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THE WORKS

OF

THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

FORMERLY

MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
CANON OF WINDSOR,
AND ARCHDEACON OF MIDDLESEX.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

THIRD EDITION, WITH COPIOUS INDEXES.

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EIGHT SERMONS

PREACHED AT

THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,

IN DEFENCE OF THE

DIVINITY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST;

UPON THE

ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN BY THE LADY MOYER,

AND AT

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON.

WITH A PREFACE,

Containing Remarks upon two late Pamphlets: one entitled, "Modest
" Plea, &c. Continued &c." the other, "Unity of God not inconsistent
" with the Divinity of Christ, &c."

TO THE
RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,
JOHN,
LORD BISHOP OF LONDON,

AND

ONE OF THE LORDS OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE
PRIVY COUNCIL.

MY LORD,

THE following Sermons, drawn up and preached under your Lordship's influence, in defence of that ancient faith which you have so seasonably and signally supported, have a natural claim and title to your Lordship's patronage. Their design is to shew, that we follow not mere *human decisions*, or *words of men*, as hath been *slanderosly reported*, but the infallible *word of God*; to which we appeal from the sentence and determination of any fallible men whatsoever. Nevertheless, it is great satisfaction to us to observe, that the Scripture evidences of our doctrine have, in all ages of the Church, appeared so full and clear, that the generality of wise and good men could not fail of coming into them. We think it no discredit, but a great advantage to our doctrine, that it is *ancient* and *Catholic*. If this be all that some mean, by objecting to us *human decisions*, we do not only acknowledge it, but glory in it. It has been the method of the wisest and best men, since the date of Christianity, to prefer *express Scripture*, or *certain consequences* from Scripture, before merely human and philosophical conjectures. *Human* but well grounded *decisions* have served to beat down the pride and vanity of *human* and ill grounded *conceits*: and hence it is that the faith of the ever blessed Trinity has constantly, and will, I trust, finally prevail over all opposition from men, whose strength and confidence is not in *Scripture*, but in *vain philosophy*; not in the *word of*

God, but in I know not what dark and blind metaphysics, the words of men.

I gladly embrace this opportunity of joining in the public thanks to your Lordship, for the late memorable instance of your truly primitive and episcopal zeal against the adversaries of our common faith. The attempt to introduce, by a private authority, new forms of doxology, in opposition to those now in use, which are of long standing and great authority in the Church of Christ, is justly abhorred by all that have the honour of our blessed Lord and of our common Christianity near at heart. To ascribe *all* glory to the Father, in contempt of those other *forms* which give glory to all the three Persons, is too plainly declaring in *facts* what is disowned in *words*; and is laying aside that *modesty* in *practice* which is pretended in *principle*. It was high time to give a check to such dangerous innovations; and to warn your faithful Clergy against such scandalous abuses. Present and future generations will be obliged to your Lordship for your pious cares and wise endeavours in this behalf; and for so eminent an example of an unshaken firmness in those principles which alone can make our Church glorious or kingdom happy. From which should we ever be so infatuated and abandoned as to start or swerve, (which God forbid,) we should, from being the purest and most justly celebrated Church in the world, become the meanest and the most contemptible of any, (if we could still be called a Church;) should expose ourselves inevitably to the just wrath and vengeance of Almighty God, and to the scorn and derision of all the Churches around us. That these and the like dangers and mischiefs may be effectually prevented or turned away from us, is the hearty prayer of,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and most humble Servant,

DANIEL WATERLAND.

P R E F A C E.

THE following Sermons may be looked upon as a Supplement to my Vindication of Christ's Divinity, before published. I intended them as such, avoiding *repetition* of the same things as much as I well could: or where I could not avoid bringing up again the same arguments, I have endeavoured to give them some further light or strength; for the most part, enlarging upon what had been before but briefly hinted. I have entirely omitted the argument from *worship*, because I had distinctly and fully treated of it under Queries sixteenth and seventeenth. Some other arguments I have passed over, purely because I had not room for them. Those which I have taken and considered appear to me of as great weight as any; and more than sufficient to justify our belief in *Christ Jesus* as a *Divine Person*, *coequal* and *co-eternal* with God the Father.

In my Vindication, &c. I was chiefly upon the *offensive*, against the adversaries of our common faith, demanding of them some clear and good proof of their pretensions in this momentous controversy; since they had hitherto produced nothing considerable enough to move any wise and good man to forsake that faith which has so *long* and so *universally* obtained, and with such visible marks of a *Divine* power accompanying it. They that undertake to alter the fundamental and universally received articles of the Christian faith, which may be traced up to the very infancy of Christianity, or as high as any records reach, ought to be well provided with *reasons* and *arguments* to make good such big pretences: otherwise they do but render their cause ridiculous, and expose their own vanity. The presumption will always lie (especially in a point of this moment, in which it can hardly be supposed that God would ever have suffered his Church to be so long, so universally, and so lamentably deceived) on the side of *prescription* and long *possession*: and nothing less than clear and evident *demonstration* can have weight sufficient to bear up against it. This therefore is what I had reason to insist upon, and what I still demand of *our new guides*, if they hope to prevail any thing with considering men. I may further demand of them to propose some other *scheme* opposite to the Catholic, and to clear it at least of all *considerable* objections. For if it appears that

there are but three schemes, in the main, Arian, Socinian, and Catholic, one of which must be *true*; and that the two former are utterly repugnant to, or can neither of them be shewn to be consistent with, the *whole* Scripture taken together; it will follow that the *third* is the *true one*, unless Scripture be inconsistent with itself; which is not to be supposed. This way of proving our point, though *indirect*, is notwithstanding *just* and *solid*; provided we can make it appear that neither the Arian nor Socinian (or what is nearly the same, Sabellian) *hypothesis* can tolerably account for several *Scripture texts*. But I have, in the following Sermons, chose, for the most part, to proceed more *directly*, giving the direct *Scripture proofs* of what has so long and so universally prevailed; that it may be seen that we have a great deal more than *prescription* or *possession* to plead for our principles. They are founded in the infallible word of God, fixed and riveted in the very frame and constitution of the *Christian* religion. If our proofs of this, merely from Scripture, appear but *probable*, they are yet *more* and *better* than can be produced, merely from Scripture, for the contrary persuasion: and if what appears but *probably* to be taught in Scripture itself appears *certainly* to have been taught by the *primitive* and *Catholic* Church; such *probability*, so confirmed and strengthened, carries with it the force of *demonstration*. Not that I think our *Scripture proofs* to be barely *probable*, though our cause would not suffer even by that supposition. I think them as clear and as strong as should be expected or desired in any case of this nature: and I know not whether the *Scripture proofs* of the *Divinity*, even of God the *Father*, his *eternal*, *immutable*, *necessary existence*, his *omniscience*, *omnipresence*, and other *Divine* attributes, might not be *eluded* and *frustrated* by such subtilities and artifices as are used to *elude* the *Scripture proofs* of the *Divinity* of God the *Son*.

It must however be allowed, that in all manner of controversy which depends upon interpretation of dead writings, he that undertakes to *prove* a point, or to *establish* a doctrine, lies under this disadvantage; that, as long as there appears any *possibility* of a different interpretation, an adversary may still demur, and demand further evidence. Now, considering the great latitude and ambiguity of *words* and *phrases*, in all languages, (if a man would search into all the senses they are possibly capable of,) and that even the most full and *express* words may be often eluded by having recourse to tropes and figures, or to some other artificial turn of wit and criticism; I say, considering this, there may be always something or other plausibly urged against any thing almost whatever: but more especially if the point to be proved be of a *sublime*, *mysterious* nature; then, besides the advantage to be taken of words, there is further ground of scruple or cavil from the thing itself.

And here the *objector* has much the easier part, as it is always easier to puzzle than to clear any thing; to darken and perplex, than to set things in a good light; to ask questions, than to answer them; to start difficulties, than to solve them. In a word, it is easier for the *objector* to shew his *own ignorance*, and perhaps the *other's* too, than it is for either of them to be *perfectly knowing*, and able to extricate a subject out of all perplexity and doubtfulness. Hence it is that both Arians and Socinians have, for the most part, been content to *object* against the Catholic scheme, having talents very proper for it, but they seldom undertake to defend and clear their *own*: or if they do, they soon see reason to repent it. When the Socinian is to prove that Christ is a *man* only, or an Arian that he is a *creature*, and that Scripture can bear no other *possible* interpretation, they come off so indifferently, and with such manifest marks of disadvantage, that they do but expose themselves to the pity or derision of their adversaries.

It was proper to observe this, in order to give the common reader a just idea of the state of the present controversy, and of the method and management of the *controvertists*, on either side. The way to judge rightly, either of it or them, is to compare things carefully together, and to observe how they perform their several parts; which are reducible to these three: 1. To prove and establish their own tenets; 2. To disprove those of the adversaries; 3. To object to, or weaken, the adversary's proofs.

For the purpose: what have the Catholics to produce from Scripture in proof of their principles? And what has either an Arian or Socinian to produce in proof of his? Take their evidences together, set them fairly one against another, and then judge of them. What have the Catholics to urge in order to *disprove* the Arian or Socinian scheme? And what again has either Arian or Socinian to plead in order to confute the Catholic doctrine? Let these respectively be balanced one against another, and let the impartial examiner judge which has the advantage upon the comparison. Lastly, let it be observed what the Catholics have to say, to weaken the proofs brought either for the Arian or Socinian hypothesis; and again, what the Arian and Socinian has to plead, to invalidate the proofs brought for the Catholic persuasion. Upon the whole, I may remark, that the most difficult task of all is to *establish* a *doctrine*: the next hardest is to *disprove* or *confute* any tenet; because that, in some cases, (where one of the two must be true,) is establishing the *contrary*: the lowest and easiest part of all is to *object* against the adversary's *proofs*, or to puzzle a cause among weak readers.

These things being premised, I may now proceed to take notice of two late pamphlets, wrote by way of Answer to my Vindication of

Christ's Divinity. The first of them, indeed, is very modestly and properly called, *An Answer to Dr. Waterland's Queries*, otherwise, *Modest Plea &c. Continued*, by an anonymous hand. I was surprised at it, because the *Queries* had received an answer long ago; and the world expected an answer to my *Defence*, not a *new* answer to the *Queries*. I will not say that the author was in hopes the common reader might not distinguish between an *Answer to the Queries* and an *Answer to the Defence*, but might be indifferently content with either; nor that he thought he might the more easily triumph over the *Queries*, after he had exposed them again naked and stripped of their guards and fences: I am unwilling to believe an author of any name or character, (as this seems to be,) could have any such low aims and little views as those mentioned. But I must observe, that the author, in his performance, is religiously observant of his *title*: for he brings up frequently the very same pretences which I had fully, largely, and distinctly answered in my *Defence*, without taking the least notice of what I had said: for his intent was not to answer my *Defence*, it seems, but my *Queries*. Whether this be a proper method to clear a dispute, and to do justice to common readers, I leave to any man to judge. But I am promised, in an advertisement at the end, a *large* and *particular answer* to my *Defence*, &c. which I shall wait for with great impatience, being desirous of nothing more than to see this controversy fairly and thoroughly discussed on both sides. In the meanwhile, I shall content myself with a few remarks upon this *late* Answer to my *Queries*, not thinking myself obliged to go so far out of my way, as to draw up any more *particular* reply to a nameless writer, and one who does not appear to have any desire or design to have the point distinctly debated and cleared; but only to throw a mist before the readers, and to fence off all fair trial or examination.

1. I must observe, that the author does not offer any particular *scheme*, for fear, I suppose, of being called upon to defend it. Yet if he at all knows what he is doing, or what he is aiming at, it is the *Arian* scheme or none he has taken up with. There are but three possible suppositions of *God the Son*, considered as a real distinct Person. Either he is a *man* only, which to say is *Socinianism*; or he is more than man, but yet a *precarious dependent* being, depending as much on the will of the Father as any *creature* whatever, and consequently a *creature*; which to say is *Arianism*, and the whole of *Arianism*, however variously expressed or differently disguised: the third supposition is, that the Son is *necessarily existing, uncreated*, and properly *Divine*, which is the Catholic doctrine.

Now this writer is evidently no *Socinian* nor *Sabellian*; and from the whole tenor of his performance it is plain he is no *Catholic*, in the

sense before given : it remains only that he is either an Arian, or else hangs between two, floating and fluctuating between Catholic and Arian ; which is the most favourable opinion that can be conceived of him.

2. As this writer pretends not to maintain any particular scheme opposite to the Catholic doctrine, so it may be observed, that he constantly avoids coming to the pinch of the question between Catholics and Arians. He never so much as attempts any the least proof of God the Son's being a *creature* ; never undertakes to justify *creature worship* ; never endeavours to clear the *Arian scheme* of the difficulties which I had charged it with in several places of my Defence, vol. i. and particularly in p. 556. where I summed up the principal of them under five heads. He is so far from this, that he commonly turns *opponent*, though he had undertaken the part of *respondent* ; and by his deep silence, in respect of the most considerable difficulties, seems *tacitly* to allow that they are not capable of any just and solid answer. I had asked only a plain question, that I might come to the point in hand, " whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can " reasonably be understood of two distinct beings, and of one infinite " and independent ; the other dependent and finite ? " Qu. 6. This gentleman desires to be excused from saying one word of *dependent* or *independent* ; and calls it an *invidious insinuation*, to mention a syllable of *finite* and *infinite*, p. 13. This was coming to the *question*, and therefore the point was not to be touched. He runs off, and talks, somewhat confusedly, about some *prime, greatest, incommunicable* perfection, (*objecting* only, when it was his business to *respond*,) not telling me whether he means it of *necessarily existing*, or only of *unbegotten*. If he means it of the former, making *necessary existence* and *self-existence* the same thing, then I shall tell him, that he has no manner of ground for supposing that that perfection is not *common* both to Father and Son : and if that be also Dr. Clarke's notion of *self-existence*, I shall then observe, that the Doctor's *propositions* (particularly his 5th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23rd,) are not so *innocent* as this writer would represent them, but are *unscriptural, false, and dangerous*. If he means it of *unbegotten*, I shall leave him to prove, at leisure, what real perfection, beyond a relation of order, or mode of existence, is contained in it. In the mean while, what becomes of the Query, which demanded a clear and determinate answer, whether the Son be *finite* or *infinite*, whether his existence be *precarious*, or *independent* on the *will* of any ? A direct answer to this would soon have let our readers into the main debate, to be tried by Scripture, reason, and antiquity. I give this instance only for a *specimen* of the author's manner of *evading* and *shifting*, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question : the reader will observe many

more such, in the perusal of the whole pamphlet. It is very plain then, that this writer never means to give us an opportunity of confuting his principles, if they happen to be contrary to ours; because he cares not to *own* them, however invited or provoked to it. The most that he aims at is the safest, lowest, meanest part of a *disputant*, who happens to have a cause which he dares not confide in; and that is, to object, cavil, and find fault with something which he likes not, without ever so much as offering any thing better in its stead, or submitting what he has to propose to the examination and judgment of the learned.

3. It is worth observing what this writer says to the two main points in debate between the Catholics and the Arians, *viz.* the *consubstantiality* and *eternity* of God the Son. He speaks indeed of Dr. Clarke; but I suppose he, at the same time, gives us to understand what his own sentiments are. "There is nothing in any of the Doctor's assertions, but what holds *equally* true upon *all* (the possible) hypotheses concerning either the metaphysical *substance* or *eternity* of the Son," p. 29. "All his propositions are *equally* true and certain both from reason and Scripture, *whatever* the *substance*, and how *unlimited* soever the *duration* of the Son be," p. 67. See also p. 23, 24, 27, 28, 43, 51.

It is some satisfaction to us, that, as this gentleman pretends not to hold *any scheme* of his own, so neither does he attempt to *confute* ours. All that we insist on and contend for may be true and right, for any thing he has to say to the contrary; which is very obliging, especially considering that he speaks both for Dr. Clarke and himself. For though we have no reason to apprehend any thing from the Doctor's arguments, yet his very *name* and *character* may do our cause harm, among many, if it be thought that he has declared *plainly* against us. This writer charges me with "palpable and direct calumny," p. 28, for saying that Dr. Clarke every where denies the *consubstantiality*. Softer words might have done as well, in one that professes "not to render *evil* for *evil*, nor railing for railing." I had certainly no intention to *calumniate* the Doctor; I gave my reasons for what I said, which have not been answered; I did not lay any thing to his charge more than what the Country Clergyman, and Mr. Emlyn, and several others, who are thought the Doctor's friends, believed of him as well as I. I will not say what may be pleaded to make good the charge, from the Doctor's own books, from the whole drift and tenor of them, besides many particular passages, and what from this very piece wrote in his defence; nor how unaccountable his whole conduct relating to this controversy is on any other supposition; nor how needless it is to prove what hardly friend or foe makes any doubt of. Let it be so, that the Doctor has neither directly nor by necessary consequence denied either the *consubstantiality* or *eternity*. I am more willing to

have it thought that the charge is false and groundless, than this author imagines; and gladly take this opportunity of acquainting the world that the Doctor has less to say against the *received* doctrine than was once believed of him. I am always very averse to representing any man worse than he really is, especially such a man as Dr. Clarke, who may be a credit to our cause, as soon as it appears that he does not really differ from us.

I am very unwilling that any man of sense and learning should be thought an Arian, (Arians generally have been men of a different character;) and if it can be made appear either that the Doctor never was such, or has ceased to be such, upon further views, (his own good sense leading him at length out of it,) I shall very heartily rejoice at it, and acknowledge my mistakes or misrepresentations with infinitely greater pleasure than I could ever be supposed to make them. If the Doctor has really denied no *consubstantiality* that either the Ante-Nicene Fathers or the Council of Nice intended, (as this author says he has not, p. 27, 28.) I am very glad of it, and desire no more than that the Doctor do *sincerely* acknowledge the same, and *abide* by it: and I hope that those who pretend to have the Doctor's authority to countenance them in their opposition to the *received doctrine*, (the same which the Ante-Nicene Fathers and Council of Nice taught,) will take *special* notice of it. What is it then that the Doctor and we differ about? This author will tell us: the Doctor's "three hundred texts" were brought to prove a *subordination*, not in mere *position or order of words*," &c. p. 40. "The Son must be *subordinate* to the Father in *real order of nature and dignity*, and not in mere *position of words*," p. 29. "The subordination of the Son——is not a subordination merely *nominal*, consisting (according to Dr. Waterland) in mere *position or order of words*——but it is a *real subordination* of the Son to the Father, in point of *authority and dominion* over the universe. This is the *main*, the true and only point," &c. p. 57, 58. Let us see then, if this *main*, this *true* and *only point* can be any way adjusted between us: for we are very desirous to have the learned Doctor on our side, as nearly as possible; or if he must be against us at last, the less the better, both for him and us. Perhaps the Doctor is with us in the main, only has happened unfortunately to mistake our principles; which is a very usual thing with disputants in most controversies. If he has the same notion which this author has, that Dr. Waterland makes the subordination to consist in "a mere position or order of words," it is a mistake indeed; and I cannot but wonder at his peculiar fancy. I always intended, always spoke of a *real* subordination: but then I considered the strict force and propriety of the word *subordination*, implying a difference of *order* only, while the *nature* is supposed

equal. We do not say that things of a *lower* kind are *subordinate*, but *inferior*, to those of an *higher*. Brutes are not *subordinate*, but *inferior* to man; and *creatures* are not (in strict propriety) *subordinate*, but *inferior* to God. I allow all that is really, truly, and strictly *subordination*; excepting against nothing but *inferiority*, (which is more than *subordination*;) and *division* of substance, such as is between two *human* persons acting *subordinately* one to the other. But of this matter I had declared my mind fully and distinctly in my Defence, vol. i. p. 442, and therefore wonder the more, how I came to be so strangely misunderstood by this *writer*. If the Doctor will be contented with a *real subordination*, (admitting no *inferiority*, no *inequality* of nature,) he and I need not differ. But if he carries the point one tittle further, I desire to know what sense or meaning he can possibly have in it, without making the Son of God a *creature*: which if he does, I hope I shall no longer be charged with *calumny*; and that the Doctor will think himself obliged, not to *say*, or to *insinuate* it only, but to *prove* it (if possible) from *Scripture*, *reason*, or *antiquity*. There will be no occasion to stand upon any nicety of expression. We shall apprehend his meaning, if he pleases only to say plainly, that the Son is not *necessarily existing*; which may be a softer way of saying, that he is a *precarious* being; which is another phrase for *creature*. The Modest Pleader, indeed, has spoke out^a; and a certain gentleman that calls himself *a seeker after truth*, and pretends to be in Dr. Clarke's interest, says, in the name of the whole party, that they *are not backward to express their denial of Christ's necessary existence*; but that they *avowedly maintain, with the most ancient Fathers*, (that is, so far as he knows any thing of the *Fathers*;) that the Son is not *necessarily existing*^b. Had Dr. Clarke not been *backward* in saying this, or had he *avowedly* and plainly *maintained* it, it would have saved us some trouble: and I must then have insisted upon it, from that *single* consideration, that every tittle of what I charged him with was just and undeniable. He does indeed drop something very like it, (Reply, p. 230, 231.) but if that be really his meaning, (which however I charge him not with,) and if his *propositions* are to be interpreted accordingly; this author does very ill in pretending, that I have not attempted to refute the Doctor's *principal* propositions, when my whole book is directly levelled against that very tenet; and is (if I do not too much flatter myself) a full confutation of the Doctor's *principal* propositions, supposing he meant *necessarily existent* by *self-existent*. I was once of opinion (but let it pass for *conjecture* only) that the Doctor, having a mind to introduce the Arian heresy, thought to do it *obliquely*; not by calling the *Son* a *creature*, which is gross, but by denying his *necessary*

^a Modest Plea, &c. p. 17, 217.

^b Second Letter to Dr. Mangey, p. 27.

existence^c, which comes to the same thing : and yet this was to be done covertly, under the name of *self-existence* ; a word with two faces, one to oblige friends, the other to keep off adversaries. But this may be my *fancy* only. One thing however I must observe, that if the Doctor has any design against the *necessary existence* of the Son, he has not so much as one single text of Scripture to help him in it. He must be obliged to the *Fathers*, (whose verdict nevertheless he will not stand to,) even for so much as a *colour* to his pretences ; as appears by his seventeenth proposition, which stands only on the *authority* of *Fathers* ; though it is the most to his purpose of any that he has, and seems to come the nearest to the point in question. It will not be difficult to disable him from doing any thing with the *Fathers* : I have, in a great measure, obviated his pretences that way in my Defence of Query the eighth. It will be easy to shew, that none of the *Fathers* looked upon God the Son as a *precarious being*, but asserted his *necessary existence*. This is certain and manifest even of those very *Fathers* who speak of a *voluntary generation*. We are not indeed to expect the word *necessary existence*, (a *school term*, and none of the most proper,) but the *thing* we shall find, in other words, fully and clearly asserted. This writer tells me (p. 15.) that I have not been able to produce one single passage out of any one Ante-Nicene Father, wherein the Son is affirmed to have *emaned*, or been *emitted by necessity of nature*. He might have said likewise, that I could not produce any one Post-Nicene Father affirming the Son to have *emaned*, or been emitted *by necessity of nature* : that is, they never express it in those *terms*. 'Ανάγκη in the Greek, and *necessitas* in the Latin, had not the same sense which the word *necessity* bears, when we say that God exists *by necessity of nature*. It shews but small acquaintance with *ecclesiastical* language, for Dr. Clarke to understand by *ἀνάγκη φυσική*, and *φύσεως ἀνάγκη*, (Script. Doctr. p. 252, 253.) the same that we understand by *necessity of nature*. The *Fathers* understood by it outward *coaction, force, or compulsion* ; and what we express by *necessity of nature*, they expressed by the word *nature* : *e. g.* God is *by nature* good, he *exists*, or is God, *by nature*, (*φύσει*, or *κατὰ φύσιν*,) generates a Son *by nature*, and so on, in opposition to *necessity*, which (in their sense) could not be ascribed to God at all^d. Such as denied the Son's existing *by necessity of nature*,

^c This very artifice was made use of by the ancient Arians, who being ashamed to call the Son a *creature*, contrived to say the same thing, in other words, by denying his *necessary existence*. Πῶς οὐ δεικνυται τούτων ἡ πολυκέφαλος πανουργία ; ὅτι καταισχυθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα, καὶ οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῆ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ἄλλως πάλιν κτίσμα λέγουσιν

αὐτὸν εἶναι, βούλησιν προβαλλόμενοι, &c. Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 610.

^d Vid. Athan. p. 611. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 9. p. 540. Damasc. de Fid. Or. theod. lib. iii. cap. 14. p. 221. Hilar. de Synod. p. 1184. Basil. contr. Eun. ii. p. 56, 57. Cyrill. Thesaur. p. 53. August. de Trin. lib. xv. p. 993. Epiph. Ancorat. n. 51.

See some other references in Petavius

would, for the same reason, have denied likewise that God exists by *necessity of nature*. *Necessary generation*, (as we call it,) they expressed generally by Christ's being God *by nature*, or a Son *by nature*. Upon the whole, we may leave the Doctor either to give up the *Fathers*, or to abide by their authority, just as he pleases. If he gives them up, he has not one text of Scripture for his main *position*, (supposing it his, that the Son is not *necessarily existent*: if he abides by the *authority* of the *Fathers*, they are, when rightly understood, plainly against him, (as may be easily made appear,) and can do him no service. But I return to the writer of the pamphlet.

4. He is pleased, in his Preface, to condemn the *method* which I have taken in this controversy. But, I suppose, little regard is to be had to the judgment of an *adversary*, who will be apt to *condemn* such a *method* as he was most afraid of, and commend such as might be most advantageous to his own cause. The *method* which he has chalked out for me is as follows. Either,

1. "To shew that Dr. Clarke had mistaken or misinterpreted *all*, or "at least the *principal* texts of Scripture which he has cited." Or,

2. "To examine the truth of *all*, or the *principal* of his *propositions*."

I have, in effect, done this, though in my own *method*. But, however, the gentleman should consider, that many of the Doctor's *comments* and *propositions* are purely wide and foreign to the dispute; excepting only that the more *pernicious* an *error* is, so much the more necessary is it to mix a great deal of truth with it, to make it go down with the readers. Many more of the Doctor's *comments* and *propositions* are *general* or *ambiguous*, looking two ways; having properly no one meaning, because no *determinate* meaning. Such being the case, I took the short and plain way, which is always the best when a man has a cause he can confide in: and that was, to cut off impertinences, and to come to the *main question*, laying all the stress there. Whatever I met with, in the Doctor's books, that appeared to make the Son of God a *creature*, or a *precarious* being, or not *necessarily existing*, (for these are all the same, without any difference, more than lies in the syllables,) I endeavoured to confute; and I hope I have done it. The learned Doctor may now open himself; or he may let it alone if he pleases: it matters not what his tenets are, provided the true Catholic tenets be preserved and maintained. If he had any *ill meaning* in his *comments* or *propositions*, I have used my best endeavours to prevent any *ill effects* it might have among some readers:

de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 8. p. 343. As to Ante-Nicene Fathers, if some of them supposed the *generation*, or *προέλευσις*, of the Son to be properly *voluntary*, yet all

of them supposed his *existence* to be *necessary*, (as we call it,) and expressed it in such terms as they expressed the *necessary existence* of the Father by.

if he had not, I am very glad of it, and have done no more than explained his doctrine for him to an *orthodox* sense; which he ought himself to have done long ago, if he really had no design against the *Catholic received* doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity. But enough of this.

I must here take notice of this gentleman's doctrine about *worship*; though it be rather obscurely intimated, than plainly expressed: the *innuendo way* of writing, as I take it, is the art of imposing upon the *vulgar*, at the same time preventing, as much as possible, the examination of the learned. All worship, he says, should "be to the glory of "God the Father," (p. 57.) Who doubts it? I hope the worship of the Son is to the "glory of God the Father:" why then does this writer find fault? or what is it he has a mind to say, and is afraid to speak out, "to the glory of God the Father?" Has he some secret and reserved meaning? So it seems, or else it will be very hard to make out the pertinency or consistency of his observations. He directs us (p. 64.) "to worship uniformly the one God, the Father Almighty, even "our Father which is in heaven, through the intercession of his only "Son our Lord Jesus Christ, in the manner the Scripture directs." Do not all Churches, and our own in particular, do it *uniformly* and in the *manner the Scripture* directs? What is it then that the writer aims at? I could perhaps point out what it is that offends him. Is it not either that *direct worship* is paid to the Son at all; or that the *Son* is worshipped as *God*? But sure the author is not so *rash* or inconsiderate, as to advise us to any such *dangerous* innovation in worship, either to leave out the *Son* entirely, or not to worship him as *God*. What could a professed Eunomian or the rankest Socinian desire more? Can Dr. Clarke, (for, I suppose, he speaks for the Doctor and himself too,) can Dr. Clarke desire this? He that has not yet determined either against the *consubstantiality* or *eternity* of God the Son: he that has only a few scruples about *subordination*, (owing to his mistake of Catholic principles, and his not attending to strict propriety of language,) hardly in the main differing from us, if this writer's pretences be *real* and *sincere*; would he have us *ungod* the Son in our *practice*, even before we see reason to alter our *principles*? or must we strike *Christ's Divinity* out of our public service, before we do it out of our *articles of faith*? It will be time enough for the Doctor to give this advice, after he has *declared* plainly against the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of the Son; after he has not only declared against them, but *disproved* them, which he can never do; after he has made it as clear as the sun, that the *Christian world* have been in an error, have been *idolaters*, from the beginning downwards to this day. It is poor pretence to say that we are "not to build any practices, wherein the

“ worship of God is immediately concerned, upon *metaphysical speculations*, not mentioned in Scripture,” p. 64. The *Divinity of Christ* is a *Scripture truth*, as much as the *Divinity of the Father*; and one is no more a *metaphysical speculation* than the other. Besides that it is strangely improper and absurd to call these principles pure *speculations*, which are of so great importance for the regulating our *worship*, that we can neither omit to worship *Christ*, if they are true, without the greatest *impiety*; nor perform it, if they are false, without being guilty of *idolatry*. In short, there is no sense in what this writer here says, but upon the supposition that *Christ* is really a *creature*; and that the dispute only were whether a *creature* might, in any forced improper sense, be said to be *eternal*, or *consubstantial*; which indeed would be both a fruitless and an impertinent *speculation*, after giving up the whole point in debate. But it is further pretended (p. 65.), that we “ should confine ourselves to the clear and uncontroverted expressions “ of Scripture concerning them (the Son and Holy Spirit) and the “ honour due unto them; and this is undoubtedly, upon all possible “ hypotheses, right and sufficient in practice.” But let this writer tell us, whether, in his opinion, every thing *controverted* is to be set aside, or only what is *justly* controverted. The former would come properly enough from a Deist, who will make Scripture itself a *controverted* point; and an Atheist would still go further. Let this gentleman shew that the *Divinity*, or *direct worship* of *Christ* is *justly* controverted: till he has done this, he has said nothing. It is ridiculous to tell us, (if that be his meaning,) that to worship the Father only, leaving out the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, is sufficient, “ upon all possible hypotheses;” when upon the *hypothesis* that all the three Persons are *one God*, (which is something more than an *hypothesis*,) no one of the Persons can be entirely omitted without manifest iniquity and impiety. It is in vain to think of any expedients in this affair, while our doctrine stands unconfuted. There is no room left so much as for a *neutrality*, in the present case. For I will be bold to say, and bound to make it good, that, all circumstances considered, there can be no reasons sufficient to make a man *neuter* in this point, but what would be sufficient to determine him on the *opposite side*.

I shall here take leave of this writer, having occasionally remarked upon some passages of his, by way of *note* to my Sermons; and designing, God willing, to consider every thing material (if I have here omitted any thing) hereafter; when I am favoured with a *large and particular answer* to my Defence of some Queries.

There is another writer who, in a sixpenny pamphlet, has drawn his pen against me. It is entitled, The Unity of God not inconsistent with the Divinity of *Christ*: (nominal *Divinity* he means :) being Remarks

on the Passages in Dr. Waterland's Vindication &c. relating to the Unity of God, and to the Object of Worship.

The author is a grave, sober writer; and ingenuously speaks his mind, without any doublings or disguises. It is a satisfaction to any man, who has no concern for any thing but *truth*, to have such an adversary to deal with; for then it is soon seen what we have to do. Much time, much trouble, much wrangling is saved: we presently enter into the merits of the cause, for the ease and benefit of the reader. This writer takes the *Arian hypothesis*: for he supposes the Son to have been a *distinct Spirit* (p. 7.); to have been *God's instrument in the creation* (p. 26.); not to be *true God* (p. 34.); to have been *ignorant* of the day of judgment, considered in his highest capacity, *i. e.* as the *second Person of the Trinity* (p. 8.) Having seen his drift and design, let us next examine his performance. He does not undertake to shew that the *received doctrine cannot* be true; or that his own (*i. e.* the Arian) *must be* true; one of which I might reasonably have expected of him, since he pretends to have drawn up *an answer to the main parts* of my Vindication &c. But he is content to shew (so far as he is able) that his doctrine *may be* true, notwithstanding one or two arguments which I have made use of against it. In a word, he undertakes to prove that *some* of my arguments against *Arianism* are not conclusive. With what success, I come now to shew; after taking notice to the reader, that, supposing he had really done what he intended, it does not follow that the Arian doctrine *must be* true, nor that there are not arguments enough to prove it *cannot* be true; but only that I have used an argument or two, which *alone* are not sufficient for my purpose. One considerable objection against the Arian scheme is, that it stands in opposition to the *first and great commandment*; introducing *two Gods*, and *two objects of worship*; not only against Scripture, but also against the unanimous sense of the *Christian Church* from the beginning, and of the *Jewish Church* before; which together are the safest and best comment we can have upon Scripture. This is one considerable objection, among many, against *Arianism*; and is what this *writer* has undertook to answer. He applies himself particularly to the *English* and *unlearned* reader, (p. 4.) whom he hopes to satisfy; the rather, I suppose, because the argument is *learned*, and must lose much of its force and strength on our side, when stripped of its additional advantages from *history* and *antiquity*: besides that the *unlearned* reader (especially in this controversy) may be easily imposed upon by little *turns* and *fallacies*; such as have been tried, and examined, and despised, long ago, by those that have been thoroughly read and conversant in these matters. But to proceed to what I design, by way of remark upon

this writer and his performance : the sum of what he pretends to is contained in the following particulars :

1. That we have no sufficient grounds for charging the Arian doctrine with the belief or worship of two Gods.
2. Nor for our own doctrine that Father and Son are *one* God.
3. That we have no certain warrant for appropriating every kind and degree of *religious* worship to God alone.
4. That *mediatorial* worship may be due to Christ, though not *true* God, or *supreme* God.
5. That Dr. Waterland has, in effect, given up the main of what the Arians contend for.

These several particulars (containing his sense, though, for brevity and perspicuity, expressed in my own words) must be examined in their order.

1. He pretends, first, that we have no sufficient grounds for charging the Arian doctrine with the belief or worship of *two Gods*. He has a particular fancy of his own, that the phrase *two Gods* signifies *two supreme independent Gods*, p. 32. And that a *supreme God* and a *subordinate God* are not *two Gods*, p. 34. I shall, first, examine his reasons for this ; and, next, endeavour to convince him that it is neither true in itself, nor would answer his purpose, if it really were true.

He observes, from Matt. vi. 24. that *two masters* do not there mean a *supreme* and a *subordinate* master, but *two coordinate or independent* masters, p. 32. He could not have pitched upon an instance less to his purpose. It may appear somewhat harsh to put *God* and *mammon* so much upon the level, as to suppose them two *coordinate or independent* masters : but, waving that, it is very plain that the text is meant of two *opposite or disagreeing* masters, whether *coordinate or subordinate*. If two *coordinate* masters agreed perfectly together, it would be as easy to *serve* both as one. If this text be any rule for the *common* way of speaking, two *coordinate or independent* masters (provided they were but wise enough and good enough to agree constantly in every thing) could not be justly called *two masters*. The Trinitarian Tritheists, if there be any such, will, I suppose, be very thankful to our author for this discovery. Upon the hardest supposition that can be made, the doctrine of the Trinity, upon these principles, will stand perfectly clear of *Tritheism* : so that if the author has any way served his own cause, he has at the same time been extremely kind to his adversaries. But what hinders this text from being at all serviceable either to one or the other is, that the *expression* here, in St. Matthew, is somewhat particular and unusual ; and can by no means be made a rule of speech, against the more general and current use of language.

This writer endeavours, next, to find some instances of a *sovereign and a subordinate king*, which together were not, or are not, *two kings*. He instances in David and Solomon; who were not, that I know of, each of them a *king* at the same time. He proceeds farther to the instance of Pharaoh and Joseph; that is, of a *king* and *no king*: and he instances in a king of Great Britain and a lord lieutenant of Ireland; that is, again, a *king* and *no king*: so hard a matter is it any where to meet with two that are *kings*, and yet are not *two kings*.

He observes, next, that "one Saviour, one Master, one Potentate, "one Father, one Lord, one Shepherd, &c. signify one supreme *Saviour*, "*Potentate*, *Master*, &c. and so *two Gods* must necessarily signify two "supreme Gods," p. 33. But, for any thing he knows, "one Saviour, "one Master, one Potentate, &c." may as well signify one *heavenly*, or one *adorable*, or one *necessarily existent Saviour*, *Master*, *Potentate*, &c. one, in some distinguishing, *emphatical* sense, whatever it be; yet not excluding what essentially belongs to that one. Our blessed Lord is *one Lord*, (1 Cor. viii. 6.) and yet I hardly believe our author will construe it *one supreme Lord*, or one Lord in the *highest* sense. He is also our *Saviour*, emphatically and eminently so styled; yet this writer will not from thence conclude that he is *supreme Saviour*, and all others (suppose the *Father* himself) *subordinate* to him. This author therefore has taken a very uncertain and fallible rule for the interpreting of *emphatical* appellations. Besides that if *one God* signifies one *supreme God*; then, since all but the *supreme God* are excluded from being *Gods*, in any religious sense, the consequence is, that an inferior *God* is *no God*; not that a *supreme* and an inferior *God* (were they really each of them a *God*) are not *two Gods*. This gentleman then, we see, is very far from proving his point. We may, in the next place, consider, whether it be not capable of a clear confutation.

I had before argued that *one God* and *another God* make *two Gods*, or else one of them is *no God*, contrary to the supposition: which reasoning is so plain and strong, that I thought it might be trusted with the meanest reader. But this *serious* gentleman (I know not why, except it be that he is not used to consider this controversy) suspects it all to be *banter*, p. 36. I will offer one argument more, which perhaps may take with him. The Pagans, though they professed generally (as is well known to the learned) *one only supreme God*, looking upon all the rest as *subordinate* ministers of the *one supreme*, yet stand charged with *Polytheism* by the Jews, by the ancient Christians, by the common consent of mankind. Thus Jupiter and Mercury (though one was supposed a *subordinate minister* of the other) were, by the Lycaonians, spoken of in the *plural* number as *gods*; that is, *two gods*, Acts xiv. 11, 12. And this

has been the common way of speaking in all writers I have met with, sacred or profane, ancient or modern.

But what if the customary usage of language had been otherwise? does this writer imagine that the dispute is only about a *name*? If the changing of a *name* would set all right, I do not know any man of sense that would contend about such a trifle. To extricate this matter, *Polytheism* may be considered either in a stricter or a larger sense: it may either signify the belief of more *Gods* than one, in the *proper* sense of *necessarily existing, supreme, &c.* (in which sense there have been few, very few Polytheists; the Pagans themselves, generally, were not Polytheists in this sense;) or it may signify the receiving more *Gods* than one, in respect of *religious worship*, whatever opinion of those *Gods* they may otherwise have. It is this kind of *Polytheism* which the *first commandment* has chiefly respect to: and it is the same that Pagans, Arians, and Socinians, stand justly charged with. Should any man alter the *name*, the *thing* would be the same still. For suppose we should not call it *Polytheism*, it would not appear at all the better under the name of *idolatry*; which it really is, as well as *Polytheism*. I must observe farther, that though the Arians or Socinians, or other such Polytheists, do not *believe* in two *supreme Gods*, and so, in that respect, are not *speculative Tritheists*, or *Ditheists*; yet by paying *worship*, religious worship, (the *incommunicable* honour due to the *supreme God* only,) to two *Gods*, they do by *construction* and *implication*, though not in *intention*, make *two supreme Gods*; and consequently are *practical Ditheists*, at least, even in the highest and strictest sense of *Ditheism*.— Thus much may suffice for the first particular. This *author* has not cleared the *Arian doctrine* from the charge of receiving *two Gods*: nor, if he had, would his cause be at all the better by changing the name from *Polytheism*, or *Ditheism*, to that of *idolatry*. Not to mention that, upon his principles, it is the easiest thing in the world for the Catholics, admitting a subordination of order, to get perfectly clear of *Tritheism*, which is the *grand* objection^e: besides that, in his way of explaining the *exclusive* terms, the Catholics will easily answer every text he can bring to prove the *Father only* to be the *true God*: for it is only saying that he is so *emphatically*, or *unoriginately*, and the *Son* may be *true God* and *necessarily existing* notwithstanding: so that if this writer has at all weakened *one* of our arguments against the Arians, he has, at the same

^e Just and wise is the reflection of a judicious Father on this head, in the following words: Μήτε τὸ τῆς τριθεΐας ἔγκλημα αἰσχυνοῦσθαι, ἕως ἂν καὶ ἄλλος κινδυνεύῃ τὴν διθεΐαν. ἢ γὰρ συνέλυσας, ἢ συνηπόρησας, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐναυάγησε μετὰ τῶν

λογισμῶν καὶ θεότητα, σοὶ δὲ παρέμεινε θεότης, καὶ εἰ ὁ λόγος ἠσθένησε, κρείσσον καμείν ἐν τοῖς λογισμοῖς μετὰ τῆς ὁδηγίας τοῦ πνεύματος, ἢ προσχείρως ἀσεβῆσαι, τὴν βασιτώνην διώκοντα. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xliii. p. 422.

time, very kindly cut the sinews of *all*, or however of the most considerable arguments of the Arians against us; and so has really *disserved* his own cause, more than he has *served* it.

2. The second particular which I propose to examine is, his pretence that “we have not sufficient grounds to conclude that Father and Son “are one God.” He does not undertake to examine or confute all we have to urge upon that head: but so much only as we urge by way of proof^f of Christ’s *Divinity*. We are used to plead thus: *the Father is God, and the Son God, and yet God is one: therefore Father and Son are one God*. This is the argument (though rather too briefly expressed) which he labours to confute for many pages together. We are now to see how he has performed.

He observes that God is the *only Saviour*, Othniel also a *Saviour*; and yet *God* and *Othniel* are not *one Saviour*, p. 17. Again, *God only is holy*, a *Bishop* must be *holy*; and yet *God* and a *Bishop* are not *one holy being*, p. 19. *God only is Master*, some men are *masters*, and yet *God* and an earthly *master* are not *one master*. These things he delivers *seriously*, without the least air of *banter*; and goes on, in the simplicity of his heart, with the like instances to the number of *twenty-eight*, as he observes, p. 30. I am very willing to take his word without counting them; nay, and to add two or three more to the number. For *God is one*, and *Moses* was *God*; and yet *God* and *Moses* were not *one God*. *God is one*, and the *Devil* is *God*, (2 Cor. iv. 4.) and yet *God* and the *Devil* are not *one being*. *Angels* are gods, and *magistrates* gods; and yet *God* with his *angels*, or with *magistrates*, does not make *one being*. This is so plain, that even the Trinitarians (blind as they are thought) both see and confess it: which had the author considered, he might have saved himself some trouble, and as much waste of time. The short of the case is this: Though there be *gods many*, and *lords many*, yet there is but one God and Lord to be honoured with *religious* worship: now Christ is God and Lord, in such a sense as to be honoured with *religious* worship; therefore Christ is the *one God*. The premises I have proved in my Defence, vol. i. Qu. 16, 17. The conclusion makes itself. This is the Catholic argument, which I leave the gentleman once more to exercise his thoughts upon; desiring him, particularly, to answer my reasons against any *inferior* or *subordinate*, but *adorable* Gods. I easily perceive now, why he did not understand a plain question which I asked: *Where did the Scripture* give any intimation of *two true Gods*? See what he says to it, p. 34. I know but *one God* that is to be *worshipped*;

^f N.B. Every argument which proves Christ to be God in the *strict sense*, proves him to be the *one God*, since God is one. But in that way Christ’s *Divinity* is presupposed; and his being the *one*

God inferred afterwards. The argument from *worship* proceeds differently, proving Christ to be God in the *strict sense*, because he is the one true *adorable* God.

that one God is the *true God*; more *adorable* Gods than one are, by necessary construction and implication, more *true Gods*.

3. The third particular which this writer insists upon (in *sense*, I mean, not in *terms*) is, that we have no sufficient warrant for appropriating all kinds and degrees of *religious* or *divine* worship to the true God only. Here indeed lies the very pinch of the argument. For if all *religious* worship be not *appropriate* to the *one true God*, the Arians (so far as I apprehend) are not justly chargeable with *idolatry* or *Polytheism* for worshipping a *creature*; neither is our argument from *worship* alone sufficient to prove that Father and Son are *one God*. I have (in my Defence, vol. i. Qu. 16.) shewn at large, that all *acts of religious* worship are, in *Scripture*, appropriated to the *one true God*, in opposition to *creature-worship*. I have to *Scripture* added the concurring sentiments of the primitive Christians. I might have added the sentiments likewise of the ancient and later Jews to the same purpose; which, however, the reader may find collected in Dr. Cudworth's. This argument has been learnedly and accurately handled by many great men (particularly by Bp. Stillingfleet) against the Papists. As the point is of great concernment, so the evidence appears every way answerable to it. Greater or stronger proofs cannot be expected, or reasonably desired, in a thing of this nature, than *express Scripture*, confirmed by the concurring sentiments both of the Jews before Christianity, and the Christian Church from the beginning; not to mention what may be farther pleaded from the nature and reason of the thing itself. This writer, on the other hand, has little or nothing of weight to oppose to such a cloud of witnesses. He does indeed give us his *own* sentiments, or rather *wishes*: for if you ask for proof, he has none. He first falls to *conjecture* (p. 39.), how *he thinks* this matter of *worship* might stand: that is, supposing he had had the direction of an affair, which an all-wise God has took into his own hands. He tells us how it might be reasonable (that is, supposing he is *wise* enough to dictate to *God*) to ask pardon of *Christ*, or any other blessings, and to thank him for them upon his *hypothesis*, *i. e.* supposing *Christ* to be no more than a *creature*. All this is only guessing, presumptuous guessing. P. 52. he lays down his whole doctrine concerning *worship* in these three particulars: 1. That all our *worship* terminate upon the one supreme God. 2. That it be not offered to other Gods; any farther than our worshipping of *them* is really a worshipping of *him*, as redounding to his *glory*. 3. That it be not offered to other Gods, (that is his sense,) any farther than the *supreme God* has *commanded*.

1. As to the first rule, it is *groundless* and *insignificant*. *Groundless*,

because he can produce no Scripture proof of it. We can easily shew that *God alone* is to be worshipped: where is it said that all worship, whether offered to *God* or *creatures*, must *terminate* upon *God*? He pleads (p. 51.) that the priests *serve* the tabernacle, (Heb. xiii. 10.) which *service* of theirs *terminated* upon *God*. But let him shew that *servicing* there bears such a sense, as when we are said to *serve* *God*; or that the priests *worshipped* the tabernacle; and then the instance may appear more to the purpose. He pleads farther, that though we are to *serve* *God only*, yet we are allowed to *serve* others also, p. 51. Therefore, I suppose, though we are to worship *God only*, yet we may be allowed to *worship* others also. But when we are ordered to *serve* *God only*, *religious* service, not every kind of service, is intended; which *religious* service is not to be paid to *creatures*, Rom. i. 25. not to those that “by nature are no Gods,” Gal. iv. 8. Having shewn then that this first rule of our author’s is *groundless*, I must next observe that it is *trifling* and *insignificant*. The very Papists and Pagans, in their grossest *idolatry* or *image-worship*, keep up to this rule. They *terminate*, at least *intentionally*, all their worship upon the one supreme *God*.

2. This gentleman’s second rule for worship is, that it must not be offered to other *Gods*, any farther than our worshipping of them is really worshipping of the *supreme* *God*, as redounding to his *glory*. But who can assure us that any worship of the *creature* is really worshipping of *God*; or that it does or can *redound* to *God’s* *glory*? Are we better judges of what is properly the *worshipping* of *God*, or of what is most for his *glory*, than *God* himself is? If this gentleman can prove that any *creature-worship* is really the *worshipping* of *God*, or that it *redounds* to *God’s* *glory*, he will then do something. I mention not, that both Popish and Pagan idolaters pretend, that all their worship is really the worshipping of the one supreme *God*, and redounds to his *glory*. But Divine wisdom seems to have fixed the affair of *worship* upon quite another foot, as it were on purpose to cut off all such pretences of men, *wise* in their *own* *conceits*.

3. The last rule laid down by this *writer* is, that worship be not offered to *others*, any farther than the *supreme* *God* has *commanded*. This is a safe and a good rule; and I wish that this gentleman, and such others, would abide by it. It is evident from the whole tenour of Scripture, that *God* has not only *not* *commanded*, but absolutely *prohibited*, all *creature-worship*; and laid it down as a fundamental rule, that *God alone* is to be worshipped, because he is *God*, in opposition to all that do not stand possessed of those excellencies and perfections which belong to *God*. If therefore this rule be good, as it certainly is, all *creature-worship* is for ever precluded by it. I proceed to,

4. A fourth particular maintained by this *writer*, *viz.* that *media-*

torial worship may belong to Christ, though not *true* God, or *supreme* God. But he has not proved that there is any such thing as *mediatorial* worship, distinct from *Divine*. If *Christ* our Mediator is worshipped, it is because he is *God* as well as *man*, a *Divine* Mediator. This writer cannot prove that Christ's *mediatorial* office is the *ground* and *foundation* of the worship which we are commanded to pay him : but it may, on the contrary, be proved that it is not. As to what he pretends from John v. 22, 23. I refer the reader to my defence of Qu. 19. vol. i. which this gentleman should have answered, instead of repeating an old objection. As to Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11. I refer to my fifth Sermon, and to my defence of Qu. 18. vol. i. p. 189, &c. where I shew that these and the like pretences are calculated only for the Socinian hypothesis, and come very absurdly from the pen of an Arian. As to Rev. i. 5, 6, and v. 12. I refer to my Defence, vol. i. p. 195, 196. which this gentleman has attempted to answer in part, but has not done it. I had said, " that the *essential* dignity of Christ's " Person is really the ground and foundation of honour and esteem, " (and consequently of *worship*, the *highest expression* of both,) which " ought always to bear proportion to the intrinsic excellency of the " object," (Defence, vol. i. p. 196.) To this he replies, " that if we " take *worship* to signify *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, then my *assertion* is " *plainly false*: for the essential dignity of Christ's Person is not the " *ground* on which his title to *prayer* and *thanksgiving* is founded." To which I rejoin, that *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered merely under the notion of *asking a favour*, or *giving thanks* for it, (as this gentleman seems to understand them,) do not suppose any *Divine* excellency in the person we *ask of*, or *give thanks* to: for we may ask a favour of a man or an *angel*, present with us, and *give thanks* to them for what they have done. But *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, in the *religious* sense, considered as *acts of worship*, suppose *Divine* excellency in the object we address to, God having commanded all *worship*, properly such, to be paid to God alone, making it thereby *incommunicable* to any *creature*. In a word then, *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, under one consideration, are founded in kindnesses to be received, or already received: but considered as parts of *religious worship*, they carry in them the same significancy which *sacrifice* or any other instance of *religious* worship does; are outward marks and expressions of that *honour* which belongs to God only, and are therefore *founded* in the *essential* dignity of the person to whom this *honour* is paid. This writer observes justly enough, (p. 43.) " that there would be no obligation either to *prayer* or *thanks-* " *giving*, if God did not exercise a providence over the world; and " from thence he infers, (p. 44.) that God's government of the " world is the *foundation* of this kind of *worship*." This may be true,

in a certain sense, and very consistent with what I had said, according as *prayer* and *thanksgiving* may be taken under different conceptions. I considered them under such precise formality, as *expressions* or *marks* of honour: and that my reasoning was just, is capable of being proved, even with the evidence of *demonstration*. I shall make it out *distinctly*, step by step, as follows. There is no reason why I should esteem or think any thing thus or thus *excellent*, but because it really is so; therefore the *intrinsic* excellency of the thing is the sole *foundation* of all just *value* or *esteem*. Inward *honour* is a mental acknowledgment of that *esteem* which I have of, or bear towards, the thing so esteemed, and consequently rests upon the *same foundation*: *worship*, considered as an *outward expression* or *mark* of that honour, (as it must be considered when once *appropriated* to the one only greatest and most excellent Being^h;) rests upon the same *foundation* that the *honour* does: *prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered as parts of *religious worship*, (and consequently as *marks* and *expressions* of that highest honour, which is appropriate to the greatest and best of Beings.) has the *same foundation* which all *worship* has; that is, which *honour* has; that is, which *esteem* has; that is, the *intrinsic excellency of the object*: which was to be proved. There is no answering this, but either by denying *prayer* and *thanksgiving* to be parts of *religious worship*; or by shewing that all *worship* is not *appropriate* to God. Thus far I have proceeded in observing, that this *writer* has not been able to make good his position, that the worship of Christ is founded on his *mediatorial* office. The *contrary* may be proved from two plain reasons:

1. That the only Scriptural foundation of any *religious worship* is the *Divinity* of the person to be adored, in opposition to all *creature-worship*; as I have formerly proved in my Defence, &c. vol. i. Qu. 16. And it is worth observing, how naturally and how easily this falls in with the *commands* to worship *Christ*; since the same Scriptures, which declare him to be *adorable*, describe him also as *God*; and, together

^h I shall endeavour to illustrate this matter for the sake of common readers. We read in Daniel, chap. vi. of a law made that no *petition* should be offered to any one for *thirty days*, save to the *king* only, under pain of high treason. By that law *petitions*, for such a time, were *appropriated* to the *crown*, became ensigns of *royal* dignity and majesty, and acknowledgments of *sovereignty* in the person to whom they should be offered. Should any subject, for that time, have made a *petition* to any but the *king*, and have pleaded that the person to whom he made it was capable of *obliging* him, and upon that *foundation* (the sole foundation of all

petitions) he had *petitioned* him; he would presently have been told, that the receiving a *petition* was a privilege of the *crown*, and went along with the *throne*; that there could not now be any *legal* foundation for it, but the *royalty* of the person to whom it should be offered. Now, put for *royalty*, *Divine perfections*; and for *petitions*, *religious prayer* and *thanksgiving*; which are *appropriated*, not for *thirty days*, but for ever, to God; and it will appear that the only *lawful* foundation of *religious prayer* and *thanksgiving*, considered as parts of *worship*, is the *Divinity*, i. e. the *intrinsic excellency* of the object.

with the *name*, ascribe to him likewise those *Divine perfections* which make up and form the *idea* signified by so august and venerable a name.

2. That the *mediatorial* office will cease at the day of judgment, and therefore cannot be the *foundation* of that *worship* which will continue beyond it; even for ever and ever, as Christ's worship will. See Rom. ix. 5. Heb. xiii. 21. 1 Pet. iv. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. i. 5, 6. v. 12, 13.

This gentleman demands of me a plain Scripture text, where it is said that Christ is to be worshipped as being *God, equal to the Father*. But to this I answer, that Scripture supposes men to have common sense; and therefore when Scripture has laid down *one only* rule and *foundation* of worship, and it appears from the same Scripture that *Christ* is to be *worshipped*; there is no need of any thing farther, the rest follows of course. Besides, that though Scripture has not in *express* terms said that he is to be worshipped on that particular account; yet, since Scripture has asserted the *equality* of the Son to the Father, in more places than one, and his right to *worship* too; a very little logic will suffice to shew what relation these two things must have to each other.

5. A fifth particular maintained by this writer, though it concerns myself more than the cause, I am now to take notice of. "Dr. Water-land," he says (p. 54.), "has, in one passage, given up both points" (*viz.* that the Son is God in a lower sense of the word *God*, and is to be worshipped only as *Mediator*) "to us." But where have I said either, or any thing like it? I have given nothing up, that I know of, which can do this *writer*, or his *cause*, any service. I have said, that the Father is *primarily* and *eminently* God, *Creator*, and *object of worship*: which he may be, without supposing him to be God in any *higher* or any *different* sense of the word *God, Creator, &c.* A different *manner* or *order* of existing or operating may, in many cases, be sufficient to ground an *emphasis* upon, (as might be proved by plain instances,) without recurring to a *higher* and *lower* sense of the words. As to the allowing of a *subordination*, it is so far from inferring a *lower* sense of the word *God, &c.* that, in strict propriety of speech, it implies the contrary; as I have before observed more at large.

Having thus examined and answered the most material pretences which this *writer* insists upon in favour of *Arianism*, or in opposition to the Catholic doctrine, I might now take my leave of him. But it may be proper first to say something to a pretended *contradiction*, which not only he, (p. 6.) but the Modest Pleader also, (p. 48.) has been pleased to charge me with; as it is usual with many to think every thing *contradictory* which they cannot readily reconcile.

My words are, (Defence, vol. i. &c. p. 248.) “Each divine Person “ is an *individual* intelligent agent : but as subsisting in one undivided “ substance, they are all together, *in that respect*, but one undivided “ intelligent agent.” This, they tell me, is to say, that *three persons are one person*. But, if they please to think again, they will find it is no more than saying, that *person*, and *undivided intelligent agent*, are not *reciprocal*. *Undivided* or *individual* intelligent agent, like the phrase *individual being*, may admit of a stricter and a larger sense. When this writer is able to fix a *certain principle of individuation*, he may then perhaps have something of colour for the charge of *contradiction*. See this matter more distinctly and fully explained in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 122.

I have detained my reader long enough, I fear too long, in the Preface. But I was willing, having this fresh opportunity of appearing in public, to take some notice of those two pamphlets, (the only ones that deserved it,) which had objected to my Vindication of Christ's Divinity, vol. iv. If I have, either through *haste*, or through a desire of *brevity*, slipped over any thing of real weight, or that may create any scruple or difficulty with impartial and considering men ; I shall, when apprised of it, (if God permit,) carefully and fully examine and discuss that, and whatever else falls within the compass of what I have undertaken, namely, the point of *Christ's real Divinity*, in opposition to the *pretended Divinity* maintained by the Arians.

I should just observe to the reader, that some of the Sermons, as they appear in print, are somewhat longer than when preached. The three last especially are so, which I was obliged to shorten in the preaching, passing over several pages, for fear of keeping the audience too long. Some *notes* I have here and there added at the bottom, since the Sermons were delivered ; though much the greater part were prepared before. I thought it very proper to intermix all along with Scripture the testimonies of the *ancients*, as the best comments upon it. The reader will be the better satisfied in having a view of both together ; and our adversaries may perhaps see cause to abate of their unreasonable and unaccountable boasts that way, when it appears from so many plain and clear proofs, that their pretences to antiquity are groundless, and their faith *novel* as it is *false*.

I cannot here forget to mention my obligations to the Reverend Dr. Knight, of St. Sepulchre's, London ; whose great learning and judgment are equal to his singular modesty and ingenuity ; and to whose judicious observations it is owing, that the following Sermons appear more correct, and may, I hope, be more useful, than they would otherwise have been.

Christ God in the strict and proper sense :

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

ASSERTED

FROM JOHN I. 1.

The first Sermon preached Sept. 9, 1719.

JOHN I. 1.

*In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and
the Word was God.*

SAINT John the beloved Disciple, the undoubted author of this Gospel which bears his name, was the youngest of the Apostles, and survived the rest many years. He saw so much the more of the state of Christianity, and of the progress it made under two persecutions; the first by Nero, the second by Domitian. Under the latter, he himself had inevitably suffered, had not God miraculously preserved him. After this, he was banished into Patmos, a little island in the Archipelago; and, during his retirement there, was favoured in a particular manner with *revelations* from heaven; which he committed to writing, and left behind him for the benefit of the Church. After a year or two's exile, it pleased God to call him forth again to Ephesus, his usual seat of residence; and there he passed the short remainder of his days, being then ninety years old, in the most divine and comfortable employment; taking upon him the charge of the churches of Christ, those especially of the Lesser Asia. As there must be *heresies* at all times, (infinite wisdom permitting them for great ends and reasons,) so were there not wanting, even in the times of the Apostles,

some denying the *divinity*, others the *humanity* of our blessed Lord, and both for the same reason; being offended at the great and unsearchable mystery of God *incarnate*. The tares had been sown by Simon Magus, Cerinthus, and others; and were grown up to a great height before St. John's death. This made it the more necessary for him to write his *Gospel*; which accordingly he undertook at the request of the bishops of Asia, and the brethren of the neighbouring provinces. But first he appointed solemn fasting and prayer for the divine blessing and assistance in it; after which being more fully instructed and more plentifully inspired, he thus began his lofty theme. "In the beginning was the WORD, and the WORD was with God, and the WORD was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." In these few words, and those that follow in that chapter, the good Apostle has not only confuted most of the heresies then on foot, but has obviated as many as should thereafter rise up in opposition to the *divinity*, *personality*, or *incarnation* of the Son of God: points of the greatest concernment to all Christians, but which nevertheless (through the perverseness of men's wits, and their proneness to take wrong measures of divine things) have been a *stone of stumbling* and a *rock of offence* to the *disputers of this world*, in former and in latter ages. This first chapter of St. John (as I said) is alone sufficient, with reasonable men, to end all disputes upon those heads. The words are plain, and the sense clear when carefully looked into; and it is for that very reason that they have been more tampered with than any in the whole Scriptures. For, when the obvious and natural meaning of a text happens to stand in the way of an *hypothesis*, or preconceived opinion, pains must be taken to darken the evidence, and to perplex the proofs which make against it. My design is briefly to enumerate the several interpretations which have been given of this chapter, to remark upon them as far as is needful, and to establish the only true one. They are reducible to four; which I may call Sabellian, Socinian, Arian, and Catholic. I shall explain them in their order. To begin with the first.

1. Under the Sabellian interpretation I include all that belongs to men of Sabellian principles, whether before or after the times of Sabellius, who lived about the middle of the third cen-

ture. The Sabellians deny the Λόγος, or WORD, whereof St. John speaks, to be any *real* or *substantial* thing, distinct from the Person of God the Father. They understand by the *Word*, either some *attribute*, *power*, or *operation* inherent and permanent in the Father; or else some transient *voice*, *sound*, and the like. How they came into these and the like fancies, I shall shew presently, after I have premised a few things about the name of the Λόγος, or WORD, which St. John uses. I do not design any historical account of the use of the term among Jews or Gentiles; being happily prevented, in that part, by a late excellent sermon of a very worthy and learned Prelate^a. But I must observe that the Greek Λόγος, which we render WORD, may signify either *inward* thought, or *outward* speech. And it has with good reason been supposed by the Catholic writers, that the design of this name was to intimate that the relation of Father and Son bears some resemblance and analogy to that of *thought*, or of *speech* to the mind^b. For example: as thought is *coeval* with the mind; so the Son is *coeval* with the Father^c. As thought is closely united to, proceeds from, and yet remains in the mind; so also may we understand that the Son is in the bosom of the Father, proceeding from him, yet never divided or separate, but remaining in him and with him. As to *speech*, it is properly the *interpreter* of the mind; and so, in this respect also, there is some resemblance and analogy, the Son being as it were *interpreter* and *revealer* of the unknown Father to the world^d. Some of the ancient Catholic writers^e joining both

^a Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. Sermon before the King.

^b Λόγος δὲ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς πρὸς νοῦν λόγος. οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ ἀπαθὲς τῆς γεννήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συναφές, καὶ τὸ ἐξαγγελτικόν—*Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 590.* Vid. etiam Basil. Hom. 15. Petav. de Trin. p. 743.

^c Vid. Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. p. 259.

^d Ob hoc Verbum nuncupatur, quia ex proprio divino ore processit, et nihil Pater sine eo aut jussit, aut fecit. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. Orth. cap. vi. p. 353.* ed. Bened.

Δύναται δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος υἱὸς εἶναι παρὰ τῷ ἀπαγγέλλειν τὰ κρύφια τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκείνου, ἀνάλογον τῷ καλουμένῳ υἱῷ, λόγῳ νοῦ τυγχάνοντος· ὡς γὰρ ὁ

παρ' ἡμῖν λόγος Ἄγγελός ἐστι τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὀρωμένων, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος ἐγνωκῶς τὸν πατέρα—ἀποκαλύπτει ὃν ἔγνω πατέρα. *Orig. Comm. in Joh. p. 41.* Vid. et Just. Mart. Dial. p. 358. Iren. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 163.

^e Theophilus Bishop of Antioch, where he speaks of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός (p. 129.) is thus to be understood. Tertullian, in his piece against Praxeas, has a great deal to the same purpose. Athenagoras, Tatian, and Hippolytus, though more obscurely, seem to have intended the same. And even Origen himself had adopted the like notion, as may appear from the following passages.

Ἐὰν ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάσωμεν αὐτοῦ πά-

these notions together, have considered them as applicable to the Son at different times, and in different capacities. Before the world was made, while he yet existed alone with the Father, (always including the Holy Ghost,) they supposed he might best be compared to *silent thought* resting in the mind, and which in Greek is called *Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*. But when he afterwards came to create the world, and to reveal both himself and his Father, then he might more properly be compared to *outward speech*, or a word spoken forth, which the Greeks express by *λόγος προφορικός*. And thus it is that the same writers sometimes speak of the *Λόγος*, or *WORD*, being both *eternal*, and in *time*: eternal in one capacity, not so in the other. For as *thought* must be considered previous to speech, so the *Λόγος*, or *WORD*, under one consideration might be conceived more ancient than under the other.

Thus far the Catholics, sober men, carried on the parallel; and there was no harm in it, while they kept close to the rule of faith, and within the bounds of sobriety. But the Sabellian heretics did not stop there. They pursued the parallel still farther, till they left the *Λόγος*, or *WORD*, no distinct personality. They observed that *inward thought* was no real substantial thing, distinct from the mind itself; and that *outward speech* was but a *voice* or *sound*, nothing fixed, real, and permanent: and from hence they took occasion to misinterpret the Apostle very widely; as if the *WORD*, which he speaks of, were nothing really distinct from the Father, not a second Person, any more than a man's *thought*, or *word*, is another person from the man. This kind of construction was openly received and propagated

σας τὰς ἐπινοίας, μόνον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι σοφία ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ.—ὡς εἰπεῖν ἂν τινα τεθαρρήκτως πρεσβύτερον πάντων τῶν ἐπινοουμένων ταῖς ὀνομασίαις τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεώς ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 19.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—ἀρχὴ δὲ μετὰ μαρτυριῶν τῶν ἐκ τῶν παροιμιῶν ἀποδέδοται εἰρησθαι ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἔστι προεπινοουμένη ἡ σοφία τοῦ αὐτῆν ἀπαγγέλλοντος λόγου, νοητόν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τουτέστι τῇ σοφίᾳ, αἰεὶ εἶναι. *Orig. in Joh.* p. 43. Compare p. 59.

Afterwards Origen uses an argument to prove that the *λόγος* has a

real substance, and adds in conclusion: Ὁ λόγος—ἐν ἀρχῇ τῇ σοφίᾳ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων, p. 44. Which words are remarkable, and worth comparing with Tertullian's upon the same subject, where he says: Jam in usu est nostrorum, per simplicitatem interpretationis, sermonem dicere in primordio apud Deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi; quia non sermonalis a principio, sed rationalis Deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens, priorem eam ut *substantiam suam* ostendat. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. v.

by ^fPhotinus, about the middle of the fourth century; by Paul of ^gSamosata, almost a century before him; by ^hSabellius and Noëtus earlier than he; and by ⁱPraxeas still higher up, about the end of the second century; and ^jprobably by some other *heretics* before him. What remains of it at this day is to be met with chiefly among the Socinians; those of them, I mean, who have refined upon their master Socinus, in this particular; and are more properly Photinians, or Sabellians. A ^kcelebrated writer abroad has openly espoused this Photinian notion in part; disguising it a little under the name *reason*, answering pretty nearly to the heretical sense of the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, or *inward thought*: so that now the Sabellian interpretation, after the latest improvements, runs thus:

“ In the beginning was *Reason*, and *Reason* was in God, and *Reason* was God himself. It was in God from the beginning, before the world was: for whatever is in nature was made with the highest *Reason*, neither is there that single thing that was made without *Reason*.”

But against this, or any other the like Sabellian construction of the first chapter of St. John, many unanswerable reasons have been urged both by *ancients* and *moderns*.

I. As first, St. John does not say that the WORD was ^lΘεῖος, a *divine Word*, which might have favoured the Sabellian sense, but Θεὸς, God; thereby strongly denoting a *real* Person. A man's *word*, or *thought*, is not called *man*; nor would the *Word* or *Wisdom* of God be called God, if a mere attribute or operation only was intended, and not a real Person. Or if it be said, that it does denote a Person, the same Person that was before

^f Hilar. p. 789, 1048, 1179. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 8.

^g Epiphani. Hæres. lxxv. p. 608, 609.

^h Epiphani. Hæres. lxxv. p. 608.

ⁱ Tertull. contr. Prax. c. vii. viii.

^j Vid. Clem. Alexandr. Strom. p. 646. Iren. p. 130, 132, 157, 158.

N. B. The notion of a *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικὸς*, in this heretical sense, is justly condemned by all the Fathers. Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Ambrose, and other Catholics censured it as smartly as the Council of Sirmium, Eusebius, or the Arians. Vid. Orig. in Joh. p. 24. in Jerem. p. 184. Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 120. de Laud. Const. c. 12. Cyril. Hiero-

sol. Catech. iv. c. 5. p. 50. Athanas. Expos. Fid. p. 99. Orat. ii. p. 503. Basil. Hom. xxvii. p. 602. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 7. Ignat. Epist. Interpolat. ad Magnes. c. 8. Some even of the Arians, after they came to make a distinction of a twofold *λόγος*, adopted, in part, this very Sabellian notion. Vid. Athanas. p. 503, 282, 260. Cyril. Alex. in Joh. lib. i. p. 30. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. c. 7.

^k Le Clerc, Comment. in Joh. i. 1.

^l Vid. Euseb. contr. Marcel. p. 83. Tertull. contr. Prax. p. 504. Epiph. Hæres. lxxv. p. 609. *Deus* erat Verbum cessat Sonus vocis—*Res* est, non *Sonus*; *natura*, non *Sermo*; *Deus*, non *inanitas* est. Hilar. p. 796.

spoken of as God, in the same verse; then how can the other words stand, that he was *with God*? He cannot be supposed the selfsame Person *with* whom he was. ^m *With God*, plainly signifies the same as *with the Father*, (see 1 John i. 2.) who is God. The Apostle can never be supposed to mean that the *Father* was *with* the *Father*; the *Word* therefore, if it denotes a Person at all, must be understood of another Person. But that it denotes a Person will appear further.

2. For it is not said that the WORD, or REASON, was *in* God, as might be proper of an attribute, &c. but *with* God; which is another *personal* characterⁿ.

3. It is said that all things were *made by* the *Word*: which (as appears from other texts) comes to the same as to say, that the WORD made all things: which is a further confirmation that a real thing is intended by the WORD, not an attribute only^o.

4. The Apostle observes (v. 8.) of John the Baptist, that *he* (ἐκεῖνος) was not that Light, intimating thereby that he had been speaking of a *Person* before, who really was: and therefore from hence also it appears that the WORD is something real.

5. It is said, (ver. 11.) of the WORD, that “he came unto his own, and his own received him not.” This is good sense, and sounds well. But to say that *Reason*, the attribute, came unto its own, and its own received it not, has hardly either sense or propriety.

6. The WORD is represented (ver. 14.) as the *only-begotten* of the Father; which again is *personal*. For if *begotten* may be a proper expression, concerning an *attribute* or *property*; yet *only-begotten* is not, unless God has no more attributes than one. The characters therefore being thus plainly *personal*, and no necessity appearing why we should have recourse to figure, the *literal* interpretation is undoubtedly preferable.

7. I may add, lastly, that St. John in his “Revelations” expressly applies the name of Λόγος, or WORD, to Christ Jesus. “His name,” saith he, “is called the WORD of God.” Rev. xix. 13.

^m Εἰ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, οὐχ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς ὃν ἦν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πρὸς ὃν ἦν ἐστὶ λόγος. *Epiphan. Hæres. lxxv. p. 609.*

ⁿ Verbum erat *apud* Deum. Nunquid audieras *in* Deo, ut Sermonem reconditæ cogitationis acciperes?—non *in* altero esse, sed *cum* altero

prædicatur. *Hilar. p. 796.*

^o Fecit enim et ipse, quæ facta sunt per illum. Quale est ut *nihil* sit ipse *sine quo nihil factum est*? Ut inanis solida, et vacuus plena, et incorporalis corporalia sit operatus? *Tertull contr. Prax. c. 7. Comp. Phœbad. p. 304.*

These reasons are abundantly sufficient to convince us, that St. John intended not any *attribute* or *operation* by the WORD, but a *real, living, substantial* thing or person, distinct from the Father: and so the Church of Christ from the beginning has constantly understood it. So much for the Sabellian interpretation of this chapter.

2. The next that offers itself is the Socinian, properly so called; never espoused by *Heretic* or *Catholic*; never so much as thought of, at least not heard of, before the days of Socinus. He supposes St. John to have intended a *real* Person, by the *Word*, viz. the man Christ Jesus. His interpretation then is to this effect:

“*In the beginning* of the Gospel, was the man Christ Jesus, “*otherwise called the WORD. He was with God, having been* “*taken up into heaven before he entered on his ministry. And* “*he was God, having the office, honour, and title of a God* “*conferred upon him, after his resurrection. The same was in* “*the beginning of the Gospel with God. All things belonging* “*to the Gospel-state were reformed and renewed by him: and* “*without him was there not any thing reformed or renewed.”*

A construction so manifestly forced and foreign, as this is, carries its own confutation along with it. It serves only to shew what contempt the heads of a sect generally have, not only of the rest of mankind, but even of their own disciples; while they can thus unmercifully impose the wildest conceits imaginable upon them. To do the later Socinians justice, they have, I think, for the most part given up this violent interpretation; and, instead of it, have rather closed in with the Sabellian construction, which is more ingenious and plausible, and serves their *hypothesis* as well. Neither of them will answer to the truth of the sacred Writ: they are both no other than the device of man, and must equally come to nought.

I proceed to the Arian interpretation, which appears better than either of the former, as coming nearer to the true one: and it is for that every reason the most insinuating and dangerous of any.

p Vinci illi vel facile possunt, vel facile vitari, quorum prima propositione omne consilium pectoris proditur. At vero hi (Ariani) quibus multa nobiscum paria sunt, facile possunt

innoxias mentes, et Soli Deo deditas, fraudulenta societate percutere, dum malorum suorum virus per bona nostra defendunt. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. Orthodoxa*, cap. i. p. 347. ed. Bened.

3. The Arian construction, invented probably before, but first openly espoused and propagated in the beginning of the fourth century, is as follows :

“In the beginning of all things, before ever the earth or the world was made, there existed a very glorious and excellent creature, (since called the WORD,) the Oracle of God, and Revealer of his will. That excellent Person, the first whom God of his own good pleasure and free choice gave being to, was *with God* the Father ; and he *was God*, another God, an *inferior* God, infinitely inferior ; but yet *truly* God, as being *truly* partaker of *divine* glory *then*, and foreordained to have *true* dominion and authority in God's own time. God employed him as an *instrument*, or under agent, in framing and fashioning the world of *inferior* creatures ; and approved of his services so well, as to do nothing without him.”

This is the sum of the Arian interpretation, as nearly as I could draw it, out of the most general principles of the sect. For it must be observed that there never was a sect so divided and various, so unsettled and fluctuating in their principles as they. The reason of it is this ; they take a kind of middle way between Catholics and Socinians, which admits of so great a latitude, that they know not where to fix. The Catholics looking upon the Son as essentially *God* in one capacity, and as *man* in another, easily know what may be proper to ascribe to him, in this or in that respect. The Socinians believing him to be *man* only, can as easily come to a resolution in the particulars of their scheme. But the Arians supposing him a *creature* at large, and not knowing the several degrees of perfection on this side *infinite*, are always in uncertainty ; not being able to determine how much or how little it may be proper to ascribe to the Son of God : and hence it is that they could never unite together in any one fixed and certain set of principles ; but have been always wavering, various, and unconstant ; and must ever be so to the world's end. But this by the way : having laid before you the Arian interpretation, nothing now remains but to offer to you the Catholic sense of this chapter, which I mean to explain, and defend ; and that will be the same thing with confuting the Arian.

4. The Catholic construction, at length, is this :

“*In the beginning*, before there was any *creature*, (consequently from all eternity,) the WORD existed ; and the WORD was no

“ *distant separate power, estranged from God, or unacquainted with him, but he was with God, and himself also every God; not another God, but another Person only, of the same nature, substance, and Godhead. All things were created by him, &c.*”

This I presume to call the Catholic and truly *primitive* interpretation of the first verse of this chapter: and what time your patience will further allow me, shall be taken up in asserting and maintaining it. St. John has here called the WORD, *God*. In what sense, is the question. The context, and circumstances, and other collateral evidences must at length decide it. I shall first inquire,

1. What kind of idea, or notion, Scripture and Christian antiquity give us of one that is *truly* and *really* God. And

2. Shall consider what reasons we have to believe that St. John here calls the Λόγος, or WORD, God, in the same sense, or in conformity to that idea.

I. I shall inquire what kind of *idea*, or notion, Scripture and Christian antiquity give us of one that is *really* and *truly* God. If we trace this matter through the Old Testament, we shall find that the *Scripture-notion* of a Person that is *truly* God, and should be received as such, includes in it *power* and *might* irresistible^r; perfect *knowledge* and consummate *wisdom*^s, *eternity*^t, *immutability*^u, and *omnipresence*^x; *creative powers*^y; *supremacy*, *independence*, and *necessary existence*^z. These are the distinguishing characters under which God was pleased to make himself known: and it is upon these accounts that he, in opposition to all other Gods, claims to be received and honoured as God. These therefore are what make up the *Scripture-idea* of a Person who is *truly*, *really*, and *strictly* God. And if Scrip-

^q Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus. *Iren.* p. 132.

^r Ἐν γὰρ ἀμφῷ ὁ Θεός· ὅτι εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ· καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. *Clem. Alex.* p. 135.

Alium autem quomodo accipere debeas, jam professus sum. *Personæ*, non *substantiæ* nomine; ad distinctionem, non ad divisionem. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* p. 506. Hunc didicimus Filium Dei esse, et Deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ. *Tertull. Apolog.* c. 21.

Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεὸς ὢν, τί οὖν φήσειεν ἄν τις δύο λέγειν θεοῦς; Δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐρῶ θεοῦς

ἀλλ' ἢ ἓνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, &c. *Hip- pol. contr. Noët.* c. xiv. p. 15.

^r Deut. iii. 24. vii. 19. x. 17. xxxii. 39. 1 Chron. xxix. 11. Job ix. 4. xii. 16. xlii. 2. Isa. xxvi. 4. xlii. 5.

^s Job xxxvi. 4. xxxvii. 16. Dan. ii. 20.

^t Psal. xciii. 2. Job xxxvi. 26. Gen. xxi. 33. Deut. xxxiii. 27. Isa. lvii. 15.

^u Mal. iii. 6.

^x Deut. iv. 7. Psal. cxxxix. 7, &c. Jer. xxiii. 23, 24.

^y 2 Kings xix. 15. Job xxvi. xxxviii. Psal. viii. 4. Isa. xlv. 7, 18. Jer. x. 12.

^z Exod. iii. 14.

ture has thus informed us what properties, attributes, and perfections, must be supposed to meet in one that is *truly* and *properly* God, our own reason must tell us, that these *attributes*. &c. must have a *subject*, and this subject we call *substance*: and therefore the *Scripture-notion* of God. is that of an eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient, almighty *substance*. If it be pretended that these are the characters of a *supreme* God only, and not of every Person that is *true* God; I answer, that *supremacy* (*negatively*^a considered in opposition to any *superior nature*) is one of the characters belonging to any Person that is *truly* God, as much as *omnipotence*, *omniscience*, or any other; and consequently he is not *truly* God. in the *Scripture-notion* of God, who is not *supreme* God. This is the *Scripture-notion* of one that is *truly* God; and thus it stood when St. John wrote his Gospel.

Let us next inquire, whether the same notion obtained in the Christian Church after St. John wrote.

Justin Martyr, a very early and excellent writer, within forty or fifty years of St. John, observes, that ^bGod alone is *necessarily existing* and *immutable*, (or *incorruptible*), and that for this very reason he is God; thereby intimating that without such perfections he could not be God.

Irenæus, another early and judicious writer, almost contemporary with Justin, expresses himself more fully and clearly upon the same head: observing that ^cno Person that has any *superior* can be justly called *God*; nor any thing that has been created, or ever began to exist. The same Irenæus has a whole ^dchapter to prove that the Old Testament, or New, never gave the title of *God*, absolutely and definitively, to any one that is not *truly* God.

Tertullian (in the beginning of the third century, or sooner,

^a I say, *negatively*; because *positive* supremacy over others could not commence till the *creation*.

^b Μόνος γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀφθαρτος Θεός, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θεός ἐστι. *Justin. Dial.* p. 21. Jebb.

^c Qui enim super se habet aliquem superiorem, hic neque Deus neque rex magnus dici potest. *Lib. iv. cap. ii.* p. 229.

Quæcunque autem initium sumpserunt, et dissolutionem possunt percipere, et subjecta sunt, et indigent

ejus qui se fecit, necesse est omnimodo uti differens vocabulum habeant apud eos etiam, qui vel modicum sensum in discernendo talia habent: ita ut is quidem qui omnia fecerit cum verbo suo, juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus; quæ autem facta sunt, non jam ejusdem vocabuli participabilia esse, neque juste id vocabulum sumere debere, quod est Creatoris. *Iren. lib. iii. cap. viii.* p. 183.

^d *Lib. iii. cap. 6.*

within a hundred years, or very nearly, of St. John) observes, that the word *God* does not, like *Lord*, signify *dominion* or *power* only, but *substance*; that none but the *eternal, uncreated substance* can justly be called *God*; that an *inferior God* is a contradiction in terms.

These testimonics are sufficient to shew (without adding any more) how the word *God* was taken and generally understood by the Christian Church, soon after the Apostle's time; and therefore very probably, in the Apostle's time also. Now let us proceed to consider,

II. What reasons we have to believe that St. John, in his first chapter, calls the WORD *God*, in the same sense, in conformity to that *idea* which Scripture hath given us of one that is *truly God*; and which the primitive writers also appear plainly to have embraced.

1. This alone is a strong presumption, in favour of our interpretation, that the Scriptures *before*, and the Christian Church *after*, espouse this notion. Would St. John have called the WORD, *God*, in the manner that he does, without guard or caution, had he not intended it in the strict sense, which Scripture itself so much favours, and in which the generality, at least, would be most apt to take it? Had he meant it in a lower sense, it might have been very proper to have inserted a qualifying clause to prevent any mistake or misconstruction; which yet he is so far from doing, (as we shall see presently,) that he has put together with it many circumstances, all tending to convince us that he used the word in the strict sense, as Scripture had done *before*, and the Christian Church did *after*. For

2. It is observable, that the Apostle does not say, in the beginning *God created the WORD*, (as the style runs in the first chapter of Genesis, and might have been properly used here, had he intended to signify that the WORD was *God*, in an inferior or improper sense:) but instead of that, he only says that the WORD *was*^f; intimating that he existed before any

^e *Deus substantiæ ipsius nomen, id est Divinitatis; Dominus vero non substantiæ, sed potestatis, &c. Tertull. contr. Hermog. p. 234.*

Deus jam vocari obtinuit substantia cui ascribo. Hanc invenies solam innatam, infectam; solam æternam, et universitatis conditricem—nega Deum quem αρχις deteriorem: nega

summum magnum, quem credis minorem. Adv. Marc. lib. i. cap. 6, 7. p. 368.

^f Παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ συνείναι τῷ πατρὶ, λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. καὶ ταυτὸν ῥῆμα, τὸ ἦν, τοῦ λόγου κατηγορεῖται, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν, καὶ ὅτε πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἦν, οὔτε τῆς ἀρχῆς χωριζόμενος.

thing was *created*, consequently from all eternity: for whatever existed before any thing was *created*, was no *creature*, as is manifest of itself; and if no *creature*, eternal. This is further confirmed from the Apostle's repeating it in the next verse, "The same was in the beginning with God." It is not improbable that the Apostle might intend this in opposition to Cerinthus, who believed the Δημιουργός, or *Creator*, to be separate and estranged from God. Nothing can be more directly levelled against that doctrine than this assertion of St. John's, that the WORD, who was *Creator* of the world, was *from the beginning*, or always, *with God*. But to proceed:

3. Another argument of St. John's intending the word *God* in the strict sense, may be drawn from the time whereof he is speaking. It was before the *creation*; he was *then* God. It is not said, that he was *appointed* God over the things that should be afterwards created. No; he was God before the world was. Our adversaries sometimes tell us of a *throne*, a power of *judging*, a *regal* authority belonging to the Son: and that therefore he is *God*; and they observe^h (as they think, shrewdly, but in truth very weakly) that the *Holy Ghost* has therefore none of that title, as having no regal dominion, &c. And when, in answer to this, we say further, that the Son was *Jehovah*, God, and Lord, under the Old Testament; they reply, that he was then ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, acting in the name and Person of God, and therefore *styled* God. Admitting all this, (which is mostly fiction,) yet what will they do with this text of St. John? Here it is plain, that the Son was God before any *dominion* over the creatures commenced; before he acted as *representative* of the Father, or was ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, in that low fictitious sense: how was he God before the creation? Here they have little left to say, but that "he was partaker of divine power and glory with "and from the Fatherⁱ." From hence then we see, that

οὔτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπολειπόμενος. Καὶ πάλιν οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενος ἐν ἀρχῇ, οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ τυγχάνειν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι γινόμενος. πρὸ γὰρ πάντος χρόνου καὶ αἰῶνος. ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. *Orig. in Joh. p. 45.*

Οὐκ ἦν γὰρ ὅτε ἀρχὴ ἀλογος ἦν. διὸ λέγεται ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. *Ibid. p. 66.*

Vid. etiam Athanas. p. 526. Hilar. p. 795. Chrysost. in Joh. p. 25. and other testimonies collected in Suicer. Thesaur. under Ἀρχή, and Petav. 147, 417.

^g Iren. lib. iii. cap. 111. p. 188. lib. i. cap. 26. p. 105. Tertull. de Præscript. Hæret. Append. p. 221. Epiphani. Hæres. xxviii. p. 110.

^h See Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2nd edit.

ⁱ Script. Doctr. p. 240. 2nd edit.

dominion alone is not sufficient to account for the Son's being *God*; not to mention that the *Holy Ghost* might have been called *God* in Scripture, as having been "partaker of divine power and glory with and from the Father," as well as the Son; so that that pretence about the *Holy Ghost* and this solution hang not well together. To such straits and inconsistencies are men reduced by bringing their *hypotheses* with them to interpret Scripture by, instead of making Scripture the rule of their faith. But to conclude this article: since then neither *dominion*, (on account of which princes and magistrates have been sometimes called *Gods*,) nor *vicegerency*, nor any thing of like kind, will account for the WORD's being called *God* by St. John in this place: and since our adversaries themselves appear to be very sensible that their principles, which serve to help them out at other times, fail them here; and that they are forced rather to say any thing, however slight or trifling, than to be wholly silent: this alone is a strong presumption on our side of the question, where the solution is so easy and natural, and entirely consistent with our other principles.

4. Another circumstance, confirming our interpretation of this passage of St. John, is, that "all things" are there said to have been "made by him;" and, to be more emphatical, that "without him was not any thing made that was made." I shall not here insist upon the dignity of the Son as *Creator*, (the distinguishing character of the *one true God*,) designing that for a distinct head of argument another time: all the use I shall make of it at present is to observe, that it is not said, all *other* things were made by him, but *all things* absolutely; wherefore he himself cannot, according to the letter, be supposed of the number of the things *made*, unless he made himself, which is absurd; and since nothing was made or created but by and through him, it is but reasonable to infer that every *creature* whatever is a *creature* of the *Son's* as well as of the *Father's*; and therefore certainly the Son is not a *creature* at all.

5. A further circumstance favouring our sense is, that the WORD is called *God*, in the very same verse, wherein the Father is mentioned as *God*, and undoubtedly in the strict and proper sense. And how shall any the most judicious reader be ever able to understand language, if in the same verse and same sentence, the same word should stand for two ideas, or bear two senses widely different and scarce akin to each other? and

that too, not only without any guard or caution, or any notice given of the change of ideas ; but also with such circumstances as give no suspicion of any change, but all tending to confirm us the more that the same idea is still kept up, and applied equally to Father and Son. It has been objected that the Father is \acute{o} Θεός, God with the article, the Son only Θεός, God without the article. But every body knows that the addition or omission of an article is no certain proof of any change at all in the sense of a word ; besides that the word Θεός, *God*, is used in the strict sense, though without the article, several times in this chapter. The sacred penmen were not so critical about articles ; neither can we imagine that a point of this moment should have been left so unguarded, with nothing to direct us but I know not what blind and dark conjectures of the use of articles ; concerning which we have no certain rules either for Scripture, or for any other writings. The word Θεός, *God*, is frequently used without the article to signify the *true God* : and it is used with the article (2 Cor. iv. 4.) where it is supposed by most interpreters to be meant of the *Devil* : so little account is there to be made of articles. But enough of this. It is further pretended, that \acute{o} Θεός, *God*, applied to the Father, may stand for *Jehovah*, which is the *proper* name of a *Person*, and that therefore *God* and *God*, in the text, cannot bear the same sense, unless both be one and the same Person *Jehovah*. But in answer to this, it is sufficient to say, that it can never be proved that *Jehovah* is a *proper* name of any Person, but as that Person is considered as having *independent* or *necessary* existence : and then the name must be *common* to as many persons as exist *necessarily*, or *independently* ; independently on the *will* or *free choice* of any. Besides that it is certain that the name belongs equally to Father or Son, (as I shall shew presently,) and therefore St. John might intend that the Father is *Jehovah* and the Son *Jehovah* too, and both in the same sense ; while at the same time, by his telling us that one was *with the other*, he has sufficiently signified that they are not the *same Person* ; but that *Jehovah* is a name *proper* indeed to one substance, or one Godhead, but *common* to more Persons than one. I proceed then,

6. To observe, that St. John did look upon God the Son as the true *Jehovah* ; and this alone is an irrefragable argument of St. John's meaning in the text before us. I shall first shew

the fact, and next make good my inference from it. The fact may be proved first from chapter xii. verse 41. of this very Gospel. The words are: "These things said Esaias when he saw his glory," (meaning Christ's glory,) "and spake of him." Now the place of Esaias referred to is chapter the sixth, which begins thus:

"I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the Seraphims—And one cried unto another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." Here we are to observe, that the Lord, which Esaias saw in his vision, was the *Jehovah*, and Lord of Hosts, which is of the same signification with *Lord God Almighty*. Him it was, and his glory, which the Prophet saw. And that this was Christ, and that glory Christ's glory, St. John has before testified; and therefore certain it is that God the Son is, in St. John's account, the *Jehovah*, and *Lord God Almighty*. This reasoning is in itself plain and strong; and is besides further confirmed by the ^kconcurring sentiments of many Catholic writers.

A late writer endeavouring to elude the force of this text, devises this construction, that the Prophet, in beholding the glory of God the Father, revealing the coming of Christ, he then saw (that is foresaw) the glory of Christ. But admitting that saw may signify foresaw, (which however is a very needless supposition, since it is certain that our blessed Lord had as much glory with the Father before the world was, as ever he had after, John xvii. 5.) yet what occasion is there to suppose the *Father's* glory to have been principally spoken of, when St. John says plainly it was *Christ's* glory, and that the Prophet spake of him, viz. Christ? It is indeed said, that Christ shall come "in the glory of his Father." (Matt. xvi. 27.) But it is also said, that "he shall come in his own glory" (Matth. xxv. 31. Luke ix. 26.); "and sit in the throne of his own glory." (Matt. xix. 28.) If then the Prophet saw indeed the glory of the *Father* also, it is because the glory of both is one; and if the Father be the *Lord of Hosts*, whom the Prophet saw, it is because the Father and Son are one *Lord of Hosts*: for it is as certain as

^k Eusebius in loc. Athanasius, p. 877, 889. Hilar. Trin. lib. v. cap. 33. p. 873. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. v. p. 115, Hieronymus in loc. Epiphani. Ancorat. p. 15, 13. Jobius apud Phot. p. 605. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. xiv. p. 202. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. c. 12. p. 141. ed. Bened. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. l. ii. p. 488.

^l Script. Doctr. p. 93. 2nd edit.

words can make it, from what St. John says, that the Son's glory was seen: and that he was the *Jehovah* of whom the Prophet spake. If the Father was so too, we have a full and strong proof, not only of the Son's being *Jehovah*, but of the Father and Son both being comprehended under the same one *Jehovah*: and so indeed ^mseveral of the ancient Fathers have interpreted it. But that is not what I insist upon now, my argument not requiring it. It is sufficient for me, that the Prophet *saw*, or *foresaw* (no great matter which) the glory of *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts*; and it was the *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts*, that the Prophet spake of. That is, as St. John interprets it, he saw the glory of *Christ*, and spake of him: Christ therefore is *Jehovah* and *Lord of Hosts*; which was to be proved.

There is a second passage in this very Gospel, which proves the same thing. It is John xix. 37. "Another Scripture saith, "They shall look on him whom they have pierced." The Scripture referred to is Zech. xii. 10. where the Lord (*Jehovah*) is introduced saying, "They shall look upon ME, whom they have "pierced." The Person pierced is *Jehovah*, and the same Person is *Christ*: wherefore, by necessary construction and implication, Christ is *Jehovah*. The *fact* being thus plain and clear, we are next to consider the inference from it. The import of the name *Jehovah* (according to the best *critics*, ancient and modern) is eternal, immutable, necessary existence. The Greek $\acute{o} \acute{\omega}\nu$, or $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\omega}\nu$, taken from it, or answering to it, has been interpreted to the same sense by Jews, Gentiles, and Christiansⁿ. It would be tedious here to enter any further into the detail of that matter. It shall suffice to observe how the *one true God* insists upon his being *Jehovah*, in opposition to all other gods, glorying, in a manner, and triumphing in it, as the distinguishing character by which he would be known to be infinitely superior to all the gods of the nations.

"I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*,) that is my name, and my glory "will I not give to another," Isa. xlii. 8. "Against all the gods "of Egypt I will execute judgment: I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*)," Exod. xii. 12. "Who hath told it from time to time? have not "I the Lord, (*Jehovah*?) and there is no God else besides me;

^m Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nysen, Ambrose, Jerome, Epiphanius, before referred to.

ⁿ Vid. Petav. Dogm. Theolog. vol. i.

lib. i. c. 6.

Appendix to the Considerations on Mr. Whiston's Histor. Præf. p. 101. and part ii. p. 2, 3, &c.

“ a just God, and a Saviour ; there is none besides me,” Isa. xlv. 21. “ I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*), the God of all flesh : is there any thing too hard for me ? Jer. xxxii. 27. “ I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*), I change not,” Mal. iii. 6. “ I am the Lord, (*Jehovah*), and there is none else : I form the light and create darkness—I the Lord (*Jehovah*) do all these things,” Isa. xlv. 6, 7. I forbear to add more texts. These are enough for a specimen. There is no giving a full and complete idea of this matter, without transcribing a great part of the Old Testament. Now since the title of *Jehovah* is, in Scripture, a principal note of distinction by which the true God was pleased to manifest himself, and to set forth his own superior excellency in opposition to all pretended deities ; and since St. John has given us to understand, that Christ is *Jehovah*, or *Lord of Hosts*, and consequently possessed of all those distinguishing powers and perfections which go along with that title ; the consequence is evident and undeniable, that when the same St. John tells us that the WORD was *God*, he intended no *nominal* or *inferior* Deity, but *God* in the true, strict, and proper sense, eternal and immutable, of the same power, nature, and perfections with God the Father. I shall now briefly sum up the particulars of the argument, that we may the more easily take into one view the whole strength and force of it.

The Apostle has here told us, in a very solemn manner, in the very entrance upon his Gospel, that the Λόγος, or WORD, was *God* ; the very mention whereof, according to the Scripture-idea of God, and the prevailing notions of those who lived in and near St. John’s time, carries with it, in its first and most natural conception, all that is good, great, or excellent : and so every unprejudiced man, upon the first reading or hearing the Apostle’s words, would be apt to understand him. He has inserted no guard or caution to prevent any such construction : but, on the contrary, has hardly omitted any thing that might tend to confirm and enforce it. The WORD was *God* before he had any *dominion*, before he had acted as *representative* of the Father ; *God, in the beginning*, before the world was, before there was any creature ; *God*, by whom the world was made, and to whom every creature owed its existence ; who coming into the world, came unto his *own*, who is *Jehovah* and *Lord of Hosts*, the same as Κύριος παντοκράτωρ, the *Lord Almighty*, and God over all : in such a sense, and with these circumstances, the WORD is called

God, in the very same verse where mention also is made of the *Father*, with whom he was, and who is there called *God*, in the strict and proper sense: all this put together amounts to a demonstration, that the Apostle intended no *nominal* or *inferior* God by the *WORD*, but the *true* and *living* God, one with the *Father*, coessential and coeternal. Thus the first Christians understood it; and thus the Catholic Church has believed: and this is the faith which we ought evermore earnestly to contend for, as being "once delivered to the saints."

I entreat your patience but a little further, just to take notice of a late pretence of an Arian writer^o.

The Jews, says he, and Gentiles believed in *one God*, understanding it of *one Person* only: our Saviour and his Apostles taught that Christ was the Son of *that one God*: when therefore Christ is also styled *God*, those among whom he was first so styled, would naturally understand it in the *subordinate* sense, as the word *Elohim* in the Hebrew, Θεός in the Greek, and *God* in the English frequently signifies.

This is the argument, and in this, the author says, "the sum of the whole controversy is briefly comprised." If this be really the case, the controversy may be brought to a short and clear issue. By *subordinate* sense of the word *God*, the gentleman means such a sense in which *creatures* may be *gods*, and have been called *gods*. I hope I have sufficiently shewn that St. John could never intend any such low sense, nor be so understood by any man of ordinary attention or common discernment. As to the question, how it would be understood by those who first heard it, it has been already determined by plain evidence of fact. It appears certainly to have been understood in the strict and proper sense, as high as Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Athenagoras, that is, within sixty or seventy years of St. John's writing: and I will venture to add Ignatius^p, which brings it up to the very time: for Ignatius had been well acquainted with St. John himself, having been once his ^qdisciple.

As to Jews or Gentiles, whatever short or imperfect notions they had of *God*, (though it is a disputable point, whether

^o Modest Plea, Postscript, p. 318.

^p Ὁς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρὶ ἦν, καὶ ἐν τέλει ἐφάνη. Ignat. ad Magn. cap. vi. p. 22.

^q Ὃς ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ λόγος αἰῶνος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθὼν. cap. viii. p. 23.

Εἰς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γενητὸς καὶ ἀγένητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γεγόμενος Θεός Ad Ephes. cap. vii. p. 14.

^q Act. Martyr. S. Ignat. cap. iii. p. 49.

they did not both admit of some plurality in the Deity,) they are to come to Christians to be more fully instructed; and we are not to be taught by them, how we are to understand a clear and plain Gospel. Hard must be our case indeed, if we are to be sent to Jews or Pagans to learn Christianity. However, Jews and Gentiles both (as many as came over to Christianity, and did not side with *heretics*.) then at least corrected (or rather filled up what was wanting in) their ideas of the divine Unity, by their faith in, and profession of one holy, undivided, and co-eternal Trinity. We have seen then, first, how St. John ought to have been understood; and next, how he actually was understood by sober men, and those that were the most competent judges of his meaning. What can be desired more to cut off all further controversy in this article?

To conclude: The Sabellians at this day, as well as formerly, are a standing evidence of the strength and force of those two or three first verses of St. John's Gospel. For as they reject the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, only because they think it repugnant to *reason*; so they reject also the Arian *hypothesis*, because they take it to be repugnant to *Scripture*, and particularly to the first chapter of St. John. They are sensible how absurd it is to suppose so much to be said of a *creature*, and said in that manner, and with those circumstances; and therefore they interpret the whole of God the *Father* himself. Thus they get over one difficulty, but unhappily split upon another; and the Arians have as plainly the advantage in the point of *personality*, as the other have in respect of the *divinity* of the *WORD*. Happy might it be for both, if, laying aside prejudice, they would contentedly submit their *fancies* to God's *written Word*; interpreting it according to its most obvious and natural meaning, without laboured subtilties and artificial glosses: remembering always that, in case of doubt, there is no safer guide to take with us, than the concurring judgment of the *ancients*; nor any more dangerous than warmth of imagination, or a love of novelties. -

Christ properly Creator :

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM CREATION.

The second Sermon preached Oct. 7, 1719.

JOHN i. 3.

All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.

I HAVE before took notice of these words of the Apostle, but so far only as was necessary to give some light to the words going before, whereof I was then discoursing. My design now is, to consider them distinctly, as containing a further argument, independent of the former, to prove the real, essential divinity of our blessed Lord, "by whom all things were made, *and without whom* was not any thing made that was made." I have, in my former discourse, intimated the various interpretations given of this chapter, under the names of Socinian, Sabellian, Arian, and Catholic, suitably to their respective schemes. Accordingly, these words of the Apostle, in passing through those several hands, have been shaped and fashioned into so many several constructions; though one only can be the true one. The Socinian will tell us, that all things belonging to the Gospel-state were regulated and modelled by the man Christ Jesus; that the *moral world* was reformed and rectified by him; and that the Apostle is not here speaking of a *proper*, but a *metaphorical* creation. Next comes the Sabellian, who thinks that the text is meant of the creation of the *natural world*, and all things in it; but then, not by the man Christ Jesus, nor by any Person *really* distinct from God the Father: all things were

made by *reason* or *wisdom*, figuratively put for God himself; so that the Apostle intended not here any *real* Person besides God the Father: thus far the Sabellian. After him succeeds the Arian, who admits of a *proper* creation of the *natural*, not the *moral* world; and admits also of a distinct Person, viz. the *Λόγος*, or *WORD*, himself a *creature*: and he does not deny him any hand or concern at all in the creation; but endeavours only to detract from him, more or less, with great uncertainty. For, as I have before observed, that sort of men are always fluctuating, hovering, and doubtful, not knowing where to fix upon any certain set of principles. Sometimes ^ayou will find them pretending that God the Son, properly speaking, did not *make* or *create* any thing at all; but that the *Father* only was *Creator*, through him. At other times^b they will not scruple to allow that the Son, by his own *inherent* power, created all things *out of nothing*; which is carrying the point as high as any the soundest Catholic can carry it: only they add, by way of lessening, that this was at the *command* of the Father, who had *appointed* him *Creator*; which however might bear a sound and good sense. Betwixt these extremities of high and low (if I may so call them) amongst the Arians, there is a middle way, and that also with a latitude: some think it enough for the Son to have *created* some things only (suppose, what belongs to one system): others again (understanding by *creating*, modelling only) apprehend it sufficient, if he did but *frame*, *model*, or *digest* what was already *created* to his hand: others, lastly, admitting both, yet say, it was not by his *own* power, but the *power* of the Father, always present with him: or that he had learned the art of *creating* by being bred up under the Father; which was the profane and wanton suggestion of Asterius, an Arian sophist of the fourth century^c. There is no end of fancies and conjectures, when men are once got out of the plain and open way of truth. I shall not undertake particularly and severally to confute the three *hypotheses*, and the interpretations built upon them: but I shall proceed to lay down the Catholic construc-

^a Πολλάκις γὰρ ἀκήκόα τινὰς λέγοντας ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς ἐποίησεν οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο τὰ γενόμενα. *Épiph. Anacorat.* p. 33.

^b Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et Creator erat constitutus. Volun-

tate et præcepto (*Dei et Patris sui*) cœlestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, *ex nullis exstantibus*, ut essent, *sua virtute* fecit. *Serm. Arianorum* apud Aug. tom. viii. p. 622. ed. Bened.

^c Athanas. *Orat.* ii. 496.

tion; which if I can maintain and defend, the other drop of course. The Catholic doctrine is this: that the Son, together with the Father, (always including the Holy Ghost,) was the *efficient* Cause of all things, the Creator and Framers of men and angels, of principalities and powers, of the whole universe. I shall therefore, in my following discourse, undertake these three things:

I. I shall endeavour to shew, that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *efficient* Cause and Creator of all things:

II. I shall consider the force of the argument arising from it, in favour of Christ's divinity.

III. I shall draw some suitable inferences from the whole.

I. I shall endeavour to shew that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *efficient* Cause and *Creator* of all things. And here I shall distinctly consider what light we may have in this matter from the New Testament, and what from the Old, and what additional confirmation from the declared sentiments of the primitive and Catholic Church.

1. To begin with the New Testament; and first with the very words of the text: "All things were made by him, and "without him was not any thing made that was made." I have, in a former discourse, asserted the *distinct personality* of the *Λόγος*, or *WORD*; shewing that the Sabellian interpretation of this chapter will by no means bear: I shall occasionally take notice of the Sabellian pretences in relation to other texts, as I come to treat of them. For the clearer understanding of the text now under consideration, we may observe, that Cerinthus and other heretics (against whose pernicious principles St. John is reasonably believed to have wrote his Gospel) had made a distinction between the *upper* and *lower* world, pretending they had not one Author. Hence, very probably, it is, that the Apostle expresses himself so particularly and emphatically in these words, (which might otherwise look like tautology,) "and "without him was not any thing made that was made." He had first told us *affirmatively*, that all things were made by the *WORD*; then he repeats, as it were, the same thing over again, but *negatively*, that nothing was made without him: that is, we are not to expect any part of the creation, not the *invisible* things above, which the *heretics* pretended to distinguish from

the other: all things *visible* and *invisible*; all, without exception, were made by the WORD. I must here observe, that, after the Arian controversy arose, the Catholics made good use of the latter part of this text especially. which is so very expressive and emphatical. The Arian principle is, that the Son was the first thing that God had made; and that God made him, *ἀμεσιτέτως*, *immediately* by himself, without the intervention of any other person. Against this, the Catholics pleaded that nothing was made without the intervention of the Son; the Apostle having emphatically declared, that “without him was “not any thing made that was made:” there was therefore nothing made *ἀμεσιτέτως*, *immediately* by the Father, without the intervention and concurrence of the Son. Consequently, the Son was not *made* at all, since it is absurd to imagine that he *intervened* or concurred to the *making* of himself; which would be the same as to say, that he existed before he existed, or was *prior* to himself. But I pass on to what I design. “All things “were made by him,” signifies the same as that he made all things. Thus the ^dancients have unanimously interpreted it, and the idiom of the language will undoubtedly bear it^e. We find the phrase of *δι’ αὐτοῦ* or *δι’ οὗ*, *τὰ πάντα*, *by whom are all things*, nearly the same with what St. John here says of the Son, twice applied to the Father himself, (Rom. xi. 36. Heb. ii. 10.) which effectually takes off any pretence the Arians can have, merely from the force of the preposition *διὰ*, as if it were intended as a note of inferiority, when it is nothing more than a note of distinction. When Father and Son are joined together, (as 1 Cor. viii. 6.) *of whom* is indeed applied to the Father, and *by whom* to the Son, to signify at once the unity of operation and distinction of Persons, and withal some priority of order, as the Father is the fountain of all, and first in conception, whenever we think of the Deity. This is all that can

^d Οὗτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄφ’ οὗ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν, &c. *Just. Dial.* p. 331.

Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο. *Athenag.* p. 38.

Verbum Dei *per quod* omnia facta sunt, et quoniam mundus proprius ipsius et *per ipsum* factus est, voluntate Patris—mundi enim *Factor* vere Verbum Dei est. *Iren.* p. 315.

Fecit enim et ipse quæ facta sunt *per illum*. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* p. 504.

Verbum autem hoc illud est quod in sua venit, et sui eum non receperunt. Mundus enim *per eum* factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. —Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo veniens in hunc mundum, in sua venit, cum homo nullum *fecerit* mundum? *Novat.* cap. xiii. p. 714, 715.

^e See Petavius de Trin. lib. vii. cap. 17. p. 431.

be reasonably inferred from the Scripture-usages of the *prepositions*: especially if it be considered that under the same latitude of expression, as *all things* are said to be *of* the Father, so likewise *all things* are said to be *by* the Son; consequently the operation of one is of equal extent with the operation of the other, and indeed is but one work of both. *All things* then are *made by* the Son, but in conjunction with the Father; and the Father hath made nothing but in and by the Son. This appears to be the true and full sense of the text in St. John, whereof I am now treating; and it is confirmed by other passages of the New Testament, which I shall take in their order. There is one occurring in the same chapter, a few verses lower. "He " was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the " world knew him not: he came unto his own, and his own " received him not." ver. 10, 11. Some have thought that by *his own*, in this place, is meant only *his own* people, the Jews, as being of his kindred according to the flesh. But this can never be the meaning of it. The Evangelist is here speaking of the Λόγος, or WORD, antecedently considered, and now coming to those who were *his own* before he came to them, before he took flesh upon him. The words immediately preceding, viz. " the world was made by him, and the world knew him not," make it probable that the Apostle was not then thinking of the Jews only, but of mankind in general. Besides this, it is worth the noting, that some *heretics*, in St. John's time probably, as well as after, had a conceit that the Creator of this lower world was separate and distant from the supreme God, and that Christ came not into a world of *his own* making, but into one that belonged to another. Now in opposition to these and the like chimerical fancies, the Apostle informs us, that the same Creator (that is, Christ in conjunction with the Father) made every thing; and that therefore when he came into the world, he came *unto his own*, his own house and workmanship, this world being by right of creation his. This construction is what Irenæus, a very ancient writer, gives of the text^f. The like construction is given of it by §Clemens of Alexandria, Hippolytus and Novatian, writers of the second and third centuries. Some, who interpret the text of the Jews, yet do not give this for the reason that the Jews were *his own*, as being *akin to him*

^f Iren. p. 188, 315, 316.

contr. Noët. cap. xii. p. 14. Novatian.

§ Clem. Alex. p. 882. Hippolyt. cap. 13.

according to the flesh; but as they were his *peculium*^h, his chosen people, and as he was in a more eminent manner their God: and so Cyril of Jerusalem seems to understand itⁱ. Taking the text either of these ways, it affords us an argument of the Son's being properly *Creator*. For if it be understood of the *world* in general, then it is manifest from the words immediately preceding, that the τὰ ἴδια refers to his right of creation, and that the world is called his *own* in that respect. Or if it be understood of the Jews, it will prove thus much, that they were his *own*, as they were *his* people, and he *their* God; and it will appear from the Old Testament, that the God of Israel was the Maker of the world, the same that *created Jacob*, and *formed Israel*, (Is. xliii. 1.) and none else. If it be said, that the Jews may here be called his *own*, as he was their promised *Messiah*, their *Saviour* and *Redeemer*; that construction seems to be the least probable of any: first, because he was equally the Saviour of *mankind*, and therefore there is no reason why the Jews should be called his *own* in that respect. And secondly, because, admitting they might be called his *own* in that respect, yet it could not have been so properly said of them, antecedently to the work of redemption, before he had bought them at the price of his blood, and thereby made them his *own*. I conclude therefore from this passage, that whether it means the *world* or the *Jews*, they were his *own* in some higher respect; and that could be no other but as he was their *Creator*.

The next Scripture I shall cite shall be out of the Revelation, the work of the same Apostle whose words I have been considering. Our blessed Lord is there called the Ἀρχὴ, “the beginning;” (that is, ^k author or efficient cause) “of the creation of God.” Rev. iii. 14. This I mention as the most probable construction of the place, suitable to what I have before observed from St. John's Gospel. Otherwise, I think, nothing can, with any certainty, be proved from this passage alone; the word Ἀρχὴ (which we render *beginning*) being a word of great latitude, and capable of many senses. The *ancients* may afford us some light in this matter; not that I find this text

^h See Deut. xiv. 2.

ⁱ Cyril. Catech. xii. p. 152, 312. Ox. ed.

^k Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῆς κτίσεως ἢ προκαταρτικὴ αἰτία καὶ ἀκτιστος. Andr. Cæsar. in loc. p. 20.

Non ideo se principium creaturæ dicit, quod ipse sit creatura, sed quod ab ipso omnia sint creata, ut puta architectus fecit domum. Berengaud. in loc. p. 511.

particularly explained or quoted by any of the earlier writers: but it is frequent with them to apply the name Ἀρχὴ to God the Son; and they give this account of it: 'he existed of and from the Father before all things: he made all things: and he governs all things: and therefore is the Ἀρχὴ, the *head*, or *beginning* of all things, or of the whole *creation*. This, I presume, may serve as the best comment we can meet with upon this text in the Revelation. I shall now proceed to other texts of more clear and certain meaning: 1 Cor. viii. 6. "To us there " is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we " in him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, " and we by him." Before I come to the argument which I intend from this text, I may just take notice that here we find Father and Son equally opposed to the *gods many* and *lords many*. There is but one Lord to us, viz. *Jesus Christ*. Is then the Father (who also is the Lord "by whom are all things," Rom. xi. 34, 36.) excluded among the *lords many*? God forbid. But Father and Son are one *Lord*. So likewise to us there is but *one God*, viz. the Father. Is then the Son excluded among the *gods many*? the Son, who, as the same St. Paul testifies, is "over all God blessed for ever?" (Rom. ix. 5.) No, certainly: but Father and Son are *one God*. Thus, and thus only, can St. Paul's reasoning in that chapter be made to hang together: or otherwise he himself has infallibly shewn us that there are *to us* two Gods and two Lords, at the same time that he intended to prove (see ver. 4.) that *to us* there is but *one God* and *one Lord*. The truth is, St. Paul has not only hereby insinuated to us, that Father and Son are one God and one Lord; but he has likewise intimated the reason why, or on what account they are one. It is because all things whatsoever arise or flow from both. There is nothing *of* the Father, but *by* the Son; nor any thing *by* the Son, but what is also *of* the Father: so that the original of all creatures is referred up to both, as to one individual fountain and cause of their existence. The Father does not make one thing, and the Son another; but what the Father creates, the Son creates, for *all things* are by the Son. Hence it is manifest that God the Son is *Creator* and *author* of *all*

¹ Ἡ τῶν ὄλων Ἀρχὴ ἣτις ἀπεικόνισται μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων. τετέπωκεν δὲ τὰ μεθ' ἑαυτὴν ἅπαντα γενόμενα. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* i. p. 669.

Οὗτος λέγεται Ἀρχὴ ὅτι ἄρχει, καὶ κυριεύει πάντων δι' αὐτοῦ δεδημιουργημένων. *Theoph. Antioch.* lib. ii. Vid. *Coloss.* i. 18.

things, as well as the *Father*; nor would the Apostle have used the same latitude of expression in respect of both, (without any the least guard, caution, or exception,) had he not so understood it^m. I find an ancient writer, under the name of Ignatius, though certainly later than Ignatius, concluding from this very text that the ⁿSon of God *created* all things. Whoever the author was, the reasoning is true and just, agreeable to other Scriptures, and to the unanimous sentiments of the primitive Church. Some amongst us of late have affected very much to say, that all things were created *through* the Son, rather than *by* the Son. But they do not tell us the meaning of their quaint distinction between *by* and *through*; nor indeed are they able, in the present case, to make sense of it. Whether they say *through* or *by*, all comes to the same thing, that the Father is Creator by the *operation* of the Son: that is, both *work* together, (“my Father worketh hitherto, and I work; what things soever he doth, these also doth the Son likewise,” John v. 17, 19.) The operation is *undivided*, and the *work* one: ^oone creation, and one Creator in all. But more of this in the sequel.

The next passage in order is Ephes. iii. 9. “God who created all things by Jesus Christ.” The sense of this must be the same with the former, and needs not any further comment. The last words, “by Jesus Christ,” are observed to have been wanting in the most ancient copies; and are therefore probably presumed to be an addition to the text. If so, then this text is nothing to our present purpose. I shall only remark, that when this text is away, there will be but one left, in the whole Scripture, where that particular form of expression is used, of *God’s making the world by the Son*. And that is Heb. i. 2. “By whom also he made the worlds.”

^m Omnia enim per Filium ex nihilo substiterunt: et ad Deum ex quo omnia, ad Filium vero per quem omnia Apostolus retulit. Et non invenio quid differat, cum per utrumque opus sit virtutis ejusdem. Si enim ad universitatis substantiam proprium ac sufficiens creaturis esset quod ex Deo sunt; quid habuit necessitatis memorasse, quod quæ ex Deo sunt per Christum sint, nisi quod unum idem est, per Christum esse, et ex Deo esse? *Hilar. Trin. lib. viii. c. 38. p. 970.*

ⁿ Πρωτόκοκος πάσης κτίσεως, και

Θεός λόγος· και αυτός έποίησε τὰ πάντα. λέγει γάρ ο άπόστολος. εἰς Θεός ο πατήρ, έξ οὗ τὰ πάντα· και εἰς Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα. *Ignat. adscript. Epist. ad Tars. c. iv. p. 106. Cotel.*

Vid. etiam Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. xxi. Athanas. Orat. i. contr. Arian. p. 124. Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. x.

^o Μη είναι άλλα Χριστοῦ δημιουργήματα, και άλλα πατρός. μία γάρ ή πάντων δημιουργία τοῦ πατρός δια τοῦ υἱοῦ πεποιηκότος. *Cyri]. Catech. xi. p. 143.*

The other places which make mention of the Son's creating all things run in a somewhat different style; saying only, that the world, or all things, were *made by him*; not that *God made* them through, or by him: which different way of expressing the same thing is worth the observing, to keep us from two extremes; that we may not so interpret *God's* making all things *by the Son*, as to exclude the Son from being properly *Creator*; nor so interpret the Son's making all things, as to forget that he is a *Son*, and as such refers all to the Father, as the *Head* and *Fountain* of the Son himself^p.

I pass on to a famous passage in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians, which runs thus:

“Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature: for by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by him, and for him. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist.” (Coloss. i. 15, 16, 17.) Strong, lively, and magnificent expressions; plainly intended of a *Person*, the Son of God just before mentioned, (ver. 13.) so that here is no room for any Sabellian pretences; of a *Person preexisting* before the world began, so that here is as little left for the Socinian; lastly of a *Person* who was before all creatures, and made all creatures, which is enough to silence the Arians. The last particular I am principally obliged to speak to. In the Greek we have two expressions, ἐν αὐτῷ and δι’ αὐτοῦ, *in him* and *by him*, were all things created; and also εἰς αὐτὸν, *for him*; the same expression which we find used of God the Father, probably, (Rom. xi. 36.) and is there rendered *to him*. So now we have found εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, as before δι’ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα, equally applied to Father and Son: such expressions, so indifferently applied to either, have a meaning; and

^p The anonymous writer of “*Most Plea, &c. continued,*” pretends that this concession of the Father's being *Head* and *Fountain*, &c. overturns our whole scheme. (p. 39.) But he does not attempt to shew how. Dr. Clarke and his adherents have been called upon more than once, to make good their consequence from *subordination* of order to *inferiority of nature*. (See my *Defence, &c.* vol. i. p. 448, 450, 535.) But this writer,

contenting himself with throwing in two or three expressions, as *explanatory* of the Father's being *Head* and *Fountain*, (which are really not *explanatory*, but a manifest perverting of the sense,) drops the point which it concerned him to speak to. The objection from *subordination*, long ago despised out of the mouth of Eunomius, will not grow considerable merely by being repeated, without any thing new to enforce it.

did not drop by chance from inspired writers. But to consider the passage more distinctly.

In respect of the words, “first-born of every creature,” our translation comes not up to the force, or meaning, of the original η . It should have been, *born* (or begotten) *before the whole creation*^r; as is manifest from the context, which gives the reason why he is said to be *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*. It is because he is “before all things,” and because by *him* were all things created. So that this very passage, which, as it stands in our translation, may seem to suppose the Son one of the creatures, does, when rightly understood, clearly exempt him from the number of creatures. He was before all created being, and consequently was himself *uncreated*, existing with the Father from all eternity. But this by the way only, the better to introduce what I have to observe further from this passage. Creation is here ascribed to the Son in very full, clear, and expressive terms. “All things:” not sublunary things only, not this inferior system, but “all things,” whether above or below, “that are in heaven, and that are in earth;” not inanimate things only, or the inhabitants of this globe, but also what is remote and distant; all things *visible* and *invisible*; and not only all rational creatures of an inferior rank and order, but the very

^q Μόνος ἰδίως υἱὸς τῷ Θεῷ γεγέννηται, λόγος αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχων καὶ πρωτότοκος καὶ δύναμις. *Justin. Mart. Ap. i. p. 46.*

Πρωτότοκος τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ Θεῷ ἐστι. *Ibid. p. 101.* Ὅς καὶ λόγος πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Ibid. p. 123.* Θεοῦ δὲ, ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὄλων κτισμάτων. *Dial. p. 364.* Πρωτότοκον τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων. *Ibid. p. 295.* Τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβλήθην γέννημα, πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ πατρί. *Ibid. p. 187.* Πρὸ πάντων ἀπλῶς τῶν κτισμάτων. *Ibid. p. 375.*

It is observable that Justin never says πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων κτισμάτων, but, simply and absolutely, before *all* creatures, clearly exempting the Son from the number of creatures.

Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον &c. *Athenag. p. 38.*

Πρὸ γὰρ τὸ γίνεσθαι, τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἐαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ὄντα ὅποτε δὲ ἐθέλησεν ὁ Θεὸς ποιῆ-

σαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικῶν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, &c. *Theoph. Antioch. p. 129.*

Primogenitus conditionis, ut Sermo Creatoris per quem omnia facta sunt. — Quomodo ante omnia, si non primogenitus conditionis, si non Sermo Creatoris? *Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. v. p. 486.*

Primogenitus omnis creaturæ — quoniam secundum divinitatem ante omnem creaturam ex Patre Deus Sermo processit. *Novat. c. 16.*

Πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, τὸν πρὸ αἰῶνων εὐδοκία τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα, οὐ κτισθέντα. *Constit. Apostol. l. vii. c. 41.*

These passages are sufficient to shew how *πρωτότοκος* was understood by the earliest Christian writers. If the reader desires to see it still further explained, he cannot consult a better than the great Athanasius. *Orat. ii. contr. Arian. p. 530, &c.*

^r See John i. 30. *πρώτως μου ἦν.*

highest orders of angels or archangels: whether there be *thrones* or *dominions*, *principalities* or *powers*; they are all created in and by him: not only so, but *for him*, or *to him*; he is the *final* as well as *efficient* Cause; as much as to say, that they are made for his service and for his glory, the ultimate end of their creation. And that it may not be suspected that they have their dependence upon another, and not upon him; or that in him they do not *live* and *move* and hold *their being*; the Apostle adds further, that "by him all things consist." He is not *Creator* only once, but *perpetual* Creator, being the *Sustainer* and *Preserver* of the whole universe.

Is this the description of a *creature*? or can any thing be said higher or stronger even of God the Father, to signify his being properly *Creator* and *Preserver* of the world^s?

I go on to Heb. i. 2. where it is said "by whom (Christ) "he (God) made the worlds:" to which is subjoined that he is *ἀπαύγασμα*, the "brightness (or effulgency) of his glory, and the "express image of his person, and upholdeth all things by the "word of his power," ver. 3. which I shall leave without further comment, to be interpreted from what hath been said before, that I may the sooner come to another passage in the same chapter, so full and strong that all the wit of man can devise no way to elude it.

"Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of "the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands. "They shall perish; but thou remainest: and they all shall wax "old as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them "up, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy "years shall not fail."

In the first place we may observe, that here the Sabellian

^s The author of "Modest Plea, &c. "continued," is pleased to say, (p. 36.) that it is a "mean thing to confound "the unlearned reader with the ambi- "guity of the terms *Creator* and *Pre- "server*." I hope he had not considered how plainly the Scripture has taught, what he thinks it so *mean* to say; nor how frequent it was with the early Fathers, as high as the second century, to apply those very titles expressly to God the Son. This was the constant Catholic language, insomuch that the old Arians, and even Eunomius himself (see Basil.

contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 58.) did not refuse to style the Son *Creator*. Other Arians scrupled not to say, "Christum colimus ut Creatorem," (vide Maxim. apud August. p. 663. ed. Bened.) *We worship Christ as Creator*. If this writer had but as honourable thoughts of God the Son, as the generality of the ancient Arians had, he could not find fault with these or the like expressions; if he has not, I leave him to reflect how *mean* a thing it is to pretend to exceed even the most refined *Arianism*, and at the same time to admit the grossest.

pretences are fully obviated. The characters are all plainly *personal*, both in this chapter, and in the Psalm from whence this is quoted. The Socinian subtillies about the renovation of the moral world are as light and empty as the other: the words are as express as the first chapter of Genesis, for the material earth and heavens: besides that it can never be explained how the *new creation* and *moral* world shall “wax old as doth a garment,” or be “folded up as a vesture,” or be *changed* and *perish*. The Arian can deal no better with this passage than either of the two former. It is the *Jehovah* and God of Israel who is here spoken of, as is plain from the Psalm whence this is taken, and it is now applied by the sacred writer to Christ. The *heavens* are here said to have been the “works of his hands,” and he it was (it is not said, another *through* him) that “laid the foundation of the earth.” Here are none of the *prepositions* *ἐν*, or *διὰ*, *by* or *through*, to criticise upon. Those pretences, however serviceable at other times, can have no place here. If therefore either plain and strong words have any sense, or Scripture any weight, God the Son is and must be *Creator*, properly and strictly so, maugre all the endeavours of weak and vain men to the contrary.

Seeing then that this passage is so full and clear, that neither Socinians, Sabellians, nor Arians, can any way work it into any of their schemes, what must be done next? †Some of them have been willing to think, and bold enough to say, that these four verses were fraudulently added, and were not originally a part of this Epistle. But all the *copies* and ancient *versions* of this Epistle retain these four verses: so that any pretence of forgery or interpolation does but expose the man that makes it, and the cause that needs it. The last pretence is, that this passage is intended of God the Father, and not of Christ. But the whole context, and the whole scope and drift of the author, in citing these verses, are sufficient to confute that conceit: nor would any one, that has not an *hypothesis* to serve, ever suspect that the words were intended of any other but *Christ*, to whom they are so manifestly applied. Thus was the passage understood (and never otherwise that I know of) in the fourth and fifth centuries, and cited in proof of Christ’s being properly *Creator* :

† Judgment of the Fathers, p. 30.

“ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 329.

not only by *Athanasius, Ambrose, Austin, Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria, but by the elder Cyril too, who has been generally thought a very moderate man, and not much a favourer of Athanasius, though he retained the same faith. But enough of this. From what hath been said it appears now plainly and undeniably, that God the Son is properly Creator of the world. It was he that "laid the foundation of the earth," and the "heavens are the works of his hands." If there be any doubt in respect of the other texts, as not being full and explicit enough, there can be none in respect of this: so that, at length, we see Scripture itself has put an end to the disputes about the *prepositions* ἐν and διὰ, *in, by, or through*, and shews that all the criticisms of our adversaries about them, if intended to prove that God the Son is not properly Creator, are groundless and false. But if any thing else be intended, they are not pertinent to the cause in hand.

I may here observe to you further, by the way, that those gentlemen who retreat to that subterfuge, that they may appear at least to have something to say, do not themselves know distinctly what they mean by it. Is it that God made the world by Christ, as he "wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul?" (Acts xix. 11.) Is the *Father* in such a sense the *efficient*, and the Son the *ministering* Cause? They do not, ^γthey dare not say it. For, besides this plain text, out of the Epistle to the Hebrews, directly against it, they cannot but know that the *whole* Catholic Church, down from Barnabas, (that is, from the days of the Apostles,) were of another mind; that even Origen and Eusebius, their two favourite authors, would condemn them; and that the soberer Arians themselves were so far *orthodox*, as to allow a proper *efficiency* to the Son, in the work of creation, Scripture and tradition running clear and strong for it. Since therefore a *proper* efficiency must be ad-

* Athanas. tom. i. p. 440, 461, 685. tom. ii. p. 10. Chrysost. in Joh. p. 44. Cyril. Alexand. Thesaur. p. 126, 205. Cyril. Hierosol. Cateches. p. 221. Pseudo-Justin. p. 296. ed. Sylburg. Ambros. de Fid. l. v. c. 2. Augustin. contr. Maxim. l. ii. p. 741. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eum. l. iv. p. 542.

^γ Dr. Clarke, indeed, says, (Script. Doctr. p. 269. 2d ed.) that the Son

created the world *by the power of the Father*: but he does not deny that he created it *by his own power*: that would be too plainly running counter to Scripture and the whole Catholic Church; and betraying meaner thoughts of Christ than the generality of the ancient Arians appear to have had. See above, p. 49.

mitted, what can they pretend next? That the Son's efficiency reached not so far, was not of the same *extent*, as the *Father's*? But here Scripture, *express* Scripture, comes in, and precludes every pretence of this nature. "*All things* were made by him," says St. John, (John i. 3.) not a single thing without him: *all things*, says St. Paul, (Eph. iii. 9.) and again, *all things* by the Son, the *same*, and therefore *as many* things as *of* the Father, (1 Cor. viii. 6.) and again, "all things visible and invisible," &c. Coloss. i. 16. If therefore a *proper* efficiency, and of the same *extent*, must be allowed, what will our adversaries allege further to lessen it? Will they say that it is not the same in *kind*? that the *Father*, for example, *created*; the *Son* only *framed* or *modelled*? But neither will this pretence serve any better than the former: for then it would not have been said that the Father *made* or *created* the world, or all things, by his Son, but *framed* and *modelled* only. And yet we have every word applied in this case, that can be supposed to carry any weight or significancy; πάντα ἐγένετο, says St. John, all things were *made*, not *framed* or *modelled* only. Or if κτίζειν, to *create*, be stronger, πάντα ἐκτίσθη, all things were *created*, twice over by St. Paul, Coloss. i. 16. Or if ποιεῖν be imagined to signify something more, we have that word also, δι' οὗ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν, "by whom also he "made the worlds," Heb. i. 2.

If then the Son's efficiency be *proper*, and of the same *extent*, and of the same *kind* with the *Father's*, let our adversaries tell us what they would have next? They will say still, the Son is *subordinate*. Right; and so long as they take the other considerations along with it, that he is *efficient* in a *proper* sense, in the same *kind*, and in the same *extent*, as the Father is, we shall not dispute the point of *subordination* with them. The Father is *primarily* Creator, as the first in order, the Son *secondarily*, as second in order; and they are both one *Creator*, as they are one in *nature*, in *power*, and in *operation*. This is the Catholic faith, which was before *Arianism*; and will be after it.

Thus far I have proceeded in the proof of my position from the *New Testament*: and there is no further need of any other. But since the *ancients* have also made use of several texts of the *Old Testament*, it will be proper to take a short view of them also; not so much to confirm what has been before proved and wants no confirmation, as to explain and illustrate it something

further, and withal to give us a clearer idea of the sentiments of the primitive writers on this head.

In the first chapter of Genesis, ver. 26, God is introduced, speaking in the *plural* number, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." This text has been understood of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, (or at least of Father and Son,) by the whole stream of Christian writers, down from the times of the Apostles. The Christians were not singular in thinking that the text intimated a *plurality*. The Jews before, and after, believed so too, as appears from Philo, and Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho the Jew; only they interpreted the text of God and his angels, which the Christians understood of the Persons of the Trinity. Justin Martyr and others made very good use of it against the Jews, observing how absurd it was to suppose that angels could be joined in that manner with God the Father, and be able to create man, or any thing.

Thus far at least we may infer from their manner of using this text, and their reasonings upon it, that the Christian Church, in general, believed Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to create, as it were, in concert, and every Person of the Trinity to be properly Creator.

This will appear further from another text of the Old Testament, which they cite very frequently to the same purpose. It is Psalm xxxiii. 6. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the hosts of them by the breath of his mouth:" or, as it may be understood, by his WORD, and by his SPIRIT. This they interpreted of the *Λόγος*, or WORD, which St. John speaks of, and of the Holy Ghost. Which interpretation ^zobtained very early in the second century, and was generally received afterwards. It must indeed be presumed that those early writers would not have entirely founded any doctrine of that moment on texts so very capable of another construction. But having already imbibed the principles of Christianity from the New Testament and Catholic tradition, they easily believed that those texts intended such a sense, when they knew from

^z Theoph. Antioch. p. 21. Ox. ed. Irenæus, p. 98, 183. ed. Bened. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. xii. p. 14. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. vii. p. 503. Origen. in Joh. p. 43. Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. vii. cap. 12. lib. xi. cap. 14. in Ps. p. 125. Athanas. p. 694. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iii. p. 82, 110. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xlv. p. 714. Epiph. Anchorat. p. 29. Pseudo-Justin. Expos. Fid. p. 296. Sylb. ed. Pseudo-Ambros. de Symb. Apost. lib. vi. p. 324. ed. Bened.

other evidences, that that sense was a truth, whether taught there or no.

Here again I must observe, that whether the text of the Psalms proves any thing or nothing to the point in hand, its being used formerly, in favour of such a doctrine, shews that that doctrine was then received, and was the faith of the Church.

There are two texts more out of Psalms, which I may put together, being both of the same import and significancy. Ps. xxxiii. 9. "He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." The other is Ps. cxlviii. 5. "He commanded, and they were created."

These the ^aancients understood of the three Persons; the Father being supposed to issue out his orders or commands for the creation, and the Son and Holy Ghost to execute or fulfil them. This notion ^bobtained among the Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers; and seems to have been grounded chiefly upon those two passages out of the Psalms, and some expressions in the first chapter of Genesis^c. What led the Fathers to take the more notice of those places, was the singular use they might be of in their disputes with Jews and Heretics. The Jews denied the *divinity*, or rather the distinct personality of the Λόγος, or WORD. They were not to be confuted out of the New Testament, (which was of no authority with the Jews,) but out of the Old, which both sides equally admitted. Hence it became the more necessary to search the Old Testament for proofs of the *divinity* or distinct *personality* of Christ. Now it was thought that no person would be introduced as giving out *orders* or *commands* to *himself*, but that such expressions denoted a *plurality* of persons. Who then could these other Persons be that received the commands? They could not be *angels* or *archangels*: why? because the *orders* were such as no angels could execute^d. They were orders to *create* man, and the whole

^a Irenæus, p. 118, 183, 169, 288. Epist. Synod. Antioch. Labb. tom. i. p. 845. Orig. in Joh. p. 18, 61. Contr. Cels. p. 63, 317, 79. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. vii. cap. 12. in Psal. p. 125. Athanas. p. 216, 499. Cyril. Catech. xi. p. 143, 147. Hilar. de Trin. lib. iv. p. 837.

^b Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285. Hippolytus contr. Noët. p. 16. Basil.

de Sp. Sanct. cap. 16. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 146. Ox. ed. Hilar. p. 325, 837, 840. Athanas. p. 216, 499. See others cited in Petav. lib. ii. c. 7. p. 141.

^c Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. xii. p. 506. Hilar. de Trin. lib. iv. p. 836. Athanas. Orat. ii. p. 499.

^d Οὐ γὰρ, ὅπερ ἡ παρ' ὑμῖν λεγομένη αἵρεσις δογματίζει, φαίην ἂν ἐγὼ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἢ οἱ ἐκείνης διδάσκαλοι ἀποδείξαι

universe. None less than God's own Son and Holy Spirit could be equal to such a charge. There are therefore two divine Persons, or at least one, besides the Father. This was their argument from the Old Testament against the Jews. They had, besides, almost the like occasion to make use of the very same argument against heretics; against the Sabellians especially, and sometimes Arians. For, as many as had a mind to prove that the Person of the Father, and he only, was God, were wont to plead that Moses and the Prophets knew of no other *real* Person that was God besides him; quoting Deut. vi. 4. ("Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord:") and other passages of the Old Testament of like import. Had this pretence been true, it would not have weakened the belief of a Trinity of Persons, founded upon a fuller and clearer discovery made by the Gospel. But they thought there were *sufficient* (though in some measure *obscure*) intimations given of a plurality of *real* Persons in the Old Testament; and accordingly they alleged those texts which I have mentioned, and abundance more too tedious to recite; insisting upon it, that Moses and the Prophets had asserted a plurality of *divine* Persons; and that, notwithstanding their doctrine of the Unity of God, they had actually applied the titles of *God, Lord, Jehovah, &c.* to more Persons than one; and that it was not the Father singly, but he, and his Son, and Holy Spirit, that *created* the world. The last particular (as I have before observed) they inferred from the texts which I have here cited out of the Psalms, and from others of like import. I have dwelt the longer upon this

δύνανται, ὅτι ἀγγέλοις ἔλεγεν, ἢ ὅτι ἀγγέλων ποίημα ἦν τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προβληθὲν γέννημα, πρὸ πάντων τῶν ποιημάτων συνῆν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τούτῳ ὁ πατὴρ προσομιλεῖ (fort. προσομιλεῖ.) *Just. Dial.* p. 187. Jebb.

—Tantus Deus, et ipse est qui per semetipsum constituit et elegit et adornavit, et continet omnia—Non ergo angeli fecerunt nos nec nos plasmaverunt, nec angeli potuerunt imaginem facere Dei; nec alius quis præter *verbum* Domini, nec virtus longe absistens a Patre universorum. Nec enim indigebat horum Deus ad faciendum quæ ipse prædefinierat fieri, quasi ipse suas non haberet manus.

Adest enim ei semper *Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus*, per quos, et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit, ad quos et loquitur dicens, *Faciamus hominem, &c.* *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Nihil in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et ipse *creatura* sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui *angeli.* *Iren.* p. 288.

Εἰ γὰρ ἐνετείλατο ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐκτίσθη τὰ δημιουργήματα, τίς ἂν κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον τῷ προφητικῷ πνεύματι, εἴη ὁ τὴν τηλικαύτην τοῦ πατρὸς ἐντολὴν ἐκπληρῶσαι δυνήθεις, ἢ ὁ (ἰν' οὕτως ὀνομάσω) ἔμψυχος λόγος καὶ ἀλήθεια τυγχάνων; *Orig. contr. Cels.* lib. ii. p. 63.

matter, because some persons, upon their first reading of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, (meeting with those passages where the Father is said to have *commanded*, and the Son to have *executed his orders*.) are apt either to be offended at them, or to draw strange conclusions from them: not considering that such men as Athanasius, Basil, and Cyril, made no scruple of them, understanding very well what such expressions meant at that time, and with what view they were intended^e. The patrons of *Arianism* will never be able to serve their cause at all by them. They would indeed gladly infer, that since the Father is introduced as *commanding*, and the Son as *fulfilling*, that therefore the Son was supposed of an *inferior* nature to the Father. But if they please to take a view of the whole argument, as it stands in the primitive writers, they will find that the very contrary is the truth. For the argument is this: the *Father* is represented in Scripture as giving out *commands* for the *creation* of the universe: no inferior *person*, no *angel* or *archangel*, no ^f *creature* whatever, could be *equal* to the office, or able to execute those *commands*: therefore there must be some other Person or Persons, distinct from the Father, and superior to all *creatures*; and those are his *Son*, and his *Holy Spirit*. Thus we see, that the primitive writers proceeded upon a supposition directly opposite to what the Arians pretend: for had they supposed the Son and Holy Ghost to be *creatures*, there had been no force at all in their argument; nor could they, in that way, have proved that there was any *Son* or *Holy Ghost* at all. But admitting that the work of creation was too big for any *creature*, and admitting at the same time that there were other Persons, besides the Father, who *created* the world; the consequence is very clear, that there are more *divine uncreated* Persons than one; and thus the doctrine of a *coeternal* Trinity is established.

I must entreat you to observe, that I do not take upon me to maintain the whole premises, which those ancient writers went upon. I think the argument from those texts is barely *probable*: I do not apprehend that a *plurality* of Persons can *certainly* be inferred, merely from such *forms* of expression, where the *Father* is said to have *commanded*, and things were *created*.

^e See the meaning of them clearly opened and explained by Athanasius. *Orat.* ii. p. 499.

^f See the quotations from Irenæus especially.

The *style* is not *improper* or *unsuitable*, as I humbly conceive, though the Father were supposed the only Person concerned in creating. It is a handsome way of expressing that to *will* or to *do* is with God one and the same thing. All that I intend is, that the *Fathers*, who made use of that way of reasoning, believed that God the Son was properly *Creator* (otherwise there is neither force nor pertinency in their argument) and properly *divine*. As to the argument itself, they had no need of it, but in occasional disputes, where it might be of some service, *ad homines* at least; or where the New Testament proofs, on which they chiefly grounded their doctrine, could not be admitted at all.

I shall now just give you a brief summary of the doctrine of the primitive Church, in this article, and then take my leave of you for this time. They believed that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were distinct Persons, and all jointly concerned in the creation of the world; not as *many* Creators, but as *one* Creator; not dividing the work into parts, but as concurring in the whole, and in every part. Man, and every man, was supposed the creature of the whole Trinity; and so also the universe, and every part of the universe, was believed to be the creature of all, there being no creatures of the *Father's* but what were likewise creatures of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*. Yet they admitted some distinction in the manner of operation, reserving to the Father, as *first* Person, some sort of preeminence in every thing. He was *primarily* considered as *Creator* by the operation of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; but without excluding them from a proper *efficiency*. So far from it, that they chose rather to represent the *Father* as *willing* or *designing*, and the two other Persons as *acting* and *executing*; contributing, as it were, but in subordination to one Head, to the beginning, the growth, and the perfection of every work. They ventured no further, nor was it proper to indulge imagination in a matter so sublime, and above the comprehension of men or angels. It is sufficient to know, that the creation was the effect of three Persons, whose operations were undivided, as their nature and essence is; and whose powers, perfections, and glory are one. But I must not anticipate what more properly belongs to my second head of discourse.

Having shewn from Scripture, that God the Son is strictly

and properly *Creator* of men, of angels, and of the whole universe, I am next to consider the force of the argument deducible from it, in favour of Christ's *divinity*. But the first part having already taken up the full time allowable in discourses of this nature, I must be content to defer the remainder to another opportunity.

Christ properly Creator :

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM CREATION.

The third Sermon preached November 4, 1719.

JOHN i. 3.

All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.

IN discoursing on these words, I proposed three things :

1. To shew that God the Son, a distinct Person from God the Father, is strictly and properly *Creator*, and *efficient Cause* of all things.
2. To consider the force of the argument arising from it, in favour of Christ's divinity.
3. To make some reflections and observations upon the whole, for our further improvement.

I had then no more time than was necessary to be taken up in making good my first position : which, I hope, I have clearly shewn to be founded in express words of Scripture, and confirmed all along by the unanimous suffrage of Catholic antiquity. The two remaining parts I reserved for the subject-matter of our present meditations. I proceed then to my second general head of discourse.

II. To consider the force of the argument, in respect of Christ's divinity, contained in this ; that he is properly *Creator* of men, of angels, of all things. I shall consider it under three views, debating the point distinctly, from the *reason* of the thing, from *Scripture*, and from *antiquity*.

1. From the *reason* of the thing. I shall not here treat of the subject in the *scholastic* way; which would afford but dry entertainment: besides that, the argument would suffer by it, and lose much of its force and efficacy. There is sometimes in moral probabilities an irresistible strength, little short of the strictest demonstration. There is something so affecting and sensible under them, that they cannot fail of making their way into every well-disposed and ingenuous mind: and so it often happens that they do as infallibly (and more agreeably) win over our assent, as demonstration can force it. To come to the business in hand: God the Son is *Creator* of all things. On that foundation I am to proceed: and when I say *Creator*, I include *Sustainer* and *Preserver*. Let us then distinctly consider him:

1. As *Creator* of man.
2. As *Creator* of the earth, and of all things in it.
3. As *Creator* of the heavens, with all their host.
4. As *Creator* of angels and archangels, thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, which live, and move, and have their being from, and in, the Son of God.

I do not heighten or rhetoricate at all, in these particulars. They are no more than strict and close comment upon Coloss. i. 16. and Heb. i. 10. only branching out into parts what is there couched and comprised in few words.

1. First then, let us consider our blessed Lord as *Creator* of *man*, of all men living quite round the globe; of all that have lived and died from Adam down to this day. I leave it to the *anatomists* and *physiologists* to describe the wonderful mechanism and exquisite workmanship of the human body: the erect posture, the figure and shape, the size and stature, the structure and use of every part, and the symmetry of the whole; which carry in them uncontestable proofs of the skill, and the contrivance, and the consummate wisdom of him that made us. How many lectures might be read upon the fabric of the eye, the texture of the brain, the configuration of the muscles, and disposition of the nerves, or glands; all bearing testimony to the power and greatness of the Son of God; of whom we may now say, that "he hath set the members every one of them in " the body, as it hath pleased him;" and hath so "tempered " the body together," as admirably to answer all the wise ends and purposes designed by him. The same wisdom, which is

visible in every single *individual*, reaches at the same time to the whole *species* round the globe. All are supported, sustained, and actuated by God the Son, in "whom all things consist." He is equally present to all, supplying motion, nutriment, and strength to every individual, extending his providential care to the ends of the earth, and in one comprehensive view grasping the whole system. For,

2. We are to consider him as *Creator* of the terraqueous globe, the earth and all things in it. He "has laid the foundations thereof," divided it into sea and land, garnished it with plants, trees, and flowers, stocked it with living creatures for the use of man, and plentifully furnished it with the most grateful and unexpressible variety. Every herb that grows, every spire of grass that springs up, every creeping thing that moveth upon the face of the earth, proclaims the wisdom of its *Maker*, sounds forth the praises of the *Son of God*. I may here apply the words of the Psalmist, which, whether meant of Father or Son, are certainly applicable to both. "Praise the Lord from the earth, ye dragons, and all deeps: fire, and hail; snow, and vapours; stormy wind fulfilling his word: mountains, and all hills; fruitful trees, and all cedars: beasts, and all cattle; creeping things, and flying fowl: kings of the earth, and all people; princes, and all judges of the earth: both young men, and maidens; old men, and children: let them praise the name of the Lord: for his name alone is excellent; his glory is above the earth and heaven." Psalm cxlviii. It would lead me too far off from my purpose to consider, or to enumerate, the many legible characters of a wisdom and power nothing short of *divine*, which are every where discoverable within and without this earth whereon we live. These I leave to the naturalists to describe. No man that considers its stupendous size, or bulk alone, but must think it a work too august and great for any thing less than a *divine* architect. We have often triumphed over atheists upon this head, alleging that no *power* or *wisdom* less than infinite could be equal to the task. The very same topics, to such as believe the Scriptures, may be as justly urged for the *divinity* of God the Son. It was his hand that made all these things, and by his power they are sustained and held together. And yet these are little things, and as nothing in comparison. For,

3. We are thirdly to consider, that the *heavens* also are the

“works of his hands.” That huge and vast compass, that immense region of ether, and therein the sun, with its planetary chorus dancing round it, the fixed stars, (perhaps suns too, with their planets rolling about them,) whatever modern much improved astronomy has discovered, or whatever yet further discoveries future ages may bring to light; all things *visible* and *invisible* have the Son of God for their *Creator, Sustainer, and Preserver*. If we survey the magnitude of the heavenly bodies, some smaller, most vastly bigger than our own globe, all of an amazing size and greatness; if we consider the nice proportion of their distances, the regularity of their situations, the harmony of their courses, and uniformity of all their motions; they cannot but raise in us an idea of the infinite power, wisdom, and greatness of him that made them. This is a theme of very wide extent, and has been often and excellently handled in defence of our common religion, against the *atheists* and *sceptics* of our age or nation. It is with pleasure I observe, that the same topics (only taking in those Scriptures which they and we own) will almost equally serve against Arians or Socinians, or any that presume to deny the *divinity* of God the Son. It is clear from the Sacred Writ, that he “created” all things, and that by him “all things consist:” and therefore it is evident, that all the marks of wisdom, power, or majesty, discoverable in this grand palace, and august structure of the universe. are so many arguments of his *divinity*, and proclaim him to be the eternal and omnipotent God. I have one particular more to urge under this head. Hitherto I have been speaking of sun, moon, and stars, prodigiously great, but yet *inanimate* bodies; and creatures less perfect than we ourselves are, who make a part, though the lowest part, of the *rational* creation. We are further to consider,

4. That the very *angels* themselves, the top, surely, of the *creation*, those bright intelligences, and glorious ministers of the court of heaven, are the creatures and workmanship of the Son of God. Whether they be *thrones* or *dominions, principalities* or *powers*, they were all *created*, not only *by* him, but *for* him. *Myriads* of those heavenly spirits are continually serving and praising him. To him they owe their perfections, their strength, their glory, their life, their very being; and on him they depend for their support and sustenance. I shall proceed no further: I have said enough. I leave it to any man of plain good sense,

and common discernment, to pass a judgment, whether, supposing these facts be true, (and they are true, if plain Scripture be so,) any longer doubt can be made of the real and essential *divinity* of the Son of God. If any one tells me, after all, that this does not amount to strict *demonstration*, because we cannot make a certain estimate of the *scale* of being, nor define peremptorily what degrees of perfection there may be short of infinite; I say, if any one urges this, I should allow that there is not what may be called strict *demonstration*: but it is demonstration that the evidence is such as ought to convince every wise and considerate man; and such as ought to have the same effect upon the mind as a thousand *demonstrations*. There are many things not capable of strict *demonstration*; and yet so evident and undoubted, that a man would forfeit the very character of sobriety and common sense, that should seriously make the least question of them. I might mention, for instance, the *existence* of the world about us; which good philosophers have thought not capable of strict *demonstration*. But a man would hardly be supposed well in his wits, that should seriously entertain any the least doubt or suspicion concerning it. His eyes, his ears, and all his senses bear testimony to the truth and certainty of it: and if it be not strictly demonstrable in the *rational* way, yet this is demonstrable, that the nature and circumstances of men are such, that he both may and must believe it. The same, in a great measure, I am persuaded, is the case which I have been mentioning. For, allowing the first position, that the Son of God is properly *Creator* of men, of angels, and of the universe; there is no man that attends to it, and considers it in its full latitude, but must come to this conclusion, that the Son of God is no *creature*, nor any thing less than the eternal and infinite God. So much for my first head of argument, from the *nature* and *reason* of the thing itself. My second head of argument is from *Scripture-texts*.

2. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the same who had told us, in his first chapter, that the Son had "laid the foundation of the earth," and that the "heavens were the works of his hands;" I say, the same author observes, ch. iii. ver. 4, that "he that built all things is God;" thus establishing the very conclusion which we are seeking after, as he had before done the premises. This, considered as a general maxim, must be applicable to the particular instance of God the Son, if it was

he that "built all things," as hath been proved: nay, it is reasonable to believe that the Apostle intended it particularly of God the Son. This construction is very suitable to the argument which the author was upon, in that chapter; and to the high things spoken of the *Son* in chapter the first: there is nothing in the context but what extremely favours and confirms it; except it be that, verse the sixth, it is said, "Christ as a Son over his own house," intimating as if he was not that Person before spoken of. (who is called *God*, ver. 4.) but *Son* of that Person. But to this it may be replied, that the author was here setting forth the preference of *Christ* above Moses: the comparison was between those two persons only. How the *Person* of the *Father* came in here, is not easy to account: but understanding it of the Person of the Son, the sense is clear, the argument proper and pertinent. As to his being called *God* in the fourth verse, and *Son* in the sixth, it was very proper and significant, because he is so *God*. as withal to be Son of God, or God of God.

I proceed now to another text, Rom. i. 20. "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." If then, as the Apostle here testifies, the work of *creation* proclaims the eternity and divinity of its *Creator*, it will follow from thence, that God the Son as *Creator* must be *eternal*, and strictly divine. I am sensible that St. Paul's argument may be taken under another view. For it may mean, not that the magnificence or greatness of the work proves that every *Creator* must be *eternal*, or *God*; but that there must be one eternal first Cause of all things; otherwise there would be a progress of causes, one higher than another, *in infinitum*, which is absurd. The first construction I take to be the more probable, as it is more obvious to common capacities, and as the argument in that view strikes the more sensibly, being such as few could miss of; and therefore the Gentiles were *without excuse*, for not attending to it. However this be, I lay no great stress upon it, designing a more general, and, I think, more convincing argument out of Scripture, than I have hitherto mentioned; which is this: that the work of *creation* is every where represented as the certain mark and characteristic of the true God. It is the favourite topic which God is pleased to insist most upon, when-

ever he would either distinguish his own peculiar majesty and power, above and beyond all the gods of the nations, or when he would excite in his people the highest idea possible, suitable to his transcendent excellency and peerless perfections. Numberless are the texts of the Old Testament, which might be cited to this purpose. I shall single out as many as may serve to give a due light and force to the present argument.

Hezekiah, in his prayer to God, thus expresses himself: "O Lord God of Israel, which dwellest between the cherubims, thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth." Then follows the reason why he is so eminently distinguished, and so infinitely superior to all others: "Thou hast made heaven and earth." 2 Kings xix. 15.

Job, describing the supereminent majesty of the one true God, thus elegantly sets it forth: "He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing. He bindeth up the waters in his thick clouds; and the cloud is not rent under them—The pillars of heaven tremble, and are astonished at his reproof. He divideth the sea with his power.—By his Spirit he hath garnished the heavens; his hand hath formed the crooked serpent." Job xxvi. 7, &c.

In the Psalms we meet with a great deal to the same purpose. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork." Ps. xix. 1. "All the gods of the nations are idols: but the Lord made the heavens." Ps. xcvi. 5. "The heavens are thine, the earth also is thine: as for the world and the fulness thereof, thou hast founded them. The north and the south, thou hast created them." Ps. lxxxix. 11, 12.

More to the same effect occurs perpetually in the Prophets. I shall cite a few examples only. "Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number," &c. Isa. xl. 26. "Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?" Isa. xl. 12. "Thus saith God the Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched them out; he that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it," &c. Isa. xlii. 5. "Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he that formed thee, O Israel." Isa. xliii. 1. So again;

“ I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and “ create darkness.” Isa. xlv. 6, 7. “ I have made the earth, “ and created man upon it; I, even my hands, have stretched “ out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded.” Isa. xlv. 12. “ Thus shall ye say unto them, The gods that have “ not made the heavens and the earth, even they shall perish “ from the earth, and from under these heavens. He hath “ made the earth by his power, he hath established the world “ by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his “ discretion.” Jer. x. 11, 12.

It would be tedious to add more texts. These are sufficient to shew what a particular stress and emphasis is laid upon God’s being *Creator* of all things. It is the distinguishing character of the one true God; and whenever Scripture intended to raise in men’s minds such esteem and veneration as they ought to have for the supreme God of Israel, nothing higher or greater could be said than this, that he had created the universe, had “ laid the foundations of the earth,” and that the “ heavens were the works of his hands.” (See Psalm cii. 25, 26.) This is further confirmed from the New Testament, Rom. i. 25, where St. Paul directs us to worship the *Creator*, in opposition to all *creature-worship*. From whence it is plain that the Apostle supposes the *Creator*, or Person creating, to be no *creature*, but God “ blessed for ever:” from whence also, by the way, we may remark that Scripture knows no *medium* between *God* and *creature*, but includes all things and all persons whatever under that distinction; as does also antiquity unanimously, and all sound philosophy, and the common sense and reason of mankind. But to proceed.

Seeing then that the title of *Creator* is thus magnificently and elegantly set forth in holy Scripture, as the distinguishing mark of eminency, the epitome of all perfection, and the sure and certain character of *true* Divinity: if nothing higher or stronger can be thought on, to raise in us the most sublime, awful, and exalted idea of the supreme God of Israel; and if the Son of God be plainly and evidently set forth to us under this same high character: if he created all things, *visible* and *invisible*; if he “ laid the foundations of the earth,” and if the “ heavens are “ the works of his hands:” if these be the premises, let any man of common abilities, that has not his faculties foreclosed, or is not steeled against conviction, be left to draw the conclusion.

To say of God the Son, that he is the Maker of the world, of the kinds in it, as well as of the grand palace itself, (as a late ingenious author^a expresses it,) is to say as *much* and as *high* of him, as it is possible to say or to *conceive* of any other person, however named: because the whole that we can naturally know or apprehend of God, his powers or perfections, is only what we can infer from his work of *creation*. Hence it is, that Socinians and Sabellians have joined with the Catholics in condemning the Arians for making two or more *creators*, the same in effect with two eternal *gods*: and since there is no way of avoiding it, but either by saying that Father and Son are *one Creator*, or else denying the Son to be *Creator* at all; those gentlemen have chose the *latter*, rather than part with their main principle, that the "unity of God is an unity of Person." But then they manifestly run counter to Scripture, which evidently makes the Son of God *Creator*, as I have before shewn.

3. I proceed now, thirdly, to inquire into the sentiments of the *ancients*, upon this head; whether they thought it did not exceed the power of a *creature* to create any thing, or whether the work of creating was not looked upon as a work properly *divine*, belonging to *God* only. It does not appear that any, except *heretics*, ever dogmatically^b ascribed the work of *creation*, or any part of it, to any *creature*.

Simon Magus, borrowing his sentiments from the Platonic philosophy, did not scruple to assert, even in the times of the Apostles, that this lower world was made by ^cangels. After him, ^dMenander, ^eSaturninus, ^fBasilides, ^gCarpocrates, ^hCerintus, with the infamous crew of Gnostics, taught the same, or very nearly the same doctrine; and this within the first century. Cerdo and Marcion of the second century have been thought by some to have asserted the same principles in the main, differing rather in words than in *reality*ⁱ. The Valentinians also were so far in the sentiments of the Gnostics, as to ascribe the creation of the lower world to a *creature* of their own devising, whom

^a Mr. Nye, Explication of the Divine Unity, p. 91.

^b Origen indeed seems to have indulged some fanciful conjectures that way, in some of his looser writings, if they be his. (See Comm. in Joh. p. 42, 43.) But in his more accurate and certainly genuine works, nothing

appears of it, but the contrary.

^c Irenæus lib. i. cap. 23. p. 99.

^d Ibid. p. 100.

^e Ibid. p. 101.

^f Ibid. p. 103.

^g Ibid. p. 105.

^h Ibid. p. 105.
ⁱ Vid. Dissert. Præv. ad Iren. et Bened. p. 70.

they called Demiurgus, or *Creator*. These wild and vain conceits were utterly detested by the sober Catholics; who would not so much as hear of any angel or archangel's creating the world, or any part of it; but ascribed it wholly to the joint operation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It appears to have been a rule and maxim of the Church, in Irenæus's time^k, and probably all along, that no *creature* whatever could have any hand in *creating*; but that *creating* was an indisputable mark of a *divine immutable* nature. These principles seem to have obtained constantly in the Church long before the Nicene Council. No sooner did the Arian controversy arise, but the Catholics, upon their old principles, charged the Arians with great inconsistency, as making a *creature* of the Son of God, and yet admitting him to be *Creator*. They scrupled not to tell them, that this was copying after Valentinus, and reviving the principles of the Gnostics: that it was confounding the ideas of *Creator* and *creature*, and was all over contradictory and repugnant. No argument bore harder upon the Arians than this, as appears by the perplexity and confusion they were in upon it; not being able to come to any fixed and certain resolution in it. Scripture and Catholic tradition appear clear, full, and strong for the Son's being properly and strictly Framer and Maker of the world; and there were but few in comparison that durst go such lengths as openly to deny it: on the other hand, to make a *creature-creator*, was in a manner unheard of, except among *heretics*, and was, besides, harsh and shocking even to common sense^l.

To soften this matter, the Arians, many of them, would not

^k Nihil enim in totum Diabolus invenitur fecisse, videlicet cum et ipse *Creatura* sit Dei, quemadmodum et reliqui angeli. Omnia enim fecit Deus, quemadmodum et David ait: *Quoniam ipse dixit et facta sunt; ipse præcepit et creata sunt.* Psal. cxlviii. 5. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 41. p. 288.

Et hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit: et quidem qui facit semper idem est. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 12. p. 240.

That this was likewise the sense of all antiquity appears from hence, that all the *Fathers*, where they declare

against *creature-worship*, do at the same time declare for the worship of the *Creator*: constantly opposing *Creator* and *creature* to each other, in such a manner as shews plainly that they thought there was no *medium* between, and that *creation* belonged to *God* alone, not to any *creature*.

See Athenagoras, p. 56. Tertull. Apolog. c. 17. Clem. Alex. p. 55, 59. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 158, 375.

^l Quis auctorem inter opera sua deputet, ut videatur id esse quod fecit? *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. i. cap. 5. p. 450.

own that they held the Son to be a *creature*; which was pretence only, and playing with words: for had they not only *verbally*, but *really* intended that the Son was no creature, they and the Catholics could have had no further dispute. But this was a contrivance to dissemble an absurdity too gross to be owned, and to disguise a difficulty which they could not answer. They had, besides, many little arts and subterfuges, to lessen and undervalue the Son's part or province in the work of creation, such as I have mentioned and confuted above; the same that are made use of by their successors at this day. But all would not do: Scripture was plain and clear, and tradition full and strong; and was not to be bore down by little quirks and subtilities. In fine, truth prevailed, *Arianism* daily lost ground; and this very argument, from the Son's concern in the work of creation, contributed, as much as any other, to sink it. The strength of it has been often tried since. The Socinians, who at the beginning were most of them Arians, were soon sensible of this difficulty. They knew not what to make of two *Creators* upon the Arian scheme, nor how to avoid it, if the texts were to be understood *literally* of a *proper* creation: and this, very probably, was one main reason of their giving the Arian scheme up, and running in with the Photinian *hypothesis*, which looked more defensible. They observed that the texts, which speak of the Son's being *Creator*, were few in comparison; and therefore thought, they might be able to deal with them; being never at a loss for some subtile and surprising meaning for any text in the Scripture which made against them. Their device, at length, was to interpret every text of a *metaphorical* creation: and so they left the Arians to shift as they could, resting themselves upon a new bottom. Yet this could not hold long, though supported and set off with all the advantages of wit and criticism. Several of the acutest and ablest of the Unitarians grew dissatisfied with it, and began themselves to feel the force of, and to close in with, the arguments of the Trinitarians against it. The result was, the preferring the old Sabellian before the late Socinian construction: and yet that is as manifestly unscriptural, false, and groundless, as either Socinian or Arian. But thus do men rove and range about, after they have once forsaken the truth, and have given themselves up to the conduct of their private fancies, instead of adhering to God's written word, and to the

most faithful guide, for the interpretation of it, the *primitive* and Catholic Church. I thought it not improper to hint thus much of the history of the argument whereof I have been discoursing. It has lost no weight or strength all the time: for truth is always the same. The variety of methods thought on to elude it, only confirm it so much the more. I doubt not but the Unitarians, of every denomination, are very sensible, that our interpretation of Scripture, so far as concerns this point, is the most easy, obvious, and natural, and most agreeable to the *letter* of the inspired writers: only they have some scruples about *three and one*, and know not how to digest *three* Persons that create, and yet but *one* Creator. There is all the difficulty: and so they choose to follow *philosophical conjectures*, (which they call *reason*.) rather than the dictates of *true* and *sound* reason, which will tell us, that we ought not to be wise beyond what is written, nor put a *violent* construction on any passages, where there is no necessity for it, nor leave a safe and plain rule, to follow our own wanderings. But enough of this. I have now finished, in a great measure, what I designed, having explained and vindicated the argument for Christ's *divinity* drawn from the consideration of his being *Creator* of the world. In a former discourse I endeavoured to maintain the premises; and now in this, to make good the conclusion. The sum of it is this: God the Son is Creator of the universe: the Creator of the universe is strictly and truly God: therefore God the Son is strictly and truly, or *essentially* God, which was to be proved. It remains now only, in the third and last place,

III. To make some reflections and observations upon the whole.

1. Having before shewn the truth and certainty of our principles, give me leave, in conclusion, to recommend them further from their plainness and simplicity. The Arians were never more perplexed about any thing, than in accounting for God's taking in a *creature* to be his agent and operator in making the world^m. What? make one creature in order to make others? Why might he not rather have made all creatures, as well as one, and reserved the sole glory of so great and so stupendous a work, as that of creating, to his own self? Did he want the

^m Vid. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 496.

assistance of an inferior being? Or was not his own will and *fiat* sufficient to give birth to all things? Besides, did he cease to work after he made the Son, leaving it to a *creature* of his own to have, in a manner, the honour of doing of every thing else, and to be the *immediate* agent and manager in all things, both in heaven and earth? These were tenets which appeared very harsh and strange, and were not *naturally*, scarce *tolerably*, accounted for on the Arian hypothesis. But, upon the Catholic scheme, all is easy, expedite, and clear. The Son is of the same nature and substance with the Father; so nearly allied, so closely united, that nothing could be the work of *one*, without being at the same time the work of *both*: hence it was, that the Son was *Joint-Creator* with the Father, that "all things were made by him." and nothing without him. It was not ⁿ possible for them either to *act* or to *exist* separately; and therefore it is, that the work of creation is in Scripture attributed to both. This is an easy and natural account of the whole thing; and besides very agreeable to Scripture. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." John v. 17. "What things soever he doth, these also doth the Son likewise." John v. 19.

2. Another thing which recommends our principles is, their great consistency with each other, and with the principles of the Catholic Church, in this article especially, from the very beginning. When the Arians first broached their *heresy*, they had some plausible things to urge, particularly in respect of the *generation* of the Son, which was their principal topic, and which they most delighted to dwell upon. But then they took but a partial and superficial view of things, and knew not how to work up a consistent scheme. The Church had all along set forth God the Son as *Framer*, *Creator*, *Maker*, nay, and *Sustainer* too, of all things, in subordination to the Father. The *subordination* looked well on the Arian side; but *Creator* and *Preserver* were strange attributes to be applied to a *creature*. This alone was sufficient to shew, that the Catholic Church had never gone upon Arian principles; having so unanimously and so expressly

ⁿ Οὐκ ἠδύνατο μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὰ δημιουργήματα· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀπανιάσματι τὰ πάντα φωτίζει, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀπανιάσματος οὐκ ἂν τι φωτισθείη. οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὡς διὰ χει-

ρὸς, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰργάσατο τὰ πάντα, &c. *Athan. Orat.* ii. p. 498.

Comp. Cyril. Alex. Comm. in Joh. i. 3. p. 45.

ascribed *creative* powers to the Son of God; and not only so, but had supposed him Inspector and Governor of the whole universe^o, extending his power and presence through the whole compass of being. That the fact was really thus, besides many other evidences, one might reasonably infer from the works of Eusebius alone; of whom I may venture to say, that he never would have ascribed more power, dignity, or perfection to the Son of God, than the plain force of Scripture and Catholic tradition obliged him to. This man, though a favourer of the Arians, (of the *men* at least, if not of their *cause*,) yet every where says many high and great things of the Son's creating and governing the whole universe, such as any man of plain sense must think can belong to no *creature*, but to God only.

In his oration before the Emperor Constantine he describes God the Son, under the most endearing and magnificent characters imaginable. "He is the omnipotent Lord and Governor of the whole universe, the framer and disposer of all things, who is above all, and through all, and in all; pervading and permeating all things both above and below, earthly and heavenly, visible and invisible. It is he that formed and brought into regularity the confused *chaos*, made it habitable and pleasurable, adorned it with trees, plants, and flowers, stored the sea with fishes, and the land with variety of animals, supporting, preserving, and sustaining them all. It is he that gave the sun its light, and who directs the courses of the stars; who is superintendent every where, and steers the whole universe. To him the very angels owe their life, their light, their knowledge, or whatever excellencies and perfections they stand possessed of. In a word, he is set forth as operator and manager, director and supervisor over all the works of God, shedding his rich blessings, and distributing his bounties through the whole creation." This is Eusebius's account of God the Son, as it lies scattered through that oration^p. A great deal too much for any Arian to say, and more than can be tolerably accounted for, upon any other than Catholic principles. I shall not here pass any positive judgment upon Eusebius, about whom the learned world has been so much divided. I shall only say,

^o Iren. p. 190, 315. Clem. Alex. Novat. cap. 14.
 p. 123, 273, 831. Tertull. adv. Prax. p. Vid. Euseb. de Laud. Constant.
 cap. xxiii. p. 514. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 501, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530,
 p. 63, 164, 239. in Johan. p. 122, 128. 531, &c.

that if he was an Arian at the bottom, he was the most inconsistent one that ever was. He ought either to have been much more of an Arian than he appears to have been, or no Arian at all. He ascribed so much to God the Son, that he hardly left any thing peculiar to the Father, but a kind of nominal greatness and majesty, as it were to be above and beyond the world. In short, he describes him, as it were, sitting in his throne of state, and looking on, and God the Son as acting and performing every thing. Athanasius's account of this matter appears much more rational and consistent. For indeed it is by no means reconcilable with good sense, and the truth and reason of things, to allow so much to God the Son as Eusebius did, and not to allow him every thing which Athanasius, with other Catholics at that time, (as the Catholic Church had all along,) ascribed to him. It was a weak thing to pretend to honour the Son of God by halves. A *creature* or no *creature*, was the question. The Arians innovated in making the Son a *creature*, and yet were minded to keep up, in other respects, the same honours and acknowledgments which had been paid him before. This was trifling and inconsistent. The Catholics were wiser men. They preserved the same honour and respect which had been formerly paid to God the Son; but withal, carefully looked after the foundation of it; that so they might be able not only to do their duty, but to give a reason also for the doing it. This was acting with thought and judgment; in which they appear to have been as much superior to their adversaries, all along, as in true piety, probity, and sincerity. But,

3dly and lastly, I would observe to you, what I before hinted, that while we acknowledge the Son of God to be *Creator*, we acknowledge him a *Son* also: the *second* only, not the *first* Person of the Trinity. The Father therefore is *primarily* Creator, as Father. He is first in conception, whenever we speak of the divine nature. And hence it is that he is said to create *by the Son*, and he is *eminently* and *emphatically* represented in the Creeds, as *Maker of heaven and earth*, the Son having another title, more peculiar to him, that of *Redeemer*. The Nicene Creed (as do many other ancient Creeds) takes notice of the *worlds*' being *made* by the Son; but yet so that he did not make the worlds *by the Father*, but the Father *by him*. This is the constant language of antiquity, always keeping up some preeminence of *order*, as proper to the *first* Person,

along with the true essential divinity of the other two. This distinction of *order*, consistent with a *parity* of *nature*, they learned from Scripture, and inviolably maintained. For thus they thought that, by referring all things to one *Head* and *Fountain*, they should preserve the unity, along with the distinction; and consistently teach a *plurality* of Persons in one *Godhead*, as we do at this day. There can be no such thing as *Tritheism*, upon the principles of the ancient Church, so long as a proper Sonship and subordination is allowed: for therein consists the relation, the alliance, the strict union of the Persons, while they are considered, as I may say, of the same stock, and included in each other. But take away that relation and alliance, either by supposing three independent separate principles, or by making two of the Persons *creatures*, and consequently of a different nature from the other; and then immediately commences either *Tritheism*, strictly so called, or *Gentile Polytheism*. So that the Catholic doctrine is the only security against a *plurality* of Gods; unless we take our last refuge in *Sabellianism*, which is utterly repugnant to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to the doctrine of the universal Church. “ Now “ to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three Persons and “ one God, be all honour and glory, power and dominion, henceforth and for evermore.” Amen.

The Scripture-Unity not an Unity of Person :

OR

THE DIVINE UNITY

STATED AND CLEARED.

The fourth Sermon preached Dec. 2, 1719.

MARK xii. 29.

Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Κύριος εἷς ἐστι.

Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.

MY design in taking this text is to inquire into the *Scripture-notion* of the *Divine Unity*: a point very necessary to be stated and cleared, in order to a right understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. I was once inclinable to defer the treating of it some time longer; thinking it most suitable to the rules of strict method to throw it off to the *last part* of what I intend upon this subject. But I considered, that while I am asserting the divinity of more Persons than one, the thought will, in a manner, perpetually occur, how it can be consistent with the Scripture-account of the Divine Unity: and many may be impatient to have that point settled before we go further. Upon this consideration, I thought it advisable to postpone this matter no longer, choosing rather to break in upon the rules of strict method, than to suffer a prejudice to lie upon the minds of any, which might so easily be removed. I shall therefore now fall directly to the business of the Unity.

The words which I have chosen to discourse on appear first in Deuteronomy, chap. vi. ver. 4, from whence they are cited by our blessed Lord, and thereby made a doctrine of the Gospel, as before of the Law. "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
" one Lord." I think it proper, in the entrance, to take notice,

that the original word in the Hebrew for *Lord*, is *Jehovah*. (according to our now customary way of reading and pronouncing it;) and if we put *Jehovah*, instead of *Lord*, into the English text, it will then run thus: *Jehovah our God is one Jehovah*. The use which I intend of this will appear presently.

There are three several constructions of this one short sentence. The differences betwixt them may appear slight, but are really of moment in this controversy, as will be seen in the sequel. The Anti-Trinitarians of all sorts have here an interest to serve in making the word *Jehovah* to be nothing more than the *proper name* of one Person only. It is for this reason chiefly they contrive to change the obvious, natural order and construction of the words: for otherwise indeed, upon their *hypothesis*, they would scarce be sense. Suppose it were said, David, our king, is one David; or Abraham, our father, is one Abraham; what sense would there be in it? And yet this sentence, *Jehovah our God is one Jehovah*, supposing *Jehovah* to be merely a *proper name*, will be just such another saying, and is too flat and insipid a sense to be suffered to pass upon the sacred writings. This our adversaries are sensible of, and therefore, to salve their *hypothesis*, they make bold with the order and construction of the words two ways; which I shall here previously take notice of and examine, and then proceed to lay down the third construction, which is the only true one.

1. The first way is, to turn the sentence thus: *Jehovah is our God, Jehovah only*. Here you see, in this form, *Jehovah* may be a *proper name*, and the words are good sense too: and so, they think, both points are secured. But the objection against it is, that the words here in St. Mark (and indeed those in Deuteronomy) will not bear that construction. For then the words should have been thus: *Κύριός ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, Κύριος μόνος*, which is very different from what we find, and is quite another proposition.

2. A second way of construing the words is thus: *Jehovah our God, even Jehovah, is one Person*. Here again you will observe, that *Jehovah* may be understood as a *proper name*, which is thought a great point gained; and a greater than that is intended by interpreting *one*, one Person. So there are thought to be two ends served at once. But it will be easy to defeat them both; which we shall see presently, as soon as we come to assert and explain the true construction of the place.

I shall here only examine a pretence which is ^amade from Zechariah xiv. 9. in favour of this fanciful interpretation. The verse runs thus in our translation: "And the Lord shall be King over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name one."

Here it is thought that the truer rendering of the latter part should be thus; *The Lord* (or *Jehovah*) *shall be one, and his name one.* That is, say they, The Lord shall be *one Person.* It is somewhat strange that they do not add likewise, that his name shall be *one thing*, to answer to the other. It requires no great acumen to perceive that the attribute of *one* is applied to *Jehovah* in the same manner as it is to the *name*; and so it is *εἷς*, or *unus*, in the masculine gender, when applied to *Lord*; *ἓν*, or *unum*, in the neuter gender, when applied to *name.* And it is evident that the meaning only is, that as there shall not be many names, but *one* name acknowledged in that day over all the earth; so there shall not be many lords, but *one* Lord, or *one Jehovah*, *one* only received as such. This consideration alone is sufficient to confute the surmise, as if the *Prophet* was here concerned about *Unity of Person*, or intended any thing like it. He certainly meant no more than that the *Jehovah*, who has the sole right of dominion over all, will then appear so in fact, and be received, among his subjects, as the only God and Lord, reigning without a rival. He will be *one*, in opposition to any *different* gods or lords, and acknowledged as one Head, uniting all under him. This is the sense of the place, as is clear from the context^b. For the text is not speaking of what God is in himself, being in that respect always the same; but of what he should be in respect of his *reception* in the world, when he should be generally acknowledged, and have no rival set up in opposition to him. The other construction, which would force *Unity of Person* out of this passage, take it which way we will, is scarce sense. For is it thus? *Jehovah* will in that day become one Person, which he was not before? This is, at first sight, ridiculous. Or, is it that *Jehovah* will then be *acknowledged* to be *one Person*? This is almost as absurd as the other. For, probably, those that did not receive the God of Israel as their God, yet might have thought him to be *one Person*, all along. This was not the point; but they were to acknowledge him so *one*,

^a See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 2. ed. 2. Modest Plea, p. 133.

^b Vid. etiam cap. xiii. ver. 2.

as not to presume to set up any rival power against him. The Prophet had something else at heart than either Unity of *substance*, or *Person*. "Ἐσται Κύριος εἷς: "There shall be one Lord" (as our version rightly renders it) both for Jew and Gentile. The expression is much such another as νόμος εἷς ἔσται, (Numb. ix. 14.) "There shall be one law to him that is homeborn, and "to him that sojourneth among you:" You shall not be under *different* rules or laws, but one and the same shall be for all. In like manner the Prophet predicts that Jew and Gentile shall not have *different* gods or lords, but one and the same God and Lord shall rule over both. Having shewn then that the second interpretation is as groundless as the first,

3. I proceed to lay down the third, which is the true one. *The Lord our God is the sole Lord, or the only God*: in opposition to *gods many*, and *lords many*, whether *supreme* or *inferior*. Thus the Scribe, to whom our Lord spake, and whom he commends as answering so far discreetly, understood it. "There is one "God, and there is none other but he." This shews that *Jehovah* was here equivalent to Θεός, or *God*. Some of the ancient versions, instead of *one Lord*, render it, *one God*: as do also some of the ^c primitive Fathers; none of them (so far as I have observed) either considering *Jehovah* in this place as a proper name of one Person only, or ever bringing this text to prove that God is but *one Person*. This they understood, and this only; that there is but one *God*, one *Lord*, and one *Jehovah*; not two *Gods*, two *Lords*, or two *Jehovahs*.

If it be asked, who, or what Person is intended by "the Lord "our God" in the text, it seems most reasonable and natural to understand it of *God the Father*; not exclusive of, but abstracting from the consideration of, the other two Persons. The Scribe perhaps understood it in the *exclusive* sense; exclusive of all other Persons. Our Lord commends him as answering *discreetly*, in acknowledging one God; but intimates withal, that he was not yet come to perfection: he wanted something further, he was "not far from the kingdom of God." One thing that he wanted was to acknowledge the Son to be God and Lord, as well as the Father: and it is pretty remarkable that both the Evangelists, St. Matthew and St. Mark, after relating this conference of our Saviour with the Scribe, imme-

^c Irenæus, lib. v. cap. 22. p. 319. Cyprian. de Orat. Domin. p. 151, 172. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 1, 2. p. 445, 448. ed. Bened.

diately subjoin the history of our Saviour's putting a question to the Pharisees, how the Messiah could be both David's Son and David's Lord, quoting that passage of Psalm cx. 1. "The Lord said unto my Lord," &c. It is no improbable conjecture of a ^djudicious Father, that our blessed Saviour thereby intended to correct the Jewish construction of Deuteron. vi. 4, and to intimate, as far as was proper at that time, that the Father is not *εἷς Κύριος*, *one Lord*, in such a sense as to exclude the Son, who is also *Κύριος*, or *Lord*, and *tacitly* included, as often as the Father is styled the *only God*, or *Lord*. But it is now time to consider more distinctly and fully the doctrine contained in the text, which I shall endeavour thus :

1. By inquiring, under what *salvos*, and qualifying considerations, we may reasonably understand the general doctrine of God the Father's being the *only true God*, or *Lord*.

2. By considering what we may justly infer from it, and what use we are to make of it.

I. I shall inquire, under what *salvos*, or qualifying considerations, we may reasonably understand the general doctrine of God the Father's being the *only true God*, or *Lord*.

The texts seem, at first view, to exclude all other persons whatever, from being *divine* in the same sense; and also from having any right or title to *religious* worship, or any degree of it. The texts run in the *personal* character; "I am the Lord thy God:" and generally ^ein the *singular* number; *I*, not *we*; or *he*, not *they*. And then the practical doctrine founded thereupon is to pay to that *Person*, not *supreme* worship only, but *all* worship; not our *highest* religious service, but our *whole* religious service; reserving no part nor degree of it to any other. If therefore the doctrine is to be interpreted up to the utmost rigour in both its parts, the *Father* only is God, in any strict or proper sense; and every part and degree of *religious* service is to be paid to him *solely*. But how can we be Christians if we say this? or how is it possible to reconcile it with other plain Scriptures? There must be some abatement, some favourable

^d Dominus ipse præcipuum mandatum legis in *unius Domini* confessione et dilectione docens esse, non suo ad Scribam, sed Prophetæ testimonio usus est, esse *se Dominum*.— Dominum *unum* ita ex lege docens, ut se quoque *Dominum*, Prophetæ

teste, confirmat. *Hilar.* p. 1001.

^e I say *generally*, not always; because there are some instances of plural expressions: Gen. i. 1, 26. iii. 5, 22. xi. 7. xx. 13. xxxv. 7. Deut. iv. 7. Eccl. xii. 1. Jos. xxiv. 19. Isa. vi. 8.

allowance of construction, in one part or other, to make Scripture consistent; and the difficulty is to know where we are to settle this necessary latitude of interpretation, so as neither to do violence to the *letter*, nor defeat the *intent* of the inspired writers. There have been two ways thought on to compromise this matter. I shall mention that first, which is the least likely to do us any service, that I may come with the greater advantage to the other, which will appear to be not only the best, but the only way of reconciling the difficulty, after we have seen that the first will not bear.

1. The first way is to suppose that the words *Lord* and *God* admit of a *higher* and a *lower* sense; so that the texts which declare the Father the *one God*, are to be understood to mean one only *supreme* God, leaving room for *inferior* and *subordinate* gods besides him: and so also worship must be understood to be of two kinds, *sovereign* and *inferior*; and that the *supreme* God claims only *sovereign*, not *all* religious worship to himself.

But against this way of reconciling there appear to be many insuperable objections. It is not only against the *letter*, but the very intent and design of the sacred writings. For, not to mention that Scripture no where tells us of *two true*, i. e. *two adorable*, Gods, or of two religious worships, *sovereign* and *inferior*; the very end and design of all the texts relating to the Unity seems to have been to preclude *inferior* gods, and them especially; there being less danger of men's running into the notion of many *supremes*. Besides the general drift and purport of those texts, there are some particular texts still more express and decisive. "There is no God before me," says the one God, "neither shall there be any after me:" and yet every *inferior* God must be *after* the supreme^f. "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth." Jerem. x. 11. And yet it is never to be supposed that any *inferior* god can be *Creator*, which is the distinguishing character of the one *supreme* God; consequently, every *inferior* god shall *perish* and come to

^f Quis ergo hoc dicit, Pater an Filius? Si Filius, *Ante me*, inquit, *non fuit alius Deus*: Si Pater, *Post me*, inquit, *non erit*: hic priorem, ille posteriorem non habet. *Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 454.*

Εἰ γὰρ Θεὸς μὲν ὁ υἱός, πᾶν δὲ μετὰ

τὸν πατέρα Θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ μὴ μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι ὁ λόγος μαρτύρεται.— Εἰ τις οὖν μετὰ τὸν Θεόν ἔστι, κτίσις τοῦτο, καὶ οὐ Θεὸς, διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων εὐρίσκειται. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. iv. p. 575.*

nothings. Besides, every *inferior* god must of course be supposed a *creature* of the *great God*. But St. Paul has expressly cautioned us against serving the “creature more than (or besides) “the Creator,” and against serving those that “by nature are no “gods.” Further than this, it is as clear as words can make it, that the *great God* has claimed to himself *all* sacrifice, without distinction of *sovereign* and *inferior*, our *whole* religious service and *whole* confidence^h. To suppose the contrary, would have been to leave room for the greatest confusion in worship imaginable, and would not have been the way to root out, but to establish, *idolatry*. Add to this, that the distinction of a twofold sense in the word *God* will not help us out of the difficulty: because we have all the reason in the world to believe that another Person, besides the *Father*, is called *God*, in the same sense, in the same Scriptures; and therefore this solution of the difficulty will not bear; but we must of course look out for another.

2. The other way then is, to suppose that the *exclusive* terms of *one*, *only*, or the like, may admit of some latitude of construction; and that, so long as the full intent and meaning of the declarations of the Unity is in this way answered, all is safe and secure. That this is the very truth of the case, I shall now proceed to shew at large.

God the Father may be, and is, very reasonably and justly styled the *one* or *only* God, without excluding every other Person; particularly, without excluding the *Son* from the one true *Godhead*. It is a rule and maxim, and may be proved by many instances in sacred and profane writings, that *exclusive* terms are not to be interpreted with the utmost rigour, so as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions, such as reason and good sense will easily supply. It may be sometimes needless or impertinent to mention every exception; and often wiser or better not to do it, but to leave them to the intelligent reader.

Thus for instance it is said, “No one knoweth the Father “but the Son, and no one knoweth the Son but the Father.” (Matt. xi. 27.) If we should here interpret the *exclusive* terms with the utmost strictness, it must follow that the Father does not know himself, nor the Son himself. But no man of common

^g See Cudworth’s Comment on this text, p. 545.

^h See my Vindication of Christ’s Divinity, Qu. 16. vol. i. p. 407, &c.

sense can think so of either; and therefore there was no occasion for any further guard or exception.

So again it is said, that "the things of God knoweth no one, "but the Spirit of God," (1 Cor. ii. 11.) as before, (in Matt. xi. 27.) "No one knoweth the Father but the Son." Now, if we understand the *exclusive* terms with the utmost strictness, it must follow from one passage, that the *Holy Ghost* knows more of the Father than the *Son* does; and from the other, that the *Son* knows more of the Father than the *Holy Ghost* does: which are propositions directly repugnant. But the truth is, here was no opposition intended to *Son* or *Holy Ghost* in either place; but to *creatures* only.

In like manner it is said, in the Revelations, of the Son of God, that "he had a name written, that no one (*οὐδείς*) knew, "but he himself;" (Rev. xix. 12.) which, if the *exclusive* term is to be strictly understood, makes the *Father* himself ignorant of what was known to the *Son*.

St. Paul says, "I determined not to know any thing among "you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified," 1 Cor. ii. 2. If this be rigorously interpreted up to the letter, St. Paul must have been contented to be ignorant of God the *Father*, and of many the most important articles of the Christian religion. But it is obvious to common sense, that such expressions are to be qualified both from the reason of the thing, and from other Scriptures. These instances are sufficient to shew that *exclusive* terms may, and in several cases must, admit of a favourable construction. Now to come to the point in hand. I shall first shew, directly and plainly, that God the Son was not intended to be excluded at all, by the texts which proclaim the Father the *one God*; and next, give some reasons why there was no occasion to make any particular exception or *salvo*, on that account; or why it was better not to do it. First, let us compare texts with texts.

Isa. xlv. 24. we read thus: "I am the Lord that maketh all "things; that stretcheth forth the heavens *alone*, and spreadeth "abroad the earth by myself." Now here, according to the rigour of construction, one should suppose the Father (if it is indeed to be understood of the *Father*) to have been *by himself* when he made the world, and that no other Person had any hand in creating, or was so much as with him when he did it. And yet certain it is from other Scriptures, as I have shewn

formerly, that God the Son was not only with him, but assisted also in the work of creation. But it was needless for the Prophet to take any notice of the *Son's* concern in it, while he was only considering the *true God* in opposition to *other gods*; besides that the time was not yet come for the distinct and clear revelation of *God the Son*. So again we find it said, probably in respect of the Father, "Thou only knowest the hearts of all the children of men," (1 Kings viii. 39.) and it is not said, Thou only knowest *originally*, or in the most *perfect* manner, but, Thou only *knowest*, simply and absolutely. And yet evident it is, from other places of Scripture, that not the *Father* only, but the *Son* also must then have known the hearts of all the children of menⁱ; and it may be certainly inferred from his being *Creator* of all men from the beginning.

We read (Ps. lxxxiii. 18.) "Thou, whose name alone is *Jehovah*," supposed to be meant of God the Father. If the exclusive term is there to be rigorously understood, no other Person but the Father has the title or name of *Jehovah*. And yet certain it is, from other Scriptures, that the *Son* is *another* Person, and that the name *Jehovah* is also his name. But it was needless, or would have been foreign, to have inserted any particular caution or exception, while the Psalmist was considering only the true God, in opposition to other gods, or to the gods of the nations. God the Father (probably) says, Isai. xliii. 11, "I, even I, am the Lord, and besides me there is no Saviour." And yet no man of sense that reads the Bible can believe, that the intent was to exclude our *blessed Saviour* from being *properly* such, as well as the Father. It is said also, (Isa. ii. 11, 17.) that "the Lord *alone* shall be exalted in that day." Suppose this be meant of God the *Father*; yet no one, who considers either the context, or reason of the thing, or other Scriptures, can imagine that this was designed to exclude *God the Son* from being *exalted*; or that it was intended in opposition to any thing but *idols* in particular, or *creatures* in general. It would be easy to illustrate this matter by more examples of the like nature: but these already given are, I am persuaded, sufficient to shew that, whether it be said that *the Father is the only God*, or whether it were said that *the Father only is God*, (which expression would be stronger,) the exclusive term *only* need not be supposed to

ⁱ John ii. 24. xvi. 30. Acts i. 24. Heb. iv. 12. Rev. ii. 3.

affect the Son at all; but he may still be tacitly understood: and there was no necessity for any express caution in the case, the reason of the thing sufficiently shewing it afterwards. When therefore we read of the Father's being the *one God*, we are to understand it of the Father *singly*, not *exclusively*; of the *Father*, but in conjunction still with the Son: not that we mean by the term *Father*, both Father and Son, but we consider the Father singly, in such cases, abstracting from the consideration of God the Son, not excluding him from partaking of the same Godhead. This then appears to be matter of fact, that God the Son is not excluded, but always *tacitly* understood in those expressions of the *Unity*, which we meet with in Scripture. The same is true of any other expressions of the like nature, as if the Father be said to be the *alone good*, the *only wise*, the *only potentate*, or *only having immortality*; they are not intended in opposition to God the Son, or Holy Ghost, (who being so nearly allied to, so much one with the Father, are *tacitly* to be understood as partaking of every perfection which is ascribed to the Father,) but in opposition to *creatures*, or *other gods*; in opposition to every thing *extra Patrem*, every thing not contained in him, or not inseparably included with him. This I observe, on supposition that those texts are meant of the *Father*: but perhaps the word *God* in those places is to be understood in the *indefinite* sense, abstracting from the particular consideration of *this* or *that* person; in like manner as the word *man* often stands, not for any particular *human* person, but the whole species, or *human nature*: *man* is *frail*, *man* is *mortal*, or the like. I say the word *God* may be thus understood; and since the doctrine of the Trinity is demonstrable from other Scriptures, we have great reason to believe that this is the true and real meaning of the word *God*, as often as the context or other circumstances do not confine its signification and intent to one Person only. It remains now only to account for the manner of speaking. For it may be asked, why, when it is said, suppose by the Father, "I am the Lord, and there is none else," it may be asked why there might not have been added, *except my Son and Holy Spirit*, or some other saving clause of like kind? To this it may be answered,

1. That it was needless.

2. That it might have been hurtful.

1. It was needless. None of those declarations concerning

the *unity of God*, and the worship due to *God* alone, were made at the beginning, or before *idolatry* was grown into practice. Their intent and design was to be a remedy against it, and to root it out of the world. Those declarations were then so understood, as it was intended they should be, in opposition to all *other gods*, all that were plainly *opposite* to, or *different* from, the one *God* of Israel. Thus the end of them was fully answered; and there was no occasion explicitly to mention the Person of the *Son*, before the proper time came to reveal his distinct Person and character fully and clearly to the world. After he was come, it was still as needless to insert any such saving clauses; because the revealing his nature, and character, and personal perfections, was equivalent thereto, and were interpretatively so many qualifying clauses or exceptions; the reason of the thing shewing that he must be supposed as included always, without any *special* proviso for it. Thus, for instance, if the Father claims all worship, homage, and adoration to himself, because *Jehovah*, because *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; and if it appears afterwards, that the Son also is *Jehovah*, *Creator*, *Sustainer*, and *Preserver* of all things; it is manifest that the worship of the Son comes within the reason, intent, and letter of the law about *worship*; and therefore it cannot, by any man of sense, be supposed to exclude him from it. There is no need of any *special salvo* to include a person, whom parity of reason shews to be included of course. So if it is said, that the Father is the only *God* or *Lord*, without any express caution or *salvo*, we might be apt to think it somewhat strange to hear of any other person who is *God* and *Lord* also: but when we find that this other Person is so nearly related, as a *Son* to a *Father*; that he and his Father *are one*; that he who has *seen* one has therein *seen* the other also; that he is in the *bosom* of the Father, and as intimate to him as *thought* to the *mind*; that all things which the Father hath are the Son's; and that what things soever the Father doth, those also doth the Son likewise; when we find them represented as "one temple," (Rev. xxi. 22.) and as having but "one throne," (Rev. xxii. 1.) and making "one light," (Rev. xxi. 23.) and that he is in the Father, and the Father in him; when we observe the same titles, the same operations, the same attributes, the same glory, &c. ascribed to both in holy Scripture: when these and the like considerations have been duly weighed, must it not look

strangely impertinent to demand any exception, or *special salvo*, as often as the Father is styled the *only God*? The Scriptures suppose men to have the use of their reason, and that therefore there was no need to make express mention of the Son, whenever the Father is declared to be the *only God*; Father and Son being so much *one*, that asserting it of either is implicitly asserting the same of both^k. And hence it may appear,

2. That particular exceptions and cautions in this case were not only needless, but might have been hurtful. Had the *first commandment* run thus; Thou shalt have no other gods besides me, *except my Son*, it had been plainly making the Son *another God*^l, which was not the intent of Scripture, nor suitable to the truth and reason of the thing. The union and intimacy between Father and Son is such, that they are not *two Gods*, but *one God*. This was the *idea* which Scripture was to insinuate along with the distinction of Persons, and which it has every where carefully kept up. What may be thought an *omission* in the case, is really an *advantage*; and the want of an exception in respect of *God the Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, is an argument to us that their unity is too strict and intimate to admit of it. A late^m writer upon these words in Deuteronomy, "I, even I, am he, and there "is no God with me," (Deut. xxxii. 39,) observes, that it is not said, *except it be in the same essence*, but absolutely, *there is no God*. He might have observed also, that it is not said, *except it be in subordination to me*, or, *except such inferior gods as are by my appointment*; but absolutely, *there is no God*. To answer more directly: it is very true that Scripture has not mentioned any such exception, because it would have been improper, not to say absurd, to do it. The design was to teach us that there is *no other God*, besides the God of Israel. Had he said there is no other God, *except it be in the same essence*, it had been the same as to say, there is no other God, *except one*, who is not *another God*. But the objector here supposes that two divine Persons in the same essence are *two Gods*, which is supposing

^k Εἰ τις ἓνα λέγοι Θεόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δίχα τοῦ ἰδίου γεννήματος ἐννοήσει ποτέ τὸν πατέρα, οὔτε μὲν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προχουμένου πνεύματος, ὃ καὶ ἐστὶν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ εἰπὼν ἄνθρωπον, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως διαμεμνήσεται καὶ τῶν ἐνότων οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῷ ἃ προσπεφυκότα μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἀποτελεῖ, οὐκ ἐνότα δέ,

οὐκέτι· κατὰ τὸν Ἰσον, &c. Cyril. Alex. contr. Julian. lib. viii. p. 264.

^l Atquin si nominasset illum, separasset, ita dicens, Alius præter me non est, nisi Filius meus. Alium enim etiam Filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Tert. Praez. cap. xviii.

^m Modest Plea, &c. p. 133.

the thing in question. The contrary appears from this very text. For let us admit that it was said, in the person of the Father, "I, even I, am he, and there is no God with me:" it is certain that God the Son was then *with* him, and that he was *God* before the foundation of the world, John i. 1. And yet there was *no God*, that is, no *other* God with him, as appears from this text: consequently the Son is not *another* God, but the same God; and therefore two divine Persons having the same essence, (as we are able to prove those two to have,) are not two Gods, but one God.

I have hitherto been observing the Scripture-manner of speaking in this article of the *unity*, and have shewn how easy it is to account for it upon Catholic principles. I shall just take notice further, that the primitive writers of the Church follow the same style exactly. We shall frequently find them giving the title of *one* or *only* God, to the *Father*, in such a manner, that if we looked no further, we might be apt to imagine that they thought of no other person's being God but the *Father*. And yet perhaps, within a few pages or lines, we shall meet with as full and strong expressions of the *divinity* of the Son, as any are, or can be; that he is *God*, *true God*, *God of the Jews*, and the like. These seeming contrarieties they sometimes leave without any guard or explication, presuming that no Christian, who had been but tolerably instructed, could mistake the meaning. At other times, upon occasion, they are more particular and explicit, shewing how reconcilable and perfectly consistent with each other, these things are. They give us to understand that the *exclusive* terms affect not the Son at all; that they are often meant in opposition to *idols* only; that at the most they exclude only *other* gods, and not the *Son*, who is the *same* and ⁿnot *another* God, nor indeed *another* Person in such a sense as *separate divided* persons are *other* persons. They are *distinct* only, not *separate*; and therefore, in a qualified sense, the Son is very *self* of the Father, as Irenæus expresses it, and as later Fathers, ἄλλος ἑαυτὸς, *alter idem*, or *alius idem*, an-

ⁿ Igitur unus Deus Pater, et *alius* absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens, non Filium negat, sed *alium Deum*. Cæterum *alius* a Patre Filius non est. *Tert. contr. Præx.* cap. xviii. p. 510.

Non ergo *alius* erat qui cognosce-

batur, et *alius* qui dicebat, *Nemo cognoscit Patrem*; sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipiens testimonium, quoniam vere homo, et vere Deus. *Iren.* p. 234, 235.

other self, another same; distinct and yet not different, one with the Father, and undivided from him. From these and the like hints and illustrations, we easily understand what either the ancient creeds or primitive Church-writers mean by styling the Father, the *one*, or *only* God^o; a title which they sometimes apply to the *Son* also, but seldom, and sparingly. The reason is this: the Father is, as it were, the top of Unity, the head and fountain of all: he is first in our conception of God, and therefore whether we speak of the *almighty* God, or the *eternal* God, or the *all-knowing* God, (and the reason is the same for the *only* God, *unity* being an attribute of the Godhead like *omnipotence*, *eternity*, &c.) we primarily and principally mean the *Father*, tacitly including the other two Persons.

This is more decent, proper, and suitable, than to have fixed these names, titles, or attributes principally upon either of the other two Persons, tacitly including the *Father*. The nature of language and customary way of speaking required that they should be thus generally fixed upon one of the Persons, and we are directed to which by the very name of *Father*, denoting some kind of *priority* of *order*, such as we cannot perfectly understand; but a confuse, general perception of it, is sufficient to all the purposes of faith or worship. In strictness, the *one God* is the whole *Trinity*: but we must be content to speak as the customary use of language will bear. Our *ideas* of *person* are plainly taken from our conceptions of *human* persons, and from them transferred to other subjects, though they do not strictly answer in every circumstance. Properly speaking, *he* and *him* are no more applicable to a *divine* Person, than *she* or

^o It is worth observing, how little stress the *ancients* laid upon the *exclusive* terms.

Clemens Alex. calls the Son the *only* Judge, p. 99. and *only* God, p. 84.

Origen calls the *Son* the *only* Lord. *Contr. Cels.* p. 389.

Cyril of Jerusalem calls him the *only* King, p. 223.

Eusebius understands, Psal. lxxxvi.

10. "God alone," &c. and Isa. xlv. 24. where it is said, that "he stretcheth forth the heavens ALONE," of God the Son.

Baruch iii. 35. "This is our God, and there shall none other be ac-

counted of in comparison of him," is by Cyprian (*Test.* lib. ii. cap. 6.) and by Lactantius (*Epit.* p. 116.) understood of God the Son: as it is also by the later Fathers in general.

Micah vii. 18. "Who is a God like unto thee?" &c. is also by early writers understood of God the Son.

So also Isa. xlv. 6. and Isa. xlv. 14, 15. See my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 291, &c.

Now had the *ancients* acknowledged any such force of the *exclusive* terms, as is insisted on by some *moderns*, the *Father* himself must have been thereby excluded from being *Judge*, *Lord*, *King*, or *God*.

her: but we have no *third* way of denoting a person; and so of the two, we choose the best, and custom familiarizes it to us. In like manner, when we would speak of *God*, we have but three ways of expressing our thoughts, and none of them without some inconvenience. To say *it*, or *that*, meaning that thing or substance, would sound low and flat; and it is the way of speaking which we have, in a manner, appropriated to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings. To say *he*, or *him*, ordinarily^p carries in it the *idea* of *one Person* only, and is therefore inconvenient on that account, as not taking in all that we apprehend of the one true God. To say *they*, or *them*, would appear as if the Persons were *divided* and *separate*, like other persons, and might sound as if the three Persons were *three gods*. Of those three ways, the best and least offensive is that which has been generally taken, as well in Scripture, as in ecclesiastical writings: which is to say, *he*, or *him*, speaking of God, and meaning it of *one Person*, principally, yet not *excluding*, but *tacitly* comprehending the other two, as partakers of the same Godhead. And since it was thus necessary to fix upon *one Person*, who should be *primarily* considered as God, it must of course be the *Father*, who revealed his own *Person* first to the world, and was known under that character before either the *Son* or *Holy Ghost* were distinctly and fully revealed; who has still the character of *Father*, as Head and Fountain of all, and is generally first in our conception, when we speak of *God* absolutely, without particularly specifying any Person of the Godhead. Yet I must observe to you, that it is far from being certain that the *Father*, or any particular Person, is always meant, whenever the word *God* is used absolutely in Scripture. For,

^p I say *ordinarily*, not constantly: and therefore the argument drawn from the *personal* characters, *I*, *thou*, *thee*, *he*, *him*, applied to God, is very weak and inconclusive against a *plurality* of Persons. We often find in Scripture the *Personal* characters of *thou*, *thee*, *he*, *him*, applied to a whole *family*, *tribe*, or *people*, collectively considered; (see Exod. xiii. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13. Numb. xxii. 5, 6. xxiii. 9. Deut. i. 21, 31. iv. 9, 10. xi. 15. xviii. 2. Josh. xvii. 15. 1 Sam. xv. 3.) and at other times we find some things applied to the *head* of a family, which belong not strictly to him alone, but to him and his whole seed. (See Gen.

xii. 2, 3. xiii. 17. xviii. 18. xlviii. 19. 20. xlix. 4, 8, &c.) Why then may not the like expressions be used of God the Father, the head and fountain of the other two divine Persons, which yet strictly are not to be understood of *him alone*, but of *him considered with his Son and Holy Spirit*, who are infinitely more united to him, than any earthly progeny is, or can be, to their head?

This argument is *a fortiori*, and there is more than *parity of reason* to be pleaded in favour of this manner of speaking, with relation to the Persons of the *undivided Trinity*.

as I before hinted, no good reason can be given why the word *God* may not be used in a large indefinite sense, not denoting any particular Person, just as the word *man* is often used in Scripture, not denoting any particular man, but man in general, or man indefinitely. (Gen. vi. 3, 7. viii. 21. ix. 6. Deut. viii. 3. 1 Sam. xvi. 7. Job iv. 17. v. 7. Psalm lvi. 11. lxxviii. 25. xc. 3. cxviii. 6, 8. Hos. xi. 9. Matt. iv. 4. Luke iv. 4. xviii. 4. 1 Thess. iv. 8. 1 Tim. ii. 5. Tit. iii. 4.) As the word *man* sometimes stands for the whole *species*; sometimes indefinitely for any *individual* of the species, without determining which, and sometimes for this or that particular man: so, by way of analogy, or imperfect resemblance, the word *God* may sometimes signify all the divine Persons; sometimes any Person of the three indefinitely, without determining which; and sometimes one particular Person, either Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. From what hath been said, I am willing to hope we may now sufficiently understand in what sense, and under what restrictions, the Father is set forth in Scripture or antiquity, as the *one or only God*. I proceed now,

II. To consider what we may reasonably and fairly infer from the Scripture-declarations of the *unity*. Of this very briefly; that I may not trespass (as I fear I already have) too long upon your patience.

1. We may certainly infer from them, that they absolutely exclude all *rival or anti-gods*, set up in opposition to God the Father; consequently all *idols*, and all the *gods* of the *heathen nations*.

2. We may further infer, that they do as certainly exclude all such gods as the Marcionites, or others, pretended to be besides, or superior to, the Creator and God of Israel.

3. We may also reasonably infer, that they exclude all things or persons whatsoever, that are *separate* from, or *aliene* to; that are not necessarily included in, and comprehended with, God the Father: briefly, they exclude all *other gods*; consequently they exclude all *creatures*: for since all *creatures* are *posterior* in time, and *different* in nature, they are *adventitious* and *extraneous*; they are not *necessarily* included in God the Father; he was without them, and may be again, if he pleases: if they are *gods* in any sense, they are *other gods*, not the *same god* with God the Father; and so stand excluded from having the name or title of *God*, in any *proper* or *religious* sense; and from receiving any

kind, part, or degree of our *religious* homage, worship, or adoration. Socinians and Arians have split upon this absurdity, supposing the Son to be a *creature* only, and yet receiving him as God, *another God* besides the Father; which is *Polytheism* and *Gentilism*, condemned by Scripture, and all Catholic antiquity. The Arians, ancient and modern, have appeared so sensible of it, that they never durst openly profess it; being reduced to this hard and truly pitiable case, to receive, in reality, into their *creed*, what they are ashamed to express in *terms*⁹.

They are used to insist much upon the force of the *exclusive* terms, when they have a mind to exclude the *Person* of the Son from being *one God* with the Father. But they entirely forget that the *exclusive* terms have any force at all, when they imagine that they do not so much as exclude *creatures* from being gods, but leave room for *other* gods, for *two gods*, or *three gods*, and as many objects of worship. Thus they appear to “strain at a gnat” while they can “swallow a camel;” and use arguments against the Catholics, which recoil more strongly upon themselves. They are forced, in their turn^r, to plead that the *exclusive* terms are intended chiefly in opposition to *idols* and *false-gods*; and that they do not exclude *Christ* from being *true God*, and true object of worship: which is unsaying all that they had before asserted, and is unravelling their own argument, so far as concerns the bare necessary force of the *exclusive* terms. For if they do not exclude *creatures* (*strangers* and *aliens*, in comparison) from being *true gods*, much less can they be supposed necessarily to exclude God’s own Son, of the same nature, and duration, and perfections with himself, (if the thing be possible,) from being *true God* with him, and *one God* with him. This then must be argued from other topics, and not

^p Consequens est, inquam, ut aut non colatis Christum, aut non *unum* Deum colatis, sed *duos*. Ad hoc tu respondere conatus, multum quidem locutus es, asserens quod et Christum *Deum* colatis: sed *duos Deos* a vobis coli, quamvis non negaveris, tamen non ausus es confiteri. Sensisti enim, *duos Deos esse colendos*, Christianas aures ferre non posse. O quam de proximo te corrigeres, si timeres *credere* quod *dicere* timuisti! cum enim clamet Apostolus, “corde

“ creditur ad justitiam, ore confessio “ fiat ad salutem:” si *ad justitiam* putes pertinere quod *credis*, cur hoc *ad salutem* etiam ore non *confiteris*? Si autem *duos Deos* colendos *ad salutem* non pertinet *confiteri*, sine dubio nec *ad justitiam* pertinet *credere*. Vid. *Augustin. contr. Maxim. lib. i. p. 677, 678.*

^r See Clarke’s Reply, p. 50. 69. Vid. et Crell. de uno Deo Patre, sect. i. cap. 1.

from any supposed necessary force of the *exclusive* terms. To conclude, we may observe that Scripture and antiquity often tell us of God and God, but never of *two Gods*; Creator and Creator, but never *two Creators*; Saviour and Saviour, but never *two Saviours*; Lord and Lord, but never *two Lords*; Judge and Judge, but never *two Judges*; King and King, but never *two Kings*. These things are easily accounted for upon Catholic principles; Father and Son are *one Creator, one Saviour, one Lord, one Judge, one King, and one God*, because their operations, attributes, powers, and perfections (and consequently the substance of both) are one. “To Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, all honour and “glory be now and for ever.” Amen.

*Christ's Divinity proved from his Coequality with
the Father :*

OR

EQUALITY OF CHRIST

WITH THE FATHER.

The fifth Sermon preached January 6, 17 $\frac{1}{2}$.

PHIL. ii. 5—11.

Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

THERE have been great disputes between the Catholics and Arians about this passage; both sides claiming it as their own, and as directly favouring their respective principles. They have neither of them been content to be on the *defensive* only, in respect of this, as in several other texts; but, interpreting the words differently, and taking them under contrary views, they urge them against each other, and appeal to them as *decisive* both ways, according to their respective tenets and persuasions.

My design is to inquire carefully into the meaning of so remarkable a passage, and to fix it, where it ought to lie, on the Catholic side. It will be proper to take along with us the scope and intent of the Apostle in it, as a sure mark to direct us to the true and genuine sense of it. The two verses immediately preceding those of the text run thus: "Let nothing be done through strife or vain-glory; but in lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves. Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others." Then follows; "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus," &c. The Apostle proposes Christ as a perfect pattern and example of the virtue or virtues which he had been recommending. And what were they? Humility, modesty, philanthropy, in opposition to vain-glory, ostentation, and self-seeking. He exhorts the Philippians to good nature and tenderness, to wave all little niceties and punctilios of ceremony, and to be willing to sacrifice their reputation or honour, upon occasion, to the glory of God and the good of others. Thus far by way of preliminary. Now let us proceed to the instance given, as a powerful motive to incite them to put on that happy temper of mind. It is the example of Christ Jesus: "Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant," and so on. Here, every word almost will require a minute and particular discussion. We must therefore be content to advance slowly, that we may clear our way as we go, and at length sum up the whole in a short paraphrase, concluding with a few brief observations upon it. And this is all the order, or method, that I propose to observe in my following discourse.

I begin with the words, "Who being in the form of God." *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*. We do not meet with this phrase elsewhere in Scripture. But there are two passages, one in the Epistle to the Colossians, the other in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which are near akin to it, and may help to direct us to the true sense of it. Our blessed Lord is by our Apostle styled the "image of the invisible God." (Coloss. i. 15.) There is not much difference between *εἰκὼν* and *μορφῆ*, betwixt *image* and *form*: and therefore, probably, the Apostle might intend the same thing by being "in the form of God," and being "the image of the invisible God." Now, as to the meaning of Christ's being the

“image of the invisible God,” it is well explained by the words immediately there following: *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*: “born (or begotten) before every creature:” that is, as he was “Son of God,” before the creation of the world. Thus was he the “image of God,” bearing his figure and resemblance, as truly, fully, and perfectly, as a “son of man” has all the features, “lineaments, and perfections belonging to the nature of man.” And thus *antiquity* ^a has constantly understood Christ to be the “image of God,” as he is God’s *Son*. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. i. we find our blessed Lord described under the character of *Son of God*, and “heir of all things, by whom *God* “made the worlds,” ver. 2. And immediately after, he is said to be the *ἀπαύγασμα*, the *shining forth* of his Father’s *glory*, and the “express image of his person,” as we render it; or, as others think the more probable construction to be, *of his substance* ^b. This is a further confirmation, that those expressions of *image* or *form* of God relate to Christ’s *sonship* or *filiation*, whereby he is, as it were, the exact copy or resemblance of God the Father, in respect of his divine nature, being as truly *God of God*, in that capacity, as he is *man of man* in another. Thus, as before said, the Ante-Nicene as well as Post-Nicene writers understood the *phrases* of Christ’s being the *image of God*, and *express image of his hypostasis*: and not only so, but the very words of the text, his being “in the form of God,” were by them ^c believed to sig-

^a In effigie et imagine, qua *Filius* Patris, vere Dei prædicatus est. *Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. v. cap. 20. p. 486.*

Εἰ ἔστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ἀόρατος εἰκὼν—τῆς ἀκατονομάστου, καὶ ἀφθέγκτου ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκὼν, ὁ χαρακτήρ, λόγος, &c. *Origen. apud Athan. tom. i. p. 233.*

Τῆν πατρικὴν ἐμφέρειαν ἀκριβῶς πέφυκε σὼξεν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, τὴν κατὰ πάντα ὁμοιότητα αὐτοῦ ἐκ φύσεως ἀπομαξάμενος, καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς τυγχάνων, καὶ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου ἔκτυπος χαρακτήρ. *Alexand. Theod. E. H. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 15.*

As to Post-Nicene writers, see Petavius, who has collected their testimonies, and who gives his judgment of all in these words:

Porro ex vi et nativa conditione productionis suæ hoc imaginem habere, ut auctorem representet: adeoque *Ver-*

bum εἰκόνα, et imaginem ideo nominari, quoniam ita procedit a Patre, ut eum necessario exprimat, antiqui omnes Theologi demonstrant; qui *imaginem* dici *Verbum Dei* asserunt, *quatenus a Patre gignitur*. *Petav. de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 5. p. 326.*

^b Vide Petav. de Trin. lib. vi. cap. 6. per totum.

Τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπαύγασμα καὶ χαρακτήρ. *Origen. contr. Cels. p. 342.*

Compare the parallel expressions in the apocryphal book of Wisdom.

Ἄτμεις τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής Ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς αἰδίου ἔσοπτον ἀκηλίδωτον τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. *Cap. vii. ver. 25, 26.*

^c Æque non erit *Deus* Christus vere, si nec homo vere fuit *in effigie* hominis constitutus—quod si in effigie et imagine, qua *Filius Patris*, vere

nify his being *God*, or *God of God*, or *Son of God*; all amounting to the same thing. This construction agrees also perfectly well with the context, which no other does. Nor the phrase of *μορφὴν δούλου λαβὼν*, “taking upon him the form of a servant,” is plainly meant of his taking upon him *human nature*, becoming thereby a *servant* of God in that capacity. The Apostle himself interprets the “form of a servant” by the word immediately following, *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*, that is, being *made in the likeness of man*; which is the same with being *really and truly* man: being in the *form of man*, as Son of man, in like manner as he was before said to have been in the *form of God*, as Son of God. The “ancients have constantly interpreted the “form of a servant” in the sense which I have mentioned. *Human nature* was that “form of a servant” which our Lord assumed, and he became a servant by becoming man. The construction then now given of the words, *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, being agreeable to the context, as well as to the literal grammatical signification of the words; and being besides countenanced by parallel places of Scripture, and received by the ancients in general, it is certainly preferable to any other: and we need not look out further for a meaning, when we have so great reason to believe that this is the true and the only true one that can be assigned. Yet I must not conceal from you, that there is another interpretation, which has been taken up of late, and much contended for by some of the Arian persuasion. I must observe to you, in the way of preliminary, that all the appearances of God, under the Old Testament, were supposed by the ancients to have been in and by God the Son. It was he that called himself God of

Dei prædicatus est, etiam in effigie et imagine hominis, qua *Filius hominis*, vere hominem inventum. *Tertul. contr. Marc.* lib. v. cap. 20. p. 486.

Ὁ μονογενὴς τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, Θεὸς ἰπάρχων ἐκ Θεοῦ, κεκένωκεν ἑαυτὸν, &c. *Hippolytus*, vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric. ed.

Θεὸς μὲν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ. *Conc. Antioch. Labb.* vol. i. p. 848.

Ἡ δὲ μορφὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος μετ’ αὐτοῦ Θεός, καὶ υἱὸς Θεοῦ. *Dionys. Alex. contr. Paul. Samosat.* p. 853. Labb.

Quamvis esset in *forma Dei*, non est rapinam arbitratus æqualem se Deo esse. *Quamvis enim se ex Deo*

Patre Deum esse meminisset, nunquam, &c. *Novat. de Trin.* c. 17.

Ipse a Patre exaltatus sit, quia se in terris *Sermo* et *Virtus*, et *Sapientia* Dei Patris humiliavit. *Cypr. de Unitat. Eccl.* p. 118. ed. Ox.

The sentiments of Post-Nicene Fathers are well known, and need not be mentioned.

^d Herm. Pastor. *Simil.* v. cap. 2. Clem. Alexandr. p. 251. Origen. in *Joh.* p. 34. Hippolyt. vol. ii. p. 2, 3, 29. Novat. cap. 17. Euseb. in *Psalm.* p. 616. Hilar. in *Psalm.* pag. 325. ed. Bened. Athanas. *Orat.* i. p. 447. ed. Bened. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 322. ed. Ox.

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and all along headed and conducted the people of the Jews. This notion, so far, is just, and the fact true, and it is of very good use against the Socinians especially; and, I may add, against the Arians also, when rightly understood. But some amongst us, mistaking this matter, have been pleased to speak of those appearances, or transactions, of the Son of God, as being little more than what any *angel* or *archangel* might have been capable of sustaining. They call it *personating* God, acting *in his name*, and speaking his words. And thus they understand that our Lord was, before his incarnation, *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*, “in the form of God,” being God’s *legate*, *vicegerent*, or *representative*. But against this there lie these following objections :

1. That this construction of *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ* is perfectly *precarious*. They cannot name any ancient Catholic writer that ever so understood it, nor bring any parallel text of Scripture to countenance it.

2. In the next place, the very supposition itself of Christ’s *personating* God, in any such low sense, is a mere fancy and fiction, unsupported by Scripture or Catholic antiquity. The primitive writers who speak of it understood that our blessed Lord did not barely *personate* God, but was himself *really* God, and spoke in his *own* name, as well as the *Father’s*; being himself Lord and God, &c. as coeternal and coessential Son of the Father^e. So that this interpretation of “form of God,” so far as there is any thing of truth in it, will at length resolve into the very same which I have before given.

3. Admitting (but not granting) that God the Son *personated* the Father in any such low sense as is pretended, (though our adversaries cannot shew that he ever said, *I am God the Father*, as he might have said upon their *hypothesis*, which is worth observing,) yet that cannot be the meaning of *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ* in the text; for this plain reason: because St. Paul going about to magnify the great condescension of God the Son, from the highest pinnacle of glory (if I may so speak) to the lowest instance of contempt and ignominy, would certainly begin with the mention of what he was in his highest capacity. Now his *personating* the Father is nothing so honourable a circumstance,

^e See my Defence, &c. vol. i. Query ii. p. 295, &c.

as what St. John speaks of in the first chapter of his Gospel, or what St. Paul himself has observed. (Coloss. i. 15, 16.) His being *God* from the beginning, and *maker of the world*, are of much higher import than *personating* God, which any angel might do, in such a low sense as is here pretended. If then the *Apostle's* argument did require that he should begin with the highest instance of perfection belonging to the Son, and if there be really a *higher* than is contained in this circumstance of *personating* God, (supposing it any thing more than a fiction,) it is a demonstration that St. Paul did not intend ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ (“in the form of God”) in any such low sense, as would only lessen the miracle of Christ's condescension, and weaken the force of the *Apostle's* argument. So much for this. Having settled the meaning of the phrase ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ, signifying as much as *God of God*, or essentially *divine*, we may next proceed to the following words: “thought it not robbery to be equal with God.”

The phrase, οὐχ ἄρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο, occurs not any where else in Scripture, nor, so far as I can find, in any profane writer; (for there is a difference between ἄρπαγμα and ἄρπαγμός^f;) so that all the light we can have into it must be from the grammatical meaning of the word, and from ancient versions, and from ecclesiastical writers, and the context. Our translators have rendered the words *literally*, and indeed very justly. It will not however be amiss to inquire what may be fairly pleaded for their interpretation. “Thought it not robbery to be equal with God.” The ancientest versions of the New Testament favour this rendering; the Greek and Latin Fathers, from the fourth century downwards, do as plainly countenance it. Nay, Tertullian^g, of the second or third century, seems to have understood it in the same sense. The words will, in strict *propriety*, bear it; and not only so, but more naturally and properly than any other. Let us then put the sense together, and see how it will stand. “Who being Son of God, and therefore essentially God, *thought it not robbery*, that is, knew that he did not wrongfully or unreasonably assume to be equal

^f Vid. Wooton. Præfat. ad Clem. Rom. p. 187.

^g Sermo enim Deus, qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit pariari Deo. Tertull. p. 329.

Deus erat Sermo—Hic certe est qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit esse se æqualem Deo. Ibid. p. 504.

“with God: but, notwithstanding, was pleased to *make* himself “of no reputation,” &c. The Apostle having before told us that the Son was really God (which I have shewn to be the meaning of “being in the form of God”) might very justly add, that he was “equal with God;” which is only explanatory of what he had said, and more emphatically expressing the dignity and majesty of that Person, whose condescension he was going to illustrate. The phrase, εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, admits of no construction so naturally as this, “to be equal with God^h.” The force of it lies in the word εἶναι. For, whatever instances may be brought of the use of the word ἴσα, it can never be shewn that εἶναι ἴσα signifies any thing so naturally as to be *equal to*, or *equal with*. What confirms this construction is, that the ancients frequently infer the *equality* of the Son with the Father, from his being the “Son of God,” or the “image of God;” either of which comes to the same sense with St. Paul’s “form of God.” And why might not St. Paul make the same just inference from the same premises, since it flows so naturally from them, and was very pertinent to the argument on which he was treating? The most considerable objection against it is from the particle ἀλλὰ, following after; which some think should rather have been ἀλλ’ ὅμως, or the like. But this piece of criticism is easily got over: it is frequent^k for the sacred writers to have the word ἀλλὰ instead of ἀλλ’ ὅμως, signifying *however*, or *nevertheless*: and so indeed our translators should have rendered it here, agreeably to their rendering of the words preceding. I shall give two or three instances out of St. Paul’s own writings. 1 Cor. ix. 12. “If others be partakers of this power over you, “are not we rather? Nevertheless” (ἀλλὰ in the Greek) “we “have not used this power.” So again, Rom. v. 13, 14. “Sin “is not imputed when there is no law: nevertheless” (ἀλλὰ

^h See Pearson on the Creed, Art. II. p. 123.

ⁱ Et bene qui dixit ipsum immensum Patrem in Filio mensuratum: mensura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 4. p. 231.

Ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεός, ὁ τῷ Δεσπότη τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθεῖς: ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 86. ed. Ox.

Ἰν’ εἰκὼν αὐτὸς τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει σώζη τὴν

εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς: οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ’ ἦν εἶναι σύμμετρον (ἰν’ οὕτως ὀνομάσω) καὶ καλὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ, μὴ καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους παριστάσαν τὴν εἰκόνα. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 323.

^k Gen. xl. 15. 2 Chron. xxx. 11. Isa. xlix. 15. Matth. xxiv. 6. Mark ix. 13, 22. x. 43. xiii. 7, 20, 24. xiv. 29, 36. Luke xvi. 30. xxi. 9. Joh. xi. 11, 16. xvi. 7. Acts vii. 47. 2 Cor. v. 16. vii. 6. xii. 16. Coloss. ii. 5. 2 Tim. i. 12. 2 Pet. iii. 14. 1 Tim. i. 16. Rev. ii. 4, 6.

again) "death reigned from Adam to Moses." There is therefore no sufficient ground for laying aside this construction on account of the *particle*; which may, and often does, signify the same as *nevertheless, howbeit, notwithstanding, &c.* Thus far I have been pleading for that sense of the words which appears in our English version. The sum of the plea is, that it is *literal* and *grammatical*; agrees with the oldest versions; is countenanced by Tertullian in the beginning of the third century, and by the Catholic Fathers in general¹ after the Nicene Council; is very pertinent to the Apostle's argument, and there is no objection of weight from the context against it. If this construction be admitted, the Apostle's reasoning so far, will run thus: "Who being essentially God, as Son of God, knew that he was rightfully and naturally *equal* with God, and could not be said to usurp or arrogate in respect to what was his *own*. Nevertheless he made himself of no *reputation*, appearing and acting much below his dignity, taking upon him human nature, &c." It must be owned that some of the Ante-Nicene writers interpreted the words differently. Origen^m, understanding the whole passage, as it seems, of the man *Christ Jesus*, (whose *soul* he supposed to have *preexisted*,) interprets the phrase, οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο, &c. *did not assume, or covet to be honoured as God.* And this construction he was led into from this consideration, that the Λόγος, or *divine nature* of Christ, could not be capable of any proper *exaltation*. Novatianⁿ understands the passage of the Λόγος, or *divine nature*, and makes the sense to be, that Christ did not pretend to an absolute equality with God the Father, considering himself as *second* only, or as *Son* of the Father. The churches of Lyons and Vienne (in a letter recorded by

¹ I may give one or two for a specimen.

Quid est "non rapinam arbitratus est esse se æqualem Deo?" Non usurpavit æqualitatem Dei, sed erat in illa in qua natus erat. *August. Tract. in Joh. 17.*

Non quasi rapinam habebat æqualitatem cum Patre, quam in substantia sui, tanquam Deus et Dominus possidebat. *Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. c. 8.*

Non alienum arbitratus est, esse quod natus est. *Aug. contr. Max. p. 681.*

Manens enim in forma Dei, non vi aliqua sibi ac rapina, id quod erat, præsumendum existimavit, scilicet ut Deo esset æqualis. Erat enim in Dei forma, nihilque ei ex ejus gloria deerat, in cujus forma manebat; sed formam servi sui per humilitatem accepit, &c. *Hilar. in Psalm. p. 325. ed. Bened.*

^m Origen. in Joh. p. 34, 413. He seems to be of the same opinion in his book against Celsus. See p. 167, 168, 172.

ⁿ Novatian. de Trin. c. 17.

Eusebius^o.) seem to understand it thus, that our Lord did not assume to himself, as he justly might have done, to be honoured as God, but waved his privilege, and declined all ostentation of his glory, for a pattern to, and for the good of others. The three interpretations now mentioned are different from each other, and all of them reconcilable with Catholic principles. Origen's, though singular, is very safe, for one that would be only upon the *defensive*, in respect of this text, against the Arians. Novatian's may serve either way; because, while he denies only such an *equality* as no Catholic contends for, he asserts the true *equality of nature* between Father and Son^p. The third interpretation is too loose and general to make any thing of on either side: only this is observable of them all, that they construe the words οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο &c. not as a part of the *preceding character of Christ's greatness*, but as part of the *consequent account of his humiliation*, so far contrary to the interpretation which I have before been pleading for. You may have observed, from what has been already hinted, that, taking the words *as a part of the consequent account of Christ's humiliation*, they are still capable of a very good meaning, and no way favourable, but contradictory, to the Arian hypothesis. For let the sense of the passage appear as follows:

“Who being essentially God, (and consequently having a “rightful claim to be honoured equally with God,) yet did not “covet or desire to be so honoured, did not insist upon his “right; but, for the greater glory of God, and for the good of “others, chose rather (in the particular instance of his incarnation) to wave his pretensions, and, in appearance, to recede “from them.” This way of paraphrasing the words takes off the objection about the particle ἀλλὰ, and answers to that sense

^o Euseb. E. Hist. lib. v. cap. 2.

^p Phœbadius of the fourth century, a zealous defender of the Catholic doctrine against the Arians, yet scruples not to interpret this text nearly in the same way with Novatian.

Hic Sermo, cum in forma Dei esset, sapientia et ratione, et spiritus ratione, et spiritus virtute constructus, hoc est, totam vim Dei possidens, non se Deo Patri adæquavit, sed formam servi accipiens humiliavit se usque ad mortem. Induerat enim quod servire, quod mori possit. Phœbad. contr.

Arian. Bibl. Patr. tom. iv. p. 304.

Cyril also of Alexandria seems, in one place, to have understood the words οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο, as part of the consequent account of Christ's humiliation.

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄλων σωτὴρ καὶ Κύριος, καίτοι μετὸν αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν μορφῇ καὶ ἰσότητι τῇ κατὰ πᾶν ὀτιοῦν ὁρᾶσθαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, καὶ τοῖς τῆς θεότητος ἐναβρύνεσθαι θάκοις, οὐχ ἀρπαγμὴν ἠγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ, ἀλλ' εἰναι τὸν, &c. Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. vi. p. 195.

of the phrase, οὐχ ἄρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο, which Origen, Novatian, and the churches of Lyons &c. took it in; and withal secures the main point which we insist on from this text, namely, the equality, the essential equality of the Son to the Father. In fine, either sense of the phrase, οὐχ ἄρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο, will suit very well with Catholic principles; but it is the latter only that can be any way drawn to favour the Arians: which indeed is the true reason why they contend so much for it. As to the two interpretations which I have given, the first, agreeing with our English version, seems to me preferable. It has been, in a manner, the standing interpretation for 1300 years. It has given indeed great uneasiness to the Arians; but they were never yet able, nor ever will be, to confute it. I pass on to the next words. “But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men.” Which words should have been turned thus: *Nevertheless he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.* This rendering is not only more exact and conformable to the *original*, but also more suitable to the rendering of the words preceding. When our Lord is said to have “made himself of no reputation,” or to have *emptied himself*, which signifies much the same, we are not to suppose that he lost any thing which he had before; or that he ceased to be in the *form of God*, by taking on him the *form of man*. No: he had the same *essential* glory, the same *real* dignity, which he ever had, but among men concealed it; appeared not in majesty and glory like to God, but divested himself of every dazzling appearance, and every outward mark of majesty and greatness, † con-

† Εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα θνητὸν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀναλαβὼν ὁ ἀθάνατος Θεὸς λόγος, δοκεῖ τῷ Κέλσῳ ἀλλάττεσθαι καὶ μεταπλάττεσθαι· μανθανέτω ὅτι ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν μὲν πάσχει ὡν πάσχει τὸ σῶμα, ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ. συγκатаβαίνων δὲ &c. Origen. *contr. Cels.* p. 170.

Non amittens quod erat, sed accipiens quod non erat. *Aust. in Joh.* Tract. 17.

Ἐσμίκρυνεν αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα. *Euseb.* lib. i. cap. 13.

Nam etsi apostolus semetipsum exinanisse dicit, formam servi accipiendo, non utique sic exinanitum accipimus ut aliud quam quod fuerat idem spiritus fieret: sed ut, seposito interim

majestatis suæ honore, humanum corpus indueret, quo suscepto, salus gentium fieret. Ut enim sol cum nube tegitur, claritas ejus comprimitur, non cæcatur; et lumen illud quod toto orbe diffusum claro splendore cuncta perfundit, parvo admodum obstaculo nubis includitur, non auferitur: sic et homo ille quem Dominus Jesus Salvatorque noster, id est, Deus, Deique Filius induit, Deum tamen in illo non interceptit, sed abscondit. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orthodox.* cap. viii. p. 355. ed. Bened.

† Τὸ σκῆπτρον τῆς μεγαλωσύνης τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔλαθεν ἐν κόμπῳ ἀλαζονίας οὐδὲ

descending to appear, and act, and converse as a man, like unto us in all things, sin only excepted. In this sense it is that our Lord *emptied* himself. He came not with any pomp and ostentation of greatness, he laid aside his Godlike majesty, and disrobed himself, as it were, of all outward glories, becoming a man, a miserable man, and in that nature suffering, bleeding, and dying for us. "Wherefore God hath also highly exalted "him." Here we must make a pause, and inquire diligently what this *exaltation* means. One that is *truly* Son of God, and in a *proper* sense God, cannot be properly *exalted*; that is, cannot be preferred to any higher or better state than he ever enjoyed, nor receive any improvement of, or accession to, his essential dignity, glory, or happiness. Hence it is, that as many of the ancients as have understood the text of a *proper* exaltation, have interpreted it of the *human* only, and not the *divine* nature of Christ. This is true of the Ante-Nicene, as well as Post-Nicene writers, which appears from Origen^s and Hippolytus^t: and I do not know of any direct testimony to the contrary. So that here again the Arians, understanding it of a *proper* exaltation to a better state, and of Christ considered in his *highest* capacity, run counter to the doctrine of the ancients before the Nicene Council, in a very material article respecting this controversy.

The ancients were certainly in the right not to admit of any proper exaltation, in the sense before given, in respect of the *divine* nature of Christ. For, as ^uAthanasius and other Catholics well argue in this case, how could he, that was *with* God, and in the *bosom* of the *Father*, be *exalted*, or become *higher* than he always was? How could the Giver and Dispenser of all *graces* receive any thing as a matter of *grace* or *favour*? How could he be then said to have attained the privilege of being *adored*, who had long before been *adored* both by men and

ὑπερφηανίας, καίπερ δυνάμενος· ἀλλὰ ταπεινοφρονῶν, καθὼς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐλάλησεν. *Clem. Rom. Ep. cap. xvi. p. 70.*

Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀφθάρτῳ αὐτοῦ δόξῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν ἠδύνατο· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐδεπώποτε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ βαστάζειν ἠδυνάμεθα. *Iren. lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 284.*

Ὅστις ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ὦν, διὰ τοὺς κολληθέντας τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ γενομένοις ὅπερ σὰρξ, ἐγένετο σὰρξ, ἵνα χω-

ρηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων αὐτὸν βλέπειν καθὼς λόγος ἦν, καὶ πρὸς Θεὸν ἦν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν. *Orig. contr. Cels. lib. vi. p. 322.*

^s Ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ὁ Θεὸς λόγος οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ ὑπερψωθῆναι. *Orig. in Joh. p. 413. Huet.*

^t Ὑπερψυοῦσθαι λέγεται, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔχων, διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον μονονοχη, &c. *Hippolyt. Fragm. vol. ii. p. 29. Fabric.*

^u Athanas. *Op. tom. i. p. 445, &c.*

angels? He who was God from the beginning, who had glory with the Father "before the world was," who is himself the "Lord of glory," and Creator and Preserver of all things, was infinitely too high, too great, and too divine, to receive any accession to his dignity, any real increase either of perfection or glory. Thus far is very right; and therefore, if a *proper* exaltation, in that sense, be intended, it can only be meant of Christ as *God-man*, receiving those honours and titles, in his human or mediatorial capacity, which he had always enjoyed in another. And thus the ancients, for the most part, have understood Christ's *exaltation* to be no more than a kind of new *investiture*, upon his new and late *condescension*; and his having those rights, titles, and honours confirmed to him as *God-man*, which as *God* he never wanted. This, in the main, is true and right; and is a good account, in part, of what was in fact. But there is some reason to think that it is not precisely and accurately the meaning of this text. For if the *exaltation* be meant only of the *human* nature, it is more natural to suppose that St. Paul would not here have spoken of the condescension of the *Logos*, but would rather have told us only what the *man* Christ Jesus had done, how humbly and how righteously Christ had demeaned himself in that capacity, and how God had rewarded his services. And thus it is that Ψ Hermas, a very early writer of the first century, represents this matter. Υ An ancient commentator upon

* Ξ $\text{Εἰ δὲ ὑψοῦσθαι λέγεται, καὶ ἐν τάξει χαρίσματος τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὄνομα δέχασθαι, εἰς ἐκεῖνο δηλονότι μετὰ σαρκὸς ἐπανάγεται, εἰς ὅπερ ἦν καὶ διχὰ σαρκός. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 130.$

Vid. etiam Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat. v. p. 597. Athanas. aliosque.

Υ Adhibito itaque *Filio*, quem carum et hæredem habebat, et amicis quos in consilio advocabat, indicat ea quæ *servo suo* facienda mandasset, quæ præterea ille fecisset. At illi protinus gratulati sunt *servo illi*, quod tam plenum testimonium Domini sui assecutus fuisset. Ait deinde illis: Ego quidem *huic servo* libertatem promisi, si custodisset mandatum meum quod dederam, et custodivit illud, et præterea opus bonum adjecit in vineam, quod mihi quam plurimum placuit. Pro hoc igitur opere quod fecit, volo eum *Filio* meo facere cohæredem; quoniam

cum sississet quod esset bonum, non omisit sed fecit illud. *Herm. Simil. v. p. 104. Coteler.*

Υ Quibusdam tamen videtur homini donatum esse nomen: quod est super omne nomen quod nullo genere, nulla ratione convenit. Si enim Christus Dei Filius idem ipse et homo est, non poterat Deus homo factus, sed manens Deus, his egere quæ habebat: aut si secundum quod homo erat, his egebat quæ Dei sunt, ipse sibi Dei Filius Deus dedisset quæ deerant ei juxta quod homo erat.— Neque caro hoc posset effici quod est Deus. Sed forte ut adoptione Deus esset: et hic color est. Incipiet enim ex parte Deus verus esse Christus, et ex parte adoptivus, aut duo Dii: sed aliud Scriptura significat. Illi enim donatum significat, qui se exinanivit, qui formam servi accepit, qui in similitudinem hominis factus est homo,

this text gives several reasons why the *exaltation* here spoken of is not, cannot be intended of the *Man* only, but of Christ in his *whole* Person. “ 1. Because, if Christ be *God* as well as *Man*, “ then all the time from his incarnation he must have had, along “ with his humanity, all that pertains to *God*; and therefore “ could not afterwards properly *receive* what he had before. “ 2. Supposing that he wanted any thing in respect of his man- “ hood, yet why should the Father be said to give what he him- “ self, as *God*, could easily supply? 3. The things mentioned as “ given to Christ are too high and great for the man to receive, “ unless the human nature be supposed to be *divine*, which is “ absurd: or if it be supposed to have been made *God* by adop- “ tion, then either Christ is *God* partly by nature and partly by “ adoption, or the two natures are two *Gods*. 4. It appears “ from the text, that the *exaltation* belongs to the same nature “ which *condescended* and emptied itself. And what nature was “ that but the *Divine* nature? Or what great matter would it “ have been for the Apostle to have told us, that a *man* did not “ pretend to be *equal* with *God*, or was obedient to *God*?”

There is a great deal of weight in the reasonings of this author, which made him at length ^aconclude, that the text does not speak of any *proper exaltation*, or new accession to any thing, but of the more illustrious *manifestation* of him, for the solemn proclaiming him to be what he always was. And this, indeed, I take to be true in part, though not the full meaning of the text before us. Though the absolute, *essential* dignity of our blessed Lord was always the same, and in respect of which he was ever *equal* with *God*, yet his *relative* dignity towards us, founded in the obligations we have received from him, never so signally appeared as in that amazing and astonishing instance of condescension and goodness, his becoming man, and dying for us. We were hereby “bought with a price,” becoming *servants* to Christ, and Christ a *Lord* to us, in a peculiar sense ^b,

qui patri obedivit. Si Homo Deo Patri obedivit, quid magnum est quod dixit Apostolus? Sed hoc magnum dicit, quia cum æqualis esset obedivit. *Pseud-Ambros.* in loc. p. 255.

^a Hoc ergo natus accepit, ut post crucem manifestaretur quid a Patre dum generaretur acceperit.

^b 1 Cor. vi. 20. vii. 22, 23. 1 Pet. i. 19.

Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ Χριστὸς καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἀνέζησεν, ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ. Rom. xiv. 9.

Invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et Verbum homo, universa in semetipsis recapitulans: uti sicut in supercelestibus et spiritalibus, et invisibilibus princeps est Verbum Dei; sic in visibilibus, et

and under a *new* and *special* title. Upon this occasion, and on this account, it pleased God, in the most solemn and pompous manner, to proclaim the high dignity of God the Son, to reinforce his rightful claim of homage, and to command heaven and earth, angels and men, to pay him all honour, reverence, and adoration suitable to the dignity of so great, so good, so divine a Person as the Son of God. He had lately run through an unparalleled work of mercy, had redeemed mankind and triumphed over death and hell: upon this his *divinity* is recognised, and his high worth proclaimed. We may observe how, under the Old Testament, it pleased God often to insist upon what great things he had done (though many of them slight in comparison to the work of redemption) in order to move the persons concerned to receive him as *God*. So he tells Abram, “I am the Lord that brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees.” Gen. xv. 7. And to the children of Israel he says: “I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God: and ye shall know that I am the Lord your God, which bringeth you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians.” Exod. vi. 7. And again, “I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.” Exod. xx. 2, 3. Or when it pleased God to speak any thing higher of what he had done, he reminded his people of his being their *Creator* and *Redeemer*. “Thus saith the Lord that created thee, O Jacob, and he that formed

corporalibus principatum habeat, in semetipsum primatum assumens, et apponens semetipsum caput Ecclesiæ, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206.

Accipiens omnium potestatem, quando Verbum caro factum est, ut quemadmodum in cœlis principatum habuit Verbum Dei, sic et in terra haberet principatum, quoniam homo justus, “qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore ejus;” principatum autem habeat eorum quæ sunt terra, ipse primogenitus mortuorum factus: et ut viderent omnia, quemadmodum prædiximus, suum regem, &c. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus. Sanctificans infantes: in parvulis parvulus—in

juvenibus juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fiens, et sanctificans Domino. Sic et senior in senioribus, ut sit perfectus magister in omnibus—deinde et usque ad mortem pervenit ut sit “primogenitus ex mortuis, ipse primatum tenens in omnibus,” princeps vitæ, prior omnium, præcedens omnes. *Iren.* p. 147, 148.

The sense of all this is very distinctly expressed by Hippolytus:

Ὁς ἐπουρανίῳ, καὶ ἐπιγείῳ, καὶ καταχθονίῳ βασιλεὺς καὶ κριτὴς πάντων ἀποδέδεικται. ἐπουρανίῳ μὲν ὅτι λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸ πάντων γεγενημένος ἦν· ἐπιγείῳ δὲ, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐγεννήθη, ἀναπλάσσωσιν δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀδὰμ· καταχθονίῳ δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἐν νεκροῖς κατελογίσθη—διὰ θανάτου τὸν θάνατον νικῶν. *Hippol. de Antichrist.* cap. xxvi. p. 15. Fabric.

“thee, O Israel, Fear not: for I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by my name; thou art mine.” Isa. xliii. 1. We see from hence, how even God the Father asserted his claim to the homage and adoration of his people, from the good and great things he had done for them. Not that he was not *God* and *Lord* before, but because the obligations laid upon them were apt to strike the more powerfully, and to bring the consideration of their duty towards him close and home to their hearts. To apply this to our present purpose; you may please to consider, that after God the Son had shewn such amazing and astonishing acts of goodness towards mankind, then was it proper to celebrate his name to the utmost, to recognise the dignity and majesty of his Person, and to recommend him to the world, as their God and Lord, with all imaginable advantage, with such endearing circumstances as could not but affect, ravish, and astonish every pious and ingenuous mind. And thus I understand the words, “wherefore God also hath highly exalted him.” That is; on account of the great work of redemption, so full of love and goodness, so astonishing and so endearing, God hath remarkably proclaimed his dignity, and set forth his glory; commanding all men hereupon to acknowledge him their *God* and *Lord*; their *Lord* always, but now more especially, by a new and distinct claim, as their *Saviour*, and *Deliverer*, and only *Redeemer*^c. As to the sense of the word *exalted*, nothing is more frequent in Scripture than such as I have here given. I shall mention

^c *God* the *Father* had remained as *glorious* as now he is, although he had never *created* the world; for the *creation* gave much, even all they had, to things created, it gave nothing unto *God*, who was in *being* infinite: yet if *God* had created nothing, the *attribute* of *Creator* could have had no *real ground*, it had been no *real attribute*. In like manner, suppose the *Son of God* had never condescended to take our nature upon him, he had remained as *glorious* in his nature and person as now he is; yet not glorified for, or by, this *title* or *attribute* of *incarnation*. Or suppose he had not “humbled himself unto death”—he had remained as *glorious* in his nature and person, and in the *attribute* of *incarnation*, as now he is; but without these glorious attributes of being “our

“*Lord* and *Redeemer*,” and of being the “*fountain of grace, and salvation*” “unto us.” All these are *real attributes*, and suppose a *real ground* or *foundation*; and that was “his *humbling* himself unto death, even the “*death of the cross*.” Nor are these attributes only *real*, but more *glorious*, both in respect of *God* the *Father*, who was pleased to give his only *Son* for us, and in respect of *God* the *Son*, who was pleased to pay our ransom by his *humiliation*, than the *attribute* of *creation* is. The *Son of God* then, not the *Son of David* only, hath been *exalted* since his death to be our *Lord*, by a *new* and *real* title, by the title of *redemption* and *salvation*. Jackson on the *Creed*, vol. iii. lib. ii. cap. 3. p. 316. See also *Bull Prim. Trad.* p. 39, 40.

only two or three examples, referring to a Concordance for the rest.

“He is my God—and I will exalt him.” Exod. xv. 2. “Exalted be the God of the rock of my salvation.” 2 Sam. xxii. 47. “Let the God of my salvation be exalted.” Psal. xviii. 46. “Be thou exalted, Lord, in thine own strength.” Psal. xxi. 13. “Thou art my God, and I will praise thee; thou art my God, and I will exalt thee.” Psal. cxviii. 28. “The Lord alone shall be exalted in that day.” Isa. ii. 11, 17. These (besides many other instances of like kind) are enough to justify this interpretation of the word *exalted*^d. Besides that I would have it observed, that the word in the original is not *ὑψωσε*, but *ὑπερύψωσε*^e. The former very probably would have been used, had the Apostle intended only a proper local exaltation of the man Christ Jesus to the right hand of God. Further: the immediate words following confirm this sense of the word. For, how is Christ *exalted*? God “hath given him a name which is above every name.” That is, he has extolled and magnified his name above all names. Thus was the Son of God *exalted*, or *glorified*, for the great things he had done, and dignified (if I may so speak) with a very high and honourable title. (too big for any *creature* to have merited, or for any thing less than himself to wear,) that of *Redeemer* and *Preserver* of man, and *Lord* of the whole universe. After the Apostle had taught us the great and supereminent dignity of God the Son, it was very proper to add, “to the glory of God the Father,” that we might not be so entirely taken up with admiring and reverencing the excellency and perfections of God the Son, as to forget that he is a *Son* still, referring all to God the *Father*^f; whose *glory* it is to have had always with him, and “rejoicing always before him,” so great and so *divine* a Son, equal to himself, the express image, the perfect transcript and adequate resemblance of his Person^g.

^d Ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε. ναί ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ λέγει τῷ Θεῷ μου Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ Δαβὶδ, Ὑψώθητι ἐπὶ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ὁ Θεός, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἢ δόξα σου.—Ἐδόξασεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατήρ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἐδόξασε τὸν πατέρα, &c. Dionys. Ascript. Epist. contr. Samosat. p. 881. Labb.

^e Σὺ εἶ Κύριος ὁ ὕψιστος ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν, σφόδρα ὑπερυψώθης ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς θεούς. Psal. xcvi. 9.

Αἰνῶ καὶ ὑπερυψῶ καὶ δοξάζω τὸν

βασιλεία τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. Dan. iv. 34.

^f *Æqualem ergo Patri credite Filium: sed tamen de Patre Filium, Patrem vero non de Filio. Origo apud illum, æqualitas apud istum—genuit autem Pater æqualem sibi, et totum quicquid est Filium, habet de Patre, quod autem Deus Pater est non habet de Filio. Itaque dicimus Patrem Deum de nullo, Filium Deum de Deo. Augustin. Serm. 140. tom. v. p. 681.*

^g Σέβονμέν γε τὸν πατέρα, θαυμάζοντες

I may just observe to you the strict accuracy of the Apostle's expression "God the Father:" not *God*, absolutely, nor *God his Father*, as some affect to speak, but "God the Father;" intimating that the Son is God also, and therefore, for distinction sake, he adds, "the Father." expressing it thus, to the "glory of God the Father."

I have at length run through the text, explaining the particulars of it in their order. I shall now subjoin a summary view of the whole, in a paraphrase conformable to the explication before given.

"Ver. 3, 4. Be ye not *vain-glorious*, or *selfish*, but be "willing to stoop and condescend even beneath yourselves, "in some instances. for the glory of God and the good of "others.

"Ver. 5. Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ "Jesus:

"Ver. 6. Who, though Son of God, and, as such, rightfully "and really *equal* with God;

"Ver. 7. Yet notwithstanding chose, in the instance of his "incarnation, to *hide his majesty*, and to *veil his glories* under "the garb of *humanity*; being content to become a man, and "thereby a *servant* to God, though by nature a *Son*, and *Lord* "of all.

"Ver. 8. And having taken upon himself the nature and "condition of a man, he submitted yet further, even to death "itself; and that too in the most ignominious circumstances, "nailed to a cross.

"Ver. 9. This amazing and astonishing instance of conde- "scension, love, and goodness, God the Father himself has most "remarkably approved; and has thereupon more solemnly and "more illustriously proclaimed the supereminent dignity of *God* "the *Son*, who had merited so highly of men.

"Ver. 10, 11. Commanding all persons to honour, worship, "and adore him as *God* and *Lord*; and under the new and "special title of *Redeemer*, to the glory of God the *Father*, whose "*Son* he is; their honour *inseparable*, and their glory *one*."

This appears to be the most natural and obvious meaning of this celebrated passage. consonant to Scripture, and to the

αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱὸν, λόγον, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πάντα. ἅπερ εἶναι μεμαθήκαμεν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ

Θεοῦ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν γεννηθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πατρός. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 387.

principles of the primitive and Catholic Church. I should now make some reflections upon the whole, but have scarce room barely to hint them for your leisure thoughts to improve.

Let the Socinians or Arians make as great a matter as they please of a *man's*, or of a *creature's* becoming a *servant* to God; we shall think it a still greater and more marvellous condescension, for one that was above every thing *servile*, himself *equal* to God, to condescend as he did.

Let them magnify his merits and performances, done for his *own* sake, to arrive at such an immense glory above all *other* creatures; we shall look upon them as more noble, more disinterested, and truly *divine*, if done for *others* only, by one that was himself too great to receive any recompense.

Let them value it as an extraordinary piece of condescension, that he did not lay claim to what he had no right to; we shall think it more pious and more decent to say, that he quitted his right, and receded from his just pretensions.

Let them honour him as their *Lord*, made as it were but of yesterday; we shall honour him as *Lord* and *God* from the beginning; the *Creator* first, and now, at last, *Redeemer* of man.

Let them, lastly, look upon him as a *servant* still, a servant at least to God, (as all *creatures* are^h;) while we, with *angels* and *archangels*, with things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, believe and confess that Jesus Christ is no *servant*, but *Lord* and *God*, to the glory of God the Father. "To whom with the Holy Ghost, all honour, and praise, might, .. majesty, power, and dominion. be ascribed now and for ever." Amen.

^h Εἴ τι γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἢ ἀνάγκης ἐλευθέρα· ἢ δὲ κτιστὴ, δουλικὴ ἄκτιστος φύσις ἐστὶν, ἢ κτιστὴ. ἀλλ' καὶ νόμοις δεσποτικοῖς ἐπομένη. Pseudo-ἢ μὲν ἄκτιστος, δεσποτικὴ καὶ πάσης Just. Exp. Fid.

Divine Titles ascribed to Christ in Holy Scripture :

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM HIS TITLES.

The sixth Sermon preached February 3, 17 $\frac{1}{2}$ ^o.

JOHN xvi. 15.

All things that the Father hath are mine : therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you.

THESE are the words of our blessed Saviour, speaking of the *Spirit of Truth*, otherwise styled the "Spirit of God^a," and "Spirit of the living God^b," and "Spirit of the Father^c," and "Spirit of the Lord^d;" and sometimes the "Spirit of Christ^e," and "Spirit of Jesus^f," and emphatically "the Spirit^g," but most commonly the "Holy Spirit," or "Holy Ghost," who is the third Person of the ever blessed and adorable Trinity. Our Lord had intimated, in the verses foregoing, that this divine Person, the *Spirit of Truth*, should shortly come upon the disciples, and "guide them into all truth;" (ver. 13.) "for," says our blessed Saviour, "he shall not speak of himself;" that is, not of himself *alone*, separate from, or independent of, every other person^h, but "whatsoever he shall hear," (that is, *know* in an ineffable manner, by his intimate union and communion in all things with

^a Matt. iii. 16. Rom. viii. 9, 14. xv. 19. 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 14. iii. 16. vi. 11. Eph. iv. 30. 1 Pet. iv. 14.

^b 2 Cor. iii. 3.

^c Matt. x. 20. Eph. iii. 14, 16.

^d Acts v. 9. viii. 39. 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.

^e Rom. viii. 9. Gal. iv. 6. 1 Pet. i. 11.

^f Acts xvi. 7. See Mill upon this place. Phil. i. 19.

^g Luke iv. 14. John iii. 8. vii. 39. Acts ii. 4. viii. 29. x. 19. Rom. xv. 30.

^h "Non enim loquetur a semet-
" ipso." Hoc est, non sine me et
sine meo et Patris arbitrio: quia inseparabilis a meo et Patris est voluntate; quia non ex se est, sed ex Patre et meo est: hoc enim ipsum quod subsistit et loquitur, a Patre et meo illi est. *Didym. apud Hieron.* vol. iv. pag. 514. ed. Bened.

Father and Son.) “that shall he speak: and he will shew “you things to come. He shall glorify me, for he shall receive “of mine, and shall shew it unto you.” ver. 14. That is, whatever influences he shall shed, whatever truths he shall reveal, whatever miracles he shall perform, they will be all so many manifestations of my glory, as coming from me, acting and speaking in and by the “Spirit of God.” Then follow the words of the text. “All things that the Father hath are mine: “therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall shew it “unto you.”

As much as to say. Think it not strange that I ascribe to myself the operations and influences of the “Spirit of God.” or “Spirit of the Father,” with the *glory* of them: for though these things do indeed of right belong to the *Father*, whose *Spirit* he is; yet this is very consistent with my claim, because “all that the Father hath is mine:” his power is my power, his works my works, his *Spirit* my *Spirit*; our perfections common, our nature equal, and our glory one^k. This is the most natural and obvious meaning of the text, consonant to other Scriptures, and to Catholic antiquity: as shall be shewn in the sequel. The text might lead me to discourse on the *divinity* of the *Holy Ghost*, as well as of the *Son*: but having hitherto confined myself to the single point of *Christ's divinity*, that I might the more fully and distinctly treat of it; I shall for the same reason do so still, and occasionally only touch upon the other, as it may fall in my way, or may be subservient to my main point. The words now under consideration will afford two distinct arguments of the *divinity* of God the Son: one *particular* and *special*, the other more *general*.

1. The first, which I call *particular* and *special*, is contained in this, that the operations, gifts, and graces of the *Spirit of God* with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ*.

ⁱ “De meo sumet,” inquit, sicut ipse de Patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio, et Filii in Paracleteo, tres efficit cohærentes, alterum ex altero: qui tres *unum* sint, non *unus*; quomodo dictum est, “Ego et Pater unum “sumus;” ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem. *Tertul. contr. Prax.* cap. xxv.

^o Ὁ πατήρ δι' υἱοῦ σὺν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι τὰ πάντα χαρίζεται. οὐκ ἄλλα πατρὸς

χαρίσματα, καὶ ἄλλα υἱοῦ, καὶ ἄλλα ἁγίου πνεύματος. μία γὰρ ἡ σωτηρία, μία ἡ δύναμις, μία ἡ πίστις. *Cyrl. Hieros. Catech.* xvi. p. 236. Ox. ed.

^k Licet a Patre procedat Spiritus veritatis, et det illis Deus Spiritum Sanctum petentibus se: tamen quia “omnia quæ habet Pater mea sunt,” et ipse Spiritus Patris meus est, et de meo accipiet. *Didym. de Spir. Sanct.* apud *Hieron.* tom. iv. p. 516.

2. The second, which I call *general*, lies in the *general* reason given as the foundation of the former; that "all things that the Father hath," our Saviour attributes to himself, and challenges as his *own*. Of these in their order.

I. We are to observe, that the operations, gifts, and graces of the *Spirit of God*, with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ*; "He shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you." He shall *glorify* me: the *glory* of whatsoever shall be *done* or *taught* by the Holy Spirit, our Lord ascribes to himself, as being (in conjunction with the Father) the author and fountain of it. The context indeed mentions only the Spirit's *teaching*; but the reason is the same for whatever should be *done* by the Holy *Spirit* of God, who is also the *Spirit* of *Christ*: and therefore the miraculous works of the *Holy Ghost* are expressly ascribed to *Christ* by St. Peter, Acts ii. 33. "Being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear." When therefore our Lord says, "he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you," it is but reasonable to understand it of every operation, gift, or influence of the *Holy Spirit*, (of whatever kind it were,) showered down upon the Apostles. All were derived from *Christ*; to him therefore (in conjunction with the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost*) is the *glory* of them to be ascribed, as is plain from the words, "he shall glorify me," ver. 14.

Now, if the Holy Ghost himself be a *divine* Person, and one with God the Father, and *adored* together with him, as the Catholic Church has all along taught¹, and Scripture itself has sufficiently intimated; then we have here a clear and irresistible proof of the *divinity* of *Christ*, who, as appears from this text, is at least *equal* to, or in some sense *greater* than the *Holy Ghost*^m. But because the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost is what our adversaries will no more admit than they will the other, and it

¹ Justin. Mart. Apol. i. cap. 16. Athenagoras, p. 40, 96. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 37. Clem. Alex. p. 1020. ed. Ox. Tertullian, contr. Prax. cap. ix. xiii. xxv. Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. xii. Origen. apud Basil. de Sp. S. p. 219. in Joh. p. 124. Cyprian. Ep. ad Jubajan. p. 203.

^m Si a Christo accepit quæ nuntiet, major ergo jam Paracleto Christus

est: quoniam nec Paracletus a Christo acciperet nisi minor Christo esset. Minor autem Christo Paracletus Christum etiam *Deum* esse hoc ipso probat a quo accepit quæ nuntiat; ut *testimonium Christi divinitatis grande sit*, dum minor Christo Paracletus repertus, ab illo sumit quæ cæteris tradit. *Novat. de Trin.* cap. xxiv.

would be here too great a digression for me to enter into the proof of it; I must be content to wave that point, and consider only whether, or how far, our argument may be conceived to stand independent of it.

The Person of the *Holy Ghost* is described in Scripture as the immediate author and worker of miraclesⁿ; and even of those done by our Lord himself^o; the Conductor of *Christ Jesus* in his *human* capacity, during his state of humiliation here upon earth^p; the inspirer of the Prophets and Apostles^q; the Searcher of all hearts, and the Comforter of good Christians in difficulties^r. To *lie* to him is the same thing as to *lie* unto God^s. *Blasphemy* against him is unpardonable^t. To resist him is the same thing as to resist God^u. He is in God, and knows the mind of God as perfectly as a man knows his own mind; and that in respect of *all things*, even the *deep things* of God^x. Men's bodies are his *temple*, and, by being his *temple*, are the *temple* of God^z. He is joined with God the Father and Son, in the solemn form of baptism^a; in religious oaths, and in invocations for grace and peace^b; in the same common operations^c: in the same authoritative mission and vocation of persons into the ministry^d; and he is joined with the Father in the same common mission, even of the *Son* himself^e: in a word, he is *Lord*^f (or *Jehovah*) and *God*^g, and Lord of Hosts^h. This is a brief summary of what the Scriptures have taught us of the person, character, and offices of the *Holy Ghost*. Exceptions may be made (though of no great weight) to some particulars, which I have not here time to consider. The least that can be inferred from them, and what the Arians themselves will not scruple to admit, is, that the *Holy Ghost* is a Person of very high eminence, dignity, and majesty; much superior to any *angel* or *archangel*, or any other person

ⁿ Acts ii. 4, 45, 46. Rom. xv. 19.
^o 1 Cor. ii. 4, 5. xii. 4, 8, 11, xiv. 2.
 Heb. ii. 4.

^p Matt. xii. 18. Acts x. 38.
^q Matt. iv. 1. xii. 18. Luke iv. 1.
 John i. 32. iii. 34. Acts i. 2.

^r See the proofs in Clarke's Script.
 Doctr. cap. iii. sect. 2.
^s See Script. Doctr. cap. iv. sect. 3.

^t Acts v. 3, 4.
^u Matt. xii. 31, 32.

^x Acts vii. 51.
^y 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11.

^z 1 Cor. vi. 19.

^a 1 Cor. iii. 16. Eph. ii. 21, 22.

^b Matt. xxviii. 19.

^c 2 Cor. xiii. 14. Rev. i. 4, 5.
 Rom. ix. 1.

^d 1 Cor. xii. 4—7, &c.

^e Acts xiii. 2. Compare Hos. ii.

^f Acts ix. 15.

^g Isa. xlviii. 16.

^h Compare Exod. xxxiv. 34. with

2 Cor. iii. 17.

ⁱ Acts v. 3, 4.

^j Compare Isa. vi. with Acts xxviii.

25, 26.

whatsoever, excepting only *God the Father*, and his Son *Christ Jesus*. Let it then be considered, that however great and glorious, however mighty and powerful, however wise and knowing, however venerable and adorable this Person is, and however intimate with, and united to, *God the Father*, whose Spirit he is; yet all that he is, and all that he does, is to be referred to *Christ*, as the author and fountain of it. He claims the *glory* of all, because all is his. Now if we consider the infinite distance there is between *God* and the very highest of his *creatures*, and how arrogant it must appear in any *creature* to make a claim of this kind and value, a claim upon *God's own Spirit*, a claim of *glory* (though in strictness *glory* can be due to *God* alone) as having a hand in all his works, and, as it were, assisting and influencing the very "*Spirit of the Father*:" I say, if we consider this, and at the same time reflect that our blessed Lord (who was the most perfect pattern of humility, meekness, and modesty) has really made this claim, and has been thus *familiar* with Almighty *God*; what can we think less than this, that our blessed Lord is infinitely superior to all *creatures*, and consequently is himself really, truly, and essentially *God*, coequal and coeternal with *God the Father*! Thus, and thus only, can his claim be justified, and his pretensions reconciled to the *Scriptures*, or to the truth and reason of things: which will appear further, if we consider,

II. Secondly, the *general* reason, upon which our blessed Lord founds his *particular* claim. "All things that the Father hath are mine." All things: and therefore the very highest of all, namely, those specified in that chapter. And indeed it is but reasonable, and even necessary to suppose, that one who could justly ascribe so much to himself must be in all respects equal to the Father, excepting only (what the text intimates in the very name of *Father*^k) that he is not another *Father*.

ⁱ Neque enim de *creaturis* sumebat Spiritus Sanctus, qui *Dei Spiritus* est; ut ex his videatur accipere, quia ea omnia *Dei sunt*. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. ix. p. 1033.

^k Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἀκριβῶς εἶρηκεν, ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατήρ, ἵνα καὶ ὧδε λέγων τὸν πατέρα, μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πατήρ νομισθῇ: οὐ γὰρ εἶρηκεν ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ πατήρ, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατήρ. *Athanas. Op.* vol. i. p. 107. ed. Bened.

Procul hinc absint dialecticorum tendiculæ et sophismata a veritate pellantur: quæ occasionem impietatis ex pia prædicatione capientia, dicunt: *Ergo et Pater est Filius, et Filius Pater*. Si enim dixisset, "Omnia quæcunque habet *Deus*, mea sunt," haberet impietatis occasionem confingendi, et verisimile videretur mendacium. Cum vero dixerit, "Omnia quæ habet *Pater*, mea sunt;" *Pa-*

but *Son* of the Father. This clearly accounts for his ascribing to himself all the influences, gifts, and graces of God's *Holy Spirit*, and the *glory* of them. For if God the Son hath all things that the Father hath, then hath he all the attributes and perfections belonging to the Father; the same power, rights, and privileges; the same honour and glory; and, in a word, the same *nature, substance, and Godhead*. Then, indeed, every *divine* work is his work; the *Spirit* of the Father is also his *Spirit*; the operations of the *Holy Ghost* must, of course, be the operations of Father and Son too; and the glory of every thing must be referred to both, as to one common author and fountain thereof. On these principles, the sense of the whole passage is easy, expedite, and clear; and very consonant to our blessed Lord's account of himself in other places of this Gospel: particularly where he says, "What things soever he," (the Father) "doth, these also doth the Son likewise," John v. 19. "I and my Father are one," John x. 30. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father—I am in the Father, and the Father in me," John xiv. 9, 10. "Glorify me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was," John xvii. 5. "All mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them," John xvii. 10. These are very high and strong expressions, confirming that sense of the text which I have given, and which prevailed in the Christian Church (as appears from Tertullian above cited) before the Council of Nice, as well as after¹. But my design is next to proceed to other Scriptures which expressly ascribe the same high titles, powers, and perfections to the Son which they do to the Father; therein justifying, or rather more fully and particularly declaring, what our Lord had but briefly intimated in the words, "All things that the Father hath are mine." My method shall be,

1. To shew that the *divine titles* are ascribed to the Son in holy Scripture: and,

2. That the *divine attributes* are also applied to him.

tris nomine se *Filium* declaravit; *Paternitatem*, qui *Filius* erat, non usurpavit. *Didym. de Sp. S. Hieron.* tom. iv. p. 516. ed. Bened.

¹ Athanasius, vol. i. p. 106. Hilarius de Trin. lib. ix. p. 1004. Didymus,

Interpr. Hieron. Op. tom. iv. p. 516. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 477. ed. Bened. Cyril. Alex. Thes. lib. ix. Augustin. contr. Maxim. lib. ii. p. 697, 706. ed. Bened. Cyril. Hieros. Cath. xvi. p. 236.

3. To sum up the force of the argument, and to obviate such *general* objections as tend to weaken our conclusion.

I. The *divine titles* ascribed to the Son in Holy Scripture are as follows: *God, God with us, Lord God, true God, great God, mighty God, God over all blessed for evermore, Jehovah, Almighty, Lord of Glory, King of kings, and Lord of lords, Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last.* Of these in their order.

As to the title of *God*, our adversaries are pleased to allow, that "the Person of the Son is in the New Testament" (and the Old Testament should not have been entirely omitted) "some-
"times" (and why is it not said *frequently*?) "styled God^m." But then we are told that itⁿ is not "so much" (is it then at all?) "on account of his metaphysical substance—as of his
"relative attributes and divine authority," that he is *sometimes* styled God. But this is more than our adversaries know, or can give the least shadow of proof to countenance. The Son of God may be proved from Scripture to be *God*, in the strict and proper sense, after the very same way, and by the same kind of arguments, that the Father himself can be shewn to be *God*, in the strict and proper sense. What is said about *metaphysical substance* (by which, it seems, is meant *abstract metaphysical substance*^o) is trifling to the last degree. For undoubtedly the Trinitarians are not so destitute of common sense and understanding, as to take the *substance* of Father, or Son, to be an *abstract idea*; which is all the sense of an *abstract substance*. They certainly mean a *real, living, intelligent*, and infinitely *perfect* substance, existing *without*, necessarily existing. And when they say that the Son is *substantially* or *essentially* God, they intend to prevent *equivocations*, and to assert, that the Son is not of a fading perishing nature, as *creatures* are; no *precarious* being, depending on the *will* and *choice* of another, but truly *divine* and *necessarily existing*. If this be admitted, we have no further occasion to speak a word of *substance*; which, after all, is nothing more than another name for *being* or *thing*. And it must appear very strange, and savouring too much of delicacy or cavilling, that, if we are able to prove the Son to be *eternal, divine, necessarily*

^m See Clarke's Scripture Doctr. Propos. xxiv. p. 263. 2nd edit.

ⁿ Ibid Propos. xxv. p. 263. ^o Clarke's Scripture Doctr. p. 342. 2nd edit.

existing, &c. we may not be allowed to say that his *substance* is *eternal*, *divine*, &c., which is really neither more nor less than saying that *he* is so. Attributes and powers must have *something* to reside and inhere in, which *something* is what we call *substance*, and considered with *divine* attributes, *divine* substance, or *God*. And this is what Scripture means in calling the Son *God*; as we are able to prove from the same topics, and in the same way of reasoning, which another might make use of to prove the one *God* (or the God of the Jews) to be the *supreme*, *eternal*, and *immutable* God, against any Marcionite, Valentinian, Manichee, or other *heretic*, that should presume to deny it. Let those who object to us the use of *metaphysics* try if they can come at the proof of the *Father's* being *self-existent*, *underived*, *one simple*, *uncompounded*, *undecided*, *intelligent Agent*, &c. without entering into *metaphysics*: and let them from thence learn to distinguish between *false* metaphysics and *true*: and not presume to condemn both promiscuously. As to consequences, be they *metaphysical* or *physical*, *moral* or *religious*, it matters not, provided they are but *just* and *true*; which is the only thing to be inquired into. We are told, that "the Scripture, when it mentions God absolutely, "and by way of eminence, always means the Person of the "Father." But this is an assertion not only void of proof, but impossible to be proved; and is besides contrary to all *antiquity*, as I have shewn elsewhere; and even to the sentiments of the ancient Arians; whom our modern Arians would be thought to come up to at least, though they really fall short of them, as well in this as in many other instances. However, certain it is that the Church of Christ, down from the very times of the Apostles, have been in nothing more unanimous than in styling the Son *God*: and what they meant by that name, as applied to the Son, is well known to the learned from their *worship* of him, and their utter abhorrence of any *inferior* deities; from their arguing for the Son's divinity considered as a *Son*, of the *same nature* with his Father; from their similitudes and illustrations; from the *divine* titles, attributes, and perfections which they ascribed to him; and indeed from the whole tenour of their writings. This is a confirmation to us, that the Son of God, in Scripture, is so styled in the strict and proper sense of *uncreated*, *eternal*, and *necessarily existing*.

P Clarke's Scripture Doctr. Propos. xi.

q Defence of some Queries, Qu. 2. vol. i. p. 278.

Another *divine title* given to God the Son in holy Scripture is *God with us*, or *Emmanuel*^r. Matt. i. 23. A late writer^s would insinuate that the word *God*, in this place of St. Matthew, *may be meant of the Father*. But the text is plain and full to the contrary. "Behold, a Virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a Son, and they shall call *his name* (the *Son's*, not the *Father's name*) *Emmanuel*." Christ therefore is *Emmanuel*, or *God with us*. The same writer pretends that the name *Emmanuel* proves nothing more, in point of argument, than even the names of places, *Jehovah-Jireh*, *Jehovah-Shammah*, *Jehovah-Shalom*, *Jehovah-Nissi*, &c. But this Socinian surmise had been before sufficiently confuted by the learned and judicious Bishop Pearson^t; whose reasonings upon this head should have been answered, instead of repeating a stale objection. I shall only take notice, that the early writers of the Christian Church constantly understood that Christ was really *God with us*, conformable to his name *Emmanuel*; and interpreted this text of St. Matthew as we do^u. To proceed:

Another *divine title* given to God the Son in holy Scripture is that of *Lord God*, which answers to *Jehovah Elohim*, the incommunicable name of the one true God. The first text of the New Testament to our purpose is Luke i. 16, 17. "Many shall he" (viz. John the Baptist) "turn to the *Lord their God*, and he shall go before him," &c. It is well observed by a late writer^x, that "these words (*the Lord their God*) are, in strictness of construction, immediately connected with the following word, *him*; which must necessarily be understood of *Christ*." Now, since there is no apparent necessity in the case of receding from the *strictness of construction*, it is but reasonable to under-

^r Μεθ' ἡμῶν ὁ Θεός. God, by way of excellency, with the article ὁ prefixed.

^s Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 71. 2nd edit.

^t Pearson on the Creed, art. ii. p. 130.

^u Diligenter igitur significavit Spiritus Sanctus per ea quæ dicta sunt generationem ejus quæ est ex Virgine, et substantiam quoniam Deus, (*Emmanuel enim nomen hoc significat*,) et manifestat quoniam homo, &c. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 21. p. 217. ed. Bened. Vid. et p. 205, 212, 273.

Quod si *Emmanuel* nobiscum Deus est, Deus autem nobiscum Christus est, qui etiam in nobis est (quotquot enim Christum tincti estis, Christum induistis) tam proprius est Christus in significatione nominis, quod est *nobiscum Deus*, quam in sono nominis, quod est *Emmanuel*. *Tertul. contr. Marc.* lib. iii. cap. 12. p. 403. Vid. et *contr. Prax.* cap. 27. It. *Novat.* cap. 12. *Cyprian. Testim.* lib. i. cap. 6. p. 36. *Euseb. Comment.* in *Isa.* vii. 14. p. 381.

^x Dr. Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 72. 2nd edit.

stand the words (*Lord their God*) of *Christ*. What confirms this construction is, that the same St. Luke, in the third chapter of his Gospel, speaks of John the Baptist's "crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord," chap. iii. 4. which answers to what he had observed chap. i. 16, 17. of John the Baptist's "going before him," that is, Christ, here called *Lord God*, as there the *Lord*: and this is further confirmed from Malachi iii. 1. "Behold, I send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant," &c. And from verse the 76th of the first of St. Luke, where he, before whom John the Baptist was to go, is called the *Lord*. There is no reasonable doubt to be made, after the comparing these passages together, but that the *Lord* (*Κύριος*) in St. Luke thrice, and in Malachi once. is to be understood of the Person of *Christ*. Neither is this construction of St. Luke strange or new, being countenanced by Irenæus, an early Father of the second century. I pass on to other texts, which style the Son *Lord* and *God*. St. Thomas's confession, John xx. 28. "My Lord and my God," is pertinent to our purpose. The application of this to *Christ* is so manifest of itself^z, and, besides, hardly now disputed, that I need not say more of it. Isa. xl. 10, 11. we read thus: "Behold, the Lord God will come with strong hand, and his arm shall rule for him: behold, his reward is with him, and his work before him. He shall feed his flock like a shepherd," &c. This is to be understood of Christ, and his second advent to judge the world; as Eusebius^a well interprets it. The words, "his reward is with him," (comp. Rev. xxii. 12.) and, "he shall feed his flock like a shepherd," (comp. John x. 11.) are sufficient indications of the Person there intended. *Christ* therefore is *Lord God* in the Scripture-style, as well as the *Father*. As to the sentiments of the ancients, many testimonies might be cited, where they call the Son *God and Lord*, or *Lord and God*: but it will be sufficient to observe their application of several texts of the Old Testament to God the Son. For instance: Genesis iii. 8. "They heard the voice of the *Lord*

^y Iren. lib. iii. cap. 10. p. 185.

art. ii. p. 131.

^z If any one doubt of it, he may consult Bishop Pearson on the Creed,

^a Euseb. in loc. p. 509.

“*God walking in the garden*^b.” Gen. xxviii. 13. “*I am the Lord God of Abraham thy Father*^c.” Exod. iii. 14. “*The Lord God of your Fathers*^d.” Exod. xx. 2. “*I am the Lord thy God*^e.” and Hos. i. 7. “*I will save them by the Lord their God*^f.” These, with many other like texts^g, were understood by the ancients in general, long before the Council of Nice, of God the Son. From whence it is evident, that the style and title of *Lord God* was thought to be very applicable to God the Son, and not peculiar or appropriate, in holy Scripture to God the Father.

True God is another *divine title* belonging to the Son of God. “*We are in him that is true, even in (or by) his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life*^h.” 1 John v. 20. We have sufficient reason to believe that God the Son is here called “*true God*.” and “*eternal life*.” It is on all hands confessed that “*eternal life*,” in the style of St. John, (see 1 John i. 2.) is an epithet appropriate to the *Son*, and is to be understood of him in this very passage. And thus a late Arian writerⁱ interprets the last words. “*This is the true God, even the Father; and this is the way that leads to him, even Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life;*” understanding *eternal life* as another name for, or as appropriate to, the Person of *Jesus Christ*. But it is manifest that the pronoun *this* (οὗτος) is the subject of both the predicates, *true God* and *eternal life*. To make good construction of it the other way, the sentence should have run, *This* (οὗτος) is the *true God*, and *that other* (ἐκεῖνος) is *eternal life*. But the words are. “*This*” (person. οὗτος) is the *true God* (ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς) and *eternal life*” (καὶ ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος). There is no other subject of the latter predicate besides the οὗτος, *this*, going before. If it be said that the particle ἡ may stand for αὐτή, and so the sense be, *This is the way*, pointing as it were to *Jesus Christ* before mentioned; yet so the construction is very harsh and unnatural: besides

^b Theoph. Antioch. p. 129. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 16.

^c Just. Mart. p. 218. Clem. Alex. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 131.

^d Iren. lib. iii. cap. 6. lib. iv. cap. 5, 12. Just. Mart. Apol. i. p. 123. Ox. ed.

^e Clem. Alex. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 131.

^f Novat. Trin. cap. 12.

^g See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. Qu. 2. p. 291, &c.

^h Οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἦκει, καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν ἵνα γινώσκωμεν τὸν ἀληθινὸν (Θεόν). καὶ ἔσμεν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ νῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ (ἡ) ζωὴ αἰώνιος. 1 John v. 20.

ⁱ Modest Plea, &c. p. 264.

that the particle *ἡ* is observed to have been wanting in the Alexandrian and several other manuscripts. Our interpretation therefore agrees much better than the other with the words following after *οὗτος*, *this*. And I must observe further, that it agrees also better with the words going before it: “We are in him that is true, even *in* (or even *by*) his Son Jesus Christ.” Then follows immediately *οὗτος*, *this*, this Person, immediately before mentioned, viz. *Jesus Christ*. For, allowing that a *pronoun* may sometimes refer to a remote *antecedent*, yet is it not so usual nor so natural; neither should it be presumed to do so, without a manifest necessity. Having shewn that the context plainly favours our construction, let us next examine the pretences on the contrary side.

It is said^k, that the *most* and *best* MSS. read τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν, *the true God*, instead of τὸν ἀληθινὸν, *him that is true*: and so the words will run thus: “We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding that we may know the true God, (viz. the Father,) and we are in him that is true, (the true God before spoken of,) in (that is, *by*) his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.” But admitting this reading of the words, it is so far from confronting the sense before given, that it rather confirms it. For then it comes to this; that we are in the *true God*, viz. the Father, by *being in his Son*, because that Son is the *true God*. This construction is so far from being absurd or flat, that it is very expressive and significant; intimating that there is none so certain way of knowing the *true God*, as by a teacher who is himself *true God*; nor any other way of being reconciled to *God*, but by being united with one who is *God*: that the Son of God *alone* can be able to unite us to the *true God*, and that because he himself is *true God*; who by being incarnate could join the *divine* and *human* natures, God and man, in one. This kind of reasoning is very much insisted on by the ancient Fathers^l;

^k Clarke’s Script. Doctr. p. 51. 2nd ed.

^l Ἀνακρινεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἑβραίωνους. Πῶς δύναται σωθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐργασάμενος; ἢ πῶς ἄνθρωπος χωρήσει εἰς Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐχωρήθῃ εἰς ἄνθρωπον; *Iren.* p. 271.

Ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Κύριος, ὅτι Θεὸν εἶδέναι οὐδεὶς δύναται μὴ οὐχὶ Θεοῦ

δοξάζοντος (leg. διδάξαντος) τουτέστιν, ἄνευ Θεοῦ μὴ γινώσκεσθαι τὸν Θεόν. *Ibid.* p. 234.

Εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἔσχομεν αὐτήν. καὶ εἰ μὴ συννηώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος, εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν

and upon this account the *divinity* of our blessed Lord was looked upon by them as an article of the utmost importance to salvation. Now we see from whence they borrowed their notions, namely, from the Apostles, from St. John especially; who, as he began his Gospel with observing that the Father is *God*, and the Son *God* also: so he ended his Epistle, teaching us to believe in the Father, as the *true God*, and in the Son, as the *true God* too; which comes to the same with the other. Add to this, that St. John, very probably in his *Epistle*, as well as *Gospel*, (which were not wrote long after one another,) had a particular respect to the *heresies* then growing up, namely, of Cerinthus and the Ebionites^m, who, as they denied the *divinity* of our Saviour, so also denied any *divine Sonship*, antecedent to the birth of the Virgin. Hence it is that St. John so often inculcates, through this Epistle, the necessity of believing in the *Son*. “He that hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life,” chap. v. ver. 12. (See also ver. 10, 11, 13. and chap. iii. ver. 23.) Now, what sort of *Son*, or *Son of God*, St. John must have meant, appears sufficiently from the first chapter of his Gospel: he was the *only-begotten* Logos, that was *with God*, and was *God*, and “by whom all things were made.” Such a *Son of God* as this, the Cerinthians and Ebionites denied our Lord to be; believing him to be a *mere man*, that had no existence before he became man. Nothing therefore could be more directly levelled against those heresies than this very verse of St. John’s Epistle, asserting at once Christ’s *proper Sonship* and his *true divinity*; which indeed amount to one and the same

τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν. *Ibid.* p. 211.

See passages of like import with this last citation from Irenæus, in the authors following:

Tertullian, *Apol.* cap. 21. *De Carn. Christi*, cap. 5. *De Resurr.* cap. 63. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 28. *Novatian*, cap. 18, 19. *Clemens Alex.* p. 251. *Origen. contr. Cels.* p. 131. *Hippolytus*, vol. ii. p. 45. *Cyprian. de Idol. Van.* p. 15. *Testim.* p. 37. *Lactantius*, lib. iv. cap. 13, 25.

^m Scripsit Evangelium, rogatus ab Asiæ Episcopis, adversus Cerinthum, aliosque hæreticos, et maxime tunc Ebionitarum dogma consurgens, qui asserunt, Christum ante Mariam non

fuisse, unde et compulsus est, *divinam ejus nativitatem edicere. Hieron. Catal. Script.* n. ix. p. 105.

Irenæus, before Jerome, testifies that St. John’s Gospel was wrote particularly against the error of Cerinthus. *Iren. lib. iii. cap. 11.*

The same Irenæus intimates, that St. John’s Epistle pointed at the same *heresy*. *Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206.* And Tertullian is still more particular in these words:

In Epistola, eos maxime Antichristos vocat, qui Christum negarent in carne venisse, et qui non putarent Jesum esse *Filium Dei*: illud Marcion, hoc Hebion vindicavit. *Tertull. Præscript. adv. Hæres.* cap. 33.

thing. These considerations put together abundantly make good our interpretation of this controverted text. But the author of *Scripture Doctrine*ⁿ is pleased to censure our construction of this passage of St. John as *modern*. "Some moderns," he says, "refer this to Christ; but others, with all the ancients, understand it of God the Father." It may be thought somewhat hard to have a construction censured as *modern*, which has undoubtedly prevailed in the Christian Church thirteen centuries upwards^o, if not higher. The Catholics of the fourth century cited it in this sense, without the least scruple, and without any intimation, so far as I can find, that it was ever otherwise understood. The Arians themselves, as seems very probable, admitted this construction^p; or certain it is that many of them allowed that the Son was Θεὸς ἀληθινός, *true God*, (I suppose in virtue of this text, since they objected not against the *title* as *unscriptural*.) but they eluded the Catholic sense of it^q. The Ante-Nicene Fathers probably understood the texts just as the Post-Nicene Catholics did; only they had less occasion to cite it, having so many other texts, both of the Old and New Testament, to produce in proof of the Son's being *God*; which was the same with them as *true God*, the distinction between *God* and *true God* being hardly ever started before the Arian controversy. It is a very singular way of speaking, which the author of *Scripture Doctrine* makes use of, when he says, *all the ancients* understood this text of God the Father. Who would not imagine from hence, that some *one*, at least, of the *ancients* might be produced, interpreting the text as he pretends they did? Yet certain it is, that he cannot produce one. The fact is only this; that none of the writers of the three first centuries interpreted this text at all: from whence this author, I suppose, concludes (if we may judge of him from a friend of his, without a name^r) that the text must, in *course*, have been understood of the *Father*. This precarious, groundless inference (without letting his readers know that it is no more than an

ⁿ Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 51. 2nd edition.

^o Athanasius, p. 99, 283, 558, 684, 888. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iv. p. 106. Didym. in loc. Cyril. Alex. Dial. 8. ad calc. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 17. p. 467. Hieron. Not. in Is.

p. 65. August. contr. Max. lib. ii. p. 705. Serm. cxl. p. 681.

^p See Ambrose, Epist. Class. 1. p. 791. ed. Bened.

^q Theodor. Eccl. Hist. lib. 1. p. 28.

^r Modest Plea, &c. p. 261.

inference) he puts upon us as undoubted fact in *Scripture Doctrine*; which is greatly abusing his readers.

The sum then of what hath been pleaded for our interpretation of the passage is, that it is *literal* and *grammatical*; agreeable to the *context*, and to the doctrine of St. John in other places; that it suits perfectly well with the *analogy* of faith, and the undoubted principles of the *primitive Church*; that there is no one instance of any contrary interpretation of the text in all *antiquity*, but all that there are, are fully and clearly for it; that the objections against it are truly *modern*, and, besides, of little or no weight in themselves. Upon the whole, every reasonable man may be left to judge whether this or the other interpretation ought to be preferred. To proceed:

Another *divine title* given to the *Son*, in holy Scripture, is *great God*. "Looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious "appearing of the great God and our Saviour" (or, our great God and Saviour) "Jesus Christ." Tit. ii. 13. What we insist upon here is, that the titles of *great God and Saviour* are, in this passage, equally applied to *Christ*. Our adversaries themselves cannot but confess that the words will *grammatically* bear this construction^t: and we have good reason to believe, that, all things considered, they can fairly bear no other. 1. Because of the omission of the article *τοῦ* before *σωτήρος*, which, in strict propriety of language, should have been inserted, had the Apostle been speaking of two Persons; as the article *generally* is (though not *always*) in such cases, where different subjects are intended^u: and it is observable, that the Apostle goes on in speaking of *Christ* only, without a word of the *Father*, ver. 14. which makes it still the more probable that the *article τοῦ* would have been inserted, had he intended different persons. 2. Because *ἐπιφάνεια*, the *appearing*, is always^x, in the New Testament, ascribed to the Son alone, and never to the Father. For though it be said, Matt. xvi. 27. that "the Son of man shall come or "appear in the glory of his Father," yet it is no where in the New Testament said, that the Father shall *appear*, but the *Son* only. If it be replied, that it is not here said that the *great God*,

^s Προσδεχόμενοι τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα, καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Tit. ii. 13.

^t Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 77.

2nd edition.

^u Vid. M. Martin, *Traité de la Relig. Revel.* part iii. p. 262, &c.

^x See 2 Thess. ii. 8. 1 Tim. vi. 14.

2 Tim. i. 10. iv. 1, 8.

or Father. shall *appear*, but his *glory* only: I answer, that *ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης* does not necessarily signify the appearing of glory, but may properly signify the *glorious appearance*; as it is rightly rendered in our English version^y. Against this construction of the text it is objected^z, that the title of *great God* is, in the Old and New Testament, the character of the *Father*: which, if true, does not prove that it may not, in this place, be the character of the *Son* too. But the fact is very uncertain, and may as easily be denied as asserted. As to the texts of the Old Testament, since there is nothing to distinguish whether they are meant of God the Father, or Son, or both, or of the whole Trinity, no certain argument can be drawn from them. The *God* of Israel is the *great God* there spoken of; and it is begging the question to interpret the passages of the *Father* only. As to the New Testament, there is but one single text cited to this purpose; and it is Rev. xix. 17. where (if that be the true reading) mention is made of the supper of the *great God*; which the objectors imagine to be spoken of the *Father*. But if it be considered that our blessed Saviour is styled “King of kings, and Lord of lords,” ver. 16. but a very little before the supper of the *great God* is mentioned; and that the *Apostle* goes on speaking of *Christ* (not God the Father) described as sitting *on the horse*, ver. 19. comp. ver. 11. and as *slaying* those whose *flesh* was to be given to the *fowls*, ver. 21. that is, as *providing* that very *supper* which is called, ver. 17. “the supper of the great God,” because of the *great God’s providing or making it*: I say, if we lay these things together, we shall be inclined to think that this text of the Revelation, instead of answering the purpose of the objectors, is another evidence of the *Son’s* being styled *great God*; and so helps to confirm our interpretation of the text in Titus, whereof we have been treating. We have seen then that there is no objection of weight to be made against our interpretation.

In confirmation of what hath been urged in favour of our construction of the place, I may observe further, that ^aBasil. Gregory Nyssen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, and Austin, of the

^y See Martin, *Traité de la Relig. Revel.* part iii. cap. 17. p. 271, &c.

^z Clarke’s Reply, p. 86. Modest Plea, &c. p. 250. Comp. True Script. Doctr. p. 26. and True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 84, &c.

^a Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. iv. p. 107. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. p. 265. Epiphani. Ancor. p. 74. Chrysos. tom. i. hom. 30. p. 341. Hom. in Joh. p. 36.

fourth and fifth centuries. interpret the text as we do. And if we may judge of the Arians from Maximin, a celebrated Bishop amongst them of the fifth century. they also admitted the same interpretation^b; so uncontested a thing was it at that time. We have the less reason to wonder at it, because the Ante-Nicene Catholics before, very probably, understood the text in the same sense. For we find ^cClemens of Alexandria, of the second century, and ^dHippolytus of the third, interpreting it in the same way: nor is there any instance in all antiquity, so far as appears, of any contrary or different interpretation. I shall only add, that the title of *great God* was without scruple applied to God the Son by the *ancients*, as appears from express testimonies^e. and as we may reasonably judge from Eusebius's^f so applying it, had we no other testimonies for it.

Mighty God is another *divine title* given to God the Son in holy Scripture. "His name shall be called Wonderful, " Counsellor. The MIGHTY GOD." &c. Is. ix. 6. *El gibbor*, the same title which is given to the one supreme God of Israel, Is. x. 21. Besides that the Hebrew word *El*, as Jerome observes^g, is for the most part the proper title of the one true God. The LXX, as the same Jerome remarks^h in rendering Is. ix. 6, have took a very unusual freedom. For, thinking it strange and harsh to apply the name of *God*, and *Mighty*, &c. to a person just before called a *child*, they chose rather to vary the sense, and to make a comment, instead of a translation, putting *μεγάλης βουλῆς Ἄγγελος*, *Angel of the great counsel*, instead of those other higher titles and epithets. But, more

^b Vid. August. Oper. tom. viii. p. 656.

^c Clem. Alex. p. 7. ed. Ox.

^d Hippolytus de Antichristo, cap. lxi. lxxvii. p. 31. 33. Fabric. It may be doubted whether this piece be genuine.

^e Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. i. cap. 5. p. 112. Testament. Patriarch. Grab. Spic. vol. i. p. 156. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. vii. p. 342.

Origen's meaning is exceeding clear, that to say that *God the Word*, (as such,) or *Truth*, or *Life*, &c. should die, is as much as to say, that the *great God* should die, or become a servant. The *Modest Pleader* therefore (*Modest Plea*, &c. p. 251.) mis-

takes this passage.

^f Euseb. in Psalm. p. 629.

^g *Deus* separatim, qui Hebraice *El* dicitur. Denique in consequentibus ubi legimus: "Tu es enim Deus et " nesciebamus." Et iterum: "Ego " sum Deus, et non est alius præter " me," et multa his similia, pro eo quod in Latino dicitur *Deus*, in Hebraico *El* scriptum est. *Hieron. Comm. in Is. p. 85. ed. Bened.*

^h Qua nominum majestate perterritos LXX reor non esse ausos de *puero* dicere quod aperte *Deus* appellandus sit, et cætera: sed pro his sex nominibus posuisset quod in Hebraico non habetur *magni consilii Angelum*, &c. *Hieron. ibid. p. 86.*

probably, the fault lay not in the LXX Interpreters, but in the Jews, who after Christ's time had corrupted some copies of the LXX. Certain it is that Irenæus, who was a professed admirer and follower of the version of the LXX, (looking upon it as an *inspired* performanceⁱ.) yet quotes not this text of Isaiah, viz. ix. 6. according to the Septuagint, as it now is, or as it was, in some copies at least, in the time of St. Jerome. Eusebius, and even Justin Martyr^k; but according to what it should be, and as it lies in the Hebrew text^l; citing it in proof of the *divinity* of Christ. In like manner, Clemens of Alexandria, though equally an admirer of the Septuagint version^m, yet cites the same text of Isaiah, much after the same sense with Irenæus, and not according to the LXXⁿ; drawing an argument from thence of the greatness, majesty, and essential *divinity* of the Son of God. It is the less to be wondered at, if afterwards we but seldom meet with this text cited in proof of Christ's *divinity*, since the Septuagint, which the primitive fathers chiefly followed and quoted from, exhibited another sense of the passage. Yet we find it cited by Athanasius^o (if that piece be his) and the elder Cyril^p, for that purpose. And there the verse is cited according to the Hebrew original; only taking in part of the LXX's translation: from whence one might suspect that there had been two versions of the same words, and both, by degrees, taken into the text, and tacked together. To what hath been said I shall only add, that the *mighty God*, spoken of Psalm l. 1. has been generally believed by the primitive fathers to be God the Son^q. But there the words *mighty God* are the rendering of *El Elohim*, and signify *God*

ⁱ Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 21. p. 215.

^k See Dial. p. 229. ed. Jebb.

^l Vocatur nomen ejus admirabilis, consiliarius, Deus fortis. Deus fortis est, et inenarrabile habet genus. Iren. p. 273.

^m Vid. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 410.

ⁿ Θαυμαστός σύμβουλος, Θεός δυναστής, πατήρ αιώμιος—ὡ τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ ὡ τοῦ τελείου παιδίου υἱὸς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ πατήρ ἐν υἱῷ. Clem. Alex. Pæd. lib. i. p. 112.

Θεὸν ἰσχυρὸν, Θεὸν παιδίον κηρύττει. Dionys. Alex. Epist. contr. Paul. Samos. p. 852. Labb.

^o Καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ μεγάλης βουλῆς Ἄγγελος, θαυμαστός, σύμ-

βουλος, Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς, ἐξουσιαστής, ἄρχων εἰρήνης, πατήρ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. Athan. de Incarn. contr. Arian. cap. xxii. p. 889. Comp. Apost. Constit. lib. v. cap. 16. Pseud. Ignat. ad Antioch. cap. 3.

^p Καλεῖται τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ μεγάλης βουλῆς τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς Ἄγγελος, θαυμαστός σύμβουλος, Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς, &c.

Εἰ σὺν Θεὸς ἰσχυρὸς τοῦτο τὸ παιδίον, περὶ αὐτοῦ δῆλον εἶρηκε Δαβίδ. Ὁφθῆσεται ὁ Θεὸς τῶν Θεῶν ἐν Σιών. Psal. lxxxiii. 8. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 332. Ox.

^q See Iren. lib. iii. cap. 6. p. 180. Cyprian. adv. Jud. lib. ii. cap. 28. p. 48. et de Bon. Patient. p. 220. Euseb. in Psal. p. 209.

of gods; which however, in sense, are at least tantamount to the other.

Another *divine title* ascribed to the Son in holy Scripture is, "over all God blessed for ever," Rom. ix. 5. That this is said of *Christ*, not of God the *Father*, appears from the whole context, and the very form^r of expression. 'Ο ὦν naturally refers to the person of *Christ* immediately before spoken of: and the *antithesis*^s between what he is according to the *flesh*, and what according to the *spirit*, requires it. Thus all the *ancients*,^t Catholics and heretics, constantly understood the words, referring them to *Christ*, as here called "over all God blessed for ever." The author of *Scripture Doctrine* says, that "the word "Θεός, *God*, is wanting in many MSS^u." But, I presume, Bp. Pearson and Dr. Mills, who both declare all the manuscripts have it^x, may be believed, till he produces his vouchers, or explains his meaning. The *reading* of the place being fixed and certain, and its reference to *Christ* no less certain^y, as well from the context itself, as from the constant, uniform sense of all antiquity, we may now proceed to consider the force and significancy of the phrase, "over all God blessed for ever." Our blessed Lord is not only here called *God*, but God with a very high epithet, *over all*, ἐπὶ πάντων, the very same that is applied to the Father himself, Eph. iv. 6. and is there rendered *above all*. Besides this, there is the addition of εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, *blessed for ever*: which again is the very same that St. Paul applies to the eternal *Creator*, Rom. i. 25. Add to this, that the title of *blessed*, as Bishop Pearson observes, "of itself elsewhere signifies the supreme God, and was always "used by the Jews to express that one God of Israel^z."

^r Comp. 2 Cor. xi. 31.

^s Comp. Rom. i. 3, 4. See Grabe's Not. in Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. cap. 3.

^t See the testimonies referred to in Dr. Mills. To which may be added Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. vi. p. 10. ed. Fabric. vol. 2.

^u Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2nd ed. Comp. Reply, p. 86. and Modest Plea, p. 142.

^x The pretence of Erasmus from the fathers is vain; and as vain is that of Grotius from the Syriac translation, which hath in it the name of *God* expressly, as well as *all the copies of the original*, and all the rest of the

translations. *Pearson on the Creed*, art. ii. p. 133.

Non tantum codd. omnino nulli omittunt Θεός, sed neque ipsa Syriaca versio. Verbo dicam lectionem hanc præferunt MSS. omnes. *Mills in locum*.

^y Some have pretended to understand the words "over all God "blessed," &c. of God the Father, whose pretences see confuted by Dr. Grabe in his Remarks on Mr. Whiston's Collection of Testimonies, p. 23, 24, &c.

^z *Pearson on the Creed*, art. ii. p. 133.

In answer to our argument from this text, it is said, that if “Christ be God over all, yet it is manifest that he is excepted, “by communication of whose divine power and supreme authority Christ is God over all^a.” Without doubt, the *Father* is excepted out of the number of those things, *over* which the Son is God. No Catholic ever pretended otherwise. Those general expressions, *over all*, &c. leave room for such *tacit* exceptions as either other Scriptures or the reason of the thing shews, ought to be made. And this, we hope, will be remembered, in favour of the *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, as often as the Father is said to be *above all*, &c. that such expressions may not be strained beyond their just and proper meaning. As to what is hinted under the word *communication*, by way of lessening, it is hardly deserving notice. *Supreme power*, whether communicated or uncommunicated, is *supreme power*: and if the Son has it *communicated*, then certainly he has it; which is sufficient to our purpose. Only we must observe, that the text now under consideration says nothing of what is *communicated*, but of what *is*: *ὁ ὢν*, who *is*, not *ὁ διατεταγμένος*, who is *appointed*, over all, &c. It is very trifling in our adversaries to refer us to 1 Cor. xv. 27, where it is said, that “all things are “put under” Christ: as if the force of our argument lay more in the words “over all.” than in the words “God blessed for “ever;” or as if Christ’s *mediatorial kingdom*, commencing at the resurrection, can any way account for his being *God*, which he certainly was before the *creation*. See John i. 1. compared with Coloss. i. 15, 16, &c.

Another *divine title* given to the Son in holy Scripture is *Jehovah*, the incommunicable name of the one true God. The fact I need not here prove, having done it elsewhere^b; besides that it is readily confessed by our adversaries^c. That the name *Jehovah* has reference to the *necessary existence* of the person so named in his *own right*, is acknowledged by the best critics, ancient and modern; and admitted even by our adversaries^d. And since they have no good reason to suspect that the Son of God hath it not in his *own right*, we may have leave to infer that he is *necessarily existing*, as well as the Father. To this it is

^a Clarke’s Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2nd ed.

^b Serm. i. p. 42. &c. Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 308, 309.

^c Clarke’s Reply, p. 142, 163. Modest Plea, p. 21.

^d See Clarke’s Reply, p. 164. Comp. Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2nd ed.

objected, that then there will be two *Jehovahs*, Father and Son^c. To which it is answered, that two *necessarily existing* persons may as well be one *Jehovah*, as *one God*; and to assert the contrary is only taking for granted the main thing to be proved. It is further pretended, that *Jehovah* is not the name of the *essence* or *substance*, but of the *person* whose it is. Had it been said of the *persons*. instead of the *person*. whose it is, we should have no occasion to differ: but to suppose it the name of one person *only*, is begging the question. *Jehovah* is the name of as many persons as are of the same *necessarily existing* substance; and is sometimes taken *essentially* and sometimes *personally*, in like manner as the name *God*. It is further said, that *Jehovah* is the *name of a living person*. not of an *abstract substance*^f. As if they, who suppose it the name of *three living persons*, were not as clear of this charge of making it the name of an *abstract substance*, as they who make it the name of *one only*. No one supposes it to be the name of an *abstract substance*, but the name of a *person*, or *persons*, expressing *his* or *their* substance considered as *necessarily existing*. Whatever *abstraction* there is, in this partial way of considering any thing, or things, under such precise formality, as *necessarily existing*, it holds equally, whether *Jehovah* be the name of one *person*, or more: for neither one *person* nor more are called *Jehovah*, $\delta\ \delta\nu$, or $\tau\delta\ \delta\nu$, any otherwise considered than as *necessarily existing*. This being really the case, our adversaries, upon their *own hypothesis*, may as well suppose it the name of an *abstract substance*, as they may upon *ours*. For whenever they consider a person merely as *necessarily existing*, they do not, under the *same* notion, conceive him under a *different* notion; the *same idea* being neither more nor less than the *same idea*. They must in this case abstract from the *idea* of personality, and consider the person no further than as the subject or *substratum* of that one property of *necessary existence*: and consequently they make *Jehovah*, thus precisely considered, the name of an *abstract substance*, as much as we: though, in strict propriety of language, neither they nor we do it at all. For, *abstract substance* is indeed solecism in speech; nothing being properly *abstract* except ideas. But I proceed:

^c See Modest Plea, &c. p. 274.

See the same objection repeated, p.

^f See Modest Plea, &c. p. 293. 160, 163, 252, 273, 274, 281.

Another *divine title* ascribed to God the Son, in holy Scripture, is *Almighty*, as we imperfectly render the Greek word, παντοκράτωρ. The most remarkable passage to our purpose is in the first chapter of the Apocalypse. "Behold, he cometh with clouds: and every eye shall see him, and they also which pierced him: and all kindreds of the earth shall wail because of him. Even so, Amen. I am Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the ALMIGHTY." Rev. i. 7, 8. All the ancients, both before and after the Council of Nice, understand this of God the Son^g. This alone is a strong presumption in favour of our construction; especially when there is nothing in the context but what confirms it, rather than otherwise. The verse immediately preceding relates to *Christ*, who is to "come in the clouds," and whom every "eye shall see:" and the title of *Alpha* and *Omega* in the same verse is applied to *Christ* more than once in the Revelations^h. A late writer, on the contrary, objectsⁱ that, ver. 4. of this chapter, the words, "he which is, and which was, and which is to come," are used as the distinguishing character of the Person of the Father. He might as well argue that the words "Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the End," chap. xxi. 6. are used as the distinguishing character of the Person of the Father; and therefore that character cannot be applied to Christ in Rev. xxii. 13. or in Rev. i. 17. where *First* and *Last* amounts to the same. It is no strange thing to find the same *characters*, in the same Scriptures, applied both to Father and Son. It is what we assert and contend for, and from thence prove that Father and Son are equally *divine*. It is mere *petitio principii*, or, taking for granted the thing in question, to suppose that such characters are to *distinguish* the Father from the Son, only because they are applied to the Father. For we can more justly argue on the other side, that they are not distin-

^g Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 17. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. vi. p. 10. Fabric. Origen *περὶ Ἀρχ.* lib. i. cap. 2. Athanasius, p. 415, 554, 684, 762. ed. Bened. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 573. Phæbad. B. P. tom. 4. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 476. Hieron. in Zech. ii. p. 1718. ed. Bened. Epiphan. vol. i. p. 488. ed. Petav. August. de Symb. ad Catech. lib. 2.

Andr. Cæsariens. in loc. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 537, 538.

^h Revel. i. 11, 17. ii. 8. xxii. 13. chap. i. ver. 17, and 18. the words are, *ὁ πρῶτος, καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, καὶ ὁ ζῶν, &c.* *The living One*: comp. Numb. xiv. 21. καὶ ζῶν τὸ ὄνομά μου. Septuag.

ⁱ Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 53. 2nd ed.

guishing of the *Father*, as *Father*, because we find them equally applied both to Father and Son. Another objection is, that the *best manuscripts* read *Κύριος ὁ Θεός*, the *Lord God*, instead of *ὁ Κύριος*, the *Lord*: which is not of great weight, since many other MSS. favour the present reading; besides that if all the MSS. had *Lord God* instead of *Lord*, it would be only a further proof that Christ is *Lord God*, consonant to other Scriptures, and to all antiquity. Origen, Ambrose, and Jerome suppose *Lord God* to be in the text; and yet scruple not to understand it of *God the Son*; as indeed they had no reason for scruple. It is objected further^k, that *παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, is always applied to the *Father only*, in the most ancient writers: which is notoriously false in fact, as appears from their understanding this very text of the Son; besides other collateral evidences^l. The last pretence is that the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, is always elsewhere, in Scripture, applied to the Father only. To which I answer, 1st, that it is mere groundless presumption to suppose that as often as that title is applied to the one *God* in the Old Testament, it is applied to the *Father only*: since it may often be understood indifferently either of Father, or Son, or of the whole Trinity. And 2dly, that there are several texts of the Old Testament, which we have good reason to believe are to be understood particularly of *God the Son*. Psalm the xxivth has by the primitive Fathers^m been interpreted of *Christ*. Now that *Κύριος δυνάμεων*, *Lord of hosts*, applied to Christ in that Psalm, is equivalent to *Κύριος παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, appears from hence, that the LXX Interpreters render the same words indifferently by one or other, as is observedⁿ by Ambrose and Jerome; and may be easily seen in a multitude of instances, by looking into Trommius's

^k Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 53. 2nd ed.

^l Justin. Mart. Application of Ps. xxiv. 10. Dial. p. 107. Jeb. Clem. Alex. p. 277, 647, 831. Tertullian. adv. Prax. cap. 17. Origen *περὶ Ἀρχ.* lib. i. cap. 2. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. vol. ii. p. 10. Fabric. Euseb. Demonstrat. Evang. lib. vi. cap. 16. p. 281. Comp. Euseb. in Psalm. p. 417. Comm. in Isa. p. 374, 435.

^m Justin Martyr. Dial. p. 197. Cyprian. adv. Jud. lib. ii. cap. 49. p. 49, 50. Origen in Matt. p. 438. Euseb. in loc. Ambros. de Fid. lib.

iv. cap. 1. p. 523.

ⁿ Nam et hic sic positum plerique codices habent, quod *Dominus Sabaoth ipse sit Rex gloriæ*: Sabaoth autem interpretes alicubi *Dominum Virtutum*, alicubi *Regem*, alicubi *Omnipotentem* interpretati sunt. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 1. p. 524. ed. Bened.

Sciendumque quia ubique Septuaginta Interpretes *Dominum Virtutum*, et *Dominum Omnipotentem* expresserint, in Hebræo sit positum *Dominus Sabaoth*. Hieron. tom. iii. p. 519. Vid. etiam tom. iii. p. 1718.

Concordance. Besides that St. John himself in his Apocalypse, iv. 8. alluding to a passage of Isaiah, vi. 3. "Holy, holy, holy, " is the Lord of hosts;" instead of *Κύριος δυνάμεων*, (or *σαβαώθ*,) "Lord of hosts:" puts *Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ*, "Lord God Almighty." It may be proved likewise from Isa. vi. 5. compared with John xii. 41. (as I have formerly observed^o,) that our Saviour Christ is "Lord of hosts," that is, *Κύριος παντοκράτωρ*, or *Lord Almighty*. The same may be further proved from Zech. ii. 8. as is noted by the learned Eusebius^p: who is therein followed by Ambrose and Jerome. And a further proof of the same thing may be evidently drawn from Zech. xii. 5, 10. compared with John xix. 34, 37. These instances are sufficient to check the confidence of such as roundly affirm, without a syllable of proof, that the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, is in holy Scripture applied always to the *Father only*.

As to the three remaining *divine titles* given to the *Son* in holy Scripture, I shall but just mention them, not having room to enlarge. He is called "the Lord of glory," 1 Cor. ii. 8; which if compared with the title of "King of glory." Psalm xxiv. and the description there given, will appear to be a title of great weight and significancy. "King of kings and Lord of lords," is another *divine title* attributed to Christ, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16. This very title is made the distinguishing character of the one true God by St. Paul, in these words: "Who is the blessed and "only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords," 1 Tim. vi. 15. The last *divine title* I intend to mention, and barely to mention, is that of "First and Last, Alpha and Omega, the "Beginning and the End," Rev. i. 17. xxii. 13. the same that is applied to the one supreme God," Isa. xli. 4. xlv. 6. and to God the Father, Rev. xxi. 6. The force of these expressions I have elsewhere^q opened and explained, and need not here add any thing further.

^o Serm. i. p. 42, 43.

^p Vid. Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. vi. cap. 16. p. 281. Hieron. in loc. p. 1718. Ambros. de Fid. lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 476.

^q See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 340. and Chaldee Paraphrase upon Isa. xli. 4.

N. B. The anonymous author of *Modest Plea continued*, p. 12. endeavours to elude the force of these texts.

1st, By referring to the words, "I am "he that liveth and was dead," &c. Rev. i. 17, 18. But he would have done well to have considered the force of *ὁ ζῶν*. See the first Letter to the Author of the History of Montanism, p. 92. 2dly, By referring to Rev. iii. 14. which I have explained Serm. ii. and which confirms the sense I had given of *Alpha* and *Omega*. 3dly, By remitting us to Rev. xiii. 16. which is

Thus far I have proceeded in recounting, explaining, and vindicating the several *divine titles* ascribed to God the Son in holy Scripture. *Particular* objections to this or that, I have took care to answer in their proper places: *general* objections against the whole, intended to weaken the conclusion we draw from them, shall be considered hereafter. But it will be proper, in the mean while, to take a view of the *divine attributes* applied, in Scripture, to our blessed Saviour. These therefore, if God permit, are to be the subject of discourse at our next meeting.

no explication of the phrase of *First* and *Last*, but very wide and foreign. 4thly, By referring to Heb. xii. 2. which if it be a good comment upon Isa. xli. 4. xliv. 6. xlviii. 12. and Rev. i. 8. xxi. 6. then let it be also a just explication of the parallel texts, Rev. i. 11, 17. ii. 8. xxii. 13. But if the contrary be manifest in one case, we must have something more than mere conjectures and fancies, before we

admit it in the other. The phrase *First* and *Last* expresses, 1st, the peerless majesty of God, who is he, the *true God*, Is. xliii. 4. 2dly, Eternity. Comp. Isa. xliii. 10. 3dly, Supreme power, dignity, and glory. See Isa. xliv. 6, 7, 8. 4thly, Creation and government of all things. See Isa. xlviii. 12, &c.

Vid. M. Abbadie on the Divinity of Christ, p. 77, &c. 183.

Divine Attributes ascribed to Christ:

OR

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM HIS ATTRIBUTES.

The seventh Sermon preached March 2, 17 $\frac{19}{20}$.

JOHN xvi. 15.

All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you.

IN a former discourse upon these words, I observed that they contained two arguments to prove the *divinity* of our blessed Lord: the *first* of which arises from this consideration, that the influences, gifts, and graces of *God's own Spirit*, with the *glory* of them, are ascribed to *Christ*; and the *second* is, that all things which the Father hath are by our blessed Lord claimed as his *own*. After a brief account of the first argument, I proceeded more at large to open and illustrate the second, proposing these three particulars:

1. To shew that the *divine titles* are ascribed to the *Son* in holy Scripture.

2. To shew that the *divine attributes* are likewise ascribed to him.

3. To sum up the force of the argument arising from thence, and to obviate such general objections as tend to weaken our conclusion.

I had then only time to go through the first of these three particulars; recounting the several *divine titles*, which are in Scripture applied to God the Son, as well as to God the Father. I proceed now,

II. To shew that the same *divine attributes* are likewise

ascribed to both. I shall insist particularly upon four; *eternity*, *immortality*, *omniscience*, and *omnipresence*; of which in their order.

1. The Scripture-proofs of the *eternity* of God the Son are many and clear; and may be divided into two sorts, being either *implicit* and *indirect*, or *explicit* and *direct*. The implicit or indirect proofs I shall but briefly mention, as belonging to other parts of my design, and not so properly coming in here. If the Son be *God* in the strict and proper sense, as I have before shewn, he is of course *eternal*. But this I pass over here, my design being now, not to prove him to be *eternal* because he is *God*, but to prove that he is *God* because he is *eternal*; founding thereupon a new and distinct argument of Christ's *divinity*.

I have before shewn that Rev. i. 8. is to be understood of *God the Son*. And now I must observe, that that single text affords two arguments of his *eternity*. He is "Alpha and Omega, the Beginning and the Ending:" which is the very description given of the *eternity* of the one God of Israel^a; and which our adversaries themselves would not scruple to interpret as we do, provided only they might be permitted to understand the text of God the *Father*. Besides this, the Son is also "he which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty." Our adversaries allow that these words denote *independent eternity*^b. Only they are pleased, without any grounds for it, to understand them of *God the Father*; having beforehand settled it as a rule of interpretation with themselves, that every text of this kind shall be understood of *God the Father*; or else that the very same phrases, when applied to *God the Son*, shall lose their significancy, and bear a very different meaning from what they do when applied to *God the Father*.

The Son's being *Jehovah* is a further proof of his *eternity*; that name expressing, as critics allow, *necessary existence*. Our adversaries would never scruple this construction of the name *Jehovah*^c, could they but find a way to confine the name, as they

^a See my Defence, vol. i. p. 340. Serm. vi. p. 143, 144.

^b Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 264. 2nd edit.

^c See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 88. 2nd ed. where he interprets ὁ ὢν and τὸ ὢν, the *self-existent Being*, or *Person*; and, to confound his readers, puts

self-existent instead of *necessarily existing*. Compare Reply, p. 164. and Script. Doctr. p. 264. See also Modest Plea, p. 163. where the author admits that the word *Jehovah* alludes to *self-existence*, (he should have said *necessary existence*;) and tells us that it signifies *him, whose that essence is,*

do the *thing*, to the Father only. But having an *hypothesis* to serve, and resolving that words shall not signify what they really do, any further than is consistent with their preconceived opinions, they are forced either to deny that the name *Jehovah* signifies *necessary existence* at all, or at least to deny that it so signifies when applied to God the Son. Such is their *partiality* in this momentous cause, in which the honour of their *God* and *Saviour* is so nearly and deeply concerned. But I proceed. The *eternity* of God the Son is further proved from his *creative powers*, which I have before explained and vindicated at large; and more directly from those passages of holy Scripture which declare him to have existed before all creatures^d. For if he existed before any thing was *made*, he must of consequence be *unmade*, and therefore *eternal*.

There is a famous passage of the Prophet Micah relating to this head, which is too considerable to be omitted: “ But thou, ‘ Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands ‘ of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is ‘ to be Ruler in Israel, whose goings forth have been from of ‘ old, from everlasting.” Mic. v. 2. Here is a plain description of two *comings forth*: one when *Christ* should be born in Bethlehem; the other long before “ from of old,” and “ from everlasting.” This passage is a full and clear proof of *Christ’s* preexistence before his birth of the Virgin, and a probable proof, at least, of an *eternal*^e preexistence. Here are two expressions, “ from of old,” and “ from everlasting;” the rendering of two Hebrew phrases, either of which singly does sometimes denote *eternity* in the strict sense^f, and therefore both together may be thought to do so much rather: especially if it be considered that here is no limitation of time intimated in the context; nor

meaning the *Father* only; adding a weak reason or two, why the same name, when applied to God the Son, shall not signify the same thing, viz. *necessary existence*.

^d John i. 3, 10. Coloss. i. 16. I Cor. viii. 6.

^e Cyril’s note upon this text is worth observing: Μη οὖν πρόσεχε τῷ νῦν ἐκ τῆς Βηθλεέμ, ἀλλὰ προσκύνει τὸν αἰδίως ἐκ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα. μη χρονικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ καταδέξῃ τινὸς λέγοντος, ἀλλὰ ἄχρονον ἀρχὴν γίνωσκε τὸν πατέρα. *Cyrill. Catech.* xi. p. 145.

Αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δύο ἔξοδοι, ἧγον πρόοδοι, ἡ μὲν πρῶται πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰῶνων ἐκ πατρὸς γενομένη, κατὰ τό· αἱ ἔξοδοι αὐτοῦ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ἐξ ἡμερῶν αἰῶνος· ἡ δὲ ἐσπέρας, ἡ ἐκ παρθένου, ἧτις ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰῶνων ἀπήτησεν. *Athanasii, Eusebii, et Cyrilli Fragm. in Psalm. apud Athan.* tom. i. p. 1256. ed. Bened. Vid. et Hieron. in loc. Epiphani. Ancor. p. 32. Euseb. Dem. Ev. lib. vii. cap. 2.

^f For the first, see Psalm lv. 19. Hab. i. 12. For the second, Psalm xc. 2. xciii. 2.

is there any deducible from the nature or reason of the thing itself. However, I pretend to call this construction of the passage no more than *probable*; since there is not ground sufficient for calling it *certain* and *indisputable*. Only this I may add, by way of remark, that whosoever should undertake to prove the *eternity* of God the Father from any *express* words, either of the Old or New Testament, would find his proof of it liable to the same difficulty and *uncertainty*, from the ambiguity of the Hebrew or Greek phrases used to denote *eternity*.

Another argument, of like kind with the former, to prove the *eternity* of God the Son, may be drawn from Solomon's description of *Wisdom*, Prov. viii. 22, 30. The Jews of old, and the Christian Church from the beginning, understood that passage of a *Person*, the *substantial Wisdom* of God^h, (either the *WORD*, or the *Holy Spirit*, but generally the former.) And this was no matter of dispute between the Catholics and Arians formerly; neither is it, as I conceive, at this day. The only dispute is, whether we are right in our interpreting the phrases, *from the beginning, from everlasting, &c.* (Proverbs viii. 23.) of a strict eternity. It must be owned that our argument, so far as it is built merely upon the critical meaning of the phrases, and their usage in Scripture, amounts only to a strong probability; as in the text of Micah before spoken of. But it may receive some additional strength from several other considerations, which it may be proper to mention. *Wisdom* is here said to have been with the "Lord in the beginning of his way, before his works .. of old;" (ver. 22.) that is, before the works of creation; before there were any creatures; consequently from all eternity. *Wisdom* is further said to have been "by him, as one brought up .. with him;" (ver. 30.) which seems to be a very easy and natural description of two that had been always together co-eternal with each other: which is further confirmed from the following words, "and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always .. before him;" (ver. 30.) intimating, as Origen has well observedⁱ, that the Father can no more be supposed to have

^g See Allix, Judgment of the Jewish Church.

^h Just. Mart. Dial. p. 184, 375, ed. Jebb. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253. Clem. Alex. p. 832. Tertull. contr. Herm. cap. xviii. contr. Prax. cap. vi. Origen. Comm. in Joh. p. 11, 17, 33,

36. Athenagoras, p. 40. Theoph. Antioch. p. 82.

ⁱ Οὐ θέμις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἀκίνδυνον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν ἡμῶν τὸ, ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἀποστερεῖσθαι τὸν Θεὸν τοῦ ἀεὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ λόγου μονογενοῦς, σοφίας ὕψους ἢ προσέχειν. οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲ

been ever without the WORD, or Λόγος, (here signified under the name of WISDOM,) than he can be supposed to have ever wanted joy and happiness. But what most of all confirms us in this sentiment is, the Son's being here represented, as we are now to suppose, under the name and figure of Wisdom; intimating that he is as near to, and inseparable from, God the Father, as his own wisdom is; and consequently coeternal. This also is taken notice of by Origen; who from thence draws an argument for the eternity of the Logos, or Word^k.

What has been here said reminds me of some other arguments, near akin to that now mentioned, of the eternity of God the Son, drawn from the several names ascribed to him in holy Scripture: such as, Λόγος, Δύναμις, Φῶς, Ἀλήθεια, Ζωή, that is, Word, Power of God, Light, Truth, Life, and the like. The ancients were of opinion that the eternity of God the Son was insinuated in those names^l: that the Father could no more be without the Son, than without thought, or power, or light, or

ἀεὶ χαίρων βοηθήσεται. Origen. apud Athanas. Decret. S. Nic. p. 233.

^k Origen. Comm. in Joh. p. 43, 44. Comp. Pamph. Apolog. p. 230. ed. Bened. int. Op. Hieron. vol. v.

^l Ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, νοῦς αἰδῖος ὢν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον, αἰδῖως λογικὸς ὢν. Athen. Leg. cap. x. p. 39.

Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus præter illum. Ceterum, ne tunc quidem solus; habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso; Rationem suam scilicet. Rationalis enim Deus, et Ratio in ipso prius; et ita ab ipso omnia. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. iv. p. 503.

Κατανοεῖται γὰρ ὁ τολμῶν καὶ λέγων, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ὁ υἱός, ὅτι ἐρεῖ καὶ τό. σοφία ποτὲ οὐκ ἦν, καὶ λόγος οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ζωὴ οὐκ ἦν. Orig. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 233.

Αὐτῷ γὰρ πειθόμεθα τῷ εἰπόντι—Ἐγὼ εἶμι ἡ Ἀλήθεια· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως τις ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνδράποδος, ὡς οἴεσθαι ὅτι ἡ τῆς Ἀληθείας οὐσία πρὸ τῶν χρόνων τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἦν. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. viii. p. 386.

Αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ὢν πολὺς ἦν, οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄσοφος, οὔτε ἀδύνατος, οὔτε ἀβούλευτος ἦν. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. x. p. 13. Fabric.

^l Ἀεὶ δὲ ἦν, εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστὶν—

καὶ εἰ λόγος, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις ὁ Χριστός.—ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις οὐσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ τυγχάνουσιν. εἰ τοίνυν γέγονεν ὁ υἱός, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα· ἦν ἄρα καιρὸς, ὅτε χωρὶς τούτων ἦν ὁ Θεός. ἀποπάτατον δὲ τοῦτο. Dionys. Rom. apud Athan. tom. i. p. 232.

Ἀεὶ τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, λόγον ὄντα, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτων ἄγονος ὢν, ὁ Θεὸς εἶτα ἐπαιδοποιήσατο—ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὢν φωτὸς αἰδῖου, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς αἰδῖος ἐστίν.—ὄντος οὖν αἰωνίου τοῦ πατρὸς, αἰώνιος ὁ υἱός ἐστι, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς ὢν—οὐδέ ἐστὶν οὔτε ὁ νοῦς ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄνους ὁ λόγος. Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 253, &c.

Τὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀνόσιον τὸ λέγειν, ποτὲ μὴ εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν λέγουσαν—ἐγὼ ἤμην ἢ προσέχαιρεν. ἢ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ποτὲ. ἢ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ ἠκρωτηριάσθαι ποτὲ, ἢ τὰ ἄλλα ἐξ ὧν ὁ υἱὸς γνωρίζεται καὶ ὁ πατὴρ χαρακτηρίζεται. τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λέγειν, συναναίρει καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον φῶς, οὐ ἐστὶν ἀπαύγασμα. Alexand. Alex. Epist. ap. Theod. lib. i. cap. iv. p. 13.

Πῶς δὲ, εἰ λόγος καὶ σοφία ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱός, ἦν ποτὲ ὅτε οὐκ ἦν; ἴσον γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοὺς λέγειν ἄλογον καὶ ἄσοφον ποτὲ τὸν Θεόν. Id. apud Socr. lib. i. cap. 6. p. 11.

truth, or *life*; the Son being deciphered and figured under those names or characters, on purpose to express his near relation to the Father, and his *inseparable coeternity*. This argument of the primitive Catholic Fathers I am the more willing to take notice of, because it has been strangely, though perhaps undesignedly, misrepresented by some late writers^m. We are told that to *argue*, as the ancients did, that the "Father considered without the Son would be without reason and without wisdom, is supposing the Son to be nothing but an attribute of the Father." But this is grossly mistaking the sense of those primitive writers, who were no less men than Athenagoras, Tertullian, Origen, Hippolytus, Dionysius of Rome, with the other Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander bishop of Alexandria: men that had not quite lost their senses when they wrote these things; most of them notoriously known to have been strenuous opposers of the Noëtian or Sabellian principle, which supposes the Son to be nothing more than an *attribute* of the *Father*. The truth is, these primitive writers did suppose, since the Son had the same names given him in Scripture that God's *attributes* have, (being called the *wisdom*, the *reason*, and the *power*, &c. of God,) that there was some meaning and significancy in those names: and they took it to be this; that the Son was near and dear unto the Father as his own *attributes*; *inseparable* from him, and *coeternal* with him. Some moderns may indeed assign other reasons for the *Son's* having those *names*: they may tell us that he is called the *wisdom* of God and the *power* of God, because "God's wisdom and power are manifested by him." But then let them own that this is but *conjecture* at most, *novel* conjecture; and that the reason assigned by the primitive Fathers may be true, for any thing that appears to the contrary; nay, is much more likely to be true, considering how near many of those writers lived to the *apostolic* time, and how unanimous they were in those sentiments, and how suitable those sentiments are to the other high things said in Scripture of the Son of God: besides that these *names* and *characters* are not common to other things; not given to *prophets* or *apostles*, nor to the very *angels*, (though God's *wisdom*, &c. is manifested by them,) but are, in a manner, peculiar to the

^m Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 255, Plea, &c. p. 308, 39.
 257. 2nd ed. Reply, p. 177. Modest. ⁿ See Clarke's Reply, p. 173.

Son of God. We find the Catholics afterwards, following the example of their predecessors, frequently insisting upon the same way of reasoning in proof of the Son's *eternity*^o: which I the rather observe, because it is evident that those later writers especially were very far from supposing the Son to be nothing but an *attribute*: and indeed it is but misrepresentation, without so much as any probable ground, to charge it upon the Ante-Nicene writers; though they may sometimes have expressed themselves more briefly or obscurely on that head.

There is another argument of the Son's *eternity* insisted on by some, even of the Ante-Nicene Catholics^p, drawn from the consideration of the Son's being the *express image* of the Father's *Person*, according to Heb. i. 3. and consequently resembling him in every perfection, and particularly in his *eternity*, the prime perfection of all. But I proceed:

There is one passage more in the New Testament, which has been usually brought in proof of *Christ's* eternity. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. vii. introduces Melchisedec as a type of *Christ*. Of him he says, that he had "no beginning of days, nor end of life:" that is, no beginning nor ending of his priesthood is any where recorded. This is a typical repre-

^o Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅτε ἄλογος ἦν, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτε οὐ πατήρ, οὐδὲ ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἀληθής, ἢ ἄσσοφος, ἢ ἀδύνατος, ἢ ζωῆς ἐνδεής, ἢ λαμπρότητος, ἢ ἀγαθότητος. *Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxv. p. 574.*

Ideo *Sapientia Dei* appellatur, ut nunquam Pater sine *Sapientia*, hoc est, sine Filio suo fuisse credatur. *Pseudo-Ambros. de Fide Orthod. cap. ii. p. 349. Vid. Alexand. Ep. Encycl. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 339. Athan. tom. i. p. 221, 416, 419, 423, 424, 428, 470, 500, 619. Phæbad. contr. Arian. p. 303. B. P. tom. iv. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. vii. p. 633, 634. Cyrill. Alex. de Trinit. p. 6. Op. tom. vi. Paris. Thesaur. lib. i. p. 23, 31.*

N.B. Their way of reasoning from other names and characters of God the Son, clearly shews their meaning in the argument drawn from the absurdity of supposing the Father to be *ἄλογος*, *ἄσσοφος*, &c. A few examples more will suffice, to leave with the *judicious*.

Πότε γὰρ εἶδέ τις φῶς χωρὶς τοῦ

ἀπανάσματος;—ἢ πῶς οὐ μαίνεται πλέον, ὁ καὶ ἐνθυμούμενος ἄλογον καὶ ἄσσοφόν ποτε τὸν Θεόν; τοιαῦτα γὰρ παραδείγματα, καὶ τοιαύτας τὰς εἰκόνας ἔθηκεν ἡ γραφή, ἵν' &c. *Athan. p. 500. Compare p. 221, 416, 428. ὁ ὢν Θεὸς ἦν ποτε ἄλογος; καὶ φῶς ὢν ἀφεγγῆς ἦν. Compare p. 618. and p. 683.*

Noli ergo credere quod fuerit momentum aliquod, quo fuerit sine *sapientia Deus*, aut sine *splendore lux*. *Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 13. p. 460.*

Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ, οὔτε ὑπόστασιν ἀχαρακτήριστον, οὔτε ἀλαμπῆ δόξαν, οὔτε ἄσσοφον Θεόν οὐκ ἄχειρα δημιουργόν, οὐκ ἄλογον ἀρχὴν, οὐκ ἄπαιδα πατέρα. *Gregor. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat. vii. p. 634. Comp. p. 633.*

Πότε οὖν ἦν ὁ πατήρ χωρὶς τοῦ ἰδίου ἀπανάσματος; Πότε οὐκ ἦν ἐν πατρὶ τὸ φῶς αὐτοῦ; *Cyrill. Alex. Thesaur. lib. i. p. 21. Compare p. 23, 27, 28.*

^p Origen. apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 233. Alexand. Alex. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 17.

sentation of *Christ*; wherefore it seems that *Christ* must *really* have what the *type* was no more than a faint resemblance of, viz. an eternal existence without *beginning* and without *end*. That he shall never have *end of life*, is uncontested. If therefore to have *no end of life* imports a future eternity in the largest sense, it seems most natural to understand that to have *no beginning of days* must import *eternity* backwards in the largest sense also⁹. Thus far I have proceeded in the Scripture-proofs^r of *Christ's eternity*, considered as distinct from the attribute of *immortality*; though in sound reasoning one implies the other, and to prove either is at the same time proving both. This being premised, I pass on,

2. To the more particular proof of his *immortality*. I shall not repeat the arguments from his being *Jehovah*; *Alpha and Omega*; *he which was, and which is, and which is to come*, or the like, equally proving both *eternity*, and *independent eternity*, that is, *immortality*; because the force of those has been already considered. But there are two or three texts, before omitted, which I have reserved for this place, and shall now consider distinctly.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, opposing the *immortality* of *Christ* to the fading and perishing nature of the *heavens* and the *earth*, sets it forth thus in very expressive terms: "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands: they shall perish; but THOU REMAINEST; and they all shall wax old as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be CHANGED: but THOU ART THE SAME, and thy years shall not fail." Heb. i. 10, 11, 12. This is the very description which the holy Psalmist gives us of the *immortality*, or unchangeable nature, of the only true eternal God. And

^d Qui typum gerens Domini, et sine patre, et sine matre, et sine generationis enarratione, et sine initio, et sine fine describitur; ut ostenderet sempiternum Filium Dei in hunc mundum esse venturum, qui et sine Patre secundum incarnationem natus est, et sine matre secundum divinam generationem, et sine enarratione generationis; quia scriptum est, "Generationem autem ejus quis enarrabit?" Ambros. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 513.

^r As to the sense of the most early Fathers in relation to *Christ's eternity*, I have occasionally shewn it in part. For the rest, I refer the ingenuous and impartial reader to Bp. Bull's Collections and Observations on that head, in his Defensio Fid. Nic. which are abundantly sufficient to satisfy every ingenuous inquirer, that the *eternity* of God the Son was the constant doctrine of the Christian Church from the beginning, and that the contrary was always accounted *heresy*.

since it is here, without any restriction or limitation, applied by the inspired writer to our Saviour Christ; we cannot reasonably understand it to mean any thing less here than it does there. There cannot be any words devised more express or emphatical than these are: "They shall perish; but thou remainest: they shall be changed; but thou art the same^s." The force of these expressions was well understood by the great Athanasius, and triumphantly urged against the Arians^t. There is another passage out of the Epistle to the Hebrews of like import, declaring in strong terms the *immortality* of Christ. "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Heb. xiii. 8. Here is the phrase *ὁ αὐτός*, *the same*, again applied to the person of *Christ*, as before in chapter the first; and, besides, here is all time, *past*, *present*, and *to come*, taken in, to make the description still more full and complete. It may be best explained from a parallel text in the Revelations, by the character of, "which is, and which was, and which is to come:" words which confessedly and undeniably denote eternal, unchangeable existence. What is there expressed by "is, was, and is to come," is here signified by "yesterday, to-day, and for ever." Thus was the text generally understood by Catholics of the fourth and fifth centuries^u, and frequently cited against the Arians. How the Arians replied to it *then*, we know not; unless we may make a judgment of it from what is said *now*. It is now pretended that the meaning of the text is only this; that "the doctrine of Christ, once taught by the Apostles, ought to be preserved unchanged^v." But, under favour, this is rather the practical inference built upon the proposition of the text, than the proposition itself: for let us take in the whole context, which is as follows: "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God: whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation. Jesus Christ (is)

^s Origen quotes the words, *ὁ δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστίν*, several times, as a proof of the *τὸ ἀτρέπτου καὶ ἀναλλοιώτου*, the unconvertible and immutable nature of God. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 17, 169, 318.

^t Athanas. p. 440, 462, 685. ed. Bened. Vid. etiam Cyrill. Alexand. *contr. Jul.* lib. viii. p. 266.

^u Alexand. Alex. apud Athanas. tom. 1. p. 399. Athanasius, tom. i.

p. 440, 453, 685. Gregor. Nazianz. *Orat.* xxxviii. p. 613. Ambros. de *Fid.* lib. v. cap. 1. p. 555. De *Incarn.* cap. vi. p. 716. Cyrill. Hierosol. *Catech.* xii. p. 156. Cyrill. Alex. de *Rect. Fid.* p. 47. De *Incarn.* Dial. p. 710.

^x Clarke's *Script. Doctr.* p. 117. *Reply*, p. 169. *Modest Plea*, &c. p. 304.

“ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines; for it is a good thing that the heart be established” &c. Now, whether the words have reference to those going before, viz. “ considering the end of their conversation;” or to the words immediately following, viz. “ Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines;” either way the sense is good, and the Apostle’s argument pertinent. For upon the former supposition the sense will run thus: “ Imitate your pastors, considering how great and how divine a Person you thereby adhere to; one who is no *created* or *mutable* Being, capable of failing in his own person, or of disappointing you in your just expectations; but one that is *eternally* and *unchangeably* the same;” whom therefore you may infallibly depend on, in the final result of things.” In this view the Apostle’s sense is both just and pertinent, and is not much unlike to what is elsewhere said of God, that he is the Lord, and “ changes not,” Mal. iii. 6. and that “ with him there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,” James i. 17. But if we understand this text with regard to the words immediately following, “ Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines,” still the sense is just and to the purpose: “ Do not ye *change*, for Jesus Christ never changes, being immutably and essentially the same: endeavour to copy after him as far as your imperfect natures will permit.” Thus the precept and the example hang together, much after the same manner as in a text of St. Matthew: “ Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect:” where an argument is drawn from the *natural* and *necessary* perfections of God, to induce us to some faint resemblance and imitation of them. Upon the whole, it appears that our interpretation of this text in the Hebrews is *literal*; which makes it preferable to any *figurative* construction, unless there were a necessity for it. It is also very agreeable to the scope and design of the author in that place, and to what he had before taught us, chap. i. ver. 12. of the same Epistle: it is further countenanced by the Catholic Fathers, at least as high as the *fourth century*; and not contradicted by those before them: in fine, it is opposed only, or however chiefly, by those who, having an *hypothesis* to serve, like not the doctrine it contains; which doctrine never-

theless is set forth by other Scriptures, and confirmed by all antiquity^z: and now let any man of common ingenuity be left to judge, which of the two interpretations offered be the true one. Having considered the Scripture-proofs of Christ's *eternity* and *immortality*, I proceed next to another of his divine attributes.

3. *Omniscience* is another *divine* attribute, ascribed in Scripture to our Saviour Christ. "Now we are sure that thou "knowest all things," said his disciples unto him, John xvi. 30. And again; "Lord, thou knowest all things," (John xxi. 17.) said St. Peter, directing his discourse to Christ. The words in both places are general, without any limitation or reserve intimated in text or context: neither does the Evangelist, who recorded these sayings, any where insert any caution to prevent our understanding them in the highest and most unlimited sense. Thus far the presumption lies in favour of our construction: and I shall endeavour further to shew from other Scriptures, that those expressions ought to be understood in their utmost latitude; and shall withal examine and confute the Arian or Socinian pretences to the contrary.

That God the Son "knoweth all things," in the strictest sense, may be justly inferred from his being the "Searcher of the heart," and his knowledge of the "deep things of God." To be καρδιουργός, "Searcher of the heart," is the peculiar and distinguishing character of the one true God; as appears from Jer. xvii. 10. "I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins." And from 1 Kings viii. 39. "Thou, even thou only "knowest the hearts of all the children of men." And from Acts xv. 8. "God which knoweth the hearts." Yet this very perfection our blessed Lord claims to himself: "I am he," saith he, "that searcheth the reins and the heart," Rev. ii. 23. And St. John testifies of him, that "he knew all men," John ii. 24. "knew what was in man," John ii. 25. And the disciples in their prayer to him (as seems most probable) say, "Thou, "Lord, which knowest the hearts of all men," Acts i. 24.

^z The immutability of Christ is *implicitly* and *consequently* asserted as often as the primitive writers assert the *eternity*, or *consubstantiality*, or *proper, emphatical* existence (which we now express by *necessary existence*) of God the Son; or declare him to be *God* in the strict sense, or no *creature*:

so that direct and express testimonies of Christ's *immortality*, if they occur not so often, are less needful. But some there are, full and particular to that very point. Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 183. Tertullian. contr. Prax. cap. xxvii. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 169, 170.

This is further confirmed from Heb. iv. 12, 13. "The WORD
 " of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged
 " sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and
 " spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the
 " thoughts and intents of the heart: neither is there any
 " creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are
 " naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to
 " do." That this passage is to be understood of the *Λόγος*, or *Word*,
 that is, of *Christ*, I think need not be doubted: the characters
 are plainly *personal*, and the name of *Word* is appropriated
 to *Christ* by St. John, John i. 1. Rev. xix. 13; and the "sword,"
 or "two-edged sword," is a figure often mentioned in the
 Revelations, where *Christ* is spoken of; Rev. i. 16. ii. 12, 16.
 xix. 15. This passage was understood of *Christ*, both before
 and after the Council of Nice, by Catholic writers^a: and the
 application of it to *Christ* is not, that I know of, scrupled by
 our modern Arians, any more than it appears to have been
 doubted of by their predecessors. Here then it is said of
Christ, that "all things are naked" before him; that every
 creature is "manifest in his sight;" and that he is a "discerner
 " of the thoughts and intents of the heart:" strong and lively
 expressions of his *divine omniscience*: I know not whether any
 fuller or more significant can be produced out of the holy
 Scripture, in proof of the *omniscience* even of God the Father.
 To this may be added another celebrated text, Coloss. ii. 3.
 "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."
 The author of 'Scripture Doctrine' pretends, that it is *ambi-*
guous whether this refers to the *Father* or to *Christ*. But if it
 certainly refers to either, there can be no reasonable doubt but
 it refers to *Christ*, immediately before mentioned. The words
 run thus: "The acknowledgment of the mystery of God and
 " the Father, and of Christ, (ἐν ᾧ,) in whom are hid all the
 " treasures of wisdom and knowledge." There may be some
 question whether the words ἐν ᾧ may not refer to *μυστηρίου*,
mystery, before spoken of; and so may not be properly rendered
in which, instead of *in whom*. But if they be rightly rendered
in whom, it is plain they must refer to the nearest antecedent,

^a Origen in Joh. p. 34. Athanas. p. 189. Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 169.
 tom. i. p. 503, 539. Serm. Maj. p. 6. See also Clarke's Script. Doctr.
 Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 7. p. p. 116. 2nd ed.
 534. ed. Bened. Euseb. in Psalm.

Christ; and in this interpreters are agreed. Origen, Hilary, and the ancient author of the *commentaries* under the name of St. Ambrose, refer the words to *Christ*. ^bThe two latter, as also Cyril of Alexandria, draw an argument from them of the absolute *omniscience* of *Christ*. Clemens of Alexandria twice cites the text: but whether he understood the words in dispute to relate to *mystery* going before, or to the person of *Christ*, is uncertain. It is observable, that four of the authors now mentioned read the words somewhat differently from the present *copies*^c. As to the sense of the words, and their reference to *Christ*, we shall find but little reason to doubt, if we consider the general scope and drift of the Apostle in this Epistle; which was to set forth the excellency and dignity of *Christ*. This appears particularly from verses 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of the first chapter; and from the 9th verse of this very chapter, where we are told, that “in him dwelleth all the fulness of the “Godhead bodily.” Well might the Apostle say, that “all the “treasures of wisdom and knowledge were in him, in *whom* “all the fulness of the Godhead *was also*.” I know, our adversaries, whether Socinians or Arians, will endeavour to elude the force of this text, as well as of the other. But as the Apostle ushered it in with a very solemn caution, to “beware “lest any man spoil *us* through philosophy and vain deceit, “after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, “and not after *Christ*!” so let all true Christians beware, lest they be imposed upon by weak pretences, built upon false *philosophy* and *vain deceit*; not upon sound and true reasoning. The author of “*Scripture Doctrine*” refers us^d to John xiv. 10. “The Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.” If he means that the Father’s nature and Godhead so dwells and resides in *Christ*, as to make a full and entire communion of substance and of all perfections, insomuch that the Son shall therefore be *totus ex toto, perfectus ex perfecto*, very God of very God; then indeed this construction would not be amiss, being the same which Hilary and some other Catholics give of it. But, if he understands the *Father’s in-dwelling* in any lower sense,

^b Origen. Comm. in Matt. p. 209. Hilar. p. 1025, 1028. Pseudo-Ambros. in loc. Clem. Alex. p. 683, 694. Vid. et Cyril. Alex. adv. Anthropomorph. p. 382.

^c *Mystery of God in Christ*; so

Clemens and Pseudo-Ambros. *Mystery in Christ*; Origen. *Mystery of God even Christ*; *Dei Christi*: Hilar.

^d Clarke’s *Scripture Doctr.* p. 114. 2nd edit.

it would have come better from a Socinian, who would interpret the *fulness of the Godhead*, of the *Father* dwelling in the *man Christ Jesus*. It cannot easily be imagined that the Apostle, who in the first chapter of this Epistle had said so many high and great things of the inherent and personal dignity of the Son of God, as existing *before all things, creating, preserving, and sustaining* the whole universe, should now fall so low as to tell us, that he meant it not of any *inherent personal* dignity of the *Son*, but of the *Father* only: or if the Apostle had so intended it, why should not he have said plainly that the *Father* dwelt in him, a plain easy thing, instead of surprising us with so solemn and pompous an expression, (and that too after the ceremony of a preface to introduce it,) as that in him dwelt "all the fulness of the Godhead *bodily*?"

The author of "Scripture Doctrine," not confiding in his first explication, invents another, inconsistent with it, though he lets both stand together in the same page. "Fulness of Godhead" he interprets *fulness of divine power, dominion, and authority*: for so the word *θεότης*, *divinity*, he says, *signifies*; and elsewhere^e, *always signifies*. He is much mistaken in his remark upon the sense of *θεότης*, as might be shewn by a hundred instances out of the best *ecclesiastical* writers; some of which I have referred to in another place^f, and upon another occasion. However, if *θεότης* *always* signifies *power, dominion, and authority*; then it *never* signifies the *Being* or *Person*, whose that *power, dominion, or authority* is: and therefore the text of St. John, xiv. 10. which speaks of the *Father's* (not the *Father's power, dominion, &c.*) *dwelling* in Christ, is very inconsistently put together with this other construction. But enough of this. As to the sense of the text, Col. ii. 9. we need not have recourse to any remote and farfetched explications, when the natural and obvious construction of it is no near at hand. Whoever considers that the *Logos*, or *Word*, was *God*, and was *made flesh*, or was "God manifest *in the flesh*," (as St. Paul expresses it,) will easily believe

^e Reply, p. 283.

^f Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 323, 504.

^g 1 Tim. iii. 16. As to *Θεός* in this text, and the agreement of the Greek copies in it, consult Bp. Pearson on

the Creed, p. 128. and Mills in loc. Dr. Clarke's surmise, that all the Fathers read *ὁς* or *ὁ*, instead of *Θεός*, till the beginning of the sixth century, which he pretends to collect from the *tenor of their comments*, is, without

that that was the great *mystery* which St. Paul had in his thoughts, when he told us that the *fulness* of the *Godhead* dwelt in Christ *bodily*. He had the more reason to usher this in with a prefatory caution against *philosophy* and *vain deceit*, because the mystery of *God incarnate* was what the *disputers* of this world were most of all offended at, and what none of the *heretics* of the earliest times would come into^h. The Docetæ, a very early sect, denied the *humanity* of Christ, that they might still retain the belief of his *divinity*; while Cerinthus and the Ebionites denied his *divinity*, that they might still acknowledge his *humanity*; neither one nor other admitting the *divinity* and *humanity* together, because such an union and mixture of *God* and *man* appeared utterly repugnant to their *philosophy*. Both those heresies probably had their rise in the Apostles' times, and before St. Paul wrote this Epistle. And now we may understand what St. Paul meant by *fulness of Godhead*. The *divine nature*, the *Λόγος*, full and perfect God, assumed a body, took flesh upon him, or became incarnate. The "Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us," (in our nature,) "and of his *fulness* have we all received." John i. 14, 15, 16.

The construction which I have here given of this remarkable passage is not mine, but that of the primitive Catholic writersⁱ, as well before as after the Council of Nice. Now to return to the point which we were before upon: since it appears how high and great things the Apostle has said of *Christ*, in the two first chapters of this Epistle, we have the more reason to believe

any grounds. See Greg. Nyssen. Orat. x. contr. Eunom. p. 693. where Θεός is read, and the *tenor* of the *comment* requires that reading.

^h See my Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 470, 471.

ⁱ Διόπερ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου σώμα, χωρήσαν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς, τῇ θεότητι ἀρέπτως ἦνωται, καὶ τεθεοποιῆται· οὐ χάριν ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς καὶ Ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεφητεύετο ἐν νόμῳ, &c. Concil. Antioch. Epist. Labb. tom. i. p. 848.

Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι κατ' οὐσίαν, ὁμοίος ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, λείπει τι τῇ εἰκόνι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι πλήρης εἰκῶν, οὐδὲ τέλειον ἀπαύγασμα. πῶς οὖν ἀναγινώσκετε τὸ, ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς; Athanas. de Synod. p. 753. Comp. p. 556. ed. Bened.

Note, that the citation which Dr. Clarke (Script. Doctr. p. 114.) brings out of Athanasius, as if it had been his interpretation of this text, has no reference at all to it; as any one may see by looking into Athanasius, Epist. ad Philadelph. tom. i. p. 916.

Tantus est Filius quantus videbitur Pater: totus de toto, integer de integro, perfectus de perfecto, consummataque virtute: sicut Apostolus dicit ad Colossenses, in quo "omnis plenitudo Divinitatis corporaliter habitat." Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xlviii. ex versione Ruff. p. 733.

Vid. Hilar. p. 979, 983, 988, 1362. Epiphan. Ancorat. p. 95. contr. Hæres. p. 889. Exposit. Fid. Justin. Mart. ascript.

that he meant to ascribe absolute *omniscience* to him, when he said, that "in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and "knowledge."

A further proof of his *omniscience* may be drawn from his being indisputably equal in knowledge to the *Holy Spirit* of God: that Spirit which "searcheth all things," even the "deep things of God;" and who is as well acquainted with the mind of God, as a man is with his own heart and mind. I mention not other arguments of the Son's *omniscience*, deducible from his *creative* powers, and his being Preserver and Sustainer of the universe, and from the names of *Wisdom* and *Truth*^k given to him in holy Scripture; and from his intimate union with, and knowledge of, God the Father: these and the like considerations may serve still more and more to confirm us in the belief of it, and to render it less questionable with serious and considering men. I shall only add, that the Ante-Nicene Catholics were no strangers to this doctrine which I here maintain: but asserted it, many of them^l, as fully as I have done: none, so far as appears, ever presuming to oppose or contradict it. But there are some objections against the evidence I have produced, which come next to be considered. I shall confine myself to such pretences as have been lately revived, and artfully set off, by the author of "Scripture Doctrine."

1. As to our Lord's being "Searcher of the hearts," he thinks^m it may be accounted for from a passage of Clemens of Alexandriaⁿ; which he would gladly so interpret as to make Clemens say, that Christ is, by the *will of the Almighty*, Inspector of our hearts. But I have in another place^o took notice how widely he has mistaken the sense of his author.

A second pretence^p to invalidate our proofs of the Son's

^k Vid. Origen in Johan. pag. 28. Didym. de Spir. Sanct. p. 515.

^l See this made good in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 337, &c.

^m Script. Doctr. p. 45, 118, 294.

ⁿ Τὸν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν τῷ παντοκρατορικῷ θελήματι ἐπίσκοπον τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν. Strom. iv. p. 611.

^o Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 338.

N. B. Παντοκρατορικῷ θελήματι, in Clemens, does not signify *by the will of the Almighty*, as the Doctor construes it; but by *his sovereign all-*

containing will.

See parallel expressions in other authors. Μόνος δὲ ὁ Θεὸς περιέχει τῇ βουλήσει τὸ πᾶν. Pseudo-Just. ad Orthod. Qu. 11.

Immensus cum sit Deus, et mundi opifex, atque omnipotens, immensa et mundi opifex, atque *omnipotenti voluntate*, et effectu novo, potenter et efficaciter fecit ut omnis plenitudo, &c. Fragm. Irenæi, p. 342. ed. Bened. Comp. Clem. Alex. p. 674, 679.

^p See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 138.

omniscience, is from John viii. 28. where our Lord says, "I do nothing of myself; but as my Father hath *taught* me, I speak these things." The full meaning of which is no more than this, that God the Son is intimately united with the Father, never separate from him; and therefore neither acts nor speaks but in concert with him. Our blessed Saviour, speaking of his Father and himself, is pleased to take up with such expressions as are of common use with us: but they are to be soberly interpreted, suitably to the dignity of the subject. This I observe, lest the word *taught*, taken from what is customary amongst men, should be apt to convey a low *idea*, when applied (though in a more refined and elevated sense) to the Persons of the ever blessed Trinity^q. It is very certain that the Son has his knowledge, and every other perfection, from the Father, in the same sense as he hath also his nature or substance from the Father: but it should be considered, that after our blessed Lord had said, "The Son can do nothing of himself," (John v. 19.) he immediately added, "For what things soever he (the Father) doth, these also doth the Son likewise." Let it then be acknowledged, that *the Son can know nothing of himself*, provided only that we add this consideration to it, that "what things soever the Father *knoweth*, these also *knoweth* the Son likewise;" and then it will appear that those expressions, which the objectors lay hold on, are so far from denoting any imperfection in the Son's knowledge, that, on the contrary, they set forth the great and unmeasurable perfection of it, as being inseparably linked with, and indeed one and the same in extent and degree with, the *Father's*.

3. A third objection^r against what we assert is taken from Rev. i. 1. "The revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him." But this has no difficulty with any who consider that all the transactions of God the Father with mankind are *in* and

^q *Dicere autem et loqui*, in Trinitate, non secundum consuetudinem nostram—accipiendum, sed juxta formam incorporalium naturarum—neque enim ignorante Filio (qui Sapientia et Veritas est) Pater suam nunciat voluntatem; cum omne quod loquitur sapiens verusque subsistens in sapientia habeat, et in substantia. *Loqui ergo Patrem et audire Filium*, vel e contrario, Filio loquente, *audire*

Patrem, ejusdem naturæ in Patre et Filio, consensusque, significatio est. *Didym. de Spir. S.* p. 515. ed. Bened.

"Filius nihil a semetipso possit facere, nisi viderit Patrem facientem:" in sensu scilicet facientem. Pater enim sensu agit; Filius vero, qui in Patris sensu est, videns perficit. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 15.

^r Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 172.

by Christ Jesus. Every revelation of God is through Christ his Son, the Revealer and Interpreter of the otherwise unknown Father, and his will, to men. This order and economy, observable in the Persons of the *sacred Trinity*, is what we ought humbly to adore and reverence, rather than pry too curiously into; lest, pretending to be "wise above what is written," we fall from our own steadfastness, and lose ourselves in inextricable mazes.

4. The last and most material objection against us is from Mark xiii. 32: "But of that day, and that hour, knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." Or "Father only," as it is in Matt. xxiv. 36. which the author of "Scripture Doctrine" particularly taketh notice of^s. He does not, in terms, declare whether this text be, in his opinion, a proof of God the Son's being *ignorant* of any thing; but is content to say^t, or insinuate, as from Irenæus, (though he mistranslates his author,) that the *Father is superior in knowledge*, and that he only has *perfect knowledge*: very suspicious and doubtful expressions, and left without guard or caution. But to come to the point: I am to shew that these texts of St. Mark and St. Matthew prove nothing at all against the *perfect knowledge*, or strict *omniscience*, of the *divine nature* of Christ. It is not said, the *Son of God* knew not the day of judgment; but the *Son*, that is, the *Son of man*, as appears from the context in both the *Evangelists*: Matt. xxiv. 37, 39. Mark xiii. 26, 34. And it is well observed by Athanasius^u, that, after our Lord had mentioned the *angels* as not knowing that day, he did not add, *neither the Holy Ghost*; that it might still be considered, that if the *Holy Ghost* knew the day, well might also *God the Son* know it; and that therefore what is here said of the *Son* relates to the *Son of man* only. It is objected by Crellius and others, that it could not with truth and sincerity be said of *Christ*, that he was *ignorant* of the day, if he knew it in any capacity; as it cannot be denied that man is *immortal*, so long as he is *immortal* in any respect or capacity. But to this I answer, that as it may be truly said of the *body* of man, that it is not *immortal*, though the *soul* be: so it may be truly said, that the *Son of man* was *not knowing*, though the *Son of*

^s See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 45, 132.

^t Ibid. p. 133, 134.

^u Athanas. tom. i. p. 593.

God knew every thing. Now, since *Christ* may speak of himself, either as *Son of God* or as *Son of man*; it is not inconsistent with truth and sincerity for him to deny that he knew what he really did know in one capacity, while he was *ignorant* of it in another. Our Lord says in one place, "Now I am no more in the world," John xvii. 11. and in another place, "Ye have the poor always with you, but me ye have not always," Matt. xxvi. 11, denying that he was, or should be, any longer present with his disciples: which can only be understood of his human nature and bodily presence; for in another respect he elsewhere says, "Lo, I am with you always," Matt. xxviii. 20. and, "If any man love me—my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him," John xiv. 23. From hence we see that our blessed Lord might, without any breach of sincerity, *deny* that of himself considered in one capacity, which he could not have *denied* in another. He denies the knowledge of the day of judgment, but in respect of his *human nature*; in which respect also he is said to have "increased in wisdom," Luke ii. 52. the divine *Logos* having with the human nature assumed the *ignorance* and other *infirmities* proper to it^x. If it be objected that the *Son* is here placed after the *angels*, and that the *gradation* requires that we should understand the text of a nature *superior to angels*; it is easily answered, that the *Son of man's* union with the *Logos*, and the particular concern the *Son of man* has in the last judgment, are sufficient to account for the supposed *climax* or *gradation*^y.

Upon the whole then it appears, that our Lord might very sincerely and justly say, that he knew not the day or hour of the final judgment, understanding it of himself considered in his *human* capacity; though at the same time, in another respect, he could not be ignorant of any thing^z. If it be pretended

^x See Mr. Boyse's very judicious account of this text, in answer to the pretences of Mr. Emlyn, who never thought fit to make any reply to that part.

^y See Dr. Bennet on the Trinity, p. 154, &c.

^z A *learned* gentleman has lately attempted a different solution of the difficulty arising from these texts; for which I heartily thank him. I do not dislike the proposing of several ways of coming to the same point: only I

wish the author had been content with *recommending* one, without *condemning* another. He may please to consider, that we are upon the *defensive* only with regard to these two texts; that we prove the Son's *omniscience* from other texts; and that a *respondent*, as such, can never *beg the question*: not to mention that the distinction of the two natures, *divine* and *human*, is demonstrably plain from other Scriptures; that therefore our solution is very natural and obvious;

further, that the *Son of God*, as such, and every other person whatever, is excluded, because of the words "Father only;" I answer, that the *exclusive* term *only* is not to be so strictly interpreted as to exclude what *essentially* belongs to the *Father*, and may be reckoned to him, as included in him, his WORD, or SPIRIT. It is said, Rev. xix. 12, of God the *Son*, that "he had "a name written, which no *one* (*οὐδείς*) knew but he himself." Now if it be reasonable and just to infer from thence, that the *Father* was *ignorant* of that *name*; then let it also be reasonable to infer from this place of St. Matthew, that the *Son* was *ignorant* of the day of *judgment*: or, if such inference be manifestly false and unjustifiable in one case, there must be something more than the bare force of the *exclusive* term to make it true or justifiable in the other.

From what hath been said it is manifest, that holy Scripture has by necessary consequence, and also in *express* terms, ascribed *omniscience* to the Son of God; and that the pretences against it are of no weight; being founded only on misinterpretation of texts, and misapplication of what relates to *Christ* in one capacity, to him considered in another.

3. I proceed, thirdly, to another *divine* attribute ascribed to *Christ* in holy Scripture, viz. *omnipresence*. The texts which prove it are these that follow: "Where two or three are "gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of "them," Matt. xviii. 20. "Lo, I am with you always, even "unto the end of the world^a," Matt. xxviii. 20. "By him all "things consist," Col. i. 17. These texts demonstrate that our blessed Lord is present on earth, at the same time that he is also present in heaven; that his presence reaches to all the ends of the earth, to all men living quite round the globe, to the whole system of creatures; for "by him all things consist:" as much as to say, "In him they live, and move, and have their being;" which is the most lively and emphatical description of the *omnipresence* of God. *Christ's omnipresence* is likewise intimated from the worship ordered to be paid him by men, by angels^b, by

that it must be admitted with regard to Luke ii. 52. (and why not in the other place?) and that if our Saviour's *dark* and *mystical* way of speaking be *sufficient* to justify even so hard a supposition as that seems to be which this gentleman goes upon,

it will be *more than sufficient* to take off all scruple with respect to so easy and so unexceptionable a solution as ours is.

^a Vid. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 239. In Joh. p. 122, 128, 419.

^b Heb. i. 6.

the whole creation^c. The same thing may certainly be inferred from his being Creator of the universe. Hence it is that the ancients do, with one voice, declare for the *omnipresence* of God the Son^d. Some of them indeed have been thought to have given into contrary sentiments, in their disputes with the Noëtians or Jews: but, upon careful inquiry, this appears to be only a groundless surmise; as is largely and solidly proved by the judicious and learned Bp. Bull^e.

It may perhaps be objected, that the Son's being present to all men, or even to all creatures, does not prove his *omnipresence* in the largest and fullest sense. To which it is sufficient to reply, that though there is not any Scripture-proof of an absolute *omnipresence* of the Son, extending beyond the limits of the world into I know not what imaginary *extramundane* spaces, yet there is full proof of his *omnipresence* through the *whole creation*: which is, to all intents and purposes, the very same thing to us with *divine omnipresence*; and is as high as Scripture has any where carried the *omnipresence* even of God the *Father*. Thus far I have proceeded in the proof of the *divine attributes* ascribed in Scripture to our Saviour *Christ*: the *titles* I have recounted and vindicated in a former discourse. Nothing now remains but

III. To sum up the force of the general argument, and to obviate such general objections as are brought to weaken our conclusion. I have left myself but little room for this: indeed, much is not needful. If the premises stand, the conclusion makes itself. Every single *attribute* that hath been mentioned, every single *title*, almost, justifies the inference, that *Christ* is no *creature*, but truly and strictly *God*: all together make so full, so clear, so irrefragable a demonstration of it, that one might justly wonder how any, who retain the least regard or reverence towards the sacred Writ, can make any serious doubt of it. It cannot be shewn that any one of those *names, titles, attributes,* and *essential properties* of God, was ever given, in this manner,

^c Rev. v. 8.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus, cum hæc hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? *Novat.* cap. 14.

^d Just. Mart. Apol. ii. cap. 11. p. 27. ed. Ox. Irenæus, p. 190, 231,

315. ed. Bened. Clem. Alex. p. 711, 831, 840. ed. Ox. Tertull. adv. Prax. c. 23. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 239, 164. Hippolyt. Fragm. p. 45. vol. ii. Fabric.

^e Bull. Defens. Fid. Nic. sect. iv. cap. 3.

and with those circumstances, to any *creature*. If one or two of them (as the name *God* for instance) might be *equivocal*, yet the rest are not so; and the *manner* and *circumstances*, wherewith they are ascribed to *Christ*, sufficiently determine the sense of them. If *titles* alone are not of weight sufficient, *attributes* come in to strengthen and confirm them; and if any scruples remain still, *creation* and *adoration* understood of, and attributed to *Christ*, render the proof still more irrefragable. The strength and number of the evidences concurring to establish *Christ's divinity*, when fewer and less considerable might have been sufficient, is very wonderful; as if Divine Wisdom had purposely so ordered it, foreseeing what opposition would be made to it. Were it possible, by any quirk or subtilty, to elude every *single* evidence, yet the joint force of all together would be very considerable; because it is hardly to be imagined that, in an affair of this moment, God would ever have suffered so many plausible appearances, and specious presumptions, of a thing that is not, to stand in Scripture, for the *deception* even of *wise* and *good* and *conscientious* men. The *Jewish Church* were trained up to a sense of the *true God* by those very *characters* which are applied to *Christ*. Upon those they formed their *idea* of the *divine* Being: and would have thought it *blasphemy* to have ascribed the same, though by way of *figure* only, (in so *serious* a concern,) to any *creature*. And not they only, but all mankind must allow, that none more expressive and significant characters of *God* can be devised, than several of those are which are applied to *Christ*. If we are mistaken in this matter, it is a mistake which the Christian world, by plain force of Scripture, has, in a manner, inevitably been led into. He must be a very weak man who can imagine, that the doctrine of the Trinity could ever have come in, or could have subsisted half a century, were it not for the plain and irresistible reasons for it, appearing in *holy Scripture*. How the matter now stands all the Christian world over (except a few Reclaimants) is very well known. If we run up fourteen hundred years higher, or thereabout, we find the body of the Bishops and Clergy, summoned from all parts to debate this very *question*, determining at length as we have done, and as much *deceived* (if we are deceived) as we are at this day. If we look sixty years higher, and may judge of the principles of the Church at that time, from those of the two celebrated Bishops of Alexandria and Rome, with

their Clergy; we still find them lying under the same fatal *deception* that prevails now. Go up a hundred years higher, to the middle of the second century; still, all the way as we pass, we meet with plain marks and characters of the same *delusion* (if it be any) overspreading the Church of *Christ*, at a time when *miracles* were not ceased, nor *revelations* uncommon. In short, when we have carried our searches up to the very *apostolic* age, we still observe manifest footsteps of the same *error* (if it be one) prevailing: nor can we find so much as one man of any considerable repute among Christians, whom we can certainly prove to have been free from it. Surely God had soon forsaken his *heritage*, and given up his Church to *strong delusions*, (that Church against which the *gates of hell shall never prevail*.) if we have been mistaken in these things. It appears however from hence, how powerful and forcible the Scripture evidences of Christ's *divinity* have ever been upon the minds of men: not the illiterate, unthinking, or injudicious; but the wisest, the most considerate, the brightest ornaments and the most eminent lights of the Christian Church. But our *adversaries* are men that can look up against all these evidences, and can harden their minds in opposition to them. Let us see what they have to plead, in order to fence off conviction, and to keep their wretched cause in any tolerable countenance, at this day.

I. To our argument, so far as respects the *divine titles* given to God the Son in holy Scripture, it is objected^f, that the highest titles of all, such as ὕψιστος, the *Most High*, or *Supreme*; παντοκράτωρ, the *Almighty*, or *Supreme over all*; εἰς Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, the *one God and Father of all*; εἰς Θεὸς ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα, *one God of whom are all things*; are never applied to the *Son* in Scripture. To which I answer, first, that if God the Son has not every *divine* title which is applied in Scripture to God the *Father*, yet he has more than enough to prove that he is *no creature*, but that he is truly, strictly, and essentially God: so that if any other high titles be ascribed to the *Father*, (not as *Father*, but as *God*;) those also, though not specially applied to the *Son* in Scripture, are virtually contained and necessarily included in those other that are *expressly* given him. I answer, secondly, that the title of παντοκράτωρ (*Almighty*) is expressly applied to God the Son in Scripture, as hath been shewn^g: and

^f Modest Plea.

^g Serm. vi. p. 141.

the sense of ὑψιστος (*Most High, or Supreme over all*) is plainly ascribed to him, Rom. ix. 5. And very probably the *title* itself in other Scriptures is applied to him^b, were it worth the while to insist upon a fruitless nicety, after so many and great proofs of what we maintain. As to the titles of *one God and Father of all*, and *one God the Father of whom are all things*, we should think it very strange indeed to find them applied to *God the Son*; because, taken all together, they are *personal* titles, peculiarly belonging to *God the Father*. It must appear very much for the advantage of our cause, that Scripture has so indifferently applied every *divine* title almost to *Father* and *Son*, as barely to leave no more than were proper or necessary to keep up the distinction of *Persons*: and it must appear as a standing monument against our adversaries, to their shame and confusion, that after we have given them every proof that can be requisite to shew that the Son is strictly *God*, yet none shall be thought sufficient, unless it be a proof of what we pretend not, of *God the Son's* being the very same Person with *God the Father*. This indeed is the secret meaning of all the opposition made against us: here lies the mystery of their *heresy* in this one false principle; that the Son cannot be the *supreme God*, that is, not truly, strictly, and essentially God, unless he be the very *Person* of the Father. Upon this bottom rest both *Sabellianism* and *Arianism*; and this is what the advocates of both have, betwixt them, been labouring to prove now for fifteen hundred years, and have met with nothing but disappointment. To conclude this article: we readily allow that the title of *one God and Father of all* is no where applied, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*, to *God the Son*; because the *Son* is not the *Father*: but the title of the *one God* we prove to belong to him, as often as we prove that he is *Lord* and *God, Jehovah, over all God blessed*, and the like; for *Scripture* acknowledges no more *Gods* than *one*. The title of *one God the Father of whom are all things*, may also be peculiar to the *Father*ⁱ, because of the

^b Psalm lxxxvii. 5. Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 27. Athanas. p. 889. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 2. p. 498. Psalm lxxxii. 18. Vid. Athan. p. 889. Ambros. p. 498. Luke i. 76. Vid. Ambros. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 2. p. 498.

ⁱ N. B. The author of *Modest Plea*

&c. continued is so destitute of arguments from *Scripture*, that he is forced to repeat this text of the *Corinthians* (though nothing to his purpose) perpetually; and it is to serve for an *answer* almost to every thing. The Son is not the *one God of whom are all things*, says he,

personal distinguishing characters, *Father*, and of *whom*, denoting some particular manner of *subsisting* or *operating*. But if the Son be God, *by whom* are all things, he is *essentially*, though not *personally*, the same God with the *Father*; unless there be more Gods than one. But,

2. Another objection to our general argument drawn from the *titles* and *attributes* is, that they are ascribed to the Father in a *higher* and more *eminent manner* than to the Son^k. This objection is so loosely and carelessly worded, that it is not easy to fix any certain sense to it. Would but the *objectors* say, in plain terms, that the titles of *God*, or *Jehovah*, or *Almighty*, when applied to the Son, do not signify truly and strictly *divine*, *necessarily existing*, *supreme over all*, as when applied to the Father, we might readily know how to deal with them: or would they but say, that the attributes of *eternity*, *omniscience*, *omnipresence*, &c. when ascribed to the Son, signify no more than a *limited duration*, *knowledge*, *presence*, &c. we should thank them for speaking plain, and for giving us an opportunity of confuting what they have to plead for such rash and *blasphemous* assertions. But since they are pleased only to express themselves indefinitely and uncertainly, we can give them no certain answer more than this; that, supposing those *titles* or *attributes* to be ascribed in a more *emphatical* and *eminent* manner to the *Father*, as *first Person*, yet they are ascribed also to the *Son* in their utmost latitude and extent, and in the very *same sense*; (*omniscience* or *eternity* signifying neither more nor less than *omniscience* or *eternity*, whether applied to *one* or to the *other*;) and therefore the objection from the *more eminent manner*, according as it is understood, is either without *truth* or without *weight*. The sum

over and over. And what then? He is not that Person there styled the *one God*, and particularized by his character, *of whom are all things*: that is, the *Son* is not the *Father*. Who pretends that he is? But *he is the Lord and God by whom are all things*. The Father *singly* is not the *first cause* of all *creatures*; but Father and Son (including always the Holy Ghost) together; as appears from that very passage. See my second Sermon, p. 31, 32, &c. The author's mixing and blending *personal* and *essential* characters together, with too *artificial* a confusedness, may take with some

readers; but is easily seen through by men of sense. There is no more in it than this; that the *Son* cannot be *God* in the proper and strict sense, because he is a *Son*: whereas the contrary is the truth; he is *God* because he is *God's proper Son*, of the *same nature* with him. This author will never prove that *unbegotten*, a *relative* character, is the proper notion of the word *God*; but *divine perfections*, wherever they really subsist, or in whatever manner they subsist, *unbegotten*, *begotten*, or *proceeding*.

^k Modest Plea, p. 148.

of all is only this, that the *Father* is *Father*, and the *Son* is *Son*; one *first* in order, the other *second*. Whatever consequences necessarily follow this *concession*, we are very ready to admit: and it would save us a great deal of trouble, if the *objectors* would but try the strength of their *philosophy*, and put the cause upon this single question, *Whether it were possible for God to have had a Son of the same nature, coequal and coeternal with him?* We shall be very ready to join issue with them upon this very point; and it seems to be both a fair and a short way of ending the controversy. But if they still delight in obscurity and darkness, declining a fair open examination of their tenets, running from the point in question, screening themselves under general and ambiguous terms, insinuating what they will not say, and saying what they cannot prove: if this be the method they persist in, it will be easily seen that they seek not *truth*, but *lie in wait to deceive*; and are afraid of coming to the light, lest their *errors* should be made manifest.

Now to God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be all glory for ever. Amen.

CHRIST'S DIVINITY

PROVED FROM

THE FORM OF BAPTISM.

The eighth Sermon preached April 6, 1720.

MATT. xxviii. 19.

Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

THE text contains the solemn form of baptism prescribed by our blessed Lord himself, as a perpetual standing law to his Church. As soon as he had run through the great work of *redemption*, having completed his conquests over death and hell by his rising from the dead, he acquaints his disciples with the commencing of his *mediatorial* kingdom. "All power was given him both in heaven and earth." Then was fulfilled the prophecy of the *royal Psalmist*, who, speaking in the person of God the Father, says, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," Ps. ii. 8. Our Lord having *redeemed* mankind, and thereby acquired a *new* and *special* claim to their homage and service, entered, as it were, and took possession of his purchased inheritance. The use he intended was, to bring *all nations*, now made his *own* by right of redemption, to the knowledge and worship of the true God. The honour of doing this was what no *prophet* or *ambassador*, before him, was admitted to. It was reserved to the *fulness* of time, for the more illustrious manifestation and more pompous reception of the Son of God. And now, since Christ himself had undertaken to draw all men unto

him, the first and principal thing which all the nations of the world were to have notice of, was the obligation they lay under to three Persons, of *high* character and distinction, and *related* to each other, called by the names of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*. In this consisted the sum of Christianity: on this foundation were the Apostles to erect a Church all the world over. Here, if any where, a right understanding would be highly necessary; nor could any one err more dangerously or fundamentally, than in an article of so great importance. The text informs us of the commission given to the Apostles; and we need not doubt but that it was every where faithfully and punctually executed, both by them and their successors. We have sufficient proof of the matter of fact from Church writers^a all along, and as high as Justin Martyr, who *lived* in or near the apostolic age, and *wrote* within forty years of it. It was then the constant practice of the Church to baptize in this *form*, pursuant to our Lord's commission; (a certain argument that this text of St. Matthew appeared in the *copies* then in use, as it is also now found in all the *copies*, and all the ancient *versions*;) and there is no just reason to suspect, but that baptism had been constantly administered in that very *form* from, and in, the times of the Apostles.

There is indeed some ground of scruple, (which the heretics^b of former times laid hold on,) arising from the history of the Acts, which no where tells us of the Apostles baptizing *in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; but mentions only

^a 'Επ' ὀνόματος γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων καὶ δεσπότου Θεοῦ, καὶ τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ Πνεύματος ἁγίου, τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τότε λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται. *Just. Apol.* i. cap. 79. p. 116. Ox. ed.

Potestatem Regenerationis in Deum dans Discipulis, dicebat eis: *Euntes docete omnes gentes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti.* *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 17. p. 208.

Novissime mandans ut tingerent in *Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum*, non in unum: nam nec semel, sed ter, ad singula nomina, in Personas singulas tinguimur. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 26. Vid. etiam *De Baptism.* cap. 13.

Dominus enim post resurrectionem Discipulos suos mittens, quemadmo-

dum baptizare deberent, instituit et docuit, dicens; *Data est mihi omnis potestas in cælo et in terra: ite ergo, et docete gentes omnes, baptizantes eos in nomine Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti*; insinuat Trinitatem, cujus sacramento gentes baptizarentur. *Cypr.* Ep. lxxiii. p. 200. ed. Ox.

Quomodo ergo quidam dicunt foris extra ecclesiam, imo contra ecclesiam, modo in nomine Jesu Christi, ubicunque et quomodocunque gentilem baptizatum remissionem peccatorum consequi posse; quando ipse Christus gentes baptizari jubeat in plena et adunata Trinitate? *Cypr.* Ep. lxxiii. p. 206.

^b Vid. Cyprian. Epist. ad Jubaian. p. 205, 206. ad Pompei.

their baptizing “in the name of Jesus Christ^c,” or “in the name of the Lord Jesus^d,” or “in the name of the Lord^e.” St. Cyprian, in answer to this difficulty, seems to admit the matter of fact so far, that the Apostles did baptize some in the *name of Christ Jesus*; but *Jews* only; not *Gentiles*, whom, he thinks, the *commission* peculiarly respected, and whose circumstances were something different from those of the *Jews*^f. Nevertheless it may be doubted, whether this was Cyprian’s solution of the difficulty, or no; some passages^g of the same epistle seeming to carry a contrary sense: and considering how unanimous most, if not all the other early writers^h of the Church have been in denying the fact, that ever the Apostles baptized in any different form from what our Lord prescribed, one may incline to think that Cyprian was of the same judgment. The most probable and most generally received account of this matter is, that the Apostles baptized all, both Jews and Gentiles, in the same form; “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;” and that when they are said to have baptized in the *name of Christ Jesus*, the meaning only is, that they baptized *into the faith and religion of Christ Jesus*; in that method, and according to that form, which our Lord himself had prescribedⁱ. The Apostles administered Christ’s, not John’s baptism; that baptism which Christ had appointed; St. Luke expresses it briefly by baptizing “in the name of Christ;” not because it ran in his *name* only, but because it was instituted by his authority. Thus the practice of the Apostles is reconciled with the *commission* given them. As to the practice of the Christian Church after the Apostles, there can be no doubt of it, considering how many and how early records we have of it. The main thing now

^c Acts ii. 38. Comp. iii. 27.

^d Acts viii. 16. xix. 5. Comp. Rom.

vi. 3.

^e Acts x. 48. xxii. 16.

^f Alia enim fuit Judæorum sub Apostolis ratio, alia est Gentilium conditio. *Cypr. ad Jub. Ep. lxxiii. p. 205.*

^g Jesu Christi mentionem fecit Petrus, (Act. ii. 38.) non quasi Pater omitteretur, sed ut Patri quoque Filius adjungeretur. *Cyprian. ibid. p. 206.*

^h Some doubt has been made of St. Ambrose as to this particular; of which see the notes to the Benedictine edition, Ambros. de Sp. S. lib. i. cap.

3. p. 607. See also Mr. Bingham’s *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, b. xi. cap. 3.

ⁱ Τὸ μὲν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν βαπτισθῆναι, σημαίνει ἂν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ βαπτισθῆναι τὸν ἐστίν, εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν καὶ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. *Eulogius apud Phot. cod. cclxxx. p. 1608.*

In nomine *Jesu Christi* jussi sunt baptizari, (Act. ii. 38.) et tamen intelliguntur non baptizari nisi in *nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti*. *August. contr. Maxim. lib. ii. cap. 17. p. 715.* See Bull, Op. Posth. p. 850, &c.

to be inquired into is, the meaning, intent, or purport of that solemn form, "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Baptism had been an ancient custom of the Jews, long before our Saviour's appearance in the flesh^k. It was by *baptism* that they admitted *proselytes* into their religion, entering them thereby into covenant with the *true God*, in opposition to all the gods of the nations. This very practice our blessed Lord took up, adapting it to the like purposes; only altering the *form* of it, now made to run in the name of the *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*^l. Had it run in the name of *Christ* only, one might have imagined that *baptizing unto Christ* had been much of the same import with *baptizing unto Moses*: *Christ* being considered as the *minister* and *publisher* of the *Christian* religion, in like manner as *Moses* was of the *Mosaic* institution. But since the *Father* himself is one of the Persons specified, into whom the nations were to be baptized, *baptizing into* must here bear a much higher sense; viz. entering into covenant with a Person as *God*, professing *faith* in him as such, listing one's self into his *service*, and vowing all obedience and submission to him. This is the most natural and obvious import of this rite of initiation, this solemn form of baptizing "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:" i. e. into the *faith, service, and worship* of the holy Trinity, the one true God. That this is really the case I shall endeavour to shew further, both from the reason and nature of the thing itself, and from the testimonies of the *ancients*.

I. We may argue the point from the nature and reason of the thing itself, which may suggest to us the following considerations:

1. That the *nations* were to be baptized in the name of *three* Persons, in the *same manner*, and therefore very probably in the *same sense*, as in the name of *one*. Whatever honour, reverence, or regard is paid to the *Father*, in this solemn rite of initiation, the same may reasonably be supposed to be paid to all three. Is he recognised as the object of worship? So are the other two

^k See Mr. Wall's Introduction to his History of Infant Baptism.

^l The Jews baptized proselytes into the name of the *Father*; that is, into the profession of God, whom they called by the name of *Father*.—It was proper among the Gentiles (to baptize)

in the name of the *Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*, that they might be hereby instructed in the doctrine of the true God. Hear this, O Arian and Socinian. *Lightfoot. Op. vol ii. p. 275.*

Persons likewise. Is he God and Lord over us? So are they. Are we his subjects, servants, soldiers listed under him? So are we equally listed under all. Are we hereby regenerated and made the temple of God the Father? So are we also regenerated unto the other two Persons, and are likewise made the temple of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*. For what good reason can be given why the same outward act, respecting all the three, shall not carry with it the same import and significancy? Or if there be any doubt or question of what it signifies, how can we better resolve it than from what is clear and plain, so far as respects the *Father*; inferring it of the other two Persons from analogy and parity of circumstances?

2. To confirm which we may consider, secondly, that in the very names of *Father* and *Son*, a near *relation*, *alliance*, and *unity* between *two* of the *Persons* mentioned is intimated; and parity of reason will infer the like for the *third*. It is not said, in the name of *God* and his *two faithful servants*; nor, into *God*, and *Christ*, and the *Holy Ghost*; which might have suggested a thought that one only of the three was *God*: but it is in the name of the *Father*, and of the *Son*, (how equal and how familiar!) without any note of distinction more than that of a *personal* relation, carrying with it the *idea* of *sameness* of nature; as every *father* and *son*, among men, are of the *same human nature* with each other. It might therefore reasonably be presumed, from the wording of the very *form* of baptism, that the two first Persons named were equally *divine*: and the inference from thence would reach to the *divinity* of the *third*, to make all suitable and consistent. Besides that the epithet of *Holy*, and the name of *Ghost*, or *Spirit*, to which it is joined, could not but favour and countenance such an apprehension of him.

3. It may further be considered, that a new religion was to be introduced and ushered in with this solemn form of words. The Gentiles were to be taught to turn from their *vanities* to the *living God*, to renounce their *idols* and *false gods*, and so to be baptized “in the name of the *Father*, and of the *Son*, and of “the *Holy Ghost*.” What more natural or obvious thought could occur to them on this occasion, than that, instead of all their deities, whom they had before bowed down to, they were now to serve, worship, and adore *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, the only *true* and *living* God? What could they imagine from

this pompous and solemn proclaiming of these three Persons, in opposition to all other gods, but that these three had really that *divinity* which was presumed only with respect to the gods of the nations; and had a *natural* right to all that homage and service which men ought to pay to a *divine* Being? I may add, that the form running in the *name*, not *names* of those three, might insinuate that the *authority* of all the three was the *same*, their power equal, their Persons undivided, and their glory one^m.

4. Give me leave to observe further, that nothing can appear more unreasonable or unnatural than to suppose that *God* and two *creatures* are here joined together in this so solemn rite of initiation into a new *religion*, into the service of the *living God*, in opposition to all *creature-worship*. Acts xiv. 15. Rom. i. 25. For, as no rational account can be given of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost's* being so indifferently joined with the *Father*, in so public an act, and of such high importance to the salvation of all men, unless it be that all men are required to have *faith* in, and to pay *worship* and *service* to them also, as well as to the *Father*: so neither can it be reasonably imagined that they are recommended to us in any such capacity, as persons to be *believed* in, *served*, and *adored*, if they be *creatures* only, or if they be any thing else but the true and *living God*.

Thus far I have been arguing the point from the nature and circumstances of the thing itself, without taking in what *Scripture* has revealed of the nature, character, and offices of the three Persons. That indeed would be the best comment upon the form of baptism: but it must be waved here, my design being to raise a distinct argument for the *divinity* of Christ from the *form of baptism*, considered by itself; only taking in such con-

^m Ubi unum nomen audis, unus est Deus: sicut de semine Abrahæ dictum est, et exponit Paulus Apostolus: in semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes: non dixit, in seminibus, tanquam in multis, sed tanquam in uno, et semine tuo, quod est Christus. Sicut ergo quia ubi non dicit in seminibus, docere te voluit Apostolus, quia unus est Christus: sic et hic cum dictum est in nomine, non in nominibus, quomodo ibi in semine, non in seminibus, probatur unus Deus Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. August. in Johan. tract. 6.

Vid. Petav. de Trin. lib. ii. cap. 12.

§. 8. cap. 14. §. 4, 5, 6.

Baptisma unum: eodem enim modo, et in Patrem, et in Filium, et in Spiritum Sanctum baptizamur, et ter mergimur, ut Trinitatis unum appareat sacramentum. Et non baptizamur in nominibus Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, sed in uno nomine quod intelligitur Deus. Et miror qua consequentia in uno vocabulo, eodem opere, et eodem sacramento, naturæ diversitatem, Arius, Macedonius, et Eunomius suspicentur. Hieronym. Com. in Eph. cap. iv. p. 362. ed. Bened.

siderations as naturally arise from it, together with the sense of *antiquity* upon it, which I come next to examine.

II. Whatever uncertainty there may be in our reasonings on this head, (though the least that can in justice be said of them is, that they are extremely probable,) if they appear to be countenanced by the concurring sentiments of *antiquity*, they must then be owned to be of much greater force, and will the more readily be submitted to by all wise and considering men. The author of “*Scripture Doctrine*” is very right in referring us to the sentiments of the *primitive Church* for the true meaning of this text of St. Matthew, containing the *form of baptism*: though he happens, as is usual with him, to give a very lame and crude account of *antiquity*; interpreting the form of baptism by the *Apostles’ Creed*, (as he pretends,) and the *Creed* itself as he pleases. As to the *Apostles’* (that is, the Roman) *Creed*, and whether it be a *professed paraphrase* upon the text of St. Matthew, I shall say more in the sequel: in the interim it will be proper to inquire into the sentiments of the earliest writers, in respect of the true and full import of the *form of baptism*.

Justin Martyr is the oldest writer we have, that mentions the commission to baptize “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” How he and the Christians of his time understood it, may be easily gathered from his writings. In his first *Apology*, he takes upon him to answer the charge of *atheism*, brought against the Christians by their heathen persecutors; and there he has these remarkable words: “We are called *Atheists*. And indeed we confess that in respect of such *reputed* gods, we are *Atheists*: but not in respect of the most true God, untainted with evil, the Father of righteousness, and soberness, and of other virtues. *Him*, and his *Son* that came from him, (and who taught us and the host of other angels that are *good*, being his followers and likened to him, these thingsⁿ;) and the *Prophetic Spirit*, we worship and adore, honouring them in spirit (in *reason*) and in truth^p.”

ⁿ His words are: “How this text was universally understood in the primitive Church cannot be doubted, there being still extant a *professed paraphrase* upon it, even the *Apostles’ Creed*; which, from the earliest times of Christianity, was, with little variation, in the several churches, the *Baptismal Creed*, or *Profession*

“*of Faith*, which all Christians were taught, on purpose that *they might understand what it was they were baptiz’d into.*” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 204.

^o See this passage justified, Bull. D. F. p. 70. Op. Posth. p. 962, 1037.

^p Ἐνθὲνδε καὶ ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα. καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων

Here it is observable that Justin. in answer to the charge of *atheism*, shews both what and whom the Christians worshipped: not God the *Father* only, but the *Son* also, and the *Holy Ghost*. The worship of these three he opposes to the worship of the *reputed* gods of the Gentiles: a plain sign of his understanding *baptism* to be an entering into covenant with all the three; and engaging in the service. faith, and worship of them as *divine*: yet not as *three Gods*, (for all antiquity declare against it;) neither yet as *one God* and two *creatures*, (for that is contrary to the supposition of their being *dicine*, besides that all antiquity, and Justin in particular. is against *creature-worship*¹: but as *one God*, the *Father*, with his *Son* and *Holy Spirit*. Justin does again. in the same *Apology*^r, assert the *worship* of all the three Persons: mentioning a difference of *order*, not of *nature*, amongst them. From the whole it appears that, in Justin's account, the *God* of the Christians is *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*; the same whereunto they are baptized.

Athenagoras, almost contemporary with Justin, is our next author: and he affords us still stronger and more express evidence of what I am contending for. In answer to the same charge of *atheism*, he breaks forth into this expression: "Who would not be astonished to hear us called *Atheists*, who acknowledge the *Father* as God, and the *Son* God, and the *Holy Ghost*: asserting their union of power (or *power of union*) and "distinction of order^s." Here again we may observe, that *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, are opposed to the *heathen deities*; and are also represented as distinct in respect of *order*, but in another respect *one*: and consequently not as *three Gods*, but as the *one God* of the Christians, instead of the heathen multiplicity. He makes the like answer elsewhere to the same charge of

Θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου, καὶ πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀνεπιμίτου τε κακίας Θεοῦ. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τε, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα, (καὶ διδόντα ἡμῖς ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιούμενων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν) πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικῶν σεβόμεθα, καὶ προσκυνῶμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώντες. *Just. Apol. i. cap. 6. p. 11, 12. Ox.*

¹ Τὸν Θεὸν μόνον δεῖ προσκυνεῖν. *Just. Apol. i. cap. 21.* Θεὸν μὲν μόνον προσκυνῶμεν. *Ibid. cap. 23.* Since

Justin declares so plainly for the *worship* of God alone, in the very same *Apology* where he declares likewise for the *worship* of the *three* Persons, it is manifest that he includes all the *three* in the *alone God*.

^r Justin. *Apol. i. cap. xvi. p. 24.*

^s Τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι, λέγοντας Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν Θεόν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δεικνύοντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν, ἀκούσας ἀθέους καλουμένους. *Athenag. Legat. cap. x. p. 40. Ox.*

atheism, mentioning *Father* and *Son* as the *God* (not *Gods*) which the Christians worshipped^t. From hence then we may very justly infer that the Christians, in his time, did not understand the words of the *form of baptism*, of *God* and *two creatures*; nor of one *supreme God* and two *inferior Gods*: but of three *divine Persons*, and all but *one God*.

About the same time with Athenagoras lived the author of a *profane dialogue*, ascribed to Lucian. Whatever doubt there may be about the *author*, there is little or none about the *time* he lived in^u; which was the *second century*, towards the middle of it. Whoever he was, he appears to have been well acquainted with the *Christian* tenets, though a professed Pagan. He introduces, in a jeering manner, a *Christian* catechising an heathen; and, among other things, instructing his *catechumen* in the mystery of the Trinity. For to the question, *Whom he should swear by?* he that personates the *Christian* returns this answer: “By the *God* that reigns on high, the great, the immortal and “heavenly, with the *Son* of the *Father*, and the *Spirit* proceeding from the *Father*; one in three, and three in one: take “these for your *Jupiter*, imagine this to be your *God**.” Here we see what kind of instructions used to be given to *catechumens*, preparatory to baptism: for it is to those that this author, while he ridicules them, plainly alludes. Here we may observe what baptizing into the *three Persons* meant at that time. It was receiving those three as *divine*, and as *one supreme God*. It is not one *supreme God*, and two *inferior Gods*; but *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are represented as being in the place of the one supreme *Jupiter*, and being all together *one God*.

Pass we on, next, to other testimonies of the same thing, in *Christian* writers of the same century. Irenæus is our next in order, about the year 173. He no where gives us any professed paraphrase upon the *form of baptism*: but from the *creeds*^y which he hath left us, with his interpretation of them; and from what he has occasionally said of the *three Persons*, it is very manifest

^t Οὐκ ἔσμεν ἄθεοι, Θεὸν ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγον. *Athenag.* cap. xxvi. p. 122.

Comp. cap. xi. p. 46. cap. xxii. p. 96.

^u Vid. Bull. Def. F. Nic. p. 73. *Judic.* p. 32. *Fabric. Biblioth. Græc.* lib. iv. cap. 16. p. 504.

^x Ὑψιμέδοντα Θεόν, μέγαν, ἄμβρο-

τον, οὐρανίωνα, υἱὸν πατρὸς, πνεῦμα ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, ἐν ἐκ τριῶν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τρία: ταῦτα νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τὸν δὲ ἡγοῦ Θεόν. *Lucian. Philopatr.* p. 770. Compare p. 774.

^y Vid. Iren. lib. i. cap. 10. p. 48. lib. i. cap. 22. p. 98. lib. iii. cap. 3. p. 176.

that he (with the Church in his time) believed the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* to be inseparably united in the work of creation, and so intimate with the Father as to make (in a manner) but *one self* and *one same* with him^z. Hence then it appears how he and the Church in his time understood the *form* of baptism: not of one *God* and two *creatures* joined together; (for he makes Father and Son *one God*, and *expressly* denies the Son to be a creature^a, *implicitly* denying it also of the Holy Ghost;) but of three *divine* Persons inseparable from each other, the one God of the Christians.

Clemens of Alexandria, another excellent writer, contemporary with Irenæus, is a further evidence of what we are pleading for. He gives us a kind of short *baptismal* creed, as it seems, in these words: "ONE Father of the whole universe, and ONE WORD of the whole universe, and the Holy Ghost ONE, "the same every where^b." Clemens in this passage attributes the same divine *omnipresence* to every Person of the sacred *Trinity*: which therefore he took to be really *divine*, and not made up of *God* and *creature*. And to shew you further that he looked upon all the three as *one God*, we may cite another passage from him as follows: "Let us give thanks "to the only Father and Son, Son and Father, to the Son our "Teacher and Master, together with the Holy Ghost, one in all " respects: in whom are all things—to whom be glory both

^z Fecit ea per semetipsum; hoc est, per Verbum et per Sapientiam suam. Iren. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 163.

Fecit ea per semetipsum; hoc est, per Verbum et Sapientiam suam. Ad est enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus, per quos, et in quibus, omnia libere et sponte fecit. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253.

Qui igitur a Prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus, hic est vivorum Deus, et Verbum ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi, &c.—Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus, qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 5. p. 232.

Cum sit unus et idem Deus Pater, et Verbum ejus, semper adsistens humano generi, &c. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 28. p. 266.

Is quidem, qui omnia fecerit, cum Verbo suo juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 183.

Unus Deus Pater ostenditur, qui est super omnia, et per omnia, et in omnibus. Super omnia quidem Pater et ipse est caput Christi: per omnia autem Verbum et ipse est caput Ecclesiæ: in omnibus autem nobis Spiritus, &c. Iren. lib. v. cap. 18. p. 315.

Ὁ γεννητὸς καὶ πεπλασμένος ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἀγενήτου γίνεται Θεοῦ. τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ πράσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος. Iren. lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285. See this last passage explained in my Defence, &c. vol. i. p. 530.

^a Vid. Iren. p. 132, 153, 217. ed. Bened. See Defence of some Queries, vol. i. p. 515, 529.

^b Εἰς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὄλων πατήρ· εἰς δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν ὄλων λόγος· καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ. Clem. Alex. p. 123.

“now and for everc.” When he says of the three Persons, that they are in *all respects* (or entirely) *one*, he means that they are *one God*; as is plain from another passage, where, speaking of Father and Son as being *one*, he explains it by their being *one God*^d. It is therefore exceeding clear that, according to this writer, *Christians* were supposed to be *baptized*, not into *God* and two *creatures*^e, but into *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three divine Persons, one God*. Thus far for testimonies of the second century, all within less than one hundred years of the last of the *Apostles*.

I pass on to *Tertullian*, at the head of the *third century*. There can be no question made of his sentiments in the present case. He tells us plainly, that the *Father is God*, and the *Son God*, and the *Holy Ghost God*, and *every one singly God*^f, and *all together make one God*^g. He says further, that this doctrine is, in a manner, the prime article in the *Gospel*, the very *sum and substance* of *Christianity*^h. Undoubtedly he understood the solemn form of baptism to contain that doctrine which he teaches; and that being baptized in the name of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, was receiving those three as *one God*, vowing all obedience, adoration, and homage to them as such. Indeed this writer, speaking of the *three Persons*, and the nature of *Christian baptism*, makes every *Person* equally the object of our faith and hope, the witness of our belief, and *surety* for our salvationⁱ.

Another celebrated writer, contemporary with *Tertullian*, is *Hippolytus*. He cites the very *form of baptism*, in his dispute against *Noëtus*, (as *Tertullian* also does against *Praxeas*.) in proof of the distinct *personality* of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*; but expresses withal his sentiments of the *divinity*

^c Εὐχαριστεῖν τῷ μόνῳ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, υἱῷ καὶ πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ υἱῷ, σὺν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πάντα τῷ ἐνὶ ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα.—ᾧ ἡ δόξα καὶ νῦν, καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. *Clem. Pæd.* lib. iii. p. 311.

^d Ἐν γὰρ ἅμφῳ, ὁ Θεός. *Clem. Pæd.* lib. i. cap. 8. p. 135.

^e This is further manifest from *Clemens's* declaring for the worship of *God* only, protesting against all *creature-worship*; (see p. 55, 59, 809, 825,) and yet admitting the *worship* of all the three *Persons*, p. 84, 311, 851.

^f Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, et Deus unusquisque. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 13.

^g Pater et Filius et Spiritus, tres crediti unum Deum sistunt. *Ibid.* cap. 31.

^h *Ibid.* cap. 31.

ⁱ Fides—obsignata in Patre, Filio, et Spiritu Sancto—habemus per benedictionem eosdem arbitros fidei, quos et sponsos salutis—sub tribus et testatio fidei, et sponsio salutis pignorentur, &c. *Tertull. de Baptism.* cap. 6.

of each Person. The greatest part of the paragraph relating to this head will be worth reciting. "If the WORD was with God, and himself was God, some perhaps may object, What does the Apostle then make *two Gods*? No; I will not say *two Gods*, but *one*; yet *two Persons*.—The Father one, but the Persons two, because of the Son; and the *third* is the *Holy Ghost*.—Their harmony in operation (or *administration*) brings all up to one God, for God is one.—The Father *above all*, the Son *through all*, the Holy Ghost *in all*. We can no otherwise think of God as one, but as believing *really* in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.—The *Word* of the Father, conscious of the economy (*of the three Persons*), and that it was the will of the Father to be thus (or *under this conception*) honoured, and not otherwise, gave his disciples orders, after his resurrection, to this purpose: 'Go teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:' signifying, that whosoever should leave out any one of the three, should come so far short of honouring God perfectly; for by this *Trinity* the Father is honoured. The *Father* gave orders (*for the creation*), the *Son* wrought (*in it*), and the *Holy Ghost* manifested^k." From this passage of Hippolytus we learn these things: that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three *real* Persons; that they are also *divine* Persons: and that they are not *three Gods*, but *one God*, by an ineffable union of power, presence, and operation. We learn also that this very doctrine, of such a *Trinity in Unity*, was intended by our Saviour in the *form of baptism*, and given in commission to his disciples, to be by them taught and inculcated as a matter of the utmost importance.

Our next author is Origen, who, speaking of *baptism*, says, "that it is, by virtue of the invocations there made, the spring

^k Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεὸς ὢν, τί οὖν φήσειεν ἂν τις δύο λέγειν Θεοῦς; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἔρω Θεοῦς ἀλλ' ἢ ἓνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο—πατὴρ μὲν γὰρ εἷς, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, ὅτι καὶ ὁ υἱὸς, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.—Οἰκονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εἰς ἓνα Θεόν. εἷς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός.—ὁ ὢν πατὴρ ἐπὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πᾶσιν. ἄλλως τε ἓνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ ὄντως πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν—γινώσκων οὖν ὁ πατρῶος

λόγος τὴν οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως βούλεται δοξάζεσθαι ὁ πατὴρ ἢ οὕτως, ἀναστάς παρέδωκεν τοῖς μαθηταῖς λέγων πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, δεικνύων ὅτι πᾶς ὃς ἂν ἐν τούτων ἐκλίπῃ, τελείως Θεὸν οὐκ ἐδόξασεν. διὰ γὰρ τριάδος ταύτης πατὴρ δοξάζεται. πατὴρ γὰρ ἠθέλησεν, υἱὸς ἐποίησεν, πνεῦμα ἐφάνησεν. Hippolyt. contr. Noët. cap. xiv. p. 16. Fabric.

“and fountain of spiritual graces, to every one that dedicates himself to the *divinity* (or *Godhead*) of the adorable Trinity¹.” All I have to observe upon this passage of Origen is, 1st, That he supposes *baptism* to be a *dedicating* ourselves to the service and worship of the whole Trinity, *θεότητι*, or, as it is otherwise read, *θειότητι*, to the *Godhead*, strictly; or, at least, to the *divine majesty*, of the *adorable Trinity*. 2ndly, That he supposes the spiritual graces or influences to descend from all the three Persons, by virtue of our *invocation* of them; which perhaps may mean only by virtue of their being solemnly *named*; or if it means more, our argument is so much the stronger. The sum is, that in baptism we recognise the *divinity* of every Person mentioned, and acknowledge our obligations of duty, and thankfulness, and adoration towards all: which cannot be made sense of, if one only of the three be supposed to be *God*, and the other two *creatures*.

I shall subjoin to these testimonies from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, a remarkable passage of St. Cyprian, of the third century. Arguing for the invalidity of heretical baptisms, he asks, How any person, so baptized, can be supposed to obtain remission of sins, and become the *temple of God*? For, says he, “of what God (*of which of the divine Persons*) is he made the temple? Is it of (*God*) the *Creator*? He cannot be so without believing in him. Is it of *Christ*? Impossible that any one should be his *temple* that *denies Christ to be God*. Is it then of the *Holy Ghost*? But since those *three are one*, how is it possible he should be at peace with the *Holy Ghost*, while he is at enmity either with the *Father* or the *Son*^m?”

¹ Τῷ ἐμπερέχοντι ἑαυτὸν τῇ θεότητι τῆς προσκυνητῆς τριάδος διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν ἐπικλήσεων, χαρισμάτων ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ πηγὴν. Origen. cit. apud Basil. de Spir. Sanct. cap. 29.

This passage is something differently read in our present copies of Origen, though the sense is much the same.

Τῷ ἐμπερέχοντι ἑαυτὸν τῇ θειότητι τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν τῆς προσκυνητῆς τριάδος ἐπικλήσεων ἐστὶν ἡ χαρισμάτων θείων ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ. Orig. Comm. in Joh. p. 124. ed. Huet.

Compare the following citations from Pamphilus's Apology:

Ex quibus omnibus discimus tantæ et auctoritatis et dignitatis substantiam

Spiritus Sancti, ut salutare baptismum non aliter nisi excellentissimæ omnium Trinitatis auctoritate, id est, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti cognominatione compleatur.—Nunquam utique in unitate Trinitatis, id est, Dei Patris inconvertibilis, et Filii ejus, etiam ipse Spiritus Sanctus haberetur; nisi quia et ipse semper erat Spiritus Sanctus. Pamph. Apolog. p. 232. ed. Bened.

^m Si baptizari quis apud hæreticos potuit; utique et remissam peccatorum consequi potuit. Si peccatorum remissam consecutus est, et sanctificatus est, et templum Dei factus est; quæro cujus Dei? Si *Creatoris*, non potuit qui in eum non credidit:

From this passage of Cyprian we may remark the following particulars :

1. That being baptized into *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, was being baptized into three *divine* Persons, or three Persons each of which is *God*.

2. That whoever is validly and savingly baptized does thereby become the *temple* of each *divine* Person, and of consequence the *temple of God*.

3. The reason why such person is not said to become the temple of *Gods*, in the *plural*, but of *God*, in the *singular*, is because the *three are one*, or *one God*; as Cyprian clearly enough intimates, and his master Tertullian expressly asserts, as before shewn.

4. That the denying *Christ* (and for the same reason any other of the Persons) to be *God*, is, in Cyprian's account, making the baptism of no effect: so nearly is the sacrament itself, and the salvation of the *recipient* concerned in the faith of the *divine* and *adorable* Trinity. Upon the whole it is manifest, that St. Cyprian understood the *form of baptism*, of three *divine* Persons, all *one God*: which is utterly repugnant to the faith of such as understand it of *God* and two *creatures*. To Cyprian's, I shall add the testimonies of two celebrated bishops of the same age, about the year 259; one of Rome, and the other of Alexandria.

Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, in a letter, (wrote, very probably, with the advice and consent of his clergy synodically convened,) very particularly explains the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as professed at that time. He calls it the most *august and venerable* doctrine of the Church; and the Trinity of Persons, the *divine Trinity*. He blames those who divide the *sacred Unity* into three *separate* hypostases, thereby making, in a manner, *three Gods*; being the opposite extreme to Sabellius, who made but *one Person*. At the same time he blames those as much, that presumed to make a *creature* of God the Son, and censures it as *blasphemy* in a very high degree; understanding the word *creature* according to the common acceptance, and as all men of plain good sense have ever understood it. The sum of his doctrine he gives us in these words: "The divine *Logos* must

si *Christi*, nec hujus fieri potest templum, qui negat *Deum Christum*: si *Spiritus Sancti*, cum tres unum sint, quomodo *Spiritus Sanctus* placatus

esse ei potest, qui aut *Patris*, aut *Filii* inimicus est? *Cypr. ad Jubai. Ep. lxxiii. p. 203. Comp. Concil. Carth. n. xxxix. p. 235.*

“ of necessity be united to the God of the universe; and the
 “ *Holy Ghost* must abide and dwell in God; and the *divine*
 “ *Trinity* must of necessity be conceived to be gathered
 “ together, and collected, as it were, into *one head*, namely, into
 “ the God of the universe, the Almighty.” From hence it is
 clear, that the Catholics of that time apprehended that they
 were baptized into the faith of three *divine* Persons, not of *God*
 and *two creatures*; and yet that those three were not *three Gods*,
 but by reason of their most intimate and ineffable relation
 to each other, and their union in one head, were *one God*. The
 other Dionysius briefly expresses the same thing thus: “ We
 “ extend the *Unity*, without dividing it, into a *Trinity*; and
 “ again, we contract the *Trinity*, without taking from it,
 “ into *Unity*.” It may be rendered more briefly thus: “ The
 “ undivided *Monad* we extend to a *Triad*; and again, the
 “ undiminished *Triad* we collect into a *Monad*.” It is very
 plain that those primitive Fathers did not answer the question,
 how *God is one*, as some moderns do, by leaving out the *Son* and
 the *Holy Ghost*, and placing the *Unity* in the *Father only*: but
 their way was to take in all the three Persons, and so to make
 up the *Monad of the undivided Triad*.

Having traced the sentiments of the earliest writers upon this
 head, I may now venture to say, with somewhat better reason
 than the author of “ *Scripture Doctrine*,” that, “ How this text (of
 “ *St. Matthew*) was universally understood in the primitive
 “ *Church* cannot be doubted;” there being still extant so many
 writings of the ancients discovering their sentiments of it: which
 therefore may serve as the best *comment*, or *paraphrase*, not only
 upon that text, but upon the *Creeds* too, which ought to be in-
 terpreted by the same rule, as I shall shew presently. I shall
 not add any testimonies of *Post-Nicene* Fathers, however many
 and weighty, because their sentiments are well known, and our
 adversaries will readily give them up to us in the present
 question⁹. I shall only observe, that the sense which I have

⁹ Ἡνωσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν
 ὄλων τὸν θείον λόγον. Ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν
 δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδαιτυσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον
 πνεῦμα· ἥδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἓνα,
 ὡσπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν
 ὄλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφα-
 λαιούσθαι τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι πάσα
 ἀνάγκη. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas.*
 vol. i. p. 231.

⁹ Ἡμεῖς εἰς τε τὴν τριάδα τὴν μονάδα
 πλατύνομεν ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὴν τριάδα
 πάλιν ἀμείωτον εἰς τὴν μονάδα συγκε-
 φαλαιούμεθα. *Dionys. Alex. apud*
Athanas. vol. i. p. 255.

⁹ The Council of Constantinople, in the year 382, in their Synodical Epistle, speaking of the Nicene faith, do in the main express the sense of

given of the form of baptism was, in the fourth century, so well known and undisputed, that the Emperor Julian (called the Apostate) made it an argument against Christ and his religion^r, that whereas Moses and the Prophets had said, "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve;" *Christ* in contradiction thereto (for so the Apostate pretended) had ordered his disciples to baptize "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Though from what hath been said I take the point I intended to have been sufficiently proved, yet it may not be improper to throw in two or three general remarks to confirm it still further.

1. The first may be taken from the known custom of the primitive Church, in requiring the *competentes*, or candidates for baptism, first to make a solemn renunciation of *idolatry* and *false worship*^s, under the general title of the *Devil and all his pomps, &c.*, and then immediately^t after to profess their faith in, and adherence to, God the *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*. A profession of faith was, from the beginning, always required of persons before baptism: we have plain examples of, and allusions to, something of that kind, even in Scripture itself^u. Upon these instances the Christian Church proceeded. At first, very probably, the profession of faith went no further than the minutes given in the form of baptism: but in a little time it came to be enlarged, as *heresies* or other incidents gave occasion. Tertullian derives it from immemorial custom, that the *answers* in baptism were somewhat enlarged beyond what Christ himself had expressly determined^x. It is not improbable that he intended this of the enlarging of the *baptismal* profession,

all the Post-Nicene Catholics as follows:

Ταύτην γὰρ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ διαστρέφουσι τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθοῦς πίστεως, συναρέσκειν δεῖ. ἦν μὲν ποτὲ πρεσβυτάτην τε οὖσαν, καὶ ἀκόλουθον τῷ βαπτίσματι, καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. δηλαδὴ θεότητός τε καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ οὐσίας μιᾶς τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πιστευομένης, &c. *Theod. E. H.* lib. v. cap. 9. p. 210.

Particular testimonies of Post-Nicene Fathers may be seen collected in Petavius de Trin.

^r Vid. Cyril. contr. Julian. lib. ix. p. 291, 294.

^s Quid erit summum atque præcipuum, in quo Diabolus et pompæ et angeli ejus censeantur, quam idololatria? *Tertull. de Spect.* cap. iv. p. 74.

See Bingham, *Christian Antiquities*, book xi. ch. 7.

^t Vid. Cyril. Hieros Catech. Mystag. i. p. 283. *Apostol. Const.* lib. vii. cap. 41.

^u Acts viii. 12, 37. 1 Pet. iii. 21.

^x Amplius aliquid respondentens quam Dominus in Evangelio determinavit. *Tertull. de Coron.* cap. iii. p. 102.

See Wall's *Hist. of Infant Baptism*, part ii. c. 9. p. 495.

or creed, beyond that *form of baptism* which our Lord himself had prescribed; and which probably was, at first, the occasion and the subject-matter of the *baptismal creed*, as well as the rule and measure of it. This I offer only as conjecture. Certain however it is, that a profession of faith in, and adherence to, God the *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, immediately followed upon the *abrenunciation* of the *Devil, &c.* which is a confirmation to us, that as, on one hand, they renounced all idolatry and false gods; so their *aggregation*, (if I may so call it,) or joining of themselves to these three Persons, was intentionally receiving them as the true and only God.

2. I shall subjoin a second consideration, drawn from the principles and practices of the ancient heretics. No sooner did they alter (many of them) or corrupt the true faith in the blessed Trinity, but they thought of altering the *form of baptism* likewise; lest it should appear inconsistent with their novel and pernicious tenets. This was remarkably seen in the Tritheists^y, and Praxeans^z, and Valentinians^a, who had all corrupted the true original faith in the Trinity. To conceal their shame and self-condemnation, and to propagate their erroneous principles, they innovated in the *form of baptism*; which was one of the best fences to the true faith, and a standing bar to most *heresies*. The like was afterwards practised by Eunomius, who was a thoroughpaced Arian, but a man of shrewd parts, and who readily perceived that it might be an easier matter to bring the very *form of baptism* into disuse, (though that was very shocking too,) than to root out of men's minds the Catholic and only true sense of it. That *form* was as great an eyesore to him and his followers, as a Nicene or an Athanasian Creed, or as *Doxologies* and *Liturgies*, expressing the Catholic doctrine, are to some now. They were forced at length to alter the instituted and only regular *form of baptism* for others of their own devising; which might be more consistent with, or favourable to, their *novel* opinions. Sometimes they chose to baptize *in the name of the Father uncreate, the Son created by the Father, and the Holy Ghost created by the Son*^b. At other times they were content, more briefly and with less offence, to baptize *into the*

^y Apostol. Can. 39.

^z Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 26.
Pseudo-Ignat. Ep. and Philip. cap. 1.
Apost. Can. 50. cum Not. Cotel. et

Bevereg.

^a Vid. Iren. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 94.

^b Vid. Epiphani. Hæres. 76.

death of Christ^c; or in the name of the *Father*, by the *Son*, in the *Holy Ghost*. All the while, it is observable that the Catholics never varied the *form*; nor so much as inserted or added any thing by way of explication, or in favour of their principles. Either it must be said that they had no need to do it, the *form* itself being so plainly and clearly on their side; or else that they were the more *pious* and *modest* men, and durst not attempt any the least innovation in a sacred law and institution of Christ. Our modern Arians^d have not yet attempted, that I know of, to alter the *form of baptism*: but they hope to be able to disguise or elude the ancient Catholic sense of it. I know not whether it might provoke our *pity* or our *indignation* most, to find some endeavouring to run down the truly *primitive* interpretation of it, under the notion of *new scholastic hypotheses*^e; and, at the same time, vending their own *novelties* and *heterodoxies* under the venerable name of *antiquity*. The pretence is, that the *Apostles' Creed* (as commonly called) is a *professed paraphrase* upon the *form of baptism*. And what if it were, would it do those gentlemen any service? Or is the faith therein contained any thing akin to theirs, or so much as consistent with it? But I shall beg leave to examine this pretence largely and distinctly once for all, and then conclude. It will be necessary to premise some things, first, of *CreeDs* in general, and, secondly, of that *Creed* called the *Apostles' in particular*.

1. Of *CreeDs* in general. It is a mistake to imagine that *CreeDs* were, at first, intended to teach, in full and *explicit* terms, all that should be necessary to be believed by Christians. They were designed rather for hints and minutes of the main *credenda*, to be recited by *catechumens* before baptism: and they were purposely contrived short, that they might be the more easily retained in memory, and take up the less time in reciting. *CreeDs*, very probably, at first, were so far from being *paraphrases* or *explications* of the form of baptism, (or of Scripture texts,) that they went no further, or very little further, than the form itself, and wanted as much *explaining* and *paraphrasing*, in order to be rightly and distinctly understood, as any other

^c Socrat. E. H. lib. v. cap. 24. Theod. Hær. Fab. lib. iv. cap. 3.

^d Mr. Emlyn, indeed, is for laying *baptism* itself aside, among the *posterity* of baptized Christians; which is

doing the business at once. (See his Tracts, p. 429, &c.) But I know not whether I am to reckon him in the number of the Arians.

^e See Dr. Clarke's Reply, p. 205.

words or forms could do. Hence it was that the *catechumens* were to be instructed in the *Creed*, previously to baptism, for many days together. Jerome says, for forty days^f; and particularly mentions the doctrine of the *Trinity* as the subject-matter of instruction for all that time. § The author of the *Apostolical Constitutions* gives us a summary of what the *catechumens* were generally taught, previously to *baptism*: and among the heads of instruction there intimated, the first and principal relates to the doctrine of the *Trinity*. Cyril of Jerusalem has left us a whole course of *Catechetical Lectures*, which he drew up for the use of those that stood candidates for baptism: and there we find that he is very large and particular in explaining those parts of the *Creed*. which concern the nature, character, and offices of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*. Creeds would have been of small use to *catechumens*, without this method of *preparatory* instructions: and yet it seems to have been solely for the use of such that *Creeds* were originally intended; being first used only in the *office of baptism*, and but by degrees taken in to make a part of the common and daily Liturgies of the Church^h. From hence we see the reason why *Creeds* were no larger, nor more *explicit*; being but a kind of recapitulation of what the *catechumens* had been taught more at large, the main heads whereof were committed to memory, and publicly recited, and so became a *Creed*. A short summary of *credenda* might then be sufficient, after the *catechumens* had been fully and particularly instructed in the sense of every article. I shall observe further, that as *Creeds* became gradually enlarged, it was rather by the addition of *new* articles, (*new* I mean with respect to the *Creeds*, and their insertion into them, though believed by the faithful from the beginning,) than by a more *explicit* opening of the older, except in some particular cases. The reason of which seems to be, that *explications* of former articles might ordinarily be left to the *catechists* to supply by way of catechetical instruction. It was sufficient for *Creeds* to have hinted what was most material, and to abound in *matter*, rather than in *words*, to answer the use intended. As *heresies*

^f Consuetudo autem apud nos xxxviii. p. 314.

istiusmodi est, ut his qui baptizandi sunt, per quadraginta dies, publice tradamus sanctam et adorandam Trinitatem. Hieron. ad Pammach. Epist.

§ Apost. Const. lib. vii. cap. 39. p. 378. Cot.

^h See Mr. Bingham's Christian Antiquities, book x. ch. 4. p. 117.

gave occasion, new articles were inserted in, or added to, the Creeds: not that they were originally of greater importance than any other articles omitted, but the opposition made to some doctrines rendered it the more necessary to insist upon an *explicit* belief and profession of them. To instance in the Jerusalem *Creed*, the oldest, it may be, of any that is extantⁱ. The article of the *Trinity* was undoubtedly in it from the beginning, and perhaps none other; and that expressed thus briefly, "I believe in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." Baptism of repentance, remission of sins, Catholic Church, resurrection of the flesh, life everlasting, are so many *new* articles, probably, added afterwards, as there was occasion. The rest are insertions and explications, giving a more particular description of the nature, character, and offices of the three Persons of the ever blessed *Trinity*: and probably these additions and illustrations came in gradually, one after another, as occasion served, in opposition to the attempts of those that endeavoured to alter, mutilate, corrupt, or misrepresent the Catholic *faith*. Other particulars there omitted may be as necessary points of faith, as some there mentioned: but those were more particularly necessary to be insisted on, at that time and in those circumstances. Which I the rather hint, that Creeds may not be taken for complete catalogues of *fundamentals*, which they are not: (for indeed we shall hardly find two that have exactly the same articles, neither more nor less:) but for such short *summaries* of the Christian faith, as were most proper to be inculcated before *baptism*, as an introduction to the right understanding and professing the whole of the Christian religion. I have not room to explain myself so largely upon this head as the thing deserves; but I shall give one example to illustrate the truth of the observation. The article of *life everlasting* was, very probably, wanting for some centuries in the Creeds of Rome and Aquileia^k. Yet who can pretend to say, that that was not as *necessary* and *fundamental* an article of faith, as any is or can be? But its being so easy, and obvious to every Christian, and hardly at all disputed, might be the reason why, however *necessary* it was to believe it, it was not thought *necessary* to make any explicit mention of it in those Creeds. Having premised

ⁱ See Bull. Judic. p. 48, 56, &c.

^k Vid. Voss. de Trib. Symb. Dissert. I. Thes. xliii. p. 29. Fell. Not. in Epist. Cyprian. lxx. p. 190.

those few things of *Creeeds* in general, I proceed next to the *Apostles' Creed* in particular.

2. It is well known to learned men, that the Creed, called the *Apostles'*, is no other than the *Roman Creed*. "It has obtained the name of the *Apostolic Creed*," as a learned and accurate author observes¹, "for no greater or other reason than this: It was a custom to call those churches in which any *Apostle* had personally taught, especially if he had resided there any long time, or had died there, *Apostolic Churches*. Of these there were a great many in the eastern parts; Jerusalem, Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch, &c. but in the western parts, none but Rome.—So that any one that in the western parts of the world spoke of the *Apostolic Church*, was supposed to mean Rome—and so their *Bishop* came to be called the *Apostolic Bishop*; their *see* the *Apostolic see*, their *faith* the *Apostolic faith*, and, among the rest, the *Creed* that they used the *Apostolic Creed*, now called the *Apostles'.*" The Creed then of the *Apostles* (as it is particularly called, though other *Creeeds* might as justly have, and really have had the name of the *Apostles' Creed*) is certainly no other than the Creed of one particular Church, the Church of Rome; and is neither so old. (taken altogether.) nor of so great authority as the Nicene Creed itself: it is but imposing on the unlearned reader to recommend it as a *professed paraphrase*, and the most early of any, upon the text of St. Matthew, when indeed it is no *professed paraphrase* at all; or if it be, there is still no reason to prefer it to other, as valuable and as ancient, *Creeeds*, which have the articles of the *divinity* of the Son and Holy Spirit more full and express; or to the continued testimonies of Church writers, which, after all, make a better and a juster *paraphrase* upon the text of St. Matthew, than either the *Roman*, or any other *Creed*. or than all the *Creeeds* put together. For, indeed, the early *Creeeds* being designedly brief and concise, full of matter, contrived rather to take in many particulars, than to dwell much upon any one, it is not to be wondered at, if they be not so *explicit* in this or that article; especially considering that some Churches, particularly the Roman, were less infested with heresies than others, and therefore needed not so long a *Creed*; and considering further, that whatever mistakes might

¹ Mr. Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. ch. 9. p. 507.

otherwise have happened to arise, through the brevity and conciseness of the Creeds themselves, they were effectually prevented by previous *catechetical* instructions, explaining more distinctly and fully what was but briefly hinted in the Creeds. To conclude this head: as to the Roman Creed, there is no reason to lay any more stress upon it than upon the Creeds of Irenæus, Tertullian, or Origen; or the Creed of Jerusalem, &c. all of them, probably, as old or older than the Roman: nor is it to be expected that every Creed, or any Creed designed only for the *office of baptism*, should teach, in *explicit* terms, all that is necessary to be believed by Christians. Yet, after all, even the Roman (called the *Apostles'*) *Creed*, short as it is, when rightly understood, is diametrically opposite to the Arian principles; and, if it must be called a *paraphrase*, is such a *paraphrase* on the text of St. Matthew as sufficiently confirms the sense which I have given of it. Our Saviour Christ is, in the Roman Creed, characterised under the title of *μονογενής*, or *only-begotten* of the Father. The meaning of that title or character was well known to the compilers of that Creed, and to the primitive *catechists* of the Church, who would not fail to acquaint the *catechumens* with it. The ancients are unanimous in understanding Christ's *sonship* of his *divine nature*. To call him the *only-begotten*, or the *Son*, of God the Father, was, in their account, declaring him to be of the same nature with God the Father; as *truly God*, as the Son of man is *truly man*^m. Hence therefore it is manifest that the Roman Creed, though briefly, yet fully sets forth the *divinity* of Christ, as has been shewn more at large by Bishop Bullⁿ. And the learned Stillingfleet, who well understood this matter, had good reason to say, "That although the *Apostles'* *Creed* does not in express words declare the divinity of the "three Persons in the unity of the divine essence; yet taking

^m *Unigenitus* ut solus ex Deo genitus proprie de vulva cordis ipsius. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 7.

Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et ideo Filium Dei et Deum dictum, ex unitate substantiæ. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. 21.

Πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 123. *Comp. Dial.* p. 183, 184, 364, 371.

Ὁ θεῖος λόγος ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεός, ὁ τῶν Δεσπότη τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθεῖς, ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν

ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. *Clem. Alex.* p. 86.

Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον—ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. *Athenag.* p. 38.

Θεὸς οὖν ὢν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ πεφυκὼς, &c. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 130.

Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat.* cap. 11.

ⁿ *Bull. Judic. Eccles.* p. 36, &c.

“ the sense of those articles as the *Christian Church* understood them from the Apostles’ times, then we have as full and clear evidence of this doctrine, as we have *that we received the Scriptures from them*.” If then we are to learn from the *Apostles’ Creed* how the words of the *form of baptism* were *universally understood in the primitive Church*, we must understand the words of that form in the same sense as those articles of the Creed were *universally understood in the primitive Church*. For to pretend that the *form of baptism* is to be interpreted from the *Creed*, as understood by the *primitive Church*; and at the same time to put a *novel* construction upon the Creed itself, is such an affront to common sense, and such an abuse of the readers, as one shall seldom meet with among *men of letters*.

Upon the whole, these things are evident; 1. That the sense of the *primitive Church*, in the articles concerning *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, may be certainly known otherwise than from the *Creeds*. 2. That the *Creeds* themselves ought to be interpreted according to that sense so known, having been so understood from the beginning, or from the time of their compiling. 3. That by laying of ancient testimonies together, and comparing of evidences, we have full and clear proof that the *primitive Church* never imagined *baptism* to run in the name of the *Father* only as God, and of the two other Persons as *creatures*; but in the name of three Persons, every one *God*, and all together the *one God* of Christians.

And now, my Christian brethren, what remains but to exhort and warn you, as you tender your everlasting salvation, to abide evermore in that *faith* whereunto you have been *baptized*, and which alone can give you any reasonable confidence, or hope of assurance towards God. Remember those who have gone before you, the *Apostles* and primitive martyrs and confessors, “ whose faith follow, considering the end of their conver-

^o Stillingfleet on the Trinity, ch. ix. p. 229.

^p N. B. A late writer (Modest Plea, &c. continued, p. 54.) says, that Dr. W. (speaking of the *Creeds*) is forced to add, “ as interpreted by those that recite them;” and the reason of it, he says, is, “ because the oldest *Creeds* mention nothing of those matters,” i. e. the *eternity* and *consubstantiality* of God the Son. To which I answer, 1. That I had good reason to refer to

the primitive writings for the interpretation of *Creeds*; especially at this distance, when unlearned readers may the more easily be imposed upon by a *novel sense* put upon them. 2. That this writer betrays his ignorance of the *oldest Creeds*; which, if they do not *explicitly* declare those articles, yet all, or most of them, do it *implicitly*: Irenæus’s, Tertullian’s, Origen’s, Jerusalem Creed, *Apostles’*, &c.

“sation. Jesus Christ *is* the same yesterday, to-day, and “for ever. Be not carried about with divers and strange “doctrines, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, “whereby they lie in wait to deceive.” What have they done, by reviving antiquated *heresies*, but disturbed the minds of the simple, raised confusion and distraction amongst many, and given a handle to *Libertines*, *Deists*, and *Atheists*, to insult and to *blaspheme*? What is there in *Arianism*, either of truth, or even of probability, to make us amends for these things? I mention not the daily inroads made upon *Christian simplicity* and *godly sincerity*; the wiles and artifices, dissimulation and disguises, by which it was at first promoted and propagated, and without which it cannot any where subsist. To this very day the patrons of it have no other way left, but to conceal and cover its *deformity* as much as possible; stifling of evidences that make against it, misrepresenting the truth of history, taking advantage of *ambiguous* terms, keeping off in *generals*, not daring so much as to own the certain and inevitable *consequences* of their principles, hardly the *principles* themselves; not trusting either to a fair, open, and regular examination, but shrinking always from the very point in question; opposing, objecting, cavilling perpetually against the *orthodox* scheme, but taking little or no care, either to *answer*, or so much as to *mention*, the main difficulties and inconsistencies visible in their own. For the truth of this I appeal to all who have been any thing curious observers of the rise, and progress, and present state of this *heresy* amongst us. They must not blame us for calling their doctrine *heresy*, which it really is, when they have the face so often to call ours *new scholastic hypotheses*, which it really is not. Names of *reproach* might have been spared on both sides, had not they began, and set us an example. Had they been contented modestly to propose their doubts, with their reasons for them; had they fairly and ingenuously set forth the arguments on our side of the question in their full strength, and then brought their own to set against them, and balance them; had they been willing to acknowledge, (what is undoubtedly true,) that we have many and great reasons such as must weigh even with wise and good men, for what we believe and profess; much from Scripture, much from antiquity, and countenanced, now many centuries, by the sober and thinking part of the Christian world; had they freely owned this, giving at the same time

their reasons on the other side, and leaving impartial men, after a fair and full hearing, to judge which should outweigh: I say, had they took this reasonable and ingenuous method, like *modest* inquirers after truth, I know not whether any fair and candid man would have condemned, or not have commended them for it. But when nothing less will serve the turn but misrepresenting us, as following only *new scholastic hypotheses*; when *antiquity* is searched only to pick out such passages as *seem* to make for one side, and much *art* used even to make them *seem* so; when our main strength from *Scripture* and from *antiquity* is, in a manner, totally concealed and disguised, and the principal objections and difficulties of their own scheme passed over in silence; the *orthodox*, all the while, being represented as a parcel of men overrun with prejudice and bigotry, preferring *human* and *modern decisions*, the *words of men*, before the infallible *word of God*; full of contradiction and absurdity, and bereft, in a manner, of common sense: I say, when this is the method which some please to take to revive an old *heresy*, such *rude attacks* upon our *common faith*, though we had less to say for it, are never to be justified; nor indeed are they capable of any kind excuse, when the men are so far from proving that we have been mistaken in this matter, that they dare not trust the merits of the cause to a fair, open, and calm hearing. They dare not venture to set their scheme in its true colours and naked simplicity against ours, fearing lest impartial men should too plainly see what advantage we are sure to have upon a just comparison. It is *ungenerous* and *mean* in any cause, (in this it is *impious*,) not to suffer all that can justly be pleaded on the opposite side to appear in its full light and strength. What harm can there be in admitting what is *truth* and *fact*, suppose it relate either to *Scripture* or *antiquity*? Let the evidences be produced, at least; the *weight* of them may be considered afterwards. And what if *Arianism* should not happen to prevail in this so *fair* and *just* a method? How can it be remedied? Must it be obtruded upon us, true or false, right or wrong, with or without reason? If there really be not evidence sufficient for it, or if it must be overpowered by contrary evidence, then this we may certainly depend on, either that the Arian doctrine is *false*, or, at the lowest, that no man can be obliged to think it *true*: which consideration alone may

be enough to satisfy any *conscientious* man in rejecting it, in its present circumstances.

To conclude all in a few words: one thing we may require and demand in the present case; that before we venture to *dethrone* our *God* and *Saviour*, by bringing him down to the rank of *creatures*; before we presume to abridge him of those honours, and that *worship*, which he has held in the Christian Church by a prescription of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen hundred years; before we run upon what has hitherto been accounted *blasphemy*, *horrid blasphemy*, by the wisest, the greatest, and most eminent lights of the *Christian Church*, in former and in latter ages; before we disclaim our solemn vows in *baptism*, where we dedicated ourselves to the service and worship of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, one God blessed for ever; before we go these lengths, let us, at least, have things fairly and impartially examined, in sincerity and singleness of heart; disguising nothing, nor smothering any evidences, but comparing things with things, Scripture with Scripture, reason with reason, and then balancing the whole account: let us know, in some measure, what we do, that we run not *blindfold* into our own certain *damnation*. In the mean while, it behoves us to retain *steadfastly*, what we have hitherto piously believed and professed, in the integrity of our hearts and minds. And may the *sacred Three*, to whom we once have so solemnly devoted all our services, accept of our sincere endeavours to preserve and keep up that *divine* honour, which has been hitherto (and we doubt not, *justly*) paid to each of them. *To the same most holy, undivided Trinity, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be all honour and glory, adoration and worship, in all churches of the saints, now and for evermore. Amen.*

AN ANSWER

TO

DR. WHITBY'S REPLY:

BEING A

VINDICATION

OF THE

CHARGE OF FALLACIES, MISQUOTATIONS, MISCONSTRUC-
TIONS, MISREPRESENTATIONS,
&c.

Respecting his Book entitled

DISQUISITIONES MODESTÆ.

IN A LETTER TO DR. WHITBY.

SIR,

I HAVE read over your Reply, lately published. I perceive you are much disturbed at the freedom I took with you, in that part of my Defence which concerned you: and though you have, for several years last past, been acting the part of a *sensor*, and a severe one too, (if we consider the *intention* rather than the *effect*,) upon many great, good, and learned men, ancient and modern; yet when it comes to be your own case to be animadverted upon, (however justly, and upon a necessary occasion,) you are not able to bear it with due temper of mind. I am very unwilling to give you any further disturbance: and, indeed, were your Reply to be read only by *men of letters*, I should not have a thought of returning any answer to it. But since the controversy, about the ever blessed Trinity, is now spread among all kinds of readers, I have judged it necessary, in so momentous a cause, to take some notice of what you have done, for the sake of some well-meaning men who might otherwise happen to be imposed upon by it.

You divide your work into two parts, *defensive* and *offensive*: the *first*, to take off (so far as you are able) what I had charged you with; the *second*, to retort the *charge*, and to raise objections from antiquity, chiefly against the Catholic cause, which I have the honour to espouse.

My Answer, accordingly, if it shall be thought needful to carry it through, must consist of two parts: one to shew that you have not been able to take off what I had charged you with; the other to make it appear that your objections against us are slight and trivial, not capable of doing our cause harm.

PART THE FIRST.

Which is to shew that you have not been able to take off what I had charged upon you.

The *Charge* was contained under two heads :

1. General fallacies, running through your whole book, entitled *Disquisitiones Modestæ*.

2. Particular defects, viz. misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, &c.

I do not add the epithets of *gross*, *egregious*, or the like, as you are pleased to do, (Reply, p. 100,) because, if I can prove the facts, the reader may be left to judge how *gross* or how *egregious* any *misconstructions*, *misrepresentations*, &c. are : and because those and the like epithets or decorations, are then only useful, when a writer lies under the unhappy necessity of endeavouring to make up in *words* what he wants of *proof*. But to come directly to the matter in hand, I must begin with the charge of *general fallacies*, which were three, and which I shall take in their order :

1. The first *general fallacy* charged upon you^a, was, your making *essence* and *person* to signify the same. One *individual* or *numerical* essence you every where interpret to a Sabellian sense ; understanding by it one *individual Hypostasis* or *real Person*. In your Reply, you admit (p. 5.) that the *same numerical intellectual essence* is, with you, equivalent to *same person* : so that the *fact* charged upon you stands good, by your own confession.

Now then, let us see whether you have dealt fairly and justly with Bishop Bull. I observed what influence this one principle, or *postulatum*, of yours must have upon the state of the *general* question ; and indeed upon your whole thread of reasoning quite through your book. For, if it appears that you have set out upon a false ground, you must of course blunder all the way, running into a perpetual *ignoratio elenchi*, (as the Schools call it,) that is, disputing besides the *question* : which, under pretence and show of confuting Bishop Bull, is really nothing else but confuting an imagination of your own. The *question* with Bishop Bull was, whether the Ante-Nicene Fathers believed the Son to

^a See my Defence, vol. i. p. 507.

be of an *eternal, uncreated*, and strictly *divine* substance. But with you it is, whether they believed him to be the same *numerical intellectual essence* (that is, as you interpret it, *Person*) with the Father. Thus you have changed the very state of the *general* question, and must of course argue all along wide of the point. So, when you come to particular authors, you still pursue the same mistake that you began with. You state the question relating to Barnabas (Disquis. Mod. p. 7.) thus; *Whether he makes Father and Son one numerical essence*: which is the same with you, as to ask, whether he makes them the *same Person*. The question is stated the same way, in respect of Hermas^b, Clemens of Rome^c, Justin Martyr^d, and others. With this kind of grave impertinence you go on confuting Bishop Bull, without so much as attacking him; while the main weight and force of your reasonings (when they really have any) falls not upon any thing which he has asserted, but upon quite another thing, which you have been pleased to invent for him. It is now time to hear what you have to say in defence of this peculiar piece of management. Your *excuses* for it are reducible to three heads. 1st, That you did not know what Bishop Bull meant. 2dly, That you had interpreted *numerical essence* as all the present *orthodox* do, whose cause Bishop Bull is supposed to have espoused. 3dly, That *numerical essence* does and must signify what you pretend, and nothing else. Though I have not taken your own words, yet, I think, I have here given your full sense; and more distinctly and clearly than you have done. I am next to examine your *excuses*, one by one.

1. You did not know what Bishop Bull meant, or in what sense he maintained the *consubstantiality*. So you pretend in your book^e, and repeat it in your Reply^f, that you are "not certain whether he" (the Bishop) "pleaded for a *numerical* " or *specific* unity of essence;" taking it for granted that every *numerical* Unity is such as you have described; and that there is no *medium* between *numerical*, in your sense, and *specific*; that is, no *medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*. This indeed is the *πρωτον ψεδος*, the prime falsehood which you set out with, and proceed upon; and which makes all your discourses on this head confused, and wide of the point. But of this more presently. As to Bishop Bull, if you had not saga-

^b Disquisit. Modest. p. 9.

^c Ibid. p. 12.

^d Ibid. p. 25.

^e Modest. Disquis. p. 31. Præf.

^f Reply, p. 7.

city enough to perceive what he meant, you might however *easily* and *certainly* have known, that he did *not mean* what you are pleased to put upon him; because he has plainly, frequently, and constantly denied *numerical Unity*, in the sense of *personal identity*. His intent was not to prove that the Fathers were Sabellians, (as your way of opposing him every where supposes,) but that they were not Arians. This you could not but know, if you know any thing: and therefore the method and way which you pitched upon, of writing against his book, was, to say the least of it, very unfair and disingenuous. You would have your readers believe that you have confuted the Bishop, when in reality, after granting you all that you have been able to prove, it is not to the purpose, is no *confutation* of what the Bishop has asserted, but of another *proposition* which the Bishop himself had disowned, as much as you can do. The charge therefore of *mistaking* the question stands good against you; and, what is more, *wilful* mistaking, since you could not be ignorant that Bishop Bull did not intend to assert *numerical Unity* in that sense wherein you oppose it. This is sufficient for me in defence of my *charge*. But for the clearer apprehension of Bishop Bull's meaning in relation to this matter, I will next cite you some of his own words:

“As concerning the *specific* Unity of Persons in the blessed
 “Trinity, such as is the union of *supposita*, or *persons*, among things
 “created, (for instance, of three men, Peter, Paul, and John,
 “which are separate from one another, and do not any way de-
 “pend upon each other as to their essence,) this the Fathers of
 “the first ages never dreamed of. They acknowledged a very
 “different union of the divine Persons, such as there is no pat-
 “tern of, no resemblance perfectly answering to it, whereby to
 “illustrate it, among created beings. They explain the matter
 “thus: that God the Father is, as I said, the Head and Foun-
 “tain of divinity, from whom the Son and Holy Ghost are de-
 “rived, but so derived as not to be divided from the Father's
 “Person, but they are in the Father, and the Father in them,
 “by a certain *περιχώρησις*, or *inhabitation*, so called, as I have
 “shewn at large. *Defens. Fid. Nic.* sect. iv. lib. 4. Petavius
 “himself contends that from this *περιχώρησις*, *inhabitation*, a
 “*numerical* Unity may be inferred, *Petav.* lib. iv. cap. 16. It
 “is certainly manifest that this explication can no way consist
 “with the Arian *hypothesis*: and it is also manifest that *Tri-*

“*theism* is excluded by it, and the unity of the Godhead made “consistent with a *real* distinction of Persons.”

Thus far Bishop Bull, in his answer to Gilbert Clarke^s. He speaks much to the same purpose also in his Defence of the Nicene Faith^h. “As to *numerical* Unity of substance of Father “and Son, (which Huetius says was denied by Origen,) I can “make it evident that Origen acknowledged that Unity as far “as any of the earlier Fathers, and even Athanasius himself “acknowledged it: that is, Origen believed the Father, Son, “and Holy Ghost, though *really* three Persons, yet to have no “divided or separate existence, (as three men have,) but to be “intimately united and conjoined one with another, and to exist “in each other, and (as I may so speak) to pervade and permeate one another by an ineffable *περιχώρησις*, which the “Schoolmen call *inhabitation*: from which *inhabitation*, Petavius asserts that a *numerical* Unity must necessarily be “ferred.”

From this account of Bishop Bull, it is evident that he neither admitted *specific* Unity, nor *numerical* in your sense: and therefore it was very artificial of you to say that you knew not which of the two he intended, as if he must have meant one, when it is so plain that he meant neither, but utterly denied both. He did indeed assert, as you see, *numerical* Unity, but not in your sense, not in the Sabellian sense of *personal identity*.

2. The second *excuse* you make for your impertinent manner of opposing Bishop Bull without contradicting him is, that you interpreted *numerical* essence as all the present *orthodox* do, whose cause Bishop Bull is supposed to espouse. So you tell us in the Preface to Modest Disquisitionsⁱ, that you dispute against the *consubstantiality*, in no other than the *numerical* sense, as asserted by *all the orthodox*. Now, supposing it were certainly true, (as it is certainly false,) that all, who at present pass for *orthodox*, understood *numerical essence* in the same sense as you oppose it in: yet would it not be fair towards Bishop Bull, to put that sense upon him which he so fully and so constantly disowns and disclaims. All that you should have done in this case, should have been to have observed, that Bishop Bull's book is nothing to the purpose of the present *orthodox*, who are all Sabellians, inasmuch as he has only shewn that the

^g Bull. Posth. Works. p. 1004.

^h Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 130.

ⁱ Whitby. Disq. Mod. p. 32. Pref. Reply, p. 4.

Fathers were not Arians, has not proved that they were Sabellians. And you might have took notice on this occasion, how weak and inconsistent all the *orthodox* are, in receiving and applauding Bishop Bull's book, a book which has proved nothing which can serve their purpose; a book which is so far from asserting *Sabellianism*, that is, *orthodoxy*, (as it is called,) that it rather stands in direct opposition to it. Now this would have been the fair open way, as well towards the present *orthodox*, as towards Bishop Bull. Towards the *latter*, because it is a certain truth that he has by no means served the cause of *Sabellianism*, or of *numerical* Unity, in your sense: towards the *former*, because it might have given them an opportunity of explaining themselves upon this head: and they might take their choice, either to give up Bishop Bull and all the Fathers at once, or else (which is most likely) declare what you say of them to be pure calumny and defamation. For my part, I make no doubt but it is a slander upon them; and that you will be found at length to understand as little of the *moderns*, as you do of the *ancients*. I have good reason for what I say, from one particular instance which I meet with in your Reply, p. 102. I am there represented, as having "departed from the general received doctrine of the Church, from the fourth century to this present age," for no other reason but for saying, I mean "a real person and no mode." Is it then really so, that all the *orthodox*, from the fourth century down to the present, have believed a *person* to be a *mode*, that is, in plain English, a *manner*; and three persons to be *three manners*? Believe it that can: I have a much better opinion, nay, certain knowledge of them. The Catholics indeed, down from the fourth (I may say from the first) century, have believed that there is no disparity of nature, no division of substance, no difference in any perfection between Father and Son; but that they are equally wise, equally infinite, equally perfect in all respects; differing only in this, that one is a Father, and the other a Son, one *unbegotten*, and the other *begotten*, as a third is *proceeding*: and these three different *manners* or *modes* of existence distinguish the persons one from another, perfectly alike and equal in all other respects. The phrase therefore of *modes of existing*, was not designed to denote the *persons* themselves, but their *distinguishing characters*. This is what Dr. South's authorities sufficiently prove, and all that they prove: and, I presume, all that he meant. For,

though you are pleased to quote him against me, he is expressly for me, where he utterly denies “^k that the three divine Persons “ are only three modes of the Deity.” However that be, I take my accounts of the *ancients* from the *ancients* themselves. If you can find any one, I do not say of the fourth, but even of the sixth, or eighth century, to go no lower, laying it down for Catholic doctrine that a *person* is a *mode*, it will be kind to oblige us with the discovery. As to the *ancients*, I will be bound to answer for them, that what you say of them from the fourth century is pure invention and romance: and as to *moderns*, I am very inclinable to hope, I make no scruple to believe, that you have misreported them as much as you have done the other.

3. Your third and last *excuse* is, that *numerical essence* does and must signify what you pretend, and nothing else: and therefore it was right to fix it upon Bishop Bull, who must be supposed to maintain *numerical* Unity. This is your meaning, (Reply, p. 4,) though you seldom take care to express yourself clearly and distinctly. To this I answer, first, that admitting that your sense of *numerical Unity* is the only true and proper sense of it; yet does it not follow, that you have any right to fix your sense upon Bishop Bull in contradiction to his declared sentiments. If any man has a mind to use words in an *improper* sense, provided he gives but sufficient notice of it, he should not be rigorously dealt with for it, or have a sense imposed upon him which he utterly disclaims. A fair and candid adversary, in such a case, should make allowance for *words*, and attend to the *thing*. To make the best of it, it is very unkind and unfair, industriously to mistake an author's meaning, in such a case, and to go about to confute what he certainly never intended to maintain; nay, what he is known to have denied and disclaimed. But to come a little closer to the point; How do you prove, after all, that yours is the only proper sense of *numerical*? What if you should fail here, in the main point of all, wherein your great confidence lies, and for the sake of which you have raised all this dust upon Bishop Bull, and thrown scandal at large both upon *ancients* and *moderns*? It is very certain, that *numerical* or *individual* Unity has been and is maintained by Catholics, and Catholics that abhorred *Sabellianism*. Could you

^k South, Animadv. c. viii. p. 290, 291.

prove that your sense of *numerical essence* is the only *proper* sense. yet you can never prove that it is the *only* sense it has been used in: so that, at length, the dispute about it would be nothing more than a dispute about words.

But I will give you a plain reason why you can never prove your sense of the words to be the only *proper* sense: it is because you can never fix any *certain principle of individuation*. It is for want of this, that you can never assure me, that three *real* Persons may not be, or are not, one *numerical* or *individual* substance. In short, you know not, precisely, what it is that makes *one being*, or *one essence*, or *one substance*. Here your *metaphysics* are plainly defective: and this it is that renders all your speculations upon that head vain and fruitless. Tell me plainly, is the *divine substance* present in every place, in *whole* or in *part*? Is the *substance* which is present here upon earth, that very *individual numerical* substance which is present in heaven, or is it not? Your answer to these questions may perhaps suggest something to you, which may help you out of your difficulties relating to the *Trinity*; or else the sense of your inability to answer either, may teach you to be less confident in matters so much above you, and to confess your ignorance in things of this nature, as I freely do mine.

You tell us very solemnly, (p. 4,) repeating it several times, that the same *numerical essence* neither doth nor can signify any more than one *essence in number*. Which is only telling us, that the same *numerical essence* is the same *numerical essence*; aye, that it is: and who doubts it? or who is the wiser for these weighty discoveries? How shall I ever know, from thence, that three real Persons may not be, or are not, one *numerical* substance, one being, one God? You will *suppose*, without doubt, that one *intellectual essence* and one *Person* are equivalent and *reciprocal*. And I, on the other hand, will *suppose* the contrary, and then we are just as we began. You have not proved, nor ever can prove, that three real Persons may not be properly called *one numerical* substance. If you have all along gone upon the supposition that they cannot, you have shewn that you can mistake, that you can beg the question, that you can wander from the point in hand, can trifle much and prove little, and that is all.

The sum then of what I have pleaded to make good my *charge* of the first *general fallacy* is, that you have set out

wrong, mistook the very point in question, pursued your mistake all along, and followed your own wanderings, instead of opposing Bishop Bull: that you have no *excuse* for understanding *numerical* essence as you do, either from Bishop Bull's book, who never so understands it, or from the Catholic sense of it, ancient or modern, which is different from yours, or from the *propriety* of the phrase itself; which may, for any thing you know, admit of another sense, and which you have no way of confuting but by *begging the question*; which is not *confuting*, but rather tacitly acknowledging that it is not capable of any confutation. So much for the first article: only here I must be so just to you as to observe, that you do not always wander from the point in question. You do sometimes, indeed often, attempt to prove that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were of those principles which were afterwards called Arian. So far is pertinent, and is directly opposing Bishop Bull. But then I must observe further, that lest you should happen, at length, to fail in your first point of proving the *Fathers* to have been Arians, you reserve the other point, as what you can prove and can never fail of, namely, that they were not Sabellians: and this is what the result of your arguments generally comes to, after you have carried them on as far as they can go. The first point is what you seem most desirous of proving, were it possible to do it: but if you cannot do that, you are content however to prove the latter, rather than seem to have done nothing. I should here conclude this article, but that two or three incidental things should be taken notice of, which must come in here, or no where. I had observed ¹several *guards* which you had put in, in the general state of the question, as it were with design to secure a handsome retreat. You say, *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers; when the *most*, or the *generality* might be sufficient. I had reason to observe this, because Bishop Bull had, in a manner, given up Lactantius: besides, that it is not necessary to assert that every writer (suppose Clemens of Rome, or Barnabas) has said enough in a short epistle, from whence it might certainly be inferred that their principles were the

¹ Defence, vol. i. p. 508. The general question is thus stated:

“Whether *all* the Ante-Nicene Fathers professed the very same doctrine which *we ascribe* to the Nicene Council; that is, whether all acknow-

ledged the same *numerical* essence of the Father to have been *communicated* to the Son and Holy Ghost, and that therefore both are one God *in number* with the Father.” *Whitby, Proœm.* p. 2.

same with those of the *Nicene Fathers*. It is sufficient, if as many as speak plainly either way are on our side; and that none of the *earlier* writers contradict it, but are in the main favourable to us, and *probably*, if not *demonstrably*, ours. Another *guard* inserted was, *which we ascribe to the Nicene Council*, instead of, *which was asserted by the Nicene Council*. The reason I had to take notice of this is apparent from what hath been said. *Numerical* essence, rather than *same essence*, was another *guard*: and what use you make of it is visible enough. That this essence, the same *numerical* essence, (or *Person*, as you understand it,) was *communicated* to two other Persons, is what you demand to have proved: and you have some pretence for cavil at the word *communicated*. This I observed before: and your Reply^m is, that what I “call a “pretence to quarrel at the word *communicated*, is indeed “*arguments* produced against it, as it is stated by the Bishop, “and which *I* durst not meddle with nor pretend to answer.” The reason of my not answering your cavils against the expression was, because it was foreign to my purpose, and because we were inquiring, whether Bishop Bull had truly and justly represented the *ancients*, not whether his doctrine (the same with the ancient doctrine) is liable to the charge of contradiction. If you are able to prove any thing of that kind (as you are not) against Bishop Bull, it will hold equally against the *ancients* and him too; and is of distinct consideration from the point which we are now upon. However, if our readers will pardon a small digression, I shall here examine those weighty *arguments*, which before, it seems, “*I* durst not meddle with.”

You object, (Præf. p. 21.) “that the *communication* of “the Father’s *essence* to a *Person* is inconceivable, because “the *Person* must be supposed to have it, to be a *Person*.” This is nothing but cavilling at a popular way of expression. In strictness of speech, the *Person* of the Son is the very thing which is derived, communicated, generated; and the Father, in communicating his essence, generates the *Person* of the Son.

You object further; “that if the same *numerical* essence of “the *Father* be *communicated*, then it is the same *numerical* “essence in both, only existing in a different manner.” To

which I answer, if you mean by *numerical essence*, the same *numerical Person*, it is not *communicated* at all: for the *Person* of the Father only *communicates*, the *Person* of the Son is *communicated*: and these two *Persons*, or *Hypostases*, constitute the same *numerical essence*; which consequently, as personalized in the Son, is *begotten*, as personalized in the Father, *unbegotten*, that is, exists in a different manner. The two *Persons* exist after a different manner, which two *Persons* constitute one *numerical essence*; and therefore I admit that the same *numerical essence* does exist in a different manner in the two *Persons*.

You object alsoⁿ, that “the essence of the Father is unbegotten, the essence of the Son begotten, therefore both cannot be the same essence.” That both cannot be the same *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, is very certain. for the reason which you give. But that two *Hypostases*, one unbegotten, the other begotten, may not constitute one substance, or essence, you have not shewn. All these objections of yours turn only upon your mistaken sense of *numerical essence*, and amount to no more than a *petitio principii*; while you take for granted the thing in question, that there cannot be two real *Persons* in one *substance*, or *essence*. I can tell you of some, whose judgment you much rely on, who must, upon their principles, allow, that the same *numerical substance* is both greater and less than the same *numerical substance*; is remote and distant from the same *numerical substance*; is contained in and contains the same *numerical substance*. (See my Defence, vol. i. p. 448.) They must likewise admit of *being* and *being*, in the same *numerical being*; *substance* and *substance*, in the same *numerical substance*: as also *being* and *being*, where they cannot say *beings*, in the plural; *substance* and *substance*, where they cannot say *substances*; *essence* and *essence*, where they cannot say *essences*. (See my Defence, vol. i. p. 371, 372.) These things, perhaps, may appear new and strange to you; but if you please to consider them, they may be useful to convince you of your fundamental mistake in confining the phrase of *numerical substance* to one particular sense of your own; and may help to satisfy you that there is nothing absurd or contradictory in the supposition, that one and the same *numerical substance* may be both *begotten* and *unbegotten*.

ⁿ Præf. p. 21.

You may also please to consider that though the Catholics (especially after they came to express themselves accurately) would never, or very seldom, say, *two substances, two essences, two spirits, two lights, two wisdoms, or two wills*, any more than *two Gods or two Lords*; yet they never scrupled to say *substance of substance, essence of essence, spirit of spirit, light of light, wisdom of wisdom, will of will*, in like manner, as *God of God*. All which is to intimate that the union is not *numerical*, in the Sabellian, that is, in your sense: and yet it is *numerical* in another; inso-much that you cannot here speak of *substances, or essences*, in the plural, as you may of things *specifically* united, and no more.

You object further^o, “that the same substance cannot be “subordinate to none in the Father, and yet subordinate in the “Son or Holy Ghost.” Yes, it may, if three Persons can be one and the *same substance*, because these Persons may be *subordinate* one to another. Here, again, you suppose that three Persons cannot be one substance. And now, is not this shrewd arguing, thus perpetually to beg the question? You have one *turn of wit* more, and it is against *interior production*, which you pretend is such a “solid argument as I had the wit to leave un-“answered.” Reply, p. 6. This “interior production,” you say^p, is “either the production of something or nothing.” Wonderful *solid!* Well, what if it be the production of *something*? For undoubtedly we do not mean it of a production of nothing, that is, of no production. Then you say it must be the production of something *new*, for a production is always of something *new*. *Solid* again! that an *eternal* production must be a production of something *new*. But you cannot conceive, it may be, *how* any *production* should be *eternal*. And what if you cannot conceive *how* any thing should be *eternal*? I expect a proof of you that it cannot be. Your *supposing* it cannot, will give me no satisfaction. I have now run through your little quirks and subtillies upon this head, which yet are not *yours*, but as old almost as the controversy; despised by men of sense all along, despised even by yourself thirty years ago; when, with honour to yourself, and to the satisfaction and benefit of others, you wrote in defence of that ancient faith, which now you revile and blaspheme.

But to conclude this article, though I have, in civility towards you, considered your arguments drawn from the *nature* and *rea-*

^o Disquisit. Mod. p. 23. Præf.

^p Ibid.

son of the thing, yet I must repeat my observation, that we may have nothing to do with them, in our present inquiry relating to the *ancients*; because if they are of any weight, they are as much against the faith of the *ancients* themselves, as against Bishop Bull, who acknowledges no other *numerical* unity than the *ancients* acknowledged. Having made good my first *charge*, I proceed to a second.

II. A second *general fallacy*¹ was your arguing from the expressions of Arians (famous for dissembling and equivocating) to those of the Ante-Nicene writers; men of a very different stamp and character, and who were not under the like temptation of saying one thing and meaning another. I had observed that you had recourse to this *salvo*, or *fallacy*, in order to elude the force of some *high expressions* (in respect of the Son's divinity) which you met with in the Ante-Nicene writers. To this you reply, (p. 9.)

1. That it "is not fairly suggested, that you do this when you "find some expressions run pretty high and strong for the divinity of Christ: for, in all the places referred to, there is no expression of that nature but in the last." If you please to look back to your Proœmium, (p. 4, 5,) you will there find that you have made use of the *fallacy* which I charge you with, as a general answer to invalidate the force of most, or all Bishop Bull's testimonies. You observe that the acknowledging of Christ to be "God of God," or "God before the worlds," was common to many who were utter enemies to the Nicene faith. You go on to prove this further by the author of the *Opus Imperfectum*, which author you pronounce an Arian. You proceed to observe from Bishop Bull himself, that the Arians scrupled not any of the Catholic forms of speech, save only the term *consubstantial*. They would say, for instance, that the Son was "begotten out of the Father himself," and was "true God;" and they rejected with indignation the charge of making the Son a *creature*. Now, what could be your meaning in these remarks, but to insinuate to your reader, that let him meet with ever so *high expressions* of the Son's *divinity* among the Ante-Nicene writers; yet, unless they have the very word *consubstantial*, they might possibly, or probably, mean no more than the Arians did after by the same or the like expressions? This is

¹ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 510.

the *fallacy* which I complained of, and which you often occasionally recur to, both in your book and prefaces, to weaken the force of Bishop Bull's authorities. † Some of the places where you do this, I referred to in my Defence, which the reader that has a mind to it may turn to; and I do not yet see that I have *suggested* any thing but what is both fair and true.

2. A second evasion you have in your Reply (p. 5.) is, that you said sometimes Arians and Semiarians, whereas I have represented you, as if you had said Arians only. I do not see that this is at all material. If either Arians or Semiarians used Catholic expressions without a Catholic meaning, they come so far under the same predicament of *dissembling* and *equivocating*: and that both were notoriously guilty of so doing, is clear from all history of those times. The Semiarians in particular were often charged with it, both by Catholics and Anomæans. You say, further, that you likewise join mostly with them some of the Ante-Nicene Fathers. But you will never be able to shew that those Ante-Nicene Fathers were of different principles from the Council of Nice: so that your joining them with the others was either foreign to the point, or supposing the very thing in question.

3. You reply, thirdly, (p. 10.) that "sure it must be a very uncharitable censure to pronounce of near a thousand bishops convened at Antioch, Seleucia, Sirmium, Ariminum, and elsewhere, that they were a pack of *hypocrites* and *equivocating knaves*." To which I make answer, first, that I know not how you will be able to make out near your number. If you add the numbers of the several councils, you may probably reckon many of the same men twice or thrice over. Neither were the men that made up those *councils* all of them Arians. There were but eighty of the whole four hundred at Ariminum really Arians. So that probably three hundred and twenty were imposed upon by the rest, and the charge of *equivocating* lies upon the eighty only. And it is evident, not only from Athanasius, but also from Sulpicius Severus, and St. Jerome, and indeed from all the historians, and all the accounts we have of that Council, that the Arians at Ariminum carried their point by *equivocation* and *wile*; and that the Catholics, most of them, were imposed upon by *double entendres*. They went upon those

† Præf. Disquisit. Mod. p. 8, 9, 40, 90, 109, 153, 157.

charitable principles which you are pleased to recommend. They could not imagine there was so much latent insincerity and guile, under so many fine words and fair pretences from men of their own order.

2. I answer, secondly, that there may be some difference between charging men with *equivocation* and calling them *knaves*. There is a reverend Doctor, whom I scruple not to charge with *equivocating*. He says, in a preface^s, he has many things which hinder him from receding from the belief of Christ's *true divinity*: and it is well known what he once meant by Christ's *true divinity*, when he wrote a Tract^t with that title in defence of it. Who would not charitably believe, from hence, that he still retained the same faith in the same *true divinity*? But see what he means by Christ's *true divinity*, (*Disq. Mod.* p. 25.^u) where he commends Justin Martyr for maintaining Christ's *true divinity*, making this an argument of it, that Justin's sentiments were clearly opposite to the doctrine of the Nicene Council. Hence it is manifest that the Doctor *equivocates* in the phrase *true divinity*. The *fact* I maintain; but if from thence you will infer that he is an *equivocating knave*, remember that the *inference* is yours, and not mine.

4. You reply, fourthly, as from Sozomen, "that when the Arians first appeared, many *bishops*, a considerable number of the clergy, and no small part of the people——favoured his party; and that two synods convened at Bithynia and Palestine, wrote to their brethren to communicate with those Arians, as being *orthodox*." And here you ask, "Were all those holy men and able judges, those *synods*, *bishops*, *clerks*, and laity, a pack of *hypocritical* dissemblers and equivocating *knaves*?" No; I charitably believe otherwise. The *synods*, *bishops*, *clerks*, and laity, who received the Arians as *orthodox*, were not, probably, the *equivocating knaves*, (as you choose to express it,) but the Arians: who, by fair words and artful *confessions*, appeared to be what they were not, and so were re-

^s Ut verum fatear, multa sunt quæ me impediunt quo minus a sententia de vera Christi Deitate recederem, id solum contendo &c. *Whitby, Disq. Mod.* p. 3. Præf.

^t Whitby, de vera Christi Deitate: *Tractatus*, ann. 1691.

^u Magnam admirationem mihi injecit iniqua eorum sententia, qui Jus-

tinum M. Christianæ fidei simplicitatem, in doctrina de Christi præ-existentia, *Veraque Deitate*, adulterasse suspicati sunt; quo Patrum nemo, (leg. *neminem*,) meo quidem judicio, vel *plura* vel *clariora* adversus *Synodi Nicænæ placita* docuisse, facile est demonstrare. *Whitby, Disq. Mod.* p. 25.

ceived as *orthodox*. You will remember that the principal of those *holy men* and *able judges* that promoted Arius's interest in the Synod of Bithynia, was Eusebius of Nicomedia; the same man that afterwards professed ^xhis assent and consent to the Nicene Creed, as the true Catholic faith; and excused his not consenting to the *anathematizing* of Arius upon this foot, that he thought Arius had been much misrepresented, and that he knew from Arius's own letters that he was not the man that the *Council* took him to be. Now if Eusebius, the principal man of the Synod of Bithynia, was thus imposed upon by Arius's fair pretences, no doubt but he represented Arius's case to the Synod, as favourably as he himself had conceived of it: and then no wonder if a man was received as *orthodox*, who was really believed to be *orthodox*. If you think that Eusebius, all the while, knew that Arius was not *orthodox*, in my sense of the word; admitting that, yet he might, for any thing I know, represent him as such then, as well as he did after: if so, the only *equivocating knave* might be Eusebius of Nicomedia; the rest might be imposed upon by his representations and colourings. *Holy men* and *able judges* can judge no otherwise of facts but as they are reported: and how could it be remedied, if Arius happened to get good testimonials, though himself an ill man? But enough of this matter: as to the Arian custom of *equivocating*, and thereby imposing upon honest men, the fact being plain, I shall insist no longer upon it, only referring to a few authors^y who give a summary account of it.

III. A third *general fallacy*, just hinted in my Defence, (p. 511.) was, your arguing against the faith of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in respect of Christ's real divinity, from this topic; that they often distinguish *God* from *Christ*, and call the Father *God* absolutely.

Here again you complain of me for *unfair dealing*. But how, or wherein am I *unfair* towards you? You say (Reply, p. 11,) "that your first instance of this nature is from the epistle of Clemens Romanus, where he constantly separates (*distinguishes* you mean) *Jesus Christ* from that God, whom he styles the "true and only God, but never once calls him God." If this answer be any thing pertinent, I suppose your meaning is, that

^x Sozom. E. H. lib. ii. cap. 16. Cave's Life of Athanasius. Cave, p. 378. Epist. Apolog. p. 96. Clerc. Epist.
^y Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 293. Crit. ii. p. 52.

your argument did not turn upon this, that *Christ* was distinguished from *God*; but upon these further considerations, that *Christ* is constantly so distinguished by Clemens, and never once called *God*. You may, if you please, call all those considerations put together, one argument: but they appeared to me to be distinct and several. You observe ^z of Clemens, that *he perpetually distinguishes Christ from God, (Christum a Deo perpetuo distinguit.)* This was one consideration, or presumption in favour of your principles. A second you add immediately after, *Deum vero ne semel nuncupat, But he never calls Christ God.* You proceed to illustrate your first observation by such instances as these following; that Clemens wishes grace and peace to the Corinthians from *Almighty God*, by *Jesus Christ*; that he introduces (chap. xx.) the *great Creator* and *Lord of the Universe* distributing his blessings by *Jesus Christ*; that *Christ* was sent of *God*, chap. xlii. and that the Apostles had their commission by *Christ* from *God*, chap. xliii. Now to what purpose were these several instances produced, except you intended them as so many arguments against Clemens's believing *Christ* to be consubstantial with him whom alone he calls *God*, and from whom he distinguishes *Christ*? But I insist upon it, that there is no weight at all in this argument. Nothing has been more common with writers, who have fully believed the doctrine of a coeternal Trinity, than this manner of speaking; especially when they have been thinking on another subject, and had no occasion to speak of *Christ's* divinity. And what if Clemens, or Polycarp, or any other writer, in a short epistle, or tract, has spoke of the Father only, under the title of *God*, and of the Son as *Lord*, or *Saviour*, or *High-Priest*? How often might the same thing be observed in modern treatises, or sermons of very orthodox men! I see no consequence that can be justly drawn against our principles from these premises. And if Clemens called the Father the *only God*, or *only true God*, though that be a distinct argument from the former; yet neither does it prove any thing more than the other, as I have shewn in another place^a.

But you refer me to some *collections* of yours in another book^b from Origen: who, it seems, in his book against Celsus, *distinguishes* and *separates* (so you say, p. 12.) *Christ* from him who is

^z Disq. Mod. p. 16.

^a Sermon iv. p. 84, &c. of this volume.

^b Præf. de S. Script. Interpr. p. 34, 35.

God above all; and declares, in the name of the generality of Christians, that *Christ* is not *the God above all*. This is not pertinent to the point in hand, having no relation to the *fallacy* I charged you with, nor belonging to the book which I was animadverting upon. But that I may not stand upon niceties with you, I will give you an answer to this *new* pretence. It is very certain that Origen never intended to deny that *Christ* is *God above all*; because all Catholics^c, (I might say *heretics* too for the most part,) both before and after Origen's time, as well as Origen himself, understood Rom. ix. 5. of God the Son, there styled ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, or *God above all*. Yet there is a certain sense in which the ancients have denied Christ to be the *God above all*; namely, when so understood as to make Christ the very *Person of the Father*, as the Sabellians understood it^d, or to set him *above the Father*^e, or *above the Creator*^f of the world, as some other *heretics* pretended. In this latter sense it is, that Origen denies the Son to be *God above all*; as he had reason to do, because it would have been denying his *subordination* and *sonship*, and inverting the order of the Persons, to have asserted that *Christ* was in any sense *above the Father*, or so *God above all*, as to have the *Creator*, or *Father*, subordinate to him.

Notwithstanding all this, Origen himself, in the very page before that which you refer to, asserts and maintains the Catholic doctrine in full and express terms, the very same doctrine that we contend for at this day. For, having objected to Celsus^g the worship of *many Gods*, telling him that if he would be consistent with his principles, he should not talk of the kingdom of *God*, in the singular, but of *Gods*, in the plural; he then bethinks himself that the argument might be retorted upon Christians, as worshipping two Gods, viz. the *Father* and *Christ*. Here was the critical place; here, if any where, we shall see of what principles Origen was. Well, how does Origen get rid of the objection? Not by saying that the Father *only* is God, in a *proper* sense; not by saying that the Father is *supreme God*, and the Son *another* God under him. No; he was wiser than to

^c See the testimonies in Mills; and my Sermons, p. 142 of this volume.

^d Vid. Apost. Constit. lib. vi. cap. 26.
Pseud-Ignat. Ep. ad Tars. cap. 5. Ad Philip. cap. 7.

^e Origen contr. Cels. p. 387. Basil. Epist. lxxviii. p. 892.

^f Vid. Iren. p. 101, 106. edit. Bened. Origen in Matt. p. 476. Huet.

^g Vid. Origen. p. 385, 386.

make himself ridiculous to Jew and Gentile by such a weak answer. But he solves the difficulty by asserting the *Unity* of Father and Son: and, after he had guarded his assertion from any Sabellian construction, he triumphantly closes up all in these words; "We therefore, as I have shewn, worship one God, the "Father and Son^h." Thus he at once cleared the Christian doctrine from *Polytheism*, and made good the charge against the Pagans.

From what hath been said it may appear, that Origen has denied no more than all Catholics deny, namely, that *the Father is subordinate to the Son*; and has asserted as much as any Catholic contends for. We do not say that *Christ* is that Person who is ordinarily and eminently styled *God above all*; nor that he is in any sense or respect *above the Creator*, or above *God the Father*, being subordinate to him; but we assert that he is essentially one God with him who is the *Father*, and, as such, is *God above all*: and this very doctrine is plainly Origen's, as well as ours. You have forced me into this digression, by making your objection in a wrong place; and therefore let that be my excuse to the reader for it. Now I return.

I have run through the three *general fallacies* which I charged you with. Your feeble endeavours to take them off prove ineffectual: and they now return upon you with the greater force.

I am next to consider the *particular defects*. But, before I proceed further, it will here be proper to remove a complaint of yours, which you repeat more than once; it is a complaint of my management and conduct relating to your book.

You tell me (p. 2.) that I "have not defended any of the "Bishop's arguments which you had produced and answered; "nor made any reply to those numerous arguments which you "produced from the Ante-Nicene Fathers against mine and the "Bishop's sentiments."—In another place you say thus, (p. 57.) "He is obliged, if he would indeed defend the Bishop, to invali- "date and refute the answers that I have given to all his argu- "ments, and to do this entirely, and not by culling out two or "three instances, and leaving all the rest in their full strength; "that being in all the other cases, to leave the Bishop in the "lurch."

By all this you seem to think that Bishop Bull's celebrated

^h Ἐνα οὖν Θεόν, ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θεραπεύομεν. p. 386.

performance is in some danger of sinking in its character, if your Modest Disquisitions be not particularly answered, paragraph by paragraph; and that I ought to have paid so much respect to your *Work*, as either not to have meddled at all with it, or to have attended you all the way through it. Now, as to this matter, I will here frankly declare to you my real thoughts, in the following particulars :

1. In the first place, I am so far from apprehending any danger to Bishop Bull, and his cause, from your book, that I should never have given myself the trouble of remarking at all upon it, had it not been given out to English readers (who must take such things on trust) that Bishop Bull's famed piece would receive an answer, such as should satisfy *all learned and unprejudiced persons*. I knew that a Latin book could do no harm, but among those that could read Latin: and such I thought might, for the most part, be very safely trusted, having Bishop Bull's book to compare with yours, which alone is sufficient to answer for itself, with men of any judgment. The danger was not from the *book* itself, but from the *reports* made of it: and it concerned me to take care that English readers might not be imposed upon; which was one principal motive of my doing what I did.

2. I considered further, that this controversy being of all others the most nice and intricate, and in which it is the easiest for a writer, that has a mind to it, to confound and puzzle such readers as have not been conversant in it; I say, I considered that it might be useful even to some Latin readers to point out the principal flaws and fallacies in your performance, which when done, your whole book is in a manner answered; or however answered as far as is needful, to prevent any honest man's being imposed upon by it.

3. You will give me leave to tell you, with all due respect, (however frankly,) that a writer who begins, and proceeds as you do, has no reason to expect an answer paragraph by paragraph; because there is a shorter and much better way of dealing with authors that are not careful to write *pertinently*. Who, do you imagine, would be at the trouble of telling you a hundred times over, that this argument is good against the Sabellians, and in such a sense of *numerical essence* as is not to the purpose; but in Bishop Bull's sense, and in the true sense, the argument is of no weight at all? One short general answer is sufficient in such

a case; and is in reality as long as the objection, which is only repetition of the same thing. Had you stated the *question* fairly, kept close to the point in hand, arguing *pertinently* at least, if not *solidly*, all along, directly opposing that, and that only, which Bishop Bull undertook to prove; then indeed it might have concerned us to attend upon you all the way through, and to have defended the Bishop against your attacks. But when instead of this, you set out upon a wrong foot, and wander wide and far from the mark you should have aimed at: when, instead of attacking Bishop Bull directly, you encounter for the most part a phantom of your own, and fight with your shadow: in such a case as this, we have no need to be solicitous about the Bishop. Those formidable preparations, which might be otherwise apt to strike terror into us, are happily diverted another way: all we have now left to do, is to stand by unconcerned, look on, and smile. These are my reasons, why I hold myself excused from making any more particular answer to your *numerous arguments*, as you are pleased to call them. You may give us leave to judge how far our cause may be endangered by what you have done: and if we who are friends to the Bishop and his cause, are in no pain about either, nor at all afraid of *leaving them in the lurch*, you may be very easy. Now I proceed to make good the particulars of the charge upon you: *misquotations, misconstructions, misrepresentations, reviving of old and trite objections, concealing the answers, &c.* These, I think, reach to about twenty particulars, which shall all be considered in the same order as laid down in my Defence.

1. I charge youⁱ with a *misquotation*^k of Polycarp's Doxology, recorded in the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna. You left out, as I said, the two most material words, *ὄν αὐτῶ*, on which the Bishop's argument chiefly depended. You acknowledge in your Reply (p. 13.) that you left those words out; and the reason you give is, because "they are neither in the edition of Bishop Usher, nor of Cotelerius, from whom you cited the "passage." This answer, give me leave to say, is more unkind to yourself than the *charge* I made. I had compared the different readings of the Doxology in the two editions, Eusebius's and Bishop Usher's. I considered, that if you should pretend to follow Bishop Usher and Cotelerius, you had falsified in two

ⁱ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 511.

^k Disquisit. Mod. p. 22.

places, changing *μεθ' οὗ* into *δι' οὗ*, and *καὶ πνεύματι* into *ἐν πνεύματι*, which are very material alterations. But if you should pretend to copy from Eusebius, there you had left out *σὺν αὐτῷ*. The latter being a sin of *omission* only, and more excusable than putting words into the text, I chose to fix the charge there where it might fall the lightest, and seem rather a slip than any ill design. I had another reason, why I was willing to charge it as an *omission* out of the text of Eusebius; and that was because Bishop Bull had followed Eusebius's copy. Now if you had a mind to take another reading from Usher and Cotelerius, you should have given notice that Bishop Bull had made use of a faulty copy, before you had triumphed over him; and should have observed that Usher's and Cotelerius's reading was the true one. But not a word do you say of this; and the reason of your deep silence, in this respect, is very evident. Bishop Bull's argument was strong and good, according to Eusebius's reading: and according to Usher's and Cotelerius's, it would have been still stronger and fuller. Since therefore neither of the *readings* would serve your purpose, you lay aside both, and invent a new one of your own¹: and then you might securely insult over the learned Prelate, having a *text* and *comment* both of your own contriving.

But, you say, the words, "as they lie in Eusebius thus, *δι' αὐτοῦ σὺν αὐτῷ*, (you mean *δι' οὗ σὺν αὐτῷ*,) want good sense, "it being improper to say *by the Son* be glory to the Father *with the Son.*" Be it *proper* or *improper*, you ought to cite passages of authors as you find them: besides that very wise men, ancient and modern, have judged the expression very *proper*: and it will be thought that the compilers of our *Communion Office*, who scrupled not to say *by whom, and with whom, &c.* understood what *good sense* is, as well as the *Modest Inquirer*.

II. A second *misquotation*^m I chargedⁿ upon you was of a passage in Athenagoras°. You was pleased to change *πρὸς αὐτοῦ* into *πρὸς αὐτὸν*, for no reason that I could see, but to

¹ The readings of the passage.

Δι' οὗ σοι σὺν αὐτῷ, ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. Euseb. E. H. lib. iv. cap. 15.

Δι' οὗ σοι, ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. Whitby, Disq. Mod. p. 22.

Μεθ' οὗ σοι καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. Usher,

Coteler.

^m Whitby, *Disq. Mod.* p. 62.

ⁿ *Defence*, vol. i. p. 511.

° *Πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο. Athen. p. 38. Ox.*

make a weak insinuation against the *divinity* of God the Son. In your Reply (p. 13.) you say ; “ Now this, I confess, is casually “ done, but (you mean *and*) without design.” But these *casual* slips have an ill appearance, especially in so noted a place as this of Athenagoras. You could not forget that this very *πρὸς αὐτοῦ*, in Athenagoras, is what we set a particular note and value upon, as shewing that the ancients did not always say *δι’ αὐτοῦ* only, in respect of the Son’s part or office in the work of creation, but sometimes *πρὸς αὐτοῦ*, a phrase which may express the *efficient* cause, and is not liable to the same exceptions as the phrase *δι’ αὐτοῦ*. Now, to falsify a testimony of this kind, though *casually*, betrays however great negligence or oscitancy. You observe that *ab eo tanquam exemplari*, serves as well your turn, as *ad eum tanquam exemplar*. That is, if we will allow you your construction. But you cannot make the former so easily, or so probably, out of *πρὸς αὐτοῦ*, as the latter, out of *πρὸς αὐτόν* : besides that by changing *πρὸς αὐτοῦ* into *πρὸς αὐτόν*, you took from us one sense of the words which we might think it proper to insist upon, namely, that of an *efficient cause*. *Πρὸς αὐτοῦ*, if it may be construed your way, may also be construed another way, and perhaps more naturally : and therefore we take it not well to be deprived of any advantage which the text gives us. I must however observe, that whatever your design was from these words, they will not answer your purpose, even though we should admit your construction. For no consequence can be drawn against our principles, from the consideration of the Son’s being the *exemplar*, after which *all things* were *made* ; unless you can imagine that he was an *exemplar* to himself.

III. The third thing I charged you with^p, was a *misconstruction*^q of a celebrated passage in Methodius^r. The passage I had produced in my Defence, to prove the *eternal generation* of the Son, as Bishop Bull also had done^s. You expressed yourself somewhat obscurely in answer to the Bishop. Only this was plain from your words, (*frustra præsule revertente*,) that you intended something opposite to the Bishop, and insinuated to your reader that this quotation of Methodius proved the very contrary to what the Bishop alleged it for. Now the Bishop

^p Defence, vol. i. p. 511.

^q Disquisit. Mod. p. 75, 76.

^r Method. apud Phot. p. 960. See

my Defence, vol. i. p. 357.

^s Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 164. 200.

had cited it in proof of the *consubstantiality* and *coeternity* of the Son : to which purposes it is indeed as full and clear as any can be desired. You are pleased however in your Reply (p. 15.) to object as follows :

1. That " to say that the Son of God was preexistent before " the ages in the heavens, is to say no more than all the Arians " and Semiarians have asserted, &c." But the force of the Bishop's argument and mine did not lie in the words *πρὸ αἰώνων* (though they are not without their weight[†], however the Arians or Semiarians might *equivocate*,) but in those other words of Methodius, that the *Son was, did not become, a Son*; that he had *no new filiation*; that *he is always the same*; and in Methodius's guarding against the supposition of a *temporal generation*, by his explaining it of a *temporal manifestation* only. Why do you overlook and conceal the main points wherein our argument consisted, and make reply only to that which neither Bishop Bull nor I laid any stress upon? But it was prudent, it may be, to pass over what could not be answered.

2. You object to us some other passages of Methodius to confront ours with. He calls the Father *ἀναρχος ἀρχῆς*, a *principium*, that had no beginning. So you translate: might you not as well have rendered it, *a beginning that had no beginning*? But that would not have served your purpose; the true rendering is, a *principium* or *head*, that has no *principium* or *head*. But you had a mind to the words *no beginning*, to insinuate as if Methodius had said this of God the Father in contradistinction to God the Son, who *had a beginning*; though Methodius says no such thing. He says indeed that the Son is *ἀρχῆς*, a *principle* or *head*, after the Father: that is, the Son is the *fountain* of all things *after* the Father; not in *time*, but in *order*; the Father being always primarily considered as *Head* and *Father* of the Son. The sum then of what Methodius has there said is, that the *Son* has a *Father*, and that the *Father* has *none*. What Catholic would ever scruple to assert the same thing? No one ever doubted but that the Father alone was *ἀναρχος*, the Son not *ἀναρχος* in this sense^u.

3. You object, thirdly, the following *words*, (for I see not the

[†] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 355. p. 563. Damascen. de Fid. lib. i. &c. cap. 11. p. 42.

^u Vid. Gregor. Naz. Orat. xxxv.

sense,) “Methodius adds that these words might be congruously applied to him, (the Son,) *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth; and those of Solomon, The Lord created me the beginning of his ways.*” Now what can an English reader make of these two passages, as you have represented them and tacked them together? From the last of them, I suppose, he is to understand that the Son was *created*, according to Methodius. But then what will he make of the text out of Genesis? Is he to understand that the Son was *created* with the heavens and the earth, in the *beginning*? So one might think, and you are very indifferent, I perceive, what your English reader may apprehend, provided you may but seem to have something to say, and something that may reflect dishonour on the Son of God. As to the passage in Genesis, Methodius interprets ἐν ἀρχῇ, (which we render *in the beginning*,) *in the Principle*; understanding by *Principle* God the Son, *in whom* all things were created, according to St. Paul, Coloss. i. 17. Now since, according to Methodius, all things whatever were *created* in the ἀρχῇ, i. e. in God the Son, it is plain that he exempts him from the number of *creatures*. As to the other text, out of Solomon's Proverbs, you have, without any ground or warrant from Methodius, rendered ἐκτίσσε *created*, instead of *appointed* or *constituted*. The meaning probably is, according to Methodius, that the Father *appointed*, or *constituted*, God the Son as the ἀρχή, the *principium*, *foundation*, or *head* over all *creatures*. This kind of construction of that place of the Proverbs, appears to have been known and received in the Church some time before Methodius; as is plain from Dionysius of Rome^x, his comment upon the text: which was afterwards countenanced by Eusebius^y and other Catholic writers^z. Athenagoras, much earlier than any of them, must have understood the text nearly in the same sense. For after he had declared expressly against the Son's being *made* or *created*, asserting his

^x Ἐκτίσσε γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἀκουστέον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπέστησε τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονόσιν ἔργοις, γεγονόσι δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νιοῦ. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas. p. 232.*

^y Ἀρχεῖν δὲ τῶν ὄλων ὑπὸ κυρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς κατατεταγμένους· τοῦ ἐκτίσσειν ἐνταῦθ' ἀντὶ τοῦ κατέταξεν, ἢ κατέστησεν εἰρημένους. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. iii. p. 151.*

^z Non enim ita *sapientiam* suam condidit, quasi aliquando sine *sapientia* fuerit—Hoc initium habeat *sapientia* Dei quod de Deo processit ad creanda omnia tam cælestia quam terrena; non quo cæperit esse in Deo. *Creata est ergo sapientia*, imo genita, non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orth. cap. ii. p. 349.*

procession from the Father to be a kind of *substratum* or *support* for the world of creatures to subsist in, receiving from thence their proper forms, order, and perfection; he immediately cites this text out of the Proverbs, as confirming his sentiments^a. To return to Methodius: he barely cites the text to prove that Christ was *prior* to the *creation*, and that all creatures had their subsistence in him. He is not so particular in explaining the sense of ἐκτισσε, as Dionysius of Rome, or Eusebius: but it is more than probable that he understood it much in the same sense. Certain it is, that your construction of him is entirely unwarranted; and not only so, but contradictory to the author's known principles elsewhere. Upon the whole, you have not been able to answer Bishop Bull's citations out of Methodius, nor to make good your own pretences against Methodius's orthodoxy. Instead of taking off one *misconstruction* which I had charged you with, you have only added to it: and have been so far from acquitting yourself of your first offence, that you have more than doubled it.

IV. A fourth thing which I charged^b upon you, was a misrepresentation and misconstruction^c of a passage in Dr. Cave^d. I blamed you for insinuating as if Dr. Cave had said or meant, that many or most of the Ante-Nicene Fathers were against the *divinity* and *eternity* of Christ. That you really intended to insinuate as much is confessed in your Reply, where you tell me (p. 26.) that "the natural import of the words" (Dr. Cave's words) "contains a full confutation of the whole design of my book, which is to prove that all the Ante-Nicene Fathers maintained the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, and the eternal generation of the Son."

I have not mistaken then as to the matter of fact, that you really did *insinuate* what I had *charged* you with. That you was *to blame* for so doing, will easily be made appear as plainly as the other. Two things I before observed; 1st, That Dr. Cave's words ought not, without a manifest *necessity*, to have been interpreted to a sense directly opposite to his well known and often declared sentiments: 2nd, That there was no such *manifest necessity* in the case before us; but rather some pro-

^a Vid. Athenag. cap. x. p. 38, 39,

40.

^b Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 512.

^c Whitby, Disquis. Mod. p. 97.

^d Cave, Histor. Liter. vol. i. p. 112.

bable grounds, even from the passage itself, for interpreting Dr. Cave's words otherwise than you have done. Now as to Dr. Cave's real sentiments, relating to the faith of the Ante-Nicene writers, I appeal to the passages appearing in the *margin*^c. You may there see that Dr. Cave looked upon the *eternity* of the Son as part of the Christian faith from the very *infancy* of the *Church*; that it had been *constantly* taught by the Catholic Fathers; and that none but mere strangers to *antiquity* could make any question of it: that the most effectual way to confute Arians, &c. is, after Scripture, to appeal to the *constant universal* consent of the *ancients*; with more to the same purpose. Is this the man whom you quote on your side? I may add that his *Apologetical Epistle* runs much upon this topic, to vindicate the primitive Fathers against such aspersions as you, among others, are too apt to throw upon them: and there needs nothing more to shew that he was perfectly in my sentiments as to that particular, and directly opposite to yours. You may say, perhaps, that Dr. Cave was inconsistent with himself; and at different times, upon different occasions, asserted repugnant propositions. But, with submission, I think it a piece of justice

^c *Æternitatem Filii, ejusque σύνδρομον τῆ ἀρχῆ τὸ εἶναι* (quemadmodum non inscite loquitur Cyrillus Alexandrinus) *concurrentem cum paterno principio existentiam*, constanter docuisse Catholicos Patres, antiquitatis ecclesiasticæ rudis plane sit oportet qui nescire potest; nec pluribus jam probare opus est quod cumulate præstiterunt alii. Hanc ecclesiæ fidem ab ipsis *Christianismi primordiis* traditam, et *perpetuo conservatam*, omni quo potuerunt nisu totisque viribus oppugnantur Ariani. *Cav. Diss. 3. ad calc. Hist. Lit. p. 79.*

Liquet, non esse efficaciorē *hæreses* refutandi rationem, quam si post allegatam SS. Scripturæ auctoritatem, *constantem et universalem* veterum consensum ad patres nostras advocemus. Expertus est id Theodosius Imperator an. 383. quando Catholicos Episcopos cum Arianis, Macedonianis, Eunomianis, coacta synodo, configere vellet; suadebat potius Nectario et Agellio, qui ipsum consuluerant, Sisiniius, ut interrogarent *hæreticos* istos num admitterent illos doctores atque interpretes Scripturarum, qui

ante ecclesiæ dissidium florissent. *Cav. Ep. Apol. p. 22. Vid. etiam p. 17.*

Monebo tantum, in Patrum Scriptis Dogmata Philosophica a *fidei articulis* probe esse distinguenda. In his, S. Literis et Catholicæ traditioni strictius se alligant, et in REI SUMMA OMNES CONVENIUNT: in illis majori utuntur libertate, et opinionēs sæpius adhibent quæ in philosophorum scholis ventilari solebant; quin et in explicandis fidei mysteriis quandoque voces e schola Platonica petitas admovent, sed ad Christianum sensum accommodatas. *Ibid. p. 48.*

Profiteatur (J. Clericus) se cum Ecclesia Catholica agnoscere, Deum esse essentia unum, Personis trinum, nempe Unitatem in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate se colere ac venerari; credere se, *Jesum Christum* verum esse et *æternum* Dei Filium, Patri vero *ὁμοούσιον*, et *συναϊδιον*—tunc demum intelligemus fidem ejus in principibus his doctrinæ Christianæ capitibus, rectam esse, orthodoxam, et tam sacræ Scripturæ, quam *primæve antiquitati* congruam. *Cav. Ep. Apolog. p. 107.*

due to every author, especially one that has bore a character in the learned world, to suppose otherwise of him, till it can be evidently made appear, that he has contradicted in one place what he had laid down in another. If there be any room left for a favourable and candid interpretation, it ought to be admitted. I before observed to you, that there was no *manifest necessity* of interpreting that passage of Dr. Cave, as you do. He recounted about seven errors of Lactantius, referring to others unnamed: and in *those*, he says, many of the *ancients* concurred with him. By *in those*, he might possibly mean in *some or other of them*, not in every *single* particular. To make it the more probable that he really meant no more, I observed that *de divinitate* stood as a distinct *article*, and might be construed *of the Deity*. Lactantius held very absurd notions of the *Deity*, as great errors as any could be. Could Dr. Cave take notice of many smaller slips, and never allude to those which were the greatest of all? And yet you cannot pretend to say that *many*, or indeed *any* of the primitive Fathers concurred with Lactantius in those errors concerning the *Deity*. From whence I justly concluded that the words *in quibus*, were not to be strictly understood of all and *singular* the errors noted.

To this you reply, that Lactantius says of God, that he is the Father of all things, “whose beginning cannot be comprehended;” as if this were all that Lactantius had said. Does he not plainly assert that God *had a beginning*, and that he *made himself*^f? You observe further, that this is fully explained by himself lib. ii. cap. 8. where he says, “God only who is not made, is from himself, as we shewed in the first book.” And what if he speaks right here? Does it follow that he has not said what he really has said in another place? Besides, if you please to admit the same candour of interpreting one place by another, I can shew you also where he has spoke very orthodoxly of God the Son^g; and can as easily acquit him of the charge of *heresy* with respect to God the Son, as you can acquit him of the like charge in respect of God the Father. In a word, his *errors* and *contradictions* in both points are visible enough: and give me leave to think that Dr. Cave might see them; and might

^f Verum quia fieri non potest quin id quod sit, aliquando esse ceperit; consequens est ut, quando nihil ante eum fuerit, ipse ante omnia ex seipso

sit procreatus.—*Deus ipse se fecit.*
Lactant. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 32.

^g Vid. Lactant. lib. iv. cap. 9.

allude to one in the article *de divinitate*, and to the other in the words, *de aeterna Filii existentia*. For, surely, otherwise he would not have put *de* and *de*, but would rather have expressed it as one article, thus; *de divinitate atque aeterna existentia Filii*; and then have proceeded with another *de*, to a new article. Upon the whole, you can never make good your point from this passage of Dr. Cave, which is not only capable of a different construction from yours, but most naturally and most probably requires it.

You would insinuate (Reply, p. 30.) from another passage of Dr. Cave, where he is speaking of Origen, that Origen's *supposed* errors relating to the *Trinity* were not, in Dr. Cave's judgment, contrary to any "article of the Church, or Apostolical traditions:" which again is doing that good man a second injury, instead of making satisfaction for the first. Dr. Cave does not say that his *supposed* errors relating to the *Trinity* were not contrary to "any article of the Church;" but only that many of Origen's censured opinions were not: and what sort of opinions Dr. Cave meant, he himself tells us in the very place referred to^h; namely, "intricate questions that had been canvassed "only in the schools of the philosophers, and some notions of "his own invention that were *minus commodæ*, not so just or "accurate as they should be." Now what is this to our present purpose? See the passages of Dr. Cave before cited, sufficiently shewing that he thought the *doctrine* of the *Trinity* to be a fundamental "article of the Church," and an "apostolical tradition." But I am weary of attending you through so many trifling pretences. To conclude this head: the most that can be made out of Dr. Cave's expressions, here or elsewhere, is no more than this, that some of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, in some places of their works, expressed themselves sometimes *improperly*, *incautiously*, or, it may be, now and then *dangerously*, in respect of the *doctrine* of the *Trinity*, before the meaning of terms was adjusted and settled; and those articles reduced to a more *certain* and more *accurate form* of expression. In the *sum* of the *matter*, in the *main doctrine*, the Ante-Nicene Fathers were agreed. This was Dr. Cave's real judgment; as may be seen by his own words before cited: and, I suppose, he may be allowed to be his own best interpreter. He was not only in

^h Histor. Liter. vol. i. p. 77.

those sentiments, but *zealous* for them, being a true lover and admirer of the primitive Fathers. How would the good man have been filled with indignation to have found his name and his authority made use of, to such purposes as you have done ! But enough.

V. I chargedⁱ you further as reporting falsely, that the titles of τοῦ παντὸς ποιητῆς, and τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός, (that is, *Creator* or *Framer* of the universe,) were such as the writers of the *second century* always distinguished the *Father* from the *Son* by. I was indeed so tender in this point, as not absolutely to charge this *falsehood* upon you : but I observed that either this must have been your meaning, or else you had made a very trifling observation. Those words of yours on which I grounded my remark, I have now thrown into the margin^k, for every Latin reader to judge of. You defend yourself (Reply, p. 16.) with these words : “ The words of Athenagoras there cited are these ; “ *One unbegotten and eternal Maker of all things. By which epithets, &c.* Now of these epithets thus joined, my words are “ certainly true ; nor had the Doctor any right to separate what “ I had thus joined.” One can hardly forbear smiling at this invented answer. If what you now pretend was really your meaning, how came you to say *epithets*, in the plural, rather than *epithet*, in the singular ? Why did you distinguish the several epithets with commas ? Again, why did you take such particular notice of *per quem. by whom*, which you say was attributed to the Son, to distinguish him from him that was *omnium opifex, Maker of all things* ? Does not your sense here, and your sense in what went before, (as I have represented it,) answer to each other, like two tallies, exactly ? I defy any man that reads your words in the Latin, to understand you otherwise. But if you will needs have it that you intended only to say that the epithet of “ one unbegotten and eternal Maker of all “ things” was *peculiar* to the Father, in the *second century*, you shall have the honour of making a shrewd observation, when you tell me in what *century* downwards to this day, that *epithet*

ⁱ Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 513.

^k Ex quibus omnibus, ex Athenagoræ sententia, Deum illum unum quem Christiani prædicabant, non alium fuisse quam Deum ingentum, æternum, τοῦ παντὸς ποιητῆν, τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, omnium opificem, liquet.

Quibus epithetis istius sæculi Scriptores Deum Patrem a Filio semper distinguebant, Deumque Filium ab hoc omnium opifice ex eo distingui docuerunt, quod sit ille *per quem*, aut cujus ministerio Pater fecit omnia. *Whitby, Disq. Modest.* p. 60.

has not been *peculiar* to the Father as much as then. I before left you the *alternative*, either of being found *trifling* in a peculiar manner, or making a *false report*; and so I do still. One might think, by what follows in your Reply to this article, that you had a mind to own the *report*, and to vindicate it from the charge of falsehood.

You say, Justin Martyr made a "difference between the word "ποιητῆς and δημιουργός;" and a little after, that he always "speaketh of the Son as being another, not from the δημιουργός, "the Builder, Framer, or Artificer, but ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ παν-
"τὸς, or τῶν ὄλων, from the Maker of all things," Reply, p. 17, 18. However that be, I shewed you plainly, from three express testimonies¹, that Irenæus, of the same century with Justin, made no such difference. The Son is ποιητῆς τῶν πάντων, *Maker of all things*, according to Irenæus, over and over, in as full and strong words as the Father himself can be: so that your remark, as to the writers of the *second* century, has no truth in it. What you observe of Justin, is not strictly true. He tells us^m indeed, that Plato made a difference between ποιητῆς and δημιουργός, understanding by the former one that *makes* a thing from nothing, and by the latter one that *frames* any thing out of *preexistent* matter. Justin takes notice of this, in order to shew that Plato's inferior gods must be *corruptible*, upon Plato's own principles: for the *great God* is styled by Plato, not ποιητῆς, but δημιουργός of the other *Gods*. Consequently they were made of matter, which is corruptible, and therefore are *corruptible* themselves. What is this to the purpose we are upon? Or how does it appear that Justin himself always observed Plato's distinction? Besides that if he did, it is certain that Justin Martyr supposes God the Son to be ποιητῆς, or *Maker* of man, whom he calls the ποίημα, *creature* of Christⁿ. And there is no reason to doubt, but that he supposed him to be as truly ποιητῆς, *Maker* of all other things, according to the constant doctrine of the Church in that very century, as appears from Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, and others.

You go on, in pursuance of your first mistake, to observe, that "δημιουργός being of an inferior sense to that of ποιητῆς
"τῶν ὄλων, it is no wonder that the Fathers sometimes give it

¹ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 383.
384.

^m Just. Mart. Paræn. p. 91. Ox. ed.

ⁿ Just. Mart. Dial. p. 187. Jeb.

“ to the Son under one of these distinctions, where they say “ with Origen the Father is *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, the first or chief “ Worker, the Son is so in a secondary sense.” This is writing just as if you had never seen the Fathers. I repeat it, that Irenæus gives both those titles indifferently to God the Son, as do other Fathers after him ; which you might have seen in my Defence, vol. i. p. 384. Yet you are loath to admit even so much as *δημιουργός* to have been applied to the Son, except with a distinction ; *quoting*, I would say *misquoting*, Origen, to countenance your pretences. If you please to look again into Origen^o, the word is *πρῶτος*, not *πρωτος*, signifying not that the Father is the *first Worker*, as if there were *two workers*, but that he is *primarily* Creator. And, what ruins all your fine airy speculations at once, Origen, in that very place, asserts the Son *ποιῆσαι* (not *δημιουργεῖν*) τὸν κόσμον, to *make*, not *frame* only, the world : which is as much as if he had called him τοῦ κόσμου, or τῶν ὄλων ποιητής.

You quote Eusebius as styling the Father *ἀπάντων δημιουργός*, the Son *αἷτιος δεύτερος*. You should have remembered that the same Eusebius styles the Son *ὁ μέγας τῶν ὄλων δημιουργός*. Had this been applied to the *Father* instead of *the Son*, what speculations might we not have expected upon the force of *ὁ μέγας*, the *great* Creator? You forget also that Eusebius scruples not to use the title of *ποιητῆς τῶν ὄλων*, *Maker of all things*, speaking of the *Son* ; as I observed in my Defence^q. This is directly against you : and if there be some expressions in Eusebius which we neither approve nor vindicate ; so there are many others that you cannot approve, or make consistent with your principles : quotations therefore from Eusebius will signify little on either side. What you produce (Reply, p. 18.) out of Methodius has been solidly answered by Bishop Bull^r.

You next cite Tatian as *a true disciple of Justin Martyr*, saying, that “ matter is produced *ὑπὸ τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ*, “ from the Maker of all things, but the Son was *ἐαυτῷ τὴν ἕλην* “ *δημιουργήσας*, Worker of this matter.” But sure the *disciple* was strangely forgetful of his *master's* distinction between *ποιητῆς* and *δημιουργός* : otherwise, when he was talking of God's *producing* matter, he should have styled him *ποιητῆς*, not *δημιουργός*. And

^o Origen. contr. Cels. p. 317.

^p Euseb. Eccl. H. lib. x. cap. 4.

^q Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 383.

^r Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 165.

you are as forgetful of what you had said but the page before : otherwise you should have made the Father no more than *Worker* of the matter, as well as the Son ; because of the word *δημιουργός*. See how strangely you are bewildered in your observations, confuting and contradicting yourself. Nothing succeeds with you ; and I will venture to predict that nothing will, so long as you are espousing the cause of *heresy*, in opposition to the faith of the Catholic Church.

VI. I charged you, sixthly, with three misrepresentations together : one relating to Basil, the other two to Athanasius^s. Basil you represented as declaring against Unity of *essence*, where he *intended* nothing but against unity of *Person*. To which you make answer, (p. 21,) that you “ dived not into Basil’s intentions, but cited his words fairly, viz. that the Sabellian doctrine was corrected by the word *consubstantial*.” A pretty way this, to cite authors without considering whether they *intended* any thing to the purpose they are cited for, or no. You cited ^tBasil. to prove that two things *consubstantial* make *two essences* ; whereas Basil meant no more than that they make *two Persons*. This you call *fairly citing his words*. You mean, I suppose, that you *fairly* transcribe his words, at the same time very *unfairly* perverting his sense.

As to Athanasius, I observed that you understood what he had said against the *ὁμοιούσιον*, as if it had been said against the *ὁμοούσιον*, betwixt which two that accurate Father always carefully distinguished. To this you reply, that you cited Athanasius to confirm this proposition, that “ they who say the essence of the Son is like or equal to that of the Father, do by that ascribe to him another numerical essence from that of the Father.” I perceive you do not yet understand a syllable of what Athanasius was speaking about. See his meaning explained in my Defence, vol. i. p. 513. Athanasius is so far from supposing *like* and *equal* to be equivalent, or even consistent, that he denies that essence to be *equal*, which is only *like* ; and he is not observing that either an *equal* or a *like essence* must be another *numerical* essence, but that an essence which is only *like* to *divine*, must be an *inferior* essence. It is very strange, that after a key had been given you to that passage in Athanasius, you should still go on, as before, to confound yourself

^s See my Defence, vol. i. p. 513.

^t Disquisit. Mod. p. 32. Præf.

and your readers. As to the other *misrepresentation* of Athanasius, whom you suppose an assertor of *numerical identity*, (which is making him a Sabellian, according to your sense of *numerical*.) as to this charge upon you, you are pleased to say never a word. That therefore stands as it did.

VII. In the next place, I blamed you for representing Barnabas's epistle. ἐν νόθοις, interpreting it *spurious*, though that be not the sense of ἐν νόθοις, as it lies in Eusebius. To this you make answer, (p. 20,) that you "neither there nor elsewhere interpret those words at all." This is another instance wherein you appear to be more unkind to yourself, than I had been to you. You declare, p. 19. of your *Disquisitions*, that Barnabas's epistle was by the *ancients* held for *spurious*. This false assertion appeared to have some *colour*, supposing that you interpret ἐν νόθοις in Eusebius, to mean *spurious*: but without that, you have made a *misreport* of the *ancients*, and have no pretence at all for it. Shew me what *ancients*, or where they reckoned Barnabas's epistle *spurious**. If you choose rather to have it thought that you have told us an untruth without any *colour* for it, than with any, be it so: I was willing to put the most *candid* construction upon the thing; and I shall do so still, if you will give me leave. For I observe, that after you had said *that Eusebius ranked this epistle ἐν νόθοις, you immediately subjoin these words, "Cotelerius confesses that he inclines to the opinion of those who think it is not the Apostle's." Now, this is so very like commenting on the phrase, ἐν νόθοις, just going before, that hardly one reader in a hundred could ever suspect that you understood by ἐν νόθοις any thing else but *spurious*; that is, falsely ascribed to Barnabas. In a word, it seems to me very much the same thing, whether you *interpret* a passage thus, or whether you lead your reader into such *interpretation*: the reader is equally deceived either way. However, if you insist upon it, that you neither *interpreted* the words at all, nor intended to lead your reader into any such *interpretation*, I acquiesce; provided only that you give us any tolerable account of your saying that this epistle was looked upon as *spurious* by the *ancients*.

* Certe quicquid de hac epistola dicant recentiores critici, eam Barnabæ nostro constanter ascribunt *veteres*. "Nemo certe fuit," inquit ὁ πᾶσι Cestriensis noster, "qui hanc Epi-

"stolam Barnabæ non tribuerit; neque in ea quidquam apparet, quod eam ætatem non ferat." *Car. Histor. Literar.* vol. i. p. 11.

* *Disq. Mod.* p. 9.

VIII. The next thing which I found fault with^y was, your partial account of the ancient *doxologies*^z. To this you reply, (p. 19.) that you “freely acknowledge your account of the primitive *doxologies* to be imperfect, as wanting the *doxologies* “ of St. Paul and St. Jude, which are the best rule and standard “ of *doxologies*.” What? better than St. John’s or St. Peter’s? But this it is to aim at wit. You may please to remember that we were not talking of the *Scripture-doxologies*, but of those which are to be met with in the writings of the Fathers. You had told us in your Disquisitions a notorious untruth, that the Fathers of the first and second century never used that form of *doxology* which has been especially called Catholic; but that the Arian form had obtained among the early Fathers. This *false* account I softly called a *partial* account; to be as tender of you as possible. It is well known that *μετὰ* or *σὺν*, in *doxologies*, is the same as if the particle *καὶ* be used to connect the Persons: and all such forms come under the name of Catholic, as opposed to such *forms* as have only *διὰ* or *ἐν*: because, though either of those forms may indifferently be used, and have been used by Catholics both in former and latter times: yet after the Arians had perverted one to an ill sense, the Catholics chose, for the most part, to make use of the other. Now of those called Catholic forms, I referred to Polycarp’s^a, the Church of Smyrna’s^b, and Clemens’s of Alexandria^c, all within the two first centuries, and standing evidences of the *falschood* of your report, supposing you meant that neither *μετὰ*, nor *σὺν*, nor *καὶ*, were applied in *doxologies* to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*. Indeed, if any of them are applied to either of those two Persons, it is a contradiction to the Arian pretence that neither of them should be glorified *with* the Father, but the Father glorified *in* or *by* them. You tell me, by way of Reply, (p. 20.) “that the words “ of Polycarp, and the Church of Smyrna, comparing the variation of copies, are certainly against me.” How *certainly*? I know of no *variation* there is with respect to the Church of

^y Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 514.

^z Disq. Mod. p. 23.

^a Μεθ' οὗ σοι καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ ἢ δόξα, &c. Polycarp.

^b Μεθ' οὗ δόξα τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. Eccles. Smyrn.

^c Τῷ μόνῳ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ, υἱῷ καὶ πατρὶ, παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ υἱῷ,

σὺν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πάντα τῷ ἐνὶ ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα. δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα ἐν, δι' ὃν τὸ αἰεὶ. οὗ μέλη πάντες. οὗ δόξα, αἰῶνες· πάντα τῷ ἁγαθῷ, πάντα τῷ καλῷ, πάντα τῷ σοφῷ, τῷ δικαίῳ τὰ πάντα· ᾧ ἢ δόξα καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. iii. p. 311. Ox. ed.

Smyrna's: Eusebius's copy being but an abstract, wants the latter part of the epistle. As to the *variation* of Polycarp's, it cannot be pretended to make any thing *certain* against me, unless it be *certain* that Eusebius's reading be the better of the two: which is by no means probable. Besides, that at the worst, *ὁὐ* is applied to the Son, even in Eusebius's copy: I suppose you do not insist upon the *variation* of your own contriving. Besides these, Clemens's *doxology* will still stand good against you, and St. Basil's testimony concerning the doxologies of the earlier centuries^d, though the doxologies produced by him reach no higher up than the beginning of the third. But the subject of *doxologies* having been accurately handled of late by others, I shall content myself with referring to their learned and useful tracts upon it^e.

IX. I censured your account of Justin Martyr, as being one continued misrepresentation^f. I considered what I said; and shall now justify my censure. You are pleased, indeed, to put on a more than usual air of assurance upon this occasion. The *brightest evidence of truth* is what you pretend to, (p. 31.) You resolve to *vindicate* yourself from this *false imputation*, and to *make me sensible of my conduct*; that I have *very artificially, very falsely represented Justin Martyr*, (p. 31.) have been guilty of *pious frauds and notorious artifices*, (p. 37.) such *artifice and fraud as you have seldom met with*, (ibid.) *A crowd of falsehoods and misrepresentations* you charge upon me, (p. 40.) Yet, after all these big words and fine flourishes, (the feeble vaunts of a desperate cause that needs them.) I will venture to refer the matter in dispute to any man of tolerable capacity and moderate skill in the learned languages. I intimated in my Defence (vol. i. p. 526.) the drift and design of Justin Martyr's Dialogue, of that part which we are now principally concerned with. It was to shew that there was a *dicine Person*, one who was really God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was not the *Father*, but was the *Logos*, or *Christ*. This account of Justin I will first demonstrate to be true and right; and next shew how easy it is to take off all your boasted *reasons*, or rather *carils*, to the contrary.

^d Basil. de Sp. S. cap. xxix. p. 218, 222.

^e Seasonable Review of Mr. Whiston's Account of primitive Doxologies.

Second Review by the same hand.

Bishop of London's Letter defended. By a Believer.

^f Defence of Queries, vol. i. p. 514.

1. Justin Martyr observes, in the beginning of his Dialogue^ε, that the Christians acknowledged *no other God* than the Jews did. "There never will be, O Trypho, nor ever was since the world began, *another God* (ἄλλος Θεός) besides the *Maker* and *Disposer* of the universe: nor do we imagine that ours is one God and yours another; but it is one and the same, that brought your Fathers out of Egypt with a mighty hand and stretched out arm: nor do we rest our hopes in any other (for there is none other) but in him whom you hope in, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." From hence may be seen how far Justin is from asserting *two Gods*. There is not, according to him, nor ever was, nor will be, ἄλλος Θεός, *another God* besides the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thus far he and Trypho were agreed.

2. It was agreed likewise between Justin and Trypho, that one certain Person, the same that created the world, and who is often spoke of in the Old Testament, as *Creator* of the universe: who was owned by the Jews under that title, and by Christians more especially under the name of *Father*; I say, it was agreed that that Person was God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

3. Justin Martyr, over and above, asserts that *that Person* had another Person with him, a *real* and *proper* Son; which Son was also *God* and *Lord*, and God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This was the chief matter in debate between Justin and Trypho; and upon which Justin Martyr spends many pages in his Dialogue, alluding to it also elsewhere. Now, the main point in dispute between you and me is, whether this was really Justin's meaning or no. I must prove every syllable of what I here assert; and therefore must dwell the longer upon this article. Justin, I say, asserts *another Person, besides the Father*, to be really *God, God of Abraham, &c.* He maintains that ἄλλος ἐστι Θεός^h, or ἕτερος Θεόςⁱ, *another is God*, which he elsewhere expresses by ἄλλος τις^j, *another who is God*, besides the Father; which comes to the same as *another Person* besides the Father. Instead of saying *Father*, he generally expresses it by the title of *Creator of all things*; the reason of which I conceive to be, that both he and Trypho received him under that notion: but under the notion of *Father*, in Justin's sense, he was not

^ε Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 34. Jeb.

^h Ibid. p. 147, 163.

ⁱ Ibid. p. 158, 161, 164.

^j Ibid. p. 161, 165.

received by Trypho, the question betwixt them being chiefly this; whether he was a *Father* in a proper sense, that is, whether he had really a *Son*. Hence, I conceive, it is, that Justin so often denotes the *Father* by the title of *Maker of all things*, rather than by the title of *Father*. Yet he does sometimes make use of the title of *Father*, instead of the other. He says in one place, οὐχ ὁ πατήρ ἦν^k, instead of saying, οὐχ ὁ ποιητῆς, τῶν ὅλων ἦν: which, though not so accurate while disputing with a Jew, serves however to shew that those two titles were only different expressions denoting the same Person. Justin, in his first Apology, where he is again upon the same argument, styles the *Father*, ὁ πατήρ τῶν ὅλων, *Father of all things*; in the same place censuring the Jews for not acknowledging that he had a *Son*^l, that is, not acknowledging him to be a *Father*, in a peculiar and *proper* sense. This I take notice of to confirm what I have already observed, that it was not proper for Justin, in dispute with a Jew, to call the *Father* by a title which the Jews did not own, but rather by another which was acknowledged on both sides; viz. *Maker of all things*, or however, *Father of all things*, not *Father* simply. To proceed: Justin asserts, and often inculcates, that this *Maker*, or *Father of all things*, has a *Son*^m, an *only-begotten Son*ⁿ, begotten *before the creation*^o, begotten of *himself*^p, (ἐκ Θεοῦ, and ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ,) without *abscission* or *division*^q, *strictly* and *properly*^r (ιδίως and κυρίως) a *Son*, and *really* (not *nominally*) distinct from him^s. He asserts further, and proves at large, that this very *Son* is really *God*, not *called* God only, but *is* God^t: and Justin never says that he is God by *voluntary appointment*, or as *representative* of the *Father*; but as *Son of God*, he is *God*. The same is God of the Jews, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, according to Justin. This last particular is what you and I chiefly differ

^k Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 261.

^l Just. Apol. i. p. 122.

^m Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 296, 371.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 309.

^o Ibid. p. 183, 187, 295, 296, 364, 375, 395. Comp. Apol. i. p. 69, 90, 101, 123. Apol. ii. p. 13.

^p Justin. Dial. p. 183. Apol. i. p. 44.

^q Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 183, 373. Comp. Paræn. p. 127.

^r Justin. Mart. Apol. i. p. 44, 46.

Apol. ii. p. 13.

^s Justin. Dial. p. 373.

^t Ἔστι καὶ λέγεται Θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος ὑπὲρ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, ὃς καὶ ἄγγελος καλεῖται. Dial. p. 161. Ἄγγελος καλούμενος καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχων, p. 187. Θεὸς καλεῖται, καὶ Θεὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἔσται, p. 176. Θεὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ προσκνητὸν Χριστὸν ὄντα ἐδήλωσε, p. 231. Θεὸν φησὶν εἶναι, p. 367.

^u Just. Mart. Dial. p. 364, 366, 370, 371. Apol. i. p. 123.

upon; and therefore I must be the more full and copious in the proof of it.

It is a rule and maxim with Justin, that God the Father never *appeared*; which, I suppose, I need not prove to you, because you yourself contend for it, and in the *title-page* of your Reply, recommend the determination of the Sirmian Synod in anathematizing any that should say, the *Father* appeared to Abraham. Please then to take notice, that Justin Martyr quotes ^xExod. iii. 16. where it is said, “The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, appeared unto me, &c.” These words Justin, upon his principles, must have understood of *Christ*: he was the Lord God, the God of Abraham, &c. who *appeared*. And indeed Justin quotes the text for that very purpose, to prove that Christ is *God*. Soon after he asks the company, whether they did not yet perceive that he who appeared to Moses had declared *himself* to be the God of Abraham, &c. This passage I before cited in my Defence, (p. 296.) to prove that, according to Justin, *Christ himself* was God of Abraham. This you complain of, very ridiculously, (Reply, p. 37,) calling it a *piece of artifice*, and I know not what, as if I had *stopped* where I ought not; whereas it is impossible that Justin’s words should have any other meaning than that which I have given: the following words in Justin are so far from confronting this sense, that they do nothing more than repeat and confirm the same thing. For after Justin had thus plainly asserted that Christ was *God* of Abraham, &c. proving it from the text in Exodus; Trypho objects, that possibly it might be an angel only that *appeared*, and *God* (that is, God the Father) might speak to Moses by that angel. To which Justin replies; “Admit that both *God* and an *angel* were concerned in that *appearance* to Moses, “as has been proved from the text cited; yet, I insist upon it, “that the *Maker of all things* was not the *God* (or that divine “Person) who told Moses that *he himself* was God of Abraham, “and God of Isaac, and God of Jacob; but it was he of whom I “have proved to you, that he appeared to Abraham, and “to Jacob, administering to the will of the Maker of all

^x Just. Mart. Dial. p. 178, 179, Comp. Dial. p. 366.

^y Ὁ ἄνδρες ἀνοήκατε, λέγων, ὅτι ὁ λέγει Μωσῆς ἄγγελον, ἐν πυρὶ φλογός

λελαληκέναι αὐτῷ, οὗτος αὐτὸς Θεὸς ὡς σημαίνει τῷ Μωσῆϊ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ; Just. Dial. p. 179.

“ things^z.” Justin goes on to prove this from the absurdity of supposing that God the Father should appear in that manner: upon which Trypho is convinced that he that *appeared* to Abraham, and was called God and Lord, and was God, was not the *Maker of all things*; not God the Father, but another, who was also an *angel*. Then Justin proceeds to give further proof, that none appeared to Moses in the bush but he only, who is called an *angel*, and is really God, namely, Christ the Son of God. To these testimonies I shall subjoin one more out of Justin’s first Apology, which in English runs thus: “ Now what was said to Moses out of the bush, I am the I AM, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and the God of thy fathers, denotes that they, though dead, are still in being, and are *men of Christ himself*^a.” In this passage, *Christ* is plainly asserted to be the *ὁ ὢν*, the *I am*, or God of the Jews, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. By four express testimonies out of Justin, this momentous point is established; and the whole tenor of this Father’s writings confirms it. The sum then of Justin’s doctrine is this: That there is no other God besides the God of the Jews, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: that God the Father is God of the Jews, God of Abraham, &c. that there is *another* besides the Father, who is also God of the Jews, God of Abraham, &c. and this other is the *Logos*, or *Christ*, the *proper* and *only* Son of the Father, undivided and inseparable from him, though begotten of him. The conclusion from all is, that *Christ* is God, and yet not *another God* from the Father, but ἄλλος τὶς another *Person* only^b. This is Justin’s true, genuine, certain doctrine, which being thus proved and fixed, all your pretences to the contrary drop at once. However, that I may not seem to neglect any thing you have to say, I shall briefly examine your objections one by one.

1. One is, that Justin often speaks of Θεὸς ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὄλων, *another God besides the Maker of all things*.

^z Οὐχ ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὄλων ἔσται Θεὸς ὁ τῷ Μωσεί εἰπὼν αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεὸν Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ Θεὸν Ἰακώβ, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀποδειχθεὶς ὑμῖν ὄφθαι τῷ Ἀβραάμ καὶ τῷ Ἰακώβ, τῇ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὄλων θελήσει ὑπηρετῶν. *Ibid.* p. 180.

^a Τὸ δὲ εἰρημένον ἐκ βίου ὁ Θεὸς Ἀβραάμ,

καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς Ἰακώβ, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων σου, σημαντικὸν τοῦ καὶ ἀποθανόντος ἐκείνους μένειν, καὶ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀνθρώπου. *Just. Apol.* i. p. 123. Ox.

^b See my Sermons, p. 141, &c. of this volume.

But I have shewn, from Justin's own interpretation, (besides that in strict propriety the words require no more,) that the meaning is only this, that there is ἄλλος τις, *another who is God*; besides him whom both sides acknowledged under the title of *Maker of all things*; that is, besides him whom Christians call the *Father*. Justin then meant only that there is *another Person* besides the *Father*, who is also *God*. To this you except^c, that the word *Person*, or *Hypostasis*, was not known to Justin. And what if he uses not the *word*, might he not without the word assert the *thing*? ἄλλος τις really signifies, and is rightly rendered, *another Person*. But you except further, that Justin does not only say ἕτερος, *another*, but ἀριθμῶ ἕτερος, *another in number*; and how can *Father* and *Son* be *numerically* the same *God*, if they be *numerically differing*? To which I answer, that they are different *Persons*, *numerically* different: and that this was really Justin's sense is manifest from his opposing the word, ἀριθμῶ ἕτερον, *another thing in number*, to that which ὀνόματι μόνον ἀριθμεῖται, only differs *nominally*, not really^d. He did not intend to say that *Father* and *Son* were *two Gods*, but only that they were more than *two names* of the same thing; as some *heretics* taught, before Sabellius. In this sense, none of the *Post-Nicene* writers ever denied that the *Son* is ἀριθμῶ ἕτερος, or ἕτερόν τι, *another*, or *another thing*, really distinct from the *Father*^e. The same way of speaking you will find in the Church as low as *Damascen*^f. But you say, (*Mod. Disquis.* p. 29,) that the *Post-Nicene* Fathers guarded their expressions by the word *hypostasis*, which Justin does not. And what if the disputes which happened after Justin's time made it necessary to guard such expressions, as having been used formerly without offence, came at length to be perverted to an ill meaning? There is nothing strange in this. It is well observed by the judicious and learned *Du-Pin*, speaking indeed of *Theognostus*, but the remark is applicable to others of the *ancients*, who may claim the like favour of interpretation. "Photius," says he, "has wrongfully accused *Theognostus* to "have erred concerning the divinity of the *Son*, upon the score

^c *Disquis. Mod.* p. 29.

^d *Vid. Justin. Dial.* p. 373.

^e *Basil. Ep.* 300. p. 1070. *Athan.*

Orat. iv. p. 619. *Contr. Sabell.* p. 41.

Cyril. Alex. Thesaur. p. 60, 110.

Ambr. de Fid. lib. iii. cap. 15. Greg. Nyss. Cat. Orat. cap. 1.

^f *Vid. Damascen. lib. i. cap. 6. lib. iii. cap. 6.*

“ of a few expressions that did not agree with those of his own
 “ age ; without taking notice that though the ancients have
 “ spoken differently as to this point, yet the foundation of the
 “ doctrine was always the same ; and that it is an horrid injustice
 “ to require them to speak as nicely, and with as much pre-
 “ caution, as those that lived after the birth and condemnation
 “ of *heresies*.” In a word, though Justin has not used the like
guards with the Post-Nicene writers, since he had not the like
 occasions ; yet his sense, without any such *guards*, is plain
 enough to any man that duly weighs and considers it.

2. You pretend from Justin, (*Disq. Mod.* p. 33.) that Christ is not *Maker of all things*. But this you can never prove out of Justin : for all that Justin meant, by distinguishing Christ from the *Maker of all things*, was only this, that Christ is not *that Person*, ordinarily and eminently styled *Maker of all things* ; that is, he is not the *Father* himself, as some *heretics* pretended, and as the Jews in effect taught, by applying these texts to God the *Father*, which Justin interprets of God the Son.

3. You object that Christ does nothing of his *own power*. This is no where said by Justin of Christ, considered in his highest capacity. Justin indeed admits that both the *power* and *substance* of the Son is derived from the *Father*. But this is a different thing from saying that Christ did nothing by his *own power*. The *Father's* power is his power, Christ's *own* power.

4. You object (*Disq. Mod.* p. 30, 33.) that Christ is *no more than the chief power*, (πρώτη δύναμις,) *after the chief God*, μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον Θεόν. But Justin no where puts those words together as you have done. He does indeed say, that the Son is the *principal Power after* (that is, next in order to) *the Father of all things* : which is no more than to say, that he is the *next Person* to the *Father*, as all allow. What inference can you draw from thence against our principles ? As to the words πρώτος Θεός, *chief God*, it is Plato's expression, and, as such, cited by Justin^h.

5. You object that Christ “ hath all that he hath from the
 ‘ Father.’” This is true, and acknowledged by all Catholics, before and after the Nicene Council, from Justinⁱ down to Damascen^k.

§ Justin. Mart. Apol. i. p. 66.

h Justin. Apol. i. p. 114.

i Ἄλλιος αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ δυνατῷ,

καὶ κυρίῳ, καὶ Θεῷ. Just. Dial. p. 374.

k Πάντα οὖν ὅσα ἔχει ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ

6. You object that, according to Justin, (Disq. p. 33.) "Christ could not be saved but by the help of God." This is spoke of *Christ*, in respect of his *humanity*; and brought in among the proofs of *Christ's* being a *man*¹. And it was suitable to *Christ's* humble state on earth, for an example and lesson to other men, to refer all to God.

7. You object that Christ is "manifestly distinguished from "the God of Abraham." But this is manifestly false, in your sense of it. Christ is plainly *God of Abraham*, according to Justin; as hath been before shewn. You may say, if you please, that the *Father* is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*; which is true, as he is distinguished from the *Son*, who is God of Abraham: in like manner, I presume, we may allow that the *Son* is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*, and leave you to make your utmost advantage of it. You observe, that when the *Son* is distinguished from the *God of Abraham*, there is added, "besides whom there is no other God." From thence you may learn, that though the *Son* be God of Abraham, as well as the *Father*, yet there are not *two Gods of Abraham*: the *Son* is not *another God of Abraham*, but another Person only.

8. You object further, (Disq. Mod. p. 27, 33,) that Christ "would not suffer himself to be called good, but remitted that "title to the Father only^m." You should have added, as Justin does in the same place, that Christ was a "worm, and no man, "the scorn of men, and the outcast of the people:" and then the reader would have seen plainly what Justin was talking about.

9. You object that Christ is not "called God by Justin, on "account of his having the Father's essence *communicated* to "him, but because of his being begotten of him before the cre- "ation:" that is, Justin has not said it in *terms*, though he has in *sense*. To be the *proper Son* of the Father, and to be *begotten* of him *inseparably*, and without *division*, (which is Justin's doctrine,) is the same thing as to have the nature or *essence of the Father communicated* to him. This is clear from Justin's similitudes and illustrationsⁿ. For, I suppose, one *fire* lighted of another is of the *same nature* with that other: and thus it is,

¹ *εἰνα. Damasc. de Fid. Orth. lib. i. Comp. 303.*

cap. 10.

^m *Ibid. p. 298.*

¹ *Vid. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 298.*

ⁿ *Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 183, 373.*

that the Nicene Fathers supposed the Son to be, as it were, *Light of Light* ; intending thereby to signify his *consubstantiality*.

10. But you object, that the Son (according to Justin) “ is God by the will of the Father.” This might be understood in a good sense, had it been asserted by Justin. But the passage which you build this upon does not say so much ; as shall be shewn in another place, and as I have before observed in my Defence, vol. i. p. 350.

11. But *Christ*, you say, is *subservient* to the will of the Father. And what if it pleased the second Person of the blessed Trinity to transact all matters between God the Father and mankind ? be thankful for it, and make not yourself a judge of the divine and mysterious dispensations. I observed in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 442.) that one Person may be delegate to another, without being of an *inferior nature* : otherwise one man could not be delegate to another. This “ thin piece of sophistry” you undertake to answer (Reply, p. 73.) in these words : “ One man may be delegate to another, because he is another *individuum* of the same species, but different in his particular essence from him ; but dares the Doctor say the second or third Person thus differs from the first ?” To which I reply, that, from your own confession, it is manifest that merely from *delegation* no argument can be drawn to *inferiority of nature* ; which was the point I was upon, and which is sufficiently proved by that instance. As to the Persons differing from each other, as one man differs from another, I readily deny any such *difference* among the *divine* Persons : and I leave you to prove at leisure, that all *delegation* requires it. When you can do that, I shall submit to the charge of *sophistry* : in the mean time, please to suffer it to lie at your own door.

Having thus considered all, or however your most considerable pretences from Justin Martyr, and shewn them to be weak and frivolous ; I hope I may have leave once more to say, that your account of this *Father* is *one continued misrepresentation*. You have, under this article, took a great deal of pains to weaken the force of an argument which I had used in my Defence, vol. i. p. 291, &c. It would break my method too much here to attend you in it ; to shew how you have left my main arguments and testimonies untouched, and have done little more than endeavoured to confront them with other testimonies ; which, notwithstanding, when rightly understood, are nothing at all to

the purpose. If the reader pleases but to consider and compare what I have said in my Defence, I am not apprehensive that your pretences can have much weight with him. However, if a proper occasion offers, and if need be, or if I have not sufficiently obviated them already, I may perhaps take some further notice of them, either in a *second part* to this, or elsewhere, whenever my adversaries shall favour me with a large and particular examination of the whole piece. I shall now proceed, in my method, to another article of the *charge*.

X. The tenth thing which I charged you with (Defence, vol. i. p. 514.) was, that in your Disquisitions, (p. 61.) you took occasion from the Latin version to misrepresent Athenagoras, insinuating from it, that the Son is not like the Father. Here you are so ingenuous as to plead guilty, and to give me leave to *triumph*, (Reply, p. 14.) but with this sting in it, that it is “the only argument I attempted to answer.” But whether that be so or no, our readers, I suppose, may be the properest judges; to whom I leave it, and proceed.

XI. I charged you further, (Defence, vol. i. p. 514, 515.) with another misconstruction of a passage in Athenagoras; a very famous one, and of singular use in this controversy. You appeared to me to construe the words οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον^o, *not as eternally generated*; which is a very new and peculiar construction. You deny the fact, as indeed you may well be ashamed to own it. But I shall literally translate that paragraph of your book, and then the reader may the more easily judge of it. “Hence “it appears that Athenagoras, with the Christians of the same “age, believed the Father only to be Θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αἰδίον, “*God unbegotten and eternal*, and the Son of God the Father to “be styled πρῶτον γέννημα, *the first offspring*, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενοι, “not on the account of any eternal generation, properly so “called, such as might constitute the Son ζῶντα καὶ ὑφ’ἑαυτῶτα, “*living and subsisting by himself*, in or out of the Father; but “because the Father, being himself an eternal mind, had from “eternity λόγον, *reason*, in himself, αἰδίως λογικὸς ὢν, *being eternally rational*.” The reader must here observe, that as you intermix Greek with your sentences six times, in the same

^o Πρῶτον γέννημα εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ, οὐχ ὡς γενόμενον, ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεός, νοῦς αἰδίως ὢν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον αἰδίως λογικὸς ὢν. *Athenag. cap. 10. p. 38.*

^p Whitby, Disquisit. Mod. p. 62.

manner, so in five of them, the words immediately following the Greek are plainly intended as the construction or interpretation of it. I had therefore good reason, from parity of circumstances, to take the words immediately following those Greek words, οὐχ ὡς γερόμενον, as your construction or interpretation of them: especially since you begin with the *negative* particle, just as the Greek does. You seem to be so sensible of this yourself, that when in your Reply (p. 14.) you come to give your English reader a different turn of the passage, you are forced to leave the Greek words οὐχ ὡς γερόμενον quite out: for had they appeared here in your Reply, as they do in your Disquisitions, the reader would have seen at once that my censure was just. But let us, for argument sake, admit your plea, that you did not intend those words following Athenagoras's Greek as an interpretation of it; do you consider how unaccountable a part you have acted in citing the words at all? They are words which we greatly value, and lay a stress upon, as being of irresistible force against the Arians. Ought you not, while you were pleading the cause of *Arianism* from this very passage, to have attempted some solution of the difficulty arising from those words, which so plainly stare you in the face? Sandius and Gilbert Clerke thought themselves obliged to say something, however weak and unsatisfactory; which was better than to attempt nothing at all. But what do you, if we are to take your own last thoughts upon it? You could not but know that these words, in their obvious natural meaning, are directly repugnant to the conclusion which you are aiming at; you see the very words, you transcribe them, and leave them as you find them, without any interpretation or solution. Now what is this but to shew that you was aware of the objection, and was not able to answer it, nor so much as willing to endeavour it; and yet resolutely persist, even against conviction, to wrest and force the passage to your own meaning? I am persuaded you might more prudently have submitted to the first charge, than have took this way of getting rid of it. But it is frequent with you, for want of considering, to double the fault which you hoped to excuse; and for the avoiding of one difficulty, to run yourself into more and greater.

To conclude this article: if you intended an interpretation of Athenagoras's words, as I conceive you did, then you have, in the whole, misrepresented the author, but with something of colour for it: if you did not, still you have, in the whole, mis-

represented him, and without any colour for it. Either way, you have dealt unfairly with Athenagoras, and have endeavoured to impose upon your readers.

XII. The next thing I laid to your charge^q was a ridiculous representation of Tertullian; as if Tertullian believed two *angels* to be as much *one*, as God the Father and God the Son are. To this you reply, (p. 21,) that you “say nothing of what Tertullian believed: but only from these words (*the Son of God is called God from the Unity of substance, for God is a spirit*) you think it evident, that Tertullian concludes hence the Unity of the Father and the Son, that *they are both spirits*; which two *angels* and two *demons* also are.” Is there then no regard to be had to what an author is otherwise known to *believe*? Or is it fair and just to construe an *ambiguous* sentence (supposing this *ambiguous*, and not rather plain enough against you) in direct opposition to his certain undoubted principles? But what makes it the more unjust in this case is, that Tertullian, in that very paragraph, within a line or two of the words which you ground your remark upon, resolves the Unity of Father and Son into this; that they are *de Spiritu Spiritus, de Deo Deus, de Lumine Lumen*; *Spirit of Spirit, God of God, Light of Light*. Can this be said of two *angels* or two *demons*, that they are *light of light*, or *spirit of spirit*? Have they any such relation to, or intimate conjunction with, each other, as is here plainly signified of Father and Son? Well then, what is the result? You have misunderstood Tertullian, or rather perverted his meaning. He does not say that Father and Son are *one*, because *they are both spirits*; any more than he says they are one, because they are *both Gods*; nor would it be sufficient for one to be *Spirit*, and the other to be *Spirit*, or one to be *God*, and the other *God*, unless one were also *of the other*, inseparably united to him, and included in him. Tertullian indeed observes that God the Father is *Spirit*, as he had before observed of God the Son: and this

^q Defence, vol. i. p. 515.

^r Disq. Mod. p. 108.

^s Et nos etiam *sermoni*, atque *rationi*, itemque *virtuti* per quæ omnia molitum Deum ediximus, *proprium substantiam spiritum* inscribimus, cui et sermo insit prænuntianti, et ratio adsit disponenti, et virtus præsit perficienti. Hunc ex Deo prolatum didicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco Filium

Dei et Deum dictum est unitate substantiæ. Nam et Deus Spiritus: et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa: sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia sed extenditur. Ita *de Spiritu Spiritus* et *de Deo Deus*, ut *Lumen de Lumine* accensum. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. xxi. p. 202, 203. Lugd.

was right, that so he might come to his conclusion, that they are *Spirit of Spirit*; which they could not be, unless each of them were *Spirit*. This therefore is mentioned, not because it makes them *one*, but because they could not be *one* without it. They must be *Spirit* and *Spirit*, to be *Spirit of Spirit*: but the latter contains more than the former; and it is into this that Tertullian resolves the formal reason of the Unity; or rather, both considerations are included in his notion of *Unity of substance*. This will appear from a bare literal rendering of his words. "We have learned that he (*God the Son*) is *prolated*, "and by his *prolation generated*, and upon that score he is styled " *Son of God*, and *God*, from *Unity of substance*. For even God " (*the Father*) is *Spirit*: and when a *ray* is produced from the " *sun*, a portion from the whole, the *sun* is in the *ray*, because " it is the *sun's ray*; and the *substance is not separated*, but ex- " tended: in like manner, here is *Spirit of Spirit*, and *God of* " *God*, as *Light of Light*." You see how Tertullian makes it necessary to *Unity of substance*, that the *substance* be not *separate*: and thus Father and Son are *one*, not merely because each of them is *Spirit*, but because both are *undivided substance*, or *Spirit*; *Spirit of Spirit*. When I wrote my Defence, I thought a hint might have been sufficient in things of this nature; little imagining I should ever have the trouble of explaining such matters as these, which appear by their own light, upon a bare inspection into the author.

XIII. In the next place, I charged you^t with a misconstruction of a noted passage in Irenæus. To this you make no reply at all; wherefore it stands as before; and I have, I suppose, your tacit allowance to *triumph* here, as, in a former place, your *express permission*.

XIV. I found fault^u with your representation^x of Tertullian; as if that writer believed God the Son to have been, in his highest capacity, *ignorant of the day of judgment*. To this you make answer, (Reply, p. 22,) that "you only cite his express " words without any descant upon them." It is very true that you make no formal *descant* upon those very words; but both before and after, you are arguing, with all your might, against Tertullian's belief of the *eternity* and *consubstantiality*. I hope it is no affront to suppose that you had some meaning in bringing

^t Defence, vol. i. p. 515, 516. ^u Ibid. p. 516. ^x Disquis. Mod. p. 147.

in the passages about the Son's *ignorance*; and that you would have your readers think them *pertinent*, at least, to the point in hand. The whole design of your book, and what goes before and after in the same *section*, sufficiently shew your intention in citing those passages; and are, interpretatively, a *descant* upon them. Your meaning and purport in it is so plain that no reader can mistake it: wherefore your pretence now that you have made no *descant* upon the words, after you find that you are not able to defend your sense of them, is a very poor evasion. There were two citations from Tertullian about the Son's *ignorance*. I had shewn that one of them plainly relates to Christ's *human* nature; and I might reasonably judge from thence the same thing of the other also, since both are of the same author. It is not therefore strictly true that I *answer nothing*, as you pretend, to the first citation: for, by answering one, I have, in effect, answered both. It was your business to prove that either of the passages were to be understood of Christ, in his highest capacity: but for want of proof, you are content to *insinuate* it only to your reader; and so you leave it with him, trusting to his weakness or partiality. However, instead of asking a proof of you, I gave you a proof of the contrary: demonstrating from the context, (especially from the words *exclamans quod se Deus reliquisset*, which Tertullian in express words interprets of the *human nature*;) that the supposed *ignorance* of Christ was understood by Tertullian of Christ's *humanity* only. Now you say (p. 22.) that "the words, *known only to the Father*, exclude the "Son in all capacities." Very well then; I had the good fortune to hit your meaning before, though you made no *descant* upon the words. As to your pretence from the term *only*, there is no ground for it. No man of any judgment, that is at all acquainted with Tertullian's way and manner of explaining the *exclusive* terms^v relating to this subject, would ever draw any such inference from them. But you have a further pretence, that "all the words preceding speak not of the Son of man, "but of the Son of God." The reason is, because he was to prove that the *Son of God* was really distinct from the *Father*; and that the *Father* was not *incarnate*, as the Praxicans pretended. He proves it unanswerably from this topic, among others; that in regard to the Son's *ignorance of the day of judgment*, Father

^v Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 2, 5, 18, 19.

and Son are plainly spoken of, as of *two Persons*; one as *knowing*, the other as not *knowing*, though in a certain respect only: wherefore the Father himself was not the *Person incarnate*, which was to be proved. In this view, Tertullian's argument is just and conclusive; and the text relating to the Son's *ignorance pertinently* alleged, though understood of Christ's *humanity*. This I observed before, and explained more at large in my Defence, vol. i. p. 517, 518, &c. You resolve, notwithstanding, to proceed in your own way, and to make a show of saying something, though you find yourself already foreclosed, and every objection obviated. You say thus: "From this mistake of Tertullian's citing texts relating only to Christ's human nature, he saw this objection would arise, that the Fathers argued impertinently against the Sabellians." I did indeed foresee, that there might be some colour for such an *objection*, among those that take things upon the *first view*, without looking any further. I proposed the *objection* fairly, and then fully answered it; as the reader may please to see in my Defence. And now, what have you to reply? I had said that Catholics and Sabellians both allowed that *God* was *incarnate*, and that the main question (that is, so far as concerns the *incarnation*, whereof I was speaking) was, whether the Father himself made one *Person* with Christ's human nature, or no. In answer hereto, you make a show of contradicting me without opposing me at all, except in one particular, wherein you are plainly mistaken. You run off for near a page together, telling us only trite things which every body knows, concerning the dispute between Catholics and Sabellians. If by *singular essence* be meant the same with *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, (as you understand it,) that indeed was the main article of dispute between Catholics and Sabellians, whether Father and Son were one and the same *Hypostasis*. But when the principles of each side were brought down to the particular case of the *incarnation*, then the main point in question was, whether the *Hypostasis* of the Father was *incarnate* or no. The Sabellians allowing but one *divine Hypostasis*, and yet admitting God to be *incarnate*, were of course obliged to assert it: and the Catholics, on the other hand, admitting more *divine Hypostases* than one, denied it. How the Catholics proved their point, I shewed you distinctly; and you have nothing of moment to reply to it. Only you are pleased to acquaint us with an invention of your own, that the Sabellians allowed

“ in Jesus only flesh ; and by the Spirit of Jesus they understood “ the Godhead of the Father.” But who, before yourself, ever reckoned it among the Sabellian tenets, that Christ had no *human soul*? It is very peculiar of you to cite Tertullian in proof of it, on account of these words ; *dicentes Filium carnem esse, id est hominem, id est Jesum ; Patrem autem Spiritum, id est Deum* : when Tertullian, in the very passage, interprets *flesh* by *man*, and *Jesus* ; and interprets *Spirit* by divine Spirit, or God. As to the belief of Christ's *human soul*, it was an established article of faith in Tertullian's time, as appears from several passages^z ; and before Tertullian, as is clear from Irenæus^a and Justin Martyr^b. How then comes it to pass, that none of the Catholics ever took notice of this error of the Sabellians, their denying a *human soul*? I mention not how the Sabellian *hypothesis* must have been very needlessly and stupidly clogged by such a tenet ; for they could never have given any tolerable account of the Son's praying to the Father, of his increasing in wisdom, of his being afflicted and sore troubled, and crying out in his agonies and sufferings, without the supposition of a *human soul*. What? Was it only *walking flesh*, or *animated clay*, that did all this? Or was it the *Hypostasis* of the Father, the eternal God, as such, that did these things? You allow only these two ; and not caring, it seems, how *stupid* and *senseless* you make all the Sabellians, one of these you must, of course, father upon them. It is true that they supposed the *Father* to have *suffered*, and they were therefore called *Patripassians* : that is, they supposed the *Father* to suffer (as we believe of the Son) in the *human* nature. But they were never so gross and wild in their imaginations as to suppose the *Godhead*, as such, to *suffer*, to be *sore troubled*, to be in *agonies*, to *cry out*, &c. And yet it is ridiculous to apply this to *flesh* only, without a *soul* : neither can it be reasonably imagined of the Sabellians, unless they believed of men in general, that they have no such thing as a *soul* distinct from the body. In short, their retreating at length to this, that there were two *Hypostases*^c in Christ, a *divine* and *human*, in order to solve the difficulties they were pressed with, sufficiently discovers their sentiments. For neither could that sub-

^z Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 16, 30.
de Carn. Christi, cap. 10.

^a Iren. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 292. ed. Bened.

^b Justin. M. Apol. ii. p. 26. Ox.

^c Vid. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 27.
Comp. Athanas. contr. Sabell. Gregal.
p. 39. ed. Bened.

terfuge do them any service, unless *Jesus* was supposed a distinct *Person*; nor could they be so weak as to imagine a *living carcass*, a body without a soul, to be a *person*. To conclude this article, the Sabellians, when they retired at length to that *salvo*, taking sanctuary in *two Hypostases*, understood one of them to be *God the Father*, the other, the *man Christ Jesus*^d: which was afterwards the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, and of Photinus, who thus refined upon the Sabellian *heresy*. But I have been rather too long in confuting a pretence which has nothing to countenance it in history; besides that it is plainly repugnant to good sense.

XV. The next thing I charged you with^e was, your pretending, falsely, that Bp. Bull had not shewn that the Fathers of the *second century* resolved the *Unity* into the same principle with the Nicene Fathers. I observed that the Bishop had shewn it, referring you to the place where^f. You now say in your Reply, (p. 24,) "That which the Bishop has done in that section is fully answered and refuted, p. 197, 198." I have turned to those pages in your Disquisitions, and can see nothing like it; except it be your fancy, or *fiction*, that the Ante-Nicene Fathers, when they speak of the *Logos* as existing in the Father before his coming forth, mean it of an *attribute* only, and nothing *real*. This groundless surmise is at large confuted by Bishop Bull^g: and give me leave also to refer you to what I have observed^h on that head. What you add, relating to Clemens Romanus, is only *gratis dictum*, and wants to be proved.

XVI. I blamed youⁱ further for referring^k to Basil, as an evidence that Gregory Thaumaturgus believed God the Son to be a *creature*. You tell me in your Reply, (p. 24,) that you "say nothing of his (Gregory's) faith." Please to look back to your Modest Disquisitions, and revise your own former thoughts, which run thus: "Lastly, it is to be noted that
 " neither Gregory Thaumaturgus, who, as St. Basil witnesseth,
 " *depressed Christ into the rank of creatures, (in creaturarum censum*
 " *depressit,*) nor Dionysius of Alexandria, who, as the same
 " (Basil) witnesseth, denied the *consubstantiality*, could have

^d See this expressly asserted in Athanasius, tom. ii. p. 39. before referred to.

^e Defence, vol. i. p. 518.

^f Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. sect. iv. cap. 4.

^g Bull. Def. Fid. sect. iii. cap. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 360, &c. Sermons, p. 149, &c. of this volume.

ⁱ Ibid. vol. i. p. 518.

^k Mod. Disq. p. 84.

“ thought rightly (*recte sentire potuisse*) of the proper eternity of “ Christ.” Is this saying nothing of Gregory’s *faith*? though he *depressed* the Son into *the rank of creatures*, as you tell us he did; and though he could not *think* (i. e. *believe*) rightly of Christ’s *proper eternity*, as you also say; yet you have said nothing of Gregory’s *faith*. Ridiculous: you have said it, and quoted Basil for it; notwithstanding that Bishop Bull had demonstrated the contrary even from Basil himself; as I before observed, and you do not gainsay. And now, to use your own words relating to this article, “ let the reader judge where the “ falsehood lies.” Your repeating some things from Petavius and Huetius, upon this occasion, signifies little. Bp. Bull had considered and answered what those two great men had said: and you come up again with the same baffled objections; though you are so sensible that they have been fully answered, that you have not a word to reply, but are forced *tacitly* to allow that Gregory’s *faith* was right; however he happened to drop some suspected words, which were made an ill use of.

XVII. I charged you^l with the revival of an old objection, which Bishop Bull had ingenuously set forth in its full force, and as fully answered^m.

To this you reply, (p. 25,) that you have fully confuted this pretended answer of the Bishop’s, in your Dissertation *de Scriptur. Interpret.* p. 51, 52. and also in the place cited of your Mod. Disquis. p. 87, 88. I have turned to your Dissertation, and find what you point to in the Preface, p. 51, 52. There I meet with two or three exceptions, mostly wide of the point, and scarce deserving notice. We must suppose our readers acquainted with the argument we are upon, which it would be tedious to give at length: and now I will shew you how slight your objections are.

1. First, you say, that the “ appearance of Christ’s divine “ nature” (to the Patriarchs) “ under human form, did not make “ the Logos *another God* from the Father.” No, certainly; nor did any of the Ante-Nicene writers pretend it: but if the *Logos appeared* in a certain manner and form; and the *Father never appeared* in any manner or form; the *Logos* is not the *Father*: which was the thing to be proved.

2. You object, that “ certainly the divine nature of Christ

^l Defence, vol. i. p. 518, &c.

^m Bull. Def. Fid. N. p. 267.

“ was in heaven, when it appeared on earth.” Undoubtedly: and those very writers who represent the *Father* as being in heaven, and the *Son* as being on earth, yet acknowledge them both to be equally present every where: and they refer it to the *οἰκονομία*ⁿ, that the two Persons are represented, as it were, in different places; one here, the other there.

3. You object, that “those ancients who looked upon it as *impious* to ascribe to the *Father* such things as they made no scruple of applying to the *Son*, *must have thought* there was some difference between the *Father* and *Son* in those respects.” I answer, that they thought of no more difference than this, that one was a *Father*, and the other a *Son*; and that one was to be *incarnate*, and the other not. It would have been *impious* to ascribe to the Person of the *Father* what was proper to the Person of the *Son*; not only because the *Father* was never to be *sent*, nor to act a *ministerial* part, any more than he was to be *incarnate*; but also because the tendency of such pretences was to make *Father* and *Son* one *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, and was in reality to deny that there was any *Son* at all. Your citations from Tertullian and Justin Martyr are not pertinent, unless you supposed yourself to be arguing against Sabellians. Having done with your Dissertation, let us next come to *Disquis. Modest. p. 87.* There, I must observe, you have hardly one word to the purpose. All that you prove is, that *Father* and *Son* are not one *numerical essence*, in your sense; that is, they are not one *numerical Person*, which is readily allowed: as also that they have not one *numerical will, power, &c.* in your sense, though they have in another. *Voluntas de voluntate, potentia de potentia* is the Catholic doctrine, as much as *substantia de substantia*, or *Deus de Deo*. In short, if you would do any thing towards confuting Bishop Bull, you should answer the authorities which he brought, to prove that those very Ante-Nicene writers (who argued that it could not be the *Father* that *appeared*, and *descended*, and was found in a *place*) acknowledged, notwithstanding, that the *Son* was, in his own nature, *invisible* and

ⁿ Habes Filium in terris, habes Patrem in cælis: non est separatio ista, sed *dispositio* divina. Cæterum scias Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potes-

tate: Filium quoque ut individuum cum ipso ubique. Tamen in ipsa *οἰκονομία* Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in cælis. *Tertull. adr. Prax. cap. 2.*

omnipresent, as well as the Father; and that the same writers (some of them) expressly interpreted those *appearances*, &c. of the *οικονομία*, *economy* or *dispensation*, which it pleased God the Son to run through; transacting all matters between God the Father and the world of *creatures*. As to the *οικονομία*, and what Bishop Bull intends by it, the reader may see in his Defence of the Nicene Faith, (p. 10.) What you mean by denying it is very hard to conjecture, unless you have some weak evasion (Reply, p. 26.) in the words, "beginning from the fall of Adam:" for you say, and seem to lay some stress upon it. that "it began "from the beginning of the creation." Does Bishop Bull deny that? See his own words in the margin°. But, it seems, you are to construe Bishop Bull's saying, that it was as "high as "the fall of Adam," (in opposition to such as supposed it to commence at the *incarnation*, and no sooner,) as if he had said, it *began* from the fall of Adam: and this you are to do, only to find some pretence for contradicting Bishop Bull, and diverting the reader from the point in hand. I referred you (Defence, vol. i. p. 518.) to authors^p, ancient and modern, who asserted the *οικονομία* in Bishop Bull's sense. To which you have nothing of any moment to oppose; only you discover a great dissatisfaction that Bishop Bull had so well guarded his point, and vindicated his doctrine, that all your most pompous and plausible pretences fall before him.

XVIII. I charged you^q with setting Clemens of Rome and St. Paul at variance; and yet giving the preference to Clemens, as "laying Christianity before us in its naked simplicity." To this article you are pleased to say never a word.

XIX. I took notice also, in another place^r, of your sophistical way of reasoning against the belief of *mysteries*, or matters above comprehension. I called upon you (vol. i. p. 459, 460.) to explain your meaning, and to let us know distinctly what there is in the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity to give you such offence, and to raise your zeal against it; whether it be that the doctrine is, in your judgment, *contradictory* to reason, or only

^o Deus Pater, quemadmodum per Filium suum mundum primitus condidit creavitque; ita per eundem Filium se deinceps mundo patefecit. *Bull. Def. F. N.* p. 10.

^p Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 2, 3.

Clem. Alex. p. 831, 955. ed. Ox. Tatian. cap. 8. ed. Ox. Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 12, 15. Fabric. Vales. Not. in Euseb. p. 5, 6, 90, 253.

^q Defence, vol. i. p. 519.

^r Ibid. p. 453.

above reason ; or that it is *unscriptural* only. and no more : but to this also you vouchsafe no reply.

XX. I charged you further (vol. i. p. 350.) with using a bad art, to serve a bad cause : which was the severest thing I had said of you, and which you had given me just occasion for ; as I shewed plainly in the place referred to. In apology for yourself, (Reply, p. 56.) you cite a passage of my Defence, (vol. i. p. 527.) where I say, “ A writer is not to be blamed, in some cases, for taking what is to his purpose, and omitting the rest.” To which give me leave to answer in my own words, as they follow in the same page ; “ But, as the case is here, the best, and indeed only, light, to direct the reader to the true meaning of what is cited, is left out.” You say, your “ design being only to prove from the words of Justin^s, that Christ was God κατὰ βουλήν αὐτοῦ, according to the will of his Father, what reason could you have to add that he was also styled an angel?” But, do you not yet perceive that the question is, whether Christ be said to be God κατὰ βουλήν αὐτοῦ, according to the will of the Father, in that place of Justin, or no ? The words, literally rendered, run thus : “ Who, according to his (the Father’s) will, is both God, being his Son, and an angel, as ministering to his Father’s will.” The meaning of the passage is not, as you represent it, that Christ is “ God by the will of the Father,” (though even that might bear a good sense,) but that it pleased God that his Son, who was *God* already, as *God’s Son*, should be an *angel* also. That he was *God*, was a necessary thing ; but that he should be *both*, was not so. This I took to be the true sense of the passage. For Justin gives the reason why he was *God* ; it was because he was *God’s Son*. He resolves his *divinity* into *Sonship* here, as indeed every where ; and *Sonship* into *communication of substance*, as I have observed above. Now let us consider what you had done with this passage. The Latin version runs thus : *Qui juxta voluntatem ejus, et Deus est, Filius quippe ipsius, et angelus ex eo quod sententiæ illius est ad-minister.* Instead whereof you give us this : *Qui ex voluntate ipsius, et Deus est et Filius ipsius^t.* Here, by putting in the particle *et* before *Filius*, and leaving out *et angelus*, you determine

^s Τὸν κατὰ βουλήν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ Θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄγγελον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ. *Dial.* p. 370.

Compare the words of Novatian :

Personæ autem Christi convenit, ut et Deus sit. quia Dei Filius ; et angelus sit, quoniam paternæ dispositionis adnuntiator est. *Novat. cap. 26.*

^t Whitby, *Disquisit. Mod.* p. 32.

the words to your own sense, though capable of another sense as they lie in the author. This is what I had just reason to complain of, that you should take upon you to leave out and put in what you please, to tie the words down to your own meaning; when the words otherwise may, or rather must, bear a different construction, if you please to let them appear entire, and without any interpolation.

You say, (Reply, p. 56,) that you “had authority from Justin’s own words to do this.” What! Had you authority from Justin’s own words to change both his words and his sense? He does not say that Christ *was God and a Son too by the will of the Father*; but that he was, according to the will of the Father, both God, as being his Son, and an angel. I insist upon it that the meaning may be no more than this, that it pleased God that he who was already God should not only be *God*, but an *angel* also; and that though it was owing to God’s good pleasure that he was *both*, yet it was necessary for him to be *one*, as he was partaker of the divine substance, being God’s Son. You cite other passages of Justin, declaring that Christ was Θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὅλων κτισμάτων, *God as being born* (or begotten) *before all creatures*: and that he was Θεὸς, Θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων, *God, as being the Son of God*. Now these and the like passages make against you, as shewing that Justin resolved Christ’s *divinity* into his *Sonship*, that is, *communion of essence, or substance*^u, not into *voluntary appointment*. If it be objected that he was a *Son κατὰ βουλήν* according to Justin, and that therefore he must be *God κατὰ βουλήν*, if he be *God as God’s Son*; I answer, that the consequence is not just. For while Justin understands the *Sonship* of a *temporal* and *voluntary προέλευσις*, or *coming forth*, he supposes the *Logos* not to have been ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, but from the very substance of the Father; and therefore he was *God*, as having ever existed before his *coming forth*, in and with the Father. In a word, he *came forth*, was not *created*, and therefore he is *God*. Had he been produced *from nothing*, as creatures are, he could not be *God*: but since he came forth as a *Son*, of the same divine substance with the Father, therefore he is *God*. This I take to be the true account of Justin’s principles relating to this head; as also

^u Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 183, 373. Comp. Apol. i. p. 44, 46. Apol. ii. p. 13.

of all the other Fathers that speak of a *voluntary* generation. See my Defence, vol. i. Qu. viii. You see then, how wide a difference there is between your account of Justin and mine. I desire only to have Justin's text fairly represented as it is. To put in or leave out any thing here, and thereby to determine the sense against us, in so critical a place as this, is very unfair and unjust; and deserves the hardest names that I could give it. Let us have no tampering with texts. You may argue and reason for your sense of the passage, if you please; as I do also for mine. Only let our readers see plainly what the words of the author are. To do otherwise is corrupting the evidence, perverting judgment, and giving sentence before the cause comes to a fair hearing. This kind of management, especially in so weighty a cause, wherein the honour of our *God* and *Saviour* is so nearly concerned, is what I cannot account for: and if upon this occasion I expressed some wonder and astonishment, that any should be so "resolutely eager to ungod their Saviour, as "not to permit the cause to have a fair hearing;" I suppose it might become me much better in defence of my Saviour's honour, than those intemperate words of yours, "impudently "false assertion," become you, in your blind zeal for your own.

I have now finished what I intended by way of answer to your *defensive* part. Upon the whole, it does not appear to me, that, of all the things laid to your charge, whether *general fallacies* or *particular mistakes*, you have been able to take off so much as one. What you have done, or shall do, in the *offensive* way, may perhaps be considered hereafter. I think it best to *postpone* my *second part*, because you are still going on to supply me with new matter for it: and you have promised the public great things, to appear in due time. I am now pretty well acquainted with you; and may therefore presume to exhibit to the reader, or to yourself, a brief account of your chief materials, with which you are to work in this controversy, and upon which your cause is to subsist.

1. In the first place, you have a strong *presumption*, that "two or more persons cannot constitute one individual or numerical being, substance, or essence." You produce testimonies of *Fathers* in great numbers, proving nothing but a *real* distinction; and by virtue of the *presumption* laid down, (which stands only upon *courtesy*,) you persuade yourself, that those testimonies

are of some weight, and pertinently alleged, even against those who admit a *real* distinction, as much as the *Fathers* do.

2. In the second place, you have another strong *presumption*, that no kind of "subordination is or can be consistent with such equality, or such union as we maintain." Hereupon you produce a further cloud of testimonies from the *ancients*, proving nothing but a *subordination*: which testimonies, by virtue of this your second *presumption*, (standing only upon *courtesy*, as the former,) are conceived to be of weight, and to be pertinently cited, even against those who readily admit of a *subordination*, in conformity with the ancient *Fathers*. From what I have observed here, and under the former article, you may perceive that, at least, nine parts in ten of your quotations are entirely wide of the point; and it may save you some trouble for the future to be duly apprized of it.

3. Besides this, you have some expressions of Origen, chiefly from those pieces which are either not certainly genuine, or not free from interpolation^x, or wrote in a problematical way^y, or not containing Origen's mature and riper thoughts; published perhaps without his consent, and such as he himself afterwards disapproved and repented of^z. And those you urge against us, notwithstanding that we appeal chiefly to his book against *Celsus*, which is certainly Origen's, and which contains his most mature sentiments; and from whence it is demonstrable that Origen was no Arian, but plainly Anti-Arian^a.

4. You lay a very great stress upon *Eusebius*, as if he were to speak for all the Ante-Nicene writers: though we might more justly produce *Athanasius* (with respect to his two first tracts) as an Ante-Nicene writer; and his authority is, at least, as good as the other's. *Eusebius* must be of little weight with us, wherever he is found to vary either from himself, or from the *Catholics* which lived in or before his time. Nothing can be more unfair than to represent antiquity through the glass of *Eusebius*, who has been so much suspected; besides that we can more certainly determine what the sentiments of the earlier writers were, (from their own works still extant,) than we can what *Eusebius's* were; whose writings are more doubtful and ambiguous; insomuch that

^x Vid. *Ruffin. de Adulter. Librorum Origen.* p. 240. ed. Bened. Huet. *Origenian.* p. 233.

^y Vid. *Pamph. Apolog.* p. 221. ed. Bened. *Phot. Cod.* 117. *Athanas.*

vol. i. p. 233.

^z Vid. *Hieron. de Error. Orig. ad Pammach. Ep.* xli. p. 347. ed. Bened.

^a Vid. *Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. sect. ii.* cap. 9.

the learned world have been more divided about him and his opinions than about any other writer whatsoever.

5. Lastly, you bring up again, frequently, some concessions of Petavius and Huetius ; such as they incautiously fell into before this matter had been thoroughly canvassed, as it hath been since by Bishop Bull, and other great men. From that time, most of the learned men in Europe, *Romanists*^b as well as *Protestants*, appear to have the same sentiments of the Ante-Nicene *faith* which Bishop Bull had. It is therefore now much out of time, and very disingenuous, to lay any great weight upon the judgment of Petavius or Huetius, however valuable and learned, since this matter has been much more accurately inquired into than it had been at that time. Huetius has lived to see Bishop Bull's works, (as we may reasonably presume,) and cannot be ignorant how highly they have been valued abroad : yet we do not find that he has ever complained of any injury done him by the Bishop, or that he ever thought fit to vindicate himself, or his great oracle Petavius ; to whose judgment (as he himself laments) he had once dearly paid too great a deference^c.

It may suffice, for the present, to have left these few general hints ; by means of which an intelligent reader, without further assistance from me, may readily discover the fallacy of your reasonings, and answer the most plausible objections you have to urge against the received doctrine of the blessed Trinity. If any thing more particular be necessary hereafter, I shall (with God's assistance) endeavour to do justice to the cause which I have taken in hand ; and, as opportunity serves, shall proceed in detecting sophistry, laying open disguises, exposing misreports, misquotations, misconstructions, or any other engines of deceit, as long as there appears to me any probable danger from thence arising to honest well-meaning men, less acquainted with this momentous controversy. In the interim, I am with all due respect,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant.

^b See Nelson's Life of Bishop Bull, p. 345, &c. 388.

^c Vid. Huetii Comment. de Rebus ad illum pertinent. p. 70.

THE CASE
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ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION
CONSIDERED:
AND THE
SEVERAL PLEAS AND EXCUSES FOR IT PARTICULARLY
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CHAP. I.

The occasion and design of these papers.

REMARKS have been lately published against a *clause* contained in a *bill* which had been brought into the House of Lords, for the more effectual suppressing of *blasphemy* and *profaneness*. It has been observed, among other things, that the *clause*, being intended as a *test* against *Arianism*, would be of little use or significancy as to the end designed by it; because those who are now understood to be Arians are ready to subscribe any *test* of that kind, containing nothing more than is already contained in the XXXIX Articles. The *Remarker* takes notice, that those gentlemen make no scruple of subscribing to our Church's forms: it is their *avowed principle* that they may lawfully do it in their *own* sense, agreeably to what they call *Scripture*. This he proves from their declared sentiments, not only in common conversation, but in print; and from their constant practice of late years, since the year 1712.

If this be matter of fact, (as I am afraid it is,) it may be high time to inquire, somewhat more particularly than hath

been yet done, into the case of *subscription*. If instead of excusing a *fraudulent* subscription on the foot of *human infirmity*, (which yet is much too soft a name for it,) endeavours be used to defend it upon *principle*, and to support it by *rules of art*, it concerns every honest man to look about him. For what is there so vile or shameful, but may be set off with false colours, and have a plausible turn given it, by the help of quirks and subtilities? Many, without doubt, have been guilty of *prevaricating* with *state-oaths*; but nobody has been yet found sanguine enough to undertake the defence of it in print. Only *Church-subscriptions*, though of much the same sacred nature with the other, may be securely played with: and the plainest breach of sincerity and trust, in this case, shall find its advocates and defenders. It must indeed be owned, that the pretences for it have not been particularly confuted or examined. The reason is, because they looked more like a wanton exercise of wit and fancy, (though it is dangerous playing with sacred things,) than any serious design to convince the world of the justice of it. Besides that the foundations of *moral honesty* were thought so deeply rooted in the hearts of men, that every attempt against them must soon fall, and die of itself. However, because the pretences for what I call a *fraudulent* subscription had been recommended by a person of some character in the learned world; and might possibly gain ground among such as take things *implicitly*, upon the credit of any *great name*; I had once prepared a formal Answer to what had been advanced on that head: and I designed to publish it by way of introduction to my Defence. But, before my papers were quite wrought off, there appeared a second edition of "Scripture Doctrine," &c. upon perusal whereof I observed that the most offensive passage of the Introduction, relating to subscription, was left out: and besides that, all those strange and unaccountable interpretations of the Athanasian Creed, &c. (which had appeared in the *first edition*,) were also prudently omitted; though those were all the author had to depend on for the justifying his subscription. Upon this, I was willing to hope that the learned Doctor had *given*, or was *giving* up his former principles, relating to subscription: and I thought it would be ungenerous now to attack him in his *weakest hold*, after he had himself betrayed a suspicion, at least, that he could no longer maintain it. Wherefore I contented myself with a short remark in my Preface, entering

a *caveat* only, against any one's abusing the Doctor's name hereafter, or misleading his authority, in the case of subscription. It was not long before a nameless writer of the party took me up for the charitable suggestion I had made in favour of the learned Doctor. That writer persisting in the Doctor's first sentiments, and being very unwilling to part with so valuable an authority, was pleased to oppose the conjecture I had made upon the Doctor's leaving out the passage in his Introduction. "I know not," says he, "for what reason Dr. Clarke omitted those words; but, I believe I may say, it was not for the reason Dr. Waterland insinuates, viz. *that such subscription is not justifiable*; because the same thing is still asserted five or six times, at least, in the Introduction as corrected in the new edition^a." I am not of that gentleman's mind in this particular. Nay, if it might not look vain, I would presume, after a competent acquaintance with the Doctor's books, to have seen a little further into the turn of his thoughts than perhaps that writer has done: and, with his good leave, I will still retain the same opinion of the Doctor's good sense and integrity so far, which I had when I wrote my Preface. I think I could give a tolerable account of the Doctor's not striking out every passage in his Introduction that looked that way: and likewise of his great reserve and caution, in not telling the world plainly that he had changed his mind. However, if I mistake, I am sure it is on the candid and charitable side; and on that which must appear much more for the Doctor's honour, (with all men of sense,) than persisting in an *error* ever can be. That it is an error, and a very great one, I mean to shew in these papers: and though I must, in appearance, carry on a dispute against the learned Doctor, because the *objections*, for the most part, must be produced in *his* words; yet I would be understood, in reality, to be rather disputing this point with the Doctor's disciples, who lay a greater stress upon what he has said than himself now seems to do; thereby making his *first* thoughts *theirs*, after they have (as I charitably conceive) ceased to be *his*. I shall have no occasion to say any thing in defence of our excellent Church, as to her *requiring subscription*; and requiring it according to her *own* sense of holy Scripture. This part of the controversy has been judiciously cleared and settled by two

^a Account of Pamphlets, &c. p. 17.

very ingenious writers; Mr. Stebbing in his *Rational Enquiry*, and Mr. Rogers in his *Discourse and Review*. My business is only to begin where they end, and to shew that, as the Church requires subscription to her *own* interpretation of Scripture, so the subscriber is bound, in virtue of his subscription, to *that*, and *that* only: and if he knowingly subscribes in any sense *contrary* to, or *different* from, the sense of the *imposers*; he prevaricates, and commits a *fraud* in so doing. This is a cause of some moment: it is the cause of plainness and sincerity, in opposition to wiles and subtilties. It is in defence, not so much of *revealed*, as of *natural* religion; not of the fundamentals of *faith*, but of the principles of *moral* honesty: and every *heresy* in *morality* is of more pernicious consequence than *heresies* in points of *positive* religion. The security and honour of our Church are deeply concerned in this question. As to its *security*, every body sees what I mean: and as to the *honour* or *reputation* of our Church abroad, whenever we have been charged with *Socinianism* or *Popery*, or any other *monstrous* doctrines, we had no defence so ready at hand, or so just and satisfactory, as this; that our *subscriptions* were sufficient to wipe off all *slander* and *calumny*. The good of the *State*, as well as of the *Church*, is likewise concerned in this question: because there can be no security against men's putting their own *private* senses upon the *public laws, oaths, injunctions, &c.* in contradiction to the sense of the *imposers*, if these principles about *Church subscription* should ever prevail amongst us. But of this more will be said in the sequel. I designed only, at present, briefly to intimate the importance of the cause I am inquiring into; to invite the readers to the more careful examination of it. And I shall enter into the *merits* of it, as soon as I have laid down the principles of the men I am now concerned with, in order to let us into the true *state* of the *question*.

CHAP. II.

The general principles or sentiments of the modern Arians (some of them at least) concerning subscription to our public forms.

THE author of the *Remarks* observes, that "it is an avowed principle among them, that these Articles" (the XXXIX Articles) "may lawfully and conscientiously be subscribed in any sense in which they themselves, by their own interpretation,

“ can reconcile them to Scripture,” (i. e. what they call Scripture ; or their *own* sense of Scripture,) “ without regard to the meaning and intention, either of the persons who first com- piled them, or who now impose them.” He says further, that “ this latitude was expressly asserted in the year 1712, by “ a learned Doctor of divinity, in a book entitled, ‘ The Scripture “ Doctrine of the Trinity ;’ and was advanced on purpose to “ justify their subscribing.” It is very well that the doctrine can be dated no higher than the year 1712 ; as indeed it cannot ; being entirely *new* : never heard of among *sober* casuists, at least, before that time. Now, the principal words of the author of *Scripture Doctrine* (as they stand in the Introduction to the *first edition*) are these : “ It is plain that “ every person may reasonably agree to such forms,” (our Church’s forms, or of any other Protestant Church,) “ whenever “ he can in any sense at all reconcile them with Scripture :” i. e. his *own* sense of Scripture. It is observable that these words are *general* ; and somewhat *ambiguous*. For the Doctor does not say, in any sense whereof the words are *capable*, and withal *consistent with Scripture*, but *consistent with Scripture* only : and if he speaks there of the forms in *general*, as he seems to do, he might possibly mean, that any man may agree to such forms when he can *any way* reconcile them : whether by giving *no assent* to passages irreconcilable, or whether by substituting *something* else in their room : and this would amount to sub- scribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture*. I know, the Doctor has took pains to reconcile the particular passages in the *public forms* to his own *hypothesis* ; from whence one might imagine that he takes every particular expression to be *capable* of a sense consistent with his scheme. But I know also, and shall shew it in due time, that he has often given a *sense* of which the words he is there commenting upon are really not *capable* : which is substituting *something else* in the room of what he finds in our *forms*, to reconcile them to his *hypothesis*. And I do not remember that the Doctor has ever expressly said, that every single expression of the *public forms* is *capable* of a sense agreeable to what he calls Scripture. Wherefore I have thought that the Doctor’s real meaning was to subscribe with this reservation, viz. *so far as is agreeable to Scripture* ; though he chose to word it something differently, and less offensively, by saying, in *that sense wherein they are agreeable*.

What confirms me in this suspicion is, that several of the Doctor's arguments for subscribing serve equally for *one* or *other*; and will either justify both those kinds of reservation, or neither. However this matter be, as to the Doctor himself, it is certain that others of the *party* have expressed themselves clearly and distinctly on this head; and have condemned the way of subscribing with the reserve of, *so far as is agreeable to the Scripture*; resting their cause entirely upon the other, viz. *in such sense wherein they are agreeable*.

The anonymous author of the *Essay on imposing and subscribing Articles*, after declaring his judgment (so far judging right) that they are not articles of *peace* only, but of *opinion*; proceeds to condemn the notion of subscribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture*; insisting upon it, that the articles are *capable* of a *sense* in which they are *agreeable* to what he calls *Scripture*: and he pretends no more than this, that a man may honestly subscribe *in any sense of which the words are capable*^b, and withal *agreeable to Scripture*.

We are told in another tract, containing an *account of pamphlets* relating to the Trinitarian controversy, that subscribing the Articles *so far as they are agreeable to Scripture*, is very different from subscribing the same *in any sense agreeable to Scripture*: and that they defend only the *latter*, having “explicitly^c condemned the former.” The sum then of what is pretended is this: It is first supposed that the Articles, &c. are *capable* of a *sense* agreeable to what they call *Scripture*: and then, and not till then, it is supposed they may be subscribed. Their defence of subscription then rests upon *two suppositions*:

1. That every expression in our public forms is *capable* of a *sense* consistent with the *new scheme*.

2. That their being *capable* of such a *sense* is enough; without regard had to the more plain, obvious, and natural signification of the *words* themselves, or to the *intention* of those who first compiled the forms, or who now impose them.

If *either* of these *suppositions* (much more if both) proves false or groundless, their whole defence of *Arian subscription* drops of course. I shall shew,

1. That the *sense* of the compilers and imposers (where

^b Page 41.

^c Page 20.

certainly known) must be *religiously* observed ; even though the words were *capable* of another sense.

2. That, whatever has been pretended, there are several expressions in the *public forms* which are really not *capable* of any sense consistent with the Arian *hypothesis*, or *new scheme*.

CHAP. III.

That the sense of the compilers and imposers, when certainly known, (as in the present case it is,) is to be religiously observed by every subscriber, even though the words were capable of another sense.

BY *compilers*, I mean those that *composed* the *Creeds*, *Articles*, or other forms received by our Church. By *imposers*, I understand the governors in Church and State for the time being. The sense of the *compilers*, barely considered, is not always to be observed ; but so far only as the *natural* and *proper* signification of words, or the *intention* of the *imposers*, binds it upon us. The sense of the *compilers* and *imposers* may generally be presumed the same, (except in some very rare and particular cases,) and therefore I mention both, one giving light to the other. The rules and measures proper for *understanding* what that sense is, are and can be no other than the same which are proper for understanding of *oaths*, *laws*, *covenants*, or any *forms* or *writings* whatever : namely, the usual acceptation of words ; the custom of speech at the time of their being written ; the scope and intention of the writers, discoverable from the occasion, from the controversies then on foot, or from any other circumstances affording light into it. This is the true and only way to interpret rightly any *forms*, *books*, or *writings* whatever.

The pretences to the contrary shall be considered in their proper place : I shall now hasten to the proof of my first position, and shall be very brief in it ; there being little occasion for proving so clear a point : what is most necessary is, to wipe off the dust that has been thrown upon it ; and that shall be done in due time and place.

1. I argue, first, from the case of *oaths*. It is a settled rule with casuists, that *oaths* are always to be taken in the sense of the *imposers* : the same is the case of solemn *leagues* or *covenants*. Without this principle, no faith, trust, or mutual

confidence could be kept up amongst men. Now, *subscription* is much of the same nature with those; and must be conceived to carry much of the same obligation with it. It is a solemn and sacred *covenant* with the *Church* or *government*; to be capable of such or such trusts upon certain conditions: which conditions are an unfeigned belief of those propositions which come recommended in the *public forms*. To change these *propositions* for others, while we are plighting our faith to *these* only, (as is supposed in the very acceptance of trusts,) is manifestly a breach of covenant, and prevaricating with God and man. It is *pretending* one thing and *meaning* another; it is professing *agreement* with the Church, and at the same time *disagreeing* with it: it is coming into trusts or privileges upon quite *different terms* from what the Church *intended*; and is, as one expresses it, not "entering in *by the door of the sheepfold*," but getting over it, as *thieves* and *robbers*.

2. To make it still plainer that such subscription is *fraudulent*: let it be considered what the ends and purposes *intended* by the ruling powers, in requiring subscription, are. They are expressed in our public *laws* and *canons* to this effect; that *pastors* may be *sound in the faith*; that no doctrines be publicly or privately taught but what the Church and State approve of; that all *diversity of opinions*, in respect of points determined, be *avoided*; that one *uniform scheme* of religion, one *harmonious form* of worship, (consonant to Scripture and primitive Christianity,) be constantly preserved among clergy and people. These are the main ends designed by subscription. But if subscribers may take the liberty of affixing their *own* sense to the public forms, in contradiction to the *known sense* of the imposers, all these ends are liable to be miserably defeated and frustrated. *Pastors*, instead of being *sound in the faith*, (which is but one,) may have as many different faiths as they happen to have different wits or inventions. Multiplicity of doctrines, opposite to each other, may be publicly taught and propagated: and, instead of any *uniform scheme* of religion, or *form of worship*, there may happen to be as many different and dissonant religions in the same church or kingdom, as there are *pastors* or *parishes*. These being the natural consequences of that latitude of subscription now pleaded for, it is evident that such a latitude is a contradiction to the very end and design of all subscription; and is therefore *unrighteous* and *full of deceit*.

3. I shall mention but one consideration more; and that is, the great scandal and pernicious influence of such a *fraudulent* practice. I cannot better express it than in the words of the late pious and excellent Mr. Nelson.

“ I could heartily now have wished,” says he, in a letter to Dr. Clarke, “ that we of the laity had no such handle ever given us, as this your last book hath afforded, as it is to be feared, but to too many who think themselves able to overturn any foundations whatever, if such a method as you there propose be allowable with respect to the most solemn acts and deeds of that Church and community whereof we are members, and to substitute what they please in their room^c.” He observes further, (p. 19,) that “ from a method of this nature, we are threatened with the overturning of foundations both sacred and civil.” And (p. 21.) that “ if the judges, and others learned in the law, shall follow the same method of interpreting the *laws of the land*, and accommodating the *civil oaths* and engagements, as Dr. Clarke has taken in interpreting and accommodating the sense of the Church, in her most authentic forms and declarations before God and man, and of the venerable Fathers of the Catholic Church; there are many of opinion, that every thing might easily be leaped over, and that no establishment could be so strong as to last long:” and “ who knows whereabouts his religion, liberty, or property may be, if such a latitude of interpretation be defensible as is avouched in Dr. Clarke’s third part openly; and is therefore suspected in his first and second?” Thus far Mr. Nelson. And there is so much strength of reason and plain good sense shewn in what he says, that all the little distinctions, evasions, and subtillies pleaded on the other side can never shake it. These and the like considerations have ever deterred wise and good men from such a method. No conscientious *Protestant* would subscribe the Romish Catechism, or Pope Pius’s Creed; no serious *Papist* would subscribe our *Articles*; no pious *Dissenter* would give his *assent* and *consent* to such parts of our public forms as he does not heartily approve of, in the plain and intended sense. Thousands have died martyrs to the maxims which I am now asserting; whose great and only misfortune it was not to have been acquainted with those *evasive arts* and *subtle distinctions*, which, it

seems, might have preserved them. I come next to examine what those pretences and evasions are: and that they may lose nothing in the recital, they shall appear in the very words of their authors; and to every particular *plea* I shall return a particular *answer*.

CHAP. IV.

The several pleas and pretences for subscribing, after the new method, examined and confuted.

PLEA I.

“The Protestant Churches require men to comply with their *forms* merely on account of their being agreeable to Scripture, and consequently *in such sense only* wherein they are agreeable to Scripture.” *Clarke’s Introd.* p. 20.

“That this is not highly reasonable among Protestants, and particularly in the Church of England; or that this hath been ever contradicted or censured by any *judgment* of the Church, I leave him (Bishop Potter) to prove.” *Bishop of Bangor’s Postscript*, p. 251.

ANSWER.

1. Before ever *Popery* was known, subscription to *creeds*, or other *forms*, has been required: and always in the sense of the *imposers*.

2. It is allowed that no man is by the Church required to subscribe *against* his *conscience*; or, what comes to the same, in a sense which he *thinks* not agreeable to Scripture. If that be any man’s opinion with respect to the *sense* of our public forms, he ought not to subscribe at all.

3. The Church indeed requires men to comply with her forms, *merely on account of their being agreeable to Scripture*: and, for that very reason, must require subscription in her *own* sense; because that *only* sense is (according to her) *agreeable to Scripture*. It is a contradiction to suppose that any church requiring subscription to her *own explanations*, (as every church does,) should at the same time permit the *subscriber* to run counter to those *explanations*. For, since she looks upon her own *explanations* as the *only true sense* of Scripture, and requires subscription to the *true sense* of Scripture; she can never be presumed to allow *other explications* which are (in her judgment) *not agreeable to Scripture*; it being her principle to admit nothing but what

is agreeable to *Scripture*. Whoever therefore does violence to the *public forms*, must be supposed (by that church whose forms those are) to do as much violence to *Scripture* itself; and consequently, such a church cannot admit of it. This *plea* then overthrows itself.

4. That it is reasonable for any *Protestant* church to require subscription in her *own sense*, is as certain as that it is reasonable to require subscription at all. For whatever church requires subscription, must require it in such a sense as that church believes to be the *true sense* of *Scripture*; and not in a sense which that church believes to be *false*. The sense therefore of the *imposers*, and none other, must be the sense which is required of the subscriber. The reason of the thing speaks it; and there is no more occasion for any *declaration* of the *Church*, in this case, than there is for a *declaration* of the *State* in the case of *civil oaths*. For who knows not that men ought to be *sincere*; and not to *subscribe* or *swear* one thing and *mean* another?

5. It is neither fair nor just to require any express *censure* or *judgment* of the ruling powers against a practice never begun till the year 1712; and which is too absurd in itself to need any formal prohibition. It was always presumed, and taken for granted, that the public forms should be understood as *intended* by the Church, and not *strained* or *wrested* to a foreign sense. King James the First, in his *proclamation* for the *authorizing an Uniformity of the Book of Common-Prayer*, hath these words; “Concerning the service of God we were nice, or rather jealous, that the public form thereof should be free, not only from blame but from suspicion; so as neither the common adversary should have occasion to *wrest ought therein contained to other sense than the Church of England intendeth*; nor any troublesome or ignorant person of this Church be able to take the least occasion of *cavil against it*.”

King Charles the First, in his Declaration prefixed to the Articles, *prohibits the least difference from the said Articles*, and expressly forbids the *affixing any new sense to any Article*. And it was the *resolution* of all the judges of England,^d that Smith's subscription to the XXXIX Articles, with this addition, (*so far forth as the same were agreeable to the word of God*), was not according to the statute of 13 Elizabeth. And one of the reasons given is, because the “act was made for avoiding of diversity

^d Coke Institut. iv. cap. 74. p. 324.

“ of opinions, &c. and by this addition the party might, by
 “ his own private opinion, take some of them to be against the
 “ word of God ; and by this means diversity of opinions should
 “ not be avoided, (which was the scope of the statute,) and the
 “ very act itself made touching subscription hereby of none
 “ effect.” Now this reason, on which the *resolution* of the *judges*
 was chiefly founded, equally affects the *subscription* here pleaded
 for, and is equally strong against it. Wherefore it must be
 allowed that such subscription has been sufficiently *censured* and
condemned by our *laws*: and that all *wresting* or *straining* of the
 public forms to any *new* or foreign sense, *different* from what the
 Church *intended*, is not only against the very end and design of
 all laws made for the establishing consent and uniformity of doc-
 trine and worship, but has also been expressly prohibited by the
 ruling powers.

PLEA II.

“ If tradition or custom, if carelessness or mistake, either in
 “ the *compiler* or *receiver*, happen at any time to put a sense
 “ upon any human forms, different from that of the Scripture,
 “ which those very forms were intended to explain, and which
 “ is at the same time declared to be the only rule of truth ; it
 “ is evident no man can be bound to *understand* those forms in
 “ such sense ; nay, on the contrary, he is indispensably bound
 “ not to *understand* or *receive* them in such a sense.” *Clarke’s*
Introd. p. 21.

ANSWER.

This *plea* confounds two very distinct things ; the rule for
understanding, and the rule for *receiving* any forms. It should
 be proved that an Arian may not be obliged to *understand* the
 public forms in a sense contrary to what he calls *Scripture*, (or,
 what comes to the same, contrary to his own *hypothesis*;) but
 all that is really proved is this only ; that he is not obliged to
receive them in that sense, but obliged to the contrary ; that is,
 to reject them, and not subscribe at all. The argument, reduced
 to a syllogistical form, would stand thus :

No man ought to *receive* any human forms in a sense repugnant
 to what he thinks *Scripture*.

But the *obvious* and *intended* sense of our public forms is a
 sense repugnant to what some think *Scripture*.

Therefore such persons ought not to *receive* them in their *obvious, intended* sense : neither indeed so to *understand* them.

Any young logician will readily perceive that here is more in the *conclusion* than there is in the *premises* ; and that so much of the *conclusion* as is really just is entirely besides the question : containing nothing but what nobody doubts of ; viz. *that no man ought to subscribe against his conscience.*

PLEA III.

“The sense in which any human forms appear to a *man’s self* “ to be consistent with Scripture, and not the presumed meaning of the *compilers, (add, or imposers,)* is to be the rule and “ measure of his *understanding* them. This is both evident in “ reason, (because otherwise every human government makes a “ new rule of faith.) and is moreover, by all Protestants, agreed “ upon without controversy in practice.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

The Doctor appears to have been in confusion here, as much as in the preceding ; not distinguishing between the rule for *understanding* human forms, and the rule for *receiving*. We are first to consider what the true meaning and intent of the forms are : and this we are to judge of from the natural force of the words, and from the scope, drift, and design of the *compilers* or *imposers*. After this, we are to consider, by the *rule* of *Scripture*, whether we can *receive* them or no. If, upon such examination, it appears to us that the forms, according to the sense of the *imposers*, are agreeable to Scripture, we may safely subscribe ; if otherwise, we must not do it for the world. What can be plainer ?

As to the suggestion that, in this way, *every human government makes a new rule of faith* ; it is mere fancy and fiction. *Public determinations* (at least generally speaking) are more likely to keep close to the *rule of faith*, than *private conceits*. Scripture is still the same *rule of faith*, only under the prudent guard of *public explanations*, to obviate the wild uncertainty of *private expositions*. This is not paying more regard to *human forms* than to *Scripture* ; but more regard to some *human explications* than to other *human explications* ; more regard to a select number of *wise men* than to *conceited opiniators* : in a word, more regard to the most prudent and most effectual (though not *infallible*)

method of preserving the sacred truths, than to another, which is so far from being *infallible* for the preserving of the true faith, that it is rather the surest means to destroy it. All *Protestant* churches have took into this approved way of securing, as far as possible, the *true sense* of Scripture, by *public* and *authorized* expositions. And this is paying the tenderest and most religious regard to the *rule of faith*; there being no safer or better way than this is to preserve it. But enough in answer to a weak suggestion; which, if it proves any thing, proves the *unlawfulness* of *imposing* any forms; not the *lawfulness* of subscribing in a sense different from that of the *imposers*.

PLEA IV.

“ With respect to civil matters——there is lodged in every government a legislative power——neither can there in this case be any other rule by which to interpret the law, but only by discovering, from the obvious signification of words, what was in the whole the real sense and intent of the legislators. But now in ecclesiastical matters——the case is very different. The Church in matters of doctrine has no *legislative* power,” &c. *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 32.

ANSWER.

1. This is only amusement. What has *legislative power* to do in this question? If an *equal*, if an *inferior* proposes me any articles to subscribe, I may indeed refuse subscription, (and so I may when proposed by *superiors*;) but if I submit to *subscribe*, I must do it in the sense of him that *articles* or *covenants* with me; and according to the *plain, usual, and literal* sense of the words.

Besides, what shall we think of *oaths* imposed by an *usurper*? May I *swear* to any thing, only because he has no *legislative* power over me? Here will be a fair way opened for any prevarication in *state oaths*, as often as any one questions the legality of the powers that impose them.

2. To answer a little more directly; subscription is required by the *legislative* powers: and there is just the same reason for attending to the sense of the *imposers*, in the matter of *subscription*, as in any *civil oaths, tests, laws*, or the like: and every objection against the one is equally strong against the other also. The legislative powers in a Christian state are under the law of

right reason, and also under the *law of Christianity*. Now, what if the *civil oaths, laws, tests, &c.* be thought contrary either to the dictates of *reason*, or to the *law of Christ*, which the *lawgivers* pretend to follow and to conform to as their rule? Then, upon the principles of the subscribing Arians, any man may force and strain the *civil oaths, laws, tests, &c.* to his own *private* sense, contrary to the meaning of the ruling powers, in order to reconcile them to what he thinks *reason* or *Scripture*; that is, to his own principles, fancies, or conceits, whatever they be. The case is parallel in all circumstances affecting the present question; and the *plea* that is here used for the justifying a *fraudulent* subscription, with a very little change, will serve as well to justify a *fraudulent* taking of the *civil oaths* or *tests*; and so there will be an end of all trust or mutual confidence, so long as words are capable of being wrested or tortured into more senses than one.

PLEA V.

“ Every man that (for the sake of peace and order) *assents to*, or *makes use of*, any such forms of human appointment, is obliged to *reconcile* them with what appears to him to be the doctrine of *Scripture*, and take care to *understand* them in such a sense only as is *consistent* with that doctrine: otherwise he parts with his *Christianity* for the sake of a civil and political religion.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 33.

ANSWER.

1. The same *plea* may serve for Papists, and persons disaffected to the government, whenever (for the sake of *peace* and *order*) they may be disposed fraudulently to take the oaths of *allegiance* and *supremacy* and *abjuration*. Those *oaths*, indeed, in their *literal* and *intended* sense, are directly repugnant to their sense of *Scripture*. But they are to take care to *understand* them in *such a sense only* as is consistent with their doctrines; otherwise, they part with *their Christianity* for the sake of a *civil* and *political religion*.

2. More directly I answer, secondly, that if any human forms, in their *obvious* and *intended* sense, appear not consistent with what some call *Scripture*; such persons ought not, for the sake of *peace* and *order*, neither yet for the sake of a *benefice* or *dignity*, nor for any consideration whatever, to *assent* to such forms.

Nay, they are indispensably bound to refuse *assent* or *subscription* to such *forms*; otherwise they part with their *Christianity* for the sake of the *mammon* of this world; or, at best, for the sake of *peace* and *order*; which is "doing evil that good may 'come,'" and is an abominable practice in the sight of God and man.

PLEA VI.

"Bishop Pearson saith, 'that whatever is delivered in the Creed, we therefore believe, because it is contained in the Scriptures; and consequently must so believe it as it is contained there: whence all this Exposition of the whole is nothing else but an illustration and proof of every particular part of the Creed by such Scriptures as deliver the same, according to the true interpretation of them.'" *Exposition on the Creed*, p. 227.

"And the whole Church of England has made the like declaration, in the sixth, the twentieth, and twenty-first of the XXXIX Articles, before cited; and in the *eighth* Article, which declares that the Creeds ought to be received and believed, because (and consequently only *in such sense wherein*) *they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture.*" *Clarke's Introduct.*

ANSWER.

1. What Bishop Pearson has there said relates to the article of Christ's *descent into hell*; the sense of which is left indefinite and undetermined by our Church; and therefore this is not pertinent to the point in hand. To let us see how far that good and great Bishop was from countenancing any thing like what the Doctor pleads for, I may transcribe one paragraph from the preceding page, p. 226. "Wherefore being our *Church* hath *not* now *imposed* that interpretation of St. Peter's words, which before it intimated, being it hath not declared that as the only place of Scripture to found the *descent into hell* upon; being it hath alleged no other place to ground it, and delivered no other explication to expound it; we may with the greater liberty pass on, find out the true meaning of this article, and to give our particular judgment in it." Had the Bishop foreseen what ill use might possibly be made of his other words, he could not have guarded more particularly

against it than he has here done. Wherefore it was very peculiar to cite him in favour of such a *subscription*, or such a *latitude*, as he would have utterly abhorred and detested.

2. As to the doctrine of the Church of England in her 6th, 8th, 20th, and 21st Articles, it is no more than this; that *nothing is to be received but what is agreeable to Scripture*. And for this very reason she requires subscription in her *own* sense, because she judges no other sense to be *agreeable to Scripture*. If any judge otherwise, let them not *subscribe*. It is but shallow artifice of the pleaders for a *fraudulent* subscription, constantly to call their *interpretations* of Scripture, *Scripture*; and from thence to infer that the Church requires or permits subscription in *their* sense. The Church surely has as good a right to call her *interpretations* by the name of *Scripture*; and then her requiring subscription to *that only which is agreeable to Scripture*, is requiring subscription in her *own* sense of Scripture, and none else. Let the Arian sense of Scripture be *Scripture* to Arians; but then let them subscribe only to Arian *expositions*; which are nothing akin to those of our *Church*.

PLEA VII.

“When in the *public forms* there be (as there generally are) expressions which, at first sight, look different ways; it cannot be but men must be allowed to interpret what is *obscure* by that which seems to them more *plain* and *scriptural*.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 33.

ANSWER.

What a fanciful representation is here of our *public forms*; as if they, either at *first sight*, or *at all*, looked towards *Arianism*; when the very strongest words which the wit of man can devise to exclude it occur every where in our *public forms*. And it is so far from being *obscure* whether the *compilers* and *imposers* intended to exclude it, and to profess the Catholic doctrine up to the height, that it is demonstration they did *intend* it. This *plea* therefore has nothing to rest upon but a *misrepresentation of fact*.

If the meaning be, that the doctrines taught by our Church are *obscure*, that is, *mysterious*, and therefore they may claim a liberty of explaining them away into what appears to them more *plain* and *scriptural*; I say, if that be the meaning of the

plea, then it comes to this ; that whenever any church imposes the belief of *mysteries*, a subscriber may honestly substitute what he pleases instead of the *mystery* ; or may make no *mystery* of it, by reducing it (contrary to the *intention* and *meaning* of the *imposers*) to something appearing to himself more *plain* and *scriptural*. Upon this foot it will be impossible for any church ever to secure the profession of any *mysterious* doctrine against secret meanings and subtle evasions : but men may subscribe to as many *mysteries* as they please, and still believe *none* of them.

PLEA VIII.

“ In the doctrine of the Trinity, I have no way certainly “ to inform myself what is the sense of the Church. The words “ of the *first Article* are *capable* of at least *four* senses ; and “ each of these senses is defended by learned divines of the “ Church.—The *four* senses I mean are these :

“ 1. That which makes the three Persons to be only *three* “ *modes* of one mind ; which I call *Sabellianism*.

“ 2. That which makes the three Persons to be something more “ than three modes of one mind, and yet *not three minds* : i. e. “ makes them to be *media* between *entia*, and *non-entia*, some- “ thing and nothing ; which I call *nonsense*.

“ 3. That which makes the three Persons to be *three equal* “ *minds* : which I call *Tritheism*.

“ 4. That which makes them to be *unequal minds*, one inde- “ pendent and existing of itself, the other two deriving their “ existence from the first :” (which the author should have called *Arianism*.) *Essay on Imposit.* p. 42, 43.

ANSWER.

This writer goes roundly to work ; and gives us a specimen both of his *profound* sense and his *modesty*. He first throws dust upon the *Article*, and then complains that it is *dark* and *confused*. The *Article* is really capable of but *one sense* ; and that sense none of the *four*, as he has represented them.

It is not *capable* of the *first* pretended *sense*. There is not a word of *three modes* either in the *Article*, or any where else in our *public forms*. The notion is neither *expressed* nor *implied* in the *Article* ; and therefore cannot be the sense of it : nay, the notion is a contradiction to the very words of the *Article*.

Mode, mode, and mode, will never amount to *substance*: but the Article plainly makes every *Person* to be *substance*, as invested with *power* and *eternity*, and as being of *one substance* with the other two Persons, and making therewith *one living and true God*.

The *second sense*, when rightly understood, is the true sense of the Article; but not as it lies under the ridiculous representation which this writer has made of it. The *sense* in it is the *Article's*, the *nonsense* is his *own*. The Article says not a word of a *medium* between *something* and *nothing*: but that the three Persons are neither *three modes* nor *three minds*, is indeed plain enough from the Article. Neither is there any *nonsense*, but a great deal both of *sense* and *truth*, in saying, that every Person is *substance*, and yet they are not *three substances*; every Person *mind*, and yet not *three minds*; every Person *God*, and yet not three Gods. The *union* is too close and intimate to admit of the *plural* expressions of *minds*, *substances*, *Gods*; which can belong only to *separate* Persons: three Persons so *united* as these are supposed to be are *one substance*, *one mind*, *one being*, *one God*; and that in a very just and proper sense.

As to the third and fourth senses of *three minds* equal and unequal, which would imply *three substances*, the Article excludes them both; by making the three Persons *one substance* and *one God*. Upon the whole, it appears that the *first Article* is not *capable* of more senses than *one*: and yet if it were capable of *many* senses, unless the Arian sense were one of those *many*, this gentleman and his brethren could not, honestly and fairly, subscribe.

PLEA IX.

“ Unless this liberty be allowed, nobody can subscribe the
 “ Articles, Creeds, and Liturgy of the Church of England at
 “ all. There are several things in these forms which, if taken in
 “ the most *obvious* sense, contradict one another: and therefore
 “ *some* of them must be understood in a sense which is not the
 “ *obvious* one. In the doctrine of the Trinity, it is plain from
 “ Dr. Clarke’s Collection, chap. i. of the third part of his Scrip-
 “ ture Doctrine, that there are a great number of passages in
 “ the Liturgy which in the *obvious* sense make for his opinion:
 “ and therefore must by those who are of a different opinion be

“ understood in a sense which is not the *obvious* one.” *Essay on Impos.* p. 43.

“ I am sure it is no more a putting of violence upon the expressions cited in chap. ii. of the third part, to make them consistent with Scripture, and with the expressions of the Liturgy cited in chap. i. than it is, on the contrary, a putting of violence upon the Scripture and upon the expressions cited in chap. i. to make them consistent with the expressions cited in chap. ii.” *Clarke's Introduct.*

ANSWER.

We here meet with the utmost confidence in affirming a matter of fact, which every man's eyes and common sense may immediately discover to be *false*. The sum of the *plea* is, that there are many expressions in our *public forms*, which in their *obvious* sense contradict the *received* doctrine of the Trinity: and that those called *orthodox* must put as much *violence* upon one kind of expressions to reconcile them to their scheme, as the Arians must put upon others to reconcile them to theirs. The expressions which are supposed in their *obvious* sense to thwart the *received* doctrine are such wherein the Father is eminently styled *God*, and sometimes *only God*, or such as intimate a *subordination* of two Persons to one.

Now the question will be, what sense of those passages has the best right and title to be called the *obvious* sense? Is it not that sense which has been in use and approved, in this *mystery*, for sixteen hundred years? Is it not that sense which was anciently taught and inculcated before baptism; *that* which all the churches in Christendom receive and approve; *that* which the *compilers* and *imposers* of our forms *certainly* intended; *that* which is so well known and has so long passed current, that nobody almost can mistake it; *that* which the words will not only *bear*, (as may be shewn from innumerable instances in approved authors,) but which they really *require*, when considered together with what goes before or after them, or with other passages in our public forms? Is not *that* to be looked upon as the *obvious* sense of those passages, rather than another of *yesterday*. never before owned by our clergy or people, never suspected to be contained in our *forms*, never *subscribed* to till very lately; a *new, strange, unheard of* sense, (so far as concerns

our *public forms*.) and such as, if admitted, must make our *forms* nothing else but a confused heap and jumble of the most irreconcilable contradictions? These things considered, I must insist upon it, that the only *obvious* sense of those passages is the *received* prevailing sense of them: it being *obvious* to every man of common understanding, that *that*, and *that only*, was ever *intended* by our Church, or received by our *clergy*; or understood to be their *true sense* by *Papist* or *Protestant*, *Dissenter* or *Churchman*, *native* or *foreigner*, from the year 1552 to the year 1712.

Our *public forms* have been well known to all the churches abroad, to all the learned in Europe. What man ever suspected, till now, that they were tainted with *Arianism*, or but looked that way? There is no need of putting *violence* upon any one passage to reconcile it to the *received* doctrine: all is easy and consistent throughout, formed entirely upon Catholic principles. Sometimes the Father is styled *only God*, oftener all *three*: sometimes two of the Persons are introduced in a subordination of *order* to the first; at other times their perfect equality of *nature* is as fully and clearly professed. No one that has been tolerably instructed can be at a loss for the meaning of these things. But as to the *violence* used by the Arian party in torturing our Creeds and Liturgy; it is such, I believe, as was never before practised with any words whatever. The old Arians would have detested such practices: the *ὁμοούσιον* alone was such a stumblingblock to them, that very few could get over it; and they would never insert it in their Creeds. And yet they were artists in their way; and had carried the mystery of *equivocation* and *chicane* far beyond any thing that had been known in the Church in the ages before them. As to the *violence* which those gentlemen are forced to use with our Church's forms, it will appear more fully in the sequel. At present, I shall content myself with two observations, which may help to give the reader a just idea of the difference between the *orthodox* and them in this particular.

1. The first is, that what the *orthodox* subscribe to, in respect of the Trinity, is no more than what all Catholics, even the most zealous opposers of the Arians, were ever ready to profess, and in the same terms as we do. But (as I have already hinted) what our modern *Arians* subscribe, is what the ancient Arians would never have admitted. They abhorred the very name and

thing of *consubstantiality, coequality, coeternity*; *one Godhead in three Persons*, or the like, which are all plainly laid down in our public forms. From hence it is manifest that the *violence* we are charged with would never have been thought any by our predecessors on the Catholic side: but the *violence* which we charge the Arians with is such as *their* predecessors would have allowed to be such.

2. Another observation is, that what the *orthodox* clergy *subscribe* to, they are ready also to profess from the press, or the pulpit, or in common discourse, which are all of a piece with their *subscription*; at least, generally speaking. They scruple not in sermons, in writings, in discourse, to give the title of *God* eminently, or of *only God*, to the Father: nor to admit of such expressions as imply a *subordination* of order in the sacred Trinity. But the Arians, on the contrary, never use any expressions like to some which they subscribe to. They will never say from the *press*, or from the *pulpit*, or in common conversation that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are *one God*; that they are *coequal, coeternal, &c.* They allow of these expressions as often as they *subscribe*; but never else. They understand what such words mean in any other place but in our *public forms*; and they do not think they can *conscientiously* make use of them at other times, however *conscientiously* they may subscribe to them. Should any man of them, in a treatise or sermon, throw out any such shocking assertions, (*shocking*, I mean, to them,) he would be looked upon as a *deserter* by the party; and a *betrayed* of the cause which he had undertaken to defend. But if he *subscribes* to them, and solemnly gives his *unfeigned assent* and *consent* thereto; this, it seems, and this only, is harmless and inoffensive.

I shall confirm what I have said by a remarkable instance. Dr. Clarke did but once declare, in a paper laid before the Bishops, that "the Son of God was eternally begotten by the "eternal incomprehensible power and will of the Father;" (an expression nothing near so strong for a *coeternity* as forty others which he has subscribed to,) and his Arian friends could not bear it^e. It occasioned a *real* and *sensible grief* amongst them. They looked upon it as *giving up* the cause, in a manner, and made broad hints of his being led by *corrupt nature* into a very

^e See Apology for Dr. Clarke, p. 49, &c.

culpable prevarication. See how easily those gentlemen can understand the force of words any where else but in our *forms*; and how carefully they guard against the *use* of such expressions, as they scruple not however to *subscribe* to. Let any man compare this conduct of the *Arians* with that of the *orthodox*; and he will plainly see that the *former* are themselves *conscious* of the *violence* they put upon the *Church's forms*; while the latter are not conscious of any *violence*, on their side, at all.

PLEA X.

“ By an induction of particular passages there are 186
 “ places wherein our *public forms* are clearly on his (Dr. Clarke's)
 “ side; and 27 only which *seem* to differ from him. Must not
 “ then the *smaller* number be reconciled to the *greater*? Or,
 “ on the contrary, must the lesser number, and the more *modern*
 “ phrases, be the standard of doctrine, and the rule of inter-
 “ preting the more *ancient* phrases, and the *larger* number?”
Modest Plea, p. 120.

ANSWER.

This is *pleasant* and *pretty*. Of the 186 pretended places, there is not one either *clearly* or *at all* on the Doctor's side, as to the *points of difference* between him and us. They are passages which may indeed be used by Arians (and so may they by Catholics) consistently with their principles. They are *capable* of different views, according to what they happen to be joined with. But as they stand in our *forms*, in company with other passages *express* and *full* for the Catholic doctrine, they can reasonably bear no other but the Catholic meaning. I think it not material to inquire into the truth and justice of this writer's calculation, founded only upon Dr. Clarke's arbitrary disposition of his *sections* or *paragraphs*; sometimes making one sentence a *distinct passage*, sometimes crowding many into one; and sometimes only *referring* to passages omitted. Let the number be as 186 to 27; those 27 do not only *seem*, but *are* directly opposite to the Doctor's principles, according to the *plain*, *literal*, and *natural* force of words, as well as the *known* sense of the *imposers*. The question then justly stated lies thus: Whether 186 passages which might (if the *compilers* and *imposers* had not *intended* them in a Catholic *sense*) have been indifferently claimed by either Catholic or Arian, should yield to 27, which are

utterly repugnant to *Arianism*, or the 27 to them. That is, whether those that can bear but *one* of the senses should yield to those that may fairly admit of either; or the contrary. Imagine 186 men to be *indifferent*, or but nearly indifferent, in any point of dispute; and 27 *resolute* on one side. Which is the way to reconcile them, and unite them all in one verdict? Is it to drag over the 27 by force of arms to what they are irreconcilably averse to? Or is it not rather to bring over the 186 to the 27, to whom they have little or no aversion, and to whose side they are no way disinclined? This latter, I think, is the proper and only method to promote harmony and concord in the whole. The *application* I trust with the ingenious; and here take my leave of this fanciful reasoning of the *Modest Pleader*.

PLEA XI.

“The Article in the Apostles’ Creed concerning Christ’s *descent into hell*, is now universally understood in a sense “probably different from what the *composers* of the Creed “intended.” *Clark’s Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

How Christ’s *descent into hell* was understood by the *composers* of the Creed is *uncertain*: neither is it certain that it is *universally* understood in any one sense. However that be, one thing is *certain*, that our Church has left that *Article* at large, intending a *latitude*; and indulging a *liberty* to subscribers to abound in their own sense. This is not the case of the *Articles* relating to the Trinity. Their sense is *fixed*, and bound upon the conscience of every subscriber by the *plain, natural* signification of the words: and by the *known intent* of the *compilers* and *imposers*. If it be asked from whence we are to learn what was the *intent* of the *imposers*, or how it may be *known*; I answer, first, from plain words; and next, from history and observation, in the like manner as the *intent* and *scope* of any writer is to be known.

PLEA XII.

“The *damnatory* clauses in the Athanasian Creed are now by “very few understood in that sense which, in all probability,

“ the *compiler* of it in that very dark and ignorant age designed “ to express.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

1. That the Athanasian Creed (so called) was composed in a “ very dark and ignorant age,” is more than the Doctor *knows*; and therefore should not be so positively affirmed by him. The Creed, however, has no signs or tokens of *darkness* or *ignorance*; but of great *accuracy* and *solid judgment*: and is the best exposition (for its compass) of the doctrines of the *Trinity* and *incarnation*, that we shall any where meet with.

2. Another thing which the Doctor affirms without *knowing* is, that “ few understand the *damnatory* clauses in the sense of “ the compiler.” Let any man shew what sense it is most reasonable to understand them in; and the same reasons (if *good*) shall serve to shew that that was the sense of the *compiler*. I know many have strained the *damnatory* clauses to an unreasonable rigour, on purpose to disparage the *Creed*: but they have not been able to prove that the *compiler* so intended it.

3. The *compiler’s* sense being doubtful, and the *imposers* having left those *clauses* without any exposition; the *subscriber* is at liberty to understand them in such sense as the words will bear; and such as best answers the main intent and design of that *Creed*; and is most agreeable to Scripture and reason. This instance is nothing parallel to the case of the Articles concerning the *Trinity*; whose sense is *fixed* and *certain*, as before said. Fix, in like manner, the sense of the *damnatory* clauses; and it shall soon be proved that every *subscriber* ought to acquiesce in it.

PLEA XIII.

“ The *procession* of the *Holy Ghost* set forth in the Nicene and “ Athanasian Creeds, in one sense, is by Mr. (*now* Dr.) Bennet, “ in his explication of his own sense concerning that point, shewn “ to be now understood *by many* (without any suspicion of insin- “ cerity) in a different sense.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 34.

ANSWER.

1. This is only *argumentum ad hominem*, (to make the most of it,) and therefore is not sufficient.

2. The argument comes not up to the point in hand. Dr.

Bennet was of opinion that our Church had determined nothing in this matter; otherwise he would not presume to interpret the *procession* in his own way. His words are; "If our Church had any where determined this matter, and declared in what sense she understood the *procession* in the Athanasian Creed, the case would be altered^f." And again: "Our Church never once adds the epithet *eternal* to the word *procession*; nor has she any one passage, that I know of, which may not be as well understood of the temporal as of the eternal procession, either in her Liturgy, her Articles, or her Homilies^g." I am not of Dr. Bennet's mind in this particular; believing that the Church has *determined* the meaning of the *procession* in those Creeds; or rather, that the meaning is so plain, all things considered, as not to need any further determining. However, it appears to be Dr. Bennet's principle, relating to *subscription*, that where the Church's sense may be known, that sense must be received; and that there is, in such a case, no latitude or liberty left to the *subscriber*. Upon this principle, he both does and must condemn Arian *subscription*; since both the *plain meaning* of words and the *intent* of *compilers* and *imposers* exclude *Arianism*. And it is well known with what zeal and earnestness Dr. Bennet remonstrates^h against that *collusion* which he takes Dr. Clarke and his partizans to be guilty of in the matter of *subscription*.

PLEA XIV.

"The doctrines of *predestination* and *original sin* are at this day, by all eminent divines, (after the example of Archbishop Laud, and of the learned Bishop Bull,) understood in a sense which there is no appearance the *composers* of the XXXIX Articles meant to teach; and which there is all appearance the *composers* of the *Homilies* intended should not be taught." *Clarke's Reply*, p. 34.

"I cannot condemn Archbishop Laud, Bishop Bull, and others, who departed manifestly from the received *sense*, not of *one*, but of *several* Articles; nor that *Declaration* of King James I. (*read* Charles I.) by which he openly patronized the subscribing the same Articles in *several*, not only *different*, but *contradictory* senses: and in effect declared it for the *honour*

^f Page 292.

^g Page 293.

^h Bennet on the Trinity, p. 226.

“ of the *Articles* that this should be so ; and that all should “ acquiesce in it without mutual reproaches.” *Lord Bishop of Bangor, Postscript*, p. 259.

ANSWER.

1. It hath often been pretended by the Calvinists that the *compilers* and *imposers* of the *Articles* &c. intended a sense different (with respect to *predestination* and *original sin*) from that which now generally prevails. But this pretence has been often and abundantly confuted by great men ; and particularly by the learned Bishop Bull, in his *Apology* against Dr. Tully : where he has unanswerably vindicated the present doctrines from the *Articles*, *Liturgy*, *Catechism*, and *Homilies* of the Church of Englandⁱ.

2. A distinction should be made between such *Articles* as, being formed in *general* terms, leave a latitude for private opinions ; and such as, being otherwise formed, leave no such latitude. It is ridiculous to pretend that, because *some* articles are *general* or *indefinite*, and may admit of different explications, therefore *all* may, allowing that either Calvinist or Arminian may subscribe to the *Articles*, (the *Articles* being *general*, and the main points in dispute left undetermined,) would it not be weak to argue from thence, that both Papists and Protestants may likewise subscribe to the *Articles* of the Church of England ? Now it is no less absurd to pretend that both Catholics and Arians may subscribe to our *forms* ; some articles being as *full* and *strong tests* against *Arianism*, as others are against *Popery*.

3. It is not *fairly*, because not *truly*, suggested, that when men of different sentiments, as to *particular* explications, subscribe to the same *general* words, that they subscribe in *contradictory*, or even in *different* senses. Both subscribe to the same *general* proposition, and both in the *same sense* ; only they differ in the *particulars* relating to it : which is not *differing* (at least, it need not be) about the *sense* of the *Article*, but about *particulars* not contained in the *Article*. For instance : let two persons assent to a *general* proposition, *This figure is a triangle* ; one believing the *triangle* to be *equilateral*, the other believing its *sides to be unequal* : they are directly opposite in their senti-

ⁱ See also Dr. Bennet on the 17th Article. Directions for studying, &c. p. 93, &c.

ments, as to what kind of *triangle* it is: but in the *general* proposition, that *the figure is a triangle*, both agree, and in the *same sense*.

In like manner, imagine the article of *Predestination* (and the same may be said of any other in like circumstances) to be left in *general* terms. Both sides may *subscribe* to the same *general* proposition, and both in the *same sense*: which sense reaches not to the *particulars* in dispute. And if one believes predestination to be *absolute*, and the other *conditionate*; this is not (on the present supposition) differing about the *sense* of the *Article*, but in their respective *additions* to it.

4. It is very uncautiously and unaccurately said, that King Charles I. patronized the subscribing the same Articles either in *contradictory* or *different* senses. His order is, that every subscriber *submit* to the Article in the "plain and full meaning thereof," in the "literal and grammatical sense." What! is the *plain and full meaning* more than *one* meaning? or is the *one plain and full meaning* two *contradictory* meanings? Could it be for the *honour* of the *Article* (or of the King) to say this? No: but the royal Declaration, by "plain and full meaning," understands the *general* meaning, which is but *one*; and to which all might reasonably *subscribe*. And he forbids any one's "putting his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the Article," or to "affix any new sense" to it: that is, he forbids the changing a *general* proposition into a *particular*; he stands up for the *general proposition*, or for the *Article* itself; and prohibits *particular* meanings, as not belonging to the Article; nor being properly *explications* of it, but *additions* to it. This is the plain import of the *royal Declaration*: and it is both wise and just; free from any of those strange consequences or inferences which some would draw from it.

5. I must further remark, that the present instance has no relation to the point in hand. The propositions concerning the holy Trinity, contained in our *public forms*, are not *general* or *indefinite*, but *special* and *determinate*, in the very points of difference between Catholics and Arians, (consubstantiality, coequality, coeternity, &c.) and that in as clear and strong words as any can be devised. This is the reason why the *subscriber* has no latitude left in this case; and why an Arian can claim no benefit from any *latitude* allowable in other Articles where circumstances are plainly different. And it must be thought a

very peculiar way of reasoning to argue that, because a man may take a liberty where the *Church* and *State* have *allowed* it, therefore he may take the same liberty where they have *not allowed* it: which is all that this *plea* amounts to.

I cannot but observe from the disputes and clamours that have been raised about the 17th Article of our Church, what a tender regard has all along been paid to the point of the *subscription*; and how jealous men have been of any the least *appearance*, or *umbrage* of *prevarication*, in so serious and sacred a thing. What then must be said of those who plead for a *plain, open* prevarication, in a case which can admit of no dispute with any considering man. and has hardly so much as a *colour* left for it?

PLEA XV.

“ That Article in the Nicene Creed (*of one substance with the Father*) is now (through the ambiguity of the Latin and English translation) by most men taken much otherwise than the Council intended it. For the greater part of modern Christians (if we may judge by the writings of eminent divines) understand it (as if it had been *ἑνθεός*) to signify *of one individual substance with the Father*, whereas all learned men know that the Greek word (*ὁμοούσιος*) never had any such signification, and that the Council meant no such thing.”
Clarke’s Reply, p. 35.

ANSWER.

Here is little more in this *plea* than a cavil upon the *double* meaning of the word *individual*; which has been sufficiently exposed in another place. It has also been shewn that the doctrine of the Nicene Council is rightly enough understood by *modern Christians*; and that while the Doctor so magisterially censures the whole Christian world, in a manner, yet no one ever understood this matter less, or talked more crudely of it than the Doctor himself hath done, in this very page of his Reply. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 544. and Reply to Dr. Whitby, p. 203, &c. of this volume.

PLEA XVI.

“ It becomes a sincere man (especially if he varies from notions commonly received) to *declare plainly* in what sense

“ he understands any words of human institution ; that his “ *inferiors* and *equals* may not be imposed upon by him, and “ that his *superiors* may judge of such *declaration*.” *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 33.

“ Dr. Clarke, of all men, could least be charged with *collusion*, “ because he has *declared publicly* his opinions in this matter.” *Modest Plea*, p. 221.

ANSWER.

I have reserved this *plea* to the last, as being of a very different kind from the rest, and withal carrying a more plausible show of frankness and sincerity in it. Nevertheless, this, though it has an appearance of fairness, will by no means serve the purpose for which it is brought.

Suppose any disaffected persons in this kingdom should invent some strange, forced, unheard of interpretation of the *civil oaths*, to *elude* and *frustrate* the intent of them ; and *declare* in print, that they themselves take the *oaths* in this *new* sense, advising their brethren to do the same ; would such *declaration* be sufficient to salve their *honesty*, or to make them *righteous* in the sight of *God* or *man* ? would they not be rather thought the more notoriously wicked, as not only venturing upon *perjury* themselves, but instructing and seducing others into the same crime ?

Their giving notice of the *prevarication* would not be acquitting themselves of the guilt, but *proclaiming* it ; and, in some respects, *increasing* it : as it would not only be doing an *ill thing*, but, what is worse, boasting of it, and teaching others to do the like. One dishonest act, or more, are not so dangerous or pernicious, as the laying down principles, and contriving *subtilties* and artificial *evasions*, whereby to undermine the very foundations of moral honesty.

I am not sensible that there is difference enough between this and the other case, to make one *innocent* and the other highly *criminal*. Nothing can be pleaded for it but the *presumed consent* of the *superiors*, after *declaration* made. But that no such *presumed consent* can have any place in the matter of *subscription*, may appear from the reasons following :

1. Because *superiors* may often connive at, or tolerate *offences* : which are never the less *offences* for such *connivance*.

2. Because so long as our *superiors* continue the same *forms*,

which clearly express such a sense, they must be presumed to *intend the same sense*, till they *declare* otherwise. And their permitting the same *forms* to stand is a much surer argument of their still *intending* the same thing, than their suffering an offender to escape, with impunity, can be of the contrary.

3. The expressions of our *Articles, Liturgies, Creeds, and Laws*, are all so *plain and full* for the *received doctrine of the Trinity*, and against the *new scheme*, that a man must have a very mean opinion either of the *understanding or integrity* of his *superiors*, to suppose that they can ever *allow* him to trifle at such a rate in so serious a matter as *subscription*. And it must be observed that our *superiors* speak by the *public forms*, as much as the *legislature* speaks by the *public laws*: and no sense can be *their sense* but the *plain, usual, literal* meaning of those *public forms*; till some as *public* and as *authentic* declaration alters the case.

If the *subscription* contended for be in itself *fraudulent*, as elusive of the *law*, a man's declaring, or giving notice of it, does not alter its nature, or make it *legal*. Suppose a man should *declare* that he subscribes only *so far as is agreeable to Scripture*; (a method disallowed by our *laws*, according to the unanimous resolution of all the *judges*, as before observed :) such *declaration* would never alter the nature of the *subscription*; but it would be as much against *law* as ever, notwithstanding: and, for that very reason, it would be unrighteous and dishonest. But I have also observed, that subscribing in any sense contrary to the *plain force* of words, and *known meaning* of the *imposers*, is equally *illegal* with the other: and therefore neither can this be justified any more than the other. And since whatever is *illegal* is of course condemned by our *superiors*, who speak by the *public laws*, it is evident that our *superiors* condemn this kind of subscription; and consequently there is no pretence left for a *presumed consent*, unless our *superiors* can be presumed both to *allow* and *condemn* the very same thing at the same time.

4. I must add, that our *superiors* have, from time to time, (as there has been occasion,) sufficiently testified their disallowance of any attempts tending to undermine the Catholic *received doctrine* of the ever blessed Trinity. His present Majesty's *Directions*, at this very juncture, are yet fresh in our minds:

where (to the general joy and satisfaction of the kingdom) he has signified his just resentments against those "impious tenets and doctrines which have been of late advanced and maintained with much boldness and openness, contrary to the great and fundamental truths of the Christian religion, and particularly to the doctrine of the holy and ever blessed TRINITY." And his royal command is, that "no preacher presume to deliver any other doctrine—concerning the blessed TRINITY, than what is contained in the holy Scriptures, and is agreeable to the three Creeds, and the XXXIX Articles of religion." Now the 8th Article of our Church expressly affirms that the "three Creeds may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture." Whosoever therefore gives it out for *Scripture doctrine*, that "the one God always signifies the Father;" or that "more Persons than one cannot be, or are not, one God;" or that "God with any high epithet always signifies the Father:" or that "the Son or Holy Ghost is not God, Lord, Almighty, eternal, uncreated, and incomprehensible, as much as the Father;" I say, whoever pretends *Scripture* for these, or the like positions, (positions plainly repugnant to the Athanasian Creed, which Creed may be proved from Scripture, according to Article the 8th,) does at the same time act in opposition to his *superiors*, who have enjoined the observance of the *Creeds* and *Articles*. If it be said that such general *orders* or *directions* of *superiors* reach not to this particular case, as not containing any *formal prohibition* of those *newly-devised* senses put upon the *Creeds* and *Articles*; I answer, that there is no more occasion for a formal prohibition against perverting the *plain* sense of the *Creeds* or *Articles*, than there is for the like prohibition against perverting the sense of the *civil oaths*. All that have common understanding are supposed to know, that directing us to adhere to the *Creeds* and *Articles*, is directing us to adhere to their *true sense*, that being always *implied*. To pervert their true and certain sense, is not *adhering* to our Church's forms, but *contradicting* them: which, though it be done in an *insidious* way, and under the false name of explaining them; yet, in reality, means the same thing as the most direct and formal *opposition* to them. And however the disguise may be serviceable in the eyes of men, yet *conscience* is not a thing to be played with in that manner: neither will such vain pretences avail any

thing in the sight of God. Subscribing in this method is really nothing else but *eluding* the whole design of the *laws*, and imposing upon the *ruling powers*: but it must be doubly rude and absurd, at the same time, to *presume*, that any man can have their *consent* for it. So much for this.

I have now run through all the *pleas*, *pretences*, or *excuses* (*arguments* I will not call them) that I could any where meet with for the *new* method of subscribing. The reader is not to wonder at the *number* of them, which is an argument only of a *bad* cause. Had there been any *good reason* whereon to found it, there had been no need of running out into such multiplicity. But when men have once left the *plain* and *true* way to follow their own wanderings, *invention* is fruitful; and it is very easy always to have a great deal to say, after a man is gone beyond the rule of *speaking to the purpose*. I believe, I may now venture to affirm that the cause which those gentlemen have taken in hand is one of the weakest that was ever undertaken by wise men. False facts, groundless surmises, and inconclusive reasonings, are all that it has to subsist upon. And yet I have hitherto allowed them, for argument sake, one *supposition*; namely, that the expressions in our forms are *capable* of a sense consistent with their principles: and I have shewn, notwithstanding, that their subscription is *fraudulent*; because repugnant to the more *plain* and *obvious* sense of the words, and the *known* intention of the *imposers*. But I must now examine the truth of that *supposition* which has been thus far allowed them: and if that also proves weak and groundless; there will then be nothing of colour or pretence left for that subscription; but the very men themselves who either use it or plead for it, must be *self-condemned*. I shall therefore next examine how that case stands; not that I need put the issue of the cause upon it, (for it is a clear point that the subscription pleaded for is *unjustifiable*, though I allowed them the present supposition,) but *ex abundanti*, and to shew how miserably weak, and destitute of all support, the opposite persuasion is, I may inquire whether even this their last refuge may not be taken from them.

CHAP. V.

That several expressions in our public forms are really not capable of a sense consistent with the Arian hypothesis, or new scheme.

IT must be owned that words are *arbitrary* signs of things; and so, in some sense, it may be said that the word *white* is capable of signifying *black*, and the word *light* might signify *darkness*, if the custom of speech had not otherwise determined. I suppose, those gentlemen will not extend their notion, of words being *capable* of their sense, thus far. They must have regard to *custom of speech*, to *use of language*, to common rules of *grammar* and *criticism*, in determining whether words be *capable* of such a sense or no. And whatever *forms* are *capable* of that sense which is contended for, must be conceived capable of being *paraphrased* into that same sense, by putting other equivalent words into their place. By these rules and measures I shall proceed in the inquiry, whether the expressions of our *public forms* are *capable* of an Arian sense or no. Dr. Clarke has reduced the number of those which we chiefly insist on to 27. I shall single out some of them, following the order wherein they lie, in the first edition of "Scripture Doctrine," together with Dr. Clarke's interpretation of them. I shall begin with the Athanasian Creed :

"Whosoever will be saved; before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith.

"Which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled; without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.

"And the Catholic faith is this, &c.

"He therefore that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity.

"This is the Catholic faith; which except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved."

These are what they call *damnatory* clauses: and it ought to be matter of serious inquiry, in *what sense* the gentlemen of the Arian persuasion can subscribe them, without subscribing their own *damnation*. The very lowest sense and import of those *damnatory* clauses has ever been conceived to intend thus much, that the *main doctrine* of the *Trinity and incarnation*, the doctrine of worshipping *one God in three Persons*, and *three Persons*

in one God; and the doctrine of *perfect God* and *perfect man*, united in one *God-man*, are necessarily to be *believed* (or however *not disbelieved*) by all persons of years and discretion, (who have had the opportunity of being duly instructed,) under peril of eternal damnation. As the author of the Creed could not intend less than this, so neither can the words themselves import less. And yet there is just reason to question whether the advocates for the *new scheme* think it necessary to *worship* God the Son or God the Holy Ghost at all; it being a principle much contended for amongst them, to *direct their prayers uniformly to God the Father*; ^k meaning, I suppose, to *him*, and to *him only*: and it is certain that they neither believe *three Persons* to be *one God*; nor *perfect God* (in the sense of the Creed) to be united personally with perfect man to make one *God-man*. Dr. Clarke, in his Comments, takes a great deal of pains to prove that *particular explications* of all or any part of the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be *necessary* to salvation. This proceeding of his would be right, if he had been teaching his followers to subscribe with this reserve, viz. *so far as is agreeable to what they think Scripture*: but since they are to subscribe in *some sense* whereof the words are *capable*, as well as agreeably to Scripture, his pains would have been better employed in shewing how the *damnatory* clauses can be *capable* of a lower sense than that which has been given.

“We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.” Here it is to be noted, that Dr. Clarke and his adherents always by *one God* understand God the Father only: and will never allow *two Persons* in *one God*, though the words of the Creed plainly include *three*. Let us see then how these words must be paraphrased, to make them consistent with their principles. It is thus:

“We worship one God (the Father) in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: and we worship Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in one God the Father. That is, by referring all the worship to the Father ultimately, as to the one supreme Head.” Let us consider what can be made of this construction. It may be turned two ways: either thus, *We worship one Person in three Persons, and three Persons in one Person*, (which is flat enough, and scarce sense;) or else thus, *We worship one God, the*

^k See Modest Plea, p. 177. Brief Answer to Dr. W. p. 64.

Father, principally, worshipping three Persons; and we worship three Persons, worshipping one God, the Father, principally. This indeed is sense; but such as no one ever did or ever would express in the words of the Creed. It is not said, *Unum Deum Patrem præcipue venerantes, Trinitatem veneremur; et Trinitatem venerantes unum Patrem præcipue veneremur*: but it is, *Unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur.* ἕνα Θεὸν ἐν Τριάδι, καὶ Τριάδα ἐν μονάδι σέβωμεν. Plainly signifying, that the one God to be worshipped is the Trinity, and the Trinity to be worshipped is the one God. We may proceed to what follows:

“Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one, &c.” Here the meaning of the words is very plain, that the *Persons* must not be *confounded*, because Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are *distinct* Persons: nor the substance of the three Persons be *divided*, because the *Godhead* of the three is *all one*. To paraphrase the words, upon the Doctor’s principles, they must run thus:

“Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Father’s substance: for the three Persons are distinct, but the *divinity* of the Son and Holy Ghost is no other than what is communicated from the Father.” By this paraphrase, the whole force of the sentence is broken and confused. Understanding *substance* of the three Persons, the whole is well connected: for here is a reason given why *their* substance is not *divided*; viz. because their *Godhead* is *one*. But what sense or connection is there in saying that the *Father’s* substance is not divided; for, or because, the *divinity* of the Son, &c. is no other than what is communicated from him? No one would ever have expressed the Doctor’s sense in those words of the Creed, or in that manner. Besides, the words *Godhead all one*, (*una divinitas. μία θεότης.*) applied here to three Persons, are of known, certain signification; denoting that the *substance* of the three is *one*, and that all are *one God*. So that if either the *coherence* of the sentence, or the *grammatical* sense of words, or their *constant* and *customary* use in Church writers, be of any weight; the passage now before us is not *capable* of that sense which the Doctor would wrest it to; but must be construed in another: which

other is likewise confirmed by the words following; “the glory equal, the majesty coeternal.”

As to *glory equal*, the Doctor takes care to tell us, it must not be understood in the same sense as *coordinate beings* are *equal* to one another. Well, that we know: but what sense must the *subscriber* understand it in? The Doctor says, in “such a sense as he who derives his essence or being from another, can be equal, &c.” Well, but what if the *subscriber*, according to his Arian sense of *deriving being*, &c. thinks that the *glory* of the second and third Persons can be in *no sense* equal to that of the first; any more than the *glory* of a *creature* can be *equal* to the *glory* of the *Creator*; how then can he subscribe to these words, which are express for *equality* of *glory*, in some sense or other? The Doctor’s last shift is, that it may be understood in such a sense as Christ is said to be $\dot{\iota}\sigma\omicron\varsigma$ $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, (or $\dot{\iota}\sigma\alpha$ $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}\varsigma$.) as *God*, or *equal with God*. But the Doctor’s construction of $\dot{\iota}\sigma\alpha$ $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}\varsigma$. (Phil. ii. 6.) is no more than to be *honoured as Lord of all things*, that is, with honour *equal*, or *suitable* to such a *God*, or *Lord*, so exalted; not with honour *equal* to that which belongs to God the Father. But the *Creed* plainly makes the *glory* of each Person equal to the *glory* of any other Person: wherefore the words are not *capable* of such a sense as the Doctor has put upon $\dot{\iota}\sigma\alpha$ $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, but the *subscriber* is left to seek out for some other; or else to subscribe the words in *no sense* at all. The next words of the *Creed* are,

“Majesty coeternal.” The word *coeternal* is of a *fixed* and *known* sense in ecclesiastical writers: never used to signify any thing less than *absolute* eternity, without beginning and without end. How contradictory this sense is to the principles of the party, may be seen from the author of the *Apology* for Dr. Clarke, who says thus: “Though the generation of the Son, and procession of the Holy Ghost may, in a sense, be said to be *eternal*, as they were $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon\varsigma$ and $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}$ $\alpha\dot{\iota}\omega\tau\omega\upsilon\varsigma$, yet what is this to the *absolute* eternity of a self-existent Being!?” We see what the Apologist thought of the great, the infinite disparity between the *eternity* of the Father and the *eternity* of either of the other two Persons: nor did the Doctor in his answer to him disapprove of his sentiments: but rather (*tacitly* at least) acquiesced in them. How then can these gentlemen

subscribe to the *coeternity* of the three Persons? The Doctor in his comments admits that the *second* and *third* Persons have *always* been with the *first*, which he explains by *before all ages*, and *before time*. If this comes up to a *coeternity*, it is well: if not, he does but deceive himself and his followers; for *coeternal* can bear but one sense, and can admit of no degrees, no difference in point of duration.

The reader should here observe the artful method of explaining away the sense of a *creed*, or of any other writing: not for the sake of learning it, (for it is not worth it,) but to be armed against it, and to prevent being imposed upon by it. When a word occurs, of a *fixed* sense, and which is not liked; the way is first to look out for another word that is *ambiguous*, which *may* bear the *same sense*, but *may* also bear another. Draw but a reader thus far to let slip the first word, and to take this other instead of it, and then the work is half done. Having a word with *two senses*, drop by degrees the sense you have no mind to, and take the other, still substituting other words which may come nearer and nearer to the sense you aim at; till at length, by several removes, you get quite off from the sense of the word you began with.

Thus in the present instance; from *coeternal*, a word of *fixed* sense, and rather too *high* for the Arian hypothesis, the learned Doctor puts "always with the Father;" which might indeed signify the same thing, but is however *capable* of a *lower* sense: and to bring the sense gradually down, the Doctor next substitutes the phrase "before all ages," which again is *equivocal*, and does not sound quite so high as the former: then, to lower the sense still further, he has another phrase, viz. "before time:" and *time*, in a *restrained* sense, may be said to have *commenced* with the *world*. So now he is got low enough, and the reader may be supposed, by these several steps, to have lost the sight of *coeternal*. But to pass on.

"Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost." The Doctor's interpretation of it is; "*such* in all senses wherein he that derives his essence or being from another, *can be such* as is he from whom he derives it." Here again he leaves his *subscriber* in the dark. For what if he had said, *such* in all senses wherein a *creature* can be *such* as his *Creator*? which I am afraid is the true meaning of most of his disciples. This would come to the same as saying such in

no sense: so that by this limitation, he takes away the plain force of the words; and teaches his followers to subscribe, not “in such sense as the words are capable of:” but “so far as is agreeable to what they call Scripture.” The Creed is positive that the *second* and *third* Persons are *such* as the *first*; and immediately after specifies the respects in which they are *such*. *Such* in respect of their being *eternal*; *such* in respect of their being *uncreated*; *such* in respect of their being *incomprehensible, Almighty, God, and Lord*. That is, all the three Persons are *equally*, and in the same sense, *uncreated, eternal, incomprehensible, Almighty, God, and Lord*. This is plainly the doctrine of the Creed; the literal and grammatical sense of the words. Now, to qualify absolute propositions with reserves and limitations, in the manner the Doctor does, is not *explaining* their sense, but *contradicting* it. Neither can this be called subscribing in a sense in which the words are *capable*, but only “so far as is agreeable to what some call Scripture:” which rule of *subscribing* is condemned by those gentlemen.

“The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate—And yet not three uncreated, but one uncreated.” The Doctor here teaches the subscriber to acknowledge every Person to be *uncreated*, (*ἄκτιστος*.) and yet, to say that there are not three *uncreated* (*ἄκτιστοι*) Persons, but *one uncreated Person*; which is a staring contradiction: besides, it is owning two of the Persons to be *creatures*, in some sense, which the Doctor at other times studiously avoids. But he was here in great straits; and was to venture upon any thing, rather than admit what he has the utmost aversion to, *three Persons to be one uncreated Being, or God*.

He has no possible way of reconciling the seeming *contradiction* contained in his comment, but by making a distinction between *derived uncreatedness* and *undervived uncreatedness*: which would have appeared so odd and fanciful, that he chose not to mention it in terms, but only to hint it in generals. What precludes this, and every other pretence of that kind, is, that the *Creed* plainly makes the *uncreatedness* of the second and third Persons to be *such as the Father's* is, that is, of the *same kind*, and to be understood in the *same sense*, there being no difference or distinction in that respect.

∴ The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible,

“ and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible—And yet there are “ not three incomprehensibles, *but one incomprehensible.*” The Doctor takes the same way with this as with the former passage; and runs into the like *contradiction* to avoid the admitting so shocking a thing to him, as the notion of three Persons being *one incomprehensible*; which is the *certain* meaning of the Creed. I shall say no more to this, but refer the reader to what I have observed upon the passage preceding.

“ The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost “ eternal. And yet they are not three eternal, but one “ eternal.” Here the words are so *express* for *three Persons* being *one eternal*. (which the Doctor can by no means bear,) that he had no way left but to change *they are not* into *there are not*: without considering that the *subscriber* must give his *unfeigned assent* and *consent* to *they are not*; and must so read in the public congregation. Besides this inconvenience, which the Doctor seemed to be unapprised of: there is another which he was forced to run upon, (contrary to his usual caution,) and that was to say, “ there are not three eternal Persons,” hereby denying the *eternity* of two of them. And yet the *Creed*, more than once, *expressly* asserts the *coeternity* of all three; and besides plainly teaches that the eternity of the *second* and *third* Persons is *such as the Father’s* is. Nor will the Doctor’s distinction of a *derived* and *underived* eternity help him in this matter: for the sense of the word *eternity* has nothing to do with that distinction, being but *one*, and importing neither more nor less than *beginningless and endless* duration.

“ The Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy “ Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not three Almighties, “ but one Almighty.” Here the Doctor again changes *they are not* into *there are not*: thereby signifying that the *subscriber* cannot honestly assent to, or make use of, *they are not*; though he does not tell him how to avoid the doing of it, solemnly, and in the face of the public congregation.

I take no notice of the Doctor’s choosing *τρεῖς παντοδύναμοι*, rather than *τρεῖς παντοκράτορες*, because he will claim the privilege of taking which he likes best: otherwise the Greek copies favour the latter as much as the former; and the Latin original is indifferent to either.

“ The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is “ God. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.” We

have the same *collusion* again practised, in changing *they are not* into *there are not*, only for the sake of avoiding what the *Creed* mainly intends to teach, that the “three Persons are one God.” I shall not here repeat what I have before said; but shall only observe an *omission* which the Doctor is guilty of, in not teaching the *subscriber* how to reconcile the contradiction of every Person being a *God*, (for so it must be on his principles.) and yet not *three Gods*. For though there be but one *supreme God*, (upon the Doctor’s hypothesis.) yet one supreme God, and two inferior Gods, are *three Gods*, in such a sense as neither Scripture nor antiquity can ever allow. The like might be said of the next paragraph, respecting *one Lord* and *three Lords*. I shall just take notice of a slight inconsistency of the Doctor, in explaining this paragraph. To account for the *Holy Ghost’s* being here called *God*, he is forced to admit that he is represented in Scripture as “exercising divine power and authority,” p. 435. But if we turn back to Prop. xxv. p. 296. we are there told that the *Holy Ghost*, in the New Testament, is never expressly styled *God*, “because *he* is no where represented as “sitting upon a throne, or exercising supreme dominion. &c.” So that it seems the Doctor can make it out either way; that the Scripture has, or has not, given ground enough for styling the Holy Ghost *God*, just as occasion serves. But to pass on.

“In this Trinity, none is afore, or after other” (*Nihil prius aut posterius*— or, *Nemo primus aut postremus*. οὐδὲν πρῶτον ἢ ὕστερον—*aliter*, οὐδὲς πρῶτος ἢ ἔσχατος) “but the whole three “Persons are coeternal.” The *coeternity* could not be expressed in stronger words than is here done, both *positively* and *negatively*.

If the Doctor and his friends believe it, it is well: if not, it is very certain that they cannot honestly *subscribe*, even upon their own principles; for the words are not *capable* of any *lower* meaning.

“None is greater or less than another; but the whole three “Persons are——coequal.”

The Doctor’s comment upon the words *none is greater*, &c. is, that the *second* and *third* Persons are *every where* with the *first*, as they are *always*. I doubt not but the sole reason which led the Doctor into this *remote* and *strained* construction, was his apprehension that the phrase *every where*, like the word

always, might help him to a *double entendre*, for the uses above mentioned.

But if *every where* be *capable* of two meanings, the words of the *Creed* are not so: "none greater or less;" and if they must be understood of *presence*, they can signify nothing lower than this; that all the three Persons are equally *omnipresent*.

I am content with this meaning; and if it be consistent with the Doctor's *hypothesis*, am very glad of it: or if it be not, then he must be conceived to advise the *subscriber* to subscribe in a sense of which the words are not *capable*.

After I had proceeded thus far, and had looked a little forwards, I was much surprised to find the Doctor interpreting *coequal* very differently from the words, "none is greater, &c." as if they did not both mean the same thing, first *negatively*, and then *positively* expressed. But the Doctor, it seems, stands by no rules of interpreting. They are "coequal" (says he *now*) "in such a sense as one or more Persons can be equal to "another (from whom they derive their being) by a plenary "communication of power, knowledge, dignity, &c." He has the like come-off for the words "equal to the Father as touching his Godhead;" that is, says he, equal "in such a sense "as a *derived being* can be." I have before observed something of this general *salvo*, for some other passages: and indeed it is such a sovereign *salvo* for every difficulty, that he need not have made use of any other. In reality, it comes to no more than this, that he admits the words, and the sense of them, so far as consistent with his *own hypothesis*, or his *own* sense of *deriving* being. In the same way, a man might *subscribe* to the decrees of the Council of Trent, or to every article of Pope Pius's *Creed*. For instance: I believe *saints may be worshipped*, but *in such a sense* as worship can be due to saints. I admit *transubstantiation*, but *in such a sense* as it can be consistent with Scripture and reason. I admit *prayers in an unknown tongue*, but *in such a sense* as can be reconciled with the 1 Cor. xiv. And thus we need not scruple any thing. Apply the same *salvo* to the *civil oaths*, and it may serve as well there, to elude and frustrate them: and a man may swear to any king, without acknowledging his just right or title. It is but saying thus: I believe such a person to be the only *rightful* and *lawful* king of these realms, *in such a sense* as he can be *rightful* and *lawful*, upon my principles, &c. And what may not a man *swear*, or *subscribe* to

in this loose method? Now in truth, though this kind of *collusion* is disguised by the words *such a sense*, as if there were a *certain sense*, in which the subscriber might fairly understand the words, consistent with his own *hypothesis*; yet it really amounts to no more than this, the subscribing *so far as is consistent with his own opinions*. For a man may make use of the same *salvo*, whether the words be *capable* of any *such sense*, or whether they be not. If they be *capable*, he is indeed bound up to *such sense*: if not, he is free, having subscribed to them no further than they *can be* so understood; which perhaps may not be at all. I cannot but from hence observe, how unfairly and unjustly the very worthy and learned Bishop of Oxford has been treated for *confounding* (as is pretended) these two things: subscribing *so far as is agreeable to Scripture*; and subscribing *in such sense as is agreeable to Scripture*. For however distinct these two things may be in the *general*, they are really *confounded* by Dr. Clarke himself in this particular case, as I have often observed. Neither will he ever be able to defend the point of *subscription* upon the *latter* only, without taking in the *former* also. His talking of *such sense* seems only to be a *cover*, or plausible disguise, for *so far as*, (which has deceived his unwary followers who have not seen so deep into this matter as he;) and hence I conceive it is, that he has never *explicitly* condemned the subscribing with the reserve of *so far as is agreeable*; though others of the party, being ashamed to stand up for so unaccountable a latitude, have indeed plainly rejected it; not being aware of the need they should have of it. But to return to the Creed.

“God, of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and man, of the substance of his mother—perfect God, and perfect man.”

The Doctor did not think proper to take any notice of this passage. I know not how any words can be stronger for the Son's having the same *divine nature* with the Father, as much as he has the same *human nature* with his *mother*: *perfect God*, and *perfect man*, having all that belongs to the *nature* of both. This is utterly repugnant to the Arian *hypothesis*; and can no more be reconciled with it than light with darkness.

We may now take leave of the Creed, (called Athanasian,) and proceed to the Litany.

“O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons, and one God, have mercy &c.”

Here the three Persons are all together invoked, and under the style and title of *one God*, directly opposite to the Doctor's principles. The Doctor has no way to evade their force, but by understanding the title of *one God* to belong to the Father only. His sense is this :

“ O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, three Persons, and “ one God, viz. the Father, have mercy &c.” This *collusion* the subscriber is to practise in his most solemn devotions: excluding two of the Persons from the *one Godhead* here, though he had addressed them both under the title of *God* in the two preceding petitions; and though the epithets, *holy*, *blessed*, and *glorious*, are equally attributed to all three, in the very same petition. If this be to “ pray with the understanding,” (as the Doctor pretends it is,) let it rather be the wish of every honest man to have *less understanding*, and *more grace* than to trifle in this manner with the tremendous Deity.

In the Collect for the third Sunday in Advent, we thus address our blessed Saviour :

“ O Lord Jesu Christ—who livest and reignest with the “ Father and the Holy Spirit, ever one God, world without “ end.” Any one, at first sight, may here see that the title of *one God* is not attributed to the Father *only*, but to all the three Persons: contrary to the Doctor's principles. The Doctor does not attempt to shew that the words are *capable* of any other meaning. Only he draws up another *form* suitable to his own *hypothesis*, and little akin to the words in the *Collect*; substituting that in the room of the other. If the *subscriber* can content himself with such shuffling in his solemn prayers, let him look to it.

There is just such another passage in the conclusion of the Collect for Christmas-day, (which the Doctor has omitted,) and there is another in the Collect for the sixth Sunday after Epiphany, (which he has also omitted,) running thus :

“ With thee, O Father, and thee, O Holy Ghost, he (Christ) “ liveth and reigneth, ever one God, world without end.” Here, whether Christ alone, or all the three Persons, (and one of these it must be,) be called *one God*; it is equally repugnant to the Doctor's principles. And he cannot subscribe to this, “ in such “ a sense as the words will bear,” (for they cannot *bear* his sense,) but only “ so far as is consistent with his principles:” which is not assenting to the words of the prayer, but to some-

thing else of his own inventing. The like may be said of the Collects for Septuagesima, and the first Sunday in Lent, and Good Friday, twice, and Easter-day, and Ascension-day, and the Sunday after; all which the Doctor has omitted out of his *collection*: an omission indeed not worth the mentioning, were it not that the *Modest Pleader* has been pleased to object the smallness of the number 27, which, we see, might have been enlarged; and were it not an aggravation of the great sin of prevaricating with God and man, to consider how often it must be repeated in the yearly course of the prayers.

The Doctor takes notice of the Collect for Whitsunday, and shifts it off in a loose manner: and so passes on to Trinity-Sunday, dealing much the same way with that also. He omits the Collect for St. Matthew's day; which is more *express* and *full* against his principles than either of the two former. I shall pass over all the other places in our Liturgy or Articles, except one, with which I shall shut up this *chapter*. It is the proper preface for Trinity-Sunday, in the Communion-Office, running thus:

“ O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God; who art one God, one Lord, not one only Person, but three Persons in one substance. For that which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, without any difference or inequality.”

The Doctor here pleasantly says, that “ there is no passage in the whole Service so apt to be understood in a wrong sense as this;” meaning, I suppose, so apt to be understood in the sense the Church intended, and so hard to be perverted to any other. And it must indeed be thought a very clear and full passage on the *orthodox* side, when a person of the Doctor's abilities, in this kind, and after he had worked his way through the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, (besides a great part of the Liturgy,) began at length to feel himself nonplused by it, and almost at the point of confessing it. His first endeavour was to perplex and puzzle the Church's sense; and next to introduce his own.

He pretends that the words “ Lord, Almighty, everlasting God,” are *personal*, and must be understood of *one Person* only, though he cannot but know that every one of those words are used in the Athanasian Creed (to say nothing of the Liturgy) of all the three Persons taken together; and they are here expressly declared to belong, not to “ one Person only,” but to

“three Persons in one substance.” The words, *who art*, he thinks, cannot be properly applied to more Persons than one. But that they are so applied here is manifest, and by those who were competent judges of propriety: and if he likes it not, why should he *subscribe*? When he comes to give us his own meaning, he never attempts to shew (good reason why) in what sense, consistent with his principles, a subscriber may believe “three Persons in one substance,” and that the same *glory* belongs to all, “without any difference or inequality.” It would be trifling to take notice of what he endeavours to put upon a *subscriber*, in order to satisfy his conscience in one of the most serious and solemn things in the world. I can never give myself leave to think that he could at all satisfy himself in it, upon second and cooler thoughts. Indeed, I should ask the Doctor’s pardon for dwelling so long upon those extravagant explications; which, I doubt not, he now heartily despises, as well as I. Neither ought they to be any longer imputed to him, who has expunged them, and cast them off, from the time his second edition has appeared. But since his disciples and followers are still proud of his *refuse*, and set a value upon his *trifles*, which he has too much sense to do himself; since they insist upon it that all the expressions of our *public forms* are, at least, *capable* of a sense consistent with their principles; and appeal, for proof of it, (having indeed nothing else to appeal to,) to the Doctor’s performances on that head; in a word, since they have been pleased to rest the whole cause of *subscription* upon the Doctor’s *explications*, it was necessary for me to take under examination those things upon which such a stress was laid; unless the Doctor himself would have been so kind (for which I should have heartily thanked him) as to speak more plainly in this matter than he has thought proper to do. One *half-sheet*, one small *advertisement* from his hand, to discountenance this kind of *subscription*, would have done the business at once, and have saved me the labour of doing any thing. The credit of his *name* was, in a manner, all it had to stand upon: and had he but pleased to take off the countenance of his *authority*, his *reasons* should have been left to stand or fall by themselves. But as the case now is, (and as the author of the Remarks observes,) that the whole party are gone after him, and still persist in the Doctor’s *first* thoughts relating to *subscription*; neither has the Doctor took any sufficient care to reclaim them, or to bring them back; the

cause is too important to wait his slow motions, or to be left any longer in suspense. The glory of God, the honour of our most holy religion, and the security of Church and State, call for our best endeavours to root out, if possible, those false and pernicious principles, and to reestablish the matter of *subscription* upon its true and solid foundations. How far I have been able to contribute to so good an end, must be left to the reader's judgment. My design however was well aimed: and this is my apology for disturbing the learned Doctor, late, and unwillingly, on this head.

I shall now briefly sum up the particulars of what has been advanced above, for the reader's clearer apprehending of it, as well as the better retaining it.

1. The Church of England requires subscription, not to *words*, but *things*; to *propositions* contained in her public forms.

2. Subscribers are obliged, not to *silence* or *peace* only, but to a serious belief of what they subscribe to.

3. Subscribers must believe it true in that particular sense which the Church intended, (so far as that sense may be known,) for the Church can expect no less; the design being to preserve "one uniform tenor" of faith, to preclude "diversity of opinions," to have her *own explications*, and none other, (as to points determined,) taught and inculcated; and to tie men up from spreading or receiving doctrines contrary to the public determinations. These and the like ends cannot be at all answered by *subscription*, unless the subscriber give his *assent* to the Church's forms in the Church's sense; that is, in the sense of the *compilers* and *imposers*.

4. The sense of the *compilers* and *imposers* is to be judged of from the *plain*, *usual*, and *literal* signification of words; and from their intention, purpose, or design, however known: the rule for *understanding* the *public forms* being the same as for *understanding oaths*, *laws*, *injunctions*, or any other *forms* or *writings* whatever.

5. Where either the *words* themselves, or the *intention* (much more where both) is plain and evident; there the sense of the *imposers* is fully known; and there is no room left for a *subscriber* (as such) to put any *contrary*, or *different* sense upon the public forms.

6. If words be capable of *several* meanings, but yet *certainly* exclude *this* or *that* particular meaning; a subscriber cannot

honestly take the forms in *that* meaning which is *specialy excluded*. For this would be subscribing against the sense of the Church at the same time that he professes his agreement with it.

7. It may be *certainly* known that any Arian sense of our public forms is such a sense as our Church *intended* to exclude, and has excluded, in as full and strong *positive* terms as the wit of man is able to devise. And all men of sense must allow, that when *compilers* and *imposers* have done the utmost they could, and as far as any words can reach, to express the Catholic doctrine of the *Trinity*; they may and must be supposed to mean that very doctrine which they have industriously laboured to express, and none other.

8. And that it may not be pretended by our modern Arians, that their sense is not Arian, (which nevertheless it certainly is,) it is further evident, and hath been shewn, that the main particulars of *their scheme* (call it what they please) is *specialy excluded*, both by the plain words and undoubted *intention* of our public forms.

9. Therefore none of the advocates for the *new scheme* can fairly or honestly subscribe to our Church's *forms*, though they could invent a sense for them consistent with their own principles; it being evident that any such sense is contrary to our Church's sense, and to the intention of the *imposers*.

10. The *pleas* and *excuses* devised to justify the subscribing in a sense contrary to, or different from, the *known* sense of the *imposers*, being founded either on false presumptions or weak reasonings, are of no weight or significancy; but the Arian subscriber must be blamable for going counter to the *known sense* of the Church, even though the words were *capable* of another meaning.

11. Yet, upon examination, it appears that many expressions of our *public forms* are really not *capable* of any sense consistent with the *new scheme*. And therefore, if the patrons of it subscribe to their *own sense*, (as they must be conceived to do,) they subscribe to a sense which is *no sense* of our public forms at all, on any supposition.

12. The subscription therefore of those gentlemen, however glossed over with the pretence of subscribing "in such sense as "is agreeable to (what they call) Scripture," really amounts to no more than subscribing "so far as is in their opinion agreeable

“ to Scripture.” Which way of subscribing not only defeats every end of subscription, and stands condemned by our *laws*, and by the *express* resolution of our *judges*, but is also absurd in itself; as leaving room for any prevarication whatever, in the matter of *oaths* or *tests*; and for subscribing the *Romish Confession*, or even the *Alcoran*, or any thing; and is moreover *explicitly* condemned, even by the generality of those who plead for *Arian subscription*.

A SUPPLEMENT
TO
THE CASE OF ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION
CONSIDERED:
IN ANSWER TO A LATE PAMPHLET,
ENTITLED
THE CASE OF SUBSCRIPTION TO THE XXXIX ARTICLES
CONSIDERED.

A SUPPLEMENT

TO

THE CASE OF ARIAN SUBSCRIPTION CONSIDERED.

WHEN I drew up the "Case of Arian Subscription." &c. I was apprehensive that so plain a charge, and so home pressed, might exasperate the persons concerned; though I took care to treat them with all the mildness and tenderness that the subject would bear: confining myself to the reasoning part, naming no particular men but such as I was obliged to quote, and candidly exempting the principal man of them, that the charge might be as general and inoffensive as possible; falling rather upon the thing itself, than upon this or that particular person. If the argument be provoking, I cannot help it: the same objection lies against the detecting or reproving any *vice* or *immorality* whatever. It is the proper business of a *divine* to state *cases of conscience*, and to remonstrate against any growing corruptions in *practice*, and especially in *principles*. If Arian subscription be really *fraudulent* and *immoral*, (which no considering man can doubt of,) it may concern those gentlemen rather to testify their sincere *repentance*, than to acquaint the world with their causeless *resentments*. I shall here say nothing to the abusive flirts of the nameless author, who has been pleased still to persist in the defence of Arian subscription; except it be to remind him, that those assuming strains very ill become either so *weak* a *cause* or such a *guilty practice*. I was once inclinable

to take no notice of so mean a pamphlet ; concluding that I had said enough, when I had said enough for men of sense and common ingenuity ; and it is often not advisable to press things to the utmost. But since this is a cause of very great moment, wherein the very foundations of *moral honesty*, as well as of *Christian sincerity*, are deeply concerned ; I think it incumbent upon me to proceed somewhat further in it : and if those gentlemen resolve to go on in maintaining an *open fraud* as long as it is possible to amuse or deceive, though only the weakest and most ignorant readers ; I also must resolve (by God's assistance, and for God's glory) to go on in the defence of *sincerity* and *probity*, till the very meanest readers may sufficiently understand it. To come to the business.

The pamphlet lately published, is entitled, "The Case of Subscription to the XXXIX Articles considered ; occasioned by Dr. Waterland's Case of Arian Subscription." The author is but just, as well as modest, in not calling it an *answer* to mine : for indeed he has left the most material points untouched, without so much as attempting any thing like an answer. If you will take his bare word for it, the Articles of our Church, so far as concerns the Trinity, are *general, indefinite, undeterminate* ; not *particular, special, or determinate*. He takes this for granted, and reasons all the way upon that supposition ; which is very unaccountable : unless it were because I had *demonstrated* the contrary, beyond all reasonable reply ; and so there was no other way left but to stifle the *evidence*, to protest against *fact*, and to bear the reader down with a *false* presumption. Such a management as this is, in effect, little else but a more untoward way of giving up the cause ; where a man does the thing, but loses all the grace and credit of it by his manner of doing it. But let us see how he goes on to give some colour, at least, to his pretences. I had pressed the Arian subscribers with the Athanasian Creed, the *Liturgy*, and the *Articles*, to prove that our Church was *particular* and *determinate* in the points disputed. Not a single word has this *writer* to shew, either that the Athanasian Creed or *Liturgy* is not *determinate*, as I represented : and as to the *Articles*, he seems to make no account of any but the *first* : of which he often intimates, that he has some way of evading it, but he does not care to tell us what, for fear he should be found faltering even there, and lie open to rebuke for it. The *first Article* alone, is, I am very

certain, more than he can fairly deal with: but I must remind him further, that the 2nd and 5th Articles do also require his consideration; and then there is the *eighth*, which, unfortunately for him, carries all the *three Creeds* in the bowels of it: creeds which, as the Article says, (and as this *writer* says, if he *subscribes* to it,) “ought thoroughly to be received and believed; “for they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy “Scripture.”

Well then, we have the *Creeds* wrapped up in the *Articles*; and the subscriber must be content to take in all or none: let us next see to the *Liturgy*. This gentleman thinks he has a fetch for that: he subscribes not to the *truth* of every particular, but to the *use* only, and that “it contains nothing contrary to “the word of God.” Now, says he, “I must freely own that I “see no contradiction, no necessary absurdity, in the *use* of what “a man may wish to have in some things corrected^a.” I would be as favourable to this *writer* as possible. I do allow of his distinction, and that it may be proper and pertinent in some cases: but I can never allow that a man may *use* a solemn formal *lie*, in his prayers, and often repeat it, under pretence that we may admit the *use* of some things which might be *corrected*. This is arguing from *gnats* to *camels*, and widening the rule beyond all measure and proportion. This will best be understood in the sequel, when the reader comes to see what kind of things those are which this gentleman desires to *use*, without *believing* a syllable of them. I must observe further, that the *subscriber* is tied up to believe that the *Liturgy* “contains nothing contrary “to the word of God.” Does not this pinch a little closer than this *writer* might wish? Has he nothing to object against any expressions in the *Liturgy*, but that they contain things seemingly contrary to *natural reason*? Have they nothing contrary to *Scripture*, to what he calls *Scripture*? I should be thankful to him for so obliging a concession. After all, I would advise this *writer* not to pretend to be wiser than Dr. Clarke. The Doctor had considered these matters much and long: and I have not yet found any disciple of his that has endeavoured to *refine* upon him, but what has exposed himself in doing it. The wary Doctor was sensible that *Articles*, *Creeds*, and *Liturgy*, must all come into account, and all be reconciled (if possible) to his own *hypothesis*. He made no distinction between admitting

^a Case of Subscription, &c. p. 46.

the *truth* of this, and the *use* only of that; well knowing, that *truth* and *use* are coincident in a case of this high moment; and that he could not submit to the *use* of those prayers but in such a sense as he thought *true*. He took the only way of settling that matter for his purpose, had there really been any: but as *his* failed, the flaw in the architecture is never to be made up by common hands.

Having shewn that *Creeeds*, *Articles*, and *Liturgy* must all come in, to determine in our present question; I would now proceed to cite passages from our *public forms*, and confront them with select sentences drawn from the writings of the *new sect*, that every common reader (for to such I now write) may have *ocular* demonstration of the truth of what I affirm, that the expressions of our *public forms* are *special*, *precise*, and *determinate* against the *new scheme*; not *general*, or *indefinite*, as this *writer* wishes, I can hardly say, *believes*. But I must first take notice of a remark which he has page the 8th, that we are obliged to subscribe only the English Articles, not the Latin. I know not what uses he intends by it; though he intimates there may be some; keeping upon the reserve, as usual, when he suspects an advantage may be taken. Dr. Clarke, to do him justice, openly declared what evasions or salvos he had to justify his subscribing. He considered, I suppose, that without this, it would be subscribing with *mental reservations*; which is perfect *Jesuitism*. But this *writer*, perhaps, thinks there is no harm in it, that it is an innocent practice; and that so long as he can but invent some secret evasion to himself, he need have no concern about satisfying the world. To return to the matter in hand. As to the Articles, English and Latin. I may just observe, for the sake of such readers as are less acquainted with these things, *first*, that the Articles were passed, recorded, and ratified in the year 1562, and in Latin only. *Secondly*, that those Latin Articles were revised and corrected by the *Convocation* of 1571. *Thirdly*, that an authentic English translation was then made of the Latin Articles by the same *Convocation*, and the Latin and English adjusted as nearly as possible. *Fourthly*, that the Articles thus perfected in *both languages* were published the same year, and by the *royal* authority. *Fifthly*, subscription was required the same year to the English Articles, called the Articles of 1562, by the famous act of the 13th of Elizabeth^b.

^b See the particulars proved at large in Dr. Bennet's Essay on the XXXIX Articles.

These things considered, I might justly say, with Bishop Burnet^c, that the Latin and English are *both equally authentic*. Thus much however I may certainly infer, that if in any places the English version be ambiguous, where the Latin original is clear and determinate; the Latin ought to fix the more doubtful sense of the other, (as also *vice versa*.) it being evident that the *Convocation, Queen, and Parliament* intended the same sense in both. For instance, in Article the first, the three Persons are declared to be *of one substance*; in the Latin, *ejusdem essentiae*, that is, *of the same essence*: from hence it is manifest, that *one substance* is equivalent to *same substance, or essence*. Again, in Article the second, the English version runs thus: “The Son, which is the *Word* of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, of one substance with the Father, &c.” Now in the English, the words, “the very and eternal God,” may possibly be referred to the Father just before mentioned: but the Latin Article^d plainly shews that the words are to be referred to God the Son, and could not have been intended of God the Father, in that place. From hence we see how useful it may be to compare the English and Latin together, in any doubtful cases: for there cannot be a more demonstrative proof than this is, (where it can be had,) of the true sense and meaning of *compilers* and *imposers*. And let this *writer* pretend what he pleases, when once the true and full sense of the *imposers* is *fixed* and *certain*, that very sense, and that only, is bound upon the *conscience* of every *subscriber*. This I have abundantly proved in my former papers: to which I shall only now add this plain reason; that, since words are designed to convey some *meaning*, if we take the liberty of playing upon words after the *meaning* is fixed and certain, there can be no security against *equivocation* and *wile*, in any *laws, oaths, contracts, covenants*, or any engagements whatever: all the ends and uses of speech will hereby be perverted; and there can be no such thing as faith, trust, or mutual confidence among men.

I proceed now to set before the reader the tenets of our *new guides*, in one *column*, with the tenets of our Church in another, opposite *column*; that from thence we may form a judgment of their agreement or disagreement. I shall take my citations of

^c Burnet, Preface to the Articles, p. 10.

^d Filius, qui est Verbum Patris, ab

æterno a Patre genitus, verus et æternus Deus, ac Patri consubstantialis, &c. Art. II.

the first *column* from Dr. Clarke and his professed disciples; not from Mr. Whiston and his, who are known to be less reserved, and who abhor this kind of fraudulent subscription as much as I do. I shall not scruple citing some passages out of the *first* edition of "Scripture Doctrine," which are left out in the *second*; because, though the Doctor does not own them, yet his disciples must, till they either give better, or yield up the cause of subscription.

The Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, according to Dr. Clarke and his followers.

Dr. Clarke's scheme makes the Unity of the Son and Spirit with the Father to be only figurative, not (necessarily^e) an *unity of essence, or individual substance*, but of *authority and consent*. *Modest Plea*, p. 7.

The *Father alone* is, absolutely speaking, the *God of the universe*. *Clarke, Prop. 8*.

The Scripture, when it mentions the *one God*, or the *only*

^e Note, that the two words, *necessarily* and *individual*, here stand for nothing but to *soften* the expression. *Necessarily* is of no moment, because the subscriber is to acknowledge that the doctrine of *one substance* is war-

The Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, according to the Church of England in her public forms.

In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons of *one substance*. *Art. 1.*

The Son—of *one substance* with the Father. *Art. 2.*

The Holy Ghost of *one substance* with the Father and the Son. *Art. 5.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art. 8.*) that the Son is of *one substance with the Father*, (*Nic. Creed*), and that he is *God of the substance of the Father*; and that we ought not to *confound the Persons*, nor *divide the substance*. *Athan. Creed*.

In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons. *Art. 1.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scrip-

ranted by Scripture, and therefore *necessarily* to be believed. And as to *individual*, it signifies nothing here; the Doctor, it seems, denying all *unity of substance*, and admitting only *unity of authority and consent*.

God, always means the supreme Person of the Father. *Clarke, Prop. 9.*

The Apostle says, *God is the Father*, which is the direct contradictory to your notion, whose definition of God is, that he is—the three Persons. *Modest Plea*, p. 150.

Demonstration that *one God is one Person only*—otherwise impossible for one Person to be God. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 108.

There are *not three uncreated Persons*. *Clarke, Script. Doct.* p. 429, edit. 1.

The Father (or first Person) *alone* is self-existent, underived, unoriginated, independent, *made of none*^f, begotten of none, proceeding from none. *Mod. Plea*, p. 5.

If any thing, it is most natural to infer that he (the Son) *is not the very God*, because he is here so expressly contradistinguished from him.

ture, (*Art. 8.*) *that the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, that they are not three Gods, but one God. Ath. Creed.*

O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, *three Persons and one God. Lit.*

Nothing contrary to the word of God contained in this form.

O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God; who art one God, one Lord, *not one only Person*, but *three Persons* in one substance, &c. *Comm. Off.*

Ever one God world without end, *frequently applied to all the three Persons in our Church's Collects.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants, &c. (*Art. 8.*) *that the Son is uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate: the Son not made, nor created: the Holy Ghost neither made, nor created. Athan. Creed.*

One Lord Jesus Christ—begotten, *not made. Nic. Creed.*

The Son—the *very and eternal God. Art. 2.*

Very God of very God. *Nicene Creed.*

^f Note, that the Father *alone* is here said to be *made of none*; which is directly saying that the other two Persons are *made*. I had observed the same of Dr. Clarke's fifth Proposition, but had it intimated to me, that the Doctor had put a *semicolon* at *independent*; to shew that *alone*

reached no further, the rest being to be understood of *Father* without the restriction of *alone*. But, it seems, the *Modest Pleader* was not aware of the significancy of the *semicolon*, but puts a *comma* only: wherefore I may justly charge him with making two of the Persons *creatures*.

The Word, when he appeared in the form of God, and as God, was *no more than the minister and angel of God.* *Mod. Plea*, p. 30.

It is *without any colour from Scripture*, that you affirm each of the three Persons to have the *same right of dominion.* *Mod. Plea*, p. 159.

When Dr. Clarke excepted *supremacy and independency*, he plainly, in reason and consequence, excepted absolute *infinite* powers, so that the objector might well have spared asking in the sixth Query, whether *infinite* perfection can be communicated to a *finite* being. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 57.

The divine attributes of the Son are not *individually the same* with those of the Father—As to their *differing as finite and infinite*, there can be but one intelligent Being^h absolutely *infinite* in all respects. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 54, 55.

God, when he is styled Father, must always be understood to be (*altría*) a true and

The whole three Persons are coeternal together and *coequal*—*equal* to the Father as touching his *Godhead.* *Ath. Creed.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art. 8.*) that such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost—the Father is *Lord*, the Son *Lord*, and the Holy Ghost *Lord*; and yet not three Lords, but *one Lord.* *Ath. Creed.*

There is but one living and true God, everlasting—of *infinite* power, wisdom, and goodness—and in Unity of *this* Godhead there be three Persons of *one substance, power, and eternity.* *Art. 1.*

That which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the *Son* and of the *Holy Ghost*, *without any difference or inequality.* *Comm. Office.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art. 8.*) that the Son is

^g Note, the word *absolute* is only to soften the expression. The author, in reason and consequence, plainly intimates that the powers of the Son and Holy Ghost are not *infinite*, and that they are *finite* beings.

^h Note, that *intelligent Being* is with this writer, and the whole party, equivalent to *person*: so that here two of the Persons are declared to be *finite* beings.

*proper Cause*ⁱ, really and efficiently giving life: which consideration clearly removes the argument usually drawn from the *equality* between a Father and Son upon earth. *Clarke, Script. Doctr.* p. 239, 273. ed. 2nd.

The Father *alone* perfect in himself. *Script. Doctr.* p. 273.

Necessary existence is as inconsistent with being *begotten*, as to have *no cause* of existence, and to have *a cause*. *Mod. Plea*, p. 17.

Self-existent, unoriginate, or underived, properly expressed by *necessary existence*. *Mod. Plea*, p. 216, 217.

The Son is *not self-existent*. *Clarke, Prop.* 12. *Comp. Reply*, 162, 230, 231.

—avowedly maintain, that the Son is *not necessarily existing*^k. *Phileleuth. 2nd Letter to Mangey*, p. 27.

An *angel might strengthen him*^l, who was now in that state of humiliation, made a little lower than the angels. *Modest Plea*, p. 93.

ⁱ Dr. Clarke's notion of a *true and proper cause* is of a person acting upon *choice*, or rather, *acting*; (for *acting*, with him, implies *choice*;) so that his meaning here is that the Father might *choose* whether the Son should *exist* or no. The latter part of the citation insinuates, that the Son is not as truly *equal in nature* to the Father, as one man is to another.

^k N. B. To deny the Son's *neces-*

God *of the substance* of the *Father*,—and man *of the substance* of his *mother*; *perfect God* and perfect man.—*Equal* to the Father as touching his Godhead. *Ath. Creed*.

The Son *begotten, not made*, of one substance with the Father. *Nic. Creed*.

The Son—*not made, nor created*, but *begotten*. *Ath. Creed*.

The Son—the *very* and *eternal God*. *Art.* 2.

Very God of very God. *Nic. Creed*.

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture, (*Art.* 8.) that the Son is *Almighty, perfect God*,—*equal to the Father*, as touching his Godhead.

sary existence is the same as to assert him to be a *precarious being*, depending as much on the *will* of the Father, for his *existence*, as any *creature* whatever, and therefore a *creature*.

^l Note, this is said of the Son of God, even in his divine nature, and whole Person, nor does this author ever allow the distinction of *divine* and *human* nature, but rejects it, as implying a *division of person*. See p. 97.

The grand principle (of Dr. Bennet) was, that the Word is *the very God*. When this was once established, it was rightly thence inferred, that *the Word cannot be exalted*—nay, this supposition will indeed justify those questions, *Was the very God exalted thereby? Is it not blasphemy to suppose it?*—Our Saviour was *highly exalted* as the reward of his sufferings—From the Doctor's principle, it is a just inference that *the Word never was exalted*. But on the other hand the Scriptures are clear, that he who was the *instrument* of his Father *in the work* of creation, yet had not a *kingdom*, and *judgment*, and *dominion*, then committed to him—but after his sufferings and death, &c. *Mod. Plea*, p. 97, 98.

This power and dominion to which Christ is advanced at the right hand of God, is not only *the highest character* and prerogative of his *Sonship*, spoken of in Scripture, but is the *foundation of his personal Godhead* and adoration. *Collect. of Queries*, p. 75. •

The Son hath a relative omniscience communicated to him from the Father; I mean that he knoweth all things relating

The Son—the *very and eternal God*. *Art. 2.*

Very God of very God. *Nic. Creed.*

The Son, which is the Word of the Father, *begotten from everlasting* of the Father, *the very and eternal God*, of *one substance* with the Father. *Art. 2.*

God, of the substance of the Father, *begotten before* the worlds. *Ath. Creed.*

Only-begotten Son of God, *begotten* of his Father *before all worlds*, *God of God*, *very God* of very God. *Nic. Creed.*

One living and true God, of *infinite power* and *wisdom*: in the Unity of *this Godhead* there be three Persons, &c. *Art. 1.*

to the creation and government of the universe: but yet he himself confesseth, *Matt. xxiv. 36, of that day and hour, &c.* By which all the ancient Ant-Nicene writers^m understand that our Lord, as the *Λόγος*, or Son of God, *did not then know the day of judgment.* *Collect. of Queries*, p. 48, 49. See also *Unity of God not inconsist.* p. 8.

There are not three eternal Persons. *Clarke, Script. Doctr.* p. 433. 1st ed.

The *eternity* of God the Father is revealed in the Old Testament—in the New Testament it is emphatically expressed, *Rom. i. 20.* But in neither is there *any mention of the Son's.* *Coll. of Queries*, p. 50.

The *Word* incarnate *passible* according to the express declaration of St. John and St. Paul. — Whether they who—make only the *human nature* passible, do not shew too little regard to the plain evidence of Scripture? *Coll. of Queries*, p. 143.

If Dr. Clarke's scheme be right, it seems to follow — that all worship ought to be directed to the Father through Christ: excepting only that such worship may be paid to Christ as Mediator, for which

That which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, *without any difference, or inequality.* *Com. Off.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture (*Art. 8.*) that the Son is *eternal*, and that the whole three Persons are *coeternal together*, and their *majesty coeternal*, and that they are *one eternal.* *Ath. Creed.*

One living and true God without body, parts, and *passions* (*impassibilis*) — in the Unity of *this Godhead* there be three Persons, &c. *Art. 1.*

The Son—the *very and eternal God* — *very God* and *very man.* *Art. 2.*

It may be proved by most certain warrants, &c. (*Art. 8.*) that the *Unity in Trinity*, and the *Trinity in Unity* is to be worshipped. *Ath. Creed.*

^m Note, that this writer everywhere *professes* his agreement with the Ant-Nicene writers: and though he is en-

tirely false in reporting *their* sentiments, yet it cannot be doubted but he here gives us his *own*.

we have express warrants from examples in Scripture.

Absolutely supreme honour due to the *Person of the Father singly*, as being *alone* the supreme original author of all being and power. *Clarke, Prop.* 43.

O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, &c. *Lit.*

O Lord, Almighty, everlasting God, who art one God, one Lord, *not one only Person*, but *three Persons in one substance*, &c. *Com. Off.*

From this view of the doctrine of our Church, compared with that of our *new teachers*. it appears that they are entirely opposite to each other, and are no more to be reconciled than light and darkness. And yet I have not took the advantage of pursuing the doctrine of those gentlemen through its direct, immediate, and inevitable consequences, in order to make the contradiction between that and our Church's forms still more glaring and palpable. Nobody can doubt of their believing the Son and Holy Ghost to be *creatures*, if either Arius, or Eunomius, or even Mr. Whiston, ever believed it. They undeniably believe them to be what every body means by *creature*, in common speech and language. This is demonstrable, many ways, from their writings, and from those very passages which I have here selected.

1. If the Father *alone* be *made of none*; then it follows that the other two Persons are *made*, that is, are *creatures*. The premises are theirs, the conclusion makes itself.

2. If the Father alone be *necessarily existing*, (as those gentlemen expressly teach,) then is the *Son* a *precarious* being, which is only another name for *creature*. The same will follow of the *Holy Ghost*.

3. If the Son, even as Son of God, wanted an *angel* to *strengthen* him, he must of course be a *weak, frail* being, that is, a *creature*.

4. If the Son, as the *Λόγος*, or *Word*, was properly *exalted*, and in such a sense as cannot without *blasphemy* be asserted of the *very God*, (as these men teach,) then it is evident that the Son is an *imperfect* and *mutable* being, that is, a *creature*.

5. If God the Son was once *ignorant*, in his highest nature. (as these men teach,) and *ignorance* can belong to nothing but *creatures*, he must of consequence be a *creature*.

6. If neither the Son nor Holy Ghost is the *one true God*, but

excluded from the *one true Godhead*, (as these men assert,) they must of course be *creatures* only.

7. If neither the Son nor Holy Ghost be the *one infinite Being*, nor have *infinite* powers, (as these men pretend,) they can be only *finite* beings; and every *finite* being is, of course, a *creature*.

8. If Christ's *exaltation*, after his resurrection, be the sole *foundation* of his *personal Godhead*, (as these men say,) then he was not *God* before that *exaltation*; nor since, in any just and proper sense, but a *creature* only.

9. If Christ be *passible*, in his highest nature, (as those men teach,) and nothing is *passible* but a *creature*; it evidently follows that he is a *creature*.

Thus may it be demonstrated, nine several ways, (and more might be added,) from their own writings, that the abettors of the *new scheme* make God the *Son*, (and so the *Holy Ghost* of course,) as very a *creature* as ever did Arius, or Eunomius, or any Arian whatever.

They must not here pretend to run into general declamations against charging men with *consequences* which they do not *own*. I allow such a plea to be reasonable in some cases, but not in this. For instance, when a Calvinist is charged with the disbelief of God's *holiness*, *justice*, or *goodness*; or an Arminian with the disbelief of God's *prescience*, *sovereignty*, &c. both sides charging each other with *consequences* respectively, as if they were truly their *tenets*; such conduct on either side is justly condemned. But why justly condemned? Because it is certain that those *consequences*, which they draw for each other, are really not their *tenets*; since they, respectively, *disavow* and *abhor* any such *tenets*; and because they are, respectively, ready, upon every occasion, to declare their full and entire belief of those *attributes*, which they are said to deny; and would rather give up their main *hypothesis*, than be really guilty of any such *impiety* against God's perfections. But now as to the *consequences* which I charge upon our modern revivers of *Arianism*, let it be observed,

1. That they are many of them so direct, plain, and immediate from their *tenets*, that they are hardly so properly *consequences*, as the very *tenets* themselves, differently expressed.

2. Those gentlemen, when pressed with those *consequences*, give but too plain suspicion, that they both see and own them,

and only *verbally* disclaim them. For they express no abhorrence or detestation of the supposition of the *Son* and Holy Ghost being *finite*, being *precarious* in their existence, being *dependent* on the *will* of another. Nor do they ever declare (except when they *subscribe*) that either of those two Persons is *infinitely perfect*, is strictly *omniscient*, is *all-sufficient*, or *independent*, as to *existence*, on the *will* of another. Instead of taking off the suspicious *consequences*, they do all they can to insinuate them into their readers; avoiding nothing but the name of *creature*; all the while inculcating the *thing*. And if they are further pressed, they must at length allow, that they do admit the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* to be *creatures*, in our meaning, in the *common* meaning of *creature*; only in some particular meaning of their own, they think they may deny it, of the *Son*, hardly of the *Holy Ghost*. For the Holy Ghost must be a *creature* with them, even upon their own definition of a *creature*; as being one of those beings brought into *existence* by the power of the Son of God, in subordination to the will and power of the Fatherⁿ. I say then, since the *consequences*, wherewith we charge those gentlemen, are plain, certain, and irrefragable; since they are not able to shew where they fail, or that they are no *consequences*; since they are not solicitous to ward them off by expressing any *abhorrence* of them, or by any acknowledgment of the *divine perfections* of the Son or Holy Ghost, in their full extent, as understood of the Father; since they appear only to avoid offensive *names*, in the mean while insinuating and inculcating, in other words, the very *things* with which we charge them: such being the case, it is just to charge them with those *consequences*, as being really their *tenets*: I say, *just*, in the way of *disputation*; as to *legal censure*, I concern not myself with it.

Having shewn how opposite the *new scheme* is to our Church's doctrine, it may now be proper to represent, in its true colours, the case of Arian subscription; that every such person, when he presumes to *subscribe*, may understand how mean and vile a part he is therein acting. Let his own *real sentiments* be here specified, together with his *professions*, in the words of our Church, and his *evasions* to satisfy his conscience, in this *sacred* engagement.

“ My faith is, that the three Persons are *three Beings*, and

ⁿ See Collection of Queries, p. 60.

“ *three substances*; two of them differing from the first, as *finite*
 “ and *infinite*: yet I profess with *Article* the 1st, that they are
 “ of *one substance*, (*ejusdem essentia*,) because the words of *one*
 “ *substance* may either signify I know not what, (see the Case,
 “ p. 40,) or may be interpreted as Eusebius did the ὁμοούσιον, to
 “ signify that *the Son and Holy Ghost have no likeness at all to the*
 “ *things which are made*, (therefore *not made*,) but are like the *Father*
 “ *in every respect*, (see the Case, p. 17,) therefore not differing *in-*
 “ *finitely*, or as *finite from infinite*.

“ My faith is, that the *Father only*, in opposition to *all other*
 “ *Persons* whatever, is *the very and eternal God*; and conse-
 “ quently, that the *Son is not the very and eternal God*: yet I
 “ make no scruple to profess, with *Article* the 2nd, that *the Son is*
 “ *the very and eternal God*: not the same *God*, but another *God*;
 “ two very and eternal *Gods*, the *divinity* of the latter being
 “ *derived* from the former.

“ I believe that the *Holy Ghost* is no where set forth in Scrip-
 “ ture as *God*, and that he is not included in the one *infinite*
 “ *substance*, but *finite* of course: yet I readily profess with *Article*
 “ the 5th, that *the Holy Ghost is of one substance, majesty, and*
 “ *glory, with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God*: not
 “ the same *God*, but another; in all, *three very and eternal Gods*°,
 “ by ineffable communication of divine powers and dignity from
 “ one to the other two.

“ My faith is, that to say, *God is three Persons*, is the direct
 “ contradictory to the doctrine of St. Paul. Nevertheless, it
 “ may be *proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture*, that
 “ the *Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is*
 “ *all one*, and that *they are not three Gods, but one God*. This I
 “ scruple not to profess, because I can understand *there are not*,
 “ when I read *they are not*.

“ My faith is, that the *Creed* called *Athanasian*, composed in
 “ a *very dark and ignorant age*, has affirmed more than is *neces-*
 “ *sary*, and more than is *true*^p, according to the compiler’s sense:
 “ yet I willingly subscribe to *Article* the 8th, asserting that it
 “ *ought thoroughly to be received and believed, and may be proved*
 “ *by most certain warrants of holy Scripture*; because I hope,

° See my Defence, vol. i. p. 469,
 470, 476, 477.

^p See Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine,

p. 418. 1st edit. and my Case of Arian
 Subscription, page 294, &c. of thi
 volume.

“ some way or other, to wrest it to a meaning suitable to my
 “ own *hypothesis*.

“ I do not believe it at all *necessary* to *salvation*, to *worship*
 “ *one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity*; or to profess *perfect*
 “ *God and perfect man*^q united in one Person: yet I readily ac-
 “ knowledge, with *Article* the 8th, that it *may be proved by most*
 “ *certain warrants of holy Scripture*, that whosoever does not keep
 “ this faith whole and undefiled, shall, without doubt, *perish ever-*
 “ *lastingly*.

“ My faith is, that there is but one Godhead supreme, viz. the
 “ Godhead of the Father; and that the Godhead of the Son is
 “ not the same Godhead, but inferior, and the Godhead of the
 “ Holy Ghost still more inferior: yet I willingly allow, with
 “ *Article* the 8th, that it *may be proved by most certain warrants*,
 “ &c. that *the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy*
 “ *Ghost is all one*, the divinity of the two latter being derived
 “ from the former.

“ My faith is, that *there are not three eternal Persons*, and that
 “ particularly as to the *eternity* of the Son, there is *no mention* at
 “ all of it in *Scripture*: yet it may be proved by most *certain*
 “ *warrants of holy Scripture*, that *the whole three Persons are co-*
 “ *eternal together*; that is, so far as an existence before *times*, or
 “ *ages*, necessarily implies *coeternal*^r.

“ I do by no means allow that the three Persons are, or can
 “ be, *one eternal*: yet I readily profess it *may be proved*, &c. that
 “ *they are not three eternal, but one eternal*, because I can put *there*
 “ for *they*, tacitly supposing one, when I read the other.

“ My faith is, that God the Son is *precarious* in his existence,
 “ that he has *no foundation* of his personal *Godhead*, but his
 “ *exaltation*, that he is no more than *an angel of God*, that an
 “ *angel* might *strengthen* him, that he was once *ignorant* in his
 “ highest nature, and was *properly exalted*, (all which it would
 “ be *blasphemy* to ascribe to *the very God*, or to any thing but a
 “ *creature*, according to the common acceptance of *creature*),
 “ yet I scruple not to assert that he is *very God of very God*,
 “ and that he is *the very and eternal God*, neither *made*, nor
 “ created; that is to say, neither made nor created by *himself*^s,
 “ but by the Father only.

^q See my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 295, &c. of this volume.

tion, p. 297, &c. of this volume.

^s See Collection of Queries, p. 60.

^r See my Case of Arian Subscription,

“ My belief is, that to say, *three Persons are one God*, is contrary to Scripture : yet I scruple not to declare that the *Book of Common Prayer*, which frequently asserts and inculcates that very thing, *contains nothing contrary to the word of God*.

“ I do not believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are *one God* ; it is *contradictory* to St. Paul : yet I am content to say, O holy, blessed, and glorious Trinity, *three Persons and one God*, &c. And frequently, in my yearly course of prayers, I call upon *all the three*, under the style and title of *one God* : for, though it be delivering a formal *lie*, before God and man, and in a point of the highest consequence ; yet I make no scruple of it, because *I must freely own, that I see no contradiction, no necessary absurdity, in the use of what a man may wish to have in some things corrected*.

“ To conclude, I do not believe that the *glory* of the *Son*, or of the *Holy Ghost*, is any way comparable to the glory of the *Father* : yet I scruple not to be the mouth of the congregation, in saying, † *That which we believe of the glory of the Father, the same we believe of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, without any difference or inequality*. This solemn mockery, in the face of God and man, may *lawfully be used* ; because, again, I see no absurdity in the *use* of what a man may wish to have in some things corrected.”

This representation of the import of Arian subscription, I take to be fully supported by what hath been above cited ; though I have not every where used their very words ; thinking it sufficient to give their *certain* sense. I might easily have drawn it out into a much greater length, but that I am unwilling to be tedious, and incline to think that the very meanest readers may now fully apprehend what a grimace and banter our Arian reconcilers make of their solemn *subscription*. Yet they stand up for it, even in printed books ; as if the first elements of *sincerity* were almost lost ; or *common sense* were extinct among us. This it is that has obliged me to be so particular, and to lay these things plain and open before the *eyes* of the readers, that they may even *see* how the case stands, almost without the pain of any thought or reflection.

I might here take leave of this *writer*, having abundantly confuted his confident assertion about the *generality*, or *lati-*

† See Case of Subscription to the XXXIX Articles, p. 46.

tude of expression, supposed in our Church's doctrine of the *Trinity*. It is, now at least, clear and manifest, that the expressions of our *public forms* (so far as concerns the points in dispute) are *fixed, special, and determinate* as possible: nor could the wit of man invent any more particular or stronger expressions against the *new scheme*, than are already in our *Creeeds, Liturgy, and Articles*.

This *writer's* main pretence being thus taken off, other occasional or incidental passages may deserve the less notice. But since I have begun, I shall now go through with him, and answer every little cavil, which may either seem to require it, or may give me an opportunity of further illustrating any part of our present argument.

Object. "If the meaning of the Articles be in such a sense one meaning, that they can be subscribed honestly only by such as agree in that one meaning; all, or all but one, of those great men, Bp. Bull, Dr. Wallis, South, Sherlock, Bennet, &c. must have been guilty, &c." p. 5.

Answer. If this writer can shew that any of those *great men* contradicted any point of doctrine plainly *determined* by our Church, as I have shewn of him and his party; then I condemn those men, be they ever so considerable, as well as the *Arian subscribers*: but if they differed in ever so many questions relating to the *Trinity*, (as there may be a great many,) and none of those questions decided either way by our Church; their differing in such *undetermined* points does not affect their *subscription*, any more than their differing about the *inhabitants* of the *moon*. Let this gentleman shew what positions of those great men plainly confront the positions of our Church; that so they may be condemned, as they ought to be, and their *subscription* with them. Or if this cannot be shewn, how *impertinent* is the objection!

Object. "When any Church requires subscription to its own sense of particular passages of Scripture, which do not contain the terms of salvation, and refuses communion with those who cannot conform to that, it is confessed that such a Church does that which it ought not to do," p. 5.

Answer. This is entirely foreign. *Subscription* is not a term of *lay-communion*, but of *ministerial conformity*, or *acceptance of trusts and privileges*: so that this gentleman here seems

to have forgot what he was upon. Besides that, had the dispute really been about the terms of *communion*, his pretence is not *pertinent*; because the Doctrine of a *coeternal Trinity* is really a *fundamental Article*, and such as our Church declares to be *necessary to salvation*.

Object. "The Articles are so composed, that some of them "are on all hands allowed to be left at large, the composers "intending a latitude, &c." p. 8.

Answer. I admitted this, in my papers before, and sufficiently shewed how impertinent the plea is to the point in hand. Undoubtedly, it never was the intent of our Church to determine all *questions* relating to every subject whereof it treats. Yet she intended to determine, and has determined, *many questions*; particularly the main questions between *Protestants* and *Papists*, between *Catholics* and *Arians*. When Franciscus a Sancta Clara^u took upon him to reconcile our Articles to *Popery*; what did he else but play the *Jesuit*, and render himself ridiculous? The like has been since done by our Arian reconcilers, with as much wresting and straining, and with as little success. It might be diverting enough, (were not the thing too serious, and full of sad reflections,) to compare the *Papist* and the *Arian* together, and to observe which of them has been the greater master in this exercise of wit, and has found out the most ingenious and surprising comment upon an *Article*. Our Articles however will stand, in their own native light, in defiance to both; so long as gravity, sobriety, and manly thought shall be esteemed and valued above the little arts of equivocating, and playing upon words. The Articles are not *general*, so far as concerns our present debate; and we need not inquire further. There is a *medium*, I suppose, between determining *all* questions, and determining *none*: one might justly wonder how this *writer* could be insensible of it, and fall into so unaccountable a way of reasoning.

Object. "We must have some *criteria* by which we may judge "which these particular Articles are, &c."

Answer. The *criteria*, in the present case, are *plain* words, not *capable* of an Arian meaning. In other cases, any *certain* indication of the *imposer's* meaning is a *criterion* to fix the sense

^u The title is, *Expositio paraphrastica Articulorum Confessionis Anglicæ*. Published A. D. 1634.

of a proposition. When there are neither *plain* words, nor any other *certain* indication of the *imposer's* meaning; the Article, so far, is left at large, and the point left undetermined.

Object. "One man subscribes to the truth of this *general* proposition, *in the Unity of this Godhead*—*there be three Persons*: meaning by this, that each divine Person is an *individual intelligent Agent*, but as subsisting in one *undivided substance*, they are altogether, *in that respect*, but one *undivided intelligent Agent*.—Another man, who does not understand this notion, nay, that sees a *contradiction* in it, is convinced that each of the three Persons is an intelligent Agent, whereof the Son and Holy Ghost is subordinate to the Father: what hinders that he cannot subscribe *honestly* and *fairly* to the *general* proposition?" p. 12.

Answer. Here are several mistakes. In the first place, that *proposition* of the first Article is not *general*, but *special*, in respect of the Arian controversy. *This Godhead* plainly denotes the one divine nature, "the one living and true God," before described in that Article. "In the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons;" therefore the three Persons are the "one living and true God;" directly contrary to the Arian doctrine, and to the *new scheme*; which is nothing else but *old Arianism* revived. As to the *explication* which this gentleman carps at, it is not properly an *explication* of the Article, (which meddles not at all with the question of *intelligent Agents*;) but it is determining a point relating to the subject, more *particularly* than the Article hath done; and this in answer to an *objection* raised out of men's over *curiosity* in those matters. I know no reason this *writer* has to find fault with that *solution*, more than this, that it fully answers an *objection* which the party are apt most to triumph in. *Intelligent Agent* is understood either of *Person* or *Being*. *Unus intelligens Agens*, or *unum intelligens Agens*, may be equally rendered *one intelligent Agent*: the former signifying *intelligent Person*, the latter *intelligent Being*. In the former sense, every Person is an *intelligent Agent*; in the latter, all the three are *one intelligent Agent*: therefore *intelligent Agent* and *Person* are not reciprocal. He that teaches this doctrine *subscribes* honestly, because he believes *all* that the Article teaches; and besides, guards it from objections. But he that interprets the Article to mean no more than that there are *three Persons*, two of which are *subordinate* to one, is worthy of censure: first,

for giving us, at least, a *lame* interpretation, short of the true and full meaning of the Article: or, secondly, for doubling upon the word *subordinate*, understanding by it *inferior*; excluding the two Persons from the *one supreme Godhead*, and thereby running directly counter to the true sense of the Article, which *supposes* all the three to be the “one living and true God,” and *expressly* asserts that they are “of one substance, power, and “eternity.” This *writer* may now be able to distinguish between an *honest* and a *fraudulent* subscriber; if he does but know the difference between one who fully believes the *whole* of what he *professes*, and one who either believes it but *in part*, or really *disbelieves* the greatest part of it.

Object. “Should any one arise, and declare those men to be “*prevaricators*——who differ from the doctrine he lays down as “*the meaning* of the Article; I ask, whether this be not to *put* “*his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the Article?*——“The fault which is condemned by the King’s *Declaration*, and “which King Charles threatened with displeasure, was, the “drawing the Article aside *any way or either way*,” p. 13, 14.

Answer. I perceive, this author knows little either of the history, design, or meaning of King Charles’s Declaration. The design was to put a stop to the *quinquarticular* controversy, then warmly agitated. The King, to prevent or quiet those disputes, thought it the most prudent way to forbid either party’s being more *particular* than the Articles themselves had been. And we find that, in fact, both sides were censured when they launched out beyond the *general* meaning of the Articles in that controversy; the *King* looking upon any meaning beyond the *general* one, to be a man’s *own* meaning or sense, not the meaning or sense of the Article. What is this to the point we are upon, where the *meaning* was never thought to be *general* only, either by that *King*, or any other, or by any considering man else? He that declares and demonstrates the sense to be *special* and *determinate*, against ancient or modern Arians, does not put his *own* sense upon the Articles, neither does he “draw the Articles aside any way;” but he secures to the Articles their *own true* and certain meaning, and rescues them from the fraudulent comments of those who really “draw “them aside,” and most notoriously pervert them. The royal *Declaration* orders every man to submit to the Article “in the “plain and full meaning thereof,” which if it be understood to

reach to our present case, (though the *King* seems to have had an eye chiefly, or solely, to quite another thing,) is a clear condemnation of this gentleman, and of every Arian subscriber.

Object. "When Mr. Rogers published his Comment upon the Articles, his book, says Dr. Fuller, gave very great offence, "because he confined the Articles to too narrow a meaning," p. 17.

Answer. Very right; and I take Mr. Rogers to have been blamable in so doing. But it is not said that Mr. Rogers confined all the Articles, or the Articles concerning the *Trinity*, to "too narrow a meaning;" nor can this *writer* shew that we do it, in condemning the Arians as fraudulent subscribers.

Object. "Such a latitude of subscription was allowed by the "Council of Nice," p. 16.

Answer. The fact cannot be proved; but the contrary may, if there be a proper occasion. However, I have no need to insist upon it, at present, because our *Liturgy*, *Articles*, and *Athanasian Creed* are more particular and determinate than the Council of Nice: so that, now at least, the sense of the *ὁμοούσιον* is fixed and determined, to every subscriber, beyond all cavil or exception.

Object. "Had the compilers or imposers intended to have "been more determinate upon any point, they ought to have "been more *explicit* and *particular*," p. 17, 18.

Answer. I defy the wit of man to invent any expressions more *particular* and *explicit*, than many of those are, which appear in our *public forms*; so far as concerns the true faith in the Trinity in opposition to the Arian doctrines. They have guarded against every thing but *equivocation*, *mental reservation*, and a violent *perverting* of their *certain* meaning. This is enough among men of *sense* and *probity*, which is always supposed. No laws, oaths, covenants, or contracts, can ever stand upon any other foot than this, that when they are plainly enough worded for every man to understand that will be *honest*, it is sufficient; though it were still possible for men of guile to *incent* some sinister meaning. I desire no other favour than to have our *public forms*, in this case, tried by the same rule.

I may observe, by the way, how unwarily this *writer* has furnished us with an argument (which his party perhaps may give him no thanks for) in behalf of our forefathers, for their *enlarging* of *Creeeds*. He would have told them, even after the

compiling of the Athanasian Creed, that "they ought *still* to "have been more explicit and particular," if they would secure the point they aimed at. I do not altogether differ from him, provided the thing *could* be done; and upon the supposition that we have been gradually departing, further and further, from the *primitive* plainness and *sincerity*. Nevertheless, I can hardly think of any additional security to what is already, except it were such as we have seen added to the *abjuration oath*; a caveat against any *equivocation*, *evasion*, or *mental reservation* whatsoever: which yet would not bind up those that can leap over any thing; (and *honest* men are the same, *without* it or *with* it;) only it might make them ashamed of ever appearing after, in defence of any *equivocating* practices.

Object. "Where a man does *all* that he is commanded to do, "and does it openly, and with all the circumstances enjoined, "he cannot be taxed with any defect in, or breach of, regard to "his superiors," p. 18.

Answer. For the purpose; if a man takes the *abjuration oath*, openly, with all the circumstances enjoined, only *not believing* a syllable of it; he is, no doubt, very *faithful* to, very *observant* of, his *superiors*. There is only this *circumstance* wanting, (which if it be not *enjoined*, is always *supposed* necessary, and to need no *enjoining*,) that the man be *sincere*: and this one defect turns all his pretended *regard* to his *superiors* into a direct *affront*, *rudeness*, and *iniquity* towards them.

Object. "He that thinks the general words, *Swear not at all*, "to be exclusive of *all* oaths, and he that thinks it lawful to "swear in *some* cases, can subscribe to, or give an unfeigned "assent to, St. Matthew's Gospel," p. 21.

Answer. But if either of them as certainly *knows* that his pretended sense of "Swear not at all," is not the true sense of *Christ*, as our Arian subscribers *know* that their sense of the Articles is not the true sense of our Church; such a Person in professing an unfeigned assent to St. Matthew's Gospel, would give himself the lie, and be guilty of a vile hypocrisy and per-
varication. This *author* is forced to allow, in the next page, (p. 22,) that he and his party "take the propositions" (of our Church "in a sense which they know *was not* the sense of the "compilers and imposers," p. 22.

Object. "If they" (the compilers and imposers) "happen so "to have expressed themselves that their words are consistent

“ with Scripture, their propositions may be assented to, though
 “ in a sense different from what they were originally intended
 “ by the compilers.”

Answer. They have not *happened* so to express themselves as that their words may be consistent with what this *writer* calls *Scripture*; any otherwise than as a man may *happen*, after using the plainest and strongest words that can be thought on to express his sense, to fall into ill hands that will industriously pervert it. This indeed may *happen*, in any *laws, oaths, contracts, or engagements* whatever, however cautiously worded: nor is there any security against it (as before said) but the common sense and probity of mankind; nor any *rule* to go by in such cases, if a liberty be once taken of running against the *known, certain* meaning of the *imposers*. Get loose from this, and the rest is wild confusion, endless playing upon words, and making a jest and banter of all speech and language.

Object. “ If their words are *fairly* capable of a Scripture meaning, then a man may subscribe to those words: if they “ are not, it is not lawful to subscribe,” p. 23.

Answer. By *Scripture* meaning, this *writer* understands his own *Arian* meaning. I readily rest the issue of the whole cause upon this very point. If the words of our Church’s forms be *fairly capable* of such a meaning, it is lawful to subscribe. But it is evident as the light, that they are many of them neither *fairly*, nor *at all* capable of such a meaning as the *new scheme* requires; and therefore, by this gentleman’s own confession, it is *not lawful* for him or his party to *subscribe*. Indeed, words are not *fairly* capable of a *false* sense, if we are any way *certain* of the *true* one; that is, of the sense *intended* by the *speaker* or *writer*. We cannot *fairly* misconstrue any words, if we are fully conscious of the *true* construction; though the words themselves might otherwise bear it. This I lay down as a rule of truth, which I think will hold in most, perhaps in all cases. But I have no occasion for it in the present dispute, because the words themselves are by no means capable of an *Arian* construction, consistent with *grammar, or custom of speech*. This I have abundantly proved in my former papers, (chapter the 5th,) and now again in these: and this *writer* himself appears to be sensible of it, with respect to the *Liturgy* and *Athanasian Creed*, at least, by his profound silence on that head; never attempting to confute that part, though the most material in our present controversy.

When therefore this gentleman says, that he pleads not for *subscription* with such reserves as, “so far as is agreeable to “Scripture,” he only betrays his want of reach. Dr. Clarke never yet *discarded* that principle, so far as I know, though his disciples have; and perhaps he is the wiser in not doing it. However, I never directly *charged* the Doctor with *holding* that principle, as this *writer* falsely pretends, page the 24th; but I shewed that the Doctor must have that, or nothing, to retreat to at length, and that he had expressed himself in such a manner as to create just suspicion that he really gave into it; having never expressly condemned it, and having used such arguments for *subscribing*, as will either justify *both* kinds of reservation, or neither.

Object. “It is a shallow artifice indeed, in controverted points, “to assume that a man’s interpretations of Scripture are *Scripture*, and that his adversary’s are not so: but it is the artifice, “*shallow* as it is, that runs through the Doctor’s book, and “makes him treat his adversaries with so much insolence,” p. 25.

Answer. This *writer* appears here to have been much out of humour: the reason is, I had unravelled a piece of sophistry whereon a mighty stress was laid; which is very *provoking*. The *sophistry* was this:

“The Church of England permits the subscriber to receive and “believe whatever is agreeable to Scripture.

“We of the *new scheme* are ready to receive whatever is agreeable to Scripture, as by us interpreted.

“Therefore the Church of England permits us to *subscribe* in “our own sense of Scripture.”

The fallacy, I observed, lay here, that the Church of England, by *Scripture*, must mean her *own* sense of Scripture, as to points by her determined: and therefore the argument really concluded for the *Church’s sense*, which they made to conclude for the *Arian* sense, though not the *Church’s*. “The Church surely,” said I, “has as good a right to call her interpretations by the name of “*Scripture*, as the Arians have to call theirs so; and then her “requiring subscription to ‘that only which is agreeable to *Scripture*,’ is requiring subscription in her *own* sense of Scripture, “and none else. Let the *Arian* sense of Scripture be *Scripture* “to Arians; but then let them subscribe only to *Arian* expositions; which are nothing akin to those of our Church.”

x See my Case of Arian Subscription, p. 276, 277, of this volume.

Now, this *angry* gentleman, either not understanding (for what is so blind as *passion*?) what I was talking about, or industriously dissembling it, represents me as not allowing the Arians to call their *own* sense of Scripture *Scripture*: notwithstanding that I had allowed it, in full and express words. But I suffer them not to think that they subscribe according to the true intent and meaning of our Church, by subscribing to their *own* sense of Scripture, which is not the *Church's*, but *repugnant* to it. I suppose only that the *compilers* of our forms, and *imposers*, were not bereft of *common* sense, were not downright idiots; intending a *subscription* to bind men up, and at the same time leaving every man as much at liberty as if there were *no subscription*. They that can suppose the governors of Church and State so *weak* and *silly* as this comes to, must not take it amiss, if we remove the undeserved reproach from wise, great, and good men, and return it to the proper owners.

Object. "It is an unaccountable method of arguing, in Dr. Waterland, that because *state oaths*, which are contrived and penned without ambiguity, and on purpose to guard against some particular things or persons, ought not to be taken in any sense but that of the *imposers*—that therefore subscriptions in cases which are not parallel, are *fraudulent*. Such arguments are only arguments of *calumny* and *slander*; and only prove that he that urges such, wants nothing but power to persecute," p. 19.

Answer. This gentleman is again pressed somewhere very hard, to make him forget his temper. I have told the world nothing but the plain truth, that the case of *oaths* and *subscriptions* is *parallel*. I now appeal to the passages above cited: and, let every reader judge whether they be not as directly opposite to the *new scheme*, as the *abjuration oath* itself is against a *Popish* successor; saving only the *caveat* in the close, against *equivocations*. Which *proviso*, however, is always to be understood (though not particularly expressed) in all *subscriptions*, *contracts*, *covenants*, *oaths*, &c. Our *courts of justice* have not judged it necessary to add the like *caveat* upon the taking of every *oath*, because the age is not, at present, thought *wicked* enough to want it: what it may be in a while, if such loose principles as I am here confuting, prevail, I do not say. But to proceed: it will not be a harder matter to *elude* and *pervert* any *oath* whatever, than it is to evade the many strong expressions of our Church

in favour of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity. This is what the gentleman is so *angry* at, that he has no way to avoid the force of the argument but by a confident avowal of a *false* fact; as if our *public forms*, as well as *state oaths*, were not penned, in this case, *without ambiguity*, and on purpose to guard against *some particular things or persons*. He that calls this plain argument *calumny* and *slander*, commits the very fault which he condemns, in calling *good, evil*: and as to the mean insinuation about *persecuting*, I suppose it needs no answer.

Object. “ If the Archbishops and Bishops, or even the *Legislature* itself, cannot determine what shall be judged agreeable “ or disagreeable to the Articles, the *insolence* of a private man “ must be intolerable, who shall presume to dictate to others, “ and to charge men with *prevarication* and *fraudulent* subscrip- “ tion, &c.” p. 32.

Answer. Softer words might have served as well, and have never hurt the argument, if it be any: the world will easily see the difference between *reasoning* and *railing*. I take not upon me to determine what the *Bishops* or *Legislature* may do: nor is it my province to make *authentic* interpretations *valid* in the *courts of law*. But, I humbly conceive, it lies within my compass to state a plain *case of conscience*, to detect *loose casuistry*, and to remonstrate against it. I know of no *insolence* there is in determining, that *coequal* signifies *coequal*, or *coeternal* *coeternal*; that *one God* does not signify *three Gods*, nor *one substance* three substances; or that the word *they* is something more than a different spelling for *there*. These and the like plain things *common sense* had determined long ago; I only repeat: deciding for the *court of conscience*, not the *courts of justice*, as this gentleman, by mistake, seems to apprehend.

Object. “ Dr. Waterland indeed refers us to the writers of “ the time when the Articles were compiled——To send a man “ to the writers of that time to know the meaning of the “ Articles, when no man wrote by authority, is to make those “ writers the standard of the Church of England, and not its “ own words or declarations,” p. 34, 35.

Answer. It is pleasant to observe how this *author* strains to make me say something which he thinks he may tolerably answer, diverting the reader from the main point. I referred to the *scope* and *intention* of the writers^y, in order to know the

^y See my Case of Subscription, p. 267 of this volume.

meaning of their *writings*; which I hope is no unreasonable method: and I was there speaking of writings in general. But as to the particular case, now in hand, I no where *send a man* to the writers of that time; nor does so plain a matter require it. The words themselves are sufficient, and carry their own interpretation with them. I desire no further *postulatum* than this, that our language has not been quite *reversed*; that *light* does not now signify *darkness*, or a *triangle a square*. I can wave abundance of niceties which might occur on the subject of *subscription*, and might be properly brought in, upon more doubtful cases. In the mean while, I may observe, that this *author's* argument is *ridiculous* enough, that the *writers* of the *time* may not be useful to discover the *scope* and *intention*, (suppose of a *law* or an *article*,) because those *writers* were not *law-makers*, or men in *authority*. It is well for the *historians*, that they do not often meet with such hard measure.

Object. “ Let Dr. Waterland vindicate the Arminians from
 “ the charge of *unrighteousness* and *deceit*, and I will venture
 “ then to acquit even his adversaries from the same charge, by
 “ the same arguments.—All the world must own (*our Articles*)
 “ to be formed upon *Calvinistical* principles; and to have been
 “ deemed *Calvinistical* Articles by our own Archbishops, and by
 “ whole Convocations in England and Ireland.—Has that
 “ learned Bishop (Bull) proved unanswerably, that the sense of
 “ the compilers of our Articles was not *Calvinistical*? It is one
 “ thing to say, that the Articles are so expressed, as not neces-
 “ sarily to oblige men to profess *Calvinism*: but it is another to
 “ say, that the sense of the compilers was not *Calvinistical*.
 “ Did Archbishop Whitgift know *the sense of the compilers of our*
 “ *Articles*? Did Archbishop Usher? Did our Universities in
 “ Whitgift's times? Did the Irish Convocations which settled
 “ their Articles? Did our Divinity Professors in Queen Elizabeth's
 “ days?”

Answer. Before I come directly to the matter, I must observe that this *writer* here seriously delivers his persuasion, that our Articles are *Calvinistical*, and formed upon *Calvinistical* principles; at the same time, as I conceive, acknowledging himself an Arminian; which I suppose may be true of the rest of the party. If this be really the case, I must come upon them with a double charge of *prevaricating* in their subscription. The Calvinists, agreeably to their principles, have indeed often pre-

tended that the Articles are *Calvinistical*: the Anti-Calvinists, on the other hand, have as constantly pleaded that the Articles are not *Calvinistical*, but rather *Anti-Calvinistical*; that they are not against them, but rather on their side. And thus the contending parties have gone on, endeavouring to justify their subscriptions, respectively, by their different persuasions. But here, it seems, is a *new set of men*, believing the Articles to be *Calvinistical*, and subscribing in *Arminianism*: and they are the first that ever boasted of so unaccountable a conduct. To excuse one fault they commit another, heaping sin upon sin, and proclaiming their own condemnation. Let them get off from the charge as they can: as to others, who understand the nature of our Articles too well to think them *Calvinistical*, they are very excusable in their avowal of *Arminianism*; so far as our divines do really avow it: for I know not that they have ever adopted the whole *Arminian* system. The historical hints given by this *writer* carry so little of argument in them, that if he has not a great deal more to urge, he will never be able to prove that our Articles are *Calvinistical*. When he speaks of *all the world's owning* it, he betrays nothing but his unacquaintedness with books and men. Has he never seen Dr. Bennet's Directions, or Bishop Bull's Apologia, or Heylin's Quinquarticular History, or Plaifere's Appello Evangelium, or Mountague's Appello Cæsarem, to name no more? Does *all the world* own that these *great men* were mistaken; or that they have not sufficiently shewn that the pretence of the Calvinists is entirely groundless?

For my own part, I think it has been abundantly proved, that our *Articles, Liturgy, &c.* are not *Calvinistical*; but I have no need to insist upon the *negative*: let this *writer*, or any man else, prove the *affirmative*, that they are *Calvinistical*, as is pretended. What he means by whole Convocations in England, determining the Articles to be *Calvinistical*, I do not at all understand. When he tells me what *Convocations*, and when, the thing may be considered: in the mean while, let it pass for a slip of his pen. His other historical hints may be thrown into order of time, and in such order I shall here briefly consider them. His vouchers are,

1. Archbishop Whitgift.
2. Our Divinity Professors in Queen Elizabeth's days.
3. Our Universities in Whitgift's time.

4. The Irish Convocations.

5. Archbishop Usher.

These are the particulars of the evidence, hinted rather than produced, to prove that our Articles are *Calvinistical*, or formed upon Calvin's principles.

As to Archbishop Whitgift, the Universities, and their *professors*, they all fall within the same compass of time; and their judgment in this matter was discovered chiefly in the year 1595: in the two famous cases of Mr. Barret and Dr. Baro. At that time *Calvinism* appears to have prevailed at Cambridge beyond what it had formerly done^z. The seeds had been sown by Cartwright some time before, while he was Margaret Professor there; and the learned Whitaker, who was made Regius Professor in 1580, very much promoted and furthered their growth. Yet Dr. Baro, of *Anti-Calvinistical* principles, was *Professor* (Margaret Professor) before Whitaker, about 1571; and had for many years gone on in his *Lectures*, without any censure or disturbance. *Calvinism* however by degrees prevailing, and especially under the influence and authority of Whitaker, the opposite opinion, of course, lost ground. But there were several considerable men, notwithstanding, who approved not the *Calvinian* tenets; and among the rest, Mr. Barret, then Fellow of Caius College. In the year 1595, he took the freedom, in a Sermon *ad clerum*, to censure the *Calvinian* tenets, and even Calvin himself, very smartly. This gave offence to the *Vice-Chancellor* (or deputy *Vice-Chancellor*) and *Heads*, who proceeded against him, and forced him at length to sign a feigned *retractation*, which they had drawn up for him. It appears from the form of *retractation*, that the *Heads* who drew it up, or enjoined it, thought our 17th Article to favour them. Within a while, this matter was laid before Archbishop Whitgift, who, in a letter to the Lord Burghley, expresses his great dislike of the proceedings against Barret, for that some of the points which the *Heads* had caused him to *recant*, were "such as the best learned Protestants, then living, varied in judgment upon; and that the most ancient and best divines in the land were in the chiefest points in opinion, against their resolutions^a," the resolutions of the *Heads*, in Barret's case. Hitherto then we have little reason to believe that our Articles

^z See Mr. Strype's *Life of Whitgift*, p. 435.

^a *Ibid.* p. 450.

favoured *Calvinism*, if Archbishop Whitgift was any judge of it. But besides this, the Archbishop had sent a letter to the *Heads*^b, wherein he tells them that in some points of Barret's Retraction, they had made him to affirm "that which was contrary to the doctrine holden and expressed by many sound and learned divines in the Church of England, and in other churches likewise, men of best account; and that which, for his own part, he thought to be false, and contrary to the Scriptures. For the Scriptures were plain, that God by his *absolute* will did not hate and reject any man. There might be impiety in believing the one; there could be none in believing the other. Neither was it contrary to any *Article of religion*, established by authority in this Church of England, but rather agreeable thereto."

He goes on to ask, upon this and that point maintained by Barret, against "what Article of religion established in this Church was it?" and some opinions of Barret which the Archbishop thought untrue, yet, he said, had no "article directly against them." Thus far the Archbishop. Next it is observable that Whitaker, in his Answer to the Archbishop^c, specified no *Article* of the Church to justify the proceedings against Barret. "For the points of doctrine," saith he, "we are fully persuaded that Mr. Barret hath taught untruth, if not against the *Articles*, yet against the religion of our Church, publicly received; and always held in her Majesty's reign, and maintained in all sermons, disputations, and lectures." This plea of Whitaker's is false in fact, though he might not be aware of it. For, to say nothing of Harsnet's Sermon at St. Paul's Cross, in 1584, and of Hooker's at the Temple, in the year 1585, both condemning *absolute reprobation*; Dr. Baro, at Cambridge, had held *lectures*, preached *sermons*, and *determined* in the schools against the *Calvinian* tenets, for the space of fourteen or fifteen years before: as may be inferred from a letter of the *Heads* to the Lord Burghley, their Chancellor, extant in Heylin^d, bearing date March 8, 1595. But, however this matter be, it is observable, that though the *Heads* in Barret's case had appealed to Article the 17th, and the Archbishop had particularly demanded of them to make good their proceedings by any *Articles* of the Church; yet Dr. Whitaker then thought it the wisest

^b See Strype, p. 440.

^c See Strype's Appendix, p. 199.

^d Heylin's

Quinquarticular Hist. p. 624.

and safest way to drop further appeals to the *Articles*, and to rest his cause rather upon the *current doctrine* of divines. Now, though it were ever so true that *Calvinism* had obtained many years in the *pulpits*, and professors' *chairs*, it no more follows from thence that *Calvinism* was the doctrine laid down in our *Articles*, than that the Cartesian philosophy was there, for the time it prevailed. All that can be justly inferred from it, is, that the generality of our divines thought the *Calvinian* tenets to be *consistent* with our *Articles*; and they might mistake even in that also. But to proceed in the story of Barret.

The *Heads* of the University, afterwards, make their humble suit to the Archbishop, to favour and countenance their proceedings against Barret. ^eThey allege that several positions of Barret were contrary to the *Articles*, *Catechisms*, and *Common Prayer*; but they neither specify those *positions*, nor at that time point to any *Article*, or particular passage of the *Catechisms* or *Common Prayer*; so that this general charge is of little or no moment. Some time after, Dr. Whitaker charged Barret upon the *Articles* of the Church, and particularly on the 11th, of *Justification*. But the Archbishop still declared that he did not yet perceive^f how such a certain position of Barret's, which he had been charged with as impugning the *Articles*, did really differ from any Article of our Church. And as Dr. Whitaker had particularly charged him upon the Article of *Justification*, the Archbishop was not satisfied with it; but desired that further inquiry might be made of those points "wherein they thought he varied from the book of *Articles*." ^gAt last a favourable *retractation* was by the Archbishop appointed for Barret; and so this matter ended. From the whole proceedings nothing certain can be gathered as to any *Calvinism* being taught by our *Articles*. The Calvinists were willing to claim them, and made some pretences that way; but, at length, rather dropped than pursued it; not being able to make that point good, though often insisted on by the Archbishop.

It may be said, that the Archbishop however, upon this occasion, countenanced and authorized the Lambeth *Articles*, drawn up by Whitaker on the foot of *Calvinism*. This is very true, though it is not so certain that the Archbishop understood them in so strict a sense as Whitaker did: for that they were

^e See Strype, p. 450.

^f Ibid. p. 456.

^g Ibid. p. 455.

thought capable of a milder and softer construction, appears by Baro's orthodox explanation^h of them, which he sent to the Archbishop, vindicating his own sentiments to be consonant to the doctrine of the Church of England, in her *avowed Articles*, and urging that the Lambeth Articles were not to be understood so as to thwart the *old Articles* of the Churchⁱ. However, admitting that the Archbishop was so far a *Calvinist*, at last, as really to countenance the Lambeth Articles in their most rigid sense; yet this does not prove that he thought the same doctrine to be taught in the *Articles* of our Church. For had that been the case, what occasion was there for drawing up nine *new Articles*? Might not the *old* ones have served for quieting all differences? It is plain from hence, that the *old Articles* were not thought sufficient to end the dispute, or to condemn the *Anti-Calvinists*; but *new ones* were devised to supply that defect: which *new ones* might indeed be thought, by some, *consistent* with the old ones; and that is all. We see however, that the Lambeth Articles, in their strictest sense, appeared to others not very consistent with the doctrine of our Church. And it is well known that the *Queen* and *Court* disliked them^k, that they thought them destructive of *piety* and *government*; and the Archbishop, for countenancing them, narrowly escaped a *præmunire*.

I have but just touched upon Baro's prosecution, not thinking it necessary to relate that whole affair, which may be seen at large in our historians. He was an *Anti-Calvinist*, and had been so for many years in his sermons and lectures; was never called to account for it before the year 1595, then defended himself handsomely, and had the favour and countenance of Lord Burghley, who reprimanded the warm proceedings of the *Heads* against him, and told them that "as good and as ancient were "of another judgment," and that "they might punish him, but "it would be for well-doing^l." This discountenance from Court stopped the prosecution; and Baro enjoyed his professorship some time longer, till his resignation of it.

Mr. Strype^m mentions four considerable men of that University, that favoured Baro and his cause: Mr. Overall, Dr. Clayton,

^h Strype's Append. p. 201. Vid. etiam Hist. Attic. Lamb.

ⁱ Strype's Life of Whitg. p. 466.

^k See the Letter to the Duke of Buckingham in Heylin's Life of Laud,

p. 131. and Collier's Eecl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 734.

^l Strype's Life of Whitgift, p. 473.

^m Ibid. p. 473.

Mr. Harsnet, and Dr. Andrews. Overal succeeded Whitaker in the Regius Professorship soon after: so that I think the *writer* of the pamphlet had no occasion to boast of the *Divinity Professors* of that time. Baro, an *Anti-Calvinist*, was Margaret Professor before Whitaker was Regius: and the immediate successor to Whitaker was of the same sentiments, in the main, with Baro. Here I may take leave of Whitgift and the University in Queen Elizabeth's time. Nothing yet appears to make our Articles *Calvinistical*.

The next thing pretended is the Irish Convocations. The fact is this: *Calvinism* had got footing in Ireland before the year 1615. In that year they drew up a *confession* of their own, (not approving of the English Articles,) and they inserted the Lambeth Articles into their *confession*. Dr. Usher, then a professed *Calvinist*, drew up the *confession*. I see nothing in this matter to prove our Articles *Calvinistical*; unless their being rejected by the *Calvinists* can amount to a proof of their being *Calvinistical*. In the year 1634, the Irish Convocation, with Usher, now Lord Primate, received the XXXIX Articles, without formally laying aside the Lambeth Articles. This shews that Archbishop Usher and the Convocation thought those two kinds of Articles *consistent*: which they might be, though there were not a syllable of *Calvinism* in ours, if they were not plainly *Anti-Calvinistical*. So that here is nothing like a proof of the pretended *Calvinism* in our Articles, either in the judgment of Usher, or of the Irish Convocations. Usher, some years after, renounced his *Calvinian* principles, as is well attested by three good hands: but I do not find that he therewith renounced our *Articles*.

Having thus answered every pretence of this *writer* for his imaginary *Calvinism*; I may now, *ex abundanti*, throw in a few brief remarks which seem to me to plead strongly on the opposite side.

It has been often pleaded by learned men, and I think well proved, that our Articles (in the year 1552) were not drawn up by Calvin's scheme, but, next to Scripture and antiquity, upon the platform of the moderate Lutherans, the Augustan Confession, Melancthon's Doctrine, and the Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christian Man, compiled about nine years before the passing of our Articles, and by many of the same handsⁿ

ⁿ See Heylin's *Quinqu.* part ii. chap. 13. sect. 3.

that concurred with these in 1552. Our Articles therefore, in their original composition, were not *Calvinistical*: how they could come to be so afterwards, being still the same Articles, I cannot devise. I do not find that the *Calvinian* rigours had obtained here in king Edward's time, except among the *Gospel-lers*, (as they were then called,) "who were a scandal to the doctrine they professed," as Bishop Burnet^o says of them; and who were often smartly reflected on by Hooper, and other the most judicious Reformers. There were some disputes upon those heads, among the *confessors* in prison, in Queen Mary's time. But none of them yet appear to have run the lengths of *Calvinism* in all the *five points*. The refugees from Geneva, in Queen Elizabeth's days, began to propagate *Calvinism* pretty early; but it does not appear that they then claimed any countenance for it from our *Articles*; which still continued the same in those points after the revisal in 1562, and again in 1571. In the year 1572, the Calvinists themselves complain of some of our Bishops as also of the *Articles*. The authors of the *Second Admonition*, as Plaifere^q observes, do accuse some Bishops as suspected of the heresy of Pelagius, and say, "for free-will, not only they are suspected, but others also: and indeed the book of Articles of Christian religion speaketh very dangerously of falling from grace, which is to be reformed, because it too much inclineth to their error." We have the like complaint of theirs, not long after, taken notice of by Dean Bridges^r, in the year 1587, whereby it appears that the *Calvinists* then made no difference between the *justified* falling away finally, and the *elect*: though the doctrine of our Church is plain that the *regenerate*, or justified, may so fall. But as to the *elect*, if that be strictly understood, it is a contradiction to say, they shall *finally* perish. The *Calvinists*, at that time, were very far from boasting of our *Articles* being clear on their side: they suspected the very contrary, being sensible how the doctrines of *universal redemption*, and of *departing from grace*, bore hard upon their scheme.

In the years 1584 and 1585, we find Mr. Harsnet, and the judicious Hooker, both of them condemning the *Calvinistical*

^o Burnet, Hist. of the Reform. vol. ii. p. 107.

^p Heylin, Quinqu. Hist. part viii. ch. 17.

^q Plaifere, Appello Evang. part iii. ch. 10.

^r Bridges, Defence of the Government established, &c. p. 1308.

doctrine of *irrespective* reprobation; and both of them received and countenanced by Archbishop Whitgift.

In the year 1603, was the famous *Hampton-court Conference*. The *Calvinists* then moved that the *book of Articles* might be “explained in places obscure, and enlarged where some things were defective;” that the *Lambeth Articles* might be taken in, and that in the sixteenth Article, after the words, “depart from grace,” might be added, “but not totally, nor finally;” which would have defeated the whole intent and meaning of the Article^s. It seems, the *Calvinists* were not yet confident of our Articles being plainly, or at all on their side; as indeed they had no reason. Yet nothing was done to satisfy their scruples, or to relieve their uneasiness on that account.

In the year 1618, our *divines*, at the Synod of Dort, had commission to insist upon the doctrine of *universal redemption*, as the doctrine of the Church of England, (though they were out-voted in it,) which one doctrine, pursued in its just consequences, is sufficient to overthrow the whole *Calvinian* system of the five points.

In the year 1624, Mr. Mountague (then Prebendary of Windsor) openly disclaimed the *Calvinistical* tenets, as being the positions of *private* doctors only, not of the Church in her *public* forms. His “*Appello Cæsarem*,” wrote in vindication thereof, was approved by King James; and Dr. White ordered to license it with this approbation; “that there was nothing contained in it but what was agreeable to the public faith, doctrine, and discipline established in the Church of England.” This is a very considerable testimony that our Articles are not *Calvinistical*. And it is very observable, that when the *Commons*, the year after, drew up their charge against Mountague^t, they could find no Article of the Church to ground their complaint upon (so far as concerned the *five points*) but the seventeenth: which yet they so understood as to make it, in sense, directly repugnant to Article the sixteenth. For they charge him with maintaining and affirming, in opposition to Article the seventeenth, “that men justified may fall away and depart from the state which once they had,” and that “they may rise again, and become new men possibly, but not certainly, nor necessarily:” which

^s See Plaifere, *Appello Evang.* part iii. chap. 16.

^t See it in Collier’s *Eccl. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 736, &c.

is the plain and manifest doctrine of Article the sixteenth, which does not say *shall*, or *must* rise again, but *may* only; intimating plainly enough, that it is neither *certain* nor *necessary*.

Such as desire to see more of Mountague's case may consult the historians of that time. I concern myself no further than to relate such particulars as give light to the present question, about the sense of our Articles in the *five points*. And I would have it observed, that I am not inquiring whether *Calvinism* was the more prevailing doctrine of those times, but whether it was generally thought to be contained in and professed by our *Articles*, or other *public* authorized forms of our Church. Many ran in with *Calvinism*, who did not pretend to find the *whole* of their doctrine in our *public* forms; nay, who suspected that our Articles were not only *defective* in those points, but even *contradictory*, in some measure, to them. This, I think, sufficiently appears from the complaints of the earlier Calvinists in Queen Elizabeth's time; from Whitaker's confession to Whitgift; from the conduct of the *Heads*, in Barret's case; and from the story of Baro; from Whitgift's procedure in the Lambeth Articles, and his frank confessions in favour of Barret; from Dr. Reynolds' proceedings at the *Hampton Conference*, and the resolutions taken thereupon; and lastly, from the Irish Convocation of 1615, and from the case of Mountague.

I shall proceed a little further into Charles the First's reign, and then conclude this article.

In the year 1626, the King put out a *Proclamation* to quiet the disputes on the *five points*; forbidding *new* opinions, and all *innovation* in the *doctrine* or discipline of the Church; commanding all to keep close to the *doctrine* and *discipline* established. This *Proclamation* seems to have been chiefly levelled against the Calvinists, who were then labouring to introduce *innovations* in *doctrine* and *discipline*.

In the year 1628, the King prefixed his famous *Declaration* to a new edition of the Articles: which *Declaration* was designed chiefly to bridle the Calvinists, but indeed to silence the *Predestinarian* controversy on both sides. The Calvinists made loud complaints against it: the King had confined them to the *general* meaning of the Articles, the *plain* and *full* meaning; had prohibited any *new* sense, and the *drawing* the *Article* *aside*. This they interpreted to be laying a *restraint* upon them from preaching

the *saving* doctrines of God's free *grace*, in *election* and *predestination*. (See Collier, p. 747.) But why so, if *Calvinism* had been before incorporated into our *Articles*; or if it were not a *new sense*, and beside their *plain* and *full* meaning? This complaint, from that quarter, looks like a confession that our *Articles* were not, in themselves, *Calvinistical*; and that *Calvinism* could not be taught without introducing a *new sense*, and *drawing* the *Articles aside*; or however, not without being more *particular* than the *Articles* had been.

Soon after the King's *Declaration*, the *Commons* drew up a kind of *Anti-declaration*, "avowing" (as they say) "that sense of the " *Articles*—which by the *public acts* of the Church of England, " and the general and *current exposition* of the writers of our " Church, had been delivered to us; rejecting the sense of the " *Jesuits* and *Arminians*."

For an answer to which, I refer the reader to Archbishop Laud's short Notes, or Scholia, upon this *Anti-declaration*, recorded by Heylin in his Life. I may observe that the *Commons* laid no claim to the *literal* or *grammatical* meaning, in favour of *Calvinism*; and that they appealed only to *extrinsic* evidence: first, to the *public acts* of the Church, when there were really none such, properly so called; next to the *current exposition* of writers, wherein they appear not to have distinguished between the *current doctrine* of writers, and the *current exposition* of the *Articles*; as if it were necessary that the whole body of the *current divinity* should have been contained in our *Articles*. Besides that even the *current doctrine* was not entirely on the side of *Calvinism*. *Absolute reprobation* had been generally condemned all along by our most judicious divines: and the doctrines of *universal* redemption, and of *departing* from *grace*, as generally approved: which doctrines, if pursued in their consequences, (though many might not be aware of it,) tend to overthrow the *Calvinian* doctrines in the *five points*.

I may further hint, that even the Article of *Predestination* has been vainly enough urged in favour of the *Calvinistical* tenets. For, not to mention the saving clause in the conclusion, or its saying nothing at all of *reprobation*, and nothing in favour of *absolute* predestination to life; there seems to be a plain distinction (as Plaifere^u has well observed) in the Article itself, of two kinds of *predestination*; one of which is recommended to us, the

^u Plaifere's Analysis of the 17th Article, p. 387, alias 198.

other condemned. See that part of the Article in the margin^x. Predestination rightly and piously considered, that is, considered (not *irrespectively*, not *absolutely*, but) with respect to faith *in Christ*, faith *working* by love, and persevering; such a predestination is a *sweet and comfortable doctrine*. But the sentence of God's predestination, (it is not here said *in Christ*, as before,) that sentence, *simply* or *absolutely* considered, (as *curious* and *carnal* persons are apt to consider it,) is a *most dangerous downfall*, leading either to *security* or *desperation*; as having no respect to foreseen *faith* and a *good life*, nor *depending* upon it, but *antecedent* in order to it. The Article then seems to speak of two subjects; first, of predestination *soberly understood* with respect to faith *in Christ*, which is wholesome doctrine; secondly, of predestination *simply* considered, which is a dangerous doctrine. And the latter part seems to be intended against those *Gospellers* whereof Bishop Burnet^y speaks. Nor is it imaginable that any *true* and *sound* doctrine of the Gospel should, of itself, have any aptness to become a *downfall* even to *carnal* persons; but *carnal* persons are apt to *corrupt* a sound doctrine, and suit it to their own *lusts* and *passions*, thereby falsifying the truth. This doctrine, so *depraved* and *mistaken*, our Church con-

^x As the *godly* consideration of *predestination*, and our *election in Christ*, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God.

So, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the *sentence of God's predestination*, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the devil doth thrust them either into *desperation*, or into *wretchlessness of most unclean living*, (*impurissimæ vitæ securitatem*,) no less perilous than desperation.

^y The doctrine of predestination having been generally taught by the Reformers, many of this sect (the *Gospellers*) began to make strange in-

ferences from it; reckoning, that since every thing was decreed, and the decrees of God could not be frustrated, therefore men were to leave themselves to be carried by these decrees. This drew some into *great impiety of life*, and others into *desperation*. The Germans soon saw the ill effects of this doctrine. Luther changed his mind about it, and Melancthon openly writ against it. And since that time, the whole stream of the Lutheran churches has run the other way. But both Calvin and Bucer were still for maintaining the doctrine of these decrees; only they warned the people not to think much of them, since they were secrets which men could not penetrate into. But they did not so clearly shew how these consequences did not flow from such opinions. Hooper and many other good writers did often dehort the people from entering into these curiosities; and a *caveat* to the same purpose was put afterwards into the Article of the Church about *Predestination*. Burnet, *Hist. of the Ref.* vol. ii. p. 107.

demns: that is, she condemns *absolute, irrespective* predestination, not the other. This appears to be the most probable construction of the seventeenth Article; for vindication whereof I shall refer to the margin^z, and to Plaifere before cited; who accordingly, in the close of his Analysis, appeals to *this very Article* of our Church, in favour of *conditionate* predestination. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to my purpose, if neither *absolute* nor *conditionate* be affirmed or denied in the Article; as hath been the opinion of many, and as I have been before (to prevent needless disputes) willing to allow. Let it be supposed that *Calvinism* is not directly *contrary* to the Articles; which is civil enough in all reason.

Now, to return to our *writer*. To justify Arminian subscription, I plead first, that the *words* themselves, of our *public* forms, do not determine on the side of *Calvinism*: nor secondly, any *known* intention of *compilers* or *imposers*: nor thirdly, any *authentic* interpretation of our superiors. On the other hand, the presumption rather lies against *Calvinism*, from express words in some Articles, (as particularly the 16th and 31st, besides several other things in the *Catechism* and *Liturgy*,) from the *probable* construction of other Articles, from the *original*

^z 1. De æterna prædestinatione recte erudiri ecclesiam summopere necessarium est: nam ut nulla doctrina uberiorem consolationem piis conscientis afferre solet, quam doctrina prædestinationis recte explicita, ita nihil periculosius est quam *recta* prædestinationis *ratione* aberrare.

2. Nam qui a *vera* deflectit, in *præcipitium* fertur, unde se recipere non potest.

3. Sunt quidam, qui cum audiunt nostram salutem in Dei electione et proposito sitam esse, et *modum verum* haud observant, *somnia stoica*, et *fabulas Parcarum* fingunt.

4. *Modus* autem prædestinationis *verissimus* est, quem Paulus nobis commonstrat, cum ad Ephes. scribit, *Elegit nos in Christo*. In hoc modo, *conditio fidei* includitur, nam *cum fide* inserimur Christo, ejus membra efficitur, et ideo electi quia Christi membra sumus. *Hemmingius apud Plaif.*

Judicamus haud dubie *electos* esse eos, qui misericordiam propter Christum promissam *fide* apprehendunt, nec abijciunt eam fiduciam ad extremum.

Melancth. loc. Theol. de Prædest.

Here you see how you shall avoid the scrupulous and most dangerous question of the *predestination* of God: for, if thou wilt inquire into his councils, thy wit will deceive thee—But if thou begin with Christ, &c. this *simple question* will not hurt thee—Christ is the Book of Life, and all that believe in him are of the same Book, and so are *chosen* to everlasting life; for only those are ordained that *believe*. *Latimer, Sermon on Septuages.* p. 214.

Bishop Bancroft, at the *Hampton Conference*, observes, that many grew libertines by relying too much on *predestination*; that this proposition, *If I shall be saved, I shall be saved*, is a *desperate* doctrine, a contradiction to orthodox belief; and that men ought not to rest their happiness on any *absolute, irrespective* decree; citing the latter part of the 17th Article relating to God's *general* promises. All which shews that he thought that Article rather to condemn than favour *absolute* predestination.

composition and design of the Articles, and from some considerable testimonies of our most judicious divines; besides the *confessions* of the more early Calvinists themselves. This *writer* has promised me to defend Arian subscription by the *same arguments*, p. 38. If it might not look too like insulting, I would now call upon him to make his words good.

The reader, I hope, will excuse the length of this part, which could not easily have been crowded into a shorter compass. I have omitted a great deal purely for the sake of brevity: and because I would not enter further into a *distinct* controversy, than the *objection* necessarily required. I may now pass on.

Object. "Would an Arminian have expressed himself in the language of the *Articles*, about *predestination* and original *sin*?"

Answer. Would a Calvinist have expressed himself in the language of the Articles, about the *five points*? Compare the Lambeth Articles, or the decrees of the Synod of Dort, or the *Assembly's Confession*; and see whether they, or any of them, speak the moderate language of our Articles. As to *original sin*, I know not whether any of our considerable *Divines* go the lengths of the Arminians in that Article. As to *predestination*, Dr. Bennet^a and Mr. Plaifere^b have both appealed to Arminius himself, as teaching the very same doctrine with our 17th Article: which may well deserve this author's special notice. But it is enough for me, if the Article has but been expressed in the middle or moderate way, in such *general* terms as come not up either to *Calvinism* or *Arminianism*: which is a supposition I have been willing to admit, for the waving of all needless controversy; though I am rather of opinion that the Article leans to the *Anti-Calvinian* persuasion.

I have heard it objected to the *supposition* of the Article's being *general*, and *indifferent* to either side, that it would make the Article useless, as deciding and determining nothing. But I beg leave to observe that the Article may be exceeding useful, notwithstanding such a *supposition*.

1. To prevent the suspicion of our Church's running in with the *Gospellers* on one hand, or the *Pelagians* on the other; and so the Article is a fence against slander and calumny.

2. Supposing the Article to be *general* and *indefinite*, in respect

^a Bennet's Directions for studying, &c. p. 95, &c.

^b Plaifere, Appello Evang. p. 38. alias p. 27.

of the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians; it is yet *special* and *determinate* against the opinion of Samuel Huber, who taught an universal election, (which in reality is *no election*,) and that all men by the death of Christ were brought into the state of grace and salvation. The Article confines the election to those that believe in Christ, and live up to that belief, persevering to the end.

The Article is also *special* and *determinate* against the opinion fathered upon Origen, that all men, even wicked men, and devils, shall at last be received to mercy. The Article is further *special* and *determinate* against the Socinians, who deny God's *prescience* of future *contingents*, and admit no *special* predestination from all *eternity*. There may be other false opinions particularly condemned by this Article: but these now specified are enough to shew the *use* of the *Article*; though we should suppose the main points, between Calvinists and Arminians, to be left *in medio*, undetermined.

Object. "I know of no obligation upon any one to subscribe "to this, that the *ideas* which the compilers of the 11th Article "had of *justification* and *faith*, &c. were consonant to the true "*ideas* which were expressed by these words in Scripture," p. 42.

Answer. The subscriber must assent to the *propositions* laid down by the *compilers* and *imposers*; which *propositions* are made up of *ideas*: and therefore, in subscribing to their *propositions*, we subscribe so far to their *ideas*. I do not say that we subscribe to any of their *private* sentiments or *ideas*, such as they have not expressed, or intended not to express, in the *public* forms. But their declared *public* sentiments contained in our forms, those, so far as we are *certain* of them, we subscribe to.

As to the meaning of the 11th Article, our Church refers us not to *Scripture*, (for such as disbelieve the Article might pretend *Scripture*,) but to the *Homily* delivering the Church's sense of *Scripture*, in regard to that Article.

Object. "There are a great many passages of *Scripture* interpreted in the *Homilies*; but yet our Church no where supposes, "that whoever differs from its explications offers violence to "*Scripture* itself," p. 44.

Answer. Neither do I suppose it, however this *writer* may love to mistake or misrepresent plain things. But wherever our Church has tied us up to the profession of any doctrine, the

subscriber, as such, must interpret Scripture conformably to that doctrine, and not in opposition thereto. He must not, for instance, interpret Scripture in favour of *purgatory*, *infallibility*, *worship of saints*, or the like; at the same time condemning those *Popish* tenets by his subscription: neither must he interpret Scripture in favour of the Son's or Holy Ghost's *inferiority*, *inequality*, &c. while he subscribes to their *coequality* and *coeternity*. He is tied up to the Church's sense of Scripture in all points determined by the Church, so far as to believe that her *explications* are, in the general, just and true: that whatever she proposes as *Scripture doctrine* is *Scripture doctrine*; and that no sense of Scripture which runs counter to her *decisions* is the true sense of Scripture, but a *violence* offered to Scripture. This is all I ever meant, or now mean, by our being bound up to the Church's *explications*.

Object. "No law requires any man to explain the Articles by "the *Liturgy*, or to subscribe the Articles in the sense of the "*Liturgic* expressions," p. 45.

Answer. The *law* of common sense obliges us to make the *Articles* and *Liturgy* consistent, at least, if we admit *both*; and to believe that *both*, in reality, mean the *same thing*, being established by the *same authority*.

Object. "The Articles may be general—the *Liturgy* more "special and determinate," p. 45.

Answer. This might have been the case; but in fact it is not; for the Athanasian Creed, contained in Article the 8th, to say nothing of other Articles, is as *special* and *determinate* as the *Liturgy* itself. The same *evasions* will not, it may be, indifferently serve for every expression to be met with in both: but a man that takes into that loose way, may, when his hand is in, find some *evasion* or other for any thing whatever. It seems to be purely accidental, that the Doctor appeared to be more confounded and nonplused in the *Liturgy*, than in the *Creeeds* and *Articles*: invention will sometimes flag, and even the keenest wit cannot bear to be always kept upon the stretch.

Object. "What advantage, real advantage, would it be to the "Church of England to eject out of its communion such men as "Dr. W. plainly points at?" p. 46.

Answer. It is unfortunate for the men who are to new model our *divinity*, and to reform our *faith*, that they should betray, at every turn, a strange *confusion* of *thought* even in clear and

plain things. This *writer* cannot distinguish between *ejecting* and *not admitting*; nor between *Church-communion* and *Church-trusts*. I said not a word about *ejecting* any man out of *communion*: I pleaded only against *admitting* any into *Church-trusts*, that must come in by *iniquity*, or not at all; and I am not sensible that I was either deceived in my reasoning, or out in my politics. However high an opinion this gentleman (or I) may have of the valuable abilities of the Arian subscribers; whatever advantage or credit we might propose, by having so considerable men amongst us; yet our misfortune is, that we cannot have them but by *sinful means*, and at the expense of *sincerity*; and we dare not promise ourselves any real or lasting benefit from so notorious a breach of *God's commandments*. On the other hand, since I am here *publicly* called upon to declare what *advantage* it may be to us, to have a stop put to this *unrighteous* practice of *subscribing*, I shall briefly hint it in a few particulars:

1. It will be much for the *honour* of *God*, and of our most *holy religion*, to have no more such *offences* seen, or once named amongst us.

2. It will be taking away one great *reproach* from our *country*, heretofore famed for its gravity and good sense; and for breeding up *divines* and *casuists*, as judicious, solid, and accurate as any upon the face of the earth.

3. It may be much for the advantage of the common people, not to be under such guides as are themselves remarkably deficient in the first principles of morality and Christian simplicity; and who may be presumed the less qualified to direct the *consciences* of others, while so manifestly faulty in the conduct of their *own*.

4. It may be a further advantage, for Christian people, to be under the care and guidance of none but *orthodox* teachers; such as will instruct them in the *fundamentals* of Christianity, and lead them in the way everlasting.

These are some of the *advantages* we may reasonably propose, along with *God's blessing*; which must be had in *God's own way*, and in the doing of what is just, honest, and upright. If there be any greater advantages on the other side, let this gentleman name them, and they shall be considered.

Object. "They disclaim *Arianism*; yet notwithstanding that, they are injuriously and unchristianly called *Arians*," p. 46.

Answer. God forbid that we should ever demean ourselves

injuriously or *unchristianly* towards any man. Here is a mistake somewhere ; and it is no hard matter to perceive where it lies. This gentleman should have said, that they disclaim the name of *Arianism* : they do indeed disclaim the *name*, but not the *thing*. We think ourselves as proper and as competent judges of what *Arianism* is, as others may be : and we cannot help judging, as long as we can read. When we have found the *thing*, being plain and sincere men, we immediately give the *name*. For the purpose ; if we meet with any man teaching the doctrines of *purgatory*, *transubstantiation*, and other distinguishing badges of *Popery* ; we never stay for his leave ; but we have, upon such evidence, a very clear and undoubted right to call such a man a *Papist*, till he has purged himself of those positions. By the very same rule, we pretend to give the name of Arians to as many as we find the Arian tenets upon : and their denial of it signifies nothing, being only *protesting* against *fact* ; which, in all parallel cases, is highly ridiculous. If they are Arians, and do not know it, they are indeed the more pitiable : but as their ignorance is no rule to those that know better ; so we hope there is nothing *injuriously* or *unchristian* in calling either men or things by their right names.

Object. “ They are charged with *fraud* and *prevarication*, because they subscribe : which is the severest reflection on their “ characters possible,” p. 46.

Answer. All the *severity* lies in the *truth* and *evidence* of the *charge*. If the charge cannot be fully proved, the man that makes it is in reality the *sufferer*, by exposing himself. But I have took care to proceed upon none but the clearest and most evident grounds : and now I may lay claim to those gentlemen’s *thanks*, for kindly shewing them both their *sin* and their *danger*. Principles are valuable and precious, and must not be parted with, in compliment to any man’s character. Besides, it is to be hoped that men of their education and abilities do not want to be told, that there are some things which they ought to be infinitely more tender of than of a shortlived *character*, (built upon *self-flattery* and *deceptive* shows,) and those are, the honour of God, the simplicity of the Gospel, and the salvation of men. One way still there is left, and indeed but one, whereby to retrieve their *characters* ; which is to *repent*, and *amend*. If they will accept of this plain and frank admonition, it may not perhaps be altogether unserviceable to them : if not, let it stand as a

testimony against them. for the benefit of others, lest they also fall into the same condemnation.

Object. " Men who have never wrote a word in the Trinitarian controversy, who have had no *occasion*, no *design* to write on that subject, yet are represented to the world under the same *invidious name*. Is this the conduct of a *Christian* and a *Divine*?—What must every man conclude when he sees the running title—*The Case of Arian Subscription, &c. and Pleas for such Subscription examined*; and yet the very first of these pleas is partly taken out of the book of *one* who has never written any thing about Arian subscription! Is this becoming " a *Protestant Divine*?" p. 47.

Answer. The reader, I hope, will excuse it, if for want of *arguments* to reply to, I am forced sometimes to condescend to take notice of mere *declamation*. This gentleman has before shewn his over *officiousness* in defending Dr. Clarke against a *supposed* injury done him; though I dare be confident, the Dr. himself knows that I have not injured him at all. Now he is offering a helping hand to a person of an higher character and station in the Church: who, I doubt not, is too wise a man to think that I have any where failed in point of strict justice, or even of decency and respect towards him. My business was to examine every the most plausible *plea* that had been brought for that *subscription* which I condemn, under the name of Arian subscription. I never represented that person under the invidious name of an Arian; nor was it ever in my thoughts to do it. But it was my professed design, not to dissemble any thing that might look favourable to the cause of Arian subscription; not to conceal either the *strongest pleas* or the *greatest names* that might appear to countenance it. And to me it seems that this *writer*, had it been his manner ever to weigh things with candour or judgment, might have thanked me for so *fair* and so *unexceptionable* a conduct: in allowing his cause all the *advantage* or *credit* that could possibly be given it. But enough: this gentleman should be advised, the next time he is disposed to stand up an advocate for greater men than himself, either to do it more *pertinently*, or to stay for their *commission*: otherwise he may happen, by his *officious* zeal and indiscreet conduct, to do them a *real* injury, while he is labouring to take off such as are purely *imaginary*.

Object. " The principles which the ingenious Dr. Bennet

“ contends for, are the same with those I have laid down,”
p. 49.

Answer. I am very glad to hear so much from this gentleman. To complete the character of a *careless* writer, he shall now be condemned out of his own mouth. Dr. Bennet’s principle, relating to *subscription*, is to allow no liberty but where the *words themselves* do allow it, where they are *fairly capable* of such a sense as we take them in, “ without doing violence to the words, “ or contradicting what our Church has elsewhere taught.” I desire no more than this, in our present question. If this be our *writer’s* principle, he has effectually condemned himself and every Arian subscriber.

Let the reader only turn back, and review the passages above cited from our *public* forms; and then try whether it be possible to reconcile them *fairly*, and *without violence*, or indeed *at all*, to the *new scheme*. Now, since this gentleman has here bound himself to stand or fall by the same rule of subscription which Dr. Bennet contends for; I leave him to apply it at leisure: and as he has thereby entangled himself sufficiently and beyond all recovery: it would be unmerciful, and even cruel, to press him closer.

It may not be here improper to cite Dr. Bennet’s application of his own rule, to this particular case; addressing himself to Dr. Clarke, in these words:

“ As I am firmly persuaded, you are a person of so great
“ integrity, that you will not venture (notwithstanding your at-
“ tempt for explaining) to *repeat your subscription*, &c. till you
“ have altered your sentiments touching these points, (which
“ I pray God may be speedily effected,) so I hope, none of those
“ persons who espouse your present sentiments will be influenced
“ by what you have written, to think your sense of those passages
“ *tolerable*. I really *tremble* at the apprehension of that *guilt*,
“ which such a *collusion* must *pollute* them with: and I cannot
“ but earnestly entreat you to *do what lies in your power*, in the
“ most *public* manner, for preventing such an interpretation of
“ our *Liturgy*, as must (I fear) necessarily *lay waste the consciences*
“ of the compliers, and pave the way for a man’s subscribing and
“ using such forms of devotion as thwart the sense of his own
“ mind.” *Bennet on the Trin.* p. 265.

Thus far the ingenious Dr. Bennet, who, I suppose, well understands both his own *principle* and the *application* of it. Whether

his rule and mine differ, is a question which concerns not our present debate: either of them effectually condemns Arian subscription. My rule appears to be rather the stricter of the two: it is this, that wherever we are *certain* of the *imposer's* meaning, that meaning we are bound up to, by our subscription. Perhaps, Dr. Bennet may think that we are never *certain* but where the *words themselves* necessarily require such a meaning. I think, there are some possible cases where we may be *certain*, though the *words themselves* might otherwise admit of *two senses*; and that the *imposers* in such cases have sufficiently done their parts, though there may be some *ambiguity* remaining in the expressions, so long as there is but any *certain* way left for a reasonable man to come at their *real* and *true* meaning. But I shall not dwell longer on this nicety, since our present debate about Arian subscription is in a great measure unconcerned in it; and we need not go further than the *words themselves* to confute and condemn it.

I shall conclude with the honest sentiments of Mr. Whiston, which are really and truly the same with my own: and his testimony, in this case, is the more considerable, because it comes from one, who lay under the same *temptation* with others, to prevaricate in this sacred engagement. His words in the first *Appendix* to his *fifth volume* are these:

“ The great latitude Dr. Clarke allows, that every person may reasonably agree to modern forms, under a *Protestant* settlement, which owns the *Scripture* as the rule of faith, *whenever he can in any sense at all* reconcile them with Scripture, if it be with a *declaration* how he reconciles them; even though it be in a sense which is owned to be plainly *forced*, and *unnatural*; seems to me *not justifiable*, but *contradictory* to the *direct meaning* and *design* of those *forms*; and of the most *pernicious* consequence in all *parallel* cases. Nor do I see, at this rate, that the same liberty can be wholly denied to a *Protestant*, as to the *Popish* doctrine and practices; since there also, it is supposed that those *forms* are intended to oblige men to nothing but what is agreeable to *Christianity*.

“ If to this observation the *Doctor* should reply, that complying with the Church of Rome, and joining with a *Protestant* Church, in the manner and with the *declarations* he does, are quite different things on these two accounts, (1.) Because the Church of Rome will not permit any of her

“ members to make such *declaration* concerning her doctrines,
 “ but positively insists upon every one’s *implicit* submission to
 “ them, in the sense that Church and her Councils receive them.
 “ without examining them by the rule of Scripture; and (2.)
 “ Because many of the doctrines of the Church of Rome, such
 “ as the invocation of the *Virgin Mary*, and of *saints*, &c. with
 “ the worship of images, can in *no sense* be reconciled, but are
 “ directly contrary to it, as setting up other *mediators* instead
 “ of *Christ*, and teaching men to apply to such beings as have
 “ *no power or dominion* over them; whereas the invocation of
 “ the Holy Ghost, and so of the whole Trinity, as used in the
 “ Church of England, (some of the most suspicious of all the
 “ things allowed by him,) may be understood, and *declared*, to
 “ be only a desiring him to bestow those gifts upon us, in *subor-*
 “ *dination* to the Father and the Son, which we are sure from
 “ Scripture it is his *proper office*, and *in his power*, to distribute:
 “ if, I say, the *Doctor* shall make this reply, I must answer;

“ 1. That I doubt, our Church does not properly allow her
 “ members to make any such *declarations*, as is here intimated,
 “ but expects their submission *in that sense she and her synods*
 “ *have imposed* her doctrines and devotions: and though it be
 “ not under the notion of *implicit faith*, and *without examination*,
 “ yet as acquiescing in *her judgment*, interpreting the Scripture
 “ according to the *Articles and Creeds*, and submitting to her
 “ *authority in controversies of faith*.

“ 2. That there are even in the Church of Rome few or no
 “ such doctrines or practices, but persons *well disposed to it* can,
 “ in *some sense or other*, reconcile them with Scripture; or at
 “ least *think* they can, which is here almost the same case, with-
 “ out dreaming of setting up *other mediators* instead of *Christ*, or
 “ doubting of some degree of *power and authority* in the beings
 “ so invoked. So that if we, without all sacred or primitive
 “ command or example, may follow our Church in the invoca-
 “ tion of the Holy Spirit, and so of the whole Trinity, from
 “ some uncertain reasonings of our own, I do not see how we
 “ can condemn the *Papists* for following their own Church in
 “ the *invocation of angels*, nay, hardly in that of *saints* also, and
 “ of the *Virgin Mary* herself.

“ Nor can any *explications of forms* directly against the *known*
 “ sense of *words*, and of the *imposers*, be other than *protestatio*
 “ *contra factum*; and so wholly *unjustifiable*.

“ Nor indeed, if this were somewhat tolerable in some particular cases of *small moment*, can it be at all so in the most “ *sacred Articles and Offices* of religion.

“ If this way be allowable, *then is the offence of the cross* “ *ceased*; then the *martyrs* have commonly lost their lives without sufficient cause; and those Jews who would die rather “ than eat *swine’s flesh*, and those Christians that would suffer “ the like punishment, rather than cast a little *incense* on the “ heathen *altars*, were very unfortunate, as having *suffered without necessity*.

“ What will become of all *oaths, promises, and securities* among “ men, if the plain real truth and meaning of words be no “ longer the measure of what we are to profess, assert, or “ practise: but every one may, if he do but openly *declare* it, “ put his *own strained interpretation*, as he pleases, upon them? “ Especially if this be to be allowed in the *most sacred matters* of “ all, the signing *Articles* of faith, the making *solemn confessions* “ of the same, and the offering up public *prayers, praises, and* “ *doxologies* to the *great God*, in the solemn *assemblies* of his “ worship. This, I own, I *dare not do*, at the *peril* of my *salvation*: and if I can no way be permitted to enjoy the benefit “ of *Christ’s* holy ordinances in public, without what I own “ would be in myself *gross insincerity* and *prevarication*, I shall, “ I believe, think it my duty to aim to enjoy that benefit some “ other way, whatever *odium* or *sufferings* I may bring upon “ myself thereby.”

I have transcribed this whole passage from Mr. Whiston, being full and clear to my purpose, unanswered, and unanswerable: and it may appear from hence that the hardest names which I have given to Arian subscription are in reality no severer than had been before given, by a known friend to the Arian cause: so that this *writer* may, with equal justice, charge Mr. Whiston also with *slander, calumny, and persecuting principles*, for his declaring such subscription to be *gross insincerity* and *prevarication*. The pious and candid Mr. Nelson and the very judicious and learned Bishop of Oxford had both expressed their abhorrence of it, before I wrote; as the anonymous author of the Case of Addressing, &c. has also done since. And indeed, who is there of any tolerable measure of *good sense*, or breathing any thing of the true spirit of *piety*, that does not utterly detest it?

I have now done with this *writer*, and, I hope, with this *cause* too: it is high time for those gentlemen, at length, to see their error, and correct it. They may succeed tolerably, for a while, in the *Trinitarian* controversy, which few, in comparison, understand thoroughly; and they may go on, for a season, in perverting *Scripture* and *Fathers*, without rebuke from the *generality*, who will not readily observe it, or be at the pains to search into it. But if they think to practise in like manner with our Articles and Liturgy, where every English reader can judge; or if they pretend to put off their *sophistry* in a *plain point of morality*, where every man, of any common discernment, can both detect and confute them; they will disoblige and disserve their own *characters* extremely; and will, at length, make but a very mean, not to say contemptible figure, in so wise and knowing an age. We did not indeed expect that any greater *geniuses* should rise up in the Arian cause, than had embarked in the same cause many ages upwards: but it was a reasonable presumption, that none would undertake the *reforming* of our *faith*, and the *new stamping* our whole system of *theology*, but such as would not (especially after notice given) betray a weakness and slowness of apprehension, even in the *plain* and *self-evident* principles of common honesty.

A
SECOND VINDICATION
OF
CHRIST'S DIVINITY:
OR, A
SECOND DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES,
RELATING TO
DR. CLARKE'S SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY,
IN ANSWER TO THE
COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S REPLY.
WHEREIN
THE LEARNED DOCTOR'S SCHEME, AS IT NOW STANDS, AFTER
THE LATEST CORRECTION, ALTERATION, AND EXPLANATION,
IS DISTINCTLY AND FULLY CONSIDERED.

Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. *Coloss. ii, 8, 9.*

Quid tibi visum est, homo Ariane, tam multa dicere, et pro causa quæ inter nos agitur nihil dicere: quasi hoc sit respondere posse, quod est tacere non posse? *Augustin. contr. Maxim. p. 677. ed. Bened.*

P R E F A C E.

IT is now about three years and a half since I offered to the world a Vindication of Christ's Divinity, or, A Defence of some Queries, in answer to a Country Clergyman. Within a few months after the publication, some notice was taken of it in an anonymous pamphlet, entitled, Modest Plea, &c. Continued; or, A Brief Answer (not to my Defence, but) to my Queries. To which I replied, soon after, as much as I thought needful, in a Preface to my Eight Sermons. I was promised, in an Advertisement at the end of Modest Plea, &c. *a large and particular answer to my Defence*: and this, I presume, is what has now lately appeared, entitled, A Reply to Dr. W.'s Defence, &c. under the name of A Clergyman in the Country. To this the following sheets are intended for a full and distinct answer: how far they are really so, or how far they come short, is submitted to the judicious reader.

The book, which I here profess to examine, may be allowed to contain, in a manner, the whole strength of the Arian cause, *real* or *artificial*; all that can be of any force either to *convince* or to *deceive* a reader. And if there appears to be a great deal more of the *artificial* than there is of the *real*, there is certainly a *fault* in the men; but, at the same time, some great *defect* in the *cause* too, which wanted to be thus supplied. For whether we consider the *hands* supposed to have been employed in drawing up the Reply, or the *time* and *pains* spent in revising and polishing, we may be confident, that had it been possible to find out any *real* and *firm* foundation for *Arianism* to rest upon, it would never have been left to stand upon *artificial* props, or to subsist by subtilty and management.

This is not the place to give the reader a full list of all the *artificial* advantages made use of by those gentlemen in support of *Arianism*: a few hints may here suffice. Their disclaiming the *name* all the while they are inculcating the *thing*; to keep their readers in *ignorance*, and to steal upon them by *surprise*: their wrapping up their doctrine in *general* and *confuse* terms; to prevent its being narrowly looked into,

or pursued in its remote, or even immediate *consequences*: their elaborate and studied prolixity in proving such points as nobody calls in question, and then slipping upon the reader, in their stead, something very different from them, without any proof at all: their avoiding as much as possible the *defensive* part, where the main stress lies, and keeping themselves chiefly to the *offensive*; perpetually *objecting* to the Catholic scheme, instead of clearing up the difficulties which clog their own: their bending their main force against our *consequential* doctrine, of *three Persons being one God*, instead of directly attacking our premises, that the *Divine titles and attributes belong equally to every one*; as to which the Scripture is very full and *express*: these and other the like *artifices* will be easily seen to run through their whole performance. But their masterpiece of subtilty lies in contriving a set of *ambiguous and equivocal* terms, to put the main *question* into; such as may be capable of a Catholic sense, or at least look very like it, in order to claim some countenance from Catholic antiquity; but such as may also be drawn to an Arian meaning, that so they may secure the point which they intend. Thus, betwixt the two senses or faces of the same words, chosen for the purpose, they shall never want pretence or colour from *antiquity*, even while endeavouring to prove things the most opposite and repugnant thereto in real sense and significancy. Such is the convenient use of *equivocal* words or phrases, when ingeniously made choice of, and managed by rules of art.

In the following papers, I have particularly endeavoured to clear the sense of the Ante-Nicene Church; and to vindicate the same from misrepresentation. All that remains to be done in this Preface is to obviate *two objections*, of very different kinds, which have been lately made by men of very opposite principles. One^a pretends that we are very *singular*, in claiming the suffrage of the Ante-Nicene Church in favour of the Athanasian doctrines: the other^b is for entirely waving all searches into *antiquity*, in relation to this controversy, as being either *needless* or *fruitless*.

1. As to the first, we are confidently told, “that few of the truly learned and impartial Athanasians themselves, from the very days of their founder, till our late writers of controversy, Bp. Bull, Dr. Grabe, Dr. Waterland, have denied the truth of this fact; that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were generally against the Athanasian, and for the Eusebian doctrines^c.” To countenance this pretence, a long and pompous detail of Athanasian Confessions (as they are called) are packed together, and laid before the English reader.

^a Mr. Whiston in his Reply to Lord Nottingham.

^b The author of Two Letters, one to Lord Nottingham, the other to Mr.

Whiston.

^c Mr. Whiston's Reply to the Earl of Nottingham, p. 3.

It will be proper here, in the entrance, to examine what truth or justice there is in this strange report; that so, prejudices being removed, the reader may come with the greater freedom to the examination of what is offered, in the following papers, on the head of *antiquity*.

We must trace this matter down from the first beginnings of the Arian heresy, about the year 319. It may be known from Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, what opinion the Catholics in general then had of the *novelty* of the Arian or Eusebian^d doctrines.

In the year 321, he with his Clergy, in their *circular* letter^e, represents the Arians or Eusebians as fallen into a great *apostasy*, and as forerunners of Antichrist. They exclaim against the Arian doctrines in this manner and in these words; "Who ever heard such things as these? or who, that now hears them, is not astonished at them, does not stop his ears for fear of polluting his ears with such impurity of doctrine? Who that hears St. John declaring that *in the beginning was the Word*, does not condemn those that say that *he once was not?*" &c. In conclusion of the Epistle, they compare them with Hymenaus and Philetus, and the traitor Judas: and they anathematize them as enemies to God, and subverters of souls. Now can we well suppose that Alexander, a very pious and good man, with great numbers of his Bishops and Clergy, would have gone these lengths in their censure, had they had the least suspicion that the Arian doctrines were at all agreeable to the faith of the Ante-Nicene churches?

Two years after this, in the year 323, the same Alexander, in his letter^f to Alexander of Constantinople, persists in the same warmth of zeal against the Arian doctrines. The abettors and favourers of them he ranks with the Ebionites, Artemonites, and Samosatenians^g, (condemned heretics,) brands them as novellists of late appearing^h, as men that thought none of the *ancients* worthy to be compared with them, pretending to be the *only wise men themselves*, and to be *inventors of doctrines which never before entered into man's head*ⁱ. This was what Alexander thought of the Arians at that time. Little did he suspect that the Ante-Nicene Church had been at all favourable to their notions.

In the year 325, as is well known, the Arian doctrines were proscribed and anathematized in the famous Council of Nice, consisting of three hundred and eighteen Bishops, very unanimous in their resolutions, excepting a few reclaimants. In their Synodical Epistle^k,

^d Note, They were called Eusebians from Eusebius of Nicomedia, one of the chief promoters of the Arian cause.

^e Extat apud Athanas. p. 397. ed. Bened. ap. Socrat. Eccl. Histor. lib. i. cap. 3.

^f Extat Theodorit. E. Hist. lib. i. cap. 4.

^g Theodoret. E. H. p. 15. ed. Cant.

^h Ibid. p. 16.

ⁱ Ibid. p. 17.

^k Apud Socrat. E. Hist. lib. i. cap. 9. Compare Athanas. vol. i. p. 283.

they declare that they had condemned the Arian doctrines of the *Son's being from nothing*, and that he once was not, as full of blasphemy and madness, and such as they had not patience to hear. So far were they from any apprehension that the Arian or Eusebian doctrines had been held by the *ancient Church*. This was the year before Athanasius (our *founder*, as Mr. Wh. calls him) was Bishop of the Church, and about fifteen years before he drew his pen in defence of the doctrines established in that Council.

Much about the same time, the good Emperor Constantine, after a fair and full hearing of the cause in the Nicene Council, bears his testimony against Arius, as being the *first broacher* of that doctrine, by the *instigation* of the Devil^l. And he makes an order to have the Arians branded with the name of Porphyrians^m, as being followers of the Pagan Porphyrius, either in their avowed *opposition* to Christ, (as some think,) or in their adopting the Platonic gradations into the Christian Trinity, as others conjecture.

In the year 335, Marcellus and Eusebius engaged on opposite sides : from which time Mr. Whiston begins the date of the Athanasian Confessions. What he produces from Eusebius himself is not to the purpose, since he reckons not him with the Athanasians, about whom our present question is. However, it is of no great moment, if Eusebius could ever so justly appeal to the *ancient Doctors* against Marcellus's particular tenets ; many of which (as Eusebius was pleased to understand them) were undoubtedly *novelties*. As to Marcellus, he charges the Eusebian or Arian heresy, as a thing then newly inventedⁿ. He gives up nothing in respect of the Ante-Nicene Fathers in general, but in respect of Origen only : whom he supposes to have been, in some points, not very consistent^o. Neither does he *confess* that Origen was entirely in the sentiments of the Eusebians ; but only that he agreed with them in making the Son a *second Hypostasis*^p : which Marcellus scrupled to allow, not considering that Origen's sense of a *second Hypostasis* (intended only in opposition to the Noëtian heresy) was a quite different thing from what the Eusebians or Arians were contending for. It is to be noted, that Marcellus and the other Eustathians were, for some time, too nice and scrupulous about admitting *three Hypostases* ; differing therein from the wiser and more judicious Athanasians.

About the year 352, Athanasius wrote his Epistle concerning the decrees of the Nicene Council. What he thought of the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene Church may appear sufficiently from one passage, running thus :

^l Socrat. E. H. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 30.

^m Ibid. p. 31.

ⁿ Euseb. contr. Marcell. l. i. c. 4. p. 20.

^o Euseb. contr. Marcell. lib. i. cap. 4.

p. 22.

^p Id. *ibid.*

“ We give you demonstration that our doctrine has been handed down to us from Fathers to Fathers. But you, ye revivers of *Judaism*, and disciples of Caiaphas, what writers can you bring to father your tenets? Not a man can you name of any repute for sense or judgment: all abhor you, excepting only the Devil, who has alone been the Father of such an apostasy^q,” &c.

Many other passages^r of the like import may be produced from Athanasius, who every where appeals to constant *tradition*, along with Scripture, for the truth of his doctrine, against the Arian novelties. Neither are the pretended *Confessions*, which Mr. Whiston alleges out of him, of any the least moment; amounting to no more than his proposing of some Arian objections; which he abundantly confutes in the very places, shewing them to be nothing else but misrepresentation and calumny.

In the year 355, Hilary, one of the greatest Bishops of the west, and who may be justly called the Western Athanasius, wrote his first letter to Constantius the Emperor; in which we have the following testimony relating to our present purpose.

“ After four hundred years almost, since the only begotten Son of God vouchsafed to take pity on lost mankind, as if there had been *no Apostles* before, or as if after their martyrdoms and deaths there had been *no Christians*, now at length is come abroad the Arian pestilence, *novel* and direful, not a plague of *infected air*, but of execrable blasphemies. Have they then, who *believed* before, entertained false hopes of immortality? It is but *late*, we know, that these imaginations have been *invented* by the two Eusebiuses and Narcissus, and Theodorus, and Stephanus, and Acacius, and Menophantus; and the two ignorant and immoral youths, Ursatius and Valens, whose letters are published, and who are further convicted by credible witnesses, such as have heard them, not so much *disputing*, as *barking* against us^s.” In another treatise, published three years after, the same Hilary, having shewn how he had received his faith from the Prophets, Evangelists, and Apostles, goes on thus: “ By these have I been taught to believe as I do: in this faith am I imbued beyond recovery. Pardon me, O God Almighty, that I *cannot* be moved from this belief; but I *can* die for it. This age is tardy, I conceive, in bringing me these most *impious* teachers: these masters are too *late* for my *faith*, a faith which *thou* hast taught me. Such was my faith in thee, before ever I so much as heard of *these names*: by thee was I thus regenerated, and from that time forwards thus am I ever *thine*!” Such is the constant strain of this blessed saint; who every

^q Athanas. de Decret. Syn. Nicæn. 676, 723. ed. Bened. p. 233.

^r Athanas. p. 111, 262, 412, 502, ^s Hilar. ad Constant. lib. i. p. 1220.

^t Hilar. de Trin. lib. vi. p. 892.

where brands the Arian doctrine as the *new, novel*, upstart heresy, folly, madness; and the broachers of it as the *new* apostolate, emissaries of Antichrist, *blasphemers*, and the like. Little did he suspect, though a knowing and a learned man, that any such doctrine had been received or taught by the Ante-Nicene Churches.

About the year 360, Basil entered the lists in this controversy. We shall often^u find him appealing to the *tradition* of the Fathers for the Athanasian doctrine. His *confession*, (in Mr. Whitson's phrase,) relating to Gregory of Neocæsarea, amounts only to this, that Gregory had made use of some expressions which evil-minded men had perverted to a false and bad sense, directly contrary to Gregory's true meaning. Basil himself bears full and clear testimony to Gregory's orthodoxy; as Bishop Bull has largely demonstrated^v, beyond contradiction.

As to what Basil says of Dionysius of Alexandria, that he was *the first who laid the seeds of the impiety of the Anomæans*: thus much, at least, may be gathered from it, that, in Basil's judgment, none of the writers before Dionysius (who wrote against Sabellius, about the year 259) had any tincture of *that impiety*; but that the Ante-Nicene Church in general was very free from it. And as to Dionysius himself, (however hardly Basil might once think of him,) he has been abundantly vindicated by Athanasius among the ancients, and by several learned moderns.

What Basil is said to *confess* of Origen, shews that in his opinion, custom and common consent was, in Origen's time, on the side of the doctrines called Athanasian; and that Origen himself, sometimes at least, conformed to it. But I shall vindicate Origen at large in a proper place.

Nazianzen, a contemporary of Basil's, in more places than one, bears testimony to the antiquity and uninterrupted succession of the Nicene faith, from the times of the Apostles. As to a pretended *Confession* of his looking the other way, it will be considered at large in the following sheets.

Epiphanius, about the year 375, says, that the *apostolical* faith (that is, the Athanasian in his account) continued pure and uncorrupted till the time of Arius, who divided the Church^y: and who by the instigation of the Devil, and with an impudent forehead, let his tongue loose against his Lord^z: so little did he imagine that *Arianism* was *primitive Christianity*. He observes further, that had it not been for the subtle practices of Eudoxius, Bishop of Constantinople, in perverting and corrupting the most pious Emperor Valens, the very

^u Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 5. De Spir. S. p. 167. Ep. 79.

^x Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 12.

^y Epiphanius. contr. Hæres. lxi. p. 728.

^z Ibid. p. 736.

women and children, and all that had been in any tolerable measure instructed in Christian principles, would have reprov'd and routed the Arians, as *blasphemers* and murderers of their Lord^a, &c. Such was the assurance the Athanasians then had, that their faith was the settled and standing doctrine of the primitive churches all the world over, till the time of Arius.

As to Epiphanius's opinion of Lucian and Origen, (two single men,) it was severe enough, and indeed not just; as Bishop Bull hath abundantly proved. Yet, from Epiphanius's censure of Origen, one may perceive plainly, that he thought the Ante-Nicene Church in general, both before and after Origen, to be of a very contrary judgment to that which he condemns in Lucian and Origen, that is, to *Arianism*.

At this time lived Gregory Nyssen; who about the year 381 encountered Eunomius, the shrewdest and sharpest Arian of that age. In his reply to him, he takes notice that the Church had been in possession of this doctrine, that *God the Son is essentially true God, of the essence of the true God*: and that if Eunomius should undertake to *confute* that doctrine, he ought to fix upon some firm and certain principles whereon to proceed, and trace them down by just and regular deductions, in order to come at his conclusion. After he had said **this**, he goes on in these words:

“ Let no one here tell me, that we ought also to give *rational* demonstration of what we profess: ‘it is sufficient demonstration of our doctrine, that we have a *tradition* coming down to us from our fathers; a kind of inheritance successively conveyed to us by the primitive saints from the Apostles themselves. They that have *changed* those doctrines for the present *novelty*, will have very great need of the succours of reason and argumentation, if they mean to convince, not the grovelling herd or giddy populace, but the grave and staunch men, men of sobriety and firmness. While they offer us discourses without any argument or demonstration to support them, it is only playing the fool, and is even brutishly stupid: as if greater regard should be had to empty talk, void of all proof, than to the doctrine of the Evangelists and of the Apostles, and their *successors*, the lights of the Christian churches^b.”

Here we see with what confidence Nyssen appeals to constant *tradition* for the truth of the Athanasian doctrine: so little did he imagine that the Ante-Nicene faith was any way different from, much less repugnant to, his *own*.

I may next mention a famous case which happened in the year 383. The Arians, Eunomians, and Macedonians were then formally and solemnly challenged by the Catholics, to refer the matter in dispute to

^a Ibid. p. 737.

^b Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. iii. p. 125, 126.

the concurring judgment of the writers that lived before the controversy began: but they declined the offer; refusing absolutely to put their cause upon that issue. This is decisive in the case, that the Athanasians had all the assurance imaginable as to the faith of the primitive churches; and that the Arians were very sensible that their doctrine could never bear so fair and just a trial. The story is thus told in Socrates, lib. v. cap. 10.

“ The Emperor (Theodosius) sending for Nectarius, the Bishop
 “ (of Constantinople), conferred with him about the properest method
 “ of putting an end to the dissensions, and restoring the unity of the
 “ Church. He proposed to have the matter in dispute, which had
 “ divided the churches, to be fully canvassed; that, removing the
 “ causes of their differences, the churches might be reduced to concord.
 “ Upon the hearing of this, Nectarius was under some concern: and
 “ calling for Agelius the Novatian Bishop, of the same faith with him-
 “ self, he acquainted him with the Emperor’s design. He, (Agelius,)
 “ though otherwise a very worthy man, yet having no talent for dis-
 “ putation, recommended Sisinnius, his Lector, to engage in a con-
 “ ference. Sisinnius was a man of great wisdom and experience, well
 “ versed in Scripture, and also in philosophy: but being very sensible
 “ that disputations generally are so far from healing differences, that
 “ they rather foment and inflame them; he suggested to Nectarius
 “ this method. He very well knew that the *ancients* had ever avoided
 “ the ascribing any *beginning* of existence to the Son of God, believ-
 “ ing him to be *coeternal* with the Father: he advises therefore to set
 “ aside all logical wranglings, and to produce the testimonies of the
 “ *ancients*; leaving it to the Emperor to put the question to the heads
 “ of the several sects, whether they would make any account of the
 “ Doctors of the Church who lived before the difference began; or
 “ whether they would reject them also, as strangers to the faith of
 “ Christ. For if they should reject them, let them also pronounce an
 “ *anathema* upon them: which if they should dare to do, they will be
 “ immediately detested by the generality, and truth will thus be mani-
 “ festly victorious. But if they reject not the ancient Doctors, then
 “ will it be our business to produce the writings of the *ancients*, by
 “ which the truth of our doctrine shall be attested.”

Thus far Socrates: who further relates that Nectarius and the Emperor well approved of the design, and immediately put it in execution. Whereupon the heads of the several sects were at first much confounded, and divided among themselves; some commending what the Emperor had proposed, and others not; but in conclusion, they all chose rather to rest the cause solely on logical *disputation*, than upon the testimonies of the *ancients*. Thus the design came to nothing. This we may learn from it, that at that time of day, when many pri-

nitive writings, since lost, were extant, the Athanasians were very willing and desirous to have their cause tried by the verdict of the *ancient* writers; being confident of victory in that method: and that the Arians, as being sufficiently sensible of the same thing, prudently declined it.

Mr. Whiston did not care to give more than short, general hints of this famous challenge, and the issue of it: but he endeavours to wind and turn himself every way to evade its force^c. He pretends, first, that the question between the Athanasians and their adversaries was not whether the *ancients* admitted the *coeternity* of the Son, but whether they admitted his existence to have been *without any limitation of time*: as if the Athanasians intended no more than that the *ancients* never assigned any *particular point* of time for the Son's beginning. But not to mention how silly such a challenge had been, and how unserviceable such a discussion to the Athanasian cause, which required a great deal more than that comes to; I say, not to mention this, Socrates' and Sozomen's account of that affair sufficiently obviates every such weak surmise or insinuation. Both say, that Sisinnius well knew that the *ancients* never durst ascribe any *beginning* at all to the Son: and why? because they thought or believed him to be *coeternal* with the Father^d. The question then was not, whether the *ancients* had assigned any particular time of the Son's beginning to exist: but whether they ascribed *any beginning* at all to him. And Sisinnius was ready to maintain that they ascribed *no beginning* to him, but believed him to be *coeternal*.

Mr. Whiston has another very extraordinary evasion, that the *ancient Doctors* appealed to were not those of the *three first centuries*, but only such as Father Eustathius, Father Marcellus, Father Alexander, &c. about or a little before the Council of Nice. A very likely matter indeed, that the Emperor should ask the Arians whether they would be tried by the verdict of those who had before condemned the Arians by name; or that the Arians should be at all afraid of pronouncing an *anathema* upon such as Father Eustathius or Father Marcellus, who had been deposed and condemned by the Eusebians or Arians before; one in a synod at Antioch, A. D. 329, the other in a synod at Constantinople, A. D. 335. Socrates observes, that the *heads* of those parties durst not anathematize those *ancient Doctors*, lest the people should abhor them for so doing; or as Sozomen expresses it, lest their *own party* should take offence, and desert them^e: is it at all

^c Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, Append. p. 63.

^d Εἰ ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ δοῦναι ἀπέφυγον κατελήφθησαν γὰρ αὐτὸν συναΐδιον τῷ πατρὶ. *Socrat. lib. v. c. 10. p. 273.*

Εὐ γὰρ ᾗδει, ὡς οἱ παλαιοὶ συναΐδιον τῷ πατρὶ τὸν υἱὸν εὐρόντες, οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τιῶς ἀρχῆς τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὸν ἔχειν. *Sozom. lib. vii. c. 12. p. 292.*

^e Ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἐξελαθήσονται. *Sozom. p. 292.*

likely that their *own party* should take such offence in this case, or should pay any great respect and deference to the memory of Eustathius, Marcellus, &c. ? Besides this, those *ancient Doctors* are styled *οἱ παλαιοί*, a word not very proper for such as lived but about fifty or sixty years before ; and some of them alive within twenty, nay within ten years of the time ; as is particularly true of Marcellus, who died A. D. 374. Add to this, that Socrates and Sozomen are express that the *ancient Doctors* appealed to were those that *lived before the rise of the differences*, (as common sense also must tell us they ought to be :) and who could those be but the Ante-Nicene Fathers ?

Come we now down to the next century, beginning with 400, where we find Ruffinus a strenuous advocate for the faith of the Ante-Nicene Church as conformable to his own. The pretended *Confessions*, which are partially represented from him, amount to little more than this, that Origen's and the two Clemens' works were originally *orthodox*, but had been afterwards *corrupted*, and *interpolated* by heretics in some parts of them. This shews what Ruffinus really thought of the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nicene writers themselves, that they were of the same faith with the Athanasians. And though Jerome endeavours to expose Ruffinus's account with all the keenness and satire of an adversary ; yet he himself was forced to allow it in the main, and almost to say the same thing. " It may be," says he, " that they erred in their simplicity, or wrote with a different meaning, or that their writings have been corrupted by little and little, by unskilful transcribers ; or however, that before the rise of the meridan demon, Arius, they might speak some things innocently and incautiously."

The pretended *Confessions* out of Jerome relate chiefly to Origen, whose case will be considered at large in the following sheets : and so I need not here say more of it. The like may be said of Theophilus.

We may now come down to St. Austin who delivers his mind in the words here following, in his Treatise of the Trinity, finished in the year 416 :

" All the Catholic interpreters of the Old or New Testament, that I could read, who have wrote before me on the Trinity which is God, intended to teach, in conformity to Scripture, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do, by the inseparable equality of one and the same substance, make up the Unity divine." Surely St. Austin must have reckoned the Ante-Nicene Doctors among his Catholic interpreters, of whom he gives this full and plain testimony. What he has said of Origen will be considered in another place.

† Τῶν πρὸ τῆς διαίρεσεως, ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προσαρμοσάντων διδασκάλων. *Socrat.* p. 273.

Πρὸ τῆς διαίρεσεως τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καθη-

γητὰς καὶ διδασκάλους τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων γενομένους. *Sozom.* p. 292.

§ Augustin. de Trin. lib. i. cap. 3.

p. 753.

I pass over Anastasius, and Justinian's pretended Confessions, as respecting none but Origen.

Photius is an author of the *ninth* century; who is known to have been often too severe in his remarks upon the Ante-Nicene writers: not considering the difference of times, or how unreasonable it is to expect that those who lived before the rise and condemnation of heresies, should come up to every accurate form of expression, which long experience afterwards found necessary, to guard the faith against the subtle practices or provoking insults of its adversaries. Bishop Bull has abundantly shewn, how easy it is to vindicate the Ante-Nicene Fathers against every thing that can be objected out of Photius.

Leaving the *ancients*, we may now descend to *moderns*, to see what judgment they have made in the present question.

Cardinal Perron, no longer ago than the reign of King James I, (A. D. 1620,) began the pretence, that the Arians themselves would readily submit to be tried by the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene writers. The occasion of it was this: the Protestants having well studied the Fathers, were now willing to rest their cause, not upon Scripture only, but Fathers too; so far at least as the *three* first centuries. And they thought that a much greater deference was due to the judgment of those early ages of the Church, than to that of the ages succeeding: while the Romanists were used to value the latter equally with the former, or even to give them the preference. The Cardinal, being pressed in dispute on this head, could think of no better an answer than that before mentioned. What Mr. Whiston calls his *confession* is, in truth, nothing else but a poor pretence, or subterfuge, made use of in a case of extremity, only to serve the interests of the corrupt Church of Rome.

Fisher, the Jesuit, in the year 1626 seconded the Cardinal in the same plea and upon the same views: but still little notice was taken of it, till a greater than both, the Jesuit Petavius, (who in the year 1622 had intimated something of it, in his notes upon Epiphanius,) did by his learned writings on the Trinity, (A. D. 1644,) give new countenance and credit to it. And if we consider well the *time* when Petavius first began to talk in that manner, (a very little after Cardinal Perron had opened the way to it,) or the use that was to be made of it in regard to the interests of the Romish cause; he may be suspected, by Protestants, to have had some *bias* in this matter, without any breach of charity^h. Some learned Romanists, such as Huetius, and Valetius, scrupled not to join in some measure (after so great an authority) in the like charge against the Ante-Nicene writers; referring to Petavius for proof of it. This passed for a while, till the Unitarians began to take

^h See Bull. Proœm. sect. 8. p. 6. Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 287. Grab. Præfat. ad Bulli Opera.

advantage of it, and to triumph upon it. In the year 1658, and 1662, Daniel Zwicker made his boasts of the Ante-Nicene Fathers as favouring *Arianism*: and though Comenius and Hoornbeckius entered the lists against him, they were hardly thought a sufficient match for him. In the year 1676, Sandius seconded Zwicker in the Arian cause: in the year 1678, our countryman Dr. Gardiner professedly undertook to clear and defend the orthodoxy of the Ante-Nicene writers: and several controversial letters passed between him and Sandius. The next that engaged in the same cause was the learned Le Moyne, in the year 1684. Soon after, in the year 1685, followed Bishop Bull, then a private clergyman; who so learnedly and so effectually defended the Ante-Nicene faith, that the Arian cause has been sinking under the weight of his elaborate pieces ever since.

When Bishop Bull's books came to be known abroad, they met with the universal esteem of the learned in Europe, as well Papists as Protestants; who from that time at least have appeared generally well satisfied in the faith of the Ante-Nicene writers, and have stood up in defence of it. As to Protestants, I might mention our own countrymen, Bishop Stillingfleet, Dr. Cave, and many others, to whom I take leave to add the very pious and learned Dr. Grabe, who long resided among us. As to the foreign Reformed, Fabricius and M. Bayle, two very learned men, have declared themselves in favour of the same sentiments: as also have several other learned Protestants abroad, whose names and treatises are recited by Fabriciusⁱ; as to Romanists, I might mention M. Bossuet, late Bishop of Meaux, with the Clergy of France^k, and even the best learned men amongst them. Du Pin is one who has taken all occasions of answering the objections made to the Ante-Nicene writers in the article of the Trinity: Noel Alexander and Lewis Thomassin have done the same. So also has M. Massuet as far as concerned Irenæus; whereof he is editor. Montfaucon has done the like, so far as properly came in his way; though he gives up Eusebius, who is not in strictness to be reckoned with the Ante-Nicenes. But the learned Le Nourry has exceeded them all, in his *Apparatus ad Bibliothecam maximam*; where he is so zealous in defending the Ante-Nicene writers in general, that he will scarce allow Bishop Bull to have done justice to some of them; particularly to Tertullian and Lactantius, whom therefore he undertakes to vindicate even beyond what the Bishop had pretended. Thus stands the matter of fact among the learned *moderns*; to whom I might add several now living amongst us, whose names I am willing to spare. What then can be meant by the strange report made of the Athanasians, from the days of their *founder*? a report without truth; and I had almost said, without

ⁱ Fabric. *Biblioth. Græc.* vol. viii. p. 312, &c.

^k Nelson's *Life of Bull*, p. 344. 385.

any sobriety or modesty. Enough hath been said to take off the pretended *singularity* of our appeal to the Ante-Nicene writers in this controversy. It remains only to throw in a word or two, in answer to another objection of a very different kind.

II. There was a pamphlet published the last year, entitled, Two Letters, &c. one to the Earl of Nottingham, the other to Mr. Whiston. The author writes on the *orthodox* side, and has said many excellent things, which deserve commendation. But as he has took the freedom to pass his censure upon others, he will give me leave, I doubt not, to use the like freedom with him. What I most find fault with is his narrowing too much his own bottom, and his unwary sapping the foundation on which he stands. To avoid *perplexities* and *uncertainties*, (as he is pleased to call them,) he is for waving all searches into *antiquity*, and is for confining the debate to *Scripture* alone: and because many *texts* made use of in this controversy have not been perfectly settled to the satisfaction of both parties, as to *readings*, *translations*, or *interpretations*, and it requires some *learning* and *critical* skill to fix and ascertain them; these *texts* therefore are to be laid aside also, and the merits of the cause left to be tried by those only that remain; "such as have never yet been disputed by the *adversaries*, or "against which they have nothing to say." Pref. p. 8. He does not consider,

1. The difficulty of finding out any texts, of *real weight* in this controversy, which have not been *controverted*, either as to their *reading*, or *translation*, or *interpretation*.

2. That the *strongest* and most *important* texts are those which have been *controverted*; and for that very reason, because they are the *strongest*, &c. For it was worth the while for the *adversary* to rack invention, and to call in all the succours of *learning* and *critical* skill to assoil them, if possible, and to wrest them out of our hands. Thus the first chapter of St. John has had more pains and art spent upon it, by our adversaries, than any other part of *Scripture*.

3. That if once the issue of the cause be put upon other texts which have been more neglected, it will be as easy, nay much easier, to invent some pretence or other against the *reading*, *version*, or *construction*, to defeat every argument built upon them.

4. That therefore the method which this author proposes is in reality (without intending it) laying the weight of the dispute upon what least deserves it, and can least of all bear it. It is deserting our *strong holds*, and engaging the adversary upon *unequal* ground, and at the greatest disadvantage: in a word, it is to expose and betray the cause which we are endeavouring to support.

What I have here observed in relation to our use of *Scripture texts* is in some measure applicable to the *testimony* of the *ancients*. The

reason why this also has been so warmly and resolutely contested with us, is because it is of *real* weight, and of very *considerable* moment for determining the main question. It would be a very weak thing to give up so momentous a point as that is, only because it has been *contested*; that is, because it is *worth* the *contending* for. If the illiterate vulgar be not competent judges of this branch of the dispute, (as indeed they scarce are of any dispute through its whole compass, though confined to *Scripture* alone,) yet there are others, whom the vulgar will take for their *guides* in this matter, (and they ought to do so,) who can understand and judge of it.

The Author had but little reason to be concerned at Mr. Whiston's followers boasting of his performance as a *victory*, in regard to the *ancients*: it was natural for them so to do, either through *ignorance* or through *prejudice*, where they had no manner of reason. Knowing and impartial judges will easily see the difference between obtaining a *victory* and giving the *last word*. I must do my Lord Nottingham the justice to say, that he effectually performed his part, with great integrity, learning, and acuteness; with the exactness of a *scholar*, and the judgment of a complete *Divine*. Had Mr. Whiston, in his Reply, confined himself (as he ought to have done, and as my Lord very justly had required of him) to those points and those citations only which were before in debate, instead of pouring in new impertinencies, and many foreign matters, to conceal and cover his defeat; the very meanest reader must have seen plainly on which side the advantage lies. But to return.

The low notion which this *gentleman* every where, through both his Letters, appears to have conceived of the *primitive saints*, may, I hope, be corrected by his more careful perusing them, when disposed to it. His chief argument against them (*viz.* that the adversaries have been able to raise *cavils* and to *perplex* their meaning) will carry him further than he is well aware; even to the laying aside, not some texts only, and those of the greatest weight, as it hath already done; but those *very texts* on which he would at length have the whole stress of the controversy laid. If this *gentleman* be of opinion, as he declares in his preface, that the *gates of hell* should never prevail over that *foundation*, over the *doctrine of Christ's Divinity*; and if he thinks it of such moment that *later ages* have universally adhered to it, (a point which would be disputed with him as well as the other, were it of half the moment or concern as the other,) certainly he must think it of some importance to clear and vindicate the faith of the most pure and primitive churches in this article; lest otherwise what he calls the *foundation* (if it cannot be proved to have been constantly upheld) appear at length not to be the *foundation*, but rather so much *wood, hay, or stubble* built upon it. To conclude, as I would not detract

from the merit of whatever this worthy gentleman has well urged in proof of our Lord's *Divinity*; so neither were it advisable in him to detract from those who, in defence of the same cause, and to very excellent purpose, have laboured in searching both *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

To the *law* and to the *testimony* let the appeal be in the first place; and next to the united suffrage of the *primitive churches*, as the best and safest comment upon the other. On these two pillars will our faith for ever stand, firm and unmovable, against all attempts; whether of *vain philosophy*, to batter the *doctrine*, or of vainer *criticisms* to corrupt or stifle the *evidence*: and "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

I should here advertise the reader, that in the following papers I have endeavoured always to express myself fully and particularly in the most material points: but as to incidental matters of slighter moment, I have sometimes, purely for the sake of brevity, passed them off in general hints only; such as will not be perfectly understood without looking into the Reply which I am answering, or sometimes into my former Defence.

I suppose the inquisitive, and such as have leisure, will not think it much trouble to compare all the *three* together as they read; especially where any thing occurs which may appear obscure by reason of its brevity. As to others, they will be content with a more confuse and general perception of such parts as are of least concernment, and require a little more pains and care in the examining than they have leisure or inclination to spend upon them.

THE ANSWER

TO

THE PREFACE.

YOU begin with big words: you have, you say, “clearly shewn, that Dr. W.’s notion is entirely contrary to reason, Scripture, and all primitive antiquity.” Your design, no doubt, is to magnify your work, and to help it forwards in the opinion of the reader. But wise men will not expect much from a performance that needs a proclamation in the entrance: had your arguments been just, and your proofs clear, a reader might have been trusted to find them out.

You proceed to complain of my “manner of writing,” as being “greatly fitted to deceive.” You apprehend, it seems, that it may still have some influence, notwithstanding that you have so *clearly* and so *entirely* confuted it: which, if it does not betray a great degree of mistrust, is a very ill compliment to the understanding of your readers.

After this general charge, you go on to particular complaints, drawn up in form.

The first is, my *entitling* my book “A Vindication of Christ’s Divinity;” being so rude as to insinuate, that the men I have to deal with, are *impugners* of Christ’s *divinity*. I confess the charge; and am so far from thinking it a fault, that I have a second time very deliberately done the same thing in this very treatise. Till you give us a better account of our Lord’s *divinity* than you have hitherto done, I must persist in it: because it is very proper that the world be made justly sensible of your prevarication, and indeed shameful banter, in a momentous article of the Christian faith. I use the word *divinity* in the plain and

usual sense of it, as the Christian Church hath long done. I know of no *divinity*, but such as I have here defended. The other, falsely so called, is really none. While you maintain the principles you do, I must look upon you as *impugners* of Christ's *divinity*; well knowing, that the Christian Church in all ages would have thought the same of you, and that your doctrine was condemned as *blasphemy* long before Arius appeared; and that, upon his first appearance, he and his adherents were charged, as you now are, and very justly, with *denying* the *divinity* of their God and Saviour^a.

You have invented a very soft name for it: it is not *denying* the *divinity* of Christ; but it is differing about the "particular manner of explication of that doctrine," p. 4. Which pretence, like many others, has a great deal more of *art* than of *solidity* in it. Explaining a doctrine is one thing, explaining it *away* is quite another. There is some difference, for instance, between explaining the *doctrine* of the *resurrection* of the *body*, and explaining the *texts* relating to it in such a manner, as to make void the very doctrine itself. When Basilides, Valentinus, Cerdo, and Marcion, so interpreted Scripture, as wholly to destroy the supreme divinity of the *Creator*, or *God of Israel*; was this, think you, no more than differing concerning the "particular manner of explication of his divinity?" They acknowledged, indeed, his *divinity* still; that is, in words, and in Scripture words too; but in a sense peculiar to themselves. The plain truth is, you and we differ about the *sense of Scripture*, in the question of Christ's *divinity*. We find Christ's *divinity* in our Bibles: you find not the doctrine there. Accordingly, we assert Christ's *divinity*, and you deny it; that is, you deny the *thing*, and retain nothing but the *name*. The difference then is, not concerning the manner of explaining our *doctrine*, (which with you is *no doctrine*;) but concerning the manner of explaining the *texts* which relate to it. You speak of Christ's *divinity* however; you have some awe and reverence for the *language* of the Church, though you have left her *faith*. Some concern you have also for your own characters, and for the interest of the cause you are engaged in; which can never prevail, no not with the populace, but under the benefit of a mask. If it be asked

^a Τὴν θεότητα τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἀρνούμενοι. *Alexand. Epist. apud Theod. E. H. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 10.*

^a Ἀρνούμενοι τὴν θεότητα τοῦ μονογε-

νοῦς υἱοῦ—πανταχόθεν ἄθεοι γεγονόασιν, ὥστε μήτε θεοῦ αὐτὸν ἐπιγινώσκειν, μήθ', &c. *Athan. ad Adelph. p. 912.*

why we have no such doctrine as that of the *divinity* of *angels* and of *magistrates*. (called *Gods* in Scripture,) or why the *divinity* of Christ should be asserted, while the other is absolutely denied, I am persuaded you will be much at a loss for any satisfactory answer, upon your principles. It will be a vain thing for you to plead, that you assert as much of Christ's *divinity* as Scripture hath asserted. For, were the fact really so, (as it certainly is not,) then indeed Scripture might justify you in your *denial* of Christ's *divinity*; but it can never justify you in calling that *divinity* which, according to the language of the Church, and just propriety of speech, you yourselves, as well as we, know to be none.

You tell me, that the "whole and only design of the authors " I oppose, has been, soberly, and in the fear of God, to collect " and consider what it is that our Saviour himself and his " Apostles have in Scripture taught us, concerning that doctrine, " separate from the *metaphysical* hypotheses of *fallible* and *contentious* men." Now, to pass by the extraordinary *civility* of these reflections upon others, and the *modesty* of assuming so much to yourselves; as if you had no *hypotheses*, no *metaphysical* fancies, were never *contentious*, scarce *fallible*, like other men: waving this, yet give me leave to say, that be your designs ever so *good*, your intentions ever so *sober*, and your searches directed in the *fear of God*; if the result of all be, that you cannot find Christ's *divinity* (properly so called) in Scripture, you ought not to pretend, either that you are advocates for Christ's *divinity*, or that any man is to blame for charging you as *impugners* of it.

You say further, that by the *divinity* of Christ, I mean my own particular *metaphysical* explication of it. A suggestion as false as it is mean. For neither is my sense any *particular sense*, but the *common sense* of all men, learned or unlearned, that know the difference between *God* and *creature*: neither is there any thing of *metaphysics* in it, more than there is in the declaration of the *God of Israel*, as often as he proclaimed himself to be *God*, (in opposition to such as were *no Gods*.) on the score of his *almighty power*, *wisdom*, *greatness*, and other *divine* perfections. However, supposing my account of the Son's *divinity* to be *metaphysical*, is not your account of the Father's *divinity* as *metaphysical* as the other? And if you, through your *false* metaphysics, exclude the Son from the *one Godhead*, I shall not be ashamed of making use of *true* metaphysics to correct your

errors, and to establish the Son's *divinity*, upon the same foot whereon Scripture has fixed it. You might be ashamed to mention *metaphysics*, when every body knows that you have little else to rely upon, for the support of your novel doctrine^b. Who sees not what a stress has been laid upon a false notion of the *self-existence* of the Father, to degrade and separate his beloved Son from the one true Godhead? What batteries have you not raised against a proper *sonship*, from *metaphysical* reasonings, should I say, or reveries? That generation implies *division*, and necessary generation outward *coaction*; that generation must be an *act*, and every *act* must mean *choice*; that necessary agents are *no agents*, and necessary causes *no causes*; that nothing *individual* can be communicated; that three persons must be *three intelligent agents*, and three intelligent agents. reciprocally, three persons; that three agents cannot be *one being, one substance, one Lord, or one God*; that there can be no *medium* between *being* and *not being*; that inseparable union, without *identical life*, will not suffice to make two Persons *one God*; and that if there be *identical life*, then they are no longer *two Persons*; nor can there be any *equality* or *subordination*; that the same living God necessarily signifies the *same individual intelligent agent*, or Person; that God the Son must be either the same *identical whole substance*, or an *homogeneous undivided part* of the infinite substance, upon my principles; and that he can be *neither*; and therefore not one and the *same God* with the Father. Here are *metaphysics* in great plenty, sufficient, one may think, to furnish out an ordinary *schoolman*. Nevertheless, we should not, on this account, be so unreasonable, as to censure either Dr. Clarke or his friends, for procuring all the *real* assistance they can from *metaphysics*; true metaphysics being nothing else but true divinity: let but your reasonings be clear, solid, and pertinent, and we shall never find fault with them for being *metaphysical*. The truth is, you have pretended to *metaphysics*; but have betrayed very great mistakes in that part, as you have also done in your other pretences, relating to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. To return to the business of the title.

You observe, very shrewdly, that you could with "much greater justice" (and yet you did not think it reasonable so to do) "have entitled your Reply, A Vindication of the Divinity of God the Father Almighty." Truly, if you had done it, you

^b See my Defence, vol. i. pp. 448, 449, 461.

would not have found me complaining of the *injustice* of it : for, what hurt could you have done to me or my cause, by making yourself ridiculous? I hope, therefore, you do not expect any thanks from me upon this head. You go on, however, seriously to shew, how you could have defended so conceited a title. You could have pleaded, that the “denying the Father to be *alone* “supreme in authority and dominion over all,” (in which consists the true notion of his *divinity*,) “*is denying his divinity.*” That is to say, you could have begged the main question, and have thereupon founded a charge against me, with the same, nay, *greater justice*, than I charge you with a plain matter of fact, no part of the main question between us. The question is, Whether the *one true Godhead* be *common* to Father and Son, or *proper* to the Father only? You have determined for the latter; therefore you have struck the Son out of the *one true Godhead*, previously to our dispute; therefore you have denied his proper *divinity*: and the question now is, not whether you have denied it, (which is out of question,) but, whether you have *justly* denied it? If you see no difference between the two cases, I can only pity your confusion. Whether *divinity*, strictly so called, can be *common* to more Persons than one, remains to be considered. In the mean while, it is evident that you, by making it *proper* to the Father only, have denied the *divinity* of all besides.

2. A second complaint is of a *motto* in my titlepage: “I am “Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick “against the pricks.” Now, I thought a writer might be at liberty to follow his judgment or fancy in such a trifle as a *motto*, without being so solemnly called to account for it. But, it seems, this must be now brought to the bar, and deliberately scanned. “As if,” say you, “the not receiving Dr. W.’s notions in meta-“physics was persecuting Christ.” As if, say I, the abusing of *metaphysics*, to the destruction of a *plain* Scripture doctrine, and the undermining the *Christian faith*, were not, by a very easy figure, justly called the “persecuting of Christ,” “crucifying the “Son of God afresh,” and “putting him to an open shame.”

Since I am called upon in this case, I will tell you, so far as I remember, what I principally intended by the *motto*.

1. One thing was, to intimate the great awe and dread which every man ought to have upon his mind, when he takes pen in hand to write in opposition to his Saviour’s *Godhead*, and with a formed design to deprive him of that *worship* and those *divine* honours which have been constantly paid him by innumerable

martyrs and confessors, by the whole Church of Christ for fourteen centuries at least, I doubt not to say seventeen. Whatever may be pleaded for disputing points of an inferior nature, and less set by; this particularly is a cause not to be entered into without "fear and trembling," by any pious man; lest haply he be found to "fight against God." You may think, perhaps, you have no need of such caution: but for that very reason, I should be apt to conclude you have.

2. Another thing intended by the *motto* was, to insinuate, how impracticable and vain (in all probability) any attempt must be to defeat the doctrine of our Lord's *divinity*; which has now stood the test for a long tract of centuries, though all imaginable endeavours and artifices have been from the beginning employed to overthrow it. A late writer^c very well observes, that "this foundation has been so upheld, that where the first institution were, as it were, sunk out of memory, by the weight of impure mixtures, as in the Greek Church; and where every other article of faith had received wounds by the innovations of error, as in the Roman Church; yet all of them have adhered to and preserved this main and *fundamental* point to this day." The same is likewise true of all the Churches of the *Reformation*: and God has visibly blasted and defeated all attempts against the *eternal Godhead* of our blessed Saviour. "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." So said a pious Father of the Church, applying it to this very case^d, (one would think with a prophetic spirit,) thirteen hundred years ago. Such were then the sentiments of the wisest and best men of those times. They were *fallible*, they were *men*: but if posterity, *fallible* as they, grow bold and daring, where the other would have trembled, let them look to it. They had the same Scriptures we have, and better helps for the understanding them: they had their faculties of discerning no less than we; and they spared no pains or care in their searches. This is a consideration of some moment, especially in a *fundamental* article. We should not, at least, go *rashly* into contrary sentiments, nor without *plain* Scripture to warrant it. We may be apt to flatter ourselves too much, and think we see

^c Two Letters to the Earl of Nottingham and Mr. Whiston. Pref. p. 19.

^d Τί γὰρ κενόδοξε, πολεμείς τὸν ἀκαταπολέμητον; τί μάχη τῷ ἀκαταμαχίτῳ; σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίξειν' σεαυτὸν σκανδαλίξεις, καὶ οὐ τὸν

λόγον' σεαυτὸν ἀλίσκεις, καὶ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα. σεαυτὸν ἀπαλλοτριούς ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ χάριτος, καὶ οὐ τὸν υἱὸν ἀπὸ πατρὸς, οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἀπὸ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. *Ephraim. Ancor. cap. xiv. p. 20.*

further than those before us; when in reality, perhaps, it is not that we have more *sense* than they, but that we want their *piety*.

You tell me how *carefully* the men of your way have "studied the Scripture," and how *sincerely* they have "made use of all the helps God has given them, to understand it rightly." Be it so: and I do not know any one that can lay it to the charge of St. Paul, that he had not, in such a sense, *sincerely* studied the Scripture, or had not *sincerely* made use of the helps God had given him, though still a *persecutor* of Christ. However *sincere* you may have been, yet believe also that others, as *sincere* as you, have carefully studied the same Scriptures; and that the most eminent lights of the Christian Church in all ages, have as *sincerely* thought it their indispensable duty to pronounce an *anathema* upon the doctrine you give us, as you do that you ought to receive and follow it. We have nothing to do to inquire after your *sincerity*, of which *God* is judge. Neither civil judicatures, nor ecclesiastical courts, ever proceed upon that bottom. Our business is not to consider the *sincerity* of the men, but the nature, quality, and tendency of the doctrine. There have been sincere Photinians, sincere Samosatensians, sincere Sabellians, sincere Papists, sincere Jews and Mahometans. And indeed, what sects are there that have not *sincere* men amongst them? The more *sincere* you are, the better it will fare with you at the great day of account. In the mean while, give us leave to be *sincere* too, in condemning heartily what we heartily disapprove. And let the *sincerity* of each be tried by the nature and quality of the cause you and we are engaged in, and by the strength of the evidence on either side; on which, as I conceive, chiefly hangs the proof of our *sincerity*. You proceed to invective. "It concerns those who thus affect to sit in the seat of God, and to equal their own disputable notions with the express word of God, to consider a little more seriously what spirit they are of." But, laying aside childish wrath, let us argue this matter coolly and sedately with you. Is it "affecting to sit in the seat of God," that we are doing our bounden duty in condemning *false* doctrine, or what we take to be such; and in "contending earnestly for the faith which was once delivered to the saints?" And how is it "equalling our own disputable notions with the express word of God," when we stand up for the "express word of God," against those who appear to us to contradict and pervert it, in favour of their *metaphysical* conceits and ill-grounded *hypotheses*? What right have a few private men to claim *express Scripture*, and

to equal their own disputable notions with the “express word of God,” in opposition to the *Christian world*, as capable of judging what *Scripture* is, as they that so vainly boast of it! Charge us no more, so fondly, with “affecting to sit in the seat of God,” lest it be told you, in return, that there appears to be infinitely more pride, vanity, and arrogance, in a few *private men* sitting in judgment upon whole Churches, and throwing their *hasty*, ill-grounded censures upon *Fathers*, and *Councils*, and all the greatest and wisest men that have lived in past centuries, than any can be imagined in those whom you so injuriously reflect on; for no cause, but for honestly declaring their abhorrence of your *novel* and *dangerous* opinions. Surely we may presume, without “affecting to sit in the seat of God,” to think some very *fallible* men liable to *errors*: and when in fact it appears that they are so, we may presume, according to our bounden duty, to take all proper care to prevent such errors spreading. But enough has been said in vindication of a *motto*.

3. A third complaint is of my *unrighteous* use of the term *Arians*, and *Arianism*. But that this censure of yours is very *unrighteous* may appear sufficiently from what I have elsewhere demonstrated^c, and may again, as occasion offers. In truth, it is complimenting you, to call you Arians; for you really come short of the old Arians, in more points than one, (as I shall observe hereafter,) and have not so *honourable* thoughts of God the Son, as the generality of the *ancient Arians* had. As to what you pretend about the “particular tenets of Arius,” I shewed you long ago^f, that yours differ not in any thing material from them. You are pleased to say, that by my “way of consequential deductions the Fathers of the Council of Nice, and all their Catholic predecessors, may with equal justice be charged with “*Arianism*.” You mean, I suppose, provided in drawing *consequences*, no regard be had to what is *plain* or *obscure*, *right* or *wrong*, *true* or *false*. Such a *consequential way*§ as this, never was *my way*; and, I hope, never will be: whether it be *yours*, we shall see. You are to prove, that the Council of Nice is chargeable with *Arianism*, upon my principles. I perceive, you are sanguine enough to undertake it; we are now to examine how you perform.

^c Supplement to the case of Arian Subscription, p. 313, &c. of this vol.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 400.

^g See my Supplement, p. 325, &c. of this volume, where I justify my

charging our adversaries with *consequences*, and also intimate in what cases such a conduct is allowable or otherwise.

I must abridge your long tedious train of argument, to bring the parts nearer together, and to save myself the trouble of transcribing. But I will take care that your argument shall not lose a tittle of its force or strength; having indeed none to spare.

“ The Council of Nice, by asserting that the Son was not
 “ (ποιηθεὶς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) *made or formed out of nothing*, but
 “ (γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς) *generated from the substance*
 “ *of the Father*—confessedly, did not mean either, that the
 “ Son was (which is the first of Dr. W.’s two senses of the term
 “ *individual*) *the same identical whole substance* with the Father
 “ —or (which is the Doctor’s other sense of the term *individual*)
 “ that he was a *homogeneous undivided part* of that infinite and
 “ inseparable substance which is the Father’s—But their
 “ meaning evidently was, that as one fire is lighted from another
 “ without any *division, abscission, diminution, &c.* so the Son was
 “ generated from the Father without any *division, abscission, &c.*
 “ of the Father’s *substance*, or of his *alone* supreme authority and
 “ *dominion over all*. And this notion of theirs, because it supposes
 “ the Son to be—not *the substance of the Father*, but *from the*
 “ *substance of the Father*: and because it supposes the genera-
 “ tion of the Son to be an *act* of the Father—and because it
 “ reserves inviolably to the Father his ἀθροῦν, his *alone* supreme
 “ *authority and dominion over all*, which makes him to be in the
 “ absolute sense, *the one God*: therefore, I say, this notion Dr. W.
 “ is pleased to rank, among other things, under the head of
 “ *Arianism*.”

This is the *consequential* thing, which you have been pleased to bring forth. The sum is thus: If Dr. W. supposes the Son to be a *part* of the Father’s substance, (which he does not,) and if the Nicene Council denies the Father and Son to be one *undivided substance*, (which it doth not,) and if the Council supposes the eternal generation to be an *act*, in the sense of *free choice*, (which is a *false* supposition,) and if the Council supposes the Father *alone* to have supreme dominion over all, (which is another *false* supposition,) if these several false and groundless suppositions be evidently true; then Dr. W. by charging some persons with *Arianism*, who deserve it, has *consequentially* charged others also, who have not deserved it. That I may be certain of doing you justice, as to this marvellous thread of reasoning, I will come to particulars.

In the first place, where do you find me saying that the Son

is either the “same identical” (that is, same, same) “whole substance with the Father,” or an “undivided part of that substance which is the Father’s?” I leave *whole* and *parts*^h to those gentlemen of strong *imagination*, who consider every thing in a *corporeal* way, under the notion of *extension*. All that I say is, that Father and Son are *one undivided substance*; which is also the sense of the Nicene Fathers. For,

2. Where do you find that the Nicene Council ever supposes the Father and Son not to be *one* and the *same undivided substance*? They say, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, *from the substance of the Father*: this is all you have to ground your cavil upon. But the Council supposes the Son to be both *from* the substance of the Father, and *of* the substance of the Father, and but *one substance* in both, because of the inseparable union and connection of both. The doctrine is plainly this, *God of God*, and both *one God*; *light of light*, and both *one light*; *substance of substance*, and both *one substance*ⁱ. This is the Catholic doctrine, which it is much easier to carp and cavil at, than to confute. I should take notice of your words, not ποιηθεὶς ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, *not made or formed out of nothing*. Why do you here insert ποιηθεὶς, and pretend to give the sense of the Council in a way wherein they never expressed it? Is it not to insinuate, that the Council imagined the Son to be *made*, or *formed*, only not *out of nothing*? One may believe that this was in your head, by your slyly remarking, presently after, that Tertullian, Origen^k, and Lactantius affirmed the same thing of *angels* and *souls*, as the Nicene Fathers did of the Son. Your report of every one of them is utterly *false*, (as shall be shewn in a proper place :) but were it true, what is it to the Nicene Fathers, who were wiser men than to countenance any such detestable doctrine? What they meant by ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, is very plain from the Creed itself, and has been fully

^h Κυρίως Θεὸς ὡσπερ οὐκ ἔστι μέρος, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὅλον, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ μερῶν ἔστι. καὶ οὐκ ἐρεῖ λόγος παραδέξασθαι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν εἶναι ἐκ μερῶν, ὡν ἕκαστον οὐ δύναται ὅπερ τὰ ἄλλα μέρη. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 18.

ⁱ Quemadmodum lumen de lumine, et utrumque unum lumen, sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia, et utrumque una sapientia: ergo et una essentia, quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere — Pater et Filius simul una sapientia quia una essentia, et singillatim sapi-

entia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia. *August. de Trin.* lib. vii. cap. 1, 2. p. 855.

Consilium de consilio, et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia. *Ibid.* lib. xv. cap. 20. p. 994.

See other examples of the same way of speaking, collected by Petavius de *Trin.* lib. vi. cap. 10. p. 351.

^k See Origen fully vindicated in this respect by Huetius *Origenian.* p. 30, 93.

explained and vindicated¹ from misconstructions. The sum of what they intended was, that the Son was not *from nothing*, nor from any *extraneous* substance, but from the substance of the Father; as light streaming out from light, but without *division*, or *abscission*, or *diminution*; being eternally in the Father, as well as *from him*, and inseparably included with him. Indeed, the Arians invidiously charged them with making the Son *a part of the Father's substance*^m, as you also are pleased to charge me. Which is to me an argument that my notion is still the same with that of the Nicene Fathers, and yours not different from that of the Arians.

3. Where do you find that the Council ever supposes the generation of the Son to be an *act*, in your sense of *act*? The Council has not a word about *act*, that I know of: nor, if it had, would it be at all to your purpose. The question about *act* will depend upon another question, viz. Whether the Council intended an *eternal* or *temporal* generation? Upon either supposition, I can allow the generation to be an *act*; but not in your novel sense of *act*, in both cases. Suppose it *eternal*, then the generation was an *act*; but in the *ancient* sense of *act* and *necessary* agency: as the *sun* was supposed to *act* in generating *rays*; fountains to *act* in generating streams; the mind to *act* in generating thoughts; trees to *act* in generating branches; bodies to *act* in generating effluvia, vapours, or perfumes; the earth to *act* in generating fruits; and the like. No matter whether, in strictness, these kinds of generations should be called acts: they are such as the *ancients* called so; and when we are interpreting the *ancients*, we must attend to the *ancient*

¹ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 544, 545. Bull. D.F. p. 114. Athanas. p. 224, 895. Eusebius of Nicomedia may be an evidence of the meaning of *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, (while he is endeavouring to expose it,) by what he uses as *parallel*, and what as *opposite* to it.

Parallel.	Opposite.
Ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἂν μέρος αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς οὐσίας.	Τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀγεννήτου μὴ μετέχων.
Ἐχει τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως.	Ἄτερον τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει.
Φύσις ἐκ τῆς φύσεως.	Κτιστόν.
	Ἰπ' αὐτοῦ γεγόνος.
	Βουλήματι γεγόμενος..

Euseb. Nicomed. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 6. p. 24.

Some of these expressions which Eusebius uses as *parallel*, are put *invidiously* and *injuriously*. But still, we may see what in the main was the Catholic sense of the phrase, through the *false* colours whereby he hoped to expose it.

^m See Arius's Letter. Apud Theod. E. H. lib. i. cap. 5. And Eusebius of Nicomedia. Theod. lib. i. cap. 6.

sense of words. Necessary *acts* were then called *acts*; and therefore no wonder if *eternal* generation was looked upon as an *eternal act*. But, suppose the Council intended only *temporal* generation, (as some have thought, and it seems not improbable,) then I readily allow it to be an *act*, even in your sense of *choice*; as much as was the Son's generation of the blessed Virgin. But then I insist upon it, that the Nicene Fathers maintained the Son's eternal and necessary existence, antecedent to the generation; which is a doctrine opposite to yours, as light to darkness.

4. In the last place, where do you find one word of the Father's *alone* supremacy of dominion in the Nicene decrees? This is purely a fiction of your own, without the least shadow of a reason for it. Do you find the Nicene Fathers telling you of a *sovereign* producing to himself a *subject*, or of a *lord* and master producing a *servant*? Is it *subject of sovereign*, *very subject of very sovereign*; instead of *God of God*, *very God of very God*? You will see that one is *of the other*, not that one is *above the other*. If the Father be there called *Almighty*, (*παντοκράτωρ*,) yet they understood the Son to be *Almighty of Almighty*, (*παντοκράτωρ ἐκ παντοκράτορος*;) as well as *God of God*: all perfections common to both, only not *coordinate*; the Father having his perfections *from none*, the Son having the same perfections *from him*; *equal* in every thing, but still *deriving* that very *equality*. If this be the *ἀθρευτία* you speak of, the thing is *true*, but not *pertinent*; if you mean more, it may be *pertinent*, but it is not *true*; nor have you a syllable of proof for it, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*.

We have now seen how well you have acquitted yourself in the *consequential* way, under this article; not quite so well, I think, as before in your charge upon me as *denying* the Father's *divinity*. I must do you the justice to say, that you can sometimes manage an argument to greater advantage: or if you could not, I should have made it my resolution not to exchange a word more with you. How you came to perform so much below yourself, here in your Preface, I know not; except it be, that your *passions* were more deeply engaged in this part than in the rest. To proceed.

4. A fourth head of *complaint* is, that I have "talked about calling in question a fundamental article of religion." I have so; and, I pray, where is the offence of so doing? Your

ⁿ Παντοκράτορα ἐκ παντοκράτορος. τεῖ, ἄρχει καὶ κρατεῖ καὶ ὁ υἱός. *Athan. πάντων γὰρ, ὧν ἄρχει ὁ πατήρ καὶ κρα-* *Expos. Fid.* p. 99.

first reason against it lies in these words; “as if the first article of the Creed was not as fundamental as the second.” But who are they that set the *first* and *second* articles at variance with each other, when for fourteen centuries, and more, they have agreed most amicably together? Do not be surprised, when I tell you, that you are the men that impugn the *first* article, by impugning the *second*. I have learned from the *first* article, that God is a *Father*: which, in the sense of the Christian Church, and according to the intention of the compilers of the Creeds^o, supposes him to have a *Son*^p; a coeternal, coequal, and coessential Son, of the *same nature* with him. And I readily submit the case to the pious and considerate reader to judge of, whether I, who, among the other perfections and glories of the Father, reckon this for one, that he has always had with him so great and so divine a Son^q, equal to himself; or you, who, out of the abundance of your *metaphysics*, contrive to rob him of that superlative glory, shew the greater zeal and concern for the honour of God the Father. The Pagans, I know, thought it very much for the honour of their *supreme God*, to have *other Gods* under him. This they looked upon as an article of grandeur, and the very top of magnificence^r. But *Christians* never talked at this rate: they thought it most for the honour of the supreme Father to have a *Son*, *equal* to him in *nature*, and *one God* with him. You go on to another exception: “As if an article’s being fundamental, was a reason why—even the most learned and able men should by no means be suffered to consider or inquire what this fundamental article is.” You have very little reason to use this kind of talk with me; because, when I first entered into conference with you, my whole design and desire was, to have the thing amicably debated betwixt us,

^o See my Sermons, p. 188 of this volume: Bull. Judic. Eccl. p. 36, &c.; Stillingsfleet, Trin. cap. ix. p. 229.

^p Πατέρα τὸν Θεὸν ὀνομάσαμεν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ νοεῖν πατέρα, νοήσωμεν καὶ τὸν υἱόν. υἱοῦ γὰρ καὶ πατρὸς οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μετὰ τῶν ὄντων. *Cyrl. Hieros. p. 114. Bened.*

Ecclesiae fides solum verum Deum Patrem confessa, confitetur et Christum. Hilar. p. 1006. Bened.

Patrem cum audis, Filii intellige Patrem, qui filius supradictæ sit imago substantiæ. Ruffin. Symb. p. 540.

^q Δόξα υἱοῦ ἐκ τιμῆς πατρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ πάλιν υἱοῦ δοξαζομένου, μεγάλως

τιμᾶται ὁ τοῦ τοσοῦτου πατὴρ ἀγαθοῦ. *Cyrl. Hieros. p. 87. Bened.*

Σέβομέν γε τὸν πατέρα, θανμάζοντες αὐτοῦ τὸν υἱόν, λόγον, καὶ σοφίαν, καὶ ἀλήθειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἅπερ εἶναι μεμαθήκαμεν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν γενηθέντα ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πατρὸς. *Orig. contr. Cels. p. 387.*

Honor Filii dignitas sit Paterna; et gloriosus auctor sit, ex quo is, qui tali gloria sit dignus, extiterit. Hilar. p. 832.

^r Onatus apud Stob. Eccl. Phys. cap. 3. Plotinus Enn. ii. lib. ix. cap. 9. p. 207.

and with *equal freedom* on both sides, in a *private* way, without troubling the *press*. And though the article I am defending be a *fundamental* one, yet it was never such to me, till I had well *examined* it: nor do I expect it should be such to you, without the like method. However, there is a great deal of difference between settling one's own *private* faith, and undertaking to *publish* and *propagate* the same among others. While a man pretends no further than to judge *for himself*, he ought to rest unmolested, to enjoy the freedom of his own *private* sentiments, wherein others are not concerned. But when he endeavours to draw *disciples* after him, the case is altered; and it then becomes the *common* concern of all that have *truth* at heart, and more especially of those who are the appointed *guardians* of the Christian faith, to be upon the watch against seducers, and to interpose their reasonable offices to prevent the growth of any dangerous error. There must be some *public* restraints to hinder conceited men from venting *crudities*; as well as a just and due regard to the interests of *truth*, if any man, with *sobriety* and modesty, has any *new* thing to offer. Where to fix the true *medium* between *liberty* and *restraint* is not my business here to inquire: I think, our *governors* in Church and State have already fixed it, beyond all reasonable exception. But to return.

Let those *learned* and *able* men you speak of consider and examine, that they may find out the *truth*; and when they have done, *defend* it. But if the result of their inquiries is the embracing and propagating of *errors*; be they ever so *learned* or *able*, they must be rebuked and reprov'd for it. What if a learned *Jew* or a *deist*, after examining and considering, thinks it right and just to reject, and openly to vilify the *Christian revelation*? May he not therefore be told that his labours have been ill laid out, and that his *infidelity* is a very great, a very unpardonable crime? And if another, after inquiry, sets himself publicly to oppose any momentous article of the *Christian faith*; it is the duty and the business of those that know better, and of those that are in authority, to stand up for the true religion, and to use all proper means for its preservation. What would have become of the Christian faith, if such *learned* and *able* men as Praxeas, Noëtus, Paul of Samosata, Photinus, Arius, Eunomius, Apollinarius, &c. had not been vigorously opposed, and expelled the Christian Church? *Errors* once entered have been sometimes kept in by the same methods, as *truth* hath been

preserved ; just as the *banks* intended to keep out the *waters*, if once overflowed, serve afterwards to keep them in : which is yet no argument, I suppose, for having no *banks* at all, or for throwing all open to inundations. You add, “ as if taking great pains — to find out the sense and meaning of a doctrine, was “ calling in question the doctrine itself :” which I have answered above. In your next words, you betray an unbecoming heat, which should be avoided always, if you desire to see clear. “ Wonderful,” you say, “ that the very foundations of all “ religion and of all truth should be thus turned into ridicule by “ men of learning, without their perceiving what they are doing !” A heinous and heavy charge ; not upon me, not upon a few private men, but upon the Church of Christ in all ages, and upon the best men of it. For, what is it, I beseech you, that you are here so severely declaiming against, under the opprobrious name, of “ turning all religion into ridicule ?” I say, what is it, but the Church’s acknowledging that there are *fundamentals* in religion, and her defending those *fundamentals*, in such a way as Christ and his Apostles have taught her, against all opposers ? Be you ever so *able* or so *learned*, (which I dispute not,) yet we know, that if an *angel from heaven* comes to teach us any *other doctrine* than what we have received from *Scripture*, we have St. Paul’s warrant for pronouncing an *anathema* upon that and him. You will say, no doubt, that you have *truth* and *Scripture* on your side. Well : that is saying something, if you can make it good : it is the very point which we are going to try. In the mean while, argue not against the properest methods of defending and preserving the *truth*, (which are undoubtedly right and good, in the *general*.) but shew, if you are able, that there is something *particular* in the present case, to put a bar to the *general rule*.

5. The last article of complaint is, my “ artificially concealing “ from the reader the true and indeed only material point in “ question, and amusing him with matters of a quite different “ kind.” In this affected charge, (which, I am unwilling to say, you do not believe one word of,) I blame not so much the *injuriousness* of it, since it is too weak to do hurt, as the *indiscretion*. Might you not have been content to set out upon a *new foot*, and, as it were, silently and unobserved, to alter the terms of the question ; but you must begin with laying your sin at my door, and charging me with the very fault which you are, that instant, committing ? I will shew you, first, that my manner of

stating the main question was right: and I shall afterwards tell you what I have to say to *yours*; which in reality (when stripped of its *ambiguity*) is not different from mine. All my labour and endeavour was, to bring the dispute to this short question, Whether the Son of God be a *precarious* being, that is, a *creature* or no^s? This was the only point I was concerned for; being that upon which all the rest turn. There therefore I laid the stress; making it my business to confute whatever I could find in Dr. Clarke's pieces tending to degrade the Son of God into *precarious* existence, or to make a *creature* of him. If this point be but once secured, that the Son is *no creature*, but *necessarily existing*; the Doctor may go on talking of *supremacy*, and whatever else he pleases; they are incidental points only, and must either fall of course, or else be understood in a sense *consistent* with the resolution of the other question.

You are sensible of this yourself; and therefore you all the way resolutely dispute with me the point of the Son's *necessary existence*, as much as the other point of the Father's *supremacy*: you are as resolute in denying the Son to be *one God* with the Father; you are scrupulous as to calling him *Creator*, and never directly assert his creating of the world by his *own* power, or his *coeternity*. In short, you dispute every thing with me that is pleaded to exempt him from the number of *precarious* beings, or *creatures*. Were it not for this, you should be permitted to talk of the Father's *supremacy* as much as you pleased, and to make sense of it at leisure. Indeed, the determining of the point of *supremacy*, and how it is to be held, depends entirely upon the other question; which is therefore the *main question* betwixt us. Do but allow me, that the Son is *no creature*, that he exists not *precariously*, but *necessarily*, that he is *one God* with the Father, that he is properly *Creator*, and by his *own* power, with other the like things; and you shall then go on, without let or hinderance, in your talk of the *supremacy*. Now then, will you please to answer me: Do you understand the *supremacy* in a sense which you believe *consistent* with the points which I maintain, viz. the Son's *necessary existence*, *uncreatedness*, &c.? If you do, the dispute is ended; go on and prosper with so Catholic a notion of the *supremacy*. Or do you understand the *supremacy* in a sense *not consistent* with those other points which

^s See my Supplement, p. 324. &c. Clarke, and his disciples, that they do by immediate and necessary consequence make the Son a *creature*.

I maintain? If this be the case, (as I presume it is,) then do not pretend that those other points are not *material*; for, by maintaining them, I overthrow your pretended *supremacy*, as much as you, by maintaining the *supremacy*, design to overthrow the Church's faith: and so it matters not, whether the main question be put into your terms or mine; since both, in reality, come to the same thing. Only there is this difference in the case; my way of stating the main question is *plain* and *clear*; yours, *obscure* and *ambiguous*: mine is fitted to *instruct* and *inform*; yours, to *perplex* and *confound* a reader: mine is proper to bring the debate to a short and clear issue; yours, to protract and lengthen out a dispute: in a word, mine is sincere and open, like that of a man that knows his cause is good; yours is fallacious and disguised, as of one that is diffident of his cause, and is retiring behind the curtain. You will have the question put thus: *Whether the Father alone hath supreme authority, sovereignty, and dominion over all?* When this is stripped of ambiguity and chicane, I suppose it will fall into mine. You determine in the *affirmative*. The Son then is naturally a *subject* of the Father, and the Father is his *sovereign* Lord and Ruler. He has an absolute right over him, to call him to account, to *reward* him, if he does well, to *punish* him, if he does amiss. This all men understand to be implied in *supreme dominion*; a right and power over *subjects*, to compel, constrain, and punish, as occasion serves; and in short, to bridle them at pleasure. Is this your meaning? Pray then, where is the difference between saying it, and calling God the Son a *creature*?

And, do you imagine that you have any the least syllable of proof of such *alone dominion*, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*? Yet there is certainly no *medium* between this and what I assert of the *equality* of Father and Son. They are either naturally and strictly *equal*; or else one is *infinitely* superior to the other, as *God* and *creature*. Well; be the consequences what they will, you are attempting to prove your point syllogistically after this manner:

“ If the Father never acts in subjection to the will of any other person, and every other person acts in subjection to his will; then the Father *alone* is the one supreme Governor of the universe.

“ But it is fact that the Father never acts in subjection, &c. and that every other person acts in subjection, &c.

“ Therefore, &c.”

This is the wonderful demonstration; lame and deficient in every part. To prove that the Father *alone* hath supreme dominion, &c. you should shew, not only that all other persons *act in subjection*, (for an *equal* may act in subjection to an *equal*, or even to an *inferior*, as our Lord acted in subjection to Joseph and Mary, and *washed his disciples' feet*;) but that they are *really* subject, and under his absolute power and authority. Your reasonings therefore on this head amount only to what the Schools call *ignoratio elenchi*; proving beside the question, or talking wide of the purpose. And how easy is it for a man to fill a book with quotations, as you have done, that can be content with any thing, however foreign to the question! You have proved, that the Son acted sometimes a *ministerial* part, or that he submitted to an *inferior* office: this is all that you have proved; and it is no more than I would have readily granted you, without quoting so much as a *single* Father for it. You are not advanced one tittle towards the proof of what you intend, that the Father and Son naturally have not one *common dominion*. I affirm that they have; and that at the very same time that the Son is executing any *inferior office*, he is still *Lord of the whole universe*, in common with the Father; and that their dominion over all is one and the same *undivided dominion*, as they are *one God* and *one Lord*. You would gladly slip upon us *supremacy of dominion*, instead of supremacy of *order*, or *office*. Instead of saying that the Father *alone* has his supreme dominion *from none*, you pretend that he *alone* has *supreme* dominion; to make *two dominions* where there is but *one*. You play with the ambiguous word *authority*, that you may have something to blind the readers with: while you quote Fathers who affirmed it in *one sense*, and you intend it in *another*. *Auctoritas* is often no more than *paternitas*, with the Latin Fathers, as *auctor* is *pater*: but you are wresting it to the sense of *dominion*. The like use you make of the *equivocal* word *dignity*; which is of *order*, or *office*, or *dominion*, or *nature*; and you artificially blend and confound all together. None, I hope, can be imposed upon by such weak fallacies, but they that want their faculties of discerning. Let the reader carefully distinguish *three* things, and he will then be able of himself to unravel all your pretences, and to throw off that studied confusion which you are labouring to introduce in a *plain* thing.

1. *Supremacy of nature*, or supremacy of *perfection*, is to be

possessed of all perfection, and the *highest* excellency possible: and this is to be *God*. There is nothing of this kind but what is *common* to Father and Son; who are therefore *one God supreme*. And as supremacy of *dominion* and *sovereignty* (properly so called) over all creatures (as soon as they exist) is included in it, and consequent upon it; Father and Son have one *common* and *undivided sovereignty* over all; the constant doctrine of *antiquity*.

2. *Supremacy of order* consists in this; that the Father has his *perfections, dominion, &c. from none*; but the Son *from the Father*. All that the *Son* has, is referred up to the *Father*, and not *vice versa*. This kind of supremacy is of the *Father alone*: and the Son's *subordination*, thus understood, is very consistent with his *equality of nature, dominion, perfection, and glory*, according to all antiquity.

3. *Supremacy of office*. This by mutual agreement and voluntary *economy*, belongs to the *Father*: while the Son out of voluntary condescension submits to act *ministerially*, or in capacity of *mediator*. And the reason why the condescending part became God the *Son*, rather than God the *Father*, is because he is a *Son*, and because it best suits with the *natural* order of Persons, which had been inverted by a contrary *economy*. These things being fixed and settled, there will be no difficulty in replying to any thing you have offered, or can offer in this cause. You may amuse us with *Scripture* and *Fathers*: but every man sees, before this time, where the whole pinch of the controversy lies; you think the *Unity* of the *Godhead*, as we teach, is not consistent with the distinction of *persons, order, and offices*. While you pretend to be disputing against me, you are really disputing against the standing doctrine of the *ancient churches*, from some *concessions* which they made, and in which I agree with them. And your way is to wrest and strain some principles, maintained both by them and me, to a sense *repugnant* with their other known doctrines. If you can prove any thing, we are ready to hear you: if you cannot, it is high time to desist from an impracticable attempt, that can bring nothing in the end, but shame and confusion to as many as engage in it. I take no notice of your reflections upon my *hardiness*, as you call it, (in denying what no good Catholic ever affirmed,) and my *metaphysical excursions*, and my fixing names of *reproach*. It will be seen in the sequel who are most remarkable for *hardiness*, who make

excursions, and who *reproach*, not their brethren only, and the whole Church of Christ, but the *Lord of heaven and earth*, the *living God*; to whom be honour and glory, now and for ever.

That the reader may not imagine our dispute to be any thing *new*, or that you have advanced any thing beyond what the ancient Arians and Eunomians vainly endeavoured in the same cause; I shall just give him a specimen of what some of the *Fathers* of that time answered to the same pretences which you are now reviving. When Eunomius had been magnifying the Father, as *alone* subject to none, on purpose to degrade and depress the Son, under the notion of a *subject*; the great Basil rebukes him, for thereby reducing God the Son to the condition of a *creature*, in these words: “Forasmuch as there are two “things, the *creature* and the *Godhead*, and the creature is “ordained to *subjection* and *servitude*, while the *Godhead* is “regnant and paramount; is it not manifest, that he that de- “prives (*the Son*) of the honour of *absolute dominion*, (δεσποτείας.) “and casts him down to the meanness of servitude, does at the “same time rank him with the rest of the creation†?”

Gregory Nyssen thus more at large answers the Eunomian pretence, of the *alone* supremacy. I shall give it in English only, because of its length, and to save myself trouble.

“He (Eunomius) says, that the Father has no *sharer* (μερίτην) “in glory with him: wherein he says the truth, though he “knows not what he says. For the Son doth not *share* (or “*divide*) the glory with the Father; but he has the Father’s “*whole glory*, as the Father has also the *whole glory* of the Son. “For thus he said, speaking to the Father, *All mine are thine*, “and *thine are mine*, John xvii.—He who is *heir of all things*, “who is *Creator of the worlds*, who shines out from the *glory of “the Father*, and together with it, and in himself, carries the “*express image* of the Father’s *hypostasis*; he has all things “whatsoever the Father himself hath, and is also *Lord of all “power*. Not that the majesty passes away from the Father; “but it abides with him, and at the same time rests upon the “Son. For while he is *in the Father*, he is together with his “*whole power*, in the Father: and as he hath the Father in “himself, he must contain the *whole power and authority* of the

† Δύο γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων, κτίσεως τε καὶ θεότητος· καὶ τῆς μὲν κτίσεως ἐν δουλείᾳ καὶ ὑπακοῇ τεταγμένης, ἀρχικῆς δὲ οὐσης καὶ δεσποτικῆς τῆς θεότητος· ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τῆς δεσποτείας τὸ ἀξι-

ωμα, καὶ εἰς τὸ τῆς δουλείας ταπεινὸν καταβάλλων, οὐχὶ δηλὸς ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο συστοιχοῦντα αὐτὸν τῇ πάσῃ κτίσει δεικνύς; *Basil. contr. Eun. lib. ii. p. 73.*

“ Father. For, he has the entire Father in himself, and not a
 “ *part* only : wherefore having the Father entire, he must have
 “ his authority also entire. What then does Eunomius mean
 “ by pretending that the Father has no *consort* in (power or)
 “ authority ?—He says, there is one only God, *Supreme Ruler*
 “ (*παντοκράτωρ*). If he means a *Father*, by the name of *Supreme*
 “ *Ruler*, he says the same as we do, and nothing contrary : but
 “ if he means it of any *Supreme Ruler* that is not a *Father* ; he
 “ may preach up *circumcision*, if he pleases, along with his other
 “ Jewish tenets : the faith of Christians looks to a *Father*.
 “ The *Father* indeed is all and every thing, he is *Most High*,
 “ *Supreme Ruler*, *King of kings*, and *Lord of lords* ; whatever
 “ titles sound high or great, they are the Father’s own : and all
 “ things that are the *Father’s* belong to the *Son*. Allow but
 “ this, and we admit the other. But if, instead of a *Father*,
 “ he introduces another kind of *Supreme Ruler* ; his doctrine is
 “ *Judaism* : or he strikes in with Plato’s sentiments. For they
 “ say, that that philosopher also taught that there is a certain
 “ supreme *Creator* and *Maker* of some *inferior* Gods. As there-
 “ fore a *Jew* or a *Platonist*, though he admits a *supreme Governor*,
 “ is yet no *Christian*, as not believing in a *Father* : so also Eu-
 “ nomius does but belie his profession, while, when his doctrine
 “ is either *Judaism* or *Paganism*, he pretends to the name of
 “ *Christianity*.”

I have recited thus much out of Gregory Nyssen. (who in the same place^u has a great deal more to the same purpose,) to give the reader a just notion of Christian and Catholic principles. For this acute writer has really hit the true point of difference between the Catholics and their adversaries ; whether Pagans, Jews, or heretics. It lay chiefly in the acknowledging, or the not acknowledging a true and proper *Father* in the *Godhead*. Pagans, Jews, Sabellians, Samosatensians, Arians, Eunomians, &c. all denied it : while there was no true Catholic but strenuously contended for it. Hence it was manifest, that the Arians were the *innovators*, in endeavouring to introduce a *Creator* and a *creature*, a *Sovereign* and a *subject*, instead of a *Father* and a *Son*. They professed the relation in *words*, but in reality they disowned it. The considering God as a *Father*, in a just and proper sense, (as the *ancients* always did,) is breaking the neck of *Arianism* at once. It gives a quite different turn, from what

^u Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. Orat. i. p. 13, 14, 15.

they aim at, to all their pretences of the Father being the *only God*, the *highest*, &c. For none who believed God to have a *Son*, (properly so called,) could ever be fools enough to imagine that such expressions were intended in *opposition* to him. On the contrary, they always understood, that magnifying the *Father* was at the same time magnifying the *Son* too: their relation being so close and intimate, that whatever *perfections* belonged to one, must of course be supposed *common* to both. He who reads the *Fathers* that lived before or after the Council of Nice, with this key, will find them clear and consistent throughout; and will the less wonder at the exceeding great offence taken against Arius, for attempting to *divide* Father and Son; and indeed to divest the one of his *Paternity*, (according to the Catholic sense of it,) and the other of his *Filiation*. Fulgentius is a late writer, of the fifth and sixth centuries; but a judicious man, and well instructed in the true and ancient principles of the Christian Church; especially in regard to our present subject: wherefore I shall close this, with an account from him^x; not because of his *authority*, but because what he says is true and just, and very well expressed, in his comment on the *Creed*, written in opposition to the Arians of that time. The sum is this, that whatever high things are said of the Father in the *Creed*, are to be understood to belong equally to the *Son*: and there was no need of any more particular application, since the very name of *Son* is sufficient.

^x Inaniter tibi visum est, *male intelligendo*, ad tuum sensum velle recitandam *symboli* retorquere, et inde præscribere sanctæ fidei Catholicæ, quia in *symbolo* non omnia dicta sunt de *Filio*, quæ sunt dicta de *Patre*: cum utique propterea plenitudo divinitatis, quantum oportebat, debuerit in *origine* commendari, quia non debuit aliter in *prole* cognosci. Cum enim quisque se dicit credere in Deum Patrem *omnipotentem*, hoc ipsum quod in Deum Patrem dicit, sicut in eo veritatem naturalis divinitatis, ita veritatem *naturalis* quoque *Paternitatis*, et ex hac veritatem *naturalis* etiam *generationis* ostendit.—Totum igitur

in se habet illa generatio divina, quicquid in se habet Dei Patris æterna substantia. Proinde *sufficiebat ut diceretur de Patre solo, quicquid æqualiter intelligendum esset in Filio*. Pater enim sic *omnipotentem Filium* genuit, sicut est ipse Pater *omnipotens*; sic *universorum Creatorem*, sicut ipse *universorum Creator est*; sic *regem seculorum*, sicut ipse *rex seculorum est*; sic *immortalem et invisibilem*, sicut ipse *immortalis est et invisibilis*. Omnia igitur, quæ Deo Patri dantur in *symbolo*, ipso uno *Filii* nomine naturaliter tribuuntur et Filio. *Fulgent. Fragm. xxxvi. pag. 652, &c.*

A SECOND
DEFENCE OF SOME QUERIES

RELATING TO
DR. CLARKE'S SCHEME OF THE HOLY TRINITY :

IN ANSWER TO
THE COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S REPLY.

Compare the following Texts :

I am the Lord, and there is none else, there is no God beside me, Isa. xlv. 5.

Is there a God beside me? yea, there is no God; I know not any, Isa. xlv. 8.

I am God, and there is none like me; Isa. xlvi. 9. Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me, Isa. xliii. 10.

The Word was God, John i. 1.
Thy throne, O God, Heb. i. 8.
Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 5.
Who, being in the form of God, Phil. ii. 6.
Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, Heb. i. 3.

QUERY I.

Whether all other beings, besides the one Supreme God, be not excluded by the texts of Isaiah, (to which many more might be added,) and consequently, whether Christ can be God at all, unless he be the same with the Supreme God?

YOUR general answer to this Query is, that the texts of Isaiah expressly and uniformly speak of a *Person*; and therefore all other persons, besides the *He*, the *I*, the *Me*, are excluded from being what *He*, who there speaks, declares himself

alone to be. To which I reply, first, that the *exclusive* terms need not be interpreted with any such rigour: and secondly, that they *ought not*, because such interpretation leads you into absurdities which you have not been able to answer.

1. I say, *exclusive terms* are not always to be interpreted with such rigour, as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions, such as reason and good sense will easily supply.

Matth. xi. 27. speaking of the *Person* of the Son, says, "No one knoweth the Father but the Son." Doth it therefore follow, that *no Person* but the Son, no, not the *Father* himself, knows the Father?

So, 1 Cor. ii. 11. "The things of God knoweth no one, but the Spirit of God;" no Person but he. Doth it therefore follow, that neither the *Father* nor the *Son* knoweth the things of God as much as the *Holy Spirit*?

Rev. xix. 12. it is said of the Son of God, that he had a name written, that "no one (*οὐδείς*) knew, but he himself." Doth it therefore follow, that neither the *Father* nor *Holy Ghost* knew it? See more instances of like kind in my fourth Sermon. I say then, that *exclusive* terms are not always to be interpreted up to the utmost rigour: and there are many reasons why they should not be so interpreted in this particular case; as I have shewn at large in the same Sermon.

2. I am next to observe, that such interpretation, in the present case, has led you into absurdities which you have not been able to answer. For, if the Son be excluded at all, by those texts of Isaiah, and others of like kind, he is *entirely* excluded. He cannot be *another God*, all *other* Gods being excluded by those texts; and you will not admit that he is the *same God*: since therefore he is not *another God*, nor the *same God*, it follows, upon your principles, that he is *no God*. That the texts exclude not only all other *supreme* Gods, but absolutely all *other* Gods, I prove, not barely from the force of the *exclusive* terms, but from the scope, drift, and intent of those texts; which was to exclude *inferior* as well as *supreme* Deities; and to leave no room for *idolatry*; which might be consistent with paying *sovereign* worship (to use your phrase) to the *God of Israel*. You take a great deal of pains to wind yourself off; or rather, to shew how much you can have to *say*, when you have nothing to *reply*. You tax me with *quibbling* in the word *beings*, as standing in the Query: which is a rebuke that comes late, now you are answering, not my Queries, but my Defence. However, since

all *other Gods* are by me shewn to be excluded, and not all other *Persons*, the expression is just, and no other but what should be. You observe, next, that the Son cannot be the *same God* with the Father on any but Sabellian principles: which is begging the question. It is sufficient to say, that the *Fathers* in general (as we shall see hereafter) acknowledged *both* to be *one God*, and not *one Person*. You cite Eusebius^a as your voucher, that the words of Isaiah, (“besides *me* there is no God,”) denote one *Person*. When you look again into Eusebius, you will find that the words are Marcellus’s not Eusebius’s: though little depends upon them either way. You have another piece of a quotation from Eusebius, p. 4, where he makes it *Sabellianism*, to say that the Father and Son are ἐν καὶ τ’ αὐτὸν, *one and the same thing*. Add, as Eusebius there does, ὀνόμασι μὲν διαφόροις, &c. *under different names only*; and then I condemn it for *Sabellianism*, as well as Eusebius. Your quoting Tertullian in this case is very extraordinary; when every body knows that he makes Father and Son *one God*, in the very same treatise where he is confuting the Sabellians; that is, the Praxeans, men of the same principles with those of Sabellius. Was Tertullian then a Sabellian? Ridiculous! You have a further shift, (but still in the way of *retorting*, not *answering*,) that I myself *when I come to explain*, do not in reality make the Son to be the *same God*, but only to be *in his substance undivided*. Add, from the Father as his *Head*, and *consubstantial* with him; and then I insist upon it, that he is therefore the *same God* with the Father, upon the certain and standing principles of all Catholic antiquity.

But what becomes of the *difficulty* all this while, which it concerned you to answer? You were to tell us, whether the Son (since he is not the *same God*) be *another God*, or *no God*. You say, he is not *another God*, in that *sense* wherein the Father is: that is your meaning. But if he be received as an object of *worship*, he is then *God* in such a sense, as none but the *God of Israel* was, and must either be the *same God*, or *another God*. By your argument, the Jews might have admitted as many *inferior Gods* as they pleased, consistent with the *first commandment*; for that would not have been admitting *other Gods*, because not *Gods* in the same sense. So you leave a gap open to all manner of *idolatry*. You say further, that the texts do not

^a Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. ii. cap. 19. p. 133.

exclude Moses from being a *God* unto Pharaoh, nor *magistrates*, nor *angels*, from being *Gods*. But the texts do exclude Moses, and *angels*, and *magistrates*, and all *creatures* whatever, from being *adorable Gods*: and therefore they can be no more than *nominal Gods*; that is to say, *no Gods*. The Jews might have had *nominal Gods* what they would: but they were to pay *worship* to one only; which comes to the same as having *no other Gods* but one. The receiving more *adorable Gods* than one, is making *another God*. Well then, will you cast off the *worship* of God the Son, or will you frankly own that you make of him *another God*? You discover a great inclination to own him for *another God*: you do not scruple in one place, to call him *another Lord*^b: and yet, when you come to the pinch, you pause, you hesitate, you are at a loss what to resolve on: *another God*, or *two Gods*, sounds very harsh; no Scripture, no Fathers ever ventured upon it; and Christian ears cannot bear it. What then must be done? You at length put on an air of assurance, and intimate to us, (p. 6,) that an inferior God besides the supreme is not *another God*; and that *two Gods*, in the nature of language, must signify two *coordinate Gods*, or Gods in the *same sense*. But, as the *nature of language* hitherto has been always different, and you can give no examples in any writings, sacred or profane, of this *new kind of language*; that any two Gods, and each of them received and adored as a *God*, were not *two Gods*, as well as *one God*, and *another God*^c; you must give us leave to think that this kind of answering is really saying nothing. All the heathens that acknowledged one *supreme God*, over many *inferior deities*, will, by your way of reasoning, stand clear of the charge of admitting *more Gods* than *one*. Strange! that you should appeal to the *nature of language*, in a case where the *language* of mankind, Jews, Pagans, and Christians, hath been always contrary.

You have two or three references at the bottom of the page; which I pass over, as not coming up to the point in hand. If you have any countenance from Eusebius, it will amount to no more than that great man's contradicting himself, and the Catholics before him, as well as those of his own time: his authority therefore, especially for a plain blunder and solecism in *language*, will be very inconsiderable, and weigh little with us.

As to my argument, concerning Baal, and Ashtaroth, and

^b Page 197.

^c See the Preface to my Sermons, p. 5, &c. of this volume.

the Pagan *deities*; you answer it by telling me, you know not how to excuse it from *profaneness*. You should have said, (for that the reader will see to be plainly the case,) that you *knew not how* to evade its force. A rebuke is much easier than a solid reply; which was here wanted. Tell me plainly, if the first Commandment excludes only other *supremes*, and not *inferior* deities; why Baal, or Ashtaroth, or any Pagan deity might not have been worshipped along with the *God of Israel*, without any violation of that *Commandment*? The Law indeed says, you shall have *no other Gods* before, or besides me; that is, according to you, no other *supreme God*, or Gods. How then are inferior and subordinate deities, how many, or whatsoever, at all excluded by that law? Here lay the pinch of the difficulty; which, because you could not take it off, you are pleased to dissemble, and to run to another point. You represent it, as if I had intended a comparison between *Christ* and the Pagan *deities*; and you remind me of the difference betwixt them; which is only solemn trifling. I made no *comparison*, nor did my argument imply any: but this is plain, that the texts which exclude only *supreme deities*, do not exclude any that are *not supreme*, or not considered as *supreme*: and so you, by your interpretation of those texts, have, in a manner, voided and frustrated every law of the Old Testament against *idolatry*. If the very mention of this evident consequence be a thing so *profane*, what must your doctrine be, that involves this very consequence in it? I shewed you, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 412. how, upon your principles, any man might easily have eluded every law of the Old Testament, relating to *worship*, or *sacrifice*. One plain and direct answer to that difficulty would have been more satisfactory to the reader, than all your studied diversions.

You proceed to a tedious harangue about *mediatorial worship*; which shall be considered in its place, but is here foreign, and not pertinent. You should have shewn how, by the force of these texts, (which declare the *Unity*, and ascribe the worship to *God* alone,) *inferior deities* can be excluded, but upon this principle, that the texts are to be understood as excluding all *other Gods* absolutely, and not with your restriction of all other *supremes* only. You have indeed contrived a way, such as it is, to bring in the *worship* of Christ: but it is by making so wide a breach in the *laws* of the Old Testament, that had it been discovered by the Jews of old, there had been room enough to let in all imaginable kinds of inferior deities. They might easily

have pleaded, that the texts were intended of one *supreme* God ; and that he *alone* was to be worshipped as such : but as to *subordinate* deities, as the texts did not reach them, so neither need they be scrupulous about the worship of them. This is the pressing difficulty, to which, after sufficient time to consider, you have not been able to make any tolerable answer. Wherefore it may fairly be concluded, that the argument is unanswerable ; and that this Query having borne the test, will now stand the firmer. You seem to think that you have done your part, when you have found out a reason why *Christ* should be worshipped : but the main thing wanting was, to give a reason (upon your principles) *out of the Law*, why any *inferior deities*, along with the *supreme*, might not be worshipped also. You do well to plead for the worship of Christ : it is a doctrine of the *Gospel*, and I think of the *Law* too. But you had done better, if you had contrived to make the *Law* and the *Gospel* hang together ; and had not entirely frustrated the main intent and design of one, in order to maintain the other.

You have some observations, p. 9, 10, 11, which seem to me foreign to the business of this Query : they may deserve some notice in a more proper place.

QUERY II.

Whether the texts of the New Testament (in the second column) do not shew, that he (Christ) is not excluded, and therefore must be the same God.

THE sum of my argument is, that since all *other* adorable Gods are excluded by the texts of Isaiah ; and yet it appears from the same Scripture, that Christ is *adorable*, and *God*, it must follow, that he is not *another* God ; but the *same God* with the Father.

This Scripture argument I confirm from testimonies of *antiquity*, declaring,

1. That *other* Gods only, (not God the Son,) or *idols*, are excluded by the texts which concern the *Unity*.
2. That God the Son is not *another God*.
3. That he is the *same God*, or *one God*, with the Father.
4. That the one God of Israel (confessedly *God supreme*) was Christ, speaking in his *own Person* ; being God, not as God's *representative*, but as God's *Son*, of the *same substance* with the Father.

This is the sum of what I endeavoured to make out, under

the second Query. I am first to consider what you have to offer, in order to take off the force of my evidence; and next, to examine any counter-evidence which you may have produced to balance mine. In this method I design to proceed: and let the reader, who desires to see distinctly into the merits of the cause, take it along with him. My *Scripture argument* was formed upon the following texts: John i. 1. Heb. i. 8. Rom. ix. 5. Phil. ii. 6. Heb. i. 3. Let us now examine them in their order.

JOHN i. 1.

My argument here is, that the *Λόγος*, *Word*, is called *God*, not in any improper, or loose, figurative sense; but in the proper and strict sense of the word *God*. Therefore he is not excluded among the *nominal* Gods; therefore he is *one* and the *same* God with God the Father.

You reply, p. 15. that God the *Word*, is not God in as "high a sense as the Father himself." The reason why he is not, or cannot, you assign, because by him, or through him, "all things were made; which cannot," you say, "be truly affirmed of the one supreme God and author of all." On the contrary, I affirm, that since "all things were made by him," he is not of the number of the things *made*; therefore *no creature*; therefore *God* in the strict sense; and, since God is *one*, the *same* God.

The most which you can justly infer from the Father's creating all things *by* or *through* Christ, is only this; that they are *two Persons*, and that there is a *priority of order* betwixt them; not that the Son is not God in as *high* a sense, or in the *same* sense as the Father.

What you cite from Eusebius signifies little; except it be to expose the weakness of a great man: whose authority is of no value with me, any further than he is consistent with himself, and with the Catholics before, and in, and after his own times. Not to mention that his authority is late; and I may almost as well produce Athanasius, Hilary, and the elder Cyril against you, as you produce Eusebius against me: who, after all, is so different from himself, in different places of his works, that, *upon the whole*, it is extremely difficult to know what judgment to make of him. To return to John i. 1.

In my Defence, vol. i. p. 281, I give the reader a view of your real and intended construction of St. John. The *Word* was with the *one supreme God*, another *God* inferior to him. a *creature* of the *great God*.

This representation, you say, is *unjust*, p. 45. It seems, your own real sense, when put into plain terms, is too frightful for yourself to admit. You endeavour therefore to wrap it up, and disguise it, in these words: “The Word was with the *one supreme God* and Father of all; and the Word was himself a *divine Person*,—in subordination to the *one supreme God*, and “*by him* did the *one supreme God* and Father of all make all “things.” All the difference between this and mine is, that I spoke out your *whole sense*, and you insinuate it, or mince it; being ashamed to say all that you mean. This *divine Person* you speak of, you own to be *God*, neither dare you say otherwise; you do not allow him to be the *same God*; therefore your meaning is, and must be, that he is *another God*: so far my representation is manifestly just. But further, this same *divine Person* you, with your whole party, deny to be *necessarily existing*; therefore you make of him a *precarious* being, which is nothing but another name for *creature*; therefore he is, upon your principles, a *creature of the great God*: and so my interpretation, or representation of your reserved and real meaning, is true and just to a tittle. Your next attempt is, not to *represent*, but to *corrupt* and *mangle* my construction of St. John. I refer the reader to my Sermons, for a full view of my sense in that particular. Let us see what you can make of it by the help of chicane and cavilling. “The Word was with the one “supreme God—himself the same one supreme God, (yet “meaning *another supreme God* in the same undivided substance,) “and by the same *one supreme God*, did the *one supreme God* “make all things.” That is to say, “The Word was with the “Father the one *God supreme*, and was himself, though not the “*same Person*, yet one and the same *God^d supreme*, and by the “Son, who is *God supreme*, and *Creator^e*, the Father, supreme “God also, made the worlds.” What is there absurd or contradictory in all this? I have given you three Ante-Nicene writers (Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, and Hippolytus) interpreting St. John in the same way as I do. Shew me one that ever

^d Dei verbum, imo magis *ipse Deus*.
Iren. p. 132.

^e Ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ Θεός. ὅτι εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. *Clem. Alex.* p. 135. conf. p. 86.

Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, Θεὸς ὦν, τί οὖν φήσειεν ἂν τις δύο λέγειν

θεούς; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐρῶ θεούς, ἀλλ' ἡ ἓνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, &c. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* cap. xiv. p. 15.

^e Mundi enim factor, vere verbum Dei est. *Iren.* p. 132.

Θεὸς καὶ δημιουργός· πάντα γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν. *Clem. Alex.* p. 156.

interpreted him in your manner. You are forced to disguise the matter, and to give your meaning but by halves; because you know you have not one Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene Catholic writer on your side, so far as concerns your construction of St. John. You pretend, that I make of the Son *another supreme God*; not the *same God*. But as this is only said, not proved, it must pass for nothing but a trifling begging of the question. Prove you that, as plainly as I have proved that you make the Son *another God, a creature God*; or else acknowledge the difference between a just representation and an injurious misrepresentation. So much for John i. 1. The second text is,

HEB. i. 8.

My argument here is, that Christ, who in his text is declared to be *God*, must be the *same God* with the *Father*, because Scripture admits but *one God*; and expressly declares against every *other God*. To which you reply, p. 13, that the Apostle sufficiently explains himself by the words, "God, even thy God;" verse the ninth: and that I "ought not to have omitted it." But I had abundantly answered that pretence^f, by interpreting the words of Christ considered in his *human* capacity, referring to Dr. Bennet for a vindication of it: which is what you ought not to have omitted. This text will come up again under Query III.

ROM. ix. 5.

From this text I form my argument after the same manner as in the two former. You pretend it "dubious, whether it may not possibly be meant of the Father;" referring to Dr. Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 75. 2nd edit. On the contrary, I maintain, that no reasonable doubt can be made of its being meant of *Christ*; referring to such as have proved it^g.

But allowing the words to be intended of Christ, (which is no great courtesy,) you have still something further to say, viz. that the meaning of this text "is distinctly explained," 1 Cor. xv. 27. and Eph. i. 22. But how explained? so as to make the Son *another God*? I see nothing like it: neither does God's being the *head* of Christ, nor his "putting all things under him," conclude any thing against what I assert, that both together are *one God supreme*. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 139. A distinct person-

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 307.

^g My Sermons, p. 138 of this vol. Grabe, Not. in Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 3. Grabe's Instances of Defects,

&c. p. 24. Second Review of Doxologies, p. 15, 16. Dr. Calamy's Sermons, p. 38.

ality, together with a supremacy of *order*, or *office*, are sufficient to account for all, upon my principles. You remind me of Hippolytus's comment on this text, in these words: "Christ is God over all: for thus he himself says plainly, All things are *given* me from the Father^h." But why did you overlook the words immediately following; "Who being over all God blessed, was be- gotten (*of the Virgin*), and becoming man, is God for ever?" You see, Hippolytus supposes him to have been *God* before the commencing of his *mediatorial* kingdom, before the time when all things were said to be *given* him; and therefore Hippolytus may reasonably be supposed to mean no more, than that all things were intrusted with him, because he, so *great* and so *divine* a Person, was the most proper to sustain so *great* a charge. The consideration thereof leads back to his *antecedent* dignity and excellency, which qualified him for so *great* and so *endearing* a charge. Wherefore it was right in Hippolytus to make mention of it, in order to confirm what was said, Rom. ix. 5, that he is "over all God blessed for ever." Epiphanius, who cannot be suspected of *Arianizing*, scruples not to argue upon the same text, just as Hippolytus does, and almost in the same wordsⁱ. And they did not quote Matt. xi. 27, (or Luke x. 22,) to shew how, or when, Christ was *appointed* God; they had no such thoughts, believing him to have been always God; but to confirm what was said in Rom. ix. 5. so as to shew withal, that he was *distinct* from the *Father*, not the *same Person* with him, as Noëtus pretended.

You bring up Hippolytus^k again, to confirm, as you imagine,

^h Οὗτος ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς ἐστίν, λέγει γὰρ οὕτω μετὰ παρρησίας· πάντα μοι παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς. Ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογητὸς γεγένηται, καὶ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος Θεὸς ἐστίν εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Hippol. *contr.* Noët. p. 10.

ⁱ Ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς, θαυμαστῶς διηγείται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ ὢν, ἐστίν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ αὐτὸς διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, λέγων· πάντα μοι παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μου· διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶ Θεός. Epirh. *Hær.* lvii. p. 487.

^k Καλῶς εἶπεν παντοκράτορα Χριστόν—μαρτυρῶν γὰρ Χριστὸς εἶπεν, πάντα μοι παραδέδοται παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ πάντων κρατεῖ, παντοκράτωρ παρὰ πατρός κατεστάθη Χριστός—πάντα ὑποτέτακται αὐτῷ ἔκτος τοῦ υποτάξαντος, πάντων κρατεῖ, αὐτοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, ἵνα ἐν πᾶσιν εἰς Θεὸς φανῆ, ᾧ τὰ πάντα ὑπο-

τάσσεται ἅμα Χριστῷ. ᾧ τὰ πάντα πατήρ ὑπέταξε παρέξ ἑαυτοῦ. Hippol. *contr.* Noët. p. 10.

Καὶ ἄλιν φησὶν ἐν τῇ Ἀποκαλύψει ὁ ὢν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος παντοκράτωρ, καλῶς κατὰ πάντα εἶπε· καλῶς γὰρ εἶπε, πάντα μοι παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μου—ἐπὶ πάντας μὲν οὖν ὢν Θεός, ἔχων δὲ ἴδιον αὐτοῦ πατέρα, &c. Epirh. *Hær.* lvii. p. 488.

Omnipotens Christus appellatur. Si enim omnia Patris Filii sunt, et ut ipse loquitur in Evangelio, "data est mihi" "omnis potestas in cælo et in terra;" "omnia mea tua sunt;" cur non etiam *omnipotentis* nomen referatur ad Christum: ut sicut Deus Dei, et Dominus Domini; sic *omnipotens omnipotentis* Filii sit? Hieronym. in *Isa.* tom. iii. p. 13.

your fancies upon 1 Cor. xv. 27. Hippolytus answering the objection of Noëtus, drawn from Rev. i. 8, where Christ is styled *παντοκράτωρ*, (and from whence Noëtus inferred, that Christ must be the very *Father* himself incarnate;) I say, Hippolytus, in his answer, hath the words which you recite: "If therefore all things are put under him, excepting him that did put all things under him, he hath dominion over all, and the Father over him; that in all things may be made appear *one God*, to whom all things are subject, together with Christ, to whom the Father hath subjected all things, himself only excepted."

Hippolytus here speaks not of the *Λόγος*, but of *God incarnate*, Christ Jesus; shewing that *Christ*, since his incarnation, has been *subject* to the Father, and will be so also, in his human capacity, after he has delivered up his mediatorial kingdom. From whence it is manifest, against Noëtus, that the *Father* himself was not *incarnate*, was not *Christ*; for then whom could Christ be *subject* to, but to himself? which is absurd. This I take to be the sense of Hippolytus, and his full sense; his argument requiring no more: besides that, it is not consistent with Hippolytus's other writings, to make the Son, in his highest capacity, *subject* to the Father, and under his *dominion*. For, not to mention that Hippolytus, in this very tract, plainly teaches that the Son is of the same substance with the Father, and *one God* with him, (as shall be shewn more fully hereafter,) he concludes his treatise with ascribing *glory* and *dominion* to the Son *with the Father and the Holy Ghost*. Now it would be very absurd thus to join *sovereign* and *subject* together, ascribing the same *glory* and *dominion* to both¹. And in the words going before, speaking of Christ, he says, "He being God, became man for our sakes, to whom the Father subjected all things^m." Which shews that all his discourse before, relating to the *subjection* of things to the Son, and of the Son to the Father, is after his incarnation; and is to be understood of the *θεάνθρωπος*, the *God-man*; who, as God, had all things under him; as man,

Nec mirum si Christus dicatur *omnipotens*, cui "tradita est omnis potestas in cœlo et in terra." Et qui dicit; "omnia quæ Patris sunt, mea sunt." Si autem omnia, id est, Deus ex Deo, Dominus ex Domino, lumen de lumine; ergo et ex *omnipotente omnipotens*: neque enim fieri potest ut, quorum una natura est, diversa sit

gloria. *Hieron. in Zach. tom. iii. p. 1718.*

¹ Αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος ἅμα πατρὶ καὶ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι, &c. *Hippol. contr. Noët. p. 20.*

^m Οὗτος ὁ Θεὸς, ὁ ἄνθρωπος δι' ἡμᾶς γεγωνῶς, ᾧ πάντα ὑπέταξεν πατήρ. *Ibid.*

was himself under the Father. To confirm which, we may observe that Hippolytus interprets Christ's *praying* to the Father, as being done *οικονομικῶς*. These are his words: "Christ made "all these prayers economically, as man, being himself very "Godⁿ." Does this look as if Hippolytus believed God the Father to have *sovereign dominion* over Christ, in his highest capacity? Might not any *subject* of God have prayed to God, as such?

You say (p. 16.) that the "doctrine which I allege this text " (Rom. ix. 5.) to prove, is a contradiction to the whole stream "of antiquity." And here again you quote Hippolytus, (the *spurious* and *interpolated* Hippolytus, according to you.) as a just interpreter of the ancients. It seems, you are willing to admit him, when he says any thing that looks for your purpose. The words you chiefly value are *παντοκράτωρ παρὰ πατρὸς κατεστάθη Χριστός*: *Christ was constituted Ruler over all by the Father*. On occasion whereof, let me observe a thing to you which you are not aware of; that though the ancients scrupled not to say, that Christ was *constituted* by the Father, *Ruler*, or *Lord*, or even *Creator*, (according to Prov. viii.) or any thing coming under the notion of *office*, (the Father being ever looked upon as *first* in order, and, in virtue thereof, the Fountain of every *office*, according to his own voluntary appointment,) yet you will never find it said by the ancients, that the Father *constituted* Christ a God, or *appointed* him to be *God*. Which observation is highly deserving your special notice; as it may discover to you a fundamental flaw in your *hypothesis*, and may shew that you have took a great deal of pains with the ancients, upon a very wrong view, and (give me leave to add) to very little purpose. Had you found ever an ancient testimony, declaring that Christ was constituted *God over all*, you would have done something: the rest are impertinent, and come not up to your point. The word *God* was never looked upon as a word of *office* or *dominion*, but of *nature* and *substance*: and hence it is, that the ancients never speak of Christ's being *constituted* God. One use indeed you may make of your observation from Hippolytus, that *παντοκράτωρ*, though it be often in the LXX the rendering of *יהוה צבאות* *Lord of hosts*, yet the Fathers sometimes used it in a lower sense, such as comes not up to the strength of the

ⁿ Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα Χριστὸς οἰκονομικῶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἤχετο, Θεὸς ὧν ἀληθινός. Ἄλλ' ὡς φθύσας εἶπον, ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ δούλου ἦν ταῦτα λέγουσα καὶ πάσχουσα. Hipp. *contr. Jud.* p. 3.

Hebrew : and therefore I readily acknowledge to you, that such passages of the Fathers as style Christ *παντοκράτωρ* are not pertinently alleged to prove him to be the *Jehovah* in the strict sense of that name, according to those Fathers. But enough of this. Upon the whole, it may appear that you have not been able to take off the force of Rom. ix. 5.

PHIL. ii. 6.

My argument from this text runs thus: He that was in the *form of God*, that is, *naturally* Son of God, and *God*, and as such *equal* with God^o, is God in the same high sense as the Father himself is; and since God is one, the same God. To this you only reply, (p. 14,) that “nothing can be more directly against “me” than this text. Which decretory sentence, void of all proof, and coming from a man *fallible* as myself, deserves no further notice. You have a great deal more upon this text from p. 50 to p. 64, but put together in so confused a manner, with a mixture of foreign matters, that I shall not spend time in pursuing you; but refer the reader to my fifth sermon upon this very text: where all that you have material is already answered, or obviated. Your incidental pleas and pretences relating to Novatian, and other ancients, will be answered in their place. I proceed to another text.

HEB. i. 3.

My argument here is, that he who is “the brightness of his “*Father’s* glory, and the express image of his person,” cannot reasonably be supposed to be *excluded* among the *nominal Gods*. But if he be not excluded, he is included in the *one supreme God*. Therefore, &c. Now, in page the fourteenth, you are content only to say, which I can as easily gainsay, that this text is *directly against* me. But you resume it again, p. 65, out of method; and thither I must attend you. There you talk much of *by* his Son, and *by* whom, and of the Father’s being *his God*: which kind of reasoning I have sufficiently answered above. But you add, that “the image of the one supreme God cannot be “himself that one supreme God, whose image he is.” But what mean you by the words “that supreme God?” Plainly, “that “supreme Father, who is God:” and thus I readily allow, that he cannot be himself *that very Person* whose *express image* he is. But why do you thus perpetually quibble with the phrase “that “supreme God;” as if there were *two Gods*, *this* and *that*, and

^o See my fifth Sermon, p. 102, &c. of this volume.

making the *supreme God* a name for one *Person* only? This, you must be sensible, is taking the main point for granted; and poorly begging of the question: which is a thing beneath the character of an able disputant. To proceed: I had been pressed with a passage of Eusebius, relating to this text; and I returned a clear and full answer to it in my Defence, vol. i. p. 285, 286. You bring another passage out of Eusebius, in his *Demonstratio Evang.* though you know that even Bishop Bull, who otherwise is a defender of Eusebius, yet makes no account of what he wrote before the Nicene Council: as neither do I. I shall not therefore give myself the trouble of attending you, as often as you fill your margin with that author. I had said however, what was true, in relation to the passage brought against me before, that by *δύο οὐσίαι*, Eusebius might mean no more than what Pierius, Methodius, Alexander, and Tertullian, meant by the like expressions; that is, *two Persons*. To which you reply, (p. 68,) that I, “by adding what the ancient writers constantly “disclaimed,” (viz. an *equality of supreme authority* in the two Persons,) “do necessarily make, what they never did, two supreme Gods, however *inseparable* or *undivided*, as to their *substance*.” But you are under a double mistake; first, in imagining that the *ancients* did not acknowledge an “equality of supreme authority,” as much as I do; and next, in fancying that they and I (for the charge affects both, or neither) thereby make “two supreme Gods.” The *ancients*, and I conformable thereto, always suppose a *headship*, or *priority* of order of the Father, referring his *consubstantial* Son to him as his *head*. And “this origination in the divine Paternity” (as Bishop Pearson speaks^p) “hath anciently been looked upon as the assertion of “the *Unity*: and therefore the Son and Holy Ghost have been “believed to be but *one God with the Father*; (N. B.) because “both from the Father, who is *one*, and so the *Union* of them.” If you ask how the *authority*, or *dominion*, (for so I understand you here, and not as *authority* sometimes signifies *Paternity*, and *auctor* is *Pater*;) I say, if you ask how it can be *supreme* in both, if it be *original* here, and *derivative* there: I answer, because it is the *same* in both, only existing in a different manner:

P Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

Φύσις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ μία, Θεὸς ἕνωσις
δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἐξ οὗ καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται
τὰ ἐξῆς. οὐχ ὡς συναλείφουσαι, ἀλλ’
ὡς ἔχουσαι. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxii.
p. 520.

In illa quippe una substantia Tri-
nitatis, *Unitas* est in *origine*, *equalitas*
in *prole*, in *caritate* autem *Unitatis*
equalitatisque *communio*. Fulgent.
ad Monim. lib. ii. cap. 11. p. 37.

neither are there *two dominions* or *two sovereignties*, any more than two *essences*, *substances*, or *Gods*. The question *from whence* the Son's *dominion* is, is one point, and *how great*, or *how high*, is quite another. If you ask *from whence* the Son's *dominion* is, I say *from the Father*, as his *essence* also is: if you ask *from whence* the Father's *dominion* is, I say, *from none*, as I say also of his *essence*. But if you ask me, *what*, or *how great*, or *how high*; I say *equal*⁹ in both, and indeed one undivided *same*, just as the *essence* is. Thus your charge of *two Gods*, which you so frequently repeat, through your abounding in false *metaphysics*, is proved a fallacy, and a groundless calumny.

You proceed to examine my authorities for my construction of Heb. i. 3. one by one. This being but a very small and incidental part of the controversy, I could be content to pass it over, for fear of being tedious to the reader. But I will endeavour to be as short as possible. You begin with rebuking me for citing Origen out of Athanasius; *who lived*, you say, above a hundred years after Origen's death. It was not quite a hundred when Athanasius wrote the piece from whence I cited the passage. But no matter. I question whether you can bring any thing of Origen's, that is of *better*, or indeed so *good* authority; considering how carefully Athanasius's Works have been preserved, how negligently most of Origen's, and how much they have been *corrupted*; as the best critics allow. Will you produce me any MSS. of Origen, above the age of Athanasius? Or will you assure us that later scribes were more faithful in copying than he? To pass on; you think however that the passage cited from Origen is "nothing to my purpose;" it does not shew that the Son is the *one supreme God*. But it shews enough to infer it, though it does not directly say it. It shews that, in

⁹ *Æqualem ergo Patri credite Filium; sed tamen de Patre Filium, Patrem vero non de Filio. Origo apud illum, æqualitas apud istum. August. Serm. cxi. tom. 5. p. 681.*

Quod si dixeris, eo ipso major est Pater Filio, quia *de nullo* genitus genuit tamen *æqualem*; cito respondebo, imo ideo non est major Pater Filio, quia genuit *æqualem*, non *minorem*. Originis enim quæstio est, quis *de quo* sit: *æqualitatis* autem, *qualis* aut *quantus* sit. *August. tom. viii. p. 718.*

Cum sit *gloria, sempiternitate, virtute, regno, potestate*, hoc quod Pater

est; omnia tamen hæc *non sine auctore*, sicut Pater, Deus ex Patre tanquam Filius, sine initio et *æqualis* habet: et cum ipse sit omnium caput, ipsius tamen caput est Pater. *Ruffin. in Symb.*

Cum Pater omnia quæ habet gignendo dedit, *æqualem* utique genuit, quoniam nihil minus dedit: quomodo ergo tu dicis, quia ille *dedit*, ille *accepit*, ideo *æqualem* Filium Patri non esse; cum eum cui data sunt omnia et ipsam *æqualitatem* videas accepisse? *August. contr. Maxim. lib. ii. cap. 14. p. 707.*

Origen's opinion, the *image* must be perfectly like the *prototype*; both alike *invisible*, and like *eternal*^r: so far he is *express*; and his premises infer a great deal more, by parity of reason. Wherefore Origen, in his book against Celsus, carries the argument up to a formal *equality* in *greatness*. His words are^s, "The God and Father of all is not, according to us, the only one that is *great*. For he hath imparted even his *greatness* to his only begotten, begotten before the creation: that he being the *image* of the invisible God, might keep up the resemblance of the Father, even in *greatness*. For it was not possible for him to be (if I may so speak) a commensurate and fair image of the invisible God, without copying out his *greatness*."

Now to me it seems, that this and the other passage of Origen are both very much to my purpose. For Origen was never weak enough to imagine that there were *two Gods*, equal in *invisibility*, in *eternity*, in *greatness*: but that the Father and Son, thus *equal* to each other, were together the one God supreme. If you have any passages to allege to the contrary, out of Origen's less accurate, or perhaps *interpolated* works, they are by no means to be brought in competition with those I have cited: besides that most of them may admit of a fair and candid construction, as meaning no more than that the Father is naturally *prior* in *order* to the Son, or in *office* superior by mutual concert and agreement.

Nor shall I think myself obliged (which I mention once for all) to answer such testimonies as have been before completely answered by Bishop Bull; unless you have something *new* to add upon the subject. We shall have more concerning Origen in another place.

You proceed to Dionysius of Alexandria, (p. 71,) whom I had also cited in relation to Heb. i. 3. You call it citing at *second hand*, because out of Athanasius. May not any writings whatever be almost with equal justice said to be cited at *second hand*? They must be conveyed to us by some hand or other: and we cannot be more certain of any parts of old writings than we are

^r Εἰ ἔστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, ἀόρατος, εἰκὼν. ἐγὼ δὲ τολμήσας προσθεῖην ἂν, ὅτι καὶ ὁμοίότης τυγχάνων τοῦ πατρὸς, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν. *Orig. apud Athan.* p. 233.

^s Οὐ μόνος δὲ μέγας καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν ὄλων Θεὸς καὶ πατήρ· μετέδωκε γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς μεγαλειότητος τῷ

μονογενεῖ καὶ πρωτοτόκῳ πάσης κτίσεως· ἵν', εἰκὼν αὐτὸς τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει σώξῃ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ πατρὸς· οὐ γὰρ οἶοντ' ἦν εἶναι σύμμετρον (ἵν' οὕτως ὀνομάσω) καὶ καλὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀοράτου Θεοῦ, μὴ καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους παριστᾶσαν τὴν εἰκόνα. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 323.

of these parts especially which were long ago cited, higher up than any MSS. now reach. But enough of this trifling. You bring up again the stale pretence about what Basil and Photius said of Dionysius: which has been answered over and over, by considerable writers^t. This is what you ought not to have concealed from your reader. You observe further, that Dionysius does not draw the *same inference* from the text that I do, viz. that the Son is the "one supreme God." Very true: neither should I draw that inference, if I was only proving the *eternity* of God the Son; but I should stop there. However, if there be occasion to advance further, nothing is easier than from the *co-eternity* to deduce all that I desire, viz. that the Father and Son are together the one God *supreme*: which is indeed the plain certain doctrine of the same Dionysius, in the same treatise. "The undivided Monad we extend to a Triad, and again the "undiminished Triad we contract into a Monad". Now, I beseech you, what is his *Monad*, but the *one God supreme*? And what does it consist of, but of *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, according to this excellent writer?

My next authority was Alexander of Alexandria^x; whom, you say, I cite out of Athanasius. You should have said, out of Montfaucon's edition of Athanasius's works, into which he has inserted this epistle of Alexander. The reader perhaps otherwise may suspect that this was again at *second hand*, as you would call it, from Athanasius. Well, what have you to say to the thing? It amounts, you think, to no more than what Arius himself might have said, viz. that the Son is not (ἀνόμιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς) of *unlike substance to the Father*. You should have added the other words by me cited, εἰκὼν τελεία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρὸς, *the perfect image and shining forth of the Father*. Which I believe neither Arius nor yourself would be willing to admit. However, Arius had denied that the Son was ὁμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, *of like substance with the Father*; as appears from that very epistle^y. And neither Arius nor you would have said ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρὸς, but ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ

^t Bull. Def. Fid. Nic. p. 142. Mr. Thirlby's Answer to Mr. Whiston's Suspicions, p. 91, &c. Ruinart. Act. Mart. p. 181. Le Moyne, Not. ad var. Sacr. p. 235. Athanasius de Sententia Dionysii.

^u Οὕτω μὲν ἡμεῖς εἰς τὴν τριάδα τὴν μονάδα πλατύνομεν ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ τὴν τριάδα πάλιν ἀμείωτον εἰς τὴν μον-

ἀδα συγκεφαλαιούμεθα. Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. vol. i. p. 255.

^x Πῶς ἀνόμιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁ ὢν εἰκὼν τελεία καὶ ἀπαύγασμα τοῦ πατρὸς; Alexand. Alexand. Ep. inter Op. Athanas. p. 399.

^y Among Arius's tenets, this is one. Οὔτε δὲ ὁμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν τῷ πατρὶ ἔστιν. Ibid. p. 398.

πατρός, which kind of expression Dr. Clarke contends for in opposition to the other. You proceed to cite a pretty large passage from Alexander's other epistle in Theodoret, to shew, as you pretend, that "he has nothing agreeable to my notion;" though the whole epistle is exactly agreeable to my notion, and indeed contains it. Alexander no where says, with you, that the Father *alone* has "supreme authority, sovereignty, and dominion:" he was too wise and too good a man to *divide* the Son from the Father. He expresses their *inseparability*² in all things, in very full and express terms; together with the Son's *necessary existence*^a, and *supreme divinity*^b; blaming the Arians for laying hold of Christ's acts of submission, and condescension, in order to sink and lessen it. All you can find in this writer that looks for your purpose is, that the prerogative of *unbegotten* belongs to the Father, (which I also constantly maintain,) and that the Son was neither *unbegotten*, nor *created*, but between both: which Alexander observes, in opposition to the Arians, who pretended there was no *medium*, but that the Son must be either *unbegotten* or a *creature*. You cite part of this passage, but omit what would have shewn fully the sense of the author; which runs thus:

For these inventors of idle tales (the Arians) pretend, that we, who reject their impious and unscriptural blasphemy against Christ, as being from nothing, assert *two unbegotten Beings*: alleging, very ignorantly, that one of these two we must of necessity hold; either that he (Christ) is *from nothing*, or that there must be *two unbegotten Beings*. Unthinking men! Not to consider the great distance there is between the *unbegotten* Father, and the things *created* by him out of nothing, (as well rational as irrational,) betwixt which two comes in the intermediate *onlybegotten nature* of God the *Word*, by whom the Father made all things out of nothing^c,

² Ἀλλήλων ἀχώριστα πράγματα δύο, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, &c. *Alexand. Epist. Ap. Theod.* lib. i. cap. 4. p. 12. Μεταξὺ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ οὐδὲν—διάστημα, οὐδ' ἄχρητινὸς ἐννοίας τοῦτο φημισασιώσαι τῆς ψυχῆς δυναμένης. *Ibid.*

^a Ἄτρεπτον τοῦτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον ὡς τὸν πατέρα, ἀπροσδεῖ καὶ τέλειον υἱόν—μόνῳ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ λειπόμενον ἐκείνου. p. 18. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λέγειν, συναρεῖ καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον φῶς, οὐ ἐστὶν ἀπαύγασμα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἦν αἰεῖ,

δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ οὐ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν, ἔστιν αἰεῖ. p. 14.

^b Ἡ υἰότης αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν τυγχάνουσα τῆς πατρικῆς θεότητος, &c. p. 14. Τῆς ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἀρχήθεν αὐτοῦ θεότητος, p. 16.

^c Φασὶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οἱ φληνάφων ἐφευρεταὶ μύθων, ἀποστρεφόμενους τὴν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἄγραφον κατὰ Χριστοῦ βλασφημίαν, ἀγέννητα διδάσκειν δύο, δυοῖν θῆτερον λέγοντες δεῖν εἶναι οἱ ἀπαίδευτοι, ἧ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων αὐτὸν εἶναι φρονεῖν, ἢ πάντως ἀγέννητα

I see nothing in this passage, but what I can heartily assent to; understanding by nature, *person*, as Alexander himself understood it; which Valesius observes. One thing the reader may remark, that the main principle upon which you and your friends found all your opposition to the doctrine of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity, is no other than what you have borrowed from the ancient Arians; and which Alexander, in this passage, severely condemns; namely, that God the Son cannot be God in the strict and proper sense, unless he be *unoriginate* and *self-existent*, as the *unbegotten* Father himself; there being, as you conceive, no *medium* between *self-existence*, in the highest sense, and *precarious* existence: that is, in plain words, (though you love to disguise it,) between being *unbegotten* and being a *creature*. And thus we have done with Heb. i. 3. Some Post-Nicene writers I had added, not to “make a show,” as you frowardly and falsely suggest; but, as you very well knew, to correct your *wonder*, and your representing it before as *strange*, and *new*, to offer this text in proof of Christ’s *divinity*.

You have not been able, we see, to invalidate the force of those few texts, laid down in this Query, with design to prove that Christ is *not excluded*, by any texts of the Old Testament, or New, from being *one God* with the Father, but necessarily included in the one *God supreme*. To these I might add many other texts, signifying that the Father and Son are *one*; that the Son is *in the Father*, and the Father *in him*; that he who hath seen *one*, hath therein seen the *other* also; that the Son is in the *bosom* of the *Father*, and as intimate as *thought to mind*; that *all things* which the *Father* hath are the *Son’s*; and that *whatsoever* the *Father* doth, the *Son* doth likewise; that they are represented as *one temple*, Rev. xxi. 22. and as having *one throne*, Rev. xxii. 1. and as making *one light*, Rev. xxi. 23. These and many other considerations, suggested in Scripture, serve to confirm and illustrate the same thing. But it is now time to examine your pretended *counter-evidence* drawn from Scripture: after the discussion of which, we may come regularly to our inquiry into the sense of *antiquity* upon this head.

You had produced John xvii. 3. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Eph. iv. 6. which prove that the Father is styled, sometimes, the *one God*,

λέγειν δύο ἀγνοοῦντες οἱ ἀνάσκητοι, ὡς μακρὸν ἂν εἴη μεταξύ πατρὸς ἀγεννήτου, καὶ τῶν κτισθέντων ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, λογικῶν τε καὶ ἀλόγων. ὧν μεσιτεύουσα φύσις μονογενῆς, δι’ ἧς τὰ ὅλα

ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου, &c. p. 17, 18.

See Bull, sect. iii. cap. 9, n. 11. Animad. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1027.

or *only true God*; and that he is God of the Jews, of Abraham, &c. I asked, how those texts proved that the Son *was not*? You say, (p. 26,) “very plainly.” Let us hear how. You add, “Can the Son of the God of Abraham, (Acts iii. 13.) be himself *that God of Abraham, who glorified his Son?*” But why must you here talk of *that God*, as it were in opposition to *this God*, supposing *two Gods*; that is, supposing the thing in question? If I allow that there is a *this God* and a *that God*, or *two Gods*; you can prove, it seems, that *two Gods* are not *one God*. Very ingenious! But if I tell you that *this divine Person* is not *that divine Person*, and yet both are *one God*; the quibble is answered. You are very often at this kind of play: and therefore it may be here proper to say something more to it. Let us make trial of the like argumentation in another case. It is the Doctor’s principle, as hath been observed, that the divine substance is infinitely *extended*, and yet the *same substance* every where. Let us now argue much after the same manner as you do against me; *this divine substance* here on earth is not *that divine substance* which fills heaven: for *this* and *that* cannot be the *same*. It is but repeating the argument, and one may prove that the Divine Being, according to the Doctor, consists of an infinite number of *different substances*, no two *parts* whatever being the *same substance*. Such is the force of your logic, by the help of *this* and *that*. But if the Doctor, on the other hand, can allow that the substance may be the *same*, where there is a distinction of *this* and *that*; then give us leave to take the benefit of the Doctor’s own principles; and to conclude in the present case, that *Father* and *Son* may be *one substance, one Being, or one God*, notwithstanding the distinction of *this Person* and *that Person*. Having once fully answered your quibble, you will not, I hope, expect that I should do it again and again, as often as you get into this trifling way. It will be sufficient just to hint to the reader, that you are again playing, as usual, with *this* and *that*; and so to dismiss it. Now let us proceed. You ask further, upon Acts iii. 13, “Can the one *supreme God* be exalted or glorified by another?” In answer to which I refer you to my fifth Sermon. You add, is it not true, that “the less is blessed of the greater?” But what has *benediction* to do with *exaltation* and glorification? I am weary of answering such things.

You come to take off the answer I had made to such texts as style the Father the *only God*, &c. I had said, he was not so

styled in *opposition* to the Son, or to *exclude* him from being the *one God*. That is, say you, "The Father, though *expressly distinguished*, is still both Father and Son." That is your mistake: we do not say, that in these, or the like instances, both persons are included in the term *Father*; but that the exclusive terms, *alone*, or *only*, are not to be so rigorously interpreted, as to leave no room for *tacit* exceptions. To make this a little plainer to you.

Rev. xix. 12. it is said of the Son, "He had a name written, " which οὐδείς, *no person*, knew but himself." This was not said in *opposition* to the Father, or as *excluding* him from that knowledge: for, it is still *tacitly* supposed, that he *knew* as much as the Son; and no question could be made of it. This is not *including* *Father and Son* under the term *Son*; but is *speaking* of one only, *abstracting* from the consideration of not *excluding* the other. I had said, that the *Father* is *primarily*, not *exclusively*, the one true God. You do not understand *primarily*: I am sorry for it. *First* in order, *first* in conception, God *unbegotten* and proceeding *from none*, as distinguished from God *begotten* and *proceeding*. You add, that "when *one person* is in *any* " respect declared to be the *only*, &c. he must needs be so, *exclusively* of all others, in *that sense* wherein he is declared to be " *the only*, &c. otherwise there is no *certainty* or *use* in language." That is to say, since *no one knoweth the Father, but the Son*, the Father must be *excluded* from *knowing* in the same, or in so high a sense: and if *no one knoweth the things of God but the Spirit*, both Father and Son are *excluded* from *knowing* in so high a sense, or in the same sense. And if *no one knew the name written but the Son himself*, both the *Father* and the *Holy Ghost* must be *excluded* from *knowing*; "otherwise there is no *certainty* or *use* " *in language*."

And if Christ be styled by the primitive Fathers, as he often is, (see my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 96.) the *only Judge*, the *only Lord*, the *only God*, the *only King*; the Father must be excluded from being *Judge*, *Lord*, *King*, or *God*, in such a *sense* as those authors intended of God the Son: "otherwise there is no " *certainty* or *use* in language." But I think the use of language and custom of speech, in all authors I have met with, has gone upon this rule, or maxim, that *exclusive* terms are always to be understood in *opposition* only to what they are *opposed* to, and not in *opposition* to what they are *not opposed* to: and there is both *use* and *certainty* enough in *language*, in this way, so long as

men are blessed with any tolerable share of common sense, and are but capable of understanding the design, drift, or purport of any speaker or writer. I see where your confusion lies: and if you will bear a while with me, I will endeavour to help you out of it. I consider the matter thus: the *God of Israel* (be it Father, or Son, or both, or the whole Trinity) is styled the *one God*, God in the strict and *emphatical* sense of the word *God*, in opposition to *creature-Gods*; which are none of them Gods in the same sense of the word *God*. Here you will observe that I lay the *emphasis* upon the sense of the word *God*: and in this very *highest* and most *emphatical* sense of the word, I suppose as well *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as the *Father*, to be God.

Again, the *Father* may be *emphatically* styled the *only God*, because of his *emphatical* manner of existing. Here I lay the whole *emphasis* upon the *manner of existing*, existing *from none*. Either *Son* or *Holy Ghost* is God in the very *highest* sense, in the *same sense* of the word *God*, but not in the same *emphatical manner*. If therefore the *emphasis* be laid upon the sense of the word *God*, every person of the three is *emphatically God*, in opposition to *creature-Gods*: but if the *emphasis* be laid upon the *manner of existing*, the *Father* only is *God* in that *emphatical manner*, and for that very reason is most frequently styled, in Scripture and antiquity too, the *only God*. I perceive, you do not distinguish between being *God* in a *different sense* of the word *God*, and being *God* in a *different manner*, though in the *same sense* of the word: and hence arises your perplexity upon this head. I will give you one example, out of many, which may help to illustrate the case. The *Father* is *Spirit*, and the *Son* is *Spirit*; but yet the *Holy Ghost* is *emphatically the Spirit*. Not that he is *Spirit* in any *higher*, or any *different* sense of the word *Spirit*; but upon other accounts, the name of *Spirit* is *emphatically* and more peculiarly attributed to him. In like manner, the *Father* is *God*, the *Son* *God*, and the *Holy Ghost* *God*; yet the *Father* is *emphatically the one God*. Not that he is *God* in any *higher*, or any *different* sense of the word *God*: but upon other accounts, (either as he is *first known*, or as being most *universally* acknowledged^d, or chiefly as being *first Per-*

^d Quin et illud observatione dignum est, Judæos per id tempus, ut erant rudes et occæcati, *solum Deum* agnovisse quem *Patrem suum* esse Christus docuerat—idcirco Joh. viii.

sic illos Christus alloquitur: “Est Pater meus, qui glorificat me, quem vos dicitis quia Deus vester est, et non cognovistis eum.” Itaque de hoc ipso Deo, quem Judæi animo capiebant,

son^e, and head of the other two,) the name of *God*, or *only God*, has been emphatically and more peculiarly appropriated to him. These things being cleared, and set right, let us now pass on. What you have, p. 27, 28. about the Son's being *sent*, considered even in his divine nature, I readily admit, and never doubted of. Neither do I dispute but that he that *sends*, is for that very reason *greater* than him that is *sent*; greater in respect of *office* voluntarily entered into; and greater in respect of *natural order* of *priority*, which made it proper for one to submit to the *inferior* office rather than the other. And therefore I have not scrupled, after Cyprian, Novatian, Athanasius, Basil, and others, in my Sermons^f, to admit that the *Son* is *greater* than the *Holy Ghost*; of which, if you please, see a full and brief account, in a book referred to in the margin^g.

Your testimonies therefore upon that head might have been spared, as containing nothing contradictory to me: unless perhaps Eusebius, or the Council of Sirmium (neither of which are of any great authority with me) might strain the notion rather too far; as it is certain you do.

You go on to 1 Cor. viii. 6, where you say the Son is in the most *express words* excluded. Excluded from being one *God* with the *Father*? Where? Shew me the *express words*, if you can. I say, the *Father* is there *emphatically* styled the *one God*; and the reason of it is intimated, because *of him* are all things; whereas in respect of the *Son*, they are only *by him*: which shews a difference of *order* betwixt them, in existing and operating. And this is all you can make of 1 Cor. viii. 6. However, as all things are *by the Son*, as well as *of the Father*; it appears from that very passage, that they are *both one Creator*, one *joint-cause* of all things. But of this text I have said more in my Sermons^h. You wonder *I should not see* in 1 Cor. viii. 6. "that if the one Lord is included in the one God," (*there spoken of*, you should have added,) "the whole reasoning of the Apostle is quite taken away." But it is

necnon Judaizantes hæretici plerique, ad quos dedocendos vel refutandos Johannes ista scribebat, loqui sic necesse habuit, ut diceret verbum erat πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, hoc est apud illum Deum, quem vos, O Judæi et hæretici, solum novistis. *Petav. Dogm. Theol.* tom. v. part. 2. p. 352. lib. xvi. cap. 4.

^e Salvo enim Filio, recte unicum Deum potest determinasse, cujus est Filius. Non enim desinit esse qui habet Filium ipse unicus, suo scilicet

nomine, quotiens sine Filio nominatur. Sine Filio autem nominatur cum principaliter determinatur ut prima persona, quæ ante Filii nomen erat proponenda, quia pater ante cognoscitur, et post patrem filius nominatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

^f Sermon VI. p. 122 of this vol.

^g Leo Allatius's Notes upon Methodius, p. 102. in Fabricius's second volume of Hippolytus.

^h Sermon II. p. 51, 52, &c. of this vol.

easy to answer, that *one God* there is taken *personally*: and so I do not pretend that it there stands both for Father and Son, but for Father only; as *one Lord* is also taken there *personally* for the Son only. Nevertheless, the giving the name sometimes to one singly, is no argument that the *same name* may not also justly belong to both together. On the contrary, it is certain, that if both are joined in the same one *common Godhead*, either of them singly has a right to be called the *one God*, not excluding the other from the same right.

What you add about *Sabellianism*, I pass over here as foreign. Your quotation from Bp. Pearson is shamefully abusing your reader, while you conceal what would have shewn that the Bishop's notion was diametrically opposite to yours. I have set down his words aboveⁱ. As to Origen's way of solving the *Unity*, it will be seen hereafter to be directly contrary to yours; as are also the Ante-Nicene Fathers in general, as will be seen presently. Eusebius I reckon not with the Ante-Nicenes; unless you will take in Athanasius too, who has two treatises written before any books now extant of Eusebius. What I had said of Novatian, stood corrected in my two later editions of my Defence, which you might have been so fair as to look into. I say, if Novatian did not mean that Christ was *God* in the same sense with the Father, and *only God* as well as the Father, it will be hard to make out the sense or connection of his inference^k from John xvii. 3. His reasoning is plainly this; that when our Lord said, "They might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent," his joining himself to the Father in that manner shews that he must be *God also*. The strength of his argument lies only in the conjunction *and*: there are but two constructions of it; either thus, Know thee, *and also* know Jesus Christ, (according to which there is nothing like an argument, at least not according to Novatian,) or else thus, Thee the only true God, *and also* Jesus Christ. Thus indeed the text does afford an argument of Christ's being *God*, and *only God* too. For it comes to this,

ⁱ Page 417.

^k Si noluisset se etiam *Deum* intelligi, cur addidit, et quem misisti Jesum Christum, nisi quoniam et *Deum* accipi voluit: quoniam si se *Deum* nollet intelligi, addidisset, et quem misisti hominem Jesum Christum; nunc autem neque addidit, nec se hominem nobis tantummodo Chris-

tus tradidit, sed *Deo junxit*, ut et *Deum* per hanc conjunctionem, sicut est, intelligi vellet. Est ergo credendum in Dominum, unum verum *Deum*, et in eum quem misit Jesum Christum consequenter: qui se nequaquam patri, ut diximus, junxisset, nisi *Deum* quoque intelligi vellet. *Novat. cap. 14.*

that the Father, *and also* Christ, is the *only true God*. And thus Ambrose^l reasons upon that text, much after the same way with Novatian: as also do Athanasius^m and Austinⁿ. Wherefore I do not see that I have at all misrepresented the sense of Novatian. What you further pretend from other parts of his treatise is by no means made out: all being easily reconciled upon the foot of the Son's *subordination* as a Son, or his voluntary *condescensions*, without the least diminution of his supreme authority, naturally and essentially adhering to him. But Novatian shall be more distinctly and accurately considered in the sequel. You tell me, p. 36, that the Nicene Creed professes the Father to be *the one God*; as if any one questioned it, or thought it of any weight in the controversy! Do not I also profess the same thing? You add further, that even the Post-Nicene writers referred the title of *ὁ μόνος ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς*, *the only true God*, to the Father only, (which is a mistake^o;) but what if they did? Then they reserved some peculiar titles to the Father, by way of *eminency*, to distinguish the *first* Person of the *Godhead*: and that is all. And if the Post-Nicene writers, notwithstanding their reserving some peculiar and eminent titles to the Father, yet believed all the three Persons to be the *one God*; why should the reserving of the same, or like titles to the Father, among the Ante-Nicenes, be made any argument against their having the same faith with those that came after? What you say of Epiphanius, (p. 37,) that he understood the words *τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν*, in John xvii. 3.

^l “ Ut cognoscant te solum verum Deum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum;” conjunctione illa Patrem utique copulavit et Filium, ut Christum verum Deum a majestate Patris nemo secernat: nunquam enim conjunctio separat. *Ambr. de Fid.* lib. v. cap. 1. Compare Hilary, p. 815.

^m Athanas. Orat. iii. p. 558.

ⁿ “ Et quem misisti Jesum Christum.” Subaudiendum est, “ unum verum Deum; et ordo verborum est, “ ut te et quem misisti Jesum Christum cognoscant unum verum Deum.” *August. de Trin.* lib. vi. cap. 9. p. 849.

Petavius remarks, that Novatian's was the same with St Austin's. *Petav. de Trin.* lib. ii. cap. 4.

^o I think it not worth while to search particularly for a thing of little

or no weight. But so far as I remember, the title of *only true God* is very often applied by the Post-Nicene writers to all the Persons together; though perhaps rarely to any single Person, except the Father. Two instances of the latter may here suffice.

‘Ο γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος μόνος Θεὸς ἀληθής, διὸ καὶ μονογενής διὰ τὸ μόνος εἶναι Θεὸς ὡς ὁ πατήρ. *Athanas. in Psal. Nov. Collect.* p. 83.

Est ergo solus et verus Deus Filius; hæc enim et Filio prærogativa deferretur. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. v. cap. 2. p. 556.

As to the want of the *article*, it is of no moment, since the words without the *article* are as full and expressive of the Catholic sense of the Son's *divinity* as possible.

of the *Father only*, is true; but you are prodigiously out in your account, when you pretend from the same Epiphanius, that *ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς*, *the true God*, in 1 John v. 20, “was in his “time universally understood of the Father.” Athanasius quotes the words seven times; constantly understanding them of God the Son: Basil applies them in the same manner^p. So also do Ambrose, Jerome, Faustinus, and Didymus. These were all contemporaries of Epiphanius. And I have not yet met with so much as one ancient writer that ever understood those words in 1 John v. 20. of *God the Father*. Cyril of Alexandria, Austin, Fulgentius, Vigilius, Eugenius, and the rest that wrote in the age next to Epiphanius’s, interpret the text the same way: and if Epiphanius did otherwise, he is very *singular* in it, and his judgment of very little weight, against so many considerable authors his contemporaries. But it is as wild a consequence as ever was drawn, that because Epiphanius did not insist upon this text, where he had occasion, therefore all the other Fathers, (though we have their own words to vouch the contrary,) understood that place of *God the Father*. Mr. Whiston, whose zeal sometimes transports him, yet did not care to come up to your lengths in this matter; being content only to say, that “Epiphanius was utterly a stranger to the Athanasian *exposition*!” which perhaps may be very true; and to the Arian exposition also. For I will frankly own, I am inclinable to suspect, that Epiphanius made use of some faulty copy which had not the word Θεὸς, but ἀληθινὸς only; though I have not observed that any other Greek writer had any such faulty copy. But it is certain, that some Latins read, *hic est verus, et vita æterna*. Hilary^r for one: and probably Faustinus, though the present editions have *Deus*: and there is a Latin treatise among the supposititious pieces ascribed to Athanasius^s, which reads the text the same way. The author, probably, Idatius Lemicensis, about the year 458.

You have something more to say on 1 Cor. viii. 6. in page 38. But, I think, I need not add any thing to what I have before said, referring also to my Sermons.

The next text we are to consider is Eph. iv. 6. “One God and “Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all:”

^p See the places referred to, Serm. VI. vol. ii. p. 133.

^r Hilarius, p. 908. ed. Bened.

^s Athanasii Opera Suppos. p. 608. ed. Bened.

^q Whiston’s Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 35. Append. p. 47.

a passage which, I said, had by the *ancients* been generally understood of the whole Trinity. Upon which you say, “a man must have a strange opinion of the ancients, who can think so.” Your reason is, because he is there distinguished from the *one Spirit* and the *only Lord*. And what if the *one Lord* and *one Spirit* be there first distinctly named, I see no absurdity in afterwards mentioning and summing up the three Persons in the *one God*, under a threefold consideration of *above all, through all, and in all*. But we are not now inquiring into the sense of the text, but into the sentiments of the *ancients* upon it, whose testimonies I have now given in one view in the margin^t. As to Irenæus, you deny that he understands the text of the *Trinity*; referring to Dr. Clarke’s Reply to Mr. Nelson. p. 71. In return for which I refer to “True Scripture Doctrine continued.” p. 67, 103. Nor is there any thing more absurd in this construction of Irenæus, than there is in his often reckoning the Son and Holy Ghost to the Father, as being his very *self* in a qualified sense. Indeed, nothing is more common than for the *head* of a family, suppose Abraham, to be understood in a stricter or larger sense; either as denoting his own proper person, or as denoting himself and all his descendants considered as contained in him, and reckoned to him. There is therefore nothing strange or absurd in it, if the *ancients* sometimes considered God the *Father*, the *Head* of both the other Persons, either in a more restrained, or more enlarged signification: it is fact that they did so, as will be seen presently.

You proceed to Hippolytus, and speak of his *spuriousness* with as much confidence, as if you were able to prove it: of which more in the sequel. You tell me also that “he is against me;”

^t Unus Deus Pater ostenditur, qui est “super omnia, et per omnia, et in omnibus.” Super omnia quidem Pater, et ipse est caput Christi: per omnia autem Verbum, et ipse est Caput Ecclesiæ: in omnibus autem nobis Spiritus, &c. *Iren.* p. 315.

Οικονομία συμφωνίας συνάγεται εἰς ἓνα Θεόν, εἰς γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ Θεός. Ὁ γὰρ κελεύων πατήρ, ὁ δὲ ὑπακούων υἱός, τὸ δὲ συνετίζον ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Ὁ ὢν πατήρ ἐπὶ πάντων, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς διὰ πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν πᾶσιν. Ἄλλως τε ἓνα Θεὸν νομίσαι μὴ δυνάμεθα, εἰ μὴ ὄντως πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι πιστεύσωμεν. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* p. 16.

Εἰς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύσσεται, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς πατήρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ, διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ. *Athanas.* p. 676.

Diversitas autem præpositionum, in quibus dicitur; “unus Deus, et Pater” omnium, qui super omnes, et per “omnes, et in omnibus,” diversam intelligentiam sapit. Super omnes enim est Deus Pater, quia Auctor est omnium. Per omnes Filius, quia cuncta transcurrit, vaditque per omnia. In omnibus Spiritus Sanctus, quia nihil absque eo est. *Hieron. in locum,* tom. iv. part. 1. p. 362.

though I think he is clearly for me, and that the Father who *gives orders*, the Son who *executes*, and the Holy Ghost who *finishes*, are, with him, *one God*, as plainly as words can make it, both before and after: which I leave to the learned reader to judge of. Only I may add, in confirmation of Hippolytus's comment on Eph. iv. 6. that he^u, as well as Tertullian^x and Irenæus, considers the *Father* sometimes in a *restrained* sense, for the Person of the Father, and sometimes in a *larger*, as containing both the other Persons. Neither is Athanasius against me, as you pretend, but directly for me, when he is justly translated, without your *interpolations*. "In the Church, there is preached *one God*, who is *above all*, and *through all*, and *in all*. *Above all*, as Father, as Head, and Fountain; and *through all* by the Word; and *in all* by the Holy Spirit." You, by putting in *he* in one place, and *his* twice, have endeavoured to pervert the author's true meaning; as if Athanasius had been speaking of the *Father* all the way, when the *one God* is his subject, and he is shewing how the *one God* is considered in the several Persons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

What you have further in page 40, 41. betrays either such strange confusion of thought, or such a peculiar talent at misrepresenting, that I hardly know what to say to it. But I must make some short strictures upon it. I had said, some texts are meant of Christ as *Mediator*; upon which you gravely tell me, that the one *Mediator* is not a *part* of Christ, but the *same Christ*, the *same Person incarnate*, and *Mediator* in respect of both natures. I hope you will remember this, when we come to speak of *mediatorial* worship, which by this account will appear to be strictly *divine* worship; since a *Mediator* is *God*, as well as *man*. But that by the way. I must however observe, that a *Mediator* is considered two ways, by *nature* or by *office*, as the Fathers distinguish. He is *Mediator* by *nature*, as partaking of both natures, *divine* and *human*: and *Mediator* by *office*, as transacting matters between God and man. The submitting to this *office* is a great instance of the Son's *condescension*; and if any low things be said of him considered as executing an *inferior* office, voluntarily undertaken, they affect not his real *inherent dignity*, or his *essential equality* in all things with the Father.

^u Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ δύναμις λόγος. Hipp. p. 14.

^x Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem. Ter-

tull. contr. Prax. c. 2.

Pater tota substantia est; Filius vero derivatio et portio totius. Ibid. c. 9.

It is not that he is really a *servant*, or *subject*, under the Father's *dominion*; but that he has been pleased to take upon him a *ministerial* part: so that now you may see how little pertinence or sense there is in your wide and loose talk (p. 41.) about *two Persons* in Christ, and about Cerinthus, or whatever else came into your head; to give you a handle to fill your margin with strange, frightful, impertinent quotations, to prejudice weak readers.

Your 43d, 44th, and 45th pages, containing little but *declamation*, I pass over: when you have any thing that looks like serious reasoning, I will attend you.

I have, I hope, sufficiently made it appear, that the texts which you brought to *exclude* the Son, prove nothing like it: as I before shewed, that you could not answer the texts alleged to prove the contrary. I should now be willing to go regularly on to *antiquity*, after the method laid down above. But in your 25th page, you have thrown some *metaphysical* jargon in my way, and of which you are so confident as to say, that unless I can reply to it "all other things are to no purpose." This is the man that builds nothing upon *metaphysics*. Indeed, I cannot but wonder at your unaccountable conduct in this controversy. If you really think the *received* doctrine of the Trinity to be *absurd* in *itself*, and therefore *impossible* to be proved, why do you amuse us with *Scripture* and *Fathers*; as if the stress of the question lay there, when, according to you, it doth not? You should rather have wrote a *philosophical* dissertation to shew, that the notion itself is contradictory, and such as no *Scripture* or *Fathers* can prove. This is really your meaning. And as the first question always is, whether a thing be *possible*, and next whether it be *true*; you should have begun with the point of the *possibility*, without meddling at all with *Scripture* or *Fathers*: which are impertinently brought in, while the question of the *possibility* remains in suspense. But if you resolve to put the cause upon *Scripture* and *Fathers*, then your *metaphysics*, which relate to the *possibility* of the doctrine, are very impertinent, and come out of place: because the *possibility* is to be always pre-supposed before we join issue upon *Scripture* and *antiquity*. But to leave you to take your own way, however peculiar or preposterous, let us examine a little into those marvellous subtilties, which you lay such weight upon. Your design is to prove that the *same God* is and must be the *same Person*, and that therefore *two* or more *Persons* cannot be *one God*. If you can

make this out, the business is done at once ; and our dispute is at an end. Several ways have been attempted by Dr. Clarke before, which now seem to be given up as unsatisfactory. It was once a principle, a maxim with him, that a person is a *being*, and that two individual beings cannot be one individual being. I have heard no more of this, since the Doctor has been apprised, that his own *hypothesis* of the divine substance being extended, could not stand with his famed maxim ; every *part* of that substance being considered as *Being*, and yet all but *one Being*. The Doctor however, and you, still resolve to hold to your *conclusion* against the *Trinity* ; and to seek for new *premises*, wherever you can find or make them. After some deliberation, comes out this *syllogism* :

There must be *identicalness* of *life*, to make the *same* God.

But three *different* Persons cannot have *identicalness* of *life*.

Therefore three *different* Persons cannot be the *same* God.

This *afterthought*, which has took you up so much time and pains, is at length good for nothing ; except it be to set weak persons a musing upon the new thing, called *identical life*. Whatever it be, you might as well have formed twenty *syllogisms* as one, and all of the same value. For you might have argued, that three persons cannot have *identicalness* of power, or *identicalness* of will, or *identicalness* of wisdom ; or, to say all in a word, *identicalness* of *essence*, which includes every thing. But when you have done your utmost, the main question, viz. what is or is not *identical*, stands just where it did, and you are not advanced a tittle further than before. There is the same rule for *life*, and for every thing else you can invent, as there is for the *essence*. The *life* is *common* to all the Persons, as the *essence* is ; and it is *identical* in all, y just as the *essence* is *identical*. So much for *syllogism* : pity it could be no more serviceable, in a case of extremity.

You are often puzzling your reader, and yourself, upon a very abstruse and intricate question ; whether any thing, or what, can make two persons or more *one God*. The short of the case is this ; the Christian Churches have collected from *Scripture*, that three Persons are *one God* : and believing the thing to be *fact*, they have, according to the best of their judgment, resolved

γ Propter unam eandemque naturam, atque, *inseparabilem vitam*, ipsa Trinitas—intelligitur unus Domi-

nus Deus noster. *August. Epist. x. ad Max. p. 609.*

the *Unity* into *consubstantiality*, *inseparability*, and *Unity of origination*; finding, (or at least believing that they had found,) that *Scripture* had also signified the three things now mentioned. This account appears as probable as any; neither perhaps can human wit invent any thing beyond it. But still it must be said, that little depends upon stating the manner *how* the three Persons are conceived to be *one God*: the *fact* is the one material point. If *Scripture* really makes them expressly, or by necessary consequence, *one God*; I know not what men have to do to dispute about *intelligent agents*, and *identical lives*, &c. as if they understood better, than God himself does, what *one God* is; or as if *philosophy* were to direct what shall or shall not be *Tritheism*. Jews, and Pagans, and Heretics of several denominations, have often charged the Christian and Catholic doctrine of the *Trinity* with *Tritheism*. The Fathers of the Church have as constantly denied the charge; giving such reasons as I have mentioned, why it is not, and therefore should not be called, *Tritheism*. One general reason might have sufficed for all, viz. That the *Unity* of the *Trinity* is too strict and close to admit of the name or notion of *Tritheism*. This is ending the dispute at once, without further inquiry into the nature of that *Unity*; unless the adversary can shew (which is impossible) that *no Unity* whatever can be sufficient to make more Persons than one, *one Being*, *one Substance*, *one God*. If we are to build our faith on *Scripture*, such an *Unity* there may be, because there really is. *Philosophy*, falsely so called, may reclaim against it; but having no certain principle of reason to go upon, no rule whereby to judge, whether the *one God* be one Person or more; it is evident, that this point must at length be determined by *Scripture* alone; and that must be the true *Unity* of the Godhead, which *Scripture* (according to its most reasonable and natural construction) has given us for such.

But it is high time now to come to *antiquity*; which has been so long staved off, and yet must make a great part of our discourse under this Query. I shaped out my method into four particulars, which may be seen above.

1. The first particular is, that the *ancients* have in accounting for the texts relating to the *Unity*, declared their judgment, that *idols* only, or *other Gods*, are thereby *excluded*, and not God the Son.

I cited Irenæus for this purpose, where he says, that the holy

Scriptures declare, that the *alone* God, excluding *others*, made all things by his *Word*^z. That is, *other Gods* are excluded, not God the Son, who is not *another God*, according to Irenæus; as we shall see under the next article. I observed further, that the Son and Holy Ghost are the very *self* of the Father, according to Irenæus; as the Father is also the *self*^a of them: wherefore it can never be imagined that either of them is excluded from the *one God*.

Let us go on to Clemens of Alexandria, who frequently teaches the same thing. He says, that “the Father of all things is “alone perfect;” immediately adding, “for in him is the Son, “and in the Son the Father^b.” This writer could never believe, that the *exclusive* terms were intended in opposition to *God the Son*. In another place, he says, “he that is the alone God, “is also the alone just:” and soon after adds, that “he, (the “Father) considered as Father, is called that only which he is, “good; but as the Son, who is his Word, is in the Father, “he is styled just, on account of the mutual relation to each “other^c.” A few pages lower, he observes that “no one is “good, but the Father;” adding presently after, that “the God “of the universe is one only, good, just. Creator, *the Son in the “Father*, to whom be glory^d, &c.” What a stranger must Clemens have been to your *novel* divinity, whereby you would *exclude* the Son from being *one God* with the Father!

Tertullian’s doctrine in this point is very well known, and that he expressly interprets the *exclusive* terms in opposition to *idols* only, or *false Gods*, or *other Gods*; not to God the Son, who is not *another God*^e. And so now I may come to the proof of my second article.

^z Universæ Scripturæ—unum et solum Deum, ad excludendos alios, prædicent omnia fecisse per verbum suum, &c. *Iren. lib. ii. cap. 27. p. 155.*

^a Si enim existens in Patre cognoscit, hunc in quo est, hoc est *semetipsum*, non ignoret. *Iren. p. 139.*

Fecit ea per *semetipsum*, hoc est per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam. p. 163.

Fecit ea per *semetipsum*: hoc est per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam. Adest enim ei semper *Verbum* et *Sapientia*, *Filius* et *Spiritus*, per quos et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit. p. 253.

^b Ἀπεδείξαμεν—μόνον δὲ εἶναι τέλειον τὸν πατέρα τῶν ὄλων ἐν αὐτῷ

γὰρ ὁ υἱός, καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατήρ. *Clem. Alex. p. 129.*

^c Αὐτὸς μόνος ὢν Θεός, καὶ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ μόνος—καθὸ μὲν πατήρ νοεῖται, ἀγαθὸς ὢν αὐτὸ μόνον ὃ ἐστὶν κέκληται ἀγαθός, καθὸ δὲ υἱός, ὢν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἐστί, δίκαιος προσαγορεύεται, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἀλληλα σχέσεως. *Clem. Alex. p. 140.*

^d Οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ—καταφανές τὸ τῶν συμπάντων Θεὸν εἶνα μόνον εἶναι, ἀγαθὸν, δίκαιον, δημιουργόν, υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ, φ᾽ ἧ δόξα &c. *Clem. Alex. p. 142.*

^e See my Defence, vol. i. p. 288, 289. Itaque præter *semetipsum* non esse alium Deum; hoc propter idololatriam

2. That the *ancients* always declared against admitting *another* God, and denied constantly that the Son was *another God*.

Justin M. in his Dialogue with Trypho^f, declares, that there never was nor will be (ἄλλος Θεός) *another God* besides the Maker of the universe. And in a fragment cited by Irenæus, he says, he could not have given credit even to our Lord himself, had he preached up any *other God* (ἄλλον Θεόν) besides the *Creator* ε.

Irenæus is very express to the same purpose in more places than one, declaring against admitting *another* God^h. And if you would know, how then he could consistently admit another Person to be God, besides the Father; he will tell you, as before seen, that the Son is considered as the very *self* of the Father, and that they are not *another* and *another* Godⁱ.

Tertullian is another voucher of the same thing. “There is,” says he, “one God, the Father; and there is none other besides “him. By which he does not mean to exclude the Son, but “*another God*; now the Son is not *another* besides the Father^k.”

Origen shall be our next evidence; who in his famous piece against Celsus, (the most to be depended on, both for the uncorruptness of the copies, and the accuracy of the thoughts contained in it,) does in a very remarkable manner teach the same doctrine.

He having charged his adversary with the worship, not of one God, but of *Gods*^l, (N.B.) though all the inferior deities were supposed *subordinate* to one supreme, comes afterwards to answer the like charge, retorted by Celsus^m; the charge of worshipping ἄλλον (Θεόν), another God, besides the one supreme God. Now,

tam nationum quam Israelis: etiam propter hæreticos, qui sicut nationes manibus, ita et ipsi verbis idola fabricantur, id est, alium Deum, et alium Christum. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

^f Just. M. Dial. p. 34. ed. Jeb. See this explained at large in my Reply to Dr. Whitby, IX. 1. &c. p. 235 of this volume.

^g Just. M. Fragm. p. 408. ed. Jeb.

^h *Alterum Deum*, præter eum qui est, non requiremus. *Iren.* p. 156.

Alterum Deum minime possitis ostendere, p. 157.

Nec tunc quidem oportuit *alterum Deum* annuntiari, p. 233.

ⁱ Non ergo *alius* erat qui cognoscebatur, et *alius* qui dicebat, *nemo*

cognoscit Patrem, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, et ab omnibus accipiens testimonium, quoniam vere homo, et vere Deus, &c. p. 235. *Vid. Massuet. Dissert. Præv.* p. 131.

^k Unus Deus, Pater, et *alius* absque eo non est: quod ipse inferens, non Filium negat, sed *alium* Deum. Cæterum *alius* a Patre Filius non est. *Tert. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

^l Ἐκεῖνος δὲ πολλοὺς ἡμᾶς διδάσκων σέβειν θεοὺς, θεῶν μᾶλλον ὀφείλειν λέγειν βασιλείαν, ἢ περ Θεοῦ. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 385.

^m Εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον οἱτοι πλὴν ἓνα Θεόν, ἦν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτενῆς λόγος· νυνὶ δὲ, &c. *Ibid.*

how does Origen answer it? Plainly, by denying the fact, that the Christians did worship ἄλλον, *another*, (i. e. *God*,) besides the God of the universe. His reason is, because Father and Son are *one*ⁿ. This was the only way he had to get off the charge of worshipping *another God*, besides the Father, by taking both into *one*, and considering both as one in the worship. Wherefore he concludes, a little after, “we therefore worship, “as before said, one God, the Father and the Son.” This was Origen’s resolution of the grand point in debate, between Christians and Pagans, as to the charge of *Polytheism*; in answer to one of the sharpest adversaries the Christians ever had, in a solemn and accurate treatise, wrote in the name and in defence of the Church, wrote by the author then above sixty years old; and (as critics now agree) after he had been admonished by Fabian of Rome, for his want of caution at other times, and therefore was the more likely to keep strictly up to the sense of the Church, in an article especially of so momentous importance. He did not pretend that a *subordinate* God, purely because *subordinate*, would not be *another God*, or would not make *two Gods*: the Pagans, in that silly way, might have cleared themselves of the charge of *Polytheism*; as Origen well knew. He did not pretend to say, that the Father *only* was God, because God in a *high* sense, (which the Pagans could also have said of their *one supreme* God, and so have got clear of *Polytheism*,) but he answered upon the true and standing principles of the Christian Church, that Father and Son were *one God*, and the Son not *another God*. This acquitted the Christians of *Polytheism*, and left the charge fixed and unremovable upon the Pagans.

We have seen then that the *ancients* never would own *another* God, that they constantly declared against it; and even in the particular case of *God the Son*. It is to the same purpose, that

ⁿ Λεκτέον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι, ἔτι περ νεοῖται ὁ Κέλσος τὸ, ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἓν ἔσμεν· καὶ τὸ ἐν εὐχῇ εἰρημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ἓν ἔσμεν· οὐκ ἂν ᾤετο ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλον θεραπεύειν παρὰ τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεόν. N. B. After ἄλλον must be understood Θεόν: for Origen could not pretend to say, that the Christians worshipped no other *Person*, besides the Father, (when immediately after he owns, that they worshipped both Father and Son,) but only that they

worshipped not *another God*; Son and Father being *one God*, as he also in the same place expressly asserts.

I may here add a passage out of the Acts of Pionius’s Martyrdom; which have the appearance of being true and genuine.

Polemon (rogat), Quem Deum colis? Respondet (Asclepiades), Christum. Polemon. Quid ergo? Iste alter est? Respondit: Non; sed ipse quem et ipsi paulo ante confessi sunt. *Ruinart. Act. Martyr. p. 144.*

they as constantly denied *two Gods*, or *three Gods*: as may appear from many testimonies: which being well known, I shall only refer to one or two in the margin^o. Nay, it was a principle so fixed and riveted in the heart of every pious Christian, that they would rather have died than have ever admitted *Gods*, or *Lords*; as is plainly intimated by Tertullian^p.

Hitherto, perhaps you tell me, that you and the *ancients* can agree, (that is, in *words*;) for neither do you assert *another God*, or *another Lord*, nor *two Gods*, or *two Lords*. To which I answer, that as to *another Lord*, you have said it in terms: and by necessary consequence, you assert *another God*; yea, *two Gods*, and *two Lords*. Nor have I ever met with a more deplorable example of self-contradiction, and resolute opposition to the most evident truth, than your pretending that Father and Son are not *two Gods*, while you affirm each to be *a God*, and deny their being both together *one God*. But we will go on with the *ancients*; who, like wise and honest men, as they would not admit *another God*, or *two Gods*, so, consistently with themselves,

3. They as constantly taught, that Father and Son were *one God*, or the *same God*: and thus they settled that grand article of the Christian faith. I will shew this plainly by clear and express evidence, and shall answer your exceptions to every *writer* as I go along. I have, in some measure, anticipated myself upon this head, in my Sermons^q, and elsewhere: and therefore shall sometimes content myself with references. Let us take the authors in order of time, fixing also the time of their *writing*, according to the latest and best accounts.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

As to Justin Martyr, I do not here produce him as one, who, in express terms, has ever styled Father and Son *one God*. But that he believed the thing may be made out two ways. 1. As he declares for the worship of God *alone*, at the same time admitting the worship of all the three Persons: which is implicitly

^o Εἰ δὲ οὖν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεὸς ὢν, τί οὖν φήσειεν ἂν τις δύο λέγειν θεούς; δύο μὲν οὐκ ἐρῶ θεούς, ἀλλ' ἢ ἓνα, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο &c. *Hipp. contr. Noët.* p. 15. Vid. *Epist. Synod. Antioch. contr. Samosat.* Labbé tom. i. p. 845.

^p Cæterum si conscientia nostra, qua scimus *Dei* nomen et *Domini*, et *Patri*, et *Filio*, et *Spiritui Sancto* con-

venire, *Deos* et *Dominos* nominaremus; extinxissemus faces nostras, etiam ad martyria timidiore, quibus evadendi quoque pateret occasio, jurantibus statim per *Deos* et *Dominos*, ut quidam hæretici, quorum *Dii plures*. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 13.

^q See my Sermons, p. 178, &c. of this volume.

including all the three in the *alone God*. (The pretence of *inferior* worship shall be answered in its place.) 2. As declaring that God the Son is not *another God*, besides the Maker of all things, (that is the *Father*,) as hath been remarked above^r. You have some things to object to what I produce from Justin, under another article: and there I shall consider them as I come to them.

A. D. 170. LUCIAN, a pagan writer.

The famous testimony out of Lucian's Dialogue, inscribed *Φιλόπατρις*, I produced in my eighth Sermon^s, to prove that, at that time, the Christians believed *three in one*, and *one in three*, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *one God supreme*. It is so noted a testimony that I need not here repeat it.

There has been some doubt, as I intimated in my Sermons, whether Lucian was the author of the Dialogue; but all agree, that it was either Lucian himself, or a *contemporary*, if not a more ancient writer^t; which serves our purpose as well.

A. D. 177. ATHENAGORAS.

I produced also, in my Sermons^u, this ancient and excellent writer, as a voucher for the truth of this doctrine, that Father and Son are *one God*. I shall not repeat what I there said, or in my Defence, vol. i. p. 289, 290. but referring the reader thither, shall proceed to answer your objections. You begin with lessening the credit of the author, (p. 105,) as being "full of very "obscure notions;" a character you would give to any writer that is *full* of the doctrine of a *coeternal* and *consubstantial* Trinity. You object, that "he describes this very doctrine in "a way directly condemned by Justin Martyr, and even by "Athanasius himself, for Gnostic or Sabellian; making the "Holy Ghost an emanation, like a ray shot forth from the sun, "flowing from it, and returning to it." But Athenagoras's doctrine is far from being the same with that which Justin condemns. He always speaks of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* as *real* and *permanent*, not as the heretics in Justin did, who supposed them to be *dissolved*, and in a manner *extinct*^x. And Athenagoras did not teach a *nominal* distinction only of the

^r See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, IX. 1, &c. p. 235 of this volume.

^s Sermon VIII. p. 178, &c. of this volume.

^t Vid. Bull. Def. F. p. 73. Jud. 32.

Fabricius Bibl. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 16. p. 504. and Le Moyne, Varia Sacr. vol. ii. p. 187.

^u Serm. VIII. p. 178 of this vol.

^x Justin. M. Dial. p. 102, 372. Jeb.

Persons, but a real distinction of *order*^s; which is directly opposite to the tenets of those heretics described in Justin. Athenagoras always speaks of the *Spirit* as *united* with the Father and the Son: and as he took the *Father* and *Son* for real Persons, he must of consequence think the same of the *Holy Spirit*; so that there is little or no resemblance between the two notions. Besides that, if you had carefully observed the passage on which you ground your remark, you might have perceived that nothing more is meant, than that the Spirit was sometimes sent to the *Prophets*, and again returned to him that sent him. As to the use of the word ἀπόρροια, and the doctrine of *emanation*, it was neither simply approved nor condemned in the Christian Church, but according as it was understood; just as προβολή, or *prolatio*, was condemned by Irenæus and Tertullian in one sense, admitted in another: and as the notion of a λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, or *προφορικὸς*, was either approved or condemned, according to its various construction and acceptation; as I have remarked in my first Sermon^z. You find fault with my construction of νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἶὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ. *For we understand, or tacitly include, God's Son also, in God* before spoken of^a. That this is the true meaning, I prove first from the words immediately preceding. Athenagoras having declared, that the Christians could not be *atheists*, because they acknowledged *one God*, who had made, adorned, and preserved the universe by his *Logos*, or *Word*, immediately adds, νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἶὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, referring to the λόγος he had just before mentioned, as contained in *God*, that did all things by him.

2. This sense is also confirmed by what follows; where he says, “Father and Son are one; the Son being in the Father, “and the Father in the Son, *by* the Unity and power of the “Spirit^b.”

3. The same thing is further proved from Athenagoras's joining (when he is again answering the charge of *atheism*)

^γ Λόγῳ δεδημιούργηται, καὶ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ πνεύματι συνέχεται τὰ πάντα. *Athen.* p. 28.

Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα—καὶ τοι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργούν τοῖς ἐκφανοῦσι προφητικῶς ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἀπόρροϊαν εἶναι φάμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀπορρέον, καὶ ἐπαναφερόμενον ὡς ἀκτίνα ἡλίου, p. 40. Δεικνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει, δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαιρέσιν, p. 40. Vid. p. 46, 96.

^z Serm. I. p. 32, 33 of this volume.

^a Ὅφ' οὗ γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, καὶ διακεκόσμηται, καὶ συγκρατεῖται, Θεὸν ἄγοντες ἰκανῶς μοι δέδεικται' νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἶὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, &c.

^b Ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ πατρὸς ἐν υἱῷ, ἐνότητι, καὶ δυνάμει πνεύματος, p. 38.

Father and Son together: and as before he had the phrase of Θεὸν ἄγοντες, speaking of the Father singly, now he applies the same phrase to both^c.

4. I further vindicated this construction, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 290, by parallel expressions of Athanasius and Tertullian: wherefore, I conceive, it may still stand.

But, though you seem to allow that Athenagoras comprehends both in *one God*, yet you say, he does “not so comprehend both “in the one God, as that one is as much the one supreme God “as the other:” which I cannot make sense of. “Nor does “he,” say you, “any where suppose the Son, *as such*, but only “the internal Reason of the Father to be *αἰδιος, eternal*.” But if *Reason* or *Wisdom* be only a different name of the same Person, the Person of the Son, considered in different circumstances, and at different times, (as Bishop Bull has fully demonstrated,) then the Son is *αἰδιος* according to this writer. “On “the contrary,” you say, “that Athenagoras expressly affirms “the unbegotten God alone to be eternal.” But the reading there should be *ἀγένητος* with single *ν*, as I shall shew hereafter, and in the one *unnude*, or *necessary existing* God, is contained *God the Word*^d.

You go on, (p. 108,) to charge Athenagoras with the ridiculous notion of the Son’s being nothing (before his generation) but the Father’s *internal Reason*; that is, nothing but an *attribute*. I hope you do not expect an answer to these pretences, so long as Bishop Bull’s confutation of them stands untouched. The English reader may see what is sufficient on that head, in my Defence^e and Sermons^f. Bishop Bull, you say, acknowledges Athenagoras meant that the “Son is the same with respect to “the Father, as the internal reason is to the mind of men.” Bishop Bull says no such thing. How shall we trust you in your reports of the *Fathers*, when you scruple not to misrepresent even a modern author, which is in every body’s hands?

Bp. Bull only says^g, that Athenagoras meant that the relation

^c Οὐκ ἐσμὲν ἄθεοι, Θεὸς ἄγοντες τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, καὶ τὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ λόγον· Θεὸν not θεοῦς.

“We are not atheists, inasmuch as we receive the Maker of the world “as God, and also his *Word*.”

^d Ὡστε τὸν λέγοντα ἀγένητον, καὶ παντοκράτορα τὸν πατέρα, νοεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀγενήτῳ, καὶ τῷ παντοκράτορι, καὶ τὸν τούτου λόγον καὶ σοφίαν, ἧ τις ἐστὶν ὁ

υἱός. Athanas. Decret. Syn. Nic. p. 236.

Οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο παραρρεῖ τὴν τοῦ λόγου φύσιν, οὐδὲ πάλιν τὸ ἀγένητον πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει τὸ σημαϊνόμενον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ γενόμενα. *Ibid. p. 235.*

^e Defence, vol. i. p. 360, &c.

^f Sermon VII. p. 150, of this vol.

^g Ita ut Filius Dei intelligatur verbum Patris, quod nempe se habeat ad

of *thought* to *mind* resembles the relation of the Son to the Father in *several respects*, which he there mentions. I have said the same thing, and explained the resemblance at large elsewhere^h. After some pains taken to falsify and misrepresent Athenagoras, (which pains had been much better spent in replying to Bp. Bull,) you come at length to charge me home with running counter to Athenagoras's notion, in "two fundamental points." I must give you the hearing in things more trifling than these; so let us inquire what they are.

1. You say, his notion makes the Son's *generation* an *act*, which mine does not. If that will please you, I will allow a *double act* in the Son's *generation*, according to Athenagoras. One of the *Father* in sending forth his Son, *another* of the Son in going forth; viz. to *create*. Did I ever deny the *procession* of the Son, which Athenagoras and several others intend by *generation*? But I assert *eternal* generation, which Athenagoras does not: there, I suppose, is the main difference. Yet Athenagoras acknowledges the *λόγος* to have been eternally *of* and *in* the Father, and referred up to him as his *head* and *source*: which is acknowledging the selfsame thing which other Catholics intended by *eternal generation*; so that the difference lies only in *words*, as I before intimated in my Defenceⁱ.

2. You say, that Athenagoras's notion "never supposes two Persons of equally supreme authority and worship, but ascribes every thing the Son does to the supreme authority and will of the Father." But where do you learn that Athenagoras ever excludes the Son from *supreme authority* (properly so called) or from *supreme worship*? Athenagoras indeed is express, that there is a difference of order among the divine Persons: but where do you find a difference of *dominion* or *worship*? You could not have chose an author more directly opposite to your sentiments, or more favourable to mine, in the very point of *dominion*; on which you are pleased to lay so much stress. For Athenagoras, addressing himself to the emperors Marcus Antoninus, and his son Lucius Commodus, styles them both equally μέγιστοι Αυτοκρατόρων, which I might translate *supreme Rulers*. And he observes, that all things were under their common rule and dominion^k; and from thence draws his com-

Patrem, ut ad mentem humanam verbum ejus interius, quod et *Spirituale* est, minimeque per se cadit in sensus; et *in mente*, unde procedit, *manet*, nec ab ea sejungitur, &c. *Bull.* p. 203.

^h Sermons, p. 31, &c. of this vol.

ⁱ Defence, vol. i. p. 365, &c.

^k Δεήσομαι δὲ ὑμῶν, μέγιστοι Αυτοκρατόρων, πρὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἀληθεῖς παρεχομένη τοὺς λογισμοὺς συγγνώμῃ—

parison for the illustration of the one common rule and government of God the Father and the Son; to whom, as being *inseparable*, all things are subject. Is this making the Father *alone* supreme Governor? Or is it likely that a *Creator* and *creature* should be thus familiar, and rule all things equally and in *common*? Where were your thoughts? To be short, all that you can possibly extract out of Athenagoras is no more than a *priority of order*, as the Father is Head and Fountain to which the Son and Holy Ghost are referred. The *dominion*, the *authority* is *equal*, is *supreme* in all: only in the Father *primarily*, in the other two *derivatively*; the same thing under a different *order* and *manner*. After you had endeavoured to puzzle and perplex Athenagoras, you go on (p. 110.) to do the like with Tatian, Theophilus, and some others. I shall not attend you now, but proceed in my method. If you have dropped any thing that is worth the notice, it shall be considered in a more proper place, under Query VIII, which you have often robbed to fill up this.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus is the next author cited to prove that “the Father and the Son are one God.” He asserts it *in sense*, and *indirectly* many ways; some of which have been hinted above; see also my Sermons^l. He does it also *in terms* more than once^m. I must now attend your exceptions to the evidence.

ἔχοιτε ἀφ’ ἐαυτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπουράνιον βασιλείαν ἐξετάζειν· ὡς γὰρ ὑμῖν, πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ πάντα κεχρίρωται, ἄνωθεν τὴν βασιλείαν εἰληφόσι—οὕτως ἐνὶ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῷ παρ’ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ υἱῷ νοουμένῳ ἀμερίστω, πάντα ὑποτέτακται. p. 64.

“Before I enter upon discourse, I beseech you, O ye greatest of Emperors, to bear with me, while I offer true reasonings—From your own selves you may form a notion of the *heavenly empire*. For like as all things are in subjection to you, being Father and Son, (having received your empire from above,) so also to the *one God* and to the *Word* who is with him, considered as a *Son inseparable*, are all things subject.” Vide *Le Moyne, Var. Sacr. Not. et Observ.* p. 169.

^l Serm. VIII. p. 179, &c. of this vol.

^m Ita ut is, qui omnia fecerit, cum Verbo suo juste dicatur Deus et Dominus solus. *Iren.* p. 183.

Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus, hic est vivorum Deus, et Verbum ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi &c.—Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus, qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. p. 232.

Propter hoc manifestissime Dominus ostendit *se et Patrem* quidem suis discipulis, ne scilicet quærerent *alterum Deum* præter eum qui *plasmaverit* hominem. p. 311.

Quoniam autem in ventre *plasmatus* nos Verbum Dei, &c. p. 312.

“He who made all things, he alone with his *Word*, is justly styled God and Lord.

“He who was adored as the *living God* by the prophets, he is the *God of the living*, and his *Word*, who also spake to Moses, &c.—Christ therefore himself, with the Father, is the *God of the living* that spake to Moses.

“For this reason our Lord mani-

To what I had observed from Irenæus, in my Defence, you say, (p. 92,) “The sense then of Irenæus, according to you, is, the “one and only God, the Father and Son, made all things by his “Word, or Son:” No; but, if you please to leave off this vein of cavilling, (which is below the character of a grave writer,) the sense is not that the Son was included under the term *Father*, which undoubtedly there stands for the *Person* of the *Father* singly, (and therefore the Son is *excluded* from being the *Person* of the *Father*,) but that he is not excluded from doing what the *Father alone* is said to do, or from being *God*, though the *Father alone* is said to be so; because the *exclusive* terms are not intended in *opposition* to God the Son.

You are often imposing this kind of sophistry upon us; wherefore I would once for all endeavour to shew you the weakness and absurdity of it, when our Saviour told his disciples that they had left him *alone*, he did not mean by this to *exclude* the *Father*, but *others*: will you therefore say, that *Father* and *Son* both are meant by the *him* left alone? When our Saviour is said to have a name given which no one knew but *himself*, the *Father* is not excluded by the term *οὐδείς*: will you therefore plead that he is included in the *Person* of the *Son*, and that both are *one Person*? How ridiculous is it, that you cannot distinguish between being not excluded with respect to the *predicate* of a proposition, and being included in the *subject* of it. In this proposition, “The *Father* is the only *God*,” we say the *Son* is not *excluded*: how? not with respect to the *predicate*; not from being *only God*, as well as the *Father*, because the *exclusive* term affects him not. But we do not therefore say that he is included in the *subject* of the proposition; or that *Father* means both *Father* and *Son*. So much in answer to this cavil, which had deserved no notice, but for your so often repeating it. Now to return; you pretend it absurd that all things should be made *by* or *through* the one supreme God. But you have not shewn that all *ministration* is inconsistent with any *supremacy*, but a *supremacy* of *order* or *office*; which I admit. What you add from Irenæus, about the *Father’s commanding* the *Word*, I have answered in my Sermonsⁿ, and shewn it to be, as understood by the *ancients*, directly opposite to your principles. You are next labouring to take off the force of what I had pleaded in

“fested both *himself* and the *Father*
“to his disciples, that they might not
“look for any *other God* but him that

“formed man——The *Word* of God
“forms us in the womb, &c.”

ⁿ Serm. II. p. 63, &c. of this vol.

respect of Irenæus's making the Son and Holy Ghost the *self* of the Father. But this was too hard a task: I will trust the reader with what you have said, to compare it with mine; and to see if he can make sense of your *immediate* obedience: as if any *obedience*, mediate or immediate, were a reason sufficient for styling the Person obeying, *one's self*. You refer to Irenæus^o saying, that *by the Son and Spirit*, (that is, *per semetipsum, by himself*, as he says in the same chapter,) he made all things *freely*, and of *his own will*. And so he well might, when the *Son and Spirit* are so much his *self*, as to have but one and the *same will* with him. Others might have *contrary* wills: they could not. You misconstrue his next immediate words: he "produced," you say, "the substance of the creatures from himself, i. e. from his own original underived power." But *himself* means there, the *Son and Spirit*; as is plain from *exemplum factorum*; (which you took care to leave out:) God the *Son* being the *exemplar* by which things were formed ^p. And Tertullian may serve to explain Irenæus's meaning in the other article^q.

You next tell us of his citing a *remarkable* passage of Hermas: as if there were any thing so very *remarkable*, in respect to our present purpose, in Hermas's saying that there is but *one God*. But Irenæus, you observe, *adds presently after*, that the *Son* "receives the power of all things from him who is the one God the Father, &c." And what wonder if he receives all things from him, from whom he receives his *essence*? We are not inquiring *whence* the *Son's* power or dominion is, but *what* it is; and whether it be not of the same quality and extent with the *Father's*, the same being *common* to both. But you say, "this power and dominion became plenary over all things both in heaven and earth, when he had been incarnate." Plenary, did you say? and over all things? I think not; nor is even the *Father's* dominion yet so *plenary* as this comes to. (See 1 Cor.

^o Ipse est qui per semetipsum constituit, et elegit, et adornavit, et continet omnia—Adest enim ei semper Verbum et Sapientia, Filius et Spiritus per quos, et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit. Lib. iv. cap. 20. p. 253. Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 87.

Ad quos et loquitur dicens, "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram;" ipse a *semetipso* substantiam creaturarum, et exemplum factorum, et figuram in mundo ornamentorum accipiens. *Ibid.*

p. 253.

^p Vid. Iren. lib. v. cap. 16. p. 313. comp. p. 163. and Clem. Alex. p. 78.

^q Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimavit, habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem—Sophiam suam scilicet—Quis non hanc potius omnium fontem et originem commendet, *materiam* vero *materiarum*—quali Deus potuit eguisse, sui magis quam alieni egens? *Tertull. contr. Hermogen.* cap. 18.

xv. 28.) But what strange thing are you here discovering, that Christ became *Lord* in a sense which he was not before! So did the *Father* become *Lord* over the Jews in a sense he was not before, when he made them his *peculiar* people. He became their *Lord*, first, when he *created* them, and again, in a more *peculiar* sense, when he chose more immediately to govern them. In like manner, Christ who was *Lord* of all men in right of creation, became *Lord* again, in a more special sense, in right of *redemption*^r; and will be their *Lord* again, in a still more *plenary* sense, after the day of judgment; as will also God the Father. What difficulty is there in these plain common things? But, I suppose, the force of your argument lies in the words *accipiens potestatem*, and *tradita sunt*^s. And yet you will think it no argument against the Father's supremacy, that he is to *receive* a kingdom, which is to be *delivered* to him by the Son, 1 Cor. xv. 24, though I need not insist upon it here, being ready to admit, that while all power and authority is common to both, yet it is primarily considered in the Father, and referred up to him: and it was the more proper for our Saviour, during his state of condescension and humiliation here on earth, to refer all to the Father; as Irenæus intimates in another case, of his referring the *knowledge* of the day of judgment. I might further observe to you, that though Irenæus sometimes represents the power and authority of the Son as descending from the Father, he at other times represents the Son as *assuming it himself*, and making *himself*^t the head over the Church, &c. which is also very true, and much in the same way, as he is sometimes said to have *raised*

^r See my Sermons, p. 114, &c. of this volume.

^s No one ever better understood this matter than the great Athanasius, who wrote a tract on purpose to shew how all things are said to have been *delivered* to God the Son. The sum is, that when all things, in a manner, were lost and sunk, and no one ready at hand to undertake their recovery and restitution, in this exigency, Christ stepped in to *redeem* those whom he had at first *created*. To him therefore were they *delivered*; into his hands were they committed, who alone was both able and willing to recover and restore them; and who accordingly took flesh upon him, and wrought their *redemption* for them.

Πάντα δέδωκεν ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ—

ἢ ὡς περ δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα γέγονεν, οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἀνακαινοθῆναι δυναθῆναι. *Athan.* vol. i. p. 104.

Eusebius's account of the same thing is not much different.

Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς ἐδίδου, καὶ παρεδίδου ἐπὶ βελτιώσει, καὶ ὄφελεία οἷα Σωτῆρι καὶ ἰατρῷ, καὶ κυβερνήτῃ τῶν ὄλων, &c. *Euseb. de Eccl. Theolog.* lib. i. cap. 19. p. 88.

^t Uti sicut in supercælestibus, et spiritalibus, et invisibilibus, princeps est Verbum Dei; sic et in visibilibus, et corporalibus, principatum habet, in semetipsum principatum assumens, et apponens semetipsum caput Ecclesiæ, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 16. p. 206.

himself from the dead, and sometimes to have been *raised by the Father*: for what one does both do, diversely considered as to the *order* and *manner* of acting.

I had cited a plain passage^u or two, to prove that the Son is *the only God*, according to Irenæus, as well as the Father. You reply, that, in the first passage, “ true and only God is evidently “ meant of the Father,” which I readily allow: and so you may see in Clemens, cited above, how he applies the like title to the Father, and yet immediately, in the same breath, makes Father and Son together the *only God*. The reason is, that neither he, nor Irenæus, nor indeed any of the ancients, ever had a thought of excluding the *Son* by the word *only*, or the like. How have you read the *Fathers*, not to see these plain things? You go on, endeavouring to elude and perplex Irenæus’s meaning. But your attempts are so feeble, and your efforts so weak, that I am almost ashamed to make any reply to them. You would have it, that Irenæus does not call the Son God in the *supreme* and *absolute* sense; though you can never shew that Irenæus had two senses of the word *God* as applied to Father and Son. The Son, you imagine, is not *God* in the *absolute* sense, but as being God’s anointed, our Lord, and our God, (p. 98.) I read of the Father’s *anointing*, and the Son’s being *anointed*, (that is, to his *office*;) but could you have shewn, that he was anointed to his *Godship*, (pardon the oddness of the word, it contains your sense,) that would have been a discovery indeed. You refer to several passages, (I could add many more,) where the Father is styled the *only God*. But to what purpose is it? Irenæus never meant thereby to exclude the Son from being, with the alone Father, *Deus et Dominus*^x, *God and Lord*, or from being with the Father, *vivorum Deus*, *God of the living*, or from being the *self* of the Father, or from being *Deus ipse*^y, *God himself*: nor would he ever allow, that the Son was not God in the *definitive*, or *absolute* sense, or that he was *another God*. What can you do with such a man as Irenæus, all the way contrary to your prin-

^u Nunquam neque Prophetæ neque Apostoli alium Deum nominaverunt vel Dominum appellaverunt præter verum et solum Deum. Multo magis ipse Dominus, qui et Cæsari quidem quæ Cæsaris sunt reddi jubet, et quæ Dei sunt Deo. *Iren.* p. 182.

Neque igitur Dominus, neque Spiritus Sanctus, neque Apostoli eum, qui non esset Deus, definitive et ab-

solute Deum nominassent aliquando, nisi esset vere Deus, p. 180.

Compare the following words:

Utrosque Dei appellatione signavit Spiritus, et eum, qui ungitur, *Filium*, et eum, qui ungit, Patrem, p. 180.

^x See above.

^y Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus. *Iren.* p. 132.

ciples, directly for mine? He styles the Father *only God*, in opposition to the *Valentinian Æons*, or other monstrous deities; never, not once, in opposition to God the Son.

After what hath been said, the reader, I hope, will not be surprised, to find me quoting another passage of Irenæus^z to the same purpose as before. It is where he proves our Lord to be the *Word of God*, and *God*, from his *remitting of sins*; upon the strength of this maxim, that none can forgive sins but *God alone*. I take the argument to lie thus: None can forgive sins but the *God of Israel*, the true and only God, (so the Jews understood and intended it:) Christ forgave sins: therefore Christ is *God*, in the same sense as intended, i. e. *God of Israel*, &c. I defy any man to come at Irenæus's conclusion from that passage any other way: and though he words it, *Verbum Dei*, it is plain from the following words, that the phrase is with him equivalent to *Deus*; the *Word of God* being necessarily *God*, or, as he elsewhere expresses it, *Deus ipse*. What you have to object is, that *solus Deus* is there predicated of the Father; I grant it: and yet Irenæus's argumentation necessarily infers, that Christ is *Deus* too, in the same sense; and therefore with the Father, *solus Deus*; the *only God* that can remit sins; and he received this power because he is *God of God*. Irenæus plainly enough intimates, that if he had not been *God*, he could not have had the power; which shews that he is speaking of such a kind of remission, by inherent power and right, as is proper to *God alone*^a; otherwise there is no sense in the argument.

^z Peccata igitur remittens, hominem quidem curavit, semetipsum autem manifeste ostendit quis esset. Si enim nemo potest remittere peccata nisi solus Deus, remittebat autem hæc Dominus, et curabat homines; manifestum est quoniam ipse erat Verbum Dei. Filius hominis factus, a Patre potestatem remissionis peccatorum accipiens, quoniam homo et quoniam Deus: ut quomodo homo compassus est nobis, tanquam Deus misereatur nostri, et remittat nobis debita nostra, quæ factori nostro debemus Deo. Iren. p. 314.

“Remitting sins, he healed the man, and at the same time plainly shewed who himself was. For if none can forgive sins, but *God alone*, and yet our Lord forgave sins, and healed

men; it is manifest that he was the *Word of God*, made Son of man, receiving from the Father the power of forgiving sins, because *man*, and because *God*: that as he suffered with us, being *man*, so he might also have mercy upon us as he is *God*, and might forgive us our debts, which we owe to God our Maker.”

^a Bene igitur Verbum ejus ad hominem dicit, “Remittuntur tibi peccata;” idem ille in quem peccaveramus in initio, remissionem peccatorum in fine donans. Aut si alterius quidem transgressi sumus præceptum, alius autem erat qui dixit, “Remittuntur tibi peccata tua;” neque bonus, neque verax, neque justus ex hujusmodi. Quomodo enim bonus, qui non ex suis donat? Aut quomodo

You here (p. 101.) take notice of another passage of Irenæus, which I incidentally brought in (p. 306. of my Defence, vol. i.) to prove that, according to Irenæus, none that has any *superior*, any God *above him*, can be justly styled *God*^b. A famous passage, and directly opposite to your principles; while you pretend to ascribe divinity to the Son, at the same time subjecting him to a *superior God*, and putting him *sub alterius potestate, under the dominion and power of another*. You do well to labour to take this off; but *how*, we shall see presently. You pretend, that Irenæus, in “numberless other passages, expressly asserts the “superiority of the Father to the Son.” I deny that he ever does it, so much as in any *single* passage, in your sense of *superiority*. Nay, to see how consonant to himself Irenæus is, I will shew you where^c he, by necessary consequence, declares the Son to have *no superior*.

The argument will stand thus :

“He that is the *God of the living*, and who *spake to Moses* out of the bush, has *no other God* above him.

“Christ is the *God of the living*, and who *spake to Moses* out of the bush.

“Therefore Christ has *no other God* above him.”

The premises are both of them Irenæus's own: and the conclusion from them is evident. We see then, that Irenæus does not only lay down the *general* maxim, that whoever is *God*,

justus, qui aliena rapit? Quomodo autem verè remissa sunt peccata, nisi ille ipse in quem peccavimus donavit remissionem? *Iren.* p. 313. Vid. Grab. in Bull. D. F. p. 85.

“Well therefore did his *Word* say “to the man, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*; he the same against whom we had sinned in the beginning, in the end vouchsafes remission of sins. “Otherwise had the precept against which we transgressed come from *one*, and it had been *another* that said, *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, he could neither have been good, nor just, nor true in doing it. For how can he be *good*, who gives what is none of his own? Or how can he be *just*, that assumes what belongs to another? Or how could sins be really forgiven, if he that forgave them were not the very same against whom we had sinned?”

^b Qui super se habet aliquem su-

periolem, et sub alterius potestate est, hic neque *Deus*, neque *Rex* magnus dici potest. *Iren.* p. 229.

^c Is qui de rubo loquutus est Moysi, et manifestavit se esse Deum Patrum, hic est viventium *Deus*. Quis enim est *vivorum Deus*, nisi qui est *Deus super quem alius non est Deus*?—Qui igitur adorabatur *Deus vivus*, hic est *vivorum Deus*, et *Verbum* ejus, qui loquutus est Moysi, qui et *Sadducæos* redarguit, &c.—Ipse igitur *Christus cum Patre vivorum* est *Deus*, qui loquutus est Moysi—*Iren.* p. 232. Vide Bull. sect. ii. cap. 5.

“He that spake to Moses out of the bush, and manifested himself to be the *God of the Fathers*, he is the *God of the living*. For who else can be the *God of the living*, but the *God* that has no other *God* above him?—Christ with the Father is the *God of the living*, who spake to *Moses*, &c.”

properly so called, can have no other God above him: but in the *particular* case of God the Son, he applies the very maxim, and declares that there is no other God above him. What will you say to these manifest truths, which so directly strike at your whole *hypothesis*? You endeavour to find some shelter, by turning *Deus* into Greek, making it $\acute{\omicron} \Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, which will not do, because it is frequent with Irenæus to give the Son the title of $\acute{\omicron} \Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ ^d. And if he did not, yet he never appears to lay any such stress upon an *article*. Nor will the occasion of Irenæus's maxim at all serve you. For though the discourse there is of *God the Father*, yet his reasoning, whereby he proves that the Person, there styled $\acute{\omicron} \Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, could have "no other God above him," will prove the same thing of every other Person so styled, or prove nothing. You produce some citations from Irenæus to prove the "Father superior in authority" (*another God above him*, you should have said, because you mean it) "to the Son, and the Son subject to him." None of them prove any thing like it, in your meaning of *superiority* and *subjection*.

The Father *commanded*, the Son *executed*. What then? I answered this above^e. Another pretence is from the words, "conditionem simul, et Verbum suum portans:" which I may leave as I find it, till you make out the consequence: or I may oppose to it, "mensura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum." Iren. p. 231. *Porto* may as well signify to *bear*, or *contain*, as *sustain*. Besides that the creatures are said, in the very same place, *portare eum*; to *sustain him*, you will say. And much will you make of it, that the *Creator* of them, *mundi Factor*, (Irenæus's own words of God the Son, in the same chapter,) was *sustained* by his creatures. You proceed to observe, that the Son *ministered* to the Father: you might have observed further, that "he washed his disciples' feet." But see Bishop Bull, who had fully answered these pretences, before you produced them. You further take notice out of Irenæus, that the "Word incarnate hung upon the cross." Who doubts it? You should have took notice likewise of what Irenæus says, in the very same chapter, that this *Word* was really "Maker of the world, and containeth all things^f." But I am weary of

^d Vid. Iren. p. 211, 215, 271. ed. Bened.

^e See also Bull. D. F. p. 80.

^f Mundi enim Factor vere Verbum Dei est—et secundum invisibilitatem continet, quæ facta sunt omnia.

Lib. v. cap. 18. p. 315.

"The *Word* of God is really *Maker of the world*—and in respect of his invisibility, (or *invisible nature*,) contains all things which are made."

pursuing trifles. If Irenæus had had a mind to express the *subjection* of the *Son*, and superior *dominion* of the *Father*, he knew how to do it. See how he expresses himself, where he declares the *subjection* of all things to God the *Son*, and the *Holy Spirit*g, at the same time speaking of their *ministration* (not *subjection*) to the *Father*: which may be sufficient to shew you how wild your *hypothesis* is, and how little countenance for it you can reasonably hope to find among the *ancients*.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.

I have already produced one plain and express passage, wherein Clemens includes the *Father* and the *Son* in the *only God*. He has more to the same purpose, where he says, “both are “one, namely God^h ;” and where he addresses both as *one Lord*ⁱ, and the whole *Trinity* as *one*^k. Which I took notice of in my eighth Sermon^l.

You are forced to confess, (p. 80,) that in Clemens’s first writings, there are “some sublime expressions, which, if taken “literally, would favour either my notion or the Sabellian.” A pretty fair confession ; but it would have been still fairer to have said, (which is what the reader must see,) *some expressions, too plain and strong to admit of any evasion*. All you have to say is, that they are highly *rhetorical*; which is saying nothing. You are next to oppose other passages of Clemens, to take off their force. Upon which, I may observe, by the way, how disingenuous your claim to the *ancients* is, in comparison with ours. You think it sufficient, if you can but find any passages which look at all favourable to your scheme, however contradictory (as you understand them) to other clear and express testimonies of the same author. On the other hand, we think ourselves obliged to *reconcile* the seemingly opposite passages, and to make an author *consistent* with himself: which if we cannot do, we give him up as *neuter*, and make his evidence *null*; unless there be reason to believe, that the author, upon better consideration, had changed his mind, or that some parts of his works are more

g Ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies, et figuratio sua, id est, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, Verbum et Sapientia; quibus serviunt, et subiecti sunt omnes angeli. *Iren.* p. 236. Comp. p. 183.

“His own *offspring*, and *figure*, “that is, the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, the “*Word*, and *Wisdom*, to whom all

“the angels are subject, and do obeisance, *minister* to him (the *Father*) “in all things.”

^h Ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ Θεός. *Clem. Alex.* p. 135.

ⁱ Υἱὲ καὶ πατὴρ, ἐν ἄμφω Κύριε. p. 311.

^k *Clem. Alex.* p. 311.

^l Sermons, p. 180 of this volume.

certainly genuine than others. But to proceed, you begin with attempting to deprave the sense of a celebrated place in Clemens, which I shall transcribe into the margin^m. In English it runs thus: "The divine Word, who is most manifestly *true God*, who "is *equalized* with the Lord of the universe, because he was his "Son, and was the *Word in God*." This is a passage very little favourable to your invention of a *superior dominion* of the Father, and a *subjection* of the Son: for the Son is here said to be *equalized*, that is, *proclaimed equal* to the Lord of the whole universe. You say, *equalized* implies an *exaltation*, a *delegation*, &c. Ridiculous. Can any thing or person be *made equal* to God the Father, *exalted* to a parity with him? But a person may be *proclaimed equal*; which is only shewing what he was before. And Clemens assigns two substantial reasons, why the Son was thus proclaimed; it was his natural and essential dignity that demanded it; for he was God's *own Son*ⁿ, of the same nature with him; and he was the *Word* that existed *in God*^o himself; most manifestly therefore *true God*, and accordingly *equalized* with God, as he had a right to be. You give us two or three words of Eusebius, as expressing the sense of Clemens. But let Clemens speak for himself, who is a plainer man, and a more consistent writer, than Eusebius; and of whom it is easier to pass a certain judgment. Suppose the words in Clemens to signify *equalized in honour*, or advanced to *equal honour and glory*: still, would you have a *subject* thus *equalized* with his sovereign? If Christ was *equalized* in honour and glory, the inference will reach to an *equality* of nature; which alone could be any sufficient reason or foundation for honouring him so highly. You would have it only, *receiving dominion* (you do not care to say *equal dominion*) from the Father. But this comes not up to Clemens's strong expression of *equalizing*; nor to his *reasons* assigned for it; the very reasons which he elsewhere gives, why the Father and Son are the *one God*, ὁ Θεός, abso-

^m Ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεός, ὁ τῷ δεσπότῃ τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθεῖς· ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. p. 86. Adm. ad Gent.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 88. Anim. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1010.

ⁿ Υἱὸς τοῦ νοῦ γνήσιος, ὁ θεῖος λόγος, φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον φῶς. Clem. Admon. p. 78.

Τὸν λόγον τέλειον ἐκ τελείου φύντα πατρός. Pædag. p. 113.

^o Compare the following passages

of Clemens, explanatory of the phrase ἐν τῷ Θεῷ.

* Ὁ τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ· ὁ τοῦ τελείου παιδίου· υἱὸς ἐν πατρὶ καὶ πατὴρ ἐν υἱῷ. Pæd. lib. i. cap. 5. p. 112.

Τῶν συμπάντων Θεὸν ἓνα μόνον εἶναι, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον, δημιουργόν, υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ. Pædag. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 142.

^o Ἐν γὰρ ἄμφω, ὁ Θεός· ὅτι εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Clem. Alex. p. 135.

lutely so called, and jointly the one *only God and Creator* of all things.

Next, you are to search out some other expressions of Clemens, to be pleaded in the way of abatement. Clemens, it seems, says in the same page, that “he sprung from the will of the Father.” But let the reader see the whole sentence, that he may be apprized of your unrighteous method of citing authors. “Being “with utmost celerity diffused upon all men, rising swifter than “the sun, out of the very will (*or heart*) of the Father, he most “readily darted forth God upon us ^{p.}” Would you have your reader here deceived into an opinion that Clemens is speaking of the Son’s *existing* by his Father’s *free* choice and pleasure? No doubt but that is your meaning, or something very little better; though Clemens is only speaking of his *mission* to mankind. *Elsewhere*, you say, *he calls him* inspector of our hearts by the *will* of the *Almighty*^q. But you are as unfortunate in this place as in the other; misconstruing the words, and perverting the sense; as I have elsewhere^r shewn. Παντοκρατορικῶ θελήματι signifies by his own *sovereign, all-containing* will. That there is no impropriety in applying the epithet παντοκρατορικὸς to *will*, I proved by parallel instances from other authors; and shall now add one more of the like kind^s. You appear very unwilling to have the Doctor’s criticisms on this passage taken from you: and therefore you endeavour, feebly, to prop them up again, in a note, p. 227. You tell me, that the parallel passages I alleged, do not signify that God is omnipresent or omniscient by his *will*, but by “his active governing wisdom.” Be it so: then let the same answer serve for the expression of Clemens; and let Christ be *omniscient* by his “active governing wisdom,” and now all is right again. I am not contending for *God’s* or *Christ’s* knowing all things by his *will*, in the Doctor’s sense: but why must Clemens be tied up to the Doctor’s strict sense of *will*, in the word θελήματι, more than other authors, who have likewise used the phrase of *all-containing will*, as well as Clemens? The Doctor’s fanciful speculations against the phrase (Script. Doctrine, p. 294.) are of as much weight against the phrase in other authors,

^p Τάχιστα δὲ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διαδοθεῖς, θάπτον ἡλίου ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀνατείλας τῆς πατρικῆς βουλήσεως, ῥάστα ἡμῖν ἐπέλαμψε τὸν Θεόν. Clem. p. 86.

^q Τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν, τὸν τῷ παντοκρατορικῷ θελήματι ἐπίσκοπον τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν. p. 611.

^r Defence, vol. i. p. 338. Sermons, p. 160 of this volume.

^s Τοῦ θείου καὶ παντοκρατορικοῦ καὶ ἀλύτου τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτῆς ἔρωτος. Pseudo Dionys. Areop. de Divin. Nomin. cap. x. p. 829.

as in Clemens; that is, of no weight at all, but to shew the folly of interpreting phrases by speculation and fancy, instead of looking into authors, to see how they have been used. You was to say something, it seems, however wide, rather than give up a favourite criticism.

You say, Clemens calls the Son *θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν* which is true; but it does not there signify the same as *πατρικόν θέλημα*, but *all-containing wisdom*, or *will* again; as is plain from the very place itself, where Clemens also styles him *δύναμις παγκρατῆς*, *all-containing power*^t. And it is the very reason given by Clemens, why he may be *known to all*, even to those that have not acknowledged him; he is *παγκρατῆς*, and *παντοκρατορικὸς*, *present to all*, or containing all. Had Clemens intended your sense, he would rather have expressed it by *πατρικῶ θελήματι*, as usual^u; or *θελήματι τοῦ πατρὸς*^x, or the like. Nor can you give any instance out of Clemens, of *παντοκρατορικὸς*, but where it either must, or however may, bear the sense I have given. The phrase *παντοκρατορικὸν βούλημα* (p. 857.) comes the nearest to the other. But it is there manifest, from the context, that it ought to be interpreted in the same way as I have construed *θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν*. I much question whether *παντοκρατορικὸς* is ever used for *τοῦ παντοκράτορος*, in the way that Dr. Clarke contends for. It is certain, that the other which I contend for is most proper, and is most usual and customary in Greek writers. This, I hope, may be sufficient to put an end to a weak criticism, which has nothing in it. Now let us go on.

As to the Son's *ministering*, I have before answered: and as to the passages you have selected, one would think you had took them out of Bishop Bull; only leaving out the Bishop's solutions^y: which is a very unfair way of protracting a controversy.

As to *second cause*, you do not meet with it in Clemens; *δεῦτερος αἴτιος*^z signifies no more than *secondary causer*, *τάξει δεύτερος*, second in order in causal operations. Besides that, if it strictly meant more, allowance must be made for Clemens, while he is adapting the *Platonic* to the Christian Trinity, if he uses the *Platonic* terms; though they may not quadrate exactly.

^t Σοφία δὲ καὶ χρηστότης φανερωτάτη τοῦ Θεοῦ, δύναμις τε παγκρατῆς, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεία· οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ὁμολογῶσιν ἀκατανόητος, θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν. Clem. p. 647.

^u Vid. Clem. p. 99, 150. Comp. p. 86, 125.

^x Vid. Clem. p. 156, 710.

^y Vid. Bull. Def. F. p. 90.

^z Clem. Alex. p. 710.

You next cite Clemens for styling the Father *μόνον ὄντως Θεόν*, and introducing the Son as joining in hymns of praise to him. As to *μόνος*, or other the like exclusive terms, Clemens made no account of them, in exclusion to the Son, as before seen; besides that, the Son is not only *ὄντως Θεός*, *truly God*, with Clemens, very frequently^a, but even *μόνος Θεός*, *only God*^b, and *only Judge*^c, and *only Master*^d. All authors I have met with thus use *exclusive* terms; it being a rule of common sense, and custom of language, that such *exclusive* terms are to be strained no further than they are intended in opposition to such or such things. As to the Son's joining in *hymns of praise*, you should have told your reader, that he is supposed by Clemens, in that very place, to do it as in capacity of *High-Priest*^e. I can scarce without indignation find such things as these offered by men pretending to *letters*, or the least *ingenuity*.

You run on, about Clemens's styling the Father the *one God, supreme over all*; though every body knows it never was intended in *opposition* to God the Son, but to Pagan deities: as is plain from what hath been said. You next come to observe that Clemens styles the Son *Πρωτόκτιστος*^f. This indeed was worth remarking, and a thing fit to be offered in the way of objection; though Bishop Bull had given a good answer to it long ago^g. It is an allusion to Proverbs viii. 22. where *Wisdom* is said to have been *created*, that is, *appointed head* over the works of God^h; which I shall shew, in due time and place, to have been the ancient and Catholic sense of that text: nor can any Antenicene Father be produced for the other sense of *creation*, in regard to that text. The stale pretence about Photius and the *hypotyposes*, hath been answered over and overⁱ. However, it is a mere fancy of yours, that Photius's censure upon the *hypotyposes* was grounded upon a passage found in his *Stromata*. I

^a Clem. Alex. p. 86, 647, 690.

^b Clem. Alex. p. 84, 142. See also another passage of his *Pædagogus*, where he seems to be speaking of God the Son: the words are, *ὁ ὄντως Θεός, ὁ ὄν αὐτὸς τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ πάντα ὁ αὐτὸς, ὅτι αὐτὸς Θεός, ὁ μόνος Θεός*. p. 150. Compare a passage of the *Stromata*, l. 4. *οὐ γίνεται ἀτεκνῶς ἐν ὡς ἐν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὡς υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἐν, ἔθεν καὶ πάντα*.

^c Clem. p. 99.

^d Ibid. p. 309.

^e Ἀμφὶ τὸν ἀγέννητον (leg. ἀγένητον)

καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ μόνον ὄντως Θεόν, συνυμνοῦντος ἡμῖν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου. αἰδίου οὗτος, Ἰησοῦς εἷς, ὁ μέγας ἀρχιερεὺς Θεοῦ τε ἐνός, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πατρὸς, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων εὔχεται, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐγκελεύεται. Clem. Alex. p. 92, 93.

^f Clem. p. 699.

^g Bull. D. F. p. 90.

^h Οὗτος ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, θελήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς, αἴτιος ὁ υἱὸς καθίσταται, πρωτοουργὸς κινήσεως δύναμις ἀληπτος αἰσθήσει. Clem. p. 833.

ⁱ Bull. Def. F. p. 91. Grabe, Instances of Defects, p. 13, &c.

have now said enough in vindication of Clemens; and he must be a very orthodox writer indeed, when in so large a volume, and wrote before the Arian controversy was started, he appears to have been so well guarded as to leave room only for very frivolous exceptions; such, perhaps, as might most of them be found even in many of the Post-Nicene writers, or in Athanasius himself.

What you say after in p. 83. is worth the taking notice of, for the peculiar turn of it; and because it may let the reader into the true state of the dispute between us. You tell me, I am "forced into the absurd inconsistency of confounding a *priority of mere order* (which expresses a perfect *coordination* "of persons equally supreme in authority) with a subordination of "authority and dominion." You are troubled, it seems, that I will not suffer two of the Persons to be thought really *subjects*, or *servants*, that is, *creatures* of the *first*. I am very earnest and serious in it; nor will I yield that momentous point to you, till you are able to prove it. As to *inconsistency*, you shall see that there is none of *mine*, it is all your *own*. I have sometimes wondered with myself, how I came to be charged by the *modest Pleader*, &c. with making a *coordination* of the Persons; when I every where admit a *priority of order* in one, a *subordination* in the other two. But now the secret is out: a *coordination* is not a *coordination*, and a *subordination* is not a *subordination*, if it be only of *order*; though I was so weak as to think that the words *coordination* and *subordination*, strictly and properly, respected *order*, and expressed an *equality* or *inequality* of order. But you have a mind to use the word *coordination* for what an accurate man would call *coequality*: and so I am charged with holding a *coordination*. I confess the charge: I always held a *coequality* of the Persons, though I never before knew that it must be called *coordination*. And while I profess a *subordination*, I as constantly declare against *inequality*. If this does not content you, I cannot help it: it is not my fault, nor indeed yours, (for you have done your utmost,) that your arguments demand no more. I will still maintain a *priority of order*, together with *coequality*. And if you insist upon it, that *priority of order* is *no priority of order*, but a *coordination*; every reader, I suppose, may see whose is the *inconsistency*, yours or mine. Besides a subordination of *order*, which is *natural*, I have also allowed a subordination in *office*, which is *economical*. Is this also nothing more than a "mere position and order of words?" True, it is not

making the Father a *sovereign* over the Son as his *natural* subject, because I never intended it: nor will you ever be able to prove any thing like it. But let us proceed.

A. D. 206. TERTULLIAN.

Tertullian is so full and clear for all the three Persons being *one God*, that I need not again ^kproduce things so well known. You yourself have confessed it: but now you come in to plead for abatements; which, if you have ever so good a right to them, will not, however, make Tertullian an advocate on your side, but a *neuter* at most, as being inconsistent, and of no credit. But let us see: perhaps he may prove a consistent evidence for us; though it is utterly impossible he ever should for you. You remind me of his being a *Montanist* when he wrote against Praxeas; which was scarce worth your observing, when you allow in the same page that Tertullian makes Father and Son *one God*, even in his *Apology*^l, wrote very probably before he was a *Montanist*: and I should be content to try the merits of the cause by that Treatise alone, which would furnish you with few or no pretences against his orthodoxy in this article. But to come to the business.

You first fall upon him for making the Son no more than a “small part of the Father’s substance.” To which I answer, that if Tertullian indulged his fancy too far in explaining the doctrine, yet he may be a good evidence of the Church’s general doctrine, that Father and Son are *one God*. However, I think this objection has been well answered by Bishop Bull^m and Le Nourryⁿ; whither I refer the reader. All I shall add is this; that if Tertullian, as I have shewn above, sometimes used the term *Father* in a large sense, (as a *head* of a *family* sometimes stands for the whole family together with their head,) then it is no wonder, if God the Son might be called *Portio totius*, being but one Person of the Trinity, not *all*; as he styles the Father, *unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia*^o. This might be illustrated from

^k See my Sermons, p. 181, &c. of this volume.

Pater et Filius et Spiritus, Tres crediti, unum Deum sistunt. Tertull. *contr. Prax.* c. 31.

^l Quod de Deo profectum est Deus est et Dei Filius, et unus (suppl. *Deus*) ambo. *Apol.* c. xxi. p. 203.

^m Bull. D. F. p. 95.

ⁿ Nourrii Apparatus. ad Bibl. Max.

vol. ii. p. 1305.

^o The like way of speaking obtained among the Pagans, in respect of their supreme Jupiter, father of the other gods.

Jupiter omnipotens regum rerumque deumque

Progenitor, genitrixque deum, Deus unus et omnis.

August. de C. D. lib. vii. cap. 9. p. 170.

the case of Abraham, considered as the *father* of many nations, and containing, in a certain sense, all his descendants. Thus was Abraham *tota familia*, and Levi only *derivatio et portio totius*; that is, of Abraham, considered in capacity of *head* and *fountain*. I do not pretend to be confident, that Tertullian had this thought in his mind: but I suppose it as a probable conjecture, to be further inquired into, to make Tertullian appear the more reasonable and consistent; who was certainly no downright idiot, such as your representation would make of him. Allowing such a supposition as I have here offered, there will be no difficulty in accounting for Tertullian's saying, that the Father is *major Filio, greater than the Son*, in the manner that he does. For it will amount only to this, that the *head*, considered as such, is *major singulis*, as containing all; though it cannot be said of any but the *head*, because the rest are considered only as *single* Persons. In the other way, it is certainly downright *nonsense* to suppose the Father, in his own proper *personal* capacity, to be the *whole*: for however small a *part* you suppose the Son to be, that *part* must go in to make up the *whole*; and no *single* Person, barely considered as such, can be called the *whole*. But consider the *Father* in capacity of *Head*, in the sense before intimated, and then the notion is just, and has nothing absurd, or strange in it. I may further argue against Tertullian's making the Son a *small part*, as you say, of God's substance, from what he says of the *omnipresence* of the Son, in as full and ample terms as can be used of the omnipresence of the Father himself^p.

You go on (p. 77.) to speak of the Son's exercising the *Father's* power: right; because the Father's and his are one^q.

^p Habes Filium in terris, habes Patrem in cælis: non est separatio ista, sed dispositio divina; cæterum scimus Deum etiam intra abyssos esse, et ubique consistere, sed vi et potestate: Filium quoque, ut individuum, cum ipso ubique. Tamen in ipsa œconomia, Pater voluit Filium in terris haberi, se vero in cælis. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxiii. p. 514.

"The Son you have upon *earth*, and the Father you have in *heaven*. This is no *separation*, but a divine *economy*. Furthermore, we are certain that God is even in the abysses, and present *every where*, but in virtue and power; the *Son* also, as in-

dividual, (or *undivided*,) is with him *every where*. But, according to the *economy*, the Father would so have it, that the Son should be considered as being upon *earth*, and himself as "being in the *heavens*."

^q *Omnia*, inquit, *Patris mea sunt*. —Suo jure omnipotens, qua Sermo Dei omnipotentis, quaque omnium accepit potestatem. cap. 17.

Pater omnia tradidit in manu ejus — a primordio tradidit. Ex quo, a primordio Sermo erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Sermo, cui data est omnis potestas in cælo et in terra—Omnem enim dicens potestatem—et omnia tradita in manu ejus, nullam excep-

You add, “by the Father’s will:” yes, and by his *own* too, for both are the same, because their substance is one^r. You say indeed in your Preface, p. 6, 7. that Tertullian affirmed the same thing even of *angels*, or *rational* souls, that “they were generated “from the substance of the Father:” and to shew that you really believe it, you quote (p. 55.) three places of Tertullian, to prove it. Had this been the case, I would have given you up Tertullian for a madman. But it is your misfortune, in two of the places, very innocently to give us Marcion’s tenet for Tertullian’s own. And as to the *third* place, out of his book against Praxeas, it is very wide of the purpose; being no more than this, that God breathed into man the breath of life, a peculiar privilege of man above all the animal creation. See below^s what he says of *angels*.

But to proceed; You talk of the Son’s *subjection*, as from Tertullian: concealing from your reader that it is of a *subjection* posterior to the incarnation, an *economical* subjection: and that Tertullian denies any *subjection*, such as you are aiming at, in full and express terms^t. You add, “upon this disparity of the Son “to the Father, (directly contrary to your notion of an *equality* “in *supreme* authority,) as well as upon his notion of *consubstantiality*, does he ground his denial of two Gods.” False every word: how can you let your pen loose, to write at this rate? Tertullian’s notion of *one common supreme authority* is exactly the same with mine^u: that the three Persons are of *one state, one substance, one divinity, one supreme power and authority*, as being *one God*. When Tertullian says, *non statu sed gradu*, by *gradus* he means *order*, as Bishop Bull hath observed, *D. F.* p. 96.

And where does Tertullian found his denial of *two Gods* upon the *disparity* of Father and Son? Or where does he resolve the *Unity*, as you do, into the *Father alone*, casting out God the Son from the *one Godhead*? His constant way is to take in *both*,

tionem temporis permittit; quia omnia non erunt, si non omnis temporis fuerint. cap. 16.

^r Quale est ut Deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in Filio et Spiritu Sancto—tam *consortibus substantiæ Patris*, &c.—Cæterum, qui Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de *substantia Patris*, nihil facientem sine *Patris voluntate*, omnem a Patre consecutum potestatem, &c. *Adv. Prax.* cap. 3, 4.

^s Angelorum—alienorum a sub-

stantia Patris. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 3.

^t Sophiam—*non sibi subditam*, non *statu diversam*, &c. *Tert. contr. Hermog.* cap. 18.

^u Tres autem non *statu sed gradu*, nec *substantia sed forma*, nec *potestate sed specie*: *unius autem substantiæ*, et *unius status*, et *unius potestatis*, quia unus Deus. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 2.

Trinitas, *unius divinitatis*, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *De Pudicit.* cap. 21.

and thus he makes of both but *one God*. What you cite from his 13th chapter is not at all to your purpose. He plays a while with Praxeas, telling him, that if he would be so *hard*, as to insist upon it that Father and Son must be *two Gods*, on the Catholic scheme, then let them be so; and let him at least grant, that Father and Son may be *two Gods*, the Son having certainly as good, or much better right to be called *God*, than many others whom scripture has so styled. But after he had thus argued a while *ad hominem*, and *ex hypothesi*, he returns to his position, that they are not *two Gods*^x, but *one God*, because of *unity of substance* and *original*. His reasoning, in short, comes to this, that if the Catholic doctrine, as Praxeas insisted, must be *Ditheism*, then let it be so; so long as it is *Scripture Ditheism*, and the doctrine certainly true, whatever *name* it be called by: but still a very good reason may and has been assigned why it is not, and therefore ought not to be called *Ditheism*; because Father and Son are really *one God*, as being of *one substance*, and the Son referred up to the Father as his *head* and *source*. This is the sum of Tertullian's thoughts on that head; which are as contrary to yours, as light to darkness.

You have another little shift grounded upon Tertullian's blaming Praxeas for making the Father incarnate, whom he there calls *ipse Deus* and *Dominus omnipotens*; as if Tertullian might not emphatically style the Father *God*, without denying it of the Son. Those phrases there are nothing but so many *periphrases* for God the Father, and do not at all relate to your purpose: unless denying the Father to be *incarnate*, be denying *Christ's supreme divinity*; where I see nothing like a consequence.

As to Tertullian's asserting a *temporary generation*, it is common to him and many Catholic writers, both Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene; and has no difficulty in it, when rightly

^x Duos tamen Deos et duos Dominos nunquam ex ore nostro proferimus — Nam etsi soles duos non faciam, tamen et solem et radios ejus tam duas res et duas species *unius indivisæ substantiæ* numerabo, quam Deum et sermonem ejus, quam Patrem et Filium. *Tert. contr. Prax. cap. 13.*

Si Filium nolunt *secundum* a Patre reputari, ne *secundus* duos faciat Deos dici, ostendimus etiam duos Deos in Scriptura relatos, et duos Dominos; et tamen ne de isto scandalizentur, ra-

tionem reddidimus; qua Dei non duo dicantur, nec Domini, sed qua Pater et Filius duo; et hoc non ex *separatione substantiæ*, sed ex *dispositione*, cum *individuum* et inseparatum Filium a Patre pronuntiamus, nec statu sed gradu alium; qui etsi Deus dicatur, quando nominatur singularis, non ideo duos Deos faciat sed unum, hoc ipso, quod et *Deus ex unitate Patris vocari* habeat. cap. 19.

^y Hilarius in Matt. p. 742. Zeno Veron. ap. Bull. p. 200. Phæbadius.

understood. What you add from Tertullian's Tract against Hermogenes, is indeed of some weight, and the most material objection that his works can furnish you with. Yet you should not have concealed from your reader, that Bishop Bull^z has spent a large chapter particularly in answer to it: and it must appear very strange, that Tertullian, who at other times speaks so highly of God the Son, should designedly contradict so many clear and plain passages of his works, by denying the *coeternity* of the Son, and reducing him to a *creature*. Is the *divinity*, subsisting in *three, similar* with itself, *one only*, and capable of no *degrees*, (the express doctrine of this writer,) and yet made up of *eternal* and *temporary*, *Creator* and *creature*, differing *infinitely*? Is *eternity* and *immutability* contained in the name and notion of *God*, and particularly as applicable to God the Son^a, and yet the Son have neither *eternity* nor *immutability*? In a word, can Tertullian pretend, that an *inferior* God is nonsense and contradiction^b, and at the same time assert a creature, a being of yesterday, to be *God*, nay, and *one God* with the Father? These are such glaring and palpable absurdities, that a man of any tolerable capacity or thought (and Tertullian was a man of no mean abilities) could scarce have been capable of admitting them. Wherefore they are to be commended, who have endeavoured to bring Tertullian out of these difficulties, and to reconcile, if possible, the seeming repugnances. There was one way left for it, which the excellent Bishop Bull, and after him the learned Le Nourry, has taken. Tertullian is known to have distinguished between *Ratio* and *Sermo*, both of them names of the selfsame Λόγος, considered at different times, under different capacities: first as *silent* and unoperating, alone with the Father, afterwards *proceeding*, or going forth from the Father; to *operate* in the creation. With this *procession* he

Bibl. Patr. tom. 4. Prudentius. Hymn. xi. p. 44. Rupertus Tuitiensis. Pseud-Ambros. de Fid. Orthod. cap. ii. p. 349.

^z Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 10.

^a Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut æternum. Transfiguratio autem interemptio est pristini. Omne enim quodcumque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse quod fuerat, et incipit esse quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit esse, neque aliud potest esse. *Sermo* autem *Deus*; et *Sermo Domini* manet in

ævum, perseverando scilicet in sua forma. *Adv. Prax.* cap. 27. Vid. Bull. p. 245.

^b Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum, quæ si quando coguntur Deum confiteri, tamen et alios infra illum volunt. Divinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica. *Contr. Hermog.* cap. 7. Deus non erit dicendus, quia nec credendus, nisi summum magnum. Nega Deum quem dicis deteriorem. *Contr. Marc.* lib. i. cap. 6.

supposes (as do many others) the *Sonship* properly to commence. So that though the *Logos* had always existed, yet he became a *Son* in time; and in this sense there was a time when the *Father had no Son*; he had his *Λόγος*, his living substantial *Logos*, his *Σοφία*, with whom he conversed, as his *Counsellor*: but the *Logos* was not yet a *Son*, till he came out to create. This notion of a temporal Sonship was what Tertullian endeavoured to make some use of in his dispute with Hermogenes, who asserted matter to be *eternal, unmade, and unbegotten*; in short, *self-existent* in the highest sense. Tertullian thought it might be an argument *ad hominem*, against Hermogenes, that he hereby made matter in some sense higher than even God the Son; while he supposed it absolutely *underived*, and in no sense *derived* or *begotten* at all; which was more than could be said of God the Son, who was *begotten*, and *proceeded* of the Father. This appears to have been Tertullian's real and full meaning, however he happened, in the prosecution of the argument, to run some expressions rather too far; as is often seen in the heat of dispute, in very good writers. Allowing him only the favour of a candid construction, he may at length be made consistent; and his other expressions stand without contradiction: and he has the greater right to it, upon the principles of common equity; since one *obscure* passage ought never to be set against *many, and plain* ones.

You proceed to obviate a passage which we are wont to cite for the *equality*. I have cited others stronger and fuller, which you have not took notice of. Your correction of *patrem* for *parem*, is what I had met with before, and it seems to me very just. But your quotation from his book *de Jejuniis*, to take off the force of the words *æquat et jungit*, does not so well satisfy me: because there is a great deal of difference betwixt *æquat* when used absolutely, and when only in a certain respect. However, as I never insisted upon the force of the word *æquat* in that place, nor have any occasion for it, after so many other more certain and less exceptionable evidences of Tertullian's making Father and Son *one God supreme*; so I shall not be at the trouble to inquire further about it.

Our next author is,

A. D. 240. HIPPOLYTUS.

This writer you bear somewhat hard upon: *spurious* and *interpolated* are the names you give him. I must first see upon what grounds; and then proceed with him, if we find him

genuine. In a note to p. 39, you are pleased to favour me with your reasons. We need say nothing of Dr. Mill, who I presume had never seen the Greek of Hippolytus against Noëtus. Neither need we lay any great stress upon Photius's calling the whole piece against heresies *βιβλιδάριον*, a *little book*, as you say, since we know not by what rules and measures Photius judged of the greatness or littleness of a book, or to what kind of tracts he confined the name of *βιβλιδάριον*. These things are slight, and such as *critics* would scarce mention. I find that some very good judges, as Tillemont and Fabricius, (I do not know how many more,) take the piece to be genuine: and nobody can doubt but it is at least so in part; as one may perceive by what is borrowed from it by Epiphanius. The only question is about *interpolations*. Mr. Whiston was so sanguine as to say, he had *evidently demonstrated*^c, that it was one half of it *interpolated*, and by an Athanasian; because Theodorit and pope Gelasius had both of them quoted a passage out of it, which appears much shorter there than in Hippolytus, as now published. You are so wise as to drop Theodorit, being apprized, perhaps, that Theodorit's quotation was not from this treatise against Noëtus, but out of another work of Hippolytus, upon the *second Psalm*^d: and what great wonder is it, if an author, in two distinct tracts, borrows from himself; expressing the same thought here more briefly, there more at large? Gelasius indeed refers to the *Memoria Hæresium*: but as his quotation is exactly the same with Theodorit's, and probably taken from him, at second hand; Theodorit is the more to be depended on, as being the *elder*, and as being a Greek writer, and noted for his accuracy; and his works preserved with greater care than Gelasius's. Whether the mistake of *Memoria Hæresium* was Gelasius's own, or his transcriber's, an easy account may be given of it; since Hippolytus's piece against *heresies* was the most noted of any, and was preserved entire for a long season, and besides really had in it a passage very like that other out of his Comments on the Psalms; and it might seem no great matter, which of the pieces they referred to. These considerations shew how little your critical censure of a book is to be *depended on*: I will therefore still continue to quote Hippolytus as genuine, till I see some better reasons against it than you have here offered. What you hint of its

^c Mr. Whiston's Answer to Lord Nottingham, p. 10.

^d Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰππολύτου, ἐκ τῆς ἐρμηνείας τοῦ β. ψαλμοῦ. *Theod. Dial.* ii. p. 167.

being changed into a *homily* in latter times, is sufficiently answered by Fabricius, vol. ii. p. 6. Let us now see what Hippolytus has to offer in relation to our main dispute.

I produced the passages which I most insist upon (to prove that Father and Son are *one God*) in my Defence, first briefly, (vol. i. p. 287.) and afterwards more at large in my Sermons, above, p. 182, &c. whither, to save myself the trouble of repeating, I beg leave to refer the reader. You have some pretended *counter-evidence* to produce, as usual, in order to evade the force of what I offered. You say, (p. 90,) that “ though he seems to “ aim at including the Son and Spirit; in some sense in the one “ God,” (it is well however that he does not aim at *excluding* them, having quite other intentions than you have,) “ yet he “ expressly ascribes to the Father, not a priority of order only, “ but a real supremacy of authority and dominion.” Where are your proofs? The first is, that he talks of the Father’s *commanding*, the Son *obeying*: so did Athanasius, Basil, Cyril, Hilary, Marius, Victorinus, and others^e, who notwithstanding would have detested your notion: for they never suspected any thing of *subjection* or *servility* in it, but only a different *order* or *manner* of operating, so far as concerns the work of *creation*; and a voluntary *condescension*, or *οικονομία*, as to other matters. But Hippolytus says, by this *Trinity* the Father is *glorified*. No doubt of it, since nothing can be more for his *glory*, than to have two such divine and glorious Persons proceeding from him, and ever abiding with him: and they that lessen this *glory*, lessen him; who, in a certain sense, is the *τὸ πᾶν*. You add, as from Hippolytus, that the Father “ begat the Son” (that is, sent or shewed him to the world, which is Hippolytus’s meaning^f) “ when he willed, and as he willed.” Undoubtedly in Hippolytus’s sense, just as he sent him to be incarnate of the blessed Virgin, “ when he willed, and as he willed.” All you have further material, I have answered above. You will never be able to shew, that either *subordination*, or *ministration*, or the Son’s condescending to become man, and in that capacity a *servant* to the Father, is at all inconsistent with the notion of both the Persons being one *God supreme*. You make a show of

^e See my Sermons, p. 63 of this volume.

Or Bull. D. F. p. 80. et alibi.

Or Petavius de Trin. lib. ii. cap. 7.

^f “Οτε ἠθέλησεν, καθὼς ἠθέλησεν, ἔδειξε τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ—λόγον ἔχων ἐν

ἑαυτῷ, ἀόρατόν τε ὄντα τῷ κτισμένῳ κόσμῳ, ὁρατὸν ποιεῖ—φῶς ἐκ φωτός γεννῶν προῆκεν τῇ κτίσει κύριον, τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν, αὐτῷ μόνῳ πρότερον ὁρατὸν ὑπάρχοντα, &c. Hipp. contr. Noët. p. 13.

producing the *ancients* against me; whereas, in reality, you can pick nothing from them more than I am ready to allow, as well as they: and you endeavour to turn what they and I agree equally in, against them, as well as me, by the imaginary strength of two or three false maxims, which you have laid down to yourself, as so many principles of reason. It might be pleasant to observe, what a dance you are leading us through *Scripture* and *Fathers*, and all for amusement; while the true secret of the business is kept behind the scenes.

The case lies here. *Scripture* and *Fathers* agree in these three things, as I also do. 1. That the Son, from the time of his incarnation, was really *subject*, in one capacity or other, to God. 2. That before his incarnation he *ministered* to the Father; as well in the creation, as in all transactions between God and man. 3. That, as a Son, he is *subordinate* to the Father, referred to him as his *Head*. Now your way is to take one or more of these three premises, and from thence to draw your *inference* against the Son's being *God supreme*. This inference you draw from *these premises*, first, as found in *Scripture*. The same *inference* you draw from the same *premises*, as found perhaps in Justin Martyr; the same *inference* again from the same *premises*, as found in Irenæus; and so quite through the *Fathers*. But a man may ask, since the *premises* are taken for granted on both sides, might it not be a much shorter and clearer way, to wave further proof of the *premises* from *Scripture* and *Fathers*, and to lay all the stress upon making out the *inference*, in a set *dissertation* to that purpose? Right: but then every body would see (what is not to be told) that it is not *Scripture* or *Fathers* you depend on, but *philosophy*; which, while you mix it all the way with *Scripture* and *antiquity*, is not thought to be, what it really is, the true source and spring of the opposition you make to us; and which, while it is behind the curtain unperceived, is yet the only thing that raises all the disturbance. But to proceed.

A. D. 249. ORIGEN.

Origen, one of the most learned and considerable writers of his age, was another voucher I had produced for the truth of the doctrine that Father and Son are *one God*^f. I have before vindicated the true construction of the passage^g, and have observed,

^f "Ἐνα οὖν Θεόν, ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν θεραπεύομεν.
Orig. *contr. Cels.* p. 386.

"worship one God, the Father and
"the Son."

^g We therefore, as we have shewn,

See what I have said above; and
compare my Sermons, p. 182. of this vol.

from the circumstances, of what moment such a resolution as that of Origen, in so critical and nice a point, (on which depended the grand question of *Polytheism* between Christians and Pagans,) is, and ought to be, when duly considered. You pretend, p. 82, it is *not clear* that Origen's words must bear my sense. I do not wonder at your holding out in such a place as this: it must trouble you to find yourself condemned in the most important article of all; and that by Origen too, whom you would have to be a *favourer* of you, as he is much a *favourite* with you. But as to the sense of his words, it is so exceeding *clear*, from the whole scope and context, that nothing can be more so. See what I have said above. What then must be done next? Still you say, admitting my construction, it is *not to my purpose*. What! not to my purpose that Father and Son are *one God*; which is what I quoted it for? And if they are *one God*, they are *one God supreme*. You add, that Origen, in that very place, "explains at large *how* the Father and Son are *one*, "and also what sort of worship is to be paid the Son." The sense, you pretend, is, "that Christians still worshipped but one "God," (the *Father*, I suppose, you mean,) "because they worshipped the Father by or through the Son." Ridiculous: for so Celsus and all the wiser Pagans worshipped but *one God*; because they worshipped the *one supreme*, by and through all their other *deities*. How then did this answer clear the *Christians* from the worship of Θεοὺς, *Gods*, more than the *Pagans*? Was Origen no wiser than to expose himself and his cause to ridicule, by so weak a reply? The strength of his solution rests entirely upon this, that Father and Son are but *one God*; and therefore the Christians worshipped not *many*: he takes in *both*, to make the *ἐν*, the *unum*, the *one thing* worshipped: otherwise there was no occasion for saying that they were *one*; one *in nature*, (as I understand by this instance of *believers*, who were all of the *same nature*, and as such *equal*,) and *one* also in *concord*, agreement, and sameness of will: which is the very account which *Post-Nicene* Fathers also give of the *Unity*; as Hilary, Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nyssen, and Austin, referred to in my Defence^h. I shall here only cite the last of themⁱ, who may speak for all the rest. I shall have occasion

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 485, &c.

ⁱ Hi tres, quia unius substantiæ sunt, unum sunt; et summe unum ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Si autem natura unum

essent, et consensione non essent; non summe unum essent: si vero natura dispares essent, unum non essent. Augustin. contr. Max. lib. ii. p. 698.

Etiam nos quippe incomparabilem

hereafter to discourse you fully upon the head of *worship*, and to vindicate Origen from your misrepresentations. It may suffice, for the present, to say, that the considering the two Persons under *distinct offices* (a good rule for the regulating the *direction* of our prayers) is no argument either against the Son's being *supreme God*, (which is no word of *office*,) or for *two worships, sovereign and inferior*, which you contend for.

The other passages of Origen which you refer me to (in pages 4, 5, 10, 23, 28, 31, 49, 56, 70.) are most of them taken from Origen's less accurate, or interpolated writings; which are of no weight, any further than they agree with his piece against Celsus. And what you have out of that very piece has been mostly answered by Bishop Bull, and is not to your purpose.

The passage you quote (p. 10.) shews one advantage the Christians had, that they could plead a *command* for the worship of Christ, which the Pagans could not for their *deities*: not that this was all they had to say, but it was *something*, and too considerable to be omitted. What you cite, p. 24, I answered in my Defence, (p. 488.) referring also, in my later editions, to Bishop Bull and Mr. Bingham^b. What you have, p. 28, is only that God the Son was *sent*. Your citation, p. 31, is answered by Bishop Bull^l. What you have, p. 49, is full for a *perfect equality* of all essential *greatness*^m, and therefore is directly against you. And I must charge it on you as a false and groundless report of Origen, when you say (p. 83.) that he is one who in his whole works does "most fully, clearly, and "expressly insist on the direct contrary to my notion." So far from it, that in his latest, best, and most certainly genuine work, he is all the way directly contrary to *your* notion, and conformable to mine; as Bishop Bull has abundantly demonstrated: nor have you so much as pretended to confute what the Bishop has said.

A. D. 256. CYPRIAN.

I cited Cyprian in my Sermonsⁿ, in proof of the three Persons

consensum voluntatis, atque individuae caritatis, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, confitemur; propter quod dicimus, Hæc Trinitas unus est Deus. August. contr. Max. lib. ii. p. 720. See my Defence, vol. i. p. 488.

To the same purpose speaks Theodorit, or Maximus.

Εἰς Θεὸς οὐχ ὡς τριώνυμος, ἀλλ' ὡς

οἱ ἐν Χριστῷ καθηρισμένοι, εἰς τῷ λόγῳ τῆς συμφωνίας καὶ τῆς φύσεως. Theod. Dial. IV. ad Maced. tom. v. p. 373.

^k Bull. Def. F. p. 121. Bingham, Orig. Eccl. lib. xiii. cap. 2. p. 45.

^l Bull. Def. F. p. 262.

^m See above, p. 414.

ⁿ Sermon VIII. p. 183 of this vol.

being *one God*. He does not use the very words, but he sufficiently intimates the thing. I shall not here repeat what I said, but refer the reader to it.

A. D. 260. DIONYSIUS of Rome, with his clergy.

This author I also cited in my Sermons^o. We have but a small fragment of him preserved by Athanasius: but it is of admirable use for shewing the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as professed by the Church of Christ at that time. Sabellius, who had started up but a few years before, gave occasion to the Church to reconsider and to clear this article.

One may see from Dionysius, not only what speculations some at that time had, but also what were approved, and what not. We have no less than four *hypotheses* there intimated: and all condemned but the one only true one.

1. One was the Sabellian, making the Son the Father, and the Father the Son^p; which Dionysius condemns.

2. A second was of those who, in their extreme opposition to *Sabellianism*, made *τρεις ἀρχὰς*, *three principles*; and, of consequence, *τρεις ὑποστάσεις ξένας ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας*, *three independent, separate Hypostases, unallied to each other*, and not united in one *head*. This is condemned as *Tritheism*; and as being near akin to the *Marcionite* doctrine of *three principles*; (against which I presume the *Canon*, that goes under the name of *apostolical*^q, was first made;) and which Dionysius censures as *diabolical*^r doctrine. Here it is observable, that we meet with *three Hypostases*, first introduced in the third century, in opposition to the *Noëtian* and *Sabellian* doctrine of one *Hypostasis*, and thought very proper to express the sense of the Church; provided the *Hypostases* were not made *separate*, as so many *heads*, or *principles*. For the Church has always condemned the notion of *τρεις ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις*^s. Origen is, I think, the first writer now extant that makes mention of two or more *Hypostases* in the *Trinity*.

3. A third opinion which some were likewise apt to fall into, in opposition to Sabellius, was to make the Father only the *one God*; reducing the *Son*, and, of consequence, the *Holy Ghost*, to

^o Sermon VIII. p. 184 of this vol.

^p Ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Σαβέλλιος) βλασφημεῖ, αὐτὸν τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι λέγων τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ἐμπάλιν. p. 231.

^q Apost. Can. 49. ubi damnatur quisquis baptizavertit in *τρεις ἀνάρχους*.

^r Μαρκίωνος γὰρ τοῦ ματαιόφρονος δίδαγμα, εἰς τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τῆς μοναρχίας τομὴν καὶ διαίρεσιν, παίδευμα ὃν διαβολικόν, &c. *Dionys.* p. 231.

^s See Basil. de Sp. S. p. 130.

the condition of *precarious beings*, or *creatures*. But this also is condemned by Dionysius, in smart terms, as *blasphemy*^t in a very high degree.

4. After rejecting the former three false and heretical tenets, he at length gives us the true faith of the Church, to this purpose. "Therefore it concerns us by all means not to divide the venerable divine Unity (or *Monad*) into *three Deities*, nor to lessen the superlative majesty and greatness of our Lord by making him a *creature*; but to believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Christ Jesus his Son, and in the Holy Ghost; and that the *Word* is united with the God over all: for, he says, 'I and my Father are one;' and 'I am in the Father, and the Father in me.' So shall the divine *Trinity*, as also the sacred doctrine of the *Unity*, be preserved^u." This was his decision of that important article; which he had also expressed before in words to the same effect, which may here also be cited. "The divine Word must of necessity be united with the God of the universe, and the *Holy Ghost* abide and dwell in God; and the *divine Trinity* be gathered together and united into *one*, as into a certain *Head*, I mean the God of the universe, the Almighty^x."

You will observe how the *Unity* is solved by Dionysius, not by making the *Son* and Holy Ghost *subject* to the Father, but by *including them in* the Father: not by the Father's *governing* them, but by his *containing* and *comprehending* them. And though Dionysius styles the Father the God of the universe, and emphatically *παντοκράτωρ*, he at the same time declares the Son to be strictly *God*, or no *creature*: and he does not afterwards weakly retract what he had said of the Son, by throwing him again out of the *one Godhead*; but wisely and consistently takes him in, as "one with the Father," included in him, and reckoned to him. These were true and Catholic principles sixty

^t Βλάσφημον οὖν, οὐ τὸ τυχόν, μέγιστον μὲν οὖν, χειροποίητον, τρόπον τινα, λέγειν τὸν κύριον. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν υἱός, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν—ἀτοπώτατον δὲ τοῦτο. *Dionys.* p. 232.

^u Οὐτ' οὖν καταμερίζειν χρὴ εἰς τρεῖς θεότητας τὴν θάυμαστήν καὶ θείαν μονάδα· οὔτε ποιήσει κωλύειν τὸ ἀξίωμα, καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος τοῦ κυρίου· ἀλλὰ πεπιστευκένα εἰς Θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα καὶ εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἠνώσθαι δὲ τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν λόγον·

ἐγὼ γὰρ, φησὶ, καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ἓν ἐσμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἐν ἐμοί· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ θεία τριάς, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον κήρυγμα τῆς μοναρχίας διασώζοιτο. *Dionys.* p. 232.

^x Ἠνώσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον λόγον· ἐμφιλοχερεῖν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιατᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· ἦδε καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἓνα ὡσπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιουῖσθαι τε καὶ συναγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. p. 231. *Athan.* vol. i.

years before Arius was heard of; and they will be such while the world stands.

I might here add the other Dionysius of the same age, and witness of the same faith. But, having produced him twice before, once in my Sermons^y, and again in these papers^z, I shall here pass him over.

A. D. 318. LACTANTIUS.

I had barely referred to this author, as an evidence of the Church's faith, that Father and Son are *one God*, and that the Son is not excluded by the texts of the Unity: and of this he is as full and plain an evidence as it is possible for a man to be, however he may differ in other points; as I never pretended to say he did not. But here you exclaim. (p. 83,) of the "strange abuse made of quotations and second-hand representations." One would think you had had some such book as Scripture Doctrine before you; which would indeed have furnished you with "variety of strange abuses^a." And had you found one, by chance, in me, you might have spared the exclamation for the Doctor's sake. But to proceed: we may learn this from Lactantius, that the common way of answering the charge of *Tritheism* was, not by excluding the Son from being *one God* with the Father, but by *including* both in the *one God*^b. We learn further, that they are *consubstantial* to each other, and to be *adored together* as one God. Nevertheless, since Lactantius had elsewhere dropped some expressions which appeared hardly, if at all defensible, I never laid much stress upon Lactantius's

^y Sermon VIII. p. 185 of this vol.

^z See above, p. 419.

^a See the Doctor's manner of quoting exposed in my Defence, vol. i. p. 533, &c.

^b Cum dicimus Deum Patrem, et Deum Filium, non diversum dicimus, nec utrumque secernimus, quia nec Pater sine Filio esse potest, nec Filius a Patre secerni: siquidem nec Pater sine Filio nuncupari, nec Filius potest sine Patre generari. Cum igitur et Pater Filium faciat, et Filius Patrem, *una* utrique *mens*, *unus Spiritus*, et *una substantia* est. Sed ille quasi exuberans fons est, hic tanquam defluens ab eo rivus; ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius a sole porrectus: qui quoniam summo Patri et fidelis et charus est, non *separatur*, sicut nec *rivus a fonte*, nec *radius a sole*, quia et

aqua fontis in rivo est, et solis lumen in radio: æque nec vox ab ore sejungi, nec virtus aut manus a corpore divelli potest. Cum igitur a prophetis idem manus Dei, et virtus, et sermo dicatur, utique nulla discretio est: quia et lingua sermonis ministra est, et manus in qua est virtus, individue sunt corporis portiones. Lact. lib. iv. cap. 29.

Filius et Pater, qui unanimis incolunt mundum, *Deus unus est*; quia et unus tanquam Duo, et Duo tanquam unus—*Unum Deum* esse tam Patrem quam Filium Esaias ostendit, &c. Ad utramque personam referens, intulit, *præter me non est Deus*, cum posset dicere *præter nos*—merito *unus Deus* uterque appellatur, quia quicquid est in Patre ad Filium transfluit, et quicquid est in Filio a Patre descendit. *Lib. iv. cap. 29.*

authority, as to the main question : though I might with a much better right have done it than you generally lay claim to *Fathers*, while you think it sufficient if you can but cite a passage or two which you imagine to be on your side ; never regarding how to reconcile many other much stronger ones against you. I am persuaded, if I have been to blame, it has been on the *modest* side ; not insisting so far upon Lactantius as I might justly have done. I shall now examine whether you have not claimed a great deal too much, and I too little, in respect of this author.

It is certain you can never make him a *consistent* evidence on your side. You can never reconcile his *consubstantiality*, and his doctrine of the two Persons being *one God*, to your principles ; so that you have little reason to boast of an evidence which at best is not for you, but either against you, or else *null* and *none* : and could you have been content to have had him set aside, without insulting me upon it, I might perhaps have let you pass. But now I shall examine what right you have to him. You say, p. 55, and again, p. 86. that his sense of *una substantia* is not clear, and that it might not perhaps be taken in the *metaphysical* sense. But nothing can be clearer than his sense of *una substantia*, both from his *similitudes* (as that of the *same water* in *fountains* and *streams*, and the *same light* in the *sun* and its *rays*.) as also from the name of *Manus* given to the Son of God, and his observing that the tongue and hands are *individue corporis portiones, undivided parcels of the same body*. Where, though the comparison be gross, and the explication savouring too much of corporeal imaginations ; yet the meaning is evident, that he intended the selfsame substance, both in *kind* and in *number*, to belong to Father and Son ; as much as you design the *same substance* in *kind* and in *number*, of any two *parts* of the one extended divine substance. You observe also, (p. 55,) that Lactantius makes *angels* to be from the “ substance of God.” If he did, he has disparaged a *certain* truth relating to the *Son* of God, by mixing with it a foolish *Manichæan* error about *angels* ; having been imposed upon by some *heretical* books. Yet Lactantius has no where said what you affirm of him. He has no where said that *angels* are “ of God’s substance,” as he has said plainly of God the Son. You can only collect it from obscure hints and dark innuendos. He uses some coarse comparisons about God’s *breathing out* *angels*, and *speaking out* his Son. But he never pretends that *angels* are *one substance*, or *one God* with

the Father. He says of the Son, that he was conceived in the *mind* of the Father, (*mente conceperat*.) which he never says of *angels*. He says of *angels*, that they were “created for “service:” of the Son, he only says, that he *proceeded*^c. In a word, allowing only for his including the *Son* and *angels* together under the general name of *breathings*, which may mean no more than *productions*, and differing infinitely in kind, though agreeing in the common name; (as *γενητὰ* likewise is a name comprehending things that proceed by *creation* or *generation*, in time or eternally,) I say, allowing only this, there appears nothing in Lactantius but what may fairly stand with his other principles, above recited^d. For if, according to Lactantius, God *breathed*, that is, *produced* his *Son* from his *own substance*, but *breathed*, or produced *angels* not from his *own substance*, but *from nothing*, as he *breathed* into man a soul^e; (Gen. ii. 7.) then there is no further ground for your censure upon him. That this was really his meaning, and all his meaning, I incline to think, as for several reasons before hinted, so also for this, that in the very chapter of the *Epitome* (cap. 42.) you refer to^f, he makes a manifest difference between the production of the *Son* and of *angels*. The *Son* was *de æternitatis sue fonte*, and *de Spiritu suo*. There was not only *breathing*, but breathing from the very “fountain of his eternity;” that is, from his *own substance*: whereas *angels* are only said to be *de suis spiritibus*, from his *breathings*. So he makes it the peculiar privilege of God the *Son*, that he was *breathed out*, *tanquam rivus de fonte*, and *ex Deo Deus*^g: which he never says of *angels*, any more than of *human souls*; which he also derives *de vitali fonte perennis Spiritus*^h, from the *fountain* of his *breathings*, but not from his *substance*; as I have also remarked of Tertullian above. Indeed most of the Fathers laid great stress upon the text in Genesis

^c Ad ministerium Dei creabantur. Ille vero, cum sit et ipse spiritus, tamen cum voce et sono ex Dei ore processit, &c. *Lib. iv. cap. 8. Comp. cap. 6.*

^d Vid. Nourriam, Appar. ad Bibl. vol. ii. p. 798.

^e Vid. Lactant. lib. ii. cap. 13.

^f Deus in principio, antequam mundum institueret, de *æternitatis sue fonte*, deque divino ac perenni *spiritu suo*, filium sibi progenuit, incorruptum, fidelem, virtuti ac majestati patriæ respondentem——Denique ex omni-

bus angelis quos idem Deus *de suis spiritibus* figuravit, solus in consortium summæ potestatis adscitus est, solus Deus nuncupatus. *Lactant. Epit. cap. 42. p. 104, 105.*

^g Lactant. Instit. lib. iv. cap. 8.

Quoniam pleni et consummati boni fons in ipso erat, sicut est semper, ut ab eo bono tanquam rivus oriretur, longeque proflueret, produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset *viribus Patris præditus*, lib. ii. cap. 9.

^h Lactant. Instit. lib. ii. cap. 12. p. 182.

ii. 7. God's *breathing* into man's *nostrils* the "breath of life;" a privilege peculiar to man above the animal creationⁱ: something of God's own *infusing* and *inspiring*, something of a purer and diviner substance, *spiritual* and *enduring*; the breath of the Almighty, a resemblance, a shadow, an imperfect copy of the *Divinity* itself. Thus far the Fathers carried the notion: and you seem to have mistaken it for the *Marcionite* and *Manichæan* notion of *souls* being the very *substance* of God: a notion which the Fathers detested; and I doubt not, Lactantius among the rest.

Your next objection against Lactantius is, that he supposed the Son to be only *mentally contained* in God, and afterwards begotten into a Person. You ground your conjecture upon a passage which you cite p. 88. and again, p. 120. I have certainly a better right here to say that the *sense is not clear*, than you had with relation to *una substantia*: and the liberty you take of translating *comprehendit in effigiem*, (or *ad effigiem*, as some editions have it,) *formed into a real Person*, is pretty extraordinary. The learned Le Nourry gives a quite different construction of that obscure passage; and which to me appears more probable than yours. But supposing the author to have expressed himself somewhat *crudely* in this place, in relation to the Son's generation, (which he at the same time professes to be inexplicable,) you very well know that the same author elsewhere speaks as *crudely* even of the *Father* himself; whom he supposes to have had a *beginning*, and to have *made himself*. His words are, "Since it cannot otherwise be, but that whatever exists *must have sometime begun to be*, it follows, that since nothing was before him, he must have sprung from himself. *Deus ipse se fecit*, God made himself." *Lactant. lib. i. cap. 7.*

ⁱ Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κελύων μόνον πεποιήκεν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον δι' αὐτοῦ ἐχειροῦργησεν, καὶ τὶ αὐτῷ ἴδιον ἐνεφύσησεν— ὅπερ ἐμφύσημα λέγεται Θεοῦ. *Clem. Alex. p. 101.*

Ὅς γε καὶ τοῦ ἐμφύσηματος ἐν τῇ γενέσει μεταλαβεῖν ἀναγέγραπται, καθαρωτέρας οὐσίας παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα μετασχών. *Clem. Alex. p. 698.*

Incorporales animæ, quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. *Insufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus flatum vitæ*— Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere ipsum *flatum vitæ* existentem. *Irenæus, p. 300.*

Animæ suæ umbram, Spiritus sui auram, oris sui operam. *Tertull. de Resurr. Carn. cap. 7.*

Intellige *afflatum* minorem Spiritu esse; etsi de Spiritu accidit, ut *aurulam* ejus, non tamen Spiritum— capit etiam imaginem Spiritus dicere *flatum*, nam et ideo homo imago Dei, id est Spiritus. Deus enim Spiritus— In hoc erit imago minor veritate, et *afflatus* Spiritu inferior, habens illas utique *lineas* Dei, qua *immortalis* anima, qua *libera* et sui arbitrii, &c. tamen in his *imago*, et non usque ad *ipsam vim divinitatis*. *Tert. contr. Marc. lib. ii. cap. 9.*

This is strange divinity: but the author was a novice; and he at other times talks in a soberer manner. He ought therefore to be interpreted with candour, and with some grains of allowance. If you take advantage of every obscure or uncautious expression, you will make him as heterodox in respect of the real divinity of the Father, as you suppose him to be with regard to the Son. But if you please to interpret him with candour, and to explain any obscure or incidental passage by what is *plain*, and is expressed more at large; he may then perhaps be found, upon the whole, sound and orthodox in relation both to the Father and Son. You next speak (p. 89.) of the Son's entire subjection and obedience to the *will* and *commands* of the Father: yet taking no notice of Lactantius vindicating to both the same *inseparable honour*, as being *one God*^k. The *subjection* you mention is intended only of what was since the *incarnation*, and therefore nothing to the purpose. And as to Christ's not setting himself up for *another God*, (which appears to be Lactantius's real and full meaning in the passage you cite^l.) I suppose it may be admitted without any scruple. Or at most, it can amount to no more than this; that in the opinion of Lactantius, Christ (during his state of humiliation) never called himself *God*, lest he should thereby give offence, and be misconstrued as preaching up *another God*. How otherwise shall the Apostles or Lactantius himself be justified (by that way of reasoning) in giving the title and character of *God* to Christ?

I conclude with repeating what I before said, that admitting some things in Lactantius (a *catechumen* only, and not fully instructed) to be such as do not perfectly agree with *Catholic* principles; yet on the other hand it must be confessed, that there are many other things taught by him, which can never be tolerably reconciled with yours^m: so that you have the less

^k Duo esse dicentur, in quibus *substantia*, et *voluntas*, et *fides una* est. Ergo et Filius per Patrem, et Pater per Filium. *Unus est honos* utrique tribuendus, tanquam *uni Deo*, et ita dividendus est per duos cultus, ut divisio ipsa compage inseparabili vinciat; neutrum sibi relinquit, qui aut Patrem a Filio, aut Filium a Patre secernit. *Lactant. Epit. cap. 49. p. 140, 141.*

^l Fuisset enim hoc non ejus qui miserat, sed suum proprium negotium gerere, ac se ab eo, quem illustratum

venerat, *separare*. *Lactant. lib. iv. p. 354.*

Vid. Nourrii Apparatus. vol. ii. p. 799.

^m Solus habet rerum omnium cum Filio suo potestatem: nec in angelis quicquam nisi parendi necessitas. *Lact. Inst. lib. ii. cap. 16. p. 197.*

“The Father alone, with his Son, has dominion over all: nor doth any thing belong to the angels, but the necessity of obeying.”

Here Lactantius plainly ascribes one common dominion to the Father

reason to boast on that head. You are pleased to observe, (p. 120,) that Bishop Bull gives up "this author as not reconcilable to his opinion:" you should have said, not reconcilable, *upon the whole*. For the Bishop suspected some passages to have been foisted in, being not reconcilable with others; or else that the author himself, being a very raw *divine*, had fallen into gross *contradictions*. But Bishop Bull insisted upon it that some passages of Lactantius were directly opposite to the men of your principles, and not reconcilable with *Arianism*: as they certainly are not.

A. D. 335. EUSEBIUS.

We now come to a man that lived after the rise of the *Arian* heresy; and who is supposed by all sides and parties to have had a tincture of it more or less; and especially in his writings before the Council of Nice. A testimony therefore from him in proof of the Father and Son being *one God* is the more considerable; since nothing could extort it from him, but either the *force of truth*, or the strength of *tradition*, or the *currency* and *prevalence* of that persuasion in his time. And which soever of these it were, it is very much to my purpose, though Eusebius might at other times contradict it. I cited Socratesⁿ for the truth of the fact, that Eusebius himself confessed *one God* in three *Hypostases*: nor do I see any reason to suspect his credit. He had his account, as he declares, from original letters which passed at that time. And whatever Eusebius might privately write, he might not have assurance enough, in *public* debate, to gainsay a thing which all Catholics allowed. Any one may see, by Eusebius's oration before Constantine, how tender he was of dropping any thing like *Arianism* in the face of the Catholics, who, he knew, would not bear it. He there speaks as orthodoxy of the blessed Trinity as a man can reasonably desire. His words are: "The ternary number first shewed justice, teaching *equality*; having *equal* beginning, middle, and end: and these are a representation of the mystical, most holy, and majestic Trinity; which compacted of a nature that had no beginning, and is uncreated, contains in it the seeds, reasons, and causes of all things that have been made. And the power of the

and the Son; and intimates, that God the Son is exempt from any *necessity of obedience* by the opposition made

between him and *angels*.

ⁿ Socrat. Eccles. Hist. lib. i. cap. 23.

“ number *Three* is rightly styled the ἀρχή, the source of all “ things.”

Thus far Eusebius: and he that could say this, (which is really stronger,) may very well be supposed to say the other, which Socrates reports of him. Now, either Eusebius was *sincere* in what he has here said, or he was not. If he was, then he is an evidence on my side, and I have a right to claim him as such: if he was not, still it shews what the *prevailing doctrine* was, and which Eusebius durst not but comply with in his *public* speech; and this is an additional confirmation of Socrates’s report, which relates to what Eusebius acknowledged in *public conferences*. The same also is confirmed by his subscribing the *Nicene faith*, drawn up upon the same principles which I am here defending.

Let this suffice in proof of my third article, that the *ancients* have all along believed and taught, that Father and Son are *one God*; and therefore God the Son was never thought to be *excluded* from the *one Godhead* by the texts which concern the *Unity*. I have waved all disputable authorities: but because there are some considerable testimonies in Ruinart’s select Acts of Martyrs, which though not so certainly *genuine* as those before given, have yet no certain mark of *spuriousness*, I may throw them into the margin ^p, for the reader to judge of as he sees cause. There can hardly be any clearer, or less contested point than this I have been mentioning. It runs, in a manner, quite through the Fathers down to the times of Arius. The only writer I have met with within this compass, that can with any show of reason be thought to make an exception, is Novatian, Presbyter of Rome; who, with Novatus of Carthage, in the year

^o Πρώτη δὲ τριάς δικαιοσύνην ἀνέδειξεν, ἰσότητος καθηγησαμένη· ὡς ἂν ἀρχήν, καὶ μεσότητα, καὶ τελευταίην ἴσην ἀπολαβοῦσα· εἰκὼν δὲ ταῦτα μυστικῆς, καὶ παναγίας, καὶ βασιλικῆς τριάδος· ἡ τῆς ἀνάρχου καὶ ἀγενήτου φύσεως ἡρτημένη, τῆς τῶν γενητῶν πάντων οὐσίας τὰ σπέρματα, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀπέληφε· καὶ τριάδος μὲν δύναμις εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα παντὸς ἀρχῆ νομοθείη. *Euseb. Orat. Paneg.* cap. 6. p. 730.

Conf. Jobium, apud Photium. *Cod.* 223. p. 605, 612.

Τῆς τοῦ ὀρθογώνιου τριγώνου δυνάμεως, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὄλων γενέσεως. *Phil. de Vit. Contempt.* p. 899.

^p Christum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto. Deum esse confiteor. *Act. Eripodii Mart. A. D.* 178. *Ruin.* p. 76.

Dominum enim Christum confiteor, Filium altissimi Patris, unci unicum. Ipsum cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto, *Unum solum Deum* esse profiteor. *Act. Vincentii Mart. A. D.* 304. apud *Ruinart.* p. 369.

Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum adoro: Sanctam Trinitatem adoro, præter quam non est Deus. *Acta Eupli Mart. A. D.* 304. apud *Ruin.* p. 407.

Adorem Trinitatem inseparabilem, quæ Trinitas Unitas Deitatis est. *Id.* p. 408.

251, began the schism called after his name; and in the year 257, or thereabout, (it could not well be sooner by his mentioning Sabellius,) wrote a tract upon the *Trinity*, still extant. That he was in the main orthodox, as to the point of the Trinity, I think plain enough from the tract itself; as has been shewn also by Le Moyne, Gardiner, Bull, and other great men. But his way of resolving the unity of *Godhead* into the Father *alone*, (not very consistently with his comment on John xvii. 3, if it is to be made sense of,) appears to me somewhat particular, and not very agreeable to the Catholics of that time. He seems to me (which I speak however with submission to better judgments) to have taken much such a method in explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, as some very worthy men^q amongst ourselves did about thirty years ago, when the controversy was rife in England. It was to admit of a *higher* and a *lower* sense of the word *God*; the higher supposed to have nothing above the other but *self-existence* or *unoriginateness*: the Father then was supposed to be God in the highest sense as *unoriginate*, but still the Son and Holy Ghost each God in a sense infinitely higher than any *creature* can be; being *necessarily existing*, and wanting nothing but *unoriginateness*. This, I say, was the scheme which some worthy men amongst us at that time took into; and which Dr. Clarke has endeavoured to make some advantage of, as falling *partly* in with his scheme; though differing in the main point of all, the *necessary existence*. This method of solving the *Unity* was thought the more plausible, as most easily accounting for the Father's being so often styled the *one*, or *only God*: and there was this thing further to recommend it, that it seemed very happily to stand clear of the most considerable difficulties raised about *one* being *three*, and *three one*. The main charge it lay liable to, was that of *Tritheism*: which yet neither Arians nor Socinians could with any face object to it; their respective schemes being equally liable to the like charge; and whatever evasions they should contrive, the *same* would, with a very small change, serve as well this, or better. But after all, to say the truth, this scheme can never be perfectly cleared. *Tritheism* may be retorted upon an Arian, as *Ditheism* upon a Socinian, and so they may throw the charge back one upon another; while a Sabellian, a Jew, or a Pagan might maintain the charge against them all. Nor is there any way of avoiding it, but the same

^q Bishop Fowler and others.

which the ancient Church in general went into, viz. the including all the three Persons in the *one God*. I have shewn however, what may be justly pleaded for Novatian's orthodoxy, in the main point, the *essential divinity* of all the three Persons; though he otherwise took a way somewhat peculiar, and almost dropped the *Unity: Unity of Godhead*, I mean; for as to *Unity of substance*, he is clear enough for it: and therefore he seems to have supposed Father and Son to be *two Gods in one substance*; though he never so called them, but endeavoured, in his way, to fence off the charge as well as he could, not very judiciously nor consistently. Upon the same scheme perhaps Eusebius's orthodoxy so far may possibly be defended, especially as to God the Son; notwithstanding what the learned Montfaucon has objected, in a dissertation to that purpose. But this by the way only; I shall have another opportunity, lower down, of saying more of Eusebius. Having cleared three of the points which I undertook, viz. that the ancients in general never thought the exclusive terms to affect the Son, never admitted *another God*, or *two Gods*; but constantly supposed Father and Son together *one God*; there remains now only my fourth article, to complete the demonstration of what I intend; namely,

4. That the ancients applied such texts of the Old Testament as undoubtedly belong to the *one God supreme*, to God the *Son*; considered in his own *Person*, and as really being all that those texts in their fullest sense imply. The authors by me cited for this purpose, in my Defence, vol. i. p. 291, &c. are Justin Martyr, Theophilus, Irenæus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, Cyprian, Novatian, the Antiochian Fathers, Lactantius, and Eusebius. Most of these have been before considered under the former article, but must now be traversed over again upon this article also, distinct from the other.

Before you come directly to attack the general argument, you have some previous considerations thrown in to prejudice the reader against it: these I must take some short notice of, in the entrance, following your method.

1. You say, my asserting Father and Son to be the "one supreme God, not one in Person but in substance, is directly affirming *two supreme Gods in Person*, though subsisting in one *undivided substance*," p. 126. To which I answer, that this is directly begging the question. *One substance*, with *one Head*, cannot make *two Gods*, upon the principles of the primitive churches: nor are your *metaphysics* strong enough to bear up

against their united testimonies, with *Scripture* at the head of them.

2. You ask, "How comes it to pass that the ancients never say that Christ is the one, or only God?"

Ans. They do say it *sometimes* of Christ singly^r, *often* of Christ with the Father; as hath been shewn under the last article: besides that the making Christ the "God of Israel, &c." is saying the same thing; unless there be *two Gods of Israel*.

3. You ask, "Why do they expressly condemn the applying the title of the one supreme God" (God over all, you mean) "to Christ?"

Ans. They never do condemn the applying the title of *God over all* to Christ, but the applying it in a *wrong* sense, and under a *false* meanings, as some *heretics* applied it. Your references I have answered above.

4. You object, that "all the texts I allege style the Son "Angel, or Messenger." Right: and so the *ancients* came to know that the texts were not meant of *God the Father*. The Son is an *Angel* and *Messenger*; not by *nature*^t, but by *office*, and voluntary condescension.

5. You object, that the ancients thought it "absurd and "blasphemous to suppose that the supreme God should appear, "be styled an angel, &c."

Ans. Blasphemous only for the supreme Father to appear; who could not submit to an *inferior* office (as they thought) without inverting the *order* of the *Persons*. See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, above, p. 251, &c. And I may observe that the *Post-Nicene* writers, who undoubtedly believed the essential divinity of Christ, yet talked the same way upon that head^u.

^r See my Sermons, p. 96, 97 of this volume.

^s See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 216 of this volume.

^t Dictus et quidem Magni Consilii Angelus, id est Nuntius; officii, non naturæ vocabulo.—Non ideo tamen sic angelus intelligendus ut aliqui Gabriel aut Michael. Nam et Filius a Domino vincæ mittitur ad cultores, sicut et famuli, de fructibus petitur. Sed non propterea unus ex famulis deputabitur Filius, quia famulorum succedit officio. Tertull. de Carn. Christ. cap. 14.

^u He is called, indeed, the *Angel of the great Council*; that is, the *Messenger*; which is a name of *office*,

"not of *nature*.—He is not therefore "to be thought an *angel*, like any "Gabriel or Michael. For even the "Son is sent to the husbandmen by "the Lord of the vineyard, as the "servants are, to gather the fruits. "But we must not therefore reckon "the Son as one of the *servants*, because of his succeeding to their *office*."

^u Pater non dicitur missus; non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat.—Si voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam, visibiliter apparere, absurdissime tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut a Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, missus diceretur. August. de Trin. lib. iv. cap. 28, 32.

Vid. Prudentium, p. 165, 168.

I may further take notice to you, that the Catholics, in their charge of *blasphemy* upon the Sabellians, did not go upon any such principle as you imagine; that the difference of the *natures* of Father and Son made it *blasphemy* to ascribe that to *one* which might be innocently ascribed to the other. but upon quite another foundation: namely, that they thought it *blasphemy* to ascribe any thing to the Father, seemingly derogatory, or lessening to his *Majesty*, beyond what *Scripture* had warranted. And as to their ascribing some *inferior* offices and services to the Son, they did not justify it by alleging the *inferiority* of his nature or person, but by shewing that *Scripture* had ascribed those things to him, and without *blaspheming*. For the truth of what I say, I appeal to Tertullian in the margin^x; who was one of those that argued in the manner you mention: and his answer to Praxeas, in relation to this very charge of *blasphemy*, in a similar case, plainly and evidently discovers what was meant by it; and how little there was of what you suspect in it. For when Praxeas, replying to the charge of *blasphemy*, had said that there was no *blasphemy* in supposing the Father to *suffer*, on his *hypothesis*, any more than it was *blasphemy* to make the Son suffer, on the other *hypothesis*, since neither of them imagined the *divine* nature to suffer, but the *human* only; how does Tertullian answer? Not by telling Praxeas of the great *disparity* between Father and Son: not by insisting upon *any inequality*; but only by alleging that *Scripture* warranted their ascribing *sufferings* to the Son, and did not warrant their ascribing any such to the Father.

6. You add, that the “absurdity of the supposition (in the manner the ancients express it) evidently arises always not from the consideration of *paternity*, but of the *Father’s supremacy*, his being the one supreme, self-existent, independent “God of the universe,” (p. 128.)

Answ. This being a *secret* piece of history which will want proof, we may pass it over: you have told us what *you* would

^x Ergo, inquis, et nos eadem ratione *Patrem mortuum* dicentes, qua vos *Filium, non blasphemamus* in Dominum Deum: non enim *ex divina*, sed *ex humana* substantia, mortuum dicimus. To which Tertullian thus answers:

Atquin *blasphematis*, non tantum quia *mortuum* dicitis *Patrem*, sed et quia *crucifixum*. Maledictione enim crucifixi quæ ex *Lege* in *Filium* competit, (quia *Christus* pro nobis *male-*

dictio factus est, non Pater;) *Christum* in *Patrem* convertentes, in *Patrem blasphematis*. Nos autem dicentes *Christum crucifixum*, non *maledicimus illum*, sed *maledictum legis referimus*; quia nec *Apostolus* hoc dicens *blasphemavit*. Sicut autem, de quo quid capit dici, sine *blasphemia* dicitur; ita quod non capit, *blasphemia* est, si dicatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 29.

have said in such a case; but the *ancients*, I think, had “not so learned Christ.” Let us now proceed to see what those good men say; and how handsomely they can plead for the *divinity* of their blessed Lord.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

My argument from Justin stands thus: (see my Defence, vol. i. p. 291.) The *Jehovah* mentioned, Gen. xviii. 1, 13, and Gen. xix. 24, 27. The God (ὁ Θεός) speaking, Gen. xxi. 12. The “Lord God of Abraham, and God of Isaac,” spoken of, Gen. xxviii. 13. “The God of Bethel,” (Gen. xxxi. 13.) *God*, (ὁ Θεός) absolutely so called, Gen. xxxv. 1. *God* calling out of the bush, and saying, “I am the God of Abraham, &c.” Exod. iii. 4. 6. and “I AM that I AM,” the “Lord God, &c.” Exod. iii. 14, 15. “God Almighty,” mentioned Exod. vi. 3. “Lord of hosts,” Psalm xxiv. 8, 10. The *Jehovah* spoken of, Psalm xlvi. 5. The *God* mentioned, Psalm lxxxii. 2. and xcix. 1. is the one true God, the one eternal God of the universe, supreme. But, according to Justin Martyr, our blessed Lord is what hath been said, and all that hath been said, in his *own Person*. Therefore, &c.

Now let us consider what you can have to except against this plain and evident demonstration. I have indeed already answered, or obviated, all you have to say, in another place: and therefore shall be so much the shorter now.

You plead, that according to Justin, it were *presumption* to say that the “Maker and Father of the universe left the super-celestial mansions, and appeared here in a little part of the earth.” Right; because the *Father*, upon their principles, was never to be *sent*, or to act a *ministerial* part, any more than he was to be *incarnate*; so that the appearing, even by *visible symbols*, (which was the only kind of appearing they ascribed to God the Son,) was not thought suitable to the *first* Person of the Trinity; who, as he is *from none*, could not, without inverting the *order* of Persons, be *sent* by any. It was therefore proper, in that *economy*, to assign *heaven* as the seat of residence to the Father, though filling all things, and the *earth* to the Son, though at the same time filling all things as well as the Father^z.

I must further remind the reader, that you have not a syllable here to plead beyond what Bishop Bull had fully and completely

^y Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 238, &c. of this volume. ^z See Tertullian above, p. 458.

answered long ago^a. And therefore the fair way would have been, not to bring up again those obsolete, and now stale things, fit only to be offered to very ignorant readers, but to have set yourself to answer what the Bishop has said; which might have been an employment worthy of a scholar.

You pretend it to be undeniably certain, from Justin, that “the divine person” appearing was not the “supreme God,” &c. whereas it is undeniably certain, that he was the *supreme God*, only not the *supreme Father*; another Person from him, not *another God*, but the same God. See above.

You bid me take notice, (p. 134,) that “the beginning and conclusion of every argument is to shew that Christ is *not* [ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς, ὁ Κύριος τῶν ὅλων, ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων,] but “always subordinately Θεὸς καὶ Κύριος, γεγραμμένος Θεὸς, Ἄγγελος καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ Θεὸς καὶ Κύριος.” You may fancy there is something of weight in what you say: but all that know any thing of Justin, know there is nothing in it. Justin uses the several phrases you have mentioned to denote the Person of the Father; and they amount to no more than if he had said ὁ Πατήρ; only there was a cause, a very just one, as I have elsewhere^b intimated, why he chose the other generally, rather than that of ὁ Πατήρ,

There was therefore good reason for Justin’s forming his conclusion in the terms he did: and it had been ridiculous to do otherwise. Yet you will find that the *titles* given to God the Son in those *texts* which Justin cites, are as high and strong as the highest you have mentioned, and are indeed the very same, many of them, by which Scripture sets forth the supreme majesty, dignity, and perfections of God the Father.

What you say of the title of Κύριος δυνάμεων, *Lord of hosts*, applied to Christ in Psalm xxiv. by Justin, is rightly observed. And therefore I have hinted above, that the title is understood by Justin, as a name of *office*; not of *nature*, as in the Hebrew original: and so we cannot draw so cogent an argument from that title, considered by Justin, as we may from the same title as it signifies in the Hebrew. This I allow, and also that every *office* is justly referred to the *Father*, as being first in order, and therefore first considered in every *economy* and *dispensation*.

You further argue, that Christ was “made παθητὸς, passible, “by the will of God, for our sakes.” Very true, because he was

^a Bull, D. F. sect. iv. cap. 3. p. 267, &c.

^b Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 235 of this volume.

made man for our sakes: not that his *divine* nature was *possible*, any more than the *Father's*. Such is Justin's own account of it, *passible* as man^c. None of the Fathers ever thought him *passible* any otherwise. But I am ashamed to remind a scholar of those *known* things.

You come next to misreport Bishop Bull. *You say*, (p. 135.) that "to all the places in Justin's unquestionably genuine writings, which thus declare *the Word to be the minister of God's will*, the learned Bishop Bull opposes one single passage "out of an epistle to Diognetus judged to be spurious." Who would not from hence imagine that the whole cause, in a manner, depended on a single passage of a *spurious* epistle? But this is a most unjust representation. Let that passage or that epistle be *spurious*, though if it be not Justin's, yet it is certainly very ancient, and about the same age with Justin; and you yourself have quoted it, without scruple, as Justin's own, (p. 27.) The cause stands very safe without it: and Bp. Bull has defended Justin admirably, and unanswerably from his other certainly *genuine* pieces^d. All the service that passage does, is only to shew that Justin once expressly denies the Son to be *ὑπηρέτης*. And has he not done the same thing twenty times over, and more, by making him the *Jehovah*, and *God of Israel*, *God Almighty*, &c. But still he allows him to be *ὑπηρέτης*, as he does *ἄγγελος*, a *minister* and *angel* by *office*, which has nothing absurd or improper in it; since he condescended much lower, even to become man.

You next give us a long passage of Bishop Bull, which shews the great *ingenuity* of that excellent Prelate. You produce the *objection*, which the Bishop frankly proposed, at length; but you mangle and misrepresent his solution of it. You say, "he thinks "they meant no more than, &c." 'Thinks? He has *demonstrated* that they meant no more. Bishop Bull's own last account of this matter, in answer to Gilbert Clerke, is as follows:

"The sum of my answer is this. Those Doctors of the Church "who wrote before the rise of Arius's heresy, as oft as they "reason thus, It was not God the Father but the Son that "appeared under the Old Testament, and became *incarnate* in "the fulness of time; the Father is *infinite*, and cannot be in- "cluded in a *place*; is *invisible*, and cannot be *seen* by any; "they did not intend to deny the Son of God to be *immense* and

^c *Σαρκοποιηθεῖς, καὶ ἄνθρωπος αἰδιῆς, ἅτιμος, καὶ παθητὸς ὑπέμεινε γενέσθαι.* *Just. Dial.* p. 255. Sylburg.

^d See Bull. D. F. p. 269.

“ *invisible*, as well as the Father, but only signified barely that
 “ both all those appearances of God, and even the incarnation
 “ itself, had relation to the *economy* which the Son of God had
 “ taken upon him; which *economy* could no way suit with the
 “ Father because of his having no *principle* from whence he is,
 “ nor deriving his authority from any besides himself. That
 “ this was the *certain* intent and opinion of those ancients, I
 “ have made appear upon these two accounts. 1. Because,
 “ upon other occasions, they in many places *all confess* God the
 “ Son to be, as well as the Father, in his own nature, *immense*,
 “ *omnipresent*, and *incisible*. 2. And again, because *some* of them
 “ do themselves expressly interpret these their sayings of the
 “ *economy*. What therefore has Mr. Clerke to say to this^e?”

The short of the matter then is, that it did not suit with the Father to act a *ministerial part*, or to be *subject to any*, (as Bp. Bull expresses it elsewhere, meaning the same thing,) because he is *from none*, and therefore sent *from none*; lest it should be inverting the *order of the Persons*.

To this you object, (p. 139,) “ the impossibility of the Father’s
 “ being a visible messenger is not founded upon his Paternity,
 “ but upon his absolute supremacy; upon his being subject to
 “ none, which is inseparable from his being the unoriginate
 “ Author.” But why do you change the terms? Who ever said that it was absolutely or physically *impossible* for the Father to act as the Son did? All that is said is, that he could not do it suitably, as not being consistent with that *priority of order* which as *Father* he is possessed of. And it is ridiculous of you to found his being *subject to none* upon his *being subject to none*, which is *idem per idem*. But his being *subject to none*, that is, his never *acting a ministerial part*, is founded upon this, that he is *Father*, first Person, *Head*, from whom every thing descends; which *order* would be inverted, if the Son were to be at the head. and the Father *minister* to him. Such ministration therefore is a contradiction to his *Paternity*, but to nothing else.

You add, “ Nor do the primitive writers ever lay the stress of
 “ this argument upon the relation of *Paternity*, but upon the
 “ supremacy.” That is to say, they do not lay it upon the *Paternity*, but upon the *Paternity*: for laying it upon the supremacy of *order*, which he is possessed of as *Father*, and no otherwise, is laying it, I think, upon the *Paternity*. And when

^e Bull. Op. Posth. p. 972, &c.

you add, (p. 140.) that the Fathers, in ascribing *omnipresence* to the Son, did not intend thereby “to infer any equality of supreme independent authority;” you only shew how much you are at a loss to make any thing like an answer to Bp. Bull’s solution of the main difficulty. For so long as the Son’s *omnipresence* is secured, (which seemed most to be affected by that argument,) the rest is all taken off at once, by allowing a *supremacy* of order, or, if you will, a *paternal authority*; which comes to the same, and is no way inconsistent with the Son’s *equality*, either of *nature* or *dominion*.

Your quotation out of Clemens, in these words, (“This is the greatest excellency of the Son, that he orders all things according to the will of the Father,”) is contrived, as your custom is, in a way very proper for the *deception* of a thoughtless or ignorant reader. Who would not imagine from the words, as you cite them, that the *highest honour* of the Son is only to be *obedient*, and to *serve*? The reader will be surprised to find how very different the *thought* is from what Clemens is there upon. His words run thus :

“The most *perfect*, most *holy*, most *lordly*, most *princely*, most *kingly*, and most *beneficent*, is the nature of the Son, which is most intimately allied to the alone Almighty. This is that greatest excellency which orders all things according to the will of the Father, and steers the universe in the best manner, and worketh all things by his indefatigable unexhausted power, &c.”

Does not the reader see, by this time, what a cheat you would have put upon him, under the name of Clemens? I mention not, that the Greek will not bear your construction : or if it would, the whole context serves to discover your fraud in it. But perhaps you did not look into the author.

A. D. 181. THEOPHILUS.

Theophilus, in his little piece, afforded me but one text, (Gen. iii. 8, 9.) where God the Son is (according to him) twice styled “the Lord God;” that is, as I understand it, the one *true God*, the Creator of man, (Κύριος ὁ Θεός,) God absolutely so called, the *Jehovah*.

† Τελειωτάτη δὴ, καὶ ἀγιωτάτη, καὶ κυριωτάτη, καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη, καὶ βασιλικωτάτη, καὶ εὐεργετικωτάτη ἢ υἱοῦ φύσις, ἢ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχαστάτη. αὐτὴ ἡ μεγίστη ὑπεροχὴ, ἢ τὰ πάντα διατάσσεται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄριστα οἰκίξει, ἀκαμάτῳ, καὶ ἀτρήτῳ δυνάμει πάντα ἐργαζομένη, &c. *Clem. Strom.* vii. sect. 2. p. 831.

You cite (p. 142.) a passage of Theophilus, which you say (according to your usual style) is “directly contrary to what I “refer to him for.” I humbly conceive not. But let us see: Theophilus argues after the same way with other ancients; that the *Lord God* there spoken of could not be the *Father*; who never *appears* because never *sent*, and is never sent because he has no *Father* to *send him*: which is the sum of what all the ancients thought in that matter. The *Father* was not to be in a *place*, even by *visible symbols*; which yet the *Son* might be, because a *Son*.

You observe that Theophilus speaks of the *Father*, not under the character of *Father of Christ*, but as being $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ τῶν ὄλων, *the God and Father of all things*. Right; because he was talking to a Pagan; to whom therefore he adapted his style, calling the *Father* by such a name as Pagans gave to their “supreme Father of gods and men.” So Justin Martyr, in his Apology, written to the Pagans, gives the *Father* that title; but in his Dialogue he generally gives him another, more proper to the Jews, because he had then to deal with Jews: and it would not have been proper to give him the name of *Father*, in the Christian sense, while disputing against those who would not yet own him a *Father* in that sense; for it would have been begging the question^s. You have therefore drawn strange consequences from an imagination of your own, which never entered into the head of Theophilus.

But you observe further, that the *Son* (according to Theophilus) “assumed the Person (not of the *Father* merely, but) of “(τοῦ Θεοῦ) *God* absolutely.” That is again not of the *Father*, but of the *Father*: for it is the *Father* he means, the Person of the *Father*, by τοῦ Θεοῦ, the same whom he had just before called the “*Father and God of the universe*,” in compliance with the Pagan style. And what cuts off all your criticisms at once, Theophilus observes there, that the *Son* being *God*^h as *God’s Son*, appeared to Adam: as much as to say, that if the *Son* had not been *God*, he could not pretend to assert, that he was the Person styled in Genesis, Κύριος ὁ Θεός, *the Lord God*. But being really *God*, as *God’s Son*, there was nothing in that title but what very well suited his Person; and so it was right to interpret Gen. iii. 8. of him. This is evidently the train and

^s See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 235 of this volume.

^h Θεὸς οὖν ὧν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ

πεφυκὸς, ὅπῳτ’ ἂν βούλεται ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὄλων, πέμπει αὐτὸν εἰς τινα τόπον, &c. *Theoph.* p. 130.

course of Theophilus's thoughts in that place; gradually to introduce Autolychus to admit *God's Son*; and therewith the *Christian* religion. This may further shew, that when Theophilus speaks of the *Logos's* assuming the "Person of God," he means this, and only this: that he acted in the character and capacity of the *eternal God*: which he might very well do, being himself *very God*, as well as that other Person, his Father, called "God" "and Father of the universe:" and it was under this very character he appeared to Adam as his *Creator*. that is, as "God" "and Father of all things;" which is not a stronger expression than *Κύριος ὁ Θεός*, the *Lord God* applied to him by Theophilus. I shall only add, that Theophilus certainly never intended to assert two *Lord Gods*, as your hypothesis requires, but one only, the Father with the *Logos*: and so all concludes *in one God supreme*ⁱ; agreeably to my principles.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

My argument from Irenæus runs thus: "*Jehovah* that rained "upon Sodom," (Gen. xix. 24.) *God* calling at the bush, and saying, "I am the God of Abraham, &c." (Exod. iii. 4, 6.) "The mighty God" spoken of, Ps. l. The *God* known in Judah, (Ps. lxxvi. 1.) ὁ Θεός absolutely; God (ὁ Θεός) standing in the "congregation," (Ps. lxxxii. 1.) "The *Jehovah* reigning," Ps. xcix. 1. The *God* and *Jehovah* mentioned, Is. xii. 2. xxxv. 4. Joel iii. 16. Amos. i. 2. *God*, who has none like him, Mich. vii. 18. "God (ὁ Θεός) that came from Teman," Hab. iii. 3. He that is all this, is the "one God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Irenæus: therefore, &c.

You have little here but repetition of the same threadbare things: that Christ "was not the one supreme God," that is, not the "one supreme Father," which you constantly confound with the other; that he *ministered*, which I do not dispute, for he *died* too; that "he fulfilled the Father's commands," which I never questioned; that the Son is "never called by Irenæus" "the one God," which I much question, and have proved to be false, though the point is not material; that the Son "received" "power to judge," that is, from whom he *received his essence*.

ⁱ Theophilus speaking of *woman* being made from the *rib* of the *man*, represents it as an emblem of the *divine Unity*, in these words:

Ὁ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τούτου δειχθῆ
τὸ μυστήριον τῆς μοναρχίας, τῆς κατὰ
τὸν Θεόν ἅμα δ' ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὴν

γυναικα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς
σάρκα μίαν. *Theophil.* p. 145.

"To signify the mystery of the
"Unity (or *Monarchy*) of God, he
"made for him a wife, (saying,) *And*
"they two shall be one flesh."

What force is there in these trite things? You add, (p. 141,) that Exod. iii. 4, 8. is applied by Irenæus to the "Father only." I know not where; but I am sure that he applies verse the 8th to the Son thrice^k. And if he has any where applied it to the Father also, the reason may be, that since both are the *same God*, the application may be proper to either; which may be likewise answer sufficient to what you observe of Exod. iii. 14, 15. As to what you have further, p. 142, I refer to what hath been said under a former article, to prove that Father and Son are (according to Irenæus) both together *one God*.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.

My argument from Clemens is to this effect:

He who is "Jehovah," "Almighty God," (Gen. xvii. 1, 2,) "Lord God of Abraham," (Gen. xxviii. 13,) "God of Bethel," δ Θεός, (Gen. xxxi. 13,) and "Lord God," (Exod. xx. 2,) is the "one God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Clemens: therefore, &c.

Here you tell me (p. 144.) of the *Pædagogus* being a "juvenile" piece, (which is more than you know^l,) or if it be, it is of never the less authority, if not contradicted by his riper thoughts, as it is not. You refer to what you have said above; and I refer to what I have said in answer above. But you further take me to task for what I had said in my Defence, vol. i. p. 295, that Christ spoke the words, "I am the Lord thy God," Exod. xx. 2, in his *own Person*, according to Clemens^m. This observation, which, it seems, tenderly affects you, you call "absurd" and "perfectly ridiculous." It is easy to give hard names; let us hear your arguments. All you have to plead is this, that "Christ is there observed to speak in his *own Person*, not "in opposition to his being the *representative* of the Person of "the Father, but in opposition to his being elsewhere spoken "of in the *third Person*." Now, I grant it was not *intended* in opposition to an opinion which nobody at that time was wild enough to hold: but while he is aiming at another thing, he

^k *Lequente Filio ad Moysem; Descendi, inquit, eripere populum hunc. Ipse enim est qui descendit, &c. Iren. p. 180.*

Nescientes eum qui figura loquutus est humana ad Abraham, et iterum ad Moysem, dicentem, Videns vidi vexationem, &c. Hæc enim Filius, qui est Verbum Dei, ab initio præstruebat, p. 236.

Ipse est qui dicit Moysi, Videns vidi, &c. ab initio assuetus Verbum Dei ascendere et descendere, p. 241.

^l See Grabe's Instances of Defects, p. 10.

^m *Πάλιν δὲ ὅταν λέγη διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου, εἰπόντων ὁμολογεῖ παιδαγωγόν· Ἐγὼ Κύριος ὁ Θεός σου, ὁ ἐξαγαγὼν σε ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου. Clem. p. 131.*

might accidentally drop a sentence which quite overthrows that *opinion*: which is the truth of the case. For what can be plainer than the words, *διὰ ἰδίου προσώπου*, *in his own Person*, and *ἐαυτὸν ὁμολογεῖ*, he professes *himself* to be *παιδαγωγὸν*, the *Leader forth*, because of his saying, “I am the Lord thy God, who *led forth* “thee out of the land of Egypt?” I translate *leader forth*, to make the English answer, as the Greek *παιδαγωγὸν* and *ἐξαγαγὼν* do. Is there any sense in what Clemens says, if the Person there speaking was the Person of the *Father*, or any other Person but the *Son*? But you was to say something to *amuse*, and was to fill up the rest with hard words. The *opposition* you have took notice of does not at all alter the case. For whether the Scripture speaks of the Son in the *third*, or he of *himself* in the *first* Person, it is still the *Person of Christ*.

A.D. 206. TERTULLIAN.

My argument from Tertullian stands thus:

“The Lord God” mentioned, Gen. iii. 8, 9. *Jehovah* appearing to Abraham, Gen. xviii. 1, 13, and xix. 24. The “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” Exod. iii. 4, 6. The “I AM,” Exod. iii. 14. The *God* spoken of, Is. xxxv. 4. “The God, “besides whom there is no God,” (Is. xlv. 14, 15) he is the “one true God supreme.” But this is *Christ*, according to Tertullian: therefore, &c.

You have here (p. 145.) two or three little cavils which I have answered above. You next tell me that Tertullian always “declares Christ to have appeared, not in his own name, *but* in “the name of the one supreme God.” But where does Tertullian say that he appeared not, or conversed not in his *own name*? He says indeed in the *Father’s name*, but in his *own name* too, the *name* and *nature* of either being *common* to bothⁿ. He took no *name* but what he had a right to: nor said any thing of *himself* but what was true of *himself*. And therefore he never said *I am the Father*, though he often said *I am God*, or *Lord*, or *Almighty*: which deserves your special notice. I allow that he acted in the *Father’s name*, coming with all the authority of the *Godhead*, common to *both*, unoriginately in the *Father*, derivately in the *Son*. This is coming in the *Father’s name*, and with his authority, to exhibit in and through himself all the *majesty* and *dignity* and *perfections* of the *Godhead*: being

ⁿ *Omnia*, inquit, *Patris mea sunt*: *Prax.* cap. 17. See my Defence, vol. i. *cur non et nomina?* *Tertull. contr.* p. 299, &c.

himself a full, perfect, and adequate transcript or image of all that the Father is.

You would have it thought that the Father was “absolutely invisible” (according to Tertullian) “on account of his supreme majesty, but the Son visible, as a comprehensible part;” and yet you very well know, that Tertullian did not allow even the Son to be *visible* in his *divine* nature^o, but only by *visible symbols* voluntarily chosen. And all the peculiar majesty of the Father lay only in this, that he was not to be *visible* in any way at all; because he was not to *minister* or to be *incarnate*. But will you persist in offering the most palpable abuses upon your readers?

A. D. 240. HIPPOLYTUS.

Hippolytus I had cited for one text only, his applying the words “that stretcheth out the heavens like a curtain” (Is. xl. 22.) to Christ. Whoever looks into that chapter, will see that the Person of whom those words were spoken is described all the way in characters peculiar to the *one true God*. That Person therefore being Christ, according to Hippolytus, the consequence is evident. You have little to say in answer, but what has been abundantly replied to or obviated before. So I pass on.

A. D. 237—244. ORIGEN.

I cited Origen but for two texts, Exod. iii. 4, 6. Psal. xxiv. 8, 10. According to him therefore Christ is “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;” “Jehovah,” and “King of glory.” “You see not,” it seems, “how this proves that Origen thought Christ to be the one supreme God.” It either proves that, or else that Origen thought there were *two Gods* of Abraham, *two Lords* of hosts: which yet Origen, as we have before seen, absolutely denies. So much for Origen.

A. D. 256. CYPRIAN.

My argument from Cyprian runs thus :

He that is “God of Bethel,” Gen. xxxv. 1. “The Lord strong and mighty;” “Lord of hosts,” Psal. xxiv. 8, 10. He that said “I am God,” (Psal. xlvi. 10,) and who is called “mighty God,”

^o Dicimus enim et Filium suo nomine eatenus *invisibilem*, qua *Sermo* et *Spiritus Dei*: ex substantiæ conditione, jam nunc, et qua *Deus*, et *Sermo*, et *Spiritus*. *Visibilem* autem fuisse ante carnem eo modo quo dicit, &c. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 14.

“For we say that the Son also, in his own Person, was *invisible*, so

“far as he was *the Word*, and *Spirit of God*: and he is so also now, as *God*, and the *Word*, and *Spirit*: the condition (or quality) of his *substance* requiring it. But he was *visible* before his incarnation, in such a way as he says,” &c.

Vid. Bull. D. F. p. 88. Nourrii App. vol. ii. p. 1310.

and "our God," Psal. l. 1, 3. The *God* arising, Psal. lxxviii. 1. "God standing in the congregation," Psal. lxxxii. 1. "The God beside whom there is none else," Is. xlv. 14, 15. He that said, "I am God, and not man," Hos. xi. 9. The *Jehovah* spoken of, Zech. x. 12. "The God in comparison of whom none other shall be accounted of," Baruch iii. 35. He that is all this, is the "one true God supreme." But such is Christ, according to Cyprian: therefore, &c.

In answer hereto you tell me (p. 146.) that "Cyprian has not one word to my purpose." But let the reader judge as he finds, and not give too hasty credit to your blunt sayings. You tell me of Cyprian's styling the Father "the one God, who is Lord of all, of unequalled majesty and power:" but you have not shewn that this was said in *opposition* to, or *exclusive* of, God the Son. Nay, it is certain it was not, because Cyprian, in his application of the texts above cited to Christ, has really said as high and as great things of him. What can run higher than that of Baruch? "This is our God, and there shall none other be accounted of in comparison of him." You have nothing further to say, but that "Christ" (*i. e.* during his humiliation here on earth) "called the Father his Lord and God," by him "prayed to be glorified," and the like. Sure you do not expect an answer as often as you bring up those poor things.

A. D. 270. ANTIOCHIAN FATHERS.

The texts which these Fathers apply to Christ are Gen. xviii. 1, 13. xxxi. 13. Exod. iii. 4, 6. Isa. xxxv. 4. xlv. 14, 15. Hos. xi. 9.

The argument from them will be much the same as that of others before recited. You plead, that "these Bishops are so far from declaring *the Son* to be the one supreme God, that they expressly, on the contrary, say, that he fulfilled the will of the Father in the creation of all things." Wonderful! *So far* from declaring it, that they say nothing but what is very *consistent* with it, or what serves to confirm it. For what is there *contrary* in his "fulfilling the will of the Father in the creation?" Or what *creature* could ever be able to execute so high a charge? But here again you discover what it is you rely on; not *Scripture* or *Fathers*, but two or three *fancies* of your own, among which this is one: that the doctrine of the

^p Labbè, tom. i. p. 845.

^q See my Sermons, p. 63, &c. of this vol.

Unity, as held by the Church, is not consistent with a distinction of *Persons*, *order*, and *offices*. Might you not therefore better plainly own to the world that there lies all the difficulty, rather than amuse them with *Scripture* and *Fathers*, only to draw such premises as are readily granted: at least by me, who dispute only your conclusion? You repeat some things about the *absurdity* of the Father's appearing, the Son's being an *angel*, and the like; which have been before answered, and need not any further notice.

A. D. 257. NOVATIAN.

This author, according to order of time, should have come in before: but I was willing to postpone him, as you had done; because I take him to be somewhat particular, and therefore of distinct consideration; as before hinted.

My argument from this writer will stand thus:

The *Jehovah* appearing to Abraham, (Gen. xviii.) and raining upon Sodom. (Gen. xix.) The *God* speaking to Abraham, (Gen. xxi.) "The God of Bethel," (Gen. xxxi.) "The God standing in the congregation," (Ps. lxxxii.) The *God* mentioned, Is. xxxv. 4. The *Jehovah* from Zion, (Joel iii. Am. i.) He is the "one true God." But such is Christ, according to Novatian: therefore, &c.

I have intimated my doubts of Novatian before, as to his way of solving the *Unity*: in which he appears to be various, and not very consistent with his own principles; though orthodox in the main, as to the Son's *essential* divinity. The Sabellian abuse of the phrase *one God*, I suppose, might make him the more scrupulous. I have sometimes wondered at it, considering the *known* principles of that age, appearing in the authors above mentioned. But he was none of the most *judicious*, nor without his *singularities*: as is plain from the *schism* begun by him. I shall now see what you have to say to this writer. You bring up (p. 148.) the whole pretence of God the Father being "immense," and "contained in no place," whereas the Son might be *contained*, &c. A general answer has been already given to this out of Bishop Bull; which answer is so full and certain, that you know not how to gainsay it. The meaning of the Fathers was no more than this, that God the Father never appeared in a *place*, no, not by *visible symbols*, which yet the Son did: and it was by such *visible symbols* only, that the Son was contained in a place, and not in his *divine nature*. Novatian himself is a proof of this

matter; for he expressly asserts the *omnipresence* or *immensity* of God the Son^r. Your other objection is, that Novatian speaks of the Son as being *subditus*, *subject* to the Father; which is meant only of the Son's *ministering* to the Father by voluntary condescension, according to the *economy* entered into from the creation: so that this is far from proving the *subjection* which you are aiming at, viz. a natural and necessary subjection of a *precarious being* to his God and Creator. Novatian would have abhorred the thought. He reserves to the Father solely and exclusively the title of the *one God*, on account of his *supremacy* of *order* and *office*, (which I think a false way of speaking,) at the same time allowing the Son to be of the *same nature* and *substance*; which is plainly making the Son *God supreme*, and God in the *strict* sense, according to just propriety of speech. In *words* then, he may seem in some measure to agree with you: but in *reality*, he agrees more with me; differing only *loquendi modo*, or *citra mysterii substantiam*, from the Catholic doctrine, as Petavius himself confesses of him. *Pref. in T. ii. c. 5.*

A. D. 318. LACTANTIUS.

There are only three texts cited from this author: Isa. xlv. 6. xlv. 14, 15. Baruch iii. 35. But they are wonderful strong and expressive, "I am the first, and I am the last; and besides "me there is no God:" this he understands of the Father and Son together. "Surely God is in thee; and there is not another God besides thee:" (so he expresses it in his Epitome:) this he understands of *Christ*; and the other text, out of Baruch, is as full and strong^s. One thing is evident, that Lactantius never dreamed of that strict force of *exclusive* terms, which you are used to insist upon. For if he had, he must have excluded

^r Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus; cum hæc hominis natura non sit, sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit? *Novat. cap. 14.*

"If Christ be only a man, how "comes he to be present as invoked "every where; when it is not the "nature of man, but of God, to be "present to all places?"

^s Unum esse Deum tam Patrem quam Filium, Esaias in illo exemplo quod superius posuimus, ostendit cum diceret: *Adorabunt te, et te deprecabuntur, quoniam in te Deus est, et non est alius præter te.* *Lact. Inst.*

lib. iv. cap. 29. *Epitom. cap. 44.*

Sed et alio loco similiter ait. *Sic dicit Deus rex Israel, et qui eruit eum Deus æternus: Ego primus et ego novissimus, et præter me non est Deus.* Cum duas personas proposuisset Dei regis, id est Christi, et Dei Patris—ad utramque personam referens, intulit, et *præter me non est Deus*, cum posset dicere *præter nos*: sed fas non erat plurali numero separationem tantæ necessitudinis fieri. *Lib. iv. cap. 29.*

Item Jeremias. *Hic Deus noster est et non deputabitur alius absque illo, &c.* *Lactant. Epit. cap. xlv. p. 116.*

the *Father* himself from being God, in virtue of the text of Baruch.

You have nothing of moment to say to Lactantius's citations, which are directly opposite to your principles: but with your usual air, when you are entirely at a loss, you would seem to contemn what you cannot answer. All you can pretend is, that Lactantius styles the Father *Deus summus*^t, *God supreme*: and yet it is certain that he supposes the Son to have the same *nature* and *substance* with the Father, and to be *one God* with him; which is what I call making the Son *God supreme*: and the author cannot be more plainly opposite to my principles in the *former* part, than he is to *yours* in the *latter*. If the parts are not reconcilable, his evidence is *null*, and of no account on either side. But I conceive, the author may be reconciled by a candid construction of *Deus summus*; either considered as opposed only to Pagan deities, or as being an inaccurate expression for *summus Pater*, the *supreme Father*, by which the author himself interprets it, and meaning no more than that he is supreme in *order* or *office*; which I allow. See *Le Nourry, Apparat.* vol. ii. p. 353.

A. D. 335. EUSEBIUS.

What you were deficient with respect to Lactantius, you endeavour to make up in regard to Eusebius. Here you insult unmercifully: a plain sign that your forbearing to do the like upon other *writers*, is not owing to your civility or modesty, but to something else. The "learned world" must be called in, and stand "amazed" at my "presumption:" as if none of the learned world had ever taken Eusebius to have any thing *orthodox* upon the *Trinity*. I gave a caution in my Defence, vol. i. p. 293, note^m, in regard to Eusebius: and it so stood in three editions

^t Unus est enim solus liber Deus, summus, carens origine; quia ipse est origo rerum, et in eo simul et Filius et omnia continentur. Quapropter cum mens et voluntas alterius in altero sit; vel potius in utroque una, merito unus Deus uterque appellatur: quia quicquid est in Patre ad Filium transfuit, et quicquid est in Filio a Patre descendit. *Lact. Inst.* lib. iv. cap. 29.

The words *et omnia* here seem to come in very strangely. Lactantius must think the *omnia* to be contained in the Father much otherwise than

the Son is: else how should he prove the Son *one God* with the Father, without proving the same of every thing else, as well as of him, by the same argument? Qu. Whether *rerum* and *omnia* may not be understood of things *divine*? all that is *divine* or adorable in such a sense as Tertullian speaks:

Unus omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem.

Here *omnia* stands only for the divine Persons. Arnobius says, *In hoc omne quod colendum est colimus.*

before you published your piece. This was on purpose to intimate, that I did not pretend to claim Eusebius as entirely on my side; but only *so far*. And with the like moderation I have always spoke of Eusebius, in my Sermons, and elsewhere, because I would not deceive my reader, nor be confident where a point is disputable. Learned men know how both ancients and moderns have differed in their opinions of this man. Hilary, Jerome, Photius, two Nicephoruses, the second Council of Nice, Baronius, Perron, Petavius, Noris, Sandius, Le Clerc, and others, and at length Montfaucon, have charged him with *Arianism*: on the other hand, Socrates, Theodorit, Gelasius Cyzicenus, Camerarius, Chamier, Calovius, Peter du Moulin, Florentinus, Valesius, Bull, Cave, Fabricius^u, defend, or at least excuse him. Athanasius^x seems to have thought that he was once an Arian, but at length came over to the Catholic side. Epiphanius says, he was *too much inclined* to the Arian way; and the learned Pagi (as an ingenious gentleman^y, from whom I have borrowed part of this account, has observed) *confesses he knows not what to make of him*. Now, in such cases as these, however firmly persuaded a man may be, on this or that side; yet in pure modesty and deference to men of name and character in the learned world, one would speak with caution and reserve: and there cannot be a surer argument of a little mind, than to be insulting and confident on such occasions. After all, the main question is very little concerned in this other about Eusebius; who cannot justly be reckoned among the Ante-Nicene writers, (to whose *indifferent* judgment we appeal,) as living and writing after the time that Arius had broached his *heresy*, and raised a faction against the Church; to which Eusebius, by *affinity* and *party*, (and perhaps upon *principle* too,) appears to have leaned. He may however be a good evidence of what the Church taught, in those very points which he endeavoured, by a novel turn, or by some private constructions of his own, to warp from their ancient intendment and significancy. And though I cannot pretend to say that he comes entirely into that scheme which I defend, yet sure I am that he can never be reconciled, upon the whole, to yours.

It would be tedious to run through all you have cited from him: it might fill a volume to discuss this single question about Eusebius. I shall content myself therefore with a few strictures,

^u Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. vol. vi. p. 32.

^x Vid. Athanas. Ep. ad Afros, p. 896.

^y Mr. Thirlby, Answer to Mr. Whiston, p. 79.

just to abate your excessive confidence. I have admitted that Eusebius did (as some other very worthy men have also done) magnify the glory of *unoriginateness* rather too far; as if it were a distinct *perfection*, and not a relation only, or *mode of existence*, as the Catholics taught: yet you will not find that Eusebius denies the *necessary existence* or *eternity* of the Son; however not after the Nicene Council. If you have a mind to gain Eusebius to your side, do not endeavour it by *false* reports and manifest *untruths*; lest the reader suspect you even in what you may *justly* plead from him. You scruple not to say, (p. 150,) as from Eusebius, that the Son is “ styled God and Lord on “ account of his having received all power and authority from “ the Father, and ministering to all his commands:” which, in effect, is making a Photinian or Samosatene of him. He no where, that I know of, says any such thing: nor do the places you refer to prove any thing like it; unless saying that Christ is *God*, as being our *Creator*^z, be the same as saying he is *God* on account of *receiving authority*, &c. Eusebius’s constant way of accounting for the Son’s being *God*, is by resolving it into his being *God’s Son*^a, and his thereby copying out a *perfect* resemblance of the Father: and he makes him “ by nature great “ God^b” on that very account. In one place more besides that before mentioned, he calls him *God*, as being our *Creator*, or *Maker*^c: unless it be there meant of the *Father*; which if it be, it shews that Eusebius’s looking upon Christ as *God* because *Creator*, was no lessening consideration. The reader may well wonder, after this, what could move you to make so strange and false a representation of an author. I may further hint, that, according to Eusebius, the Son could not be *God*, if he were produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων *from nothing*, or did not participate of the Father’s *divinity*^d. How does this suit with your notion of his *Godship* being owing to his receiving of authority? You next produce a passage where Eusebius is arguing that the Father, or *God over all*, could not have appeared, because it is “ impious to

^z Ὅτε δὲ γενητῶν πάντων καθηγείται τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, ὡς ἂν πάντων ὑπάρχων σωτήρ, καὶ κύριος καὶ δημιουργὸς—τηνικαῦτα, καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ δεσπότης, καὶ σωτήρ, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀναγορεύοιτο αὐν. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. ii. p. 111.*

^a *Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 146, 213. 227.*

Contra Marc. p. 7, 62, 68, 69, 72,

111, 123, 127.

Comm. in Psalm. p. 534, 634.

^b Φύσει μέγας ὢν Θεὸς, καὶ μέγας τυγχάνει βασιλεὺς, ἅτε μονογενὴς ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος. *Euseb. in Psalm. p. 629.*

^c Κύριος ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ὡς δούλων, καὶ Θεὸς ὡς πλάστης. *Euseb. Com. in Psal. p. 645.*

^d *Euseb. Eccl. Th. p. 69. See below, p. 500.*

“ say God was changed :” and this you leave with your reader. You add another passage of like kind to it : “ It can no way be said that the unbegotten and immutable essence of God supreme was changed into the form of a man.” This also you leave for any simple reader to imagine, that Christ, who took upon him human form, is not, according to Eusebius, of *immutable* essence, but subject to *change*. Yet Eusebius certainly meant no more than that it was not so suitable to the majesty of the first Person, (whom he calls indeed *supreme God*, in contradistinction to the Son,) to submit to take upon him any *visible symbols*, or to be *incarnate*. As to the *nature* and *essence* of the Son, he believed it to be absolutely *immutable*^e, and liable to *no change*, as well as the Father’s. Wherefore though Eusebius does insist on the *supremacy* of the Father, more than other writers before him, (which might bring him under the suspicion of *Arianizing*,) this is in a manner all he can be said to agree with you in, being directly opposite to you in the main points of your scheme. Such men as Dr. Cudworth, Bp. Fowler, and others amongst us, might perhaps have claimed Eusebius as their own : you and your friends are quite of another stamp ; though you are willing to seek some cover and countenance from the *few things* wherein they agreed with you. The next passage you cite (p. 152.) proves no more than that Eusebius strained the point of the Father’s supremacy too high, in calling the Son a *second Lord* ; which *second* however was, in his opinion, in a manner infinitely *higher* and more excellent than your scheme makes him, by depriving him of *necessary existence*, and reducing him thereby to a *creature*, which Eusebius declares against more than once. And though I will not undertake to clear Eusebius of *Tritheism*, or *Ditheism* ; yet it appears plainly enough to me, that he was very far from *Arianism* ; at least, after the Nicene Council.

As to the next text, about which I appeal, you pretend that

^e Μένων αὐτὸς πάλιν ἄυλος οἶος καὶ πρὸ τούτου παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἦν οὔτε μεταβαλὼν τὴν οὐσίαν.—οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔπασχεν ὁ ἀπαθής, &c. *Euseb. Orat. Paneg. cap. xiv. p. 761.*

Σχήματι εὐρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀλλοίωσιν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἔδοξεν ἰπομένειν, ἀναλλοίωτος ὢν καὶ ἀρρηπτος ὡς Θεός. *Euseb. in Psal. p. 185.*

“ He performed all things by the man he had assumed—Continuing

“ immaterial in himself, such as he had been before this, with the Father, without any change of his substance. Nor did he suffer any thing in respect of his substance, being impassible.

“ Being found in fashion as a man, he might seem to undergo no small change, though *unchangeable* and *unvariable* as God.”

Eusebius is expressly against me. Why? Because he says that the Son is not *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, that is, he is not the *supreme Father*: which is all you could make of many the like places in Eusebius; were there not others still stronger elsewhere. I could shew you where Eusebius styles the Son *Θεὸς τῶν ὄλων*^f, and *ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὄλων*^g, and might translate *supreme God*, as you do *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων*, were there nothing else to be considered in this matter. But I will not deceive my readers. Nor is there any such peculiar force in the words *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς*, that Eusebius might not, as well as the Phrygian martyrs, apply them to the Son^h. But I attend to the sense, not to the phrase. To proceed:

You grow bolder in your next page, (154,) pretending to tell me, from a passage in Eusebius, that “the ancient Church worshipped Christ, not as being the one supreme God, but to the glory of the Father who dwelt in him, and from whom, says Eusebius, he received the honour of being worshipped as God.”

The reader will easily see the drift and purport of these *rash* words; for which you have not one syllable of proof. Whatever may be thought of Eusebius, the *ancient Church* stands perfectly clear; as shall be shewn in due time and place. As to your cavil upon the words of Eusebius, (*Eccl. Hist.* lib. i. cap. 3,) I refer to Valesius’s Notes for an answer. Nothing more certain, than that Eusebius ordinarily founds the worship of the Son upon his being naturally *Son of God*, or *very God*ⁱ. If he contradicts this in his comment on Isa. xlv. 15, he is the less to be regarded, as being inconsistent: and it is one great prejudice against the notion, that among fifteen Christian writers who have considered and quoted that text^k, he is the only one that ever drew so wild a consequence from it. But the truth is, Eusebius never had a thought of what your words insinuate of him. Let him but explain himself, and all will be very right. It depends upon Eusebius’s notion of the Father’s

^f Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 67, 70.

^g Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 11.

^h Τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸν Χριστὸν ἐπιπορευόμενος τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος. Euseb. *Eccl. Hist.* lib. viii. cap. 11.

ⁱ Ὅ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ὀρωμένοις τε καὶ ἀφάνεσιν, ἐπιπορευόμενος τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος. Euseb. *Orat. Panegy.* cap. i. p. 719.

^j Οἷα τοῦ καθόλου Θεοῦ παῖδα γνήσιον, καὶ αὐτόθεον προσκυνεῖσθαι. Euseb. *Eccl. Hist.* lib. x. p. 468.

Vid. *Eccl. Theolog.* p. 69, 111.

^k Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. iv. p. 8. Cyprian. adv. Jud. lib. ii. cap. 6. Tertullian. contr. Prax. cap. 13. Patres Antiocheni, p. 845. Lactantius Epit. et Institut. Hilarius, p. 849. Cyrilli Catech. p. 156. Athanasius, p. 491, 686. Hieronymus in loc. Epiphanius, vol. i. p. 486. Ambros. de Fid. lib. i. cap. 2. Marius Victorin. lib. i. p. 261. Gregor. Nazianz. p. 733. Zeno Veronens. de Nativ. Christi, 1250.

inhabitation; which he fully lays open in another place¹: where he tells us, that the Father in the *generation* of the Son communicated of his fulness, the fulness of his *Godhead*, without division or separation; and it is in this respect that in him “dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead:” so that the worshipping of Christ as having the Father *dwelling* in him, comes to the same with worshipping him as being *God of God*, eternally begotten^m of the Father; which is Eusebius’s doctrine. And thus Eusebius agrees well with Hilaryⁿ, and other Catholic Fathers.

You go on in triumph (p. 155,) in the most extraordinary manner, imputing to me whatever first comes into your head. All I was to prove from Eusebius was, that the texts there cited were applied to Christ; “determining nothing of his other principles,” as I expressly noted in p. 293. vol. i. Yet neither you, nor any man else, can ever clear Eusebius of the charge of *Polytheism* and *self-contradiction*, if, notwithstanding the applying these texts to Christ, he did not think him the *one true God*. And if he had learned of the Arians a *novel* way of eluding an argument which the Catholics before him knew nothing of, nor ever used; he is still a witness of the Church’s *application* of those *texts*, (which is what I cited him for,) though it be against his own principles. But I am not yet satisfied that Eusebius differed in any main doctrine, except it were in the manner of expressing the *Unity*; still believing the essential *divinity* of God the Son. You cite Montfaucon as charging Eusebius with *Arianism*; at the same time telling us, that he erroneously calls it *Arianism*. But if that learned man did not know what *Arianism* is, he might more easily mistake in determining of Eusebius’s doctrine; which is a much more intricate business. The truth is, that learned and judicious man understood very well what *Arianism* is, and is guilty of no error in that respect: but as to his judgment of Eusebius, it is not so entirely to be depended on. After he has given us a sketch of Eusebius’s doctrine, as being *Arian*, he does not yet pretend to reconcile all Eusebius’s doctrine to that scheme, to make him, in the whole, a *consistent* writer: but he still seems to suspect that he may be found various and repugnant; which at last is rather

¹ Euseb. contr. Marcell. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 62.

^m Τῆς ἀνάρχου γεννήσεως. Euseb. in Psal. p. 15. Ἀδιδιον γέννησιν. Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 73.

ⁿ Deus enim in eo est: et in quo

est Deus, Deus est. Non enim Deus in diversæ atque alienæ a se naturæ habitaculo est, sed in suo, atque ex se genito manet, Deus in Deo, quia ex Deo Deus est. Hilar. de Trin. lib. v. cap. 40. p. 851.

making him a *neutral*, than clear for any side°. Nor do I think it would be difficult to acquit Eusebius of the charge of *Arianism*, at least from the time of the Nicene council.

It is plain enough that he does not *ordinarily* (for I must except a passage before cited) make Father and Son *one principle*, or *one God*; upon which chiefly Montfaucon founds his charge of *Arianism*. He did not consider that a man might assert the *eternity* and *necessary existence* of the Son, and yet throw the *supremacy* and *Unity of Godhead* upon the Father alone, as *self-existent* and God in a *higher sense*; which others have done besides Eusebius; though, I think, not very judiciously or consistently. Montfaucon takes too much advantage of Eusebius's *Demonstratio Evangelica*, or other pieces, wrote before the Council of Nice, and contradicted or corrected in several points afterwards by the same Eusebius. I will give two or three examples. In his *Demonstratio* he makes the Son to be *δημιούργημα*^p. In his dispute with Marcellus he plainly retracts and contradicts it^q. In his *Demonstratio*^r, he pretends that nothing can be properly said to be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, without doubt to gratify the Arians, that they might in a certain sense deny the Son to be *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*. But in his piece against Marcellus he asserts plainly that creatures are *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*^s, meaning that they come from *non-existence* into *existence*, (which is the true signification of the phrase,) at the same time denying that the Son is *ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*, in the same sense of the phrase^t. Wherefore the learned Montfaucon does not do justice to Eusebius, when he imputes to him the opinion of the Arians, that the Son passed from *non-existence* to *existence*: for Eusebius plainly denies the Son to be *ἐκ*

° Quod si in his Eusebius secum pugnare deprehenditur; id sane proprium erroris est, ut consistere non valeat, sibi que ipsi adversetur. *Prelim. in Euseb.* p. 28.

^p Τέλειον τελείον δημιούργημα. *Demonstr.* lib. iv. cap. 2.

^q Τοῦ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φύντος υἱοῦ οὐκ ἂν δημιουργοῦς λεχθεῖν. *Euseb. contr. Marc.* p. 68.

^r Μηκέτι εὐλόγως φάναι δεῖν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων εἶναι τὶ τῶν ὄντων. *Euseb. Dem.* lib. iv. cap. i. p. 145.

^s Euseb. *contr. Marcel.* p. 68, 150, 152, 166.

^t Ibid. p. 67, 68, 69, 150.

I shall here cite one passage, being a pretty remarkable one.

Οἱ δὲ δύο δόντες ὑποστάσεις, τὴν μὲν

ἀγέννητον, τὴν δ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων κτισθεῖσαν, ἓνα μὲν Θεὸν ὑφίστανται. ὁ δὲ υἱὸς οὐκ ἐτ' αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ μονογενὴς ἔσται, οὐδὲ μὲν κύριος, οὐδὲ Θεός, μηδὲν μὲν ἐπικοινωνῶν τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς θεότητι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς κτίσμασι, καθ' ὃ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπέστη, παραβαλλόμενος. *Eccl. Theol.* lib. i. cap. 10.

“ They that admit two *Hypostases*, “ one unbegotten and the other created “ from nothing, do indeed make *one God*; but in their scheme, the Son will “ be no *Son*, nor *only-begotten*, no, “ nor *Lord*, nor *God*; having no “ communion of the Father's God- “ head, but being likened to the rest “ of the creatures, as having existed “ from nothing.”

τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, in the same sense that he affirms it of creatures; and therefore must deny his passing out of *non-existence* to *existence*, unless he were the greatest prevaricator and shuffler imaginable. If it be said that he intended that creatures were not made *out of any thing preexisting*, he must then affirm that the Son was *out of something preexisting*: and then let any man tell me what he could mean by it; except it were that he *existed before his generation*, having been eternally in and with the Father; of the same homogeneous divine substance that the Father is. But my persuasion is, that Eusebius believed *eternal* generation; and if so, it is plain enough what he meant by denying the Son to be ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. It does not appear to me that Eusebius denied the Son to be αἰδιος, though I know Montfaucon charges him with it; and there are more passages than one^u that say something very like it. Eusebius was very earnest in his charge against Marcellus, and was ready to put any the most invidious construction upon his words. As often therefore as Marcellus had made the Son αἰδιος, Eusebius construes it ἀγέννητος, that he might reduce him to an absurdity; and believing perhaps that αἰδιος and ἀγέννητος, upon Marcellus's hypothesis, went together and resolved into one. In this sense only I conceive Eusebius to have denied the Son to be αἰδιος. And if any one narrowly examines the passages, he may find good reason to believe that this is real fact.

It may be questioned whether ever Marcellus asserted the Son to be ἀγέννητος. But Eusebius charged it upon him as a consequence of his *hypothesis*; and laid hold of αἰδιος as implying it, and meaning as much with Marcellus, who denied any *antemundane* generation. But to return. To shew me how low an opinion Eusebius had of God the Son, you quote part of his comment on Ps. cix. (which I cannot find there,) intimating that “by the laws of nature the father of every son is his lord;” and therefore God the *Father* is *Lord* and *God* of the Son. Admitting this rule, I suppose *by the same laws of nature*, every *Son* is of the same nature with his Father, and as such *equal*; and so let the similitude serve equally, if you please, for both. But since you produce one testimony, as you say, from *that book*, (from Eusebius on the Psalms,) give me leave, in my turn, to produce some few of a very contrary strain to what you would wish.

^u Euseb. contr. Marcell. p. 35, 106, 119.

1. I shall first remind you of Eusebius's accounting for Christ's *praying*, praying as *man* for things which himself could bestow, or dispose of as *God*^x. This seems to run cross to *two* of your principles. One of which is, that Christ being a *subject* is to refer all *grants* entirely to his *Sovereign*: the other is, that the speaking of Christ in *two distinct* capacities, in the manner Eusebius does, you would call absurd. (as in p. 233.) as if *part* of Christ prayed, and another *part* did not pray; which is your profane way of ridiculing a distinction universally made use of by the primitive churches, and held sacred amongst them.

2. I must next observe to you, that, according to Eusebius, Christ is *Creator of all things*. (ὁ πάντων δημιουργός^y.) not only so, but ὁ ποιητής^z also, and he created all things by his *own power*^a. This is a step beyond what Dr. Clarke is yet advanced to: who often talks of the Son's creating by the *power* of the Father, and interprets Heb. i. 3. "the upholding all things by "the Word of his power," of the Father's power; but is not yet come to say, that it is by the Son's *own* power. If he does not here contradict Eusebius, he is however vastly short of him: and has not yet discovered any such honourable thoughts of God the Son as Eusebius has done.

3. Eusebius does not scruple to give the Son the title of *only God*^b, believing it to have been him that so called himself, in opposition to *strange Gods*, and challenging the *Jewish* worship as his own due upon that very score. How does this suit with your doctrine about the *exclusive* terms, and the texts running *personally*, *I, thou, he*? By which doctrines, upon Eusebius's principles, you must exclude the *Father*. I do not therefore cite these and the like passages of Eusebius to prove that Father and Son are *one God*; but to shew that there is no force (according to him) in your argument drawn from the *personal* and *exclusive* terms.

^x Αἰτεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, δίδωσι δὲ τὴν αἴτησιν ὡς Θεός· εὐδοκούντος δηλονότι καὶ συνεργούντος τοῦ οικείου πατρὸς. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 53. Vid. p. 142, 366, 698.

^y Ὁ πάντων δημιουργός ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 89. Vid. p. 90, 125, 634.

^z Τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτήρος ἡμῶν ἴδια τυχάνει· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτῶν. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 630.

^a Ὅ τῆδε καὶ τῆδε τῆ σαντοῦ δυνάμει μεγαλοουργήσας, &c. *Euseb. in Psal.*

p. 318. Vid. p. 616.

^b Λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ εἰδωλολατρεῖν· ἐμὲ δὲ μόνον Θεὸν εἶδέναι παρεκλευσάμην — οἷς ἐπιλέγει, ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμι κύριος ὁ Θεός σου, παριστὰς ἑαυτὸν οὔτε ξένον, οὔτε ἀλλότριον, οὔτε πρόσφατον ὄντα Θεόν· ἦν γὰρ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος, καὶ ὁ πάλαι διαφόρως τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρηματίζων, ὁ δὲ καὶ Θεὸς Ἰακώβ ἐπικεκλημένος — διόπερ παρακελεύεται λέγων· Ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμι κύριος ὁ Θεός σου, &c. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 503, 504. Vid. p. 533.

4. Eusebius, in this same book, fully and significantly expresses the immutable *eternity*^c of God the Son. For applying the words of the 92nd (alias 93rd) Psalm, “Thy throne is established of old, thou art from everlasting,” to our Saviour Christ, he takes particular notice of the force of *thou art*, *σὺ εἶ*, as denoting *immutable existence*; agreeably to his explication of the same phrase elsewhere^d.

5. I have above took notice of Eusebius’s styling God the Son, “great God by nature,” which is a very high and strong expression. I shall here further observe how he interprets the name of *Hand of God*, given to the Son. Not after a low disparaging manner, as you are used to interpret it, but as Christ is the *all-creative power of God*^e.

6. I may add a few more observations from Eusebius’s Commentary on Isaiah. His comment on Isa. xlii. 8. is pretty remarkable^f; “I will not give my glory to another.” Where he takes notice, that it is not said, that “I will give my glory to no one,” (for the Son, says he, has the *Father’s glory*;) but that it will not be given to *another*. Now, though Eusebius here comes not entirely into the common and Catholic way of construction, yet he differs very much from you in several particulars, as that the *Father’s glory is also the Son’s glory*, and that the *exclusive* terms do not affect God the Son. I may also take notice how magnificently Eusebius sets forth the Son’s *omnipresence*, both here^g and in his Comment upon the Psalms^h, in words as expressive and full as any can be. Here also Eusebius keeps closer to the sense and language of the Church, in relation to the *one Godhead*, than he has at other times been observed to do; except in his Oration before Constantine, taken notice of above. His words areⁱ: “There being but *one Head*, there will be no more than *one Godhead*, with which is taken in what

^c Οὕτως γοῦν ἦν ἔτοιμος ὁ θρόνος σου, ἐφ’ ὃν σὺν αὐτῷ καθέζεσθαι ὁ γεννήσας σε πατὴρ παρακελεύετο. Καὶ ἔτοιμος ἦν ἀπὸ τότε, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος σὺ εἶ. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦς, φησὶν, ἀλλ’ εἶ. μόνον γὰρ αὐτῷ, σὺ εἶ, λέγεσθαι ἀρμόττει. διὸ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται· σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ, καὶ τὰ ἐτη σου οὐκ ἐκλείψουσι.—ἦν μὲν οὖν ἔτοιμος ὁ θρόνος σου ἀπὸ τότε, ἀφ’ οὗ δηλαδὴ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ἦς, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος σὺ εἶ.

^d Vid. p. 584.

^e Χεὶρ γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡ ποιητικὴ ἀπάν-

των δύναμις αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρα οὐσα τοῦ δι’ οὗ γέγονε τὰ πάντα τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγος. Euseb. in Psal. p. 701.

^f Ἐπιστήσαι ἄξιον ὡς οὐκ εἴρηται τὴν δόξαν μου οὐδενὶ δώσω· δεικνύται γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχων τὴν δόξαν· &c. Euseb. Com. in Isa. p. 520.

^g Euseb. Com. in Isa. p. 428.

^h Euseb. Com. in Psal. p. 707, 708.

ⁱ Ἐγὼ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι παρέξ ἐμοῦ σώζων. μίᾱς γὰρ οὐσης ἀρχῆς, μία εἶη ἂν ἡ θεότης ἢ συμπαραλαμβάνεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ μονογενοῦς αὐτοῦ θεολογία. Euseb. in Isa. p. 524.

“concerns the divinity of his only-begotten.” It is much to the same purpose with what he elsewhere says^k, that the Son is *partaker* of the Father’s *Godhead*, and is, as it were, to be reckoned to him.

Upon the whole, you will find Eusebius much more favouring my principles than yours; though not fully coming in to either: and you ought hereafter either to reconcile such things as I have here cited out of him, besides many others, to your *hypothesis*, (which can never be done,) or to leave off boasting on that head. It should be considered that Eusebius lived and wrote at a time when the Arian pretences, being mostly *new* and *untried*, appeared therefore the more specious and plausible: and his familiar acquaintance and friendship with the heads of the party contributed to give them the greater force with him. They received an additional strength from the injudicious solutions which had been offered by Marcellus and other weak defenders of the *Homoousian* doctrine. Athanasius, Hilary, and other judicious advocates of the Catholic faith, had not then wrote their immortal pieces, to clear the doctrine from misrepresentation, to set it in a due light, and to unravel the main objections brought against it. No wonder if, in these circumstances, Eusebius might incline too much towards the *Arian* cause, and give too far into it. Yet, even under these disadvantages, he kept himself free from the grosser tenets of the Arians; and he retained so much of Catholic principles, that had he but attended to the true and certain consequences of many of his own positions in that behalf, he could not have failed of being entirely orthodox and Catholic. He had not so clear a judgment as Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and other eminent defenders of the Nicene faith: nor did he live to see how easily the *Arian* sophistry was defeated and baffled after it had passed the scrutiny of such masterly hands. In the mean while he seems to have had no *consistent* set of principles, but a confused mixture of Catholic and Arian tenets^l, such as could not stand with each other in true and just reasoning.

You have certainly no right to claim him as yours.

If you would look among the *ancients* for your scheme, it must not be in Eusebius, nor in any Ante-Nicene Father, or Post-Nicene: but in such Fathers as Arius, Aetius, Eunomius,

^k Τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς θεότητος κοινωνός, &c. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 534.

^l See my Sermons, p. 81. of this volume.

or Philostorgius: and yet you come short even of them in some points; particularly in the part you assign the Son in the creation of all things by the *Father's power*; (you do not yet say by his *own*, which several of the ancient Arians would never have scrupled;) and in the account you give of Christ's being appointed "God over all" after his resurrection; and your resolving his *worship* into the power then given him: doctrines proper only to a Samosatenean^m or Socinian.

Having shewn, from Father to Father, down to the *Arian* times, that our Lord Jesus Christ was supposed by them to be the *Jehovah*, the *Almighty*, the *one true God*, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, acknowledged as the *one true God*, and worshipped by the patriarchs as such: having proved this to have been the ancient Catholic doctrine of the Church, without any exception; unless of Novatian, who yet differs not from it in the main, but in expression rather; not in the doctrine of the Son's *real* and *essential* divinity: this foundation being laid, it remains now only to take off some pretences you have offered to invalidate the force of the evidence.

Your pretence is, that though God the Son was "God of Abraham, God of Israel, &c." yet he was such only in a "sub-ordinate sense," because he was "representative" of God the Father, p. 159. To which I answer, that had the ancients supposed him to be styled *God* and *Lord*, purely in virtue of such *representation*, there would then be some force in your reasoning: but that they did not, will appear most evidently from the following considerations:

1. None of the Fathers ever put the *Godhead* of the Son upon that foot; they never say nor insinuate, that he is *God* on the account of any such *representation*.

2. They are so far from doing it, that their whole drift and method of arguing supposes and implies the utmost contradiction to it. For if the Son were supposed to be *God* on the score of the *representation*, then any *angel* might be *God* also on account of such *representation*; and then it could never be proved (in the way that the Fathers tookⁿ) that there was any *God the Son* at all; but the whole force of their reasoning would be vacated and null. On the contrary, they presumed that none could either *represent God*, or *personate God*, or use the *style* of God, that was not really *God*: and upon this presumption their whole reasoning

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 434, &c.

ⁿ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 297, 298, 526.

turns. If therefore they are any where to be understood of a *representation*, they must mean a full and adequate representation, such as none could exhibit or sustain, who was not himself every thing that he *represents*. For as nothing but *man* can fully and adequately represent *man*; so nothing but *God* can perfectly and suitably represent *God*.

3. Add to this, the ancient Fathers always suppose the Son to be *God* antecedently to the supposed *representation*; which is decisive in the case. They suppose him *God* as being *God's Son*, of the same nature and substance with *God*. This is what all the Fathers *expressly*, or in words equivalent, resolve the Son's *divinity* into: which consideration cuts off all your pretences at once; as I before intimated^o, and you take no notice of it. The reason why you did not must be visible to the meanest reader.

In proof of the fact, that the Fathers did so resolve the *divinity* of Christ, (though it be what no scholar can be ignorant of,) I shall, for the sake of common readers, here recite their testimonies.

Justin Martyr, in his first Apology, says of God the Son, "Who being the *Word*, God's *first-begotten*, is also God^p." In his Dialogue he often repeats the same thing. He is "God, on account of his being his Son begotten before all creatures^q." In another place, "Had you but understood what is said by the prophets, you could not have denied him to be God, being the Son of the only, the uncreated, the ineffable God^r."

To the same purpose he elsewhere styles him *God*; immediately adding, "as being Son of God^s." And Justin is known to represent the Son as begotten *from*, or *out* of God^t, (ἐκ Θεοῦ and ἐξ αὐτοῦ,) without *abscission* or *division*^u, as one fire from

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 302.

^p Ὁσ καὶ λόγος πρωτότοκος ὢν τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ Θεὸς ὑπάρχει. *Apol.* i. p. 123. Ox.

^q Θεοῦ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι τέκνον πρωτότοκον τῶν ὄλων κτισμάτων. *Just. Dial.* p. 364.

^r Εἰ νεοήκατε τὰ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τῶν προφητῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἐξηγνήσθε αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεόν, τοῦ μόνου, καὶ ἀγενήτου, καὶ ἀρρήτου Θεοῦ υἱόν. *Dial.* p. 366.

N. B. I read ἀγενήτου with single *v*, for a reason which will appear more fully afterward: and I understand μόνου in opposition to creatures only, or false gods, not to the Son, who is

always to be *tacitly* understood to belong to, and to be included in, the *alone God*. And I take this of Justin to be nearly equivalent to these other of Philo and Cyril of Alexandria.

^s Ὁσ τοῦ αὐδίου λόγος ὢν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἀφθαρτος. *Phil. de Conf. Ling.* p. 326.

^t Ὅπερ ἂν ἐξ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου γεγέννηται, τοῦτο πάντως ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἀγενήτον. *Cyril. Thesaur.* p. 34.

^s Θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ. p. 170. Θεὸς, Θεοῦ υἱὸς ὑπάρχων. p. 171.

^t *Just. Dial.* p. 183. *Apol.* p. 49.

^u *Just. Dial.* p. 183, 373. *Paræn.* p. 127.

another, and as being *strictly* and *properly*^x (ιδίως and κυρίως) Son of God. All which together expresses the *consubstantiality*, sameness of *nature*, and most entire and perfect *Unity* imaginable. Such is Justin Martyr's account of Christ's *divinity*; never speaking of his being *appointed* God, or being God by I know not what *representation*; but of his being *God* by partaking of the one true Godhead, naturally Son of God.

The same account, but more briefly, we have from Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, a little lower in the same century; who speaks of Christ *being God*, as *God's Son*. The same we have also from Clemens of Alexandria, in a very remarkable passage above cited. The same also from Tertullian, who says, "that which is derived from God is God, and Son of God, and both one *God*." Novatian speaks as plain, in these words; "As nature herself has made it a rule that he must be accounted man, who is of man: so the same rule of nature prescribes, that he must be accounted God who is of God^a."

I forbear to cite more. It is a ruled case in antiquity, that Christ is *God*, (not by appointment, deputation, representation, or any thing of like kind.) but by his *Sonship*; deriving the same divine nature from the Father as is in the Father. Nor was the name of *God* ever thought by them to denote an *office*, or any *relative character*, but *nature* and *substance*, as the word *man*. It will now be easy to answer those little pleas and exceptions which you have remaining. You have, in the main, but one argument, which you repeat over and over: viz. that Christ cannot be *supreme God*, because he was an *angel*, or messenger of God: which is as much as to say that Peter, for instance, could not be *man*, if sent by *man*. The whole strength of your argument lies in the artificial confusion of *ideas*. Christ could not be *supreme* in office while executing an *inferior office*, that is very certain: but what has supremacy of office to do with the notion of *supreme God*? *God* is a word expressing *nature* and *substance*: he is *supreme God*, or God *supreme*, that has no God of a *superior nature* above him. Such is Christ, even while he submits and condescends to act *ministerially*: and thus all your speculations on this head, arising only from confusion of

^x Just. Apol. i. p. 45, 46. Apol. ii. p. 13.

^y Θεὸς οὖν ὦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ πεφυκὼς, &c. *Theoph.* p. 130. Ox.

^z Quod de Deo profectum est Deus est, et Dei Filius, et unus (*suppl.* Deus)

ambo. *Tertull.* *Apol.* cap. 21.

^a Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum esse qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat.* cap. 11.

ideas, drop at once. I submit sometimes to your phraseology, of *supreme God*, though it be improper, and rather Pagan than Christian. *Supreme God* has generally a tacit reference to an *inferior God*; and so it was used in the Pagan theology. But Christians, who acknowledge but *one God*, should never talk of a *supreme God*; the more proper name being rather the *one God*, the *true God*, the *God of the universe*, *God supreme*, and the like. But you, to introduce your *Polytheism*, are perpetually telling us of the *supreme God*; and every time you meet with ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, or ὁ Θεός τῶν ὅλων, you falsely and corruptly render it, the *supreme God*, (instead of the *God of the universe*,) to serve your *hypothesis*. I do not find that the Fathers were used to style God the Father *supreme God*; except when disputing with Pagans, or the like, they accommodated themselves in some measure to their style, reserving to themselves the Christian sense. And it is but very rarely they use πρῶτος Θεός, or *Deus Princeps*, for the *Father*; and when they do, it is, as I said, to express the *supreme Father* in a style not proper to Christian principles, only in condescension to the Pagans, to be the better understood.

To return. I perceive the *subordination* is what you lay the main stress upon, in order to overthrow the Church's doctrine of Christ's *real* divinity. You will now be reduced to this single maxim, (which you are sensible you can never *prove*, but every where *suppose*,) that the *unity* or *equality* which we teach is not consistent with any distinction of *order* or *offices*. Whenever you are disposed to try the strength of your *metaphysics*, that point may be debated with you. At present you have thought it the wiser way only to speak your *wishes*, and to deliver out *dictates* instead of *proofs*: a method which may be thought rather too assuming in *private*, and withal very *fallible* men; to expect that their bare *affirmations* should have any weight against the united verdict of all the Christian churches, ancient and modern.

I shall take but little notice of the "incidental errors" which you are pleased to charge me with, p. 160, &c. because the reader will have seen, before this time, that they are *imaginary* only, founded upon your own mistakes. I may just observe that, p. 164, you give a character, or description of *God the Father*, calling it, very absurdly, "the signification of the word *God*, when applied to the Father." You might as well have given a description, or character of Adam, calling it the signifi-

cation of the word *man*, when applied to Adam. To say what the Father's *Person* is, is one thing: to say what is signified by the name *God*, is another. Your testimonies none of them come up to the point: which was to shew, that *unbegotten*, or that particular *manner of existing*, is necessarily included in the signification of the word *God*. There is nothing more under this Query, but what I have before sufficiently answered or obviated. But since this Query has been drawn out into a very great length, so as almost to take in the whole of the controversy; it may be for the ease and conveniency of the reader, to subjoin a brief recapitulation or summary of what has been done in it.

It has been shewn, first, from *Scripture*, that God the Son is *not excluded* by such texts as speak of the Unity; not excluded from being *God*, and *one God* with the Father. The texts that prove this have been explained and vindicated; and the pretended contrary evidence from *Scripture* has been shewn to be null, and of no account.

It has been further proved, that the *ancients* in general teach the same thing, by understanding the *exclusive* texts to affect *idols* only, or *other* Gods; by declaring against admitting any *other God* besides God the Father, yet admitting God the Son; by their asserting Father and Son together to be *one God*, or the *one God*: and, lastly, by their believing God the Son to have been that very Person, who declared *himself* God of Israel, God of Abraham, &c. besides whom the Jews were to have no God; declaring this of himself, in his *own proper Person*, (not excluding the Father or Holy Ghost, one with him,) as being really *God*, because *Son of God*, of the *same divine nature and substance* with God the Father. These things have been proved to have been unanimously taught by the ancients; saving only some little difference in Novatian, a schismatic at that time, and of no considerable authority, (though he also agrees in the main doctrine of the Son's *essential* divinity;) allowing also for some dissent in Eusebius, (a late writer, and a familiar acquaintance of the leading Arians,) in which he is not consistent with himself, or with the Creed which he subscribed, or with his public speeches and debates.

Upon the whole, one can scarce desire fuller or better evidence of what I advanced in this Query than has been produced for it. And, as I formerly told you, so I again repeat it, (though perhaps you may be the last to believe,) that "the Fathers

“ stand pointed against you, and you are certain to expose your cause as often as you hope for any relief or succour from them.” Which shall be yet more fully evidenced in the sequel.

QUERY III.

Whether the word (God) in Scripture can reasonably be supposed to carry an ambiguous meaning, or to be used in a different sense, when applied to the Father and Son in the same Scripture, and even in the same verse? See John i. 1.

YOUR new answer to this Query is, that the word *God*, when applied to the Father, “ denotes him who alone has all perfections, &c. in and of himself, original, underived, &c.” but when applied to the Son, it denotes one who has not his perfections of himself, but derived, &c. and so the word *God* is used in *different* senses, *supreme* and *subordinate*. You might as well say that the word *man*, when applied to Adam, denotes the person of Adam, who was *unbegotten*; but when applied to Seth, it denotes the person of Seth, who was *begotten*; and therefore the word *man* does not signify the same thing, or carry the same *idea* in both cases, but is used in different senses. What I assert is, that the word *God* signifies or denotes *absolute perfection*, whether applied to *Father* or *Son*; and is therefore applied in the same sense to both. He that is possessed of *all perfection* (whether *originally* or *derivatively*) is *God*; all that *God* is, *God* in the highest and fullest sense of the word *God*. You are to shew that *unoriginateness*, or *paternity*, is contained in the *idea* or definition of *God*; or that the word *God* necessarily implies it. By your account, the word *God*, in one sense, signifies as much as *God* and *Father* together. You have no ground for this fancy, either in Scripture or antiquity. The truth is, *God* denotes *all perfection*, and *Father* denotes a *relation* of order, and a particular *manner* of *existing*: all which you confusedly blend together, as if signified by the one word *God*. Hitherto then you have brought no proof of two *different* senses of the word *God*, when applied to Father and Son.

I must observe, that here appears to be a very great change, a very material alteration in your scheme since your writing before. *God* was then a mere *relative*, a word of *office*, and *always* so, in *Scripture*: so the learned Doctor had told us^b, and

^b See Clarke's *Script. Doctrine*, p. 296. 1st edit. Reply, p. 119, 290.

that it was never intended to express *metaphysical attributes*. But now it is to signify *all perfections, original, underived*, (by which you mean *necessary existence*, as you elsewhere explain it.) So that you now come into my notion of the *true* and *proper* sense of the word *God*; excepting that you confound *unoriginateness* with *necessary existence*, which I keep *distinct*: and as I take the necessary existence into the definition of God, I as constantly throw out *unbegotten*, as having nothing to do in it. What kind of a *divinity* you have left to God the Son, you may do well to consider; having excluded him from the one *necessarily existing* Godhead, and from being *God* in the most usual and *scriptural* sense of the word; which you had some pretence to before, while you supposed the word *God* a mere *relative*, whether applied to *Father* or *Son*.

Our dispute about *dominion* is now at an end; though it before made a great part of this Query. I allow that the phrase, *our God*, expresses some *relation* of God to us, as well as what he is *absolutely in himself*. I admitted as much before; so that you need not now have mentioned it as any discovery.

You do not tell me in what sense you make Christ *God*, after you have struck him out of that sense which occurs ordinarily in Scripture, and which is indeed the only *true* and *proper* sense of the word; all the rest being *loose* and *figurative* only, as I shewed at large^d. Instead of *answering* difficulties, which was the part you undertook, you turn *objector*; thereby to hide and cover, if possible, the many flaws in your scheme.

Why do you not tell me plainly in what sense the Son is *God*, that I may argue the point with you, and do justice to the common readers, who want to be satisfied in so important a question?

You *object* to me thus: "If none can properly be styled God, who has not all perfections, how come you to leave out the principal of the essential perfections of the first Cause and Author of all things?" p. 173.

To which I answer, that I leave out no *perfections* at all. I suppose the *Son*, with the *Father*, to be the *one Cause and Author of all creatures*; and there is no need of saying *first* where there is never a *second*. At the same time, I suppose the *Father* to be *Father* of his *Son*; which expresses a *relation* of *order*, and *mode* of existence; not any difference in any *essential perfection*.

^c Defence, vol. i. p. 306.

^d Ibid. p. 304, &c.

Neither is there any greater *perfection* in being a *Father*, in this case, than in being a *Son*; but both are equally *perfect*, equally *necessary* in respect of existence; all things common but the personal characters: and *self-existence*, as distinct from *necessary existence*, is expressive only of the *order* and *manner* in which the *perfections* are in the *Father*, not of any distinct *perfection*. With this answer the Catholic Fathers baffled the Arians and Eunomians, objecting in the same way you now do: and as you might have known this, it might have been more for your credit to have shewn the *answer* to be insufficient, than barely to repeat a stale objection. You have little else but repetition in pages 174, 175. One argument, in a manner, is to serve quite through your book. The *Son* cannot be *supreme God*; no, he cannot, because he is a *Son*, because he is *subordinate*, because he has acted, or still acts *ministerially*. Repeat this ever so often, it proves nothing but a distinction of *Persons*, *order*, and *offices*; no difference of *nature*, or *perfections*, or *Godhead*. And what has the question about *supreme Godhead*, relating to *nature* and *substance*, (as *God* is a word denoting *substance*, and he is *God* supreme that knows no *nature* superior to his own,) to do with *order* or *offices*? The *Son* is *God* supreme for that very reason, because he is a *Son*, of the *same nature* and the same divine *perfections* with the *Father*. But you say, the word “*nature* is of very uncertain, various signification:” and you return me the same loose answer which Dr. Clarke gave to Mr. Nelson^e, which I sufficiently exposed in my Defence^f. The plain fact is, that you are pinched, and you see where, and have nothing to retreat to but insignificant words.

What is there in the words *equality of nature*, more than what every peasant or child may understand? *Man* is in *nature* equal to *man*; *angel* to *angel*; any *individual* to another of the *same* kind: a very little *metaphysics* may suffice in so plain a thing. This then is what I assert, that a supremacy of *order* or of *office* is consistent with *equality of nature*; and if the *Son* be in *nature* equal to the *Father*, he is also equal in *Godhead*, which is a word expressing *nature*; and if equal in *Godhead*, equally *God* *supreme*. Q. E. D. This I took to be sound and true reasoning before: and you have been pleased to confirm it by your *tacit* confession: while you avoid replying to it.

To prove that Christ is *God* in the same sense as the *Father*

^e Clarke's Reply, p. 17.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 448.

is, I appealed to his name *Jehovah*; as I have also elsewhere^g, more at large. To this you have little to answer, besides what I have abundantly replied to above, about Christ's being a *messenger and representative*, &c.

As to what you add of *inferior* angels speaking in the style of their *principals*; you will consider, that it is a notion directly opposite to all the *ancients*; whose general argument for the *divinity* of God the Son, drawn from the appearances under the Old Testament, would be entirely eluded and frustrated by it: neither could they have proved, in that way, the existence of *God the Son*, but upon a supposition directly contrary to you. This therefore is one great prejudice against your notion, and such as ought to have weight with you, while you make your boasts of *antiquity*. Besides, I thought you had before allowed that God the Son was *Jehovah, God, Lord, &c.* in his own *Person*, though in a *subordinate* sense: and I think you then gave me a rebuke, p. 159, for supposing the contrary. Are you now altered of a sudden, and become *another man*? But be it so, this *new* answer will serve no better than the former: for as to any pretended instance you can bring from the Old Testament, it will be answered, that the *angel* was the *Logos*, for that very reason, because he used the *style* of *God*; as it was customary for him to do. And as to your instance from Rev. xi. 1, 3. I own it so runs in the English; but a *scholar* should have looked into the Greek, where he will not find it. This you had notice of long ago^h.

Your example given of the Roman *fecialis* is as little to your purpose as the other. For in the words, *Ego populusque Romanus, I and the Roman people*; *I* does not denote the *senate*, as you imagine, but the *fecialis*, the *herald* himself coming in the name of the *Roman people*, considered in their large collective sense, comprehending all the Romans. senate and people. And so you find, in Rosinus, the herald saying, *Ego sum publicus nuncius populi Romani*: not, *Ego sum populus Romanus*, or, *Ego sum senatus*; as your supposition would require. However, I do not pretend that no instance can be given of such a thing as a *proxy*, in any case whatever. But that God should thus permit a *creature* to be his *proxy*, (as man may permit man,) appears by no means proper or congruous, because of the *infinite disparity*; and because of the inevitable danger it would bring men into, of mistaking the *creature* for the *Creator*, and misplacing their wor-

^g Sermons, p. 44, &c. of this volume.

^h True Script. Doctr. continued, p. 194. See also Mr. Wade, p. 33.

ship, which would be *idolatry*. You proceed (p. 178,) to weaken the force of what I had said in relation to the *name* or *appellation* of *Jehovah*.

Our dispute is in a great measure superseded, since you no longer insist upon the *relative* meaning of the word *God*; against which I was then arguing.

It is very indifferent to me whether *Jehovah* be ever an *appellative*, (as Bishop ⁱPearson thinks,) or always a *proper name*, as others ^kteach; provided only that it be looked upon as a name expressive of an *intrinsic perfection*, and not of an *outward relation*, like *king*, *governor*, &c.

And that it is expressive of *necessary existence*, the best critics, ancient and modern, agree. I had said (vol. i. p. 310, of my Defence) that its primary *signification* is *Being*; to which you answer very strangely, that "the name *Jehovah* signifies neither "primarily, nor at all, Substance, or Being, but Person." This is little more than equivocating upon the word *signify*; which is low employment. Let it *denote* a Person, which is what you mean by *signify*, (for I hope you do not intend to say that the word *Person* is the English for the Hebrew *Jehovah*.) still it signifies the *nature* of that Person to whom the *name* is given, to be *existing*, in the emphatical sense, or *necessarily existing*: and if it be applied to more Persons than one, it still signifies the same also. You are fallen into such a road of talking, without any distinct meaning, that I am sometimes at a loss to know what it is you would say. *Jehovah*, you observe, does not signify *substance*, but the "Person, whose the substance is." I beseech you, what is *Person* but *substance*? Is it intelligent, agent *nothing*? *Person*, as I take it, is intelligent, acting *substance*; (though that is not a full definition;) and so the sense of what you have said amounts to this; that *Jehovah* does not signify *substance*, but the intelligent acting *substance*, whose that *substance* is. Readers will be much edified by these very curious and deep remarks. The truth may be said at once, in a very few words, that the name *Jehovah* denotes the *necessary existence* of as many Persons as it is applied to; and being applied to *Christ*, it is a proof that he is *necessarily existing* as well as the Father, and one *Jehovah* with him; since *Jehovah* is *one*^l. You say, Father and Son being *two agents* will be two *Jehovahs*: but that, you will remember, is begging the question. The *Father* is intelligent

ⁱ Pearson on the Creed, p. 150. ed. 10. ^k Brocklesby's Gospel Theism, p. 347. ^l See my Sermons, p. 140 of this volume.

substance, and the Son intelligent substance; and both *one substance, one Jehovah, one God*. You add, (p. 180,) “being consubstantial with Jehovah will no more make another Person to be the same Jehovah, than being consubstantial with the Father will make him the same Father.” For want of *arguments*, I am forced to take your *sayings*, where there is no argument. I never put the Unity upon *consubstantiality* alone^m: one man is *consubstantial* to another, and yet they are not *one man*, nor *one substance*. But if the Son be not *only consubstantial*, but also *one substance* with the Father, (styled *Jehovah*,) as proceeding from him, and inseparably contained in him; then he is also *one Jehovah* with him. You have a further pretence, that if the Son be *Jehovah*, or $\acute{o} \grave{\omega} \nu$, he will be “unbegotten, unoriginate, &c.” But your reasoning is lame; because you have not proved that $\acute{o} \grave{\omega} \nu$ either signifies *unbegotten*, or ever necessarily implies it. The Father indeed is $\acute{o} \grave{\omega} \nu$, and is *unbegotten*; but not $\acute{o} \grave{\omega} \nu$, because *unbegotten*, but because *necessarily existing*.

Page 181, you come to inform the reader what it is I mean by the Son's being *supreme God*: it is, you say, *supreme* in the *strict sense*; God in the *same sense*, and in as *high* a sense as the *Father himself*; and yet, *strange contradiction!* “referring all to the Father as Father, Head, Fountain, &c.” Now here is no *contradiction* at all, but what you have made to yourself, through your *confusion* of thought, and your want of *distinct* perception. For when I apply *supreme* to the word *God*, I mean as I ought to mean, that the Son is *God supreme*, (knowing no *superior God*, no *divine nature* greater, higher, or more excellent than his own,) not that he is the *supreme Father*: who, though superior in *order*, is not therefore of *superior Godhead*; for a supremacy of *order* is one thing, a supremacy of *nature* or *Godhead*, another. These are plain things to all that have ever dipped in this controversy.

But you come a little closer up to me in your following words, which will indeed deserve notice; because it is running your argument up as far as it can possibly be carried. You say, that upon my principles “there is no impossibility but the Father (if the economy had been so laid) might as well have exercised the authority of the Son, executed his orders, &c.” nay, and “have been begotten also of the Son, and from him have received his being.” But do not blend things together which

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 543, 544.

ought to be kept *distinct*; and then we shall see clearly into this matter, so far as is needful.

If you ask, why that Person called the *Son* might not have been *Father*; I have nothing to say, but that in fact he is not: so it is *written*, and so we *believe*. The Father is *Father*, and the Son is *Son*; and because of this relation of *Father* and *Son*, there is a natural priority of *order*, (I say, *natural*, not *economical*.) by which the Son is referred up to the Father as his *Head*, and not *vice versa*.

As to the Son's acting a *ministerial* part, that indeed is purely *economical*; and there was no *impossibility*, in the nature of the thing, but the Father himself might have done the same: but it was more congruous that he who is *first* in *order* should be *first* in *office* too: and had it been otherwise, it would have been *inverting the order* of the Persons; which, I think, is reason sufficient against it. To which purpose Bp. Pearson very justly observes: "Upon this preeminence, (of the Father,) as I conceive, may safely be grounded the *congruity* of the divine *mission*. We often read that Christ was *sent*, from whence he bears the name of an *apostle* himself, as well as those whom he therefore named so; because as the *Father sent him*, so *sent he them*. The Holy Ghost is also said to be *sent*, sometimes by the Father, sometimes by the Son: but we never read that the Father was *sent* at all; there being an *authority* in that name which seems inconsistent with this *mission*." All this is very right in the Bishop's sense of *authority*; not in yours, as signifying *power* and *dominion* over a *subject*; which is neither *excellent* nor *true* divinity, but false and blasphemous.

You proceed to consider my argument for one and the same strict sense of the word *God*, drawn from John i. 1, which argument the reader may see briefly summed up in my first Sermon, above, p. 45.

I argued, as is usual^o, from the word *God* occurring twice in the *same verse*, without the least hint of any *different* sense. You pretend, on the contrary, that "for that very reason it must

ⁿ Pearson on the Creed, p. 36.

^o Si——evangelista Deum alium majorem et supremum hic indicat, alium vero minorem et longe inaequalem; incogitanter admodum Johannes, ut ait plerumque Athanasius, res adeo disparatas, sine ulla distinctione, uno eodemque vocabulo utramque copulans, significavit: et Verbum, ait, erat apud

Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. Nam quis non voci Deus conjunctim repetitione eandem utrobique significationem statim aptaverit? Quis eandem vocem, bis eodem loco enuntiatam tam disparatas significare putaverit? Montfaucon, Prelim. Dissert. in Euseb. Comment. in Psalm. p. 21.

“bear a different sense, because it is used in the very same “sentence by way of contradistinction,” p. 183. By what kind of *logic* you draw this strange inference, I see not. Suppose it were said, Seth was with *the man*, (i. e. Adam,) and Seth was *man*; doth it follow that the word *man* carries two senses? or God the Father was with *the Spirit*, (meaning the *Holy Ghost*,) and the Father was *Spirit*; does it follow that the word *Spirit* bears two senses? Would it not be rather manifest in both cases, that the words so repeated, and so near one another, are interpretative of each other? “The *Son*,” you say, “is styled *God* the “*Word*, or *Messenger*,” which is more than you know. See my Sermons as to the meaning of the name *Word*^p. But suppose him so styled by way of *prolepsis*, (being here considered antecedently to the creation,) as one that was to be sent to create the world, and to reveal the Father to mankind; how is this at all repugnant to the doctrine of his being the *one God supreme*? I have so often answered this pretence, that I am afraid of nauseating the reader with repetition. You say, “he is distinguished “from him who of his own original supreme authority sends the “message.” Very true; he is distinguished from the *Person* of the *Father*, who has his authority *from none*: and yet the Son having the same *supreme authority* (if you mean power and dominion) *from the Father*, is *one God supreme* with him. He is distinguished, you say, from the “first Cause, of whom are all “things,” because “through him” are all things. He is distinguished in *Person*, and in the *manner*, or *order* of operating; but not as *one cause* from *another cause*: for as all things are *of one*, and *by the other*, both together are *one Cause* of all things^q; their operations undivided, their nature, power, perfections, and glory one.

I had argued, that the Son was God *before the creation*. You say (p. 183.) this infers not *supremacy*. Yes it does: he was before *all creatures*, therefore *no creature*, therefore *no precarious* being, therefore *necessarily existing*, therefore *equal* in nature and *Godhead* with the Father; therefore *God supreme* as well as the Father. The link is never the worse for its length, if it be but well connected.

I had said, that the Son could not be called *God*, in the sense of *dominion*, John i. 1, because he is there considered antecedently to the *creation*, and before any *dominion* commenced.

^p Sermon I. p. 31, &c. of this volume.

^q See my Sermons, p. 54, &c. 66, 80, 82. of this volume.

This, I think, is self-evident. But you have a mind to dispute the point. Your argument is, that God was *merciful, good, and just*, before the creation, therefore also he was *possessed* of dominion, p. 183, 184.

That is to say, he was *disposed* to acts of *goodness, mercy, and justice*, and likewise to *have dominion* in his own appointed time; therefore he had *dominion* before he had it. Does not every body know, that *dominus* and *servus, master and servant*, are *relatives*, as much as *father and son, husband and wife*, and always suppose and imply each other, commence and fall together? Tertullian therefore was very right and accurate in his distinction about *God* and *Lord*^r; that the Father was always *God*, God denoting *nature, substance, and perfections*; but became *Lord* in time, as soon as the creation commenced; *Lord* expressing his *relation* to his creatures. To proceed:

I had argued for Christ's *real* and supreme divinity, from his part in the *creation*, according to John i. Here you have only the same thing over again, about the distinction of *of whom* and *by whom*; which is nothing to the purpose.

I allow, that the Father is *primarily* Creator, and Son *secondarily*, or *subordinately*; and both *one Creator*. There is a difference of *order, or manner*, which yet makes no difference of *power* or *Godhead*: so that this is mere trifling, unless you could prove that the *Unity of Godhead* is not consistent with the distinction of *Persons, order, or offices*; which you have not done. I dispute not whether *διὰ* may express the *primary* efficient cause; it expresses as much *efficiency* as *ὑπὸ* or *ἐκ*, which is all I am concerned for: and as to the different *order* or *manner* of the two Persons concurring in the same thing, it neither makes them *two Causes*, nor *two Creators*, nor *two Gods*; nor is it any argument against the Son's being *Cause, Creator, or God*, in the same high and full sense of those words as the Father.

You have something to say to two instances given, (Rom. xi. 36. Heb. ii. 10.) where *διὰ* is applied to the Father. You interpret the texts of his *providential care*: not that things are *created*, but *preserved, through* him. Allowing you this construc-

^r *Dei* nomen dicimus semper fuisse apud semetipsum et in semetipso, *Dominum* vero non semper. Diversa enim utriusque conditio. *Deus* substantiæ ipsius nomen, id est, divinitatis: *Dominus* vero non substantiæ, sed *potestatis*: substantiam semper fuisse cum

suo nomine, quod est *Deus*; postea *Dominus*, accedentis scilicet rei mentio. Nam ex quo esse cæperunt in quæ potestas Domini ageret, ex illo, per accessionem potestatis, et factus et dictus est *Dominus*. *Tertull. contr. Hermog. cap. 3.*

tion, (which is perfectly precarious,) yet you have only *seemed* to say something, as usual, when, upon the matter, you have really said nothing. For if *διὰ* may be applied even to the Father, who, with you, is the *original efficient Cause* of the *preservation* of all things, and whose is the *original governing Providence*, (a work and business not less considerable than the work of *creation*;) what can you infer merely from *διὰ* being applied to God the Son? He might, notwithstanding what you have here said, be *efficient*, and even *originally* too, either in *creation* or *conservation*; for they are near akin to each other: and so *conservation* has been sometimes styled *continued creation*, being a continuance of the same power. Might you not therefore have been content with my granting you more than you can fairly prove from the bare force of *διὰ*, instead of labouring a needless point; where, at last, you can make nothing out? I have allowed you (which I may now call a *courtesy*) a *priority of order*: make your advantage of it. You say it is in *words*; that is, because you make a difference in *order* to be *no difference in order*; and confound *coordination* with *coequality*. I desire no greater advantage over an adversary than to see him reduced to *self-contradiction* and plain defiance to *common sense*, only to keep up an *hypothesis*. I admit a difference of *order*, not of *nature*: but that word *nature* is so very obscure and *nutaphysical*; I would say, that *distinction* is so plain and obvious, carrying in it so entire a confutation of all you have been saying or doing, that you cannot endure the least mention of it. You have thought it material to observe, (p. 186,) that things are said to have been created for the *pleasure* of God the Father, (Rev. iv. 10, 11,) which is no where said of the Son. To which I answer, nor *twice* of the Father. However, nobody can doubt but the world was created for the *Son's pleasure* as well as the Father's: and to me it seems that the expression of St. Paul ("All things were created by him, and for him") is as strong and significative as the other. I am the more confirmed in it, because I observe that you translate, or construe, *εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα* in Rom. xi. 36. (the very same phrase here used in Coloss. i. 15.) "To his glory they all terminate," (p. 185,) which is as much as *terminating in his pleasure*^s.

We are now to hold a debate about *ὁ Θεός*, which is very needless in the main, because I had really admitted (to shorten

^s See my Sermons, p. 58 of this volume.

our dispute) more than you could prove, either from *Scripture* or *antiquity*. I had allowed δ Θεός to be the ordinary title of God the Father, and rightly reserved to him, in most cases, as his distinguishing personal character^t, in the sense of *αὐτόθεος*. Yet I very well know that this is more than you can prove from the *Fathers*, except from Origen; and that not from his latest and best writings. Might you not then have thought it sufficient to build upon my *concessions*, rather than to make your cause appear the weaker, by endeavouring to give it more strength than belongs to it? It is demonstration, that the *Fathers* in general made no account of the distinction between Θεός and δ Θεός, in our present case; because of their applying a multitude of texts to Christ, where there is δ Θεός, as before shewn. Your pretence of his being considered as *representative* only, has been fully answered above: besides that you are fluctuating and inconsistent in your accounts of that matter; sometimes allowing Christ to be what he is there styled (viz. δ Θεός) in his own *Person*; and again retracting it, by supposing the title to belong only to the *other Person*, whom he *represented*. In short, you seem not to know what to determine, or where to fix; so various and unconstant a thing is error. It being certain that the *Fathers*, in general, so interpreted *Scripture* as to make no account of your distinction; it will be of less weight if they appear to make more of it in their own writings: for why should they fix a rule to themselves which *Scripture* (by their own account) had not observed, but the direct contrary? Indeed, you have two writers, before the Nicene Council, to produce for it, Clemens and Origen: as to Clemens, how little he made of the distinction, as to our present question, may be observed from his manner of styling the Father and Son together δ Θεός, as hath been noted above. Besides this, I took notice that he often gives the Son, *singly*, the title of δ Θεός: and I referred to the places^u: you have something to say to every one of them, to shew how resolute you can be in defending any thing you have once pretended to lay a stress upon. To the first passage^x, you say it is only an allusion to Psalm xxxiv. 8. And what then? Is it ever the less true, that δ Θεός is there applied to Christ? To the second passage^y you say, the Λόγος is spoken of, as per-

^t See my Defence, vol. i. p. 315.

^u Clemens Alex. p. 72, 132, 251, 273, 436, 832.

^x Ἰδετε ὅτι Χριστὸς ὁ Θεός. Clem.

p. 72.

^y Ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἀνονόματος ἦν ὁ Θεός ὁ Κύριος μηδέπω γεγενημένος ἀνθρώπος. Clem. p. 132.

sonating the Father. Not a word does Clemens say of *personating*, but of the Son's being the *face* of the *Father*^z: so that in seeing one, both were, in a manner, seen; one being the perfect resemblance of the other, and *representing* him, (not in your low sense of *personating*,) but exhibiting him, as in a lively mirror, by exhibiting himself. Besides, that it is plain from Clemens, that the same Person who was to be man, was $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός. Was this the *Father*, think you, or the *Son*? To the third passage^a, you say, that the $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός "is not the Λόγος, but a sanctified Christian." But your better retreat is to the *various lection*; not only because your construction is at least *dubious*, but because if it were *certain*, it were still an instance of $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός applied by Clemens contrary to your criticism. To the *fourth* and *fifth* passages^b, you reply, that "τὸν Θεὸν and τῷ Θεῷ may be understood of the Father." To which I need only say, they cannot without straining, and making the construction forced and unnatural. To the *sixth*^c, you say, "the limitations added are "strongly against me." That is only a fancy of your own: but was not the question, whether $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός was applied to Christ by Clemens? An ingenuous man would either have confessed plain fact, or have said nothing. None of the passages, you say, "give to the Son the title ($\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός) in the *absolute* and *unlimited* "construction." And might you not have had this reserve, if I had produced a thousand passages with $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός applied to Christ? I do not expect you should grant them to be understood in the *unlimited* construction: you have resolved against it: and if there were as many instances in *Scripture* as in the *Fathers*, you might still have some pretence against an *unlimited* construction. In the mean while, what becomes of your criticisms upon $\acute{\omicron}$ Θεός, if we are to judge from *other rules*, whether it is to be understood with *limitation*, or otherwise? Doth it not appear, even from yourself, that the insisting on the *article* is very trifling? I had likewise produced Clemens for styling the Son, $\acute{\omicron}$ παντοκράτωρ^d. Here you tell me it is not in an *absolute* construction. And what if it is not? The instance is sufficient to shew that Christ is *true God*, upon Clemens's principles, because he is $\acute{\omicron}$ παντοκρά-

^z Πρόσωπον δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος, ᾧ φωτίζεται ὁ Θεός, καὶ γνωρίζεται. τότε καὶ Ἰσραὴλ ἐπωνόμασται, ὅτε εἶδε τὸν Θεόν, τὸν κύριον· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, ὁ λόγος, &c. Clem. *Ibid*.

^a Clem. Alex. p. 251.

^b *Ibid*. p. 273, 436.

^c Ἀγνοία γὰρ οὐχ ἄπτεται τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου συμβούλου γενομένου τοῦ πατρός. Clem. p. 832.

^d Ἀνευδεῖς γὰρ ὁ τὸν παντοκράτωρα Θεὸν λόγον ἔχων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ὧν χρήξει, ἀπερεί ποτε Clem. p. 227.

τωρ^c, for Clemens makes no distinction about *absolute* construction. But neither can you prove that Clemens does not use the words τὸν παντοκράτορα, in the passage cited, in an *absolute* construction, (if one can know what you mean by *absolute*,) nor if you could, would it at all change the sense of the word παντοκράτωρ, or make it signify any thing less than when applied ever so *absolutely*. Clemens reasons from it in the same manner as he would have done from the same word, or title, understood in the fullest and highest sense that παντοκράτωρ, or *Almighty*, can come up to. It is to little purpose for you to shew that Clemens sometimes styles the Father μόνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ. It is not Clemens's way to use the *exclusive* terms, in such instances, in any *opposition* to God the Son, but quite the contrary; as hath been observed above. As to Origen, you will be able to make no more of the place cited^f than this; that as the Λόγος excels all other his inferiors, so also the Λόγος is *excelled* by the Father; not in the same degree, but in a certain sense, as the Father is αὐτόθεος, God from none, the Son God by partaking of the Father's Godhead.

However, if Origen or his *interpolators* have any where in these *comments* dropped any unwary expressions; you will remember that they are of no moment any further than they are consistent with Origen's certain, well-weighed doctrine, in his treatise against Celsus.

As to Eusebius, your last authority for the distinction between Θεὸς and ὁ Θεός, (whatever his principles were,) all the use he makes of the distinction is only to prove against Marcellus, that the *Son* was not the *Father*. For he perpetually charges Marcellus with *Sabellianism*; as making the *Son* to be the *Father*, and *vice versa*. His words, literally and justly rendered, (not as you render them,) run thus: "The Evangelist could have said, the Word was ὁ Θεός, with the addition of the article, had he thought the Father and Son to be one and the *same thing*, and that the Word himself was *the God* over allg." The sense of this passage will entirely depend upon a right consideration of what it was that Eusebius charged Marcellus

^c Οὐ γὰρ Θεὸν ἀπλῶς προσεῖπεν ὁ τῆ τοῦ ἄρθρου προτάξει τὸν παντοκράτορα δηλώσας. Clem. p. 548.

^f Δεκτέον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὅτι τότε μὲν αὐτόθεος ὁ Θεός ἐστι—πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενον, οὐκ ὁ Θεός, ἀλλὰ Θεὸς κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο. Orig.

in Joh. p. 46, 47. Vid. Huetii not. p. 93, 94.

^g Δυνάμενος γοῦν εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὁ Θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος, μετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἄρθρου προσθήκης, εἴ γε ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἠγάγει τὸν πατέρα εἶναι καὶ τὸν υἱόν' αὐτὸν τε εἶναι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεόν. Euseb. contr. Marc. p. 127.

with ; or how he understood Marcellus to affirm the Father and Son to be the *same thing*, or *same God*.

Now this will easily appear from divers places in Eusebius's treatise against him. He charges Marcellus with making the Word a mere *notional* thing, fleeting and vanishing, like a *human* word, nothing *living* and *subsisting*^h. He charges him with taking it in a *Jewish* sense, and making no more than a *nominal* difference between the *Father* and his *Word*ⁱ: one *Essence* and one *Hypostasis* too, in the way of Sabellius. He charges him with taking away the very *existence* as well as *Hypostasis* of the Son ; with making one *Hypostasis* with *three names*^k, having no more than a *nominal*, not a *real* distinction. Hence it is plain what Eusebius, in the passage above cited, meant by ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν, *one and the same thing*; as also by making the Λόγος to be τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεόν, *the God over all*. It was making Father and Son *one Person*, as we now term it ; and so confounding both in one, as to take away all *real distinction*. You have therefore no reason to think I had *partially* represented Eusebius, when I said, (*Defence*, vol. i. p. 315,) that he made no further use of the observation about the *article*, than to prove against Marcellus, that the Λόγος is a distinct *real Person*, and not the *Father* himself. It is you that have *partially* represented Eusebius, either to serve your *hypothesis*, or for want of considering the drift and scope of Eusebius's treatise, and in what sense he uses his terms.

What then is the result of your inquiries about the *distinction* between Θεὸς with the article and without it? 1. You have not been able to prove that the Ante-Nicene writers in *general* took any notice at all of it: *two* only are found, Clemens and Origen. The former never applies it at all to the text of St. John, nor makes any use of it to shew the preeminence of the *Father* above the *Son*: so far from it, that he gives the title of ὁ Θεὸς indifferently to Father, or Son, or to both together, according as occasion offers. The latter has indeed, in an unaccurate work, or perhaps corrupted, mentioned the distinction, and applied it to prove some preeminence of the Father as being God *of himself*, or *unbegotten*. But in his later and more certainly genuine works, he has nothing of this kind, but resolves the *Unity* in a very different way from what he had done in his *Commentaries*; answering the objection of *Ditheism* upon quite another foot.

^h Euseb. p. 4, 19. p. 5.

ⁱ Euseb. p. 33, 35, 36.

^k Ibid. p. 167, 175.

2. You have not been able to shew that the Fathers ever imagined the *Scripture style* to be at all conformable to that *distinction*: nay, the contrary is evident from their citing a multitude of texts of the Old Testament, and applying them to *Christ* as therein denoted by the title of $\delta \Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$. 3. You have not been able to shew, that the Father ever invariably or carefully followed any such rule in their *own style*, (though you confidently affirm they did, p. 188.) For, besides what hath been shewn from Clemens, examples may be given to the contrary out of the other ancient writers¹. 4. If it could have been proved that this *distinction* had been ever so constantly observed; yet no certain consequence in favour of your principles could be drawn from it: nothing but what (for the sake of shortening a dispute) I would have admitted, without your producing any ancient writer for it; namely this, that the Father is emphatically $\delta \Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$, as *first Person*, though the Son be $\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ in the same sense: almost in like manner as the Holy Ghost is emphatically $\tau \acute{o} \pi \nu \epsilon \acute{\upsilon} \mu \alpha$, though the Father or Son be $\pi \nu \epsilon \acute{\upsilon} \mu \alpha$ in as strict and proper a sense of $\pi \nu \epsilon \acute{\upsilon} \mu \alpha$ as the other.

You at length bring me a quotation from Theodorus Abucara, a very orthodox man of the ninth century, allowing that in *Scripture style* $\delta \Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ is a title *appropriate* to the Father. This is more than the *ancients* would have allowed; except the observation be confined to the New Testament. However, you may perceive that, in the judgment of very orthodox men, our cause is in no danger from this famed distinction^m: they knew the difference between allowing $\delta \Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ to be an *appropriate title*, and making the sense of $\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ depend upon an *article*.

As to John i. 1. where the want of the *article* before $\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ is made an objection against us, it should be considered that the expression, $\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma \eta \nu \delta \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma$, is just what it should be on our principles. The want of the *article* determines $\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma$ to be the *predicate*, ascertains the construction against the Sabellians, and is the very expression which any accurate Greek writer would

¹ Irenæus, p. 211, 215, 271. ed. Bened. Hippolytus, vol. i. p. 267. ii. p. 15, 20. Melito, cit. a Grab. Not. in Bull. p. 86. Origenes contr. Cels. p. 85, 162.

^m Petavius, where he cites the passage you mention, cites also another of the same author; which deserved your notice.

$\Theta ε \acute{o} \varsigma \delta \epsilon \xi \acute{\alpha} \iota \rho \acute{\epsilon} \tau \omega \varsigma \lambda \acute{\epsilon} \gamma \epsilon \tau \alpha \iota, \acute{\epsilon} \pi \epsilon \iota \delta \eta \eta$

$\acute{\epsilon} \nu \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma, \eta \tau \omicron \iota \alpha \nu \acute{\alpha} \pi \tau \upsilon \xi \iota \varsigma \kappa \alpha \iota \alpha \nu \alpha \kappa \epsilon \phi \alpha \lambda \alpha \acute{\iota} \omega \sigma \iota \varsigma \tau \eta \varsigma \tau \rho \acute{\iota} \alpha \delta \omicron \varsigma \delta \acute{\omicron} \pi \alpha \tau \acute{\eta} \rho \acute{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \iota \nu, \acute{\omega} \varsigma \acute{\epsilon} \dot{\iota} \pi \epsilon \nu \delta \theta \epsilon \omicron \lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \varsigma. \textit{Petav. Trin. lib. iv. cap. 15. p. 262.}$

“He is emphatically styled *God*, because the Father is the *Union*, or “folding up, or recapitulation of the “Trinity; as (Gregory) the *divine* “has observed.”

choose, rather than the other, to signify what we understand by it.

Having done with criticisms, you return to your *logical* subtleties. I had admitted a *priority of order*, yet denying the Son to be God in a *subordinate* sense: upon which you remark, “then he is God in a coordinate sense; and what becomes of “the priority of order?”

To which I answer, that though he be God in a *coordinate*, or rather the *same sense* of the word *God*. yet he is God in a *subordinate manner*, as being *God of God*: and now what becomes of the *subordinate sense* of the word *God*?

You pretend, that *subordinate* has necessarily a relation to *government*: which I deny. And if you could prove it, (as you cannot,) all that would follow is, that God the Son is not *subordinate*. And then, instead of saying that he is *subordinate*, we would only say that he is *a Son*, or that he is *of the Father*; changing the phrase, but still retaining the doctrine under other terms. But it is ridiculous to assert, that a difference of *order* does not make a *subordination*, or an equality of *order* a *coordination*. To my instance of Adam and Seth, you say, that “to Adam, considered as a governor, Seth was subordinate.” Yes, and *subject* too. But to Adam, considered merely as a *Father*, he was only *subordinate*, and not *subject*.

You add, that “man being the abstract name of a species, “all men are equally men.” In like manner, *God* being a name for as many Persons as have the *divine nature*, every Person having that *nature* is equally *God*. You go on: “Among men “a son does not derive his being from his father—but God, “when he is styled Father, must always be understood to be “*airía*, a true and proper cause, really and efficiently giving “life.” This is the philosophy of Dr. Clarke”: and it is to intimate, that though every son of man has the “nature of man,” and is *equal in nature* to his father; yet the “Son of God” must not have the “nature of God,” nor be in nature equal to the Father. Excellent doctrine! And yet you are affronted to be called Arians. The answer is, that God the Father is not the *cause* of his Son, in Dr. Clarke’s sense; who admits no *necessary* causes. Neither can the Doctor prove, either from *Scripture* or *Fathers*, that ever the Son was so *caused* by a voluntary act, or *choice*. In the old sense of *cause*, as the sun is the

ⁿ Clarke’s Script. Doct. p. 239, 273. ed. 2nd.

cause of light, the root of its branches, the fountain of streams, and the like, the Father was ever believed to be the *cause* of his Son, and no otherwise.

What you hint from Novatian about power, means only *paternal authority*, and *priority of order* on that account. You conclude with saying, that I might have argued that "the Son " is included in the one unbegotten God." But I do not find Scripture speaking any thing of the one *unbegotten* God. It mentions the *one God*, and excludes all *other* Gods; wherefore the Son being included, is not *another God*, but the *same God*. And though I like not the expression of "the unbegotten God, and "the begotten God," because it comes too near the language of *Ditheism*, (which you are every where inculcating,) yet I shall make no scruple of saying, that the Father, God *unbegotten*, and the Son, God *begotten*, are both *one God*°.

QUERY IV.

Whether, supposing the Scripture notion of God to be no more than that of the Author and Governor of the universe, or whatever it be, the admitting of another to be Author and Governor of the universe, be not admitting another God; contrary to the texts before cited from Isaiah, and also to Isa. xlii. 8. xlvi. 11. where he declares he will not give his glory to another?

IN defence of this *Query*, I charged you with *Ditheism*, as professing one *Author and Governor* to be a *God*, and another *Author and Governor* to be a *God* likewise: not the *same God* with the other, but *another*, consequently *two Gods*; which is undeniably evident in your scheme.

You say, in answer, that my "defence of this and of the "following *Query* is in reality (without intending it) an attempt "to expose and render ridiculous the *express* doctrine of St. John "and St. Paul, and to make it appear inconsistent with the Old "Testament," p. 195.

The reader, I doubt not, will be surprised at this high flight of extravagance. Hitherto I thought I had to do with a *sober man*, however mistaken in many things. But you are now giving yourself liberties of such a kind, as can scarce be thought consistent with that character. What I expected of you was, that you should clear your *hypothesis* of the charge of "two Gods;" every man taking it for granted, that neither St. John nor St. Paul, neither *Scripture* nor *antiquity*, ever taught *two Gods*.

° See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, p. 209, &c. of this volume.

But the charge being so full and plain, that you can no way evade it, you are resolved, it seems, to carry it off with an air of assurance, and to charge even St. John and St. Paul with the same. You do well to put your authorities very high and strong; because, I remember, Justin Martyr and Irenæus have said, that they could not have believed even our *Lord* himself, had he preached up *another God* beside the Maker of all things. However, if you are able to make your point good from *Scripture*, I shall think it sufficient. And suffer me once more to dispute it with you; not to *expose* or render ridiculous St. John or St. Paul, (God forbid!) but men of a much lower class; who, when their cause is most desperate, are used to put on the greatest confidence for a blind to the readers. Let us hear what you have to say: and do not tell me that I am “not arguing against “Dr. Clarke and you, but against plain Scripture;” as if Scripture were plain for *two Gods*.

You begin with your old pretence, that the texts of Isaiah are all “expressly personal.” Be it so: so also are many expressions in *Scripture* and *antiquity*, indeed in all writers; where yet the *exclusive* terms exclude those persons only whom they were intended in *opposition* to. It is a rule of language common to all kinds of authors; whereas your rigorous interpretation of the *exclusive* terms has nothing in the nature of the thing, or in custom of speech, to support it. You can scarce dip into any writer, but you find exceptions against it.

You endeavour further to shift off the charge of *Ditheism*, by retorting it upon me. But how wide a difference is there in the two cases! As I maintain that the Son is not *another God*, nor both *two Gods*, so I consistently teach that both are *one God*: you maintain, that God can be a name for no more than “one Person,” that each of the Persons is “a God,” and that they are not together “one God.” What is this but saying directly that they are *two Gods*? I may mistake in my *hypothesis*, (which yet has not been shewn,) but you are plainly *self-condemned*. You have recourse to St. Paul, (p. 197,) who favours your notions as little as I do. You ask, whether he “was a teacher of “Polytheism?” I verily think not: and if your doctrine stands as clear as St. Paul’s, all will be well with you. But do not father your conceits upon the blessed Apostle. He *directs* us, you say, “to the one true God, of whom are all things.” Yes, he tells us that the “Father, of whom are all things,” is the “one God,” in opposition to false ones, to *nominal* gods and lords:

and it is plain, that he meant it not in *opposition* to God the Son, because he reckons him “God to us,” (Rom. ix. 5,) which none of the *nominal* gods are. Now, since the same St. Paul says that “there is no other God but one,” (1 Cor. viii. 4,) it is manifest that though the Father be *emphatically* styled *one God*, yet he and the Son together are not *two Gods*, but *one God*^p.

You ask, whether when St. Paul tells us that “God our Saviour——saved us——through Jesus Christ our Saviour,” he does thereby preach *two Saviours*? (Tit. iii. 4, 6.) Yes certainly, unless both *be one Saviour*. Wherefore you by denying them to be *one*, make *two Saviours*, as you do also *two Gods*. To your other question, I answer, that *Jesus Christ* is the same *God* and the same *Saviour*, though not the same *Person* with him styled “God our Saviour,” Tit. iv. You go on: “Did our Saviour himself introduce heathen Polytheism, when he said, (Mark xii. 29,) *The Lord our God is one Lord*, and yet immediately after mentions *another Lord*, ver. 36?” But who has taught you to call that *other, another Lord*? This did not our Saviour: you are the *Polytheist*, (and not he,) by your strained and false comments upon his words.

This is what you call producing *express Scripture*.

What you have further, p. 198, about Bp. Pearson and Bp. Bull, (who are both directly against you,) is marvellous; as also your account of *antiquity*, which has been answered. Your pretence, that no ancient writer ever argued against *Polytheism*, by alleging that Christ is the “one supreme God,” or individually the “same God,” is a shameful misreport, a manifest untruth; unless you have some poor equivocation in the words. Tertulian, Origen, Hippolytus, Lactantius, &c. as many as resolve the Unity of *Godhead* into *Unity of substance*, (as the ancients in general do,) are so many evidences of your falsehood. For if Christ be *one substance* with the Father, he is *one God supreme*, God being a name of substance.

Your telling me that I make “one substance,” but never “one God,” is just as if you had said, I make *one God*, but never make *one God*: or else it is a weak begging the question. You pretend, the Unity of God is secure by making one *original Cause*. Right; if you take in God the Father and God the Son into the *one Godhead*: otherwise, by excluding one of your *Gods*, you make a *supreme God* and an *inferior God*, after the

^p See my Sermons, p. 53, &c. of this volume.

way of *Pagan Polytheists*; and so *Ditheism* is unavoidable. I asked, where the sacred writers ever limited the sense of the texts relating to the *Unity* by the word *supreme*? Where do they say there is but one *supreme* God, instead of *one God*? You have not one text to produce out of the *laws* against *idolatry*: a plain sign that Scripture went upon quite other principles than yours. And the reason of it is evident, because the design was to intimate that no *other* God but the *God of Israel* was to be admitted.

To have made him *supreme* God only, would have left room for any *inferior* deities to be taken in with him. The place of the Psalms (Ps. xlvii. 2.) declaring God to be ὑψιστος, or *most high*, reacheth not the point; unless it had been said, *you shall have none other most high God but him*, to leave room for *lower* deities. There is a great deal of difference between saying, there is *one most high God*, and there is *one God who is most high*: as much as between saying, there is *one supreme King of Great Britain*, and there is *one King of Great Britain who is supreme*. Your instance is the more unfortunately chosen, because the very Person there styled ὑψιστος, *most high*, is by some of the ancients (Justin Martyr particularly) understood to be *God the Son*; which I infer from their interpreting verse the 5th, &c. of him. Your other instances are as little to your purpose: but it is pretty remarkable, that while you are confidently glorying of nothing less than *plain* and *express* Scripture, you are talking in a style *unknown* to Scripture, but very well *known* to the Pagans, that there is one only *supreme* God; intimating that there are *inferior* Gods, or *one God* at least, besides him. As to your several *what-think-you's*, p. 200, I refer you to my Sermons 9.

You tell me, that ὁ Θεός, in Scripture, &c. signifies the *supreme* God. Does it so? Then according to all *antiquity*, applying ὁ Θεός to Christ in their citations of the Old Testament, Christ is the *supreme God*. But I beg leave to say, that it signifies only *God*; and there is no need of saying *supreme God*, when there is no reference to an *inferior* God: and therefore Scripture, and generally *antiquity*, say nothing of a *supreme* God, because they acknowledged no *inferior* God; to which such expressions have a tacit reference. It was from the Pagans that such language was at first borrowed, and used at length by some Christian writers. (as Arnobius and Lactantius,) though by them very

9 Sermon VII. p. 167 of this volume.

rarely; and with such cautions as might be sufficient to prevent misconstruction.

As St. Paul was willing to adopt the name of *unknown God*, in compliance with the Pagan *phrase*, to lead them into a belief of the God of the Christians: so some of the Fathers were inclinable to take the name of *πρῶτος Θεός*, or *princeps Deus*, and to apply it, in a Christian sense, to draw the Pagans insensibly to the worship of the *true God*, under such a name as they had given to a *false* one. Otherwise this kind of phrases is not properly Christian. nor to be used by Christians.

It is one thing to say God is *supreme*, is *παντοκράτωρ*, is *over all*, or the like; and quite another to say, there is one *supreme God*; which, in propriety of speech, implies that he has *another God* under him. We say of *the King*, that he is *supreme* in his dominions; but who ever talks of the *supreme King of Great Britain*, as if there were any *other* king of Great Britain? *Supreme moderator* and *governor*, we say, because there are subordinate *moderators* and *governors*. You do well to quote Nebuchadnezzar for the phrase of "God of Gods." Dan. ii. 47. It was a very proper expression for an idolatrous king to use; and was well suited to a Pagan *hypothesis*. And if the like phrase occurs elsewhere^r, in the sacred writers, the intent is not to signify that any *inferior* God was admitted under the *supreme*, but that the *God of Israel* was far superior to all the *reputed* gods of the nations.

Your comment upon Isa. xlii. 8. xlviii. 11. is very extraordinary, that God will not give the *glory* of being *underived* (that is all your comment amounts to) to any. Certainly he *will not* do what he *cannot*. But was it suitable to the divine Majesty to acquaint his people, that he will not (with reverence be it spoken) do the most staring contradiction and palpable absurdity? It is evident that his glory is his worship, all religious worship, (which might be taken from him, and placed upon false gods,) and he would not suffer it with impunity to be transferred from him to other objects. As to your pretended "mediate" worship, it shall be considered hereafter.

My saying that God has engrossed all divine honour to himself, you call "a most presumptuous contradiction to the whole New Testament." But as it is no great *presumption* to dispute with men fallible as myself, about the sense of the New Testament; so I hope the reader will not take you to be in earnest,

^r Esdras v. 8. Nehem. viii. 6. Vid. Cleric. in loc.

but will rather kindly excuse a few passionate words, such as men are apt to throw out in great extremities.

You appeal to John v. 22. to prove that God has given honour and worship to Christ as "Son of man." This will be distinctly debated hereafter. At present, it is enough to say, that Christ, rather than the Father, is to execute judgment upon *man*, because he himself is *man*, (which the Father is not,) and that so high and great an *office* is an evident token of what he is, *very God*, as well as very man; and therefore all men are to "honour him even as they honour the Father." You have taken a great deal of fruitless pains to shew, that the particular glories belonging to the Son, on account of his *offices*, are distinct from the glories belonging to the Father. You might, in the same way, have shewn, that the particular glories due to the Father under this or that consideration, are distinct from the glories of the Father considered under another capacity. For instance, the glory of the Father considered as *King*, is one glory; as *Judge*, another glory; as *God of the Jews* one thing, as *God of Christians* another, as *God of angels* another. And thus you may multiply the *worship* of the Father into a thousand several *worships*, by as many distinct considerations. But as all these several glories arise from the display of his *attributes* of wisdom, justice, goodness, &c. and all his attributes are founded in the excellency of his *nature*; so all the particular *worships* are reduced to *one*, as being an acknowledgment of that *one divine nature*, the root and source of all. The same I say of God the Son: all the particular glories belonging to him on account of his *offices*, relative to us, are but partial considerations of his attributes, of his *goodness, mercy, wisdom, &c.* which *attributes* have their root and foundation in the excellency of his *nature*, which *nature* is the same with the Father's; and thus all the particular *glories*, or *worships*, resolve into *one glory*, or *worship*, paid to that *nature* which is *common* to Father and Son. But of this I shall treat more distinctly in the sequel.

To conclude this article, you have not been able to clear yourself of the charge of believing and professing *two Gods*: but after a great many big words, and only words, about St. John, and St. Paul, and *plain Scripture*; you appear to have been doing nothing else but *perverting* Scripture, and *depraving* Christianity, and teaching us a *new* language, as well as a new faith, in asserting a *supreme* God and an *inferior* God, instead of *one God*.

QUERY V.

Whether Dr. Clarke's pretence, that the authority of Father and Son being one, though they are two distinct Beings, makes them not to be two Gods, as a king upon the throne, and his Son administering his Father's government, are not two kings, be not trifling and inconsistent? For if the King's son be not a king, he cannot truly be called king; if he is, then there are two kings. So, if the Son be not God, in the Scripture notion of God, he cannot truly be called God; and then how is the Doctor consistent with Scripture or with himself? But if the Son be truly God, there are two Gods upon the Doctor's hypothesis, as plainly as that one and one are two: and so all the texts of Isaiah cited above, besides others, stand full and clear against the Doctor's notion.

YOU go on here in the same confident way, (your confidence always rising as your arguments fall,) telling me that I "condemn Scripture for giving the Son the title of God:" because, forsooth, I condemn you for giving him the *title*, and denying him the *thing*; while Scripture allows him *both*. You have nothing to reply, but that there is "one first Cause," &c. and therefore but "one God." If a man were to admit this, you would still never be able to come at the conclusion you intend. For suppose the Father were allowed to be *one God*, as the *first Cause*, but God the Son *God* notwithstanding, as *necessarily existing*; this *hypothesis* is every whit as defensible as yours, or more so: only it is liable to the charge of *Ditheism*, as yours also is; and the like solutions would serve equally for either. This I hint, that you may not imagine yourself ever able to gain your point in that way of reasoning. But I proceed in my charge of *Ditheism* upon your scheme. You own the Son to be a *God*, though not included in the *one God*; therefore you make *two Gods*. You have no hopes of evading the charge yourself: but you think it may be some relief to bring me in to share with you in it; and so you feebly endeavour to retort it. I will not transcribe all you have trifled on this head: your argument, or rather no argument, but *calumny*, is, that I make "two supreme Gods." Shew me how. You tell me they are "two Gods," (in my *hypothesis*.) though "undivided in substance." But this is a miserable begging of the main question, that *two Persons* cannot be *one God*: whereas my charge of *Ditheism* upon you is founded upon this plain maxim, as plain as that two and two are four, that *one God* and *another God* are *two Gods*: or that two Per-

sons, each of which is a God, and not together *one God*, are *two Gods*. Learn at length to submit to a self-evident maxim, and either confess *two Gods*, or throw out the Son from being *God* at all. You talk, in your usual deceitful way, of the ancient Christians making the “origination in the divine Paternity to be “the assertion of the Unity:” which is a thing directly and fully to my purpose, and as directly contrary to yours. For the *ancients* from this principle concluded that all the three Persons are *one God*, (which Bishop Pearson observes;) and you, in contradiction to the *ancients*, infer from the same principle, that they are not “one God.” Was there ever a more shameless abuse upon the ignorant readers? I have recited the passage of Bishop Pearson (which you refer to) once before, and shall now again (if it be possible to make any impressions upon your modesty) cite it to your shame, for thus imposing on your readers.

“This origination in the divine Paternity hath anciently been “looked upon as the assertion of the Unity: and therefore the “Son and Holy Ghost have been believed to be but *one God* “with the Father, because both from the Father, who is one, and “so the *Union* of them^s.” This is a true account of the *ancients*, worthy of that great man; while yours is so entirely false, that were it not that you have the privilege of writing without a *name*, one might think, that pure regard to your *character* might deter you from these liberties.

How have you the *assurance* to represent my notion as different from Bishop Pearson's, when every body that has seen my books knows that Bishop Pearson's and mine are exactly the same? Do not I every where assert the *Paternity*, and resolve the Unity, as the Bishop with all the *ancients* does, into Unity of *substance* and *original*? All the three are *one God*, because two are referred up to one Father, to whom they adhere, and from whom they derive their substance, the same divine substance with his. I had reduced you to this dilemma, either to assert *two Gods*, or to make *no God* of the Son; which I called *ungodding* him. Instead of an answer, you give me a rebuke; as usual, when sore pressed. You pretend, that you declare the Son to be God as much as *Scripture* does: and so will any Socinian or Samosatene say, while he supposes him never to have existed before he was *man*. By the same or the like argument you may make a *God* of every *angel*, inasmuch as angels are called *Gods* in *Scripture*. But while, notwithstanding,

^s Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

you deny the *necessary existence* of an *angel*, and make his title *nominal*, who sees not that you deny him to be *God*? And thus do you with God the Son. The case is manifest: and an ingenuous man would rather give up so plain a point, than expose himself by inventing little quibbles to make things appear what they are not, and to keep up a show of believing what he believes not.

But I am next to be charged as “ungodding the Son.” Let us hear how: you have been hitherto very unhappy in the way of retorting. I assert *him to be God in as high a sense as the Father*. Well, how is this *ungodding* him. Here you are silent. But I acknowledge him to be *derived, sent* to execute the Father’s orders, &c. Shew me then that either his being a *Son*, or being *sent*, is any way inconsistent with *equality of nature* or *Unity of Godhead*: here you are lost again. But you come *trembling* to tell me, “I ungod the Father.” You ought to *tremble* at such false and unrighteous accusations. Well, how do I do it? By *asserting another independent, another supreme Lord, &c.* Wonderful; when my business is to maintain, that he is not *another independent supreme Lord*, but the *same Lord*. “I deprive him,” you say, “of his original independent supremacy.” What! of his *Paternity*? but I own him to be *Father*, and first considered in every thing common both to the Son and him. You have made nothing out in the way of retorting. Come we next to Tertullian and Athenagoras; to see whether they agree with you or me, in resolving the *Unity*. The criterion is this: if they take Father and Son both into the *one God*, they are *mine*; if they separate the Son from the Father, making *another God*, or *no God* of him, then they are *yours*. Tertullian, you say, founds the “Unity of God upon the supremacy of the Father *alone*, in the government of the “universe.” That is false; for Tertullian makes all the three Persons of *one authority, one state, one substance*, because *one God*. They are his very words cited above^t. Neither are you able to prove any thing contrary to it, out of all his Works. I referred you to a passage of Tertullian, where he rejects the notion of an *inferior God* as a Pagan dream^u: and to shew how consistent

^t See above, p. 459.

^u Neque enim proximi erimus opinionibus nationum, quæ si quando coguntur Deum confiteri, tamen et alios infra illum volunt. Divinitas autem gradum non habet, utpote unica.

Contr. Hermog. cap. 7. Deus non erit dicendus, quia nec credendus nisi summum magnum. Nega Deum quem dicis deteriozem. Contr. Marc. lib. i. cap. 6.

he is with himself, he makes the *Son* not an *inferior* God but the *same* God with the Father; and he applies the general maxim to the particular case of *Father and Son*^x, as having the same *divinity*, same *power*, &c. Your pretence of Tertullian's making the *Son subordinate*, is meanly equivocating upon a word. He makes him subordinate, as I also do, in *order*, or *office*, not in *dominion*: and you are very sensible that while you are pleading Tertullian's expressions in favour of your notions, you make him all over *inconsistent*, and *contradictory* to his own plain and avowed principles. You might at this rate quote all the *Post-Nicene* Fathers, who allow of a *subordination* as much as Tertullian. You run out (p. 211.) upon the history of his dispute with Marcion, as if that were any secret. After a great many words, you have nothing to elude his testimony against an *inferior* God, but a *precarious* fiction, or conjecture, that he would not have owned the *Son* to be *summum Magnum*, the *supreme Being*; though he plainly does own it in making his *substance* the same with the *Father's*, and ascribing the same *divinity*, *power*, and *quality* (*unius status*) to him. Your cavils about *derivatio* and *portio* have been considered above, (p. 458.) But you lay great stress upon Tertullian's supposing the *summum Magnum*, the *supreme Being*, to be *unbegotten*, which you think must exclude the *Son*. But, under favour, it is never Tertullian's way to exclude the *Son*. *Father and Son* together, upon his principles, were the one *unbegotten eternal substance*, till the *generation* of the *Son*: and then the *Son* was *begotten*, the *Father unbegotten*, and both still the *same substance* as before, under a different *economy*. You would insinuate, as if the *Son* was (according to Tertullian) *begotten into a Person*, just before the creation, by the good pleasure of the *Father*. I refer the reader to Bp. Bull, for a confutation of this weak and groundless charge. I may however take notice of it, as a thing very particular, that, till you have made the *ancients* the most *stupid men* that ever lived, you presume not to claim them as advocates for your opinions. Is it a fair way of dealing with authors to strain and wrest their expressions to a sense directly repugnant to their known and standing principles? Could not you do the same by Athanasius himself, if you were so disposed, and claim all the

^x Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie: *Unius autem substantiæ, et unius status, et unius potestatis,*

quia unus Deus. *Contr. Prax.* cap. 2. Trinitas unius divinitatis, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus. *De Pudic.* cap. 21.

Post-Nicene Fathers, as well as *Ante-Nicene*, by the help of the like chicane? The question, you say, "is not whether Tertullian always speaks consistently:" and you "are not" you say, "indicating Tertullian's reasoning," but such "plainly is his notion." In this way of talking, I know not why you should not put in your claim to all the *orthodox* men that ever wrote upon the Trinity. For, as you think them all *inconsistent*, it is only taking those principles which you may be able to strain to a sense agreeable to your notions, and then you may claim their countenance and authority: much in the same way as Dr. Clarke has shewn you, in respect of our *Creeds* and *Liturgy*. The reader, I hope, sees, by this time, what your boasts of *antiquity* amount to: little more than the same game over again with the *ancients*, which the Doctor had before practised with our Church's *forms*.

You are next finding fault with my account of Tertullian, vol. i. p. 321, 322. of my Defence. The objection, I said, as Tertullian resolved it, was, that the *authority would not be one*. I thought my putting in the parenthesis (as Tertullian resolves it) might have been hint sufficient to a man of ordinary acumen. I knew what the objectors meant by *monarchia*; and I knew also to what sense Tertullian turned it in his answer: which, it seems, you did not attend to. He tells you, from his knowledge of Greek and Latin, that *monarchia* ought to signify *singulare et unicum imperium, one singular government, or authority*; and under this view he proceeds to answer Praxeas's objection about *monarchia*. But you say this instance of Tertullian may serve to shew that Father and Son are not two Monarchs, but that "the one Monarch must be he only in whom the authority is original." But then you will consider that hereby you make the Son no *Monarch*: and so, instead of making the Father and the Son *one God*, (which this example was intended to illustrate,) you make the Son no *God* at all; or else you make a *supreme God* and an *inferior God*, that is, *two Gods*, which you pretend to disown. Nor can you ever come off from so evident a *dilemma*.

I say then, that Tertullian's similitude, though it answered his purpose, does not at all serve yours. And therefore I observed to you, that Tertullian resolved the Unity of God, not into the Father's being sole Monarch, which would have been giving up the *divinity* of God the Son, but into Unity of *power, substance, Godhead*, common to both: taking both into the *one Godhead*, and *one God*. Had you done so too, you had done

wisely, and might then have claimed some countenance from *antiquity*; which your *novel* scheme is directly opposite to.

“Unity of substance,” you say, “can never make two equally “supreme Monarchs *one God*.” But it may make two Persons, considered as equally *supreme* over all, to be but *one Monarch*, and *one God*; and that is as well.

I had said of Athenagoras, that he resolves the Unity of God-head into Unity of *substance* and original. “As if,” say you, “Unity of substance and Unity of original were the same thing.” I do not say they are precisely the *same*; for then I need not have mentioned both. But this I say, that no *Unity of substance*, unless the *original* was one, so as to make the substance, as it were, of the same stock, would be sufficient upon the principles of the ancients.

I very well knew what I was talking about. Two *unoriginate* divine Persons, however otherwise *inseparable*, would be *two Gods*, according to the ancients. But if one be not only *consubstantial*, but also *of the other*, and referred up to him as a head or fountain, two such Persons were believed to be *one God*. This was the Catholic method, not of making the Father *singly*, but Father and Son *one God*; which was their pious care and truly Christian concern, and which they expressed on all occasions against Jews, Pagans, and heretics.

Your observations on Athenagoras are answered above. You have in this page (p. 216.) and the following one, the shrewdest way of talking I have yet met with. You have discovered, it seems, that my principles and yours are the very same; and that we *need not dispute longer*. Indeed, I was wondering at your dulness in not making the discovery sooner. For I very well knew that you could never bring over the *ancients* to your principles, but you must at the same time take me also along with them: and the very same arguments which you make use of to draw them in as advocates to your cause, must of course draw me in too, being inviolably attached to them. You have therefore here done me justice, undesignedly. I am really on your side as much as ever the *ancients* were: and you are very consistent in taking me in with them. But the misfortune is, that the *pretty* way you have of fetching any thing, or any man you please, into a side, and forcing them into your service, is become greatly contemptible; especially after the attempts made upon such men as Bishop Pearson and Bishop Bull, and

upon our *Creeeds, Articles, and Liturgy*. You have carried the wile too far : and now every body sees through it.

But let us hear, at length, how it is that I am brought over to countenance your principles ; and let the reader, from this instance, make a judgment of the rest. You proceed thus : “ If
“ the Unity of the Godhead is to be resolved into one *head, root,*
“ *fountain, and Father of all,* the Son who is not the *head, root,*
“ *fountain, &c.* cannot be himself *that* one supreme God which
“ is the Father, head, root, and fountain of all.” Thus, after you have swelled yourself up with assurance, and your reader with expectation, you produce nothing but the silly sophism about *this* and *that* ; which I before (p. 318.) promised to dismiss, wherever I should find it.

My “ own hands,” you tell me, “ have entirely destroyed my “ own scheme.” Happy for me, that I am here to answer for myself ; when with Bishop Pearson, Bishop Bull, and almost all the *ancients*, I am called in to countenance such notions as I had not only *detested*, but formally *confuted*. You tell me, “ had I rested here,” (that is, in asserting the Father to be *head, root, &c.*) “ the controversy had been at an end.” Now, if it may contribute any thing to end one of the idlest disputes, to say no worse, that ever was begun amongst us, I beg leave to assure you that I do *rest there* : and, by so doing, I have at once taken from you, as I humbly conceive, all your pretences both from *Scripture* and *antiquity* ; leaving you nothing but your *metaphysics* to trust to ; which, after repeated experiments, you have found very unserviceable, and *lighter than vanity itself*.

After you had taken notice of what I had granted, as to the Father’s being *root, head, fountain, &c.* you say, “ if this be true, “ as I have fully proved, &c.” and you refer to what you had done above, adding some other authorities in the margin. The reader here cannot but observe how unaccountably you have

Y You scruple not, p. 218, to cite Athanasius, Hilary, and Gregory Nazianzen, as making the Father the *only God* ; as if they also intended to exclude the Son from the *one God-head*. Such as have ever looked into those writers themselves, instead of taking up scraps at second-hand, cannot want an answer to such weak pretences. I shall think it sufficient to refer you to a few places of these three writers, to give you a just notion

of their principles upon this head : Athanasius, p. 556, 878. in Psal. p. 75. Hilarius, p. 836, 859, Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxxvi. p. 586. As to your pretence that you “ cannot find that any “ even of the Post-Nicenes of the 4th “ century said that the Son was equal “ in authority and in all perfections ;” it is either a poor quibble upon the word *authority*, or else betrays your great want of reading.

spent your time and pains in an elaborate proof of what I had readily before granted. This is what commonly, and very justly, goes under the name of *impertinence*; and is a method almost peculiar to those who, having once espoused a *bad cause*, have an after-game to play for their own *reputation*, more than for the sake of the *cause* they are entered into, to carry on the *appearance* of a dispute after the dispute is really ended. What other account can be given of your filling so many tedious pages with quotations from the *ancients*, really proving nothing but what I had ingenuously admitted before, leaving it to you to make all the advantage you possibly could of it?

The reader here may again plainly see, that your pretended arguments against me are not more against me than against the *ancients*, by whose principles mine must either stand or fall. And while you are charging me with *contradictions*, the charge falls equally upon them; whose faith I follow, and whose principles I here maintain. It may be seen, with half an eye, that you deal with the *ancients* just as you do with me. You pretend first to split their notion into *contradictory* principles; and then you take one part of the pretended contradiction and play it against the other part; crying out, the *ancients*, the *ancients*, all the way; with much the same justice as you can, when you have a mind to it, cry out, the *Creeds*, the *Articles*, the *Liturgy*, and what not.

You tell me, (p. 217,) of my "perpetual self-contradiction." Now, if you are able to prove it, you will do something; if not, you only betray your own want of judgment or fairness, in making the charge. As to the *perfection* you imagine in the *Father* as such, more than in the *Son*, I deny any, except what is contained in a *mode of existing*, or *relation of order*. You go on cavilling, in a childish manner, against *Unity of substance*, *individual*, *numerical*, &c. which kind of *cavils* I abundantly answered again and again in my Defence, and shall not repeat. *Homogeneous substance* and *inseparability* amounts with you to *substances united*. You should have avoided this, because you hereby charge your friend the Doctor with making the *divine substance* a heap of *substances* united. If there cannot be substance and substance without *substances*, the Doctor and you are in a lamentable case, while you suppose the divine substance to be *extended*: for you thereby suppose him *compounded* of innumerable *substances*. Learn hereafter to have your thoughts more about you, when you are charging *contradictions*.

I had said in my Defence, vol. i. p. 323. that the Fathers believed *God* to be a word denoting *substance*^z, not *dominion* only. You are unwilling to let this pass, notwithstanding that you have changed your mind in this point of *God's* denoting *dominion* only, since your last time of writing. Now the word, you say, denotes the Person "whose the substance is:" that is, the substance whose the substance is; for *Person* denotes *substance*. As to *θεότης*, which before signified, with you, "divine dominion," it now signifies "divine dignity and authority." And it is pleasant to observe how you can change the sense of a word, and yet give the very same reason for the *new* sense, as before for the *old* one. We were before told, that "θεότης, like ἀνθρωπότης, and all other words of the like formation, *always* signifies divine dominion^a." Now "θεότης, like ἀνθρωπότης and all other words of the like formation, *always* signifies divine dignity and authority." That is to say, once upon a time, it *always* signified an *outward relation*, expressed by the word *dominion*; but now it *always* signifies some *intrinsic perfection*, expressed by the word *dignity*. I hope, the next time you write, it will *always* signify *divine nature*, like ἀνθρωπότης, (which signifies the *human*,) and "all other words of like formation." I gave many plain examples of this signification, by references in the margin of my Defence^b. One would think that you, in your Reply, had a mind only to divert the reader. You tell me in the passage of Melito, *θεότης* is expressly opposed to ἀνθρωπότης. I know it, and I choose it for that very reason; because, as ἀνθρωπότης there undoubtedly signifies *human nature, in concreto*, so it determines the signification of *θεότης* to the *divine nature*. Besides that your own notion of *dignity* (if you have any sense in it) falls in with mine of *substance*. For whatever expresses *intrinsic dignity* (and not mere outward relation) expresses the *nature* and *substance*, the seat and ground, of that *intrinsic dignity*.

You pass over a page or two of *my* Defence, till you find something to carp at: and it is my saying that the Sabellian singularity consisted in making the Godhead *μονοπρόσωπος*, one single *Hypostasis*. To which you reply, that the "contrary is

^z See Tertullian above, p. 518.

Κατὰ τὰς πᾶν πολλῶν δόξας φύσεως ἐνδεικτικόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα. *Bas. Ep.* 80.

Ὁ ὢν, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματα. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* xxxvi. p. 586.

Οὐδὲ ἑτέρα ἢ οὐσία παρὰ τὴν θεότητα, οὐδὲ ἑτέρα ἢ θεότης παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. *Epiph.* vol. ii. p. 11.

^a See Dr. Clarke's Replies, p. 283.

^b Defence, vol. i. p. 323, 504.

“notoriously true, that the Sabellians supposed God to be μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος.” Now, of all things, there is nothing more contemptible among men of sense, than pedantry about words. Men of learning know that the word πρόσωπον has been sometimes used to signify only an appearance, or manifestation, or character: in this sense, the Sabellian tenet is, that the Godhead is μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος, *one Hypostasis* under three *Persons*, that is, *names, appearances, characters*; the same being either *Father*, or *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, according to his several manifestations, or different appearances. But then the word πρόσωπον has been likewise used to signify the same with *Hypostasis*, a real Person^c: in this sense the Sabellian principle makes the Godhead μονοπρόσωπος, or ἐν πρόσωπον, one single Person^d. But I am weary of instructing you in such *known* things as you ought to have been well versed in, before you engaged in this controversy. I excuse your telling me, that I “manifestly contradict all antiquity, by supposing πρόσωπον and “*Hypostasis*” (sometimes, for I never pretend they do *always*) “to mean the same thing.” I charitably believe you spoke it in your simplicity, not *designing* any misreport, but for want of knowing better.

Upon inquiry into this matter, the truth appears to me to lie thus. Upon the first broaching of the Praxean and Noëtian heresy, which charged the Catholic doctrine with *Tritheism*, the use of the terms *substance* and *persons* came in: the Catholics pleaded, that they did not assert *three Gods*, but *three Persons* only; meaning by *Persons*, *real Persons*, as is plain of Hippo-

^c It is thus used as early as Hippolytus, *contr. Noët.* cap. 7, 14. in which sense also Tertullian frequently uses the Latin word *Persona*. Gregory Nazianzen makes it indifferent whether to say ὑποστάσεις or πρόσωπα, provided the meaning be secured. *Orat.* xxxix. p. 630. By degrees the words came to be indifferently used, one for the other, as Damascen has observed to have been common with the *Fathers*.

Χρῆ δὲ γνώσκειν, ὡς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὑπόστασιν καὶ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἄτομον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάλεσαν. τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἰδιοσυστάτως ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκότων ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ ἀριθμῶ διαφέρον, καὶ τὸν τινα δηλοῦν, οἷον Πέτρον, καὶ Παῦλον. *Damasc. Dialect.* p. 46.

^d Σοφίαν λέγοντες, ὁμοίαν εἶναι λέ-

γουσι τῇ ἕξει τῇ ἐν ψυχῇ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων συνισταμένη· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρόσωπόν ἐν πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, &c. *Basil. Homil.* xxvii. p. 602.

Πρόσωπον is many times used in this Homily to signify the same with ὑπόστασις.

Οὐδὲ πάλιν υἱοῦ καὶ πνεύματος ἐν πρόσωπόν ἐστιν. *Ibid.* p. 606.

Μίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸν ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐν τριώνυμον πρόσωπον. *Theodor. de Sabellio. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii.* cap. 9.

Sabellius—cum veram Trinitatem intelligere non voleret, unam eandemque credidit sub triplici appellatione personam. *Leon. M. Serm.* xxiii. p. 155. ed. Quenell.

lytus and Tertullian. Such was the ancient Catholic sense of *πρόσωπον* and *Persona*. Afterwards came Sabellius, who, reviving the Praxean and Noëtian doctrine, yet thought it prudent to adhere to the Catholic terms of *one substance*, or *one God*, and *three Persons*. But then he misinterpreted *Person*, understanding it of a *manifestation* or *representation*, only, and nothing *real*, or *substantial*.

Thus, after the manner of *heretics*, he kept to the Church's language, but depraved and corrupted the Church's sense. From this time *one God* and *three Persons* became an ambiguous phrase, capable either of a Catholic or Sabellian sense. As to the truth of the fact, I ground it chiefly upon what I have observed out of Hippolytus and Tertullian; and that it does not appear that either Praxeas or Noëtus ever talked of *three Persons*, as Sabellius did after. He was the first that introduced the theatrical sense of *person* into Christianity, making the *τρία πρόσωπα* to be *ἀνυπόστατα*, while the Catholic notion was of *τρία πρόσωπα ἐνυπόστατα*. There was but a very small variation in the words, but a very great one in the sense and application. One thing however I may remark, that there is a slight difference between *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον*, that the former may be applied to *inanimate* or *irrational* things, the latter to *rational* only: when therefore I say that they are of the same import, I would be understood to mean only when applied to *rational* or *intelligent* things.

You proceed to mention an incidental thing, which, in common prudence, you might better have omitted. In order to vindicate your notion of there being but *one God*, while you suppose *another God* under him, you had asked me whether "Herod the Great was not King of Judæa, though the Jews had no king but Cæsar?" To which I civilly answered, that Herod the Great had been *dead above thirty years* before the time when it was said that the Jews had *no king but Cæsar*. You had here committed a *chronological* slip; such as ingenious men, through haste, may be sometimes apt to fall into. But you are pleased to quarrel with me for putting *when the Jews*, instead of *though the Jews*. I own the fact: for I supposed you to mean, being a man of sense, that the *two kings* were alive, when it was said the "Jews had no king but Cæsar." For otherwise you must be sensible of a great inadvertency in your argument; which was intended to prove that there may be *two kings* (as *two Gods*) at the *same time*; and yet the name of *king* (or *God*) devolved

entirely upon the *superior*. Now whether you will submit to a slight slip in *chronology*, or to a gross *blunder* in the argument, is all one to me: but a prudent man would have passed a matter over quietly, which could not be called up again but to his own confusion. You tell me now, that Herod was king under Augustus. Very right: but how do you prove that, at *that time*, the "Jews had no king but Cæsar?" There lay the pinch of the difficulty; which it is a wonder a man of your acumen should not be able to perceive.

We have nothing more, that is material, under this Query. The charge of professing *two Gods* remains still unanswered; and must remain, till you think proper to discard God the Son from all *religious worship*. Then indeed he will be no longer *God* to us, any more than *angels*, or *magistrates*, or other *nominal Gods*: and you may then rest consistently in *one God*, and no more; namely, in God the Father.

QUERY VI.

Whether the same characteristics, especially such eminent ones, can reasonably be understood of two distinct Beings; and of one infinite and independent, the other dependent and finite?

YOUR new answer to this Query is,

1. That the characters "can no more be understood of two distinct Persons, than of two distinct Beings."

To which I answer, that it may be proved from *Scripture* that the characters belong to *two Persons*: it cannot be proved that they belong to *two Beings*, much less that they belong to two such *disparate* and *unequal Beings* as you suppose Father and Son to be.

2. You answer, secondly, that "the characters are not the same, because powers derived and underived are not the same."

This answer is very contrary to the sentiments of wiser men, who have argued the other way, that if the powers had been equally *underived*, they had not been the *same* in the two Persons^e: but as one of the Persons is derived from the other,

^e In *duobus ingenitis* diversa divinitas invenitur: in uno autem *genito ex uno ingenito*, naturalis unitas demonstratur. *Fulgent. contr. Arian.* p. 59.

Si ambo vocarentur *Patres*, essent profecto natura dissimiles. Unusquisque enim ex semetipso constaret, et communem substantiam cum altero

non haberet; nec Deitas una esset, quibus una natura non esset. *Idem*, p. 52.

Si verus Deus est, et de Patre non est, duo sunt habentes singuli et voluntates proprias et imperia diversa. *Greg. Nazianz.* p. 729. *Pseud. Ambros.* p. 348. Confer Eugenii Confess. ap. *Vict. Vit.* p. 37. *Chiff.*

“ being Light of Light, God of God, substance of substance,” both together are “ one God, one substance, &c.” And the same *powers* are *common* to both; as there is the *same life* in root and branches, the *same light* in the sun and its rays, the *same virtue* in the centre and what proceeds from it. And though no comparisons are sufficient to illustrate infinity, and there must be a great deal more than we are able to conceive; yet there is no principle of reason to contradict this notion, that the same *powers, properties, perfections*, may be diversely considered in the fountain from whence they flow, and in the streams to which they descend.

You yourself can give no tolerable account how the same *powers, attributes, &c.* are equally diffused to infinitely distant parts of the *divine substance*, as you conceive it under *extension*: nor is our notion of the *same powers* being *common* to three Persons at all more unconceivable or inexplicable than yours is of the other^f. So that here let us be content to stop where it becomes us, and not pretend to measure *infinity*. You say, the “ powers are no more the same than the Persons are:” nor, certainly, less the same than the *substance* is. All this will depend upon the settling the sense of *sameness*, and the several kinds of it.

When you are able to explain to me how the *wisdom* residing in *one part* of the divine substance (on your *hypothesis* of extension) is the *same*, and yet *not the same* with the *wisdom* residing in any other *part*; I may then be able to account for the degree of *sameness* in the *powers* belonging to the three Persons.

3. In the third place, you tell me of an “ invidious insinuation,” couched under the words *finite* and *infinite*. This you borrow, as you do many other things, from the author of Modest Plea, &c. Continued. I returned a brief answer to it in the Preface to my Sermons^g. There is nothing *invidious* in the case. But you ought, if you have none but fair and honest designs, to come out of ambiguous terms, that we may fall directly upon the question. You are the less excusable for continuing your disguises, while you write under cover and conceal your name. It looks now as if you were afraid only of having your *cause* exposed, while there is no danger of your *persons*. Dr. Clarke, even in books which he has set his name to, is hardly more *reserved* than you are without a name. What is the meaning of this, but to protract

^f See my Defence, vol. i. p. 375.

^g Page 9 of this volume.

a controversy, and to run from the question ; being sensible that your cause is not really defensible ?

But to proceed. You say, “you set no limitations to the “perfections of the Son of God, *more* than the Scripture has “done :” which is saying nothing ; because you tell us not what “Scripture has done,” according to your sense of it. But you add, “by declaring them to be derived :” which in my sense of *derived* is no *limitation* at all ; you should tell me whether it be in *yours*. “Self-existence,” you say, “is a perfection.” Prove from *Scripture*, or any other way, if you can, that *self-existence*, as distinct from *necessary existence*, is any *perfection* : it is a relation of *order*, a *mode* of existing^h, and that is all.

Aye, but you say it denotes “positive greatness,” (p. 226.) and you refer me to the Modest Pleader, who makes it the same with *necessary existence*ⁱ. If this be indeed your meaning, I own it, in that sense, to be as great a perfection as possible, and the sum total of all perfection : but then I assert it to be *common* to Father and Son, who are, in this sense, equally *self-existent*. Only, the Father particularly is *unbegotten* and *underived* ; under which conception, *self-existence*, as peculiar to him, is *negative* and *relative*. We had long been amused with Dr. Clarke’s denying the *self-existence* of the Son and Holy Ghost ; by which he was supposed to mean no more, than that they were *begotten* and *proceeding*, which every body allows : but now, it seems, he meant to deny their *necessary existence* ; which is directly reducing them to *creatures*. You see now what you have to do : either prove that the mere character of *underived* expresses any *positive* perfection ; or that *necessary existence* belongs not equally to all the three Persons : and then you will shew yourself an able disputant.

You need not now be scrupulous about “dependent” and “independent :” you have said enough. Whatever is not *necessarily existing* is *precarious* and *dependent*, as much as any *creature*, which is enough in all reason ; we understand you. You say, that you suppose the Son “dependent in no other “sense than is implied in the notion of being begotten.” It may be so, according to your notion of *begotten*, (I suppose, very little differing from *created* ;) but you will have a hard task to shew

^h Ὑπάρξεως τρόπος τὸ ἀγέννητον, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄνομα. *Basil. contr. Eun.* lib. iv. p. 763. Vid. *Damascen.* vol. i. p. 135, 140, 143, 210, 409. ii. p. 817.

Pseudo-Just. Exposit. Fid. Mich. Psell. apud Fabric. vol. v. p. 56.

ⁱ Modest Plea, p. 217.

that either *Scripture* or *antiquity* favours any such notion of *begotten*, as to make the Son *precarious*, or not *necessarily existing*. The *voluntary generation* mentioned by the primitive writers will not serve you at all in this matter, as will be seen in the sequel: and as to *Scripture*, you have not a single text to help you, but what must first be racked and tortured with *metaphysical glosses*, to make it speak what it never meant. You have a surprising piece of subtilty (p. 224.) to bring yourself off from the just and well-grounded suspicion of making the Son a *precarious being*. It is a difficult matter to force *logic* against *common sense*; but you are resolute enough to try. Your words, speaking of the Son's existing by the Father's *free act* and *choice*, (which is Dr. Clarke's known sense of this matter,) are these: "Which yet
 " no more implies the Son to be a *precarious and mutable being*,
 " than those perfections of God, his power, justice, goodness,
 " veracity, and the like, (the exercise whereof always implies
 " the notion of *action*, and consequently depends wholly on the
 " *will* of the *agent*,) are therefore more *precarious* or *uncertain*
 " in their effects, than those other perfections, (which imply in
 " them *nothing of action*, and consequently have no dependence
 " upon the *will* of the *agent*,) such as eternity, omnipresence,
 " omniscience, or the like."

Here, if one may presume to understand such obscure reasoning, God the Son is proved to be *no precarious being*, because the acts of God's *justice*, *goodness*, &c. are *certain* in their *effects*: which they undoubtedly are, whether God pleases to *annihilate* or to bring into existence. Therefore, most evidently, the Son is *no precarious being*: nor is any *creature* whatever at all *precarious* or *mutable*, by the same way of reasoning. A mighty honour done to God the Son, to make him no more *precarious* than the rest of the *creation*. Certain however it is, that, upon your principles, there is *no natural necessity* for his existing: he might either never have existed, or may even cease to exist, (as much as may be said of any *creature*,) if it should please God so to order it. This is the proper and full notion of a *precarious being*, a being having no *necessary* foundation of existence, but *depending* entirely upon the *free-will* and *choice* of another being. All the subtilties imaginable can never bring you off here, any more than they can bring together both ends of a contradiction.

Our readers may now see plainly what you have been doing. You set out with general and ambiguous words of the Father's

being *alone* supreme in “authority, dominion, &c.” But, at length, you can make nothing of it, without interpreting this *supremacy* by the perfection of *self-existence*, and *self-existence* by *necessary existence*; thereby depressing God the Son into *precarious* existence. Now indeed you have made the Father *sole* Governor very effectually: for who will ever be so mad as to dispute, whether a *precarious* being, a *creature*, be *subject* to his Creator? But let us return to the Query, and consider whether those eminent characteristics, specified in the texts cited, are such as at all suit with a finite, dependent, precarious, created being.

You pretend (p. 225.) that “no distinguishing character of “the one supreme God is ascribed to the Son in Scripture.” But let the reader see the texts which ascribe *omniscience*, knowledge of the *heart*, *eternity*, to the Son; *attributes* by Scripture *appropriated* to the one true God: besides some *titles*, appearing in these texts, applied to Christ, and appropriate likewise to the *one God*. As to two or three other characters, which you mention as appropriate to the *one God*, and which are not applied (as you pretend) to the Son; see my Sermons^k, and what I have said above: I do not love to fill my paper with repetition as often as you do yours. You come next to lessen the *characters* given to God the Son. He is “Searcher of the heart:” but as “received of the Father:” which the text says not one word of. Only, four verses lower, it is said, that he received “power over the nations,” of the Father; which is very wide of our present purpose. You have some pretences to elude the force of the title “First and Last;” which see answered in my Sermons^l. As to “mighty God,” you pretend the Father is so *absolutely*, the Son with limitation; and here you refer to the Son’s being (μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελος) *angel of his great council*; which is not according to the Hebrew, and so is of no account while I am arguing from *Scripture*, not from the *Fathers*. The Father is “Lord of all,” you say, “absolutely:” and so is the Son, for any thing that appears: though the Father “put all “things under him.” Let it be shewn that the Father has any natural *subjects*, which are not equally *subjects* of the Son too. There is therefore no ground for your imaginary *limitations* in respect of the powers and perfections ascribed to the Son.

You add, (p. 228,) that nothing can be “communicated to “the one supreme God.” The force of this lies only in the

^k Sermons, p. 167 of this volume.

^l Ibid. p. 143, 144.

terms. The *first* Person may eternally communicate to the *second*, and both be *one God*. "He can have nothing," you say, "of himself:" well; if he has it but *in himself*, and *of the Father*, it suffices. The question is not *whence* he has his perfections, but *what* he has. It is remarkable, you say, that the "throne, kingdom, &c. is never ascribed to Christ upon account of his "part in the work of creation," p. 230. And what if it is not? The Father is recommended to us principally as *Creator*, the Son as *Redeemer*, to keep up a more distinct notion of their *Persons* and *offices*. What a stress do you lay upon common things taught in our *Catechism*! Besides, I had obviated this cavil in my Defence^m. It is remarkable again, you say, "that "the descriptions of the Word, in the Old Testament, always "represent him as the *Angel* or *Messenger*." You should only have said *generally*: and there is good reason why; because by that *criterion* chiefly, we know that it was *God the Son*, not *God the Father*. He is at the same time represented also as *God*, and as *Lord*, *Jehovah*, &c. What use you can make of this *remarkable* thing has been shewn. I pass over your speculations on Dan. vii. 13, 14, as carrying no argument in them. You go on in speaking of *Christ's receiving* dominion; which relates only to the *economy* or *dispensation*: according to which God the Father will *receive* a kingdom at the last day, and enlarge his *dominion* over his subjects. As to Phil. ii. 6, I refer to my fifth Sermon; where I had obviated your pretences before you made them. You insist upon your construction of ἀλλά: which if admitted, yet you can never ascertain your whole construction, (as I shewed in my Sermonⁿ;) but the words will still naturally bear a meaning opposite to yours. However, as to your criticisms about the use of ἀλλά in that place, they appear to me of no manner of force. The sense is exceeding clear and unbarred, running thus: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not "robbery to be equal with God:" (see how great, how divine a Person he was:) "yet, notwithstanding, he humbled himself", " &c." You pretend that the words, "thought it not robbery," would be the *example* proposed. No; but they are part of the

^m Defence, vol. i. p. 433, 434.

ⁿ Sermon V. p. 110 of this vol.

^o Clemens understands it in the same way as I do. Ὅς ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, οὐχ ἄρπαγμόν ἠγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ· ἐκένωσεν δὲ ἑαυτὸν ὁ φιλοκτιρῶν Θεός, σώσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον γλιχόμενος. *Clem. Alex.* p. 8. Οχ.

That Clemens here interprets the place as I do, appears from his changing ἀλλά into δέ, from his making a pause after ἴσα Θεῷ, and from his choosing a new subject of his proposition, ὁ φιλοκτιρῶν Θεός, instead of ὅς preceding.

preface to it, to make the example the more forcible and the more endearing: so that I may return you the compliment of *inattention*.

In my Sermons, you tell me, "I most absurdly interpret God's "highly exalting Christ, in the same sense as men in their "prayers highly exalt God." No; but if you had not had a strong propensity to misrepresentation, you would have said in the same sense as men in *preaching*, or the like, exalt God by *proclaiming* and *publishing* his praises. And now where is there any the least appearance of absurdity, after taking out the idea of *praying*; which you improperly threw in, to abuse the reader, and to give some colour to your accusation? I always suspect a *magisterial* censure to have no weight at the bottom: it is to make up in the *manner* what it wants in the *substance*. Shew me one instance in the Scripture and *Apocrypha* together, of your sense of *ὑπερυψώω*, and I will give you above thirty of mine. Indeed, I know but of a single place where it can bear such a sense as you are contending for; which is Psalm xxxvii. 35. And yet there it may as well bear mine. Please to tell me why *ὑπερυψώω* may not as well be so used as *δοξάζω*, and why one should be thought more *absurd* than the other, and I will stand corrected. I shewed you that I was not singular in interpreting *ὑπερυψώω* by *δοξάζω* in that place. The context favoured it, the words would well bear it; and an ancient Greek writer, under the name of Dionysius, as well as a Latin writer, under the name of Ambrose, were beforehand with me in it. And what if your own favourite Eusebius^p should be found to chime in with both? I love not to be positive where I may be mistaken: but it appears to me extremely probable, from Eusebius's manner of speaking of it, that his sense of *ὑπερυψώω* was the same with mine: and the rather, because Origen (of whom Eusebius was a great admirer) would never have admitted *ὑπερυψώω* in your sense of the word, understanding it of Christ in his highest capacity: as Eusebius plainly does. Nor do I think that Eusebius ever had so low an opinion of *God the Son*, as to think him capable of being *exalted* in any other sense but that of being *glorified*, or having his glory manifested. It is observable, that Eusebius does not

^p Ὁ δοξάζων αὐτὸν, ὁ ὑπερυψῶν, ὁ ἀναδείξας βασιλεῖα τῶν ὁλῶν—ὄν οὕτω δοξάζοντα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Πατέρα, ἀμοιβαίως ἀντιδοξάζων ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ Κύριον, καὶ Σωτῆρα, καὶ Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων, καὶ σύν-θρονον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείας ἀνέδειξε. Euseb. contr. Marcell. p. 70. Conf. Josh. iii. 7. ἄρχομαι ὑψῶσαι σε κατὰ νόμιον πάντων.

interpret the text of *constituting* our Saviour *Lord, King, and God*; but recognising, or manifesting him as such: and it is certain that Eusebius resolves all the Son's real and essential greatness into his *Sonship*⁹, and not into any subsequent exaltation. It was as *Son of God* that he acknowledged him *Lord, and Saviour, and King, and God*: wherein Eusebius's theology, however you may boast of him, very far exceeds yours. You charge me with interpreting ἐχαρίσατο most absurdly. I suppose, if you had had any *reason* to assign, you would have obliged us with it. I see no *absurdity* in interpreting *giving a name* to be *giving a name*; which is all I have done. But it is very *absurd* of you to imagine that God may not *glorify* his Son, as well as his Son may *glorify* him; by spreading and extolling his name over the whole creation.

You go on to Heb. i. 2. "Whom he hath appointed heir of all things;" by which you intend, I suppose, to prove that he was not *Lord* before: though in the very same verse it is said, "by whom also he made the worlds." Might not this shew you that the Apostle is only speaking of that peculiar and *special* right founded in the merits of Christ's *redemption*; by which he became, in a more *special* sense, *Lord* of all he had redeemed; just as God the Father became, in a more *special* sense than before, *Lord* of the Jews, upon his choosing them as his *peculium*, or upon his delivering them from Egyptian slavery? What you are here endeavouring, it is hard to devise; unless you are coming directly into the Socinian scheme; for which only, your present discourse is calculated. You observe, "Then it was that God said, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." What then? Was he not the *begotten Son* long before? If he was, then you are proving nothing more than that the Son's glory was *manifested* in time; which is certainly true both of the *Father* and *Son*: if you mean otherwise, you run directly into *Socinianism*; as I before hinted. You add, "Then it was, that God commanded, Let all the angels of God worship him." And why did you not add, that *then it was*, that "he laid the foundation of the earth." and *then it was*, that the "heavens were the works of his hands?" Do you imagine that St. Paul, in that chapter, had no other design, but

⁹ Καθὸ δε μόνος αὐτὸς, ὁ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθεὶς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐν μορφῇ ὑπῆρχε τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, καὶ πρωτότοκος ἀπάσης κτίσεως· διὸ καὶ τμᾶν, καὶ σέβειν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν μόνον αὐτὸν οἷα Κύριον, καὶ Σωτῆρα, καὶ Θεὸν ἐάντης μεμαθήκαμεν. Euseb. contr. Marcel. p. 69.

to describe the manifestations of Christ's glory subsequent to his incarnation? You find, that he was the *Lord*, who in the "beginning laid the foundations of the earth:" which is a stronger character than all the rest put together: and may convince you that he was *Lord* long before his incarnation, as John i. 1. declares him *God* before the *creation*. To your pretences about the Son's "receiving power, glory, &c." I had answered, with many of the Fathers, that he received in *capacity* of *man*, what in another *capacity* he had before ever enjoyed. This is not the *only* good answer to the difficulty proposed: I have myself made use of another, which may as effectually serve to take off the imaginary force of your argument. But let us hear what you have to say to it. You "no where find this distinction in Scripture" What! Do not you find that he was *God*, and that he was also *man*? When you have found this, you have found the *distinction*. But you "no where find in Scripture any thing "given to Christ. or any thing ascribed to him, but what is "applied to his whole Person." We say, whatever is applied, is applied to his *whole Person*; but considered *secundum quid*, or in a certain *capacity*, not in every respect which goes in to make up the Person. And can you pretend to deny this? Let us see what you are like to make of it. Jesus *increased* in stature: Will you say, that the *Word* (for that you certainly allow to be constitutive of the *Person*) grew *taller* and *larger*, because this is applied to the *Person*? He *sweat*, as it were, *great drops of blood*: Was the *Λόγος* in a sweat? He *died*, and was *buried*, and he *lay in the ground*: according to you, the *whole Person*, the *Λόγος*, it seems, as well as the *body*, suffered all this; for you know of nothing that was ever applied to *part of the Person*, but to the *whole Person*. When you consider this matter again, learn to form your argument with a little more judgment: for you seem not, at present, to know how to oppose us in the best method, nor how to give your cause the advantage it is really capable of. You should not have found fault with us for applying any thing to a *compound person*, in such respect or capacity only as is suitable thereto; for this is the commonest thing imaginable, and is done every day, as often as we say Peter or John is fat, lean, low, tall, well, sick, or the like: but you should have laid your argument against our taking so much in as we do into the Person of Christ, (the *Λόγος*, the *soul* and the *body*,) and then you might have shewn some degree of acuteness. But it is not my business to point out to you the properest

way of defending your *heresy*, which is every way indefensible: it may suffice, if I reply to such things as you have to produce.

You say, “ judgment *was not given* to part of him which is “ the Son of man; but to him, because he is the Son of man.” There is nothing at all in your argument: for, suppose a *wound* or a *plaster*, to be given to Peter, that is, to the *whole Person*; yet, I suppose, it may be understood with respect to one *part* only of him, viz. his *body*. But I have allowed you that the authority of executing judgment was *economically* devolved upon Christ (considered in both capacities) as the properest Person for it; being *equal* to the charge as *God*, and over and above peculiarly fitted for it as being also *man*; and so a more suitable judge of *man*^r. The reason then why, out of three *divine Persons*, Christ is peculiarly appointed to the office of *judging* us, is because he had to his *divinity* superinduced the *humanity*. and thereby familiarized himself the more to us. You see then, that your ingenious argument about *parts*, however it might affect another *hypothesis*, (though it can really hurt none,) does not at all concern my account of that matter.

As to the place of *Hermas*, which I produced in my Defence, I refer the reader to Bishop Bull and Dr. Grabe. All you have to object, is the expression of *corpus*, by which you understand a *human body*; I, the whole *human nature*, consisting of *body* and *soul*. Nothing more common in writers than to express the whole man by *flesh*, or *bodys*; and by the latter especially, when considered as a *servant*: so that your construction is at least very *precarious*; and is what neither the *expression* itself, nor what goes along with it, gives any reasonable ground for. But I leave that matter to be considered by the learned; there being some difficulties as to the text of *Hermas*, not yet fully adjusted by the manuscripts.

You are insinuating the same thing of *Novatian* which you had before of *Hermas*; as if he imagined the *Word* to have assumed *flesh* only, without a *soul*: which, if true, we would give you up *Novatian* for a very silly man, and withal a heretic. The point of Christ's having a *human soul* was a thing so settled in *Novatian's* time, and long before; so universally maintained

^r Pater Verbum suum visibile effecit omni fieri carni, incarnatum et ipsum, ut in omnibus manifestus fieret rex eorum. Etenim ea quæ judicantur oportebat videre judicem,

et scire hunc a quo judicentur. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 9. p. 184.

^s See *Suicer's Thesaurus* in *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*.

from the very beginning of Christianity, by all the Fathers, without exception; that had Novatian taught otherwise, he could not have passed for a *schismatic* only. You may see what Socrates^t says to that point, who was himself of the Novatian sect, and his testimony therefore the more material; as disciples seldom vary in any thing very considerable from their leaders. He declares, that *all the ancients* (sure he did not exclude the head of his own party) believed that Christ had a *human soul*, and asserted it as a *doctrine universally received*. He mentions Irenæus, Clemens, Apollinaris of Hierapolis, Serapion Bishop of Antioch, the Synod that met about the case of Beryllus, Origen, Pamphilus and Eusebius: and it is evident still from their own works, of as many as have left us any. To those he has named, may be added Clemens Romanus^u, Justin Martyr^x, Melito^y, Hippolytus^z, Tertullian^a, and perhaps several more which may have escaped my notice. Now, what will Novatian's single testimony signify against such a cloud of witnesses? But the more *universal* the doctrine was, the less probable is it that Novatian should dissent from it. And indeed you have no foundation for any such suspicion of him, more than what lies in the use of the word *caro, flesh*; which is a very common expression for *man* (body and soul) in *Scripture* itself, as well as in ecclesiastical writers. Besides that Novatian interprets Christ's being *made flesh*, by his assuming of *man, hunc hominem*,^b *this man*: which is a name he would scarce have given to mere *body* or *flesh*; well knowing that man is made up both of *body* and *soul*. Your pretence about *Son of God* and *Son of man* being *two Persons*, (upon my scheme,) hinted only, without any reason to support it, may be passed over. The clearing of that matter will require a large discussion of the true notion and definition of a *person*; which you have not attempted: I, perhaps, may, in a proper place. What you add further is of more weight, that I seem to *suppose* that the "glory which Christ had before the world was, is the very same with that authority and power of judgment" (so you express it) "wherewith he was invested after his resurrection." But that *authority* and *power of judging*, as you call it.

^t Socrates Eccl. H. lib. iii. cap. 7. p. 178.

^u Clem. Rom. Epist. cap. 49. p. 169. Cant.

^x Apol. ii. cap. 10. p. 26.

^y Melito apud Cav. Hist. Lit. tom. ii. p. 33.

^z Hippolytus contr. Noët. cap. 17. p. 18.

^a Tertullian contr. Prax. cap. 16, 30. de Carn. Christi, cap. 10.

^b Caro fit, et habitat in nobis, hoc est, assumit hunc hominem, &c. *Novat.* cap. 16.

is what our *Lord* had before his *resurrection*, as himself declares, John v. 28, &c. And what *I suppose*, is this; that all the *powers, glories, honours*, given to the Son, were nothing but so many declarations, indications, or manifestations of the *dignity* and *divinity* of his Person: which *dignity* and *divinity* had been celebrated in *heaven* before, and were now to be *recognised* after his *incarnation* and *humiliation*: so that in the main, this was no more than receiving the same *honours* he before had, and returning, as it were, to the same *state of glory*; only now clothed with *humanity*, which before he was not.

You have something further to observe of *Hermas*. in respect of *coheir*. How can the *divine nature*, say you, be *heir* of any thing? But I hope a *Son* may, without offence, be said to be *heir* to all his Father's glories, in allusion to what passes among men, though the similitude may not answer in every circumstance. It is a lively and elegant way of conveying to us a notion of *divine* things; and is to be understood, like many passages of Scripture, θεοπρεπῶς, though spoken ἀνθρωποπαθῶς.

You conclude with a passage of *Irenæus*, which I have cited in my Sermons^c; whither, to save myself trouble, I refer the reader; who may there also find a sufficient explication of it. What you infer from it is, that the "Word received an additional power and glory upon his resurrection." *Power* is an ambiguous word: but he received an *additional manifestation* of his glory; as God the Father also did at the very same time, as well as often before. And he became *Lord* and *Proprietor* of mankind, under a more peculiar title and stricter alliance: just as God the Father, when he had by his many deliverances, favours, and blessings, made the people of the Jews more peculiarly his *own*, became their *Lord* in a strict and special sense. Thus both Father and Son will (we hope) receive daily additions of external *honour*, and increase of *dominion*, by the coming in of Jews, Turks, Pagans, and Infidels. God's full *kingdom* is not yet come; we pray for it: and if the Father himself be not yet completely *King*, in the fullest sense, what wonder is it, if we hear of our *Lord's* receiving a *kingdom*, or *dominion*, in time. External *relations* may accrue to any of the divine Persons, such as *dominion*, &c. But your great misfortune is, that you can no where find *divinity* accruing to God the Son, (except it be by *eternal generation*;) you can no where find, that

^c Sermons, p. 114, 115 of this volume.

he was ever constituted *God*^d, (as he might be *Lord*;) or that he became, by any new accession, more truly or more fully *God* than he was ever before. This consideration at once shews the weakness of your *hypothesis*. (as I hinted above.) and is alone sufficient to unravel all your fallacies.

QUERY VII.

Texts applied

To the one God.

Thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men, 1 Kings viii. 39.

I the Lord search the hearts, I try the reins, Jer. xvii. 10.

I am the first, and I am the last; and beside me there is no God, Isa. xlv. 6.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. i. 8.

King of kings, and Lord of lords, 1 Tim. vi. 15.

The mighty God, Is. x. 21.

Lord over all, Rom. x. 12.

To the Son.

He knew all men, &c. John ii. 24.

Thou knowest all things, John xvi. 30.

Which knowest the hearts of all men, Acts i. 24.

I am he that searcheth the reins and the heart, Rev. ii. 3.

I am the first, and I am the last, Rev. i. 17.

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, Rev. xxii. 13.

Lord of lords, and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. xix. 16.

The mighty God, Is. ix. 6.

He is Lord of all, Acts x. 36. Over all, God blessed, &c. Rom. ix. 5.^e

^d Novatian is the only ancient writer I have observed to say any thing like it; in the words

Universæ creaturæ et Dominus et Deus constitutus esse reperitur. *Nov.* cap. 15.

Yet his constant way, at other times, is to resolve the Son's divinity into his *Sonship*:

Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. cap. 11. Deus quia Dei Filius comprobatur. cap. 16. Hoc ipsum tamen a Patre proprio consecutus, ut omnium et Deus esset, et Dominus esset, et Deus ad formam Dei Patris ex ipso genitus atque prolatus. cap. 17. Deus, sed qua Filius Dei natus ex Deo. cap. 18. Deus ergo processit ex Deo, dum qui processit Sermo, Deus est qui processit ex Deo. cap. 22. Unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et dum ex ipso nascitur, dum ex ipso processisse

reperitur, per quod et Deus est. cap. 23. Quoniam ex Deo est, merito Deus; quia Dei Filius dictus sit. cap. 26. Personæ Christi convenit ut et Deus sit, quia Dei Filius. cap. 26. Est ergo *Deus*, sed in hoc ipsum genitus ut esset Deus. cap. 31.

These passages considered, it is manifest that Novatian, in the former place cited, either used the word *constitutus* improperly, for *positus*, that is, *declaratus*: (see chap. xii.) or else, which appears to me most probable, that arguing there against the heretics, who would not allow Christ to be more than *man*, he was content at first to bring them so far, at least, as to admit Christ to be *God* in a higher sense than Moses, and so by *degrees*, to bring them up to Catholic principles.

^e N. B. These texts should have been inserted in Query vi.

Whether the Father's omniscience and eternity are not one and the same with the Son's, being alike described, and in the same phrases?

HERE you answer, that *underived* and *derived* are not the same. To which I answer, that wisdom of wisdom is *one wisdom*, omniscience of omniscience *one omniscience*; just as substance of substance is *one substance*, Light of Light *one Light*, and God of God *one God*; because of the *inseparable* Unity of the Persons, and their mutually including and containing each other. As to the degree of *sameness*, I before intimated that it is inexplicable; and is no more to be accounted for than your supposing the *same wisdom*, &c. to reside in innumerable infinitely distant parts of the same substance. This controversy (whatever you imagine) is not to be decided by *metaphysics*, but by *Scripture* and *antiquity*; where we may find some footing, which we cannot in the other.

Your next answer therefore is more sober, could it but be proved to be just. You deny that the Son's *omniscience* and *eternity* are alike described, and in the same phrase. It lies then upon you to shew the *difference*; as I have shewn the *resemblance*. It is not necessary that every phrase which is used of the Father be also used of the Son. I singled out some of the strongest, fullest, and most expressive; shewing that they are applied to both: and if they were not the *strongest*, yet if they are such as Scripture has declared *peculiar* to the *one God*, my argument is just, and it would have become you first to answer it, and then to call it a *quibble*.

You interpreted the texts which concern the Son's *omniscience* of a *relative omniscience*: upon which I blamed you for speaking of a *relative* omniscience, instead of saying plainly, that the Son was *not omniscient*; that so we might have come directly to the question. Here, by a peculiar kind of turn, proper to yourself, you tell me how ill I treat *Scripture*. Why so? Are you so perfectly wrapped up in *Scripture*, that the justest rebuke imaginable cannot reach you, but through the sides of the *Scripture*? "Our Lord," you say, "told his Apostles, that the Holy Ghost should teach them all things, and guide them into all truth: might he not better have said," (so you go on,) "that he should not teach them all things, and not guide them into all truth?" Now, at length, it is out: and thus I have maltreated *Scripture*. Was there ever a wilder inference? You should have considered, that there was no question raised about

the Apostles and their *omniscience*: if there had, I doubt not but our Lord would have readily said, what was true, that the Apostles were *not omniscient*. He would not have disguised his sentiments, nor have deceived his hearers with *ambiguous* terms, when they wanted to be resolved in an important matter, and honestly desired to have the truth fairly examined and scanned. And therefore your asking, "Had he not better have said," and repeating it again and again, is mere trifling; unless you can shew that our *Lord* or the *sacred writers* had been called upon (in such manner and in such circumstances as Dr. Clarke and you have been) to *declare* what they meant, and to let truth have a *fair trial*. But by this roundabout way you would insinuate, I presume, (for still you are shifting, and do not care to speak out,) that the texts speaking of the *Son's omniscience* are of no force, because something of like kind has been said of the *Apostles*, whom all allow not to be *omniscient*. To this I answer, 1. That the expressions relating to our Saviour are much stronger than the other: such as *knowing all men*, knowing the *hearts of all men*, *searching the reins and the heart*: a kind of knowledge peculiar to God alone. 2. Considering that our Lord was *Son of God*, and likewise *God*, such expressions would very probably be taken in their most obvious and literal sense: and therefore they should not have been applied to him, (without guard and caution.) unless really so intended, as the words appear to declare. As to the Apostles being no more than men, there could be no danger in a few general expressions of their *knowing all things*, being *taught all things*, or the like: since nobody could mistake the meaning of the words when so applied.

Your next attempt is to make some advantage of Matt. xxiv. 36. and Mark xiii. 32. relating to Christ's not knowing the day of judgment: of which I have fully and distinctly treated elsewhere: where I have also added other strong and clear proofs of Christ's *omniscience*; which you take no notice of, though you quote the Sermons. You like not my ascribing the *ignorance* to the *human nature*: you ask whether "any nature can with any sense be said to know or do any thing?" Yes, why not? You charge me (p. 238.) with *inconsistency*, for interpreting the text of the *human nature*, and yet saying that Irenæus, upon that text, is to be understood of the *Λόγος*. As if both might not be true, that Irenæus understood the text of the *Λόγος*, while I think it better to understand it of the *human nature*: I am

weariness of such trifling. You proceed to shew that Irenæus, in his Comment on these texts, ascribed *ignorance* to God the Son. You take not the least notice of the several weighty and substantial reasons given by Bishop Bull^ε, and referred to by me^h, against your opinion from other places of Irenæus's works. It is not your way to be at all solicitous about making any writer consistent with himself. If you can but meet with a passage seemingly favouring your opinion, it must be presently forced into your sense, however contradictory to the author's *known* principles elsewhere. I must desire the reader to consider well what I have said upon this passage in my Defence; and not to take it from your representation, which is extremely partial. And he may also compare M. Massuet's account of the same passage in his Previous Dissertationsⁱ to his edition of Irenæus. I shall here content myself with transcribing so much of Irenæus as may be sufficient to clear his meaning, and to take off that confusion which you have been industriously throwing upon it, either in translating or commenting. The literal rendering is thus, much the same as I before gave in my Defence :

“ If one inquires into the reason why the Father, though communicating in *all things* to the Son, is yet set forth by our Lord as alone knowing that day and hour; he cannot, at present, find any fitter, or more decent, or indeed any other safe answer than this, (seeing our Lord is the only teacher of truth,) that we are to learn of him that the Father is *above all*; for *the Father*, saith he, *is greater than I*. And therefore the Father is declared by our Lord to have the preference in knowledge, to the end that we also, while we live in this world, may refer the perfection of knowledge, and such intricate questions to God^k.”

Now, that Irenæus's design was not to represent the Son as *ignorant*, but quite the contrary, may appear from this very passage duly considered. For the question, with him, was not why the Father is more knowing, but why, since both are *equally*

^ε Bull. D. F. N. p. 82. Animadv. in G. Cler. p. 1056.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 334.

ⁱ Massuet. Præv. Diss. in Iren. p. 133.

^k Si quis exquirat causam propter quam *in omnibus* Pater communicans Filio, solus scire et horam et diem a Domino manifestatus est, neque aptabilem magis, neque decentiorem, nec sine periculo alteram quam

hanc inveniat in præsentî; (quoniam enim solus verax Magister est Dominus) ut discamus per ipsum, super omnia esse Patrem. Etenim *Pater* ait, *major me est*. Et secundum agnitionem itaque præpositus esse Pater annuntiatuſ est a Domino nostro, ad hoc, ut et nos, in quantum in figura hujus mundi sumus, perfectam scientiam et tales quæstiones concedamus Deo. *Iren. lib. ii. c. 28. p. 158, 159.*

knowing, our Saviour made such a declaration as gave the preference to the Father as *alone* knowing. He puts the question, why the Father though communicating *in all things* (absolutely, not in all *other* things) is yet *set forth*, or *alone declared*, to know. So that the question is not about his *knowledge*, but about our Lord's *declaration*, why, or on what account, he made it, seemingly contrary to *truth*; since all things are *common* to Father and Son. What then could be meant by such a *declaration*? It must be *true* some way or other, our Lord being a *teacher of truth*; what then is the case? Irenæus tells us, that it is *true* in respect of the Father's having the *preeminence* in every thing, and so *alone* knowing every thing in the *first place*, or *primarily*: and therefore it was upon this account that our Lord gave him the preference, and referred that knowledge to him *solely*, as the *sole* fountain of it; which it well became him to do, especially during the state of his humiliation, while *in figura mundi*, *conversing below*: though at the same time the Son also has the same knowledge, but *derived*, all things being *communicated* to the Son, as Irenæus had observed. Basil's and Nazianzen's accounts of this matter will clear it up further, and will fix Irenæus's real meaning beyond all reasonable exception.

Basil, in answer to the doubt about our Lord's not knowing that day, says, he will give the solution which from a child had been taught him by the Fathers before him: and which he represents in these words: "As to what is said, *no one knows that day*, we understand it as ascribing to the Father the *primary* knowledge both of things present and things to come; and as signifying to us that he is in all things the primary *cause*!" Nazianzen chooses rather to refer Christ's not knowing *that day* to his *humanity*; yet he mentions also this other construction of Christ's not *knowing* it *originally*, or in that high manner, as the Father may be said to know it. His words are to this effect. If the first construction be not sufficient, we may give this for a second: "As every thing else, so also the knowledge of the greatest things is to be referred up to the *cause* *itself*, for the honour of the *Father*!"

Every one may see that Irenæus's construction falls in with this of Nazianzen and Basil; who perhaps might both borrow

¹ Τὸ, οὐδείς οἶδε, τὴν πρώτην εἶδησιν 391. p. 1168.

τῶν δὲ ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἔσομένων ἐπὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀνάγοντος. Καὶ διὰ πάντων τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑποδεικνύοντος εἰρησθαι νομίζομεν. Basil. Ep.

^m Ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώσις τῶν μεγίστων ἐπὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναφερέσθω τιμῇ τοῦ γεννήτορος. Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. p. 588.

it from him: nor is it possible from Irenæus's words to prove that he meant any thing more. Nay, the words themselves most easily and naturally resolve into this sense, as I had abundantly before proved from the *context*, and from Irenæus's main scope and design in the whole.

You call it *pleasant* for me to add, *consequently in all knowledge*, where Irenæus says, that the "Father communicates in all "things to the Son." But is it not more *pleasant* of you to understand by *all things*, all *other* things, which Irenæus does not say, nor does his argument require it, but the contrary?

I took notice of Dr. Clarke's slipping over some words *through inadvertency*: which words he has since added in his *second edition*. And here, to shew your inclination to find any little fault, you blame me for taking no notice of the *amendment*. Indeed the thing was very slight, scarce worth remembering. Yet in two later editions of my book, which you might have seen, I was so just to the Doctor as to leave my former words out. And now, I think, you ought to have inquired before you took this needless handle for complaint. As to *manifestatus*, which you construe *expressly declared*, I, *set forth, represented, or said*. (which you weakly call "deceiving the reader,") it is not very material which be taken, provided only the question were why, or in what sense, our Saviour *declared* it; not, why the *Father only knew the day*. Which question Irenæus resolves in saying, *Præpositus esse Pater annuntiatu est*. It was in this sense he declared him to be *alone knowing*, as declaring him *præpositum, set before, preferred* to the Son in knowledge, on account of his being *alone first* in every thing. So that the sum of all is, that Irenæus does not suppose the Father *more knowing*, but knowing every thing in the highest manner; as having it *primarily, and from none*; which was also the sense of Basil and Nazianzen. But enough of this. You go on to Origen; whom I had cited, after Irenæus, Ignatius, and Clemens of Alexandria, to confute your round assertion, that *all* the Ante-Nicene writers believed the *Λόγος* to have been *ignorant*, &c. when you could not prove it of so much as *one*. Irenæus may now stand; as also Ignatius and Clemens. As to Origen, you have nothing to object against what I cited him for, namely, that the Son knows as much as the Father, *or all that the Father knows*; which is *omniscience* in the highest and fullest sense, not your *relative omniscience*, no where found among the ancients. But you oppose another passage of the same comment, saying,

that the Father is *greater* than the *truth*, that is, than the *Son*: which nobody doubts: *greater* as Father, which is all that Origen means. And what is that to the purpose? Your other quotation out of Jerome (then a vehement Anti-Origenist, and straining every thing to the worst sense) is of very slight moment. Let the reader consult Bishop Bullⁿ in defence of Origen against Jerome's invectives; for I have no inclination to repeat: or let him turn to Origen's treatise against Celsus, where Origen directly contradicts that very doctrine which you, upon Jerome's authority, endeavour to ascribe to him; he asserts, that the Son knows the Father *κατ' ἀξίαν*, *suitably to his dignity*^o.

From the slender opposition which, after long deliberation, you have been able to make against the Son's *omniscience*, it ought now to pass as a thing concluded and determined, being fully supported by *Scripture* and by all *antiquity*. For besides the *particular* testimonies before mentioned, I gave you also a *general* argument, to prove that the Son's *omniscience* must have been a ruled case, a settled point with the Ante-Nicene Church: to which argument you make not a word of reply. Only you single out an expression of mine, relating to Sabellianism, which you think is not just, and which you call "abusing the reader;" though you have not yet been able to produce any one instance where I have done it. I have discovered many in you, and shall many more as I pass on. What you blame me for, is, for supposing that the Greek word *hypostasis* signified *person*, during the time of the Sabellian controversy. I do assert that it did, and could very easily prove it: but Bishop Bull has already done it to my hands ^p. And it is something hard, that as often as you forget yourself, or happen to be *ignorant* of what every scholar should know, I must be charged with *abusing* my reader. As to the Sabellian notion of *μία ὑπόστασις τριπρόσωπος*, I have before shewn how it is to be understood: and that Eusebius himself so understood it is plain to every man that can read him. But I suppose, the *secret* reason of all this was for the sake of a translation of yours, "one single individual substance " under three personal distinctions:" which though *literal*, is a very *false* translation, as *substance* and *personal distinctions* are now understood: and therefore this was meanly applying to the *populace*. The true sense of the words, as we should now express it, is, *one person under three nominal distinctions*: which is mani-

ⁿ Bull. Def. F. Nic. p. 121.

^p Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. p. 103.

^o Origen. contr. Cels. p. 287.

&c.

festly what Eusebius meant by it; as may appear from the account I have given of him above (p. 522,) Your referring me to Dr. Cudworth is pretty extraordinary; when it is well known that that great man was mistaken, and that his account of that matter (espoused also by Curcellæus) has been at large confuted⁹ by Bishop Stillingfleet⁹; not to mention what has been done also by Dr. Wall^r, and others, since that time.

The truth is, had Dr. Cudworth but distinguished between *substance of substance*, (which supposes no *division*, but *one substance*;) and saying *substances*, or *essences*, which implies *division*, his account had been, in the main, very just: for the Fathers knew nothing of a Trinity of *modes*, such as seems to have been taught by some of the later Schoolmen. But I pass on.

The *eternity* of God the Son comes next under consideration. You tell me, it "is not alike described" with the Father's, because the Father's is *unoriginate* and *underived*: but where do you find *unoriginate* or *underived* at all mentioned in the texts wherein the Father's eternity is described? You may collect it perhaps by inference: but still the Scripture phrases for the *eternity*, whether of Father or Son, are the same: neither does the distinction of *derived* and *underived* signify any thing as to the sense of *eternity*, which imports neither more nor less than *beginningless* and *endless* duration. You next endeavour to find some difference in the manner wherein the texts are applied to each Person. As to the phrase *first* and *last*, it has been vindicated already. As to Rev. i. 8, which you understand of the Father, it is to be interpreted (with all antiquity) of God the Son^s. I know how much it concerns you to contend for the application of this text to God the Father; and therefore it is that you plead so strenuously for it towards the latter end of Query xvii. It will be of some service to settle that text here; and therefore I shall stop a while to consider the strength of your reinforcement. In my Sermons,

1. I pleaded from the context.
2. From antiquity.
3. I shewed the weakness of the Doctor's reasons for applying the text to the Father.

As to the *context*, you make no reply at all; though it is certainly of very great moment, for the ascertaining the con-

⁹ Stillingfleet on the Trinity, p. 76. to p. 100.

^r Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, p. 337. to p. 354. True Scripture

Doctrine continued, p. 239. to 252.

^s See my Sermons, p. 141, &c. of this volume. Defence, vol. i. p. 537, &c.

struction. As to *antiquity*, never were men more unanimous than the *ancients* were in this matter; there being no one exception, on record, against it. And though you may make slight of Post-Nicene writers, (Athanasius, Ruffinus, Gregory Nazianzen, Phœbadius, Ambrose, Epiphanius, Jerome, Austin, Andreas Cæsariensis,) yet their concurring voices in the case are really very considerable; and amount to a probable proof, at least, of the universal sense of the Ante-Nicene Church; especially where nothing can be brought to confront it. I observe, it is pretty frequent with you, upon the citing of Eusebius singly, immediately to cry out the *ancient Church*, even in points wherein Eusebius stands alone, or runs counter to the ancients. I have certainly a much better right to claim the verdict of the *ancient Church*, upon the strength of so many evidences, (and few of them either much later or less considerable than Eusebius.) in a matter which the ancients have no where contradicted. But I appealed also to two Ante-Nicene writers, (Hippolytus and Tertullian, to say nothing now of Origen,) and I observed further, that their testimonies in the case were not to be looked upon merely as the private judgment of two writers, but as shewing that the Praxicans and Noëtians had all along taken it for granted, that the Church applied Rev. i. 8. to God the Son; and that Hippolytus and Tertullian, however pressed in dispute, presumed not to question it. A proof of this kind amounts to more than many testimonies of *single* Fathers, in relation to their own interpretation of a text. As to Hippolytus, you call him (p. 509.) as usual, a “spurious or interpolated” author; your pretences for which have been answered. But we have Epiphanius^t here stepping in to confirm the same thing, viz. that Noëtus urged that text, as applied to God the Son, against the Catholics: and he answers as Hippolytus had done, by admitting the text to be understood of Christ; borrowing his answer (as will be plain by comparing) from this very piece of Hippolytus, which you call *spurious* or *interpolated*. It is therefore manifest, that the part we are now concerned in is no *interpolation*.

As to Tertullian, you say, “He does not suppose this text to “be spoken of the Son,” (p. 508.) What, does he not? Surely you never looked carefully into Tertullian. He observes of the Praxicans^u, (just as Hippolytus does of Noëtus,) that they had

^t Epiphan. vol. i. p. 488.

responsum adversus id quod et de Apocalypsi Joannis proferunt: *Ego Do-*

^u Interim, hic mihi promotum sit

cited and urged this text against the Catholics; applying it to God the Son: and Tertullian, in his answer, admits that application. Wherefore it is a clear case, that the Ante-Nicene Church universally understood this text of the *Son*, and not of the *Father*; which I am now proving. What you throw in to lessen the sense of *παντοκράτωρ*, when applied to the Son, I pass over here, as not affecting our present question. Origen I insist not upon, because of the doubtful credit of his translator. Yet, considering that the text was certainly so applied before Origen's time, and constantly after, it is more than probable that that part at least is Origen's own. However, I want not his testimony, having abundant proof of what I assert, without him.

Since therefore the *context*, and all *antiquity*, pleads on my side for understanding that text of God the Son, I must have strong reasons for the other *application*, before I admit it. Dr. Clarke's principal reason, drawn from verse the fourth of that chapter, I answered at large in my Sermons^x. It is no more than this; that the title, "which is, and which was, and which is to come," is given to the Father, ver. 4, therefore the same title, ver. 8, must belong to him also: as if the *same title* were not often in Scripture, and in the Apocalypse too, given to both. I instanced in the title of *Alpha* and *Omega*, &c. being applied by St. John, sometimes to the *Father*, and at other times to the Son. All you have to say by way of reply, is, that the title of *Alpha* and *Omega* is indisputably given to the Son in other places; whereas this other is never given to the Son any where else but here; where it is *disputable* whether it be given him or no. To which I answer, that there is very little force in this argument, provided we have other good reasons for understanding the text of God the Son in this one place; as we certainly have both from the *context* and from *antiquity*: and there is still the less force, if *Scripture*, and even St. John himself, has elsewhere applied, if not this very title, yet *equivalent* titles to God the Son; which he undoubtedly has. For brevity

minus qui est, et qui fuit, et venit omnipotens; et sicubi alibi Dei omnipotentis appellationem non putant Filio convenire. Quasi qui venturus est, non sit omnipotens, cum et Filius omnipotentis tam omnipotens sit quam Deus Dei Filius. Tertull. contr. Prax.
c. 17.

N. B. The Praxeans could not imagine that any such high title could belong to the *Son*, unless the Son was the very Father himself: which therefore they concluded him to be from this and the like texts.

^x Sermons, p. 141 of this volume.

sake, I refer only to St. John's application of Isa. ix. 6, 9. to God the Son^y, "Holy, holy, holy *Lord God of hosts*:" which St. John expresses (Rev. iv. 8.) by Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ, much the same with what we have Rev. i. 8.

There is therefore no force in your reasoning against the application of Rev. i. 8. to the Son.

The Doctor's other reason drawn from the *ancients*, as generally applying the title ὁ παντοκράτωρ to the Father, is ridiculous; when we have plain positive proof that they understand this very text of God the Son. Whatever use may be made of the general observation, (as there cannot much^z;) it does not affect the question about the application of this text to the Son.

Having sufficiently vindicated our application of Rev. i. 8, I may proceed, and make my proper use of it, as occasion may require. I may now venture, by your allowance, to call God the Son *supreme over all*; which is your own rendering of ὁ παντοκράτωρ. And let us not presume to deal partially and unequally between the Father and the Son, in this important question. We may now return to the point of the Son's *eternity*.

I observed, in my Defence^a, that by eluding the proof of the Son's eternity, you had scarce left yourself any for the eternity of God the *Father*: or if you had, I desired you to shew in what manner you could (consistent with your principles) prove the *eternity* of the Father. You make a doubt whether I intended it for *sober reasoning* or *banter*. You do well to put the matter off with as good a grace as you can: but I was very serious in it; that you had come very near defeating every proof that could be thought on in the case; if you had not entirely done so. And indeed, I am still of opinion, that, through your imprudent zeal against the divinity of God the Son, you have really betrayed the clearest and best cause in the world to the first bold Marcionite, or Manichee, that shall deny the *eternal Godhead* both of Father and Son, and assert some *unknown God* above them both. You will remember, the question was, whether that *particular Person*, called the Father, be the eternal God, or how you could prove it upon your principles. His being called *God* ever so often would amount to nothing; that being no more than a word of *office*. His being *Creator* was nothing, that you could *elude*. His being *Jehovah* was of no weight, meaning

^y See my Sermons, p. 43 of this volume.

^z Ibid. p. 142.

^a Defence, vol. i. p. 341, &c.

no more than a person true and faithful to his promises. As to his *eternity*, none of the texts were strong enough for it, but might bear a limited sense. I may now add, that the title of *παντοκράτωρ*, *Almighty*, or *God over all*, or the strongest words of like kind in the Old Testament, signify nothing; being capable of a *subordinate* sense. Well then; what have you at length reserved, to prove so momentous an article? Only this: that he is the *Father*, or *first Cause*, of whom are all things. But *first Cause* is no where said, that is your own. All that is said is, "To us there is one God the Father, of whom are all things," 1 Cor. viii. 6. And you know how to elude the force of the word *all things*, when you are disputing against God the Son: so that creating *all things* may mean no more than creating *some things*; as Christ's knowing *all things*, according to you, means *some things* only. The utmost therefore of what you have proved is no more than that he is *Creator*; and being *Creator*, you had told me long ago, did not imply *eternity*, nor an *infinite* subject^b. You have not then been able to prove, that the particular Person, called the Father, is the *first Cause* of all things; or that there is not *another God* above him; who is really, and truly, and in the *metaphysical* sense, the *eternal God*. You may proceed as you think proper, to make up the apparent deficiency of your pretended demonstration. By loosening the proof of Christ's *divinity*, you have loosened every proof of the *divinity* of God the Father also; which perhaps you was not aware of. For my part, I shall always think, that his being so often called *God*, and *true God*, and his being *Creator*, and *Almighty*, and *Jehovah*, and *he that is, and was, and is to come*, are clear incontestable proofs that he is the one *necessarily existing* God, whose *existence* my reason assures me of: and when I am got thus far, I will prove, by the same topics, that God the Son is so likewise: and thus the same artillery shall serve both against Manichees and Arians; while you, by pleading the cause of one, have insensibly given up a greater cause to the other.

I must however do you the justice to observe, that since your first writing, you seem to be drawing off, with the Doctor, from some of your former principles. You do not now make the word *God* to be *always* a word of *office*: nay, you assert it to be very "improper to say, that the supreme God has an office," (p. 220,) which makes a great alteration in your scheme, and is jumping from one *extreme* to another; overlooking, as usual, the truth,

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 342.

which lies in the midway. I do not know, whether you can yet prove that particular Person, called God the *Father*, to be the one eternal God. You suppose the word *God*, when applied to him, to denote his *Person*; and you suppose that *Person* to be the one eternal *God*. But *supposing* is one thing, and *proving* another: and I do not see how you have proved it, or ever can prove it; unless you allow the title of *God* to carry the notion of *necessary existence* in it, allowing the same also of *Jehovah*. Then indeed you may prove your point as to the *divinity* of God the *Father*: and as soon as you have done it, by the same arguments we will also prove the *divinity* of God the *Son*. So choose you whether to take in *both*, or give up *both*: for I see no remedy but that the *divinity* of *Father* and *Son* must stand or fall together.

To proceed: you pretend now, that “you was not arguing “against the eternity of the *Son*, but shewing the weakness of “my arguments to prove his independent eternity.” You shall have the liberty of recanting and growing wiser, whenever you please. But the truth of the fact is, that you were then arguing against the *eternity* of the *Son*, in these words quoted in my Defence, vol. i. p. 343. “This office and character (of a Redeemer) relative to us, presupposes not, nor is at all more “perfect for, the eternal past duration of his being.” It was the *eternity*, you see, not *independent* eternity, against which you were disputing. I asked, how you came to take for granted what you knew nothing of; viz. that any power less than *infinite* might be equal to the work of redemption. And what do you say to this? My argument is, if you cannot shew that it did not require *infinite power*, you cannot shew that it did not require an *eternal* agent. You say, that “an office commencing in time, “does not require an eternal duration of him that executes.” Right: every *office* does not: but we are speaking of an *office* which may (for aught you know) require *infinite*, and therefore *eternal* powers, because nothing *infinite* can be *in time*. You say, “Infinity of powers is not a consequence of eternal duration.” Suppose it be not, (which you know nothing of again,) yet my argument is *vice versa*, that *eternal* duration is a consequence of *infinity of powers*; which you did not attend to. At length you are forced to give up the point; not being hardy enough to pronounce that the work of redemption did not require *infinite powers*.

But you attempt to prove it another way. A “mediator,”

you say, "cannot be himself the one supreme God." You should have said, (for it is all that you can prove,) that a *mediator* cannot be the same person whom he mediates to. And this is what Eusebius shews in the passage produced by you; which was very needlessly brought to prove what every man's common sense teaches. The whole force of Eusebius's reasoning lies only in this, that the two persons could not be *one person*: or if he meant any thing more, (which I am not sensible he did,) his arguing is low and trifling. I had pleaded, that by your reasoning, you had entirely frustrated the argument drawn from the acts of creation, to prove the *divinity* of God the Father: for the *office* of creating commenced *in time*. You are pleased to allow my consequence, (however scandalous it may appear upon you.) and to tell me, that the "perfections of God the Father appear not barely and immediately from the act of creating, *but* from the consideration of the nature of a first Cause." I am glad to find you begin to be reconciled to that *metaphysical* word, *nature*, which you will hardly allow us to use. But I must tell you further, that by weakening and destroying so many clear and undeniable proofs of the Father's *divinity*, you have not left yourself enough to prove him to be the *first Cause*. This perhaps you was not aware of, being entirely bent upon destroying the Son's *divinity*; and taking it for granted, that the *Father's* would be admitted without proof. It is a dark business: but disputants will sometimes overshoot. Dr. Clarke, I believe, began to be sensible of his error in this respect, as having undermined every *Scripture proof* of the *necessary existence* of God the Father. By an after-thought, in the *second* edition of "Scripture Doctrine^c," he was pleased to allow, that the Father's *self-existence* and *independent eternity* were taught in Rev. i. 8.

I am very glad he pitched upon that text, because we can easily vindicate it to *God the Son*: and so we shall have an *express* proof of the *necessary existence* of the *Son*; and leave you, with shame, to make out the *Father's*, by some other as express texts, or by *consequence* only. I have before hinted, that 1 Cor. viii. 6. will do you no service *directly*, or by itself; because *all things* may mean *some things*, and *God to us*, may not mean absolutely *the God of the universe*. But if the Son's *necessary existence* be once admitted, according to Rev. i. 8, the *consequence* will be clear and certain for the *necessary existence* of the *Father*

^c Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 264. ed. 2nd.

also. Thus, as you had once lost the proof of the *Father's divinity*, by denying the *Son's*; so, by asserting the latter, you may again recover the former, and then all will be right.

QUERY VIII.

Whether eternity does not imply necessary existence of the Son; which is inconsistent with the Doctor's scheme? and whether the Doctor hath not made an elusive equivocating answer to the objection; since the Son may be a necessary emanation from the Father, by the will and power of the Father, without any contradiction? Will is one thing, and arbitrary will another.

WE have many important matters to debate under this present Query, which will require the reader's most careful attention.

You begin with telling me, that *eternal generation* does not imply *necessary existence*, nay, that it is *contradictory* to it. Let us hear your reason. "Generation is an act, and all actions "spring from the will only; and an act of the will (that is, free "choice) cannot be necessary," p. 251. Your argument is undoubtedly just, according to your own *novel* sense of the word *act*. But it is ridiculous to imagine, that giving *new* names to *old truths* can ever alter their *nature*. Either argue against generation being an *act* in the *old* sense of *act*, or confess your trifling, in bringing the whole to a dispute about *words* and *names* only. In the *old* sense of *act*, generation is an *act*; in your *novel* sense of *act* it is not: and where are you now, but where you at first set out?

You tell me, after the *Modest Pleader*, (to whom I briefly replied in a *Preface*,) "that I have not been able to produce one "single passage out of any one Ante-Nicene writer" (you should have added *Post-Nicene* too, it being equally true of all the *Fathers*) "wherein the Son is affirmed to have *emanated*, or been "emitted, from the Father, *by necessity of nature*."

Will you please to shew me, where either *Scripture* or *Fathers* (*Post-Nicene* or *Ante-Nicene*) ever said, that God the Father existed by *necessity of nature*. They have never said it; though they have, in *other terms*, asserted the same thing, which we now mean by *necessity of nature*: and this may also be the case as to the *necessary* generation of the Son: and it certainly is so. To clear this momentous point I shall here shew,

1. Why neither *Father* nor *Son* were ever said, by the ancients, to exist by *necessity of nature*, but the contrary.

2. I shall shew that the *ancients*, notwithstanding, believed the very same thing which we now differently express; namely, the *necessary existence* of *God the Son*, as well as of *God the Father*.

3. I shall inquire in what sense, or by whom, *necessary generation* or *emanation* was held, and in what words they expressed it: where I shall also account for the *Son's* being said to be generated by the will of the *Father*.

1. I am to begin with observing, why neither *Father* nor *Son* were ever said, by the *ancients*, to exist by *necessity of nature*, but the contrary. None of the *ancients* durst have said, that *God* exists by *necessity*, because it would have been the same as to say, that he was compelled by a superior force, and against his will, (such was their sense of the word *necessity*,) to exist. The Greek ἀνάγκη had been much used among philosophers in this hard sense. Some had made νοῦς and ἀνάγκη^d, *mind* and *necessity*, the two *causes*, or *sources* of all things. Some made *necessity* alone the first and highest *cause*^e. Plato meant the same as ὕλη, or first matter, by *necessity*^f, following therein *Timæus* Locrus. Some made *necessity* the *mother of the fates*, and the *first* among the deities^g. Many made their gods all subject to *necessity*; as is particularly true of the *Stoics*. I forbear to cite passages which might be given in great numbers. Such being the use of the word *necessity*, no wonder, if the *Fathers* forbore saying, that *God* existed by *necessity*, or if they even denied it.

Plotinus, a famous Platonist, of the third century, denies that *God* exists ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης^h, *by necessity*, being no other than what he would choose to be.

Lactantius hints at the same thoughtⁱ. And upon the same principles, the *Fathers* were always very careful to remove every thing of *necessity*^k from *God*; and would never say that he

^d Vid. *Timæum* Locrum de Anim. Mund. p. 543. Amst.

^e Vid. *Phurnutum* de Natura Deorum, p. 19. alias 155.

^f Vid. *Platonis Timæum*. Chalcid. in *Timæum*, p. 377. ed. Fabric.

^g Vid. *Proclum*. Theolog. Platon. p. 405, 406. Pausan. lib. ii. p. 93. Theodorit. de Provid. Dei Serm. vi. p. 562, 563.

^h Μῆτε ἂν ἑαυτῶ τί μέμψασθαι ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὄν, ὃ ἔστι τοῦτο, τὸ αὐτὸς εἶναι ὅπερ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει. *Plotin. Enn.* vi. p. 748.

ⁱ Ex seipso est, ut in primo diximus libro, et ideo talis est qualem se esse voluit. *Lact. Inst.* lib. ii. c. 8. p. 161.

^k Τίς ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτῶ; εἰ δὲ ἀτοπὸν ἔστι λέγειν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ ἀνάγκην, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φύσει ἀγαθὸς ἔστιν. *Athanasius*, 611.

Bonus Pater, non aut ex voluntate est, aut *necessitate*, sed super utrumque, hoc est, *natura*. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. iv. c. 9. p. 540.

Non ex voluntate, nec ex *necessitate*, quia Deo nulla manet *necessitas*. Supra voluntatem et *necessitatem* est

existed, or was God, by *necessity*. Damascen well expresses the thoughts of them all in these words :

“God being by *nature* good, and by *nature* endued with “creative powers, and by *nature* God, is not any of these by “*necessity*: for, who has laid any *necessity* upon him?” I render δημιουργός, *endued with creative powers*, that being the sense of it ; though otherwise, literally, it is *Creator*.

As low then as Damascen, who lived in the eighth century, we have no instance, that I know of, of the use of *necessary existence*, or of *necessity of nature* in the *modern* sense. They that would seek for it, must look among the later *Schoolmen*, and not among the *Fathers* of the Church. When it first came in is no great matter, nor worth my search : so I leave it to those who have leisure. But I must complain of it as a great instance of *unfairness*, after I had given you the hint of this in the *Preface* to my *Sermons*¹, (which you have read,) for you to bring up this pretence again, that the Ante-Nicene writers did not allow the Son to exist, or to be generated by *necessity of nature*. Which pretence amounts to no more than a poor quibble upon an expression : and you might have used the very same argument against the *necessary existence* even of God the Father. The ancient writers, I conceive, for eight centuries (I know not how much lower) would have denied, or did deny, that God was God *by necessity*: well therefore might they deny, or never assert, that the Son was generated by *necessity*. Yet they asserted the very same things which we do, in respect of *Father* or *Son*, under *other* terms ; as I come next to shew.

2. The ancients believed and taught the *necessary existence* of God the Son ; expressing it in such manner and in such phrases as were suitable to their own times. The most usual way of expressing what we call *necessary existence*, was by saying, that any thing was this or that, φύσει or κατὰ φύσιν, *by nature* : another pretty common way was by ὁ ὢν, τὸ ὄν, ὄντως ὢν, and the

id quod est Deitas. *Vigil. Taps. de Trin.* lib. x. p. 273. Conf. *Toletan. Concil.* xi.

Φύσει γὰρ ὢν ἀγαθὸς ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ φύσει δημιουργός, καὶ φύσει Θεὸς, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτά ἐστι· τίς γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων. *Damasc. de Fid. Orth.* lib. iii. p. 228.

Εἰ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν τὸ φυσικὸν πάντως καὶ ἠγακασμένον· φύσει δὲ ὁ Θεὸς, Θεὸς, φύσει ἀγαθός, φύσει δημιουργός· ἀνάγκη ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς, Θεὸς, καὶ ἀγαθός,

καὶ δημιουργός· ὅπερ καὶ ἐννοεῖν, μήτι γε λέγειν ἐσχάτης ἐστὶ βλασφημίας· Τίς γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων ; *Maxim. Disp. cum Pyrrh.* tom. ii. p. 163. *Combefis.*

Ὁ τῶν ὄλων Θεὸς οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγιος, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός, ζωὴ, φῶς, σοφία, καὶ δύναμις ; ἀρ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀβουλήτως καὶ ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, ἅ ἐστιν. *Cyriil. Alex. ad Anathem.* 3. *contr. Theodor.* p. 213.

¹ At the beginning of this volume.

like, *existing* emphatically. Several other ways of expressing the same thing will occur as I go along, in tracing the sense of the Fathers upon this head, the *necessary existence* of God the Son.

A. D. 116. IGNATIUS.

I begin with Ignatius, one of St. John's disciples, whose words are these: "There is one physician, both fleshly and spiritual, *made* and *unmade*, though in flesh *God*, in death true life, both *of Mary* and of *God*; first passible, then impassible, Jesus *Christ* our Lord^m." The word which I here lay the stress on, in proof of the Son's *necessary existence*, is ἀγέννητος, *not made*: a word but seldom, if ever, used, in this manner, to signify any thing less. Thus Athanasiusⁿ, and Pope Gelasius^o, long ago, understood this place of Ignatius: you pretend (p. 295.) that the reading is ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, and that it is "plainly set *in opposition only to human generation.*" But this which is so *plain* to you, is by no means plain to any man else: the contrary is rather so from many considerations. You must mean, I suppose, that he was *unbegotten*, as having no *human father*, born of a *virgin*. Against which construction there lie these several reasons. 1. That no other Catholic writer ever styled Christ ἀγέννητος on this account. 2. That Ignatius is plainly speaking of two several natures in the same person of Christ, as appears by the *antitheses* all along. Call it the *flesh* only, if you please, (though he meant by *flesh* human nature entire,) yet you see the opposition carried on quite through, *flesh* and *spirit*, *flesh* and *God*, *death* and *true life*, one of *Mary*, the other of *God*, one *passible*, the other *impassible*; so that the plain sense is, that one was *made*, the other *unmade*: unless you will say, that as the *flesh* was *begotten*, the Λόγος, the *God* was *unbegotten*: which can bear but two senses, one of which will not suit with your principles, nor the other with *Catholic* principles. You will not say, that the Λόγος was *unbegotten* of the Father, nor would Ignatius, that Christ, as *God*, was not *begotten* of *Mary*. It being a *Catholic* maxim, that *Mary* was θεοτόκος: that is, the doctrine was always held, though differently ex-

^m Εἰς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σάρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γενητός καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ, πρώτον παθητός καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς

Χριστὸς ὁ Κύριος ἡμῶν. Ign. Eph. ad Ephes. c. vii. p. 14. Ox.

ⁿ Athanas. de Synod. Arim. p. 761.

^o Gelasius de duabus Naturis, p. 690. Bas. ed.

pressed; and it is the express doctrine of Ignatius^p himself. Since then Ignatius was undoubtedly speaking of what Christ was in two distinct *natures*, or *capacities*, to one of which γενητός is applied, and ἀγέννητος to the other; you may readily perceive, that your construction of him is entirely wide and foreign. 3. I shall add, thirdly, that I have some reason to doubt whether there was any such word as ἀγέννητος so early as the time of Ignatius. This will lead me into a long but useful inquiry; useful upon many other accounts besides the present. You are of opinion, that the ancient Christian writers, wherever they style God ἀγέννητος, meant the same as ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, p. 294. My opinion is, that it was late before they styled him ἀγέννητος at all; and that when they styled him ἀγέννητος, they never meant precisely *unbegotten*, but either *unmade*, or *undervived* absolutely. We must trace this point up to the old philosophers. Thales is the first of them: and he uses the word ἀγέννητος^r, to signify either *unmade* or *eternal*.

Parmenides^s, about a hundred years after, uses the word ἀγέννητον, as is plain from the metre; and not in the sense of *unbegotten*, because he supposes the same thing to be μονογενές, *begotten*.

Clemens understands the passage of *God*: but Eusebius and Theodorit more rightly of the *world*: though perhaps both may be consistent, as some have imagined *God* and the *world* to be the same, and proceeding from a *chaos*. But I incline to understand it rather of the *world* distinct from *God*, as the *only begotten of God*; μονογενής being a title given to the *world* by Timæus Locrus^t, and Plato^u, who are imitated by Philo^x.

Here then ἀγέννητος can only signify *unmade*, *eternal*, or *necessarily existing*.

^p Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ γενομένου ἐν ὑστέρω ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ καὶ Ἀβραάμ. Ignat. ad Rom. c. vii. p. 40.

^q Patri novum innascibilitatis nomen ecclesia imposuit. Cum enim Sabelliana hæresis genitum ex virgine Patrem voluisset asserere, ingenitum contra. Hanc confitendo ecclesia tradidit Patrem, et utique in divinis Scripturis ingenitum nunquam legimus Patrem. Vigil. Taps. Disq. Not. 21.

^r Πρεσβύτερον τῶν ὄντων Θεός· ἀγέννητον γάρ. Diog. Laert. lib. i. p. 21.

Τί τὸ θεῖον; τὸ μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον, μήτε τελευτήν. Thales apud Diog. Laert. p. 22.

^s Πολλὰ μάλ' ὡς ἀγέννητον εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,

Ὀῦλον, μονογενές τε, καὶ ἀτρεμές, ἢδ' ἀγέννητον. Apud Clem. Alex. p. 716. Euseb. Præp. Ev. p. 43. Theod. tom. iv. p. 504, 528.

^t Timæus Locrus, p. 4. Gale. alias p. 545. Amst.

^u Plato Tim. c. 16. p. 239. Fabric. Vid. Orig. contr. Cels. p. 308.

^x Philo, p. 244, 298, 876.

Ocellus Lucanus^y uses it to express *beginningless* and *endless* existence: or what we should call *necessary existence*; always and unvariably the same.

Timæus Locrus applies it to *ideas* and to *duration*: where he seems to mean no more than *eternity* and *immutability*^z. I read the word with single *ν* in both places; there being no reason for making it double. There is a passage of Timæus^a, cited by Clemens, where the copies have ἀγέννητος. Sylburgius had observed it should be ἀγένητος rather. But I believe the true reading is ἀγένατος, to answer the dialect. I suppose Timæus must have meant νοῦς, by his μία ἀρχή, one of his two *principles*: ἀνάγκα was the other. And I must note, that ἀγένατος here seems to be used in the sense of *undervived* absolutely.

We may now descend to Plato, about 360 years before Christ. It is frequent with him to use the word ἀγένητος to express *eternal*, *immutable* existence, that is, *necessary existence*. And though he derived his νοῦς and ψυχὴ, *mind* and *soul*, from the τὸ ἀγαθόν, yet he supposed them ἀγένητα, *necessarily existing*; as Athanasius^b hath observed: and the like is observed of him by Eusebius^c. Dr. Clarke tells us, in his *Demonstration of the Being, &c.* that, according to many of Plato's followers, the world was supposed to be "an eternal voluntary emanation from "the all-wise and supreme Cause^d." But I know not whether the Doctor will be able to prove this of them, in his present sense of *voluntary*. Plotinus, who is one of his authorities, makes God's *will* to be the same with God's *essence*: and he derives the very being of God from his *will*, that is, from himself^e. You seem therefore to be under a great mistake when you tell me, (p. 254,) that the Platonists expressly affirmed the world to be

^y Τὸ πᾶν ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀγένητον· αἰεὶ τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἔσται. *Ocell. Lucan.* p. 8. Gale. al. 506.

^a Ἀγένητος καὶ ἀφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος· ἀναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος. *Id.* p. 16, 28.

^z De idea, τὸ μὲν ἀγένατόν τε καὶ ἀκίνατον, καὶ μένον τε. *Tim. Locr.* p. 2. ἀγενίῳ χρόνῳ ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορούμεος, p. 10.

^a Μία ἀρχὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος (leg. ἀγένατος) εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγένετο. *Clem. Alex.* p. 718. Plato in his Phædrus applies this reasoning to the soul. *Phædr.* p. 344. Vid. *Cicer. Tusc.* i. p. 45.

^b Ὁν λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νοῦν, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ψυχὴν, καίτοι γνώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν ὅμως καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν ἀγένητα. *Athanas. de Decret. S. N.* p. 234.

^c Νοητῆς οὐσίας—ἀγενήτους εἶναι φάσκων αὐτὰς ὡσπερ καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἔπειτα ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου συστήναι λέγων. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος αὐτὰς γεγονέαι διδόναι βούλεται. *Euseb. Præp. Ev.* l. 13. c. 15. p. 694.

^d Dr. Clarke's *Demonstration, &c.* p. 31. 4th ed.

^e See Cudworth, p. 405.

eternal, and by the *will* of God, and *not by necessity*: as if *will* in their sense (because it is in *yours*) must needs be opposed to *necessity*, in your sense also of *necessity*; when neither their sense of *will* nor of *necessity* was the same with yours ^f.

To Plato we may subjoin Aristotle, who is known to make the world ἀγένητος, *necessarily existent*; which you (because you affect *singularity*) will needs call *self-existent*. But as there is certainly a different *idea* from that of *self-existent* fixed to the word ἀγένητος, when applied to the thing *caused*, we will, with your good leave, give the different *ideas* different names. Simplicius, quoted by Dr. Cudworth ^g, observes of Aristotle, that while he makes God the *cause* of the world, he yet supposes the world to be ἀγένητος, *necessarily existing*. You say, Dr. Cudworth justly charges Aristotle with making the world *self-existent*. But Dr. Cudworth was a wiser man, than to charge Aristotle with it. He observes, that neither Aristotle, nor any of the Pagan theologers, from his time, ever supposed the *world* or the inferior Gods to be *self-existent* ^h; but to proceed eternally from a *cause*. You allow the same thing (p. 294.) of the Stoics their ἀγένητοι θεοί, *eternal* and *necessarily existing* Gods, produced from the *substance* of God. So that now we have the sense of three famous sects of philosophers, (Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics,) all distinguishing between *self-existence* and *necessary existence*; and all using the word ἀγένητος to express the latter singly, as often as they applied it to things *produced*.

From the whole we may make this observation, which will be useful to us in our reading the Fathers, that there is nothing strange or uncommon in giving the title of ἀγένητος to what is supposed to have been *produced*, or *begotten*. To the ancient instances already given from profane writers, I shall add a few more of something later date; one is from the Hermaic books, quoted in Cyril ⁱ, where the Λόγος is styled ἀγένητος, and yet

^f Basil gives a very different account of these philosophers and their sentiments, that they supposed the world *eternal*, and not by the *will* of God.

Καὶ καθότι πολλοὶ τῶν φαντασθέντων συνπαρχειν ἐξ αἰδίου τῷ Θεῷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐχὶ γεγενῆσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ συνεχώρησαν' ἀλλ' οἰοῦν ἀποσκίασμα τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ αὐτομάτως παρνοπστήναι. Καὶ αἴτιον μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν Θεόν, αἴτιον δὲ ἀπροαιρέτως, ὡς τῆς σκιᾶς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τῆς λαμπη-

δόμος τὸ ἀπαναγάζον. Basil. in Hexaem. Hom. 1. p. 10.

So also St. Ambrose:

Quamvis causam ejus Deum esse fateantur, causam tamen volunt non ex voluntate, et dispositione sua, sed ita ut causa umbræ corpus est. Ambr. in Hexaem. l. 1. c. 5.

^g Τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Θεὸν λέγων, ὅμως ἀγένητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι. Cudworth, p. 253.

^h Ibid.

ⁱ Ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἄρχοντα ἐπικείμενον

γήσιος υἱός. More may be cited from Plotinus^k, and other Platonists: who call things ἀγένητα, *eternal* and *necessarily existing*, though proceeding from another. All the while it is observable, that ἀγένητος was sometimes used in a higher sense, when applied to what those philosophers called the *first Cause*, or *supreme God*: for it might then signify both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*, that is, *undervived* absolutely: though it might often signify no more than *necessary existence*, abstracting from the consideration of *self-existence*: which may best be judged of by observing what the word is *opposed* to. I meet not however with the word ἀγέννητος to denote particularly *self-existent*: nor does it seem to have been in use so high as Philo's time. For when Philo had a mind to express how the Λόγος was *necessarily existing*, but not *self-existent*, (so I understand him,) he had no way of doing it but by saying that he was not ἀγένητος in the highest sense as God is, nor γενητός in the low sense as creatures are, but between both^l. If he had had the two words ἀγένητος and ἀγέννητος, he might much more easily have expressed the thought: as many of the Christian Fathers did after. I take the word ἀγέννητος to have been first brought in by the Christians, to distinguish the *Father* from the *Son*; that is, *unbegotten* from *begotten*. But when, or by what degrees it came into use, is not easy to determine. Hardly so early as Ignatius; or if it had, he would not have applied it to God the *Son* in any sense: wherefore it is highly improbable that ἀγέννητος should be the word in the place cited. But ἀγένητος was a common word, and very applicable; and the more likely to be applied by him to God the *Son*, whom he also styles, as the *Word*, αἰδιος^m,

δημοουργόν, λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὅς μετ' ἐκείνον πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγένητος, &c.—“Ἐστι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου πρόγονος, καὶ τέλειος, καὶ γόνιμος γήσιος υἱός. *Apud Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. i. p. 33.*

^k Γενητὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἀρχῆν ἔχειν ἀγένητα δὲ ὅτι μὴ χρόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ αἰεὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄντα αἰεὶ. *Plotin. Enn. ii. lib. 4. p. 161, 162.*

Αἱ τῶν θεῶν οὐσίαι οὐδὲ ἐγένοντο· τὰ γὰρ αἰεὶ ὄντα οὐδέποτε γίνονται—οὐδὲ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας, ἢ ἀλλήλων χωρίζονται· ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ψυχῆς αἰ ἐπιστῆμαι. *Sallust. de Mund. c. ii. p. 245.*

Αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κόσμον ἀφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον εἶναι ἀνάγκη—εἰ γὰρ μὴ φθίρεται, οὐδὲ γέγονεν.—καὶ ὅτι

ἀνάγκη διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητα ὄντος τοῦ κόσμου αἰεὶ τε τὸν θεὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὑπάρχειν, ὡσπερ ἡλίῳ μὲν, καὶ πυρὶ συνυφίσταται φῶς, σώματι δὲ σκία. *Ibid. c. vii. p. 256.*

^l Οὕτε ἀγένητος ὡς θεὸς ὢν, οὕτε γενητός ὡς ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μέσος τῶν ἀκρων, ἀμφοτέροις ὀμηρεύων. *Philo, p. 509.*

^m Ὅς ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ λόγος αἰδιος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθὼν. *Ignat. ad Magnes. p. 23.* N. B. Αἰδιος here looks backwards, and is to be understood *a parte ante*, as the Schools speak. Compare what Irenæus says; *Ubi est sige non erit Logos; et ubi Logos non utique est sige.* *Iren. l. ii. c. 12. p. 129.*

of like signification with ἀγέννητος, and frequently joined with it in ancient writersⁿ. I have nothing further to add, but that the Arian interpolator well understood the force of ἀγέννητος in that place of Ignatius; and therefore craftily enough altered the passage, applying it to the Father only; suitably to Arian principles, which allow not either ἀγέννητος or ἀγέννητος to be applied to God the Son.

I should take notice, that Theodoret lays it to the charge of Saturnilus, that he asserted our Saviour to be not only ἀγέννητος, but also ἀγέννητος^o, therein contradicting himself, since he owns him to have a *Father*. But it is difficult to know whether Theodoret drew this from Saturnilus's own expressions, or only expressed what he took to be Saturnilus's sense in his own words. If the former were certain, we should have a proof of ἀγέννητος being used about Ignatius's time, though among heretics only: but that I leave to be considered. I incline to think, that even when the Father was spoken of, the word was still ἀγέννητος, but understood sometimes in the highest sense, signifying *self-existence*; as we see in the Sibylline verses^p. Athanasius's observation may hold true, that the ἐν τὸ ἀγέννητον did not signify the *one unbegotten*, but the *one underived*^q, when applied to the Father; carrying in it both *necessary existence* and *self-existence*: though it was often expressive of the former only, being understood in opposition to *precarious existence*, and nothing else: and so the Son might be included in the ἐν τὸ ἀγέννητον. I have made no account of any Latin translations of the Greek ἀγέννητος, because nothing is more uncertain. The translator of Irenæus is various, and often translates by *innatus* or *ingenitus*, where it is plain the word should be *infectus*. Tertullian sometimes translates the one word ἀγέννητος, by two together, *innatus et infectus*; which confirms me that the word was ἀγέννητος, and that, for want of a proper word for *underived*, he chose to express it by two. Yet Tertullian has also the word *innatus* for *unbegotten* alone; applying it to the Father in contradistinction to the Son. But I shall weary the reader. He that would see more of the use of

ⁿ Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰδιον καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ ἀφθαρτον; ὃ χρόνος οὐδεὶς μεταβολὴν ἐπάγει. *Plutarch. de ei in Delphis Script.*

^o Theod. Hæret. Fab. 194.

^p Εἰς Θεὸς ὁς μόνος ἐστὶν ὑπερμεγέθης ἀγέννητος. *Theoph. Antioch. p. 181.*

Αὐτογενής, ἀγέννητος, ἀπαντα κρατῶν

διαπαντός. *Ibid.*

^q Οὐκ ἀγοσοῦμεν δὲ ὅτι καὶ οἱ εἰρηκότες ἐν τὸ ἀγέννητον τὸν πατέρα λέγοντες, οὐκ ὡς γεννητοῦ καὶ ποιήματος ὄντος τοῦ λόγου οὕτως ἔγραψαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ ἔχει τὸν αἴτιον, καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς πατὴρ μὲν ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας, &c. *Athanas. vol. i. p. 761. Bened.*

ἀγένητος may consult the authors in the margin^r. The benefit of what hath been hinted will appear as I go on.

A. D. 145. JUSTIN MARTYR.

I am next to shew, that Justin Martyr also taught the *necessary existence* of God the Son. His doctrine is, that the Son is ὁ ὦν, the *I AM*; a phrase expressing, according to Justin, and all other the best critics, proper *emphatical existence*; the same which we now call *necessary existence*. As to the proof of the fact, that Justin really styles God the Son ὁ ὦν, and in his own proper Person, I have given it in my Defence^s; and am now only to take off your exceptions to the evidence. You have very little of moment to reply; which is the reason, I suppose, that you appear so fretted all the way under this Query, and betray a very indecent warmth in your expressions. You have only your old pretence, (which is worth nothing,) that, according to Justin, Christ was *Messenger*, or *Minister* to the Father: and so he was according to me too, in my Defence, and now; and yet he is ὁ ὦν together with the Father; and he will be, maugre all the endeavours of *passionate* men to the contrary.

I insisted further in my Defence^t, that the very reason given why the Father is God, Θεός, (not ὁ Θεός,) is because he is ἀγένητος, *necessarily existing*.

Now since Justin every where expressly styles the Son Θεός, and says that he is Θεός, *God*, he must of consequence believe the Son to be *necessarily existing*. Here you are in a passion; telling me, (p. 296,) that it “is exactly as ridiculous as if a man “should argue that since, according to St. Paul, God’s being “the *Father*, of whom are all things, is declared to be the reason “of his being the *one God*; therefore if the Son be not the “Father, he is not God at all.” But have a little patience, and you will see the clearer. Had St. Paul said, that the *reason* of the Father’s being *God*, is because he is the *Father of whom*, &c. it would be manifest, that, according to St. Paul, no one could be *God* that was not also the *Father of whom*, &c. But as St. Paul has said no such thing, the case is not parallel. Nor is the Father’s being the *Father of whom*, &c. the *reason* or *foundation* of his being the *one God*, but only a reason why he principally is styled the *one God*: so that you have yet said nothing to take off the force of my argument relating to Justin. You are ex-

^r Suiceri Thesaur. Petavius de Athanas. de Decr. S. N. p. 207.
Trin. lib. v. c. 1, 2. Cudworth, p. ^s Vol. i. p. 296, 363, 364.
253, 254. Montfaucon, Admon. in ^t Vol. i. p. 362, 363.

tremely angry at my construing ἀγένητος in Justin, *eternal, uncreated, immutable, not unbegotten, or self-existent*; and you say, (p. 292,) “that I have not the least ground for it, from any “ancient writer whatsoever.” Who would not imagine you were perfectly acquainted with every *ancient writer*, to talk of them so familiarly? I have shewn you from *many ancient writers*, that ἀγένητος has been commonly applied to things *begotten or proceeding*; where it could not signify *unbegotten*. I would further hint to you, which perhaps may surprise you, that you cannot prove that ever Justin Martyr used the word ἀγέννητος with double ν, or that he knew of any such word. That he uses ἀγένητος is certain; sometimes meaning by it *undervived* absolutely^u; sometimes *necessarily existing*^x. One thing I will presume to *know*, and to be certain of; that in the place by me cited, he used it in the sense of *necessarily existing*, and no other; because it is opposed to *precarious, perishable* being; as I shewed in my Defence: and this was the sense that the old philosophers most commonly used it in, whether speaking of the *supreme Cause*, or their *incorruptible* Deities, as opposed to the *corruptible creation*.

You think ἀγένητος. (for so I read it,) in his second Apology^y, must signify *unbegotten*. Far from it: it signifies no more than *eternal*, or however *necessarily existing*, in my sense of the word. His argument requires no more than this, that God should have none older than himself to have given a *name* to him; and because he had not, he had *no name*: wherefore also the Son (as Justin observes) being *coexistent* with him (συνών) from the first, and afterwards begotten, had *no name*, having none older than himself. Thus the connection of Justin's sense is plain and clear; and his observation just and natural. O, but you say, “Justin, in this very sentence, styles the Son γεννώμενος, in “express opposition to ἀγένητος.” But that I deny; γεννώμενος is opposed only to συνών, his *temporal* generation to his *eternal* coexistence with the Father: for so I interpret that passage with the learned Dr. Grabe; so entirely void of all foundation is every one of your exceptions.

To those already given I shall add one proof more of Justin's professing the *necessary existence* of God the Son. It is from a

^u Pag. 387, 408, 410. ed. Thirlby.

I do not meet with more places where the word must necessarily signify more. In the rest, I conceive, it must, or may signify no more than

necessary existence.

^x Pag. 20, 37, 72, 78, 114, 128, 148, 149, 150.

^y Just. Apol. ii. p. 13. Grab. p. 114. Thirlb.

fragment only^z; but there appears no reason to suspect its being genuine. What I build my argument upon, is Justin's styling the Λόγος, *life by nature*; by which I understand *necessarily existing* life, no phrase being more commonly used to signify *necessary existence* than φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, by the ancients. This very phrase of *life by nature*, is so used by Cyril of Alexandria, and others^a. But what most of all confirms this sense, is Justin himself, or a venerable person whom he produces in his Dialogue with approbation, arguing against the *necessary existence* of the soul, upon this topic, that she has not *life* in herself^b, but her life is precarious, depending on the *will* of another. Now, in this *fragment*, Justin asserts, that the Λόγος is *life by nature*, and enlivening whatever is joined thereto: the very description which the Platonists^c give of the τὸ Θεῖον, the *divine Being*, which *emphatically* exists. I might add further proofs, from Justin, of the Son's *necessary existence*; the same that Bishop Bull has produced out of him for the *consubstantiality*; for whatever proves one, proves both. But these are sufficient, and I may have occasion to hint more of this matter, when I come to answer the objection made from the *temporal* generation.

A. D. 177. ATHENAGORAS.

Athenagoras, the next in order, will be a powerful advocate for the *necessary existence* of God the Son. He declares him to be οὐ γεόμενος^d, *not made*; the very same phrase whereby he expresses the *necessary existence* of God the Father^e; and which comes to the same as ὁ ὢν, φύσει ὢν, ἀεὶ ὢν, all words, or phrases, expressing in Athenagoras *necessary existence*.

It is ridiculous of you to plead, in opposition to me, (p. 296,) that Athenagoras calls the Son γέννημα in the very same sentence. It is the thing that we contend for, that he may be γέννημα, and

^z Ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ προσεπλάκη τῷ τῆν φθορὰν δεξαμένῳ. *Justin. Fragm.* p. 406. *Jeb.* Grabe *Spicil.* vol. ii. p. 172.

^a Κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ ζωοποιὸς ὁ παντὸς ἐπέκεινα νοῦ. *Cyril. Alex. contr. Jul.* lib. vii. p. 250.

Ζωὴ κατὰ φύσιν ὁ Θεὸς, ὡς Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, καὶ ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς. *Cyril. in I Joh.* p. 51.

^c Ὁς λόγος ὢν, καὶ ζωὴ, καὶ φῶς, καὶ ἀλήθεια, καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ σοφία, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. Or.* i. p. 1.

^b Οὐ γὰρ δι' αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν, ὡς τῷ Θεῷ. *Ju. t. Dial.* p. 23. *Jeb.*

^c Οὐ γὰρ ὡς μετέχον τοῦ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὡς παρέκτικον τῆς θείας ζωῆς, τὸ θεῖον ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. *Procl. Pluton. Theol.* p. 65.

^d Οὐχ ὡς γεόμενον. *Athenag.* p. 38.

^e Αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ γεόμενον, ὅτι τὸ ὄν οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. P. 21.

Τὶ τὸ ὄν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν τε οὐκ ἔχων ἢ τὶ τὸ γεόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε. P. 67.

Οὐ φύσει ὄντων, ἀλλὰ γεομένων. P. 68.

yet necessarily existing; nay, that he is so, because he is *γεννημα*^f, properly so called; every *Son* being of the same nature with his *Father*. And why might not Athenagoras think the *Son* necessarily existing, and begotten also? No philosopher nor Catholic Christian ever imagined it at all inconsistent, for the same thing to be both *γεννώμενον* and *ἀγένητον*, as may appear, in a good measure, from the testimonies I have given above.

I have something further to plead from Athenagoras. He intimates, that God could never be without the *Λόγος*^g, any more than without *reason* or *wisdom*; which is declaring his existence as necessary as the *Father's* existence is. See this argument of the *ancients* explained and vindicated in my Sermons^h: besides that Bishop Bull has so fully defended Athenagoras in particular, from the senseless charge of his supposing the *Son* to be no more than an *attribute* before his generation, that an ingenuous man should be ashamed to revive it, till he can make some tolerable answer to what the Bishop has said. But I have mentioned this matter once before.

You object, that Athenagoras speaks emphatically of the *unoriginate underived eternity of the Father*, as the one *unbegotten* and *eternal God*, and again, that the *unbegotten* God is alone eternal. Had this been really said by him, yet nobody that knows Athenagoras could ever suspect that he had intended any *opposition* to the *eternity* of God the *Son*, included in him; and therefore it were of no great moment to dispute this point with you. But in regard to *truth*, I think myself obliged to observe, that no proof can be given of Athenagoras's ever using the word *ἀγέννητος*, but *ἀγένητος*. It is under the conception of *necessary existence*, not as *unbegotten*, that he proposes the *Father* as the *true God*, in opposition to all the *perishing* and feeble deities of the Pagans: and while he does this, he still bears in mind that this *Father* has a *Son* of the same nature with himself; and forgets not to mention him in his proper place: particularly in those very pages (37, 122.) from whence you quote the two passages of the *unbegotten* *Father*, (as you call him,) he takes care to bring in the mention of the *Son*, as included in him, and *one God* with him. It is very strange, that an ancient writer cannot be allowed to speak of the *Father*, in the first place, as the *one God*, (which all the churches in Christendom have ever

^f Vid. Dionys. Rom. ap. Athan. p. 232.

^g Ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς, νοῦς αἰδίου

ὦν, εἶχεν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν λόγον αἰδίου λογικὸς ὦν. Athen. p. 38.

^a Page 149, &c. of this volume.

done, and still do in their *creeds*.) but presently he must be charged with *excluding* God the Son: as if reserving him a while in mind, and forbearing to make mention of him till it be a proper time and place, were the same thing with *excluding* him from the *one true Godhead*. Upon a view of the placesⁱ where Athenagoras uses the word ἀγέννητος, it is plain to me, from what I find it *opposed* to, that he means no more than οὐ γινόμενος, or φῦσει ὄν, *necessary existence* by it, in opposition to the Pagan perishing deities.

A. D. 187. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus will be found to teach the *necessary existence* of God the Son many ways, with great variety of expression; sometimes declaring him to be *ipse Deus*^k, *God himself*; sometimes the *self*^l of the Father, *Creator*^m often; which, with Irenæus, is always a certain argument of *immutable existence*ⁿ, and a mark of distinction between what is *necessarily existing*, and what not: intimating also, that whatsoever is a *creature* could never create^o. I have shewn also, above, that Irenæus asserts the Son not to be *another* God, but the *same God* with the Father; from whence it must follow, that he is also *necessarily existing* as well as the Father. He further supposes him *God*, in respect of his *substance*^p, and coexisting^q always with the Father. By these and other the like characters, too long and too many to be here cited at length, does this very early and judicious Father proclaim the *necessary existence* of God the Son. I shall over and above produce two passages; one where Irenæus styles the Son *infectus*, and another where the *Father* and his *Word* are so described, as plainly to shew that they are one *necessarily existing* Being. The first runs thus; “Thou art not, O man, *necessarily existing*, “neither didst thou always *coexist* with God as his own *Word*.” I make no doubt of *infectus* being the rendering of ἀγέννητος, a word often used by Irenæus; but whether he ever has ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, I am not positive: it does not appear to me that he has. Now as to the sense of the place, it is certainly the most

ⁱ Athenag. p. 19, 27, 37, 53, 67, 122.

^k Iren. p. 132.

^l Ibid. p. 139, 163, 253.

^m Ibid. p. 44, 79, 190, 219, 307, 315.

ⁿ Ibid. p. 169, 183, 240.

^o Ibid. p. 288.

^p Generationem ejus quæ est ex Virgine, et substantiam quoniam Deus. Iren. p. 217.

^q Ibid. p. 153, 163, 209, 243.

^r Non enim infectus es, O homo, neque semper co-existebas Deo, sicut proprium ejus Verbum. Iren. p. 153.

^s The reader may turn to the pages here marked, if he be disposed to examine. N. B. I make no account of the present readings.

Iren. p. 2, 5, 11, 53, 54, 56, 67, 100, 101, 103, 153, 183, 284, 285, 348. Bened. ed.

natural to refer each branch of the sentence to the same *Word* of God. That is to say, *Neither art thou unmade*, as the *Word* is, *nor didst thou always coexist with God*, as he, the same *Word*, has. But because it is barely possible for the words to admit of another construction, I shall not contend about it. One thing however is certain, that the *eternal coexistence* of God the *Word* is here plainly taught; which, among all sober reasoners, will imply his *necessary existence*, as well as *eternity*.

The other place of Irenæus runs thus:

“ But in him who is God over all, for as much as he is all *Mind* and all *Word*, (as we have said,) and having nothing “ sooner or later, or any thing of diversity in himself, but all “ equal and alike, and ever continuing one; there can be no such “ order of emission,” (as the *Gnostics* pretend^t.)

To this may be added another such passage:

“ For the Father of all is not a kind of compound substance “ (animal) of any thing besides mind, as we have shewn. But “ the Father is *Mind*, and *Mind* the Father. Wherefore it is “ necessary that the *Word*, which is of *him*, or rather the “ *Mind* itself, since it is *Word*, should be perfect and impassible, “ and the emissions therefrom being of the *same substance* with “ him, should be perfect and impassible, and always continue “ like to him that emitted them^u.”

These two passages will not be perfectly understood by any that are not in some measure acquainted with the Gnostic principles. Among other conceits of theirs, this was one, that the *Word* was remote from the Father in nature and perfections, and liable to ignorance and passion: which absurd tenet Irenæus here confutes, by teaching that the *Mind* is *Word*, and the *Word* *Mind*, both of the *same substance* and perfections. It is

^t In eo autem qui sit super omnes Deus, totus Nus et totus Logos cum sit, quemadmodum prædiximus, et nec aliud antiquius, nec posterius, aut aliud alterius habente in se, sed toto æquali et simili et uno perseverante, jam non talis hujus ordinationis sequitur emissio. *Iren.* p. 131, 132.

^u Non enim ut compositum animal quiddam est omnium Pater præter Nun, quemadmodum præ-ostendimus: sed Nus Pater, et Pater Nus. Necesse est itaque et eum qui ex eo est Logos, imo magis autem ipsum Nun, cum sit Logos, perfectum et impassibilem esse, et eas quæ ex eo sunt

emissiones, ejusdem substantiæ cum sint, cujus et ipse, perfectas et impassibiles et semper similes cum eo perseverare qui eas emisit. *Ibid.* p. 139.

Compare

Qui generationem prolative hominum Verbi transferunt in Dei æternum Verbum, et prolationis initium dantes et genesim, quemadmodum et suo Verbo. Et in quo distabit Dei Verbum, imo magis ipse Deus, cum sit Verbum, a Verbo hominum, si eandem habuerit ordinationem et emissionem generationis? *Ibid.* p. 132.

plain, that by *Word*. in those passages, is not meant any *attribute* of the Father, but the *Person* of the Son, by what follows in p. 132, where he speaks of the *eternal Word* under that notion, and still continues the same thought of *God himself* being *Word*, or *Logos*, as before. The *Word* therefore is *perfect*, is *impassible*, is *necessarily existing*, as the Father is, according to Irenæus^x.

A. D. 192. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS.

Clemens is another unexceptionable evidence for the same doctrine. He styles the Son *ὄντως Θεὸς*^y, *really God*: a phrase which he often applies with particular emphasis to God the Father^z, as being the one true God. in opposition to pretended deities. I omit here, what I have before abundantly shewn, that the Father and Son together are the *one God*, according to Clemens: I pass over also Clemens's doctrine of Christ being *Creator*, *Almighty*, *adorable*, &c. from whence, by certain consequence, it may be proved, that his substance is truly *divine* and *necessarily existing*. I shall here insist only on such passages, as more expressly and directly signify his *necessary existence*; among which this is one:

“ But this must of necessity be took notice of, that we ought “ not to think any thing wise *by nature*, but the τὸ Θεῖον, the “ *divine Being*; wherefore also it is *Wisdom*, *God's Power*, that “ teaches truth: and from thence the perfection of knowledge is “ received^a.” Here *Wisdom* is plainly included in the τὸ Θεῖον, the *divine Being*, said to be wise *by nature*, that is, *necessarily* wise. All that know Clemens's style will allow, that by *Wisdom* is meant the *Son of God*, the teacher of *truth*, as Clemens himself explains it in the following page^b; and a few pages after, he gives him the titles of σοφία, *Wisdom*, and δύναμις Θεοῦ, *Power of God*^c, as here. Wherefore God the Son is φύσει σοφός, and also τὸ Θεῖον, which fully express *necessary existence*. Another passage of Clemens, proving the same thing, is as follows: “ We “ are not as the Lord, and if we would, we cannot: for no “ disciple is above his Lord. It is enough, if we be made such “ as the Master: not in *essence*, for it is impossible for that

^x Vid. Massuet. Dissert. Præv. p. 128.

^y Clemens Alex. p. 86.

^z Ibid. p. 45, 55, 60, 61, 81, 92, 150.

^a Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρασημειωτέον, ὡς μόνον τὸ θεῖον σοφὸν εἶναι φύσει νοεῖσθαι χρή· διὸ καὶ ἡ σοφία

δύναμις Θεοῦ, ἡ διδάξασα τὴν ἀλήθειαν· κἀνταῦθ' αὖ ποῦ εἴληπται ἡ τελείωσις τῆς γνώσεως. Clem. p. 452.

^b Δι' οὗ καθορᾶται τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν καλὰ καὶ δίκαια. Ibid. p. 453.

^c Ὁ Κύριος ἀλήθεια, καὶ σοφία, καὶ δύναμις Θεοῦ. Ibid. p. 457.

“ which is by *adoption* (or *appointment*) to be equal in *essence* (or *existence*) to what is *by nature*: only we may be *made eternal*, and may be admitted to the contemplation of things that are, and may have the *title* of *sons*, and may see the Father in what belongs to him^d.”

In these words it is clearly intimated, that our Lord is *κατ' οὐσίαν*, essentially, and *φύσει*, by nature, eternal, and knowing, and *Son of God*: which are the known ways by which the ancients express *necessary existence*. *Φύσει* as opposed to *θέσει* is a familiar and very common expression for what is *naturally* and *necessarily*, in opposition to *voluntary appointment* or designation^e.

Clemens has another celebrated passage, worth the reciting:

“ The Son of God never comes down from his watch-tower, is never divided, never parted asunder, and never passes from place to place; but is always every where, and yet contained no where: all mind, all light, all the Father's eye, sees all things, hears all things, and knows all things^f.”

Here we find the principal essential attributes of God (*immortality*, *immensity*, *omnipresence*, and *omniscience*) ascribed to God the Son. And what can all this mean less than *necessary existence*? Compare with it what I had just before cited from Irenæus; who in like manner describes God as being all *mind*, all *word*, &c. And it is observable, that this was a way of speaking never applied to any but the eternal and necessary existing God. It is so applied by Clemens himself in another place^g. The manner of speaking was indeed first borrowed from the philosophers^h, who applied it to none but the *divine nature*

^d Οὐκ ἐσμὲν δὲ ὡς ὁ Κύριος, ἐπειδὴ βουλόμεθα μὲν, οὐ δυνάμεθα δέ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ μαθητῆς ὑπὲρ τὸν διδάσκαλον ἀρκετὸν δὲ εἶναι γενώμεθα ὡς ὁ διδάσκαλος; οὐ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ὑπαρξιν, τὸ θέσει τῷ φύσει· τὸ δὲ αἰδίους γεγονέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων θεωρίαν ἐγνωκέναι, καὶ τοὺς προσηγορευέσθαι, καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων καθορᾶν μόνον. *Ibid.* p. 469.

^e Χάριτι, καὶ οὐ φύσει τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἡξιωμένους. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun.* lib. i. p. 17, 126.

^f Εἶπαν πρῶτον τὸ οἰκείον, πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου, ὅπερ ἦν κατὰ φύσιν· εἴτ' ἐπαγαγὼν καὶ πατέρα ὑμῶν, ὅπερ ἦν κατὰ θέσιν. *Cyrl. Hierosol.* p. 116. ed. *Benedict.* Vid. et p. 46, 114, 117,

138, 149, 151, 152, 153, 158.

^g Athan. *Orat.* 2. p. 442, 527. *Eustath.* apud *Theod.* Dial. 1. The Arian doctrine was, Οὐ φύσει υἱὸς τίς ἐστιν τοῦ Θεοῦ. *Alexand. Epist.* apud *Theod.* E. H. lib. i. c. 4.

^h Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ μερίζομενος, οὐκ ἀποτεμνόμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντη δὲ ὧν πάντοτε, καὶ μηδαμῇ περιεχομένος, ὅλος νοῦς, ὅλος φῶς, πατρῶος ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, πάντα ὄρων, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα, &c. *Clem.* p. 831.

ⁱ Ὅλος ἀκοῆ καὶ ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, ἵνα τίς τοῦτους χρησῆται τοῖς ὀνόμασι, ὁ Θεός. *Ibid.* p. 853.

^k Xenophanes, some hundred years before Christ, seems to have been the

as such : and they are herein followed by manyⁱ of the Fathers, before or after Clemens.

I shall just point out one place more of Clemens, taken notice of by M. Lequien, the learned editor of Damascenk. The words are, “ Let us hasten to salvation, to (baptismal) regeneration, to “ be united together many of us, in one love after (the example “ of) the unity of the one *singular essence*^l.”

The words are supposed to be an allusion to John xvii. 21, 22, 23, where Christian unity is described by our Lord, as resembling, in some measure, the union of father and son. This construction of that place in Clemens is extremely plausible : but that the words are strictly capable of no other, I will not pretend ; let the reader make his judgment of it. Having traced the doctrine of the Son’s *necessary existence* down to Clemens, I need not go lower, where the case is still plainer. As to Tertullian, you allow, that he supposes the *Son* to be a *self-existent part* of God’s *substance* : which is throwing his sense into *invidious* terms to disparage it ; but is, in the main, confessing the thing, that the Son is by him supposed *necessarily existing*, and but *one Person* of the Trinity ; which Tertullian might not perhaps express in the best manner, though his meaning is right and good. I might produce vouchers for the same doctrine, as many Fathers^m as have pleaded that God the Father could never have been without the *Word*, any more than without *thought, power, truth, life*, or the like : and those I have reckoned up in another placeⁿ, whither I refer the reader.

I shall content myself with particularly mentioning one more only, and that is

A. D. 249. ORIGEN.

I shall begin with the famous passage in his treatise against Celsus, where he expressly styles the Son *ἀγένητος, unmade*,

first that used it. *Vid. Diog. Laert.* p. 559.

Plinii Nat. Hist. lib. ii. c. 7. Sext. Empiric. contra Phys. i. sect. 144.

ⁱ Irenæus, p. 130, 131, 151, 240.

Novatian c. 6. Lactantius de Opif. c. 2.

Cyrrill. Hieros. p. 91. ed. Bened.

Zeno Veron. in Psal. p. 139. Hieronym. in Psal. 93. p. 371.

^k Damasc. Op. vol. i. p. 132.

^l Σπεύσωμεν εἰς σωτηρίαν, ἐπὶ τὴν παλιγγενεσίαν, εἰς μίαν ἀγάπην συναχθῆναι οἱ πολλοί, κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς

οὐσίας ἔνωσιν. *Clem. Alex.* p. 72. Compare p. 146.

^m Hippolytus contr. Noët. c. 10.

Dionys. Roman. apud Athanas. 232.

Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. 230, 253,

257. Alexand. apud Theod. lib. i. c. 4.

Add to these Methodius (ap. Phot. p. 960.) and Theognostus, (ap. Athanas. p. 230.) declaring the Son to be

eternal and uncreated, that is, *necessarily existing*.

ⁿ P. 149, 150 of this volume.

that is, as I understand, *necessarily existing*. The whole sentence runs thus^o:

“ Our Saviour and Lord, the *Word* of God, setting forth how great a thing it is to know the Father, that he is comprehended and known principally, and, according to his *dignity*, by himself (*the Son*) alone, and in the second place by those who have their minds enlightened by the very *Word* of God, says, ‘ No one knoweth the Son, but the Father, neither the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son shall reveal him.’ For no one can be able worthily to know him that was unmade, and begotten before all created nature, as the Father who begat him: neither can any one (know) the Father, as (he is known by) his living *Word*, his *Wisdom*, and *Truth*.” I need say nothing here in defence of my way of rendering *πάσης γεννητῆς φύσεως πρωτότοκος*, having sufficiently vindicated it in another place. The stress of my argument for the Son’s *necessary existence* lies in the word *ἀγένητον*, which you are very sensible of, and therefore endeavour all possible ways, though in vain, to elude it.

You say, (p. 295.) that “ the place is evidently corrupt.” I suppose, because it is *evidently* against you. But where are your manuscripts? Or by what authority do you pretend to pronounce any place *corrupt*, without the least shadow of a reason? You plead the term *πρωτότοκος*. But that, if rightly understood, confirms the reading rather than otherwise: for if the Son was begotten before *all created nature*, he must be *uncreated*^q. And I doubt not but Origen chose *πάσης γεννητῆς φύσεως*, instead of *πάσης κτίσεως*, on purpose to make it answer the better to *ἀγένητος* going before, and to preserve the elegance of the sentence. You urge *γέννησας αὐτὸν*, as if the same thing could not be said to be *ἀγένητος*, and yet *begotten*: which all the *philosophers* had admitted, and nothing more frequent (as the testimonies produced above shew) than the application of both to the same person or thing: not to mention, that if Christ was a *Son*, in the

^o Οὐτε γὰρ τὸν ἀγένητον, καὶ πάσης γεννητῆς φύσεως πρωτότοκον, κατ’ ἀξίαν εἶδέναι τις δύναται, ὡς ὁ γεννήσας αὐτὸν πατήρ, οὐτε τὸν πατέρα ὡς ὁ ἔμψυχος λόγος καὶ σοφία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀλήθεια. *Origen. contr. Cels. lib. vi. p. 287.*

^p P. 57 of this volume. See also Le Moynes, Not. et Observ. p. 447. Wall’s Defence, p. 37.

^q Dionysius, of the same age, thus

reasons very remarkably upon the phrase *πρωτότοκος*, &c.

Ποίημα ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, ὁ ἐκ γαστρὸς πρὸ ἐωσφόρου γεννηθεὶς, ὁ εἰπὼν ὡς σοφία, πρὸ δὲ πάντων βουρῶν γεννᾷ με; καὶ πολλαχοῦ δὲ τῶν θείων λογίων γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ γεγονέναι τὸν υἱὸν λεγόμενον εὔροι τις ἄν. *Dionys. Rom. apud Athanas. p. 232.*

strict and *proper* sense, (as all the Fathers have taught,) he must have been *unmade*, or *necessarily existing*. Your last pretence is from Gelenius, the editor, rendering it *ab æterno genitus*: which is descending low indeed. You might have urged the authority of Dr. Clarke, if you had pleased, which would have signified to me as much as Gelenius's. To imagine that ἀγένητον stands for ἀειγέννητον is making any thing stand for any thing: what man that knows Greek would use ἀειγέννητος for ἀειγενής, which is the proper word in such a case? To read γεννητὸν, as you pretend, is still worse, being flat, and scarce sense: besides that Origen, intending here to say the highest things that could be said of the Son, would never use any such expression in this place.

Mr. Whiston^r, I think, has two or three little exceptions, more than you have mentioned. He appeals to Origen's known "doctrine and language elsewhere." But neither has this pretence any weight or force in it. Origen's doctrine can no way be better known than from this very treatise; which is every where conformable with what he has here said^s. And I have produced some evidence of it above. There is another place, in this very treatise, where Origen teaches the same doctrine implicitly, while he clearly distinguishes and exempts the Son ἀπὸ παντὸς γενητοῦ^t, *from all created being*: which comes to the same thing as the styling him ἀγένητος.

Mr. Whiston has one plea more from the *silence* of Origen's Athanasian vindicators. But this is very slight, unless all that was ever anciently pleaded for Origen were still extant; whereas, we have very little, in comparison, remaining. But if Origen's friends were *silent* on this head, it may be, his adversaries may have supplied the defect. Among the heads of the accusation drawn up against him, this was one, *quod dixerit filium innatum*, that he asserted the Son to be *unbegotten*^u. It is no improbable conjecture of the learned Huetius^x, that they had respect to this very passage; maliciously and captiously construing ἀγένητον, *unbeggotten*, instead of *unmade*. But enough of this matter. It appears from what hath been said, that there is no reason at all for imagining the place *corrupt*. You have no manuscript, no

^r Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 15.

^s Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9.

^t Ἄμικτον πρὸς ὃ, τιποτοῦν γενητὸν — παντὸς μὲν ἀφιστάσῃ γενητοῦ, προσαγοῦσῃ δὲ δι' ἐμφύχου καὶ ζῶντος

λόγου, ὃς ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία ζῶσα, καὶ υἱὸς Θεοῦ, τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεῷ. Orig. contr. Cels. lib. iii. p. 160.

^u Pamphili Apolog. p. 235. ed. Bened. inter op. Hieron.

^x Huetii Origeniana, p. 43.

various lection. no plea from the *context*, none from Origen's doctrine in other places, (however not in this treatise,) no argument of any kind, but what is mere trifling: nor have you been able to invent any *correction* or *emendation*, but what either is not Greek, or makes the sentence flat, and even silly in comparison: so unfortunate and unadvised a thing is it, to play the *critic* in a wrong place.

Origen, as we have seen, has styled the Son ἀγένητος. *unmade*, or *uncreated*, (for that is his own interpretation^y of the word ἀγένητος :) and it is no objection to this, that other Fathers have been sparing of applying that title to Christ. The reason is, because the word ἀγένητος was ambiguous, and was not applicable to Christ in every sense of it. For the like reason it is, that γενητός is also very rarely applied to Christ: which though it might be applicable in one sense^z, yet being more generally used in another, and too low a sense, was therefore avoided. It is once applied to Christ by the Antiochian Fathers directly, and again obliquely: though a doubt may be made whether it should be γενητός or γεννητός. And Origen (I do not remember any other of the Ante-Nicenes) is charged by Epiphanius^a with so applying it: which Epiphanius, as the humour then ran, very partially wrests to an ill sense, though he would have interpreted the same word more candidly in any one but Origen, as he there declares. So much had the Eustathian party prevailed in their unreasonable clamours against Origen, notwithstanding the endeavours of the wisest, and coolest, and best men of the Church, and even Jerome amongst them for a considerable time. However, though the phrase of γενητός Θεός might bear a good sense, (and I doubt not was so intended by Origen,) yet I commend not his discretion in the use of it; since it might also bear an *ill one*, and had been a phrase applied by the Platonists to their *inferior gods*, or to the *world*. It might be on account of some of these uncautious sallies of Origen, that he was forced to purge himself to Pope Fabian, in a letter to him: after which, as in his treatise particularly against Celsus, he was more cautious, and kept closer to the language of the

^y Ἀγένητοι οὐσαι, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ κτισθείσαι. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 187.

^z Γενητός sometimes denotes only a thing's proceeding from another, whether eternally or temporally, whether by generation or creation.

Γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ'

αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἄντα αὐτόγονον, οἷδὲ αὐθιπόστατον. *Cranitor. apud Procl. in Tim.* p. 85.

Γενητὸν, τὸ ὅπως οὖν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἰφιστάμενον. *Vid. Cudw.* p. 254.

^a Epiphanius. *Hæres. Origenist.* c. vii. viii. p. 531.

Church. To proceed: I might produce other very clear proofs of Origen's faith in the *necessary existence* of God the Son, from the attributes of *immutability*^b, *omnipresence*^c, *impassibility*^d, &c. which he ascribes to him, as well as from other topics^e. But I refer the reader to Bishop Bull's accurate account of him and his sentiments, and now hasten to what is most material, to take off your famous, and almost only objection drawn from what the Fathers have said about Christ's generation being by the *will* of the Father.

3. I am here to inquire, in what sense, and by whom, *necessary* generation or *emanation* was taught; and to account for the Son's being said to be generated by the *will* of the Father.

Here, in the first place, we are carefully to distinguish between those who asserted a *temporal generation* only, and those who asserted an *eternal generation*. As to the former, it may be allowed, that they supposed the generation to be by the *will* of the Father, even in your sense of *will*: and all you now have to do, is to prove, if you are able, that those writers believed no *real* or *substantial* existence of the Son, antecedent to that generation.

As to the latter, who held *eternal generation*, your business will be to shew, that they believed it to be an *act* [of the *will* in your sense of *will*, if possible to be done: or, without this, you do nothing. It were sufficient to men of sense, and to scholars, to have pointed out a way of solving all that you have, or ever can advance upon this head: but because some readers will want to see some things more particularly cleared, I shall be at the pains of tracing this matter down quite through the Fathers: shewing you your mistakes all the way. You will not expect I should take any notice of the Apostolical Constitutions, so often and so unanswerably proved^f to be a patched, spurious, and interpolated work. Nor shall I have any thing to do with Ignatius's interpolated epistles, till you have confuted Bishop Pearson and Daille. I refer you to a learned foreigner^g, in the margin, for

^b Origen. contr. Cels. p. 169, 170.

^c Ibid. p. 63, 164, 209, 325.

^d Ibid. p. 77, 170.

^e Viz. the many strong expressions of the Son's *real* and *natural*, or essential *divinity* occurring in that treatise of Origen. Τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπαύγασμα—τοῦ θείου, p. 342. Τῆ φύσει κυρίου λόγου Θεοῦ, p. 392. Τῆς τοῦ θείου λόγου φύσεως ὄντος Θεοῦ,

p. 171. Ἀπαύγασμα φωρὸς αἰδίου, p. 387. Τῆς ἀληθείας οὐσία, p. 386.

^f See Ittigius de Pseudepigraphis Apostolorum, p. 190. Mr. Turner on the Apost. Constitutions. Dr. Smal-broke.

^g Quas solas genuinas esse, alteras vero illas quas sinceras esse dixi, ab Athanasio decurtatas, inauditum et incredibile Wilhelmi Whistoni, novi

the sense of wise and judicious men in relation to Mr. Whiston's wild attempt to substitute the *larger* instead of the *smaller* epistles. I proceed then to the genuine Ignatius, in the smaller epistles. I allowed in my Defence^h, that Ignatius supposes the Son to be a Son by the *will* of the Father; and I shewed in how many senses it might be taken, without at all favouring your principles. You imagine I was *greatly puzzled*; which I take to be an argument only of your small acquaintance with those matters. You pretend that three of the senses have *no distinct sense*. But are you to sit down in your study, and make reports of the *ancients* out of your own head, without looking into them, to see in what sense they used their phrases? I was not inquiring what you or I should now express by the word *will*, but what ideas the *ancients* had sometimes fixed to the word: for by that rule we must go in judging of the *ancients*. What think you of those that gave the name of *Will*, or the *Father's Will*, to the *Person* of the Son? They had a meaning, though not such a meaning as you or I now understand the word *will* in. They must therefore be interpreted by the *ideas* which *they*, and not *we*, affixed to the phrase, or name. And what think you of others who used the phrases of *omnipotent*, or *all-containing Will*, (as we have seen above,) had not they

Arianorum in Anglia Promachi, paradoxon est, singulari nuper scripto proditum magis quam demonstratum. *Fabricii Bibl. Gr.* lib. v. cap. 1. p. 40.

The same learned writer has also very lately given his judgment of Mr. Whiston's attempt about the Constitutions.

Quam parum feliciter hoc ei successerit, evidenter exposuerunt Rob. Turnerus, Richardus Smalbroke, Jo. Ernestus Grabe: consulendus etiam Simon Ockley. Licet vero Whistonus identidem tueri sententiam suam conatus est repetitis scriptis adversus Grabium, adversus Petrum Allixium, adversus Turnerum, vix quemquam tamen antiquitatis ecclesiasticæ peritum confido esse futurum, cui illius argumenta petita longius, et conjecturæ leves, rem tantam persuadere poterunt. *Fabr. Bibl. Gr.* vol. xi. p. 11.

^h Vol. i. p. 349.

ⁱ Ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθὸν βούλημα. *Clem. Alex.* p. 309.

Θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν, *Sovereign Will.* p. 647.

Ipsè erat Voluntas et Potestas Patris. *Tertull. de Orat.* cap. 4.

Θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστὶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* cap. xiii. p. 15.

Charitatem ex charitate progenitam. Voluntas ex mente procedens—
Orig. περὶ ἀρχῶν. Pamph. Apol. p. 235.
Τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βούλησιν. *Constant. apud Gelas.* part. 3.

Βουλή καὶ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς. *Athanas.* p. 613.

Sicut Sapientia, et Verbum, et Virtus Dei, et Veritas, et Resurrectio, et Via dicitur, ita etiam *Voluntas*. *Hieronym. Com. in Eph.* i. p. 323.

Quidam ne Filium consilii vel voluntatis Dei dicerent unigenitum Verbum, ipsum *Consilium*, seu *Voluntatem* Patris idem Verbum esse dixerunt. Sed melius, quantum existimo dicitur *Consilium de Consilio* et *Voluntas de Voluntate*; sicut substantia de substantia, Sapientia de Sapientia. *Augustin. Trin.* lib. xv. cap. 38. p. 994. Vid. Petav. *Dogmat.* vol. i. p. 229. Coteler. *Not. in Recogn.* p. 492.

some different idea of *will* from that which you have? And must not they be interpreted accordingly? You are very *angry* at those that have presumed (without your leave) to say the "Will of God is God himself," (p. 259.) And yet, whether the saying be right or wrong, when you would interpret the doctrine of such as made that their maxim, you must take their words as they meant them, and according to *their* ideas, and not your *own*. For aught I see, they spake more properly than you do in so often mentioning *acts of the will*. Does any thing *act* but an *agent*; and is the *will* an *agent*? How absurdly do you speak! Not that I should blame you for using a common phrase: only do not be so very severe and smart upon others; who knew how to speak as properly, or perhaps more properly than you^k. It seems to be owing only to narrowness of mind, and want of larger views, that you would confine all writers to your particular modes of *speaking*. The word *will* has been used by some of the *ancients* to signify any *natural powers* of God^l. *Will*, in the sense of *approbation* or *acquiescence*, is very common with ancient writers: nor was it thought absurd to say, that God had *willed* thus or thus, from all *eternity*, and could not *will* otherwise. Whether there be any thing very edifying in these notions or not, is not the question. But when we are searching into the sentiments of the *ancients*, we must carefully observe in what sense they understood the *terms* they made use of: otherwise we shall be apt to make very gross mistakes in our reports of them. To return to Ignatius. To cut off dispute, I admitted that Ignatius might understand by generation, a *voluntary* antemundane generation, or *manifestation*, with several other Fathers. In answer to which, you tell me, that I should "have proved that *he* had somewhere or other spoken of another "higher generation, otherwise I have given up the question." What question? the question of the *eternal* or *necessary* existence of the *Logos*? Nothing like it. I admitted that many of the Fathers speak of no *higher* a generation than that *antemundane* one: but still I insist upon it, that those very Fathers acknowledged the existence of a *real* and living *Word*, a *Word*

^k See Petavius's *Dogmata Theol.* vol. i. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 61, &c. lib. 5. cap. 4. p. 211. cap. 12. p. 239.

Where may be seen what Fathers said *the Will of God was God himself*, and what they meant by it.

^l *Omnis Potentia naturalis (Dei)*

est *Voluntas. Mar. Victorin. adv. Arium*, lib. i. p. 199. Basil. ed. Vid. Petavii *Dogm.* vol. i. p. 229.

Ταυτὸν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι φρόνησιν καὶ βούλησιν εἶναι. *Athan. Orat.* cap. lxxv. p. 613.

of God, eternally *related* to the Father, whose *Word* he is: which *relation* to the Father as his *Head*, is all that any writers ever meant by *eternal filiation*. They therefore acknowledged the same thing, but under another *name*: there was no difference in *doctrine*, but in the *expression*, and the manner of *wording* it; as I observed in my Defence^m. Ignatius, of whom we are now speaking, owns an *eternal Logos*, and his *necessary existence*; as I have already proved: which is sufficient to my purpose, unless you can shew that he meant an *attribute* only, by the *Logos*.

I go on to Justin Martyr; who, as I before allowed, speaks of no generation higher than that *voluntary* ante-mundane generation, otherwise called *manifestation*: and I shewed both from Justin and Methodius, that a *manifestation* might be called a *generation*ⁿ. To the same purpose I quoted Hippolytus^o; who plainly makes a *manifestation* to be the Son's *generation*; as do also several others^p. Now certainly there is nothing amiss in supposing God the Son to have been *manifested*, in the proper season, by the *will* of the Father. I allow then that the *Logos* became a *Son* (according to Justin) by *voluntary appointment*: but I do not allow that he became *God*. The latter is what you are endeavouring to prove out of Justin. The passage which you insist principally upon is this, which I have explained in my Defence^q, and elsewhere^r. “Who, according to his (the “Father’s) will, is both God, being his Son, and an angel also, “as ministering to his will^s.” Upon which I observed that Christ is not here said to be God by the *will of the Father*; though if it were, *it might bear a good sense*. For supposing that to be the case, Justin may mean no more than that the *Son*

^m Vol. i. p. 366, &c.

ⁿ Τότε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ λέγων γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐξότου ἢ γνώσει αὐτοῦ ἐμῆλλε γίνεσθαι. *Just. Mart. Dial.* p. 270.

Προόντα ἤδη πρὸ τῶν αἰῶνων ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ἐβουλήθη καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ γεννησαί, ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ πρόσθεν ἀγνωσούμενον γνωρίσαι. *Method. apud Phot. Cod.* 237. p. 960.

^o Ὁν λόγον ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀρατόν τε ὄντα, τῷ κτισμένῳ κόσμῳ ὀρατόν ποιεῖ, προτέραν φωνὴν φθεγγόμενος, καὶ φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς γεννῶν. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* cap. 10.

^p Cujus ex ore prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus; exinde *visibilis* effectus quia humanum genus visitaturus erat. *Zen. Veronens.*

Creata est ergo Sapientia, imo *genita*; non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud-Ambros. de Fid.* cap. 2. p. 349.

Deus Filium non doloribus parturit sed virtutibus esse manifestat; nec præter se facit quod ex se est; sed generat, dum quod in se est aperit, et revelat. De Patre processit Filius, non recessit; nec successurus Patri prodivit ex Patre, sed prodivit mansurus semper in Patre. *Petr. Chrysol. Serm.* lvii. p. 51.

^q Vol. i. p. 350.

^r Page 254 of this volume.

^s Τὸν κατὰ βουλὴν τὴν ἐκείνου καὶ Θεὸν ὄντα, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄγγελον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ. *Dial.* p. 370.

acted and appeared as *God*, with consent of the Father, who appointed him so to appear and act, being every way qualified for so doing, as being *Son* of God, and so really *God*. This sense the words may reasonably bear, were it certain that Justin applied the words *κατὰ βουλήν* to the first part of the sentence *Θεὸν ὄντα*. Or if this be not admitted, *κατὰ βουλήν* may mean no more than that the Son is God, and in perfect *harmony* with the Father; not an *Anti-God*, not set up in opposition to him: according to what Justin says elsewhere; ἀριθμῶ—ἕτερος, ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμη^t, adding, that he never did any thing but what was perfectly agreeable to the will of the Father. Neither of these senses is any thing so improbable as yours, that the Son “was *God* by voluntary appointment:” which none of the other Fathers ever said or thought; nor has Justin any thing elsewhere to countenance such a notion. But besides what I have here pleaded, I further urged that the words did not necessarily require the application of *κατὰ βουλήν* to both the parts of the sentence singly: but I understood them thus; that it was the Father’s good pleasure that he who before was *God*, as being his *Son*, should now be *God* and *Angel* both, by the addition of the *office*. That he was one, was *necessary*; but that he should be *both* in one, this was a matter of *voluntary* appointment. In like manner it may be said to be by the Father’s good pleasure that he is *Θεὸς* and *ἄνθρωπος* together, or *θεάνθρωπος*. I do not yet see any thing, either in Justin’s words or in your comments upon them, that should move me to recede from this construction: however, I leave it to the learned to judge whether there be any thing harsh or unnatural in it.

You charge me. (p. 264,) with “self-contradiction,” for saying in a note^u, that though the Son was God as being a Son, and a Son *κατὰ βουλήν*, yet he was not God *κατὰ βουλήν*. You should have let the reader see what I had offered in the same place^u, to clear up and take off the pretended contradiction. Let us consider whether a few words may not set all right: he *proceeded* from (was not *created* by) the Father; therefore he is *God*. The *procession* makes him a *Son*, and is *voluntary*; but at the same time shews him to have been always *God*. For since he was not ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, was not *created*, but *proceeded* as a *Son* from the Father; therefore he is of the *same nature* with him, and God from all eternity. Wherefore, though he is a Son *κατὰ βουλήν*, and God because a *Son*, he is not God *κατὰ βουλήν*, which

^t Justin. Dial. p. 164. ^u Vol. i. p. 350. See also p. 255, 256 of this vol.

I asserted. And now where is the *contradiction*? Your objecting (p. 265,) that the *supreme God* could not minister as an *angel*, has been often answered: so we may dismiss such quibbling for the future. As to Christ being *κύριος δυνάμεων* by the Father's appointment, I have allowed it above, in Justin's sense; which comes not up to the sense of the Hebrew. As to the Father's being *Lord* of the *Son*, Justin explains it by his being *Cause*, or *Fountain* of the *Son*: in which all Catholics are agreed^x. You object that the generation (compared with one fire lighted from another) was yet *δυνάμει καὶ βουλή αὐτοῦ*. I do not well apprehend what you have been doing for a page and a half. You seem to think that I have somewhere denied the *highest* generation, spoken of by Justin, to be *temporal*; whereas I have constantly allowed it: and so you do not dispute against me.

The Son proceeded *φῶς ἐκ φωτός*, in time, according to Justin, and according to many more besides him; particularly Hippolytus, and perhaps even the Nicene Fathers. Well, but, then you will say, what becomes of what I call *eternal generation*? I answer, that before the *procession* the *Λόγος* was *ἐν γαστρὶν*, as Justin would have expressed it; *in corde, pectore, utero*, as others^z. And this is the same thing which Post-Nicene Fathers called *eternal generation*; viz. that *eternal relation and reference* which he had to the Father; *in whom*, and *with whom*, and *of whom*, he always was. So that there is still no more than a difference in *words* between Justin's doctrine of the generation and Athanasius's; for Athanasius owned the *procession* which Justin speaks of, as much as he.

You had cited a second passage from Justin; which, by your leaving out a material part of the sentence, was made to run thus: "He hath all these titles, viz. Son, Wisdom, Angel, God, Lord, and Word, from his being begotten of the Father by "his will." The thing that offended me here was, to find *angel* brought in among the other names, as given him on account of his being *begotten*. For if this were the case, he would be an angel by *nature*, and not by *office* only; which is directly making a *creature* of him, suitably to your sense of *begotten*: and you will remember that you had produced this citation among others, to

^x Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. iv. cap. 2. p. 259.

^y Ἐκ γαστρὸς γεννηθῆναι. *Just. Dial.* p. 85.

^z Ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 129.

^z Cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus *Zen. Veron.*

Ex ore quamlibet Patris sis ortus, et verbo editus, tamen paterno in *pectore* sophia callebas prius. *Prudent. Hymn. xi. p. 47.*

prove that the Son was "brought into existence;" it is your very expression^a. I had therefore just reason to complain of your leaving out the words, *from his ministering to his Father's will*, which shewed the name *angel* to be a name of *office*, and gave a new turn to the whole sentence. The censure I passed upon your quoting so *carelessly* or *partially* was only this: "The account you give is such as must make one think either "that you never saw the book you mention, or else——" with a stroke: which you are pleased to call "wrathful" and "un-christian;" as it is natural for a man, when he is detected, to fly in the face of the calmest rebuke, and to give hard names. You now tell me, you had no design in the citation more than this; to shew that the Son was "begotten by the will of the "Father." Had that been all, you should have had no contradiction from me: for I had again and again allowed it to be Justin's doctrine. But if you did not *design*, you had really *done* more, in that *partial* citation; which I saw, at least, if you did not: and could I imagine you so unthinking, as not to perceive how the *alteration* was exactly fitted to your purpose? But as you best know what you intended, let it pass: only the more I allow to your *good meaning*, the less must be attributed to your *sagacity*. You proceed, in a very abusive manner, to misrepresent my words, and to throw dirt where you have very little occasion. You charge me with omitting a material word in a "marginal translation," (which yet you know was *no translation*;) and you intimate I know not what artifice in leaving out *θελήσει*, though it appears in the Greek; and I could not possibly have any ill design in the case, because I frankly admitted that the generation of the Son was *θελήσει*, by the *will* of the Father, and had no dispute with you on that head. But your warmth of temper here carried you too far: and you were resolved, it seems, not to be outdone in *wrathful* and *unchristian* expressions: at the same time not considering the difference between a *just censure* and an *injurious calumny*.

Tatian, who was Justin's scholar, may come next. I allow him to speak only of a *temporal generation*, or procession; in like manner as Justin. If you can do any thing here, it must be to prove that the *Word* was no more than an *attribute*, before the *procession*. But Bishop Bull^b is beforehand with you; having demonstrated the contrary. You have but little to say, and that scarce worth notice. You observe that Tatian says of the *Word*,

^a Collection of Queries, p. 51.

^b Bull. D.F.N. sect. iii. cap. 6. p. 209.

that he was ἐν αὐτῷ, (not πρὸς αὐτὸν,) “ which shews, (as St. Basil argues against the Sabellians,) that by the Word is “ meant an internal power or property,” (p. 282.) But Basil was never so weak as to argue that ἐν αὐτῷ must necessarily denote an *attribute*; but only that πρὸς αὐτὸν is a stronger expression to signify *personality*; as I have also myself argued in another place^c: ἐν αὐτῷ may indifferently serve either for *person* or *attribute*: πρὸς αὐτὸν will not. When Christ says, “ I “ am in the Father, and the Father in me,” doth it follow that neither of them is a *Person*? There is therefore no force in your remark about ἐν αὐτῷ, more than this; that the Λόγος in Tatian might be an *attribute* agreeably enough to that expression, were there not other very convincing reasons to the contrary.

The words of Tatian (θελήματι τῆς ἀπλότητος αὐτοῦ προπηδᾷ ὁ Λόγος) you have rendered *two* several ways, and both of them wrong. The first you have, (p. 110.) “ By the simple efficiency “ of his will, this Reason, or Word, proceeded forth:” where I complain of your putting in “ efficiency” to serve your *hypothesis*. The second is, (p. 270.) “ The Word proceeded from the “ simple will of the Father:” where I complain of the words “ from the simple will,” to intimate to the English reader, as if nothing but a *simple act* of the *will* was concerned in that matter. Let the words appear as they lie in the author, without the mean artifice of giving them a false turn. “ By the will “ of his simplicity the Word proceeded forth.”

I admit the same thing of Athenagoras as of Justin and Tatian, that he speaks of no higher generation than the *procession*: yet he believed the existence, the *eternal* and *necessary existence* of the Λόγος, as before proved. Here you can have no pretence, except it be to imagine that the Λόγος was an *attribute* only, before the procession; as to which, Bishop Bull^d has effectually prevented you: and as to what little observations you had to make, I have replied to them above.

Theophilus comes under the same predicament with the three writers before mentioned. You have something to except against Bishop Bull’s reasons^e for Theophilus’s believing the Son to be a *real Person* before the *procession*. His reasons were these:

1. That very *Logos* which had been from all eternity ἐνδιάθετος ἐν καρδίᾳ, becomes afterwards προφορικός^f. If therefore he was ever a *Person*, (as is not doubted,) he must have always been so.

^c Page 34 of this vol. ^d Bull, D.F. sect. iii. cap. 5. ^e Ibid. cap. 7. p. 215.

^f Τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν. *Theoph.* p. 129.

2 The Λόγος who spake to the prophets, and was then undoubtedly a *Person*. was the same individual Λόγος which was always with the Father ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ.

3. He was the Father's *Counsellor*, σύμβουλος, before the procession; and therefore a *Person*.

4. He is said to have been *with him*, and to have *conversed with him*, which are *personal* characters.

5. Even after the procession, he is still supposed to be perpetually (διαπαντὸς) in the *heart* of the Father; not separate from him, but exerting himself, *ad extra*, in the work of the creation; which is the meaning of *procession*, and becoming προφορικὸς.

6. Theophilus goes upon the same principles with Athenagoras, Tatian, and others; whatever therefore could be pleaded for those writers, in the case. would be at the same time pleading for Theophilus.

You pass over all those reasons, except the *third* and *fourth*; though Bishop Bull^h principally insists upon the *first* and *second*. And what you have to say. (p. 116,) to the third and fourth, reaches only the *fourth*. For Bishop Bull had allowed, that sometimes, in *common speech*, (such as Tatian sometimes uses,) a person may be said to *be with himself*. But he allowed not that a person might be said to be *counsellor* to himself, in the manner Theophilus speaks: besides that though sometimes, and improperly, a person may be said to be *with himself*; yet more generally, *being with*, denotes two persons, as in John i. 1. It may therefore be used as an argument which in the main is right and good, though admitting of some few particular exceptions.

I had almost slipped over your 254th page, where you say, that "that generation, before which the person generated was every thing he could be after it, is no generation." But it is undoubtedly what those writers, and many after them, call *generation*: and therefore this is disputing not against *me*, but *them*. However, though the *Logos* was the same *essentially* before and after the generation, he was not the same in respect of *operation*, or *manifestation*, and outward *economy*: which is what these Fathers meant.

Tertullian goes upon the same *hypothesis*, in the main, with those before mentioned: and so need not have any distinct consideration: he has been before vindicated at large.

^g Theoph. p. 81, 82.

^h Bull. D. F. p. 216, 217.

Clemens of Alexandria, whom I should have mentioned before, may be likewise allowed to speak of the *procession*. And when he says the Word sprang, or arose, ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς βουλήσεως, *from the will of the Father*, it is plainly intended of his being sent out to mankind, as observed above, (p. 453.) Though I am of opinion that Clemens there means the same that other Fathers have expressed by ἐκ καρδίας, or ἐκ γαστρὸς, and might be rightly rendered in St. John's phrase, from the *bosom* of the Father, John i. 18.

Irenæus comes not under our inquiry, having said little either of *eternal* or *temporal* generation. Only from what hints we can gather, he seems to have asserted *eternal* generation^k. And you cannot shew that he has said any thing of its being by the *will* of the Father.

Hippolytus was undoubtedly in the *hypothesis* of the *temporal generation*, or *procession*. And if you can shew that the Λόγος, before that procession, was an *attribute* only, according to him, you will then take that writer from us. You do endeavour it, p. 119. Bishop Bull^l had observed, and^m I after him, that Hippolytus supposes God, before the procession, to have been *one*; and *many*, because he had the *Son* and *Holy Spirit* in him and with himⁿ. You say, "that learned Prelate seems not to "have sufficiently considered," that (by the same reasoning) the *power* also, and the *counsel* mentioned in the same sentence must have been *persons*. But that learned *Prelate*, having a *judgment* equal to his *learning*, was used to *consider* things with great exactness; and was not so prone to mistake as those that too hastily pass their censure upon him. You have not considered (though I gave notice of it^o) that the words ἄλογος, ἄσοφος, ἀδύνατος, ἀβούλευτος, correspond to λόγος, σοφία, δύναμις, and βουλή, names of the *Son* and Spirit, and all so applied, except βουλή, (for which θέλημα is used, cap. 23,) in that very treatise. And Hippolytus speaks there just in the same way as many other both Post-Nicene and Ante-Nicene Fathers do upon the same subject; several testimonies whereof may be seen in a note

ⁱ Clemens Alex. p. 86.

^k See my Defence, vol. i. p. 353.

^l Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 8. p. 219.

^m Defence, vol. i. p. 360, &c.

ⁿ Αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ὢν, πολὺς ἦν, οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄσοφος, οὔτε ἀδύνατος, οὔτε ἀβούλευτος ἦν. Hipp. contr. Noët. p. 13.

Compare this of Gregory Nazianz.

Οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅτε ἄλογος ἦν, οὔδ' ἦν ὅτε οὐ πατήρ, οὔδ' ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἀληθής, ἢ ἄσοφος, ἢ ἀδύνατος, ἢ ζωῆς ἐνδεής, ἢ λαμπρότητος, ἢ ἀγαθότητος. Orat. xxxv. p. 574.

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 360.

elsewhere^p; and their sense vindicated from such exceptions as you have made to it. You add further, that the Bishop “did not observe that it is the one *unbegotten* God, even the Father, who is here said to be many.” I know not why you pretend the Bishop did not observe what nobody can doubt of: nor do I see of what service the observation can be to you or your cause. Allowing you that by *μόνος* is meant the *Father*, who was *many*, and the *τὸ πᾶν*: still it was the Father considered in the *comprehensive* way, as a *head* of a family containing all; in such a sense as I have explained above^q. It was not Hippolytus’s way to exclude or separate from the alone God and Father, what was *essential* to him, and contained in him; his *Logos*, or his *σοφία*, his *own mind*, (*νοῦς*.) which is the name he gives to the *Son*, thereby expressing his inseparable union and coexistence.

Origen, our next writer. I cited ^rfor *eternal generation*: to which you have little to object, beyond what I have answered to above. If that passage is to be depended on which you cite (p. 272.) from Huetius’s *Origeniana*; then Origen has asserted, besides the *eternal generation*, the *προέλευσις* also.

Novatian I also considered at large^s, which you pass slightly over. Dionysius of Alexandria, and the other Dionysius of Rome, I also brought ^tas evidences for *eternal generation*: whom you let pass without ever a word, of any weight or moment.

Methodius^u was another voucher for the same doctrine: which you do not, cannot gainsay. Only you endeavour to confront his known, certain, and genuine doctrine, with a *spurious* passage out of his *Symposion*: a piece very much corrupted and adulterated in the judgment of Photius, as Bishop Bull had observed^x, and you take no notice.

Pamphilus I also cited for the same doctrine; and also Alexander of Alexandria, to whom you have some little exceptions, which I have answered above, and which are perfectly foreign to the present question.

Eusebius I did not cite, because some just exceptions may be made to him; and there is no reconciling him perfectly with himself, at different times. This you must know; and yet, very deceitfully, you “conclude,” as you say, (p. 273,) “the Ante-
“Nicene writers on this head, with the judgment of the learned

^p Sermon VII. p. 149, &c. of this volume.

^q P. 430, &c. 451, &c.

^r Defence, vol. i. p. 353.

^s *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 354.

^t *Ibid.* p. 357.

^u *Ibid.* p. 357. See also my Reply to Dr. Whitby, p. 221, &c. of this volume.

^x Bull. Def. p. 166.

“ Eusebius, which may justly be esteemed to be the true sense of the ancients before him:” producing a passage from his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, wrote before the Council of Nice, and before he had well considered the subject, and corrected in some material points afterwards, as I have observed above, p. 500.

And now we are come down to the Arian times; in which Dr. Clarke and you think you have found something to your purpose; artificially tacking together testimonies of several kinds, some *Catholic*, some *Arian*, and some *doubtful*: of which in their order, that I may fully clear the point I am now upon. But before I come to these testimonies, I must strike out a little into history, to give the reader a clearer notion of what we are about.

I have elsewhere^y given a brief account of an argument which the Arians made use of to prove the Son of God a *creature*. They argued that the Father must produce his Son either *volens*, *willingly*, (by which they understood *free choice*,) or *nolens*, *against his will*, which in Greek they expressed by φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη, meaning what we should now call *extrinsic necessity*. The argument is much the same with what Dr. Clarke urges in these words: “ Whatever proceeds from any being otherwise than by the *will* of that being, doth not in truth proceed from that being, but from some other cause or *necessity*, *extrinsic* to and independent of that being^z.” And in another place^a, “ Whatever is caused by an intelligent being, is caused by the *will* of that being; otherwise it is not (in truth and reality) caused by that being at all, but by some superior cause, be it *necessity*, or *fate*, or whatever it be, &c.”

This was the old Arian argument, and that was their sense of *necessity*, or φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη: which I shall prove by plain testimonies beyond contradiction. Athanasius may be first cited, who writes thus^b: “ They have another way of saying the Son is a *creature*, by pretending *will*, and arguing thus: if he did not exist by *will*, then God had a Son by *necessity*, and *unwillingly*. But who is it, you miscreants, that imposes *necessity* upon him?”

^y Defence, vol. i. p. 347, &c.

^z Clarke's Reply, p. 227.

^a Ibid. p. 113.

^b Ἄλλως πάλιν κτίσμα λέγουσιν αὐτὸν εἶναι, βούλησιν προβαλλόμενοι, καὶ λέγοντες, εἰ μὴ βουλήσει γέγονεν,

οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, καὶ μὴ θέλων ἔσχευ ὁ Θεὸς υἱόν. Καὶ τίς ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπιβαλὼν αὐτῷ, πονηρότατος; &c. Athan. p. 610.—ἀντίκειται τῇ βουλήσει τὸ παρὰ γνώμην, p. 611. ἄσποπὸν ἔστι λέγειν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ ἀνάγκην.

Epiphanius represents it thus^c: “They object that he begat the Son *willingly* or *unwillingly*: and if we say *unwillingly*, then the divine nature is forced by *necessity*, and not by freedom of will.” He concludes that the generation was neither *willingly* nor *unwillingly*, but *naturally*.

St. Ambrose^d, St. Austin^e, and others^f, represent the same cavil of the Arians much in the same way; which being once well understood, we may easily deal with your pretended authorities. The first is of the Council of Sirmium in the year 351, which condemned Photinus. It is to be noted, in the first place, that this Synod of Sirmium was made up mostly of men of suspected faith, Arians or Semi-Arians: and though they did well in condemning Photinus, and though Hilary laboured much in putting the best construction possible upon their *confession* and *anathemas*; yet Athanasius and others rank them in the class of Arians; and it is certain they stand not perfectly clear in their character against some very just and weighty objections. M. Tillemont says of them, that “they were the declared enemies of the Church, the same Eusebians who had been condemned in the Council of Sardicæ:” and it seems that Hilary himself, who had once judged very kindly and candidly of them, saw reason afterwards to alter his sentiments^h. Having now some notion of the men, let us next see what they say, in relation to our present point:

“If any one say that the Son was begotten, and the Father not willing, let him be anathema. For the Father did not beget the Son, as being constrained, or impelled by a *physical necessity*, as not willing; but he at once willed and produced

^c Θέλων οὖν ἐγέννησεν ἢ μὴ θέλων; ἔαν εἴπωμεν μὴ θέλων ἀνάγκη περιβάλλομεν τὸ θεῖον—καὶ ἔαν εἴπωμεν ὅτι οὐ θέλων ἐγέννησεν ἄρα ἀνάγκη φύσεως ἦκται τὸ θεῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἐλευθεριότητι θελήματος. *Eriph. Ancor. cap. li. p. 55.*

Οὕτε θέλων τοίνυν ἐγέννησε, οὕτε μὴ θέλων, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολῇ φύσεως ὑπερβαίνει γὰρ ἡ θεία φύσις βουλήν—οὕτε ἀνάγκη ἄγεται. *Eriph. ibid.*

^d Subtexunt aliam impietatem, proponentes utrum *volens*, an *invitus* generaverit Pater—Sed nihil in sempiterna generatione præcedit, nec *velle* nec *nolle*: ergo nec *invitum* dixerim nec *volentem*—non generat ex

voluntate, aut *necessitate* Pater, sed super utrumque, hoc est *natura*. *Ambros. de Fid. lib. iv. cap. 9. p. 540.*

^e Interrogant (Ariani) utrum Pater Filium *volens*, an *nolens* genuerit. *August. contr. Serm. Arian. p. 626.*

^f Gregor. Nazianz. *Orat. xxxv. p. 565, 566.* Cyrill. *Alex. Thesaur. p. 50, 52.*

^g Tillemont, *History of Arians, p. 144.* a book which I would particularly commend to the perusal of the English readers, to give them a just notion both of ancient and modern *Arianism*.

^h See Tillemont, p. 145.

“him from himself, begetting him without time, and without “suffering any thingi.”

The expressions here are cautious and guarded: and though perhaps the men had something more in their hearts than they were willing to utter; yet as they have explained the Father’s *willing* the generation in opposition only to his being *forced*, *βιασθεῖς*, and (*ἀχθεῖς*) *impelled*; their doctrine may pass. And so Hilary putting the mildest and most candid construction upon it, explained it to mean only that the generation was not *volente Patre, against the will of the Father*. And his comment upon ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθεῖς, is *nec coacta imperio naturalis legis essentia est; his essence was not compelled by the command of a natural law*.

You ask me, (p. 257.) “whether the persons censured by “the Council of Sirmium, or any others, ever were so stupidly “senseless, as to think any thing that is *necessary*, to be therefore “against the will of God, as well as *without it*?” To which I answer, that the Arians (whether *stupidly* or *maliciously* I know not) so interpreted the *Catholic* sense of *natural* and *eternal* generation; allowing no *medium* between *free choice* and such *compulsive* necessity^k. And there is one Dr. Clarke, who at this day (whether *stupidly* or otherwise I know not) charges the same doctrine with the same consequence, (as I have shewn,) allowing no *medium* in this case, between what he calls *will*, and *extrinsic* necessity. You ask, “if God be omnipresent *by* outward *coaction*, “or against his will, *because not by it*?” I like your argument very well: please to apply it to what I have quoted above from Dr. Clarke: it may serve as an answer to him, in respect of *necessary* generation. You are here arguing for me, and happen not to know it. You ask again, “Is not he omnipresent by “*φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη*, necessity of nature?” He is omnipresent by *necessity of nature*, in the modern sense of the phrase: but *φυσικῆ*

ⁱ Ἐἴ τις μὴ θελήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννησθαι λέγοι τὸν υἱὸν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω· οὐ γὰρ βιασθεῖς ὁ πατήρ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθεῖς, ὡς οὐκ ἠθέληεν ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱόν· ἀλλ’ ἅμα τ’ ἐβουλήθη καὶ ἀχρήνως καὶ ἀπαθῶς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν γεννησας ἀπέδειξε. *Socrat. Hist. Eccl. lib. ii. cap. 30. p. 126. Athan. de Synod. p. 744.*

Si quis nolente Patre natum dicat Filium, anathema sit: non enim nolente Patre coactus Pater, vel naturali necessitate ductus, cum nollet, genuit Filium; sed mox voluit sine tempore,

et impassibiliter ex se eum genitum demonstravit. *Hilar. p. 1184.*

^k To the testimonies before cited, I shall add one more, a very full and plain one, from the eighth anathema of an Arian council: in the year 344 or 345.

Τοὺς οὐ βουλήσει οὐδὲ θελήσει γεγεννησθαι τὸν υἱὸν εἰρηκότας ἀνευλαβῶς, ἀνάγκην δὲ δηλονότι ἀβούλητον καὶ ἀπροαίρετον περιτεθεικότας τῷ Θεῷ, ἵνα ἄκων γεννήσῃ τὸν υἱόν, δυσσέβεστατους καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ξένους ἐπιγνωσόμεν. *Apud Athanas. tom. i. p. 740.*

ἀνάγκη never stood for what we call, in this case, *necessity of nature*. I know not whether there be one instance of it in all antiquity: I have not yet met with any, no, nor of the word *necessity* so applied. Certain however it is, that in the places which we are now concerned with, φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη had no such meaning, but that only which I have given. You go on arguing and reasoning, what *necessity of nature* must signify: which is only talking without book, and guessing what words *anciently* meant, without consulting the *ancients* to know the fact. But at length you come to argue somewhat more like a scholar: you observe the *opposition* made by ἐβουλήθη on the one side, and ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς ἀχθεῖς on the other. That is well urged: but observe also, βιασθεῖς ὁ Πατήρ. Can any words be stronger? This determines φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη to the sense I am pleading for; and therefore ἐβουλήθη is rather to be interpreted by its *opposition* to this. So Hilary interprets it, and construes ὡς οὐκ ἤθελεν, *cum nollet*. But I will frankly tell you what my opinion is, which I ground chiefly upon the consideration of the men concerned in that Council, that they really meant by ἐβουλήθη what you say, and yet by φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη what I say; admitting no *medium*, any more than Dr. Clarke has done in this case, between *necessity* in the *hard compulsive* sense, and *free choice*: and perhaps they intended, obliquely, to charge the Athanasian doctrine (as the Arians used to do) with that hard *necessity*, just as Dr. Clarke has been pleased to charge it as a *consequence* upon ours. Thus, I think, we may fairly compromise the dispute about the Sirmian Synod.

You next mention the Council of Sardica, meaning the false Sardican Council, or Synod of Philippopolis, in the year 347: which condemned Athanasius, Hosius, Julius; as they themselves had been condemned by the true Sardican Council.

Hilary¹ bestowed the same kind pains here that he used afterwards with the decrees of the Sirmian Synod, to interpret their confession to a *Catholic sense*. And coming to the words, *ex voluntate et consilio*, he understands them, not in the sense of *free choice*, but in opposition to *corporalis passio, corporal passion*, that is, *extrinsic necessity*. However, I am persuaded (knowing the men) that Hilary was too kind in his construction; though with a good design, hoping by condescending towards the weak, to reduce them, by degrees, and to gain them over to the true

¹ Hilarius de Synod. p. 1172.

and sound faith. He was forced to apologize afterwards for his good-natured and well-meant endeavours; which had rendered him suspected with some that were zealous for the Catholic faith.

But let us now come to some better instances than such as you have brought me from suspected *synods*. Sure you do not expect I should take notice of the Arian Council of Antioch. What if they condemned some Arian tenets? Has it not been common for Arians, being ashamed of their leader, to condemn some of his tenets in words, at the same time professing the same things in other terms? Give me authorities from men of steady principles, known Catholics, and not from known Arians. You do pretend to three such, Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen. Let us examine them.

Marius Victorinus says, that the generation “was not by necessity of nature, but by the will of the Father’s Majesty^m.” Such are his words: but when you inquire what he meant by *will*, and what by *necessity*, he is directly against you. *Will* is with that writer a name for any *natural power*, or for God himselfⁿ; so that generation by *will* comes to the same with generation *by nature*, which is what we now call *necessary generation*: and it is plain, that he understood by *necessity*, extrinsic necessity, as opposed to intrinsic nature. What is this to your purpose? Whoever will be at the pains to search into the sentiments of so obscure and perplexed a writer, (whom I am not very fond of quoting,) will perceive thus much at least, all the way through him, that he believed the substance of the Father and Son to be equally *necessarily existing*. I shall content myself with a few references^o.

Basil is also quoted by Dr. Clarke, as saying that the Father begat his Son, having his “power concurrent with his will;”

^m Est autem lumini et spiritui imago, non a *necessitate naturæ*, sed voluntate magnitudinis Patris. Ipse enim seipsum circumterminavit, &c. Filius ergo in Patre imago, et forma, et λόγος, et voluntas Patris — Sic igitur voluntate Patris voluntas apparuit ipse λόγος, Filius. *Mar. Victor.* lib. i. *adv. Arium*, p. 188. Basil. ed.

ⁿ A se movens Pater, a sese generans Filius, sed potentia patris sese generans Filius; voluntas enim Filius, unde enim si ipsa voluntas non est a sese generans, nec voluntas est: sed quoniam Dei est voluntas, equidem

ipsa, quæ sit generans, generatur in Deo. Et ideo Deus Pater, voluntas Filius, unum utrumque, &c. *Ibid.* p. 188.

^o Una eademque substantia, vi pari, eademque potentia, majestate, virtute: nullum alteri prius, nisi quod causa est alterum alterius, p. 224.

Una eademque substantia, et simul, et semper: hoc est enim *ὁμοούσιον ὁμοουσίαν ἔχον*, simul substantiam habens, *paremque existendi vim* atque virtutem, eandemque substantiæ naturam, &c. p. 225. Vid. p. 227, 234.

and that the Son springs from the Father's *goodness*^p. If the design be to deceive the populace with the sound of words, there may be some use in such quotations. But such things ought not to be offered either to scholars or by scholars. Who knows not that Basil is as express as possible for the *necessary existence* of God the Son: and directly denies and confutes the very thing for which you are pleading? "Will you not cease, you impious wretch," says he to Eunomius, who was pleading the same cause that you now are,) "to speak of his not existing, who exists necessarily, who is the Fountain of Life; who gave being to all things that are?" I render τὸν ὄντως ὄντα, *necessarily existing*, because it always signifies the same with what we express by that word. Again, speaking of the Eunomians, he says, "They *blaspheme* in pretending to say, the Son of God ever was not: as if he did not exist *by his own nature*, but was brought into being by the *favour* of God." What is this, but directly and flatly denying the very thing which you are contending for? Against which you set an obscure passage or two, which mean nothing of what you intend by them. As to Basil's first expression, of the Father's having his power *concurrent* with his *will*, it signifies only, that his *will* and his *nature* are the same, coeval with each other, and equally *necessary* in this case. Cyril of Alexandria thus expresses the same thought, something more distinctly than Basil.

"It were superfluous and silly to imagine the Father to be a Father either *unwillingly* or *willingly*; but rather *naturally* and *essentially*. For he is not *unwillingly* whatever he is *naturally*: having the *will* to be what he is, *concurring* with the *nature*."

He means that the *will* and the *nature* are both together *coeval* and *coeternal*: in like manner as God always was what he would be, and always would be what he was. The like thought

^p Ὁ Θεὸς σὺνδρομον ἔχων τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν, ἐγέννησεν ἄξιον ἑαυτοῦ ἐγέννησεν ὡς αὐτὸς οἶδεν. *Basil. Hom. xxix. p. 624.*

Φῶς εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν γεννητὸν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννητοῦ φωτὸς ἀπολάμψαντα, καὶ αὐτοζῶν, καὶ αὐτοάγαθον ἐκ τῆς ζωοποιῶν πηγῆς, τῆς πατρικῆς ἀγαθότητος. *Contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 66.*

^q Οὐ παύσῃ μὴ ὄντα προσαγορεύων, ὦ ἄθεε, τὸν ὄντως ὄντα, τὴν πηγὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὸν πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσι τοῦ εἶναι παρ-

εκτικόν. *Basil. contr. Eun. ii. p. 56.*

^r Μὴ εἶναι ποτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ βλασφημοῦντες, ὡς τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει μὴ ὄντα, χάριτι δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ παραχθέντα. *Ibid. p. 57.*

^s Περιττὸν ἂν εἶη καὶ ἀμαθές, τὸ γοῦν ἀνεθελήτως, ἢ θελητῶς γεννητοῦ ἀπάραχου οἰεσθαι τὸν πατέρα, φύσει δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνεθελήτως ἃ ἔστι φυσικῶς, σὺνδρομον ἔχων τῇ φύσει τὴν θέλησιν τοῦ εἶναι ἃ ἔστι. *Cyrril. Dial. ii. de Trin. p. 456.*

we have before seen in Lactantius^t. Here is nothing in this that at all favours your principles.

As to the second citation from Basil, the passage itself leads to the meaning. He there styles the Son *αυτοάγαθον*, essentially good, as proceeding from the Fountain of essential Goodness, that is, from the Father himself: which is no more than saying, that he is *Goodness of Goodness*, in like manner as *God of God*.

Come we now to Gregory Nyssen, where the reader will admire at Dr. Clarke's pretences and yours upon this head; unless you take up passages at second-hand, without ever looking into the author themselves. The words you have first pitched upon are these^u:

“For neither doth that immediate connection between the Father and the Son exclude the *will* of the Father, as if he had the Son by some *necessity* of nature, without his will: neither does the will divide the Son from the Father, so as to make any distance betwixt them.”

Thus far Dr. Clarke quoted; shaping his translation, with little hints and parentheses, as near as he well could, to his *own* sense; however opposite to the author's. Let Gregory go on: “Let us neither exclude from our notion the Father's *will* about the Son, as if it were straitened (or *burdened*) in the connection of the Son's unity with the Father; neither let us dissolve the immediate connection by considering the *will* in the generation.” (Gregory proceeds to tell us, that to will what is good is essential to, and inseparable from the nature; as also to enjoy the thing willed, and that it cannot possibly be conceived without it. He further illustrates his meaning by the instance of

^t Ex seipso est, et ideo talis est qualem se esse voluit. *Lactant. Inst. lib. ii. cap. 8. p. 161.*

Plotinus, before any of them, speaking of God, says that his *will* was concurring with his existence: and he and his will are the same.

Σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὧν ὅπερ θέλει, καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν. *Plotin. Enn. vi. lib. viii. cap. 13.*

Τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ ἐλεήμων, ἔχει μὲν, οὐκ ἐκ βουλήσεως δὲ οὔτε μὲν ἀβουλήτως ταῦτά ἐστι· θέλει γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν αἰεὶ, καὶ ἐσται οὕτω. *Cyril. Thes. p. 56.*

Οὐ μὲν ἀβουλήτως καὶ ἀβελήτως ἐστὶν

ἀγαθός· ὁ γὰρ ἐστι, τοῦτο καὶ θελή-
τόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ. *Athan. Orat. iii. p. 615.*

^u Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἄμεσος αὐτῆ συνάφεια ἐκβάλλει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὡς κατὰ τινα φύσεως ἀνάγκην ἀπροαιρέτως τὸν υἱὸν ἐσχληκός· οὔτε ἡ βούλησις διίστημι τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν, ὡς τι διάστημα μεταξὺ παρεμπύπτουσα, ὡς μήτε ἐκβάλλειν τοῦ δόγματος τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ υἱῷ βούλησιν τοῦ γεννήσαντος, οἷα στενοχωρουμένην ἐν τῇ συναφείᾳ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἐνότητος, μήτε μὴν τὴν ἀδιάστατον διαλεύειν συνάφειαν, ὅταν ἐνθεωρῆται τῇ γεννήσει βούλησις. *Greg. Nyss. Orat. vii. contr. Eunom. p. 206.*

fire, and *light* streaming from it; that if the fire be imagined to have *reason* and *will*, it would choose or will to send forth its streams of light, according to its nature, with more to that purpose.

From hence it is manifest, that Gregory intended no more by *will* than we mean when we say God *wills* his own existence, or is what he would choose to be. Whether this be a proper sense of *will* is not the question: but it was Gregory's sense. And it is plain he does not mean by *φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη* *necessity of nature* in the modern sense, but such a *necessity* as lays a *restraint* or *burden* upon the *will*^x, would be an imperfection, or a pain and uneasiness to the person. I might shew this further by many and express proofs of the *necessary existence* of God the Son, occurring in this very treatise, too tedious to recite at length: I must refer to some in the margin ^v.

Now for a word or two of St. Austin; and then we may shut up our inquiries into the sense of the ancients on this head. You tell me of a *childish* quibble of St. Austin's, (p. 255.) I gave the reader, in the Appendix to my Defence, an account of what Dr. Clarke and you call a "childish quibble:" by which it may sufficiently appear that the *childishness* is none of St. Austin's. It is no commendation of your discretion to revive the memory of a thing which can serve to no purpose, except it be to expose your unacquaintedness with antiquity. You pretend to tell me, that I "repeat the same quibble in my Appendix, without attempting to answer the Doctor's reasoning." But the design of my Appendix was to shew that the Doctor had committed an error, in supposing that St. Austin was making an answer to such testimonies as the Doctor had produced; when he was answering nothing but a mean quibble of the Arians about *nolens volens*. As the Doctor had there made a slip, for want of knowing or considering what St. Austin had been doing, and upon what occasion he had said what he did; for the Doctor's credit, you should have let it drop, and have said no more of it. The

^x In such a sense Gregory uses the phrase elsewhere:

Ὁ δὲ ἀνάγκη φύσεως ὑπεξευμένος ἐνεργεῖ διὰ παντός, μᾶλλον δὲ πάσχει τὴν ὑπακοήν· οὐδὲ εἰ μὴ βούλοιτο τοῦτο ποιεῖν συγχωρούσης τῆς φύσεως. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun. lib. i. p. 44. Paris. Vid. p. 49, 292.*

^y Ἀνάγκη φυσικὴ is constantly spoken of as an *imperfection*, or mark of sub-

jection or servitude: for which reason it was not thought applicable to God.

Natura necessitas used in that low sense by Hilary, p. 976, 986, 1116, 1117.

^y Θεός—κατὰ φύσιν, p. 1. τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, understood of all the three Persons, p. 3. αἰὶ ὄντος ὅπερ ἐστίν, of the Son, p. 4. φύσει ὡν Θεός· ὁ ὡν, p. 9. ὄντως ὄντα, p. 205, 272.

colour you would now give to it is, that my answer to what was objected of the Son's being generated by *will* was out of St. Austin: which is only heaping mistake upon mistake, and defending one error by another. Look again into my Defence, (vol. i. p. 347, &c.) and you will find I was shewing how *necessary emanation* might be and had been understood, consistent with *will*. St. Austin came in by the bye indeed, but he was not cited as admitting either *volens* or *volens* in the case; but as one who had contented himself with *retorting* the objection of the Arians upon themselves. I therefore passed on (p. 348.) to others, who had allowed the generation to be *by will*, and I intimated in what sense they allowed it: not in any such sense as Dr. Clarke intended, though he cited those very men (Marius Victorinus, Basil, and Gregory Nyssen) as favouring his doctrine. He should not have opposed *will* to *necessary generation*, when citing men that asserted *both*; and who understood by *will* a quite different thing from what he did. This was my answer with respect to citations of that kind. But as to other authorities from Justin Martyr, &c. I allowed *will* to be taken in the Doctor's sense: and my answer there was, that they intended it only of the *προέλευσις*, not of the *eternal generation*.

Upon my saying in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 347,) that you could not but have apprehended my meaning, about the difference between *will* and *arbitrary will*, had you retained in mind what you must have observed in the reading of the *ancients*; I say, upon this you remark, that those *ancients* were really "moderns," (p. 259,) and that I often "express myself in this ambiguous "and unfair manner." Yet you yourself take the liberty of calling the very same writers, and those of the same age, "ancient writers:" such as the Sirmian Council, Hilary, Basil, Marius Victorinus, and Gregory Nyssen; to whom Dr. Clarke had appealed in his Scripture Doctrine^z. It was to obviate those testimonies that I referred you to the writers of that time, calling them *ancients*; as you yourself have since done twice together, (p. 256, 257,) So easy is it to condemn another, and to do the same thing yourself. It seems they are *ancients* with you, while they furnish you with *objections*: but when the same writers, or their contemporaries, afford solutions also, then they become *moderns*. But to return.

The sum then of what hath been said is this: all the Fathers

^z Part ii. sect. 17.

believed the *necessary existence* of God the Son: I have proved it of several, and might have done it of more, were it necessary. But the material thing was to take off the objection of the *voluntary generation*. I have done it, by distinguishing between those that asserted only a *temporal* generation, (where I allow *will* to be understood in the strict sense,) and those that asserted *eternal*. As to the latter, none of them ever allowed generation to be by *will*, in your sense of the word. They sometimes admit it in the sense of *approbation*, and they always reject *necessity of nature*; meaning by it extrinsic force, fate, or coercion, never what we now understand by it when applied to God.

Having thus cleared the main point, it remains only to take some notice of a few incidental objections you have made; which could not before be brought in, without breaking my method and disturbing the connection.

You object, (p. 253,) that if this be the case, that the Son *necessarily* exists; then he is *self-existent*: that “if the sun were self-existent, so also would be its rays; if a tree, so also its branches:—the same thing partially considered:—derivation, origination, causality, generation, in such a case are figurative, improper expressions.”

By this then I perceive I have been doing nothing in searching *antiquity*: you have some maxims to yourself that must overrule all *authorities*. I shall answer you what I think sufficient. 1. Allowing your plea, the consequence then is, that the Son is *self-existent* as well as the Father: we change the *name*, but retain the *thing*. And now we shall challenge you to prove either from *Scripture* or *antiquity*, that the Son is not *self-existent*; provided you keep steadily to what you have said, that whatever is *necessary* is also *self-existent*. If this maxim be certain, then the Son is *self-existent*, though referred up to another, and I have proved it in proving his *necessary existence*.

But, 2, I answer, you appear a little too late to be a corrector of the language of all the *ancients*, philosophers and divines. They have constantly distinguished the *ideas*; and wherever there is a difference of *ideas*, there is a reason for assigning different names. Who does not see that the question *whence* a thing is, and the question *what* it is, are very different questions? Or that *immutably* existing, and existing under this or that *relation*, as a *father*, or as a *son*, are quite different things? And though we do not say that Father and Son are the same

thing *partially* considered, where there are no *parts*: yet we admit them to be the *same substance* diversely considered, under distinct *relations* and personalities.

You refer me (p. 251.) to Modest Plea, p. 173. where I find it objected, that “if generation were necessary, there would be “no limitation to the number of Persons.” Yes, the number will be limited to so many as are *necessary*: and no more can be *necessary* than there are found, in fact, to *exist*.

It is further objected, that “in Scripture, the begetting of “the Son is always mentioned as an act of the Father; and an “act cannot be necessary.” But shew me that Scripture ever makes it an *act*, in your sense. I have heard of *begotten*, I never read that it was a *voluntary* act, a matter of *choice*; which is your sense of *act*. Scripture represents it by the relation of *thought* to *mind*^a, or by the ἀπαύγασμα, the shining forth of light^b from the luminous fountain: and so does all *antiquity*. This answers to the *old* sense of *begetting*^c and *acting*: but do not invent *novel* senses of them, and still pretend *Scripture* and *antiquity*. In your *new* sense of *begetting* and *acting*, there is no proof either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*, that the Father *begat* or *acted*: and now what have you done but altered *names*, and left things as before? Was there ever truer pedantry about words? You may call *generation*, in our sense, *metaphorical*, if you please; though you have no reason to give, why it is not *proper*: but when you have done, shew, if you can, that this *metaphorical* sense was not the true and only sense wherein it was understood both by *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

You object, that my “distinction between *will* and *arbitrary* “*will* is elusive and equivocating.” But I pray excuse it for the Doctor’s sake; who makes the same distinction^d, in other words, between will of *approbation* and will of *choice*; which is all that I mean.

You object, that the doctrine of “necessary emanations was “Gnostic and Valentinian:” which you can never prove. But I must remind you that Athanasius charged upon the Arians two things as Gnostic and Valentinian, which undoubtedly are so:

^a See my Sermons, p. 31. of this vol.

^b Ibid. p. 104.

^c Λόγον γεννώμεν. *Just. M. Dial.*

183.

Nec dubitaverim *Filium* dicere et radicis fruticem, et fontis fluvium, et solis radium; quia *omnis origo parens est*, et omne quod ex origine profertur

progenies est.

Γεννᾶ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὁ ἥλιος τὴν ἀυγὴν. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. i. cap. 12.*

Lux splendorem generat. *Ambros. de Fid. p. 540.*

Ἀπαύγασμα γεννᾶται. *Basil. contr. Eun. p. 89.*

^d Scripture Doctrine, p. 248. ed. 2.

one was their bringing in *θέλημα*^e, *will*, between the Father and his *Word*: another was their making a *creature Creator*^f. Philastrius further charges them with borrowing another principle from the infamous Apelles, (of the Marcionite tribe,) which was the making a *second God*, a *creature* and a *subject* of the *first*. Not to mention that Bishop Bull had run up your doctrines to the old Gnostics^h long ago; and was never yet confuted, nor ever will be. It might therefore have been more prudent in you, to have been silent on this head.

Now we have mentioned the matter of *necessary emanations*, it may be proper to hint briefly what has been the Church's constant doctrine in that article. It occurs not indeed any where under those terms: neither does the *necessary existence* of God the Father. The *ancients* expressed not either of the doctrines in those terms: so the question must be, not about the *name*, but the *thing*: and *emanation* must be distinguished according to its two senses: as either signifying the *Person* emaning, or the *emaning* itself. They that spake only of a temporal *procession*, or *emanation*, could not mean that such *procession* was *necessary*. Only, as they held the *necessary existence* of the Person, proceeding in time, but always existing in the Father to whom he belonged, and to whom he is referred; their doctrine, however expressed, comes to the very same that has been since called eternal *generation*, or *emanation*. They that held *eternal generation* were all in the principle of *necessary emanation*, directly and plainly. Only the word *emanation* (if it stands for ἀπόρροια) was either approved, or otherwise, according as understood: and *generation* was the more common name for it. All is summed up in this, that the Son is *necessarily existing*, but still of the *Father*, and referred to him as his *head*.

You pretend, that the distinction of a *threefold generation* is groundless. If you mean that *single* writers do not speak of *three* generations, it may be true of most of them, not *all*: for an exception must be made for someⁱ, who plainly acknowledged

^e Προλεμαίος γὰρ ὁ Οὐαλεντίνου ἔφη δύο ζυγοὺς ἔχειν τὸν ἀγέννητον, ἔννοιαν καὶ θέλησιν· καὶ πρῶτον ἐνενόησεν, εἶτα ἠθέλησε· καὶ ἄπερ ἐνενοίει, οὐκ ἠδύνατο προβάλλειν εἰ μὴ ὅτε καὶ ἡ τοῦ θελήματος δύναμις ἐπεγένετο· ἔνθεν Ἀρειανοὶ μαθόντες, θέλημα καὶ βούλησιν προηγέισθαι θέλουσι τοῦ λόγου. *Athan.* p. 608.

^f Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀγγελιοὶ δημιουργεῖν

δυνήσονται, κρίσματα ὄντες καὶ αὐτοὶ, κἂν Οὐαλεντίνος, καὶ Μαρκίων, καὶ Βασιλείδης τοιαῦτα φρονῶσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων ζηλωταὶ τυγχάνητε. *Athan. Orat.* ii. p. 489.

^g Philastrius Hæres. cap. 47.

^h Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. i.

ⁱ See Bull. D. F. p. 232. Animadv. in Gilb. Clerke, p. 1054. Fabricius Not. in Hippolyt. vol. i. p. 242.

eternal generation, temporal procession, and Christ's incarnation. But taking the Fathers *collectively*, there is demonstration for that *threefold* distinction I have mentioned. And even as to *single* Fathers, though they did not give the *name* to all the three, they acknowledged the things meant by that name; as I have fully shewn. Which of the three is most *properly* called by the name of *generation*, is a very fruitless question: it is manifest that that name was given by *some* or *other* of the *ancients* to all the three.

You object, (p. 283,) that Irenæus argues against all *internal* generations. The reader may see that matter handsomely cleared up in Massuet's Previous Dissertations upon Irenæus^k.

You object, (p. 285,) that the notion of *consubstantiality* (I suppose you will say the same now of *necessary existence*) is far from inferring *equal supremacy*. But, having once sufficiently proved his *necessary existence*, and took off your pretences about *will* (which you chiefly trusted to,) the rest will create no difficulty with considering men. As to your weak charge upon Tertullian, &c. about *angels* and *souls* being *consubstantial* with God, it has been answered. You have a pleasant argument, (p. 271,) that "if the Son was generated, by the will and power "of the Father, into a state of Sonship, either in time or from "eternity, it is sufficient to distinguish him from the one supreme, "self-existent, *immutable* God; who is incapable of any *change*, "even so much as in any *mode* of existence." Your argument here turns upon a fanciful supposition, that all generation, whether *temporal* or *eternal*, implies *mutability*, or *change*. But be pleased to make sense of what you have here said, on either supposition. Suppose the generation *eternal*, what sense is there in conceiving a *change* where there is nothing *new*, no state *antecedent*, no *prius* or *posterius*, which every *change* implies? Suppose it *temporal*; then as it means no more than a *manifestation*, *exertion*, or taking a new *office*, *relation*, &c. what *change* is there in all this, more than there is in God the Father, upon any new *act*, *manifestation*, *exertion* of power, &c.? There is no *change* at all in it, no, not so much as in any *mode* of existence.

I have now run through all that I find material under this Query. Upon the whole it appears, that the *ancients* firmly believed and professed the *necessary existence* of God the Son: as well those who maintained the generation to be *temporal*, as those that professed it *eternal*. And you have not been able to

^k Massuet. Præv. Dissert. p. 36, 128.

prove, either that the former thought the Son an *attribute* only before his generation, or that the latter ever made generation to be by *will*, in any sense but what is consistent with what we now call *necessary existence* and *necessary emanation*.

It may not be here improper to throw in a few words about the several *similitudes* and *illustrations* made use of by the ancients to help imagination, and to give men a more lively sense of divine truths. They are all of them *low*, and infinitely short of what they were intended to represent; some of them perhaps too coarse, and such as might better have been spared: but writers are not always upon their guard. They had a pious design in adapting their comparisons to the very meanest capacities. The *resemblances* were these; *mind* and *thought*, *light* and its *shining*, *sun* and its *rays*, *fountain* and *streams*, *root* and *branches*, *seed* and *plants*, *body* and its *effluvia*, *fire* and *fire*, *light* and *light*, *water* and *streams*.

These similitudes were intended to represent the *consubstantiality* or *coeternity*, or *both*, according as they were most fitly adapted, respectively, or most proper to represent either or both.

The comparisons of *fountain* and *stream*, *root* and *branch*, *body* and *effluvia*, *light* and *light*, *fire* and *fire*, and such like, served more peculiarly to signify the *consubstantiality*: but those of *mind* and *thought*, *light* and *splendor*, (*φῶς καὶ ἀπαύγασμα*.) were more peculiarly calculated to denote *coeternity*; abstracting from the consideration of *consubstantiality*. For *thought* is not any thing *substantial*: and I know not whether *light*, *ἀπαύγασμα*, was ever taken to be so by the ancient Fathers. It is certain that sometimes it was looked upon as a mere energy or quality¹. I say then, that *coeternity* was more fitly represented by those two similitudes than *consubstantiality*.

Indeed Eusebius would not allow that^m *coeternity* was signified in the similitude of *light* and *splendor*; or, I may more properly say, *luminous body* and *light*, for that is the meaning. But in this that great man was very *singular*. And though Montfaucon's censure of him, as *commonly* wresting Scripture, and the Church's doctrine, to his own private fanciesⁿ, may seem rather

¹ Justin. Martyr. Dial. p. 372. Euseb. Dem. Evang. lib. iv. c. 3. Damascen. vol. i. p. 135, 137. Theodorit. in Epist. ad Hebr. c. i. ver. 3. Hær. Fab. lib. v. c. 7. p. 256.

^m Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. iv. c. 3. p. 147.

ⁿ Nihil itaque insolens si Eusebius, qui plerumque Scripturarum et Ecclesiæ dogmata ex sensu et opinione sua æstimare ausus est, in multis lapsus sit. Montf. Prælim. in Euseb. &c. p. 29.

too severe; yet it is certainly true of him in this instance: unless we could suppose that *parenthesis*, or digression, (for such it seems to be,) foisted into his work by some other hand. No Catholic, before or after him, ever talked in that way, but quite the contrary. Origen^o, Theognostus^p, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander, (to say nothing of later writers^q;) give a very different account of that *similitude*: and they are more to be regarded than Eusebius, who stands alone in his account of it, directly thwarting the sense of all the Catholics his contemporaries, as well as of his predecessors that have used it. But to proceed.

It is observable that those who expressly maintained the *temporal* generation only, as Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, and several others, they also illustrate it by similitudes; not by φῶς and ἀπαύγασμα, so far as I have observed, but by *light of light*, one *fire* from another, *fountain* and *streams*. They have sometimes also the *sun* and its *rays*, which seems to me to amount nearly to the same with φῶς and ἀπαύγασμα. Those writers considered the light, not only as breaking forth, or streaming out from the Father *absolutely*, (as they considered it, who illustrated *eternal* generation thereby,) but also *relatively*, in respect of the *creatures*; upon whom it began to break forth and shine, when the *Son* exerted his power in the creation. Then was light sprung up *to them* from the Father, which light had been before eternally in and of the Father, not manifested *ad extra*, not sent abroad, as they would express it.

You give hints in your preface, (p. vii.) and book, p. 285, and elsewhere, that the notion of the ancients was no more than that the Son was from “an internal substantial power of the Father, by his will, *without any* division, abscission, diminution, &c. as one fire is lighted from another:” but you represent their sense very partially, or at least very obscurely. Their plain meaning was, that the Son was *really*, and not *nominally* distinct from the Father; which they signified by *one*

^o Θεὸς γὰρ φῶς ἐστίν· ἀπαύγασμα οὐκ εἶχε τῆς ἰδίας δόξης, ἵνα τολμήσας τις ἀρχὴν διῶ εἶναι νιοῦ πρότερον οὐκ ὄντος. *Orig. ap. Athanas.* p. 233.

^p Οὐκ ἔξωθεν τίς ἐστίν ἐφευρεθείσα ἢ τοῦ νιοῦ οὐσία, οὐδὲ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ἐπεισῆχθη· ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ἔφυ, ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὑδατος ἀτμῖς. *Theogn. ap. Athanas.* p. 230.

Ἀπαύγασμα δὲ ὡν φωτὸς αἰδίου, πάντως καὶ αὐτὸς αἰδιὸς ἐστίν. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athan.* p. 253.

Τὸ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης μὴ εἶναι λέγων, συναίρει καὶ τὸ πρωτότυπον φῶς. *Alexandr. Alex. apud Theod. lib. i. c. 4.*

^q See some testimonies in my Sermons, p. 151 of this volume.

fire and *another*: and they meant further to signify, that though the Son did in a certain sense come out from the Father, yet he was not *divided* from him, but remained still really in him and with him. I have set the principal passages in the ^rmargin; which may serve to explain each other, and fully to ascertain the meaning. It would be tedious here to enter into the particulars. Upon the whole, their meaning was, that the Son so came out from the Father, as still to remain in him: it was an *economical*, not a *real* separation. And so the Father did not leave himself *emptied*, as it were, of his Son, by his sending him out to create and to transact all matters between him and the creature.

This, I doubt not to say, is the *certain* and the *full* meaning of those Fathers: and had it not been for some persons coming to read them with the notion of *eternal* generation in their heads, they could never have mistaken so plain a matter as this is, of the Son's being sent out *economically* from the Father, first to *make*, and next to govern the *creatures*: which *mission*, *manifestation*, or *exertion*, is, with those writers, his *generation*: as it was also so reckoned even by many of the Post-Nicenes, who may be seen in the margin^s. It must be owned, that Hilary

^r Λόγον γεννώμεν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποτομήν, ὡς ἐλαττωθῆναι τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν λόγον προβαλλόμενοι (leg. προβαλλόμενον) καὶ ὁποῖον ἐπὶ πυρὸς, ὁρῶμεν ἄλλο γινόμενον, οὐκ ἐλαττουμένου ἐκείνου ἐξ οὗ ἡ ἀναψις γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένοντος καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναφθῆν καὶ τὸ ὄν φαίνεται οὐκ ἐλαττώσαν ἐκείνο ἐξ οὗ ἀνέφθη. *Just. Dial.* p. 183.

Οὐ κατ' ἀποτομήν ὡς ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, ὅποια τὰ ἄλλα πάντα μεριζύμενα καὶ τεμνόμενα, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἂ καὶ πρὶν τμηθῆναι. *Justin.* p. 373.

Γέγονε δὲ κατὰ μερισμὸν, οὐ κατ' ἀποτομήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτμηθῆν τοῦ πρώτου κεχώρισται· τὸ δὲ μερισθῆν οἰκονομίας τὴν αἴρεσιν προσλαβὼν, οὐκ ἐνδεῶ τὸν ὄθεν εἴληπται πεποίηκεν, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπὸ μᾶς δαδὸς διὰ τὴν ἕξασιν τῶν πολλῶν δαδῶν οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται τὸ φῶς· οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος προσελθὼν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἄλογον πεποίηκε τὸν γεγεννηκότα. *Tatian.* p. 22.

Πρὸ γὰρ τὴ γίνεσθαι τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ὄντα· ὅποτε δὲ ἠθέλησεν ὁ Θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικόν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως, οὐ κενωθεὶς αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ λό-

γον, γεννήσας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντὸς ὁμιλῶν. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 129.

Nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur—a matrice non recessit, sed excessit. *Tert. Apol.* c. 21.

Hæc erit probola veritatis, custos unitatis, qua prolatum dicimus Filium, et non separatum. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* c. 8.

Trinitas per consortos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens, et monarchiæ nihil obstrepit, et æconomiciæ statum protegit. *Tert. ibid.*

Habes Filium in terris; habes Patrem in cælis. Non est separatio ista, sed dispositio divina. *Tert. contr. Prax.* c. 23.

^s Scirent Verbum in principio Deum, et hoc a principio apud Deum, et natum esse ex eo qui erat, et hoc in eo esse qui natus est, quod is ipse est penes quem erat antequam nasceretur; eandem scilicet æternitatem esse giggentis et geniti. *Hilar. in Mat.* p. 742.

Procedit in nativitatem, qui erat, ante quam nasceretur, in Patre, —cujus ex ore prodivit unigenitus Filius, cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus: exinde visibilis effectus, quia humanum genus

seems to have changed his language and sentiments too afterwards: or else he held a *generation* prior to this, along with the *προέλευσις*. It must also be confessed, that the Catholics themselves were for some time pretty much divided about the question of *eternal generation*; though there was no question about the *eternal existence*. Whether the *Λόγος* might be rightly said to be *begotten* in respect of the state which was antecedent to the *προέλευσις*, was the point in question. Athanasius argued strenuously for it, upon this principle, that whatever is of *another*, and referred to that other as his *head*, (as the *Λόγος*, considered as such, plainly was,) may and ought to be styled *Son*, and *begotten*: besides, the Arians had objected, that there would be two *unbegotten* Persons, if the *Λόγος* ever existed, and was not in the capacity of *Son*; and the Church had never been used to the language of two *unbegottens*. These considerations, besides the testimonies of elder Fathers who had admitted *eternal generation*, weighed with the generality of the Catholics; and so *eternal generation* came to be the more prevailing language, and has prevailed ever since. There is nothing new in the doctrine more than this, the calling that *eternal generation* which others would have styled the *eternal existence* and *relation* of the *Λόγος* to the Father; which at length amounts only to a difference in *words* and *names*. This appears to me a fair and full account of that matter, after the most careful and impartial search I have been able to make into the ancients upon it: that I might not deceive either myself or my readers.

In conclusion, since you have been pleased to call upon me for *satisfaction*, (p. 297,) which I shall be always ready to pay for any injury I have really done to my readers; I now leave it to your "ingenuity to consider, what satisfaction you ought to "make your readers," for the following particulars:

visitaturus erat. *Zen. Veron. apud Bull. p. 200.*

Ortus habens initium in navitate, in statu non habens. *Phœbad.*

Hoc initium habeat Sapientia Dei quod de Deo processit ad creanda omnia tam cœlestia quam terrena; non quo cœperit esse in Deo. Creata est ergo sapientia, imo *genita*, non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Pseud. Ambros. de Fid. c. ii. p. 349.*

Ἐγεννήθη, μάλλον δὲ προήλθεν αὐτὸς, καὶ πάντοτε ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὄν, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν

ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγεννημένων διακόσμησιν. *Constantin. apud Gelas. p. 58.*

Ex ore quamlibet Patris sis ortus, et verbo editus;

Tamen paterno in pectore *Sophia* callebas prius. *Prudent. Hymn. xi. p. 44.*

Vere enim et sine voce natum, et omnia potentialiter continens Verbum, tum Pater actualiter *generavit*, quando cælum et terram, quando lucem et cætera fecit. *Rupert. Tuitiens.*

† Athanasius contr. Arianos, Orat.

1. For carelessly passing over the many and plain testimonies I produced for *eternal generation*; from Irenæus, Origen, Novatian, Dionysius of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Methodius, Pamphilus, and Alexander of Alexandria: as to which, you have not attempted to shew that I have misconstrued the passages, nor have you endeavoured to *reconcile* them to your principles; contenting yourself with *objecting* only, instead of *answering*, as usual with you.

2. For imposing upon us the *spurious* or *interpolated* Constitutions: which, you know, are of no value in this controversy, with men of letters.

3. For representing the Councils of Sirmium, Sardica, Antioch, as undoubtedly *orthodox*; though never so accounted, or received as such, by the Catholics in general, but suspected as Arian by many, and that very justly.

4. For your several *unfair*, not to say manifestly *false* translations: of the words of the Sirmian Council, p. 258, 274. of Hilary, p. 259, 275. of Tatian, p. 270, 110. of Basil, p. 291.

5. For representing (p. 273, 287.) Eusebius as giving the sense of the ancients upon a point wherein all the Catholics before, and in, and after his times, are flatly against him, (as many as speak of it.) and not a man concurring with him.

6. For your very slight, superficial, and elusive answers to the many weighty reasons I before gave in my Defence, (vol. i. p. 360. to 365.) to prove that the *Logos* was a *real* and an *eternal* Person (according to the *ancients*) antecedently to his *procession*, otherwise called *generation*.

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable?

TO this you say, "it is sufficient to answer, that individual " attributes can neither be communicated with nor without the " essence." Your reason: "because communication of an in- " dividual, without the communicator's parting with it, is " supposing it to be not an individual, and is consequently a " contradiction in terms," p. 301. Thus far you: and you go on after this with so peculiar an air of self-complacency and satisfaction, that one would almost think you weak enough to imagine you had said something considerable. The great difficulty is still behind, to determine what makes an *individual*, or

to fix a *certain principle of individuation*. I called upon you for it before; knowing that very wise men thought it as difficult a problem as to *square the circle*. But to a man of your abilities nothing is difficult; you can solve the doubt in three words.

You undertake it, (p. 307.) telling me, that the "principle of individuation is a self-evident thing." To those only, I presume, who have not sagacity enough to see where the difficulty lies: to such all things are easy, as all colours are alike to men in the dark. Let us have this solution. "It is that by which any one thing, be it simple or complex, is that one thing which it is, and not another." That is to say, it is that by which any thing is an individual. And pray what is that? Are we not just where we were? If any should ask you what is the *cause* of the *motion* of the heart, you would tell them, I suppose, it is *that by which the heart is made to beat*; or if you are asked the *cause* of the *tide*, it is *that by which the waters are made to ebb and flow*. Who would be the wiser for such discoveries? You have not told me what makes an *individual*; but you have signified, in other words, what is meant by the phrase, *principle of individuation*, which I knew very well before.

Having laid your foundation, such as it is, you proceed to build upon it. "Two beings," you say, "may be one complex being, but they cannot either of them be that one being which this is. Two substances may be one complex substance, but they cannot either of them be that one substance which this is." Wonderful edifying! But the great defect is, (and it is strange you should not perceive it,) that we do not yet know what we are to call *one being* or *two beings*; *one substance* or *two substances*: if that were settled, any child could go on. We must therefore stop your course a little, and bring you back again to the place where you set out. To convince you of your being mightily out of the way, let me put a case to you. Upon Dr. Clarke's principles, of the *divine substance* being *extended*, I desire to know whether *this substance* which fills the earth, be *one* with *that substance* which fills heaven: this is bringing your doctrine of *individuals* to the test, in order to see of what service it may be to us. By your principles, so far as I yet perceive, *this substance* and *that substance* must be two *simple* substances, and one *complex substance*. I wondered indeed why you chose the word *complex* rather than *compound*, which signifies the

same. But now I recollect that Dr. Clarke had declared^u against God being a *compound* substance. He may be *complex*, however, upon your *hypothesis*: and so if we must have a *complex Deity*, it may as well be *with a Trinity* of divine Persons, as *without*. Clear your own schemes, and you clear ours at the same time.

Dr. Clarke's notion of *individual substance* appears plainly to be this; that if the substance be but *spiritual*, and there be no *disunion*, then the substance is *one*, one *simple* substance. I approve of his notion as very just: and since the three divine Persons are supposed by us to be all *spiritual*, and *united* as much as possible, more closely indeed (being equally *omnipresent*) than you suppose the *parts* of the divine substance to be; I say, since these things are so, the three Persons may be *one individual* substance, upon the Doctor's principles, one *simple* and *uncompounded* substance; which is what we assert: and if the substance be *individual*, the *attributes*, we hope, may be so too: and then all is right. You are used to pay a deference to the learned Doctor's judgment in other matters; do so in this: or if you are resolved to debate the point, dispute it first with him: he may probably give you good satisfaction, and save me any further trouble.

You are displeas'd with me (p. 309.) for mentioning *parts* of the *divine substance*. But let your displeasure fall where it ought, upon the learned Doctor; who having subjected the divine substance to *extension*, has necessarily introduced *parts*; there being no *extension* where there are not *parts*. Besides that the Doctor has expressly admitted *parts*, provided only they be not *separable*, *compounded parts*, which I charge you not with. You say, indeed, that instead of *parts*, I should have said "partial apprehensions of its omnipresence." But, I beseech you, put me not off with *words*, nor with such answers as you would not yourself admit in another case. I am talking of the divine substance, which is not made up of *apprehensions*, but of somewhat *real*; which (upon your and the Doctor's *hypothesis*) must be called *extended parts*. You would laugh at us, if we should

^u Dr. Clarke's Answer to the *sixth Letter*, p. 4. His words are; "The meaning of *parts* is separable, compounded, ununited parts, such as the parts of matter; which for that reason is always a *compound*, not a *simple* substance. No matter is *one substance*, but a *heap* of substances.

"And that I take to be the reason why it is a subject incapable of thought. Not because it is *extended*; but because its parts are distinct substances, ununited, and independent on each other: which, I suppose, is not the case of other substances."

tell you that the three Persons are three *partial apprehensions*, when you ask us what they are; whether *beings* or not *beings*. Do not therefore put us off with empty sounds, when we ask you the like questions about the *parts* of the divine substance; whether *Beings* or *one Being*; and if one Being, whether one *individual* Being; and if so, whether *simple* or *complex*. By that time you have furnished out proper answers to these questions, all that you have objected about *individual* will drop and dwindle into nothing. And it will be great satisfaction to us to observe, how handsomely you can plead on the *opposite* side, and how ingeniously you can unravel your own sophistry. You may at length, perhaps, be sensible, that all the difficulties you have raised about *individual, numerical, specific, &c.* resolve only into this: that we know not precisely, in all cases, what to call *individual, or numerical, or specific*. You have a very distinct notion (in your way of thinking) of any *two parts* of the divine substance: and yet you know not whether it be proper to say, that *this* part is *individually* and *numerically* the same substance with the *other* part. You would be as much puzzled about *specific*; since you would hardly think it sufficient to say, that they are *specifically* one and the same substance. Learn therefore, from hence, to distinguish between difficulties relating to *things* and difficulties about *names* only.

You attempt to answer what I had urged in my Defence, vol. i. p. 445, where I had argued against the same *wisdom, goodness*, or any other attributes, being supposed to reside in infinitely distant parts. I thought no maxim clearer than this, that attributes of any subject reach not beyond their subject: and therefore whatever attribute is in *this substance*, cannot be also in *that substance*; unless *this* substance be *that* substance. I did not urge these things as being of any *real* weight in themselves; but only as having the very same weight as your objections against the doctrine of the *blessed Trinity* have, or ought to have: and I was to convince you of the folly of wading beyond your depth. You have answers, such as they are, ready for every thing; either to shew that you know *more*, or else know *less* than wise men do: for, it is one degree of knowledge to be sensible of one's ignorance. You tell me that the "same individual moment of time is every where, and the same individual truth is every where." Admitting this, why then may not the *same individual wisdom, power, &c.* be in *three Persons*? But if I should ask you to give me any distinct notion of the same

individual moment or the same *individual truth* being every where, possibly you might be strangely confounded. Is this *moment* or this *truth* substance or attribute? If *attribute*, what is the *subject* of it? If the *divine substance* be the subject, how can these *truths* and these *moments* reside in an extended subject without being *coextended*? And how can the attributes of one part be the attributes of another part, any more than the *extension* of one is the extension of another? However, since you have been pleased to admit that this *individual truth* and that *individual moment* are “entirely in the whole, and entirely “in every part of the universe;” we shall want a good reason why the same *individual attributes* may not be *entirely in the whole Trinity, and entirely in every Person of it*. But you will say, that you suppose the attributes *common*, and not *communicated*: and so there will be a difference between your *hypothesis* and ours. But, as the main difficulty lies in conceiving the *same attributes* to be *entirely in the whole, and entire in every Person*; this being happily got over, the other will create no difficulty. It is as easy to conceive the same thing *common* in *this manner*, as common in *that manner*: for there is no other difference but in the *manner*, between *common* and *communicated*. Having thus despatched the main point, relating to the *principle of individuation*, (which stands just where it did,) you will not expect any further answer to such objections as turn only upon the uncertain meaning of *individual*.

I freely own my ignorance, that I am not yet got beyond the common School definition, *Individua sunt quæ dividi non possunt in plura ejusdem nominis, et naturæ singularis*. Individual is something *undivided*, in such respect as it is conceived to be *one*: and *one* is something *single*, and not *multiplex*, in that respect wherein it is conceived to be *one*. I pretend not to make any man wiser by such an account as this: but it is proper to confess our *ignorance* where we know nothing. This, however, I pretend to be certain of, that every *individual* is, upon your principles, made up of *parts*; and that all *oneness*, or *sameness*, is by *union* of parts: otherwise there is nothing in the world that you can call *one substance*, or *same substance*, at all. Now, if *union* makes *oneness*, or *sameness*, you will be extremely puzzled to find out any *union* closer, or stronger, or higher, than that *union* which we conceive to be among the three Persons. Why then may they not be one *individual Substance, Being, God*? or the *same individual Substance, Being, God*? I like what

St. Bernard^x has said of this matter; and leave you to confute it when you are able.

I may here take some notice of the author of the Appeal to a Turk, &c. who thinks it strange we should pretend to know that three Persons are *one Being*, when, by our own confession, *we know not precisely what makes one Being*, nor can fix upon any *certain principle of individuation*, p. 54. Now, as to the fact, that three Persons are *one God*, or *one Being*, we pretend to know it from Scripture: but as to the *manner* how they are *united*, we know it not at all. I suppose, we may know that soul and body are so united as to make *one man*; though we understand not the nature of the *union*: or that the parts of matter *cohere*, though we understand not the *manner* or *cause* of their *cohesion*. And if we are puzzled in accounting for the *union* of things so familiar to us, and suited to our capacities, what wonder is it, if our thoughts are lost in accounting for the *divine union* of the tremendous Deity? It is one thing to know that three Persons are *one God*, another to know *what makes them one*. If the author's objection lies only against calling the Persons *one Being*, as not being *scriptural*; we shall be content if he admits them to be *one God*, or *one Jehorah*, which is evidently *Scripture doctrine*. His reasoning, p. 56, is of the same size for acuteness and penetration with what he has, p. 54. If we have no *idea* of the manner *how* two may be *one*, he will infer, that "we have no idea either of two Persons or of one God." That is to say, if we have no *idea* of the manner *how* soul and body make *one man*, we have no idea of *soul*, or *body*, or of *one man*. Now the case is this; we have an idea of the *Persons* united, and we understand that they are *one*, having a confuse general idea of *unity*: but as to the internal *cause*, or particular *manner* of the union, we have no *idea* of it. What is there strange or surprising in this, unless it be strange for *ignorant* creatures to know only *in part*, and to be able to understand something without knowing every thing? But to return to you.

I shall now look back, to see if there be any incidental passages under this Query deserving notice. Page 303, I find you endeavouring to prop up the Doctor's aphorism, that "necessary agents are no agents, and necessary causes no causes." This is also strife about *words*; in which the cause is nothing concerned. For admitting all you would have, it comes to this

^x Inter omnia quæ recte unum dicuntur, arcem tenet Unitas Trinitatis; qua Personæ tres una substantia sunt: secundo loco, illa præcellit, qua e converso, tres substantiæ una in Christo persona sunt. Bernard. de Conf. lib. v. c. 8.

only; that the ancients have *improperly* called the Father an *Agent*, or *Cause*, in respect of the *generation*: the doctrine will stand exactly as before, only in other *terms*. And you must not pretend to *change* the sense of the *ancients* in respect of the words *act* or *cause*; and still appeal to their expressions as countenancing your *novel* notions: that will be affronting the readers indeed. But let us inquire a little into this *new* philosophy. I asked, whether an infinitely *active* Being can ever *cease* to act? To which you answer not a word. I asked, whether God's *loving himself* (which is loving every thing that is good, and which *general love*, or *natural propensity*, seems to be the *prime mover* in all the divine acts) be not *acting*? To which you reply nothing. I believe we are almost out of our depth here, and might more modestly leave the *divine acts* to that divine Being who alone understands the nature of them. But since you pretend to be wise in such high things, I may put a few questions to you concerning them. You say, "the essence of action is exerting of power, and the will is the original of all exerting of power." Well, let *action* be exerting of power: Does God never *naturally* or *necessarily* exert any power? Who can be wise enough to know these things? But, the "will is the original:" and is not the *will* itself determined by essential wisdom, goodness, and truth? And why is not that as much the *original* which determines, as that which is determined? How is it that God cannot but *will* good, cannot but *will* happiness: as, on the other hand, he cannot but *will* evil, cannot but *will* unhappiness? Are *approving* and *disapproving* the same with *knowing* good and evil? Or does he not rather *approve* and *disapprove*, because he *knows* why? How hard a thing then is it to distinguish between what shall be called *acts*, or *actions*, and what not? You have discarded all that in common speech passes under the name of *action*. Walking, riding, running, are no *acts*: they are *bodily motions*, following the impulses of something else that moves and actuates. Human *acts* must be confined to what is *invisible*, to what passes in the dark recesses of our minds. And here our *ideas* are very defective and obscure; and our language almost all *improper* and *metaphorical*; taken from bodily motions, which are no acts. We may divide the powers or faculties of the mind into *perceptive* and *active*: and we may call the latter by the name of *will*. But still what is that perpetual *activity* of the mind, that general pursuit of happiness, and avoidance of misery, which is not merely *perceptive*, and yet is *necessary* and *unavoidable*? It will be said, per-

haps, that it is *natural*, resulting from our *nature*; that is, from God, who gave us our nature: and so herein we *act* not, but are *acted* upon. Be it so; let us next go higher, to the first cause of all things: are there no *natural* and *necessary* propensities there, no *natural* or *necessary* aversions; in a word, no *willings* and *nillings*, which are as *necessary* as it is to exist? Yet they are *acts*, *internal* acts; and the ground of all *external*: or else we know not what *acts* are. But enough of this matter: which as I before observed, is entirely foreign to the cause.

You object, that the Father is not *aitios* (as Basil styles him), if the Son *necessarily* coexists with him. But he is *aitios*, notwithstanding, in Basil's sense of *aitios*, in the ancient sense of *aitios*, when *necessary* causes were styled *causes*: and can any thing be more ridiculous than to plead *ancient* phrases, and not to take them in their *ancient* sense? Could not I, in this way, quote Dr. Clarke, Mr. Whiston, Mr. Emlyn, (and indeed whom not?) as being perfectly in my sentiments; let me but put a sense upon their words as I please, however contrary to the known, certain sense of the authors? Was there ever a wilder method of supporting an hypothesis?

You have something, p. 305, which is reasonably put, and deserves consideration. I had pressed you with insuperable difficulties relating to the *omnipresence*, and other undoubted truths. To which you reply, that the "omnipresence is a truth demonstrated by reason, and affirmed in Scripture:" which our doctrine is not, at least not so certainly: that therefore though the *difficulties* be equal, here and there, yet the *positive* evidence is not. You will forgive me for putting your argument somewhat clearer and stronger than you had done. Now to this I answer, that our *positive* evidence from Scripture is very great and full; as hath been often shewn. I will here mention but one argument of it, viz. that you have not been able to *elude* our proof of the *Son's* divinity, without eluding, at the same time, every proof of the Father's *divinity* also; as I have shewn above. Is not this a very sensible and a very affecting demonstration of the strength of our *Scripture proofs*? You add further, that our doctrine is "impossible to be understood." A groundless calumny, which I confuted at large. Is *omnipresence* impossible to be understood, which you say can be *demonstrated*? or is our doctrine more hard to be conceived than that is? But you pretend an *insuperable* difficulty in our scheme, that it makes

^y Page 564, &c. of this volume.

^z Defence, vol. i. p. 453, &c.

more *supreme Gods* than one: which is another calumny as groundless as the former. You ask, are not two supreme Gods though undivided, two supreme Gods? Yes, certainly; but two *supreme Persons*, that is, two equally supreme in *nature*, (though not in *order*;) and *undivided* in substance, are not *two Gods*, but *one God*. You add, that making "one substance" is not the same thing with making "one God." To which it is sufficient to say, How do you know? or how came you to be wiser, in this particular, than all the Christian churches early and late? The *heathens*, you tell me, did not pretend that their subordinate deities, though *consubstantial*, were equally *supreme*. They were therefore the more silly in supposing them *consubstantial*, and not *supreme*; that is, of the *same nature*, and yet of a *different nature*. But the heathens were further wrong in making more *deities* than *one*, supreme and inferior: wherein you copy after them, adopting their *Polytheism*, and *paganizing* Christianity, as Dr. Cudworth expresses it.

You accuse me, (p. 311,) as "presumptuously" calling my doctrine "the doctrine of the blessed Trinity," in opposition to yours. But why will you give yourself these affected airs? Great *presumption*, indeed, to believe that the Catholic Church has kept the true faith, while Eunomians and Arians made shipwreck of it. But it is high *presumption* in a few private men to revive old *heresies*, and to talk as confidently of them, as if they had never been confuted. A modest man would be apt to distrust his own judgment, when it runs counter to so many eminent lights of the Christian Church, and has been so often condemned by the wiser and better part of the Christian world. A becoming deference would appear well in a case of this nature: nor do I know any thing short of *infallibility* that can either warrant or excuse this big way of talking which you affect to appear in.

You intimate, (p. 311,) that it is not *reason*, but *Scripture* you appeal to; and that you will here *join issue with me*, apart from *metaphysical hypotheses*. Agreed: discharge then your *metaphysics* for the future; let us hear no more of *self-existence*, to *divide* the Father from the Son, when *Scripture* tells us they are *one*. Let us no more be told, that *begetting* is an *act*, and every *act* is of the *will*: this is all *metaphysical*. Wave all further discourse about *specific*, and *individual*, and *intelligent agent*, and the like, to hinder plain Christians from seeing that *Scripture* makes no more Gods but *one*; never supposes the Son *another*

God, nor admits Father and Son to be *two Gods*. Drop your pretences about subordination of *offices*, as implying distinct *authorities*, *unequal power*, *independence* on one hand, *subjection* on the other: such reasonings are *metaphysical*. Let us hear no more that three *divine* Persons must be three *personal Gods*, three *Beings*, three *Substances*; and that there can be no Unity of Godhead, but *identical* personal Unity, confined to one Person solely: these are *metaphysics*; deep, profound *metaphysics*. Tell us no more that *derived* and *underived* powers cannot be the *same* powers, nor any *equality* stand with the distinct *relations* or *offices* of a *father* and a *son*. Give up your famed *dilemma* against the Unity, that each Person must be either the *same*, *whole*, *identical* substance, or else an *homogeneous undecided part* of that substance: and your other *dilemma*, that the Persons must either have the same *identical life*, or distinct *identical* lives; neither of which (you imagine) can stand with our principles. These are abstract *metaphysical* speculations, such as never disturbed the churches of Christ, until many years after they had professed their *faith* in, and paid their *worship* to, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as the one true God. Wave these things for the future, and we shall readily join issue with you upon *Scripture* alone; and shall then believe that you mean what you say, when you hereafter plead for the laying aside of *metaphysics*. We desire no metaphysics but in our own necessary self-defence: if you begin in that way, we must also enter the lists in the same way, and oppose *false* metaphysics with *true*; to shew the world your wanderings and your inconsistencies, even in what you most rely upon, and (though you will not own it) almost solely trust to.

QUERY X.

Whether, if they (the attributes belonging to the Son) be not individually the same, they can be any thing more than faint resemblances of them, differing from them as finite from infinite; and then in what sense, or with what truth can the Doctor pretend that all divine powers, except absolute supremacy and independency, are communicated to the Son? And whether every being, besides the one Supreme Being, must not necessarily be a creature and finite; and whether all divine powers can be communicated to a creature, infinite perfection to a finite being?

I FIND nothing in your further reply (which is no *reply*) to this Query, but what I have fully obviated in my Defence.

and now in my answer to the other Queries above. All that the reader can learn from what you have here said, is, that if the question be, what it is not, viz. *Whether the Son be the Father*; you have something to plead for the *negative*: but if it be, as it really is, *Whether the Son be a creature and finite*; you have nothing to say to it. The evidence is so full and strong against you, that you dare not submit it to a fair hearing. Allow you but to wrap yourself up in *ambiguous terms, supremacy, self-existence, individual, &c.* and you are willing to hold on a frivolous and tedious dispute, of no benefit to the readers: but bring you down to plain sense and fixed terms, then you draw off, and take your leave. A conduct suitable to such a cause, but very unworthy of the hands engaged in it.

QUERY XI.

Whether if the Doctor means by divine powers, powers given by God, (in the same sense as angelical powers are divine powers,) only in a higher degree than are given to other beings; it be not equivocal, and saying nothing: nothing that can come up to the sense of those texts before cited, or to these following?

Applied to the one God.

Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, &c. Neh. ix. 6.

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, Gen. i. 1.

To God the Son.

All things were made by him, John i. 3. By him were all things created; he is before all things, and by him all things consist. Coloss. i. 16, 17.

Thou, Lord, in the beginning, hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thy hands. Heb. i. 10.

THE questions here were, what Dr. Clarke meant by *divine powers*, and whether his meaning comes up to the texts here cited. I am now told, that the "divine powers of the Son are "not only in a higher degree than angelical powers, but totally "of a different kind: for" (let us observe the reason) "to the "Son is committed all judgment," p. 316. Well then, the Son's *divine powers* are at last dwindled into his *offices* given him by God; therefore *divine* most certainly. This is the *divinity* of God the Son, which you stand up so zealously for in your preface; and for the sake of which you are so highly affronted to be thought opposers of Christ's *divinity*. But let us go on. I insist upon the Son's having *creative powers*, according to the

texts cited, and as I have proved more at large in my Sermons. You have little to reply, but that *derived* and *underived* are not the same: whereas they are the same, because they descend from one to the other: were they both *underived*, they could not (at least according to the *ancients*) have been the same. *Derived* and *underived* may be the *same substance*, as well as *greater* and *less*, *containing* and *contained*, may be the *same substance*: which you are forced to allow in your *hypothesis* of the extended parts of the same substance. And why must you be perpetually quibbling upon the different senses, or kinds of *sameness*, and using arguments against us, which inevitably recoil upon yourselves? Do but keep to that strict sense of *sameness* which you are using against us, in the argument about *derived* and *underived*; and I will demonstrate to you, upon your own principles, as before hinted, that there is no such thing as *one* and the *same* substance in the world.

In answer to hard arguments, in this Query, you return me *hard* names. “Heaps of contradictions, not treating the argument seriously;” in short, any thing that first came into your head, being at a loss for an *answer*, and resolved not to be entirely silent. You are cavilling at the account I gave of the *ancients*, as assigning to three Persons their several parts and provinces in the work of creation. I observed what meaning they had in it^a, and that their words are not to be strictly and rigorously interpreted. Have you a syllable to object to the truth of this report? Not a word: the thing is too plain and evident to be gainsaid. The truth is, if the *ancients* are to be interpreted rigorously, the Father is not *properly* Creator at all, but the Son only; for he is represented as *doing* and *executing*, the Father as issuing out *orders* only. But who can entertain so absurd a thought, as that the Father did not *work* in the creation as much as the Son? Again, the Father is represented as standing in *need*^b of the assistance of the Son and Holy Ghost. How will this suit with that *supreme* dignity, that *alone* self-

^a Defence, vol. i. p. 381.

^b Ὡς βοηθείας χρήζων ὁ Θεὸς εὐρίσκειται λέγων· Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. οὐκ ἄλλω δέ τινι εἴρηκε ποιήσωμεν, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σοφίᾳ. *Theoph. Antioch.* p. 114.

Nec enim indigebat horum Deus ad faciendum quæ ipse apud se prædefinierat fieri, quasi ipse suas non habe-

ret manus. *Iren.* p. 253.

Si necessaria est Deo materia ad opera mundi, ut Hermogenes existimavit; habuit Deus materiam longe digniorem—Sophiam suam scilicet—materiam materialiarum—quali Deus potuit *equivisse*, sui magis quam alieni egens. *Tertull. contr. Hermog.* cap. 18.

sufficiency, which you are contending for? If you interpret this rigorously, it must be as great a lessening to the Father as you pretend the *executing* of another's *orders* is to the Son. It is plain therefore, that these sayings of the *ancients* were intended only to preserve a more lively sense of the *distinction* of Persons; while they considered them altogether as equally concerned in the creation, and equally working in it. You object that no ancient writer ever said that the three Persons "created in concert," p. 299. But what did the *ancients*^c mean then, by understanding the text of Genesis, "Let us make man," of all the three Persons? And what did they mean by giving the Son the title of *σύμβουλος*^d, *Counsellor* to the Father, in that work? How much does this come short of what I said? Nor can you make any thing more of *ἀθροετία*. (a word which rarely occurs,) or of *auctoritas*^e, (which is used oftener,) than the preeminence of the Father as *Father*, his priority of *order*. When you wrote before, you were confident that the Son was not styled *ποιητῆς τῶν ὄλων*: and this you noted, to confirm your fiction, that the Father only was *efficient* cause, the Son *instrumental*. You have been since convinced of your error by plain testimonies given you in great numbers^f. But still you go on in your pretence about *efficient* and *instrumental*, notwithstanding *ποιητῆς*, which you had before allowed to be expressive of the *efficient* cause. Now the defect is, that the Son is not *ὁ ποιητῆς*: and neither is that true, for I cited Eusebius for *ὁ ποιητῆς* applied to God the Son. I have spoken of *διὰ* before, and so here pass it over. You are persuading me that even Cyril of Jerusalem, whom I quoted in my Defence. (vol. i. p. 381.) is expressly against me. Ridiculous to any that know Cyril; you can mean this only for such as do not read. If there is any thing to be suspected of Cyril, it is rather his excluding the Father from being *Creator*, than the Son from being *efficient*. But the late learned Benedictine editor has sufficiently cleared up Cyril's orthodoxy on that head^g. I charged^h you with opposing *efficient* to *ministering* cause; either very unskillfully or very unfairly. Now you would seem

^c Barn. Ep. cap. 5. 6. Herm. Past. Sim. 5. Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 185. Irenæus, p. 220, 295. Theoph. Antioch. 114. Origen. contr. Cels. p. 63, 257. Synod. Antioch, Labbé, tom. i. p. 845.—See Dr. Knight's first Sermon.

^d Iren. p. 292. Clem. Alex. p. 769, 832. Tertullian. contr. Hermog. p. 18.

Theoph. Antioch. p. 129. Hippolyt. vol. ii. p. 13.

^e Insinuat nobis in Patre *auctoritas*, in Filio *nativitas*, in Spiritu Sancto Patris Filique *communitas*, in tribus *æqualitas*. August. Serm. 11.

^f Defence, vol. i. p. 384, 385.

^g Dissert. iii. p. 139, &c.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 381.

to come off by making the Father efficient, *by way of eminence*. Why then did you not allow both to be *efficient*, and leave the *eminence* only to the Father, that the readers might understand you, and that I might save myself the trouble of disputing that point? Let but both be equally *efficient*, and as to the *eminence of order* in the *efficiency*, (which is all you can make of it,) I readily assent to it.

You tell me of Origen's making the Father *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, the *first and principal Creator*: as if Origen admitted two *Creators*. But if you mean not to deceive your readers, you should tell them, that Origen never uses the phrase of *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, but where he is retorting upon his adversary Pagan testimonies in the Pagan styleⁱ; as was proper to do. But when Origen speaks in the Christian style, and is delivering his own sense; it is then *πρῶτος δημιουργός*, *primarily Creator*^k. You have something more to urge from Origen, that the Son was *ἀπουργός*, *immediate worker* in the creation. Well then, I hope the Son was *efficient*; and, by your representation, more properly so than the Father, who only gave out *commands*. Are you sensible of what you are doing? Or have you a mind, at length, through your great zeal in attributing to the Father the *commanding part* only, to make him properly *no Creator* at all? If you strain the expressions of the *ancients* to the utmost rigour, that must be the consequence. Be content therefore to allow a proper latitude of construction, and a significant mystery in these things. But I have obviated all you have said upon this topic, about the Father's *commanding*, elsewhere^l. You quote Eusebius again, his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, which is of no consideration with me at all. What if he styles the Son *ὄργανον*, does he not style him *δημιουργημα* too, in the same piece, though he contradicted it again afterwards? Why must Eusebius be thought to speak the sense of the *ancients*, especially in things where he manifestly ran counter to the ancient doctrine? You may see this very notion of the Son's being *ὄργανον* condemned by the famous synod of Antioch^m long before Eusebius wrote. I value Eusebius in many things; but not where he attempted to deprave and corrupt the doctrine of his Catholic predecessors; perhaps to gratify some novelists, before he had well considered

ⁱ Origen. contr. Cels. p. 308.

^k Ibid. p. 317.

^l Sermons, p. 63 of this volume.

^m Οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος καὶ ἐνεργούντος, ὡς Λόγου ἅμα καὶ Θεοῦ, δι' οὗ ὁ

Πατήρ πάντα πεποίηκε, οὐχ ὡς δι' ὄργανου, οὐδὲ ὡς δι' ἐπιστήμης ἀνποστατου γεννήσαντος μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὡς ζῶσαν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἐννπόστατου, ἐνεργούντα τὰ πάντα ἐν πάσιν.

what he was doing. However, if any one has a mind to see what mild construction may be put upon that expression of Eusebius, he may consult Bishop Bull and Dr. Caveⁿ. For my own part, I think the best defence to be made for him is, that he seems to have grown wiser afterwards. You charge Basil with weakness for making Aëtius the inventor^o of the distinction between *ὑπό* and *διά*. But where was Basil's mistake? You say, Origen, Eusebius, and Philo insist upon it. But Philo's is only general, without application to this case: and Origen's and Eusebius's amount to no more than a *preeminence* of the *Father* as such. They do not carry it to a difference of *nature*, as Aëtius did^p; and you also do: you do it indeed under other terms, but as plainly, while you deny the *necessary existence* of the Son. You will find none higher than Aëtius, or Eusebius of Nicomedia, to countenance you in it. There is nothing more that is material under this Query.

You have not been able to take off the force of what is urged from *Scripture* and *antiquity* for the Son's *creative powers*: and that *creative powers* are *divine powers*, in quite another sense than the Doctor and you use the phrase, in the equivocating way, will be seen as we pass on.

QUERY XII.

Whether the Creator of all things was not himself uncreated; and therefore could not be ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, made out of nothing.

AS to your complaint of my wording this Query, and my styling Christ the *Creator of all things*; I refer to my Sermons^q, where I have proved the thing, and to my Defence^r, where I have shewn that it is the language of all *antiquity* to style him *Creator*, and not barely in your deceitful way, him, "by whom " God created all things," while you inform us not what you mean by it. You say, you "affirm not (nay, you blame those " that presume to affirm) that the Son of God was created, or " that he was ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, out of nothing." With what sincerity you say this, let the reader judge from the *nine arguments* I produced in my Supplement, to shew that you make the Son

ⁿ Bull. D. F. p. 256. Cav. Diss. iii. p. 66.

^o Basil. de Sp. Sancto, p. 145, &c.

^p The Synodicon Vetus agrees with Basil's account of Aëtius.

^q Ὁ γὰρ μακαρίτης Εὐστάθιος Ἀντιοχείας, ἐκ τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκτεθέντος

ἀσεβοῦς τόμον, ἀνόμοιον λέγοντος τὸ ἐξ οὐ, τοῦ δι' οὐ, τὸν ἄθεον Εὐσέβιον δὴλεγε καὶ Ἀέτιον. Synod. Vetus ap. Fabric. B. Gr. vol. xi. p. 211.

^r Serm. 2 and 3, p. 48, &c. of this volume.

^r Vol. i. p. 383, &c.

a *creature*^s. How you may *equivocate*. I know not: but I am sure you dare not tell us distinctly what you mean by saying, you blame those that affirm that the Son is “out of nothing:” it is either a mean quibble, or something worse that you are ashamed to own. You are pleased to give up some criticisms of Dr. Clarke’s in relation to a passage of Origen which I had took notice of in my Defence^t; so that we have done with. Still you talk of “ten thousand passages” in Origen, as opposite to my sentiments. When you were in the way of *romancing*, (which has no certain rule.) you did well to take a large number. I challenge you to produce a *single* passage from any piece of his, that is to be depended on, which either directly or indirectly makes the Son a *creature*. That, you know, was the point here in question.

The remainder of this Query is filled with all the worthless trifles you could rake up from Sandius, or others, to represent the *ancients* as making the Son a *creature*. At the same time, because you know they have been answered, and that you cannot stand by them, (yet having a strong propensity to make use of them, for the deception of ignorant readers,) you produce them with this faint and disingenuous censure upon them. “I think “that the writers I have here cited were mistaken in their “judging about consequences, when they thus charged with “*Arianism* the most learned and most eminent men the Christian Church ever had.” Permit me here, for a while, to choose myself a new *adversary*; one that *honestly* professes his belief of the Son’s being a *creature*, and has produced those very passages, most of them, as favouring those sentiments; which he is not *afraid* nor *ashamed* (while maintaining, as he believes, the honour of the *great God*) to call his *own*. After long and deliberate considering the question of the Son’s being a *creature* or no *creature*, the argument he mainly depends on^u, with respect to the sentiments of the *ancients*, is this: the universal application of the words in Prov. viii. 22, “The Lord created me the “beginning of his ways, &c.” by the ancient Christians, to the *creation* of Christ by God the Father. And indeed, hardly any thing can be brought out of the ancients, at all looking like it, but what is either the application of, or allusion to this text. The argument then is this: the text in the Proverbs has ἐκτίσσει according to the *Septuagint*: the Fathers, knowing little or no

^s Page 324, &c. of this vol.

^t Vol. i. p. 389, &c.

^u See Mr. Whiston’s Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 28.

Hebrew, followed that rendering : ἔκτισε signifies *created* : therefore the Fathers, in general, believed and taught that the Son is a *creature*. The argument would be irrefragable, if the word ἔκτισε, as it might signify what is pretended, could be shewn to have been so understood by the Fathers. But if *created* may signify *appointed*, or *constituted*, (as in good Latin authors, *consuls*, *captains*, *magistrates*, are said to be *created*, and we sometimes use the word in English, of *creating* a peer, or *creating* any officer,) and it may be certainly shewn that some Fathers so understood it, and no proof can be given that any of them understood it otherwise ; then there will appear such a flaw in the argument, as the wit of man will not be able to make up. We have it upon record, that this very point came to be considered about the middle of the third century, by Dionysius of Rome^x, (with his clergy ;) who fearing, upon the rise of *Sabellianism*, lest some should run into the opposite extreme of making the Son a *creature*, first condemns all such doctrine, as highest *blasphemy*, and next answers what had been urged by some from this text, expressing himself as follows : “ And what
 “ need I say more of these things to you, men full of the Holy
 “ Ghost, and well knowing what absurdities follow upon the sup-
 “ position of the Son’s being a *creature* ? To which the leaders
 “ in that opinion seem to me not to have well attended, and so
 “ they have very much erred from the truth ; interpreting that
 “ place, ‘ The Lord created me the beginning of his ways,’ not
 “ according to the meaning of the divine and sacred writ. For,
 “ as you know, ἔκτισε is a word of more senses than one, ἔκτισε,
 “ *created*, here stands for ἐπέστησε, appointed, over the works
 “ (God) had made by the Son himself. The word ἔκτισε is not
 “ here to be understood to be the same as ἐποίησε : for ποιῆσαι
 “ and κτίσαι are very different.” Here we find how that text was understood by the most considerable men of the Church about the year 259.

And let it not here be objected, that the piece is of doubtful credit, because extant only in Athanasius : for nobody that knows any thing of Athanasius, and is not strangely bigoted to an *hypothesis*, can suspect any foul play in this matter. It is the less to be suspected here, because, as I shall shew presently, Athanasius did not entirely approve of this construction of Dionysius, and would certainly never have forged an interpretation different from his *own*. Besides, it is observable that

^x Apud Athanas. p. 232.

Eusebius, in his famous piece against Marcellus, interprets that text in the very same manner as Dionysius had done, defending it at large^y by several parallel places of Scripture. He interprets *ἐκτίσσει* by *κατέταξεν* and *κατέστησεν*, *appointed*, or *constituted*. So that we have very great reason to believe that this was the prevailing and current construction of Prov. viii. 22. in the Ante-Nicene church. What confirms it is, that they all understood *ἀρχὴν* in the *active* sense, for *Head* or *Principle*, just as Dionysius and Eusebius do: and so the sense is, that *the Father appointed the Son Head over all his works*.

That this was the sense of *ἀρχὴν* all along, may be proved^z from Justin, Theophilus, Tatian, Clemens, Origen, and Methodius, to name no more: which consideration is alone sufficient in the case, when there is no positive proof on the other side. Only I must add further, that clear and strong passages may be brought, from the Fathers in general, to prove that they believed the Son to be *uncreated*. Seeing then that this text may bear such a sense as has been mentioned; seeing it was certainly so interpreted by some, and no reason appears for Mr. Whiston's interpretation at all; but the sense of *ἀρχὴν*, as understood by the ancients, is entirely against him, as also many clear testimonies of the Son's being uncreated: these considerations put together are enough to shew that there is no force in the argument drawn from the Fathers following the LXX, and reading *ἐκτίσσει* in that text.

But I further promised to give some account of Athanasius, in relation to this text; because Mr. Whiston^a has been pleased to say some very hard, and indeed unjust things of him, in relation hereto. Athanasius could not be at a loss to know the meaning of *ἐκτίσσει*, which had been so well explained both by Dionysius and Eusebius. He therefore closed in with the common interpretation, as signifying *appointed*, or *constituted*^b. But then he understood the *appointing* to be to the work of *redemption* only, not the work of *creation*: at least he makes no mention of the latter. He seems to have been apprehensive that the notion of *appointing* to the work of *creation* might sound too low: and indeed many of the Arians scrupled not to say as much, at least, in words. Athanasius thought the way of speaking not so proper, his notion being that the Father could

^y Euseb. contr. Marcell. p. 150.

151.

^z See Bull. D. F. p. 210.

^a Reply to Lord Nottingham, p.

29.

^b Athanas. Orat. ii. p. 513.

no more create without the Son^c, than exist without him, both being alike necessary; and therefore *appointing* was not so proper a word for it. This principle he lays down in the very same Oration, where he at large comments upon Prov. viii. 22. Nevertheless it may be said, that this great man might perhaps be too scrupulous in this matter. Cyril^d of Jerusalem (whose orthodoxy is unquestionable) scruples not to assign a reason why the Son was appointed to create: and it has been usual with all the Christian writers to represent all *offices* as descending from the Father to the Son. Athanasius himself allows that God the Son wrought in the creation, upon the Father's issuing out his *fiat*, or *command* for it: as also do several other Post-Nicene writers^e. This in reality comes to the same thing with what others intended by *appointing*, or *constituting* to the work of creation.

But here indeed Athanasius guards against the notion of the Son's being *υπουργός*, an *underworker*, in the low Arian sense: for otherwise he admits that the Father wrought *by* and *in* the Son. And I doubt not but it was his apprehension of the Arians misconstruing the *appointing*, which made him so scrupulous in relation to Prov. viii. The expression however, when it is not abused, is very innocent; and some zealous Athanasians^f were not afraid to understand Prov. viii. 22. of God the Son's being *appointed* and *constituted* Creator, and Head over all the works of God. Faustinus, that severe and rigid Homoousian, of the Eustathian party, and Luciferian sect, understands that text of Christ, as being appointed by the Father, the *Head* and *Conductor* of all his works, as well of *creation* as *redemption*^g. Let

^c Οὐκ ἠδύνατο μὴ δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὰ δημιουργήματα. καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀπανγιάσματι τὰ πάντα φωτίζει καὶ ἀνευ τοῦ ἀπανγιάσματος οὐκ ἂν τι φωτισθείη· οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὡς διὰ χειρὸς, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰργάσατο τὰ πάντα, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ. *Athanas. Orat.* ii. p. 498, 499.

^d Cyril. Hieros. Catech. xi. p. 160.

Πατὴρ δὲ βουλθθέντος τὰ πάντα κατασκευάσθαι, τῷ τοῦ πατρὸς πνεύματι ὁ υἱὸς τὰ πάντα ἐδημιούργησεν. ἵνα τηρῇ τῷ πατρὶ τὴν ἀδελφικὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς δὲ πάλιν ἔχῃ ἐξουσίαν τῶν ἰδίων δημιουργημάτων, &c.

Theodorit's account of this matter appears to be as just and accurate as any.

Οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ βοηθείας δεόμενος κτίζει

διὰ υἱοῦ, οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς βοηθείας χρῆζων, κτίζει διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐκ τῶν γυγνομένων δειχθῇ πατὴρ, καὶ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἡ ταυτότης. *Dial.* iv. adv. *Macedon.* p. 367.

^e Athanas. p. 216, 499. Hilarius, p. 325, 837, 840. Basil. de Sp. S. c. 16. Greg. Nyss. tom. i. p. 993. tom. ii. p. 454.

^f Hoc initium habet Sapientia Dei, quod de Deo processit ad creanda omnia tam caelestia quam terrestria, non quo coeperit esse in Deo. *Creata* est ergo Sapientia, imo genita; non sibi quæ semper erat, sed his quæ ab ea fieri oportebat. *Hilar. Diacon. apud Ambros.* p. 349.

^g Quod *creata* est Sapientia, ad mysterium vel *rerum creandarum*, vel

this suffice to have shewn the sense of antiquity upon that text.

Now I return to you, who are entertaining your reader with a collection of *scandal*, and which you *know* to be such, for the greatest part of it. The *scandal* is produced at length; and what should have been, and has been pleaded to remove and confute it, is disingenuously kept out of sight: only it is said by you, "sufficient apologies have been made" for this or that Father, to shew that he was not indeed of Arius's notions. But what then? You pretend that your notions were not Arius's: so you would still have your reader apprehend that those Fathers might have been in *your* notions; whereas Bp. Bull, in his confutation of those *scandals*, (most of them *misreports*, and some of them malicious tales and lies,) has effectually prevented their being really serviceable either to Arius's cause or yours; which in reality (however you disguise the matter) are the very same. The conclusion you draw from this heap of stuff is pretty remarkable: "It evidently shews, that those ancient Fathers had not "entertained such a confused notion as you are labouring to "introduce of the Creator of all things:" whereas it is evident, to a demonstration, that my *confused notion* (as you unrighteously call it) was the very notion which all those Fathers had: or, if you think otherwise, why did you not distinctly shew where they contradict it, instead of producing a deal of idle tales, which (though you would have your reader lay some stress on) you yourself dare not undertake to defend?

Where is the consequence to be drawn from such premises? As let us see. The Apostolical Constitutions, which are *spurious* and *interpolated* by some Arian, have said something; therefore &c. Melito is said to have wrote *περὶ κτίσεως Χριστοῦ*, which learned men doubt of; and neither Ruffinus nor Jerome would allow; therefore &c. Clemens has been charged with some things of which he was very *innocent*; therefore &c. Dionysius had enemies that told *lies* of him, abused him, and misrepresented his words; and some honest men were deceived thereby; therefore &c. Gregory likewise met with some that perverted his words, (as many have perverted our *Articles* or *Liturgy*;) therefore &c. In short, several other very *orthodox*

humana dispensationis intellige: quam cum Dei Sapientia dignanter adsumit, *creata* dicitur. *Faustin. contr. Arian.* c. vi. p. 153.

Sapientia cum *creata* dicitur, non substantia ejus quasi quæ non erat, facta est: sed ipsa existens *creata est initium viarum in opera ejus.* *Ibid.*

men have been either falsely charged, or wrongfully suspected : therefore undoubtedly Dr. Waterland is mistaken in supposing them to have been *orthodox*. I refer the reader to Bp. Bull, who has abundantly answered what relates to these trifling accusations. Only, because you seem to insult and triumph the most in respect of Origen, I shall be at the trouble of giving the reader some account of that great man and his writings, and their hard fate in the world.

Origen was one that wrote much, and sometimes in haste : and it might be no great wonder if some uncautious things might sometimes drop from him ; or if his writings, passing through ignorant or malicious hands, might be otherwise represented than he intended or wrote. He complained of such misrepresentations in his lifetime ; and made an apology for things of that kind in a letter to Pope Fabian, about the year 248. The doctrine of a coeternal and consubstantial Trinity could be no new thing at that time. It appears by the famous case of Dionysius, but about ten years after, that it was the settled faith of the Church ; and that the generality, at least, were extremely jealous of the appearance of any thing that seemed to break in upon it. Origen's works however were still in great esteem ; and it does not appear that, for many years after his death, they were ever charged with heterodoxy in that article. Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius of Alexandria, whose orthodoxy in that doctrine has been abundantly vindicated by Bp. Bull, were great admirers of the man and of his writings. Methodius, about the year 290, (a man of orthodox principles,) began to impugn some of Origen's doctrines : but laid nothing to his charge in relation to the Trinity. About the year 308, he first began to have articles drawn up against him ; and among the several charges there were some upon that head. Pamphilus and Eusebius then undertook to apologize for him ; not by justifying any thing that seemed to lessen the divinity of the Son or Holy Ghost, but by shewing from Origen's own writings, that his doctrine was on the side of Christ's divinity, and against the Holy Ghost's being a *creature*. This appears from the remains we have of that *Apology*, according to Ruffin's translation ; who professes solemnly that he did not add a syllable, but made a just and literal translation. So that though Ruffin's other versions, where he professes to have taken a liberty, are the less to be depended on, this is of another kind, and may more securely be confided in : from whence I would take notice

by the way, that even Eusebius at this time, before the rise of the Arian controversy, appears to have been very orthodox. I know there is an objection to be made out of Jerome: which the reader may see answered in Bp. Bull^h.

After Pamphilus, we find mention made of another *apologist*ⁱ, a very orthodox man himself, in respect of the Trinity, even in the judgment of Photius; who was used to judge too severely sometimes of the ancients, comparing their expressions too rigidly with those in use in his own times. That *apologist* acquits Origen as to any erroneous doctrine in the article of the *Trinity*: only he allows that Origen's zeal against *Sabellianism* might sometimes draw him into expressions that *seemed* to go too far the other way. Let us now come down to the Arian times. About the year 330, or later, the Arians endeavour to gain some countenance from Origen's writings: and some of the more zealous Catholics of the Eustathian party, who were for professing one *hypostasis*, had no opinion of Origen. The reason, I presume, was, because Origen every where insists upon the *distinction* of persons very much, and seemed not very reconcilable to the Eustathian way of professing one *hypostasis*. Origen therefore was much out of favour with that more rigid part of the Catholics; who differed from the rest in *expression* rather than real meaning, as appeared fully afterwards^k. Athanasius all the while stood up for Origen, and vindicated his own doctrine from Origen's writings^l. Gregory Nazianzen and Basil were both of them friends of Origen: defending his orthodoxy against the Arians^m. This was about the year 360. And though Basil thought Origen's notion of the Holy Ghost not to have been *altogether sound*, yet he objects nothing against him in respect of God the *Son*: and as to the *Holy Ghost*, he yet quotes passages from him where Origen spoke conformably to the doctrine and tradition of the Churchⁿ. And possibly the other suspected passages might not be Origen's own.

Titus of Bostra, another orthodox man of that time, was an advocate of Origen.

About 370, flourished Didymus, who is known to have been very zealous for the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and zealous also for Origen; looking upon those as weak men, and

^h Bull. Def. F. p. 125.

ⁱ Photius, Cod. cxvii. p. 293.

^k Vid. Athanasium ad Antiochenos, p. 773. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxii. p. 396. Or. xxxii. p. 521.

^l Athanas. de Decret. Syn. N. p. 232.

^m Vid. Socrat. Eccl. II. lib. iv. c. 26. p. 246.

ⁿ Basil. de Sp. Sanct. c. xxix. p. 219.

of small sagacity, that suspected Origen on that head^o. Hitherto we have found no considerable men that condemned Origen as *heterodox* in the doctrine of the Trinity. The Catholics of greatest name and reputation asserted the contrary.

Let us come a little lower, to the year 380, and we shall now perceive a storm gathering: chiefly, I presume, by the means and the interest of the Eustathians, who had disliked Origen from the first. Epiphanius, about this time, was drawn in to be a party in a quarrel against the Origenists; and laid severe charges against Origen, even with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity. Ruffinus, at the same time, was a zealous advocate for Origen's orthodoxy; himself, as is well known, a strict Athanasian. Jerome being now about fifty years old, was also a great admirer of Origen. Nay, in the years 388 and 391, when past sixty, he still retained the same kind of opinion of Origen and his writings: as appears by his calling him the "master of the churches, second to none but the Apostles themselves^p." He declares that those who had in Origen's lifetime censured him, did it not for any *novel* doctrine, or *heresy*, but for *envy*; because they could not bear the reputation he had raised^q. Now could Jerome, so orthodox a man himself, and who had translated Didymus in defence of the *divinity* of the *Holy Ghost*; could he ever have thus commended Origen, had he, at that time, believed him heterodox in the doctrine of the Trinity? Impossible. He gives no better a name than that of *barking dogs* to those that then charged Origen with *heresy*: though at the same time Arians, or Macedonians, and all impugners of the *divinity* of *Christ* or the *Holy Ghost*, were *heretics* in Jerome's account. To do Jerome justice, he stood up for Origen with resolution and courage some time: till, finding the stream run strong, he thought it convenient to tack about: and then (as is the nature of *new converts* in any case) he grew zealous and vehement on the opposite side. Then he set himself, meanly, to run down the man whom before he had so much commended. He fell to criticising his works, sometimes manifestly perverting his sense, sometimes representing it by halves; always putting

^o Vid. Hieronym. tom. iv. p. 347. 355, 409.

^p Origenem, quem post Apostolos, ecclesiarum magistrum nemo nisi imperitus negabit. *Hieron. Pref. in Nom. Hebræ.*

^q Non propter dogmatum novitatem,

non propter *hæresim*, ut nunc adversus eum rabidi canes insimulant; sed quia gloriam eloquentiæ ejus et scientiæ ferre non poterant; et illo dicente omnes muti putabantur. *Hieron. tom. iv. p. 67.*

the worst constructions he possibly could upon his writings: as did also Epiphanius and Theophilus, who were afterwards joined with Anastasius Bishop of Rome, and many other Bishops of the west. Still Origen was not entirely destitute of some good and great defenders; as Gregory Nyssen, the great Chrysostom, (bred up under Melctius, and never of the Eustathian party,) Theotimus, and John of Jerusalem. Severus Sulpitius, of that time, is a kind of neuter, passing a doubtful and moderate censure. St. Austin^r appears doubtful; but, taking his accounts from Epiphanius, or other adversaries, leans to the severer side. Vincentius Lirinensis^s inclines to think that the plea about Origen's writings being *adulterated*^t might be very just. Socrates and Sozomen, of the fifth century, defend Origen's orthodoxy, and think he had been greatly misrepresented. Theodorit, of the same age, has been justly looked upon as a favourer of Origen; because he reckons not the Origenists in his list of *heretics*: as neither did Philastrius, who wrote sixty years before him. What followed in the *sixth century*, under Justinian, is rather too late to come into account.

From what hath been said, it appears, that though antiquity were much divided in their sentiments of Origen's orthodoxy, in respect of the Trinity; yet the most early and the most valuable men down to the times of Jerome, (and for a long while Jerome himself.) had acquitted him on that head. This account is a sufficient answer to what you have raked together in pages 327, 328, 329, 330. And I must observe, that were it really fact that Origen had taught what you pretend in respect to the article of the *Trinity*, it would by no means follow that he was therein a true interpreter of the *Church's doctrine* in that instance, any more than in the *other articles* laid to his charge by his accusers: many of which are known to have been directly contrary to the standing doctrines of the Church, as well *before* as *after*

^r Origeniani—mortuorum resurrectionem negant, Christum autem et Spiritum Sanctum *creaturam* dicunt—Hæc quidem de Origene, Epiphanius refert. Sed defensores ejus dicunt Origenem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum *unius ejusdemque substantiæ* docuisse; neque resurrectionem repulisse mortuorum. Sed qui ejus plura legerunt, contradicunt—

Dicit præterea ipse Origenes quod Filius Dei sanctis hominibus comparatus veritas sit, Patri collatus mendacium; et quantum distant Apostoli

Christo, tantum Filius Patri. Unde nec orandum est Filius, &c. *Augustin. Hæres. 43.*

^s Sed dicat aliquis, *corruptos esse Origenis libros.* Non resisto, quin potius malo: nam id a quibusdam et traditum et scriptum est; non Catholicis tantum, sed etiam Hæreticis. *Vincent. Lirin. c. xxiii.*

^t See Ruffinus's plea about the *adulteration* of Origen's books, handsomely defended against St. Jerome, by the learned Huetius. *Origeniana*, p. 187, 188.

his time. Such was the denial of the *resurrection of the dead*, imputed to him, among other errors, by his adversaries; as St. Austin observes: who, in the same place, mentions some other erroneous and uncatholic tenets of Origen. At last, the question of Origen's faith in the Trinity may be certainly determined out of his treatise against Celsus, (still remaining, and free from corruption.) And it is from thence chiefly, that Bishop Bull has demonstrated that Origen's doctrine on that head was sound and just, directly opposite to the principles which you are now espousing.

I may take notice of your citing (p. 335.) a second-hand passage of Eusebius; as if he had made the Son *created* in the vulgar sense of *created* in this question, directly contrary to what Eusebius has argued at large in his piece against Marcellus. I hope you did it *ignorantly*. However, to prevent the like for the future, I shall here give you Eusebius's own words. Commenting on Prov. viii. 22. he says thus: "Though he says *created*, he does not say it, as if he came from *non-existence* into *existence*; nor as if he also, like as the rest of the creatures, were from *non-entity*, (as some have erroneously imagined;) "but he was living and subsisting, prior and preexisting to the creation of the universe: and being *appointed* of the Lord his Father to bear rule over the universe; *created* here stands for *appointed*, or *constituted*." He goes on to several texts of Scripture, 1 Peter ii. 13. Amos iv. 13. Psalm ci. 19. to shew that *κτίσις*, or *κτίζω*, may admit that sense of *appointing*, or *ordaining*, rather than *creating*. And upon the words of the Psalm, "Create in me a clean heart, O God," he observes, that this is not said as if the Psalmist's heart was then to begin to exist, but what was before should be *cleansed*. You will please to remember how highly you resented my quoting Socrates for Eusebius's opinion, seemingly contradictory to Eusebius's other tenets. You have here quoted a short sentence out of an *index* of a book, not published to speak for itself; and have given it a construction flatly contrary to what Eusebius undoubtedly taught in his piece against Marcellus; namely, that Prov. viii. 22. was

^u Εἰ δὲ λέγοι ἐκτίσθαι αὐτὸν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρελθὼν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶποι, οὐδ' ὡς ὁμοίως τοῖς λοιποῖς κτίσμασι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γεγωνῶς, ἢ τινες οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπελήψασιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑφ' ἐστῶς μὲν καὶ ζῶν, πρῶν τε καὶ προϋπάρχων τῆς

τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου συστάσεως· ἄρχειν δὲ τῶν ὄλων ὑπὸ κυρίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρὸς κατατεταγμένος, τοῦ ἐκτινεῖν ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ τοῦ κατέταξεν, ἢ κατέστησεν εἰρημένον. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol.* p. 150, 151.

not to be understood of *creating*, in the sense you pretend. As to what you cite from him in respect of the *Holy Ghost*, I know not whether it may admit of a candid^x construction. He was certainly mistaken, if he took that doctrine, such as you understand it, to be the doctrine of the Church. But it is out of my compass to treat of the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost. To conclude; I referred^y you to Ignatius, Athenagoras, Irenæus, Origen, Dionysius of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Theognostus, and Methodius; as *express* authorities against the doctrine of the Son's being a *creature*. As to *consequential* and *indirect* testimonies against it, they are numberless; and have been produced by Bishop Bull, Le Moyne, Nourry, and many others, in this controversy. To this you have *opposed* such evidence as Bishop Bull has already answered, and you will not stand by, or engage to defend; but have rather owned to be indefensible. Only you think some advantage you should make of it; which *some advantage* is yet very *unfair*, and not regularly or *distinctly* laid down by any certain consequence, but is merely a confused and *precarious* conclusion. Upon the whole, every *honest* reader will easily perceive on what side he ought here to determine.

QUERY XIII.

Whether there can be any middle between being made out of nothing, and out of something; that is, between being out of nothing, and out of the Father's substance; between being essentially God and being a creature; whether, consequently, the Son must not be either essentially God, or else a creature?

IF any man wanted an instance of the power of affections or prejudice in holding out against *conviction*; or if there were not too many lamentable examples of it in history, *sacred* and *profane*; I would recommend to him the perusal of what you have under this Query, to give him a very lively example and idea of it. You begin with telling me, "there are many *dilemmas* in *meta-physics*, *physics*, and *theology*, wherein it may be very presumptuous to determine absolutely which part of the *dilemma* is the "truth." Had you rested *neuter* in this controversy, your plea would have appeared the better: but as you have determined on one side, and in virtue of such *dilemmas* as are neither half so *clear* nor half so *certain* as this is, you have no pretence left of that kind.

^x See the Bishop of London's Letter Defended, p. 56, &c.

^y Defence, vol. i. p. 389.

You should therefore tell me what *medium* there is between being *essentially God*, and being a *creature*; or else own the Son a *creature*. We do not thus shift and shuffle with you, when you press us with *dilemmas*. *Derived* or *underived*; we say *derived*: *being* or *not being*; we say *being*: *necessary* or *not necessary* in existence: we say *necessary*: *self-existent* or *not self-existent*; we say *not self-existent*: *supreme God* or *not supreme God*; we say *supreme God*. And whatever *invidious* terms, or however liable to be misunderstood, you put the question in, still we answer frankly, and discover our minds. And what can be the reason of the difference between your conduct and ours, but that we desire to be open and plain, and you love disguises? We have a cause which we know we can defend: you are conscious that you have not. We are justly sensible what advantage you every where make by putting the question, “Whether God the Son be *the supreme God*, or *that supreme God*?”

1. The expression is apt to insinuate to the reader a notion of *two Gods*, supreme and inferior: on which supposition the Son certainly could not be the *supreme*.

2. It is further apt to confound the reader, as insinuating, either that we suppose the Son to be the *supreme Father* himself, or else that the *supremacy* of *order*, or *office*, belonged equally to both. Yet we bear with your thus unequally and partially wording the question: being content to admit it with proper distinctions, and to assert that God the Son is *the supreme God*, or even *that supreme God*, as you are pleased to word it for us.

And why should not you as plainly own, that you make the Son a *creature*; there being no imaginable medium between *uncreated* and *created*, between *God* and *creature*? Yet you pretend to be arguing only against the Son's being essentially God, or *supreme God*, and not to be arguing for his being a *creature*; though they come to the same thing differently expressed. You say, p. 338, there lies a fallacy in my words, *essentially God*. As how? Shew where the fallacy is. You say, the words ought to mean *self-existent* in such a sense as the Father *alone* is. Well then; if you take *self-existence* and *necessary existence* to signify the same thing, you of consequence allow no *medium*, but that the Son must either be the *Father* himself, or else a *creature*. Why do you not therefore say plainly he is a *creature*? You will ask then, whether I would prove that the Son is the *Father himself*, in proving him to be *no creature*? No. But when I have proved that point, (as is easily done, and has been done a thou-

sand times,) it will then be apparent how absurd and wild your notion is, that there is no *medium* between God the Father and a *creature*. I say then, that there neither is nor can be any *medium* between being *necessarily existing* and being a *creature*: and therefore since you allow nothing to be *necessary* but the Father, you plainly make a *creature* of the Son. Instead of answering this plain argument, you do nothing but evade, and shift in such a manner, as shews only that you are afraid of coming to the point, and of putting the controversy on a fair issue: which is highly disingenuous. Were I to abuse my readers at this rate, how would you insult, and look upon it as no better than giving up the cause. I told you before^z, and now tell you again, that you assert evidently, and by immediate necessary consequence, "that the Maker, and Redeemer, and Judge of the "whole world is a *creature*, is mutable and corruptible, depending "entirely on the good pleasure of God, has a precarious exist- "ence and dependent powers, finite and limited; and is neither "so perfect in his nature, nor so exalted in privileges, but that "the Father may, when he pleases, create another, equal, or "even superior to him."

This is no *unrighteous representation*, nor appealing to the *prejudices of the ignorant vulgar*: you know it is not: but it is laying down the plain naked truth. And it ought to be sounded in the ears and riveted in the thoughts of all that come to read you; that they may be deeply sensible what you are doing, and whether it is that you are leading them.

These are not things shocking to the *vulgar* only, nor so much to the *vulgar* as to the wisest and most considerate, and most religious men. In short, they are such weights upon your *hypothesis*, as have ever sunk and bore it down among the sober part of mankind: and they will ever do so, as long as true piety and sobriety of thought have any footing in the world. This you are sensible of; and are therefore forced to wink hard.

You are next endeavouring to *retort*; which is your constant method when you are nonplused, and have no direct answer to give. I "assert," you say, "many supreme Gods in one undivided substance." Ridiculous: they are not *many Gods*, for that very reason, because their substance is *undivided*. Is there no difference between charging *false* consequences and *true* ones? Make you out the consequence which you pretend, at your leisure: mine is self-evident, and makes itself.

^z Defence, vol. i. p. 394.

You run off (p. 341,) to some foreign things, which have been answered in their place. You talk of *authority* and *dignity*; not telling us what you mean by them, whether of *order* and *office*, or of *nature*; though it is about the last only that we are inquiring. I suppose, if there be ever so many testimonies in antiquity for the Son's *uncreatedness*, *consubstantiality*, *eternity*, *necessary existence*, *omnipresence*, *omnipotence*, and other divine attributes; all must yield to a few equivocations and quibbles about *authority* and *dignity*: which if you had once defined and fixed to a determinate meaning, (as every ingenuous man would have done,) it would have been presently seen whether any testimony you produce were *pertinent* or no; or rather, that *none of them* are pertinent. As to Basil, whom you pretend to cite, it is certain he did not mean by ἀξιώματι what you mean; for he absolutely denies that the Father is *greater* in respect of *dignity*^a, meaning *essential* dignity: and he particularly excepts against your notion of making the Son *subject*; and censures Eunomius smartly, for taking from him the dignity of dominion, τῆς δεσποτείας τὸ ἀξίωμα. In another place, he spends a whole chapter in confutation of that very notion you are contending for; proving that God the Son is united in *nature*, in *glory*, in *dignity*^b with the Father, of *equal* honour and authority^c. I had told you, that “an eternal substance, not divine, and a Son made “out of it, was what you must mean, or mean nothing^d.” This you confute by calling it a “calumny, ridiculous, and unjust;” which is a very easy way of confutation. Let the reader see the reason why you had nothing to offer but *hard words*. You deny the Son's being of the *same divine substance* that the Father is; you allow him not to be *necessarily existing*; you deny his being *out of nothing*. Let any Œdipus make other sense of this put together, than what I made of it^e.

^a Ἄλλὰ μεγέθει μὲν ὁ πατήρ τοῦ υἱοῦ οὐκ ἂν λεχθεῖν μείζων, ἀσώματος γάρ — ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀξιώματι, οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ὁ οὐκ ἦν ποτέ. *Basil. contr. Eun. lib. iv. et lib. i. p. 236. ed. Bened.*

^b Τῷ ἀξιώματι συνημμένον.

^c Σύνθρονον καὶ ὁμότιμον — τὸ τῆς ἀξίας ὁμότιμον. *Basil. de Sp. Sancto, cap. 6.*

^d Defence, vol. i. p. 396.

^e Qui Filium de Patris substantia natum denegant, debent utique dicere

unde arbitrentur Dei Filium exstisise: utrum de nihilo, an ex aliquo? Si de nihilo exstitit, Creatura dicendus est, non Creator. Si autem de aliquo dicitur, sic etiam id ipsum Deus fecit, unde Filium genuit. An forte coæternum dicitur aliquid habuisse unde posset Filium generare? Si coæternum aliquid æstimatur, unde genitus Filius creditur, Manichæorum error hac adsertione firmatur. *Fulgent. Resp. contr. Arian. object. iv. p. 58.*

QUERY XIV.

Whether Dr. Clarke, who every where denies the consubstantiality of the Son as absurd and contradictory, does not of consequence affirm the Son to be a creature, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, and so fall under his own censure, and is self-condemned?

HERE, being conscious that this charge is just, you can give no direct answer; but, as usual, must retreat to little shifts and poor evasions. I sufficiently explained the *true* sense, and *my* sense of *consubstantiality* in my Defence, vol. i. p. 543, 544. Yet now you pretend to complain, you understand not what I mean by *consubstantiality*: whereas the truth is, you understand it so well as to know that this Query is unanswerable. But let us hear how you can *caril* where you cannot *reply*. “Sometimes.” you tell me, I “seem to mean that the Father and Son are individually the same single, identical, whole substance.” But where do you ever find me talking so weakly and crudely? This you gather only from the word *individual*; which is capable of a larger and stricter sense, as I have often intimated. When you suppose that part of God’s substance which fills the *sun*, to be *individually* the same with what fills the *moon*; do you mean that both are *individually* the same single, identical, whole substance? How often must you be reminded of your unequal dealing in this controversy, that arguments must hold against the *Trinity*, which, in other cases, have no force with you at all? I may speak of *whole* and *parts*, while I am arguing against a man that brings every thing under *extension*: but as to the Catholic doctrine of the Church, which I here defend, the words are not proper: only this is certain, that *one Person* of the Trinity is not *all the Persons* of the Trinity. Yet because the Persons are *undivided*, they are one *individual* substance: which is as far from *Sabellianism* as from *Tritheism*, and can justly be charged with neither. You pretend that Dr. Clarke does not deny such *consubstantiality* as was taught by the Nicene Fathers. If this be true, then he admits, or does not deny, that the substance of the Son is of the *same kind* with that of the Father, as truly as *light* answers to *light*, *very God* to *very God*, *uncreated* to *uncreated*, and so on^f: that is, he admits all that I do, and there is no longer any dispute between us. For I will easily prove to him, after he is advanced thus far, that whatever is thus *equal* in nature to the Father, cannot be *unequal* in any essential powers or perfections: and so all that you have been doing drops at once. If these be

^f See my Defence, vol. i. p. 544.

the Doctor's present sentiments, I am very glad of it : they were not always so. You say, indeed, " whatever the Son's metaphysical nature, essence, or substance be, all the Doctor's propositions (so far as you perceive) hold nevertheless equally true." Are you then so very *unperceiving* in a plain and clear case? Turn to five of the Doctor's *propositions*, (5th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23rd,) where he denies the Substance, or Person, of the *Son*, or *Holy Ghost*, to be *self-existent* : and compare your own construction of *self-existent*, by *necessarily existing*, with them ; and then tell me, whether the Doctor has determined nothing about the *substance* of the Son. Doth he not make the substance of the Father *necessary*, the other *precarious* ; the one *self-sufficient*, the other *depending* ; the one *immutable*, the other *mutable* at pleasure ; in a word, the one *infinitely perfect*, the other *infinitely short* of it? All this follows by self-evident connection from the Doctor's denying the Son's *necessary existence*. Now certainly he has hereby determined their substances to be entirely different in *kind* ; or else I should despair of shewing, that a *man* and a *horse*, a *tree* and a *stone*, are not *ὁμοούσια*, are not of the same kind. For what is it we denote and distinguish *different kinds* of substances by, but by their different essential properties? Do not therefore now bring me the lame pretence, about the Doctor's *propositions* being the same on *either* supposition. I bore with it in the Modest Pleader, (though sensible how little *sincerity* was in it,) because I was then doubtful whether the Doctor should be charged with denying the *necessary existence*. You have eased me of that doubt : and now the plea is ridiculous, and will serve no longer. The mystery is at length come out ; and *self-existence*, wherewith we have been so long amused, wants no unriddling.

QUERY XV.

Whether he also must not, of consequence, affirm of the Son, that there was a time when he was not, since God must exist before the creature ; and therefore is again self-condemned. (See Prop. 16. Script. Doctr.) And whether he does not equivocate in saying, elsewhere, that the second Person has been always with the first ; and that there has been no time when he was not so : and lastly, whether it be not a vain and weak attempt to pretend to any middle way between the orthodox and the Arians ; or to carry the Son's divinity the least higher than they did, without taking in the consubstantiality ?

† See the Preface to my Sermons, at the beginning of this volum

IT has been shewn that the Son is, upon the Doctor's principles, a *precarious being*, which is nothing but another name for *creature*: and now the question is only whether a *creature* can be *eternal*. And this is of no great moment to the *cause* itself, but only to shew the Doctor's *self-condemnation*, in blaming such as have said, *there was a time when the Son was not*. If, for the sake hereof, you will maintain that a *creature is eternal*, you shall dispute by yourself, or else against Mr. Whiston^b; who justly calls it a *despised* and *absurd* tenet: only he happened to have his thoughts a little wandering, when he called it an Athanasian mystery, instead of calling it an Arian one. For I never heard of any one Athanasian but what despised and rejected it. There were some Arians who formed a new sect about the year 394, under the name of Psathyrians, who have been charged with that principle by Theodoritⁱ; though I think Soerates's and Sozomen's account^k of them rather acquits them of it. Now if you are inclined to maintain such wild doctrine, say so plainly: if not, let us know the meaning of the Doctor's censuring those that should presume to say of the Son, that *there was a time when he was not*^l; and of his saying that the second Person has been *always* with the first. I am sensible there is something very *mean* and *disparaging* in the way of *equivocating* upon so serious a subject. A man may well be ashamed to own it: so I press it no further.

You were to find a *middle way* between the *orthodox* and the *Arians*: which I called a *vain* and *weak* attempt, and proved it to be so. You do not care to own your mistake here: but you say, "it is not material to determine." That is, you find it has been evidently *determined* against you; though you are very unwilling to confess it. Next you come to your usual method of misrepresenting my notion, and charging *three supreme Gods*: which trifling has been answered oftener than it deserved. What follows, p. 348, 349, is so exceeding low, that in pure commiseration one would pass it over. Page 350, you come to dispute the point, whether the Doctor's scheme was condemned

^b Nor do I quite despair of seeing such shrewd and cunning Athanasians as Dr. W. driven to this *last evasion*, and of hearing them broach this other great Athanasian mystery, how despised and absurd an one soever, that any *creature* whatsoever may be strictly speaking, in point of *duration*, *coeternal* with its Crea-

tor. *Whiston, Reply to Lord Nottingham*, p. 30.

ⁱ Theod. Hæret. Fab. lib. 4. Compare the supposititious *Disputatio contra Arium*. p. 211. ed. Bened.

^k Socrat. Eccl. Hist. lib. v. cap. 23. p. 300. Sozom. Eccl. Hist. lib. vii. cap. 17. p. 303.

^l Clarke's Script. Doctr. prop. 16.

near 1400 years ago by the Council of Nice. You pretend that none of his Propositions were condemned. But I insist upon it, that the Doctor, in denying the Son's *necessary existence*, evidently makes him a *creature*: and therefore all that is *material* in the Doctor's Propositions, all that we find fault with, in respect of his doctrine of God the Son, stands fully condemned by the Nicene Council. And do not imagine that the point of difference betwixt us lies only in *authority*, or *office*, and not in *nature*: you make the *nature* of the Son wholly of a *different kind* from the Father, as hath been shewn. I told you of our doctrine, that it has "prevailed for 1400 years:" upon which you remind me of my saying of the Arians, that the "world was once, in a manner, "their own." In a manner, that is, when they had got the *emperors* of the world, in a *manner*, on their side. You return to your quibble about *individual essence*. Please to observe, *essentia de essentia, substantia de substantia*, was Catholic doctrine all along: and this is the full meaning of *individual essence*. Not *essences*, nor *substances*, nor *beings*: any more than you will say *substances*, while yet you admit *substance* and *substance*; or *beings*, where yet you are forced to allow *being* and *being*^m.

You tell me, I acknowledge *person* and *intelligent agent* to be the *same*. I never acknowledged any such thing; but always denied their being *reciprocal*. But because this word *person* is a matter of much dispute, I shall here endeavour, having nothing further worth notice under this Query, to give the best account I am able of the true notion of *person*. I shall not here search into the books of *philosophers*, but into the common apprehensions of mankind, learned and unlearned; which appears to be the true method of knowing what ideas are affixed to the word *person*.

Our *ideas* are at first all of them *particular*, and borrowed from what we daily converse with, from what we *see* and *feel*. Our first notion of *person* is the notion we have of a *man*, a *woman*, a *child*. By degrees we learn to *abstract* from the differences of *age*, *sex*, *stature*, &c. and so we form a more general idea of an *human person*, meaning one of our own species: and this *idea*, perhaps, a rude countryman would express, improperly, by the word *Christian*, in opposition to *brutes*, or *inanimate* things. From the idea of *human persons* thus formed, we proceed to make a more *general* idea, by leaving out what is pecu-

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 371, 372, 448. and Reply to Dr. Whitby. p. 209 of this volume.

liar to our *species*, and keeping in what we conceive *common* to us with *angels*, suppose. or any intelligent being. And now we take in *rationality* only, or *intelligence*: and a person is *something intelligent* in opposition to the *brutal* creation. Indeed there is something analogous to *person* even in brutes: and so it is common to say *he* or *she* of them, in like manner as we speak of *persons*. But still the common notion of *person* includes *intelligence*: and I think Damascenⁿ is very singular in bringing in τὸνδε τὸν ἕππον under ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον, signifying *person*. But perhaps he meant it of ὑπόστασις only, and did not nicely distinguish. Thus far we are advanced, that *person* is something which is the *subject* of *intelligence*. But still we are not come far enough to fix the idea of a *single person*: for an army, a council, a senate, is something which is the *subject* of *intelligence*, something that *understands* and *acts*. We must therefore be more particular: and at length we may bring it to this: a single person is *an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, he; and not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters*. This definition or description will, I think, take in all the *ideas* that mankind have generally affixed to the word *person*, when understood of a *single person*. I will shew this first *negatively*, and then *positively*.

1. *Negatively*. An *army*, a *senate*. &c. is not a *single person*, because *divided* into more. The *Trinity*, upon the Catholic *hypothesis*, is not a single person, because *distinguished* into more intelligent agents than one.

2. *Positively*. A *man* is a single person by the definition.

An *angel* is a single person by the same.

Father, Son, or *Holy Ghost*, a single person by the same.

Any *separate soul*, a single person also.

The θεάνθρωπος, or *God-man*, a single person: because not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents than one, having each of them the *distinctive* characters.

To clear this matter a little further, we must next distinguish persons into several kinds: as, 1. *divided* and *undivided*; 2. *simple* and *compound*: which, when explained, will, I hope, set this whole affair in a true and full light.

1. As to the distinction of *divided* and *undivided*; all persons, but the *three divine Persons*, are divided and separate from each

ⁿ Damascen. Dialect. c. xliii. p. 46.

other in nature, substance, and existence. They do not mutually include and imply each other: therefore they are not only distinct *subjects*, *agents*, or *supposita*, but distinct *substances* also. But the divine Persons, being *undivided*, and not having any *separate* existence independent on each other; they cannot be looked upon as *substances*, but as one *substance* distinguished into several *supposita*, or intelligent agents.

2. As to the other distinction of *simple* and *compound*, it will appear what reason there is for it. An *angel*, or a *soul*, (whether supposed first *preexisting*, or afterwards *separated*,) is a *simple* person, and so is God the *Father*, or God the *Holy Ghost*, upon the *Catholic* scheme. But *man* is a *compound* person of *soul* and *body*. It is plain, that according to the common idea of *person*, (which must here be our rule,) the *body* goes to make up the *person*: otherwise we could not say James or John is *fat* or *lean*, *low* or *tall*, *healthful* or *sickly*, or the like; such things belonging to the *body* only, and yet belonging to the *person*. If we suppose John's soul to have *preexisted*, it would be a *person* in that *preexistent* state as much as after, having all that belongs to the *definition* of a person: and by taking a *body* afterward, the *soul* does not become *major persona*, but *major persona*: that is, the *person* is enlarged by the addition of a *body*, but still altogether is considered but as one subject with intelligence in it; and all is but one *Peter*, one *John*, one *I*, *he*, or *thou*, which completes the notion of a *single person*. Let John die, the *body* is no longer part of the *person*, but the *person* goes where the *intelligence* rests; the *soul* in this case becomes, not *minus persona*, by the separation, but *minor*.

Our next example of a *compound* person is the *θεάνθρωπος*, consisting of the *Logos*, the *soul*, and the *body*. The *Logos* was a *Person* before the incarnation, as much as after. But by taking in a *soul* and *body*, the *whole* Person then is made up of all *three*. And thus *Christ* is always represented in Scripture in the same manner as any *single person* is represented; one *I*, one *he*, one *thou*, whether he is spoken of with respect to what he is as the *Logos*, or as having a *soul* or a *body*. The same *Christ* made the world, increased in *wisdom*, was pierced with a spear: in which three examples, it appears that the *Logos*, the *soul*, and the *body*, all go to make up the one Person, the one *compound* Person of *Christ*. And hence it is, that the churches of God, following the common idea of a *single person*, which they found

to suit with the Scripture representation of Christ, have rightly and justly included all the three constituents in the *one Person*°.

These are my present thoughts of the word *person*, and the *ideas* contained in it. If any man has any thing to object to it, I shall be willing either more fully to explain, or else to alter the notion, as I see reason for it. You will perceive that *intelligent acting substance* is implied in every *person*; and more persons are more intelligent *substances*, whenever their substance is *divided*, but not otherwise: and two intelligent substances are two persons, where *both* have existed *separately*, or have been severally capable of the *distinctive* characters, but not otherwise. You will also perceive, that *intelligent acting substance* (that is, *intelligent agent*, as you call it) is not equivalent to *person*, neither are the phrases reciprocal. But to *intelligent agent* add, its *not being divided*, nor *distinguished* into more intelligent agents having the same distinctive characters; and then, as I conceive, you complete the notion of *person*, according as it has commonly passed with mankind. I suppose not any of the divine Persons a person in a *sense different* from the common meaning of the word *person*: they are *Persons* in the same common sense of *person*; but *Persons* of a *different kind*, and differently circumstantiated from what *human*, or *angelical*, or any other kinds of *persons* are. Thus *person*, like triangle, appears to be the name for an *abstract idea*: and the *name* is equally applicable to *every kind* of person, as the name of *triangle* is to every kind of triangle.

QUERY XVI.

Whether by these (of the first column) and the like texts, adoration and worship be not so appropriated to the one God, as to belong to him only?

Divine worship due

To the one God.

Thou shalt have no other gods before me, Exod. xx. 3.

Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve, Matt. iv. 10.

To Christ.

They worshipped him, Luke xxiv. 52. Let all the angels of God worship him, Heb. i. 6.

That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father, John v. 23.

UNDER this Query I fully proved, in my Defence, that,

° Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum, sed conjunctum in una Persona, Deum et hominem Jesum. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 27. Τοῦ Θεοῦ

Λόγου ἐνώσει, τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν φυσικῇ, ἐνωθέντος τῇ σαρκί, &c. Irenæi Fragm. p. 347. Bened.

according to *Scripture* and *antiquity*, adoration is due to *God alone*, in opposition to all *creature-worship* whatever. You enter very little, if at all, into the particulars of the evidence which I produced: but you form two objections against the thing in general, leaving me the part of a *respondent*, instead of undertaking it yourself, as was proper in answer to *queries*. Your two objections are these: 1. That if my arguments prove any thing, they prove too much, viz. that Christ is the very Father himself. 2. That they again prove too much in disallowing all *mediatorial worship*; which, you think, is plainly warranted by *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

1. As to your first pretence, it is founded only on the *personal* characters, *I, thou, he*; seemingly excluding all persons but one. To which it is answered, that there is no necessity arising from any pretended force of the *exclusive* terms, for excluding all other persons ^P: but there is a necessity, from the very *end* and *design* of the Law, for excluding all *other gods*; and from the whole tenor of *Scripture*, for excluding all *creatures*: so that my argument proves what I intended to prove, and no more. And why have you not answered, after you have been so often called upon, the reasons I had offered in my Defence, and Preface to my Sermons, against the receiving *inferior gods* to any degree of *religious worship*? Surely it should be your business to *respond* sometimes, especially in reply to *queries*, and not merely to *oppose*.

2. As to your second pretence about *mediatorial worship*, first borrowed from Pagans, handed on by Arians, and brought to our own times by Papists; I shall give it a large and distinct answer presently. You have for some time (I mean you and your friends) amused unthinking persons with a phrase, never yet distinctly explained by you, but serving to delude such as can be content with *sounds* instead of *sense*. I shall endeavour to search this matter to the bottom, once for all; and then shew how easy it is to unravel your speculations on this head.

By *mediatorial worship* you intend some kind of worship to be paid to Christ; such as you have been pleased to invent for him, rather than none. I do not find that you have secured any worship at all to the *Holy Ghost*, (who is no *mediator*,) though all antiquity has paid him worship. But you are so confused and undeterminate in your account of *mediatorial worship*, that it is not easy to discover what you precisely mean by it; or perhaps you yourself do not yet know what you intend. There are but two

^P See my fourth Sermon, p. 84, &c. of this volume.

general senses, so far as I conceive, to be put upon it; though these again are divided into many *particular* ones. The two I speak of, are either, 1. the making Christ the *medium* of worship; or, 2. the worshipping him under the character of a *Mediator*. We must examine both these:

1. A *medium* of *worship* is a phrase of some latitude and ambiguity. It must be explained by instances and examples; that considering all cases which can well be thought of, we may at last hit upon what you mean by *mediatorial* worship. An *image* has been sometimes thought a *medium* of worship, when God is supposed to be worshipped by and *through* an image: as in the instance of the *molten calf*, and in the golden calves of Dan and Bethel. Such mediatorial worship as this leaves very little honour to the *medium*: all is supposed to pass through, to the ultimate object. Thus the Egyptians, in worshipping the sacred animals, supposed the worship to pass to the *prototype*, to the Deity whereunto the animals belonged. This, I presume, is not your notion of *mediatorial* worship: if it be, it is low indeed.

There may be a *second* sense of making a *medium* of worship: as, if we were to pray to Christ, to pray for us. This is near akin to the Romish doctrine of praying to *saints* and *angels*. If this be what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, your opinion of Christ may still be very low, as of one that gives us nothing himself, but only asks another to give us. But, besides that there is no warrant for praying to any thing less than *God*, and so such a practice must be wholly unjustifiable; I conceive that this is not what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, it being so extremely low and dishonourable to suppose that he can himself do nothing for us, especially having declared the contrary, John xiv. 13, 14.

There is a *third* sense of a *medium* of worship: as if we ask the Father any thing by and through the *merits* of *Jesus Christ*. If this be what you mean by *mediatorial* worship, I am afraid it will amount to no worship at all upon your principles. You will not say that the *same* worship is therein paid to both: and unless you say that, you leave no worship at all for God the Son in such addresses or applications.

There may be a *fourth* consideration of a *medium* of worship, supposing Christ to be directly worshipped, but “to the glory of the Father:” the Father being imagined to be glorified through Christ as through a *medium*. Now here I must ask, Whether the worship supposed to be paid to Christ be *supreme* or *inferior*? You will not say *supreme*: and if it be *inferior*, it

cannot be presumed to pass on to the *supreme* object, who would not be honoured but affronted with *inferior* worship. It must therefore rest in the inferior object, and so cannot be called *mediate*, but *ultimate* worship. I must add, that no worship of a *creature* can terminate in the *Creator*, or be for his *glory*, because he has absolutely forbidden all *creature-worship*: and therefore, again, such worship as we are now supposing cannot be *mediate*, but *ultimate*, terminating where it is offered.

Indeed, the Scripture never makes any difference between *directing* and *terminating* worship; but supposes it always to terminate in the object to which it is directed, or offered. God interprets all *image-worship*, or *creature-worship*, as terminating in the *image*, or *creature*, to which it is offered. When the Israelites worshipped the calf, they “offered sacrifice to an “idol,” not to God; and they “worshipped the molten image,” not God, in doing it; however they might *intend* and mean it (as they certainly did) for the *Jehovah*. They are said to have “forgot God their Saviour,” (Psalm cvi. 21,) notwithstanding their *intention* to remember him in it; because it was not remembering him in a manner suitable to his commandment, which was to *offer* worship to *God* only. So also Jeroboam is said to have made *other gods*, and to have cast “God behind his “back.” (1 Kings xiv. 9. 2 Chr. xiii. 11.) notwithstanding his intention to *terminate* all the worship in the true *Jehovah*. I may add, that when St. John was preparing to offer worship to an angel, (whether out of a sudden transport, or not then knowing that it was a mere angel,) no doubt but he designed the *glory* of God, and to terminate all worship there: and yet it is observable, that the angel, notwithstanding, bade him “worship “God;” intimating, that it is not worshipping of *God*, unless the worship be directly offered to *God*. Dr. Clarke^a has a fancy, that the *idolatry* of such as worshipped the *true God* through *mediums* of their own inventing, lay only in their making *idol-mediators*, such as God had not allowed them to have. But this notion is very peculiar, and has no foundation in *Scripture* or *antiquity*. To pay *religious* worship to any thing is, in Scripture style, making a *God* of it. This is true, even of what is called *mediate* or *relative* worship; as I have before instanced in the case of the *golden calf*, and the calves of Dan and Bethel. And Laban’s teraphims, or images, which were supposed to be no more than *symbols* or *mediums* of the worship of the *Jehovah*, (for

^a Clarke’s Script. Doct. p. 344. 2nd ed.

Laban worshipped, as some believe, the true God^r;) are called *gods*^s; because worship was offered directly to them, instead of being offered immediately to God. To make any medium of worship was setting up *other gods*, not *other mediators*; *strange gods*, not *strange mediators*; it was robbing *God*, not any *mediator*, of his honour; and making an *idol-god*, not an *idol-mediator*. The idolaters are never charged with mistaking the *medium*, but mistaking the *object*; not with having false mediators, but *false gods*; not for worshipping those that were not *mediators* by *office*, but those that *by nature* were *no gods*; for worshipping the *creature*, not instead of the *mediator*, but instead of the "Creator, who "is blessed for ever." Such is the constant language both of the Old and New Testament, which never fix the charge upon the setting up false *mediators* or *mediums* of worship; nor ever insert any caution against it: so weak and groundless is the Doctor's notion of *idol-mediators*. What then is the result, you will ask, of this reasoning? Does not the worship of Christ terminate in the glory of God the Father? Admit that it does so: then certainly the worship of Christ is not *creature-worship*. For since all worship terminates in the object to which it is directed or offered, if the same act of worship, offered to Christ, terminates in God the Father; then the case is plain that it terminates in *both*, and both are one undivided object. Having considered the several senses of a *medium* of worship, and shewn that none of them will answer your purpose, I come now,

2. To consider the worship of Christ under the character of a *Mediator*, and to see what sense we can make of *mediatorial worship* under that view. A *Mediator* may be considered two ways, according to the ancients; a *Mediator by nature*, and *Mediator by office*. The first and principal sense of a *Mediator* (μεσίτης) between God and man, is a *Person* partaking of the *nature* of both, perfect *God* and perfect *man*. In this sense, *principally*, the ancient Christians constantly understood Christ to be a *Mediator*. So Irenæus, Melito, Clemens, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Novatian, and others of the Ante-Nicenes; whose testimonies I have placed in the margin^t. As to Post-

^r Gen. xxxi. 49, 53.

^s Gen. xxxi. 30. Josh. xxiv. 2.

^t Εἰ μὴ συννηώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. ἔδει γὰρ μεσιτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοῦς

ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν. Iren. p. 211. ed. Bened.

Θεὸς γὰρ ὢν, ὁμοῦ τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος τέλειος, ὁ αὐτὸς τὰς δύο αὐτοῦ οὐσίας ἐπιστώσατο ἡμῖν. Melito, Cav. H. L. vol. ii. p. 33.

Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος

Nicenes, since no doubt can be made of them, I content myself with referring to Petavius, who has collected their testimonies^u.

Now, if you would but please to understand *mediatorial worship* conformably to this true and ancient sense of *Mediator*, we might not perhaps despair of coming to some terms of agreement. For *mediatorial worship*, thus understood, would nearly coincide with what we call *divine*. It would be worshipping Christ because, with the human nature, he is possessed also of the *divine*, and is therefore strictly and properly *adorable*, as well as the Father.

But *Mediator* may be considered also in respect of *office*, without considering the *nature* at all: and this, I presume, is the sense you contend for. Accordingly, for the most part, by *mediatorial worship*, you seem to intend some *inferior* kind of worship payable to our *Lord* considered as *mediating*, or as executing the *office* of a Mediator between God and man. Now we must confess that Christ is really Mediator by *office*, as well as by *nature*: but how this can ever justify you in making a *new* and an *inferior* worship, and calling it *mediatorial*, we understand not. Fanciful men will have their peculiarities: and it is a wonder to me, you have not yet invented twenty several kinds of worship, *superior* and *inferior*, for God the *Father*. For the purpose; you may consider him as *King*, and so you may present him with *regal* worship; or as *King of kings*, and then it will be *super-regal*. You may consider him as *Judge*, your particular *Judge*, and so present him with *judicial* worship: but if you consider him further as Judge of *all men*, nay, and as Judge of *angels*, or of the whole system of creatures, the worship will be

Θεός. καὶ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ μεσίτης ἐκτελεῖ. μεσίτης γὰρ ὁ Λόγος ὁ κοινὸς ἀμφὸν Θεοῦ μὲν υἱὸς, σωτὴρ δὲ ἀνθρώπων. *Clem. Alex. p. 251.*

Ἴνα δὲ δειχθῆ τὸ συναμφοτέρον ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν τε τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγει, μεσίτην Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπος Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς. ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ δύο. Ἔδει οὖν τὸν Χριστὸν Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μεσίτην γενόμενον παρ' ἀμφοτέρων ἀρραβῶνά τινα εἰληφέναι, ἵνα φανῆ δύο προσώπων μεσίτης. *Hippol. vol. ii. p. 45.*

Hic sequester Dei atque hominum appellatus; ex utriusque partis deposito commisso sibi. In another place, *utriusque substantia. Tertull. de Resur. Carn. c. 51. contr. Prax. c. 28.*

Deus cum homine miscetur. Hic Deus, hic Christus est, qui Mediator duorum, hominem induit quem perducit ad Patrem. *Cypr. de Idol. Van. p. 15.*

Quoniam si ad hominem veniebat; ut Mediator Dei et hominum esse deberet, oportuit illum cum eo esse, et Verbum carnem fieri; ut in semetipso concordiam confibularet terrenorum pariter atque cælestium; dum utriusque partis in se connectens pignora, et Deum homini et hominem Deo copularet. *Novat. c. 18.*

Mediam inter Deum et hominem substantiam gerens—Deum fuisse et hominem, ex utroque genere permistum. *Lactant. l. iv. c. 13.*

^u Dogm. Th. tom. v. part. 2.

then most highly and superlatively *judicial*. You may next consider him as *Creator*, *ποιητῆς*, without an *article*, and then you are to present him (pardon the novelty of the phrase) with *creatorial worship*: but if you consider him further as *the Creator*, *ὁ ποιητῆς*, with an *article*, the worship then becomes eminently *creatorial*. You may next consider him as *Protector*, as *Deliverer*, or *Defender*, and each of these in a higher or a lower sense: and hence may arise as many *several worships*. Nay, when your hand is in, every *attribute* you consider him under will be a distinct foundation of a *particular worship*: and so you will have *worships* innumerable, to pay to one and the same Person. But you will say, that these *many worships* are all but one worship of the one *divine* Father under variety of conceptions. Right: and so, though the Son be considered as *Mediator*, as *Judge*, as *Creator*, as *King*, &c. in our worship of him, these are all but one worship of the one *divine* Son, under variety of conceptions. The worship then both of Father and Son centering in this, that they are both *divine*, this makes it *divine* worship: and divine worship being one with itself, it is very manifest that the worship of both is *one*.

Aye but, says the learned Doctor^x, "There is an adoration due to Christ as *Mediator*, which cannot possibly be paid to "the one supreme God;" supreme Father he means. And what is there in this, more than an affected manner of expressing what every body allows, that Father and Son have distinct personal *characters* and *offices*? He need not have gone thus round about: the shorter way would have been to divide adoration into two sorts, *paternal* and *filial*; and to plead that one of these *worships* can never be paid to the *Son*, any more than the other to the *Father*, because the Son must never be considered as *Father*, nor the Father as *Son*. But had the Doctor remembered that *both* may be considered as *divine*, and that *divine* worship is but one, he might have perceived that there is no foundation for the *two worships* which he is introducing: unless he has a mind to bring in a hundred worships as well as two: which may be easily done in the way he has taken. The truth of the case is this; worship has an immediate respect to the *divinity* of the Person to be worshipped. That must be presupposed in all *religious* worship: otherwise such worship is *idolatry*; as hath been proved. This foundation being laid,

^x See Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 343. 2nd ed. Modest Plea, &c. Continued. p. 33.

whatever *personal* characters or offices we consider the Person worshipped under; *divine* goes along with all: it is a *divine* Mediator, a *divine* Priest, a *divine* Prophet, a *divine* King: and so our worship of him never wants its proper object, never moves from its proper foundation, but remains constantly the same. Our considering the Son under the character or office of *Mediator* does not hinder us from considering him as *God* at the same time, (indeed *Mediator*, in strictness, implies it,) any more than our considering the Father as *King*, *Judge*, *Preserver*, or *Rewarder*, hinders us from considering him also as *divine*.

All the acts and offices of Christ, relative to us, are only so many manifestations of his goodness, power, wisdom, and other *attributes*, which attributes are founded in his *divine* nature, which nature is *common* to the Father and him: thus all our acknowledgments centre and terminate in one and the same *divine* nature; and all the particular *worships* amount to no more than *one worship*, one *divine* worship belonging equally to both.

Having thus far cleared my way, I may now proceed to examine what you have done under this Query. But I should first observe to the reader what you have *not done*, that he may be the more fully apprised of your manner of disputation: which is to answer difficulties, by slipping them over without notice.

I urged the great design of the *Law* and of the *Gospel* to exclude *inferior*, as well as other *supreme* deities; you take no notice. I urged, that even *miracles* could not suffice for the introducing *another God*: you are profoundly silent. I pleaded, that the *reasons* of worship which God insists upon are such as exclude all *creatures*: not a word do you give in answer. I shewed, (vol. i. p. 412,) that any man with your distinction of *sovereign* and *inferior* worship, might have eluded every law about *sacrificing* to the true God only: you have nothing to say to it. I pleaded the impropriety of *absolute* and *relative* sacrifices, vows, oaths, &c., not a syllable do you reply. I pleaded several texts of Scripture, and several examples against *creature-worship*, and against your distinction made from the *intention* of the worshipper: all is passed over. I further pressed you with

† *Sacrifice*, without distinction of absolute and relative, supreme and inferior, the outward act of sacrificing, was always looked upon as *appropriate* to God. Now *prayers* were of the same import with sacrifice, in the pri-

mitive Church, and esteemed by them as the purest and best sacrifices.

See Just. Mart. Dial. p. 340. Jeb. Irenæus, l. iv. c. 17. p. 249. Clem. Alex. p. 848. Tertull. ad Scap. c. 2.

the practice and principles of the primitive *martyrs*; of which you take no notice. You have indeed something to *oppose* in favour of the other side of the question: but is it *my* business only to answer objections? I thought you had undertook to answer *queries*; to *clear* something, and not to be always in the way of *puzzling*. But let us see however what you have in the way of *objection*. I have answered your two principal pleas already: I am now to seek for some of the slighter pretences. You find fault with me (p. 357,) for making the *nature* of God, not the *Person*, the object of worship. But what if I make *three Persons* the object (which is the truth of the case) on account of their *divine nature*? Is there any thing more absurd in this, than in your making *one Person*, on account of his perfections, that is, of his *nature*? And where is the difference between you and me, but that you worship *individual living substance*, which you confine to *one Person*; and I, *individual living substance*, which I suppose *common* to more Persons? You the τὸ Θεῖον in one Person; I the τὸ Θεῖον in more than one.

You say, “the texts of the Old Testament relate not to an *indefinite* Person, but *definitely* to the Person of the Father.” Yet many of them (in the judgment of all antiquity) relate to the person of the Son, as we have seen before: and that none of them are ever meant *indefinitely* is what you can never prove^z. However, if you could, you would still be far from proving your point. For, supposing *God*, or *Jehovah*, to be always taken *personally*, sometimes denoting the *Person* of the *Son*, abstracting from the consideration of the *Father*, and sometimes denoting the *Person* of the *Father*, abstracting from the consideration of the *Son*; it might still be nevertheless true, that *Jehovah* is one, both *Father* and *Son*.

You attempt, (p. 360.) to prove that the worship of the Son is “subordinate, mediate, relative.” You quote Heb. i. 6, and infer that the angels are to worship him, “not as supreme, but “by the command of the Father.” Wonderful! that if the *Father* has ever *commanded* any one to worship himself, (as he often has,) his worship therefore is not *supreme*. Has not our Saviour *commanded* us to worship the *Father*; is his worship therefore not *supreme*? Sure, arguments must run very low with you, or you would not trifle at this rate. As to Heb. i. 9, I have answered it above: and as to John v. 23, Christ is not worshipped because God *committed* judgment to him: but God

^z See my Sermons, p. 99, &c. of this volume.

committed it to him for this end and purpose, that men might be sensible of the dignity and *divinity* of his Person, and thereupon worship him. The prophecy of Daniel (chap. vii. 13.) speaks of a *kingdom*, and a *dominion*, in a particular sense; as 1 Cor. xv. speaks of a kingdom to be *received* by the Father: this is all *economical*, and makes nothing for your purpose. But your argument is calculated for the Socinian hypothesis, rather than the Arian. The ancient Arians would have condemned such men as you, for their low thoughts of our Saviour. They did not worship him merely as having a *judgment* or a *kingdom* committed to him, but as being *Creator*^a. You throw together (p. 361, 362.) a multitude of texts, proving only that Christ is *Mediator*. Does any Christian doubt of it? There is not a syllable about *absolute* and *relative*, *sovereign* and *inferior* prayer: which is what you were to shew. A Mediator may be a *divine* Mediator notwithstanding: and so all your pretences vanish into air. And what if it be said, (Rev. v. 9, 12.) “Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory:” and if it be said, “Unto him that loved us, and washed us, &c. be glory and dominion,” Rev. i. 5, 6, what are we to learn from thence? Here is nothing said of the *foundation* of worship: but the Person is described under his proper and peculiar characters, and such as may recommend him to our *affections*. Not a word is there of *mediatorial* worship, or of any thing like it. And if his being *God*, or *God supreme*, be not assigned as the reason for worshipping him, doth it therefore follow that he is not to be worshipped as *God supreme*? By the same argument, you might as well prove, that neither is the Father to be worshipped as *supreme God*. We find it said, (Eph. iii. 20, 21,) “Unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us; unto him be glory in the Church by *Christ Jesus*,” &c. The reason here assigned for worshipping the Father, is not his being *supreme God*, but only his being “able to do more than we can ask or think.” So again in the Book of Revelations, (ch. xix. 1, 2,) “Salvation, and glory, and honour, and power unto the Lord our God; for true and righteous are his judgments,” &c. Here the reason assigned is not his being *supreme God*, but his being *true* and *righteous*. Again, in chapter iv. ver. 11, “Thou

^a Christum colimus ut Creatorem. *Serm. Arian. ap. Augustin.* p. 623. Maximin. ap. August. p. 663.

“art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power :
 “for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are
 “and were created.” Here the reason assigned for worshipping
 the Father, is not that he is *supreme God*, but that he “created
 “all things for his pleasure :” which reason, though not ex-
 pressly applied in this manner to God the Son, is yet equally
 applicable in virtue of Heb. i. 10. and Col. i. 16. I own that
supreme God is implied in this last title of *Creator* : which how-
 ever is equally true, either of Father or Son. I observed in my
 Sermons^b, how frequent it is for the Father himself to insist
 upon what he had done for men ; claiming their worship upon
 those moving reasons, or *motives* : and what wonder is it, if
 some much greater and more endearing works of God the Son
 be mentioned as *motives* to our worship of him ? the *foundation*
 still of worship stands as before ; which is wholly to be resolved
 into the infinite excellency and *divinity* of his Person^c. You
 pretend to say, that “the worship of the Father is founded
 “principally in his supreme, independent, underived power,” &c.
 If you mean any thing contrary to me, you mean, on his *self-*
existence, or being *unbegotten*, as distinct from *necessary existence*.
 Shew me one text of Scripture for it, at your leisure. You do
 not pretend any : but you speak of *all antiquity* ; not knowing
 what you say, nor whereof you affirm. You should have shewn
 me who, and what *ancients* ever founded his worship in his being
Father, or *unbegotten* ; and not in his being *God*.

After abundance of trifling, you come at length to make some
 reply to what I had urged from *antiquity*^d : only you first take
 notice of my charging you^e with *slipping over a difficulty*, by
 putting *honour*, an ambiguous word, instead of *worship* and
adoration. The reason I had for it is, that *worship* and *adoration*
 stand for *exterior acts* ; whereas *honour* may stand for either
interior or *exterior*, and is therefore more ambiguous. *Exterior*
acts have their signification fixed and determined by circum-
 stances, and do not depend upon the *intention* of the mind to
 make their signification *higher* and *lower* ; as *mental* honour
 does. This therefore was the reason of my blaming you for
 changing *worship* into *honour*. The difference of these two is
 easily seen in this instance : *equality* and *inequality* of honour
 are proper expressions : but equality or inequality of *sacrifice*

^b P. 115, 116 of this volume.

^d Defence, vol. i. p. 418, &c.

^c See the Preface to my Sermons,
 at the beginning of this volume.

^e Ibid. p. 411, 421.

(an outward act) is very improper. Now our dispute was about *outward acts*. The foundation I went upon was this; that in order to have God's authority and superlative excellency owned, there should be some *outward visible acts*, which we call *worship*, appropriated to God, to put a *visible* difference between *God* and the *creature*. For herein lies the *manifestation* of that inward sense we have of his superlative excellencies and perfections: and the confounding this difference, by applying these peculiar and *appropriated* acts to any *creature*, is the great sin of *idolatry*. The inward *intention* is of no moment in this case: for if the *outward acts* be the same, how then shall God be *outwardly* distinguished (as he ought to be) in the honours paid to him, above the creatures? This consideration is alone sufficient to cut off every plea and pretence for offering *religious worship* to any but God. You have first a distinction of *supreme* and *inferior*, of *ultimate* and *mediate worship*: but that is utterly unserviceable, because it would not so much as exclude the worship even of Pagan *deities* (if considered as *inferior*) along with the true God. You may next say, that worship should not be paid to any inferior gods, that stand in *opposition* to the true and supreme God: and yet neither will this restriction sufficiently answer the purpose; since it does not exclude the worship of *saints* or *angels*, friends of God, and not *opposite* to him. You may retreat to a further restriction, that even *inferior* religious worship must be paid to none but such as God has *nominated*, and allowed to be worshipped: which, you may think, will effectually exclude all but *Christ*. But after you have thus far followed your own inventions, in your several restrictions, and qualifyingings of an *absolute* command; there is still this invincible reason against them all, that whereas there ought to be some peculiar *outward acts* (as sacrifice was formerly) *appropriated* to God, as exterior acknowledgments of his infinite excellencies and perfections above his *creatures*; by these restrictions and limitations, all such *peculiarity* of exterior acknowledgments is taken away, and it is made impossible even for God himself to prescribe any. Now you see why I found fault; and that I had some reason for it. But you ask me, why then did I "found Christ's worship upon "John v. 23," which speaks only of *honour*? The reason is plain: if I am to *honour the Son, even as I honour the Father*; I must signify it by the same *outward* expressions, that is, by *worship*. The text then is very much to my purpose; though *honour* and *worship* are not the same thing, but differing as the *internal*

thought and the outward manifestation. Now let us come to the *ancients*, upon this head of *worship*.

I shewed by plain testimonies what their doctrine was; viz. to worship *God alone*, the *Creator*, in opposition to the *creature*. You take no notice of the last particular; because it was very *material*, and pressed hard upon your scheme. But you observe, by the "alone God" is evidently meant "the God and Father of all." I am persuaded you, in the main, are right in your observation: and now the question will be, whether when they proposed the Father as the *only God*, they intended it in opposition only to *false gods* and *creature-gods*, admitting a latitude in the *exclusive* terms; or whether they intended any distinction of *worship*, making it *supreme* and *inferior*, *absolute* and *relative*, *ultimate* and *mediate*. This is a question which will admit of an easy and a certain decision, upon a due consideration of circumstances. There are but two ways of making this matter out; either by admitting some latitude in the *exclusive terms*, so that the Father shall be understood to be the *only God* in opposition to *creatures* and *false gods*; or by admitting some distinction and degrees of worship, that *supreme* worship may be due to the Father as the highest God, and *inferior* to the Son as an *inferior* Deity. Now this, I say, will be easily decided. If, when the ancients speak of worshipping *one God*, the Father, they either say, that he alone is to be *sovereignly*, or *absolutely* worshipped; or if they found his title to worship upon his being *Father*, or *unbegotten*, rather than upon his being *God*; or if they admit any *inferior God*, or any *other God* besides the Father; then you will have something to plead from the *ancients* for your opinion. But, on the other hand, if they never mention *two worships* or *two Gods*; if they mean, when they speak of worship as due to *God alone*, not *sovereign* worship only, but all *religious* worship; if they suppose the Son not to be *another God*, but *one God* with the Father; and if they intimate their intention to be to exclude *creatures*, or *false gods*, not *God the Son*; then the case will be manifest, that they used the *exclusive terms*, not with utmost strictness, but with a proper latitude; and this will be the true way of interpreting the *ancients*. That this latter is really the case, is evident to every man that is at all conversant with the ancients: and he that thinks otherwise must either never have read them, or have read them with very little judgment. Their way was to speak of the *one God* in opposition to all false deities; and by the *one God* they meant principally the

Father, as *first* in conception, and *first* in order ; but always with a reserve for the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, reckoned to him, and included in him : so that the *Father*, considered with what *naturally* belonged to him, was the *one God* of the Christians in opposition to all *other* deities. This is so clearly and so evidently the current and prevailing notion of the ancients, that I scruple not to say, that they who see not this, see nothing. I shall briefly consider the testimonies I before gave, and then conclude this article.

Justin Martyr says, “God alone is to be worshipped^f.” He does not say *sovereignly*, or *absolutely*, but barely *worshipped* : neither does he say, Worship him alone as *supreme God*, to insinuate any *inferior God* : and therefore it is evident that Justin was not in your scheme of *two Gods* and *two worships*, but in mine of *one God* and *one worship* ; considering the Father *primarily* as the *one God*, not exclusive of the Son.

Athenagoras^g lays the stress upon worshipping the *Creator*, in opposition to *creatures* : so that it is plain he was in my principles, not yours : besides that he says nothing of *sovereign* and *inferior* worship.

Theophilus^h speaks of *worship* simply, not *sovereign* worship as due to *God* alone : and the reason he gives why the king is not to be worshipped, is not because he is not *underived* or *unbegotten*, but because he is not *God*.

Tatianⁱ denies *worship* (not *sovereign* worship only) to the creatures.

Tertullian^k is express against any *inferior* worship, any *worship* at all but to the *one God* ; in which *one God*, as every body knows, he includes all the three Persons.

Clemens Alexandrinus^l has not a word that looks favourable to the distinction of *supreme* and *inferior* worship ; but he con-

^f Θεὸν μὲν μόνον προσκυνούμεν. *Apol.* i. cap. 23. Τὸν Θεὸν μόνον δεῖ προσκυνεῖν. cap. 21.

^g Οὐ τοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τεχνίτην αὐτοῦ προσκυνητέον. *Athen.* p. 55. Οὐ τὰς δυνάμεις προσιόντες θεραπεύομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν καὶ δεσπότην. p. 56.

^h Διὰ τί οὐ προσκυνεῖς τὸν βασιλέα ; ὅτι οὐκ εἰς τὸ προσκυνεῖσθαι γέγονεν — Θεὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπος, &c. *Theoph.* p. 30. οὐκ ἄλλω ἐξόν ἐστι προσκυνεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ ἢ μόνω Θεῷ. *Theoph.* p. 33.

ⁱ Δημιουργίαν τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγε-

νημένην χάριν ἡμῶν προσκυνεῖν οὐ θέλω. *Tatian.* p. 18. Σεβεῖν δὲ τῶν στοιχείων τὴν ἰπόστασιν οὐτ’ ἂν πεισθεῖν, &c. p. 79.

^k Quod colimus Deus unus est. *Tertull.* *Apol.* cap. 17. Præscribitur mihi ne quem alium Deum dicam, ne quem alium adorem, aut quoquo modo venerer, præter unicum illum qui ita mandat. *Scorpiace,* cap. 4. Conf. *Prax.* cap. 31. *Orat.* cap. 2. cum notis *Albaspinaei.*

^l See the passages in my Defence, vol. i. p. 419. *Comp.* p. 424.

fines all worship to the *Creator*, excluding all *creatures* from it, making no *medium* between *Creator* and *creature*.

Irenæus^m speaks of *adoring* or *worshipping*; but not a word of *sovereign*, or *absolute* adoration: and it is reason sufficient with him against the worship of any thing, that it is a *creature*: which you take no notice of.

Origenⁿ also is express against the worship of any *creature*; which you observe not, though before hinted. Neither does he speak of *supreme* worship, but *all* worship. when he confines it to the *Creator*, to the *divine nature*, τὸ Θεῖον, to the eternal and *uncreated nature* of God. You pretend, that τὸ Θεῖον is a figurative way of speaking for ὁ Θεὸς, like the *King's Majesty* for the *King*. p. 356. But I affirm, on the contrary, (which is sufficient against your bare affirmation,) that it generally, if not always, signifies the *divine nature*, or *substance*^o, considered as the *subject* of divine perfections.

As to Origen in particular, in his piece against Celsus, I know not that he any where uses the phrase of τὸ Θεῖον, but where it either must or may bear the sense I contend for. See p. 158, 159, 226, 321, 374, 375, 376, 377, 392. And, I think, if what Origen has in p. 342 be well considered, it may suffice to determine the dispute about the sense of τὸ Θεῖον in him. For there he plainly uses τὸ Θεῖον to denote that which is *divine* in our Lord, (as distinguished from his *human nature*,) viz. The *only-begotten of God*; intimating that his *substance* is very different in that respect: ἄλλος ὁ περὶ τούτου, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, λόγος ἐστὶ, παρὰ τὸν περὶ τοῦ νοουμένου κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀνθρώπου. And he afterwards gives the name of τοῦ Θεοῦ to that very *divinity*, or *divine nature*, which he supposes in our Lord together with the *manhood*^p.

The like may be said of Clemens's use of the phrase, who likewise includes the Son in the τὸ Θεῖον^q, as observed above.

^m Dominum Deum tuum adorare oportet et ipsi soli servire, et non credere ei qui falso promisit ea quæ non sunt sua; *Hæc omnia tibi dabo, si procidens adoraveris me.* Neque enim conditio sub ejus potestate est, quandoquidem et ipse unus de *creaturis* est. *Iren.* p. 320.

ⁿ See the passages collected in my *Defence*, vol. i. p. 419, 420.

^o The reader may see several plain examples in Gregory Nyss. *contr. Eunom.* It is not worth the while to search or cite many authorities for a

known thing, which nobody conversant in the Greek Fathers can doubt of.

Greg. Nyss. p. 89, 92, 145, 147, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 180, 181, 191, 203, 264, 281, 291, 294, 301, 302, 303, 319, 327, 329, 412, 427.—448, 451, 453, 457, 471.

^p Τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν τοίνυν καθὸ μὲν νενόηται θεότητι ἐν αὐτῷ πραχθέντα, ἐστὶν ὄσια, καὶ οὐ μαχόμενα τῇ περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐννοίᾳ. *Orig.* p. 343.

^q Clem. Alex. p. 452.

^r Query VIII. p. 584 of this vol.

other places^s of Clemens, where the phrase is also used, may be compared at leisure. τὸ Θεῖον and ὁ Θεός may sometimes indifferently stand for each other: but a judicious reader may often observe τὸ Θεῖον to be used where ὁ Θεός would be very improper, and so *vice versa*. God considered *substantially*, as *res divina*, is the proper notion of τὸ Θεῖον, [θεῖον γένος, or θεῖον πρᾶγμα,] and not considered according to *personal* characters, acts, or offices. It would be improper to say, for instance, that the τὸ Θεῖον *begat*, or *sent* his Son, or did acts of *mercy*, or the like. I need not give more instances: an intelligent reader will easily perceive, from the circumstances, where τὸ Θεῖον is the more proper phrase, and where ὁ Θεός. To return to Origen.

You translate ἀγένητον φύσω in Origen^t, *unoriginate nature*, instead of *uncreated nature*: which is the constant sense of ἀγένητον in that treatise of Origen, opposed to γενητόν, a name for *created*, *mutable*, and *perishing* things. You have no instance in all Catholic antiquity where worship is put upon the *un-derivedness* of the Father, any further than as it implies *necessary existence*: nor a single example to prove a distinction of *two worships*, one *supreme* and the other *inferior*. Some pretences of yours relating hereto will be examined in the next Query.

QUERY XVII.

Whether, notwithstanding, worship and adoration be not equally due to Christ; and consequently, whether it must not follow that he is the one God, and not (as the Arians suppose) a distinct inferior Being?

YOU here begin with repeating your argument from the *personal* characters, *I, thou, he*: which has been often answered. You go on (p. 368) to argue for *mediate* worship, because the worship of the Son is to the *glory of the Father*. I might here insist upon it (as an ingenious gentleman^u hath lately done) that the words, Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ Πατρὸς, may be justly rendered, *The Lord Jesus Christ is (or Jesus Christ is Lord) in the glory of God the Father*: which rendering, agreeable to the *Italic*, and some other versions, would entirely defeat your argument. But allowing the common construction, and that the

^s Clem. Alex. p. 50, 53, 58, 113, 704, 778, 829, 836, 841, 845, 848.

^t Orig. contr. Cels. p. 189.

^u Mr. Wade's short Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 55.

N. B. Cyprian, Novatian, Hilary,

and other Latins, so read and understand Phil. ii. 11.

Ὁ οὐκ ἀλλότριος Θεοῦ ὦν, ἀλλὰ εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ πατρὸς. Eriphan. p. 972. Conf. 880.

worship of God the Son *terminates* in God the Father; still it is manifest, for that very reason, that it is not an inferior worship, because then it could not terminate in the Father, being unworthy of him. Nor indeed can any act of worship extend to *both*, unless both be *one object*, as before shewn. As to the same act of worship being considered as ultimately resting in the Father, it is because the *divine nature* to which the worship is paid is considered *primarily* in the Father, though belonging equally to *both*. You object that, by this account, no worship is paid to the *Father*, but to the *substance* or *essence* of the Father. Ridiculous; as if worshipping the divine substance as *personalized* in the Father, were not the same thing with worshipping the Father's *Person*. Pray, what is the *Person* of the Father but living, acting, intelligent *substance*? Do you mean, by *intelligent agent*, intelligent and acting *nothing*? "All worship," you say, "is personal:" and I say every person is *substance*: therefore worship may as well be called *substantial*, as *personal*, amounting, in this case, to the same thing. And if worship be paid to *three Persons*, is it not truly *personal*, as well as when paid to one? Your quotation from Bishop Pearson is nothing to the point in hand, but wide and foreign as possible. I had observed, in my Defence, that you had many things to say, *in hopes* to lessen the honour attributed to the Son in Scripture. Upon this, you go solemnly to prayers: "I pray God forgive you the injury you here do me." I thank you for your charitable prayer, if really such. But had you put it up from your *closet*, instead of sending it from the *press*; there would have been less suspicion either of *affectation* or *malice* in it. As keen a *satire* and as *bitter* a revenge may appear in the shape of a *prayer* as in any other form. The great *injury*, it seems, lies only in the word *hopes*; an expression perhaps not so exactly proper or accurate: a *candid* construction of it would have been a much surer token of a *forgiving* and *charitable* temper, than this unusual sally of *devotion* thrown out upon so slight an occasion. But let us pass on.

You tell me, (p. 371,) of "building my notion of religious worship upon metaphysical speculations:" which is doing me a great injury, and laying your own faults to my charge. I build my notion upon *plain Scriptures*, the universal suffrage of antiquity, (till the time that praying to *saints* and *angels* came in,) and upon the principles and practices of the Jews before Christ: who always looked upon *creature-worship* as *idolatry*. You build your *dissent* to such a cloud of witnesses upon no-

thing, that I can yet perceive, but some *metaphysical* speculations about *self-existence*, generation being an *act*, acts being all acts of the *will*, necessary generation being *coaction*, and the like. And when, in the strength of these speculations, you have discarded God the Son from the *one Godhead*; then you have recourse to such principles as Pagans first, and Papists since, have made use of in favour of *idolatry*, to bring in the *worship* of the Son at a back-door; instead of fixing it where *Scripture*, and *antiquity*, and all sober Christians have ever fixed it. You ask me, if I “really think that the worship of the “Father does as much terminate finally in the Son, as the worship of the Son terminates finally in the Father?” But let me ask you, do you really think that any *creature-worship*, any *inferior* worship terminates in the Father? I have shewn you that it does not, and cannot. Your own argument therefore turns upon yourself. Either the supposed *inferior* worship terminates in the Son, and then it is *ultimate*; or it terminates in the Father, and then it is *supreme*: choose which you please. I say, what I take to be sense and truth, that it terminates in the *divine nature*, considered primarily in the Father and *derivatively* in the Son: and now all is right. You ask, if the Son’s “glorifying the Father” means the very same thing with the “Father’s glorifying the Son?” Yes, the very same thing: how can you doubt of it, when you read John xvii. 1? And as to Phil. ii. 9. I question not its meaning being the very same.

I allowed, that prayers are *generally* to be offered rather *through*, than *to* the Son, because of his *being Mediator*. You ask, how this is consistent with the allowing no distinction of *mediate* and *ultimate* worship? You should have shewn how it is *inconsistent*: but you choose rather to amuse your reader with *words*, where you give him no distinct *ideas*. Either the Son is not worshipped in this case, or he is worshipped: if he is not, there is no *mediate* worship; if he is, then in worshipping the Father *through him*, his *divinity*, and *essential union* with the Father, (which alone can render our services accepted, and unite us to God,) are at the same time acknowledged. And so the worship of both is *one*, being an acknowledgment of the same *divine* excellencies under a distinction of *Persons* and *offices*. Where do you find two different worships, more than two *different natures* in these cases? Only the *worship*, as the *nature*, being *one*, is considered primarily in the Father, and secondarily in the Son: this is all you can make of it. You will never

prove any thing of *inferior* worship, unless you can first prove the nature of the Son to be *inferior* to the Father. Why then do you not come to the pinch of the question, instead of amusing us with little cavils wide of the point? You fall to your usual quibbling with *abstract essence*, which has been often answered. You proceed to repeat your pretence about *derived* and *underived*; which indeed makes, in a manner, the sum total of your Reply; having little else to retreat to when pressed. Yet you love not *metaphysical* speculations. Let us see, however, what these curious things are: "that is, either derived and underived are the same, and the Son has the underived "perfections of the Father derivatively: or else self-existence and underived self-sufficiency are no perfection at all." Here is nothing in this matter but quibbling upon the word *same*; which must admit of a closer and larger sense: or else there is no such thing as *same substance* or *same perfection* in the world: I am sure in your way of considering every thing as *extended*, there is not. To answer them more directly; the perfections of the Father and of the Son are *equal*, and the same in *kind*, though differing in the *manner* of existing, *underderivatively*, and *derivatively*: and they are also the same in *number*, by reason of their inseparable unity and coexistence. That *union* is sufficient to make *sameness*, numerical sameness, you must allow, as I have often hinted: otherwise how do you suppose innumerable extended parts of substance to make one *numerical* substance? Or will you venture to say, that they are the same *specifically*, and no otherwise, making *many* substances in *number*, though the same in *kind*? These *metaphysical* subtilities therefore ought to be dismissed, as being of no use in our present question. The same *substance* or the same *perfections* may be both *derived* and *underived*; allowing such a sense of *same* as you admit yourself in other cases.

I charged you with begging the question all the way, as confounding a *distinction* of *Persons* with difference of *nature*. You have nothing to say to *nature*. But what is the meaning of this shifting, but shutting your eyes against a necessary *distinction*, which at once discovers the fallacy of your reasonings, and leaves you utterly destitute of any further reply? It is not that you understand not *nature*: but you understand it too well to be ever capable of getting over so clear and plain a distinction. You have nothing further worth notice, till you come to consider *antiquity*, p. 375.

I began with Justin Martyr, shewing that he maintains the *worship* of the Son; and upon *my* principles, not *yours*. You cite some passages out of him to prove the contrary. I stand amazed at your note, p. 375, wherein you insinuate, as if Justin were for the worship of *angels*; nay, and had set them before the Holy Ghost. I little thought you would fall in with Bellarmine and other Roman Catholics, in an interpretation which has been so often confuted by learned Protestants. I will not do over again what has been done to my hands. Let the reader consult the authors in the margin^x upon that passage of Justin. Justin speaks of honouring the Son in the *second place*: he does not say with *inferior* worship: he says expressly second in *order*. He says also, that the *Word*, who *is of the uncreated*, or *necessary existing God*y, (intimating thereby, as I conceive, the necessary existence also of the Λόγος himself,) *we worship, and we love next after God*. Next in *order* again, he does not say with *inferior* worship, or *inferior* love. He adds the reason why we are to *love* him, namely, on account of his merits in our redemption.

Your next quotation from Justin proves only that God has *commanded* his Son to be *worshipped*: and so has Christ commanded us to worship his Father. What is this to the point of *inferior* worship?

Your last proves, that we worship the Father *through Christ*; which I readily admit.

What you say to Athenagoras and Theophilus requires no further answer than what I have given more than once. As to Tertullian, I have shewn before, that he is directly against inferior worship. You have nothing from Clemens, but that God is worshipped *through Christ*; which is wide of the purpose. As to the place cited by you out of his *Protrepiticum*, it has been considered above^z.

Irenæus is plainly on my side of the question, as never making any distinction of *supreme* and *inferior* worship, never allowing worship to any *creature*, asserting Father and Son together to be *one God*, and testifying that the same acts of adoration^a under

^x Le Moyne Var. Sacr. Not. p. 180. Bull. D. F. p. 72. Op. Posth. p. 962, 1037. Clerici Histor. Eccles. p. 616. Nourr. Apparat. ad Bibl. Max. p. 414.

As to *angels* being taught by God the Son, see Clem. Alex. p. 769. Iren. p. 163. Cyril. Hierosol. p. 90. ed. Bened.

^y Τὸν γὰρ ἀπὸ ἀγεννήτου (leg. ἀγε-

νήτου) καὶ ἀρρήτου Θεοῦ Λόγον μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν προσκυνούμεν, καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, ὅπως καὶ τῶν παθῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων συμμετοχος γενόμενος, καὶ ἴδαισι ποιήσεται. *Apol.* ii. p. 35.

^z Page 455.

^a Qui igitur a prophetis adorabatur Deus vivus; hic est vivorum Deus et

the Old Testament were applied to both. You have two objections to make against it: one, that Irenæus makes a prayer to God *through Jesus Christ*; which has no difficulty: the other is, that every knee, according to the *good pleasure* of the Father, is to *bow to Christ*; which scarce carries the face of an objection. For why may not the Father, who, according to his *good pleasure*, makes known *himself*, and demands worship to *himself*, do the like for his Son?

Hitherto the point in dispute is clearly determined on my side, by antiquity. Origen's principles appear more disputable: but when he is rightly understood, he will be also an advocate on the same side. I shall first lay down the arguments on my side, and vindicate the same from your exceptions: and then shall consider what counter-evidence you have pretended out of him.

1. In the first place. Origen declares fully against the worship of all *creatures*^b whatever; clearly distinguishing the Son from the *creatures*.

This you say nothing to.

2. The *reasons* which Origen founds worship on are applicable to the Son, as well as to the Father. The *uncreated nature*, ἀγένητος φύσις, is adorable as such: but such is the nature of God the Son: I have proved above, that he makes the Son ἀγένητος. The δημιουργὸς τοῦ παντός, *Creator of the universe*, is adorable as such: but such also is the Son. To this you object, (p. 380,) that the Father is *primarily* Creator, (so you ought to have rendered πρώτως δημιουργὸν, and not *primarily* Maker,) the Son only *immediate* Maker, at the Father's command. But a difference in *order* or *manner* makes no difference in the thing itself: or if there be any, the Son is more properly *Creator* than the Father, according to the strictness of the expression in Origen.

Origen's doctrine is, that he who *made all things* is *adorable*, as such: and he asserts expressly, that the Son *made all things*, the very words^c. To which you again object, that he made them at the *command of the Father*: which I allow in such sense as the ancients meant it, explained above. But the point of *worship* is not put upon the *primary* manner of making, nor upon the

Verbum ejus, qui et loquutus est Moysi, &c.—Ipse igitur Christus cum Patre vivorum est Deus qui loquutus est Moysi, &c. p. 232.

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 419, 425.

^c Ibid. vol. i. p. 425.

commanding to make, by Origen, but upon the *making*: so that in this respect there is no difference.

3. I further pleaded Origen's supposing the Son to be *worshipped*, because *God*^d. And I have above proved^e, that he is to be worshipped as *one God* with the Father: therefore their worship is *one*, not *two worships*, supreme and inferior.

4. I pleaded, lastly, that the worship of Father and Son is *inseparably* and *undividedly* one, according to Origen. His words are: "Now he has ascended to the God of the universe, who *undividedly, inseparably, unpartedly* worships him through the Son, the *Word* and *Wisdom* of God, seen in *Jesus*, who alone brings those to him that^f," &c.

You were sensible how strong this passage was against your principles; and therefore endeavoured to pervert the sense, by foisting in a word into your translation. You say, "with an undivided, undistracted, unparted affection." Where do you meet with *affection*? Or how came it in here, where the author is not talking of the *undistractedness of our affections*, but the *undivided worship* of Father and Son? He is commenting on 1 Cor. viii. 6. where it is said, "one God, of whom are all things," and also "one Lord, by, or through, whom are all things:" and this made him bring in the discourse of worshipping one by the other *inseparably*. What follows in that sentence further shews, that this must be his meaning; where he observes, that it is the Son only, who is the very *Word* and *Wisdom* of God (well therefore may he be *undivided* from God) that brings men to God. This then may shew you what worshipping the Father *through* the Son means in Origen: it is directing the worship to the Father; but so as to look upon the Son as *inseparably* worshipped in the same act. I illustrated the thought by a parallel place of the elder Cyrils, which you take no notice of.

^d Origen. *contr. Cels.* p. 46.

^e Page 436, 466.

^f Ἀναβέβηκε δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸν, ὁ ἀσχίστως καὶ ἀδιαρέτως καὶ ἀμερίστως αὐτὸν σέβων διὰ τοῦ μόνου προσάγοντος ἐκείνω υἱοῦ, τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον καὶ σοφίας ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ θεωρουμένου, &c. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 382.

^g Μῆτε διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸν πατέρα νομίζειν, ἐν τι τῶν δημιουργημάτων τὸν υἱὸν ὑποπέυσσωμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς πατῆρ δι' ἐνὸς υἱοῦ προσκυνεῖσθω, καὶ μὴ μεριξέσθω ἢ προσκύνησις. *Cyril. Catech.*

xi. p. 143. Ox.

Μία γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ θεότης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μία τιμὴ καὶ μία ἐστὶ προσκύνησις, ἡ ἐν υἱῷ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ γινομένη τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ οὕτω προσκυνῶν, ἓνα Θεὸν προσκυνεῖ. *Athan. Orat.* p. 3. 555.

Dum ad solius Patris personam honoris Sermo dirigitur, bene credentis fide, tota Trinitas honoratur. Et cum ad Patrem, litantis destinatur intentio, sacrificii munus omni Trinitati uno eodemque offertur litantis officio. *Fulgent. ad Monim.* lib. ii. c. 5. p. 31.

Having now seen what Origen's real and certain doctrine was upon this head, it will be the easier to take off the force of your pretended counter-evidence from the same Origen.

There is but one passage, in his whole treatise, that looks at all favourable to your principles; and that being obscure, and of doubtful meaning, ought never to be set against *many* and *plain* ones, but rather to be interpreted by them. I gave a sufficient answer to it before, producing the passage in the margin. You tell me that. "for a very good reason I thought not fit to translate it." I must own, I do not love to abound in translations, only to swell pages; while I suppose myself writing more for the use of *scholars*, than for the *populace*, who are scarce competent judges of our disputes about *antiquity*. I perceive, you are very full of *translations*, out of Eusebius especially; as if you intended *show* more than any thing else: for they are of no more real weight, than if I were to translate as much out of Alexander, Athanasius, or Cyril the elder, and throw it before the readers. But this by the way. I return to Origen. The passage, justly and literally rendered, runs thus: "All *supplication*, and *prayer*, and *intercession*, and *thanksgiving*, "are to be sent up to the God over all, by the High Priest, "who is above all angels, being the *living Word*, and *God*. "And we may also offer *supplication* to the *Word* himself, and "intercession, and *thanksgiving*, and *prayer*; if we can but "understand how *prayer* is taken in *propriety of speech*, or in an "*improper sense*h."

What I gather from this passage is, that *prayer* in the most *proper* sense is to be understood of prayer directed immediately to the Father. This has been the most usual and common method of *praying*: wherefore this kind of *praying* has obtained generally the name of *prayer*, and is what the word *prayer* has been ordinarily used to mean. Origen does not say, that the *prayers*, *supplications*, *intercessions*, and *thanksgivings*, offered to God the Son, are none of them properly so called; but he makes his remark upon *prayer* only: and he does not say, that even *prayer*, when directed to God the Son, is not *proper divine*

h Πᾶσαν μὲν δέησιν γὰρ καὶ προσευχὴν, καὶ ἔντευξιν, καὶ εὐχαριστίαν ἀναπεμπτέον τῷ ἐπὶ πάνσι Θεῷ, διὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀγγέλων ἀρχιερέως, ἐμφύχου Λόγου καὶ Θεοῦ· δεησόμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Λόγου, καὶ ἔντευξόμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ εὐχαριστήσομεν, καὶ προσευξόμεθα δὲ,

ἐὰν δυνώμεθα κατακοῦειν τῆς περὶ προσευχῆς κυριολέξεως, καὶ καταχρήσεως. *Orig. contr. Cels. lib. v. p. 233.*

Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. p. 121. Bingham, *Origin. Eccl. lib. xiii. c. 2. p. 45, &c.* *Origen. περὶ εὐχ. p. 78. in notis.*

worship, or that it is *another* worship, or an *inferior* worship: nor can any such consequences be justly drawn from his words. All that we are obliged to grant, in virtue of this passage, is, that one part of *divine* worship called *prayer*, is most properly and emphatically *prayer*, when *directed* to the *first Person* of the Godhead; inasmuch as that method of *praying* has been most customary and prevailing, and has thereby, in a manner, engrossed the name of *prayer* to itself: just as *addresses*, by being most commonly offered to a prince, come at length, by use, to mean *addresses* of that kind only; and then *addresses* to *others* are not so properly *addresses*. *Prayer* then, properly, or emphatically speaking, is praying to the Father, to whom all prayer *primarily* belongs. Allowing this to be Origen's meaning, (and it is the very utmost that can be made of it,) how will you prove *supreme* and *inferior* worship from it?

I have before observed, that the worship of the Son, according to Origen, is properly *divine*; being offered to him as *Creator*, and as *necessarily existing*, and as *God*: and I observed also, that Father and Son together are worshipped as *one God*. I observed further, that even in prayers directed to the Father *through the Son*, the Son is supposed, by Origen, to be worshipped *undividedly* in the *same act*. How then do you make out your *two worships*? Suppose the prayer to pass *through* or *by* the Son to the Father; still it is *one prayer*, *one worship*, considered as belonging to both in a different manner. For as the *one work* of creating descends, as it were, *from* the Father *by* the Son; who are therefore *one Creator*: so the *one worship* ascends, as it were, *by* the Son *to* the Father; who are therefore *one object* of worship. You should have proved two *unequal* worships: but you have proved no more than this, that *one* and the *same worship*, diversely considered, is paid to both, in the very same act: to the Father directly, as being *primarily* and *eminently* Creator, God, &c. and *supreme* in order and office; to the Son obliquely, or interpretatively, as being *equally* God, Creator, &c. but *God of God*, and *mediating* between God and man. There is therefore no difference in the worship itself, no *superiority* or *inferiority*, no acknowledgment of *higher* and *lower* perfections: but the same worship, the same acknowledgments of the same infinite perfections, admit of a different manner of application, to keep up a sense of the distinction of Persons, order, and offices.

You represent Bishop Bull (p. 383) as making a distinction

of *one worship* paid to the Son as God absolutely, and *another worship* paid to him as God of Godⁱ. This is not a just representation of Bishop Bull, as if he admitted *one and another worship, two worships*, to God the Son; when he makes but *one worship* of all, due to Father and Son. This, I suppose, was to give some colour to your own *hypothesis*. Bishop Bull's meaning is plainly this; that the Son is considered as *divine* whenever we worship him; and that that alone is the *foundation* of his worship^k. But we may consider him barely as *divine*, abstracting from all relations of *order* and *office*; or *divine* in such an *order*, or together with the *office* of *Mediator*. The *divine worship* is the same, under these *three conceptions*, because *divine* enters them all: but the additional consideration of *order* and *office*, in the two last, makes a difference, not in the *worship itself*, but in the *order* and manner of *applying* it.

You proceed to cite another passage of Origen^l, where arguing *ad hominem*, (as the Schools call it,) he pleads a *command* for the worship of Christ, against Celsus; who could plead no command for the worship of the Pagan deities. This was indeed shewing a very great difference in the two cases, such as was worth insisting upon: but it does not from hence follow, (the contrary is very evident,) that Origen ever *founded* the worship of Christ upon mere *command*, without reference to the dignity and real *divinity* of his Person. What you further cite from the piece *περὶ εὐχῆς*, whether Origen's own, or foisted in by some other hand, is of no moment in the case, being clearly contradicted in his treatise against Celsus, which is certainly *genuine*, and contains Origen's last and maturest thoughts upon the subject. Do you ever find Origen placing the Son among the *γεννητὰ* in his book against Celsus? Doth he not constantly distinguish him from them, and set him above them, making him *ἀγέννητος*, as I have proved? Or does he ever deny that Christ is to be prayed to at all; as this author of the piece *περὶ εὐχῆς* does? No, but he frequently, plainly, and fully asserts the contrary.

What you add (p. 386) about *doxologies* is low and trifling;

ⁱ Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 9. s. xv. p. 120.

^k Vid. Bull. Prim. Trad. p. 36.

N. B. The design of this piece of Bishop Bull, is to prove that the worship paid to Christ is properly *divine*, and

not merely *mediatorial*. From whence let the reader judge with what *truth* or *fairness* you represent Bishop Bull as differing from me, in the allowing *mediatorial worship*, p. 120.

^l Orig. contr. Cels. p. 384.

especially after that matter has been so carefully and accurately discussed by learned hands. And your quoting the lying Philostorgius in a matter of fact of Flavian's introducing a new kind of doxology, which he reports against the faith of all history^m, is a great affront upon your readers.

I might quote you a better authority than Philostorgius, namely, Theodoritⁿ, to prove that Arius introduced a change of the ancient *doxologies*. But learned men know that neither of those accounts is true: but that *doxologies* of both sorts were in use long before either Flavian on one side or Arius on the other.

You go on to other writers, endeavouring to prove, as you say, *mediate* and *ultimate* worship: that is your phrase now, instead of *inferior* and *supreme*; because you imagine the reader may more easily be *deceived* under those terms, than under these. For if the Father be but worshipped *through* Christ; presently you cry out *mediate* worship; though it be all one *divine* worship, not *two*: and either the Son is not worshipped at all, in such a case; or, if he is, the *same* worship is then offered to *both*. The nature of the worship is not altered by the manner of *conveyance*; any more than a present of *gold*, made to two persons, becomes *brass* to one and *gold* to the other, only by being conveyed through one to the other. You will never be able to prove any difference in the nature or kind of the worship, merely from the *economical* manner of applying it. You begin with the Apostolical Constitutions; which you know are of no authority: and so I shall not trouble myself to shew that the passages, were they really genuine, are nothing to your purpose. You go on to Polycarp; who glorifies God *through* Christ. Cyprian says, that the Father *commanded his Son to be worshipped*: therefore his worship is *mediate*. Wonderful! Novatian says, if Christ be a *man* only, why is he *invoked* as *Mediator*? therefore again his worship is *mediate*. You did not consider Novatian's notion of a *Mediator*, that he must be both *God* and *man*: and so you lost the whole force of his argument; which was to prove the Son to be *God* from the *invocation*, and not *man* only, as some heretics pretended.

What you cite from Lactantius, I have answered above: or if I had not, you must be sensible that very little stress ought to

^m Vid. Bull. D. F. sect. ii. c. 3. p. 51.

ⁿ Theod. Hæret. Fab. lib. iv. c. 1.

be laid upon a few uncautious expressions of a catechumen, not yet perfectly instructed in the doctrines of the Church, which was the case of Lactantius. He had, however, learned so much of the Church's doctrine, as to determine directly against you in the present question; where he says, *one honour* belongs to both as to *one God*, and that their worship is *inseparable*°.

As to Eusebius, your last evidence, though I build little upon so late and so suspected an authority, (which, as I have often hinted, you ought no more to urge against me, than I to urge Alexander, Cyril, Athanasius, or Hilary, against you.) yet neither had he any such mean thoughts of God the Son as you have: nor did he found his *worship* upon any such low principles; which I have shewn above. He is, however, the first you could find, among such as have been ever called Catholics, who pretended to say, that Father and Son are not *ισότιμοι*, the first that durst ever flatly contradict St. John, (or rather our Saviour himself by St. John,) where he says, "that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." John v. 23. I conclude with the same declaration I formerly made, that "I desire only to have things *fairly* represented, as they *really* are: no evidence smothered or stifled on either side. Let every reader see plainly what may be *justly* pleaded here or there, and no more." Had you attended to these good rules, which you are pleased to remind me of, and to favour with your approbation, you might have brought your book into a less compass; and perhaps have done as much *real* service to your cause, and less hurt to your character.

QUERY XVIII.

Whether worship and adoration, both from men and angels, was not due to him, long before the commencing of his mediatorial kingdom, as he was their Creator and Preserver, (see Col. i. 16, 17,) and whether that be not the same title to adoration which God the Father hath, as Author and Governor of the universe, upon the Doctor's own principles?

IT is proper the reader should be let into the full design and purport of this Query, that he may be able to pass a more certain judgment of the pertinence or impertinence of your answer. The question is, whether the worship of Christ be founded upon

° *Unus est honos utrique tribendus tanquam uni Deo: et ita dividendus est per duos, cultus, ut divisio ipsa compage inseparabili vincitur.*

Neutrum sibi relinquet, qui aut Patrem a Filio, aut Filium a Patre discernit. Lact. Epit. c. xlix. p. 141. ed. Cant.

any thing *antecedent* to his incarnation and exaltation, or only upon the *powers* then supposed to be given him. If it was founded on any thing *antecedent*, then the Doctor and you have very impertinently cited Matt. xxviii. 18. John v. 22, 23. Phil. ii. 10, 11. and the like texts, as carrying in them the sole *foundation* of his worship, after the manner of the Socinians: if it was not founded on any thing *antecedent*, what account can you give of Christ's being *Creator*, of his being *God* before the creation, John i. 1, of his having "glory before the world was," and the like? In short, the Doctor is here confounded between two schemes, Socinian and Arian, and very unskilfully endeavours to tack both together; which is utterly impracticable. Either let him found the worship of the Son upon what was *antecedent* to the incarnation, and then he may tolerably go on upon the Arian scheme: or if he chooses to found it entirely upon the *subsequent powers*, he is all over Socinian, and does not know it.

My design is not to suffer you to take the advantage of *both* the schemes, which are utterly inconsistent with each other. You must either drop your Arian principles, and so settle in Socinianism: or if you resolve to retain your Arian tenets, you must drop your Socinian pleas, to be all of a piece. This is what you may easily be driven to; and that was the design of this Query. If the reader takes this along with him, he will readily perceive how hard you are here pressed; and how elusive and insufficient all your answers are.

You say, whenever the *mediatorial kingdom* began, the *worship* however of Christ was by the *command* of the Father. That I allow: and so was also the worship of the Father first introduced by the *command* of the Father. Hitherto you are only shifting; and come not to the pinch of the *question*; namely, *when* the worship *began*, or *whereon* it was *founded*. What follows, (p. 392,) is still evading, and running from the point in question. What comes nearest to it is your saying, that *he by whom God created all things* has not the same title to *adoration* with him *who created all things by him*. Well: but has he any title at all upon the foot of his being *Creator*? Or do you make him a mere *nominal* Creator? If, according to Heb. i. 10, "he laid the foundation of the earth," and if "the heavens were the works of his hands;" and if he was *God* before the creation, (according to John i. 1,) then shew me, that the *power of judging*, or any thing of like nature subsequent, ever could be a *higher* or an *equal* foundation of worship with what has been

mentioned. You cannot shew, that he was made a *God* after his resurrection: but it is plain, and you cannot gainsay it, that he was *God* before the creation. Wherefore I insist upon it, that he had as clear and full a title to worship before his incarnation, as any you can shew after: and therefore it is strangely inconsistent of you to *found* his worship upon the *power of judging*, &c. No one ever would do this that believed the Son to be *God* and *Creator* (though in a lower sense than the Father) before the world. The Socinians were shrewd men, and shewed some parts and sagacity in the working up their scheme. They founded the worship of Christ upon the *power of judging*, and his *exaltation*: but then they were never so silly as to suppose him *God* and *Creator* before. The Arians founded the worship of Christ upon his being *Creator* and *God* before the world: but then they were not so weak as to found it upon the *power of judging*, &c. Whereas you, to give a specimen of your great dexterity in forming a scheme, have marvellously tacked two parts together, one of which will suit only with the Socinian scheme, the other only with the Arian or Catholic; thereby betraying great unskilfulness and want of thought. Which of these parts you will at length give up, I know not: but all men of sense and common discernment will laugh at you for holding *both*.

When I wrote my Defence, the Doctor had not determined that God the Father is ever called *God*, in Scripture, in the *metaphysical* sense. Worship even of *him* was to be founded only upon his *office*, (God was then a name of *office*) *relative* to us. I was therefore of opinion, that if the Son was *Creator*, as great an *office* as any, and as highly meriting of us, he must then, upon the Doctor's own principles, have the same title to adoration as the *Father* himself had: nor do I see, that you have yet been able to baffle this reasoning. You have been forced to allow, (obliged thereto by the unanimous current of antiquity, Eusebius not excepted,) that the Son is *immediate* Artificer, or *Creator*, of the universe. This is meriting as highly of us as is possible; more, one would imagine, than merely giving out *commands*; which is an honour you reserve peculiar to the Father. If therefore worship be founded, not upon any *dignity* and *excellency of nature*, but upon *relative offices*; it seems to me, that the Son's title to our worship is as clear and full as possible, upon your *own* principles; such, I mean, as they were at that time. My argument therefore was good when I made it; however you may

have varied your notions since. I add further, that my argument, from the hand the Son had in *creating*, will remain impregnable for an *equality* of worship, whatever principles you take up in hopes to elude it: though that particular was not the special purport of this Query.

You had argued against *creating* being a just *foundation* of worship, because *no act of dominion*: to which I replied, that the same argument would hold with respect to the *Father* also: and so his *creating* the world would be no foundation for worshipping him, being no more an *act of dominion* than the *Son's* creating is. To which you now reply, that the world was made by the *Father's* "original absolute authority and power." This is not defending your *first* answer, but retreating to *another*. However, this will not do, any more than the first. For you will never be able to prove, that the Son is not as completely and fully *Creator* as the *Father*: and Scripture never founds worship upon the *original undervived* manner of creating, which you speak of. but upon the *creating* itself. What you object from Rev. iv. 10, 11. "created for his pleasure," has been answered above⁹. You go on upon this argument of the *Son's* having the *same title* that the *Father* has, though but a by part of the Query. Not a word do you say to clear yourself of *Socinianism*; not a syllable to vindicate your inconsistency in *founding* the *Son's worship* upon his *mediatorial powers* given after his resurrection; at the same time admitting that he was *God* before the world, and *created* the world. This perhaps was too tender a point to be touched.

To pursue you in your own way. I pleaded John xvii. 5, "Glorify me with the glory," &c. not to prove that the Son had the *same title to worship* which the *Father* has; but to shew that the *glory* he had after his incarnation was *not greater* than he had before: and therefore it was a weak thing of you to overlook his *former glories*, equal to any, and to found his *worship* upon what came after. To this you reply. (p. 394.) "His being restored to "the glory he had before, does not prove that the power of "judgment, &c. was not an additional exaltation." Yes, but it proves something more; that even after *all judgment was committed to him*, he was yet not invested with *that glory*, not with so *great glory*, (for why should he ask for less, if he had greater.) as he *had before the world was*. But you add, that "if the Son

^p See my Sermons, p. 73, 74 of this volume.

⁹ Page 519.

“ had the same right to *glory* that the Father had, it could be no more proper for the Son to pray to the Father, to *glorify him*, than for the Father to pray to the Son.” But the case is different, because the Son was *incarnate*, and not the Father: therefore it became the Son to *pray*, but not the Father. Aye but, say you, could not the Son himself have given it by his own authority? Yes; but as the Father did not disdain to receive *glory* from the Son, why should the Son refuse to receive *glory* from the Father? As to Irenæus’s testimony, that the Son was of old worshipped together with the Father, it is a very plain one; and I have given it above. The Father and Son together are there expressly styled the “ God of the living:” and it was the “ God of the living” that the Patriarchs *adored*.

You have a pleasant remark (p. 142.) on that passage of Irenæus: you say, I take no notice of the *emphatical* words, *resurrectio autem ipse Dominus est*. Behold, now I have taken notice of them: of what use are they. I beseech you, in our present debate? How do they at all lessen the force of my argument? Would you have it, that Christ was adored by the Patriarchs of old, as *God*, because he was to be exalted to be *God* 2000 years after? You should speak out plainly, that a reader may understand you: unless your design be to give a hint as if you had something material to say, when you have really nothing. It puts me in mind of the Modest Pleader, who once thinking himself obliged to quote, at full length, a noted passage of Bishop Pearson’s, which had been usually cut into halves, (the latter half begins with, “and therefore,”) he claps this note upon it: “ What that learned writer meant by the word *therefore*, I submit to the judicious reader^t.” No doubt but he would have the *judicious reader* imagine there is something weighty in the remark; though he can neither shew *what* nor *why*. But to proceed.

I had referred to Eusebius and Athanasius, as both agreeing that God the Son was worshipped by Abraham, Moses, and the Jewish Church: it was therefore the sense of the ancients in general, (as we may safely conclude from these two writers, and their agreement; were there no other proofs,) that God the Son had distinct worship paid him long before his incarnation: and therefore his *worship* (whatever it were) could not be founded on the commission to *judge*, or the like, as you have founded it. After your many boasts of the *ancients*, ground-

^r Page 672.

^s See it above, p. 533.

^t Modest Plea, p. 212.

less and shameless as I ever met with, here in a very important point, the point of *worship*, wherein our practice is nearly concerned; here, I say, you run counter to all the Catholics of the primitive Church; nay, to all the sober Arians, who will hereafter rise up in judgment and condemn you, for founding Christ's worship so *meanly*, upon I know not what *powers* given after his resurrection. They founded it upon reasons *antecedent* to his incarnation, upon his being *God* before the world, and *Creator* of the world by his *own* power^u.

You endeavour to shew that Eusebius's doctrine about the worship of Christ runs not so high as mine. Perhaps it does not: I did not cite Eusebius for that purpose. But I cited him as an evidence, to prove that all antiquity is directly and fully against your way of founding Christ's worship in the *power of judging*, &c. You have none of the ancients, except such as Photinus, or Paul of Samosata, to countenance you in it: the Arians, at least the generality of them, would have been ashamed of it. This is what I before pressed you with; and you, in your reply, dissemble and totally conceal it, leading your reader off to quite other things.

What you have from Philo is still diverting, and running off from the main point: nor are Philo's notions, in this case, of any moment in the controversy; unless the Apostles and primitive Christians had no better guide than Philo. Philo might hit upon some truths, but shaded with errors, and not breaking out with full lustre and brightness. A clearer and fuller discovery was a privilege reserved for the Christian Church. Your remark (p. 397.) about the *angel* which appeared to Manoah is just: and had you looked into the last edition of my Defence, you would have found that part corrected. For it is not my way, after I perceive any mistake, to persist in it.

To conclude. The reader is desired to observe, that you had been charged with taking in two inconsistent schemes (Arian and Socinian) into one, and tacking them very absurdly together; that you have been called upon to declare which of the disjointed parts you will give up, or else to shew how it is possible to make them stand together; that after mature deliberation, you have made no answer to the charge, but have passed it over

^u Christum colimus ut *Creatorem*. *Serm. Arian. ap. August.* p. 663.

Antequam faceret universa, omnium futurorum Deus et Dominus, Rex et *Creator* erat constitutus. Vo-

luntate et præcepto (*Patris*) cælestia et terrestria, visibilia et invisibilia, corpora et spiritus, *ex nullis existantibus*, ut essent, *sua virtute* fecit. *Serm. Arianor.* p. 622.

in profound silence. These are the *facts*; let every honest reader judge what to *infer* from them.

QUERY XIX.

Whether the Doctor hath not given a very partial account of John v. 23. founding the honour due to the Son on this only, that the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; when the true reason assigned by our Saviour, and illustrated by several instances, is, that the Son doth the same things that the Father doth, hath the same power and authority of doing what he will; and therefore has a title to as great honour, reverence, and regard, as the Father himself hath? and it is no objection to this, that the Son is there said to do nothing of himself, or to have all given him by the Father; since it is owned that the Father is the fountain of all, from whom the Son derives, in an ineffable manner, his essence and powers, so as to be one with him?

THOUGH you have nothing under this Query but what I have before fully answered or obviated; yet because you are pleased to repeat, I shall repeat also. Dr. Clarke's pretence is, that Christ's *honour* is *founded* upon the *power* of *judgment* committed to him: I say, his honour is *founded* on the *intrinsic* excellency and *antecedent* dignity of his Person; whereof the power of judgment committed is only a further attestation, and a provisional security for the payment of his due honour. It did not *make* him *worthy*, but *found* him so: and it was added, that such his high worth and dignity might *appear* to men, and be acknowledged by them—"The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son, that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." This is not giving us the *formal reason*, or *foundation* of his *honour*, but the *final reason*, or *moving cause*, why the Son is to execute judgment rather than the Father himself. It is because men would hereby be apprised of his *antecedent* worth and dignity, and at the same time be incited to pay him suitable honour, in external acts of *worship* and *adoration*, as to the Father himself. This is the obvious, natural construction of the place in St. John; as I before intimated. And I confirmed it by the accounts which St. John has given us of his *antecedent* dignity, his being *God* before the creation, and his *creating* the world; which makes it plain, that the *committing* of *judgment* was no addition of *new* dignity, but rather declarative of the *old*; that it might *appear* the more fully, and be the more secure of the *effect* upon mankind. This

reasoning appearing to me very clear and just, demanded as clear an answer. But you have little to say, except in the way of *objection* and *repetition*, about *derived* and *underived*: which is not arguing from *Scripture*, but from *metaphysical* notions you have taken up about *sameness*, and such as you allow not in any case but this; contradicting that strict notion of *sameness*, as often as you make an infinite number of extended parts to be the *same* substance.

To what you repeat from the Modest Pleader about the Father's being *Fountain*, I returned a sufficient answer in a note to a Sermon^x. You ask, "Can one person commit powers to another who had already in himself the same powers?" Yes, by voluntary *economy*, the exercise of powers *common* to many may devolve upon one chiefly; and may run in his name. I gave you a proper rebuke in my Defence, vol. i. p. 438, for your expressing great *amazement* at my *prejudice* and *blindness* in maintaining only what had been held by all the Christian churches. I reminded you of the many *wise*, *great*, and *good* men, whom you charged through my sides. "This," you say, "is not a right way of dealing with Scripture." That was not the point: but it might be a right way of dealing with a gentleman who was gone beyond *decorum*, and appeared too full of *himself*; forgetting that a *modest* deference is due to *wise*, *great*, and *good* men, even where we *dissent* from them. But to pass on.

I charged your interpretation of John v. 19. as *unnatural* and *forced*, making the context *incoherent*. "The Son can do nothing but by commission: for" (observe the reason) "he can do every thing the Father does." But if the sense runs thus, *The Son being one with the Father can do nothing separately*, then the context is coherent; "for whatsoever the Father doth, the Son does also, or likewise." You say, "The word *for*, in the latter part of the 19th verse, is not the reason given of what went before, but that the latter part is a parenthesis." But who will give you the liberty of making a *parenthesis* where there is no occasion, only to serve an *hypothesis*? I shewed, that you cannot make your sense out of the passage, but by supplying the deficiency of the text with what the text has not said. Which observation of mine you call *retracting* the charge before made, when it is really *enforcing* it: and I preferred the Catholic interpretation as more *natural*, and as arguing no *deficiency* in the text. Besides that, admitting the sentence to be elliptical, in order to make the sense *coherent* in your way of construction;

^x Sermon II. p. 55, 56 of this volume.

yet I took notice further, how very harsh and strange it must sound for a creature to be commissioned to do all that the Creator does. To which you have nothing to reply, but that your interpretation does not suppose the Son created. Say then, that he is uncreated, and let us end the dispute; provided only you will please to mean, as well as say. I accept, however, of your tacit acknowledgment, that my argument against the Son's being a creature is unanswerable. How far you are concerned in it, the readers will judge. You go on; "it must be odd, and strange, that the supreme God should be commissioned." Nothing strange at all, that one who is supreme in order and office, should give commission to another not supreme in order or office; though both be equally supreme in nature; which is the true notion of supreme God.

I shewed you what answers had been formerly given to your objections by Hilary, Chrysostom, Cyril, and Austin: in reply to which, you tell me, that Novatian and Eusebius were more ancient Fathers. But did I put it upon the authority of the Fathers which I cited? I insisted upon the reasons they gave, against those very pretences which you revive. And why did you not answer them? Their reasons were drawn from Scripture, and founded on the text itself; against which neither Novatian nor Eusebius is of any the least weight. But thus you love to disguise the true matter in question, and to lead your reader off to something wide and foreign. However, Novatian has not a word to your purpose; unless copying out the Father's works (*imitator operum Paternorum*) proves the Son to be of a different nature from the Father. Tertullian, ancients than either Novatian or Eusebius, understands the Son's doing nothing of himself, of the intimate conjunction of the Father and Son, the Son being in the Father, and seeing all that he does, or rather all that he designs or conceives. He goes upon the old notion, that the designing or conceiving part belongs peculiarly to the Father, the executive and finishing part to the Son: and thus Father and Son

γ *Filius nihil a semetipso potest facere, nisi viderit Patrem facientem. Pater enim sensu agit; Filius vero qui in Patris sensu est, videns perficit; sic omnia per Filium facta sunt, et sine illo factum est nihil. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. 15.*

Τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς τύπους ἐνοσημαίνεται μὲν ὁ πατήρ, ἐπιτελεῖ δὲ ὁ Λόγος, οὐ δουρικῶς, οὐτ' ἀμαθῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπιστημονικῶς, καὶ οἰκειότερον εἰπεῖν,

πατρικῶς. *Greg. Naz. Or. xxxvi. p. 584.*

Eusebius has the like thought, which he expresses however in terms somewhat harsh:

Ὁ μὲν οὖν πατήρ διετύπων, καὶ ἡτοίμαζε διανοούμενος, &c.—ὁ δὲ τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς λογισμοῖς ἐνατενίζων, καὶ μόνος ἐποπτεύων τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βάθη, δι' ἔργων ἐχώρει, τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξυπηρετούμενος νεύμασι. *Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. iii. c. 3. p. 164.*

were jointly concerned in every operation. As to Eusebius's authority, where he has not *reasons*, nor elder Fathers to support him, it is worth nothing. Athanasius has writings extant older, probably, than any we have of Eusebius's: except his oration before Paulinus of Tyre, or what may be had in Pamphilus's Apology. And as to Hilary, there is about twenty years difference between his age and Eusebius's: a mighty thing for you to boast of.

I excuse your citing (p. 404.) a sentence of the Semi-Arians in Epiphanius; mistaking it for Epiphanius's own; I suppose you did it ignorantly. And it is the more pardonable, because *learned* men had formerly made the same blunder: though, I believe, never since the time that Petavius's sagacity set that matter right in his notes to his edition, the same that you made use of.

To your argument drawn from the Father's *loving* the Son, I replied, that he *loves* also himself: which is no matter of *choice*. You pretend, however, that "shewing the Son all things, is "free:" which you have no ground for saying, but it is purely fiction to serve an *hypothesis*. Your adding, his "giving authority to do likewise," is corrupting the text, which says nothing of *authority*; though, if it had, it might be understood of such authority, power, and perfections, as descend with his nature from the Father to the Son.

You quote John xv. 10. of Christ's "abiding in his love." If you see any consequence favourable to your principles in that text, you should have shewn it: I can see none. You tell me of bringing Hilary in again: and you entirely slip over the reasons I produced from him, without any answer. Is this dealing fairly with the reader?

I had challenged you to shew, that one person may not be *delegate* to another, without being unequal in *nature*. But you are frightened, as usual, with the distinction of *order* and *nature*: and run off in the utmost confusion. A "delegated "power," you say, "cannot be equally supreme and independent." Come out of the clouds, and tell me what you mean by *supreme* and *independent*. If you mean as *great* a power, and as *necessarily existing*, I shall tell you, there is no difference between the *Father's* and the *Son's*: if you mean, that the Son's is *of the Father*, the *Father's* from *none*. I allow a supremacy of *order*, and a different *manner* of existing; and the question is not *whence* the Son has his powers, but *what* they are. As to supremacy of *order* being only in placing of *words*, I have shewed

your inconsistency on that head above. Your blaming me for citing Ruffin's translation. in a case where it is all one whether the words were Ruffin's or Origen's, is low carping. You did not perceive that the passage was brought in among several others of Post-Nicene writers; and intended only for illustration. But you are still more offended at my styling my doctrine *the doctrine of the Trinity*; as if others had not as good a right to style theirs so. Supposing you have, (which I deny,) yet sure I may style my own according to what I take to be right and true. But your Trinity of a *great God, a little God, and no God*, must have some strong figure to help it, to make it a *Trinity*; which is a word that has long stood for a quite different thing.

I had retorted upon you your own arguments against the received doctrine of the Trinity; to shew the world how *unequal* and *partial* you have been in the handling this controversy. You had several maxims about *individual*, about *sameness*, about *substance*, about *being*, which were to be urged as of great force against the doctrine of the *Trinity*; though of no force in another subject, upon your own principles. You could allow being and being, where you could not say *beings*; substance and substance, where you could not say *substances*; *individual* substance, where yet you could distinguish between *this* and *that*; and *same* substance, where it is not the *same* in such a sense of *same*, as you urge against us. *Sameness* by *union* you can allow, where you have a mind: only in our present dispute, no such thing was to be admitted. This unreasonable, and indeed shameful conduct, in so momentous an affair, I endeavoured to expose as it deserved. The reader may please to look into my Defence, vol. i. p. 444, &c. to see what I had to say on that head: I have no mind to repeat. Pressed with the difficulties of the *omnipresence* retorted upon you, you now tell me, that my foundation was wrong, in supposing *the substance of God to be God*. This I am a little startled at: let us hear what your philosophy can produce in defence of so wild a paradox, that *the substance of God is not God*. I will give the reader your words at length, that he may marvel: "God is
"neither the substance of God, nor the attributes of God, but
"he is that intelligent Agent whose both the substance and

z Τριάς ὡς ἀληθὸς ἢ τριάς ἀδελφοί. τριάς δὲ οὐ πραγμάτων ἀρίστων ἀπαρίθμησις—ἀλλ' αἰσῶν καὶ ὁμοτίμων σύλληψις. *Greg. Nazian. Orat. xiii. p. 211.*

Εἰ δὲ τριάς ἐστίν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔστι,

δεδείκται δὲ ἀδιαίρετος οὕσα καὶ οὐκ ἀνόμοιος. ἀνάγκη μίαν ταύτης εἶναι τὴν ἀγιότητα, καὶ μίαν ταύτης τὴν αἰδιότητα, καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀτρεψίας φύσιν. *Athanas. Ep. i. ad Serap. p. 678.*

“ attributes are. And as infinity, for instance, so every other “ attribute, power, or perfection, of the omnipresent Being, is the “ individual attribute, power, or perfection, of that one individual “ intelligent Agent, whose the omnipresent substance is,” p. 407. The philosopher that fixed the *earth* upon an *elephant*, and the *elephant* upon a *tortoise*, and knew not where to go next, could not be more confounded than you appear to be here. The *substance*, it seems, is to be fixed upon the *Person*, (which is neither *substance* nor *attribute*; but something between both.) and thus all difficulties are wiped off at once, by making *person* stand for nobody knows what; an *idea*, I suppose, or nothing. I have often suspected your notion of *intelligent agent* to be very confused; but never thought it so wild and unaccountable as this comes to. Do you consider that *intelligent* and *agent* are two *adjectives*, which suppose a *substantive*, two attributes that require *substance* for their support? Say that *person* is the subject: but then what is *person*, but either *substance*, or *attribute*, or *nothing*? Resolve it into its several *ideas*, and you will find that *person* always implies *intelligent* and *acting substance*; not *intelligent acting nothing*. Now intelligence, and activeness, are *attributes* only of *God*, that is. of the *divine substance*; which is *God*, and what we mean by *God*, as often as we speak of him, considered as the *subject* of his own attributes.

I know not whether you might not be led into the mistake through the *vulgar* way of speaking about the *substance* of *God*, or substance of the *Father*; as if the substance were not *God* himself, or not the *Father* himself, but something *belonging* to him. The same way of speaking might be as good an argument to prove, that the *Person* of the *Father* is not the *Father*, but something *belonging* to the *Father*. Such a mode of speech is very common in other cases; as when we say the *body of the moon* for the *moon*, or the *matter of the world* for the *world*. Which kind of language has its reason and foundation in our way of forming and ranging our *ideas* for our more *distinct* perception. For, not content with a *general* confuse *idea* of any thing, we take it, as it were, into pieces, or parcels, for a more distinct and particular view of it. The *idea*, suppose, of *God* the *Father*, we divide into two *ideas*, *substance* and *attribute*; and attribute again into many *ideas* still more distinct and particular. And now *Father* stands for the *general* confuse *idea*, while *substance* and *attribute* are considered as parts of it, and belonging to it. This I take to be the true account of that way

of speaking ; as well in this, as in the other cases above mentioned. So, though *the Person of the Father* be really nothing else but the *Father* ; yet it is considered as something *distinct*, after we have once parcelled out the *general confuse idea* into several particular *ideas* ; as into *person, power, goodness, &c.* for the greater *distinction*. Then even *Person* is considered as but part of that *confuse idea*, for which the word *Father* stands ; and it is conceived to belong to it, as a *part* to the *whole*. Hence, as I apprehend, arises the way of speaking before mentioned ; which is right and just in respect of our *ideas*, but very inaccurate in regard to the *things* themselves, for which the *ideas* stand : because indeed our *ideas* are not *adequate* ; being formed in a way suited to our own *infirmity*, rather than to the *truth* and *strictness* of *things*.

QUERY XX.

Whether the Doctor needed have cited 300 texts, wide of the purpose, to prove what nobody denies, namely, a subordination, in some sense, of the Son to the Father ; could he have found but one plain text against his eternity or consubstantiality, the points in question ?

YOU have little under this Query but *repetition* and *reference* : which requires no further notice. As to the *Form of Baptism*, which you mention in the close, I have considered it in a distinct Discourse^a, which you had seen before you came to this Query. You have nothing to object but a passage from the spurious Constitutions, of no value ; and another from Eusebius, of very little. I content myself therefore with referring to my Defence and Sermons.

QUERY XXI.

Whether he be not forced to supply his want of Scripture-proof by very strained and remote inferences, and very uncertain reasonings from the nature of a thing confessedly obscure and above comprehension ; and yet not more so than God's eternity, ubiquity, prescience, or other attributes, which we are obliged to acknowledge for certain truths ?

YOU tell me, in the entrance, that “ none of Dr. Clarke's propositions, on which he lays any stress, are drawn by mere reasonings from the incomprehensible nature of God.” But what think you of *five* of his *propositions*, where he denies the *necessary existence* (for so you now understand *self-existence*) of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* ? Has the Doctor so much as *one text* in the

^a See my eighth Sermon, p. 171, &c. of this volume.

Scripture for any of them? Not a syllable, either in *Old* or *New* Testament, but what he pretends to infer from very *obscure* and *uncertain* reasonings about *derived* and *underived*, about *acts* and *no acts*, about *necessary* agency being *no agency*, about *will*, *coaction*, &c. profoundly *metaphysical* and *fanciful*, with nothing solid or certain in them. The like may be said of the doctrine contained in his 17th proposition; which has no text of Scripture to stand upon, though he lays great stress upon it. In short, I observed in my Defence, and here repeat, that “the main strength of the Doctor’s cause lies first in his giving either a *Sabellian* or *Tritheistic* turn (admitting no *medium*) to the Catholic doctrine; and then charging it with *confusion* of *Persons*, *Polytheism*, *nonsense*, *contradiction*. Take away that, (to which his constant resort is, whenever he comes to the pinch of the question,) and there will be little left considerable.” For the truth and justice of this report, or censure, I appealed^b to the Doctor’s own books, which is a fair procedure: and if you have any thing to say in vindication of the Doctor, shew that the fact is otherwise than I represented. Not being able to do any thing of this kind, you endeavour, as usual, to turn it off by *retorting*; and to put me upon the *defensive*, having nothing to plead in defence of the Doctor or yourself. This may serve to *blind* a reader, and to conceal your *shame*: but it is not answering Queries. You fall again upon 1 Cor. viii. 6. which has been answered over and over. What is that to the point now in hand, the Doctor’s making *strained inferences*, except it be giving one example more, by his wresting of that text?

As to God’s “eternity, ubiquity, prescience,” you say, “they themselves are the subject of our belief, not particular men’s philosophical explications of the *manner* of them.” Well then, let it be the subject of our belief, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; and that they are the *one God* of the Christians. But as to the *manner* how they are *three*, or *one*, let nobody concern himself about it. If any one, under pretence of explaining the *manner*, changes the *sense* of the word *God*, making the Son a *nominal* God only, and the Holy Ghost scarce so much; what is this but doing the same, as if under pretence of explaining the *manner* of *eternity*, *ubiquity*, or *prescience*, he should introduce the doctrine of a *nominal*, not *real* eternity; a *nominal* ubiquity, a *nominal* prescience; undermining the doctrines themselves? Our dispute is about the

^b See my Defence, vol. i. p. 450, 451, 464.

sense in which any of the Persons is *God*: let this be determined by Scripture and antiquity, and proper rules of *criticism*. Make no objections from the *manner* how the thing should be: for all such objections are as improper, as it would be in the question of *presciences*, *eternity*, or *ubiquity*; to leave Scripture, and such approved rules as serve to determine the sense of it, and to retreat to philosophical reasonings about the *manner* how these things are. This is the very fault which you have perpetually run into. And while we are bringing you plain *Scripture* proofs for Christ's *divinity*, as plain as can be brought for the *divinity* of the *Father*; you are filling people's heads with *Tritheism* and *Sabellianism*, with *specific* and *individual*, with *identical wholes* and *undivided parts*, with *acts* and *no acts*, with *causes* and *no causes*, with *derived* and *underived*, with *co-ordinations*, *three supreme Gods*, *three substances*, and I know not what; all cavils taken from the *manner* of the thing, and intended to undermine the *doctrine* itself, which is and ought to be the *subject of belief*. You will say, perhaps, that we have not so full proof of this doctrine, as we have of *eternity*, *prescience*, or *ubiquity*. Admit we have not: yet let that point, as to the

^c A late author, in his Appeal to a Turk or Indian, being pressed with the instance about *prescience* and *free agency*, has no way of coming off, but by denying that there is so much as a *seeming repugnancy* between the two ideas, p. 5. He is the first man of *parts* who, after considering the subject, ever thought so. I could name him many of the clearest heads and finest wits among *ancients* and *moderns*, (such as Dr. Burnet of the Charter House, Mr. Locke, &c.) who have been so sensible of the *seeming repugnancy*, as to despair of ever clearing it, or reconciling the *ideas*. Is there no *seeming repugnancy* in maintaining that the same act is *certain*, as being foreknown, *uncertain*, as depending on the *will* of a free agent? I should be glad to see the *seeming repugnancy* answered, or took off any other way than by an humble acknowledgment of our *ignorance* in the *high things* of God. And I would remind this author, that this very instance about *prescience* and *free will* carries much greater difficulty in it than the doctrine of *three* and *one*. For there is no argument, I know of, against the *latter*, but what is capable of a just

solution: that is, it may be shewn where the argument has a *flaw*, and where the *chain* breaks. But in the other case, I think, the utmost we can do is only to *prove* that the argument must have a *flaw somewhere*, though we see not *where*; being content to resolve all into the inscrutable perfection of the divine *Prescience*, which infinitely transcends our finite capacities. With this author's good leave, then, *there is a difference between these two cases*: but the advantage lies wholly on the side of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as being more easily *defended* than the other. And if he pleases but to point his *logic*, contained in page 6, against *free will*, or *prescience*, with the same *rigour* as he intends it against the *Trinity*, I dare promise him an absolute victory *there*, though not *here*. But this, perhaps, the author was not aware of; any more than of the *difference* between saying, that few understand the *doctrine* of the *Trinity*, and few understand the *controversy* about the *Trinity*; committing the same blunder twice, p. 12, 153. See my Supplement, p. 363 of this volume.

truth of the doctrine, be decided by *proper* evidence: discarding all vain pretences about the *manner*; and then we may bring it to a short issue.

“The directions,” you say, “given in Scripture concerning the worship of God and Christ (and not philosophical conjectures concerning substances and essences) ought to be the guide of our practice.” Let us then follow the directions given in *Scripture*: not *philosophical* conjectures about *self-existence*; nor Pagan distinctions about *absolute* and *relative*, *ultimate* and *mediate* worship; nor *precarious* suppositions of one that had been *God* and *Creator* before, becoming *greater* by being appointed *Judge*. Let worship, all religious worship, be paid, as Scripture every where directs, to *God* alone, and to no *creature*. Let none have worship that *cannot* be proved to be *God*, nor any want it that *can*: and then there will soon be an end of all disputes; and *worship* will stand upon its old foundations, as it had ever stood, before Pagans, Arians, and Papists perverted and corrupted the true notions of it.

You state the main question between us in these terms, (p. 413.) “Scripture,” you say, “tells us there is but one God, even the Father.” Yes: Scripture styles the Father the “one or only God:” that is all you should pretend. The same Scripture styles the Son *God*, ascribing also *divine* titles, attributes, glory, to him. Now let your question be put: “In what sense these two propositions are, according to reason and the use of language, best understood to be consistent.” I have at large considered this very question, so stated, in a distinct Discourse^d; which was published before this part of your Reply was put to the press: as appears by your quoting my Sermons in the former part. I have therefore just reason to complain of your *complaint*, which you have borrowed from the Modest Pleader; and which, whatever was then, you have now no pretence for. I have shewn abundantly that your argument from the *exclusive terms* is not, either *according to reason* or *use of language*, of any weight, in comparison to the proofs we bring of Christ’s being God in the *same sense* as the Father is, and *one God* with him. The 1 Cor. viii. 6. which you urge in such a manner as if the whole Scripture was to yield to *one text*, and that misinterpreted, has been often answered. You blame me for not expressing my faith in any *Scripture positions*: as if every thing I assert as matter of faith were not as much *Scripture*

^d Sermon IV. p. 84, &c. of this volume.

position, according to my way of understanding Scripture, as yours is to your *Scripture position* according to your way: only the difference is, that mine is the Catholic, approved way; yours is partly Arian and partly Socinian.

Under this Query, I entered into a discourse about the meaning of believing *mysteries*, in answer to the objection, that our doctrine is *not intelligible*. I shewed both of the doctrine in *general*, and of the *particulars* most usually excepted against, that they are *intelligible*; as intelligible, at least, as *omnipresence*, *eternity*, *prescience*, God's *simplicity*, *self-existence*, &c. To the main of the discourse you have nothing to reply: but here and there you throw in some short strictures upon such parts as you think proper.

I had said, "the learned are hardly agreed, whether self-existence be a negative or positive idea." Upon which you remark, "how absurd this is I have already shewn." What is absurd? The *report* I had made of learned men, and their differing on that head? No; the fact is undoubtedly true. But it is absurd for any one to make the idea *negative*: that, I presume, is your meaning. And yet you here entirely mistake what I was talking about; and have certainly determined on the wrong side of the question. For the question upon which the learned have differed is this; whether when we say any thing exists *of itself*, or is *self-existing*, the words *a se*, or *of self*, have any *positive* meaning, or mean only that it does *not exist of another*. Some have carried the notion of its being *positive* so far, as to say God is the *cause of himself*^e, or even *made himself*, as Lactantius expresseth it: which is supposing the *idea positive* indeed, and is manifestly absurd. Dr. Clarke, one of the latest writers, and from whom one might have expected something accurate, yet appears to be all over confused upon this very head in his famous "Demonstration" of the "Existence." His professed design there is to prove the existence of a *first cause a priori*: which has no sense without the supposition of a cause *prior* to the *first*: which

^e The expressions of *αυτογενής* and *αυτοφύης*, if strictly taken, lead to such a meaning. As also *ex se ortus*, *ex seipso*, and the like. Petavius cites several testimonies of this kind. *De Trin.* lib. v. cap. 5. p. 294.

Υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ. Synes.

Solus Deus est, itaque principium; qui ex seipso dedit sibi ipse principium. *Zen. Veron.*

Deus—ipse sui origo est, suæque

causa substantiæ. *Hieron. in Ephes.* 3.

Id quod est, ex se, atque in se continens. *Hilar.*

Ex se principium cui contigit. *Hilar. alter.*

"Ἐχει ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶναι ὃ ἐστὶν." *Zach. Mitylen.*

Sui namque principium.

Ex seipso procreatus—ipse se fecit. *Lactant.*

yet is *nonsense*. The Doctor was too wise a man to say that God is the *cause of himself*: and yet he says what amounts to it unawares. He speaks of "necessity of existence," as being "antedecedently, in order of nature, the cause or ground of that "existence f:" which is, in short, making a *property* or *attribute* antecedent, in order of nature, to its *subject*, and the *cause* and *ground* of the subject. And he talks in his Letters, of this necessity *absolute* and *antecedent* (in order of nature) to the existence of the first Cause, *operating* every where alike g. As if a *property* operated in *causing* the substance, or making it to be what it is. All this confusion seems to have been owing to the Doctor's not distinguishing between *modal* and *causal* necessity; and his not considering that *self-existence*, or *aseity* h, as the Schools speak, is *negative*; and does not mean that the *first Cause* is either caused by any thing *ad extra*, or by *itself*, (much less by any *property* of itself,) but has no cause, is absolutely *uncaused*. I was not therefore considering, whether any, or what *positive* perfections are implied in *self-existence*, or in any being that is self-existent, as you hastily apprehended, but whether *self-existence* (having plainly a reference to the question *whence* the thing is) is to be considered *positively* or *negatively* in regard to the *cause* of that existence. I have now determined, I think upon plain reasons, that it is *negative* only; and that we are not to suppose any cause, *external* or *internal*, but absolutely *no cause*; because there is no cause *prior* to the *first*. The true way of ending the dispute about the attribute of *self-existence* being *positive* or *negative*, is by shewing what *ideas* are supposed to be contained in it. No doubt but *existence* is a positive idea: and the question only is, whether the manner of existing expressed by *self* denotes any thing *positive*. It is plain it doth not, since it means existing from *no cause*, which is *negative*; though such *existence* implies all positive perfections. Bishop Stillingfleet on the Trinity (p. 278.) says, "To be from *himself*, in the sense "generally understood, is a mere *negative* expression:—and in "this sense only, learned men have told us, that it is to be "understood by those ancient and modern writers, who have "used that expression, as when St Jerome saith, that God

f See Demonstration, &c. p. 9, 10, 16. Letters, p. 35, 36, 16.

g Letters, p. 20, 37.

h Hanc Dei proprietatem quidam ex recentioribus philosophis *aseitatem* vocarunt, quia Deus, eo quod princi-

pio caret, est *a se*, non ab alio; contenduntque eam esse *positivum* attributum; quod eodem quidem redit ac id quod diximus, sed vocibus novis sine causa expressum est. Clerici *Pneumatol.* cap. 3. p. 150.

“ is *self-originated*, and St. Austin, &c.—All these and such “ like expressions are only to be *negatively* understoodⁱ.” To return.

You proceed to make two or three little exceptions (scarce worth notice) to what you met with in my Defence. You declare that your argument against the Son’s being God, in the *strict sense*, is not founded upon what *can* or *cannot* be, (which I am glad to hear,) but upon 1 Cor. viii. 6, which I have often answered. You acquaint me further, (p. 416,) that “ two supreme “ Gods” cannot be “ one supreme God ;” which I readily agree to: as neither can two Gods, supreme and inferior, be one God, or ever stand with the Scripture doctrine of *one God*. But two Persons in *nature* equal, and so equally supreme, may be one *supreme God*.

You assure me, that you did set out “ upon the foot of Scripture, and do continue upon that foot still.” I heartily wish you could *mean*, as well as *say*, and not revoke all again presently, by denying the Son and Holy Ghost to be *necessarily existing*: which you have not the least syllable of *Scripture* to countenance you in. And I wish you would not every where represent a distinction of *order* or *office* to be inconsistent with the *divine Unity*: which again you have no *Scripture* for, but mere fanciful speculations. You have the less reason to blame me for mentioning *office* in respect of God: because, you know, there was a time, when the word *God* was thought to be always a relative word of *office*.

As to Lucian’s Philopatris, I have given my thoughts of it above, (p. 439.) Your hints about a passage of Irenæus, which I had sufficiently explained^k by another of Novatian, and a third of Tertullian, are very trifling. Those heretics thought it mean and degrading for *God* to become *man*: which made some of them deny Christ’s *divinity*, and others his *humanity*; all, the union of *both natures* in *one Person*. Whether you or I give the most countenance to those *heretical* tenets, I leave the reader to judge.

QUERY XXII.

Whether his (the Doctor’s) whole performance, whenever he differs from us, be any thing more than a repetition of this assertion, that being and person are the same, or that there is no medium between Tritheism and Sabellianism? Which is removing the

ⁱ See Pearson on the Creed, Art. i. p. 39.

^k Defence, vol. i. p. 463.

cause from Scripture to natural reason, not very consistently with the title of his book.

YOU begin with telling me, that “if two or more intelligent agents can be the same being, or subsist in the same individual substance, (provided the agents be not all of them self-existent,) this will no way affect the truth of Dr. Clarke’s propositions.” The reader is to know that by the *same being*, or *substance*, in this case, is understood the same *necessarily existing* substance: for *necessary* and *precarious*, that is, *uncreated* and *created*, cannot be called the *same individual substance*. By *self-existent*, as you have now explained yourself, you mean *necessarily existing*. The sum then of what you have here said amounts to this wise sentence; “If two or more intelligent agents can be the same *necessarily existing being*, or subsist in the same *necessarily existing* substance, (provided the agents be not all of them *necessarily existing*,) this will no way affect the truth of Dr. Clarke’s propositions.” What is this to the purpose? Do not you here plainly deny that two persons can be one *necessary* being, or substance? And this is what Dr. Clarke has often denied¹; and could never give a sufficient reason for doing it. Indeed the Doctor (or you for him) seems at length to have given up his general principle, which he first insisted upon, viz. that “two persons cannot be one being;” which he chiefly grounded upon the consideration of the imaginary *composition* implied in it. I say, he appears to have given this up; being at length sensible that he has allowed, in another case. *substance* and *substance*, *being* and *being*, to make *one substance* and *one being*, without any *composition*. But what the Doctor (or you) insist upon now, is, that two *such* Persons cannot be one *necessary* Being or substance; or that *derived* and *underived* cannot be both included in one *necessary substance*. Which though it be putting the objection upon a different foot, yet wants to be proved as much as did the other: and is equally liable to the charge I brought

¹ Three intelligent agents in one individual, identical substance, is so self-evident a contradiction, that I think no reasoning can make it plainer than intuition. *Dr. Clarke’s Three Letters*, p. 31.

Two persons to be *one being*, I think a manifest contradiction in terms. *Clarke’s Reply*, p. 157.

Two persons in one and the same

individual *uncompounded* being, is an express contradiction. *Ibid.* p. 169.

Two individuals cannot, without an express contradiction, have an identity of nature. *Ibid.* p. 184.

The reason why our Saviour could not affirm that *he and his Father were one Being*, is because he would thereby have affirmed that they were *one* Person. *Ibid.* p. 291.

against the Doctor in this Query, his removing the cause from *Scripture* to *natural reason*; to a philosophical question, whether the ideas of *self-existence* and *necessary existence* be the same or different, or whether *underived* expresses an essential perfection, all that *necessary existence* does, or only a *relation* of order, and mode of existence. After all your pretences to *Scripture*, you really resolve the dispute into this *metaphysical* question: and you cannot advance your cause at all by *Scripture*, but by the help of your *metaphysics*. You take your rise from 1 Cor. viii. 6, to come at *unoriginate*: thus far is commenting upon *Scripture*. The rest is *philosophy*, false philosophy, drawing inferences from *unoriginate* to *self-existence*, from *self-existence* to *necessary existence*, from thence to the Father's being *alone* necessarily existing, from thence to the *exclusion* of the Son from being *necessarily existing*, from thence to the making him a *precarious* being, (though in words you deny it,) and from thence to his being a *creature*: this is the course of your reasoning. Your *πρώτου ψεῦδος*, or fundamental error, lies in your *philosophy*, confounding *unoriginate* (as did the ancient Eunomians) with *necessary existence*; which you have no foundation for: or if you be allowed to make *necessary existence* the same with *self-existence*; you will then never be able to prove that the Father *alone* is self-existent; or that the *self-existence* of three Persons (so understood) is at all inconsistent with a *real* distinction of *order* and *office*. It will be changing the *names* of things, and nothing more. It is manifest, from what I have observed, that *Scripture* is not the thing you trust to, but *philosophy*; because when we have granted you all you pretend to have proved from *Scripture*, viz. that the Father is the *first* Person, derived *from none*, you are still but where you were, till you call in *philosophy* and *metaphysics* to make out the rest, and to determine the main question. You are now pleased to put the matter upon this, whether two supreme Persons can be one supreme God. You say, (p. 420,) “two equally supreme Persons united may be in the complex sense, *one Being, one substance*; but they will not consequently be one supreme Governor, one Lord, one God.” Now here, in the first place, I very much blame your not attending to the distinction of supreme *in nature* and supreme *in order*. It is in the first sense only that we assert two or three *supreme Persons*; supreme in every perfection, having no *higher* or *lower*, no *better* or *worse*, no degrees of essential *power, wisdom, or any other* attribute. At the same time, those Persons, thus *equally* supreme

in *nature*, are not equally supreme in *order*, but two of them are *subordinate* to one, the *Head* and *Centre* of Unity. And because they are in nature *undivided*, and in *order* referred up to that one *Head* and *Fountain* of all; they are therefore, with him, *one Governor*, *one Lord*, and *one God*. And though the authority, the dominion, the power be considered always *primarily* in the Father, yet is it *common* to all; only with this *order*, that the Father has it *from none*, they *from the Father*: so that all that remains peculiar to the Father is a preeminence, or priority of *order*. This is the Catholic doctrine which you are endeavouring to confute: but, instead of arguments, you generally give us only ambiguous words and names, to confound and perplex what ought to be kept clear and distinct.

You tell me of running counter to *Scripture* and *antiquity*, in making more than one “absolutely supreme over all.” Here you are only doubling upon, or trifling with, the word *supreme*. I make three *supreme* in *nature*; I suppose one only *supreme* in *order* or *office*: shew me either *one* text of *Scripture* or one *single* testimony of Catholic *antiquity*, (I allow not Eusebius for such,) that plainly contradicts *either* of these *positions*. They appear to me, both of them, true and just positions; founded in *Scripture*, and confirmed by the universal suffrage of the *ancients*. If they appear not consistent in your *philosophy*, own it frankly and ingenuously, as an honest man would: but do not misreport *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

What follows in p. 421 is only repeating your own *fictions* both of me and of the *ancients*.

I had appealed to the Prophet Isaiah, as interpreted by St. John, making Father and Son “one Lord of hosts.” You tell me bluntly, “there is no such thing in the texts;” referring me to Dr. Clarke’s *Scripture Doctrine*. I say, there is in those texts all that I before asserted: and why do you now refer me to Dr. Clarke, whose pretences I had before^m considered, and, I think, confuted?

You tell me that neither the ancient writers nor Bishop Bull are at all of my opinion in the point of “equal supremacy of “dominion.” But so far as I apprehend of the *ancients* and of Bishop Bull, they were exactly of my opinion, as they are directly opposite to yours: and I wonder at your presumption in claiming any acquaintance with them or interest in them.

You have a pretty argument (p. 425.) to prove St. Paul a

^m Sermons, p. 43 of this volume.

Pagan and an idolater, upon my principles; that is, upon the principles of the Catholic Church in all ages; for mine are no other. But how is this wonderful consequence to be raised? It is first by supposing, that St. Paul excluded the Son from the *one Godhead*; an imaginary consequence drawn from 1 Cor. viii. 6. And next by supposing, that St. Paul allowed *mediate* and *inferior* worship; another *imaginary* inference drawn from 1 Tim. ii. 5. Phil. ii. 11. After sporting yourself a while in so ridiculous an argument, you come to invent something for me to say: you suppose I shall say, that our Lord is *that one God* mentioned 1 Cor. viii. 6. which you think highly absurd. But what if I should plead, that *that one God* is a silly expression, where there are not *two one-ods*; and therefore should rather say, that our Lord is not *that Person* there styled *one God* by way of eminence, but another Person, who is yet *one God* with him. Your interpretation of the *gods many* and *lords many*, as alluding to the *superior* and *inferior deities* of the Pagans, stands upon the authority of Mr. Mede: who, like a modest and learned man, proposed it only as a plausible *conjecture*, not with the confidence you speak of it. An ingenious gentlemanⁿ has very lately suggested several things on that head well deserving consideration; and such as appear sufficient to make Mr. Mede's construction pass for *precarious* at least, if not certainly *false*. There is one obvious objection to be further used against it; that to make the *gods many* answer in the comparison, (in your way,) they should be understood to be many *supreme* Gods; which yet the heathens never asserted, but the contrary; as Dr. Cudworth and other learned men have abundantly shewn. To me it appears, that the *many gods* and *many lords* mean the same thing, under different names; and that St. Paul, in opposition to having *many*, asserts that *all things* were *of* the one God, and *by* the one Lord, intimating their perfect *unity* of power, perfection, and operation, so as to be both but *one God* and *one Lord*; the one Lord being *one* with the one God, and *vice versa*. To proceed: how well you have been able to answer the charge of *Polytheism* has been seen before: and particularly as to Origen, it has been shewn that his answer to the charge in his piece against Celsus was nothing like yours, but directly contrary; affirming Father and Son to be *one God*.

I pass over your *repetitions* in p. 426, 427, which have been abundantly answered. Two Gods, one *supreme* and another *in-*

ⁿ Mr. Wade's Short Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. p. 39, &c.

ferior, is so manifestly your doctrine, that you do but expose yourself to ridicule by struggling to evade it. The Socinians, in this, were plainer men, and did not scruple to confess a clear thing.

You pretended, before, to bring Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers against me, as to the point of charging you with *Polytheism*. I knew you had none, but that you had unhappily deceived yourself with a few second-hand scraps of Athanasius, Hilary, and Basil, which you understood not. I answered your pretences, and produced full and plain testimonies^o against you, both from Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene antiquity. One was out of a fragment of Dionysius Romanus, preserved by Athanasius: a very valuable one, and such as *no critic* will ever doubt of, as to its being genuine: your exceptions therefore against it, as of doubtful authority, are not worth the notice; besides that I have answered them above^p. Another testimony I produced from Athanasius himself, (or perhaps Basil,) who makes it *Ditheism* either to suppose *two principles*, or to admit *one God underived* and *another God derived*. Your remark upon him for it is so very shrewd and sagacious, that it is pity the reader should lose it: he shall have it in your own words: “ You cite a passage of Athanasius, that he who introduces a “ God underived, and another who is a God derived, makes two “ Gods: which is not very consistent with his own foregoing “ words, that *he who introduces two original principles preaches “ two Gods*: for, that in this unoriginate principality over all, “ consists the unity of God, was the express doctrine of all the “ Ante-Nicene writers.” Now are you really so blind as not to have perceived, that that *origination* (according to the ancients) was not supposed to make the Father *one God* exclusive of the other Persons? But because two of the Persons were referred to one as their *Head*, undivided from him; therefore *all three* together were the *one God*. This was the use they made of the *origination*: not to throw out the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, as you do, but to take them both in. Yet you are constantly representing that *origination* in a quite different light, and to a quite different purpose; meanly quoting Bp. Pearson for it: who contradicts you in the very same sentence, and represents the case as it really stood among the *ancients*, being a *learned* and a *judicious* man.

Upon this occasion, I shall here translate that passage of

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 470.

^p Page 634.

Athanasius, that the common reader may see what the ancients thought of *Tritheism*, in a very few words :

“ He that introduces *two principles* (or *heads*) preaches up *two Gods* : such was the impious doctrine of Marcion. Again, he that asserts an *uncreated* God, and another God *created*, does also make *two Gods* ; because of the difference of nature (*essence*) which he blasphemously introduces. But where there is one Head, (or *Father*,) and one offspring from him, there is but *one God* ; the Godhead being perfect in the Father, and the perfect Godhead of the Father being also in the Son.” I refer the reader to my Defence, (vol. i. p. 470,) for the *original* ; where he will also find other passages to the same purpose.

What you produce next from Justin, Novatian, Hilary, and Bishop Pearson, the reader may judge of by the last of them ; whom you quote as saying, “ This origination in the divine Paternity has anciently been looked upon as the assertion of the unity.” Here you stop, as usual. The very next words of Bishop Pearson are ; “ and therefore the Son and Holy Ghost have been believed to be but one God with the Father, because both from the Father, who is one, and so the union of them^q :” directly contrary to what you cited him for. Such are your representations of authors ; such your manner of using the common reader.

QUERY XXIII.

Whether the Doctor's notion of the Trinity be more clear and intelligible than the other ?

The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity is, how three Persons can be one God ?

Does the Doctor deny that every one of the Persons, singly, is God ?

No : Does he deny that God is one ? No : How then are three one ?

Does one and the same authority, exercised by all, make them one, numerically or individually one and the same God ? That is hard to conceive how three distinct Beings, according to the Doctor's scheme, can be individually one God, that is, three Persons one Person.

If therefore one God necessarily signifies but one Person, the consequence is irresistible ; either that the Father is that one Person, and none else, which is downright Sabellianism ; or that the three Persons are three Gods.

Thus the Doctor's scheme is liable to the same difficulties with the other.

^q Pearson on the Creed, p. 40.

There is indeed one easy way of coming off, and that is, by saying that the Son and Holy Spirit are neither of them God, in the Scripture-sense of the word. But this is cutting the knot, instead of untying it; and is in effect to say, they are not set forth as divine Persons in Scripture.

Does the communication of divine powers and attributes from Father to Son and Holy Spirit, make them one God, the divinity of the two latter being the Father's divinity? Yet the same difficulty recurs; for either the Son and Holy Ghost have distinct attributes, and a distinct divinity of their own, or they have not: if they have, they are (upon the Doctor's principles) distinct Gods from the Father, and as much as finite from infinite, creature from Creator; and then how are they one? If they have not, then, since they have no other divinity, but that individual divinity, and those attributes which are inseparable from the Father's essence, they can have no distinct essence from the Father's; and so (according to the Doctor) will be one and the same Person, that is, will be names only.

Q. Whether this be not as unintelligible as the orthodox notion of the Trinity, and liable to the like difficulties: a communication of divine powers and attributes, without the substance, being as hard to conceive, nay, much harder, than a communication of both together?

YOU begin thus: "The difficulty in the conception of the Trinity, is not how *three Persons can be one God*. For the Scripture no where expresses the doctrine in those words: and the difficulty of understanding a Scripture doctrine ought not surely to lie wholly upon words not found in Scripture." The reader is to know that this is a *new turn*, intended to bring you off from the first state of the question, where you happened to lose yourself in your first answer. However, though it may pass for an ingenious shift in distress, there is very little in it more than in your *first* answer. Only it is hard upon me to have *new* answers now formed to *old* Queries, and to be put upon changing my method of *defence*, as often as you are pleased to vary your responses. Whoever taught you this *new turn* was a man of no great prudence or foresight: he did not consider how it inevitably recoils upon Dr. Clarke. For the Scripture no where expresses in words or in sense his *main doctrine*, that the Father alone is *necessarily existing*, that neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost is *necessarily existing*; (so you now confessedly understand *self-existence*;) these are tenets not found in Scripture expressly, nor so much as deducible by any consequence, or shadow of a

consequence. Why then did you not consider better, before you drew up a charge upon others, which at length falls only on your own friends? You go on: "It is very strange that a man of your abilities should write a large book without so much as knowing, or ever once being able to express, what the true question is." And it is very strange that a man of your abilities should perceive nothing of my *mistaking* the *question*, when you first answered the *Queries*; but should be forced to learn this at length of the *Modest Pleader*, from whom you have been content to echo it. Though my *abilities* are very slender, yet this mean suggestion will hardly find credit, even among the lowest readers that can at all distinguish between a *probable* untruth, and one that is plainly *romantic*. When you are again disposed to abuse an *adversary*, do it a little more artfully; if without any *truth*, yet with a little *discretion*. But I excuse you for being misled by a third person, who was too wise to set his *name*. As to the *question*, I have not mistook it, but have kept close to it; while the Doctor and you have been either industriously disguising it, or unfairly running from it. You might think it sufficient, if your shifting and shuffling in so momentous a controversy (which plain and honest men, on either side, can but hardly excuse) be passed over as *tolerable*; or may but admit of any *candid* and *plausible* colour, from the circumstances you are under. It becomes you not, in the mean time, so magisterially to correct others for stating the question *right*, and as it ought to be stated. Had you but had the courage and spirit of your friend Mr. Whiston, I doubt not but you yourself would have stated the question as he, and I, and all men of sense and undisguised ingenuity have ever done. But enough of this.

You were here to clear Dr. Clarke's doctrine of the charge of *three Gods*. You first observe, that the word *God* no where in Scripture denotes the *Holy Ghost*. Well then, you will throw him out from being *God*, and reduce the number to *two*: though, when I wrote before, I imagined Dr. Clarke and you had admitted the *Holy Ghost* to be *God*; and the rather, because I never heard that you had retracted your *subscription*, or would scruple to *repeat* it. But not to press you further on so tender a point; how get you off from asserting *two Gods*, the Father and the Son? You have nothing to say, but repeating and trifling: let us go to another point.

You are next to retort the charge of *Tritheism* upon me: which I have answered more than once, and need not do it

again. Dr. Clarke's scheme, you say, is easily expressed in the very words of Scripture. But had the Doctor gone no further than *Scripture*, his scheme could never have been expressed at all. Only, since he has told you where, and how, to understand *self-existent*, and where to exclude it; now you pretend his scheme may be expressed in *Scripture* words. Do you imagine that I cannot as easily, or more easily, find *Scripture* words for mine? But this is trifling. Why have you not laid down your doctrine in Scripture words, that I might compare it with the Doctor's propositions, to see how far they exceed or come short? I may here dismiss the Modest Pleader, who is set in the front, and is not answering my Defence, but my Queries: which you had done before, and, I think, more to the purpose; I am sure more *ingenuously* and *frankly*, and more like a lover of truth. I have reason to complain of your not digesting your book better, and not throwing your disjointed materials into a more neat and regular order, after you had so long time for the compiling. For when sometimes I thought a point had been discussed, and we were to have no more of it, in that Query at least; as I go on some pages forwards, there, I observe, I am to discuss the same things again; which gives me some trouble, and must create confusion in the reader.

The Modest Pleader, I perceive, draws off in p. 436, and now I am to engage a *new* man, whom I will suppose to be the man I am writing to. You need say no more about the charge of *three Gods*, or *two Gods*. I understand you very fully, that the Father is *one God*, as being *necessarily existing*; the Son *another God* infinitely inferior, of the Father's *appointing*. Strain no more for apologies: the thing is out, though long a bringing forth; and now our dispute will run clear. Here is very little of moment occurring but what has been answered. You have a few quibbles in p. 438, which are all abundantly answered in my Defence^r. You object Bishop Pearson to me against my saying, that the word *God* is sometimes taken *personally* and sometimes *essentially*. And what says Bishop Pearson? I have a great respect for his memory. He says, the word *God* in the Apostles' Creed is not taken *essentially*: so say I too. Nor is it taken *essentially*, but *personally*, in the Nicene Creed. Therefore what? therefore it is *never* taken otherwise: that is your consequence, when you can make any *consequence* of it. It is the old Valentinian distinction, you observe. I am glad

^r Vol. i. p. 477, 478.

it is so old however: those *heretics* sometimes borrowed good things from the Church: though they happened to spoil them in the use. But, if you look again into Tertullian, you will find that Valentinian distinction to be nothing akin to ours, except it be in the *name*.

In page 439, you are finding I know not what perplexities in a very easy thing; which I have accounted for twice already in print^s. *Intelligent agent*, being only two adjectives, is to be understood according to the *subject* to which the attributes are applied. Put the words to *substance*, and then we have *intelligent agent substance*, whether in *person* or *persons*. If the substance be thus or thus circumstantiated, (as explained above,) *intelligent agent substance* may be a *single* person; if otherwise, it may be *more persons*: so that *intelligent agent* is different in sense and meaning, according as it may be differently applied. What you repeat about a *principle* of *individuation*, and your further speculations thereupon, have been sufficiently obviated; or have nothing contradictory to any thing I assert. I allow that *three* stands for three, and *three substances* for three substances, and *three Gods* for three Gods. What is all this to me? I do not assert that *three* stands for more or less than three; nor that three substances, but that three Persons (who are not three substances) are one substance; nor that three Gods, but three Persons (who are not three Gods) are *one God*. What you say of Sabellius (p. 442) has been answered above. And what you say of the Church's holding "one and the same individual identical whole substance," affects not me, who never express my notion in such uncouth terms. The *same undivided substance* is what I hold and maintain in opposition both to *substances* and to the Sabellian notion of one *Hypostasis, nominally*, and not *really* distinguished.

Origen's account of the Sabellian notion is very distinct and accurate, as I before observed, viz. that the Father and Son were *one, not in essence only*, (or substance,) *but in subject*, (or *suppositum*.) *being called Father and Son under different considerations*, not really or *personally* distinguished^t. This is a just account of Origen's sense in that passage. And it is observable, that the Noëtians of that time would not have been blamed for

^s Preface to Sermons, at the beginning of this volume. Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, p. 332 of this volume.

^t Μη διαφέρειν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν υἱὸν

τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνοντα ἀμφοτέρους, κατὰ τινὰ ἐπινοίας, οὐ κατ' ὑπόστασιν, λέγεσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱόν. *Orig. Com. in Joh. p. 186.*

supposing the Father and Son to be ἐν οὐσίᾳ, *one in essence*, (or what we call *one in substance*;) had they not carried the *union* so high as to make one *suppositum*, or what we now call *one Person*, of both, without any *real* distinction. Your account of it is very little different from mine; only you are fond of the phrase, *single existent substance*, which serves you to play with, and you know not what you mean by it. Do but define what a *single existent substance* is, and I will soon tell you whether the *name* belongs to every *single person*, or to all together.

Undivided substance, in three Persons, you say, makes *three substances*. How do you prove it? I have often told you that Dr. Clarke and you will not admit this kind of reasoning in another case, for fear of dividing the divine substance into numberless substances. If you can admit *substance* and *substance*, nay, *this substance* and *that substance*, where there are no *substances*; why do you deal thus unequally with others? You must allow that *union* is enough to constitute *sameness*, without making either *complex* or *compound* substance: otherwise you make a *complex* or *compound* substance of God. Since therefore the same or equal difficulties bear upon both, be so fair and so candid as to condemn or to acquit both. As to the sense of *Hypostasis*, I have delivered my mind above.

You bring in a long detail of the sense of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, in which I am very little concerned; having never pretended that *Hypostasis*, or *Person*, does not imply *substance*, or signify *substance*. Only, in *divinis*, a person is not *separate substance*, nor, consequently, more *persons* more *substances*: so that what you have to say in the following pages is mostly wide and foreign. I may just throw a few strictures upon your account, as I pass along. Ὑπόστασις, you say, signifies *singular identical substance*. Now, because you often speak of *singular identical substance*, as if you really understood what you are talking about; let us stop a while, and examine what you mean by it. I conceive, you mean just as *much substance* as you take into your thoughts at once, considering it as *one*. You have brought the *divine substance* under *extension*; and so give me leave to question you a little upon that head, in a style proper to your notion. You can conceive, in your thoughts, as much of that substance as is commensurate, suppose, to the *sun*: pray tell me, if this be not a *singular identical substance*, in your own way of reasoning. Consider only *half* of that; and then there is another *singular identical substance*. Divide into *quarters*; and then you have four

singular identical substances. And as every thing extended is (as our *mathematicians* tell us) *infinitely* divisible: there will be as many *singular identical substances* as you are pleased to conceive divisible parts. Do I misrepresent you? Or are none of those parts *singular identical substances*, but all one *singular identical substance*? What is the reason of it? Is it not that *union* makes *sameness*, all real *sameness*? You must say so: otherwise, upon your principles, I will demonstrate that there is not a *singular identical substance* in the world; the least imaginable *same* being still further *divisible*, in conception, infinitely. What use you will now make of *singular identical substances*, I know not: but this I know, that you can never oblige me to admit two *undivided inseparable persons* to be two *singular identical substances*, till you divide the divine substance (as you conceive it) into as many *singular identical substances* as there are conceivable parts. Having given this hint of the fruitlessness of the pains you are taking about *Hypostasis*, I may now ask, is this the doctrine Christ came to teach, that *three divine Persons must be three singular identical substances*? But to proceed. I forgot to ask you, whether any two parts of the divine substance, in your way of thinking, are *ὁμοούσια*, or *ταυτοούσια*, or *μοροούσια*? I know they must be *una substantia*, though either of them is *singular identical substance*, distinct by itself, and *this is not that*. I believe you would be more puzzled about the use of *terms*, in that case, than ever were the Fathers in respect of the *Trinity*.

What I intend by all I have here said is, to make you at length sensible of two things, about which you have been hitherto very slow and unperceiving.

1. That a man may have a very clear and full notion of an *union* and a *distinction*, and yet be very much puzzled about the *names* whereby they should be called.

2. That the *metaphysical* objections wherewith you have been endeavouring to elog the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, (about *specific, numerical, individual, identical*, and the like, are not so much owing to any difficulty there is in the conception of the *doctrine*, (which was a *plain thing* long before ever those words came in, and still is so,) but to the difficulty of fixing, defining, settling, in all cases, what those several *words, names, or phrases*, shall import. But I proceed.

Instead of amusing your reader with a long detail of the use of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, such as the learned will despise, and the

unlearned will not edify by ; it were better to have endeavoured to give him a distinct idea of what the ancients meant by one *Hypostasis*, or three *Hypostases*. That I may say something which may be useful to common readers, the case lies thus : The faith of the Church all along was in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one God, into which they were baptized. The Father was not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either of the other. This was the common faith of the Church before either *person* or *substance* was talked of.

In Justin Martyr's time, we find that nothing was to be worshipped but *God* ; that these three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were all *worshipped*, yet not as *three Gods* ; that they were believed to be *really* distinct, and not *nominally* only : but the *distinction* was not expressed by *persons*, nor the *union* by *substance* ; nor does it appear that the word *Trinity* was yet applied to this case.

In Athenagoras, we find plain mention made of the *union* and *distinction* of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; but still nothing of *persons* and *substance*.

Theophilus, of the same age, about the year 180, is the first writer extant that expressly gives them the name of *Trinity*. But still *persons* and *substance* were not mentioned.

But upon the disputes raised by Praxeas, Noëtus, and Sabellius^u, (one after another,) it by degrees grew into common use to express the distinction by *persons*, and the *unity* by *one substance*. I know not whether Clemens of Alexandria may be reckoned the first writer extant that expressly has the name of *one substance* (*μοναδικὴ οὐσία*) applied in this case. It is certain Tertullian has it, and *persons* too. And this became the usual way of expressing what had been all along believed and professed, though under other terms. The Sabellians (by which I mean all of Sabellian principles) charged the Catholics with

^u Facundus Hermianensis is a little mistaken, when he confines it to the times of Sabellius : but if we understand him of Sabellius, and his predecessors, Nöetus and Praxeas, his observation is just. His words are :

Nam sic Ecclesia Christi, etiam cum necdum ad distinctionem Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, uteretur nomine *Personæ*. Tres credidit, et prædicavit, Patrem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum,—*Personarum* autem nomen non nisi cum Sabellius impugnaret

Ecclesiam, necessario in usum prædicationis assumptum est ; ut qui semper tres crediti sunt, et vocati, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, uno quoque simul et communi *Personarum* nomine vocarentur. Deinde etiam *subsistentiæ* dictæ sunt, quoniam Ecclesiæ placuit, ad significandam Trinitatem, et hoc nomen distinctioni personali tribuere. *Facun. Herm. lib. i. p. 8.*

See what I have said above, p. 541.

three Gods, and thereby first gave occasion to the Church to make use of the word *Person*: for their answer was, that they did not profess *two Gods*, or *three Gods*, but *one God* and *two Persons*, or *three Persons*^x.

There being in the *Trinity* a *distinction* and an *union*, there would naturally arise some difference about the use of several *terms*, to be either *plurally* or *singularly* predicated, according as the intent might be to speak of the *Persons* as *distinguished* into *three*, or as united in *one God*. The same names either *plurally* or *singularly* predicated sometimes served to express both the *distinction* and *union*. Gregory Nazianzen calls them *Lights* and *Light*, that is, *three Lights*, and yet but *one Light*; and so *three Lives*, and yet but *one Life*; *three Goods*, and yet but *one Good*; *three Glories*, and yet but *one Glory*; the mind conceiving the three as *distinct*, though in themselves united and inseparable. All the care to be take in these cases was, not to make the *distinction* too wide by the *plural* expressions, nor the *unity* too close by the *singular*: and the disputes that arose in this case were from men's different apprehensions about this or that *phrase*, or *expression*, as being liable to abuse one way or other. *Three Spirits* was a phrase generally thought to carry the *distinction* too far: and therefore *one Spirit* became the more common language; though even Jerome himself has been thought to have used the phrase of *three Spirits*^z.

But the greatest debate of all was about three *Hypostases*, begun at Antioch. The Arians had used the phrase to signify *three substances*, understanding them to be *different in kind*, (as *gold*, *silver*, *brass*,) and *separate* from each other. Again, the Sabellians had made use of *one Hypostasis*, to signify *one substance* in such a sense as left no *real* distinction, but *nominal* only. Here was therefore danger on either side; either of *dividing* the *substance* by making *three Hypostases*, or of *confounding* the *Persons* by making *one*. This difference was at length compromised, (A. D. 362,) in a synod at Alexandria, where Athanasius presided: either manner of expression was left indifferent, so long as they agreed in one *common* faith, meaning both the

^x See Hippolytus contr. Noët. and Tertull. adv. Prax.

^y Ζωῆς καὶ ζωῆν, φῶτα καὶ φῶς, ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν, δόξας καὶ δόξαν— Θεὸν ἕκαστον ἂν θεωρῆται μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα. Orat. xiii. p. 211.

^z Tres Spiritus nominatos breviter

ostendam.—Principalem Spiritum Patrem appellat: quia Filius ex Patre, et non Pater ex Filio. Spiritum autem rectum, veritatis atque justitiæ, Christum Dominum significat.— Porro Spiritum Sanctum aperto nomine vocat. Hieron. in Galat. tom. iv. cap. 14. p. 168.

same thing under different terms. So that *μία ὑπόστασις* or *τρῆς ὑποστάσεις* might be asserted, in like manner as *φῶς* or *φῶτα*, the same word *plurally* predicated to express the *distinction*, and also *singularly* to express the *union*; the *plural* being equivalent to three Persons, the singular to *one God*: for that was all the ancients intended, never to make the Persons *one*, nor the Godhead *many*.

The Latins^a could hardly bear the phrase of *tres substantiæ*: it seemed to carry more in it than the Greeks' three *Hypostases*. It was understood to mean either *three substances*, (that is, a *division* of substance,) or three *different kinds* of substance; neither of which could be borne: and therefore *una substantia* became the common language: but so that the *real* distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost was kept up, to guard against *Sabellianism*. Indeed Hilary uses *tres substantiæ*^b: and so, no doubt, did some other Latins who were zealous Catholics: but then they intended no difference in the *kind* of substance, nor any *division* in the *same kind*: which secured the true Catholic notion; and the offence lay only in the *expression*. In short, the main thing they intended in all was, that the three Persons were *really*, and more than *nominally* distinct, and all but *one God*. And they admitted several ways of expressing the *distinction*, or *union*, in such modes of speech as were thought most proper to it. Provided both a *real* distinction, a *real Trinity* were kept up, and at the same time an *unity* of Godhead; the rest amounted only to a *verbal* dispute, or strife about *words*.

I may here remark, that Basil, Nazianzen, Austin, and others, blame the scantiness of the Latin tongue, as being the sole reason of the perplexity of the Latins, in relation to the phrase of *tres*

^a Et quisquam, rogo, are sacrilego *tres substantias* prædicabit? *Hieron. Ep. ad Damas.* tom. iv. p. 20.

Sub nomine Catholicæ fidei, impia verba defendunt; dicentes, *tres esse substantias*, cum semper Catholica fides *unam substantiam* Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti confessa sit. *Faustin. Fid. Theodos. Missa.*

Quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus *essentiam* quod intelligitur cum dicimus *substantiam*; non audeamus dicere unam *essentiam*, *tres substantias*, sed unam *essentiam* vel *substantiam*, tres autem *Personas*. *August. Trin. lib. v. c. 9. p. 838.*

Sunt *tria quædam* coeterna, consub-

stantialia, coessentialia. Sed cum quæreretur a patribus, ut diceretur, Quid *tria*; nec *essentias*, nec *substantias*, nec *naturas* dicere ausi sunt; ne aliqua forte *diversitas* crederetur *essentialiarum*, aut *naturarum*, aut *substantiarum*: sed dixerunt *tres Personas*, unam *essentiam*; ut una *essentia* declararet *Deum unum*, tres autem *Personæ Sanctam Trinitatem* ostenderent. *Fulgent. de Trin. cap. iii. p. 330.*

^b Idcirco *tres substantias* esse dixerunt, subsistentium *Personas* per *substantias* edocentes, non *substantiam* Patris et Filii diversitate dissimilis *essentiæ* separantes. *Hilar. de Synod. p. 1170.*

substantiæ. Yet we find, that for a long season the phrase of *τρεις ὑποστάσεις* was almost as much a bone of contention among the Greeks, as *tres substantiæ* among the Latins; and that it was with great difficulty that it at length prevailed, and became the common language^c; as it was also with some difficulty that the other way of speaking, viz. *una substantia*, obtained among the Latins. The true ground of all was this, that both Greeks and Latins wanted a phrase to express substance considered as *united*, but *distinguished* at the same time. *Three substances* (whether *ὑποστάσεις* or *substantiæ*) expressed, ordinarily, three *divided* substances: and the latter, three of different *kinds*: what therefore could they invent to express *three things* (*tres res* or *tria*) real and substantial, but *undivided*? Here lay the pinch of the difficulty. *Substantia de substantia* expressed it tolerably well; like as *Lumen de lumine*, and *Deus de Deo*: but still what were they to put to the word *three*, in the plural way of predication? *Persons*? But Sabellius had wrested and depraved the sense of the word *person* to an ambiguous or sinister meaning. *Substances*? But that was also liable to misconstruction, and to be perverted to another extreme. However, the Greek *ὑποστάσεις*, by degrees, obtained to signify the same as *πρόσωπα ἐνυπόστατα*. And so long as no *division* be understood, the phrase may serve very well: and so perhaps might the Latin *substantiæ*, had not custom carried it the other way. The Latins have since invented *tres substantiæ*, *tria supposita*, instead of *tres substantiæ*; though the very Schoolmen have not scrupled *tres substantiæ*, with the addition of *incommunicabiles*, or *relative*^d, to intimate that the Persons are not *divided substances*, but that they are *united*, and depending on each other, *relative* as to existence, so that one cannot be without the other, or *separate* from the other: under which cautions they can admit *tres substantiæ*, and yet *una*

^c Quamobrem gratis Basilius Romanis objiciebat, quod cum nominum Græcorum vim ignorarent, illarum duarum vocum significationem confunderent; quandoquidem alii e Græcis nativæ patriæque linguæ non ignari prorsus, earum discrimen non satis intelligebant. *Le Quien Panopl.* p. 28.

^d Est æquivocum *substantiæ* nomen, et sæpe significat *essentiam*—Potest etiam significare *suppositum*; et maxime si addatur *prima* substantia, quia *suppositum* maxime per se subsistit. Unde in hac significatione admitti

possunt *tres substantiæ* in Deo, non vero in priori. Et propter hanc equivocationem vitandam, multi ex antiquis patribus negarunt hanc locutionem, ne viderentur cum Ario sentire, qui essentias in Trinitate multiplicabat—et ita D. Thomas dicit juxta consuetudinem Ecclesiæ non esse absolute dicendas *tres substantias*; addendo vero aliquid, quod determinet significationem, dici posse—ut *tres substantiæ incommunicabiles*, seu *relativæ*. *Suarez. Metaph. Disq.* xxxiv. sec. 1. n. 6. p. 177.

substantia in all : like as *tres res*, though all together *una summa res*. The truth is, every *Person* is *substance*, (but not properly a *substance*,) *substance* in *union* with *substance*, and not *divided* : a thing easy to be understood, but not easy to be expressed. You would find the like difficulty in expressing the *parts* of the *divine substance*, in your hypothesis of extension. You cannot but admit that every part is *substance*, (substance it must be, or nothing,) and yet because of their inseparable union, and their making *one substance* in the whole ; you would not dare to call one part a *substance*, or *several* parts *several substances*. This I again intimate, that you may not be too severe upon others, merely about a *mode* of *expression*. (which is all the case,) when in a parallel instance the objection may be as strongly retorted upon yourselves. You admit *substance* and *substance*, where you think it not proper to say *substances* : and if you had not, yet you could never be able to shew that *substance* and *substance*, considered in *union*, must always make *substances*. Yet a great part of what you have been endeavouring under this Query, as well as what Dr. Whistby has urged in the Second Part of his Reply, is founded chiefly upon a precarious, nay false supposition, that, if every person be *substance*, three Persons must be *three substances*, and cannot be *one substance*. Now to return.

I must here take notice of a passage of Gregory Nazianzen, produced first by Mr. Whiston^e with great pomp, as making some notable discovery ; and now by you, I suppose, for the like purpose. What Mr. Whiston professedly (and you covertly) intends from that passage is, that Athanasius was the first inventor or teacher of the *divinity*, *consubstantiality*, *coequality*, and *coeternity* of the Holy Spirit. This would be a great discovery indeed, had Gregory Nazianzen really said it.

But before we come to the remarkable passage, it will be proper to inform the reader what Gregory had been saying before, and how this sentence, which I shall presently produce at length, came in. The oration is a panegyric upon Athanasius ; wherein he runs through the most remarkable incidents of his life : his *sufferings* and his *services*, his great prudence, fervent zeal, and undaunted courage in the cause of Christ. He observes how Athanasius^f, even in his younger years, before the Nicene Council, had very just and accurate notions of the doctrine of the Trinity ; keeping a mean between the *extreme* of Sabellius

^e Whiston's Reply to Lord Nottingham, Add. p. 92.

^f Greg. Naz. Orat. xxi. p. 380, 381.

(who had too much contracted the Godhead by confounding the distinction) and the other extreme of Arius, who had divided the Godhead into separate Deities. He describes afterwards the many difficulties Athanasius met with, raised by the hatred and enmity of the Arians: particularly in the year 356, in the reign of Constantius, when Gregory the Arian was put into the see of Alexandria, and Athanasius forced to flee for his life. Then were the churches put into the hands of the Arians: who, having the *secular* power on their side, spared no severities; but raged against the Catholics with all imaginable cruelties. Then it was, especially about the year 359, that the *ancient* and *pious doctrine of the Trinity* (as Nazianzen^s says) was dissolved and destroyed: and *Arianism, unscriptural Arianism*, brought in, in its room. Many, who were in their hearts true friends to the *ancient doctrine*, yet complied too far with the Arian confessions^h; which, Nazianzen says, he had often lamented with tears. And such was the violence of the *persecution*, that, excepting some *few* men that stood out, and others whose station was so low as to make them be overlooked, all yielded to the times; induced thereto either by fear or by interest, or else ignorantly circumvented by fraud. During these storms, and in the midst of so general an apostasy, Athanasius stood firm and unmoved; the main support of the true ancient faith. In 361, Constantius, who had been the strength of the Arians, dies: and a worse than he, Julian the apostate emperor, succeeds. Here was some peace to the Church, but it was yet miserably distracted with heresies, with variety of sects and parties, tearing one another. In 363, Julian being slain, Jovian succeeded: still things were in confusion as to the state of the Church. The Arians, in some places, were many and powerful, and had been endeavouring very early to stir up the emperor Jovian against Athanasius and all his adherents. At this critical time, in the midst of danger, that great and good man was not afraid to preach the truth boldly, and to propose it open and undisguised to the Emperor himself in *writing*: of which noble instance, both of his courage and constancy, Nazianzen thus speaks:

“ And here particularly appeared the integrity of the man
 “ (Athanasius) and the firmness of his faith in Christ. For
 “ when, of all the other Christians, divided into three parts,
 “ *many* were unsound in their faith concerning the *Son*, and
 “ *more* concerning the Holy Ghost, (where to be only *less impious*

^s Greg. Naz. p. 386.

^h Ibid. p. 387.

“ was esteemed *piety*,) and but a *few* were sound in both articles ;
 “ he was the *first* and *only* man (or however with a very few)
 “ that had the courage to profess the truth, in writing, plainly
 “ and in express words, the one Godhead and essence of *three*.
 “ And what many of the Fathers before had been divinely moved
 “ to confess in relation to the *Son*, he was afterwards *inspired*
 “ to confess concerning the Holy Ghost ; bringing a gift truly
 “ royal and magnificent to the Majesty Royal, a written faith in
 “ opposition to unwritten noveltyⁱ.”

Now what is there in this passage of Nazianzen more than this : that at a time when many had abandoned the faith, and more had been sneakers and time-servers, Athanasius, with a few adherents, had the courage to speak out the truth boldly, without mincing it : and that this brave resolution of his was owing to the *Spirit* of God, *moving* and *inciting* him to make that glorious confession in the face of the world ? I have translated *ἐχαρίσθη*, according to what appears to me to be the true and full meaning of Nazianzen : who in this very oration speaks of the Nicene Council as called together by the *Holy Ghost*^k, that is, moved and incited by the *Holy Spirit* to the resolutions they made against Arius and his *heresy*. In like manner, he supposes Athanasius to have been stirred up, by the *same Spirit*, to make that noble confession of the *divinity* of the Holy Ghost, and in the like *expressive* words. All this well agrees with what Nazianzen had said but a few pages before, that, notwithstanding the violence of the persecution, there were some that had courage to resist, and stand firm ; whom God preserved, that there might be still remaining some seed and root for Israel to reflourish, and take new life by the *influxes* of the *Holy Spirit*^l.

That this was all his meaning, may appear further, from his representing the doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity, every where, as *ancient* doctrine ; and his branding the contrary doctrine as *novelty*, in that very passage. Nor could a man of Nazianzen's good sense and piety be so ridiculous and silly as to build his *own faith* (which this was) upon any supposed *private inspiration* in the

ⁱ Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ὅσοι τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς λόγου, τριχῆ νενεμημένων καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀρρωστούντων, πλείονων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ἔνθα καὶ τὸ ἦττον ἀσεβεῖν, Εὐσέβεια ἐνομίσθη ὀλίγου δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀμφότερα ὑγιαίνοντος· πρῶτος καὶ μόνος, ἡ κομιδῆ σὺν ὀλίγοις, ἀποτολμᾷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν σαφῶς

οὐτωσὶ καὶ διαρρήθην, τῶν τριῶν μίαν θεότητα καὶ οὐσίαν ἐγγράφως ὁμολογήσας· καὶ ὁ τῷ πολλῷ τῶν πατέρων ἀριθμῷ περὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἐχαρίσθη πρότερον, τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος αὐτὸς ἐμπνευσθεὶς ὕστερον, &c. Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxi. p. 394.

^k Greg. Naz. Orat. xxi. p. 381.

^l Ibid. p. 387.

fourth century, or any century after the Apostles, or indeed upon any thing but the *sacred* writings. It is certain he looked upon the doctrine of the *Godhead* of the *Holy Ghost*, as one of those *truths*, into the knowledge whereof the *Apostles* were led immediately after Christ's ascension^m. All that was done after was the fixing it by *terms* that could not be *eluded*.

I must observe, that where Gregory Nazianzen speaks of the smallness of the number joining with Athanasius, and adhering to the Nicene faith; some allowance must be made for his oratorical manner of setting forth Athanasius's singular courage and constancy: or else he must be understood only of the Christians of Alexandria or Constantinople; who had been, for the generality, perverted by the Arians. For, as to other places, it is certain, that the Nicene faith was, at that very time, professed by almost all the churches, all the world over. For no sooner did the Catholics recover a little respite from persecution, about the year 362, but they condemned all that had been done by the Arians in the Council of Ariminumⁿ; and professed their steady attachment to the Nicene faith. Athanasius assures the emperor Jovian, in that very year 363, that the Nicene faith was universally received by all the Churches of Spain, England, and Gaul; by all Italy, Dalmatia, Dacia, Mysia, and Macedonia; by all Greece and Africa, by the islands of Sardinia, Cyprus, and Candia, by Pamphylia, Lycia, Isauria, Egypt, Libya, Pontus, Cappadocia, and the East; that is, by all the earth, excepting a small number of Arians. He declares, that he was assured of the faith of all those churches; and had their letters by him to produce^o, in testimony of it.

From hence I infer, that Nazianzen is to be understood only of some *particular* place at that time overrun with Arianism; most probably Constantinople, where Eusebius of Nicomedia, Macedonius, and Eudoxius, had successively held the see for above 20 years; and must of course have corrupted great numbers: and it is certain, that by the succession of Demophilus, (another ringleader of the Arians,) the Catholic interest in that city was in a manner oppressed and stifled, before Nazianzen came thither, about the year 378.

To return. I have nothing more to say to your long account

^m Τούτων ἐν εἶναι νομίζω, καὶ αὐτὴν τοῦ πνεύματος τὴν θεότητα, &c. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* xxxvii. p. 609.

Arians, sect. 83. p. 279, &c.

^o Athanas. *Epist. ad Jovian.* p. 787.

ⁿ See Tillemont's History of the

of *Hypostasis*, which does not at all affect me: when you are once able to fix and settle the precise meaning of *individual, identical substance*, you may then know how to oppose me. That person is *substance*, I have always allowed; that *substance and substance* always makes *substances*, you cannot prove: or if you could, you know very well, that the consequence bears as hard upon the Doctor and you, as it can upon me; since it makes the *divine Being*, upon your own principles, a *compound* of innumerable substances: so that you cannot condemn my way of thinking and speaking, but with the shame of self-contradiction, and condemning your own selves.

I had told you in my Defence, vol. i. p. 479, that to say the one God is *one Person* only, and the *Father* that Person, is the essence of *Sabellianism*, and the doctrine of Paul of Samosata^P. This you call *romantic* history; which I am willing to excuse, charitably believing you really think so: though had any man well versed in antiquity told me as much, I must have had a hard opinion of his *sincerity*. You pretend, that the professed doctrine of those that opposed Paul of Samosata was, that the “one God was the Father, by way of eminence.” That is, the Father was *eminently* styled one God: not that the Father *alone* was the one God, *exclusive* of a *real* Son; as Sabellius and Paul of Samosata taught. I have shewn you above, that the Church’s doctrine was to make both *one God*: and this was done by the defenders of the Catholic faith, even against the Praxeans, Noëtians, and Sabellians. You add, that Paul of Samosata, and the Sabellians, taught that the “one God was not the “Father only, but Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” Here you are playing with *terms* (whether ignorantly or designedly, I know not) to deceive the reader, in a very plain case. Pray, what did the Sabellians mean, or Paul of Samosata, by making *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* one *God*? Just the same as if you should style the *Father Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier*, and then say, that the *Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier* are *one God*. To the *Person* of the Father, the *alone God*, (according to them,) they were pleased to apply two *names* more, that of *Son* and *Holy Ghost*: and so the same *one real Person*, the *Person* of the

^P Καὶ γὰρ τῶ ὄντι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δύο φαμέν εἶναι θεοὺς οὐδὲ θεότητας, ἀλλὰ μίαν θεότητα—οὗτος δὲ οὐ λέγει μόνον Θεὸν διὰ τὸ πηγὴν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ μόνον Θεὸν ἀναιρῶν, ὅσον τὸ κατ’ αὐτὸν, τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότητα καὶ ὑπό-

στασιν, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος—πρόσωπον ἐν τὸν Θεὸν ἅμα τῶ λόγῳ φασίν, ὡς ἄνθρωπον ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. *Epiphan. de Paul. Samosat. Hær. lxxv. p. 609.*

Father, was alone, with them, the *one* God. I shewed you this by plain testimonies: and now, where is the difference between them and you; except that they made the Person of the Father the *alone* God, under *three* names; you make the same *one* Person the *alone* God, under the one name of the *self-existent* God? This I demonstrated very distinctly to you in my Defence; and you take not the least notice of it. The reader will suspect you had a reason for slipping over so material a point.

I retorted upon you your plea from 1 Cor. viii. 6. asking, how you can make *two* Gods, in contradiction to St. Paul, who says there is *but one*? You distinguish between a *supreme* God and an *inferior* God; which St. Paul does not: we distinguish upon the *strict* or *large* intent of the *exclusive* terms: and I told you, that our distinction was much older, and better warranted than yours. I therefore desired you no more to charge us with contradicting St. Paul; but either to condemn yourselves for doing it, or at least to acquit both. To this you reply, that to say "the Son is (*an inferior*) God, is no way contrary to this text." But it is contrary to the whole tenor of Scripture, and to the fourth verse of that very chapter; which says absolutely, that "there is none other God but one." St. Paul does not say, no *supreme* God only, but absolutely, *none*. In strictness therefore you contradict St. Paul, as directly as possible: and you have no other way of coming off, but by a *novel* distinction. Now, since it is easy for us to come off from the charge you make, by

Ἡ Φάσκει δὲ (Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεὺς) Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν, καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἓνα Θεόν.—μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ Θεῷ, ὡς περ ἀμέλει καὶ ὁ Σαβέλλιος, &c. *Epiph. Hær. lxx. p. 698.*

Παῦλος ὁ Σαμοσατεὺς Θεὸν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου ὁμολογεῖ, Θεὸν ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ὀφθέντα—τῷ μὲν προορισμῷ πρὸ ἀιώνων ὄντα, τῇ δὲ ὑπάρξει ἐκ Ναζαρέτ ἀναδειχθέντα ἵνα εἰς εἶν, φησὶν, ὃ ἐπὶ πάντα Θεὸς, ὁ πατήρ. *Athanas. contr. Apollinar. p. 642.*

Ὁ γὰρ Σαβέλλιος λέγει τριώνυμον, τοῦτον εὐνόμιος ὀνομάζει ἀγέννητον. *Greg. Nyss. contra Eunom. p. 676. alias 248.*

Uterque hæreticorum istorum *singularem* in Deo *personam* asseruit; quod de Sabellio nemo prorsus ignorat: de Paulo Samosateno testantem Epiphanium audivimus. *Petav. Dogm. vol. v. p. 6.*

† See my Defence, vol. i. p. 480,

&c. Gregory Nyssen's observation is worth the reciting: he says thus:

"To charge our doctrine with Sabellianism, or Montanism, is much the same as to impute to us the blasphemy of Eunomius. For if any one carefully examines into the common mistake of those heresies, he will find that it has a near affinity to that of Eunomius. Both Judaize in the same doctrine; as not admitting the *only-begotten* to be God, nor receiving the Holy Ghost into the communion of the Godhead of him whom they call the *great* and the *first* God. For, whom Sabellius calls the *trinominal* God, the same does Eunomius name *self-existent*: and neither of them looks upon the Godhead as common to a *Trinity* of Persons. Let the reader then judge who it is that comes nearest to Sabellius." *Greg. Nyss. Orat. ix. p. 676. alias 248.*

the help of a *distinction*, and one much better warranted than yours; why are we blamed, and you freed? I have before shewn what we mean by saying that the Son is tacitly included, though the Father be *eminently* styled the *one God*: not that the word *God*, or the word *Father*, in such cases, includes Father and Son; but it is predicated of one only, at the same time that it is tacitly understood that it may be equally predicated of either or both; since no opposition is intended against either, but against *creatures* and *false gods*. You have here passed over fifteen pages of mine, which contained things of great moment: I may pass over two of yours, which contain nothing but words.

QUERY XXIV.

Whether Gal. iv. 8. may not be enough to determine the dispute betwixt us; since it obliged the Doctor to confess, that Christ is by nature truly God, as truly as man is by nature truly man.

He equivocates there, indeed, as usual. For he will have it to signify that Christ is God by nature, only as having, by that nature which he derives from the Father, true divine power and dominion: that is, he is truly God by nature, as having a nature distinct from, and inferior to, God's, wanting the most essential character of God, self-existence. What is this but trifling with words, and playing fast and loose?

THE Modest Pleader here stands in the front; and, after his solemn way, gives me *rebukes*, when he is at a loss for *answers*. He tells me of an *express Scripture-distinction* that I am *ridiculing*: as if ridiculing what is really *ridiculous*, and what is very *profanely* called *express Scripture*, (*viz.* the distinction of *two adorable Gods, supreme and inferior,*) were ridiculing Scripture. However, I was *ridiculing* nothing in this Query; but only laying before the reader two or three instances of Dr. Clarke's *equivocating* and *trifling*: which, it seems, is resented as a high affront, and is to be turned upon the *Scripture* itself. And the reader is to be gravely called to judge, whether it were a "zeal according to knowledge, &c." All this, because one *fallible* man, who has been charging whole churches and whole ages with *contradiction* and *nonsense*, has been charged with trifling and contradicting himself; and that in a case too, which is self-evident and undeniable.

The argument on which the charge rests is this:

"He that has not the nature of the *true and only God*, or is

“not naturally and necessarily God, is not by nature truly God,
“as truly as man is by nature truly man.

“Our Lord (according to the Doctor) has not the nature of
“the true and only God, nor is he naturally and necessarily God:
“therefore he is not by nature truly God, as truly as man is
“by nature truly man.”

Let the reader now judge whether the Doctor, in saying that Christ is “by nature truly God,” &c. has not either grossly contradicted himself, or meanly equivocated. It might have become this Modest Pleader either to have confessed the charge, or to have shewn how to get clear of it. All he can say is, that “the Son has, by that nature which he derives from the Father, true dominion:” and so has every lawful magistrate true dominion, in as just a sense as is here understood of Christ, a dominion derived from God. Is this what according to use of language, and custom of speech, has been understood by the phrase *God by nature*? And how has Christ, by nature, true dominion, when his nature is supposed to have existed before any dominion commenced, and is supposed also to continue after the dominion shall cease? Not to mention that the dominion is also presumed to proceed from free grant, and to be given or taken away at pleasure. Is this to be as truly *God by nature*, as man is by nature truly man? If this be not burlesquing Scripture, ridiculing every thing serious, and making a jest of all language. I know not what is. To divert the reader from dwelling upon the Doctor’s mismanagement, you charge me next with a “heap of absurdities,” (p. 465,) as it is a very easy matter for a man, when his head is clouded, or his passions are up, to make blunders for others, and then comment upon them. Let us hear:

1. The first pretence is, that I contradict myself in making *self-existence* no essential character, and yet approving the putting it in a definition of the supreme Being, as an essential character. That is to say, because *self-existence* often has, and still may be, used in different senses, therefore the allowing in one sense what I disallow in another, is contradicting myself.

2. The second pretence is, that to call *self-existent* an ambiguous term, and an equivocal word, is ridiculous. To which it is sufficient to say, that to deny it is much more so.

3. The third pretence is, that to call *self-existence* a character merely negative, is absurd. That is according as it is under-

stood : for to make it *positive*, in some cases, is infinitely absurd ; as hath been shewn above.

4. A fourth cavil is, that the distinction of *essential* and *personal* has no place here, because both the *Person* and the *essence* are self-existent. But this is begging the question. The *essence* belongs to three Persons ; *self-existence*, or *underivedness*, to one only : therefore though *necessary existence* be an *essential* character common to all, *self-existence* is not.

5. A fifth cavil is against my including *supreme* in the definition of the divine nature, abstracting from the consideration of person. “ As if,” say you, “ supremacy was a character, not “ of a living agent, but of an abstract essence.” Ridiculous enough : as if the living substance, *common* to three persons, were not as truly *living*, and *agent*, as when considered in one^s. Let the reader now judge to whom the “ heap of absurdities” justly belongs. You have invented some *imaginary* ones for me, and betrayed *real* ones of your own ; having a happier talent at writing *nonsense* for others, than *sense* for yourself.

Your argument to prove that a person may be *God* on account of *dominion* before any dominion commenced, has been already answered. As to the sense of Gal. iv. 8. I referred to what has been said by a learned gentleman^t upon it. You, on the other hand, refer to Dr. Clarke’s pieces, and to Modest Plea, &c. The dispute is about the meaning of the phrase τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὖσι θεοῖς, or shorter, about φύσει Θεός, *God by nature*, what it should signify ; whether *substantially* and *essentially* God, or *really* God, as *having true dominion*. The reasons for the former interpretation are such as follow :

1. The common use of the term φύσις, for essence, or substance.

2. The use of φύσει Θεός in that sense among Greek writers^u : as particularly by Irenæus and Athanasius ; and by Gregory Nyssen in relation to this very text.

3. Worship is required to be given to God principally on ac-

^s See my Sermons, p. 140 of this volume.

^t The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, &c. p. 19, &c. True Scripture Doctrine Continued, p. 73, &c. Edwards’s Critical Remarks, p. 18.

^u *Naturaliter Deus*, in opposition to one that only bears dominion, who is God *verbo tenus*. Irenæus allows

the distinction, but rejects the application. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 1.

Θεὸν ὄντα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ὅπερ ὁ πατήρ. *Athan.* vol. ii. p. 43.

Φύσει Θεός. *Athan. in Psal.* p. 83. *Greg. Nyss. contr. Eun.* p. 9. See

above, p. 570. Eustathius, *Fabric.* vol. viii. p. 174, 185. *Vid. Cleric. de Art. Crit.* p. 103.

count of his being $\acute{o} \acute{\omega} \nu$, or *Jehovah*; that is, on account of his being *essentially*, or *substantially* God. Nor is it of any moment what the Modest Plea urges, that then Father and Son will be *two Jehovahs*, if each of them is to be worshipped as being $\acute{o} \acute{\omega} \nu$, or *Jehovah*: for that is supposing the name *Jehovah* to be proper to *one Person* only, and not common to more; which is begging the question.

4. Scripture is used to argue against the gods of the heathen. as being *no Gods*; not as wanting divine *dominion* only, but as having no divine nature or substance.

5. The true notion of *idolatry* is paying *religious* honour to any thing that has not the *divine perfections*; that is. divine substance, the only ground of divine perfections. To which may be added,

6. That St. Paul (Rom. i. 20.) condemns the worship of the *creature*, confines all worship to the *Creator*: which is explicatory of Gal. iv. 8. Now the Creator is God *essentially*, the creature not essentially God: wherefore. as all things are really excluded by St. Paul from worship that are not *essentially divine*; that must be the meaning of Gal. iv. 8. These are the reasons on our side. Dr. Clarke, on the other hand, pleads,

1. The different use of the word $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in *Scripture*, to signify *state, condition, capacity, &c.* and even *customs* only. But if the places be well considered where the expression $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$, *by nature*, occurs; we shall find that it is put in opposition to something *accessional, superinduced, accidental*, or the like: from whence one may plainly perceive that it relates to something inherent, innate, permanent, fixed and implanted in any thing from the first. The uncircumcision by nature (Rom. ii. 27.) is opposed to circumcision superinduced *by law*. The wildness *by nature* (Rom. xi. 24.) is opposed to what is superinduced *by grace*. The Jews are said to be such *by nature*, as being such from their birth, in opposition to being *made* or *adopted*. The Gentiles do *by nature* the things contained in the law, (Rom. ii. 14,) in opposition to the doing the same by a superinduced *law*. We are *by nature* children of wrath, born such in opposition to the superinduced new-birth *by grace*: that is, by our *depraved nature*, our *conditio nascendi*, since the fall, we are under the sentence of the divine displeasure^x. Even in that famous place, (1 Cor. xi. 14.)

^x Naturam aliter dicimus cum proprie loquimur naturam hominis, in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est: aliter istam in

qua, ex illius damnati pœna, et mortales et ignari, et carni subditi nascimur. *August. de Lib. Arbitr.* lib. iii. cap. 19.

“Doth not even nature itself teach you, &c.” the word *nature* does not signify *custom*, but the *masculine* nature, in opposition to the *feminine*. Subjection is *natural* to the woman, in token whereof she is to wear her *veil*; and her *hair*, as another kind of veil: while the *man*, in token of his being *naturally* superior to the woman, goes with his head uncovered, and with short hair. Nature, in the formation of the two sexes, has made the distinction of *superiority* and *inferiority*; and they are born to this or that, by the condition of their sex. This appears to be the most obvious and easy sense of that text. Such being the usual sense of *nature*, or of the phrase *by nature*; we may infer thus much from Gal. iv. 8. That nothing is to be *worshipped* that has not a *divine nature*. Whatever is *God by nature*, as Christ is now supposed to be, must have *that which makes God to be God*, (in like manner as man by nature must have *that which makes man to be man*; or a Jew by nature must have *that which makes a Jew to be a Jew*, and the like :) and what can that be, but his having the *divine perfections*, and consequently, the *divine substance*, coeval with the Father; that is, from all eternity?

I may add, that whatever passages may be brought of the use of *φύσει*, yet they come not fully up to the case; unless *φύσει Θεός* could be shewn to bear such a sense as you would put upon it. Many examples may be brought of ours: few, or perhaps none, of yours. The Modest Pleader, (p. 247,) thinks that the passage cited out of Eusebius^y, where Æmilian the Roman præfect makes mention of the Pagan deities, as being *gods by nature*, is directly contrary to our notion; because the Romans did not look upon their gods to be *self-existent* and *supreme*. This observation is to the purpose, and is not without its weight. But as the Pagans had several schemes of *theology*, and several hypotheses in respect of their gods, and it cannot be certainly known what hypothesis Æmilian went upon; we cannot be certain in what sense he used the phrase. And though the Pagans did not believe more than one *supreme God*, yet their *inferior* gods were generally supposed *ἀγένητοι*, *eternal*, and *necessarily existing*; which answers to *θεοὶ κατὰ φύσιν*, *gods by nature*^z. Besides that, as many Pagans as supposed the inferior

^y Τίς γὰρ ἡμᾶς κωλύει καὶ τοῦτον, εἴπερ ἐστὶ Θεός, μετὰ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν θεῶν προσκυνεῖν; Euseb. lib. vii. cap. 11. p. 335.

^z The primary and archical beings, according to Proclus, were the Pagan deities.

^z Ἀπαρτες οὖν ὅσοι πρόποτε θεολογίας

gods to be nothing but the *polyonymy* of their one supreme God, must have thought them all to be θεοὶ κατὰ φύσιν, *gods by nature*.

I may add, that it seems highly probable that Æmilian designed what he said, in answer to what Dionysius or other Christians had pleaded; viz. that they worshipped one that was God *by nature*, in opposition to the *Pagan deities*, which were none of them such. I say, in answer hereto, he pleads that *their deities* were gods *by nature* also: and why then might not Christians worship both the *Pagan gods* and their *own*? The heathens had before this time learned to refine their *theology*, and to pretend as much in honour of the *Pagan divinity*, as the Christians pleaded for *theirs*: and the dispute now was, which of them could most clearly make good their plea^a.

But I proceed to a second argument for your sense of the text.

2. The Modest Pleader argues, that if St. Paul had gone upon our scheme, he would not have said τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὐσι θεοῖς, but τοῖς μὴ φύσει οὐσι θεῶ; not them which by nature are not *gods*, but them which by nature are not *God*: because to say, they are not *gods*, as not being of the same divine substance, seems to intimate that they would be *gods* if they were of the *same substance*, and not *one God* as upon our principles. But St. Paul's expression is very right. The fault of the *Pagans* was not in worshipping *gods*; had there really been *many gods*, many gods *by nature*: their fault was in worshipping *gods* that were not *really* and *essentially* such. Nor would it be any fault in Christians to worship *many gods*, were there really many gods *by nature*: but the fault is in worshipping any that are not *gods by nature*, or more gods than there *really* are; which fault is committed by worshipping more gods than *one*, because there is but *one God by nature*. Whether more persons than one would be *more gods*, or otherwise, by partaking of the same substance; is neither affirmed nor denied in the place of St. Paul: only the *Pagans* are condemned for worshipping those as *gods*, which had

εἰσὶν ἡμένοι, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν θεοὺς ἐπονομάζοντες περὶ ταῦτα τὴν θεολογικὴν ἐπιστήμην πραγματεύεσθαι φασί. Procl. Plat. Theol. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 5. Vid. Plotin. Ennead. 2. lib. ix. cap. 1.

Αἱ τῶν θεῶν οὐσίαι οὐδὲ ἐγένοντο. Τὰ γὰρ αἰὶ ὄντα οὐδέποτε γίνονται. Sallust. de Mund. cap. ii. p. 244.

^a Cum de re loquimur divina vobiscum, hoc ut ostendatis exposcimus, esse Deos alios natura, vi, nomine: non in simulachris propositos quos videmus, sed in ea substantia in qua conveniat aestimari tanti esse nominis oportere virtutem. Arnob. contr. Gent. lib. iii. p. 101.

not the *nature of gods*, or what was necessary to make them really *gods*.

3. It is further pleaded by Dr. Clarke, that the true notion of *idolatry* is the ascribing to any being such worship and honour as does not belong to it.

To this pretence see a sufficient answer in True Scripture Doctrine Continued^b, of which the Modest Plea has taken no notice.

To conclude this article; you have not been able to acquit the Doctor of the charge of *equivocating*, or *contradicting* himself; nor to take off the force of our argument built upon Gal. iv. 8. for the *essential* divinity of God the Son: who, because he is *adorable*, is therefore *God by nature* in virtue of that text. Your trifling about the definition I gave from Melancthon, as if it could not be *scriptural* because it is taken from Melancthon, who took it from Scripture, is beneath my notice.

QUERY XXV.

Whether it be not clear from all the genuine remains of antiquity, that the Catholic Church before the Council of Nice, and even from the beginning, did believe the eternity and consubstantiality of the Son; if either the oldest creeds, as interpreted by those that recite them; or the testimonies of the earliest writers, or the public censures passed upon the heretics, or particular passages of the ancientest Fathers, can amount to a proof of a thing of this nature?

I AM here to dispute first with the Modest Pleader, who may be known by his *positive* style, and *magisterial* air, to make good the *title* of his treatise. I am rebuked for my *presumption*, in this Query: and why? Because I have presumed to tell the world what has been proved an hundred times over: and yet not positively affirming it, but putting it by way of Query, to be fairly debated. This solemn gentleman, I suppose, will call it *presumption*, in a while, for any man to undertake to defend the faith of all the Christian churches. To such a height may men be carried by a strong conceit of their own novel *hypothesis*.

I had modestly appealed to the *oldest creeds*, not directly, but as *interpreted by those that recite them*. And where was the *presumption* of doing it? His cavil, upon this occasion, I answered in a note to my eighth Sermon^c. I appealed also to *censures* passed upon *heretics*. In reply to this, I am told,

^b True Script. Doctr. p. 76, 78, &c.

^c P. 193 of this volume.

1. That the most remarkable censures were passed upon the Ebionites; who taught that Christ was a *mere man*, in whom the supreme God dwelt. But if their great guilt, and the heinousness of it, lay in the *consequence* of their principles, in their denying Christ's *divinity*; then it will appear that the modern impugners of Christ's *divinity* are nearly concerned in the censures passed upon the Ebionites. For indeed the great danger and impiety of their heresy was not merely in making a *creature* some years, or ages, *younger* than he really was; but in *denying* their *God*, in refusing to acknowledge him as really and truly *God*. Irenæus^d, the oldest Father that mentions the Ebionites, represents the case thus: "The Ebionites God will judge: "How can they be saved, if he was not *God* who upon earth wrought salvation? Or how shall man come to God, if God (*ὁ Θεὸς*) had not come to man?" In another place, he says, "Vain are the Ebionites, not admitting the union of *God* and *man*, by *faith*, into their souls." He proceeds to observe, that the *Holy Spirit* (by which he understands the *Logos*, as do many other Fathers^e) came upon the Virgin: and a little lower, blames the Ebionites again, as "not receiving God" along with the man. Now it is well known in how strict a sense Irenæus understood the word *God*, and that he applied it in the same strict sense to God the Son; as I have proved above. As many therefore as deny the Son to be *God* in that sense, were condemned in the Ebionites long ago; as is plainly proved from this Father. To the same purpose speak other writers^f of the Ebionites (and of

^d Ἀνακρινεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐβιωνίους πῶς δύνανται σωθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐργασάμενος; ἢ πῶς ἄνθρωπος χωρήσει εἰς Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐχώρηθῃ εἰς ἄνθρωπον; Iren. lib. iv. cap. 30. p. 271.

Vani autem et Ebionæi, unionem Dei et hominis, per fidem, non recipientes. Iren. lib. v. cap. 1. p. 293.

Non recipientes Deum ad commixtionem suam.

^e Irenæus, p. 216. Just. Mart. Apol. i. cap. 43. p. 69. Clem. Alex. p. 654. Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 26, 27. Novat. cap. 19.

^f Καὶ γὰρ κακίνοι ἦτοι ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁμολογοῦσι πεφυκέναι τὸν Χριστὸν εἰς τὸν βίον, θεότητος αὐτοῦ τὸ τάλεντον ἀρνούμενοι. Hippol. Fragm. vol. i. p. 281.

Accedit his Theodotus, hæreticus Byzantius, qui—doctrinam intro-

duxit quæ Christum hominem tantummodo diceret, Deum autem illum negaret. Auctor. Append. ad Tertull. de Præscript. cap. 68.

Ἀρνησιθέου ἀποστασίας. Euseb. lib. v. cap. 28.

Paul of Samosata, his crime was denying his God.

Τοῦ καὶ τὸν Θεὸν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κύριον ἀρνούμενου. Epist. Syn. Antioch. apud Euseb. lib. vii. cap. 30.

Hebion discipulus Cerinthi, in multis ei similiter errans, Salvatorem nostrum hominem de Joseph natum, carnaliter æstimabat, nihilque in eo divinitatis fuisse docebat; sed sicut omnes prophetæ, sic et eum gratiam Dei habuisse adserebat, non tamen *Domini Majestatis*, et *Dei Patris Filium* cum Patre sempiternum credebat. Philastr. Hæ. cap. 37.

such others as the Ebionites) both before and after the Nicene Council. The great *impiety* of such men was in their being ἀρησιθεοί, *deniers* of Christ's *divinity*, blasphemers against his *Godhead*. How you can yet clear yourselves of the same charge, I see not. It was not without reason that Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, charged the Arians, upon their first appearance, with reviving the impiety of Ebion, Artemas, and Paul of Samo-sata. *Theod. E. H.* lib. i. cap. 4.

2. The Modest Pleader goes on to tell us that Cerinthus was censured; who taught *that the Son of God was not himself made man, but only united to a man*. He thinks he has here said something smart: but, because every body will not understand the *innuendo*, and he durst not speak plainer for fear of discovering his whole *heart*, we may pass it over. He takes no notice of Cerinthus's being condemned, as well as Ebion, for denying our Lord's *divinity*, and the *eternity* of the *Word*. He proceeds to observe, that the Valentinians and Cataphrygians were censured; from whom arose the doctrine of *necessary emanations*: to which weak piece of calumny I have answered above. He takes no notice of the Valentinians denying the *eternity* of the *Logos*, nor of their making *creature-creators*, nor of several of their other principles, whereby they led the way to *Arianism*, as Athanasius hath shewn^h.

3. Sabellius, it seems, was censured for teaching *individual consubstantiality*: that is, for *nonsense*. For *consubstantiality* and *individual* (in the Sabellian sense of *individual*) are repugnant, and contradictory as possible. Nor did Sabellius ever teach *consubstantiality* at allⁱ. Whether the Modest Pleader has here shewn *a zeal according to knowledge*, let any man judge that *knows* antiquity. He takes no notice of Sabellius's being condemned for confining the *Godhead* to one *real Person*, (instead of extending it to three,) upon the very same principles on which Arius afterwards founded a different *heresy*^k; viz. the apprehension of there being no *medium*^l between making the Son to

^g See Bishop Bull, D. F. p. 178. Jud. Eccl. cap. 2.

^h See Montfaucon's preface to the first volume of Athanasius, p. 24.

ⁱ Ὡς περ γὰρ μισεῖ ὁ ὀφίς τὴν ὄσμην τῆς ἀσφάλτου—οὕτως καὶ Ἀρειος καὶ Σαβέλλιος μισεῖ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ὁμολογίας τοῦ ὁμοουσιου. *Epirrh. Hæc.* lxi. n. 70. p. 797.

^k See my Defence, vol. i. p. 469, 481.

^l Σαβέλλιος δὲ τοῦ Σαμοσατέως Παύλου, καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ἐπιδέδεικται τὴν γνώμην· δεδοικῶς γὰρ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου διαίρεσιν, τῇ ἀναιρετικῇ καταπέπτωκε πλάνῃ. *Athanas. contr. Apoll.* lib. ii. p. 942.

^m Ἀρειος μὲν πρὸς τὴν Σαβελλίου τοῦ λίθου δόξαν ἀπαντῆσαι μὴ δυνηθεῖς, τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐξέπεσε πίστεως, πρόσφατον Θεὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ δογματίσας. *Socr. E. H.* lib. iv. cap. 33. p. 256.

be the *self-existent* Father himself, and *excluding* him from the *one Godhead*.

After a lame, partial, and false account of the ancient heresies condemned by the Church, the Modest Pleader goes on to give as partial and false accounts of the doctrine of the Fathers. But having obviated all his frivolous pretences on that head before, I may now dismiss him, and return to you.

You are pleased to say, that my "Defence of this Query is "nothing but a confused heap of words relating to metaphysical "subtilties," &c. The reader, I suppose, understands by this time what these and the like complaints from you mean. I no sooner find you expatiating this way, but I conclude you had met with something you could not answer; it being your constant method thus to proclaim your defeat.

You durst not enter upon the main question debated under this Query. It was whether the Ante-Nicene writers, in general, taught a *proper* consubstantiality. You were before of opinion that it was a *figurative* or *oratorical* consubstantiality. I suffered not the reader to go away with any such weak pretence, instead of a just answer. I laid before you several reasons to the contrary, such as, I thought, might be depended on: and I perceive now, by your manner of replying, (which is no *replying*,) that you think so too. I shall repeat the reasons once more: and where you have scattered any loose hints that any way relate to them, I shall consider them in their proper places:

1. I thought it strange and unaccountable that so *many* Fathers should *rhetoric* in a matter of *faith*, and of the greatest *importance*: and that *none* should be met with wise enough or good enough to throw off the varnish, and to tell us the naked truth.

2. I thought it still stranger that they should do it, not in *popular harangues*, but even in *dry debates*; where it particularly concerned them to speak accurately and properly, out of figure and flourish.

Hitherto you are pleased to be silent; not a syllable of reply. Let me go on.

3. I observed, that one principal and standing objection of heretics against the Catholic doctrine was, that it inferred a *division* of the Father's substance. I thought there must have been at least some *colour* for the objection; as indeed there was, if the Catholics professed a *proper* consubstantiality: otherwise

there was none at all^m. For who could be silly enough to imagine that angels or archangels, or any creature whatever, might not be *created* without a *division* or *abscission* of the divine substance?

You endeavour at something (p. 472.) by way of reply; telling me that the ancients, “by denying all division, abscission, or “diminution, did not mean to affirm that the Son was the “individual identical substance of the Father.” I would be glad to know what this phrase, *individual identical*, &c. means with you. I think it plain, that the *objectors*, in inferring a *division* of substance, thought of the *same substance*; and the Catholics by denying *division*, asserted the *same undivided substance*. Whether this amounts to your *individual identical*, &c. is no great matter; since you do not care to say, or rather do not yet know, what you mean by it. You pretend that the ancients intended only, to “assert the absolute immutability of “the Father;” and that “he generated the Son, as one fire “lights another, without any diminution of himself.” But what pretence or colour could there be for the Father’s *diminishing* himself, unless a proper *consubstantiality* was intended? And if one fire be consubstantial to another, as I think the Fathers believed; the very instance proves the thing I am speaking of. I have however explained above what they meant by *diminution*, and what by denying it in this case.

4. A fourth argument I drew from another noted *objection* made to the Catholic doctrine, viz. *Tritheism*: and I observed both from the sense of the *objectors*, and from the method taken in the answers, what kind of *Tritheism* was intended; such as was founded on the supposition of a *proper consubstantiality*. This argument you have taken no notice of, but have left it in *the heap*, undisturbed.

5. I added a fifth reason from the particular state of the Sabellian controversy, and the arguments made use of in it; quite different from what would have been, and must have been, had the Fathers been of the *same* or *like* principles with you and Dr. Clarke. To which you say nothing.

6. In the sixth place, I threw in a *heap* of *reasons*; *reasons*, I think, and not *words* only: to one of which, relating to *worship*, you vouchsafe me a brief answer, but such as I have answered in another place. Upon the whole, you appear to have been

^m See my Defence, vol. i. p. 498.

much distressed in this Query : for otherwise, who would believe that a man of your abilities, after so long considering, would leave any thing unanswered ?

Aye, but after all, you say, Dr. Clarke's propositions will remain *true* and *untouched*, which way soever any of these points be determined, (p. 471.) Indeed, they are wonderful *propositions* : they seem to be much of the Stoic make and constitution ; that if they be ever so distressed or crushed, or even ground to pieces, yet they cannot be *hurt*. To be serious ; if the Doctor's *propositions* have really nothing contrary to the Son's *eternity*, or *consubstantiality*, or *necessary existence*, (which comes to the same ;) if they leave to God the Son that *honour* and that *worship* which those *divine* perfections demand ; if they do not make him *precarious* in existence, or *dependent* on the *good pleasure* of another ; in short, if they leave to the Son the one *true Godhead*, or *divine substance*, then let the propositions pass as very harmless, innocent, *trifling* propositions, containing nothing but *old truths* under a novel and conceited way of expression. But if the propositions really run counter to the *necessary existence*, the *immutable* perfections, the *divine worship*, &c. of God the Son, (as I conceive they do,) then the *propositions* appear to be very nearly concerned in what I have been proving.

But you say, the true and only material question is, " Who is " the alone first Cause, the alone supreme Governor?" &c. Now as to this matter, I will be very frank and plain with you. Do but sincerely and plainly acknowledge that God the Son is *coeternal* and *consubstantial* with the Father, of the same *divine substance*, *necessarily existing*, having the *divine perfections*, Creator by his *own* power, worthy of *equal* honour, and of the same kind of *worship* : do but admit these things, and you shall have the liberty of talking as you please about the *alone first Cause*, and the *alone supreme Governor* ; that is, *first in order* and *office*. But if you deny the Son's *necessary existence*, if you deny his *divine perfections* strictly so called, if you scruple to admit him as *Creator* by his *own* power, (which many Arians allowed,) and to worship him as *Creator* ; nay, to call him *Creator*, which the very Eunomians never scrupled : if you betray your dissent from us in so *many* and so *material* points as these are, do not then pretend that the *supremacy* is the *main* point of difference, or the *only material question* : because it is pretending something directly *false*, and what you *know* to be false ; and therefore what ought not to be pretended by any honest or good man. It is possible

you may understand *supreme Governor* in such a sense, that all the other questions may be reduced to that one: and so may they also to this *one question*; whether God the Son be *a creature* or no. If this be your meaning, then there is no difference betwixt your state of the question and mine, except this; that what you have put into ambiguous, equivocal, deceitful words, to *confound* the readers, I have put into plain, clear, and distinct terms, to instruct and inform them. And now the main question will not be about the *supremacy*, whether it be asserted or denied; but about the sense and meaning of *supremacy*: whether supremacy is to be asserted in such a *sense* as to make the Son *a creature*, or in such a *sense* only as is consistent with his being *essentially* God, and *one God* with the Father. For you may please to take notice that many other questions must come in, in order to give light into the question about *supremacy*: or if you pretend to take the *supremacy* in a sense peculiar to yourself, and then to argue from it; this is only begging the *main question*, and pursuing your own inventions, in opposition both to *Scripture* and *antiquity*.

You have an odd remark in the close: you say, “to preserve the priority of the Father, and withal the divinity, the *essential* divinity, of the Son, is no difficulty.” This is *news* from you: I hope you are *sincere*, and have no *double* meaning. For if these two things, the *essential* divinity of the Son, and the *priority* of the Father, be admitted as consistent, the dispute is at an end. But you add, that I pretend something more, viz. “to preserve the priority of the Father, and withal, the equal supremacy of the Son in point of authority and dominion.” Yes; I do pretend to hold the *priority* of the Father in *order* (which is *natural*) and in *office* (which is *economical*) as consistent with the Son’s *essential* and equal divinity: in a word, I hold any *supremacy* consistent with the Son’s *essential* divinity. If you carry the *supremacy* further, you either *contradict* yourself, or *equivocate* in a childish manner in the word *essential*. Choose you either part of the *dilemma*: it is all one to the argument whether the fault lies in your *heart* or your *head*.

QUERY XXVI.

Whether the Doctor did not equivocate or prevaricate strangely, in saying, “The generality of writers before the Council of Nice were, “in the whole, clearly on his side:” when it is manifest, they were, in general, no further on his side, than the allowing a subordination

amounts to; no further than our Church is on his side, while in the main points of difference, the eternity and consubstantiality, they are clearly against him? that is, they were on his side, so far as we acknowledge him to be right, but no further.

HERE I am told by the Modest Pleader, (who was to rectify your unwary answers to my Queries, after he had seen my Defence,) that Dr. Clarke did not *equivocate*, or *prevaricate*; because the Ante-Nicene writers agree with him in all the points laid down in his propositions. This is a shameful untruth, as hath been often proved: and since you have now owned that *self-existent* is necessarily existent, I shall point out to you what propositions of the Doctor's are flatly contrary to the Ante-Nicene writers in general. His 4th is one: for the *ancients* always thought that the *nature, essence, or substance* of the Persons was sufficiently declared in Scripture. His 5th proposition is another: for the *ancients* never taught that the Father *alone* is necessarily existing, but the contrary. His 7th is ambiguous. His 8th is contrary to all *antiquity*. So are the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th. So is the 14th, in part, if by *self-existent* he meant *necessarily existing*. His 17th is directly contrary to the *ancients*, in *sense*, though not in *words*. The 19th has no manner of foundation in antiquity. The 25th has no foundation in antiquity: the *ancients* are contrary. The 33rd is not agreeable to the primitive doctrine. The 38th is oddly expressed: the covert meaning directly contrary to the Ante-Nicene faith. The 39th is contrary to the *ancients*.

As to proposition 43, the *ancients* knew nothing of *supreme* and *inferior* worship. The 48th is contrary to all the *ancients*. So is the 50th in part: and the 51st in the whole. The 54th may admit of some dispute; but, in the main, the *ancients* are against it.

About one third of the Doctor's *propositions* are either directly contrary to *antiquity*, or have no countenance from it. I shall not here stay to prove the particulars: it has been done before, under the proper heads, in my Defence, and in this vindication of it. But, supposing I had charged the Doctor with something not to be found in his *propositions*, but in his *replies*, or other *pieces*; is the Doctor ever the less guilty of *equivocating* or *prevaricating*? Are we not to take his sentiments from any other part of his writings, as well as from his *propositions*? But to proceed.

What you add about *supremacy* and *subordination* has been

abundantly answered. You surprise me a little by one sentence, p. 477: "The question," you say, "is not whether the Son be generated consubstantially, but whether he be generated at all." I understand you. The question is, whether God could have a *Son* of the same nature, power, and perfections with himself: or, more briefly, whether such *divinity* as the Church maintains, is consistent with *Sonship*. You have hit the matter right: but why have you pretended all the while to lay no stress on *metaphysics*, when you here rest the main debate upon *metaphysics*, and that only? For you will not be weak enough to maintain that *Scripture* any where says that the *only-begotten* Son of God is *another* God, or not *one* God with the Father, or that he is of a *different nature*, or not *necessarily existing* as the Father, *Metaphysics* must do this for you, or nothing. You must call in all your *vain* philosophy, about *individual*, about *necessity*, about *intelligent agent*, about *coaction*, about *substance* and *substances*, *causes*, *acts*, *will*, and I know not what else: and at length you will go off without a proof, just as you came on.

You return to your quibble about the *supremacy* and *monarchy* of the Father. That is, all *dominion* over the *creatures* (I know of no *dominion*, properly so called, over any thing else) is *primarily* in the Father, *secondarily* in the other two Persons, and *common* to all three. The *dominion* is not in the Father *alone*: only he *alone* has it from none, they from him; this is the whole truth. Dr. Clarke having made some pretence to *antiquity*, I thought it proper to hint, in *eleven* particulars, his disagreement with itⁿ. I must here be forced to repeat them, because you have something to say to every one of them.

1. The first was, in the point of *consubstantiality*: in denying of which he runs counter to all the ancients. In reply, you say, you "do not presume to say that the Son is not consubstantial;" but only that "the Father *alone* has supreme authority and dominion." Which is either saying the same thing in other words, or saying nothing. But as you presume to say that the Son is not *necessarily existing*, I suppose all men of sense will see that that is denying the *consubstantiality*; or I know not what is so.

2. The second charge was, that you do by necessary consequence deny the Son's *coeternity*. Here again you *presume not to say the Son is not eternal*, but the Father is *supreme*, &c. I did not ask about the *Father*: however, what you intend, is,

ⁿ See my Defence, vol. i. p. 503, &c.

to deny the *eternity*, not directly, but implicitly, by asserting the Father *alone* to be *necessarily existing*. Now it is all one to us, whether you do it *directly* or by *consequence*: undermining the faith in a serpentine way, is as pernicious as a more open attacking it. If you do not deny the *eternity*, it is plain however that you do not assert it; and therefore you come very short of the *ancients*.

3. Another article was, the Doctor's asserting Θεός, *God*, to be a relative word. This I shewed to be contrary to all antiquity, a few instances excepted: your reply to this article hath been obviated above, p. 54^o.

4. You differ from all the *ancients*, in pretending that the Father *only* was God of Abraham, &c. You plead, in answer hereto, that it is a *Scripture proposition*: which is false, as hath been shewn. However, the *ancients* (about whom our present question is) never thought it to be a *Scripture position*, but quite the contrary.

5. You differ from all antiquity, in pretending that the titles of *one, only, &c.* are exclusive of God the Son. This you ridiculously call an express *Scripture proposition*. I have answered your cavils on that head: in the mean while it is evident, and you do not gainsay it, that the *ancients* never thought as you do.

6. You again differ from all *antiquity*, in pretending that the "Son had not distinct worship paid him till after his resurrection." You here make references only, which I may answer by references^o.

7. You run counter to all *antiquity*, in pretending that *two Persons* may not be, or are not, *one God*. To this you reply, that the *one God*, you think, always, in the Ante-Nicene writers, signifies the Father. I have demonstrated the contrary. However, if both together be ever called *God*, or included in that singular title, it comes to the same thing, though the word *one* be away.

8. You contradict all the *ancients*, in saying, that "the title "of God, in Scripture, in an absolute construction, always signifies the Father." The quotations of the *ancients* from the Old Testament have been abundantly vindicated above. See Query II, p. 409, &c.

9. You run counter to all *antiquity*, in admitting an *inferior God* besides the *supreme*; and allowing *religious worship* to both,

^o Defence, vol. i. p. 432, &c. See above, on Query xviii. p. 679, &c.

You appeal to St. Paul, which I have often shewn to be a weak plea; and it is here foreign. The *ancients* never understood St. Paul in any such sense, but the contrary. You have therefore no plea from the Ante-Nicene Fathers, which was the point in hand.

10. You contradict all *antiquity*, in denying the Son to be "efficient Cause of the universe." You now say, you "do not deny it;" which I am very glad of: there is one point gained. You did before, in opposing *efficient* to *instrumental*, and reserving the first to the Father only. You now say, the Son is not the "original efficient Cause." This is ill expressed, and worse meant: but do you ever find the *ancients* making *two causes*?

11. You run counter to all antiquity, in supposing (not saying) the Son to be a *creature*. That you suppose it, and really mean it, under other terms, hath been shewn^p.

12. You contradict all antiquity in resolving the *foundation* of the Son's *personal Godhead* into the power and dominion which you suppose him advanced to after his resurrection. It is your express doctrine. Collect. of Queries, p. 75.

13. You run counter to all the *ancients* in supposing the *Logos* to have supplied the place of a *human* soul; and making the *Logos*, as such, *passible*. As to the former part of this charge, you have given broad hints, up and down, in this *reply*: as to the latter part, it is, or was, your express doctrine. Collect. of Queries, p. 143.

Let the reader now judge of your repeated boasts of *antiquity*: such as none could ever have made, but the same that could espy *Arianism* in our *Liturgy* and our *Articles*, and bring the *Creeeds* of the Church to speak the language of *heresy*.

QUERY XXVII.

Whether the learned Doctor may not reasonably be supposed to say, the Fathers are on his side, with the same meaning and reserve as he pretends our Church forms to favour him; that is, provided he may interpret as he pleases, and make them speak his sense, however contradictory to their own; and whether the true reason why he does not care to admit the testimonies of the Fathers as proofs, may not be, because they are against him?

YOU ask me whether I admit the *testimonies of the Fathers* as

^p See my Supplement, p. 324, &c. of this volume.

proofs, since I disapprove of the Doctor's making them *illustrations* only.

You think, it *had been just in me to declare* upon this head. Verily, I thought I had *declared*^p plainly, that I admit their testimonies as *proofs*, two ways: *certain* proofs, in many cases, of the Church's doctrine in that age; *probable* proofs of what the doctrine was from the *beginning*. In respect of the latter, they are *inferior* additional *proofs*, when compared with plain *Scripture proof*: of no moment, if Scripture is plainly contrary; but of great moment where *Scripture* looks the same way, because they help to fix the *true interpretation* in any disputed texts. I build no article of faith upon the *Fathers*, but upon *Scripture* alone. If the sense of Scripture be disputed, the concurring sentiments of the *Fathers* in any doctrine will be, generally, the best and safest comments upon Scripture, so far as concerns that doctrine: just as the practice of *courts*, and the decisions of eminent *lawyers*, are the best comments upon an *act of Parliament* made in or near their own times: though it be nevertheless true, that the obedience of the *subject* rests *solely* upon the *laws* of the *land*, as its rule and measure.

You proceed to vindicate some *translations* of the Doctor's, which I had found fault with. But you are first wrapped up in admiration of the Doctor's performance; that so "acute a man, &c. could not find above twenty passages to cavil at, in a book "of near five hundred pages full of quotations." Whether it was *cavilling* shall be seen presently. But you will remember, that, besides a *general* charge of want of *pertinence* in many, and of great *unfairness*^q in the whole course of them; I had over and above taken notice of particular faults, very great ones, in the Doctor's *versions*. And surely twenty faults of this kind were enough for one man to commit within the compass of about three hundred pages: for I examined no further^r, having found and noted a sufficient number for my purpose; which was to awaken the reader's caution, and to prevent his relying too implicitly upon the Doctor's representations. And you will consider, that it was not merely for *inaccuracy* in his translations, that I blamed him, (such as a man may innocently commit, or

^p Defence, vol. i. p. 538.

^q See my Defence, vol. i. p. 533.
&c.

^r The learned reader will observe more instances of like kind, in

Script. Doctr. p. 295, 296, 297, 304, 312, 314, 322. 2nd edit. The most shameful of them is a version, in p. 312, of a passage cited at the bottom of p. 311.

sometimes choose, to save time or pains, when the cause is not concerned in it, or when it is not material whether a scrupulous exactness be observed or no,) but it was for his mistranslating such parts of what he cited, as were of *greatest moment* to the question in hand, and his industriously warping them to his own *hypothesis*. You do well to labour this point: for indeed the Doctor's *integrity*, or *fidelity*, to say no more, is pretty deeply concerned in it; though my design was, not to expose his *character*, but to prevent the *deception* of the reader. They who desire to reexamine this matter may please to look into my Defence, that I may not be at the trouble of repeating.

1. In the first passage, I complained of two false renderings; one of the words, *οὐκ εἰς ἀνάρεσιν*, another of the word *ἀπαύγασμα*, in both which the Doctor served his *hypothesis*, obliquely, *against* the sense of the *author*. You cannot, you do not pretend that his version was *just*: I cited as far as was necessary to shew that it was not. What then? You pretend I leave out the *only words* for the sake of which the Doctor cited it. I left out no words that were at all necessary to shew the *sense* of the author, or to judge of the Doctor's *version*. It was undoubtedly the Doctor's business either not to cite or translate the author at all, or to render his words faithfully, so far as he did pretend to translate from him. And though the Doctor's *particular* design, in that passage, might be to shew that Athanasius allowed the Father to be styled the *only* God, (Mark xii. 32,) yet he had a more *general* design running through his performance, which was to keep the reader in the dark as to the ancient way of understanding it, in opposition to *false* gods, or *idols* only: to serve which *general* design, he perverted the sense of that passage in his *translation* of it.

2. The second passage^s which the Doctor had mistranslated, you are willing to correct, in some measure, by leaving out the word *most*. But you will still have it *absolutely and strictly* God, instead of *really* God: which might not be much amiss, had not the Doctor made such frequent ill use of *absolutely*, in respect of the Father; intending therein an opposition to God the *Son's* being *absolutely* God. This was not the meaning of Athanasius, who meant no *opposition* but to *idols*^t. I observed, that Athanasius would have said, or had said, in other words, as much of the *Son*, as he has there said of the *Father*. To which you reply,

^s Τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ὄντως ὄντα Θεόν, *Gent.* p. 9.
τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατέρα. *Athan. contr.*

^t See my Defence, vol. i. p. 524.

that you “will not undertake to answer what Athanasius would “have said, were I to indite for him : but you deny that he has “said it.” I shewed before what Athanasius had said, in that very treatise^u, namely, that the Son is the *ὄν*, signifying *emphatical existence*; which amounts to the same thing he had before said of the Father. And to shew further what Athanasius *would have* said, I have quoted in the margin what he really *has* said, in a treatise^x annexed to the other, written at the same time, and being a second part to it, so that they may be justly esteemed one treatise. He there teaches us to *worship the Son only*, and he styles him *true God*. These things put together amount to full as much as was said of the Father^y in the passage cited by the Doctor; namely, τὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ ὄντως ὄντα Θεόν, signifying that he is the *true God*, and that he exists *emphatically*: and it is manifest, that Athanasius intended no *opposition* to the Son, in what he said of the Father, but to *idols* only.

3. As to the third place which I found fault with, you would persuade us that the Doctor was very favourable in his *translation*, and took the least advantage possible. I blamed him for his rendering “far above all derivative being,” intending thereby to include the Son; as if Athanasius meant that the Father was *far above the Son*: whereas if it be rendered, as it ought to be, *far above all created being*; it would then be plain that this passage relates not to the Son at all, but to *creatures* only. But the Doctor, you now say, might have translated it “far above “all begotten being.” He might, indeed, have done so, and have thereby shewn himself as ill a *critic*, as before a *partial* writer. For what if some copies read *γεννητῆς*, with double *v*, instead of single; is any thing more common than mistakes of that kind? A little lower, in the same page, the editions had *γεννητῶν* instead of *γεννητῶν*^z. The sense must determine us in such cases, and a critical judgment of the principles laid down in the same treatise. One thing is certain, that however *γεννητῆς*

^u Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὄν ἐστι καὶ οὐ σύνθετος, διὰ καὶ ὁ τούτου Λόγος ὄν ἐστι καὶ οὐ σύνθετος, ἀλλὰ εἷς καὶ μονογενῆς Θεός — ὡς ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ Λόγῳ καὶ αὐτῷ ὄντι Θεῷ τὴν σύμπασαν διακνυβερνᾷ καὶ καθίστησιν. *Athan. contr. Gent.* p. 40.

^x Πανταχοῦ τὴν τοῦ Λόγου θεϊότητα βλέπων, οὐκ ἔτι μὲν ἀπατάται περὶ Θεοῦ, μόνον δὲ τοῦτον προσκυνεῖ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καλῶς τὸν πατέρα γινώσκει. *Ibid.* p. 87.

^y Ἐγνωρίσθη Θεὸς ἀληθινός, Θεοῦ Θεὸς Λόγος. P. 88.

^y Ὑπερεπέκεινα πάσης γεννητῆς οὐσίας ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατήρ. *Athan. contr. Gent.* p. 39.

^z Ἄλλος μὲν ἐστι τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, ἴδιος δὲ καὶ μόνος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ὑπάρχει Λόγος, &c. p. 39. ed. Bened. *Comp. Orat. i. c.* 56. p. 460, &c. which, if there be any doubt, will determine the meaning of the phrase ἄλλος τῶν γεννητῶν, &c.

be rendered, the Doctor is entirely false in ranking the Son under *γενητῆς οὐσίας*, because Athanasius, in the very page, clearly exempts him from the *τὰ γενητὰ*, from *created beings*. You may, if you please, say, from the *begotten beings*, and justify it in the same way as you pretend to justify the other. The late learned editor of Athanasius easily perceived that the word should be *γενητῆς* in one place, and *γενητῶν* in the other: and so it stands corrected in his edition.

4. I found fault with the Doctor's translation of a place in Eusebius^a, wherein he was doubly blamable: first, for tripping in his *logic*, by opposing *efficient* to *ministerial* cause, when the same may be both *efficient* and *ministerial*; and secondly, for faltering in a momentous article of *faith*, excluding God the Son from being *efficient Cause* of all things. Upon this you are in a vehement passion: it is "a cavil, most ridiculous, as well as unjust." I am not displeased to hear you say so; because now I may be confident that what I said was very right, just, and unanswerable. It is an observation the reader may have made, which will not be found to fail in any one instance, that whenever you throw out this kind of language, it is a certain mark of your distress, and of your not being able to make any solid reply. Let us see whether it does not hold true here, as well as in former instances. The Doctor's *translation*, you say, "does not exclude the Son from any proper efficiency, but from "supreme self-authoritative efficiency." You may be a better judge than I of what the Doctor believes, or maintains upon *second* thoughts: but I may presume to judge of a written translation. And I say, it is plain from his opposing *efficient* (not *supreme efficient*) to *ministerial*, that, unless his wits were absent, he intended as much to say that the Son was not *efficient Cause*, as that the Father was not *ministerial*. He continues the same thought all along, concluding the Father to be the *Maker*, (not *supreme Maker* only) of *all things*; therein shewing his *supreme power and efficiency*. This is the obvious sense of the Doctor's version. But I am not sorry to find, that either the Doctor or you are coming off from it, and approaching nearer to Catholic

^a Οὐχ ἕπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτοῦ ὧν ἡμᾶς ἀναπέμφθη ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ποιητικὴν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐθεντίαν. Euseb. Eccl. Theol. lib. i. c. 20.

The Doctor's *translation*, or *phrase*.

"Whereas he might have expressed "it thus, All things were made by him,

"as the *efficient Cause*; he does not "so express it, but thus; All things "were made by him as the *ministering Cause*; that so he might refer us to "the *supreme power and efficiency* of "the Father, as the *Maker* of all "things." *Script. Doct.* p. 89. alias 79.

principles: though it still looks a little suspicious, that you are every where scrupulous of styling the Son *Creator*, or *Maker*, and will never say that he created by his *own* power, but by the power of the Father.

5. I found fault with the Doctor's partial rendering a place of St. Chrysostom^b, and cutting the quotation short. You repeat (p. 462,) the same thing that the Doctor had pleaded for himself; and which I shewed to be insufficient in my Appendix. As to Basil, the Doctor had dealt as partially by him^c. Basil makes the Son's inherent power *equal* to the Father's; and in that sense says, that *as to power*, he is *equal* and *the same*. The Doctor means no more than that the Son's power (however *unequal*,) is derived from the Father, and in that sense they are *one in power*. Now I say, Basil's idea and the Doctor's are very different: and the Doctor was sensible of it; dropping the word *equal* in his version of Basil. Basil should not have been quoted as agreeing in the *thing*, when he agrees only in the *name*. You say, Basil could not mean that the Son's power is *coordinate*. But he certainly meant, and said, that the *Son's power is equal*: let the Doctor say this, and our dispute is ended. It is plain, that Basil's reason for the Father and Son *being one* is quite another than what the Doctor's is; and that the Doctor's notion of *one in power* is not Basil's notion^d. Why then was he quoted, and *mistranslated*, to confirm an interpretation entirely different from, nay, contrary to his own?

6. I found fault with the Doctor's *partial* rendering a noble passage of Irenæus^e. That Irenæus was not speaking of the Son, considered in a *representative capacity*, (which the Doctor, without any warrant^f, would express by ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ,) is manifest from Irenæus's referring to John i. 1. which describes the Son as *God*, before that fictitious representation the Doctor speaks of. Therefore the τὸ θεϊκὸν καὶ ἐνδοξον, in that place of Irenæus, is to be understood of the *antecedent* character which belonged to God the Son before the world was; and not of any subsequent *representation*.

7. I took notice^g of a passage in Justin cited by the Doctor,

^b Defence, p. 489, 525, 560.

^c Page 304.

^d The Doctor, by *power*, seems to mean *moral power*; such as *moralists* define to be that by which a person is enabled to do a thing *lawfully* and with *moral effect*: but Basil means *natural power*. The Doctor inter-

prets the text of Christ's *assuming to himself the power and authority of God*. Reply, p. 147. See also p. 136, 254.

^e See my Defence, vol. i. p. 525, 561.

^f See my Sermons, p. 106 of this volume.

^g Defence, vol. i. p. 526.

and truly rendered, but set in a *false light* to deceive the reader; as if God the Son were not himself *Creator* and *God* of Abraham, but one *personating* the Creator and God of Abraham.

I observed, that the Doctor could not have confuted the Jew, as Justin did, while he goes upon the supposition of the Son's *personating* the Father: a plain and evident token of the Doctor's misunderstanding and misrepresenting his author, when he makes a great part of the Dialogue nonsense, to bring it to his *hypothesis*. For how should Justin ever prove that there was a *divine Person*, distinct from *angels*, one that was really *God*, *God* of Abraham, &c. if the person pretended to be such was only *personating* the God of Abraham, and was not himself God? Might not the Jew insist upon it that it was an angel only, *personating* God? Why must it be another, who was really *God* of Abraham as well as the Father^h? The whole drift of Justin's argument is entirely defeated by such a fiction of *personating*: which makes it evident that Justin had no such notion, but the quite contrary. You do not pretend to say that the Doctor, upon his principles, could have confuted the Jew in the same way with Justin: only you say, "He never thought of confuting "him upon mine." But it is manifest that he did confute him upon this principle, that there was a *Person*, besides the *Father*, *God* of Abraham, really so, in his own *Person*, because so described in Scripture: and therefore there exists a *divine Person*, besides the Father, *Son* of that Father; which was to be proved. Your weak pretences about the Son's *ministering*, and his not being *supreme God* because of that, have been often answered.

8. I took notice of some things of a slighter kind; but such as betrayed too much leaning to an *hypothesis*, and tended to convey false *ideas* to the common readerⁱ. And though the alteration in such cases may appear slight, like the change of a figure or a cypher in an account; yet is it very mischievous, and, if designedly done, very dishonest.

9. I blamed the Doctor^k for skipping over some very material

^h For if he always spake *in the name*, &c. of the Father, no texts could be brought to prove him *Lord God*, because *Lord God* would express the *Person* and *authority* of the Father: but it is evident that Justin, Irenæus, and others, do pro-

fessedly cite passages of Scripture to prove the Son to be *Lord God*: that title or name then no less expresses the *Person* and *authority* of the *Son*, than of the *Father*. *True Script. Doctr. Continued*, p. 146.

ⁱ Defence vol. i. p. 526. ^k Ibid.

words of Novatian. Do you deny the fact? No: but you insist upon it, that Novatian has a great deal which may look for your purpose. I allowed as much before: only, as the words were capable of a Catholic meaning, and must be determined to that meaning if some parts of the sentence are incapable of any other; I desired that the words *per substantiæ communionem*, by *communion of substance*, (which the Doctor had unfairly omitted,) might be brought in to end the dispute.

As to Novatian's real principles, I have given you my thoughts above. He takes a particular way in the resolving the *unity*, very like to yours: yet he maintains the *eternity*¹ and *consubstantiality* of God the Son; wherein he differs as much from you as he agrees with me. The *subordination* he expresses in very strong words, but yet such as do not amount to an *inferiority of nature*.

You intimate, that the author intended an inequality of *perfections*, and not merely an inequality in respect of *original*: which is more than Novatian's words prove: or, at least, than they appear to me to prove. I shall give the passage in the margin^m, which must decide this matter. Novatian there many ways expresses the same thing, that had the Father and Son been equal in respect of *original*, had they both been *underived* or *unbegotten*, there might then have been just pretence

¹ As to Novatian's supposing the Father prior to the Son, I accounted for it in my Defence, vol. i. p. 355, 356. I shall here add a few parallel expressions from other Catholic writers, who undoubtedly believed the *coeternity*.

Ex quo ostenditur semper fuisse vaporem istum virtutis Dei, nullum habentem initium nisi ipsum Deum: neque enim decebat aliud ei esse initium nisi ipsum unde est et nascitur. *Pamphil. Apolog.* p. 230.

Primitivus est dictus quia præter Patrem, cui etiam coæternus est divinitate, cum Spiritu Sancto, ante ipsum nullus est primus. *Zen. Veronens. Serm. in Exod. ix.*

Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς—ὁ μηδὲν ἔχων προεπινοούμενον ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ μὴ τὸν ἐξ οὗ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι· οὐ διαστήματι ὑπερέχοντα, ἀλλὰ τῇ αἰτίᾳ προεταγμένον. *Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 735.*

^m Si enim natus non fuisset, innatus comparatus cum eo qui esset innatus,

æquatione in utroque ostensa, duos faceret innatos, et ideo duos faceret Deos. Si non genitus esset, collatus cum eo (qui) genitus non esset, et æquales inventi, duos Deos merito reddidissent non geniti; atque ideo duos Christus reddidisset Deos. Si sine origine esset, ut Pater, inventus, et ipse principium omnium, ut Pater, duo faciens principia, duos ostendisset nobis consequenter et Deos. Aut si et ipse Filius non esset, sed Pater generans de se alterum Filium, merito collatus cum Patre, et tantus denotatus, duos Patres effecisset, et ideo duos approbasset etiam Deos. Si invisibilis fuisset cum invisibili collatus, par expressus, duos invisibiles ostendisset, et ideo duos comprobasset et Deos. Si incomprehensibilis, si et cætera quæcunque sunt Patris; merito dicimus, duorum Deorum quam isti confingunt controversiam suscitatset. Nunc autem quicquid est, non ex se est, quia nec innatus est. *Novat. c. 31.*

for making them *two Gods*. He adds, that had they been both *invisible* and *incomprehensible*, they had then been *two Gods*. To understand which, we are to remember that it was the general doctrine of the Fathers, that God the *Son* might be *visible* and appear in a *place*, *per assumptas species*, by *visible symbols*; but that God the *Father* might not, it being unsuitable to the character of the *first Person* to be *sent*, and consequently to appear in that manner. Upon this *hypothesis*, had the *Son* been *invisible* and *incomprehensible*, in such a sense as the *Father* was conceived to be, it would have been the same thing as if he had been *another Father*, or another *first Person*; and that would infer *two Gods*. He is not therefore speaking of any difference as to *essential perfections*, but only of the difference between a *first* and *second Person*; that one could not be *sent*, or become *visible* and confined to a *place* in any sense: the other might in such a sense as hath been mentioned, viz. by *symbols* of his presence. Otherwise Novatian admits the *Son* in his own nature to be *omnipresent*, as well as the *Father*, as is plain from his wordsⁿ. See this point more fully cleared in Bishop Bull^o. The whole course and tenor of Novatian's discourse tends only to this, that there is but one *Head*, viz. the *Father*, to whom the *Son* himself, his *substance*, his *power*, and perfections are referred, and in whom they centre; that there is a difference of *order* because of that headship; and that, conformably thereto, the *Son* in all things acts *subordinately*, *ministers* to the *Father*, and executes inferior offices under him, as a son to a father, not as a *servant* to his *lord*. This is all that Novatian's words strictly amount to: and though he speaks of the *subjection* of the *Son*, it does not necessarily mean any thing more than that voluntary *economy* which God the *Son* underwent, and which would not have been proper for the *Father* himself to have submitted to, because not suitable to the *order* of the *Persons*.

One passage I must here give, because we differ chiefly about what that passage contains. The literal version runs thus P:

ⁿ Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo adest ubique invocatus? Cum hæc hominis natura non sit sed Dei, ut adesse omni loco possit. *Novat. cap. 15*. See True Script. Doctr. Continued, p. 170.

^o Bull. D. F. sect. iv. cap. 3.

^p Cujus sic divinitas traditur, ut non aut *dissonantia*, aut *inæqualitate* divinitatis, duos Deos reddidisse vi-

deatur. Subjectis enim ei, quasi Filio, omnibus rebus a Patre, dum ipse cum his quæ illi subjecta sunt, Patri suo subjicitur, Patris quidem sui Filii probatur, cæterorum autem et Dominus et Deus esse reperitur. Ex quo dum huic qui est Deus, omnia subtracta (*leg. substrata*) traduntur, et cuncta sibi subjecta Filii accepta refert Patri, totam divinitatis auctori-

“ Whose Godhead is so delivered, as not to appear to make two Gods, either by a *disagreement* or *inequality* of Godhead. For all things being by the Father made subject to him, as to a Son, while he himself, with those things which are made subject to him, is subject to his Father: he is shewn indeed to be the Son of his Father; but is found to be Lord and God of all things else. And since all things are thus subjected to him (*the Son*) who is God, and since he owes their being made subject under him to the Father, he again refers back to the Father all the authority of the Godhead: and so the Father is shewn to be the one true and eternal God, from whom alone this efflux of the Godhead being sent out and communicated to the Son. revolves again to the Father by *communion of substance*. The Son is indeed shewn to be God, as the Godhead is communicated and delivered to him: but at the same time the Father is nevertheless *the one God*, while that very Majesty and Godhead is, by a reciprocal course, returned, and referred up again from the Son to the Father that gave it.”

This is, I think, a fair and true rendering of Novatian: only I am now to justify such parts of it as you will be apt to except against. Instead of *inequality*, you choose the reverse, viz. *equality*; upon some slender suspicions of your own against the faith of the copies. *Conjectural* emendations ought never to be admitted, but upon the greatest necessity. For it often happens that men please themselves awhile with reasons that look plausible; but when the thing comes to be well considered, reasons as plausible, or more so, may appear on the other side. It has been urged, in this very case, by a learned gentleman^q, that what you would make a reason for *non æqualitate*, is sufficiently answered by the words, *non dissonantia divinitatis*. For had the Father and Son been *equally unoriginate*, there would have been *dissonantia*, according to Novatian^r; a disagreement of two independent Deities, without any *Sonship*, which makes

tatem rursus Patri remittit; unus Deus ostenditur verus et æternus Pater, a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa, etiam in Filium tradita et directa, rursum per substantiæ communionem ad Patrem revolvitur. Deus quidem ostenditur Filius cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur; et tamen nihilominus unus Deus Pater probatur; dum gradatim reciproco meatu illa majestas atque divinitas ad Patrem,

qui dederat eam, rursum ab illo ipso Filio missa revertitur, et retorquetur. *Novat. cap. 31.*

^q True Scripture Doctrine Continued, p. 172.

^r Dum non aliunde est quam ex Patre, Patri suo originem suam debens, *discordiam divinitatis* de numero duorum Deorum facere non potuit. *Novat. cap. 31.*

the *union*^s. Hence then Novatian excludes *equality* of original, by the words *non dissonantia*; but at the same time teaches an *equality* of nature, or *Godhead*, that he might avoid the opposite extreme. And this is but suitable to the very tenor of his discourse, there and elsewhere. For how can there be a *communication* of substance and Godhead, without the supposition of *equality* of nature and *Godhead*? A little before, he had said, the *Word* was *divine substance*^t: and he here speaks of the *Godhead* being communicated, or imparted to the Son, and revolving again to the Father as the Head or Fountain. Besides that, Novatian is known to make the Son as truly of the *same nature* with the Father, as any *man* is of the same *human* nature with his Father^u. What is this but, in other words, declaring equality of *nature* or *Godhead*? There is therefore no reason for altering Novatian's text^x: however positively you may express yourself on that head.

As to the words *accepta refert Patri*, they really mean no more than that he received them from the Father, or acknowledged them to be received: which comes not up to the Doctor's expression, (which I found fault with,) "in acknowledgment returned:" besides that the Doctor was not there translating *accepta refert*, but *reciproco meatu revertitur, &c.*

^s Si ambo vocarentur *Patres*, essent profecto *natura dissimiles*: unusquisque enim ex semetipso constaret, et communem substantiam cum altero non haberet; nec *Deitas una* esset, quibus *una natura* non esset. *Fulgent. Resp. contr. Arian.* p. 52.

Duos autem Deos dicere non possumus, nec debemus: non quod Filius Dei Deus non sit, imo verus Deus de Deo vero; sed quia *non aliunde* quam de ipso uno Patre Dei Filium novimus, proinde unum Deum dicimus.—Si verus Deus est, et de Patre non est, duo sunt, habentes singuli et voluntates proprias, et imperia diversa. *Greg. Nazianz. Op.* vol. i. p. 728. *Ambros. Op.* vol. ii. p. 347.

Quicquid *extra* eum est, cum contumelia ei honoratæ virtutis æquabitur. Si enim aliquid quod *non ex ipso est*, reperiri potest *simile* ei, et *virtutis ejusdem*; amisit *privilegium Dei* sub consortio *coæqualis*: jamque non erit *Deus unus* a quo indifferens sit *Deus alius*. At vero non habet contumeliam *proprietas* æqualitas, quia *suum est* quod sui simile est; et *ex se est* quod sibi ad similitudinem comparatur; nec

extra se est, quod quæ sua sunt potest: et profectus *dignitatis* est genuisse potestatem, nec alienasse naturam. *Hilar. de Trin.* p. 934.

^t *Substantia* scilicet illa *divina*, cujus nomen est *Verbum*. *Novat. c.* 31.

^u Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura hominem credendum qui ex homine sit: ita eadem natura præscribit et Deum credendum esse qui ex Deo sit. *Novat. cap.* 11.

^x I may here cite a passage of Hilary, which may serve as a just comment upon this of Novatian; being extremely like it, and carrying the same thought, probably, in it.

Insunt sibi invicem, dum non est nisi *ex Patre* nativitas, dum in *Deum alterum* naturæ vel *exterioris*, vel *dissimilis* non subsistit, dum Deus ex Deo manens non est *aliunde* quod Deus est. *Hilar. p.* 937.

Here are the same reasons given why Father and Son are not *two Gods*: and Hilary's expression of *non naturæ exterioris* answers to Novatian's of *non dissonantia*; as also his *non dissimilis* to the other's *non inæqualitate*.

The words *vis divinitatis*, I render *efflux of the Godhead*; which you render *divine power*. I could not think of a better expression than what I made use of. That I have not missed the sense I persuade myself, because Novatian is speaking of *communion of substance* in the same sentence, and had stiled the Word *divine substance* a little before: and he is here plainly speaking of the divine substance being *porrecta* and *tradita*, communicated from Father to Son, and recurring to the Father as Head. If *vis* answers to the Greek *δύναμις*, as I conceive it here does, it means the same as the *living* and *substantial* power of God, the same that we express by *efflux*, or *emanation*. The thought of Novatian seems to be the same with that of Tertullian^y, whom he loved to imitate in many things. To make it still plainer that I interpret him rightly, please to observe the words, *Deus quidem ostenditur Filius, cui divinitas tradita et porrecta conspicitur*. Here he gives the reason why the Son is *God*: it is because the Godhead extends to him, or is communicated to him. Compare this with what the author says in another place^z; and you will see how consistent and uniform this writer is in his doctrine, that it is the Son's *proceeding* from the Father, or his partaking of the *divine substance*, that makes him *God*. So little reason have you to imagine that the words *per substantiæ communionem*, crept into the text out of the margin. Whether the Doctor or I have pursued a wrong scent in explaining Novatian, I now leave to the reader to judge.

10. I had remarked^a upon the Doctor's rendering a passage of Athanasius^b, more to serve his *hypothesis*, than pursuant to the sense of the author. The reader must be left to judge for himself, after comparing what hath or may be said on both sides. The author, as I take it, is there blaming the Sabellians for imagining the Son to be the *only God*, in such a sense as to make *one Person* only (under *three names*, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) in the Godhead, instead of three real Persons. Accord-

^y Cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius, nec separatur substantia, sed extenditur. Tertull. Apol. cap. 21.

Prolatum Filium a Patre, sed non separatum. Contr. Prax. cap. 8.

^z Qui idcirco unum potest dici, dum ex ipso est, et dum Filius ejus est, et dum ex ipso nascitur, et dum ex ipso processisse reperitur, per quod et Deus est. Novat. cap. 23.

Si homo tantummodo Christus, quomodo dicit, *Ego ex Deo prodii et veni?* cum constet hominem a Deo factum esse, non ex Deo processisse — Deus ergo processit ex Deo, dum qui processit sermo, *Deus est qui processit ex Deo*. Novat. cap. 23.

^a Defence, vol. i. p. 528.

^b Ὁ σαρκωθείς Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ πατὴρ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐκείνοι φαίεν, ὁ μόνος Θεός. Athan. contr. Greg. Sabell. p. 47.

ingly, the same author censures them (p. 39^c.) for making the Son *μόνος*, or the *alone* divine Person, in contradiction to John viii. 16. "I am not alone, because the Father is with me." Which text he produces to prove that Father and Son were *two Persons*, and that the Son was not *μόνος* in such a sense, as to infer a *confusion* of Persons. This therefore being all that the author intended against the Sabellians, it seems to me plain, that the construction I before gave of *ὡς ἐκείνοι φαίεν*, was right, and the Doctor's wrong. That the author could not deny the Son to be the *only God* in any other sense, is plain from his making Father and Son *one perfect substance*^d; and his asserting *one Godhead* of both^e. In another place^f, he censures the Sabellians for making the Son the *one and only God*: but how? So as to deny the *distinct Personality*, and no otherwise. And in the very place we are now upon, all that the writer insists upon is, that the Father and Son are distinct Persons, not one Person: in which sense the author does not admit the Son to be *ὁ μόνος Θεός*. But that it is always Sabellian to apply the phrase to the Son singly, or to both together, is not said, neither can you prove it. The force of your argument lies only in the article *ὁ*: for as to *μόνος Θεός*, *only God*, that it is often applied to the Son, cannot be denied^g: and this consideration might be sufficient to make the author put in the restriction of *ὡς ἐκείνοι φαίεν* to the latter branch of the sentence, which he did not to the former, where it is *ὁ Πατήρ*. For there is a sense wherein the Son is *ὁ μόνος Θεός*, but he is not *ὁ Πατήρ* in any sense: which shews the reason why the author expressed himself as he did.

II. I took notice^h of another passage directly contrary to the Doctor's purpose, though cited by him. For the Doctor's design was to make the Father the *only God* exclusive of the Son: while that passage makes him the *only God including* the Son; di-

^c Πῶς οὐκ ἀποστασία σαφῆς ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ τρία, καὶ μόνον εἶναι λέγειν τὸν φάσκοντα· οὐκ εἰμὶ μόνος, ὅτι ὁ πέμψας με πατήρ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐστι—ἰδοὺ γὰρ δύο πρόσωπα. *Athan.* tom. ii. p. 39.

^d Μία δὲ οὐσα οὐσία τελεία. P. 41.

^e Μία θεότης πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ. P. 42.

^f Οἱ τὴν τριάδα μονάδα ποιοῦντες νοθεύειν καὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν, ὡσπερ τὴν γέννησιν, ἐπιχειροῦσιν· εἴσω γὰρ ὄντα φασὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱόν, ἁγιασμὸν ἀνθρώπου ἐργάζεσθαι, τουτέστιν, αὐτὸν τὸν εἶνα καὶ μόνον Θεόν, οὕτως ἀπεστάλλαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ Θεὸν παρὰ Θεοῦ. P. 47.

^g Μόνω τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων Θεῶ. *Clem. Alexand.* p. 84.

Τῶν συμπάντων Θεὸν εἶνα μόνον—υἱὸν ἐν πατρὶ. P. 142.

Christus Jesus solus esset Deus. *Aristid. apud Petav.* Præf. ad 2. tom. Theol.

Τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος μόνος Θεὸς ἀληθής—μόνος Θεός ὡς ὁ πατήρ. *Athan. in Psal.* p. 83. nov. collect.

Υἱὸν μόνον εἰρησθαι Θεὸν, &c. *Greg. Naz. Orat.* xxxvi. p. 586.

Ἐμὲ δὲ μόνον Θεὸν εἰδέναι, &c. *Euseb. in Psal.* p. 503.

^h Defence, vol. i. p. 528.

rectly the reverse. Had the Doctor's intention been only to prove that the Father is styled the *only God*, the method had been fair: but as his professed design was to *exclude* the Son from the *one Godhead*, his manner of citing authors for it, who in these very passages were directly against it, is an intolerable abuse upon the readers.

12. The like may be said of another passage taken notice of in my Defenceⁱ. You seem to forget the Doctor's note on prop. 9. where he precautions his reader to understand it in such a sense as to exclude the Son from *necessary existence*, (so you interpret *self-existent*.) Now can any thing be more unfair or fraudulent, than to cite authors as styling the Father the *only God*, to countenance a proposition in such a sense as those authors detested and abhorred? All the apologies you can possibly invent can never make such a practice righteous, or honest.

13. I remarked^k upon a passage cited out of Nazianzen; where the Doctor, by a note, had most shamefully stifled and perverted the author's meaning. You say not one word of the Doctor's note, the only thing I found fault with: and which indeed can admit of no colourable excuse, except it were done through carelessness, taking a passage at *second hand*, and commenting upon it, without ever looking into the author to see what went before or after.

14. As to the passage of Justin Martyr, enough hath been said above.

15. I remarked^l upon another note of the Doctor's, on a passage in Irenæus, and gave several reasons to shew the unfairness and falseness of it. You have here nothing to say in his defence: so I pass on.

16. I remarked upon another passage^m, where the Doctor had read the text of Irenæus wrong; which you civilly acknowledge, and thank me for the notice. But there are still two questions betwixt us relating to that place. First, whether it should be *ἀγέννητος* or *ἀγένητος*, and next, whether the Son be included by Irenæus, in that place, in the *ἀγένητος Θεός*, supposing that to be the reading. It was needless for you to heap passages upon me to prove that none but the *Father* should be

ⁱ Vol. i. p. 528. ^k Ib. p. 529. ^l Ibid.

^m Ὁ γεννητός καὶ πεπλασμένος ἄνθρωπος κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ ἀγεννήτου γίνεται Θεοῦ· τοῦ μὲν πατρὸς

εὐδοκοῦντος, καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ υἱοῦ πρᾶσσοντος καὶ δημιουργοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξαντος. *Iren. lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 285.*

styled ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, or *unoriginate*; which I readily allow. All the question is about ἀγέννητος, *uncreated, unmade, eternal, or necessarily existing*. The reasons why I think ἀγενήτου to be the reading in Irenæus are these:

I. The translator's rendering it by *infecti*: which however I acknowledge to be of less weight, because he is sometimes mistaken in such cases; putting *ingenitus* for *infectus*, and perhaps *infectus* for *ingenitus* or *innatus*.

II. A much stronger reason is, that through that whole chapter ἀγέννητος is opposed to things *made*, things of transient and *precarious* existence. The opposition runs between the things *made*, and the *Maker* of themⁿ:

III. Another very weighty reason is drawn from the opposition between γεννητὸς ἄνθρωπος, and ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ: that the reading is γεννητὸς, not with double ν, is evident from the whole chapter; where the opposition runs between man *made*^o, and God his *Maker*. And there is not the least hint of man considered as *begotten*, or as *Son of God*; as you would understand it, referring to Luke iii. 38. These reasons convince me that the true reading of the words is ὁ γεννητὸς ἄνθρωπος. and τοῦ ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ.

The next question is, whether the Son be here included under ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ. I gave several reasons why all the three Persons are included; which reasons may be seen in my Defence. I shall add two more: one, that as the opposition runs between the thing *made* and the *maker*; so it is observable that God the Son frequently is *factor*, ποιητής, *Maker*, according to Irenæus; which shews that he is included in the ἀγέννητος Θεός. And again, it is Irenæus's doctrine, that man's being made after the *image of God* is to be understood of his being made in the image of God the *Word*^p: which still further confirms my construction of that passage; and I now submit it to the judgment of the

ⁿ Τῷ μὲν Θεῷ, αἰὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντι, καὶ ἀγεννήτῳ ὑπάρχοντι—τὰ δὲ γεγονότα καθὼ μετέπειτα γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἰδίαν ἔσχε, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑστερεῖσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐ γὰρ ἠδύναστο ἀγέννητα εἶναι τὰ νεωστὶ γεγεννημένα. *Iren.* p. 283.

Volunt similes esse factori Deo, et nullam esse differentiam infecti Dei et nunc facti hominis. P. 285.

^o Ἐκεῖνος ἄρτι γεγονώς—νεωστὶ γεγονότα ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι μὴ ἀγέννητος ἦν. P. 284.

^p Ἐδεῖ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρῶτον γενέσθαι, καὶ γενόμενον ἀξέησαι, &c. p. 285.

^p Ὁ Λόγος, οὐ κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει.

Ὁ Λόγος—τὴν εἰκόνα ἔδειξεν ἀληθῶς, αὐτὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος ὅπερ ἦν εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ. *Iren.* lib. v. cap. 16. p. 313.

Quia jam adhærebat illi Filii, secunda persona, sermo ipsius, et tertia, Spiritus in sermone, ideo pluraliter pronuntiavit, faciamus, et nostram. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 12.

Unum enim sunt, quorum imaginis et similitudinis unum est homo factus exemplum. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. v. cap. 8.

learned reader. As to my translating *εὐδοκοῦντος* by *designing*, I have accounted for it above.

17. As to the passage in Basil, which the Doctor had not done justice to, I desire the reader to see my Defence^q. That Basil allows the Father to be a natural *cause* of the Son is very true; not a *cause* in the Doctor's sense: nor do Basil's words convey any such notion to the reader, as the Doctor's word, *effects*, does. And therefore the Doctor cannot be acquitted of a misrepresentation. I leave it to any reader, who will compare my account of Basil with the Doctor's version, to judge whether the *ideas* here and there be not very widely different. And what occasion was there for the Doctor's saying *effects*, instead of *things issuing from them*, but to favour an *hypothesis*, and to hold out a false light to the readers? As to what you say of *ἀξίωμα*, *dignity*, I have answered it above. Your reason for *προτετάχθαι* signifying more than *priority of order*, is very peculiar, viz. because Basil in another place has both *τάξει* and *ἀξιώματι*: therefore when he makes mention of *order* only, (as in the word *προτετάχθαι*,) he meant more than *order*. You might perceive, by the reason given in both places, that *προτετάχθαι* applied to the Father, and *τάξει δεύτερος* applied to the Son, answer exactly to each other, and literally signify *order*, and nothing else^r. And had you attended to Basil's reasoning, where he allows *ἀξιώματι* as well as *τάξει*, you would have perceived that it was rather *ad hominem*, or for argument sake, than any thing else. For admitting that the Son or Holy Ghost were *ἀξιώματι*, as well as *τάξει*, *second* and *third*, (as Eunomius pretended,) yet he shews that no certain consequence can be drawn from thence to *inferiority of nature*. Or however, at the most, all you can make of it is, that the Father being *supreme in office*, as well as in *order*, was on that account *ἀξιώματι πρώτος*, first in dignity: as one angel (which is Basil's illustration) is superior to another in *rank*, or *office*, though in *nature* equal. *Basil. lib. iii. p. 79.*

19. The last passage I found fault with, you are content to throw off under the name of a *quibble*; because you could not account for the Doctor's foul play in mistranslating it, and warping it to his own *hypothesis*. Why was not the word *δημιουργήματα* rendered *creatures*, as it ought to have been? And why did the Doctor put *all things*, when speaking of things produced by the Father, and *things* only in respect of the Son's producing, when he had no ground for the distinction in Basil?

^q Vol. i. p. 531.

^r See another passage of Basil above, p. 723.

But enough of this. The Doctor's partiality in many of his quotations has been sufficiently manifested. And though you are pleased to pass the matter off with as good a face as you can, (and it is your wisest way so to do,) yet you will hardly find many readers of opinion with you, that these kind of slips, in a man of character, are of slight moment. Had Bishop Bull been ever guilty of things of this kind, I well know what use would have been made of it. Mr. Whiston^s charged him with once *unfairly* translating a passage of Origen; where yet the Bishop was right, and Mr. Whiston certainly wrong, as I have proved in my Defence^t: and this one pretended instance of *unfairness* is brought up again, and aggravated, by another gentleman^u, with some kind of insult. A few slips of this nature, where a charge is really just, are not easily pardoned in any writers of the higher class: betraying either want of *learning*, or want of *care*, or, what is worst of all, want of *honesty*.

You endeavour to throw off the force of the next five or six pages of my Defence, (which you can never fairly answer,) by charging something *disingenuous*, as you pretend, upon me: "as if all the Doctor's citations from the Fathers in general were *concessions only from* writers, who were adversaries in the *whole.*" But I made a distinction^x, as the Doctor himself had done^y, between Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene writers. As to the latter, he laid claim to nothing but *concessions*: and as to the former, he did indeed claim more in respect of *some* of them, though I think without reason. You are still sanguine enough to say, that "much the greater part of the authors he cites, all," you think, "of the three first centuries, agree with him in the *full sense of all his propositions.*" How wild, and indeed romantic, this imagination of yours is, hath been sufficiently shewn all the way; first, in my Defence, and again in these papers: particularly in the *eleven* instances above mentioned, wherein the Doctor runs counter to all antiquity. As to *supreme dominion*, which you lay so much stress on; it is demonstration that the Fathers held no *supremacy* but what was thought consistent with *equality of nature*, and with the unity of the same *Godhead* common to Father and Son. If this be your *supremacy*, all is right and well. But it is ridiculous in you to quote *ancients*

^s Primitive Christianity Revived, Append. ii. p. 44.
vol. iv. p. 154.

^x Defence, vol. i. p. 522.

^t Vol. i. p. 389, &c.

^y Preface to Script. Doctr. p. 18.

^u Primitive Christianity Revived. 1st ed. Reply, p. 5, 6.

for the supremacy, and at the same time to throw out all the considerations which should come in to qualify, fix, and determine the notion of *supremacy* among the ancients. Are not all the other tenets, wherein the *ancients* evidently contradict the Doctor's whole scheme, so many *demonstrations* that they never understood *supremacy* in any such sense as he does? What is the Doctor or you doing, but playing *one* or *two* principles of the *ancients*, of uncertain meaning in themselves, against twenty *clear, plain, undoubted* principles? which if you were able to do with success, it would not be proving that the *Fathers* were on your side, but that they were fools and mad, and are of no account on either side of the controversy. But I hope the reader will easily see through the mystery of the whole deceit which you are putting upon him, (and perhaps upon yourselves at the same time,) which is only this: the straining and perverting the true and Catholic notion of *supremacy* (held in all ages of the Church, before and after the Nicene Council) to an *Arian* and *heretical* sense; that so you may *obliquely* (what you care not to do *directly*) reduce the Son and Holy Ghost to the rank of *creatures*. Your constant plea is, the *supremacy*, the *supremacy*: the *ancients*, it seems, were for supremacy, *amidst all their variety of metaphysical speculations*: so that every other tenet, whereby the *ancients* plainly overturn your whole scheme, must be thrown off as a *metaphysical speculation*; and nothing but *supremacy* must be sounded in our ears. Yet, after all, you can make nothing of this pretended *supremacy* till you turn it into a *metaphysical speculation* upon *self-existence*, and that again into *necessary existence*; then adding sundry other *metaphysical speculations*, to degrade and sink God the Son into *precarious* existence. This was not the way of the *ancients*; nor was this the use they ever made, or intended to make of the *supremacy*: if they had, you would have allowed them, I suppose, in this single instance, to run into *metaphysical speculations*. One thing is evident, *amidst all their variety of metaphysical speculations*, in which you think they abounded more than you, that what *metaphysics* they had in their *great abundance*, they employed them all in *defence* of our Lord's *divinity*; while you, on the contrary, employ the *little* you have, in *direct opposition* to it. Certainly, the *ancients*, being so much given to *metaphysics*, could have been *metaphysical* on your side of the question, as well as you are now: but either they were wise enough to distinguish *false* metaphysics from *true*; or, they *had not so learned Christ*. But to return.

I intimated^z how a Romanist might, in Dr. Clarke's way, fill pages with quotations wide of the purpose, and call them *concessions*, and thereby deceive weak readers. Here you have nothing to reply, but that I do the Doctor wrong in applying this to *all his citations*. I applied it not to *all*, but to as many (be they *more* or *fewer*) as have been thus deceitfully made use of by the Doctor. By his own account it must be understood of as many Post-Nicene Catholics as he quotes in that manner: and how many Ante-Nicenes it ought to be understood of, may appear from what I have shewn of their being in very opposite sentiments to his, in the most material points of our dispute. But allowing your plea, is it any justification of the Doctor's method of quoting? I charge him with *deceit*: and you, in his *defence*, represent him as practising it not so *much*, or so *often*, as I might imagine. But why did he practise it at all?

You next endeavour to retort something upon me like to the Romanists, though entirely wide and foreign, and brought in most strangely. They have recourse, you say, to *tradition*: you should have said to *oral* tradition, which is quite another thing from *written* tradition. And what harm is there in having recourse to the *written* tradition of Fathers for the sense of Scripture, more than in having recourse to a Dictionary for the sense of words; or to the practice of *courts*, resolutions of Judges, or books of Reports, for the sense of *laws*? All helps, for the understanding of Scripture, ought to be made use of: and recourse to the *Fathers* is one, and a very considerable one. The Romanists, you add, call their own doctrine Catholic: yes, and without reason. The Fathers, long before *Popery*, called their doctrine Catholic, and with good reason. What then? The Romanists also call that *heresy*, which is really none: may we not therefore call that *heresy*, which really is such, and which has been ever so accounted in all ages of the Church? What you have further is repetition: except your speculations on Rev. i. 8. which have been mostly considered above^a. There remain only a few incidental matters to be here taken notice of, very briefly. I had referred to four places^b in Clemens, where he either directly or indirectly makes the Son παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*. Of *three* of them no reasonable doubt can be made: and *three* are

^z Defence, vol. i. p. 534. 535.

^a Page 562 of this volume.

^b Τοῦ παντοκράτορος καὶ πατρικοῦ Λόγου. p. 148. Τὸν παντοκράτορα Θεὸν

Λόγον, p. 277. Δύναμις παγκρατῆς—
θέλημα παντοκρατορικόν. p. 146. Ἡ
νίου φύσις ἢ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι
προσεχεστάτη. p. 831.

sufficient. The *fourth* only says, that the nature of the Son is *προσεχέσιότατη*, most intimately united to the *alone Almighty*; which, according to Clemens's notion of their *union*, is supposing both *Almighty*. But this I need not insist upon, having *three* plain testimonies besides; two of which have been vindicated above. You cite another passage^c of Clemens, and you translate it most shamefully, to serve your *hypothesis*, in these words; "He is irresistible as being Lord of all; most certainly irresistible, because ministering to the will of the good and supreme Father over all." You have here exceeded Mr. Whiston by far; whose translation is very modest and reasonable in comparison. The literal and just rendering is thus: "Neither could he be obstructed by any other, being *Lord of all*, and chiefly (or *most perfectly*) ministering to the will of the good and Almighty Father." Clemens's thought is this; that as to *creatures*, they cannot obstruct him, since he is *Lord over them*: and as to the *Father*, he *will not*, inasmuch as all that the Son does is *perfectly agreeable* to his *will*^d. I need not say any thing here further in relation to Justin or Eusebius; having given my thoughts of both in the preceding sheets.

QUERY XXVIII.

Whether it be at all probable, that the primitive Church should mistake in so material a point as this is; or that the whole stream of Christian writers should mistake in telling us what the sense of the Church was: and whether such a cloud of witnesses can be set aside without weakening the only proof we have of the Canon of the Scripture, and the integrity of the sacred text?

THE Modest Pleader thinks it not material to inquire, "whether the ancient writers of the Church were better skilled in *metaphysical* speculations, than we at this day?" This kind of talk is what he affects, and pleases himself in; though he has nothing but *metaphysics* to depend on, as I have often observed: and I will venture to assure him, that the old and well tried *metaphysics* of the ancients are such as he will find much superior to his own. *Metaphysics* were indeed first brought in by *heretics*, and were much encouraged by Arius, Eunomius, and

^c Οὐθ' ἕφ' ἑτέρου κωλυθείη ποτ' ἂν ὁ πάντων κύριος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐξυπηρετῶν τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος θελήματι πατρός. p. 832.

^d See Bull. D. F. sect. ii. cap. 6. Nourrii Apparatus. vol. i. p. 954. Lord Nottinghams's Answer to Whiston, p. 5.

the whole sect of Arians : but the Fathers of the Church, having better sense than they, were able to baffle them at their own weapons. The Modest Pleader, I think, (if there be not an interpolation by another hand,) still goes on, and tells me “ how “ unanimously, how uniformly *the ancients* asserted a real supremacy of the Father’s dominion.” And yet the certain truth is, that he has no Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene Catholic writer that ever came up to his notion of it. Where does he find them saying, that the Father *alone* is supreme in dominion? He may find many expressly contradicting it; as many as make Father and Son *one God*, or proclaim them *undivided* in dominion, or say that they are *unius Potestatis, unius Divinitatis, of one Power and Godhead*, and the like: many testimonies whereof have been given in the course of these papers. All he can prove is a *supremacy* of the Father, a *supremacy* in respect of *order* or *office*, nothing more. But his way is to take *old* expressions, and to affix *new* ideas to them, under pretence that those old writers knew not how to speak accurately. What they called *cause*, is with him no *cause*; what they called *acts*, are *no acts*; what they called *generation*, is no *generation*; and their *subordination* (like mine) is a *coordination*: and so, I presume, their *supremacy* is *no supremacy*, but must be stretched further upon the foot of the *new metaphysics*. This is the whole of the case; new *ideas* to old terms, that a man may *seem* to concur with the *ancients*, while he is *really* contradicting them in the grossest manner, and introducing a *novel* faith. I know not how far such a method may serve with the populace: wise men will see through it, and give it its due name; viz. either great *ignorance* of antiquity, or great *partiality*.

But he goes on: “ whole streams of writers in matters of controversy, representing other men’s opinions otherwise than in “ the words of the persons themselves, are no manner of evidence.” One would wonder what this wise paragraph meant, or what it was to the purpose. Have we not the sense of the Church from Churchmen themselves? But he wanted to introduce an ill-natured gird upon somebody. He is terribly afraid lest any man should judge of Dr. Clarke’s writings from his *adversary’s* accounts. I hope the reader will bear this caution in mind, as often as he reads Dr. Clarke’s account of the Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene writers, to whom he is an utter *adversary*; though a *professed* one to the latter only. As

to what he says about *weakening the canon of Scripture*, I refer to my Defence^e; where that matter is fairly and fully stated.

I now come to you. You repeat the pretence of *supremacy*: which requires no further answer but this; that you mistake the *alone unoriginateness* for *alone dominion*. The Father is not the *alone Governor*: but he *alone* hath his authority and dominion *from none*.

QUERY XXIX.

Whether private reasoning, in a matter above our comprehension, be a safer rule to go by, than the general sense and judgment of the primitive Church in the first 300 years: or, supposing it doubtful what the sense of the Church was within that time, whether what was determined by a Council of 300 Bishops soon after, with the greatest care and deliberation, and has satisfied men of the greatest sense, piety, and learning, all over the Christian world, for 1400 years since, may not satisfy wise and good men now?

I HERE meet with nothing but what has been abundantly answered or obviated. Your former pretences were;

1. That the Nicene Council knew nothing of *individual consubstantiality*.
2. That they understood *consubstantial* in a *figurative* sense.
3. That if they intended any *real* consubstantiality, it was *specific* only.
4. That several Councils, more *numerous* than that of Nice determined against the *ὁμοούσιον*.

All these *pleas* were particularly *examined* and *confuted* in my Defence: and you have been content to drop them, as indefensible, without any reinforcement.

You have nothing further but a few trifling quibbles about *individual*, and *identical*, and *supreme* authority: which may now pass with the readers for words of course; such as you have accustomed yourself to repeat, when you have no mind to be silent. I must desire the reader to turn to my Defence of this Query, and to compare it with your Reply, if he finds any thing in what you have said that seems to require any consideration.

QUERY XXX.

Whether, supposing the case doubtful, it be not a wise man's part to take the safer side; rather to think too highly, than too meanly of

^e Vol. i. p. 541, &c.

our blessed Saviour; rather to pay a modest deference to the judgment of the ancient and modern Church, than to lean to one's own understanding?

I MUST take notice of what the Modest Pleader here pretends, that "this Query may be retorted with irresistible strength." After he has thus prepared his reader, let us hear what his words come to. It is thus, "whether it be not a wise man's part, rather to think too highly than too meanly of God the Father; and to be tender of his *incommunicable* honour." To which I answer, that God the Father has determined this question already, by his *commands* laid upon us to *honour* his *Son* even as *himself*; and by his giving no particular cautions against honouring him *too much*. If we err on this part, in honouring the Son *too highly*, (without the least thought of dishonouring the Father.) we err on the *right side*, as erring on the side of the *precept*; whereas the other is erring against the *precept*. This I urged before; and neither the Modest Pleader nor yourself take the least notice of it. However, I rested my argument upon this further consideration, that the *modest* side is the *safest* to err in: and I thought a debt of *modesty* very proper to be paid to the *ancient Church*, and to all the *modern Churches*; unless you had plain *demonstration* for your dissent.

But the Modest Pleader says, a "modest deference should be paid to the express declarations and commands of Scripture, rather than to the additions of any human and fallible judgment." But where is his *modesty* to call his *unscriptural* inventions by the venerable name of *Scripture*? The question is not, whether *express Scripture* ought to be obeyed: but whether, what a few confident men call *express Scripture*, and all the Churches of Christendom, early and late. take to be directly *contrary* to *express Scripture*, is to be admitted as an article of faith.

It is very strange that you should so often speak of *human* and *fallible* judgment, and never consider that the judgment you make is *human* and *fallible*, as well as the rest. Are you, in particular, privileged from *errors*, or blessed with the gift of *infallibility*? Since we are comparing *human* with *human*, and *fallible* with *fallible* judgment; think it possible that *many*, and *great*. and *wise* men may have judged *right*, and that a *few* may have judged *wrong*. There is a presumption, a strong probability, to say no more, against you: nor will any thing less than *demonstration* be sufficient to support your pretences, in opposition

to the current judgment of the Christian world. In modesty, the *novelists* ought to pay a deference to wiser men than themselves; and not presume that they have *Scripture* on their side, till they are able to *prove* it. But of this I said enough in my Defence^f; and you make no answer. You have nothing more, under this Query, but repetition of your preface; which I have answered in its place. Only I must take notice of one very peculiar piece of grave banter: your accusing me as appealing to the *passions of the readers*, only for retorting upon you your own declamation, in somewhat stronger words; as I had a better cause to support them. Who was it that first called upon us to “consider, what to answer at the great day, &c.?” So solemn an appeal, upon such trifling pretences as you had, obliged me to remind you of the infinitely greater risk you run, in unaccountably denying your *Lord* and *God*. You tell us also of names of *reproach*; at the same time reproaching the Church of God, and the most eminent lights of it in all ages, as *Tritheists*, or *Sabellians*, or *Scholastics*, or as *contentious* men, that built their faith on *metaphysical speculations*. It seems, you can feel any thing that looks like a *reproach* upon yourselves; at the same time causelessly dealing about hard names, and most injurious reflections upon all around you. Learn to be *modest*, or at least commonly *civil* to others, and you may meet with suitable returns. We shall not suffer you to run on with your charge of *Sabellianism*, *Tritheism*, *scholastic jargon*, &c., which you cannot make good against us; without letting the world know something of a charge of *Arianism*, which we can make good against you, having often done it with the force and evidence of demonstration. As to the charge I made (p. 558, vol. i.) relating to your resting your cause, in the last result, solely upon *metaphysics*, though you are pleased to call it *calumny*, there is not a syllable of it but what is strictly true, and may be undeniably proved from Dr. Clarke’s own pieces, and yours. I except one or two particulars, which I remember to have met with only in Mr. Emlyn’s Tracts^g. I hope you will not think him an *ignorant writer*, nor one that is used to *allege such reasons only* as his adversaries should *desire* or wish for. He has long studied this controversy, and, as I conceive understands it better than some who have succeeded him in it, and who have been content sometimes to borrow from him. But that by the

^f Vol. i. p. 541, 542.

^g Emlyn’s Tracts, p. 165.

way: I still continue to affirm, having proved it more than once, that in the *last result* your doctrine stands upon *metaphysics* only, and such pretences as I mentioned in the place above cited. They are what you constantly *retreat* to, when pressed: and *without them* you cannot advance one considerable step towards what you aim at, with all your pretended proofs from *Scripture* or *antiquity*.

QUERY XXXI.

Whether any thing less than clear and evident demonstration, on the side of Arianism, ought to move a wise and good man, against so great appearances of truth on the side of orthodoxy, from Scripture, reason, and antiquity; and whether we may not wait long before we find such demonstration?

WHAT the Modest Pleader here pretends against the charge of *Arianism* has been abundantly answered more than once^b. And as to his cavil against charging *consequences* in this case, I have distinctly considered it elsewhereⁱ.

Among all the charges I made, you will hardly meet with any such *general* charge as is here brought against me, of "subverting all science, and all religion," without shewing *how* or *why*. When I make a charge, I signify upon what I found it, and give you the liberty of defending yourselves if you can. This other method of *general scandal*, thrown out in such a way as to bar a man the privilege of *self-defence*, is of all the most ungenerous, mean, and detestable. All I shall say to it is this: that I have demonstration before me, that if the man had had any thing he could have mentioned without exposing himself, he would certainly have produced it at full length: and therefore, I presume, his *general* charge about nobody knows what, may reasonably pass for a bounce extraordinary, words and no more.

After a deal of trifling repetition, you are at length pleased to ease your reader and me; leaving me some words of my own, which stand better in their place. You do well to return me back the good advice I gave you, which you had made no use of. As to the honest reader, I desire him to take notice, that every thing material in this Query is entirely dropped: no *demonstration* given of the *new scheme*, nor so much as pretended; no answer to *five* particulars which required satisfaction. As you begin, so

^b In my Defence, and in this Second Defence, and particularly in my Supplement to the Case of Arian

Subscription, vol. ii. pp. 663, 664, 694, 695.

ⁱ Supplement, vol. ii. p. 664. &c.

you end, with evasions and subterfuges, shiftings and disguises; perpetually running off from the true point in question, and wrapping yourself up in clouds and darkness; studying and contriving all possible ways to perplex rather than instruct, and fearing nothing so much as to have the issue of the cause put upon a clear foot, or left to a fair hearing. It might reasonably have been expected, while you write under cover, that you would have taken quite another method: and give me leave to judge so *justly*, or at least so *kindly* of you, as to believe you would have done it, had you been left entirely to your own counsels. I am not such a *stranger* to you, or so unacquainted with your *style*, your *manner*, your *diction*, (in many *private* papers, as you well know, besides what you have *published*,) as not to perceive, that many things, which I have here answered as yours, yet never came from your pen. I cannot indeed critically distinguish in all cases, where you begin to speak, or where you end: but, in the general, where there is any thing that looks of a more *ingenuous* strain, and is most like what one would expect from a *plain, honest man*; that I conceive certainly to be all your *own*. Indeed, you have interpretatively made the whole *yours*, by lending your *name*, I should rather say your *person*, to it: for you are *personated* all the way through. You will therefore the more easily excuse me for directing myself generally to you, even in those parts where I am sensible I have had to do with another man.

One thing I complain of, and that is of the disingenuous use every where made of writing under concealment, and without a *name*. I should have had a great deal less trouble in examining the Reply, had it been to be *owned* by any man of character, and his *name* set to it. He would have written, very probably, with more *care*, had his *reputation* been staked upon it; he would have cut off many impertinences, would not have attempted to put so many gross and palpable abuses upon the readers, nor have undertaken to defend what was at first sight plainly indefensible. He would have selected such things, and such only, as might bear some *colour* at least, and appear of *real weight*: such, in a word, as might become a *scholar*, a man of *sense*, and a man of *probity*, to urge, and nothing more. And then I am sure, that both the Reply itself, and my labour in examining it, would have been very much shortened: and our readers would have been more agreeably and more usefully entertained.

I shall conclude with observing, how easy a thing it may be

to reduce this controversy into a small compass; if men would but come sincerely to it, and keep close to the principal points in question. The most convenient method, and most natural order of inquiry, would, I conceive, be this following one:

I. *What* the doctrine to be examined is.

II. Whether it be *possible*?

III. Whether it be *true*?

I.

The first question is, *what the doctrine is*; which lies in these particulars:

1. That the Father is *God*, (in the strict sense of *necessarily existing*, as opposed to *precarious* existence,) and the Son *God*, and the Holy Ghost *God*, in the *same* sense of the word *God*.

2. That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son: they are *distinct*, so that one is not the *other*; that is, as we now term it, they are three distinct *Persons*, and two of them *eternally* referred up to *one*.

3. These three, however *distinct* enough to be *three* Persons, are yet *united* enough to be *one* God.

II.

The second question is, *whether the doctrine be possible*? All that relates to this question is resolvable into three other questions:

1. Whether there can be three Persons *necessarily existing*?

2. Whether three such Persons can be *one* God, in the nature of the thing itself, or upon the foot of mere *natural* reason?

3. Whether they can be *one* God, consistently with any *data* in Scripture, any thing plainly laid down in sacred writ: as, suppose, *subordination*, *mission*, *generation*?

If any one of these questions can be determined in the *negative* with sufficient *certainty*, then the doctrine, as here stated, is not *possible*: but if none of these questions can be with any *certainty* determined in the *negative*, the doctrine then must be allowed to be *possible*.

1. The *first* question cannot be determined in the *negative*; for, after frequent trials so to determine it, no one has been yet found able to do it: all the pretended proofs of it are *sophistical*; they may be, they have been, shewn to be so.

2. As to the *second* question, no one has hitherto been able to determine it in the *negative*; though often attempted. And

there is this reason to be given why it never can be done ; that no certain *principle of individuation* ever has or can be fixed : upon which alone the resolution of that question, on the foot of mere *natural* reason, entirely depends.

3. As to the *third question*, there is no determining it in the *negative* ; because it is certain that *subordination* or *mission* may be consistent with *equality of nature* ; as is seen even in *men*. And if it be pleaded, that such *subordination* is not consistent with the *unity*, (though it might with the *equality*.) our ideas of the *unity* are too imperfect to reason solidly upon : nor can any man prove that every kind of unity must be either *too close* to admit of any *subordination*, or else *too loose* to make the *Persons one God*. How shall it be shewn, that the *distinction* may not be great enough to answer the *subordination*, &c. and yet the *union* close enough to make the *Persons one God* ? Our faculties are not sufficient for these things. If *eternal generation* be objected to as a thing *impossible*, the objectors should shew that there cannot be any *eternal reference* or *relation* of one to the other, as *head*, *fountain*, or *centre* : which is the sum of what *eternal generation* amounts to ; and which (though often attempted) could never yet be proved to carry any thing *contradictory* in it. Not to mention that could it be really proved to be absurd or contradictory, yet the *main doctrine* might possibly stand independent of it ; among such at least as scruple not to throw off the *ancients*, and confine the dispute to *Scripture* alone : which is not so clear or full for the *eternal generation*, as it is for the *eternal existence* of the Son. Upon the whole, since the doctrine can never be proved to be *impossible* ; it must be allowed to be *possible* : and now,

III.

The third and last question is, whether the doctrine be *true* ? For the resolving of which, we must have recourse to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. Whoever undertakes to debate this question should forbear every topic drawn from the *nature of the thing* ; because such arguments belong only to the other question, *whether the doctrine be possible* : and, in all reason, the *possibility* should be *presupposed* in all our disputes from *Scripture* or *Fathers*.

By what I have here observed, it appears that the controversy of the Trinity may be easily brought to a short issue, and be comprised in two sheets of paper. The strength of the adversaries

most certainly lies in the question of the *possibility*: and if they have any thing considerable to urge, it may be despatched in a very few words; one *demonstration* (if any one can be found) being as good as a hundred.

If none can be found, I doubt not but all reasonable men will immediately give up the point in respect of *Scripture* and *antiquity*; which have been so often and so unanswerably proved to be on our side.

My hearty concern for *truth*, on whatever side it may be conceived to lie, and my desire to submit every doctrine (not excepting even those which we call *fundamental*) to a free and fair trial, makes me willing to offer those hints; which may be useful to our adversaries, if there be any *real* strength in the cause they have undertaken. I am not afraid of pointing out to them the shortest and readiest way of confuting us, if there be any way of doing it. Let them try the strength of their *philosophy*, or *metaphysics*, when they please: I desire only to have the cause put upon *clear* and *solid* reasoning, upon firm principles pursued by regular and just inferences or deductions. And let the world see whether any modern improvements in philosophy, logic, or metaphysics, can raise *Arianism* up, in these latter days, which never could be supported, formerly, by all that human wit and learning could invent or contrive for it.

ANSWER

TO

THE POSTSCRIPT.

YOU conclude with a Postscript relating to Dr. Calamy : whom you first reproach very roundly, as one that has been *throughout misled, by trusting to my citations and comments.* You ought to beg his pardon for this unrighteous report ; which was not made in the *fear of God*, nor under a sense of the common obligations of *humanity* or *justice* towards man. If I should report that you had been *frequently* (I do not say *throughout*) misled by Dr. Clarke's citations and comments, I should say no more than I have given abundant proof of : but what proof have you given that Dr. Calamy has been *throughout* misled by *mine* ? I know not whether you will be able to give a single example of it. However it had been but just, rather to have said that he had been misled by trusting to his *own judgment*, concurring with mine. For it is plain enough that the Doctor has examined for himself : and if he has fallen, in a great measure, into the same way of thinking with me, it is not as *trusting to my citations or comments*, but as approving the grounds upon which they stand. You had the less reason to reproach him as having been *throughout misled* by me, when the main design of your Postscript is to intimate to the world that he differs from me in one part of his scheme, which you think very considerable : an argument, sure, that he did not take things upon *trust* from others ; but considered and examined carefully, before he gave into them.

The *second* citation which you produce from him, to intimate to me (as you pretend) the *consequence* of my *notion*, relates not to *my notion* ; nor was it written with any such *view*, but with regard to quite *another notion*^a. The unaccountable part you have here acted, in citing it, and tacking it most unrighteously to the former, must make your very friends blush for you, or stand astonished at you. Whether it was done with *design*, or was purely *blunder*, the author of the Postscript (for I would

^a See Dr. Calamy's Sermons, p. 345.

gladly hope it was not you) best knows. Suppose it owing to *haste* and *carelessness*; yet even *want of care*, in charges of this kind, will be apt to cast some blemish upon a writer's *honesty* or *probity*.

I lay hold on this opportunity of thanking Dr. Calamy for his learned and useful labours in defence of our *common faith*: and it is with pleasure I take notice of the seasonable stand which he and many others (the most eminent and most considerable men of the *Dissenting way*) have made, in opposition to the threatening *defection*, and to preserve their flocks in time of danger. If he has any where differed from me, in less material points, holding the *foundation sure*, the doctrine of a *real* and *coequal* Trinity; he is at liberty to follow his own judgment, and to defend the *main articles* in such a way as appears to him most reasonable, and freest from embarrassments. I will first suppose that he really differs from me in the point of *subordination*, (though, I conceive, he does not,) yet what advantage do you propose to reap from it, that you should now so plume yourself upon it? Do not deceive yourself in this matter: if Dr. Calamy has made any *concession* of this kind, beyond what I have thought proper to do, he will still be able to maintain his ground against Dr. Clarke and his adherents, both from *Scripture* and *antiquity*. As to *Scripture*, allowing any *natural* subordination of Christ, as *God*, to be inconsistent with his *essential* Divinity; the question then will be, whether your proofs of any such *natural* subordination (distinguished from *economical*) are plainer, stronger, or fuller than the proofs of the *essential* Divinity. Here, I conceive, he will have the advantage very evidently, both in the *number* and the *strength* of his proofs. Your pretended *voluntary generation* he will reject as an *unscriptural* dream of human invention: your Scripture proofs of the *necessary existence* of the Father will stand upon no better a foot than his Scripture proofs of the *necessary existence* of the Son. Your pretences from the prepositions *of*, *by*, *through*, or *in*, he will resolve into *economical* order: and you will not be able to prove from 1 Cor. viii. 6. that God the Son is included in the *all things* which are *of* the Father. *Metaphysics* you will be ashamed to offer, having so often pretended to condemn them in us. All your little quibbles about *derived* and *undervived*, about *cause* and *effect*, about *acts* of the *will*, about *identical* substance, *identical* lives, and the like, will drop at once. In short, when *antiquity* is set aside, you will find it extremely difficult to make it appear

that the Scripture account of *subordination* necessarily infers any *natural* subordination, or may not possibly be understood of *economical* only; as some writers of note seem to have understood, as high as the sixth century^b, if not higher.

As to *antiquity*, you will be able to prove a *natural subordination*, very plainly, from the earliest Fathers: but not more plainly than Dr. Calamy will be able to prove the *consubstantiality*, *coeternity*, *omnipresence*, *omniscience*, and other *Divine* attributes of God the Son: not more plainly than he will prove from the *ancients*, that the Father and Son are *one God*, (one God *most high*,) that *creature worship* is *idolatry*, that no *inferior* God must be admitted, and the like. The question then will be, (since the *ancients*, upon the present *hypothesis*, must be said to have contradicted themselves and each other,) I say, the question will be, whether you have *more* and *stronger* testimonies for one part of the *contradiction*, than the Doctor will have for the other part. Here again he will manifestly have the advantage over you, in the *number* and *strength* of his testimonies: and he may justly plead, either to have the evidence of antiquity set aside as *null*; or that the *many* tenets, wherein the *Fathers* agree with his scheme, be admitted as more considerable than the *few* tenets wherein they agree with you. Thus, so far as I apprehend, you and your friends will be really no gainers by Dr. Calamy's concessions; or by throwing off the *subordination*, as *impossible* and *contradictory* on both sides.

Nevertheless, I am fully and unalterably persuaded, that the true and right way is, to admit the *subordination*, and to assert the *essential* Divinity of all the three Persons together with it. Both parts appear to be *founded* in *Scripture*, and were undoubtedly believed by the *ancients* in general: and there is no *repugnancy* between them, more than what lies in mistaken fancy or imagination. I know not whether Dr. Calamy might not pay too great a regard to Dr. Clarke's partial representation of this matter; and so take Bp. Pearson's and Bp. Bull's sentiments something otherwise than they intended them. I observe, that he admits *eternal generation*, *necessary emanation*, and *natural order*; which is, in other words, admitting all that is intended by priority of *order* or *subordination*. The Son proceeds *from the Father*; the Father *from none*: this is the difference of *natural order* which the *ancients*, and after them those two excellent *moderns* speak of; viz. that the Son is referred

^b See Jobius apud Photium Cod. ccxxii. p. 624, 625. ^c Sermons, p. 20, 49, 263.

up to the Father as up to a Head or Fountain, and not *vice versa*. This reference or relation of the Son to the Father, we call *subordination*: and this is all that is *natural*, the rest is *economical*. If Dr. Clarke has represented *subordination* otherwise, pretending Bp. Pearson's or Bp. Bull's authority for it, he has done unfairly: and perhaps Dr. Calamy intended no more than to condemn the notion so represented^d. Which is not condemning either Bp. Pearson's, or Bp. Bull's, or my doctrine; but something else which others have invented for us.

I know not indeed whether you will allow me to put myself in; because I am represented as teaching a real *coordination*, and a *verbal* subordination only. But I am very certain that the same objection, or rather cavil, lies equally against Bp. Pearson or Bp. Bull; and you are very sensible of it: only you are disposed to serve a turn by making some use of those *great names*. They both asserted a *coequality*, in as full and strong terms as I any where do: which *coequality* you are pleased to miscall, in me, *coordination*; assuming a strange liberty of altering the sense of words, and affecting to speak a *new language*, to make way for a *new faith*.

To conclude; if Dr. Calamy and I really differ, (as I think we do not,) we *agree* however in the *main* points, and much better than our late revivers of *Arianism* agree among themselves. And I doubt not but that by the united labours of the true friends of our *common faith*, (with God's blessing upon them,) the vain attempts of our new Arians and Eunomians will be defeated and baffled, (as were formerly those of their predecessors,) and that the Catholic doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, that sacred *depositum* of the Church of Christ, will be preserved whole and entire, and handed down, as to us, so to our latest posterity, through all generations.

^d "Whosoever will be at the pains
 " to compare the several passages
 " cited by Dr. Clarke, as they stand
 " in the places whence they are taken,
 " with other clear and express pas-
 " sages of our learned author, (Bishop
 " Bull,) and with the whole scope and
 " purport of his reasonings for the
 " truth of the Nicene doctrine, must
 " evidently perceive that these are all
 " placed *in quite another* light than in
 " the book referred to: that some are
 " *directly contrary to the author's*
 " *true meaning*, and to his design in
 " writing; and most of the rest *incon-*
 " *sistent*, at least, with the same, as
 " *the Doctor very well knew.*" *Nel-*
 " *son's Life of Bull*, p. 326, 327.

