritual life, all religious faith, all morality, all intellectual freedom and greatness, all loyalty, chivalry, and nobility of sentiment, all political wisdom and all political liberty, all real social order, and, for immense numbers of the poor people, all honest means of subsistence, nay, of the means of subsistence at all. The whole annual income of France, for instance, if equally distributed among the thirty-six millions of Frenchmen, would give to each only between nine and ten cents a day.

Here is where modern progress, has brought us. Here is the stern reality that now stares us in the face. Mad as the world is, it cannot be satisfied with this result. Nay, it does not even profess to be satisfied with it, as its heavings and commotions, its insurrections and revolutions, its communistic and socialistic theories and schemes, daily and even hourly put forth, amply prove. Never was the world more uneasy, agitated, discontented; and it acknowledges that all it has thus far gained has been a dead loss, unless it be regarded as the necessary condition of attaining to a state not yet attained to. Everybody, or almost everybody, feels, and feels in his heart and all through his frame, that it is impossible to remain where we are, that we must either push on in the direction we have been rushing for the last four hundred years, or recoil and retrace our steps.

Precisely here comes in our author, and shows, on the one hand, that to advance is impossible without precipitating ourselves into the socialistic abyss, and, on the other, that, if we recoil and retrace our steps, it is impossible to find a stopping-place short of the church. The only alternative is now either socialism or Catholicity. No compromises, no *via media* schemes, no heathen premises with half-christian conclusions, can now avail any thing. A great man, and for the moment one of the most useful men of society, M. Proudhon, has stripped off all disguises, and with an invincible logic given the thought of the age its precise formula-

LA PROPRIÉTÉ C'EST LE VOL, Property is robbery. None of the usual subterfuges of sophists and demagogues, such as Protestantism, liberalism, and moderate democratism, can now be resorted to, for this bold man, with his clear head, iron nerves, and invincible dialectics, has laid them bare, and revealed the age to itself. Nothing therefore remains but socialism or Catholicity. This assumed or established, the author applies himself to prove that socialism is the inevitable result of the paganism we have fostered, and that it is intrinsically repugnant to all civilization, being in direct contradiction to all the laws of providence, intellectual, moral, social, political, and economical, and that, on the contrary, Catholicity is adapted to all the real interests of man and society, has been the creator of all the capital of the modern world, is the sole civilizer, and, if submitted to, amply sufficient to redeem us from our present frightful state, to reestablish social order and political as well as social freedom, by inspiring virtue, consecrating labor, and inducing moderation in enjoyment.

This is what the author aims to prove ; how true and just it is in our judgment we need not to inform our readers, for in one form or another we have for years been doing our best to set it forth and to establish it. But the author must permit us to say, and we do so with great respect and deference, that, in developing and proving his thesis, he uses language, and sometimes adopts, at least in appearance, principles, borrowed from the very heathen schools against which he so nobly and so ably protests. It may be that we do not always catch his precise meaning, and also that what seems to us objectionable comes less from the unsoundness of his thought than from his neglect to state his meaning with the requisite clearness, distinctness, and precision. Nevertheless we are not able to explain him always in harmony with the Catholicity he professes.

The fundamental distinction between Christianity and heathenism is, that the former asserts God as man's sole first cause and as his sole final cause, and the latter asserts man as his own final cause. The one commands us as the rule of life to seek God in all things, and to do all for him ; the other bids us in all things to seek ourselves, and to consult in all only our own pleasure. Heathenism was first preached in the garden by the serpent, who summed it all up in the promise, "Ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil,"—a promise which, though a lie, and made by the

father of lies, this age holds to have been true, not hesitating to maintain that the serpent promised the truth, and that man did, by eating the forbidden fruit, really become as a god. In heathenism man takes the place of God, and stands as the sole end for which he is to live. But man cannot assert himself as his own final cause without also asserting himself as his own first cause, from which it must follow, either that man is in the strictest sense God, or that man makes himself. But as to assert that man makes himself, and as to hold that man is absolutely God, is too open an outrage upon common sense, heathenism in our times compromises the matter by conceding that God creates the germ, or at least man is given in germ, but is left to develop and complete himself by his own efforts. This developing and completing himself from the original germ is what our age calls progress, and hence progress in the heathen sense implies that man is joint creator, or in part at least the first cause of himself.

Progress in this heathen sense is, as somebody has said, the evangel of the nineteenth century. We find it asserted everywhere, in theology, ethics, politics, metaphysics, and in universal cosmology. All modern science, in so far as it deigns to recognize a creative God at all, recognizes him as creating only the germs of things, which are completed by their own internal law or force. As to the material universe God created only the gases, which from their own intrinsic force have developed in globes, suns, stars, minerals, plants, and animals. Man is only the last term known to us of a social development which begins in the lowest and rudest form of animal life, and the civilized man is only the development of the savage. Religion is only the successive development and growth of a vague sentiment of the human heart, called sometimes a sense of dependence, a sense of the infinite, and Christianity is only the product of this sentiment successively working its way upward through fetichism, polytheism, monotheism, and reposing in a grand syncretism of all preceding religions. Even men who have not the least suspicion of their own orthodoxy carry the same principle into Catholicity, and maintain that Christian doctrine itself was revealed only in germ, and has been formed, completed, in the course of time by development. All proceeds on the assumption, that God never finishes any thing, never creates any thing but the mere germs of things, or reveals any thing but the mere germs of doctrine, leaving

them always to the creature to complete. This is the grand thought of all modern science, and the illustrious author of the *Essay on Development* only applies to the supernatural order, to the formation of Christian doctrine, the principles which the author of the *Vestiges of Creation* applies to the natural order, or to the formation of the universe, and his well-intended justification of his conversion is after all only an ingenious but undesigned attempt to harmonize unchangeable Christian doctrine with the modern heathen notion of progress. So all-pervading is this heathen doctrine that very few of us are able entirely to escape it; and men whose faith and piety are unquestionable give utterance to principles which need only to be developed to be pantheism or nihilism. These men will not themselves so develop them; the grace they have received, and with which they freely concur, will save them from that; but who can say that others may not come after them who will develop them, and push them to their last logical consequences?

Now we do not suppose that our author in any thing he says intends this heathen doctrine of progress, but he certainly says many things which seem to us to involve it. He, indeed, expressly states that God is our final cause, the end we are to seek at all times and in all things. This is much, and, if consistently maintained, is every thing. But he tells us, man is placed in this world not to satisfy his wants, which is true enough, but to grow, and rise in being by the efforts they awake in his soul. "Man is born," he continues, "neither free nor perfect; but simply with the capacity to become so. He brings only his germ. The germ of the apple, for instance, does it not envelop apples? If it withstands the wind, drought, above all, if grafted, as we are, by society, then it bears fruit. Open your eyes, see that infant in long clothes. That infant is man. Idiots, lunatics, do not become, they only remain such. Man is born an idiot, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul. God has given to men alone the capacity to acquire liberty, will, memory, reason, and the other faculties, but only in proportion as they acquire them, so that the inequality among men comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them in equal degrees." Over and over again he both asserts and implies that man makes himself, and is the product of his own labor and virtue. He reasons continually on the supposition that man com-

menced his career in space and time, not merely without political or social liberty, but without liberty as free will, the principle of moral responsibility, and had to create his liberty and establish himself a moral agent. To form his *moi* or personality four thousand years of heathenism were necessary, and the reason why our blessed Lord was not sooner incarnated is, that the human person, human freedom, human responsibility, was not sooner formed. The Gospel could not have been sooner given, because there was not a human person to receive it, and hence heathenism was a sort of necessary preparation for Christianity. So also he contends, or appears to contend, that Protestantism is a necessary preparation for Catholicity. Protestantism is the religion of personality; it can begin human nature, but cannot complete it. Man forms his personality to offer it to God. Protestant nations are those to whom God has offered half the task, because not prepared for Catholicity, which undertakes human nature on all points at once. This old human nature, though ransomed by four thousand years of suffering and slavery, cannot bear at once the flood of Catholic light and virtue. Though Christianity from the first day triumphed in the Byzantine empire, the human mind would not adhere to it; and Islamism has saved a people to civilization that else had irrevocably returned to barbarism; and on the decline of Islamism we shall, perhaps, see them pass under the aurora of some Protestant sect before arriving at the noonday of Catholicity.

The author assumes that man commenced a mere infant, and that the savage is to be regarded as the primitive man. Men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. The earth, as man received it from his Maker, was empty and void, barren sand or naked rock, and he had not only to make himself, but the soil by which he makes himself. As a matter of fact, God, indeed, assisted man in the beginning, made him certain advances; but these are to be considered in the light of temporary loans, to be redeemed in proportion as man forms his own personality and is able to subsist by himself on his own products. Even Christianity is given to man only in germ, and left to be developed and completed by his own intelligence and virtue, because God cannot outrun man himself, or travel faster than the race. These statements, principles, reasonings, scattered all through the volume before us, and some of them repeated almost to weariness, if words are to be used in any re-

lation to their plain and natural sense, prove that the author does not wholly escape the errors of modern progressists and developmentists, but does, in some respects, at least, assert progress in what we have termed the heathen sense.

Let us not be misunderstood ; we do not condemn progress in every sense. Progress is certainly recognized, demanded, and assisted by our holy religion. But progress in what? We may regard the universe as presenting two cycles, the one the procession by way of creation, not emanation, of existences from God, as their first or efficient cause, and the other their return, without being absorbed into God, as Indian pantheism teaches, to him as their final cause or last end. God has created all things, and has created them for himself alone. These two cycles are presented alike in the primitive creation or natural order, and in the new creation or supernatural order, that is, Christianity. In both orders progress in the second cycle is admissible and commanded. But progress in the second cycle is simply moral progress, not physical, a progress in *doing*, not in *being*. It is a progress not in making ourselves, nor in completing ourselves physically, but in fulfilling the end for which God has made us,—in a word, a progress in moral perfection. This is the progress of which St. Paul speaks, when he speaks of pressing forward towards the mark of the prize of the high calling in Christ Jesus, the progress for which we were all made free moral agents, for which the law was given, Christian truth revealed, the church founded, and the sacraments were instituted, after which every Christian aspires, and the saint successfully strives. This progress is very admissible, and we cannot insist too strenuously on it, or have too much of it.

But in the first cycle, that of creation, there is no progress by the agency of the progressing subject admissible, because God is sole creator, and creates by himself alone ; and this alike whether we speak of the natural creation or of the supernatural. Creation *ad extra*, or placing existences in space and time, may or may not be progressive, according to the will of the Creator ; all we mean to deny is, that it is progressive in any sense by the agency, will, or concurrence of the creature. In the first cycle God is sole actor, for the action of second causes in all cases, in so far as the action of second causes, is in the second cycle, or return to God as final cause. Their action never reacts and completes themselves physically, nor can it ever create any substance or

entity. God himself creates all things from nothing by the sole energy of his word, and each after its kind, with a specific and determinate nature, unalterable physically, except by his own will and omnipotence. Thus is it in the first cycle of the natural order. It is the same in the first cycle of the supernatural order, as really and as truly a creation as the natural order itself. *Gratia est omnino gratis.* We can do nothing of ourselves to merit grace, for all merit is of grace. All in this order that pertains to the first cycle is the pure creation or free gift of God, without any merit, effort, or activity of ours; hence Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism are heresies. In the second cycle we of course are active, and to merit must concur actively by grace with grace; but in creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing the grace, we have no part or lot. Determining what shall be revealed, what shall be taught and believed as Christian doctrine, and revealing and teaching it, pertains exclusively to the first cycle, and therefore to God alone. Consequently the development or gradual formation of Christian doctrine by the activity of the human mind, or believing subject, cannot be supposed. Development of Christian doctrine there undoubtedly has been, and if the Gospel were provisional, if it looked to a more perfect religion, as the law looked to Christ, we would add, development there may be. The whole Christian doctrine was revealed in substance to our first parents, but nobody pretends that it was revealed to them as fully and as explicitly as it is possessed by us. But the development, explication, or completion of the primitive revelation has not been effected by the agency of the human mind, supernaturally assisted or unassisted, but by inspiration, by divine revelation through prophets and apostles, that is, by action of the Holy Ghost in the first cycle. What is to be denied is not the progressiveness of past revelation by divine agency, but the development and growth of doctrine by the mental or moral action of the faithful.

Here was the radical error of the distinguished author of the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, an ingenious work, indicating severe intellectual labor, rare speculative powers, extensive erudition, and much honest endeavor, but which undeniably transports human activity into the first cycle, the peculiar province of God, and makes man joint creator with the Holy Ghost of Christian doctrine. It should excite no surprise that the learned author fell into

this error at the time of writing his essay, for he was not then even a Catholic, and, as he himself confesses, "his eyes were dim, and he could but employ reason in the things of faith." He was led into his error by the false philosophy of the age, which asserts that the mind apprehends truth only under subjective forms, and by his Protestantism, which misapprehends the real character of those new definitions and further explications of the faith opposed by the church to novel heresies and errors as they arise. Confounding the simple belief of the truth with the intellectual process of comprehending it, he fell into the mistake of supposing that heresy has always an honest origin, that it always springs from the necessary and laudable effort of the mind, an effort which every true believer must make, to ascertain and comprehend the truth, and that it always presupposes the faith on the point it contradicts was previously unknown to the pastors of the church,—a sad mistake, for the church has never hesitated as to the faith to be opposed to the novel heresy, which proves that she knew it prior to the heresy, and the heresy never originates in ignorance of the faith or in an honest endeavor to ascertain it, but in the desire to establish a favorite theory, or to follow one's own private judgment. If Dr. Newman, now that he knows something of Catholic theology, and can take St. Thomas for his guide, were to review the fathers, he would probably find that the theory he has adopted to reconcile their teachings with the actual faith of the church, or to explain what he regards as their discrepancies and variations of doctrine, is as unnecessary as it is historically, philosophically, and theologically false and inadmissible; and were he to reëxamine his theory itself he would find, we doubt not, that he has throughout, unconsciously, mistaken development and growth of heresy for development and growth of Christian doctrine. In the sense of further explications or new definitions of the faith explicitly held from the beginning by the church, though not by every individual pastor, *contra errores insurgentes*, as St. Thomas says, development is certainly to be asserted; but in the sense of evolving by the action of the faithful new articles, dogmas, or propositions of faith, unknown to the primitive pastors of the church, and not proposed to primitive believers, it cannot be asserted, especially on the ground that the human mind can apprehend and believe truth only under special aspects, and as it subjects it to its own formative process; for it gives to the mind a share

in the formation of Christian doctrine. It is as to doctrine precisely what semi-Pelagianism is as to merit; for it assigns to revelation, the divine action, in the formation of doctrine, the precise office that semi-Pelagianism assigns to grace in the formation of Christian character. Semi-Pelagianism developed is pure Pelagianism, and pure Pelagianism developed is pure heathenism, the last word of which is socialism.

Now, it is precisely progress in this first cycle that modern heathenism asserts, and the real error of the age is in attempting to do God's work, and in neglecting its own. The more advanced portion of the age, they who best represent its spirit, reject the supernatural order altogether, and assert progress in the first cycle simply of the natural; the less advanced portion, who wish to be considered as remaining within the pale of Christendom, admit the supernatural order, indeed, but they show their sympathy with the age by asserting that God creates and reveals it only in germ, and we are to complete it by our own intelligence and virtue. But do we know what it is to assert progress in the first cycle? It implies, as we have seen, that man, in part at least, is his own first cause, the joint creator of himself, and this, which is a manifest absurdity, implies that God is not our sole final cause. God is our sole final cause only in that he is our sole first cause. If he is not our sole creator we are not bound to seek him as our ultimate end in all things and at all times. Thus, to seek him is to render unto him the tribute of our whole being as his due; but we cannot so render unto him the whole as his due, unless he has created the whole. What we have ourselves created, supposing it possible for us to create something, is our own, and we owe it to no one. We may, *pro tanto*, live for ourselves, and therefore are not bound, as our author and Christianity assert, to live for God alone. "Man forms his personality," says the author, "to offer it to God." This has a pious sound, but if man is the author of his own personality, in whole or in part, he does not owe it to God, and then in giving it to God he offers God something he has not received from God, and in crowning it God crowns, not his own gifts to man, but man's gifts to him. This is not Catholic doctrine. God is our sole final, because our sole first cause. To deny that he is our sole first cause is to deny Catholic faith, to subvert the foundation of Christian morals, and to assert in principle the very heathenism our author so bravely, and for the most part so successfully combats.

The author is correct in saying that idiots do not become,

but simply remain such, though not in affirming the same of all lunatics, *aliénés*, for men of intelligence and virtue have been known to become insane. It is not true to say that man is born an idiot, without any of the faculties of his soul, and with only the capacity to acquire them, for idiots are precisely those who are born without that capacity, in the only sense in which we can be said to possess it. It is, moreover, a grave error to maintain that any man is born without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, and only with the power to acquire them. The soul, strictly speaking, does not and cannot acquire its faculties, for they are it, and indistinguishable from it. Faculties are distinguishable in the soul, not from the soul. They are not accidental to the soul, but essential, and enter into its very substance or entity. To suppose it *in potentia* to any one of them is to suppose it *in potentia* to them all; and to suppose it *in potentia* to them all is to suppose it to be itself *in potentia*, a merely possible soul, without any actual existence,—a soul which God indeed may create *ad extra* if he chooses, but which he has not as yet so created. The soul may be *in potentia* to acts, but not to faculties.

In a certain sense the infant is no doubt the germ of the man, but only as to the body, not as to the soul, which is properly the man. The soul is born with all its faculties even in the idiot, and is no subject of development or growth, for it is a simple, immaterial substance, and hence it is not by development and growth, but by infused grace, that man is able to aspire to a perfection above the plane on which he is born. In passing from infancy to manhood the soul does not grow; only the bodily organs grow, and their development and growth fall within the second cycle, not the first. To assume that the soul grows because these material organs grow, is to confound the soul with the body, and to assume that the faculties of the soul are simply bodily developments, which is rank materialism. The soul, being in a manner inexplicable to us united to a body, has no ordinary way of manifesting itself externally except through bodily organs; but it in no sense depends on them for its faculties or intrinsic power to operate. Moreover, even since the Creator has willed to perpetuate the race by generation, as to the body, rather than by renewed creations, if man born in the bosom of society were born only in germ, it would not follow that the race began as a mere

germ, and that the law which governs the race is that of development and growth, for the new-born child is not a new mankind, nor a renewal of mankind, but the continuation of the race, and presupposes the race already existing in its maturity.

The author cannot maintain that man is born without liberty in the sense of free will, and that he is not created, but makes himself, a responsible being. Free will is essential to man. The author himself terms it *le moi*, the personality, and therefore it is the last complement of man's rational nature, without which, unless supplied by the divine personality, as in the human nature of Christ, that nature has no subsistence. Yet man, as yet insubsistent, gives to his nature its last complement! Free will is a *vis*, and therefore an *esse*; can man create not only an *esse*, but his own *esse*, or rather *existentia*? It would require, we apprehend, somewhat more than four thousand years of heathenism to enable him to do that. If man is born without free will, without responsibility, or even the principle of responsibility, how will the author explain original sin, and the baptism of infants? If the child is not born with free will, a real person, he is born simply a thing or an animal. Can a mere thing or a mere animal be born a sinner, and be the proper subject of baptism? The author can hardly be aware of the heretical consequences his doctrine, that men are born idiots, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of the soul, necessarily involves.

There is something unpleasant to us in the doctrine that heathenism was a necessary preparation for Christianity, or that Protestantism is a useful preparation for Catholicity. The author seems to us to lose sight in his theorizing of the salvation of individual souls, the bearing of heathenism and Protestantism on the world to come, and thus incurs the very guilt he charges upon the age. Those false and heretical religions are fatal to the souls of all who adhere to them, and it does not seem to us compatible with what we know of God, that he should make it necessary for generations to live and die in a state of sin and damnation, in order to prepare the way for succeeding generations to live and die in a state of justice and salvation. We would respectfully recommend to the author's meditation the assertion of St. Paul, that without faith it is impossible to please God, and the Catholic dogma, which so many in our days forget, or attempt to explain away, that out of the church no one shall ever be saved.

Moreover, the author mistakes the duration of heathenism as the prevailing order of society. He speaks of its having endured four thousand years before the birth of our Lord. No doubt it was in the world from the time the serpent seduced Eve in the garden, but it was formed and carried away the nations not till about the time of the calling of Abraham. The primitive patriarchal religion even in the time of Abraham does not appear to have been generally abandoned by the nations, and idolatry was probably general only in Chaldea. Melchisedech, king of Salem, worshipped the true God. So did Abimelech, king of Gerar, and so also Pharaoh, king of Egypt. But let this pass. Heathenism, we are told, prepared the way for Christianity by constituting human liberty, the personality, or free will; but this cannot be true, for the origin of heathenism was precisely in the abuse of free will, in the perverse activity of human personality, in egotism or pride, and necessarily supposes the personality already formed. Protestantism again is, the author says, the religion of personality, yet, with his permission, not, as he supposes, the religion that forms the personality, and so far so good, and failing only in that it does not offer the personality to God after having formed it, but a religion that springs from the personality substituting itself for God. It is simply apostasy from the church, as heathenism was from the primitive or patriarchal religion, that is, simply heathenism under modern conditions. It is a grave mistake to suppose that an apostasy from the truth is a preparation for the truth. Christianity in its substance is older than heathenism, and has come down to us, not through the line of the gentiles, as the author's Saint-Simonian friends maintain, but through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church. Protestantism is not the dawn of Catholicity, but its setting; and if it retains some rays of light, they are only such as gild the evening clouds after the sun has sunk below the horizon. Mistake not the evening twilight, which soon is swallowed up in darkness, for the morning twilight that ushers in the day. Catholicity is prior to Protestantism, not its development. Truth is before error; God before man; orthodoxy before heresy. This old human nature, of which the author speaks, is undoubtedly unable to bear on all points at once the flood of Catholic truth and virtue, but who asks it to bear it? Nature alone assuredly is unequal to the splendor of Catholic faith or the sublimity of Catholic virtue, but what then?

The author should not have forgotten that Catholic faith and virtue are not expected without grace, that sufficient grace is given unto every man, and that, though we can do nothing of ourselves, we can do all things through Christ strengthening us. The Catholic never reasons well when he forgets to make any account of grace.

We cannot accept the author's doctrine that the savage was the primitive state of mankind. It is not historically true that men were first hunters, then shepherds, and then agriculturists. Cain, the first born of Adam, was an agriculturist, and offered in sacrifice the first fruits of the earth; Abel, the second born, was a shepherd or herdsman, and offered the firstlings of his flocks. Some suppose Lamech was a hunter, but the first hunter distinctly named is Nimrod, who is also represented as a great builder of cities. It is the opinion of the theologians that men did not eat flesh till God gave them permission to do so after the flood. There is no evidence that Adam, immediately after his expulsion from the garden, or that Noah and his family, immediately after the deluge, fell into the savage state, and all the monuments of antiquity that remain tend to prove the reverse. Universal tradition ascribes civilization directly to the Divinity, and those nations that have in process of time become civilized always confess to having borrowed their civilization from nations previously civilized. Thus the Greeks ascribe theirs to Egyptian and Phenician colonies. Nations once civilized have been known to lapse into the barbarous or savage state, but there is no instance on record of a savage tribe, by its spontaneous efforts, having risen from the savage to the civilized state, and the author himself maintains that the savage state is unprogressive. The savage is the degenerated, not the primitive man, and no more the inchoate civilized man than the heretic is an inchoate believer.

These considerations sufficiently refute the doctrine which appears to be authorized by the plain and natural force of M. Saint-Bonnet's language; but we are free to confess that it is not impossible but that, in some respects, we have drawn a meaning from his language which he does not himself distinctly intend. Though as a writer he is vigorous, bold, and striking, he is not remarkably clear, precise, or exact. He writes as if he held logical precision and technical exactness in lofty disdain; and he appears to aim at moving the heart through the imagination still more than

through the understanding. His words are familiar, and his sentences for the most part simply constructed, but what he really means by them we are often at a loss to determine. He is a disciple of the modern romantic school, and, like Châteaubriand, sacrifices at times distinctness of thought and exactness of doctrine to æsthetic effect. The church in the catechism is always clear, distinct, exact, and precise in expression, and in reading the brilliant pages of the author of *Les Martyrs* and *Le Génie du Christianisme*, we often wish that he had taken the pains to learn it. His errors, though never springing from his heart, are but poorly atoned for by the charms of his style and the fervor of his sentiments. We are old-fashioned enough to prefer orthodoxy to highly excited sensibility, felicitous phrases, or happily turned periods. In his own mind, in his own understanding of his words, it is not impossible, after all, that our author is, for the most part, defensible. The chief errors we seem to find in his pages grow out of his neglect to distinguish the meaning of his terms, and to distribute his assertions according to their respective categories. He usually says what he means, but we suspect he does not always mean what he says. He expresses his meaning, but at the same time something more, or something else.

The author certainly uses the word *liberty* in the sense of free will, *le moi*, personality, the principle of moral responsibility, and just as certainly uses it for the perfection which is acquired by the right exercise of free will, and that too without in the least distinguishing the one sense from the other. In the sense of free will, liberty is the person, enters into the essential definition of man, and pertains to him in the first cycle, or to his physical nature. To say that liberty in this sense is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without liberty, is false, and involves all the difficulties we have indicated. But to say that liberty, as the exercise of free will, as sanctity, as "the liberty of the sons of God," of which the blessed apostle speaks, is acquired, or that in this sense man is born without it, is perfectly true, for he is born a sinner, and not even with the capacity to acquire it without grace. The author confounds the two senses and reasons as if the two were one and the same sense, and hence asserts the error along with the truth.

Man, the author says, is born neither free nor perfect, but simply with the capacity to become so; and if he were born free and perfect the socialists would be right. The

question as to freedom we have just disposed of. As to being born perfect, we must distinguish. In the first cycle, in his physical nature, in his essential qualities or attributes, man is most certainly born perfect, that is, perfect in his kind, perfect man, though not, of course, perfect God; that is, again, he is born with the full complement of his nature as pure nature; but in the second cycle, in the moral order, he is not born perfect, for he is born a sinner under the dominion of Satan, as the church teaches expressly in her councils, and in exorcising and baptizing the new-born infant. The author confounds these two senses, and so asserts the error with the truth, and fails to negative, except in part, the doctrine of the socialists. The error of the socialists is not in asserting that man is born perfect as to the first cycle, for that they do not assert; but in asserting that he is born perfect as to the second cycle, that is, without sin, pure, holy, in no need of pardon or redemption. The author contradicts them in this last doctrine, it is true, but agrees with them in the former, which, if possible, is the more fatal error of the two.

The author makes an analogous mistake in regard to all our faculties. He uniformly confounds the faculty in the first cycle with the faculty in the second; that is, the faculty as it enters into the essential definition of man with its exercise, or the perfection attainable by its exercise. Man is born, he says, without liberty, will, memory, reason, or any of the faculties of his soul. God has given him only the capacity to acquire them; and men possess them only in the degree in which they acquire them; and hence the inequality which exists among men in society comes from the fact that they have not all acquired them equally. Hence the origin of ranks and social inequalities. They express the varying degrees in which individuals have acquired their faculties. Here is a truth and a falsehood. As they enter into his essential definition, man is not born without his faculties; as they mean simply the perfection acquired by their exercise, of course he is born without them, and possesses them only in the degree in which he acquires them. But whether social ranks and distinctions are always in the ratio of virtue is another question, to which we shall have occasion to return before we close.

What we regard as the author's errors originate mainly in this confusion of thought, this confounding of faculty with the perfection attainable by it, of the actor with the act,

being with doing; but it is only simple justice to him to say, that, though he fails to distinguish the truth from the falsehood in his expressions, and even in his reasonings, the truth is that which is uppermost in his mind. When he tells us man is born an idiot, without any of his faculties, it is only fair to presume that it is faculty in the sense of the perfection that comes from its exercise that he chiefly intends. When he says that man makes himself, his real though not distinctly stated meaning is, that man makes himself morally, which, though rather commonplace, is strictly true, for a man's morality or virtue is always his own act. This is true, notwithstanding his moral perfection of himself is not possible without grace moving, assisting, and elevating him, because the grace by which he perfects himself is in the first cycle, and is not his act, but the principle of his act, and only physically completes him, so to speak, as an actor under God's gracious providence. If a man makes himself morally, that is develops and completes himself in the second cycle, he must make morally, as to the same cycle, whatever enters into him as its necessary condition. Thus, though he has nothing to do with creating, procuring, conferring, or infusing grace, yet, to obtain the perfection that is by it, he must by it concur voluntarily with it, and by this concurrence make it his, or, what is the same thing, the perfection that is by it his perfection. So of the globe and all the things pertaining to it, necessary to his perfection; he must himself morally make and appropriate them. Hence man makes both himself and the soil of the globe he inhabits; that is, in order to attain to the end for which God has made him, man must make a right use of his free will, both in regard to himself and to all not himself, and can no more become perfect by immorality in the economical or industrial order, than in any other department of life, which is undoubtedly true. Man must use, and not abuse, both his faculties and the world.

Keeping in mind these distinctions, we may proceed to a more particular analysis of the volume before us. The work is directed against the revolutionists, socialists, liberalists, and communists of the day. It is divided into three books, the first on Capital, the second on Order, the third on Aristocracy, and it is designed to show that the economical, social, and political doctrines approved by the age, and contended for by the classes named, if reduced to practice, must result in the destruction of all virtue, all capital, all govern-

ment, all society, and of man himself, save as a mere savage. It undertakes to do this by showing the conditions of capital or property, its relation to individual virtue and the constitution of families, the relation of families to the aristocracy and social order, and the relation of aristocracy to government, to the constitution, preservation, and progress of society, or the continued increase of capital and virtue. Capital founds man, the freeman as distinguished from the slave, man founds the family, families found the aristocracy, and the aristocracy found and direct society, while capital itself is founded by virtue, and virtue by religion. To destroy religion is to destroy virtue, to destroy virtue is to destroy capital, to destroy capital is to destroy liberty or the freeman, to destroy the freeman is to destroy families, to destroy families is to destroy the aristocracy, to destroy the aristocracy is to destroy government, and to destroy government is to destroy society, and to destroy society is to drive men back to the savage state. The labor of the author is to show that all these elements act and react on and produce one another, and that civilization is only the result of their mutual action and reaction, and can be produced, preserved, or restored only by the presence and concurrence of them all. Consequently, to attack religion, virtue, capital, individual freedom, family, aristocracy, or authority, is to attack civilization, nay, man himself.

The author starts with the important assertion, that the radical error of the age, under an economical as well as a theological point of view, is the assumption that man is here simply to enjoy, that the end of production is the satisfaction of his desires, and therefore that in all his efforts and arrangements he is to consult the greatest possible consumption. Man is not placed in this world to satisfy his wants, but to grow,—morally,—by the efforts they awaken in his soul. The end of production is not consumption, but moral growth, the establishment of man in his liberty, his individual independence, and the development and completion of his moral faculties. In consequence of the fall, man has now to make this independence for himself, and he makes it by virtue of capital. But such is the disorder of his nature that to acquire capital without effort, or to possess it without labor, is morally destructive. Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery only corrupts him, while wealth acquired by labor renders him moral. Hence, as God has made capital necessary to the production and maintenance of liberty

or manhood, he has made labor necessary to the production of capital; and therefore has placed in man hunger, thirst, and other wants, for the purpose of forcing him to labor.

Capital is not, as Jews and merchants formerly imagined, a surplusage of coin laid by, but what man has produced over and above what he has consumed, and consists in the soil he has created and fertilized, his dwelling-houses, barns, out-houses, fixtures, utensils, implements of agriculture, mechanics' shops and tools, provisions, clothing, mills, roads, governments, laws, institutions, manners, customs, habits, education, instruction, &c. Capital is the product of labor, and labor decomposed is sorrow and liberty. Sorrow or pain, *douleur*, excites liberty or activity, and man labors or works, and produces.

Man has had to produce all by his own labor,—himself and the very soil of the globe. The world when he received it from his Maker was, under the economical point of view, empty and void, barren sand or naked rock. Its soil was not yet created, its surface was not yet clothed with verdure, for the rains had not descended to water it, since as yet there was no man to till it. Man had not only to make himself a freeman, but the very soil of the globe, without which he could neither make himself nor even subsist. True, his Creator came to his aid, made him certain temporary advances, placed him in the East in a warm climate, under a clement sky, on a fertile oasis, where he could live with scanty clothing, and on the spontaneous productions of the earth. But this was only a provisional order, and in no sense the law by which man was to subsist on this globe. These advances were only temporary loans to liberty, indispensable in the first instance, but to be redeemed or withdrawn in proportion as man acquires his liberty, and becomes able to stand by himself and subsist on his own products, and therefore not to be considered in determining the great economical law by which capital is created, and liberty constituted. “En dehors de l'absolu il y a la liberté. Bien qu'elle ait eu commencement, elle repose sur la grande loi; il faut qu'elle soit par elle-même. Sa première mise de fonds lui est retirée tous les jours, afin que son moi lui soit propre.” We are therefore to proceed as if no advances had been made, and to consider the law to be precisely what it would have been, if man had really been cast a mere germ of a man upon the barren sand or naked rock, and left to create the soil, and complete himself by his own efforts, or

the efforts to which his inherent wants impel him. Without these wants he would not labor; without labor he could neither grow nor subsist. But if he wastes his faculties as fast as he develops them, consumes as fast as he produces, he creates no capital; for capital is the excess of production over consumption. Hence the conditions of capital are want,—sorrow or pain, *douleur*,—liberty, and abstinence; that is, labor in producing, and moderation in consuming.

Man is naturally averse to this moderation. He is naturally inclined to produce only to satisfy his wants, and—as his wants always more than keep pace with his means of satisfying them—to consume all he produces. To practise this moderation therefore demands an effort against nature, the virtue of self-denial, not possible without religion. Religion is indispensably necessary to produce this virtue of moderation, and it produces it by teaching us that the end of production is not consumption, is not to satisfy wants, but to prepare man for the future life, to form his personality that he may offer it to God. Hence, in the last analysis, religion is the essential basis of capital, and through it of liberty, family, aristocracy, government, order, and society. As religion depends on the church, the clergy are the real producers of capital; and as a matter of fact, the modern world, while it listened to the Catholic clergy, had augmented its capital fivefold over that of the ancient world, and has found it diminishing in proportion as it has ceased to respect them, abandoned the church and her maxims, and returned to heathenism. So great has been this diminution of capital in the principal European nations during the last century and a half, that they are, unless they immediately retrace their steps, on the eve of being forced to reëstablish slavery, the resort of antiquity to supply the deficiency of capital.

Man constitutes his liberty, and therefore his virtue, only by the creation of capital, and in proportion as he creates it. Capital, as the indispensable condition and as the product of liberty and virtue, is always in proportion to merit. It is acquired by individuals in various degrees, according to their respective degrees of merit. Hence in society we find a distinction of ranks, such as people, burghers, nobles, saints, and the several ranks express the various degrees in which capital, and therefore personality, liberty, and virtue, have been acquired. Every rank is the expression of the degree of merit acquired by its members. The superior ranks owe

their superior rank to their superior merit. The aristocracy of a nation are its merit, its capital, its virtue, its religion, and the more numerous and powerful they are, and the higher they are elevated above the people, the more wealthy, virtuous, and meritorious is the nation. A nation that can no longer produce an aristocracy, or that has lost its aristocracy, whether by democratic revolution or by their adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, has ceased to be progressive, has become a spendthrift, is obliged to live on its capital, its past savings, which must be soon exhausted, and, if left to itself, cannot fail to lapse into the barbarous or savage state.

The aristocracy, the superior classes, are the saved products, the hoardings of a nation. In like manner as capital is indispensable to production, they are indispensable to national progress. They are literally the capital of the nation, at once the producers and the product of its virtue. A nation without an aristocracy can no more be productive, than labor can be productive without capital. Religion founds virtue, virtue founds the aristocracy, the aristocracy founds capital, and through it society, and society founds man, or is the essential condition of man's development and completion of himself. This is the order.

The people of themselves found nothing ; they have never constituted and never can constitute society, because they are precisely those whose liberty or virtue is least developed, and who are nearest the infancy of the race, the least advanced from the savage state. To turn towards them, as is the fashion of the day, to find the institutors or restorers of society, is to turn towards brute matter. The present deplorable condition of the European nations springs from the vices and faults of the aristocracy, who have abandoned their order in adopting the manners and sentiments of the people, or, in a word, have ceased to be aristocrats, and made themselves *people*, or at best mere burghers or commons. The question as to social restoration, especially as to the restoration of French society, turns entirely on the fact whether the aristocracy have still remaining capital and virtue enough to resume and perform the proper offices of their order, and as to France in particular, whether the *bourgeoisie*, who by the revolution of 1789 wrested power from the hands of the old *noblesse*, are able to take their place, and discharge the proper functions of a true aristocracy. If so, European society will be restored ; if not, the great European nations

must fall into the condition of savages, or of the barbarous tribes that now roam over the sites of the once renowned empires of the old Asiatic world.

This is a brief and a very unsatisfactory analysis of M. Saint-Bonnet's work, and can give no adequate conception of its value to one who has not read the volume itself, the great merit of which consists in its details, in its treatment of particular or special questions, rather than in its general theory; but we have given as faithful and as full an analysis as our time and space have permitted. To our apprehension there is much and important truth in the volume, but also much error, growing out of what is to us a painful confusion of thought, a careless blending together of distinct categories. We agree entirely with the author as to the essential elements and conditions of society; but as to the production or evolution of these elements and conditions, if we understand him, we must differ from him. Is the author treating of the historical origin and constitution of society, or of its mere logical origin and constitution? Is he describing the action and reaction of the several social elements in society regarded as already constituted and in operation; or is he pointing out how in the historical order these elements have been successively developed from original germs, and combined into a civilized society? We confess we are unable to say which he is really doing, and he seems to us to do sometimes the one and sometimes the other, without noting that both are not one and the same. As we understand the author, he is obliged throughout to obtain the cause either from the effect or in producing it. He assumes that man starts as a mere germ, to be completed by self-development, and yet he makes completely developed manhood the essential condition of that self-development. Man is virtually cast a mere germ upon the barren sand or naked rock, and compelled to make himself and the soil of the globe by which he subsists and makes himself. Man, the author tells us, makes the soil, the soil makes the climate, the climate makes the blood, the blood makes the man, and thus man makes himself. But how make the soil before he himself is made? How get the effect before the cause, or convert it into the cause of itself? Capital is given always as the essential condition of religion and virtue, and yet it is declared to be the product of religion and virtue. Savages remain savages because they have no capital. They cannot cease to be savages without capital,

and cannot acquire capital without ceasing to be savages. The human race began in the savage state, and the *people*, or lowest class, in civilized communities, are those who remain in that state or who have advanced but a step beyond it. The aristocracy have been produced by an advance beyond it, and yet no advance beyond it is possible without the aristocracy, but by their aid. We do not see how the author has contrived to get his aristocracy, or the human race out of the savage state.

The necessity of the aristocracy—we use the word in a good sense—we cheerfully concede; that they raise the people, not the people themselves, and found, preserve, and govern society, we hold to be indubitable. Society without an aristocracy, without diversities of ranks and conditions, is absolutely inconceivable, and what your mad European and some American democrats propose as society, constituted after their principles of *liberty, equality, fraternity*, is only the negation of all society. But we are unable to reconcile this with the author's doctrine that mankind began in the savage state, that the aristocracy have been evolved by man's labors at self-development, and that the *première mise de fonds* of liberty is to be regarded only in the light of temporary loans, to be daily withdrawn as man's personality is formed. Holding with the author in the former doctrine, we are obliged to dissent from him in the latter. We are obliged to hold that the adult is prior to the infant, the aristocracy to the people, civilized society to the savage state; and that the advances made by the Creator in the beginning are to be regarded not as temporary loans simply, to enable the race to start, but as a permanent grant of capital to the race; and therefore, that the economical law is not that of the creation from nothing, but the preservation and right employment of capital. Consequently, when individuals or nations have exhausted their portion of the original capital, or advances made by the Creator, their only resource is in those who have retained their portion, and properly employed it. This capital, in so far as essential to individual virtue and social well-being, was originally invested with the priesthood as its trustees, who were thus constituted from the beginning the true and only real aristocracy, the first fathers, institutors, and directors of the people, or of society.

No doubt, M. Saint-Bonnet concedes the fact of the primitive advances, but, if we understand him, they are to be

regarded as merely accidental, and the law which governs the race is that of self-evolution and self-subsistence. He seems to suppose, because individuals born in the bosom of society have a progress and grow from infancy to manhood, we must, in considering the law of civilization, assume that the race itself began originally in infancy, and has had an analogous progress or growth. The race, indeed, exists not without individuals, but yet it exists, the author's conceptualism to the contrary notwithstanding; but abstracted from individuals it has no destiny. It returns to God as final cause, but only in individuals; consequently, only individuals have, or can have, any progress. The physical conditions of this progress pertain solely to the first cycle, and must therefore be given outright by the Creator; for man creates only morally, that is, by the physical aid of the essential conditions of progress morally concurs with them. These conditions, under the present point of view, are expressed by the word *society*. Individuals can be born only in society, and it is only in society that they can subsist, grow, and accomplish their destiny. Consequently, society, and whatever is essential to it must be instituted and exist before the race can begin to propagate and continue itself by the generation of individuals, or by the production of man in germ, as M. Saint-Bonnet considers the infant. Man as the race must therefore have been man before he was a child, and the race, that is, mankind on this globe, must be conceived as commencing, not in infancy, but in adult age, in complete and vigorous manhood, as we know from faith was the fact. God created our first parents not babies, not savages, but full grown, and gave them to start with all that is essential to the institution and conservation of the highest civilized society. Thus we must always proceed on the principle that man started, not from the lowest, but from the highest level of human society, and with the means of raising individuals, as successively born, to the same level. The aristocracy which founds society, civilization, elevates the people, and renders virtue possible and actual, was given in the beginning, was originally in Adam, and during the whole continuance of the primitive or patriarchal order, in the patriarch, in the *paterfamilias*, who was both priest and king.

In process of time the priest and the king have been disengaged from the *paterfamilias*, and separated into a sacerdotal class and a royal class. The king has gradually

become the king and nobility, the secular prince and the secular aristocracy; but the clergy, the king, and nobility were all in Adam, and whatever virtue or capital they represent is only the virtue or capital with which mankind started in him. The aristocracy have always subsisted in the race, and never been evolved from the people, or obtained as the result of the growth or progress of individuals. They subsist always in society, engaged or disengaged, as its essential elements, and no society is conceivable without them, any more than an individual man is conceivable without reason and free will. The moral progress of man is not in creating them, is not in becoming them, but in submission and obedience to the principles they embody and the laws they administer. Consequently, though the aristocracy have been disengaged and become in some respects distinct classes in society, we are not to consider them the product of acquired virtue, and must still assume them as existing and in full vigor at the moment God placed the human race on this globe; and therefore we must take as our point of departure society constituted, civilization or social perfection realized, or placed by God in advance.

We thus, when we reason of the human race or of society, place the point of perfection in the beginning, not in the end, in God's work, not in man's. For individuals in a moral sense we place the point of perfection in the end, and regard it as the product of individual effort under the social conditions which God has provided. Hence we do not fall under the necessity of supposing self-production, which is inconceivable; that man makes the aristocracy, the aristocracy makes society, and society makes the man. The aristocracy, in our sense of the word, subsist from the beginning, therefore from the beginning society exists, is constituted; and therefore from the beginning there subsist all the necessary conditions of individual growth, all the conditions necessary for the individual to fulfil his destiny, that is, return to God as his final cause. We have nothing to do with founding society, or founding an aristocracy to found it. God has done all that for us.

M. Saint-Bonnet holds that social ranks and distinctions as they actually exist are determined by virtue or merit, and simply mark the several degrees of moral progress made by the members of society. He recognizes four different ranks, the people, burghers or commons, nobles, and saints. The people are the lowest, the poorest, the least virtuous, those

who have advanced least in forming their manhood, and remain nearest infancy or the savage state. The burghers, *la bourgeoisie*, are those who have risen a degree above the people, the nobles those who have risen a degree above the burghers, and saints are those who rise above the nobles, those who have reached the goal, attained to perfect manhood. Every individual, in his own person or that of his family, must pass successively through these several degrees in order to become a saint, must be successively people, burgher, noble, and then saint; for he can be a saint only by these successive purifications of his blood. Sometimes a rare individual goes in his own person through all these successive purifications, and from one of the people becomes a saint; more ordinarily, however, a man of the people becomes, by his virtue, accumulation of capital, and the purification of his blood, a burgher, and founds a respectable burgher family; in process of time, a member of this burgher family by a similar process raises himself to the class of nobles, and founds a noble family; after some generations, perhaps, a member of this noble family in the same way rises to be a saint, and it may be to found a family of saints. Saints are generally from the ranks of the nobility.

This is too fanciful for our taste. In our mode of considering social ranks, the lowest are not those who have not yet risen to manhood, but those who have fallen below it, and the highest are not those who have acquired, but those who retained, their original rank of freemen. The aristocracy may be replenished or recruited by individuals from the people, but, as a social order or class, they are never to be regarded as a people developed and completed, any more than believers are to be regarded as heretics developed and completed, or Catholicity as the development and completion of Protestantism.

Moreover, we are not prepared to concede that the true aristocracy owe their rank either to their blood or to their personal merit. We are too much of a republican to believe that God has created two races of men, one noble and the other ignoble, and men themselves cannot create races. The most subtle chemical analysis can detect no difference between the blood of the noble and that of the people. M. Saint-Bonnet himself places, very properly, the clergy at the head of the aristocracy, and calls them the first or chief aristocracy; and the clergy, under Christianity, are taken indiscriminately from all classes of society, and it is fair to

presume that, if blood were a matter of importance, the church would make it a condition in candidates for holy orders. Our Lord selected his apostles, not from the highest, but the lowest class of their countrymen, poor fishermen and despised publicans. It does not appear that St. Peter was distinguished for his blood, nor is the aristocracy, the aristocracy that founds and directs society we mean, always such in consequence of personal merit. It is an aristocracy of office, position, education, science, and manners, an aristocracy which does not make itself, but which God mediately or immediately institutes for religious, moral, and social purposes. The efficacy of the sacraments does not depend on the personal merit of the minister. Aristocracy is an office, a trust, and they who hold it are responsible for the manner in which they discharge its duties. This is certainly true of the clergy, and was originally true of the secular nobility, and the great and deplorable fall of modern society was effected when the title became expressive of a social rank without an official rank or corresponding employment. The feudal nobility was not a mere titular nobility, and England shows some relic of her old Catholic wisdom in restricting the title of noble to the members of her house of peers. The author either takes blood and merit in an unauthorized sense, or else he pushes his theory to a ridiculous extreme. As a matter of fact, the clergy, the only real aristocracy, are in personal merit infinitely superior to any other class of society, but some of them have not led very edifying lives, and their efficiency in respect to civilization, as in respect to salvation, is in their office, in the doctrine, the sacraments, the discipline of which they are the ministers, not in their personal virtue.

The author attributes the savage state to the lack of capital, and the lack of capital to the lack of security. The savage has no security that if he sows he shall reap,—and therefore sows not and fails to make the soil, the soil fails to make the climate, the climate fails to make the blood, and so he himself remains unmade. But savages have among them all the social ranks and distinctions ordinarily found in civilized communities. Our American Indians have their priestly, their royal, and their noble families. How happens it that their aristocracy do not establish this security, found society, and raise their people to a civilized state? Nay, this very lack of security is exaggerated. The depredations of one tribe upon another are not more com-

mon than the depredations of one state upon another among modern civilized states, and there are few civilized communities now to be found in which internal police, according to the Indian sense, is better maintained than in the bosom of the tribe itself. The reason is obvious enough why our Indian aristocracy fail to establish society. It is not in the lack of capital, unless we use the word in a sense which begs the whole question, not in the lack of security, nor yet in the lack of blood; but in the lack of the true religion and the orthodox clergy, the only civilizers. Send the Catholic missionary among them, let him preach Christ crucified to them, catechize and baptize them, and feed them with the bread of angels, and they become good Christians, even saints; and that too in the first generation, without any change as to material capital, the soil, the climate, or the blood. Here is a fact that suggests to us a strong doubt as to M. Saint-Bonnet's theory of capital and blood. The saint, according to that very theory, is highest in the social hierarchy, and the most perfect form of developed manhood. Yet here is your poor savage, by faith and the sacraments, with no other change than they imply, becoming a saint, and rising to the topmost round of civilization. Many a congregation of savages, converted by our humble, laborious, and self-sacrificing missionaries, in all the really Christian virtues can put to shame not a few of your European kings and nobles. Yet nothing in their condition that comes properly under the head of capital has been changed. They live mainly by fishing and hunting, as did their ancestors.

The early Christians, the saints and martyrs, who by their faith, their piety, their zeal, their charity, and their heroic sufferings conquered pagan Rome, and planted the cross in triumph on the capital of the world, were seldom gathered from the secular nobility or the nominally superior classes of society, but chiefly from slaves, the poor, and the ignoble. "For you see your vocation, brethren, that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are; that no flesh should glory in his sight. But from him are ye in Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom from God, and justice, and

sanctification, and redemption, that, as it is written, He that glorieth may glory in the Lord." This was true not only in the beginning, but it is the settled order of God's providence in advancing his kingdom in this world. He chooses always the course opposed to that which human wisdom approves. The blessed apostle makes no account of material capital; he says nothing of its being necessary, in order to attain to sanctity, that man should make the soil, the soil the climate, the climate the blood, and the blood the saint. Capital and blood, except the blood of Christ that cleanseth from all sin, do not appear to have been regarded by him as of any importance at all, in the process of making saints. The reason probably is, that sanctity is not a plant of natural growth, nor a product of natural culture. The apostle always places it in the supernatural order and teaches that it is from God through Christ Jesus, who is made to us wisdom, and justice, and sanctity, and redemption, and therefore not through human culture and development, through man's labor in making the soil, the soil making the climate, the climate making the blood, and the blood making the saint. This process of making saints the apostle certainly does not recognize, no doubt because he received no notice of it in the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is probably a recent development.

The author tells us that, notwithstanding the apostolic labors of St. Francis Xavier and others in India, Japan, and China, Christianity could not take root there, and the holy missionaries failed entirely to establish there a Christian civilization, and because the blood of those old effete nations would not bear it. He thinks that those nations can be converted and made Christian nations only by carrying there the European, and perhaps the French flesh, which has for eighteen centuries been nourished by the *flesh* of Christ.

"Le christianisme n'entrera vivant au Japon et ailleurs, que lorsque des masses de chrétiens vivants iront porter leur sang dans les veines épuisées de ces peuples. Il n'a été donné à la morale de commencer des races que chez nous, loin du soleil, loin de toutes les avances faites par la nature aux premiers humains. Désormais la race cérébrale, a fait trop de progrès pour qu'on puisse racheter un peuple à notre degré sans le faire communier à notre chair. Malgré ses efforts, sa vie, sa sainteté, son martyre, Saint François-Xavier n'a pu laisser une civilisation chrétienne au Japon. Par des révolutions peu prévues, cette chair *humaine*, à laquelle la chair du Christ sert de levain depuis dix-huit siècles, ira porter

son ferment de vie dans la chair esclave des enfants de Sem et de Cham. Et d'ailleurs, si l'Orient eût pris le premier le christianisme, c'eût été le christianisme rêveur avant d'être le christianisme pratique des peuples occidentaux. L'amour s'y fût formé avant la personnalité; le sol humain n'y eût pas reçu un assez profond labourage; il n'aurait pu fournir la sève au monde européen, comme il est appelé maintenant à l'en recevoir. Saint Pierre fut établi avant Saint Jean, bien que ce dernier soit, aussi, celui que mon âme préfère."

It is true the author cites in this passage M. Enfantin, late sovereign pontiff of the Saint-Simonian religion; but he cites him in a manner which proves that he adopts it, and adopts it as showing the reason why Christianity has not maintained its ground in the East, and why the oriental nations still remain out of the pale of Christian civilization.

M. Saint-Bonnet contends that the order of Providence is, that in this world all should be distributed according to merit, and that men are people, burghers, nobles, saints, and nations are savage, barbarous, civilized, Christian, most Christian, according to their several degrees of merit. As merit proceeds from the will, from the activity of man, God is obliged in the order of facts to follow man, and therefore Christianity cannot precede or go before man's merit. What the author really means by this is to us uncertain; but certainly, as he not seldom applies his principle that all is according to merit, that principle is one which as a Catholic he cannot hold; for it is rank Pelagianism, the dominant heresy of the age. A man does not become a saint because he merits to be a saint. Did not St. Paul say, "By grace I am what I am"? Is grace of merit? Is not grace always gratuitous, even by the very force of the word? Man prior to grace cannot merit grace, nor even prepare himself for it. The beginning and end of his sanctity are of pure grace. Even by keeping the precepts of the natural law man does not positively dispose himself for grace; he only removes the obstacles which actual sins interpose to its operation. The author in his brilliant theorizing seems to us to forget this important Catholic doctrine. By making all depend on merit, instead of the free grace of God, by representing man as making the soil, the climate, the climate, the blood, and the blood the saint, he gives man the right to glory in himself, whereas the apostle allows him to glory only in the Lord. The author, too, we suspect, is a little *carnal* in his views of the influence of the sacred body of our Lord received in the Blessed Sacrament. We

are not aware that it works a revolution in the blood or flesh of the race. Its influence we had supposed was spiritual, not carnal. The old Adam remains even in the saint, as long as he lives, and the child of saintly parents is born a child of wrath as well as the child of infidels, and in administering baptism to either the church observes the same rites and ceremonies. The Christian transmits no Christian virtue with his flesh. Now, as before the coming of our Lord, every one of us must say, "I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." The Christian graces and virtues are personal, and affect solely the personal character; they do not enter into human nature, and become the natural inheritance of the race. The Son of God assumed human nature *in individuo*, not *in specie*, and he was not, and is not converted into flesh; he only took human nature up to himself. The author seems also not to remember that the virtues by which, according to him, wealth is accumulated, are not Christian virtues, and have no necessary connection with Christian sanctity. Sanctity is not in their order, and they, or any of the secular virtues, are never its germs. The author could not fall into a graver mistake than to suppose that the saint is the natural development or complement of what he calls *people*.

Slavery, in the ancient world, the author says, was a sort of *forced* Christianity, and justifiable because necessary to supply the deficiency of capital, to break down human pride, and to produce the Christian virtues of patience and resignation. But where is the justice in reducing one portion of mankind to slavery that the other portion may be free? Why is it necessary that a freeman should consume more in proportion to what he produces than a slave? If it is not, there was no necessity of slavery to supply the lack of capital, and it was no real substitute for capital. Did slavery tend to humble or to exalt the pride of the slave-holders? Were the *forced* virtues of patience and resignation *Christian* virtues? If they were, and slavery is favorable to their growth, why does the author represent it as one of the chief glories of the church that she has abolished slavery throughout the European world? St. Augustine teaches us that slavery pertains to the penal providence of God, originates in sin, and may serve, like all the sufferings of this life, as a salutary penance, if properly submitted to.

Labor, says the author, is not for wants, but wants are for labor, and labor is to prevent wealth from being a great

evil. But what is wealth for, if not for wants? Wealth acquired by idleness or robbery, that is, without labor, always corrupts. How, then, does the author defend hereditary wealth against the socialists, since wealth inherited is not acquired by the labor of him who inherits it? Wealth acquired by immoral means, no doubt, proves that corruption already exists, and with just as little doubt it tends to extend or increase corruption; but is it true, on the contrary, that wealth acquired by labor always tends to make the possessor moral? If so, the Chinese, the Scotch, the English, and the Anglo-Americans should be the most moral people on the globe, instead of being, as they are, the most immoral, if we speak, as the author must be understood to speak, of Christian morality. In fact, labor for the accumulation of wealth for the sake of gratifying sensuality, or for its own sake, as the miser accumulates it, is itself immoral, and repugnant to Christian sanctity. Labor in itself considered is neither moral nor immoral. It is a punishment imposed upon the human race, and, like all punishments in our probationary state, may or may not have a moral effect, according to the temper in which it is borne, and the end to which it is directed by the will of him who bears it. As a general rule, wealth, however acquired, is a temptation and a snare.

But we are exhausting our space, and most likely the patience of our readers. We do not regard our author as a profound or an exact theologian, but we do think him an able political economist, and wise and just in his political views and observations. His practical remarks on our current politics deserve the highest praise, and we are really grateful to him for having demonstrated in an unanswerable manner, that all labor bestowed on the fabrication of luxuries adds nothing to capital, but really diminishes it, and thereby demonstrating that our modern industrial and commercial system, so much applauded, tends to impoverish instead of enriching the nations that have adopted it. Here, and in most of the special questions he treats, the author shows extensive knowledge, rare sagacity, and just thought, which, notwithstanding its errors in a theoretical point of view, give to his work in the actual state of things a very great practical value. We hope to return to his views of some of these special questions hereafter; for we would not have our readers infer that we hold either the author or his labors in light esteem, because we have found in his volume

some things to censure. He has bravely combated the modern enemies of society, he has exposed most satisfactorily the fallacies of the socialists, and vindicated the absolute importance of the church as the first and only source of civilization, order, and society. If he has erred, it has not been with malice; the sincerity of his faith is unquestionable, and his heart is in the right place.

The errors we have indicated may be traced to the same causes which came so very near leading the excellent Balmes astray, which make us tremble for Padre Ventura, which engulfed the brilliant La Mennais, and have stranded the proud and philosophic Gioberti. They come, when they come honestly, as in the case of our author, from the attempt to combat the enemies of religion and society with their own weapons, or rather from the habit of considering Catholicity in its relation to society and civilization, instead of considering it in its relation to the supernatural destiny of man, or the salvation of the individual soul. We are, perhaps, in danger of falling ourselves into the very heresy we are combating. Our religion is just now opposed in the name of man, of liberty, of society, of the earthly well-being of mankind, as our blessed Lord himself was by the old carnal Jews, who rejected him, and crucified him between two thieves, because he came as a spiritual prince, to save men's souls, not as a temporal prince, to found an earthly kingdom and secure prosperity to his followers. We meet them on their own ground. It is an undeniable fact, that the church has founded modern civilization, and has been the source of all the real well-being of modern nations. We hasten to bring forward and prove this fact, and having done so, we say to her enemies, *Therefore* return to the church, and love and obey her as your mother. M. Saint-Bonnet sees—what is most true—that there is no good for us even in this life, unless we live for God and heaven, and he adds, *Therefore* live for God and heaven, not reflecting that, if *therefore* we live for God and heaven, we do not live for them, but for this life alone, and are still carnal Jews expecting a temporal Messiah and an earthly paradise. The church secures us the real goods of this life precisely because she does not propose them, because she makes no account of them, and subdues in our hearts the desire to possess them; precisely because she proposes only God and heaven, concentrates our affections on another life, and entirely absorbs us in the great work of saving our souls, of

making our calling and election sure. God and heaven are gained by being sought; earth, by being rejected, despised, trampled on.

We seek the reason of the lapse of nations once Catholic into heresy, infidelity, barbarism, in extrinsic causes, now in this civil or ecclesiastical policy, now in that particular national vice or corruption; and we seek to win them back to their duty and to salvation by a variety of extrinsic motives, addressed to the dominant tendencies of the age. All this is natural, but we suspect not altogether as wise and as prudent in God's eyes as in our own. When individuals or nations break away from the church, the reason is, that the natural pride of the human heart and the love of the world have gained dominion over them, and in most, if not in all, precisely in consequence of temporal prosperity. "The beloved grew fat and kicked. He grew fat, and thick, and gross; he forsook God who made him, and departed from God, his sovereign." And we can recall them to faith only in proportion as they are humbled, and we can make them feel that they have souls, souls exposed to eternal damnation, and which cannot be saved out of the Catholic Church. The world is bad, but not, after all, so bad as in the days of St. Paul; and yet he went forth to correct it, not with speech of man's wisdom, not with systems of political economy, nor human philosophies, nor with long arguments to prove the adaptation of the church to the earthly wants of society; but with the word of God, as the humble minister of the Gospel, resolved to know nothing, in the midst of the corrupt and abandoned world, but "Christ and him crucified." The germ of all the evil that afflicts individuals and nations is in the individual human heart, is born with us, and loses not its vitality of death so long as we remain in the flesh. It is only by Catholic faith, sacraments, and discipline that it can be repressed or prevented from sprouting forth and bearing its poisonous fruit; and these, by repressing it in the individual heart, and generating in the same heart the dispositions and virtues requisite to eternal salvation, do all that can be done to remove even national evils, and secure temporal well-being. Here is the conclusion of the whole matter, and they after all who confine themselves solely to the eternal destiny of the individual, without once thinking of the bearing of their labors on this world, are under God the true founders of nations, promoters of social order, and reformers of society. God's ways are not ours, but it is only as we follow his ways that we can succeed.

Works written to show the civilizing influences of Catholicity, its absolute necessity as the founder and preserver of society, the assertor and only real defender of liberty, may do great good in removing prejudices, and the various impediments to the reception of the truth placed in its way by the false liberalism and mad socialism of the age. And so far as they are fitted to have this effect, we are grateful for them; but the more exclusively even such works are written from the point of view, not of an earthly destiny, but of our supernatural and eternal destiny, which after all *in hac providentia*, is our only destiny, the more really serviceable will they prove. The fault of most of the works of this sort which fall under our notice is, that they consider God and heaven from the human point of view, in their bearing on man and society, not man and society from the point of view of God. Their authors proceed from man, society, history, to the church, not from the church to these; that is, they start with man, with psychology, and not with the catechism, and really seek to develop the church from man and society, instead of man and society from the church; or if they go not so far astray as this, they still assign to man an earthly destiny, distinct, and in some measure separable, from his heavenly destiny, and then attempt to consider the church solely in her relation to this earthly destiny,—Gioberti's grand error in his *Del Primato*,—sometimes under the special aspect of philosophy, sometimes under that of literature and art, and sometimes under that of politics and political economy. The fate of La Mennais, Hermes, and Gioberti, not to say of Rosmini and Ventura, is the best evidence we can ask of the dangerous tendency of this method of considering our holy religion. By the catechism, which, as we learn more, becomes more precious to us, and by the holy Scriptures properly read and meditated in the light of the catechism, we are placed at the point of view, if we may so speak, of God himself, and see things, as far as we see them at all, as God sees them, as they are, and become able to judge them with his judgment. Seen and judged according to divine revelation, we can represent them in their true light, and then in that light in which alone their representation becomes effectual for good.

God has placed the church in the world to redeem men from sin, and elevate them to himself. He has placed her here as the divine and essential element in society, and without her no true society is practicable, or even conceivable.

He has enriched her with the infinite treasures of his love and his wisdom. In the patriarchal form, in the synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, she subsists in all ages and nations, and is in each the divine assistance requisite to enable man to return to God as his last end, to save his soul, and thus fulfil his only destiny. In her is the necessary capital, the *première mise de fonds* of liberty, the blood that forms the true aristocracy; nay, the true aristocracy itself, that institutes, preserves, or restores society. She through her clergy can preserve the old civilized state, restore the state when fallen into the condition of the modern European nations, and civilize the most barbarous and savage tribes, by insisting, *and because insisting*, only on the things which pertain to the salvation of the individual soul, if she be obeyed and her instructions followed. If individuals and nations submit to her, and according to her instructions, seek only the eternal salvation of the soul, all will go well with them; if they will not, there is no help, there is no good for them; and they shall be turned into hell, and the greater their temporal prosperity the deeper will be their damnation. Here is the settled order of God's providence, let men wrangle, fight, dispute, speculate, reason, as they will. So we need not trouble ourselves with philosophical, political, social, or economical problems as such. Let us once acquire the virtues indispensable to salvation, and these problems will solve themselves, or cease to need solution. We must be Christians, not heathens or carnal Jews, or else there is no good for us.

HILDRETH'S THEORY OF MORALS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1844.]

WHEN an author tells us, in his preface, that his work is written in strict accordance with the inductive method of investigation, we are sure, if his work concerns religion or morals, that he is either about to disgust us with his nonsense, or to shock us with his blasphemy. Mr. Hildreth, in this brief treatise on morals, succeeds in doing both. Only the rank infidelity of his doctrine, and his blasphemous sneers at the existence of God, in every sense in which his existence is distinguishable from that of nature, and at all who believe in God and rely on his providence and grace, give it sufficient character to render one pardonable for even taking the trouble to condemn it. It is an exaggeration, in morals, of what Mr. Parker's "Discourse on Matters pertaining to Religion" is in theology; and, without the grace to confess it, is as absurd as Bentham's Utility, as sceptical as Hume, and as positively atheistic as D' Holbach.

Mr. Hildreth begins his work by condemning all those moralists who believe in the eternal distinction between good and evil; and by assuming that all our knowledge is confined to a knowledge of our own constitution; that we do not, and cannot, know things in themselves, but merely what they appear to us; that is to say, we can know only our own subjective modes and affections. And after having assumed this, he has the consummate impudence to talk of morals, of moral distinctions, of justice and injustice, of virtue and vice! "The constitution of our own nature," he tells us, "not the absolute constitution of things, is the proper object of human research; and only in the constitution of man can we find, if we find at all, the origin of human opinions and actions." So all in the life of man originates in man, and we need not to look beyond man himself, for the explanation of his history. Man, then, must be sufficient for himself; then, so far as concerns himself,

* *Theory of Morals. An Inquiry concerning the Law of Moral Distinctions, and the Variations and Contradictions of Ethical Codes.* By RICHARD HILDRETH. Boston: 1844.

in the place of God! With all this for his point of departure, it is easy to foresee, our author must ultimately arrive—NOWHERE.

Let the matter be understood. Mr. Hildreth promises us a Theory of MORALS. Morals must have some foundation; but he assigns them no foundation, or, at most, only such foundation as they may have in the constitution of man himself. The morals, then, of which he can, at best, give us a theory, whether true or false, are not morals in the proper sense of the term, but only what man, as he now is, holds to be morals. That is, he gives us not a theory of morals, but a theory of men's NOTIONS of morals. But as we can know nothing beyond ourselves, the truth or falsity of these notions, objectively considered, we can never know; therefore we can never know whether what we call moral really be moral or the reverse.

This is to begin a theory of morals by denying the possibility of any science of morals. All morality necessarily presupposes an objective law,—a law out of man, above man, and to which man is accountable; which he is under obligation to obey; obedience to which constitutes his virtue, and the rectitude of his act, and disobedience to which constitutes his vice, and the injustice of his act. The conception of this law, to which we are accountable, is essential to the very idea of morality. Without conceiving of this law, no moral character, or moral distinction, is in the remotest degree conceivable. Is there such a law? Is it known or knowable? What does it enjoin? If there be no such law, or if no such law is or can be known by us, then man is not a moral being, and it is sheer nonsense to talk of a theory of morals.

Mr. Hildreth nowhere recognizes a moral law, nor even a moral lawgiver. *Duty* is a word not needed in his vocabulary; accountability is a conception he does not appear even to have entertained. He has studied Benthamism till his head is more confused, if possible, than was ever Bentham's own head, and till even his heart appears to have lost all its native appreciation of right and wrong. There evidently can be no morality without a moral law; no moral law without a moral lawgiver, nor without a moral lawgiver who has the sovereign right to impose the law,—that is, to command; whose word is a command, whose will is law. All morality, then, has necessarily its foundation in theology; and no man who denies the existence of God can recognize,

consistently, any moral obligation whatever. The attempt to separate between religion and morals, and to obtain a solid foundation, independent of religious faith, for our moral superstructure, has always proved, and must always prove, no less disastrous to morals than to religion. Atheism, or even pantheism, is incompatible with the recognition of moral distinctions. The foundation of all moral conception is the conception of God, and of God as sovereign Law-giver.

Now, Mr. Hildreth sneers, from the beginning of his book to the end, at those who, as he expresses it, believe "in a personal God." We are aware that we have had some few transcendental philosophers, if philosophers they are, who have really fancied, that, in denying the personality of God, they were not making a profession of atheism; but because these men and women, or rather boys and girls, have dreamed silly dreams, and talked nonsense while seriously believing themselves to be speaking as oracles of wisdom, we know not that we should be debarred from calling men and notions by their right names. Doctrines pass current among us, are even entertained by many of whom we should have a right to expect better things, which, if not disguised by a peculiar terminology, which, if called right out, in good, plain English, by their proper names, would be regarded with all but universal horror, and recoiled from as from the Evil One himself. The transcendental dishonesty of dressing out infidel notions in the language of piety and faith, imported from Germany and propagated among us by the Dial-istic* philosophers and poets, or rather philosopherlings and poetasters, has caused infinite confusion in the minds of good, plain, honest people, and cannot be condemned in terms too pointed or too severe. We call the man who denies the personality of God an atheist, and we can rank him nowhere but with "the fool" of the Psalmist, who says "there is no God;" only he is rather an exaggeration of the Psalmist's fool, for he not only says there is no God, but has also the folly to try to persuade himself and others, that in denying God he does not deny him.

* *The Dial*, a quarterly review published at Boston, was the organ of the transcendentalists. It was edited by Miss Sarah Margaret Fuller and Ralph Waldo Emerson, who were assisted by A. Bronson Alcott, W. H. Channing, George Ripley, Theodore Parker, and others.—Ed.

Mr. Hildreth assumes everywhere throughout his book, that to believe in a personal God—that is, in a God at all, a God who is, and knows that he is, and who doeth according to his will in the armies above and among the inhabitants of this lower world, and whose providence extends to all events, from the rearing of the infant colony, the overwhelming of the empire, to the consoling of the humble and contrite heart, and the falling of the feeble sparrow—is the very height of absurdity, worthy only of a sneer, too egregious a folly to be seriously refuted. And yet Mr. Hildreth has been brought up in a professedly Christian community, received an education from professedly Christian parents at a professedly Christian university, and we should not be surprised, if he should even fancy himself a Christian, and take the charge of atheism, which we bring against his doctrine, as a foul misrepresentation! But will he tell us what he means by an *impersonal* God? In what sense can his impersonal God be distinguished from nature? And has he the effrontery to maintain, in open day, that a doctrine which identifies God and nature is compatible with a belief in God at all? In this case, the radical conception of God as *creator* is rejected, and replaced, at best, only by the *natura naturans* of Spinoza, which no possible ingenuity can make the equivalent of *God creating*. Spinoza admits but one only substance with its infinite modes; and according to him, what we call the universe, and which is resolvable into thought and extension, is nothing but these two modes of the infinite substance, which, according to him, it matters not whether called God or nature. Here you have merely *substance* and *mode*, where you should have *cause* and *effect*, creator and creation. The difference between the two is immense. The mode is a mere distinction in the substance itself, not a somewhat to be distinguished *from* the substance. Consequently, it is identically the substance itself, under a special aspect. Hence, God and the universe, conceived as substance and mode, are conceived to be identical; and therefore we may say, indifferently, the universe is God, or God is the universe. But the distinction of cause and effect, of creator and creation, is of an altogether different nature; it is a distinction, not in God, but *between* God and his creation, whereby the one is distinguished from the other, as a man's thought is distinguished from himself, or he himself from his volition. If we deny this distinction, if we deny that God exists independently of his works, that

he works freely, sovereignly, from will, purpose, intention, design, we deny the fundamental conception of God, and are virtually atheists. Now, in denying the personality of God, and identifying God and nature, we do deny all this.

This established, we find our author talking of morals, and undertaking to give us a theory of morals, after having denied the Lawgiver. God denied, where is the sovereign whose word is a command, whose will is law? You cannot have a law, unless you have a lawgiver. Well, where is your lawgiver? Nature? Do you know what you mean? What is nature but your own constitution? What are its laws, but your own natural tendencies, instincts, appetites, propensities, passions? What is it, then, to say that nature imposes the law, but to say that man is bound to act out himself, follow his own inclinations, and live as he listeth; that is, but to say, that man is without law, is under *no* law, and may revel in the wildest license to which his nature prompts? Is this your theory of *morals*? But even waiving this, we demand what right nature has to impose the law, and whence the ground of my right or of my duty to obey nature? What we demand, as the foundation of morals, is not only a lawgiver, but a lawgiver who has the *right* to *impose* the law. Even admitting nature could impose a law, whence would that which nature imposes derive its strictly legal character? A man who knows so much as our author, who puts on such lofty airs, and with a mere puff demolishes all the great moralists, from Moses and Plato down to the author of "Archy Moore,"* ought not to have left so important a question unnoticed.

Mr. Hildreth is, substantially, a Benthamite,—for his slight modification of Benthamism amounts, practically, to nothing at all; and Jeremy Bentham was, as one of Dickens's characters says of another, "a humbug." There is no use in trying to smooth the matter over, or to invent fine phrases to cover up the intolerable stupidity, ignorance, and dogmatism of that prince of utilitarians,—a man innocent of all philosophical conceptions and of all philosophical tendency, wise in his own estimation only, because obstinately ignorant of the wisdom of others,—an exaggeration of the very worst features of John Bull, crying out against cant and humbug, and all the time the very prince of canters and humbuggers,

*This was an anti-slavery novel written by Mr. Hildreth and afterwards enlarged and published as "The White Slave."—Ed.

and the most egregious dupe of them both. We deny not that Jeremy Bentham may have had some good intentions. We deny not that the man even had a heart,—for we are assured that he once actually loved, and continued to love to the day of his death,—but all in his mind was a confused jumble, and he never succeeded in getting even one tolerably clear notion of the science of morals, either in its principle or in its details. The author of “Archy Moore,” in the work before us, succeeds no better. He does not appear to want ability; he even gives evidence of having been originally endowed with talents of a very high order; and his capacity as a writer, when he chances to blunder on the right side, is more than respectable. But he has never clearly and distinctly grasped the real problems of the science he professes to treat; he has read some, thought some, but has never cleared up his thoughts, and determined their exact import and value.

After rejecting what he calls the *Platonic* theory of morals, the selfish, the Stoic, and the Epicurean systems, our author proceeds to set forth his own, which is, That such actions as produce, or are supposed to produce, or tend to produce, immediately or ultimately, pleasure to sensitive beings other than the actor, are *right* actions; and that such as produce, are supposed to produce, or tend to produce, pain to sensitive beings other than the actor, are *wrong* actions. “The word *good* is employed,” he says, “to describe any thing that gives us pleasure; the words *bad* and *evil*, any thing that gives us pain, whether a moral pleasure or a moral pain, or a *pain* or a *pleasure of any other kind*.” So, then, when I perform an action which tends to the pleasure of others, I do good, and perform a *right* action; and, if I do it with the design or intention of giving pleasure, I am virtuous. On the other hand, when I perform an action which tends to give pain to others, I do *evil*, perform a *wrong* action, and I, if I have done it designedly, am *vicious*.

But will Mr. Hildreth inform us, whence he derives his proofs that good and evil are resolvable into simple pleasure and pain? If I ask him, What is good? He answers, Pleasure. Moral pleasure? Yes, or any *other kind* of pleasure. If I ask, What is evil? He answers, Pain. Moral pain? Yes, or any other kind of pain. Pleasure and pain are the exact synonymes of good and evil,—with the single exception, that the pleasure be that of some being

other than the actor, and also the pain. But whence this exception? If pleasure is good, why is not my pleasure as much a good as the pleasure of any other being? And what reason can be assigned why it is less right for me to promote my own pleasure than it is to promote the pleasure of others? If pain is evil I should like to know why my pain is less an evil than another man's pain? And why it is not as wrong for me to pain myself as to pain another? Whence, then, we ask again, the ground of this exception? We do not deny that an action, to be a right action, must possess the quality of contributing to the good of some other being or beings than the actor; but we say, if pleasure is good, no reason can be assigned why the pleasure of the actor should be excluded.

Again, if all pain caused to others is evil, and the causing of it wrong,—then the pain I cause my child when I correct it, my friend when I admonish him of his faults, or that which the surgeon causes in amputating a gangrenous limb, is evil, and the act of causing it wrong, and, therefore, an act that should not have been done. If pleasure is good, and the causing of it, *in all cases*, right, when it does not chance to be the pleasure of the actor,—then the pleasure I should give the thief, by enabling him to steal, or the felon, by enabling him to escape the fangs of justice, or the pleasure I should give by enabling men to gratify their depraved appetites and passions, would be good, and the promoting of it right, and I virtuous in promoting it! Is our moralist prepared to stand by all this? If not, he would do well to ask leave to amend his definition. Pleasure is not the exact synonyme of good. There are guilty pleasures, and many there are “who take pleasure in unrighteousness.” Is it less wrong for me to aid others to the pleasures of unrighteousness, than it is to indulge them myself? Pain is not always an evil, but is sometimes, especially the pain of remorse, and pain imposed by the minister of God by way of penance often the means even of a great and permanent good. Pleasure is not good, unless it possess some quality beside that of being pleasure; and pain must possess some quality beside that of being pain, in order to be evil. Only *lawful* pleasures are good, and only *unlawful* pains are evil.

Here comes up, again, the question of the Law, and therefore of the Lawgiver. What pleasures are *lawful*? What pains are *unlawful*? Will Mr. Hildreth answer, Such pleasures are lawful as tend to the good, advantage, or utility of beings other than the one who causes them?

And unlawful pains such as tend to the evil, disadvantage, or harm of beings other than the one who causes them? Then his doctrine, if he resolve good into utility, will be utilitarianism, and differ from Benthamism only in excluding the actor himself from the number whose advantage is to be sought, and from the number whose harm is not to be sought.

Suppose we resolve pleasure into good, and good itself into utility, will Mr. Hildreth tell us what is his criterion by which he determines what is or is not for the greatest advantage of others? What is the test of utility? How do you determine whether this particular act, before which I am deliberating, is or is not useful? But utility itself is not ultimate. For a thing is useful only as it contributes to some end, and harmful only as it prevents or hinders the realization of some end. Nor is this all. That is not harmful that prevents the realization of a *bad* end; nor that useful which facilitates the realization of an end not good. Hence, before we can define what is useful or harmful, we must define what are good and bad ends; which can be done only by determining what is absolutely good and what is absolutely evil. So the adoption of the utilitarian rule relieves no difficulty. Before I can know what is useful to others, I must know what is the end they ought to seek; and before I can know that, I must know what is the end of creation itself; that is, the end for which God made and sustains the universe,—a knowledge which Mr. Hildreth represents as wholly out of the question.

Nor would this be all. I should be obliged not only to know the end of creation, and the end of the particular beings in question, but also the precise bearing of the act I propose to perform on that end, whether to hinder or to facilitate it. Do we know this of any action we are called upon to perform? Who seeth the end? Who can tell what are to be the effects of his act? Who knows but that which he soweth in joy and hope may spring up in sorrow and anguish? Have not our best intentions for others often proved mischievous? How often is it that philanthropy, pure and ardent, in the pursuit of a special object, tramples on more rights than it secures, and causes greater evil by the way than it realizes in the end? The whole history of our race is full of examples of this sort, and our own country, and our own section of it, affords, at this moment, its full share of these examples. How, then, are we to determine what

is a useful or a harmful act? What is, we ask again, the test of utility?

But even this does not exhaust the difficulties of the subject. Morality implies, always, obligation. Suppose I know what is for the good, the advantage, or even the pleasure of others, whence follows it that I am bound to labor for it? What is the ground of my obligation to do good to others, to promote their advantage, or their pleasure? Here our author is singularly deficient. Here is his definition of duty, which, so far as our reading extends, he may claim as peculiarly his own. "Duties, or obligatory actions," are "actions the performance of which is expected from all men." Expected by whom? And on what ground? Why, poor man, in thy infidel darkness, thou hast lost even the ordinary sense of words. Duty is that which a man is *bound* to perform. It necessarily implies, independent of man, a law that binds, and a sovereign lawgiver that imposes the law. This is what all the world understands by *duty*. Are there duties in this sense? Answer, yes, or no. If not, then say so, reject the term, and not in a cowardly manner seek to escape, by using the word *duty* divested of its ordinary meaning, the odium which every man justly incurs, who denies all moral obligation.

Our author contends for benevolence, disinterestedness, that we should labor to promote others' happiness without any regard to our own. This would seem to be somewhat, nay, to be much, and will impose upon many, and make them believe him the advocate of pure and lofty moral principle. But we have no right to seek even the happiness of others but by lawful means, that is to say, by right means. Because my motive is good, because I am conscious that I am disinterested, that I am ready to lay down my life for others, it does not follow that my conduct is right, and that I am wholly guiltless in what I do. God is, say Mr. Hildreth what he will; and God is the moral governor of the universe, and has prescribed to us the path in which we are to walk. He has fitted means to ends, and it is only when we adopt the means he has appointed, and seek to do good in the way he has ordained, that we can be justified in laboring for the good of others. Right ends can be rightfully sought only by right means. The sentiment of benevolence, then, must operate lawfully, in an orderly manner, in obedience to the law of God, or it is no more to be indulged than selfishness. Here is a principle which reform-

ers, radicals, come-outers, disorganizers, would do well to bear in mind, for it is a principle they are exceedingly prone to neglect. It is little credit to a man that he has a zeal for the good of others, if it be not a zeal according to knowledge. Here is wherefore so many, who would do good, who band together for noble ends, and labor with all zeal and diligence, do yet prove the greatest plagues and tormentors of their kind. Ten chances to one, a man with the crotchet of philanthropy in his head, proves to be possessed by the devil in the guise of an angel of light. Let men be careful, how, Uzza-like, they reach forth the hand to steady the ark of God.

But this is not all. Wherefore am I bound to be benevolent? Why are acts of disinterestedness and sacrifice excellent and praiseworthy? We, of course, with the limitations suggested, do not question the fact; but in a theory of morals the ground of all this should be shown. Does Mr. Hildreth show this? Not at all. He nowhere shows me how I am to know what is a right action, for he nowhere shows me how I am to know what will be useful to others; and, more than all this, he fails utterly to show me why I am under obligation to seek it, even in case I should ascertain it. What, then, is the value of what he has done? What light does he throw on any ethical problem, or any question of casuistry? None at all. Yet he talks as a man who has mastered his subject, and as one who has the right to speak *ex cathedra*. The arrogance of his tone is only equalled by his insensibility to all religious truth. His work seems to have been written for the express purpose of furnishing a moral code to transcendentalists and come-outers.

But we have not yet done with Mr. Hildreth. The most important bearing of his definition remains to be considered. He defines a wrong action to be an action which causes or tends to cause pain to others; a right action, one which causes or tends to cause pleasure to others. But these others must be *sensitive* beings. This definition is expressly designed to exclude religion from the domain of morality. Moral actions are, usually, he tells us, divided into three classes: 1. Duties to ourselves; 2. Duties to others; 3. Duties to God. The definition excludes the first class; for nothing we can do to ourselves, or indulge in, is wrong, save so far as it causes pain to others, or diminishes our disposition or ability to please them. The third class are also

excluded ; because God, being impersonal, a mere unconscious force, is incapable of being pleased or displeased, of approving or disapproving. Consequently, to do, or to forbear doing, this or that, because it is pleasing or displeasing to God, is a great absurdity. Morality knows no God, knows no divine command, must have reference to no divine pleasure or displeasure. Consequently, they are altogether in the wrong who represent the love and worship of God as moral duties, or who deny that the atheist is, or can be, a moral man. God, according to our author, is a mere creature of the human imagination, a mere human personification of the forces of nature, and, of course, can have no influence over a true sage !

Mr. Hildreth proceeds to divide all moralists into two classes,—the forensic moralists and the mystics. Forensic systems of morals are those in which the *other beings*, whose pleasure we are to seek, “are men, or occasionally animals” ; “the mystical systems of morals are those in which it is the pain or pleasure of the Deity, by which the moral character of actions is to be tested. Such an act is praiseworthy, because it pleases God ; in other words, because it gives God pleasure ; such an act is wrong, because it is displeasing to God ; in other words because it gives God pain ; such an act is indifferent, because it does not affect God in any way.”

We see that he means here, by the mystical systems, those which have a religious foundation, and which make the will of God the rule of moral action ; but does he state the case fairly ? Who ever dreamed of giving God pleasure or pain, in the sense Mr. Hildreth implies ? Does Mr. Hildreth hold it a moral action to tell the truth ? To the religious moralist, God is the Good, and nothing is good that is not godlike. God is the standard. But God is a living being, an infinite personality, that is to say, an infinite *will*, and therefore is he rightly said to approve what conforms, and to disapprove what does not conform to him. In seeking the pleasure of God, we are simply seeking to obey his law, that is, to do that which he approves, that is, to do that which conforms to his will, that is to say, again, that which conforms to himself. Nobody supposes that when we refuse to conform to his will he suffers pain ; or that, when we conform, he experiences what we term the emotion of pleasure. To please God is simply to conform to his will ; to displease him is simply to disobey him.

"The mystical theory, however, when it is made the foundation of practical morals, is usually amalgamated with the selfish theory ; that is, with the theory, that virtue consists in securing our own greatest happiness. This amalgamation easily takes place ; for since, according to the mystics, every thing depends on the volition of God ; and as God is supposed to act, at least to a certain extent, as men act, *to be influenced by feelings of gratitude* ; hence, those who please God will certainly be rewarded by him in the end, and those who displease him will be punished. But as this present life does by no means exhibit any such rewards and punishments, *mysticism has been led to adopt the hypothesis of a future retribution* ; a doctrine which the semi-Stoics and the semi-Epicureans have also found themselves obliged to adopt, as the only means of giving any plausibility to their idea of the coincidence of virtue and happiness."

Mr. Hildreth nowhere accepts what he calls the mystical theory ; he means to sneer at it, and to hold it up to our abhorrence. He therefore intends to scout the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, and to discard every system of morals that depends at all on a future state of existence. We have evidently gone far in our downward progress. It is hardly to be presumed, that our community, designedly, with full consciousness of what it is doing, would reject Christianity ; and yet it calls in question every article of the Christian's faith, and, what is remarkable, it does it in the name of Christ. The great labor, for some time, has been to prove that Jesus was no Christian, and that, in point of fact, he was, if not an infidel, very much like a modern come-outer. Men amongst us—and to our shame be it said, we were once, in more respects than one, of their number—there are, who really believe they are honoring Christ as the Teacher of Truth, while they are denying every doctrine he taught, and while, in the poverty of their religious creed, they fall below the most stupid of heathen nations ! Nay, we find them parading this poverty, making their boast of what should be their shame. If the great body of Christian believers, from the time of Christ down, have mistaken his doctrines, and given us something entirely different from the Gospel, then one should regard the Saviour as having been wanting in the essential qualities of a teacher, that of making himself intelligible ; or else he provided with miserable skill and judgment for the preservation of the right understanding of his doctrine. In either case, we declare him unworthy of our confidence, and, as honest and brave men, we should reject him altogether.

It is painful to one who has awaked from the sleep into which he had been drugged by the spirit of his age and country, to see how men, even in the name of Christ, have pared down the Gospel till nothing of it is left. We are, many of us, boasting of our success in this work, and swearing in the very teeth of gainsayers, that we are true Christians, first-rate Christians, the only genuine Christians, while denying every distinctive doctrine and precept of the Gospel. With what ineffable disdain do we treat the simple follower of Jesus, who is content to believe with the apostles, the fathers, and the church universal! Why, we have grown infinitely too wise to fall into the absurdity of believing there was wisdom in the world before we were born. Nobody ever knew any thing of the true meaning of the Gospel, till we were born! We for the first time, have seized its true significance, and, after all, it is no such mighty affair. It is all perfectly simple, and means merely that if one is good and does good,—then one is good and does good.* We have rejected from the Gospel all that was foreign to it, all that ignorance, superstition, false learning, false philosophy, and priestcraft have added to it; we have demolished hell; scouted the devil; laughed at the fall; reduced the Son of God, first, to a promising Hebrew youth, who was a successful mesmeriser, and, finally, to a mythic personage, created by the creeds and fancies of men; we have, moreover, successively disrobed God himself of his justice, his truth, his sovereignty, his paternity, his providence, at last of his personality, and resolved him into a blind force, or a mere fate or irresistible necessity. And in all this we have been guilty of no heresy, of no error in doctrine,—have been, in fact, good, true, faithful, enlightened, liberal Christians, the reformers of the church and the restorers of primitive Christianity! Surely, this is a wonderful age, and we are marvellous people!

If there is any one doctrine dear to a Christian heart, it is the doctrine of future retribution, the only doctrine capable of clearing up the confusion and apparent anomalies of this life, and of giving us, at all times, in the darkest moments, a ground for unwavering confidence in God. The

* See Parker's Discourse, *passim*. The statement in the text contains the whole sum and substance of the Christian revelation, according to this erudite, eloquent, and *philosophic* divine.

man, who denies a future state of rewards and punishments for deeds done in this life, denies, in the plainest and fullest manner possible, Christianity itself, and saps the foundation of all morals, both theoretical and practical. The great evil we have now to contend with is this wide-spread doubt in respect to a future state of retribution. Men have ceased, to an alarming extent, to believe in future rewards and punishments, and we lose our hold on their consciences. There is a wide-spread feeling, that what people have heretofore feared is all a fable, and men have seriously published books to prove that there is no punishment for the wicked after death, because, forsooth, certain Greek and Hebrew words, translated *hell* in the English version of the Bible, did not, in their primitive use, designate a place of punishment. As well say that there is no such place as London, because the word *London*, in its primitive sense, does not mean a great city. Men everywhere around us say to themselves, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die, and there is an end of us"; or else they say, "Go to, who's afraid? God is good; our conduct cannot affect him; he is compassionate and kind, and is not willing that any should perish; and so he will not damn us; but as soon as we die, he will take us right into heaven, to enjoy inconceivable bliss, forever and ever." So, through faith in universal annihilation, or faith in universal salvation, there is no longer any chance of touching a man's conscience, and arresting him in his wickedness. The law has no terrors for the wicked, and love can operate only on the redeemed. Hence the deplorable state of our morals, the terrible moral corruption spreading over Christendom. And now, here is a man who judges himself wise enough to instruct his countrymen, coming out with a work on morals, in which he makes it a reproach for moralists to rest any portion of their systems on considerations drawn from a future life!

We should like to have Mr. Hildreth show us how he would enforce the disinterested morality he contends for, by considerations drawn only from this life. He requires me to sacrifice myself for the good of others. Very well. I do not complain of him for this; but through what motive am I to do it? I do not ask him to assure me of a personal reward which I am myself to receive, but I do want him to show me that *this good of others, which I am to promote, is worth sacrificing myself for*. If you tell me the evil men suffer is only for this short life, to be succeeded,

whether I make an effort to remove it or not, by an eternity of bliss, I am very sure that I shall put myself to no great inconvenience to make them happy here; for their present sufferings will only enhance the relish of their future joys. If, again, you tell me that there is no hereafter, that this life is man's whole life, and that it is only for men's good while on this side the grave, that I can labor, you make them such miserable abortions, and the greatest amount of good that can be procured for them so contemptibly little, that I cannot disturb myself on their account. "Poor devils," I must say, "ye are born in the morning, to be cut down at noon, and wither away in the evening; at best, mere insects, born to flutter an hour in the sun;—flutter on, and flutter as ye will; it's enough for me to take care of my own wings." A cold and heartless selfishness would possess me, and I should be utterly incapable of a benevolent emotion, or a disinterested act. If I am to act for others' happiness, you must show me that it is worth acting for; that it may be hazarded; that my acts are needed to secure it; and that it may continue for ever. In seeking to save others from misery, if I am to seek with much earnestness, I must feel that they are exposed to an infinite loss, that it is not from the petty ills of this short life merely, but from the pains and woes of eternity, I must save them. Hence, we regard the moralist, who sneers at a state of future rewards and punishments, as guilty of the grossest wrong. He is undermining the very foundation of morals, depriving morals of all sanction, and virtually letting men loose in the wildest license. We have no charity for such a man,—no excuse. No community can tolerate him, without the greatest conceivable danger to its institutions, to its peace, to its moral and religious life.

But we have no disposition to pursue Mr. Hildreth further. His system professedly belongs to the class of moral systems usually denominated the *sentimental*. He makes all moral distinctions originate in the sentiment of benevolence, and makes the moral character of the act depend entirely on its producing pleasure or pain to beings other than the actor. This would seem to place virtue in disinterestedness, and to demand perpetual self-sacrifice. But Mr. Hildreth, after all, is none of your self-sacrificing moralists. He thinks it as great an absurdity for one to sacrifice himself for the love of man, as for the love of God; but how he really saves himself from inconsistency in this, it is not, at first sight,

very easy to perceive, yet, if we comprehend him, we shall be able to clear him from contradiction. We must understand, in the first place, that Mr. Hildreth recognizes no right and wrong, independent of man himself. The notion, that there is, independent of man, a good which he is under obligation to seek, which he does not make, but which he perceives, by means of his natural power, or by means of supernatural instruction, he regards as false and puerile. This is what he condemns, as the *Platonic* theory. Let it be understood, then, the right is not something we are bound to do, but simply an affection of our nature, which we have agreed to call right. Now, considering our actions in relation to their motive, or subjective principle, they are divisible into five classes: 1. Meritorious actions; 2. Duties, or obligatory actions; 3. Indifferent actions; 4. Permissible actions; and 5. Vicious, criminal, or wicked actions.

Duties, or obligatory actions, are those actions beneficial to others, which are performed by the greater number of any given society. Meritorious actions are those which are performed by only a few in a given society, and which argue in those who perform them more than an ordinary force of the sentiments which operate beneficially to others. *Permissible* actions, though injurious to others, are such as the majority do not judge it necessary to refrain from doing! Vicious, criminal, or wicked actions are those which are performed by but few, and are more injurious to others than is the ordinary conduct of the majority. Indifferent actions are actions with a double result, being injurious to some, and beneficial to others; if we fix our attention on the injury they do, we shall class them as wrong; if on the good, as right. One would suppose, therefore, that these actions could hardly be called *indifferent*. But that is Mr. Hildreth's affair, not ours.

Well, now, the man who does his duty, is he not a moral man? Duty is a beneficial action, to perform which is to practise as well as the majority. If, then, I conduct as well as the majority, I do my duty. I do, then, all that can be demanded of me. But it is very certain that the majority practise very little of this self-denial, contended for by the disinterested moralists; therefore it is not a man's duty to sacrifice himself for others. But, to attain to the highest excellence of character, must he not? We, assuredly, shall not disagree with Mr. Hildreth, in regard to a distinction be-

tween duties and meritorious actions ; * but we suppose he will concede to us, that it is man's duty to do right. Now, if he places the right in acting in obedience to the sentiment of benevolence, we see not how he can make the distinction he contends for. The right being exclusively in the sentiment of benevolence, it must needs demand the exclusive exercise of that sentiment ; and that sentiment, become exclusive, is the self-denial which Mr. Hildreth contends duty does not demand. If there be any thing certain in Mr. Hildreth's theory, it is, that a man is moral only in the exercise of benevolence. If it is man's duty to exercise benevolence at all, then how will he prove that a man can be *meritorious* in the exercise of benevolence ? For, we suppose, no man will contend, that one is *meritorious*, unless he does more than his duty. The distinction between meritorious acts and duties, with all deference to Mr. Hildreth, we think, is pointed out with more clearness and justice in the New Testament. There came one to Jesus, and said, " Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life ? " Jesus answered, by pointing him to the demands of the moral law, specifying its several precepts. " All these," answered the young man, " have I kept from my youth up ; what lack I yet ? " " If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me." The young man, in complying with the law, did his duty, was just, and could inherit eternal life ; but, in doing this, he was only just ; he had not attained to the highest degrees of excellence. To become perfect, it was necessary that he should do more than the law demanded, that he should rise from justice to love. If I am rich, it is not my *duty* to give what I possess to the poor. The law does not demand this, but Christian love does, and it is my privilege to do so, and will be set down to my merit, not in discharge of my debt.

But Jesus did not measure a man's duty by the conduct of the majority. Here, again, is a serious defect in Mr. Hildreth's system, and shows that he carries his demagoguism into morals as well as into politics. The standard, with him, is the conduct of the majority. Duty is that which is done by the majority of a given community, that

*The distinction really is between works of obligation and of supererogation ; but both are meritorious.—ED.

which makes a man as virtuous as the majority; meritorious actions are those which the majority agree to applaud, and criminal actions are those which the majority condemn, as sinking below the practice of the majority. A fine doctrine, this! and a man holding a respectable rank in the community where he lives has the effrontery to avow such a demoralizing doctrine,—a doctrine which ought to be condemned, in the severest terms, by every one who has the least sense of what is due to himself, or to his fellow-men. The law to which a man must conform, in order to discharge his duty, is not the practice of the majority, nor the *opinion* of the majority, which is always better than the practice,—but the law of God, which demands precisely the same things in all ages and countries, and of every individual with the ordinary faculties of a human being.

The general state of mind, in which Mr. Hildreth writes, may be seen in this statement: “To believe a man against our own senses and reason is a high compliment. Hence the merit ascribed by theologians to implicit faith.” Now, if Mr. Hildreth knows any thing at all of what theologians call implicit faith, or rather, faith in God, he knows this statement is not true. They have never yet supposed a man could, in any respect, pay our heavenly Father a compliment. Theologians are not such consummate simpletons as all that comes to. I demand implicit faith in me on the part of my child, because there are a great many things which he must do or avoid doing, the reason of which he cannot comprehend. This notion, which has latterly prevailed, that you must appeal to a child’s reason, and show him the reason of whatever you demand, is of a piece with all the rest of our modern inventions. The first lesson to be taught a child is obedience,—ay, blind obedience, if you will,—for, till after years of training, your child will be utterly unable to comprehend the reasonableness of your command. Your command, your wish, must be your child’s reason. To give him, till considerably advanced, any other reason, is to destroy the foundation of that respect, that reverence for one’s elders and superiors, of which we as a people have so little, and without which there is, and can be, no solid worth of character. Now, this same trust, which I demand of my child in me, God demands of us all in him. We can know what he commands; but the reason of the command or wherefore he commands what he does, we cannot always know, and are, for the most part, incapable of

comprehending. It should, therefore, be enough for us, that he commands. His command should always be a sufficient reason for obeying. The mind, that would seek to go behind the command for its reason, is essentially impious and atheistic. Just as if, in the nature of things, a more conclusive reason were possible, for doing a thing, than that God wills it! The will of God is, not theologically only, but philosophically, the ultimate reason itself; and when you have got to the ultimate, why seek to go beyond?

So, again, with regard to matters of belief. Show me that God has said it, and you show me that it is true; for it is impossible for God to lie. His word is truth, and the highest possible evidence of truth. This is the view theologians take of what so scandalizes our author. What is sneered at, as implicit faith, is the most reasonable thing imaginable. Is it unreasonable to believe a proposition on sufficient evidence? Does such belief derogate from the *rights* and *dignity* of the mind? Of course not. Then what do I surrender, when I believe my heavenly Father on his word? Nay, suppose, as I firmly believe, the church to be the divinely commissioned interpreter of God's word, what do I surrender in submitting to the decision of the church, that I do not equally surrender when I believe any proposition on adequate evidence? If I believe at all, it is always on authority; and what higher authority can I have in any case than the authority of God, or of the church authorized by him to speak in his name? We do not believe God's word, because by so doing we compliment the Almighty, but because, as reasonable, nay, as rational beings, we can do no less. But enough; we have already spent more time on Mr. Hildreth than his book deserves.

HILDRETH'S JOINT LETTER.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1845.]

THIS pamphlet seems to us to be improperly termed a *joint* letter; for a joint letter, we believe, is not a letter addressed by one person to several others in common, but a letter addressed in the joint names of two or more authors, whether addressed to one or to many. As it is not probable that Mr. Hildreth wishes to deny his own unity, or to intimate that he is, as the respectable Mrs. Malaprop says, "two gentlemen at once," he would express himself more correctly, in our judgment, if he should say, *A Letter addressed conjointly, &c.* A philosopher should never disdain to use language correctly.

The *Letter* is addressed conjointly to us and to the *North American Review*. In what way our brother reviewer will receive or dispose of the portion intended specially for him, we have no means of knowing; but as he is still vigorous, and blest with a strong constitution and firm nerves, we trust he will survive it. As for ourselves, being naturally kind-hearted, although the world may think differently, and feeling that Mr. Hildreth has received rather rough handling from all quarters, we are disposed to congratulate him on his happy delivery, and to gratify him, as much as we may, by a brief reply. It is churlish, when a man sends out a pamphlet, or but the third of a pamphlet, against you, not to acknowledge the favor. We all have our little vanities, and, as we none of us like to have our own little vanities wounded, we should be careful not to wound those of others.

Mr. Hildreth is somewhat known in this immediate neighbourhood by several publications, which we have been assured are not without merit. He was formerly one of the writers for the *Boston Atlas*, and, under the supervision of its senior editor, the late Mr. Haughton, contributed not a little to the reputation and influence that paper for a time enjoyed with its party. Some time since he appears to have persuaded himself that he was a philosopher, and he con-

*A Joint Letter to O. A. Brownson and the Editor of the *North American Review*. By R. HILDRETH, Author of "Theory of Morals."

ceived a series of works, which were to embrace the whole circle of the science of man. The first work of the contemplated series he completed and published over a year ago, under the title of *Theory of Morals*. This work was sent to us, and reviewed, as we thought proper. A copy was also sent, we presume, to the *North American*, in which respectable periodical it received as severe treatment as it had previously received from us. Meanwhile the book does not sell, but lies on the bookseller's shelves or in the binder's garret. To remain unsold, and at the same time to be cut up by hostile reviews, is too much for flesh and blood. The author can contain himself no longer. Hence, the *Joint Letter* before us,—the hint of which may possibly have been taken from Byron's famous satire, *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*, and the author's ambition may have been to do in plain prose what the poet effected in polished verse. The *Letter* wants, it must be admitted, something of the keen wit of the satire, but this we do not think is the author's fault; it is heavily written, in a loose, declamatory style, as we cannot deny; but what it wants in liveliness, terseness, and logic, it abundantly supplies in vulgarity, vituperation, and abuse. The author appears to have thrown his whole heart and soul into his work, and to have executed it as well as he was able; and therefore should not be blamed for not doing it as well as his friends may have wished. We can rightfully ask of no man more than the best he can do; for the best can do no better than they can.

We have read the *Letter* with sufficient care, but we do not find that the author has vindicated his theory from the very grave objections we urged against it; nor do we find that he has successfully controverted any of the positions we assumed in our *Review* against him. His restatement of his theory proves that we rightfully apprehended him, and were far from misrepresenting his views. Our strictures, then, remain, so far as we can see, in their full force. Whether our venerable contemporary can say as much, we are not so certain. Mr. Hildreth makes some strong points against him, which, from his point of view, we think he will find it difficult to meet. But this is no affair of ours. A few of the points Mr. Hildreth has attempted to make against us, although they hardly touch the great ethical questions involved, we shall briefly notice, because by so doing we may offer some remarks which will not be wholly valueless to our readers.

The fine names, as Gnostic, Sophist, Thwackum, &c., which Mr. Hildreth has so liberally bestowed on us, we must, however reluctantly, pass over. Some men will be ridiculous, though you call them by their baptismal names; others cannot be made ridiculous, call them by what ludicrous names you will. Moreover, admitting the appropriateness of these names, we cannot perceive how from them Mr. Hildreth can logically conclude to the soundness of his theory of morals.

Mr. Brownson objects to my theory of morals;

But Mr. Brownson is a gnostic, a sophist, a thwackum;

Therefore, my theory of morals is sound.

The man who could reason in this way would make an admirable professor of logic!!

We are a gnostic, a sophist, &c., it seems, because we profess to have attained to truth in relation to the fundamental principles of morals. For this profession Mr. Hildreth sneers at us in his most approved style, and commends himself for his own modesty in not pretending to so much,—in contenting himself with the simple claim to be a philosopher, or one who loves and *seeks* the truth. Very well. If he seeks the truth, it must be because he feels that he has not yet found it. If he have not yet found the truth, what confidence can he have or expect us to have in his theory of morals? If he feels that he has found the truth, with what justice does he term himself a *seeker*? We own, that, for ourselves, we do not think it a reproach for a man to feel that he has arrived at moral truth. In morals, which are an every-day concernment, the truth ought to be early ascertained, and the progress which we ought all to aspire to should be not so much in knowing the law as in keeping it. Progress we of course approve; but progress in obedience, not in doctrine. We may come to such perfection in doctrine, that, in ordinary cases, we have no more to learn; but in obedience we never become so perfect that there is nothing more for us to do.

But it seems we are a "Gnostic of the Roman school." That we are a Roman Catholic now, we own, and thank God that we are; but we were not when we wrote the review of Mr. Hildreth's book, for our conversion dates only from last October, and the ethical theory we opposed to his was one which, consistently or inconsistently, we had advocated for years. A moralist should study to be exact even in trifles.

According to Mr. Hildreth, nothing is or can be fixed or permanent in moral doctrine. "Every tree," he says, "grows old, ceases to bear wholesome fruit, and comes presently to cumber the ground. It must be cut down, and something more adapted to existing wants and circumstances planted in its place." From this we infer, 1. That he holds that his own theory will soon cease to bear wholesome fruit, and come presently to cumber the ground,—in which he is probably right; and 2. That morality is a creature of circumstance, one thing in one age or one country, and another thing in another; one thing under one set of circumstances, and another thing under another; and therefore that there is no universal, eternal, and immutable right. It is easy now to understand why Mr. Hildreth commends those who are ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth; for, according to him, there is in morals no truth to be known.

Mr. Hildreth makes morality consist in obedience to the inherent laws of man's nature, and characterizes as right obedience to the law or sentiment of benevolence. His theory is therefore, *naturalism*, and belongs to the class denominated *sentimental*. Of this we were aware when we wrote our strictures, and we condemned his theory, among other reasons, because it had only a sentimental basis. Sentiment can afford no solid basis for an ethical doctrine, because none of our sentiments can be safely indulged, save under the direction and control of reason. Benevolence, as simple benevolence, can inflict pain on the guilty no more than on the innocent. Obeying simply its impulses, we should throw open the prison doors and let the convicts escape, when both public and private good might require them to be confined and punished. Benevolence itself, then, must be exercised under the direction and control of reason, that is, must be in subjection to reason. Similar remarks may be made of all the sentiments;—which proves that none of them can ever be taken as safe guides in matters of duty.

In opposition to this sentimental theory, we stated in our strictures, that morality presupposes a law out of man and above him, imposed by a sovereign lawgiver, which he is bound to obey. The lawgiver is God; the law is his will; therefore morality is simply obedience to the will of God. To this Mr. Hildreth objects, that it implies that "might makes right." We deny the conclusion. Because God is

infinitely and essentially good, and his will is the expression of his infinite and essential goodness, not of his power regarded as a distinct attribute. God is essentially the right in itself, absolute right, because he is in his own essence the good in itself, that is, absolute goodness. Whatever he wills, then, must be right, not by reason of his infinite power, but by reason of his essential goodness. We do not, then, make right depend on might; for in God it is not dependent at all, and in creatures it depends on the infinite, eternal, and immutable goodness of the Creator, to which his power, as a distinct attribute, is not legislative, but simply ministerial.

Men may reluct as they will to our doctrine, but no doctrine except the one that makes morality consist solely and simply in obedience to the will of God can abide the test of reason. Atheism leaves as little foundation for morals as for theology. Morality is rightly termed *theologia moralis*, or practical theology. It consists in practical obedience to the will of God, and to the inherent laws of human nature only so far as they express, and only for the reason that they express, the will of God.

The question naturally comes up, then, How are we to ascertain the will of God? Up to a certain point, unquestionably, by the light of nature, that is, by natural reason operating on our own natures and the nature of things, so far as open to our inspection. This gives us natural morality, which is good and true as far as it goes, but which is deficient in clearness, extent, and power, as we may learn from the history of all nations destitute of divine revelation. Divine revelation is necessary to supply its deficiencies.

But this divine revelation will need an interpreter. Granted. This interpreter, according to us, is the church. Granted again. Then, says Mr. Hildreth, we "make the church the sovereign lawgiver, the God we are to trust and obey." Not at all. There is a very obvious distinction between the legislature that enacts, and the court that expounds and applies, the law. The church does not make the law; she merely keeps, expounds, and applies it, and is herself bound by it. This is so obvious, that Mr. Hildreth is unpardonable for having overlooked it, and so, too, is the good president of Dartmouth College, who also asserts that we regard the church as God. We hope we are not quite stupid enough to confound the organ with the speech, far less with the speaker. God gives the law to the church, who has

nothing except what she receives ; and we receive the law from her, because he has authorized her to declare it.

Our infidel doctors on the one hand, and our Protestant doctors on the other, must have queerly constructed minds to be able to imagine that Catholics fall into such gross absurdities as they now and then charge us with. One is forced to believe that their own education has been sadly neglected, and their reasoning powers left wholly uncultivated. We sometimes amuse ourselves by representing to ourselves the strange feelings these sage doctors, who talk so flippantly about Catholicity, would have, if they could suddenly change places with the Catholic, and see the marvellous ignorance and gullibility on their part which their objections usually imply. It is rare that we meet with an objection to the church, that does not impeach the common intelligence, the common sense, or the common honesty of the objector ; and in almost all cases, the difficulty of replying to the objection lies solely in the fact that the objector is too ignorant of the subject to understand the refutation. The ignorance of the enemies of the church is really deplorable. And yet, to believe them, they are the only enlightened portion of mankind. If they should die, all light would be extinguished, and total darkness would cover the earth. Poor men ! would they would "get wisdom, and, with all their getting, get understanding ;" at least, so far as to be able to bring forward objections not discreditable to themselves.

Mr. Hildreth says, Roman Catholics, as well as Protestants, teach that "man is totally depraved, utterly incapable of any good action. As all his actions want the quality of voluntary obedience to God, in which alone goodness consists, they are all bad, and all equally bad. It is only those persons who are redeemed, sanctified, marvellously regenerated, by divine grace, who are capable of good actions." This may be Calvinistic theology, but it is not Catholic theology. The church does not teach, that men, even since the fall, are naturally incapable of good actions, or that all actions performed without the aid of divine grace are bad, far less that all are equally bad. The actions of men in an unregenerate state may be good, and no small portion of them, unquestionably, are good ; but *none of them are meritorious in relation to the supernatural destiny to which the elect are appointed.* They are good in relation to our natural destiny ; but not good, though not necessarily bad,

in relation to our supernatural destiny, because no natural act can bear any proportion to a supernatural end. No man can gain eternal life without the infusion of supernatural grace, which enables him to perform acts of a supernatural virtue; yet every man has the natural ability, if he will but exercise it, to keep the law of God in the whole sphere of natural morality, or else his disobedience would not be his sin.

It is never safe to assume that the Catholic and Protestant theologies are the same, for they are widely different. Protestant theology teaches, that man, by the fall, lost the ability to will the good, and therefore that the fall destroyed in man both reason and free-will; Catholic theology teaches, that the fall, though it wounded, weakened, reason and free-will, did not destroy them. According to it, the principal effects of the fall are in the loss of the supernatural grace by which man, before he sinned, was able to keep his lower or sensitive nature in perfect submission to his higher or rational nature; his reason and will in perfect submission to the will of God; and to fulfil the law of God in that supernatural sense in which obedience merits eternal life. By losing this grace, man lost his ability to merit eternal life, for that life was never *meritable*, so to speak, save through the aid of supernatural grace; he lost, also, the dominion of reason and will over the lower nature, or the flesh. The flesh, therefore, escaped from its subjection, became disorderly, rebellious, breeding all manner of lusts, and not unfrequently bringing reason and will themselves into bondage to the law of sin and death reigning in the members. According to Protestant theology, man ceased, by the fall, to be a moral being, because he lost by it reason and free-will, and became therefore necessarily incapable, till regenerated, of performing a moral act, a single good act in any sense whatever. According to Catholic theology, he did not cease to be a moral being, nor become incapable of performing moral acts, good acts, acts meritorious in their sphere, but only incapable of performing acts meritorious of eternal life, of which no natural act, either before the fall or since, before regeneration or after it, ever was or ever can be meritorious.

This premised, we distinguish; if you say man is incapable, till regenerated, of performing acts which are good, meritorious in relation to our *supernatural* destiny, we grant it; if in relation to our *natural* destiny, within the sphere

of natural morality, we deny it. Bearing this distinction in mind, the objection Mr. Hildreth brings against Catholic theology, that, according to it, no man, till redeemed, sanctified, regenerated, can perform a moral act, is unfounded. The objection may bear, and in fact does bear, against Calvinistic theology, but not against Catholic theology. It would do those who wish to write about Catholicity no harm, but perhaps some good, to begin by reading a short course of Catholic theology. It might save them from many blunders and from much useless labor.

Mr Hildreth in his *Letter* talks largely of the triumphs of reason, and informs us that "Rome has fallen to rise no more." All this may be very fine, but we cannot take it for granted. We have heard much of these triumphs of reason, but we have never seen them, and know not where to look for them. Where are they? Will our Protestant brethren name to us a single point in theology on which they are all agreed,—a single question they have definitively answered, and which they all regard as no longer an open question? Will our philosophers inform us what has been settled in philosophy? Was there a single question debated by the old philosophers of Greece and Italy, which is not debated still in our modern schools? What have we settled? On what single point have philosophers come to a definitive conclusion? Systems we have had, and have, in abundance, but is there any one whose right to reign is undisputed? We have had Cartesianism, but that is defunct; Lockism, but that is dethroned; Condillacism, but that has become a tradition: Leibnitzism, Wolfism, Kantism, Fichteism, Schellingism, Hegelism, but they are all exploded, even in the land where they originated; we have had the Scottish school, but it is nearly forgotten; the eclectic school, the humanitarian and progressist school, Owenism, Fourierism, Saint-Simonism, transcendentalism, and we know not how many more *isms*, but they all, to say the least, have culminated. The wildest disorder, confusion, and uncertainty now reign throughout the whole philosophic world. Each man has his own theory, and no two have the same. Where, then, are your boasted triumphs of reason?

You have for three hundred years been triumphing and boasting of your triumphs, and yet you do not possess the extent of territory you won during the first fifty years of your existence. You rebelled against the church and the schools; you demanded a reform. Well, you got it, but it

was not enough. You must reform the reformation; you did so. But that would not do; you must reform the *reformed* reformation. Well, that you did, but found yourselves as bad off as ever. Reform had stoppped short of the mark. You would reform the *reformed* REFORMED reformation. You have done so, but are as far from being satisfied as you were at first. Ever a "lower deep" yawns before you. In France you have resolved the supreme Being into void; in Germany your triumphs have resulted in nihilism; in this country, in Hildreth's *Theory of Morals*, which everybody scouts. Yet reason triumphs, and the mighty heart of humanity leaps and exults in the wonderful progress of her children! Be so good, gentlemen, as to draw up an inventory of what you have really won, of what you regard as settled, and then—we will talk with you about the triumphs of reason.

And then you talk of reason, as if reason were against the church, and as if you were reasoners. Strange infatuation! Happy should we be to find an opponent of the church that could, or at least *would*, reason. Our great complaint against the enemies of the church is, that they either will not or cannot reason; that they are governed by prejudice, caprice, and rarely seem able to distinguish between reason and their own fancies; whence we find them able, on the one hand, to resist the clearest demonstrations of reason, and, on the other, to believe without even the shadow of a reason. They who suppose reason has any thing to do with their opposition to Catholicity are grievously mistaken. Infidels do not reason against us, for they do not reason at all. Protestants do not reason against us; they declaim, denounce, invent idle stories and tell gross falsehoods about us; and when these fail, they burn our convents, our churches, seminaries, dwellings, shoot us down in the street, pass severe penal laws against us, set a price on our heads, hunt us down as wild beasts. This is the way Protestantism reasons against us, and has reasoned against us for three hundred years; and it is by such arguments, which you call reason, and we unreason, that she has won her boasted triumphs. O my brother, say no more about reason, for reason laughs you in the face, and scorns the relationship you claim.

Then, again, where are the evidences that Rome has fallen to rise no more? Do you find them in the violent hostility manifested at this very moment throughout all Protestantism against Catholicity? Do you find them in the Protes-

tant unions, the "Native American" mobs in this country, and the Free Corps in Switzerland? Do you find them in the multitude of boooks and pamphlets against the church with which a licentious but all active press now is teeming? Why this fear and consternation? Why do the heathen rage, and the Protestant people imagine a vain thing? Do Protestants tremble before the fallen? do they trample on the dead? Do you find the proofs of your assertion in the fact, that never, since the commission was given to the apostles to teach all nations, has the church been more united, more active, more vigorous, more faithful in the discharge of her high trusts, and that she has never, at any one period, counted a larger number of members than at this moment? Strange evidences, these, that Rome has fallen to rise no more. A single Jesuit makes whole masses of Protestants and infidels tremble and turn pale. Why this blanching of the cheek, and this trembling of the frame, before the church, if it be defunct? Is it that a dead lion is better than a living dog? O my friend, be not deceived! Rome has not fallen, and your very fears and deadly rage prove it. The church is not dead, cannot die; for she is immortal, the living spouse of the living God. She will outlive, aye, and triumph over, all her enemies; for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth, and hath declared it. Vain is your rage, impotent is your malice. You may harm yourselves, but her you cannot harm.

Mr. Hildreth and some others take considerable pains to account for our conversion to the Catholic Church, and, assuming that we must needs be still a Protestant at heart, conclude that it must have been in consequence of visions of lawn sleeves, a cardinal's hat, and perhaps of a Yankee pope, that floated in the distance before us. It is a pity to spoil their solution of the problem, but we are obliged to tell them, they are quite wrong, for there is a lady in the way, and known to be in the way, of the realization of such visions, before our conversion. Married men cannot take orders in the church, and one cannot aspire to a cardinal's hat unless he be in orders. Whatever might be our personal ambition, or however capable we might be of having respect, as the president of Dartmouth College has it, to "the purple glory," we can, as a Catholic, be nothing but a simple layman. There can be no dispensation in our favor, and we must submit.

Moreover, if there were no barrier of the kind intimated,

it is not quite so certain that we could attain to the "purple glory." He must know little of the church, and of her thousands upon thousands of meritorious sons, who could dream that one so insignificant as ourselves could ever be thought of, save by her enemies, as a candidate for her honors. Mr. Hildreth and others estimate us quite above our merits. We are nothing to the church, except as we have a soul to be saved. It was not the church that needed us, but we that needed the church; and we would fain hope that a poor sinner, long beaten about in the world, might fly to her maternal bosom and find peace for his troubled conscience, rest for his wearied soul, and helps to a holy life, without dreaming of lawn sleeves, or even a cardinal's hat. These things do not have such powerful attractions for Catholics as they seem to have for Protestants. To the true Catholic, earth has no honors he cares for; to him, no crown is desirable but the crown of life, and no glory but the glory of God. The Catholic religion teaches us that this world is not our home, that the great ends of our existence are not attained to in this life, and our real good can come from nothing earthly, temporal, or changeable. It teaches that we were made for heaven, to find our good in serving God here, and in enjoying him for ever hereafter. It bids us, therefore, to place our affections on things above, to aspire to the eternal and the immutable, to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. To the soul that listens to and obeys this teaching, the honors and distinctions of this life, all that the men of the world live for and aspire to, are vanity, yea, less than vanity and nothing. Nor was it only in olden times this teaching could be received, and believed. Men still hear it, believe it, and, we trust, strive to obey it, as incredible as it may seem to the great mass of our Protestant and infidel brethren.

We have now remarked on all the points in Mr. Hildreth's *Letter* which we have thought worth while to notice. Mr. Hildreth intimates, in the conclusion of his *Letter*, that another review will soon be commenced, to be, we presume, the organ of views similar to his own, perhaps to be edited by himself. Be this as it may, it is his affair and not ours. But, if he expects us to reply to any thing more he may write, he must write in a style somewhat different from that adopted in the letter before us. He must try to write, if not as a Christian, at least as a gentleman. We have replied

to him now, because we really felt compassion for him, and were actually touched by the severity with which he had been treated from all quarters, and because we did not wish him to feel that he was entirely an outcast. He has talents, and, we can believe, benevolent intentions; and we have wished that he might have an opportunity to redeem himself, and devote his very considerable powers to the cause of truth and good morals,—if not to religion, at least to natural morality and social improvement. We take our leave of him, with our wishes for his speedy recovery from his foolish notions, and for his future usefulness.

JOUFFROY'S ETHICAL SYSTEM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1845.]

THIS work has been translated into English, and adopted as a text-book of moral philosophy in the University of Cambridge, Massachusetts. It has been read by many among us, been favorably noticed by several of our leading journals, and is, probably, as well known and as highly esteemed in our community as similar works on similar subjects generally are, or can be expected to be.

We ourselves were the first to bring the work to the notice of the American public, by a favorable review of it inserted in *The Christian Examiner*, for September, 1837. We then estimated the work very highly, and regarded it as a valuable contribution to moral science. As such we spoke of it; as such we commended it; we honestly believed that it had solved the great ethical problems, and prepared the way for the construction, on the law of nature as discoverable by natural reason, of a complete and satisfactory system of ethics, which would endure as long as human nature should remain unaltered. Our review of the work, and the commendatory terms in which we have on several occasions spoken of it, have, no doubt, contributed some-

**Cours de Droit Naturel, professé à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, par M. TH. JOUFFROY. Première Partie. Prolégomènes au Droit Naturel. Paris: 1835.*

what to the favorable reception it has found in our community; and we therefore feel it incumbent on us to assign at least some few of the reasons which have finally operated to change our views of it, and to induce us to reject its principal doctrines as insufficient, false, or mischievous.

We are not surprised that we should have approved this work at the time we did, for it issued from a school of philosophy to which we were then attached; but nothing seems to us more unaccountable, now, than the confidence and warmth with which we received the teachings of that school, of which M. Jouffroy, if not one of the founders, was at least one of the most distinguished disciples,—unless, indeed, it be the fact, that they were also received by some of our friends, well qualified by age, experience, attainments, and natural ability to be our masters. Some eight or ten years ago, we regarded the eclectic school as a glorious school, and counted it our highest felicity to be recognized by its master, M. Victor Cousin, as one of his disciples. Many amongst us, indeed, opposed it, but, unhappily, in bad temper, or on untenable grounds; and their opposition tended only to confirm our confidence, increase our admiration, and inflame our devotion. But since the novelty has worn off, and we have had leisure to recover our self-possession, and to look the school calmly and steadily in the face, with an undazzled eye, we have found it utterly unsatisfactory, and utterly unable to solve a single important problem. It throws no light on any of the dark passages of human nature, gives no satisfactory explanation of the past history of our race, presents no consistent theory of the universe, and furnishes no solution of our future destiny. All too late for our personal credit as a philosopher have we discovered this; for all too late for our credit as a philosopher, though we hope not all too late to make sure of our destiny as a man, have we discovered that philosophy, separated from supernatural revelation, is unable to solve any of the great problems of man or the universe.

Philosophy, taken strictly, is science deducing conclusions from principles obtained by the light of natural reason, and can arrive at no conclusion which is valid beyond the range of natural reason. But all the great problems of man and the universe lie beyond this range, and therefore, if solved at all, can be solved only by the aid of supernatural revelation. When we discovered this fact, we enlarged our definition of philosophy, and defined it science deducing conclusions

from principles obtained both from reason *and* revelation. In this sense the word philosophy is used in all our writings for the last two or three years. But in this sense philosophy is made to embrace not only philosophy properly so-called, but theology also. This usage of the word is unauthorized, is unnecessary, and tends to generate confusion. Moreover, there is a science of man and the universe, and even of the Author of man and the universe, deduced from principles furnished by natural reason, and distinct from theology, which is very true, and very important. This science, from the time of Pythagoras, has received the name of philosophy. This is its proper name, and this name it should be permitted to bear.

In defining philosophy to be science deducing its conclusions from natural reason alone, and in declaring it impotent to solve the great problems of the universe, we say nothing against reason, and imply no distrust of reason. We merely say, what all know to be true, that reason has its bounds, beyond which it cannot pass. All our faculties are good, and were given us to be exercised. Reason is man's distinguishing characteristic. It is this which distinguishes him from the animal world. It would, therefore, be absurd to forbid him to exercise his reason, the faculty which ennobles him and gives him his rank in the scale of being. Moreover, if we were to deny to man the exercise of his reason, or if we were even to distrust it, we should deny to him the possibility of having any well grounded faith,—indeed, of having any faith at all. For, though faith itself is never taken on the authority of reason, but on the veracity of God, who reveals it, yet the motives of credibility are all addressed to reason, and reason judges supremely whether the witness for God be worthy of credit or not. All we ask is, that reason be confined to its legitimate province, and that men attempt not to do by reason what they cannot do by it.

The error of philosophers is not in their using reason, but in using it unreasonably,—in fancying that by its aid alone they can discover the true end of man, and determine the rules according to which he should conduct his life; or, in other words, in imagining that philosophy may supersede revelation by taking cognizance of the same matters. Our modern philosophers, on the one hand, magnify beyond all reason the power of reason, and imagine they obtain results from it which they obtain only, directly or indirectly, from supernatural revelation; or, on the other hand, profess-

ing to accept supernatural revelation, unduly depress, under pretence of explaining it, and reduce the mysteries of faith to mere propositions of philosophy. This last is the error of the eclectic school. It professes to accept all the mysteries of faith, but that, in accepting, it explains them; and at first sight it seems to do what it professes. It is this which deceives us. We read its productions. We find all the consecrated terms of faith, in name at least, all the dogmas the most rigid orthodoxy can insist upon our believing, and we do not readily see what is wanting. All is explained; all seems perfectly clear and easy; we are enraptured, and exclaim, All hail, glorious and triumphant philosophy! But as soon as we begin to look a little deeper, to penetrate a little below the surface, we discover, that, if we have the orthodox terms, we have by no means the orthodox sense. The proposition, we took to be the dogma of faith, turns out to be merely a proposition of philosophy, and the explanation of the mystery to be simply its rejection. The Christianity we seemed to have grasped with a firm hold, and which we felt so able to demonstrate, proves to be merely a cold speculation and a chilling infidelity.

The eclectic school falls into a fatal error,—that of assuming that religion and philosophy do not differ as to their *matter*, but only as to their *form*. Faith is the truth, but the truth enveloped; philosophy is the same truth, but developed. This is M. Cousin's doctrine; it was also M. Jouffroy's. But as the truth developed and possessed in the clear light of philosophy is much superior to truth enveloped in the mystic folds of faith, so philosophy is superior to religion. Yet, as all cannot rise to this clear vision, or obtain the transcendent lucidity of the eclectic philosophy, so philosophy, with a generous condescension, a noble pity for human weakness, deigns to take religion under its protection, and to extend the hand to the ignorant masses who are still enveloped in its folds! Thus, M. Jouffroy contends that Christianity must needs recoil before the advance of philosophy, and finally disappear, when all the world become philosophers. No doubt, faith loses itself where vision begins, but the error is in assuming that faith embraces no matters which transcend the reach of philosophy. The matter of faith and philosophy is not one and the same. The matter of philosophy is what is intrinsically evident to natural reason; the matter of faith is that portion of universal truth which God has been pleased to reveal, which is

intrinsically inevident to reason. *Fides est credere quod non vides*, says St. Augustine: Faith is, to believe that which you see not;—or, as says the blessed Apostle Paul, “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of things which appear not,—*Argumentum non apparentium*.” The matter of faith, then, is not the matter of philosophy, but transcends it, and is that before which philosophy must bow down and worship.

M. Cousin is right in representing faith as obscure, but wrong in predicating this obscurity of the *form* under which its matter is apprehended. He is wholly mistaken, when he makes faith the enthusiastic perception of truth, clothing itself in the picturesque forms of poetry, and expressing itself only in the hymn and the chant. It is not faith, but devotion consequent upon faith, that demands sacred hymns and chants. The dogmas of faith, as laid down in the *Credo*, are expressed in forms as clear, as precise, as exact, as sober, as philosophy herself can aspire to. The dogmas of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of Transubstantiation, as *formal* propositions to be believed, are as simple and as intelligible as the proposition, two and two make four. They are, no doubt, great and impenetrable mysteries; but the mystery is not in the form, but in the matter,—not in the expression, but in the thought. This single fact overthrows the whole eclectic theory concerning divine revelation and the difference between religion and philosophy.

The eclectic school, the modern German schools, and even our *liberal* Christians, as they call themselves, really reject all supernatural revelation, in believing themselves able to explain its mysteries. To explain, in the sense these understand it, is to make intrinsically evident to natural reason. They wish to explain the mysteries, that is, to find in them some intrinsic evidence of their truth, so that they may believe them without being obliged to take them on the authority of Him who reveals them. But nothing can be made intrinsically evident to reason, whose intrinsic truth transcends reason, or, what is the same thing, is not naturally knowable by reason. The contents of supernatural revelation are matters whose intrinsic truth transcends natural reason. For, if not, they would not need to be supernaturally revealed, and we should have with supernatural revelation no more than we might have without it. Consequently, the contents of supernatural revelation, or the matter revealed, are necessarily inexplicable to natural reason, and therefore

the attempt to explain its mysteries is only to attempt to prove that they are not matters supernaturally revealed.

A supernatural revelation must necessarily contain mysteries. A mystery is something whose intrinsic truth is inevident to natural reason, and therefore inexplicable to natural reason. A pretended revelation, containing no mysteries, would be proved at once not to be supernatural, because it would be all explicable to natural reason. It might be true, we grant; but its truth would be truth pertaining to the natural order, not to the supernatural order. The simple question is, Has God made us a revelation of truths of the supernatural order? If not, we are left to the light of nature, and it is idle to talk of divine revelation. If he has, then these truths must needs be mysteries, intrinsically inevident, though extrinsically evident; that is, evident, not because we apprehend their internal reasonableness and truth, but because the authority of God revealing them is ample warrant of their truth. We do not, in saying that they are intrinsically inevident, say that it is unreasonable to believe them. Far from it. Nothing is more reasonable than to believe on the veracity of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; nothing, in fact, would be more unreasonable than not to believe God on his word. Our philosophers and liberal Christians, then, instead of seeking to explain the mysteries, should ask rather if God has revealed them, or if we have sufficient grounds for believing that he has revealed them. We cannot conclude from the internal reasonableness of the doctrine to the fact of revelation, but we must conclude from the fact of revelation to the internal reasonableness.

The pretended explanation of a real mystery is never its explanation, but always its rejection. This is evident from the language of our liberal Christians themselves. They are great in explaining the mysteries. After philosophizing awhile on a mystery, they seize, as they imagine, its real significance, and exclaim, "See, all the world has been wondering away about this for eighteen centuries. And yet it means *only* this." But what have they in reality done? Why, they have merely pared the mystery down, fitted it to the narrow apertures of their own minds, and called this explaining it, comprehending it! It becomes under their process a *mighty* little affair, and they have reason to wonder that the world should have made so much ado about it. So they go through with all the mysteries of faith, one after

another, and having eliminated all that is mysterious in them, that is, all that rises above the natural order, they call what remains liberal Christianity, rational religion, adapted to the wants of this enlightened age,—just what it demands to recall it to faith, and to save it from the terrible scourge of infidelity!

All this comes from assuming that the matter of faith and philosophy is one and the same, and that faith and philosophy differ only as to their form. The matter of both is assumed to belong to the natural order, and hence philosophy is able to strip from faith its mysterious robes, and present its naked truth to the natural understanding. Delusion all! Philosophy concerns solely truths naturally cognoscible, and faith, truths only supernaturally cognoscible, and of course, till we are supernaturally elevated to see them in themselves, intrinsically inevident. There is no use in quarrelling with this fact. We either believe such truths on the authority of God's word duly accredited, or we do not believe them at all. It is idle, then, to think of bringing men to faith in Christianity by attempting to divest Christianity of its mysteries. We do not, by such a process, convert the unbeliever to the Gospel, but the Gospel to the unbeliever, as we ourselves did in our *Charles Elwood, or the Infidel Converted*. Our liberal Christians make a sad mistake. They find men, perverted by a false philosophy, rejecting the Gospel because they will not believe what is not intrinsically evident to their natural reason; and instead of undertaking to prove to them that God has really revealed these mysteries which they refuse to believe, and that nothing is more reasonable than to believe God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, they foolishly, not to say impiously, set to work to prove that these mysteries are at bottom no mysteries, and that the Gospel contains nothing which transcends reason, or whose internal reasonableness and truth are not obvious even to an ordinary understanding. They may, indeed, in this way, adapt Christianity to the age, but not to the *wants* of the age. They conform to the infidelity and corruptions of the age, instead of resisting them. They deceive themselves, if they think they are promoting faith in our holy religion by laboring to bring its teachings within the scope of human philosophy. They but lessen the matter to be believed, without augmenting faith. He who rejects a single dogma, because it appears to him unreasonable, has no true faith in a single

article of revelation. The whole of revelation is unreasonable and incredible, if you consult only its intrinsic evidence; but in the last degree reasonable and credible, if you look only to the veracity of God who makes the revelation, and to the evidence of the fact that he has made it. He who will not take God's word for much cannot consistently take it for little. He who will reject the doctrine of the Trinity, because it is incomprehensible, is a miserable logician, if he can believe any doctrine whatever, because God has revealed it. This process of *rationalizing* Christianity, so much in vogue among *liberal* Christians, does no good, gains no one to the faith, but keeps men from it, and renders conversions more difficult and hopeless.

What we have said of the eclectic school in general, we may say of M. Jouffroy in particular. Yet, personally, we would treat M. Jouffroy with great tenderness. He was a believer before he became acquainted with M. Cousin; and we hope he recovered his faith before he died, although we have no evidence of the fact. M. Cousin's philosophy perverted his understanding, destroyed his faith, and plunged him into infidelity. Our indignation is not so much against him who was the unhappy victim, as against the master who misled him. His ethical system we reject, because it is constructed upon principles derivable solely from natural reason, and natural reason cannot furnish adequate and safe rules for the conduct of life. We do not dispute the reality of the law of nature (*droit naturel*); we admit that ethics is a science, but a science whose chief fundamental principles must be borrowed from faith, the supernatural revelation which God has made us. We believe God has made us a revelation of truths pertaining to the supernatural order, and because it was necessary for the conduct of life that we should know them. Believing this, we cannot believe in the sufficiency or safety of rules which are deduced from natural reason alone. If natural reason could have sufficed for our guidance, no supernatural revelation would have been needed or made. From the fact, that such revelation has been made, we may infer its necessity; and from its necessity, that it is perilous to disregard it. We think, also, that we are able, from natural reason alone, to demonstrate the insufficiency of natural reason. If we mistake not, reason herself proclaims her own insufficiency, and affirms the necessity of something beyond her reach to serve for our guidance.

It is not our purpose to attempt a complete statement of M. Jouffroy's ethical system; we can give only a brief outline of its more prominent features, and this only so far as we propose to make them the subject of a few disconnected comments. M. Jouffroy has rightly seen that man must have an end or destiny in order to be the subject of a moral law, and that this end or destiny must be known before we can proceed to establish the rules according to which man should govern himself in the conduct of life. The first inquiry, then, is, Has man a destiny? He decides that he has, and a destiny which is not accomplished in this life; therefore man must live a life or lives beyond this life. The second question is, What is man's destiny? The answer to this question is the great affair. Does M. Jouffroy answer it, and answer it correctly and adequately? This is what principally concerns us in our present remarks; and what we proceed to inquire.

"What distinguishes one being from another," says M. Jouffroy, "is organization. It is this which distinguishes a plant from a mineral, an animal of one species from an animal of another species. Each being has its proper nature, and, because it has its proper nature, it is predestinated by that nature to a certain end. If the end of the bee, for instance, is not that of the lion, if that of the lion is not that of man, the sole reason is to be found in the difference of their nature. Each being, then, is organized for a certain end; so that we may, from a perfect knowledge of its nature, deduce its destination or end. The end of a being is what is called its *good*. There is, then, an absolute identity between the good of a being and its end. Its good is, to fulfil its destiny, to go to the end for which it has been organized."

Man is created with a specific nature, and by that nature is predestinated to a certain end, which is his good. This nature has certain primitive tendencies, which begin to operate as soon as man begins to exist, and each to go to a special end, each seeking its special satisfaction, which is its special good. The satisfaction of a tendency is the good of that tendency. The satisfaction of all man's tendencies, that is, the sum of the particular satisfactions of all his tendencies taken separately, is the total good of the individual man.

These natural tendencies, which Gall and Spurzheim call *faculties*, and which are the primitive forces of human nature, have each their particular end, towards which each in-

cessantly tends. But experience soon teaches us, that, if these tendencies be left to their instinctive or spontaneous action, one will seek its satisfaction at the expense of another, and hence confusion and disorder will be produced in the bosom of the individual, which will distract him from his veritable destiny. This experience teaches him the necessity of subordinating all these separate tendencies to one common end, which may be called the greatest good or interest of the individual. A little larger experience teaches the individual that there are other men besides himself in existence, each with his particular destiny, and that one man seeks his good, or his interest, at the expense of another, which produces disorder, confusion, in the bosom of the race. Thence arises a new conception, that of *the greatest good of the race*, to which the individual must subordinate his own good. But having arrived here, and reason developing itself more and more, he learns that there are other beings in the universe besides men; he rises to the conception of *the good of the universe*, which is universal order, absolute good, and finds that it is his duty to labor for universal order, which is man's highest moral conception.

But the universe is composed of parts and the good of the whole is nothing but the sum of the good of the parts. So it matters very little, as to the result, whether the individual labors in view of the good of the universe, of the good of the race, of himself alone, or leaves himself to be borne along by his instinctive tendencies, each seeking its own special satisfaction. The universe is so constructed, that universal order is alike promoted, secured, whether man merely obeys his instincts, acts from supreme selfishness, supreme philanthropy, or from pure regard to absolute good. A very convenient morality!

The satisfaction of a tendency is followed by a certain sensation which we call *pleasure*; its disappointment, by a certain sensation which we call *pain*. The pleasurable sensations generalized are called *happiness*, and whatever tends to produce them is called *useful*; the painful sensations generalized are what we term *unhappiness*, and whatever tends to produce them is termed *hurtful*. Hence the ideas of pleasure and pain, useful and hurtful, happiness and unhappiness, which we must be careful to distinguish from good and evil. Good is gaining our end, fulfilling our destiny; evil is failing to do so; and either would be precisely what it now is, were we so made as to be incapable of re-

ceiving pleasure or of suffering pain. So, also, when we labor for absolute good, we approve ourselves, which is called *moral approbation*, and this moral approbation is followed by an internal satisfaction which is termed *moral pleasure*; and when we fail to do so, we condemn ourselves, which is termed *moral blame*, followed by a moral pain which is termed *remorse*. But the moral pleasure is not moral good, nor is it an end to be sought; the remorse is not moral evil, nor an end to be shunned. Both are mere accidents accompanying our actions, but wholly unrelated to our end or destiny; and are never to be taken into the account in our endeavour to determine what is good or evil, the end we are to seek or to avoid.

That this system indicates on the part of its author, very great ingenuity, as well as much and even profound reflection, we have no disposition to deny; but it cannot teach us so much of ethics, even as a science, as knows the boy who has simply learned his catechism. This is entirely owing to the fault of its method. M. Jouffroy was a psychologist, and sought to construct his ethical system by the simple study of human nature. But the study of human nature alone can give us, at best, only man's natural destiny, and furnish us only with the rules for fulfilling it. To fulfil our natural destiny, or the destiny indicated by our nature, is merely to fulfil our nature itself, to perfect it, or to realize its highest type. But this is not the end for which God made us, and to which he bids us aspire. We know from revelation that we are made for a supernatural destiny, to which we do not, and cannot, attain by natural development, but by an obedience possible only on condition of the infused habit of supernatural grace.

So far, in fact, is the fulfilment of our natural destiny, or, what is the same thing, the perfecting of our nature, from being the means, or condition even, of attaining to our supernatural destiny, that it is only as we attain to our supernatural destiny, that our nature itself is or can be fulfilled or perfected. This supernatural end being the veritable end, that for which we were created, our nature is wounded whenever separated from it, and *groans in pain* whenever left to itself. Hence the disappointment we all experience in every case of merely natural satisfaction, whether of intellectual, sensual, or even philanthropic tendencies. None of our tendencies are really satisfied by their natural objects, even when fully gained. This is the sad experience of all men,

and is so because to gain these objects was not the end for which we were made. But this last is a fact which we can hardly learn from the study of human nature alone. This study can disclose to us only the end to which we are predestinated by our nature; and from experience we can learn only that the gaining of this end does not satisfy our nature;—which may, indeed, lead us to suspect that our natural destiny is not, after all, our veritable destiny.

Nor does M. Jouffroy get beyond our natural destiny, even by admitting a life after this life. Man, he reasons, has capacities,—natural capacities, which are not and cannot be fulfilled in this life. Our destiny is not accomplished in this world. But, in creating us with these capacities, the Creator has given us a pledge of the means and conditions of their fulfilment. Hence another life, in which may be completed the destiny begun, but left unfinished, here. But this only demonstrates a future *natural* existence, not the life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel. It is not the “eternal life” promised as the reward of the just. It is only a prolongation, in another state, of our present life. Its admission is not the admission of a supernatural destiny, nor of an end to which we may not attain by our natural strength and development, provided our natural existence be but continued. Hence, the admission of this future prolonged existence would demand no rules for the conduct of life, which would not be demanded, in like manner, in case our existence terminated at the grave.

But we take higher ground, and deny that from nature alone it is possible to conclude even to our natural destiny. The destiny of a being is its final cause, that for which it exists, which it is the purpose of its being to accomplish. But nature nowhere reveals to natural reason final causes. We know from reason that all created existences must have a final cause, as well as a first cause; for we know from reason the existence of God, and even his eternal power and godhead, that he is wise and good, and must therefore act to a wise and good end. We know, therefore, that the universe has a final cause, that each particular being of the universe has its final cause, and that this cause is wise and good. But what this final cause or end is, we cannot, either in the case of the whole or of a part, in a single respect, from the study of nature alone, ever ascertain. I may, perhaps, from the study of the nature of the bee, ascertain that it is fitted to make honey, and infer that

it was designed to make honey ; but to make honey is not the final cause of the bee, for to what end shall it make honey ? To live ? But to what end live ? We may, from the study of man's nature, ascertain that it is adapted to the performance of certain functions, and hence infer that he was intended to perform them ; but this tells us nothing of the final cause of his existence. To what end perform these functions ? So as to perfect his nature ? But to what end perfect his nature ? Why, the end of man is to perfect his nature. Man was originally created imperfect ; his law is progress ; his end is perfection. That is to say, the end of man is to be perfect man ! But what is perfect man for ? That the end of imperfect man, that is, of incomplete man, in so far as incomplete, is to become perfect, we do not doubt, but this is not our question. When we ask what is the end of man, we ask the end of perfected no less than of unperfected man. Man was not made imperfect ; but suppose he was, and suppose that by progressive development he has become perfect, what now does he exist for ?

M. Jouffroy says, man is predestinated by his nature to a certain end, which is his destiny, and that by a perfect knowledge of man's nature we may know what this destiny is. But this destiny, according to his own system, is simply the satisfaction of my natural tendencies, by gaining the natural objects they seek. These tendencies are myself. Consequently, my destiny is to satisfy myself. But what is *myself* for ? I have a natural tendency to eat, to drink, to sleep, &c. Was I made for the simple purpose of eating, drinking, sleeping, &c. ? Of course not. For what, then, *was* I made ? To fulfil my destiny. What is my destiny ? The satisfaction of my tendencies. But to what end satisfy my tendencies ? So that I may exist as a perfect man. But to what end exist as a perfect man ? To satisfy my tendencies ! "The millions," somebody says, "live to dig, and dig to live." Nature turns for ever in a vicious circle.

Not so. M. Jouffroy, it may be said, gets out of it. He identifies our destiny with our good. We are to satisfy our natural tendencies because that is our good, and it is our good because it is a fragment of the good of the race, which is a fragment of universal good, identical with universal order, which is absolute good. But wherefore is universal order good ? Universal order is ultimate, and we are not required to go beyond the ultimate. But we demand the

proof that universal order *is* ultimate. It may, indeed, be as far as your system can carry you, but are you sure it is as far as the truth requires you to go? Does the universe exist solely for the purpose of realizing order? What is order? The proper arrangement or adjustment of the several parts; nothing more, nothing less. So the universe exists for the sole purpose of having all its parts adjusted or properly arranged!

Order is nothing in itself, but is a mere state or condition. We may as properly ask why order is good, as why this or that particular act is good. Order is, no doubt, good as a means or condition; but that it is good as an end cannot be conceived. If we ask why universal order is good,—we can answer, because it is the necessary condition of securing to all the beings of the universe free scope to develop their nature and satisfy their natural tendencies,—that is, free scope to accomplish what M. Jouffroy calls their destiny. It is not that accomplishment, but its condition. It therefore leaves us to turn, as before, in our vicious circle. To what end the satisfaction of a given natural tendency? The total satisfaction of the individual. The total satisfaction of the individual? The total satisfaction of the race. The total satisfaction of the race? The total satisfaction of the universe. The total satisfaction of the universe? The establishment of universal order. The establishment of universal order? The establishment of the necessary condition of the satisfaction of the natural tendencies of all and of each. “The millions live to dig, and dig to live.”

We must be careful, M. Jouffroy admonishes us, not to confound the satisfaction of a tendency with the pleasure which follows it. The pleasure is no part of the satisfaction, but its simple accident. It is not the good, but its attendant, and therefore is not the end to be sought. The good is solely in gaining the natural object of the tendency. This must not be forgotten. Now, the point to be proved is, that the gaining of this object, which is what is meant by satisfying a natural tendency, *is* good. Is it good, and for what reason? This is what we want shown.

Now, good may be taken in two senses; absolutely, as the end, and relatively, as the means of gaining the end. The satisfaction of our tendencies is not good in the first sense, unless we are prepared to say that we live to eat, instead of saying that we eat to live. Is it good in the second sense? But how can we answer, till we know what is our destiny, and what are the means of fulfilling it?

M. Jouffroy assumes it to be good in both senses. It is good as an end to the individual, because it is his destiny ; good as a means, because it contributes to absolute good. But it cannot be good as a means, unless it is also good as an end ; for the absolute good of which M. Jouffroy speaks is nothing but the aggregate good of the several parts of which the universe is composed. It can, then, contain nothing not to be found in the parts. The total satisfaction, in universal order, of the natural tendencies of the universe can be called good, only on condition that the satisfaction of the tendencies of each of the parts is in itself good without relation to the sum total. When, therefore, M. Jouffroy pronounces the satisfaction of my tendencies good, because by satisfying them and establishing order in my own bosom I contribute to absolute good, he merely begs the question.

Nor is this all. M. Jouffroy really admits no absolute good. A good, which is the mere aggregate or sum total of separate goods, is not absolute ; for absolute good must be independent, self-subsisting, and self-sufficing. It is a contradiction in terms to say, that what depends on the several beings of the universe, and is made up of their separate goods, is absolute ; for destroy these separate goods and it would be dissolved. But we can at any time resolve it into these separate goods, and thus dissolve or destroy it. These separate goods themselves, moreover, can be good only by virtue of participating of absolute good. They cannot compose it, because they must participate of it or not be good. If independent of them there is no absolute good, of which they can participate, and by virtue of which they are good, there can be no good at all, neither absolute good nor relative good. The absolute must precede the relative, for the relative exists only in relation to the absolute. Then, either there is an absolute good existing in itself, independent of all partial and relative goods, neither diminished nor augmented by them, or there is no good. If independent, it is not made up of the separate goods of individuals, and then the satisfaction of my tendencies cannot be good because it goes to make up the sum total of the good of the universe, or because necessary to make up absolute good.

Now, before M. Jouffroy can pronounce the satisfaction of my tendencies good, he must prove that by satisfying them I participate of absolute good, of the good in itself, self-subsisting and self-sufficing. Is he able to do this ? Is he able to say what absolute good is ? This is an ontologi-

cal question, and must be answered before we can answer what is good psychologically. But, unhappily, M. Jouffroy denies the possibility of attaining to ontological existence. He confines philosophy within the sphere of psychology, and denies that it can attain to ontology, or know the reality of any thing lying back of the psychological phenomena. Hence, he has never considered absolute good in an ontological sense, as absolutely existing ; but has considered it merely as phenomenal, or as an aggregate of phenomena ; which is pure atheism. If he had fixed in his mind, that there can be no particular good but by virtue of participating of absolute good, he never would have defined our good to be the fulfilment of our nature or the satisfaction of our tendencies ; for he would have seen that this satisfaction would have been good only on condition of its causing us to partake of absolute good, the good in itself. Nor would he, in the next place, have sought to legitimate this satisfaction and prove it to be good, on the ground of its contributing to absolute good ; for he would have seen that absolute good precedes relative good, and is not made up of separate, partial goods, but is that by virtue of which they themselves are good.

But we ought, in justice to M. Jouffroy, to say, that he does not consider this satisfaction in relation to absolute good for the purpose of settling the question of good, so much as for settling that of virtue. He regards it as good in itself, as we began by stating. Good is to gain the end for which we were made, which, according to him, is nothing but what we have called the satisfaction of our tendencies. This is good. But, if this be good, what is virtue ? It is this question, rather than the question of good, which has preoccupied him, at least in those of his works which have been published. But having, perhaps too hastily, decided that good is fulfilling our natural destiny, or attaining to the end indicated by our nature, which is, as we have seen, simply obtaining the natural objects craved by our tendencies, he has passed on to the question of virtue, and asked, if this satisfaction of our nature be good, wherein consists our virtue ? The common sense of mankind revolts at the assertion, that a man is virtuous solely in seeking his own natural satisfaction. It pronounces such a man selfish, and, if not vicious, at least void of merit. Yet, man ought to seek good ; and if the satisfaction of his own nature be good, he ought to seek it. How shall he vindicate his right to

seek it, and prove that in seeking it he may be meritorious? Here is the question, and it seems to us what M. Jouffroy has regarded as the principal ethical problem.

To get at his answer to this question, we must take up a portion of his system which we have not yet presented. We must remember that he is a psychologist, and is concerned only with what he calls the *moral facts* of human nature. In studying these facts, he is led to recognize in the life of man, as developed in this world, four epochs:—1. The *instinctive* epoch, which begins as soon as man exists, and in which man does not act from motives, but follows instinctively his natural tendencies, and obeys them without the least reflection. He is not properly *moral* in this epoch, performs, in fact, no moral act, and is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy,—is not a man with faculties, but a thing with properties. This epoch is of uncertain duration, but with many, perhaps the majority, it lasts through life.—2. The *selfish* epoch; in which man governs his tendencies by reason and directs them to a common end, to wit, his own individual interest. He now acts from a rational motive, but not a moral motive.—3. The *benevolent* epoch; in which man seeks to subordinate his own interest to the interest of other beings beside himself, and to make the general good of other beings the motive of his conduct. In this epoch he is translated out of selfishness, but hardly into the region of morality.—4. The *moral* epoch. In this epoch, his reason developed, man perceives that the universe tends to a common end, to wit, universal order, or absolute good. The realization of absolute good becomes now his motive, the end to which he directs all his efforts. Now he is moral, virtuous, meritorious.

1. This sounds well, but it will hardly bear examination. Virtue, we grant, is in the will or motive from which we act; but we are not able to act from purely disinterested motives, as M. Jouffroy himself seems to admit; consequently, we cannot will this absolute good in the purely disinterested sense demanded. It is impossible for man to will without more or less reference to himself. In our moments of exaltation we may fancy we put ourselves entirely out of the question, and can will our own damnation, as our Hopkinsian friends teach; but we deceive ourselves. We do not even love God disinterestedly. Some one says,

“God, I would fear thee, though I feared not hell;
And love thee, though I had no hopes of heaven,”—

and with truth, if he means no other hell than that of not loving, and no other heaven than that of loving. We always seek to possess what we love, and in some sense do possess it. In loving God, we in some degree participate of his infinite beauty and goodness, and if we did not, we would not and could not love him. In love, charity, we are united to him, and he to us; we become one with him. Is not this the highest reward we can conceive of? and what but reference to this reward, this ineffable joy which we experience in this love, makes us will to persist in loving? What but the desire of possessing this in a still greater degree draws us nearer and nearer to God, and fills us more and more with his divine charity? Assume that in loving God we found not this reward, this ineffable joy, that we in fact gained nothing, tasted nothing,—could we love him? Nay, what is more to our purpose, could we *will* to love him? What would be the motive of such a will?

Moreover, virtue and duty are closely related, for virtue is always obligatory, and may be enforced as a duty. But how enforce a duty without appeal to rewards or punishments? If I gain nothing by doing my duty, and lose nothing by not doing it, I am the same whether I do it or not. How, then, find any motives to persuade me to do it, or to dissuade me from neglecting it? The good I am to will is absolute good; then it is independent of me, and remains unaffected, let me will what I may. What motives, then, can influence me to will it, save such motives as appeal directly or indirectly to my own good or evil?

But we may be told, this good we are to will is the good of others, and that the motive to do good to others without hope of reward is sufficient to induce us to will it. But, in the first place, it is not yet settled, that what I am required to will is the good of others. It is called universal order, absolute good; but, at bottom, it is merely the satisfaction by each being of all its natural tendencies. Whether this is good or not can be determined only by determining what is good in itself, which M. Jouffroy has not done. In the second place, the simple willing of the good of others is not virtue. I must will their good, as my own, for the sake of absolute goodness, in order to be virtuous, according to our author himself.

2: Virtue consists in willing the supreme good; but the universal order we are required to will is not the supreme

good, for it is merely the sum total of the separate goods of the several parts or beings which make up the universe. Supreme good is, as we have seen, the good in itself, that by participation of which this or that is good. How, then, in willing this universal order, am I virtuous? Suppose I do act in reference to it, what is my merit, since I am not acting in reference to the supreme good? Will it be said, that virtue, consisting entirely in the will, cannot be destroyed by a mistake of the understanding? We do not deny this. A man may, doubtless, be virtuous in acting from the motive here supposed, but only on condition of invincible ignorance; for a mistake of the understanding is no less culpable than perversity of will, if possible to be avoided. But the object of moral science is to enlighten the understanding. It will hardly do, then, for a writer, who professes to give us ethical *science*, to give us a system which renders virtue possible only to the invincibly ignorant.

3. This doctrine of virtue makes virtue and its opposite practically the same. The acts to be performed are the same, whatever the motive from which we act. This M. Jouffroy is careful to inform us. What is done is the same in all cases, to wit,—the satisfaction of our natural tendencies. This is what we are to do, whether we obey instinct, act from selfishness, benevolence, or a view of universal order. So far as actions and results are concerned, it matters not what is the motive from which we act. The sole difference is in the view we take of the reason for doing what we do. Practically, the supremely selfish man is as good as the supremely virtuous man, and receives and does as much good. What superiority, then, has virtue? Why is it better to be virtuous than to be not virtuous? Why are we bound to be virtuous? Where is the obligation? I am to promote universal good by promoting my own; and I have a right to promote my own personal good, because it is a fragment of universal good. This is the doctrine. If I do it for the sake of myself, I am selfish; if for the sake of universal good, I am meritorious. Meritorious for what? What have I really done? Simply, found out a reason for being selfish; the method of being, with purely disinterested motives, supremely selfish. But what is the merit of disinterested motives themselves, especially if they have no tendency to lead to disinterested external acts? The practical rule, and the only practical rule of life,—this sublime system, which makes a man live solely for himself,

for the purpose of promoting universal good,—is, Look out for number one; let each take care of himself, and then all will be taken care of. I am revelling in every luxury, satisfying to the utmost all my natural tendencies,—primitive passions, as Charles Fourier names them,—while the poor beggar stands shivering and starving at my gate; but, for his consolation, I send him my servant to assure him that he may go in peace and be thankful, for I am doing all in my power to augment the good of all beings by augmenting my own! Admirable morality this, and worthy of being early instilled into the minds and the hearts of our New-England youth!

But enough. M. Jouffroy talks largely and learnedly of man's destiny, of individual good, universal good, and absolute good; but he fails utterly to tell us what is our real destiny, what is good, and, *a fortiori*, what are the rules which should govern us in the conduct of life. A puny eclecticism runs through his whole work, and the vain attempt is everywhere made to accept and harmonize in one consistent whole the leading principles of contradictory schools. Much is said, but nothing is done. We rise from the study of his system as uninstructed in all that relates to the end for which God made us, or the means of attaining to that end, as we were before. No theoretical problem is solved, no practical difficulty removed, no wise practical suggestion offered. We are amused and misled by words. We seem at moments to have grasped somewhat; but we open our hand and find we have nothing. We might as well have attempted to catch a handful of smoke.

M. Jouffroy's *first* great mistake is in not perceiving clearly and steadily, that good, if good there be, must be independent, self-subsisting, set before us, and not contained in us. The first ethical problem is necessarily, What is good? It is the old question of the *summum bonum*; and till this is answered, we cannot proceed a single step in the construction of the science of ethics, whether speculative or practical. Now, this question M. Jouffroy does not answer, or, at least, not correctly. He, indeed, contends that order is the supreme good, but wrongly; for order is but a mere state or condition, wholly dependent on the parts ordered, and good only as the means of enabling the beings ordered to gain good.

His *next* mistake is in confounding the end for which we were made with the mere fulfilment of our nature, or the

realization of its most perfect type. According to him, our nature contains its destiny in itself; which is to say, that man is his own final cause. But man can no more be his own final cause than his own first cause. None but a self-existent and self-subsistent being can be its own final cause. Man is neither self-existent nor self-subsistent. This final cause, or end he is to gain, is therefore not in himself, but out of himself,—something not possessed, but to be attained to.

The second great ethical problem is that of obligation. The first is the problem of good, and its solution reveals to us the end to be sought. The second establishes our duty to seek that end,—not only stating the fact that we *feel* we ought to seek it, but disclosing the grounds of the obligation. This is the problem which M. Jouffroy has chiefly labored in the volumes before us. There can be no morals unless there is a moral law, and none if a law which does not bind. Now, after all his labor, M. Jouffroy fails entirely to establish the reality of such law. He recognizes no lawgiver but human nature. Man, then, is under no law, but the law imposed by his own nature, which is to say, no law at all. Why am I bound to obey the law of my nature?

Failing to establish a real moral law, M. Jouffroy of course fails to establish the possibility of virtue, of merit; for virtue can be found only in obedience, actual or intentional, to the moral law. But if no moral law, then no virtue, then no merit, no praise, no blame. M. Jouffroy really comes to this conclusion; for he recognizes no distinction in actions but such as exists solely in the mind of the actor. We say, then, with truth, that his whole system, as a system, whatever the ingenuity, learning, and ability it indicates, is a complete failure, and leaves us no wiser than it found us.

This mournful result was the necessary consequence of M. Jouffroy's vicious method. From the study of man's nature it is impossible to conclude to man's destiny or end, or to deduce the rules for the conduct of his life; *because man was not made to follow nature, but God*. This is the grand fact which the author began by discarding, and hence all his mistakes and errors. Having begun wrong, started in the wrong direction, no speed he could make could bring him to the right termination. The faster he travelled, the further he departed from the truth. Yet he errs only in common with all our great German, English, and Scotch moralists. All these, or nearly all, adopt the rule, that we must follow nat-

ure, and assume that the end to be sought is the perfection of our nature. M. Jouffroy tells us that we are predestinated by our organization to a certain end, which is our good. Follow nature, and you will gain it. Here the fulfilment of our nature, or the complete satisfaction of our natural tendencies, is assumed to be the good. Obtain this, and you obtain good. This is the case also with our Fourierists. M. Jouffroy and Charles Fourier adopt precisely the same ethical system, with this simple difference,—that what the one calls *tendencies* the other calls *passions*, what the one terms *order* the other terms *harmony*. Absolute good with the former is universal order, with the latter it is universal harmony; the means of attaining to it is with the one the satisfaction of our natural tendencies, with the other the satisfaction of the primitive passions. And even this, not because by this satisfaction the individual is placed in relation with an order or harmony which exists independent of him; but because by establishing order or harmony in the individual, it contributes so much towards the general order or harmony of the universe. It is not good for the reason that it participates of absolute good, but because it contributes to it; and it can contribute to it only on condition of its being good in itself, that is to say, itself the absolute good! Now, what authority has any man for saying that this satisfaction is absolutely good in itself?

But it is vain to tell us to follow nature. Nature herself recoils from her own teachings, and universally shrieks out, "Save me from myself." They who follow her as ultimate never find good. She herself sees that she is not sufficient for herself,—that there must be something above her, of which we must participate, or there is no good for us. But at the same time she sees and feels that she is impotent to discover what that something is, or to elevate us to its participation. This is demonstrated by the fact, that natural reason itself rejects all the great ethical systems founded on natural reason alone, and is daily seeking and concocting new systems, to yield in turn to others still newer, and thus on for ever. Nature never satisfies nature. Nature never finds her good in herself. We may gain all the natural objects craved by our natural tendencies or passions, and still ask from the depths of our souls, "Who will show us any good?" Our tendencies grow, and demand more, the more we obtain; they become morbidly active, crying out, like the daughters of the horseleech, "Give, give!" or they be-

come satiated, surcharged, wearied, and, all things palling on our hearts and senses, we cry out with the Preacher, *Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.*

We take the wrong road. It is not in following nature alone that we find the country we seek. Not in that direction lies our veritable good. The sad experience of all ages and climes proclaims it in a voice too loud not to be heard, too distinct not to be understood. True wisdom requires us to return from our weary wanderings to the fountain of living waters. If nature could have sufficed, no other teacher would have been vouchsafed us ; no supernatural revelation, as we have said, would have been needed, none would have been made. But a supernatural revelation has been made, and because we needed it for our guide in the conduct of life. In the light of this revelation all becomes plain and easy. The problem of our destiny ceases to be a problem. Man was made, not for a natural, but a supernatural destiny ; not for pleasure, not for happiness, but for beatitude, which consists in our being elevated by the light of glory to know and love God as he is in himself, with a knowledge and love, though different in degree, yet the same in kind as the knowledge and love with which God knows and loves himself. Here is our sublime destiny. We have but to remember that God is infinite truth, wisdom, beauty, goodness, and to consider what is the joy the soul finds in knowing and loving truth, wisdom, beauty, goodness, to be assured that eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, what is reserved for us in the heaven to which we are destined. God made us that we might become partakers of his own infinite blessedness, because he is good and delights to communicate his goodness.

To this blessedness we are not naturally equal, we do not attain to it by natural development, the famous "self-culture," of which in these days we hear so much ; because it is not the fulfilment of our nature, the realization of its most perfect type, but something far transcending nature, graciously bestowed by our heavenly Father. A Goethe, with his long life of study, with his "many-sided" culture, bringing his whole nature to the highest possible state of perfection, is further from it than the little child over whom the priest has just pronounced the baptismal formula. It is hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed unto babes, that no flesh may glory in the presence of God. Here learn

the vanity of all your earth-born greatness and wisdom, of all that the wisdom of this world applauds. Not by the wisdom to which we attain by natural culture and development,—not by a vain philosophy which sees neither behind nor before,—not even by natural elevation, nobility, kindness, and love, do we attain to the end to which our God in his ineffable goodness has appointed us. The great man of the earth must become as the little child, the rich man poor as the poorest beggar, and the wise man as the fool. All pride must humble itself, all towering thoughts be brought down, all self-importance, all self-confidence, be laid aside; meek and lowly in heart, we must bow down at the foot of the altar, and receive it as a free bounty, which we have done nothing to merit, and could do nothing to merit. Behold us, O Lord! We are nothing,—yea, less than nothing; do unto us according to thy will,—not according to ours.

Human pride revolts at this. We shrink from this profound humility. We would have the reward, we would possess the infinite beatitude; but we would earn it by our own labor, win it by our own stout hearts and strong arms; and would receive it not as a largess, but as a due, and claim it as our right. Hence it is that we seek in human nature, means which nature alone has placed in our hands, to wring out the secrets we must know, and to gain the end without which there is no true life for us. Hence your Jouffroys, Fouriers, and others, construct systems of morals resting on nature alone, and seek from the simple study of man to ascertain his destiny and determine the rules after which he should govern his conduct. But let them pass. Heed them not. They can only divert you from the truth, alienate you from your God, and debar you from heaven. Return to your God; take his revelation for your guide, let him be your ethical teacher; and from him who is your beginning and your end, in whom you live, move, and have your being, learn your destiny, and obtain the means of fulfilling it.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1852.]

WE find in this excellent periodical, for the 15th of last May, a characteristic letter to the *Heraldo* of Madrid by Donoso Cortés, Marquis de Valdegamas, lately, and we believe still, Spanish ambassador at the court of France. As every thing from the pen of this eminent statesman and sincere Catholic possesses a high interest, and as the letter discusses, though briefly, very freely, topics on which American statesmen are seldom suffered to think and speak as freemen, we think we shall gratify our readers by laying it before them. The letter was written in Spanish; but as we have not seen it in the original, we translate it from the Italian.

Paris, April 15, 1852.

"The *Heraldo* of the 8th instant contains an article in defence of rationalism, liberalism, and parliamentarism, in which you review and eulogize the many advantages of discussion, and seek to strengthen your positions by recalling some words spoken by me in the *Athenæum* of Madrid in 1836, against the divine right of kings,—words which you qualify as eloquent, although they were, at best, only bombast.

"I think it my duty to remind you that I have not for a long time deserved such eulogiums, or been able to expect from you any thing but abuse or forgetfulness. Between your doctrines, which I maintained in my youth, and those which I now hold, there is a radical contradiction, an insuperable repugnance. You hold that *rationalism* is the road to the *reasonable*; that *liberalism* in theory is the way of arriving at liberty in practice; that *parliamentarism* is the necessary constitution of *good government*; that discussion is to truth as the means to the end; and finally, that the king is only the representative of human right. At present I hold the contrary of all this. I acknowledge no human right, and hold that, strictly speaking, there is no right but divine right. In God is right and the concentration of all rights; in man is duty and the concentration of all duties. Man calls the utility which he derives from the fulfilment by others of their duties to his advantage his *right*, but the word *right* on man's lips is a vicious expression, and when he goes fur-

**La Civiltà Cattolica, Pubblicazione periodica per tutta l'Italia il 1° e 3° Sabato di ciascun Mese.* Roma. Vol. IX. 3° Sabato di Maggio, 1852.

ther and erects this vicious expression into a theory, the tempest is let loose upon the world.

"Discussion, as you understand it, is the source of all possible errors, and the origin of all imaginable extravagances. As to parliamentarism, liberalism, and rationalism, I hold the first to be the negation of government, the second, the negation of liberty, and the third, the affirmation of madness.

"Perchance you will ask me, What, then, are you? If you reject discussion as understood by the modern world, if you are neither a liberal, nor a rationalist, nor a parliamentarian, what are you? An absolutist? I reply, that I should be an absolutist if absolutism were the radical contradictory of these systems. But history shows me rationalistic absolutisms, to a certain extent; also, liberal absolutisms, cherishing discussion, and even absolutist parliaments. Absolutism at most is the contradiction of the form, not the essence, of these doctrines, now become famous by the grandeur of their ruins. Absolutism is not their contradictory; for there is no contradiction between things not of the same nature. It is a form, and nothing else; and is it not absurd to seek in a mere form the radical contradiction of a doctrine, or in a doctrine the radical contradiction of a mere form?

"Catholicity is the sole contradictory of the doctrines I oppose, and give to Catholic doctrine what form you please, you will see it instantly transform every thing, and renew the face of the earth. With Catholicity there is no thing or phenomenon which is not arranged respectively in the hierarchical order of things and phenomena. Reason ceases to be rationalism, that is to say, it ceases to be a pharos, which, that it may arrogate to itself the privilege of shining without any borrowed light, claims to be uncreated, and becomes a marvellous light which concentrates in itself and sends forth from itself the most splendid light of Christian doctrine,—the most pure reflection of the uncreated and eternal light of God.

"As to liberty, it is in the Catholic mind neither a right in its essence, nor a covenant in its form; it is not preserved by war, does not originate in contract, and is not won by conquest. It is not a drunken bacchanalian, like our demagogical liberty; it does not walk among the nations with a queenly train, like parliamentary liberty; it has not tribunes and courtiers for its servants, is not lulled asleep by the buzzing of the crowd, has no standing army of the national guard, and finds not its pleasure in being borne at its ease on the triumphal car of revolution.

"The commandments of God are the bread of life. Under the empire of Catholicity, God distributes it to governors and governed, reserving to himself the inalienable right of exacting the obedience of both. Under the auspices and in the presence of God, the sovereign and subject are united in a species of wedlock, whose sanctity makes it more like a sacrament than a contract. The two parties find themselves implicitly bound by the commandments of God. The subject contracts the obliga

tion of obeying with love the sovereign placed over him by God, and the sovereign that of ruling with love and moderation the subjects whom God has placed in his hands. When the subjects fail in their obedience, God permits tyrannies; when the sovereign fails in moderation, God permits revolutions. By the first, subjects are reduced to their obedience; by the second, rulers are brought back to moderation, and thus, while man draws evil from the good works of God, God draws good from the evil doings of man. History is the record of the different phases of this gigantic struggle between good and evil, between the divine and the human will, between a most merciful God and rebellious man.

“When the commandments of God are faithfully observed, that is to say, when princes are moderate and the people obedient (I mean with a moderation and obedience inspired by love), from this simultaneous submission to the divine commands there flows a certain social order, a certain condition and well-being both individual and common, which I call the *state of liberty*. And it is truly such, since then justice rules, and it is justice which makes men free. See then wherein consists the liberty of the sons of God, that is, Catholic liberty. It is not something definite, particular, and concrete; it is not a part of the political organization, nor a social institution different from others. Catholic liberty is not this, and yet it is more than this; it is the general result of the good disposition of all the organs, of the harmony and agreement of all the institutions. It is as the soundness of man’s physical organization, which is not an organ, and yet is worth more than a sound organ; as the general life of the social and political body, which is more precious than the floridness of any particular institution. Catholic liberty consists precisely in these two things (health and life), more excellent than all else, which, as they are for the whole, cannot be in any particular institution. This liberty is so holy that the least injustice offends it; at once so strong and so weak that every thing vivifies it and the least disorder suffices to change it; so tender that its love seizes all men; so sweet that it sheds peace into all hearts; so modest and retiring that, although it came from heaven for the consolation of all men, it is known only to a very few, and perhaps applauded by none. Indeed, it scarcely knows its own name, or if it knows it, it imparts it to none, and the world is ignorant of it.

“As to discussion, there is more resemblance between Catholic and philosophical discussion than there is between Catholic and political liberty. In this matter, here is the Catholic method. It receives from on high a ray of light which it imparts to man, that he may fecundate it with his reason; and, thanks to the intellectual fecundation, this small ray of light is converted into a torrent of splendor that fills all space as far as eye can reach. Philosophism, on the contrary, astutely throws a thick veil upon the light of truth we have received from heaven, and proposes to our reason an insolvable problem, of which the formula

might be: To draw truth and light from doubt and obscurity, which are the only things assigned to the intellectual activities. And thus philosophism asks of man a solution which he is unable to give without first inverting the immutable and eternal laws. According to one of these laws, fecundation is nothing but the development of the germ according to the conditions of its own nature; and thus the obscure proceeds from the obscure, the luminous from the luminous, like from like,—*Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine*. In obedience to this law, human reason in fecundating doubt has reached denial, and in fecundating obscurity has arrived at palpable darkness; and all this by means of logical and progressive transformations, founded in the very nature of things.

“It is no wonder that Catholicity and philosophism, starting from such different points and proceeding by such different routes, should come to such different results. For eighteen centuries Catholicity has followed her own method of discussion, and it is precisely this method that has always obtained for her the victory. Every thing passes before her, things in time and time itself; she passes not; she remains where God has placed her, immovable in the midst of the tempest of universal agitation. Death has no power to approach her, even in those deep and dark regions subject to its empire. For a trial of her forces Catholicity once said, ‘I will choose a barbarous age and fill it with my wonders;’ and, having chosen the thirteenth century, crowned it with the four most magnificent monuments which human genius has ever raised,—the *Summa* of St. Thomas, *Las Partidas* of Alphonso the Wise, the *Divina Commedia*, and the Cathedral of Cologne.

“For four thousand years rationalism has followed its own method of discussion, and has left to perpetuate its memory two immortal monuments,—the pantheon where all philosophies lie prostrate in the dust, and the pantheon where the ruins of all constitutions lie gathered together.

“Nothing occurs to me to be said of parliamentarism. O, what would it become with a truly Catholic people, a people in whose bosom man will learn from his very infancy that he must render an account to God of even his idle words!

“I am, &c.,

“JUAN DONOSO-CORTÉS.”

The editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica* regards the epithet vicious (*viciosa*), which the writer applies to the expression human right, as hyperbolical or exaggerated, and in his translation softens it to *imperfetta*, imperfect, and subjoins a note in justification, on which we must be permitted to make a few observations. We insert a translation:—

“Instead of *imperfect*, the text has *vicious* [*viciosa*]. If our translation should fall under the eye of the writer, we hope he will pardon us for softening his expression. We perfectly agree with him that right in

man is very different from right in God, and that it originates essentially in the order which the Creator has established in the universe, and the obligation man is under of conforming thereto. We have explained this at length elsewhere.* Nevertheless, we do not believe the word *right* is vicious when applied to man, any more than are the other terms which human language adopts *analogically*, as say the theologians, in speaking both of infinite and finite being; for no expression in man can be *vicious*, we had almost said *imperfect*, when he speaks according to his nature. Now man's nature is such that he can know things above him only through the medium of the sensible world,—*invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*. Hence, though God alone is beauty, greatness, wisdom, power, &c., it is not vicious to say that a man is beautiful, great, wise, powerful, &c., when he participates of these divine attributes. To deny this participation is to fall into Hindoo pantheism, which regards every participated being as a Maia, or pure illusion; or into the system of occasional causes, according to which creatures have no proper causality, and God alone acts in the universe,—a system refuted by the angelic doctor, in the first part of his admirable *Summa*.† Man is, in the hands of God, an instrument, like the saw in the hands of the carpenter, and as it is not vicious to ascribe action to the saw, although it cannot act without the carpenter, so it cannot be vicious to ascribe to a man a right, or a force to bend the will of another, any more than it is to ascribe to him any other force whatever, although this force depends essentially on God as its first cause."

We are very far from regarding the word *right* in every sense as a vicious expression when adopted by man, but our contemporary's note fails to convince us that it is not vicious in the sense intended by the author of the letter, or that in changing *viciosa* into *imperfetta* he has merely softened the expression of the text, without changing the system of the author. The Italian critic and the Spanish statesman do not, as it strikes us, adopt the same ethical philosophy, and explain the ground of rights and duties by the same method. The critic says he agrees perfectly with the author, "that right in man is very different from right in God, and that it originates essentially in the order which the Creator has established in the universe, and the obligation man is under of conforming thereto." But we see not how this can be, for, if we understand him, the marquis denies all human right, and his precise doctrine is, that man has no rights at all, that all rights are God's rights, and that man has only

* "*Idea del Dritto*," *Civiltà Cattolica*, Vol. II., p. 267 et seq.; especially p. 277 and n. 22.

† Q. 115, and elsewhere.

duties, and of course duties, strictly speaking, only to God. There can, then, be no agreement or disagreement between him and his critic as to the origin of human right, or as to the difference or the sameness of right in man and right in God. The marquis denies, strictly speaking, all human right; his critic asserts human right, though he concedes that it is only an imperfect right, as all the forces of second causes are imperfect, inasmuch as they all depend on God as their first cause. The difference is not one of exaggeration, but one of system, and the question is, Which system ought to be adopted?

Our contemporary holds that there is human right, and that this right has its immediate origin in the order of nature as second cause, and its remote origin in God as first cause,—which assumes that nature is, in an imperfect sense at least, legislative, and can found rights and impose duties. The question here is not whether we are bound to conform to the order of nature, to keep what is called the natural law, for on this point there is no dispute; it is not any more whether it is necessary to keep the natural law in order to secure happiness and fulfil the end for which we were created, or the design of God in creation, for here, again, there is no dispute. The question relates to the reason or ground of our obligation to conform to the order of nature. Here, again, all agree, that is, all Christians agree, that the ultimate reason or ground is God, and the precise question is narrowed down to this: Is God the immediate reason or ground, or is he it only mediately, inasmuch as he is the author and end of the order of nature? Donoso Cortés appears to us to adopt the former, his critic adopts the latter view.

We have examined carefully the article on the Idea of Right, *Idea del Dritto*, to which we are referred in the note. It is elaborate, written with rare ability, by a disciplined mind, but it hardly touches the real question at issue, and in no instance, as far as we have discovered, even recognizes obligation at all in the sense we have been accustomed to understand, or to imagine we understand, it. Why am I bound to conform to the order of nature? We find several assumptions which we certainly do not dispute, but no distinct answer to this question. We are told that we cannot obtain happiness if we do not; but this is no answer, because we may ask, Why are we bound to seek happiness, whether our own or another's? Are we answered

that every man is impelled by the very constitution of his nature to seek happiness? This alleges a fact, but does not assign a reason; it tells us what the order of nature in this respect is, but not why we are bound to conform to it. Moreover, if we assume that we are bound because impelled by nature, we fall into modern transcendentalism, whose maxim is, Follow thy instincts, Act out thyself. We are also told that we must conform to the order of nature because God is its author and end, and if we do not conform to it, we oppose his design, and labor to defeat his purposes in creation. Nothing in the world more true, but it only brings us back to the point from which we started. Why am I bound even to seek God, to conform to his purposes, and to conspire to the end he has proposed? This question, as far as we can discover, our contemporary has not even raised; and yet it seems to us to be very essential in the discussion of the idea of right, that is, of law, of duty. Right in one is duty in another, and law is simply the obligatory phase of right. My right is your law, for what is my right you are bound to perform, and what is against my right you are forbidden to do. In a scientific discussion of the idea of right, then, there should be, first of all, a discussion of the ground of obligation, or of law in general.

We have discussed this subject at length in our *Letter to Protestants*,* and we can offer here only some brief remarks. We regret to find ourselves on any point not in exact agreement with the *Civiltà Cattolica*. We regard this periodical with great deference, and are bound so to regard it, published as it is at Rome, and conducted by distinguished members of the learned Society of Jesus; but we hope, as the question is not one of dogma, it is not temerity in us to say that we are as yet reluctant to abandon the views of the subject before us which we have been accustomed to hold, and which seem to us to be unimpeachable. We are not able to recognize in nature, as created nature, any proper legislative character, or to found rights or duties on instinct or necessity, or in any sense on second causes, for law is always the expression of free-will, and second causes are never for themselves. Undoubtedly, we may consult instinct, the necessity of nature, second causes, the whole natural order, when the question is as to what is law, or what does the law com-

* *Brownson's Works*, Vol V., pp. 270 *et seq.*

mand ; but not, it strikes us, when the question is as to the ground of right or the obligation of duty. Government is a social necessity, and society could not exist a moment, nor the individual be born, be nurtured, or be buried, without some sort of government. This is a good reason for the existence of government, and for my *de facto* submission to it ; but the right of the government, or my moral obligation or duty to obey it, cannot be deduced from this social necessity. Moreover, to found the right of the government, or the duty of the subject, on this social necessity, is to authorize that divorce of politics from religion, that political atheism, which is the characteristic error of our age. If we found rights and duties immediately on second causes, and only mediately on God as first cause, we encourage, in these times, men to stop short with second causes, and to look no further for their origin or end.

Our contemporary, of course, is as strongly and as ardently opposed to every form of rationalistic or atheistical politics as we can be, and it is only simple justice to him to say that he maintains in his article, *Idea del Dritto*, that there is no conception of right—he says no reverence—without some apprehension of God. But he apparently says this only on the ground that nature proceeds from and tends to God, and such is its scope, design, or end, that we cannot conform to it without apprehending it, and we cannot apprehend it without some apprehension of God. Since God was infinitely perfect and supremely happy, he could create only for the purpose of manifesting his own glory in the happiness of his intelligent creatures. We were created to find our happiness in admiring and loving him as our Creator. This is our end, and to this end all nature is ordered. To conform to nature is to conform to this order and conspire to this end. But as this end is our happiness in loving and admiring God as the author of the admirable order established, we cannot of course conspire to it without apprehending him as admirable and worthy of all love. Right is conformity to this order which God has established ; and non-conformity is wrong, because contrary to truth, because it denies that God is admirable and worthy of love, and excludes man from all good. Hence no real morality without a recognition of God, and consequently no atheistical politics or morals are admissible.

This is all very true, and, though much, is not all that is needed to meet fully the errors of our unbelieving age. It

states the fact, but does not declare the law. It tells why it is fit, proper, convenient, or useful to conform to the order established by the Creator in the universe, but it does not tell us why we are bound, much less why I have the right to require my neighbor, to conform to it. The age has gone further in its doubts and denials, we apprehend, than most of those who have had the happiness of escaping its contaminations are prepared to believe. Even St. Thomas, Bellarmine, and Suarez, were they living and writing now, would, we think, find it necessary, not indeed to change their doctrine, but in some respects their form of expression, and to bring out in new and greater prominence certain aspects of the truth which they held than was required in order to oppose the dominant errors of their times. They all had to meet the immediate divine right of government as set up in favor of the temporal prince against the sovereign pontiff, on the one hand, and the liberty of the subject, or the common good of the community on the other. The questions of their day did not demand a special vindication of the authority of government in face of the subject, nor the special vindication of the duty of the people to obey legal authority, because neither was then specially denied. The "rights of man" had not yet become the watchword of the enemies of God and society, and they had no occasion to insist on the divine dominion against democratic despotism, or as the ground of allegiance to legally constituted government. Human right, or the right of man to establish law, found right, or impose duty, if asserted, was not then asserted as the denial of the rights of God, and in favor of the absolute independence and self-sufficingness of second causes; and, if denied, it was not denied, as we deny it, for the purpose of vindicating the rights of God and maintaining political authority and liberty, but for the purpose of throwing off all government and giving loose reins to licentious will and passion. The error of all ages is virtually the same error, but it is always changing its form, and we must, in order to meet it, in some respects change with it the expression of the truth we oppose to it. While, therefore, we should feel sure of being wrong, if we found ourselves in opposition to the teaching of these great Catholic doctors, we still think we may, if necessary, so modify its outer form as to adapt it to the present aspects assumed by prevailing errors. Development of doctrine in this sense—and this is all the develop-

ment that Dr. Newman needed—is lawful and necessary, if the truth is to be preserved in a practical and living form. It seems to us that our contemporary, in his anxiety to adhere to the letter of the great doctors, sometimes misses their real sense, and fails to go far enough back to meet the errors we have now to combat. This is less the case with him than with most writers we meet, and far less than with the excellent Balmes. Prove that this or that is demanded by the order of nature, and the age has so little sense of religion that it will answer, Concede it, what then? Why are we bound to observe the order of nature, or to do what it demands? Because God has established it, and by his eternal law commanded us to preserve it, and forbidden us to violate it. But wherefore are we bound to obey God? Because he is admirable and altogether lovely, infinitely good and holy. But why are we bound to admire and love the admirable and lovely, the good and the holy, or to do what they require? Because we cannot otherwise be happy. But why are we bound to be happy? Why may we not be miserable if we choose? Why are we bound to promote the happiness of our neighbor; or whence our right to force him to consult our happiness? We are so constituted that we are impelled by the very force of our nature to seek our own happiness. Very true, but this only states a fact; it does not declare a law; and we repeat, Why are we bound to seek our happiness? God commands you to do so. That is a good answer if he has the right to command us, and we are bound to obey him. Clearly, then, the first point to be established is, even with those who do not deny the existence of God, that we are bound to obey God, and till we have proved this, and determined the reason or ground of our obligation to obey God, we are not prepared to answer the questions of our day, and determine to its mind either right or duty.

No doubt a correct answer may be found to the question, Why are we bound to obey God? in the current teachings of the schools; but we have not met one in so clear, precise, and definite a form that we can easily use it in our controversies with our modern deniers of the obligation to worship God, and of moral accountability. We think, however, that a very simple answer may be given, not chargeable with novelty, or of being original with us,—though seldom stated in the precise shape in which we present it,—and which will meet our wants. We are bound to obey God, whatever he

commands, because we are his, and not our own. We are his because he has made us out of nothing, and the maker has the sovereign right of property in the thing made,—the creator in the thing created. God as our creator is our sovereign proprietor, and as the sovereign proprietor is the sovereign lord of his property, God is our sovereign Lord and Master, and has the right to command us; and if he has the right to command us, we are bound to obey him. We are his, soul and body, reason and will, and therefore we are accountable to him for ourselves and all our thoughts, words, and deeds. Our duty to obey God is the correlative of his right to command us, and his right to command us is in his dominion over us, and his dominion over us is in his right of property in us, and his right of property in us is in his having created us. All dominion rests on ownership, and all real ownership on creation. We found, then, God's sovereignty of the universe on his creative act, by which he has produced it from nothing.

The question of human right, properly so called, is now easily disposed of. The *Civiltà Cattolica* may, perhaps, say here, that man, though not the first cause, is yet a cause, and in the sense of second cause he can produce, create, and therefore have right; not indeed a perfect, but an imperfect right, a right corresponding to the sense in which a second cause is said to cause, is said to act or produce. But the absolute lord or owner owns not only the property, but all its faculties, and consequently all that it by the exercise of those faculties can in a secondary sense produce or acquire; otherwise we should not be accountable to God for our doings, or the exercise of our faculties. This seems to us a complete answer to all those who contend that rights may be founded or duties imposed by second causes. If we belong entirely to God, as assuredly we do, and are his, all we are, all we have, all we can do, then we can owe only him, and can be in debt to no other. There is, then, for us no duty but our duty to God, and therefore no man in his own name, or by the simple virtue of his humanity, can have any right against us. But our neighbor, as ourselves, owes all to God, for God is his creator as well as ours, and therefore can owe nothing to us. Then we can have no right, in our own name, against him. Then, strictly speaking, man has no rights,—he has only duties, and all his duties are duties to God, and to God only.

But not by this do we deny that what men, when rightly

instructed, call their rights are real rights, or that what in the schools are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor are real duties, which no one is at liberty to neglect. God, in regard to these rights, which are his, out of his own goodness transfers them to us, or makes a certain part of our duties to him payable to ourselves and to our neighbor. "It is to God," says Father Avila, as cited by Father Rodriguez in his *Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection*, "that we owe all things; but since he stands in need of nothing, he transfers all the right he has to our brethren, and grants us a full discharge thereof, provided we serve them in all things possible for us to do." This, indeed, expresses the case a little too strongly, for God does not so transfer all his right or make our whole debt to him payable to our neighbor, because a certain portion of it he requires to be paid immediately to himself, and to himself alone. Nevertheless, it asserts that we owe all to God, and owe our neighbor only because we owe him, and pay duties to our neighbor only by his order. What we call our rights are real rights, and good against our neighbor; but they are ours only as transferred to us, or as we by the will of God, whose they are, are appointed to receive the duties they imply. What are called our duties to our neighbor are real duties, and good against us, but they are due, not to our neighbor in his own right, but to God, who makes them payable to him, so that in paying them to him we pay them to God.

Certainly, we are bound to love our neighbor, though a bitter enemy, as ourselves; but to whom are we bound? Not formally to our neighbor, but to God. This love of our neighbor is a debt which we owe to God, and if we do not pay it to our neighbor, we do not pay it to God. "As long as ye did it not unto these least ones, ye did it not unto me." We are not bound, strictly speaking, to our neighbor, because, since he owes all to God, he has nothing he can call his own with which to bind us; but we are bound to God to love him as ourselves, because he like ourselves belongs to God, is the property of our master, and we owe the same respect to the property of our master in another that we do to his property in ourselves. We are bound also to respect and not to injure ourselves,—not bound to ourselves, because no being can be bound to himself, but to God, because we are his, and we have no right to injure or not to take care of the property of our master, whether in ourselves or in others.

Here is the ground of our obligation to seek our own good or happiness and that of our neighbor. We are bound to seek it, not because it is his or ours, but because it is the right of God, and a duty we owe to him. We are bound in God, for God's sake, to seek our own and our neighbor's good, but out of him we are not and cannot be so bound. We are not bound to seek our good for our own sake, nor our neighbor's for his sake.

Our contemporary, it seems to us, cannot, even with his own definition of right, maintain his doctrine of proper, though imperfect human right. Right, according to him, as we collect from his article, *Idea del Dritto*, is a moral force which one has to subject another to his will, and which, though it may be violated by material force, whether our own or that of others, is always subsisting, living, and speaking. This force is based on a practical truth, for "you cannot say, *I have right*, unless you feel in yourself a force capable of obtaining from another compliance with your desires"; and therefore you must have as the basis of right a practical truth to which every man is forced in reason to submit, and which no one can resist without doing violence to his own conscience, and denying his own reason. But it is evident that this force, which is to subdue the will of another to our own, and which is termed our right, is not the force of our will, but the force of the practical truth which we are able to present. Now this truth, whatever it be, is independent of us, is objective to us, and no more ours than it is our neighbor's. How, then, can we call this force ours, or *our* right? Our right, if ours, is our right to have our will prevail. If you deny it to be this, you use a vicious expression, when you call it *ours*. But if the force be simply the force of truth, since truth is neither ours nor ourself, what you call our right is only the right of the truth or of the law to prevail, and therefore is not our right. If the right were ours it would need nothing beyond our will to establish it. *Sic volo*, so I will, would be all the reason that could be demanded to bind to obedience. Our contemporary, therefore, having based right on truth, not on will, does not appear to us to be able to assert proper human right at all.

But although this definition of right seems to us to make against the *Civiltà Cattolica*, we are not prepared to accept it. In our judgment, it leaves out the essential element of right. Our right, as we have said, binds you, is your law,

prescribes your duty to us; for law is only the obligatory phase of right. Now, in this definition of right we find it to be a force which subdues, indeed, but not that it is a force that *ought*, or that has the *right* to subdue, the will of another to us. To say of a force that it subdues, is one thing; that it ought or has the right to subdue, is quite another thing. The former merely tells the truth, the latter declares a law. Truth convinces the understanding; law commands the will. Here is the defect of the definition. It makes law a simple fact, or a simple truth, and thus places the seat of law in reason instead of will. Law is not *actus rationis*, but *actus imperii*, therefore an act of will, for will, not reason, is the imperative faculty. Reason enlightens will, but will commands reason. Reason is declarative, not legislative, does not found the law, but declares what the law is. It tells us what is good, what is bad, what is desirable, what is undesirable, but does not bind us to seek the one or avoid the other. Law is the voice of authority, and derives its binding force as law from him who commands, not from what is commanded. To know whether it is law or not, we ask not, What is said? but, Who speaks? God speaks—is the ultimate reason of all obedience; for who may say unto him, What doest thou? or, Why commandest thou thus? Law undoubtedly is reasonable, but it is law not because it is reasonable, but because it is the expressed will of the sovereign, of him who has the right to impose his own will as law.

The term *law*, we are well aware, is frequently used in a wider sense than that in which we here use it. It is frequently applied to inanimate and irrational nature. Thus men speak of the *laws* of matter, of motion, of plants, of animals; they speak also of intrinsic laws, and laws of instinct; but in all these instances the word is used in an analogical or metaphysical, not in its true and proper sense. It is never intrinsic, or instinctive, but always objective, independent of the subject, imposed on him, not operating from within him. *Lex necessario requirit aliquem, cui possit imponi*, says Suarez,* and therefore not only some one on whom it may be imposed, but some one, distinct from the subject, to impose it. *Lex est actus imperii*, as the same Suarez says again. Law is an act of authority over free will, and as such can be imposed only by the sovereign Lord on

**De Leg. Lib. II cap. 1.*

persons, or creatures endowed with intellect and free will. Such is the constitution of the will, philosophers tell us, that it always seeks good, but its innate appetency for good is not a law commanding us to seek good; and to seek good through the simple force of this appetency, or as impelled by the natural constitution of the will, is not to seek good in obedience to law, and in so seeking it we are, if innocent, no more moral than the flower in blossoming, or the bee in constructing her cell. To render it an act of obedience to law, we must seek it, not because impelled by nature, but by an act of free volition, because our sovereign wills it.

No doubt many have a repugnance to placing law primarily in will and only secondarily in reason. Desirous of sitting in judgment on the law, and to be at liberty to grant or withhold obedience according to the decisions of their own minds on the intrinsic character of what is commanded, many contend for a more ultimate ground of law than the will of the sovereign—something which shall bind that will as well as their own. Hence some place the ground of right or law in that it is conducive to happiness or to utility, some in the reason or fitness of things, which means we know not what, some in truth, and others in the reason or wisdom of God. That all human and natural laws must always seek their binding force as laws in something that transcends both human will and nature we concede, and most earnestly contend, because, as we hold, neither nature nor human will has any real dominion, or proper legislative character. So-called natural laws and human laws derive all their legality immediately from the law of God, or what is termed the eternal law; but the law of God, the law of all human and natural laws, derives its legality from nothing more ultimate than the will of God; because the will of God is free from all law, and because to place the ground of its legality anywhere else would divest law of its imperative character, and reduce it to a mere measure, rule, or truth of reason. St. Anselm says: *Deum esse omnino liberum a lege, et ideo quod vult, justum, et conveniens esse; id autem quod est injustum, et indecens non cadere in ejus voluntatem, non propter legem, sed quia non pertinet ad ejus libertatem.** God's commands bind, not because of what

* *Cur. Deus Homo*, Lib. I. cap. 12. Apud Suarez, *De Leg.* Lib. II. cap. 2. [Suarez so quotes St. Anselm, probably from memory, and the author follows Suarez. In St. Anselm (ed. Gerberon, Paris, 1675, in folio,) the passage referred to is as follows: "Cum Deus sic sit liber ut

they command, but because they are *his* commands; yet what he commands is always reasonable and good, not because he is restrained by law, but by his own nature, from commanding the contrary; so that his law expresses always his eternal reason, love and goodness, as well as his authority or dominion. Undoubtedly, the doctors speak of the eternal law, from which natural and human laws derive their legality, but the eternal law is the law of God, and is eternal in the sense that creation is eternal, that is, in the eternal will or decree of God to create. In no other sense could it be eternal, because prior to creation there was no one capable of law—*capax legis*.

St. Augustine, indeed, defines the eternal law to be the reason or will of God commanding the order of nature to be preserved and forbidding it to be violated—*Lex æterna est, ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*.* But this makes nothing against the view we have taken. Law may be considered either as it is law, or in respect to its contents and the end to which it tends. Considered simply as law, as a binding force, it has its seat in the will of God; considered in relation to what it commands, and to the end to which it tends, it is divine reason, or has its seat in the eternal reason of God. In this last sense the law is the subject of profound and pious meditation, and is dwelt upon by all devout minds as a revelation of the wisdom and goodness, the sanctity and love of God, offering us motives sweet as heaven, strong as love, and terrible as hell to keep his commandments. For the law is wise and just, is good and holy, even the law of nature, regarded as God's law, and tends to manifest his glory in the happiness of his creatures. Here is a light in which we should be sorry not to consider the law, for God is beautiful and altogether lovely in all his

nulli legi, nullius subiaceat judicio, et ita sit benignus, ut nihil benignius cogitari queat; et nihil sit rectum aut decens nisi quod ipse vult; mirum videtur si dicimus quia nullatenus vult aut non ei licet injuriam suam dimittere, a quo etiam de his quas aliis facimus solemus indulgentiam petere. Ans. Verum est quod dicis de libertate, et voluntate, et benignitate illius; sed sic eas debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati illius non videamur repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc quod expedit, aut quod decet; nec benignitas dicenda est, quæ aliquid Deo indecens operatur. Quod autem dicitur quia quod vult justum est, et quod non vult justum non est; non ita intelligendum est, ut si Deus velit quodlibet, inconveniens, justum sit, quia ipse vult.—ED.]

* Contr. Faust. Lib. XXII. cap. 28.

works, in his works of nature as well as in his works of grace. But when we seek the ground of law, its binding force as law, or consider it in relation to right or duty, we refer it solely to the will of God. But in doing this we do not refer it to will in the abstract, or to will in general; we refer it to the will of God, and to no other will, and to his will as it is, not as it is not and as it cannot be—therefore to his will inseparable from his reason, his love, and his goodness, for the divine attributes are indistinguishable, save in our inadequate mode of conceiving them.

It must be clear enough to the reader, that we do not deny our obligation to conform to the order of nature; on the contrary, we establish that obligation by establishing the obligation to obey God. We are not bound to obey the order of nature precisely because it is the order of *nature*; we are bound to obey it because it is created and established by God our sovereign, and because he by his law commands us to obey it. The eternal law, as St. Augustine says, commands the natural order to be preserved, and forbids it to be violated,—*ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*. Whatever is necessary to the preservation of this order is of course authorized, and when we have ascertained that this or that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without further inquiry that God commands it. All we contend for is that the reason of the obligation is not the necessity, but the divine will. The practical duties or offices of life as set forth in the current teaching of the schools are all affirmed, and declared obligatory, only they are referred immediately, not mediately, to the law of God for their obligatory character. Rights and duties remain, only they are held to be rights of God and duties to God; and what are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor remain real duties, only they derive their character of duties from the command of God, and are strictly duties to him, merely payable by his order respectively to ourselves and to our neighbor.

Undoubtedly, the denial of proper human right denies the proper right of human government, and converts what it usually claims as a right into a trust. But this is only an evidence of its truth. It destroys, in principle, the very basis of despotism, and offers a solid foundation both of liberty and authority. The basis of all despotism is the assumption of human right, or of the power to govern as a right inherent in the human ruler, instead of recognizing

and holding it as a trust from God. Of oriental despotism the basis is the assumption of the inherent right of one man to govern; of democratic despotism, the right of every man, expressed in universal suffrage as a *natural right*; of aristocratic despotism, the right of the nobility; of parliamentary despotism, the right of the parliamentary body for the time. No matter in which of these you vest the power, you have a despotism in principle, if you assert the power to govern as a human right. But when you deny it as a human right, in whose hands soever lodged, and assert it as a trust only, you destroy at once the principle of every species of despotism. We do not deny or weaken the authority of human governments; we only deny that their authority is, strictly speaking, their own, or that of human right. The human government may rightfully govern, but by the authority of God, not by its own; as the minister of God, not as an independent sovereign, whether independent in a higher or a lower, a broader or a narrower sphere. The government as a fact may sometimes originate in popular convention, but it derives its authority to govern, not from the convention, but immediately from God, and its right to govern is God's right, and not its own, or that of the people. It receives its power from God as a trust, and is of course bound to exercise it in the name of God, and according to the conditions he has annexed. These conditions, since annexed by God, are wise, just, and good, as is his own law, and tend directly to the good of the community. So long as the government conforms to these conditions, it is legal government, governs rightfully, and is salutary in its action; but when it neglects them, violates them, and abuses its powers, it forfeits the trust, and the subject is absolved from his allegiance; because his duty is duty to God, and to the government only as the minister of God, and necessarily ceases to be due to the latter, the moment it has forfeited its trusts and ceased to be God's minister. We are bound to obey government only inasmuch as God authorizes it, and of course no longer than he authorizes it. This cuts off all despotism and asserts a solid basis for true liberty, and at the same time provides, in principle, for the stability of government and the good order of society, for it adds to all the motives usually drawn from social necessities and advantages, the obligations of religion. We are bound to obey the state as the minister of God, because bound to obey God, and we come short in our duty to God if we do not.

The great practical objection in these times, to the doctrine which asserts proper human right, or that derives right from nature as second cause and from God only as first cause, is that it affords a basis to modern rationalism and social despotism. If you assert human right strictly so called, you must assert the independence of the human will, and its right to refuse assent unless human reason is convinced, and therefore the right of private judgment, which is pure rationalism, that is, human independence, or despotism in the intellectual order. Our contemporary is constantly and earnestly fighting modern rationalism, but has he reflected that, in conceding proper human right, he concedes to his opponents in the outset the very principle of which rationalism is only a logical development? The error of the rationalists is not so much an error in drawing conclusions, as an error in the premises. Grant them their premises, and you will hardly dispute their conclusions with success, theoretical or practical.

If we allow man or nature, that is, second causes, a proper legislative character, as we must if we assert proper human right, we cannot, in our times, successfully resist despotism, either of the state or of the individual. If the state is permitted, in any other sense than as the minister or trustee of God, to say *my right*, it will invariably include under the denomination of its right all the power it can get. We then necessarily give it an independency, not only in face of its subjects, of which we do not complain, but in face of the spiritual power, and therefore of God himself. Right, if right, is good against every one, and may be defended from every attack, let the attack come from what quarter it may. The state may assert its right, if right it have, in face of the church of God as well as in face of its subjects; nay, *pro tanto* at least, the church, and therefore God himself, is the subject of the state. Assume this, and how shall we be able to resist the encroachments on the spiritual power by the present Sardinian government? The state alleges that it is simply exercising its rights as the temporal authority, and defending them against the usurpations of the church. This in every contest of the sort is what the state always says. What else said Frederic II., Henry IV., or Joseph II., of Germany? What else said Henry Plantagenet, Henry Tudor, or his daughter Elizabeth, of England? What else said Louis XIV., the Regency, the Constituent Assembly, or the Convention, of France?

It is always on the part of the state, if we may believe it, nothing but the assertion and vindication of its rights. What, on the principles we oppose, has the church to reply for herself? That the state encroaches, and that she in resisting it is only asserting and vindicating her own rights? But both assert the same principle, each claims the right, and which has the right to prevail? On your principles, both and neither, and you must tolerate usurpation on one side or other in the name of right, without any principle by which the controversy can be terminated. The possession of a right necessarily carries with it the right to define it, or to judge of its limits and its extent, and therefore of its infraction; for if you give to another the right to define your right, you surrender it. I am the judge of my own right, and if you make it necessary to submit its determination to another, you deny it to be my right, and declare it a trust, which I hold subject to the will or the judgment of another. Either, then, you must deny the state all inherent and underived right, or else you must allow it to be the judge both of the limits and extent of its right, and, then, of the time and mode of exercising it. In other words right, if right in the proper sense of the word, is absolute, supreme, and universal; and there is no way of terminating a controversy between parties each acknowledged to have rights, for each is independent. The only way of terminating the controversy between the spiritual and the temporal is to regard the rights of the state as trusts from God, and the duties of subjects or citizens to it as duties solely to God. This makes both the rights and the duties religious rights and duties, and brings them within the jurisdiction of the spiritual order, and therefore of the church as the representative of that order on earth. The state then has no authority, no right in face of the church, and consequently cannot under the pretext of asserting and vindicating the temporal authority, oppress religion and enslave conscience. St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., Boniface VIII., and St. Pius V. all understood very well that the independence of the spiritual order in face of the temporal can be asserted only by asserting the dependence of the state and the supremacy of the church, and that it is only by subjecting the temporal to the spiritual that civil despotism can be effectually denied, or the freedom of religion and of the people as individuals be maintained. They designated to Cæsar his place and bid him keep it, and

smote him with the sword of Peter and Paul when he left it.

On the other hand, if we allow the individual to say *my right*, and babble of the rights of man, not to say, rights of woman, we must expect every man to understand by his rights the right of his own will to prevail in all things. We cannot, at least in these times, assert right for an individual without conceding the unrestricted right of private judgment, and then not without asserting pure individualism, or the absolute supremacy of the individual. If you assert the rights of man, human right, in favor of the community, you authorize social despotism, or the despotism of society over its members, as is the tendency of all your modern socialisms, communisms, red-republicanisms, whether as advocated by a Mazzini, a Kossuth, a Ledru-Rollin, a Saint-Simon, a Robert Owen, a Pierre Leroux, a Fourier, a Cabet, or a Proudhon. If you assert the rights of man in favor of the individual, you assert the despotism of the individual, which is anarchy, or the struggle of independent wills each for the mastery, of which every democracy, when not a social despotism, offers an example, and to which our country is undeniably tending, as well as to social despotism. The assertion of the "rights of man" is the denial of all legal authority, and if we make it, we must abandon all hope of government and of society, we must expect demagoguism, revolutionism, anarchy, and military despotism to be the order of the day. All the terrible political and social convulsions of our times originate in the pride of man which terms his duties his rights. In all these convulsions, which have made of all Europe a camp, if not a battle-field, the sole pretence has been the assertion and vindication of the rights of nature and of man. The soldiers in these new wars do not go forth to battle with prayers and hymns to God, in the name of the God of battles, shouting, like the old Crusaders, *Deus vult*; no, they go forth in the name of man, as soldiers of humanity, and their prayers and hymns are songs in praise of man and nature, and execrations on the anointed priests of God, and their shout is, *Populus vult*, the mob wills. In vain you tell them that they exaggerate their rights and forget their duties, in vain you exhort them to take more moderate and less unreasonable views. When was it that you could concede men rights, and have them remember their duties? Since when has it been true that you could give them an

inch and they not take an ell? It is not moderate men, reasonable men, you have to deal with; it is unreasonable men, madmen rather. They are madmen indeed, but even madmen reason correctly enough from their premises, and their insanity is in their always reasoning from false premises. Grant them their premises, as you do when you concede them human right, and it is folly to hope to resist their conclusions. If we would resist their rationalism, their atheism, their destructive doctrines, tendencies, and deeds, we must strike their ground from under them, and leave them nothing to stand on. We must refuse them their starting-point, and prove to them that what they arrogate to themselves as their rights are the rights of God, not theirs, to be exercised only in his name, and only by those whom he authorizes to exercise them, and that they have for themselves duties, only duties, and duties only to God.

Indeed, if our duties are not all duties to God, and to others only for his sake, why are we required in order to discharge our duty to God to refer all our actions to him? If we owe a duty to our neighbor in his own right, our neighbor is the ultimate end of that duty. Why, then, are we bound to refer it to God, and discharge it for his sake? What claim has God to it? Does the universe, or any part of the universe, exist for itself? Has not God created all things for himself alone? How then can there be duty except to him? Second causes have no creative power, and therefore all their activity is confined to the second cosmic cycle, the return of creation to God as its final cause. This return is not a right, it is in all rational creation a duty. It is our duty to return by an act of free volition to God who has made us, in the way and manner he prescribes, and this is our whole duty. It is not our duty because we cannot otherwise secure happiness. That we cannot otherwise secure happiness is certainly true, and is a good reason why we should return, but is not the reason or ground of our obligation to return; for to seek our happiness in any other way is not merely a mistake, but also a sin. If all our activity is confined to this return, and if this return be our duty and our whole duty, as it assuredly is, how can we pretend that we owe any duties but duties to God? If all our duties are duties to God, then all rights are his, and right on human lips, as Donoso Cortés says, is a vicious expression, and our contemporary's criticism was uncalled for, and is unauthorized.

We find nothing in this doctrine to favor the system of occasional causes, for it does not deny the proper activity of second causes, or assert God as sole actor in the operations of nature. We assert the activity of second causes; we deny only their creative activity; and we had supposed it lawful to maintain that creatures cannot create, and that to create is the incommunicable prerogative of God alone. It is because creatures cannot create, that we deny them in their own right all dominion, deny that they have, properly speaking, any right or power to bind others to themselves, and maintain that they have only duties, and duties only to God their creator. My right is my own; and if I have right, I have something I can call my own, something the absolute ownership of which is vested in me. But how can this be when I have not even the ownership of myself? We do not deny the proper activity of nature as second cause; we only deny its legislative character, because to found law pertains to him who has the sovereign dominion, and dominion depends on ownership, and ownership on creation. But as nature is created, not creative, it has no ownership; then no dominion; then no power to found laws. We do not deny the obligation of the law of nature, but we do not call it *law* precisely because without fulfilling it we cannot fulfil the purpose of our existence, nor the law of *nature* precisely because it is impressed upon nature, innate, intrinsic, and operative in all natural actions, but because it is the law of God, the will of our Sovereign commanding us to observe the order of nature, and forbidding us to depart from it. It is law only because the will of God, and therefore it is that there is no atheistical morality, and the denial of God is the denial of all law.

We do not perceive that we are in any danger here of falling into Hindoo pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in denying the proper activity of second causes, and therefore second causes themselves, and is really only occasionalism rendered consistent with itself. In denying human right we do not deny the reality of nature nor the proper activity of second causes. The activity of second causes is none the less activity because confined to the second cycle, or return to God as the end for which they were made. Undoubtedly, all activity is, in a certain sense, productive, otherwise it would not be activity; but the activity of second causes produces only in the order of the end, and in man is termed virtue, which is the product of duty dis-

charged, and therefore is included in the return to God. This return to God is in man more than an instinctive, more even than an intelligent return; it is a free, voluntary return, in which the end is not only apprehended, but freely willed. There is no higher conceivable activity of second causes than this, none which approaches nearer the similitude of the divine activity. Man is never more truly or distinctively man, and never performs an act more properly his own, than when performing an act of obedience, or discharging a duty.

It strikes us that there is less danger of pantheism or occasionalism in this doctrine, than in that suggested by our Italian contemporary in his note. Undoubtedly, we must admit participated beings, and most assuredly we may apply to them analogically the terms which language adopts in speaking both of finite and infinite being. It is not improper to call a man beautiful, great, wise, powerful, although only God is beauty, greatness, wisdom, and power, if he participates of these divine attributes. The expression is imperfect, that is, expresses what is imperfect, but it is not vicious. But we cannot say therefore it is not vicious to apply the word *right* to man, because it does not appear that right is participable in the sense in which these attributes are. Right is the divine sovereignty, and, to participate of it is to participate of the divine dominion, which, since the divine dominion, like the creative act on which it is founded, is incommunicable, is, if any thing, to be identically God. To assert such participation would place us in the order of the first cause, give us at least a share in the work of creation, and thus assert, if not pantheism, polytheism. The illustration selected by the *Civiltà Cattolica* is not applicable, because right is not, like beauty, greatness, wisdom, power, &c., a participable attribute. The example of the saw in the hands of the carpenter is not, it seems to us, happily chosen. The saw is a mere passive instrument in the hands of the carpenter, and can only in a loose and improper sense be said to act at all. To represent man as such passive instrument in the hands of God, would be to deny his proper activity, all proper human acts, and, if pressed hard, would go far towards representing God as the only operator in nature,—would go far towards the denial of the activity of second causes and the assertion of occasionalism. Pantheism or occasionalism would be more likely, then, to be deduced from our contemporary's

doctrine than from the one we oppose to it. Pantheism is the reigning philosophical heresy of our times, but amongst us it has grown out of the habit of regarding the forces of nature, especially of human nature, as divine laws, because nature is the work of God, and then assuming them to be divine forces. If divine forces, they are God, and then God and nature are identical, and God is the only operator, which is occasionalism; and if second causes have no operative virtue, they are *Maia*, pure illusions, which is pantheism. This is best guarded against by denying man all activity in the first or creative cycle, in confining his activity to the second cycle, and therefore denying him in the proper sense of the term all right, and recognizing in him only duties. The clear and distinct recognition of duty is the practical, as well as speculative, denial of both pantheism and occasionalism.

Nevertheless, we do not object, with proper explanations, to the application ordinarily made of the terms *right* and *natural law*. In the sense in which Donoso Cortés condemns, and his critic defends them, we cannot accept them, till otherwise instructed than at present; yet we may call right *our* right in the sense that it is a real right against our neighbor, and is made payable by the divine order to us. Strictly speaking, the right is God's right, not ours, and is ours only as we are its trustees, or his ministers; yet if we bear in mind that we hold it only from God, and mean by calling it ours only that it is a real right, and good in our favor, against our neighbor, it is lawful as well as convenient for us to speak of our rights. So of the law of nature. We may speak of the law of nature, and insist on it as law, if we only bear in mind that it is law not by simple force of nature, regarded as *natura naturata*, but by the will of God our sovereign. It is also necessary to use the term when we wish to distinguish between nature and grace, or between the law by conformity to which we fulfil the purposes of our natural creation and the law by which we attain to the end of our supernatural creation. With these qualifications and explanations well understood, the terms can do no harm, are convenient, and sanctioned by a usage upon which we have as little right as disposition to innovate. All we insist on is, that we shall always, when strictness of language is necessary, assert all right as belonging to God, and for man only duties, and in this, after all, we doubt not, our highly esteemed contemporary will fully agree with us.

As to the letter itself of the noble Spaniard, we have not many comments to offer. We commend it to the attention of our readers as a specimen of free, bold, manly thought and expression, in a Catholic and a monarchist. They will be struck with the freedom, independence, and manliness of its tone, so superior to the tameness and servility of thought and utterance of our American statesmen on similar topics. There is no country in the world where the people or the public counts for so much, or is so free and independent as with us, and none where man individually is so little, so servile, so far removed from a real freeman. American democracy is the most intolerant despot in the world, and will tolerate not the least approach to freedom of thought and utterance on the origin and constitution of government. It strikes with its anathema every public man who refuses to offer it incense. We speak not of laws on the statute-book; so far as formal legislative enactments on the subject are concerned, we are free enough; but the force of public opinion, the clamor of the mob, renders this statute freedom of no avail to any one who would stand well with his countrymen. We ourselves, personally, speak with freedom and independence, for it is in us to do so, and we would do so if the dungeon, the rack, or the scaffold, gibbet, or stake, awaited us, for we do not hold our life worth saving at the expense of liberty or duty; but we are able to do so not without paying the penalty. Happily, we do not happen to desire the votes of our countrymen; but if we did, we should find our views of government, to say nothing of our views of religion, rendering us more effectually ineligible than it could be done by any constitutional provision or legislative enactment. Why, we could not get elected to the humblest popular office in our own town. We care not for this in our own case, for we have deliberately chosen our own course with a full view of the penalty annexed; but the fact operates most injuriously to our country. No discussions on the origin and constitution of power have been entered into by any of our public men since 1794, when John Adams published his very able work in defence of the American constitutions against M. Turgot, who complained of them for not instituting centralized democracy, of which the world saw so brilliant a specimen in the Reign of Terror in France. No public man among us, however eminent, however patriotic or loyal, could obtain for any office the suffrages of his fellow-citizens, were he to utter the least word in disparagement of the democ-

racý. More freedom of thought and expression on political principles, on forms of government, or the methods of constituting power, are tolerated under the most arbitrary monarchical governments of the world, than under our liberalism. Our journals mourn over the restraints placed on the French press by the prince-president, and tell us that in "la belle France" thought is tongue-tied. Yet the French press is free to defend and praise the governing powers, and our press dares do no more. The only difference is, a public law restrains the press in France, and servility to the mob controls it in the United States. The consequence is, that manly utterance is foreclosed, manly thought expires, and the whole of our political science consists in fulsome panegyrics on the revolution, more fulsome eulogiums on the integrity, wisdom, and independence of the people, and inane declamations in favor of what is called popular liberty, which means the right of the people to go where they please, and the declaimer's right or power to ride them thither. The instruction needed by the new generations as they come up, the free and manly thought that is to kindle in them a sense of their manhood, render them free and loyal in their souls, must be sought from abroad, from writers born and bred in despotic Spain, priest-ridden Italy, or absolutist Austria. Hence we think it well to lay such letters as this of Donoso Cortés before our readers, although we may not personally adopt every sentiment they may contain.

We do not quite agree with Donoso Cortés in condemning parliamentary government, though in its modern degeneracy it is little better than a public nuisance, and our congress has been called a bear-garden. Let your parliament be a parliament of estates under a strong executive, and let it sit with closed doors, with all publicity to the speeches of its members denied, so as to prevent the members becoming in their legislative character mere demagogues, making, as we say in this country, speeches for buncombe, and parliamentary government would, wherever in accordance with the habits of the people, be worthy of the praise it has received. We find, or imagine we find, the marquis leaning to the exclusive legality of the monarchical *régime*. We cannot agree with him in this. Monarchy is the legal order in Spain, republicanism in the United States. Governments are purely national matters. Let each have its own, and abide by it. For ourselves, we can no more admit the exclusive legality of monarchy than of democracy.

J. V. H. ON BROWNSON'S REVIEW.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1853.]

WE ought, perhaps, to apologize to our readers for introducing to them an article which appeared last July in a New York journal, commenting with some severity on what is assumed to be the metaphysics and moral theology of our *Review*; but we do so for the sake of the writer and the interest of the questions raised, not for the gravity of the article itself, or the importance of the medium through which it was communicated to the public. The writer, though he signs only the initials of his name, cannot be considered as unknown. He is one, unless we are greatly at fault, for whom we have a warm personal esteem, and who for his fine descriptive powers, lively and brilliant imagination, extensive acquaintance with society, and manly avowal of his religion when it can only endanger his literary success, deserves to stand in the first rank of American popular authors. It is true, that the principal works which he has published are not entirely free from faults of taste and even of judgment; but we look to him for many and most valuable contributions to our popular Catholic literature.

The Catholic journals of the country have very generally criticised with great severity—greater, in our judgment, than was deserved—*Alban, or the History of a Young Puritan*; and the author seems to have felt it more deeply than he needs to have done, and to be resolved to turn upon his critics, and give them blow for blow. In this we honor his pluck, but we doubt his judgment. Some of these critics are too slender to be hit, some are too solid to be moved, and some are too well inured even to harder blows than he is able to strike, to feel them. No man is ever written down, says Dr. Johnson, unless by himself, and, as a general rule, when what is written against him affects only the author's personal taste or judgment, the wisest way is to receive it in silence, profit by whatever truth may be suggested, and

* *Brownson's Review and the Idea of Right.* By J. V. H. New York. *Truth-Teller.* July 16, 1853.

leave it to time to dispose of what is unfounded or unjust. But there is, we believe, no law, but that of prudence, which forbids an author to criticise his critics, if he chooses. The critic is not more inviolable than the author, and sometimes deserves, even more than his author, a severe castigation. J. V. H. seems to think this is the case with the Catholic journals for their treatment of *Alban*, and he appears to be resolved to administer it as effectually as in his power.

We are somewhat surprised that he should select us as the principal object of this castigation, for we have been the least severe and the most indulgent of his Catholic critics. It is true, we could not commend *Alban* without some important qualifications, but our remarks on that work were intended less to censure it than to moderate the censures bestowed on it by others. He has not a more admiring or a warmer friend among American journalists than ourselves, one more disposed to appreciate highly his motives, his literary talent, or the value of his publications. We cannot understand why, therefore, he should feel it necessary to begin by making an onslaught upon us. However, we trust we can bear it with patience and equanimity, and we are sure that it will not sour our feelings towards him, or make us less ready or willing to appreciate his literary labors.

The *Freeman's Journal*, and one or two other Catholic newspapers, having very unnecessarily and very foolishly attempted to get up a cry against our *Review*, J. V. H. thinks, he tells us, that it is a good time for him to join in and have his say, as "he has a bone to pick with" us on his "own account." This may be prudent, but it says not much for his generosity or nobility of sentiment. A generous enemy would scorn to attack us when we were beset on every side by others. But we do not complain of it, for we can excuse much to an author smarting under a sense of real or imaginary injustice, and we do not allow ourselves to judge a man's real character by what he does or says in a moment of irritation.

J. V. H. commences "picking a bone" with us by denying us philosophical talent of the first order, in which he is right, and by allowing us "philosophical talent of the second order," in which he is wrong, for even that is more than we regard ourselves as entitled to. The newspapers, it is true, have awarded us more than this, but the judgments of newspapers are far from being irreformable, and we often

wonder how even they can be so extravagant as to speak of us as a man of talent and learning. Having fixed, as he supposes, our rank as to philosophical talent, J. V. H. proceeds to reproduce and criticise our philosophy, to point out wherein it is sound, and wherein it is unsound.

"Talent of the first order *originates*; talent of the second order expresses and popularizes. Nothing in metaphysics can be more clearly and perfectly expressed than Mr. Brownson's writings. He says what is necessary to make himself understood, and he says no more. Then he apprehends each idea (of his own) with almost absolute clearness. Many men in writing are searching after the idea they would fain express. Mr. Brownson is an experimentalist who holds it in the nippers of his logic, and describes it with leisurely accuracy. This vivid perception is the first prerequisite of a clear style. It is the same in artistic writing, where the power of description depends first on the power of conceiving what you would describe. We admire Mr. Brownson, then, when he states so clearly that reason in man is equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths. These truths, which, as perceived by us, are called *ideas* of reason (an ancient, approved, and convenient phrase, which we see no cause for discarding), are presupposed as the light of all our knowledge; they are the *necessary air* of intellectual life, without which the operations of that life could not be continued for a single instant. They constitute reason; they *are* reason. M. Bonnetty maintains 'that reason is an *innate, natural* faculty to *know* the truth': but even this definition supposes that the idea of the *true* and the *not-true* is already in the reason. All the clearest traditions in the world could never communicate that idea, for without it they would be unintelligible. The same may be said, and in the like manner proved, respecting *all* the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant,—such as the just and the unjust, the right and the wrong, the eternal and necessary and the contingent, the substance and the phenomenon, the cause and the effect. The tradition which preserves these ideas in the world, and which is the aliment of reason, would be useless as food to the dead, unless the ideas themselves were the native powers of reason itself, its light, proceeding directly from God, its breath, inspired by him. This is the light of all our seeing. If the traditionalists, in their ontological zeal, go to deny this psychological truth, they either reduce man to a brute by depriving him of reason altogether (but man is not a brute), or else they *deify* his intelligence by resolving it directly into the divine. Reason, with its definite ideas, is an attribute of the finite intelligence. So far, Mr. Brownson is magnificent in his demonstration, though he borrows it from those whom he stigmatizes as psychologists."

The secondary merit of clearness of expression, which is so freely awarded us, we can hardly claim; for if we under-

stand J. V. H., he does not understand us, and reproduces and commends as ours, not the philosophy we have endeavored to set forth, but the very philosophy we reject, and labor especially to refute. He represents us as holding that "reason in man," that is, if we understand it, reason as a human faculty, "is equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths," and that these truths, which may be "called ideas of reason," "constitute reason," in fact, "*are* reason" itself; that is, the power to perceive necessary truths, or at least the perceiving of necessary truths, and the truths themselves, are one and the same, or that the faculty or the exercise of the faculty, and its object, are identical. Does he call this sound philosophy? Whether he does or not, we must assure him that it is not ours. He may well say this is borrowed from those whom we "stigmatize as psychologists," for it is without any doubt sheer psychologism; but we have not borrowed it from them, for it is precisely what we reject, and in all our writings touching the point, since 1841, we have uniformly labored to refute.

"M. Bonnetty maintains that 'reason is an innate, natural faculty to know the truth;' but even this definition supposes that the idea of the true and the *not*-true is already in the reason." We do not say this, and we cannot accept it, for it is not true. It implies that there cannot be knowledge unless there is knowledge prior to all knowledge, which, if it means any thing, means that all knowledge is impossible, for to have the idea of the true is to apprehend, that is, to know truth. "All the clearest traditions in the world could never communicate that idea, for without it they would be unintelligible." That is, intelligibility is in the subjective reason, not in the object. The reverse of this is what we hold. Moreover, the idea of the true and the *not*-true, in the mind of J. V. H., is not the truth itself, but some *a priori* possession of the reason, which must precede all knowledge of truth, and all power to know it. It can at best, then, be only an abstract idea, and therefore he would represent us as holding, and, what is more singular still, commend us for holding, that the apprehension of the abstract precedes all knowledge of the concrete,—a doctrine which we deny indeed, but which we do not hold, for the abstract is intelligible only in the concrete. Then, again, what does our learned and philosophical critic mean by the idea of the *not*-true? The *not*-true is pure negation,

and does he hold that negation is an idea, that is, an intelligible object, or an object which the mind can apprehend or form an idea of? We have been in the habit of supposing that only that which is or exists is intelligible, and therefore that no negation or denial is conceivable, but by the assertion of truth. Falsehood can be denied only by opposing to it the truth. Hence universal scepticism or denial is absolutely impossible.

"The same may be said, and in like manner proved, respecting *all* the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant,—such as the just and the unjust, the right and the wrong, the eternal and necessary and the contingent, the substance and the phenomenon, the cause and the effect. The tradition which preserves these ideas in the world . . . would be as useless as food to the dead, unless they were themselves the native powers of the reason itself." The mind, then, can know only what is native to itself, only the native powers of human reason; that is to say, only its own innate ideas! This, we know, is maintained by some transcendentalists, but we never suspected anybody would regard us as holding it, much less commend us for holding it. But these ideas, according to J. V. H., are native powers of "reason in man," that is, of reason as a faculty of the human soul, and are "necessary truths." Then the human reason is a necessary truth, and man is God. Then the contingent, the phenomenon, the effect, is necessary; then creation is necessary; then there is no free creation; then no creation at all; then the universe is only a divine emanation, and pantheism must be accepted. If this is our critic's philosophy, it certainly is not ours.

J. V. H. misapprehends entirely what we mean by necessary truths, if he imagines that they can be properly "called ideas of reason." *Idea* may be taken either objectively or subjectively, that is, either as simple mental apprehension, or as the intelligible object apprehended. If we take ideas in the sense of simple mental apprehensions, it is obvious that necessary truths cannot be called *ideas*; if we take them objectively, as the object of the apprehensions, it is equally obvious that they cannot be called ideas of *reason in man*, that is, of reason as a human faculty; for that would imply that reason in us, our reason, is God, and certainly so if we say "they constitute reason; they *are* reason." J. V. H. probably takes ideas in neither of these

senses, neither as simple apprehensions or simple perceptions, nor as the intelligible object apprehended or perceived, and therefore not as ideas in any sense at all. He makes them the "native powers" of the reason, but of reason in man, reason therefore as a subjective faculty, as does Cousin, not of reason as distinct from man, and as the object of our intellectual faculty. As they are neither the apprehension nor the object apprehended, they must be either what Descartes calls innate ideas, which are not ideas, or what Kant with more justness denominates the *necessary forms* of the understanding, preceding all actual knowledge as the antecedent and necessary conditions of all knowing. But if pure forms of the understanding, they cannot be necessary truths, unless man himself is necessary, and therefore God. Moreover being pure forms of the understanding, they are subjective, and can have no objective value; and are neither apprehensions of something, nor something apprehended or apprehensible. This surely is not our doctrine, nor does it come within our order of philosophical thought, and is above or below it.

J. V. H., in reproducing what he supposes to be our doctrine, has overlooked the distinction which we always keep in mind, between reason as subject and reason as object. We do not think that he understands this distinction. He says we hold "reason in man to be equivalent to the power of perceiving necessary truths." This is not exact. We hold it to be that power itself. Reason in man, or reason as a faculty of the soul, is, among other things, the power to perceive necessary truths. This is the subjective reason, the same with the intellectual faculty of man; for we do not, with some Germans, distinguish between reason as subject and the understanding. But reason may also be taken objectively, as the object of reason as subject, that is, as the necessary truths or ideas themselves. J. V. H. fails to keep these two senses of reason distinct, and confounds reason as object with reason as subject,—the characteristic of psychologism, which confines it for ever to the sphere of the subject, without ever attaining to real objective knowledge, and leads either, with Fichte, to the identification of God with man, or, with Hegel, to the identification of man with God,—to the absolute egoism of the former, or to the absolute pantheism, or rather nihilism, of the latter. The characteristic of ontology, under the present point of view, is to keep distinct these two senses in which the word reason is and

may be used, and to assert reason as necessary idea or necessary truth, as the object really and immediately perceived or apprehended by reason as subject or intellective faculty of the soul. This is what we always insist on, and therefore we are surprised to hear ourselves commended for holding the opposite doctrine.

Our objection to M. Bonnetty and the traditionalists is not, as J. V. H. supposes, that something more is required on the part of the subject, in order to know the truth, than reason as an innate, natural faculty to know it; and it never could have entered into our head to maintain, that this faculty is not enough unless there be already in the reason the idea of the true and the not-true, or that without that idea truth is unintelligible. The innate, natural faculty to know the truth is all that is required on the part of the subject to be able to know it, and if M. Bonnetty showed us how with his doctrine of tradition he could consistently hold reason to be such a faculty, we should have no quarrel with him. But this is precisely what he does not show, and which we undertake to show for him. We maintain, indeed, that without intuition of the intelligible, the idea, the necessary, there can be no knowledge; not, however, on account of any defect in the intellective faculty, but because there is nothing objective to be known. The mind apprehends truth in its intuition or perception of the true, but without the intuition of the true it cannot know truth, for without it there is no truth, either necessary or contingent. It is not the idea of the true in the mind that renders truth intelligible, but the idea as object of the mind or necessary truth existing *a parte rei* that renders things intelligible, because without that things do not exist, and things are intelligible only in that they exist. Things can be known only in the respect that they are, and as they are only in the necessary truth, they can be known only in intuition of that, for as they are only in that, so only in that are they intelligible. We assert that the intuition of the true, the necessary, the idea, objectively considered, must be logically our first intuition, for an ontological reason, because without it there is and can be no object to be known, and therefore nothing intelligible; J. V. H. asserts that the idea must be in the reason for a psychological reason, because without it, the truth, though really existent, is unintelligible. According to him, the intelligibility of truth is in the subjective reason; according to us, it is in the truth itself, and hence the object is known because it is intelligible, not intelligible because it is known.

The misfortune of J. V. H., as of all psychologists, is in his attempt to assert ideas which are neither the object apprehended, nor the mental apprehension of an object existing *a parte rei*. But what is *idea* in this sense? What, for instance, is the idea of the true, as distinguished from truth on the one hand, and the mental perception, apprehension, or intuition of truth on the other? Three things we can understand, the object apprehended, the subject apprehending, and the apprehension; but something to be termed *idea*, which is distinguished from all these, passes our understanding. Is it truth? Then it pertains to the object apprehended. Is it the power of apprehending truth? Then it belongs to the subject apprehending. Is it the mental representation of the object? Then it is the apprehension or intuition. Is it something else? Then what? Nobody can tell, for nobody can tell what nothing is. The old scholastic doctrine of ideas as something intermediary between subject and object, neither one nor the other, yet something by means of which subject and object are brought into relation, is in the commonly received interpretation thoroughly exploded, and among all real philosophers the direct perception or intuition of the object itself by the perceiving subject is now asserted, which is only the revival of the sound part of Plato's doctrine, of what St. Augustine held, and of what, till the abuse of Aristotle in the latter part of the middle ages prepared the way for the decline of philosophy, had always been the doctrine of the great fathers and doctors of the church.

"But when he proceeds to say that this intuition of necessary truths (without which reason is extinguished like a lamp) is the intuition of God himself, as the real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, we must distinguish. *God hath no man seen at any time*, and his existence is not a matter of sight, not even of rational sight, but of faith. God is a tradition. He is the God of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, the God of our *fathers*:—this is his name unto all generations. It is a simple and old demonstration indeed, to reason from our perception of necessary truths to the existence of God, who is the real and necessary BEING; but this is only a proof, not an intuition. In fine, if human reason be not pure *Maia*; if the pantheistic doctrine that God simply becomes conscious in man, and that man consequently *is* God, be a heresy, and the negation of God and man alike; then both tradition is necessary, and also a reason furnished with ideas, constituted by ideas, in order to understand the teaching of tradition concerning God. Moral science, then, has an objective, historical basis, and a subjective, rational basis too. The shield

has a gold and silver side. The traditionalists are right, and the Catholic rationalists are right; and they are both wrong, too, in what they exclude, as Mr. Brownson observes; but a theory *which is scarcely one step divided from pantheism*, is not the 'solution' of their difficulties."

J. V. H. concedes here that we have intuition of necessary truth, and if he does not it matters nothing, for we have heretofore sufficiently proved it. We have, then, intuition of necessary truth. This necessary truth is either something or nothing. Not nothing, because it is *truth*, and truth is in being, not in not-being. Universal being is universal truth, and universal not-being is universal falsehood. Then it is something, and if something, it is either created or uncreate, for besides created and uncreate there is nothing. Not created, because it is *necessary*, and whatever is created is contingent, therefore not necessary. Then it is uncreate; then it is God, for whatever is and yet is not created is God, and can be no other. If something, it is real; if real and uncreate, it is real and necessary being; if real and necessary being, it is eternal and immutable being. Therefore either we have no intuition of necessary truth, or our intuition of it is intuition of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, that is, of God. The former cannot be said, therefore the latter must be conceded, and J. V. H. would never have denied it, if he had understood that abstractions do not exist *a-parte rei*, and that we can have intuition only of the real.

But "we must distinguish." As much as you please. "God hath no man seen at any time." With the eye of the body or with the eye of the mind, as God, as he is in himself, conceded; with the eye of reason, as the necessary, the eternal, and the immutable, denied; for we have just proved that intuition of these is intuition of real, necessary, eternal, and immutable being, which is God, and can be no other. No knowledge is possible without intuition of necessary truth. Then either we know and can know nothing, or we have intuition of God,—although it is very true that we do not take note in the intuition that that of which we have intuition is God. We know this only subsequently, by reflection operating on the representations furnished by tradition, and some, like our New York critic, have never yet learned it.

"His existence is not a matter of sight, not even of rational sight, but of faith." Then his existence is not demon-

strable, and J. V. H. differs from St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and the great body of Catholic theologians, who all maintain that the existence of God can be demonstrated, and therefore that it is a matter of science as well as of faith, and, as St. Thomas says, the preamble to faith. If it be not a matter of science as well as of faith, we should like to see the author of *Alban* undertake to prove his faith as a Catholic, or assign any motives of credibility for the Christian religion. If the divine existence be a matter of science, it is, of course, a matter of rational sight, for reason cannot demonstrate what it cannot apprehend. "God is a tradition." The writer does not mean what he says. He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of our fathers." Would he assert that there was no God before Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or our fathers? Does he mean to say there would be no God if there were no creatures, and thus maintain the doctrine, not unknown in the history of the aberrations of the human mind, that God is realized only in creating, becomes real God only in creation, and therefore self-conscious first in man—the Hegelian doctrine, which he singularly enough half, or more than half, insinuates is our own? We do not believe it. But he ought to know that God, as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of our fathers, is the God of the covenant, the Author of grace, God in the supernatural order, in which sense nobody pretends that his existence is other than a matter of faith.

"It is a simple and old demonstration indeed, to reason from our perception of necessary truth to the existence of God, who is real and necessary being; but this is only a proof, not an intuition." The reasoning is not an intuition, but the perception of necessary truth is, and if the perception of that truth be not an intuition of God, how from it conclude that God is? or what is the process or value of the proof? God can be concluded from the perception of necessary truth only on condition that it either is God or contains him as the particular in the general; for there can be nothing in the conclusion not contained in the premises. God cannot be contained in the necessary truth perceived as the particular in the general, for that would imply that there is something more general than God, which is not admissible. Then he is concluded only on condition that the necessary truth perceived is God, and the proof is not, strictly speaking, that God is, but that the necessary

truth of which we have intuition is God. As this is demonstrable, we say the existence of God can be demonstrated. The argument, which is older than we know, but which usually bears the name of St. Anselm, is a good one, though not in the sense sometimes explained, and certainly not on the principles of psychologism; for its conclusiveness rests on the identity of the necessary truth perceived with God, and therefore on the fact that intuition of it is intuition of him. It is only the ontologist who can use this argument, and hence many psychologists reject it as worthless.

The writer of the article under review intimates that the theory which we proposed as the solution of the mutual difficulties of the traditionalists, and the Catholic rationalists is scarcely one step divided from pantheism, and therefore is insufficient to solve them. We do not see that this conclusion follows. If the theory is divided at all from pantheism, it is not pantheism, and therefore may be true, and if true, it must be sufficient. We apprehend that on certain points the truth runs very close to pantheism, though of course without touching it. It takes a nice metaphysical eye, unless specially illuminated, to distinguish the dividing line between some parts of mystic theology and pantheism, and J. V. H. might find himself scandalized were he to read the Christian mystics. Pantheism is the error which lies nearest to truth, and therefore we regard it as the first error into which the gentiles fell, on their apostasy from the patriarchal religion. Yet because the theory may, as every true theory must, on certain points, run close to pantheism, and our learned critic may be unable to distinguish the line of demarcation, it does not follow that, if divided from it at all, it is to be rejected. If, however, he wishes to be understood as meaning more than he says, that the theory is not divided at all from pantheism, we must tell him he labors under a slight mistake, that of taking his own theory for ours, which is not pantheism solely because he is too good a Christian or too poor a logician to push his principles to their legitimate conclusions. Besides, the *Free-man's Journal* says that the solution we suggested we borrowed from M. Bonnetty, through his friend, M. Nicholas, and though this does not happen by any means to be the fact, as we suggested it in our *Review* before we ever heard of M. Nicholas or his books, it claims it as M. Bonnetty's. If J. V. H. chooses to call it pantheism, we must turn him

over to the tender mercies of that journal, which will hear nothing said unfavorable to that distinguished French publicist.

But J. V. H. does not stop with our general metaphysics ; he pushes his objections even to the doctrine we maintain on rights and duties, or the origin or ground of law.

“ This tendency of Mr. Brownson to omnify God to the utter absorption of the creature, is yet more strikingly manifest in another part of the same article, where he reiterates his approbation of the saying of Donoso Cortés, that ‘ right on human lips is a *vicious* expression,’ and argues at length in its defense. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, a learned journal conducted at Rome by members of the illustrious Society of Jesus, corrected this expression of Donoso Cortés as exaggerated, and as leading to the pantheistic notion that man is a pure illusion. What God communicates to man (such was their argument) that he really has, although not in the same perfect and absolute sense as it is possessed by the Creator. Thus God is the only wise, the only good, the only fair, yet wisdom, goodness, and beauty, in an imperfect sense, are really participated in by man. And so of *right*. It belongs in an absolute sense to God alone, as the Creator and Lord of the universe ; but in an imperfect sense it belongs to man, as God’s *gift* to man. He has bestowed rights upon us, to whom all rights belong. Mr. Brownson flatly denies this. Following the *Univers* and Donoso Cortés, in order to combat what he calls the *atheistic* tendency of the age, he maintains that ‘ only God has rights, and that man has only *duties*, and duties only to God.’ Mr. Brownson confesses that this is repugnant to ‘ the ordinary forms of expression used by the great doctors of the church,’ who have always maintained that man has rights ; but he contends that it is not opposed to their meaning. We contend that it is opposed to their forms of expression, and to their meaning, too, to common sense, and to sound theology.”

Whether our doctrine be true or false, no objection more ridiculous can possibly be imagined against it than this, that it leads “ to the pantheistic notion that man is a pure illusion ;” for it is impossible by any form of words to mark more intelligibly man’s distinction from God, or to assert his substantiality as second cause more decidedly, than to declare that he has duties, and duties to God. An illusion can be under no obligation, and God cannot have duties to himself, or to any one else ; for we must say with St. Anselm, whom we before cited, “ *Deum esse omnino liberum a lege, et ideo quod vult, justum, conveniens esse ; id autem quod est injustum, et indecens non cadere in ejus voluntatem, non propter legem, sed quia non pertinet ad ejus libertatem.*”

Deus est omnino liber a lege. If in every sense free from law, God can have no duties, for duties are imposed and defined by law only. Then only second causes can have duties, and, as pure illusions can have no duties, second causes can have them only in that they are second causes, and *substantially* distinct from God the first cause. We were not a little surprised at the objection when brought by *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and we replied to it, and showed very clearly, that, if there was any pantheistic tendency in the case, it was not in our doctrine, but in that which was opposed to it.

J. V. H. states correctly, however, neither our doctrine nor that of the *Civiltà Cattolica*. He supposes that we maintain that *right* on human lips is *always, in every sense*, a vicious expression, and that the *Civiltà Cattolica* maintains that man has rights, though in an imperfect sense, *because God communicates them to man, and what he communicates to man, man really has*. This is true of neither, and our New York critic fails to seize the real point of the question. We do not deny human rights in the sense of God's direct gifts to man, nor does our Roman contemporary restrict itself to the assertion of them in that sense. Furthermore, we do not confess that our doctrine is repugnant to the forms of expression ordinarily used by the great doctors of the church, but at most only that it may *appear so at first sight*. All we confess is, not a real repugnance even to the forms of expression ordinarily adopted by the doctors, but only an apparent repugnance, and even this only *at first sight*, disappearing on a closer view, while we maintain that it is in perfect accordance with their sense, and our critic brings forward, and, so far as we can discover, attempts to bring forward, nothing to prove the contrary.

The following passage from our article on *Rights and Duties* will show that we do not deny in every sense that man has rights:—

“ Nevertheless, we do not object, with proper explanations, to the application ordinarily made of the terms *right* and *natural law*. In the sense in which Donoso Cortés condemns, and his critic defends them, we cannot accept them, till otherwise instructed than at present; yet we may call right *our* right, in the sense that it is a real right against our neighbor, and is made payable by the divine order to us. Strictly speaking, the right is God's right, not ours. and is ours only as we are its trustees, or his ministers; yet if we bear in mind that we hold it

only from God, and mean by calling it ours only that it is a real right, and good in our favor against our neighbor, it is lawful as well as convenient for us to speak of our rights. So of the law of nature. We may speak of the law of nature, and insist on it as law, if we only bear in mind that it is law not by simple force of nature, regarded as *natura naturata*, but by the will of God, our sovereign. It is also necessary to use the term when we wish to distinguish between nature and grace, or between the law by conformity to which we fulfil the purposes of our natural creation and the law by which we attain to the end of our supernatural creation. With these qualifications and explanations well understood, the terms can do no harm, are convenient, and sanctioned by a usage upon which we have as little right as disposition to innovate. All we insist on is, that we shall always, when strictness of language is necessary, assert all right as belonging to God, and for man only duties; and in this, after all, we doubt not, our highly esteemed contemporary will fully agree with us."

We should suppose that any man of plain common sense and an ordinary command of the English tongue who had read this, might have understood that we defended the saying that "right on human lips is a vicious expression," only in a particular, not in a universal sense, and that that particular sense is the one in which we supposed Donoso Cortés denied, and *La Civiltà Cattolica* asserted, that man has rights. It is only for that particular sense we are responsible, and it is only by proving that man has rights in that particular sense that we are or can be refuted. What is that particular sense?

The real subject discussed in our article was the origin and ground of natural law, or the law of nature, and our purpose was not the defence of the sentence in the letter of the lamented Donoso Cortés, to which his Italian translator took exceptions, and which occasioned the discussion, but to deny that the natural law derives its character as law, or its binding force, from nature, and to assert that it derives that character or that force solely and directly from the command or will of God, in accordance with what we supposed to be the plain sense of the apostle in the text, *Non est potestas nisi a Deo*. The question of *right* came up only in the sense of *jus*, in the sense in which right is legislative, makes the law, and imposes and defines duty. The question of right we showed to be a question of law, because a man's right is law for all but himself, and imposes and defines their duty to him; and the question, therefore, whether man, strictly speaking, has rights, is simply the question

whether he has in and of himself true legislative power, and can make the law, that is, impose and define duties. But this question resolves itself into a more general question, namely, whether nature, as second cause, has in any degree proper legislative authority; that is, whether what we call the law of nature, derives its character or binding force as law from nature as second cause. If it does, then man has rights, in the true and proper sense of the word, and Donoso Cortés is wrong, for then there is no sense in which it can be true to say, "Right on human lips is a vicious expression;" if it does not, then man has no proper rights, and what we called *his* rights are grants, trusts, or privileges. We maintained the latter, as we had done before the Marquis de Valdegamas had ever been heard of in connection with questions of this sort, or the existence of the *Univers* was known to us. What we maintain is, not that man in no sense has rights, but that he has no inherent, indefeasible, natural rights, deriving their character of rights, that is, their binding force as law, from man himself, because nature or second causes have and can have in themselves no proper legislative authority.

The doctrine which *La Civiltà Cattolica* asserted against Donoso Cortés, and which we opposed, was not, as we understood it, that God gives man rights *extra naturam suam*, and therefore man has rights, since whatever God gives him is really his; but that he has, though in subordination to God as supreme legislator, proper legislative authority, or right in the sense that it imposes and defines duty, therefore right in the sense that it makes the law, not indeed in a perfect sense, but in an imperfect or participated sense. In like manner as man participates beauty, greatness, wisdom, power and being, which are perfect only in God, it contended that man participates *right*, that is, in his nature, and therefore makes right a participated power, therefore man's own, as his beauty, wisdom, or being, and derived from God in no sense save as God is the author of his nature, or has created him. But as all right is legislative, this assumes for man, if not supreme legislative power, at least real legislative power in subordination to the supreme legislator. Man owns his right, as the farmer in a free state owns his farm, subject merely to the right of eminent domain in the prince, and subject to the eminent right of God he may found law or be a lawgiver. This is what we denied. We denied that right in the sense asserted is participable. Right

is legislative, and makes the law. But to make the law is, as all concede, the prerogative of sovereignty; sovereignty rests on dominion; dominion rests on ownership, and all ownership on creation; and God is sole Creator. Therefore, God is sole legislator. He is not merely supreme legislator with subordinate legislators under him, each a proper legislator within a given sphere, but sole and universal legislator, not in the sense of *eminent* legislator only, as he is the *eminent* cause of all that is done by second causes, but in the sense of direct legislator, so that all legality, all the binding force of law, all law as law, emanates directly from his will. Therefore, strictly speaking, only God has rights, that is, in the sense in which right is legislative, which, we take it, is the strict and proper sense of right. The law of nature is, we grant, true law, but it derives its character of law directly from the will of God, not from nature as second cause; and what we call our rights, whether public or private, are real rights, but they derive their character of right from the divine will, not our own, as we before stated.

“It must be clear enough to the reader that we do not deny our obligation to conform to the order of nature; on the contrary, we establish that obligation by establishing the obligation to obey God. We are not bound to obey the order of nature precisely because it is the order of nature; we are bound to obey it because it is created and established by God our sovereign, and because he by his law commands us to obey it. The eternal law, as St. Augustine says, commands the natural order to be preserved, and forbids it to be violated—*ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans*. Whatever is necessary to the preservation of this order is, of course, authorized, and when we have ascertained that this or that is necessary to its preservation, we may know without further inquiry that God commands it. All we contend for is that the reason of the obligation is not the necessity, but the divine will. The practical duties or offices of life, as set forth in the current teaching of the schools, are all affirmed, and declared obligatory, only they are referred immediately, not mediately, to the law of God for their obligatory character. Rights and duties remain, only they are held to be rights of God and duties to God; and what are called duties to ourselves and duties to our neighbor remain real duties, only they derive their character of duties from the command of God, and are strictly duties to him, merely payable by his order respectively to ourselves and to our neighbor.”—*Ante*, p. 306.

The difference between us and the school so ably represented by *La Civiltà Cattolica*, and so feebly defended by

J. V. H., arises most likely from the different manner in which we respectively consider law. We consider law only in its obligatory character, and ask simply what it is that makes it law; it considers law rather in its contents, and asks what it is that makes the law right (*recta*) or reasonable. In this latter sense law has its seat in the divine reason, or wisdom, and is undoubtedly participable, and possessed by us in an imperfect sense, as it asserts; but in this sense it is not properly law, for law is not *actus rationis*, but *actus imperii*,—is a command, and command proceeds only from will. Law considered in its obligatory character, in that it commands, or, as we say, imposes and defines duties, has its seat, not in reason, but will, which is not participable. Man may conform to the will of God, but even God himself cannot make his will our will in a perfect or in a participated sense. Right as predicable of the will is personal, and not communicable. Assuming that the reason of the obligation is will, it is clear that no will but the will of God can impose it. No will but the will of God is in itself sufficient to place us or any one under obligation, and therefore we say very properly that he only has rights in the strict and proper sense of the word. His will alone is law, for we are not permitted to go behind the fact that it is his will to inquire whether it be right or reasonable; and this again is proof that the seat of law as law is the divine will, not the divine reason, and therefore, as will is incommunicable, that creatures can have no power to make the law except as his delegates.

Having said this much by way of presenting the real subject of the controversy and the true state of the question before our readers, we proceed to consider the proofs adduced that our doctrine is repugnant to the meaning of the great doctors of the church, to common sense, and to sound theology:—

“To simplify matters, the notion of right in creatures, that is, in man, which we assert, is the following, viz.: That God, who is the Lord and Creator of all men, and of the universe, in whom, consequently, all rights originally are, to whom, in an absolute sense, all right appertains, has, in his sovereign bounty, by an act which cannot fail of its full effect, GIVEN men rights. Consequently, they really possess them, in the strictest sense. Absolute right, like absolute truth, beauty, justice, wisdom, *being*, belongs only to God; but as creatures, that is men, really *are*, in the strictest sense of *being*, and are (that is, the saints) wise, true, beautiful, and just, in the strict sense, though imperfectly; so they have *rights*, in the strict sense, and that because God has given them rights.”

We cannot detect here any remarkable simplification of the matter. We say, "Strictly speaking, only God has rights, and man has only duties, and duties only to God." Our energetic opponent says men have rights because God has *given* them rights. Have we denied that God gives men rights? What is the difference between saying, "All rights are originally in God, to whom, in an absolute sense, all right appertains," and saying, "Strictly speaking, only God has rights"? "In his sovereign bounty [God] has given men rights." Be it so. Rights which God gives us in his bounty are not rights which man participates by his own nature, the only rights we deny to man; and such rights are not binding against God, for they are of bounty, not of justice; therefore, though favors, exceedingly great and precious favors, they are not rights in the strict sense of the word, for they derive their force of rights from the will of God who gives, not from the will of man who receives them. "They really possess them in the strictest sense." As the gifts of God's bounty, or as trusts, conceded; as the inherent and indefeasible rights of their nature, denied; for that begs the question.

J. V. H. perhaps is not aware of the error into which he falls, when he says, "Creatures, that is, men, really *are*, in the strictest sense of being." Being in the strictest sense of being is absolute being, and absolute being is God, and beside him there is and can be no absolute being. To say that men *are*, in the strictest sense of being, is only saying in other words that they are God. God alone is *ens simpliciter*, as say the schoolmen, and creature is only *ens secundum quid*. If we wish to speak strictly, we must say creatures, that is, men, *exist*, not that they *are*, unless we add *in God*, for the being of creatures is in God, not in themselves, since they are only participated beings; hence the apostle says, *In ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*,—In him we live, and move, and are, or have our being. God alone can, strictly speaking, say with truth, I *AM*, and hence he gives as his name to Moses, *Ego sum qui sum*, I am who am. It is no sin in our New York critic not to be a metaphysician, but he should take care to keep clear of pantheism himself before accusing his brother of pantheistic tendencies.

"The error is analogous to that of the Calvinists, who denied the reality of human merit, and indeed, as we shall presently show, involves it. The creature, they argued, cannot lay the Creator under an obliga-

tion; when man has done all, he has done simply his duty; therefore he merits nothing; which, in the absolute sense, is true; but is false in fact, because God by his promise has obliged himself to reward the just man, and so by his sovereign will has made his justice meritorious. Indeed, it is demonstrable that man possesses real, proper, strict rights in the natural order (by the gift of God), because he possesses them in the supernatural order. The human being who dies in a state of grace has a *right* to eternal life, by virtue of the promise and covenant of God. *That they may have a right to the tree of life*, says the Scripture. What is more common among Catholic theologians than to say that, if man corresponds to the ordinary graces of God, God is *bound* to give him the necessary light to discern the true church, *subauditur*, by his divine promise, otherwise not, and how does that differ from saying that such a man has a *right* to that further illumination? But if he who corresponds to grace given has (by God's promise) a right to more, if he who dies a saint has a right (which is incontestable) to eternal glory, if, consequently, men may have, if all men may acquire, in the supernatural and eternal order, *rights* which they may plead against God himself (could the essential justice extenuate, or the everlasting veracity deny his promise, or the immutable goodness repent of it), *how much more* may men have rights, by the same bounty, in the things of this life?"

Merit is gained in fulfilling the law, or in the performance of duty, not in the possession of rights. If the merit acquired be said to be our right, our right to the reward, it is only in a qualified sense, for J. V. H. himself concedes that, absolutely speaking, "the creature cannot lay the Creator under an obligation"; that, "when man has done all, he has done simply his duty, and therefore merits nothing." Merit, then, is not in the order of justice, but in the order of grace or bounty, and man merits only "because God by his promise has obliged himself to reward the just man, and so by his sovereign will has made his justice meritorious." Then it is his own promise, not man's right, that binds God, and therefore nothing is said to prove that man has in his own nature power to impose any obligation on any one, much less on God, his creator, whose he is, body and soul, with all his faculties, and all he can acquire by their exercise. "The human being who dies in a state of grace has a *right* to eternal life, by virtue of the promise and covenant of God." No doubt of it, but not therefore by virtue of his own nature. The right is not in his nature, but in the promise and covenant of God, and it is God that binds himself so to speak, not man who binds God. "What is more common among Catholic theologians than to say that,

if man corresponds to the ordinary graces of God, God is bound to give him the necessary light to discern the true church, *subauditur*, by his divine promise, otherwise not?" We are not accustomed to hear Catholic theologians say this, and we do not know that the assertion is true; but if they do, it amounts to nothing, if they add that he is bound "by his promise, otherwise not"; for then, again, it is God who binds himself, and not man's right that binds God. "And how does this differ from saying that such a man has a *right* to that further illumination?" It differs precisely as a promise of God differs from a human right. Man has no natural right, that is, no right in the order of justice to any grace at all, neither to the first grace nor to the augmentation of grace, for only grace can merit grace, since *gratia est omnino gratis*. What J. V. H. calls our *rights* are the gracious promises of God, and he is mistaken in supposing that we can plead them as our *rights* against him. We can only plead them as his promises, for it is his own perfection, not our right, that binds him to keep his promise, and should he, *per impossibile*, not keep his promise, he would do us no injustice. His promises to us are gratuities, made for our benefit solely, not in consideration of benefits derived or to be derived from us by him, and therefore do not fall under the ordinary law of contracts. Therefore, though they may give us a title to eternal life, they do not confer on us a right which binds God to give it, so that he could not withhold it without doing us wrong. Our friend in his horror of Calvinism must take care not to fall into Pelagianism, and set up a claim to heaven as his right, as something due him in justice.

Having failed to establish our strict and proper right to things of the supernatural order, the *a fortiori* by which J. V. H. concludes it to things of this life, or of the natural order, falls of itself. Men have no natural right to any thing, for they had and could have no natural right to be created. God was under no obligation to them to create them, and he is under just as little to preserve them in existence, for the act of creation and preservation is one and the same act.

We argue, in our article on *Rights and Duties*, that right is a power to legislate, that to legislate is the prerogative of sovereignty, that sovereignty belongs to God alone, because it rests on dominion, dominion on ownership, ownership on creation, and God alone can create; therefore God alone,

strictly speaking, has right; therefore right, strictly speaking, on human lips, is a vicious expression. J. V. H. replies, "Mr. Brownson might as well argue that property on human lips is a vicious expression, because all property rests on ownership, and all ownership on creation." Undoubtedly, and we do so argue, and therefore deny to man property in the same sense in which we deny to him rights, but in no other. Is our good friend shocked at this? Has he yet to learn that all property is God's, and that man is only his steward for its management? Has man any thing which God may not rightfully take from him whenever he pleases,—any thing which man may justly withhold when God immediately or by the voice of his supreme vicar demands it,—any thing he can hold up to God, and say, This is mine, touch it not without my consent? If God asks our life for his service, his honor, or his glory, are we free to withhold it? and in asking it does he ask any thing which is not by every title already his to dispose of as he pleases? If our life is his, how much more what we call our goods? J. V. H. would perhaps not do amiss to read St. Bonaventura on this subject, and the Homilies of St. John Chrysostom.

But J. V. H. argues that, if we have no proper right to our goods, we are not wronged when deprived of them against our will without a just cause. Are not wronged as God's stewards, his trustees, or his beneficiaries, denied; are not wronged in any other sense, we sub-distinguish: in the sense of being deprived of a natural *right*, we concede it, in the sense of being deprived of a *good*, we deny it. The wrong as opposed to right in the sense of law is done to God, and to us only as his trustees; as opposed to good, is done to us, for whose advantage the trust was created. He who deprives us of them does *evil* to us, but does not wrong us in the sense that wrong is the violation of law. The evil is a wrong in that sense, or in an ethical sense, only because it is a violation of the right of God; and is therefore simply evil as against us, and a moral wrong only as against God. So of the maiden who is robbed by violence of her honor, the innocent whose life is taken, and all the other instances adduced by J. V. H. in his magnificent declamation. The evil is to the sufferer, the moral wrong is to God, whose property is injured, and whose law is broken. Is our friend dissatisfied with this? Does wrong lose its horror because it violates the rights of God instead of the rights of man?

Is an act less wrong because it is a wrong done to God, than it would be if a wrong done to a creature? And should we hold our own rights dearer than the rights of God, or feel more deeply outraged at a wrong to ourselves, or to our fellow-men, than at a wrong done to our Creator, our Sovereign, our Redeemer, our Benefactor, and our Father? We do not think so.

"Does not every prince say, 'I will defend the rights which *God gave me*?' Is it not the sentiment of free nations, 'Our rights were given us by God, and we will defend them to the last drop of our blood'?" We should like to believe so. The universal sentiment to which J. V. Happeals against us, if rightly represented by him, is in our favor; for mark, the prince does not say, *My rights are my own*, and I will defend them; free nations do not say, *Our rights are our own*, and therefore we will defend them to the last drop of our blood. Both refer the rights to God, as rights held from him, and it is in his name, not in their own, that they take their heroic resolution to defend them. But surely our friend does not mean here to assert that those rights which God gives become the proper and indefeasible rights of princes and nations, for that would be to assert a doctrine which every Catholic theologian, of any authority, denies,—the doctrine of the inamissibility of power, or the divine right of kings, as contended for by James I. of England, and refuted by Bellarmine, Cardinal Duperron, and above all by Suarez, the great authority on this subject. J. V. H. is unfortunate. In almost every instance in which he attempts to oppose our doctrine, he falls into the precise error he seeks to establish against us, and in the one or two cases in which he does not, he falls into an error of the opposite description. Here he is trying to make us appear as the advocate of despotism, and his own doctrine, if understood in a sense opposed to ours, offers the firmest basis to despotism that it is possible to conceive. The rights of princes and nations, according to us, are trusts from God, and are held and can be exercised only in his name and by his authority, under responsibility to him, according to the conditions which it has pleased him to establish. Held as trusts, they are forfeited by abuse, and the power is lost, and may be transferred to other hands, as the sovereign pontiffs in the deposition of secular princes have always asserted; but if held as indefeasible rights, they could not be forfeited, and under no circumstances could resistance to tyranny and oppression be lawful.

"It is the unanimous sense of mankind that the validity of rights springs from God, who gave them." We are glad to hear it. But then why tell us that our doctrine is opposed to the meaning of the great doctors of the church, to common sense, and to sound theology? "His perfect and absolute right as the creator, lord, and sovereign owner of all things, *is the very thing which imparts validity to his grant, and makes the right he gives a real, strict, proper right, a right which it is in itself unjust to violate.*" Very well said, and it expresses our own thought almost as well as we ourselves expressed it, except the last clause, the meaning of which in this connection we do not understand. That which gives validity to a right is that which gives it its character of right, and which gives to the correlative duty its obligation or its character of duty. So, just avoid the confusion between *rights* in the sense of grants or privileges, and rights in the strict sense of the word, and this will be substantially our own doctrine.

Here we might close, but our New York critic makes a few points more which we suppose he will expect us to notice; and if we should not, some might be rash enough to conclude that we found them too hard for us. He expresses surprise that we object to *La Civiltà Cattolica's* definition of right, that it leaves out the essential element of right. It defines right to be "a moral force which one has to subdue another to his will, and which, though it may be violated by material force, whether our own or that of others, is always subsisting, living, and speaking." We objected to this, that it does not define this force to be one that *ought*, or has the right, to subdue. J. V. H. says that, in being defined to be a *moral* force which survives though violated, it is defined to be "a force that *ought* to subdue, and has the right to subdue." This is not evident to us. Moral force is contrasted by *La Civiltà* with material force, and when so contrasted it does by no means imply that it is a force that *ought*, or that has the right, to subdue. The force of reason is a moral force, but not therefore does it make or impose the law. But we founded our objection not so much on the words of the definition as on *La Civiltà's* development of it; for we did not ask in what sense or senses it might be taken, but in what sense it really was taken by its author. This was in accordance with a habit we have of always seeking to get at and speak to the exact sense of an author, instead of seeking what sense may be ex-

tracted from his words. In his own understanding of it, the author did not include what we regard as the essential element of right, unless in developing it he did great injustice to his thought.

J. V. H. pronounces us incredibly sophistical in our reasoning from this definition against the existence of strict human right. If we allowed ourselves to bandy epithets with a writer whom with all his peccadilloes we love and honor, we should say the incredible sophistry is exhibited in his effort to refute our reasoning. "‘This force,’ *La Civiltà Cattolica* says, ‘is based on a practical truth.’ ‘No,’ Mr. Brownson says, ‘for if the right were *mine*, it would need nothing beyond my will to establish it, but since truth is neither mine nor myself, what you call my right is only the right of the truth or of the law to prevail, and therefore is not my right.’ A gross paralogism, for so it might be shown that God has no right, since the moral force of his will to subdue ours is equally the force of truth, the truth that he is our creator and sovereign, and as such has a right to our obedience.” Not unless God can say of that truth, “It is neither mine nor myself;” for if the truth is himself, or is his, dependent on his will, the right founded on it must be also his. The writer has reproduced our objection only in a mutilated form, but has failed to perceive its point even as he has reproduced it. The point of the objection is, not that the right is based on a practical truth, but on a practical truth independent of my will, and which is neither mine nor myself. My right, if mine, is the right of my will to prevail. When you base that right on a truth, you affirm it to be the right of that truth. Then, if that truth be independent of my will, and be neither mine nor myself, you deny the right based on it to be my right. But you cannot retort the argument, for the truth on which the right of God is founded is his truth, entirely dependent on his will; for he is perfectly free to create, or not to create, and being his, whatever is founded on it is also his. Even the author of *Alban*, we should suppose, might understand this, and see that the sophistry was his, not ours.

Our New York friend, who not obscurely hints that he possesses philosophical talent of the first order,—that talent which originates,—tells us that right is indefinable, and then proceeds to describe it. “It is,” he says, “an idea *eternal* as God, *necessary* as his essence (in which he subsists), the *mirror* of his justice, the legislator of the uni-

verse." Right then must be God, for what subsists in the essence of God is that essence, and the essence of God is God, and an idea subsisting in God, eternal and necessary as his own being, is also God, since, as St. Thomas teaches, *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud, quam essentia Dei*. But all the ideas with which the traditions of moral science are conversant, we were told some time ago, are native powers of reason, constitute reason, are reason as reason in man, that is to say, human reason. So human reason is not only God, but more than God! Right, we are told, is the *mirror* of God's justice. A mirror is distinct from that which it reflects, therefore justice is distinct from God and right! But what is justice distinct from right? Or God deprived of justice? Right is eternal as God, and necessary as his essence. Yet right is the legislator of the universe. Therefore the legislator of the universe is a necessary, not a free legislator. Therefore no free government of the world, no free providence, but all are subjected to stern and invincible necessity!

The writer of the article we are reviewing is, he must permit us with all respect to say, more practised in rhetoric than in logic, and is more of a poet than a philosopher. We do not question his talent of the first order, but he must allow us to believe that he is not much accustomed to the investigation of the higher philosophical questions, and has not paid sufficient attention to them to be able to acquit himself creditably in their discussion. He does not appear to understand the importance to a philosopher of the categories, and of keeping different though kindred matters distinct. He does not seem to be aware that right is used in our language in two distinct senses, and that law itself may be considered under a twofold aspect, either as it is right (*recta*), reasonable, fit, proper, or convenient, or as it is obligatory (*jus*), as the command or precept of the sovereign, and he treats the question before us as if these two aspects or senses were one and the same. In his description of right, where he says it is an idea eternal as God and necessary as his essence, in which it subsists, he uses the word *right* in the sense of rectitude (*rectum*), and asserts that it is the eternal reason or wisdom of God. This is an admissible sense of the word, and in this sense men participate it as they participate reason, and they would not be capable of receiving a moral law if they did not. But when he adds that right is the legislator of the universe, he

either changes the sense of the word, or else he declares reason to be legislative, and law in its essential character as law an *actus intellectus*. We know very well that many ethical writers represent reason as legislative, and regard will as, only executive; but this can be maintained only when the law is considered in relation to what is commanded, or the reason why the sovereign commands it, not when considered as to its obligation, or the reason why it binds the subject. Properly speaking, reason is declarative, not legislative. It determines the rectitude of the law, declares it to be obligatory, but does not itself render it obligatory. The law as founded in reason alone is a simple rule or measure of right and wrong, declaring what is right (*rectum*), proper, decent, and what is not, but not binding the will to do the one, or not to do the other. In other words, a law of reason, *actus rationis*, is law for the understanding, but not law for the will; reasonable, but not obligatory. It teaches, but does not command. Hence, when we ask why we are bound to obey it, we are usually answered, it is reasonable that we should, it is conformable to nature to do so, it is useful, it is for our happiness, and we shall be miserable if we do not. All very true, but nothing binding the will, or asserting the reason of obedience.

If, to get law in an obligatory sense in which it is law for the will, we go further, and assert reason not merely as declarative, but as strictly legislative, we then lose all free legislation, for reason is necessary, not free. By placing the obligation as well as the rectitude of the law in reason, we place it in the eternal and necessary essence of God, and then God is no longer a free legislator, for in his essence he is necessary being. The law, then, is of necessity, and God has no freedom in governing the world. Then there is no free providence, and God can intervene in human affairs only in accordance with stern, inflexible, and necessary laws, which he can no more change or modify, than he can his own eternal, necessary, and immutable essence. Then no miracles are possible, no order of grace conceivable, no supernatural revelation can be made, no prayers can be answered, and Christianity is inadmissible, save as a mythical, poetical, or symbolic representation, for the vulgar, of the universal, necessary, and unchangeable laws which bind alike God, man, and nature in the all-encircling chain of an invincible and inexorable destiny. Study the Hegelian philosophy in Germany, or the eclectic philosophy in France,

represented by the brilliant Cousin, and the logical but despairing Jouffroy, and you may see where the doctrine that law is to be referred for its obligatory character to reason, inevitably leads. It makes God universal fate, and renders all freedom, save freedom *a coactione*, impossible. Those who have not, like ourselves, pushed modern heresy, in their own eager pursuit of truth, to its last consequences, may not feel as we do the danger of that doctrine, and the importance of refuting it in its principle. The age with its clamorous tongues demands liberty, and gets—slavery. We, too, demand liberty, the liberty of God. We are deafened and wearied half to death with the ceaseless babble about the rights of man, and we seek relief in a piercing cry for the rights of God. We had wandered in darkness, stumbling from error to error, with downcast look and saddened heart, craving freedom and finding only bondage, till one day broke in upon us a solitary ray, the first that had ever penetrated our darkened understanding, and our heart bounded with joy to behold that God is free. Then began the revolution in our whole order of thought; then rolled back the clouds that had gathered over us; then fell the chains that had bound us, and entered into our very soul; and we found ourselves at once rejoicing in the glorious freedom and light of the church of God. The revelation to us of the liberty of God wrought the change; it was the first step in the process of our conversion to Catholicity, and hence we feel most deeply the importance of asserting it. Its denial is at the bottom of all modern heresy. But the liberty of God, the foundation and support of all real liberty, can be asserted only by referring law, in that it is obligatory, to the will of God, and regarding it not as his eternal essence, but as his creature, and therefore whatever he chooses to make it. There is no freedom where there is no free legislator, and man has no freedom, save in being freed from all created wills, and in being subjected to the will of God alone, who is free to impose on him whatever law he in his infinite wisdom and unbounded goodness judges best. Then we are not chained to the car of a stern and inexorable necessity, but are subjected to a free and living and loving sovereign, to whom our hearts may expand with true loyalty, to whom we can prefer our petitions and address our prayers, and who is free to hear and answer us, who is flexible to our wants, who can condescend to our weaknesses, bear our infirmities, console us in our afflictions, and

rejoice with us in our joy. Give us this Sovereign, revealed to us by our holy religion,—this sovereign legislator who has free will, who is above all law, and whose laws are flexible to all his gracious designs, to all the dictates of his loving kindness, and we can feel that we are free in the infinite freedom of God.

We may be mistaken, but we think that all modern heresy, beginning with the Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, which supposes the law is not obligatory on account of the will that commands, but on account of what it commands, down to the assertion of the absolute independence of man and denial of the authority of God by Proudhon, finds its basis in the doctrine that law derives its essential character as law from reason, and that right in the sense of *jus* is participable. Hence we must believe that, to meet and refute that heresy in its principle, it is necessary to make a distinction which we find in St. Augustine, but which we do not always find expressed in the mediæval doctors, and which is seldom noticed in the little men of our times, between law regarded as to its contents, or as to the reason why God wills it, and law regarded as obligatory, or as that which binds the subject. In the former sense, it is *actus rationis*, and has its seat, its origin and ground, in the eternal reason of God; in the latter, it is *actus voluntatis*, and has its origin and ground in the free will of God, as has the creative act itself. It is only by means of placing obligation solely in the fact that God wills it, that we know how to carry on the war against the peculiar errors of our times. In this we do not regard ourselves as innovating, or as departing from the truth as taught by the mediæval doctors, but simply as applying that truth under the special form required to meet the errors of our times, as they applied it under the special forms required to meet the errors of their times.

But to return to our New York friend. He contends that we must have rights in the strict and proper sense of the word, because we have the *notion* of right. This notion must be derived either from rights which we possess as our own, or from *error*. The latter cannot be said. Therefore we must say the former. Therefore we have rights. This argument, he says, must be conclusive with us, for we are an ontologist, and contend that an idea must exist outside the mind before it can exist in it. How an argument which is based on pure psychologism must be conclusive

with us because we are an ontologist, is not very clear to us. The notion of right cannot be obtained from an error, we concede, and that it can be obtained only from the intuition of real right, we also concede; but how it follows from this that we have rights in the strict and proper sense of the term, we cannot understand. J. V. H. says, indeed, that "all our ideas of spiritual and heavenly things are first taken from their earthly patterns;" but this is not ontology, nor do we admit it to be true. The reverse is what we hold. "See," said the Lord to Moses, "that you make all things according to the pattern shown you in the mount." We did not before know that the spiritual and heavenly things were patterned after the earthly; we thought the earthly was patterned after the spiritual and heavenly, and that the *idea exemplaris* was in God, in the divine mind, not in the creature. Certainly we have read something like this among the gentiles in Plato, and among Christians in St. Augustine and St. Thomas. It is psychologism, not ontology, that teaches that the order of science is the reverse of the order of reality. We suppose that, as right is a reality, it may be known to us in the same way that other realities, without being our property, are known to us.

J. V. H. argues that there must be human rights in the sense we deny, because God is the true Nemesis, and avenger of the wronged. But has he forgotten that the Lord says, "Revenge is mine, and I will repay?" But how can this be true, if the rights to be avenged are not his? He forbids us to revenge ourselves, because revenge belongs to him, and not to us, and therefore we should conclude that the rights violated and to be avenged were his, and not ours, for if they were ours we should have the right to avenge them. But we have rights in the sense of trusts, created for our benefit, and we can conceive that God might with propriety be said in avenging their violation to avenge us, for he does avenge, in avenging the violation of his own rights, the benefit of which he has granted to us, both us and himself.

But the argument that is utterly to confound us our Catholic objector has reserved to the last to cap the climax. "If, finally, 'right on human lips be a vicious expression,' then what becomes of the rights of the apostolic see of which the popes in their briefs and allocutions constantly speak? What are the 'Catholic rights' of which Mr. Brownson speaks at the close of this very article? If 'right

on human lips is a 'vicious expression,' let Catholics learn henceforth not to speak of their rights, but only of their 'duties,' and the sovereign pontiffs cease to protest that the 'rights' of their glorious throne are violated." This is a grave objection, and we can only say in our defence, that we wrote as a Catholic, and very innocently took for granted that Catholic rights and the rights of the apostolic see are, in the minds of Catholics, divine, not human rights, the rights of God, and not the rights of man. The sovereign pontiff, we have been taught, holds, exercises, defends, the rights of the apostolic see as the successor of Peter and the vicar of our Lord Jesus Christ, not in his own name, as his own inherent and indefeasible personal rights. Catholic rights are the rights of the church, and the rights of the church are the rights of her celestial Spouse. At least so Catholics believe. Is not J. V. H. a Catholic? If he is, will he tell us by what *right* he assumes that the rights of the church are human rights? It strikes us that he has something here to settle with his confessor, and to explain to his Catholic brethren. He must have forgotten himself, for we cannot suppose him to be ignorant that a Catholic is not at liberty to follow Ranke and Macaulay, and call the church commissioned by Almighty God to teach and govern, in his name, and by his authority, all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, a human institution, to speak of her rights as human rights, and conclude that man has proper rights of his own, from the fact that she as God's church has rights. Her rights are God's rights, and unless the question between us and the *Civiltà Cattolica* be decided against us, no doubt can be thrown on them. J. V. H., by resorting to this last argument has damaged his own reasoning more, perhaps, than we have damaged it, because by it he plainly shows that he has either been blinded by passion, or has never begun to understand the subject on which he affects to speak as a master.

But we have said enough, and more perhaps than was necessary. However, we are not sorry that J. V. H.'s irritation has given us an opportunity to bring this great question of Rights and Duties before our readers again, for in our judgment it is the most important question of our times. We are not precisely ignorant of what may be adduced against us; we have seen in the *Ami de la Religion* a most frightful list of authorities, embracing well nigh a catena of all the fathers and doctors of the church, in favor of the

expression that man has rights, but we have not seen one, in that list or elsewhere, that asserts them clearly and unequivocally in the sense in which we deny them. None of them seem to have taken up the question in the precise form that we have, and though St. Thomas would seem to be against us, inasmuch as he formally teaches that law is *actus intellectus*, it is clear to us that he proves it to be so only in the sense in which we concede that it is, and we can find authority enough in his writings to prove that it is also *actus voluntatis*. Suarez, whom since writing thus far we have consulted for the first time on this point, in his *De Legibus*, the standard authority on this subject, appears to adopt and defend our view, that law in that it is obligatory is *actus voluntatis*. He gives three opinions, and certainly inclines to the third, which reconciles the other two, and this third opinion is the one we have defended. If we consider law as to its contents, or in answer to the question why the sovereign chooses to enact it, it is no doubt *actus intellectus*, but in that sense it is only improperly called law; if we consider it as obliging, or in answer to the question, why does it bind the subject to obedience, there is just as little doubt that it is *actus voluntatis*, for it certainly does not bind till the sovereign has willed it. If it did, it would be eternally law, and no sovereign will would be requisite to constitute it law. Its obligation would be in what it commands, not in him who commands, which no Catholic theologian, and none but an infidel or a *liberal* Christian can admit. The reason which induced some to hesitate about placing law in will, that is, to escape the doctrine, that whatever the prince or human sovereign wills is law, is obviated by our doctrine that the right to make the law is in God alone, and in human governments only by delegation or as a trust from him, and the force of the law as law is directly from him, and human governments act only in his name, and bind their subjects only in so far as they have his authority. And as they never have his authority for any unjust acts, such acts are null and void from the beginning, and when they persist in them they abuse their trusts and forfeit their powers. As we ascribe the law-making power solely to God, and allow it to others only as his delegates, tied up by the conditions he annexes, there is no danger in saying that the binding force of the law is derived solely from the will of the sovereign.

WARD'S PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1861.]

MR. WARD was one of the earliest and most distinguished of the converts to the church from the now almost forgotten Oxford movement, and we agree with our able and learned contemporary, *The Dublin Review*, that "no work since the appearance of the *Tracts for the Times* has issued from the English press that can equally claim the attention of Catholics" with his treatise on *Nature and Grace*, the first volume of which, embracing an elaborate preface and a philosophical introduction, is now published and before us.

The treatise, we are told in the preface, is composed of a part of the course of lectures on dogmatic theology given by the author in St. Edmund's Seminary, and "includes all those revealed truths which relate to each man's moral and spiritual condition; all those which concern his individual relations with God, his true end, whether tending toward that end, or unhappily moving in an opposite direction." It is divided into five books, of unequal length: 1. Philosophical Introduction; 2. Theological Prolegomena; 3. On Man's Moral Action; 4. On Divine Grace; 5. On God's Providence and Predestination. His work, the author tells us, corresponds, in the main, to the *Pars Secunda* of St. Thomas, borrowing, however, from the *Pars Prima*, the topics of *Providence and Predestination*, and from the *Pars Tertia*, that of *Attrition* in relation to the justification of adults in the sacraments of baptism and penance.

If we understand the learned and philosophical author, he embraces, under the head of nature and grace, all that part of theology, natural and revealed, which relates to the second cycle, or return of existences or creatures to God as their last end,—that is, all that part of theology which relates to God as the final cause, in distinction from that which relates to God in himself, and as first cause. He contends that this, according to St. Thomas, the second part of theology, may be treated by itself, independently of the

*On *Nature and Grace: A Theological Treatise. Book I. Philosophical Introduction.* By W. G. WARD. London: 1860.

first part, or that which treats of the existence, nature, and attributes of God, of the unity and the trinity of God, and of God as creator, or first cause. He says St. Thomas, in the *pars secunda* of his *Summa Theologica*, takes a fresh start, and might as well have treated it in the first, as in the second place. "It is impossible to understand the *de Deo Trino* till we have studied the *de Deo Uno*; and it is impossible to understand *de Gratia*, till we have studied *de Actibus Humanis*. But that portion of science on the one hand which contains the *de Deo Uno et Trino*, and that portion, on the other hand, which contains the *de Actibus Humanis* and the *de Gratia*—these are mutually independent; it is a matter of indifference which is studied before the other. . . . Upon these two independent portions is founded the doctrine of the Incarnation, and all which follows." But how can we scientifically treat *de Actibus Humanis* independently of the *de Deo Creatore*? of man's end before we have treated of his origin? or of *de Gratia* before *de Incarnatione*, the origin and end of the "new creation," or life of grace?

Theology, in its broadest sense, embraces both natural theology, or metaphysics, and supernatural theology, that is, all the truths we know by the natural light of reason, and all that we know by divine revelation, or the supernatural light of faith. There is always, then, to be carried along, the double order, and the theologian has to treat the origin and end of man in the natural order, and his origin and end in the supernatural order, which, as to the end, in some sort *assumes* the natural. The origin and end of the natural order depend on God as creator; of the supernatural, which presupposes the natural, on God incarnate. We should say, then, that the order of science, as of being, requires that *de Deo Creatore* should, as in St. Thomas, precede *de Actibus Humanis*, and *de Incarnatione*, *de Gratia*. It is true St. Thomas places *de Gratia* before *de Incarnatione*, and *de Incarnatione* only before *de Sacramentis*, as if the Incarnation is to be regarded as the effect of the *Gratia Dei*, and the source, or cause, only of sacramental grace. There may be a question whether in this he follows the true scientific order or not, because there is among theologians a question whether, if man had not sinned, the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity would, or would not have become incarnate. Grace certainly pertains in the supernatural order to the first cause.

the first cycle or procession of the supernatural life from God, and if we hold with St. Thomas that if man had not sinned, the Word would not have assumed flesh, we must regard the Incarnation as the effect of the grace of God, and then treat it after treating grace; but if we regard, with the general current of modern theology, the Incarnation not as merely reparatory of the damage done by sin, and taking sin as the occasion of elevating man to a higher and nobler destiny than he would have attained to had he not sinned, but as primarily intended to ennoble man, and to elevate him, as his final beatitude, to union by nature with his Creator, and, therefore, the Word would have been incarnated even if man had not sinned, we should, it seems to us, place *de Incarnatione* before *de Gratia*, immediately after *de Deo Creatore*, as we find it placed by Father Perrone in his *Prælectiones Theologicæ*. We incline to the latter view, and, therefore, we should maintain that no treatise on nature and grace can be scientifically constructed independently of *de Deo*, *de Deo Creatore*, and *de Incarnatione*, for we cannot understand how the final cause can be treated independently of the first cause, or the return of existences to God as their last end independently of their procession by way of creation from him as their first beginning.

But, however it may be with regard to the Incarnation, we are certain that there can be no scientific treatment of moral theology, or the speculative part of ethics, natural or supernatural, that excludes all consideration of God as first cause; and nearly all the criticisms we shall have to make on the author's theory of morals, as set forth in the volume already published, grow out of his attempt to find a solid basis of morals without taking into the account the creative act of God, or considering in its proper place and bearing man's relation to God as his first, as well as his final cause. But more of this hereafter.

The volume before us is introductory to the volumes that are to follow, but it is complete in itself, and contains a very full treatise on moral philosophy as distinguished from practical ethics. It is purely philosophical, that is, wholly within the province of natural reason, and treats of an important branch of natural theology. The matter treated is arranged in four chapters: 1. On the Principles of Morality; 2. On Ethical Psychology; 3. On Self Charity; 4. On various Kinds of Certainty and Impossibility. Our remarks in the present article will be confined, for the most part, to the

first chapter—*On the Principles of Morality*. This chapter is subdivided into seven sections: 1. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude; 2. On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth; 3. On the Relation between God and Moral Truth; 4. Catholic Authority on Independent Morality—placed at the end of the volume; 5. On the Idea of Moral Worthiness; 6. On the Extent of the Natural Rule; 7. On God's Power of Interference with the Natural Rule. We shall have, at present, little to say, except on the first three sections of the first chapter, which contain the fundamental principles of the whole introduction. The author, we hardly need remark, is a psychologist, and, though professing to recognize objective truth, discusses all questions from the point of view of the subject, or his own *ego*. He begins by distinguishing between judgments of consciousness and judgments of intuitions. I judge that I am this moment suffering the sensation of cold, hunger, or thirst; this is a judgment of consciousness. I remember that some time ago I suffered that sensation; this is a judgment of intuition, or intuitive judgment. Judgments of consciousness are simply the interior recognition of our own present mental state; intuitive judgments are the direct and immediate perception or apprehension of objective truth or reality, that is, something exterior to and independent of the percipient or intuitive subject. Intuition, then, in the author's sense, is the *perception* of the Scottish school, and the *judgment a posteriori* of the Kantian. It is the simple, direct, immediate apprehension of the object by the subject, and is presented as a purely subjective or psychological act.

It would seem, from this statement, that the author holds the judgments of memory to be judgments of intuition. There is, undoubtedly, a valid distinction between being conscious and remembering; between suffering the toothache as a present fact, and remembering it as a past fact; but is this memory of the fact properly an intuition? Is it, when not remembered, an objective fact, a fact exterior to one's self? We do not profess to be able to unravel the mystery of memory, but we are disposed to maintain that a judgment is always a judgment of consciousness, though not always a present sensation; for *judgment* is always an intellectual act. The fact remembered, though past in relation to the senses, or even to reflex consciousness, has always remained present to the soul in what is called *direct* con-

sciousness,—present by virtue of the presence and light of being, in which the soul lives, moves, and has its being. We do not like to say *intuition* of memory; we prefer to say *perception* of memory. But this is a small matter. A graver matter is, that after having defined judgments of intuition to be the direct and immediate perception of objective reality, or judgment that the object really exists, the author provokingly tells us, that of intuitive judgments some are true, and some are false—that is, in intuition we sometimes *intue* something—to use his term—and sometimes nothing.

“Such, then,” he says, “are intuitive judgments in the sense we shall consistently assign to that word. They are judgments, which I do not hold as being inferred in any way from other judgments, but as *immediately evident*. Yet, on the other hand, they are totally distinct from judgments of consciousness; or, in other words, from the various reflections made by the mind upon its actually present experience. *Many of the judgments we thus form are true; many are false.*” If this be so, how distinguish which is true, which is false? A—A. Intuition equals intuition, and what have we or can we have more certain than intuition with which to verify intuition? If he concedes it possible that intuition in any case may be false, he yields the whole question between him and the sceptic. He quotes the tests proposed by Father Buffier; but these tests he concedes are not wholly satisfactory, and indeed no tests can be; for no test, either in its origin or in its application, can be more certain or evident than intuition. He himself, whether consciously or not, seeks the test in the *sensus communis*, or *consensus hominum*; but is it more certain to me that this or that is supported by the *sensus communis* or the *consensus hominum* than is the intuitive judgment itself? He claims to refute the sceptic by virtue of the principle that it is possible for an intuitive judgment to carry with it its own evidence of truth; but if there can be false intuitions,—that is, intuitions in which nothing is *intued* or apprehended,—he must concede that intuition alone does not, as the sceptic alleges, carry with it its own evidence.

The author seems to us to have in the outset made a fatal concession to the sceptic, and so far from refuting the sceptic, as he honestly believes, he has rendered him on his ground invulnerable. He has done this by distinguishing

between the intuition and its evidence, and conceding the evidence to be necessary to sustain the truth of the intuition, or to establish the fact that in intuition something is *intued*, or that the idea or *noema* is not a mere illusion; for no evidence distinct from the intuition can be more evident than the intuition itself. We say such or such a proposition is self-evident, that is, it is intuitively evident, or we intuitively grasp or apprehend the objective truth or reality itself. No further evidence is possible or conceivable. But the moment you assert the possibility of false intuitions, then you deny that intuitions carry with them their own evidence, or that the fact of intuition by itself alone is a sufficient affirmation of the objective truth. The author falls into his error by confounding *intuition*, which is and always must be true, and present the truth *a parte rei*, with *conception*, which may indeed be false, as well as obscure, indistinct, and inadequate; for it is an act sometimes of the imagination, sometimes of the reflective reason, and is subject to all the infirmities of the human subject. This part of his work, the author, we trust, will see reason to revise in a second edition.

We cannot stop long to discuss the author's principle of certitude, and his attempted refutation of scepticism. The question of certitude, as he understands it, and as all who follow the psychological instead of the ontological method must understand it, is vital, and on their ground and his own, Balmes is right, when he says in the opening sentence of his great work, "El estudio de la filosofía debe comenzar por el examen de las cuestiones sobre la certeza: antes de levantar el edificio es necesario pensar en el cimiento." Yet either scepticism must be accepted, or the whole question of certitude excluded from philosophy. Either we know or we do not. If we know, the sceptic's question, how we *know* we know, is absurd; for, to know, equals to *know* we know; if we do not know, there is an end of the matter, and the sceptic's question is alike unaskable and unanswerable. If the point to be determined between us and the sceptic be, as Mr. Ward states, "Can reason be legitimately trusted?" we may as well give up the question at once, for we know nothing but reason with which to prove the trustworthiness of reason, and every argument we construct against the sceptic but simply begs the question. We have only one answer to the sceptic, namely, knowing is knowing, and we know that we know by knowing.

The objection does not lie against philosophy, properly so called, nor against our human faculties, but against the peripatetic and psychological methods of philosophizing. Let us frankly reject the pretence of some that scepticism is a disease of the mind ; for the greatest sceptics in practical life disavow their scepticism, and Hume, while he asserts no man can disprove scepticism, maintains that no man can practically accept it. Every man sees and knows it is false and absurd, which is a sufficient proof that our faculties are not in fault. We can assert its falsehood only by seeing and opposing to it the truth it denies. Then all men see and know objective truth. Where, then, is the difficulty ? Why, the difficulty is, that we have adopted theories, according to which it is uncertain whether seeing be seeing, knowing be knowing, and which require us to prove after seeing that we see, that in knowing we know, that in perceiving we perceive, as if perception were not all that is perception of perception, as if knowing does not say just as much as knowing that we know, or seeing as much as seeing that we see. When I know I know that I know, for in the fact of knowing, I possess at once the object as known, and myself as the subject knowing. The doubt is due neither to our faculties nor to things themselves, but to our false systems of philosophy, which make it necessary, after we have intuition, to determine whether the intuition be true or false—that is to say, whether intuition be intuition ; whether the object *intued* be a reality existing independent of us, or a mere mode, affection, or production, of the intuitive subject ! This comes from giving the question of method precedence of the question of principles, and seeking the principle in the subject instead of the object.

Passing over this fatal concession, that intuitions may be false, we must still object to Mr. Ward, that he makes intuition the act of the subject, a simple perception or judgment *a posteriori*, or empirical intuition, impossible, as Kant has proved, without a synthetic judgment *a priori*, or ideal intuition. The synthetic judgment *a priori*, or intuition of the ideal or intelligible, cannot be primarily our mental act or judgment, since without it the mind cannot act at all, or even exist, any more than the will can elect to concur with grace, without the aid of grace. The mind is essentially active, and the soul is essentially a thinking substance. Its very essence is to think. It, then, cannot be conceived as

existing and not thinking. It is not merely a power to think when the occasion arises. It may be *in potentia* to this or that particular thought, but not *in potentia* to all thought, for that would deny it all existence *in actu*, and suppose it a mere possible, not an actual soul. But thought is invariably and essentially a synthetic fact, embracing simultaneously and indissolubly three terms, subject, object, and their relation, and that, too, whether regarded psychologically or ontologically. There is no thought without the thinking subject, and none without the intelligible object. There is, again, no thought unless the subject and object are placed in direct relation. The subject prior to thought cannot place itself in relation to the object, for prior to thought it does not exist; since its very existence, if essentially a thinking substance, commences in thought. Then the object must not only exist independently of the subject, but must place itself in relation to the subject, and in so doing create it, and affirm itself to it. The primitive object, since its affirmation creates the subject, must be, and can only be, God himself in his intelligible being and creative act. It is evident then, that the ideal intuition is *a priori*, and therefore primarily the act of the object, and only secondarily the concurrent act of the subject.

Mr. Ward does not seem to be aware of the necessity to the scientific treatment of his subject of the recognition of this primitive intuition, whence is derived the ideal and apodictic element of thought. He maintains, very properly and very justly, that what philosophers, whether in the moral order or the purely intellectual, call necessary truth, is God; but he does not provide in his system for the possession of necessary truth by the human mind, since the mind must possess it before empirical intuitions or judgments *a posteriori* are possible. His doctrine seems to us to require the soul to think or perceive before it exists. To suppose the soul exists, and exists with all its faculties prior to the fact of intuition, would be to suppose it an independent existence and self-sufficing, which would be to suppose it being, not mere existence, and therefore God,—the Fichtean error. No creature or created existence has, or can have its being in itself; for all being properly so called is real, necessary, and eternal. We have our being, and live, and move, not in ourselves, but in God; as the apostle says, in accordance with the highest philosophy, "In him we live, and move, and have our being." This must be

as true of us in the sense we are thinking or intelligent creatures or existences, as in any other sense, if any other sense be conceivable. Then, since the object is as essential to thought as the subject, the soul cannot be conceived as having an independent power of thought, or as capable of initiating an intellectual act by itself alone, or otherwise than as created by the object and in concurrence with it,—a doctrine taught by all our theologians, in what they call the divine concurrence. If this be true, the soul cannot come into possession of necessary truth, or the ideal, the intelligible—which Mr. Ward agrees with us is identical with God, although we know it not by direct and immediate intuition—by any act or judgment primarily its own; and to suppose we obtain it by empirical intuition or judgment *a posteriori* is simply, if we did but know it, a denial of the soul as creature, and the assertion, that it has its being not in God, but in itself, and therefore is itself God.

The author in words concedes synthetic judgments *a priori*, but, he will permit us to say in words only. He says in a note that he accepts Kant's position, "that the mind *forms* various *a priori* synthetic judgments; which, by the way, is not Kant's position, but rather its contradictory, for a great part of Kant's labor was devoted to proving that the mind does not, and cannot *form* synthetic judgments *a priori*; and yet without them no judgment *a posteriori* is possible. His doctrine is that the synthetic judgments *a priori* are innate, or inherent forms of the understanding, which the understanding supplies in the empirical fact, or judgment *a posteriori*. Besides, a judgment *formed* by the human mind is not *a priori*; and as the author holds, and on his system must hold, that all judgments are formed by the activity of the mind itself, it is clear that he does not and cannot concede any synthetic judgments really *a priori*.* All synthetic judgments formed by the mind are necessarily *a posteriori*—or, as we say, empirical judgments, or facts of experience. The

* Kant has approached much nearer the truth than we ourselves formerly supposed. His error was in making the categories of the subjective reason, or innate ideas in the primitive Cartesian sense, instead of the objective reason illumining the subjective. Reduce all his categories, as may be done, to being and existence; supply, what he omits, the *nexus*, or copula, and regard them as forms of the ideal, and you will have the ideal formula itself, *Ens creat existentias*, which we ourselves maintain.

author adopts, as does Father Buffier, as does the Scottish school, the psychological method ; and no man who adopts that method and strictly follows it, can do otherwise than make all begin and end in and with the soul. It is impossible for the psychologist to escape from subjectivism, and pure subjectivism is the assertion that I am myself my own object, therefore that I suffice for myself ; and therefore, again, that I am independent being, or God.

The only way to avoid this conclusion is to abandon the psychological method for the ontological. No doubt the point of departure for philosophy is thought ; but it is necessary to observe that thought is never a purely subjective fact, is never the sole product of the activity of the subject. In every thought there is object as well as subject, and it is the object that affirms the subject, not the subject that affirms the object. The psychologist assumes that it is the subject that at once affirms the object and itself. It affirms itself, and then affirms what it sees that is not itself. But only Being can affirm itself ; only God can say, in and of himself, I AM. The ontologist starts from thought, indeed, but from thought in the sense that it is objective as well as subjective, in which it reveals and affirms the subject to itself. We do not see or perceive, or, as Mr. Ward would say, *intue* ourselves in ourselves, for we are not intelligible in ourselves. Not intelligible in ourselves, St. Thomas maintains, because we are not pure intelligences in ourselves. If we could see ourselves in ourselves we should be intelligible in ourselves, and if intelligible in ourselves, we should be in ourselves both subject and object, therefore God ; for only God has, or can have, his own object in himself. We see, know, or recognize ourselves only in the object, which, therefore, must affirm, intuitively, both itself and us or the subject. In this way we easily escape all the difficulties, both of the sceptic and of the subjectivist. On the psychological method it is impossible to find any passage from the subjective to the objective, for if the mind can exist and act with no object but itself, how can you prove that any thing but itself exists ? How prove that there is any thing exterior to me, or that what I take to be an objective world is not merely myself projected ? But by the ontological method, which starts from the ideal, the objective intuition, we find that it is only by the object that the subject exists and comes to a knowledge even of itself. The sceptic's problem cannot come up, for it is only

by virtue of the presence and activity of the object, existing *a parte rei*, that there are, or can be, what Mr. Ward calls judgments of consciousness. Without the presence and activity of the ideal, the source of our internal light, there can be no consciousness, for the precise definition of consciousness is, the recognition of the soul as subject in the intuition of the object. Hence we maintain that the true scientific philosopher never has occasion to discuss the principle of certitude; the principle asserts itself.

The mistake of most philosophers in modern times is in placing the question of method before that of principles, as if principles were found or obtained, instead of being *given*. The principles determine the method, not the method the principles; and when once we understand principles are objective, we understand that our method must be objective, instead of subjective. The object determines the form of the thought, and all our faculties are distinguished and named, as every theologian is aware, from their respective objects. Everybody knows that first principles are and must be *a priori*, for the mind can neither exist nor act without them. They must, then, be given, and the first act in intuition must be on the part of the ideal, or intelligible object. We cannot, then, say with Mr. Ward, that we *intue*, see, or perceive the ideal, or necessary truth, but that it intuitively, directly, immediately affirms itself, and in affirming itself it creates the mind, and is its immediate object and light. Reflection, which must be distinguished from intuition, or this primitive *a priori* or ideal affirmation, or divine judgment, discovers, as we never cease to repeat, that, like every affirmation or judgment, it is a synthesis of three terms, subject, predicate, and copula, expressed in the ideal formula, *Being creates existences*. We do not, of course, assert that we know by direct and immediate intuition that this formula expresses the primitive judgment, or judgment *a priori*, any more than that we know intuitively that necessary truth or the *being* affirmed, is identically the eternal and self-existing God. The identification, or the drawing out of the formula, is the work of reflection, operating on the original affirmation. This is the great work of philosophy, a long, laborious, and difficult work, and one which few of our race ever successfully accomplish. The intuitive judgment contains the three terms in their real relation, but we do not know intuitively that it contains them, and few persons ever reflect that the necessary

truth we all assert in every judgment we form, is God himself intuitively present in reason. The demonstration of this identity is what is called the demonstration of the existence of God.

The good point in Mr. Ward's treatise is his assertion of the identity of necessary truth with God, although his psychological method does not enable him to prove it. The error of most of our philosophers is in attempting to distinguish between the necessary and God, and this error is in no one more striking than in Rosmini, whose system has at least one able advocate in England, the young professor who writes for the *Rambler* under the signature of M. All use the conception of the necessary as the basis of their demonstration that God is; but there are few who do not proceed on the assumption that it implies God, rather than that it is God, and thus fall into the fallacy of maintaining that more may be contained in the conclusion than in the premises, or that reflection can attain to a truth not given in intuition. There is affirmed to us in intuition that which is God, but that it is God we know only as demonstrated by reflection. The demonstration, however, is a simple identification, but an identification which the mass of mankind are practically incapable of making; and hence the mass of mankind, though asserting in every judgment they express that God is, would have no formal belief in God, if it were not for the supernatural or social instruction they receive,—the truth on which traditionalism builds, but which, unhappily, it exaggerates and abuses. Perhaps the remarks we have just made on this point will relieve those of our friends who cannot see their way clear to accept the ideal formula, because they suppose its defenders maintain that it is not only given intuitively in its several terms, but is given, as distinctly and formally stated, by and for the reflective reason; which is a great mistake, for, if it were so, we should never meet either scepticism or subjectivism, atheism or pantheism.

Leaving what the author says of intuitions, we proceed now to the second section of his first chapter, which is "On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth." Here we find, or seem to find, the author very confused and obscure. We very naturally expect him to give us clear, distinct, and categorical statements of what, in his view, are the essential characteristics of moral truth. We expect him to define it *per genus et differentiam*, so that we may recognize what it

is in itself, and distinguish it from every thing else. But he hardly meets our expectations. He does not deal in definitions, nor in direct categorical statements; he prefers to leave us to collect his meaning from instances and illustrations, in which he is not always felicitous. All we can gather is, that moral truth is a simple intuitive judgment; a synthetic, not an analytic judgment; an intuition, not an inference; a necessary, not a contingent intuition. Its characteristics are simplicity and necessity, given us in direct, immediate intuition. But may not the same be said of all truth in the ideal order, indeed of the simply good itself? What special meaning, then, does he attach to the epithet, *moral*? What, in treating of *moral* truth, does he say that he would not say were he treating of truth, goodness, or fairness, each regarded as absolute? What, then, is the characteristic of moral truth, or by what does he distinguish it from other truth?

Moral truth, he says, is a simple, not a complex idea; synthetic, not analytic; given intuitively, not discursively obtained. As an instance of what he means, he says: "A friend of mine, who has loaded me with benefits, entrusts to my keeping a jewel of great value, for the sake of the safe custody, while he goes to seek his fortune in other lands. He returns in a state of great distress, and reclaims his jewel. I recognize immediately, and without the faintest shadow of doubt, that I ought to restore it: or, in other words, that I am under the moral obligation of restoring it." "Who has loaded me with benefits," and "in a state of great distress," may be dismissed as having nothing to do with the obligation of restoration. I should be equally bound in justice to restore the jewel on its reclamation by the depositor, if neither circumstance existed. This obligation is, we take it, what he means by distinctively moral truth, and this, he says, is "a simple necessary *intuëm*," or idea, or immediate intuitive judgment; but, to our understanding, it is clearly an illative judgment, or logical conclusion. I am bound to render unto every one, especially when he reclaims it, his own, or what is his. The jewel deposited with me for safe keeping is my friend's; it is his property, therefore I am bound to restore it on his reclaiming it. The moral judgment, I am under moral obligation to restore my friend's deposit, is but a particular application of a prior moral judgment, namely, "render unto every man his own." *Sum cuique.*

According to the author, to say I am under the moral obligation to restore the jewel is the same as to say it would be morally evil not to do it. Undoubtedly. But that is only a play on words. The term *moral* includes, in this case, all that we express by the term *obligation*, or the term *ought*, and the two propositions are, therefore, equivalent. But this is not the point. Does the epithet *moral*, applied to good or to evil, add any thing to simply good or simply evil? Is the judgment morally good, the same as the judgment good; or the judgment morally evil, the same as the judgment evil? If so, what is the difference between virtue and good, vice and evil; between the judgment virtuous man, and the judgment a good dog; between the judgment a vicious action, and the judgment a deformed leg or a clubbed foot? If not so, then the epithet *moral* must express something not expressed by the simple term good, or the simple term evil. What is this something? Be it what it may, it must be the characteristic of moral truth; and without telling us what it is, it is clear that the author does not and cannot tell us "what are the essential characteristics of moral truth."

We have a very profound respect for the author, but he must permit us to doubt if, in the present matter, he really understands himself. He maintains that moral truth is a simple necessary idea—*intuem*, as he says. The judgment is simple, like sweet or bitter, and morally good can be defined only as the opposite of morally evil, and morally evil can be defined only as the opposite of morally good. It is not only a simple idea, but a necessary idea. In his third section, *On the Relation of God to Moral Truth*, he maintains very properly, as we hold, that all necessary ideas, or what some philosophers call necessary truths, are God. But that I ought to restore my friend's jewel, is a simple necessary truth, or idea; therefore, that I ought to restore it, is God! The obligation to restore it is not an obligation imposed upon me by God as my sovereign, but is identically God himself! It is clear, then, that by morally good, the author understands simply good, which, in the absolute sense or the good in itself, is undoubtedly God, the source and measure of every particular or participated good. The author, it seems to us, confounds moral obligation with the good in itself, which, we hardly need say, is to confound it with the end we are obliged to seek; a mistake of the same nature with that of confounding the effect with the cause,—the error of pantheism.

The author, no doubt, aims to prove that moral good and moral evil, virtue and vice, are not mere arbitrary distinctions, dependent on any will whatever, but are founded in the intrinsic nature of things. But between this and the assertion that moral obligation is God, or that "moral obligation by no means need imply the existence of any other person (is moral obligation a person?) who imposes it," there is, to our understanding, some difference. Ethics is a mixed science. It has an ideal, necessary, apodictic element, which is God, necessary, immutable, eternal as the divine essence itself; but it has also a contingent element, connected with the ideal only by the creative act, and as contingent, related to the nature and acts of the creature. Things are, no doubt, intrinsically good or evil, and that is a reason why they should be commanded or prohibited; but it is not the reason why they are or are not obligatory on my will. The author seems to hold, and it appears to us the great point with him, that the simple intellectual apprehension or intuition of the intrinsic good itself imposes the moral obligation, or rather is itself that moral obligation. This we cannot accept; for it would imply not that our reason or intellectual faculty perceives or takes cognizance of the law, or is the medium of its promulgation, but is itself the law imposing the obligation, which is not true, and which, if we understand him, is precisely what Suarez opposes in the doctrine, as he represents it, of Vasquez. In the first place, intellectual apprehension is not and cannot be law. I may and must intellectually apprehend the law, but my apprehension of it is not the law, for, as Suarez says, even as cited by the author, "there can be no law properly so called without the *will* of some one giving command." *Lex enim propria et præceptiva non est, sine voluntate alicujus præcipientis.** Besides, a law imposed and promulgated by our intellect, would be only a human law, and no divine law at all, and would imply that the legislator, the law, and the subject on which it is to operate, are all identically one and the same. In this case the moral maxim would be that of the transcendentalists, "obey thyself," which is only another way of saying, "thou art free from all law, therefore live as thou listest." Where there is no law, there is no obligation. It is the law that binds, and a law that does not bind is simply no law at all. To say a

* *De Leg. Lib. II. Cap. 6, No. 1.*

thing is obligatory is only saying, in other words, "it is the law," or "the law enjoins it." The law imposes the obligation. But if there can be no law without a law-giver, without some will, or, as Suarez maintains, the will of some one commanding, how can the author assert that, "moral obligation by no means need imply the existence of any other *person* (law-giver?) who imposes it?" There can be no obligation without law, and no law without a will, and we will add, without the will of the superior commanding.

The author's theory of morals, therefore, strikes us as unsound. It is founded on two assumptions, which we regard as unwarranted; the first, that the simple intellectual apprehension of good and evil is the apprehension of the morally good and the morally evil; and the second, that this apprehension imposes the obligation to do the one and to avoid the other. The first assumption identifies moral obligation with God, which is objective pantheism; the second, identifies it with our own intellect, which is subjective pantheism, or Fichteism. That there is an intrinsic difference between good and evil, we, of course, concede; and that in this difference is founded, not the law, but the reason of the law or the moral obligation, we maintain as earnestly as any one can do. This intrinsic nature of things not Omnipotence itself can alter. It is not the law, indeed, but the measure of the divine action as well as of the human. But what is meant by this intrinsic and immutable nature of things? Is this intrinsic nature of things, which not even Omnipotence can alter, and in which is to be sought the reason of the divine commands and prohibitions, a mere abstraction, therefore nothing; or is it a reality—that is to say, being, since all reality is in being? If being, is it created or uncreated? That it is created, or creature, is not admissible. If it is uncreated being, then it is identically the supreme being we own and worship as God, or there are two self-existent, eternal, and independent beings. This last, of course, cannot be said. What, then, is this intrinsic nature of things?

We answer this question as we have answered it in these pages more than once: that it is the essence or intrinsic nature of God himself, and is immutable and eternal, because he himself, in his very nature, is immutable and eternal. He cannot alter it, because he cannot alter himself, or make himself other than he is. He cannot contradict or annihilate himself, but is obliged by the perfection or plenitude

of his being to act always consistently with himself, or with his own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic goodness of the acts of creatures is in their conformity, their intrinsic evil is in their non-conformity to his intrinsic being. All that is necessary, all that is necessity is in him, is his being, as is asserted in the assertion that he is necessary being. In some sense he is himself necessitated. He is necessarily what he is. He is free in his creation and providence, but in case he creates and governs, he must create and govern according to his own essence or eternal and immutable ideas. He cannot make what is intrinsically good evil, nor what is intrinsically evil good; command his creatures to do evil, or forbid them to do good, for that would be to contradict himself, to change or annihilate his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being. When, then, we speak of the intrinsic nature of things, we mean, if we understand ourselves, the intrinsic nature of God, that is, God himself.

The author cites and approves our doctrine, as set forth in the "Conversations of Our Club,"* that good and God are identical, and therefore that to ask, if God be good, is absurd; but objects that it is not absurd to ask, if our creator be good or benevolent, for it is imaginable, he says, that an evil and malignant being has created us. Perhaps so, perhaps not so, as we shall soon proceed to inquire. Suffice it now to say, that he concedes that good and God are identical. Then the good in itself, and being in itself are the same. Yet we fear he is not quite prepared to admit this conclusion. He does not seem to us to have any very lively sense of the unity and simplicity of God, or that God is, as the schoolmen say, *ens simplicissimum*, most simple being, and therefore that his attributes are not distinguishable *in se* from his essence, or even from one another. The schoolmen all tell us that the distinction between the divine *essentia* and the divine *esse*, or between the divine being and the divine attributes, and between one attribute and another, is simply a *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*—a distinction which exists not in God himself, but simply in our manner of conceiving him, or which we are forced to make in consequence of the feebleness and inadequateness of our faculties, which are incapable of apprehending his being at one view, in its simplicity and infinite fulness, and therefore compelling us to consider it under distinct and

*Brownson's Works, Vol. XI., p. 436.

successive aspects. The distinction, owing to our limited powers, is valid *quoad nos*, but not *quoad Deum*, for *essentia*, *esse*, and *attributum*, are one and the same in the simplicity of his being. The divine *bonum* and the divine *ens* must, then, be the same. If the *summum bonum* be not identically *summum ens*, it must be some quality added to it, and substantially or entitatively distinguishable from it, which would not only deny the divine simplicity, but imply a *summum bonum*, distinguishable from the divine being, by participation of which God is good; which is absurd, since God is necessary being, and therefore is necessarily what and all he is.

We do not say that the divine being necessarily includes every perfection, and since good is a perfection, therefore must include good; because the term *perfection* is not strictly applicable to God himself, or to the intuition of God, and is applicable only to our conception of God, which is always inadequate and in need of completion by other conceptions. *Perfection* is a making perfect, a completing or finishing, and is inapplicable to God, who is necessarily being in its plenitude, to which nothing can be added, in which there is no imperfection, no want, no void, and therefore nothing to be perfected, completed, or filled up, finished. Also, we refuse to say it, because the intuition of God is logically prior to the notion of perfection or imperfection; and it is only by reference to him as measure or standard that we can say of any particular thing it is perfect or imperfect, complete or incomplete. The intuition of the divine being is the intuition of the divine pleroma or fulness, and without that intuition all our conceptions of particular existences, substances, or qualities, would be meaningless, or simply impossible. We do not, therefore, agree with those who suppose our notion of God is made up of particular notions, or notions of distinct excellencies discoverable in creatures, carried up to infinity, and added together as a sum total. God is not composed or made up of separate or distinct excellencies or perfections, but is originally, in the very unity and simplicity of being, infinite fulness, and it is only in the intuition of his being as infinitely full, and of creatures related to him and distinguishable from him, that the notion of imperfection, want, or incompleteness is possible. St. Anselm, indeed, attempts, in his *Monologium*, to rise by induction from the several finite excellencies discoverable in creatures to the conception of God or most

perfect being. Most philosophers, not of the first class, attempt to do the same; but in this way, we attain only to abstract being, and the God we assert is only an abstraction, a generalization, a creature of our own minds. St. Anselm himself appears to have been dissatisfied with his *Monologium*, in which he followed the ordinary method of the schools in his time, as well as ours, for he afterward wrote his *Proslogium*, in which he adopts quite another method, and proceeds in his demonstration of the existence and attributes of God ontologically, from the intuition, or, as he says, *idea* of the most perfect being, which he finds already in his mind, and without which we should and could have no mental standard, measure, or criterion of perfection or imperfection, of good or evil.

No doubt our conception of God includes eminently all our conceptions of particular or finite perfections, but we do not say God includes all perfections, that *summum ens* is necessarily *summum perfectum*, and therefore, as good is a perfection, God is good; we say, he is good because he is being, necessarily good because he is necessary being. Good and being are ontologically identical, and no distinction between them is possible or conceivable. All being is good, and all good is being; all creatures are good, participate of good in precisely the respect in which they participate of being. Good and being are identical *in re*, and are distinguishable only in relation to our faculties. Being, considered in relation to the intellect, is called the True, *Verum*; in relation to the will or the appetitive faculty, is called the Good, *Bonum*; in relation to the imagination, is called the Fair, *Pulchrum*; hence God is the True, the Good, and the Fair. But truth, goodness, beauty, or fairness, are not distinct qualities added to being, but are, ontologically considered, being itself in its unity, simplicity, and fulness. He who says being, says all he says who says truth, goodness, fairness, as we are taught, in fact, by God himself, who reveals his name to Moses, as I AM THAT AM, SUM QUI SUM. Either the good in itself is being, therefore God, or it is nothing. Good, if good there be, is not a quality or attribute of being, but is being itself; and creatures are good, because through the creative act they participate in being. Hence, God saw the things he had made, and behold they were good, very good.

The author, we have said, holds, as well as we, that to ask, if God be good, is absurd; but to ask, if our Creator be

good, is not absurd, for it is imaginable, though false, that an evil and malignant being might have created us. Imaginable, perhaps—but supposable, no; because it implies a contradiction in terms. Only being can create, for only being can act from its own energy alone, and all being is by the fact that it is being, good. To create, is to produce from nothing by the sole power or energy of the creator. Then, no creature can create, because no creature can act without the concurrent action of being on which it is dependent. All that is and is not creature is being. To suppose, then, that our creator might have been evil and malignant is a contradiction, for it were to suppose being to be both being and not-being. Our author by not discriminating between good and moral good, or good and virtue, fails to perceive that good is in being, and evil in the privation of being; that good is positive; that evil, like falsehood, is negative; and seems to imagine that there is a positive principle of evil, as well as a positive principle of good, which is Manicheism, or oriental dualism. But there cannot be two eternal beings, one good and one evil; for, as good and being are identical, the idea of evil is repugnant to the idea of being, precisely as it is repugnant to the idea of good.

If the distinguished author had really understood and accepted our doctrine in the passage he cites from the *Conversations of Our Club*, of the identity of good and God, as he professes to do, he would have spared us his elaborate and ingenious criticism. In those conversations we are discussing the grounds of our obligation to obey God. Our obligation to obey God, or our duty to obey him, is simply the correlative to his right to command us. Whence, then, his right to command us? This right is in his sovereignty. His sovereignty is in his dominion; his dominion is in his right of property in us; and his right of property is founded on his creative act, on the fact that he has created us, on the principle that the thing made belongs to the maker; for it is the maker *mediante* his own act. God's right to command us, then, rests in the last analysis, on his creative act, and we are bound to obey him because he is our creator, and therefore our proprietor. "Then," says one of the interlocutors, "if the devil were our creator, we should be bound to obey him." The author agrees with us, if, *per impossibile*, God were not our creator, he would not have the right to command us, but denies if, *per impossibile*, the devil were our creator, we should be bound to obey the devil; for it is

not in the fact that "God is holy; but in his being our *holy* creator, that his full claims to our allegiance are founded." We can assure him that we are as far as he from maintaining the proposition that if the devil, *per impossibile*, were our creator, we should be bound to obey his commands. And we had supposed that no reader could imagine for a moment that the proposition was introduced for any purpose but to show that it could not be entertained, because it implies a contradiction in terms. To suppose the devil to create, is to suppose the devil to be real and necessary being, therefore God, and no devil at all. The proposition, then, is absurd, and therefore an impossible proposition. The other proposition is supposable; because God is a free creator, and the creative act is not necessary to his being; and to suppose him not to be creator, does in no sense suppose him not to be, or not to be what and all he is, even being creator. The supposition that he is not our creator is impossible to be made by us, for he only can be our creator; and if he did not create us, we should not exist, and therefore could make no supposition; but, in regard to God himself, the supposition is possible, and involves no contradiction in terms.

We maintain, simply, that God's right to command, or his sovereignty, rests on his creative act, from which it no doubt follows that our creator, whoever he might be, would have the sovereign right to command us. Any being we can suppose as our creator, we may suppose to have the right of sovereignty over us; but we cannot suppose the devil our creator, because the terms, *devil* and *creator*, mutually exclude each other. The author concedes that only our creator can have the right to command us, but maintains that even our creator has that right only by virtue of his sanctity; and therefore unless our creator proves himself holy creator we are not bound to obey him. He does not seem to see that, as Father John explains to him, the term *holy* is included in the term *creator*, precisely as is the term being. He labors to prove, as the basis of moral obligation, that God is holy. But what does he understand by proving that God is holy? That holiness or sanctity is distinguishable from real and necessary being, or that it is included in it? He must understand the latter, or that real and necessary being is necessarily sanctity. The judgment, God is holy, is analytic, not synthetic, for the predicate is contained in, not added to the subject, and is therefore in-

cluded in the term creator. To say God is our *holy* creator, is to say in reality no more than to say God is our creator. The author is misled by his psychology, and does not see that the distinction he makes between the essence of God and his attributes is only a distinction *ex parte subjecti*, to which there is no corresponding distinction *ex parte objecti*; or, in other words, that God is *ens simplicissimum*. The judgment, God is creator, or God is sovereign, is synthetic, for the predicate is something joined to, not contained in the subject; but God is being, is self-existent, is necessary, is eternal, is immutable, is intelligent, is wise, is powerful, is good, or is holy, is an analytic judgment, for the predicate explains the subject, but adds nothing to it. Who says *ens*, or being, says all of God considered in himself that can be said. SUM QUI SUM is all that God can say of his own nature to us through natural reason; and all we say of him, however we multiply our words or vary our forms of expression, is simply QUI EST. Adjectives and qualifying terms add nothing to simple *ens*, or being, and are necessary only because our faculties cannot take in at one view all of being that is intelligible to us, or because it is necessary to guard against the false meanings an erroneous philosophy has attached to the word.

The author maintains, as a vital point, that moral truth, by which he means the morally good or the morally obligatory, is a simple synthetic judgment. As to its simplicity, we say nothing, for we are not quite clear as to what the author means by a simple judgment, or in what sense he holds a synthetic judgment is or can be simple. But that the moral judgment is a synthetic judgment, or a judgment in which the predicate is joined to the subject, not contained in it, we hold to be unquestionable. But if this be so, how can the author hold that it is simple necessary truth, identically God himself? Where, in such case, is the synthesis? Every judgment, the logicians tell us, has three terms: subject, predicate, and copula. When the predicate is identical with the subject, or is contained in the subject, the judgment is analytic; when the three terms are distinct, and no one of them can be identified with another, or both of the others, the judgment is a synthetic judgment. The author says moral truth is a synthetic judgment. Then he must find in it a real synthesis of three distinct terms not resolvable one into another. Then how can he identify it with the single term, as he does when he identifies it with

God? Does he not see that when he does so, he contradicts himself, and makes the judgment analytic, not synthetic?

The author has misunderstood us, and those who agree with us, in supposing that we identify moral truth with God. We identify all necessary truth, therefore the good in itself, and therefore the ideal or apodictic term of the moral judgment with God. But we hold that the judgment itself is synthetic, and, like all synthetic judgments, affirms a real synthesis of the subject and predicate, or of the necessary and contingent, or being and existences. The three terms of the judgment cannot be found in *ens*, or God as being. They can be found only in three terms of the real synthesis of things, *ens creat existentias*. The moral judgment demands as its condition the ideal formula, or the real synthetic judgment *a priori*, without which, as Kant demonstrates, no synthetic judgments *a posteriori* are possible. The principle of the moral judgment is in the three terms united of this formula, not in any one of them taken singly. Being alone cannot give us the conception of sovereignty, of law, or obligation, without which there can be no moral judgment; existence alone, or creation alone, cannot furnish the principle, for neither is apprehensible or conceivable without *ens*, the first term of the formula. There can be no moral obligation, unless there are creatures; there can be no creatures without the creative act; and no creative act without *ens necessarium et reale*, or real and necessary being. The author, however strenuously he insists on the intrinsic nature of good and evil, does not attempt to deduce analytically the conception of moral obligation from the conception of the being or the attributes of God. "It is not," he says, "on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." God is not, we repeat, a necessary creator, and the creative act is not included in the conception of the being, or the attributes of God. Therefore the author must modify his assertion, and instead of saying moral truth is God, he must say it is God *mediante actu suo creativo*, and agree with us, that the principle of moral obligation is in the divine creative act.

Take the instance once more of the jewel. I am bound to restore my friend's deposit, and am morally wrong if I do not. But this particular judgment depends on the more general judgment, I am bound to render unto every one his own, or his due. This is the principle of justice. Not

to render unto every one his own or his due is to be unjust, to violate the demands of justice. The moral judgment in the instance selected is not that the jewel deposited with me by my friend for safe keeping is still his, but that being his, I *ought* in justice to restore it on his reclaiming it. The essential and distinctive moral judgment is expressed by this word *ought*, which is the same as the word *owe*, and in all languages the judgment is expressed by an equivalent word. In all languages we know any thing of, moral obligation is expressed as *debt*, something *owed*, and to be *paid*. I owe to justice the restoration of my friend's jewel, or its restoration is a debt due to justice. Justice, strictly taken, however, expresses the moral relation between God and his creatures, or the claims of God as creator on them, rather than God, or the supreme being himself; though taken absolutely, and as the just in itself, it is and must be God, identical with his infinite and eternal being. The real moral judgment, then, is, I *owe* to God the restoration of my friend's deposit, or the restoration of my friend's deposit is a debt due to God. Grant now the owner of the debt is God, the debt itself cannot be God, for it is alike distinguished from him and from me. Whence comes this debt? How comes it that I owe it to the supreme being? I owe and can owe it to him only for the reason that he is my owner. If I owned myself, and my actions, I could not owe him the restoration, for being my own owner, neither he nor any one else could place me under moral obligation, or call me to an account for my acts, or any use I see proper to make of myself. The moral judgment, then, implies God as my owner, or the judgment, I owe myself, and therefore my acts to God. God owns me and my acts, and I owe all I am, all I have, all I can do to him. Whence this divine ownership, the principle of all moral obligation? It certainly is not identifiable with the divine being, or in other words, the divine ownership in which is founded all moral obligation, is not inherent in or identical with the divine nature or essence, and therefore the distinctively moral truth is not and cannot be identically God himself.

This divine ownership can be founded only in the creative act of God, by which he, by his sole energy, creates me from nothing. As the author himself concedes, when he says of God, "It is not on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." He owns us because he has made us, for the

thing made belongs to the maker. The distinctively moral judgment, then, is not, in all its terms, a necessary judgment, or necessary truth, as the author asserts, for the obligation depends immediately on the copula, or creative act of God. The ideal or necessary term of the judgment is God, as it is in every judgment, but the predicate and copula are distinguishable from him as the act and its product are distinguishable from the actor; are, as in the divine judgment or primitive intuition itself, contingent, since, as we constantly repeat, creation *ex parte Dei* is a free and not a necessary act. The principle that the thing made is the maker's is a necessary and eternal truth, but that any thing is made, or that the occasion is created for the application of the principle, is a contingent fact, dependent on the will of God to create or not to create. Hence the eternal law, of which all just laws are transcripts, is eternal only *ex parte Dei*, not in its subjects, save in the sense that God's free purpose and decree to create them is eternal, or, as is more commonly said, from eternity. We cannot, then, accept, without important qualifications, the author's assertion that the moral judgment is simple and necessary, that is, simple necessary truth. Simple necessary truth is God, we grant; but the moral judgment is not the judgment God is, but the judgment God is our owner, or we owe to God our existence, and therefore our actions. We owe and can owe ourselves and actions to him, only because he is our maker. The owing depends on creation, and connects us morally, as the creative act connects us physically, with God.

The author seems at one time to be an exclusive psychologist, and at another an exclusive ontologist, and we find him nowhere recollecting that the primitive judgment is the synthesis of the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*. In declaring the moral judgment necessary, or, as he understands it, necessary truth, therefore God, he makes the judgment analytic, not synthetic, and therefore exclusively ontological. He confounds good with moral good, or the good in itself with the moral obligation of creatures to seek good as their final cause; as he confounds the good as final cause, or beatitude, with the good as first cause. The good in both cases is ontologically the same, indeed, but not the same in respect of moral truth. Moral science, or the science of ethics, is founded on the two-fold relation of creatures to God; their relation to him as first cause, and their relation to him as final cause. Creatures

have a double movement, that of procession by his creative act from God as first cause, and their return to him, without absorption in him, as their final cause, their last end, or beatitude. God is the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of all existences. Creation,—since it is the free act of God, the free act of reason, intelligence, wisdom, love, as well as power,—must be an act *propter finem*, for some end and for some good end, and therefore for an end inseparable from being. But as God only is being, and is all being, or being in its plenitude, *QUI EST*, the end for which he creates must be himself. As he is the end for which he creates and creatures exist,—“all things are by him and for him,”—he is our end, and our good is in our return to him as our final cause. Our good, or the good for which creatures exist, is in his being or eternal essence. But our moral good is not in simply returning or attaining to him as our last end, but in doing so voluntarily, by our own free act; for we are created with free will. Our obligation to return to God is imposed by the creative act, which, as a free act, is the act of the divine will. The obligation is, then, imposed by the will of God, and consequently has the essential characteristic of law; since, as Suarez tells us, there is no law without some will commanding. It connects us in the moral, as the creative act connects us in the physical order with God, and is the copula between being and existences, the subject and predicate of the ideal judgment; only in the moral order the subject and predicate change sides, and existences attain to being as the product of their free activity.

It is not difficult, now, to clear up the mystery and solve the problems which come up as to the principles of morality,—the first part of natural moral theology, or speculative ethics. Are we asked what is good? We answer, God. Are we asked what is *our* good? We answer again, God. Are we asked why is he *our* good? We answer, because he is the good in itself. Why is he the good in itself? Because he is being, being in itself, and all good is in being, or rather is being. If you ask us what is moral good? we answer, in voluntarily returning to God, without absorption in him, as our final cause or last end. If you ask why we are morally obliged to return to God as our last end, or, in other words, to seek our own good, we answer, because it is the will of God, as he himself declares in the very act of creating us for that end. If it is asked, why are we bound

to obey the will of God? we answer, because he has made us, and we are his; he is our owner, and the owner may do what he pleases with his own. We may go behind the will of God to find the reason of the law, for the reason of the law is in his own eternal reason; but we cannot go behind the will itself to find the reason of our obedience. God wills, is always the sufficient reason of man's obedience, because his will is the will of man's sovereign. To this last answer only does our author try to frame an objection, but he does not succeed. If God were not holy, he reasons, even though our creator, we should not be bound to obey him; and yet he does not found the obligation to obedience on the divine sanctity, for he says expressly, "It is not on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." What he means is, that the obligation is imposed neither by the sanctity alone, nor by the creative act alone, but by both conjointly; so that if we could conceive an unholy creator, we should not be bound to obey him. We are bound to do the will of him whose we are, and we are his who creates us, for we are the creator *mediante* the creative act, which act is his. If we could suppose the devil to be our creator, and devil still, we should be bound to do the devil's bidding—no question of that. But, as we have sufficiently shown, we cannot suppose the devil to be our creator, because only being can create, and no evil or malignant being is supposable, conceivable, or imaginable, since the idea of being and the idea of good are identical; or all being, by the fact that it is being, is good. The difficulty of the author grows out of the fact that he confounds *ens* with *existens*, and as existences or creatures are evil or malignant in a greater or less degree, it implies, in his mind, no contradiction in terms to suppose or imagine an evil and malignant being, therefore an evil or malignant creator. In loose popular language we may and do call existences or creatures, beings; but philosophers should use language more strictly, and with more exactness and precision. The distinction between being and existence or creature, *ens* and *existens*, is important and valid, and would save us much needless perplexity and much unmeaning speculation, if observed. The practice of the schools, of using the term *ens* indiscriminately for being and existence, real being and possible being, necessary being and contingent being,—as if the contingent and the necessary, the possible and the real, the creature and creator, could be put

in the same category,—is as unphilosophical as any thing well can be, and seldom fails to have a most injurious effect on our speculations. To suppose the devil creator, is to suppose the devil being, therefore good and holy, as we have said, and no devil at all. Has the author ever undertaken the refutation of Manicheism? If he has, will he tell us what, in his view, is the principle of that refutation? If he supposes it possible that there should be an evil and malignant being, how can he demonstrate the falsity, or logically refute the doctrine of two original and eternal principles—the one good, and the other evil?

Indeed, the author seems to us to go further in the Manichean direction than he suspects. He makes evil a positive quality of actions. This he expressly maintains. Then it must be a positive quality of actors. Then it must have a positive original principle opposed to the principle of good, for good cannot create evil. Then he must suppose two eternal principles; therefore two eternal self-existent beings, two Gods, the one good, the other evil. He teaches us that morally good and morally evil are both positive. But St. Thomas holds, and so do most theologians, that good alone is the object of the will; consequently, that malice or evil will is privative, not positive, which must be the fact if, as we maintain, good and being are identical. But the author, though he asserts the identity of God and good, does not recognize the identity of good and being, for he conceives, and even speaks of an evil and malignant being, as implying no contradiction in terms. The good, in his conception, is not being, but a quality, attribute, or accident of being. Accidentally, or as a fact, being is good, but not necessarily good in that it is being. That good, however, is an accident of being, in the scholastic sense, he cannot hold, for he holds that the good is a necessary truth. He can, then, hold it as an attribute of being only in the sense that the scholastics distinguish attributes from accidents,—that is, as an *essential* and necessary attribute, indistinguishable from the essence of the subject, attribute only in our mode of conceiving, but in reality no attribute at all, but the subject itself. Substance stands under and supports accidents, but does not stand under and support essential attributes, for they are the substance itself. The author labors at great length and with much earnestness to show that good is identical neither with the free command nor with the necessary command of God, that is, with the act

of God; then, in identifying God and good as he does, he must identify good with the eternal *being* of God, and holds, if he understands himself, that the good and real and necessary being are identical, and that evil being is as much a contradiction in terms as an evil good, or a good evil. If so, he must concede that evil is not positive, but negative,—not being, but privation of being; consequently, that we cannot will evil, because evil being nothing in itself, to will evil would be to will nothing, and to will nothing is simply not to will.

Assuming, now, good and being to be identical, and our good to be from and in being, we can understand why the love of God imposes on us the obligation of returning to him as our final cause. The law, though imposed by the will of God, is yet not an arbitrary law, for it is the expression of his eternal reason, or his intrinsic wisdom, goodness, love. He enjoins us to return to him, because it is only in him that there is or can be any good or beatitude for us. Our good, as the good itself, is in being, and there is and can be no being but God; for he only can say *SUM QUI SUM*. As without him as first cause we could not exist, so without him as final cause we can have no beatitude, cannot exist as blest; without him as first cause we should be nothing in the order of physical existence, so without him as final cause we should be nothing in the moral order or order of beatitude. All movement toward God as our last end is a movement toward being, in which alone is beatitude; all movement in the moral direction from God is a movement away from being toward no-being, therefore toward evil. Even the omnipotence of God cannot make it otherwise, because he cannot provide for beatitude without being, or create existences that shall have being in themselves, or not have their being in him, in his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being. Hence his law, imposing upon us the duty of returning to him as our end, imposes upon us no obligation but that of seeking our real beatitude where, and only where, it can be found. Hence the law of God is good, and philosophy itself requires us to say with the Psalmist, "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. The precepts of the Lord are right, giving joy to hearts; the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, giving light to the eyes." God is the fulness of beatitude, because the fulness of being, and it is impossible for him to com-

mand us in his law what is not for our good, because it is impossible for him to command what is repugnant to his own nature and essence. His law, then, is the expression toward us of his love, not his wrath, and is our friend, not our enemy. Therefore the good love the law and joy to do the will of God. In keeping his commandments there is joy, and in doing his will there is peace.

We may now understand the question of evil. Evil is no positive being or existence; it is simply privative. There is, then, and can be no physical evil, for all positive physical existence is good, inasmuch as it participates through the creative act in being. The only sort of evil that can be conceived is moral evil, and that is not a positive object or quality of the will, any more than falsehood is a positive object or quality of the understanding. It has pleased God to create men free moral agents, or with free will, which enables them to act not merely *ad finem*, but also *propter finem*. Free will implies freedom of election, or power of choice. Now, being created thus free, we may choose or will to act for God, that is, to return to him as our chosen final cause, and if so, we move morally toward good, and there is and can be no evil for us. Nothing can harm us, or do us the least conceivable injury; pain, suffering, trials, afflictions, temptations, however grievous while they last, are no evils, and are simply effective means to help us on in our march toward our final beatitude. We may, also, choose not to act for God as our final cause, to disregard his law, and to turn, as it were, our backs upon him, and depart from him. We then depart from being, and turn our faces and march toward no-being, toward — nothing. The evil is not, then, in something positively inflicted on us, but in the rejection of the positive, and seeking our good where it is not, and in what is not. We, then, under the moral point of view, precipitate ourselves into the abyss of infinite want, where there is no bread for our hunger, no water for our thirst. The soul participating as creature in being, and as creature having its being not in itself, has necessarily wants and desires, all good, since they spring from being, which only being can fill up or satisfy. Consequently, when it takes its portion of goods, turns its back on God, and departs for a far country, it leaves behind all that could satisfy its inherent desires, its internal wants, while its wants and desires remain in full force. The soul then suffers the rage, the torture, the agony of wants unfilled, desires unsatisfied. What it

suffers is not something positive, but the want or privation of something positive. As heaven or beatitude is in the satisfaction or replenishment of the soul with being, so hell, its opposite, the culmination of evil, the torments of the damned, we may suppose to consist not in something positive inflicted, but in the absence of this replenishment with the consciousness of having forfeited it,—in the everlasting unappeasement of our inherent desires, in the everlasting torture of wants unfilled.

As evil is privative, it is never any thing positively willed, and we never do and never can will evil simply for the sake of evil. All sin implies malice, but malice, evil will, as we say, does not imply the willing of evil for the sake of evil. All evil is in *carentia* of some sort. When the soul turns away from God as its final cause, it does not mean to reject good, but means to find it in creatures, or in itself, ignorant, or not reflecting, that it cannot find it there. In not willing God as our good, we still will to fill up our wants, to appease our desires, therefore will beatitude. But elsewhere than in God our beatitude is not, for besides him there are only his creatures, and they have being only in him, none in themselves. The evil is not in our being created with wants and desires that only being can satisfy, for these spring from the high destiny of our nature, but in not seeking their satisfaction, where, and where only it can be found. But even this is not the result of pure malice, but of the ignorance which mistakes the creature for the creator, or the weakness that shrinks from the effort necessary to forego a present, temporary, and relative good, for the real and eternal good.

Other questions, and important questions, too, there are, in the first part of morals, but, as we are not writing a treatise of moral philosophy, we are not required here to solve them. If we mistake not, they are all solvable by the aid of the principles and method we have briefly and feebly defended in modification of the principles and doctrines set forth by our author. At any rate, it is time to bring our review of the first chapter of his Philosophical Introduction to a close. We may, perhaps, return to his volume hereafter, and offer some further remarks, for we consider his publication, however much we may differ from him, an event in our English-speaking world. It can hardly fail to provoke thought, and compel our frivolous public to betake themselves to graver studies, and profounder investigations.

No man, probably, will be found, to whom his work will prove less satisfactory than to ourselves; yet we can assure him that we have not only a high esteem for him personally, but for his work, which, under many points of view, we regard as a great work, marked at times by profound, frequently by ingenious, and always by independent and manly thought.

LECKY ON MORALS.*

[From *The Catholic World* for 1869 1

ARTICLE I.

MR. LECKY divides his work into five chapters. The first chapter is preliminary, and discusses "the nature and foundations of morals," its obligation and motives; the second treats of the morals of the pagan empire; the third gives the author's view of the causes of the conversion of Rome and the triumph of Christianity in the empire; the fourth the progress and deterioration of European morals from Constantine to Charlemagne; and the fifth the changes effected from time to time in the position of women. The author does not confine himself strictly within the period named, but, in order to make his account intelligible, gives us the history of what preceded and what has followed it; so that his book gives one, from his point of view, the philosophy and the entire history of European morals from the earliest times down to the present.

The subject of this work is one of great importance in the general history of the race, and of deep interest to all who are not incapable of serious and sustained thought. Mr. Lecky is a man of some ability, of considerable first or second-hand learning, and has evidently devoted both time and study to his subject. His style is clear, animated, vigorous and dignified; but his work lacks condensation and true perspective. He dwells too long on points comparatively unimportant, and repeats the same things over and

* *History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne.* By WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOOLE LECKY, M. A. London : 1869.

over again, and brings proofs after proofs to establish what is mere commonplace to the scholar. till he becomes not a little tedious. He seems to write under the impression that the public he is addressing knows nothing of his subject, and is slow of understanding. He evidently supposes that he is writing something very important, and quite new to the whole reading world. Yet we have found nothing new in his work, either in substance or in presentation, nothing—not even an error or a sophism—that had not been said, and as well said, a hundred times before him; we cannot discover a single new fact, or a single new view of a fact, that can throw any additional light on European morals in any period of European history. Yet we may say Mr. Lecky, though not an original or a profound thinker, is above the average of English Protestant writers, and compiles with passable taste, skill, and judgment.

We know little of the author, except as the author of the book before us, and of a previous work, on *Rationalism in Europe*, and we have no vehement desire to know any thing more of him. He belongs, with some shades of difference, to a class represented, in England, by Buckle, J. Stuart Mill, Frank Newman, and James Martineau; and of which the *Westminster Review* is the organ; in France by M. Vacherot, Jules Simon, and Ernest Renan; and, in this country, by Professor Draper, of this city, and a host of inferior writers. They are not Christians, and yet would not like to be called anti-Christians; they are judges, not advocates, and, seated on the high judicial bench, they pronounce, as they flatter themselves, an impartial and final judgment on all moral, religious, and philosophical codes, and assign to each its part of good and its part of evil. They aim to hold an even balance between the church and the sects, between Christian morals and pagan morals, and between the several pagan religions and the Christian religion, all of which they look upon as dead and gone, except with the ignorant, the stupid, and the superstitious. Of this class Mr. Lecky is a distinguished member, though less brilliant as a writer than Renan, and less pleasing as well as less scientific than our own Draper.

The writers of this class do not profess to break with Christian civilization, or to reject religion or morals, but strive to assert a morality without God, and a Christianity without Christ. They deny in words neither God nor Christ, but they find no use for either. They deny neither the

possibility nor the fact of the supernatural, but find no need of it, and no place for it. They concede providence, but resolve it into a fixed natural law, and are what we should call naturalists, if naturalism had not received so many diverse meanings. In their own estimation, they are not philosophers, moralists, or divines, but really gods, who know, of themselves, good and evil, right and wrong, truth and error, and whose prerogative it is to judge all men and ages, all moralities, philosophies, and religions, by the infallible standard which each one of them is, or has in himself. They are the fulfilment of the promise of Satan to our mother Eve, "Ye shall be as gods."

Mr. Lecky, in his preliminary chapter, on the nature and foundation of morals, refutes even ably and conclusively the utilitarian school of morals, and defends what he calls the "intuitive" school. He contends that it is impossible to found morals on the conception of the useful, or on fears of punishment and hopes of reward; and argues well, after Henry Moore, Cudworth, Clarke, and Butler, that all morality involves the idea of obligation, and is based on the intuition of right or duty; or, in other words, on the principle of human nature called conscience. But this, after all, is no solution of the problem raised. There is, certainly, a great difference between doing a thing because it is useful, and doing it because it is right; but there is a greater difference between the intuitive perception of right and the obligation to do it. The perception or intuition of an act as obligatory, or as duty, is not that which makes it duty or obligatory. The obligation is objective, the perception is subjective. The perception or intuition apprehends the obligation, but is not it, and does not impose it. The intuitive moralists are better than utilitarians, in the respect that they assert a right and a wrong independent of the fact that it is useful, or injurious to the actor. But they are equally far from asserting the real foundation of morals; because, though they assert intuition or immediate perception of duty, they do not assert or set forth the ground of duty or obligation. Duty is debt, is an obligation; but whence the debt? whence the obligation? We do not ask why the duty obliges, for the assertion of an act as duty is its assertion as obligatory; but why does the right oblige? or, in other words, why am I bound to do right? or any one thing rather than another?

Mr. Lecky labors hard to find the ground of the obliga-

tion in some principle or law of human nature, which he calls conscience. But conscience is the recognition of the obligation, and the mind's own judgment of what is or is not obligatory ; it is not the obligation nor its creator. This mistake proceeds from his attempt to found morals on human nature as supreme law-giver, and is common to all moralists who seek to erect a system of morals independent of theology. Dr. Ward, in his work on *Nature and Grace*, commits the same mistake in his effort to find a solid foundation in nature of duty, without rising to the creator. All these moralists really hold, as true, the falsehood told by Satan to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil ;" that is, in order to know good or evil ye shall not need to look beyond your own nature, nor to recognize yourselves as subject to, or dependent on, any authority above or distinct from it. It is the one fundamental error that meets us in all gentile philosophy, and all modern philosophy and science, speculative, ethical, or political, that holds itself independent of God. The schoolmen understood by morals, when the term means duty, or any thing more than manners and customs, what is called moral theology, or the practical application of speculative and dogmatic theology to the offices of life, individual, domestic, and social or political. Natural morality meant that portion of man's whole duty which is prescribed by the natural law and promulgated by reason, as distinguished from revelation. They based all morals on the great principles of theology, and therefore they called theology the queen of the sciences. We have made no advance on them.

In morals, three things—first, the obligation ; second, the *regula* or rule ; third, the end—are essential, and must be carefully distinguished. Why am I bound to do one thing rather than another ? that is, why am I bound at all ? What am I bound to do, or to avoid ? For what end ? These three questions are fundamental and exhaustive. The intuitionists hold that all morals involve the idea or conception of duty ; but they omit to present the reason or ground of duty or obligation, and therefore erect their moral fabric without any foundation, and make it a mere castle in the air. They confound conscience with obligation, and the rule or law with the reason or motive for observing it. Suppose we find in human nature the rule or law ; we cannot find in it either the obligation or the motive, for the simple reason that human nature is not independent, is not suffi-

cient for itself, does not belong to itself, and has in itself neither its origin nor its end, neither its first nor its final cause. The rule—*regula*—is the law, and the law prescribes what is to be done and what is to be avoided; but it does not create the obligation nor furnish the motive of obedience. Mr. Lecky himself maintains that it does not, and is very severe upon those who make an arbitrary law the ground of moral distinctions or the reason of duty. The law does not make the right or the wrong. The act is not right because commanded, nor wrong because prohibited; but it is commanded because it is right, and prohibited because it is wrong. Whence then the obligation? or, what is it that transforms the right into duty? This is the question that the independent or non-theological moralists, no matter of what school, do not and cannot answer.

There is no answer, unless we give up the godship of man, give Satan the lie, and understand that man is a dependent existence; for an independent being cannot be bound or placed under the obligation of duty, either by his own act or by the act of another. If man is dependent, he is created; and, if created, he belongs to his Creator; for the maker has a sovereign right to that which he makes. It is his act, and nothing is or can be more one's own, than one's own act. Man, then, does not own himself; he owes himself, all he is, and all he has, to his Creator. As it has pleased his Creator to make him a free moral agent, capable of acting from choice, and with reference to a moral end, he is bound to give himself, by his own free will, to God to whom he belongs; for his free will, his free choice, belongs to God, is his due; and the principle of justice requires us to give to every one his due, or what is his own.

Here, then, in man's relation to God as his creator, is the ground of his duty or obligation. It grows out of the divine creative act. Deny the being of God, deny the creative act, deny man is the creature of God, and you deny all obligation, all duty, and therefore, according to Mr. Lecky's own doctrine, all morals.

The irrational cannot morally bind the rational. All men are equal, and no man, no body of men has, or can have, a natural right to bind or govern another. Only the Creator obliges, as the owner of the creature; and if I owe myself, all I am and all I have, to God, I owe nothing to another in his own right, and only God has any right over me, or to me. Here is at once the basis of obligation and of liberty,

and the condemnation of all tyranny and despotism. From this, it clearly follows that every system of morals that rests on nature, the state, or any thing created, as its foundation, is not and of itself cannot be obligatory upon any one, and that without God as our creator, and whose we are, there is, and can be no moral obligation or duty whatever. Pantheism, which denies the creative act, and atheism, which denies God, both alike deny morals by denying its basis or foundation. Either is fatal to morals, for obligation is only the correlative of the right to command.

Having found the ground of obligation, and shown why we are morally bound, the next thing to be considered is the rule by which is determined what we are bound to do, and what we are bound to avoid. Mr. Lecky makes this rule conscience, which, though he labors to prove that it is uniform and infallible in all ages and nations, and all men, he yet concedes varies in its determinations as to what is or is not duty according to the circumstances of the age or nation, the ideal or standard adopted, public opinion, &c. That is, conscience assures us that we ought always to do right, but leaves us to find out, the best way we can, what is or is not right. Conscience, then, cannot be itself the rule; it is a witness within us of our obligation to obey God, and the judgment which we pass on our acts, usually, in practice, on our acts after they are done, is at best only our judgment of what the rule or law is, not the rule or law itself. The rule or *regula* is not conscience, but the light of conscience, that by which it determines what is or is not duty; it is the law which, according to St. Thomas, *quædam est regula et mensura actuum, secundum quam inducitur ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur*;* or, in the sense we here use the term, the rule, or measure of duty prescribing what is to be done, and what avoided. It is, as St. Thomas also says, *ordinatio rationis*, and as an ordination of reason, it can be only the rule or measure of what is obligatory to be done or to be avoided. It defines and declares what is or is not duty, it does not and cannot make the duty, or create the obligation. The author and his school overlook the fact that reason is perceptive, not legislative. They confound the obligation with the rule that measures and determines it, and assume that it is the reason that creates the duty. They are psychologists, not philoso-

* *Sum. Theol.* 1. 2. quest. xc. art. 1, in corp.

phers, and see nothing behind or above human reason, man's highest and distinguishing faculty. Certainly without reason man could not either perform, or be bound to perform, a single moral act; and yet it is not reason that binds him; and if he is bound to follow reason, as he undoubtedly is, it is only because reason tells him what is obligatory, and enables him to do it.

Since only God can bind morally, only God can impose the law which measures, defines, or discloses what independent of the law is obligatory. The rule of duty, of right and wrong, is therefore the law of God. The law of God is promulgated in part through natural reason, and in part through supernatural revelation. The former is called the natural law, *lex naturalis*; the latter, the revealed law, or the supernatural law. But both are integral parts of one and the same law, and each has its reason in one and the same order of things, emanates from one and the same authority, for one and the same ultimate end. There are, no doubt, in the supernatural law, positive injunctions, and prohibitions, which are not contained in the natural law, though not repugnant thereto; but these have their reason and motive in the end, which in all cases determines the law. All human laws, ecclesiastical or civil, derive all their vigor as laws from the law of God, and all the positive injunctions and prohibitions of either are, in their nature, disciplinary, or means to the end, in which is the reason or motive of the law. Hence there is, and can be, nothing arbitrary in duty. Nothing is or can be imposed, under either the natural law or the supernatural law, in either church or state, in religion or morals, that does not immediately or mediately grow out of our relation to God as our creator, and as our last end or final cause. As a Christian I am bound to obey the supreme pastor of the church, not as a man commanding in his own name, or by his own authority, but as the vicar of Christ, who has commissioned him to teach, discipline, and govern me. As a citizen I am bound to obey all the laws of my country not repugnant to the law or the rights of God, but only because the state has, in secular matters, authority from God to govern. In either case the obedience is due only to God and he only is obeyed. It is his authority and his alone that binds me, and neither church nor state can bind me beyond or except by reason of its authority derived from him.

The law is the rule, and is prescribed by the end, in

which is the reason or motive of duty. The law is not the reason or motive of duty, nor is it the ground of the obligation. It is simply the rule, and tells us what God commands, not whence his right to command, nor wherefore he commands. His right to command rests on the fact that he is the Creator. But why does he command such and such things, or prescribe such and such duties? We do not answer, because such is his will; though that would be true as we understand it. For such answer would be understood, by this untheological age, which forgets that the divine will is the will of infinite reason, to imply that duties are arbitrary, rest on mere will, and that there is no reason why God should prescribe one thing as duty rather than another. What the law of God declares to be duty is duty because it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of our existence, or the end for which we are created. Every thing that even God can enjoin as duty has its reason or motive in that purpose or end. The end, then, prescribes, or is the reason of, the law.

The end for which God creates us is himself, who is our final cause no less than our first cause. God acts always as infinite reason, and cannot therefore create without creating for some end: and as he is self-sufficing and the adequate object of his own activity, there is and can be no end but himself. All things are not only created by him but for him. This is equally a truth of philosophy and of revelation, and even those theologians who talk of natural beatitude, are obliged to make it consist in the possession of God, at least, as the author of nature. Hence, St. Paul, the greatest philosopher that ever wrote, as well as an inspired apostle, says, "Of him, and by him, and in him are all things;" or, "in him and *for* him they subsist," as Archbishop Kenrick explains in a note to the passage. The motive or reason of the law is in the end, or in God as final cause. The motive or reason for keeping or fulfilling the law is, then, that we may gain the end for which we are made, or, union with God as our final cause. This is all clear, plain, and undeniable, and hence we conclude that morals, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be asserted unless we assert God as our creator and as our last end.

Mr. Lecky and his school do not, then, attain to the true philosophy of morals, for they recognize no final cause, either of man or his act; and yet there is no moral act that is not done freely *propter finem*, for the sake of the end.

We do not say that all acts not so done are vicious or sinful, nor do we pretend that no acts are moral that are not done with a distinct and deliberate reference to God as our last end. The man who relieves suffering because he cannot endure the pain of seeing it, performs a good deed, though an act of very imperfect virtue. We act also from habit, and when the habit has been formed by acts done for the sake of the end, or by infused grace, the acts done from the habit of the soul without an explicit reference to the end are moral, virtuous, in the true sense of either term; nor do we exclude those gentiles who, not having the law, do the things of the law, of whom St. Paul speaks, Rom. ii. 14-16.

Mr. Lecky overlooks the end, and presents no reason or motive for performing our duty, distinguishable from the duty itself. He adopts the philosophy of the Porch, except that he thinks it did not make enough of the emotional side of our nature, that is, was not sufficiently sentimental. The Stoics held that we must do right for the sake of right alone, or because it is right. They rejected all consideration of personal advantage, of general utility, the honor of the gods, future life, heaven or hell, or the happiness of mankind. They admitted the obligation to serve the commonwealth and to do good to all men, but because it was right. The good of the state or of the race was duty, but not the reason or motive of the duty. The professedly disinterested morality on which our author, after them, so earnestly insists, closely analyzed, will be found to be as selfish as that of the Garden, or that of Paley and Bentham. The Epicurean makes pleasure, that is, the gratification of the senses, the motive of virtue; the Stoic makes the motive the gratification of his intellectual nature, or rather his pride, which is as much a man's self as what the apostle calls concupiscence, or the flesh. Intellectual selfishness, in which the Stoics abounded, is even more repugnant to the virtue of the actor than the sensual selfishness of the votary of pleasure. We care not what fine words the Stoic had on his lips, no system of pagan morals was further removed from real disinterested virtue than that of the Porch.

Mr. Lecky denounces the morality of the church as selfish, and says the selfish system triumphed with Bossuet over Fénelon; but happily for us he is not competent to speak of the morals enjoined by the church. He does not understand the question which was at issue, and entirely mis

apprehends the matter for which Fénelon was censured by the Holy See. The doctrine of Fénelon, as he himself explained and defended it, was never condemned, nor was that of Bossuet, which, on several points, was very unsound, ever approved. Several passages of Fénelon's *Maxims of the Saints* were censured as favoring quietism, already condemned in the condemnation of Molinos and his adherents—a doctrine which Fénelon never held, and which he sought in his *Maxims* to avoid, without running into the contrary extreme, but, the Holy See judged, unsuccessfully. His thought was orthodox, but the language he used could be understood in a quietistic sense ; and it was his language, not his doctrine, that was condemned.

The error favored by Fénelon's language, though against his intention, was that it is possible in this life to rise and remain habitually in such a state of charity, or pure love of God for his own sake, of such perfect union with him, that in it the soul no longer hopes or fears, ceases to make acts of virtue, and becomes indifferent to its own salvation or damnation, whether it gains heaven or loses it. The church did not condemn the love of God for his own sake, nor *acts* of perfect charity, for so much is possible and required of all Christians. The church requires us to make acts of love, as well as of faith and hope, and the act of love is : "O my God ! I love thee above all things, with my whole heart and soul, because thou art infinitely amiable and deserving of all love ; I love also my neighbor as myself for the love of thee ; I forgive all who have injured me, and ask pardon of all whom I have injured." Here is no taint of selfishness, but an act of pure love. Yet though we can and ought to make distinct acts of perfect charity, it is a grave error to suppose that the soul can in this life sustain herself, habitually, in a state of pure love, that she ever attains to a state on earth in which acts of virtue cease to be necessary, in which she ceases from pure love to be actively virtuous, and becomes indifferent to her own fate, to her own salvation or damnation, to heaven or hell—an error akin to that of the Hopkinsians, that in order to be saved one must be willing to be damned. As long as we live, acts of virtue, of faith, hope, and charity, are necessary ; and to be indifferent to heaven or hell, is to be indifferent whether we please God or offend him, whether we are united to him or alienated from him.

It is a great mistake to represent the doctrine the church opposed to quietism or to Fénelon as the selfish theory of

morals. To act from simple fear of suffering or simple hope of happiness, or to labor solely to escape the one and secure the other, is, of course, selfish, and is not approved by the church, who brands such fear as servile, and such hope as mercenary, because in neither is the motive drawn from the end, which is God, as our supreme good. What the church bids us fear is alienation from God, and the happiness she bids us seek is happiness in God, because God is the end for which we are made. Thus, to the question, "Why did God make you?" the catechism answers, "That I might know him, love him, and serve him in this world, and be happy *with him* forever in the next." *With him*, not without him. The fear the church approves is the fear of hell, not because it is a place of suffering, and the fear of God she inculcates is not the fear of him because he can send us to hell, but because hell is alienation from God, is offensive to him: and therefore the fear is really fear of offending God, and being separated from him. The hope of happiness she approves is the hope of heaven, not simply because heaven is happiness, but because it is union with God, or the possession of God as our last end, which is our supreme good.

Here neither the fear of hell nor the hope of heaven is selfish; for in each the motive is drawn from the end, from God, who is our supreme good. It therefore implies charity, or the love of God. And herein is its moral value. It may not be perfectly disinterested, or perfect charity, which is the love of God for his own sake, or because he is the supreme good in himself; but to love him as our supreme good, and to seek our good in him and him only, is still to love him, and to draw from him the motive of our acts. The church enjoins this reference to God in which, while she recognizes faith and hope as virtues in this life, she enjoins charity, without which the actor is nothing.

If Mr. Lecky had known the principle of Catholic morals, and understood the motives to virtue which the church urges, he would never have accused her of approving the selfish theory, which proposes in no sense God, but always and everywhere self, as the end. He will allow us no motive to virtue but the right; that is, in his theory, duty has no reason or motive but itself. No doubt his conception of right includes benevolence, the love of mankind, and steady, persevering efforts to serve our country and the human race; but he can assign no reason or motive why one should do so without falling either into the selfishness or the utilitarian-

ism which he professes to reject. The sentimental theory which he seems to adopt cannot help him, for none of our sentiments are disinterested; all the sentiments pertain to self, and seek always their own gratification. This is as true of those called the higher, nobler sentiments, as of the lower and baser, and, in point of fact, sentimentalists, philanthropists, and humanitarians are usually the most selfish, cruel, heartless, and least moral people in society. Men who act from sentimental instead of rational motives are never trustworthy, and are, in general, to be avoided.

Mr. Lecky maintains that right is to be done solely because it is right, without any consideration of its particular or general utility, or regard to consequences. But he shrinks from this, and appeals to utility when hard pressed, and argues that considerations of advantage to society or to mankind, or a peculiar combination of circumstances, may sometimes justify us in deviating from the right—that is, in doing wrong. He contends that it may be our duty to sacrifice the higher principles of our nature to the lower, and appears shocked at Dr. Newman's assertion that "the church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions of its inhabitants to die of starvation in extreme agony, *so far as temporal affliction goes*, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one venial sin, tell one wilful untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing, without excuse." This is too rigid for Mr. Lecky. He places duty in always acting from the higher principles of our nature; but thinks there may be cases when it is our duty to sacrifice them to the lower! He supposes, then, that there is something more obligatory than right, or that renders right obligatory when obligatory it is.

But this doctrine of doing right for the sake of the right is utterly untenable. Right is not an abstraction, for there are no abstractions in nature, and abstractions are simple nullities. It must be either being or relation. If taken as a relation, it can be no motive, no end, because relation is real only in the related. If being, then it is God, who only is being. Your friends, the Stoics, placed it above the Divinity, and taught us in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius that it binds under one and the same law both God and man. But an abstraction which is formed by the mind operating on the concrete can bind no one, for it is in itself simply nothing. The weaker cannot bind the stronger, the inferior

the superior, or that which is not that which is. But there is no being stronger than God or above him; for he is, in every respect, supreme. Nothing can bind him, and right must either be identified with him or held to grow out of the relations of his creatures to himself. In the first case, right is God; or God is right; and the obligation to do right is only the obligation to do what God commands. Right, as being, cannot exist distinct from God, and can bind men only in the sense in which God himself binds them. Their sovereign, in such case, is God, who, by his creative act, is their lord and proprietor. But right and God are not identical, and, consequently, right is not being, but a relation. What binds is not the right or the relation, but he who, by his creative act, founds the relation. Rejecting, then, right as an abstraction, we must understand by the right what under this relation it is the duty of the creature to do. Right and duty are then the same. Ask what is man's duty; the answer is, what is right. Ask what is right, and the answer is, whatever is duty.

But right does not make itself right, nor duty itself duty. Here is the defect of all purely rationalistic morals, and of every system of morals that is not based, we say not on revelation, but on theology, or the creative act of God. Right and duty are identical, we grant; but neither can create its own obligation, or be its own reason or motive. To say of an act, it is duty because it is right, or it is right because it is duty, is to reason, as the logicians say, in a *vicious* circle, or to answer *idem per idem*, which is not allowable by any logic we are acquainted with. We must, then, if we assert morals at all, come back to theology, and find the ground of obligation or duty—which is simply the right or authority of God to command us—in our relation to God, as our creator or first cause, and the reason or motive in our relation to him as our last end or final cause.

No doubt the reason why the rationalistic moralists in modern times are reluctant to admit this is, because they very erroneously suppose that it means that the basis of morals is to be found only in supernatural revelation, and is not ascertainable or provable by reason. But this is a mistake, growing out of another mistake; namely, that the creative act is a truth of revelation only, and not a truth of science or philosophy. The creative act is a fact of science, the basis, rather, of all science, as of all life in creatures, and must be recognized and held before revelation can be logically

asserted. That God is, and is our creator, our first cause, and our final cause, are truths that do not depend on revelation to be known ; and the theological basis of morals which we assert, in opposition to the rationalistic moralists, is within the province of reason or philosophy. But the rationalists, in seeking to escape revelation, lose God, and are forced to assert a morality that is independent of him, and does not suppose or need him in order to be obligatory. They are obliged, therefore, to seek a basis of morals in nature, which in its own right has no legislative authority ; for nature is the creature of God, and is nothing without him.

The intuition of right, obligation, duty, which, according to our author, is the fundamental principle of morals, is only, he himself maintains, the immediate apprehension of a principle or law of human nature, or of our higher nature, from which we are to act, instead of acting from our lower nature ; but our higher nature is still nature, and no more legislative than our lower nature. Nature being always equal to nature, nothing is more certain than that nature cannot bind nature or place it under obligation.

Besides, when the author places the obligation in nature, whether the higher or the lower, he confounds moral law with physical law, and mistakes law in the sense in which it proceeds from God as first cause for law in the sense in which it proceeds from God as final cause. The physical laws, the natural laws of the physiologists, are in nature, constitutive of it, indistinguishable from it, and are what God creates : the moral law is independent of nature, over it, and declares the end for which nature exists, and from which, if moral nature, it must act. It is supernatural in the sense that God is supernatural, and natural only in the sense that it is promulgated through natural reason independently of supernatural revelation. Natural reason asserts the moral law, but asserts it as a law *for* nature, not a law *in* nature. By confounding it with physical laws, and placing it in nature as the law of natural activity, the author denies all moral distinction between it and the law by which the liver secretes bile, or the blood circulates. He holds, therefore, with Waldo Emerson, that gravitation and purity of heart are identical, and, with our old transcendentalist friends, that the rule of duty is expressed in the maxims, Obey thyself ; Act out thyself ; Follow thy instincts. No doubt they meant, as our author means, the higher instincts, the nobler self, the higher nat-

ure. But the law recognized and asserted is no more the moral law than is the physical law by which the rain falls, the winds blow, the sun shines, the flowers bloom, or the earth revolves on its axis. Physical laws there are, no doubt, in human nature; but the theologians tell us that an act done from them is not an *actus humanus*, but an *actus hominis*, which has no moral character, and, whatever its tendency, is neither virtuous nor vicious.

Mr. Lecky, as nearly all modern philosophers, denies God as final cause, if not as first cause. The moral law has its reason and motive in him as our final cause, and this is the difference between it and physical law. The pagan Greeks denied both first cause and final cause, for they knew nothing of creation; but being a finely organized race and living in a country of great natural beauty, they confounded the moral with the beautiful, as some moderns confound art with religion. The author so far agrees with them, at least, as to place duty in the beauty and nobility of the act, or in acts proceeding from the beauty and nobility of our nature—what he calls our higher nature. We do not quarrel with Plato when he defines beauty to be the splendor of the Divinity, and therefore that all good, noble, and virtuous acts are beautiful, and that whoever performs them has a beautiful soul. But there is a wide difference between the beautiful and the moral, though the Greeks expressed both by the same term; and art, whose mission it is to realize the beautiful, has of itself no moral character; it lends itself as readily to vice as to virtue, and the most artistic ages are very far from being the most moral or religious ages. The mistake is in overlooking the fact that every virtuous or moral act must be done *propter finem*, and that the law, the reason, the motive of duty depends on the end for which man was made and exists.

But the author and his school have not learned that all things proceed from God by way of creation, and return to him without absorption in him as their last end. Morals are all in the order of this return, and are therefore teleological. Not knowing this, and rejecting this movement of return, they are forced to seek the basis of morals in man's nature in the order of its procession from God, where it is not. The intuition they assert would be something, indeed, if it were the intuition of a principle or law not included in man's nature, but on which his nature depends, and to which it is bound, by the right of God founded in his creative act, to

subordinate its acts. But by the intuition of right, which they assert, they do not mean any thing really objective and independent of our nature, which the mind really apprehends. On their system they can mean by it only a mental conception, that is, an abstraction. We indeed find men who, as theologians, understand and defend the true and real basis of morals, but who, as philosophers, seeking to defend what they call natural morality, only reproduce substantially the errors of the gentiles. This is no less true of the intuitive school, than of the selfish, the sentimental, or the utilitarian. Cudworth founds his moral system in the innate idea of right, in which he is followed by Dr. Price; Samuel Clarke gives, as the basis of morals, the idea of the fitness of things; Wollaston finds it in conformity to truth; Butler, in the idea or sense of duty; Jouffroy, in the idea of order; Fourier, in passional harmony—only another name for Jouffroy's order. But these all, since they exclude all intuition of the end or final cause, build on a mental conception, or a psychological abstraction, taken as real. The right, the fitness, the duty, the order they assert, are only abstractions, and they see it not.

It is the hardest thing in the world to convince philosophers that the real is the real, and the unreal is unreal, and therefore nothing. Abstractions are formed by the mind, and are nothing out of the concrete from which they are generalized. A system of philosophy, speculative or moral, built on abstractions or abstract conceptions of the true, the right, the just, or duty, has no real foundation, and no more solidity than "the baseless fabric of a vision." Yet we cannot make the philosophers see it, and every day we hear people, whose language they have corrupted, talk of "abstract principles," "abstract right," "abstract justice," "abstract duty," "abstract philosophy," "abstract science;" all of which are "airy nothings," to which not even the poet can give "a local habitation and a name." The philosophers who authorize such expressions are very severe on sensists and utilitarians; yet they really hold that all non-sensible principles and causes, and all ideas not derived from the senses, are abstractions, and that the sciences which treat of them are abstract sciences. Know they not that this is precisely what the sensists themselves do? If the whole non-sensible order is an abstraction, only the sensible is real, or exists *a parte rei*, and there is no intelligible reality distinct from the sensible world. All heathen philosophy ends in

one and the same error, which can be corrected only by understanding that the non-sensible is not an abstraction, but real being, that is, God, or the real relation between God and his acts or creatures. But to do this requires our philosophers to cast out from their minds the old leaven of heathenism which they have retained, to recognize the creative act of God, and to find in theology the basis of both science and morals.

Mr. Lecky proves himself, in the work before us, as in his previous work, an unmitigated rationalist, and rationalism is only heathenism revived. He himself proves it. He then can be expected to write the history of European morals only from a heathen point of view, and his judgments of both heathen and Christian morals will be, in spite of himself, only those of a respectable pagan philosopher, and in the latter period of the pagan empire, and attached to the moral philosophy of the Porch. He is rather tolerant than otherwise of Christianity, in some respects even approves it, lauds it for some doctrines and influences which it pleases him to ascribe to it, and to which it has no claim; but judges it from a stand-point far above that of the fathers, and from a purely pagan point of view, as we may take occasion hereafter to show, principally from his account of the conversion of Rome, and the triumph of the Christian religion in the Roman empire.

But we have taken up so much space in discussing the nature and foundation of morals, to which the author devotes his preliminary chapter, that we have no room for any further discussion at present. What we have said, however, will suffice, we think, to prove that rationalism is as faulty in morals as in religion, to vindicate the church from the charge of teaching a selfish morality, and to prove that the only solid basis of morals is in theology.

ARTICLE II.

Two irreconcilable systems of morals have disputed the empire from the earliest times. The one is founded on the fact that God creates man; the other on the assumption that man is himself God, or, at least a God unto himself. The first system finds its principle in the fact stated in the first verse of Genesis, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth; the second finds its principle in the assurance of Satan to Eve, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and

evil." The first system is that of the Biblical patriarchs, the synagogue, the Christian church, and all sound philosophy as well as of common sense—is the theological system, which places man in entire dependence on God as principle, medium, and end, and asserts as its basis in us, HUMILITY, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." The other system is the gentile or pagan system, or that which prevailed with the gentiles after their falling away from the patriarchal religion. It assumed, in its practical developments, two forms, the supremacy of the state and the supremacy of the individual; but in both was asserted the supremacy of man—or man as his own law-giver, teacher, and master, his own beginning, middle, and end, and, therefore, individually or collectively, man's sufficiency for himself. Its principle or basis, then, is PRIDE.

Mr. Lecky adopts, as we have shown in our former article, the pagan, or more properly, the satanic system of morals, at least as to its principle, though in some few particulars he gives the superiority to Christian morals, particulars in which Christians advanced further than had advanced the best pagan school before the conversion of Rome, but in the same direction, on the same principle, and from the same starting-point. He nowhere accepts the Christian or theological principle, and rejects everywhere, with scorn, Christian asceticism, which, according to him, is based on a false principle—that of appeasing the anger of a malevolent God. He accepts Christianity only so far as reducible to the pagan principle.

The only points in which Christian morals—for Christian dogmas, in his view, have no relation to morals, and are not to be counted—are a progress on pagan morals, are the assertion of the brotherhood of the race, and the recognition of the emotional side of human nature. But even these two points, as he understands them, are not peculiar to Christianity. He shows that some of the later Stoics, at least, asserted the brotherhood of the race, or that nothing human is foreign to any one who is a man—that all good offices are due to all men; and whoever has studied Plato at all, knows that Platonism attached at least as much importance, and gave as large a scope to our emotional nature, as does Christianity. Christian morals have, then, really nothing peculiar, and are, in principle, no advance on paganism. The most that can be said is that Christianity gave to the brotherhood of the race more prominence than did paganism,

and transformed the Platonic love, which was the love of the beautiful, into the love of humanity. This being all, we may well ask, How was it that Christianity was able to gain the victory over the pagan philosophers, and to convert the city of Rome and the Roman empire?

Mr. Lecky adopts the modern doctrine of progress, and he endeavors to prove from the historical analysis of the several pagan schools of moral philosophy, that the pagan world was gradually approaching the Christian ideal, and that when Christianity appeared at Rome it had all but attained to it, so that the change was but slight, and, there being a favorable conjuncture of external circumstances, the change was easily effected. The philosophers of the empire had advanced from primitive fetichism to a pure and sublime monotheism; the mingling of men of all nations and all religions in Rome, consequent on the extension of the empire over the whole civilized world, had liberalized the views, weakened the narrow exclusiveness of former times, and gone far towards the obliteration of the distinction of nations, castes, and classes, and thus had, in a measure, prepared the world for the reception of a universal religion, based on the doctrine of the fraternity of the race and love of humanity.

All this would be very well, if it were true; but it happens to be mainly false. The fact, as well as the idea of progress, in the moral order, is wholly foreign to the pagan world. No pagan nation ever exhibits the least sign of progress in the moral order, either under the relation of doctrine or that of practice. The history of every pagan people is the history of an almost continuous moral deterioration. The purest and best period, under a moral point of view, in the history of the Roman republic, was its earliest, and nothing can exceed the corruption of its morals and manners at its close. We may make the same remark of every non-Catholic nation in modern times. There is a far lower standard of morals reached or aimed at in Protestant nations to-day than was common at the epoch of the reformation; and the moral corruption of our own country has increased in a greater ratio than have our wealth and numbers. We are hardly the same people that we were even thirty years ago; and the worst of it is, that the pagan system, whether under the ancient Græco-Roman form or under the modern Protestant form, has no recuperative energy, and the nation abandoned to it has no power of self-renovation.

Pagan nations may advance, and no doubt, at times, have advanced, in the industrial order, in the mechanic arts, and in the fine arts, but in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual order, never.

Mr. Lecky confines his history almost entirely to the moral doctrines of the philosophers; but even in these he shows no moral melioration in the later from the earlier, no progress towards Christian morals. In relation to specific duties of man to man, and of the citizen to the state, the Christian has, indeed, little fault to find with the *De Officiis* of Cicero; but we find even in him no approach to the Christian basis of morals. The Greeks never have any conception of either law or good, in the Christian sense. The νόμος was only a rule or principle of harmony; it had its reason in τὸ καλόν, or the beautiful, and could not bind the conscience. The Latins placed the end, or the reason and motive of the moral law, in the *honestum*, the proper, the decent, or decorous. The highest moral act was *virtus*, manliness, and consisted in bravery or courage. The rule was, to be manly, the motive, self-respect. One must not be mean or cowardly, because it was unmanly, and would destroy one's self-respect. We have here pride, not humility; not the slightest approach to the Christian principle of morals, either to the rule or the motive of virtue as understood by the Christian church.

Yet Mr. Lecky tells us the moral doctrines of the philosophers was much superior to the practice of the people. He admits the people were far below the philosophers, and were very corrupt; but we see no evidence that he has any adequate conception of how corrupt they were. What the people were we can learn from the satirists, from the historians, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, especially from the *De Civitate Dei* of St. Augustine, and the writings of the early Greek and Latin fathers. Our author acknowledges not only that the philosophers were superior to the people, but also that they were impotent to effect their moral elevation or any moral amelioration of their condition. Nothing more true. How, then, if Christianity was based on the pagan principle of morals, was in the same order with paganism, and differed from it only in certain details, or, as the schoolmen say, certain accidents—how explain the amelioration of morals and manners which uniformly followed whenever and wherever it was received?

If, as the author holds, Christianity was really only a de-

velopment of the more advanced thought of the pagan empire, why did it not begin with the philosophers, the representatives of that advanced thought? Yet nothing is more certain than that it did not begin with them. The philosophers were the first to resist it, and the last to hold out against it. It spread at first among the people, chiefly among the slaves—that is, among those who knew the least of philosophy, who were least under the influence of the philosophers, and whose morals it is confessed the philosophers did not and could not elevate. This of itself refutes the pretence that Christianity was an offshoot of heathen philosophy. If it had been, and its power lay in the fact that the empire in its progress was prepared for it, its first converts should have been from the ranks of the more advanced classes. But the reverse was the fact. “You see your calling, brethren,” says St. Paul to the Corinthians, “that not many are wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble; but the foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong; and the mean things of the world, and the things that are contemptible, hath God chosen, and things that are not, that he might destroy the things that are; that no flesh should glory in his sight.” So said the great teacher of the gentiles, as if anticipating the objection of modern rationalists. Evidently, then, the pretended preparation of the Roman empire for Christianity must count for nothing, for Christianity gained its first establishment among those whom that preparation, even if it had been made, had not reached.

We cannot follow step by step the author in the special chapter which he devotes to the conversion of Rome, and the triumph of Christianity in the empire. We have already indicated the grounds on which he explains the marvellous fact. He denies all agency of miracles, will recognize no supernatural aid, and aims to explain it on natural principles or by natural causes alone. Thus far he has certainly failed; but let us try him on his own ground. We grant that the breaking down of the hundred nationalities and fusing so many distinct tribes and races into one people, under one supreme political authority, did in some sense prepare the way for the introduction of a universal religion. But it must be remembered that the fusion was not complete, and that the work of amalgamating and romanizing

the several nations placed by conquest under the authority of Rome was only commenced, when Christianity was first preached in the capital of the empire. Each conquered nation retained as yet its own distinctive religion, and to a great extent its own distinctive civilization. Gaul, Spain, and the East were Roman provinces, but not thoroughly romanized, and it was not till after Christianity had gained a footing in the empire that provincials out of Italy were admitted to the rights and privileges of Roman citizenship. The law recognized the religion of the state, but it tolerated for every conquered nation its own national religion. There was as yet nothing in the political, social, or religious order of the empire to suggest a universal religion, or that opened the way for the introduction of a catholic as distinguished from a national religion. All the religions recognized and tolerated were national religions. Christianity was always catholic, for all nations, not for any particular nation alone. If, then, at a subsequent period, the boasted universality of the empire favored the diffusion of Christianity, it did not favor its introduction in the beginning. In all other respects there was, as we read history, no evangelical preparation in Rome or the Roman empire. The progress, if progress it may be called, of the gentiles, had been away from the primitive religion reasserted by Christianity, and in a direction from, not towards, the great doctrines and principles of the Gospel. What of primitive tradition they had retained had become so corrupted, perverted, or travestied as to be hardly recognizable. They had changed, even with the philosophers, the true basis of morals, and the corrupt morals of the people were only the practical development of the principles adopted by even the best of the gentile philosophers, as rationalism is only the development of principles adopted by the reformers, who detested it, and asserted exclusive supernaturalism. Even the monotheism of some pagan philosophers was not the Christian doctrine of one God, any more than simple theism—the softened name for deism—or even theophily is Christianity. The Christian God is not only one, but he is the creator of the world, of all things visible and invisible, the moral governor of the universe, and the remunerator of all who seek him. The God of Plato, or of any of the other philosophers, is no creative God, and the immortality of the soul that Plato and his master Socrates defended had hardly any analogy with the life and immortality brought to light

through the Gospel. The Stoics, whom the author places in the front rank of pagan moralists, did not regard God as the creator of the world, and those among them who held that the soul survives the body, believed not in the resurrection of the flesh, nor in future rewards and punishments. Their motive to virtue was their own self-respect, and their study was to prove themselves independent of the flesh and its seductions, indifferent to pleasure or pain, serene and unalterable, through self-discipline, whatever the vicissitudes of life. The philosophers adopted the morality of pride, and aimed to live and act not as men dependent on their Creator, but as independent gods, while the people were sunk in the grossest ignorance and moral corruption, and subject to the most base and abominable superstitions. Such was the pagan empire when Christianity was first preached at Rome, only much worse than we venture to depict it.

Now, to this Roman world, rotten to the core, the Christian preachers proclaimed a religion which arraigned its corruption, which contradicted its cherished ideas on every point, and substituted meekness for cruelty, and humility for pride, as the principle of morals. They had against them all the old superstitions and national religions of the empire, the religion of the state, associated with all its victories, supported by the whole power of the government, and by the habits, usages, traditions, and the whole political, military, social, and religious life of the Roman people. They could not move without stepping on something held sacred, or open their mouths without offending some god or some religious usage; for the national religion was interwoven with the simplest and most ordinary usages of private and social life. If a pagan sneezed, no Christian could be civil enough to say, "Jupiter help you," for that would recognize a false god. Yet the Christian missionaries did succeed in converting Rome and making it the capital of the Christian world, as it was, when they entered it, the capital of the heathen world. You tell me this mighty change was effected, circumstances favoring, by natural and human means! *Credat Judæus Appella, non ego.*

The causes of the success, after the preparation named, which turns out to have been no preparation at all, were, according to the author, principally the zeal, the enthusiasm, and the intolerance or exclusiveness of the Christians, the doctrines of the brotherhood of the race and of a future life, and their appeals to the emotional side of human nature.

He does not think the conversion of Rome any thing remarkable. The philosophers had failed to regenerate society in the moral order, the old religions had lost their hold on men's convictions, the old superstitions were losing their terrors, and men felt and sighed for something better than any thing they had. In fact, minds were unsettled, and were ready for something new. This description, not very applicable to Rome at the period in question, is not inapplicable to the Protestant world at the present time. Protestants are no longer satisfied with the results, either dogmatic or moral, of the reformation, and the thinking portion of them wish for something better than any thing they have; yet not, therefore, can we conclude that they can easily, or by any purely human means, be converted to the Catholic Church; for they have—with individual exceptions, indeed—not lost their confidence in the underlying principle of the reformation, or opened their minds or hearts to the acknowledgment of the principle, either of Catholic dogma or of Catholic morals. It is not so much that they do not know or that they misconceive that principle, but they have a deep-rooted repugnance to it, detest it, abhor it, and cannot even hear it named with patience. So was it with the pagan Romans. The whole pagan world was based on a principle which the Christian preacher could not speak without contradicting. The Christian ideal was not only above, but antagonistic to the pagan ideal, and, consequently, the more zealous the Christian missionary, the more offensive he would prove himself. His intolerance or exclusiveness might help him whose faith was strong, yet little heeded in practice; but when faith itself was not only wanting but indignantly rejected, it could only excite anger or derision.

The apostle had no *point d'appui* in the pagan traditions, and it was only rarely that he could find any thing in heathen authors, poets, or philosophers that he could press into his service. The pagan, no doubt, had natural reason, but it was so darkened by spiritual ignorance, so warped by superstition, and so abnormally developed by false principles, that it was almost impossible to find in it any thing on which an argument for the truth could be based. The Gospel was not in the pagan order of thought, and the Christian apologists had to support it by appealing to a line of tradition which the gentiles had not, or had only as corrupted, perverted, or travestied. The only traditions they could

appeal to were those of the Hebrews, and they found it necessary, in some sort, to convert the pagans to Judaism, before they could convince them of the truth of the Gospel. This was any thing but easy to be done; for the gentiles despised the Jews and their traditions, and the Jews themselves were the most bitter enemies of the Christians, had crucified the founder of Christianity, and rejected the Christian interpretation of their Scriptures.

The doctrine of the brotherhood of the race taught by the church was something more than was taught by the philosophers, in fact, another doctrine; and, though it had something consoling to the poor, the oppressed, the enslaved, yet these are precisely the classes with whom old traditions linger the longest, and prejudices are the most inveterate and hardest to be overcome. They are the classes the most opposed to innovations, in the moral or spiritual order. The Protestant reformers proved this, and the peasantry were the last to accept the new gospel they preached, and rarely accepted it at all but through the influence or compulsion of their princes and nobles. We see, also, now, in Protestant countries, that, the peasantry having become Protestant, are far more difficult to convert than persons by birth or education belonging to the upper classes. Yet, it was precisely among the lower classes, or rather the slave class, that the Christian missionary had his greatest success; though the emancipation and equality he preached were spiritual only, not physical or social.

The doctrine of future life the church taught was coupled with two other doctrines hard for pagans to receive. The mere continuance of the spirit after the death of the body was, in some form, no doubt, held by the whole pagan world, a few sceptics excepted; but the resurrection of the body, or that what had once ceased to live would live again, was a thing wholly foreign to the pagan mind. Plato never, to my recollection, once hints it, and could not with his general principles. He held the union of the soul with the body to be a fall, a degradation from its previous state, the loss of its liberty; regarded the body as the enemy of the soul, as its dungeon, and looked upon death as its liberation, as a restoration to its original freedom and joy in the bosom of the Divinity. The pagans had, as far as I can discover, no belief in future reward and punishment in the Christian sense. They believed in malevolent gods, who, if they failed to appease their wrath before dying, would torture them

after death in Tartarus; but the idea that a God of love would doom the wicked to hell, as a punishment for their moral offences or sins, was as hard for them to believe as it is for Mr. Lecky himself. Yet Christianity taught it, and brought the whole empire to believe it. Christianity, while it delivered the pagans from the false terrors of superstition, replaced them by what to the pagan mind seemed even a still greater terror.

In what the author says of appeals to the emotional side of our nature, he shows that he has studied paganism with more care and less prejudice than he has Christianity. The emotions, as such, have for the Christian no moral or religious value. The love the Gospel requires is not an emotional love, and Christian morals have little to do with the moral sentiment which Adam Smith asserted, or the benevolence which Hutcheson held to be the principle of morality. There is no approach to the Christian principle in the fine-spun sentiment of Bernardine Saint-Pierre, Madame de Staël, or Châteaubriand. Sentimentalism, in any form, is wholly foreign to Christian morals and to Christian piety, and neither has probably a worse or a more dangerous enemy than the sentimentalism so rife in modern society, and which finds its way even into the writings of some Catholics. The sentiment of benevolence may be a *mobile*, but it is never the *motive* of Christian virtue. No doubt one of the great causes of the success of Christianity was the inexhaustible charity of the early Christians, their love for one another, their respect for and tenderness to the poor, the forsaken, the oppressed, the afflicted, the suffering. But that charity had not its origin in our emotional nature, and though it may be attended by sentiment, is itself by no means a sentiment; for its reason and motive was the love of God, especially of God who had assumed our nature, and made himself man for man's sake, and died on the cross for man's redemption. The Christian sees God in every fellow-man who needs his assistance, or to whose wants he can minister. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." The Christian finds his Lord, the Beloved of his soul, wherever he finds one for whom Christ died, to whom he can be of service.

This charity, this love, may be mimicked by the sentiment of benevolence, but it does not grow out of it, is not that sentiment developed or intensified; it depends on the

great central mystery of Christianity, that of "the Word made flesh," and can never be found where faith in the Incarnation is wanting, and faith is, always and everywhere, an intellectual act, not a sentimental affection. If it were a natural sentiment or emotion, why was it to be found among Christians alone? The heathen had all of nature that Christians have; they even recognized the natural brotherhood of the race, as does the author; how happens it, then, if Christianity is only a development of heathenism, and Christian charity is only a natural sentiment, that you find no trace of it in the pagan world? There is no effect without a cause, and there must have been something operating with Christians that was not to be found in paganism, and which is not included even in nature.

The pagans, like modern Protestants, worshipped success, and regarded success as a mark of the approbation of the gods. Misfortune, ill-luck, failure was a proof of the divine displeasure. Cromwell and his Roundheads interpreted uniformly their victories over the royalists as an indisputable proof of the divine approval of their course. It never occurred to them that the Almighty might be using them to chastise the royalists for their abuse of his favors, or to execute vengeance on a party that had offended him, and that, when he had accomplished his purpose with them, he would break them as a potter's vessel, and cast them away. The heathen looked upon the poor, the needy, the enslaved, the infirm, the helpless, and the suffering, as under the malediction of the gods, and refused to offer them any aid or consolation. They left the poor to struggle and starve. They did not do even so much for them as to shut them up in prisons called poor-houses. They looked with haughty contempt on the poor and needy, and if they sometimes threw them a crust, it was from pride, not charity, without the least kindly sympathies with them. As with modern non-Catholics, poverty, with them, was regarded and treated as a misfortune or as a crime.

Yet the Christians looked upon the poor with love and respect. Poverty, in their eyes, was no misfortune, no crime, but really a blessing, as bringing them nearer to God, and giving to the Christian more abundant in this world's goods an opportunity to do good, and lay up treasures in heaven. The Christian counts what he gives to the poor and needy as so much treasure saved, and placed beyond the reach of thieves and robbers, or any of the vicissitudes

of fortune. Whence this difference between the pagan and the Christian, we might say, between the Catholic and non-Catholic? It cannot come from the simple recognition of the natural brotherhood of the race, for the natural ties of race and of kindred fail to call forth a love so strong, so enduring, so self-forgetting as Christian charity. Indeed, Christian charity is decidedly above the forces of nature. The brotherhood that gives rise to it is not the brotherhood in Adam, but the closer brotherhood in Christ; not in generation, but in regeneration. Give, then, as large a part as you will to Christian charity, in the conversion of Rome, you still have offered no proof that the conversion was effected by natural causes, for that charity itself is supernatural, and not in the order of natural causes.

Mr. Lecky wholly fails to adduce any natural causes adequate to the explanation of the conversion of Rome and the triumph of Christianity over paganism. He cannot do it, for this one sufficient reason, that paganism was impotent to reform itself, and yet it had all the natural causes working for it that Christianity had. The Christians had no more of nature than had the pagans, while all the natural advantages, power, wealth, institutions, human learning and science, the laws, habits, customs and usages of the entire nation, or aggregation of nations, were against them. How, then, not only do by nature what the same nature in paganism could not do, or by nature alone triumph over nature clothed with so many advantages, and presenting so many obstacles? Why should nature be stronger, and so much stronger, in Christians than in pagans, that a few illiterate fishermen from the lake of Genesareth, belonging by race to the despised nation of the Jews, could change not only the belief, but the moral life of the whole Roman people? Clearly, the Christians could not succeed without a power which paganism had not, and therefore not without a power that nature does not and cannot furnish.

The author denies the supernatural, and seeks to combat the argument we use by showing that several eastern superstitions, especially the worship of Isis, were introduced into Rome about the same time with Christianity, and gained no little currency, in spite of the imperial edicts against them. This is true, but there was no radical difference between those eastern superstitions and the state religion, and they demanded and effected no change of morals or manners. They were all in the order of the national religion, were

based on the same principle, only they were a little more sensual and corrupt. Their temporary success required no other basis than Roman paganism itself furnished. And the edicts against their mysteries and orgies were seldom executed. It needs no supernatural principle to account for the rapid rise and spread of Methodism in a Protestant community, for it is itself only a form of Protestantism. But Christianity was not, and is not, in any sense, a form or development of paganism; in almost every particular it is its direct contradictory. It was based on a totally different principle, and held entirely different maxims of life. A worshipper of Bacchus or Isis could without difficulty conform to the national or state religion and comply with all its requirements. The Christian could conform in nothing, and comply with no pagan requirements. He could take no part in the national festivities, the national games, amusements, or rejoicings, for these were all dedicated to idols. There is no analogy in the case.

Mr. Lecky denies that the conversion of Rome was a miracle, and that it was effected on the evidence of miracles. He admits that miracles are possible, though he confounds miracles with prodigies, and says there is five times more proof in the case of many miracles than would be required to prove an ordinary historical fact; but he rejects miracles, not for the want of proof, nor because science has disproved them, but because the more intelligent portion of mankind have gradually dropped them and ceased to believe in them, as they have dropped the belief in fairies, dwarfs, &c. The enlightened portion of mankind, it must be understood, are those who think like Mr. Lecky, and profess a Christianity without Christ, moral obligation without God the creator, and hold effects are producible without causes. We confess that we are not of their number, and probably never shall be an enlightened man in their sense. We believe in miracles, and that miracles had not a little to do with the introduction and establishment of Christianity. As the author admits them to be possible, and that many are sustained by far greater proof than is needed to prove ordinary historical events, we hope that it will be allowed, that, in believing them, we are not necessarily involved in total darkness. But we have no space, at present, to enter upon the general question of miracles—a question that cannot be properly treated without treating the whole question of the natural and the supernatural.

The author tells us that the early Christians at Rome rarely appealed, if at all, to miracles as proofs either of their doctrines or their mission. Yet that they sometimes did would seem pretty certain from the pains the pagans took to break the force of the Christian miracles by ascribing them to magic, or by setting up analogous or counter miracles of their own. Certain it is, however, that they appealed to the supernatural, and adduced not only the miracle of the resurrection of our Lord, which entered into the very staple of their preaching, and was one of the bases of their faith, but to that standing miracle of prophecy, and of a supernatural providence—the Jewish people. The very religion they preached was supernatural from beginning to end, and they labored to prove the necessity of faith in Christ, who was crucified, who rose from the dead, and is Lord of heaven and earth. There is no particular miracle or prophecy adduced to prove this that cannot, indeed, be cavilled at; but the Hebrew traditions and the faith of the Jewish people could not be set aside. Here was a whole nation whose entire life through two thousand years had been based on a prophecy, a promise of the Messiah. This prophecy, frequently renewed, and borne witness to by the national organization, the religious institutions, sacrifices, and offerings, and the entire national and moral life through centuries, is a most stupendous miracle. When you take this in connection with the traditions preserved in the Hebrew Scriptures, which go back to the creation of the world—developing one uniform system of thought, one uniform doctrine, one uniform faith, free from all superstition; one uniform plan of divine providence, and throwing a marvellous light on the origin, duty, and end of man—you find a supernatural fact which is irresistible, and sufficient of itself to convince any unprejudiced mind that Christianity is the fulfilment of the promises made to Adam after his expulsion from the garden, to the patriarchs, to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and to the Jewish people.

We have no space here to develop this argument, but it is the argument that had great weight with ourselves personally, and, by the grace of God, was the chief argument that brought us to believe in the truth of Christianity, and in the church as the fulfilment of the synagogue. The apostles and early apologists continually, in one form or another, appeal to this standing miracle, this long-continued manifestation of the supernatural, as the basis of their proof of

Christianity. They adduced older traditions than any the pagans could pretend to, and set forth a faith that had continued from the first man, which had once been the faith of all mankind, and from which the gentiles had fallen away, and been plunged, in consequence, into the darkness of unbelief, and subjected to all the terrors of the vilest, most corrupt, and abominable superstitions. They labored to show that the gentiles, in the pride of their hearts, had forsaken the God that made them, creator of heaven and earth, and all things therein, visible or invisible, for Satan, for demons, and for gods made with their own hands, or fashioned by their own lusts and evil imaginations. They pursued, indeed, the same line of argument that Catholics pursue against Protestants, only modified by the fact that the Protestant falling-away, so clearly foretold by St. Paul in his epistles, is more recent, less complete, and Protestants have not yet sunk so low as had the gentiles of the Roman empire.

But it was not enough to establish the truth of Christianity in the Roman mind. Christian morals are above the strength of nature alone; yet the pagans were not only induced to give up their own principle of morals, and to accept as true the Christian principle, but they gave up their old practices, and yielded a practical obedience to the Christian law. Those same Romans changed their manner of life, and attained to the very summit of Christian sanctity. The philosophers gave many noble precepts, preserved from a purer tradition than their own, but they had no power to get them practised, and our author himself says they had no influence on the people; yet they enjoined nothing above the forces of nature. The Christians came, taught the people a morality impracticable to nature even in its integrity, and yet what they taught was actually practised even by women, children, and slaves. How was this? It was not possible without supernatural aid, or the infusion of grace which elevates the soul above the level of nature, enabling it at once to act from a supernatural principle and from a supernatural motive. All who have attempted the practice of Christian perfection by the strength of nature alone, have sadly failed. Take the charitable institutions, societies for relieving the poor, providing for the aged and infirm, protecting the fatherless and widows, for restoring the fallen, and reforming the vicious or criminal, established by non-Catholics—they are all com-

parative, if not absolute failures. Though modeled after institutions of the church, and supported at lavish expense, none of them succeed. They lack some essential element which is efficacious in Catholic institutions, and that element is undoubtedly supernatural grace, for that is all Catholics have that they have not in far greater abundance. They have humanity, natural benevolence, learning, ability, and ample wealth—why do they not succeed? Because they lack supernatural charity, and the blessing of God that always accompanies it. No other reasons can be assigned.

Mr. Lecky thinks the persecutions by the state, which the early Christians had to endure, or that the spread of Christianity in spite of them, are not worth any thing in the argument. In the first place he pretends that the persecutions were not very severe, and were for the most part confined to particular localities, and rarely became general in the empire; they were of brief duration, and came only at distinct intervals, and the number of martyrs could not have been great. In the second place, the persecutions rather helped the persecuted religion, as persecution usually does. Rome, in reality, was tolerant, and most of the pagan emperors were averse to harsh measures, and connived at the growth of the new religion, which they regarded as one of the innumerable superstitions hatched in the East, and which must soon pass away.

Rome tolerated for conquered nations their national religion, or worship, but no religion except the state religion for Romans. The national gods recognized by the senate, and whose images were allowed to stand by the side of the Roman gods, might be worshipped; but no Roman citizen was allowed to desert the state religion, and nowhere in the empire was any religion tolerated that was not the national worship of some people subject or tributary to Rome. Now, Christianity was no national religion, and was hostile to the state religion, and utterly irreconcilable with it; for it there was no toleration; it was prohibited by the laws of the empire as well as by the edicts of the emperors. The Christians might at first be overlooked as too insignificant to excite hostility, or they might have been regarded, since they were chiefly Jews, as a Jewish sect; they might also, as they were a quiet, peaceable people, obeying the laws when not repugnant to the law of God, performing all their moral, social, and civil duties, and never mingling in the affairs of state, have been connived at for a time. But they had

no legal protection, and if complained of and brought before the tribunals, and proved to be Christians, they had no alternative but to conform to the national religion or suffer death, often in the most excruciating forms; for the Romans were adepts in cruelty, and took delight in watching the writhings and sufferings of their victims. Even Trajan, while he prohibited the search for them, ordered, if accused and convicted of being Christians, that they should be put to death.

Such being the law, the prefect or governor of a province could at any time, without any imperial edict, put the law in force against the Christians, if so disposed; and that they did so in all the provinces of the empire, frequently and with unsparing severity, we know from history. The Christians were safe at no time and nowhere in the empire, and it is probable that the number of victims of the ten general persecutions were by far the smaller number of those who suffered for the faith prior to the accession of Constantine. We place no confidence in the calculations of Gibbon or our author, and we have found no reason for believing that the Christian historians, or the fathers, exaggerated the number of those who received the crown of martyrdom.

It is a great mistake to suppose that paganism had lost its hold on the Roman mind till long after the Christians had become a numerous body in the empire. There were, no doubt, individuals who treated all religions with indifference, but never had the pagan superstitions a stronger hold on the mass of the people, especially in Rome and the western provinces, than during the first two centuries of our era. The republic had been transformed into the empire, and the government was never stronger, or the worship of the state more intolerant, more fervent, or more energetically supported by the government. The work of romanizing the various conquered nations was effected under the emperors, and the signs of decline and dissolution of the empire did not appear till near the close of the third century. The Roman state and paganism seemed to be indissolubly linked together—so closely that the pagans attributed to the rise and progress of Christianity the decline and downfall of both. Certain it is, that paganism lost its hold on the people or the state only in proportion to the progress of Christianity; and the abandonment of the heathen gods and the desertion of the heathen temples were due to the preaching of the

Gospel, not a fact which preceded and prepared the way for it. Converts were seldom made from the irreligious and indifferent classes, who are the last, in any age, to be reached or affected by truth and piety.

The fact is, that paganism fought valiantly to the last, and Christianity had to meet and grapple with it in its full force, and when supported by the strongest and most effective government that ever existed, still in the prime and vigor of its life. The struggle was harder and longer continued than is commonly supposed, and by no means ended with Constantine. Paganism reascended the throne—in principle, at least—under Constantius, the son, and avowedly under Julian, the nephew of the first Christian emperor. Every pagan statesman saw, from the first, that there was an irrepressible antagonism between Christianity and paganism, and that the former could not prevail without destroying the latter, and, of course, the religion of the state, and apparently not without destroying the state with it. The intelligent and patriotic portion of the Roman people must have regarded the spread of Christianity very much as the Protestant leaders regard the spread of Catholicity in our own country. They looked upon it as a foreign religion, and anti-Roman. It rejected the gods of Rome, to whom the city was indebted for her victories and the empire of the world. We may be sure, then, that the whole force of the state, the whole force of the pagan worship, backed by the passions and fanaticism of the people, whether of the city or the provinces, was exerted to crush out the new and offensive worship; and, whether the numbers of martyrs were a few more or a few less, the victory obtained by Christianity against such fearful odds is not explicable without the assumption of supernatural aid—especially when that victory carried with it a complete change of morals and manners, and the practice in not a few who underwent it of an heroic sanctity, or virtues which are confessedly above our natural strength.

No false or merely natural religion could have survived, far less have vanquished, such opposition as Christianity encountered at every point. The very fact that it thrived, in spite of the fearful persecution to which it was subjected, is a proof of its truth and divinity. We grant the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church, but persecution fails only when it meets truth, when it meets God as the resisting force. We know the strength of superstition and the tenacity of fanaticism; but we deny that persecution has

ever increased or multiplied the adherents or aided the growth of a false religion. There is no example of it in history. It is only the truth that does not succumb; and even they who profess the truth, when they have lost the practice of it, have yielded to the spirit of the world, and have ceased to be faithful to God, fail to stand before persecution, as was seen in the almost entire extinction of Catholics in the European nations that accepted the Protestant reformation. The inefficacy of persecution to extinguish the doctrine persecuted is a commonplace of liberalism; but history proves the contrary, and hence the fact that Christianity, instead of being extinguished by the heathen persecution, spread under it, and even gained power by it, is no mean proof of its truth and its supernatural support.

The author obtains his adverse conclusion by substituting for the Christianity to which Rome was actually converted, and which actually triumphed in the empire, a Christianity of his own manufacture, a rationalistic Christianity, which has nothing to do with Christ Jesus, and him crucified; a Christianity despoiled of its mysteries, its doctrinal teachings, its distinctive moral precepts, and reduced to a simple moral philosophy. It is with him a theory, a school; not a fact, not a law, not an authority, not a living organism, nor of an order essentially different from paganism. His Christianity has its starting point in paganism, and only marks a particular stage in the general progress of the race. He does not see that it and paganism start from entirely different principles, and come down through separate and hostile lines, or that they have different ancestors. He does not understand that Christianity, if a development at all, is not the development of paganism, but of the patriarchal and Jewish religion, which placed the principle of duty in man's relation to God as his creator and final cause, not in the assumption of man's own divinity or godship. Hence he finds no need of supernatural aid to secure its triumph.

The author, placing Christianity in the same line with paganism, supposes that he accounts sufficiently for the conversion of Rome by the assumption that the Christians placed a stronger emphasis on certain doctrines held by the pagan philosophers, and were actuated by a greater zeal and enthusiasm than were those philosophers themselves. Yet he does not show the origin of the greater zeal, nor its character; and he entirely misapprehends the enthusiasm of the early Christians. They were, in no received sense of the

word, enthusiasts, nor were they, in his sense of the word, even zealots. They in no sense corresponded to the character given them in *The Last Days of Pompeii*. They were neither enthusiasts nor fanatics; and their zeal, springing from true charity, was never obtrusive or annoying. We find in the earlier and later sects enthusiasts, fanatics, and zealots who are excessively offensive, and yet are able to carry away the simple, the ignorant, and the undisciplined; but we never find them among the early orthodox Christians, any more than you do among Catholics at the present day. The early Christians did not "creep into houses and lead away silly women," or assault people in the streets or market-place, and seek to cram Christianity down their throats, whether they would or not, but were singularly sober, quiet, orderly, and regular in their proceedings, as Catholics have always been, compelling not people to hear them against their will, and instructing in the faith only those who manifested a desire to be instructed. The author entirely mistakes both the Christian order of thought and the character of the early Christians who suffered from and finally triumphed over the pagan empire.

MADNESS OF ANTICHRISTIANS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1847.]

M. MICHELET is a professor of history in the *Collège Royal* of France, and is pretty well known as the author of several historical works, and of two or three publications against religion, which have been favorably received by the Protestant community in general. He is not deficient in natural endowments, and appears to be a scholar of respectable attainments. As a writer, though wanting in dignity, he is lively, brilliant, and sometimes even eloquent. His historical works can be cheerfully recommended to all who wish only to become acquainted with his theorizing, poetizing, and sentimentalizing on history, but they are not in-

* *The People*. By M. MICHELET. Translated by G. H. Smith, F. G. S. New York: 1846.

dispensable to those who would study history itself. His work against the *Jesuits* is mere frothy declamation, without any coloring of fact or argument; his *Le Prêtre et la Femme de Famille* is a compound of ignorance, infidel malice, prurient fancy, and maudlin sentiment; and the work before us is the author himself. "This book is more than a book; it is myself, . . . it is I." Indeed, whatever the author may appear to be writing, it is always himself that he writes.

The book we have introduced to our readers is of no great intrinsic value. It throws no certain light on the condition of the people, and makes no important suggestions for their improvement. The only thing we can say in its favor is, that it proves the mass of the French people are less immoral than they are commonly represented, and shows that the modern system of industry has not so many advantages over that which it has superseded as is commonly imagined. But the work mainly interests us as an exponent of the spirit of the Anticatholic world. The author considers himself a fair representative of the age, and, so far as the age is not Catholic, he appears to us to be so. They who study the age in him will not be likely to mistake its dominant tendencies. He is carrying on a war against religion, and has published this work to enlist his countrymen on his side. It may, therefore, be taken as an index to the kind of appeals the enemies of religion are making to the people, and to the ground on which they are to be met and routed. We no sooner open it than we perceive the bold and direct denials of religion, made by the infidels of the last century, are not now continued. The age of absolute negations appears to have gone by. The present age shrinks from the direct issue,—religion or no religion,—and returns to the old device of attempting to oppose Christianity in the name of Christianity herself, and to seduce the people from their love and fidelity by substituting something real and positive in her place, and something, too, which she apparently approves and consecrates.

What is this something? Christianity represents the Divinity on earth, and to oppose it is to oppose God and all that pertains distinctively to the divine order. In the nature of things, then, they who oppose it can oppose to it nothing divine, nothing positive, in fact, but man himself, or what is simply human. The enemies of Christianity must oppose to it either man or nothing. In the last cen-

tury, for a time, they really opposed nothing, and relied on simple hatred to religion itself. But hatred is spasmodic, unnatural, and short-lived. Only the devil himself can make it a universal and permanent principle of action. The bulk of mankind are not bad enough for that. They must have something positive to love and strive for; and they will not act long steadily and energetically, unless for something they love and wish to possess. But when God is opposed, when Christianity, the church in which he resides and dispenses his grace, is discarded, nothing is left to love and strive for but man, and what pertains to him as man. Hence, we find M. Michelet opposing man to God, and seeking to draw off our love from God by means of our love for the human.

This, in principle, is no new device. It is precisely what the Protestant reformers themselves did. They rebelled against God; and as God cannot be divided and set against himself, they were forced to fall back on what is simply human for their support. They asserted sometimes the supremacy of the state against the supremacy of the church; but this was only a human authority; for the state is human. They asserted, also, the supremacy of the Scriptures, taken on and interpreted by a human authority. But this, again, was only asserting the supremacy of man; for the Scriptures, so taken and interpreted, are only a human authority, and impose no faith but what each interpreter chooses to find in them. They asserted, in fine, the right of private judgment. But this all the world knows is human; and no one who has analyzed their movement doubts for a moment, that, reduced to its general formula, it is,—MAN IS SUPREME, AND IS TO US IN THE PLACE OF GOD.

Nor was this the device of Protestantism alone. There was very little originality in the Protestant movement. It proceeded on the principle common to all movements, no matter in what age or country, against the city of God, and did but continue the *protest* which our first parents, through the seductions of the serpent, made in the garden. There may be development and modification of external representation from age to age, or from place to place; but there is no substantial change. The principle is always the same. It is always in the name of man, always under pretence of bringing up and out the human element, that religion is opposed. The effort is always to create an antagonism between the love of God and the love of man, or to subordi-

nate God to man. "Ye shall be as *gods*, knowing good and evil." That is, if we may paraphrase it,—“The command you suppose God has given you, and which you suppose you must keep, is tyrannical; it degrades your nature, cripples its energies, enslaves its affections, and hinders the development and growth of its god-like faculties. If you were free, or if you had the courage, to eat the forbidden fruit, your eyes would be opened; you would not need to see by another's eyes; you would know good and evil, and not with another's knowledge, but with your own knowledge, for yourselves, in like manner as God himself knows in and of himself, without another to teach him. Has God said, Ye shall not eat, lest ye die? Nonsense. Believe no such thing. Can God wish to keep you children and slaves for ever? What pleasure can he take in the homage of those who have no mind, no will of their own, who dare neither think nor act but as they are bid? No; God loves the free, bold, *manly* spirit, that acts from choice, affection, not from compulsion. Would you be acceptable to him, you must entertain more worthy notions of him, divest yourselves of your idle fears, of the silly notion that God requires you to submit to a command that would keep you for ever weak and puny slaves. There is a soul within you; let that speak; listen to that; follow it, and be free, be great, be noble, be gods.” So spake the serpent; Eve was charmed, and no doubt fancied that the best way to render herself acceptable to God would be to disobey him. But be this as it may, the temptation which seduced her from her allegiance was the elevation of the human, the glory and dignity of man.

The same temptation is repeated in our days. The church is opposed from the same motives that Satan urged in the beginning. What hear we? “The church is dangerous to the state; it is hostile to liberty; it obscures the dignity of human nature; it does not respect the rights of man; denies private judgment; tyrannizes over the freeborn mind; and is in the way of intellectual and social progress.” All the popular charges the age prefers against the church are reducible to these several heads, and therefore all oppose man to God, the human to the divine. It were easy to prove this by reference to the literature of the day, to the movements and boasts of the age; but the fact is so salient that it is not necessary.

The real characteristic of the Antichristian, that is, An-

ticatholic, world is, in brief, the SUPREMACY OF MAN. It makes man its God, its master, the end for which it must strive, and the fountain from which it must derive its light and strength. It is man against God. There can be no denial of this fact. Whoso wars against the church wars against Christianity, and whoso wars against Christianity wars against God. Let no one deceive himself on this point. Christianity is not an abstraction nor a dead letter; it is a living organism, the church, and without the church it is not—is inconceivable. The distinctions you imagine between Christianity and the church—the Roman Catholic Church, we mean—are mere moonshine. No such distinctions are possible. God did not first give you a Christianity, and then build up, or leave you to build up, a Christian church around it, to embody and express more or less of it. He gave the church in the beginning, and gave you nothing but what is included integrally in it. When you oppose the church, you oppose the religion of God, and God himself. You cannot do otherwise, if you would. There is no middle course for you. You must either say, God, and man for the sake of God, or, Man, and God, if at all, for the sake of man. There is no need of words or wry faces. Here is the plain, indisputable fact. There is no medium between the two possible in the nature of things. You are on the Lord's side, or you are against it. If you are on his side, you are on the side of the church in which he is universally and permanently present unto the consummation of the world; if you are on the side opposed to the church, you are on the side opposed to God. No verbiage, no sophistry, no art or ingenuity, can alter this fact; and the sooner you become convinced of it, and look this fact steadily in the face, the better will it be for all of you who are carrying on your unhallowed war against God's holy church.

But, assuming the fact to be as we state it, what have the enemies of religion to offer us? In general terms, they offer us man, represented in the family, native land, and universal brotherhood. M. Michelet opposes to the church, simply, if we abstract his verbiage, family and native land. These are the means and end of man's existence. These are M. Michelet's religion. "France," he says, "is a religion." These he would substitute in the place of religion, and he would educate solely in reference to them. He opposes the church because she insists on educating for God, and subordinating family and country to God, and teaching us they

are good and holy only when sought and loved for God's sake. Others add to family and country, or, one may almost say, substitute for them, universal brotherhood, and place the supreme excellence of moral character in PHILANTHROPY. These are philanthropists, and test all things by their schemes for the general improvement of mankind. They do not ask, Is the church divine, is she from God, commissioned by God himself to teach us what we shall believe and do? But they ask, Is she an abolitionist, a teetotalter, a radical, a socialist?

Now we certainly respect family, native land, brotherhood, and hold them to be sacred, when elevated by religion to her own order, and referred to God as the end for which they are, and are to be loved or sought. So viewed, we have as much to say in their favor as have the Antichristian reformers themselves, and perhaps more, too. The madness of these reformers does not consist in their devotion to them, but in their devotion to them for their own sake, as detached from God, the end for which they are, and made to be ends in themselves. This is their madness; it is precisely here where lies their power of deception. Religion consecrates all these terms. The Gospel pronounces marriage holy, and makes it a sacrament; what do I, then, when I extol it, but what the Gospel itself does? The Gospel enjoins patriotism; when I present the claims of native land, and ask that all be trained to love it, am I not following out the Gospel? The Gospel declares that love is the perfection of the law, that he who loveth dwelleth in God and God in him, for God is love; when, then, I proclaim the excellence of love, make love the basis of my system, and call upon all to love one another, and to live as brothers, what do I but follow both the spirit and the letter of the Gospel? This looks plausible, and the uninstructed and unwary may not at first sight perceive wherein lies the sophistry, or wherein they who reason thus are opposed to Christianity.

Marriage, when blessed by the church, is a sacrament, and when sought for God's sake, is indeed holy, but not otherwise. Patriotism is a duty, and is meritorious, when we love and serve our country from love of God, not when we love and serve it simply for its own sake. Love is the perfection or fulfilling of the law, when understood in the Gospel sense for charity; not when it is understood in the human sense for philanthropy. The error lies in the neglect of these distinctions, and in predicating of marriage, patriotism, love

of mankind, when referred simply to what is human as the end, what may with truth be predicated of them when they are referred to God. The enemies of the city of God say, because family, native land, brotherhood, when referred to God, are sacred, and to seek them is a religious act, to seek them is a religious act when they are not so referred; because to love our neighbour as ourselves, for the love of God, is a precept of the divine law—to love him for his own sake, without reference to the love of God, is the fulfilling of that precept; and because whoso loves God must love his brother also, God is loved in man, not man in God.

Now all this makes man the end, and supreme, and, if our modern reformers were not stark blind, they could not fail to perceive their absurdity. There is a solemn truth burnt into the heart of every man who has had some little experience of life, that man never suffices for man, and therefore that nothing human is ever sufficient for itself. The good to be derived from marriage, from native land, from universal brotherhood, is never attainable when they are sought for their own sake, and not for the sake of God. When sought for his sake, there is all the good derivable from them which our reformers allege; but by no means when sought for their own sake, as all experience proves.

The age prates everywhere of love, of woman, and of family. Nothing is more remarkable than the rank assigned to woman, and the reliance that is placed on her for whatever good is looked for. She is made the church, and men nowadays ask from her what in the ages of faith they asked from the immaculate spouse of the Lamb; and the worship we pay to the blessed mother of God is, in more instances than one, taken by persons out of the church to be symbolical of the worship due to the sex. M. Michelet tells us, man is man only when with a wife, with whom he is married or not married; and Frederika Bremer, the popular Swedish novelist, whose works even the *Dublin Review* has commended, with only a faint whisper of dissent, confounds the sentiment of two passionate lovers for each other with the love of God, apparently regarding it as one of the purest and highest forms of charity. It would not be difficult to trace the same doctrine through no small portion of that literature which at once forms and expresses the age. All this may be very fine and charming in one of love's paroxysms, but the love of man for woman, and of woman for man, taken in its most honest sense, never suffices for itself;

and pure and hallowed as may be woman's gentle influence, when she herself loves God supremely and exclusively, it can never be safely appealed to when she does not so love him. Her influence, when religion is wanting, is more fatal than that of man himself. What is said of her, the appeals made to her, and the flattery bestowed on her by this age, only mark its luxury and gross corruption.

We may love, should love,—but God only. All else that is loved must be loved in him and for him. This is as true in relation to the mutual love of husband and wife, of parents and children, as in relation to any other love. And when this is forgotten or neglected, the love is full of misery and wretchedness. Our novelists delight to picture two young lovers, all and all to each other, living only one for the other, unable to live one without the other, seeing their heaven in each other's eyes, and shocked at the bare thought that either could find a heaven hereafter, save in the presence of the other. Adelaide, in one of Miss Bremer's novels, believing herself to be dying, consoles Alaric, her lover, with the assurance that he will soon follow her, and that they will meet in heaven, which would be no heaven to her without him. Never was love more worshipped than in our days; never was more pains taken to enlist all imaginations in his favor, and to introduce him into every heart of the least susceptibility. Yet what is the complaint which we everywhere hear? The heart is not met; we have a power to love which is not called forth; the heart is lonely, sad, and sighs for some one to love, some one it *can* love, which will fill its capacity to love, and on which it may lavish all its wealth of love. But in vain. There is no such object. We try one, then another, then still another, all to no purpose. No one comes up to our idea; no one understands us; no one enters into all our feelings, and responds to all our nice sensibilities. Our deep and rich affections, longing to overflow and fertilize a kindred heart, are repulsed, forced back upon their source, and stagnate and rot. Such is the tone of the complaints we hear. Indeed, the very age itself is a lovesick maiden. It believes in love, celebrates it in prose and rhyme, and sighs and whimpers that it can find nothing to love. All this is natural and inevitable. Love, left to itself, is madness, and cannot be satisfied with love. It is never for two successive moments in the same mood; and it is never, when obtaining, the same as when demanding. Nothing can satisfy it. No human being can meet its caprices, or appease its cravings.

Now, all this comes, not from the fact that love is sought, or is regarded as a good, but from the fact that it is sought for its own sake ; subordinate love to religion, love only in reference to God ; seek the love, the peace, the tranquillity of the family for God's sake, and not for the sake of the family itself, and the whole tone and temper change. There is no less love, no less generous or tender affection, no less sensibility, no less of all that which in love is lovable ; but the love is controllable, is no longer a madness, is rational ; for it now lives not on itself alone, feeds not by devouring itself, but is nourished, sustained, directed by something higher, nobler than itself,—something nor time nor change can affect, and which keeps it as fresh and vigorous, when age and care have furrowed the cheek or frosted the brow, as in the heyday of youthful beauty. Nothing in this world more needs religion than does love itself. Only the religious can truly love, or find love a blessing. It is only where God is loved supremely and exclusively that there is real marriage,—marriage in the Christian sense of the word. They only receive the fruits of the sacrament of marriage who are married in God, and love each other with infinite tenderness for the love of God. Then are they indeed no longer twain, but one,—made one by the true medium of union, the living and lifegiving God. Their union is perfect and living, and is indissoluble till death. There is no return upon self, no asking if one loves or is loved, whether one understands or is understood, appreciates or is appreciated ; each looks to God, finds the other in him, and is satisfied. Where it is thus, there may be family in its true sense. Husband and wife, parents and children, love each other, for they all love one another in the one love of their Father in heaven. There is no discord, no division, for they are all one in this higher love. Such family is sacred, is holy ; its sweet affections, its peace, its solitudes, its troubles, are all religious, and acceptable offerings to God. Infirmities are borne with, personal qualities do not impair affection, and toil, and want, and suffering do but endear the members the more to one another, and make them the more indissolubly one. Yes, there *is* religious family. The error is not in extolling family, is not in exalting the virtue and peace of domestic life, when referred to God, but in detaching the family from religion, in making it in itself religious, and in seeking it for its own sake. Seek God and him only, and you may find the family ; and then, but only then, will it be all you desire it.

The principle we have asserted in relation to love, marriage, and the family, holds good throughout every department of human life. Philanthropy, in our days, is a high-sounding word, and it is regarded as a high compliment to a man to call him a philanthropist. But philanthropy, in itself considered, is a mere human sentiment, and brings good neither to its subject nor to its object. It has never effected any thing great or good for the race. It has been the mainspring of none of those noble institutions which have more or less flourished in every age of the church, and from which mankind have derived so much advantage. Moved by a simple love of humanity, men may talk finely, use charming words, and vent much exquisite sentiment; but they effect nothing, unless it be to aggravate the evils they undertake to cure. Philanthropists are the most useless race of mortals, as well as the most disagreeable, that it is easy to imagine. Their heads are full of kinks and crotchets, and there is no living with them. They intermeddle with every thing, and mind everybody's business but their own. They seem to fancy that their trade of philanthropy gives them the right to trample on all the laws of good-breeding, to outrage every honest feeling, and to make themselves supremely offensive. Poor creatures! they are just a-going to effect something great and glorious; but, alas! it is always they are *just a-going* to do it.

Our age teems with philanthropists of all sorts, sizes, and colors. It claims to have a large share of generous sympathy for man. It is socialist. It is terribly pathetic over depressed humanity, especially the poorer and more numerous classes. Never before has man understood the value of man; never before has he felt for man as man. Now, for the first time in the world's history, man sees a brother in his fellow-man, and a man in the humble, toil-worn laborer, as well as in the lordly noble. An ocean of love for the oppressed and indigent is now stirred up from its depths, and the race, after its sleep of six thousand years, awakes to a sense of the duty it owes to each of its members. Take courage, ye poor and neglected, ye wronged and outraged, ye oppressed and downtrodden, ye perishing classes, one and all! It is the glorious nineteenth century, the century of light, of love, of humanity. Now blessed are the poor, for now shall they have the Gospel preached. All men are brethren. Man measures man the world over; hear it, ye poor and outcast, and lift up your heads; hear it, ye rich and proud, whose eyes stand out with

fatness, and tremble. A new age commences. The great order so long foretold, so long and so ardently desired, now descends from heaven, and the Saturnian years begin. Oppression shall end, slavery shall cease, the captive shall go free, the bruised spirit shall be healed, and all men shall be as brothers, and love one another. Admirable! But how? What a question! Up start a thousand schemers and projectors; each has a sovereign remedy, and there is a confusion of tongues, as if Babel had come again. Such muttering, sputtering, chattering, vociferating, pulling and hauling, clatter and racket, that one is glad to escape with a whole skin; and unless he has a large share of grace, must wish it had pleased Heaven to have given him his birth in some other than this enlightened and philanthropic nineteenth century.

Now, with all deference to our enlightened philanthropists, we must express some doubts whether this age is so original as it imagines. Some go so far as to deny its originality altogether, and it has been publicly declared that it has not done so much as to "invent even a new humbug." This may be saying too much; but, after all, it has not falsified the word of God, which declares there is nothing new under the sun. It was not left to this age to be the first to preach the Gospel to the poor, or to discover the real worth of man as man. The antics which people play, the capers they cut, when they get a new idea into their heads, are often as much a proof of their ignorance as of their knowledge. Many is the fledgling philosopher or philanthropist who fancies the world is rapidly advancing, because he has learned something to-day of which he was ignorant yesterday. Sometimes we fancy we are making discoveries, when we are only learning what the scientific take it for granted everybody knows, as was the case with Bacon in regard to the schoolmen.

No Christian has ever needed to be taught the very commonplace truths which so inflate our modern reformers, for every Christian has learned them in his catechism. The Christian needs not this flood of light which the nineteenth century boasts. What it calls a flood of light is to him but the last flicker of a farthing-candle, and he wonders where these enlightened reformers came from, that so small a light so dazzles their eyes and turns their heads. Surely they are birds of the night, owls or bats, and no eagles, accustomed to gaze on the sun. Certainly every man must

deplore the condition of the millions of our race unblest by the light of the Gospel, perishing for lack of the bread of life; certainly every Christian must and does deplore the physical wretchedness of vast multitudes in all countries,—but chiefly for the moral destitution which too often accompanies it. He feels with and for the poor and destitute, and does all in his power to relieve their wretchedness. Not he stands indifferent to suffering humanity, or in the way of relief. But there is a great distance between that love for the masses which originates in the simple love of man for his own sake, and that which originates in the love of God, and loves them in and for him. The one we call philanthropy, the other charity, and the age makes such a fool of itself in regard to the former simply because it wants the latter. Philanthropy turns its head because it is ignorant of charity. We grant the age philanthropy, the love of man, for it sets up man against God; but this, instead of being its glory, is its shame. It boasts the less, because it has not the greater.

In nothing is the absolute insufficiency of man for himself more striking than in the philanthropic efforts of the day. Whether our philanthropists have for their object to relieve the indigent, to liberate the slave, to check a prevalent vice, to remodel the state, or reorganize society, they proceed as madmen, prove utterly impotent, save to unhinge men's minds, to unsettle what is fixed, and to throw into chaos what has been reduced to order. Never was more breath or ink wasted over the indigent classes; never was a greater variety of splendid schemes devised for their relief; and never was there a period in the history of the world when they were more in need of help and when they received less. What is now done for them only increases their disquiet, their intense longings for what they have not and cannot get,—only sharpens their sensibilities, and augments their sufferings. The evils of poverty are more than half relieved, when you have removed from the poor the craving to be rich, and made them contented with their state in life. Philanthropy cannot understand this; she cannot conceive a good for them, unless they are placed in another rank in life; and all her tears over them, all her exhortations to them, only increase their craving to be other than they are, and to deepen the sense of their misery.

So it is, and so it must be, when we rely on philanthropy, and mistake it for that love which the blessed apostle says is

the perfection of the law. When we do so, we begin at the wrong end, and seek God in man, instead of man in God. Man out of God can do no good, can receive no good,—that is, no good in any deep sense of the word. The true course is the reverse; it is to begin in God, and to find all in him. The love we should have for our neighbour, and which his good, as well as our true worth, requires us to have, is, not that human sentiment beginning and ending in man, which our philanthropists contend for, but that blessed charity which loves God above all things, with the whole heart and soul, because he is infinitely amiable and deserving of all love, and our neighbour as ourselves, for the love of God. Not by any means is it wrong to love our neighbour; not by any means is the love of mankind to be discountenanced; but it must, through religion, be made infinitely more than philanthropy, or it will inevitably be less. As we said of the love of the family, so say we of the love of mankind. The merely human sentiment has never its complement in itself, is always weak and whimpering, and evaporates in words, sighs, and tears. We have no true and solid love one of another, unless one love the other not in himself, but in God. Only in God can the brotherhood of the race be found. Men must be carried up to the Father, before they can be seen and loved as brethren. So far from the love of God being antagonistical to the love of man, it is only in loving God that we really do or can love man. We love the child because we love the Father.

We do not love our fellow-men less because our love is charity instead of philanthropy, but we love them from a higher and a stronger motive, with a purer, richer, and more enduring love. Having found our neighbour in God, we can then find God in our neighbour, and live or die for our neighbour; for it is not for him, but for God. Those who, in what Protestants call the dark ages, from pure love of God, associated themselves for the redemption of captives, and, when their funds failed, sold themselves as the ransom of the slave, probably loved the slave not less than do our modern abolitionists, who, at a convenient distance, declaim against his master, and gain the praise of philanthropy by making speeches against slavery, and by their incendiary proceedings riveting the chains of the slave all the firmer. Philanthropy never did and never will loosen the bonds of the captive. Let philanthropy go, let the slave go, let humanity go,—but let the heart be touched by divine charity,

let each love God and him only, live for God, and desire nothing but God in heaven or on earth, and the prison-doors will fly open, the fetters drop from the slave's feet, the bowed down will be raised up, the whole race will be free, their hearts will be one heart, beat with one love and one hope, and bound with one joy.

We open up here a great subject, which we would gladly, if our space permitted, pursue still further. We may, perhaps, resume it hereafter. The age would do well to weigh it as it has not weighed it; and it would do well to contrast what charity did in the ages of faith, and what it does now where men are not ashamed to be Christians in their deeds, with the puny and abortive efforts of philanthropy,—Rome, for instance, with London, or England of the fourteenth century with England of the nineteenth. The principle we contend for has no exceptions. There is only God we can seek and not miss. Whatever else we seek we gain not, or, if we gain it, it turns out to be worthless, or worse. God is the supreme good. We must seek him, and leave all subordinate goods to follow or not follow, as he pleases. If they follow, it is well, be thankful; if they do not, still be thankful, for it is just as well. He who has God has all. The possession of secondary goods adds nothing, their loss diminishes nothing. They are goods only in so far as they are included in him. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you"; for, in so far as they are for his glory and your good, they are included in his gift of himself. If he gives himself, what good thing can he withhold?

We have written not to depress the human, but to show its impotence when abandoned to itself or sought for its own sake. The great rule to be observed is to deny the human, or to seek it only in God, where it ceases to be human, and becomes divine. This is the self-denial taught us by our holy religion. We must utterly renounce ourselves, crucify our nature, as the only possible condition of obtaining any thing good. "He that will save his life shall lose it." But this crucifixion of nature, this self-renunciation, is moral, not physical. Nature remains with all its capacities, and self remains with all its faculties, but not as an end, not as that which is to supply the motive or reason of acting. We annihilate ourselves for God, live for him only, and we live for ourselves only in him. We exercise still all our faculties, and retain the same sensibility to pleas-

ure or pain ; but we retain not the sensibility, and exercise not the faculties, for their own sake. We cease to be our own. We are the Lord's. Yet in this we lose nothing, but gain every thing. "He that shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." We give ourselves to God, to live only for him, to have no will but his, no thought but for him ; and in return he gives us himself, and in himself gives us the sovereign good, all conceivable good, yea, more than is conceivable. All good is ours, moral, spiritual, physical. The secondary goods, the elevation of the individual and of society, the freedom of the captive, and the unloosing of the bound, so far as they are goods, follow in the train ; and we are sure to find, that, in giving up all for Christ, we receive in return a hundred-fold in this life, and the promise of that which is to come. Christian asceticism is the only path to true good, individual or social.

CHARITY AND PHILANTHROPY.

[From the Catholic World for January, 1867.]

THERE is no denying that our age, in its dominant tendency, places philanthropy above charity, and holds it higher praise to call a man philanthropic than to call him charitable. In its eyes charity is to philanthropy as a part to the whole, and consists, chiefly, in giving the beggar a penny or sending him to the poor-house, and in treating error and sin with even more consideration than truth and virtue. Could any thing better indicate the distance it has fallen below the Christian thought, or its failure to grasp the principle of Christian morals ?

Philanthropy, according to the etymology of the word, is simply the love of man ; charity, according to Christian theology, is the love of God, and of man in God. Philanthropy is simply a natural human sentiment ; charity is a virtue, a supernatural virtue, not possible without the assistance of grace—the highest virtue, the sum and perfection of all the virtues, the fulfilment of the whole law, the bond of perfectness which likens and unites us to God, for God is charity, *Deus caritas est*. It does not exclude but in-

cludes the love of man, our neighbor, or our brother ; “for if any man say, I love God and hateth his brother, he is a liar. For he that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, whom he seeth not ?” Whoever loves God must necessarily love his brother, for his brother is included in God, as the effect in the cause, and he who loveth not his brother proves clearly thereby that he doth not love God. But charity, though it includes philanthropy, is as much superior to it as God is to man.

The natural sentiments are all good in their origin and design, as much so since as before the fall ; and man would be worthless without them ; would be a monster, not a man. But in themselves they are blind. Each one tends, when left to itself, to become exclusive and excessive, and hence comes that internal disorder, anarchy, or war of conflicting sentiments of which we are all more or less conscious, and in which originate all life’s tragedies. Even when developed, restrained, and directed by the understanding, as they all need to be, they are not even then moral virtues, meriting praise. Moral virtue is a rational act, an act of free will, done for the sake of the end prescribed by the law of God ; but in the sentiments there is no free will, except in restraining and directing them, and man acts in them only as the sun shines, the rain falls, the winds blow, or the lightnings flash. There may be beauty and goodness in them, as in the objects of nature, but there is no virtue, because the spring of all sentimental action is the indulgence or gratification of the sentiment itself, not the will to do our duty, or to obey the law by which we are morally bound.

Indeed, what most offends this age—perhaps all ages—and for which it has the greatest horror, is duty or obedience ; for duty implies that we are not our own, and, therefore, are not free to dispose of ourselves as we please ; and obedience implies a superior, a lord and master, who has the right to order us. It, therefore, sets its wits to work and racks its brain to invent a morality that excludes duty, and exacts no such hateful thing as obedience. It has found out that it is far nobler to act from love than from duty, and to do a thing because we are prompted to do it by our hearts, than because God, in his law, commands it. In other words, it is nobler, more moral, to act to please ourselves, than it is to act to please God. This passes for excellent philosophy, and you may hear it in conversation of

many young misses just from boarding-school, read it in most popular novels and magazines, and be edified by it from the pulpit of more than one professedly Christian denomination.

This philosophy sets the so-called heart above the head, that is, it distinguishes the heart from the understanding and will, and places it, as so distinguished, above them. Hence we find the tendency is to treat faith, considered as an intellectual act, and consequently the Christian dogmas, with great indifference; and to say, if the heart is right, it is no matter what one believes, and, it may be added, no matter what one does. What one does is of little consequence, if only one has fine sentiments, warm and gushing feelings. Jack Scapegrace is a hard drinker, a gambler, a liar, a rake, and seldom goes near a church; but for all that he is a right down good fellow—has a warm heart. He gives liberally to the missionary society, and makes large purchases at charity fairs. Hence a good heart, which at best means only quick sensibilities, and which is perfectly compatible with the grossest self-indulgence, and the most degrading and ruinous vices, constitutes the sum and substance of religion and morality, atones for the violation of every precept of the decalogue, and supplies the absence of faith and Christian virtue.

All errors are half truths. Certainly, love is the fulfilling of the law, and the heart is all that God requires. "My son, give me thy heart." But the "heart" in the scriptural sense is reason, the intellect and the will; and the love that fulfils the law is not a sentiment, but a free act of the rational soul, and, therefore, a love which it is within our power to give or withhold. It is a free, voluntary love, yielded by intelligence and will. In this sense, love cannot be contrasted with duty; for it is duty, or its fulfilment, and indistinguishable from it; the heart cannot be contrasted with the head, in the scriptural or Christian sense of the word; for in that sense it includes the head, and stands for the whole rational soul—the mistress of her own acts. To act from the promptings of one's own heart, in this sense, is all right, for it is to act from a sense of duty, from reason and will, or intelligence and free volition. In souls well constituted and trained, or long exercised in the practice of virtue, no long process of reasoning or deliberation ever takes place, and the decision and execution are simultaneous, and apparently instantaneous, but the act is none the less an act of deliberate reason or free will.

Plato speaks of a love which is not an affection of the sensibility, and which is one of the wings of the soul on which she soars to the empyrean ; but I can understand no love that contrasts with duty, except it be an affection of the sensitive nature, what the Scriptures call "the flesh," which is averted by the fall from God, and as the Council of Trent defines, "inclines to sin"—"the carnal mind," which St. Paul tells us, is at enmity with God, is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be. Christianity recognizes an antagonism between the flesh and the spirit, between the law in our members and the law of the mind, but none between the love she approves and the duty she enjoins, or between the heart which God demands and the head or the understanding. Love by the Christian law is demanded as a duty, as that which is due from us to God. We are required to love God with our whole heart, mind, soul, and strength, and our neighbor as ourselves. This is our duty, and therefore the love must be an act of free will—a love which we are free to yield or to withhold, for our duty can never exceed our liberty. The Christian loves duty, loves self-denial and sacrifice, loves the law, and delights in it after the inner man ; but in loving the law he acts freely from his own reason and will, and he obeys it not for the sake of the delight he takes in it, but because it is God's law ; otherwise he would act to please himself, not to please God, as his act would be simply an act of self-indulgence.

The age, in its efforts to construct a morality which excludes duty and obedience, tends to resolve the love which Christianity demands into an affection of the sensibility, and thence very logically opposes love to duty, and holds it nobler to act from inclination than from duty, to follow the law in our members than the law of the mind. It may then substitute, with perfect consistency, the transcendentalist maxim, Obey thyself, for the Christian maxim, Deny thyself !

But this is not all. The age, or what is usually called the age, not only resolves virtue, which old-fashioned ethics held to be an act of free will done in obedience to the divine law, into a sentiment, or interior affection, of the sensibility, but it goes further and resolves God into man, and maintains that the real sense of the mystery of the Incarnation, of the Word made flesh, is that man is the only actual and living God, and that beyond humanity there is only infinite possibility, which humanity in its infinite prog-

ress and evolution and absorption of individual life, is continually actualizing, or filling up. So virtually teaches Hegel, inconsiderately followed by Cousin, in teaching that *das reine Seyn*, or simply possible being, arrives at self-consciousness first in man. So teach the Saint-Simonians, Enfantin, Bazard, Carnot, and Pierre Leroux; and so hold the school or sect of the positivists, followers of Auguste Comte, who have actually instituted a *culte* or service in honor of humanity. The positivists are too modest to claim to be themselves each individually God, but they make no bones of calling humanity, or the great collective man God, and offering him, as such, a suitable worship. This is taught and done in France, the most lettered nation in Europe; and the principle that justifies it pervades not a little of the popular literature of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.

If man or humanity is God, of course the highest virtue is and must be philanthropy, the love of all men in general, and of no one in particular. Resolve now God into man, and philanthropy or the love of man into an affection of the sensibility or sensitive nature, and you have in a nutshell the theology, religion, and morality to which the age tends, which the bulk of our popular literature favors, which our sons and daughters inhale with the very atmosphere they breathe, and which explains the effeminacy and sentimentalism of modern society. It is but a logical sequence that the age, since women are ordinarily more sentimental than men, places women at the head of the race, and holds woman—if young, beautiful, amiable, sentimental, and rich—to be the most perfect and adorable embodiment of the Divinity. The highest form of philanthropy is the love of woman. I would say, philogyny, only that might be taken to imply that the highest virtue is the love of one's wife, or wifehood, which is too old-fashioned, unless by wife is meant the wife of one's neighbor. But, my dear young lady, be not too vain of the homage you receive; it will be withheld with the appearance of the first wrinkle or the first gray hair. It is better to be honored as a true woman than to be worshipped as a goddess or even as an angel.

The sentimental worship of humanity, or the reduction of the virtue of charity to the sentiment of philanthropy, necessarily weakens and debases the character; and whatever we may say under various aspects in praise of our age and however strong our confidence that God in his

providence will turn even its evil tendencies to good, we cannot deny its moral weakness; and it is doubtful if the debasement of individual character was greater, even in the Lower Empire, or that men were more dishonest or fraudulent, more sordid or venal. Other ages have been marked, perhaps, by less refinement of manners, more violent crimes, and greater criminals, but few are found less capable either of great virtues or great expiations. This need not surprise us, for it is only the natural effect of substituting sentiment for virtue, and sentimental for moral culture, which we are constantly doing.

Many, perhaps, will be disposed to deny that we have substituted sentimental for moral culture, and it must be conceded that the didactic lessons given in our schools throughout Christendom, for the most part, remain very much as they have been ever since there was a Christendom, and in general accord with pure Christian ethics. There are few, if any, schools for children and youth, in which the sentimental and humanitarian morality, or rather immorality, is formally taught. But we should remember that the didactic lessons of the schoolroom do very little toward forming the character of our youth, and that the culture that really forms it is given by the home circle, associations, the spirit and tone of the community in which they are brought up. There is a subtle influence, what the Germans call *der Weltgeist*, which pervades the whole community, and affects the faith, the morals, and character of all who grow up in that community without any formal instruction or conscious effort of any one. So far as formal lessons and words go, the culture of our children and youth is, for the most part Christian; but these lessons and words receive a practical interpretation by *der Weltgeist*, what I call the spirit of the age, and should, perhaps, call "the prince of this world," which deprives them of their Christian sense, takes from them all meaning, or gives them an anti-Christian meaning. It is one of the striking peculiarities of the age that it inculcates the baldest infidelity, the grossest immorality in the language of Christian faith and virtue. It is this fact which deceives so many, and that makes the assertion of sentimental for moral culture appear to be a total misstatement, or, at least, a gross exaggeration of the fact.

It will, no doubt, also be said that a decided reaction in our popular literature against sentimentalism has already

commenced. The realism of Dickens and the Trollopes is opposed to it, Bulwer Lytton, in his late novels at least, is decidedly hostile to it, and Thackeray unmercifully ridicules it. These and other popular writers have undoubtedly reacted against one form of sentimentalism, the dark and suicidal form placed in vogue by Goethe in his *Sorrows of Werter*, and now nearly forgotten ; but they have not ridiculed or reacted against the form of sentimentalism which substitutes the sentiment of philanthropy for the virtue of charity. They encourage humanitarianism, and make the love of man for woman or woman for man the great agent in developing, enlarging, and strengthening the intellect, the spring of the purest and sublimest morality. The hero of popular literature is now rarely an avowed unbeliever or open scoffer, and in all well-bred novels the heroine says her prayers night and morning, and the author decidedly patronizes Christianity, and says many beautiful and even true things in its favor ; but, after all, his religion is based on humanity, is only a charming sentimentalism, embraced for its loveliness, not as duty or the law which it would be sin to neglect ; or it is introduced as a foreign and incongruous element, never as the soul or informing spirit of the novel.

The fact is undeniable, whether people are generally conscious of it or not, and we see its malign influence not only on individual character, but on domestic and social life. It has nearly broken up and rendered impossible the Christian family in the easy and educated classes. Marriage is, it is said, where and only where there is mutual love, and hence the marriage is in the mutual love, is lawful between any parties who mutually love, unlawful between any who do not. Love is an interior affection of the sensibility, a feeling, and like all the feelings independent of reason and will. All popular literature makes love fatal, something undergone, not given. We love where we must ; not where we would nor where we should, but where we are fated to love. It needs not here to speak of infidelity to the marriage vows, which this doctrine justifies to any extent, for those vows are broken when broken from unreasoning passion or lust, not from a theory which justifies it. I speak rather of the misery which it carries into married life, the destruction of domestic peace and happiness it causes. Trained in the sentimentalism of the age, and to regard love as a feeling dependent on causes beyond our control, our young people marry, expecting from marriage what it

has not, and cannot give. They expect the feeling which they call love, and which gives a roseate hue to every thing they look upon, will continue as fresh, as vivid, and as charming after marriage as before it ; but the honeymoon is hardly over, and they begin to settle down in the regular routine of life before they discover their mistake, the roseate hue has gone, their feelings have undergone a notable change, and they are disappointed in each other, and feel that the happiness they counted on is no longer to be expected. The stronger and more intense the feeling the greater the disappointment, and hence the common saying : Love matches are seldom happy matches. Each party is disappointed in the other, frets against the chain that binds them together, and wishes it broken.

This is only what might have been expected. Nothing is more variable or transitory than our feelings, and nothing that depends on them can be unchanging or lasting. When the feelings of the married couple change toward each other, the marriage bond becomes a galling chain, and is felt to be a serious evil, and divorce is desired and resorted to as a remedy. It is usually no remedy at all, or a remedy worse even than the disease ; but it is the only remedy practicable where feeling is substituted for rational affection. Hence, in nearly all modern states, the legislature, in direct conflict with the Christian law, which makes marriage a sacrament and indissoluble, permits divorce, and in some states for causes as frivolous as incompatibility of temper. It is easy to censure the legislature, but it must follow and express the morals, manners, sentiments, and demands of the people, and when these are repugnant to the divine law, it cannot in its enactments conform to that law ; and if it did, its enactments would be resisted as tyrannical and oppressive, or remain on the statute-book a dead letter, as did so much wise and just legislation inspired by the church in the middle ages. The evil lies further back, in the humanitarianism of the age, which reverses the real order, puts the flesh in the place of the spirit, philanthropy in the place of charity, and man in the place of God, and which promotes an excessive culture of the sentiments, at the expense of rational conviction and affection. There is no remedy but in returning to the order we have reversed, to the higher culture of reason and free will, not possible without faith in God and the Christian mysteries.

But passing over the effect of sentimental morality on in-

dividual character, the private virtues and domestic happiness, we find it no less hostile to social ameliorations and reforms in the state. The age is philanthropic, and wages war with every form of vice, poverty, and suffering, and is greatly shocked at the evils it finds past ages tolerated without ever making an effort to remove them, hardly even to mitigate them. This is well as far as it goes; but in an age when the sensitive nature is chiefly cultivated, when physical pain is counted the chief evil, and sensible pleasures held to be the chief good, practically, if not theoretically, many things will be regarded as evils which, in a more robust and manly age, were unheeded, or not counted as evils at all. Many things in our day need changing, simply because other things having been changed, they have become anomalous and are out of place. What in one state of society is simple poverty, is really distress in another; and poverty, which in itself is no evil, becomes a great evil in a community where wealth is regarded as the supreme good, and the poor have wants, habits, and tastes which only wealth can satisfy. The poorer classes of to-day in civilized nations would suffer intensely if thrown back into the condition they were in under the feudal *régime*, but it may be doubted if they do not really suffer as much now as they did then. Perhaps such wants as they then had were more readily met and supplied than are those which they now have. In point of fact, Christian charity did infinitely more for the poor and to solace suffering in all its forms, even in the feudal ages, than philanthropy does now; and we find the greatest amount of squalid wretchedness now precisely in those nations in which philanthropy has been most successful in supplanting charity.

Philanthropy effects nothing except in so far as it copies or imitates Christian charity, and its attempted imitations are rarely successful. It has for years been very active and hard at work in imitation of charity; but what has it effected? what suffering has it solaced? what crime has it diminished? what vice has it corrected? what social evil has it removed? It has tried its hand against licentiousness, and licentiousness is more rife and shameless than ever. It has made repeated onslaughts on the ruinous vice of intemperance, and yet drunkenness increases instead of diminishing, and has become the disgrace of the country. It has professed great regard for the poor, but does more to remove them out of sight than to relieve them. It treats poverty

as a vice or a crime, looks on it as a disgrace, a thing to be fled from with all speed possible, and makes the poor feel that wealth is virtue, honor, nobility, the greatest good, and thus destroys their self-respect, aggravates their discontent, and indirectly provokes the crimes against property become so general and so appalling. What a moral New York reads us in the fact that she makes her commissioners of "Public Charities" also commissioners of "Public Corrections!" Philanthropy rarely fails to aggravate the evil she attempts to cure or to cure one evil by introducing another and a greater evil. Her remedies are usually worse than the disease.

Owen, Fourier, Cabet, and other philanthropists have made serious efforts to reorganize society so as to remove the inequalities or the evils of the inequalities of wealth and social position; but have all failed, because they needed, in order to succeed, the habits, character, and virtues which, on their own theories, can be obtained only from success. As a rule, philanthropy must succeed in order to be able to succeed.

Philanthropy—humanitarianism—has been shocked at slavery, and in our country as well as in some others it formed associations for its abolition. In the West India Islands belonging to Great Britain, it succeeded in abolishing it, to the ruin of the planters and very little benefit to the slave. In this country, if slavery is abolished, it has not been done by philanthropy, which served only to set the North and South by the ears, but by the military authority as a war measure, necessary, or judged to be necessary, to save the Union and to guard against future attempts to dissolve it. Philanthropy is hard at work to make abolition a blessing to the freedmen. It talks, sputters, clamors, legislates, but it can effect nothing; and unless Christian charity takes the matter in hand, it is very evident that, however much emancipation may benefit the white race, it can prove of little benefit to the emancipated who will be emancipated in name, but not in reality.

The great difficulty with philanthropy is, that she acts from feeling, and not reason, and uses reason only as the slave or instrument of feeling. Wherever she sees an evil she rushes headlong to its removal, blind to the injury she may do to rights, principles, and institutions essential to liberty and the very existence of society. Hence she usually in going to her end tramples down more good by the way

than she can obtain in gaining it. She has no respect for vested rights, regards no geographical lines, and laughs at the constitutions of states, if they stand in her way. Liberty with us was more interested in maintaining inviolate the constitution of the Union and the local rights of the several states, than it was even in abolishing negro slavery, and hence many wise and good men, who had no interest in retaining slavery, and who detested it as an outrage upon humanity, did not and could not act or sympathize with the abolitionists. They yield in nothing to them in the earnest desire to abolish slavery, but they would abolish it by legal and peaceful means—means that would not weaken the hold of the constitution and civil law on conscience, and destroy the safeguards of liberty. The abolitionists did not err in being opposed to slavery, but in the principles on which they sought its abolition. Adam did not sin in aspiring to be God; for that, in a certain sense, he was destined, through the Incarnation, one day to become. His sin was in aspiring to be God without the Incarnation, in his own personal right and might, and in violation of the divine command, or by other means than those prescribed by his Creator and Lawgiver, the only possible means of attaining to the end sought.

Philanthropy commits the same error whatever the good work she attempts, and especially in all her attempts at political reforms. She finds herself “cabined, cribbed, confined” by old political institutions, and cries out, Down with them. She demands for the people a liberty which she sees they have not and cannot have under the existing political order, and so proceeds at once to conspire against it, to revolutionize the state, deluges the land in blood, and gets anarchy, the reign of terror, or military despotism for her pains. Never were there more sincere or earnest philanthropists than the authors of the old French revolution. The violent revolutions attempted in modern Europe in the name of humanity, have done more harm to society by unsettling the bases of society and effacing in men’s minds and hearts the traditional respect for law and order, than any good they could have done by sweeping away the social and political abuses they warred against. The French are not politically or individually freer to-day than they were under Louis Quatorze.

There are, no doubt, times when an old political order, as in Rome after Marius and Sulla, has become effete, and

can no longer fulfil the duties or discharge the offices of a government, in which a revolution, like that effected under the lead of Julius and Augustus Cæsar, may be desirable and advantageous, for it establishes a practicable and a real government in the place of a government that can no longer discharge the functions of government, and is virtually no government at all. The empire was a great advance on the republic, which was incapable of being restored. But revolutions properly so called, undertaken for the subversion of an existing order and the introduction of another held to be theoretically more perfect, have never, so far as history records, been productive of good. No doubt England is to-day in advance of what she was under the Stuarts, but who dares say that she is in advance of what she would have been had she not expelled them, or that she has become greater under the whig nobility than she might have been under the tory squirarchy?

There has been, I readily concede, a real progress in modern society, at least dating from the fifth century of our era; but, as I read history, the progress has been interrupted or retarded by modern socialistic or political revolutions, and has in no case been accelerated by philanthropy as distinguished from Christian charity. Moreover, in no state of Christendom has charity ever been wholly wanting. Nations have cast off the authority of the church, and have greatly suffered in consequence; but in none has divine charity been totally wanting, and the influence of Christianity on civilization, even in heretical and schismatic nations, is not to be counted as nothing. I am far from believing that the nations that broke away from the church are not better than they would have been if they had not had the benefit of the habits formed under her teaching and discipline. I know that *extra ecclesiam nulla est salus*; but I know also that the church is as a city set on a hill, and that rays from the light within her may and do extend beyond her walls, and relieve in some degree the darkness of those who are outside of them. How much the church continues to influence nations once within her communion, but now severed from it, nobody is competent to determine, nor can any one but God himself say how many, in all these nations, though not formally united to the body of the church, are yet not wholly severed from her soul. The Russian church retains the orthodox faith and the sacraments, and is officially under no sentence of excommunication from the body

of Christ, and only those who are individually and voluntarily schismatic, are guilty of the sin of schism; and in other communions, though undoubtedly heretical, there may be large numbers of baptized persons who do really act on Christian principles, and from purely Christian motives. All I mean to deny is, that society or humanity ever gains any thing from violent or sentimental revolutions.

The impotence of philanthropy without charity, or pure humanism, is demonstrable *a priori*, and should have been foreseen. It is opposed to the nature of things, and implies the absurdity that nothing is something, and that what is not can act. It is an attempt to found religion, morals, society, and the state without God; when without God there is and can be nothing, and consequently nothing for them to stand on. It assumes that man is an independent being, and suffices for himself; which, whether we mean by man the individual or humanity, "the universal man," "the one man" of the transcendentalists, or "the grand collective Being" of the positivists, we all feel and know to be not the fact. Man in either sense is a creature, and depends absolutely on the creative act of God for his existence; and let God suspend that act, and he sinks into the nothing he was before he was created. Therefore it is in God *mediente* his creative act he lives and moves and has his being. Hence it is, whether we know it or not, that we assert the existence of God as our creator in every act we perform, every thought we think, every resolution we take, every sentiment we experience, and every breath we draw, for no human operation—physical, intellectual, or moral—is possible without the divine creative act and concurrence.

Philanthropy, or the love of man, separated from charity, or the love of God and of man in God, is therefore simply nothing, a mere negation, for it supposes man separated from God is something, and separated from God he is nothing. Hence St. Paul, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, says: "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." This is so not by virtue of any arbitrary

decree or appointment of the Almighty, even if such decree or appointment is possible, but in the very nature of things, and God himself cannot make it otherwise. God is free to create or not to create, and free to create such existences as he pleases; but he cannot create an independent self-sufficing being, for he cannot create any thing between which and himself there should not be the relation of creator and creature. The creature depends wholly, in all respects whatever, on the creator, and without him is and can be nothing. The creature depends absolutely on the creator in relation to all his acts, thoughts, and affections, as well as for mere existence itself. God could not, even if it were possible that he would, dispense with charity and count the love of man as independent of God, as something, because he is truth, and it is impossible for him to lie, and lie he would were he to count such supposed love something, for independent of him there is no man to love or to be loved. Man can love or be loved only where he exists; and as he exists in God, so only in God can we possibly love him, that is, we can love our neighbor only in loving God. The humanitarian love or morality is, therefore, a pure negation, simply nothing.

Man is, indeed, a free moral agent, and he would not be capable of virtue or a *moral* action if he were not; but he can act, notwithstanding his moral freedom, only according to the conditions of his existence. He exists and can exist only by virtue of a supernatural principle, medium, and end. He exists only by the direct, immediate creative act of God, and God in himself and in his direct immediate acts, always and everywhere, is supernatural, above nature, because its creator, and, as its creator, its proprietor. The maker has a sovereign right to the thing made. The creature can no more be its own end than its own principle or cause. Man cannot take himself as his own end, because he is not his own, but is his Creator's, and because independent of God he is nothing. So God is both his principle and end. But the end is not possible without a medium that places it in relation with the principle, as theologians demonstrate in their dissertations on the mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity, and as common sense itself teaches. As the principle and end are supernatural, so the medium must be supernatural, for the medium must be on the plane of the principle and end between which it is the medium. The medium, in the moral or spiritual order, the Gospel teaches us, is the

grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which infused by the Holy Ghost into the soul elevates her to the plane of her supernatural destiny, and strengthens her to gain or fulfil it. Hence, as says the apostle, *Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia*—all things are from him, and by him, and to or in him. These are the essential conditions of all life, alike in the natural or physical order, and in the moral or spiritual. In all orders God is the principle, medium, and end of all existence, of all action.

In the moral or spiritual order, not in the natural or physical order, man is a free agent, and acts from free will, as Pope sings :

‘ God, binding nature fast in fate,
Leaves free the human will.”

Grace assisting, man can conform to the essential conditions of his existence—conditions determined and unalterably fixed by his relation to God as his creator—by the free act of his own will ; and by doing so he lives morally, or has moral life. He can also, by virtue of his liberty or freedom, refuse to conform, or in theological language, to obey God, but he cannot so refuse and live in the moral order. This refusal is not a living act, it is simply the negation of moral life, and therefore is moral death, as the Scriptures call it. He does not necessarily cease to exist in the natural or physical order, for in that order he cannot sever himself from God, even if he would ; he may kill his body, but not the physical life of the soul, immortal, except by the will of its creator. But he can extinguish his moral life, or refuse to live a moral life, which is moral or spiritual death ; and death is not a positive existence, but the negation of existence, and therefore, nothing. Hence life and death in the moral order are set before us, and we are free to choose which we will. To choose, grace assisting, life, and freely of our will to conform to the conditions of life, to God as our principle, medium, and end, is precisely what is meant by Christian charity, a virtue that fulfils all the conditions imposed by our relation to God as his creatures, the whole law of our existence, and unites our will with the will of God, and by so doing makes us morally or spiritually one with God. He who refuses charity, or has it not, voluntarily renounces God, separates himself morally, and so far as his own will goes even physically, from God ; and as severed from God he exists not at all ; and therefore says the

apostle, "Without charity I am nothing." He only declares what is real, what is true in the nature of things, and which God himself cannot alter.

Philanthropy is, therefore, necessarily impotent, for it tends to death, not life; and as there is no action, physical or moral, that does not tend to a real end, it is not action, but a negation of action, and is therefore in itself nothing positive. All the sentiments for this reason are negative, simple wants of the soul. The soul may exert her powers to satisfy them, or to fill up the void in her being, which they all indicate, but they are in themselves nothing. They indicate not what the soul has, but what she wants or needs to complete herself; and that can never be obtained from the creature save in God, for the creature out of God, separated or turned away from God, is nothing; it is something only in God. Any morality, then, built on the sentiments is as unsubstantial as castles in the air, and as unreal as "the baseless fabric of a vision." The sentiments being wants, negative, with nothing positive in themselves, are necessarily impotent. They are unsatisfied wants, and incapable of attaining to any thing that can satisfy them. They are a hungering and thirsting of the soul for what it is not and has not. Here is the explanation of the misery and wretchedness of a sentimental age, why it is so ill-at-ease, so restless, so discontented in the midst of material progress, and the accumulations of sensible goods. It explains, too, why the damned, or those who fail in their destiny, must suffer for ever. Death and hell are not positive existences or positive creations of God, but are the want of spiritual life, are the unsatisfied wants, the endless cravings of the soul for what can be had only in God, and the lost have turned their backs on God.

Charity is not negative, not a want, but a power; and it is easy, therefore, to understand that while philanthropy is impotent it is effective. Charity grasps, as do all the rational affections, her object, and is effective because she is positive not negative, living not dead; and living, because she conforms to the real conditions of life, and participates, through his creative act, in the life of him who is life himself. She is less pretentious and more modest in her proceedings and promises than philanthropy, but makes up for it in the richness and magnificence of the results she obtains. She works slowly and with patience, for she works for eternity, not time—without pomp or parade, in obscurity

and silence, for she seeks the praise of God, not the praise of men. To the onlooker she seems not to move, any more than the sun in the heavens; but after a while we find that she has moved, and has transformed the world. Broad in her love and expansive as the universe, and embracing all ages and nations in her affections, she yet wastes not her strength in vague generalities, nor in manifold projects of reform or progress of the race in general, from which no one in particular has any thing to expect; but takes men in the concrete as she finds them, does the work nearest at hand and most pressing to be done, and proceeding quietly from the individual to the family, from the family to society and the state, she works out the regeneration of all in working out the regeneration of each. She works as God works, without straining or effort, for her power is great and never fails. Power needs make no effort; it speaks and it is done, commands and it stands fast. Let there be light, and there is light. It is weakness that must strain and tug, as we see in the feeble literature of the day, and philanthropy seems to the observer to be always more in earnest and far harder at work than charity, and attracts far more attention, but while she fills the world with her hollow sounds, charity, unheeded and unheard, fills it with her deeds.

History is at hand to confirm the conclusions of reason, though the full history of charity has never been written, and the greater part of her deeds are known only to him whose eye seeth all things, and will be revealed only at the last day. But something has been recorded and is known. We in our day think we are doing much to relieve the poor and oppressed, to console the suffering, and to bind up the broken-hearted; but the best of us would be put to shame were we to study what charity did during the decline and fall of the Roman empire and the barbarous ages that immediately followed. We have boasted, and perhaps justly, of the services rendered to humanity during our late civil war by our Christian Commissions and Sanitary Commissions; but what was done by them during four years is nothing in comparison with what was done daily by Christian charity to relieve suffering and distress far greater than were experienced by those even who suffered most from the ravages of our civil war, and that not for four years only, but for four centuries. I have here no room for details, or even for the barest outline of what charity did during the long agony of the old world and the birth of the new; but

this much must be said, that it was everywhere present and energetic, and seemed everywhere to renew the miracle of the five loaves and two fishes; and when that old world had passed away, it was found that a new world on a far broader and more durable foundation had taken its place. Charity had to deal with poverty and want, with sickness and sorrow, and she relieved them; with captives and prisoners of war, and she ransomed them even with the plate from the altar; with barbarians whose highest vision of heaven was to sit in the halls of Valhalla, and quaff from human skulls the blood of their enemies—and she tamed, humanized, and civilized them, and made them the foremost nations of the world; with slaves, for Europe was covered over with them—and she mitigated their lot, lightened their oppression, secured for them the moral rights of Christians, and finally broke their chains and made them, not freedmen only, but freemen, Christian freemen, and brothers of the noblest and proudest.

What if it took centuries to abolish slavery? It did not take her centuries to christen the slaves, to bring them spiritual freedom, and provide for their souls. She did not wait till she had abolished the slavery of the body before abolishing the far more grievous slavery of the soul, teaching the slaves the truth that liberates, incorporating them into the church of God, and making them free and equal citizens of the commonwealth of Christ. With this spiritual freedom, of which philanthropy knows nothing, but which is the basis of all real freedom, and with ample provisions for the wants of the soul, the slave could wait in patience for the day of deliverance from bodily servitude. That day might be long in coming, but come it surely would; and it did come, and peaceably, without civil war, social convulsion, industrial or economical disturbance. But, unhappily, with us only a feeble portion of the slaves were really christianized, and by their moral and spiritual training as free and equal members of the church, which makes no distinction between the bond and the free, the white and the black, fitted to take their position and play their part as free and equal members of civil society. Moreover, we have not been able to emancipate them peaceably; we have done it only by a terrible civil war, in the midst of the clash of arms, as a means of saving the life of the nation, or of perpetuating the union of the states; and the most difficult problem remains to be solved, which the humanitarians flatter

themselves will be solved without trouble by political economy, or the general law of demand and supply; but which they will find it will need more Christian charity than the nation has hitherto possessed to solve, without the gradual extinction in this country of the negro race. The last thing to be relied on for adjusting any social question, elevating any class to social or civil equality, or making freedmen really freemen, is political economy, which treats man not as a free moral agent, or as a social being, but simply as a producing, distributing, and consuming machine, placed in the same category with the steam-plough, patent reaper, spinning-jenny, and the power-loom. If the question, What shall be done with our freedmen? be left to politics, political economy, or philanthropy, without the intervention of Christian charity, emancipation will only have changed the form of their slavery, or given them all the cares and burdens of freedom with none of its blessings.

It is the same in all human affairs. No measures of reform or progress, individual or social, domestic or political, ever succeed or succeed without an overbalance of evil, unless inspired and directed by charity. They may and do succeed without perfect charity, but never without the principle of charity. Philanthropy is man's method, and leads to nothing; charity is God's method, and conducts to its end.

But we must not confound charity with weakness or effeminacy of character, for that would be to confound it with sentimentalism. Charity is not credulity or mental imbecility; it is always robust and manly, the rational soul raised above itself by divine grace, and endowed in the spiritual order with superhuman power. Charity loves peace, but follows after the things which make for peace, and shrinks not from following after them, when need is, even through war. Modern peace-societies are founded by philanthropy, not by charity, and though they have been in existence for half a century, and proudly boasted that there would be no more war, yet there have been more wars and bloodshed during the last twenty years than during any period of equal duration since modern history began. Charity founds no anti-hangman societies for the abolition of capital punishment in all cases whatsoever, or prisoners' friends societies, to convert our prisons into palaces; yet recoils from all cruelty or undue severity, and seeks to prevent punishment by preventing crime. She never forgets

justice, nor sacrifices in her love for individuals the protection of society or the safety of the state. Her great care is to save the soul of the criminal, and to this end she visits the most loathsome cells, takes her stand on the scaffold by the side of the condemned, and will not give him up till she has made his peace with God. She fills the soul with love for enemies and forgiveness of injuries, but they are *my* enemies she bids me love, and *my* personal injuries she bids me forgive. I cannot forgive injuries done to my neighbor, to society, or to my country, for they are not mine; and she herself bids me, when summoned by the proper authority, to shoulder my musket and march to the battle-field to defend public right and repress public wrong. Charity is never weak, sentimental, lackadaisical, or cowardly. It is the principle of all true greatness and manliness, and the most charitable are the strongest, bravest, the most heroic, wherever duty calls them to act as well as to suffer.

THE REFORMATION NOT CONSERVATIVE.*

[From the Catholic World for September, 1871.]

DR. KRAUTH is a man highly esteemed in his own denomination, and, though neither very original nor profound, is a man of more than ordinary ability and learning, well versed in Lutheran theology, and, we presume, a trustworthy representative of it as contained in the Lutheran symbolical books, and held by the more conservative members of the Lutheran church—a church, or sect rather, of growing importance in our country, in consequence of the large migration hither from Germany and the North of Europe, and in some respects the most respectable of all the churches or sects born of the Protestant reformation, or, rather, the Protestant revolt and rebellion against the church of God.

* *The Conservative Reformation and its Theology; as Represented in the Augsburg Confession, and in the History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.* By CHARLES V. KRAUTH, D. D., Norton Professor of Theology in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: 1871.

Yet he will excuse us if we refuse to follow him step by step in his exposition of the Lutheran theology, for all that is true in it we have in the teaching of the Catholic Church, without the errors and falsehoods Luther mingled with it. It were a waste of time to study it, unless we were called upon to refute it in detail, which we are not.

That there is much that is true mingled with much more that is false in Lutheran theology, we do not dispute, and we readily admit that Dr. Krauth means to hold, and in his way does hold, most of the fundamental principles, if not dogmas, of Christianity; but this is no more than we might say of any other system of false theology, or of any heathen religion or superstition, ancient or modern, civilized or barbarous. There is no pagan religion, if we analyze it and trace it to its fountain, in which we cannot detect most, if not all, of the great primary truths of the Christian religion, or the great principles which underlie the dogmas and precepts of the Catholic Church, and which could have been obtained only from the revelation made by God himself to our first parents before their expulsion from the garden. Yet what avails the truth false religion conceals, mingled as it is with the errors that turn it into a lie? It serves, whether with the lettered and polished Greek and Roman or the rude, outlying barbarian, only as the basis of barbarous superstitions, cruel, licentious, and idolatrous rites, and moral abominations. The fundamental ideas or principles of civilized society are retained in the memory of the most barbarous nations and tribes, yet are they none the less barbarous for that. They lack order, subordination; neither their intelligence nor their will is disciplined and subjected to law; and their appetites and passions, unrestrained and untamed, introduce disorder into every department of life, and compel intelligence and will, reason itself, to enter their ignoble service, and as abject slaves to do their bidding. Civilization introduces the element of order, establishes the reign of law in the individual, in the family, in the state, in society, which is not possible without a religion true enough to enlighten the intellect, and powerful enough over conscience to restrain the passions within their proper bounds, and to bend the will to submission.

All Protestant sects hold much of truth, but, like the heathen religions, they hold it in disorder, out of its normal relations and connections, out of its unity and catholicity, and consequently no one of them is strong enough to re-

cover the element of order, and reëstablish and maintain the reign of law in any of the several departments of life, spiritual or secular; for the very essence of both consists in rejecting Catholicity, the only source of order. We therefore make no account of the principles, truths, or even Catholic dogmas retained by the various Protestant churches or sects from Catholic tradition. Held as they are out of unity, out of their normal relations, and mingled with all sorts of errors and fancies, they lose their virtue, become the basis of false religion and false morality, pervert instead of enlightening reason, and mislead, weaken, and finally destroy conscience. They are insufficient to preserve faith and the worship of God, and naturally tend to revive in a lettered nation the polished heathenism of Greece and Rome. Their impotence is seen in the prevailing disorder in the whole Protestant world, and especially in the singular delusion of modern society, that the loss of Catholic truth, Catholic authority, of spirituality, is a progress in light, liberty, religion, and civilization—a delusion which counts the revolutions, the civil commotions, the wars between the people and the government, between class and class, and capital and labor, the insurrections and terrible social disorders of the last century and the present, only as so many evidences of the marvellous advance of the modern world in freedom, intelligence, religion, and Christian morals. Is not this the delusion that goeth before and leadeth to destruction?

Dr. Krauth has not advanced so far, or rather descended so low, as have some of his Protestant brethren. He has strong conservative instincts, and still retains a conviction that order is necessary, and that without religious faith and conscience order is not possible. He has a dim perception of the truth, that unless there is something in religion fixed, permanent, and authoritative, even religion cannot meet the exigencies of society or the needs of the soul; but, a child of the reformation, and jealous of the honor of his parentage, he thinks it necessary to maintain that, if religion must be fixed and permanent, it must at the same time be progressive; authoritative, and yet subject to the faithful, who have the right to resist or alter it at will. Hence he tells us, page viii., "The church problem is to attain a Protestant Catholicity, or a Catholic Protestantism," and seeks to establish for Lutheranism the character of being a "conservative reformation." The learned doctor may be a

very suitable professor of theology in a Lutheran theological seminary, or a proper professor of intellectual and moral philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania, but he seems either not to have mastered the categories or to have forgotten them. Contradictory predicates cannot be affirmed of the same subject. The Lutheran reformation and conservatism belong to different categories. That only can be a conservative reform of the church that is effected by the church herself or by her authority, and which leaves her authority and constitution intact, by no means the case with the Lutheran reformation, which was a total subversion of the constitution of the church and the denial of her authority. In the sense of the author, conservative reformation implies a contradiction in terms.

Logicians, at least those we have had for masters, tell us that of contradictories one must be false. If there were ever two terms each the contradictory of the other, they are *Catholic* and *Protestant*. One cannot be a Catholic without denying Protestantism, or a Protestant without denying Catholicity. "Protestant Catholicity" or "Catholic Protestantism" is as plainly a contradiction in terms as a square circle or a circular square. If Catholicity is true Protestantism is false, for it is simply the denial of Catholicity; and if the Protestant denial of Catholicity is true or warranted, then there is nothing catholic, no catholicity, and consequently no catholic Protestantism. Dr. Krauth has, we doubt not, a truth floating before his mind's eye, but he fails to grasp it, or to consider to what it is applicable. "The history of Christianity," he says, page vii., "in common with all genuine history, moves under the influence of two generic ideas: the conservative, which desires to secure the present by fidelity to the results of the past; the progressive, which looks out in hope for a better future. Reformation is the great harmonizer of the true principles. Corresponding with conservatism, reformation, and progress, are the three generic types of Christianity; and under these *genera* all the species are but shades, modifications, or combinations, as all hues arise from three primary colors. Conservatism without progress produces the Romish and Greek type of the church; progress without conservatism runs into revolution, radicalism, and sectarianism; reformation is antithetical to both—to passive persistence in wrong or passive endurance of it, and to revolution as a mode of relieving wrong." That is, reformation preserves its subject

while correcting its aberrations, and effects its progress without its destruction, which, if the subject is corruptible and reformable, and the reform is effected by the proper authorities and by the proper means, is no doubt true; and in this case reformation would stand opposed alike to immobility and revolution or destruction.

But is the learned and able professor aware of what he does when he assumes that Christianity is corruptible and reformable, that it is or can be the subject either of corruption or of reformation? Intentionally or not, by so assuming, he places it in the category of human institutions, or natural productions, left to the action of the natural laws or of second causes, and withdraws it from the direct and immediate government and protection of God. Not otherwise could its history be subject to the laws that govern the movement of all genuine history, be either perfectible or corruptible, or ever stand in need of being reformed, or of intrinsically advancing. Christianity itself is a revelation from God, the expression of his eternal reason and will, and therefore his law, which like himself is perfect and unalterable. The terms the professor applies, can apply, then, only to men's views, theories, or judgments of Christianity, not to Christianity itself, either as a doctrine or an institution, either as the faith to be believed, or as the law to be obeyed—a fact which, in the judgment of some, Dr. Newman's theory of development overlooks. Christianity embodied in the church is the kingdom of God on earth, founded immediately by the incarnate Word to manifest the divine love and mercy in the redemption and salvation of souls, and to introduce and maintain the authority of God and the supremacy of his law in human affairs. It is not an abstraction, and did not come into the world as a "naked idea," as Guizot maintains, nor is it left to men's wisdom and virtue to embody it; but it came into the world embodied in an institution, concentered in the church, which the blessed apostle assures us is "the body of Christ," who is himself Christianity, since he says, "I am the way, the truth and the life." Neither as the end nor as the divine institution, neither as the law nor as the authority to keep, declare, and apply it, then, is the church imperfect, therefore progressive or corruptible, and therefore reformable. This is the Catholic doctrine, which must be retained by Protestantism if Protestantism is to be Catholic.

The learned professor either overlooks or virtually denies

the divine origin, character, and authority of the church, or else he supposes that the divine founder failed to adapt his means to his end, and left his work incomplete, imperfect, to be finished by men. From first to last, he treats the church not as the kingdom of God on earth, but as an institution formed by men to realize or embody their conceptions or views of his kingdom, its principles, laws, and authority. He thus makes it a human institution, subject to all the vicissitudes of time and space. As men can never embody in their institutions the entire kingdom of God, the church must be progressive; as whatever is defective may be corrupted by the errors and corruptions of the faithful, as what is subject to growth must also be subject to decay, the church may from time to time become corrupt, and men must be free, as she has need, to reform her. This manifestly supposes the church is not divine, but simply an attempt, as is every false religion of men, to realize or embody their variable conceptions of the divine. If this were not the professor's view, he could not talk of conservatism, progress, and reformation in connection with Christianity, nor the correspondence of these with "the three generic types of Christianity," for these terms are inapplicable to any thing divine and perfect, and can be logically applied only to what is imperfect and human, to what is perfectible, corruptible, and reformable. As there is but one God, one Christ, the mediator of God and men, there can be but one Christianity, and that must be catholic, one and the same in all times and places. To suppose three generic types of Christianity is as absurd as to suppose three Christs or three Gods, generically distinguished one from another, that is—three Christs or three Gods of three different types or genera.

Supposing the professor understands at all the meaning of the scholastic terms he uses, it is clear that he understands by Christianity the history of which moves under the influence of two generic ideas—nothing divine, nothing fixed, permanent, and immutable, the law alike for intellect and will, but the views and theories or judgments which men form of the works of God, his word, his law, or his kingdom. Christianity resolved into these may, we concede, not improperly be arranged under the three heads of conservatism, progress, and reformation, but never Christianity as the truth to be believed and obeyed. We do not, however, blame the Lutheran professor for his mistake; for,

assuming his position as a Protestant to be at all tenable, he could not avoid it, since Protestants have no other Christianity. They have only their *views* or judgments of Christianity, not Christianity itself as the objective reality.

There is progress *by* Christianity; and that is one great purpose for which it is instituted; but none *in* Christianity, because it is divine and perfect from the beginning. There may be reformation in individuals, nations, and society, for these are all corruptible, but none of Christianity itself, either as the creed or as the body of Christ, for it is indefectible, above and independent of men and nations, and therefore neither corruptible nor reformable by them. Not being corruptible or capable of deterioration, the term conservative, however applicable it may be to states and empires in the natural order or to human institutions and laws subject to the natural laws, has no application to Christianity or the kingdom of Christ, which is supernatural, under the direct and immediate government and protection of God, an eternal and therefore an ever-present kingdom, universal and unalterable, and not subject to the natural laws of growth and decay. Dr. Krauth forgets the law of mechanics, that there is no motion without a mover at rest. The movable cannot originate motion, nor the progressive be the cause of progress, or corruption purify and reform itself. If Christianity or the church were itself movable, or in itself progressive, it could effect no progress in men or nations, individuals or society; and if it could ever become itself corrupt, it could be no principle of reform in the world, or in any department of life.

The office of Christianity is to maintain on earth amidst all the vicissitudes of this world the immutable divine order, to recover men from the effects of the fall, to elevate them above the world, above their natural powers, and to carry them forward, their will consenting and concurring, to a blissful and indissoluble union with God as their supreme good, as their last end or final cause. How could it fulfil this office and effect its divine purpose, if not itself free from all the changes, alterations, and accidents of time and space? Does not the learned professor of theology perceive that its very efficiency depends on its independence, immovableness, and immutability? Then the conceptions of conservatism, progress, and reformation cannot be applied to the church of God, any more than to God himself, and are applicable only to what is human connected with her. In applying

these ideas to her, the professor, as every Protestant is obliged to do in principle at least, divests her of her divinity, of her supernatural origin and office, and places her in the natural and human order, and subjects her to the laws which govern the history of all men and nations deprived of the supernatural and remaining under the ordinary providence of God manifested through second causes. The professor's doctrine places Christianity in the same category with all pagan and false religions, and subjects it to the same laws to which they are subjected.

This being the case, Dr. Krauth, who is a genuine Lutheran, has no right to call Luther's reformation a *conservative* reformation. It may or may not be conservative in relation to some other Protestant church or sect, but in relation to the church of God, or to Christianity as the word or the law of God, it is not conservative, but undeniably destructive; for it subverts the very idea and principle on which the church as the kingdom of God on earth is founded and sustained. The church on the principles of Luther's reformation is subject to the authority of men and nations, and, instead of teaching and governing them, is taught and governed by them, and instead of elevating and perfecting them, they perfect, corrupt, or reform it. This is manifestly a radical denial, a subversion of the church of God, of Christ's kingdom on earth if it means any thing more than a temperance society or a social club. In this respect, the principle of the Lutheran reformation was the common principle of all the Protestant reformers, as we may see in the fact that Protestantism, under any or all of its multitudinous forms, wherever not restrained by influences foreign to itself, tends incessantly to eliminate the supernatural, and to run into pure rationalism or naturalism. How absurd, then, to talk of "*Protestant Catholicity*, or of *Catholic Protestantism*"! The two ideas are as mutually repellant as are Christ and Belial.

The church has, indeed, her human side, and on that side she may at times be corrupt and in need of reform, that is to say, the heavenly treasure is *received* in earthen vessels, and those earthen vessels, though unable to corrupt or sully the divine treasure itself, may be unclean and impure themselves. Churchmen may become relaxed in their virtue and neglect to maintain sound doctrine and necessary discipline, and leave the people to suffer for the want of proper spiritual nourishment and care, even to fall into errors and vices

more in accordance with the heathenism of their ancestors than with the faith and sanctity of the Christian. Moreover, in a world where all changes under the very eye of the spectator, and new forms of error and vice are constantly springing up, the disciplinary canons of the church, and those which regulate the relations of secular society with the spiritual, good and adequate when first enacted, may become insufficient or impracticable in view of the changes always going on in every thing human, and fail to repress the growing evil of the times and to maintain the necessary discipline both of clerics and laics, and therefore need amending, or to be aided by new and additional canons. In this legislative and administrative office of the church, not in her dogmas, precepts, constitution, or authority, which, as expressing the eternal reason and will of God, are unalterable, reforms are not only permissible, but often necessary. The councils, general, national, provincial, and diocesan, have always had for their only object to assist the papacy in suppressing errors against faith, in enforcing discipline, maintaining Christian morality, and promoting the purity and sanctity of the Christian community.

We do not deny that reforms of this sort were needed at the epoch of the Protestant revolt and rebellion, and the holy Council of Trent was convoked and held for the very purpose of effecting such as were needed, as well as for the purpose of condemning the doctrinal errors of the reformers; but we cannot concede that they were more especially needed at that epoch, than they had been at almost any time previous, since the conversion of the barbarians that overthrew the Roman empire, and of their pagan brethren that remained in the old homesteads. Long, severe, and continuous had been the struggle of the church to tame, humanize, and christianize these fierce and indocile barbarians, especially those who remained beyond the frontiers of the empire, and to whom the Roman name never ceased to be hateful, as it is even to this day with the bulk of the northern Germanic races. The evils which for eight centuries had grown out of the intractable and rebellious spirit of these races in their old homes, and their perpetual tendency to relapse into the paganism of their ancestors, and which had so tried the faith and patience of the church, had been in a great measure overcome before the opening of the sixteenth century, and their morals and manners brought into close conformity with the Christian ideal. The church,

through her supreme pontiffs and saintly bishops, zealous and hard-working priests and religious, had struggled successfully against them; and was even getting the better of the polished Greek and Roman heathenism, partially revived in the so-called revival of letters, or the renaissance, and was pursuing, never more steadily or more successfully, her work of evangelization and civilization; and we can point to no period in her history since the conversion of Clovis, king of the Franks, the missionary labors of St. Columbanus and his colonies of Irish monks in eastern Gaul and Italy, and of St. Boniface and his Anglo-Saxon companions and successors in central Germany and the Netherlands, when reforms were less necessary, or the bonds of discipline were less relaxed, than at the epoch of the rise of Protestantism.

But, granting that reforms of this sort were especially needed in the sixteenth century, who had the right, on conservative and orderly principles, to propose or to effect them? Certainly not private individuals, on their own authority, except so far as it concerned their own personal faith and morals, but the ecclesiastical authorities of the time, as we see in the holy Council of Trent. Reforms, even if needed and proper in themselves, if attempted by unauthorized individuals on their own responsibility, and carried out without, and especially in opposition to, the supreme authority of the church, are irregular, disorderly, and unlawful. A reform attempted and effected in church or state by unauthorized persons, and especially against the constituted authorities of either, is unquestionably an attempt at revolution, if words have any meaning. Now, was Luther's reformation effected by the church herself, or by persons authorized by her to institute and carry it on? Was it done by the existing authorities of the church in accordance with her constitution and laws, or was it done in opposition to her positive prohibition, and in most cases by violence and armed force against her?

There is no question as to the fact. Luther had no authority or commission from the church to attempt and carry out the reforms or changes he declared to be necessary; and, in laboring to effect them, he proceeded not only without her authority, but against it, just as he does who conspires to overthrow the state or to subvert the constitution and laws of his country. Luther, then, was not a conservative reformer, but a decided revolutionist, a radical, a sectarian,

a destructive, and Dr. Kranth counts too much on the ignorance or credulity of his readers in expecting them to accept Lutheranism as a "conservative reformation." A conservative reformation, as distinguished from or opposed to revolution, is a legal, constitutional reformation, effected under the proper authorities and by constitutional and legal means. Dr. Kranth himself would despise us or laugh at us if we should concede that such was Luther's reformation. It was effected by persons unauthorized to reform the church, against her constitution and laws existing at the time, and to which they themselves owed strict fidelity and unre-served obedience. They were conspirators against lawful authority, against their spiritual sovereign, and their pretended reform was a revolt, a rebellion, and, as far as successful, a revolution. It is idle to deny it, or to attempt to defend Luther and his associates on legal and constitutional principles. The reform or movement he attempted was without and against law, against the constitution and canons of the church, and was condemned and prohibited by the supreme spiritual authority. This is undeniable, and Dr. Kranth knows it as well as we do, and yet he has the hardihood to call it a "conservative reformation"!

But the Protestant pretence is that Luther and his associates acted in obedience to a higher authority than that of popes and councils, and were justified in what they did by the written word of God and Christian antiquity. An appeal of this sort, on Protestant principles, from the decisions of a Protestant sect, might be entertained, but not on Catholic principles from the decision of the Catholic Church, for she is herself, at all times and places, the supreme authority for declaring the sense of the written as well as of the unwritten word, for declaring and applying the divine law, whether naturally or supernaturally promulgated, and for judging what is or is not according to Christian antiquity. Their appeal was irregular, revolutionary even, and absurd and not to be entertained for a moment. She authorized no appeal of the sort, and the appeal could have been only from her judgment to their own, which at the lowest is as high authority as theirs at the highest. Luther and his associates did not appeal to a higher law or authority against the popes and councils, but to a lower, as Döllinger has done in asking permission to appeal from the judgment of a general council, to that of a national or rather a provincial council. The appeal to Christian antiquity was equally

unavailable, for it was only setting up their private judgment against the judgment of the supreme court. The church denied that she departed from the primitive church, and her denial was sufficient to rebut their assertion. In no case, then, did they or could they appeal to or act on a higher law or authority than hers. They opposed and could oppose to her judgment, rendered by popes and councils, of the law or word of God, written or unwritten, or of Christian antiquity, only their own judgment, which at the best was no better than hers at the worst.

The simple fact is, there is no defence of the so-called reformation on catholic, church, or conservative principles. It sought to reform the faith, and to change the very constitution of the church, and wherever it was successful, it proved to be the subversion of the church, and the destruction of her faith, her authority, and her worship. Dr Kranth says that this was not originally intended by the reformers, and that they had in the beginning no clear views, or fixed and determined plan of reform, but were carried forward by the logic of their principles and events to lengths which they did not foresee, and from which they would at first have recoiled. But this only proves that they were no divinely illumined and God-commissioned reformers, that they knew not what manner of spirit they were of, that they took a leap in the dark, and followed a blind impulse. If the spirit they obeyed, or the principle to which they yielded, led them or pushed them step by step in the way of destruction, to the total denial of the authority of the church, or to transfer it from the pope and hierarchy to Cæsar or the laity, which we know was universally the fact, it is clear proof that the spirit or principle of the reformation was radical, revolutionary, destructive, not conservative.

That conservative men among Protestants abhor the radicalism and sectarianism which the whole history of the Protestant world proves to be the natural and inevitable result of the principles and tendencies of the so called reformation, we are far from denying; but whatever of resistance is offered in the Protestant world to these results is due not to Protestantism itself, but either to Catholic reminiscences and the natural good sense of individuals, to the control of religious matters assumed by the civil government, which really has no authority in spirituals, or to the presence and constant teaching of the Catholic Church. "What is bred in the bones will out in the flesh." Every-

where the Protestant spirit, the Protestant tendency, is to remove further and further from Catholicity, to eliminate more and more of Catholic dogma, Catholic tradition, Catholic precepts, and to approach nearer and nearer to no-churchism, to the rejection of all authority in spiritual matters, and the reduction of the whole supernatural order to the natural. Faith in the Protestant mind is only a probable opinion, sometimes fanatically held indeed, and enforced by power, but none the less a mere opinion for that. The conception of religion as a divine institution, of the church as a living organism, as a teaching and governing body, as the kingdom of God, placed in the world as the medium of divine grace and of the divine government in human affairs, is really entertained by no class of Protestants, but disdainfully rejected by all as spiritual despotism, *Romish* usurpation, or popish superstition.

It is useless to say that this is a departure from or an abuse of the principle of the Protestant reformation. It is no such thing; it is only the logical development of the radical and revolutionary principles which the reformers themselves avowed and acted on, and which carried them to lengths which, in the outset, they did not dream of, and from which Dr. Kranth says truly they would, had they foreseen them, have shrunk with horror. We do not find that Lutheranism, when left by the civil magistracy to itself, and suffered to follow unchecked its own inherent law, is any more conservative or less radical in its developments and tendency than Calvinism, or Anglicanism, that prolific mother of sects, or any other form of Protestantism. Every revolution must run its course and reach its goal, unless checked or restrained by a power or influences foreign to itself, and really antagonistic to it. The reformers rejected the idea of the church as a kingdom or governing body, or as a divine institution for the instruction and government of men, and substituted for it, in imitation of the Arabian impostor, a book which, without the authority of the church to declare its sense, is a dead book, save as quickened by the intelligence or understanding of its readers. Their followers discovered in the course of time that the book in itself is immobile and voiceless, and has no practical authority for the understanding or the will, and they cast it off, some, like George Fox and his followers, for a pretended interior or spiritual illumination, the reality of which they can prove neither to themselves nor to others; but the larger

part, for natural reason, history, erudition, and the judgment of learned or *soi-disants* learned men. Their work has gone on till, with the more advanced party, all divine authority is rejected, and as man has and can have in his own right no authority over man, reason itself has given way, objective truth is denied, and truth and falsehood, right and wrong, it is gravely maintained, are only what each man for himself holds them to be. The utmost anarchy and confusion in the intellectual and moral world have been reached in individuals and sects said to have "advanced views."

Such have been the results of Dr. Krauth's "conservative reformation" in the spiritual order, in Christianity or the church. It introduced the revolutionary principle, the principle of individualism, of private judgment, and insubordination into the religious order, and, as a necessary consequence, it has introduced the same principle into the political and social order, which depends on religion, and cannot subsist without it. Hence, the great and damning charge against the church in our day is that by her unchangeableness, her immovable doctrines, her influence on the minds and hearts, and hold on the consciences of the faithful, she is the great supporter of law and order—despots and despotism, in the language of the liberal journals—and the chief obstacle to the enlightenment and progress of society, in the same language; but radicalism and revolution in ours. Hence, the whole movement party in our times, with which universal Protestantism sympathizes and is closely allied, is moved by hostility to the church, especially the papacy. Hence, it and the Protestant journals of the Old World and the New are unable to restrain their rage at the declaration of the papal supremacy and infallibility by the Council of the Vatican, or their exultation at the invasion of the states of the church, their annexation to the Sub-alpine kingdom, and the spoliation of the Holy Father by the so-called king of Italy. Why do we see all this, but because the revolutionary principle, which the reformers asserted in the church, is identically the principle defended by the political radicals and revolutionists?

Having thrown off the law of God, rejected the authority of the church, and put the faithful in the place of the pope and hierarchy, what could hinder the movement party from applying the same subversive principle to the political and social order? The right to revolutionize the church, and to

place the flock above the shepherd, involves the right to revolutionize the state, and the assertion of the right of the governed to resist and depose their governors at will, or at the dictation of self-styled political and social reformers. Protestantism has never favored liberty, as it claims, and which it is impotent either to found or to sustain; but its claims to be the founder and chief supporter of modern liberalism, which results naturally and necessarily from the fundamental principle of the reformers, that of the right of the people to resist and depose the prelates placed over them, cannot be contested. If no man is bound, against his own judgment and will, to obey the law of God, how can any one be bound in conscience to obey the law of the state? and if the people may subvert the constitution of the church, and trample on her divine authority, why may they not subvert the constitution of the republic, and trample under foot the human authority of the civil magistrate, whether he be called king or president? It is to Protestantism we owe the liberalistic doctrine of "the sacred right of insurrection," or of "revolution," assumed to be inherent in and persistent in every people, or any section of any people, and which justifies Mazzini and the secret societies in laboring to bring about in every state of Europe an internal conflict and bloody war between the people and their governments. It deserves the full credit of having asserted and acted on the principle, and we hold it responsible for the consequences of its subversive application; for it is only the application in the political and social order of the principle on which the reformers acted, and all Protestants act, in the religious order against the church of God.

The principle of revolution, asserted and acted on as a Christian principle by the reformers, has not been inoperative, or remained barren of results, on being transferred to modern political and civil society. If the reformation, by drawing off men's attention and affections from the spiritual order, and fixing them on the material order, has promoted a marvellous progress in mechanical inventions and the applications of science to the industrial and productive arts, it has at the same time undermined the whole political order, shaken every civil government to its foundation, and, in fact, revolutionized nearly every modern state. It has loosened the bonds of society, destroyed the Christian family, erected disobedience into a principle, a virtue even, and reduced authority to an empty name. It has taught the

people to be discontented with their lot, filled them with an insane desire for change, made them greedy of novelties, and stirred them up to a chronic war with their rulers. Everywhere we meet the revolutionary spirit, and there is not a government in Europe that has any strong hold on the consciences of the governed, or that can sustain itself except by its army. Even Russia, where the people are most attached to their emperor, is covered over with a network of secret societies, which are so many conspiracies against government, laboring night and day to revolutionize the empire. Prussia, which has just succeeded in absorbing the greater part of Germany, and is flushed with her recent triumph over the French empire and the improvised French republic, may seem to be strong and stable; but she has the affections of the people in no part of Germany, which she has recently annexed or confederated under her headship, and the new empire is pervaded in all directions by the revolutionary spirit to which it owes its existence, and which may be strong enough to resist its power, and reduce the ill-compacted body to its original elements to-morrow.

We need not speak of Austria; she may become hereafter once more a power in Europe, but she is now nothing. Voltaireism, and the spirit generated by the reformation, have prostrated her, and sunk her so low that no one deigns to do her reverence. In England the government itself seems penetrated with the revolutionary spirit, or at least believes that spirit is so strong in the people that it is unsafe to resist it, and that it is necessary to make large and continual concessions to it. It is a maxim with the liberals and most English and American statesmen, or politicians rather, for our age has no statesmen, that a government is strengthened by timely and large concessions to popular demands. The government is undoubtedly strengthened by just laws and wise administration, but in our times, when the old respect for authority has gone, and governments have little or no hold on consciences, there is no government existing strong enough to make concessions to popular demands, or to the clamors of the governed, without endangering its power, and even its existence. The Holy Father, Pius IX., in the beginning of his pontificate, tried the experiment, and was soon driven from his throne, and found safety only in flight and exile. Napoleon III. tried it in January of last year, was driven by his people into a war for which he was unprepared, met with disasters, was defeated and taken pris-

oner, declared deposed and his empire at an end by a Parisian mob, before the end of September of the same year. The policy of concession is a ruinous policy; one concession leads to the demand for another and a larger concession, and each concession strengthens the disaffected, and weakens the power of authority to resist. But England has adopted the policy, is fully committed to it, as she is to many false and ruinous maxims, and it will go hard but she yields to her democracy, and reaps in her own fields the fruits of the liberalism and revolutionism which she has, especially when under Whig influence, so industriously sown broadcast throughout Europe.

We need not speak of our own country. Everybody knows its intense devotion to popular sovereignty, its hatred of authority, and its warm sympathy—in words at least—with every insurrection or uprising of the people, or any portion of the people, to overthrow the established authority, whether in church or state, they can hear of, without any inquiry into the right or wrong of the case. The insurrection or revolutionary party, it is assumed, is always in the right. There is no more intensely Protestant people on the globe than the American, and none more deeply imbued with the revolutionary spirit, in which it is pretended our own institutions originated, and which nearly the whole American press mistake for the spirit of liberty, and cherish as the American spirit. What will come of it, time will not be slow in revealing.

But France, so long the leader of modern civilization, and which she has so long led in a false direction, shows better than any other nation the workings of the revolutionary spirit introduced by the reformers. She, indeed, repelled, after some hesitation and a severe struggle, the reformation in the religious order; but through the indomitable energy of the princely Guises and their brave Lorraine supporters, whom every French historian and publicist since takes delight in denouncing, she was retained in the communion of the church; but with Henry IV. the *parti politique* came into power, and Protestantism was adopted and acted on in the political order. On more occasions than one, France became the diplomatic and even the armed defender of the reformation against the Catholic sovereigns of Europe. She was the first Christian power to form an alliance with the Grand Turk, against whom Luther declared to be against the will of God for his followers to fight, even in defence of

Christendom ; she aided the Low Countries in their rebellion against Catholic Spain, Protestant Sweden, and northern Germany in their effort to crush Catholic Austria, and protestantize all Germany ; and saw, without an effort to save her, Catholic Poland struck from the list of nations. Twice has she with armed force dragged the Holy Father from his throne, and secularized and appropriated the States of the Church, and set the example which the Italian liberals have but too faithfully followed. Rarely, if ever, has she since the sixteenth century, by her foreign policy, consulted the interests of the church any further than they happened to be coincident with her own. In an evil hour, she forgot the principles which made the glory of the French sovereigns, and on which Christendom was reconstructed after the downfall of the Roman Empire of the West, and severed her politics from her religion. At first asserting with the reformers and the Lutheran princes the independence of the secular order of the spiritual, afterwards the superiority of the secular power, and finally the sovereignty of the people or the governed in face of their governors, as the reformers asserted the sovereignty of the faithful in face of the pope and hierarchy, she made her world-famous revolution of 1789, inaugurated the mob, and has been weltering in anarchy and groaning under despotism ever since.

The accession of Henry IV., the beau ideal of a king with the French people, marks a compromise between Catholicity and Protestantism, by which it was tacitly agreed that France should in religion profess the Catholic faith and observe the Catholic worship, while in politics, both at home and abroad, she should be Protestant, and independent of the spiritual authority. It was hoped the compromise would secure her both worlds, but it has caused her to lose both, at least this world as every one may now see. It is worse than idle to attempt to deny the solidarity of the French revolution with Luther's rebellion ; both rest on the same principle and tend to the same end ; and it is the position and influence of France as the leader of the civilized world, that has given to the revolutionary principle its popularity, diffused it through all modern nations, and made it the *Weltgeist*, or spirit of the age. The socialistic insurrection in Paris, and which we fear is only "scotched, not killed," is only the logical development of '93, as '93 was of '89, and '89 of Luther's revolt against the church in the sixteenth century. Its success would be only the full realization in church and

state, in religion and society, of what Dr. Kranth calls "the conservative reformation." The communists deny the right of property, indeed, but not more than did Protestants in despoiling the church and sacrilegiously confiscating the possessions of religious houses and the goods of the clergy. No more consistent and thoroughgoing Protestants has the world seen than these French socialists or communists, who treat property as theft and God as a despot.

We do not exult in the downfall of France, in which there are so many good Catholics and has always been so much to love and admire, any more than, had we lived then, we should have exulted in the downfall of the Roman empire before the invasion of the barbarians. Like that downfall, it is the breaking up of Christendom, and leaves the Holy Father without a single Christian power to defend his rights or the liberty of the Holy See; but it deprives Protestantism of its most efficient supporter and its great popularizer, and all the more efficient because nominally Catholic. It is not Catholic but Protestant and liberal France that has fallen. The Bonapartes never represented Catholic France, but the principles of 1789—that is, the revolution which created them, and which they sought to use or retain as they judged expedient for their own interests. In the last Napoleon's defeat we see the defeat, we wish we could say the final defeat, of the revolution. Yet so terrible a disaster occurring so suddenly to so great a nation, we think must prove the turning-point in the life and tendencies of the nations of Europe, and pave the way for the reconstruction of Christendom on its old basis of the mutual concord and co-operation of the two powers. We think it must lead the nations to pause and reflect on the career civilization has for three centuries been running, and open their eyes to the folly and madness of attempting to found permanent political and social order, or authority and liberty, on the revolutionary principle of the reformation of 1789. We look for a powerful reaction at no distant date against the revolution in favor of the church and her divine authority. It is sometimes necessary to make men despair of the earth in order to turn their attention to heaven.

But to conclude: we have wished to show Dr. Kranth that the reformation in any or all of its phases, in its principle and in its effects, in church and state, is decidedly revolutionary. He as a Protestant has not been able to see and set forth the truth; bound by his office and position to defend

the reformation, he has considered what it must have been if defensible, not what it actually was, and has given us his ideal of the reformation, not the reformation itself. If it does not, he reasons, maintain all Catholic principles and doctrines it is indefensible; but if it concedes that these principles and doctrines were held in their purity and integrity, in their unity and catholicity, by the church Luther warred against, what need was there of it? Our good doctor must then assume that they were not so held, that the church had erred both in faith and practice, and that the reformation simply restored the faith, purified practice, reëstablished discipline, freed the mind from undue shackles, and opened the way for the free and orderly progress of the world. All very fine; only there does not happen to be a word of truth in it. Besides, if it were so, it would only prove that the church had failed, therefore that Christianity had failed, and that Christ was not equal to the work he undertook. If Christ is true, there must always be the true church somewhere, for she is indefectible as he is indefectible. If the church in communion with the see of Rome had become corrupt and false, as the reformers alleged, then some other existing body was the true church, and Luther and his associates, in order to be in the true church, should have ascertained and joined it—a thing which it is well known they did not do, for they joined no other church or organic body, but set furiously at work to pull down the old church which had hitherto sheltered them, and to build a new one for themselves on its ruins.

We grant the reformation should have been conservative in order to be defensible, but it was not so, it was radical and subversive. It rejected the papacy, the hierarchy, the church herself as a visible institution, as a teaching and governing body, and asserted the liberty of the faithful to teach and govern their prelates and pastors. It is the common principle of all Protestant denominations that the church is constituted by the faithful, holds from them, and the pastor is called, not sent. This, we need not say, is the subversion of all church authority, of the kingdom of God founded by our Lord himself, and ruling from above instead of from below. It reduces religion from law to opinion or personal conviction, without light or authority for conscience. This principle, applied to politics, is the subversion of the state, overthrows all government, and leaves every man free to do "what is right in his own eyes." It transfers power from

the governors to the governed, and allows the government no powers not held from their assent, which is simply to make it no government at all. It has been so applied, and the effect is seen especially in France, which, since her revolution of '89, has had no settled government, but has alternated, as she alternates to-day, between the mob and the despot, anarchy and military despotism.

We so apply it, theoretically, in this country; and in the recent civil war the North was able to fight for the preservation of the Union only by pocketing for a time its principles and forswearing its logic. The logic was on the side of the South; the force was on the side of the North; on which side was the right or the wrong, it is not our province to decide. We will only add that we do not agree at all with journals that speak of the issues which led to the war as being decided by it. War may make it inexpedient to revive them, but the only issue it ever does or can decide is, on which side is, for the time, the superior force. We deny not the right of the people to resist the prince who makes himself a tyrant, if declared to be such and judicially deposed by the competent authority, but we do deny their right, for any cause whatever, to conspire against or to resist the legitimate government in the legal exercise of its constitutional powers. We recognize the sovereignty of the people in the sense that, if a case occurs in which they are without any government, they have the right, in concert with the spiritual power, to institute or reconstitute government in such way and in such form as they judge wisest and best; but we utterly deny that they remain sovereign, otherwise than in the government, when once they have constituted it, or that the government, when constituted, holds from them and is responsible to their will outside of the constitution; for that would make the government a mere agent of the people and revocable at their will, which is tantamount to no government at all. The doctrine of the demagogues and their journals we are not able to accept; it deprives the people collectively of all government, and leaves individuals and minorities no government to protect and defend them from the ungoverned will and passions of the majority for the time.

We accept and maintain loyally, and to the best of our ability, the constitution of our country as originally understood and intended, not indeed as the best constitution for every people, but because it is the best for us, and, above

all, because it is for us the law. In itself considered, there is no necessary discord between it and Catholicity, but as it is interpreted by the liberal and sectarian journals, that are doing their best to revolutionize it, and is beginning to be interpreted by no small portion of the American people, or as interpreted by the Protestant principle, so widely diffused among us, and in the sense of European liberalism or Jacobinism, we do not accept it, or hold it to be any government at all, or as capable of performing any of the proper functions of government; and if it continues to be interpreted by the revolutionary principle of Protestantism, it is sure to fail—to lose itself either in the supremacy of the mob or in military despotism—and doom us, like unhappy France, to alternate between them, with the mob uppermost to-day, and the despot to-morrow. Protestantism, like the heathen barbarianism which Catholicity subdued, lacks the element of order, because it rejects authority, and is necessarily incompetent to maintain real liberty or civilized society. Hence it is we so often say, that if the American republic is to be sustained and preserved at all, it must be by the rejection of the principle of the reformation, and the acceptance of the Catholic principle by the American people. Protestantism can preserve neither liberty from running into license or lawlessness, nor authority from running into despotism.

If Dr. Krauth wants conservatism without immobility, and progress without revolution or radicalism, as it seems he does, he must cease to look for what he wants in the Lutheran, Calvinistic, Anglican, or any other Protestant reformation, and turn his thoughts and his hopes to that church which converted pagan Rome, christianized and civilized his own barbarian ancestors, founded the Christendom of the middle ages, and labored so assiduously, unweariedly, perseveringly, and successfully to save souls, and to advance civilization and the interests of human society, from the conversion of the pagan Franks in the fifth century down to the beginning of the sixteenth century, and which still survives and teaches and governs, in spite of all the efforts of reformers, revolutionists, men, and devils to cover her with disgrace, to belie her character, and to sweep her from the face of the earth. She not only converted the pagan barbarians, but she recovered even the barbarian nations and tribes, as the Goths, Vandals, and Burgundians, that had fallen into the Arian heresy, which like all heresy is a

compromise between Christianity and heathenism, and even reconverted the Alemanni, Frieslanders, and others who had once embraced the Gospel, but had subsequently returned to their idols and heathen superstitions. God is with her as of old, and lives, teaches, and governs in her as in the beginning; and she is as able to convert the heathen to day, to reconvert the relapsed, and to recover the heretical, as she was in the days of St. Remi, St. Amand, St. Patrick, St. Austin, St. Columbanus, St. Willebrod, or St. Boniface. She is the kingdom of God, and like him she cannot grow old, decay, or die. Never had her supreme pontiff a stronger hold on the consciences, the love and affections of the faithful throughout the world, than he has at this moment, when despoiled of all his temporalities and abandoned by all earthly powers, nor ever were her pastors and prelates more submissive and devoted to their chief. Never did she more fully prove that she is under the protection of God, as his immaculate spouse, than now when held up to the scorn and derision of an heretical and unbelieving world. Dead she is not, but living.

Let our learned Lutheran professor remove the film from his eyes, and look at her in her simple grandeur, her undorned majesty, and see how mean and contemptible, compared with her, are all the so-called churches, sects, and combinations arrayed against her, spitting blasphemy at her, and in their satanic malice trying to sully her purity or dim the glory that crowns her. Say what you will, Protestantism is a petty affair, and it is one of the mysteries of this life how a man of the learning, intelligence, apparent sincerity, and good sense of Dr. Krauth can write an octavo volume of eight hundred closely printed pages in defence of the Protestant reformation.

BISHOP FENWICK.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1846.]

Few who had the honor of personally knowing the late eminent bishop of Boston but looked upon him as a great and good man, and upon themselves as highly privileged in being permitted to love and revere him. Especially was this the case with those who were in habits of daily intercourse with him, who sat familiarly at his table, and shared his intimacy. To them he was a pleasant companion, a faithful and affectionate friend, a wise and prudent counselor, a watchful and loving father. They have no words to say how much they loved and venerated him, or to express how deeply they feel their bereavement. They never met, and they have no hope of meeting, his equal in another; and their grief would be more than they could bear, did they not find consolation in reflecting that it has been theirs to know familiarly one who gave them, by his virtues, a higher conception of the capacities of our common nature, and of the power and riches of divine grace; that they have felt the influence, enjoyed the friendship, and received the paternal counsels and blessing of one whose labors and example were a precious gift from heaven to the community in which he lived; and that he is removed from them only to enter upon the rewards of his fidelity and life of self-sacrifice, and to be able to serve more effectually the children he so tenderly loved, by his more intimate union with the common Father of us all.

It would give us great pleasure to be able to write the life and portray the character of this eminent divine, and model of Christian prelates; but that is an honor to which it is not ours to aspire. That honor is reserved for others, who are less recent members of the flock over which he was set by the Holy Ghost, who have known him longer and better, and can speak more worthily of the events of his active life and his invaluable services to religion in this country, and who are more entitled to the consolation of

* *The Right Reverend Benedict Joseph Fenwick, second Bishop of the Diocese of Boston.*

delineating, for the edification of the faithful, those traits of his character which so quickened their love of virtue, and so endeared him to their hearts. We can presume only to recall for our readers a few impressions we personally received in our short but frequent intercourse with him during the last two years of his life,—an intercourse, we need not say, we regard as one of the richest of the many blessings which a kind Providence has ever scattered with a liberal hand along our pathway in life.

We saw Bishop Fenwick for the first time in the spring of 1843. During the preceding winter our religious views had undergone several important modifications, and we began to suspect that the Catholic Church might prove to be less corrupt than we had supposed,—might, perhaps, after all, turn out to be the church of God. Our attention was called more particularly to this point by seeing some of our essays copied with commendation into one or two Catholic journals. We had had, strictly speaking, no acquaintance with Catholics; we had never read, hardly even seen, a single book written by a Catholic in exposition and defence of Catholic doctrines; and we thought it singular that we should be able to write any thing acceptable to Catholics. Were we in very deed approaching the church? Had we unconsciously adopted principles which, if followed out, would require us to abandon our position in the Protestant world? The question was worth settling, and we knew not how to settle it without applying to some living Catholic teacher. Accordingly, with many misgivings, after much internal conflict, and summoning up all our courage, we sought an interview with Bishop Fenwick. A young friend, who had been introduced to him, called with us; we were shown into his room, our friend told him our name, and in a moment we were perfectly at our ease. A lively conversation instantly ensued, on one subject and another, but with no direct reference to the point on which we wished to consult him. It was Holy Week; his time was much taken up, and we forebore to prolong our interview beyond fifteen or twenty minutes. Requesting permission to call and see him again, when he should be more at leisure, we took our leave.

Certainly, nothing remarkable occurred in this interview; nothing remarkable was said; and yet we were strangely affected, and had a strong inclination, on taking our leave, to kneel and beg the bishop's blessing. What affected us

we could not have told, can hardly tell even now, and yet affected we were, and went out from his presence feeling that we were a different man from what we were on entering. We had remarked no extraordinary ability or acquirement, and what had been said on either side had been said in a lively and half-sportive strain. If one thing struck us more than another in the bishop's character, it was his ease and agreeableness of manner, and his ready humor and pleasant wit. Yet there was, withal, so much tenderness, so much sweetness and simplicity of spirit, so much paternal sensibility, that he took instant possession of us, and we were never able afterwards to dismiss him from our mind or heart. Assuredly, on entering his room, we had no serious thought of becoming a Catholic; but we left him with the full determination to return, as soon as he should be more at leisure, and solicit his instructions.

Certainly, we did not leave Bishop Fenwick with the impression that he was personally that remarkable man we subsequently found him. Indeed, while we were conversing with him, though he related an anecdote of himself, our thoughts were not fixed on him personally. He was not occupied with himself, and he did not permit you to be occupied with him. Persons were out of the question, and forgotten. He entered into no argument with us, and said nothing to flatter our vanity or self-love, and we went out humbled, not exalted, in our estimation. What, then, was the secret of his influence? It was hard to say. But, in fact, the influence of the truly great man is always a puzzle, for you rarely see or suspect, at the moment, his real greatness. The men who strike us suddenly as great, are, in general, men who are so only in this or that particular, and who, though calling forth our admiration, exert very little influence on our minds or hearts. They have certain prominences of character which arrest attention; but on familiar acquaintance, they are almost always found to be wanting in many of the requisites of true greatness. The truly great man presents always, so to speak, an even surface, and fails, by his very greatness, to impress us at first sight with a sense of his superiority. One feels this in studying the character of Washington. His is a character of admirable proportions, remarkable for its completeness and integrity. Nothing projects from the rest, and it is only after a long study and comparison that its real superiority begins to dawn upon us. It was so with Bishop Fenwick, in a re-

markable degree. His character was admirably balanced; the proportions were preserved throughout, and you were unconscious of its real superiority till you had measured the scale on which it was constructed. In company with him and others, you would often feel that he counted for the least present, till gradually you discovered that he was the life and soul of all that had been going on, and that, without intending it, without being conscious that he was doing it, he had moved each according to the operations of his own mind. Perfectly unassuming, void of all pretension, and anxious to make himself of no account, he was ever the master-spirit, and would have been, place him where or with whom you might. We have known intimately some of the most distinguished among those our countrymen delight to honor, but in this respect we have never seen him surpassed, or even equalled. It was over a year before we saw Bishop Fenwick for the second time. Immediately after Easter, he left Boston to attend the provincial council at Baltimore, and to spend some weeks on a visit to his friends in Maryland, his native state. Before he returned, we were engrossed with a new question. We could accept the church, but hesitated to abjure Protestantism. We regretted that the reformers, in the sixteenth century, had broken away from the church, and set up rival and hostile communions of their own; and we should have rejoiced if it had been our lot to have been born and brought up in her communion. But when we came to reflect seriously on the matter, we found we could not join her communion without saying, by our act, that we believed Protestantism to be an unsafe way of salvation. If salvation was attainable out of the church, there could be no solid reason for joining her; if not, what was to be said of the whole Protestant world, and of those eminent Protestants whom we had been accustomed to love and honor as the glory of their age and race? To assume that all these must be finally lost, if dying out of the pale of the Roman Catholic Church, was altogether more than we were prepared for. Could not an alternative be found? Is there not some ground on which we may accept the church, without abandoning our hope for our Protestant friends? We spent a whole year in trying to discover some such ground; but without any satisfactory success. Meanwhile, the matter began to assume a serious aspect,—began to come home to our own conscience. We had no lease of life; we might, at any moment, be summoned to our last account; and, if

dying where we were, could we hope to see God? There was no blinking the question; and why, after all, should we peril our own salvation in debating whether our Protestant friends could or could not safely remain where they were? Perhaps the greatest charity to them would be for us to obey God in his church. Thus questioning with ourselves, but unable to come to any final decision, we thought we would once more call on Bishop Fenwick, propose to him the difficulty, and ascertain how he would meet it.

This time we called alone. He received us in a frank and cordial manner, said he read our Review with attention, perceived that we were making some progress towards the church; but he was surprised that we objected to the pope. "What can be your objections to the pope?" "I do not object to the pope. Some time ago I was foolish enough to say, that the problem of the age is *Catholicism without papacy*; but I no longer entertain that notion. I have no objection to the church, and the church without the pope would be to me no church at all." "Why, then, are you not a Catholic?" "I could be, were it not for these Protestants. I do not like to say they are all wrong, and out of the way of salvation; and if I could discover some ground on which I could be a Catholic without saying so, I should have no difficulty." "So that is your difficulty. But why should that affect you? If our Lord has established his church, and given her authority to teach, why should you refuse to obey him, till you satisfy yourself that you may disobey him with safety? God is just, and you may leave your Protestant friends in his hands; for he will not punish them unless they deserve it. If they break the order he has established, obstinately refuse to obey their lawful pastors, and preach from their own head instead of his word, that is no good reason for you to remain where you are, and neglect to make sure for yourself." "True. But I am not willing to believe that all who live and die out of the pale of the Roman Catholic Church must be finally lost. I wish to be able to find some justification, at least some excuse, for the Protestant movement; and it is this which has kept me back." "The inquiry is no doubt an interesting one, but you find it, probably, somewhat difficult. Have you thus far met with much success?" "I cannot say that I have, and I am almost afraid that I shall not succeed." "It is not best to be hasty. The question is serious, and you will do well to inquire further and longer. Perhaps

you will find some excuse for the Protestant reformation. If you do, you will not fail to let me know it."

After some more conversation on the same topic, and on general subjects, and his assuring us that it would give him pleasure to have us call and see him when we found it convenient, we took our leave. A week later, we called again, and he lent us some books; a fortnight later still, we called once more, and requested him to place us in charge of some one who would take the trouble to instruct and prepare us for admission into the church. He immediately introduced us to his coadjutor, now his successor, who readily charged himself with that task, and performed it with a patience and uniform kindness of which it does not become us to speak. The feelings of the convert towards the spiritual father who has poured on his head the regenerating waters, or heard the story of his life, and in God's stead pronounced over him the words of absolution and reconciliation, are too sacred to be displayed.

What most impressed us, in this second interview with Bishop Fenwick, was the firm and uncompromising character of his Catholicity. He used not a single unkind word, in speaking of Protestants; but with all our art,—and we did our best,—we could not extract from him the least conceivable concession. He saw clearly what held us back, and that we believed we were prepared to join the church, if we could only have some assurance that individuals dying out of the pale of her communion need not necessarily be despaired of; but neither by word nor tone did he indicate that he had any such assurance to give. He was a Catholic, heart and soul; he had learned the church as the way of salvation, but he had learned no other. What he had received, that could he give; but nothing else. He was not the author of the conditions of salvation, and he would not take the responsibility of enlarging or contracting them. It was well for us that he was thus stern and uncompromising in his Catholicity. A man brought up a Protestant is apt to distrust the sincerity of another's faith, and, in general, looks upon a well educated and intelligent Catholic priest or bishop as acting a part, or merely speaking from his brief, without any firm conviction of what he professes. He also understands, in advance, that Catholicity is exclusive and boldly asserts that salvation out of the pale of the church is not possible. If, then, we had found him less uncompromising; if we had perceived in him the least disposition to soften what seemed to us the severity

of the Catholic doctrine, or to conceal or explain it away, we should have distrusted the sincerity of his faith, have failed to give him our confidence, and have lost what we had in his church.

No man living better understood or appreciated the difference between charity and that spurious liberality which sometimes usurps its name, than Bishop Fenwick. His own heart was full of tenderness, literally overflowed with love to all men, and his charity knew no bounds. There was nothing severe in his disposition. If he had a fault, it was in his inability to think ill of another. You could not make him believe ill of any one, especially of one who had done wrong to him. No matter how strong were the appearances, undeniable the facts, he would always find some excuse, and prove to you that you were doing the man injustice. But he had, nevertheless, no sympathy with that false liberality which fears to shock another's principles or cross his wishes. He knew that charity must often shock in order to save. In proportion to his tenderness, in proportion to the depth and fervor of his charity, did he feel it necessary to hold up the stern and naked truth, and to be studiously on his guard against dropping a single word which, through misapprehension, might tend to inspire a false confidence or induce an ungrounded hope. Wherever, then, he appeared stern and unbending, it was not from severity of temper, but from his ardent charity, his fidelity to God, and his earnest desire to save souls.

Naturally, Bishop Fenwick was of a lively and playful disposition. He had an exhaustless fund of wit and humor, and his social qualities and conversational powers were unrivalled. He relished a good joke, and could give and receive one with inimitable grace and delicacy. Yet his wit never left a sting; no one enjoyed it more heartily than its victim, as we had often occasion ourselves to experience. His memory was stocked with a world of stories and anecdotes, which he would, in his moments of relaxation, relate with a grace and a charm which it would be as vain to attempt to describe as to imitate. We have listened with the intensest pleasure, for the hour together, and heard him relate anecdotes and stories with which we were perfectly familiar, and which we had ourselves previously related, perhaps a hundred times; and we have heard him relate the same anecdote the twentieth time with as much pleasure as the first. He had the rare faculty of investing the familiar with novel charms, and he threw

the hues of his own mind over whatever he touched. He was a great favorite with children, and it was difficult to determine whether he found the more pleasure in their society or they in his. It was beautiful to see the perfect sympathy between them. His own spirit was as playful, as light, as sunny, as guileless, as theirs, and he could at once touch their young hearts and gain their entire confidence. We were with him most of the afternoon of the Friday preceding his death. He was then all but dying, yet he was as cheerful, as playful, as we had known him when in perfect health; and we sat for a long time and admired his sportiveness with a little girl, some four or five years old, who came with her mother to see him. At first he frightened her, made her tremble and cling closer to her mother; then gradually he relaxed her fears, made her face brighten, and then laugh outright,—and all by his simple conversation. It was the last conversation of his to which we listened.

This playfulness at first deceived us, and made us draw inferences unfavorable to the depth and earnestness of his piety. We had not then learned that Catholics suppose our Lord meant what he said, when he told his disciples not to be as the hypocrites, who love to pray standing in the synagogues and the corners of the streets, and when they fasted, not to disfigure their faces, but to anoint their heads and wash their faces, so as not to appear unto men to be fasting, but to their Father in heaven. We have since learned that they do not regard the downcast look, the long face, and the sepulchral tone, to which we had been accustomed, as the peculiar marks of piety, and that they associate with religion ideas of cheerfulness and joy, not of sadness and gloom. A more really pious and devout man than Bishop Fenwick never lived, but he took as much pains to conceal his piety and devotion as Protestants do to display theirs. He, in fact, led a truly mortified life, but it was only by accident you were led to suspect it, and he would have been grieved to have had you suspect it at all.

Of Bishop Fenwick as an intellectual man and a scholar we are not well qualified to speak. He was averse to all display, and was always so modest and unassuming that you were perpetually in danger of underrating him. Yet one was always sure to find his natural ability and his learning equal to the occasion, whatever it might be. His mind was evidently of a practical, rather than of a speculative cast. He had no special fondness for metaphysical studies and

scholastic subtilties, but he was always at home in any speculative question which came up, and familiar with all the nice and subtle distinctions it might involve. His memory was remarkably tenacious, and was rarely at fault. He seemed to have read every thing, and to have retained all he read. We never, in our intercourse with him, knew a subject to be broached of which he was ignorant. He spoke several languages with ease and fluency, was an eminent classical scholar, and apparently familiar with the whole range of modern literature and science. No matter what the subject, however obscure or remote from his professional studies, on which you sought information, he could either give it or direct you at once to the source whence you could obtain it. That he was a sound divine, well read in dogmatic and moral theology, we suppose there can be no question; but his favorite studies seemed to us to be history and geography, in both of which, whether general or particular, he excelled. He had studied them extensively and profoundly. He seemed to have been present in all countries of the globe, and in all ages of the world. In history, he would not only give you the outlines of the history of a particular country, or of all countries, ancient or modern, but he would give you universal history, as a whole and in its details, in its causes, connections, and dependencies. He had been behind the curtain, in the secret cabinet-council, and had seen and mastered all the secret springs of events, great and small, and was able to trace those events out into all their ramifications and in their remotest consequences. Nothing had escaped him. In the history of his own country, which he loved as a Christian and a patriot, that is, with the affection of a son, without being blind to the merits of others, he was, as may be supposed, well versed; and he possessed a comprehensive and minute knowledge of all that concerned it, together with a multitude of details and anecdotes of its eminent men, from the earliest colonization down to the present moment, that would have made him an invaluable acquaintance to the learned and eloquent historian of the United States, who lately filled, with credit to himself, a seat in the national cabinet. He was, moreover, preëminently a business man, remarkable for his practical talents, as he evinced so clearly in the administration of his diocese, and which would have fitted him to govern a nation with equal ease and success. Upon the whole, he left on us the impression of a man of rare natural powers, of varied and profound learning, and of

being the best informed man we had ever had the honor of meeting, although his native modesty and his humility concealed the fact that such was the case, as much as possible.

Bishop Fenwick could be, when he chose, a keen and subtle disputant, and he delighted to set those who were gathered round him to disputing; but, for himself, he rarely argued, especially with the opponents of the faith. He was, of course, a perfect master of the controversy between Catholics and Protestants, but he was convinced that the best way to reach the understanding is through the heart. It is not precisely argument the enemies of the church most need, for their objections are less in the understanding than in the will. Their moral state is wrong; their affections are misplaced, and it is therefore that their minds are darkened. To do them good it is necessary to touch their hearts, and win their reason through love. Hence, he rarely resorted to argument with them. He heard them patiently, but generally replied by some appeal to the heart and conscience. He consequently discouraged controversial preaching, and enjoined it upon his clergy to be plain and practical in their instructions, and to study first of all to make their own people earnest and devout Catholics. This is not only the best way of maintaining peace and harmony in a community where there are conflicting religious views, but really the best way of propagating the truth; and it was his opinion that those sermons which are best adapted to send Catholics to their duties are the best to affect favorably the hearts of those who, unhappily, are out of the church. Those of his own sermons which we had the happiness of hearing were plain and practical expositions of duty, or earnest and affectionate addresses of a loving father to the hearts and consciences of his children. They were marked by no display of learning, or even of eloquence; and yet he could have been, if he had chosen, the first pulpit orator of the age. He had every requisite of the orator, the eye, the voice, the figure, and the manner—a clear, rich, forcible, and elevated style, a ready command of language, extensive knowledge, an exhaustless fund of varied and felicitous illustration, a free, bold, earnest, and dignified delivery, appropriate and graceful action. But his natural modesty, his deep humility, his abiding sense of his responsibility as a shepherd of souls made him shrink from whatever could look like display, and study to feed his flock rather than distinguish himself, and lead them to love and obey their Saviour rather than to lose themselves in admiration of their pastor.

We have spoken of Bishop Fenwick's humility. This was, perhaps, the most striking trait in his character. It gave to his whole character that placid beauty, and that inexpressible charm, which made his society so delightful, and which so endeared him to our hearts. He rarely spoke of himself, and when he did, it was always evident that his mind was not preoccupied with himself. He spoke of the transactions in which he had taken part, nay, in which he had been the sole actor, as if he had had no connection with them. He held no prominent place in his own eyes. He was not merely indifferent to praise, but seemed to have risen to that sublime degree of humility which takes pleasure in being contemned. He was happy in opportunities to humble himself the deeper before God. Through grace his spirit had become as sweet, as gentle, as docile, as that of the little child, of whom our Saviour said—"Of such is the kingdom of heaven." He had long ceased to live for himself, and he was incapable of thinking how this or that would or would not affect his own reputation. He chose always the lowest seat, and was anxious only to draw out and encourage others. He made himself nothing for Christ's sake, and was free and strong for whatever there was for him to do. It was a lesson and a blessing to contemplate one so truly eminent for his abilities and acquirements, able to rank with the greatest men and most learned scholars of the age, making himself of no account, completely annihilating himself, for the love of God and the good of souls, and emulous only of serving the lowest and assisting those who were most in need of being assisted. It abashed one's pride, made him ashamed of arrogating any thing to himself, and feel that nothing is truly estimable, save so far as consecrated to the greater glory of God.

It is hardly necessary to speak of this good father's tender solicitude for the flock committed to his charge. Every member was dear to him, and he took a lively interest in each one's concerns, temporal as well as spiritual. They were all his children, and no father's heart ever warmed with more generous affection, or overflowed with more tender solicitude. He lived only to serve them, and he brought all his energies to bear in devising ways and means to benefit them, both here and hereafter. Their joy was his joy, their sorrow was his sorrow. Especially was he the father of the poor. He gave every thing he had, even the very considerable estate he had inherited, and, if all were not amply

provided for, it was only because his purse was not so large as his heart. He carried his kindness and paternal love even to those who did not always make a suitable return; and possessed, preëminently, the power of rendering good for evil. No ingratitude ever discouraged him; no unworthy recipients of his bounty ever induced him to abandon or reproach them. If, as rarely happened, some rude or violent member of his flock forgot what was due to their father, he felt no resentment, but melted in compassion for the offender. All who had any real or fancied grievances were permitted to tell their story in their own way, were listened to with patience, and dismissed with gentleness and the paternal blessing. Yet his remarkable patience and gentleness, so obvious to all who were in the way of observing his intercourse with all sorts of people, were the work of grace; for we are inclined to think he was, naturally, somewhat impatient and irascible. This trait in his character was, therefore, all the more beautiful, for it proved the victory of grace over nature. The victory was complete; if nature showed sometimes a disposition to rebel, she was instantly suppressed, and nothing was seen but the meekness, gentleness, and forbearance of divine grace.

Bishop Fenwick's consideration for the feelings of others was another beautiful trait in his character. He could not bear to give the least pain to another, and he studied to hide his excessive tenderness under an affectation of harshness and severity, which, however, only made it the more apparent. He delighted to have his children, especially his clergy, around him, and was never happier than when they shared freely his boundless hospitality. Nothing could be more delightful than to mark his kindness to them and their love and veneration for him. Nothing was constrained, nothing was cold or distant. It was truly the reunion of the father and his children. No one was overlooked; no one was unwelcome; and we have often admired the unaffected, the apparently unconscious, consideration shown to the feelings of each one present. If one had been longer absent than usual, without any sufficient reason, or seemed to show that he doubted whether he was perfectly welcome or not, the conversation was always sure to take such a turn, and without any one's being able to perceive when or how, as to make him certain that his absence had been regretted, and that, if any thing had occurred to wound his sensibility, it was unintended, and would be atoned for at any sacrifice.

All this was done so naturally, so spontaneously, so unconsciously, so from the heart, that none but a very nice and practised observer could detect or suspect it.

He ever studied to make others happy, and his joy was always to see himself surrounded by glad hearts and smiling faces. He had had his trials, and trials of no ordinary severity; he had met with many things, in the administration of his diocese, to grieve his paternal heart; but he never permitted his own afflictions to cloud his brow, or that of another. With him all was smooth and sunny, and you imagined that he was free from all solicitude, and that no care ever oppressed him. This trait in his character was strikingly displayed all through his long and painful illness. He had naturally a vigorous constitution, and had always enjoyed robust health. In 1844, he assured us that he knew sickness only by seeing it in others. When, therefore, he was taken down in the early part of the last winter, we all felt, and he must himself have felt, that it would most likely go hard with him, and that his recovery was, at best, extremely doubtful. But his habitual cheerfulness never for a moment deserted him. He knew how much we all loved him, and how painful it would be to his flock to feel that he was suffering, and that there was danger that he would be removed from them; and he made light of his disease, continued as playful as ever, compelling us to forget, when with him, that he was ill and dying. He rarely alluded to his illness; answered to our inquiries, that he was well or very nearly well; talked of matters and things in general, and of his plans for the church, for his people, as if nothing ailed him, and really made one feel that his sufferings were but trifling. He would have no one afflicted on his account; and up to the Saturday previous to his death sat in his usual place, talked in his usual lively and brilliant strain, and the stranger admitted to his table would not have dreamed that he was not in his usual health. And yet, none of this time was he free from suffering. For nine months he had not lain down, and had no means of resting himself but in changing from one chair to another.

They who knew him were not surprised that he bore his long, tedious, and painful illness without a single complaint, a single murmur, and that he manifested never the least impatience, but exhibited throughout the whole the most perfect gentleness and resignation; for they expected no less. He felt that suffering was good for him, and he was

thankful for it. If needed as a purgatory, it was better to have it here than hereafter; if not so needed, it would only afford the opportunity of acquiring a larger stock of merit. Death had and could have no terrors for him. To our remark, in the early stages of his sickness, that we were unable to look upon death as a thing to be dreaded, he mildly rebuked us, and replied, "It is a great thing to die"; but when the opinion of the physicians was communicated to him, that his disease must prove fatal, he exhibited not the least emotion, not the slightest change of look, tone, or manner. He said his own opinion was different, but it was best to act as if it were not. He subsequently rallied, and many thought he would recover; those who saw him daily, and knew the nature of his disease, thought otherwise. But when he was taken down for the last time, on Saturday previous to the Tuesday on which he died,—when it was evident to all that his departure was at hand, and Bishop Fitzpatrick told him that hope was gone, and he must die, he exhibited no more emotion than on the former occasion. He simply replied, calmly and in his usual tone, "In the name of God, then, let us prepare." He recollected himself for a few moments, and then made his confession and received the last sacraments. From that time till Tuesday forenoon, his sufferings were great and almost unremitted, but he bore them without a murmur, without a groan; was cheerful as usual, and consoled those of his children around him as long as the power of speech remained.

Of his truly edifying death we cannot speak in detail. It was what was to have been expected from his life. He retained his faculties and his recollection to the last moment. He knew the change that was taking place, but it did not take him by surprise. All his life had been but a preparation for it, yet he made all the acts and preparations the time and the occasion required. He who had never left him, who, through all his sickness, had nursed him with the tender affection of the son and the tenderer charity of the Christian, stood by him, whispering suitable aspirations in his ear, which he repeated after him. His last words were, "*In te, Domine, speravi, non confundar in æternum.*" As he repeated the words, half formed, the agony seized him; he stretched forth his hands as if for absolution and the last indulgence, which were given; some one thought they heard him respond, "*Amen*"; the agony was over; the spirit was emancipated, and its joy was reflected on that countenance which had been so dear to us all.

We have nothing more to add. His monument is in the grateful recollections of his people, whom he fed with the bread of life, and governed with equal affection and wisdom for over twenty years. Everywhere in his diocese we may read the proofs of his paternal solicitude, his wisdom and energy, his devotion to the people of his charge, and of his having lived and labored with no thought but for the greater glory of God, and the advancement of the church. He has stamped his character on his diocese, and his influence will continue to be felt till that day comes when the elements shall melt with fervent heat, and the heavens and the earth be dissolved. He found his diocese with only three small churches, and one priest; he leaves it with nearly fifty churches, and as many priests. His flock was poor, small, and scattered; his means, saving his paternal inheritance, all of which he expended for the church, were to be created. Yet he succeeded in creating them, and, to no small extent, in providing for the wants of his diocese. He relieved the poor, paid especial attention to the education and training of the young, and finally crowned his well-spent life with the erection of that noble monument to his love of learning and his zeal for his people, the College of the Holy Cross, at Worcester, destined to be, if the youngest, yet the first, of the noble literary institutions of New England, and where the grateful student long shall kneel at his tomb, and pray that he may be like him, and his last end like his.

His remains, on the Thursday after his death, were carried in procession, an immense concourse of people following, from the Cathedral of the Holy Cross to the railroad depot, from there on the cars to the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, where they were deposited agreeably to his wish and his special request. *Requiescat in pace.* Take him all in all he was such a man as heaven seldom vouchsafes us. It will be long before we look upon his like again. But he has been ours; he has left his light along our pathways; he has blessed us all by his pure example and his labors of love, and we are thankful. We bless God that he gave him to us: we bless God that he has seen fit to remove him from his labors to his rest.

Not Catholics alone wept his removal. Our whole city seemed to feel that one of her firmest supports was taken away. Religious differences and prejudices for the moment were hushed, for it was felt that God was speaking. The conduct of our citizens during his sickness and the funeral

solemnities was what we expected from Bostonians, and induced many a regret that they are not more generally members of that church which alone can exalt their proverbial philanthropy into charity, and give to their benevolence and energy a direction safe for themselves and glorious for humanity.

Bishop Fenwick is succeeded by his former coadjutor, the Right Reverend John Bernard Fitzpatrick, a native Bostonian, born November 1. 1812. He received his early education in the public schools of this city; he made his humanities and philosophy at Montreal, Canada, and his theology at the Seminary of St. Sulpice, Paris. He was selected by Bishop Fenwick to succeed him, and we may be permitted to trust that not all of the father we have lost will disappear in the one we have found. Long may his life be spared to us, and, when called to the reward of his labors, may he be followed by the tears and benedictions of his people! The church is now firmly established in this diocese; the principal obstacles have been overcome; and its course will be constantly onward, if Catholics are only careful to practise the requirements of their holy religion.

ARCHBISHOP HUGHES.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1874.]

MR. KEHOE has been very successful in collecting the scattered writings of the late eminent Archbishop of New York, and placing them within the reach of the general public; but he would have more fully discharged his duties as editor if he had added more copious notes, explanatory of the several historical events and occasions which called them forth, or the exigencies they were intended to meet. The volumes would thus have contained a very complete history of the church in New York, we might almost say in the

* *Complete works of the* MOST REV. JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Archbishop of New York. Comprising his Sermons, Letters, Lectures, Speeches, etc., carefully compiled from the best sources, and edited by LAWRENCE KEHOE. New York: 1873.

United States, from 1838 to 1864. But this would have required no little labor, and would have swollen the volumes to an immoderate size ; yet we hope it will be done before it is too late.

Archbishop Hughes was a man of action rather than a man of study, and he kept his eyes open to almost every movement at home or abroad that seemed likely to affect, in any degree, favorably or unfavorably, Catholic interests. We have had among our prelates closer students, more accomplished scholars, more learned doctors, profounder theologians, but we have known none among them who surpassed him in energy of character and bold and decided action. His action might not always seem judicious to his episcopal brethren, nor did it always meet in all respects their approval ; but his activity was great and ceaseless, and extended to every thing that could affect the public interests of Catholics. His mind was broad and comprehensive, and he seemed to labor especially to gain for the church a public recognition and position in the country, which she was entitled to indeed, but had not hitherto enjoyed. He appeared to believe in political agitation, and to aim, by the aid of Catholic votes, to force the legislature to recognize and protect the equal rights of Catholics : and consequently, to those outside, he seemed to be a politician using his power over his people as a Catholic bishop to gain political ascendancy for his church. Hence he accidentally strengthened *their* false pretence, that the church is simply a political body aiming at political power, the most formidable objection urged in our times against her. Yet this was unjust to the illustrious prelate. He undoubtedly did labor to secure to Catholics, through political or legislative action, the practical enjoyment of the equal rights and freedom of conscience guaranteed to them by the constitution, but which an unjust and tyrannical anti-Catholic public opinion denied them, as it does still ; but he asked only justice and equality, and justice and equality to Catholics mean, in the minds of non-Catholics, the political ascendancy of Catholics. These non-Catholic countrymen of ours cannot believe that they stand on a footing of equality with Catholics, unless they have the power to govern, oppress, and enslave them. They are equal only when they are superior.

Protestants can never understand that the same laws may bear very unequally on them and on Catholics. The general law with regard to church property, which regards the parish

as the unit, or as complete in itself, works no injury to Protestants, for with them, unless the Methodists form an exception, the parish or congregation is the unit. But with Catholics the case is very different. With Catholics the unit is the diocese, not the parish or congregation, and the temporalities, according to the law of the church, are held and administered by the spiritual authority, whether that of the bishop or of the bishop and his chapter, not by the laity, as with Protestants. In the law which vests the temporalities of the church in the hands of lay trustees chosen by the congregation, there is no violation or oppression of conscience in the case of Protestants; but in the case of Catholics it is far otherwise, for it conflicts with the constitution and laws of the church. The public-school law is open to a similar objection. Nothing can be more equal on its face, or more unequal or unjust in its operation. It works no violence to the conscience of Protestants, for they have no conscience against recognizing the state as educator—so long as they can control the state, and they have really no concrete religion or morality which they hold to be the basis of all sound public or private education; but Catholics are conscientiously opposed to the state as educator, and hold education to be exclusively the function of the church. They are conscientiously opposed to separating secular education from religious instruction and discipline; they have a concrete, specific, and definite religion, opposed to the vague generalities and abstractions of the sects that recognize no religion in particular, “and assert at best only a common Christianity,” which is equivalent to no Christianity at all. They are conscientiously opposed to the public schools for their children. They cannot with a good conscience send their children to them, and yet they are taxed their quota and their rightful proportion of the public school funds to support them. Is not this unequal and unjust?

Now it must be manifest to all right-minded persons, that the archbishop, in warring against these and similar wrongs done to his church and people, and in striving to secure the equality to which they are entitled by the constitution or fundamental law of the state, did not travel beyond the sphere of his duty as a Catholic bishop, and by no means justified the senseless charge, that he was grasping at political power, so persistently made against him. Of his boldness, energy, and perseverance in asserting the rights of Catholics, there can be no doubt, and just as little of the ex-

traordinary influence he wielded even over non-Catholics in his day. As long as he lived, he was a power in the land, and a power that politicians and statesmen felt that they must reckon with. Whether his measures or methods were always the wisest or most judicious possible, it is not within our province to decide or even to inquire. We know that he filled a large space in the public mind, and that he gave in his own diocese, perhaps far beyond it, a position to the church and to Catholics which they had never before occupied in this heretical and infidel country, and which they have hardly maintained since his death. In his own diocese he overawed and rendered comparatively harmless both the so-called Native American and Know-Nothing parties, and effectually protected his people from their wild fanaticism.

The archbishop was supposed to be fond of power, and he certainly watched with a jealous eye every individual or combination of individuals that threatened to become too strong for him to control. He would suffer no one among Catholics to acquire an independent power. But, though we personally suffered from the jealousy with which he guarded his own authority, and perhaps had some right to feel aggrieved at his occasional public criticisms, we are sure that he was not moved by any inordinate love of power, or by any thing but his clear conviction, and let us add, just conviction, of the danger of the growth of any power in a diocese too strong for its ordinary to control, or which, if assuming the attitude of opposition, might create embarrassment for authority. On this point his experience had made him extremely sensitive, and so sensitive, it is possible, as sometimes to lead him to suspect individuals unnecessarily, but from no vulgar principle or motive. He knew a bishop's authority in his diocese, which he holds by the grace of God and the appointment of the Holy See, cannot be resisted or impeded without the gravest injury to religion, and that it is the duty of the bishop to maintain his authority against all opposition, and at all hazards, and to see that it is duly respected by all, cleric or laic, under his charge. He is appointed to *govern*, and though he is required by the law of Christ to govern as a father, or as the shepherd his flock, he is nevertheless required to govern; and the history of the church shows that far more evil results from the neglect of prelates to exert their full authority, than from their too strenuous assertion of it. Better, in government, to be too rigid than too lax. Discipline must be rigidly maintained, or ruin ensues.

The archbishop, knowing that his flock was composed of the faithful of various nations, was extremely vigilant to suppress the first symptom of a tendency among them to divide according to their respective nationalities, and though the Catholics of American origin were the weakest and least numerous portion of his flock, he was especially severe against any union or movement among them apparently designed to carry their own nationality into the church. There was at one time a small club in this city, composed of priests and laymen, chiefly neo-Americans or sons of foreign-born parents, supposed to have some such object in view, and we ourselves were made to suffer not a little, for our supposed connection with it, and presumed intention of making the *Review* the organ of an American party among Catholics. What the real purpose of the club was, we never knew; we were never a member of it, and never met with it but once, and then only as an invited guest. We never dreamed of forming an American party in the church, and never united with those who demanded a native-born clergy, for it was always a matter of indifference to us where a bishop or priest was born or to what nationality he belonged, if he understood the wants of his diocese or of his mission, since we always held the church superior to all distinctions of race or nation. All we ever contended was that an American on his conversion to the church is not required by his religion to renounce his American nationality, and that foreign nationalities, domiciled on American soil, should treat his nationality with respect, not, as we sometimes found them doing, with contempt.

The question was raised by the organization of the Native American and Know-Nothing parties, and we as a Catholic publicist had to meet it, and we aimed to meet it without denying our own nationality, or confessing ourselves a foreigner in our native country, as also without offending the susceptibilities of any foreign-born Catholic. The question is now out of date; for the struggle now is not to vindicate the right of Americans to remain Americans after conversion, but to prevent foreign-born Catholics and their children born here from americanizing too rapidly, and thus in a great measure losing, with their old national customs and usages, the rich virtues of their Catholic ancestors. The archbishop was undoubtedly right in suppressing, by the weight of his character still more than by his episcopal authority, the first symptom of an American party among

Catholics, but he misapprehended us, and some of our clerical friends, when he supposed that we wished to form such a party, or that we aimed at any thing more than to assert that an American, although a Catholic, has as good right to be an American in America, as an Irishman has to be an Irishman in Ireland, or a Frenchman to be a Frenchman in France, and that it is the duty of all foreign settlers in the country, naturalized or not, to recognize and respect that right. We therefore refused to defend our Catholic population against the Know-Nothing and Native American parties, by separating ourselves from our countrymen, in so far as American, or by renouncing our American nationality; for that would have served only to confirm the charge against the church, namely, that one cannot be a Catholic and a loyal American, which these parties brought against her. The question, in the form in which it came up in 1854 and 1855, is antiquated now, but were it to come up anew, we, probably, should avoid some expressions we used formerly, but we should meet it substantially in the same manner, though less gravely; for we see more clearly now than we did then, that the charge is a mere pretext, and not seriously made by the leaders of our anti-Catholic countrymen.

It would be the basest ingratitude on the part of the Catholic American to entertain any prejudice against foreign-born Catholics, whether cleric or laic, for it is to them principally that we owe the upbuilding and extension of Catholicity in our country. We would not withhold the meed of praise from those old American Catholics who held fast to the faith and sustained it when to be a Catholic was to incur almost universal odium: but it cannot be denied that the growth of Catholicity with us began with the more recent migration hither of foreign Catholics, and their settlement in the country. Very few of our bishops and clergy have been of the old American stock, and certainly the most energetic and efficient laborers in the American vineyard, whose toil, privations, and sacrifices God has so richly blessed, have nearly all come to us from old Catholic nations. We are debtors to every nation in Europe, principally to France, Ireland, and Germany. We do not find that native American priests are a whit more successful or more acceptable than foreign-born priests. There is no reason for demanding an exclusively native-born clergy.

In all ages of the church her most formidable enemy has been nationalism, that is to say, gentilism, in some one or

other of its various forms; that is, again, the city of the world, in the language of St. Augustine, set up over against the city of God. The demand for a national clergy, whenever and wherever made, is prompted, not by the spirit of Christ, but the spirit of Satan, who governs in the city of the world. In the city of God there is neither Jew nor gentile, neither Greek nor barbarian. In the spiritual order all national distinctions are effaced, as also all distinctions of race or complexion, of noblemen and simple men, of rich and poor, and of bond and free. These distinctions obtain in the city of the world, but cannot enter the city of God. The New Testament recognizes no such virtue as patriotism, the highest virtue known to the gentile world. In so far as love of country is subordinated to the love of God, it is a natural virtue and not censurable, but it is never in itself a distinctively Christian virtue, any more than is the natural love of husband and wife, or of parents and children. The demand for a national church or a national clergy is anti-Catholic, for it is a demand that the city of God should be modelled after and subordinated to the city of the world. We, who have always opposed Catholicity to nationalism, and held that the church as the spiritual order, is above all national or race distinctions, and supreme over all men and nations, never could have so far forgotten our logic as to join in any demand of the sort.

We hope we shall be pardoned these references to matters on which it was supposed at the time that there was a misunderstanding between us and our venerable archbishop, and which unpleasantly affected our standing as a Catholic publicist. We were, on other questions, especially on the emancipation of the slaves as a war measure, not in accord with the archbishop. He wrote or dictated in the *Metropolitan Record* a severe criticism on an article of ours, entitled *Slavery and the War*, opposing the policy we recommended, but which the government found itself ultimately obliged to adopt. He hoped, with his old friend William H. Seward, secretary of state, that the war could be ended and the Union saved without disturbing in the states that seceded the relation of master and slave. We thought differently (and were right, as the event proved), if the war was to go on; yet we could not maintain our Catholic standing against the weight of the archbishop's influence. We complain not of this, for it was fitting that his authority should be sustained, though the question was mainly politi-

cal and national, not religious, and one in which we were free to follow our own convictions. The archbishop once said to us, "I will suffer no man in my diocese that I cannot control. I will either put him down or he shall put me down." We do not object to the principle; no bishop should suffer, if able to prevent it, the rise within his jurisdiction of any power, in opposition to his authority, too strong for him to control. We suppose he regarded us not unlikely to become dangerous, and therefore felt it his duty "to put us down," though we do not think we were ever powerful enough, however ill-disposed, to be dangerous, and we know that we were never capable of resisting legitimate authority. At no time had authority to do more than to speak in its own name to be obeyed, and obeyed cheerfully. The difficulty was, as we assured the cardinal prefect of the Propaganda, that we refused to recognize as the voice of authority an anonymous article in a newspaper. The archbishop was somewhat in the habit of exacting, for unsigned articles in a public journal, the obedience due only to his pastoral authority. If a bishop writes as a journalist we hold he waives his episcopal authority, and places himself, so far, on a par with other journalists.

Archbishop Hughes wrote much for the journals. He had not only a paper of his own devoted to Catholic interests, in which he frequently wrote the leading editorial article, but he entered the secular journals, sometimes under his own and sometimes under an assumed name, in order to repel attacks on himself or his church, and to vindicate the equal rights of Catholics. His articles and letters are able, adroit, and for the most part conclusive against his opponents. In vindicating the rights and inviolability of conscience, he was not always careful, however, to distinguish between the civil rights of American citizens, and their theological or spiritual rights, and left it to be inferred, though falsely inferred, that man has the right before God to be of any religion he chooses, or even of no religion, which would absolve heresy and infidelity from all sinfulness or moral blame. Before the state or civil law, in this country at least, a man is free to be of any religion he pleases, and is entitled to the protection of the law in its free and full enjoyment; but before the moral law, before God, no man has the right to be of any religion but the Catholic religion, the one only true religion. Heresy and infidelity are not civil offences in this country, but they are deadly sins.

None more so. There may be cases in which the man who adheres, as we have elsewhere said, through invincible ignorance or invincible necessity, to a heresy or to unbelief, may be excused from the sin of heresy or infidelity; but no one can be saved without the true faith, for without it there is no remission of sins, and no one can have the positive virtue, to which heaven is given as a reward. It would be unjust to the archbishop to suppose that he was either ignorant of this distinction or that he denied it. We know personally, from his own lips, that he was theologically as intolerant as our *Review* had ever been, and that is saying enough. But having in his various controversies to vindicate only the civil rights of Catholics under the American constitution and laws, which recognize the freedom and equal right of all religions in the civil order, he was not called upon to discuss the rights of heresy and infidelity, or their character in the moral or spiritual order.

In reading his collected writings, nearly all of which were called forth by the circumstances of the day or the hour, we are struck with the immense difficulties that had to be overcome before the church here could receive her regular organization, discipline be introduced and carried out, and she be enabled to take up, so to speak, her regular march to the conquest of souls for her Lord. The greatest of these difficulties did not come from without, at least not the most vexatious. There were not a few refractory priests in proportion to the whole number of Catholics in the country, and not a few of the laity were slow in learning that the democratic principle recognized in the state, and usually confounded with liberty, because it emancipates the people from all legitimate authority and asserts their right to do collectively whatever they please, has no place in the constitution and government of the church. The church has her own constitution and laws, and her own officers, whose rights and powers, derived through the supreme pontiff from God, are independent of the people, and are the same in all ages and nations, whatever the form of civil government adopted or maintained. In monarchical states the prince, in democratic states the people, that is the laity, combat this independence of the church, and ordinarily insist on having a voice in the ecclesiastical administration, at least in the management of the church's temporalities, and always are there found priests, and sometimes even bishops, so forgetful of the rights as well as the duties of their order,

as to support the laical pretensions whether of princes or of people.

The laity have always been, from Ananias and Saphira down to our own times, slow to learn that, while free to give or not to give to the church of their substance, yet when once given, it is no longer theirs; it is the Lord's, and passes from their control. Protestants, recognizing no real church, and no real distinction between cleric and laic, spiritual and temporal, do not need to learn this lesson, and therefore very properly retain in the hands of the laity the proprietorship and management of the goods devoted to religious and eleemosynary purposes. There is no incongruity in the vestry or wardens of an Episcopalian congregation closing the door of their meeting-house—church, they call it—against the bishop of the diocese, and forbidding him to enter within its walls; for an Episcopalian bishop has no authority to govern, and in no sense represents the spiritual order, even in his own diocese. He can perform, when invited and where permitted, certain episcopal functions, but he is little else than a figure-head, and the power is congregational, vested in the rector and wardens, or in the wardens alone. But for Catholics the bishop is the church in his diocese, subject to no lay authority, and responsible only to the supreme pontiff; and to be separated from the bishop is to be separated from the church.

The laity intervened in the government of the church in this country through lay trustees chosen by the congregation, and in whom all church property was vested. The bishop was rendered dependent on the several congregations of his diocese, and the pastor, instead of governing his congregation, was, through lay trustees, in a measure governed by them, as among Protestants, with whom the sheep govern the shepherd. It is difficult to estimate the injury done to the church for years by lay trustees; and the archbishop of New York fought and won no more important battle than that which from the first he waged against the system, substantially that of Bismarck in Germany. By his boldness and energy he put it down in his own diocese, and we hear little complaint of it now elsewhere. It exists in name, but only in such form as to be unable to offer any obstacle to the spiritual authority of the diocese. The bishop and pastor have in each particular congregation in the several dioceses of this state, and also some other states, the power to control their action, as well as to appoint or displace at

will the lay members of the board. The spiritual authority is thus rendered, as it should be, independent of the laity in all ecclesiastical matters, and the consequence is that schisms are now rarely attempted, unity of action is secured, the church is governed by her own laws, and religion prospers.

How far the archbishop, by his writings in the public journals, contributed to soften or to embitter opposition from without, is a question which it is not necessary for us to raise or to discuss. His example in this respect, the other bishops and archbishops of the country have not generally followed. Some of them doubt its expediency, some regard it as incompatible with the episcopal dignity, and prefer saying what they deem it necessary to say to the public in the form of pastorals or *mandements* addressed to the people of their charge, and others probably have no taste for newspaper controversy, and shrink, as much as possible, from public notoriety. To the outside public, Archbishop Hughes was looked upon as our only live bishop, and as embodying in himself, so to speak, the whole Catholic hierarchy in the United States. He was supposed to be omnipotent with the whole Catholic population. But this grew out of the fact that his name was more frequently seen in the papers, or appeared more prominently before the public; but in reality other bishops, whose names were seldom mentioned outside of Catholic circles and never in connection with politics, were not less influential than he, and quite as efficient workers in their own sacred vocation. Not always do they who occasion the most noise or attract the most public attention effect the most. Yet certain it is, that Archbishop Hughes was one of the most remarkable and efficient prelates the church in the United States has ever had. He was a prelate of large views, great firmness and decision of character, ceaseless activity, and untiring industry. We will not say he never made any mistakes, or misjudged the time for raising and discussing certain great questions; nor will we say the contrary. Time and events have proved that he was right in many things in which we thought him wrong, or at least injudicious, at the time, and it is not for us to say that he was not always right, wise, and judicious. We are laymen, and not judges of episcopal administration.

Archbishop Hughes was a large-hearted man, a man of deep and earnest feeling, and of warm and tender affections. He was severe only when he felt it his duty to be severe;

he could not relax discipline, but he was always open and ready to pardon offences against himself, and to give the offender a new chance. He was a true, kind, and faithful friend, and we remember, and as long as we live we shall remember with deepest gratitude, his many acts of kindness and regard shown, for years, to us personally, and which, we grieve to say, we did not sufficiently appreciate at the time. He disapproved in later years, in some respects, the course of the *Review*, as did many other prelates, though not more than we ourselves disapprove it now; but he never treated us harshly, or with personal unkindness. He was not one of those who preferred charges against us to the Holy See: but in the very height of the opposition wrote us that he had written to Rome, giving the Holy See assurance of his full confidence in our personal orthodoxy. We mention this fact in proof of his generous nature, and to correct an impression entertained at the time, by some of our friends, to the contrary. He had a large and generous nature, and not a few of the elements of a great man, the greatest we have ever known; and though we own we had at the time unjust prejudices against him, for his treatment of others rather than of ourselves, we felt, when told of his death, that Catholics had lost a protecting power, a father who could shield us from our enemies. We felt personally orphaned, left desolate, and helpless; that no man was left us who could fill his place, and act his part. He was, whatever his imperfections, a providential man; he did a great work, was an honor to the hierarchy, and a glory to the land of his birth.

Of his writings here collected in two goodly volumes, we can attempt no review. They are well known to the public, and have been already adjudged. "I hope," said the archbishop to us *à propos* of Bishop England's Works, then just collected and published, "that no one will venture, when I am dead, to collect and publish my various writings. It would be an injustice to my memory, a grave injury to my reputation. All that I have written has been written hastily to meet some pressing occasion, and is crude and unfinished. I have written nothing which I wish to be preserved, or by which I am willing to be judged." We think he undervalued his writings, though he felt, as every really able writer must feel in looking back on what he has written, that it does not do him justice. It is but a small part, and that by no means the best part of what passes in the

mind of a writer, that he can express in his writings, and every writer worthy of the name feels that his happiest efforts fall infinitely short of his ideal, and express only the least, and perhaps, the least worthy part of himself. Every really great man, every man of real genius as an author, reads over, if read over he can, with a deep feeling of humiliation, the best things he has written, even when not marred by the errors of the press. The archbishop usually wrote under the pressure of the occasion, and when the pressure was removed and the natural excitement subsided, his writing, thought it had effected its purpose, seemed to him of little or no permanent value. We cannot accept his estimate of his own writings, they all have at least a permanent historical value, if no other, and much other they certainly have.

All the writings of Dr. Hughes indicate a writer of unmistakable genius. They are all written in a clear, forcible, chaste, and dignified style. Their diction is pure and choice, and often remarkably felicitous. The author was an accomplished rhetorician, and we may add, as all who ever heard him speak, know full well, a graceful, dignified, and most impressive orator. He was one of the ablest, most pleasing, and effective preachers we have ever listened to. Much under the medium size in fact, he always left the impression that he was far above it. His head was large, his features were noble and masculine, and his look was commanding, even majestic. His wit as a writer was keen and delicate, but his logic was not always equal to his rhetoric or his wit. His writings were popular, eloquent, and effective, but not remarkable for that higher logic which always seizes the ultimate principle on which depends the solution of the question before one; and his conclusions, though valid against his actual opponents, are not always valid against all classes of objectors, and leave something to be said after him.

This was the principal defect, as we regard it, of the illustrious archbishop's mind, or at least of his intellectual culture. He was in the habit of taking practical views of all questions, and of acting according to circumstances. In discussing a question he rarely states distinctly the principle on which the question turns, and gives it only in his practical solution, from which it is not always easy to gather it. In this respect he resembled the English and American Protestant writers, rather than the higher class of Catholic

authors, and fails sometimes to satisfy the demands of the thoroughly trained Catholic theologian or philosopher. You cannot readily reduce his argument to its principle, but are obliged to take it as a whole, as rhetorical rather than as logical. He was not what is called a suggestive writer. He enlightens the question distinctly before him, but throws little light on collateral problems. He has, so to speak, no side lights. In reading him you get the answer to the direct question discussed, but nothing more, no principle which enables you to solve various kindred, though at first sight, unrelated problems. He has in this the advantage of being always intelligible, and of having his whole thought and its bearings grasped at once, for there is no more in it than appears. Such a writer is always, in no objectionable sense of the word, a popular writer; while those we call suggestive writers, who seek to solve all particular questions by the light of universal or ultimate principles, are never popular, and are appreciated only by the few who study as well as read them; for there is more in them than appears on the surface, and more than the ordinary reader ever thinks of looking for.

As a controversialist Dr. Hughes was adroit, diplomatic, and subtle, sometimes too subtle and refined, and puzzled and silenced his opponent without absolutely refuting him. His Oral Discussion with Breckenridge, especially in the part in which he undertakes to prove that Presbyterianism is hostile to civil liberty, did not satisfy us, when as a Catholic we read it; we accepted the proposition, but not for the reasons assigned. So, in the Letter to General Cass, vindicating Catholics from the charge of having ever oppressed the consciences of Protestants. He denies the charge on the ground that conscience is interior, what is most intimate in man, and therefore beyond the reach of external violence or oppression. Yet he had himself complained that Protestant powers had oppressed the consciences of Catholics. He replied to the charge in a sense in which General Cass did not make it. The charge of course was false, but not for the reason the archbishop assigned. There is and can be no conscience against God, and conscience is oppressed, and its freedom violated only when one is forbidden by the civil law to conform to the law of God infallibly promulgated. But the archbishop, we suppose, did not judge it wise or prudent to adopt this line of defence; for it was directly in face and eyes of the

American doctrine of the liberty of conscience, which he seems on all occasions to have studiously avoided contradicting. The syllabus had not been published before his last sickness, which was to terminate in his lamented death, though Gregory XVI. of immortal memory, had condemned in one of his encyclicals the false doctrine of liberty of conscience, as asserted by this heretical and infidel age, and defended even by so-called liberal Catholics.

We accept what is called civil toleration, at least as a necessity of our times and country, and are satisfied where the church in the civil order is placed, as with us, on an equality with the sects; but nothing shall induce us ever to defend the sects as having any rights of conscience before God or against his church. In the spiritual order heresy, infidelity, error, have no rights, whatever they may have in the civil order. They may in certain cases, as we have said, be excusable through invincible ignorance or invincible necessity; but every one is morally bound to believe the truth, to obey the law of God, and to have a *good* conscience. We know no error more fatal to the soul and to society itself than that which resolves truth into each man's opinion of what it is, and the law of God into what each one for himself judges it to be. We respect and defend the real liberty of conscience, but we are aware of no error which it is more necessary to oppose *à outrance* than the false doctrine of liberty of conscience, only another name for indifferentism, which our age and country so generally profess.

The greater part of the archbishop's writings were called forth in the discharge of his official duties, and have a permanent value as historical documents, as throwing light on the difficulties our bishops have had to contend with, even down to the present moment, and the severe trials they have had to undergo in order to place the church in the United States in its present healthful and prosperous condition. Their trials and difficulties are not yet over, and never will be so long as human depravity remains, and men retain their free-will. But we think they have been lessened, and there is probably no country in which the church is freer and her pastors have more to encourage or more to console them, than in these United States; and that it is so is due, as far as our knowledge goes, to no one man more than to the late Most Rev. Dr. Hughes, the first archbishop of New York. He was a man for his day, and for the

important city in which was his see. His memory will long remain in the church, and his labors will only be the more highly appreciated as time goes on. We trust that he still remembers the people of his charge, and aids them by his prayers in the goodly company of the angels and the spirits of just men made perfect.

We have not written his panegyric, a task to which we are not competent; we have only attempted to give a few traits of his character, chiefly as they came under our own personal observation, or were brought out by our personal relations with him. We were no blind admirer of his during his life, and we frankly confess that we often did him injustice in our thoughts and words too freely spoken. We have written what we have from a desire to repair as far as possible any injustice we did him, as well as to show our high appreciation of his character in its external relations. The task was for us a delicate one, for it is well known that, though we never fell under his official censure, we did fall under the lash of the archbishop's unofficial criticism, which was not at all pleasant, and the perfect candor and impartiality of our judgment may reasonably be distrusted. But we have aimed to be just, and we certainly cherish the memory of the late archbishop as that of a large-hearted man, in most respects an eminently great man, and a prelate of rare energy and activity untiringly devoted to the interests of religion.

ARCHBISHOP SPALDING.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for January, 1874.]

REV. J. L. SPALDING has here paid a most affectionate tribute to the memory of his illustrious uncle, the late archbishop of Baltimore, and given us a book of rare interest and solid merit. In reading this eloquently written and handsomely printed volume, we feel a deep regret that so little has hitherto been done by Catholics to preserve the memory of the earlier bishops and missionaries who labored

* *The Life of the Most Rev. M. J. Spalding, D. D., Archbishop of Baltimore.* By J. L. SPALDING, S. T. L. New York: 1873.

long and wore out their lives in planting, amidst tears and privations, the faith in this moral wilderness; and especially we regret the scantiness of the materials preserved, at least within the reach of the student, for the early history of the church in the United States. Richard H. Clarke, in his *Lives of the Deceased Bishops*, has done something; but one is astonished, after reading his two goodly octavo volumes, to find how few facts he has been able to rescue from oblivion, and how vague and indeterminate are the impressions he gives us of the individuality of the several bishops whose lives he has professedly written. Archbishop Spalding, in his *Sketches of the Early Missionaries of Kentucky* and his *Life of Bishop Flaget*, has done much, yet the facts narrated are exceedingly scanty, almost as scanty as in general they are in the text of Alban Butler's *Lives of the Saints*.

The *Life of Archbishop Spalding* is less barren in facts and historical and biographical details, and yet it would be difficult to gather from it the history of the church, either of Louisville or of Baltimore, during his successful administration of each, and still more, a distinct and lively impression of the marked individuality of the illustrious prelate himself. Here, as elsewhere, the *disciplina arcani* seems to have been observed, and the details, which would individualize the person and throw light on the events of his life and the history of his times, are either suppressed or vaguely and indistinctly related. There appears to be too great caution observed not to blame or to offend any Catholic party. The biographer or historian tells you something happened between certain parties, but not unfrequently refrains from naming the parties or telling the reader what it was. This is very unsatisfactory. Either tell the whole fact, or forbear to allude to it. The half-light thrown on it is worse than total darkness. It shows a want of frankness on the part of the writer, and leaves the reader to suspect that there is something behind that it will not do to tell. To a certain extent this want of perfect frankness this fear of offending, or this fear of giving scandal, detracts from the merits of this admirably written *Life*, and leaves, by its reserve, those outside to fancy that we Catholics are a secret society, and have matters that need to be hushed up, or not divulged.

But enough of this. The defects in our biographical and historical literature are not very conspicuous in this *Life* of

Archbishop Spalding. The *Catholic Mirror*, seldom happy when it has not some work of real excellence to depreciate, or some namby-pamby work of no merit to extol, complains that the style of Father Spalding's Life of his uncle is too oratorical and epigrammatic for biography; but we confess that we read it with special admiration for its style, which is manly, dignified, and unaffected; clear, forcible, chaste, simple, and natural. It is long since we have read so well-written a book by any American author, and we regard it as highly creditable to our American literature. It proves the author an accomplished literary man, a deep and earnest thinker, a learned and enlightened theologian, and a devoted priest. We see in him more than the fulfilment of the promise we read in the boy, and we shall be greatly disappointed, if he does not more than make good the loss of his distinguished uncle. His book is almost the only biography worthy of the name to be found in our American Catholic literature. The author shows a breadth of view, a depth of reflection, a knowledge of the moral and spiritual wants of modern society, of the dangers of the country, and the real issues of the hour, that promise to the country an author of the first order, and to the church a distinguished servant whose memory she will long cherish, if God spares him life and health, and he continues as he has begun.

We knew the late Archbishop Spalding well when he was bishop of Louisville, and we had in him for years an efficient and highly revered friend, to whom we owe a lasting debt of gratitude. We, however, lost his friendship before he became archbishop of Baltimore, and have no reason to suppose that we ever recovered it. We corrected, in a note to one of his articles in the *Review*, on Education, an error of fact into which he had fallen in regard to the action of Napoleon III., on the Law of Instruction in France, of March, 1850. Napoleon he regarded at that time as a great man, and as sincerely devoted to Catholic interests; we, either better informed or less disposed to put our trust in princes, held the Nephew of his Uncle from the first to be, as the event has proved, the enemy, not the friend of the church, and disposed to use, not serve her. We also reviewed, courteously indeed though not favorably, his *History of the Protestant Reformation*. We thought it superficial and rather commonplace, and complained that it did not go deep enough into the question, and give us the

real, but more recondite causes of that disastrous event. Perhaps we were wrong. He certainly resented our criticism, and we fear never pardoned it. To crown our offence and fill up the measure of our iniquity, we sided with the Union, and though no abolitionist, advocated the emancipation of the slaves as a war measure.

Yet, however he may have cooled in his feelings towards us, or forgotten our existence, we never forgot his many acts of kindness to us, or ceased to revere his frank, cordial, and noble character, to honor him for his learning and ability, his singleness of purpose, and his unwearied activity in his high vocation. We regarded him as a fluent, pleasing, and graceful writer, but not remarkable for originality, depth, or vigor; but we probably underrated him, and certainly we never gave him credit for the broad and just views we find in the extracts from his correspondence in the volume before us. His gentleness, modesty, humility, and childlike simplicity most likely deceived us; but, judging from the specimens given us by his nephew, we cannot but think that he appears much greater in his correspondence than in his set writings. His writings which we read were mostly in our own line, that is, essays and reviews, and though we regarded him, with the exception of our old friendly enemy, Rev. Dr. Charles I. White, as the only Catholic writer we knew who had the knack of writing proper review articles, we thought him too diffuse and unable to condense his thoughts within a reasonable compass, and less exhaustive of his subject than was desirable. We thought him wanting in concentration and vigor of thought, and we rarely found him, what we prize very highly in a writer, suggesting more than he actually said, and it was only as a writer that we did or had any right to judge him. But the Life proves that he was far greater than we thought.

As a controversialist the archbishop seldom took the line which had been marked out for us, and to which our own taste and judgment inclined us. He seemed to us to treat Protestants, especially if Kentuckians or Marylanders, with a respect which our Protestant education and experience had rendered it impossible for us to feel. We had no confidence in the good faith of Protestants as a body, and looked upon Protestantism, long before we were admitted into the Catholic communion, as a puny affair, as made up mainly of cant and hypocrisy, and decidedly antichristian. We had never, after the age of twenty, doubted that if our

Lord founded any church at all, it was the Roman Catholic Church, and we were for years repelled from investigating its claims by finding Catholics treating Protestants as Christians, and apparently conceding that it was not necessary for them to become united to the church in order to be saved. But however conciliating we thought Dr. Spalding, it is very evident from the volume before us that his estimate of Protestants and Protestantism did not in reality differ very widely from our own. He, in fact, though more influenced by the line of controversy previously adopted by Catholics in this country, and which had become traditional, than we, a neophyte, and without the responsibility of a charge, were or could be, if able to distinguish at all between the traditions of Catholics and Catholic tradition, counted Protestantism, professing to be a religion, of little importance, and saw very clearly that the real issue of the day is between Catholicity and infidelity or rationalism. The great body of Protestants, in this country at least, will rush on to the denial of Christianity itself, in any historical or dogmatic sense, sooner than return to the church against which the reformers protested.

We have spoken of Archbishop Spalding as a writer and a controversialist. It hardly becomes us, a layman, to speak of him as a theologian or a bishop. He made his theological studies at the college of the Propaganda in Rome, and received the doctor's cap and ring after maintaining with credit, against all objectors, two hundred and fifty theses taken from universal theology and canon law. He loved Rome, had a great affection for the Italians, and we presume he was a strong anti-Gallican, at least as to the fourth of the four Gallican articles. Whether he was equally anti-Gallican in relation to the other three articles—and it by no means follows from his Roman education that he was—we have no means of knowing. His nephew tells us that Gallicanism never had any foothold in this country, which we think is hardly correct; at least, his statement is not confirmed by our experience. Archbishop Carroll, Bishops Dubois and Bruté, were, if we have not been misinformed, very decided Gallicans, and we have yet to see any proofs that Catholics of the old Maryland stock were noted for their ultramontaniam. Bishop England, the first bishop of Charleston, was an able and learned man, but an indifferent papist; inclined at least to regard the pope as restricted in his action by the councils and canons of the church, and his

authority as analogous to that of a president of the United States. He allowed himself sometimes to abuse the pope hypothetically, as we ourselves have heard even a distinguished Jesuit father do. France has always had a predominant influence on the Catholic mind here, and we are inclined to believe that it was not till after the larger number of the prelates and clergy of France had repudiated Gallicanism, that it was generally repudiated with us. Certain it is, that when we became a Catholic in 1844 we found, or thought we found, many more Gallicans than ultramontanes among Catholics.

The essential principle of Gallicanism, as we understand it, was not its denial of the infallibility of the pope, but in the denial of his spiritual independence and supremacy in the government of the church, and of men and nations. It subordinated the papacy on the one hand to the episcopacy, and on the other to the temporal order. It asserted the independence of secular governments in face of the church, or of the temporal order in face of the spiritual, which was, in principle, to emancipate the prince or the state from subjection to the law of God, and therefore favored that gangrene of modern society which we call political atheism. The infallibility of the pope, which had never been explicitly defined, was denied, because otherwise the Gallican principle could not be asserted, since the popes had again and again condemned it. Now what we found, or thought we found, was not that Catholics here as a rule formally denied the inerrancy of the pope when speaking *ex cathedra*, but that they very generally held what we have called the essential principle of Gallicanism. Of course, no Catholic held formally and expressly the political atheism on which Prince Bismarck and the Italian and Spanish governments or usurpations persecute the church, but they very generally asserted principles which, to our understanding at least, implied it, and we think not a few of them do so yet. The boast of the author that the Catholics of this country, especially Catholics of the old Maryland stock, have always been free from all taint of Gallicanism, is not, so far as our knowledge extends, justified by the facts in the case.

The archbishop, it is evident from his correspondence as published by his nephew, held the official infallibility, by divine assistance, of the supreme pontiff, when teaching, declaring, or defining the faith or matters pertaining to faith, for the universal church, and wished the Council of the

Vatican to define it, but he wished an *implicit*, not an *explicit* definition. We had hoped, before the assembling of the council, that the question would not be raised by the fathers assembled, but if raised, we hoped it would be explicitly defined, for it had already been implicitly defined in the Council of Florence. When the Council of the Vatican assembled, and the question was so furiously agitated outside of it, and such violent opposition was threatened by Gallicans, or the party of the sovereigns, it was clear to us that the council must take it up and explicitly define it. Archbishop Spalding saw this, ceased to defend the *via media* policy he had at first favored, and became one of the most ardent and uncompromising champions of the explicit definition. How great was the influence he exerted we are unable to say, but the Life, we suspect, exaggerates it, for the definition was obtained by the predominating influence of no one man, nor of any number of men, however eminent or powerful, but by the Holy Ghost, who moved in the council and determined its decision. Archbishop Spalding's influence was no doubt very great, but it was not great enough to carry with him his illustrious colleagues of Cincinnati and St. Louis, whom, from our personal intercourse with them, we had taken to be among the most decided anti-Gallicans in the country, not less so than the bishop of Boston, or the bishop of Burlington.

In the beginning Archbishop Spalding headed the so-called third party, on whom Döllinger and his set, including Count Montalembert, Lord Acton, and the late Père Gratry, relied to defeat what was called the Italian, sometimes the Jesuit faction; but when he saw that no middle course was practicable he abandoned that party, and urged with all his heart and soul an explicit definition of the papal infallibility. Believing a definition desirable, in which respect he from the first differed from the inopportunist, there was, when the *tiers parti* failed, no other course open to him; for the failure to assert explicitly the papal infallibility would have been, under the circumstances, as Döllinger and German professorhood well knew, its implicit denial. We were never able to respect the first position assumed by Archbishop Spalding, and it seemed to us inconsistent with his naturally frank and fearless character. To demand a definition, and yet to demand that it be made in an indirect and roundabout way, seemed to us hardly worthy of an eminent Catholic prelate. To oppose any

definition at all as inopportune, inexpedient, or unnecessary was an intelligible and a defensible position ; but to demand a definition, and yet oppose an explicit definition, seems to us wholly untenable. The church is no time-server, and is never afraid to tell her own mind, or to say distinctly, explicitly, and precisely what she means. It was an explicit definition, if any, that was needed, and so the council, assisted and directed by the Holy Ghost, decided, to the great joy of all Catholics.

Archbishop Spalding was, of course, a genuine Catholic, of the old Maryland stock, and the surface of his character was affected by the Maryland traditional caution, prudence, and fear of giving offence. Thus when we were about to give a lecture, at his invitation, in Louisville, then his episcopal see, he admonished us to be on our guard against saying any thing offensive to Protestants. Yet, if he was timid, it was only on the surface of his character. In his nature he was manly, bold, and fearless, and no one contributed more than he to the marked change in regard to manliness and courage that has come over the Catholic population of this country within the last thirty or forty years, or to abolish from Catholic controversy that apologetic and deprecatory tone which so disgusted us, while we were still outside of the church, and made us look upon Catholics as spiritless, mean, crouching, and cowardly, who hardly dared say, in the face of their enemies, that their souls were their own. We judged them harshly, we admit. Born and reared in the bosom of the persecuting class, we did not and could not make a proper allowance for the effect of ages of persecution or oppression on its victims. We came into the church with a bold, determined spirit, which had never been crushed by persecution, and very naturally gained among Catholics the reputation of being haughty, proud, arrogant, harsh, and overbearing, especially of being shockingly imprudent, while we thought we only exercised the firm and independent spirit that becomes the freeman, and the defender of the rights and dignity of the truth he loves and knows he possesses. The late bishop of Boston, of immortal memory, under whose direction we wrote and published, insisted that we should not confine ourselves to repelling attacks made on the church, to acting simply on the defensive, but should assume an aggressive tone, and put not Catholicity, but Protestantism on the defensive, and if possible, compel it to defend or try to defend itself. So

long as we pursued this course Dr. Spalding was among our firmest, most efficient, and generous supporters.

As bishop of Louisville and archbishop of Baltimore Dr. Spalding was an able and successful administrator, and in both he left, on his departure, the church in a prosperous condition. He was active and untiring in his labors; but in this respect he differed from none of our bishops that we have personally known. In 1854 and in 1855 we were more or less personally acquainted with nearly every bishop in the United States, and with a very large portion of the clergy, regular and secular; and we never found an indolent bishop or priest among them. We have known a few, comparatively speaking a very few, intemperate priests, but as a body, both bishops and priests, we have found them earnest, apostolic men, devoted to their work, laboring day and night, hardly allowing themselves the time necessary for sleep and refreshments; a more active and hard-working body of men, in any calling, we do not believe is to be found. They have no leisure for amusements of any sort, and find very little for friendly visits or social intercourse, except in the way of their profession. They are a self-sacrificing body, and labor without hope of reward in this life, save the joy and consolation they feel in the conversion of sinners and the prosperity of the church. Archbishop Spalding differed chiefly from the majority of his brethren, in that he acted more outside of his proper episcopal functions, as a reviewer and lecturer, but not in his untiring labors and ceaseless activity.

In our transient visits to the principle dioceses East of the Rocky Mountains, we found few dioceses which struck us as better supplied, in proportion to its Catholic population, with priests and religious institutions, or where there was more perfect harmony or greater mutual confidence between the bishop and his clergy, than that of Louisville. The academy for young ladies at Nazareth pleased us better, and had more of a home atmosphere about it than any other we have ever visited. The bishop had a great regard for religious orders and congregations, and multiplied them in his diocese. He had great faith in missions, and encouraged them, often preaching them himself. His churches were not wholly, we presume, free from debts, but apparently had no unmanageable debts. He was not in the highway of the migration from Europe, and seldom found himself overwhelmed with large bodies of poor emigrants for whom

he was called upon to provide churches and priests. Comparatively few of the poorer emigrants from Ireland or the Continent settled in his diocese, and there were few dioceses in the Union where the growth of the church was so exclusively from within, or from the older settlers of the country; though in the city of Louisville itself there were large numbers of Irish and German emigrants. The poorer emigrants remained chiefly in or nearer the Atlantic ports in which they landed, and very few sought or were provided with a home in the former slave states. The single diocese of New York contained in the time of the civil war more Catholics than were in the eleven states that seceded—a fact our European friends could never be made to believe. They would have it that the South was Catholic, and the North Puritan. Yet nowhere in the Union has the growth of Catholicity been relatively greater or is to-day stronger or more firmly seated, than in Puritan Massachusetts and Connecticut, unless in the little state of Rhode Island.

To Catholic emigrants wishing to devote themselves to agricultural pursuits, the heretofore slave states offer the greatest advantages of climate, soil, and productions. Land is cheap and white labor in demand. They are far preferable to the West, and equally favorable to the planting and growth of Catholicity. Since the civil war, conversions in the South have been more numerous, if we are rightly informed, than in any other section of the Union, and the southern character is in many respects less repugnant to Catholicity than the northern. It is more frank, open, and impressible. If the Catholic migration hither should continue, and be directed to the southern states before they become completely yankeeized, it would prove a great blessing to the southern people, and to the Union, for Catholicity would tend to preserve the nobler traits of the southern character, and in some measure to counterbalance the shopkeeping and speculating disposition of the North and West, just now ruling and corrupting the country.

But to return from this digression, in which our personal preference for the southern character may be detected, as well as our hopes for the conversion of the southern people, who have been made to feel by bitter experience that nothing on earth is stable but the Catholic Church. It would seem that Dr. Spalding was even more successful as archbishop of Baltimore than as bishop of Louisville. Maryland

was originally settled chiefly by Catholics, and for forty years it was a Catholic colony; but after that the Protestants gained the ascendancy and proved it in the usual Protestant way by penal laws against Catholics. It is perhaps, even yet, the strongest Know-nothing state in the Union. But though deprived of power, stripped of their rights, and oppressed, till the revolution brought them relief and the restoration of their right to landed property, the greater part of the Maryland Catholics preserved their faith, and their descendants form to-day a large and most respectable portion of the native population of the state. The descendants of the original Catholic settlers are for the most part wealthy, or in easy circumstances, cultivated, refined, hospitable, genial, and almost excessively patriotic; but though very exact in observing the precepts of the church, in making novenas, and practising the smaller optional devotions, they have never, so far as we can learn, been remarkable for their Catholic public spirit, in which respect they contrast not favorably with the more recent emigration from Ireland and Germany. Yet, if we may believe the volume before us, Archbishop Spalding, a descendant of an old Maryland family, succeeded in breaking through the crust of *respectability*, and infusing into the great body of his diocesans a real Catholic public spirit, a truly missionary spirit, and made them, by the blessing of God, a living Catholic people, prepared, though in a quiet and genteel way, as becomes a Marylander, especially a Baltimorean, to take an active part in the great Catholic works of the day. Archbishop Spalding became the fast friend of Father Hecker, founder of the missionary congregation of St. Paul the Apostle, and the liberal patron of the Catholic Publication Society, the last, by the way, no favorite with our Catholic publishers and booksellers. He also frightened our Methodist friends well-nigh out of their propriety, by establishing a mission for the conversion of the freedmen, whom they regarded as their property. We look upon the establishment of this mission, yet in its infancy, as the most important of the good works undertaken by the archbishop, and if we were a younger man still in the prime and vigor of life, and permitted to take orders, we should ask no higher glory on earth than to be allowed to take part in it and devote ourselves to the spiritual welfare of the people among us of African descent. But alas, we are too old and too infirm of body to think of any thing of the sort. We can only give

it our prayers and good wishes, and urge the young aspirants to the priesthood, who are ambitious to bear the cross with their master, to prepare themselves for the work, and to devote themselves heart and soul to it. There is no way, it seems to us, in which a young Catholic American can do more to serve his church or his country. Till converted to the church, these freedmen, with the exception of unprincipled bankers, brokers, railroad presidents, and corporators, and professional politicians, are and will be the most dangerous element in American society. Only the church can save their souls, or make them good and trustworthy citizens.

But to draw our desultory remarks on the character and services of the late archbishop of Baltimore to a close, we may say, without fear of contradiction, that his memory will live as that of one of the principal glories of the church in America. Others may have been more learned theologians, as, for instance, his immediate predecessor in the see of Baltimore; others may have been deeper and more original thinkers; others still may have been equally successful as pastors, as the late bishop of Pittsburgh; but we know none that excelled him in singleness of purpose, in devotion to Catholic interests, and intense zeal and activity in the cause to which his life was consecrated and devoted without reserve.

In returning to the work before us, as an exponent of the views of its highly gifted author, we are struck not only by its bold and manly tone, but by its just appreciation of Protestantism. He regards it as a recrudescence of gentilism or paganism. This is the view we took of it in a work we published as long ago as 1836, some years before we became a Catholic. We called it the triumph of materialism, or of the flesh over the spirit. True, we thought then that the church had erred by an exaggerated spiritualism, and that it had unduly depressed the material order, or the goods of this world, in which we ourselves erred in consequence of our ignorance of the church and her teaching. Protestantism was, we held, the reaction or reassertion of the rights of the material or sensible order against the exaggerated or exclusive spiritualism of the church, that is to say, of Christianity. The work to be done in our day was, we contended, not the destruction of either, but their reconciliation in a higher and more comprehensive order of truth, substantially the view taken about the same time by

the Italian Abbate Gioberti, though clothed in the form of orthodoxy. But whoever has analyzed carefully the writings of the distinguished Italian will find that their central thought or leading purpose is the reconciliation of Christianity and gentilism, or the harmonious union of the Christian civilization of the middle ages with the civilization of Greece and Rome. Hence we find him uniformly giving the superiority of culture and completeness of character to the great men of Greece and Rome over the great men formed under Christian civilization. Hence his lack of sympathy with Christian asceticism, and his depreciation of the religious orders.

But all this by the way. In our *New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church*,* we defended at length the thesis that Protestantism is essentially a revival or reassertion of gentilism or paganism against the church. It culminated or rather triumphed, for a time at least, in the old French revolution, as was symbolized by the conversion of the church of Ste. Geneviève into the Pantheon. In this view we have never varied. It runs through all we have since written, is distinctly set forth in an essay in an early volume of the *Review*, entitled *Christianity and Heathenism*†, and also an article in *The Catholic World*, entitled *Rome and the World*.‡ We have never considered Protestantism a simple heresy, but ever since we studied its real character, have held it to be the revival of the great gentile apostasy from the patriarchal religion, the primitive religion of mankind, in its principles identical with Christianity as held and taught by the Catholic Church. We hold this view to be very important in controlling our judgment of the so-called reformation and as directing the course of argument to be adopted in our controversy with Protestants.

Our controversial writers forty, or even thirty years ago, at least in the English-speaking world, hardly took note of the identity or analogy of Protestantism with gentilism, or of the so-called reformation with the great gentile apostasy, apparently inaugurated by Nimrod, the "stout hunter before the Lord," which itself was only the revival of the doctrine preached by Satan, in opposition to the commandment of God,

* Brownson's Works, Vol. IV., p. 1, *et seq.*

† *Id.* Vol. X., p. 357.

‡ *Id.* Vol. III., p. 324.

to our first parents in the garden, and which seduced them from their allegiance to their rightful sovereign and brought sin and death and all our woe into the world. Satan was the first Protestant, and Luther was a resuscitated Nimrod. We are glad to find that our author at least identifies the Protestant spirit with the pagan spirit, and proves that henceforth Catholic controversialists will treat Protestantism not as a form of Christianity, but as revived paganism, that is, the renewal in the modern world of the old gentile apostasy.

We see in several of the extracts from his correspondence given in this volume, that Archbishop Spalding, though always treating Protestants with great consideration and tenderness, had come or was coming to look upon Protestantism as, in principle at least, only a revival of heathenism, a view still more decided in the bold, independent, and learned author, though set forth with the gentleness of the Christian and the courtesy of the gentleman. It is not singular that the earlier Catholic controversialists, while they saw clearly enough whither Protestantism would lead, if pushed to its last logical consequences, did not dwell on its essentially heathen character, for it never entered their heads that Protestants would, as a rule, follow out their spirit of revolt to a complete revival of paganism rather than return to the church. They could not believe that Protestants loved their Protestantism better than they loved Christianity. They therefore treated their Protestantism as a heresy, not as an apostasy, and sought to recover its victims by proving to them the heterodox character of their errors. It is no reproach to the earlier Catholic controversialists to say that they did not fully understand the nature and reach of the Protestant movement. Protestants themselves did not understand the spirit by which they were moved, nor foresee that instead of reforming alleged abuses in the church, they were in fact laboring to destroy it, and receding from Christianity itself, casting off the whole spiritual order and asserting pure materialism. They thought, as some of them still think, that Protestantism lies within the Christian order.

But if Catholics were ever deceived with regard to the real nature and reach of Protestantism, its more recent developments have pretty effectually undeceived them, and it no longer shocks their sensibilities to hear Protestantism called antichristian, or to see the Catholic polemic identifying it with the great gentile apostasy. The change which has taken place in the estimate of Protestantism by Catholics

we regard as one of the most hopeful signs of the times. Protestantism can no longer deceive the Catholic mind, and, while the Catholic polemic may cherish the tenderest compassion for Protestants, and do all in his power to bring them to the knowledge of the truth, he can feel himself free to treat Protestantism simply as a resuscitation of Greek and Roman paganism. He will see that it is useless to attack it as a heresy, or a congeries of heresies, and will no longer waste his time in refuting mere details, or the Christian pretensions of Protestants. He will see that he must go deeper, to the first principles of religion and science, and vindicate against Protestantism the reality of the spiritual order and the sovereignty of God.

We think it important to insist on this, for it is through their pagan spirit that Protestants are able to exert a corrupting influence on Catholics themselves. Catholics are on their guard against what they see or understand to be paganism; but they do not generally see or suspect the pagan character of Protestantism, and are, while regarding it as Christian, though heterodox, more or less open to its seductions, especially since it cunningly appeals to the pride natural to the human heart, and to that carnal mind which is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be, and against which the Christian must struggle as long as he remains in the flesh. If we mistake not, the work before us is written with the view we insist on, and therefore, coming from the quarter and with the authority it does, it has for us a far higher value than that of being an admirable biography of one of the most eminent prelates of the church in America. It is fitted to mark an epoch in our polemical literature.

COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1874.]

THESE letters of the late illustrious Count Charles de Montalembert are not so important for their intrinsic value, though that is not slight, as for the light they shed on the sentiments and studious habits, tastes and aspirations of the youth of a nobleman who in the prime of his manhood, was justly admired and honored as the chivalric champion of Catholic rights and interests, and as one of the foremost men of the age. The letters themselves reveal a most affectionate disposition, and charm by their frankness, earnestness, and simplicity. They prove that such as we knew the Catholic orator in the house of peers, and in his speeches from the tribune, the historian of the "Monks of the West," and the fearless defender of order under the republic of 1848, and of liberty under the second empire, such was the boy and the youth—*qualis ab incepto*. His device from his earliest youth was "God and liberty," and the passion and aim of his life was christianizing the spirit agitating the modern world, which he took to be the spirit of liberty, or its alliance with Catholicity, and when he saw that spirit condemned and the aim of his life declared impracticable in the syllabus, he despaired, and—died, as it would seem, neither submissive nor rebellious.

To understand the position of Montalembert we must take into consideration the epoch of his birth, and the political tendencies which operated to form his character or to give it its peculiar direction. He was born in 1810, when the reaction against the old French revolution was strong, and the word *liberty* filled with horror every person who believed in religion or desired social order and peace. Liberty meant revolutionism—meant war on the church, war on the priests and religious—meant infidelity, atheism, licentiousness, murder, sacrilege, the reign of terror. Catholics, not prepared to abandon their religion, were obliged to rally to the support of power and legitimate

**Count de Montalembert's Letters to a Schoolfellow*. 1827-1832. *Qualis ab incepto*. From the French, by C. F. AUDLEY. London: 1874.

authority, to labor to reëstablish the old order overthrown by the revolution, and to resist every tendency to political innovation. Especially did this become the case after the fall of the first Napoleon, the armed soldier of the revolution, and the impersonation of its despotic, its satanic spirit.

But the great body of the people, or at least a very large portion of the people, had become infected with the revolutionary spirit, which they mistook, as they still mistake, for the spirit of liberty. They called all royal, imperial, or non-parliamentary governments, tyrannies, and all who supported them or resisted the revolutionary spirit, *oscurantisti*, absolutists, enemies of the people, and friends of oppression. Hence society was divided into two parties, regarded respectively as the party of the governments or authority and the party of the people, called respectively sometimes absolutists and liberals, sometimes the stationary or stand-still party and the movement party, the latter aiming at parliamentary government after the English type, or at republicanism and democracy after the American type.

The church, though always on the side of liberty, being always the guardian and defender of all rights—the rights of man, as of the rights of God—must necessarily oppose all revolutionism, all insurrectionary or disorderly movements, and sustain the rights of authority, without which liberty is impracticable and the rights of the people have and can have no guaranty, no protection. Finding the right of legitimate authority everywhere assailed by the movement or revolutionary party, simply the revival or continuation of the old revolutionary party of '89, of which that of '93 was the inevitable development, she necessarily opposed it, and hence came to be regarded as the enemy of liberty, as hostile to the rights of the people and to social progress, and the friend and supporter of despotism or absolutism.

In the midst of this conflict of parties, the church and the governments on the one side, and the people, as pretended, on the other, Count Montalembert was born and grew up. His father was an *émigré*, and for some years, we are told, a colonel in the British service; his mother was an English lady, of a distinguished family—a Scottish lady rather, we should infer from her name, which was Forbes, though the count in one of his letters before us claims to be through her of Irish extraction. He resided in England till 1820,

and his early education seems to have been principally directed by his maternal grandfather. His editor says he was born in England, but he himself, in a document he sent us, declares in answer to a juridical interrogation that he was born in Paris. However that may be, he received his earliest impressions in England, his mind was to a great extent formed by his study of English literature, especially by the English poets and the English and Irish orators, and he retained a warm admiration during his life for the English character and the English civil and political institutions. Nothing was more natural than that, like most Englishmen, he should mistake the movement party for the party of freedom and progress.

Count Montalembert was brought up a Catholic, and these letters show us that he adhered firmly to his faith and to the practice of his religion, at the college of Sainte-Barbe, though he stood alone among his fellow-students, and in spite of their ridicule and opposition. But though a Catholic and a legitimist, and so far was opposed and even jeered by them, he won their sympathy by his liberalism, and his intense devotion to liberty. Between his liberalism and his Catholic faith and practice he saw no incompatibility. He seems at a very early age to have believed the liberal spirit he cherished to be something very different from the revolutionary spirit, and perfectly compatible with Catholicity, if not generated by it, and that Catholics, in opposing it, as most of them did under the restoration, were false alike to the spirit and to the interests of their church. He had in his own mind no quarrel with the church; but he did quarrel with those Catholics who arrayed themselves against the movement party, and labored to press the church into the service of absolutism.

The count's great labor as a Catholic, was not to defend the purity and integrity of doctrine, but to prove that the church is always on the side of liberty, that all her influences are exerted to promote it. It is the one thought that runs through all his writings, unless the *Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary*, be an exception. It pervades his entire *History of the Monks of the West*, all his pamphlets, speeches, addresses, and these youthful letters addressed to a schoolfellow. He was not wrong in this. The church is the mother and nurse of freedom, for she is the enemy of all wrong, of all injustice, and as we have said, the guardian and protector of all rights divine and human, and therefore

necessarily the enemy of all tyranny or despotism, as well as of all disorder. His error was not here, for thus far he was right. His error was in regarding the liberty clamored for by the movement party or its demagogic leaders, as true liberty, or the liberty which the church favors, the freedom wherewith the Son makes us free. He never demanded liberty without religion, and never believed it practicable or desirable without the inspiration and direction of the church; and yet what he was understood by his contemporaries to demand was the same sort of liberty demanded by the liberals. Indeed, he himself consciously and intentionally defended liberty as he had learned it, not from the church, but from the English poets, in his estimation the only real poets of the modern world. And yet, the liberty one learns from the English poets, English orators, or English literature, is gentile liberty, based on pride, on the assumption that "I am as good as you," not on humility or love of our neighbor. It is classical, Græco-Roman, not Christian, and exalts man at the expense of God.

We may do injustice to the memory of the illustrious orator and chivalric champion of Catholic interests, but we cannot help thinking that in his admiration of English literature, he failed to perceive that, while the liberty which it sets forth comes from without, the liberty the church promotes and consecrates comes from within, and depends on the operations of religion in the soul of the individual, and through the individual on the interior life of the nation, not on external efforts or arrangements. Liberty, in the Christian sense, is never secured by efforts made directly to secure it, but is gained, if at all, by efforts to conform the interior life to the divine law, and to secure the eternal life of heaven. Montalembert seems to us to have never grasped the profound philosophy of the Christian religion. He was erudite and eloquent, disinterested and chivalric, but he was neither a philosopher nor a theologian, and appears never to have understood the principle on which Catholicity regenerates society and promotes its well-being. Montesquieu says it is a wonderful thing, *chose admirable*, that Christianity, which bids us live only for the goods of another world, as a fact secures us the highest goods of this world; but he seems never to have understood that it is precisely *because* she so bids that she does it. He who seeks to save his life or to gain the world loses it, for whoever would be the disciple of Christ must deny himself, take

up his cross, and follow him. Liberty flies her wooers and follows those who turn their backs on her and seek only the kingdom of God and his justice.

The church initiates and sustains liberty by regenerating the soul, through the operations of the Holy Ghost, elevating it to the plane of its supernatural destiny, restraining its disorderly passions, moderating its lusts, and warming the heart with the love of truth and justice. She frees society by first freeing the soul from the chains of Satan, its bondage to sin, its slavery to the lusts of the flesh. She can do it in no other way. It is not a free government that makes a free people, but a free people that make a free government. You may knock off the manacles from the hands and the fetters from the feet of a people, but they are none the less slaves, unless at the same time you free their souls, and make them freemen in Christ. This is because the source of freedom and of slavery is within, and neither originates without, in the external, or in a man's surroundings. No institutions or external arrangements can make or keep a people free that are as individuals in bondage to their lusts, and no efforts of tyrants or despots can reduce to slavery a people whose souls are free. The English conquerors of Ireland have left nothing undone that malice could suggest or power effect to enslave the Catholic Irish, and yet the Catholic Irish, with their free souls and trust in God, have never been interiorly enslaved, or ceased to feel as freemen. In our own country liberty has every possible external advantage and guaranty, but non-Catholic Americans have hardly the least conception of what liberty, as distinguished from lawlessness and impudence, means.

The church, when she went forth, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, to deliver the world from the dominion of Satan, found tyranny and despotism everywhere. The Roman empire, which included then the whole civilized world, having changed the patrician for the imperial tyranny, had become an unmitigated despotism, governed by such moral monsters as Nero and Caligula. Three-fourths of the population were slaves, villeins, *adscripti glebæ*, or *coloni*, and before the fall of the empire the taxes imposed by the imperial fisc bore so heavily on the *decurii* or freemen of the municipalities, that not a few of them sought relief from the intolerable burden by selling themselves into slavery, and voluntarily sinking into the class of slaves. Yet we do not find that the church agitated for political or social re-

forms, that she demanded the abolition of slavery or the enfranchisement of the slaves. She never denied the right of the master to the bodily services of his slave, and she enjoined on her children submission for conscience' sake to the higher powers. No absolutist under the restoration in France ever went further, or taught more decidedly the doctrine of non-resistance and passive obedience.

Yet the church laid the axe at the root of the tree of evil, and, while laboring exclusively for the spiritual regeneration and moral progress of men, laid the foundation of a higher civilization and a purer and freer state of society than the world had hitherto seen. Though her work was often interrupted by the invasion of the barbarians, pagan Huns, Saracenic hordes, and plundering Northmen, there was an ever advancing amelioration of society, or progress of order and liberty, down to the sixteenth century. Slavery gradually disappeared, it is difficult to say when, or how, yet disappear it did without political or social convulsion or disturbance, so that early in the seventeenth century the French courts could say, "Slaves cannot breathe the air of France." All who are competent judges of the question, while conceding the imperfections, the barbarities, and the crimes even of the middle ages, are agreed that in no known period of history has the human race made so great or so genuine a progress in the highest civilization, in political and civil liberty, in virtue, intelligence, and social or even material well-being as in those very middle ages so much decried and so little studied and understood, or in which the European nations, upon the whole, enjoyed so great a sum of human happiness.

Since the rise of Protestantism, which is only the revival of the gentile conception of liberty, there has been much more fuss and talk about liberty, a louder and more constant clamor for and more evident efforts to gain and establish it; but there has been a constant decline and loss of real freedom. The efforts to obtain it have, in no instance that we can recall, been successful, and Europe is less free than it was in the twelfth or even the fifteenth century. The Protestant reformation introduced an era of revolutions, and revolutions in behalf of liberty always fail, and result only in introducing anarchy or in intensifying despotism. Revolutions and all the methods and projects of reform approved by the movement party proceed on the supposition that liberty and social progress come from without, demand

external changes, and depend on external arrangements, social or political organization, and according to the principle and method followed by the church must necessarily fail, and simply aggravate the disease which they are intended to remedy. We by no means pretend that we are to acquiesce in every abuse of power, or that power may never be lawfully resisted: but we do pretend and maintain that the subject may never resist it on his own authority. We hold, with the American congress of 1776, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject, but a higher authority than the prince must judicially declare his tyranny before the subject can resist or attempt to depose him. Power is a trust, and he who abuses forfeits it, but, till an authority above the prince and to which he as well as the subject is responsible declares the forfeiture, the subject has no right to attempt to oust him. In those cases in the middle ages in which the pope judicially declared the forfeiture of the prince and absolved his subjects from their oath of fidelity, they could lawfully refuse to obey the prince, and even seek to carry into effect the papal judgment of forfeiture, for the pope, as vicar of Christ and representative of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, is his superior. In ousting the prince in such a case I am not a revolutionist, or warring against my legitimate sovereign, but am simply acting in obedience to the highest authority on earth, in fact in obedience to the authority of God.

We will not say that the reactionary party against the revolution, never exaggerated, especially among non-Catholics, their monarchical and absolutist doctrines. The revolution was opposed to monarchy and in behalf of republicanism or rather democracy. It pronounced monarchy despotism, tyranny, and democracy liberty, the natural right of every people; and in the name of liberty, of the people, it made war on the church, desecrated the temples of religion, overturned the altars of God, massacred, beheaded or deported priests and religious, and sent to the guillotine the noble, the virtuous, the beautiful, and the good, and invested the base, the vile, the hideous—moral monsters, philanthropy on their lips and satanic rage in their hearts—with power, and committed society to their direction. It was not strange that in the recoil from the terror introduced by the revolution, the friends of religion should proscribe the very word *liberty*, and, with our Fisher Ames, pro-

nounce democracy "an illuminated hell," rebound to the opposite extreme, and contend that every constitution of society but the monarchical is illegitimate. Democracy, in the sense of Europeans and many Americans, that is, democracy in the sense of the absolute sovereignty of the people, or their native and underived might and right to do whatever they please, and which is a plain denial of the sovereignty of God, is incompatible with Catholicity, but no more so than is the assertion of the same absolute sovereignty for Cæsar; and Cæsar has more than once made as fierce and as destructive war on the church as was made by the old French Jacobins, or the more recent Paris commune. Catholicity excludes the absolute sovereignty of either prince or people, for God is the Lord and sovereign of both, and it is as anti-Catholic to identify religion with absolute monarchy as it is to identify it with absolute democracy, and the absolutist party, if they went so far, were guilty of precisely the same error which they opposed in the revolutionary party, that of subjecting the spiritual to the political. But we do not think the Catholic legitimists, either under the restoration or since, ever seriously maintained as a universal proposition, that absolute or unlimited monarchy is the only form of government a Catholic is free to support. All they meant was, we presume, that such monarchy was the only government *de jure* in France, or that a Catholic was free to defend for that kingdom. Frenchmen, as we see in Louis Veuillot, in the earnestness of their convictions sometimes forget that what may in matters of government be true and best for France may not after all be true and best for the whole world. Monarchy has no rights in this country, and the church requires me to be loyal to the form of government which God in his providence has instituted for my country.

Montalembert was no democrat, and had always, as he said in one of his charming letters to us, had an instinctive horror of democracy, and deeply regretted that it had penetrated even into the Catholic camp. He thought that his friend Père Lacordaire showed it too much favor, and was exerting in 1848 and 1849 an unwholesome political influence. We confess we ourselves were not edified to see the good father, in his Dominican habit, taking his seat with the extreme left in the national assembly, with whom, as a matter of fact, we have since learned, he had no sympathy. Montalembert, as we have said, was a constitutional mon-

archist or parliamentarian, which proves what we have asserted, that he adopted the English, which is the heathen, view of liberty. He wished not liberty without religion, held liberty to be highly useful, if not necessary to religion, but never conceived it as originating in and resulting from religion living and operating in the heart, and through the individual soul. They were two forces, originating, the one in grace, the other in nature; they might and should coexist and act together in harmony, but the one was not derived from the other. Liberty was not regarded as the offspring of Catholic faith and worship. They rest on two distinct and independent foundations, and have each its own laws and conditions; and the problem is to harmonize them, and to make them mutually assist each the other. The count and his liberal friends believed that much of the hostility which one finds in the people to the church is due to her want of zeal in behalf of liberty, and to the opposition of the majority of the clergy, especially of the higher ranks, to the movement party. By espousing the popular cause and blessing the efforts of the friends of the people to extend and confirm popular freedom, as La Mennais urged, she would disarm their hostility, recall them to her bosom, and enlist their mighty energy, now sweeping every thing before it, on her side. Besides, by so doing, she would regain the control over the discontented populations, rescue them from the lead of unprincipled demagogues—for the most part briefless lawyers, the great pests of modern society—direct their movements, and prevent those wild outbursts of rage and ferocity which characterized the revolution of '93.

There is much that is plausible in this view, and under a certain aspect something true; and we confess that we early adopted, and for a long time acted on it, especially before our conversion to the church of God. But it conceals a vicious principle. It makes the liberty it asserts independent of religion, a force existing by its side, and capable of opposing it or of forming an alliance with it. It assumes that liberty represents the human element, and that there are such things as the rights of man, not derived from nor included in the rights of God placed under the safeguard of the church, the representative of the divine sovereignty on earth. We see in it the error we have heretofore pointed out in Gioberti, that of seeking to harmonize gentilism and Christianity, or to form an alliance between the spirit of Christ and the spirit of the world. It conceals the anti-

Christian advice to conform to the spirit of the age, and study, not what is true and just, but what is popular. The *New York Herald* gravely tells us that the Vatican Council caused the schism in Germany, and, no doubt, if the so-called Old Catholics had not been condemned by the council, and had been left free to hold and defend their heresies in the bosom of the church, they would not have separated exteriorly from Catholic unity, or offered any opposition to the acts of the council. Let the church support the age in its pet projects or dominant passions, and the age will cease to oppose her, nay, the world will love and cherish her as its own—till it changes, and she refuses to change with it.

The dominant passion of this age, as shown by the movement party, is popular liberty; and liberty with it means freedom from restraint, or from all obligation to consult and obey any will but one's own. In the sense of this age, he only is a freeman who is his own master, and subject to no power that is or claims to be above him. Let the church ally herself to this spirit and bless the various movements of the discontented populations to secure liberty in this sense, and no doubt the world would cease to oppose her, and all sections of the movement party, Mazzinians, Garibaldians, red-republicans, socialists, and communards would throw up their caps and shout with all the force of their lungs, "*Evviva il Papa!*" "Long life to Mother Church!" But suppose a change should "come over the spirit of its dream," and the age should clamor, as did the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for absolute monarchy, what should the church do? Desert the sans-culottes or Jacobins, and join her forces to those of Cæsar? In neither case would the church represent the divine sovereignty, which is immutable and universal. Besides she would not direct and govern the world, but be directed and governed by it. The view which has so charmed our liberal Catholics, would, if adopted, make the church a miserable time-server, "a waiter on providence," and always ready to serve the more popular party. If our Lord had done as these wise liberals wish his church to do, he would most likely have escaped being crucified between two thieves, but then—he would not have redeemed the world.

We do not deny nature nor absorb it in grace; we recognize the natural law and natural rights, even so-called rights of man, but we maintain that the rights of nature or the rights

of man are rights of God, the sovereign lord and proprietor, and it is for that reason that they are sacred and obligatory for all men. We admit that liberty is in the natural order; but we hold that nature is not alone sufficient to maintain her own freedom, or to assert practically her own rights under the law of God. We yield to no one in our love of liberty, but we hold that no people left to nature alone can maintain it, otherwise than theoretically. The natural law may be known by natural reason, but except by the very *elite* of the race, perhaps, it cannot be fulfilled by our natural strength in our present state, or without the gracious or supernatural assistance of God, or as we say, independently of the church. To be able to do it, the soul must be regenerated, elevated above its natural strength. Grace presupposes, includes, and perfects nature. As liberty, though in the natural order, depends on grace for its practical maintenance and perfection, it is to grace regenerating and elevating the soul we are to look for freedom, not to nature outside of grace, and as independent of the interior operations of the Holy Ghost.

What we object to is, 1, seeking liberty from the natural alone; and, 2, supposing an external alliance between the church and liberty, as two independent forces or powers, is practicable or necessary. The church alone suffices for its assertion and vindication, and a full and unreserved submission to her, which is full and unreserved submission to the law of God, of itself suffices, and renders tyranny and slavery impossible. Nature alone does not suffice for nature, and therefore not for natural liberty. Man was never created to live by nature alone, or without the grace the church dispenses. All experience, all history, proves it. The nations that forget God, and assert the sufficiency of nature for itself are not free nations, and if they ever enjoyed freedom they have lost or are rapidly losing it. Not one of the nations of Europe that has embraced Protestantism is as free as it was before its apostasy from the church. The nations that have convulsed the world during a century with their revolutions in behalf of liberty, have only lost liberty, and the conditions of maintaining it. These are not random assertions, made in the heat of controversy, or in the love of paradox, but are the result of careful study, and made with deliberation and some knowledge of the subject.

We ourselves were disposed to follow for several years the

lead of the illustrious champion of Catholic interests. We saw nothing serious to censure in his views, and we found fault with his strong and frequent assertions of devotion to liberty, only because they seemed likely, in the existing state of the public mind, to be misinterpreted and tend to encourage the revolutionary party. But we observed, after awhile, that the prominent men, counted for a time among the boldest and most energetic defenders of Catholicity, but who sought to form an alliance of the church with the spirit of the nineteenth century, as they went on in their career, gradually lost the fervor of their faith, and ceased to sympathize with the Catholic body, became censorious of bishops and priests, whom they looked upon as ignorant or as neglectful of the true interests of the church, and complained of them as not understanding their age or country. They soon lost sight of the church as a divine institution, under the guidance and protection of the Holy Ghost, and practically treated her as a purely human institution, standing in human wisdom and virtue alone. The eloquent La Menais broke wholly with the church, went clear over to liberalism, and became the associate of Pierre Leroux and George Sand. Padre Ventura de Raulica, the accomplished Theatine, escaped only by the skin of his teeth, and by taking refuge in caesarism; Gioberti died, we believe, excommunicated, and his last book published before his death contains a scurrilous attack on Pius IX., and bears not a trace of the Catholic believer, far less of the Catholic priest.

Père Lacordaire for himself personally made a timely retreat, but he retained a taint of Lamennaisism to the last, which reappears in some of his disciples. Of Père Gratry, Père Hyacinthe, Dr Döllinger, and other intimate personal friends of Montalembert, we need not speak. Père Gratry made a kind of retraction on his death-bed; the others are out of the church and no longer counted among Catholics.

But what most alarmed us and made us pause and reflect, was observing in ourselves a tendency to what some called the neo-Catholic movement, which, if followed, would have carried us out of the church, and caused us to make shipwreck of the faith. Happily, the grace of God restrained us before it was too late, and we resisted the tendency before it had led us into heresy or schism. These facts and the effect of the theory on our own spiritual life not only alarmed us, but served to convince us that the theory concealed some dangerous and antichristian error, and made us

pause and recoil. The Syllabus, in condemning as an error the proposition that church and state ought to be separate, made it clear that we were facing in a wrong direction. For the separation and mutual independence of church and state involve the very principle on which the theory rests. There can be no external alliance between religion and liberty, unless they are two separate and mutually independent forces or powers.

Montalembert used the expression, "A free church in a free state," meaning by it, as we understood him, that the church can be free in our times, only in the general freedom of the citizen. This, however, as interpreted by the able but more than unscrupulous Count Cavour—who wound the emperor of the French around his finger, and whom Bismarck has taken for his model and imitates as closely as the heavy Teutonic genius can imitate the subtle and wily Italian genius, superior, for good or for evil, to the genius of any other nation—means the freedom of the state to adopt and pursue its own line of policy without heeding the church, her divine rights or commands, leaving her no freedom to intermeddle with any matter pertaining to this world, no freedom in regard to any matter, not even to pray, but what the state in its omnipotence disdains to take from her. Yet, though we defended it, both in the *Review*, and in our "Liberalism and the Church," in Montalembert's sense, we are not sure that Cavour's interpretation is not the legitimate sense of the dictum, however indignantly the French orator repelled it.

The assumption that the freedom of the church is secured only in the general freedom of the citizen, assumes that civil and political freedom is the necessary condition of the freedom of the church; but this overlooks the rather important fact, that the freedom and independence of the church is the essential condition of the establishment and maintenance of civil and political liberty. Liberty grows out of religion, and civil and political liberty is the consequence of the freedom and independence of the church, not its source or guaranty. The civil and political liberty of the citizen depends on what is called a free state, on the civil and political constitution; but that constitution is not unchangeable; and what security have we that an heretical or infidel majority will not change or override it? You have, without the church, only a human dependence for civil and political liberty, and consequently none higher for

the freedom of the church. Montalembert's interpretation of the maxim, "a free church in a free state," makes the freedom of the church in the last analysis as completely dependent on the secular order, and the secular order as completely independent of the church, as does the interpretation of Count Cavour, under which the Italian nationalists have confiscated ecclesiastical goods, suppressed religious houses, and expelled their pious inmates; banished bishops and priests, plundered princes of their estates, invaded and annexed the Roman state, and confined the Holy Father to his palace, where he remains a prisoner, a spectacle to the whole world.

A friend writes us from the Tyrol, that in the town in which he is temporarily residing, though the immense majority of the people are Catholics, the mayor elected is an atheist, and he thinks that if universal suffrage obtained, the result of the election would be different. We doubt it. The Catholic European populations have been for centuries trained in political atheism—in the maxim that one's religion has nothing to do with one's politics, and we find them, even where they have votes and are in a decided majority, returning infidels, Protestants, Jews, or nominal Catholics who pride themselves on their independence of the *parti-prêtre*. The old Catholic populations of Europe have had no political training, and, attentive to the observance of their religion and the management of their private affairs, pious, honest, industrious people, good souls, ignorant of the tricks and wiles of politicians, they are unable in an open field to cope with the liberal minority, restrained by no scruples of conscience, by no fear of God or man, fired with a satanic rage for what they call liberty, and against every thing fixed, stable, just, or holy. We may say the political education of the people in Catholic countries has been unduly neglected, but our Lord said to his disciples, Behold, I send you forth as lambs among wolves: be ye therefore as prudent as serpents and as harmless as doves, and we presume that it was never the intention of our Lord that his followers should be able to contend with their enemies on the same ground, with the same passions, and the same weapons. They were to overcome pride by humility, wrath by meekness, wrong by patience, hatred by love, oppression by forgiving the oppressor, persecution by prayer for the persecutor.

We often find it difficult to restrain our indignation at what seems to us the imbecility or mean-spiritedness of Catholics

even where they are the immense majority of the population, in patiently submitting to be governed, oppressed, by a handful of infidel terrorists, or led like sheep to the slaughter, as we saw in France during the old revolution ; yet it may be doubted if our indignation does not spring rather from the old Adam than from the new. We ask in it the gentile virtues of Christians whose distinctive virtues are of another and an infinitely higher order. These imbecile Catholics, who allow themselves to be trampled in the dust by the haughty and merciless children of Satan, can die courageously for Catholicity, and to die heroically is better than to slay. The evil is not in suffering, but in doing wrong. It is, to say the least, doubtful, if it be possible to combine in the same character the gentile virtues and the Christian. This at bottom was the dream, the aspiration of Montalembert and his coterie of liberal, or as some called them, neo-Catholics. It was the direct and undisguised aim of Gioberti, that Italian priest of marvellous genius, and, we were about to write, satanic power. Gioberti failed to effect the combination, for pride and humility will no more combine than oil and water. In seeking to save the heathen virtues, he lost the Christian. He found himself in opposition to the whole current of Christian asceticism, and making deadly war on the Jesuits and religious or monastic orders generally, whether of men or of women, and finally, on his staunchest friend, Pio Nono, if not on the papacy itself. Montalembert, who, by the way, detested Gioberti, perhaps did not go so far, but he mourned the entrance of a favorite daughter into religion, as if he was following her to the grave, set his face against the papal supremacy, opposed with what strength he had left the definition of papal infallibility, and the last letter of his we saw published was a parting kick at the papacy.*

It is far from our thought to say that it is never lawful for Catholics to defend their faith, their churches and altars, their pastors and consecrated virgins, against the enemy that

* Mrs. Oliphant, in her memoirs of the count, relates, on what authority we know not, a conversation of his with a friend, in which he expressed his conviction that the council would not declare the papal infallibility, but, if it should do so, the only course possible to him would be to accept it. We hope this is true, and that the historian of the "Monks of the West," and the author of the beautiful *Life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary*, did not suffer his political hatreds and predilections to make shipwreck of his faith, and leave us without hope for his future.

assails them, when summoned to do it by legitimate authority, as they often have been. Catholicity does not deprive men of their manhood nor of their natural rights. We by no means defend the Jacobite doctrine of passive obedience, nor the Quaker doctrine of non-resistance; but all that is lawful is not expedient. He who resorts to the sword shall perish by the sword, and he who leans on a human arm leans on a broken reed, and shall find it pierce his hand. True wisdom is not seldom in exhorting the faithful to "stand still and see the salvation of God." God's ways are not our ways, and he chooses ordinarily to work out the deliverance of his people in his own way. He withers the hand of Oza, stretched forth to steady the jolting ark. The glory of the victory must redound to him, and he brings it about, usually, in a way to baffle human calculation, and to show the nothingness of human wisdom. There may be a point beyond which resistance becomes a duty to the public, but the individual never loses any thing by meekly enduring wrong, however intolerable. The good gain by it, for they receive ample compensation in eternal life; and the wicked alone are losers. They will be punished as they deserve, and it is for the sake of the wicked rather than for the sake of the good, that we should deplore wrongs and outrages and labor to put an end to them, that the punishment of those who commit them may be the lighter.

Montalembert was, as we have said, neither a philosopher nor a theologian, at least not in any deep and worthy sense. We do not blame him for any deficiency he may have had as a philosopher, for Europe has had no philosophy since that flippant Bas-Breton Descartes attempted to divorce philosophy from theology. The excellent Père Ramière gravely tells us to follow the tradition of Catholic philosophy. With all my heart, good Father. Only tell me what it is, or where I may find an authentic statement of it. Follow St. Thomas. Good again. But it is a little too much like the Protestant direction: "Follow the Bible." "You all," said a young Jesuit student of philosophy to us not long since, "profess to follow St. Thomas, but, unhappily, I can find no two of you who can agree as to what St. Thomas actually taught." Am I to follow Father Ramière's interpretation of St. Thomas, or my own? "Neither, but the tradition of the Catholic schools." All very well; but, said to us one of the ablest and profoundest prelates of the United States, "the philosophy taught in

our Catholic colleges consists of some fragments of Catholic theology badly taught." There is a certain routine followed by a number of professors in our colleges, but, in point of fact, outside of theology nothing is more unsettled among us than philosophy. To talk of a Catholic philosophy, save as to certain outlines, if that exception can be made, is simply absurd. We have no Catholic philosophy, and when an intelligent convert asked us the other day to name to him a text-book from which he could get a summary of Catholic philosophy, we could not name one that we dared recommend. It is to be hoped that Providence will send us some new St. Augustine or new St. Thomas, or some man of real philosophical genius, who will be able to bring order out of our present confusion, and recombine in one and the same science theology and philosophy, and undo the work of Descartes, who still holds too much sway over the French mind, which owes not a little of its flippancy and frivolity to his philosophy "made easy."

Even our better Catholic colleges under charge of learned religious orders and congregations are extremely deficient in the theological science they impart to their pupils. The young men who graduate from them, unless in exceptional cases, may know the principal doctrines of the church, but are innocent of any knowledge of their mutual relation to one another, their interdependence, or the chain that binds them together so as to form one complete and systematic whole. They see no reason why, if you hold this doctrine, you must hold that, except that the church teaches both alike. The several doctrines lie in their own minds as several, unrelated, isolated doctrines, not as so many distinct parts or phases of one indissoluble whole. The faith has for them plurality, but no unity; consequently no catholicity, since what is not one cannot be catholic. They see no intrinsic or dialectic reason why the denial of any one article, dogma, or proposition of the faith is really the denial of the whole. They do not see that Catholicity is a golden chain let down from heaven to earth, from God to man, and that whatever link you strike, "tenth or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike." Nothing is more common than to find highly accomplished and intelligent, even learned and scientific Catholic laymen, educated and taught Christian doctrine in Catholic colleges, whose faith controls or enlightens their intelligence only in relation to specific dogmas and specific acts of worship, while in all other ques-

tions, moral, political, literary, or scientific, they think, talk, and act just as if they were simply non-Catholics, and often with less truth of principle, elevation of thought, and grandeur of sentiment than is to be met with in cultivated gentiles. Their Catholicity is not catholic, for it spreads over and transforms only a small part of their intelligence, or understanding.

Thus we find that from this want of proper instruction in the philosophy of Christianity, or in the Christian faith as an indissoluble whole, Montalembert was left in his own mind with an incomplete faith, which he was fain to complete from alien sources, and with heterogeneous elements. He saw everywhere all manner of antagonisms, which he was called upon to reconcile, while he lacked the key of their reconciliation. The Catholic *elements* of his intelligence, as time went on, as disappointments met him on every hand, and his heart became saddened, if not embittered, by painful defections among his friends and partisans, were greatly weakened, and almost disappeared. His politics gradually impaired his confidence in the sounder part of the Catholic body, and weakened his reverence for the papal administration. Opposed, heart and soul, to centralism, whether imperial or popular, in the state, he wished to decentralize the ecclesiastical power, and to distribute it, in part at least, among the bishops as a sort of parliamentary body, restricting and sometimes overriding the central authority of the pope. The absolute supremacy of the pope in governing, and his infallibility in teaching the universal church, revolted him, as repugnant to the political constitutionalism and parliamentarism which he borrowed from England and held so dear. He never understood that the church, being apostolic and founded on Peter, in whom was the plenitude of the apostolate, is necessarily papal, that the papal supremacy and infallibility are essential elements in her constitution, and that the denial of either is tantamount to the denial of her existence. He might, and probably would, if he had lived, have accepted the decrees of the Vatican in his intention and will, but that he would have done so in the interior of his understanding, may be doubted. He would, most likely, have yielded to external authority, not to interior conviction.

The count, whether consistently or not, always protested against the subjection of the church to the state, and were he living, we should hear him denouncing in the most in-

dignant eloquence the policy of Prince Bismarck in Prussia; but we have never found in his writings or in his correspondence any recognition of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and of the authority from God of the church to declare the divine law for rulers as well as for subjects, for states as well as for individuals. From first to last he was more or less tainted with the Gallican dualism, and if he excused the popes in the middle ages from usurping the power they exercised over temporal princes, it was never on the ground that they possessed that power, *jure divino*, or by divine right, but only *jure humano*, or by human right, by the consent of the people, or what was at the time the *jus publicum*, which is only a disguised Gallicanism, the doctrine of the sovereigns and their lawyers, but of the church never. Had he understood that the pope has jurisdiction under the natural law as well as under the revealed, and is under both laws by right divine the supreme judge of all men and nations, he would have escaped what we have pointed out as his errors, and have left an indelible mark on the history and church in our times.

There was another point we marked in the count's public character, that of toleration of heresy. He is often severe in his denunciation of what he held to be political errors, but he never, so far as we have observed, appears to be very deeply impressed with the enormity of heresy. He never seemed to regard it as a deadly sin, or to hold that those who are out of the church are out of the way of salvation. He says expressly in one of the letters before us, that the dogma, Out of the church no salvation, is not to be taken literally, and intimates that it means no more than that there is no salvation without the Christian religion in some form. We do not find that he ever modified this opinion, or restricted the Christian religion to the church. He had no sympathy with Evangelicals, or Methodists, as they are called in Catholic countries, but he treats Anglicanism with great respect, and in his "*Avenir politique de l'Angleterre*," a work we sharply criticised at the time of its publication, he complains of the Catholics in England for their hostility to the Anglican establishment. He certainly was devoted to Catholic interests, but he looked almost solely to the introduction or support of constitutional government—the tribune—as the means of promoting or protecting them. Where he found constitutional government and the tribune, he seemed to be very well content, though the peo-

ple were any thing but orthodox. In a word, Count Charles de Montalembert, a noble-minded man, of chivalric disposition, pure and disinterested, pious and devout even, was an orator, historian, scholar, publicist, statesman, rather than a philosopher or theologian, and viewed the church rather in her political and social relations, than in her relation, as the body of Christ, the visible representation of the Incarnation, to the salvation of the soul or the beatitude of heaven.

We may be wrong, but we think it has been the common fault of all of us Catholic publicists that we have made too much of the external relations of the church, and have sought, unduly, aid from without, and that, too, whether liberals like Gioberti and Montalembert, or absolutists like Louis Veuillot and his admirers. We have charged, in some of our articles, the literary degeneracy of the age to the influence of feminine writers; we think we may with equal truth charge the philosophical and theological degeneracy of our times to the influence of lay writers, chiefly journalists, or as the term is now used, publicists. No layman, unless he has made a regular course of theology, and a more thorough course than is actually made in the majority of our theological seminaries, is competent to write on Catholic matters, or to conduct a Catholic periodical or journal. Journalism is the curse of our age, and yet it seems to be a sort of necessary evil, and we know not how, as things are, it is to be dispensed with. It is, undoubtedly, lawful to learn from an enemy, but we have some reluctance to use in our own defence the weapons invented by our enemies, and which they can wield more effectively than we can. Journalism is an invention of the enemy, in the old French revolution, prior to which it did not exist, and it is hardly adapted to Catholic use. Journalism concentrates, but cannot form, public opinion; can corrupt, not reform, debase, not elevate it. It is un-Catholic in its process, for it proceeds, like democracy, on the assumption that wisdom and power come from below, not from above.

The older we grow the less disposed we are to rely on external aid, and the less to set up lay wisdom either against or as an auxiliary of clerical wisdom. True wisdom, in our judgment, is for Catholics to place their sole confidence in God, and to rely on the spiritual resources of the church as the body of Christ. The church is God's church, and they serve her best who most lovingly confide in her, and the most cheerfully and promptly do her bidding. The arm of

flesh can add nothing to her strength against her enemies, nor the wisdom of man add any thing to the wisdom she derives from the indwelling Holy Ghost. We are all too apt to forget that God is the Sovereign of the world, and that he doeth according to his will among the nations of the earth. It is not without his permission, or some ulterior purpose of his loving kindness, that the church seems now abandoned to her enemies, and the wicked appear to triumph. Bismarck can go no further than God permits, and no further than his satanic policy can be made to enhance the faith and glory of the church. When Providence has used him as far as he can serve this purpose, he will break him to pieces, hurl him from power, or leave him to wail and gnash his teeth in outer darkness. God's own hand will get him the victory, and work out our deliverance. It is ours to cast our burdens on him, and look by prayer and praise for whatever we need. In our patience, suffering, we therefore possess our souls in peace.

These letters to a school-fellow present the young count as a noble-spirited and earnest-minded youth, as very estimable and very lovable. He had great tenderness of heart, a rare capacity for friendship, and almost a feminine craving for sympathy, not uncommon in richly endowed natures, raised by their genius above the common level. But he is revealed here as too dependent on others, and too easily depressed, too ready to despond, if encountering obstacles or meeting any grave disappointments. He felt more than so great and unworldly a man should have felt the loss of his seat in the corps législatif, and of the opportunity of addressing the public from the tribune. He approved, or at least urged Catholics to condone, the *coup d'état*, and sustained Louis Napoleon as dictator, till he found that he and his committee could not control his policy. He finally broke with him only when he confiscated the estates of the Orleans family. After that he despaired of the emperor, threw himself into the opposition, which, for lack of certain personal qualities necessary to a political leader, he did not and could not lead, and so lost his influence in the empire. In his despair he went so far at last as to recommend his friends to vote for and with Jules Favre and other notorious leaders of the left, against the imperial government.

It was a grave mistake to support Napoleon in the first instance, and to trust him with the government of France, but it was a still graver mistake to abandon him in 1869,

when the republican opposition had commanded very nearly a majority of the popular vote. We never admired Louis Napoleon, and always distrusted him as a Catholic. He was willing to use the church, as most Catholic sovereigns have been, but he never understood her true interests or had any disposition to promote them. He was no friend to the papacy, and was a true cæsarist, but he was not a much worse enemy than the majority of secular princes. His political concessions on the 19th of January, 1870, were a blunder, and we said to our friends at the time that it would prove the end of the empire and most likely of the Napoleonic dynasty. He was not strong enough to afford to make concessions to the liberals. We have no wish to see the empire restored, but we think its overthrow in 1870 was the greatest calamity that could at that time befall France, or even entire Europe. The men who best deserve the execration of the civilized world are the men of the 4th of September. France suffered at Sedan, but she was prostrated and dishonored by the government of defence, which, if the empress-regent had had a single quality of a ruler, never would and never could have been instituted. She proved herself, save as a wife and mother, imbecile enough to have been a Bourbon. Happily for the last moments of the illustrious count he did not live to see the catastrophe which had been brought about by the opposition, which, without really sympathizing with it, he had contributed not a little to strengthen.

Yet Montalembert was an eminent man, one of the most eminent of our contemporaries ; but his greatness was that of the scholar and the orator, not that of a party leader. He was not fitted by temperament or the qualities of his mind to be a leader, and in this respect he was far inferior to his plebeian rival, who succeeded in taking the Catholic party in France from him, and establishing himself at its head, not only in France but throughout Europe and America. One might almost as well question the infallibility of the pope as the supreme wisdom and prudence of Louis Veuillot, though, since he saw proper to denounce as savages the great body of the Catholics of the United States, indeed all except the comparatively small number of French birth or descent, some doubts of his infallibility have been entertained. Yet he is and will continue to be a sort of lay pope. Something he owes to his rare ability, but more to his consummate tact in detecting and following the dominant

sentiment of the party he appears to lead, and his merciless attacks on any one, bishop or priest, who dares oppose his policy—a human policy, as hostile to the freedom of religion as that of Bismarck.

Montalembert had nothing of the demagogue nor of the satirist in him, and could never have defended the Catholic cause in the sneering spirit of Voltaire or with the savage ferocity of Peter Porcupine. He had too broad a mind, and was too intent on creating an enlightened and just public opinion, to be a successful party leader. A successful party leader must be a man of a narrow mind, superficial, intense, clever, but incapable of considering questions presented under more than a single aspect. Louis Veuillot is not a man of broad or comprehensive views, but he has made a profound study of the arts and methods by which the enemies of religion carry on their war against the church, naturally approves them, and has no scruple in using them against his former friends and associates. This Montalembert was incapable of doing. He was chiefly remarkable for the elevation of his views and the nobility of his sentiments, and could not adapt himself to minds of a low, vulgar, or tricky order. The leader must to a great extent be on a level with those he leads. The mass of men, in no country, have any very elevated sentiments, and grovel rather than aspire. He who seeks to lead them by high thoughts, noble sentiments, and lofty aspirations is sure to fail. The public will turn from him to follow the empiric, the vulgar and unprincipled demagogue, who has no moral or intellectual superiority over them. The more superficial and inflated a writer the greater his popularity.

However Montalembert may have erred, may have been mistaken on some points, however he may have been prone to despond, or ill-fitted to bear up against disappointment, he was unquestionably a man of rare purity of heart, singleness of purpose, and nobility of soul. His aims were high and noble, and he was heart and soul devoted to the promotion of true Catholic interests. Mankind are the better for his having lived and written, and his name will live for ever in the grateful remembrance of all who regard the welfare of their fellow-men in time or eternity. The cloud that obscured the brilliancy of his Catholic faith during the last years of his life must be ascribed to his constitutional tendency to despond, and to his long and painful illness, which, however, he bore with great fortitude, though it may have

impaired in some degree the clearness of his vision and the vigor of his intellect. We personally lost in him a dear and honored friend. *Requiescat in pace.*

QUESTIONS OF THE SOUL.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1855.]

WE have in these "Questions of the Soul" a remarkable work, and one of the very few original and genuine American books our country can boast. It could have been written only by an American to "the manner born," and is destined, in our judgment, to have a marked influence on American thought and American literature.

We cannot introduce this interesting and instructive, though simple and unpretending volume, to our readers, without recollecting that we have known the author almost from his boyhood, and have always regarded him as one to whom Almighty God has given a mission of vital importance to our common country. Few men really know him, few even suspect what is in him; but no one can commune with him for half an hour, and ever be again precisely what he was before. He is one of those men whom you feel it is good to be with. Virtue goes out from him. Simple, unpretending, playful, and docile as a child, warm and tender in his feelings, full of life and cheerfulness of manner, he wins at once your love, and infuses as it were his own sunshiny nature into your heart. From his youth he has been remarkable for his singular purity of heart, the guilelessness of his soul, the earnestness of his spirit, his devotion to truth, and his longing after perfection. We owe personally more than we can say to our long and intimate acquaintance with him. How often, when neither of us knew or believed in the glorious old Catholic Church, have we talked together by our own fireside, on the great questions discussed in the volume before us, and stimulated each other's endeavors after truth and goodness! His modesty and docility made him in those times regard us as his teacher

**Questions of the Soul.* By I. T. HECKER. New York: 1855.

as well as his senior, but in truth we were the scholar. It was in these free communings, where each opened his mind and heart to the other, that we both were led, the grace of God aiding, to feel the need of the church, and that we talked, if we may so say, without intending or foreseeing it, each other into the belief and love of Catholicity. Each perhaps was of service to the other, but he aided us more than we him, for even then his was the master mind. These personal recollections are most dear to us, and we hope the author's modesty will not be offended at the homage which our heart cannot withhold. We loved him then as a younger brother, and happy are we to reverence him now as a father. Years have passed away since those times when we were both groping our way from the darkness in which we had been bred to the light of God's truth, and many changes have come over us both; but always will the recollection of our early intercourse be fresh in our heart. After long investigation of the various systems of religion and various plans of world-reform or of individual perfection agitated in our country, outside of the church, he, through the mercy of God, found in the Catholic religion what he had so long and so patiently sought. He soon felt a vocation to a religious life, was received into the Congregation of the most Holy Redeemer, and went abroad to make his novitiate, and to prepare himself for the priesthood. After his ordination, he was two years on the mission in England, when he was permitted by his superiors to return to his native land, where, with others, he has been employed in giving missions in various parts of the country, with consoling success. We have watched his career as a missionary priest, both at home and abroad, with affectionate interest, but in this book more fully than anywhere else we have found again our young friend. Here he begins to utter what God has given him to utter, and his words will go to the hearts of all his early friends, and they are all who knew him. He has greater things than this to say, but he has here spoken the word that was needed, the proper word for the time and place, and it will and must fetch an echo from the inmost souls of not a few of his countrymen, especially in our own New England, where he was so well known and so warmly loved.

The author has given us here the very book the want of which many have felt, and has done what we ourselves have often attempted to do, and would have done had Al-

mighty God given us the genius and ability to do it. We can now throw the manuscript of our own partially completed work on the same subject into the fire. All who have had any experience in the matter know that, with all the variety and excellence of our Catholic literature, we have no book precisely adapted to the peculiar state of mind and tone of thought that we every day meet among the better and more earnest and aspiring class of our countrymen. All our controversial works have been written for a state of things which has passed or is passing away in this country. They do not meet our American mind; they fail to recognize to that mind the truths which it unquestionably has, and attack its errors under forms that it does not recognize as its own. There has as yet been no real medium of communication between Catholic and non-Catholic Americans, and if our Catholic writers have understood the non-Catholic American, he has not understood them. They have not spoken to the comprehension of the real American mind and heart, or penetrated to what we would call the inner American life.

The genuine American character is the most difficult character in the world to comprehend, and foreigners almost invariably fail in their efforts to understand it. Few Americans themselves, though they feel at once whether you understand it or not, can explain it either to themselves or to others. Our deeper inner life has never yet received its expression. We are as yet a mystery to ourselves, and cannot say what we are or are not. The chief reason of this is, that we are in our infancy, and our character, though forming, is not yet formed, at least not fully developed. To the foreigner and even to ourselves we seem an adult people, with a fixed character such as it is. But this seemingly fixed character is only on the surface. It is no index to the real national character, and can only mislead those who do not penetrate deeper. Under this beats the American heart, operates the real American life, which is rapidly transforming, assimilating, or casting off all this which the superficial observer takes to be Americanism. In order to seize the real American character, we must study, as in the child, what we are becoming, rather than what we are. Like children we live in the future, not in the present or the past, and look forward, not backward. We have hope, but no memory. As a people, we feel that we have no past, and we despise the present. We feel ourselves

bound by no traditions, whether of truth or error ; we have faith only in what is to come. The great words we sometimes use are spoken prophetically, and express what we feel we are to be, not what we feel we are. We think, feel, speak, in reference not to what we are, but to what it is in us to be. Our character is in the bud ; it has not yet blossomed, far less ripened into fruit. Hence the difficulty of comprehending it, and only they who can foretell the blossom and the fruit from studying the bud can comprehend it.

To arrive at some acquaintance with the American character in its proper sense, we must not study it in the busy, bustling life of the multitude, in our shops, in our streets, on our wharfs, in our hotels, in our saloons, in our political caucuses, or in our sectarian meeting-houses and assemblies. Here you see us only on our outside, in our transitional state, or in what we have retained or imitated from the Old World, modified by the peculiarities of the framework of American society. The real American heart is not there, and is not indicated by what we there meet. We must look for it in what is to-day apparently a small and hardly heeded minority. It will not do to regard us as a people with a *credo*, a fixed form of belief, whether true or false ; and it will do just as little to regard us as an infidel or unbelieving people. We are, if the thing be conceivable, neither the one nor the other. As a people, we have no distinctive or dogmatic faith ; we have ceased to believe in distinct and definite doctrines, and so far have fallen into a sort of religious indifference ; but we have a strong religious nature, we recoil with horror from open unbelief, and have a persuasion that there is and must be a true religion of some sort, though we know not precisely what or where it is. We are best represented by those who have outgrown all the forms of dogmatic Protestantism, and are looking, like Emerson and Parker, for something beyond the reformation, and have glimpses of a truth, a beauty, a perfection above it, to which they long to attain, but feel that they have not as yet attained and know not how to attain. These are the real American people, however few their number, and theirs are the only words that as yet fetch an echo from the American heart. The former Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Socinian, is as such no representative of the American people, and is obliged to yield to the dissolving influence of American life. He is an exotic that

cannot long flourish in our soil or under our heavens. There is an agency at work in American minds and hearts that transforms him against his will, against his knowledge,—an agency that resists silently and mysteriously all sects with formal doctrines, and that will for ever prevent them from being naturalized or nationalized among us. They all feel the workings of this silent, secret agency, and many of them very unnecessarily suppose that it is the secret influence of Rome, the result of a concealed “Jesuitism,” or “of a popish conspiracy.” It is no such thing. The same agency is at work among Catholics, and would transform Catholicity in the same way, were it not divine truth, protected by the hand of God himself. In ascertaining or estimating the real American character, we must look beyond all the sects, to those who have thrown them off, and that, too, without lapsing into cold materialism, or losing their natural religiosity and uprightness. These are already more numerous than is commonly imagined, and their number is every day rapidly increasing. In these is our hope, for he who can speak to the minds and hearts of these, speaks to the real American mind and heart.

We doubt if any man, without extraordinary grace, can do this effectually, unless he is one who knows them by his own personal experience. Catholics who have lived long in the country, nay, who have been born and brought up in the country, do not readily enter into their state of mind, and rarely succeed in making themselves thoroughly intelligible to them; for they live not the same life, and speak not the same language. But yet it is through this class Catholicity is to be presented to the American heart and the country converted. In regard to individuals we may find, indeed, a point of support in the Catholic dogmas retained by most of the sects, but not for the conversion of any considerable number of the American people. Our best and firmest reliance is not on these Catholic dogmas which Protestantism still professes, for Protestants, speaking generally, hold them too loosely, but on the innate cravings of the soul, finding itself abandoned to simple nature, on that inward need which all men feel even by nature, for truth and goodness. We shall, with the grace of God, find our account in proportion as we address the heart, and the intellect through the heart. The fulcrum for our lever is in the natural craving of the heart for beatitude, to love and to be loved. We shall do well not to slight the mystic

element of the soul, an element perhaps stronger than any other in our American nature.

Hitherto our Catholic authors, very naturally and very properly, have confined themselves, when addressing those without, either to the defence of Catholicity against the objections of Protestants, or to the refutation of the errors of non-Catholics. We have confined ourselves personally, in our discussions, mostly to the latter object, for it suited best our peculiar temperament. But, after all, we in this way present Catholicity mainly on its negative side, and silence the logic rather than win the hearts of non-Catholics. We show them in this way our religion under its least amiable and most repulsive aspect. There is another way of presenting it, which we have as yet hardly tried, that of presenting it in its purely affirmative or positive character, as the adequate object of the heart, which Tertullian says is naturally Christian, frankly recognizing its natural wants and activities, and showing it that Catholicity is that unknown good that it craves, the ideal to which it aspires, the true life it would live, and that superhuman help which it feels that it needs and which it has hitherto sought in vain, and must in vain seek elsewhere than in the church. Now this is what our author has attempted, and, as far as we can judge, with complete success, in the volume before us. He makes no apologetic defence of Catholicity, and no polemical assault on Protestantism, although his work really contains a masterly refutation of the latter, and a triumphant defence of the former; but he presents Catholicity as the answer to the Questions of the Soul. He lets the people whom he addresses state these questions in their own way, and give him their own list of the wants of the heart, and tells them that they need not despair of finding an answer to these questions, or full satisfaction of these wants. He does not reproach them for raising these questions, or for feeling these wants, for he owns them to be natural, and regards them as indicative of the dignity and noble capacities of man's nature. He accepts them, and shows that Catholicity is that which adequately answers them all. In this consist the originality and peculiar merit of his method. It is not controversial, it is not speculative, it is not dogmatic, but a simple statement of facts to the heart, which instructs and satisfies the understanding. It assumes nothing, but simply relates what those whom he addresses experience, and shows them affectionately what it is they want and where and how

they may find it. It is frank, confiding, hopeful, overflowing with tenderness and good will towards those who have not yet found what the author has found.

The author addresses himself more especially to the persons known amongst us as transcendentalists, and he finds something true and beautiful in many of those choice souls, who, however mistaken in their practical endeavors, sought earnestly for a time to live a higher life, and deserved something better than the sneers and scoffs they received from an unsympathizing world. He may not reach them all, but he must reach many of them, and even those he fails to convince will find his book surprising and attracting them. He has presented Catholicity in its true light to their understandings, and they must wish to accept it even when they fail to do so.

It is no easy matter to make selections that will give our readers a passable idea of this remarkable book. It is what every book should be, a genuine whole, and to give an idea of it we should need to extract it all. It is a genuine work of art in the highest sense of the term, as beautiful as true, and as true as beautiful. Any extract we can make will be weakened by being detached either from what precedes or follows it. We must, however, call especial attention to the first chapter, *Has man a Destiny?* and we beg the reader to remark this sentence, so directly in the face and eyes of Calvinism and Jansenism: "No; man has a destiny, and to corrupt, to enfeeble, or to abandon those instincts, faculties, and activities which God has given him whereby to reach his destiny, this is the soul's suicide; this, and this alone, is sin." Here is the distinct recognition of all that is true in the saying of the transcendentalists about following our instincts, and the truth without the error.

After having settled the question that man has a destiny, the author proceeds to the question, What is man's destiny? He shows by a series of most interesting extracts from the writings of the greatest and most distinguished non-Catholics of the age, of men who are rightly called its representative men, that, while this question torments its soul, it is unable to answer it.

We commend the chapter on the Dignity of Man to our non-Catholic readers. They suppose, in their ignorance of Catholicity, or rather in confounding Catholicity with the heresy of the Jansenists, usually regarded by Protestants as "the better class of Catholics," as said to us one day the

excellent Dr. Nevin, that we degrade human nature, and in order to exalt God belittle man. But in our Catholic belief, it is not necessary to detract from the creature in order to make up the greatness of the Creator. God is infinite, and infinitely great in himself and in his own right. No greatness of the creature can diminish his greatness or lessen his dignity. God himself has lowered himself to man, that he might raise man to himself, and not lightly should we speak of that nature which the Son of God has not disdained to assume as his own. That nature which was created by God, redeemed by him and destined to consort eternally with him, cannot be wanting in dignity. The views of your Dr. Channing, who, in the later years of his life, made the dignity of human nature his constant theme, fell far below those entertained by the Catholic. We honor all men, not as God, nor as able without the assistance of his grace to attain to supernatural union with him, but as the noble creatures of God, made in his image and his likeness, and for an inconceivably glorious destiny. There is no danger in overrating the dignity of our nature, so long as we do not forget that God is its principle and end, and that we can do nothing without him, and are unable by our simple natural strength to attain to eternal life.

From the question of man's destiny in general, the author proceeds to show that each man has a "special destiny, a definite work to do," and that this work is a great, an important, a divine work." This will be found a most interesting and instructive portion of the work. It offers an admirable commentary on Fourier's doctrine of "Attractions proportional to Destiny," and on the attempts made to realize it by means of associations and communities in ancient and modern times, including Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and the Brotherhood of the Cross. He shows that there is a tendency in a choice number of minds, in all ages and in all countries, to make it their special object to strive after perfection and an unworldly life. In other words, that the monastic life is in some sense a natural want, and only a mode of realizing the natural aspirations of highly spiritual souls. But he shows, at the same time, that these souls have never been able to fulfil their special destiny in any of the institutions founded outside of the Catholic Church. After showing the failure of all these institutions, he asks, is there no "path that leads to our final aim?" That is, no way by which men may attain not only to their general, but to their

special destiny? No "one that has discovered it, and standing out as a guide, can say to humanity, 'Tis I; I am the way that leads to truth and life,—follow me?' Does the past give us such an answer? What says the past?"

The author, in answer to this question, seeks and finds a model man, and a model life, in Jesus the God-man. He deduces the idea of the church from the wants of the soul, and then raises the inquiry whether that idea is realized, and if so, where. He first examines Protestantism, and in a few pages gives the most masterly refutation of it that we have ever read, by simply showing its inability to answer the questions of the soul, or to satisfy its wants. He then interrogates Rome, the Catholic Church, and shows, by a simple statement of Catholicity, that she can answer, has answered, and does answer, every question the soul asks, and satisfy every want it feels. He shows that she meets all the wants of the soul, and affords all the means and facilities necessary to enable every one to fulfil his destiny, whether general or special. This book might therefore be called *The Questions of the Soul, and their Answers*; for such it really is. Its great merit is, that it asks and answers those questions in the form in which they come up here and now, in our own age and country, and more especially as they have come up in our own New England. We have never met a man born and brought up in New York who had a more just appreciation of the New-England inner life, and as a New-England man by birth, though not by education, we most cordially thank him for the justice he does us. New England certainly is not the whole Union, but it has impressed its own mind upon no small part of it, whether for good or for evil it is not for us to say, and such, with all her faults, is her intellectual and religious influence, that her conversion to Catholicity would go a great way towards the conversion of the whole country. Nevertheless, no genuine Catholic can be in this country a sectionalist. We are all one country, one people, and one people too, whether Protestant or Catholic, whether Celt or Anglo-Saxon, German or French, by our descent. Catholicity is itself superior to all nationalities and all distinctions of race, but it respects every nationality in its appropriate sphere, and enlightens and protects and fosters a pure and ardent patriotism.

No extracts can give our readers any thing like an adequate idea, hardly any idea at all, of the interest and value of this book. They must read it for themselves. It is

written with great simplicity and eloquence. It is a genuine utterance, a faithful expression, as far as it goes, of the author's own heart. He has thought, felt, suffered, enjoyed, lived, all he here says; for, after all, the book is but a chapter from his own deep and varied spiritual experience. He himself is one who has sought and found peace in the very way he points out. What we admire in this book, even more than its sound theology, its rare philosophy, and its deep thought, is its genial spirit, its youthfulness and freshness, its enthusiasm, its hopefulness, and its charity. It is refreshing in these days to meet such a book. It is free, bold, independent, manly, but it is kind and gentle, tender and loving. We have not found a bitter expression or a sarcasm in it, from beginning to end. It is a model in its way, and shows how a Catholic can say all that it is needful to say without giving offence to any one. Even they who may not accept the author's conclusions will have no unpleasant associations connected with them, will be disarmed of many prejudices, and be drawn towards him with love and respect. We need not say that we have endeavored to profit by its perusal, and we hope that it will be studied by all our lay writers who wish to present Catholicity to the American mind and heart.

Especially do we recommend this book to the youth of our country. Our hope for our country is in the youth, in the young men now growing up and forming their characters, who have not yet lost by contact with the world the down from their hearts. Young America, we know, is not just now in very good repute, but we know that there are thousands of warm and generous hearts among our educated young men, crying out for the great and kindling truths of this book, and demanding some object worthy of their lofty ambition. To them more especially is this book addressed, and we trust not in vain. They have each a mission. Our glorious republic too has a mission, a great work in divine providence, the sublime work of realizing the idea of Christian society, and of setting the example of a truly great, noble, Catholic people. In this work, young men, you are called to take your share,—a share in the work and in its glory.

ASPIRATIONS OF NATURE.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for October, 1857.]

THE numerous readers of that admirable book, *The Questions of the Soul*, will most eagerly welcome a new work by the same popular author. Mr. Hecker's *Aspirations of Nature* is written in the same free and earnest style, so much admired in his former publication, and is marked by the same loving spirit, the same tone of independent thought, and the same glowing enthusiasm, while it takes broader and deeper views of the subjects it discusses, and addresses itself to a larger public.

The aim of this new book is to show that all men naturally aspire to religion, and that the aspirations of their nature can be satisfied in the Catholic Church, and nowhere else. The author endeavors, on the one hand, to vindicate the rights and dignity of human nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, who decry it, and seek to supersede it by what they call grace; and on the other, to show that fidelity, in a large sense, to one's own reason and nature, will conduct the earnest seeker to the communion of the Catholic Church. He takes his starting-point in our own rational and moral nature, and proceeds on the principle that no religion can be deserving of the slightest respect, that contradicts reason or leaves the aspirations of our nature unsatisfied. He meets the rationalist and the transcendentalist each on his own ground, accepts their principle and method, and endeavors to prove that if they will only be faithful to them, they will and must find the true religion.

The author proves that Protestantism does not and cannot, and that Catholicity can and does, fulfil the conditions demanded by the Earnest Seeker; and, as far as we can judge, does it with a force of argument, beauty of expression, and felicity of illustration that leaves little to be desired. There can be no doubt that what is called Evangelical Protestantism is utterly unable to meet the demands of reason or the wants of the heart, and no one who knows

**Aspirations of Nature*. By I. T. HECKER. New York : 1857.

Catholicity can doubt its capacity to do both. Calvinism proceeds on the principle that our nature has been totally corrupted by the fall, and that men as they are now born are incapable of thinking a good thought or performing a good deed. Hence it teaches that all the acts of the unregenerate, even their prayers, are sins. Catholicity proceeds on the principle that, though by the fall man has lost all power, prior to regeneration, to perform acts meritorious of eternal life, he yet retains his essential nature,—reason and free-will,—and can discover and embrace truth, and perform acts really good, in the natural order. Hence the church condemns the proposition: “All the works of infidels are sins,” and asserts the reality of natural truth and virtue. Catholicity presupposes reason or natural truth as the preamble in the logical order to revelation, and nature as the recipient of grace, and therefore accepts natural reason and our natural affections, and elevates them to a higher order, purifies and strengthens them, instead of decrying and condemning them.

It will be seen that the author boldly accepts the principle that “what contradicts reason contradicts God.” There is nothing startling in this principle to Catholics, though they do not usually express it in this way, for it is more reverent and less dangerous to say, what contradicts the word of God contradicts reason, making thus the revelation the criterion of reason, not reason the criterion of the revelation. When we say, what contradicts reason contradicts God, we have the appearance of favoring the rule of private judgment, and of justifying rationalists in setting up their private opinions as the criteria of revealed truth. There are comparatively few who can practically distinguish between reason and their own mental habits and prejudices, or so to speak, between reason and their own view of reason, that is to say, between reason and their own private judgment. To the mass of men brought up in a Protestant community, nothing appears more contradictory to reason than the various dogmas and practices of the Catholic Church, and they really are contradictory to *their* reason, that is, to reason as modified or perverted by their anti-Catholic habits and prejudices. Certainly, reason taken strictly, in its own essential nature, approves or teaches nothing that does not accord with the teachings and usages of the church. But men do not generally so take reason in practice. They do not easily divest themselves of their

habits and prejudices. They reason as they are. In practice they confound their habits and prejudices with reason itself, and conclude that whatever contradicts them, contradicts reason. Hence the rule, as stated, is not regarded generally as a safe practical rule, and although strictly true, for God is present in reason as well as in revelation, and his veracity is the same in the one as in the other, the author, we presume, would not lay it down if he did not regard it as in no danger of being abused by the class of minds he is addressing, and also as necessary in some sort to give a strong denial to the denunciations of reason by so-called orthodox Protestantism. He has thought it proper and in the highest degree prudent to show the earnest seeker after truth, who is revolted by the depreciation of reason and nature by Calvinism, that on this point Catholicity is totally different, and not the enemy, but the warm friend of reason. In this he is certainly right, and giving the right direction to Catholic controversy.

We must bear in mind that the author addresses his book not indiscriminately to all classes of non-Catholics; but to that class who have cast off Protestantism, fallen back on simple nature, have become earnest seekers after religion, and are prepared to accept it the moment that they see that it meets their intellectual and moral wants, and that they can embrace it without denying the plain dictates of reason or forfeiting the rights and dignity of their human nature. He thinks this class includes a majority of the adult portion of our population. On this point, however, we are not able to agree with him. We may be wrong, but we are not, with what knowledge we have of our countrymen, able to believe that they have as yet, to any great extent, cast off false Christianity, absolutely got rid of all the various forms of Protestantism, and now stand in simple unprejudiced nature, prepared to receive Catholic truth in proportion as it is clearly, distinctly, and affectionately presented. It is true, as the author states, that the majority of the adult population have been said, on respectable authority, to profess no religion: but I attribute the fact, if it be a fact, not to the keenness of their intelligence which has seen through the hollowness of Protestantism, and rejected it from a conviction that it is essentially unreasonable and false, dishonorable to God and unfit for man; but to their indifference to religion itself, to their want of seriousness, earnestness in the affairs of the soul, and to their insane devotion to the

world and its goods. They are not precisely sceptics, but are to Protestantism what cold, dead, and worldly Catholics are to Catholicity. Awaken them to a sense of their religious obligations, make them feel the necessity of attending to their salvation, and they unite with some one of the various Protestant sects, the one in which their infancy was trained, or to which accident determines them. A General Jackson, old and on the brink of eternity, unites with the Presbyterians, a Henry Clay with the Episcopalians. The American mind properly so called, whatever we may say of it or hope from it, is as yet thoroughly Protestant. Protestantism, chiefly under the Calvinistic or Methodistic phase, has had the forming of the American religious character, and what of religion the American people have is cast in a Protestant mould, and when quickened into life and activity runs in a Protestant channel.

A change is, no doubt, taking place with as great a rapidity as we could reasonably expect, and we look for large accessions to the church from conversions, but not so much from among those who have cast off all religion, as from among those who really believe the Christian truth Protestantism retains, and who see that it is incomplete, fragmentary, insufficient for itself, and are led from a view of its defective and broken character to seek its unity and integrity in the Catholic Church. We are all of us liable to be deceived by relying too much on our own peculiar experience, and taking what, after all, was only our own clique, coterie, or party, as representative of the whole country. It is evident to any one who reads the book before us, and has been acquainted with the New-England transcendentalists, that the author has taken them as the representatives of the class he addressed, and as an index to the direction likely to be taken by the American mind. But every thing in this country changes so rapidly that a reasonable induction from a state of facts which existed yesterday becomes absurd to-day, though it should chance to be reasonable again to-morrow. The transcendentalists, with Ralph Waldo Emerson for their high priest, Margaret Fuller for their high priestess, and *The Dial* for their organ, never a numerous or a very powerful party, have nearly all disappeared, and are as hard to find in New England now as are the Saint-Simonians in France. They were able, in their best estate, to find little response from the national heart, and were, after all, an exotic transplanted to

our American garden from Germany, rather than a plant of native origin and growth, and we think but little account should be made of them in estimating the tendencies of the American people.

There has been, if we are not much mistaken, since the palmy days of transcendentalism, a reaction in the American mind towards Evangelicalism. The naked pantheism of the transcendentalists, and the tendency of their speculations and utterances to foster a weak sentimentalism, never slow to run into a demoralizing sensualism; the rationalistic tendencies of the Unitarian preaching and literature; and the bold, unblushing infidelity of Theodore Parker and his friends, together with the attacks of the Catholic press, have alarmed, to some extent, the better portion of the American people, and produced a reaction in favor not directly of Catholicity, but of more conservative forms of Protestantism. I may be mistaken, but I think the American people are more Evangelical to-day than they were fifteen or twenty years ago. But I also believe them nearer the church, because I believe them less rationalistic, and more deeply impressed with those elements of Protestantism which have been retained from Catholicity. Protestants have, to some extent, changed their front. Alarmed by the extravagances and ultraisms of a portion of their own number, and pressed from without by Catholicity, which insists on its right to hold them responsible for all these extravagances and ultraisms, they are now falling back, not as they were on simple nature, but on the truth the reformers retained. We hope much from this reaction, for it will give us some elements of *Christian* truth in the Protestant mind to which we can make our appeals. We therefore think the class of minds the author addresses not so large as he supposes, nor in fact so large as it was fifteen or twenty years ago. The direction of the leading American mind has changed, and our hopes are now from the more serious and religious among non-Catholics, rather than from those who still retain their rationalistic and transcendentalist tendencies. In addressing ourselves to rationalists and transcendentalists, and in accepting their principle and method, there may be danger of doing more to confirm them in their present tendencies than to win them to the church; for it may well happen that they will be more deeply impressed with our strong assertions in favor of reason and nature, than with our arguments, clear and con-

clusive as they may be, designed to prove that Catholicity meets all the demands of intellect and all the wants of the heart. They have not, with individual exceptions, any very deep or painful sense of the need of something above reason and nature, and are far better satisfied with themselves as they are, than we who know from our religion and from our own experience the insufficiency of reason and nature alone commonly imagine. It is only when divine grace is operating on them or striving with them, that they experience those internal longings or those deep aspirations to something above nature, which creates so much misery in the bosoms of non-Catholics. However strictly accordant reason and nature may be with Catholicity, or however necessary it may be to enable man to attain to his supernatural beatitude, reason and nature do not of themselves aspire to it, for they do and can of themselves aspire only to a beatitude in their own order, that is to say, a natural beatitude.

The author has shown clearly that Calvinism, indeed Protestantism throughout as set forth by the leading reformers, is contrary to the dictates of natural reason, and the purer instincts of our nature, that it annihilates reason and nature to make way for grace, and in doing this, though it has been done many times before, he has done good service to the cause of religion. He has demolished for ever the claims of modern Protestantism to be the friend of reason, an intellectual religion, and the emancipator of the mind, the assertor of the rights of reason and the dignity of human nature. He has gone further; he has proved that Catholicity protects reason and the rights of nature. Under this last head it is possible that some who do not fully understand the question may think that he has gone too far, and assigned to reason and nature more than belongs to them. Nobody knows better than the author that we ourselves do not belong to the school of theologians he is disposed to follow, and that we think the disasters of the fall greater than that school appears to regard them; but we cannot find that in any thing he positively says, he goes beyond the line of sound doctrine, and it is only fair to interpret his strong assertions in favor of reason and nature as intended to deny the false assertions of the reformers. If he should be found, in the opinion of some, inexact in one or two expressions, he should be excused, if his general thought is Catholic and his intention right. The author

writes to the popular mind, in a popular style, and seldom aims at technical precision. He is chiefly intent on the general impression he produces, and perhaps is not always so clear and exact in his particular statements as if he were writing a strictly scientific work. He intentionally writes in a style familiar to the class of persons he addresses, and expresses his thoughts as far as possible in their language, in the way which he judges most likely to convey the truth to their understandings. We must not tie such an author, anxious to reach the understandings and the hearts of non-Catholics, down to stereotyped forms, but must defend for him the largest liberty compatible with loyalty to the faith.

We do not think, however, that even as to the effects of the fall and the present powers and capacities of reason and nature, the author has said any thing to which any Catholic can reasonably object, or any thing that he has not a right as a sound theologian to say. If any one has any doubt on the subject, it arises either from his own misunderstanding of Catholic doctrine, or from the fact that the author's purpose has led him to dwell on the goods retained after the fall rather than on those lost by it. His line of argument required him to present the goods retained in the strongest light possible, and those lost in the weakest light possible. Hence he has presented in its full strength the case of reason and nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, but not in its full strength as against rationalists and transcendentalists. To the superficial reader, therefore, he may appear to express more on the one side than he means, and less on the other than he actually holds.

There is nothing that is unorthodox, although the terms selected and the forms of expression adopted, betray the purpose of the author to make the most possible of reason and nature in their present condition, and the real loss by the fall is in part implied rather than fully brought out. It is possible that the author holds that man was created in a state of pure nature, and afterwards adorned with the gifts of integrity and of sanctifying grace, but he does not assert this, for he asserts pure nature only as the state in which man originally was, or *might have been*, created. Some Catholics have held, I believe, that man actually was created in a state of pure nature, and only afterwards endowed with the integrity of his nature and sanctifying grace; but the more common doctrine is that he was origi-

nally created in the integrity of his nature, and instantly endowed with the sanctifying grace by which he was constituted in a state of justice. All that Catholic faith requires us to hold on the point is, that God could, not that he did, create man in the beginning, as he is now born. For our own part, we do not believe man actually exists or ever did exist in what theologians call *status naturæ puræ*, and we believe he is and always has been under a super-natural providence.

The author's statement of the effects of original sin is we believe dogmatic, as far as it goes. Certainly by the fall man lost none of his natural faculties, and he retains all that is or ever was absolutely essential to his nature as human nature, intrinsically unimpaired; but he did lose not only original justice, but the integrity of his nature, what theologians call the *indebita*, by which the body was held in subjection to the soul, the flesh to the spirit, the appetites and passions to reason, and reason to the law of God. He did not lose reason and free-will, but reason and free-will lost their dominion over the lower nature, whence internal disorder, anarchy, and discord, immediately followed, as they follow in a state the moment it is deprived of civil government. In the integrity of his nature, man experienced no internal disorder, no lawless concupiscence; all within was peaceful and harmonious: the flesh moved only at the command of reason, and, through the subjection in which it was held by reason, only in subordination to the will of God. Man's whole nature was orderly; its face was towards God, and it aspired to him as its supreme good. All this was changed by original sin. Reason and free-will retained their original nature indeed, but losing their dominion, no longer held the lower nature in subjection, but became its servants, often its vile slaves, serving where they should rule. The flesh, the appetites and passions, the inferior powers retained their nature also, but no longer held in subjection by reason, they went ahead, so to speak, each on its own hook, to its own special end. The appetite for food, dormant before the fall, before the law of death began to operate, for food is necessary only to resist the operations of that law, or to supply the continual waste it causes, sought according to its nature its special gratification, pushed the man to excess, and he became a glutton; the appetite for drink did the same; pushed the man to excess, and, as soon as he had found the means, he be-

came a drunkard. Noah planted the vine, drank of the juice thereof, and was drunk. The same may be said of all the appetites and passions according to their respective natures. Hence the world became filled with excesses, vices, and crimes.

Now, as the special end of all the inferior powers is a created good, our lower nature, by escaping from the dominion of reason and will, became averted from God, and turned from the Creator to the creature, practically carrying away with it even our higher nature. Original sin, in fact, rendered man averse from God, and he needs to be converted, to be turned towards God, before the primary and instinctive motions of his nature tend to him. We do not think it true to say that man, as a fact, always aspires to God, or tends naturally to him even as the Author of nature; nor do we understand the author of the book before us to maintain that he does. Intellect and will have, as before the fall, truth and good for their respective objects, and of course naturally aspire to the true and the good; and as God is the only absolutely true and the only absolutely good, they may be said to aspire implicitly or indirectly to God, inasmuch as that to which they do aspire can be found in its fulness, in its perfection, only in him. But in point of fact, left to fallen nature, intellect and will are developed under the influence of our lower nature, and seek the creature rather than the Creator. Concede that they seek truth and goodness, it is rarely that they directly and formally seek the supreme truth and goodness. The will takes up with a smaller present good, in preference to a greater but more remote good, and there is often intellect enough expended on an intrigue or in compassing a crime, a robbery, or a revenge, if rightly directed, to ascertain the true religion. All this is certain, and included in the consequences of what our nature lost by the fall. The author does not dwell on this, because he is not writing a treatise on original sin, and because he was necessarily more intent on what we retained than on what we lost; but we cannot find that he anywhere contradicts it, or implies the contrary.

The point the author is intent on maintaining is that we did not by the fall lose reason and free-will, and therefore that our higher nature did not become *necessarily* subjected to the lower, as represented by the reformers, but retained the power or ability to assert and maintain its freedom, and

to aspire to God, in the natural order. It is not to what our nature actually does, but to what it has the innate power to do, that he directs our attention. We are able by our natural forces to keep the natural law, but we do not do so, and our theologians of all schools derive an argument for revelation and the aids of grace from their practical necessity to enable men to grasp the truths and to practise the virtues even of the natural order. The author himself does as much, for although he maintains that reason can demonstrate the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of man, he argues from its failure to do so, the necessity of seeking the helps of revelation, assistance from above.

If we should find any fault with the author, it would not be in his overstating the radical power of reason and nature, for in his statements on this point he is sustained by the highest and most decisive authorities; but in perhaps not taking sufficient pains to guard his readers against confounding what reason and nature have the power to do with what they actually accomplish. The church has decided that "Reasoning,—*ratiocinatio*—can prove—*probare potest*—with certainty, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of man;" but I am not aware that she has ever decided that man does, in fact, arrive at these great primal truths of all science and morality, without the aid of revelation. St. Thomas teaches us that revelation is necessary, practically necessary, to enable men to know even the natural law, especially in the case of the great mass of mankind. Undoubtedly, "the great ideas and sentiments which constitute the foundations of the noble institutions of human society, are a part of the domain of reason;" but not therefore does it follow that reason and nature alone have erected those noble institutions, or are practically able to sustain them. Reason, inasmuch as purely natural reason, is in the savage as well as in the civilized man, and all in the one that it is in the other, and yet the savage does not erect them. If men by reason and nature alone erect the noble institutions of human society, what becomes of all our talk about the services rendered by Catholicity to modern civilization? What reason and nature can do, when rightly directed and exerted to their full power, is one thing, and what they actually do or will do when abandoned to themselves, is another, and a very different thing. The church vindicates the ability of reason

and nature, and asserts what they are able to do, but she also has occasion to condemn them, to conclude them under sin for not doing it.

The author, perhaps, in his strong desire to show the power of reason and the dignity and worth of human nature, has not made enough of the practical aberrations of reason and miseries of our fallen nature, or rather, has not brought out as carefully as he might the other side of the picture. He does it, indeed, in the chapter in which he shows that the problems of the Earnest Seeker do not find their solution in philosophy, ancient or modern, and also in the chapter in which he proves the necessity of light and strength from God to enable us to solve them; but he does not perhaps, show as clearly and as satisfactorily to his readers how he reconciles the failures of reason and nature with what he asserts of their native ability and aspirations as might be desired. In speaking of their ability and aspirations, he has the appearance of asserting not only that they are able to do, but that they really do what they are able to do; in asserting that they have failed and urging the need of light and help from above, he denies that they have done it, maintains that they have been abused, misdirected, or not properly exerted. Certainly we do not mean that there is any inconsistency in asserting the ability of reason in the strong terms used by the author, and asserting also its miserable failures; and we do not object in the least to the real meaning of the author; but he will permit us to say, that it seems to us that he has so expressed himself that the unlearned reader may regard him as maintaining, when asserting reason and nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, what he denies when asserting revelation and grace against rationalists and transcendentalists. The contradiction is apparent, not real, and the author really avoids it, but is not as clear, as distinct, in his statements as we could desire. There is a little confusion of tone and expression, but after all no inconsistency. If it had comported with his purpose to expose the weakness as well as the strength of reason, its practical inefficiency as well as its innate ability, its voluntary submission to the inferior nature as well as its power to master it and maintain its freedom, he would have avoided even the appearance of inconsistency, and shown clearly and satisfactorily how, with all its innate ability, reason in fact accomplishes very little even in the order of natural truth and virtue, without the aid, direct or indirect, of divine revelation and grace.

The author's design, it cannot be denied, is one that it is difficult to execute. He starts with the principle of the transcendentalist that nature aspires to God, and with the principle of the rationalist that reason is able to apprehend and conduct us to our appointed end. He therefore boldly accepts the challenge for Catholicity of the Earnest Seeker. But the fact is, though these principles are true in his sense, they are not true in their sense. As held by them they are false, though there is a truth that underlies them. The difficulty is to eliminate that truth, and fix their minds on it alone, while accepting their statements, or at least not objecting to them. A serious, and, as we think, an insurmountable difficulty. The author does all that man can do to get over it, but after all, he does not get over it. When we use the language of rationalists and transcendentalists, whatever explanations and qualifications we may introduce, they will understand us in their own sense, and fail to catch the sense we intend. Concede to the non-Catholic world that they already hold our first principles, and they will find in that fact a reason for being satisfied with themselves as they are, rather than for coming to us; for they feel very little need of logical consistency, or necessity of developing all the consequences of the principles they hold. Strictly speaking, our nature, though it might aspire, and ought to aspire to God, as a general thing, does not explicitly so aspire, nor does it instinctively move in the direction of its true end. It requires an effort of reason and will to raise our affections to God. Virtue is always an effort. The soul desires good, no doubt of that, but to desire good and to aspire to God as the good in itself, or as our good, are not formally one and the same thing, and it is only by a process of reasoning that we perceive that our true good is in God, that he is the end of our nature, and only by an effort of free-will that, after we apprehend this, we really aspire to him. The transcendentalist principle then is not true, and consequently we can never deduce the truth from it, or bring the truth to harmonize with it. Even if the principle were true, it would not help the matter much, and would be no proof that man naturally aspires to the Catholic Church, or that she is that which responds to the aspirations of nature; for the aspirations of nature cannot rise above nature; nature can aspire to God only in the order of nature,—to God simply as its natural beatitude, while Catholicity and the beatitude it promises lie in the supernatural order.

We know that many theologians maintain that man has an innate natural desire for the supernatural, or to see God as he is in himself, impossible by the simple forces of nature. But this desire is only a vague, inefficacious, and indirect desire, which resolves itself into our general desire of knowing things as they are in themselves, and in their causes, which we cannot fully know unless we see and know God in his essence, as he is in himself. In any other sense the assertion that we have it, is condemned by Pius VI. in the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*. For ourselves, we doubt the innateness of the desire, and think in so far as it has any explicitness, it is due to reminiscences of the revelation made to our first parents in the garden. We should say, and we suppose that this is really what the author means, not that the soul aspires to Catholicity, but that Catholicity meets its aspirations to good, by securing it the good it craves, or a greater and more abundant good, though not precisely of the kind it craves.

The author justifies himself in accepting this principle of the rationalists, on the ground that reason can attain, though not of itself to the true end of man, to a certain belief in revelation. But this is not to attain to our end by reason and nature. Reason can do all that reason is required to do. From the motives of credibility addressed to it, it can attain to a certain belief that God has made us a revelation, but this belief is not faith, nor are these motives of credibility the formal reason of faith. Even these motives of credibility are not furnished by reason; they are furnished by the Revelator himself, and addressed by him to reason, and they render the act of belief in revelation a perfectly reasonable act, for they are sufficient to convince and satisfy it. Revelation is neither through reason nor by reason, but is made to reason, and reason is simply able to receive it, and to yield its assent to it from the motives of credibility in the case. It is not correct to argue, then, that man by reason can attain to his appointed destiny, or his true end, because by it we can attain to a full belief in the supernatural means by which it can be attained. What the author means is not what the rationalist holds. He means that Catholicity presupposes reason, respects it, addresses it, and satisfies its innate desire for truth, not only by enabling it to know better, more clearly, more fully the truths of the natural order, but by pouring in upon it a flood of light from above, and raising it to the possession and contempla-

tion of the truths of the supernatural order. This is true, but it is not what the rationalist means, nor will it, in point of fact, satisfy him; for what he wants is to be rid of revelation, to be rid of the supernatural, and to be able to assert the sufficiency of reason and nature. The unreasonableness of Calvinism serves him as an excuse for his rationalism, but its real source is in his aversion from God, in the pride of the human heart which refuses to receive assistance even from its Maker. Instead of aspiring to God, the rationalist wishes to suffice for himself, and till subdued by divine grace, he revolts at the thought of being dependent on another.

What the author is really laboring to prove is that the church accepts reason and nature, operates on and with them, vindicates their rights and capacities, and meets and more than meets their purest, highest, and noblest aspirations after truth and good, and therefore that a man may become a Catholic without sacrificing his reason, his natural dignity, or his manhood. He is laboring to prove that in Catholicity the man will find all his intellectual and moral wants amply provided for, but not that Catholicity is formally that to which he naturally aspires or tends, or that to which by a right use even of his faculties, operating upon natural *data* alone, he can attain. The slight confusion, or want of clear, distinct, and direct statement, which the reader meets or fancies he meets here and there, does not, we are sure, spring from any confusion or inexactness in the author's mind, but from the necessities of the line of argument he has wished to adopt, and, from his unwillingness to set forth distinctly in the outset his real purpose, lest he should unnecessarily excite the prejudices of the class of persons he proposed to address, and therefore, lose his labor. Thus he studiously avoids using the word *supernatural*, and presenting and defending Christianity, in name, as the supernatural order. He has wished to conduct the Earnest Seeker on his own principles, step by step, to the acceptance of Catholicity, without informing him in advance whither he intends to conduct him. A very pardonable artifice, but, as it strikes us, wholly useless, for every reader knows beforehand, the author is a Catholic, and intends to conduct him to Catholicity. We would excite gratuitously no man's prejudices, but Catholicity *is* the supernatural order, or it is nothing, and the Earnest Seeker must accept it as such, not as a development of reason and nature, or he does not accept it at all. We cannot, if we would, seduce men into

accepting the church through rationalism and transcendentalism. In accepting, or appearing to accept the first principles of rationalists or transcendentalists, we are more likely to be regarded as converting the church to them, than we are to convert them to the church. The moment we convince them that their avowed principles and aspirations require them to go further and join the Catholic Church, they will, unless divine grace prevents, enter into a new analysis of reason and nature, eliminate from their principles and aspirations what is due to tradition and the influences of Christian civilization, and fall back on a reason and nature that aspire to natural good alone.

The fact is, practically considered, reason and nature never operate as pure reason and nature. The Earnest Seeker, as described by the author, is not a man who has or has had only his own unassisted reason and nature. His confessions are such as no man, not in some sense christianized, could possibly make; they presuppose a belief, vague and indefinite it may be, that there is a supernatural order, a supernatural religion somewhere, of some sort, whence may come the solutions demanded. These demands of intellect, these wants of the heart, these aspirations of the soul, which the author so feelingly and so eloquently sets forth and which all serious and earnest-minded men, brought up outside of the church, are more or less conscious of, are not those of a soul in a state of pure nature, but of a soul born and bred in Christendom, and are due rather to reminiscences of a lost faith, than to the operations of pure nature. Christian civilization is never to be confounded with Christianity, yet something Christian enters into it, and is, as it were, assimilated by Christian nations. Reason and nature in the bosom of a Christian nation are indeed essentially what they are everywhere, we grant; but they receive from the first a culture, and are imbued with habits, which render them in their practical development very different from the reason and nature of the savage, the barbarian, or even the civilized pagan or Mahometan. Formed under the influences of Christian civilization, they have habits, wants, and aspirations which are not purely natural, and which in part are due directly or indirectly to the church. Nowhere out of Christendom could the author's Earnest Seeker be found. He is not a man, save as to merit, remaining in a state of pure nature, but a man who has been born and trained in a Christian atmosphere, under direct or indirect

Christian influences, for no man absolutely ignorant of revelation and grace could propose his problems in the form he proposes them. He is, we were about to say, an inchoate Christian, and has principles, views, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, which he owes at least to the Christianity Christian nations have morally assimilated, and which characterizes what is called Christian civilization.

Even the heathen were never abandoned to pure reason and nature alone, for they never lost all tradition of revelation made to our first parents in the garden. Among all tribes, and nations, however high or however low in the scale of civilization, we find, mixed indeed with errors and superstitions, beliefs, notions, and practices, which were never derived from reason alone, but from the primitive revelation preserved in a corrupt state by gentile, and in its pure and integral state by Jewish and Christian tradition. The state of pure nature is a possible, but is not, and never has been, an actual state. As a matter of fact, it has never existed, certainly not since the fall; for Almighty God intended from the beginning man for a supernatural end, and placed him under a supernatural providence, with gracious helps always within his reach.

We commend this consideration to a very spirited and agreeable writer, for whom we have a great liking, in the *London Rambler*, who, in his zeal for the justice of God, imagines in the upper regions of hell a sort of natural heaven into which he proposes to admit not only unbaptized infants dying in infancy without actual sin, but the greater part of the heathen world, as well as of "our dissenting brethren" who die out of the church. Indeed, he seems to think the only use of hell, properly so called, is to punish bad Catholics. We can conceive it probable, as our theologians generally hold, and are permitted to hold, that unregenerated infants dying in infancy, though they will never see God, may have mercifully concealed from them the knowledge of what they have lost. Not being guilty of any actual sin, they cannot be condemned to suffer the *pœna sensus*, and therefore will not be exposed to positive suffering. But with regard to adults, who have attained to the use of reason, we understand no natural beatitude in or out of hell for them, for they are placed under a supernatural providence, and sufficient grace, if complied with, is given to every one to enable him to gain the supernatural reward of the just; and for one, come to the use of reason, not to

comply with that grace is sin, and deserving of punishment according to the degree of malice in the non-complying individual.

Considering that man has never been left without at least some reminiscences of revelation, and that the grace of God strives with all men, it is never safe to conclude that what we experience in ourselves or observe in others, even though not in reality transcending reason and nature, is in fact derived from them; and to found an argument upon it as an argument founded on pure reason and nature will never have that weight with rationalists and transcendentalists it really ought to have. For our own part we think the best way of dealing with those who are disposed to assert the sufficiency of reason and nature, is not to labor to show them that our religion lies in their plane, or may be attained to by reason and nature, but that we have in our religion something far better than any thing they have, far better than reason and nature in their best estate, and that while we accept the natural order, and assert and maintain it in all its rights and dignity, we are able to offer them a supernatural order, another order of life proceeding from the same author, corresponding to it indeed, but infinitely superior to it, and inconceivably better and infinitely more desirable. While we concede to them that reason and nature are not essentially impaired by the fall, and are still good in their own order, and that God could, had he chosen, have created and left man in a state of pure nature, destined to a purely natural beatitude, it is best to tell them distinctly that he did not do so, and did not do so because he chose to do something inconceivably better for us, and thus labor to present our religion not as a want or necessity of their nature intellectual or moral, which, if it be supernatural, it is not and cannot be, but as a higher and nobler manifestation of his infinite love, which would not be contented with providing us nothing more than natural beatitude. It is not so much the needs or the satisfaction of reason and nature we would insist upon, as the inexhaustible bounty of God, which does for us far more than we are naturally able to ask or even to conceive,—more than we have ever desired or been able without divine assistance even to desire,—a bounty that not only meets our desires and aspirations, but infinitely exceeds them. This, it strikes us, is more likely to touch the heart, to win love, and command obedience, than simply showing that Catholicity responds to the wants

or aspirations of the soul. It is the fact that Christianity is supernatural, that it introduces us into an order above nature, inconceivably better than nature, good as nature may be, and gives to reason a higher and clearer light, and to nature new and nobler aspirations, that constitutes its great recommendation, and makes it dearer to us than life itself. It is dear in that it redeems us from the curse of the law, and heals the wounds we received by the fall; it is dearer in that it ennobles human nature by making it the nature of God, through its union with the human nature assumed by the divine Word.

In these remarks it would be alike unjust to the author and to us to suppose that we are questioning any doctrine he asserts. We may not place as much confidence in the line of argument he is pursuing as he does, but that is not saying that that line of argument is not allowable, or that it is not important. Brought in with other arguments, we place on it a very high value, and it has always been recognized by our theologians. When taken alone by itself, we do not think it the strongest or the safest. But this is only our opinion, which must go for what it is worth. Every man should be allowed to take his own method of addressing the non-Catholic mind, so long as he keeps within the limits of faith and allowable opinion. Because we think there may be a better line of argument, it does not follow that we are right or that he is wrong. He does not claim his own line of argument as the only one it is lawful to adopt, and we do not claim ours as exclusive of others. We have made our remarks not to controvert any views he advances, but to guard the reader against the injustice of confounding him with a school which we do not like, and to which he certainly does not belong—a school which seems to us to found itself on what may be called the eccentricities of theologians, rather than on the general current of theology, on opinions which are tolerated rather than approved, *sententiæ in ecclesia* rather than on *sententiæ ecclesiæ*. Several publications, to which our attention has been recently drawn, make us fear such a school is rising, and we do not believe its introduction into our country would do any good. We are also opposed to every thing which looks like accommodating Catholic teaching to the tastes and temper of the age or country. In choosing our mode of presenting Catholic doctrine, we should consult this taste and temper, but that which we present is that over which we

have no control, no right, and must be the same one Catholic truth, believed always and everywhere by the Catholic Church; and in this sentiment the author will assuredly agree with us. There are, as far as we can discover, no other points in Mr. Hecker's book likely to be misapprehended, or to which exception can be taken by any Catholic however fastidious.

The author has addressed his book to non-Catholics, and we hope it will be read by them, and do something towards overcoming that silly and mischievous prejudice which excludes nearly every Catholic book from non-Catholic circles. He has written it with a view to what he conceives to be the wants and aspirations of the American mind, which he has studied with lively sympathy, and evidently with the hope that it will turn the attention of the American people to investigating the claims of the Catholic religion, and ultimately, with the grace of God, lead to their conversion. He thinks there is a crisis in their affairs, and that they cannot pass it safely without the aid of Catholicity. It is but simple justice to him to say that he does not urge this as a reason why they should become Catholics, but as an excellent reason why they should not oppose the church, and why they should investigate her titles.

There has been much said and written of late on the conversion of Americans, and no man amongst us is more devoted to the work of effecting it, or more hopeful of its being effected, than our author. He does all by word and by writing in his power for it, and has quickened the zeal of many to do the same, among whom we may count ourselves. But from the much we say and write in reference to this subject, and the frequency with which we speak of the American mind, the American people, American institutions, and the appeals we make to American patriotism, some Catholics not of American birth, or not having any very lively sympathies with the American character as they see it manifested, are led to suspect us of a design to americanize Catholicity, and of a desire to induce the American people to embrace our religion through appeals to their American prejudices, passions, habits, or patriotism. This suspicion, so far as we are concerned, is wholly unfounded, although we as well as others may have used expressions which would seem at first sight to warrant it. Unhappily this is a country in which no good thing can be proposed, but there stand ready a large number of unem-

played individuals to convert it at once into a hobby, to mount it, and to ride it to death. Certainly no such thought or design exists as is suspected, but with unreasoning opposition on the one side and unreasoning enthusiasm on the other, we cannot say what may come in the end, if no pains be taken to guard against extremes, and if there be not on the part of those who are so earnest for the conversion of the country a proper respect for the prelates whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us, and full recognition of their authority and obedience to it. We know there is a feeling in certain quarters that, under the pretext of converting the country, or presenting Catholicity to the American people in a form adapted to their understanding, there is a secret intention to undermine, or at least to restrict the authority of the bishops and clergy, and to give the laity an influence in ecclesiastical matters which they are not entitled to, and cannot have without subverting the order of government which our Lord has established for his church. Although we know that on our part and that of our personal friends among the laity, there is nothing to justify this feeling, yet the fact of its existence may well make us fear that there has been imprudence somewhere, and that expressions may have been used or a tendency manifested, which are not in strict accordance with Catholic order.

The government of the church is not vested in the hands of the laity, and it does not pertain to them, even though editors of journals and reviews, to assume the direction of Catholic affairs, or to labor through outside pressure, or the force of public opinion which they may create, to compel the ecclesiastical authorities to favor a movement of any sort which has not received from them the initiative. It is no great stretch of humility on our part to concede that the bishops and clergy understand as well as we Catholic interests, have them as deeply at heart, and however unassuming they may be, are quite as well fitted to direct us as we are to direct them. If they fail in their duty, as individual bishops and priests may, it is not our business to call them to an account, for we have not been appointed either their judges or their overseers. We must leave that to God and his vicar. *Appels comme d'Abus* to the editorial tribunal are, in principle, of the same nature as appeals from the ecclesiastical courts to the council of state. Before we can hope to effect any thing for the conversion of the country, we who are Catholics must be thoroughly respectful and

obedient to legitimate authority, so that our bishops and priests may have freedom of movement, and liberty to mature and carry out their plans for the advancement of religion.

In a country like ours there is always danger of disrespect and disobedience to authority, save with those who have a simple childlike faith, together with great humility of character, or those who add to the same faith great and manly intelligence. The tone of the country is averse to authority; its very atmosphere is that of liberty,—we might also say, that of license, of insubordination. Young America rails at the “Governor,” and has a great dislike to obedience. The very essence of Protestantism lies in its transfer of the ruling authority in the church from the clergy to the laity. Under Protestantism power operates from low to high, the sheep choose, commission, and govern the shepherd; and when he refuses to let them stray whither they please, they dismiss him, and choose a new shepherd, who will prove himself more accommodating. Catholics who mingle much with Protestants, and in general American society, catch something of the Protestant tone, and there is always more danger with us of the laity tyrannizing over the clergy, than there is of the clergy tyrannizing over the laity. The laity, no doubt, have rights, but the more resolute and firm we are in asserting them, the more scrupulous we should be in recognizing and respecting the rights of authority. It were better that our rights than those of authority should suffer. What we call our Americanism does very well in the political order,—at least so our countrymen hold,—but it cannot be transferred to the church without heresy and schism.

We have shown as strong a disposition, both by word and example, to assert and maintain the rights of the laity as any man that can be named; we have gone the full length we can go, without exceeding the limits marked by Catholic discipline; perhaps we may have gone further in appearance; but we have never forgotten that our first duty is obedience to God in his ministers, and that no plan or project of ours touching religion, can be urged with propriety or advantage against their wishes, or without at least their tacit approbation. We know the Holy Father has admonished the bishops to encourage laymen of science, learning, and piety to write in defence of religion; but we know, also that he addressed this admonition to them, and it is

authority to them to encourage such men, but it is not an authority to us to do what is recommended without them. We know that every man has the right to do all the good in his power, and no one has the right to hinder him ; but whether what he takes to be good, or whether he is really doing good or not in the way he attempts to do it, is not for him, but for authority to judge. Order is Heaven's first law, and we can never expect the blessing of God upon any enterprise, however good in itself, that carries with it the slightest taint of irregularity. Every movement intended to advance religious or Catholic interests, initiated by laymen, and supported by them against the wishes, or without the approval of authority, is to be distrusted, and abandoned by every one whose attachment to his church is stronger than his attachment to his own private opinion. No one should ever knowingly take part in any such movement. No movement of any sort, not approved by the prelates of the country, should ever have our countenance, unless it has the express sanction of the pope, the bishop's superior, as well as our own,—a sanction never to be counted on against the united voice of the prelates of any country.

Having made these remarks in reply to feelings and suspicions which we know exist in certain quarters, and which are unfounded, so far as we are personally concerned, and which we trust are not likely to be justified by any movement or tendencies worthy of the slightest consideration, we are acquainted with, we turn to the subject of the conversion of the country. Here it seems to us necessary to be on our guard against crotchets and hobbies, and to take care not to say so much about it as to disgust both those within and those without. The bishops and clergy know at least as well what it is necessary to do, in order to convert non-Catholics, as the laity do, and we are not disposed to run in advance of them. There is a great work to be done here before any direct efforts on a large scale can be attempted for the conversion of those who are without. If the souls of non-Catholics are dear to our Lord, the souls of bad Catholics are no less dear. With all that our bishops can do, they can only partially provide for the spiritual wants of the Catholics already in the country. We have a large Catholic population unprovided for, who neglect, if they do not forget, their religion, and are the greatest drawbacks there can be on the conversion of non-Catholics. The pastor's first care is to those who are of the household of

faith, and, we may add, to the children of the faithful. The conversion of bad Catholics, the proper training of Catholic children, the correction of the vice of intemperance, and other immoralities, prevalent in a portion of our Catholic population of this city, and the introduction of morality, good order, sobriety, and economy, into what are now haunts of drunkenness, dens of vice and petty crimes, would do more for the conversion of non-Catholics than all the books and reviews we can write, all the journals we can edit, or efforts we can make expressly for their conversion, for it would prove to them, what they now doubt, the practical moral efficiency of our religion. We must provide first for our own spiritual wants, get our own population all right, and then we may turn our attention with confidence and success to those who are without.

The conversion of the country is a thing every Catholic desires, prays for, and to some extent, no doubt, works for, although perhaps not with as much earnestness, zeal, and hopefulness as the impatience of us converts demands. But the conversion of a whole Protestant people, like the American, is a work of magnitude, and not to be effected in a day. We agree with our author that there never was opened a more glorious field to the church than is opened here. We believe the church is destined to reap here a glory that she has never reaped in the conversion of any other country, not because the conversion of this country is more easy than that of others, but because it is more difficult. It was easier to convert the Roman empire, than it is to convert the American republic, and it took the church six centuries to complete that; it is easier to convert Great Britain than the United States, for her people have more of the habit of obedience, subordination, submission, and retain a stronger attachment to religion. There is scarcely a trait in the American character as practically developed that is not more or less hostile to Catholicity. Our people are imbued with a spirit of independence, an aversion to authority, a pride, an overweening conceit, as well as with a prejudice, that makes them revolt at the bare mention of the church. In dealing with them the church has and can have no extrinsic aid. She has to address them as individuals, and can hope nothing any further than she can convince the individual reason and win the individual heart. Her success here she must owe to herself alone, to her own intrinsic power and excellence. This is no reason why the Catholic should des-

pair of the conversion of the country, or make no exertions to effect it. The post of difficulty and danger is precisely the post the true Catholic chooses. Notwithstanding all the difficulty of the task, we believe the church is able to accomplish it, and will accomplish it, and in doing so acquire a glory greater than she acquired in converting the Roman empire.

But we do not believe it is to be accomplished by any new or unusual means. The American people, like every other people, have, no doubt, their peculiarities, their idiosyncrasies, but their conversion will never be effected by seeking in these our *point d'appui*. They must be converted very much in the way and by the same means that other nations have been,—by addressing that in them which is common to all men, their reason, their heart, and their conscience, not what is peculiar to them, or what is their local or temporary interest or passion. We shall not do it by appeals to their patriotism, or by favoring their radicalism or their conservatism, their slavery or their anti-slavery proclivities. The church leaves to every people their nationality and to every state its autonomy, and in return claims to be free and independent of the temporal order. To induce the American people to become Catholic from patriotic motives would be to make them like the multitude who followed our Lord for the sake of “the loaves and fishes.” It would be to subordinate the church to American nationality, as the English did at the time of the reformation, as the republicans did, or attempted to do in France in the last century, and to destroy her Catholic freedom and independence. The church must obey God and follow truth and justice irrespective of nationalities. She cannot be trammelled by nationalities. She is catholic, not national, and can no more be American, than European, Asiatic, African, or Australian. She is a kingdom in this world, but not of this world. To mix her up with a radical party or a conservative party would be to compromise her Catholicity. Were we to court the North by leaguering Catholic interests with the anti-slavery movement, abolitionists might pat us on the back, call us clever fellows, and profess great respect for our church. Were we to labor to identify them with the slave interest, southern politicians would also pat us on the back, call us clever fellows, and profess great respect for our church. But besides losing as much in the one section as we should gain in the other, we should be trammelled by the section we

courted. If the abolitionists or the pro-slavery men should be disposed to go further than we could with our Catholic conscience go with them, the party deserted would come down upon us in a storm of wrath, and all the politicians among our own friends would stand aghast, and fear that Catholic interests were ruined, or put back a century. So it must be, if in the hope of winning the American people to the church, we as Catholics form a coalition with one or another political party, or with one or another outside interest. As Americans we have a nationality, political preferences and duties, but as Catholics, we know no nationality, no political party, unless a party is formed for the purpose of depriving us of our Catholic freedom. The church cannot be involved in the conflicts of nationalities or the squabbles of demagogues.

Moreover, in our country the Catholic population is made up of a variety of nationalities, and one nationality in the eyes of the church is as respectable as another. These in time will be moulded into one American nationality. We cannot hasten that time by any attempts to force them to americanize. It is well to bear in mind that they will americanize, so that measures may be taken in season to guard against americanizing becoming apostatizing. The most efficient portion of our Catholic population are of foreign birth and training, and it will be so for some time to come. We cannot serve the interests of religion by throwing our American nationality in their faces, any more than they can by throwing theirs in our faces. Americans have the right to be Americans, and we will defend that right against whosoever assails it, as we would defend our country against the enemy who should invade our shores; but in laboring to promote Catholic interests in the country, the best way undoubtedly is, to lay aside nationalities, to remember only that we are Catholics, and make our appeal to our countrymen as men, as simple human beings, endowed with reason and free-will, having souls that will never die, and capable by a right use of their faculties, assisted by divine grace, to attain to the endless beatitude of heaven.

We must also bear in mind that the instruments Almighty God will use in the conversion of the country are the population with their clergy already Catholic. However we may work for non-Catholics, we must work with Catholics, and carry with us the sympathies and affections

of the Catholic body, or effect nothing. No doubt that body has, outside of its religion, its crotchets, its peculiarities, its idiosyncrasies, and, above all, its sensitiveness. We must never run athwart these when it can be helped; we must remember we belong to the same body, with our own crotchets, peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, sensitiveness, and therefore must not be too rude upon others. We cannot move much in advance of the public sentiment of our own body. While, however, we say this in reference to those who are thought to be too impatient to americanize, we hope it will be permitted us to say to others of different tendencies or sympathies, that they must not be too suspicious, too ready to take offense at a word or an expression, or to put a bad construction when a good one is possible. On this point we need not say that some injustice has been done to our *Review*, and its position and influence very unnecessarily injured. No one seems to have considered the delicate position in which we and every American-born Catholic were placed on the rise of the Know-nothing party. There was no question that we must oppose that party with all the force and energy we could command; but the difficulty, hard for any one but an American by birth and breeding to appreciate, was to oppose the party without offending the sentiment of American nationality, enlisting it on the side of the party, and thus rendering it still stronger and more dangerous. To oppose it in an anti-American spirit, or on Catholic grounds alone, would have been about as wise as for a man to attempt to bite off his own nose. There was only one ground on which we could offer any effectual opposition, that was the American ground,—to accept distinctly and sincerely the American nationality, and to prove that the spirit and principles, the ends and aims of the party were opposed to the genuine principles and spirit of American institutions. It was necessary to take from the party all chance of appeal to the sentiment of nationality, the sentiment common to every man with regard to the land of his birth, and defend Catholics and foreign-born citizens, not as Catholics and foreigners, but as American citizens, as we well could do. Our misfortune was that, while we were doing all in our power to prevent a false issue from being made up before the public, which would have been fatal to us as Catholics, and deeply prejudicial to the foreign-born portion of our population, whether Catholic or not, we were understood to be

working on the side of the Know-nothings, and sharing their sentiments against foreigners. A greater mistake it was not possible to commit, and greater injustice could not be done us. The Know-nothing party is now comparatively dead, passion has had time to subside, and Catholic charity may induce those who so grossly misconstrued our motives, to inquire if they were not too hasty, and if our course, which seemed to them so unjust and ungenerous, was not dictated by a wise and prudent regard for all the interests attacked by the Know-nothings. A little reflection, it seems to us, might have convinced the persons who took offence, that, supposing us to have the least grain of common sense, we could not have meant any such thing as they supposed; and common justice, not to say Catholic charity, if passion and suspicion had slept, would have prevented us even from being accused. We had and have no interests and no affections but such as are bound up with the Catholic body of which we are an insignificant member, and as the portion of that body from which we have the most to hope for Catholicity are Irish or of Irish descent, it is ridiculous to suppose that we were anti-Irish in our feelings, or were disposed to join the Know-nothings in a war against Irish Catholics, which could be only a war equally against ourselves.

Certainly, we do not allude to these bygone events for the purpose of complaining; we suffered, yet not more than we expected to suffer; but we allude to them for the purpose of reminding those who suppose that there is an American party forming amongst the Catholics of this country, and that it is necessary to crush it out by crushing every man supposed likely to favor it, that they should guard against ungenerous suspicions, lest they in the end bring about the very thing they oppose, and to which we are as strongly opposed as they are. It is difficult for flesh and blood to bear with equanimity what we have had to bear during the last three years, from men whom we have done our best to serve, and if the grace of God had not restrained us, and our deep devotion to the Catholic cause had not influenced us, we might, when provoked almost beyond endurance, have even ourselves been tempted to do what we should for ever have regretted. Confidence begets confidence, and suspicion breeds suspicion, and sometimes makes the thing it dreads. We think there has been too great readiness to suspect American-born Catholics and con-

verts of designs, intentions, aims, and wishes which we would be the last to entertain. We have ourselves been sneered at in the Catholic press as a convert; sometimes we have been scolded because we did not show a proper regard for converts, at other times we have been admonished that being a convert we should shut up our mouth; and one journal has gone so far as to sing its palinode for the encouragement it had given us, and to admonish Catholics that they are too ready to confide in converts and to push them forward. All this is sad, sad, and not the best way to encourage conversions. It is hard enough to feel that one is a convert, that he has not had the advantages of being trained from his childhood in the true faith, and of having grown up with Catholic habits and tastes, without having it flung in his face by Catholics, if he ventures to speak boldly on Catholic matters. But these are trifles, and are mentioned only to show that if there are complaints on one side there might be complaints also on the other, and that the only way is for all to study mutual forbearance, mutual confidence and mutual charity, so that there shall be, as there ought to be, no *one* side or the *other* side, but one body, with no rent or schism in it. In reality there is no American side, and no foreign side, but there are American feelings and foreign feelings, which it would not be impossible for evil-minded persons to push to the formation of a native party and a foreign party. Happily, through the good providence of God, no such parties are formed among us, and we trust there never will be, certainly shall not be by our means. We publish our *Review* because originally invited to do so by the prelates of the church, and because we wish to serve Catholic interests; but if we believed that it was likely to produce any such division, or could, under any possible combination of circumstances, become the organ of any particular section of the Catholic body, we would discontinue it with the present number, for the evil it would do would far overbalance any good it could possibly effect; and we assure the authorities of the church that the moment they signify to us that they lack confidence in its usefulness, that moment we will discontinue it at whatever loss to ourselves personally. We want no party for us or against us; we want to form no schism or school; we want simply to serve the Catholic cause. When it is made clear to us that in the opinion of those who are the proper judges we are not serving it, we shall retire, not because of clamors,

or opposition, but because our only motive for publishing a Catholic review will then cease to exist.

Although we have made these remarks *à propos* of Father Hecker's book, happily neither he nor it is implicated in them, and one of its great merits is, though addressing Americans, it is not American in any offensive sense, and avoids all references that could offend the most fastidious foreign-born Catholic, yet its author has a livelier sympathy with his own countrymen than we have, and is less disturbed by the dangerous tendencies by which they are affected than we are. With him hope is constant, ever-living, and active; with us it is spasmodic, and is kept up only by an effort. We fear the tendencies now at work in our people will carry them so far, licentiousness and corruption of all sorts, in public and private life, will become so universal before the salutary influences of the church can be brought to bear on them with the requisite power, that they will need to be visited by Almighty God in judgment rather than in mercy. We fear also that they are more likely to carry away with them a large proportion of our Catholic population, than this population is to restrain them; we fear that even the salt that should save them will lose its savor, and we tremble hardly less for our Catholic than for our non-Catholic population. But it is always better to take counsel of our hopes than of our fears, and we will not dwell on our gloomy forebodings, which, after all, may spring from the ill-health, under the depression of which we are forced to write.

In conclusion, we wish to thank the author sincerely and earnestly for his deeply interesting and highly valuable book. It is free from routine, from all cant, from all pretensions; a fresh, sincere, earnest, genuine book, warm from the mind and heart of the writer, and cannot fail to reach the minds and hearts of his readers. It is written in a style of great force and beauty, free, spirited, and seductive. The parts which please us the most are those in which the author answers the popular objections of the day to Catholicity. His answers to them are almost universally happy, brief, animated, witty, good-natured, and conclusive, refuting the objector without ever wounding his self-love or mortifying his vanity. It is in its way a model of controversial writing, and it cannot fail to have a good influence on our polemical literature, to which it is certainly one of the most important contributions ever made by a

native-born Catholic. We are much mistaken, if it do not prove one of the most popular works ever issued by our American press, and it will certainly establish the author in the first rank among our most esteemed Catholic writers. The author may not realize all his expectations as to the influence on the precise classes he addresses, but there are many minds, where they are not looked for, that it will reach and help, and it will be read with interest and profit very generally by members of his own communion. It belongs to the class of books of which we cannot have too many, and which can nowhere else be produced but in our own country.

MEDITATIONS OF ST. IGNATIUS.*

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for July, 1862.]

THESE Meditations are called *Meditations of St. Ignatius*, because they follow the method of St. Ignatius, the illustrious founder of the Society of Jesus, in his world-renowned *Exercises*, which are not only remarkable in themselves, but still more remarkable from the fact that the author when composing them was comparatively uneducated, without theological training, and almost a stranger to the ascetic literature of the church. He had been a soldier, a man of the world, and was slowly recovering from a wound received in defending for his sovereign the city of Pampe-luna against the French. He owed these *Exercises* to his meditations and communings with our Lord during the long inactivity to which he was forced by his wound, or rather, by the unskilfulness of his surgeons. They were the first fruits of his conversion, and a foretaste of that eminent spiritual judgment and eminent sanctity to which he subsequently attained, and which have made him an object of veneration on our altars throughout the world. Some have gone so far as to suppose they were supernaturally inspired, as being above the natural capacity of a man so

**The Meditations of St. Ignatius, or the "Spiritual Exercises" expounded.*
By FATHER LIBORIO SINISCALCHI, S. J. Philadelphia: 1862.

little instructed and so little cultivated as was Ignatius at the time of composing them; and that they were really inspired in some sense of the word there can be no doubt, though perhaps not in precisely the sense alleged, or in the sense of Holy Scripture, for they contain no original revelation of any of the great mysteries of our faith, and nothing that exceeds the natural faculties of a man who seriously and understandingly meditates the great truths of religion. Yet, they were inspired by an ardent love of God, and a lively sense of his presence in the soul, and poured out from a heart holding constant and intimate communion with him who is the source and well-spring of all spiritual life. Their great merit is that they grew out of the real interior life and thought of the author, and were neither composed at the order of a superior, nor compiled from the writings of others. They are the genuine utterances of the author's own heart, and the faithful expression of his own interior life.

St. Ignatius is one of the greatest characters in history, and one of the most eminent saints in the calendar. He was a real man, an heroic man, a reality, as Carlyle would say, not an unreality, a spectre, a sham, a make-believe. He was a man in downright earnest, who looked at the verities of things, who understood his duty, and did it. He was born great, with a rich and noble nature, and he did great things. He was a poet, in the sense of *maker*, with a true creative genius, and ranks with St. Dominic, St. Francis, St. Bernard, and St. Benedict, and as a monastic founder and legislator, inferior, perhaps, only to St. Benedict himself. We mean not that he was only naturally great, that he was what he was by the simple force of nature, or that to divine grace he owed nothing. Genius itself is a gift, but a gift that needs to be developed and invigorated by grace. Grace does not create nature, and is what schoolmen call a *habitus*, not a faculty. Grace may make very holy men out of men naturally feeble; but it does not supply the natural lack of brains, or make great saints out of men not fitted by nature to be great. Grace develops, aids, and exalts nature, but it cannot make a great man out of one not born with the elements of greatness within him. It elevates, directs, and strengthens, but does not create nature. Hence the great saints were all great men, men who even in their natural powers rose head and shoulders above their contemporaries. St. Peter was offi-

cially the superior of his colleagues, but in all other respects St. John and St. Paul tower far above him, and receive a far deeper homage from the mind and heart of Christendom. Grace does not supersede or disparage nature; nor does nature supersede or disparage grace; for it is by grace that nature is completed, fulfilled—elevated to or sustained in the regeneration. The hierarchy of nature is not necessarily excluded from the hierarchy of grace, and they were all naturally great men whom St. Ignatius chose to be his companions.

The method of meditation adopted by St. Ignatius in his *Exercises* is that adopted by the Jesuit fathers generally, and through them by almost all modern spiritual directors and masters of the spiritual life. Nearly all the meditations published for the last two or three centuries to aid private meditation, or to serve as models for the faithful, at least so far as we are acquainted with them, are composed after his method. We do not suppose any Jesuit or any spiritual director would insist on that method as obligatory, or maintain that a meditation not made in accordance with it is no acceptable meditation at all. The method, we are told, is recommended not as obligatory, but as a help in preparing the mind and heart to meditate, and as a guide in meditating. We have no doubt that if a uniform method of meditation is to be prescribed for all minds, none better, more natural, more scientific, more edifying than that of St. Ignatius can be prescribed. But that it aids and assists one in meditating to cast his meditation in the Ignatian mould, we do not think is universally true; and, probably, when true, it is chiefly so in the case of those who have been long trained to it. Methods are, no doubt, good and useful in their place, but we have for ourselves always found it impossible to meditate after any prescribed method or formula. Every mind has its own peculiarities, its peculiar tendencies, attractions, associations, and laws of operation, and we weaken the mind, we chill the affections, distract the attention, and lose the choicest fruits of meditation, if we seek to suppress individuality, and to drill all minds and hearts to the same step and the same motions, like a company of soldiers. The object of spiritual direction, we need not say, is not to make men machines, or merely parts of one grand machine; but to bring the individual into free and living relation with God as his principal, medium, and end. There is, it seems to us, nothing in which the individual soul should

be left more free, or abandoned more completely to its own spontaneous action, than meditation, its secret and personal intercourse with its God, its Redeemer and Saviour. The man should be instructed, as thoroughly instructed as possible, in the truths of religion, in the nature, end, and aim of prayer and meditation; but in the prayer and meditation as actual exercises, we think the soul should be left free to follow its own *attrait*, and not be distracted by feeling that it must observe any particular method, or conform to any particular formula.

We say nothing here that is not said, and frankly said, by all spiritual directors, and yet somehow or other we poor laymen almost universally get the impression that a certain method is to be observed in our prayer, and a great many of us not being able to follow the method we find laid down in the books, either do not, or fancy we do not, pray or meditate at all. We know we ought to pray, but finding it impossible to pray according to rule, we are apt to give up praying or meditating, and to content ourselves with saying a few vocal prayers. Prayer is the Christian's breath of life, and it is as natural to him to pray as it is to breathe. It is, therefore, a real damage to the growth of the spiritual life to suppose prayer is something foreign, formal, or artificial, that can be done only in a formal and artificial manner. Indeed we are disposed sometimes to think that piety is weakened, and spiritual growth stunted by the very multiplicity of appliances for their nurture and progress. We have too many helps, and are the weaker Christians for it. We are overnursed, too tenderly cared for, and lack naturalness, health, and robustness. Christians in the earlier ages, who had fewer of these artificial appliances, who were necessarily thrown more on their own resources, and compelled to rely more on themselves, were stronger, healthier, and better than we are. They were better able to stand alone, and could be more safely trusted out of sight. They had more life and energy, more originality and spontaneity, and left on their times a more indelible mark of their existence. They conquered the world to Christianity; we fail to keep it Christian.

Nevertheless, here as well as everywhere else, we must take care not to forget that there is an equal, if not a greater danger to be avoided on the other side. While we are warring against artificiality and casting all pious thoughts and affections in one and the same mould, we must remember

that even nature needs training, and if neglected it soon runs wild, and produces either no fruit at all, or crabbed and bitter fruit, not worth the gathering. Mankind are prone to extremes, and usually swing from one extreme to its opposite. It is seldom possible to correct one excess without provoking a contrary excess. Nature should be followed indeed, but not therefore should it be left uncultivated; it should be allowed to operate freely, spontaneously, but not lawlessly or wildly. The rules should be large and liberal, but it should not be left wholly without rules. It is, no doubt difficult to hit the exact medium; but we may say generally that a soul rightly instructed in the mysteries and dogmas of faith will, if serious, if really in earnest, hardly make its prayer ill or in an unacceptable manner, if it really prays or meditates at all. The great point not to be overlooked is, that though no particular method be obligatory, prayer or meditation itself is obligatory upon every soul that would live in communion with God, or advance in godliness. Dogmatic instruction in the case of all to the fullest extent practicable is always necessary, for ignorance is the mother of error and vice, of sin and iniquity, and no cultivation of the affections without a large and liberal cultivation of the intelligence will ever suffice to make a great saint or an eminent Christian. But dogmatic instruction is not enough, for we may see and believe, and do not; behold clearly enough what is right, what is duty, and yet neglect it. There must always be spiritual edification as well as intellectual instruction. It is not enough that we intellectually apprehend the truth; we must, if we would grow in holiness, spiritually appropriate it, assimilate it to our own interior life, and this we can do only by assiduous prayer and meditation. A speculative knowledge of truth only may leave the soul lean and weak, for merely speculative knowledge affords her of itself little nourishment. Moreover, even our speculative knowledge itself suffers when the soul is not properly nurtured. All truth is learned by contemplation, not by discursion, which is useful only by way of explication or proof, and the success of contemplation depends on the state and attitude of the soul in regard to the objects to be contemplated. The mind cannot contemplate, unless it stands in presence of the object, and the soul is elevated to its plane, and opened to its reception.

Speculation, discursion, reasoning, are all good in their way and in their place, but not by them do we acquire

truth. They serve to remove obstacles, to break down barriers, to strip off envelopes, and to place our intellectual acquisitions in their logical order, but we acquire a knowledge of truth itself only by standing face to face with it, and by calmly contemplating it, that is, by elevating the heart to it, and meditating on it. The mental act is intuitive, not discursive, for discursion requires truth for the basis of its operations, and cannot begin till the truth is apprehended. Hence it is that prayer and meditation are necessary conditions not simply of spiritual growth, but also of the acquisition of the highest order of intellectual truth, and therefore of the highest order of intellectual greatness. This is true, even confining ourselves to prayer and meditation as a subjective exercise, without taking into view the objective graces that the exercise obtains from God. The mind is naturally fitted for truth, for truth in the intelligible order, but if it turns away from it, or will not look toward it, and consider it, it will not find it, but will remain in ignorance. The light shines and illumines all around us, but what avails it, if we shut our eyes, or refuse to open them to it? Meditation, from the point of view we are now considering it, is opening the eyes of the soul to the light that ever shines within and without it, and contemplating the divine objects it presents.

We are all too apt to forget that all truth is in and from God, whose word is truth, and that it is in him we live, and move, and have our being. It is seldom without a mental effort that we think of God as near to us, as all around and within us, and not as afar off, as a distant God, residing away, up above the sky, inaccessible to us poor grovelling mortals. Yet he is near us. We are, though we realize it not, in his immediate presence, and could not exist even for a moment if removed from it. Separation from God is death, annihilation. He is our Creator, and his act creating us is his act sustaining us. We continue to exist, because he ceases not to create us. Were he to suspend for one instant his creative act, we should not be living without God, but we should cease to exist, be annihilated, the nothing we were before he created us. So also in the regeneration, regarded as our Redeemer, Saviour, and ultimate end, God is equally near, even nearer, if possible, to us. The Son of Mary even takes up into himself our nature, and is the very life of our life, and it is because he lives that we live, because he has attained that we can attain, because he is God

that we may become God. He is here, without, and within us, and separation from him were our death, our annihilation as Christians, or as heirs of immortality. Separation, no matter how slight, if separation it be, is hell, the second death. As Christians we live only as we are regenerated in Christ and sustained in him by his grace continually operative in us, and uniting us to him as the members to the head or the branches to the vine. To be dissevered from him is to be excluded from the regeneration, to be and to be compelled to remain mere cosmic and therefore inchoate existences, out of the way of life, and without any means of returning or attaining to God as our last end, our supreme good. God in whom are all things, from whom all things proceed, and to whom all things tend, is not, then, afar off; and to place ourselves consciously in his presence, and therefore in the immediate presence of all truth in its principle, we have only to elevate our hearts, and open our minds. His light, always shining, even in the darkness, though the darkness comprehendeth it not, will then inundate the soul, clear the vision, and fill and warm the heart. This elevating of the heart and opening of the eyes of the mind to the divine presence is what our spiritual writers call prayer or meditation, and hence all prayer is contemplative and unitive in its essence, and the distinction made by the masters of spiritual life is a distinction of degree, not of kind; and hence, too, prayer or meditation is at all times possible to the soul, if we will it, and may be carried on wherever we are, or whatever the work in which we may be engaged. The soul is always and everywhere able to pray, though it may not, owing to its own imperfections, be always and everywhere able to rise at once, by a single bound, to what is called the prayer of union, the perfection of prayer.

But God not only creates us, but he creates us for himself, and he himself is our final cause as well as our first cause. He, again, is not only our beginning and end, but, what we are still more apt to forget, the medium of our life. We live from him and to him; we live also in him and by him. He is principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Word is the medium, the Holy Ghost is the end or consummation. Hence the necessity of recognizing and accepting with a firm and unwavering faith the mystery of the Trinity. We are created by the Word as medium, we are redeemed by the Word made flesh, and it is only by the Word made flesh that we receive the Holy Ghost, and

are consummated in glory. It is only by God that we proceed from God, and by him that we tend to him as our last end. But we tend to him not fatally as the rivers run to the ocean, or as the lighting rives the oak. We tend to him not blindly or involuntarily, but freely, voluntarily, by an act of our own choice. We cannot tend to him without him,—“without me ye can do nothing,”—nor with him without the active concurrence of our own will, for our return to him must be *our* act,—an act not possible indeed without his grace, but still our act, a proper *actus humanus*, as say the theologians. This must be so, for though creation and redemption are acts in which we do not and cannot concur, yet heaven or glorification is always in Scripture proposed as a reward, consequently as a reward of merit, and there can be no merit where there is no act. Undoubtedly, in crowning the blest God does but crown his own gifts, and it is only through his merits that we can merit; but his gifts are real gifts, and when given us are really ours, and his merits are the medium of ours, and enable us to merit, instead of rendering merit on our part impossible or unnecessary. His grace assists and completes without superseding or disparaging nature. But his grace or assistance, though proffered to all, is effectually given only to those who desire it. The song of the angels was, “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will.” God is ever near and ready to help, but he helps not where the good will is wanting, because he created man free, and always deals with him as a free moral agent. He forces his help upon no one against his free will, and the grace that goes before and excites the will becomes aiding or assisting grace only in case the will opposes it not, and elects to concur with it. Man attains not to God as his end without grace, divine help, nor with it, without his own free co-operation.

There must, then, be in the Christian life, as in our Lord himself, a union of the human and the divine. Always must man depend on divine assistance, and always must he act himself. Never must he sit down with the feeling or conviction that grace will do it all, and he need not trouble himself about it; nor with the feeling or conviction that he has no need of grace, that he is sufficient for himself, and has no need to depend on God as the medium of his salvation or glorification. He must have help, and he must himself act. His great study, then, must be, on the one hand,

to secure the needed help, and, on the other, to remove all obstacles in himself to its reception, and to coöperate with it. Here is the reason of the necessity and utility of prayer or meditation, which removes the obstructions to grace, and places the soul in the proper attitude to receive it and to act,—to act with a clear mind and a firm will. So the advantages of meditation are twofold, objective and subjective,—in the grace received, and the state of the mind and affections produced.

The forms of speech we adopt, though perhaps unusual, are not unintentional. They are adopted not to express a doctrine not recognized by all ascetic theologians, but to bring out in bolder relief, what many overlook, that the grace received is not, *ex parte Dei*, a special grace conferred on the praying soul, but is a stream from that fountain of grace which is in the Word made flesh, and which is always near the soul, ready to flow in the instant the soul opens the valves of her heart, or permits it to flow in and circulate through her veins. The grace exists always in all its plenitude, and near the soul of every one. Meditation simply opens the heart, and permits it to flow in, and the soul to appropriate or assimilate it. The grace is supernatural, but no special miracle is wrought on occasion of the prayer or meditation. The miracle is the one grand crowning miracle, the Incarnation, the very apex of the creative act of God. The grace already exists, is a living fountain open in the sacred side and heart of Jesus, and its flowing into the soul on occasion of meditation which tends to remove the obstructions the soul herself places in its way, is the effect not of a special or isolated act of God, but of the one continuous act by which he became incarnate, and offers himself a perpetual sacrifice for us. We thus refute those who pretend that prayer has only a subjective value, and that it brings us nothing from without, from above, from God, on the ground that God is immutable, and all his acts are laws. God does not change, or work a special miracle in answer to prayer; yet not do we in prayer receive nothing from him that we should not have equally received without it. The light shines when our eyes are closed as it does when they are open, and, whether our eyes are opened or closed, it changes not; and yet to say that we see by it precisely the same objects when we shut as when we open them, is not in accordance with most men's experience. Prayer has undoubtedly a subjective value, but it has also an objective

value, as it opens the soul to receive a grace from God which otherwise it would not and could not receive.

We know there is, enveloped as we are in a world of sense, where all is individual, particular, without any sensible bond of unity, a real difficulty with many in bringing home to their understandings that what is only specially received is not specially created, or that what has no sensible existence has any existence at all. It is not true, as a class of sophists pretend, that this sensible world has no objective existence, is unreal, an illusion, or, at best, a mere picture painted on the retina of the eye. The sensible world, the outward, visible world is a real world, but it is not all the world, is not the whole reality. It is real, but also symbolic, now concealing, now revealing a higher and more comprehensive reality, a real world above itself in which it has its principle and root. Our Lord had a real sensible body, he was the real Son of Mary, flesh of her flesh, and to the ordinary onlooker he was only the carpenter's son, a poor Jewish mechanic, in whom nothing remarkable was apparent. He had no form or comeliness that we should desire him; nay he was despised and rejected of men. One day he took with him Peter, James, and John, and went up into a high mountain, and was there transfigured before them. "And his face did shine as the sun, and his garments were white as snow." Yet there was no change in him, and the glory beheld was not something borrowed, something anticipated, something created for the occasion. The transfiguration was only a partial withdrawal of the sensible veil which concealed from his disciples the glory inherent in him, and at all times really his. The natural properties of the bread and wine remain unchanged after consecration, but under them is the real presence, the body and blood of our Lord. The sacrifice of the mass in the sensible world is a special act of the priest offering simple bread and wine, and yet it is the one real sacrifice made by our Lord of himself on Calvary. It is not simply a symbolic representation of that sacrifice; it is not even its renewal or repetition in an unbloody manner, but is that identical sacrifice itself, that one and the same universal and ever present sacrificial act. They who assert only one sacrifice made once and for all, are right, but they who deny the reality of the sacrifice of the mass daily on our altars, place the real sacrifice and the whole sacrifice in its mimetic or sensible accidents, and see, conceive, believe nothing above them.

Not only this, but in all the great mysteries of our religion there is more than the mind at first view takes in. Not on the side of the affections only does the soul suffer for the want of meditation. "As I meditated the fire burned," the prophet tells us; as we meditate, not only does the heart glow with love, but its view of truth enlarges, becomes clearer and more comprehensive, and it is this clearer and larger view of truth which kindles the fire, and intensifies the affections. Each monad, says Leibnitz in his *Monadology*, represents the entire universe from its own point of view, and, we may add, represents also from its point of view the whole being, majesty, and glory of the Creator. Touch the sensible where you will, consider it, and it enlarges, grows under your meditation, expands into a universe, and on every point touches God. How much more the mysteries, all of which are catholic or universal truths, that centre and become one truth in the creative act of God, or the manifestation of his infinite and eternal Word! The highest knowledge we ever attain to of our religion by cold reflection or the speculative action of the mind, though important, is comparatively low, and may be barren of results. We get thus, as it were, only the shell or hull of truth. It is only by meditation that we penetrate the hull, seize and appropriate the food within, attain to the highest reality of the mystery, and, as it were, assimilate to our souls its life-giving truth. We thus penetrate to the very adytum of the temple of wisdom, hold personal intercourse with Wisdom itself, and become wise not by human wisdom, but by divine wisdom, in which is the origin and well-spring of all wisdom. We penetrate beyond the world of sense, the outward and visible, to the inward and invisible, and taste the infinite truth and glory of a higher and more real world, even the hidden verities of things. It is in fact only because we neglect meditation, because we turn away from the contemplation of the divine mysteries, that we understand so little of them, that they are so unfruitful to us, that we lose sight of the higher realities of things, become low and grovelling in our aspirations, are led to deny the super-sensible world, and imagine that the horizon that bounds our vision is the boundary of the universe. Neglecting meditation, taking the mysteries as distinct, as isolated, or speculative facts, we become darkened in our understandings, we lose the relish of spiritual pleasures, become sensual men, believing only in a sensible world, and

greedy only of sensible goods. Our philosophy and our morals no less than our piety suffer, are degraded and debased by neglect of meditation, the elevation of the soul to God, from whom all light emanates, and in whom is our life, our strength, our hope, our beatitude.

Objectively and subjectively, meditation is alike useful and necessary, and all experience bears witness that not only does the decline in one's piety and relish for spiritual things, but even his understanding of the truths of religion, the basis of all truth, date from his neglect of prayer or meditation. Prayer, in the sense taken by our spiritual writers, is meditation, or the elevation of the soul to God, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. It is the elevation and opening of the soul to the Light, to the source and fountain of grace, or that objective assistance we need from God in order to return to him as our last end, our supreme beatitude. This assistance is real, objective, and divine, as well as indispensable. It is more fully rendered, is greater in degree and strength in proportion to the earnestness, sincerity, and perseverance with which we seek it. The grace in itself is exhaustless, and is in regard to the soul limited only by the soul's preparation to receive it. The prayer or meditation, always possible, because the grace of prayer is given to all men, at all times, and in all places, is the subjective preparation of the soul to receive it, and the more frequent and thorough the preparation the more will the soul receive.

Man has no proper creative power, and when he needs a power greater than his own, he studies to avail himself of one or more of the great agents or forces of nature. He constructs his ships to float on the waters, and to be propelled by the winds, or by steam. He invents and constructs machinery, by which he augments his power a thousand or a million fold, but the force that propels his machine is not his own, is not created by him, but is made available to him by his machinery. So it is, in some sense, in the spiritual world. Man needs a more than cosmic power, more power from God than is given in his simple creation. That power through the Incarnation is provided for him, as the oceans and rivers, as the wind, the fire, and the water for his navigation. He only needs to place himself in relation with it to avail himself of it. Prayer or meditation is the proper means of establishing this relation, and of receiving the divine breath to swell our sails, and propel us onward to our destined port.

What may be done at any time will be done at no time, unless we set apart some particular time for it. We should, therefore, set apart some portion of each day as a special time for meditation. True we may and should pray at all times, even in our work, for *laborare est orare*, but if we do not have a special time for prayer, such is our imperfection, our indolence, our readiness to put off till to-morrow whatever it is not absolutely necessary to do to-day, that we are in danger of neglecting prayer altogether, and of depriving the soul of her daily food and supply of strength.

We have said nothing of vocal prayers, because they do not come within the subject we are treating, but, we apprehend, the principles we have laid down will apply to them as well as to mental prayer or meditation. There may be blessings our heavenly Father is ready to grant to those who ask them, and which he will grant to no others, because to no others would they be blessings. God does not change in granting or withholding, because in the divine constitution prayer is made the condition of bestowing them, the law of their concession.

END OF VOLUME XIV.

B
908
B6
1882
v.14

LIBRARY CARD

.....
.....
.....

B
908
B6
1882
v.14

Brownson, Orestes Augustus
The works of Orestes A.
Brownson

