






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BISHOP WARBURTON'S  
W O R K S.

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VOLUME THE SIXTH:

CONTAINING

CONTROVERSIAL TRACTS.

P A R T I.

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T H E  
W O R K S  
O F T H E  
R I G H T R E V E R E N D  
W I L L I A M W A R B U R T O N,  
L O R D B I S H O P O F G L O U C E S T E R.

I N S E V E N V O L U M E S.

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V O L U M E T H E S I X T H.

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L O N D O N,  
P R I N T E D B Y J O H N N I C H O L S:  
A N D S O L D B Y T. C A D E L L, I N T H E S T R A N D.

M D C C L X X X V I I I.



## C O N T E N T S

O F

## T H E S I X T H V O L U M E.

**A** VINDICATION of the Author of the Divine Legation of Moses, &c. from the Aspersions of the Country Clergyman's Letter in the Weekly Miscellany of February 24, 1737; p. 1—15.

A CRITICAL and Philosophical Commentary on Mr. Pope's Essay on Man. In which is contained a Vindication of the said Essay from the Misrepresentations of M. De Resnel, the French Translator, and of M. De Croufaz, Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics in the Academy of Lausanne, the Commentator, p. 17—168.

REMARKS on a Book, intituled, "Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Antients, particularly the Philosophers; wherein some Objections of the Rev. Mr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moses, are considered, 1742;" with a Postscript, in Answer to some Objections of Dr. Sykes; and a Letter to Bp. Smallbrook, p. 169—249.

REMARKS on several Occasional Reflections: In Answer to the Rev. Dr. Middleton, Dr. Poccoke, The Master of the Charter-House, Dr. Richard Grey, and others; serving to explain and justify divers Passages in the Divine Legation, objected to by these Learned Writers.



A  
V I N D I C A T I O N  
OF THE  
A U T H O R  
OF  
THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c.  
FROM  
The Aspersions of the COUNTRY CLERGYMAN'S LETTER in the  
WEEKLY MISCELLANY of FEBRUARY 24, 1737.



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A  
 V I N D I C A T I O N  
 OF THE  
 A U T H O R  
 OF  
 THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c.

AFTER having twice offered my Thoughts to the Public, on two very *important Subjects*, and had the Honour to be favourably heard, it must needs be a sufficient Mortification to me to be obliged to descend to *so low a Subject as myself*. That, and the Deference due to the Public, had certainly restrained this Appeal to it, had the Matter terminated there. But when the Accusation intended against me appeared visibly designed to render a projected Defence of Revelation suspected; which, I will presume (and, as the Author of it, the Reader will excuse me for presuming) may be of some small Service to our Holy Faith, I thought it my Duty to vindicate myself, in this public Manner, from the *horrid Accusations* of a Letter Writer in the *Weekly Miscellany* of the 24th of February last. Whether this was the true Motive of this Vindication will be best seen by the Temper in which it is written.

The Letter Writer begins with me in this Manner, *A late Writer, the Author of the Divine Legation of Moses, &c. is very severe upon ALL Clergymen who take the Liberty of censuring the Conduct OF ANY OF THEIR BRETHREN.* The Passage, on which this Accusation is founded, is in p. 21\* of the Dedication—*I appeal then to the Public, whether my Severity falls on those who censure the conduct of any of their Brethren: or on those, who abuse the whole Body of the Clergy, considered as an Order instituted by Christ, and established by the State.*

He goes on,—*If I am capable of understanding the Meaning and Drift of his Book, he had Reason to apprehend it might draw upon him the Censures of all the Clergy who are sincere Friends to Christianity—therefore it might be politic to obviate the Force of such Animadversions before-hand.* Had I been conscious of deserving the Censure of any honest Man, I had done, like those who delight in Mischief; I had wounded in the Dark. But when I chose to write without a Name, it was for very contrary Purposes. When I presumed to publish (in Defence of the Established Clergy) a Vindication of the Church of *England*, under the Title of *The Alliance between Church and State*, which surely might deserve their Pardon, lest the World should imagine I expected *more*, I put it out without my Name. And now writing in the common Cause of *Christianity*, I have publicly owned it. For if ever the Suspicion of being ashamed of the Faith of *Jesus* be more carefully to be avoided at one time than at another, it must certainly be in *this*, when Infidelity is become so reputable as to be esteemed a Test of superior Parts and Discernment.

He proceeds,—*I shall add, that if he really means to defend Christianity, he hath published the weakest Defence of it that I have ever read.* How are we to understand him here? Must we rectify the Proposition thus,—*If the Author gives this Volume as a Defence of Christianity, then it is the weakest?*—The Consequence will then indeed be true. But I had cut off all Pretence for *begging the*

\* First Edit. 8vo.



*Premises.* For I have formally and expressly said in the Beginning, and repeated it towards the End, that the Design of this Volume was only preparatory to the Defence of Revelation, and to prove *the use of Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular to Civil Society.* And had I not said *this*, the Book itself would shew that it is no more a *Defence of Christianity* than the first Proposition of the three Terms is a Syllogism.

But if the Letter Writer means, what his Words express,—*That if I have a serious Purpose of defending Christianity, this Volume is the weakest Defence?* his Premises will be true indeed, but then they will have no relation to his Conclusion. For it does not follow from those Premises, that this *is any Defence at all*; any more than that, if I had a serious Purpose of building a House, the Foundation-stones were that House.

The Deference due to the Public, from so obscure a Writer as myself, was the true Reason why this first Part came out separately; the Author not presuming to obtrude a voluminous Work upon it till he had some Assurance of its Willingness to receive it. But the same regard that obliged me to this Conduct, would not suffer me to make a Secret of the *Medium* by which I pretended to establish my Demonstration, especially as it had the Fortune to be generally esteemed a *Paradox*. I therefore gave the *Proof in form* two Years ago in the *Appendix to The Alliance between Church and State*. There it is to be found; and had the Letter Writer, instead of indulging his monstrous Suspicions of the Author, turned himself to making Objections to his Argument, he might possibly have then as much served *Truth* as he now has violated *Charity*.

He goes on.—*He is a warmer Advocate for Dr. —, who denies the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures, than for the Scripture themselves.* How warm an Advocate I am for him, we shall see by and by; how true an Accuser the Letter Writer is of him, we shall examine at present. Dr. — says\*, *it is NECESSARY to believe of the Scriptures in general that they are divinely inspired*; and that

\* Remarks on a Reply to the Defence of a Letter to Dr. W. p. 69.

all which he denies is, that the Scriptures are of absolute and universal Inspiration. He shews that Tillotson and Grotius were of the same Opinion, who, he charitably presumes, were Christians. And as he tells his Friends and Acquaintance the same he tells the Publick, the Letter Writer must excuse me, if I believe a Man whose Candour, Sincerity, Benevolence, and Charity I have experienced, before him, who has not given me the Pleasure of remarking in him any of those Christian Qualities.

But I would not have the Letter Writer infer, that, because he has been pleas'd to make me Dr. —'s Advocate, I am to be responsible for his Opinions. I differ widely from him in the Matter of Inspiration, and as widely in some others. But we can differ from each other, and avow and maintain our Difference of Opinion, without Violation of common Humanity, Friendship, or Christian Charity. I will give the Letter Writer another Instance of Difference in Opinion between us, from this very Book he so much condemns. The Writer of the *Defence of the Letter to Dr. W.* p. 45, says,—*Is the Nation of the Divine Origin of the Law and Inspiration of Moses to be resolv'd into Fiction, or Fable, or Political Lying? No, far be it from me to think or say so. But this perhaps one may venture to say, that the Supposition of some Degree of such Fiction may possibly be found necessary to the solving the Difficulties of the Mosaic Writings, without any Hurt to their Authority, or Advantage to Infidelity.* I am, as I say, of a different Opinion. The Writer endeavours to support his by several Arguments; amongst which one is, *the Professions and Example of the ancient Sages and Legislators.* Now, in the second Section of my Third Book I have enquir'd into the Principles that induc'd the ancient Sages and Legislators to deem it lawful to deceive for the Publick Good; in the Discovering of which, I think, I have made it evident that those Reasons or Principles could have no Place amongst the Founders and Propagators of the Jewish and Christian Religions. This Truth

\* Remarks on a Reply to the Defence of a Letter to Dr. W. p. 70.

(as well as several others interspersed throughout this First Volume, and which may perhaps give Offence to the indiscreet Zeal of the Letter Writer) is in my next Volume applied and enforced to the Overthrowing that Opinion *that some Degree of Fiction may be necessary, &c.* And even in *this* I could not forbear, in the most conspicuous Place of my Book, to shew the Use of it, as may be seen by these Words of the Contents, B. III. S. 2.—*The Principles, that induced the ancient Sages to deem it lawful to deceive for Public Good in Matters of Religion, are explained AND SHewn TO BE SUCH AS HAD NO PLACE IN THE PROPAGATION OR GENIUS OF THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN RELIGION.*

But I am a warm Advocate for Dr. —. In what? I have called him *a very formidable Adversary to the Free Thinkers.* And I think I had Reason: For the Arguments he hath used for the TRUTH of *Christianity* against *Tindal* have never yet been answered by them, nor I think ever can. I say *for the Truth of Christianity*; for his Reasonings, from p. 59 to 64\*, relate only to its Truth, and can be understood in no other Sense. After this, to think he would have *Christianity* supported only because it is useful, is such a Way of interpreting a Writer as my Charity will never suffer to follow.

The Opinion I have of Dr. —'s Abilities, and of the Sincerity of his Professions, were the true Reasons of that Esteem I express for him; being desirous of allaying all Disgust, if any hath arisen in him, from the Treatment of his less candid Adversaries; and of engaging him to a further and more compleat Vindication of our Holy Faith, at a Time when the good Dispositions of the meanest Advocate for Revelation should not, I think, in Prudence be discouraged: Nay, was I so unhappy to think of Dr. — as the Letter Writer is disposed to do, I should yet be inclined to behave myself very differently towards him. I should be so far from estranging him further from the Faith by uncharitable Anathemas,

\* Letter to Dr. W.

that I should do all I could to court and allure him to *Christianity*, by *making* well of its Professors. Thus much, I conceive, *Christian Charity* would require; and how far *Christian Policy* would persuade, let the *Learned* say, who know what Ornament his Pen would be to the Christian Faith, and his *Acquaintance* of what Example his Morals to Christian Practice.

But the Letter Writer, having taken it into his Head, that Dr. —'s true Sentiments are, that *Christianity* can only be defended as useful in the present Circumstances of Life, makes, as it would seem, this Imagination the Key to my real Sentiments and Designs in defending Revelation. Hence those strange Expressions—*If I am capable of understanding the Meaning and Drift of his Book—he must excuse me, if I suspect his Faith and condemn his Book—This I am sure of, the Author must be a subtile Enemy to Revelation, or a very indifereet Friend—I must own he has left me in no Doubt.* Now if those be Dr. —'s true Sentiments, which yet I no more believe than that *Tindal* was a *Christian* in his Heart, I shall not scruple to say that he whom I called one of the most formidable of the Free-Thinkers Adversaries, is indeed one of the weakest and most contemptible. But if they be *mine*, after all I have said in this Volume, I will not scruple to say, that That Character would be far too mild for me; and that it would be but Justice to esteem me the most abandoned Writer that ever appeared in any Cause.

Let us now take this *Key*, and apply it to what I have written.—And it will indeed thoroughly serve the Letter Writer's declared Purpose to lessen my Credit. For it will make the whole Volume a Heap of Absurdities and Contradictions. But lay aside this visionary *Key*, and let me be interpreted by those common Rules that all Mankind have ever used in understanding one another, and then it will be seen I could not possibly have had any other Intention than TO PROVE MOSES TO BE A TRUE PROPHET SENT IMMEDIATELY AND EXTRAORDINARILY FROM GOD.—I pretend to do it from *Moses's* Omission

Omission of the Doctrine of a future State; which under an *unequal* Providence, is (as I have shewn in this Book, that being the only End of writing it) absolutely necessary to Society. From whence I conclude *Moses's* Pretensions were true: who assured the *Israelites* that God had chosen them to be his People, had condescended to be their King, and would consequently govern them by an EQUAL, that is an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE; which Conclusion (that appears almost self-evident) I employ my second Volume to support, illustrate, and free from Objections.

Hence it appears on what Account I so much insist on the *Usefulness* and *Necessity* of Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular to Society. The Course of my Argument, and all the Rules of Logic, obliged me to this Conduct: And indeed I thought it the peculiar Happiness of my Argument that they did so; for I suppose, till the Infidels be convinced that Religion is *useful* to civil Society, they will never be brought to believe it *true*.

I now haste to the other Part of the Letter-writer's Charge, lest he should be tempted, in his Impatience, to repeat it; and say again, that *I am a warmer Advocate for Dr. — than for the Scriptures*. The Reader, who has never seen my Book, will naturally conclude from these Words, that either I had *undervalued Scripture*, or at least neglected a fair Opportunity of *vindicating it*. He will be surpris'd to be told that the latter Part of the Charge was only for *compleating the Antithesis*. So indeed it appears to me; but the Reader shall judge for himself.

There are but two Places in this Volume, in which I had Occasion to make Observations on the Scripture; the one is at p. 117, where I endeavour to shew that the Argument which the Commentators use to prove the Pentateuch (against *Spinoza* and others) to be written by *Moses*, is a very strong and solid one. The other is at p. 83. where I say, that the New Testament *does not contain any regular or compleat System or Digest of moral Laws; the occa-*

*ſional Precepts there delivered, how excellent and divine ſoever, ariſing only from Conjunctions and Circumſtances that were the Subjects of theſe Preachings or Writings, in which ſuch Precepts are found. For the reſt, for a general Knowledge of the whole Body of moral Duty, the great Pandect of the Law of Nature is held open by it to be ſearched and ſtudied. Finally, ſays the Apoſtle Paul, whatſoever Things are true, &c.*

I ſuppoſe then, if the Letter Writer had any particular Meaning, this was the Place that was to juſtify him in ſaying that *I was no warm Advocate for the Scriptures.* But does the *New Teſtament* contain any ſuch *complete or regular System*? will the Letter Writer ſay ſo? will any one beſides ſay ſo? How weak and *indiscreet a Friend* ſoever he may pleaſe to think me of Religion, I will aſſure the Reader, that as I make it one Point of my Religion to ſay nothing but what I think the Truth, ſo I do not uſe to throw about thoſe Truths at random. The Obſervation was here neceſſary to overthrow the moſt pernicious Doctrine that ever infected Society. If it was true, then, it was not untimely urged. But had the Letter Writer had a little Patience, he would have ſeen in the ſecond Volume (as that will be the Caſe of many other Truths interſperſed throughout the firſt) that, by the Aſſiſtance of this very Truth, I overthrow a prevailing Notion, which I ſuppoſe *He*, no more than *I*, will think very orthodox, namely, *that Chriſtianity is ONLY a Republication of the Religion of Nature.*

This, I can aſſure the Reader, is the Caſe of all other Principles occaſionally laid down in this firſt Volume, which are not only here uſed to prove the Uſefulneſs and Truth of Religion in general, but are in the next Volume applied to prove *the Truth of Revelation in particular.* To give one Inſtance at preſent, in the ſixth Section of the ſecond Book, I have attempted to explain the Nature of Paganifm, as diſtinguiſhed from true Revelation; where I have ſhewn, that though they abounded in

in pretended Revelations, they were utter Strangers to the Idea of one Revelation's being founded upon, or the Completion of another. This Principle I apply and inforce in the second Volume against the fourth Chapter of Collins's *Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, where he lays it down for one of his fundamental Principles (against all Antiquity and Fact) *that it is a common and necessary Method for new Revelations to be built and grounded on precedent Revelations.* See p. 20—26.

The Letter Writer proceeds—*Mr. Warburton modestly says, they [the English Clergy] have undertaken to prove Christianity without understanding it.* As in the Case before, about censuring the Conduct of Clergymen, the Letter Writer turned what I said in general of the Body, particularly, to Individuals; so here, by a strange Perversity, he turns what I said particularly of some certain Persons, generally, to the *English Clergy.* My Words are these, p. 2. *Who, in this long Controversy between us and the Deists, hath not applied to certain late Advocates of Revelation what was formerly said of Arnobius and Lactantius, that they undertook the Defence of Christianity before they understood it?*

But have none but *Englishmen* wrote of late in Defence of *Christianity?* Have no *Englishmen* but the *English Clergy* wrote in Defence of it? If neither of these Questions can be answered in the Negative, I would ask a third, What possessed the Letter Writer to bear Witness against me, to the World, that I have any where said *that the English Clergy have undertaken to prove Christianity without understanding it?* I solemnly declare, that in the Passage above quoted I meant no *English Clergyman* whatsoever. So far from that, I expressly say, in p. 19 of the Dedication, *that the Clergy of the established Church are they who have been principally watchful in the Common Cause of Christianity, and MOST SUCCESSFUL in repelling the Insults of its Enemies.* I must appeal then, this second Time, to the Public for Justice.

As I was bold in Defence of Scripture in general, so my next Charge is, that I have *undervalued the Evidence arising from Miracles*. Would the Reader know how?—Hardly, by saying, as I expressly do, p. 3, *that Men have proved our Religion actually divine thereby*. But this went for nothing, because I said in the same Place, that the *external Evidence* (in which Miracles are included) is *not capable of strict Demonstration*; but that the *Internal* is. Now here might be some Pretence for saying I *over-valued internal Evidence*: But by what Kind of Logic it could be infered that, *therefore, I undervalued Miracles*, I know not.

The Letter Writer next turns (as it would seem) from me to those who deny *the Divinity of Christ, the Merits of his Death, the Obligation and Effects of the Sacraments, and the Doctrine of Grace*. But it is but *seeming*. He appears willing that these tall Opinions should be thought mine: For having charged me with *horrid Crimes*, without Shadow of Proof or Probability, he would cover the Scandal by insinuating me guilty of Heterodoxy; or why else did he lead his Reader to the very Door of Calumny, by artfully joining *me, as undervaluing Miracles*, to one of *these*, who he says *denies the Truth of one of them*?

But the Letter Writer should have considered, if this was his Design, that in this very Book I affirm more than once or twice, that the *Doctrine of Redemption* is the Foundation, and of the very Essence of *Christianity*. He should have known that all or most of those true Christian Doctrines mentioned above are contained in the *Doctrine of Redemption*.

There are, and those esteemed sincere *Christians* too, who would have taken the Names of Infidel and Heretic for Favours at the Hand of the Letter Writer. But I am of a different Humour. These Titles have no Charms for me. I have lived some Time in the World; and, blessed be God, *without giving or taking Offence*. This Time has been spent in my Parish Church (for I am  
a Country



a Country Clergyman, and reside constantly on my Cure) in the Service of my Neighbour, in my Study, and in the Offices of filial Piety,

- “ With lenient Arts t’extend a Mother’s Breath,
- “ Make Languor smile, and smooth the Bed of Death,
- “ Explore the Thought, explain the asking Eye,
- “ And keep awhile one Parent from the Sky.”

Excess of Zeal in such as the Letter Writer, and Defect of Religion in others of better Breeding, so efface these Feelings of Nature, that I could hardly have known how to have told them, had I not both the Example, and the fine Words too, of one of the politest Men of the Age to keep me in Countenance. The Time spent in my Study has been employed in confirming my own Faith against the erroneous Opinions the Letter Writer has raked together, and *then*, in planning a Work to confirm my Brethren. All the Reward I ever had, or ever expect to have here, is the Testimony of a good Conscience within Doors, and a good Name without. The first no Man can take from me; the other, this Letter Writer, in the most unchristian Manner, has attempted to invade.

—But I heartily forgive him: And instead of putting uncharitable Constructions on his secret Intentions, will believe, though I know no more of him than by his Letter, that he is *sincere*, and only unhappily agitated by a furious Zeal for the Cause of God and Religion; instead of thinking *he ought to be hindered from any further Advancement in the Church*. If the Want of that be the Cause of his Spleen and Virulency, I heartily wish it may be speedily removed: nay, that the Letter he has wrote against me may contribute towards it. Instead of *using any warm Endeavours to lessen his Credit*, which he professes in so many Words. to be his Purpose against me, I wish him all Increase of Reputation and Honour: and instead of insulting him with the Words

he

He seems to apply to me—I pray for the Forgiveness and Conversion of our bad Men, I will assure him, that I pray for him as a Brother.

I have only one Word more to add: I have presumed to appeal to the Public, in a Matter indeed that little concerns it, yet perhaps of some Moment in the Consequence and Example. But what our Necessity I now found myself under of not submitting to so false a Charge, the Public need not be under Apprehensions that I shall ever give them a second Trouble of the same Kind. It must be some strange Provocation indeed that can make me repeat it. For if I can forgive Injuries of this Kind, it is sure no hard Task to despise them. In a Word, I have made my Defence against these Calumnies now once for all; and my Enemies must pardon me, if I decline to be *drawn in*, into a Controversy of this Nature; or to be *drawn off* from the Subject I have commenced in Defence of Revelation. And, by the Grace of God, no *unchristian Treatment* shall ever make me languid or remiss in vindicating the Truth of the *Christian Cause*. Whether I am a *weak* Defender of *Christianity* must be submitted to the Judgment of the Public. But I am persuaded that That Public will suspend all Severity of Judgment till they see the whole Performance: and then, I hope, those who now think I have advanced a *Paradox* that cannot be supported, will be of another Opinion. But if it should not be my good Fortune to make out my Point to their Satisfaction, yet I should hope they will pass a more equitable Construction on the Attempt than the Letter Writer has thought fit to do; and make all favourable Allowances for the Newness and Difficulty of the Subject, and the many incidental Points touched upon, which will, I hope, be thought by all Persons of Equity, Candor, and good Learning, to have their Use. In the mean Time, I can say with great Truth, and, I hope I may do it with *Modesty*, that what I offer to the Public concerning *The Divine Legation of Moses* is not a hasty sudden Thought, and what has appeared flattering to me upon its first Appearance

Appearance only; as such Things often strike, which, upon Review, give no Satisfaction. But this has been long the Subject of my Thoughts; often laid by, and then again, at proper Intervals, resumed, reviewed, and turned on all Sides. What then I have been in no Haste to approve after carefully weighing and examining *every Part*, I shall hope the equitable Reader will be in no Haste to condemn or suspect while he has seen only *one*.



A  
CRITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL  
C O M M E N T A R Y  
O N  
MR. P O P E ' S E S S A Y O N M A N .

IN WHICH IS CONTAINED  
A VINDICATION OF THE SAID ESSAY  
From the MISREPRESENTATIONS of  
MR. D E R E S N E L , the *French Translator*,

AND OF  
MR. D E C R O U S A Z ,  
Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics in the Academy of *Lausanne*, the COMMENTATOR.

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*“Vide quam iniqui sunt divinatorum munerum aestimatores etiam quidam  
“PROFESI SAPIENTIAM.” SEN.*

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T O M Y

W O R T H Y F R I E N D

R A L P H A L L E N, Esq.

S I R,

I GIVE myself the pleasure of conversing with you, in this Form; as I see you less under the Idea of a Patron, than of a joint Labourer with me in the Service of Mankind. For while I attempt to explain the Theory of this divine Philosophy of *Universal Benevolence*, you illustrate it by your Practice. At most therefore I can but offer you the *ESSAY ON MAN*, set in a just Light, as a Mirrour for your Cabinet; where you may behold the perfect Image of your own Mind: And the Works of this Artist, who is beholden only to *Truth* for their Polish and their Lustre, you are too well acquainted with to suspect them of Flattery. To preserve the Lustre of this Mirrour was the sole Purpose of the following *Letters*. For the dull Breath of Malice had attempted to defile its Purity; and, by staining it with the black Imputation of *Fatalism*, to tarnish every Virtue it reflected.

It hath been observed in *Physics*, that Nature never gave an Excellence, but she at the same time produced its contrary, with Qualities peculiarly adapted to its Destruction. As we see how this serves the wise Ends of Providence, by keeping us in that State

of *Impertinence* and *Dependence* in which it hath pleas'd the Author of all Things to place us, we need not be much surpris'd to find the same Phenomenon in the *moral World*: In no Instance more apparent than in the *Doctrine of FATE*, which, almost coeval with the *Practice of VIRTUE*, is yet altogether the Destruction of it.

But as there is not that Decay, nor Degeneracy of *Good*, in the *natural* as in the *moral World*; so neither is there that increase of *Evil*. I say this chiefly with regard to the *Doctrine of Fate*, which hath been still growing, from Age to Age, in Absurdity and Impiety: And therefore no Wonder, that *Virtue*, whose specific Bane it is, should proportionably sicken and decline.

Indeed, it stopp'd not till it became like the *Tree* in the *Chaldean's Vision*, which *reached to Heaven, and extend'd over the whole Earth*; and *receiv'd* all the irrational and impure Creation, *Loam, Beasts, and Insects, to its Shade and Shelter*.

To consider *Fate* in its Growth and Progress, it divides itself into four principal Branches.

The *first* and earliest is that which arose from the strange and prodigious Events in the Life of Man: Where the amazed Beholder observing the Ends of human Wisdom so perpetually defeated, even when supported by the likeliest Means, concluded that nothing less than an over-ruling *Fate* had travers'd his well-conducted Designs. This early Conclusion concerning God's Government *here*, from Observations on *Civil* Events, was again infer'd in After-ages, by another Set of Men, with regard to his Government *hereafter*, from their Contemplations on *Religious*; while, from an utter Inability to penetrate the Designs of Providence in its partial Revelations to Mankind, they concluded that *Fate* or *Predestination* had determin'd of our future, as well as present Happiness. These, which are only different Modifications of the same imaginary Power, may be call'd the *POPULAR* and *RELIGIOUS Fate*.

The



The *second* kind arose from a supposed moral Influence of the *heavenly Bodies*: founded in an early Superstition that the *Hero-Gods* had migrated into *Stars*. It was first understood to be confined to *Communities*, as such were the more immediate Care of these *Heroes* while living: But the same Considerations which produced the first Species of *Fate*, in a little time, extended it to *Particulars*. And this is the *CIVIL* or *ASTROLOGIC Fate*. Hitherto, *Free-will* was only curbed, or rendered useless. To annihilate it quite, needed all the Power of *Philosophy*. So true is the Observation, that without *Philosophy* Man can hardly become either thoroughly absurd or miserable.

The *Sophist*, in his profound Inquiries into human Nature, and on what it is we do, when we judge, deliberate, and resolve, came at length to this short Conclusion, *That the Mind is no more than a Machine, and that its Operations are determined in the same Manner that a Balance is inclined by its Weights*. This absolute Necessity of Man's Actions is the *third* Species of *Fate*, called the *PHILOSOPHIC*.

From this, to the *last*, that is to say, the Necessity of *Gods*, was an easy Step. For when, from the very Nature of *Mind* and *Will*, the *Philosopher* had demonstrated the Absurdity of Freedom in Man, the same Conclusion would hold as to all other Beings whatsoever. And this is the *ATHEISTIC Fate*.

These, Sir, were the glorious Effects of *PRIDE*: which our incomparable Friend, with so good Reason, esteems the Source of all our Misery and Impiety. The *Pride* of accounting for the *Ways of Providence* begot the two first Species: and the *Pride* of comprehending the *Essences of Things*, the two latter. *Ab! misera mens hominum, quo te FATA sepiſſimè trahunt!* In the Name of *Paul*, if one might be allowed to ask, *What shall deliver us from the Body of this Fate?* which hangs about the Soul like that Punishment of the ancient Tyrant, who bound *dead Bodies* to the living. I answer, the *Religion* of *JESUS*: which hath instructed

of regularity in the Nature of *Man*, as in the Nature of *God*; in the *Subject*, as well as in the *Object*, of Worship. A *Worship* founded, as Reason and Conscience tell us it ought, on these two great Principles, the FREEDOM and the WEAKNESS of *Man*. The first, making our Approach to God a REASONABLE SERVICE; the latter, God's Approach to us a COVENANT OF GRACE. And this, Sir, is that *glorious Gospel*, which you are not ashamed to adore, as able to put to Silence the Ignorance of foolish Men.

And, in fact, the fashionable Reasoner is now gone over to the Cause of *Liberty*; but still true to his overweening *Pride*, is gone over—in the other Extreme. Let the Fatalist talk what he pleases of the Mind's being a *Balance*; if its Operations be mechanical, I am sure it is more like a *Pendulum*, which, when well leaded, is incessantly swinging from one side to the other. For the vain Reasoner is now as much disposed to deny the *Weakness* of the Mind, as before to deny its *Freedom*. Hence it is, we see the *Christian* Doctrine of GRACE despised and laughed at; and the Means instituted by its Founder for obtaining it, as impiously as sophistically, explained away. Yet without human *Freedom* Religion in general is a Farce; and but on the Truth of human *Weakness*, the Religion of *Jesus*, a Falsehood.

With regard then to *Free-will*, what need we more than the Declaration of *Religion*? The simple-minded Man naturally supposes it; the good Man feels it; the thinking Man understands it; and nothing but vain *Philosophy* holds out both against *Nature* and *Grace*: Not so openly indeed as formerly; but still as obstinately. The ablest Advocates of *Necessity* now enveloping it in *Systems*; and insinuating it in all the artful Detours of what they call a *sufficient Reason*.

None have gone farther, or with more Success, into this Contrivance than the famous *Leibnitz*; who, with great Parts and Application of Mind, had an immoderate Ambition of becoming Founder of a Sect. He first attempted to raise a Name, like the Heroes

Heroes of old, by the Invasion of another's Property : But being detected and repulsed, he turned himself to *Invention* ; and framed an *Hypothesis* in direct Opposition to that *Theory* which he before seemed willing to have made his own. This *Hypothesis*, founded in a refined *Fatalism*, he chose to deliver by Hints only, and in piece-meal ; which, at the same time that it gave his Scheme an Air of Depth and Mystery, kept its Absurdities from being observed. So that it soon made its Fortune amongst the *German Wits* ; who were not out of their way when they took the same deep and cloudy Road with their Master. It was no Wonder then, that this should raise a Jealousy in the Advocates of Religion, and make the warmer sort of them (not the best at a charitable Distinction, though great Logicians) to mistake their Friends for their Enemies.

Amongst other *Follies* of this kind, it brought down a Storm of Calumny on the *ESSAY ON MAN* ; and, in its Turn, occasioned this *Vindication* of our inimitable Poet. A short, and an easy Talk. For my Point, you know, Sir, was not to expose the *Absurdity* of *Fate* ; but to prove the *Essay* free from a Doctrine, which my Adversary and I agreed to be an *Absurdity*. But if any one, confiding in the Tricks of Sophistry under the cloudy Conveyance of Metaphysics, would dispute this Point with us ; I shall give up my Share of him to my Adversary, and leave him entirely to the Mercy of his *Logic*. All the Answer he must expect from me, is of that kind with the Philosopher's, who, disputing with one who denied local Motion, only used his Legs, and walked out of his Company : That is to say, I shall decline his Challenge merely for the Exercise of my Freedom. And indeed, what other Answer does he deserve, who refuses to acquiesce in that *CONSCIOUSNESS* of *Freedom* which every plain Man has, on reflecting upon what passes in his Mind when he thinks and acts ?

But yet, it may be worth while to remark the Nature of this *Consciousness* ; from which alone (as I think, Sir, I have had the Pleasure to observe to you in our Conversation on these Subjects)

*Freedom*

*Freedom of Will* may be demonstrated to all but the downright Atheist. It will, I suppose, be allowed to be an Impression on the Mind, made by *Reflexion*, as strong as any of those made by *Sensation*. And sure he must be as blind as even blind Fate can make him, who does not see thus far at least. So that the only question is, whether it be, like them, subject to Deception? I answer, No. And first, for a *natural* Reason, As the Organs of Sense are not employed to convey the Intelligence: But secondly and principally, for a *moral* one, As there would be nothing left to redress the wrong Representation. For, *Reason*, which performs this Office in the false *Impressions of Sense*, is the very Faculty employed in making the *Impressions of Reflexion*. Were these therefore liable to the same Kind of Deception, we should be unavoidably led into and kept in Error by the natural Frame and Constitution of Things. But as this would reflect on the Author of Nature, no Theist, I presume, will be inclined to admit the Consequence. If the *Fatalist* should reply, that *Reason*, when well exercised and refined, does here, as in the false *Impressions of Sense*, lay open the Delusion; this, I must tell him, is the very *Folly* we complain of: That, when Things are submitted to the Arbitrement of *Reason*, her Award should be rejected while standing in the Road of *Nature*, with all her Powers and Faculties entire; and not thought worthy to be heard, till made giddy in the airy Heights of *Metaphysics*, and racked and tortured by all the Engines of Sophistry: In a word, when *Reason* is no more herself; but speaks as her *Keepers* and *Tormentors* dictate.

However, it is not the looking *within* only, that assures the Theist of his *Freedom*. What he may observe *abroad* of the horrid Mischiefs and Absurdities arising from the *Doctrine of Fate*, will fully convince him of this Truth. It subverts and annihilates *all Religion*: For the Belief of Rewards and Punishments, without which *no Religion* can subsist, is founded on the Principle of Man's being an *accountable* Creature; but when *Freedom of Will* is wanting,

ing, Man is no more so than a Clock or Organ. It is likewise highly injurious to *Society*: For whoever thinks himself no longer in his own Power, will be naturally inclined to give the Reins to his Passions, as it is submitting to that *Fate* which must at last absolutely turn and direct them.

But, after all, the most powerful Argument for *Freedom*, I confess, Sir, is such a *Life* as yours. Of which, though I could say much, and with Pleasure, I will only say that it has made me, in common with every one who knows you,

*Your obliged,*

*Your affectionate, and*

*Your faithful Servant,*

May 18, 1742.

W. WARBURTON.



## P R E F A C E.

**T**HERE are two sorts of Writers, I mean the BIGOT and the FREE-THINKER, that every honest Man in his Heart esteems no better than the Pests of Society; as they are manifestly the Bane of *Literature* and *Religion*. And whoever effectually endeavours to serve either of These, is sure immediately to offend both of Those. For, the Advancement of Literature is as favourable to true Piety, as it is fatal to *Superstition*; and the Advancement of Religion as propitious to real Knowledge as discrediting to *vain Science*.

The Author of the following *Letters*, who hath aimed at least to do this Service, by his Writings, regarding these two sorts of Men, as the irreconcilable Enemies of his design, began without any Ceremony (for he was not disposed, for their Sake, to go about) to break through those lumpish impediments they had thrown across the Road of Truth; and laboured to clear the way, not only for himself, but for all who were disposed to follow him. In which it fared with him as it sometimes happens to those who undertake to remove a public Nuisance for the Benefit of their Neighbourhood, where the nicer Noses hold themselves offended even in the Service thus undeservedly rendered to them. For notwithstanding our Author hath taken all Opportunities, and even *sought out* Occasions to celebrate every Writer, living or dead, who was any way respectable for Knowledge, Virtue, or Piety, in whatever Party, Sect, or Religion, he was found, especially such as he had the Misfortune to dissent from, and this sometimes with so liberal a hand as to give offence on that side likewise; though he hath done this, I say, yet

Moving, for the Reasons above, declared eternal War with *Bigotry* and *Free-thinking*, the strong, yet sincere Colours in which he hath drawn the Learning, Sense, Candour, and Truth of those Subjects in which these noble Qualities are most eminent, have been censured as Insolence and Satire, and a Transgression of all the bounds of Civility and Decorum. But he will not be easily induced, by the Clamours of the falsely Delicate, to betray the Interests of all that is good and valuable amongst Men, in complaisance to their Notions of Politeness. 'Tis no time to stand upon ceremony when Religion is struggling for Life; when *the whole Head is sick, and the whole Heart faint*.

The *Bigot*, who, between a corrupt Will, and a narrow Understanding, imputes odious Designs to his Adversaries, and impious Consequences to their Opinions, is not, I suppose, to be *complimented*, either into Sense or Honesty. The Writer here confuted is amongst the chief of them. And it is not impossible but the recent Memory of the like Usage our Author himself met with from others of the same leaven, might give him a quicker Sense and stronger Retinment of the Injury done his Neighbour.

As for the Tribe of *Free-thinkers*, *Toland*, *Tindal*, *Collins*, *Coward*, *Blount*, *Strutt*, *Chubb*, *Dudgeon*, *Morgan*, *Tillard*, and their Fellows, the mortal Foes both of Reason and Religion, injured *Wit* as well as *Virtue*, by the Mouth of their happiest Advocate and Favourite, long ago called out for *Vengeance* on them:

—The Licence of a following Reign  
 Did all the Dregs of bold *Socinus* drain;  
 Then unbelieving Priests reform'd the Nation,  
 And taught more pleasant Methods of Salvation;  
 Where Heaven's free Subjects might their Rights dispute,  
 Lest God himself should seem too absolute.  
 Encourag'd thus, Wit's Titans brav'd the Skies,  
 And the Prefs groan'd with licens'd Blasphemies.  
*These Monsters, Critics, with your Darts engage,*  
*Here point your Thunder, and exhaust your Rage!*



A

## C O M M E N T A R Y

O N

MR. P O P E'S E S S A Y O N M A N.

## L E T T E R I.

WHEN a great Genius, whose Writings have afforded the World much Pleasure and Instruction, happens to be enviously attacked and falsely accused, it is natural to think, that a Sense of Gratitude due from Readers so agreeably obliged, or a Sense of that Honour resulting to our Country from such a Writer, should raise a general Indignation. But every Day's Experience shews us the very contrary. Some take a malignant Satisfaction in the Attack; others, a foolish Pleasure in a literary Conflict; and the greater Part look on with an absolute Indifference.

Mr. *De Croufaz's* Remarks\* on Mr. *Pope's Essay on Man*, seen in part, through the deceitful Medium of a *French Translation*,

\* They are contained in two several Books, the one intituled, *Examen de l'Essai de Mr. Pope*; à Lausanne, 1737. The other, *Commentaire sur la Traduction en vers de M. l'Abbé Du Rosnel de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme*; à Geneve, 1738.

have

have just fallen into my Hands. As those Remarks appear to me very groundless and unjust, I thought so much due to Truth, as to vindicate our Great Countryman from his Censure.

The principal Object therefore of this Vindication shall be, to give the Reader a fair and just Idea of the *Reasoning* of that *Essay*, so egregiously misrepresented; in which I shall not consider it as a *Poem* (for it stands in no need of the Licence of such kind of Works to defend it) but as a *System of Philosophy*; and content myself with a plain Representation of the Sobriety, Force, and Connection of *that Reasoning*.

I shall begin with the first Epistle. The opening of which, in *fifteen Lines*, is taken up in giving an Account of his Subject; which he shews us (agreeably to the Title) is AN ESSAY ON MAN, or a Philosophical Inquiry into his *Nature*, and *End*, his *Passions*, and *Pursuits*:

A mighty Maze!—but not without a Plan,

as Mr. *De Craufaz* and I have found it, between us. The next Line tells us with what Design he wrote, *viz.*

To vindicate the Ways of God to Man.

The Men he writes against he hath frequently informed us are such, as

Weigh their Opinion against Providence. l. 110.

Such as,

— cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjust. l. 114.

Such as fall into the Notion,

That Vice and Virtue there is none at all. Ep. ii. l. 202.

This occasioneth the Poet to divide his *Vindication of the Ways of God* into *two* Parts. In the *first* of which he gives *direct* Answers to those Objections which libertine Men, on a View of the Disorders arising from the Perversity of the human Will, have intended

tended against Providence: And, in the *second*, he *obviates* all those Objections, by a true Delineation of human Nature, or a *general* but exact *Map of Man*; which these Objectors either not knowing, or mistaking, or else leaving (for the mad Pursuit of *metaphysical Entities*) have lost and bewildered themselves in a thousand foolish Complaints against Providence. The *first Epistle* is employed in the Management of the *first* part of this Dispute; and the *three* following in the Management of the *second*. So that the whole constitutes a complete *Essay on Man*, written for the best Purpose, *to vindicate the Ways of God*.

The Poet therefore having enounced his *Subject*, his *End of Writing*, and the *Quality of his Adversaries*, proceeds [from l. 16 to 23.] to instruct us *from whence* he intends to draw his Arguments for their Confutation; namely, from the *visible Things* of God, in this System, to demonstrate the *invisible Things* of God, his *eternal Power and God-head*: And *why*; because we can *reason only from what we know*, and we *know* no more of *Man* than what we see of his Station here; no more of *God* than what we see of his Dispensations to Man in this Station; therefore

Thro' Worlds unnumber'd though the God be known,  
'Tis ours to trace him only in our own\*.

This naturally leads the Poet to exprobrate the miserable Folly and Impiety of pretending to pry into, and call in question, the profound Dispensations of Providence: Which reproof contains [from l. 22 to 43] the most sublime Description of the Omniscience of God, and the miserable Blindness and Presumption of Man.

Presumptuous Man! the Reason would'st thou find  
Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind?  
First, if thou canst, the harder Reason guess  
Why form'd no weaker, blinder, and no less?

\* Hunc cognoscimus solummodo per Proprietates suas et Attributa, et per sapientissimas et optimas rerum structuras et causas finales. Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. sub finem.

Ask of thy Mother Earth, why Oaks are made,  
Taller or stronger than the Weeds they shade?  
Or ask of yonder argent Fields above,  
Why *Jove's* Satellites are less than *Jove*?

In the four last Lines, the Poet has joined the utmost Beauty of Argumentation to the Sublimity of Thought; where the similar Instances, proposed for their Examination, shew as well the *Abfurdity* of their Complaints against Order, as the *Fruitefulness* of their Enquiries into the Arcana of the Godhead.

So far his modest and sober *Introduction*: In which he truly observes, that no Wisdom less than omniscient

Can tell why Heav'n has made us as we are.

Yet though we can never discover the *particular* Reasons for this Mode of our Existence, we may be assured in *general* that it is *right*: For now entering upon his Argument, he lays down this self-evident Proposition as the Foundation of his *Thesis*, which he reasonably supposes will be allowed him: *That of all possible Systems, infinite Wisdom hath formed the best*; [l. 43, 44.] From hence he draws two Consequences.

1. The *first* [from l. 44 to 51.] is, that as the best System cannot but be such a one as hath no unconnected Void; such a one in which there is a perfect Coherence and gradual Subordination in all its Parts; there must needs be, in some part or other of the Scale of Life and Sense, such a Creature as MAN; which reduces the Dispute to this absurd Question, *Whether God has placed him wrong?*

It being shewn that MAN, *the Subject of his Inquiry*, has a necessary Place in such a System as this is confessed to be: And it being evident that the Abuse of Free-will, from whence proceeds all moral Evil, is the certain Effect of such a Creature's Existence; the next Question will be, how these Evils can be accounted for, consistently with the Idea we have of God's Attributes? Therefore,

2. The *second* Consequence he draws from his Principle, *That of all possible Systems, infinite Wisdom has form'd the best*, is, that whatever

whatever is wrong in our private System, is right, as relative to the whole [l. 50 to 53.]

Respecting Man, whatever wrong we call,  
*May, must* be right, as relative to ALL.

That it *may*, he proves [from l. 52 to 61.] by shewing in what consists the Difference between the *systematic* Works of God and those of Man, *viz.* that, in the *latter*, a thousand Movements scarce gain one Purpose; in the *former*, one Movement gains many Purposes. So that

—Man, who here seems *principal* alone,  
 Perhaps acts *second* to some Sphere unknown.

And *acting thus*, the Appearances of *wrong* in the *particular* System may be *right* in the *universal*: For,

'Tis but a Part we see, and not a Whole.

—That it *must*, the whole body of this Epistle is employed to illustrate and inforce. Thus *partial Evil is universal Good*, and thus Providence is fairly acquitted.

From all this he draws a general Conclusion [from l. 60 to 87.] that, as what had been said is sufficient to vindicate the Ways of Providence, Man should rest submissive and content, and confess every Thing to be disposed for the best; that to pretend to inquire into the Manner how God conducts this wonderful Scheme to its Completion, is as absurd as to imagine that the Horse and Ox shall ever come to comprehend why they undergo such different *Manage* and *Fortunes* in the Hand of Man; nay, that such Knowledge, if communicated, would be even pernicious to Man, and make him neglect or *desert* his Duty here.

Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,  
 All but the Page prescrib'd, the present State,  
 From Brutes what Men, from Men what Spirits know,  
 Or who would suffer Being here below?

This he illustrates by an Instance in the Lamb, which is happy in not knowing the Fate that attends it from the Hand of the Butcher; and from thence takes occasion to observe, that God is the equal Master of all his Creatures, and provides for the proper Happiness of each Being.

Who sees with equal Eye, as God of all,  
A Hero perish, or a Sparrow fall\*.

But now the Objector is supposed to put in, and say; "You tell us indeed, that all things will turn out for Good; but we see ourselves surrounded with present Evil; and yet you forbid us all Inquiry into the Manner how we are to be extricated; and in a Word, leave us in a very disconsolate Condition." Not so, replies the Poet {from l. 86 to 95.} you may reasonably, if you so please, receive much comfort from the HOPE of a happy Futurity; a *Hope* given us by God himself for this very Purpose, as an Earnest of that Bliss, which *here* indeed perpetually flies us, but is reserved for the good Man *hereafter*.

What future Bliss he gives not thee to know,  
But gives that *Hope* to be thy Blessing now.  
*Hope* springs eternal in the human Breast,  
Man never *is*, but always *to be* blest.  
The Soul uneasy, and confin'd from home,  
Rests and expatiates in a Life to come.

Now the Reason why the Poet chuses to insist on this Proof of a future State in Preference to others, I conceive, is in order to give his System (which is founded in a sublime and improved *Platonism*) the utmost Grace of Uniformity. For we know this HOPE was *Plato's* peculiar Argument for a future Stee; and the Words here employed, *The Soul uneasy, &c. his* peculiar Expression: We have seen the Argument illustrated with great Force of Reasoning, by our most eminent modern Divines: But no where

\* Matt. x. 29.

stronger urged than by our Poet, in this *Essay*. He says here, in express Terms, That *God gave us Hope to supply that future Bliss which he at present keeps hid from us*. In his 2d Ep. l. 264. he goes still farther, and says, this HOPE quits us not even at Death, when every Thing mortal drops from us.

Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die.

And, in the 4th Epistle he shews how the same HOPE is a certain Proof of a future State, from the Consideration of God's giving Man no Appetite in vain, or what he did not intend should be satisfied; (which is *Plato's* great Argument for a future State.) For, describing the Condition of the good Man, he breaks out into these rapturous Strains :

For him alone Hope leads from Goal to Goal,  
 And opens still, and opens on his Soul ;  
 Till, lengthen'd on to Faith, and unconfu'd,  
 It pours the Bliss, that fills up all the Mind.  
 He sees, why Nature plants in Man alone  
 Hope of known Bliss, and Faith in Bliss unknown :  
 Nature, whose Dictates to no other Kind  
 Are giv'n in vain, but what they seek they find. l. 331, *et seq.*

It is only for the good Man, he tells us, that Hope leads from Goal to Goal, &c. It would be strange indeed then, if it should be a Delusion.

But it hath been objected, that the *System of the best* weakens the other natural Arguments for a future State, because if the Evils, which good Men suffer, promote the Benefit of the whole, then every thing is here in order; and nothing amiss that wants to be set right: Nor has the good Man any reason to expect a Reparation, when the Evils he suffered had such a Tendency. To this we reply, that the *System of the best* is so far from weakening those natural Arguments, that it strengthens and supports them. To consider it a little, if those Evils to which good Men are subject be

mere *Disorders*, without any Tendency to the greater Good of the Whole, then, though we must indeed conclude that they will hereafter be set right, yet this View of Things, representing God as suffering Disorders for no other Purpose than to set them right, gives us a very low Idea of the divine Wisdom. But if those Evils (according to the *System of the best*) contribute to the greater Perfection of the Whole, a Reason may be then given for their Permission, and such a one as supports our Idea of Divine Wisdom to the highest religious Purposes. Then, as to the good Man's *Hopes* of a Retribution, those still remain in their original Force. For our Idea of God's Justice, and how far that Justice is engaged to a Retribution, is exactly and invariably the same on either Hypothesis. For though the *System of the best* supposes that the *Evils themselves* will be fully compensated by the Good they produce to the *Whole*, yet this is so far from supposing that *Particulars* shall suffer for a *general Good*, that it is essential to *this System*, to conclude that, at the Completion of Things, when the whole is arrived to the State of utmost Perfection, *particular* and *universal* Good shall coincide.

Such is the WORLD's great Harmony, that springs  
From Union, Order, full Consent of Things;  
Where *small* and *great*, where *weak* and *mighty*, made  
To *serve* not *suffer*, *strengthen* not *invade*.

Ep. iii. l. 296, *et seq.*

Which Coincidence can never be without a retribution to good Men for the Evils suffered here below.

To return then to the Poet's Argument, he, as we said, bids Man comfort himself with Expectation of future Happiness, and shews him that this HOPE is an Earnest of it: But first of all puts in one very necessary Caution,

Hope *lumbly* then, with *trembling* Pinions soar.

And provoked at those Miscreants, whom he afterwards [Ep. 3. l. 262.] describes as building *Hell on Spite*, and *Heaven on Pride*,  
he



he upbraids them [from l. 94 to 109.] with the Example of the poor *Ind'an*, to whom also Nature hath given this *common HOPE* of *Mankind*. But though his untutored Mind had betrayed him into many childish Fancies concerning the Nature of that future State, yet he is so far from excluding any Part of his own Species (a Vice which could proceed only from vain Science, which *puffeth up*) that he humanely admits even *his faithful Dog to bear him Company*.

And then [from l. 108 to 119.] shews them, that Complaints against the *established Order of Things*, begin in the *biggest Absurdity* from misapplied *Reason* and *Power*, and end in the *biggest Impiety*, in an Attempt to degrade the God of Heaven, and assume his Place.

Go wiser thou, and in thy Scale of Sense  
Weigh thy *Opinion* against *Providence* :  
*Destroy* all Creatures for thy Sport or Gust,  
Yet cry, if Man's *unhappy*, God's *unjust* ;  
If Man alone ingross not Heaven's high Care,  
Alone made *Perfect here, Immortal there*,

That is, be made God, *who only is Perfect and hath Immortality* :  
To which Sense the Lines immediately following confine us :

Snatch from his Hand the Balance and the Rod,  
Rejudge his Justice, be the God of God.

From these Men, the Poet turns to his *Friend*, and [from l. 118 to 137.] remarks that the Ground of all this Extravagance is *Pride* ; which, more or less, infects the whole Species :—shews the ill Effects of it, in the Case of the fallen Angels ; and observes, that even *wisbing* to invert the Laws of Order is a lower Species of their Crime :—then brings an Instance of one of the Effects of *Pride*, which is the Folly of thinking every thing made *solely* for the Use of Man ; without the least regard to any other of God's Creatures.

Ask for what End the heavenly Bodies shine,  
Earth for whose Use ? PRIDE answers, 'Tis for *mine*.

For

For *me*, kind Nature wakes her genial Power,  
 Suckles each Herb, and spreads out ev'ry Flower;  
 Annual for *me*, the Grape, the Rose, renew  
 The Juice nectareous, and the balmy Dew;  
 For *me*, the Mine a thousand Treasures brings,  
 For *me*, Health gushes from a thousand Springs;  
 Seas roll to waft *me*, Suns to light *me* rise,  
 My Footstool, Earth; *my* Canopy, the Skies.

The Ridicule of imagining the *greater Portions* of the material System were solely for the Use of Man, *Philosophy* has sufficiently exposed: And *Common Sense*, as the Poet shews, instructs us to know that *our Fellow Creatures*, placed by Providence the joint Inhabitants of this Globe, are designed by Providence to be joint Sharers with us of its blessings.

Has God, thou Fool! work'd solely for *thy* Good,  
*Thy* Joy, *thy* Pastime, *thy* Attire, *thy* Food?  
 Who for *thy* Table feeds the wanton Fawn,  
 For him as kindly spreads the flow'ry Lawn.  
 Is it for *thee*, the Lark ascends and sings?  
 Joy tunes his Voice, Joy elevates his Wings.  
 Is it for *thee* the Linnet pours his Throat?  
 Loves of his own and Raptures swell the Note.  
*Is thine alone* the Seed that strows the Plain?

The Birds of Heaven shall vindicate their Grain. Ep. 3. l. 27.

Having thus given a general Idea of the Goodness and Wisdom of God, and the Folly and Ingratitude of Man, the great Author comes next (after this necessary Preparation) to the *Confirmation* of his *Thesis*, That partial moral Evil is universal Good: But introduceth it with a proper Argument to abate our Wonder at the Phenomenon of moral Evil, which Argument he builds on a Concession of his Adversaries. "If we ask you, says he, [from l. 136 to 147.] whether Nature doth not err from the gracious End of  
 " its

“ its Creator, when Plagues, Earthquakes, and Tempests, unpeople  
 “ whole Regions at a time? you readily answer, No. For that  
 “ God acts by general and not by particular Laws; and that the  
 “ Course of Matter and Motion must be necessarily subject to some  
 “ Irregularities, because nothing created is perfect.” Say you so?  
 I then ask, why you should expect this Perfection in Man? If you  
 own that the great *End of God* (notwithstanding all this Devia-  
 tion) be *general Happiness*, then it is *Nature*, and not God that de-  
 viates; and do you expect greater Constancy in Man?

Then Nature deviates, and can Man do less?

*i. e.* If Nature, or the inanimate System (on which God hath imposed his Laws, which it obeys as a Machine obeys the Hand of the Workman) may in Course of Time deviate from its first Direction, as the best Philosophy shews it may\*; where is the Wonder that Man, who was created a Free Agent, and hath it in his Power every moment to transgress the eternal Rule of Right, should sometimes go out of Order?

Having thus shewn how Moral Evil came into the World, namely, by *Man's Abuse of his own Free-will*, he comes to the point, the Confirmation of his *Thesis*, by shewing how *moral* Evil promotes *Good*; and employs the *same* Concession of his Adversaries, concerning *natural* Evil, to illustrate it.

1. He shews it tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*, or *Universe* [from l. 146 to 157.] and this by Analogy. “ You own, says he, “ that Storms and Tempests, Clouds, Rain, Heat, and Variety of “ Seasons are necessary (notwithstanding the accidental Evils they “ bring with thm) to the Health and Plenty of this *Globe*; why then “ should you suppose there is not the same Use, with regard to the

\* While Comets move in very eccentric Orbs, in all Manner of Positions, blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same Way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted, which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase till this System wants a Reformation. Sir Is. Newt. Optics, Quest. ult.

“ *Universe*,

“*Universe*, in a *Borgia* and a *Catiline*?” But you say you can see the one and not the other. You say right. One terminates in *this System*, the other refers to the *Whole*. But, says the Poet, in *another Place*,

—of this Frame, the Bearings and the Ties,  
 The strong Connexions, nice Dependencies,  
 Gradations just, has thy pervading Soul  
 Look'd thro' ? Or can a *Part* contain the *Whole* ?

l. 29, *et seq.*

Own therefore, says he, *here*, that,

From Pride, from Pride our very Reasoning springs ;  
 Account for *moral* as for *natural* Things :  
 Why charge we Heaven in those, in these acquit ?  
 In both *to reason right*, is *to submit*.

2. But secondly, to strengthen the foregoing *analogical* Argument, and to make the Wisdom and Goodness of God still more apparent, he observes next [from l. 156 to 165] that *moral Evil* is not only productive of *Good* to the *Whole*, but is even productive of *Good* in our own *System*. It might, says he, perhaps appear better to us, that there were nothing in this World but *Peace* and *Virtue*,

That never Air nor Ocean felt the Wind,  
 That never Passion discompos'd the Mind.

But then consider, that as our *material System* is supported by the Strife of its Elementary Particles, so is our *intellectual System* by the Conflict of our Passions, which are the Elements of human Action.

Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling Train,  
 Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain,  
 These mix'd with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,  
 Make and maintain the Balance of the Mind.

Ep. 2. l. 107, *et seq.*

For

For (as he says again in his *second* Epistle, where he illustrates this Observation at large)

What Crops of Wit and Honesty appear  
From Spleen, from Obstinacy, Hate or Fear! l. 175.

In a word, as without the benefit of tempestuous *Winds*, both *Air* and *Ocean* would stagnate, and corrupt, and spread universal Contagion throughout all the Ranks of Animals that inhabit, or are supported, by them; so, without the Benefit of the *Passions*, that *Harmony*, and *Virtue*, the Effects of the Absence of those Passions, would be a lifeless Calm, a stoical *Apathy*,

Contracted all, retiring to the Breast:  
But Health of Mind is *Exercise*, not *Rest*. Ep. 2. l. 93.

Therefore, concludes the Poet, instead of regarding the *Conflict of Elements*, and the *Passions of the Mind*, as *Disorders*; you ought to consider them as what they are, Part of the *general Order* of Providence: and that they are so, appears from their always preserving the same unvaried Course, throughout all Ages, from the Creation, to the present Time:

The *general Order*, since the Whole began,  
Is kept in *Nature*, and is kept in *Man*.

We see therefore it would be doing great Injustice to our Author to suspect that he intended, by this, to give any Encouragement to *Vice*; or to insinuate the *Necessity* of it to a happy Life, on the equally execrable and absurd Scheme of the Author of the *Fable of the Bees*. His System, as all his *Ethic Epistles* shew, is this, That the Passions, for the Reasons given above, are necessary to the Support of *Virtue*: That indeed the Passions in Excess, produce *Vice*, which is, in its own Nature, the greatest of all Evils; and come into the World from the Abuse of Man's Free-will; but that God, in his infinite Wisdom, and Goodness, deviously turns the natural

Bias of its Malignity to the Advancement of human Happiness, and makes it productive of general *Good*:

TH' ETERNAL ART EDUCES GOOD FROM ILL. Ep. 2. l. 165.

This, set against what we have observed of the Poet's Doctrine of a *future State*, will furnish us with an Instance of his *steering* (as he well expresses it in his Preface) *between Doctrines seemingly opposite: If his Essay has any Merit, he thinks it is in this.* And doubtless it is uncommon Merit to reject the Extravagances of every System, and take in only what is rational and real. The *Characteristics*, and the *Fable of the Bees*, are two seemingly inconsistent Systems: The Extravagancy of the first is in giving a Scheme of *Virtue without Religion*; and of the latter, in giving a Scheme of *Religion without Virtue*. These our Poet leaves to any body that will take them up; but agrees however so far with the *first*, that Virtue would be worth having, though itself was its only Reward; and so far with the *latter*, that God makes Evil, against its Nature, productive of Good.

The Poet having thus justified Providence in its *Permission* of partial MORAL EVIL, employs the remaining part of this Epistle in vindicating it from the *Imputation* of certain supposed NATURAL EVILS. For now he shews, that though the Complaint of his Adversaries against Providence be on Pretence of *real moral Evils*, yet, at bottom, it all proceeds from their Impatience under *imaginary natural ones*, the Issue of a depraved Appetite for visionary Advantages, which if Man had, they would be either *useless* or *pernicious* to him, as unfuitable to his State, or repugnant to his Condition. [from l. 164 to 199] "Though God (says he) hath so bountifully bestowed on Man, Faculties little less than *Angelic*, yet he ungratefully grasps at higher; and then, extravagant in another Extreme, with a Passion as ridiculous as that is impious, envies even the peculiar Accommodations of *Brutes*. But here his own Principles shew his Folly." He supposes them all made for his Use: Now what Use could he have of them, when he had robbed them

them of all their Qualities. *Qualities*, as they are at present divided, distributed with the highest Wisdom : But which, if bestowed according to the froward Humour of these childish Complainers, would be found to be every where either *wanting* or *superfluous*. But even with these *brutal* Qualities Man would not only be no Gainer, but a considerable Loser, as the Poet shews, in explaining the Consequences that would follow from his having his Sensations in that exquisite Degree in which this or that Animal is observed to possess them.

He tells us next [from l. 198 to 225] that the complying with such extravagant Desires would not only be *useless and pernicious to Man*, but would be breaking the Order, and deforming the Beauty, of God's Creation. In which *this* Animal is subject to *that*, and *all* to Man ; who by his Reason enjoys the Benefit of all their Powers :

Far as Creation's ample Range extends,  
The Scale of *sensual, mental* Powers ascends :  
Mark how it mounts, to Man's imperial Race,  
From the green Myriads in the peopled Grass !  
Without this just Gradation, could they be  
Subjected these to those, or all to thee ?  
The Powers of all subdued by thee alone,  
Is not thy Reason all those Powers in one ?

And farther [from l. 224 to 259] that this breaking the Order of Things, which as a Link or Chain connects all Beings from the highest to the lowest, would unavoidably be attended with the Destruction of the Universe :

For if each System in Gradation roll,  
Alike essential to th' amazing Whole ;  
The least Confusion but in one, not all  
That System only, but the Whole must fall.  
Let Earth unbalanc'd from her Orbit fly,  
Planets and Suns rush lawless thro' the Sky :

Let ruling Angels from their Spheres be hurl'd,  
 Being on Being wreck'd, and World on World,  
 Heaven's whole Foundations to their Centre nod,  
 And Nature tremble to the Throne of God.

For that the several Parts of the Universe must at least compose as entire and harmonious a Whole, as the Parts of an human Body do, cannot be doubted: Yet we see what Confusion it would make in our Frame, if the Members were set upon invading each other's Office.

What if the Foot, ordain'd the Dust to tread,  
 Or Hand to toil, aspir'd to be the Head? &c.  
 Just as absurd, for any Part to claim  
 To be another in this gen'ral Frame:  
 Just as absurd, to mourn the Task and Pains  
 The great directing \* MIND of ALL ordains.

Who will not acknowledge that so harmonious a Connection in the Disposition of Things, as is here described, is transcendently beautiful? But the *Fatalists* suppose such a one.—What then? Is the first great free Agent debarred from a Contrivance so exquisite, because some Men, to set up their Idol, *Fate*, absurdly represent it as presiding over such a System?

Having thus given a Representation of God's Creation, as *one entire Whole*, where all the Parts have a necessary Dependance on and Relation to each other, and where every *Particular* works and concurs to the Perfection of the *Whole*; as such a System would be thought above the reach of vulgar Ideas; to reconcile it to their Conceptions, he shews [from l. 258 to 273]<sup>p</sup> that God is equally and intimately present to every Sort of Substance, to every Particle of Matter, and in every Instant of Being; which eases the labouring

\* Veneramur autem et colimus ob Dominum. Deus enim sine Dominio, Providentia, et causis Finalibus, nihil aliud est quam FATUM et NATURA. Newtoni Princip. Schol. gener. sub finem.

Imagination,



Imagination, and makes it expect no less, from such a *Presence*, than such a *Dispensation*.

And now, the Poet, as he had promised, having *vindicated the Ways of God to Man*, concludes [from l. 272 to the End] that from what had been said it appears, that the very Things we blame contribute to our Happiness, either as *Particulars*, or as *Parts of the Universal System*; that our *Ignorance*, in accounting for the Ways of Providence, was allotted to us out of Compassion; that yet we have as much *Knowledge* as is sufficient to shew us, that we are, and always shall be, as blest as we can bear; for that NATURE is neither a *Stratonic Chain* of blind Causes and Effects,

(*All Nature is but Art unknown to thee*);

nor yet the fortuitous Result of *Epicurean Atoms*,

(*All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see*);

as these two Species of Atheism supposed it; but the wonderful Art and Direction (unknown indeed to Man) of an all-powerful, all-wise, all-good, and free Being. And therefore we may be assured, that the Arguments brought above, to prove partial moral Evil productive of universal Good, may be safely relied on; from whence one certain Truth results, in spite of all the Pride and Cavils of vain Reason, That **WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY.** And this Truth once owned, all Complaints against Providence are secluded.

But that the Reader may see, in one View, the *Exactness of the Method*, as well as *Force of the Argument*, I shall here draw up a short *Synopsis* of this Epistle. The Poet begins in telling us his Subject is *An Essay on Man*.—His End of Writing is *to vindicate Providence*.—Tells us against whom he wrote, *the Atheists*.—From whence he intends to fetch his Arguments, *from the visible Things of God seen in this System*.—Lays down this Proposition as the Foundation of his Thesis, *that of all possible Systems, infinite Wisdom has*  
formed

*formed the best.*—Draws from thence two Consequences; 1. *That there must needs be somewhere such a Creature as Man*; 2. *That the moral Evil which He is the Author of, is productive of the Good of the World.* This is his general *Thesis*; from whence he draws this *Conclusion*, *That Man should rest submissive and content, and make the Hopes of Futurity his Comfort—but not suffer this to be the Occasion of PRIDE*, which is the Cause of all his impious Complaints.

He proceeds to confirm his *Thesis*.—Previously endeavours to abate our Wonder at the Phenomenon of *moral Evil*.—Shews first *its Use to the Perfection of the Universe*, by Analogy, from the Use of *Physical Evil* in this particular System.—Secondly, *its Use in this System*, where it is turned, providentially, from its natural Bias, to promote Virtue—Then goes on to vindicate Providence from the Imputation of certain *supposed natural Evils*, as he had before justified it for the Permission of *real moral Evil*, in shewing that though the Atheist's Complaint against Providence be on Pretence of *real moral Evil*, yet the true Cause is his Impatience under *imaginary natural Evil*; the Issue of a *depraved Appetite for fantastical Advantages*, which he shews, if obtained, would be *useless*, or *hurtful to Man*—and deforming and destructive to the *Universe*; as breaking into that *Order* by which it is supported.—He describes that *Order*, *Harmony*, and *close Connection of the Parts*. And, by shewing the intimate *Presence of God* to his whole Creation, gives a Reason for an Universe so amazingly beautiful, and perfect. From all this he deduces his general *Conclusion*, *that Nature being neither a blind Chain of Causes and Effects, nor yet the fortuitous Result of wandering Atoms, but the wonderful Art and Direction of an all-wise, all-good, and free Being; Whatever is, is Right, with regard to the Disposition of God and its Ultimate Tendency*; which once granted, all Complaints against Providence are at an End.

This is a plain and consistent Account of the Argument of this famous Epistle, which (though here humbled, and stripped of all its Ornaments) hath such a *Force of Reasoning* as would support  
Rhimes

Rhimes as bad as *Donne's*, and such a *Strain of Poetry* as would immortalize even the wretched Sophistry that Mr. DE CROUSAZ has employed against it.

Whose Objections it is now high time we should consider. For having shewn what Mr. *Pope's* System really is, we come next to shew what it is *not*; namely, what that Writer hath the Injustice, or the Folly, to represent it. He begins his *Examination*, with saying, that "Mr. *Pope* seems to him, quite throughout his System, to embrace the *pre-establisht Harmony* of the celebrated *Leibnitz*, which, in his Opinion, establishes a Fatality destructive of all Religion and Morality\*."—That the *pre-establisht Harmony* of *Leibnitz* terminates in Fate, is readily owned; but that Mr. *Pope* hath espoused that impious Whimsy, is an utter Chimæra. The *pre-establisht Harmony* was built upon, and is an outrageous Extension of, a Conception of *Plato's*; who combating the atheistical Objections about the Origin of Evil, employs this Argument in Defence of Providence; "That, amongst an infinite Number of possible Worlds in God's Idea, *this*, which he hath created, and brought into Being, and admits of a Mixture of Evil, is the *best*." But if the *best*, then Evil consequently is *partial*, comparatively small, and tends to the greater Perfection of the *whole*. This *Principle* is espoused and supported by Mr. *Pope* with all the Power of Reason and Poetry. But neither was *Plato* a *Fatalist*, nor is there any *Fatalism* in the Argument. As to the Truth of the Notion, that is another Question; and how far it clears up the very difficult Controversy about the Origin of Evil, that is still *another*. That it is a full Solution of all Difficulties, I cannot think, for Reasons too long to be given in this Place. Perhaps we shall never have a full Solution here; and it may be no great Matter though we have not, as we are demonstrably certain of the *moral Attributes* of the Deity. However,

\* Examen de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme.

what may justify Mr. *Pope* in enforcing and illustrating this *Platonic* Notion is, that it has been received by the most celebrated and orthodox *Divines* both of the ancient and modern Church.

This Doctrine, we own, then, was taken up by *Leibnitz*; but it was to ingraft upon it a most pernicious *Fatalism*. *Plato* said, God chose the best: *Leibnitz* said, he could not but chuse the best. *Plato* supposed Freedom in God, to chuse one of two Things equally good: *Leibnitz* held the Supposition to be absurd; but however, admitting the Case, he maintained that God could not chuse one of two Things equally good. Thus it appears the first went on the System of Freedom; and that the latter, notwithstanding the most artful Disguises in his *Theodice*, was a thorough *Fatalist*. For we cannot well suppose he would give that Freedom to Man which he had taken away from God. The Truth of the Matter seems to have been this: He saw, on the one hand, the monstrous Absurdity of supposing, with *Spinoza*, that blind Fate was the Author of a coherent Universe; but yet, on the other, could not conceive, with *Plato*, that God could foresee and conduct, according to an archetypal Idea, a World, of all possible Worlds the best, inhabited by free Agents. This Difficulty, therefore, which made the *Socinians* take Preference from God, disposed *Leibnitz* to take Free-will from Man: And thus he fashioned his fantastical Hypothesis: He supposed that, when God made the Body, he impressed on his new-created Machine a certain Series or Suite of Motions; and that when he made the fellow Soul, the same Series of Ideas, whose Operations, throughout the whole Duration of the Union, so exactly jumped, that whenever an Idea was excited, a correspondent Motion was ever ready to satisfy the Volition. Thus for Instance, when the Mind had the Will to raise the Arm to the Head, the Body was so pre-contrived as to raise, at that very Moment, the Part required. This he called the PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. And with this he promised to do Wonders.

Now

Now we see, that, from the Principle of *Plato*, as well as from that of *Leibnitz*, this grand Consequence follows, THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT; because every thing in this World, even Evil itself, tends to the greater Perfection of the *whole*. This Mr. *Pope* employs as a *Principle*, throughout a Poem (the most sublime that ever was written) to humble the Pride of Man, who would impiously make God accountable for his Creation. What then does common Sense teach us to understand by *whatever is, is right*? Did the Poet mean *right* with regard to Man, or *right* with regard to God? *Right* with regard to itself, or *right* with regard to its ultimate Tendency? Surely *with regard to God*: For he tells us, his Design is

To vindicate the Ways of God to Man. l. 16.

Surely *with regard to its ultimate Tendency*: For he tells us again,

All partial Ill is univerfal Good. l. 283.

Yet Mr. *De Croufaz* preposterously takes it the other way; and so perversely interpreted, it is no Wonder that he, and his wife Friends, should find the Poem full of Contradictions\*.

But, before we come to an Examination of Particulars, it will be necessary to remind the Reader once again, that the Subject of this Epistle is a Justification of Providence, against the impious Objections of atheistic Men. It is to *vindicate the Ways of God to Man*.—Thus the Poet addresses them at the *Beginning*:

Presumptuous Man! the Reason would'st thou find

Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind? l. 35.

Then say not Man's imperfect, *Heav'n in fault*. l. 69.

\* J'ai lu l'essai de Mr. Pope (repond un Ami de la compagnie) et jamais je n'eus plus besoin de patience. J'ai fait des grands efforts, pour y trouver quelque sens raisonnable, et je les ai faits inutilement. Tantôt j'y suis tombé sur des précisions sophistiques, tantôt sur des décisions également hardies et sans preuves, tantôt enfin sur des longues périodes d'un pompeux galimatias, &c. Examen de l'Essai.—Thus his Friend runs on in this abusive Way, and grows more particular in his Scurrility, while Mr. De Croufaz, good Man, is unable to make him hold his Peace,

As he proceeds, he still applies his Reasoning to the *same Men* :

Go — and in thy Scale of Sense

*Weigh thy Opinion against Providence ;*

Call Imperfection what thou fancy'ſt ſuch ;

Say, here *he gives too little, there too much ;*

Deſtroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Guſt :

Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, *God's unjuſt.* l. 109, & ſeq.

And concludes with this Reproof to them :

Ceafe then, nor *Order Imperfection* name. l. 273.

Having premiſed thus much, we now proceed to Mr. *De Crouſaz*.

Mr. *Pope* had ſaid :

The Lamb thy Riot dooms to bleed to-day,

Had he thy Reaſon, would he ſkip and play ?

Pleas'd to the laſt, he crops the flow'ry Food,

And licks the Hand juſt rais'd to ſhed his Blood.

O Blindneſs to the Future ! kindly giv'n,

That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n. l. 77, & ſeq.

On which his *Commentator* :—“ We do not, indeed, perceive  
“ any Thing in Beaſts, that ſhews they have an Idea or Apprehen-  
“ ſion of Death. But, ſurely, with regard to Man, to reflect on  
“ Death, and to contemplate the Certainty of it, are of great  
“ Uſe to a prudent Life and a happy Death. Reaſon and Religion  
“ agree in this, and a Man muſt want both one and the other, to  
“ cry out,

“ O Blindneſs to the Future ! kindly giv'n,

“ That each may fill the Circle mark'd by Heav'n.

“ This ſuppoſes, that if Men had a Foreknowledge of their Def-  
“ tiny, they would do all they could to avoid it, and that they  
“ would ſucceed : Becauſe, without this Ignorance, Heaven, it  
“ ſeems, could never bring all its *Beings* to fill that Circle marked

“ out

“ out by it. Yet this, notwithstanding, is a Consequence that can have no Place, if it be impossible for Men to act with Freedom. “ But the Doctrine of FATE necessarily draws us into Contradictions \*.” Mr. *Croufaz* introduces his *Commentary*, by solemnly acquainting his Reader, *That he had, from his very Infancy, a strong Bias towards LOGIC: that he has given a considerable Time to that Study, and does not repent his Pains; that he has profited by Maxims which he has found in Books not written with a Design to give them; that he has run through every Book that has fallen into his Hands under that Title, or any Thing approaching to it; that he has not even neglected the most out-of-fashion'd Works of this Kind: But, as the greatest Treasure is worthless, unless well used, he is resolv'd to employ some of it upon Mr. Pope †.* And here you have the Fruits of his Labours. Here he has shewn, to some Purpose, his Skill in extracting Doctrines from Books not designed to give them. And for this Passage I will be answerable, that he has extracted a Doctrine from it which our POET did not design to give; who, when he had answered the atheistical Objection about positive Evil, supposes the Objector to reply to this Effect:—It may be true, what you say, that *partial Evil tends to universal Good*: But why, then, has not God let me clearly into this Secret, and acquainted me with the Manner how? The Poet replies, “ For very good Reasons. You were sent into the World on a Task and Duty to be performed by you. “ And as the knowing these Things might distract you, or draw you from your Station; it was in Mercy that God hath hid these Things from you:

Heav'n from all Creatures hides the Book of Fate,  
All but the Page prescrib'd, their present State,  
From Brutes what Men, from *Men what Spirits know*;  
*Or who would suffer Being here below?* l. 73, & seq.

\* *Commentaire sur la Traduction en vers de Mr. l'Abbé du Resnel de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme, p. 63, 64.*

† P. 27, 28.

“ To illustrate this by a familiar Instance ; how kindly hath Nature  
 “ acted by the Lamb, in hiding its Death from it ; the Know-  
 “ ledge of which would have inbitter'd all its Life ?” This is  
 the Force of the Poet's Argument ; and nothing can be better con-  
 nected, or more beautiful. But our great *Logician*, instead of at-  
 tending to the Argument of a very close Reasoner (whose Thread  
 of Reasoning, therefore, one should have imagined might have con-  
 ducted a Mathematician too, as he is, to the true Sense of the Pas-  
 sage) rambles after a Meaning that could not possibly be Mr. *Pope's* ;  
 because it both disagrees with the Context, and directly opposes what  
 he lays down in express Words in this very Essay. Mr. *De Crousaz*,  
 we see, imagines that this Instance of the *Lamb* was given to shew  
 how *hurtful a Gift* God bestowed upon us, when he gave us  
 the Knowledge of our End. Mr. *Pope* says expressly, that it was  
 a *friendly Gift* :

To each *unthinking* Being Heav'n a *Friend*,  
 Gives not the *useless Knowledge of its End* :  
 To *Man* imparts it ; but with such a *View*,  
 As, while he dreads it, makes him *hope* it too.

Ep. iii. l. 75, & seq.

i. e. “ Heaven, which is not only friendly to Man, but Beast, gives  
 “ not this *latter* the Knowledge of its End ; because such Knowledge  
 “ (which is necessarily attended with Anxiety) would be useless to  
 “ it. On the other hand, He gives it to Man ; because it is of the  
 “ highest Advantage to him, who, being to exist in a future State,  
 “ may, by this Means, make a fitting Preparation for his good  
 “ Reception there ; which Preparation will *temper*, and, at length,  
 “ quite *subdue* the Anxiety necessarily attendant (as is said) on the  
 “ Knowledge of our End, by the certain *Hope* of a happy Im-  
 “ mortality.”

After these extraordinary Fruits of our *Logician's* long Appli-  
 cation to the *Art of Thinking*, he goes on, for four Pages together \*,

\* *Commentaire*, p. 66 to 70.



to shew how useful and necessary it is for Man to cultivate his Understanding. You ask whom he contradicts in this? He absurdly supposes, Mr. *Pope*; while he is indeed but quarelling with his own Imaginations. Here we must recollect what we observed above of the Subject of the Poem; which is a Vindication of Providence against impious Complainers. As these will not acknowledge it just and good, because they cannot comprehend it, and as this Argument is only supported by *Pride*, the Poet thought proper to mortify that *Pride*; which could not be done more effectually, than by shewing them, that even a Savage *Indian* reasoned better:

Lo! the poor *Indian*, whose untutor'd Mind  
Sees God in Clouds, and hears him in the Wind;  
His Soul proud Science never taught to stray  
Far as the Solar Walk, or Milky Way;  
Yet simple Nature to his Hope has giv'n,  
Behind the cloud-topt Hill, an humbler Heav'n;  
To *be* contents his natural Desire,  
He asks no Angel's Wing, or Seraph's Fire, &c.

l. 95, & seq.

What are we to conclude from hence? That Mr. *Pope* intended to discourage all Improvements of the human Understanding? or that it was only his Design to deter Men from Impiety, and from presuming to *rejudge the Justice* of their Creator? Mr. *Croufax*, contrary to common Sense, and the whole Tenor of the Epistle, has chosen the former Part; though Mr. *Pope* had immediately added,

Go wiser thou, and in thy Scale of Sense  
Weigh thy Opinion against Providence.  
Call Imperfection what thou fancy'st such,  
Say, Here he gives too little, there too much;  
Destroy all Creatures for thy Sport or Gust:  
Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, God's unjust. l. 109, & seq.

But

But to this, the *Commentator* :—“ To whom does Mr. *Pope* address himself in this long Period? Is it to those presumptuous Men, who are continually confounding themselves, and abusing the Fruitfulness of their Imaginations, to teize good Christians with Objections against Providence? Their Rashness and Impatience well deserve, in my Opinion, the Censures Mr. *Pope* here inflicts upon them\*.”—Wonderful! Our Logician has, at length, discovered the Subject of Mr. *Pope's* Epistle. Why then did he not do Justice to Truth, by striking out all the rest of his Remarks? For if this be right, all the rest must, of consequence, be wrong.

Mr. *Pope* says, speaking of the End of Providence,

As much that End a constant Course requires  
Of Showers and Sunshine, as of Man's Desires;  
As much eternal Springs and cloudless Skies,  
As Men for ever temperate, calm and wise. l. 147, & seq.

On which the *Examiner*, “ A continual Spring and a Heaven without Clouds would be fatal to the Earth and its Inhabitants; but can we regard it as a Misfortune that Men should be always sage, calm and temperate? I am quite in the dark as to this Comparison †.” Let us try if we can drag him into light, as unwilling as he is to see. The Argument stands thus.—Presumptuous Man complains of moral Evil; Mr. *Pope* checks and informs him thus: The Evil, says he, you complain of, tends to universal Good; for as Clouds, and Rain, and Tempest, are necessary to preserve Health and Plenty in this sublunary World, so the Evils that spring from disorder'd Passions are necessary.—To what? Not to Man's Happiness here, but to the Perfection of the Universe in general. So that,

If Plagues or Earthquakes break not Heaven's Design,  
Why then a *Borgia* or a *Catiline*?

\* *Commentaire*, p. 79.

† *Examen de l'Essai*, &c.

On which the Examiner thus descants,—“ These Lines have no Sense but on the System of *Leibnitz*, which confounds Morals with Physics; and in which, all that we call Pleasures, Grief, Contentment, Inquietude, Wisdom, Virtue, Truth, Error, Vices, Crimes, Abominations, are the inevitable Consequence of a fatal Chain of Things as ancient as the World. But this is it which renders the System so horrible, that all honest Men must shudder at it. It is, indeed, sufficient to humble human Nature, to reflect that this was invented by a Man, and that other Men have adopted it\*.” This is, indeed, very tragical; but we have shewn above, that it hath its Sense on the *Platonic*, not the *Leibnitzian* System; and besides, that the Context confines us to that Sense.

What hath misled the Examiner is his supposing the Comparison to be between the Effects of *two Things in this sublunary World*; when not only the *Elegancy*, but the *Justness of it* consists in its being between the *Effects of a Thing in the Universe at large*, and the familiar and known *Effects of one in this sublunary World*. For the *Position* inforced in these Lines is this, *that partial Evil tends to the Good of the Whole*:

*Respecting Man*, whatever Wrong we call,  
May, must be right, as relative to all. l. 51.

How does the Poet inforce it? Why, if you will believe the Examiner, by illustrating the Effects of partial moral Evil in a particular System, by that of partial natural Evil in the *same* System, and so leaves his *Position* in the lurch; but we must never believe the great Poet reasons like the *Logician*. The Way to prove his Point he knew was to illustrate the Effect of partial moral Evil in the *Universe*, by partial natural Evil in a *particular System*. Whether partial moral Evil tend to the Good of the Universe, being a *Question*, which by reason of our Ignorance of *many* Parts of that Universe, we cannot decide, but from known Effects; the Rules of Argument require that it be proved by *Analogy*, *i. e.* setting it

\* Examen de l'Essai, &c.

by, and comparing it with a Thing *certain*; and it is a Thing *certain*, that partial natural Evil tends to the Good of our *particular System*. This is his Argument: And thus, we see, it stands clear of Mr. *De Croufatz's* Objection, and of *Leibnitz's Fatalism*.

After having inforced this analogical *Position*, the Poet then indeed, in order to strengthen and support it, employs the same Instance of natural Evil, to shew that, even here to *Man*, as well as to the *Whole*, *moral Evil* is productive of Good, by the gracious Disposition of Providence, who turns it deviously from its natural Tendency.

Mr. *Pope* then adds,

From Pride, from Pride, our very Reasoning springs;  
Account for moral, as for nat'ral Things:  
Why charge we Heaven in those, in these acquit?  
In both, to reason right, is to submit. l. 153, & seq.

Our *Commentator* asks—"Why, then, does Mr. *Pope* pretend to reason upon the Matter, and rear his Head so high, and decide so dogmatically, upon the most important of all Subjects\*?" This is indeed pleasant. Suppose Mr. *De Croufatz* should undertake to shew the Folly of pretending to penetrate into the Mysteries of *revealed Religion*, as here Mr. *Pope* has done of *natural*, must he not employ the Succours of Reason? And could he conclude his Reasonings with greater Truth and Modesty, than in the Words of Mr. *Pope*?—*To reason right, is to submit*.—But he goes on, "If you will believe him [Mr. *Pope*] the Sovereign Perfections of the eternal Being have *inevitably* determined him to create this Universe, because the Idea of it was the most perfect of all those which represented many possible Worlds. Notwithstanding, there is nothing perfect in this Part, which is assigned for our Habitation: it swarms with Imperfections; it is God who is the Cause of them, and it was not in his Power to contrive Matters otherwise. The Poet had not the Caution to recur to Man's

\* *Commentaire*, p. 94.

“ Abuse of his own Free-will, the true Source of all our Miseries, “ and which are agreeable to that State of Disorder in which Men “ live by their own Fault \*.” I will venture to say, every Part of this Reflection is false and calumnious. The first Part of it, that the *Eternal Being*, according to Mr. Pope, was inevitably determined, and that he had not Power to contrive Matters otherwise, I have already shewn to be so. It is still a more unpardonable Calumny to say that Mr. Pope has thrown the Cause of moral Evil upon God, and had not the Caution to recur to Man's Abuse of his own Free-will: For Mr. De Croufuz could not but see that the Poet had, in so many Words, thrown the Cause entirely upon that Abuse, where, speaking of natural and moral Evil, he says,

What makes all Physical and Moral Ill!  
 There deviates Nature, and here WANDERS WILL,  
 GOD SENDS NOT ILL. Ep. iv. l. 109, & seq.

When he had said this, and acquitted the supreme Cause, he then informs us what is God's Agency, after Natural and Moral Evil had been thus produced by the Deviation of Nature, and Depravity of Will; namely that he hath so contrived, in his infinite Wisdom and Goodness, that Good shall arise from this Evil.

—If rightly understood,  
 Or partial Ill is universal Good,  
 Or Chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,  
 Short and but rare, till Man improv'd it all. l. 111, & seq.

And speaking in another Place of God's Providence, he says,

That counterworks each Folly and Caprice,  
 That disappoints th' Effects of ev'ry Vice. Ep. ii. l. 229.

What is this but bringing Good out of Evil? And how distant is that from being the Cause of Evil?

\* Commentaire, p. 94, 95.

After this, a *Philosopher* should never think of writing more till he had rectified what he had already wrote so much amiss.

The next Passage the *Examiner* attacks is the following :

Better for us, perhaps, it might appear,  
Were there all Harmony, all Virtue here ;  
That never Air or Ocean felt the Wind ;  
That never Passion discompos'd the Mind :  
But all subsists by elemental Strife,

*And Passions are the Elements of Life.* l. 157, & seq.

Here the *Examiner* upbraids Mr. *Pope* for degrading himself so far as to write to the gross Prejudices of the People. " In the corporeal Nature (says he) there is no Piece of Matter that is perfectly simple ; all are composed of small Particles, called elementary ; from their Mixture, proceeds a Fermentation, sometimes weak, and sometimes strong, which still farther attenuates these Particles : and thus agitated and divided, they serve for the Nourishment and Growth of organic Bodies ; to this Growth it is we give the Name of Life. But what have the Passions in common with these Particles ? Do their Mixture and Fermentation serve for the Nourishment of that Substance which thinks, and do they constitute the Life of that Substance ?" Thus Mr. *De Croufuz*, who, as, a little before, he could not see the Nature of the Comparison, so here, by a more deplorable Blindness, could not see that there was any Comparison at all. " You, says Mr. *Pope*, perhaps may think it would be better, that neither Air nor Ocean was vexed with Tempests, nor that the Mind was ever discomposed by Passion ; but consider, that as in the one Case our material System is supported by the Strife of its elementary Particles, so in the *Intellectual*, the Passions of the Mind are, as it were, the Elements of human Life, i. e. Actions." All here is clear, solid, and well-reasoned, and hath been considered

\* Essai de PEEU.

above. What muſt we ſay then to our *Examiner's* wild Talk of *the Mixture and Fermentation of elementary Particles of Matter for the Nourishment of that Subſtance that thinks, and of its conſtituting the Life of that Subſtance?* I call it the *Examiner's*, for, you ſee, it is not *Mr. Pope's*; and *Mr. Crouſaz* ought to be charged with it, becauſe it may be queſtioned whether it was a *ſimple Blunder*, he urging it ſo invidiouſly as to inſinuate that *Mr. Pope* might probably hold the *Materiality of the Soul*. However, if it was a Miſtake, it was a pleaſant one, and aroſe from the Ambiguity of the Word *Life*, which in *English*, as *la Vie* in *French*, ſignifies both *Exiſtence* and *human Action*, and is always to have its Senſe determined by the Context.

*Mr. Pope* ſays, ſpeaking of the Brute Creation,

*Nature* to theſe, without Profuſion, kind,

The proper Organs, proper Powers aſſign'd. l. 171.

*Mr. Crouſaz* obſerves, that “ In this Verſe, by the Term *Nature*, we muſt neceſſarily underſtand the *Author of Nature*; it “ is a Figure much in Uſe. *SPINOZA* has employ'd all his *Meta-“ physics* to confound theſe two Significations\*.” Therefore, I ſuppoſe, *Mr. Pope* muſt not employ the Word at all, though it be to vindicate it from that *Abuſe*, by diſtinguiſhing its *different* Significations. But this we are to conſider as a Touch of our *Logician's* Art. It is what they call *Argumentum ad invidiam*.

The Poet,

For as Creation's ample Range extends,

The Scale of ſenſual, mental Powers aſcends :

Mark how it mounts to *Man's imperial Race*,

From the green Myriads in the peopled Graſs.

Ep. i. l. 199, & ſeq.

On this the *Commentator*, “ That Place of Honour, which the “ Poet has reſerved to Man in another Part of his *Epistle*, he gives

\* *Commentaire*, p. 99.

“ him here, because it serves to embellish and perfect the Gradation. At every Step Mr. *Pope* forgets one of those principal and most essential Rules, which Mr. *Des Cartes* lays down in his *Method*; that is, exactly to review what one asserts, so that no Part be found to be *gratis dictum*, nor the *Whole* repugnant to itself.” This we are to understand, as said, διὰ δεικνύμεως. But I shall beg leave to observe that our Logician here gives his Lessons very impertinently. For, that Mr. *Pope*, in calling the *Race of Man imperial*, hath bestowed no Title on him in this Place, which he had denied him elsewhere. He, with great Piety and Prudence, supposes what the Scripture tells us to be true, that *Man was created Lord of this inferior World*; he *supposes* it, I say, in these Lines of this very Epistle:

Without this just Gradation could they be  
Subjected these to those, and all to thee?

The Powers of all subdued by thee alone,

Is not thy Reason all those Powers in one? l. 221, & seq.

He expressly asserts it in the third Epistle:

Heaven's Attribute was universal Care,

And Man's Prerogative to rule, but spare. l. 160.

And this, in the very Place where he gives the Description of Man in Paradise.

What misled our Critic so far as to imagine Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himself was, I suppose, such Passages as these:

Atk for what End the heavenly Bodies shine, &c.

And again:

Has God, thou Fool! work'd solely for thy Good, &c.

But in Truth this is so far from a Contradiction to what was said before of *Man's Prerogative*, that it is a Confirmation of it, and of what the Scripture tells us concerning it. And because this Matter

\* Commentaire, p. 168.



has been mistaken, to the Discredit of the Poet's religious Sentiments, by Readers, whom the Conduct of certain licentious Writers, treating this Subject in an abusive Way, hath rendered jealous and mistrustful, I shall endeavour to explain it. Scripture says, that Man was made *Lord of All*.—But this Lord, become, at length, intoxicated with Pride, the common Effect of Sovereignty, erected himself, like particular Monarchs, into a *Tyrant*. And as *Tyranny* consists in supposing *all made for the Use of one*; he took those Freedoms with *all*, that are consequent on such a Principle. He soon began to consider the whole Animal Creation as his *Slaves*, rather than his *Subjects*; as being created for no Use of *their own*, but for *his* only; and therefore used them with the utmost Barbarity: And not so content; to add *Insult* to his *Cruelty*, he endeavoured to philosophise himself into an Opinion, that *Animals* were mere *Machines*, insensible of Pain or Pleasure. And thus, as Mr. Pope says, *Man* affected to be the *Wit*, as well as *Tyrant of the Whole* \*. Our Commentator can tell us what deep Philosopher it was that invented this witty System, and by the Assistance of what METHOD so wonderful a Discovery was brought to Light. It became then one who adhered to the Scripture Account of *Man's Dominion*, to reprove this Abuse of it, and to shew that,

Heaven's Attribute was *universal Care*,  
And *Man's Prerogative to rule*, BUT SPARE.

The poetical Translator † has turned the Words, *to Man's imperial Race*, by

Jusqu'à l'Homme, *ce Chef, ce Roy de l'Univers!*  
*Even to Man, this Head, this King of the Universe.*

Which is so sad a Blunder, that it contradicts Mr. Pope's whole System. Who, although he allows Man to be King of this inferior

\* Grant that the Powerful still the Weak controul,  
Be *Man* the *Wit* and *Tyrant* of the whole. Ep. iii. 54-

† M. L'Abbé du Resnel.

World, is far from thinking him *King of the Universe*. If the System itself could not teach him this, yet methinks the following Lines of this very Epistle might :

So Man, who here seems *Principal* alone,  
Perhaps acts *Second* to some Sphere unknown. l. 57.

If the Translator imagined Mr. *Pope* was here speaking *ironically*, where he talks of *Man's imperial Race*, and so would heighten the Ridicule by *ce Roy de l'Univers*, the Mistake is still worse; the Force of the Argument depending upon its being said *seriously*. For the Poet is speaking of a Scale, from the *highest* to the lowest, in the Mundane System.

But now we come to the famous Passage which is to fix the Charge :

All are but Parts of one stupendous Whole,  
Whose Body Nature is, and God the Soul.  
That, chang'd through all, and yet in all the same,  
Great in the Earth as in th' Etherial Frame,  
Warms in the Sun, refreshes in the Breeze,  
Glow's in the Stars, and blossoms in the Trees,  
Lives thro' all Life, extends thro' all Extent,  
Spreads undivided, operates unspent,  
Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,  
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart;  
As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,  
As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns:  
To him no high, no low, no great, no small;  
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

Ep. i. l. 259, & seq.

On which our *Examiner*, blind to the Light of Reason, as well as deaf to the *Charms* of Harmony—*A Spinozist* (says he) *would express himself in this Manner* \*. I believe he would, and so would

\* Examen de l'Essai,

St. Paul too, writing on the same Subject, namely, the Omnipresence of God in his Providence, and in his Substance. *In him we live and move and have our Being* \*; i. e. we are *Parts* of him, his *Offspring*, as the Greek Poet, a *Panttheist*, quoted by the Apostle, observes: and the Reason is, because a religious *Theist*, and an impious *Panttheist*, both profess to believe the Omnipresence of God. But would *Spinoza*, as Mr. Pope does, call God *the great directing Mind of all*, who hath intentionally created a perfect Universe †? Or would Mr. Pope, like *Spinoza*, say there is but one universal Substance in the Universe, and that blind too? We know *Spinoza* would not say the first; and we ought not to think Mr. Pope would say the latter, because he says the direct contrary throughout the Poem. Now it is *this* latter only that is *Spinozism*.

But this sublime Description of the Godhead contains not only the *Divinity* of St. Paul; but, if that will not satisfy, the *Philosophy* likewise of Sir *Isaac Newton*.

The Poet says,

All are but *Parts* of one stupendous Whole,  
Whose Body Nature is, and God the *Soul*.

The *Philosopher*, “Deus omnipræfens est, non per *Virtutem* solum,  
“sed etiam per SUBSTANTIAM: nam *Virtus* sine *Substantia* subsistere  
“non potest †.”

Mr. Pope,

That, chang'd thro' all, and yet in all the same,  
Great in the Earth as in th' *Ethereal* Frame,  
*Warm*s in the Sun, *refreshes* in the Breeze,  
*Glow*s in the Stars, and *blissoms* in the Trees,  
Lives thro' all Life, *extends thro' all Extent*,  
*Spreads undivided*, *operates unspent*.

\* For in him we live and move, and have our Being; as certain also of your own Poets have said, For we are also his Offspring, Acts xvii. 28.

† For that is the Meaning of

All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;

All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see.

‡ Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. sub finem.

Sir *Isaac Newton*—“ In ipſo continentur et moventur univerſa, ſi d*ubij*que mutua poſſion*e*. Deus nihil patitur ex corporum motibus ; illa nullam ſentiunt reſiſtentiam ex Omni-præſentia Dei.—“ *Cōſpore omni* et ſigura corporea deſtituitur\*.—*Omnia regit et omnia cognoviſcit*.—Cum unaquæque ſpatii particula ſit ſemper, et unumquodque Durationis indiviſibile momentum, *ubique*, certe rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus non erit nunquam, *niſi quomodo* †.”

Mr. *Pope*,

Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,  
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart ;  
As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,  
As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns :  
To him no high, no low, no great, no ſmall ;  
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.

Sir *Isaac Newton*—“ Annon ex Phænomenis conſtat eſſe Entem Incorporum, Viventem, Intelligentem, Omnipræſentem, qui in ſpatio infinito, tanquam ſenſorio ſuo, *Res ipſas* intime cernat, penitusque perſpiciat, *totaſque intra ſe præſens præſentes complectatur* ‡.”

But now admitting, for Argument's ſake, that there was an Ambiguity in theſe Expreſſions, ſo great, as that a *Spinoziſt* might employ them to expreſs his own particular Principles ; and ſuch a thing might well be, without any Reflection on the *Poet's* Religion, or Exa $\dot{c}$ tnefs as a Writer, becauſe it is none on the *Apoſtle's*, who actually did that which Mr. *Pope* is not only falſely, but, as we ſee from this Inſtance, fooliſhly accuſed of doing, and becauſe the *Spinoziſts*, in order to hide the Impiety of their Principle, are uſed to expreſs the *Omnipreſence* of God in Terms that any religious Theiſt might employ : In this Caſe, I ſay, how are we to judge of the *Poet's* Meaning ? Surely by the whole Tenor of his Argument.

\* Newtoni Principia Schol. gener. ſub ſinem.

† Id. ib.

‡ Opticæ Queſt. 20.

Now take the Words in the Sense of the *Spinozists*, and he is made, in the Conclusion of his Epistle, to overthrow all he has been advancing throughout the Body of it: For *Spinozism* is the Destruction of an Universe, where every thing tends, by a foreseen Contrivance in all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*. But allow him to employ the Passage in the Sense of *St. Paul*, *that we and all Creatures live, and move, and have our Being in God*, and then it will be seen to be the most logical Support of all that had preceded. For the Poet having, as we say, laboured through his Epistle, to prove that every Thing in the Universe tends, by a foreseen Contrivance, and a present Direction of all its Parts, to the Perfection of the *Whole*; it might be objected that such a Disposition of Things implying in God a painful, operose, and inconceivable Extent of Providence, it could not be supposed that such Care extended to *all*, but was confined to the more noble Parts of the Creation. This gross Conception of the *First Cause*, the Poet exposes, by shewing that God is equally and intimately present to every Particle of Matter, to every Sort of Substance, and in every Instant of Being.

And how truly, may be seen by *the Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, wrote expressly against *Spinozism*, where the excellent Author has shewn the Necessity of the *immediate Influence of God*, in every Moment of Time, to keep Matter from falling back into its primitive Nothing.

The *Examiner* goes on: "Mr. *Pope* hath Reason to call this "Whole, a *stupendous Whole*; nothing being more paradoxical and "incredible, if we take his Description literally \*." I will add, nor nothing more so than *St. Paul's*, *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*, if taken literally. I have met with one who took it so, and from thence concluded, with great Reach of Wit, *that SPACE was God*.

But Mr. *Pope* having said of God, that he,  
Breathes in our Soul, informs our mortal Part,  
As full, as perfect, in a Hair as Heart: "

\* Examen de l'Essai.

the *Commentator* remarks, that "one should make a criminal Abuse of these pompous Expressions, if once launched out, with *SPINOZA*, to confound the Substance of God with our own; and to imagine that the Substance of what we call *Creature*, is the same with that Being's, to which we give the Name of *Creator* \*." *Spinoza* is still the Burthen of the Song. To cut this Matter short, we shall therefore give *Mr. Pope's* own plain Words and Sentiments, in a Line of this very Essay, that overturn all *Spinozism* from its very Foundations: Where, speaking of what *Common Sense* taught Mankind, before *false Sense* had depraved the Understanding, he says,

THE WORKER FROM THE WORK DISTINCT WAS KNOWN,  
And simple Reason never fought but one. Ep. iii. l. 230.

But the *Commentator* is, at every Turn, crying out, *A Follower of Spinoza would express himself just so*. I believe he might; and sure *Mr. Crouzas* could not be ignorant of the Reason. It being to well known that that unhappy Man, the better to disguise his Atheism, covered it with such Expressions as kept it long concealed even from those Friends and Acquaintance with whom he most intimately corresponded. Hence it must necessarily happen, that every the best intentioned, most religious Writer will employ many Phrases, that a *Spinozist* would use, in the Explanation of his Impiety.

To persist, therefore, from henceforth, in this Accusation, will deserve a Name, which it is not my Business to bestow.

*Mr. Pope* concludes thus:

Cease then, nor Order Imperfection name:  
Our proper Bliss depends on what we blame.  
Know thy own Point: this kind, this due Degree  
Of Blindness, Weakness, Heaven bestows on thee.

\* Commentaire.

Submit.—In this, or any other Sphere,  
 Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear:  
 Safe in the Hand of one disposing Power,  
 Or in the natal, or the mortal Hour. l. 273, & seq.

“ The Heart gives itself up (says Mr. *De Craufax*) to the Magnificence of these Words.—But I ask Mr. *Pope*, with regard to such consolatory Ideas, whether he was not beholden, in some Measure, to Religion for them \* ?” This is in the true Spirit of modern Controversy.—Our Logician had taken it into his Head, that the Poet had no Religion; though he does not pretend his Proofs rise higher than to a legitimate Suspicion; and finding here a Passage that spoke plainly to the contrary, instead of retracting that rash uncharitable Opinion, he would turn this very Evidence of his own Mistake into a new Proof for the Support of it; and so insinuate, you see, that Mr. *Pope* had here contradicted himself. He then preaches, for two Pages together, on the Passage, and ends in these Words: “ From all this I conclude, that the Verses in Question are altogether edifying in the Mouth of an honest Man, but that they give Scandal and appear profane in the Mouth of an ill one †.” How exactly can *Rome* and *Geneva* jump on Occasion! So the Conclave adjudged, that those Propositions, which in the Mouth of St. *Austin* were altogether edifying, became scandalous and profane in the Mouth of *Jansenius*.

But the Examiner pursues the Poet to the very End, and cavils even at those Lines, which might have set him right in his Mistakes about the Sense of all the rest.

All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;  
 All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see;  
 All Discord, Harmony not understood;  
 All partial Evil, universal Good;  
 And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's Spite,  
 One Truth is clear, *Whatever is, is RIGHT.*

\* Commentaire, p. 124, 125.

† Ib. p. 127.

" See (fays our Examiner) Mr. *Pope's* general Conclusion, *all that is, is right*. So that at the Sight of *Charles* the First loſing his Head on the Scaffold, Mr. *Pope* muſt have ſaid, *this is right*; at the Sight too of his Judges condemning him, he muſt have ſaid, *this is right*; at the Sight of ſome of theſe Judges, taken and condemned for the Action which he had owned to be right, he muſt have cried out, *this is doubly right* \*."

How unaccountable is this Perverſeneſs! Mr. *Pope*, in this very *Poſſible*, has himſelf *thus* explained *Whatever is, is right*,

Reſpecting Man, whatever wrong we call,  
 May, muſt be right, as relative to *all*,  
 —So Man, who here ſeems Principal alone,  
 Perhaps acts Second to ſome Sphere unknown,  
 Touches ſome Wheel, or verges to ſome Goal;  
 'Tis but a Part we ſee, and not a Whole. l. 51, & ſeq.

But it is amazing that the Abſurdities ariſing from the Senſe in which the Examiner takes Mr. *Pope's* grand Principle, *Whatever is, is right*, could not ſhew him his Miſtake: For could any one in his Senſes employ a Propoſition in a Meaning from whence ſuch evident Abſurdities immediately ariſe? I had obſerved, that this Conclusion of Mr. *Pope's*, *that whatever is, is right*, is a Conſequence of his Principle, that *partial Evil tends to univerſal Good*. This ſhews us the only Senſe in which the Propoſition can be underſtood, namely, that **WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT, WITH REGARD TO THE DISPOSITION OF GOD, AND TO ITS ULTIMATE TENDENCY**. Now is this any Encouragement to Vice? Or does it take off from the Crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces Good out of Evil? Had Mr. *Pope* abruptly ſaid in his Conclusion, *the Reſult of all is, that whatever is, is right*, Mr. *De Crouſaz* had even then been inexcusable for putting ſo abſurd a Senſe upon the Words, when he might have

\* Examen de l'Eſſai.



seen that it was a *Conclusion* from the general *Principle* above-mentioned; and therefore must necessarily have another Meaning: But what must we think of him? when the Poet, to prevent Mistakes, had delivered in this very place, the *Principle* itself, together with this *Conclusion* as the Consequence of it:

All Discord, Harmony not understood;  
*All partial Evil, universal Good;*  
 And spight of Pride, in erring Reason's Spight,  
 One Truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right.*

I cannot see how he could have told his Reader plainer, that *this Conclusion* was the Consequence of *that Principle*, unless he had wrote **THEREFORE**, in great Church Letters.

Thus have I gone through what I found material in Mr. *De Croufaz's Examen and Commentary* on the *first Epistle*: I will only observe, that he has, in several Places, charged Mr. *Pope* with pretended Absurdities and Impieties, for which his *free* Translator \* is only answerable. But as he professes not to understand *English*, those Things might have been passed over, had he not had, at the same time, a very exact and excellent Translation in prose †, by which he might have discovered the Mistakes of the other. Notwithstanding that, he has chosen to follow a Version abounding in Absurdities; because it gave him frequent Opportunity to calumniate. On this account therefore, it may not be amiss to give an Instance or two of these confederate Misrepresentations, as a Specimen of this Part of the Performance, likewise.

The Translator says,

Il ne desire point cette celeste Flame,  
 Qui des purs Seraphins devore, et nourrit l'Âme ‡.

That is, the Savage does not desire that heavenly Flame, which, at the same time that it devours the Souls of pure Seraphims, nourishes them. Mr. *De Croufaz* remarks: "Mr. *Pope*, by exalting the Fire

\* Mr. *Refnel*.

† By Mr. *De Silhouette*.

‡ *Commentaire*, p. 77.

“ of his Poetry by an Antithesis, throws, occasionally, his Ridicule  
 “ on those heavenly Spirits. The *Indian*, says the Poet, contents  
 “ himself without any thing of that Flame, which devours at the  
 “ same time that it nourishes.” But Mr. *Pope* is altogether free from  
 this Imputation; nothing can be more grave or sober than his *English*  
 on this Occasion:

To *h*, contents his natural Desire;  
 He asks no Angel's Wing or Seraph's Fire. l. 105.

But neither, I dare say, did the Translator mean any Thing of  
 Ridicule in his *devoit & nourrit l'ame*. It is the sober solid Jargon  
 of the Schools; and Mr. *l'Abbé* no doubt had frequently heard it  
 from the Benches of the *Sorbonne*. Indeed had a Writer like Mr.  
*Pope* used such an Expression, one might have suspected that he  
 was not so serious as he should be.

The Poet, speaking of God's Omnipresence, says,  
 As full, as perfect, in vile Man that mourns,  
 As the rapt Seraph that adores and burns. l. 269.

Which Mr. *l'Abbé* has thus translated,  
 Dans un homme ignore sous une humble chaumiere,  
 Que dans le Seraphin, rayonnant de lumiere\*.

That is, *as well in the ignorant Man, who inhabits an humble  
 Cottage, as in the Seraphim encompassed with Rays of Light*. Our  
*Frenchman* here, in good earnest, thought, that a *vile Man that  
 mourned* could be none but some poor Inhabitant of a Country Cot-  
 tage. Which has betrayed Mr. *De Croufaz* into this important Re-  
 mark: “ For all that, we sometimes find in Persons of the lowest  
 “ Rank, a Fund of Probity and Resignation, that preserves them  
 “ from Contempt; their Minds are indeed but narrow, yet fitted  
 “ to their Station, &c.” But Mr. *Pope* had no such childish Idea  
 in his head. He was opposing here the *human Species* to the ange-

\* *Commentaire*, p. 120.

*lic*, and so spoke of *that*, when compared to *this*, as vile and disconsolate. The Force and Beauty of the Reflection depend on this Sense, and, what is more, the Propriety of it; and it is amazing that neither the *Translator* nor the *Critic* could see it. There are many Mistakes of this Nature, both of one and the other, throughout the *Translation* and the *Commentary*, which perhaps we may have occasion to take notice of as we proceed.

In a Word, if it were of such Men as our Commentator that Mr. *Pope* speaks, when he expresses his Contempt for Modern Philosophers, he might well say,

Yes, I despise the Man to Books confin'd,  
 Who from his Study rails at human Kind,  
 Though what he learns he speaks, and may advance  
 Some general Maxims, or be right by Chance.

## L E T T E R II.

**H**A RD hath been the Fate of our great Countryman, to fall into the hands of such a *Critic* and *Translator*. We have already seen how Mr. *De Croufaz* hath discharged himself. I now turn to M. *l'Abbé du Resnel*, whose Sufficiency at least equals the Malice and Calumny of the other; and is attended with just the same Issue.

I have shewn, in my first Letter, that this noble Production of human Wit and Reason is as singular for its philosophical *Exactness of Method*, as for its poetical Sublimity of Style.

Yet hear how our Translator descants upon the Matter: “The only reason for which this Poem can be properly termed an *Essay*, is, that the Author has not formed his Plan with all the Regularity of Method which it might have admitted.”—And again,—“I would not willingly have made use, in my Version, of any other Liberties than such as the Author himself must have taken, had he attempted a *French* Translation of his own Work; but I was by the unanimous Opinion of all those whom I have consulted on this Occasion, and, amongst these, of several *Englishmen*, completely skilled in both Languages, obliged to follow a different Method. The French are not satisfied with Sentiments however beautiful, unless they are methodically disposed; Method being the Characteristic that distinguishes our Performances from those of our Neighbours, and almost the only Excellence which they

“agree

“agree to allow us. That Mr. *Pope* did not think himself confined to a *regular Plan*, I have already observed. I have therefore, by a necessary Compliance with our Taste, divided it into “*Five Cantos* \*.” But the Reader will see presently, that our Translator was so far from being able to judge of Mr. *Pope's Method*, that he did not even understand either his *Subject* or his *Sense*, on which *all Method* is to be regulated.

For I now come to the Poet's *second Epistle*. He had shewn, in the *first*, that the Ways of God are too high for our Comprehension; whence he rightly concludes, that

The proper Study of *Mankind* is *Man*.

This *Conclusion*, from the Reasoning of the *first Epistle*, he methodically makes the Subject of his *Introduction* to the *second*; which treats of *Man's Nature*. But here immediately the Accusers of Providence would be apt to object, and say, “Admit that we had run into an Extreme, while we pretended to censure or penetrate the Designs of Providence, a Matter indeed too high for us; yet have you gone as far into the Opposite, while you only send us to the Knowledge of ourselves. You must mock us when you talk of this as a *Study*; for sure we are intimately acquainted with ourselves. The proper Conclusion therefore from your Demonstration of our Inability to comprehend the Ways of God, is, that we should turn ourselves to the Study of the Frame of NATURE.” Thus, I say, would they be apt to object; for there are no Sort of Men more elate with *Pride* than these *Freetinkers*; the Effects of which the Poet hath so well exposed in his *first Epistle*, especially that Kind of *Pride*, which consists in a boasted Knowledge of their own Nature. Hence we see the general Argument of the late Books against Religion turns on a supposed Inconsistency between Revelation, and what they presume to call the eternal Dictates of human Nature. The Poet therefore, to convince them

\* See English Translation of his Preface.

that this Study is less easy than they imagine, replies [from l. 2 to 19] to the *first Part* of the Objection, by describing the dark and feeble State of the *human Understanding*, with regard to the *Knowledge of ourselves*: And farther, to strengthen this Argument, he shews, in answer to the *second Part* of the Objection [from l. 18 to 31] that the highest Advances in natural Knowledge may be easily acquired, and yet we all the while continue very ignorant of ourselves. For that neither the *clearest Science*, which results from the *Newtonian Philosophy*, nor the *most sublime*, which is taught by the *Platonic*, will at all assist us in this *Self-Study*; nay, what is more, that Religion itself, when grown *Fanatical and Enthusiastic*, will be equally useless: though pure and sober Religion will best instruct us in Man's Nature, that Knowledge being essential to Religion, whose *Subject* is Man, considered in all his Relations, and consequently whose *Object* is God.

To give this *second Argument* its full Force, he illustrates it [from l. 30 to 43] by the noblest Example that ever was in Science, the incomparable NEWTON, whom he makes so superior to *Humanity*, as to represent the *Angelic Beings* in doubt, when they observed him of late unfold all the Law of Nature, whether he was not to be reckon'd in their Number; just as Men, when they see the surprizing Marks of Reason in an *Ape*, are almost tempted to think him of their own Species. Yet this *wondrous Creature*, who saw so far into the Works of *Nature*, could go no farther in *human Knowledge*, than the Generality of his Kind. For which the Poet assigns this very just and adequate Cause: In all other Sciences, the Understanding is unchecked and uncontrouled by any opposite Principle; but in *the Science of Man*, the *Passions* overturn, as fast as *Reason* can build up.

Alas, what Wonder! Man's superior Part  
 Uncheck'd may rise, and climb from Art to Art;  
 But when his own great Work is but begun,  
 What Reason weaves, by Passion is undone.

This

This is a brief Account of the Poet's fine Reasoning in his Introduction. The Whole of which his poetical Translator has so miserably mistaken, that, of one of the most strong and best connected Arguments, he has rendered it the most obscure and inconsistent, which even the officious *Commentator* could scarce make worse by his important and candid Remarks. Thus beautifully does Mr. *Pope* describe Man's Weakness and Blindness, with regard to his own Nature :

—Plac'd on this Isthmus of a middle State,  
 A Being darkly wise, and rudely great ;  
 With too much Knowledge for the Sceptic Side,  
 With too much Weakness for the Stoic's Pride,  
 He hangs between ; in doubt to act, or rest ;  
 In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast ;  
 In doubt, his Mind, or Body to prefer,  
 Born but to die, and reasoning but to err.

And as he hath given this Description of Man, for the very contrary Purpose to which *Sceptics* are wont to employ such Kind of Paintings, namely, not to deter Men from the *Search*, but to excite them to the *Discovery* of *Truth* ; he hath, with great Judgment, represented Man as doubting and wavering between the *right* and *wrong* Object ; from which State there are great *Hopes* he may be relieved by a careful and circumspect Use of Reason. On the contrary, had he supposed Man so blind as to be busied in chusing, or doubtful in his Choice, between two Objects *equally wrong*, the Case had appeared desperate ; and all *Study* of Man had been effectually *discouraged*. But his Translator not seeing into the Force and Beauty of this Conduct, hath run into the very Absurdity I have here shewn Mr. *Pope* hath so artfully avoided.

The Poet says,

Man hangs between ; in doubt to Act, or Rest.

Now he tells us 'tis Man's Duty to *Act*, not to *Rest*, as the

St. L's thought; and to their Principle this latter Word alludes, he having just before mentioned that *Scél*\*, whose Virtue, as he says, is

— fix'd as in a Frost;

Contracted all, retiring to the Breast:

But Strength of Mind is EXERCISE, not Rest. l. 92, & seq.

But the Translator is not for mincing Matters.

Seroit-il en naissant au travail condamné ?

Aux douceurs du repos seroit-il destiné !

According to him, Man doubts whether he be condemned to a *stagnant* *T* and Labour, or destined to the *Luxury of Repose*; neither of which is the Condition whereto Providence designed him. This therefore contradicts the Poet's whole Purpose, which is to recommend the Study of Man, on a Supposition that it will enable him to determine *rightly* in his *Doubts* between the *true* and *false* Object. 'Tis on this Account he says,

Alike in Ignorance, his Reason such,

Whether he thinks too *little*, or too *much*;

Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd,

Still by *himself abus'd*, or *disabus'd*.

*I. e.* the proper Sphere of his Reason is so narrow, and the Exercise of it so nice, that the too immoderate Use of it is attended with the same Ignorance that proceeds from the not using it at all. Yet, though in both these Cases, he is *abus'd by himself*, he has it still in his own Power to *disabuse himself*, in making his *Passions* subservient to the *Means*, and regulating his *Reason* by the *End of Life*. Mr. De *Croymaz* himself had some Glimmering of the Absurdity of those two Lines of the Translator: And because he shall not say, I allow him to have said nothing reasonable throughout his whole *Commentary*, I will here transcribe his very Words:

\* With too much Weakness for the *Stoic's* Pride.



“ Ce qui fait encore, que les Antitheses frappent au lieu d'instruire,  
 “ c'est qu'elles sont outrées. *L'Homme n'ait-il condamné au travail?*  
 “ *Doit-il se permettre la mollesse et le repos?* Quel sujet de decou-  
 “ ragement ou de trouble, si l'on n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux  
 “ partis si contraires? Mais nous ne naissons ni destinés à un  
 “ repos oisif, ni condamnés à un travail accablant et inhumain.”  
 p. 138.

Again, Mr. Pope,

In doubt to deem himself a *God*, or *Beast*.

*i. e.* He doubts, as appears from the Line immediately following this \*, whether his Soul be *Mortal* or *Immortal*; one of which is the Truth, namely, its Immortality, as the Poet himself teaches, when he speaks of the Omnipresence of God :

Breathes in our *Soul*, informs our *mortal* Part. 1 Ep. 1. 267.

The Translator, as we say, unconscious of the Poet's Purpose, rambles, as before :

Tantôt de son esprit admirant l'Excellence,  
 Il pense qu'il est Dieu, qu'il en a la puissance ;  
 Et tantôt gemissant des besoins de son Corps,  
 Il croit que de la brute, il n'a que les ressorts.

Here his Head (turned to a sceptical View) was running on the different Extravagances of *Plato* in his *Divinity*, and of *Des Cartes* in his *Philosophy*. Sometimes, says he, Man thinks himself a *real God*, and sometimes again a *meer Machine*; Things quite out of Mr. *Pope's* Thoughts in this Place.

Again, the Poet, in a beautiful Allusion to the Sentiments and Words of *Scripture*, breaks out into this just and moral Reflection upon *Man's* Condition here,

Born but to die, and reasoning but to err.

\* In doubt his *Mind* or *Body* to prefer.

The Translator turns this fine and sober Thought into the most outrageous Scepticism;

Ce n'est que pour mourir, qu'il est né, qu'il respire,  
Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire :

and so makes his Author directly contradict himself, where he says of Man, that he hath

—too much Knowledge for the Sceptic Side.

Strange! that the Translator could not see his Author's Meaning was, that, as we are *born to die* and yet enjoy some small Portion of Life; so, though we *reason to err*, yet we comprehend some few Truths. Strange! that he could not see the Difference between that weak State of Reason, in which Error mixes itself with all its true Conclusions concerning Man's Nature; and an *abstract Quality*, which we vainly call Reason, but which, he tells us, is indeed scarce any thing else but Madness. One would think he paid little Attention to the concluding Words of this sublime Description, where the Poet tells us, Man was

Created *half to rise*, and half to fall;  
Great Lord of all Things, yet a Prey to all;  
Sole Judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd:  
The Glory, Jest, and Riddle of the World.

Indeed he paid so much, as to contrive how he might pervert them to a Sense consistent with his

Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire :

Which he does in these Words:

Tantôt feu, tantôt sage, il change A CHAQUE INSTANT.

This is indeed making a *Madman* of this *sole Judge of Truth*, to all Intents and Purposes. But Mr. *Pope* says nothing of his *changing every Moment from Sage to Fool*; he only says, that Folly and Wisdom are the inseparate Partage of *Humanity*: Which is quite another Thing.

But

But *Mistakes*, like *Misfortunes*, seldom come single; and the reason is the same, in both cases, because they influence one another. For the Translator, having mistaken both the *Nature* and *End* of the Description of the Weakness of human Nature, imagined the Poet's *second* Argument for the Difficulty of the *Study of Man*, which shews, that the *clearest* and *sublimest* Science is no Assistance to it, nor even Religion itself, when grown *Fanatical* and *Enthusiastic*; he imagined, I say, that this fine Argument was an *Illustration* only of the foregoing Description, in which Illustration, Instances were given of the several *Extravagances in false Science*; whereas the Poet's Design was, just the contrary, to shew the prodigious Vigour of the human Mind, in Studies which do not relate to itself; and yet that all its Force, together with those Effects of it, avail little in this Inquiry.

But there was another Cause of the *Translator's* Error; he had mistaken, as we say, the Poet's *first* Argument for a Description of the Weakness of the human Mind with regard to *all Truth*; whereas it is only such with regard to the *Knowledge of Man's Nature*. This led him, as it would seem, to conclude, that, if Mr. *Pope* were to be understood as speaking *here* in his *second* Argument, of real and great Progress in *Science*, it would *contradict* what had been said in the Description; and therefore, out of Tenderness to his Author, he turns it all to imaginary *Hypotheses*.

Let us take the whole Context.

### I.

Go, wondrous Creature! mount where Science guides,  
Go measure Earth, weigh Air, and state the Tides;  
Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets stray,  
Correct old Time, and teach the Sun his Way.

### II.

Go soar, with *Plato*, to th' Empyreal Sphere,  
To the first Good, first Perfect, and first Fair;

### III.

## III.

Or tread the mazy Round his Followers trod,  
 And quitting Sense call imitating God.  
 Go teach eternal Wisdom how to rule,  
 Then drop into thyself, and be a Fool.

Mr. *Pope*, says, *Go, wondrous Creature*; and he never speaks at random. The Reason of his giving Man this Epithet is, because, though he be, as the Poet says, in another Place \*, *little less than Angel* in his Faculties of Science, yet is he miserably blind in the Knowledge of himself. But the *Translator* not apprehending the Poet's Thought, imagined it was said ironically, and so translates it;

Va, sublime Mortel, fier de ton Excellence,  
 Ne crois rien d'impossible à ton Intelligence.

Mr. *Pope*—

—Mount where Science guides,  
 Go measure Earth, weigh Air, and state the Tides;  
 Shew by what Laws the wand'ring Planets stray;  
 Correct old Time, and teach the Sun his Way.

This is a *Description* of the *real* Advances in Science, such as the *Newtonian*. And the very Introduction to it,—*Mount where Science guides*, shews it to be so.

But the *Translator*, carried away with the Fancy of its being an *Illustration* of the foregoing Description, turns the Whole to *vain, false, imaginary* Science, such as that of *Des Cartes*:

Le Compas à la main, mesure l'univers;  
 Règle à ton gré le flux et le reflux des mers;  
 Fixe le poids de l'air, et commande aux planetes;  
 Détermine le cours de leurs marches secrètes;

\* Ep. i. l. 166.

Soumets à ton calcul l'Obscurité des tems,  
Et de l'Astre du jour conduis les mouvemens.

Here, in order to add the greater ridicule to his false Sense, he introduces the Philosopher, *with Compass in hand, measuring the Universe*, mimicking the Office of God in the Act of Creation, as he is represented by the Ancients, who used to say, 'Ο Θεός γεωμετρεῖ. Whereas Mr. Pope's Words are,

*Go measure Earth—*

Alluding to the noble and useful Project of the modern Mathematicians to measure a Degree at the Equator and the polar Circle, in order to determine the true Figure of the Earth, of great Importance to Astronomy and Navigation.

*Regulate*, says he, *according to your own Will, the Flux and Reflux of the Sea*; and this, *Des Cartes* presumed to do: But it was *Newton* that *stated the Tides*. It is the pretended Philosopher that *fixes the Weight of the Air*; but the real Philosopher that *weighs Air*. It was *Des Cartes* that *commanded the Planets, and determined them to roll according to his own good Pleasure*; but it was *Newton* who

*Shew'd by what Laws the wand'ring Planets stray.*

*Submit*, says the Translator, *the Obscurity of Time to your Calculation*.—The Poet says,

*Correct old Time.*

He is here still speaking of *Newton*. *Correct old Time* alludes to that great Man's *Grecian Chronology*, which he reformed on those two sublime Conceptions, the *Difference between the Reigns of Kings, and the Generations of Men*, and the *Positions of the Colures of the Equinox and Solstices, at the time of the Argonautic Expedition*.

And when the Translator comes to the *third Instance*, which is that of *false Religion*, he introduceth it thus,

Et joignant la folie à la temerité.

Which shews how ill he understood Mr. *Pope's* Instances of the *Natural Philosophy* of *Newton*, and the *Metaphysical Philosophy* of *Plato*. And yet all the Justness, the Force, and Sublimity of the Poet's Reasoning consist in a right Apprehension of them.

Mr. *Pope*—

Go teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule,  
Then drop into thyself, and be a Fool.

These *two* Lines have only contributed to keep the Translator in his Error; for he took the *first* of them to be a *Recapitulation* of all that had been said from l. 18. Whereas *both* of them together, are a *Conclusion* from it, to this Effect: "Go now, vain Man, elated with thy Acquirements in *real* Science and *imaginary* Intimacy with God; Go and run into all the Extravagances I have exploded in the first Epistle, *where* thou pretendedst to teach Providence how to govern; then drop into the Obscurities of thy own Nature, and thereby manifest thy Ignorance and Folly."

Mr. *Pope* then confirms and illustrates this Reasoning by one of the greatest Examples that ever was:

Superior Beings, when of late they saw  
A mortal Man unfold all Nature's Law,  
Admir'd such Wisdom in an earthly Shape,  
And shew'd a NEWTON, as we shew an Ape.

In these Lines he speaks to this Effect.—"But to make you fully sensible of the Difficulty of this Study, I shall instance in the great *Newton* himself; whom when superior Beings, not long since, saw capable of unfolding the whole Law of Nature, they were in doubt whether the Owner of such prodigious Science should not be reckoned of their own Order; just as Men, when they see the surprising Marks of Reason in an Ape, are almost tempted to rank him with their own Kind. And yet this wondrous Man could go no farther in the Knowledge of his own Nature, than the Generality of his Species."

Thus

Thus stands the Argument, in which the Poet has paid a higher Compliment to the great *Newton*, as well as a more ingenious, than was ever yet paid him by any of his most zealous Followers: Yet the Translator, now quite in the dark, by Mistake upon Mistake, imagined his Design was to depreciate *Newton's* Knowledge, and to humble the Pride of his Followers: Which hath made him play at cros Purposes with his Original:

Des celestes Esprits la vive Intelligence  
 Regarde avec pitie notre faible Science;  
*Newton*, le grand *Newton*, que nos admirons tous,  
 Est peut-etre pour eux, ce qu'un Singe est pour nous.

“The heavenly Spirits, whose Understanding is so far superior to ours, look down with Pity on the Weakness of human Science; *Newton*, the great *Newton*, whom we so much admire, is perhaps in no higher Esteem with them, than an Ape is with us.”

But it is not their *Pity*, but their *Admiration*, that is the Subject in Question: And it was for no slight Cause they admired; it was to see a mortal Man unfold the whole Law of Nature: which, by the way, might have shewn the Translator, that the Poet was speaking of *real* Science in the foregoing Paragraph. Nor was it Mr. *Pope's* Intention to bring any of the Ape's *Qualities*, but its *Sagacity*, into the Comparison. But why the *Ape's*, it may be said, rather than the Sagacity of some more decent Animal; particularly the *half-reasoning Elephant*, as the Poet calls it, which, as well on Account of this its Superiority, as for its having no ridiculous Side, like the *Ape*, on which it could be viewed, seems better to have deserved this Honour? I reply, Because as none but a Shape resembling human, accompanied with great Sagacity, could occasion the Doubt of that Animal's relation to Man, the Ape only having that Resemblance, no other Animal was fitted for the Comparison. And on this Ground of Relation the whole Beauty of the Thought depends; *Newton*, and those superior Beings being

equally immortal Spirits, though of different Orders. And here let me take notice of a new Species of the *Sublime*, of which our Poet may be justly said to be the Maker; so new that we have yet no Name for it, though of a Nature distinct from every other poetical Excellence. The two great Perfections of Works of Genius are *Wit* and *Sublimity*. Many Writers have been *witty*, several have been *sublime*, and some few have even possessed both these Qualities *separately*. But none that I know of, besides our Poet, hath had the Art to *incorporate* them. Of which he hath given many Examples, both in this Essay, and in his other Poems. One of the noblest being the Passage in Question. This seems to be the last Effort of the Imagination, to poetical Perfection. And in this compounded Excellence the Wit receives a *Dignity* from the Sublime, and the Sublime a *Splendour* from the Wit; which, in their State of separate Existence, they both wanted.

To return, This Mistake seems to have led both the *Translator* and *Commentator* into a much worse; into a strange Imagination that Mr. *Pope* had here reflected upon Sir *Isaac Newton's* moral Character; which the Poet was as far from doing, as the Philosopher was from deserv'g: For,

After Mr. *Pope* had shewn, by this illustrious Instance, that a great Genius might make prodigious Advances in the Knowledge of *Nature*, and at the same time remain very ignorant of *himself*; he gives a Reason for it:—In all other Sciences the Understanding has no opposite Principle to cloud and bias it; but in the Knowledge of Man, the *Passions* obscure as fast as *Reason* can clear up.

Could he, whose *Rules the rapid Comet bind,*  
Describe, or fix, one Movement of the Mind?  
Who saw those Fires *here rise, and there descend*\*,  
Explain his own Beginning, or his End?

Alas,

\* Sir *Isaac Newton* in calculating the *Velocity* of a *Comet's* Motion, and the Course it describes, when it becomes visible in its Descent to, and Ascent from the Sun, conjectured,



Alas, what Wonder! Man's superior Part  
 Uncheck'd may rise, and climb from Art to Art;  
 But when his Own great Work is but begun,  
 What Reason weaves, by Passion is undone.

Here we see, at the fifth Line, the Poet turns from *Newton*, and speaks of *Man* and his *Nature* in general. But the *Translator* applies all that follows to that Philosopher :

Toi qui jusques aux cieux oses porter ta vue,  
 Qui crois en concevoir et l'ordre et l'étendue,  
 Toi qui veux dans leur cours, leur prescrire la loi,  
 Sçais-tu regler ton cœur, sçais-tu regner sur toi ?  
 Ton esprit qui sur tout vainement se fatigue,  
 Avide de sçavoir, ne connoit point de digue ;  
 De quoi par ses travaux s'est-il rendu certain ?  
 Peut-il te decouvrir ton principe et ta fin ?

On which the *Commentator* thus candidly remarks ; “ It is not to be disputed, but that whatever Progress a great Genius hath made in Science, he deserves rather Censure than Applause, if he has spent that Time in barren Speculations, curious indeed, but of little Use, which he should have employ'd to know himself, *his Beginning and his End*, and how to regulate his Conduct ; and if, instead of that Candour and Humanity, and Desire to oblige, Virtues so becoming our Nature, he be over-run with Ambition, Envy, and a Rage of Preheminence, whose Violence and Rancour are attended with the most scandalous Effects, of which there are too many Instances ; *Vices which Mr. Newton lived and died an entire Stranger to* \*.”

jectured, with the highest Appearance of Truth, that they revolve perpetually round the Sun, in *Ellipses* vastly excentrical, and very nearly approaching to *Parabolas*. In which he was greatly confirmed, in observing between two Comets a Coincidence in their *Perihelions*, and a perfect Agreement in their Velocities.

\* Commentaire, p. 147,

I have transcribed this Passage to expose the malignant Motives the *Commentator* appears to have had in writing against the *Essay on Man*. As to the *Translator*, it would be indeed harder to know what Motives he could have in translating it, for it is plain he did not understand it. Yet this is he who tells us, that *the Author of the Essay has not formed his Plan with all the Regularity of Method which it might have admitted; that he was obliged to follow a different Method; for that the French are not satisfied with Sentiments however beautiful, unless they be methodically disposed, Method being the Characteristic that distinguishes their Performances from those of their Neighbours.*

Thus neither did the *Critic*, nor *Translator*, suspect (and never were poor Men so miserably bit) that

'Those oft' are Stratagems which Errors seem,  
Nor is it *Homer* nods, but we that dream.

The poetical Translator could not imagine so great a Poet would pique himself upon close Reasoning; and the fastidious Philosopher, of course, concluded, that a Man of so much Wit could hardly reason well; so neither of them gave a proper Attention to the Poet's System. A System logically close, though wrote in Verse, and complete, though studiously concise: This second Epistle particularly (the Subject of the present Letter) containing the truest, clearest, shortest, and consequently the best Account of the Origin, Use, and End of the Passions, that is, in my Opinion, any where to be met with. Which I now proceed to consider, in the same strict Manner I have scrutinized the *Introduction*. For our Poet's Works want nothing but to be fairly examined by the severest Rules of Logic and good Philosophy, to become as illustrious for their Sense, as they have long been for their Wit and Poetry.

I go on therefore to the Body of the Discourse; which, as plain as it is, I find Mr. *De Crousus* has made a Shift (though extremely free with his Insinuations of Irreligion and *Spinozism*) to mistake  
from

from End to End. So true is the old Saying, *Homine imperito nihil est iniquius.*

The Poet having thus shewn the Difficulty attending the *Study of Man*, proceeds to our Assistance in laying before us the *Elements* or true *Principle* of this *Science*, in an Account of the Origin, Use, and End, of the Passions. He begins [from l. 42 to 49] with pointing out the *two* grand *Principles* in human Nature, SELF-LOVE and REASON. Describes their *general* Nature: The first *sets* Man upon acting, the other *regulates his Action*. However, these Principles are *natural*, not *moral*: And, therefore, *in themselves*, neither *good* nor *bad*; but *so*, only as they are *directed*.

Nor this a *good*, nor that a *bad* we call,  
Each works its End, to move or govern all;  
And to their *proper* Operation still-  
Ascribe all *Good*, to their *improper* Ill.

This Observation is made with great Judgment, in Opposition to the desperate Folly of those *Fanatics*, who, as the *Ascetic*, pretend to eradicate *Self-Love*; as the *Mystic*, would stifle *Reason*; and *both*, on the absurd Fancy of their being *moral*, not *natural* Principles.

The Poet proceeds [from l. 48 to 57] more *minutely* to mark out the distinct Offices of these *two Principles*, which he had before assigned only in *general*; and here he shews their *Necessity*; for without *Self-Love*, as the *Spring*, Man would be *unactive*, and without Reason, as the *Balance*, active to *no Purpose*.

Fixt like a Plant on his peculiar Spot,  
To draw Nutrition, propagate, and rot:  
Or, Meteor-like, flame lawless through the Void;  
Destroying others, by himself destroy'd.

Having thus explained the *Ends* and *Offices* of each Principle, he goes on [from l. 56 to 69] to speak of their *Qualities*: And shews how they are fitted to discharge those Functions, and answer their respective

respective *Intentions*. The Business of *Self-Love* being to excite to Action, it is quick and impetuous; and moving instinctively, has, like *Attraction*, its Force prodigiously increased as the Object approaches, and proportionably lessened as that recedes. On the contrary, *Reason*, like the *Author of Attraction*, is always calm and sedate, and equally preserves itself, whether the Object be near, or far off. Hence the *moving* Principle is made more *strong*; though the *restraining* be more *quick-fighted*. The Consequence he draws from this is, that, if we would not be carried away to our Destruction, we must always keep Reason upon Guard.

But it would be objected, that if this Account be true, human Life would be *most* miserable, and, even in the wisest, a perpetual Conflict between *Reason* and the *Passions*. To this therefore the Poet replies [from l. 68 to 71.] *First*, that Providence has so graciously contrived, that even in the voluntary Exercise of *Reason*, as in the mere mechanic Motion of a Limb, *Habit* makes that, which was at first done with Pain, easy and natural. And, *secondly*, that the *Experience* gained by the long Exercise of *Reason* goes a great Way towards *cluding* the Force of *Self-love*. Now, the *attending to Reason*, as here recommended, will gain us this *Habit* and *Experience*.

*Attention, Habit and Experience gains;  
Each strengthens Reason, and Self-love restrains.*

Hence it appears, that this Station in which Reason is to be kept constantly upon Guard, is not so uneasy a one as may be at first imagined.

From this Description of *Self-love* and *Reason* it follows, as the Poet observes [from l. 70 to 83] that both conspire to one *End*, namely, *human Happiness*, though they be not equally expert in the Choice of the Means; the Difference being this, that the *first* hastily seizes every thing which has the *Appearance* of Good; the *other* weighs and examines whether it *be indeed* what it appears.

This

This shews, as he next observes, the Folly of the *Schoolmen*, who consider them as two *opposite* Principles, the one *Good*, and the other *Ill*: The Observation is seasonable and judicious; for this dangerous *School-Opinion* gives great Support to the *Manichean* or *Zoroastrian* Error, the Confutation of which was one of the Author's chief Ends of Writing. For if there be two Principles in Man, a *good* and *bad*, it is natural to think him the joint Product of the two *Manichean* Deities (the first of which contributed to his *Reason*, the other to his *Passions*) rather than the Creature of *one individual Cause*. This was *Plutarch's* Notion, and, as we may see in him, of the more ancient *Manicheans*. It was of Importance therefore to reprobate and subvert a Notion that served to the Support of so dangerous an Error. And this the Poet has done with more Force and Clearness than is often to be found in whole Volumes wrote against that heretical Opinion:

Let subtle Schoolmen teach these Friends to fight,  
 More studious to *divide*, than to unite;  
 And Grace and Virtue, Sense and Reason split,  
 With all the rash Dexterity of Wit.

But the *French* Translator has mistaken these Lines for a Reflection, not on the *Theology*, as Mr. *Pope* intended them, but on the *Logic* of the *Schools*, with which the Poet had here nothing to do. This, it is true, delights in *Distinctions* without *Difference*, which is indeed a Fault, but not of so high Malignity as the other: *that*, which the Poet censures, leading directly into Error; *this*, which his Translator reproveth, only hindering our Progress in Truth or Science.

Qu'un Scholastique vain cherchant à *discourir*  
 Cache la *Verité* loin de la découvrir,  
 Que, par un long tissu d'*Argumens inutiles*,  
 Par des tours ambigus, par des raisons *inutiles*,  
 Voulant tout *diviser* jusques à l'*infini*,  
 Il separe avec art ce qui doit être uni.

Now, though this Fault in the *Logic of the Schools* be univerſally owned and condemned by all *out of them*, and by no one more than by Mr. *De Creuzer* himſelf, in his Books of *Logic*, yet in pure Contradiction to Mr. *Pope*, who, as he thought, had condemned it, he could not forbear ſaying, *A Poet may happen to write with more Elegance than a Schoolman, and yet for all that not be able to expreſs himſelf with more Juſtneſs and Preciſion* \*.

The Poet having given this Account of the Nature of *Self-love* in general, comes now to *anatomize* it, in a Diſcourſe of the *PASSIONS*, which he aptly names the *Modes of Self-love*; the Object of all theſe, he ſhews [from l. 82 to 91] is *Good*; and when under the Guidance of Reaſon, *real Good*; either of our own, or of another; for ſome *Goods* not being capable of Diviſion or Communication, and *Reaſon*, at the ſame time, directing us to provide for ourſelves, we therefore, in purſuit of theſe Objects, ſometimes aim at *our own Good*, ſometimes at the Good of *others*; when fairly aiming at our own, the *Paſſion* is called *Prudence*, when at another's, *Virtue*.

Hence (as he ſhews from l. 90 to 95) appears the Folly of the *Stoics*, who would *eradicate* the Paſſions, Things ſo neceſſary both to the Good of the *Individual*, and of the *Kind*. Which prepoſterous Method of promoting Virtue, he therefore very reaſonably reproveth. But as it was from Obſervation of the Evils occaſioned by the Paſſions, that the *Stoics* thus extravagantly projected their Extirpation, the Poet recurs [from l. 94 to 101] to his grand Principle, ſo often before, and to ſo good Purpose, inſiſted on, that

— *partial Ill is univerſal Good* :

and ſhews, that, though the Tempeſt of the Paſſions, like that of the Air, may tear and ravage ſome few Parts of Nature in its Paſſage, yet the ſalutary Agitation produced by it preſerves the whole in Life and Vigour. This is his *fiſt* Argument againſt the *Stoics*, which he illuſtrates by a very beautiful Similitude, on a Hint taken from Scripture Story † :

\* Commentaire, p. 152.

† 1 Kings xix. 11, 12.

Nor God alone in the *still Calm* we find,  
He mounts the *Storm*, and walks upon the Wind.

But the Translator, not taking this Allusion, has turn'd it thus :

Dieu lui-même, Dieu fort de *fin profond repos*.

And so has made an *Epicurean* God of the Governour of the Universe, of whom Scripture afforded Mr. *Pope* this grand and sublime Idea. Mr. *De Crousars* does not spare this Expression of *God's coming out of his profound Repose*.—*It is* (says he) *excessively poetical, and presents us with Ideas which we ought not to dwell upon*. But when he goes on—*(there is nothing in God's directing the Storm which can authorise the Passions that disturb our Happiness\*)*, he talks very impertinently. Mr. *Pope* is not here arguing from *Analogy*, that as God raises and heightens the *Storm*, so should we raise and heighten the *Passions*. The Words are only a simple Affirmation in the poetic Dress of a Similitude, to this Purpose.—“ Good is not only “ produced by the Subdual of the Passions, but by the turbulent “ Exercise of them :”

Nor *God* alone in the *still Calm* we find,  
He mounts the *Storm*, and walks upon the Wind.

A Truth conveyed under the most sublime Imagery that Poetry could conceive or paint. For he is here only shewing the providential Effects of the Passions, and how, by *God's* gracious Disposition, they are turned away from their natural Biass, to promote the Happiness of Mankind. As to the Method in which they are to be treated by *Man*, in whom they are found, all that he contends for, in favour of them, is only this, that they should not be quite rooted up and destroyed, as the *Stoics*, and their Followers in all Religions, foolishly attempted. For the rest, he constantly repeats this Advice :

The Action of the *Stronger* to suspend,  
REASON still use, to REASON still attend.

\* Commentaire, p. 158.

His *second* Argument against the *Stoics* [from l. 100 to 113] is, that *Passions* go to the Composition of a *moral Character*, just as *Elementary Particles* go to the Composition of an *organized Body*: Therefore, for Man to go about to destroy what composes his very Being, is the Height of Extravagance: It is true, he tells us that these *Passions* which in their natural State, like *Elements*, are in perpetual Jar, must be tempered, softened, and united, in order to perfect the Work of the *great plastic Artist*; who, in this Office, employs human *Reason*: Whose Business it is to follow the *Road of Nature*, and to observe the *Dictates of the Deity*. *Follow her and God*. The Use and Importance of this Precept is evident: For in doing the *first*, she will discover the Absurdity of attempting to eradicate the *Passions*; in doing the *second*, she will learn how to make them subservient to the Interest of *Virtue*:

Suffice that Reason keep to *Nature's* Road,  
 Subject, compound them, follow *her* and *God*.  
 Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling Train,  
 Hate, Fear, and Grief, the Family of Pain,  
 These mixt with Art, and to due Bounds confin'd,  
 Make and maintain the Balance of the Mind.

His *third* Argument against the *Stoics* [from l. 112 to 117] is, that the *Passions* occasion in us a perpetual Excitement to the Pursuit of *Happiness*; which without these powerful Inciters we should neglect, in an insensible Indolence. Now *Happiness* is the *End* of our Creation; and this *Excitement* the *Means of Happiness*: Therefore these Movers, the *Passions*, are the Instruments of God, which he has put into the Hands of Reason, to work withal:

Pleasures are ever in our Hands or Eyes,  
 And when in Act they cease, in Prospect rise;  
 Present to grasp, and future still to find,  
 The whole Employ of Body and of Mind.



The Poet then proceeds in his Subject; and this last Observation leads him naturally to the Discussion of his next Principle. He shews then, that though all the *Passions* have their Turn in swaying the Determinations of the Mind, yet every Man has one MASTER PASSION that at length stifles or absorbs all the rest. The *Fact* he illustrates at large, in the *first Epistle of his second Book*. Here [from l. 116 to 132] he gives us the *Cause* of it: "Those Pleasures or Goods, which are the Objects of the Passions, affect the Mind, by striking on the Senses; but, as through the Formation of the Organs of the human Frame, every Man has some Sense stronger and more acute than others, the Object, which strikes that stronger or acuter Sense, whatever it be, will be the Object most desired; and, consequently, the Pursuit of that will be the *ruling Passion*:"

All spread their Charms, but charm not all alike,  
 On different Senses different Objects strike;  
 Hence different Passions more or less inflame,  
 As strong, or weak, the Organs of the Frame;  
 And hence one *Master Passion* in the Breast,  
 Like *Aaron's Serpent*, swallows all the rest.

—that the Difference of Force in this *ruling Passion* shall at first, perhaps, be very small or even imperceptible; but *Nature, Habit, Imagination, Wit*, nay even *Reason* itself, shall assist its Growth, till it hath at length drawn and converted every other into itself.

All this is delivered in a Strain of Poetry so wonderfully sublime, as suspends for a while the *ruling Passion* in every Reader, and ingrosses his whole Admiration:

As Man, perhaps, the Moment of his Breath  
 Receives the lurking Principle of Death;  
 The young Disease, that must subdue at length,  
 Grows with his Growth, and strengthens with his Strength:  
 So, cast and mingled with his very Frame,  
 The Mind's Disease, its RULING PASSION came:

Each.

Each vital Humour which should feed the whole,  
 Soon flows to this, in Body and in Soul ;  
 Whatever warms the Heart, or fills the Head,  
 As the Mind opens, and its Functions spread,  
 Imagination plies her dangerous Art,  
 And pours it all upon the peccant Part.  
 Nature its Mother, Habit is its Nurse ;  
 Wit, Spirit, Faculties, but make it worse ;  
*Reason itself but gives its Edge and Power,*  
 As Heaven's blest Beam turns Vinegar more four\*.

This naturally leads the Poet to lament the *Weakness and Insufficiency of hum in Reason* [from l. 138 to 151]; and the honest Purpose he had in so doing was, plainly to intimate the Necessity of a more sublime Dispensation to Mankind :

We, wretched Subjects, though to lawful Sway,  
 In this weak Queen some Fav'rite still obey.  
 Ah! if she lend not *Arms* as well as Rules,  
 What can she more than tell us we are Fools ?  
 Teach us to mourn our Nature, not to mend,  
 A sharp Accuser, but a helpless Friend !

St. *Paul* himself did not chuse to employ other Arguments, when disposed to give us the highest Idea of the Usefulness of *Christianity* †. But, it may be, the Poet finds a Remedy in *natural Religion*: Far from it. He here leaves Reason unrelieved. What

\* The Poet, in some other of his *Epistles*, gives Examples of the Doctrine and Precepts here delivered. Thus, in that of the Use of Riches, he has illustrated this Truth in the Character of *Cotta* :

Old *Cotta* shun'd his Fortune and his Birth,  
*Yet was not Cotta void of Wit or Worth,*  
 What though (the Use of bar'rous Spits forgot)  
 His Kitchen vied in Coolness with his Grot ?  
 If *Cotta* liv'd on Pullie, it was no more  
*Than Bramis, Saints, and Sages, did before.*

† See his Epistle to the Romans, c. vii.

is this then but an Intimation that we ought to seek for a Cure in that Religion which only dares profess to give it ?

But Mr. *De Croufæz* says, the Poet, in this Representation of human Reason, has contradicted what he said of it in the 80th and 98th Lines of this Epistle. And, possessed with this Notion, he goes on, in his declamatory Way, so unworthy a grave Logician : *Does Mr. Pope take a Pleasure in blowing hot and cold, in giving us successively the Sweet and Bitter, to reduce us to such a State that we may not know what to stick to ? If there be no ill Design at Bottom in these Contradictions, but that they only spring from the imprudent Custom, established in the Schools, of talking Pro and Con\*, &c.* And then tells an idle common-place Story of Cardinal Perron. In the mean time it happens that this is no Contradiction at all, or, if it be, it is that very Contradiction into which St. Paul likewise fell, when he so continually recommended the Use of Reason, and yet so energetically described its Imbecillity and Impotence. But as our Logician said before, on a like Occasion, *this might be edifying in a good Man, yet give Scandal in an ill one.*

To proceed, as it appears from the Account here given of the ruling Passion, and its Cause, which results from the Structure of the Organs, that it is the *Road of Nature*, the Poet shews [from l. 150 to 157] that this Road is to be followed. So that the Office of Reason is not to direct us what Passion to exercise, but to assist us in RECTIFYING, and keeping within due Bounds, that which Nature hath so strongly impressed ; for that

A mightier Power the strong Direction sends,  
And several Men impels to several Ends.

Here Mr. *De Croufæz* pours out the full Stream of his Candour and Politeness, in his Criticism on these Lines :

Yet Nature's Road must ever be preferr'd ;  
Reason is here no Guide, but still a Guard ;

\* Commentaire, p. 166.

'Tis her's to RECTIFY, not overthrow,  
And treat *this Passion* more as Friend than Foe.

*The only Refuge I have here left (says he) is to suppose that Mr. Pope thought the very Mention of this Nation would be sufficient to expose the Absurdity and Horror of it, and of those who regulate their Conduct on such unwarrantable and shocking Ideas. And I conceive I should do M. l'Abbé de Sep-Fontaines much Injustice, if I did not believe this was his intention in translating this Passage. But, to have a more perfect Idea of the Ridicule and Horror of it, let us put the Words into the Mouth of a Confessor \*, &c. And so he goes gayly on †, to represent a ghostly Father encouraging his Penitents in their several Vices on Mr. Pope's pretended Principles. But we shall spoil his Mirth, by only assuring him, that the Poet's Precept can have no other Meaning than this, "That as the ruling Passion is implanted by Nature, it is Reason's Office to regulate, direct, and restrain, but not to overthrow it. To regulate the Passion of Avarice, for instance, into a parsimonious Dispensation of the public Revenues; to direct the Passion of Love, whose Object is Worth and Beauty,*

"To the first *Good*, first *Perfect*, and first *Fair* ‡,

"as his Master *Plato* advises; and to restrain *Spleen*, to a Contempt and Hatred of Vice." This is what the Poet meant, and what every unprejudiced Man could not but see he must needs mean, by RECTIFYING THE MASTER PASSION, though he had not confined us to this Sense, in the *Reason* he gives of his *Precept*, in these Words :

A mightier Power the strong Direction sends,  
And several Men impels to several Ends.

For what Ends are they which God impels to, but the Ends of Virtue?

Commentaire, p. 170.

‡ Το καλόν.—† ἀγαθόν.

† Id. 171, 172.

But for a *more perfect Idea* (to speak in his own free Terms) of the *Ridicule* of our Logician's Comment, let us attend to what he remarks on these two last Lines. *These Words* (says he) *may be understood in more than one Sense, which is not rare, and may have a more or less restrained Meaning. They are susceptible of a Sense extravagant and injurious to Providence, and they will admit of a reasonable one, and very worthy our Attention* \*. Here, we see, he doubts about the Meaning of the *Reason* of the Precept; admits it may have a good one; and yet condemns, without Hesitation, and in the grossest and most shocking Terms, the *Precept* itself; whose Meaning must yet, according to all rational Rules, even those of his own Logic, if it have any such, be determined by the *Reason* of it.

But to return. The Poet having proved that the *ruling Passion* (since Nature hath given it us) is not to be overthrown, but *rectified*, the next Inquiry will be of what Use the *ruling Passion* is; for an Use it must have, if Reason be to treat it thus mildly? *This Use* he shews us [from l. 156 to 187] is twofold, *Natural* and *Moral*.

1. Its *natural Use* is to conduct Men steadily to *one certain End*, who would otherwise be eternally fluctuating between the *equal Violence* of various and discordant Passions, driving them up and down at random:

Like varying Winds, by *other Passions* tost,  
This drives them constant to a certain Coast;

and by that Means enables them to promote the *Good of Society*, by making each a Contributor to the common Stock.

Let *Power* or *Knowledge*, *Gold* or *Glory* please,  
Or (oft more strong than all) the *Love of Ease*:  
Through Life 'tis follow'd.—

2. Its *moral Use* is to ingraft our *ruling Virtue* upon it:  
Th' eternal Art, educing Good from Ill,  
Grafts on this Passion our *best Principle*;

\* Commentaire, p. 174.

and by that Means enables us to promote *our own Good* by turning the Exerctancy of the *ruling Passion* into its *neighbouring Virtue*:

See *Anger*, Zeal and Fortitude supply;  
 Even *Jealousy*, Prudence; *Sloth*, Philosophy;  
 Nor Virtue, male or female, can we name,  
 But what will grow on Pride, or grow on Shame.

The Wisdom of the divine Artift is, as the Poet finely observes, very illustrious in this Contrivance: For the Mind and body having now one common Interest, the Efforts of Virtue will have their Force infinitely augmented:

'Tis thus the Mercury of Man is fixt,  
 Strong grows the Virtue with his Nature mixt;  
 The Dross cements what else were too refin'd,  
 And in one Interest Body acts with Mind.

But lest it should be objected that this Account favours the Doctrine of *Necessity*, and would insinuate that Men are *only acted upon* in the Production of Good out of Evil; the Poet teacheth [from l. 186 to 192.] that Man is a *free Agent*, and hath it in his *own Power* to turn the natural Passions into *Virtues* or into *Vices*, properly so called:

Reason the Biass turns from Good to Ill,  
 And Nero reigns a Titus, if he WILL.

Secondly, If it should be objected, that though the Poet doth indeed tell us some Actions are *beneficial* and some *hurtful*, yet he could not call those *Virtuous*, nor these *Vicious*, because, as he has described Things, the *Motive* appears to be only *Gratification of some Passion*; give me leave to answer for him, that this would be mistaking the Argument, which in this Epistle [to l. 239.] considers the Passions *only with regard to Society*, that is, with regard to their *Effects* rather than their *Motives*.—That however it is his Design to teach that Actions are *properly virtuous and vicious*; and though  
 it

it be difficult to distinguish *genuine* Virtue from *spurious*, they having both the same *Appearance*, and both the same *public Effects*; yet they may be disembarrassed. If it be asked, by what Means? He replies [from l. 192 to 195] by *Conscience*, which is sufficient to the Purpose; for 'tis only a Man's *own* Concern, to know whether his Virtue be pure and solid; for what is that to *others*, while the Effect of this Virtue, whether real or unsubstantial, is, as to *them*, the same?

This Light and Darknefs, in our Chaos join'd,  
What shall divide? *The God within the Mind.*

A *Platonic* Phrase for CONSCIENCE; and here employed with great Judgment and Propriety. For *Conscience* either signifies, *speculatively*, the Judgment we pass of Things upon whatever Principles we chance to have; and then it is only OPINION, a very unable Judge and *Divider*: Or else, it signifies, *practically*, the Application of the *eternal Rule of Right* (received by us as the *Law of God*) to the Regulation of our Actions; and then it is properly CONSCIENCE, *The God* (or the Law of God) *within the Mind*, of Power to divide the Light from the Darknefs in this Chaos of the Passions.

But still it will be said, why all this Difficulty to distinguish true Virtue from false? The Poet shews *why* [from l. 194 to 201] "That though indeed Vice and Virtue so invade each other's Bounds, that sometimes we can scarce tell where one ends and the other begins, yet great Purposes are serv'd thereby, no less than the perfecting the Constitution of the Whole; as Lights and Shades, which run into one another in a well-wrought Picture, make the Harmony and Spirit of the Composition." But on this Account to say there is neither *Vice* nor *Virtue*, the Poet shews [from l. 200 to 207] would be just as wise as to say there is neither *black* nor *white*; because the Shade of *that*, and the Light of *this*, often run into one another:

Ask your *own Heart*, and nothing is so plain;  
 'Tis to mistake them costs the Time and Pain.

This is an Error of *Speculation*, which leads Men so foolishly to conclude, that there is neither *Vice* nor *Virtue*.

2. There is another of *Practice*, which hath more common and fatal Effects; and is next considered [from l. 206 to 211:] It is this, That though, at the first Aspect, *Vice* be so horrible as to fright all Beholders, yet, when by Habit we are once grown familiar with her, we first suffer, and in time begin to lose the Memory of her Nature:

Vice is a Monster of so frightful Mien,  
 As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;  
 Yet seen too oft, familiar with her Face,  
 We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

Which necessarily implies an equal Ignorance in the Nature of *Vice*. Hence Men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other.

But it is not only that *Extreme of Vice next to Virtue*, which betrays us into these Mistakes: We are deceived too, as he shews us [from l. 210 to 221], by our Observations about the *other Extreme*.

But where th' Extreme of Vice was ne'er agreed:  
 Ask where's the North? at York 'tis on the *Tweed*;  
 In *Scotland*, at the *Orcades*; and there  
 At *Greenland*, *Zembla*, or the Lord knows where.

For, from the *Extreme* of Vice's being unsettled, and perpetually shifting, Men conclude, that *Vice itself* is only nominal.

3. There is yet a *third* Cause of this Error of *no Vice no Virtue*, composed of the other two, *i. e.* partly *speculative*, and partly *practical*: And this also the Poet considers [from l. 220 to 229] shewing it ariseth from the *Imperfection* of the *best* Characters, and the *Inequality* of *all*; whence it happens that no Man is extremely virtuous



virtuous or vicious, nor extremely constant in Pursuit of either. Why it so happens the Poet assigns an admirable Reason in this Line:

For, Vice or Virtue, SELF directs it still.

An Adherence or Regard to what is, in the Sense of the World, a *Man's own Interest*, making an Extreme in either impossible. Its Effect in keeping a good Man from the *Extreme of Virtue* needs no Explanation: And in an ill Man, *Self-interest* shewing him the Necessity of some kind of Reputation, the procuring and preserving that will necessarily keep him from the *Extreme of Vice*.

The Mention of this Principle that *self directs Vice and Virtue*, and its Consequence, which is, that

Each Individual seeks a several Goal,

leads the Author to observe

That Heaven's great View is one, and that the Whole;

and this brings him naturally round again to his main Subject, namely, *God's producing Good out of Ill*, which he prosecutes in his inimitable Manner [from l. 228 to 239].

That counterworks each Folly and Caprice;  
That disappoints th' Effect of ev'ry Vice:  
That happy Frailties to all Ranks apply'd,  
Shame to the Virgin, to the Matron Pride,  
Fear to the Statesman, Rashness to the Chief,  
To Kings Presumption, and to Crowds Belief.

I. *Hitherto* the Poet hath been employed in discoursing of the *Use of the Passions*, with regard to *Society at large*, and in freeing his Doctrine from *Objections*. This is the *first* general Division of the Subject of *this Epistle*.

II. He comes to shew [from l. 238 to 251] the *Use of these Passions*, with regard to the *more confined Circle of our Friends, Relations, and Acquaintance*. And this is the *Second* general Division:

*Wants,*

*Wants, Frailties, Passions* closer still ally  
 The common Interest, or endear the Tie :  
 To *these* we owe true Friendship, Love sincere,  
 Each home-felt Joy that *Life* inherits here :  
 Yet from *the same* we learn in *its* Decline  
 Those Joys, those Loves, those Interests to resign.

As these Lines seem not to have been understood by the *Translator*, and are scandalously misrepresented by the *Commentator*, who would insinuate them to be a kind of Approbation of *Suicide*\*, I shall here give the Reader their plain and obvious Meaning.

“ To these Frailties (says he) we owe all the Endearments of private Life ; yet, when we come to that Age, which generally disposes Men to think more seriously of the true Value of Things, and, consequently, of their Provision for a future State, the Consideration that the *Grounds* of those *Joys, Loves and Friendships*, are *Wants, Frailties and Passions*, proves the best Expedient to wean us from the *World* ; a Disengagement so friendly to that Provision we are now making for *another*.” The Observation is new, and would in any Place be extremely beautiful, but has *here* an infinite Grace and Propriety, as it so well confirms, by an Instance of great Moment, the Poet’s general Thesis, *That God makes ill, at every Step, productive of Good*.

III. The Poet having thus shewn the Use of the Passions in *Society* and in *domestic Life*, he comes in *the last Place* [from l. 250 to the End] to shew their Use to *the Individual*, even in their *Illusions* ; the imaginary Happiness they present helping to make the real Miseries of Life less insupportable. And this is his *third* general Division :

—*Opinion* gilds with varying Rays  
 Those painted Clouds that beautify our Days :  
 Each Want of Happiness by Hope supply’d,  
 And each Vacuity of Sense by Pride.

\* *Commentaire*, p. 206.

These build as fast as Knowledge can destroy :  
 In Folly's Cup still laughs the Bubble Joy ;  
 One Prospect lost, another still we gain ;  
 And not a Vanity is given in vain.

Which must needs vastly raise our Idea of God's Goodness, who hath not only provided more than a Counter-balance of *real* Happiness to human Miseries, but hath even, in his infinite Compassion, bestowed on those, who were so foolish as not to have made this Provision, an *imaginary* Happiness ; that they may not be quite over-borne with the Load of human Miseries. This is the Poet's great and noble Thought, as strong and solid as it is new and ingenious. But so strangely perverse is his *Commentator*, that he will suppose him to mean any thing rather than what the obvious Drift of his Argument requires ; yet, to say Truth, cares not much in what Sense you take it, so you will believe him that Mr. *Pope's* general Design was to represent human Life as *one grand Illusion fatally conducted*. But if the Rules of *Logic* serve for any other Purpose than to countenance the Passions and Prejudices of such Writers, it may be demonstrated, that what the Poet here teaches is only this, " That these Illusions are the Follies of Men, which they *wilfully* fall into, and through their own *Fault* ; thereby depriving themselves of much Happiness, and exposing themselves to equal Misery : But that still God (according to his Universal way of Working) graciously turns these Follies so far to the Advantage of his miserable Creatures, as to be the *present* Solace and Support of their Distresses,"

—Tho' Man's a Fool, yet God is wise.

## L E T T E R III.

WE are now got to the *Third Epistle* of the *Essay on Man*. Mr. *Pope*, in explaining the Origin, Use, and End of the Passions, in the *second Epistle*, having shewn that Man has *social* as well as *selfish* Passions; that Doctrine naturally introduceth the *Third*, which treats of Man as a SOCIAL Animal; and connects it with the *Second*, which considered him as an INDIVIDUAL. And as the Conclusion from the Subject of the *First Epistle* made the Introduction to the *Second*, so here again, the Conclusion of the *Second*,

Ev'n mean Self-love becomes, by Force divine,  
The Scale to measure others Wants by thine,

makes the Introduction to the *Third*:

Here then we rest; the Universal Cause  
Acts to *one* End, but acts by *various* Laws.

The Reason of *Variety* in those Laws, all which tend to *one* and the same End, the Good of the *Whole*, generally, is, because the Good of the *Individual* is likewise to be provided for; both which together make up the Good of the *Whole univerſally*. And this is the Cause, as the Poet says elsewhere, that

Each Individual seeks a *several* Goal. Ep. ii. l. 227.

But

But to prevent their resting *there*, God has made each need the Assistance of another : and so,

On mutual Wants, built mutual Happiness. Ep. iii. l. 112.

It was necessary to explain these two first Lines, the better to see the Pertinency and Force of what follows [from l. 2 to 7] where the Poet warns such to take Notice of this Truth, whose circumstances placing them in an *imaginary* Station of Independence, and a *real* one of Insensibility to mutual Wants (from whence general Happiness results) make them but too apt to overlook the true System of Things; such as those in *full Health* and *Opulence*. This Caution was necessary with regard to *Society*; but still more necessary with regard to *Religion*: Therefore he especially recommends the Memory of it both to Clergy and Laity, when they *preach* or *pray*; because the *Preacher* who does not consider the *First Cause* under this View, as a Being consulting the Good of the Whole, must needs give a very *unworthy* Idea of him: And the Suppliant, who prays as one not related to a *Whole*, or as disregarding the Happiness of it, will not only pray in *vain*, but *offend* his Maker, by an impious Attempt to counterwork his Dispensation:

In all the Madness of superfluous *Health*,  
The Trim of *Pride*, the Impudence of *Wealth*,  
Let this great Truth be present Night and Day,  
But most be present, if we *preach* or *pray*.

The Translator, not seeing into the admirable Purposes of this Caution, hath quite dropt the most material Circumstances contained in the *last* Line; and, what is worse, for the sake of a foolish Antithesis, hath destroyed the whole Propriety of the Thought, in the *first* and *second*, and so, between both, hath left his Author neither Sense nor System,

Dans le Sein du bonheur, ou de l'*Adversité*.

Now, of all Men, those *in Adversity* have the least need of this Caution, as being the least apt to forget *that God consults the Good of*

the *Woe*, and provides for it, by procuring mutual *Happiness* by means of mutual *Wants*: Because such as yet retain the Smart of any fresh Calamity are most compassionate to others labouring under the same Misfortunes, and most prompt and ready to relieve them.

The Poet then introduceth his System of human *Sociability* [l. 7, 8] by shewing it to be the Dictate of the Creator, and that *Man*, in *this*, did but follow the Example of *general Nature*, which is united in *one close System of Benevolence*:

Look round our World; behold the Chain of Love  
Combining all below, and all above.

This he proves, *first* [from l. 8 to 13] (on the noble Theory of *Attraction*) from the Oeconomy of the *material World*; where there is a general Conspiracy in all the Particles of Matter to work for one End; the Use, Beauty, and Harmony of the whole Mass.

## I.

See plastic Nature working to this End,  
The single Atoms each to other tend,  
Attract, attracted to, the next in Place  
*Form'd* and *impell'd* it's Neighbour to embrace.

*Form'd and impell'd*, says he. These are not Words of a loose undistinguished Meaning, thrown in to fill up the Verse. This is not our Author's Way, they are full of Sense; and of the most philosophical Precision. For to make Matter so *cohere* as to fit it for the Uses intended by its Creator, a proper Configuration of its insensible Parts is as necessary as that Quality so equally and universally conferred upon it, called *Attraction*.

But here again the Translator, mistaking this Description of the *Preservation* of the material Universe by the Principle of Attraction, for a Description of its *Creation*, has quite destroyed the Poet's fine analogical Argument, by which he proves, from the Circumstance

cumstance of mutual Attraction in Matter, that Man, while he seeks Society, and thereby promotes the Good of his Species, cooperates with God's *general Dispensation*. For the Circumstance of a *Creation* proves nothing but a *Creator* :

Voi du *Scin du Chaos* eclater la lumiere,  
Chaque Atome ebranlé courir pour s'embrasser, &c.

The Poet's *second* Argument [from l. 12 to 27] is taken from the *vegetable* and *animal World*; whose Beings serve *mutually* for the Production, Support, and Sustainment of each other.

## II.

See Matter next, with various Life endued,  
Pres to one Centre still, *the general Good* ;  
See dying Vegetables Life sustain,  
See Life dissolving vegetate again :  
All Forms that perish other Forms supply,  
By Turns they catch the vital Breath, and die ;  
Like Bubbles to the Sea of Matter born,  
They rise, they break, and to that Sea return, &c.

One would wonder what should have induced Mr. *l'Abbé* to translate the two last Lines, thus :

*Sort du neant y rentre, et reparoit au jour.*

*Comes out of Nothing, and enters back again into Nothing.*

But he is generally as consistently wrong as his Author is right. For having, as we observed, mistaken the Poet's Account of the *Preservation* of the *material World*, for the *Creation* of it; he makes the very same Mistake with regard to the *vegetable* and *animal*; and so comes in here (indeed rather of the latest) with his *Production of Things out of nothing*.

I should not have taken notice of this Mistake but for Mr. *De Crousaz's* ready Remark. " Mr. *Pope*, says he, descends even to " the most vulgar Prejudices; when he tells us, that *each Being*

“*creation of Nothing*,” the common People think that that which “disappears is annihilated. The Atoms, the finest Particles, the “Roots of terrestrial Bodies subside,” &c.” But who it is that contends to the word *ex par Prajudicis*, the Reader will see when he is told that Mr. *D. Orosius* knew very well that Mr. *Pope* said not one Word of each Being’s *going back into Nothing*; both from his not finding it in the Profane Translator, and from *Rhuel’s* Confession in his Preface, that he had taken great Liberties with his Original.

But this Part of the Argument, in which the Poet tells us, that God

Connects each Being, greatest with the least;  
 Made Beast in Aid of Man, and Man of Beast;  
*All serv’d, all serving*——

awaking again the old *Pride* of his Adversaries, who cannot bear that *Man* should be thought to be *serv’ing* as well as *serv’d*; he takes this Occasion *again to humble* them [from l. 26 to 53] by the same kind of Argument he had so successfully employed in the *first Epistle*, and which our *first Letter* has considered at large.

However, his Adversaries, loth to give up the Question, will reason upon the Matter; and we are now to suppose them objecting against Providence in this Manner—We grant, say they, that in the *irrational*, as in the *inanimate* Creation, *all is serv’d, and all is serv’ing*. But, with regard to Man, the Case is different; he stands single. For his *Reason* hath endowed him both with Power and Address, sufficient to make all Things *serve him*; and his *Self-love*, of which you have so largely provided for him, will dispose him, in his Turn, *to serve none*. Therefore your Theory is imperfect.—“Not so, replies the Poet [from l. 52 to 83] I grant you, Man indeed affects to be *the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole*, and would fain “shake off

—That Chain of Love,  
 Combining all below and all above:

\* Commentaire, p. 221.

“But



" But Nature, even by the *very Gift of Reason*, checks this Ty-  
 " rant: For *Reason* endowing Man with the Ability of setting  
 " together the *Memory* of the past, and *Conjecture* about the Future;  
 " and past Misfortunes making him apprehensive of more to come,  
 " this disposes him to pity and relieve others in a *State* of Suffer-  
 " ing. And the Passion growing habitual, naturally extends its  
 " Effects to all that have a *Sense* of suffering. Now as Brutes have  
 " neither Man's *Reason*, nor his inordinate *Self-love* to draw them  
 " from the System of Benevolence, so they wanted not, and  
 " therefore have not, this *human Sympathy* of another's Misery. By  
 " which Passion we see those Qualities, in Man, balance one ano-  
 " ther, and so retain him in that general *Order*, in which Provi-  
 " dence has placed its whole Creation. But this is not all; Man's  
 " Interest, Amusement, Vanity, and Luxury, tie him still closer  
 " to the System of Benevolence, by obliging him to provide for  
 " the Support of other Animals; and though it be, for the most  
 " part, only to devour them with the greatest Gust, yet this does  
 " not abate the proper Happiness of the Animals so preserved, to  
 " whom *Providence has not given the useless Knowledge of their End*.  
 " From all which it appears, that the Theory is yet uniform, and  
 " perfect.

Grant that the Powerful still the Weak controul,  
 Be Man the Wit and Tyrant of the Whole:

Nature that Tyrant checks; he only knows  
 And helps another Creature's Wants and Woes.

Say, will the Falcon, stooping from above,  
 Smit with her varying Plumage, spare the Dove?

Admires the Jay the Insect's gilded Wings,  
 Or hears the Hawk when *Philomela* sings?

Man cares for all, &c.—

For some his Interest prompts him to provide,  
 For more his Pleasure, yet for more his Pride.

This

This is the Force of this fine and noble Argument. The senseless and scandalous Reflections of Mr. *De Croufaz* on the latter Part of it, I have refuted in my former Letter.

But even to this, as a *Caviller* would still object, we must suppose him so to do, and say—Admit you have shewn that Nature hath endowed all Animals, whether human or brutal, with such Faculties as admirably fit them to promote the *general Good*: Yet, in its Care for *this*, hath not Nature neglected to provide for the *private Good* of the Individual? We have Cause to think it hath, and we suppose that it was on this exclusive Consideration that it kept back from Brutes the Gift of *Reason* (so necessary a means of *private* happiness), because *Reason*, as we find in the Instance of Man, where there is Occasion for all the complicated Contrivance you have described above, to make the Effects of his *Passions* counterwork the immediate Powers of his *Reason*, in order to keep him subservient to the *general System*; *Reason*, we say, naturally tends to draw Beings into a *private*, independent System.

This the Poet answers by shewing [from l. 82 to 109] that the *Happiness* of *animal* and *human* Life is widely different. The Happiness of human Life consisting in the Improvement of the Mind, can be procured by *Reason* only: But the Happiness of animal Life consisting in the Gratifications of Sense, is best promoted by *Instinct*. And, with regard to the regular and constant Operation of each, in *that*, *Instinct* hath plainly the Advantage: For *here* God directs *immediately*; *there*, only *mediately*, through Man:

Reason, however able, cool at best,  
 Cares not for Service, or but serves when prest;  
 Stays till we call, and then not often near;  
 But honest Instinct comes a Volunteer.  
 And Reason raise o'er Instinct as you can,  
 In this 'tis *God* directs, in that 'tis *Man*.

The Commentator (who I will, in Charity, suppose saw nothing of this fine and sober Reasoning, nor was apprehensive of the *Objection* which occasioned it, though that Objection arises directly from

from the Subject) accuseth the Poet of designing to represent *Brutes as perfect as Man, who is* (says he) *of a Nature susceptible of Religion* \*. But if our Commentator could not see the Chain of Reasoning, he might yet, methinks, have attended to this plain Denunciation of the Poet, which introduceth the Discourse that gives him so much Offence :

Whether with Reason or with Instinct blest,  
*Know* all enjoy the Power, which suits them best :  
 To Bliss alike by that Direction tend,  
*And find the Means proportion'd to the End.*

Which shews the *Perfection* here spoken of not to be a Perfection equalled to that of another Being, but only such an one as is *proportioned* to the Being itself, of whom this Perfection is predicated.

The Poet now comes to the *main* Subject of his Epistle, the Proof of Man's SOCIABILITY, from the two general Societies composed by him; the NATURAL, subject to *paternal* Authority; and the CIVIL, subject to that of a Magistrate: Which he hath had the Address to introduce, from what had preceded, in so easy and natural a Manner, as shews him to have the Art of giving all the Grace to the Dryness and Severity of Method, as well as Wit to the Strength and Depth of Reason. For the philosophic Nature of his Work requiring he should shew by what Means those Societies were introduced, this affords him an Opportunity of sliding gracefully and easily from the *Preliminaries* into the *main Subject*; and so of giving his Work that Perfection of Method, which we find only in the Compositions of great Writers.

For having just before, though to a different Purpose, described the Power of bestial Instinct to attain the Happiness of the *Individual*, he goes on in speaking of Instinct as it is serviceable both to *that*, and to the *Kind* [from l. 108 to 148] to illustrate the Original of Society. He shews, that though, as he had before observed, God had founded the proper Bliss of each Creature in the

\* Commentaire, p. 229.

*Nature* of its own *Being*, yet these not being independent Individuals; but Parts of a Whole, God, to bless that Whole, built mutual Happiness on mutual Wants: Now for the Supply of mutual Wants, Creatures must necessarily come together; which is the first Ground of Society amongst Men:

Whate'er of Life all-quickening Æther keeps,  
 Or breathes through Air, or shoots beneath the Deep,  
 Or pours profuse on Earth; one Nature feeds  
 The vital Flame, and swells the genial Seeds.  
 Not Man alone, but all that roam the Wood,  
 Or wing the Sky, or roll along the Flood,  
 Each loves itself, but not itself alone,  
 Each Sex desires alike, till two are one.

He then proceeds to that called *natural*, subject to *paternal* Authority, and arising from the Union of the two Sexes; describes the imperfect Image of it in Brutes; then explains it at large in all its Causes and Effects: And, lastly, shews, that as IN FACT, like mere *animal* Society, it is founded and preserved by mutual Wants, the Supplial of which causes mutual Happiness; so is it likewise in RIGHT, as a *rational* Society, by Equity, Gratitude, and the Observance of the Relation of Things in general:

Reflection, Reason, still the Ties improve;  
 At once extend the Interest, and the Love:  
 With Choice we fix, with Sympathy we burn,  
 Each Virtue in each Passion takes its Turn;  
 And still new Needs, new Helps, new Habits, rise,  
 That graft Benevolence on Charities.  
 Mem'ry and Forecast just Returns engage,  
 That pointed back to Youth, this on to Age;  
 While Pleasure, Gratitude, and Hope combin'd,  
 Still spread the Interest, and preserv'd the Kind.]

But the Atheist and *Hobbist*, against whom Mr. *Pope* writes, deny the Principle of *Right*, or of *natural Justice*, before the Invention

of *civil Compact*, which, they say, gave Being to it: And accordingly have had the Effrontery publickly to declare, *that a State of Nature was a State of War*. This quite subverts the Poet's *natural Society*: Therefore, after his *Account of that State*, he proceeds to support the *Reality* of it, by overthrowing the oppugnant Principle of *no natural Justice*; which he does [from l. 147 to 170] by shewing, in a fine Description of *the State of Innocence*, as represented in Scripture, that a State of Nature was so far from being without *natural Justice*, that it was, at first, the *Reign of God*, where *Right and Truth* univerſally prevailed:

Nor think, in Nature's State they blindly trod,  
 The State of Nature was the Reign of God.  
 Self-love, and social, at her Birth began,  
 Union, the Bond of all Things, and of Man.  
 Pride then was not; nor *Arts*, that Pride to aid;  
 Man walk'd with Beast, joint Tenant of the Shade.

Now let us hear Mr. *De Crouſax*, who tells us, *he had redoubled his Attention upon this Epistle* \*.—Mr. *Pope* (says he) *speaks with the Assurance of an Eye-witness of what passed in this first Age of the World* †.—And why should he not, when conducted by his Faith in Scripture History?—*That which he here represents*, says he, *is much less credible in itself, than that which Moses teacheth us* †. Now what must we think of our Logician's Faith, who taking it for granted, that Mr. *Pope* would not borrow of *Moses*, has here condemned, before he was aware, the Credibility of Scripture History? For the Account here given of the *State of Innocence* is indeed no other than that of *Moses* himself.

He goes on—*This Religion, common to Brutes and Men, insinuates to us, that, in those happy Times, Men had no more Religion than Brutes* †.

\* Commentaire, p. 218.

† Ib. p. 240.

This shrewd Reflection points at the following Lines :

In the same Temple, the resounding Wood,  
All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God.

But does not the Poet speak, in this very place, of Man, as officiating in the priestly Office at the Altar, and offering up his blameless eucharistical Sacrifice to Heaven ?

The Shrine with Gore unstain'd, with Gold undrest,  
Unbrib'd, unbloody, stood the blameless Priest.

As to the Line,

All vocal Beings hymn'd their equal God,

our Logician should be sent to Scripture for its Meaning ; who, had he been as conversant with the *Psalmist* as with *Burgersdicius*, would have learned to have judged more piously as well as more charitably. The *inspired* Poet calling to Mind (as Mr. *Pope* did here) the *Age of Innocence*, and full of the great Ideas of those

—Chains of Love,

Combining all below, and all above ;

which

Draw to one Point, and to one Centre bring  
*Beast, Man, or Angel, Servant, Lord, or King ;*

breaks out into this rapturous and divine Apostrophe, to call back the devious Creation to its pristine Rectitude. That very State Mr. *Pope* describes above :—“ Praise the Lord, all ye *Angels* : praise him, all ye Hosts. Praise him, Sun and Moon ; praise him, all ye Stars of Light. Let them praise the Name of the Lord, for he commanded, and they were created. Praise the Lord from the Earth, ye Dragons, and all Deeps : Fire and Hail, Snow, and Vapour, stormy Wind fulfilling his Word : Mountains and all Hills, fruitful Trees, and all Cedars : *Beasts* and all Cattle, creeping Things, and *flying Fowl* : *Kings* of the Earth and all *People* ; *Princes* and all *Judges of the Earth*. Let them praise  
“ the

“ the Name of the Lord ; for his Name alone is excellent, his  
 “ Glory is above the Earth and Heaven.” *Pfal.* cxlviii.

To return. Strict Method (in which, by this time, the Reader finds the Poet more conversant than our Logician was aware of) leads him next to speak of that Society which succeeded the *natural*, namely the *civil*. But as he does all by easy Steps, in the natural Progression of Ideas, he first explains [from l. 169 to 200] the *intermediate Means* which led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society. These were the *Invention* and *Improvement of Arts*. For while Mankind lived in a mere State of Nature, unconscious of the Arts of Life, there was no need of any other Government than the *paternal*; but when Arts were found out and improved, then that more perfect Form under the Direction of a *Magistrate* became necessary. And for these Reasons; *First*, to bring those Arts, already found, to *Perfection*; and, *Secondly*, to secure the Product of them to their rightful *Proprietors*. The Poet, therefore, comes now, as we say, to the *Invention of Arts*; but being always intent on the great End for which he wrote his *Essay*, namely, to mortify that *Pride*, which occasions the impious Complaints against Providence, he, with the greatest Art and Contrivance, speaks of these *Inventions*, as only Lessons learnt of mere Animals guided by *Instinct*; and thus, at the same time, gives a new Instance of the wonderful Providence of God, who has contrived to teach Mankind in a Way not only proper to humble human Arrogance, but to raise our Idea of infinite Wisdom to the greatest Pitch. All this he does in a *Prosepopæia* the most sublime that ever entered into the human Imagination :

See him from *Nature* rising slow to *Art!*

To copy *Instinct* then was *Reason's* Part :

Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature spake—

“ Go, from the Creatures thy Instructions take ;

“ Thy Arts of Building from the *Bee* receive,

“ Learn of the *Mole* to plow, the *Worm* to weave ;

" Learn of the little *Nautilus* to sail,  
 " Spread the thin *Oar*, and catch the driving *Gale*, &c.  
 " Yet go! and thus o'er all the *Creatures* sway,  
 " Thus let the *Wiser* make the rest obey,  
 " And for those *Arts* mere *Instinct* could afford,  
 " Be crown'd as *Monarchs*, or as *Gods* ador'd."

The Delicacy of the Poet's Address, in the first Part of the last Line, is very remarkable. I observed, that, in this Paragraph, he has given an Account of these *intermediate Means* that led Mankind from *natural* to *civil* Society, namely, the Invention and Improvement of Arts. Now here, on his Conclusion of this Account, and Entry upon the Description of *civil Society* itself, he connects the two Parts the most gracefully that can be conceived, by this true historical Circumstance, that it was the *Invention* of those Arts, which raised to the Magistracy, in this *new Society*, now formed for the *perfecting* them.

I cannot leave this Part without taking notice of the strange Turn the Translator has given to these two Lines:

Thus then to Man the Voice of Nature spake—  
 " Go, from the *Creatures* thy Instructions take."

La Nature *indigné* alors se fit entendre ;  
 Va, *malheureux* mortel, va, lui dit-elle, apprendre  
 Des *plus vils* animaux.—

One would wonder what should make him represent *Nature* in such a Passion at Man, and calling him Names, when Mr. *Pope* supposes her in her best good Humour, and Man the most *happy* in the Direction here given. But what led him into this Mistake was another full as gross: Mr. *Pope* having described the State of Innocence, which ends at these Lines,

Heaven's Attribute was universal Care,  
 And Man's Prerogative to rule, but spare,

turns



turns from *those* Times to a View of *these* latter Ages, and breaks out into this tender and humane Complaint :

Ah, how unlike *the Man of Times to come!*  
 Of half that live the Butcher and the Tomb ;  
 Who, Foe to Nature, hears the general Groan,  
 Murders their Species, and betrays his own, &c.

Unluckily, the Translator took this *Man of Times to come*, for the Corrupter of that *first Age* ; and so imagined the Poet had introduced *Nature* only to set things right : he then supposed, of course, she was to be very angry, and not finding Mr. *Pope* had represented her in any great Emotion, he was willing to improve upon his Original.

To proceed, after all this necessary Preparation, the Poet shews [from L. 199 to 211.] how *Civil Society* followed, and the Advantages it produced. But these are best described in his own Words :

Great Nature spoke ; observant Men obey'd ;  
 Cities were built, Societies were made :  
 Here rose one little State ; another near  
 Grew by like Means, and join'd through Love, or Fear.  
 Did here the Trees with ruddier Burthens bend,  
 And there the Streams in purer Rills descend ?  
 What War could ravish, Commerce could bestow,  
 And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.  
 Converse and Love Mankind might strongly draw,  
 When Love was Liberty, and Nature Law.  
 Thus States were form'd.—

Nothing can be juster than this Account, or more corroborative of the Poet's general Theory. Yet his Translator has a strange Fatality in contradicting him, whenever he attempts to *paraphrase his Sense*.

The first Line Mr. *l'Abbé* turns thus,  
 Par ces mots la Nature excita l'Industrie,  
 Et de l'Homme feroce enchaina la furie,  
 Chained up the Fury of Savage Man,

And.

And so contradicts his Author's whole System of *Benevolence*, and goes over to the Atheist's, who supposes the *State of Nature* to be a *State of War*. That which seems to have misled him was these Lines:

What War could ravish, Commerce could bestow,  
And he return'd a Friend, who came a Foe.

But the Translator should have considered, that though his Author maintains a *State of Nature to be a State of Peace*, yet he never imagined there could be *no Quarrels* in it. He well knew, that *Self-love drives through just and through Unjust* \*. He pushes no System to an Extravagance; but *steers between Doctrines seemingly opposite* †, or, in other Words, follows Truth uniformly throughout.

Having thus explained the Original of *Civil Society*, he shews us next [from l. 210 to 216] that to this Society a *civil Magistrate*, properly so called, did belong: and this, in Confutation of that idle Hypothesis of *Filmer*, and others; which pretends that God conferred the *regal Title* on the *Fathers of Families*, from whence Men, when they had instituted Society, were to fetch their *Magistrates*. On the contrary, our Poet shews that a *King* was unknown till *common Interest*, which led Men to institute civil Government, led them, at the same time, to institute a *Governor*. However, that it is true that the same *Wisdom* or *Valor*, which gained *regal Obedience* from Sons to the *Sire*, procured *Kings* a *paternal Authority*, and made them considered as *Fathers of their People*. Which probably was the *Original* (and, while mistaken, continues to be the chief *Support*) of that slavish Error; Antiquity representing its earliest Monarchs under the Idea of a *common Father*, *πατήρ ἀνθρώπων*. Afterwards indeed they became a kind of *Foster-Fathers*, *ποιμένες ἡμῶν*, as *Homer* calls them: Till at length they began to *devour* that *Flock* they had been so long accustomed to *shear*; and, as *Plutarch*

\* Ep. iii. l. 270.

† See Preface.

says of *Cecrops*, ἐκ χρησῆ βασιλεύς ἄγχιον ἢ δρακοντάδη γενόμενον  
 TYPANNON.

—the Name of King unknown,  
 Till common Interest placed the Sway in one.  
 'Twas Virtue only (or in Arts, or Arms,  
 Diffusing Blessings, or averting Harms)  
 The same which in a Sire the Sons obey'd,  
 A Prince, the Father of a People made.

Our Author has good Authority for his Account of the Origin of Kingship. *Aristotle* assures us of this Truth, that 'Twas Virtue only or in Arts or Arms. Καθίσταται Βασιλεύς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτεκνῶν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ταύτης γένεως\*.

The Poet now returns [at l. 216 to 242] to what he had left unfinished in his Description of *natural Society*. This, which appears irregular, is indeed a fine Instance of his thorough Knowledge of the Art of Method. I will explain it.

This third Epistle, we see, considers *Man with respect to Society*; the second, *with respect to himself*; and the fourth, *with respect to Happiness*. But in none of these Relations does the Poet ever lose sight of him under *that* in which he stands to God; it will follow therefore, that speaking of him *with respect to SOCIETY*, the Account would be then most imperfect, were he not at the same time considered *with respect to his RELIGION*; for, between these two there is a close, and, while Things continue in *Order*, a most *interesting* Connection.

True Faith, true Policy, UNITED MAN;  
 That was but Love of God, and this of Man. l. 240.

Now *Religion* suffering no *Change*, or *Depravation*, when Man first entered into civil Society, but continuing the same as in the State of Nature, the Poet, to avoid Repetition, and to bring the

\* Polit. lib. v. c. 10.

Account: of *true* and *false* Religion nearer to one another, in order to *compare* them by the Advantage of that Situation, deferred giving Account of his *Religion*, till he had spoken of the Origin of *this* Society. Thence it is, that he here resumes the Account of the *State of Nature*, that is, so much of it as he had left untouched, which was only the *Religion* of it. This consisting in the *Knowledge* of one God, the Creator of all Things, the Poet shews how Men came by that Knowledge. That it was either found out by REASON, which, giving to every *Effect* a *Cause*, instructed them to go from *Cause* to *Cause*, till they came to the FIRST, who being *causeless*, would necessarily be judged *self-existent*: Or taught by TRADITION, which preserved the Memory of the Creation.—He then tells us *what* these Men, undebauched by false Science, understood by God's NATURE and ATTRIBUTES. 1<sup>st</sup>, Of God's *Nature*; that they easily distinguished between the *Workman and the Work*; and saw the *Substance* of the Creator to be distinct and different from *that* of the Creature; and so were in no Danger of falling into the horrid Opinion of the *Greek* Philosophers, and their Follower *Spinoza*. And simple Reason teaching them, that the Creator was but *One*, they easily saw that *all was right*; and were in as little Danger of falling into the *Manichean* Error, which, when *oblique Wit* had broke the *steady Light* of Reason, imagined *all was not right*, having before imagined all was not the Work of *One*. 2<sup>dly</sup>, *What* they understood of God's *Attributes*; that they easily conceived a *Father* where they had found a *Deity*, and that a *sovereign Being* could only be a *sovereign Good*.

Till then, by Nature crown'd, each Patriarch fate,  
 King, Priest, and Parent of his growing State:  
 On him, their *second Providence*, they hung,  
 Their Law his Eye; their Oracle his Tongue, &c.  
 Till drooping, 'sickening, dying, they began  
 Whom they rever'd as God, to mourn as Man.

I. Then,

## I.

Then, looking up from Sire to Sire, explor'd  
One great first Father, and that First ador'd.

## II.

Or plain Tradition that this all *begun*,  
Convey'd unbroken Faith from Sire to Son.

## I.

The Worker from the Work distinct was known,  
And simple Reason never fought but *one*.  
Ere Wit oblique had broke that steady Light,  
Man, like his Maker, saw that *all was right*.

## II.

To Virtue in the Paths of Pleasure trod,  
And own'd a *Father* when he own'd a God.  
Love all the Faith, &c.

Our *methodical* Translator, not apprehending that the Poet was here returned to finish his Description of the State of Nature, has fallen into one of the grossest Mistakes that ever was committed. He has taken this Account of *true Religion*, for an Account of the *Origin of Idolatry*, and thus fatally embellishes his own Blunder,

Jaloux d'en conserver les traits et la figure,  
Leur zele industrieux inventa la Peinture.  
Leurs neveux, attentifs à ces hommes fameux,  
Qui par le droit du sang avoient régné sur eux,  
Trouvent-ils dans leur suite un grand, un premier pere,  
Leur aveugle respect l'adore et le révere.

Here you have one of the finest Pieces of Reasoning in the World, turned, at once, into as mere a Heap of Nonsense. You will wonder how it came about: The unlucky Term of *Great first Father* confounded our Translator, and he took it to signify a *Great-Grandfather*. But he should have *considered* that Mr. Pope always

represents God as every wise and good Man would do, and as our Religion directs us to do, under the Idea of a FATHER: He should have observed that the Poet is here describing those Men, who

To *Enter* in the Paths of Pleasure trod,  
And own'd a *Father*, where they own'd a *God*.

You may be sure Mr. *De Croufaz* has not let these fine Strokes about the *Original of Painting* escape him. But here the Critic (which is a Wonder) proves clearer-sighted than the Translator; he saw that the Lines in Question were a Continuation of something *not immediately preceding*; but that was *all* he saw, as may appear by his sagacious Remark. "We shall be mistaken" (says he) "if we regard this Passage as a Continuation of the History immediately going before. It would be too great an Anachronism to suppose it. The Government of *Fathers* of *Families* did not succeed that of *Kings*; on the contrary, the Reign of *these* was established on the Government of *those* \*."

Order leads the Poet to speak next [from l. 241 to 246] of the *Corruption of civil Society* into Tyranny, and its *Causes*; and here, with all the *Art of Address*, as well as *Truth*, he observes, it arose from the Violation of that *great Principle*, which he so much insists upon throughout his Essay, *That each was made for the Use of all*:

Who first taught Souls enslav'd, and Realms undone,  
Th' enormous Faith of *many made for one*?  
That proud Exception to all Nature's Laws,  
T'invert the World, and counterwork its Cause.

And in this *Aristotle* places the Difference between a King and a Tyrant; that the *first* supposes himself made for the People; the *other*, that the People are made for him †.

\* Commentaire, p. 249.

† Επειδὴ δὲ βασιλεύει ἕως φιλῶς, ὡς οἱ μὴ κερταίωσι τὰς πόλεις, μηδὲ ἀδικῶν πάσχειν, ὁ δὲ ἀδικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὲν, οἷον τῆν ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΝ, ὁ γὰρ ἄλλο ἀπεβλάπτει κούνη; εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ἀφελείας χάριν.  
P. l. v. c. 10.

But we may be sure, that in this Corruption, where natural Justice was thrown aside, and *Force*, the Atheist's Justice, presided in its stead, *Religion* would follow the Fate of *civil Society*. We know, from ancient History, it did so. Accordingly, Mr. *Pope* [from l. 245 to 270] with corrupt Politics describes corrupt Religion and its Causes; he *first* informs us, agreeable to his exact Knowledge of Antiquity, that it was the POLITICIAN, and not the PRIEST (as our illiterate Tribe of Free-thinkers would make us believe) who first corrupted Religion. *Secondly*, that the SUPERSTITION, he brought in, was not invented by him, as an *Engine* to play upon others (as the dreaming *Atheist* feigns, who would thus miserably account for the Origin of Religion), but was a *Trap* he first fell into himself.

Force first made Conquest, and that Conquest, Law;  
Till Superstition taught the Tyrant awe,  
Then shar'd the Tyranny, then lent it aid,  
And Gods of Conquerors, Slaves of Subjects made.

All this is agreeable to the Poet's vast Knowledge of human Nature. For that *Impotency* of Mind, as the *Latin* Writers call it\*, which gives Birth to the enormous Crimes necessary to support a Tyranny, naturally subjects its Owner to all the *vain*, as well as *real* Terrors of Conscience. Hence the whole Machinery of *Superstition*.

She, 'midst the Lightning's Blaze and Thunder's Sound,  
When rock'd the Mountains, and when groan'd the Ground,  
She, from the rending Earth and bursting Skies,  
Saw Gods descend, and Fiends infernal rise.

And it is no Wonder that those, who had so impiously attempted to counterwork the Design of Nature, by acting as if *many were*

\* They expressed the *Passion for tyrannizing* by this Word. A fine *Roman* Historian says of *Marius*, that he was *Gloriæ insatiabilis, IMPOTENS semperque inquietus*. And of *Pompey*, *Potentia sua nunquam aut raro ad IMPOTENTIAM usus*.

*made for one*, should now imagine they saw all Nature arming in Vengeance against them.

It is true, the Poet observes, that afterwards, when the Tyrant's Fright was over, he had Cunning enough, from the Experience of the Effect of Superstition upon himself, to turn it by the Assistance of the Priest (who for his Reward wept Shares with him in the Tyranny) as his best Defence against his Subjects.

With Heaven's own Thunders shook the World below,  
And play'd the God an Engine on his Foe.

For a Tyrant naturally and reasonably takes all his *Slaves* for his *Enemies*.

Having given the *Causes* of Superstition, he next describes its *Effects*:

Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,  
Whose Attributes were Rage, Revenge, and Lust:  
Such as the Souls of Cowards might conceive,  
And, form'd like Tyrants, Tyrants would believe.

The ancient Pagan Gods are here very exactly described. This Fact is a convincing Evidence of the Truth of that Original which the Poet gives to Superstition: For if these Phantasms were first rais'd in the Imagination of Tyrants, they must needs have the Qualities here assigned them. For *Force* being the Tyrant's *Virtue*, and *Luxury* his *Happiness*, the Attributes of his God would of Course be *Revenge* and *Lust*; in a Word, the *Antitype* of himself. But there was another, and more substantial Cause, of the Resemblance between a *Tyrant* and a *Pagan God*; and that was the making *Gods of Conquerors*, as the Poet says, and so canonizing a Tyrant's *Vices* with his *Person*. That these Gods should suit a People humbled to the Stroke of a Master, will be no Wonder, if we recollect a generous Saying of the *Ancients*;—*That, that Day which sees a Man a Slave, takes away half his Virtue.*

The



The Inference our Poet draws from all this [from l. 269 to 284] is, that *Self-love* drives through Right and Wrong; it causes the Tyrant to violate the Rights of Mankind; and it causes the People to vindicate that Violation. For *Self-love* being common to the whole Species, and setting each Individual in pursuit of the same Objects, it became necessary for each, if he would secure his own, to provide for the Safety of another's. And thus Equity and Benevolence arose from that same *Self-love* which had given Birth to Avarice and Injustice.

For what one likes, if others like as well,  
 What serves one Will, when many Wills rebel?  
 How shall he keep, what sleeping or awake  
 A Weaker may surprize, a Stronger take?  
 His Safety must his Liberty restrain;  
 All join to guard what each desires to gain.

The Poet hath not any where shewn greater Address in the masterly Disposition of his Work, than with regard to the *Inference* before us; which not only gives a proper and timely Support to what he had before advanced, in his *second Epistle*, concerning the Nature and Effects of *Self-love*; but is a necessary Introduction to what follows concerning the *Reformation of Religion and Society*, as we shall see presently.

The Poet hath now described the Rise, Perfection, and Decay of *civil Policy and Religion*, in the more early Ages. But the Design had been imperfectly executed, had he here dropp'd his Discourse; there was, after this, a Recovery from their several Corruptions. Accordingly, he hath chosen that happy Period for the Conclusion of his Song. But as good and ill Governments and Religions succeed one another without ceasing, he now, with great Judgment, leaves *Facts*, and turns his Discourse [from l. 283 to 296] to speak of a more lasting Reform of Mankind, in the Invention of those *philosophic Principles*, by whose Observance a *Policy*  
 and

and *Religion* may be for ever kept from sinking into *Tyranny* and *Superstition*.

'Twas then the studious Head, or generous Mind,  
 Follower of God, or Friend of human Kind,  
 Poet or Patriot rose, but to restore  
 The Faith and Morals, Nature gave before ;  
 Relum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,  
 If not God's Image, yet his Shadow drew ;  
 Taught Power's due Use to People and to Kings,  
 Taught not to slack, nor strain its tender Strings, &c.

The easy and just Transition into this Subject, from the foregoing, is admirable. In the foregoing, he had described the *Effects* of *Self-love* ; now the *Observation* of these Effects, he, with great Art and high Probability, makes the *Occasion* of those *Discoveries*, which speculative Men made of the *true Principles* of Policy and Religion, described in the present Paragraph ; and this he evidently hints at in that fine Transition,

'T WAS THEN the studious Head, &c.

Mr. *De Croufas*, who saw nothing of this Beauty, says,—*It is not easy to guess to what Epoch Mr. Pope would have us refer his THINGS* \*. He has indeed proved himself no good *Guesser*, which yet is the best Quality of a Critic. I will therefore tell him without more ado, Mr. *Pope* meant the *polite and flourishing Age* of Greece ; and those Benefactors to Mankind, which, I presume, he had principally in View, were *Socrates* and *Aristotle*, who, of all the Pagan World, spoke best of *God*, and wrote best of *Government*.

Having thus described the *true Principles of civil and ecclesiastical Policy*, the great Poet proceeds [from l. 295 to 305] to illustrate his Account by the similar Harmony of the Universe :

\* Commentaire, p. 261.

Such is the World's great Harmony, that springs  
 From Union, Order, full Concert of Things!  
 Where small and great, where weak and mighty, made,  
 To serve, not suffer, strengthen, not invade,  
 More powerful each as needful to the rest,  
 And in proportion as it blesses, blest,  
 Draw to one Point, and to one Centre bring  
 Beast, Man, or Angel, Servant, Lord, or King.

Thus, as in the *Beginning* of this Epistle, he supported the *great Principle of mutual Love or Association in general*, by Considerations drawn from the *Properties of Matter*, and the mutual *Dependence* between vegetable and animal Life; so, in the *Conclusion*, he has enforced the *particular Principles of civil and religious Society*, from that *universal Harmony* which springs, in part, from those *Properties and Dependences*.

But now the Poet, having so much commended the Invention and Inventors of the *philosophic Principles of Religion and Government*, lest an evil Use should be made of this, by Men's resting in *Theory and Speculation*, as they have been always too apt to do, in Matters whose *Præctice* makes their Happiness, he cautions his Reader [from l. 304 to 311] against this Error, in a *Warmth of Expression*, which the sublime Ideas of that *universal Harmony*, operating incessantly to *universal Good*, had raised up in him.

For *Forms of Government* let Fools contest;  
 Whate'er is best administer'd is best.  
 For *Modes of Faith* let graceless Zealots fight;  
 His can't be wrong, whose Life is in the Right.  
 All must be false, that thwart this one great End,  
 And all of God, that bless Mankind, or mend.

The Seasonableness of this Reproof will appear evident enough to those who know, that mad Disputes about *Liberty and Prerogative* had *once* well nigh overturned our Constitution; and that  
 others

others about *Myſtery* and *Church Authority* had almoſt deſtroyed the very Spirit of our holy Religion.

But theſe fine Lines have been ſtrangely miſunderſtood. The Author, againſt his own expreſs Words, againſt the plain Senſe of his Syſtem, has been conceiv'd to mean, *That all Governments and all Religions were, as to their Forms and Objects, indifferent.* But as this wrong Judgment proceeded from Ignorance of the *Reason* of the Reproof, as explained above, that Explanation is alone ſufficient to rectify the Miſtake.

However, not to leave him under the leaſt Suſpicion, in a Matter of ſo much Importance, I ſhall juſtify the Senſe here given to this Paſſage more at large. Firſt by conſidering the *Words themſelves*: And then by comparing this miſtaken Senſe with the Context.

The Poet, we muſt obſerve, is here ſpeaking, not of civil Society *at large*, but of a *juſt* legitimate Policy,

Th' according Muſic of a WELL-MIX'D State.

Now theſe are of ſeveral Kinds; in ſome of which the *Democratic*, in others the *Ariſtocratic*, and in others the *Monarchic* FORM prevails. Now as each of theſe *mix'd Forms* is equally legitimate, as being founded on the Principles of natural Liberty, that Man is guilty of the higheſt *Folly*, who chuſes rather to employ himſelf in a ſpeculative Conteſt for the ſuperior Excellence of one of theſe Forms to the reſt, than in promoting the good Administration of that ſettled *Form* to which he is ſubject. And yet all our warm Diſputes about Government have been of this kind. Again, if, by *Forms of Government*, muſt needs be meant *legitimate Government*, becauſe that is the Subject under Debate, then by *Modes of Faith*, which is the correſpondent Idea, muſt needs be meant the *Modes or Explanations* of the *true Faith*, becauſe the Author is here too on the Subject of *true Religion*;

Reſum'd her ancient Light, not kindled new.

Beſides,

Besides, the very Expression (than which nothing can be more precise) confines us to understand, by *Modes of Faith*, those human Explanations of Christian Mysteries, in contesting which, Zeal and Ignorance have so perpetually violated Charity.

Secondly, If we consider the *Context*; to suppose him to mean, that *all Forms of Government are indifferent*, is making him directly contradict the preceding Paragraph; where he extols the Patriot for discriminating the *true* from the *false* Modes of Government. He, says the Poet,

Taught Power's due Use to People and to Kings,  
 Taught not to slack, nor strain its tender Strings;  
 The less and greater set so justly true,  
 That touching one must strike the other too;  
 'Till jarring Interests of themselves create  
 Th' according Music of a *well-mix'd State*.

Here he recommends the *true* Form of Government, which is the *mixt*. In another Place he as strongly condemns the *false*, or the absolute *jure Divino* Form:

For Nature knew no *Right Divine* in Men. l. 237.

To suppose him to mean, that *all Religions are indifferent*, is an equally wrong as well as uncharitable Suspicion. Mr. Pope, though his Subject in this *Essay on Man* confines him to *natural Religion* (his Purpose being to vindicate God's natural Dispensations to Mankind against the Atheist), yet gives frequent Intimations of a more sublime Dispensation, and even of the Necessity of it; particularly in his *second* Epistle [l. 139], where he speaks of the *Weakness and Insufficiency of human Reason* \*.

Again, in his fourth Epistle [l. 331] speaking of the good Man, the Favourite of Heaven, he says,

For him alone, *Hope* leads from Goal to Goal,  
 And opens still, and opens on his Soul;

\* See the second Letter, p. 94.

Till lengthen'd on to *Faith*, and unconfin'd,  
It pours the Bliss that fills up all the Mind.

But *natural Religion* never lengthen'd *Hope* on to *Faith*; nor did any Religion, but the Christian, ever conceive that *Faith* could fill the Mind with Happiness.

Lastly, The Poet, in this very Epistle, and in this very Place, speaking of the great Restorers of the Religion of Nature, intimates that they could only draw God's *Shadow*, not his *Image*:

Releas'd her ancient Light, not kindled new,  
If not *God's Image*, yet his *Shadow* drew.

As reverencing that Truth, which tells us that this *Discovery* was reserved for the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the IMAGE OF GOD\*.

Having thus largely considered Man in his *social Capacity*, the Poet, in order to fix a momentous Truth in the Mind of his Reader, concludes the Epistle in recapitulating the *two Principles* which concur to the Support of *this Part* of his Character, namely, *Self-love* and *social*; and shewing that they are only two different Motions of the *Appetite, to Good*, by which the Author of Nature has enabled Man to find *his own* Happiness in the Happiness of the *Whole*. This the Poet illustrates with a Thought as sublime as is that general Harmony he describes:

On their own Axis as the Planets run,  
Yet make at once their Circle round the Sun;  
So two consistent Motions act the Soul,  
And one regards itself, and one the Whole.  
Thus God and Nature link'd the general Frame,  
And bad *Self-love* and *social* be the same.

For he hath the Art of converting Poetical Ornaments into Philosophic Reasoning; and of improving a *Simile* into an *Analogical Argument*. But of this Art, more in our Next.

\* 2 Cor. iv. 4.

## L E T T E R IV.

THE Poet, in the two foregoing Epistles, having considered MAN with regard to the MEANS (that is, *in all his Relations*, whether as an *Individual*, or a Member of *Society*) comes now, in this last, to consider him with regard to the END, that is, HAPPINESS.

It opens with an *Invocation to Happiness*, in the Manner of the ancient Poets, who, when destitute of a Patron *God*, applied to the *Muse*, and, if she was engaged, took up with any simple *Virtue*, next at hand, to inspire and prosper their Designs. This was the *ancient Invocation*, which few modern Poets have had the Art to imitate with any degree of Spirit or Decorum; while our Author, not content to heighten this poetic Ornament with the Graces of the *Antique*, hath also contrived to make it subservient to the Method and Reasoning of his philosophic Composition. I will endeavour to explain so uncommon a Beauty.

It is to be observed that the Pagan Deities had each their *several Names* and *Places of Abode*, with some of which they were supposed to be more delighted than with others, and consequently to be then most propitious when invoked by the favourite *Name* and *Place*: Hence we find the Hymns of *Homer*, *Orpheus*, and *Callimachus*, to be chiefly employed in enumerating the several Names

and Places of Abode by which the Patron God was distinguished. Now, our Poet, with great and masterly Address, hath made these *two Circumstances* serve to introduce his Subject, according to the exactest Rules of Logic. His Purpose is to write of *Happiness*; Method therefore requires that he first define what Men mean by *Happiness*, and this he does in the Ornament of a poetic *Invocation*:

O *Happiness*! our Being's End and Aim,  
Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content!, what'er thy NAME.

After the DEFINITION, that which follows next, in order of Method, is the PROPOSITION, which here is, *that human Happiness consists not in external Advantages, but in Virtue*. For the Subject of this Epistle is the detecting the *false* Notions of Happiness, and settling and explaining the *true*; and this the Poet lays down in the next sixteen Lines. Now the Enumeration of *Happiness's* several supposed *Places of Abode* (which, in Imitation of the ancient Poets, he next mentions in the *Invocation*, and which makes ten of the sixteen Lines) is a Summary of *false Happiness*, placed in *Externals*:

Plant of Celestial Seed! if dropt below,  
Say in what mortal Soil thou deign'it to grow?  
Fair opening to some Court's propitious Shine,  
Or deep with *Diamonds* in the flaming Mine?  
Twin'd with the Wreaths *Parnassian Laurels* yield,  
Or reap'd in *Iron Harvests* of the Field?

The six remaining Lines deliver the *true* Notion of Happiness to be in *Virtue*. Which is summ'd up in these two;

Fixt to no Spot is Happiness sincere,  
'Tis no where to be found, or every where.

The Poet, having thus *defined* his *Terms*, and laid down his *Proposition*, proceeds to the Support of his *Thesis*; the various Arguments of which make up the body of the Epistle.



He begins [from l. 18 to 27] with detecting the *false Notions of Happiness*. These are of two kinds, the *Philosophical* and *Popular*: The latter he had recapitulated in the *Invocation*, when *Happiness* was call'd upon at her several supposed Places of Abode; the *Philosophic* then only remained to be delivered.

Ask of the *Learn'd* the Way, the *Learn'd* are blind,  
 This bids to *serve*, and that to *shun* Mankind:  
 Some place the Bliss in *Action*, some in *Ease*;  
 Those call it Pleasure, and Contentment these.

The Confutation of these *Philosophic Errors*, he shews to be very easy, *one common Falloey* running through them all; namely this, That, instead of telling us in what the *Happiness of human Nature* consists, which was what was asked of them, each busies himself to explain in what he placed *his own peculiar Happiness*:

Who thus define it, say they more or less  
 Than this, that Happiness is Happiness?

And here, before we go any farther, it will be proper to turn to our *Logician*, who, blind to these Beauties in the admirable Disposition of the Subject, is extremely scandalized at the Poet for not proceeding immediately to explain *true Happiness* (after having defined his Terms and delivered his Thesis) but for going back again (as he fancies) to a Consideration of the *false*.—Speaking of the sixteen Lines, he says—“Happiness is then near me, and I feel  
 “myself considerably refreshed; but, by ill Luck, it is only for a  
 “Moment, my Doubts presently return, and I find myself in the  
 “Hands of a Poet, who can do what he will with me, and who  
 “having placed me on the very Borders of Happiness, on a sudden  
 “shuts up all its Avenues\*.”

But a very little *Patience* and *Impartiality* would have shewn him, that they were immediately laid open again in the very next Lines [from 26 to 33] where the Poet shews, that if you will but

\* *Commentaire*, p. 271.

take the Road of *Nature*, and leave that of *mad Opinion*, you will soon find Happiness to be a Good of the Species, and, like common Sense, equally distributed to all Mankind:

Take Nature's Path, and mad Opinion's leave,  
 All States can reach it, and all Heads conceive;  
 Obvious her Goods, in no Extreme they dwell,  
 There needs but thinking right, and meaning well;  
 And, mourn our various Portions as we please,  
 Equal is common Sense, and common Ease.

But this is so far from satisfying our Bully-Critic, that it only furnishes him with fresh Matter for a Quarrel. He is much offended at the two first Lines. "—I must here renew my Complaints. "Take Nature's Path, you say; and what am I to understand by "this Nature? Must I take the *reasonable Nature* for my Guide? "But, according to you, the Philosophers have consulted it to no "purpose. Shall I give myself up to the *Animal Nature*? This "would soon reduce me to great Distresses. Encompassed with "Doubts and Difficulties, what have I left, but to suffer "myself to be borne away by Chance or Hazard? And to conclude, that the Counsel here given of taking *Nature's Path*, "comes at length to this, to march stedily on in the Footsteps of "Fatality."

It would be hard indeed, if our Commentator could not find the Road to *Fatality*, in every Step the Poet takes. But here, in avoiding the Horns of his own chimerical *Dilemma*, he jumps upon it more awkwardly than usual. The Poet, says he, must either mean the *Reasonable*, or the *Animal Nature*. Agreed. He could not mean the *Animal Nature*. This too is true. Nor the *Reasonable*. Why not? Because it stood the Philosophers in no stead. What then? Do you think he has ever the worse Opinion of it on that Account? They could not possibly have run into more Mistakes

\* *Commentaire*, p. 272, 273.

about *Happiness*, than you have about the Poet's *Meaning*: And yet, for all that, I apprehend he will think never the worse, either of *Reason* or *himself*.

But what is indeed incredible, after Mr. *De Croufaz* had thus commented the two first Lines, he goes on with his Remarks on the immediately following, *Obvious her Goods, &c.* in these Words: "See Mr. Pope once again under the Necessity of restoring Reason to its Rights\*." Prodigious! It seems then, after all, Mr. *Pope* by *Nature's Path*, did indeed mean the *reasonable Nature*. For we now see it was Mr. *De Croufaz*, not Mr. *Pope*, that was under the Necessity of restoring Reason to its Rights.

To proceed, the Poet having exposed the two false species of *Happiness*, the PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and denounced the *True*, in order to establish the *last*, goes on to a Confutation of the two former.

I. He first [from l. 32 to 47] confutes the PHILOSOPHICAL, which, as we said, makes *Happiness* a *particular*, not a *general* Good: And this two Ways:

1. From his *grand Principle*, That *God acts by general Laws*: The Consequence of which is, that *Happiness*, which supports the well-being of every System, must needs be *Universal*, and not *Partial*, as the Philosophers conceived:

Remember, Man! *The universal Cause*  
*Acts not by partial, but by general Laws*;  
 And makes, what *Happiness* we justly call,  
 Subsist not in the Good of One, but All.

2. From *Fact*, That Man instinctively concurs with this Designation of Providence, to make *Happiness* universal, by his having no Delight in any thing *uncommunicated* or *uncommunicable*:

There's not a Blessing Individuals find,  
 But some way leans and hearkens to the kind.

\* Commentaire, p. 281.

No Bandit fierce, no Tyrant mad with Pride,  
 No cavern'd Hermit rests self-satisfied.  
 Abstract what others feel, what others think,  
 All Pleasures sicken, and all Glories sink.

II. The Poet, in the second Place [from l. 46 to 65] confutes the POPULAR Error concerning *Happiness*, namely, that it consists in *Externals*: which he does,

1. By inquiring into the Reasons of the present providential Disposition of *external Goods*: A Topic of Confutation chosen with the greatest Accuracy and Penetration. For, if it appears *they* were distributed in the Manner we see them, for Reasons *different* from the *Happiness of Individuals*, it is absurd to think that they should make *Part* of that Happiness.

He shews therefore, that Disparity of external Possessions among Men was for the sake of *Society*, 1. to promote the Harmony and Happiness of a *System*:

Order is Heaven's first Law; and, this confess,  
 Some are, and must be, greater than the rest,  
 More rich, more wise,—

Because the *Want* of external Goods in some, and the *Abundance* in others, increaseth general Harmony in the *Obliger* and *Obliged*.

Yet here (says he) mark the impartial Wisdom of Heaven; this very *Inequality of Externals*, by contributing to *general Harmony* and Order, produceth an *Equality of Happiness* amongst *Individuals*; and, *for that very reason*,

Heaven to Mankind impartial we confess,  
 If all are equal in their Happiness:  
 But mutual Wants this Happiness increase,  
 All Nature's Difference keeps all Nature's Peace.  
 Condition, Circumstance is not the Thing:  
 Bliss is the same, in Subject, or in King;

In

In who obtain Defence, or who defend;  
 In him who is, or him who finds, a Friend.  
 Heaven breathes thro' every Member of the Whole  
 One common Blessing as one common Soul.

2. This Disparity was necessary, because, if external Goods were equally distributed, they would occasion perpetual Discord amongst Men all *equal* in Power:

But Fortune's Gifts if each alike possess,  
 And each were equal, must not all contest?

From hence he concludes, That, as *External Goods* were not given for the Reward of Virtue, but for many different Purposes, God could not, if he intended Happiness for all, place it in the Enjoyment of *Externals*:

If then to *all* Men Happiness was meant,  
 God in Externals could not place Content.

2. His second Argument [from l. 64 to 71] against the *popular Error* of Happiness's being placed in *Externals*, is, that the *Possession* of them is inseparably attended with *Fear*, the *Want* of them with *Hope*; which directly crossing all their Pretensions to making happy, evidently shew that God had placed Happiness *elsewhere*:

Fortune her Gifts may variously dispose,  
 And these be happy call'd, unhappy those;  
 But Heaven's just Balance equal will appear,  
 While those are plac'd in HOPE, and these in FEAR:  
 Not present Good or Ill, the Joy or Curse,  
 But future Views of better or of worse.

Hence, in concluding this Argument, he takes occasion [from l. 70 to 75] to upbraid the desperate Folly and Impiety of those, who, in spite of God and Nature, will yet attempt to place *Happiness* in *Externals*.

O Sons of Earth! attempt ye still to rise,  
 By Mountains pil'd on Mountains, to the Skies?  
 Heaven still with Laughter the vain Toil surveys,  
 And buries Madmen in the Heaps they raise.

I must not here omit to observe, that the Translator (unconscious of all this fine Reasoning between the 32d and 75th Lines, where the Poet first confutes the *Philosophic* Errors concerning Happiness, and next the *Popular*) hath strangely jumbled together and confounded his different Arguments on these two different Heads. But this is not the worst; he hath perverted the Poet's Words to a horrid and senseless *Fatalism*, foreign to the Argument in hand, and directly contrary to Mr. *Pope's* general Principles.

The Poet says,

Remember, Man! the universal Cause  
 Acts not by partial, but by general Laws.

His Translator,

— Une Loi generale

Determine toujours la Cause Principale.

That is, a *general Law* ever determines the *principal Cause*, which is the very *Fate* of the ancient Pagans, who supposed that Destiny gave Law to the *Father of Gods and Men*.

The Poet says again,

Order is Heaven's first Law:

That is, the *first Law* made by God, relates to *Order*, which is a beautiful Allusion to the Scripture History of the Creation, when God first appeas'd the Disorders of *Chaos*, and separated the Light from the Darkness. Let us now hear his Translator:

L'Ordre, cet inflexible et grand Legislatteur,  
 Qui des decrets du Ciel est le premier Auteur:

*Order,*

*Order, that inflexible and grand Legislator, who is the first Author of the Laws of Heaven.* A Proposition abominable in most Senses, and absurd in all.

But now what says Mr. *De Croufax* to this, who is perpetually crying out, *Fate! Fate!* as Men in Distraction call out *Fire?* The Reader will be surprized to hear him pass this cool Reflexion on two so obnoxious Passages.—“*This Order, the first Author of Laws, presents us with very harsh Expressions, and bold Ideas, which Mr. Pope elsewhere condemns as rash and unjustifiable* \*.” But this is his Moderation, when Mr. *L'Abbé* comes under his Critique: And we know, the excellent Prose Translation gave him the Advantage of knowing whom he had to do with.

To proceed, the Poet having thus confuted the two Errors concerning *Happiness*, PHILOSOPHICAL and POPULAR, and proved that true Happiness was neither *Solitary and Partial*, nor yet placed in *Externals*; goes on [from l. 74 to 91] to shew in what it doth consist. He had before said in general, and repeated it, that Happiness lay in common to the whole Species. He now brings us better acquainted with it, in a more explicite Information of its Nature; and tells us, it is all contained in *Health, Peace, and Competence*; but that these are to be gained only by VIRTUE, namely, by *Temperance, Innocence, and Industry*:

Reason's whole Pleasures, all the Joys of Sense,  
Lie in three Words, Health, Peace, and Competence.  
But Health consists with Temperance alone,  
And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

The first Line,

*Reason's whole Pleasures, all the Joys of Sense,*

is the most beautiful Paraphrasis for *Happiness*; for all we feel of Good is by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*. The Translator, who seemed little to concern himself with the Poet's Philosophy or Argument,

\* *Commentaire*, p. 282.

mistook this Description of *Happiness* for a Description of the *intellectual and sensitive Faculties*, opposed to one another; and therefore thus translates it:

Le charme seducteur, dont s'enyvrant les Sens,  
Les Plaisirs de l'Esprit encore plus ravissans.

And so, with the highest Absurdity, not only makes the Poet constitute *sensual Excesses* a Part of human Happiness, but likewise the Product of Virtue.

After this, we shall no longer wonder at such kind of Translations as the following:

Mr. *Pope* says,  
And Peace, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

The Translator,  
Pour vous, O Paix du Cœur, digne fille des Cieux,  
Vous êtes du bonheur le gage précieux.

*Conscious Innocence*, says the Poet, is the only Source of internal Peace, and known Innocence of external; therefore Peace is the sole Issue of Virtue; or, in his own emphatic Words, *Peace is ALL thy own*; a conclusive Observation in his Argument. O *Peace*, says the Translator, *thou art the precious Pledge of Happiness*; an Observation, which concludes no more than that the Translator did not understand the Argument, which stands thus:—Is Happiness rightly placed in Externals? No, for it consists in Health, Peace, and Competence. Health and Competence are the Product of Temperance and Industry; and Peace, of perfect Innocence.

But hitherto, the Poet hath only considered *Health* and *Peace*:

But *Health* consists with Temperance alone,  
And *Peace*, O *Virtue!* Peace is all thy own.

One Head yet remains to be spoken to, namely, *Competence*. In the Pursuit of *Health* and *Peace* there is no Danger of running into Excess. But the Case is different with regard to *Competence*.

Here,



Here, *Wealth* and *Affluence* would be too apt to be mistaken for it, in Mens passionate Pursuit of external Goods. To obviate this Mistake therefore, the Poet shews, that, as *exorbitant Wealth* adds nothing to the Happiness arising from a *Competence*, so, as it is generally ill gotten, it is attended with Circumstances that weaken another Part of this triple Cord, namely, *Peace*:

The Good or Bad the Gifts of Fortune gain ;  
 But these less taste them as they worse obtain.  
 Say, in Pursuit of Profit or Delight,  
 Who risque the most, that take wrong Means or right ?  
 Of Vice or Virtue, whether blest or curst,  
 Which meets Contempt, or which Compassion first ?  
 Count all th'Advantage prosperous Vice attains,  
 'Tis but what Virtue flies from, and disdains ;  
 And grant the Bad what Happiness they would,  
 One they must want, which is, to pass for good.

Here Mr. *De Croufaz's* Remarks are indeed very extraordinary—  
 “ To whom (says he) are these Interrogatories addressed?—If you  
 “ refer yourself to the Judgment of a Troop of young Libertines,  
 “ such as are to be found in great Cities, and in Armies, you will  
 “ certainly not have the Laughters on your Side \*,” &c. What  
 then? If *Reason* require they should, is not that sufficient for the  
 Poet's Purpose, in a Discourse where *Reason* is continually appealed  
 to, in a Controversy between him and them? But our Logician's  
 Perversity is without Example. Till now, his Quarrel with the  
 Poet was, that his Arguments flattered the corrupt Sentiments of  
 Libertinism. At present he is as captious with him for their oppos-  
 ing those Sentiments. Does not this look as if he were resolved  
 to approve of nothing Mr. *Pope* could say?

Our Author having thus largely confuted the Mistake of *Happi-  
 ness's* consisting in *Externals*, proceeds to expose the terrible CON-  
 SEQUENCES of such an Opinion, on the Sentiments and Practice of

\* Commentaire, p. 289, 290.

all Sorts of Men, making the DISSOLUTE impious and atheistical, the RELIGIOUS uncharitable and intolerant, and the GOOD restless and discontent. For when it is once taken for granted, that *Happiness consists in Externals*, it is immediately seen that *ill Men* are often more happy than *good*; which sets all Conditions on objecting to the Ways of Providence, and some even on rashly attempting to rectify its Dispensations, though by the Violation of Law, divine and human. Now this being the most momentous Part of the Subject under Consideration, is deservedly treated most at large. And here it will be proper to take notice of the exquisite Art of the Poet, in making this Confutation serve, at the same time, for a full Solution of all Objections which might be made to his main Proposition, *that Happiness consists not in Externals*.

1. He begins, first of all, with the ATHEISTICAL *Complainers*, and pursues their Impiety [from l. 95 to 129] with all the Vengeance of his Eloquence.

Oh blind to Truth, and God's whole Scheme below!  
 Who fancy Bliss to Vice, to Virtue Woe:  
 Who sees and follows that great Scheme the best,  
 Best knows the Blessing, and will most be blest.

He exposes their Folly, even on their own Notions of *external Goods*.

1. By *Examples* [from line 96 to 109] where he shews *first*, that, if good Men have been untimely cut off, this is not to be ascribed to their Virtues, but to a Contempt of Life that hurried them into Dangers. *Secondly*, That if they will still persist in ascribing *untimely Death* to Virtue, they must needs, on the same Principle, likewise ascribe *long Life* to it. Consequently as the Argument, in *Fact*, concludes both ways, in *Logic*, it concludes neither.

But Fools the *Good* alone unhappy call,  
 From Ills or Accidents that chance to all.

Say,

Say, was it Virtue, more though Heaven ne'er gave,  
 Lamented *Digby!* sunk thee to the Grave?  
 Tell me, if Virtue made the Son expire,  
 Why full of Days and Honour lives the Sire?  
 Why drew *Marjeilles'* good Bishop purer Breath,  
 When Nature sicken'd, and each Gale was Death?  
 Or why so long (in Life if long can be)  
 Lent Heaven a Parent to the Poor, and me?

This last Instance of the Poet's Illustration of the Ways of Providence, the Reader sees, has a peculiar Elegance; where a Tribute of Piety to a *Parent* is paid in a Return of Thanks to [*Lent Heaven a Parent, &c.*] and made subservient of [*Or why so long—*] his Vindication of, the *Great Father of all Things*.

2. He exposes their Folly [from line 108 to 129] by *Considerations drawn from the System of Nature*; and these, two-fold, *Natural* and *Moral*. You accuse God, says the Poet, because the good Man is subject to Natural and Moral Evil: Let us see whence these proceed. Natural Evil is the necessary Consequence of a material World so constituted: But that this Constitution was *best*, we have proved in the first Epistle. Moral Evil ariseth from the depraved Will of Man: Therefore neither the one nor the other from God.

What makes all Physical or Moral Ill?  
 There deviates Nature, and here wanders Will.  
 God sends not Ill, if rightly understood;  
 Or partial Ill is universal Good;  
 Or Chance admits, or Nature lets it fall,  
 Short, and but rare, till Man improv'd it all.

But you say (adds the Poet, to these impious Complainers) that though it be fit Man should suffer the Miseries which he brings upon himself, by the Commission of moral Evil, yet it seems to be unfit his innocent Posterity should bear a Share of them. To this, says he, I reply,

We

W' just as wisely might of Heaven complain  
 That righteous *Abel* was destroy'd by *Cain*,  
 As that the virtuous Son is ill at ease,  
 When his lewd Father gave the dire Disease.

But you will still say (continues the Poet) why does not God either prevent, or immediately repair these Evils? You may as well ask, why he doth not work continual Miracles, and every Moment reverse the established Laws of Nature :

Shall burning *Etna*, if a Sage requires,  
 Forget to thunder, and recal her Fires?  
 On Air or Sea new Motions be impress'd,  
 O blameless *Bethel!* to relieve thy Breast?  
 When the loose Mountain trembles from on high,  
 Shall Gravitation cease, if you go by?  
 Or, some old Temple nodding to its Fall,  
 For *Chartres'* Head reserve the hanging Wall?

This is the Force of the Poet's Reasoning, and these the Men to whom he addresses it, namely, the *Libertine* Cavillers against Providence.

II. But now, so unhappy is the Condition of our corrupt Nature, that these are not the only Complainers. *Religious* Men are but too apt, if not to *speak out*, yet sometimes secretly to *murmur* against Providence, and say, *its Ways are not equal*: Especially those more inordinately devoted to a Sect or Party are scandalized, that the JUST (for such they esteem themselves) *who are to judge the World*, have no better *Portion in their own Inheritance*. The Poet therefore now leaves those more *profligate* Complainers, and turns [from l. 128 to 147] to the *Religious*, in these Words :

But still this World (so fitted for the Knave)  
 Contents us not. A better shall we have?  
 A *Kingdom of the Just* then let it be,  
 But first consider how those *Just* agree.

As the more impious Complainers wanted external Goods to be the Reward of Virtue for the *moral* Man; so these want them for the *Pious*, in order to have a *Kingdom of the Just*. To this the Poet holds it sufficient to answer: Pray, Gentlemen, first agree amongst yourselves, who *those Just* are. We allow,

The Good must merit God's peculiar Care,  
 But who but God can tell us who they are?  
 One thinks on *Calvin* Heaven's own Spirit fell,  
 Another deems him Instrument of Hell:  
 If *Calvin* feels Heaven's Blessing or its Rod,  
 This cries, There is, and that, There is no God.

As this is the Case, he even bids them rest satisfied; remember his fundamental Principle, *That whatever is, is right*; and content themselves (as their Religion teaches them to profess a more than ordinary Submission to the Ways of Providence) with that common Answer which he with so much Reason and Piety gives to every Kind of Complainer.

However, though there be yet no Kingdom of the *Just*, there is still no Kingdom of the *Unjust*. That both the *Virtuous* and the *Vicious*, whatsoever becomes of those whom every Sect calls the *Faithful*, have their Shares in external Goods; and, what is more, the *Virtuous* have infinitely the most Enjoyment in them:

—This World, 'tis true,  
 Was made for *Cæsar*, but for *Titus* too:  
 And which more *blest*? who chain'd his Country, say,  
 Or he whose Virtue sigh'd to lose a Day?

I have been the more careful to explain this last Argument, and to shew against whom it is directed, because much depends upon it for the Illustration of the Sense, and the just Defence of the Poet. For if we suppose him still addressing himself to those *impious* Complainers, confuted in the thirty-eight preceding Lines, we should make him guilty of a *Parallogism* in the Argument about the

701, and in the Illustration of it by the Case of *Colvix*. For then the Libertines ask, Why the *Just*, that is, the *moral Man*, is not rewarded? The Answer is, That none but God can tell who the *Just*, that is, the *truly faithful Man*, is. Where the term is changed, in order to support the Argument; for about the *truly Moral Man* there is no Dispute; about the *truly Faithful*, or the *Orthodox*, a great deal. But take the Poet right, as arguing here against *religious* Complainers, and the Reasoning is strict and logical. They ask, Why the *truly Faithful* are not rewarded? He answers, They may be for ought you know, for none but God can tell who they are. Mr. *De Craufas's* Objections to this Reasoning receive all their Force from that wrong Supposition, That the Poet was here arguing against *Libertine* Complainers; and consequently they have no Force at all.

III. The Poet having dispatched these two Species of Complainers, comes now to the third and still more pardonable Sort, the discontented *good Men*, who lament only, that *Virtue starves, while Vice riots*. To these the Poet replies [from l. 146 to 155] that admit this to be the Case, yet they have no Reason to complain, either of the good Man's Lot in particular, or of the Dispensation of Providence in general. Not of the *former*, because *Happiness*, the Reward of Virtue, consists not in *Externals*; nor of the *latter*, because ill Men may gain Wealth by commendable Industry, good Men want Necessaries through Indolence or bad Conduct.

But as modest as this Complaint seems at first View, the Poet next shews [from l. 154 to 165] that it is founded on a Principle of the highest Extravagance, which will never let the discontented *good Man* rest, till he becomes as vain and foolish in his Imaginations as the very worst sort of Complainers. For that when once he begins to think he wants what is his due, he will never know where to stop, while God has any thing to give.

But this is not all; he proves next [from l. 164 to 175] that these Demands are not only *unreasonable*, but in the highest degree  
*absurd*

*absurd* likewise. For that those very *Goods*, if granted, would be the *Destruction* of that *Virtue* for which they are demanded as a *Reward*. He concludes therefore on the whole, that,

What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,  
The Soul's calm Sunshine, and the heart-felt Joy,  
Is Virtue's Prize.—

But the Poet now enters more at large upon the Matter: And still continuing his Discourse to this *third* Sort of Complainers (whom he indulges as much more pardonable than the *first* or *second*, in rectifying all their Doubts and Mistakes) proves both from *Reason* and *Example*, how unable any of those things are, which the World most admires, to make a *good* Man *happy*. For, as to the *philosophic* Mistakes concerning Happiness, there being little Danger of their making a general Impression, the Poet, after a short Confutation, had dismissed them all together. But *external Goods* are those Syrens, which so bewitch the World with Dreams of *Happiness*, that of all Things the most difficult is, to awaken it out of its Delusions; though, as he proves, in an exact Review of the most Pretending, they dishonour *bad* Men, and add no Lustre to the *Good*. That it is only this third and least criminal Sort of Complainers, against which the remaining Part of the Discourse is levelled, appears from the Poet's so frequently addressing himself, while he inforces his Arguments in Behalf of Providence, from henceforward to his Friend.

I. He begins therefore [from line 174 to 195] with considering RICHES. 1. He examines, first, what there is of *real* Value in them, and shews, they can give the *good* Man only that very Contentment he had before, or, at most, but burthen him with a Trust to be dispensed for the Benefit of others:

For *Riches*, can they give but to the Just  
His own Contentment, or another's Trust?

Since the *good* Man esteems all, beside what is sufficient to supply

him with the Conveniencies of Life, as entrusted to him by Providence, for the Supplial of others Necessities.

It is true, he tells us elsewhere, that another Sort of *good Men* are of a different Opinion :

The grave Sir *Gilbert* holds it for a Rule,  
That every *Man in Want is Knave or Fool* :  
*God cannot love* (says *Blunt*, with lifted Eyes)  
*The Wretch he starves*—and piously denies.

*Of the Use of Riches*, l. 103.

And these are they to whom he here alludes, where he says,

O Fool ! to think God hates the worthy Mind,  
The Lover, and the Love, of Human-kind,  
Whose Life is healthful, and whose Conscience clear,  
Because he wants a thousand Pounds a Year !

The Poet next examines the *imaginary* Value of Riches, as the Fountain of *Honour*. For his Adversaries Objection stands thus :—  
As *Honour* is the genuine Claim of Virtue, and Shame the just Retribution of Vice ; and as *Honour*, in their Opinion, follows Riches, and Shame Poverty ; therefore the *good Man* should be *rich*. He tells them in this they are much mistaken :

Honour and Shame from no Condition rise ;  
Act well your Part, there all the Honour lies.

What Power then has *Fortune* over the *Man* ? None at all. For, as her *Favours* can confer neither Worth nor *Wisdom* ; so neither can her *Displeasure* cure him of any of his *Follies*. On his *Garb* indeed she has some little Influence ; but his *Heart* still remains the same :

*Fortune* in Men has some small Difference made,  
One *flaunts* in Rags, one *flutters* in Brocade.

II. Then, as to *NOBILITY*, by *Creation* or *Birth*, this too he shews [from l. 195 to 207] is, in itself, as devoid of all real Worth



as the rest: Because, in the *first* Case the *Title* is generally gained by no Merit at all:

Stuck o'er with Titles, and hung round with Strings,  
That thou may'st be by Kings, or Whores of Kings.

In the *second*, by the Merit of the first Founder of the Family, which will always, when reflected on, be rather the Subject of *Mortification* than *Glory*:

Go! if your ancient, but ignoble, Blood  
Has crept through Scoundrels ever since the Flood,  
Go! and pretend your Family is young;  
Nor own your Fathers have been Fools so long.

III. The Poet in the next Place [from l. 206 to 227] unmasks the false Pretences of GREATNESS, whereby it is seen that the *Hero* and *Politician* (the two Characters which would monopolize that Quality) after all their Bustle, effect only this, if they want Virtue, that the one proves himself a *Fool*, and the other a *Knave*: And *Virtue* they but too generally want. The *Art of Heroism* being understood to consist in Ravage and *Defolation*: and the *Art of Politics*, in *Circumvention*. Now

—Grant that those can conquer, these can cheat,  
'Tis Phrase absurd to call a *Villain*, Great:  
Who wickedly is wise, or madly brave,  
Is but the more a *Fool*, the more a *Knave*.

It is not *Success* therefore that constitutes *true Greatness*; but the *End aimed at*; and the *Means* which are *employed*: And if these be right, *Glory* will be the *Reward*, whatever be the *Issue*:

Who noble Ends by noble Means obtains,  
Or failing, smiles in Exile or in Chains,  
Like good *Aurelius* let him reign, or bleed  
Like *Socrates*, that Man is great indeed.

IV. With regard to FAME, that still more fantastic Blessing, he shews [from l. 226 to 249] that all of it, besides what we hear ourselves,

ourselves, is merely nothing; and that even of this small Portion, no more of it gives the Possessor a real Satisfaction, than what is the Fruit of Virtue.

All *Fame* is foreign, but of true Desert,  
Plays round the *Head*, but comes not near the *Heart*.

Thus he shews, that *Honour*, *Nobility*, *Greatness*, *Glory*, so far as they have any thing real and substantial, that is, so far as they contribute to the *Happiness* of the Possessor, are the sole Issue of *Virtue*, and that neither *Riches*, *Courts*, *Armies*, nor the *Populace*, are capable of conferring them.

V. But lastly, the Poet proves [from l. 248 to 259] that as *no external Goods* can make Man happy, so neither is it in the Power of *all internal*. For, that even SUPERIOR PARTS bring no more real Happiness to the Possessor, than the rest, nay, put him into a worse Condition; for that the Quickness of Apprehension, and Depth of Penetration, do but sharpen the Miseries of Life:

In Parts superior, what Advantage lies?  
Tell (for You can) what is it to be wise?  
'Tis but to know how little can be known;  
To see all others Faults, and feel our own, &c.  
Painful Pre-eminence! yourself to view  
*Above Life's Weakness, and its COMFORTS too.*

This to his Friend—nor does it at all contradict what he had said to him concerning *Happiness* in the Beginning of the Epistle:

'Tis never to be bought, but always free,  
And fled from Monarchs, *St. John!* dwells with thee.

For he is now proving that nothing either external to Man, or what is not in his own Power, and of his own Acquirement, can make him happy *here*. The most plausible Rival of *Virtue* is *Knowledge*. Yet even this, he says, is so far from giving any degree of real

real Happiness, that it deprives Men of those *common Comforts* of Life, which are a kind of Support to us under the Want of *Happiness*: Such as the more innocent of those *Delusions* which he speaks of in the second Epistle, where he says,

Till then, Opinion gilds with varying Rays  
Those painted Clouds, that beautify our Days, &c. l. 265.

Now *Knowledge* (as is here said) *destroys* all those Comforts, by setting Man *above Life's Weaknesses*: So that in him, who thinks to attain *Happiness* by *Knowledge*, the *Fable* is reversed, and in a preposterous Attempt to gain the *Substance*, he loses even the *Shadow*. This I take to be the true Sense of this fine Stroke of Satire, on the wrong Pursuits after *Happiness*.

Having thus proved how empty and unsatisfactory all these Greatest external Goods are, from an Examination of their Nature, the Poet proceeds to strengthen his Argument [from l. 258 to 299] by these two *farther* Considerations,

1st, That the Acquirement of these Goods is made with the Loss of one another; or of greater, either as inconsistent with them, or as spent in attaining them:

How much of other each is sure to cost?  
How each for other oft is wholly lost?  
How inconsistent greater Goods with these?  
How sometimes Life is risqu'd, and always Ease?

2dly, That the Possessors of each of these Goods are generally such as are so far from raising Envy in a good Man, that he would refuse to take their Persons, though accompanied with their Possessions. And this the Poet illustrates by Examples:

Think, and if still the Things thy Envy call,  
Say, would'st thou be the Man to whom they fall? &c.

3dly,

3dly, Nay, that even the Possession of them all together, when they have excluded Virtue, only terminates in more enormous Misery :

If all, united, thy Ambition call,  
From ancient Story learn to scorn them all.  
There, in the *Rich*, the *Honour'd*, *Fam'd*, and *Great*,  
See the false Scale of Happiness complete !  
Mark by what wretched Steps their Glory grows,  
From Dirt and Sea-weed, as proud *Venice* rose, &c.

Having thus at length shewn, that *Happiness* consists neither in any *external* Goods, nor in all kinds of *internal*, that is, such of them as are not of our own Acquirement, he concludes [from l. 298 to 301] that it is to be found in VIRTUE ALONE :

Know then this Truth (enough for Man to know)  
Virtue alone is Happiness below.

Which the Translator turns thus :

Appren donc qu'il n'est point icy bas de *Bonheur*  
*Si la Vertu ne regle et l'Esprit, et le Cœur.*

i. e. Learn therefore that there is no *Happiness* here below, if *Virtue* does not regulate the *Heart* and the *Understanding*, which destroys the whole Force of the Poet's Conclusion. He had proved, that *Happiness* consists neither in *external Goods*, as the *Vulgar* imagined, nor yet in the *visionary* Pursuits of the *Philosophers*: He therefore concludes that it consists in VIRTUE ALONE. His Translator says, *without Virtue there can be no Happiness*. And so say the Men against whom the Poet is here arguing. For though they supposed *external* Goods requisite to *Happiness*, yet it was, when enjoyed according to the Rules of *Virtue*. Mr. *Pope* says,

*Virtue* ALONE is Happiness below,

and so ought his Translator to have said after him.

Hitherto

Hitherto the Poet had proved, NEGATIVELY, that *Happiness consists in Virtue*, by shewing it consisted not in any other thing. He now [from l. 300 to 317] proves the same POSITIVELY, by an Enumeration of its *Qualities*, all naturally adapted to give, and to increase human Happiness: As its *Constancy, Capacity, Vigour, Efficacy, Activity, Moderation, and Self-sufficiency*:

The only Point where human Bliss stands still,  
 And tastes the Good, without the Fall to Ill;  
 Without Satiety, tho' e'er so blest'd,  
 And but more relish'd, as the more distress'd:  
 Good, from each Object, from each Place, acquir'd,  
 For ever exercis'd, yet never tir'd;  
 Never elated, while one Man's oppress'd;  
 Never dejected, while another's blest'd;  
 And where no Wants, no Wishes can remain,  
 Since, but to wish more Virtue, is to gain.

Having thus proved that *Happiness* is indeed placed in *Virtue*, he proves next [from l. 316 to 319] that it is RIGHTLY placed there: For, that *then*, and *then only*, ALL may partake of it, and ALL be capable of relishing it:

See the sole Bliss Heaven *could* on ALL bestow,  
 Which who but feels can taste, but thinks can know.

The Poet then observes, with some Indignation, [from l. 318 to 331] that as *easy* and as *evident* as this Truth was, yet *Riches* and *false Philosophy* had so blinded the Perception, even of *improved Minds*, that the Possessors of the *first* placed Happiness in *Externals* unsuitable to Man's *Nature*; and the Followers of the *latter* in refined *Visions*, unsuitable to his *Situation*: While the simple-minded Man, with NATURE only for his Guide, found plainly in what it should be placed:

Yet *poor* with *Fortune*, and with *Learning blind*,  
 The Bad must miss, the Good untaught will find;

Slave to no Sect, who takes no private Road,  
 But looks thro' Nature up to Nature's God.  
 Pursues that Chain, which links th' immense Design,  
 Joins Heaven and Earth, and Mortal and Divine.  
 Sees that no Being any Bliss can know,  
 But touches some above, and some below ;  
 Learns, from this Union of the rising *Whole*,  
 The first last Purpose of the human Soul ;  
 And knows where Faith, Law, Morals, all began,  
 All end, in LOVE OF GOD, and LOVE OF MAN.

To this Mr. *De Croufaz*,—" I made my Remarks as I went  
 " along, in reading the Poem of Mr. *Du Resnel* ; and, in Propor-  
 " tion as I advanced in it, I have had the most agreeable Satisfac-  
 " tion to find, that my Commentaries have been too hasty and im-  
 " mature on this Poem ; in so clear a Light has the illustrious  
 " *L'abbé* placed those Truths, which the Prose Translator had deli-  
 " vered with much less Preciseness. In this Translation I evi-  
 " dently meet with the sacred Terms of *Faith*, *Hope*, and *Charity* ;  
 " but I don't know where he had them. And it is not easy for  
 " me to find, how the Ideas which I have been accustomed to fix  
 " to them can agree with them. I am puzzled to know what they  
 " have to do here \*."

This, to use our Critic's own Words, is a Specimen of that *Gallimatias*, which runs through his whole Commentary. He suspects, he approves, he doubts, he applauds ; but it all ends in Calumny and Condemnation. Here you have an old Veteran Controversialist of seventy-five, who gives the World his *second Thoughts* (for he had published his *Essamen* before he wrote his *Commentary*) telling us that he scribbled at random, and made the greatest Part of his Remarks before he had read over the Book he wrote against : A Book that contains a regular, well-digested System, whose Parts, having a mutual Dependence, necessarily support and illustrate one

\* *Commentaire*, p. 332.

another. But if a Man would make so free with himself as to tell this strange Story to the World, which certainly he had a Right to do, he should, as his moral Character was concerned, have made Satisfaction for his Folly, by striking out all those odious Imputations with which the foregoing Part of his Commentary abounds. Instead of this, he was not only content to leave the Calumnies of *Fatalism* and *Spinozism* un-retracted; but has thought fit to renew them, even after this Confession of his hasty, *immature* Way of Writing. Ah! misera mens hominis, quo te *fatum* læpissime trahit! What but this could have forced him to write a whole Book in Contradiction to the very *Principle* he himself lays down to proceed by? *An over-scrupulous Exactitude* (says he) *would hurt the very End of Poetry. But we must make it a Law to interpret one Expression by another, for fear of attributing Notions to a Poet that would be injurious to him* \*.

But to return: This is not all; the Poet shews farther [from l. 330 to 343] that, when the simple-minded Man, on his first setting out in the Pursuit of Truth, in order to Happiness, has had the Wisdom

*To look thro' Nature up to Nature's God,*

instead of adhering to any Sect or Party, where there was so great Odds of his chusing wrong; That then the Benefit of gaining the *Knowledge of God's Will written in the Mind* is not there confined; for that standing on this *sure Foundation*, he is now *no longer* in Danger of chusing wrong, amidst *such Diversities* of Religions; but by pursuing this grand Scheme of Universal Benevolence, in *Practice*, as well as *Theory*, he arrives at length to the *Knowledge of the revealed Will of God*, which is the *Consummation* of the *System of Benevolence*:

For him alone *Hope* leads from Goal to Goal,  
And opens still, and opens on his Soul,

\* Commentaire, p. 196.

'Till lengthen'd on to FAITH, and unconfin'd,  
It pours the Blits, that fills up all the Mind.

But let us once more hear Mr. *De Croufaz*: "We are brought  
" (says he) at length to the *Truths of Revelation*.—See Man once  
" again re-established in his Rights, raised as far above Brutes as  
" Heaven is above the Earth. How infinite a Difference between  
" what one reads in this *fourth* Epistle, and what the Poet ven-  
" tured to propose in the *first*, and in part of the *two following*?  
" There, corrupt Minds *thought* they read their own Sentiments;  
" and even this, which we find here, is insufficient to bring them  
" back again from their Preventions\*."

That the *three first* Epistles have nothing contrary to the *fourth*,  
we have not only sufficiently evinced, but shewn likewise, that  
the Doctrine of this *last*, so much approved by Mr. *De Croufaz*,  
is the necessary Consequence of that laid down in every one of  
the *preceding*, so much condemned by him. But, that *corrupt*  
*Minds thought they read their own Sentiments there*, nay, that it  
will be hard to bring them back again from their Preventions, I can  
easily conceive; because, not only *Partiality* to Mens *own* Opi-  
nions, but *Prejudice* against the Opinions of *others*, may make them  
fancy they see Doctrines in a *celebrated Writer*, which are in-  
deed not there. And then, *Self-love* on the one hand, and *Self-*  
*conceit* on the other, may easily keep both in their several Delu-  
sions, against all the Power of Conviction.

To proceed, The Poet, in the last Place, marks out [from l.  
342 to 363] the *Progress* of his *Good Man's* Benevolence, pushed  
through *natural* Religion to *revealed*, 'till it arrives to that Height,  
which the *Sacred Writers* describe as the very Summit of *Chri-*  
*stian Perfection*: And shews how the Progress of *human* differs  
from the Progress of *divine* Benevolence. That the *divine* descends  
from Whole to Parts; but that the *human* must rise from indi-

\* Commentaire, p. 332, 333.



vidual to universal. And with this rapturous Description the Subject of the Epistle closes:

*Self-love* thus push'd to social, to divine,  
 Gives thee to make thy Neighbour's Blessing thine:  
 Is this too little for the boundless Heart?  
 Extend it, let thy Enemies have Part.  
 Grasp the whole Worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense,  
 In one close System of Benevolence.  
 Happier, as kinder! in whate'er Degree,  
 AND HEIGHT OF BLISS, BUT HEIGHT OF CHARITY.  
 God loves from Whole to Parts; but human Soul  
 Must rise from Individual to the Whole.  
*Self-love* but serves the virtuous Mind to wake,  
 As the small Pebble stirs the peaceful Lake;  
 The Centre mov'd, a Circle strait succeeds,  
 Another still, and still another spreads, &c.

The last Part of the Observation is important. *Roquescault*, *Ejprit*, and their wordy Disciple *Mandeville*, had observed, that *Self-love* was the *Origin* of all those Virtues Mankind most admire; and therefore foolishly supposed it was the *End* likewise: And so, *taught* that the highest Pretences to Disinterestedness were only the more artful Disguises of *Self-love*. But Mr. *Pope*, who says, somewhere or other,

Of human Nature Wit its worst may write,  
 We all revere it in our own Despite,

saw, as well as they, and every body else, that the Passions began in *Self-love*; yet he understood human Nature better than to imagine they terminated there. He knew that Reason and Religion could convert *Selfishness* into its very opposite; and therefore *teaches* that

*Self-love* but serves the virtuous Mind to wake,

and thus hath vindicated the Dignity of human Nature, and the philofophic Truth of the Christian Doctrine.

But let us turn once more to Mr. *De Croufaz*, who, conftant to himfelf, concludes, in the fame even tenor in which he firft fet out. “ A Man (fays he) muft ufe fome Efforts to go even fo far “ as to love his Enemies.—But as to what concerns all Parts of the “ Univerfe, and all the living Beings that inhabit it, as well thofe “ we fee not, as thofe we do fee, we find nothing in ourfelves re- “ pugnant indeed to the giving them our Love; but then, on the “ other hand, we do not feel any Motions towards the rendering it “ to them. And while fo great a Number of Objects, with which “ we are clofely furrounded, demand our Attention and Concern, “ it appears not only fuperfluous but even irrational, to teaze our- “ felves with I cannot tell what Kind of Tendernefs, for the Inha- “ bitants of *Jupiter* \*, &c.”

This presents him with a pleafant Idea, and he purfues it with his ufual Grace and Vivacity.

After this one would fcarce think that in the very next Words he fhould confute himfelf, answer his own Objections, and vindicate the very Charity he had ridiculed. And yet this he now does, as much without Fear, as the other was without Wit. “ I own “ (fays he) that a Soul devoted to its Creator, and struck and raifed “ with Admiration at the attentive View of his mere corporeal “ Creation, would be ready to lend thofe Beings his Voice and Sen- “ timents, in order to join with them in an Offering of Praife and “ Thankfgiving to their common Creator, whose Glory they fo “ magnificently declare, though without any Knowledge of the “ Truth which they proclaim. Nay, I go farther, and fay, that a “ Soul fo fanctified, and at the fame time well affured, that there “ are innumerable Choirs of happy Intelligences, who continually “ adore their Creator in extatic Raptures, far furpaffing our Con- “ ceptions, will *congratulate* with them on their Glory † and Feli-

\* *Commentaire*, p. 336.

† *Ib.* p. 337, 338.

“ city.”

“city.” Here we see described, and, to say the Truth, not ill, that very State of Mind which produced the Raptures of our admirable Poet :

Grasp the whole Worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense,  
 In one close System of Benevolence.  
 Happier, as kinder ! in what'er Degree,  
 And height of Elifs but height of Charity.

No, says our Critic, who would still keep on foot the Censure he himself has overthrown ; the Elevations I speak of, are not *Elevations of Charity for those glorious Intelligences. We are the Objects of their Charity, not they of ours* \*. Egregious Philosopher ! By Charity, Mr. Pope not only means Benevolence, but expressly calls it so. And Benevolence surely may be as well exercised towards Superiors, as by them.

But he proceeds—“This pretended chimerical Affection can have no Foundation but in the chimerical System of a *Whole*, of which we make a Part, and of which all the Parts without Exception are so dependent on each other, that, if any *one only* be displaced, or never so little deviating from its proper Function, that Disorder will affect the rest, and spread itself over the *Whole* : And, by consequence, extend to us, who make an essential Part of that Whole. *Self-love* therefore, interests itself in every thing that exists and moves.” *Self-love* was never sent on such an Errand, no not by *Rochefoucault* or *Esprit*, though they forced it to do all their Drudgery. Here, a Man who never yet once rightly understood *what* his Adversary *did say*, will now pretend to guess at his *Reasons for saying*. One might have foreseen with what Success. But something he has taught us, and that is, to rest content with the Poet's own Reasoning. His Argument then for this extended Benevolence is, that as God has made a *Whole*, whose Parts have a perfect Relation to, and an entire Dependency on each other, Man, in extending his Benevolence throughout that *Whole*, acts in

\* *Commentaire*, p. 338.

Conformity to the Will of his Creator; and therefore, this *Enlargement* of his Affection becomes a *Duty*.

But the Poet hath not only shewn his *Piety* in this *Precept*, but the utmost *Art* and *Address* likewise in the *Disposition* of it. The *Essay on Man* opens with exposing the Murmuring, and impious Conclusions of foolish Men against the present Constitution of Things. As it proceeds, it occasionally detects all those false Principles and Opinions that led them to conclude thus perversely. Having now done all that was necessary in *Speculation*, the Poet turns to *Prælice*; and ends his Essay with the Recommendation of an acknowledged Virtue, *Charity*, which, if exercised in the Extent that Conformity to the Will of God requires, would effectually *prevent* all Complaints against the present Order of Things: Such Complaints being made with a total Disregard to every thing, but their own *private System*; and seeking Remedy in the Disorder, and at the Expence of all the rest.

The Art and Contrivance, we see, is truly admirable. But Mr. *De Croufaz* pursues his own Ideas. For to know Mr. *Pope's*, seems to have been his least Concern throughout his whole *Commentary*. "This System [namely, of a *Whole*] will carry us to a great length. "Miracles, which deviate from the ordinary Course of Nature, "must pass from henceforward as idle Fable." [Observe his reason] "It was impossible that any kind of thing which has happened, "should not have happened, or not have happened in the Manner "it hath \*." As to Mr. *Pope's* Fatalism, we have said enough of that Matter already. But now, if, for Disputation's Sake, we admit what, for Truth's Sake, we must reject, according to my Notions of Logic, this Conclusion would follow, *that therefore Miracles could not but have been*; not Mr. *Croufaz's*, *that therefore they never could be*. Miracles are proved, like other Matters of Fact, by *human Testimony*: If *that* says, Iron at one time swam, at other times sunk, and we suppose Things ordered fatally; these two

\* *Commentaire*, p. 339.

Events were equally *necessary*: So that, to make out his Conclusion, he must be forced to add downright *Atheism* to his *Fate*.

Mr. *De Craufaz* has now pushed Matters to a decent Length. He has said, the Poet's *Extent of Charity was irrational—the System on which it was founded chimerical—that it ended in Fate—and overthrew all Miracles*. One would imagine this should have satisfied the most orthodox Repentment. But there wanted something to make a right polemical Climax. To crown the Whole, therefore, he tells us, that, “According to the Poet, the Universe would not have been a Work sufficiently worthy of God, had there not been Atheists, Superstitious, Persecutors, Tyrants, Idolaters, Assassins, and Poisoners \*.” What I can find in the *Essay* coming nearest to this, is, That those Mischiefs do not deform God's Creation; *because* the divine Art is incessantly producing Good out of Evil: And that as this Universe is the best of all those in God's Idea, therefore, whatever is, is right, with respect to that Universe: Either as tending, *in its own Nature*, to the Perfection of it, or made so to tend by infinite Wisdom, *contrary to its Nature*. The true Consequence drawn from all this, is, *That an Universe with Atheists, Superstitious, &c. is sufficiently worthy of God*. How that can infer this other, *That the Universe would not have been a Work sufficiently worthy of God, had there not been Atheists, Superstitious, &c.* I leave Mr. *De Craufaz* to draw out by his own *Logic*, or, which seems the more ductile of the two, his own *Conscience*.

The Poet's Address to his Friend, which follows, and closes this *Epistle*, comes not within the Design of these Observations! which are only to explain the *Philosophy* and *Reasoning* of the *Essay on Man*. Otherwise, this single Apostrophe would furnish a Critic with Examples of every one of those *five* Species of Elocution, from which, as from its Sources, *Longinus* deduceth the *SUBLIME* †.

\* Commentaire, p. 340.

† —πίση σωμαί τούς αίσιν τ' ἐψήφισας. 1. Πρώτον μὲν ἢ κρείττον ἐὼς τοῦ τοῦ τούτου ἀπὸ τούτου. 2. Διότι οὐδὲ τὸ σφαιρὸν ἢ ἰσότητος μὲν πάλιν. 3. Ποῦ τῶν σφαιρῶν πάλιν. 4. Ἡ γὰρ αἰὶν ἔχειται. 5. Πῶς μὲν δὲ μεγάλῃ αἰσίν, ἢ σωμαί, τὰ πρὸς ταῖς ἀπάθῃς, ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων.

1. The first and chief is a *Grandeur and Sublimity of Conception*:

Come then, my Friend! my Genius come along,  
O Master of the Poet, and the Song!  
And while the Muse now floops, and now ascends,  
To Man's low Passions, or their glorious Ends.

2. The *Second*, that *Pathetic Enthusiasm, which at the same time melts and enflames*:

Teach me, like thee, in various Nature wise,  
To fall with Dignity, with Temper rise,  
Form'd by thy Converse, happily to steer  
From grave to gay, from lively to severe,  
Correct with Spirit, eloquent with Ease,  
Intent to reason, or polite to please.

3. *A certain elegant Formation and Ordonance of Figures*:

O! while along the Stream of Time, thy Name  
Expanded flies, and gathers all its Fame,  
Say, shall my little Bark attendant sail,  
Pursue the Triumph and partake the Gale?

4. *A splendid Diction*:

When Statesmen, Heroes, Kings, in Dust repose,  
Whose Sons shall blush their Fathers were thy Foes,  
Shall then this Verse to future Age pretend  
Thou wert my Guide, Philosopher, and Friend?  
That, urg'd by thee, I turn'd the tuneful Art,  
From Sounds to Things, from Fancy to the Heart;  
For Wit's false Mirror held up Nature's Light;

And *fitly, which includes in itself all the rest, a Weight and Dignity in the Composition*:

Shew'd erring Pride whatever is, is RIGHT;

That

That REASON, PASSION, answer *one great AIM*;  
 That true SELF-LOVE and SOCIAL are the SAME;  
 That VIRTUE only makes our BLISS below;  
 And all our Knowledge is OURSELVES TO KNOW?

But this, as we say, is not our Province at present. I shall therefore content myself with an Observation, which this sublime Recapitulation of the general Argument, in the last Lines, affords me to conclude with. Which is, of one great Beauty that shines through the whole *Essay*. It is this, that the Poet, whether he speaks of Man as an *Individual*, a Member of *Society*, or the Subject of *Happiness*, never misseth an Opportunity, while he is explaining his *State* under any of these Capacities, to illustrate it, in the most artful Manner, by the Inforcement of his grand Principle, *That every thing tends to the Good of the Whole*. From whence his System receives the reciprocal Advantage of having that grand *Theorem* realized by *Facts*, and his *Facts* justified on a *Principle of Right* or Nature.

Thus have I endeavoured to analyse and explain the noble Reasoning of these four Epistles. Enough, I presume, to convince our Critic's *Friends* that it hath a Precision, Force, and Closeness of Connection, rarely to be met with, even in the most formal Treatises of Philosophy. Yet in doing this, it is but too evident I have destroyed that Grace and Energy which animates the Original. So right was Mr. *Pope's* Prediction of the Event of such an Undertaking, where he says, in his Preface, that, *he was unable to treat this Part of his Subject more in Detail, without becoming dry and tedious*. And now let the Reader believe, if he be so disposed, what our great Logician insinuates to be his own Sentiments, as well as those of his Friends: "That certain Persons have conjectured that  
 " Mr. *Pope* did not compose this *Essay* at once, and in a regular  
 " Order; but that after he had wrote several Fragments of Poetry,  
 " all finished in their Kind; one, for Example, on the Parallel  
 " between *Reason* and *Instinct*; another, upon Man's groundless

“ *Prudence*; another, on the Prerogatives of *human Nature*; another, “ on *Religion* and *Superstition*; another, on the *Original of Society*; “ and several Fragments besides, on *Self-love* and the *Passions*; he “ tacked these together as he could, and divided them into four “ Epistles, as, it is said, was the Fortune of *Homer’s Rhapsodies* \*.” Yes, I believe full as much of *Mr. Pope’s Rhapsodies*, as I do of *Homer’s*. But if this be the Case, that the *Leaves* of these *two great Poets* were wrote at random, tossed about, and afterwards put in Order, like the *Cumæan Sibyls*; then, what we have till now thought an old lying Bravado of the Poets, *That they wrote by Inspiration*, will become a sober Truth. For, if *Chance* could not produce them, and *human design* had no hand in them, what must we conclude, but that they are, what they are so commonly called, *Divine*?

However, so honourable an Account of *Rhapsody Writing* should by all means be encouraged, as Matter of Consolation to certain modern Writers in Divinity and Politics. But the Mischief is, our Logician has given us an unlucky Proof in his own Case, that *all Rhapsodists* are not so happy.

To be serious: As to *Homer*, one might hope, by this time, those old exploded Fooleries about his *Rhapsodies* would be forgotten. But as to his *Translator*, it must be owned, he has given Cause enough of Disgust to our *Philosophers* and *Men of Reason*. Till this time, every Poet, good or bad, stuck fairly to his Profession: But *Mr. Pope*, now the last of the poetic Line amongst us, on whom the large Patrimony of his whole Race is devolved, seems desirous, as is natural in such Cases, to ally himself to a more lasting Family; and so, after having disported himself at Will, in the flowery Paths of Fancy, and revelled in all the Favours of the Muses, boasts of having taken up in time, and courted and espoused *Truth*:

That not in *Fancy’s* Maze he wander’d long,

But sloop’d to *Truth*, and moraliz’d his Song.

But now, in what Light, must we think, will the graver Christian Reader regard the Calumnies we have here confuted? How sad

\* Commentaire, p. 346.



an Idea will this give him of the *present* Spirit of Christian Profession, that a Work, wrote solely to recommend the *Charity* that Religion so strongly inforceth, and breathing nothing but Love to God, and universal Good-will to Man, should bring upon the Author such a Storm of uncharitable Bitterness and Calumny, and that, from a pretended Advocate of Christianity? A Religion the very Vitality of which (if we may believe it, Propagators) is Universal Benevolence: *For the End of the Commandment is Charity* \*. Conformably hereunto we may observe, that in their *Epistles* to the *Churches*, whatever the Occasion was, whatever Discipline they instituted, whatever Points of Faith they explained, whatever Heresies they stigmatized, whatever Immoralities they condemned, or whatever Virtues they recommended, CHARITY was still the Thing most constantly enforced, as the very End of all, *the Bond of Perfection* †. The *beloved Disciple* of our Lord, particularly, who may surely be supposed to know his Master's Will, hath wrote *his* Epistle on set Purpose to recommend this single Virtue: At a Crisis too, when, as Heresies were springing up apace, a *modern Controversialist* would be apt to think he might have employed his Time better. And why (it may be reasonably asked) so very much on *Charity*, in an Age when Christians had so few Provocations or Temptations to violate it? For their Faith being yet chaste from the Prostitutions of the *Sabocii*, and their Hierarchy yet uncorrupted by the Gifts of *Constantine*, the Church knew neither *Bigotry* nor *Ambition*, the two fatal Sources of uncharitable Zeal. I will tell you, it was the Providence of their prophetic Spirit, which presented to them the Image of those miserable Times foretold by their Master, when *Iniquity should abound, and the Love of many wax cold* ‡. So that if the Men of those Times should persist in violating *this Bond of Perfection*, after so many repeated Admonitions, they might be found altogether without Excuse. For I can by no means enter into the Views of that profound Philosopher, who discovered that *Jesus* and his Followers might preach up Love

\* 1 Tim. i. 5.

† Col. iii. 14.

‡ Matt. xxiv. 12.

and

and Charity, the better to enable a Set of Men, some Centuries afterwards, to tyrannise over those whom the *engaging Sounds of Charity and Brotherly Love* had intrapped into Subjection \*.

I am aware that certain modern Propagators of the Faith, aided with a *School Distinction*, will tell you, that it is pure Charity which sets them all at work; and that what you call *Uncharitableness*, when they insult the Fame, the Fortune, or the Person of their Brother, is indeed the very Height of Charity, a Charity for his *Soul*. This indeed may be the Height of the Hangman's Charity, who waits for your Cloaths: But it could never be *St. Paul's*. His was *not easily provoked, thought no Evil, bore all Things, hoped all Things, endured all Things* †. It was a Charity that began in Candour, inspired good Opinion, and fought the temporal Happiness of his Brother.

I leave it with Mr. *De Croufars* to think upon the different Effects which Excess of Zeal in the Service of Religion hath produced in him. For I will, in very *Charity*, believe it to be really *that*; notwithstanding we every Day see the most despicable Tools of *others Impotency*, and the vilest Slaves to their *own Ambition*, hide their corrupt Passions under the self-same Cover. This learned Gentleman should reflect on what the sober Part of the World will think of his Conduct. For though the Apostle bids *AGED MEN BE SOUND IN FAITH*, he adds immediately, and *IN CHARITY, IN PATIENCE* ‡ likewise. But where was his *Charity* in labouring, on the slightest Grounds, to represent his Brother as propagating *Spinozism* and Immorality? Where was his *Temper*, when he became so furious against him, on the Supposition of his espousing a *Syst m* he had *never read*, that of *Leibnitz*; and justifying a Doctrine he had *never heard of*, the *pre-established Harmony*? Where was his *Patience*, when, having conceived this of him, on the mere Authority of a *most mistaken Translator*, he would not stay to inquire whether the Author owned the Faithfulness of the Version; but

\* *Charactericks*, vol. i. p. 87. vol. iii. p. 115. Ed. 1737.

† 1 Cor. xiii. 5. 7.

‡ Titus ii. 2.

published his Conceptions, and the strongest Accusations upon those Conceptions, in Volume after Volume, to the whole World? Where, if in any of these Imaginations so founded, he should be mistaken, he became guilty of a deliberate and repeated Act of the highest Injustice; the attempting to deprive a virtuous Man of his honest Reputation.

If Mr. *De Croufaz* presumes his Zeal for the Honour of God will excuse his Violations of Charity towards Men, I must tell him, *he knows not what Spirit he is of. If a Man (says the beloved Disciple of our Lord) say, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a Liar: For he that loveth not his Brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen \*?* A Free-thinker may perhaps laugh at the Simplicity of this Argument, which yet he would affect to admire, could any one find it for him in *Plato*. But let him for once condescend to be instructed by his *Bible*, and hearken to a little *Christian Reasoning*.

“ You say you *love God* (says the Apostle) though you hate your  
 “ Brother: Impossible! The Love of any Object begins originally,  
 “ like all the other Passions, from Self-love. Thus we love our-  
 “ selves, by Representation, in our Offspring; which Love extends  
 “ by degrees to our remoter Relations, and so on through our  
 “ Neighbourhood, to all the Fellow-Members of our Community.  
 “ And now Self-love, refined by Reason and Religion, begins to  
 “ lose its Nature, and deservedly assumes another Name. Our  
 “ Country next claims our Love; we then extend it to all Man-  
 “ kind, and never rest till we have, at length, fixed it on that  
 “ *most amiable* of all Objects, the great Author and Original of Being.  
 “ This is the Course and Progress of human Love:

God loves from Whole to Parts, but human Soul  
 Must rise from Individual to the Whole.

Now (pursues the Apostle) I reason thus: “ Can you, who are  
 “ not yet arrived at that inferior Stage of Benevolence, the Love

\* 1 John iv. 20.

“ of your Brother, *whom you have seen*, that is, whom the Neces-  
 “ sities of Civil Life, and a Sense of your mutual Relation might  
 “ teach you to love, pretend to have reached the very Height and  
 “ Perfection of this Passion, the Love of God *whom you have not*  
 “ *seen?* that is, *whose* wonderful Oeconomy in his System of Crea-  
 “ tion, which makes him so amiable, you cannot have the least  
 “ Conception of; *you*, who have not yet learnt that your own pri-  
 “ vate System is supported on the great Principle of Benevolence?  
 “ *Fear* him, *flatter* him, *fight* for him, as you dread his *Power*,  
 “ you may; but to *love* him, as you know not his *Nature*, is im-  
 “ possible.” This is the Apostle’s grand and sublime Reasoning;  
 and it is with the same Thought on which the Apostle founds his  
 Argument that our moral Poet ends his Essay, as the just and neces-  
 sary Conclusion of his Work:

*Self-love* but serves the virtuous Mind to *wake*,  
 As the small Pebble stirs the peaceful Lake;  
 The *Centre* mov’d, a *Circle* strait succeeds,  
 Another still, and still another spreads;  
*Friend, Parent, Neighbour*, first it will embrace,  
 His *Country* next, and next, *all human Race*;  
 Wide, and more wide, th’O’erflowings of the Mind  
 Take every Creature in, of every Kind;  
*Earth* smiles around, with boundless Bounty blest,  
 AND HEAVEN BEHOLDS ITS IMAGE IN HIS BREAST.

# R E M A R K S

ON A BOOK, INTITULED,  
FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS  
BELIEVED BY THE ANTIENTS,  
PARTICULARLY THE PHILOSOPHERS;

Wherein some Objections of the Rev. Mr. WARBURTON,  
in his DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, are considered, 1742.

W I T H

A POSTSCRIPT, IN ANSWER TO SOME OBJECTIONS  
OF DR. SYKES;

A N D,

A LETTER TO Bp. SMALLBROOK.

“ Beware lest any Man spoil you through PHILOSOPHY and vain  
“ Deceit, after the Traditions of Men, after the Rudiments of  
“ the World, and not after CHRIST.” Col. ii. 8.

ADVERTISEMENT to the SECOND EDITION, 1742.

THE Author of the Pamphlet here examined hath lately made a public Confession of his Authorship, signed with his own *Name*; and thereby saved himself from all farther Correction of this kind. For he who is so lost to Shame, as a WRITER, to *own* what he before wrote, and so lost to Shame, as a MAN, to *own* what he hath now written, must needs be past all Amendment, the only reasonable View in *Correction*. I shall therefore but do, what indeed (were it any more than repeating what he himself hath discovered to the Public) would be justly reckoned the cruelest of all things, tell my Reader the Name of this Miserable; which we find to be I. TILLARD.

REMARKS.

## R E M A R K S.

## I.

**T**HOUGH I could not persuade myself to take this Notice of such a kind of Writer as him of the *Miscellany*, yet a very little thing, the Reader sees, will engage me to give an Adversary Satisfaction; while I suffer myself to be seduced into a Controversy by the Writer of a late Book, intituled, *Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Ancients, particularly the Philosophers; wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of MOSES, are considered* \*.

And a very little Thing it was; only the finding in his Book one single Truth, which does me a Piece of Justice, that the *orthodox* Writer above-mentioned would by no means be brought unto, even after his Conviction of Calumny on that Head. It is in these Words; *But I must here do so much Justice to Mr. Warburton, as to acknowledge, that the Point he denies, is, that the Philosophers only did not believe future Rewards and Punishments; whereas he allows all others did believe them* †.

\* 8vo, London, 1740. Printed by M. Steen, in the Inner-Temple Lane.

† P. 84.

For the rest, neither his *Abilities* nor his *Candour* deserved this Notice. His *Abilities* are duly celebrated in these few Sheets; and for his *Con. &c.* the Reader will, I believe, require no farther Proof than the following:—*After all these lovely Descriptions—if there can be any? Doubt remain in the Reader's Breast—it must arise from the Influence and Propriety of a few random Expressions now and then thrown out to depreciate the Philosophers, by certain Persons, who, thinking themselves obliged to say something out of the common Road, very frequently discover their IGNORANCE AND WANT OF SENSE IN THE VERY ATTEMPT TO DISPLAY THEIR LEARNING: But that SUCH PRETENDERS TO KNOWLEDGE, SUCH EMPTY MIMICS OF REAL WORTH, MAY NO LONGER IMPOSE upon Persons of good Understanding.—I shall, &c.*

But though I threw this Distinction to a puny Truth half overlaid, which I was forced to draw from under an unwieldy Heap of Blanders and Prevarications: yet, let it be observed, that this is only for once, and out of due Regard to the first Writer against me, that has condescended to say any thing truly of me: For I hope common Honesty is not so rare, even *amongst Answerers by Profession* (of all febrile Knaves the most corrupt) that this Tribute need be paid twice unto it.

My Considerer begins his Preface thus: *The Motive which principally induced me to publish the following Collection and Observations, was the strange and unjustifiable Methods which some Men take to advance their own SYSTEMS by depreciating and running down those of others* †. The Reader sees what the Man would be at. Here is no Disguise or Reserve however. It is the old Infidel Grudge against the *intolerant* Spirit of Christianity, deliveredly as crudely as ever his dear Friends, the *Philosophers*, urged it against the *primitive Apologists*. Their great Quarrel to Christianity was, that its Defenders endeavoured *to advance their own Systems, by depreciating and running down those of others* ‡: And this, in their, and in their

† P. 164, 165. ‡ P. iii.

‡ See The Divine Legat. vol. I. p. 431—434.



Advocates Opinion, *was a strange and unjustifiable Method.* And how should he think otherwise? when he has so mean an Opinion of the Cause of Revelation, as to tell us presently after, That most of that vast number of Books that have been wrote to prove the Necessity and Excellency of our holy Religion, are thought very mean and insufficient by the unprejudiced and inquisitive Adversary, but appear in a very different Light to the Mob of Christians, who, by the happy Prejudice of Education, have been brought up to doubt of nothing. But hear him in his own more emphatic Words: *The vast number of Books and Pamphlets which have of late Years been so plentifully poured out, to prove the Necessity and Excellency of our holy Religion, certainly deserve the Approbation and Thanks of every zealous and truly devout Christian: And though many of these Performances have been THOUGHT BY THE ADVERSARY VERY MEAN AND INSUFFICIENT, yet they have appeared in a quite different Light in the Eyes of the Bulk of Mankind; WHO, FROM THE HAPPY CAST OF THEIR NATIVITY, HAVE, IN THEIR EARLIEST AGE, BEEN TAUGHT TO FORM A MUCH BETTER JUDGMENT OF THINGS; AND WHO, SELDOM HAVING ANY DOUBTS OR SCRUPLES TO DISTURB THEM, are therefore the easier confirmed in the quiet and full Persuasion of these Doctrines THEY AT FIRST RECEIVED\*.*

Had I not Reason to say as I did, "That the Heathen Philosophers of our Times might be well excused in being angry to see their ancient Brethren shewn for Knaves in Practice, and Fools in Theory; but that any else should think themselves concerned in the Force and Fidelity of the Drawing, was a Mystery I did not know what to make of †?"

It is therefore Matter of much Consolation to me, to find that the real Friends of Revelation have at length left these *Heathen Philosophers* (the Men whom only it concerns) to dispute this Point with me. I have now got a *Gentleman Freethinker* under my Hands; and, if those other Folks will be but easy, I'll promise to give a good Account of him.

\* P. iii. iv.

† Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 136.

Our *Confidant* proceeds to shew the Reasons why some Defenders of Christianity will not acknowledge the Doctrine contained in his Book. He graciously acquits them of all Malice and Design, and throws it first,

1. Upon their Ignorance. *The first of which is the Ignorance, in this particular, of by far the greatest Part of them* [Defenders of Christianity] *who really do not know that Rewards and Punishments in another Life are any where spoken of but in the New Testament, unless it be in some dark and figurative Terms, which (AS IF THERE WERE NONE SUCH AMONGST THEMSELVES) they think they have a Right to laugh at and expose. They remember, perhaps, some Stories in their School-books of Elysium, of Tartarus, of Cerberus, &c. and conclude, very hastily, that this was all that was ever thought of or believed by the Heathens concerning a World to come\**. It was not for nothing, we find, that he despised the Defenders of Christianity as Scribblers, whom none but a prejudiced Mob would give any Credit to: For the *far greatest Part of them*, it seems, knew no more of Antiquity than a few *Stories in their School-books*. But who can enough admire the Modesty of this, in one, who confesses he has forgot his *Greek*, and this only in order to insinuate that he has some *Latin* which yet sticks by him?

2. He throws it, *Secondly*, Upon their *Prejudices*, that is, *their great Attachment to their own Religion*. On this Head, he talks I don't know what—*of captivated Lovers—pious Zeal—Prejudice of Education—Interest—Preferment*; in short the common Dog-trot of Infidelity and Freethinking.

After this Specimen of his *Modesty*, he presents us with one of his *Abilities*. *As to what relates (says he) to the Subject of the following Sheets, the Case in Faët is this. It is indisputably true, and beyond all reasonable Contradiction, that the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments is clearly and plainly delivered and laid down in the New Testament: And it is as indisputably true, and beyond all reason-*

\* P. v.

*able Contradiction, that the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments* IS CLEARLY AND PLAINLY DELIVERED AND LAID DOWN in the *Books and Writings of the Heathens*. THE TRUTH OF WHICH POINT is now submitted to the Judgment of every impartial Reader \*. This indisputable Point, which he writes a Book to prove, is, I believe, strictly *β*. At least it was never disputed by his humble Servant. On the contrary, I have said, the Heathen Philosophers were perpetually inculcating to the People the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in their Discourses and Writings †. But his Title-page professes to prove the Truth of a very different Point, not quite so indisputable. *Future Rewards and Punishments BELIEVED by the Ancients, particularly the Philosophers, wherein some Objections of the Reverend Mr. W. in his Divine Legation of MOSES are considered*. Thus we see this able Writer has mistaken his Question before he be got to the End of his Preface. *Dids me de contiēda con quēn me contiēda*, says the Spanish Proverb, *God grant me an Adversary that understands me*. But, wretch that I am, after having met with such an Adversary, I am now forced to contend with one that does not understand himself.

His Preface concludes thus: *I thought once to have changed the Order in which the Quotations of the second Chapter are placed*. BUT METHOD IN SUCH CASES DEPENDING ALMOST AS MUCH UPON THE FANCY OF EVERY READER AS THE REAL PROPRIETY OF THE THING ITSELF, *I chose rather to submit them as they are* ‡, &c. By these his frank Sentiments of *Method*, it appears he has forgot his *Logic* too, if ever he had any, as well as his *Greek*, which, he tells us, *he had neglected, like Lord Chief Justice Hale, by a long Association to Studies of quite another Nature* §. Whatever his Studies were, he can scarce persuade the Reader to think them like *Lord Chief Justice Hale's*. That learned Man indeed lost his *Greek*, but got a great deal of *good Sense*. Our Author too has lost his *Greek*. And what has he got? Marry, the Knack of writing without any Sense at all.

\* P. vii.

† Divine Legat, Book III. § 2. Vol. II. p. 8.

‡ P. ix-

§ P. vii.  
II. We

## II.

We come now to his *first* Chapter, the only one that I am concerned in; and therefore the only one I shall, at present, give myself the Trouble of considering. As just before he had innocently blundered *out* of the Question; so now by entering on his Attendance on the Author of *The Divine Legation*, he has as innocently blundered *into* it: And thus has set all right again.

After having frankly told the Reader, that the Author of *The Divine Legation* had not the direct and immediate Discovery of Truth, and the REAL and SUBSTANTIAL Improvement of Mankind [*i. e.* the Recommendation of Pagan Philosophy] in his Thoughts and Studies, but the Advancement of a certain favourite Scheme \* [*i. e.* of Revelation] he goes on to † quote the Apologies I make for venturing to deny a commonly received Opinion. On which he thus descants: *By all which, and indeed his whole manner of treating this Subject, he plainly discovers such a great Distrust of his Arguments and Conclusions to convince the Judgment of his Reader, that ‡, &c.* I am a very unlucky Writer. If I express myself with Confidence, I am supposed to distrust other Men's Opinions; if with Diffidence, my own. But let him rest himself content. I am under no manner of Diffidence. Or, if I had any, his writing against me had easily removed it. However, in this I shall never recriminate. I confess, he writes all the way as much without Fear as Wit.

*I shall* (says our crafty Advocate) *pass over his nice Distinctions, Divisions, and Subdivisions* §. Now this, I cannot but think hard. He had before made his Exceptions to Greek, and I dare say he would think it unfair to have it urged against him after he had so fairly pleaded *Ignoramus* to it; yet a critical Use of that Language is alone sufficient to determine a decisive Question in this Controversy, namely, *of the Spinozism of the ancient Philosophers*: And here he debars me all Benefit of Logic, and won't have Patience while I state the Question, and divide the Subject. *I shall pass over* (says he) *his*

\* P. 1, 2.

† P. 2, 3.

‡ P. 3.

§ Ibid.

*nice Distinctions, Divisions, and Subdivisions.* So that because he knows neither *Greek* nor *Method*, I shall use none. Here then I might fairly dismiss this *minute Philosopher*, who dares me to the Combat, and yet excepts against all the Weapons in Use. But not to disappoint the Company we have brought together, I will accept his Challenge, and fight him with his own wooden Dagger.

*I proceed (says he) directly to take notice of those Reasons which, IN MY APPREHENSION, any ways affect the present Question; and these, I think, may be reduced to two.* 1st, “*That the Philosophers held it lawful, for the public Good, to say one Thing, when they thought another, and that they actually did so.* 2dly, “*That they held some fundamental Principles of Philosophy, which were altogether inconsistent with the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments\*.*” But surely, if he will needs write against me, his Business is not only to consider what, *in his Apprehension*, tends to the Proof of my Point, but likewise what *in my Apprehension* I had said does so. For Instance, *in his Apprehension*, this Argument, *That the Philosophers held it lawful in general to say one Thing, when they thought another*, and this, that they actually did so, tends to the Proof of my Point. And, *in my Apprehension*, this other Argument likewise, *That the Philosophers acted on the above Principle, with regard to a future State of Rewards and Punishments, the very Doctrine in question*, has, at least, as strong a Tendency: For which Reason I had employed *six large Pages* to enforce it. But to all this my Adversary has thought fit to say—Nothing.

However, if he will needs confine the Strength of my Discourse to those two Points, I must be content, and accept the best Terms he can be brought to. Nor will the Reader perhaps think these bad ones. But, alas! he yet knows little of our Advocate. Of a hundred Arguments from Reason and Authority which support those two Points, he has not ventured so much as at a *Decimation*; and

\* P. 3, 4.

his Attacks of those few he shuffles off in so evasive a manner, as would never get him *Notice in the Schools*\*, nor hardly Credit at the Bar. But what would he not do, or what would he not forbear to do, for his Philosophers? For if that Set of modern Heathens, as he gravely tells us, ARE NOT FAR FROM THE KINGDOM OF GOD, *whilst being really in good earnest in the Search of Truth, have without Prejudice considered, and have calmly, seriously, and with the utmost Diligence examined into the Obligation of the several Religions, or Sects of Religion, which now prevail in the World; and after the maturest Deliberation are satisfied there is nothing extraordinary or immediately Divine in any of them; but that, upon the Whole, all which they contain or pretend to (except what relates to our Duty to God, and our Obligations to Morality) is merely human Invention, and the Product of Design, of Error, or of Enthusiasm* †. If these be so near Day, in what a hopeful Condition are those of the elder House, who certainly cannot be said to have rejected the Gospel; though so ready to give a *diligent and dispassionate Examination* to any thing that would afford room for a Dispute.

## III.

But we must take him as we find him, and be thankful. The Reader will say presently we have Reason. For he now proceeds to the Confutation of the first Point, *That the Philosophers held it lawful, for public Good, to say one Thing, when they thought another*. And how does he set about it? Truly in a very new Way. By PROVING it at large, from the fourth to the sixteenth Page: Which, he *bon stily*, for the second Time, concludes thus: *All which is, in Effect, no more than what Mr. Warburton himself says* ‡. Why, no; but he being able to say it so much better, had a Mind to shew his Parts. And now, according to his own Confession, *the Philosophers holding it lawful, for the public Good, to say one thing when they thought another*; and I having proved, to which Proof

\* P. 3.

† P. 201, 202.

‡ P. 16, 17.

he has not opposed a single Syllable, *that they practised this Rule in the very Point in Question*, the Dispute is fairly at an End. This will certainly surprize our less attentive Readers: But they must know, all this good-natured Pains was neither for their Sakes nor for mine, but for his dear *Philosophers*. The Case stood thus: When I spoke of the *double Doctrine*, I considered the Practice of it as not altogether free from Blame. Not that this Representation contributed to prove it practised in the Point in question, but because I thought the Representation *true*. But my Adversary, as we see, having taken it for granted, that *I had not the direct and immediate Discovery of TRUTH in my Thoughts and Studies*\*, had nothing left, but the first Reason to assign for my Representation, which affecting the Credit of his Masters, he will endeavour, as great an Enemy as he is to *Divisions and Distinctions*, to *distinguish* away this Opprobrium. He therefore *divides* the Practice of the *double Doctrine* into two Sorts. The one, a little criminal: The other, quite free from Blame †. And to shew his Judgment, in the first Class he places *Priests* and *Politicians* ‡, and in the *second*, the *Chinese Literati* §, who, taught Atheism in private; and *Orpheus* ||, who against his Conscience, as he says, taught Polytheism in public. But the Class of Innocents, you may be sure, was erected chiefly for his dear *Philosophers*, whose *double Doctrine* he impiously compares to the Practices of the ever blessed *Jesus* \*\*. For which I remit him to the *appointed* Defenders of Religion: who will, I hope, give him due Correction for all his Insults on their *Ignorance* and their *School-Books*.

The mighty Argument then he labours with, and for the sake of which he has, before he was aware, given up the whole Cause, is this: “The *Philosophers* Practice of the *double Doctrine* was innocent and laudable: therefore it could never be employed to preach  
“ up a Future State of Rewards and Punishments in Public, and to

\* P. 1, 2.

† P. 7.

‡ Ibid.

§ P. 12.

|| P. 13, 14.

\*\* P. 32—39.

“pushed down in private.”—This, I suppose, he would have said, if he knew how to express his own Meaning. Let us see then what Force it has upon his Principles. For, as much as he contends for the Propagation of Truth, he is not likely to die a Martyr to it; as you may hear by his talking.—*To disturb the public Peace, to break the Laws, and fruitlessly to expose ourselves to manifest Danger for the sake of propagating our Religion, seems to carry a Contradiction in itself, and would need no Confutation, if the mistaken Principles and Practice of a few Zealots did not inflame some People to think otherwise*\*. It is no wonder this should raise his Indignation. For had not *Christ* and his Apostles been guilty of the very Misdemeanor that, he tells us, *carries a Contradiction in itself* (which, whatever it means in his Jargon, is surely something very bad) we had never had the poor Philosophers at this time of Day so disgracefully pushed beside the Chair. But for this, I again send him to be disciplined by the *Defenders* aforesaid; and go on to try his Argument on his own Principle. *The Philosophers, as he confesses, used, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.* They saw that the Doctrine of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments was firmly believed by the People, and of infinite Service to Society. But their speculative Opinions led them to reject it. What was to be done? Telling what they thought the Truth would be injurious, on the Supposition, both to Society and themselves. And (as he assures us) *fruitlessly to expose one's self to manifest Danger for the sake of propagating one's Religion, seems to carry a Contradiction in itself.* Here then their Principle of *saying one thing when they thought another*, came in Practice, nothing being left, but to *profess* in public, and *believe* in private. But he will say, perhaps, *that sincere impartial Inquirers after Truth*, like his Philosophers, could not, *after the most careful Examination*, reject the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments. Why not, I ask him? They might be as covise of Belief, for ought he knows,

\* P. 43.



as his favourite Class of Free-thinkers; who, with the same Qualifications, reject all Revelation in general. But it ran strangely in his Head, that if I thought the Philosophers practised the double Doctrine on the Point in question, I must needs suppose they had *no fixed Principles*.—But it is very unreasonable (says he) and unjust from hence to conclude, that they who do so, have no Belief of their own, or that they think all Religion whatever the Invention of designing Men\*. And again—So that, notwithstanding their double Doctrine, they had still some fixed ones of their own †. Why, thou mighty Defender of Heathen Wisdom! who ever said they had not! Or who but such a Defender would not have seen, that all the force of my Argument rests upon this very Truth, that they had *fixed Principles*, that they had a *Belief of their own*?

But as if he had not done enough in this obliging way, he will go on, and prove for me, that *the double Doctrine was not about different Opinions, but the same*. I indeed thought it incumbent on me to shew this: because it was bringing my Argument home to the Point, that a Future State was one of the Objects of the *double Doctrine*. But how it could be made to serve his Purpose, was quite beyond my reach. Judge then of my Surprize, when I saw him attempt to prove it at large; and to conclude his Proof thus: *It appears then that the external Doctrine related to the same thing as the internal ‡*. I was some time at a loss for his Meaning in the former Case: but here I gave over the Search as desperate. Not but I concluded there was Mischief somewhere. At last I found this slender thing of an Argument lie lurking under a *Columndrum*. I don't know whether it will bear the handling; but at present it hangs together thus: “The external Doctrine related to the same thing as the internal. Now a *Future State* is *one* thing, and *no Future State*, another. These therefore being *two*, could not be the Object of the *double Doctrine*, which was concerned with *one* thing only.” But our Advocate is so

\* P. 45.

† P. 47.

‡ P. 24.

is not being able to make a good Argument, that, to the Shame of his *Profession*, he knows not how to make a good *Quibble*. For Tillard, who affirmed the Philosophers, both in their *external* and *internal* teaching, held a *Future State* (here's his *one and the same thing* for him :) In their *external*, a Future State with Rewards and Punishments; in their *internal*, a Future State without them.

But though he contends, that *the external Doctrine related to the same thing with the internal, yet it does not* (he says) *in the least appear, that the Philosophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the People* \*. This is strange indeed. These Philosophers then must be like their Advocate, and teach *nothing*. Otherwise, if the external Teaching was for the People, and the internal what the People could not be trusted with, and both about the same thing, the two Ways of Teaching must certainly proceed upon contrary Propositions. But, perhaps, in the Humour he is now in, an Authority may be better liked than a Reason. I will give him one above all Exception: His own. In another Place he tells us, *it did fully appear, that the Philosophers believed one thing, and taught a quite contrary to the People*; for he says——THE EXTERNAL THEREFORE MUST BE JUST THE REVERSE [to the internal] WITH RELATION TO THE SAME POINTS †.

## IV.

Our Advocate hath given me so little room to quarrel with him on this Head, that the Reader must needs have had a very poor and meagre Entertainment. Nothing but a still-born Blunder, and the Ghost of a departed Quibble. He must therefore be content to make out his Treat with what cold Scraps I can pick up from the over-fodden *Crambe* of his *Logic* and *Literature*.

In the fifth Page he says, Mr. *Warburton* EXPRESSES *himself* very AMBIGUOUSLY, where he asserts that they held it lawful, for the public

\* P. 19.

† P. 24.

good, to say one thing when they thought another. For, in the present Question, if we understand by this, that the Philosophers believed a Future State in a spiritual, refined, and rational Sense, while they sometimes countenanced the People in their gross, vulgar, and corporeal Notions of it, then what he lays down is certainly true: But if we understand it, AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD, that the Philosophers preached the Doctrine of a Future State to the People, while themselves believed the contrary, viz. that there was no future State of Rewards and Punishments at all; then his Charge on the Philosophers is absolutely false.

The Logic of this incomparable Period stands thus:

1. First I talk *ambiguously*, BECAUSE it is in his Power to misunderstand me; for in the present Case (says he) if we understand, &c. not because of any thing I myself said, or omitted to say. For when I asserted what he here lays to my Charge, I had added, that the Philosophers preached the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments to the People, while themselves believed the contrary; and repeated it so often over, that this Writer himself, who accuses me of *expressing myself ambiguously*, confesses, in the very Attempt to prove his Accusation, that he knows my Meaning. But if we understand it (says he) AS HE INTENDS WE SHOULD——

2. Secondly, I talk *ambiguously*, BECAUSE, in his Sense of the Words, they are true, in mine, not true.

These are such Discoveries in the *Art of Reasoning*, that I could almost with the Author would add a Chapter of *Ambiguities* to our common *Logics*. A thing, I'll assure him, very much wanted.

In his seventeenth Page we have these Words, *Notwithstanding which* [viz. the double-doctrine], *the Design and End of the Philosophers in both, was still in general the same, that is, to improve Mankind as much as they would bear; and the Doctrines in Substance and at the bottom were all along one and the same; JUST AS*

*the Christianity* MAY NOW BE, *though in some Countries scarce discovered, being overwhelmed with Legends, false Miracles, Image-worship, and all the Trumpery of Popish Superstition.*

Here's a Period, let me tell you, that has no weak Side of *Sense*, but is impenetrable all round. Does he mean that the external and internal Doctrines of the Philosophers were in general the same, *just as* pure Christianity, and corrupt Christianity *overwhelmed with Legends, false Miracles, Image-worship, and all the Trumpery of Popish Superstition*, are in general the same? Or does he mean that the external and internal Doctrines of the Philosophers were both to improve Mankind as much as they could bear, *just as* pure Christianity, and corrupt Christianity *overwhelmed with Legends, false Miracles, Image-worship, and all the Trumpery of Popish Superstition*, are both to improve Mankind as much as they can bear? Or lastly, which perhaps should have been asked first, had he any Meaning at all? However it is every Way so profound, that I should advise him to add a Chapter of *Comparisons* to his Chapter of *Ambiguities*, that the one may furnish us with *Examples* to fit his *Rules* in the other. This shall suffice at present for a Specimen of his *Art of Reasoning*.

Let us turn to his *Literature*, and see first how he manages his *Latin Translations*.

He gives us the following Quotation from Ælian's *Various History*\*: *Ita vero etiam Socratem non explicite differere; si quis autem eas Dissertationes CONVERTAT, planissimas esse*; and translates it thus: *Socrates used to talk ambiguously; but if any one turns and SIFTS his Discourses WITH ATTENTION, they will appear most plain and easy* †.

The Reader will seek to no Purpose in the Latin for *sifts with Attention*; but this was the Paraphrase of a Word he did not understand, *convertat*, ἐπέψει, used by the Author in allusion to its *literal*, not *figurative* Sense. Ælian had just before told a Story of

\* L. xiv, c. 15.

† P. 18.

one, a *Connoisseur* like our Advocate, who would needs have a Horse painted rolling on his Back. The Artist brought him a running Horse; which not contenting him, the other put it into the Posture required, by turning the Picture upside down. Turn *Socrates* thus, says *Ælian*, and you have his true Meaning. That is, *understand him by Contraries*. And this Rule was given with Judgment. For *Socrates* being perpetually *ironical*, take him in the reverse, and he is in his right Sense. But our Advocate knew as little of *Socrates's* Character as of his Translator's Latin. "*Pausonem enim Pictorem, quum audivisset a quodam, ut volutantem se equum pingeret, currentem eum pinxisse. Quum igitur is qui tabulam pingendam locarat, indignaretur, tanquam contra pactum ille pinxisset, respondisse Pictorem, VERTE [ὄτις ἐπέψω] Tabulam, & ita volutans tibi esto Equus, qui nunc est currens. Ita vero etiam Socratem non explicitè differere; si quis autem eas Dissertationes CONVERTAT [ἐπέψω] planissimas esse.*" Let us now see how ably he acquits himself of his Original Writers.

He brings a Passage from *Macrobius* in these Words, *Si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines & exempla confugiunt.—Sic ipsa Mystéria figurarum cuniculis operiuntur; ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se Natura præbeat; sed Summatibus tantum Viris Sapientia Interprete veri Arcani conscis; contenti sint Reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate secretum, 1. Macrob. 2. Ed. Lond. 1694.* Which he translates thus, "TO THE SAME PURPOSE *Macrobius*, speaking of God and Nature," says, *The Philosophers when they treated of such Subjects as were beyond all our Words, and exceeded even our Thoughts, they had Recourse to Similies and Allusions. FOR THAT THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING; but that others should be content WITH AN AWFUL VENERATION for them under the Veil of Figures and Allegories, LEST THEY SHOULD BE DESPISED\**.

\* P. 20.

This comes of *Freethinking*, and leaving his *School-books* to the *Clergy*: who owe him a Shame for that contemptuous Donation\*.

1. We see here, he makes the Words, *Si quid de his assignare conantur*, to *confugiunt*, to relate to the *double Doctrine* of the Philosophers, as is evident by this Introduction, *To the same Purpose Macrobius*. To what Purpose, I beseech you? Why, to the Purpose of *Burnet's* Words immediately preceding, which expressly treat of the Nature of the *twofold Doctrine of the Ancients*. But who but a *Freethinker* would not have found that these of *Macrobius* relate to a quite different thing? namely, the Inability of expressing spiritual and abstract Ideas any otherwise than by Words conveying sensible and material Images. Not, like the *external Doctrine*, a Matter of *Choice*, but *Necessity*; a Necessity arising from the Nature of Things. A Way of speaking the Philosophers could not avoid, even when conveying their *internal Doctrine* to their *Adepts*. But now the Reader will be apt to ask, If this be so, as is evident even from the Words themselves, what must we do with the rest of the Passage, beginning at *Sic ipsa Mysteria*—which does indeed relate to the *double Doctrine*; for it gives a Reason why Men *have Recourse to Similies and Allusions*, a Reason founded in the Nature and Expediency of the *double Doctrine*? What shall I say? that our Advocate has wilfully murdered and dismembered poor *Macrobius*? or, that it was mere Chance-medley? Let the Reader determine. It is sufficient he be made to know, that the latter Part of the Quotation, beginning at *Sic ipsa Mysteria*, has no other Relation to the former Part, beginning at *Si quid de his assignare*, than is between two Things set in direct Opposition to one another.

2. *Macrobius* had observed, that the Philosophers did not admit the *fabulous* in all their Disputations; but in those only which related to the Soul, the HEAVENLY BODIES, and the HERO-GODS. On the contrary, when they discoursed of the *First Cause*, and the *Mind* proceeding from him, that then every thing was delivered

\* See the Quotation, at p. 174.

agreeably to strict Truth—"Sciendum est tamen non in omnem Disputationem Philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita \*, sed his uti silent, cum vel de anima, vel de ÆRIIS, ÆTHERIISVE POTESTATIBUS, vel de CETERIS DIS loquuntur. Ceterum cum ad summum & principem Omnium Deum, qui apud Græcos τ' ἀρχαῖον qui πρῶτον εἶσιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad Mentem, quam Græci νῦν appellant, Originales rerum species, quæ ἰδέαι dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam & profectam Deo: Cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, Summo Deo & Mente, nihil fabulose penitus attingunt." But then he immediately subjoins, in the Words in Question, that, though here they spoke nothing but the Truth, yet, by Reason of the high Abstraction and spiritual Nature of the Subject, they were unavoidably at a loss for adequate Expressions, and therefore obliged to speak figuratively, that is, make use of sensible and material Images. SED SI QUID DE HIS ASSIGNARE CONANTUR, QUÆ NON SERMONEM TANTUMMODO, SED COGITATIONEM QUOQUE HUMANAM SUPERANT, AD SIMILITUDINES ET EXEMPLA CONFUGIUNT.

When *Macrobius* had said this, and illustrated the last Observation by an Example from *Plato*, he goes on to the other Part of his Subject, namely, to tell us how the Philosophers managed when they treated of the other Gods and the Soul; then (he says) they admitted of the *fabulous*; not childishly, or to please a wanton Imagination, but because they knew that exposing Nature, naked as she was, would be greatly injurious to her. Who, as she withdraws herself from the Knowledge of the Vulgar by her various Covering and Disguise of FORMS, so it is her Pleasure that the

\* All the old Editions had these Words *vel licita*: the more *modern*, not knowing what to make of them, fairly sunk them. *Gronovius* takes notice of the Fraud, and restores them to their Place, but in order finally to degrade them on a fair Hearing. He says they are corrupt, and should be read *vel ficta*. But *licita* is the genuine Word, which this Critic would have seen, had he apprehended that it signified those *theological Fables allowed of by public Authority*. So that *fabulosa vel licita* signify either such Fables as the Philosophers themselves invented, or such as they borrowed from the popular Belief.

Philosophers should handle her Secrets in Fable and Allegory.—  
 “ De Diis autem, ut dixi, ceteris, & de Anima non frustra se, nec  
 “ ut oblectent, ad Fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt Inimicam  
 “ esse Nature apertam nudamque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vul-  
 “ garibus Hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum TEGMINE  
 “ OPERIMENTOQUE subtrahit; ita a prudentibus Arcana sua voluit  
 “ per Fabulosa tractari.”—Then follow the rest of the Words,  
 which should be translated thus: *So the Mysteries themselves are hid  
 under the Deceits of figurative Representations, lest the naked Truth  
 should obtrude itself even on the Initiated. But while the Greatest  
 Men, with Wisdom for their Guide, are conscious of the true Secret;  
 the rest may be well content with such Representations as secure the dig-  
 nity of the Secret, and are contrived to excite their Veneration.* SIC  
 IPSA MYSTERIA FIGURARUM CUNICULIS OPERIUNTUR, NE VEL  
 HÆC ADEPTIS NUDA RERUM TALIAM SE NATURA PRÆBEAT:  
 SED SUMMATIBUS TANTUM VIRIS, SAPIENTIA INTERPRETE,  
 VERI ARCANI CONSCIIS, CONTENTI SINT RELIQUI AD VENE-  
 RATIONEM FIGURIS DEFICIENTIBUS A VILITATE SECRETUM.  
 The Reader now sees that *this* Period, and the *other*, beginning  
 with *Si quid de his assignare*, which our Advocate had tacked to it,  
 are so far from belonging to one another, that the first describes  
 the unavoidable Condition that attends the speaking *Truth*; the  
 other the Advantages that may be reaped from *lying*. But as ill as  
 he understood the Original, his own bad Translation, methinks,  
 might have informed him, that the two Parts of the Quotation  
 would have nothing to do with one another, they are so full of  
 Contradiction. The first Part says, the high Subjects there spoken  
 of are beyond all our Words, and exceed even our Thoughts. The se-  
 cond Part says no such Matter, the wise are capable of receiving them.  
 For these, they must do as they can; be content with, I do not  
 know what, an awful Veneration, &c. But more of this Matter  
 presently.

3. For I have not yet done with this wondrous Advocate of old  
 Philosophy. We have seen how he has acquitted himself as to the  
 general



general Purport of the *Quotation*: Let us now see whether he be equally happy in the Sense he gives of the Words and Phrases.

The learned Reader perceives, that the Words last quoted, *Sic ipsa Myſteria*, &c. are an Illustration and Inforcement, taken from the Practice of the *Myſteries*, of the foregoing Observation, *that it was commendable to hide ſome things under Fables*. How does our Advocate tranſlate *Sic ipsa Myſteria*? Thus, FOR THESE THINGS WERE AS MYSTERIES. So, from an *Illustration* he makes it an *Illation*: And *Myſteria*, the Rites ſo called, he degrades to a ſimple Secret. SIC FOR — IPSA THESE THINGS—MYSTERIA WERE AS MYSTERIES.—A hopeful Scholar! He had Reason to upbraid us with the *Memory* of our *School-books* \*. Well, but what are *theſe things* that are ſo like *Myſteries*? Why, even by his own Account, *abſtraẽt Ideas expreſſed in metaphorical Terms*. According to this, the DICTIONARY ſhould be the moſt *myſterious* Book in the World: And ſo, I ſuppoſe, our Freethinker found it: And having a natural Averſion to *Myſteries*, he turned himſelf to *Studies of quite another Nature* †.

The next Words, *Figurarum Cuniculis operiuntur*, he has paſſed over untranſlated, and with good Reason. For as they allude to the *Shews of the Myſteries* represented in *ſubterraneous Places*, he could have no kind of Conception of them. The next—*ne vel hæc Adeptis nuda rerum talium ſe Natura præbeat*, undergo the ſame Neglect; and on the ſame Account. He knew not what to make of *Adeptis*, the *Initiated*; and he thought too it contradicted

The next—*Sed Summatibus tantum Viris, Sapientia Interprete, veri Arcani conſciis*. Here he breaks Silence, and, on my Word, to the Purpoſe, WHICH THE WISE ONLY WERE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING. *Sapientia Interprete, the Wiſe only are capable of receiving*. Notwithſtanding the Difference of Number, it is plain he thought *Sapientia Interprete* was put in *Appoſition* to *Summatibus Viris*. He did not ſee the Conſtruction was *Summatibus Viris veri Arcani con-*

\* See p. v. of his Preface.

† P. viii. of the Preface.

*scitis, Sapientia Interprete*, nor that the *Sapientia Interpres* alluded to the *Hierophant* of the *Mysteries*, who explained the Secret to the most capable of the *Initiated*, the *Summatibus Viris*; by which *Macrobius* meant Heroes, Princes, Legislators, in Allusion to their old Practice, of seeking Initiation into the greater Mysteries \*. And those he had distinguished from the rest of the *initiated*, by the foregoing Words, *ne vel hæc Adeptis nuda rerum talium se Natura præbeat*.

The concluding Words are, *Contenti sint Reliqui ad Venerationem Figuris defendentibus a Vilitate Secretum*, which he translates, *but that others should be content with an awful Veneration for them, under the Veil of Figures and Allegories, lest they should be despised*. What is meant by a *Worshipper's* being content with an awful Veneration I do not understand: Much less his being content with an awful Veneration, lest the things venerated should be despised. The Object worshipped indeed may be well enough said to be content with an awful Veneration, lest, if it should be unreasonable, and expect more, it might come to be despised. But, as our profound Translator well observes, *These Things are as Mysteries*, and so we will leave them. However, the learned Reader sees he took *contenti sint Reliqui ad Venerationem Figuris*, to be the same as *contenti sint Reliqui veneratione Figurarum*, whereas it is equivalent to *contenti sint Reliqui Figuris ad Venerationem excogitatis*; and should be translated thus: *The rest may be well content with such Representations as secure the Dignity of the Secret, and are contrived to excite their Veneration*. What must we think of our Advocate? Does not he come well instructed in his Cause? Which shall we admire most; his Modesty, his Learning, or his Good Faith? But his *Translations*, of which his Book is almost all made up, abound with these Beauties; I shall therefore reserve the Examination of them for a Work by itself, and leave him at present,

*With all his blushing Honours thick upon him.*

\* Divine Legation, Vol. I. p. 243.

## V.

Our Advocate goes on to the second of the Arguments, which, in his Apprehension, affects the present Question: namely, that the Philosophers held some fundamental Principles, which were altogether inconsistent with the Doctrine of future Rewards and Punishments. Of these he tells us, and, indeed, tells us fairly, that the first was, that God could neither be angry nor hurt any one. The second, that the Soul was a dispersed Part of the Whole, and that this whole was God, into whom it was again to be resolved\*.

These he undertakes to examine in their Order.

From the first, that God could not be angry nor hurt any one, I drew this Conclusion, that they could not believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments. Which I endeavoured to support from a Passage in Tully's Offices to this Effect. The Writer is commending Regulus for keeping his Oath. But (says he) it may be objected, what is there in an Oath? The Violator need not fear the Punishment of Heaven, for all the Philosophers hold that God cannot be angry nor hurt any one. To this Tully replies, and owns that indeed it was a Consequence of the general Opinion of God's not being angry, that the perjured Man had nothing to fear from the divine Vengeance. But then it was not this Fear, which was indeed nothing, but Justice and good Faith which made the real Sanction, or moral Obligation of an Oath. "Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in Jurejurando? Num iratum timemus Jovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium Philosophorum, nunquam nec irasci Deum, nec nocere—Hæc quidem Ratio non magis contra Regulum quam contra omne Jusjurandum valet: sed in Jurejurando non qui Metus, sed quæ Vis sit, debet intelligi. Est enim Jusjurandum Affirmatio religiosa. Quod autem affirmate, quasi Deo Teste, promiseris, id tenendum est: jam enim non ad Iram Deorum, quæ nulla est; sed ad Justitiam & ad Fidem pertinet †."

\* P. 47.

† De Offic. l. 3. c. 28, 29.

1. Now what says our Advocate to this? *Upon the whole of this Authority* (he says) *I think it appears that the OBJECTOR rightly cited an Opinion of the Philosophers, but, mistaking the true Meaning, drew a wrong Conclusion from it. Tully, NOT TROUBLING HIMSELF TO CONFUTE OR SET HIM RIGHT, goes on with his Purpose, and proves the intrinsic Sacredness and Obligation of an Oath, without regarding the Circumstances of Hope or Fear\**. What an Idea has he here given us of this great Reasoner! *Tully* thinks an Objector worth taking notice of, and yet WILL NOT TROUBLE HIMSELF TO CONFUTE HIM. Without doubt our Advocate here compared *Tully* to himself for reasoning; as before he had compared himself to Chief Justice *Hale* for *Greek*. And because he can write books against an Objector † without *troubling himself to confute him*, he thought *Tully* might do so too. But the best of the Story is, that this Objector proves to be *Tully's* own self: *Dixerit quis, a Man might perhaps object* (says he). And sure *Tully* did not *mistake the true meaning of a common Opinion*. And as for a voluntary Slip, it was not *His* Way, as it is this Author's, to make Blunders, and pass them off for other Men's, with a *dixerit aliquis*. But it seems, *Tully* not only *mistook the true Meaning*, but *drew a wrong Conclusion from it*. This is hard. And, harder still, he had not the Patience to stay and set himself right. But sure, if he had all this Leisure to discredit his own Judgment, by inventing wrong Meanings, and drawing worse Conclusions, he would have found time to restore himself to his Reader's Opinion by confuting them. But then, whether the Objection was *Tully's* or another Man's, what a low Opinion must *Tully* have, in the mean time, of the Importance of a *Future State* to Society, if, in a *Book of Offices*, he would not *trouble himself to confute or set an Objector right*, whom he had brought in with a mistaken Argument that overturned it? There is indeed a Time when a serious Writer would not *trouble himself to confute or set a Wrangler right*. And it is such an one as this, where

\* P. 49.

† See his Title-page.

the Perverfity is fo great, as to become an Infult upon every Reader's Understanding.

2. But his *Translation* is in all refpects as curious as his *Comment*. It follows in thefe Words: *But fome one might object and fay, that Regulus need be under no Apprehenfion from the Breach of his Oath, of his being punifhed by the Gods, fince it is a WELL KNOWN SAYING amongst Philofophers, That God cannot be angry.* “Tully, in answer “to this, fays” that *this might be a Reafon not only againft Regulus, but againft all Oaths whatfoever; for (fays he) in fwearing it is not the Fear of Punifhment, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of it, which is to be regarded; for an Oath is a religious Affirmation made in the Prefence of God, and as fuch ought to be folemnly obferved. To conclude then, it is not the Anger of the Gods, which is NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] but Juftice and Good Faith which is [IMMEDIATELY] to be RESPECTED\*.*

*Hoc quidem COMMUNE eft OMNIUM Philofophorum, fays Tully. It is a WELL-KNOWN SAYING AMONGST the Philofophers, fays his Tranflator, inftead of, this is a Tenet common to all the Philofophers, commune Dogma, Decretum.*

*In Jurejurando (fays Tully) non qui Metus, fed quæ Vis fit debet intelligi. In fwearing (fays his Tranflator) it is not the Fear of Punifhment, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of it which is to be regarded.* The pretended Objector obferving that the People were chiefly influenced, in their Oaths, by the Fear of Divine Punifhment, argues againft the *Efficacy* of Oaths in this Manner. All the Philofophers (fays he) hold that God cannot be angry, therefore he cannot punifh; confequently Oaths will have no *Efficacy*, or there will be nothing in an Oath. To this Tully gives a plain Answer. The *Efficacy* of an Oath (fays he) is not to be meafured by the Degree of Fear that attends the taking it, but by the moral Obligation of keeping it, that is, by its proper *Sanction*. *In Jurejurando non qui Metus, fed quæ Vis fit debet intelligi.* Literally,

\* P. 48, 49.

in *faciens* it ought to be considered, not what Fear attends it, but what Sanction it hath. And then shews, this Sanction to be good Faith. All here is close and well argued. Let us now hear how his Translator makes him reason. An Oath (says the Objector) is of no EFFICACY [*quid est in Jurejurando?*] because Fear is no more. Oh, replies Tully, it is not Fear, but the EFFICACY and IMPORTANCE of an Oath that is to be regarded. Admirably concluded. And had Tully reasoned thus, I should have believed he had forgot his Greek too, and turned himself to Studies of quite another Nature.

But the Flower of Translations is the following: Tully; *Jam enim non ad Iram Deorum, QUÆ NULLA EST.* His Translator; To conclude then, it is not the Anger of the Gods, which is NOTHING [IN THE PRESENT CASE] *Quæ nulla est!* Here he believed in good earnest that *quæ nulla est* was equivalent to *quæ nihil ad rem pertinet*: and so it may be, for ought I know, in his *Low-Latin*, but in Cicero's, it signifies the same as *quæ vana & commentitia est.* Tully; *sed ad Jussitiam & ad Fidem PERTINET.* His Translator; but Justice and Good Faith which is [IMMEDIATELY] to be RESPECTED. *Pertinet, immediately to be respected.* He could not find the Nominative Case to his Verb, and so took *pertinet* to be the impersonal. But another time let him remember it is governed of *ID.* *Jam enim [id quod promiseris] non ad Iram Deorum, quæ nulla est, sed ad Jussitiam & ad Fidem pertinet.* Literally thus, For now what you have promised relates not to the Anger of the Gods, which is indeed no Anger, but to Justice and Good Faith. This concludes the Argument very logically. But our Advocate says, *Justice and good Faith is IMMEDIATELY to be respected*: Which vitiates the whole Reasoning. First, as these Words do not imply the Sanction, the very thing Tully is here fixing. Secondly, as they do imply that something else was to be respected, the very thing Tully is here opposing.

Is not this an able Interpreter of his old Philosophers? Yet the poor Man did his best; and, without doubt, laboured hard. With what

what Gravity does he introduce this Subject! *From the first* [Principle] *that God could not be angry nor hurt any one, he* [Mr. W.] *draws a Conclusion, that they could believe no future State, &c. which he endeavours to support by a Passage in Tully, the TRUE SENSE of which, when CONSIDERED, will not, as I apprehend, answer his Purpose* \*.

## VI.

But he will still go on: *To shew* (says he) *that the Ancients did not draw the same Conclusion from this Opinion of the Philosophers, as the Objecter in Tully or Mr. Warburton, it appears in many places that they believed—What? that the Gods actually punished this very Crime, and that Men incurred their Anger and Displeasure by committing it* †. And so say I too. Nay more, I shew at large ‡ the Consistency of this Belief, that *the Gods punished, with that other, that the one God did not.* And yet to establish this important Point he brings two Witnesses, *Cornelius Nepos and Xenophon.*

But, as if conscious of the Impertinence, he talks more to the Purpose in what follows. *And that Mr. Warburton's Distinction between the Anger of Demons and that of the Supreme Being may have no Place here, it may be necessary to shew by a Passage or two, that, as to the Effect, the same is asserted of the SUPREME GOD* §. This is saying something. But now to his Evidence. The first he produces are three Poets. *Hesiod* (says he) *tells us, that he who speaks the Truth in public, will be rewarded by all-seeing Jove; but he who forswears himself is irreparably lost, and his Posterity shall come to nothing, but the Generation of the Just shall flourish.* And *Phocylides, Forswear not thyself either inadvertently or knowingly, for the immortal God hateth a false Oath; and others have spoke to the same Purpose* ||, for which he quotes 4 *Iliad.* 167.

\* P. 47, 48.

† P. 50.

‡ Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 85, &amp; seq.

§ P. 52.

|| P. 52, 53.

1. Let us attend to the Question. It is, Whether the *Greek Philosophers* believed the *One Supreme God* punished and rewarded? And for the Proof of the Affirmative, he brings us three *Greek Poets*. But this is not the worst:

2. Two of these *Poets* do not so much as speak of the *Supreme Being*, but of the false Idol Gods of the People. *Homer* and *Hesiod* expressly call the God, they here speak of as the Rewarder and Punisher of true and false Swearers, ΖΗΤΣ ΚΡΟΝΙΔΗΣ, *Jupiter Saturnus*. Now it will be News, I suppose, to this Writer, that *Jupiter Saturnus* was not the *One Supreme Being*, but *Jupiter the Son of Saturn*, an Idol-Deity, though set at the Head of the College.

The other *Greek Poet* is, if possible, still less to his Purpose. For he happens to be no Heathen at all; indeed not so honest a Man: but a false Christian, the Disgrace of our holy Religion, who would put himself on the World for old *Phocylides* the *Milesian*, contemporary with *Tæognis*. But the Imposture hath been detected by Critics of the first Order, such as *Joseph Scaliger*, *Ger.* and *Jf. Vossius*, *D. Heinsius*, *Huetius*, *Reiskius*, *Bartbius*, *Taubman*, &c. To the abundant Arguments they have produced, we may add this very Expression, cited by my Adversary, Ψεῦδοκλον ζευγεί Θεός ἀλόγιος.

3. But had these *Poets* been *Philosophers*, and their *Idol Gods*, the *Supreme*, who, unless it was our Advocate, would not have seen that, in popular Writings, they must needs talk popularly, and keep an *esoteric* Opinion, so destructive of Society, to themselves?

But he comes yet closer to the Point.—*And PLATO says*, *GOD will execute Vengeance on him, who, slighting the awful Majesty of his Divine Power, shall at any time forswear himself*\*. He hath given us a *Philosopher* at last we see; but to understand with what Judgment, we must again state the Question.

1. Which is, whether the *Greek Philosophers* BELIEVED that the *Supreme God* punished and rewarded. Now our Advocate hath

\* P. 52, 53.



*owned*, and, what is more, hath *proved* that the Philosophers had a two-fold Doctrine, an internal and an external; that the one contained Matter of *Belief*, the other of *Utility*. I have proved (to which our Advocate hath said nothing) that the Philosophers divided their Writings into two Classes, the *exoteric* and *esoteric*; and that this very Book of *Plato*, intituled, *Of Laws*, from whence he hath taken the Passage above, was of the *exoteric* kind. Yet for all this, he can without blushing, or, perhaps, without knowing why he should blush, quote the Book of *Laws*, for *Plato's* real Sentiments, in contradiction to what *Tully* and *Lactantius* tell us was Part of the *esoteric* Doctrine of *all* the Philosophers. The impartial Reader with hardly reflect on this without some Sort of Pity or Indignation. But what will he say when I tell him that this *Fallacy*, with others as gross, that have been and shall be taken notice of in their Place, run through every Page of his Performance?

2. But we have not yet done with this Quotation from *Plato*. It is doomed to undergo a still greater Disgrace. In an evil Hour did our Advocate forget his *Greek*, unconscious that *Fate* and *Free-thinking* had decreed to raise him up, in Spite of Nature, for the Preparer of the Way to pure Pagan Philosophy, with his

—*Petite hinc, Juvenescque, Senescque,  
Finem animo certum miserisque viatica canis* \*.

For here *Serranus* hath given him a terrible *quid pro quo*; which he hath innocently swallowed. This Translator makes *Plato* say *DEUS illum Odio prosequitur, qui SACROSANCTA DIVINI NUMINIS Auctoritate neglecta falsum Juramentum dicit* †. But *Plato* says no such thing. He speaks of *the GODS*, in the *plural*, such as the People worshipped. The whole Passage is in these Words: *Let no Man, when he invokes the GODS for his Truth, mix any thing of Falshood, Fraud, or Insincerity, either in his Word or Deed; unless he chuses to become*

\* The Motto to his Title-page.

† Plat. 917, 2. Ed. Serr.

me? hateful to the Gods. As in the first Place is he, who, without any Reverence to the Gods, swears falsely: And in the second Place, he, who lies before his Betters. Ψεύδῃ μηδὲς μηδὲν μὴδ' ἀπάτην, μηδὲ τι κίβδηλον, γίνῃ ἐπικαλέμενος ΘΕΩΝ, μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειεν, ὃ μὴ θεομισέεισσι. [Dius infensissimus, says Serranus rightly here] ἔσεσθαι μέλλων ἔτῃ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀν' ὅρκους ὀμνὺς ψευδεὺς μηδὲν φοροῦντι ΘΕΩΝ· δευτέρῳ δέ, ὃς ἀν' ἐπιθήσιον τῶν Κρείττωνων αὐτῷ ψεύδεται. Had our Advocate had the least Taste of Antiquity, he might have seen, from the concluding Period, with what Spirit the whole was written. With no other sure than to instruct the People in their Devoirs to Society. A likely Place to find any of *Plato's esoteric Doctrines*.

But if one considers the whole Evidence together, one would wonder how it could ever enter seriously into the Head of one, whose Profession (if it taught him any thing) taught him to judge of the Nature of Evidence, that Poets writing to the People, and speaking their Language, or a Poetical Philosopher writing a Popular Book of *Laces* to keep them in Order, should ever talk to a Heathen Commonalty of the *only One God*.

## VII.

But he is wiser in what follows. *The next Authority* (says he) *M<sup>r</sup>. Warburton brings to strengthen his Conclusion is from Lactantius, which he calls an illustrious Instance; but on reading, it turns out so low and insipid, THAT IT IS NOT WORTH CONSIDERING\**. Indeed, so short! How happy had it been for him had he passed the same Judgment on all the rest! The Argument from *Lactantius* stood thus: That eloquent Writer, in defending *Christianity*, found nothing so much opposed the Doctrine of a *future Judgment*, as a prevailing Principle common to all the Philosophers, that God could not be angry. He therefore composed his Discourse, intituled, *De Ira Dei*, to combat this following Syllogism:

\* P. 53.

If God hath no Affections of Love or Hatred, Fondness or Anger,  
he cannot reward or punish.

But he hath no Affections, &c.

Therefore, &c.

A modern Advocate of Religion would certainly have denied the *major*, but that was a Principle which *Laëtantius* expressly tells us was received by all Parties. He therefore turns his whole Discourse against the *minor*; and endeavours to prove that God hath these Affections. Nor does he at all mince the Matter. For he tells us there are in God, as in Man, the Passions of Love and Hatred: And, to make all sure, contends for God's having an human Form. Now the Inference I drew from it was this, that, as *Laëtantius* was admirably well skilled in all Pagan Philosophy, he could not mistake a Principle which all the Philosophers held, nor a Consequence which they all drew from it. The *Principle* was, that the Supreme God had no Affections; and the *Consequence*, that he could neither reward nor punish. Therefore this *Principle* and this *Consequence* were held by ALL, the Point to be proved. It was on this Account, that I called the Case of *Laëtantius* an *illustrious one*. Our Advocate says 'tis *low and insipid, and not worth considering*. Utri creditis, Quirites?

But I commended him too soon. He won't let the Matter rest when 'tis well: See then what comes of it.

He tells the Reader, that *I myself say Laëtantius knew little of Christianity* \*. Egregious Advocate! must not this be the very Cause (if there were any Cause at all) of those *Philosophic Prejudices*, which so fatally disposed him to attack the *minor* rather than the *major*?—*That he fell into many Errors* †. Could it be otherwise while he opposed the *minor*?—*That his Treatise was obscure* ‡. Must it not needs be so, when his Opposition to the *minor* led him to main-

\* P. 53.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

tain, that there is in God, as in Man, the Passions of Love and Hatred?—*And strongly contended that God had a human Form* \*. Was not this Extravagance a full Proof that the Connexion between the *Principle* (of God's having no Passions) and the *Consequence* (that he could neither punish nor reward) was so universally held that he could find no Way to *break through*; but was forced to *evade* it, by asserting God had Passions? For which to provide a proper Subject, he thought fit to give him a human Form likewise.—*All then* (says our Advocate) *that appears from this illustrious Instance is, that Lactantius grossly mistook this fine Sentiment of the Philosophers* †. Does he know whom he talks of? Why, this *Lactantius* was a *Philosopher* himself; not like that canting Tribe of Dunces, *Porphyry*, *Jamblichus*, &c. who first brought their Fanaticism into the Schools of Philosophy, which so soon after, and so fatally, infected the Church of *Christ*; but one whom the greatest Monarch of the World made choice of for the Governor of his Son. He was a *Lawyer* too, and his Critics say, a happy Emulator of the Eloquence of *Cicero*. Yet our Advocate believes in good earnest, that *he grossly mistook this fine Sentiment of the Philosophers*. Alas! What he *mistook* were *the fine Sentiments of Christianity*; and this in too warm a Zeal for overturning those of *Philosophy*, which he understood but too well.—*And in combating with it fell into a Puddle of foul Absurdities* ‡. Who told him so? Doctors differ. *St. Jerom* calls this Tract *De Ira Dei, pulcherrimum Opus*. Which had our Advocate known, without doubt, he had opposed the Judgment of a Father of the Church to mine. For, to say the Truth, I am answerable for all the Freedoms he here takes with *Lactantius*; what he knew of the *De Ira Dei* being only from *The Divine Legation*. But I produce the Authority of *Jerom*, who differs so much from my Sentiments of the Tract, to shew the Reader that *Lactantius's* Manner of supporting a *future Judgment* against the Philosophers,

\* P. 53.

† P. 54.

‡ Ibid.

was the approved Defence of the learned Christians of that time. Consequently *Lactantius* did not grossly mistake this FINE Sentiment of the Philosophers.

## VIII.

But this *Principle* seems fated to disgrace him; so that he can't for his Life let it alone. He goes on therefore in these Words: *To clear this Matter more fully, it may now be proper to consider the PRINCIPLE itself, which, as Mr. Warburton says, greatly embarrassed Antiquity; because the Ancients, says he, could not distinguish between human Passions and the divine Attributes of Justice and Goodness, p. 393\*. But I hope to make it appear, that the Ancients were not all embarrassed; and that they distinguished in this Particular, just in the same Manner as we do now †.*

He tells the Reader, I say *the PRINCIPLE greatly embarrassed Antiquity*, and refers to page 393\*. Let the Reader then hear me speak. "We see *Tully* owns the *Consequence* of this universal *Principle*.—" "A modern Reader, full of the Philosophic Ideas of these late "Ages, will be surpris'd, perhaps, to be told, THAT THIS CON- "SEQUENCE GREATLY EMBARRASSED ANTIQUITY; when he can "so easily evade it, by distinguishing between human Passions and "the divine Attributes of Justice and Goodness, on which alone "the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments is "vincibly established. But the Ancients had no such precise Ideas "of the Divine Nature. They knew not how to sever Anger from "its Justice, nor Fondness from its Goodness."—He charges me with saying the *PRINCIPLE greatly embarrassed Antiquity*: and I say the *CONSEQUENCE* from that *Principle greatly embarrassed Antiquity*. What are we to think of this? That it was done with Design? Alas! No. The poor Man knew no Difference between *Principles* and *Consequences*, *Promises* and *Conclusions*. Or if he had any Meaning, it was to shew his Contempt of these, and all other my

\* Div. Leg. cōl. 4to, vol. II. p. 88.

† P. 54.

like *Divisions, Divisions, and Subdivisions*, which, he tells us, he *felt* as *many* *as* *his* *Curiosities*.\*

But the next attack at Lißort is still more surprising. For he tells us in his *Journal*, that *Homer's Battles* in their Terror, I had *felt* as *many* *as* *his* *Curiosities*. He will prove *they were not at all embarrassed*, without so much as knowing what *Ancients* must needs be meant. Now the intelligent Reader sees they are the ancient CHRISTIAN, not Pagan Writers, for this plain Reason, That, though I hold neither Christian nor Pagan Writers could *distinguish between human Passions and the divine Attributes*, yet none but Christian Writers could be *embarrassed* with the *Consequence* of God's not being angry (which Consequence was, that therefore he could not punish) because none but *Christians* (according to my Assertion) held that he could punish. Now from their holding, as they did at first, with the *Philosophers*, that God *could not be angry*, and with the *Founders of their Faith*, that he *would punish*, arose all that EMBARRAS I took notice of; and which of course I must suppose the Pagans free from, by their not holding those two supposed contrary Propositions. Our Advocate, who had not the least Conception of all this, will yet venture to contradict me; and taking it for granted, as he does every thing he can't prove, that I meant PAGAN Antiquity lay under this *Embarrass*, he brings a Number of Passages from Pagan *Philosophers* to confute my Assertion. Thus all he proves, if he should chance to prove any thing, being nothing to the Purpose, I might here fairly leave him to himself.

But as *Pagan Antiquity*, though it was not *embarrassed* like the *Christian*, yet was not at all more *exact* in its Ideas of the Divine Attributes, I will permit our Advocate, for once, to suppose, that I had said, that *the ancient Philosophers were embarrassed, and could not distinguish between human Passions, and the Divine Attributes*: Let us see then what he will make of it. But as I restore him his Arms, and

\* P. 3.

instruct him how to use them, it may be allowed me to remind my Reader,

1. That when I say they could not distinguish between *human Passions and the Divine Attributes*, I mean the Attributes of the *first Cause of all Things*.

2. When I say they could not *distinguish*, I mean distinguish in such a Manner, as to leave Room for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; all other *Distinctions* being out of the Question.

Well then, to prove that Antiquity was not embarrassed, how does this mighty Champion of Old Philosophy set out? Why first he proves *that he himself is not embarrassed* \*. Secondly, that *those who read the Scriptures cannot be embarrassed* †. But this is only to feel his own Strength, and make the Flourish of his Arms. He soon comes to himself, and then says, *But that the Reader may see how rightly the Philosophers could distinguish between human Passions and the Divine Attributes, I shall now lay before him some Passages, in which it is said God is not subject to Passion, or that he is void of Anger, and can hurt none; and others, where he is said to be angry, and to punish Sinners for their Crimes; by which every one may the better judge, whether the Ancients were not exactly of the same Opinion as himself, and did not speak as Christians now do, sometimes with regard to the ineffable and absolute Rectitude of an infinitely perfect Being, and sometimes with Respect to the Relation he bears to us his finite and imperfect Creatures* ‡. This is indeed to the Point.

And first, says he, *I readily agree with Mr. Warburton, that it was the Opinion of all the Philosophers, that God could not be angry, nor hurt any one* §. And though we agree in this, yet he will bring several Witnesses to prove it. This is always his Way when he has so safe Ground to go upon. Thus he proved the *double Doctrine* of the Philosophers, and the *single Object* of that double Doctrine. And on such Occasions, I must acquaint the Reader, he is a most

\* See p. 54.

† P. 55.

‡ P. 55, 56.

§ P. 56.

unmerciful Prover. But as he can never forbear mixing and confounding the several Parts of his Subject, the last of his Testimonies, to prove *God cannot be angry*, being taken from *Seneca*, he is drawn to another Question before his Time. But Order, Method, and Logic, we know, are nothing with this Writer. However, a good Thing never comes amiss. What then says *Seneca*? *That that Man is mistaken, who supposes the Gods can hurt any one; for they neither can do wrong, nor suffer it, both of which betoken Frailty. But Seneca immediately after says, that the Gods do exact Punishment, and chastise some for their Gods. Therefore Seneca must either contradict himself, or speak of the same Beings in different Respects; and indeed these two last Passages of Seneca, one of which is quoted by Mr. Warburton, TO PROVE that the Gods can hurt none, seem to have no Reference to their just Anger against Sinners, but to such Hurt or Injury as arises from Wrong or Injustice \*.*

1. This whole Remark is nothing to the Purpose. *Seneca* here means the Gods of Paganism, not the first Cause of all Things, where he talks of their punishing and chastising. Now the first Cause is the Subject of our Question.

2. *But of these two Passages, one is quoted by me (he says) TO PROVE that the Gods can hurt none.* The Passage is in page 402, of the second Edition †. My Words are these, *A Benevolence too that went not from the Will, but the Essence of the Supreme Being; SO Seneca informs us, Que causa est Diis, &c.* Here again his old Luck follows him. I quoted it to shew what Kind of Benevolence they gave to God: He says, *I quoted it to prove the Gods can hurt none.*

Having thus notably supported his Agreement with me, that it was the Opinion of the Philosophers that God could not be angry nor hurt any one; he proceeds, *But that THEY are angry, so as to punish the wicked for their Crimes, might be proved by a multitude of*

\* P. 58.

† Vol. II. p. 99, of this edition.



*Testimonies* \*. Without doubt it might. But what then? I require him to shew, that the Philosophers believed the *One God* could be angry and punish; and he says, they believed their *false Gods* could. And so said I, and proved it likewise. Yet he brings Witness upon Witness, Poets upon Philosophers, to shew they thought *THE GODS could be angry and punish*: And then goes on thus: *By all which it manifestly appears, that when the Ancients said, God could not be angry, they meant, &c* †. Was there ever such a Reasoner? He will prove what the Ancients thought of their *false GODS*, a Thing nobody asked; and from thence conclude, what they thought of the *SUPREME*, a Thing nobody will believe.

But lest the Reader should suspect, as he has little Reason, that this was only a Blunder in Words; and that though our Advocate promised to shew by Quotations, what was nothing to the Purpose, yet the Quotations themselves might haply inform us of what was; I shall run through his Passages.

The two first ‡ are from *Plato's Book of Laces*, a Writing of the *exoteric* Kind, in which the Philosopher speaks to the People; and consequently must needs speak of those Gods they were acquainted with. In one of the Passages he actually uses the *plural*, in the other the *singular*, used perpetually, in the Writings of the Ancients, for the *plural*: Sometimes as the peculiar tutelary God of the People was meant; sometimes as it was *Jupiter* the first of the Class; but most frequently as it was a common Figure of Speech for a *Greek* Republican to say the *God* or the *Magistrate*, when there were a hundred of each. But what will surprize our Advocate (who appears not to have received Instruction on this Matter) they sometimes, though very rarely, used the *Plural* for the *Singular*. As *Seneca*, in the Place that came in Question just above, *Quæ causa est Diis*, &c. and *Sallust*, in another, that will come in Question below. A little Discernment is sufficient to take them right, in either of these *conversions*. But this is more, it seems, than we are

\* P. 58, 59.

† P. 60.

‡ P. 59.

to respect of our Advocate, who puzzling on, between his *true* and *false* Gods, hangs, like a false Teacher as he is, between Heaven and Earth, in the Fool's Paradise of Pagan Philosophy.

The other two Passages he brings\* are from a spurious Thing given to *Cicero*. This was a pleasant Mistake. He had seen me quote *Tully's de Consolatione*, twice, and therefore thought he might safely do the same. But my two Passages were from the genuine Fragments of that lost Book; his two, by the Malice of his old Luck, from that Forgery of *Sigonius*, intituled, *De Consolatione*, and tattered upon *Tully*: But it could never get a Godfather till our Advocate became its *Sponsor*. *Cicero* (says he) *says that a Man by his Wickedness becomes an Enemy and hated of God*. And for this dejected Saying, *Cic. de Consol.* is quoted.

He goes on, *But we need not question the Philosophers, when the Poets say the same* †. Nay, it must be owned they're all in a Story. And how should they chuse, when prompted by their *false Gods*, in whose Favour they are speaking?

At length however, as if even sensible of the Impertinence of all he had been saying, he goes on thus: *But not to let this Matter rest wholly upon CONCLUSIONS, though never so well grounded*.— He means *Inferences*. You must excuse him. If he be there, or thereabouts, 'tis enough for a Man so averse to the *Nicety of Distinction*. Well, *not to let it rest then* (though I suspect it had been the wiser Course, as I am so well acquainted with his Way of mending Matters) What then? Why, he will *further shew what Constructions they put upon such Expressions, by one who has wrote a whole Chapter upon this Question, "In what Sense can the Gods, who are immutable, be said to be either angry or appeas'd?"* In which he tells us, that God cannot, properly speaking, be said to rejoice, for then he must sometimes be affected with Sorrow; nor to be angry, since Anger is a Motion of the Mind; nor to be pleas'd with Gifts, for that would be to be overcome with Pleasures, &c.; but while

“we are good, we are united to the Gods by Similitude, and when wicked, separated for our Unlikeness: Not that they are really angry, but that our Offences hinder the Light of their Goodness from shining upon us; wherefore it is the same thing to say, God hat th, or is angry with Sinners, as to say the Sun is hid from the Eyes of those who are blind\*.” These are the Words of *Sallyß* the Philosopher. To which I answer,

1. That this *Sallyß* is no legal Evidence. I have expressly excepted against him and all his Fellows, all that came so long after the Times in question; which I confine to the Period before *Christ*. The rising of the *Gospel*, I confess, again and again, gave such Light to the *Philosophers*, that they refined all their Doctrines by its Splendor, and then, like their mimic Brethren of the present Age, ungratefully abused their Benefactors. These are my Words in one Place of my Book: “Such was the general Doctrine on this Point before the coming of Christianity. But then those Philosophers who held out against its Truth, after some Time, remodelled both their Philosophy and Religion: making their Philosophy more religious, and their Religion more philosophical.—So amongst the many Improvements of Paganism, the softening this Doctrine was one.—And it is remarkable, that *then, and not till then, the Philosophers began really to believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments †.*” What now must we think of our Advocate? Was there ever any thing so shameless? Yet this is one of his hackney Fallacies, that runs on all his Errands.

2. But as our Advocate is turned Solicitor, and, without doubt, has been at much pains in finding out this Witness, we will hear him. And if he should chance to prove what I affirm, and what my Adversary denies, it would be but the common Case of Evidence picked up at a Venture, to support a bad Cause. To keep him no longer in Suspense, I must here let him know, that, had I

\* P. 62, 63.

† Divine Legt. vol. II. p. 116.

searched all Antiquity, I could not have found a Passage more to my Purpose. Such is his old Luck at quoting.

This *Sally*? having put together some common-place Stuff of the *Gods and the World*, in his fourteenth Chapter proposes to speak to this Question, *How the immutable Gods may be said to be angry and appeas'd.* Πῶς εἰ Θεὸς μὴ μετὰ ἀλλοίωσις, ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ θερραπύεσθαι δυνατόν. He says, in the first place, that God has no human Passions, he neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeas'd with Gifts, & χαίρει Θεός—ὐδὲ ὀργίζεται.—ὐδὲ δούροις θερραπύεσθαι. So far doubtless is agreeable to Truth. But how then? Why that the Gods are eternally beneficent, or, as *Seneca* had said, *Causi Diis benefaciendi NATURA, and beneficent only, but never hurtful, ἐπινοίαν ἀγαθοῖ τε εἶναι ΑΕΙ, ἢ ἀποδοῦναι μόνον βλάβησι δὲ ἰδέσθαι.* Thus having avoided one Extreme, he falls into another, and supposeth it *blind Nature* and not *Will* that determines God's Beneficence. The Inference from this is, that the Rewards and Punishments of Heaven are the *natural and necessary Effects* of Actions; not *positive, arbitrary Consequences*, or the Designation of Will. And so our Philosopher maintains. For now the Difficulty being, that if *Nature be the Cause of the Beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow Good on the virtuous Man, and Evil on the Wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: *While we are good, we are joined by Similitude of Nature to the Gods; and when evil, separated by Dissimilitude—They become our Enemies, not because they are angry at us, but because our Crimes hinder the Gods from striking on us—wherefore it would be the same thing to say, that God is turned away from the Evil, as to say, the SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN.* Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὅτις δι' ὁμοιότητος Θεοῖς συναπόμεθα, κακῶς δὲ γεγήμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητος χωριζόμεθα—ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ ὀργίζομεν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνομοιότητων Θεὸς μὲν ἡμῖν ἐν ἐπίπῳ ἐλλάμπειν—ὡσεὶ ὁμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν εἰς κακὸς ἀπιστρέφεσθαι ἢ τὸν HAION τοῖς ἐσερημένοις τῶν ἰσθμῶν κρύβεσθαι. An apt Comparison, and very expressive of the Case; where the Influence of the Deity is suppos'd to be *natural*, like the Sun's, and consequently all Reward and Punishment, not the

the *moral*, but the *necessary* Issue of Things. A Platonic \* Principle entirely subversive of the proper Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, as believed every where by the People, and taught by the Christian Religion. But this Matter I had explained at large in page 398 of the Book \* he pretends to write against. The Pagans then, we find, in taking away human Passions from God, left him nothing but an essential Excellence, that went not from his *Will*, but his *Nature* only, and consequently was destitute of *Morality*. This was one Extreme. The *Primitive Christians*, as *Lactantius*, seeing clearly that the Platonic Notion of God overturned a *future Judgment*, and not seeing that Medium which their Masters in Science, the *Philosophers*, had misled of, maintained that God had human Passions. And this was the other Extreme. And whence, I pray, did both arise, but from neither's being able to distinguish between *human Passions* and THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE AND GOODNESS, the true Medium between *human Passions* and a *blind Excellence of Nature*? Did not I guess right when I said, if he would not let the Matter rest, he would soon make it worse? Yet hear how triumphantly he goes off; unconscious of all the fine Work he has been making. *And now I may venture to affirm* (says he) *that no one can reasonably imagine this Opinion of the Philosophers, that God cannot be angry, &c. could be any the least Obstacle to their believing a future State of Rewards and Punishments* †. I, for my Part, will only venture to affirm that the Dispute between us (if that may be called a *Dispute* where there is no *Contradiction*) stands thus: I had said, *The Ancients could not distinguish between human Passions and the divine Attributes of Justice and Goodness in the FIRST CAUSE of all Things*: And he has proved *they could distinguish between just and unjust Passions in their IDOLATROUS GODS*. I had said *they could not so distinguish as to leave any Foundation for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments*: And he has proved *that I said true*, by one of his own Witnesses, *Sallust* the Philosopher.

\* Div. Leg. Book III. Sect. 2. &amp; seqq.

† P. 63.

But, what the Reader can *reasonably imagine*, upon this View of the Evidence, as I would not pretend to direct his Judgment, *I will not venture to affirm.*

## IX.

*I now come to the next Principle (says our Advocate) which Mr. Warburton lays down as repugnant to the Belief of a future State, &c. which is, "That the generality of the Philosophers held the Soul to be a dispersed Part of a whole, and this whole was God, into whom it was again to be resolved." BUT HERE HE BEGINS, AS IN OTHER PLACES, TO EXPRESS HIS FEARS "that the Reader will suspect (as I am apt to think he will) these Kind of Phrases are highly figurative Expressions, and not to be measured by the severe Standard of metaphysical Propriety;" and therefore he desires the Reader to take notice of another Consequence from this Principle, which is, that the Soul was eternal à parte antè, as well as à parte post; and this, as he says, was universally held by Antiquity, though he attempts to bring but one Authority to prove it, which he says is above Exception; and therefore I shall transcribe it out of his own Book, as he quotes it from Cudworth, that the Reader may the better judge of its Validity. "It is a thing very well known (says the great Cudworth) that according to the Sense of Philosophers these two things were always included together, in that one Opinion of the Soul's Immortality, namely by its Præ-existence as well as its Post-existence; neither was there ever any of the Ancients before Christianity, that held the Soul's future Permanency after Death, who did not likewise assert its Præ-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it was once granted that the Soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corrupted: And therefore the Asserters of the Soul's Immortality commonly began here; first to prove its Præ-existence\*, &c."*

*Here (says he) he begins, as in other Places, to express his FEARS. This is the second Time he has told me of my Fears. And without*

\* P. 64, 65.

Doubt he took me in good earnest for some very *fearful Animal*, or he would never have ventured so wantonly to insult me. But the Reader perhaps may be curious to know how that Writer expresses his *Fears* of his own Arguments, who has been represented by the Bigots of the opposite Party, as despising all other Men's. The *fearful* Passage is in these Words: "And that the Reader may not suspect these kind of Phrases, as that the *Soul is Part of God*; *discerped from him*; *of his Nature*; which perpetually occur in the Writings of the Ancients, to be only *bigly figurative Expressions*, and not to be measured by the exact Standard of metaphysical Propriety; he is desired to take notice of one Consequence drawn from this Principle, and universally held by Antiquity, which was this, that the Soul was eternal *à parte antiè*, as well as *à parte post*; which the Latins well expressed by the Word *Sempiternus*\*." Does the Reader find any of that Passion here which our quick-sighted Advocate has discovered? All I can say to the Matter is, that as it is the Punishment of *free-acting* to fear for one's self, where no fear is; so it is, it seems, the Reward of *free-thinking* to see Fear for others where no Fear is.

Well, but let us hear what he has to say to the Passage from *Cudworth*. Now I readily agree (says he) that what *Cudworth* says of the Philosophers is true; but deny that what *Mr. Warburton* quotes him for, can any ways be proved from thence; which is, that the Philosophers held the Soul to be eternal *à parte antiè* as well as *à parte post*; and indeed there is not ONE WORD which either expresses, or, WITH ANY TOLERABLE PROPRIETY, implies any such Doctrine. They held, says *Cudworth*, the Soul's *Præ-existence*, or that it was in Being before the Body; but it will IMMEDIATELY OCCUR to the Reader, that if it *præ-existed* only one Day or one Hour, before it was infused into the Body, it really *præ-existed* as much, though not so long, as if it had been from Eternity. And the whole Design of *Cudworth* is to

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 104.

*show*, that the Ancients held the Soul to be immortal. For this Reason amongst others that it was not propagated with the Body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it; but was a distinct Substance from it, for that it præ-existed, or was made before it, as he proves from a Passage of Aristotle. Therefore the Doctrine of Præ-existence does not in the least prove the Soul to be eternal à parte antè; much less that it was dispersed or torn from God in a literal Sense\*. Pity me, Reader! who am forced into a Controversy with an Advocate of old Philosophy, who has not yet so much as learnt his first Elements either in the old or new. Why, thou mighty Man of Law! if the Ancients were to prove (as in this Case you own they were) that the Soul was eternal à parte post by an Argument taken from its Præ-existence, and that it was an acknowledged Principle (as we both agree it was) that whatsoever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible, must not by that Præ-existence be meant an eternal Præ-existence? For if there were a Time when the Soul was generated, though many millions of Years before its Entrance into the Body, it could not be proved to be eternal à parte post. The acknowledged Principle that whatever was generated could not be proved to be incorruptible, forbidding that Conclusion. For the Reader must take notice, their Point was not to give an analogical Probability that the Soul simply survived the Body, but a metaphysical Demonstration that it would survive for ever. And let him not imagine that our Advocate has only mistaken the Question, and argued right from the wrong State of it. He delivers it truly in these Words, *The whole Design of Cudworth is to show, that the Ancients held the Soul to be IMMORTAL.* He wanted, we see, no Knowledge of the particular Question; all his Want was Want of common Apprehension. Yet Cudworth thought the Argument so obvious, that no one, who was fit to read his Book, could possibly mistake in it; and therefore contented himself in using Præ-existence simply, without adding eternal, as the Argument necessarily determined the Mode of the Præ-

\* P. 65, 66.



*existence*. Yet has he at length got a Reader who is fairly able to mistake him, and who, instead of being thankful for an Explanation made, as it appears, for his peculiar Use, will find fault with his Instructor, and not content with saying that *there is not one Word in Cudworth, which expresses my Sense*, will add, *that there is nothing that can with any tolerable Propriety in ply it*. This he says; and yet (what exceeds Belief) he had but just before transcribed these very Words of *Cudworth*: THEY CLEARLY PERCEIVING, THAT, IF IT WAS ONCE GRANTED THAT THE SOUL WAS GENERATED, IT COULD NEVER BE PROVED, BUT THAT IT MIGHT ALSO BE CORRUPTED. Now if he would not see it, is he fit to write? And, if he could not, is he fit to be read? Who can be positive, after this, that he ever saw *Cudworth's* Book, which concludes the whole Observation in these Words: "The *Totum* or *Compositum* of a Man or Animal may be said to be *generated* and *corrupted* in regard of the Union and Disunion, *Conjunction* and *Separation* of those two Parts, the Soul and *Body*. But the Soul itself, according to these Principles, is *NEITHER A THING GENERABLE NOR CORRUPTIBLE* \*." Yet our Advocate tells us, *the whole Design of Cudworth is to shew, that the Ancients held the Soul to be immortal FOR this Reason amongst others, that it was not propagated with the Body, and therefore could not be corrupted with it*. Which is just as wise a Reason as the following: *The last Lord Mayor of London will live a thousand Years, FOR this Reason, amongst others, that he was in being before his Entrance on his Office, and existed after his going out of it*. But he has all the Way done Wonders with his FOR. I have taken upon me to dignify several of them with *Capitals* for their eminent Services. But the bold Humour of the *English* is, never to spare this Particle. On the contrary, the *French*, a wise People, when the Royal Academy was founded for the Advancement of *Eloquence*, with which *Reason* had little to do, held a solemn Sessions for the Extirpation of their FOR, CAR, as an useless and dangerous Word.

\* *Intell. Syst.* p. 39.

And though I think it escaped, and even survived the Edict of *Nantes* (notwithstanding all the Mischief it had done the Catholic Cause) yet their prudent Writers are extremely reserved in the Use of this and all other their *illative Particles*. Feu Gomberville (says one of their Dictionary Writers) *haïssoit le mot CAR, parce, disoit-il, qu'il venoit du Grec. The late Gomberville hated the word CAR, because, as he said, it came from the Greek.* How happy for us, that our FOR is differently descended, or we had lost a great Reasoner, who bears as thorough an Antipathy to Greek, as ever did Monsieur Gomberville!

He goes on, *And if I may be allowed to argue in the same Way as Mr. Warburton.* The Public, I believe, will pardon him, let him begin when he will. Well, but allow him to do what, however, we are never to expect of him, to talk a little plain Sense; what then? Why *the Ancients could not strictly believe this Doctrine [that the Soul was Part of God], because it is greatly INCONSISTENT with another well-known Opinion amongst them, that Souls were linked to Bodies for a Punishment, or sent down as into a State of Tryal.* Now for his Reason.—FOR to suppose in the gross Sense, that Pieces or Parts of the ever perfect and supreme God were so served, is WHAT NO ONE WILL IMAGINE THE PHILOSOPHERS CAPABLE OF\*. FOR is here again, as usual, on very desperate Service. He Promises to shew the *Inconsistency* between two *metaphysical* Opinions. What Reader now but would expect a *metaphysical* Reason? Instead of that, he puts us off with a *moral* one. *No one will imagine the Philosophers capable of holding both those Opinions.* And to finish the Absurdity, this is called arguing like me, in an Instance where I proved the Meaning of a *metaphysical* Term by a *metaphysical* Opinion. *If I may be allowed, says he, to argue in the same Way as Mr. Warburton.*

2. But to be at a Word with him and his Philosophers together. What both are CAPABLE OF we shall now see. It is agreed that

\* P. 66, 67.

Pythagoras and Plato held that Souls were linked to Bodies for a Punishment, or sent down as into a State of Trial. Yet of this very PYTHAGORAS Cicero speaks thus: *Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit Animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commicantem ex quo nostri animi CARPERENTUR, non vidit Distractione humanorum Animorum DISCERPI ET LACERARI DEUM.* Of PLATO and his Followers Arnobius speaks thus: *Ipse denique Animus qui IMMORTALIS a vobis & DEUS ESSE NARRATUR, cur in Ægris æger sit, in Infantibus stolidus, in Senectute defessus? Delira & fatua & insana!* Here we see what two great Writers of Antiquity thought the Philosophers capable of. Was he ignorant of this? No; I had quoted them in the Discourse he pretends to confute\*. Did he attempt to confute them? No; nor a great Number more to the same Purpose, unless this may be called a Confutation, *And we may observe, that some of his Authorities to prove this are exceedingly strained, and, as himself acknowledges more than once, are otherwise understood by learned Men.* SOME? What then are the rest? But as to these some, does he prove what he says? Yes: And how? By quoting my Acknowledgment, that *they are differently understood by learned Men.* And now, Reader! What dost thou imagine our Advocates capable of?

## X.

He goes on.—*And because the Philosophers, speaking of the Soul, often call it the Image of God, divine and immortal, &c. he would lead the Reader, from such Expressions, unwarily to imagine, that it was literally a Part of God, eternal à parte antè, the same as the Soul of the World, &c. But I hope to make the Contrary appear by some plain Testimonies of Antiquity: and the first I shall produce is one Mr. W. himself has helped me to, and is from Stobæus, where Speusippus, one of Plato's Followers, says, "that the Mind was neither*

\* Divine Legation Vol. II. pp. 108, 110.

“the same with the One or the God, but had a peculiar Nature of its own.” This, Mr. W. owns, expressly contradicts what he asserted of Plato’s holding the Soul to be Part of God; “but he says that Stobæus and the learned Stanley were both mistaken in thinking Speulippus spoke of the human Mind, whereas, says he, it relates to the third Person in the Trinity.” Now supposing we take Mr. Warburton’s Judgment before that of Stobæus or Stanley, we may still fairly conclude, that if even the third Person in the Trinity was not the same as God, but had a peculiar Nature of his own, much less was the Soul of Man the same; but that it had a distinct Nature likewise\*.—He would lead, says he, the Reader by such Expressions unwarily to imagine, that it was literally a part of God. Hear then, by what kind of Expressions I would mislead the unwary Reader. *A natura Deorum* (says Cicero) *ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, haustos animos & libatos habemus.* And again, *Humanus autem animus decerptus ex Mente divina, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo comparari potest †.*—He will not dispute whether Stobæus and Stanley, or I, be in the right. He does well. But then he says, *We may still FAIRLY CONCLUDE, that if even the third Person in the Trinity was not the same as God, but had a peculiar Nature of his own, much less was the Soul of Man the same; but that it had a distinct Nature likewise.* Such a Concluder would have made Aristotle forswear Syllogism. In the 404th Page of the first Volume of the *Divine Legation ‡* he saw these Words: “Again, the Maintainers “of the *Immateriality* of the Divine Substance were likewise divided “into two Parties; the first of which held but *one* Person in the “Godhead; the other *two* or *three*. So THAT AS THE FORMER “BELIEVED THE SOUL TO BE PART OF THE SUPREME GOD; THE “LATTER BELIEVED IT TO BE PART ONLY OF THE SECOND OR “THIRD HYPOSTASIS.” What is to be done with this Prevaricator? Will he plead guilty, to have the Benefit of his Clergy? Or will he own he could not read, and so stand upon his Defence?—

\* P. 67, 68.

† Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 103.

‡ Vol. II. p. 102. of this edition.

“ You may complain (I hear him say) but whose Fault is it? You had put this Passage amongst your *nice Distinctions, Divisions, and Subdivisions*: And those I was not obliged to take notice of, after having so fairly given you Warning that I *passed over* all such as *need not Curiosities.*”

But I begin to be quite weary of my Advocate; I am drawing towards a *Conclusion* with him, and will dispatch him with all possible Expedition. What follows won't stay us long. *As to the Passage which he quotes from M. Antoninus, it is nothing more than an Exhortation to consider what will become of the Soul when it is disunited or separated from the Body: and though Mr. W. makes him to speak of its being resolved into the Anima Mundi; yet he owns at the same Time, that neither Gataker in his Notes, or Casaubon, had any Notion that the Doctrine of Resurrection was here alluded to\*. Gataker and Casaubon did not understand it in my Sense. Does he pretend to say I understand it wrong? He pretends to know nothing of the Matter: So I leave it to those who do. For I should have a strange Love for answering, if I gave this any other Reply than Antoninus's own Words: “ [To die] is not only according to the Course of Nature, but of great Use to it. [We should consider] how closely Man is united to the Godhead, and in what Part of him that Union resides; and what will be the Condition of that Part or Portion of it when it is resolved [into the Anima Mundi] †.”*

*The next Authority (says he) I shall produce, is from PLOTINUS, who tells us that the Soul is from God; and therefore necessarily loves him, yet it is a different Existence from him. Here again he plays his old Trick upon us. Plotinus, a Philosopher deep in the Times of Christianity. I have tried in vain to make him understand. I will try now if I can make him blush; while he forces me to repeat, for the second Time, the following Words of the Divine Legation. “ Such was the general Doctrine on this Point”*

\* P. 68.

† Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 114.

[namely, that the Soul was God, or Part of God] before the coming of Christianity; “but then those Philofophers, who held out against its Truth, after some Time new-modelled both their Philofophy and Religion; making their Philofophy more religious, and their Religion more philofophical.—So amongst the many Improvements of Paganifm, THE SOFTENING THIS DOCTRINE WAS ONE. The modern *Platonifls* confining the Notion of the Soul’s being Part of the Divine Subftance to that of Brutes.— And it is remarkable that then, and not till then, the Philofophers began really to believe the Doctrines of a future State\*.” How true this is we may fee by this very Quotation from *Plotinus*. And one of common Apprehenfion would have feen, by his Words, *yet it is a different Exiftence from him*, that this was an Innovation in Philofophy. For were it not the common Opinion, that the Soul was of the fame Exiftence with God, or Part of him, this Caution and Explanation had been impertinent. However, he goes on unmercifully to fhew the Orthodoxy of *Plotinus*, and of his Commentator *Picinus*, in this Point: Where fpeaking I don’t know what, nor why, of the *vegetative Soul*, he takes an Opportunity to criticifé a Paſſage I brought from *Plutarch*. Of this Soul [namely the *vegetative*] it is of which *Plutarch* manifefly fpeaks, where he fays, “that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the Soul to be immortal; for that launching out into the Soul of the Universe, it returned to its Parent and Original.” THAT THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL IS PLAIN, from his mentioning two other Souls from the fame Authorities, immediately after in a quite different Light. “*Pythagoras* and *Plato*, fays he, hold that the rational Soul is immortal; for that this Soul is not God, but the Workmanſhip of the Eternal God; and it is the irrational Soul which is mortal and corruptible.” So that unleſs we can ſuppoſe *Plutarch* intended to make *Pythagoras* and *Plato* contradict themſelves, we muſt conclude their Opinions in this Paſſage to be, that the *vegetative Soul* was diffuſed

\* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 116.

into the Life of the Universe; that the sensitive or irrational Soul was mortal and corruptible; and that the rational Soul was a distinct Existence made by God. But this last Part is not at all taken notice of by Mr. Warburton, though in the very same Paragraph with the first which he quotes\*.

1. Unless we can suppose (says he) Plutarch intended to make Pythagoras and Plato contradict themselves. Suppose, Quotha! Did he never hear that this Plutarch wrote an express Treatise on the Contradictions of the Stoics? A Sect of as good a House as either Pythagoras or Plato. Will he never see, that if the Philosophers had a double Doctrine, which he has laboured to prove, they must perpetually contradict themselves? But our Advocate is so captivated a Lover †, so enamoured of his dear Philosophers, that the very Air of a Contradiction shocks him.

2. Well then, not to disgust the Delicacy of a Lover, I will humour him. It shall be no Contradiction; nor will I suppose Plutarch such a Brutal as to insinuate any thing so gross. But now, if, like a true *Inamorato*, he will not suffer them to be defended by any Hand but his own, then we shall begin to differ. He tells us that when Plutarch says Pythagoras and Plato held the Soul to be immortal, IT IS PLAIN THIS MUST BE INTENDED OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL.—An immortal vegetative Soul! 'Tis a Prodigy that deserves an Expiation. But to know whether Plutarch or our Advocate be the real Father of this Monster, it will be necessary to transcribe the whole Chapter: “Pythagoras and Plato held the Soul to be immortal; for that lanching out into the Soul of the Universe, it returns to its Parent and Original. The Stoics say, that on its leaving the Body, the more infirm (*that is, the Soul of the Ignorant*) suffers the Lot of the Body: But the more vigorous (*that is, the Soul of the Wise*) endures to the Conflagration. Democritus and Epicurus say the Soul is mortal, and perishes with the Body: Pythagoras and Plato, that the reasonable Soul

\* P. 70, 71.

† P. v. of the Preface.

“ is uncorrupt (*for it is to be observed, the Soul is not God, but the* “*Workmanship of the Eternal God*) and the irrational mortal.” Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξέτισαν γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῷ πατρὶ; ψυχὴν ἀαχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἴμογεῖες. Οἱ Στωϊκοί, ἐξέτισαν τῶν σωματῶν ἐπιφέρεισαι, τῇ μὲν ἀδθενεζέσαν ἄμα τοῖς συκρίμοισι γενέδοαι. (ταύτην δὲ εἶαι τὰν ἀπαδευταί) τῇ δὲ ἰσχυρῆεραν, εἴα ἐστὶ ππερὶ τες σοφές, ἔ μέχμι τες ἐκπτύσεως. Δημόκρῳ, Ἐπίκρῳ, φθαρήν, τῷ σώμασι συνδιαφθειρομένην. Πυθαγόρας ἔ Πλάτων, τὸ μὲ λοβικόν, ἄφθαρον (ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχὴν, εἴ θεοί, ἀλλ’ ἔργον τῷ αἰδία θεῷ ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, φθαρήν. Περὶ τῶν Ἀρεσ. τοῖς φιλ. Βιβλ. δ’. Κ. ζ. Here we see, the Soul first mentioned, and said to be *immortal*, and to launch out into the Soul of the Universe, was the same which the Stoics held to endure, when it had been in their wife Man, till the Conflagration; was the same which *Democritus* and *Epicurus* held to be mortal. And was this the *VEGETATIVE Soul*? How hard has the World dealt with *Democritus* and *Epicurus* for twenty round Ages, only for holding that the *vegetative Soul was mortal*? A very reasonable Opinion, had there been any *vegetative Soul* at all. But what then must we say to the *Contradiction*, which I have promised to remove, and which seems now quite fixed, since we have evaporated this Spirit of *vegetative Immortality*, from the Passage? The plain Solution of the Difficulty is this: When *Plutarch* had mentioned the impious Notion of the Soul’s *Mortality*, first started by *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, he opposes it by that of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. He had told us before, that these held the Soul to be *immortal*: But now, using their Authority to confute the other two, he, like a judicious Writer, explains it with more Exactness. He tells us, that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held the *reasonable Soul* to be *immortal*, the *irrational mortal*. When, in the Beginning of the Chapter, he had said, they held the Soul to be *immortal*, he added *their Reason, For that launching out, &c.* ΓΑΡ εἰς τὸ τῷ πατρὶ, &c. Now here, in the Conclusion, mentioning again the same Dogma, he adds *his own, For it is to be observed*

*the*



*the Soul is not God, &c.* ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχὴν, &c. For *Plutarch* had, with the rest of the Philosophers of the Christian Times, refined his Notions on this Matter: *They said, the Soul was immortal, because it was related to the Soul of the Universe: He said, it was immortal, because it was the Work of God.* *Henry Stephens*, who, it seems probable, saw this was *Plutarch's*, and not *Pythagoras's* or *Plato's* Philosophy, makes the Words  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \tau\eta\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu\ \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\nu\ \alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\tilde{\epsilon}\ \alpha\iota\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}\ \upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ ) a Parenthesis, as he does ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπειθέουτων) and as he should have done οἷα ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς σαρφῆς; both which are the explanatory Remarks of *Plutarch*. And now it is to be hoped our Advocate sees why this last Part was not at all taken notice of by *Mr. Warburton* though in the very same Paragraph with the first which he quoted. But what does he now see of his Contradiction?

We have said what it was that induced *Plutarch* to interfere with his own Opinion in this Matter. The very same Concern for the Orthodoxy of old Pagan Philosophy (then to be opposed to Christianity) that now seems to distress our Advocate. The very same that made *Plotinus* cry out, as above, *The Soul necessarily loves God, yet is a different Existence from him.* And this will account for *Plutarch's* labouring so much as he does, in the Place quoted by our Advocate, at his 75th Page, to free *Plato* from the Charge of making the Soul eternal and uncreated. For a Charge, it seems, it was, and a heavy one too, upon him. Now where *Plutarch* performs the faithful Office of an Historian, in delivering us the *Placits* of the old Philosophers, there, we see, he owns both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* held this Opinion; but here, where he acts the *Advocate*, I mean of old Pagan Philosophy, he endeavours to distinguish away the Accusation. Thus at length we see the Contradiction lies at *Plutarch's* Door; which will require more than a vegetative Immortality to remove: *Legaleio dignus vindice nodus.*

These three Passages, from *Stobæus*, *M. Antoninus*, and *Plutarch*, are the only three of the great Number I brought to prove the *Greek* Philosophers held the Soul to be Part of God, which our Advocate

Advocate has ventured to undertake. These he thought he could manage: And Envy must own he has acquitted himself to Admiration.

## XI.

But that *Plato* was orthodox in this Point, he will now shew from *Plato* himself.—*And that this was Plato's Opinion* (says he) *concerning the human rational Soul, I shall further prove—from himself.—In one Place he says, “ We have spoke most truly in asserting the “ Soul was made before the Body, and the Body in the second Place, and “ after the Soul, forasmuch as the governing Part ought in Point of “ Time to be created before that which is governed\*.”* Where says he this? Where think you but in the old Place, his *Book of Laws*? It is an odd Fancy this, in our Advocate, to go so continually to a *Book of Laws* for *Plato's* religious Sentiments. *Law* and *Gospel*, let me tell him, agreed no better formerly than they do now. But he must needs go as his *Index* led him. Which in this Road always points easterly. Let us follow him then into his Warehouse of *Laws*. Here, to our great Surprize, we find, that *Plato* is not speaking of the Origin of the human rational Soul, but of a very different Thing. This *tenth Book of Laws*, from whence he takes his Quotation, is employed to prove the Being of a God against Atheism. One of his Arguments, for an *eternal Mind*, is, That that is the first efficient Cause which moves itself and all other Things. But MIND moves itself and all other Things: Therefore MIND is the first efficient. Hence, in the Words of the Quotation, it is inferred, *That the Soul was before the Body*, *Ψυχὴν μὲν πρότερον γενόμεναι σώματι ἡμῶν*. And farther, that there is one general Soul or Mind, that governs the Universe, *Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικῶσαν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς πάντη κινουμένην ἡμῶν ἐξ τῶν ἔργων ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι*; Now, who sees not that it was *Plato's* Business here, to shew only in the *Abstract*, that Mind was prior to Body; and altogether besides his Purpose to speak of the Origin of the human Soul? Yet our Advocate, misled by the

\* P. 71, 72.

*Latin* Translator, and unaided by any Discernment of his own, makes *Plato's* Words relate to the Creation of the Soul. *That the Soul was MADE before the Body; Animum ante Corpus FACTUM fuisse.* But *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, referring to this very Place, explains the Meaning in these Words: *That every Soul is elder than every Body; ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἶη ψυχὴ σώματι ἢ ἅπαντα πάσης.* Yet was this Passage so far from helping our Advocate to the true Sense of his Quotation, that he even refers to it for the Confirmation of his Mistake. All therefore that *Plato's* Argument required, was to prove, that *Mind* was before *Body*. But had he thought proper to digress about the *Origin* of the Soul, he must needs have made it *ungenerated*, from a Principle he lays down in this very Place, namely, *That the Soul was a self-moving-Substance; Τὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν φησὶ λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐστίαν, ἥπερ τ' ἔνομαι ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύουμέν;* for a *self-moving* and an *eternal-moving* Substance were the same Thing amongst the Ancients. So *Plutarch* tells us, that *Thales* was the first who taught the Soul to be an eternal moving OR self-moving Nature, *Θαλῆς ἀπεφώνησεν ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτεκίνητον* \*.

Our Advocate goes on with his *Plato*: *In another Place* (says he) *God, after having made the ANGELS, is introduced as delivering them Materials to form Man and other Animals, and as speaking to them in this Manner: "Go to then, turn yourself to the Formation of Animals, according to the Laws of Nature, and imitate that efficacious Power which I myself used in your Production; and since they will be created as it were Fellow-Citizens with yourselves, they shall be esteemed of divine Extract, and shall have Dominion over all other Creatures †."*

1. *God, after having made the ANGELS* (says he). Would the Reader know what Sort of *Angels* he has here to do with? Our Advocate is silent. But honest *Plato* tells us their Names: *Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, Juno*, and the rest of the Pagan Gods and *Demons*.

\* Plat. Phil. l. 4. c. 2.

† P. 72.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπέ·—Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὀκεανὸς τε καὶ Τηθύς ἐργεσθῆν· ἐκ τούτων δὲ, Φόβος τε καὶ Κρόνος καὶ Ῥέα, &c. But if *Philosophers* are to pass for *Apostles*, why may not *Heathen Gods* stand for *Angels*? Of these *holy Angels* Plato says it would be Impiety not to believe what the ancient Mythologists taught concerning them, ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ δὲ τοῖς εἰρηόσοις ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν Θεῶν ἔστιν ὡς ἔφρασαν, σαφέως δὲ πρὸς αὐτῶν προγόνοις εἰδέναι· ἀδιναστον ἔν Θεῶν πατρὶν ἀτίσει. Being now in the Humour, he tells us, that when God created Souls he disposed them amongst the Stars: Ἐυστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν δεῖλε ψυχὰς ἰσχυρόταται τοῖς ἀστροῖς, ἐνεμεθ' ἐκείσῃ πρὸς ἑκάστου.—That they suffered *Transmigration into Brutes*—ἔθρα καὶ εἰς θηρία βίον ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ ἀρκενέεται μὴ παύομενοι δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἐπι κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακίοντο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά τῆς τῆ τρόπε γενέσεως, εἰς τινα τοιαύτην ἀεὶ μελαροαλλεῖ· θηρία φύσιν. And is not this a likely Place to find *Plato's real Sentiments* concerning the Soul?

2. But what do we talk of his real Sentiments? The Book, from whence our Advocate brings this Passage, contains not *Plato's* Sentiments at all, but another Man's, one *Timæus Locrus*, of whose Book, *de Anima Mundi*, this Work of *Plato's* is a *Comment*. The Passage in Question, particularly, being a *Paraphrase* on these Words of *Timæus*, ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τὸν τῶ κέσω σύσασιν, &c.\*

But our Advocate, now grievously bemired, yet flounders on.—*And again PLATO MUCH TO THE SAME PURPOSE SAYS, "that after God had formed the World, he allotted the human Soul to be disposed of by Nature, as his Vicegerent †," &c.* Can the Reader now guess whither we are sent to look for these Words?—To 3 *Plat.* 99. D. which fairly brings us a Mile beyond *Plato*, to a Treatise of *Timæus Locrus*, intituled *De Anima Mundi*. The swallowing *Sigonius* for *Cicero* was a Trifle to this Exploit. Here he saw writ in fair *Latin Characters*, over the Page, *Timæi Locri de Anima Mundi*. If one did not know him, one should take him to be of the Humour of that Critic, who had a great mind that every thing that was good

\* Plato Serv. Vol. III. p. 99.

† P. 73.

should be his Favourite Author's. But he was puzzled with the two Titles. One was, *the Timæus of Plato*; the other, *the Anima Mundi of Timæus*. This was the deep Problem of *the Horse-mill, and Mill-horse*: But the best of the Story is, he here again (as in the former Case of the *Book of Laws and Epinomis*) brings these Words of *Timæus* to confirm his Sense of the foregoing Quotation from *the Timæus of Plato*; and says, as well he might, 'tis much to the same Purpose. This I remark to the Honour of his Penetration. For though he did not know one was the *Text*, and the other the *Comment*, yet he found out by mere Dint of Sagacity, that they were very near a-kin. And this is all the Fruit of his *Piatic* Journey. Unhappy Advocate! What a Progress hast thou made! from *Plato* nothing to the Purpose, to no *Plato* at all! But we had best stop here, lest the next Quotation should be from *No Body*. And indeed 'tis next to *no body*; 'tis from *Apuleius*, a Writer in the *Christian Times*. A Trick, now too stale even to laugh at.

We are come at last to our Advocate's *Peroration*. And to say the Truth, it was Time for him to have done. *Therefore, after all this* (says he) *Mr. Warburton need not any longer admire, &c.* No truly, he has eased me of this Passion, The *Admiring* at a Free-thinker.—*It is very true, that some few Expressions now and then may be found in the Writings of the Philosophers, as, that the Soul is a Part of God; comes from God; is discerned from him; is a Ray of the Divinity; is one with God, &c. if taken in a strict literal Sense, might in some Measure answer Mr. Warburton's Purpose: BUT WHEN THE LITERAL SENSE IS PLAINLY ABSURD, and the Contrary maintained by a Multitude of clear Expressions, we of course understand them FIGURATIVELY\**. Without doubt. So that when we are told *Epicurus* held the Sun and Moon to be no bigger than they seem; *Pyrro*, that nothing could be known; and *Zeno*, that all Crimes were equal; *the literal Sense being plainly absurd*; we must believe nothing of the Matter. But as he hath talked of the *figu-*

\* P. 75, 76.

*rative* Terms of a Language, in which he understands no Terms at all, he should now learn to hold his Tongue, and hearken to his Teachers. The great *Gassendi* was incomparably the best versed in ancient *Greek* Philosophy of any Man in these latter Ages, and he never dreamt of this more than *figurative* Folly of our Advocate. He knew the *Greek* and *Latin* Expressions would bear no such Interpretation: And therefore tells us roandy, that there was scarce an ancient Philosopher, who was not what we now call a *Spinozist*. " *Interim* (says he) *tamen vix ulli fuere (quæ humanæ Mentis Caligo, atque Imbecillitas est) qui non inciderint in Errorum illum de REFUSIONE IN ANIMAM MUNDI. Nimirum, sicut existimarunt SINGULORUM ANIMAS PARTICULAS ESSE ANIMÆ MUNDANÆ, quarum quælibet suo Corpore, ut Aqua Vase, includeretur; ita & reputarunt unamquamque Animam, Corpore dissoluto, quasi diffractò Vase, effluere, ac ANIMÆ MUNDI E QUÀ DEDUCTA FUERIT, ITERUM UNIRI.*"

And now, after all that has passed between us, I may be allowed at parting to ask my nameless Adversary what he is? His betters, when they went *incognito*, have been thus questioned, and without Offence. The great *Pythagoras* himself was asked it; and his Answer will fit our Advocate as if it had been made for him. And that he may not be forced to descend from his present Dignity of Quotation, I will press him no farther, but suppose he gives an Enquirer this, that his ancient Master made to *Leon*, Prince of the *Phliastians*, who asked him what he was. ART (says he) *I know none; but I am a PHILOSOPHER* †.

## XII.

Let us conclude with a general View of our Advocate's Performances. He will write against the *Third Book of the Divine Legislation of Moses*: But proposes only to consider what in *his Apprehen-*

\* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 106.

† Artem quidem se scire nullam; sed esse Philosophum. Cic. Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 3.

*fon* affects the Argument. Yet of this *little*, for his *Apprehension* is not *much*, he has not considered one tenth Part. And how that abounds in all kind of *false Reasoning*, and *absurd Quotation*, we have given the Reader a kind of Specimen. But to make amends for an imperfect Representation, he may be pleased to take notice, that, besides all particular local Graces, there are FOUR GENERAL FALLACIES, that run throughout this noble Work. Two in Point of *Quotation*, two of *Reasoning*.

- I. The first is in quoting Poets, or any body, instead of Philosophers.
- II. The second in quoting Philosophers after *Christ*.
- III. The third in urging *exoteric* Doctrines for *esoteric*.
- IV. And the fourth in concluding from what was said of *false* Gods, to what they thought of the *true*.

I call these by the knavish Title the *Schools* of Philosophy have given them, which, like the *Courts of Law*, make no Provision for Fools: But, upon my Word, I am not satisfied whether they be not very honest *Blunders*. However, he has now his Choice to call them what he will, so he no longer pretend to call them Arguments.

His *first* Chapter, as I said, is the only one with which I am concerned. His *second* is intituled, *The Opinions of the Philosophers concerning a future State*. It is made up of some six dozen of ill-chosen Quotations, which so amazed him that he could not forbear saying on the Entrance to his Labour, *It seems very surprizing, notwithstanding all the following Authorities, and many more which no doubt this learned Gentleman must have met with to the contrary, that he should thus speak of the Philosophers: "I have examined their Writings with*  
*" all the Exactness I was able, and it appears evident to me that these*  
*" Men believed nothing of a future State of Rewards and Punishments,*  
*" which they most industriously propagated in Society \*."* By this

\* P. 2.

Time, I suppose, I have eased him of his *Surprize*: So that we are now even by a reciprocal Cure. In one Point however he is right. He supposes I could have furnished him with *many more Authorities*. I could, I'll assure him: More than with six hundred to his six dozen. But it is pleasant to observe, in this *Chapter of Quotations*, with what Judgment he brings in three *Epicureans*, *Virgil*, *Lucian*, and *Celsus*, to bear Witness to a future State of Rewards and Punishments, who without doubt *believed* what they said. Honest *Celsus* cries out, under the *Mask* and in the *Tone* of a modern Free-thinker, *God forbid, that either they, or I, or any Man living, should endeavour to subvert the Belief of a future State of Rewards and Punishments* \*. Who, when he hears this, can forbear concluding with our Advocate—I say, *when a Man talks in this manner, it is hardly possible not to imagine him in Earnest* †.

I call this his *Chapter of Quotations*. It is its proper Title: It is made up of them, and a jolly Company they are, but so transcendently chosen and translated, that some Time or other it may chance to become as famous as *Scarron's Chapter of Horse-Litters*, which once, indeed, on a Time met together because they were forced; but for all that each of them, while in the Disposal of their Owners, was taking a different Road. At present I shall only desire the Reader to observe, that the *three first* of the *four general Sophisms* shine throughout this Chapter with a distinguished Lustre.

He has two more *Chapters* upon something or other; and then concludes with a Pastoral-Letter to the Free-thinkers, *Ut SOBRII ad evertendam Rempublicam Christianam accederent*.

Thus it hath been my Fortune to displease the *Bigots* on both Sides. I make no Question, but the impartial Reader will be ready to congratulate with me on so fair an Appearance of being in the Right.

As for this fantastic Zealot in the Cause of Paganism, I have used him, it is true, with little Ceremony. Let the Reader judge, if he deserved more. I had put my Name to what I wrote, and he

\* P. 152.

† P. 82.



attacks me in secret. Had either I concealed mine, or he told his, he might then have expected (if on other Accounts he had a Right to it) what the usual Commerce of Civility demands between People upon equal Terms: But writing without a Name, in the Manner he has done, is least of all excusable. For, when a Man's Person or Reputation is attacked, I know little Difference between the Russian, and the Writer, in the Dark.

I may be the rather allowed to speak freely on this Head, because I never yet wrote against any Book or Author whatsoever, any farther than occasional Reflections on particular Questions, which no one can avoid who treats of Subjects like those I am engaged in. Once indeed, and but once, I took upon myself the Honour of *defending* a sublime Genius against the Cavils of an injurious Pedant. But an *Attack* by *Answer, Remarks, Confutation*, or any of the formal Apparatus of literary Assault, I never made on any Author whatsoever. To say the Truth, I prize my Ease and Quiet at too high a Rate, to hazard them in the Vain or *interested* Employment of discrediting any Popular or Party Writer whatsoever.—*Nec quisquam noccat Cupido mihi Pacis!*

I should now, perhaps, crave Pardon of the severer Reader for the Levities that have escaped me both *here* and in the *Preface*. But if he that loses may have leave to speak, sure he that's libell'd though he loses nothing, may have leave to laugh. And what else was to be done with my *Doctor and Student?* who, whether they railed or reasoned, how much soever in their own Professions, were still on the wrong Side common Sense and common Honesty. For they have managed Things so well, that the one has lost his *Reasoning* in the Study of the *Law*, and the other his *Charity* in Defence of the *Gospel*. Besides, on some Occasions, what Mortal can forbear? Who would have suspected our solemn tragic Doctor for a *risible Animal?* Yet there are Seasons, when his own Blunders dispose him to be jocular, and he irreverently aims at Wit with the Face of an *Irish Inquisitor* \*.

\* See The Weekly Miscellany throughout.

In Conclusion, *If any Man* (to use the Words of a great Writer) *EQUAL TO THE MATTER* \*, *shall think it appertains him to take in Hand this Controversy, either excepting against aught written, or persuaded he can shew better how this Question may receive a true Determination; if his Intents be sincere to the Public, and shall carry him on without BITTERNESS to the OPINION or to the PERSON dissenting, let him not, I intreat him, guess by the Handling which meritoriously hath been bestowed on these Objects of Contempt and Laughter, that I account it any Displeasure done to me to be contradicted in Print: But as it leads to the Attainment of any thing more true, shall esteem it a Benefit; and shall know how to return his CIVILITY and FAIR ARGUMENT in such Sort, as he shall confess that to do so is my Choice, and to have done thus was my Chance.*

\* Mr. Chubb, I am told, has address'd something or other to me at the End of his late Discourse on Miracles. I suppose he only wants my Acknowledgments; and he shall have them: For the reason above shews why I must always decline his kind Overtures of farther Acquaintance. I confess then he is a very extraordinary Person: and think he may say with the subtil Peasant in Moliere—Où, si j'avois étudié, j'aurois été fongeur à des choses où l'on n'a jamais fongé.

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 POSTSCRIPT TO THE REMARKS,

In Answer to some OBJECTIONS of Dr. SYKES.

TO put Things of a Sort together, I shall take this Occasion to pay my Respects to the Author of the *Principles and Connexion of natural and revealed Religion*\*, who has honoured me, in passing, with a couple of random Reflexions. A kind of Fatality seems to attend these Gentlemen; who, when I lie so open to them, have still the Luck to offer at me in the wrong Place.

In his 399th Page he has these Words: “It is not of any Moment to enter further into what Philosophers have said, when they attempt to account for the Soul’s *Eternity*. Common Sense taught them, that real proper Punishments were inflicted upon Men for Sins. Who can read *Plato’s Gorgias* (which is not ranked amongst the *Exoterics* by a late Writer, in which alone the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, he thinks, are [is] detailed out); who can read that, and conceive that *Plato* did not really believe a State of future Punishments and Rewards? When he had professed at large, how wicked Men are punished, and how good Men are rewarded in a future State, he declares *That to be his full Persuasion, and from thence it was,*

\* Arthur Ashley Sykes, D. D.

“ *that*

“ that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having a most pure  
 “ Soul. And if they imagined Men to be punished for Sin, and re-  
 “ warded for Virtue, even supposing this was talked of in a Way  
 “ that might be proved fabulous, yet the Doctrine itself was un-  
 “ shaken. Suppose the Fables of *Acheron*, and *Styx*, and *Cocytus*,  
 “ and *Elysian Fields*, may be all demonstrated to be false; yet it  
 “ does not follow, that the Thing conveyed under these Words  
 “ were [was] believed to be all false. It does not follow that Souls  
 “ were believed to die, or to be incapable of receiving Punish-  
 “ ments or Rewards: but only that this Manner of representing  
 “ them is false \*.”—These are his Words; and they deserve to be  
 well considered.

*It is not of any Moment* (he says) *to enter further into what Philo-  
 sopher's have said, when they attempt to account for the Soul's ETER-  
 NITY.* I thought it of great Moment. I am sure I found it of  
 great Difficulty. And if I have ill explained what the *Philosophers*  
*meant by the Soul's Eternity*, one Reason was, that I wanted more  
 Helps than Antiquity would afford me. But it is the Privilege of  
 veteran Disputers, to want nothing but willing Hearers. But why  
 will he enter no further, when he goes out of his Way to pay me  
 this Visit?

Because *common Sense* (he says) *taught them, that real proper Punish-  
 ments were inflicted upon Men for Sins.* I have shewn from *Faët* that  
 common Sense did not teach them. No matter: He will prove  
 from *Reason* that it did. His Argument is plain and simple. Com-  
 mon Sense *might* teach them: therefore common Sense *did* teach  
 them. This it is to be a practised Disputant. It is but knowing  
 what common Sense *might* teach, and he will presently tell you, by  
 his Scale of Logic, what it *did*. By the same way, I make no  
 doubt, he could prove that the *Epicureans* believed a Providence;  
 the *Stoics* Inequality of Crimes; and the *Pyrrhonians* the Certainty  
 of Truth. He has only to shew that *common Sense taught them*, or

\* P. 400.

was ready to teach them; and we have only to believe, that they were as ready to *learn*. I had myself a kind of Guess, that *common Sense* might have taught the Philosophers that real proper Punishments were inflicted upon Men for Sins; and had I known no more of Antiquity than this Writer has entered into, 'tis ten to one but I had concluded as he does, that *common Sense* did teach them. Though hardly, I think, after another had clearly shewn the Contrary from Antiquity. However, the Reader may not be displeas'd to hear how much I gave to *common Sense* in the Introduction to my Discourse on the *Philosophers*. These were my Words:—"It will be proper to premise, that the Constitution of the *Greek* Philosophy being above measure refined and speculative, it always us'd to be determined by *metaphysical* rather than *moral* Principles; and to stick to all Consequences, how absurd soever, that were seen to arise from such Principles. Of this we have a famous Instance in the ancient *Democritic* Philosophy, &c.—So well supported, we see, is that Censure which a celebrated *French* Writer passes upon them: *When the Philosophers once besot themselves with a Prejudice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves: because they besot themselves not only with the Prejudice, but with the false Reasoning employed to support it.* The Reverence and regard to *metaphysical* Principles being so great, we shall see, that the *Greek* Philosophers must of necessity reject the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, how many *invincible* moral Arguments soever there really be in Support of it, when we come to shew, that there were two *metaphysical* Principles concerning *God* and the *Soul*, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all Notion of a future State of Reward and Punishment\*."

In the *Conclusion* I repeat the same Observation in the following Words:—"These two Errors in the *metaphysical* Speculations of the Philosophers, concerning the Nature of *God* and of the *Soul*,

\* Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 86.

" were what necessarily kept them from giving Credit to a Doctrin  
 " highly probable in itself, and rendered to even by themselves,  
 " from many moral Considerations, perpetually preached up to the  
 " People. But, as we observed before, it was their ill Fate to be  
 " determined, in their Opinions, rather by *metaphysical* than *moral*  
 " Arguments. This is seen by comparing the Belief and Conduct  
 " of SOCRATES with the rest. He was singular in confining himself  
 " to the Study of *Morality*, and as singular in *believing* the Doc-  
 " trine of a future State of Reward and Punishment. What could  
 " be the Cause of this latter Singularity but the former? Of which  
 " it was a natural Consequence. For, having thrown aside all  
 " other Speculations, he had nothing to mislead him. Whereas the  
 " rest of the Philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of Fa-  
 " naticism, to Physics and Metaphysics, had drawn a Number of  
 " absurd, though subtle Conclusions, that directly opposed the  
 " Consequences of those moral Arguments. And as it is common  
 " for Parents to be fondest of their weakest and most deformed Off-  
 " spring, so these Men, as we said, were always more swayed by  
 " their metaphysical than moral Conclusions \*." Now this was all  
 " I could, in Conscience, allow to *common Sense*, when Antiquity  
 " stood so directly in my Way.

But lest it should be said he had overlooked *all* Fact, he  
 has thought fit to make the following Observation: *Who can*  
*read Plato's Gorgias (which is not ranked amongst the Exoterics*  
*by a late Writer, in which alone the Doctrin of a future State of Re-*  
*wards and Punishments, he thinks, is detailed out); who can read that,*  
*and conceive that Plato did not really believe, &c.* The Force of  
 this Observation, the Reader sees, lies in the Parenthesis, *that I*  
*have not ranked the Gorgias of Plato amongst his Exoterics.* But how,  
 if this be false? Let the following Words of the *Divine Legation*  
 determine: " It is very true, that, in his Writings, he [*Plato*] in-  
 " culcates the Doctrin of a future State of Rewards and Punish-

\* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 122.

ments; but this always in the grossest Sense of the Populace,—  
 “that the Souls of ill Men descended into Asses or Swine,—that the  
 “uninitiated lay in Mire and Filth: that there were three Judges  
 “of Hell; and talks much of *Styx, Cocytus, Acheron*, &c. and all  
 “so *seriously* as shews he had a mind to be believed. But did he  
 “himself believe them? We may be assured he did not\*.” Where,  
 at the Word *seriously*, I expressly refer to the *Gorgias, Phædo*, and  
*Republic*. Now, if the *Phædo* and *Republic* (as he will not deny)  
 be of the *exoteric* Kind, and I place the *Gorgias* in the same Class,  
 is not this *ranking the Gorgias amongst the Exoterics*? What then was  
 it that could induce this Writer to say, I had not ranked it there?  
 Was it the following Passage? “But *Albinus*, an old *Platonist*,  
 “has, *in some measure*, supplied this Loss [namely, the Loss of a  
 “Treatise of *Numenius*, concerning the secret Doctrine of *Plato*]  
 “by his *Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato*. From whence it  
 “appears, that those very Books, in which *Plato* details out the  
 “Doctrine of a future State of Reward and Punishment, are all of  
 “the *exoteric* Kind. For in that Class *Albinus* ranks the *Criton*,  
 “*Phædo*, *Minos*, *Symposium*, *Laws*, *Epistles*, *Epinomis*, *Menæxenus*,  
 “*Clitophon*, and *Philebus* †.” If this were the Passage, ’tis plain the  
 Writer mistook the latter Part for a formal List of *Plato’s exoteric*  
 Writings. But the very Words might have taught him better:  
 (I only say that *in that Class Albinus* ranks such and such Tracts)  
 Especially if he had looked into the Discourse referred to: where  
 he would have found the Reason why I expressed myself in that  
 Manner. And I don’t use to write at hazard, as *hasty* as he  
 thinks me. *Albinus*, in his fifth Section, divides *Plato’s* Dia-  
 logues into Classes. Not into the two general ones of *exoteric*  
 and *esoteric*; but into the more minute, and different, of *natural*,  
*moral*, *dialectic*, *confutative*, *civil*, *explorative*, *obstetric*, and *subversive* ‡

\* Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 64.

† Ibid. p. 61.

‡ τῶ μὲν φυσικῶ, — τῶ δὲ ἠθικῶ — τῶ δὲ λογικῶ, — τῶ δὲ πολιτικῶ, — τῶ δὲ ποικιλικῶ, —  
 τῶ δὲ κρητιστικῶ, — τῶ δὲ μαθητικῶ, — τῶ δὲ ἀπολυτικῶ. Alb. Introd. in Plat. Dial. Sect. 5.  
 apud Fabr. Bibl. Græc. lib. 3. c. 2.

It will be asked then, how I came to say, that *Albinus* ranked the *Criton*, *Phaedrus*, *Meno*, *Symposium*, *Laws*, *Epistles*, *Epinomis*, *Menexenus*, *Clitophon* and *Philebus*, in the *exoteric* Class? For this plain Reason, he says they were all of the *civil* Kind. And I hope I need not tell the learned Reader, that all of that Kind were *exoterical*. And now it is seen why I might well suppose the *Gorgias* of the *exoteric* Kind; and yet, why I could not use *Albinus's* Authority for placing it with the rest: Because it is evidently of the *civil* Class, and yet not ranked there by that old *Platonist*. The Reason of his different Assignment was this: The *Gorgias* is a Dialogue concerning the Use and Abuse of Rhetoric. The Sophists had abused this Art to pervert public Justice, and to amass Wealth and Power. They are here shewn that its true Use was to aid and enforce the Laws, and to render the Members of a Community wiser and better. Hence, in Conclusion, the Author takes occasion to enforce the Practice of Virtue from the Consideration of *future Rewards and Punishments*: his usual Manner of concluding his political Discourses; the *Gorgias* being, indeed, properly a Supplement to the Books of *Law* and *Republic*: But it being at the same time altogether employed in overturning the Practice of the *Sophists*, was, I suppose, the Reason why *Albinus* thought it came more naturally into that Class which he calls *subversive*. This is a true Account of the *Gorgias*; as well as of my plain Sentiments, concerning it, in the first Volume of *The Divine Legation*. And yet this Writer cries out, *Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive that Plato did not really believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments?* Rather, let me ask, Who that has read the *Gorgias*, can talk at this rate?

Well, but his Reason: "When he [*Plato*] had professed at large, how wicked Men are punished, and how good Men are rewarded in a future State, he declares that to be his full Persuasion, and from thence it was, that he endeavoured to appear before his Judge having a most pure Soul." The original is, Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὃ καλλίσκλεις, ὑπο τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀπεφανῆμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην ἔχων τῆν ψυχὴν. Here, we see, the



the Writer has funk upon us the important Words ὑπὸ τέτων τῶν λόγων, upon which the whole Sentence turns. This could hardly be by Chance. The Reasons of the Omission are but too evident. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἔν, ὃ Καλλιέλης, ΤΗΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΩΝ *πέπεισμαι*, *I am persuaded* (says the Speaker) *O Callicles, ON THE AUTHORITY OF THESE DOCTRINES.* Say you so? To understand then how *full* the Persuasion was, we must consider what Credibility *these Doctrines* had. Now he that reads the *Gorgias* will find, that they consisted of a long fabulous Account of *the Establishment of the three Judges of Hell\**: And of a strange Opinion, that the Dead not only retained the visible Marks of the Passions and Affections of the Soul, but also the Scars and Blemishes of the Body †. It was on the Authority, therefore, of these goodly Doctrines, that the Speaker founds his Belief: and what is more, it was to these Doctrines that the very Words, in which he expresses this Belief, allude: Ἀποφανῶμαι τῷ ΚΡΙΤΗ, relating to the *infernal Judges*; and the ΥΓΙΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ τὴν ψυχὴν, the *most sound or healthy Soul*, to its Affections, Marks and Blemishes. The Speaker therefore must of course believe a future State thus circumstanced, if he believed any future State at all. Here is no room for the Writer's Evasion: who supposes the Philosophers *might reject the Fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elyfian Fields, and yet believe the Thing conveyed under these Words.* For here the Belief of the *Thing* is expressly said to be built on the Authority of those *Fables*: But those *Fables* our Author gives up as not really believed. By his Favour therefore I would conclude that the *Thing* built upon them was not believed.

But as I little thought this Writer would have had the better of me on the believing Side, I will suppose, as he does contrary to Evidence, that the Speaker did indeed in this Place deliver his real

\* Tom. I. p. 523. Ed. Serr. See Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 271, & seq.

† Plato, ut supra, tom. I. p. 524. See Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 276.

Sentiments. Let us see now what will come of it. He asks, *Who can read the Gorgias, and conceive, that Plato did not really believe—when he has professed at large.*—So then; the Dispute between us is, Whether PLATO believed a future State of Rewards and Punishments? And, to prove that PLATO did, he gives me a Speech of SOCRATES. For unluckily what he quotes for the Words of Plato are the Words of his *Master*; who, I have endeavoured to shew, by better Reasons than such a kind of Speech, did really believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments.

But he goes on:—*And IF THEY IMAGINED Men to be punished for Sin, and rewarded for Virtue, even supposing that this was talked of in a Way that might be PROVED fabulous, yet the Doctrine itself was unshaken.* Without doubt, if I will allow they imagined a future State of Rewards and Punishments, he will prove they believed one; that being the Conclusion he seems to aim at in the aukward Expression of—*proved fabulous, and—was unshaken.* For the Point between us is not about what was true or false, but about what was believed or disbelieved. But he himself seems dissatisfied with his Expression, and therefore attempts to mend it in this Repetition (for it would be hard that he who begs his Question, should not be able to get to his Conclusion). *Suppose the Fables of Acheron, and Styx, and Cocytus, and Elysian Fields, may be all DEMONSTRATED to be false, yet it does not follow, that the Thing conveyed under these Words was believed to be all false.* Here again his Words, *demonstrated to be false,* leave him just where he was. For nothing can be concluded concerning the Philosophers believing or not believing a Thing, from our *demonstrating* it to be true or false. His Expression fails him here again. He therefore attempts it a *third* time. *It does not follow, that Souls were believed to die, or to be incapable of receiving Punishments or Rewards, but only that this manner of representing them IS FALSE.* As ill as ever! He is still in the very Place where he set out. And that which at first so perplexed him has stuck by him through all his Variation of Phrase—*Is false, for, was not believed.* As if the Philosophers must needs disbelieve all that

that was false, and believe all that was true. And indeed it seems to have been this strange Prepossession that has made him run into all his Confusion of Language. A Disease that fatally infected the Lawyer of late Memory. I put his expressions in the most favourable Light. For if there be no Blunder, there is much Malice: The Period (supposing the Words accurate) tending to prove the *Credibility* of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments; which, being directed against my Discourse, necessarily insinuates, that I had wrote something against that *Credibility*. But I have too good Opinion of his Honesty, to believe this to be his secret Purpose.

What therefore this Writer so fruitlessly labours to bring forth, is this simple Conception, That the Philosophers might believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in general, and yet disbelieve all the particular Fables of the Populace concerning it. But those who are acquainted with Antiquity, will know, that this *was* not, and *could* not be the Case. I have given a Reason in the first Volume \* of *The Divine Legation*, to shew, *it was not*, in these Words: “ We have given just above a Quotation from *Tully’s* “ Oration for *Cluentius*, in which he having ridiculed the popular “ Fables concerning a future State, subjoins, *If these be false, as all “ Men see they are, what hath Death deprived us of besides a Sense of “ Pain?* Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali Mors attulit? “ Nisi forte ineptius ac fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud In- “ feros Impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. *Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod “ omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud Mors eripuit præter sensum “ doloris?* From this Inference of *Cicero’s* it appears, that we have “ not concluded amiss, when, from several Quotations, interspersed “ throughout this Work, in which a Disbelief of the *common Notion* “ of a future State of Rewards and Punishments is implied, we have “ inferred the Writer’s Disbelief of a future State of Rewards and “ Punishments in general.” There are many Reasons likewise,

\* Div. Leg. ed. 4to. vol. II. p. 83.

why it *could not be the Case*; too long indeed to mention here; however, I will just hint at one. The Pagan Notion of a future State of Rewards and Punishments was founded in old Tradition: But that Tradition, which conveyed down the general Doctrine, brought along these *Circumstances* of it. But I forget, that I am arguing with an Enemy to all Tradition: Who, as highly as he advances the Knowledge of the Philosophers, yet is unwilling to allow they were indebted for it to any thing but their own Reason. So entirely has that childish Sophism got the better of him: *Whatever Reason might teach, it did teach.* But how has he made out his Point? By encountering a few weak Efforts of the *Fathers* in Support of traditional Knowledge. He has great reason to boast his Victory: It is like his who triumphed for having tript up a Cripple. But Reverence for Age should dispose us to spare the *Fathers*, especially when more able-bodied Men stand in our Way. Till he meet with these, I would recommend the following Fact to his Consideration. The more ancient Philosophers, in the Delivery whether of their moral, natural, or theologic Principles, constantly recommend them on this Footing, that they received them from TRADITION: One Truth came from a *Priest* of this Religion; and another from the  *sacred Books* of that. Scarce any thing is ever represented as the Deduction of their own Reasoning: Though such a Representation had been attended with much Honour, and we know they were immoderately fond of Glory. Now if this were the Case, I only ask, *Why should we not believe them?*

## II.

The Writer's second Remark begins thus: "It has been maintained indeed by some, that all that the old Philosophers held, was a natural *Metempsychosis*, or a Transition from one Body to another, without any moral Designation whatsoever. But surely this Conclusion is too hasty: For when it was said, that the Souls of ill Men descended into *Asses* or *Swine*, they did not suppose the Souls of good Men so to descend. The Souls of evil  
" Men,

“ Men, e. g. of Murderers, went into the Bodies of Beasts, those of lascivious Men into the Bodies of Swine or Goats, ποτὶ κήλασιν, for Punishment, says Timæus Locrus. Was this done for Punishment, and yet was no Regard paid to the Morals of wicked Men \* ?”

*It hath been maintained* (says he) *by some, that the old Philosophers held only a natural Metempsychosis—but surely this Conclusion is too hasty.* Who it is that has been too hasty, is submitted to the Judgment of the Public: Whether I, in *concluding* from a hundred well-weighed Circumstances; or He, in *condemning* from one only, and that, as we shall see, neither weighed nor understood.

But *it is too hasty*, FOR when it was SAID, that the Souls of ill Men descended into Asses or Swine, they did not suppose the Souls of good Men so to descend. How are we to understand him? If by SAID be only meant *taught*, then, from what they said of the Souls of ill Men, nothing can be concluded, concerning what they SUPPOSED or BELIEVED of the Souls of good Men: Because it was their Way to say one Thing and suppose another. But if by SAID we are to understand *supposed* or *believed*, then I will readily grant, that, if they supposed the Souls of ill Men to descend, they did not suppose the Souls of good Men so to descend. But why this to me? Did I ever say, the old Philosophers supposed, that is, believed, that the Souls of ill Men descended into Asses or Swine? He would insinuate I did; as appears not only from his Address, but from his plain Allusion to the following Words of my Book: *However, it is true, that in his Writings he [Plato] inculcates the Doctrine of a future State of Reward and Punishment—that the Souls of ill Men descended into Asses and Swine—did he himself believe it? we may be assured he did not †, &c.* Was it from these Words he gathered, that I held, Plato supposed, what, I own, he inculcated? Let him look again, and I imagine he will alter his Opinion. But he will still say, though I do not hold, that the ancient Philosophers so supposed; yet, what is more to the Purpose, an ancient Philosopher does.

\* Divine Legation, vol. II. p. 53.

† Ib. vol. II. p. 64.

For thus he goes on: *The Souls of evil Men, e. g. of Murderers, went into the Bodies of Beasts, those of lascivious Men into the Bodies of Swine and GOATS, πρὸ κέλευσιν, for Punishment, SAYS TIMÆUS LOCURUS. Was this done for Punishment, and yet was no Regard paid to the Morals of wicked Men?* This is indeed amazing! The Reader cannot forget, that I quoted this very Passage at large\*, as the most incontestable Evidence, that the *Pythagoreans* did not believe one Word of all they taught concerning the *Souls of ill Men descending into the Bodies of Brutes for Punishment*; Timæus Locrus prefacing the Relation of those Transitions in these very Words: *For as we sometimes cure the Body with unwholesome Remedies, when such as are not wholesome have no Effect, SO WE RESTRAIN THOSE MINDS BY FALSE RELATIONS which will not be persuaded by the true: There is a Necessity therefore of instilling the Dread of those foreign Torments. As that the Soul shifts and changes its Habitation; that the Criminal is thrust ignominiously into a Woman's Form, the Murderer imprisoned within the Furr of a Savage, the Lascivious condemned to animate a Bear or Scæv, &c.* Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσῶσι πῶκα ἰσχύονται, εἴτα μὴ εἰσὶ τοῖς ὑγιεινῶταῖς ἔτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπειρηγῶτος. ΠΥΤΑΓΩΣΙ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ, εἴτα μὴ ἀγῆται ἀλαθέσι λέγωντο δ' ἀναγκαίως ἢ τιμωρῶν ζῆναι ὡς μετενδυσμέναν τῶν ψυχῶν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν ἐς γυναικεία σκίλευα, πρὸ ὕβρις ἐκδιδόμενα τῶν δὲ μαιφόνων ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ΠΟΤΙ ΚΟΤΛΑΣΙΝ· λάθων δ', ἐς σῶν ἢ κάπρων μορφάς †.

Did *Timæus Locrus* then suppose, i. e. believe, that the *Souls of ill Men descended into Brutes*? Does he not expressly tell us he supposed they did not, but that these Fables were inculcated in order to restrain the Populace from Vice? To tamper then with my own Evidence, and to turn it against me in this Manner, as if nothing had been said, is so new a Stroke in Controversy, that we have yet no Name for it; but, on Occasion, shall now be able to assign it a Patronymic.

However, to do the Writer Justice, I must be so fair to say, that it may admit of some Doubt, whether ever he read this Passage in

\* Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 53.

† Ibid.

‡ De Anima Mundi, sub fine.

*The Divine Legation*, or only in the *Letters to Serena*, a Book that undergoes his Censure in the same Place where I am so unhappy to incur it. I am inclined to think the latter, from this remarkable Circumstance. The Author of the *Letters to Serena* had translated ἐς συὸν ἢ ΚΑΙΡΩΝ μορφᾶς, into the *Forms of Swine or GOATS* \*. And so too has this Writer: into the *Bodies* (says he) of *Swine or GOATS* †, which is so singular an Interpretation, that, notwithstanding the Proverb, that *good Wits jump*, I can hardly think them to be both original. But perhaps that excellent Correspondent of *Serena's* had here a mind to shew his Learning; and knowing, that the *Tyrrhenians*, a *Greek Colony in Italy*, used κάπρῶς for a *Goat*, he would conclude, by Analogy, that the *Locrians*, another *Greek Colony in Italy*, did the same. Again, *Timæus Locrus* says, ἐς Θηρίων σώματι; *Toland*, into *Beasts of Prey*. This Writer, into the *Bodies of Beasts*. Here, where *Toland* is right, he leaves him; but sticks charitably by him while he continues wrong. For *Θηρίων* signifies *Beasts of Prey*: And that precise Idea is required to complete the Sense; the Habitation of the *Murderer* being here spoken of. Again, *Timæus* says, ποτὶ κόλασιν, which *Toland* faithfully renders for a *Punishment*; and which this Writer particularly insists on, as the very Cream of his Argument: *Murderers* (says he) went into the *Bodies of Beasts*, those of lascivious Men into the *Bodies of Swine or Goats*, ποτὶ κόλασιν, FOR PUNISHMENT, says *Timæus Locrus*. Was this done for *Punishment*, and yet, &c. But here I must retract my Suspicion; for from this last Instance it would seem, that he had read and compared my Translation, in which the *English* of those formidable Words, ποτὶ κόλασιν, is not literally to be found. And now the Secret is out. He seems to suppose I omitted them, as conscious of their containing some strange Matter against my general Opinion. But in truth, it was partly, because they were redundant; *Timæus* representing the whole Affair under the general Idea of a *Punishment*; and partly, because the Sense of ποτὶ κόλασιν was comprised in the Word *imprisoned*, which I used in the very Case to

\* *Letters to Serena*, p. 58.† P. 402 of his *Connexions*, &c.

which those Words are applied. As to the Idea itself, that was so far from hurting my Argument, that it could not do without it.

He goes on:—*They* [the Philosophers] *really conceived Punishments and Rewards of evil or good Actions in Men; and some imagined a Punishment by the means of Transmigration, others imagined a Punishment inflicted in Hades, others BY IMMEDIATE ACTS OF PROVIDENCE; and all supposed Rewards or Punishments, notwithstanding they might treat as Fables the Stories of Cocytus and Acheron\**. He sticks to his Point, we see; and will still have it, that they believed a *Hell*, though they treated the Stories of *Cocytus* and *Acheron* as Fables, which (to tell him my Mind once for all) is just as if one should say, some among us believe the Miseries of the King's-Bench-Prison, and yet treat the Stories of Jailors, Turnkeys, Bailiffs, and Attorneys, as mere Fables. But what have *immediate Acts of Providence* to do in this Period? Did not I endeavour to prove, that *all* the Theistical Philosophers believed a Providence in this Life? These Words therefore, as they are found in a Paragraph that relates solely to my peculiar Opinion, I can consider in no other Light than as a false Insinuation *ad invidiam*.

I have now attended this Writer quite through his little Excursion. Let us see how he returns to himself; HOWEVER, *what I contend for, is, that the HEATHEN held a moral [a future] State of Rewards and Punishments, according to Good and Evil done here †*. It is worthy his Contention; and I should be ready to be his *Second* in it. But why then should he go out of his Way, and *contend* for another Thing that will do neither himself nor his Cause any Credit? I mean him Honour, when I say *his Cause*: For I really believe it to be the Cause of Christianity. Now, I conceive this not at all advanced by endeavouring to shew that the sacred Writers had but small reason for their harsh Censure of the *Greek* Philosophy ‡; as the *contending* for its Orthodoxy in this Point effectively does. But I will suppose the sacred Writers have been misunder-

\* Connexions, &c. p. 402.

† Ib.

‡ Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 134.



flood. And perhaps this may be no great Reflexion upon any Party; if we consider, that the *Jansenists*, scarce inferior to any in their Talents of Reasoning and Criticism, have strangely mistaken those Censures, while they understood them to be directed against human Science in general. I supposed therefore, that, to shew the sacred Writers only censured the *Greek* Philosophy, and that it deserved their Censure, was not one of the least Services one might render to our holy Religion. But the Occasion now seems to be more urgent. The Pretensions of these Philosophers have been of late highly advanced. The Author of the Book, intituled, *Future Rewards and Punishments believed by the Ancients*, hath, we see, forced the inspired Teachers of Mankind to give them the right hand of Fellowship. I had exposed their *prophane and vain Babblings* in one capital Instance, because it came directly into my particular Design; as well for that I thought it useful to Revelation in general. I did not then indeed imagine the Necessity so pressing. I may hereafter perhaps find Occasion to examine these spurious Rivals of the Apostolic Function on every Head of Morality and Religion, in the manner I have already done on one; and fully vindicate the Majesty of Sacred Writ in the just Sentence it hath passed upon them.

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A  
L E T T E R

To the RIGHT REVEREND

**DR. RICHARD SMALLBROOK,**

Lord Bishop of LICHFIELD and COVENTRY.

MY LORD,

**T**HIS Trouble is occasioned by a Passage in your Lordship's *late printed Charge* \* to your Clergy, in which you have been pleased to censure me by Name with some Frankness, and, I am sorry to say, with equal Injustice.

The Regard due to your Lordship's *Order*, especially while in Discharge of your Function, would have certainly restrained me from complaining of ought that was a *mere Declaration* of your Lordship's Dislike of my Writings. It is your Lordship's *Right and Duty* to warn your Clergy against all ill Books: And your Lordship is, in that Place and on that Occasion, an authorized Denouncer of what are so. Had your Lordship therefore only said, that *The Divine Legation* was a very bad Book, I had not attempted, by any Address of this Nature, to disturb you in the quiet Possession of your

\* Printed in 1741, by J. and P. Knapten, Octavo.

Opinion.

Opinion. But when a Reason added to that Declaration turns your vague Censure into a *formal Accusation*, then, my Lord, it becomes equally my *Right and Duty* to defend my Character, if I find it mistaken.

To put the Public therefore (which your Lordship has forced me to appeal to) in Possession of the Fact, it will be necessary to go so far back as to tell them what it is your Lordship says you propose to make the Subject of your *Charge*. *It is* (in your own Words) *to lay before your Clergy some Reasons, drawn from the Christian Revelation itself, which evince the Pretensions of Morality antecedently to divine Revelation, to be carried much too high, and vindicate the Christian Faith, as well as Morality, from those INVIDIOUS INSINUATIONS that have been been CAST upon them by SEVERAL LATE WRITERS, WHO will occasionally be ANIMADVERTED upon in the following Discourse* \*.

Your Lordship having gone through your *Reasons*, comes, in Page 24, to draw your Inferences from them. The second of which, you tell us, is, “ That though Christian *Morality* is much “ superior to that of all other Religions, yet it does not of itself “ (that is abstractedly from the *Facts* recorded in the Gospel, with “ which it is incorporated) evince the *Truth*, though it does most “ clearly the *Excellency* of the *Christian Religion*. It is certain (says “ your Lordship) that the Reasonableness and Sanctity of the *moral* “ Precepts of the Gospel give great *Advantages* to Christianity, as “ compared with any other Religion ancient or modern. And this “ of itself is sufficient to give a well-disposed Mind very favourable “ Thoughts of the Christian Religion, and to induce it to make “ farther Enquiries into the Truth of those *Facts* which establish “ its Divine Authority. And this is as far as the Argument needs “ to be pushed; and in fact it is as far as one of the best modern “ Apologists for the Truth of Christianity, the most learned “ *Grotius*, in Concurrence with the principal Apologists amongst “ the Ancients, and more especially the famous *Origen*, thought “ fit to urge it. It is clear that they thought themselves obliged

\* Page 2.

“ only to shew, that the *Morality of the Gospel* does vastly excel  
 “ that of all other Religious and Moral Institutions, and is most  
 “ worthy of God in all respects. But neither they nor any other  
 “ thoughtful Persons, that have formerly engaged on this Subject  
 “ (as far as I can recollect) have thought it reasonable to lay so  
 “ great a Stress on the Excellency of the *Morals* of the Gospel, con-  
 “ sidered distinctly from the *Faëts* of the Gospel, and in their own  
 “ Nature solely, as necessarily to infer from thence the Certainty  
 “ of the Christian Revelation. And much less have they asserted,  
 “ as has been done by some LATE WRITERS, that the Morality of  
 “ the Gospel, which they call the *internal Evidence* of it (though  
 “ indeed it has not the Nature of *Evidence* properly so called), is  
 “ the strongest Evidence of the Truth of Christianity, and is highly  
 “ superior to all its *external Evidence*, that is, the Evidence which  
 “ arises from the *Faëts* recorded in the Gospel, and attended with  
 “ other Attestations of ancient Writers, which support its Divine  
 “ Authority \*.” This is all from your Lordship; where at the  
 word WRITERS we find a Mark of Reference to the following  
 Note—See Mr. Arscot’s *Considerations on the Christian Religion*, p. 10.  
 51. 59, 60, &c. Part II. p. 63. Part III. and elsewhere. SEE  
 TOO MR. WARBURTON’S DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES, &c. p. 1,  
 2, 3, 4, 5 †.

So that here, my Lord, I find this Proposition affirmed, That  
 Mr. Warburton, in his *Divine Legation of Moses*, &c. p. 1, 2, 3,  
 4, 5, has asserted THAT THE MORALITY OF THE GOSPEL, WHICH  
 HE CALLS THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF IT, IS THE STRONGEST  
 EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, AND IS HIGHLY SU-  
 PERIOR TO ALL ITS EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

This, my Lord, is your Accufation; a very capital one it is;  
 and such as, if true, would prove me devoid of common Sense, as  
 well as in all other respects unworthy the Character I bear of a  
 Christian, a Clergyman, or a Defender of Revelation. I am there-

\* Page 36, 37, 38.

† Page 38.

fore necessitated to call upon your Lordship, in this public Manner, either to make it good, or to give me Reparation. Your Lordship confines the Proof of your Accufation to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth Pages of the First Volume of *The Divine Legation*. But as I am not disposed to chicanery in so serious a Matter, I hereby promise, that if either in those Pages, or in any other Pages of that Work, or in any thing I have ever written, preached, or said, your Lordship produces the Proposition in question as held and maintained by me, either in express Terms, or deducible by fair and logical Consequence, I promise, I say, to submit to any Censure your Lordship's self shall think fit to inflict. But if, on the other hand, you can produce no such Proposition, I shall then expect so much from your Lordship's Justice as to retract your Accufation in the same public Manner you have been pleased to advance it.

*I am, My LORD,*

*Your LORDSHIP'S*

Nov. 17, 1741.

*Most Obedient Servant,*

W. WARBURTON.



R E M A R K S  
O N S E V E R A L  
O C C A S I O N A L R E F L E C T I O N S :

I N A N S W E R T O  
T H E R E V. D R. M I D D L E T O N, D R. P O C O C K E,  
T H E M A S T E R O F T H E C H A R T E R H O U S E,  
D R. R I C H A R D G R E Y, a n d o t h e r s.

S e r v i n g t o e x p l a i n a n d j u s t i f y d i v e r s P A S S A G E S, i n t h e  
D I V I N E L E G A T I O N,  
O b j e c t e d t o b y t h o s e L E A R N E D W R I T E R S.

T O W H I C H I S A D D E D,  
A G E N E R A L R E V I E W o f t h e A r g u m e n t o f *The Divine Legation*,  
a s f a r a s i s y e t a d v a n c e d : w h e r e i n i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e R e l a t i o n t h e  
f e v e r a l P a r t s b e a r t o e a c h o t h e r, a n d t o t h e W h o l e.

T O G E T H E R W I T H  
A N A P P E N D I X,  
I n a n s w e r t o a l a t e P a m p h l e t i n t i t u l e d,  
*An Examination of Mr. W——'s Second Proposition.*

Quid immerentes hospites vexas, Canis,  
Ignavus adversum Lupos?  
Nani, qualis aut Molossus, aut fulvus Lacon,  
AMICA VIS PASTORIBUS,  
Agam per altas aure sublata nives,  
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.  
Tu quum timenda voce complesti Nemus,  
Projectum odoraris CIBUM. *Hor.*



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P R E F A C E.

**I**N the Prefatory Discourse to the First Volume of the D. L. I spoke pretty largely of the *Use of Ridicule*, in Religious Subjects; as the *Abuse* of it is amongst the fashionable Arts of Free-thinking: For which I have been just now called to Account, without any Ceremony, by the *Nameless* Author of a Poem intituled, *The Pleasures of Imagination*. For 'tis my Fortune to be still concerned with those who either *do* go masked, or those who *should*. I am a plain Man, and on my first Appearance in this Way, I told my Name and who I belonged to. After this, if Men will *rudely* come upon me in Disguise, they can have no Reason to complain, that (in my Ignorance of their Characters) I treat them all alike upon the same free Footing they have put themselves.

This Gentleman, a Follower of Ld. S. and, as it should seem, one of those to whom that Preface was address'd; Certainly, one of those to whom I applied the Words of Tully, *non decet, non datum est*; who affect Wit and Raillery on Subjects not meet, and with Talents unequal; this Gentleman, I say, in the 105th and 106th Pages of his Poem, animadverts upon me in the following Manner:

*Since it is (says he) beyond all Contradiction evident, that we have a natural Sense or Feeling of the ridiculous, and since so good a Reason may be assigned to justify the Supreme Being for bestowing it; one cannot*  
*without*

and that Astonishment reflect on the Conduct of those Men who imagine it for the Service of true Religion to vilify and blacken it without Distinction, and endeavour to persuade us that it is never applied but in a bad Cause. The Reason here given, to shew, that Ridicule and Buffoonry may be properly employed on serious and even sacred Subjects, is admirable: it is, because we have a natural Sense or Feeling of the ridiculous, and because no Sensation was given us in vain; which would serve just as well to excuse Adultery or Incest. For have we not as natural a Sense or Feeling of the Voluptuous? And was it not given for as good Purposes? But he will say, it has its proper Objects. And does he think, I will not say the same of his Sense of Ridicule? For he stretch'd a Point, when he told the Reader I vilified and blacken'd it without Distinction. The Thing I there oppos'd, was only, an extravagant Disposition to unseasonable Mirth\*. The abusive Way of Wit and Rallery on serious Subjects †. With as little Truth could he say, that I endeavoured to persuade the Public that it is never applied but in a bad Cause: For, in that very Place, I apologized for an eminent Writer who had applied it to a good one ‡.

But, in the next Words, if he means by, *is not*, ought not to be, he gives me up all I want. *Ridicule* (says he) *is not concerned with mere speculative Truth or Falshood*. Certainly. And, for that very Reason I would exclude it from those Subjects. What need? He will say, For when was it so employed? Hold a little. Was it not concerned with *mere speculative Truth*, when his Master ridiculed the Subject of Mr. Locke's *Essay of Human Understanding*, in the Manner mentioned in my Preface §? Was it not so concerned too, when the same Noble Person ridiculed Revelation, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put a *wrong Bias on their Reason* in order to believe right ||?—Unless, by *mere speculative*

\* Div. Leg. ed. 4to. Ded. p. x.

† Ibid. p. xii.

‡ Ibid. p. vii. &amp; seq.

§ Dedication to the 1st vol. D. L. p. xxii, Note (||).

¶ Char. II. vol. III. Misc. 2. c. 3. p. 99.

*Truths*, he means, Truths of *no Use*: And for all such, he has my free Leave to treat them as he pleases. He has shewn, by his Poem, they are no improper Subject for his Talents.

He goes on, *It is not in abstract Propositions or Theorems, but in Actions and Passions, Good and Evil, Beauty and Deformity, that we find Materials for it; and all these Terms are relative, implying Approbation or Blame.* The Reason here given, why, not *abstract Propositions, &c.* but *Actions and Passions, &c.* are the Subject of *ridicule*, is, because these latter are *relative Terms implying Approbation and Blame.* But are not the former as much *relative Terms, implying Assent and Denial?* And does not an absurd Proposition as frequently afford Materials for Ridicule as an absurd Action? Let the Reader determine by what he finds before him. *To ask then, (says he) whether Ridicule be a Test of Truth, is, in other Words, to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be just and becoming; or whether that which is just and becoming can be ridiculous. A Question that does not deserve a serious Answer.* Why then did he put it? For it is of nobody's *asking* but his own. However in Civility to his Master, or rather indeed to his Master's Masters, the Ancient *Sophists*, who, we are told\* in the *Characteristics*, said something very like it, I shall shew it deserves a *very* serious Answer. For how, I pray, comes it to pass, that to ask *whether Ridicule be a Test of Truth, is the same Thing as to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true?* As if, whatever *Ridicule* was applied to, as a *Test*, must needs be *ridiculous*. Might not one ask, *Whether the Copel † be a Test of Gold*, without incurring the Absurdity of questioning *whether the Matter of the Copel was not standard Gold?* What was the Man dreaming of? That a *Test*

\* 'Twas the Saying of an Ancient Sage, that Humour was the only Test of Ridicule. Vol. I.

P. 74.

† I chuse this Instance of the Refiner's *Copel*, because the *English* for it, which is *Italian*, is *Test*; from whence the latter Word was metaphorically used to signify all Kinds of *sure Trial*. This was proper to observe, as our Poet seems not to know the Meaning of the Word.

and a *Detection of Falshood*, were one and the same Thing? or that it was the Practice to bring nothing to the *Test* but what was known, beforehand, whether it was *true* or *false*? His Master knows much better versed in the Use of Things. He says \*, *Now, what Rule or Measure is there in the World, except in considering the true Temper of Things, to find which are truly serious, and which ridiculous?* And how can this be done, unless by applying the *Ridicule* to see whether it will bear?

But if the Reader be curious to see to the Bottom of this Affair, we must go a little deeper. Lord S——, we find, was willing to know, as every honest Man would, whether those things, which had the Appearance of Seriousness and Sanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The plain way of coming to this Knowledge had been hitherto by the Test of *Reason*. But this was too long and too slow a Progress for so sublime a Genius. He would go a shorter and a quicker Way to work, and do the Business by *Ridicule*, given us, as his Disciple tells us, for this very End, *to aid the tardy Steps of Reason*. This therefore the Noble Author would needs apply, to see whether these Appearances would bear the Touch. Now it was this ingenious Expedient, which I thought I had Cause to object to. For when you have applied this *Touch*, and that, to which it is applied, is found to bear it, what Reparation will you make to Truth, for the ridiculous Light in which you have placed her, in order only, as you pretend, to judge right of her? Oh, for that, says his Lordship, she has the Amends in her own Hands: Let her railley again; for why should fair *Honesty* be denied the Use of this *Weapon* †? To this so wanton a Liberty with sacred Truth, I thought I had many good Reasons to oppose; and so, it seems, thought our Poet likewise: And therefore he endeavours to excuse his Master, by putting another Sense on the *Application of Ridicule as a Test*, which supposes the Truth or Falshood of the Thing tried, to be *already known*. But the shift is unlucky;

\* Char. Vol. I. p. 12.

† Ibid. p. 128.

for while it covers his Master, it exposes himself. For now it may be asked, what need of Ridicule at all, after the Truth is *known*; since you make its sole Use to consist in the *Discovery* of the true State of Things?

But the odd Fortune of our Poet's Pen makes the pleasant Part of the Story. Here, we see, where he aims to make an absurd Proposition, for the Use of others, it proves a reasonable one: 'Tis odds but we find him, before we have done, trying to make a reasonable one, for his own Use, that turns out at last an Absurdity.

But let us come to the *Philosophy* of his Criticism: For *it is most evident, that as in a metaphysical Proposition offered to the Understanding for its Assent, the Faculty of Reason examines the Terms of the Proposition; and finding one Idea, which was supposed equal to another, to be in Fact unequal, of Consequence rejects the Proposition as a Falseness: So in Objects offered to the Mind for its Esteem or Applause, the Faculty of Ridicule feeling an Incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with Laughter and Contempt.* And now, how does this sublime Account, of Reason and Ridicule, prove the foregoing Proposition to be absurd? Just as much, I suppose, as the Height of *St. Paul's* proves *Grantbam Steeple* to stand awry. I, for my Part, can collect nothing from it, unless it be that the Poet thought *metaphysical Propositions* were the only proper Objects of the *Understanding's Assent, and the Reason's Examination.*

However, if it cannot *prove* what precedes, he will try to make it *infer* what follows: *When THEREFORE (says he) we observe such a Claim obtruded upon Mankind, and the inconsistent Circumstances carefully concealed from the Eye of the Public, it is our Business, if the Matter be of Importance to Society, to drag out those latent Circumstances, and, by setting them full in View, convince the World how ridiculous the Claim is; and thus a double Advantage is gained; for we both detect the moral Falseness sooner than in the Way of speculative Enquiry, and impress the Minds of Men with a stronger Sense of the Vanity and Error of its Authors. And this, and no more, is meant by*

*the Application of Ridicule.* A little more, if we may believe his Master: who says, it is not only to detect Error, but to try Truth, that is, in his own Expression, to see *whether it will bear.* But why all this a-do; for now, we see, nobody mistook what was meant by the *Application of Ridicule*, but himself—As to what he said before, that when *Objects are offered to the Mind for its Esteem and Applause, the Faculty of Ridicule, feeling an Incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with Laughter and Contempt*; it is so expressed, as if he intended it not for the Description of the *Use*, but the *Essence of Ridicule.* Whereas the Dealers in this Trash frequently urge the *Mind to reject* many things with *Laughter and Contempt*, without feeling any other *Incongruity*, than in their own Pretensions to Truth and Honesty. And this our Poet very well knows.

For now he comes to the Point. *But it is said the Practice is dangerous, and may be inconsistent with the Regard we owe to Objects of real Dignity and Excellence. I answer, the Practice, FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous.* An Answer which has only taught me to reply, that the Use of Stiletto's and Poisons, *fairly managed*, can never be dangerous. And yet all wise States, for the Security of its Members, when any of them have shewn a violent Propensity to these things, have ever forbidden their promiscuous Use and Sale.

However, he allows at length, that *Men may be dishonest in obtruding Circumstances foreign to the Object; and we may be inadvertent in allowing these Circumstances to impose upon us; but—* but what? Why the SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT. And, he had told us before, that this is a *natural Sense, and bestowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to aid our tardy Steps in Pursuit of Reason.* Why, as he says, who can withstand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be dishonest; Readers may be imposed on; the Public may be misled; and Men may judge wrong. But what then, the *Sense of Ridicule always judges right.* And while we can support our Platonic Republic of Ideas, what signifies

fies what becomes of the *Fæces Romuli*, the *Actions* of the People? And so again it is, we see, in the Use of Poisons: Though *Men may be dishonest in obtruding them, and we may be inadvertent enough* to suffer them to *impose upon us*; yet what then? The Efficacy of Poison is without Malice; and does but do its kind; is a *natural Power*, and bestowed upon us by the Supreme Being, to *aid our tardy Steps* in Pursuit of Vermin.—In Truth, one would imagine, by so extraordinary an Argument, that the Question was not, *of the Injury to Society* by the Abuse of Ridicule, but *of the Injury to Ridicule itself*.

But let us hear him out: *The Socrates of Aristophanes is as truly ridiculous a Character as ever was drawn. True; but it is not the Character of Socrates, the divine Moralist, and Father of ancient Wisdom.* Indeed!—But then, if, like the true *Syssa*, in the other Comedy, he must bear the Blows of his fictitious Brother, what signifies it to injured Virtue, to tell us, that he did not deserve them?

*What then?* (says he) *did the Ridicule of the Poet hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming those foreign Circumstances which he had falsely introduced into his Character, and thus rendering the Satirist doubly ridiculous in his Turn.* See here again! all his Concern, we find, is, lest good Raillery should be beat at its own Weapons. No, indeed, I cannot see how it could possibly *hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming.* But *this* it did, which surely deserves a little Reflection, it hindered the *People* from seeing what he had *detected and disclaimed*—A mighty Consolation, truly, to expiring Virtue, that he *disclaimed* the Fool's Coat they had put upon him; though it stuck to him like a *Sambenito*; and at last brought him to his Execution.

But what is the Sacrifice of a *Socrates* now and then, to secure the *free Use* of that inestimable Blessing, *Buffoonry*? So thinks our Poet; when all the Answer he gives to so natural, so compassionate an Objection as this, *No: but it nevertheless had an ill Influence on the Minds of the People,* is telling us a Story of the Atheist *Spinoza*; while the Godlike *Socrates* is left neglected, and in the

Hands of his Judges; whither *Ridicule*, this noble Guide of Truth, had safely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding Answer which the respectable *Spinoza* is employed to illustrate.—*And so* (says he) *has the Reasoning of Spinoza made many Atheists; he has founded it indeed on Suppositions utterly false; but allow him these, and his Conclusions are unavoidably true. And if we must reject the Use of Ridicule because, by the Impression of false Circumstances, things may be made to seem ridiculous, which are not so in themselves; why we ought not in the same Manner to reject the Use of Reason, because, by proceeding on false Principles, Conclusions will appear true which are impossible in Nature, let the vehement and obstinate Declaimers against Ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare trust it with any one; whose Common Sense is not all turned to *Taste*. What! Because REASON, the Guide of Life, the Support of Religion, the Investigator of Truth, must be still used though it be continually Subject to Abuse: therefore RIDICULE, the poultry *Buffoon* of Reason, must have the same Indulgence! Because a King must be intrusted with Government, though he may misuse his Power; therefore the King's Fool shall be suffered to play the Madman! But upon what footing standeth this extraordinary claim? Why, we have a *natural Sense of the Ridiculous*; and the *Ridiculous has a natural Feeling of the Incongruous*; and then—*who can forbear laughing?* If to this, you add *Taste, Beauty, Deformity, Moral-sense, Moral-repentance, Moral-falseness*, you have then, I think, the whole Theory of the *Ridiculous*. But I can tell him of a plain *English* Proverb worth all his Modish *Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* put together, and that is, TO BE MERRY AND WISE. Which concerns him nearer than one may think. For who would imagine, that, while he was supporting Ridicule from the Charge of *Abuse*, he should be supplying his Adversary with a fresh and flagrant Exception to his own Plea? Not indeed, that the Comment disgraced the Text; or that there was much *Incongruity* in pleading for a Fault he had just then committed.



mitted. But so it is, kind Reader, that, where he is marshalling the several Classes of Folly in human Life, he places the whole *Body of the Christian Clergy* in the First and Foremost: Amongst those, who, he tells us, *assume some desirable Quality or Possession which evidently does not belong to them\**.

- “ Others, of graver Mien, behold; adorn’d  
 “ With holy Ensigns, how *sublime* they move,  
 “ And, bending oft their *sanctimonious* Eyes,  
 “ Take homage of the *Simple-minded Throng*,  
 “ AMBASSADORS of Heav’n †.”

And well do they deserve his *Moral-ridicule*, supposing them to be drawn *like*. For, if I understand any Thing of his Colouring, the Features are, Pride, Hypocrisy, Fraud, and Imposture. I call it an Insult on the whole Body of the Clergy, because I know of no Part of them who hold that the *Ministry* of the Gospel (or, as St. Paul calls it, *of Reconciliation*) *was given them* by the Religion of *Christ*, but hold likewise, with the same Apostle (who speaks of himself here as a simple Minister of the Gospel) *that they are AMBASSADORS for Christ* †.—But let it go like what it is, a poor pitiful Joke of his Master’s §, and spoil’d too in the telling. The *Dulness* of the *Ridicule* will sufficiently atone for the *Abuse* of it. And I may find Time to call the Great Man of *Taste* himself to account, for his so frequent and ill-employed *Raillery* against RELIGION.

\* P. 49.

† P. 96.

‡ 2 Cor. v. 23.

§ Char. vol. III. p. 336. Third edit.



## R E M A R K S

ON SEVERAL

## OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

**T**HE State of Authorship, whatever that of Nature be, is certainly a State of War: In which, especially if it be an *holy War*, every Man's hand is set, not against his Enemy, but his *Brother*. But as these furious fighting men are generally as much mistaken in the use of their Arms, as in the Objects of their Repentments, there is seldom any great Harm done. I speak for myself. I have found none. And indeed no wonder. I have been all the while very much out of the question. For my Answerers write not so properly *against* me, as *for* something they like better than me. This, for his dear *Orthodoxy*; That, for his dearer *Philosophers*; A third, for his *Lawyers*; A fourth, for his *Caballists*; A fifth, for *himself*; and a sixth for, I don't know what, besides the pure *Love of Scribbling* \*. So that I have been now, for some time, only a silent Looker-on; to see how the Public and they would get acquainted. I have given them full Liberty to try what They can

\* Webster, Tillard, W \* \*, Bate, Morgan, Bott.

make or it, or It of them: and wish them better luck with their Readers Intellects than I have had with theirs. For, from the first to the last of them, their constant cry has been, *They do not understand me*. Now, though I can allow this to be a better Reason for their writing at me than any they have hitherto assigned; yet it would be a very bad one for my answering them; because it would keep me engaged *till they did understand me*; which I presume no gentle Reader would think a reasonable Task for one born when human Life is at the shortest. When therefore I took my last leave of the whole Tribe, in the Person of their great Exemplar and Archetype, the learned *Advocate* of Pagan Philosophy, I engaged, that if any Writers more equal to the subject should come abroad, I would return their Civility and fair Argument in such sort as that the World should see I esteemed every sincere Inquirer after Truth rather as a Friend to the Publick than an Enemy to myself. Since that time, the Misfortune I had of differing in Opinion from some Writers of great Merit and Learning has been the disagreeable Occasion of reminding me of my Promise.

## S E C T. I.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 6. sub fin.

OF these, the first place would be due to my very learned Friend, the Author of the elegant and useful *Letter from Rome*; who, taking entirely to himself what was meant in general of the numerous Writers on the same Subject, and the more numerous Followers of the same Hypothesis, hath done a \* Notion of mine the Honour of his Confutation, in a *Posscript* to that *Letter*. But the same friendly Considerations, which induced him

\* Divine Legat. lib. iv. § 6. sub fin.

to end the Postscript with declaring his Unwillingness to enter further into Controversy with me, have disposed me not to enter into it at all. This, and neither any Neglect of him, nor any Force I apprehend in his Arguments, have kept me silent. In the mean time, I owe so much both to myself and the Public, as to take notice of a *Misrepresentation* of my *Argument*; and a *Change* of the *Question* in Dispute between us: Without which Notice, the Controversy (as I agree to leave it in his Hands) could scarce receive an equitable Decision. The *Misrepresentation* I speak of is in these words: "He [the Author of the D. L.] allows that the Writers, who have undertaken to *deduce the Rites of Popery from Paganism*, have shewn an exact and surprising Likeness between them in a great Variety of Instances. This (says he) one would think, is allowing every thing that the Cause demands: It is every thing, I dare say, that those Writers desire." That it is *every thing those Writers desire*, I can easily believe, since I see my learned Friend himself hath taken it for granted, that these two Assertions, 1. *The Religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen Ancestors*; and, 2. *An exact Conformity or Uniformity rather of Worship between Popery and Paganism*, are convertible Propositions. For, undertaking, as his Title Page informs us, to prove, *the Religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen Ancestors*; and having gone through his Arguments, he concludes them in these Words, "But it is high time for me to conclude, being persuaded, if I do not flatter myself too much, that I have sufficiently made good WHAT I FIRST UNDERTOOK TO PROVE, an exact Conformity or Uniformity rather of Worship between Popery and Paganism †." But what he *undertook to prove*, we see, was, *The Religion of the present Romans derived from their heathen Ancestors*. That I have, therefore, as my learned Friend observes, *allowed every thing those Writers desire*, is very likely. But then, whether I have *allowed every thing that the Cause demands*, is another

\* Postscript, p. 228.

† Letter, p. 224.

Question. Which I think can never be determined in the Affirmative, till it be shewn that no other probable Cause can be assigned of this *equal Conformity between Papists and Pagans*, but a *Borrowing, or Derivation from one to the other*. And I guess, this is not now ever likely to be done, since I myself have actually assigned *another probable Cause*, namely, the *same Spirit of Superstition operating in equal Circumstances*.

But this justly celebrated Writer goes on—“ This Question, according to his [the Author of *The Divine Legation*] Notion, is not to be decided by *Facts*, but by a Principle of a different Kind, a *superior Knowledge of human Nature* \*.” Here I am forced to complain of a want of Candour, a want not natural to my learned Friend. For, whence is it, I would ask, that he collects, *that, according to my Notion, this Question is not to be decided by Facts, but a superior Knowledge of human Nature?* From any thing I have said? Or from any thing I have omitted to say? Surely, not from any thing I *have said* (though he seems to insinuate so much by putting the Words *a superior Knowledge of human Nature* in Italic Characters, as they are called) because I leave him in possession of his *Facts*, and give them all their full Validity; which he himself observes; and, from thence, as we see, endeavours to draw some Advantage to his Hypothesis: Nor from any thing I *have omitted to say*; for, in the short Paragraph where I delivered my Opinion, and, by reason of its Evidence, offered but one single Argument in its Support, that Argument arises from a supposed *FACT*, *viz.* that the *superstitious Customs in question were many Ages later than the Conversion of the imperial City to the Christian Faith*: Whence I concluded that the ruling Churchmen could have no Motive in borrowing from Pagan Customs, either as they were then fashionable in themselves, or respectable for the Number or Quality of their Followers. The *Supposition* I could easily convert into a *Proof*, were I not restrained by the Considerations before

\* Postscript, p. 228.

spoken of. And what makes this the more extraordinary is, that my learned Friend himself immediately afterwards quotes these words; and then tells the Reader that *the Argument consists of an HISTORICAL FACT and of a Consequence deduced from it.* It appears therefore, that, according to my Notion, the Question is to be decided by *Fa&T*s, and not by a *superior Knowledge of human Nature.* Yet I must confess I then thought, and do so still, that a *superior Knowledge of human Nature* would do no Harm, as it might enable Men to judge better of *Fa&T*s than we generally find them accustomed to do. But will this excuse a candid Representor for saying, that *the Question, according to my Notion, was not to be decided by Fa&T*s, but a *superior Knowledge of human Nature?* However, to do my learned Friend all Justice, I must needs say, that, as if these were only Words of Course, or Words of Controversy, he goes on, through the Body of his *Postscript*, to invalidate my Argument from *Fa&T*; and we hear no more of a *superior Knowledge of human Nature* than in this Place where it was brought in to be laughed at.

As to the Argument, it must even shift for itself. It has done more Mischief already than I was aware of: And forced my learned Friend to extend his Charge from the *modern* to the *ancient Church of Rome.* For my Argument, from the *low Birth* of the Superstitions in Question, coming against his *Hypothesis* after he had once and again declared the Purpose of his *Letter* to be the exposing the heathenish Idolatry and Superstition of the *present Church of Rome*; he was obliged, in support of that Hypothesis, to shew that even the *early Ages* of the Church were not free from the Infection. Which hath now quite shifted the Subject with the Scene, and will make the Argument of his Piece from henceforth to run thus, *The Religion of the present Romans derived from their early Christian Ancestors; and theirs, from the neighbouring Pagans.* To speak freely, my Reasoning (which was an Argument *ad hominem*, and, as such, I thought would have been reverenced) reduced the learned Writer to this Dilemma; either to allow the Fact, and give up

his *Hypothesis*; or to deny the *Fact*, and change his *Question*. And he has chosen the latter as the lesser Evil. For a simple *Question* is but like a Wife to wrangle with; and when we lose one we easily find another. But the *Hypothesis* begot upon it is of the Nature of one's Offspring, whose Loss perhaps is irreparable. I find, however, his *Lincoln's Inn Advocate* never thought him wedded to his *Question*; for he takes the Change of it, like the Change of a Mistress, for *Politeness*; and has accused me not only of ill-breeding, but of *Contradiction*, because I would not change it too. I had shown, in my first Volume of *The Divine Legation*, that the ancient *Christians of Greece* had borrowed several forms of Speech from the Pagan Mytheries: And in my second, I had denied that the modern *Christians of Rome* had borrowed several Forms of Worship from the Pagan Ritual. On which, our Advocate catching me at this Advantage, thus candidly expostulates with me. *Thus the SAME FACT, when it tends to prove a part of a favourite Hypothesis, is in your Hands notoriously true; but it is no sooner made use of by the ingenious Author so often mentioned [Dr. M.] than it proves to be an utter Mistake\*. And again, the DIFFERENT OPINIONS which on different Occasions you have entertained of this Matter, may serve to teach us †, &c. &c.* But let me assure this Writer, that when I spoke of the *Ancients* borrowing *Words* from the Pagan Mytheries, I no more meant the *Moderns* borrowing *Rites* from their *open Worship*, than, when ‡ I spoke of *Answerers by Profession*, I meant *Lawyers by Profession*; who, without flattering them, I may say, deserve as little the Character there given of the said *Answerers* as I do the Calummies here bestowed by this *Letter Writer*.

But his Charge of *Contradiction* was excusable. The Doctor had led him up to the *primitive Church*, and there he found me; and there he supposed I had always been: And seeing me not quite conformable to the Doctor's Decisions, he would quarrel with me for a

\* Letter from a Gentleman of Lincoln's-Inn, p. 55.

† Page 59.

‡ *Divine Legation*, Appendix to Book III. vol. II. p. 216.



Schismatic. But I can easily overlook this (that he took upon trust, as he did his *Greek*) for the sake of so charitable Office as the teaching me how to write; which he kindly professes to be the whole Purpose of his *Letter*.

My learned Friend will excuse my speaking thus much of a Controversy which he knows, from the Time of the first Publication of his *Postscript*, I had intended not to keep up. But thus much was necessary to state it truly, and to hold it fairly on the Foot whereon he first placed it, and I had left it. As to the Subject itself, so curious and interesting, if ever I should be disposed to treat it at large, as possibly I may, I would chuse to do it *in Thesi*, and not in prosecution of any particular Controversy.

## S E C T. II.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 4.

THE first Writer I am concerned with is the Reverend Dr. *Richard Pococke*: Who, in his late Book of *Travels*, hath a Chapter on the ancient *Hieroglyphics of the Egyptians*, wherein, in opposition to my Account of the Nature of that Kind of Writing, he expresseth himself as follows—“ If Hieroglyphical Figures stood  
 “ for Words or Sounds that signified certain things, the Power of  
 “ Hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a Number of Letters  
 “ composing such a Sound, that by Agreement was made to signify  
 “ such a thing. For Hieroglyphics, as Words, seem to have stood  
 “ for Sounds, and Sounds signify Things; as for instance, it might  
 “ have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile might stand for  
 “ the Sound that meant what we call Malice: The children of the  
 “ Priests were early taught that the Figure of a Crocodile stood for  
 “ such a Sound, and, if they did not know the Meaning of the  
 “ Sound, it would certainly stand with them for a Sound; though,  
 “ as the Sound, it signified also a Quality or Thing; and they  
 “ might

“ might afterwards be taught the Meaning of this Sound ; as words  
 “ are only Sounds, which Sounds we agree shall signify such and  
 “ such things ; so that, to Children, Words only stand for Sounds,  
 “ which relate to such Things as they know nothing of ; and, in  
 “ this Sense, we say Children learn many Things like Parrots,  
 “ what they do not understand, and their Memories are exercised  
 “ only about Sounds, till they are instructed in the Meaning of the  
 “ Words. This I thought it might be proper to observe, *as some*  
 “ *say Hieroglyphics stood for Things and not for Words*, if Sounds ar-  
 “ ticulated in a certain manner are Words. And though it may be  
 “ said, that in this case, when different Nations, of different Lan-  
 “ guages, agree on common Characters, that stand for certain  
 “ Things they agree on, that then such Figures stand for Things :  
 “ This will be allowed ; but then they stand for Sounds too, that  
 “ is, the Sounds in each Language that signify such Things : And,  
 “ as observed before, to Children, who know nothing of the seve-  
 “ ral Things they stand for ; to them they are only Marks that  
 “ express such and such Sounds : So that these Figures stand not  
 “ for Things alone, but as Words, for Sounds and Things \*.”

The Design of this Passage, the Reader sees, is to oppose the  
 Principle I went upon, in explaining the Egyptian Hieroglyphics,  
*That they stood for Things, and not for Words*. But that is all he  
 sees ; for the obscure Expression, arising from a Confusion of Ideas,  
 will not suffer one to do more than guess at the Proof he aims at ;  
 which seems to be this—That Hieroglyphics cannot be said to stand  
 for Things *only* ; because Things being denoted by Words or Sounds ;  
 and Hieroglyphics exciting the Idea of Sounds (which are the Notes  
 of Things), as well as the Idea of the Things themselves, Hiero-  
 glyphics stand both for Sounds and Things.—This seems to be his  
 Argument, put into intelligible Language. But, for fear of mis-  
 taking him, let us confine ourselves to his own Words.

\* Pag. 228, 229, of a Book intitled, A Description of the East, &c.

*If Hieroglyphical Figures (says he) stood for Words or Sounds that signified certain Things, the Power of Hieroglyphics seems to be the same as of a Number of Letters composing such a Sound that by Agreement was made to signify such a Thing.* Without doubt, if Hieroglyphics stood for Sounds, they were of the Nature of Words, which stand for Sounds. But this is only an *hypothetical* Proposition: Let us see therefore how he proves it.

FOR Hieroglyphics, AS WORDS, seem to have stood for Sounds, and Sounds signify Things; as for Instance, it MIGHT have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile MIGHT stand for the same Sound that meant what we call Malice. The Propriety of the Expression is as remarkable as the Force of the Reasoning. 1. Instead of saying, *but Hieroglyphics*, he says, *for Hieroglyphics*; which not expressing an *Illation*, but implying a *Reason*, obscures the Argument he would illustrate. 2. He says, *Hieroglyphics, as Words, seem to have stood for Sounds.* Just before he said, *Hieroglyphics stood for Words OR Sounds.* Here they are *AS Words*, or, *like Words*, and seem to stand FOR Sound. What must we stick to? are Words Sound? or, do they stand for Sound? He has given us both to chuse of. But it is fit himself should chuse first: Which not having yet done, we go on, 3. Lastly, to complete all, he corroborates this *seeming* Truth by an Instance in which the Possibility of its standing for a Sound is made a Proof of the Likelihood of its so doing; *It MIGHT (says he) have been agreed that the Figure of a Crocodile MIGHT stand, &c.*

But he makes amends for his former Diffidence in what follows. *The Children of the Priests were early taught that the Figure of a Crocodile stood for such a Sound, and if they did not know the meaning of the Sound it would certainly stand with them for a Sound.* This indeed is an Anecdote. But where did he learn that these Children, before they could decipher the Sounds of their own Language, were taught Hieroglyphics? Till now, Hieroglyphics were understood to be reserved for those instructed in their secret and mysterious Science. But let us suppose that they were taught to Children amongst their first Elements: Yet even here, as we shall see from  
the

the Nature of the Thing, they could never stand as Marks for *Things*, or *Sound*. When a Child is taught the Power of Letters, he learns that those Letters, that compose the Word *Malice*, for instance, express the *Sound*: which, naturally arising from a Combination of the several Powers of each Letter, shews him that the Letters stand for such a Sound or Word. But when he is taught that the Figure or Picture of a *Crocodile* signifies *Malice*, he as naturally and necessarily conceives (though he knows not the meaning of the Word) that it stands for some *Thing* signified by that Word, and not for a *Sound*: because there is no natural Connexion between *Figure* and a *Sound*, as there is between *Figure* and a *Thing*. And the only Reason why the word *Malice* intervenes, in this Connexion, is because of the Necessity of the Use of *Words* to distinguish Things, and rank them into sorts. But the veriest Child could never be so childish as to conceive that, when he was told the Figure of a Beast with four Legs and a long Tail signified *Malice*, that it signified the *Sound* of *Malice*; any more than if he were told it signified a *Crocodile*, that it signified the *Sound* of the Word *Crocodile*. The Truth is, the Ignorant often mistake Words for Things, but never, Things for Words. The former is so true that they frequently take the *name* of a Thing for its *Nature*; and rest contented in the Knowledge which that gives them. I remember a Country Fellow staring at the Picture of an Elephant, a *thing* he had never seen before, asked his Friend who stood by, *What it was?* and, on his answering, that it was *the great Czar*, inquired no further, but went away well satisfied in his Acquaintance with the strange Beast. Yet I apprehend he did not understand his Informer to mean that it signified only the *Sound* of that Word. But perhaps our Author will say, the Cases are different; that the *Elephant* was a mere Picture, and the *Crocodile* a Sign or Mark. But I have proved at large that the ancient *Egyptian* Hieroglyphics were at first *mere Pictures*; and that all the Alteration they received, in becoming *Marks*, was only the having their general Use of conveying Knowledge rendered more extensive and expeditious.

To proceed ; our Author considers next what he apprehends may be thought an Objection to his Opinion, *And though* (says he) *it may be said that, in this Case, where different Nations of different Languages agree on common Characters, that stand for certain Things they agree on, that then such Figures stand for Things.* To which he answers, *This will be allowed, but then they stand for Sounds too, that is, the Sounds in each Language that signify such Things.* He who can allow this, and without Injury to his Cause, need be under no Fear of ever giving his Adversary Advantages. We may expect to hear him say next, when disputing about the Colour of an Object—*that it is Black, will be allowed; but then it is White too.* For a Mark for Things can no more be a Mark for Sounds, than Black can be White. The Reason is the same in both ; the one Property excludes the other : Thus, if *hieroglyphic Marks* stand for Things, and are used as common Characters by various Nations differing in Speech and Language, they cannot stand for Sounds ; because these Men express the same Thing by *different Sounds* ; unless, to remove this Difficulty, he will go farther, and say, not, as he did before, that one *hieroglyphic Word* (to use his own Language) stood for *one Sound*, but, that it stands for an Hundred. Again, if *hieroglyphic Marks* stand for Sounds, they cannot stand for Things : Not for those Things which are *not* signified by such Sounds ; this himself will allow : Nor yet, I affirm, for those which *are* ; because it is the Sound that stands for the Thing signified by the Sound, and not the hieroglyphic Mark. But all this Mistake proceeded from another as gross, though less glaring, namely, *that Words stand both for Sounds and Things*, which we now come to. For he concludes thus, *So that these Figures (viz. Hieroglyphics) stand not for Things alone, but, as Words, for Sounds and Things.* An unhappy Illustration ! which has all the Defects, both in point of Sense and Expression, that a Proposition can well have. For if, by *Words*, he meant *articulated Sounds*, then the Expression is Nonsense, as affirming, that Sounds stand for Sounds. And that he meant to is possible, because, in the Beginning of the Passage quoted, he uses *Words* for articu-

*the Sound*.—*Hieroglyphics*, says he, *stand for Words or Sounds*. But if, by *Words*, he meant *Letters* (and that he might mean so, is possible likewise, for he presently afterwards uses *Words* in that Sense too—*Hieroglyphics as Words*, says he, *seem to have stood for Sounds*: then the Proposition is only false; the plain Truth being this, *Letters stand for Sounds only*; which Sounds they *naturally* produce; as Sounds *arbitrarily* denote Things.

But to be a little more particular; as in this Distinction lies the Judgment which is to be made, if ever it be rightly made, of the Controversy between us. All this Confusion of counter-reasoning proceeds, as we observed before, *first*, from not reflecting that *Letters*, which stand for Words, and *Hieroglyphics* which stand for Things, have not an *arbitrary* but *natural* Designation. For as the *Powers* of Letters naturally produce Words or Sounds, so the *Figures* of Hieroglyphics naturally signify Things: Either more simply, when they express *Substances*; or more artificially, when they denote *Modes*; yet in neither Case arbitrarily: but by *Representation* in the first, and by *Analogy* in the last. *Secondly*, from his not considering, that as we cannot think nor converse about Things either accurately or intelligibly without *Words*, so their Intervention becomes necessary in explaining the *Marks of Things*. But therefore, to make *Hieroglyphics the Marks of Sounds*, because Sounds accompany *Things*, would be as absurd as to make *Letters the Marks of Things*, because Things accompany *Sounds*. And, who ever (besides our Author) said that *Letters signified Things as well as Sounds*? unless he had a Mind to confound all human Meaning. If he chose to instruct, or even to be understood, he would say, that *Letters naturally* produced Sounds or Words; and that *Words arbitrarily* denoted Things: And had our Author spoken the same intelligible Language, and told us that Hieroglyphics *naturally* expressed Things, and that Things were *arbitrarily* denoted by Words, he would indeed have spared both of us the present Trouble, but then he had said nothing *new*. But it is possible he might be led into his Conclusion by mistaking, for *Egyptian*, a ridiculous Kind of

of *rebus-writing* more ridiculouſly called Hieroglyphics, the ſenſeleſs Amuſement of our idle People, in which, indeed, the Figures ſtand only for Sounds. As for thoſe ſignificative Figures properly called Hieroglyphics, they never denoted other than *Things*. If there ever were an Exception, it was in a late Traveller; whoſe ſignificative Egyptian *Figures*, I am told, are not ſo properly the Representatives of the *Things* themſelves, as of the Writer's *Words*, or his verbal Deſcriptions to the Ingraver — But there is no End of correſting the Extravagancies of a perverſe Imagination. Here we have one, who is for making the Egyptian *Hieroglyphics* a Kind of Letters: We have lately heard of another, ſtill more at Deſiance with common Senſe, who is for making the *Hebrew* Letters a Kind of *Hieroglyphic* Characters \*. And this without ever having travelled for it.

But

\* See *Propoſals for printing by Subscription the Book of Job in the Hebrew Character, and now firſt Decyphered into Engliſh, dated July 1, 1745*. From which, I ſhall beg Leave to borrow a Specimen of the *Undertaker's* Reaſoning and Eloquence. “ To obviate,” ſays he, “ any Scruples of Alarm which the Appearance of Novelty and Paradox might occasion, it may be proper to acquaint the Reader——*What?*——that the new Verſion of *Job*, now offered to the Public, was made independently of any Tranſlation, “ Commentator, or Critic,” &c. Without doubt it was a ready way to quiet all Alarms, ariſing from the Appearance of *Novelty*, to tell his Readers, the Appearance was *real*. But perhaps by——*obviating any Scruples of Alarm*, this great Linguist might mean, what the Words naturally imply, the freeing his Reader from any *Scruples* about the Uncharitableneſs of being *alarmed* to one's Neighbours Diſcredit without very apparent Cauſe. And if this were his Meaning, he has certainly ſet his Reader's Conſcience at Eaſe. But with Regard to the *Alarm* itſelf, I know but one way of ſilencing *that*; which is, the reaſonable Proſpect his Reader has that this, which is now a *Novelty and Paradox*, is likely to continue ſo.

He goes on——“ In the mean time, if the ſagacious Reader is prompted to ſearch “ after Truth, too long concealed in her myſterious Recesses——let him guard againſt “ all Systematical Notions, and aſſume no other Hypotheſis but this, that the beſt Senſe “ which can be affixed to the *Hebrew* Letters, conſiſtently with the Context, and with “ the Laws of the Character, is the genuine Senſe of the Writer.” The *Context*, does he ſay? Why, the *Context* is yet to make; as well as the *Senſe that is to be affixed to the Hebrew Letters*. And if, when he has them both in his Hands, he cannot make them

But our Author seems to have been misled by a wrong Imagination; that the Public would expect it of a *Traveller* to be intimately conversant in all the old Learning and Religion of the Places he had visited: As if these were to be picked out of the Rubbish of the dead Walls in which they were once contained, rather than from the living Monuments of their contemporary Inhabitants. But even the learned World is less unreasonable; this would exceed even the old *Egyptian* Exaction, and be requiring *Brick*, not indeed without *Straw*, for enough of that, we see, is to be gathered in rambling *through the Land*; but, what is worse, without *Materials*. However, to this Imagination it appears we owe his Account of the *Hieroglyphics* in the *present*, and of the *Mythology of the antient Egyptians*, in the preceding Chapter; which he introduces in this

agree, he must be the very dullest of all his bungling Tribe. The Man had heard, or seen, or other, of that trite critical Canon, *of interpreting agreeably to the Context*, which means only that the Parts should conform to the Whole, and to one another; and the more obscure be explained by the more intelligible: And this, he has innocently applied to *Paras* and a *Wrote* that are to be all of his own making; which he may as well take as obscure at least, if not as intelligible, as he pleases.

Having thus strongly *plumed* himself with his Grey-Goose Quill, he at length takes his Flight.—“ Thus prepared,” he says, “ he will defy Difficulty and scorn Assistance; esteeming an officious Hint an Affront to his Genius, or suspecting he was entitled the Pleasure of investigating the Theorem. Fantastic Glory! short-lived Pleasure! that must vanish into Indignation, for not having sooner perceived so transparent an Artifice.” But here we leave him. He now soars out of Sight, and becomes intolerable to mortal Eyes.

Indeed, he might have passed without any Notice at all, had he not betrayed his *Kind* when he attempted to *rear*. For, though it be his Business to possess the Public with an high Idea of the Knowledge he is about to open to them from the Discovery of a *new real* CYBER, yet he can't, for his Life (even in this very *Specimen*) forbear to call it a SACERDOTAL *Jargon*—a *Gibberish of their own*. Let the *Priests* then look to themselves. Here is a *new Church-Decipherer*, who has not only discovered they are accustomed to write in *Jargon*, but has also found the *Key*. We know them to be always plotting against the *Government of Nature*: The Public therefore cannot but be as impatient for their Conviction, as this *Decipherer* is for the filling his *Subscription*: Which, as it will be the Means of satisfying both, I would beg Leave to recommend to their Consideration. *Subscriptions are taken in by J. Nourse at the Lamb without Temple-Bar.*

extra-



extraordinary Manner: “ As the Mythology, or fabulous Religion  
 “ of the ancient *Egyptians*, may be looked on, in a great Measure,  
 “ as the Foundation of the Heathen Religion, in most other Parts;  
 “ so it may not be improper to give some Account of the Origin  
 “ of it, as it is delivered by the most ancient Authors, which  
 “ may give some Light both to the Description of *Egypt*, and also  
 “ to the History of that Country. We may suppose, that the  
 “ Ancients were the best Judges of the Nature of their Religion;  
 “ and consequently, that all Interpretations of their Mythology,  
 “ by Men of fruitful Inventions, that have no sort of Foundation  
 “ in their Writings, are forced, and such as might never be in-  
 “ tended by them. On the contrary, it is necessary to retrench  
 “ several things the Ancients themselves seem to have invented,  
 “ and grafted on true History; and, in order to account for many  
 “ Things, the Genealogies and Alliances they mention must in  
 “ several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been  
 “ invented to accommodate the Honours of the same Deities to  
 “ different Persons, they were obliged to deify, who lived at dif-  
 “ ferent Times; and so they were obliged to give them new Names,  
 “ invent Genealogies, and some different Attributes \*.”

He says, *We may suppose that the Ancients were the best Judges of the Nature of their Religion.* But the *Ancients*, here spoken of, were not *Egyptians*, but *Greeks*; and the *Mythology* here spoken of, was not *Greek*, but *Egyptian*: Therefore these *Ancients* might well be mistaken about the Nature of a Religion which they borrowed from Strangers; the Principles of which, they themselves tell us, were always kept secreted from them. But this is not all, they in fact were mistaken; and by no means *good Judges of the Nature of their Religion*, if we may believe one of the most authentic of these Ancients, HERODOTUS himself, where discoursing of the *Greeks* he expressly says,—“ But the Origin of each God, and whether  
 “ they are all from Eternity, and what is their several Kinds or

\* P. 221, 222.

“ Natures, to speak the Truth, they neither knew at that time nor “ since \*.

He goes on—and CONSEQUENTLY *that all Interpretations of their Mythology by Men of fruitful Inventions, that have no sort of Foundation in their Writings, are forced, and such as might never be intended by them.* This is indeed a Truth, but it is no CONSEQUENCE, therefore impertinent. For, whether the *Ancients* were, or were not, *the best Judges*; whether the *Moderns* have, or have not, *fruitful Inventions*, yet if their *Interpretations have no sort of Foundation in ancient Writings*, it is certain they are forced, and such as might never be intended by them. But what does he get by this hypothetical Proposition more than the Discredit of begging his Question?

But the most extraordinary, is his making it an additional Reason for leaving the *Moderns*, and sticking to the *Ancients*, that *the Ancients themselves seem to have invented and grafted on true History, and, in order (he says) to account for many Things, the Genealogies and Alliances they mention, must in several respects be false or erroneous, and seem to have been invented, etc.* Now, if the *Ancients* were thus mistaken, the *Moderns* sure might be excused in endeavouring to set them right: Therefore to a plain Reasoner, this would seem to shew the use of their *Interpretations*. But this Use is better understood from our Author's own Example; who, in the Chapter we are upon, has attempted to give us some Knowledge of Antiquity without them.

And here we find, the *ancient Account*, to which he so closely adheres, is not only fabulous, by his own *Confession*; but contradictory, by his own *Representation*; a confused Collection of Errors and Absurdities; the very Condition of Antiquity which forced the *Moderns* to have Recourse to *Interpretations*: and occasioned that Variety whereon our Author grounds his Charge against them. A

\* Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν ἔκαρτος τῶν Θιῶν, ἔπειθ' αὐτὸν ἔσαν πάντες, ἕκαστος τῶν τοῦ τὰ εἰδή, ἀεὶ ἠπριεῖτο μέχρι ἢ πρὸ τῆς γῆς, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου. Lib. ii. cap. 33.

Charge however in which his *Ancients* themselves will be involved; for they likewise had their *Interpretations*; and were, if their Variety would give it them, at least, as *fruitful* in their *Inventions*. How differing, for instance, were they in Opinion concerning the Origin of ANIMAL WORSHIP \*? Was our Author ignorant that so extraordinary a Superstition wanted Explanation? By no means. Yet for fear of incurring the Censure of a *fruitful Invention*, he, instead of taking the true Solution of a *Modern Critic*; or even any rational Interpretation † of the *ancient Mythologist*, whom yet he professes

to

\* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 468, & seq.

† This, at least, the learned Author of the late *Defence of the prime Ministry of Joseph* has thought it but decent to do, p. 522, whom I just mention here because he does not so properly come within the Purpose of this Pamphlet. For as, in several Parts of his *Defence*, he consents to me without Acknowledgment; so, in others, he differs from me without Contradiction. I have another Reason not to examine the Grounds of his Difference, and that is, because I apprehend he may, on second Thoughts, retract his Opinion on every of those Points, as he seems already to have done in one or two. Thus for instance, speaking p. 522, of the *Origin of Brute-worship*, in *Egypt*, he says, “But there is another Reason [of *Brute-worship*] assigned by *Lucian*, that to me is the most probable of all. He tells us that the Egyptians found out how to measure the Motions of the heavenly Bodies, and how to compute Years and Months and Seasons. They divided that Part of the Heavens and the fixed Stars stationed in it, through which the moveable Stars and Planets pass, into twelve Parts, and represented each Part by some proper different Animal of their own. And from hence arose many Sorts of sacred Rites in *Egypt*, &c.” Yet, at p. 458, he assigns a very different Original. “I think there is little doubt but that the monstrous Figures of the Egyptian Gods, and great Part of their stupid Idolatry and Beast-worship, took its Rise from these *hieroglyphic* Characters.”—So again, p. 472, speaking of the *Origin of Idolatry*, he makes the first Species of it to be HERO-WORSHIP. “And I think (says he) that the Account given of them [*the Sons of the Elohim in the antediluvian World*] by the Historian, that they were the mighty Men of old, Men of the Name, as the Hebrew expresses it, famous and remarkable from ancient Ages, points them out as the most ancient, Gods and Heroes; a Supposition that we shall see presently confirmed by the Testimony of profane History.” Yet at p. 515, he makes the Beginnings of Idolatry to be the Worship of the HEAVENLY BODIES. “These several Accounts put together clearly shew us the Rise and Progress of Superstition and false Worship in the World. It began, as it was

“natural

to follow, contents himself with that wretched Fable of *Typhon's* dividing the Body of *Osiris* into twenty six Parts, and distributing them to his Accomplices: Which, being afterwards found by *Iſis*, and delivered by her to distinct Bodies of Priests to be buried with great Secrecy, she enjoined them to pay divine Honours to him, and to consecrate some particular Animal to his Memory. *From this Account* (says our Author very gravely) *we may see the Reason why ſo many ſacred Animals were worſhipped in Egypt* \*. Again, the *Greek Account*, in *Diodorus*, of *Osiris's Expedition*, has been ſhewn to be a Heap of impoſſible Abſurdities; yet our Author believes it all; and would have believed as much more rather than have run into the Raſhneſs of any *modern Invention*.—But this Matter comes under our next *Section*; where we have to do with a very different Sort of Writer; whoſe Regard, however, for Antiquity in *that* point is, we conceive, as much too ſmall as this Author's is too great.

“ natural to imagine it ſhould, in the Adoration of the heavenly Luminaries, the Sun,  
 “ Moon, and Stars, who were ſuppoſed to preſide over the Day and Night, and the va-  
 “ rious Seaſons of the Year, and to whom the earlieſt Nations were taught to aſcribe  
 “ the Origin and Diſſolution of all Things. Next after theſe the Earth, and the  
 “ ſeveral Elements of which the World was ſuppoſed to conſiſt, had imaginary Deity  
 “ aſcribed to them, and came in for their Share of Adoration. And as the Glory of the  
 “ celeſtial Bodies, and the conſtant Benefit Men received by their Light, Warmth, and  
 “ continual Influences on the Earth, firſt impreſſed Men with Wonder, drew them into  
 “ Adoration, excited their Gratitude, and created in them an Imagination of their be-  
 “ ing Gods; they were AFTERWARDS led into an high Veneration for their Princes,  
 “ whom they admired for their Power, Prudence, Strength, and Knowledge: con-  
 “ ſidering them as their Benefactors who firſt taught them the Uſe of ſuch Things  
 “ as greatly tended to the Preſervation, Security, good Order, and Conveniencies of  
 “ Life.”

\* P. 226.

## S E C T. III.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Book IV. Sect. 5.

WHEN I entered on a Confutation of Sir Isaac Newton's *Egyptian Chronology*, I was willing, for the greater Satisfaction of the Reader, to set his Arguments for the *Identity of Osiris and Sesostris*, on which that Chronology was founded, in the strongest and clearest Light. On this Account I took them as I found them collected, ranged in Order, and set together in one View, with the greatest Advantage of Representation, by the very worthy and learned *Master of the Charter-House*, in a professed Apology for that excellent Author. But this Liberty the learned Writer hath been pleased to animadvert upon in the late *Latin Edition* \* of the Tracts to which that Apology was prefixed——“ We are not (says he †) ignorant of what has lately happened, that the Author of  
 “ *The*

\* *De veris annis D. N. Jesu Christi natali & emortuali Dissertationes duæ Chronologicæ.*

† “ Non nescimus nuperrime accidisse, ut Vir ingenio & eruditione præstans †, quum  
 “ ratus sit ad Divinam Legationem Mosis demonstrandum aliquo modo pertinere, ut  
 “ probetur Osiris non esse idem cum Sesostris, omnia huc allata in lusum jocumque ver-  
 “ terit, inlicita comparatione Arthuri illius fabulosi cum Wilhelmo Normanno, quos  
 “ æquè bonis rationibus in unum hominem constari posse ait (quamvis nihil fere ha-  
 “ beant inter se commune aut simile) ac nos Osirin cum Sesostris confundimus. Et de  
 “ hac re disputationem in 70 paginas & ultra producit. In qua tamen hæc nostra de Se-  
 “ sostris neque negat neque refellit, sed irridet. Alia vero quedam Newtoni dicta de  
 “ sero inventis ab aliquo rege artibus, armis, instrumentis oppugnat, et ea quidem parte  
 “ cause vincit. Nam ut ista longe ante Sesostris ætatem apud Ægyptios reperta sint,  
 “ Scriptura sacra jubet credere; ab ullo unquam regum inventa esse haud ita certum.  
 “ Sed ea prius non attigimus, ut quæ nihil ad propositum nostrum attinent, neque

† D. Warburton Div. Legat. Mosis Demonstr. &c. Tom. ii.

“ *The Divine Legation* supposing it, some how or other, to concern  
 “ *Moses's* divine Mission to prove that *Ofiris* was not the same with  
 “ *Sesoftris*, hath turned all that is here said into Ridicule, by a  
 “ Comparison made between the fabulous *Arthur* and *William* the  
 “ *Norman*; who, he says, may be made one by as good Reasons  
 “ (though they have scarce any thing alike or in common with one  
 “ another) as those which we have brought to confound *Ofiris* with  
 “ *Sesoftris*: And on this Point he draws out a Disputation through  
 “ seventy Pages and upwards; wherein, notwithstanding, he nei-  
 “ ther denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have here  
 “ said of *Sesoftris*. It is true indeed that some other of *Newton's*  
 “ Assertions he does oppose, as those concerning the late Invention  
 “ of Arts, Arms, and Instruments by some certain King; and in  
 “ this Part of the Argument he has the better. For that these  
 “ Things were found out by the *Egyptians* long before the Age of  
 “ *Sesoftri*, holy Scripture commands us to believe: But whether  
 “ found out by any of their Kings, is not so certain. However, these  
 “ were Matters we never touched upon, as relating nothing to our  
 “ Purpose; nor do they yet induce us to recede from that Conclu-  
 “ sion of the famous *Newton*, That *Sesac* was *Sesoftris*, *Ofiris*, and  
 “ *Bacchus*. But the Cause being now brought before the Public,  
 “ let the Learned determine of it.” Thus far this candid and in-  
 genuous Writer.

He says, *the Author of the Divine Legation supposes that it some  
 how or other concerns Moses's divine Mission to prove Osiris not the  
 same with Sesoftris*; which seems to imply that this learned Person  
 doth not see how it concerns it. And yet afterwards he owns, *that  
 Scripture* (meaning the Writings of *Moses*) *will not allow us to be-  
 lieve, with Sir Isaac, that the Invention of Arts, Arms, and Instru-  
 ments, was so late as the Time of Sesoftris*. Now it follows, as I have

“ nunc nos movent, ut pedem retrahamus ab ista Cl. Newtoni conclusione Sefacum,  
 “ Sefoftri, Osiris & Bacchum fuisse. Lite jam contestata judicent eruditi.” In Dedic.  
 p. XII. XIII.

shewn,

shewn, by certain Consequence, that, if *Osiris* and *Sesoftris* were one and the same, then the Invention of Arts was as late as the Time of *Sesoftris*. But this contradicting *Scripture*, or the Writings of *Moses*, as the learned Writer himself confesseth, the Reader sees *how it concerns Moses's Mission to prove Osiris not the same with Sesoftris*.

The learned Writer, speaking of the Comparison I had made between *Arthur* and *William the Norman*, says, *they have scarce any thing alike or in common with one another*. I had brought together *thirteen* Circumstances (the very number the learned Writer thinks sufficient to establish the Identity of *Osiris* and *Sesoftris*) in which they perfectly agreed. I am persuaded he does not suspect me of falsifying their History. He must mean therefore that *thirteen* in my Comparison, is *scarce any thing*, which, in his, is *every thing*.

He goes on,—in a Disputation of seventy Pages and upwards the Author of the Divine Legation neither denies nor confutes, but only laughs at what we have said of *Sesoftris*. What is it the learned Writer bath said of *Sesoftris*? Is it not this? That between his History and that of *Osiris* there are many Strokes of Resemblance: From whence he infers (with Sir *Isaac*) that these two Heroes were one and the same. Now if he means I have not denied nor confuted this Resemblance, he says true. I had no such Design. It is too well marked by Antiquity to be denied. Neither, let me add, did I laugh at it. What I laughed at (if my bringing a similar case is to be called by that Word) was his Inference from this Resemblance, that therefore *Osiris* and *Sesoftris* were one and the same. But then too I did more than laugh: I both denied and confuted it. First I denied it, by shewing that this Resemblance might really be though *Osiris* and *Sesoftris* were two different Men, as appeared by an equal Resemblance in the actions of two different Men, *Arthur* and *William the Norman*. But as the general History of ancient *Egypt* would not suffer us to believe all that the *Greek* Writers have said

of this *Reſemblance*, I then explained the Cauſes that occaſioned their miſtaken Accounts of the two perſons, from whence ſo perfect a Reſemblance aroſe. Secondly, I *confuted* it, by ſhewing from the concurrent Teſtimony of Antiquity, and from ſeveral internal Arguments deducible from that Teſtimony, that *Oſiris* and *Seſeſtris* were in fact two different Perſons, living in two very diſtant Ages.

The learned Writer proceeds — *It is true indeed that ſome other of Newton's Aſſertions he does oppoſe, as theſe concerning the late Invention of Arts, Arms, and Inſtruments, and in this Part of the Argument he gets the better.* But if I have the better here, it is paſt Diſpute I overthrow the whole Hypotheſis of the *Identity of Oſiris and Seſeſtris*. For, as to that *Reſemblance*, which Antiquity hath given them, *that*, conſidered ſingly, when the pretended *late Invention of Arts* hath been proved a Miſtake, will indeed deſerve *only to be laughed at*. But were it, as Sir *Iſaac Newton* endeavoured to prove, that the *Invention of Arts* was no earlier than the Time of *Seſeſtris* or *Seſac*, there is then indeed an end of the *ancient Oſiris of Egypt*; and *He* ſo much boaſted of by that People can be no other than the *Seſeſtris* of this Author. For the very Foundation of the Exiſtence of the *ancient Oſiris* was his civilizing *Egypt*, and teaching them the Arts of Life: But if this were done by *Seſeſtris*, or in his Reign, then is *He* the true *Oſiris of Egypt*. As on the contrary, were the *Invention of Arts* as early as Scripture Hiſtory repreſents it, then is *Egypt* to be believed, when ſhe tells us that *Oſiris*, their Inventor of Arts, was many Ages earlier than *Seſeſtris* their Conqueror: And conſequently all Sir *Iſaac Newton's Identity* ſeparates and falls to pieces. In a word, take it which way you will, if *Oſiris* were the ſame as *Seſeſtris*, then muſt the *Invention of Arts* (for all Antiquity have concurred in giving that *Invention* to *Oſiris*) be as late as the Age of *Seſeſtris*, the *Seſac* of *Newton*: But this, Scripture Hiſtory will not ſuffer us to believe. If, on the other hand, *Oſiris* and *Seſeſtris* were not the ſame, then was the *Invention of Arts* (and for the ſame Reaſon) much earlier than the Age of *Seſeſtris*; as indeed all Mankind thought before Sir *Iſaac*. Theſe were



were the Considerations which induced that great Man, who so well understood the Nature and Force of Evidence, to employ his whole Sagacity of Criticism in proving the Invention of Arts to be about the Age of his *Sesostris* or *Sesac*. And is it possible he should have a Follower who cannot see that he hath done this? or the Necessity he had of doing it? It will be said, perhaps, "that Sir *Isaac* has, indeed, argued much for the low Invention of Arts: "but hath neither enforced it under the Name of an Argument, "nor stated it in the Form here represented." The Objection would ill become a Follower of the great *Newton*, who should know that his Master's Method, as well in these his *critical* as in his *physical* Inquiries, was to form the principal Members of his Demonstration with an unornamented Brevity, and leave the Supplial of the small connecting Parts to his Reader's Capacity. Besides, in so obvious, so capital, so necessary an Argument for this *Identity*, it had been a ridiculous Distrust of common Sense, after he had spent so much Pains in endeavouring to prove the *low Invention of Arts*, to have ended his Reasoning in this formal Manner: "And "now, Reader, take Notice that this is a conclusive Argument for "the *Identity of Osiris and Sesostris*." Lastly, let me observe, that this very Reason which induced Sir *Isaac* to be so large in the *Establishment* of his Point, the *low Invention of Arts*, induced me to be as large in the *Subversion* of it. And now some reasonable Account, I hope, is given of the seventy long Pages.

What follows is still more extraordinary.—*However these were Matters* (says the learned Writer, speaking of the Invention of Arts) *we never touched upon as relating nothing to our Purpose*. Here I cannot but lament the learned Writer's ill Fortune. There was but one single Point, in the Book he would defend, which is essentially to his Purpose, and *that*, he hath given up as *nothing to his Purpose*; And more unlucky still, on a Review of the Argument, hath treated it as an Error in his Author who took so much Pains about it, but yet as an Error that does not at all affect the Question. For,

He

He concludes thus—*nor do they yet induce me to recede from that Conclusion of the famous Newton, that Sefac was Sefoftris, Osiris, and Bacchus.*—*Sefac*, as I said before, I have no Concern with. And as to *Bacchus*, it is agreed to be only a different Name for *Osiris*. The thing I undertook to prove was that *Osiris* and *Sefoftris* were not one and the same Person: But, in doing this, I did not mean to say that *Osiris* was not one of the Names of *Sefoftris*. This is a very different Proposition; and the rather to be taken notice of, because I suspect a Quibble in the Words of the learned Writer which would confound the *Difference*. Nor is this Suspicion unreasonable. For I have met with some who have even ventured to say that Sir *Isaac* meant no more than that *Sefoftris* was AN *Osiris*. But if he meant no more, I would allow him to mean any thing, and never to have his Meaning disputed. I, for my part, and so I suppose the rest of the World, understood him to mean, “That  
 “ the old *Osiris*, famous amongst the *Egyptians* for Legislation and  
 “ the Invention of the Arts of Life, was the very same Man with  
 “ *Sefoftris*, who, those *Egyptians* say, was a different Man, of a  
 “ later Age, and famous for the Conquest of the habitable World.”  
 This was the Proposition I undertook to confute. Wherein I endeavoured to shew, “ that there was a *real Osiris*, such as the *Egyptians* represented him, much *earlier* than their *Sefoftris*.” And now (to use this Writer’s Words) *the Cause being brought before the Public, let the Learned determine of it*. As to the other Point, that *Sefoftris* went by the Name of the earlier Hero, this I not only allow, but contend for, as it opens to us one of the principal Grounds of that Confusion in their Stories which hath produced a Similitude of Actions whereon Sir *Isaac Newton* layeth the Foundation of their  
 IDENTITY.

## S E C T. IV.

SEC DIVINE LEGATION, Vol. II. Book VI. Sect. 2.

THE reverend and learned Dr. *Richard Grey* having lately epitomized the Commentary of one *Albert Schultens* on the Book of *Job*, hath thought fit, in the *Preface* to his Abstract, to criticise my Dissertation on the same Book in the following manner.—“Nor should we omit, in the fourth Place, the Opinion of our Countryman, Mr. *Warburton*, who, with great Sharpness of Wit and many Arguments sufficiently specious, endeavours to prove that the whole Book of *Job* is dramatical and allegorical, yet founded in true History, and written by *Esdra* in Solace of the *Jews*, now returned from *Babylon* into their own Country, and about to experience, contrary to their Expectations, an ordinary and unequal Providence. Now in a matter very uncertain, and which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the different Opinions of learned Men, hardly any Hypothesis perhaps can be thought of which will satisfy in all its Parts \*.” Then having

\* —Non autem prætermittenda est, quarto, sententia doctissimi viri Warburton: nostri, qui magno ingenii acumine, multisque argumentis, satis quidem speciosis, probare nititur, Totum librum esse opus dramaticum & allegoricum, veræ tamen historię superstructum, ab Esdra conscriptum, in solatium Judæorum, qui e Babylone in suam patriam reversi, providentiam ordinariam & inæqualem, contra atque expectabant, jam erant experturi. In re admodum sane incerta, & que eruditorum hominum disensione incertior adhuc reddita est, vix ulla forsitan hypothesis excogitari possit, quæ ex omni parte satisfaciat.—Ut ad eorum itaque sententiam accedo, qui librum Jobi omnium sacrorum codicum antiquissimum esse putant; ita a Moyse quidem ex authenticis monumentis desumptum, poeticeque ornatum fuisse, nullus dubito.—Atque ex nostra hac opinione ratio satis idonea reddi potest omnium eorum textuum, siquæ sint, in quibus sive ad legem, sive ad historiam Judaicam ante scriptum librum, allusum est, non minus ac si ab Esdra eum scriptum fuisse concedatur, de quo viro diversa sentiunt eruditi. Quod vero ad eos locos, quos ad sequiorum temporum historias referre putat vir doctissimus,

namque

Having told us what *Sphanhim* said, and what his Author *Schulien* says, which are nothing to the matter in hand, he goes on thus :

“ There-

cepte ad Hezekie agitadinem & convalescentiam, cap. xxxiii. 25. & exercitus Assyrii interfecti nem, cap. xxxiv. 26. ita eos intelligi ut nihil necesse est, ita commodius aliter accipi posse, ex notis, ad quas lectorem remitto, satis apparebit. Porro, opus esse dramaticum, seu potius veram historiam formâ dramatica, habituque poetico exornatam, temper exstimavi; at vero subesse quoque allegoriam, persuaderi nequeo, siquidem non scriptoris tantum ætas, sed & libri scopus, quantum ego quidem video, ei sententiæ advenitur. Nam quod dicit vir clariss. id præcipue in hoc libro discceptari, nempe an bonis semper bona, malisque mala, an utriusque utraque promiscue obtingant: hæc autem quæstionem (a nobis quidem alienam, minisque ideo perpenfam) nusquam alibi gentium præterquam in Judæa, nec apud ipsos Judæos alio quovis tempore, quam quod assignat, moveri potuisse, id omne ex veritate suæ hypotheseos pendet, et mea quidem sententia, longe aliter se habet. Nempe id unum voluisse mihi videtur facer scriptor, ut piis omnibus, utcumque afflictis, humilitatis & patientiæ perpetuum extaret documentum ex contemplatione gemina, hæc infinitæ Dei perfectionis, sapientiæ ac potentiæ; illinc humana, quæ in sanctissimis quoque viris inest, corruptionis, imbecillitatis, & ignorantie. Quavis enim in sermonibus, qui in eo habentur, de religione, de virtute, de providentia, Deique in mundo gubernanc'o sapientia, justitia, sanctitate, de uno rerum omnium principio, aliisque gravissimis veritatibus dissertetur, hunc tamen quem dixi unicum esse libri scopum, tam ex initio & sine, quam ex universa ejus œconomia cuivis opinor manifestum erit. Ea enim, ut rem omnem summam complectar, Jobum exhibet, primo quidem querentem, exposulantem, effræni luctui indulgentem; mox (quum, ut sacri dramatis natura postulabat, amicorum contradicitione sinistrisque suspicionibus magis magisque irritatus & laceratus esset) imprudens Deum provocantem, atque in pietatis suæ glorientem; ad debitam tandem summisionem sui que cognitionem revocatum, tum demum, nec antea, integritatis suæ tam præmium, quam testimonium a Deo reportantem. Ex his, inquam, apparet, non primario agi in hoc libro de providentia, sive equali, sive inequali, sed de personali Jobi integritate. Hanc enim (quod omnino observandum est) in dubium vocaverant amici, non ideo tantum quod afflictus esset, sed quod afflictus impatientius se gereret, Deique justitiæ obmurmuraret: & qui strenuus videlicet aliorum hortator fuerat ad fortitudinem & constantiam, quum ipse tentaretur, victus labasset. Quum accesserat sanctissimi viri malis hæc gravissima omnium tentatio, ut inquam improbus & hypocrita ab amicis damnaretur, & quod unicum ei supererat, conscientie suæ testimonio ac solatio, quantum ipsi potuerunt, privandus foret, quid rursus faciendum erat? Amicos perfidiæ & crudelitatis arguit: Deum integritatis suæ tribem vindicantem appellat: quum autem nec Deus interveniret, ad innocentiam ejus vindicandam, nec remitterent quicquam amici de acerbis suis censuris, injurisque criminationibus,

“ Therefore as I am of their Opinion who think the Book of *Job*  
 “ the oldest in the Canon, so I am fully persuaded that it was writ-  
 “ ten by *Moses* himself, who took it from authentic Records, and  
 “ put it into the Drefs of Poetry.—And, on this our Opinion,  
 “ a good Account may be given of all those Texts, if any such  
 “ there be, wherein Allusion is made to the Jewish Law or History  
 “ before the Book was written, no less than if we should allow it  
 “ to have been written by *Esfiras*, of whom the Learned think  
 “ differently. And as to those Places which, in the Opinion of  
 “ the Author of *The Divine Legation*, refer to Histories of later  
 “ Times, such as the Sickness and Recovery of *Hezekiah*, cap.  
 “ xxxiii. 25. and the Destruction of the *Assyrian Army*, cap. xxxiv.  
 “ 20. it will sufficiently appear by the Notes, to which I refer  
 “ the Reader, that there is no need to understand them in this  
 “ Sense, and that they are more commodiously understood other-  
 “ wise. Further, that the Work is dramatical, or, to speak more  
 “ properly, a true History in the Form of a Drama, and adorned  
 “ with a poetic Drefs, was always my Opinion: But that any  
 “ Allegory lies under it I can by no means persuade myself to be-  
 “ lieve; because not only the Age of the Writer, but the very

nationibus, ad supremum illud iudicium provocat in quo redemptorem sibi affuturum, Deumque a suis partibus staturum, summa cum fiducia se novisse affirmat. Jam vero si cardo controversiæ fuisset, utrum, salva Dei justitia, sancti in hac vita adfigi possent, hæc ipsa declaratio litem finire debuerat. Sin autem de personali Jobi innocentia disceptetur, nil mirum quod veterem canere cantilenam, Jobumque ut fecerant, condemnare pergerent socii, quum Dei solius erat, qui corda hominum explorat, pro certo scire, an jure merito sibi Jobus hoc solamen attribueret, an falsam sibi fiduciam vanus arrogaret. Hac igitur difficultate sublata, nempe cur non statim obmuerunt amici, quum de futuro iudicio tam soleanniter magnificeque dixisset Jobus, nil obstat quo minus celebrem illum contextum cap. xix. non de temporali in integrum restitutione, sed de resurrectione ad vitam æternam, intelligere possis. Quod si argumentis a commentatore nostro allatis, ea quoque adjeceris quæ vir omni laude major, jam episcopus Sarisburiensis, in dissertatione sua, *De sententia veterum de circumstantiis & consequentiis lapsus humani pulcherrime contexuit*, nil ultra, credo, desideraris, vel ad libri antiquitatem, vel ad vexatissimi hujus loci sensum, confirmandum. *Præf.* p. x—xv.

“ Scope of the Book (as far as I can see) leads us to conclude other-  
 “ wise. For as to what this Writer says, that the main Question  
 “ handled in the Book of *Job* is whether Good happens to the Good,  
 “ and evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiscu-  
 “ ously to both: and that this Question (a very foreign one to us,  
 “ and therefore the less attended to) could never be the Subject of  
 “ Disputation any where but in the Land of *Judea*, nor there  
 “ neither at any other time than that which he assigns: All this,  
 “ I say, depends on the Truth of his Hypothesis; and is, in my  
 “ Opinion, far otherwise. For the sole Purpose of the sacred Wri-  
 “ ter seems to me to be this, to compose a Work that should re-  
 “ main a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good  
 “ Men in Affliction, from this two-fold Consideration, as on the  
 “ one hand, of the infinite Perfection, Power, and Wisdom of  
 “ God; so on the other of human Corruption, Imbecillity, and  
 “ Ignorance, discoverable even in the best of Men. For although  
 “ in the Speeches that occur there be much Talk of Religion,  
 “ Virtue, and Providence; of God’s Wisdom, Justice, and Holi-  
 “ ness, in the Government of the World; of one Principle of all  
 “ things, and other most important Truths; yet that this, which  
 “ I have assigned, is the only Scope of the Book, will appear mani-  
 “ fest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from  
 “ the Oeconomy of the whole. For to say all in a word, it first  
 “ presents *Job* complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself  
 “ in an ungovernable Grief, but soon after (when, as the Nature  
 “ of the sacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends  
 “ and their sinister Suspicions he became more and more teized and  
 “ irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own In-  
 “ tegrity; yet at length brought back to a due Submission and  
 “ Knowledge of himself; and then, at last, and not before, re-  
 “ ceiving from God both the Reward and Testimony of his Up-  
 “ rightness. From all this, I say, it appears that the personal In-  
 “ tegrity of *Job*, and not the Question concerning an equal or un-  
 “ equal Providence, is the principal Subject of the Book. For *that*  
 “ it

“ it was (and there our Attention should be fixed), which his  
 “ Friends doubted of; not so much on account of his Affliction, as  
 “ for the not bearing his Affliction with Patience, but complaining  
 “ of the Justice of God. And that he who was an able Adviser of  
 “ others to Fortitude and Constancy, should, when his own Trial  
 “ came, sink under the Stroke of his Disasters. *See* cap. iv. ver. 12. 34.  
 “ Now when the most grievous Trial of all was added to the other  
 “ Evils of this holy Person, to be condemned by his Friends as a  
 “ Profligate and a Hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much as in  
 “ them lay, of his only remaining Support, the Testimony of a  
 “ good Conscience, what was left for the unhappy Man to do? He  
 “ accuses his Friends of Perfidy and Cruelty; he calls upon God  
 “ as the Witness and Avenger of his Integrity: But when neither  
 “ God interposed to vindicate his Innocence, nor his Friends forbore  
 “ to urge their harsh Censures and unjust Accusations, he appeals  
 “ to that last Judgment in which, with the utmost Confidence, he  
 “ affirms that he knew, his Redeemer would be present to him,  
 “ and that God would declare in his Favour. But now, if the  
 “ Hinge of the Controversy had turned on this, Whether or no,  
 “ consistently with God’s Justice, good Men could be afflicted in  
 “ this Life, this Declaration ought to have finished the Debate:  
 “ But if the Question were concerning the personal Innocence of  
 “ *Job*, it was no Wonder that they still sung their old Song, and  
 “ went on as they had begun, to condemn their old afflicted Friend,  
 “ since it was in the Power of God alone to explore the Hearts of  
 “ Men, and to know for certain whether it was *Job’s* Piety that  
 “ rightly applied a Consolation, or whether it was his Vanity that  
 “ arrogated a false Confidence to himself.

“ This Difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why his  
 “ Friends were not immediately put to Silence when *Job* had so  
 “ solemnly and magnificently talked of a future Judgment, nothing  
 “ hinders us from applying that celebrated Text cap. xix. not to a  
 “ temporal Restitution to his former Condition, but to a Refur-  
 “ rection to eternal Life. But if, to the Arguments brought by our

“ Commentator, you add also those, which a Writer above all  
 “ praise, the present Bishop of *Sarum*, hath most beautifully inter-  
 “ woven in his Dissertation on *the Opinion of the Ancients concerning*  
 “ *the Circumstances and Consequences of the Lapse of Mankind*, I be-  
 “ lieve you will want nothing to confirm you in the Opinion of  
 “ the Antiquity of the Book, and my Sense of this most perplexed  
 “ Passage.” Thus far the very candid and learned Writer; who  
 will not be displeas'd with me for examining the Reasons he hath  
 here offer'd against my Explanation of the Book of *Job*.

He begins with saying, that *I have by many Arguments sufficiently specious, endeavour'd to prove that the whole Book of Job is dramatical and allegorical, yet founded in true History, and written by Esdra in Solace of the Jews, &c.* And then immediately subjoins, *Now in a Matter very uncertain, and which hitherto hath been made more uncertain by the different Opinions of learned Men, hardly any Hypothesis can be thought of which will satisfy in all its Parts.* Let us attend to the opening of his Cause. 1. He owns my *Hypothesis to be sufficiently specious*, and yet calls the Subject, which this *Hypothesis* explains, a *Matter very uncertain*; nay, *HITHERTO rendered more uncertain*—By what? why, if you will believe himself, by *many Arguments sufficiently specious*; for this is the Character he is pleas'd to give of these of mine, which fill up the Measure of those *different Opinions*, from whence so great *Uncertainty* is accumulated. 2. He says that *in an uncertain Matter scarce any Hypothesis can satisfy*. Now, though this be a common-place Thought, it is nevertheless a very false one. For it is only in *uncertain Matters* that *Hypothesis's* are invented, to be applied, to account for the Appearances of Things: And sure it is not of the *Nature* of an Hypothesis to be *unsatisfactory*? 3. It is equally false that an *uncertain Matter is*, otherwise than by Accident, *rendered more uncertain by Diversity of Opinions*. For the greater the Diversity is, the greater is the Chance of coming to the Truth: As the more Roads Men take in an uncertain Way, the greater the Likelihood of finding out the Right. 4. It is not required in a *satisfactory Hypothesis* that it should *satisfy*



*tisfy in all its Parts*: For then the greatest and most momentous Truths would never be acquitted in, since some of the fundamental Points of Religion, natural and revealed, do not *satisfy in all their Parts*; there being inexplicable Objections even to *demonstrative* Propositions. 5. But what is strangest of all, though he says *hardly any Hypothesis can be thought of which will satisfy in all its Parts*; yet, before he comes to the end of his Paragraph, he has found one that does *satisfy*: and, stranger still, it is the *common* one, whose Incapacity of giving *Satisfaction* was the Reason for the Critics excogitating *so many different ones*. However, in this Hypothesis he rests, like a prudent Man as he is. *Therefore* (says he) *as I am of their Opinion who think the Book of Job the oldest in the Canon, so I am fully persuaded that it was written by Moses himself, who took it from authentic Records, and put it into the Dress of Poetry*. Indeed, to make Way through so much Doubt and Uncertainty, to an Opinion he may find his Account in, he has kept a Wicket open by the Insertion of the Particle *vix*; *vix ulla forsam Hypothesis*—but this will scarce serve his Purpose; For the Reasons why *hardly any Hypothesis can satisfy* extend as well to *that* he has given as to those he has rejected: unless he will suppose the rest to be discredited by dissenting from *that*, and not *that* from the rest: which perhaps after all may be his Thought.

He proceeds—*And on this our Opinion a good Account may be given of all those Texts, if any such there be, wherein Allusion is made to the Jewish Law or History before the Book was written, no less than if we should allow it to have been written by Esdra, of whom the Learned think differently*. Now, not to insist upon this, that the *common Hypothesis*, here followed, which makes *Moses* the Author, supposes him to have wrote it *before* his Mission; and consequently, *before* the *Jewish Law* and Affairs, alluded to, were given and transacted: Not, I say, to insist on this, though no probable Reason can be assigned for *Moses's* Writing such a Work but for the People in *Captivity*; I will readily allow that *Moses* might write any Thing that happened to him or his People, in or before his Administration,

as easily as *Esfra* could do. But the Question is, which of the two is most *likely* to have done so. Our Author grants this to be a Work of *Imitation*, or of the dramatic Kind; in which the Manners and Adventures of the Persons acting are to be represented. Now could *Moses* mistake, or, in such a Work, give without mistaking, the History of his own Time for the History of *Job's*? that is, make *Job* speak of the *Egyptian* Darkness, or the Passage of the Red Sea? Adventures of the Writer's own atchieving. *Esfra* indeed either way might well do this, as he lived so many Ages after the Facts in Question. Could *Euripides*, for Example, have been so absurd as to make *Orestes* and *Clytæmnestra* speak of *his own* Time or Actions? Though he might, without much Absurdity, have made them mix the Manners, or allude to some Adventures of the Time of *Draco*. But our Author's Caution deserves Commendation; if (says he) *there be any such*: The Use of this is evident, that if his own Solution will not hold, he may be at Liberty to deny the Thing itself. But what he means, by observing it, in Discredit of *Esfra's* Claim, that *Learned Men think differently of him*, as if they did not think differently of *Moses* too, is, I confess, not so evident.

He goes on—*And as to those Places, which in the Opinion of the Author of the D. L. refer to Histories of later Times, such as the Sickness and Recovery of Hezekiah, chap. xxxiii. ver. 25. and the Destruction of the Assyrian Army, chap. xxxiv. ver. 20. it will sufficiently appear, by the Notes to which I refer the Reader, that there is no need to understand them in this Sense, and that they are more commodiously understood otherwise.* On this Point I agree to join Issue with him, and to refer myself to the Judgment of the Public.

*Further, (says he) that the Work is dramatical, or, to speak more properly, a true History in the Form of a Drama, and adorned with a poetical Dress, was always my Opinion: but that any Allegory lies under it, I can by no Means persuade myself to believe; because not only the Age of the Writer, but the very Scope of the Book (as far as I can*  
*see)*

*see*) leads us to conclude otherwise. As to the *Scope of the Book*, we shall examine that Matter by and by: But his other Argument, from the *Age of the Writer*, deserves no Examination at all, as it is a downright begging the Question; which is concerning the Writer and his Age. Now these, by reason of the Writer's Silence, being *uncertain*, must be determined by the Subject and Circumstances of the Work, which are *certain*: For our Author, therefore, to disprove a Circumstance, brought to determine the Question, by an Argument in which the Question is taken for granted, I should think unfair, were it not become the authorized Logick of all those Writers who give their own *Opinions for Principles*. It rests then at last, we see, in his *Belief and Persuasion*: And this is always regulated on the Belief and Persuasion of those who went before. Thus he believes the Book to be *dramatical*, because others have believed so too: He believes it not to be *allegorical*, because he could find no other in that Belief before the Author of the *D. L.*— But let us now hear what he has to say concerning *the Scope of the Book*.

For as to what this Writer [the Author of the *D. L.*] says, that the main Question handled in the Book of Job is whether Good happens to the Good, and Evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both; and that this Question (a very foreign one to us, and therefore the less attended to) could never be the Subject of Disputation any where but in the Land of Judæa, nor there neither at any other time than that which he assigns; all this, I say, depends on the Truth of his Hypothesis, and is, in my Opinion, far otherwise. That which depends on the Truth of an Hypothesis has, indeed, generally speaking, a very slender Foundation: And I am partly of Opinion it was the common Prejudice against this Support that inclined our Author to give my Notions no better. But he should have been a little more careful in timing his Observation: For, as it happens, what I have shewn to be the Subject of the Book is so far from depending on the Truth of my Hypothesis, that the Truth

er my Hypothesis depends on what I have shewn to be the Subject of the Book; and very fitly so, as every *reasonable Hypothesis* should be supported on *Faët*. Now I appeal to the whole learned World, whether it be not as clear a *Faët* that the Subject of the Book of *Job* is *whether God happens to the Good, and Evil to evil Men, or whether both happen not promiscuously to both*; as that the Subject of the first Book of *Tusculan Disputations* is *de contemnenda morte*. On this I established my Hypothesis, that the Book of *Job* must have been written about the Time of *Esdra*, because no other assignable Time can be suited to the Subject.—But 'tis possible I may mistake what he calls *my Hypothesis*: For aught I know he may understand not *that* of the Book of *Job*, but *that* of the Book of the *Divine Legislation*. And then, by *my Hypothesis*, he must mean the great religious Principle I endeavour to evince, THAT THE JEWS WERE IN REALITY UNDER AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. But it will be paying me a very unusual Compliment to call *that* my Hypothesis which the Bible was written to testify; which all Christians *profess* to believe; and which none but Infidels *directly* deny. However, if this be the *Hypothesis* he means, I need desire no better a Support. But the Truth is, my Interpretation of the Book of *Job* seeks Support from nothing but those common Rules of Grammar and Logic on which the Sense of all kind of Writings are or ought to be interpreted.

He goes on in this Manner. *For the sole Purpose of the sacred Writer seems to me to be this, to compose a Work that should remain a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction from this two-fold Consideration, as on the one hand of the infinite Perfection, Power, and Wisdom of God; so on the other, of human Corruption, Imbecillity, and Ignorance, discoverable even in the best of Men.* Such Talk in a Sermon to his Parish for the sake of a moral Application, might be right: But to speak thus to the *learned World*, is surely out of Season. The Critic will be apt to tell him he has mistaken the *Actor* for the *Subject*, and might on the same principle as  
well

well conclude that the purpose of *Virgil's* Poem is not the Establishment of an Empire in *Italy*, but the personal Piety of *Æneas*. But to be a little more explicite, as the peculiar Nature of this Work demands. The Book of *Job* consists of two distinct Parts; the *Narrative*, contained in the Prologue and Epilogue; and the *Argumentative*, which composes the Body of the Work. Now when the Question is of the Subject of a Book, who means other than the Body of it? Yet here our Author, by a strange Fatality, mistaking the *narrative* Part for the *argumentative*, gives us the Subject of the Introduction and Conclusion for that of the Work itself. And it is very true that the *beginning* and the *end* do exhibit a perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction. But it is as true that the *Body* of the Work neither *does* nor *could* exhibit any such Document. First it *does not*; for, that Humility and Patience, which *Job* manifests before his entering into Dispute, is succeeded by Rage and Ostentation when he becomes heated with unreasonable Opposition. Secondly, it *could not*; because it is altogether *argumentative*; the Subject of which must necessarily be a *Proposition* debated, and not a *Document* exemplified. A *Precept* may be conveyed in History, but a Disputation can exhibit only a debated *Question*. I have shewn what that *Question* is; and he, instead of proving that I have assigned a wrong one, goes about to persuade the Reader, that there is no Question at all.

He proceeds. *For although in the Speeches that occur there be much Talk of Religion, Virtue, and Providence, of God's Wisdom, Justice, and Holiness in the Government of the World, of one Principle of all things, and other most important Truths, yet that this which I have assigned is the only Scope of the Book will appear manifest to every one, as well from the Beginning and the End as from the Oeconomy of the whole. For to say all in a word, it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable Grief; but soon after (when as the Nature of the sacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends, and their sinister Suspicions, he became more*

and more teized and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity: yet at length brought back to a due Submission and Knowledge of himself. The Reader now sees that all this is just as pertinent as if I should say, Mr. *Chillingworth's* famous Book against *Knot* was not to prove the Religion of Protestants a safe way to Salvation, but to give the Picture of an artful Caviler and a candid Disputer. For, although, in the Arguments that occur, there be much Talk of Protestantism, Popery, Infallibility, a Judge of Controversies, Fundamentals of Faith, and other most important Matters, yet that this which I have assigned is the only Scope of the Book, will appear manifest to every one, as well from the beginning and the end, as from the Oeconomy of the whole. For it first of all presents the Sophist quibbling, chicaning, and indulging himself in all the imaginable Methods of false Reasoning: And soon after, as the Course of Disputation required, resting on his own Authority, and loading his Adversary with personal Calumnies; yet at length, by the Force of Truth and good Logic, brought back to the Point, confuted, exposed, and put to silence. Now if I should say this of the Book of *Chillingworth*, would it not be as true, and as much to the Purpose, as what our Author hath said of the Book of *Job*? The Matters in the Discourse of the Religion of Protestants could not be treated as they are without exhibiting the two Characters of a Sophist and a true Logician. Nor could the Matters in the Book of *Job* be treated as they are without exhibiting a good Man in Afflictions, complaining and expostulating, impatient under the Contradiction of his Friends, yet at length brought back to a due Submission, and Knowledge of himself. But therefore to make this the sole or chief Scope of the Book, (for in this he varies) is perverting all the Rules of Interpretation. But what misled him we have taken Notice of above. And he himself points to it, where he says, the Subject I have assigned to the Book of Job appears the true both from the BEGINNING and the END. It is true, he adds, and from the Oeconomy of the whole likewise.

Which

Which he endeavours to prove in this Manner :

*For it first presents Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable Grief: but soon after (when, as the Nature of the sacred Drama required, by the Contradiction of his Friends, and their sinister Suspicions, he became more and more teased and irritated) rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity: yet at length brought back to a due Submission and Knowledge of himself; and then at last, and not before, receiving from God both the Reward and Testimony of his Uprightness.* This is indeed a fair Account of the Conduct of the Drama. And from this it appears, *first*, that that which he assigns for the sole Scope of the Book cannot be the true. For if its Design were to give a *perpetual Document of Humility and Patience*, how comes it to pass, that the Author, in the Execution of this Design, represents *Job complaining, expostulating, and indulging himself in an ungovernable Grief, rashly challenging God, and glorying in his own Integrity?* Could a Painter, think you, in order to represent the Ease and Safety of Navigation, draw a Vessel getting with much Pains and Difficulty into Harbour, after having lost all her Lading and been miserably torn and shattered by a Tempest? And yet you think a Writer, in order to give a *Document of Humility and Patience*, had sufficiently discharged his Plan if he made *Job conclude resigned and submissive*, though he had drawn him turbulent, impatient, and almost blasphemous throughout the whole Piece. *Secondly*, it appears from the learned Author's Account of the Conduct of the Drama, that that which I have assigned for the sole Scope of the Book is the true. For if, in *Job's* distressful Circumstance, the Question concerning an *equal or unequal Providence* were to be debated: His Friends, if they held the former Part, must *needs* doubt of his Integrity; this doubt would naturally provoke *Job's* Indignation; and, when persisted in, cause him to fly out into the intemperate Excesses so well described by our Author; yet conscious Innocence would at length enable Patience to do its Office, and the con-

lative Argument for his Integrity would be his Resignation and Submission.

The learned Writer shuts up the Argument thus. *From all this, It is, it appears, that the personal Integrity of Job, and not the Question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, is the principal Subject of the Book.* He had before only told us his *Opinion*; and now, from his *Opinion*, he says it *appears*. But Appearances, we see, are deceitful; as indeed they will always be, when they arise only out of the Fancy or Inclination, and not from the real nature of things.

But he proceeds to push his Advantages. *For that* [i. e. his personal Integrity] *it was which his Friends doubted of, not so much on account of his Affliction, as for the not bearing his Affliction with Patience, but complaining of the Justice of God. And that he, who was an able Adviser of others to Fortitude and Constancy, should, when his own Trial came, sink under the Stroke of his Disasters.—But why not on account of his Afflictions? Do not we find that even now, under this unequal Distribution of Things, censorious Men (and such doubtless he will confess Job's Comforters to have been) are but too apt to suspect great Afflictions for the Punishment of secret Sins? How much more prone to the same Suspicion would such men be in the Time of Job, when the Ways of Providence were more equal? As to his Impatience in bearing Affliction, that Symptom was altogether ambiguous, and might as likely denote want of Fortitude as want of Innocence, and proceed as well from the Pain of an ulcerated Body as the Anguish of a distracted Conscience.*

Well, our Author has brought the Patriarch thus far on his Way to expose his *bad Temper*. From hence he accompanies him to his Place of Rest; which, he makes to be in a *bad Argument*.—*Now, when* (says the learned Writer) *the most grievous Trial of all was added to the other Evils of this holy Person, to be condemned by his Friends as a Psefigate, and an Hypocrite, and to be deprived, as much*



as in them lay, of his only remaining Support, the Testimony of a good Conscience, what was left for the unhappy Man to do? He accuses his Friends of Perfidy and Cruelty; he calls upon God as the Witness and Avenger of his Integrity: But when neither God interposed to vindicate his Innocence, nor his Friends forbore to urge their harsh Censures and unjust Accusations, he appeals to that last Judgment, in which with the utmost Confidence he affirms that he knew that his Redeemer would be present to him, and that God would declare in his Favour. To understand the Force of this Representation, we must have in Mind this unquestionable Truth: "That be the Subject of the Book what it will, yet if the sacred Writer bring in the Persons of the Drama disputing, he will take Care that they talk to the Purpose." Now we both agree that *Job's* Friends had pretended to suspect his Integrity. This Suspicion it was *Job's* Business to remove: and, if our Author's Account of the Subject be true, his only Business. To this end he offers various Arguments, which failing of their Effect, he, at last (as our Author will have it), appeals to the second Coming of the Redeemer of Mankind. But was this likely to satisfy them? They demand a present Solution of their Doubts, and he sends them to a future Judgment. Nor can our Author say, though he would insinuate, that this was such a sort of Appeal as Disputants are sometimes forced to have Recourse to, when they are run aground and have nothing more to offer: For *Job*, after this, proceeds in the Dispute; and urges many other Arguments with the utmost Propriety. Indeed there is one way, and but one, to make the Appeal pertinent: And that is, to suppose our Author mistaken, when he said that *the personal Integrity of Job, and not the Question concerning an equal or unequal Providence, was the main Subject of the Book*: And we may venture to suppose so without much danger of doing him wrong: For, the Doctrine of a future Judgment affords a Principle whereon to determine the *Question of an equal or unequal Providence*; but it leaves the *personal Integrity of Job* just as it found it. But the learned Author is so little solicitous for the

*Pertinency:*

*Pertinency* of the Argument, that he makes, as we shall now see, its *Impertinence* one of the great Supports of his System. For thus he goes on: *But now if the Hinge of the Controversy had turned on this, whether or no, consistently with God's Justice, good Men could be afflicted in this Life, this Declaration ought to have finished the Debate: but if the Question were concerning the personal Innocence of Job, it was no wonder that they still sung their old Song, and went on as they had begun, to condemn their old afflicted Friend; since it was in the Power of God alone to explore the Hearts of Men, and to know for certain whether it was Job's Piety that rightly applied a Consolation, or whether it was his Vanity that arrogated a false Confidence to himself.* This is a very pleasant Way of coming to the Sense of a disputed Passage: Not, as of old, by shewing it supports the *Writer's Argument*, but by shewing it supports nothing but the *Critic's Hypothesis*. I had taken it for granted that *Job* reasoned to the Purpose, and therefore urged this Argument against understanding him as speaking of the Resurrection in the sixth Chapter. "The Disputants (say I, Div. Leg. Vol. ii. Ed. 2. \* p. 546), are all equally embarrassed in adjusting the Ways of Providence. *Job* affirms that the good Man is sometimes unhappy: the three Friends pretend that he never can; because such a Situation would reflect upon God's Justice. Now the Doctrine of a Resurrection supposed to be urged by *Job* cleared up all this Embarrass. If therefore his Friends thought it true, it ended the Dispute; if false, it lay upon them to confute it. Yet they do neither: They neither call it into question, nor allow it to be decisive. But without the least Notice that any such thing had been urged, they go on as they begun, to enforce their former Arguments, and to confute that which they seem to understand was the only one *Job* had urged against them, viz. the Consciousness of his own Innocence." Now what says our learned Author to this? Why, he says, that if I be mistaken, and he right, in his Account of the Book of *Job*, the Reason is plain why the three

\* Vol. III. ed. 4to. p. 524.

Friends took no notice of *Job's* Appeal to a Resurrection; namely, because it deserved none. As to his being in the *Right*, the Reader, I suppose, will not be greatly solicitous, if it be one of the Consequences that the sacred Reasoner is in the *Wrong*. However, before we allow him to be right, it will be expected he should answer the following Questions. If, as he says, the Point in the Book of *J. b* was *only his personal Innocence*, and this, not (as I say) *upon* the Principle of *no innocent Person punished*, I would ask how it was possible that *Job's* Friends and Intimates should be so obstinately bent on pronouncing him guilty, the Purity of whose former Life and Conversation they were so well acquainted with? If he will say, the Disputants went *upon that Principle*, I then ask how came *Job's* Appeal to a Resurrection not to silence his Opposers? as it accounted for the Justice of God in the present unequal Distribution of Things.

The learned Writer proceeds—*This Difficulty therefore being removed, namely, why his Friends were not immediately put to silence when Job had so solemnly and magnificently talked of a future Judgment, nothing hinders us from applying that celebrated Text chap. xix. not to a temporal Restitution to his former Condition, but to a Resurrection to eternal Life.* How well he has removed the Difficulty, the Reader now sees. But he is too hasty, when he adds, that *now nothing hinders us from applying that celebrated Text chap. xix. to a Resurrection to eternal Life.* I have shewn, in my Discourse on *Job*, that many Things hinder us from understanding it in this Sense, besides the Silence of the three Friends; such as the Silence of *Elibu* the Moderator, nay even of God himself the Determiner of the Dispute\*. Which Difficulties become still more perplexing, if indeed the *sole Scope* of the Book be, as our Author supposes, to give a *perpetual Document of Humility and Patience to all good Men in Affliction*: For then the Doctrine needed the Sanction of the most deliberate and authoritative Speakers. Add to this, that the learned

\* Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 298.

Writer's Account of the *Author* creates new Difficulties. For can we suppose, *Moses* would so clearly mention a *future Judgment* here, and entirely omit it in the *Pentateuch*? Or is it a Matter of so slight Moment that a single Mention of it would suffice? Indeed, were *Esdra* (as I suppose) the Author, much more might be said in behalf of this Interpretation; as we have shewn that the later Prophets opened, by degrees, the great Principles of the Gospel Dispensation: Of which I would fain think the Doctrine of the *Resurrection of the Body* to be one.

He concludes—*But if, to the Arguments brought by our Commentator, you add also those, which a Writer above all Praise, the present Bishop of Sarum, hath most beautifully interwoven in his Dissertation on The Opinion of the Ancients concerning the Circumstances and Consequences of the Lapse of Mankind, I believe you will want nothing to confirm you in the Opinion of the Antiquity of the Book, and my Sense of this most perplexed Passage.* To seek refuge in that excellent Prelate, whose Notions of the Nature and Design of the Book of *Job* overthrow all he has been saying, and confirm all he has been opposing, looks very much like Distress. However, if he will submit to the Bishop's Authority for the Scope of the Book in general, I shall be very willing to allow his Interpretation of the *ninetieth* Chapter. Our Author indeed does that great Man's Character but Justice. Yet how Dr. *Schultens* and Dr. *Sherlock* came to hit the same Palate, to me, I confess, is as hard to reconcile, as how *Bavius* and *Virgil* should meet for a Model to the same Writer.

But the Name of that great Man is *auspicious* to sacred Truth. One can no sooner mention him, on any Occasion of Literature, than one sees him pointing out some Truth or other, capable, if attended to, of clearing up whatever may be in question. His fine Discourse on the Book of *Job* abounds with Instances of this kind. One of which falls here naturally in my Way. And as it seems the least supported of his Interpretations, and, at the same time, greatly confirms what I have advanced concerning the *Age* of the Book, I shall

shall endeavour to set it in a just Light. The *Truth* I mean is in his Interpretation of these Words of *Job*, *By his Spirit the Heavens are garnished; his Hand formed the CROOKED SERPENT* \*. By which, he supposes, is meant the DEVIL, the *apostate Dragon*, δράκων ἀποστάτης; as the *Septuagint*, by thus translating it, seems to have understood the Place. For he reasonably asks, *How came the forming of a crooked Serpent to be mentioned as an Instance of Almighty Power, and to be set, as it were, upon an equal Foot with the Creation of the Heavens and all the Host of them.—Can it possibly be imagined* (says he) *that the forming the crooked Serpent means no more than that God created Snakes and Adders* †. Certainly, this could never be the meaning. But then it will be objected by those who are as loth to find a *Devil* for their *Tempter*, as a *God* for their *Redeemer* (imagining they are well capable of performing both Parts themselves), that, by the *crooked Serpent*, is meant a *great Constellation* near the Arctic Pole, so called; or, at least, that *enormous Trail of Light* to which the Pagans have given the Name of the *Via Lactea*: either of which will beautify the Sense, and ennoble the Expression of the Context; the Circumstance, of *garnishing the Heavens*, being immediately, precedent. It must be owned that this Interpretation has an extreme Air of Probability. But it is nevertheless a false one; as I shall now endeavour to shew.

It is certain then that the ancient *Hebrews* (if we may believe the Rabbins, who seem, in this case, to be unexceptionable Evidence) did not, in their Astronomy, represent the Stars, either single, or in Constellations, by the Name, or Figure, of any Animal whatsoever; or distinguish them any otherwise than by the Letters of their Alphabet artificially applied. And this, they tell us, was their constant Practice, till in the latter Ages; when they got acquainted with the Science of the *Greeks*: then indeed, they learnt the Art of new tricking up their *Sphere*, and making it as

\* Cap. xxvi. ver. 13.

† The Use and Intent of Prophecy, &c. 3d Edit. p. 213, 214.

fashionable as their Neighbours. But they did it still with Modesty and Reserve; and scrupled, even then, to admit of any human Figure. The Reason given for this Prudery (which was *the Danger of Idolatry*) is the highest Confirmation of the Truth of their Account. For it is not to be believed, that when the *Astronomy* and *Superstition* of *Egypt* were so closely colleagu'd, and that by this very means, the *Names* given to the Constellations, that *Moses*, who, under the Ministry of God, forbid the *Israelites to make any Likeness of any thing in Heaven above*, would suffer them to make *new Likenesses* there: which if not, in the first Intention, set up to be worshipp'd, yet we know never waited long without obtaining that Honour. From all this it appears, that neither *Moses* nor *Ezra* could call a Constellation by the Name of the *crooked Serpent*. The Consequence is, that his Lordship's Interpretation is to be received; there being nothing else of Moment to be oppos'd to its Truth. But this Sense, we say, gives strong Support to what we have observ'd, in *The Divine Legation*, concerning the Age of the Author. It being there shewn \*, that, according to the Method us'd by Providence for the gradual Opening of the Gospel Principles, we might look to find, in this very Place (as we in fact do find) the *first* more express Information concerning the *real* Author of the Fall of Man, as recorded in the *third* Chapter of *Genesis*.

But, to conclude with the learned Editor of the Book of *Job*. He had, I presume, given the intelligent Reader more Satisfaction, if, instead of labouring to evade two or three independent though corroborating Proofs of the *Truth* of my Hypothesis, he had well accounted how that Hypothesis, which he affects to represent as a *false* one, should be able to lay open and unfold the whole Poem upon one entire, elegant, and noble Plan, that does honour to the sacred Writer who compos'd it. And not only so, but to clear up, consistently with that *Plan*, all those particular Texts, whose Want of Light had made them hitherto an easy Prey to Critics and In-

\* Div. Leg. vol. III. p. 614, & seq.

terpreters from every Quarter. And this, in a Poem become through Time and Negligence so desperately perplexed, that Commentators chose rather to find their own Notions in it than to seek for those of the Author. This, how negligently soever the learned Writer may think of it, the Public, I am persuaded, will consider as a very uncommon Mark of Truth; and deserving of another kind of Confutation than what he hath bestowed upon it.

## S E C T. V.

See DIVINE LEGATION, Vol. I. and II.

**H**ERE I should have ended had I not been told, there was something still more wanted than a Defence of particular Passages; which commonly indeed carry their own Evidence along with them; and That was a general Review of the Argument of *The Divine Legation*, so far as it was yet advanced; explaining the Relation which the several Parts bear to each other, and to the whole: For that the deep Professor who had digested his Theology into *Sums* and *Systems*, and the gentle Preacher who never ventured to let a Thought expatiate beyond the Limits of a *Pulpit Essay*, would join to tell me, I had promised to DEMONSTRATE THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES; and that now, I had written two large Volumes with that *Title*, all that they could find in them were Discourses on the *Foundation of Morality*; the *Origin of civil and religious Society*; the *Alliance between Church and State*; the *Policy of ancient Lawgivers*; the *Mysteries of the Priests*, and the *Opinions of the Greek Philosophers*; the *Antiquity of Egypt*, their *Hieroglyphics*, their *Heroes*, and their *Brutal-Worship*. That, indeed, at last, I speak a little of the *Jewish Policy*, but I soon break away again as from a Subject I would avoid; and employ the remaining Part of the Volume on the *Sacrifice of Isaac*, the *Book of*

*Job*, and on *primary and secondary Prophecies*. But what, say they, is all this to the DIVINE LEGATION of MOSES?

*Dic, Posthume! de tribus Capellis.*

—To call the *Notion* a PARADOX was very well: But not to see that I had attempted to prove it, must be owned to be still better. I was aware of this Complaint, because I knew with whom I had to do; and therefore, in the Entry of my second Volume, was willing that CICERO, who had been in the like Circumstance himself, should speak for me \*.

But (as it proved) to little Purpose. The Greatness of his Authority, and the Docility of his Readers, which made a few Words sufficient in his Case, were both wanting in mine. So that I soon found myself under a Necessity of speaking for *myself*, or rather, for my *Argument*. Which as it was drawn out to an uncommon Length, and raised upon a great Variety of Supports, sought out from every Quarter of Antiquity, and sometimes from the most remote and darkest, it was the less to be admired if every *candid* Reader should not see their full Force and various Purpose; and still less, if the *Envious* and *Prejudiced* should concur to represent it as an unconnected Heap of Discourses put together to disburthen a Common-place. For the Satisfaction therefore of the *former*, I shall endeavour to expose, in one clear and simple Light, the whole Conduct of these *mysterious* Volumes.

Nor should the *latter* be neglected. Though 'tis odds but we part as dissatisfied with one another, as *Bertrand* and his Customer. Of whom the Story goes, that a grave well dressed Man, coming to

\* Video hanc primam ingressiorem meam non ex Oratoris disputationibus ductam, sed è mediâ Philosophiâ repetitam, & eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram, aut reprehensionis aliquid, aut certe admirationis habituram. Nam aut mirabantur *quid hæc se teneant ad ea quæ querimus*: quibus satisfaciæ res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur: aut reprehendent, *quod injustas vias indagemus irritas relinquamus*. Ego autem me sæpe nova videre dicere intelligo cum pervetera dicam, sed inaudita plebique. *Cicero*.



the Shop of that ingenious Inventer and Reliever of the Distresses of all those who are too dull to know what they want, and too rich to be at Ease with what they have, demanded one of his best Reading Glasses; which when he had examined upon all Sorts of Print, he returned back with solemn Assurance that he could not read at all in it. *Bertrand*, when he had recovered from the Surprise of so strange a Phenomenon, fairly asked him, *Sir, could you ever read at all?* To which the other as fairly replied, *Had I been so happy, I had not come hither for your Assistance.* Should I not therefore, with the same Forecast, have asked these People, “Gentlemen, before I put my Argument for you in a new Light, pray tell me, do you understand an Argument in any Light at all?” But would they have answered with the same Ingenuity? They are silent. They modestly let their *Works* speak for them. To go on, therefore, with our Subject.

In reading the *Law* and *History* of the *Jews*, with all the Attention I was able, amongst the many very singular Circumstances of that amazing Dispensation (from each of which, as I conceive, the *Divinity* of its Original may be clearly deduced) these two Particulars more forcibly struck my Observation, *First*, the *Omission of the Doctrine of a Future State* of Rewards and Punishments in the Religion of that People; no Instance of the like Nature being to be found throughout the whole History of Mankind: In all the infinite Variety of Gentile Religions this Doctrine ever making a principal and most essential Part. The *other* was no less singular, that the Founder of this Religion should pretend *his Dispensation was to be administered by an extraordinary Providence*; that his Laws should have all one constant Direction pursuant to this Pretence; and that the succeeding Writers of the Jewish History should all concur in the same Representation: No Lawgiver or Founder of Religion ever promising the like Distinction; and no Historian ever daring to record so singular a Prerogative.

As unaccountable as the *former* Circumstance appeared, when considered separately and alone, yet when set against the *latter*, and their Relations to each other examined, one illustrious Reason of the *Omission of the Doctrine of a Future State* was not only immediately perceived, but, from that very *Omission*, the *Divinity* of the Jewish Religion clearly demonstrated. Which, as Unbelievers had been long accustomed to decry from that very Circumstance, I chose *that* preferably to all other, as a Proof of THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES. The Argument is, in a supreme Degree, strong and simple; and not needing many Words to make it understood.

I. *Religion*, such as teaches a God, the Rewarder of Good, and the Punisher of evil Actions, is absolutely necessary for the Support of *Civil Society*: Because human Laws alone are not sufficient to restrain Men from Evil in any degree necessary for the carrying on the Affairs of public Regiment. But the *Inequality* of Events here below shaking the Belief of that *Providence* on which all Religion must be founded (for *he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them who diligently seek him*) there was no other Way of supporting and re-establishing that Belief than by the *Doctrine of a future State*, wherein all these Inequalities should be set even, and every Action receive *its due Recompence of Reward*. The *Doctrine* therefore of a *future State* is *immediately* necessary to *Religion*; and, through that, *ultimately* to *civil Society*. Yet, here we find a Religion *without a future State*, professed with great Advantage through many Ages by a civil-policed and powerful People. It appears, from what has been said above, that, under the *common* Dispensations of Providence, *such* a Religion would be so far from supporting Society, that it could not even subsist itself. We must conclude, therefore, that the *Jewish People* were, as their Founder and their Historians pretended, *indeed* under the Dispensation of an *extraordinary* Providence.

II. Again,

II. Again, it appears from the universal *Practice* of the ancient *Lawgivers*, and the *Principles* of the ancient *Sages*, that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments was esteemed thus necessary to Religion and Society, under the common Dispensations of Providence. The *Egyptian Policy* and Wisdom particularly, from whence those *Lawgivers* and *Sages* borrowed *theirs*, cultivated this Doctrine, for these Ends, with an amazing Assiduity. Now *Moses*, who, as we are assured by the infallible Testimony of the Holy Spirit, was *learned in all the Wisdom of the Egyptians*, and whose Laws themselves, as the Deist confesses, bespeak him a consummate Master in his Art; this *Moses*, I say, when instituting a *new Religion*, and forming an *uncivilized People* to Society, hath been so far from inculcating the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, that he hath even *omitted* to make the least Mention of it. Who sees not then that one Reason of the *Omission* must needs be, that this wise Lawgiver understood, his Religion and Policy might well subsist without it? But, under the common Dispensations of Providence, his Principles of *Egyptian Wisdom* had taught him, that neither one nor the other could do so. What therefore are we to conclude, but that he himself was fully convinced of the *Truth* of what he taught his Countrymen, *That they were thenceforward to live under the extraordinary Providence of God.*

These two Proofs of my MAIN PROPOSITION, from the *Thing omitted*, and the *Person omitting* (which as they are distinct and independent of one another, so I would desire the Reader to observe that they are either of them *alone* sufficient to establish my Demonstration) may be reduced to these two SYLLOGISMS.

- I. Whatsoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.  
 The Jewish Religion and Society had no future State for their Support.  
 Therefore the Jewish Religion and Society were supported by an extraordinary Providence.

Again,

Again, II. It was univerſally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles of Legislation and Wiſdom, that whatſoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support muſt be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

*Mofes*, ſkilled in all that Legislation and Wiſdom, inſtituted the *Jewiſh* Religion and Society without a future State for its Support.

Therefore *Mofes* who taught, believed likewiſe, that *this* Religion and Society were to be ſupported by an extraordinary Providence.

This is the grand PARADOX I have been accuſed of advancing: In the mean while, the *Free thinker* eſteems it *none* to contradict the univerſal Voice of Antiquity; nor the *System-maker*, to explain away the whole Letter of ſacred Scripture. For had not Libertines denied the MAJOR Propoſitions of theſe two *Syllogiſms*; and certain Bigotted-believers, the MINOR; my Demonſtration of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* had not only been as *ſtrong*, but as *ſhort* too as any of *Euclid's*: whoſe *Theorems*, as *Hobbes* ſomewhere truly obſerves, were but the Paſſions and Prejudices of Men equally concerned in, would ſoon be made as much matter of Diſpute as any *moral* or *theological* Propoſition whatſoever.

It was not long then before I found that the Diſcovery of this important Truth would engage me in a full Dilucidation of my *four Propoſitions*: Neither a ſhort, nor an eaſy Task. The *two firſt* requiring a ſevere Search into the civil Policy, Religion, and Philoſophy of ancient Times: and the *two latter*, a minute Enquiry concerning the Nature and Genius of the *Jewiſh* Conſtitution. To the *firſt* part of this Enquiry, therefore, I aſſigned the *firſt* Volume; and to the *other*, the *ſecond*.

I. The

## I.

I. The FIRST Volume begins with proving the MAJOR Proposition of the *first* Syllogism, that *whatsoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.* Where it is shewn, that *Civil Society*, which was instituted as a Remedy against *Force* and *Injustice*, falls short in many Instances, of its Effect; as it cannot, by its own proper Force, provide for the Observance of above one *third* Part of *moral* Duties; and, of that third, but *imperfectly*: and, which is still of greater Importance, that it totally wants the *first* of those two Powers, *Reward* and *Punishment*, which are owned by all to be the necessary Hinges on which Government turns, and without which it cannot be carried on. To supply which Wants and Imperfections, some other coercive Power was to be added. This Power is shewn to be *Religion*; which teaching the *Providence* and *Justice* of the Deity, provides for all the natural Deficiencies of *civil Society*. But then those *Attributes*, as we shew, can be supported only by the Doctrine of a *future State* of Rewards and Punishments; or by a present Dispensation of Things very different from that which we experience to be here administered.

The point being thus proved, the Discourse proceeds in removing *Objections*. The Reader observes, that the Steps and Gradations of this great Truth rise thus.—A *future State* is necessary, as it supports *Religion*; Religion is necessary, as it supports *Morality*; and *Morality*, as it supports *Society*. Hence I *concluded* the Doctrine of a *future State* to be necessary to *Society*. Now there are various degrees in *Libertinism*. Some, though they own *Morality*, yet deny *Religion*, to be necessary to *Society*: Others again go still further, and deny even *Morality* to be necessary. As these equally attempt to break the Chain of my Reasoning, they come equally under my Examination. And luckily, in the *first* Instance, a great Name, and in the *second*, a great Book, invited me to this Entertainment. 1. The famous Mr. Bayle had attempted to prove that

*Religion* was not necessary to Society; that *Morality*, as distinguished from Religion, might well supply its Place; and that an ATHEIST might have this *Morality*. His Arguments in Support of these Propositions I have examined at large. And having Occasion, when I come to the last of them, to enquire into the *true Foundation of Morality*, I consider all its Pretences; inquire into all its Advantages; and shew that *Obligation*, properly so called, proceeds from *Will*, and *Will only*. This Enquiry was *directly* to my Point, as the Result of it proves that the *Morality* of the Atheist must be without any true Foundation, and consequently weak and easily shaken. Yet it had a further Propriety, as the Religion, whose divine Original I was here attempting to demonstrate, has founded moral Obligation in *Will only*; and a peculiar Expediency, as it is become the Humour of the Times to seek for this *Foundation* in any thing rather than in what *Religion* places it. 2. But the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* went a large Step further, and endeavoured to prove that *Morality* was so far from being necessary to Society, that, on the contrary, it was Vice, not Virtue, which rendered States flourishing and happy. This pernicious Doctrine, which would cut away our Argument by the Root, was enforced with much laboured Art and plausible Insinuation. I undertook therefore to examine and confute the Principles it went upon: which I presume to have done so effectually, as will secure the Reader from the Danger of being any longer misled by it. In this manner I endeavoured to prove the MAJOR Proposition of the *first* Syllogism: and, with this, the *first* Book of *The Divine Legation of Moses* concludes.

II. The *second* begins with proving the MAJOR Proposition of the *second* Syllogism, that *It was universally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles of Legislation and Wisdom, that whatsoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence*. This Proof divides itself into two Parts, the *Conduct of the Lawgivers*, and the *Opinion of*  
*the*

*the Philosophers.* The *first Part* is examined in the *present Book*, and the *second* in the *following*.

In proving the Proposition from the *Conduct of the Lawgivers*, I shew, I. Their Care to PROPAGATE, First, *Religion in general*.  
 1. As it appears from the *Reason of Things*, viz. the State of Religion all over the civilized World. 2. As it appears from *Fact*, such as their universal Pretence to *Inspiration*; which, it is shewn, was made only to establish the Opinion of the Superintendency of the Gods over human Affairs: And such as their universal Practice in the manner of *Prefacing* their Laws; where the same Superintendency was taught and inculcated. And here I desire it may be observed, that the proving their Care to propagate *Religion in general*, proves, at the same time, their propagating the Doctrine of a *future State*; because there never was any Religion in the World but the *Jewish*, of which that Doctrine did not make an essential Part. I shew, Secondly, their Care to propagate the *Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in particular*. And, as the most effectual Method they employed to this Purpose was the Institution of the MYSTERIES, I give a large Account of their Rise and Progress; which I shew to have been from *Egypt* into *Greece*. The Detection of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of these *Mysteries*, which were the *Unity of the Godhead*, and the *Error of the grosser Polytheism*, not only confirms all that is advanced concerning the Rise, Progress, and Order of the several Species of Idolatry, but rectifies and clears up much Embarrass and Mistake even in the best modern Critics, such as *Cudworth*, *Prideaux*, *Newton*, &c. while they ventured, contrary to the Tenure of holy Scripture, to suppose that the *One God* was commonly known and worshipped in the Pagan World. For finding many, in divers Countries, speaking of the one God, they concluded he must needs have a national Worship paid to him; though the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, represent the Gentiles in a total Ignorance of the true God, and entirely given up to Polytheism. This, as we say, has occasioned much Confusion and Mistake in our best Writers on this Subject, while

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they

they would reconcile their own Conclusions to Scripture Premises. Now the Discovery of the ἀπὸκρύφια of the Mysteries, enables us to explain the perfect Consistency between sacred and profane Antiquity; which, left to speak for themselves, and without Interpreters, inform us of this plain and consistent Truth, "That the Doctrine of the One God was taught in all Places, as a profound Secret to a few in the Celebration of their mysterious Rites; but that a public or national *Worship* was paid to him no where but in the Land of *Judæa*." Where, as *Eusebius* well expresses it, *for the Hebrew PEOPLE alone was reserved the Honour of being initiated into the Knowledge of the Creator of all Things.* And, of this Difference, God himself speaks, by the Prophet, *I have not spoken in secret, in a dark Place of the Earth; I said not unto the Seed of Jacob seek ye me in vain* \*. And the holy Apostle informs us of the Consequence of this mysterious Manner of teaching the true God, that when, by this means, they came to the Knowledge of him, *they glorified him not as God* †. To confirm my Account of the Mysteries, I subjoin a critical Dissertation on the *sixth Book of Virgil's Æneis*; and another, on the *Metamorphosis of Apuleius*. The first of which I prove to be one continued Description of the Mysteries; and the second, to be written purposely to recommend their Use and Efficacy. But by Mischance (and the only one of this kind in the two Volumes) the Dissertation on *Apuleius* is misplaced. The Reader will observe that, through the Course of this whole Argument, on the Conduct of the ancient Lawgivers, it appears that all the fundamental Principles of their Policy were borrowed from EGYPT. A Truth that will be made greatly subservient to the Minor of my second Syllogism (that *Moses was skilled in all the ancient Legislation and Wisdom, and yet instituted the Jewish Religion and Society without a future State for its Support*) as well when I prove the latter Part of the Proposition in the second Volume, as the former Part, in the Third; where the Character of *Moses* is vin-

\* Isaiah, xlv. 19.

† Romans, i. 21.



dedicated from the Objections of Infidelity. From this, and from what has been said above of *moral Obligation*, the intelligent Reader will take notice, that throughout *The Divine Legation*, I have all along endeavoured to select for my Purpose such kind of Arguments, in Support of the *particular* Question in hand, as may, at the same time, either illustrate the Truth of *Revelation in general*, or serve as a Principle to proceed upon in the *Progress of the Argument*. Of which we shall give, as occasion serves, several further Instances in the Course of this *Review*.

Thus, having shewn the Legislator's Care to *propagate* Religion in general, and the Doctrine of a future State in particular (in which is seen their Sense of the inseparable Connection between them), I go on, II. To explain the Contrivances they employed to PERPETUATE them: By which it may appear that, in their Opinion, *Religion* was not a temporary Expedient to secure their own Power, but a necessary Support of Civil Government. 1. The first Instance of their Care to this End was, as we shew, the ESTABLISHING every where a *national Religion protected by the Laws of the State*. But Men ignorant of true Religion could hardly avoid falling into Mistakes in the *Mode* of this *Establishment*; pursuing a right End by very wrong Means: Therefore, as the Subject of our Book is no idle unconcerning Speculation, but such as affects us in all our highest Interests as Men and Citizens, I thought a Defence of the Justice and Equity of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION would well deserve the Reader's best Attention; and this I have given him, in an Explanation of the true *Theory* of the *Alliance between Church and State*. 2. The second Expedient the Legislator used for *perpetuating* Religion, I shew was the Allowance of a GENERAL TOLERATION, which, as it would, for the same Reason, be as wrongly conceived as an *Establishment*, I have attempted to give the true *Theory* of that likewise. Where, speaking of the Cause and first Occasion of its Violation, the Subject naturally led me to vindicate true Religion from the Aspersions of Infidelity. And here I shew that the first Persecution for Religion was not *that* which was committed, but  
*that*

that which was *undergone*, by the Christian Church. And thus ends the *second* Book of *The Divine Legation*.

III. The *Third* begins with the *latter Part* of the Proof of the MAJOR Proposition of the *second* Syllogism; namely, *the Opinions of the Philosophers*. For as the great Waste of Time hath destroyed most of the Monuments of ancient *Legislation*, I thought it proper to strengthen my Position, of the Sense of their Lawgivers, by that of their Sages and Philosophers. Where I shew *first*, from their own Words, the Sense they had in general of the Necessity of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments to civil Society. But to set the Fact in the strongest Light, I *next* endeavour to prove, that even those of them (namely, the several Sects of *Grecian* Philosophers) who did not believe this future State, yet, for the Sake of Society, sedulously taught and propagated it. That they *taught* it, is confessed. That they did *not believe* it, was my Business to prove. Which I first do, by the three following *general* Reasons. 1. That they all thought it allowable to say one Thing and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be lawful. And, 3. That they practised it with regard to the very Doctrine in Question. To explain and verify the two first of these Propositions, I had Occasion to enquire into the Rise, Progress, Perfection, Decline, and Genius of the ancient *Greek* Philosophy under all its several Divisions. In which, as its Rise and Genius are shewn to have been from *Egypt*, we lay in a still further Support for the *minor* Proposition of the *second* Syllogism.

The Discourse then proceeds to a *particular* Enquiry into the Sentiments of *each* Sect of Philosophy on this Point. Where it is shewn, from the *Character* and *Genius* of each School, and from the *Writings* of each Man, that none of them did indeed believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments. But, from almost every Argument brought for this Purpose, it, at the same time, appears of how high Importance they *all* thought it to Society.

Further,

Further, to support this Fact, I prove next, that these Philosophers not only *did not*, but *could not* possibly, believe the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, because it contradicted two metaphysical Principles univerſally held and believed by them concerning the Nature of GOD and of the SOUL; which were, that *God could not be angry nor hurt any one*; and that *the Soul was Part of God, and reſolved again into him*. In explaining, and *verifying the Reception* of this latter Principle, I take Occaſion to ſpeak of its Original; which I ſhew was *Grecian*, and not *Egyptian*, as appears from the different Genius and Character of the two Philoſophies; though the ſpurious Books going under the Name of *Hermes*, but indeed written by late *Greek* Platonists, would perſuade us to believe the contrary. The uſe of *this* Enquiry likewiſe (concerning *the Origin of this Principle*) will be ſeen when we come to clear up the *Character of Moſes* as aforeſaid. But with regard to the general Queſtion (concerning *the Belief of the Philoſophers*) beſides the direct and principal uſe of it for the Support of the MAJOR Propoſition of the *ſecond* Syllogiſm, it has (as I ſaid before I had contrived my Arguments ſhould have) two further uſes; the one *to ſerve as a Principle in the Progreſs of my Argument*; the other *to illuſtrate the Truth of Revelation in general*. For, 1. It will ſerve for a ſufficient Answer to that Objection of the Deists, to be conſidered in the laſt Volume, that *Moſes did not propagate the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, becauſe he did not believe it*: It being ſhewn, from *Fact*, that the not believing a Doctrine, ſo uſeful to Society, was eſteemed no Reason why the Legiſlator ſhould not propagate it. 2. It is a very ſtrong Proof of the *Neceſſity* of the Goſpel of *Jeſus*, that the Sages of *Greece*, with whom all the Wiſdom of the World was ſuppoſed to be depoſited, had *philophiſed* themſelves out of one of the moſt evident and uſeful Truths with which Mankind is concerned. Nor need we ſeek any other Juſtification of the Severity with which the holy Apoſtles always ſpeak of the Philoſophers or Philoſophy of *Greece*, than this, the ſhewing it was directed againſt theſe pernicious Principles; and

not,

not, as both *Deists* and *Fanatics* have concurred to represent it, a Condemnation of human Learning in general.

But as now it might be objected that, by this Representation, we lose on the one hand what we gain on the other; and that while we shew the *Necessity* of the Gospel, we run a risque of discrediting its *Reasonableness*: For that nothing can seem to bear harder upon *this*, than that the best and wisest Persons of Antiquity did not believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments: as this, I say, might be objected, we have given a full Answer to it; and, to support our Answer, shewn, that the two Extremes of this Representation, which Divines have been accustomed to go into by contrary Ways, are attended with great and real Mischief to Revelation. While the only View of Antiquity, which yields solid Advantage to the *Christian* Cause, is such a one as this here given; such a one as shews natural Reason to be *clear* enough to *perceive* Truth, and the *Necessity* of its Deductions when proposed; but not generally strong enough to *discover* it, and draw right Deductions from it. And we presume the *Objectors* may allow this to be the *true*, as we have *Cicero* himself for our Warrant, who with an Ingenuity becoming his profound Knowledge of human Nature thus decisively expresses himself: “*Nam neque tam est acris acies* “*in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam, nisi* “*monstratas, possit videre; neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas,* “*ut eas non peritus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo adspexerit\*.*” In explaining this Matter, it is occasionally shewn that of the *ancient* and *modern* Systems of *deistical* *Morality*, the confessedly superior Perfection in the *latter* is entirely owing to the *unacknowledged* Aid of Revelation.—Thus the Reader sees in what manner we have endeavoured to prove the MAJOR Propositions of the two *Syllogisms*, that *whatsoever Religion and Society have no future State for their Support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence*: And that *this was universally believed by the Ancients, on their common Principles*

\* De Orat. l. iii. c. xxxi.

*of Legislation and Wisdom.* For, having shewn that Religion and Society were unable, and believed to be unable, to support themselves under an ordinary Providence without a future State; if they were supported without that Doctrine, it could be, and could be believed to be, only by an extraordinary Providence.

But now, as this Proof is conducted through a long Detail of Circumstances, shewing the absolute Necessity of Religion in general to Civil Society, and the Sense which all the Wise and Learned of Antiquity had of that Necessity; lest this should be abused to countenance the idle and impious Conceit, that Religion was the Invention of Politicians, I concluded the third Book and the Volume together, with proving, that the Notion is both impertinent and false. Impertinent, for that, were this Account of Religion right, it would not follow that Religion itself was visionary; but, on the contrary, that it was most real, and supported on the eternal Relations of Things: False, for that Religion, in fact, existed before the Civil Magistrate was in being. But my End in this was not barely to remove an Objection against the Truths here delivered; but to prepare an opening for those which were to follow. For if Religion were so useful to Society, and yet not the Invention of the Magistrate, we must seek its Origin in another Quarter: either from Nature, or Revelation, or both.—Such is the Subject of the first Volume of *The Divine Legation*: Which, as I thought proper to publish separately, I contrived should not only contain Part of that Proof, but likewise be a complete Treatise of itself, establishing one of the most important Truths with which we have to do, viz. *The Necessity of Religion for the Support of Civil Government.* And if, in this View, I have been more than ordinary minute, while treating some Capital Articles in Support of that Question, I presume I shall not want the Reader's Pardon.

## II.

We come now to the second Volume of *The Divine Legation*; which is employed in proving the MINOR Propositions of the two

Syllogisms; the first, *That the Jewish Religion and Society had no future State for their Support*; the other, *That Moses, skilled in all the ancient Legislation and Wisdom, instituted the Jewish Religion and Society without a future State for its Support*. But in proving the MINOR, a Method something different from that observed in proving the MAJOR Propositions was to be followed. The MAJOR, in the first Volume, were proved *successively*, and in their Order; but in this, the MINOR Propositions are enforced all the Way *together*: And this, from the Reason of the Thing; the Facts brought to prove the Doctrine omitted, at the same time, *accidentally* shew the Omision designed; and the Facts, brought to prove it designed, *necessarily* shew it omitted. To proceed therefore with the Subject of the *second* Volume.

IV. I just before observed, that the Conclusion of the *first* Volume, which detected the *Aburdity* and *Falsity* of the atheistic Principle, that *Religion was a Creature of the State*, opened the Way to a fair Inquiry whether its original were not as well from *Revelation* as from natural Reason.

In the Introduction therefore to this Volume, I took the Advantage which that Open afforded me, of shewing that the universal Pretence to Revelation proves *some* Revelation must be true: That this *true* Revelation must have some *characteristic Marks* to distinguish it from the *false*: And that these Marks are to be found in the Institution of *Moses*. But thus far only by Way of *Introduction*, and to lead the Reader more easily into the main Road of our Inquiry; by shewing him that we pursued no desperate Adventure while we endeavoured to deduce the Divinity of *Moses's* Law from the Circumstances of the Law itself.

I proceeded then to the Proof of the MINOR Propositions, *That the Jewish Religion and Society had no future State for their Support; and that their Lawgiver purposely omitted it*. To evince these Truths, with sufficient Evidence, the Nature of that Institution was to be well understood. But to form a right Idea of *that*, it was expedient

dient we should know the *Manners* and *Genius* of the *Hebrew* People, and the *Character* and *Abilities* of their Lawgiver. Now these having been entirely fashioned on *Egyptian* Models, it was further expedient we should know the *State of Egyptian Superstition and Learning* in those early Ages.

In order to this, therefore, I first advanced this Proposition, That *the Egyptian Learning celebrated in Scripture, and the Egyptian Superstition there condemned, were the very Learning and Superstition represented by the Greek Writers, as the Honour and Opprobrium of that Kingdom.* Where, I first state the Question, and shew the equal Extravagancies of both Parties in unreasonably advancing or depressing the high Antiquity of *Egypt*.

I then support my Proposition, first by *Fact*, the Testimony of holy Scripture, and of the ancient *Greek* Writers set together, and supporting one another.

Secondly by *Reason*, in an Argument deduced from the Nature, Origin, and various Use, of their so famed *HIEROGLYPHICS*. Where it is shewn, 1. That these were employed as the sole Vehicle of *Egyptian* Learning even *after* the Invention of *Letters*. For which no good Reason can be assigned but this, that they were employed to the same Purpose, *before*. Now *Letters* were in use in the Time of *Moses*. 2. Again, it is further shewn that the *ONIROCRITICS* borrowed their Art of Deciphering from *hieroglyphic Symbols*. But *hieroglyphic Symbols* were the mysterious Vehicle of the *Egyptian* Learning and Theology. Now *Onirocritic*, or the Art of Interpreting Dreams, was practised in the Time of *Joseph*. 3. And again, that *hieroglyphic Symbols* were the true Original of *ANIMAL WORSHIP* in *Egypt*. Now *animal Worship* was established before the Times of *Moses*. From all this it appears that *Egypt* was of that high Antiquity, which Scripture and the best *Greek* Writers represent it. By which we come to understand what were the specific Manners and Superstitions of *Egypt* in the Time of *Moses*; they being, as now appears, identically the same with

what the *Great* & Writers have delivered to us. In the Course of this Proof from *Reason*, in opening at large the Nature, Origin, and various Kinds of *Egyptian Hieroglyphics*, I interweave (as the necessity & Explanation of my Subject required) a detailed History of the various *Modes* of ancient *Information* by *Speech* and *Action*. As (on the same Account) in the Original of *Brute-Worship*, I give the History of the various *Modes* of ancient *Idolatry* in the Order they arose out of one another. Now *these* I have not only made to serve in Support of the Question I am *here* upon; but likewise in Support of a *future*, and a *past*. For, in this History of *the various Modes of ancient Information* was laid, as the Reader will find, the Foundation of my Discourse on the *Nature of ancient Prophecies*, in the *sixth* Book; the Connexion of which Discourse with my *main Subject*, and its high Impertance to *Religion in general*, will be explained when we come to that Place: And, in the History of *the various Modes of ancient Idolatry*, he may see my Reasoning in the latter End of the *third* Book, against the Atheistic Origin of Religion, supported and confirmed. So studious have we been to observe what a great Master of Reason lays down as the *Rule* and *Test* of good Disposition, *that every former Part may give Strength unto all that follow; and every latter bring Light unto all before.*

But the *high Antiquity* of *Egypt*, though proved from *Antiquity* itself, seem'd not enough secured while the Authority of one great *Modern* remained entire and unanswered. In the next Place, therefore, I ventured to examine Sir *I. Newton's Chronology of the Egyptian Empire*, as it is founded in the supposed *Identity* of *Osiris* and *Sesysiris*; which I shew not only contradicts all *profane*, but, what is more, all *sacred* Antiquity; and, still more, the very *Nature of Things*. In the Course of this Confutation, the *Causes* of that endless Confusion in the ancient *Greek History* and *Mythology* are inquired into and explained; which serves, at the same time, to confirm and illustrate all that hath been said, occasionally in the *first* Volume, concerning the Origin and Progress of *Idolatry*, the Ge-



nus of Pagan Religion, their Modes of Worship, and their theological Opinions.

Thus far concerning *the high Antiquity of Egypt*. Which, besides the *immediate* Purpose, of leading us into a true Idea of the *Jewish* Institution, hath these *further* Uses. We have seen, in the foregoing Volume, that *Egypt*, as it was most famed for the Arts of Legislation, so it most of all inculcated the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments. Now if *Egypt* were of the high Antiquity I contend for, the Doctrine was inculcated in the Time of the *Hebrew* Captivity: the *Israelites* therefore who lived so long in *Egypt*, and had so thoroughly imbibed the religious Notions of the Place, must needs have been much prejudiced in favour of so reasonable and flattering a Doctrine: and, consequently, their Lawgiver, who had been bred up in all the Learning of *Egypt*, if he had acted only by human Direction, must needs, in Imitation of his Masters, have taken Advantage of this favourable Prejudice to make the Doctrine of a future State the grand *Sanction* of his Religion and Law. Again, the Proof of the high Antiquity of *Egypt* was a necessary Vindication of Sacred Scripture; which all along declares for that Antiquity. But which the *Deist* having endeavoured to take Advantage of against *Moses's* Claim to Inspiration, *Believers* were grown not unwilling to explain away. And while this CHRONOLOGY offered itself to support the Bible Divinity, they seemed little attentive to the Liberties it took with the Bible History.

To proceed: In order to bring on this Truth of the *high Antiquity* of *Egypt* nearer to my Purpose, I next advanced this *second* Proposition, That *the Jewish People were extremely fond of Egyptian Manners, and did frequently fall into Egyptian Superstitions: And that many of the Laws given to them by the Ministry of Moses were instituted partly in Compliance to their Prejudices, and partly in Opposition to those Superstitions*. Through the Proof of the *first* part of the Proposition was proposed to be shewn the high *Probability* of an Institution formed with Reference to *Egyptian*

*tion* Manners; and through the Proof of the *second*, a Demonstration that it was, in *Fact*, so formed. In the Progress of this Argument is given an historical Account of the amazing Perversity of the *Jewish* People, from the Time of *Moses's* first Mission, to their Settlement in the Land of *Canaan*. Which serves not only to evince the Fact we are here upon, *their Fondness for Egyptian Manners*; but to prove (what will stand us in stead hereafter), that a People so obstinate and headstrong needed, in the Institution of their civil Government and Religion, all possible Curbs to Disorder; of which, for this end, the Doctrine of a *future State* was ever held the chief in ancient Policy.

But now, as it might be objected, that while I am endeavouring to get, this Way, into the *Interior* of the *Jewish* Constitution, I open a Door to the Ravages of Infidelity; it was thought necessary, in order to prevent their taking Advantage of the great Truth contained under the last Proposition, to guard it by the two following,

*First*, That *Moses's Egyptian Learning, and the Laws instituted in Compliance to the People's Prejudices, and in Opposition to Egyptian Superstitions, are no reasonable Objection to the Divinity of his Mission*. Where, in answering an Objection to the Proof of the *first* Part of this Proposition, I had Occasion to explain the Nature and Origin of the *Schools of the Prophets*: Which, the Reader will find of this *further Use*, to give Strength and Support to what is said, in the *sixth* Book, of the *Nature of Prophecy*; and particularly to what is remarked of *Grotius's* Mistakes in his Manner of interpreting them. And, after having established the Proof of the *second* Part, from the Nature of Things, I examine all the Arguments which have been urged to the contrary, by the learned *Herman Witsius*, in his *Ægyptiaca*, as that Book had been publicly recommended, for a *distinct and solid Confutation of Spencer, De Legibus Hebræorum ritualibus*.

But

But I go further in the *second Proposition*; and prove, that *these very Circumstances of Moses's Egyptian Learning, and the Laws instituted in Compliance to the People's Prejudices, and in Opposition to Egyptian Superstitions, are a strong Confirmation of the Divinity of his Mission*; For, that one, bred up in the Arts of *Egyptian Legislation*, could never, on his own Head, have thought of reducing an unruly People to Government on Maxims of Religion and Policy fundamentally opposite to all the Principles of *Egyptian Wisdom*. And yet *Moses* did this, in *enjoining* the Worship of the *true God* only; and, in *omitting* the Doctrine of a *future State*. And again, that One who *falsely* pretended to Inspiration, and to receive the whole Frame of a national Constitution from God himself, would never have risked his Pretences by a ritual Law, which the People could see was politically instituted, partly in Compliance to their Prejudices, and partly in Opposition to *Egyptian Superstitions*. And with this the *fourth Book* concludes.

V. What hath been hitherto said was to let us, in *general* only, into the Genius of the *Jewish Policy*; in order to our judging more exactly of the *peculiar Nature* of its Government; that from thence, we might be enabled to determine, with full Certainty, on the Matters in Question, as they are contained in the two *MINOR Propositions*.

The *fifth Book*, therefore, comes *still nearer* to the Point, and considers this *peculiar Nature* of the *Jewish Government*. Which is shewn to have been a *THEOCRACY*, properly so called, where God himself became the supreme civil Magistrate. This Form of Government is shewn to have been *necessary* for the Times. In proving which, the Law of *punishing for Opinions*, under a *Theocracy*, is occasionally explained. And as the *Deists* have been accustomed to object this Punishment against the divine Original of the Law, it is justified at large, on the Principles of natural Equity: Which serves, at the same time, both to confirm the *Reality* of a  
*Theocracy,*

*Theocracy*, and also to give new Strength and Support to what had been said on the Subject of *Toleration*, in the *first* Volume.

2. This Theocracy, which was *necessary*, was (as I then shew from the Notions and Opinions of those Times concerning *Tutelary Deities*) of the most *easy Introduction* likewise. But here, speaking of the Method of Providence in employing the *Prejudices* of Men to the great Ends of its Dispensations, I observe, that whenever divine Wisdom thought fit so to do, it was always accustomed to insert some characteristic Note of Difference, to mark the Institution, it established, for its own: which leading me to enumerate some of those *Notes*, I insisted chiefly upon this, “that the *Mosaic* Religion was *built upon a former*, namely, the *Patriarchal*: “Whereas the various Religions of the *Pagan World* were all *unrelated to, and independent of one another*.” As this was a Circumstance necessarily to be well understood for a perfect Comprehension of the *Jewish Establishment* (the Subject in hand), I took the Advantage which the celebrated Author of *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion* had afforded me, (who, to discredit *Revelation*, has thought fit to affirm the direct contrary) of supporting it against him in an Examination of his *Facts* and *Reasonings* on this Head.

3. I proceed, in the next Place, to shew, that those Prejudices which made the *Introduction* of a *Theocracy* so *easy*, occasioned as *easy a Defection* from the Laws of it. In which I had Occasion to explain the Nature of the *Worship of tutelary Gods*, and of that *Idolatry* wherewith the *Jewish People* were so obstinately besotted. Both which Discourses serve these further Purposes, the *former*, to support and explain what had been said, in the *first* Volume, concerning the Genius of *Pagan Intercommunity* of *Worship*: And the *latter* (besides a particular Use to be made of it in the *third* Volume) to obviate a common Objection of *Unbelievers*; who, from this Circumstance of the continual *Defection* of the *Jews* into *Idolatry*, would infer, that God's Dispensation to them could never have

have been so illustrious as their History represents it : These Men supposing that this Idolatry consisted in *renouncing* the Law of *Moses* ; and renouncing it as *dissatisfied of its Truth* : Both which Suppositions are here shewn to be false.

Having explained the *Nature* of the *Theocracy*, and the *attendant Circumstances* of its *Erection* ; we then inquire concerning its *Duration*. A *Theocracy*, therefore, in strict Truth and Propriety, we shew, continued throughout the whole Period of the *Jewish* State, even to the Coming of *Christ*. The Use to be made hereafter of this Truth, is to inforce the *Connexion* between the two Religions ; a Circumstance, though much neglected, incumbent on every rational Defender of *Revelation* to support.

We come next to the *peculiar Consequences attending the Administration of a Theocracy* : Which bring us yet nearer to our Point. Here, it is shewn that one *necessary Consequence*, was an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. And agreeably to this, (as deduced from the *Nature of Things*) that holy Scripture does *in Fact* exhibit to us this very Representation of God's Government : And further, that there are many favourable Circumstances, in the *Character* of the *Jewish* People, to induce a candid Examiner to conclude this Representation *true*. Though here the Reader should observe, that my Argument does not require me to prove more, in this place, than that an *extraordinary Providence* is *represented* in Scripture, *to be administered* : The Proof of its *real Administration* it is the Purpose of this Work to give through the great MEDIUM of my Theses, *the Omission of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments*. If therefore I clearly shew, from the whole *Jewish* History, that the Matter is thus *represented*, the Inference from my *Medium*, which proves the Representation *true*, answers all Objections, both as to our inadequate Conception of the Manner how such a Providence could be administered ; and as to certain Passages in holy Scripture that seem to clash with this its general *Representation*. And yet both these Objections (to leave no Shadow of Doubt unsatisfied)

are considered likewise: But as important as this Fact, of an *extraordinary Providence represented*, is, even to our present Purpose, it has a still further Use when employed amongst those distinguishing *Marks* of the Truth of *Moses's* divine Mission in general. For, from hence, we may observe, the unnecessary Trouble and Hazard to which he exposed himself, had that Mission been only pretended. Had he, like the rest of the ancient Lawgivers, done no more than barely affected *Inspiration*, he had then no occasion to propagate the Belief of a *constant equal Providence*; a Dispensation, if only feigned, so easy to be confuted. But, by deviating from their general Practice, and persuading the People, that the *inspiring tutelary God* would become their *King*, he laid himself under a Necessity of teaching an *extraordinary Providence*; and perpetually insisting on it as the great Sanction of his Laws; a dead Weight, if he were an Impostor, that nothing but downright Folly could have brought him to undergo.

To proceed, after having laid this strong and necessary Foundation, we come at length DIRECTLY to our Point. If the *Jewish* Government were a *Theocracy*, it was administered by an *extraordinary Providence*; the Consequence of which is, that *temporal Rewards and Punishments* (the Effects of this Providence) and not *Future*, were the SANCTION of their Law and Religion. Thus far therefore hath the *very Nature* of the *Jewish* Government brought us. And this methinks is bringing us fairly up to the Proof of our two MINOR Propositions. So necessary, as the reader now sees, was this *long Discourse of the Nature of the Jewish Government*. But, to prevent all Cavil, I go further; and shew, that the Doctrine of a *future State* of Rewards and Punishments, which could not, from the Nature of Things, be the *Sanction* of the Law, *was not*, in fact, *taught in it at all*; but purposely omitted by their great Prophet. This is proved from several Circumstances in the Books of *Genesis* and the *Law*. Where, to shew, that *Moses*, who, it is seen, *studiously* omitted it, was well *apprised* of its Importance, I prove that the *Punishment of Children for the Crimes of their Parents*

was brought into this Institution purposely to supply some Advantages to Government, which the Doctrine of a *future State* affords. This, at the same time that it further supports the Opinion of *no future State* in the *Mosaic* Dispensation, gives me a fair Occasion of vindicating the Justice and Equity of the *Law, of punishing Children for the Crimes of their Parents*; and proving the perfect Agreement between *Moses* and the *Prophets* concerning it: Which had been, in all Ages, the Stumbling-block of Infidelity.

But we go yet further, and shew, that, as *Moses* forbore to teach the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, so neither had the ancient *Jews*, that is to say, the *Body* of the People, any Knowledge of it. The Proof is striking, and scarce to be refuted by any Party or Profession but the *System-maker's*. The Bible contains a very circumstantial History of this People from the Time of *Moses* to the great Captivity. Not only of public Occurrences, but the private Adventures of Persons of both Sexes, and of all Ages and Stations, of all Characters and Complexions; in the Lives of Virgins, Matrons, Kings, Soldiers, Scholars, Priests, Merchants, Husbandmen. They are given too in every Circumstance of Life, victorious, captive, sick, and in Health; in full Security and amidst impending Dangers; plunged in civil Business, or retired and sequestered in the Service of Religion. Together with their *Story*, we have their *Compositions* likewise. Here they sing their Triumphs; there their *Palinodia*: Here they offer up their Hymns of Praise and Petitions to the Deity; here they urge their moral Precepts to their Countrymen; and here again they treasure up their Prophecies and Predictions for Posterity: Yet in none of these different Circumstances of Life, in none of these various Casts of Composition, do we ever find them acting on the Motives, or influenced by the Prospect of a *future State*; or indeed expressing the least *Hopes* or *Fears*, or even common *Curiosity* concerning it: But every thing they do or say respects the present Life only; the Good and Ill of which are the sole Objects of all

their Pursuits and Aversions \*. And here I will appeal to my Adversaries themselves. Let them speak, and tell me, if they were now first shewn some History of an old *Greek* Republic, delivered in the Form and Manner of the *Jewish*, and no more Notice in it of a future State, whether they could possibly believe that that Doctrine was national, or generally known in it. If they have the least Ingenuity, they will answer, *they could not*. On what then do they support their Belief here but on *religious Prejudices*? Prejudices of no higher an Original neither than some *Dutch* or *German* System: For, as to the *Bible*, one half of it is silent concerning *Life* and *Immortality*; and the *other* half declares the Doctrines were *brought to light through the Gospel*; which too is a Circumstance in Support of our Conclusion from the *Jewish History*, that would be wanting in the Case given of a *Grecian*.

The Strength of this Argument is still further supported by a View of the general History of Mankind: And particularly of those Nations most resembling the *Jewish* by their Genius and Circumstances: In which we find the Doctrine of a future State was always pushing on its Influence. It was their constant *Viaticum* through Life; it stimulated them to War, and spirited their Songs of Triumph; it made them insensible of Pain, immoveable in Danger, and superior to the Hour of Death. But this is not all, we observe that even in the *Jewish Annals*, when this Doctrine was become national, it made as considerable a Figure in their History, as in

\* It is very remarkable, that nothing more strongly evinces the desperate Folly of those who imagine the *Bible* has been adulterated by the *Jews* (unless it be their own Scheme of reforming it, by the Assistance of a *Jew*, who has accommodated it to the Taste of *Paganism*) than this very Circumstance of the profound Silence throughout, concerning a future State. For had the *Rabbins* ever tampered with it on any Head, it had certainly been on this, which they hold to be the very *Fundamental of Fundamentals* †. And which yet, after all their Sweat and Labour, to discover in the *Bible*, they could never get to; but are forced at last to take it upon Trust or Tradition, as the *Indians* do their *Fundamental Tortoise*.

† Maimonides.



that of any other People. In the last Place we shew, that it is not on the *negative Silence only* of the sacred Writers, or of the Speakers they introduce, that we support our Conclusion; but from their *positive Declarations*, by which they plainly discover, that there was no popular Expectation of a future State or Resurrection. Such as these; *That he that goeth down to the Grave shall come up no more* \*. — *That in Death there is no Remembrance of God, and in the Grave no one shall give him Thanks* †. — *That the Dead know not any thing, neither have any more a Reward* ‡. — *That they who go down to the Pit cannot hope for God's Truth* §. — *That those who are dead, are not* ||. Where we find it to be the same popular Language throughout, and in every Circumstance of Life; as well in the *cool Philosophy* of the Author of *Ecclesiastes*, as amidst the *Distresses* of the *Psalmist*, the *Lamentations* of the Prophet, and the *Exultations* of good *Hezekiah*. But is it possible this could be the Language of a People instructed in the Doctrine of *Life and Immortality*? Or do we find one word of it, on any Occasion whatsoever, in the Writers of the *New Testament*, but where it is brought in to be confuted and condemned? The People in *Jeremiah* say, that *those who are dead, are not*: *Jesus*, in the Gospel, that *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are amongst the Living*. Good Men amongst the *Jews* said, that *those who go down to the Grave come up no more, know not any thing, have no Reward*, and therefore prayed for long Life here, to praise the God of their Salvation: *St. Paul*, on the contrary, devoutly wished for his Dissolution, in order to receive elsewhere the Reward of his Faith and spiritual Warfare. Here, therefore, let me admonish certain *Dealers in Systems*, for once to suspend their *Trade*, and attend a Moment to the Arguments they write against. For it will not be thought enough that they prove, on the Principles of their Systems, that *the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments OUGHT to be in the Religion of Moses, and therefore*

\* 2 Sam. xiv. 14.

† Psal. vi. 5.

‡ Eccles. ix. 5.

§ Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19.

|| Jer. v. 7.

is *there*. The Public will now expect, that they directly apply themselves to the Refutation of *these* Arguments; which, being founded on *no System*, proceed in a different manner; and, from the *Proof* of what is *not* there, *conclude*, what *ought not* to be there. But it is much easier to tell us *what should be* in a Book, than to account for *what is* in it.

From the *Old Testament*, we proceed to the *New*; by which it appears, from the inspired Writers of *this* likewise, that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments did *not* make Part of the *Mosaic Dispensation*. Their Evidence we have divided into two Parts, the *first* proving that *temporal* Rewards and Punishments were the *Sanction* of the *Jewish Dispensation*; the *second*, that it had *no other*. And thus, with the directest and most unexceptionable Proof of the two *minor Propositions*, the *sixth* Book concludes.

VI. But to remove, as far as I was able, all Grounds of *Prejudice* to this momentous Truth, I employed the *sixth* and last Book of this Volume in examining those Texts of the *Old* and *New Testament*, which had been commonly urged to prove that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments *did* make part of the *Mosaic Dispensation*.

Amongst those of the *Old Testament*, the famous Passage in the sixteenth Chapter of the Book of *Job* holding the principal Place, I judged it of Importance, for the Reasons there assigned, to examine this Matter to the Bottom; which necessarily engaged me in an Enquiry into the *Nature* and *Genius* of that Book; *when written*, and to *what Purpose*; whereby not only a fair Account is given of the Sense of that Passage, consistent with my Proposition; but a strong Support is provided for what will be further said in the *third* and last Volume, concerning the *gradual Decay* of the extraordinary Providence, from the Time of *Saul* to the Return from the great Captivity, and Resettlement in the Land of *Judea*.

But

But this Dissertation has still a further, and very important use, regarding *Revelation in general*. For shewing therein, how the Principles of the Gospel Doctrine *opened by Degrees*, fully obviates the Calumnies of *Tyndal* and *Collins*: who pretend that the Priests and Leaders of the *Jews* refined their old Doctrines concerning the Deity, and invented new ones, just as they advanced in Knowledge or the People in Curiosity; or as both were better instructed in the Country to which they were led captive.

In examining the Texts of the *New Testament*, the famous *eleventh Chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews* was not forgotten; the Sense of which is cleared up from the strongest and most inveterate Mistakes of systematical Divines. In this Place is occasionally explained and illustrated a Matter of the highest Moment for the understanding *St. Paul's Epistles*, namely, *the Nature of the Apostolic Reasoning against the Errors of the Jewish Converts*; and this likewise contributes still further to support the Truth of our two MINOR Propositions.

As in all this I taught nothing contrary to the Doctrine of our excellent Church, my Profession, in common *Decency*, not to say *Justice* both to myself and others, required I should vindicate the Reality of my Conformity. Having therefore declared it as my unfeigned Opinion that, “ though a future State of Rewards and  
 “ Punishments made no part of the *Mosaic Dispensation*, yet that  
 “ the Law had a *spiritual* Meaning, to be understood when the  
 “ Fullness of Time should come, and hence received the *Nature*,  
 “ and afforded the *Efficacy* of *Prophecy*: And That in the *interim*,  
 “ the *Mystery of the Gospel* was occasionally revealed by God to his  
 “ chosen Servants, the *Leaders* and *Fathers* of the *Jewish Nation*;  
 “ and the *Dawning* of it gradually opened by the Prophets to the  
 “ People:” Having, I say, declared this to be my unfeigned Opinion, I shew, from the Words of the *Seventh Article of Religion*, that it is the Opinion of our excellent Church likewise. And that I may not be suspected of Tergiversation, when I subscribe to this *Article*, that *They are not to be heard which jeign, that the old*  
*Fathers*

*Fathers did look only for transitory Promises*, I attempt to illustrate the Words of *Jesus*, where he says that *Abraham rejoiced to see Christ's Day, and saw it, and was glad*, by the noblest Instance that ever was given of the *Harmony* between the *Old and New Testament*, on the Principles before laid down in the Discourse on the *Hieroglyphics*; and shew that the Command to *Abraham* to offer *Isaac* was merely an Information (given at *Abraham's* earnest Request) in a *representative Action*, instead of *Words*, of the Redemption of Mankind by the great Sacrifice of *Christ*. From whence we gain two other Advantages, besides that more *immediate*, of justifying the Doctrine of our *national Church*. The *first* of which is the supporting a real and essential *Connection* between *Judaism* and *Christianity*. The *other* is, disposing the *Deists* to think more favourably of their Bible: For our Interpretation overthrows all Objections to this part of *Abraham's* History. The Matter therefore being of this high Importance, it was proper to fix it on such Principles as would leave no Room for Doubt or Objection. And this could be done only by explaining the Nature of those various *Modes of Information* in use amongst the Ancients; for which Explanation likewise a proper Foundation had been laid in the Discourse on the *Hieroglyphics*. But this is not all; we get a yet further and much more considerable Benefit by it, and that is the clearing up and vindicating the logical Truth and Propriety of *Types in Action*, and *secondary Senses in Speech*: whereon the Divinity of the ancient *Prophecies concerning Christ* are to be supported; and which, at this Time, most needed a Support. For though the greater part of these *Prophecies* relate to *Jesus* only in a *secondary Sense*, yet had some Men of Name and in the Interests of Religion, through Ignorance of the true Original and Nature of *secondary Senses*, rashly concurred with modern *Judaism* and *Infidelity*, to give up all such as *illogical* and *enthusiastic*, to the imminent Hazard of overturning the very Foundation of our Faith. In the Course of this Enquiry, I had an Opportunity of examining and confuting one of the most able and plausible Books ever written  
against

against Revelation, *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, which goes entirely upon the illogical Fanaticism of a *secondary Sense of Prophecies*.

The intelligent Reader will, I presume, allow these Reasons sufficient to justify the Length of this *Dissertation*: but there were two other more *immediately* relative to my Question, that engaged me in the Enquiry. The *one* was to shew, that those, who contend for the *Christian Doctrine of a future State's* being revealed to the early *Jews*, destroy all Reason of a *secondary Sense of Prophecies*; (a Matter, as we have shewn, of the utmost Importance to Revelation :) For how can it be *certainly* known, from the Prophecies themselves, that they contain *double Senses*, but from hence, that the *old Law* was preparatory to, and the Rudiments of, the *New*? How shall *this Relation* be *certainly* known, but from hence, *that no future State of Rewards and Punishments is to be found in the Mosaic Dispensation*? So close a Dependence have all these momentous Principles on one another. The *other* more *immediate* Reason for this *Dissertation*, on *Types and secondary Senses*, was this: As I had shewn that a future State of Rewards and Punishments was revealed under no part of the *Jewish Oeconomy* any otherwise than by *those Modes of Information*, it was necessary, in order to shew the *real Connection* between *Judaism* and *Christianity* (the Truth of the latter Religion depending on that *real Connection*) to prove *those Modes* logical and rational. For as on the one hand, had the Doctrine of Life and Immortality been *revealed* under the *Mosaic Oeconomy*, *Judaism* had been *more* than a *Rudiment* and *Preparation of Christianity*; so had no *covert* Intimations at all been given of the Doctrine, it had been *less*: That is, the Dependency and Connection between the two Religions had not been sufficiently marked out and ascertained. With this *necessary Dissertation*, therefore, this *sixth* and last Book of the *second Volume* concludes.

Thus the Reader sees at length, how *regularly* and *intently* these two Volumes have been carried on: The *first* in proving the *Major*, and the *second*, the *Minor Propositions* of the two *Syllogisms*. In

which, though the Author (whose Passion is not so much a fondness for his own Argument as for the Honour and Support of Religion itself) has neglected no fair Occasion of enforcing every Circumstance, that might serve to illustrate the Truth of *Revelation in general*; yet he never loses Sight of his End; but, as the Rule for conducting the most regular Works prescribes,

*Semper ad eventum festinat.*

This Volume too I thought fit to publish *alone*, as I did the *First*; though not *merely* for the same Reason, its being a perfect and entire *Whole* of itself, explaining the *Nature and Genius of the Jewish Constitution*; but for a much better—that *it fairly finished the Argument*. For my Logic teaches me, that, *when the MAJOR and the MINOR are once proved, the CONCLUSION follows of course*. And this is, that THE JEWISH RELIGION AND SOCIETY WERE SUPPORTED BY AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE: For be this never so furious a PARADOX, it may be rendered as tame and harmless as any other Truth by the common Advantages of Argument; unless a Raiser of *Paradoxes*, like a Raiser of *Rebellion*, is to be *ipso facto, outlawed*; and the *One* denied all Benefit of the *Logic*, as the *Other* is, of the *Law*, of his Country.

### III.

VII. It may be asked then, what I mean by a *third* Volume, if the Argument be *ended* in the *second*? To this I answer, That it is one Thing to satisfy Truth; and another, her pretended Followers. He who engages for *Revelation*, has *many* Prejudices to encounter; but he who engages for it, under *Reason* only, has *many more*. I cannot then make too sure of my Reader. And, luckily, the *Plan* of my Work obliging me to continue the *History of the Religious Doctrines of the Jews*, from the Time of the first *Prophets*, to that of the *Maccabees*, when the Doctrine of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments first became *national*; this History will afford abundant Proofs for the further Illustration of the

MAJOR

MAJOR Propositions of the two Syllogisms. And this will make the Subject of the *seventh* Book of *The Divine Legation*, or the *first* Part of the *Third* Volume.

VIII. Having in this Manner gone through my *general Argument*, what remains is an Examination of the principal *Objections* that may be urged against it: And these being founded in the supposed Views and Objects of the *Jewish* Lawgiver, this Examination will be chiefly employed in explaining and vindicating the true CHARACTER of MOSES: From whence will arise a new Series of Arguments for the Support of the MINOR Propositions of the two *Syllogisms*: and, particularly, a Demonstration that shews the *Conclusion* of the *second* Syllogism \*, to have all the Force of the *first* †: the only thing it might seem to want. This Demonstration may be reduced to this Syllogism.

None, but one ignorant of the World, or an Enthusiast, who had received a Promise like that given to the *Jews*, and had lived to the Time marked for its Accomplishment, could be mistaken either about the Promise or its Completion.

But *Moses* received such a Promise, and lived to the Time marked for its Accomplishment, and was neither ignorant of the World, nor an Enthusiast.

Therefore *Moses* not mistaken either about the Promise or its Accomplishment.

This will make the Subject of the *eighth* Book, or the *second* part of the *third* Volume.

IX. But having, towards the Conclusion of the *eighth* Book, in answer to various infidel *Objections*, examined the *pretended Reasons* of the *Omission* of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in the *Mosaic* Dispensation; I am naturally and neces-

\* Namely, that *Moses*, who taught, believed likewise, that the Jewish Religion and Society were to be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

† Namely, that they were under an extraordinary Providence.

fairly led to enquire, further, into the TRUE. For now it might be *finally objected*, that though, under an *extraordinary Providence*, there might be *no Occasion* for the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, in Support of Religion, or the Ends of Government; yet, as that Doctrine was *true*, and, consequently, under every Regiment of Providence, *useful*; it seems hard to conceive that the Religious Leader of the *Jews*, because, as a Law-giver, he could do without it, that therefore, as a Divine, he would omit it. The Objection is of Weight in itself, and receives much additional Strength from what we have observed in the *fifth* Book concerning the Reason of the Law of *punishing Children for the Crimes of their Parents*. I hold it therefore not sufficient barely to reply, *Moses omitted it, that his Law might thereby remain throughout all Ages an invincible Monument of the Truth of his Pretences*; but proceeded to explain the *great* and *principal Reason* of the Omission. And now, *ventum ad VERUM est*. This leads me into one general View of the whole Course of God's universal Oeconomy from *Adam* to *Christ*, ending in a Dissertation on the true Nature and Genius of the CHRISTIAN FAITH, and so adding new and irresistible Force to the CONCLUSIONS of both my *Syllogisms*. With this the *ninth* Book, or *third* Part of the last Volume, concludes.

This I purpose to give the Public without Delay: Not for any pressing Necessity my *Argument* has of it, for I left it not, as was insinuated, naked and supportless; but, as the Reader now sees, surrounded with various *Outworks*, and standing strongly on its *Conclusion*; But, principally, that I may be at Liberty to address myself to a much larger Work. *A full Defence of Revelation in general and of the Christian Faith in particular, against Unbelievers of all Denominations*. A Work long projected, and which my Christian Profession, and still more solemn Engagements in the Service of Religion, persuaded me was my Duty, with the good Leave of my Brethren, to devote myself unto.—Not to speak at present of the high Encouragement to all Attempts of this Nature from the  
Felicity



Felicity of the Times, which is, or would be, always urging me on, in the Words of the Poet :

- “ — Va pâlir sur la Bible ;  
 “ Va marquer les écueils de cette mer terrible :  
 “ Perce la faine horreur de ce Livre divin :  
 “ Confons dans un Ouvrage et Tindal et Collin :  
 “ Débrouille des vieux tems les querelles célèbres ;  
 “ Eclairci des Rabins les savantes ténèbres :  
 “ Afin qu'en ta vieillesse, un livre en maroquin  
 “ Aille offrir ton travail à quelque heureux Faquin,  
 “ Qui, pour digne loier de la Bible éclaircie,  
 “ Te paie en l'acceptant d'un JE VOUS REMERCIE.”

BOILEAU.

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A P P E N D I X.

C O N T A I N I N G

The Judgments of GROTIUS, EPISCOPIUS, and Bishop BULL;

S H E W I N G,

That a future State of REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS was not taught  
to the People of the Jews by the Law and Religion of MOSES.

G R O T I U S.

“**M**OSES in Religionis Judaicæ Institutione, si diserta Legis respiciamus, nihil promittit supra hujus vitæ bona, terram, uberem, penum copiosum, victoriam de hostibus, longam & valentem senectutem, posteros cum bona spe superstites. Nam, si QUID EST ULTRA, in umbris obtegitur, aut sapienti ac DIFFICILI ratiocinatione colligendum est.”

E P I S C O P I U S.

“In tota Lege Mosaica nullum vitæ æternæ præmium, ac ne æterni quidem præmii INDICIUM VEL VESTIGIUM extat: quicquid nunc Judæi multum de futuro seculo, de resurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam ostendere conentur,

" nentur, NE LEGEM MOSIS IMPERFECTAM ESSE cogantur agnoscere cum  
 " Sadducæis ; quos olim (& uti observo ex scriptis Rabbidorum, ho-  
 " dieque) vitam futuri sæculi Lege Mosis nec promitti nec contineri adfir-  
 " maffe, quum tamen Judæi essent, certissimum est. Nempe non nisi per  
 " Cabalam five Traditionem, quam illi in universum rejiciebant, opinionem  
 " five fidem illam irrepsisse asserunt. Et sane opinionum, quæ inter Ju-  
 " dæos erat, circa vitam futuri sæculi discrepantia, arguit promissiones Lege  
 " factas tales esse ut ex iis certi quid de vita futuri sæculi non possit col-  
 " ligi. Quod & Servator noster non obscure innuit, cum resurrectionem  
 " mortuorum colligit Mat. xxii. non ex promisso aliquo Legi addito, sed  
 " ex generali tantum illo promisso Dei, quo se Deum Abrahami, Isaaci,  
 " & Jacobi futurum sponderat : quæ tamen illa collectio magis nititur  
 " cognitione intentionis divinæ sub generalibus istis verbis occultatæ aut  
 " comprehensæ, de qua Christo certo constabat, quàm necessaria conse-  
 " quentia five verborum vi ac virtute manifestâ, qualis nunc & in verbis  
 " Novi Testamenti, ubi vita æterna & resurrectio mortuorum prorsum &  
 " puppim faciunt totius Religionis Christianæ, & tam clarè ac disertè pro-  
 " mittuntur ut ne hiscere quidem contra quis possit." Infit. Theol. lib. iii.  
 sect. 1. c. 2.

## B U L L.

" Primo quæritur an in Vet. Testamento nullum omnino extet vitæ  
 " æternæ promissum ? de eo enim a nonnullis dubitatur. Resp. Huic quæ-  
 " stioni optimè mihi videtur respondere Augustinus, distinguens nomen  
 " Veteris Testamenti ; nam eo intelligi ait aut pactum illud, quod in monte  
 " Sinai factum est, aut omnia, quæ in Mose, Hagiographis, ac Prophetis  
 " continentur. Si Vetus Testamentum posteriori sensu accipiatur, concedi  
 " FORSITAN possit, esse in eo nonnulla futuræ vitæ non obscura indicia ;  
 " præsertim in libro Psalmorum, Daniele, & Ezekiele : quanquam vel in  
 " his Libris clarum ac disertum æternæ vitæ promissum VIX AC NE VIX  
 " quidem reperias. Sed hæc qualiacunque erant, non erant nisi præludia  
 " & anticipationes gratiæ Evangelicæ, AD LEGEM NON PERTINEBANT.—  
 " Lex enim promissa habuit terrena, & terrena tantum.—Si quis contra  
 " sentiat ejus est locum dare, ubi æternæ vitæ promissio extat ; quod  
 " CERTE IMPOSSIBILE EST.—Sub his autem verbis [legis ipsius] Dei inten-  
 " tione comprehensam fuisse vitam æternam, ex interpretatione ipsius  
 " Christi

“ Christi ejusque Apostolorum manifestum est. Verùm hæc non sufficiunt  
 “ ut dicamus vitam æternam in Foedere Mosaico promissam fuisse. Nam  
 “ primo promissâ, præsertim Foederi annexa, debent esse clara ac diserta,  
 “ & ejusmodi, ut ab utraque parte stipulante intelligi possint. Promissâ  
 “ autem hæc typica & generalia, non addita aliunde interpretatione, PENE  
 “ IMPOSSIBILE ERAT UT QUIS ISTO SENSU INTELLIGERET.” Harmonia  
 Apostolica, Dissert. postler. c. x. sect. viii. p. 474. inter Op. Om. Ed.  
 1721.

1. Thus these three great Ornaments of the Protestant Religion. And what more has been said or done by the Author of the *Divine Legation*? Only this, he hath shewn, that the Absence or Omission of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in the *Mosaic* Religion is a certain Mark of its Divinity. *Forgive me this Wrong*. It has indeed been objected that Bishop Bull talked very differently in an *English* posthumous Sermon. All that I can say to this is, that, if he did so, it was not by my Direction; who hold it to be unlawful to say one thing to the People, and another to their Pastors. But Bishop Bull, it seems, might say what he pleased. He might, to support his Opinion, say without Censure, nay, with Commendation, that the Doctrine of a future State was amongst the Arcana of the Jews: That there was a twofold manner of teaching amongst them, one suited to vulgar Apprehensions, the other to those who had made some Proficiency in Knowledge\*. But if I venture to say so, a Legion of Bigots are in arms. And do I say any other, in affirming, that during the early Ages of the Jewish Republick a future State was not a national Doctrine, but known only to some few of their Leaders? Thus can the Writer quoted above abuse me, throughout a whole Pamphlet, for holding the very same thing for which Bishop Bull merited his Commendation; and this in an outrageous Manner too, as if I had said something most derogatory to the Honour and Attributes of God. But this is the *Hocus pocus* of Controversy. When the Bishop and I have paid him in the same Coin, that, from the Bishop's Pocket, shall be true orthodox Sterling; which, from mine, comes out clipt, washt, and counterfeited. But the Man's a Bungler; and neither understands clean Conveyance, nor has Assurance enough to outface the Fraud. For conscious, as it were, of an ill-played Trick, he patches up the Cheat in this slovenly

\* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's second Proposition, &c. in an epistolary Dissertation addressed to the Author, p. 125, just now come to my Hands.

Manner, Surely, (says he) *there is a great Difference between industriously keeping a thing out of Sight, and industriously propagating it amongst all who WERE ABLE AND WILLING TO RECEIVE IT\**. Illustrious Distinguishter! Does not the BISHOP'S *industriously propagating it amongst all who are able and willing to receive it*, imply the *keeping it out of Sight* from the rest? And does not MY *industriously keeping it out of sight* from the rest, imply the *propagating it amongst all who were able and willing to receive it*? But, in this Case, I have done more than by Implication; I have said over and over again, that it was communicated to the few *able* to receive it. I did not indeed add *willing*. That Discovery was reserved for the wonderful Penetration of our Author. I had no Conception but that every Jew was *willing* enough to receive *not only the Promise of the Life that now is, but of that which is to come*: But it is a reasonable Question whether they were as *able*; and would not then have quitted both the School and *School-master that was to bring them to Christ* long before the good Time he had appointed. But these are Matters above our Author's Comprehension. He will needs know why God acted thus mysteriously. I will tell him when he informs me (and perhaps before) why *America* for so many Ages was debarred the Light of the Gospel. Were not these his Offspring as well as the Sons of *Abraham*? But this is the Advantage that he and his Fellows take with the Ignorant. They cry out, What! a Religion from God without a future State? No. Rather than this, any thing. They will go a Text-hunting, lie at catch for an Ambiguity, divorce the Sentence from its Context, strip it naked; and if, after all this Violence, it does but squint their way, see here, say they, as clear a Proof of it as from the preaching of *Jesus*. Yet let these Texts but speak for themselves, or without any other Prompter than the Context, and we shall soon see that there is not one of all they have ever produced, in the Period in question, that can by any Rules of good Critic be made to signify the least Notice of a future State, otherwise than in a secondary and spiritual Sense. In the mean time let no good Man be scandalized with their Clamour. All such shall soon see this Tempest of Malice and Bigottry dispersed, and the Scripture of God at last vindicated even from its worst and most fatal Mischiefs; the Virulence of false Zeal. But this and Bigottry have so blinded our Anonymous, that in another place he

\* Page 125.

insultingly asks me \*, *WHERE I learnt that Death doth not now reign?* and yet before he ends his Page he himself quotes these Words of the Apostle, *Jesus Christ hath abolished Death* †.

2. But now, if the bringing over such kind of Writers, and leading them into the *Dawn of Sense*, were any Matter of Merit, I had much to boast of. When I first adventured to fall upon their Systems, nothing was heard amongst them but “that *Moses did teach* a future State; and plainly “too; if not, the worse for him; for he *ought to have taught it.*” This was then the Cry. But now their Note is altered. This Anonymous owns very frankly that *Moses taught no future State*, nay more, *could not teach it.* *Moses* (says he) *as an authorized Teacher could not declare the Doctrine of a future State* ‡. *This Doctrine was not in his Commission* §. And so, in other Places, to the same Purpose. Thus, after having fought through all their own Weapons in vain, they will now try if they cannot silence me with *mine*; and make that very Principle on which I raised my *second Proposition* serve to the Subversion of it. For the Reader must not fancy that they now begin to embrace any of my Principles in the Love of Truth, but of Contention only. But let us take him as we find him. He says, *Moses had it not in Commission to teach a future State.* Be it so. I ask then, first, how he comes to *know* this? If he says, because *Moses did not teach it*, he will argue as becomes him. But I will suppose him to say, *because it was reserved for the Commission of Jesus.* Then thus I argue—I hat *traditional Knowledge*, which this Man says they had of the Doctrine, was either a *divine* or *human Tradition*. If he says, a *divine*, then some holy Man had it in *Commission* to teach before *Moses*, or God himself taught it. In either Case, I ask why it could not have been intrusted to *Moses*, when instituting a new Religion and civil Government, since it was of a *Nature to be intrusted?* If he will say, of *human Tradition*, it is then certain *Moses's* Silence, in a Religion to which nothing was to be added, and from which nothing was to be taken, must have very soon erased all human Traditions from the Minds and Memory of the People; which indeed was the Case. Though human Traditions, in After-ages, they had enough. And when I come to shew why they took them up, and whence they had them, that they had them not in the Times in question will be seen to a Demonstration. I only mention this to shew, the wretched Fu-

\* P. 70.

† 2 Tim. i. 10.

‡ P. 5.

§ P. 7.

tility of such a Writer, who, when he steals a true Principle, knows so little what to make of it. It is very true, *This Doctrine was not in Moses's Commission*. And from this great Truth I shall prove, to the Shame of all such Writers, that it *could not* be a national Doctrine amongst the Jews in the Times I mention. But this in my *last* Volume. For I proceed very differently from these Writers. They, from what they imagine, *could not be*, would prove it *was not*. I, from what I prove *was not*, shew afterwards what *could not be*. But he saw not this, that the People's *not having* the Doctrine was a necessary Consequence of *Moses's not teaching* it. And no wonder, when we consider how he came by his Principle, that he should understand none of its Consequences. Hence it is that he so ignorantly accuses me of *having confounded these two things throughout my Book*. That is, of taking Advantage of, and, all the way, enforcing a necessary Consequence from a certain Principle.

But, one Word more with him on this Head. He says, *Moses had it not in Commission*. What thinks he of the Book of *Job*? He says he thinks of it very *differently from me*. It is prudently said, and enough to secure his Credit, and keep him orthodox. We will for once support his Modesty; and conceive him to hold, that the Book was written by *Moses*; and that the famous Text, in the nineteenth Chapter, relates to the Resurrection. But then what becomes of the *Principle of Moses's no Commission*? Or will he say *Moses* did not write it, and that the Text in the nineteenth Chapter does not relate to a Resurrection? What then becomes of his *Orthodoxy*? See now what it is to be shirking the Principles of the Profane. Common Sense cries out against this un sanctified Commerce,

*Veto esse tale luminis commercium.*

If the good Man will believe me, he is out of his way. I would advise him to return again as fast as he can into the old *Dunstable* Road of *Moses* and a future State for ever. This was only an intemperate Fit of Zeal that hurried him half Seas over, before he knew where he was, or had time to look about him. For what is it he is doing? "*Moses* " instituted the Whole of an entire new Religion: enjoins nothing to be " added to, nor taken from it: Purposely omits the Doctrine of a future " State, because it was not in his Commission, but reserved for the great " Redeemer of Mankind; and yet the People, to whom he gave this

"Religion, had the Doctrine of a future State as of National Belief, all along from his time, to the Captivity, though we can find no Foot-steps or Traces of it in their History."

*Credat JUDÆUS Apella,*

may, I believe, be given in answer to this Man's *Creed* with greater Propriety than ever it was applied since *Horace* first used it. After this, is such a Writer to be argued with? To talk of a Doctrine not being in the Commission of a Minister of God, because it was reserved for a future Age; and yet that the People on whom his Ministry was employed had all along this very Doctrine, is a Mockery both of God and Man. For why was not *Moses* permitted to teach it, but because the Knowledge of it was reserved for a future Age? Or if they were then taught it, or had it, what hindered but *Moses* might have taught it? Be not deceived; as *God is not mocked*, so neither does he mock his Creatures. In short, this Reasoning of my Adversary is, *verbis tollere, re ponere*, the Reverse of the *Epitaphian*: But perhaps he may like it the better for it, as 'tis paying those *Jewish Epitaphians*, the *Seducees*, in Kind: And with this Class of Answerers the Reverse of *Wrong* is always *Right*. But I am quite ashamed of my Anonymous—Let the Reader only take notice, that this is the sole Point now remaining in Dispute between us.

3. As to the *Palmary* Argument, (of a future State of Rewards and Punishments not being known to the *Jews*, or making part of their national Doctrine from *Moses* to the Captivity) taken from the Consideration of *their whole History*, as delivered in the Bible; which the Reader has an Account of in p. 102, of this *Review*, our Answerer has not so much as attempted to touch upon it: Though against him, who owns *Moses* neither did, nor could teach a future State, it comes with a redoubled Bound. Indeed at page 102, of his Pamphlet, he has the *Courage* to quote it in part, and still greater neither to pretend to answer it, nor to confess its Force; but, to end all, he drops it in this manner.—*Why truly, Sir, there is a Difficulty in conceiving it: And yet were the Case as you have represented it, I should not venture to call it a DEMONSTRATION. Mere negative Proofs are of all others most uncertain, &c. Venture!* Why I see you dare not venture so much as to look it in the Face. And what you may call it behind its Back, will be but the railing of a baffled Coward. No, your Genius has directed you to a sifter Task; and you go on to prove that the Body of the

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the *Jews* had the Doctrine, from Texts nothing relating to the Matter, but such as have been forced into this Service by *Jews* and System-makers—as, *Days of Pilgrimage—being gather'd to their Fathers—giving up the Ghost—God's bringing every Work into Judgment—the Righteous having Hope in his Death—David's Hope being in God—his being a Stranger and Sojourner—*—And the Joke of it is, he tells me I might have found out this Meaning in them too, had I but consulted his *Commentators*. And with this miserable *secoſcia crambe* his whole Pamphlet is stuffed out from Side to Side.

4. I had introduced my Evidence from the Writers of the New Testament in this manner. “But what is of greatest Weight, the inspired Writers of the New Testament expressly declare the same. They assure us that the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments did not make part of the *Mosaic Dispensation*.” On which our Writer thus remarks: The Christian Reader perhaps may be at a Loss to know why the Testimony of the inspired Writers of the *New Testament* should be of greater Weight in this Case than the inspired Writers of the *Old*. But what is worse, Unbelievers (for whose Conviction I presume your Demonstration is intended) may ask by what Right the Authors of the *New Testament* came to be admitted as Evidence, who lived at the Distance of so many hundred Years, &c. †.” Which shall we here most admire? the charitable Insinuation in the first part? or the shrewd Remark in the second? Thou Flower of Divines! I did not say that the Testimony of the inspired Writers of the *New Testament* has greater Weight than an equal Testimony of the inspired Writers of the *Old*. But that their Testimony in the Case in hand had greater Weight, as (in the Opinion of such as you whom I am here endeavouring in vain to convince) a positive Proof by express Declaration, is stronger than a *Negative* arising from an Omission. It was but just before this very Man was quarrelling with *negative Evidence*. But *what is worse*, says he, *Unbelievers may ask*, &c. What! that which nothing concerns them? I had observed over and over that they all agreed to *this Truth*, and that therefore, *it is Part*, I address'd myself to *Believers*. But, ashamed himself of this Disingenuity, he retracts his own Objection:—*But as I am arguing*, says he, *secundum Christian Principles, I can have no Benefit from this Plea* ‡. And was not I

\* Div. Leg. Book V. Sect. VI. init.

† P. 66.

‡ P. 67.

arguing with him, as well as he with me? Can he blush for this, or mutt I?

5. In Sect. VI. of the Fifth Book of *The Divine Legation*, where I endeavour to prove the *minor* Proposition from the New Testament, I introduce the Discourse thus, “ This Evidence may be divided into two Parts, “ the *first* proving that temporal Rewards and Punishments were the “ Sanction of the *Jewish* Dispensation; the *second*, that it had no other \*.” Now let the Reader turn to this Writer, p. 67, & *seq.* and he will see how, by the vilest Prevarication, he has argued against the *first* sort brought by me to prove *temporal Rewards the Sanction*, as if I had brought them to the same Purpose with the *second*, namely, to prove, that there was *no other*.

6. With the same Spirit it is that he endeavours to make me contradict myself †, where in one place ‡, speaking of the Patriarchs (who, I own, referred to *Heb.* chap. xi. ver. 13, and 14. *saw the Promises afar off and were persuaded, &c.*) I say that *even they*, the sacred Writer assures us, *had not received the Promises*, referring to ver. 39. And, in another place §, speaking of the same 39th Verse, I say the sacred Writer is speaking here of *the faithful Israelites in general*. Hence this great Critic says I am guilty of a manifest *Contradiction*, and laments in his kind way, *that these Passages are both suffered to stand to shame one another*, p. 97. They shall stand for a better Purpose, to *shame* all such Scribblers as are not yet come to their Elements; and do not so much as know that *omne majus continet in se minus*. For if in Verse 39 the sacred Writer be speaking of the faithful *Israelites* in general, had I not Reason to say from thence, *that EVEN the Patriarchs* were included? However, he might at least have understood so much *English* as to know that the Conjunction *even* implies not *Exclusion*, but *Extension*.

7. He insults me, and puzzles himself with this Question, “ If the ancient Heathen Legislators taught it [a future State] or if the main Body “ of the *Jewish* Nation believed it before the coming of *Christ*, how was it “ brought to light by the Gospel? If this Text will stand with supposing “ that the general Knowledge of a future State was generally received amongst the *Jews* from the Time of the *Maccabees* down to “ *Christ*, will you be pleased to inform me why it will not as well “ stand with supposing that they had this Doctrine for as many ages

\* *Divine Legation*, vol. III. p. 155.

‡ *Divine Legation*, vol. III. p. 355.

† Page 97.

§ Page 597.

“backward.”—And for fear I should not answer him (as indeed he had Reason) he answers it himself. *To bring to Light does not here signify to discover what before was absolutely unknown. It signifies THEREFORE the more open or public Manifestation of what before was known either imperfectly or but to a few* \*. Egregious Divine! If it does not signify *that* (you say) it must signify *this*. Beat your Brains no further: For once I'll tell you, it signifies *neither*; but (what your Systems never dreamt of) that this was the first Time of its being *revealed by God*, either to the *Jewish* People as a Nation, or to Mankind in general. The sacred Writer did not deign to call that, *bringing to light*, which was hatched in the bosom of Superstition, and soon became polluted with a thousand Fables in passing through the impure Hands of System-making *Jews* and *Gentils*. From whence I reasonably concluded it was never taught *by God* to the *Jewish* People throughout the Period in question. What was taught *by Man* is another thing, and entirely out of the question. But you do not understand this: I believe so: Nor, I will say that for you, scarce any one general Proposition throughout my whole Book.

8. I said that the Doctrine of a future Life and Resurrection was not national till the Time of the *Maccabees*. He tells me, he *knows I will say that they had it from the Prophets, yet the Prophets were dead two hundred Years before*. Why then (says he) *could not the Jews learn this Doctrine from the very first, as well as their Posterity at the Distance of Ages afterwards* †? This sorely distresses our Theologaster: Yet instead of humbling himself under the Weight of his own Dulness, he turns, as is his Way throughout, to insult the Author of *The Divine Legation*. Now, though this Usage deserve no Favour, I will try to open his Understanding.—The Prophets had expressed a *temporal Destruction and Restoration* in the figurative Terms of *Death and Resurrection*. This being agreeable to the Language of those Times, the People, full only of Ideas of a temporal Nature, rested in the *primary* Sense. But when by the total withdrawing the *extraordinary* Providence of God, these People (who had right Notions of his Being and Attributes) had once begun to entertain the reasonable Hopes of a future State; they would then as naturally search their Scriptures for Support. And then it was they first began to understand that those Prophecies had a *secondary* Sense, and a sublimer Meaning. In this Sense, and on this Account it is that I say, *they receive the Doctrine of the Resurrection from the*

\* Page 72, 73.

† Page 112, 113.

*Prophet*. If he ask me, with his usual Insolence, how I come to know that I received the Doctrine of the *Resurrection* from the Prophets, I will tell him this too, which is more than his *Geneva* Systems could inform him of, that the Doctrine was no where else to be had. If all this will not satisfy him, let us turn the Tables, while I *question* him. The Prophets prophesy of the Birth, Office, Death, and Passion of *Jesus*. The *Jews* in general, till the coming of *Christ*, and some time after, mistook this Prophesy for the Promise of a *temporal Deliverer*, quite different from the Messiah of Mankind; Yet, after the Resurrection, they understood better. *How so?* I ask in his own Words, *Is it likely that the Sons should have learnt from the dead Prophets what the Fathers could not learn from the Living?* He would be hard put to it, I believe, for a pertinent Reply, without condescending to use the Answer I have provided for him above.—What is here said will serve for an Answer to the same kind of Objection urged again at page 50. where, from my owning that some Passages, which relate *literally* to temporal Things, had a *spiritual* and sublimer Meaning, he supposes the *Jews* of those Times must needs have found it out.

9. Again, “ Though here (says he) you seem to be of Opinion that it will in nothing affect the Practice of Virtue whether a future State is believed or not, provided the Will of God is allowed to be the Foundation of Morality; yet, in your Preface to the *Jews*, you tell them that the *Jewish* Religion must want much of absolute Perfection because it wants a Doctrine so essential to Religion. It is inexplicable to me, Sir, how that should be essential to Religion, by the Want of which the Practice of Virtue will in nothing be affected †.”—And are you indeed so dull as you pretend? or is this only a Mask for your Modesty, to hide your Blushes, for so shameless a Prevarication? What Man living but your learned self does not see, that where I speak, in the first Case, of the Practice of Virtue, on, what I call, the true Foundation of Morality ‡, I am considering it under an extraordinary Providence amongst the *Jews* of old: And where, in the Preface, of a future State as essential to Religion, I am considering it under an ordinary and common Providence, amongst the § *Jews* of the present Times? Yet in this very Page || has this Man the modest Assurance to say, TRUTH IS WHAT I SEEK.—It may possibly be so; and therefore I will take a little more Pains with him. What then, let me

\* Page 112.

† Page 130, 131.

‡ Divine Legation, vol. III. p. 98.

§ Page 23.

|| Page 131.

ask him, has the *Purity* of Virtue to do with the *Perfection* of Religion, so as that they must necessarily imply one another; and I be accused of Contradiction, for saying, that the *Jewish* Virtue was *pure*, and yet their Religion *imperfect*? Will not this very Man himself say the same Thing, though, I wren, for different Reasons? But do the different Reasons of an Assertion, make the same Assertion a *Contradiction* in me, and a *plain Truth* in him? Allow him but a future State for his *Jews*, and their Virtue, then, becomes *pure*: But will he say their Religion is *perfect*? But, because there can be no *perfect* Religion without *pure* Virtue, he concluded the other way, that there could be no *pure* Virtue without a *perfect* Religion; and so has catched me in his Contradiction-Trap, which he has laid, with the same Success, I don't know how often, throughout the Course of this Debate.

And here the judicious Reader, I am sure, cannot but smile to see him insinuate\*, with a Sneer, that Bishop Bull must needs be a Stranger to my Scheme, as he thinks it, of *moral Obligation*. He supposed, in good earnest, the Bishop could read his Bible, as he has done, without seeing that the *Ground* of this *Obligation* is *there* made to be *the Will of God*. But this it is to have to do with a Head whose Sense is all run to System.

10. Once more. In that miserable sophistical Shuffle with those few of my Arguments, on the *Case of Abraham*, which he dares venture to encounter in his *Appendix*, he brings it as a *Contradiction*, that, after I had said, the Information, conveyed in the Command to offer *Isaac*, was for *Abraham's sole Use*, I should then suppose his *Family* knew of it. And in this he triumphs with his usual Vivacity and Success†. Here again I am at a Loss, as things are so equally balanced, to know which was at Fault in this Place, his Head or Heart; but no matter: They are both past my mending. I will turn to the Reader.—Where I speak of the Informations being given for *Abraham's sole Use*, I am assigning a Reason for the Obscurity of the historical Relation, so far as concerns the *Information*, which I supposed to be conveyed in the Command: consequently, *his sole Use*, is opposed to the *Jewish People*, when the *History of the Command* was written; and not to his own *Family*, *Isaac* and *Jacob*, when the *Command* was given; whom I all along reckon amongst those Patriarchs who had some Knowledge of the Redemption of Mankind—Suppose it should be thought pro-

\* Page 129.

† Page 167, 168.

per to give this Man a *Dignity for his Works' Sake, in this Labour of Love*; and he should be told it was for his *ſt. Uſe*; he would be apt, I ſuſpect, to think that this rather excluded the Body of the Poor and Needy, than his own dear Family.

11. Again—“Nor (ſays he) will the *Pagan Fable of Diana's* ſubſtituting a Hind in the Place of *Iphigenia* at all help your Unbeliever. *This did not, ſay you, make Idolaters believe that ſhe therefore abhorred human Sacrifices.* But do not they themſelves, or have not you aſſigned a very proper and ſufficient Reaſon why it did not, *viz. that they had been before perſuaded to the contrary?* Where human Sacrifices make a part of the ſettled ſtanding Religion; the Refuſal to accept a human Sacrifice in one particular Inſtance, may indeed rather be looked upon as a particular Indulgence than as a Declaration againſt the thing in groſs. But where the thing was commanded but in one ſingle Inſtance, and the Command revoked in that very Inſtance (which is our preſent Caſe) ſuch Revocation in all reaſonable Conſtruction is as effectual a Condemnation of the thing as if God had told *Abraham*, in ſo many Words, that he delighted not in ſuch Sacrifices <sup>2</sup>.” I quote this out of mere Charity, becauſe it looks like Senſe; and is the only thing that does ſo throughout the whole Pamphlet. But this fair Appearance is only in Profile. What it has on one Side, it wants on another; and betrays the groſſeſt Ignorance of Antiquity. At this very time human Sacrifices had overſpread the Superſtition of *Canaan*. And thence it is that the Deift's Argument receives its Force. The Family of *Abraham*, ſay they, who found the ſame Practice commanded him which they ſaw eſteemed by all the *Pagans* round about as the ſublimeſt Height of Piety, a Practice, as appears from Scripture, not *poſitively* forbidden but by the Law of *Moſes*, would, in the Caſe they put, be naturally tempted to think as favourably of it as thoſe *Pagans*, who underſtood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia*, though ſhe accepted a Hind in her ſtead.

12. After all theſe Victories, he may be well excuſed the interpoſing with his own Good Will and Pleaſure. “if it is your Intention (ſays he) to proceed, and it were not too great a Preſumption in me to offer my Advice; it ſhould be to lay the Weight of your Argument, not upon

\* Page 161.

" *this*, that the *Jews knew nothing* of a future State; but upon *this*, that  
 " the *Law of Moses* had made *no Provision* for it. IF THIS PRINCIPLE IS  
 " ALL YOU WANT, IT WILL STAND, and you will have nothing to answer  
 " for, but the ill Judgment of advancing and taking so much Pains to  
 " support another Point with which your Conclusion has nothing to do \*."

Goodly and gracious! Here he shews how capable a Reader he is of *The  
 Divine Legation*. He confesses not to know whether *this Principle is all I  
 want* to establish my Demonstration; and yet he will turn *Answerer*. But  
 what the Connexion of a long Chain of Reasoning hindered him from  
 seeing, I hope this short *View* will bring to Light: And that the *second  
 Syllogism* will inform him, that WHAT HE GRANTS IS ALL I WANT. For if  
*Moses* would leave his People to get or keep a Doctrine as they could, so  
 necessary, and believed by him to be so necessary, under an *ordinary Pro-  
 vidence*, to Religion and Society, we must needs conclude, he was well  
 assured, that his Institution could do without it; or, in other Words, that  
 the Defect would be supplied by the Administration of an *extraordinary  
 Providence*. The Dispute, therefore, seems now to be at an End between  
 us. He owns, I have gained my Point: That I have got to the Goal: All  
 that he would now dispute with me is the Road. I must take the Track he  
 marks out to me; and *I have nothing to answer for but the ill Judgment of  
 advancing and taking so much Pains to support another Point with which my  
 Conclusion has nothing to do*. Say you so, kind Sir! with what Face then  
 could you tell the World, just before, that *I ought to make Amends for the  
 Wrong I have done to Religion in the second Volume of The Divine Legation,  
 in which, instead of placing Christianity on a surer Bottom, I have only fur-  
 nished out more Handles to Unbelievers* †? What! Is proving the *Divinity  
 of Moses's Religion*, a Thing for which I ought to make *Amends* and re-  
 pent, as a *Wrong* done to Christianity? Suppose I was willing to support  
 the Proof in a Way you do not like; you confess that, in this, *I have no-  
 thing to answer for but the ILL JUDGMENT of taking Pains to support another  
 Point with which my Conclusion has nothing to do*. Am I therefore, for my  
*ill judgment*, to be ranked amongst the injurious Subverters of Revelation?  
 What then will become of you? But such as these seem to care little  
 whether Religion be true or false, unless it can be supported on their Sys-

\* Page 134.

† Page 132.

tens. They had been bred up in the Belief that the old *Jews*, as well as their *Law*, were *spiritual*, and then

—*Tu pe putant parere minoribus, & quæ  
Imberbes didi. ere, sines peragenda fateri.*

After this, it was in vain for the Apostle to tell them, in the Person of a *Jew*, *We know that the Law is SPIRITUAL, but I am CARNAL*. However let him set his Heart at rest (if at least the Conscience of so unjust a Calumny will suffer him). For though this Principle, *that the Law of Moses made no Provision for a future State*, be all I want to support my Demonstration; yet I mean, I can assure him, to secure it with this other, *that the Body of the Jews for some Ages knew nothing of it*. This I should do, were it for nothing else but that it is a TRUTH offensive to Bigots and their Systems; by which they have done their best to render both the *Word of God*, and Reason of Man, *of no Effect*. But I have weightier Motives: I shall make it serve for the noblest Purposes of religious Truth and Piety.

But why do I speak of these Matters to him; who is so exceeding ignorant even of the very *Forms* of Argument, that, having given us to understand that he saw I had finished the *major* Proposition in the first Volume, and the *minor* in the second, he goes on thus—"As your *Conclusion* is to be the Subject of a future Book, I think I have no Right to meddle with it at present. I will prejudice you in nothing, and shall therefore leave you at full Liberty to CONNECT IT WITH YOUR PREMISES, as you shall find yourself able \*?" Here he plainly appears not to understand *what natural Connexion* there is between the *Major*, *Minor*, and *Conclusion*. I had learnt that the CONCLUSION had been CONNECTED with the PREMISES by *Aristotle* long ago; but it seems, so unhappy still am I, that the thing is yet to do. Thanks indeed to this merciful Divine!—*I am left at full Liberty to do it, as I shall find myself able.*

13. But one Word more, and I have done. "Whether (says he) you intend to proceed, or will suffer yourself to be wholly diverted from your Purpose by Matters of another kind *less suitable to your clerical Function*, you best know. But give me leave to say, Sir, you are a Debtor to the Public; and I hope that in your next Volume you will make some

\* Page 4.



“ amends, for the *Wrong you have done to Religion in this*; in which, instead of placing Christianity upon a surer bottom, you have only furnished out *more Handles to Unbelievers* \*.” I scarce know whether I am not to take this for pure Kindness, and a sort of friendly Impatience for my third Volume: Which certainly, if it would hold, he has contrived a very speedy Way to obtain: And that is by proving it a *Debt*. And this at least I will do him the Justice to say, that if I be a *Debtor to the Public*, it must be for the Reason he so candidly suggests, or none at all. But, alas! he has, as a good Friend in the like Case might have, his Doubts and his Fears. He questions whether I will not suffer myself to be wholly diverted from my Purpose by Matters of another kind *less suitable to my clerical Function*. Less suitable than what? why, according to him, than *writing to the Wrong and Injury of Religion*, and *giving more Handles to Unbelievers*. What I am then *diverted* by, must be very *unsuitable* indeed. But will the good Man be so kind to tell us what this *Diversion* is? Thank you for that indeed. As Things are now carried, and left in the Dark, who knows but the Reader, in Excess of Charity, may take it to be a Whore, or a Horse-race, or a good Job of Simony; a Party Pamphlet, or Levy-hunting, or Exchange Alley, or, in short, twenty Things besides; each of them sufficient to discredit the mere unorthodox Man! With this good Luck, I make no Doubt but he would *wipe his Mouth* and applaud his innocent Address. Well then, since the Meanness and Malignity of his Heart will not suffer *him* to tell, *I* will. The *Diversion* he hints at, and yet dare not name, is a Critical Defence and Illustration of the Writings of one of the greatest Geniuses of this, or indeed of any Age, to convince the Prejudiced and Ignorant, that the incomparable Writer hath been always on the Side of Truth, Virtue, and Religion. And now the Secret is out. In the mean time, I dare suppose, that our *Anonymous* holds it as a Thing very *suitable to clerical Profession*, to calumniate his Brother only for differing from him in Opinion, though in the Support of that very Cause which himself pretends to espouse. I give *Handles to Unbelievers*, while I endeavour to prove an *extraordinary Providence*, administered in the *Jewish Republic*, a Fact, by the Truth or Falshood of which, the Religion of *Moses* must stand or fall. But this Man and his Fellows, it seems, give none, who, in writing against me, are so far from saying one Word in its *behalf*, that

\* Page 132.

they seem rather to treat it as a Vision of the Author of the *D. L.* This Writer particularly seems to have given no obscure Intimations, up and down his Pamphlet, that he believes nothing of the Matter. But how has my saying, that the Doctrine was not national, but unknown to the Body of the *Jewish* People between the Times of *Moses* and the Captivity, given more Handles to Unbelievers? Was I the first Broacher of the Opinion? Look upon the three great Testimonies above. Or would it have remained hid, had I not divulged it? Has this Man never heard of *one Deist* that believed a future State to be a national Doctrine amongst the *Jews* within the Period aforesaid? Or, to be plain with him, is there indeed more than a few Bigots like himself that now believe it? What was then to be done? Here was a very general Opinion, grounded upon common Sense, supposed to be discreditable to Revelation. I examined it. On Examination it appeared to me a Truth. Was I to disguise or hide it (according to the Principle and Practices of these Men) because it gave Scandal? Far be those Arts from every Minister of the Gospel! I well knew, if it were a Truth, it would never hurt Revelation. I chose then to give Glory to Truth; and, in that, to the God of Truth: and, by so doing, I became enabled to demonstrate to Unbelievers that this, which they esteemed a Discredit to the Religion of *Moses*, was a convincing Mark of its Divinity. And for this, and this only, I am said by this Writer to have *wronged Religion, and given more Handles to Infidelity.* But I forgive him, and pray that God, whose holy Religion I am defending, may forgive him too.

14. But the Reader, by this time, must needs be curious to know what it was that could provoke our *Anonymous* to write with so much Acrimony against his Brother, embarked with him in the same Cause of Religion, while there were so many *Infidel-writers* remaining unanswered,

*Cumque superba foret Babylon spolianda trophæis.*

And for what? a Vision, nobody will thank him for, unless it be half a Dozen Bigots: Always excepting the venerable *Jewish Church*, of which he has shewn himself so zealous a Support. She surely owes him her best Acknowledgments for keeping her Children close attached to her, and hardening them in their Infidelity. For, were it not for this inveterate

Error,

Error, they had long since come over to the Faith of *Jefus*, there being then nothing to obstruct their Sight in the manifest *Imperfection of the Law*: to prevent which, their Leaders, as the great *Episcopus* informs us, took so much Pains (so well seconded here by our *Anonymous*) to ASSERT THE FAITH OF THE ANCIENT JEWISH CHURCH; and to prove, that their Forefathers always had the Doctrine of a future State. *Quicquid nunc Judæi multum de futuro seculo de Resurrectione mortuorum, de vita æterna loquantur, & ex Legis verbis ea extorquere potius quam ostendere conentur, NE LEGEM MOÏS IMPERFECTAM ESSE cogantur agnoscere* †. For he cannot sure be so weak to think it possible, that, when he has agreed with them, that their *Church* always had a future State, they will agree with him, that *Moses* did not teach it. All this considered, it would have been very difficult to divine his *Motive* for writing against me, had not he himself fairly, and without Disguise, informed us of it, in the very Entrance on his Work. Not to mince the Matter, it was that *little Reputation*, (yet *more* than he could bear) which, it seems, the *Divine Legation* had accidentally bestowed upon its Author.—“That you have given (says our *Anonymous*) great Proofs of “your Learning and Ingenuity I shall not dispute: And you have had a “fair Time allowed you to receive the COMPLIMENTS OF THE PUBLIC ON “that Score. It may now be seasonable to call you to something, which, “though perhaps less agreeable to you, may yet be more profitable; and “that is, to consider how much Truth you have advanced, and what real “Service you have done, or are likely to do to Religion by this Under- “taking †.” And why will he not *dispute the great Proofs of my Learning and Ingenuity*? He has disputed a more incontestable thing; the *Truth*, which that *Learning and Ingenuity* were employed to illustrate: and, if these appeared with any Distinction, it was solely owing to the Advantage of the *Subject*.

But *I have had a fair Time allowed me to receive the Compliments of the Public*. How allowed me? and by whom? certainly not by such Writers as these. For if their Clamours could have prevailed, I had received the *public Odium* rather than its *Compliments*. And the Reader may see, by the short List given of them in the Beginning of this Pamphlet, that those Clamours begun the very Moment the first Volume of *The Divine Legation*

\* See the Quotation above.

† Page 34.

appeared; and have continued ever since, without Interruption, to the Publication of our Author's *Epistolary Dissertation*.

But, after all, what were these *Compliments*? And where have they lain hid? Nothing, from the Public, ever came to my Knowledge but the *Columnics* of my Adversaries. In some Sense, indeed, these may be called *Compliments*, and substantial ones too. For, next to the *old* way of complimenting, *Laudari a laudato Viro*, I prize the *new*, now all in Fashion, *vituperari a perditissimo quoque*. He, perhaps, may think the Sale of the Book a good substantial Compliment. But, for that, my Bookfeller must thank them; especially if he gave them not their Pennyworth for their Money.

However, to take these *Compliments* in their obvious Sense. I know of nothing for which I had more Reason to expect the *Compliments of the Public* than for the *Alliance between Church and State*, as it was a Defence (and I will presume, from its being yet unanswered, an *eff. Etual* one) of the Justice and Equity of our present happy Establishment; at a Time when the Enemies of all Church Establishments were commonly supposed to have demonstrated it to be indefensible. Yet what *public Compliment* did I ever receive for this Service? unless it may be reckoned a Compliment, that those, in whose Behalf it was particularly written, have never yet publicly disfavoured the free and moderate Principles on which it goes. But *that*, the honest Layman will perhaps say, is no bad Compliment to themselves.

I am here all along pleading for my Adversary. For had I *indeed* received the *Compliments* he talks of, he would find it very difficult to bring his *Modesty* off unhurt. The *wrong Judgment of the Public* being, in *that* Case, the principal Object of his Pamphlet: the Drift of which is to shew that I *deserved no Compliment*, as I had confounded and mistaken the Question, run into Contradictions, and done Injury to Christianity: Nay, even in this very place, where he talks of the *great Proofs of my Learning and Ingenuity*, he cannot forbear insinuating that I have *advanced no Truth, nor done any real Service to Religion*. Miserable then, indeed, is that *Learning and Ingenuity!* Well does he say he would not *dispute* them. For, for any thing they are worth, there they may lye; and he may safely trust to Time to revenge his Quarrel on them.

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From all this then, we must conclude that these *public Compliments* are but the *Morrows* of his own Brain : Things he rather *feared* than *fees*; and that through the false Consciousness of a supposed Worth he is no Judge of. In this troublesome Situation, the only way he had of *escaping himself* was to attempt to give *me Pain*; indeed the only *Ease* such Writers are capable of, when they see, or imagine they see, a *Merit* in others. *It is time* (says he) *to call you to something less agreeable*.

Well, but if it be, as he promises, *more profitable*, he makes me sufficient amends. And there was no Danger of his not keeping his Word: For an Use is always to be made of the Calumnies of one's Enemies. Besides, it must be a poor thing indeed that will not afford more *Profit* than the airy Compliments he talks of: Which were they as real as, for aught appears, they are imaginary, I solemnly assure him, I would give them all for the honest Satisfaction of having made one single Convert; and I have Reason to hope I have made many by my Writings, from Irreligion to the Faith of *Jesus*.

However, the *Profit I may get* by an Adversary is one thing; and the *Profit he may propose* is another. Let us see then what our *Anonymous* aims at. *It is* (he tells us) *to consider how much Truth I have advanced, or what real Service I have done, or am likely to do to Religion by this Undertaking*. Modestly intimating, that I have advanced no Truth; done no real Service, nor likely to do any to Religion. And now, methinks, I hear the equitable and indignant Reader crying out, *Some superstition, &c.* And certainly if this Liberty may be allowed in any Case, it must in this, where a Man's honest Endeavours, in his proper Station, to serve his Country and Mankind, are blackened by the dull low Envy of an anonymous Slanderer. What! *Was it advancing no Truth, was it doing no Service to Religion*, to confute the Atheistic Principles of *Bayle*, the immoral Doctrine of *Mandevile*, and settling Morality on its true Basis, and shewing it to be that on which Revelation hath placed it? To justify the Equity of an established Religion; vindicate the Christian from the Charge of a persecuting Spirit; shew the absolute Necessity of Religion for the Support of Society, and yet that it had its Original, neither from Priests nor Statesmen, but from Truth, and Truth's great Author? Again, *Was it advancing no Truth, was it doing no Service to Religion*, to shew that the *Mosaic* had all the distinguishing Marks of Divinity; to vindicate the Bible

History against the greatest modern Philosopher and Chronologer; to explain the Nature of the *Jewish* Theocracy, and, by that, to justify the Equity of those two famous Laws, of *punishing for Opinions*, and *punishing Posterity for the Crimes of their Forefathers*; to confute the most able Book ever wrote against Revelation, *the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*; and, above all, to explain, and to be the *first* who ever did explain, the Nature of *Types* in Action, and *secondary Senses* in Speech, on which, depend altogether the rational Interpretation of ancient Prophecies, and the Truth of the Mission of *Jesus*?—But for the further Confutation of so wretched a Calumny, the Reader need only turn back again to the *View* I have here given of the *Argument of the Divine Legation*. Yet none of these Matters, no, nor an hundred more, has he so much as touched upon, or pretended to confute. Will he say therefore that these are not what he meant, when he promised to shew, *that I had advanced no Truth, done no real Service to Religion?* But only my *peculiar* Argument for *The Divine Legation of Moses*. Why then did he make his *Charge* so *general*, when his *Proof* was so *confined*? As his Modesty will not suffer him to tell, it shall be helped out. The Reader then must know, that it is a fundamental Maxim with all the Writers of this Class (as it is amongst the *Jesuits*) never to acknowledge that an Adversary can do any thing *well*, lest the Public should take it into their Heads that other things are not so ill as is represented. This is the wicked Spirit of Controversy, and under the Possession of it I leave him. For I am ashamed of having wasted a Moment with so unprofitable a Writer.

The judicious Reader, I am sure, would not excuse me if he thought many were so misemployed. The Truth is, the reading his Book (which is the first I ever read through, of all that have been hitherto wrote against me), and the writing this *Appendix*, took me up but a Part only of this one Evening. Though I have answered every thing in it worth Notice: or that had the least Chance of misleading a well-meaning Reader. However, if he will tell his Name, and shew his Face; and it appears that the one has been heard of, or the other ever seen in good Company, I do hereby promise to give his *Considerations on the Case of Abraham*, &c. a distinct Answer, Paragraph by Paragraph, in the Manner of *that*, to one much his Betters, the truly learned and worthy

thy Editor of the Book of *Job*. Nay, I will do more for his Encouragement: I will shew as particular a Respect to the *rest* of his Pamphlet; but on this further Condition however, that he, at the same time, produce me some ONE competent Judge who shall say, on his Credit, that it deserves any other Answer than what has been already given to it. But without this, a final Adieu to his *Nameless Nothing*; but with this Testimony however, that a duller, a more disingenuous, or ignorant Book I never read.

December 17, 1743.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

I HAVE said, that all this *Writer* has urged, from *Texts* of Scripture, to prove a *future State* in the *Jewish* Dispensation, is so utterly contemptible, and void of Sense, as to deserve no kind of Answer. But that he may not flatter himself in the Imagination of any other Cause of my Neglect of him, I shall here examine a single *Objection* (sent me in a private *anonymous Letter*), which has more Plausibility of Reason than all his Arguments, on this Head, put together. And, as the Author's manner of communicating it has the Appearance of Candour and Love of Truth, he will always deserve more Regard than a thousand such Writers as the *Examiner of the second Proposition*. The *Objection* is in these Words: "Moses enforces the Obedience of the *Israhelites* upon this Consideration, "Ye shall therefore keep my Statutes and Judgments, which if a Man do he shall live in them". Here is a Promise of Life made to those who should observe the Statutes and Judgments which God gave them by his Servant Moses; which cannot be understood of this temporal Life only, because the best Men were often cut off in the midst of their Days, and frequently suffered greater Adversities than the most profligate Sinners. The *Jews* therefore have constantly believed that it had a respect to the Life to come. When the Lawyer in the Gospel had made that most important Demand, *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal Life* †, our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the Law; and, upon his making a sound and judicious Answer, approves of it; and for Satisfaction to his Question tells him, *This do, and thou shalt live.*"—

\* Levit. xviii. 5.

† Luke x. 25.



The Objection is very ingenious; and, as we shall see, not less *artfully* managed.

The Objector would have the Promise of *Life* in *Leviticus* to signify *eternal Life*. But *St. Paul* himself has long ago moderated this Question for us, and declared for the negative. A Dispute arose between him, and the Judaizing Christians, concerning *what it was that justified before God*, or intitled to that *eternal Life* brought to light by the Gospel. They held it to be the *Works of the Law* (*believing*, perhaps, as the Objector assures us they did, that this Text, in *Leviticus*, had a respect to the *Life to come*): *St. Paul*, on the contrary, that it was *Faith in Jesus the Messiah*. And thus he argues—"But that no Man is justified by the Law in the Sight of God " it is evident: for *the just shall live by Faith*. And the Law is not of " Faith, but the Man that *doth* them shall live in them\*."—As much as to say—That no Man can obtain *eternal Life* by virtue of the *Law* is evident from one of your own Prophets [*Hab.*] who expressly says, that *the just shall LIVE by FAITH* †. Now, by the *Law*, no Rewards are promised to *Faith*, but to *Works only*. *The Man that DOETH them* (says the *Law*, in *Levit.* ‡) *shall live in them*.—Here then we see that this very Text which the Objector brings to prove *eternal Life by the Law*, *St. Paul* urges, to prove it *not by the Law*. Let us attend to the Apostle's Argument. He is to shew, that *Justification*, or *eternal Life*, is by *Faith*. This he does, even on the Concession of a  *Jew*, the Prophet *Habakkuk*; who expressly owns it to be by *Faith*. But the *Law*, says the Apostle, attributes nothing to *Faith*; but, to *Deeds only*, "which if a Man *do* he shall live in them." Now, if, by *Life*, be here meant, as the Objector supposes, *eternal Life*, then *St. Paul's* Argument does not come out as he intended it; namely, *that Faith and not the Works of the Law justify*; but thus, that *both Faith and the Works of the Law justify*, which would have satisfied these *Judaizers*, (as reconciling, on their own Prejudices, *Moses* and *Habakkuk*); but, by no means, our Apostle; whose *Conclusion* on this Question (where discussed at large, in his Epistle to the *Romans*) is, *that a Man is justified by Faith WITHOUT the Deeds of the Law* §. The very Drift of his Argument therefore shews us, that he must necessarily understand the *Life*, promised in this Text of *Leviticus*, to be *TEMPORAL Life only*. But charitably

\* Gal. iii. 11, 12.

† ii. 4.

‡ xviii. 5.

§ Gal. iii. 28.

studious, as it were, to prevent all possible Chance of our mistaking him on so important a Point, he immediately subjoins, *Christ hath redeemed us from the Curse of the Law*\*. Now we know that our *Redemption* by *Christ* was from that *Death* which the first Man brought into the World: This was the *Curse* he entailed upon his Posterity. The Apostle's transferring this Term from *Adam* to the *Law* shews, therefore, that, in his Sentiments, the *Law* had no more a Share in the Redemption of fallen Man than *Adam* himself had. Yet it is certain, that if the *Law*, when it said, *He who keeps these Statutes and Judgments shall live in them, meant for ever*, it proposed the Redemption of Mankind as certainly as the blessed *Jesus* himself did, when he said, *he that believeth in me shall have everlasting Life*. This becomes demonstrably clear if *St. Paul's* Reasoning will hold, who surely had heard nothing of this *Prerogative* of the *Law*, when he said, *If there had been a LAW given which could have given Life, verily righteousness should have been by the Law*. Where observe, I pray you, the Force of the Word *ζωοποιῆσαι*, which signifies to *quicken*, or to *make alive*; plainly intimating, the same he had said in the Place before quoted, that those in Subjection to the *Law* were under a *Curse*, or in the State of *Death*.—Let me add only this further Observation, that if (as the Objector pretends) by *Life*, in the Text of *Levit.* be meant *eternal Life*; and if (as the Apostle pretends) by *Life* in the Text of *Habakkuk* be meant *eternal Life*: then will *Moses* and *Habakkuk* be made directly to contradict one another; the First giving *eternal Life* to *Works*; the Latter, to *Faith*.

But the Objector would insinuate, that *Jesus* himself seems to have fixed this Sense to the Text in *Leviticus*; at least that he has plainly inferred, that eternal Life was taught, if not obtained, by the *Law*.—“When the Lawyer in the Gospel (says he) had made that most important Demand, *Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal Life* †? our blessed Lord refers him to what was written in the *Law*, and upon his making a sound and judicious Answer, approves of it; and for Satisfaction to his Question, tells him, *This do and thou shalt live*.”—Would not any one now conclude from the Sense here put upon the Words of *Jesus*, that the *sound and judicious Answer* of the Lawyer must have been a Quotation of the Text in *Leviticus*, or at least some *general* Promise made to the Observers of the *whole Law* of *Moses*? Nothing like it. On the contrary, the Lawyer's Answer was a Quotation of only one Precept of the *Law*,

\* iii. 13.

† Luke x. 25.

*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy Heart, &c. and thy Neighbour as thy self.* Now how much soever we may differ about a future Life's being held out by the *Law* through a Messiah that was to come, I suppose we are both agreed that *Faith in the Messiah*, either actual or imputed, is necessary to obtain this future Life. There are but two ways then of understanding this Text of *St. Luke*, neither of which is to his Purpose. The first is supposing *Jesus* included *Faith in himself* in this Precept of *loving God with all the Heart, &c.* which will appear no forced Interpretation to him who holds *Jesus* to be *really and truly God*; as I suppose we both do; and may be supported by a Circumstance in the Story, as told by *St. Matthew* \*, though omitted by *St. Luke*, which is *Jesus's* saying, *that on these two Commandments hang all the Law and the PROPHETS.* The second and exacter Interpretation is, that *Jesus* spoke to a professing Follower, who pretended to acknowledge his *Mission*, and wanted only a *Rule of Life.* For *Jesus* is here preaching the Gospel to his *Disciples*, and a *Lawyer stood up and tempted him*, that is, on the false footing of a Disciple required a *Rule of Life.* Now in either Case, this Reference of *Jesus* to the *Law* must imply this, and this only, *that without Righteousness and Holiness no Man shall see the Lord.* A Point in which, I suppose, we are agreed.—But still the Objector will say that these Words of *Jesus* allude to the Words of *Moses.* Admit they do. It will not follow, as he seems to think, that they were given to *explain* them. How many Allusions are there in the *New Testament* to Passages in the *Old*, accommodated to a *spiritual* Sense, where the Texts alluded to are seen, by all but Fanatics, to have only a *carnal*? And even in this very Allusion, if it be one, we find that the Promise made to the Observers of the whole *Law* is *transferred* to the Observance of one single Precept in the *moral Part* of it. But let us grant him all he would have; and admit that these Words of *Jesus* were given to *explain* the Words of *Moses.* What would follow from thence, but that the Promise in *Leviticus* was *prop' etical*, and had a *secondary* Sense, of a *spiritual* and sublimer Import? Will this give any Advantage to our Adversaries? surely none at all. And yet the Abuse of this Concession is all they have for it, to support their systems. Thus the Reader has seen how the *Examiner* of the *second Proposition* triumphs on my Assertion, *that the later Jews excogitated the Doctrine of the Resur-*

\* Matt. xxii. 40.

*Ignorance of the proper Language of former Ages*; and asks (with an Ignorance excusable only in a Savage to his Catechist) how *these Jews* came to be more quick-sighted than *those* contemporary with the Prophets? I had in vain endeavoured to teach him that a *Carnal* and a *Spiritual* Sense (both of which, we are agreed, the Law had, in order to fit *God's Word* to the use of *two* Dispensations) implied an *Ignorance* of the *Spiritual* Sense during the *first* of them. But my Word ought to go for nothing, in this Case, when unsupported by Scripture. Let us hear then what the Apostles themselves say to this matter: Who, in order to shew the superior Excellence of the *Gospel*, in their Reasoning against *Jews* and judaizing Christians, set the *Law* in Contrast to it, under the Titles of *The Law of a carnal Commandment*; *The Ministration of Death*; *The Law of Works*: and call Subjection to it, *Subjection to the Flesh*. Yet these very Writers at the same time own that *the Law was SPIRITUAL*, or had a *spiritual Sense*. But if by this they meant, that *that Sense* was generally understood during the *Law Dispensation*, their whole Argument had ended in the highest Futility. For then it was not a *Law of a carnal Commandment*, a *Ministration of Death*; but, indeed a *Law of the Spirit*, a *Ministration of Life*; only under a dead and carnal Cover; which, being clearly seen through, was no other than a Foil to set it the better off: and consequently was of equal Dignity, and, though not of equal Simplicity, yet, indeed, essentially the same with the *Gospel*. Thus we see into how high a Degree of Contempt with Unbelievers, these Principles of my Adversaries would naturally bring the holy Apostles, did not those admirable Reasoners take care themselves to guard against so horrid a Perversion of their Meaning. They owned, we see, that the Law had a *spiritual Sense*: But *when*, and by whom *discovered*, the Apostle Paul informs us, by calling *that Sense* the NEWNESS OF SPIRIT\*; which he opposes to *the Oldness of the Letter*, that is, the *Letter of the Law*. In the former Part of the Verse, he speaks of the *Law being dead*; and, here, of its being *revived* again with a *new Spirit*, in Contradistinction to the *Oldness of the Letter*. So true was it, what, in another Place, he observes, that *the Law was a SHADOW of Things to come*; but *the BODY was of Christ* †. The *Shadow* not of a *Body* then to be seen or understood, as our Adversaries imagine, but of a *Body that was to come*, and, by its Presence, explain the Meaning and Reason of

\* Rom. vii. 6.

† Col. ii. 17.

the *Shadow*. For the *Jews* being, as the Apostle says, in *Bondage under the Elements of the World*\*, were as Men shut up in Prison, with their Faces kept turned from the Light, towards the whited Wall of Ceremonies: on which indeed they saw many *Shadows*; but the *Body* or opposite Substance at their Backs, to which they could not turn, they saw not. And in this State, says the same Apostle, they were *kept shut up unto the Faith, which should afterwards be revealed* †. Till that time therefore, it appears that the *Body of the Jews* had no Knowledge of this *Faith*; one of the essential Articles of which is *Life everlasting*. This we must needs have concluded, even though he had not said that till that time they were in *Bondage under the Elements of the World*. A proper Character truly of a People acquainted with the *revealed Doctrine of Life and Immortality!*

But, as the *Epistle to the Hebrews* is so much insisted on by my Adversaries, I shall, in the last Place, produce a Text or two from it, sufficient alone to determine the Controversy between us; and to justify what I said of it in the *Divine Legation, that in this Epistle there are more express Declarations that Life and Immortality was not taught by nor known under the Law, than in all the other Books of the New Testament*. For which indeed a very good Reason may be given; as it was addressed solely to the *Jews*; amongst whom this fatal Prejudice, that a *future State was taught by the Law*, was then, and has continued ever since, to be the strongest Impediment to their Conversion. But to come to the Point. The inspired Writer, in the second Chapter and second Verse, hath these remarkable Words, *For if the Word spoken by Angels was steadfast, and every Transgression and Disobedience received a just Recompence of Reward; how shall we escape, &c.* By the *Word spoken by Angels* every one knows is meant the Law delivered to *Moses* by them for his People: So that here is an express Declaration, 1. *That the Sanctions of this Law* were of a temporal kind. He then goes on, Verse the fifth, *For unto the Angels hath he not put in Subjection the World to come, whereof we speak*. And this is as express a Declaration, 2. *That the Law taught no future State*. Thus far then we are got. Let us next attend to the fourteenth and fifteenth Verses; *he [Christ] also himself likewise took Part of the same [Flesh and Blood] that, through Death, he might destroy him that had the Power of Death, that is, the Devil; and deliver them who, through Fear of Death, were all their Life-time subject to*

\* Gal. iv. 3.

† Gal. iii. 23.

*Bondage.* The Devil is here said to have the *Power of Death*, as he brought it in by the Delusion of the *first Man*; therefore, before Death can be abolished, he must be destroyed. But his Destruction is the Work of the *second Man*. Till then, we infer from hence, that Death reigned under the Devil. But this is not all; we are expressly told, that the *Jews, all their Life-time, were through Fear of Death subject to Bondage*. Which certainly can imply no other than, 3. *That they had no future State* to secure them from this Fear. See here then, for a Conclusion, the Principle of the *Divine Legation* justified on the plainest and most consequential Reasoning of the holy Apostle.

But now, say these Men, if the early *Jews* had no Knowledge of a Future State, the chosen People of God were in a much worse Condition than the Gentiles who all had it.—To this Purpose let us hear our anonymous *Examiner*, who has not only spoken the full Sense of his Party, but has urged it too with a Candour peculiar to himself.

“ You consider (says he) the Ignorance of the *Jews* as to the Doctrine of a future State, as one of the most *momentous Truths* that Religion has to boast of. I, on the other hand, look upon it as a *DISGRACE* to Revelation; as, by the very Act of God himself, it shuts out his own chosen People, for many Ages, from that single Point of Knowledge, which could be the Foundation of a reasonable Worship; while by the Directions of his Providence, all the World besides were permitted to have the Benefit of it \*.”

He says, *He looks upon no future State amongst the Jews as a Disgrace to Revelation*. Why so? *Because by the very Act of God himself it shut out his own chosen People, &c.* Sure he has forgot what he so oft told his Reader, that *Moses taught not, nor had it in his Commission to teach, a future State to the Israelites*: Otherwise he would have seen that *this*, alone, went a great way towards *shutting out the chosen People*. And if they were *let in* at all, it certainly was not by this Prophet of God. Consequently, if the holding, that *God shut them out*, be *disgraceful* to Revelation, this very orthodox Gentleman, we see, is got as deep in the Mire as the Author of the *Divine Legation*. In truth, I pity the poor Man, who thus, at every Step, brings himself into these Distresses: And all, from a *false Modesty*. He was ashamed of the Absurdity of his Party, in holding that *Moses*

\* Page 131, 132.

*taught, or ought to have taught, a future State*; and therefore, at this turn, leaves them in the lurch, and takes up the better Principle of his Adversary, that *Moses had no Commission to teach it*: For he must have been dull indeed not to have collected that this was his Adversary's Principle, after he had seen him write a Book to prove that *Mos did not teach it*.—And he not offended, good Sir, that I call this a *selfe Modesty*; for what is it else, to be shocked with *one* Absurdity in your Party, and yet to defend all the *rest*? Whose only plausible Support, too, happens to be in that *one* which you reject. Indeed, indeed, my kind Friend,

—*Pudor te malus urget,  
Insanos qui inter vecare insanos haberi.*

—But the Cause, though not the Advocate, demands a serious Confutation. And as the only Support of it, against the *Argument of The Divine Legation*, lies in these calumnious Appeals to vulgar Prejudices; which our *Anonymous*, in the Passage above, has enforced with his heartiest Malice; I will here, once for all, examine their Pretensions: and so as they shall never henceforward be considered, in the learned World at least, as any other than mere vulgar Prejudices.

To begin then with the *Subject* of the *first* Proposition, That *God shut out the Israclites from the Knowledge of a future State*; which (in the Case given) is throwing that upon God for which Man only is accountable. The *Israclites* were indeed *shut out*; yet, not as he dreams, *by the very Act of God himself*; but, if he will have the Truth who never seeks it as he ought, by the very Act of their Forefather, *Adam*. It was the *first* Man who *shut them out*: And the Door of Paradise was never opened again till the coming of the *second* Man, *the Lord from Heaven*. But this, I own, is answering him in a strange Language; the Language of Scripture. A Language his Systems will never enable him to understand.—But more of this Secret, for such, I find, it is to our *Examiner*, in my next Volume.

But, to shew what infinite Loss they sustained in this Exclusion, he goes on, and says, that *a future State is the single Point of Knowledge which can be the Foundation of a reasonable Worship*. Here, Doctors differ. St. PAUL places *the Foundation of a reasonable Worship* in another Thing. He saith, that HE THAT COMETH TO GOD MUST BELIEVE THAT HE IS, AND THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM \*. What is

\* Heb. xi. 6.

Man's Purpose in *coming to God*? Why, certainly, to *worship* him. And what doth the Apostle tell us is the true, the *reasonable Foundation of this Worship*? Why, *to believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that seek him*. What becomes then of our Examiner's *only Foundation of a reasonable Worship*? The Apostle, we see, places it in the *Nature*, and not (as our Examiner) in the *essential Circumstances*, of *Reward*: Consequently a Reward given *here*, was as true a *Foundation of reasonable Worship* to the early *Jews*, living under an *extraordinary Providence*, as a Reward given *hereafter* is to us Christians, living under an *ordinary* one: And consequently our Examiner must have been mistaken, when he made a *FUTURE STATE* the *single Point of Knowledge which can be the Foundation of a reasonable Worship*.—But does not *common Sense* say the same thing?

For to come a little closer to this formidable Man, now I have got an Apostle on my Side; I will undertake to *demonstrate* (how much soever he dislikes the Word) that a *FUTURE STATE* is so far from being *the only Foundation of a reasonable Worship*, that, while *God is believed the Rewarder of them that diligently seek him* (and that is the Case of a People under an *extraordinary Providence*) the *Ignorance of a Future State* neither affects *Piety* nor *Morality*; the two things which constitute a *reasonable Worship*, and perfect Mankind in *Virtue*.

Not *Piety*, because that (in the Case given) depends solely on the *Belief that God is*.

Not *Morality*, because that depends solely on the *Knowledge of what God commands*.

And this, which *right Reason* teaches, the *Law of Moses* has promulged. We are commanded to *love God* for his Sake, that is, for the Excellence of his Nature, the most lovely of all Objects. We are commanded to *love our Neighbour*; and the prescribed Measure, *as our selves*, points to the Equity of the Command; for, being all equal by Nature, we should have but one Rule of acting, for ourselves and others. This is resolvable into the natural Relations of things; and those Relations are the *Declarations of God's Will*, the only true Foundation of *Morality*; and, as such, perpetually enforced by the *Law of Moses*. Thus firmly established are the Duties of the first and second Table. Now, *on the Love of God and of our Neighbour hang all the Law and the Prophets*. That these therefore should not be able at the same time to support a *Reasonable Worship*, when, to all this *Divine Enforcement of the Belief that God is*, it is added, that he is an exact



exact Rewarder of them that diligently seek him, would be a very hard Case indeed; especially if we consider, that, to our corrupt Nature, it is not the immeasurable Reward at Distance, but that which is present, and understood by us, that most forcibly attracts us. And this it was, which the Law of *Moses* held out.

In a Word then, since *pure Virtue*, under which Term I comprise *Piety* and *Morality*, consists in acting agreeably to those Relations in which we stand to all Beings whatsoever; is it possible there can be any more forcible Inducement to our *reasonable Nature* for the Practice of it, than that which is proposed by the Law of *Moses*, namely, that God commands it out of our Love and Fear and Duty towards him? Or any more forcible Inducement to our *corrupt Nature*, than that every Work shall receive its full Recompence of Reward, through the Administration of an *extraordinary Providence*? How then is it possible that a *Long*, or *short Duration*, the Rewards of *this*, or of *another* Life, should in the least *essentially* affect the Purity, or Integrity of human Virtue, so taught and recommended; that is, a *reasonable Worship*, in the *Spirit* of Piety, and *Truth* of Morality?

To suppose that Virtue cannot be pure and perfect but when forced upon Men by the Immensity of Punishment, is having no better an Idea of it than the Pagan Slave in the Poet,

*Sum bonus ac frugi: renuit negitatque Sabellus.*

Indeed, in the *ordinary* Distribution of Things, where the Rewards and Punishments of Religion lie at distance, I believe nothing less than the Promises and Terrors of the *Christian* would be, generally, sufficient to support the Practice it enjoins. But here too, it is still the Love and Fear of *God*, not of *Reward* and *Punishment*, that are held out to us, to perfect and sublime our Virtue; though the *others* likewise be laid before us to raise and quicken it.

But here, let me not be again misunderstood, as I have been once already, by this super-subtile *Examiner*. I deny indeed that the Want of a future State in the *Jewish* Religion, under an *extraordinary Providence*, could at all affect the Truth and Purity of human Virtue, as there founded and enforced: Yet, at the same time, I am very far from denying but that other Things did hinder that Religion from being perfect. Nay, in my Address to the *Jews*\*, prefixed to the second Volume of *The Divine*

\* Ded. to the Jews, p. xxii.—In the present Edition, see vol. II. p. 276.

*Legation*, I have shewn what these Things were: As, first, *the whole Turn of the Actual Laws*: And, secondly, *the Want of a future State under the ordinary and common Providence of Mankind* \*. For I am there applying, to these mistaken People, a View of *Moses's* Religion as it appears under their present Condition, in order to convince them of the Necessity of having its Imperfection supplied by the Religion of *Jesus*; in which, I suppose, all Christians are agreed. At least, as many as are out of the thick Darkness of Controversy will see these to be very different and distinct Positions. The one saying, that their Virtue might be pure and perfect, *during the Times of an extraordinary Providence*, for any thing that the Ignorance of a future State could affect to the contrary. The other, that a Religion without a future State, on the Supposition of its being to serve *for all Times*, must be very imperfect.

I might now expect, after so full a Confutation of this erroneous Opinion, concerning *the Foundation of a reasonable Worship*, that our Examiner should *blush* for his Rashness in asserting, that *the Ignorance of the Jews concerning a future State is a Disgrace to Revelation*. An Expression, which, were there but a Chance of his being wrong, a sober Divine would carefully have avoided; as altogether unsuitable to that Reverence we owe to God, while measuring his tremendous Providence by our scanty and uncertain Ideas of *fit and right*. I might say, indeed, that the *Jews's* Ignorance of a future State was a Truth of *so high Importance*, that, from thence, could be demonstrated the Divinity of their Dispensation; and, I presume, without Offence to any sober Man; because, if I were mistaken, no Injury was done to Revelation; I left it whole and entire, just as I took it up. But should the Examiner be mistaken, his calling this Ignorance a DISGRACE TO REVELATION would be affording such an Handle to the Enemies of Religion to blaspheme, as he should tremble to think of.

But, if I know him well, he is not a Writer of *Retractions*. He has another Reason for calling it a *Disgrace to Revelation*. For, *It shuts up* (he says) *God's own chosen People from a future State, while by the Directions of his Providence all the World besides were permitted to have the Benefit of it*. And now, good People, you have it all: And if this will not move you, why—The Author of *The Divine Legation*, for any thing I see, may go on.

This *second* Proposition we see is, that (in the Case given) “all the “Pagan World were by the divine Providence *permitted* to enjoy a *Benefit*

\* Page xxiii, (Vol. II, p. 276.)

“which

“ which was denied to the *Jews*.” Examining the *Predicate* of this Proposition, we shall first consider the PERMISSION, and then the BENEFIT.

*All the World besides*, says he, *were permitted*.—By what Instrument? By the Use of their Reason.—And had not the *Jews* the Use of theirs? Not the *free* Use: For their Prophet delivering to them, from God, a new Law and Religion, in which the Doctrine of a future State was not found, this would naturally lead them to conclude against it.—What, in Defiance of all the Deductions of Reason, which, from God’s demonstrable Attributes of Goodness and Justice, made the Pagan World conclude, that, as moral Good and Evil had not their Retribution *here*, they would have it *hereafter*? Yes indeed, so we find it was.—Strange! that this *Moses* should have such an Influence over a People’s Understanding! Why, if you will have it, he promised that Good and Evil should have their Retribution *here*.—Ay, now the Secret is out. Well, indeed, might this *but* them up from looking further; especially if (as you pretend to *believe*) he not only *promised*, but *performed*, likewise. See then to what this PERMISSION amounts, so invidiously urged, not against me, for that is nothing, but against the Scriptures of God. Just to thus much, “ That *all the World* “ *besides* were *permitted* to find out, by *Reason*, what his own chosen People were taught, by the practical Demonstration of an *extraordinary Providence*; namely, that God would act with Justice and Goodness towards “ Man.”

Come we now to the *Benefit*. The Benefit of the Doctrine of a *future State* is twofold. To *Society as such*, as it is a Curb to *Vice* by supporting the Belief of a Providence, under the *unequal* Distribution of Things: And to *Religion as such*, as it is an Incentive to *Virtue*, by shewing the Rate set upon it. The Doctrine of a *future State*, in the Pagan World, afforded indeed that *Benefit to Society*: But then, that Benefit the *Jewish* State did not want, as being under an *equal* Distribution of Things. *Benefit to Religion*, their *Doctrine* of a future State afforded none. It was over-run with Superstitions; and generally gave the Rewards of another Life, not to *moral* but to *ritual* Observances. And when not so, as in the open teaching of the *Mysteries*, yet even there the severest Punishments in the Pagan Hell were allotted to the *Atheists*, or the Rejectors of the vulgar *Poltheism*; which, not only utterly deprived Religion, but riveted Men in its *Darkness*. So that, in the Sense of our *Examiner* (who is here speaking of the Benefit

Benefit of a future State to *Religion, as such*, this *future State of all the World besides* was indeed no *Benefit* at all. But he will say, I have shewn, that the *Discovery* of the *Mysteries* removed these Errors. It is true, I have. But, at the same time, likewise, that these were revealed to very few. And, to let Matters even, has not he shewn from Bishop Bull \*, that the *hidden Mysteries of the Law were opened to fit Hearers, wherever they were found?* though, from the *total Silence* of a future State, in the old *Jewish History*, I suspect, *these were still fewer*. Which Opinion I will be ready to retract, when he shall shew me, in the *Jewish Antiquities*, as plain Intimations of a *future State*, amongst the *hidden Mysteries of the Law*, as I have shewn him in the *Grecian*, of the Doctrine of the *Unity, and the Detection of vulgar Polytheism* amongst the *Mysteries of Paganism*. But had a future State afforded the *Pagans* never so much Benefit to *Religion as such*: Yet neither this did the *Jewish* People want, and for the same Reason as above, because they were under an *extraordinary Providence*. And now let us see to what the *BENEFIT* amounts.

The *Pagans had a future State* to support their Society and Religion.

But then, so circumstanced, that it was of Service to *Society* only, although *both* wanted it.

The *Jews had no future State* to support their Society and Religion.

But then, *neither* wanted it.

And now, I pray you, on which Side lies the Balance of the *Benefit*? We commonly hear it said, that *seeing is believing*: but I suspect our Examiner has been imposed on by a very different Aphorism, as absurd in the Thought as the other is in the Expression, that *believing his having* a Principle not unworthy of his School. Else how comes he to place so great a *Benefit* in the Point in Question, if he did not suppose that the *Jews'* want of the *Doctrine* deprived them of the *Thing*?

But have I not been reckoning all this Time without my Host, while I argued against these silly Prejudices, upon the Confession of an *extraordinary Providence*? For, disputing here with *Christian Men*, I have supposed that they believed such a Dispensation. And prudent was it in me so to do. For had I been called upon to prove my *Supposition*, I do not know whether what I could say would have satisfied the judicious Reader, who had observed that all the Arguments they use against me receive the little Force

\* Page 123.

they have on a *contrary* Supposition. And even this *private* Letter-writer, one of the most candid of his kind, had still a Reason in reserve, to prove why the Promise of *Life*, in his favourite Text of *Leviticus*, must needs mean *eternal Life*, and not *temporal* only, which looks very much that way; it is, *because the best Men* (he says) *were often cut off in the midst of their Days, and frequently suffered greater Adversities than the most profligate Sinners.* Who now that had even a Mind to let us see he believed nothing of the Matter, could have expressed his Meaning in stronger or more significant Terms? I am not ashamed to confess I read my Bible; and believed what it told me of this *extraordinary Providence*; and, in the Simplicity of my Heart, would needs try if I could make the Deist believe too. I found it was this that most revolted him: and therefore undertook to prove, from the very Constitution of their Oeconomy, that the *Representation* must needs be true, and so, while I was removing his *Objections* to Revelation, give him a Demonstration of its *Truth*. In the mean time, I little suspected that a Set of Men, who call themselves Believers, would, for the Sake only of combating the *Medium* of my Demonstration, ever venture to call in Question that very Fact for which I was contending with *their* Adversaries; and in a way their Adversaries (except it were perhaps *Spinosa* and his Man *Toland*) had never attempted, namely, by a virtual Denial of the *Representation*. If this was to be contested me, I could have wished, for the Honour of *Revelation*, it had been done by the professed Enemies of it: And then I could have exposed their *Prevarication* without much Regret. As it is, I rather chuse to draw a Veil over this *Infirmity of the Flesh*; AND WAIT FOR the *Renewal of a right Spirit within them.*



R E M A R K S  
O N S E V E R A L  
O C C A S I O N A L R E F L E C T I O N S :

I N A N S W E R T O

The R E V E R E N D D O C T O R S

S T E B B I N G and S Y K E S.

Serving to explain and justify the Two DISSERTATIONS in the

D I V I N E L E G A T I O N,

C O N C E R N I N G T H E

*Command to ABRAHAM to offer up his Son;*

A N D T H E

*Nature of the JEWISH THEOCRACY;*

Objected to by those L E A R N E D W R I T E R S.

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P A R T II. and Last.

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Arcades ambo,  
Et cantare pares, et RESPONDERE parati. VIRG.

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Quid immerentes hospites vexas, Canis,  
Ignavus adversum Lupos?  
Nam, qualis aut Molossus, aut fulvus Lacon,  
AMICA VIS PASTORIBUS,  
Agam per altas aure sublata nives,  
Quæcunque præcedet Fera.  
Tu quum timenda voce complesti Nemus,  
Projectum odoraris CIBUM. *Hor.*



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P R E F A C E.

THE two SUBJECTS here debated will deserve the Attention of every serious Believer; especially, those of my own Order. For the Sake of such, I shall just hazard a few Observations, which I thought rather too good to be thrown away upon those whom the following Sheets more immediately concerned.

I. The Reader finds here, what the Learned Dr. *Stebbing* has been able to object to my Interpretation of the COMMAND TO ABRAHAM: Which, I presume, when fairly attended to, will be no light Confirmation of its Truth. But, as I have no Notions to advance, not founded in a sincere Desire to demonstrate the Divinity of our Holy Religion, I would by no means take the Advantage of a weak Adversary, to recommend them to the public Acceptance. I hold it not honest, therefore, to conceal an Objection to my Interpretation, by far more plausible than any that zealous Gentleman has urged against it; which is This, “That it is difficult to conceive how a Circumstance of so much Importance to Revelation, as the removing one of the strongest infidel Objections against its Truth, and proving a real Connexion between the two Dispensations of it, should never be clearly explained and insisted on by the Writers of the New Testament, though the Historian of the *Old* might have had sufficient Reasons for concealing it.” To which I beg Leave to reply, that it is very certain, that many Truths of great importance, for the Support of Religion against Infidelity,

Insidiously, were taught by *Jesus* to his Disciples (amongst which, I reckon this Interpretation to be one) which never came down, by their Conveyance, to the Church. But being, by the Assistance of God's Holy Spirit, discoverable by those who devote themselves to the Study of the Scriptures with a pure Mind, have, for the wise Ends of Providence, inscrutable to us, been left for the Industry of Man to find out, that, as occasion required, every Age might supply new Evidence of God's Truth, to *put to Silence the Ignorance of flesh Men*: And that, in proportion as the Power of Darkneſs thickened, ſo might the Splendour of the Goſpel light; that Light which was ordained, at laſt, entirely to diſperſe it. In ſupport of what is here ſaid, I beg the Reader to reflect on what is told us by the Evangelist, of the Converſation between *Jesus* (after his Reſurrection) and the two Diſciples journeying to *Emmaus*; where their Maſter ſays unto them, *O Fools, and ſlow of Heart to believe all that the Prophets have ſpoken! Ought not Chriſt to have ſuffered theſe Things, and to enter into his Glory? And beginning at MOSES, and all the Prophets, he expounded unto them the Things concerning himſelf* \*. Now who can doubt, but that many Things were here revealed, which would have greatly contributed to the Demonſtration of the Goſpel Truth? Yet hath it pleaſed Providence that this Diſcourſe ſhould never be recorded. But that the Apoſtles uſed, and made a good uſe too, of thoſe Inſtructions, we have the plaineſt Evidence from their amazing Succeſs in the Converſion of the World, by this Application of the Writings of *Moses and the Prophets*. And if I be not greatly deceived, amongst Truths inforced on thoſe Occaſions, that, which I preſume to have diſcovered in the *Command to Abraham*, was not forgotten. Let the unprejudiced Reader judge. *St. Paul*, making his Apology before King *Agrippa*, recapitulates his Defence in theſe Words: *Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this Day witneſſing both to ſmall and great, ſaying none other Things than thoſe which the Prophets, and MOSES,*

\* St. Luke, chap. xxiv. ver. 26, 27.

DID SAY SHOULD COME: *that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the Dead* \*. The Greek is rather stronger, in predicating this Circumstance of *Moses*—ὡς τε ὁ πρῶτος φῆται ἐλάλησαν μελλόντων γίνεσθαι ΚΑΙ ΜΩΣΗΣ. Now where, let me ask, in all his Writings, except in the *Command to Abraham*, is there the least Trace of any such Circumstance, as *that Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the Dead*? Or in that *Command* either, if not understood according to our Interpretation?

But further, as the Apostles did not convey several illustrious Truths taught them by their Master to the Churches which they founded: So neither (and doubtless for the same wise Ends of Providence) did the Churches convey down to Posterity several Truths revealed to them by the Apostles. An Instance of which we have in *St. Paul's* second Epistle to the *Thessalonians*, where, speaking of *Anti-Christ*, or the *Man of Sin*, he reminds the Church of what it was he told them yet *lett* or hindered his Coming.—*Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now you know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his Time.* But the Knowledge of this *lett* or *hindrance* the Church of God hath long lost. And yet it is a Matter of very high Concernment. I have ever thought, the Prophecies relating to Antichrist, interspersed up and down the New and Old Testament, the most convincing Proof of the Truth of the Christian Religion that any moral Matter is capable of receiving. That a *Roman Power* is meant, is so exceeding evident, that it is that Point in which all Parties are agreed. But to fix it to the individual Power (a Determination highly interesting both the Truth and Purity of Religion) it must first be known whether the Power spoken of be *Civil* or *Ecclesiastical*. Protestants, in general, think they see all the Marks of the latter. The Catholics, as they are called, contend of Necessity for the former: And they have many great Names even among us on

\* Acts, Chap. xxvi, ver. 22, 23.

their Side (by what odd Concurrence of Circumstances, may be considered in another Place). This has long embarrassed a Question, on the right Determination of which alone, I am fully persuaded, one might rest the whole Truth of the Christian Cause. Now the Knowledge of what it was that *lett* or *bindered* the Appearance of Antichrist, which St *Paul* communicated to the Church of *Jherusalem*, would at once determine the Question. But this is the State in which it hath pleased Providence to place the Church of *Christ*: With abundant Evidence to support itself against Infidelity; yet so much left to be discovered as may rightly exercise the Faith and Industry of all humble and sober Adorers of the Cross. Which however shews it was not the Intent of Providence that one of these Virtues should thrive at the Expence of the other. Therefore when my learned Adversary \*, in order, I will believe, to advance Christian Faith, would discourage Christian Industry, by calumniating, and rendering suspected, what he is pleased to call EXPERIMENTS in Religion, it is, I am afraid, at best, but a *Z'el without Knowledge*. Indeed, if Men will come to this Study with *unwashed Hands*, that is, without a due Reverence of the Dignity of these sacred Volumes; or, what is as ill in the other extreme, with *unpurged Heads*, that is, stuffed full of Systems, or made giddy by Enthusiasm, it is not unreasonable to expect the Success which Dr. *Stebbing* pretends to have observed. But then, let him keep his Advice for those whom it concerns.

II. The other Subject debated in this Pamphlet is of the THEOCRACY of the *Jews*. Having undertaken to prove the Divinity of the *Mosaic* Religion from the actual Administration of an extraordinary Providence over that State in general, and over private Men in particular, by the Medium of the Omission of a future State of Rewards and Punishments in their Oeconomy; what I had to do was to shew from Scripture, that such a Dispensation of Providence was there *represented* to have been administered. This I did two

\* Dr. Stebbing.

Ways, from the Nature of the thing; and from the exprefs Words of Scripture. Under the first Head, I shewed \* that, from the Nature of a *Theocracy*, it necessarily followed, by as plain an Induction as that Protection follows Obedience to the Civil Magistrate, that there must be an extraordinary Providence over the State in general, and over all the Members of it in particular. And that though a Theocracy were only pretended, yet, if the Institutor of it knew the meaning of his own Contrivance, he must, of courie, pretend *this* extraordinary Providence likewise. In support of which last Observation I have shewn \*, in the second Place, that such a Dispensation of Providence is actually, and in exprefs Words of Scripture, said to be administered. After this, what has an Unbeliever to do (for it is hard to think how any other should have any thing to do in it) who would invalidate this *Representation*, but either to deny that the *Jewish* Form of Government was *Theocratical*, and, by that means, endeavour to deprive me of the *first* of my Proofs, from the Nature of the thing: Or to allow this pretended *Theocracy*, yet shew from Fact, by Scripture History, that such a Dispensation of Providence was not administered; which would subvert *both* my Proofs. And this sure none but an Unbeliever could deliberately do, because it argues *Moses* of Imposture. For if an extraordinary Providence to the State and to Particulars necessarily follows a Theocracy, and yet such a Providence was not actually administered, then this Theocracy was not real, but pretended only. Now Dr. *Sykes* has undertaken to prove that the extraordinary Dispensation of Providence did not extend to particulars. In this I blame him not. Every Man must think for himself; and the Objection is fairly urged. But what creates my Wonder is, that when, contrary to common Sense and common Scripture, he pretends to admit an extraordinary Providence to the State in Consequence of a *Theocracy*, while he opposes that to particulars, he should yet think to pass upon his Reader for an Advocate of the Bible. If he sees the thing in the Light here stated, what an

\* Both in *The Divine Legation* and in this Pamphlet.

Opinion must he have of the Public? If he sees it not, what an Opinion must the Public have of him? But let him debate this Point with himself at leisure. All the Advantage I have taken of his bad Reasoning is not to discover, nor consequently to discredit, his Opinions; but merely to support my own.

III. In the last Place, it may be permitted me to observe, that these two learned Doctors, who imagine, that all the Time they have been writing against me, they were opposing the *Conclusion of The Divine Legation*, have, indeed, allowed all I wanted to make my Argument demonstrative: Dr. *Stebbing*, by owning that *Moses did not teach, nor had it in Commission to teach, a future State of Rewards and Punishments*; and Dr. *Sykes*, by owning that *an extraordinary Providence was administered over the Jewish State and People in general*. If it be asked then why I would clog my Argument, by insisting on the *Jewish People's Ignorance in general of a future State*, and the Administration of an *extraordinary Providence to particulars*; I reply, it was on the same Principle that *Moses* clogged his Institution with a *Theocracy*. He did it in Obedience to the Divine Command; and I, out of my Observance to Truth. But had he been of that Species of Lawgivers in which Dr. *Sykes* seems to rank him, I conclude he would not have unnecessarily instituted a form of Government that must, at every step, have detected his Imposture. And had I wrote to advance my own Notions, the equitable Reader will conclude I should never have given so many needless Provocations to this testy Race of ANSWERERS.

April 14, 1745.

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 R E M A R K S

ON SEVERAL

## OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

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 P A R T   T H E   S E C O N D .
 

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**T**HE Curious Reader of the many and various Answerers of the *Divine Legation* (if any such there be) cannot chuse but smile to see them so unaimously concur in representing me as desperately enamoured of Controversy, and resolute and determined for the last Word; especially, when it is observed, that, of Ten or Twelve very sizable Books, written against it, I have taken notice of a small part only of Two or Three. What their Motives were, in this representation, is neither worth mine, nor the Reader's while, to conjecture. The plain fact is, I would willingly avoid all controversy, so far as is consistent with a regard to the Public; to which I have thought fit to appeal; and, to which, consequently, I have given a kind of right to expect, either an Answer to all material Objections, or a Confession of their Force.

For such as these I have still waited; and now find I am likely to wait. In the mean time, I must either be silent, or take up with what Fortune sends. And who could be long undetermined? For he must be very fond of Controversy indeed, who would think of entering into a serious Dispute, either with *him*, who holds *That natural Religion has not, and yet the Law of Moses has, the Sanction of a future State of Rewards and Punishments*\*: Or with that *other*, who *cannot see*, and therefore, with a modest Boldness peculiar to the blind, affirms “there is *not* the least connexion “between the two propositions, an *extraordinary Providence* and the “*Omission of a future State* †.” With the same quickness of Sight, I make

\* An Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, by T. Rutherford, B. D. Fellow of St. John's College in Cambridge, and of the Royal Society. Cambridge.

† The Belief of a future State proved to be a fundamental Article of the Religion of the Hebrews, &c. By John Jackson, Rector of Rofington, &c. London.—p. 64. Where the Reader will see, that all his Objections, even to the very Blunders, have been obviated or answered by me long ago. An Instance of this, as it now happens to lye before me, will not be unentertaining.—“As a Future State (says he) may be demonstrably deduced from Principles of natural Reason, so IT IS CONTAINED in the Proposition laid down by St. Paul, *He that cometh to God (as a Worshipper of him) must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of those who diligently seek him*, Heb. xi. 6.” P. 9. His Argument requires him to mean *necessarily contained*. But before that can be shewn, it must be proved that God *cannot*, in this World, reward those who diligently seek him; And he who should go about to prove that, would go near to contradict all which Moses has said, in the Sanction of his Law, “that God not only *could*, but *would*, reward those, in this World, who diligently seek him.” But St. Paul knew what he said, though this Man does not. He knew the Proposition did not *necessarily*, but might, or might not, contain a future State, just as the Writer applied it: And he delivered it accordingly. First, As he was an *exact* Reasoner, Because the support of Religion depends not on Rewards *here* or *hereafter*; but on the *equal* Distribution of them, *wherefoever* they are conferred. Secondly, he was a *pertinent* Reasoner, because he would include the Sanction of the *Mosaic* as well as *Christian* Religion; the first of which (as he tells us elsewhere) had the *Premise of the Life that now is*; the other, of *that which is to come*. This Blunder, as the Reader may remember, was exposed in the *first Part* of these *Remarks*, p. 371. But I would recommend Mr. Jackson's whole Pamphlet to his Perusal as a Specimen of that illustrious Band, in which he has thought  
fit



I make no doubt he would affirm, *that there is not the least Connection* between the old *English* Honour, and the long *Omission* of a Qualification Law for Members of the House of Commons: And is therefore to be referred to the Class of those whom I send for an Answer, to the Story of *Bertrand* and his Reading Glasses.

But when, at present, no urgent Occasion drove me to trouble the Reader in my own Vindication, an inviting Opportunity offered itself, of revenging Letters in general, on their very worst and most relentless Enemy, the ANSWERER BY PROFESSION. Of whose Trade happening to speak with the Contempt that it deserves, I was accused by the *dull Malice of these Answerers* themselves to mean the Gentlemen of the long-Robe; the most learned as well as useful Body in the State; and, by far, the most capable Part of that Public to whose Lay-judgment I had appealed: The only Men who speak Sense concerning MORAL OBLIGATION, and the best Judges of Truth, by their Knowledge of MORAL EVIDENCE: Their habitual Acquaintance with its Nature and with the proportioned Weight accompanying every varying Degree of Probability, (a Knowledge where Reason is in its Sovereignty) qualifying them to determine in all clear Questions of Religion. But as the plainest Description could not secure me against so ridiculous a Calumny; it may be proper to present the Reader with the Originals themselves. Two of which, Fortune hath just thrown into my Hands; and two the most curious of their kind. They had been *Answerers* from their early Youth; and, as the Heads of opposite Parties, never yet agreed in any one thing but in writing against the

fit to insist; and which indeed would have been imperfect without this *Answerer General*; who has all his Life long opposed himself to whatever received the Public Approbation: And after having written against the *Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, does me too much Honour to be entirely overlooked. Which however, it is probable he had been. but for these Words in his *Title Page*,—*The Doctrine of the ancient Philosophers concerning a future State shown to be consistent with Reason*. A vile Insinuation! intimating that I had written something *against* the Reasonableness of that Doctrine.

*Divine*

*Divine Legation.* Here they went to work as Brethren : and, indeed, not without Reason : The Book was manifestly calculated to spoil their Trade.

These Reverend Veterans, whom one may, not improperly, call *Wardens of the Company*, had both, as we say, trod the same Path to Glory,

*Ille pedum melior motu —*

*Hic membris et mole valens —*

and stuck themselves to the Fortunes and Principles of two truly great Men, to whom, the present happy Establishment is exceedingly indebted; to the One, for his support of our *Religious* Constitution; to the Other, for that of our *Civil*. In the Prosecution of which Services, just Reasons of Church and State had drawn them into different Ways of thinking and engaged in a very warm Controversy, where the Interests of both were capitally concerned.

Into this famous Dispute, without any other Preparation than a willing Mind, and a strong Desire to be doing, our two Squires-Errent would needs thrust themselves, to bear the Wallet, for Salve and Lint, and the Balsam of *Pierabras*: Where they battled it, unasked, with the broken Launces, that fell on each side, from the conflict of their Masters. But let not the Reader imagine these were only Things they picked up in the Combat. For, though the Dispute was, whether a pure Virgin Church should be given up to the polluted and prophane Embraces of old Civil Policy; yet our Squires, like honest *Sancho Pancha* at the Marriage-feast of the fair *Quiteria*, agreed not to quarrel with the *Scum* of good *Camacho's* Kitchen. In a word, not to dishonour them by Comparitons, like *Homer's* Heroes, they did their Work, and din'd.

But now that both have been so much luckier than Men generally are after a drawn-battle, one would imagine they should have been glad to give the poor remainder of their Lives a little Rest;

and

and not go out again seeking Adventures, where nothing was to be expected but dry Blows. For the golden Days of Controversy had been long over. Here was no Church to be defended but that of *Moses*; which would hardly bear its own Charges. A *Jewish* Theocracy was a barren Field, compared to an *English* Establishment; and a Conflict in those quarters was like a Battle in Fairyland, which affords no Spoils but in Description. The sage *Sancho* might, here again, have been their Example, who was glad at last, even unknighthed, to retire with the moderate gratification of a *Bill of exchange* for three Asses. But,

“ Our Beavor’d Knights, who bear upon their Shield  
 “ Three Steeples argent in a fable Field,”

are still restless and unsatisfied, and aspiring after the GOLDEN HELMET OF MAMBRINO.

Since therefore they have thought fit once more to entertain the Public, I will do my part that they lose not the last and only reward yet unpaid them, a Ceremonial and solemn *Plaudite*: that the Posterity of those whom they so well entertained in the last Age, may understand what good Judges their Fathers were of Merit. For Merit they laid claim to; and this search after Adventures, they called a *search after Truth*. For the easiest of all things is to give a good Name; as the hardest is to deserve one. Thus, (in the manner of these Moderators between Truth and Falshood) the TOY-MAN OF BATH, with great Solemnity of Face informs you, that he is a *Factor between the Poor and the Rich*. Not that this Importance would be much amiss, if it stopt there; as affording others (who take the thing right, in the sense of *making the most of both*) a very innocent occasion of mirth: But the mischief is, It is apt to give them wrong Notions of themselves: And the *Answerer* begins to think himself a Servant of Truth; and the Toyman, an useful Member in the State.

But I should be very unjust to my own Order, did I suffer the Reader to remain under a wrong Impression, as if these were the usual

usual ways of rising to the Honours of the Gown. I have the Pleasure of seeing, in the number of my Friends, many who have made their Fortune by supporting the Dignity of Scholars, and preserving the Integrity of Churchmen. And it is with high Satisfaction I can take this occasion of doing Justice to the Merit of two of them in particular, who have both greatly distinguished themselves, in the common Service of Religion, against Libertinism and Infidelity. In which, the one has so employed his great talents of Reasoning, and profound Knowledge in true Philosophy; and the other, his familiar Acquaintance with Antiquity, and his exact and critical Skill in the Languages; as to do all that can, in these Times, be expected from the ablest Servants of Truth, to put Infidelity to silence: While at the same time, to approve their own Sincerity, they have been so far from looking with a jealous or suspicious Eye on others engaged with them in the same Service, that it was with Pleasure they saw new Lights attempted to be struck out for its support; and with Readiness that they lent their best Assistance to put them in a way of being fairly considered. I need not tell the Reader, that in this Account I pay a very sparing Tribute to the Merit of the worthy Deans of *Christ-Church* and *Winchester* \*.

## R E M A R K   I.

BUT it is now time our Heroes should *answer* for themselves. The *Examiner of my second Proposition* leads the way: Who, at the time of writing my *Appendix* to the first part of these *Remarks*, I had not the least conception to be Dr. *Stebbing*. And when afterwards I found the Pamphlet generally given to him, I had still one very particular Reason not to credit the Report. But when (on the best Information) I could no longer doubt of the Author, I sent him Word, that, if he would own his Book, I would give it a full Answer. He desired to be excused: And still hides

\* Dr. John Conybear and Dr. Zach. Pearce.

his head; so that we must try to catch this Eel of Controversy by the Tail; the only part which sticks out of the Mud; more dirty indeed than slippery; and still more weak than dirty: as passing through a Trap where he was forced, at every Step, to leave part of his Skin, that is, his System\*, behind him. His *Appendix* therefore, the part yet untouched, shall be the Subject of our following Remarks: It is intituled, *Considerations on the Command to offer up his Son*. In this he opposes an Explanation, which, if true, will be owned by all to be of the highest Service to Religion. I shall therefore beg leave to quote and re-examine it Paragraph by Paragraph.

By which it will be seen, that, as *Cicero* says of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, “ He fears nothing so much as to appear to the Reader to “doubt of any thing †:” And hopes nothing so much as that the Reader will never doubt of him. Hence it is, that he, all the way, boldly denies what he does not understand; and prudently conceals what he is unable to confute. But soft! before this important APPENDIX shews itself, we are gradually brought on and prepared for its Appearance by this Inquisitorial Sentence, which concludes his EXAMINATION. “ Whether you intend (*says he*) to proceed, “ or will suffer yourself to be wholly diverted from your Purpose “ by Matters of another Kind, LESS SUITABLE TO YOUR CLERICAL “ FUNCTION; you best know. But give me leave to say, Sir, you “ are a Debtor to the Public; and I hope that in your next Volume “ YOU WILL MAKE SOME AMENDS FOR THE WRONG YOU HAVE “ DONE TO RELIGION in this; in which, instead of placing Christianity upon a surer Bottom, YOU HAVE ONLY FURNISHED OUT “ MORE HANDLES TO UNBELIEVERS—Do you think such an “ Image of Revelation as this is likely to cure Unbelievers of their “ Prejudices, and will not rather minister fresh OFFENCE? If any “ thing hinders this Effect, it must be the ABSURDITY OF THE

\* See my Remarks on Several Occasional Reflections, p. 346, et seq.

† Nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur.

“ CONCEIT. But ENOUGH of this. If the Reader has a Mind to  
 “ see another very STRONG EXAMPLE OF THE SAME SORT OF MA-  
 “ NAGEMENT, he may find it in the APPENDIX \*.”

And in this manner has every honest Man been treated before me, whenever he did, or did but endeavour to serve Mankind. *Harvey* himself, who had more and much abler Examiners of the *Absurdity of his Conceit* than I have had of mine, scarce got better off with one *Æmilius Parisanus*, a Man of great name in *Italy*, who wrote a complete *Refutation* (as he called it) of the Doctor’s Arguments for the Circulation of the Blood: A Discovery which appears to have given this *Italian* no less Disturbance than *The Divine Legation* has given our Examiner.—“ Quamobrem nos aliter philosophati  
 “ et ratiocinati de *Harveii* fidentia (says he) admirati; de clar.  
 “ *Londinensis* *Academix* consensu et conspiratione obstupescati, &c.  
 “ —Verum enimvero collecto spiritu, missa tandem maximæ novi-  
 “ tatis admiratione, melius nobis consulti, ad vivum *Harveii* allata  
 “ refecantes, ut commenticia et ficta excogitata colligentes, propria  
 “ nostra sententia permanimus.—Semper in ore atque in animo  
 “ habere debemus, ut homines nos esse meminerimus, ea lege  
 “ natos, ut exposita fortunæ telis omnibus et nostra sit vita, & nos-  
 “ træ actiones cunctæ sub Censoribus semper extent: Proindeque  
 “ PERPETUO PUGNANDUM SIT; & nunc quam maxime, quum  
 “ pro aris et focis atque etiam *Larariis* (quippe *de Corde*, &c.) for-  
 “ titer decertandum.”—Seriously, this was a sad Story. The poor Gentleman was plainly frightened. But still he laments like a Gentleman. Here are no Insinuations that *Harvey* had suffered himself to be diverted by matters less suitable to his medical Function, while he was exploring the use of the *venal Valves*. Nor does he take the Liberty to tell him, that he ought to make *Amends for the Wrong he has done to Physic*; though he thought he had done a great deal: or that he had furnished out more bundles for *Empirics*; though he thought they had already too many: But he politely lays the

\* Exam. of Mr. *W*: second Prop. p. 132, 133.

fault upon the restless Temper of human Nature itself: which will never suffer us to enjoy our old Opinions in Quiet. But our Examiner is of another Cast. And nothing can save you harmless, when once you have incurred the Danger of OFFENCE, but the *Absurdity of your Conceits*: Though *Offence*, that fatal Enemy to Truth, be, of all *Conceits*, the most *absurd* whenever it is taken before it be given. It is true, the good *Æmilius* comes a little to himself, and nearer to our Examiner, in the Language of his Conclusion had recovered Heart; his Victories had elated him; and *Harveius* numerous Experiments upon all animal Nature afforded him a happy an Occasion of Raillery, as the *Dissertations* in *The Doctor's Legation* have given those who took them for *Digressions* “ Jam  
 “ diu (says he) per dumeta, vepres, fyrtes, ac scopulos, duxit nos  
 “ Harveius; diuque in ejus vivariis et piscinis inter testudines, an-  
 “ guillas, cochleas, ranas, bufones, et serpentes, vagati sumus;  
 “ omnia tamen evertimus, ejusque perversa vestigia cuncta detexi-  
 “ mus; omnia cum pulvisculo everrentes quàm longissime ablega-  
 “ vimus. Quæ in celebrium antiquorum recentiorumque omnium ab  
 “ Harveio immerito notatorum, defensionem dicta sunt. Heic—  
 “ redeamus; ut quæ jam reprobata et ablegata sunt, ratione, sensu,  
 “ AUTOPSIA, experimentis, in veritatis gratiam fortius obstringan-  
 “ tur—prædictæ opinionis omnia destruendo, et inter sese pugnanti-  
 “ ulterius ostendendo,” &c. &c. And in the same Strain, our Examiner. Who assures his Reader, that, if any thing can hinder the ill Effects which my Interpretation of *the Command to Abraham* must have upon Religion, it will be his exposing the *Absurdity of the Conceit*. This is confidently said. But, what then? He can prove it. So it is to be hoped. If not—However let us first give him a fair hearing.

“ I nunc, et verbis virtutem illud superbis.”

## H.

He begins with telling me, “that my Account of the Command  
 “to *Abraham* to offer up his Son *Isaac*, has no Foundation in Truth;  
 “and that in attempting to remove Objections, very well GUARDED  
 “against by the common Interpretation, I have raised new ones  
 “not to be answered upon mine. And of this (*says he*) let the  
 “Reader judge \*.”—Agreed—“Your Position then (continues he)  
 “is this: *That when God says to Abraham, Take thou thy Son, thy*  
 “*only Son Isaac, &c. the Command is merely an Information by Action*  
 “*instead of Words, of the great Sacrifice of the Redemption of*  
 “*Mankind, given at the request of Abraham; who longed, impatient-*  
 “*ly, to see Christ’s Day.* The Foundation of your Thesis you lay  
 “in that Scripture of *St. John* (c. viii. 56.) where *Jesus* says to the  
 “unbelieving *Jews, Your Father Abraham rejoiced to see my Day,*  
 “*and he saw it and was glad,* p. 572. As this Text is your Cor-  
 “ner-stone, your Interpretation ought to be very strongly support-  
 “ed †.” Well, as he doubts its Strength, and loves the solid But-  
 tress of an Authority, let him even take before we go any further,  
 this old seasoned one from the famous *Hammond*; who when he had  
 translated *ἡγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν*, by—*Was exceeding*  
*glad THAT HE MIGHT SEE my Day*, proceeds to paraphrase the Text  
 in the following Words, which our Pharisaical Examiner may very  
 naturally consider as addressed to himself. *And because you talk so*  
*much of ABRAHAM, I will now say of him that he, having received*  
*the Promise of the Messiah, Gen. xi. 35. DID THEREUPON VEHE-*  
*MENTLY and with great Pleasure and Exiliency of Mind DESIRE*  
*TO LOOK NEARER INTO IT, to see my coming into the World, and a*  
*REVELATION of it WAS MADE UNTO HIM, and in it of the State of*  
*the Gospel, and he was heartily joyed at it ‡.* However, the force of

\* Considerations on the Command to *Abraham* to offer up *Isaac*, p. 137, 138.

† *Ibid.* p. 138.

‡ Paraph. on the New Testament, in loc.



our Examiner's concluding Remark will be seen when he comes to give us the Reason of it in it's place. In the mean time, let me observe, that, if he will needs make *this Text* my Corner-stone, he should have shewn it fairly as it was laid in *The Divine Legation*; and not have taken it out of its Cement, to make it fit for nothing but the blind Corner of an incoherent Pamphlet. But it was not for the Credit of his Examination to acquaint the Reader that my Observations on the Text of *St. John* were introduced in this Manner. *If we consider Abraham's personal Character, together with the Choice made of him for the Head and Origin of that People, which God would make holy and separate to himself, from whence was to arise the Redeemer of Mankind, the ultimate end of that Separation, we cannot but conclude it probable that the Knowledge of this Redeemer would be revealed to him. Shall I hide from Abraham the thing which I do? says God, in a Matter that much less concerned the Father of the Faithful. And here in the Words of Jesus, Abraham rejoiced, &c. we have this PROBABLE FACT made certain\*, &c.* And then I went on to prove, that by the Word *Day*, in the Text, was meant the great Sacrifice of *Christ*—But let us take it as it lies in our Considerer. “You say then (continues he, addressing himself to the Author of *The Divine Legation*) that by the Word *Day* is meant the great Sacrifice of *Christ*; which is thus proved: “*When the figurative Word DAY is used not to express in general the Period of any one's Existence, but to denote his peculiar Office and Employment; it must needs signify, that very Circumstance of his Life, which is the Characteristick of such Office and Employment. But Jesus is here speaking of his peculiar Office and Employment, i. e. his Office of Redeemer. Therefore, by the Word DAY must needs be meant that characteristic Circumstance of his Life. But that Circumstance was laying it down for the Redemption of Mankind. Consequently, by the Word DAY is meant the GREAT SACRIFICE of*

\* *Div. Leg.* Vol. II. Ed. 2. [which is that from whence I make all the following Quotations; not having the first Edition by me] p. 564. [See Vol. III. p. 371. of this Edition.]

“*Christ,*”

“Christ,” p. 593\*. This is indeed my Argument, fairly stated. And to that he replies. “Really, Sir, I see no manner of Consequence in this reasoning. That *Christ’s* Day hath reference to his Office as Redeemer, I grant. The Day of *Christ* denotes the Time when *Christ* should come, *i. e.* when HE should come who was to be such by Office and Employment. But why it must import *also* that when *Christ* came he should be offered up as a Sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend: Because I can very easily understand, that *Abraham* might have been informed that *Christ* was to come, without being informed that he was to lay down his Life as a Sacrifice. If *Abraham* saw that a Time would come when one of his Seed should take away the Curse, he saw *Christ’s* Day. And this I say he might see, whether he saw by what Act the Curse was taken away or not †.”

The Reader sees here, that, at first Sight, he would seem to grant my Premises.—“That *Christ’s* Day (says he) hath reference to the Office as Redeemer, I grant.” Yet the very next Words which he uses to explain it contradict it: *The Day of Christ denotes the TIME when Christ should come.* All the Sense therefore, I can make of the Concession, when joined to the Explanation of it, amounts to this—“*Christ’s* Day has reference to his Office: No, not to his Office, but to his Time.” But he may grow clearer as he runs. “But why it must import ALSO that when *Christ* came he should be offered up as a Sacrifice, I do not in the least apprehend.” Nor I, neither. Had I said, that the Word *Day* in the Text, imported the *Time*, I could have as little apprehended as he does, how that which imports *Time*, imports ALSO the *thing done* in Time. Let him take this Nonsense, therefore, to himself. I argued in a plain Manner, thus—When the Word *Day* is used to express, in general, the Period of any one’s Existence, then it denotes *Time*; when to express his peculiar *Office* and Employment, then it denotes, *not the Time*, but that Circumstance of Life cha-

\* Considerations, p. 138, 139.

† P. 139.

raſterific of ſuch *Office* and Employment. *Day*, in the Text, is uſed to expreſs *Chriſt's* peculiar *Office* and Employment. Therefore — But what follows is ſtill better. His want of Apprehenſion, it ſeems, is founded in this, “That he can eaſily underſtand, that *Abraham* might have been informed that *Chriſt* was to come; without being informed that he was to lay down his Life as a Sacrifice.” Yes, and ſo could I likewiſe; or I had never been at the pains of making the Criticiſm on the Word *Day*: Which takes all its Force from this very Truth, that *Abraham* might have been informed of one, without the other. And, therefore, to prove he was informed of *that other*, I produced the Text in Queſtion, which afforded the Occaſion of the Criticiſm. He goes on—“If *Abraham* ſaw, that a Time would come when one of his Seed ſhould take away the Curſe, he ſaw *Chriſt's Day*.” Without doubt he did: Becauſe it is agreed that *Day* may ſignify either *Time*, or *Circumſtance of Action*. But what is this to the purpoſe? The Queſtion is not whether the Word may not, indefinitely, ſignify *Time*; but whether it ſignifies *Time* in this Text. I have ſhewn it does not. And what has he ſaid to prove it does? Why that it may do ſo, in another Place. His whole Answer, therefore, to the Argument, we ſee, proceeds on an intire Inapprehenſion of the very Drift and Purpoſe of it.

## III.

I had ſaid, That not only the Matter, *but the Manner, likewiſe, of this great Revelation, is delivered in the Text.*—*Abraham* rejoiced to ſEE my Day, and he ſAW it, and was glad. Ἰνα ἴΔῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν, καὶ εἶΔΕ. Which evidently ſhews it to have been made, not by Relation in Words, but by REPRESENTATION in Action. That

\* But the Reader may ſee this Truth very well enforced, from Obſervations on the Context, by a learned and ſenſible Writer, in a Pamphlet ſigned L. U. P. and intituled, A Letter to the Author of a late Epistolary Diſſertation, addreſſed to Mr. Warburton, p. 38 to 41.

*the Verb εἶδω is frequently used, in the New Testament, in its proper Signification, to see sensibly. But whether literally or figuratively it always denotes a full Intuition. That the Expression was as strong in the Syrian Language, used by Jesus, as here, in the Greek of his Historian; which appears from the Reply the Jews made to him.—* Thou art not yet Fifty Years old, and hast thou SEEN Abraham? Plainly intimating, that they understood the Assertion, of Abraham's seeing Christ's Day, to be a real beholding him in Person. That we are therefore to conclude, from the Words of the Text, that the Redemption of Mankind was not only revealed to Abraham, but was revealed likewise by Representation\*. This Argument our punctual Examiner represents in the following Manner. "You are not more successful in your next Point, Abraham rejoiced to see my Day, and he saw it and was glad. Ἰὼα ἸΑΔΗ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμὴν ἔξ ΕΙΔΕ.— "This (say you) evidently shows it [the Revelation] to have been made not by Relation in Words, but by Representation in Action." "How so? The Reason follows. *The Verb εἶδω is frequently used in the New Testament in its proper Signification to see sensibly.—* In "the New Testament do you say? Yes, Sir, and in every Greek "Book you ever read in your Life. What you SHOULD have said "is, that it is so used here; and I suppose you would have said so, "if you had known how to have proved it †."

"The Reason follows" (says he). Where? In *The Divine Legation* indeed, but not in his imperfect Quotation; which breaks off before he comes to my Argument. One who knew him not so well as I do, would suspect this was done to serve a Purpose. No such Matter: 'Twas all pure Innocence. He mistook the Introduction of my Argument for the Argument itself. The Argument itself, which he omits in the Quotation (and which was all I wanted for the Proof of my Point), was, *That the Verb εἶδω, whether used literally or figuratively, always denotes a full intuition.* And this Argument, I introduced in the following Manner, *The Verb*

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 595, 596. [Vol. III. p. 388. Ed. 4to.]

† Considerations, p. 139, 140.

*εἶδω* is frequently used in the New Testament in its proper Signification, to see sensibly. Unluckily, as we say, he took this for the Argument itself, and thus corrects me for it: "What you should have said, is, that it is so used here; and I suppose you would have said so, if you had known how to have proved it." See, here, the true Origin both of *prescribing* and *divining*! His Ignorance of what *I did say*, leads him to tell me what *I should have said*; and to *divine* what *I would have said*. But, what I said, I'll stand to, *That the Verb εἶδω always denotes a full Intuition*. This was all I wanted from the Text; and on this Foundation, I proceeded, in the Sequel of the Discourse, to prove that *Abraham saw sensibly*. Therefore, when my Examiner takes it (as he does) for granted, that because, in *this Place*, I had not proved that the Word implied to see *sensibly*; I had not proved it *at all*; he is a *second Time* mistaken.

He goes on, "One Thing needs no Proof, which is, that, in all Languages, seeing and knowing are frequently used as equivalent Terms\*." As I don't know what he means by this one Thing, I can only requite him with another, that needs as little; which is, that, in all Churches, *seeing* and *believing* are frequently used, by Bigots, as *equivalent Terms*. Here's my Observation for his Observation; and, I think, a good deal more to the Purpose.

## IV.

But our Examiner will now shew, that, seeing *Christ's Day*, and seeing the *Promises afar off*, are one and the same Thing. "We have an Instance (*says he*) directly to the Point in hand, *Heb. xi. 13. These all died in Faith, not having received the Promises; ἀλλὰ πῶρρωθεν ἀφ' ἃς ἸΔΟΝΤΕΣ, but having SEEN them afar off*. "You will remember, Sir, that *Abraham* stands in this Catalogue, "amongst the rest; and the Apostle says of them all indifferently,

\* *Cofid. p. 140.*

“ that they saw the Promises, *i. e.* that Blessing which was the Subject of these Promises. How did they see them? By Representation, in Action will you say? I suppose not. But the Apostle tells you how. They saw them by Faith, a great way off: And why may not this be all that our Saviour intended? What Difference, in Sense, is there between saying, that he *saw the Promises afar off*; and that he *saw Christ's Day* \* ?”

“ We have an Instance (*says he*) directly to the Point in hand.” Of what? Why, that the Verb *εἶδω* signifies the same in this Place of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* as in the Text in question. Now, there it is applied to *Promises*, so cannot be literal: And here it is applied to *Day*, and so, very well, may. Yet this he calls “ an instance directly to the Point in Hand.”

“ You will remember, Sir (*says he*) that *Abraham* stands in “ that Catalogue amongst the rest.” And you will remember, Sir, say I, That *Abraham stands alone* in the Words of *Jesus*. But your Logic, I suppose, concludes thus: If *Abraham* knew as much as the rest; why, then the rest knew as much as *Abraham*. Otherwise you would have observed, that the seeing the Promises afar off related to that Time of the Life of each Patriarch in which he performed the Act of Faith there celebrated. For the Argument stands thus: By Faith, *Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham*, did so and so; yet, as illustrious as those Acts of Faith were, they had then only seen the *Promises afar off*: Therefore you Christians, &c. And it is remarkable that the Acts of Faith, for which *Abraham* is here celebrated, were prior in Time to the Command to offer up his Son. Now, after this, what hinders our concluding, from the Words of *Jesus*, that *Abraham* had a still more illustrious Manifestation of the Promise? However, if I should fail in reconciling *Jesus* and the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, let the Reader remember, that it is our Examiner who has set them at Variance. And he only makes the Breach wider, where he tries to bring them

\* Confid. p. 140.

to a Temper. "The Apostle (*says he*) tells you, they saw the "Promises, by Faith, a great way off: And why may not this be "all that our Saviour intended? What Difference IN SENSE, is "there between saying, that he saw the Promises afar off, and, "that he saw *Christ's* Day?" What Difference do you ask? Why, about as much as between your Sight and *Ciblingworth's*. Or as much as between an Object seen, at a Distance, through a Mist; and one, at Hand, in broad Day-light.

## V.

"But, *he owns*, that, if this was all, perhaps *I should* tell him, "that it was a very strange Answer of the *Jews*, *thou art not yet* "fifty Years old, and *hast thou seen Abraham*\*." He is very right. He might be sure I would. In answer therefore to this Difficulty, he goes on and says, "No doubt, Sir, the *Jews* answer our "Saviour, as if he had said, that *Abraham* and *He* were *Contem-* "poraries; in which, they answered very foolishly, as they did on "many other Occasions; and the Answer will as little agree with "your Interpretation as it does with mine. For does your Inter- "pretation suppose that *Abraham* saw *Christ* in Person? No; you "say it was by Representation only †."

"The *Jews* answer our Saviour as if he had said, that *Abraham* "and he were Contemporaries." Do they so? Why then, 'tis plain, *the Expression was as strong in the Syrian Language, used by Jesus, as in the Greek of his Historian*, which was all I aimed to prove by it. But "in this (*says he*) they answered very foolishly." What then? Did I quote them for their Wisdom? A little *Common-sense* was all I wanted of them: And that, 'tis plain, they had. For the *Folly* of their Answer arises from it. They heard *Jesus* use a Word in their vulgar Idiom, which signified to *see corporeally*; and *Common-sense* led them to conclude he used it in the vulgar Meaning. In this they were not mistaken. But, from

\* Confid. p. 140.

† Ibid. p. 140, 141.

thence, they inferred, that he meant it in the Sense of *seeing personally*; and in this, they were. And now let the Reader judge whether the *Folly* of their *Answer* shews the *Folly* of my Argument, or of my Examiner's. Nay further, he tells us, they answered "as foolishly on many other Occasions." They did so; and I will remind him of one. *Jesus* says to *Nicodemus*, *Except a Man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God*\*, &c. Suppose now, from these Words, I should attempt to prove that *Regeneration* and *Divine Grace* were Realities, and not mere Metaphors. For that *Jesus*, in declaring the Necessity of them, used such strong Expressions that *Nicodemus* understood him to mean the being physically *born again, and entering the second Time into the Womb*. Would it be sufficient, let me ask my Examiner, to reply in this manner, "No doubt, Sir, *Nicodemus* answered our Saviour as if he had said, that a Follower of the Gospel must *enter a second Time into his Mother's Womb and be born*: in which he answered very foolishly; and the Answer will as little agree with your Interpretation as it does with mine. For does your Interpretation suppose he should so enter? No; but that he *should be born of Water and of the Spirit*." Would this, I say, be deemed, by our Examiner, a sufficient Answer? When he has resolved me this, I shall, perhaps, have something farther to say to him. In the mean time I go on. And, in returning him his last Words referred to their Subject, help him forward in the Solution of what I expect from him.—"The Answer (*says he*) will as little agree with your Interpretation as it does with mine. For does your Interpretation suppose that *Abraham* saw *Christ* in Person? No; you say, it was by Representation only." Very well. Let me ask then, in the first Place, whether he supposes what I said on this Occasion, was to prove that *Abraham* saw *Christ* from the reverend Authority of his *Jewish* Adversaries; or to prove that the Verb *είδω* signified to *see literally*, from their mistaken Answer? He thought me here, it seems, in the way of those Writers, who are quoting

\* St. John iii 3.



*Authorities*, when they should be giving *Arguments*. Hence, he calls the Answer the *Jews* here gave, a *solus one*: As if I stood Sponsor for its Orthodoxy.

But our Examiner is still farther mistaken. The Point I was upon, in support of which I urged the Answer of the *Jews*, was not the seeing *this*, or *that Person*: But the seeing *corporeally*, and not *mentally*. Now, if the *Jews* understood *Jesus*, as saying that *Abraham* saw *corporeally*, I concluded, that the Expression, used by *Jesus*, had that Import: And this was all I was concerned to prove. *Difference*, therefore, between their *Answer* as I quoted it, and my *Interpretation*, there was none. Their Answer implied that *Abraham* was said to see *corporeally*; and my Interpretation supposes that the Words used had that Import. But to make a Distinction where there was no Difference, *seeing in Person*, and *seeing by Representation*, are brought in, into a Question, where they have nothing to do.

## VI.

Our Examiner, after all these Feats, now stops and looks about him; as waiting modestly for his Reader's Approbation and Applause; and to shew how well he deserves it, purposes, out of pure Love of Justice, to resume his Task, and kill me over again. "To do you full Justice (*says he*) I will take in one Observation more, by which, you have endeavoured to strengthen yourself, and which relates to the former Part of the Text. That *Abraham* had a general Promise, that in him *all the Families of the Earth should be blessed*, which general Promise comprehends or contains the Promise of the Redemption, is agreed between us. And this general Promise, I suppose, might be the Subject of the Patriarch's Joy. You (in Favour of your Hypothesis) suppose, that subsequent to this general Promise, *Abraham* had, upon his earnest Request, some special Promise made to him of a more distinct Communication of the Manner how, and the Means by  
 " which

" which this great Work should be accomplished ; and that this  
 " special Promise was the Matter of his rejoicing. *This History of*  
 " Abraham (say you) *had plainly three distinct Periods. The first*  
 " *contains God's Promise to grant his Request, when Abraham rejoiced*  
 " *that he should see.—Within the Second, was the Delivery of the*  
 " *Command to sacrifice his Son.—And Abraham's Obedience, through*  
 " *which he saw Christ's Day and was glad, includes the third. The*  
 " *Promise, which you say God made to Abraham to grant his Re-*  
 " *quest, cannot be the general Promise, that he should be a Blessing*  
 " *to all Nations ; for this was given upon his first Vocation with-*  
 " *out his Request. Therefore it must be a special subsequent Pro-*  
 " *mise. But there is not one Word in the History of the Old Tes-*  
 " *tament to justify this three-fold Distinction ; as you confess your-*  
 " *self. For you say that Moses's History begins with the second*  
 " *Period ; and that the first was wisely omitted by the Historian.*  
 " *If there never was any such Period, never any such special Pro-*  
 " *mise requested or made ; it was very honest in the Historian to*  
 " *say nothing about it : And YOU WILL BE THE WISE MAN, WHO*  
 " *CAN SEE WHAT IS NOT TO BE FOUND \**."

" The general Promise made to *Abraham*, that in him *all the*  
 " *Families of the Earth should be blessed*, it is agreed (*he tells us*)  
 " comprehends the Promise of the Redemption : And this general  
 " Promise, he supposes, might be the Subject of the Patriarch's  
 " Joy," mentioned by *Jesus*, in the Text in question. Which  
 " Observation, he is so fond of, that he repeats it again in p. 145.  
 " *Abraham*, seeing a Redemption to come through his Seed, RE-  
 " JOICED at the Blessing." But now, if *Abraham* was ignorant  
 " that this *general Promise* comprehended in it the *Promise of Redemp-*  
 " *tion*, how could that Redemption be the *subject of the Patriarch's*  
 " *joy* ? That he was ignorant, I prove from the best Authority  
 " with our Examiner ; I mean his own. This *general Promise*, as a

\* Confid. p. 141, 142.

Prophecy of the Messiah or Redeemer, is agreed, on all hands, to be obscure. Now our Examiner has laid it down as a Maxim, that "so far as Prophecy is obscure (and it is in the Nature of Prophecy to be obscure more or less) so far it was obscure to the Prophets themselves\*." This, in Satisfaction to himself. But in Satisfaction to his Reader, I go further; and shew, that the *general Promise*, mentioned by *Moses*, could not be the Occasion of the Patriarch's *Joy*, mentioned by *Jesus*; even on our Examiner's own contradictory Conception of Things. I will suppose, for once, that *Abraham* did understand, that, in the *general Promise*, was contained a *Promise of Redemption*. But will he say the *Time*, too, was contained in it? Now he owns, that the Occasion of *Abraham's Joy* was the Knowledge of the *TIME* when *Christ* should come. "The Day of *Christ* (*says he*) denotes the Time when *Christ* should come †." I conclude, therefore, from his own Words, that "the Subject of the Patriarch's Joy COULD NOT be this general Promise." And, by this Conclusion, expose the Injustice of his following Remark, that it "was in favour of my *HYPOTHESIS* that I supposed there was a *special Promise* made to *Abraham* at his earnest Request, subsequent to the general one." If it was in favour of any thing but *Truth*, it was in favour of *Common-sense*, which always leads to it. And which pointed out to me the *three Periods* I discovered in this *special Promise*. "But (*he tells me*) there is not one Word, in the History of the *Old Testament*, to justify this threefold Distinction." And that I myself CONFESS as much. It is true, that I confess not to find in the *Old Testament* what is not there. And had the like Modesty been in him, he would have been content to have found a *future State* in the *New Testament* only. But where is it, I would ask, that, "I confess there is not one Word, in the History of the *Old Testament*, to justify this three-fold Distinction?" For this is News.

\* Confid. p. 156.

† Ibid. p. 159.

So far will I from any Thoughts of such Confession, that I gave a large critical Epitome \* of *Abraham's* whole History, to shew that it *justified this threefold Distinction*, in every part of it. But his manner of proving my *Confession*, will clearly convict him of the Falseness of his *Charge*. For, instead of doing it from *my own Words*, he will argue me into it from *his own Inferences*. “ You “ confess it (*says he*) FOR you say, that *Moses's* History begins with “ the second Period, and that the first was wisely omitted by the “ Historian.” See, here, the Perverfity of our Examiner! When the Point is a Question of *Right*, he gives his Reader an Authority: When a Question of *Fact*, a Reason. But what sort of Reason let us now see, by applying it to a parallel Case. I will suppose him to tell me, (for, after this, he may tell me any thing) “ that “ I myself confess there is not one Word in the Iliad of *Homer*, “ to justify the being three Periods in the Destruction of *Troy*, “ (the first the Robbery of *Helen*; the second, the Combats before “ the Town; and the third, the storming of it by the *Greeks*) “ for that I say, that *Homer's* Poem begins at the second Period; “ wisely omitting the first and last.” Now will any one conclude, from *this Reason*, that I had made *that Confession*?—He is so far from owning that I had given any Reasons (though I had given many) of *Moses's* Wisdom in omitting the mention of the first Period, that his following Words, if they have any Meaning, insinuate I had given none. “ If there never was any such Period; it was “ very honest in the Historian to say nothing about it.” The Reader sees, I question his having a *Meaning*; and my Reason is, because, I find, it was to introduce a Piece of *Wit*. For, as the Town-Poet frequently compounds for the *Rhime*, with one half of his Distich; so the Town-prof-Man for the *Wit*, with one half of his Sentence.—“ And you (*says he*) will be the WISE MAN who can “ see what is not to be found.” Now the two Members of his Wit do not agree.—“ It was very honest in the Historian—and you

From p. 598, to 603, of *The Divine Legation*, Vol. II. [Vol. III, 378—383, ed. 4to.]

“ will

“ will be the wife Man.”—The careless Reader may think he only meant, here, to call me *Fool*. But, indeed, it was my *Knavery* that was to stand in Opposition to *Moses's Honesty*. This, therefore, is to be considered as one of those *disguised Sentences*, which the Critics so much admire, in the Works of the greatest Writers. However I here call upon him first to prove that I did *confess* what he charges upon me, in Pain of being deemed a false Accuser.—  
And this for the **FIRST TIME**.

## VII.

He proceeds—“ But what is wanting in *History*, it seems, *Criticisn* is to supply. *The Words in the Original are, ἡγαλλιάσατο*  
 “ *INA ΙΔΗ*; i. e. (say you) *he rejoiced that HE MIGHT SEE*; which  
 “ *implies that the Period of this Joy was in the Space between the*  
 “ *Promise that the Favour should be conferred, and the actual conferring*  
 “ *it, in the Delivery of the Command.—The English Phrase, to see, is*  
 “ *equivocal; and means either the present Time, that he did then see; or the*  
 “ *future, that he should see. But the Original ἴνα ἴδῃ has only the latter*  
 “ *Sense: so that the Text plainly distinguishes two different Periods of*  
 “ *Joy: the first, when it was promised he should see; the second, when*  
 “ *he actually saw: And it is to be observed, that in the exact Use of*  
 “ *the Word, ἀγαλλιάσασθαι signifies that tumultuous Pleasure which*  
 “ *the certain Expectation of an approaching Blessing, understood only*  
 “ *in the gross, occasions; and χαίρω that calm and settled Joy, that*  
 “ *arises from our Knowledge in the Possession of it. Where are your*  
 “ *Authorities for all this? You produce none. Wherever you had*  
 “ *your Greek, I am very sure you had it not from the New Testa-*  
 “ *ment, where these Words are used indiscriminately\*.”—“ Where*  
 “ *are your Authorities? You produce none.” No. I wrote to those who understood their Grammar, and read Greek: And such*

\* Confid. p. 142, 143.

want none in a Case fo clear and notorious. But this is to inſinuate, that I had none to produce. He dare not, indeed, ſay ſo. And in this I commend his Prudence, as he knew nothing of the Matter. However, in *this*, he is poſitive, that “wherever I had “my *Greek*, I had it not from the *New Teſtament*.” The Gentleman is hard to pleaſe: Here he is offended that I had it not; and, before, that I had it from the *New Teſtament*. Here I impoſe upon him; There I trifled with him. But, in all this Diverſity of Acceptance, 'tis ſtill the ſame Spirit; of an *Answerer by Profeſſion*.

I had ſaid, the two *Greek Words*, in *their exact Uſe*, ſignify ſo and ſo. Which ſurely implied an Acknowledgment, that this Exactneſs was not, *always*, kept up to; eſpecially by the Writers of the *New Teſtament*; who, whatever ſome may have dream'd, did not pique themſelves upon a claſſical Elegance. Now, this Implication, our Examiner takes upon him to confirm, but by way of Confutation. “In the *New Teſtament* (*ſays he*) theſe Words are uſed “indiscriminately.” I had plainly inſinuated the ſame; and he had better have let it reſt on my Acknowledgment: For the Inſtances he brings, to prove the *Words uſed indiscriminately in the New Teſtament*, are even enough to perſuade the Reader that they are *not*. His firſt Inſtance is, 1 *Pet.* iv. 13. “*Rejoice* [χαίρειτε] “*inaſmuch as ye are Partakers of Chriſt's Sufferings; that when, his* “*Glory ſhall be revealed* [χαρῆτε ἀγαλλιάμενοι] *ye may be glad with* “*exceeding Joy*. See you not here (*ſays he*) the direct Reverse of “what you ſay; that χαίρω ſignifies the Joy which ariſes upon “Proſpect, and ἀγαλλιάομαι that which ariſes from Poſſeſſion\*.” No indeed. I ſee nothing like it. All the Reverse here, is the Reverse of common Senſe. Yet in that Reverse, (a Feat none but himſelf could have brought about) the Confirmation of my own Remark.—Amazing! The Followers of *Chriſt* are bid *rejoice*, χαίρειτε. For what? *For being Partakers of Chriſt's Sufferings*. And was not this a *Bleſſing in Poſſeſſion*? But ſome Divines, it ſeems,

\* Conſid. p. 143.

have no notion how *Suffering* can be a *Blessing*. Yet St. *Paul* reckons the *Fellowship* of Christ's *Sufferings* amongst the great *Privileges* of the Gospel, such as *the excellency of the Knowledge of Christ and the Power of his Resurrection* \*. And St. *John* couples it with *Christ's Kingdom* †;—*the Kingdom and Patience of Jesus Christ*. And how great a *Blessing* St. *Peter* (in the Examiner's Text) esteemed it, appears by what follows,—*that when his Glory shall be revealed, χαρήτε ἀγαλλιάμενοι, ye may be glad with exceeding Joy*. But I have other Business with these last Words. For as he quoted the foregoing to prove that *χαίρω* signifies the Joy which arises upon *Prospect*; so he quotes these to prove that *ἀγαλλιάομαι* signifies that which arises on *Possession*. And with equal Success. They are bid to *rejoice* now in *Sufferings*, that they might rejoice and be exceeding glad at *Christ's* second Coming. And is this a *Rejoicing* at a Good in *Possession*? Is it not for a Good in *Prospect*? The Reward they were going to receive. For I suppose the Appearance of *Christ's* *Glory* will precede the Reward of his Followers. Unless our Examiner has another Mystery to shew us, which St. *Paul* left untold, That the Reward is to come first, and the *Glory* follow. So that now the Reader sees he has himself fairly proved, by a good substantial Text, the Truth of my Observation, *That in the exact Use of the Words, ἀγαλλιάομαι signifies that tumultuous Pleasure which the certain Expectation of an approaching Blessing occasions; and χαίρω that calm and settled Joy that arises from our Knowledge in the Possession of it.*

His other Instances are, Rev. xix. 7. “*Let us be glad and rejoice* [χαίρωμεν ἔ ἀγαλλιάμεθα]—*for the Marriage of the Lamb is come.*” Where both Words refer to Blessings in Possession. Again, Matt. “v. 12. *Rejoice and be exceeding glad* [χαίρετε ἔ ἀγαλλιάσθε] *for great is your Reward in Heaven: where both refer to Blessings in* “*Prospect* ‡.” His villainous old Luck still pursues him. The first Text from the *Revelations*; *Be glad and rejoice FOR the Marriage of*

\* Phil. iii. 8—10.

† Rev. i. 9.

‡ Confid. p. 143, 144.

*the Lamb is come*; bids the Followers of *Christ now* do that, which they were bid to *prepare* for in the Words of St. Peter, *that, when his Glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad with exceeding Joy*. If, therefore, where they are bid to *prepare* for their rejoicing, the Joy is for a good in Prospect (as we have proved it was), then, certainly, where they are told that this time of rejoicing *is come*, the Joy must still be for a good in Prospect. And yet he says, *the Words refer to Blessings in Possession*. Again, the Text from St. Matthew.—*Rejoice and be exceeding glad, FOR great is your Reward in Heaven*, has the same Relation to the former part of St. Peter's Words, [*Rejoice inasmuch as ye are Partakers of Christ's Sufferings*] as the Text, in the Revelations has to the latter. *Blessed are ye* (says Jesus in this Gospel) *when Men shall revile you and persecute you, and shall say all manner of Evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad, FOR great is your Reward in Heaven*. Rejoice! For what? Is it not for the Persecutions they suffer for his sake? A *present Blessing* sure; though not, it may be, to our Author's Taste. The Reason why they should rejoice, follows, *for great is your reward in Heaven*. And yet here, he says, *the Words refer to Blessings in Prospect*. In truth what led him into all these cross purposes, of reasoning, was a very pleasant Mistake. The one Text says—*Be glad and rejoice, FOR ὅτι*—The other, *Rejoice and be exceeding glad, FOR ὅτι*—Now he took the Particle, in both Places, to signify *propter, for the sake of*; whereas it signifies, *quoniam, quia, and is, in proof of something going before*. So that he read the Text—*Rejoice for the Marriage of the Lamb is come*;—as if it had been—*Rejoice for the Marriage of the Lamb, which is come*: And—*rejoice, for great is your Reward in Heaven*; as if it had been,—*Rejoice for your great Reward in Heaven*.

But now let us consider all these Texts in another view, in order to do Justice to his *Delicacy of Judgement*. I had said that, in the *exact Use* of the two *Greek Words*, they signified *so and so*; and applied that Observation to a *Fact*; where a Person *was said to have rejoiced, &c.* In order to disprove this Criticism, he brings three Passages,



Passages, in which those *Greek* Words are used, where no *Fact* is related; but where Men are, in a rhetorical manner, *called upon, and bid to rejoice, &c.* In which Case, the Use of one Word for another, is an elegant Conversion. Those, in Possession of a Blessing, are bid to rejoice with that exceeding Joy, which Men generally have in the certain Expectation of one approaching; and those in Expectation, with that calm and settled Joy, that attends full Possession. And now who but our Examiner would not see that all his Instances fall short and wide of the Point in Question: The use of Words being *one thing*, in an Historical Assertion; and *another*, in a rhetorical Invocation \* ?

## VIII.

However, having so ably acquitted himself of one Criticism, he falls upon another. “But what then (*says he*) shall we do with *ἴνα*? To rejoice *that he might* see the Blessing which he already *had*; in the *English* Language, is not Sense. I grant it. And therefore our Translators avoid it, and render the Passage thus; *Abraham rejoiced to see my Day*; which Rendering will very well stand with the *Greek*; where *ἴνα* is often put for *ὅτε* or *ὅτι*; POSITIVE AS YOU ARE THAT IT ALWAYS REFERS TO A FUTURE TIME †.

“What shall we do with *ἴνα*?”—What indeed! But no sooner said than done. He fathers it upon me. And having stript it of all its Relations will needs make me maintain it. “*ἴνα* (*says he*) is often put for *ὅτε* or *ὅτι*, positive as you are, that it always refers to a future Time †.” Now, so far from being *positive* of this, I positively deny that I ever so much as gave the least Hint of such a Thing. And here I again call upon him to prove it, as

\* See what the Letter Writer, quoted above, has said concerning the Use of these two *Greek* Verbs, p. 62 to 65, with much Learning and Judgment.

† Confid. p. 144.

‡ Ibid.

he values his Character of an *Answerer by Profession*; and this for the **SECOND TIME** \*. I said, indeed, that *ὅρα ἰδῆ*, in the Text refers only to a future Time. And this I say still, though the Translators have rendered it, equivocally, *to see*; whether for the Reason assigned by me, or my Examiner, is left to the Judgment of the Reader. Yet he affirms, that I say, “*ὅρα* always refers to “a future Time.” That I am positive of it, nay very positive, “positive as you are,” says he. And to cure me of this Fault, he proceeds to shew, from several Texts, that *ὅρα* is often put for *ὄρα* or *ὄρα*. “Thus *John* xvi. 2. *The Time cometh THAT [ὅρα] whosoever killeth you will think he doth God good Service.* Again: *1 Cor.* iv. “3. *With me it is a small Thing THAT [ὅρα] I should be judged of you.* And nearer to the Point yet 3 *John* 4. *I have no greater Joy [ὅρα εὐδῶ] than THAT I hear, or than TO hear that my Children walk in the Truth.* And why not here, Sir; *Abraham rejoiced [ὅρα ἰδῆ] WHEN he saw, or, THAT he saw, or, which is equivalent, TO SEE my Day †.*” In Acknowledgment of which Kindness, all I can do is, to return him back his own Criticism; only with the Greek Words put into *Latin*. The Translator of the vulgar *Latin* has rendered *ὅρα ἰδῆ* by *ut videret*, which Words I will suppose him to say (as indifferent a *Latinist* as he appears to have been) refer only to a future Time. On which I will be very arch and critical: *Positive as you are, Sir, that ut always refers to a future Time, I will shew you that it is sometimes put for postquam, the past,*

Ut vidi, ut perii, ut me malus abstulit Error!

and, nearer to the Point yet, sometimes for quanto,—Ut quisque op-

\* Here the learned Writer abovementioned is justly scandalized at his Man. “Pray, Sir, (says he) what Authority have you for this, that Mr. W. is positive *ὅρα* always “refers to a future Time?—What he saith is, that *ὅρα ἰδῆ* in the Text signifies “the future Time: And this, Sir, it does, and needs must, for abundance of Reasons.”—p. 59.

† Confid. p. 144.

timè Græcè sciret, ita esse nequissimum. “And why not here, “ Sir, *Abraham* rejoiced [*ut videret*] WHEN HE saw, OR THAT he “ saw, or, which is equivalent, TO SEE my Day.

## IX.

And now he tells us, “ There is but one Difficulty that stands “ in the Way.” And what is *one* to a Man who can surmount them with the same Ease he makes them? The Difficulty is this;— “ That according to his [*the Examiner's*] Interpretation, the latter “ Part of the Sentence is a Repetition of the former. *Abraham re- “ joiced to see my Day, and he saw it and was glad*; i. e. *Abraham “ rejoiced to see, and then saw and rejoiced*. But such kind of Repe- “ titions are frequent in the sacred Dialect; and, in my humble “ Opinion, it has an Elegance here; *Abraham rejoiced to see my Day*; “  $\xi$  εἶδε,  $\xi$  ἐχάρη, HE BOTH SAW and WAS GLAD \*.”

I had talked much of Repetitions in the sacred Style; and he will do so too; but without knowing the Difference between a *Pleonasm* and a *Tautology*; the first of which is, indeed, often a Beauty; the other, always a Blemish in Expression: And in this Number is the *elegant Repetition* of our Examiner's own making. But, for the Reader's better Information, I shall transcribe what I said on this Subject in *The Divine Legation*. *The Pleonasm evidently arose from the Narrowness of a simple Language: The Hebrew, in which this Figure abounds, is the scantiest of all the learned Languages of the East: Amant (says Grotius) Hebræi verborum copiam; itaque rem eandem multis verbis exprimunt. He does not tell us the Reason; but we have given it above, and it seems a very natural one: For when the Speaker's Phrase comes not up to his Ideas (as in a scanty Language it often will not) he endeavours, of course, to explain himself by a Repetition of the Thought in other Words; as he, whose Body is straiten'd in room, is always dissatisfied with his present*

\* Confid. p. 144, 145.

*Posture* \*. A Repetition of this kind, made in different Words, is called a *Pleonasm*: But when in the same Words, (as it is in the Text in question, if there be any Repetition at all) it is then a *Tautology*; which, being without *Reason*, our Examiner will find a Beauty in it. "In my humble Opinion (*says he*) it has an Elegance." This is not ill expressed. *Humility of Opinion* well becomes him who *begs* his Question; and still better, him who is about to *steal* it; which we shall see under the next *Remark*, he was just now projecting—But the only Pretence to *Elegance*, nay even to Sense, in his Translation of the Text, arises from our being able to understand the equivocal Phrase *to see* in my Meaning of, *that he might see*; as will appear to the Reader, by confining it to the Examiner's Meaning; thus, Abraham rejoiced when he had seen my Day, and he saw it and was glad. The Absurdity of which Expression arises from hence, that the latter Part of the Sentence, beginning with the Conjunction *Completive*,  $\&$ , naturally implies a further Predication. Yet there is no further. But our Examiner, willing to avoid so glaring an Absurdity, artfully drops the *Sense* of  $\&$  in the *Sound* of  $\&$ . I call it the *Sound*, for Sense there is none. Abraham rejoiced to see my Day; he both saw and was glad, says our elegant Translator. As if, when he rejoiced to see, there could be any Doubt whether he did not  $\&$  see and rejoice. Therefore I should advise him not to despise the Assistance the learned Letter Writer gives him, who tells him here, that the best Sense, he will ever be able to make of it, will be this, Abraham rejoiced to see my Day; ay, that he did  $\&$ . But then as for the Elegance of it, he must look to that himself.

\* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 147, 148. [Vol. II. p. 444. ed. 4to.]

† Letter to the Author of a late Epil. Diff. p. 66.

## X.

Having now so happily got through his Criticism on my Text, he draws one concluding Argument; with which he runs a muck at my *whole* Dissertation. "I suppose, Sir, it may now be granted that it is not clear from these Words of our Saviour; that *Abraham* had any such Notice of *Christ's* Sacrifice as you contend for.— Here THEN, Sir, your Argument must necessarily have its Period. For this Text stands as the FOUNDATION of all that follows\*." Fair and softly, good Sir, for, (though your Argument, be already answered, in a Confutation of your *Premisses*) I would not have you run away with the Opinion that there is any Relation between *them* and your *Conclusion*; further than what arises from an Equivocation, which is a very bad Bond of Connexion. The Word FOUNDATION, when applied, figuratively, to a *Thesis*, signifies either the *Support* of it; or the *orderly Introduction* to it. That I used it in the latter Sense, appears, not only from the Nature of the Thing, but from my own *express Words*, in the very Place where I speak of this *Foundation*. *The Foundation of my Thesis I lay in that Scripture of St. John, where Jesus says to the unbelieving Jews, Your Father Abraham rejoiced to see my Day, and he saw it and was glad. If we consider Abraham's personal Character, together with the Choice made of him for Head and Origin of that People which God would make holy and separate to himself, from whence was to rise the Redeemer of Mankind, the ultimate End of that Separation, WE CANNOT BUT CONCLUDE IT PROBABLE that the Knowledge of this Redeemer should be revealed to him. Shall I hide from Abraham the Thing which I do, says God, in a Matter that much less concerned the Father of the Faithful. And here, in the Words of Jesus, we have this PROBABLE FACT, ARISING FROM THE NATURE OF THE THING, made certain and put out of all reasonable Question †.*"

\* Confid. p. 145. † Div. Leg. vol. II. p. 594. [Vol. III p. 374. Ed. 4to.]

Here the Reader sees that I use the Words of *Jefus* which I call the *Foundation*, as the orderly Introduction to and *Confirmation* only of a Thesis which I call *probable*, and prove by other *Media*. And as I shew, both from the Words of *Jefus*, and *the Nature of the Thing*, that *Abraham* saw *Chrij's Day*: So, from both, I prove that this Truth must be recorded somewhere or other in the Old Testament. From thence I proceed to the Proof of these two Points, "1. That there is no Place in the whole History of *Abraham*, but that where he is commanded to offer up his Son, which bears the least Marks or Traces of the Revelation of *Chrij's Day*. 2 That this Command has all the Marks of it, and is, indeed, that very Revelation." In doing this, amongst the various Arguments employed, I shew that, at the Time of *Abraham*, Information by Action was the most familiar Mode of Conversation;—that the History of the *Command* has all the Marks of such a Conversation;—that, if it be not so understood, the Story of *Abraham* is abrupt and unconnected;—and the History of the *Command* attended with insuperable Difficulties. Yet for all this, my Examiner tells you, That my Thesis "must necessarily have its Period," when he has taken away the *Foundation* in my Text †.

'Tis true, he gives a Reason for this definitive Sentence, which is this: "That the Tendency of all that follows is ONLY TO SHEW THAT ADMITTING, OR ALLOWING THAT ABRAHAM WAS ACQUAINTED WITH THE GREAT SACRIFICE OF CHRIST, that then it is reasonable to expect an Account of it in his ‡ History," &c. &c. The Reader observes from my own Words, in *The Divine Legation*, quoted above, that I thought we might *from the Nature of the Thing*, expect an Account of it in his History. This is therefore the **THIRD TIME** I am obliged to call solemnly upon him, to shew that all my Proofs of the *Command's* being the

*Divine Legat.* Vol. II. p. 592. [Vol. III. p. 273. Ed. 4to.]

† See the Point well argued by the learned Writer of the Letter before-mentioned, in *ibid.*, from p. 3 to 12, he very ably confutes the Examiner's Conclusion.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 147.

Revelation of *Christ's* Day, rest upon "the Admission or Allowance  
 " that *Abraham* was acquainted with the great Sacrifice of *Christ*,  
 " as it is to be collected from the Text in *St. John*." The Last Words  
 I have added; and thereby hangs a Tale. The Reader is now to  
 be let into a Secret. The Examiner, in giving the finishing Stroke  
 to the *Dissertation on the Case of Abraham*, had reserved, as was fit,  
 one of the neatest Tricks of his Trade to be played off on this Occa-  
 sion. And thus he does the Feat. "Your Foundation (*says he*)  
 " is subverted; therefore all that follows is overthrown." Why  
 so?—Why so! Because "the Tendency of all is to shew, that,  
 " admitting or allowing that *Abraham* was acquainted—then it is  
 " reasonable to expect"—Well, but may it not be *admitted or allowed*,  
 from other Arguments produced in *The Divine Legation* besides the  
 Text in Question, that *Abraham* was acquainted with the great  
 Sacrifice of *Christ*? Your humble Servant, Sir, says he for that.  
 The Force of my Consequence depends upon the honest Reader's  
 taking it, as I design he should; that it could only be *admitted or*  
*allowed* from the Text in Question: For if once he conceives that  
 it might be *allowed* from other Arguments in *The Divine Legation*,  
 there is an End of my *Consequence*; and yet you would put me upon  
 explaining.

## XI.

However, our Examiner, as if not quite satisfied himself, with  
*this Period he hath put to my Argument*, goes on thus: "But to make  
 " good the Defect in this consequential Reasoning, you offer at  
 " one direct Proof, to shew that the Command, and the Transaction  
 " consequent upon it, was indeed as a representative Information to  
 " *Abraham* of the Redemption of Mankind, by the Sacrifice of  
 " *Christ*; which is, That the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrewes*  
 " has plainly hinted that he considered it in this Light. Your  
 " Proof is from these Words, Chap. xi. ver. 17—19. By *Faith*,  
 " *Abraham* offered up *Isaac*—*accounting that God* was able to raise  
 " *him from the Dead*; from whence also he received him in a Figure,

“ EN ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗ, in a Parable: *A Mode of Information by Words*  
 “ or Actions, which consist in putting one thing for another. Now  
 “ in a Writer (say you) who regarded this commanded Action, as a  
 “ representative Information of the Redemption of Mankind, nothing  
 “ could be more fine or easy than this Expression. For though Abra-  
 “ ham did not, indeed, receive Isaac restored to Life after a real Dis-  
 “ solation; yet the Son being, in this Action, to represent Christ suf-  
 “ fering Death for the Sins of the World, when the Father brought  
 “ him safe from Mount Moriah, after three Days, during which  
 “ he was in the State of Condemnation to Death; he plainly received  
 “ him under the Character of Christ’s Representative, as restored from  
 “ the Dead. For as his coming to the Mount, and binding, and lying  
 “ on the Altar, figured the Sufferings and Death of Christ; so his being  
 “ taken from thence alive, as properly figured Christ’s Resurrection  
 “ from the Dead. With the highest Propriety, therefore, and Elegance  
 “ of Speech, might Abraham be said to receive Isaac from the Dead; in  
 “ a Parable, or in Representation \*.”

Let us see now what our Examiner has to object to this Criticism.—“ By your Leave, Sir,” says he—which, by the Way, he never asks, but to abuse me; nor never takes, but to misrepresent me.—“ If the Apostle had meant by this Expression, to signify, that  
 “ Isaac stood as the Representative of Christ, and that his being  
 “ taken from the Mount alive was the Figure of Christ’s Resurrec-  
 “ tion; it should have been said, that Abraham received CHRIST  
 “ from the Dead in a Figure †.” See here, ye little Critics; that  
 “ N<sup>o</sup>. 2, that *Soul of Criticism*, which Bently so much lamented he  
 “ could find no where, out of himself. The Writer of the *Epistle to*  
 “ *the Hebrews* is giving an Instance of Abraham’s Faith, who, against  
 “ Hope, believed in Hope, where his only Son (through whom he was  
 “ promised to be the Father of a mighty Nation) was commanded to  
 “ be offered up in Sacrifice. In which Account, the sacred Writer  
 “ hath used an Expression which I supposed doth intimate that he un-

\* Confid. p. 146, 147.

† Ibid. p. 147.



derstood the Nature of the Command to be, what I have attempted to explain it. To this our Examiner says, *No*. Had he thus understood it, he SHOULD have said, not that *Abraham* received ISAAC, but that he *received CHRIST from the Dead in a Figure*. What? where the Discourse was not concerning *Christ*, but *Isaac*? Had, indeed, the sacred Writer been speaking of *Abraham's Knowledge of Christ*, something might have been said; but he is speaking of a very different Thing, his *Faith in God*; and only intimates, by a forceable Term, what he understood that Action to be, which he gives, as an Instance of the most illustrious Act of Faith. I say, had this been the Case, something might have been said; something, I mean, to keep him in Countenance; yet still, nothing to the Purpose, as I shall now shew. The *Transaction of the Sacrifice of Christ*, related to *God*. The *Figure* of that Transaction, in the Command to offer *Isaac*, related (according to my Interpretation) to *Abraham*. Now, it was *God* who received *Christ*: As it was *Abraham* who received *Isaac*. To tell us then, that (according to my Interpretation) it SHOULD have been said, that *Abraham* received *CHRIST from the Dead in a Figure*, is only shewing us that he knows just as much of Logical Expression, as of Theological Argumentation: It is true, could he shew the Expression improper, in the Sense I understand it, he would then speak more to the Purpose; and this, to do him Justice, he would say so. For thus it follows, "For (says he) *Christ* it was (according to your Interpretation) that "was received from the Dead in a Figure, by *Isaac* his Representative, who really came alive from the Mount. If the Reading had been, not ἐν παραβολῇ, but εἰς παραβολὴν, it would have suited "your Notion; for it might properly have been said, that *Isaac* "came alive from the Mount as a Figure, or that he might be a "Figure, of the Resurrection of *Christ* †." Miserable Chicane! As, on the one Hand, I might say with Propriety, that *CHRIST*

\* See here again the learned Writer of the Letter abovementioned, p. 43.

† Confid. p. 147.

was received from the Dead in a Figure, i. e. BY a Representative: So could I not as well say, on the other, that ISAAC was received from the Dead in a Figure, i. e. AS a Representative? For he, sustaining the Person of Christ, who was raised from the Dead, might in a Figure, i. e. as that Person, be said to be received: Yet this our Examiner denies, and says, the Apostle SHOULD have said that Abraham received CHRIST, and not ISAAC. "But (says he) if the reading had been not ἐ. Περαιβολῆ; but εἰς Περαιβολῆν, it would have suited your Notion." And the Reason he gives is this: "For it might properly have been said that *Isaac* came alive from the Mount as a Figure, or THAT HE MIGHT BE a Figure, of the Resurrection of Christ." Amazing! he says this would have suited my Notion; and the Reason he gives shews it suits only his own, which is that the Exactness of the Resemblance, not the Declaration of the Giver of the Command, made it a Figure. This is the more extraordinary, as I myself had shewn that the old Latin Translator had turned the Words into IN PARABOLAM instead of in Parabola for this very Reason, that he understood the Command in the Sense our Examiner contends for; viz. That *Isaac*, by the Resemblance of the Actions, MIGHT BE, or might become a Figure, &c. But the Nature (say I) of the Command being unknown, these Words of the Epistle have been understood to signify only that Isaac was a Type of Christ, in the same Sense, that the Old Tabernacle in this Epistle is called a Type—ἡ τῆς ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΗΣ, that is, a Thing designed by the holy Spirit, to have both a present Significancy and a future. Which amounts but just to this, that Abraham receiving Isaac safe from Mount Moriah, in the Manner Scripture relates, he, thereby, became a Type. An ancient Interpretation, as appears by the reading of the vulgate Latin. Unde eum IN PARABOLAM accepit, for in Parabola, as it ought to have been translated, conformably to the Greek\*.

\* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 613. [Vol. III. p. 394. Ed. 4to.]

## XII.

But to return to our Examiner; who, after all this Expend of Criticism, owns, at last, that “a Reason will be wanting, why instead of speaking the Fact as it really was, that *Isaac* came alive “from the Mount, the Apostle chose rather to say (what was not “really the Case) that *Abraham* received him *from the Dead*.” Well; and have not I given a Reason?—And what then? For what did I commence Examiner, if I mayn’t have Reasons of my own?—They follow thus, “If *Isaac* did not die (as it is certain “he did not) *Abraham* could not receive him from the Dead. And “yet the Apostle says, he received him *from the Dead*. The clearing up this Difficulty, will shew the true Sense of the Passage †.” What, will the clearing up a Difficulty of his own making discover the true Sense of another Man’s Writing? This is one of his new Improvements in Logic; in which, as in Arithmetic, he has introduced a *Rule of False*, whereby an unknown Truth is to be ferretted out by a known Untruth. For there is none of this Difficulty in the sacred Text; it is not there, as in our Examiner’s Expression, said by the Apostle, simply, that *Abraham* received *Isaac* from the *Dead*, but that he received him, from thence, IN A FIGURE, or under the assumed Personage of *Christ*. Now if *Christ* died, then he, who assumed his Personage, in order to represent his Passion and Resurrection, might, surely, well be said to be *received from the Dead in a Figure*. A wonderful Difficulty truly! and as wonderfully solved, by a Conundrum! But with Propriety sufficient: For as a real Difficulty requires Sense and Criticism, an imaginary one may well enough be managed by a Quibble. Because the Translators of *St. Mark’s* Gospel have rendered ἐν ὧν ἰσχυροτέρῳ, by—*with what Comparison shall we compare it*, therefore ἐν ἰσχυροτέρῳ, in the Text in Question, he says, signifies COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING. But no Words can shew him equal to his own—

\* Confid. p. 147, 148.

† Ibid.

“The

“ The Apostle does not say *simply* and *absolutely*, that *Abraham* received *Isaac* from the Dead ; but that he received him from the Dead, ἐν παραβολῇ, in a *Parable*.” See here now ! Did not I tell you so ? There was no Difficulty all this while : The Sentence only opened to the Right and Left to make Room for his Objection : And now closes again. “ It was not simply said ”—No. “ But that he received him—ἐν παραβολῇ, in a *Parable*, i. e. in a *Comparison*, or by *Comparison*. Thus the word is used *Mark* iv. 30. *Wherunto shall we liken the Kingdom of God, or with what COMPARISON* [ἐν οὐρα παραβολῇ] *shall we compare it*. The Meaning then may be, that *Abraham's* receiving *Isaac* alive (after his Death was denounced) by the Revocation of the Command, was AS IF HE HAD received him from the Dead. Thus several Interpreters understand the Place. Or it may be, as others will have it, that the Apostle here refers to the Birth of *Isaac* ; which was [ἐν παραβολῇ] COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING, a receiving him from the Dead ; his Father being old, and his Mother past the Age of Child-bearing, on which Account the Apostle styles them both *dead*. Which Interpretation, I the rather approve, because it suggests the proper Grounds of *Abraham's* Faith \*.”

He says, ἐν παραβολῇ signifies *in or by Comparison* ; and that the Word is so used in *St. Mark* ; to prove which, he quotes the *English* Translation. Now I must take the Liberty to tell him, that the Translators were mistaken ; and he with them. Παραβολῇ, in *St. Mark*, is not used in the Sense of a *Similitude* or *Comparison*, but of a *Parable*. The Ancients had two Ways of illustrating the Things they enforced ; the one was by a *Parable*, the other by a simple *Comparison* or *Simile*. How the latter of these arose out of the former I have shewn in *The Divine Legation* †. Now, I say, that both these Modes of Illustration are referred to in the Text of *St. Mark* ; which should have been translated thus, *To what shall we COMPARE the Kingdom of God, or with what PARABLE shall*

\* Confid. p. 148, 149.

† Vol. II. p. 93. [Vol. II. p. 411. Ed. 4to.]

we illustrate or parabolize it—ἰμοιώσωμεν—παρομοιάσωμεν.—So that the latter Part of the Verſe is not a Repetition, as the Tranſlator ſeem to have thought, of the former; ſo frequent in the Scripture Style; but, both together, expreſs two different and well-known Modes of Illuſtration.

But now ſuppoſe, ἐν τοῖς παρομοιάσιν had ſignified *with what Compariſon*: How comes it to paſs the ἐν παρομοιάσιν ſhould ſignify *by Compariſon*, or *as it were*, or COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING? In plain Truth, his critical Analogy has terminated in a pleaſant Blunder. How ſo? ſays he.—Nay 'tis true there's no denying, but that *ſpeaking by Compariſon* is *comparatively ſpeaking*: And, if Men will needs put another Senſe upon it, who can help that? Was it a Time for our Author, when he was writing *Examinations*, to ſpoil a good Argument by nicely enquiring into the *Senſe* of an Expreſſion? He left it to thoſe whom it more concerned, to tell the Reader, that *comparatively ſpeaking* does not at preſent (whatever it might heretofore) ſignify, *ſpeaking by a Compariſon*; but ſpeaking looſely and incorreſtly; which Senſe of the Phraſe, I ſuppoſe, aroſe from the *Compariſons* of ſuch Kind of Writers as our Examiner; that were generally obſerved to be lame and inaccurate. However, though I am no great Friend to the *Innocence of Error*, I ſhould have been ready enough to think it a ſimple Blunder, had I not obſerved him to go into it with much artful Preparation; a Circumſtance by no Means characteristic of that *genuine Turn of Mind*, which is quick and fudden, and over Head and Ears in an Inſtant: But he begins with explaining, *in a Compariſon*, by—*by Compariſon*: In which, you juſt get the firſt Glimpſe, as it were, of an enaſcent Equivocation; and this [*by Compariſon*] is preſently, afterwards, turned into, *as it were*, or, *as if he had*; and then, *comparatively ſpeaking* brings up the Rear, and cloſes the Criticiſm three deep. But he “approves of the Interpretation” which makes the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* “refer to the Birth of *Iſaac*, becauſe it ſuggeſts (*he ſays*) the PROPER grounds of *Abraham's* Faith.” Till now I thought the *proper grounds* of *Abraham's*

his Faith (as of every other Man's) had been his Knowledge of the Nature of the Godhead, one of whose Attributes is Veracity. No, says this great Philosopher and Divine; his *proper grounds* were these, that God had told him Truth once already.—And now had he not Reason, after all this, to turn to me, and with an Air of Triumph and Gaiety to accost me in the following Manner? “It is not to be supposed, Sir, that you are a Stranger to these Interpretations, which are in every body's Hands; but as if nothing of this Sort had ever been thought of, you pass it over with absolute Neglect; and will needs have it, that the Apostle was full of your Ideas; for no other Reason that I can see, than because you are full of them yourself\*.” Indeed, Sir, comparatively speaking, I was much a Stranger to them. For what were they, till seen in the pleasant Light in which you have placed them? I will only say one Thing to your Argument (as I now hasten to your Wit); which is, that, had you known the Force of the Word *ἐκπλήρης*, in the Text, you had known that the *Deadness of Sarah's Womb could not be meant*. But, since you love the Authority of Interpreters †, I will give you what the great *Scaliger* says on the Words ἐν *παραδείσῳ*, “*In imagine quadam resurrectionis: quia qui immolationi addictus erat, & postea liberatus, videtur tanquam resurrexisse. Hæc est Calvinii expositio, longe omnium optima.*”

But, says our Examiner, “you will needs have it that the Apostle was full of your Ideas.” *My Ideas*, intimates Ideas discovered by me; and to suppose the Apostle full of these, would have been, I confess, a little extraordinary. The Truth is, I said nothing so silly. I said, *THESE Ideas*. But what then? It was necessary, perhaps, to the Wit that follows—“for no other Reason that I can see, than because you are full of them yourself.” And shall I be angry with him for this? Surely, no. I can easily forgive the

\* Considerations, p. 148, 149.

† The learned Letter Writer abovementioned gives another good Reason, and produces another good Authority against this Fancy. See p. 48.

false Quotation for the Sake of so much Wit. For, as *Stephano* says to his Viceroy on the like Occasion, “I thank thee for that Jest: ‘tis an excellent Pats of Pate: and Wit shall not go unrewarded while I am King of this Island.”

## XIII.

Our Examiner goes on: “The last Step (*says he*) you take in this Argument is to raise Objections against the common Account of this History; in order to draw an Inference from thence, that your Account must be the true one; and this is what I shall next consider\*.” He had said before, that having struck my *Corner-stone*, and unsettled my *Foundation*, he had stopt me short, and put a *Period to my Argument*. But it seems, somehow or other, I had recovered myself, and pushed it forward. For now he talks of another Step I had taken in this Argument. Happily indeed, both for himself and me, it is the last. “You tell us then (*says he*) that the Command, as it hath been hitherto understood—occupies a Place in Abraham’s History, that, according to our Ideas of Things, it cannot properly have. The Command is supposed to be given as a Trial only. Now when the great Searcher of Hearts is pleased to try any of his Servants, either for Example-sake, or for some other End—as in this he condescends to the Manner of Men—so, we may be assured, he would accommodate himself to their Manner likewise, in the most material Circumstance of the Trial. But amongst Men, the Agent is always tried before he is set on Work, or rewarded, and not after—On the contrary—this Trial was made after all Abraham’s Work was done; and all God’s Mercies received—nay, what is still more strange, after he had been once tried already.—We must needs conclude therefore, that the Command was not (according to the common Notion) a Trial only, because it comes after all God’s Dispensations. Yet, as the sacred Text assures us, it was a Trial, and as a Trial necessarily precedes the Employment or

\* Considerations, p. 149.

“Reward of the Person tried; we must needs conclude, that as no Employment, so some Benefit followed this Trial. Now on our Interpretation, a Benefit, as we shall see, did follow. We have Reason therefore to conclude this Interpretation to be the true \*.” To this he answers, “You lay it down here as the common Interpretation, that the Command to Abraham to offer up his Son was given as a Trial ONLY; WHICH IS NOT TRUE.” Why? Because “the common Opinion is, that God’s Intention in this Command was not only to try Abraham, but also to PREFIGURE the Sacrifice of Christ †.” Excellent! I speak here of the Command’s being given. But given to whom? To all the Faithful, for whose Sake it was recorded? or to Abraham only, for whose Sake it was revealed? Does not the very Subject confine my Meaning to this latter Sense? Now, to Abraham, I say (according to the common Opinion) it was given as a Trial only. To the Faithful, if you will, as a Prefiguration. If, to extricate himself from his confused or sophistical Reasoning, he will say it prefigured to Abraham likewise; he then gives up all he has been contending for, against my Interpretation, viz. that Abraham knew this to be a Representation of the great Sacrifice of Christ: I call his Reasoning confused or sophistical. See, if he be not obliged to me for my Indecision. Where I speak of the common Opinion, I say, the Command is supposed to be GIVEN as a Trial only. He thinks fit to tell me, I say not true. But when he comes to prove it, he changes the Terms of the Question thus, “For the common Opinion is that GOD’S INTENTION in this Command was,” &c. Now the Purpose of God’s giving a Command to Abraham, for his Sake, might be one Thing; and his general Intention, in that Command, as it concerned the Whole of his Dispensation, another. I leave it therefore to the Reader to determine, whether our Examiner changed the Terms of the Question by

\* *Confid.* p. 149, 150.

† *Confid.* p. 150. Here again the learned Writer in his Letter to our Examiner, p. 14. very clearly exposes this Sophism.



Design or Ignorance. But I have another Reason why he should have allowed me, in this Place at least, not to have been mistaken. And that is, because a great Man (whose Authority is deservedly the highest in the learned World, and which our Examiner has more Reasons than one to pay a due Regard to) is in the same Sentiments; and takes it for granted, as we shall see by the Words that follow, that the *common Opinion* is that God's *giving* this Command was "only to try *Abraham*. I was (says he) under a Difficulty " (a Case, which, I dare say, never happened to our Examiner) to " account for this Action on the Foot of its being a 'Trial only \*.'" But to prove further that I said *not true*, when I said, that, *according to the common Interpretation the Command was given for a Trial only*; he observes, that I myself had owned that the *Resemblance to Christ's Sacrifice was so strong, that Interpreters could never overlook it*. How much this is to the Purpose, unless we allow *Abraham's Knowledge* of the Figure, has been seen already. Nor does he appear to be less conscious of its Impertinence; therefore, instead of attempting to inforce it to the *Purpose* for which *he quotes it*, he turns, all on a sudden, to shew that it makes nothing to the Purpose for which *I employed it*. But let us follow this *Proteus* through all his Windings.—"The Resemblance (*says he*), no doubt, is *very* " strong: but how this *corroborates* your Sense of the Command, I " do not see. Your Sense is, that it was an *actual Information* " given to *Abraham*, of the Sacrifice of *Christ*. But to *prefigure*, " and to *inform*, are different Things. This Transaction *might pre-* " *figure*, and *does prefigure*, the Sacrifice of *Christ*; whether *Abra-* " *ham knew* any thing of the Sacrifice of *Christ* or no. For it does " not follow, that because a Thing is *prefigured*; therefore it must " be *seen and understood, at the Time* when it is *prefigured* †." Could it have been believed that these Words should immediately follow an Argument, whose Force, that little it has, is founded on the Principle, *That to prefigure and to inform are not different Things?*

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 614, note 6. [See Vol. III. p. 372, Ed. 4<sup>to</sup>.]

† Confid. p. 130, 131.

But Retroſpects, with bad Reckoners, are troubleſome Things. At this Rate, I ſhould ſoon find my Talk double. I ſhall therefore take his Accounts as they lie. And if they betray themſelves, why ſo. He ſays then, “ he does not ſee how this CORROBORATES “ my Senſe, *becauſe* to prefigure and to inform are different Things.” It was that very *Difference* which made me call it a *Corroboration* of my Senſe. Had there been *no Difference*, I ſhould not have called it a *Corroboration* of my Senſe, but my very Senſe itſelf. As to the Obſervation that follows, and the Explanation of it, all he ſays is very true. But a Truth the moſt unlooked for ; 1. Becauſe it is a Truth I myſelf had much inculcated throughout *The Divine Legation*. 2. Becauſe it is a full Answer to all he has himſelf urged in the Body of his Pamphlet for a future State’s being known or taught to the *Jewiſh* People. 3. Becauſe (as is hinted at above) it is as full an Answer to the very Queſtion we are upon, *viz.* Whether, according to the common Opinion, the Command was given *only to try* Abraham ; or whether *both to try and to prefigure*, &c. Now I was there ſpeaking of the Command, as given to *Abraham*. Therefore *to prefigure* could not be one End, becauſe it was not to *inform*.

## XIV.

But we are yet only in the Skirts of his Argument, on which, indeed, I have ſat too long. “ Thus much (*ſays he*) being obſerved “ TO PREVENT Confuſion\*.” This puts me in Mind of the *Conſtable*, who being called in to appeaſe a Quarrel, firſt knocked down every one he met ; and then ſaid, “ Thus much to prevent Diſ- “ order.” For the Reader ſees all the *Confuſion* is of his own making ; and that, I have Reaſon to fear, will keep riſing by every new *Obſervation*. “ Let us now (*ſays he*) attend to your Argument †.” Indeed it is time ; and ſo, without more Ceremony

\* Confid. p. 151.

† Ibid.

take it. One of my Proofs against the common Interpretation was, that according to *that* there was no Reward subsequent to the Trial. To which he answers, "But how can you prove that, according to the common Interpretation, there was no Reward subsequent to the Trial \*?" How shall I be able to please him? Before he was offended that I supposed the Author of the Book of *Genesis* might omit relating the *Mede* of a Fact, when he had good Reason † to do. Here, because I suppose *no Fact*, from there being none recorded, when no Reason hindered, he is as captious on this Side. "How will you prove it? (*says he*). From the Silence of the Historian, say I, when nothing hindered him from speaking. Well, but he will shew it fairly recorded in Scripture, that there *were Rewards subsequent to the Trial*. This, indeed is to the Purpose: "*Abraham (says he)* lived a great many Years after that Transaction happened. He lived to dispose of his Son *Iaac* in Marriage, and to see his Seed. He lived to be married himself to another Wife, and to have several Children by her; he had not THEN received all God's Mercies, nor were all God's Dispensations towards him at an End; and it is to be remembered that it is expressly said of *Abraham, Gen. xxiv. 1.* (a long Time after the Transaction in Question) *that God had blessed him in all Things ‡.*" The Question here is, of the *extraordinary* and uncommon Rewards bestowed by God on *Abraham*; and he decides upon it, by an Enumeration of the *ordinary and common*. And, to fill up the Measure of these Blessings, he makes the marrying of *another Wife* one. Though unluckily, this Wife at last proves but a *Concubine*; as appears plainly from the Place where she is mentioned. But let me ask him seriously; Could he, indeed, suppose me to mean (though he attended not to the Drift of the Argument) that God immediately withdrew all his Favours from the

\* Confid. p. 151.

† See the Reason assigned, Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 610. [Vol. III. Book VI. § 5.]

‡ Confid. p. 151, 152.

Father of the Faithful, after the last great Reward he conferred upon him, though he lived many Years after? I can hardly, I confess, account for this, any otherwise than from a certain Turn of Mind which I don't care to give a Name to: But which, the Habit of answering has made so common that nobody either mistakes it, or is much scandalized at it. Though I, for my Part, should esteem a total Ignorance of Letters a much happier Lot than such a learned Depravity. "But this is not all," (*says he.*)—No? I am sorry for it! 'Twas enough in Conscience!—"What surprizes me most is, that you should argue so WEAKLY, as if the Reward of good Men had Respect to this Life only. Be it, that *Abraham* had received all God's Mercies; and that all God's Dispensations towards him, in this World, were at an End; was there not a Life yet to come, with Respect to which the whole Period of our Existence here is to be considered as a State of Trial; and where we are all of us to look for that Reward of our Virtues which we very often fail of in this\*?" Well, if it was NOT ALL, we find, at least, 'twas all of a Piece. For as before he would sophistically obtrude upon us *common*, for extraordinary Rewards; so here, (true to the Genius of his Trade) he puts *common* for extraordinary Trials. The Case, to which I applied my Argument, was this;—God, determining to select a chosen People from the Loins of *Abraham*, would manifest to the World that this Patriarch was worthy of the Distinction shewn him, by having his Faith found superior to the hardest Trials. In speaking of these Trials, I said, that the Command to offer *Isaac* was the last. "No," *says the Examiner*, that cannot be, for, with Respect to a Life to come, the whole Period of our Existence here, is to be considered as a State of Trial." And so again, (*says he*) with Regard to the Reward; which you pretend, in the Order of God's Dispensations, should follow the Trial: Why? We are to "look after it in another World."—Holy Scripture records the History of one,

\* *Confid.* p. 152.

to whom God only promised (in the clear and obvious Sense) temporal Blessings. It records, that these temporal Blessings were dispensed. One Species of which were extraordinary Rewards after extraordinary Trials. In the most extraordinary of all, no Reward followed: This was my Difficulty. See here, how he has cleared it up.—I would willingly believe the best: Yet the bringing in a *future State* (no more to clearing up the Difficulty than a *future Parliament*) looks so very like, what the Logicians call, *Argumentum ad invidiam*, that I don't know whether I shall bring the Reader to believe with me. "What furprizes me most (*says he*) is, that you should argue so weakly."—*Weakly*, does he say? Let him speak out, and rather say *wickedly*; which is indeed what he would have the Reader understand, though in Tendernefs he prefers a softer Word: For he roundly asserts, that *I have argued as if the Reward of good Men had respect to this Life only*. I had said, indeed, frequently said, that many good Men had no Respect to any other Reward; *but that the Reward of good Men had respect to this Life only*, I not only never said, but even abhor the Thoughts of. I must therefore call upon my Examiner, for this **FOURTH TIME**, to prove that I ever argued in that Manner, on Pain of passing for a Calumniator.

## XV.

But he seems to be sensible of his bad Argument; whatever might be his Intention in using it; and would save all by another Fetch: For the weakest are ever most most fruitful in Expedients. "And what (*says he*) if, after all this, the Wisdom of God should have thought fit, that this very Man, whom he had singled out to be an eminent Example of Piety to all Generations, should, at the very Close of his Life, give Evidence of it, by an Instance that exceeded all that had gone before; that he might be a Pattern of patient Suffering, even unto the End? Would there not be SENSE in such a Supposition \*?"

\* *Confid.* p. 153.

In Truth, I doubt not, as he has put it: And I will tell him, why. *Abraham* was not a mere *Instrument* to stand for an Example only, but a *moral Agent* likewise; and to be dealt with as such. Now, though, as he stands for an *Example*, we may admit of as many *Trials* for *patient Suffering* as our good-natured Examiner thinks fitting; yet, as a *moral Agent*, it is required (as I have proved from the Method of God's dealing with his Servants, recorded in sacred History) that each Trial be attended with some Work done, or some Reward conferred. But these two Circumstances in *Abraham's* Character, our Examiner perpetually confounds. He supposes nothing to be done for *Abraham's own Sake*; but every Thing for the *Example's Sake*. Yet, did the good Cause of *answering* require, he could as easily suppose the contrary. And that I do him no Wrong, I will here give the Reader a remarkable Instance of this Dexterity, in the Counter-exercise of his Arms. In p. 150, of these *Considerations*, (*he says*) "IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, that, because a Thing is prefigured, therefore it must be seen and understood AT THE TIME when it is prefigured." Yet in the Body of the Pamphlet, p. 112, 113, having another Point to puzzle; he says (on my observing that a future State and Resurrection were not national Doctrines till the Time of the *Maccabees*) "he knows I will say they had these Doctrines from the Prophets—yet the Prophets were dead two hundred Years before."—But if the Prophets were dead, their Writings were extant—"And what then? is it LIKELY that the Sons should have learnt from the dead Prophets, what the Fathers could not learn from the Living?—Why could not the *Jews* learn this Doctrine from THE VERY FIRST, as well as their Posterity at the Distance of Ages afterwards." In the first Case we find he expressly says, *it does not follow*; in the second, he as plainly supposes, that *it does*.

## XVI.

“ But there are other Objections besides this (*he says*) to my  
 “ Interpretation of the Command: As first it doth not *appear* how  
 “ *Abraham* could collect from this Transaction, that *Christ* was to  
 “ be offered up as a Sacrifice. I can easily understand that *Christ*  
 “ may be maintained by *Actions* as well as by *Words*. What you  
 “ have said upon that Subject, p. 81\*, &c. no doubt is very just;  
 “ and the Instances you have produced from Scripture, where Ac-  
 “ tions have been used as foreshewing the Determinations of Pro-  
 “ vidence, are beyond all Exception. But whereas you have con-  
 “ sidered the Action of *Abraham* in offering up his Son as a Case  
 “ parallel to these; it differs from them all in a very material Cir-  
 “ cumstance, *viz.* that nothing is here added by Way of *Displama-*  
 “ *nation* to *show* the Import of it. When *Zedekiah* made him horns  
 “ of Iron, he said,—THUS shalt thou *push* the Syrians, 1 Kings xxii.  
 “ 11. When *Jeremiah* was bid to take a Linen Girdle and hide it  
 “ in the Hole of a Rock, &c. the Explanation immediately follows:—  
 “ Thus saith the Lord, AFTER THIS MANNER will I mar the Pride  
 “ of Judah, &c. *Jeremiah* xiii. 1—9. And so it is in every Instance  
 “ you have produced; which I need not particularly prove because  
 “ you have confessed it, p. 609 †. And no doubt such Explanations,  
 “ attending the Transaction, were always necessary for the Infor-  
 “ mation of the Prophet; because though *Actions* are as expressive  
 “ of *Ideas* as *Words* are; yet it is on Supposition that there is ei-  
 “ ther *common Use*, or *special Intimation*, to determine *what* Ideas  
 “ *such* or *such* Actions import; otherwise nothing can be under-  
 “ stood. You will not pretend, I suppose, that by any *common*  
 “ *Usage* of those Times, this Transaction was *significant* of the  
 “ Sacrifice of *Christ*; therefore there must have been some *specia-*  
 “ *Intimation* attending the Transaction, and determining it to this  
 “ Meaning, if it was the Intention of Providence, hereby to give  
 “ *Abraham* any such Information; of which special Intimation since

\* Ed. 4to. vol. II. p. 405.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 392.

“*nothing appears, it can never appear that any such Information was intended. The Presumption lies the other Way: Because if any such Information had been intended; it is natural to think that the Explanation would have been recorded with the Trans- action, as it is in all other such like Cases\*.*” This, indeed, stands unequalled, even by himself. In *The Divine Legation*, I had shewn the Nature of this significative Action here *commanded*;—I had shewn how it *agreed*, and how it *differed*, from others of the same Kind—I had shewn how *Abraham* must necessarily understand the Import of it. Yet here, the Examiner comes over me with an Objection, that implies a profound Ignorance of every thing I had said. I would fain instruct him; but if he chuses rather to be shamed; why, every Man to his Taste. He says, I consider the Information by Action *in the case of Abraham as parallel* to the Information given to, or by the Prophets *Zedekiah* and *Jeremiah*, for the Instruction of the People: “Whereas it differs from them in a very material Circumstance; namely, that nothing is here added by Way of Explanation, to shew the Import of it.” Hear, now, whether I consider it as *parallel* or *different*—having spoken of those significative Actions done by the Prophets, at God’s Command, for the People’s Information, I go on thus, *By these Actions the Prophets instructed the People in the Will of God—but where God TEACHES THE PROPHET, and, in Compliance to the Custom of that Time, condescends to the same Mode of Instruction, then the significative Action is generally changed into a Vision, either natural or extraordinary—I say generally, but not always. Sometimes, though the Information was only for the Prophet, God would SET HIM UPON AN expressive Action, whose obvious Meaning conveyed the Intelligence proposed or sought †.* I therefore call upon him here again, the **FIFTH TIME**, to prove that I considered them as *parallel*; or else to make his Retraction. He says, “he supposes, I will not pretend that, by any common Usage of those Times, this Trans-

\* Confid. p. 153, 154.

† *Divine Legation*, Vol. II. p. 83, 84. [Vol. II. p. 406, 407, ed. 4to.]

“action



“action was significative of the Sacrifice of *Christ*.” All that I pretended to, I delivered in very plain Terms, in the following Manner. *From the View given of Abraham’s History, we see, how all God’s Revelations to him, to this last [of the Command] ultimately relate to that mystic fundamental Promise, made to him on his first Vocation, that in him should all Families of the Earth be blessed. God opens the Scheme of his Dispensations, by exact and regular Steps—We see, throughout, a gradual Opening and fit Preparation for some further Revelation, which—could be no other than that of the Redemption—the Completion of the Whole of God’s Oeconomy—But the only remaining one recorded—is the Command to offer Isaac.—Now the Happiness or Redemption of Mankind, promised to come through Abraham, could not but make him more and more inquisitive into the Manner of its being brought about, in Proportion as he found himself to be more and more personally concerned, as the Instrument of so great a Blessing.—We have shewn it to be the Custom of Antiquity to instruct by Actions as well as Words—that God himself, in Compliance to a general Custom, used this Way of Information.—Nothing could be conceived more apposite to convey the Information than this very Action; ABRAHAM DESIRED EARNESTLY to be let into the Mystery of the Redemption, and God, to instruct him—said, Take now thy Son, &c. The Duration of the Action was the same as between Christ’s Death and Resurrection, &c\*.—Could Abraham now, after this, be any more in Doubt, that this Command was to prefigure the Sacrifice of *Christ*; than Ezekiel, that what he saw in the Chambers of Imagery was to represent the Idolatries of his Countrymen? But our Examiner artfully concealed, that I had, all along, supposed from the Proofs given, that this Revelation was “made at Abraham’s earnest Request:” And then asks, Whether “by any common Usage this Transaction was significative of the Sacrifice of *Christ*.” If not, he says, there must have been some special “Intimation determining it to this Meaning: Of which, since no-*

\* See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 606, & seq. [Vol. III. p. 385, ed. 4to.]

“thing

“ thing appears, it can never appear that any such Information was intended. The Presumption lies the other Way, because if any such Intimation had been intended, it is natural to think, the Explanation would have been recorded with the Transaction, as it is in ALL other such like Cases.” Here again, he honestly conceals from his Reader, that I had given *two Reasons*, why the Explanation was not recorded. The one arising from this Species of Information; the other, from the Nature of the Thing informed of. The first was, that *the Narrative of such a Converse by Action was not, in its Nature, so intelligible or obvious, as that where God is shewn conversing by Action to the Prophets, in the several Instances before given. And the Reason is this: Those Informations, as they are given to the Prophets for the Instruction of the People, have, necessarily, in the Course of the History, their Explanations annexed. But the Information to Abraham being solely for his own Use, there was no Room for that formal Explanation; which made the commanded Actions, performed by the Prophets, so clear and intelligible\**. And, to illustrate the Truth of the Observation, I gave an Example, in the Relation of *Jacob's wrestling with the Angel*. Which (like this of the Command) was an Information by Action, for *Jacob's* sole Use: And therefore has the same Obscurity, as not having its Explanation annexed. I have shewn what that Information was. And will he say, because the Explanation was not recorded, that this was the History of a *simple Wrestling*, as that was of a *commanded human Sacrifice*? Or will he rather chuse to retract what he had said, that where it is an Information by Action, the Explanation is always recorded in such like Cases?

The *second* Reason I gave why the Explanation was not recorded, arose from the Nature of the Thing informed of. *The Knowledge of God's future Dispensation, in the Redemption of Mankind, by the Death of his Son, revealed as a singular Favour to the Father of the Faithful, was (say I) what could, by no Means, be communicated to the Hebrew*

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 611. [Vol. III. p. 392, ed. 4to.]

*People, when Moses wrote his History for their Use; because they being then to continue long under a carnal Oeconomy, this Knowledge of the End of the Law would have greatly indisposed them to that Dispensation with which God, in his infinite Wisdom, thought fit to exercise them\*."*

## XVII.

But he has learnt his Trade for nothing. Catch an Answerer without his Salvo if you can. You may trust him to take Care that it shall never be said, he had passed over, in absolute Silence, the Answer given above; he therefore subjoins—"To this you reply, *that the Information to Abraham being solely for his own Use, and which could, by no Means, be communicated to the Hebrew People when Moses wrote his History; there was no room for the formal Explanation which made the commanded Actions performed by the Prophets so clear and intelligible*†."—To this (says he) you reply." To what? To his Objections against my Interpretation; which are these—"That nothing is added by way of Explanation—that this Transaction was not, by any common Usage of those Times, significative of the Sacrifice of *Christ*—that if any such Information had been intended, it is natural to think that the Explanation would have been recorded with the Transaction."—Had he given but a common Attention to what I wrote, he would have seen, that the Answer, he here quotes from me, was a Reply to quite a different Thing; namely, *Why the sacred Writer did not, for the Information of the Jewish Church, give an Explanation of the significative Action.* In the mean Time, the Reply I made to his three Objections, he still reserves in profound Silence. I have quoted it above, and it is in Substance this, *That where the commanded Action is for the Information of the Prophet only, there no*

\* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 610. [Vol. III. p. 391, ed. 4to.]

† Confid. p. 155.

*Explanation accompanies it.*—That the Command being given at Abraham's earnest Request to be further acquainted with the Mystery of the Redemption, he must needs see (though the Transaction was not, by any common Usage of those Times, significative of the Sacrifice of Christ) the true and real Import of it.—I had said, that our Examiner could not have been thus grossly mistaken had he given a common Attention to what he saw written. But the Reader may have Reason to suspect something worse, when he observes, that, in quoting this, which he calls my *Reply*, he makes me say, that, “as the Information was given solely for *Abraham's* Use, there was no Room for that formal Explanation, WHICH MADE THE COMMANDED ACTIONS PERFORMED BY THE PROPHETS SO CLEAR AND INTELIGIBLE.” Words so devoid of all Purpose, to the Argument he pretends I was there upon, that, had I used them, or any other like them, I should have been ashamed, after such Impertinence, to have appeared again in Print: Yet we find they were to our Examiner's Purpose to bestow upon me; in order to persuade the Reader, that this was really a *Reply* to his Objections.

But be the *Reply* what you please, if it will but give him an Opportunity to answer, to examine, to force a Trade, it is enough for him. He goes on, therefore, in this Manner, “But this which you offer, as a Solution of the Difficulty, is, WITH ME, A NEW OBJECTION.” See here now, do I belye the Man?—“For if the Knowledge of *Christ's* Sacrifice was not to be communicated; to what Purpose was it clearly revealed to *Abraham*? You say, that the *Jews*, being to continue long under a carnal Oeconomy; this Knowledge—would have greatly indisposed them to this Dispensation. But why was it then communicated to *Abraham*? For his sole Use\*, you say.”—Here he asks me a Question, then quotes my Answer to it: And, not liking that, asks the Question over again; and then makes an Answer for it himself, which, he thought, he could manage better. For let the Reader take Notice,

\* Confid. p. 155.

that

that the last Answer is not mine. I had talked very impertinently indeed, had I given it as a Reason why the Revelation was made to *Abraham*, and not given to the *Jews*, that it was for *Abraham's* sole Use. I had proved, indeed, from *Fact*, that it was for *his* sole Use: But the *Reason* I gave, for its not being communicated, was the unfit Circumstances and Disposition of the *Jewish* People to receive it. But what then? this which he calls the *Answer* does its Business; as that which he called the *Reply* had done before it; and serves him for a Handle to a NEW OBJECTION.

And thus he proceeds—"What Use? Will you be pleased to tell us? Was there any good Use that *Abraham* could make of this Knowledge, which the rest of the People of God might not have made of it as well as he? Or if it was unfit for every Body else, was it not unfit for *Abraham* too\*?" Amazing! Had not I given it as the Reason why it could not be communicated to the *Jewish* People, that they were to continue long under a burthenfome carnal Oeconomy; which, this Knowledge would have tempted them to throw off before the appointed Time? And did this Reason extend to *Abraham*, who was never under that Oeconomy?

## XVIII.

But he goes on—"In short, Sir, I do not understand this Doctrine (with which your whole Work much abounds) of revealing Things clearly to Patriarchs, and Prophets, and Leaders, as a special Favour to themselves; but to be kept as a Secret from the rest of Mankind."—It is but too plain (as he says) "he does not understand it:" For which I can give no better Reason than its being *Scripture-Doctrine*; and not that of *Sums* and *Systems*. Yet what he cannot understand, his Client Bishop *Bull* could, however: who (as he himself informs us) asserts, "that there were Arcana in the *Jewish* Theology, and consequently a twofold

\* Confid. p. 155.

“manner of teaching amongst them; one suited to vulgar Apprehensions; the other to those who had made some Proficiency in Knowledge.” *Exam. of Mr. W’s second Proposition, p. 125.* So that I ascribe this rather to a want of *Memory* than want of *Understanding*.

“I have been used (*says he*) to consider Persons under this Character, as appointed, not for themselves, but for others; and therefore to conclude that *WHATEVER* was clearly revealed to them, concerning God’s Dispensations, was so revealed, in order to be communicated to others\*.” This is the old hacknied Sophism; that, because Persons act and are employed for *others*; therefore they do nothing, or that nothing is done for *themselves*. When God said, *Shall I hide from Abraham that Thing which I do?* was not this said to, and for himself? But he sinks and flounders under this false Bottom, That *whatever was clearly revealed* to the Prophets, *was so revealed, in order to be communicated to others*. Here then a little *Scripture-Doctrine* will do him no Harm. Did *Moses* (and this is a Case in Point) communicate all he knew to the *Israelites*, concerning the *Christian Dispensation*; which the Author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* tells us *was clearly revealed* to him in the Mount?—*Priests* (*says he*) *that offer Gifts according to the Law, who serve unto the Example and Shadow of heavenly Things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the Tabernacle* †. Again, we find that *Ezekiel*, on his being called upon his Mission, saw, what the Author of *Ecclus* calls *the glorious Vision*; and had (as appears from the Allegory of the Roll of a Book) a full Interpretation thereof. Yet, notwithstanding all his Illumination, he was directed by God to speak so obscurely to the People, that he at length found Cause to complain, *Oh, Lord, they say of me, Doth he not speak Parables* ‡? And now let him ask the Prophets with the same Pertness he is accustomed to *examine me, Was there any good Use you could make of your Knowledge, that the People of God might*

\* Confid. p. 155, 156.

† Heb. viii. 4, 5.

‡ Ezek. xx. 49.

not have made of it as well as you?—But the same Dispensation is alluded to, and continued, under the Kingdom of Christ—And his Disciples asked him saying, *What might this Parable be?* And he said, *Unto you it is given to know the Mysteries of the Kingdom of God: But to others, in Parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand* \*. And now, Reader, shall I claim his Promise? “If you can shew (*says he*) that I am mistaken in “this, pray do it, and I shall be obliged to you †.” For, you see, I have taken him at his Word. And ’twas well I did; for it was no sooner out of his Mouth, than, as if he had repented (not of his Candour, but his Confidence) he immediately cries, Hold—and tells me “I might have spared myself in asking another Question, “*Why, if Revelations cannot be clearly recorded, are they recorded at all ‡.*” But, great Defender of the Faith—of the ancient Jewish Church! I asked that very Question, because the Answer to it shews how much you are mistaken; as the intelligent Reader, by this Time, easily perceives. But why does he say I might have spared that Question? because, “if a Revelation is not clearly given, it cannot “be clearly recorded §.” Did I say it could? Or will he say, that there are no Reasons why a Revelation, that is clearly given, should be obscurely recorded? To what Purpose then, was the Observation made? Made! why to introduce another. For, with our equivocal Examiner, the Corruption of Argument is the Generation of Observation.—“And yet (*says he*) as you intimate, there may be “Reasons why an OBSCURE REVELATION should be recorded, to “wit, for the Instruction of future Ages, when the Obscurity being “cleared up by the Event, it shall appear, that it was foreseen and “fore-ordained in the Knowledge and Appointment of God ||.”

What I intimated, was not concerning an *obscure Revelation*, but a *Revelation obscurely recorded*. These are two very different Things, as appears from hence, that the latter may be a *clear Revelation*, the

\* Luke viii. 9, 10.

† Confid. p. 156.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

Word being relative to him to whom the Revelation was made; but this is a Peccadillo only. However, he approves the Reason of *recording*; for that, thereby, "it shall appear, that it was fore-  
 "seen and foreordained by God." It—what? the *obscure Revela-  
 tion*, according to grammatical Construction: But, in his *English*,  
 I suppose, it stands for the Fact revealed. Well then; from the  
 recording of an obscure Revelation, he says it will appear, when  
 the foretold Fact happens, that it was foreseen and preordained by  
 God. This too he tells the Reader I *intimated*; but, if the Reader  
 will take my Word, I never intimated any thing so foolish. For  
 every Fact, whether prefigured and foretold, or not prefigured and  
 foretold, must needs have been foreseen and preordained by God.  
 Now, whether we are to attribute this to *Exactness*, or to *Inaccu-  
 racy* of Expression, is hard to say. If to the former, it is to be  
 considered as one of his Arts, to get to a Consequence which he  
 immediately afterwards endeavours to deduce from it; which is,  
 "that, as well on his Sense of the Command, as on mine, a De-  
 "pendency between the two Dispensations may be deduced." And  
 it is certain, that if that Dependency arises from God's Foreknow-  
 ledge of the Fact, he is much in the right; but that will be seen  
 by and by. On the other hand, if it be an *Inaccuracy*, as I am  
 rather inclined to think; then it is plain he must mean *something  
 else*; and that *something* might, perhaps, be this; that, from such  
 a *Record*, a real Connexion might be proved between the Old and  
 New Testament, arising from the EVIDENCE that God, in this  
 commanded Action, did INTEND to prefigure the Sacrifice of *Christ*.  
 —Just before, he had said, "he desired not to be mistaken\*." But  
 this, let me tell him, is an unreasonable Request, unless he *desired*  
 too to be *understood*. And that he desires not this, is evident from  
 his perpetual Equivocations. However, we presume, we have here  
 insinuated ourselves into his Meaning. But if the Reader now  
 should ask how this makes for the point to be proved, namely, that

\* Confid. p. 156.



“ I might have spared myself in asking the Question, *Why, if Revelations cannot be clearly recorded, are they recorded at all?*” I must tell him, and let him not be surpris'd, that it was not design'd to have any thing to do with the Point to be proved, at all; but only to *produce* or give Birth to another OBSERVATION; begot, as he well expresses it, UPON the foregoing putrid Argumentation.—

“ UPON this Principle (*says he*) you must give me leave to OBSERVE, “ that the Transaction in Question will have the same Efficacy to “ *shew the Dependency between the two Dispensations.* Whether “ *Abraham* had thereby any Information of the Sacrifice of *Christ* or “ not\*.” This, indeed, is saying something. And, could he prove it, would be depriving my Interpretation of one of its principal Uses. Let us see then how he goes about it. “ For this “ does not arise from *Abraham's* KNOWLEDGE, or any body's “ KNOWLEDGE, at the Time when the Transaction happened, but “ from the Similitude and Correspondency between the Event and “ the Transaction, by which it was prefigured; which is exactly “ the same upon either Supposition †.” To this I answer and say,

1. That I myself never supposed that the Dependency between the two Dispensations did “ arise from *Abraham's* Knowledge, or any “ body's Knowledge,” at that or any other Time; but from God's INTENTION that this commanded Action should import or represent the Sacrifice of *Christ*: And then comes in the Question whether that *Intention* be best discovered from God's Declaration of it to *Abraham*, or from a Similitude and Correspondency between this commanded Action and the Sacrifice of *Christ*. Therefore, 2. I answer and say, that a SIMILITUDE and CORRESPONDENCY *between the Event and the Transaction which prefigured it*, is not enough to shew this DEPENDENCY to the Satisfaction of Unbelievers: Who say, that a Likeness between two Things of the same Nature; such as the offering up two Men to Death, though in different Ways, and transacted in two very distant Periods, is not sufficient alone to

\* Confid. p. 156.

† Ibid. p. 156, 157.

shew that they had any Relation to one another \*. With the same Reason they will say, you might pretend that *Jephtba's* Daughter, or the King of *Mob's* Son, whom the Father sacrificed on the Wall †, were the Types of *Christ's* Sacrifice. Give us, say they, a Bible-Proof that God declared or revealed his Intention of prefiguring the Death of *Jesus*; or some better Authority at least than a modern Typifier, who deals only in *Similitudes* and *Correspondences*. Now whether it be our Examiner, or I, who have given them this Satisfaction, or whether they have any Reason to require it of us, is left to the impartial Reader to consider.

## XIX.

We now come to the UTILITY of my Interpretation of the Command, having got through all his Objections to its TRUTH. And here, the same Civility and Candour which so polished and enlivened the foregoing Part, shine out again, in the very first Words of this. “And now, Sir (*says he*) give me Leave to ask, what Service have you done to Religion by your Interpretation? We were prepared for it, p. 84. by an Intimation that something was to arise from it *to the Confusion of Infidelity*: As how? why first, as by your Manner of explaining this Transaction of *Abraham*, you should illustrate God's Truth by the noblest Instance that ever was given of the Harmony between the Old and New Testament.” And 2dly, “as by its Aid you should be enabled to give the true Solution of those inexplicable Difficulties which have been so long the Stumbling-Block of Infidelity †.”

And now he addresses himself to shew, that my Interpretation has neither of these Advantages. “First, as to the Harmony (*he says*) “he has just above shewn that the Transaction will be equally prophetic of *Christ's* Sacrifice, whether my Interpretation be ad-

\* See what the Letter-Writer abovementioned says, p. 53, 54, much to the same Purpose.

† 2 Kings iii. 27.

‡ Confid. p. 157.

“mitted or not\*.” He hath shewn it indeed! as the *Irishman* shewed his——. And it is fresh in the Reader’s Memory. Come we, then, to the second. “As to the second (*says he*) the *Difficulties* which have been so long the Stumbling-block of Infidelity, “which upon the Foot of the common Interpretation you call *insuperable*; I greatly marvel that you should call them so, when “you acknowledge, in the very same Page, that *the Arguments hitherto brought to support the History of this Command are of great Weight and Validity* †.” He marvels! Why let him marvel. I suppose he never heard that there are *insuperable Difficulties* even to some demonstrable Propositions. But he, of all Men, should have accepted my Concession upon fair Terms, since it was made to humour Divines like himself; who think it enough for Religion if the Objections to it be, as he warily expresses it, GUARDED AGAINST ‡: Which, God knows! they often are, by Arguments of no great *Weight or Validity*.

## XX.

However (*says he*) “whether you had owned this or not, I “SHOULD HAVE TAKEN UPON MYSELF THE PROOF that these *insuperable Difficulties* may be very effectually and substantially removed, without borrowing any Aid from your Interpretation. “The Substance of the Objection to the historic Truth of this Relation, as collected by yourself, p. 614 §, is this, *That God could never give such a Command to Abraham, because it would throw him into inextricable Doubts concerning the Author of it; as whether it proceeded from a good or evil Being—[because] it would mislead him in his Notions of the Divine Attributes, and of the fundamental Principles of Morality. For though the revoking the Command prevented the Homicide; yet the Action being commanded, and, at the Revocation, not condemned; Abraham and his Family must needs*

\* Confid. p. 157.

† Ibid. p. 157, 158.

‡ Ibid. p. 157.

§ Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 397.

“ have they *let* human Sacrifices grateful to the Almighty. For a *single* revoking was no Condemnation; but would be more naturally  
 “ *pleased* a peculiar Indulgence for ready Obedience. Thus the Pagan  
 “ Fable of Diana’s substituting a Hind in the Place of Iphigenia, did  
 “ not make Idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human Sacri-  
 “ fices, they having before been persuaded of the contrary\*.” The  
 Objection, the Reader sees, consists of two Parts: The *one*, that  
*Abraham* must doubt of the Author of the Command: The *other*,  
 that he would be misled concerning his Attributes; or in the Grate-  
 fulness of human Sacrifices to him.

To the *first*, our Examiner answers †, partly from what I myself  
 had observed might be urged by Believers, as of *great Weight and*  
*Validity*, and partly from what he had picked up elsewhere. But  
 here I shall avoid imitating his Example, in endeavouring to shew  
 the Invalidity of Arguments professedly brought in Support of Re-  
 ligious: An Employment by no Means becoming a Christian Divine.  
 If they have any weak Parts, I shall leave them to Unbelievers to  
 find out. I have the more Reason too to trust them to their own  
*Weight*, both as they are none of his, with whom only I have  
 here to do, and as I have acknowledged their *Validity*. All I shall  
 observe is, that, as I had made that Acknowledgment, I see not  
 to what End they are urged against me; unless it were to entertain  
 us with his Common-Place: Which I should have received in Si-  
 lence, had he not affected to introduce it with so much Pomp—  
 “ Whether you had owned this or not (*says he*) I should have taken  
 “ upon myself the Proof.” Whereas, all that he has *taken* is the  
 Property of others: Made his *own*, indeed, by a weak and an im-  
 perfect Representation.

But now he comes to the *second* Part of the Objection. “ As to  
 “ the latter Part of the Objection (*says he*) that from this Com-  
 “ mand, *Abraham* and his Family must needs have thought hu-  
 “ man Sacrifices acceptable to God; the revoking the Command at

\* Confid. p. 158.

† Ibid. p. 159, 160.

“ last, was a sufficient Guard against any such Construction. To  
 “ this you make the Unbeliever answer: No; because the Action  
 “ having been *commanded* ought to have been *condemned*; and a  
 “ simple *Revocation* was no *Condemnation*. But why was not the  
 “ Revocation of the Command, in this Case, a Condemnation of  
 “ the Action? If I should tempt you to go and kill your next  
 “ Neighbour, and afterwards come and desire you *not* to do it;  
 “ would not this *After-declaration* be as good an Evidence of my  
 “ Dislike to the Action, as the first was of my Approbation of it?  
 “ Yes, and a *much better*, as it may be presumed to have been the  
 “ Result of *maturer* Deliberation. Now though *Deliberation* and  
 “ *After-thought* are not incident to God; yet as God in this Case  
 “ condescended (as you say, and very truly) to act after the *Man-*  
 “ *ner* of Men; the same *Construction* should be put upon his Actions,  
 “ as are usually put upon the Actions of *Men* in like Cases\*.”  
 Now, though, as was said above, I would pay all decent Regard  
 and Reference that becomes a Friend of Revelation, to the common  
 Arguments of *others* in its Defence, yet I must not betray my *own*.  
 I confessed they had great *Weight and Validity*; yet, at the same  
 Time, I asserted, they were attended with *insuperable Difficulties*.  
 And while I so think, I must beg Leave to inforce my Reasons for  
 this Opinion. And, I hope, without Offence; as the Arguments,  
 I am now about to examine, are purely this Writer's own. And  
 the Reader has, by this Time, seen too much of him to be apprehen-  
 sive, that the lessening his Authority will be attended with any  
 great Disservice to Religion.

I had observed, that the Reasonings of Unbelievers on this Case,  
 as it is commonly explained, were not devoid of all Plausibility,  
 when they proceeded thus—That as *Abraham* lived amongst Hea-  
 thens, whose highest Act of Divine Worship was Human Sacrifice;  
 if God had commanded that Act, and, on the point of Perform-  
 ance, only remitted it as a Favour (and so it is represented);

\* Confid. p. 160, 161.

without declaring the Iniquity of the Practice, when address'd to Hols: or his Abhorrence of it, when directed to himself; the Family must have been misled in their Ideas concerning the moral Rectitude of that Species of Religious Worship: Therefore, God, in these Circumstances, had he commanded the Action as a *Trial only*, would have explicitly condemned that Mode as immoral. But He is not represented as condemning, but as remitting it in *Favour*: Consequently, say the Unbelievers, God did not command the Action at all.—Now what says our Examiner, in *answer* to all this? He says,—“ But why? Was not the Revocation of the Command “ a Condemnation of the Action? If I should tempt you to go and “ kill your next Neighbour, and afterwards come and DESIRE you “ not to do it, would not this After-declaration be as good an Evi- “ dence of my Dislike to the Action, as the first was of my Appro- “ bation of it?” To this I reply; That the Cases are, by no means, parallel; either in themselves, or in their Circumstances: 1<sup>st</sup>, Not *in themselves*. The Murder of our next Neighbour was, amongst all the Gentiles of that time, esteemed a high Immorality; but, on the contrary, human Sacrifices a very holy and acceptable Part of Divine Worship. 2<sup>dly</sup>, Not *in their Circumstances*. The *Desire* to forbear the Murder tempted to is (in the Case *he* puts) represented as *Repentance*: Whereas the Stop put to the Sacrifice of *Isaac* is (in the Case *Moses* puts) represented as *Favour*.

But what follows I could wish (for the Honour of modern Theology) that the Method I have observed would have permitted me to pass over in Silence. “ Now, though Deliberation and After- “ thought (*says he*) are not incident to God, yet, as God, in this “ Case, condescended (as you say, and very truly) to act after the “ Manner of Men; the same Construction should be put upon “ his Actions, as are usually put upon the Actions of Men in like “ Cases:” *i. e.* though *Deliberation* and *After-thought* are not incident to God; yet you are to understand his Actions, as if they

\* Confid. p. 155, 156.

were incident. A horrid Interpretation! And yet his Representation of the Command and his decent Illustration of it, by a *Murderer in Intention*, will not suffer us to interpret it in any other Manner. For God, as if in Haste, and before due Deliberation, is represented as commanding an immoral Action; yet again, as it were by an *After-thought*, ordering it to be foreborn, by reason of its Immorality. And in what is all this impious Jargon founded? If you will believe our Examiner; on the Principle I laid down, *That God condescends to act after the Manner of Men*. I have all along had Occasion to complain of his misrepresenting my *Principles*. But they were Principles he *disliked*. And this the modern Management of Controversy has sanctified. But here, though the Principle be approved, he yet cannot forbear misrepresenting it. So bad a Thing is an evil Habit. Let me tell him therefore, that by the Principle of *God's condescending to act after the Manner of Men*, is not meant, that he ever acts in Compliance to those Vices and Superstitions, which arise from the Depravity of human *Will*: But in Conformity only to Men's indifferent Manners and Customs; and to those Usages which result only from the finite Imperfections of their Nature. Thus though, as in the Case before us, God was pleased, in Conformity to their Mode of Information, to use their Custom of revoking a Command; yet he never condescended to imitate (as our Examiner supposes) the Irresolution, the Repentance, and Horrors of Conscience of a *Murderer in Intention*. Which (gracious Heaven!) is the Parallel this Divine brings to illustrate the Command to *Abramam*. But he had read that God is sometimes said to *repent*; and he thought, I suppose, it answered to that Repentance which the Stings of Conscience sometimes produce in bad Men. Whereas it is said, in Conformity to a good Magistrate's or Parent's Correction of Vice, first to threaten Punishment; and then, on the Offender's Amendment, to remit it.

## XXI.

But he goes on without any Signs of Remorse. “Nor will the Pagan Fable of *Diana’s* substituting a Hind in the Place of *Iphigenia* at all help your Unbeliever. This did not, say they, or YOU FOR THEM, make Idolaters believe that she therefore abhorred human Sacrifices. But do not they themselves, or have not you assigned a very proper and sufficient Reason why it did, viz. that they had been *before persuaded of the contrary*? Where human Sacrifices make a Part of the settled standing Religion; the Refusal to accept a human Sacrifice in one Instance may, indeed, be rather looked upon as a particular Indulgence, than as a Declaration against the Thing in gross. But where the Thing was commanded but in one single Instance, and the Command revoked in that very Instance (which is our present Case), such Revocation in all reasonable Construction is as effectual a Condemnation of the Thing, as if God had told *Abraham*, in so many Words, that he delighted not in human Sacrifices\*.” To come to our Examiner’s half-buried Sense, we are often obliged to remove, or at least to sift well, the Rubbish of his Words. He says, the *Revocation* was an *effectual Condemnation*. This may either signify, that *Men now* free from the Prejudices of Pagan Superstition may see that human Sacrifices were condemned by the Revocation of the Command: Or, that *Abraham’s Family* could see this. In the first Sense, I have nothing to do with his Proposition; and in the second, I shall take the liberty to deny it was an *effectual Condemnation*. With how good Reason let the Reader judge.

*Abraham*, for the great Ends of God’s Providence, was called out of an idolatrous City, infected, as all such Cities then were, with this horrid Superstition. He was himself an Idolater, as appears from the Words of *Joshua*—*Your Fathers dwell on the other side of*

\* Confid. p. 161.



*the Flood in old Time, even Terah the Father of Abraham, and the Father of Nachor: and THEY served other Gods. And I took your Father Abraham* \*, &c. God, in the Act of calling him, instructed him in the Unity of his Nature, and the Error of Polytheism: as the great Principle, for the sake of which (and to preserve it in one Family amidst an universal Overflow of Idolatry) he was called out. That he must be prejudiced in favour of his Country Superstitions, is not to be doubted; because it is of human Nature itself to be so: And yet we find no particular Instruction given him, concerning the Superstition in question. Further, the noble Author of the *Characteristicks* observes, that “it appears that he was under no extreme Surprise on this trying Revelation; nor did he think of ex-  
“postulating in the least on this occasion; when at another time  
“he could be so importunate for the Pardon of an inhospitable,  
“murderous, impious, and incestuous City †.” Insinuating hereby, that this kind of Sacrifice was a thing he had been accustomed to: Now the noble Author observes this, upon the *Examiner’s*, that is, the *common* Interpretation. And I believe, on that footing, he, or a better Writer, would find it difficult to enervate the Observation. Whereas I have shewn (in the Place from whence I have here quoted it) that it falls together with *that* Interpretation.

Well; *Abraham* is now in the Land of *Canaan*; and again surrounded with the same idolatrous and inhumane Sacrificers. Here he receives the Command: And, on the point of Performance, has it countermanded as a FAVOUR. A Circumstance, in the Revocation, which I must beg the *Examiner’s* leave to insist upon; especially when I find him so slippery as, at every turn, to forget it; that is, to pass it over in silence, without either owning or denying. As indeed, the little Support his general Argument has, in any place, is only by keeping Truth out of sight. But further, the *Favour* was *unaccompanied* with any Instruction concerning the

\* Josh. xxiv. 2, 3.

† Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 624. Note <sup>m</sup> [Vol. III. p. 403. 567. Ed. 4to.]

moral Nature of this kind of Sacrifice; a Practice never positively forbidden but by the Law of *Moses*. Now, in this case, I would ask any candid Reader, the least acquainted with human Nature, whether *Abraham* and his Family, prejudiced as they were in favour of human Sacrifices; (the one, by his Education in his Country Religion; the other, by their Communication with their Pagan Neighbours, and, as appears by Scripture, but too apt to fall into Idolatry) would not be naturally tempted to think as favourably of human Sacrifices as those Pagans were, who understood that *Diana* required *Iphigenia*; though she accepted a Hind in her stead. And with such Readers, I, finally, leave it.

## XXII.

Our Examiner having now shewn, first, That my Interpretation is not founded in *Truth*. Secondly, That it is productive of no *Utility*: He comes, in good time, to the third and last Part of his *Herculean Labour*, to shew, that it makes *matters worse than I found them*: Which, in other Words, we shall find, will amount to this — That the *common* Interpretation agrees with *his System*; but that *mine* does not: which *System*, by the known Courtesy of Controversy, you are to permit him to call the *Word of God*.

“ This, Sir (*says he*) is the Substance of what has been or may be offered, in Answer to the Objections propounded upon the common foot of Interpretation. Let us now see what *your* Interpretation affords that is better. You say then; That *the Command could occasion no Mistakes concerning the divine Attributes, because it was only the Conveyance of an Information by Action instead of Words*; in Conformity to the common Mode of conversing in early Times. *This Action therefore being mere Scenery, and, like Words, only of arbitrary Signification; it had no moral Import; but the Formality of that Action, which has no moral Import, is seen no way to affect the moral Character of the Author.*—All this, Sir, is “ admitted.”

“admitted.” Very well, proceed. “In your way of reckoning, the Command had no moral Import; for nothing was intended to be done to *Abraham’s* Hurt or Prejudice; who, as you tell us, very well understood—*how the scenical Representation was to end*;—and must needs conclude—either that God would set his Hand when he came to give the sacrificing Stroke; or that—his Son, sacrificed in the Person of Christ, was IMMEDIATELY to be rejoiced to Live. This Solution, no doubt, clears up every thing as to *Abraham*; and consequently removes *one* Part of the Objection, which says; that God could not give such a Command, because it inferred a Violation of the natural Law\*.”

Here certainly I can complain of nothing but my ill Fortune. This is the first time the Examiner has pleased to own that I have removed an Objection. And now, instead of rejoicing in the Honour he does me, I have a Scruple of Conscience about accepting it. And my Case is this. He says I have removed it upon this Principle of mine, *that the Command had no moral Import*. But alas! in crossing the Proverb, and looking, as it were, into his Mouth, (for there his Words have their birth, and not from his Heart) I find he foully mistakes the Meaning of the Principle; and, what is worse, seems to give his own wrong Meaning to me. “In your way of reckoning, the Command had no moral Import; for nothing was intended to be done to *Abraham’s* Hurt or Prejudice.” But as near as he thinks himself to me, he is a Mile from the Reason. The Reason why I say it had no moral Import, was, not because *nothing was done to Abraham’s Hurt or Prejudice*; Alas! No: but because the Act commanded was, both in the Intention of God, and in the Knowledge of *Abraham*, a mere *scenical Representation*, and not a *Religious Sacrifice*: For that a *scenical* Representation has nothing of that *moral Import* which belongs to the thing represented. Let the Gift, then, go current or not, just as the Reader pleases. I find I have little Reason to be anxious about its

\* Confid. p. 161, 162.

Value, and lets to be proud of the Honour: For he immediately subjoins, "But as this Solution removes one Difficulty, it creates another." What, another in favour of Infidelity! No. But concerning *Abraham's Merit in Obedience*. Yet his Purpose is here to shew, that my *Interpretation* can do nothing against an infidel *Objection*; which, were it not for *his Answers*, that, as he well expresses it, stand guard over them, might run nobody knows whither. So that still, by his own Confession, my *Interpretation* has removed one of the strongest Infidel *Objections*. However, as I would not before accept this Honour at the Expence of Truth; so neither will I now at the Expence of *Abraham's* Character. Let us enquire, therefore, into this new-created Difficulty. "It is (*says he*) "that the Command will not stand with the Notion of a Trial, in "one Point, in which the History itself intimates it was intended as "such. You tell us; that *Abraham*, in expressing his extreme Readiness to obey, declared a full Confidence in the Promises of God; "which is very true. But you say nothing of his *Virtue*, i. e. of "his *Patience* and *Self-denial*; of which yet this Command was intended as a Trial. The very Words of the Command shew "this. *Take now thy Son, thine ONLY Son Isaac, whom thou "lovest*. Here are two things pointed at, as standing in the "Way to hinder *Abraham* from obeying this Command. 1. The "Assurances which God had given him, that *Isaac* should be the "Heir of the Promises; for *Isaac* was *Abraham's* ONLY Son, not "by Birth but by Promise. 2. His natural paternal Affection. The "first Difficulty his Faith was to remove; the second was to be conquered by his Resolution and Fortitude. But where, I ask, was "Abraham's Resolution; if he knew, either that God would not "suffer the Command to be put in Execution; or if he did, that "he should instantly be restored to him? Resolution is shewed by "bearing hard Things; but on neither of these Suppositions "had *Abraham* any Thing in Expectation, by which he could be "a Sufferer\*." And now we see how willingly he was misled,

\* Confid. p. 163.

when he mistook my Reason, why the Action had no moral Import; and saying, it was because nothing was intended to be *done* to Abraham's *Hurt or Prejudice*. For it was preparatory to what he here undertakes to shew, that, according to my Interpretation, *Abraham* had no room to exercise his paternal Affection; that being what he drives at by all his round-about Words. But to proceed. He says, "You tell us that *Abraham*, in expressing his extreme Readiness to obey, declared a full Confidence in the Promises of God. But you say nothing of his Virtue; *i. e.* of his PATIENCE and SELF-DENIAL, of WHICH THIS COMMAND WAS INTENDED AS A TRIAL." He says very true I said nothing of it, and the Reason was (not that I thought he had them not, but) because Holy Scripture *says nothing of them* \*. But he tells me, though Scripture *said nothing*, it *pointed* to them. And so did I, if he goes to that. Indeed, I neither *said* nor *pointed* at any thing so absurd, as that *the Command was intended as a Trial of his Patience and Self-denial*, because Scripture represents it as a Trial of his Faith only. BY FAITH ABRAHAM WHEN HE WAS TRIED offered up *Isaac*, says the Author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*. But I won't promise what I shall not do for the future. I think it deserves to be *pointed at*. But he says I speak of *Abraham's Faith*, and say nothing of his *Virtue*. It is commonly said, indeed, that *Patience is a Virtue*; but it is as true that *Faith* is one also. Though he may be in the number of those subtle Schoolmen the Poet speaks of, for aught I know,

"Who *Faith* and *Virtue*, Sense and Reason split,  
With all the rash Dexterity of Wit."

Yet, for all this, I own, that the great *Merit* of *Abraham's Faith* implied in it *Patience* and *Self-denial*. Let us hear then how I have lessened these Virtues. Why then "hear (*says our Examiner*) what "the Author of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* says; who best un-

\* See what the Letter-Writer has very pertinently replied to this Purpose, p. 77.

“ derstood this Matter. *By Faith*, Abraham *when he was tried*,  
 “ offered up Isaac; and he that had received the Promises, offered up  
 “ his only begotten Son; of whom it was said, that in Isaac shall thy  
 “ Seed be called; accounting, that God was able to raise him up even  
 “ from the Dead. Heb. xi. 17, 18, 19. It is in the Nature of  
 “ the Thing, necessary to be supposed; that Abraham was firmly  
 “ persuaded, either, that God would revoke the Command; or,  
 “ that he would raise up his Son from the Dead; for otherwise  
 “ the Promise could never stand. The Apostle tells you *precisely*,  
 “ which of these he believed; *viz.* that it was, that God would  
 “ raise Isaac from the dead. And this agrees with the Character  
 “ that the Scripture gives of Abraham’s Faith; his believing  
 “ AGAINST HOPE, *i. e.* against all the Appearances or Probabilities  
 “ of human Things. When Isaac was born, he received him *from*  
 “ the dead; *i. e.* from a dead Womb. Supposing him slain, he be-  
 “ lieved that he should again receive him *from the dead*; and this  
 “ again was believing AGAINST HOPE; for one was as much against  
 “ the natural Course of Things, as the other, But pray observe  
 “ this, Sir; the Apostle does not say, that Abraham accounted that  
 “ God would raise his Son INSTANTLY. He might (for aught  
 “ Abraham knew, or had any Reason to hope to the contrary) be  
 “ FOR EVER lost TO HIM; though he was assured he could not be  
 “ so lost as that the Promise of God should fail; upon which Foot,  
 “ there will be room left for all that Disturbance from Passion and  
 “ natural Affection, which every Father feels upon the loss of a  
 “ beloved Child; and consequently, Matter left for the Exercise  
 “ of his Virtue. It suits best indeed, with your Hypothesis, to  
 “ say, that Abraham believed that his Son should be raised IN-  
 “ STANTLY. For if this whole Transaction was a scenical Re-  
 “ presentation, to inform Abraham of the Sacrifice of Christ; and  
 “ if this (as you say, p. 612 \*) was the principal Design of the Com-  
 “ mand; the Information once given, the Scenery ought to be at an  
 “ End. And this is one Reason, among others, why I cannot

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 395.

“believe your Account to be the true one; because it destroys  
 “the Force and Virtue of the Command, considered as a Trial of  
 “*Abraham’s Resolution and Self-denial*; which nevertheless, the  
 “very History plainly intimates to us, it was intended to be.”

But now when I thought he was going to prove that *Abraham* had these Virtues of *Patience and Self-Denial*, he is got upon quite another Scent; and has started two other Virtues, his *Resolution* and his *Fortitude*.—“The first Difficulty his Faith was to remove; the  
 “second was to be conquered by his RESOLUTION and FORTI-  
 “TUDE.” But what must be *my Difficulty* all this while, who have to do with such a Writer! Shall I examine what he says to *Abraham’s Patience and Self-denial*? Come on then. But now they are of a sudden turned to *Resolution and Fortitude*? Shall I seize upon his *Resolution and Fortitude*? In vain. Before he gets to the End of his Argument, they are changed into *Resolution and Self-denial*. “The Command (*he says*) is to be considered as a Trial  
 “of *Abraham’s RESOLUTION and SELF-DENIAL*.” And so the two Pair of Virtues, *Patience and Self-denial*, and *Resolution and Fortitude*, have fairly compromised the matter. And at last it is agreed, as in a Whig and Tory Election, that *Resolution and Self-denial* shall stand each for the other’s Representative. Matters therefore being now well settled, here we shall leave them. For there is the same Reverence due to the *Nonsense* of great Writers, as the honest Translator of *Sallust* has taught us to be due to the *Corruption* of great Ministers. Therefore, what he says of this latter Quality may not be unfitly applied to the former, that  
 “what sounds like Nonsense may not be Nonsense: and it is not  
 “so much the Act, as the Characters of Men that constitute it †.”  
 —But as I can make nothing of his Words, I will try to pick out

\* Considerations, p. 163—5.

† “What sounds like Corruption may not be Corruption; and it is not so much  
 “the Act, as the Characters of Men that constitute it.” Gord. Transl. of Sall. Pol.  
 Disc. p. 97.

his Meaning; which, after all, seems to accuse me of leaving *Abraham* neither *Patience* nor *Self-denial*: And is founded in this, that, according to the common Interpretation, as *Abraham* did not know when *Isaac* would be restored to him, “there was room left for all that Disturbance from Passion and natural Affection, which every Father feels upon the loss of a beloved Child; and consequently Exercise for his Virtue.” But on my Interpretation (that *Abraham* knew his Son must be soon restored to him) there was no room, it seems, for the Exercise of these Virtues. And now, what is here worth answering? In both Cases *Abraham’s Faith* had the same Trial. And this is allowed. And had not his *Paternal Affection*? In neither case did he know, but that his Son was to receive the sacrificing stroke. And was not the *Paternal Affection*, as much interested in receiving him to Life after three Days, as after three Years? Supposing, (as is granted) that his *Faith* in God’s Promises was exactly the same in both Cases. How then does the Reader think our Examiner supports his Chicane? How? but in that way all Chicane is supported. By representing both Cases falsely. Under the common Interpretation, he represents it thus,—“*Isaac* might (for aught *Abraham* knew, or had any Reason to hope to the contrary) be FOR EVER LOST TO HIM.” And he tells me, “it suits best with my Hypothesis, to say that *Abraham* believed that his Son should be raised INSTANTLY\*.” I know of nothing that suits so well with my Hypothesis as Truth; nor nothing so ill with it, as our Examiner’s Understanding. What shall I say! Or rather what shall I not say. O *Patience*! I feel thou art a *Virtue*, as our Examiner truly calls thee?—What? do not those very Words of Scripture, of which the Examiner serves himself in support of the common Interpretation, accounting that God was able to raise him up even from the Dead, imply, in all common Construction, that *Abraham* accounted, or believed, or had

\* Confid. p. 164, 165.



*Reason to hope*, that *Isaac* was NOT FOR EVER LOST TO HIM? But it could not be otherwise even upon our Examiner's own Interpretation, who in p. 148, makes the *receiving from the Dead* an Allusion to the dead Womb of *Sarah*; For, according to this Sense, which, he tells us, he *prefers* to any other, the Writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* could never suppose (whatever our Examiner does) that *Abraham* might fear that *Isaac* would be *for ever lost to him*. For the Argument, according to his Conception of the Apostle's Sense, runs thus,—*Abraham* received *Isaac* out of *Sarah's* dead Womb; so he hoped to receive him again from the Ashes of the Sacrifice. Thus does this Examiner, at every turn, forget his own Principles: or, rather, having no Principles of his own, he perceives not that he takes the contradictory Principles of others. Again, does not my Interpretation, which supposes that *Abraham* well understood that this commanded Action was a scenical Representation of *Christ's* Sacrifice on the Cross, necessarily imply that *Abraham* knew no more than that, as the Redeemer of Mankind could not lie under the Power of the Grave; so, his Representative, even though he received the sacrificing Stroke, would not? Should he, therefore, have so prevaricated as to insinuate, that I used the Word *instantly* in the Sense of momentarily; when my Argument shews I used it in opposition to a distant Time? If the Stroke had been given, we know, it could not have been till the third Day at least. And in this time I hope there was “room enough left for all that Disturbance from Passion and natural Affection which every Father feels upon the Loss of a beloved Child\*.”

After all this, could the *candid* or *sensible* Reader conceive it possible that our Examiner should end his Argument in the following Strain? “So that in taking one Handle away from Unbelievers, you have given them another. For if, upon the Foot of the common Interpretation, they think they see a Violation of the natural Law;

\* Considerations, p. 164, 165.

“they

“ they may, upon your Interpretation, alledge an Inconsistency of  
 “ the Scriptures with themselves: and I apprehend, Sir, that it is  
 “ a much easier Thing to shew that the Command carries no Vio-  
 “ lation of the natural Law, the common Interpretation admitted;  
 “ than it will be to reconcile your Hypothesis to the Scripture Ac-  
 “ count of this Matter. So much has Christianity *gained* by your  
 “ Interpretation \* !”—But I leave him to the Reader’s Mercy.

## XXIII.

“ But this is not the greatest Difficulty you have to account for  
 “ (*says he*). The Objection relates not to *Abraham* only, but also  
 “ to his *Family*; who (as you have made your Unbeliever say)  
 “ MUST NEEDS *have thought human Sacrifices acceptable to God*;  
 “ because the Action was not *formally condemned* at the *Revocation*  
 “ of the Command. I do think, Sir, that it would be a very con-  
 “ siderable objection to this History; if it did give any reasonable  
 “ Encouragement to the Belief, that human Sacrifices were accept-  
 “ able to God; and I have given my Reason why I think it can-  
 “ not give any such Encouragement; which is that, in this Case,  
 “ the Revocation of the Command, without any formal Condem-  
 “ nation of the Action, is sufficient to guard against any such Abuse.  
 “ Whether you agree with me in this Principle, or whether you are  
 “ of the infidel Side of the Question in this particular Point, you have  
 “ not told us; nor shall I take upon me to guess. But you are fully  
 “ persuaded, that, upon your Hypothesis, the Objection is entirely  
 “ removed. Your Words are these; *There was not the least Occa-*  
 “ *sion, when God remitted the Offering of Isaac, that he should formally*  
 “ *condemn human Sacrifices, to prevent Abraham, OR HIS FAMILY’S*  
 “ *falling into an Opinion, that such Sacrifices were not displeasing to*  
 “ *him—For the Command, having, as we said, no moral Import;*  
 “ *being only an Information by Action, where one Thing stood for the*

\* Confid. p. 165.

“ *Representative of another; all the Consequence that could be deduced*  
 “ *from it was only this; that the Son of God should be offered up for*  
 “ *the Sins of Mankind: Therefore the Conceptions THEY [Abraham,*  
 “ *viz. AND HIS FAMILY] had of human Sacrifices after the Command,*  
 “ *must needs be just the same which they had before; and therefore,*  
 “ *Instruction concerning the execrable Nature of human Sacrifices was*  
 “ *not only needless, but quite beside the Question; p. 618, 619 \*. I*  
 “ *can easily understand, Sir, how the Matter stood with Abra-*  
 “ *ham; and that HE was in no Danger of being misled, as to the*  
 “ *Nature of human Sacrifices, who knew the Secret of the whole*  
 “ *Affair; and that it was nothing else but Scenery. But how this*  
 “ *Answer will serve for his Family; who are to be presumed to have*  
 “ *known nothing of this scenical Representation, is utterly past my*  
 “ *Comprehension. I say that the Family of Abraham must be pre-*  
 “ *sumed to have known nothing of this scenical Representation;*  
 “ *because you have told us from the very first, that the Informa-*  
 “ *tion to be conveyed by it was intended for Abraham’s SOLE*  
 “ *USE; and I do not see how Abraham could open to his Family*  
 “ *the Scenery of the Transaction, without explaining the Mystery.*  
 “ *Accordingly, your Answer, in this very Passage, imports, that*  
 “ *Abraham’s Family, as well as himself, were acquainted with this*  
 “ *Mystery; for you say that all the Consequence that could be de-*  
 “ *duced from this Transaction was, that the Son of God should be of-*  
 “ *fered up for the Sins of Mankind. All the Consequence that could*  
 “ *be deduced! By whom? Why, by the Family of Abraham; for*  
 “ *to them, as well as to Abraham, does the Inference, which you*  
 “ *immediately subjoin, belong—THEREFORE the Conceptions THEY*  
 “ *had of human Sacrifices must needs be just the same, &c. But is not*  
 “ *your putting the Family of Abraham in Possession of this Conse-*  
 “ *quence a very plain Declaration, that they knew the Mystery*  
 “ *of Christ’s Sacrifice! Now therefore, Sir, take your Choice, and*  
 “ *give up one Part of your Hypothesis, or the other, as best pleases*

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 400.

“ you ; for to hold *both* is impossible. If you say that the Family  
 “ of *Abraham* were acquainted with the Mystery of *Cbrist's* Sacrifice ; it will overturn all you have said concerning their Ignorance of a future State : For to what Purpose the Son of God  
 “ was to be offered up for the Sins of Mankind, if no Life is to be expected after this, it is impossible to comprehend. It likewise  
 “ overturns the *single* Reason you have given why the *Explanation*  
 “ (usual in all such Cases) to shew the *Import* of the Transaction was not added, *viz.* that it was a Point *not fit* for *common Knowledge*. But if you shall chuse to say, that the Revelation of this  
 “ Mystery, was for the *SOLE* Information of *Abraham*, and that *his*  
 “ *Family* knew nothing of it (which I think you *must* say, to make  
 “ your Interpretation good), the Objection will lie full against you,  
 “ unanswered. For upon this supposition, *they* must have considered this Transaction, not in your *artificial, hidden* Light, but  
 “ in its *apparent, natural* Light ; and the Construction in favour  
 “ of human Sacrifices must have been the *very same*, as if no such  
 “ Representation as you speak of had been intended \*.”

“ Whether (*says he*) you agree with me, or ARE OF THE INFIDEL SIDE OF THE QUESTION.” A dire Dilemma ! to which he reduces all his Adversaries. *Agree* not with him, and you are at once on the *Infidel Side of the Question*.

“ Qui meprise Cotin, n'estime point son Roi,  
 “ Et n'a, felon Cotin, ni Dieu, ni foi, ni loi.

But if this be my Alternative, *fit anima mea cum philosophis*, as was said on the like occasion ; they are much the better Company.—I believed that an Infidel Objection to the Command to *Abraham*, on the common Interpretation of it, had weight ; and I explain the Force of it, in order to remove it ; and to excite other Defenders of Revelation to consider it : For which, it seems, I am *of the Infidel side of the Question*.

\* *Confid.* p. 165—168.

I had said, that the Command was for *Abraham's sole use*; and “therefore (*he says*) that the Family of *Abraham* must be presumed “to know nothing of this scenical Representation.” Notwithstanding this, *I presume they did know it*. Here he takes me in a flagrant Contradiction. But did he indeed not see that where I spoke of its being given for *Abraham's sole Use*, I was opposing it, (as the course of my Argument required), not to the Family which lived under his Tents, but to the *Jewish* People, when the History of the Transaction was recorded\*?—And now having exposed his wrong Conclusion from *my* Words, let us consider next the wrong Conclusion he draws from *his own*. “I do not “see (*says he*) how *Abraham* could open to his Family the “Scenery of the Transaction without explaining the Mystery.” What does he mean by, “open the Scenery of the Transaction?” There are two Senses of this ambiguous Expression; it may signify, either *explaining the Moral of the Scenery*; or simply, *telling his Family that the Transaction was a scenical Representation*. He could not here use the Phrase in the first Sense, because he makes *explaining the Mystery* a thing different from *opening the Scenery*. He must mean it then in the latter. But could not *Abraham* tell his Family, that this was a *scenical Representation* without *explaining the Mystery*? I don't know what should hinder him, unless it were a Charm. If he had the free use of Speech, I think, he might, in the Transports of his Joy, on his return

\* Here the Letter Writer, so often mentioned before, is quite scandalized; and cannot forbear [breaking out, at p. 77.—“I declare it, if you be Dr. S—, I am perfectly astonished at you.” But so am not I. The good Man knows nothing of the Contagion of Controversy. He seems to have studied his Profession with an Intent only of coming to the Truth; and he speaks from the Heart. His whole Pamphlet is a learned and well-argued Performance: And if he has been more attentive to the Force of his Reasoning than to the Ornaments of his Language, the Lovers of Truth have the more to thank him for, as he gives her to them undressed, and puts a Glois upon nothing.

home, tell his Wife, “that God had ordered him to sacrifice his  
 “ Son, and that he had carried him to Mount *Moriab*, in Obedience  
 “ to the Divine Command, where a Ram was accepted in his  
 “ stead. But that the whole was a mere scenical Representation, or  
 “ Figure, of a mysterious Transaction which God had ordained to  
 “ come to pass in the latter Ages of the World.” And I suppose  
 when he had once told his Wife, the Family would soon hear of it.  
 Now could they not understand, what was meant by a *scenical*  
*Representation*, as well when he told them it was to prefigure a  
*Mystery*, as if he had told them it was to prefigure the *Crucifixion*  
*of Jesus*? The Explanation, here given, had I no other way of  
 blunting his Dilemma (for if I escape his *Contradiction*, he has set  
 his *Dilemma*, which, he says, ’tis impossible I should avoid) had I  
 nothing else, I say, ’tis very likely I should have insisted upon this:  
 But there are more ways than one of taking him by his Horns.  
 “ Now therefore (*says he*) take your Choice, and give up one Part  
 “ of your Hypothesis or the other, as best pleases you; FOR TO  
 “ HOLD BOTH IS IMPOSSIBLE. If you say that the Family of *Abra-*  
 “ *ham* were acquainted with the Mystery, it will overturn all you  
 “ said concerning their Ignorance of a future State.—But if you  
 “ shall chuse to say that the Revelation of the Mystery was for the  
 “ sole Information of *Abraham*, and that his Family knew nothing  
 “ of it, then—the Construction in favour of human Sacrifices must  
 “ have been the very same as if no such Representation, as you  
 “ speak of, had been intended.” I desire to know where it is that  
 I spoke ANY THING concerning *Abraham’s Family’s Ignorance of a*  
*future State*; and therefore call upon him, for the **SIXTH AND**  
**LAST TIME**, to name the Place. But, I am afraid, some-  
 thing is wrong here again: and that, by *Abraham’s Family*, he  
 means the *Israelites under Moses’s Policy*. For, with regard to them;  
 I did indeed say that the gross Body of the People were ignorant  
 of a future State. But then I supposed them equally ignorant of the  
 true Import of the Command to *Abraham*. But, if, by *Abraham’s*  
*Family,*

*Family*, he means, as every Man does, who means honestly, *these who resided with him under his Tents*, I suppose them indeed acquainted with the true Import of the Command; but then, at the same time, not ignorant of a future State. Thus what our Examiner had pronounced IMPOSSIBLE, was, it seems, all the while very possible. And, in spite of his Dilemma, *both Parts of the Hypothesis* were at peace. I can hardly think him so grossly immoral as to have put this Trick upon his Reader with Design; I rather think it was some confused Notion concerning the Popish Virtue of TRADITION (that trusty Conveyancer of Truth) which led him into all this Absurdity; and made him conclude, that what *Abraham's* Family once knew, their posterity could never forget. Though the *Written Word* tells us, that when *Moses* was sent to redeem this Posterity from Bondage, they remembered so little of God's *Revelations* to their Fore-fathers, that they knew nothing even of his *Nature*.

## XXIV.

Our Examiner now concludes his Considerations (which we have quoted Word for Word in order as they lye, without curtailing or abridging) in this manner. "Thus, Sir, it appears; that what was *well* before comes out *bad*, from under your Hands. Which confirms to me, what I have often thought; that *Experiments* in Religion are seldom good for any thing. The Truth of this whole Case, appears to me in this plain Light. God called *Abraham* to this great Trial; to make him an Example of *Faith* and *Resignation*. *Abraham* obeys God's Call; under a full Persuasion that his Son was *lost* to him; and yet as fully assured that the Promises of God should not fail. In this View he is an Example of *both*; and thus much the Scriptures warrant. We, who see the *Resemblance* between this Case, and God's requiring his only Son to be offered up as a Sacrifice for the Sins of the whole World, rightly say, that the *one* was intended to be the

“ *Figure of the other.* But whether *Abraham* knew any thing at all of *Christ’s Sacrifice*; or whether he knew *nothing*; the *Scripture* is *rebellously silent*; and you ought to have been silent too. It is fit for us to stop where the *Scripture* stops——and let *Infidelity* do its worst .”

“ What was well before, comes out bad, it seems, “ under my hands;” which *confirms* him in a “ Thought he often had, THAT EXPERIMENTS IN RELIGION ARE SELDOM GOOD FOR ANY THING.” By the way though this seems but an odd Compliment to the many fine *Experiments*, which a great Prelate of his Acquaintance has made in Religion. However, that he *often had this Thought*, I do not at all doubt. The thing I least expected was, that he should venture to *tell his Thoughts*. But, in the Paroxysm of *Answering*, out it came; and from a Man not the best formed by Nature *aperto vivere voto*. Writers, indeed, have differed much how these EXPERIMENTS should be made. Some would have *Scripture alone* employed in making them: others were for taking in *Fathers and Councils*; and some again for applying *Raillery and Ridicule* to the Work. But I know of no Protestant till our Examiner, who ever talked against the thing itself. That Language had been now, for near two hundred Years, confined to the Walls of the Inquisition. For what is *making Experiments in Religion*, but illustrating it by new Arguments, arising from new Discoveries made of the Harmony in God’s various Dispensations to Mankind; just as Philosophers unfold Nature, by new Enquiries into the Contents of Bodies? No EXPERIMENTS, is the Language indeed of POLITICIANS (for in some things Bigotry and Politics agree; as Extremes run easily into one another, by their very Endeavour to keep at distance). because, according to the Politician’s Creed, *Religion* being useful to the State, and yet not founded in Truth, all *Inquiries* tend, not to confirm, but to unsettle, this necessary Support of Civil Government. But can a Man who believes Religion to have come from

\* Confid. p. 169.



God, use this Language! If he pretends to believe, and will yet talk at so scandalous a rate, let me ask him, how it comes to pass, that *Experiments*, which do such Service in our Advancement in the Knowledge of *Nature*, should succeed so ill in Religion? Are not both equally the Works of God? Were not both given to be the Subject of human Contemplation? Have not both, as proceeding from the Great Master of the Universe, their Depths and Darknests? And does not the unveiling the Secrets of his *Providence* tend equally with the unveiling the Secrets of his *Workmanship*, to the Advancement of his Glory? Have not the Wisdom and Goodness of God been wonderfully displayed, in these latter Ages, to the Confusion of *Atheism*, by some noble Experiments made in Nature? And why should not the same Wisdom and Goodness be equally displayed, to the Confusion of *Deism*, by Experiments made in Religion? I believe I should not be accused of Vanity, even by our Examiner himself in his better Mood, should I venture to appeal to *The Divine Legation* itself, for the POSSIBILITY of the thing: For he has been graciously pleased to allow, that “what I have said of Converse being maintained by Actions as well as by Words, is very just; and that the Instances I have produced from Scripture, where Actions have been used as foreshewing the Determinations of Providence, are beyond all Exception \*.” Now here, I presume, his Modesty will confess, that I have taught him something *New*; both in the Principle, and in the following Application of it to the Primary and Secondary Sense of Prophecies. But if ever there was an *Experiment* made in Religion, this was one; it being deduced from a careful *Analysis* of the several various Modes of human Communication. In a word, had no *Experiments* been made in *Nature*, we had still slept in the Ignorance and Error of *School-Philosophy*: And had *none* been made in *Religion*, we had still been groping about, and stumbling in the Darknests and Superstition of *School-Divinity*. For,

\* Confid. p. 153.

what were they, but *Experiments in Religion*, made by a *Wickliff*, a *Cranmer*, a *Calvin*, an *Erasmus*, a *Hooker*, that rescued us from that Darknefs and Superftition? Or is making Experiments, like making Gunpowder, a Monopoly? that none are to be intrufted with it, in *Religion*, but great Names, and Fathers of the Church; and none, in *Nature*, but *Fellows of the Society*. The worft Mifchief they ever do is, now and then, blowing up an indiscreet Divine, when he comes too near, and tramples upon them with Security and Contempt. To repay our Examiner, therefore, one Secret for another; I will tell him what I have *often thought*, and what his own Words *confirm*, “That he who can talk in this “manner, whatever face he may put on, muft needs have his “Doubts and Fears about the Truth of that Religion which he fo “peevifhly defends.”—“*Abraham (fays he)* obeys God’s Call under “a FULL PERSUASION that his SON was loft to him.” So! the Doubt is now determined. Before, it was only “That *Ifaac* might, “for aught *Abraham* knew, be for ever loft to him.” But this it is for a Writer to have a *full Perfuaſion* both of himſelf and his Reader.

“WE who SEE (*fays he*) the RESEMBLANCE between this Caſe “[*the Action commanded*] and God’s requiring his only Son to be “offered up as a Sacrifice, for the Sins of the whole World, RIGHT- “LY ſay, that the one was intended to be the Figure of the other.” Theſe *Seers by Reſemblance* into Facts, are like the *Seers by Second-ſight* into Futurity: That is to ſay, equally under the Power of the Imagination; which, whatever light it may afford to them, yet leaves their *Readers* ſtill in the dark. As to this *ſeeing by Reſemblance* in particular, the Reader may, if he pleaſes, conſult the XVIIth *Remark* for all that is neceſſary to be ſaid on that Subject.

“But whether *Abraham (fays he)* knew any thing at all of “*Chriſt’s* Sacrifice, or whether he knew nothing, the Scripture is “wholly ſilent: AND YOU OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN SILENT TOO.” To this I reply, in the *fiſt* place, that the Reaſon why I was *not ſilent* was, becauſe Scripture itſelf was *not ſilent*; but, in the Words  
of

of *Jesus*, declared, that *Abraham* did know of *Christ's* Sacrifice. Secondly, I do not see why, even though Scripture had been silent, I ought to have been silent too. Scripture is silent concerning the Substance of the Son. But so are not you; who, I make no doubt, declare at least, that he is of *one Substance with the Father*. And why do you so? Because (you will say, and you will say true) that, although this Proposition be not expressed in the Bible, in so many Words; yet it is to be deduced from *Scripture Doctrine*, by the most known Principles of Philosophy and Logic. Why then will you not allow me the Benefit of the same Answer, in the present Case.—But in another Mood he can be angry with me for being silent where Scripture is silent. And for not speaking out when that only gives a Sign. “You say nothing (*says he*) of *Abraham's* “Virtue, his Patience and Self-denial, yet Scripture POINTS AT “them.”

But “It is fit (*he says*) for us to stop where the Scripture stops.”—With how good a grace, and how pertinently too, this Maxim may be, sometimes, applied; I shall beg leave to observe; that, with regard to the *fundamental* Points of the *Christian* Faith, it is, indeed, fit we should stop where the *NEW TESTAMENT* stops; because that is able to *make us wise unto Salvation*; and because there is now no reasonable Expectation of any further Revelation of God's Will to us, that shall refer to this, and be explanatory of it. But with regard to an *historical* Passage, told obscurely (for the wise Ends of God's Dispensations, which opened gradually upon Mankind) in the *OLD TESTAMENT*, to which the *New* refers and is explanatory; There, I hope, we may go on, without Presumption, to shew how, from such a Passage, may be demonstrated the real Connexion and Dependency between the two Covenants. Yet, by the strangest Perversity, there are Men who will not stop in the first Case; and, in the second, will not go forward. But whatever our Examiner's *Notions* be; it is plain, he took his *Expressions* from somebody who applied the Maxim to a *Maker of New Fundamentals*. For such a one, only, it is seen to fit. “In Con-  
“clusion

“elution (*hys le*) LET INFIDELITY DO ITS WORST.” And so it may, for what our Examiner or his Fellows seem inclined to oppose to its Progress. They keep *guard*, as our Author says; they perform Watch and Ward as the Law requires: and let such as like it go to blows for them. One of my most abusive Adversaries, in a Book he wrote against me, intitled, *A Reply to Mr. W.'s Appendix in his second Volume of The Divine Legation*, has a long Digression (for it has nothing to do in the Dispute between him and me) of Seventy Pages, to prove that the *Miracles and Morality of Paganism* equal *these of Judaism and Christianity*: In which he has made a very elaborate Collection of Passages from Classic Writers, drawn up and set in battle array against parallel Places of Scripture. Eight or Ten Clergymen of the Church of *England* have found Leisure and Inclination to write against *The Divine Legation*, nobody knows for what; and yet not one of them has taken the least notice of this open bare-faced Insult and Defiance of Revelation. But what then? Mr. *Tillard*, no doubt, was considered by them as a Fellow-labourer in a good Cause. Or was it, for that he is an active Member of the Society for the *Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts?* of which, indeed, in these Passages he has given a Proof. For finding it was for staying at home, he, like a good Member as he is, does his best to send it packing!—But still, says our Examiner, “let Infidelity do its worst.” And does he indeed think it could do worse than what himself has here attempted? I had wrote a *Dissertation*; which, if it has any *Reality or Foundation*, in *Reason or Scripture*, is of the highest Service to *Religion*: And, principally, on these Two Accounts, first, as rescuing a Passage out of the hands of Libertines, which was more obnoxious to the Objections of Infidelity than any in the whole Bible: And secondly, as discovering a real and substantial Circumstance of *Connexion and Dependency* between the *Old and New Testament*; not subject to any of those Objections which arise from Typical or Allegorical Interpretations. Now, against such a Discourse, so directed, was it natural to conceive, that a Divine of Name should address himself,

himself, with much Haughtinefs and Malice, to write an elaborate Confutation? Would not a good Man, who had a real Regard for the Interests of Religion, and was persuaded of the Weakness of my Discourse, have left it to some unthinking, unbelieving Scribler, to expose? And here, let me call, seriously, upon this learned Man, to lay his Hand upon his Heart, and to acquit himself of his Intentions, before the *Public*; who finding nothing in this *Dissertation* (how erroneous soever it may be deemed) either of Heresy or Libertinism, will needs be at a loss to discover any good Purpose, in an Attempt so seemingly inconsistent with his Character and Profession. For the Public sees he has taken the Unbelievers' Talk out of their hands, and executed it with such a Spirit, as cannot chuse but give them the highest Satisfaction.

“ Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.”

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SOON after the Publication of Dr. *Stebbing's Examination*; another Book came out against me, as much larger in Bulk as honest in its Production: For it carried the Name of its Author, Dr. *A. A. Sykes*, in the Front. To this Gentleman, likewise, I sent a civil Message; To inform him, that I had seen his Book, in which he likewise professes to "examine my Account" (for they are all *Examiners*, and would be *Inquisitors*) "of the Conduct of the "Ancient Legislators—Of the Double Doctrine of the Philosophers—Of the THEOCRACY OF THE JEWS—and of Sir *I. Newton's* Chronology:" That I supposed he would think himself neglected to have *no* Notice taken of him: That I was not at leisure to go through the Whole; but that if he would point out to me which of the Four Parts he chose to trust to, I would endeavour to give him the Satisfaction he seemed to want. To this, he sent me word back, "That he should not be, in the least, concerned, were I to "forbear all Notice of him: but, if I took any, that he hoped I "would keep to the Merits of his Book: That he was not to chuse "for me; but that he thought, One or Two of the Parts were "more immediately to the Purpose to clear up: But expected that "this should be done in such a manner as every good Man wishes; "in the Love of Truth, and in the Spirit of one that seeks it: "And that then I should find, in him, a Mind open to Conviction." All this was very well: And, from the *Reasonableness* of the Demand, who would not believe, but his Book was a Standard of Candour, Politeness, and Ingenuity? at least, who would have suspected the contrary? So that his civil Preliminary, when interpreted

interpreted on the Principles of the *Double-Doctrine*, is in plain *Engliſh* this,—That the Liberties, which he and old honeſt Mr. P. have ſo freely taken with my Book and Character, ſhould be entirely overlooked, or received as Compliments: And that I ſhould addreſs myſelf to their Conviction, as to the Service of my Two beſt Friends, who wrote only to *recommend* the Truths I had advanced; by putting me in a way to remove all Doubts and Difficulties concerning them. “And therefore, that I ſhould keep to the Merits “of his Book;” that is, be tender of his bad Logic, and worſe Criticiſm; overlook his ill Expreſſion; and find out his Meaning if I can. And, indeed, who would not engage in any Labour for the ſake of finding ſo rare a Curioſity, as a “Mind open to Conviction,” in an Anſwerer by Profeſſion? Well then, be it ſo. Since they profeſs to *be ſo open*, let them be received with good Humour at leaſt, and ſuffered only to expoſe themſelves;

“Laugh where we muſt, be candid where we can,  
But vindicate the WAYS OF GOD to Man.”

However, this is a mere Act of Good-will; and what the Doctör has not the leaſt Claim to; as may be ſeen by the preliminary Converſation between him and his old Friend Mr. P. Part of which I ſhall here beg leave to tranſcribe for the Reader’s Entertainment:

“You know very well (*ſays Dr. Sykes to the Rev. Gent. to whom he addreſſes his Examination*) “our old Friend Mr. P\*\*\*; He calls “Mr. Warburton’s Book a learned Romance; and he ſays, WITH “SOME HUMOUR, that the Digreſſions in it about the Myſteries, “the Hieroglyphics\*, the Book of *Job*, are, or may be deemed,  
“ ſo

\* Foreigners ſeem to have a different Opinion of *The Divine Legation*, from theſe Two learned Friends. The *Journal des Savans*, Mars 1744, in an Abſtract of a French Tranſlation of Part of *The Divine Legation*, ſpeaks thus of the Diſcourſe on the *Hieroglyphics*: “Il regne une ſi belle analogie dans le ſyſtème de M. Warburton, & “toutes ſes parties tiennent les unes aux autres par un lien ſi naturel, qu’on eſt “porté à croire que l’origine & les progrès de l’Ecriture & du Language ont été tels “qu’il les a décrits. Le Public doit avoir bien de l’obligation au Traducteur de lui avoir

“ so many ingenious Novels, which serve to relieve or divert the  
 “ Reader. But then he goes so far as to doubt whether Mr. *War-*  
 “ *burton* writes for Utility or for Truth. For he has told us so  
 “ much (*says he*) about the Practices of those old Philosophers, and  
 “ how much they were wont to *lie for the Public good*—and he de-  
 “ clares himself to have come from the *Schools* of those Heathen  
 “ Philosophers, THAT I CANNOT BUT THINK HE MAY BE REA-  
 “ SONABLY SUSPECTED—to have received an Infection from them,  
 “ and to have learnt to *lie for the Public good*, as his Masters did  
 “ before him. It is true (*says our Friend*) that Mr. *Warburton* does  
 “ not think those Men to be *altogether free from Blame*; and it may  
 “ be said in his favour, that what he blames a *little* in them, he  
 “ would not do himself: But yet his Censure of *them* is so very  
 “ soft, and he is so tender of their moral Character, while he  
 “ is so ready to flame out against, and to shew no Mercy to  
 “ others, who do not think as he does, that one cannot help ima-  
 “ gining, that in his Opinion, the good End they had in view, did  
 “ sanctify the Means they used, and that it was no great Fault

“ fait connoître un Ouvrage si curieux. Mais il auroit été à souhaiter, pour rendre la  
 “ lecture de sa traduction plus agreable, qu’il ne se fut pas si fort attaché à rendre mot à  
 “ mot le texte Anglois.”

The Judgment of the Jesuits of *Trevoix*, in their Journal of *July* 1744, differs not  
 much from that of *Paris*. “ M. Warburton n’a pu, sans une erudition profonde, une  
 “ lecture murement digerée & des reflexions infinies traiter avec tant de precision, de  
 “ justesse, & de netteté, un sujet de lui même si difficile à mettre en œuvre—Les plus  
 “ savans hommes se sont laissé seduire sur l’origine des Hieroglyphes, & la plupart ont  
 “ regardé un effet du peu d’experience des Egyptiens, comme un raffinement de la plus  
 “ mystérieuse sagesse. C’est cette erreur que M. Warburton s’applique particulièrement  
 “ à detruire dans la premiere partie. Il le fait de la maniere la plus naturelle—ce  
 “ n’est point un Systeme fondé sur DES IMAGINATIONS VAGUES. Ses raisonnemens, ses  
 “ preuves, sont appuyées sur des FAITS, sur la NATURE des choses, & sur les prin-  
 “ cipes les plus lumineux du SENS COMMUN.” But as to this last Testimony, I shall  
 not chuse to insist upon it; lest it should be now said, that these famous modern Prac-  
 ticers of the *Double Doctrine*, and the Apologist for the ancient Inventors of it, had too  
 close an Understanding with one another.

“ in



“ in them to have external and internal Doctrines \* ;” &c. &c. Now a Man so apt to *flame out* would have been as apt to call this a piece of dull scurrilous Buffoonry, in another Writer ; but in so candid a Disputant as Dr. *Sykes*, who writes, we see by his own Words, “ in the Love of Truth, and in the Spirit of one who seeks it,” I can consider it only as the Effect of a *pious Zeal* for the Interests of Revelation, which is apt to warm itself in a Conversation between two such Friends ; and a *charitable Fear* that the Author of the *Divine Legation* was indeed artfully undermining the Foundation, while he pretended to new-fortify the Structure of Religion : and they, good Men, as faithful Centinels, thought it their Duty to give the Alarm. But here, their candid Simplicity of Manners, which makes them utter Strangers to all the Tricks of *Free-thinking*, has put them upon a false Cry. It would be *Charity* therefore to set them right ; and, as they have *Minds so open to Conviction*, indeed but *justice*. And, for this, all the return I ask, is only to share with them in the *Pleasure*, which a clear Conviction, that their Suspicions were groundless, must needs give them.

In order, therefore, to this, it would seem sufficient to observe, that if indeed the *Divine Legation* were written to undermine Revelation, and (as is said) by an Author initiated in “ the Cabinet Councils of Old Lawgivers,” and just come “ from School, from Heathen Philosophers,” he must have learnt very little of his Masters : For it is certainly the most bungling, ill-contrived Attempt that was ever made against Revelation. But if this be not enough, let us go further, and consider, how an artful Freethinker would probably have executed such a Design as is here laid to my Charge. And the same Intimacy in the Cabinet-Councils of Old Lawgivers, and in the Schools of Pagan Philosophers, which makes it so unlikely that I could have done no better on so good a ground ;

\* An Examination of Mr. *Warburton's* Account of the Conduct of the Ancient Legislators, of the Double Doctrine of the Old Philosophers, of the Theocracy of the *Jews*, and of Sir *Isaac Newton's* Chronology, 1744.

may enable me to shew how well a Scheme of this Nature might be executed by another: As the many unhappy Examples we have amongst us, of real Attempts against Religion, will enable the Reader to judge how near I keep to Probability. And thus qualified, I take the liberty to set our *Underminer* to work.

In the first place, I will suppose it not unlikely, that, in order to conceal his Purpose, as well as to carry on his Attacks more regularly, he should begin with an *Outwork* of Religion, on Pretence of some Defect in its Construction, that might prejudice the Defence of the *Fort* itself. For instance, let us suppose it to be that illustrious Testimony of Paganism, recorded by *Pblegon*, for the unnatural Darkeness at the Crucifixion\*. Where some Mathematical Unbeliever might very fitly serve him in the Post of *Engineer*. When he had tried what could be made of this, he might then come closer to his Work.

And, as MIRACLES and PROPHECIES are the two great Credentials of the *Divine Legation* of *Jesus*, he might now proceed directly to the Sap.

And first, of the *Miracles*. The Distempers cured by *Jesus* were of two Sorts; Natural, and Supernatural. When the latter are removed, the other (as the Freethinkers tell us) are easily dealt with. The *Force of Imagination*, in the *Patient*, might be supposed to go a great way; and *Natural Virtue*, in the *Agent*, a great way farther. Thus long since (say they) Distempers fled at *Vespasian's* Touch; and very lately at *Abbé Paris's* Tomb: But, in the still more famous Case of *Greatrakes* the *Irish Stroker*, both Causes seem'd to concur to produce the most extraordinary Effects. But neither *Natural Virtue*, I wist, nor *Force of Imagination*, could fright the Devil. Here now is a Difficulty worthy of him,

“ Nunc animis opus, *Ænea!* nunc pectore firmo.

\* See a Dissertation on the Eclipse mentioned by *Pblegon*.—By A. A. Sykes, D. D.  
1732.

What has he then to do, but, under pretence of freeing the Gospel-History from Superstition, to write the *Scripture Doctrine of Demoniacs*\*; that is, to persuade us that there never was any? For you must know, the *Scripture Doctrine* of a thing, is the Phrase in fashion, to prove—nothing. And in this Service he would have the hardy and valiant *Hobbes* for his Precursor in the *Kingdom of Darknes* †; or his Captain of Light-horse à *batte Pestrade*.

We have now only one Stroke more to perfect our Mine; and that Stroke is at *Prophecies*. Now Theology has divided the Prophecies, that relate to *Jesus*, into Two Sorts; such as foretel his Mission in a primary and literal Sense, and such as foretel it only in a secondary and figurative: But the Freethinkers assure us there was no need of this Division; for that all the Prophecies, which relate to *Jesus*, relate to him only in a secondary and figurative Sense. At this Open, then, comes in our Underminer; and shews ‡, that all Pretence of Prophecies to a *double Meaning* is senseless and fanatical. And here he approaches under the Cover of the great *Collins*; who had so deeply intrenched himself before the place, that he *could* not of a long time be forced; and our Underminer may be excused if he too hastily § concluded, that therefore he never *would*.

I might now turn to the learned Doctor, as little concerned as he is in all this; and ask him whether this would not be doing like a Workman. I own him indeed a very incompetent Judge in such Matters. His Singleness of Heart, his Simplicity of Manners, his Zeal for Religion, his total Estrangement from Free-

\* See An Enquiry into the Meaning of the Demoniacs in the New Testament, 1737.

† The Title given by Hobbes to the Fourth Part of his Leviathan.

‡ See The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion distinctly considered. By A. A. Sykes, D. D. 1740. p. 227, & seq.

§ See Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 643, & seq. [Vol. III. Book VI. § 6. Ed. 4to.]

thinkers and their Arts, make him very unfit to be appealed to on this Occasion. Yet methinks there is something so striking in the Sketch here chalked out, that the most unexperienced Man must feel both its natural and moral Fitness for its End. Here we see a cautious, indeed, but a regular, a steady, and determined Purpose. The Approaches are made in form; The Trenches opened; the Battery played; the Breach stormed; and at last the old hollow Fortrefs of Religion blown up into Air. If ever this should happen, my main Concern would be for old Mr. *P.* For what must be that good Man's Sorrows to see the *Abomination of Desolation standing in the Holy Place*; while he could start thus at *his own* Shadow? For it must be his own and not *mine* if he saw Infidelity so near a Book, whose Purpose was to shew the use of Religion in general, to human Society; and the superior fitness of Revealed Religion in particular: The Truth of the *Jewish*, from the Administration of an equal Providence; and the Truth of the *Christian*, from the Completion of *Jewish* Prophecies concerning it.

But now I talk of *Prophecies*, let me ask the learned Doctor; but, gently in his Ear, how it comes to pass, that when it was the Subject of Prophecies only which occasioned all this Hostility, he should leave my Confutation of his Discourse on *Double Senses* unanswered; and turn his Pen to the Four Subjects above-mentioned? Did this Forbearance suit a hand so accustomed to Slaughter? or did this Reserve indicate a *Mind so open to Conviction*? But perhaps in this he would emulate the great *Scipio*; who, when he had lost his own, had the Courage to carry the War into his Enemy's Country. I must pursue him therefore with the same Disadvantage that the *Carthaginian* left the rich Campania of *Italy*, to follow his Adversary through the barren Sands of *Afric*. For the true Explanation of the Nature of the *Double Sense* of Prophecies (of which I had shewn he had given a Notion destructive of the Connexion between the Old and New Testament, through his Ignorance of the very Terms of the Question)

tion) is of the highest Importance to Religion : whereas the Subjects, for the sake of which he hath forsaken this, are of infinitely less Importance. And these too he has handled in so unusual a manner, that all we can collect from the first of them, *on the Conduct of the ancient Legislators*, is, that, in his Opinion, *Moses* was but of the same Species with the Pagan Lawgivers \* : As to the *Double Doctrine of the old Philosophers*, he has fairly shewn that he knew no more of it than of the *Double Sense of Prophecies* : And with regard to *Sir I. Newton's Chronology*, he mistakes the very Question ; imagining that I disputed the Truth of his *Greek*, instead of his *Egyptian* Chronology. So that indeed there was nothing left that I could, in conscience, seize upon but his Discourse of the *THEOCRACY of the Jews*. And this, I suppose, was the *thing*, which, in his Answer to my Message, he alluded to, when he said, “ that he thought One or Two of the Parts were more immediately “ to the Purpose to clear up.”

I have another Reason, too, to believe that he may esteem this the Forte of his new Excursions. An *extraordinary Providence* to

\* That I do Dr. Sykes no wrong, when I say he regards *Moses* as of the same Species, and puts him upon the very same footing with the Heathen Legislators, appears from his own Words : “ This Doctrine [of a future State] was universally believed. Now “ *Moses*, as a Legislator, was to lay down Laws to the *Jews*, and he was to incorporate “ their National Religion into their Civil Law. This was done, *not by inculcating what “ was universally received and believed by them ; but by inculcating such Points as were to “ make the National Religion of the Jews*. An in this he did EXACTLY what other Legis- “ lators did : what was USEFUL TO THE STATE, he admitted into the Body of his Laws ; “ and so FAR as it was useful to the State, BUT FURTHER THAN THAT NEITHER HE NOR “ ZALUCUS CONCERNED THEMSELVES,” p. 59, 60. In which short Period are contained these Four Propositions—*That it is not the Practice of Legislators to inculcate what is universally believed—That a future State does not make One Point of National Religion— [And for a good Reason. Because]—That a future State is not useful to Society—That, farther than the good of the State, Moses concerned himself no more than Zalucus, or any other Heathen Legislator.*—How much now has this Author to thank me for ; when, instead of exposing the other Three Parts of his Book which abound with these Beauties in every Page, I confined myself to this, where the natural Obscurity of the Subject hides both his Blunders and his Blushes ?

*Particulars*, though expressly promised by, and, as I have shewn, a necessary Consequence of, the Law of *Moses*; yet, partly from the Nature of the thing, and partly from mistaken Passages of misunderstood Books of Scripture, is not entirely free from Objections. Here then he thought he could do something; though it were but retailing the Objections of others. And truly, as ill as he has managed these Advantages, he was not mistaken in his Choice. For the rest—it is all over such Argument! and such Criticism! as one might well conceive should be reserved to close the Scene of Letters in an Age like this; when every Science was retiring from its *Professors*, to DICTIONARY-MAKERS and BOOKSELLERS.

## REMARK I.

He begins his *Examination of the Nature of the Jewish Theocracy* in this manner:—"This Form of Government of the Jew, being properly called a Theocracy, there are two Points which Mr. *Warburton* has largely considered. The first is, in relation to the Origin, Continuation, and Duration of this Theocracy. The other is in relation to the Exercise of an extraordinary Providence over particular Persons, as well as over the State in general. In relation to the former of these Points he tells us, *That most Writers suppose it to have ended with the Judges, but scarce any bring it lower than the Captivity: On the contrary, I hold that in strict Truth and Propriety it ended not till the coming of Christ, p. 404*\*. Here it is that he attacks *Dr. Spencer's* Dissertation on the Jewish Theocracy, a *Treatise by no means in the number of those on which Spencer raised his Reputation: He goes on a wrong Hypothesis; he uses weak Arguments; and he is confused and inconsistent in his Assertions, p. 414*†. Are we not now, from hence, to imagine, that *Dr. Spencer* was one of those Writers that supposed the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges, or, at furthest, with the Captivity? And yet *Mr. Warburton* is forced to own

\* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 69.

† Ibid. p. 77.

" that

“ that *Spencer* “ *supposes*” [I say he positively asserts] “ that some “ *obscure Footsteps* of it remained to the Time of Christ. Yes, and “ longer too, for his Words are, *ad extrema usque polities sue tempora*, i. e. quite to the latter Times of their Policy, even to the last “ Times of expiring *Judaism* \*.” I had observed, that most Writers suppose the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges; scarce any bring it lower than the Captivity; I myself suppose it continued to the Time of Christ: that *Dr. Spencer* wrote a weak and inconsistent Treatise on this Subject. Well, and what says our Answerer to this? “ Are we not now (*says b*) from hence to IMAGINE that “ *Dr. Spencer* was one of those Writers that supposed the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges?” What Demands of Imagination his Trade may have upon him is hard to say. But, from my Words, a Reasoner would conclude nothing but that I meant to prove what I said; namely, that *Dr. Spencer’s* Book of the Theocracy was weak and inconsistent. Few Answerers have stuck at a Misrepresentation; but then it was to carry on their Business, the Manufactory of false Argument. Our Examiner, on the contrary, seems to do it only to keep his hand in use; for Argument he could make none, though he had the laying together of his own Premises. In a word, the whole is a studied Misrepresentation of all I said on this Subject. The Method of which was as follows: First to shew [from p. 405 to 407 †], that the Theocracy continued to the Time of Christ. Secondly, to confute *Le Clerc’s* Arguments [from p. 407 to 414 ‡] for its ceasing with the Judges. And this makes up the body of the Discourse concerning the Duration of the Theocracy. Having done this, I proceeded in these Words— Thus the Dispute ended [namely between *Le Clerc* and *P. Simon*]; and for further Satisfaction *Le Clerc* refers us to a Book of *Spencer’s*, written professedly upon this very Subject. It is his Tract De Theocratia Judaica. What is to be found there, besides the Arguments

\* An Examination of Mr. Warburton’s Account, &c. 168—170.

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 69—71.

‡ Ibid. p. 71—77.

*Le Clerc borrowed from it, and which have been considered already, I shall now, with some Reluctancy, inform the Reader* \*. Then I go on to give a Character of this Tract, as quoted by the Examiner. And to justify this Character, I consider what is there said that may seem to contradict what I had before observed concerning the *Duration of the Theocracy*. Now the Reader sees that this is only an Accessory to the body of the Discourse, given, partly, to enervate the Authority which *Le Clerc* built upon it; and partly, to strengthen and confirm what had been advanced by myself. Yet our simple-minded Doctor, after having concealed all this, says (quoting p. 404 †.) “HERE it is that he attacks *Dr. Spencer’s* Dissertation;” whereas the very mention of *Dr. Spencer* does not commence till Fourteen Pages afterwards: And, as if that were not enough, goes on in this manner:—“Are we not now from hence to imagine that *Dr. Spencer* was one of those Writers that supposed the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges? &c.—“And yet *Mr. W.* is FORCED to own that *Spencer* supposes,” &c. I should not have been so long in laying open so immaterial a Cheat, but as it was convenient the Reader should, on his first Acquaintance with our Doctor, be let a little into his Manners.

## II.

But he will not only shew, that my arraigning *Spencer* was absurd; but that the Charge against him is unjust. “His first Charge against him is, that he thought the Theocracy was established by degrees, and abrogated by degrees. *A Conceit highly absurd* (says *Mr. Warburton*) *as God was Legislator*. But wherein lies the Absurdity of this gradual Progress and gradual Declension, even in Cases where God was Legislator? I suppose he will say that the Theocracy began at the instant of the *Horeb* Covenant; and not when the Children of *Israel* were delivered from *Egypt*,

\* Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 414. [Vol. III. p. 77. Ed. 4to.]

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 69.



“ and were first under the immediate Protection of God. But  
 “ *Spencer* INTENDED BY HIS WORD THEOCRACY, all the time that  
 “ the *Jews* were under the direct Power and immediate Domi-  
 “ nion of God; which certainly began at the Deliverance of the  
 “ *Jews* from *Egypt*, and was completed in the highest and fullest  
 “ Sense at the *Horeb* Covenant, when God was constituted their  
 “ King\*.” I called *Spencer’s* Notion of the *gradual Progress and*  
*gradual Declension of a Theocracy*, an ABSURDITY. He says, no :  
 and how does he prove it is not ? By shewing, that, by the Word  
*Theocracy*, *Spencer* meant a *Thing which gradually arose and gra-*  
*dually declined*. But is not this the very *Absurdity* I complain of ? I  
 call an Opinion absurd : and He, to free it from this Censure, tells  
 us—what that Opinion is. But as I do not suppose he will be ever  
 able to answer my Question, I will try if I can answer his—  
 “ Wherein lies the Absurdity of this gradual Progress and gradual  
 “ Declension even in the Cases where God was Legislator ?” The Ab-  
 surdity, learned Sir, lies here : When God is pleased to assume the  
 Character of Civil Magistrate, he must, like all other Magistrates, enter  
 on his Office *at once* ; and (as common Sense requires) leave it *at*  
*once*. Now the Government, under such a Magistrate, is, what  
 we properly call a THEOCRACY : therefore to talk of the *gradual*  
*Progress and gradual Declension* of this Mode of Civil Relation, is  
 the same Absurdity as to talk of the *gradual Progress and gradual*  
*Declension* of Paternity or any other Mode of *Natural* Relation.  
 Whether this was a *Blunder* or a *Sophism*, is of no Consequence ;  
 if the Detection of it does but shew the Reader what good Reason  
 I had to suppose, *that the Theocracy began at the Instant of the*  
*Horeb Covenant* ; and how much *Spencer* was mistaken in the use  
 of the Term, if he intended by it, *all the Time that the Jews*  
*were under the direct Power and immediate Dominion of God*. For,  
 in that Case, he should have used the Word *Legislature*, and not

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 170, 171.

*Theocracy*.—But it had best stop here, lest this new Distinction should still further embarrass this able Advocate of Dr. *Spencer*.

## III.

However, he goes on to support his Reasoning in this manner:—  
 “ So when Dr. *Spencer* speaks of its declining gradually—of the  
 “ Government of God being lessened—of its making a nearer Approach  
 “ to its ceasing, I think, if there be any Absurdity or Inconsistency  
 “ in this manner of speaking, it may be justified by Mr. *Warburton*’s  
 “ own Authority. He himself tells us, that indeed in the Period  
 “ immediately preceding their [the Jews] Captivity, on the gradual  
 “ withdrawing the extraordinary Providence from them—they began  
 “ to entertain Doubts concerning God’s further peculiar regard to them  
 “ as his chosen People, p. 400\*. So that he here expressly owns a  
 “ GRADUAL WITHDRAWING of the extraordinary Providence from  
 “ the Jews. And where is the Absurdity of Dr. *Spencer*’s gradual  
 “ Declension or Imminution of the Theocracy, which Mr. *Warbur-*  
 “ *ton*’s gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary Providence is not  
 “ liable unto? or was not the gradual withdrawing of the extra-  
 “ ordinary Providence a proper Imminution of the Theocracy †?”  
 He is so fond of this Argument that he repeats it again at p. 218.  
 “ Dr. SPENCER and Mr. WARBURTON seem to express themselves  
 “ so exactly alike about the Imminution of THE THEOCRACY, that  
 “ one would wonder how it should happen that Dr. *Spencer*’s No-  
 “ tion is a Conceit highly absurd, and Mr. *Warburton*’s should be so  
 “ consistent, and easy, and natural.” To all this I answer, that our  
 Advocate has here fairly convicted himself of a degree of Ignorance  
 that I never would have ventured to suspect of him, which is, the  
 not knowing the Difference between the FORM OF GOVERNMENT  
 and the ADMINISTRATION of it. Now Dr. *Spencer* talked of a  
 gradual Decline of the *Form of Government*; which I thought ab-  
 surd. I, of the gradual Decline of the *Administration of it*; which,

\* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 51, 52.

† Exam. of Mr. *H*’s Account, &c. p. 171, 172.

whether

whether it be equally absurd. may be seen by a parallel Instance.— For though, not long since, I spoke of Parallels, Similitudes, and Resemblances, as weak Instruments for the Discovery of Truth; yet they are often of more use than better things for the Detection of Falshood. If I should say then, that there was, during the Reigns of *James* the First and *Charles* the Second, a gradual withdrawing the *Protection* of the People, and the equal *Administration* of Justice; I should speak, I presume, both Sense and Truth: Yet if *Olamixon* himself should affirm that there was, during this Period, a gradual withdrawing of the *Monarchy*; I should go near to say, he talked as much like a Fool in this, as he talks like a Knave in most other Parts of his History.

## IV.

Well, but our Advocate will go further; and shew, that though *Dr. Spencer* be consistent, yet I am not.—“ I will observe further (*says he*) “ *Dr. Spencer* maintains that some obscure Footsteps of the “ *Theocracy* remained even to the Time of Christ. And *Mr. Warbur-* “ *ton* holds it ended not till the coming of Christ, p. 404. 417\*. *Dr.* “ *Spencer* is consistent; but it is far from being clear that *Mr. War-* “ *burton* is so. For He hath told us, that in the Period immedi- “ ately preceding the Captivity, there was a gradual withdrawing “ of the extraordinary Providence, p. 400 †. In another Place he “ tells us, that after their perfect Settlement on their return from Cap- “ tivity (when we know, from the Course and Progress of God’s Oc- “ cconomy, the extraordinary Providence would cease) we hear no more “ of it amongst them, nor did they make the least Pretence to it, though “ they now adhered much more strictly to their Religion, than they had “ ever done before. They pretended not—to either Prophets, Oracles, “ or extraordinary Dispensations, p. 440 ‡. Here *Mr. Warburton* men- “ tions the Misfortune at *Bethsura*, caused by the Sabbatical Year; a “ Misfortune of which we have no Instance before the Captivity, and “ therefore a plain Proof, that the extraordinary Providence was in-

\* Ed. 4to. Vol. III. Book V. § 2. † Ibid. p. 52. ‡ Ibid. p. 118.

“*deed withdrawn*, p. 440 \*. Again; *The extraordinary Providence kept gradually decaying, till on their full Settlement after their Return it entirely ceased*, p. 445 †. From these assertions of Mr. Warburton I argue, that if the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE *entirely ceased* on the full Settlement of the *Jews* after their Return, “it ceased some Centuries at least before the Days of *Christ*; and “CONSEQUENTLY the THEOCRACY must have ceased some Centuries before the Days of *Christ*. How then is Mr. Warburton more “consistent about the Duration of the Theocracy than others are, “since he pleads for its Continuance till *Christ’s* Time, and yet “maintains that it entirely ceased so long before his Time ‡?”

The Argument, we see, gathers as it rolls. In the beginning, The *ceasing* of an *extraordinary Providence* only implied, in *consequence* the *ceasing* of the *Theocracy*. But, before we get to the end of the Sentence, an *extraordinary Providence* and a *Theocracy* are one and the same thing. Mr. Warburton pleads for its [a Theocracy’s] Continuance till *Christ’s* Time, and yet maintains that “IT entirely ceased so long before his Time.” Thus again to the same purpose at p. 178. “Or by what Rule does he form a Judgment that WHAT was gradually decaying to the Captivity, was “entirely to cease after their Return and full Settlement; and yet “was to continue till *Christ’s* Time?”—Nay, if he begins to talk of *Rules*, let me ask him by what *Rule* he found out, “that a *Monarchy* and an exact *Administration of Justice* are one and the same “thing?” I suppose by the *Genus generalissimum* of the Schools; and might be borrowed, for aught I know, of a certain Predecessor of his in the Church of *Sarum*, who, when the Bishop (to whom he was construing in the *Latin Testament*) asked him what the Word *Argentum* was governed of, replied, “Of God Almighty, who governs all things.” But Times are changed, and now *Argentum* governs in its turn. The truth is, our Examiner was thus

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 118.

† Ibid. vol. III. p. 122.

‡ Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 173, 174.

grievously

grievously misled by the Ambiguity of the *English* Word THE GOVERNMENT; which signifies either the MODE of Civil Policy, or the ADMINISTRATION of it. But was this to be expected in a Man who had been all his Life-long writing ABOUT *Government*?

Yet thus he runs along, pushing his own Blunder before him, from Page to Page. And still, as if unwilling to leave it, is at last hardly content to recapitulate his Argument in the following manner. “What now is the difference between these TWO GREAT MEN? Dr. *Spencer* has dated the Abatement of the Theocracy from the End of the Time of the Judges: Mr. *Warburton* allows that *Under the Judges* IT WAS PERFECTLY EQUAL. Dr. *Spencer* says that the Theocracy suffered some Imminution under *David* and *Solomon*: Mr. *Warburton* says, when the People demanded a King—“there was a great Abatement in the Vigour of THIS extraordinary Providence. At last Mr. *Warburton* owns a total cessation upon the return of the Jews from Captivity; and to the time of the Captivity, a gradual Decay. Dr. *Spencer* says, there was a gradual Imminution of the Theocracy; but as for a total Cessation before *Christ’s* Time, he was NOT INCONSISTENT ENOUGH to maintain that\*.” What must we do with our Doctor under this strange Idiosyncrasy? The general Case of such kind of Writers, when they stumble, is to run instinctively, as it were, from their own Blunders. But our Doctor delights to dwell upon his, affects to enjoy them, though but for a Moment, returns again and again to them, as if enamoured of his own Image, in them.

## V.

But now for a Master-stroke; worthy an *Answerer by Profession*. “It [the extraordinary Providence] had ceased (*says he*) some hundred of Years before *Christ* came; as Mr. *Warburton* over and over confesses. The Difficulty then is to shew that the Theocracy continued, or, ended not till the coming of *Christ*; p. 404 †.”

\* Exam. of Mr. *W’s* Account, &c. p. 177.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 69.

“ Perhaps Mr. *Warburton* will distinguish between the ceasing of  
 “ the *Theocracy*, and the ceasing of the *Extraordinary Providence* :  
 “ He may say that the *Theocracy* continued till the coming of *Christ* ;  
 “ the *Extraordinary Providence* entirely ceased at the full Settlement  
 “ after the return of the *Jews* from their Captivity. Let us then  
 “ grant that the *Theocracy* revived after the return from the Captivi-  
 “ ty, as he tells us, p. 416 \*. And that that Dispensation of Provi-  
 “ dence soon ceased after the Re-establishment ; *ibid.* We are still as  
 “ much in the Dark as ever ; nor will this Distinction help the Mat-  
 “ ter, or free Mr. *Warburton* from great Self-contradiction. For  
 “ he tells us, one NECESSARY Consequence [of a Theocracy] was an  
 “ EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE. For the Affairs of a People  
 “ under a Theocracy being administered by GOD as KING ; and his  
 “ peculiar and immediate Administration in human Affairs being what  
 “ we call an Extraordinary Providence, it follows that an Extraor-  
 “ dinary Providence must NEEDS be exercised over such a People. My  
 “ Meaning is, that if the *Jews* were really under a Theocracy, they  
 “ were really under an Extraordinary Providence.—In a Word, they  
 “ must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable ; p. 419 †.

“ If this be the Case, then it is plain that a *Theocracy* cannot be  
 “ without an *Extraordinary Providence*. But then Mr. *Warburton*  
 “ has shewn, and at large insists upon it, that the *Extraordinary*  
 “ *Providence* ENTIARELY CEASED several hundred Years before *Christ*'s  
 “ coming : Nay he says, that he knows from the Course and Pro-  
 “ gress of God's Oeconomy, that the *Extraordinary Providence*  
 “ WOULD cease at the full Settlement of the *Jews* after their return  
 “ from the Captivity ; p. 440 ‡. He has likewise proved by several  
 “ Arguments, that the *Theocracy* continued even to the coming of  
 “ *Christ* ; p. 417, 418 §. By this means we are left in inextric-  
 “ cable Difficulties : For first we have a *Theocracy* subsisting  
 “ many hundred Years without an *extraordinary Providence*,

\* *Ed.* 4to. vol. III. p. 79.

† *Ibid.* p. 98.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 116.

§ *Ibid.* p. 60.

“viz. from the Settlement of the *Jews*, after their return, to the time of *Christ*: And consequently, Secondly, a *Theocracy* wherein an *Extraordinary Providence* NEEDS not be exercised. Thirdly we have a *Theocracy* without a NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE of a *Theocracy*, *i. e.* without an extraordinary Providence. And whereas he asserts that *the Theocracy and extraordinary Providence must be either Both true or Both false, but still inseparable*. He himself has shewn them to be *separable*, by shewing that the one did in fact subsist without the other for so many hundred Years as were between the Settlement of the *Jews* after their return from Captivity and the coming of *Christ* \*.”

The first thing I shall observe is, that the *Theocracy* and the *Extraordinary Providence* are now become *two* again, after they had been so long *one*. But who can help it! The Author of *The Divine Legation* would needs have them, *two*. However he will still shew they are *inseparable*; and that, from the Author's own Confession.—I have here quoted him Word for Word, without the omission of a Syllable; that when we see what he was resolved not to see, we may the better judge of what he meant, by a *Mind open to Conviction*: no more, I dare say, than a *Man who had been often convicted*; though never perhaps before in so flagrant an Instance.—The Truth is, I had expressly and particularly considered and confuted this very Objection, in the 420th † Page of the second Volume of *The Divine Legation*, where (on the Words.—*They* [the *Theocracy* and extraordinary Providence] *must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable*, Words which our Examiner has twice quoted) I have this Note at the bottom of the Page—*The Thing here asserted has been misunderstood, as contradicting what I afterwards observe concerning the gradual Decay and total Extinction of the extraordinary Providence, while the Theocracy yet existed. But when I say an extraordinary Providence was one necessary Consequence of a Theocracy, I must needs mean that it was so in its original Constitu-*

\* Exam. of Mr. *W*'s Account, p. 180—182.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 98.

tion, and in the established Nature of Things: Not that in this, which was matter of Compact, the contravening Acts of one Party might not make a Separation. For as this extraordinary Providence was, besides, a Reward for Obedience to the Theocracy, it became subject to a Forfeiture by Disobedience and Rebellion, though Subjection to the Government still continued. To illustrate this by a domestic Instance: A Voice in the supreme Council of the Kingdom is the necessary Consequence of an English Barony; yet they may be separated by a judicial Sentence; and actually have been so, as in the Case of the famous Lord Bacon, who was deprived of his Seat in the House of Lords, and yet held his Barony. This was the specific Punishment of the rebellious Israelites. They were deprived of the extraordinary Providence; and yet held subject to the Theocracy, as appears from the Sentence pronounced upon them by the Mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel: "Ye pollute yourselves with your  
 " Idols even unto this Day: and shall I be enquired of by you, O House  
 " of Israel? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be enquired  
 " of by you. And that which cometh into your Mind shall not  
 " be at all, that ye say, we will be as the Heathen, as the Families  
 " of the Countries to serve Wood and Stone. As I live, saith  
 " the Lord, with a mighty Hand, with a stretched-out Arm, and  
 " with Fury poured out, will I rule over you. And I will bring  
 " you out from the People, and will gather you out of the Countries  
 " wherein ye are scattered, with a mighty Hand, and with a  
 " stretched-out Arm, and with Fury poured out. And I will bring  
 " you into the Wilderness of the People, and there will I plead with  
 " you Face to Face. Like as I pleaded with your Fathers in the  
 " Wilderness of the Land of Egypt, so will I plead with you, saith  
 " the Lord. And I will cause you to pass under the Rod. And I  
 " will bring you into the BOND OF THE COVENANT." Chap. xx.  
 ver. 31—37. It is here, we see, denounced that the extraordinary  
 Providence should be withdrawn; or, in Scripture Phrase, that God  
 would not be enquired of by them; that they should remain in the  
 Condition of their Fathers in the Wilderness, when the extraordinary  
 Providence,



*Providence, for their signal Disobedience, was for some time suspended. But for all that, though they strove to disperse themselves amongst the People round about, and projected in their Minds to be as the Heathen, and the Families of the Countries to serve Wood and Stone, yet they should still be held under the Government of a Theocracy: which, when administered without its naturally attendant Blessing of an extraordinary Providence, was, and was justly called, the ROD and BOND OF THE COVENANT\**. He is now fairly and openly convicted. What shall be his Punishment? That, which hath proved, hitherto, his Reader's; *To write on.*

## VI.

He proceeds, “*Mr. Warburton's second Objection against Dr. Spencer is—in his Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy, instead of attempting to prove it on the great Principles of Civil Policy, the only way of determining the Question with Certainty, he insists much on the Disuse of Urim and Thummim, &c. He brings the Despotic Power of the Kings, as another Argument, which I think proves the very contrary. For were these Kings the Viceroys of God, whose Power was Despotic, theirs must necessarily be the same; not so, if Monarchs in their own right; p. 415 †.—In his Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy.—Has Dr. Spencer any Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy before the Days of Christ? He has no such Arguments; nor, I dare say, never thought of such a Topic; because he tells us it continued to the last Times of their Policy. He has indeed a Section about the Duration of the Theocracy, in which he lays down four Theses, about the gradual declining of the Theocracy: And in one of them he shews it was not at an End in Saul and David's Days, because in their Time the divine Oracle was consulted; that in Solomon's Time, there was a disuse of Urim and Thummim, which*

\* Divine Legat. Vol. II. Part II. p. 420, 421. Note °. [Vol. III. p. 96—100, ed. 4to.]

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 78.

“ was a most eminent Pledge and Indication of the divine Govern-  
 “ ment : From this he concludes it nearer ἀφωτισμῶ, to a disap-  
 “ pearing. But since he allows it to continue for a thousand or  
 “ eleven hundred Years after this, how is it POSSIBLE for him to  
 “ bring Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy from the  
 “ *Urim and Thummim*? He could MEAN only an Abatement\*.”

Hear now, *my own Words*, fairly printed together, in *The Divine Legation*; and let the Reader believe it, if he can. *This Treatise is by no Means in the number of those on which Spencer raised his Reputation. He goes on a wrong Hypothesis; he uses weak Arguments; and he is confused and INCONSISTENT in his Assertions.* 1. *He thinks the Theocracy was established by Degrees and abrogated by Degrees. A Conceit highly absurd, as God was Legislator. He thinks the first Step to its Introduction was the delivery at the Red-sea; and the first Step to its Abolition, the Israelites demand of him a King: That it was more impaired when Saul and David got Possession of the Throne: That it approached much nearer its End when it became hereditary, under Solomon: And yet, for all this, that some obscure Footsteps of it remained even to the time of Christ.* 2. *In his ARGUMENT for the ABOLITION of the Theocracy, instead of employing the great Principles of civil Policy, the only Means of determining the Question with certainty, he insists much on the Disuse of Urim and Thummim, &c. He brings the despotic Power of the Kings as another Argument; which, I think, proves just the contrary. For were these Kings the Viceroys of God, whose Power was despotic, their Power must necessarily be so too: not so, if Monarchs, in their own Right.* 3. *Though as we observed, Spencer, in the second Section of the fourth Chapter, supposes a gradual Decay of the Theocracy; and that even some obscure Footsteps of it remained to the Time of Christ; yet in the following Section he all the way ARGUES UPON THE SUPPOSITION OF AN ABSOLUTE AND ENTIRE ABRIGATION by the establishment of the Kings †.*

\* Examination of Mr. W's Account, p. 182, 183.

† Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 415, 416. [Vol. III. p. 77—79, ed. 4to.]

And in evidence of this last Assertion, I quote at the bottom of the Page these following Words of Dr. *Spencer*.—"Regiminis hujus  
 " MUTATI vel ABROGATI causa principalis—De regiminis hujus  
 " ABROGATI effectu vel eventu breviter differendum est."—*Op. Spen. p. 241. 243. Vol. I.*

This then is the whole of what I said of Dr. *Spencer* on this occasion. Where the Reader sees, my sole Purpose was to prove my Assertion, that Dr. *Spencer* argued *weakly* and *inconsistently*. In the first Paragraph, I shew his Arguments for a *gradual Decay* are weak. In the second that his Arguments for an *Abolition* are as weak. And in the third, that he was *inconsistent*, talking one while of the continuance of it to the time of *Christ*; and another, of its Abrogation under the Kings. Now what says our learned Doctor to all this? Why in the first place, he detaches the second Paragraph from the first and third; though they all relate to, and connect with one another; and quotes it alone as if intire and independent. With such a Liberty the Reader would reasonably think he might have made some shew at least of an Argument: But, by the good Provision of Nature, his Head was made an exact Tally to his Heart. I had said that *Spencer* talked inconsistently in, first, supposing a *gradual Decay and Continuance* to the Time of *Christ*; and yet saying that it was *abrogated* under the Kings. What is his Answer? "Since *Spencer* allows it to continue for a thousand or eleven hundred Years after *Solomon's* Time, how is it possible for him to bring Arguments for the Abolition of the Theocracy from the disuse of *Urim* and *Thummim*? He could mean only an Abatement." That is in plain *English*.—How is it possible a Man should contradict himself? Or in still plainer—Your Charge of INCONSISTENCY must be false, otherwise Dr. *Spencer* would be INCONSISTENT.

## VII.

“The third Objection of Mr. Warburton (says our Doctor) is, that though *Spencer* in one place supposes a gradual Decay of the Theocracy, and that even some obscure Footsteps of it remained to the Time of Christ, yet in the following Section he all the way argues upon the Supposition of an absolute and entire Abrogation by the Establishment of the Kings, p. 416 \*. Here again is Dr. *Spencer* MUCH MISREPRESENTED, from not considering what he MEANT by the ABRIGATION of God’s Government. Not that the Theocracy entirely ceased; but the Government received an ALTERATION and ABATEMENT. And therefore he uses more than once the Phrase of *Regiminis mutati*, in this very Section, and tells us that when the *Israelites* desired a King—*hac in re Deus ab arte regis politici non recessit*. God DID NOT REcede FROM THE ART of a political Governor, but consented to their Requests in order to avoid a greater Evil. Where is the Absurdity or Inconsistency of this Way of reasoning, unless Abrogation is made to signify a total Abolition; and Duration is to be construed Cessation † ?

“*Spencer* (says he) is much misrepresented; he did not mean by ABRIGATION a CEASING, but an ALTERATION and ABATEMENT.” In the first place then, it seems that when one charges an Author with Contradiction in his Expressions; if he had a Meaning, that was consistent, he is much misrepresented. A good commodious Principle for the whole Class of Answerers! Secondly, he says that *Abrogation* [*regimen abrogatum*] does not signify ceasing. Where did he get his *Latin*? *Cicero*, *Livy*, and all the *Roman* Writers, Lawyers as well as Philosophers, use it only in the Sense of Dissolution, Abolition, and the entire ceasing of an Office or Command. What then does it signify? why it signifies an ALTERATION AND ABATEMENT. But now, Where did he get his

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 79.

† Exam. of Mr. *W*’s Account, p. 185, 186.

*Engliſh*? What! Is an *Alteration* of Government only an *Abatement* of it? The *Alteration* of a *Theocracy* we underſtand: But what is the *Abatement* of it? That indeed I cannot tell. But this I know, that we have here a ſufficient Proof of what I laid to his Charge, that he perpetually confounds the *Mode* of Government with the *Adminiſtration* of it: *Alteration* being applicable to the former; and *Abatement*, only to the latter. *Thirdly* he ſays—“and THEREFORE *Spencer* uſes more than once the Phraſe of *regiminis MUTATI* in this very Section.”—*Therefore!* Wherefore? why, becauſe, by *abrogati* he meant only *abated*; therefore he uſes *mutati*, more than once, to explain himſelf; that is to ſay, becauſe, by *totum*, I mean *pars*; THEREFORE I uſe *omne*, more than once, to explain my Meaning. Well, if he did not ſatisfy us before; he has done it now. But *Abrogation* muſt not only ſignify *Prorogation*, but, what is more, *mutati* muſt ſignify *immutati*. Till now we thought that *mutatus* had ſignified *changed*; a groſs *Miſrepreſentation*, ſays he; it ſignifies *unchanged*, though indeed *abated* or *diminiſhed*.

*Fourthly*, he ſays that *Spencer* tells us, when the *Iſraelites* deſired “a King—*hac in re Deus ab arte regis politici non receſſit*; God did “not recede from the Art of a Political Governor.” This the Reader is to take as a Proof of *Spencer's* holding that *God did not give up his Office*; and conſequently, that there could be no *Abrogation*; for we have here to do with a very ſubtile Reaſoner.—*Seriouſly*, the Blunder is a delightful one! *ab arte regis Politici non receſſit*, according to our Critic, ſignifies, that God did not recede from the Art or Exerciſe of Governing; or did not throw up his Office. He has tranſlated the Words, we ſee, *verbatim*; ſo that it is a little hard when he ſtuck ſo cloſe to his Text, he ſhould be thrown ſo wide from its Meaning: which is, indeed, no more than this, that *God condeſcended to uſe the Addreſs of Political Monarchs*, who, when they cannot ſtop or repel a Torrent, contrive to elude it. And “where(*ſays he*) is the Abſurdity or Inconſiſtency of this “way of reaſoning?”—Nay, for that matter, the Reaſoning is full

as good as the Translation. But here he should have stopp'd. For so fatal is his Expression, when the Fit is upon him, that he cannot alk quarter for one Blunder without committing another—"un-  
 " LETS ABROGATION is made to signify a total ABOLITION, and  
 " DURATION is construed to be CESSATION ?" I can find (*says he*) no Absurdity or Inconsistency in Dr. *Spencer* without perverting the common Signification of Words.—This is his Argument—*Without calling Duration, Cessation*—so far is well. But he goes on—*and, Abrogation, Abolition.* And here he sinks again. For *Abrogation* was *Abolition*, in all Nations and Languages, till Dr. *Sykes* first pleaded in ABATEMENT.

In a word, the Charge, against *Spencer* was of *Absurdity* and *Contradiction* in one Instance amidst a thousand Excellencies. Dr. *Sykes* assumes the Honour of his Defence. But with what Judgment he soon lets us understand, when he can find no other Part of that immortal Book to do himself the Credit of supporting than his Treatise of the *Theocracy*. Like the ancient Advocate of *Cicero*, who, while that great Man's Character was torn in pieces by his Enemies, the Flatterers of *Oetavius*, would needs vindicate him from the *Wart* upon his Nose, against his Friends.

Hitherto the Controversy was unnatural. Dr. *Sykes* became Advocate for *Spencer* against an Accusation brought by the Author of *The Divine Legation*. But Both soon return again to their proper Business: He to objecting against the extraordinary Providence of Heaven; I, to a Defence of this certain and necessary Consequence of a *Theocracy*.

### VIII.

“ Let us now proceed (*says the learned Doctor*) to the second Point,  
 “ which relates to the Exercise of an extraordinary Providence over  
 “ particular Persons as well as over the State in general. The Scrip-  
 “ ture Representation of the Theocracy; as Mr. *Warburton* assures us,  
 “ was, 1. over the State in general; and 2. over private Men in parti-  
 “ cular,

“ *cular*, p. 434 \*. I have no Doubts about the former of these  
 “ Cafes: For where a Law was given by God, and he condescended  
 “ to become King of a Nation, and a solemn Covenant was en-  
 “ tered into by the People, and by God, as their King, and where  
 “ Blessings were solemnly promised upon Obedience to the Law,  
 “ or Curfes were denounced upon Difobedience: and this by one  
 “ who was able to execute whatever he engaged; no Doubt can  
 “ be about the reciprocal Obligations, or about God’s performing  
 “ his Part of the Obligation, fince it is his Property not to lie nor  
 “ deceive. Temporal Rewards and Punifhments being then the  
 “ Sanction of the *Jewifh* Law, thefe muft be difpenfed by God fo  
 “ as to make the State happy and flourishing if they kept the  
 “ Law, or elfe miserable if they difobeyed it. If they obferved and  
 “ did all the Commandments, which God commanded them, God  
 “ had engaged to make them *high above all Nations which he had*  
 “ *made, in Praise, and in Name, and in Honour*; and *if Enemies rofe*  
 “ *up againft them, the Lord would caufe them to be fmitten*. On the  
 “ other hand, if they grew negligent of the Law, or *went afide*  
 “ *from any of the Words commanded them—to ferve other Gods*, then  
 “ the Lord was to fend *Curfing, Vexation, and Rebuke in all THOU*  
 “ *fettest THINE Hand unto for to do, until THOU be destroyed and until*  
 “ *THOU perifh quickly*. The Bleffings and Curfes were general  
 “ and national, agreeable to the Character of a King, and a legal  
 “ Adminiftration: Such as related to them as a People; and not  
 “ to particular Perfons †.”

Here, he affures us, “ he has no Doubts about the extraordinary  
 Providence over the State in general.” And he tells us his Rea-  
 fon,—Becaufe “ the Law was given by God, and he condescended  
 “ to become the King of the Nation, by a solemn Covenant made  
 “ with the People.” This, I fay, is his Reafon, when taken out  
 of the Verbiage of his Expreflion. Now if it can be proved that

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 112.

† Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 186, 187.

this very Reason holds equally strong for an extraordinary Providence over *Particulars*, this *second Point*, as he calls it, will be soon decided between us. In order to this, let me ask him what those Reasons are whereby he infers that, from *God's becoming King of a Nation*, he must administer an extraordinary Providence over the *State in general*, which do not equally conclude for God's administering it over *Particulars*? Is not his Inference founded upon this, That where God condescends to assume a Civil Character, he condescends to administer it in a Civil Manner? Which is done by extending his Care over the Whole. If our Doctor says, his Inference is not thus founded; I must then beg leave to tell him, that he has no Foundation at all to conclude, from God's being King, that there was an extraordinary Providence exerted over the State in general. If he says, it is thus founded; then I infer, upon the same grounds, an extraordinary Providence over *Particulars*. For the Justice of the regal Office is equally concerned in extending its Care to *Particulars* as to the *State in general*. It may be asked then, what hindered our Examiner from seeing so self-evident a Truth? I reply, an old inveterate Blunder, with which he first set out; and which yet sticks to him. I have observed above what Confusion he ran into by not being able to distinguish between the *Form of Government* and the *Administration of it*. Here again he makes the same blind work from not seeing the Difference between a *Legislator* and a *King*. "For where a *LAW* (*says he*) was given "by God, and he condescended to become the *KING* of a Nation, &c." implying that, in his Opinion, the *giving a Law*, and the *becoming a King*, was one and the same thing. Hence it was, that as the *Legislative Power*, in the Institution of good *Laws*, extends its Providence only over the State in general, he concluded, that the *executive Power*, in the Administration of those *Laws*, does no more. Which brings him to a *Conclusion* altogether worthy the Abilities exerted in the Dilucidation of his *Premises*—"The "Blessings and Curses (*says he*) were general and national, AGREE-

" ABLE



“ABLE TO THE CHARACTER OF A KING AND A LEGAL ADMINISTRATION.”—What! Is it only agreeable to the Character of a King and a legal Administration to take Care of the *State in general*, and not of *Particulars*? So, according to this new System of Policy, it is agreeable to the Constitution of *England* to fit out Fleets, to protect the Public from Insults, and to enact Laws to encourage Commerce; but not to erect Courts of Equity, or to send about itinerant Judges. What makes our Examiner’s Ignorance in this matter the more inexcusable is, that I had pointed out to him this *Distinction*, in the following Passage; the former Part of which he has quoted, but dropt the latter, as if determined that neither himself nor Reader should be the better for it. My Words are these: *It* [the extraordinary Providence] *is represented as administered, 1. over the State in general. 2. Over private Men in particular. And such a Representation we should expect to find from the Nature of the Republic*; BECAUSE AS AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE OVER THE STATE NECESSARILY FOLLOWS GOD’S BEING THEIR TUTELARY DEITY [in which Capacity he gave them Laws]; SO AN EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE TO PARTICULARS FOLLOWS AS NECESSARILY FROM HIS BEING THEIR SUPREME MAGISTRATE\*. Here then I might fairly leave him, having proved my Position on the very same Principles, and in the very same manner, he has proved his own. But let us hear him out.

## IX.

He proceeds to tell his Reader what is the Question between us. But we now know enough of him to be upon our guard whenever he begins to tell his Story. And, in truth, it is no more than needs. For here he tops his Part. “The Question then (*says he*) that now is to be considered is, whether an extraordinary Providence was administered to Particulars in such a manner, that

\* Divine Legation, Vol. II. p. 436. [See Vol. III. p. 112, Ed. 4to.]

“no Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law  
 “miss’d his Reward. This was the State of the *Jews* under an  
 “equal Providence, as Mr. *Warburton* tells us, p. 452 \*, and by this  
 “means *human Affairs might be kept in good order without the Doc-*  
 “*trine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments.* That God did  
 “best’s particular Persons amongst the *Jews*, as well as now he does  
 “in all Nations, is certain; But that he so dispens’d his Favours,  
 “as that no Observer of the Law miss’d his Reward, nor did any  
 “Transgressor escape Punishment, is far from being clear. The Na-  
 “tion, considered as a Nation, had this peculiar to it, that when  
 “they did evil in the sight of the Lord, they were delivered into  
 “the Hands of their Enemies. When they repented and put away  
 “the strange Gods from amongst them and served the Lord, they  
 “were delivered. Instances of this are frequent in the Book of  
 “*Judges*, and in the History of the Kings of *Israel*. But if  
 “we descend to an extraordinary Providence over Particulars,  
 “even in those Times, I do not remember what will amount to  
 “Proof †.”

He says the Question between us is, “Whether an extraordinary  
 “Providence to Particulars was administred IN SUCH A MANNER,  
 “that no Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor any Observer of the  
 “Law miss’d his Reward.” On the contrary, he himself owns,  
 in the very preceding Paragraph, that the Question between us is  
 simply this, whether the extraordinary Providence was only over  
 the State in general; or whether it extended to Particulars. And  
 on that occasion fairly quotes the Passage where I stated the Na-  
 ture of this extraordinary Providence. Nay, in the very Paragraph  
 just quoted from him, he owns, in Conclusion, that the Question  
 is about an extraordinary Providence over Particulars; without con-  
 fining or extending it to this or that Mode; for he denies the very

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 136, 137.

† Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 187, 188.

thing itself. What then are we to suppose was his Drift in changing the State of the Question; and telling us now, that it is, whether “the extraordinary Providence was administered IN SUCH A MANNER that no Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missed his Reward?” What think you? But to introduce a commodious Fallacy under an ambiguous Expression; that should be always at hand to answer his Occasions? Which, we shall find as we go along, *this* always is. And indeed the cautious Reader (and I would advise no other to have to do with him) will suspect no less, when he observes that the Words, [*no Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missed his Reward*] quoted from me, are not to be found in that place where I stated the Nature of the extraordinary Providence; but in *another*. Where I speak of the Consequences of it, in these Words.—*We have shewn at large in the first Volume, that under a common or unequal Providence, civil Government could not be supported without a Religion, teaching a future State of Reward and Punishment. And it is the great Purpose of this Work to prove, that the Mosaic Religion wanting that Doctrine, the Jews must necessarily have enjoyed an equal Providence under which holy Scripture represents them to have lived. AND THEN, no Transgressor escaping Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missing his Reward, human Affairs must be kept in good order without the doctrine of a future State* \*. What now has this Answerer by Profession done? He has taken the Words [*no Transgressor escaping Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missing his Reward*] from their natural place, misrepresented their Purpose, and given them to the Reader as my DEFINITION of an extraordinary Providence to Particulars; and, not content with that, has put this false and sophistical Sense upon them, THAT NO ONE SINGLE PERSON, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, ever escaped Punishment, or ever missed his Reward. And in this monstrous Sense he, by the worst Prevali-

\* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 454. [Vol. III. p. 136, Ed. 4to.]

cation, repeats, and applies them, on every following Occasion, as the sole answer to all my Reasonings on the Subject of an extraordinary Providence. To prepare the Reader therefore, for a proper Reception of all the miserable Chicane that arises out of this his ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΨΕΥΔΟΣ, I shall here shew, that the Words [*no Transgressor escaping Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missing his Reward*] could not mean by any Rules of just Construction, that every *single Person, without Exception*, was thus punished and rewarded; but only that this very extraordinary Providence over particulars was so exactly administered, as that no one could hope to escape it, or fear to be forgotten by it.

*First* then, Let it be observed, that the Words are no *absolute* Assertion; but a *Consequence* of something asserted.—AND THEN *no Transgressor escaping, &c.* which illative Words the honest Examiner omitted. Now what had been asserted \* was simply this, that the extraordinary Providence over the *Jews* was, in Scripture, represented as Administered over Particulars; but that this very Administration would of Necessity be attended with some Inequalities †. Must not then the Consequence I draw from these Premises be as restrained as the Premises themselves? *Secondly*, I said, that God had promised an equal Providence to Particulars, but that he had declared at the same time how it should be administered, *viz.* in such a manner as would occasion some few Exceptions. If therefore Doctor *Sykes* would not allow me, he ought to have allowed God, at least, the right of explaining himself. *Thirdly*, had the Words been absolute, as they then might have admitted of two Senses, did not common Ingenuity require, that I should be understood in that which was easiest to prove, when it was equally to my Purpose? Which is an extraordinary Providence over Particulars in the manner here explained. But there was still more than this to lead an ingenuous Man into my meaning; which was, that he might observe, that I used, through-

\* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 436. [Vol. III. p. 112. Ed. 4to.]

† Id. Ib. p. 445. [Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 121.]

out my whole Discourse of the *Jewish* Oeconomy, the Words *extraordinary Providence* and *equal Providence*, as equivalent. By which he would understand that I all along admitted of Exceptions. *Fourthly*, If such rare Cases of Exception destroyed an equal Providence to *Particulars* (which Providence I hold), it would destroy with it the equal Providence to the *State* (which Doctor *Sykes* pretends to hold). But if not for the sake of Truth in Opinion, yet for fair-dealing in Practice, Doctor *Sykes* should have interpreted my Words not absolutely, but with Exceptions. For thus stood the Case. He quoted two Positions from the *Divine Legation*. 1. That there was an extraordinary Providence over the State in general. 2. Over private Men in particular. He grants the first; and denies the second. But is not the Extent of that Providence understood to be, in both Cases, the same? Now in that over the *State*, he understands it to have been with *Exceptions*, as appears from his own mention of the Case of *Achan* p. 190; and of *David*, p. 197. Ought he not then, by all the Rules of honest Reason, to have understood the Proposition-denied, in the same Sense he understands the Proposition-granted? If in the Administration over the State in general, there were some few Exceptions, Why not in that over private Men in particular?

But if now the candid Reader will ask me why I employed Expressions that, when divorced from the Context, might be abused by a Caviler to a perverse meaning, I will tell him: I used them in Imitation of the Language of the Apostle, who says that, under the *Jewish* Oeconomy, *EVERY Transgression and Disobedience received a just Recompence of Reward* \*. And if he be to be understood with *Exceptions*, why may not I?

Having now exposed, as it deserves, this Master Fallacy, the Rabble of Sophisms, which follow it, and pretend to make their Fortune by it, are easily dispersed. But before we come to that, we have something further to say to the Paragraph in Hand. We

\* Heb. ii. 2.

observed, that, in concluding it, he returns again to the true State of the Question.—These are his Words.—“ But if we descend to “ an extraordinary Providence over Particulars even in those Times “ [the Judges and Kings of *Israel*], I do not remember what will “ amount to Proof.” To assist his bad Memory, or long Absence from his Bible, I shall quote again from *The Divine Legation*, the following Passages.—*In the Dedication of the first Temple Solomon addresses his Prayer to God that the Covenant between him and the People might remain for ever firm and inviolate, and the old Oeconomy be still continued. And after having enumerated divers Parts of it, he proceeds in these Words: When the Heaven is shut up, and there is no Rain, because they have sinned against thee; yet if they pray towards this Place, and confess thy Name, and turn from their Sin when thou dost afflict them: Then hear thou from Heaven, and forgive the Sin of thy Servants, and of thy People Israel, when thou hast taught them the good way, wherein they should walk; and send Rain upon the Land, which thou hast given unto thy People for an Inheritance. If there be Dearth in the Land, if there be Pestilence, if there be Blasting or Mildew, Locust or Caterpillars; if their Enemies besiege them in the Cities of their Land; whatsoever Sore or whatsoever Sickness there be: Then what Prayer or what Supplication shall be made of any Man, or of all thy People Israel, when every one shall know his own Sore, and his own Grief, and shall spread forth his Hands in this House; then hear thou from Heaven and forgive, and render unto every Man according unto all his Ways, whose Heart thou knowest\*. The Psalmist bears his Testimony to the same Oeconomy; I have been young (says he) and now am old: yet have I not seen the Righteous forsaken, nor his Seed begging their Bread †. God himself declares it by the Prophet Isaiah: Say ye to the Righteous that it shall be well with him: for they shall eat the Fruit of their Doings. Wo unto the Wicked, it shall be*

\* 2 Chron. vi. 28. et seq.

† Psal. xxxvii. 25.

ill with him: for the Reward of his hands shall be given him\*. *And again:* He that walketh righteously and speaketh uprightly, *etc.* he shall dwell on high: his place of Defence shall be the Munitions of Rocks, Bread shall be given him, his Waters shall be sure †. *And we learn from a parabolical Command in Ezekiel how exactly these Promises were fulfilled:* And the Lord said unto him, Go through the Midst of the City, through the Midst of *Jerusalem*, and set a Mark upon the Foreheads of the Men that sigh, and that cry for all the Abominations that be done in the midst thereof. And to others he said in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the City, and smite: let not your Eye spare, neither have ye Pity. Slay utterly old and young, both Maids and little Children, and Women; *but come not near any Man upon whom is the Mark;* and begin at my Sanctuary ‡, &c. *But GOD, by the Prophet Amos, describes this Administration of Providence in the fullest manner:* Also I have withholden the Rain from you, when therewas yet three Months to the Harvest, and I caused it to rain upon one City, and caused it not to rain upon another City: one Piece was rained upon, and the Piece whereupon it rained not, withered. So two or three Cities wandered into one City to drink Water; but they were not satisfied: yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord. I have smitten you with Blasting and Mildew, &c. §. *And again:* Lo I will command, and I will sift the House of *Israel* amongst all Nations, like as Corn is sifted in a Sieve, yet shall not the least Grain fall upon the Earth ||. Yet all this he had overlooked as *not amounting*, I suppose, to *Proof*.

\* Chap. iii. v. 10, 11.

† Chap. xxxiii. v. 15, 16.

‡ Chap. iv. v. 7—11.

§ Chap. ix. v. 4, 5, 6.

|| Chap. ix. v. 9.

## X.

At last he owns I had allowed, “*that the sacred Writings themselves freely speak of the Inequality of Providence to Particulars in such a manner as Men living under a common Providence are accustomed to speak*.” Which shews it was impossible I should mean the Proposition of *No Transgressor ever escaping Punishment, &c.* in the Sense he has put upon it. But this is so far from shaming him for his Prevarication, that, after having given Examples to confirm my Observation of the *Sacred Writers speaking of the Inequalities of Providence*, he goes on thus: “*This Objection taken from the Complaints made by the Sacred Writers was so full and strong, that, though Mr. Warburton promises to prove hereafter that an equal Providence was actually administered, yet, for his Reader’s present Satisfaction, he will shew, that these Representations of Inequality are very consistent with that before given of the Equality of Providence. I will examine with as much brevity as I can, what he has said; and leave you to judge whether he has said enough to give his Reader present Satisfaction †.*”

The first Remark I shall make on this Passage is, that it represents me forced to make an Acknowledgement, not out of any regard to Truth, but through Necessity. Secondly, where he says that I promise *to prove hereafter that an equal Providence was actually administered*, he mistakes, as usual, my Sense, and supposes I meant, in the *third Volume of The Divine Legation*. Whereas all, who understand that Book, know I meant, in the latter part of the *Second*, then in my Hands. And even he himself may now see as much by the short view I have given of it, in the first part of these *Remarks*: where speaking of this Matter, I express myself in the following Terms.—*Here the Reader should observe that my Argument does not require me to prove more than that an extraordinary Provi-*

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 188. [See also Div. Leg. Vol. III. p. 120. of this edition.]

† Exam. &c. p. 191.



dence is REPRESENTED in Scripture to be administered: The Proof of its REAL Administration it is the Purpose of this Work to give through the great MEDIUM of my Theses, “The Omission of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments.” If therefore I clearly shew from the whole Jewish History that the matter is thus represented, the Inference from my Medium, which proves the Representation true, answers all Objections, both as to our inadequate Conception of the Manner how such a Providence could be administered; and as to certain Passages in holy Scripture that seem to clash with this its GENERAL REPRESENTATION. And yet both these Objections (to leave no shadow of doubt unsatisfied) are considered likewise \*. These Considerations our Examiner has now attacked. Let us see with what success.

## XI.

He tells the Reader, my first Consideration is, “That when the Sacred Writers speak of the Inequality of Providence, and the unjust Distribution of Things, they sometimes mean that State of it amongst their Pagan Neighbours, and not in Judea, as particularly in the Book of Psalms and Ecclesiastes, p. 443 †.” To this he replies,—“Asaph, or whoever was the Author of the Psalm before cited, complains heavily at the Prosperity of the Wicked. These wicked Men were, it seems, not Jews, but his Pagan Neighbours ‡.” &c. Would not any one, now believe, that this Psalm before cited was one I had cited, to prove that, in the Book of Psalms the Writers of it sometimes mean that State of Providence amongst their Pagan Neighbours? So far from it, I had cited it to the very contrary purpose; as a Proof of the extraordinary Providence to the Jewish People, who are there all along spoken of. But what then? He had cited it a Page or two before: And his Trade required him to cite it again. Or did he, indeed, imagine, that when I said,

\* Remarks on Several Occasional Reflections, Part I. p. 99, 100. [See also Vol. VI. p. 329, of this Edition.]

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 120.

‡ Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 191, 192.

The Writers of the Book of Psalms sometimes spoke of that State of Providence amongst their Pagan Neighbours, I meant in every Psalm? It is hard to tell. I have sometimes catch'd him at a worse Inference. However, as he loves to be encouraged, I shall say no more to him of the Psalms, till he has *cited*, and of course misinterpreted, every one of them: And then he may hear further from me.

In the other Case of *Ecclesiastes* (thanks however to the Nature of the Book) he has argued fairer at least. "Much less still (says he) is the Reflection of the Preacher in *Ecclesiastes* designed to relate to his Pagan Neighbours. It is an universal Observation, that the *Work of God* is inscrutable even to a *Wise Man*. On which Account the Author proposes to declare, that no Man could judge of either *Love or Hatred* by what was before him, *since all Things come alike to all, there is one Event to the Righteous and to the Wicked, &c. This was an Evil among all Things done under the Sun, that there is one Event to all.* Has he made any Exception for *Israel*? No: but he maintains, *that the Race is not to the Swift; nor the Battle to the Strong; neither yet Bread to the Wise; nor yet Riches to the Men of Understanding; nor yet Favour to Men of Skill; but Time and Chance happeneth to them all, Eccles. ix, 11.* Could a Wise Man, under an *Extraordinary Providence* himself, talk in this Manner, thus Universally, and make no Exceptions for his own Nation? Did he not see a *Difference* betwixt the People of *Israel*, and all other People? Or if there was such a Difference as Mr. *Warburton* contends for, could he fail taking Notice of it? Would not his own People be led into wrong Notions by such universal Assertions? I cannot therefore but think, that this Solution given by Mr. *Warburton* is not only not sufficiently well grounded, but that it has no *Foundation* at all, *viz.* that the *Psalms*, and the *Son of David*, spoke of their *Pagan Neighbours*, and not of the *Jews*, when they expressed themselves so strongly about the Prosperity of the Wicked and the Misfortune of good Men."

“Men \*.” I now begin to think, he had some reason to lament, that a *right good Critical and Grammatical Comment has never yet been wrote upon the Bible* †. Till then I shall beg leave to supply his Wants with a short Account of the general Plan and Purpose of this famous Book. It is a Philosophical Enquiry into the *Chief Good* or *Summum Bonum*, so universal a Subject of Dispute, amongst the Ancient Sages; and managed much in their way; *i. e.* chiefly employed in detecting the false Notions of Happiness. And that it was not unusual for *Solomon* to personate the Garb and Manners of the *Gentile* Sages we understand by *Josephus*, in the Story he tells of *Solomon* sending Riddles to the King of *Tyre* as Tryals of the Abilities of his wise Men; whose Sagacity, at that time, lay chiefly, as we find by *Herodotus*, towards such kind of decyphering.

This alone is sufficient to shew us, that the sacred Writer address'd himself to his Countrymen, not so much under the Idea of a selected Nation, as to Part of the Posterity of *Adam* and of the human Race at large. Otherwise, to what Purpose was this Philosophical Inquiry? For as the Chosen People, their Law expressly pointed out, and led them *directly* to, the *supreme good*: Which, indeed, the Sacred Writer, at last ends with: And he could do no other, both as he was a *Jew*, and as he address'd himself to his Countrymen, neither of whom could long divest themselves of their peculiar Character. *Let us hear the Conclusion of the whole Matter* (says he); *Fear God and keep his Commandments, for this is the whole Duty of Man* ‡.

But to be a little more particular. The BOOK OPENS in this manner:—*Vanity of Vanities, all is Vanity. What Profit has a Man of all his Labour which he taketh under the Sun?—All Things are full of Labour. Man cannot utter it: The Eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the Ear filled with hearing. The thing that hath been is that*

\* Examination of Mr. W's Account, p. 195, 196.

† Princip. and Connex. of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 217.

‡ Chap. xii. 13.

what shall be—and there is no new thing under the Sun. Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See this is new?—There is no Remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any Remembrance of things that are to come, with those that shall come after\*? The Propositions are here all general; and plainly relative to Mankind at large: For some of them are not true with respect to the chosen Nation; such as the Assertion that *nothing was new under the Sun*, &c. But the following Words more expressly declare his Meaning to be general, *And I gave my Heart to seek and search out by Wisdom, concerning all things that are done under Heaven—I have seen all the Works that are done under the Sun* †. In the SECOND Chapter he still more professedly assumes the Character of an ancient Sage; and inquires whether happiness be to be found in Mirth and Jollity; in Magnificence; in Luxury; in Wealth; in Power, or in Wisdom. All, but the last, he gives up. This indeed had some Pretensions to it: For *he found Wisdom exceeded Folly as far as Light exceedeth Darkness* ‡. Yet, when he observed that *the same thing happened both to the Fool and the Wise* §; he rejected this likewise with the rest: And, now floundering deeper and deeper in his *Philosophical Enquiries*, he sinks at last into gross *Epicurism*, *There is nothing better for a Man, than that he should eat and drink* ||, &c. But then adding, *and of such good who can enjoy more than I\*\*?* This recalls his real Character, and affords him an Opportunity of ending the Enquiry in a decent manner, *For God giveth to a Man that is good in his Sight, Wisdom, and Knowledge, and Joy, but to the Sinner he giveth Travel* ††, &c. Which was done with the finest Address; and prevented what he had said just before, in his personated Character, from giving Scandal, or being misunderstood. Let me observe too, that there is no way of reconciling this last Verse with the 14th, where he declares, that *one Event happeneth to all*, than by supposing, he there spoke of the State of Mankind in general;

\* Chap. i. 2—12.

† Ib. 13, 14.

‡ Chap. ii. 13.

§ Ver. 14.

|| Ver. 24.

\*\* Ver. 25.

†† Ver. 26.

and here of the *Jewish* Nation in particular. On this Principle, several other contradictory Passages, to the same Purpose, must needs be interpreted. In the THIRD Chapter, having resumed his personated Character, he seeks for Happiness, and finds nothing but *Vanity*, in the natural Constitution of things. In the FOURTH Chapter, he seeks it, and finds the same, in the *moral Constitution* of things. And here he, all along, speaks of Mankind in general. *I have seen the Travel which God hath given to the Sons of Men, to be exercised in it. He hath made every thing beautiful in his Time: also he hath set the World in their Heart* \*.—Nay, there are some Places where his Thought must be confined to other Countries, as where he says, chap. vi. ver. 2. *A Man to whom God hath given Riches, Wealth, and Honour—yet God giveth him not Power to eat thereof, but a STRANGER eateth it.* This could not happen under Solomon in the Land of *Judæa*, when Inheritances never went out of the Twelve Tribes. Again, *And moreover I saw under the Sun the Place of Judgment that Wickedness was there, and the Place of Righteousness that Iniquity was there* †. Are we to think that Solomon was afraid of saying, this was in *Judæa*, which he governed absolutely; and so disguised his Expression to make us believe he meant it of the World at large? Or could the Civil Administration of the Land, which he governed with so much Wisdom and Equity, be in the miserable Condition here described? The Fourth Chapter begins—*So I returned and considered all the Oppressions that are done under the Sun.*—Returned! from whence? From a Contemplation of the *natural State* of Things (spoken of in the preceding Chapter) to the *moral*, every where over the whole Face of the habitable Globe;—*all the Oppressions that are done under the Sun.* But the 13th and 14th Verses certainly allude to some fact out of *Judæa*. *Better is a poor and wise Child than an old and foolish King: For out of Prison he cometh to reign; whereas also he that is born in his Kingdom becometh poor.* In the same manner we must interpret

\* Chap. iii. 10, 11.

† Ver. 16.

the 14th and 15th Verses of the 6th Chapter; and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Verses of the 9th Chapter. From hence, that is, from the End of the *Fourth* Chapter, to the Conclusion of the Book, the sacred Writer employs himself in miscellaneous Reflections illustrating and supporting his main Question: partly abstracted, in his assumed Character of *Sage*; and partly *practical and didactic*, in his Character of *Preacher*: Till he comes to the Conclusion of his Enquiry after Happiness, which he places in God. *Remember thy Creator, &c.* And in this Part, agreeable to the Character in which he speaks, he sometimes asserts an *equal* Providence, and sometimes an *unequal*. As where he says, in behalf of the first—*It is good that thou shouldst take hold of this, yea also from this withdraw not thine Hand, for he that feareth God shall COME FORTH of them all\**. *Who keepeth the Commandments shall FEEL NO EVIL THING †.*—*But it shall not be well with the Wicked, neither shall he PROLONG HIS DAYS, which are as a Shadow, because he feareth not before God ‡.*—On the contrary he says, in the very following Verse: *There is a Vanity which is done upon the Earth, that there be just Men unto whom it happeneth according to the Work of the Wicked: Again, there be wicked Men to whom it happeneth according to the Work of the Righteous §.* This is worthy our Observation. When, in the preceding Verse, he had asserted an *equal* Providence; and by the Words, *prolong his Days*, marked it to be such a one as we are told in the Law, was administered over the Land of *Judea*; when he comes to speak in this Verse of an *unequal* Providence, he as plainly intimates that he meant it in the World at large, by the introductory Expression of, *There is a Vanity which is done upon the Earth.*

But, how the Book of *Ecclesiastes* came to be written; and how it came to be cast into this Form; though such an Enquiry might tend to illustrate and support our Interpretation; I shall not at present, nor, perhaps, ever hereafter, think fit to inform our *Examiner*. What has been already said is more than sufficient to justify

\* Chap. vii. 18.

† Chap. viii. 5.

‡ Ver. 13.

§ Ver. 14.

my Assertion, *That when the Writer of Ecclesiastes speaks of the Inequality of Providence, he means that State of it amongst his Pagan Neighbours*:—The Argument stands thus; There are several Places in the Book of *Ecclesiastes* where an *equal* Providence is asserted; several, where an *unequal*. These can be only *reconciled* by supposing, that, in the first Case, he speaks of it as administered in the Land of *Judæa*; in the second, as in the World at large. The *Supposition* is justified in this manner: 1. by shewing, that the very Expression, in both Cases, supports this Distinction: 2. that the Author sometimes speaks in the personated Character of a Sage or Philosophic Enquirer after Truth; in which, he transports himself into the World at large: Sometimes, in his own Character of a Preacher, where he confines himself to the *Jewish* People.—But to go on now with our Examiner.

## VIII.

“Mr. Warburton (*says he*) has given us a second Solution of “this Difficulty, no better, I think, than the former. *We sometimes find particular Men complaining of Inequalities in Events, which were indeed the Effects of a most equal Providence. Such as the Punishment of Posterity for the Crimes of their Forefathers, and of Subjects for their Kings.* These are indeed remarkable Instances “of an extraordinary equal Providence, where NO TRANSGRESSOR “COULD ESCAPE PUNISHMENT, NOR GOOD MAN ESCAPE REWARD, “to tell us of transgressing Forefathers escaping, and their INNOCENT CHILDREN BEING PUNISHED; of wicked Kings under no “Misfortunes, and innocent Subjects suffering on their Account\*!” And thus he goes on, repeating his *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, for eight Pages together. For now this *Mystery of Iniquity* begins to work. He must be content therefore to be reminded (for the **F I R S T** **C H A P T E R**) that he here stands charged with putting a FALSE Sense upon, *no Transgressor escaping Punishment, &c.* by which alone

\* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 196, 197.

his Argument is supported. And we shall have frequent occasion, as we go along, to repeat his Crime, and set this black Mark upon him. But so gross a Misrepresentation does not stand single. It is accompanied with another as gross, which, however, seems rather to be the Fault of his Understanding. He expressly represents me as affirming, that, by the Law of God, INNOCENT CHILDREN WERE PUNISHED FOR THEIR GUILTY PARENTS; *in a manner that cannot be reconciled to Justice, or Goodness, or Impartiality in an extraordinary Providence* \*. An atrocious Accusation! and without a Possibility of Proof. For in this Discourse, which our Author refers to, and understands not, I had shewn, 1. That where the Posterity of guilty Parents were deprived of any of their *natural unconditional* Rights for their Parents' Crimes, There, the Posterity were *not innocent*. Which, I observed, might be understood, from the Law itself; where, *although God allowed capital Punishment to be inflicted for Lese Majesty on the Person of the Offender, by the delegated Administration of the Law; yet concerning his Family or Posterity he reserved the Inquisition to himself; and expressly forbid the Magistrate to meddle with it in the common Course of Justice* †. For why was the Magistrate forbid to imitate God's Method of punishing, but because no Power less than omniscient could, in all Cases, keep clear of Injustice in such a Perquisition? But I observed further, that God had expressly declared *why* he reserved this Method of Punishment to himself, in the Place where he informs us, *how*, or in what manner, he was pleased to administer it. *Your Iniquities* (says he) *and the Iniquities of your Fathers together* ‡, &c. 2. I had shewn, that where an *innocent* Posterity suffered for the Crimes of guilty Parents, it was only in the Deprivation of their *Civil Conditional* Rights. For the *Israelites*, as Scripture informs us, were supported in *Judea* by an extraordinary Administration of Providence; the Consequence of which were great temporal Blessings

\* Exam. of Mr. H's Account, p. 197.

† Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 458. [Vol. III. p. 140. Ed. 4to.]

‡ Isa. lxx. 7.



given them on Condition; and to which they had no natural Claim. Nothing therefore could be more equitable than, on the Violation of that Condition, to withdraw those extraordinary Blessings from a Father thus offending. To confirm which, I shewed, that it exactly corresponded with the Practice of all States, in Attaint of Blood and Confiscation \*." And now, was it possible for the most arrant *Answerer* by *Profession*, had he understood what was said, to charge me with holding, that by the Law of God, *Innocent Children were punished for their guilty Parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to Justice, or Goodness, or Impartiality in an extraordinary Providence?* Not but we must think that he had read that Dissertation. For there is scarce any Part of it which, under this Head, he does not quote: but in so absurd a manner, and to so absurd Purposes, as evidently shew, that he understood not what he read. Of which take the following Instances.

To prove that the Importance of the Doctrine of a *Future State* was well understood by *Moses*, I shew, that the Law of *punishing the Iniquities of the Fathers upon the Children*, was a Provision opposed to the inconvenient Consequences of its *Omission*. For that the Violence of irregular Passions would make some sort of Men, of stronger Complexions, superior to all the Fear of personal temporal Evil. To lay hold therefore of these, and to gain a due ascendancy over the most determined, the Punishments, in this Institution, are extended to the *Posterity* of wicked Men; which the instinctive fondness of Parents for their Off-spring would make terrible, even to those who had hardened themselves into an Insensibility of personal Punishment †. Now this, Dr. Sykes, expressly represents as said to "get rid of this Difficulty, *viz.* How innocent Children "being made to suffer for their sinning Parents can be consistent "with the Law of an equal Providence ‡." This is scarce indeed to be believed, though we see his end in his Prevarication. For now

\* Divine Legat. vol. II. p. 459. [Vol. III. p. 141. Ed. 4to.]

† Ibid. p. 454. [Vol. III. p. 137. Ed. 4to.]

‡ Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 199.

the Answer comes out easy in a mere denial.—“This is not consistent with the Law of an equal Providence.” Whereas had he told the Reader Truth concerning my Purpose, in the Observation, then, in order to answer it, he must have proved, that the Punishment on the Posterity of a wicked Man *did not* lay hold of his instinctive Passions; which, I suppose, would have not been so easy. But indeed I am always ready to suspect, that I attribute more to Design in this Writer, than I ought. And, in his Repetition of this false Representation, there is something so *natural*, that I am almost ready to acquit him of all *Practice*.—“It is certain (*says* “*be*) the instinctive Fondness of Parents will restrain, &c.—But “this is NOT THE CASE in hand. The PREVIOUS SUPPOSITION is, “that *no Transgressor is to escape Punishment*, &c. The QUESTION “THEN IS, upon this Supposition, how a guilty Parent’s Crimes can “*be visited upon his innocent Children* \*.” For is it possible he should knowingly venture the being detected in so gross a Misrepresentation by any one who will but turn to Page 454†, of the Second Edition of the Second Volume of *The Divine Legation* ?

His next Observation collects his scattered Absurdities together; and so frees us at once from the trouble of any further Quotations from him on this Head.

He says, the Author of *The Divine Legation* goes on and observes “that *this Punishment* [of visiting the Iniquities of Fathers upon “Children] *was only to supply the want of a Future State*. But “how will this *extraordinary Oeconomy* SUPPLY this want? The “Children at present suffer for their Parents Crimes; and are supposed to be punished when they have no guilt. Is not this a “plain Act of HARDSHIP? And if there be no future State or “Compensation made, the Hardship done must continue for ever “a Hardship on the unhappy Sufferer ‡.” 1. The Question is,

\* Examination of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 201.

† Ed. 4to. Vol. III. p. 136, 137.

‡ Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 202, 203.

whether this Law of punishing, was a SUPPLY to the want of a future State? If it laid hold of the Passions, as he owns above it did, it certainly was a SUPPLY. However, he will here prove it was none. And how? Because it was a HARDSHIP. 2. He supposes that when Children were punished, in the proper Sense of the Word, they were innocent, which is absolutely false, for then they were always guilty. When the *innocent* were affected by their Parents' Crimes, it was by the deprivation of Benefits, in their Nature forfeitable. 3. He supposes, that if *Moses* taught no future State, it would then follow that there was none.—Which puts me in Mind of the same sort of Confutation which the *first* Volume of *The Divine Legation* underwent. Where speaking of the true Foundation of Morality, I observed, (to the discredit of Atheism, which I thought destructive of Society) that an Atheist could not, on *his Principles*, find any grounds of Moral Obligation. Hence it was inferred that, on *my reasoning*, an Atheist, who transgressed the Rule of Right, would not deserve Punishment. A Conclusion founded in the same Logic with our learned Doctor's, that, if an Atheist thought there were no God, then there was none. Otherwise, how the right Consequences drawn by him, from Premises which he never could have embraced but through a criminal Negligence or Partiality, should be faultless, I then had not, nor yet have Penetration enough to discover\*.

But he ends his false reasoning on this Subject, as all false reasoning must end, when drawn out to that comfortable length with which Dr. *Sykes* always regales his Reader, in compleat unintellectual Absurdity. “Mr. *Warburton* (*says he*) had before him the

\* I would not here be supposed to hint at a very ingenious Writer, who seems to have fallen into this mistake, in a Discourse printed in the *Works of the learned Sir A. J. 1743*, intitled, *Remarks upon some Writers concerning the Foundation of Moral Obligation*. A Writer by no Means to be ranked with the Riffraff now upon my Hands. The Discourse here mentioned being one of the most polite, candid, rational Performances, I ever saw on that Side the Question; and enlightened with a Spirit of sublime and unaffected Piety, superior to all Reasoning.

“ *Prælice of Modern States in attain of Blood and Confiscation*, and  
 “ he allows this to be done with the highest Equity: and says,  
 “ *thus it must needs be under a Theocracy; God supported the Israe-*  
 “ *lites in Judea by an extraordinary Administration of his Providence:*  
 “ *The Consequence of which was great temporal Blessings given them*  
 “ *on Condition and to which they had no natural Claim. Could any*  
 “ *thing be more equitable, than on the Violation of that Condition to*  
 “ *withdraw those extraordinary Blessings from the Children of a Father*  
 “ *thus offending? p. 457, 458 \**.”

“ It is true, that the *Jews* had *no natural Claim* to great tem-  
 “ poral Blessings. But then they had a Claim to them from express  
 “ *Promise*; which is as good a Claim in the present Case as any  
 “ natural Claim whatever. They had this Claim indeed *on Condi-*  
 “ *tion*; A Condition of certain Behaviour, which if they complied  
 “ with, no Observer was to *miss his Reward*. The Case is put of  
 “ an *innocent Child* suffering on account of a *guilty Father*. The  
 “ *innocent Child* has a right to *temporal Blessings* by virtue of ex-  
 “ press *Promise*; and no Sin of the Father can deprive him of these  
 “ Blessings without a Violation of the Covenant: For if it would,  
 “ an *Observer* of the Law would *miss his Reward*. It would there-  
 “ fore in the present Case be so far from *equitable* to withdraw *those*  
 “ *extraordinary Blessings from the Children of an offending Parent,*  
 “ that it would be a direct Violation of Contract and Engagement:  
 “ It would be a Breach of Promise in God, and consequently a thing  
 “ impossible in itself †.” What is it that our Answerer drives at?  
 He grants the *Jews* had no natural Claim to great temporal Bless-  
 ings. He grants, these were given on condition of Obedience. He  
 grants, that a Punishment was denounced on Posterity for the  
 Crimes of their Parents. These three things he grants. Yet he  
 affirms “ that it would be so far from equitable to withdraw those  
 “ extraordinary Blessings from the Children of an offending Parent,

\* Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 121.

† Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 203, 204.

“ that

“ that it would be a direct Violation of Contract, and Engagement.” And does not this great Legist see, that a conditional Grant, when conveyed through Parents to Children, if forfeited by the Parent, does not descend, of right, to the Children; and consequently, may at any time, with the utmost justice, be resumed? For when a thing is given to Parents and their Posterity, on Condition of Obedience; and, at the same time, the Punishment of offending Parents threatened on their Posterity, is not the Parents’ good Behaviour part of the Condition? What is it then, that could thus confound the Understanding of our learned Doctor? *His own sophistical Prevarications.* Which generally reward their Inventors as the Devil does a Witch, after having served them in many juggling Tricks, at length draws them into a Rope, and there leaves them. I had said that *an innocent Posterity were sometimes punished for the Crimes of their wicked Fathers.* I had likewise said that *no Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor any Observer of the Law missed his Reward.* Now, instead of interpreting the first Proposition as I explained it, in the very Place where I used it, to signify no more than that an innocent Posterity were deprived of civil Blessings which their Fathers had legally forfeited; he represents me as saying, that by the Law of God, “ innocent Children were punished “ for their guilty Parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to “ Justice or Goodness or Impartiality in an extraordinary Providence \*.” Instead of interpreting the second Proposition in the sense of the Apostle, from whence I borrowed the Expression, who says that under the *Jewish* Oeconomy *every Transgression and Disobedience received a just Recompence and Reward,* he will have it to be my Meaning that no one single Person, without Exception, ever escaped Punishment, or ever missed his Reward: Though, as I have shewn, it contradicts all Logical Rules of Interpretation. And now see what comes of it. By applying these Prevarications to the place in Question, he argues in such a manner as if he never

\* An Examination of Mr. Warburton’s Account, p. 197.

had the least Conception of what others call the common Principles of Sense or Justice.

## XIII.

My "third Solution of the Difficulty (he tells us) stands thus, "admitting the Reality of an equal Providence to Particulars, in the Hebrew State, the Administration of it must needs be attended with such Circumstances as sometimes to occasion those Observations of Inequality, i. e. in plain Terms, an equal Providence MUST NEEDS be unequal. Is not this a plain Acknowledgment, that an equal Providence cannot be administered at all since it must needs be attended with such Circumstances as must appear unequal \*?"— I say, *an equal Providence must needs be attended with such Circumstances as to occasion Men's Observations of Inequality.* This Proposition he affirms is, *in plain Terms,* equivalent to this other, *that an unequal Providence must needs be unequal.* Which may perhaps be true when he has proved these three Points: 1. That his Sense of *no Transgressor escaping Punishment* is no Prevarication. 2. That some Inequalities, in an equal Providence, is the same thing as the common Providence. 3. That the Observations of Men must needs be infallible. But to shew his answer in its full shame, let us consider only the last of them. The Reader may take notice that the Words, immediately preceding these, [of Men's Observations of Inequality] speak of the *Falshood* of such Observations, even in the Case of David himself, *Who owned that he was sometimes too hasty in judging of these Matters. And that he understood not the course of God's Justice till he had considered the way in which an equal Providence must necessarily be administered under a Theocracy and the Consequences of such an Administration* †. Having said this, I join it to the Proposition in Question, by the Conjunction *For*; [*For even*

\* Exam. of Mr. H's Account, &c. p. 205.

† Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 445. [Vol. III. p. 121. Ed. 4to.]

*admitting]*

admitting] and refer to it by the Pronoun *those*, [*those Observations of Inequality*]. But we have here to do with a Doctor, as little like *David* in his Piety, as his Sense: Who if the Administration of an equal Providence, under a Theocracy, must needs be attended with the *Appearances* of Inequality, will shew that God could not administer it at all: Without doubt, upon this Principle, that God either ought not, or cannot *do*, what Man, with the Degree of light God has been pleased to give him, cannot *comprehend*. An Argument worthy this great Advocate for the Light of Nature.—But he is not a Man to be serious with. Having done me the Honour of giving me this Proposition, *that an equal Providence must needs be unequal*; he will then tell the Reader what I must needs infer from it.—“Is not this (*says he*) a plain Acknowledgment that an equal Providence cannot be administered at all, since”—Since what? The Reader may imagine his Premises require him to conclude thus,—“Since it must needs be attended with such Circumstances as occasion an unequal Providence.” But this would be concluding like other Men. No, he says—“since it must needs be attended with such Circumstances as to occasion MEN’S OBSERVATIONS of Inequality.” And thus he himself at length betrays his own Sophistry. The Truth is, it was so hardy in the Proposition, that he was even ashamed to repeat it in the Inference. And so became the Dupe, not of his returning Honestly, but of his deserted Courage. His whole Argument indeed is one complicated Sophistry. First, he takes what is there said of Men’s Observations of Inequality to be true Observations; whereas, they are there said to be false ones. Secondly, he makes them to signify that Men observed an unequal Providence; whereas they mean that Men observed some Inequalities in an equal Providence: which (whether he understands it or no) is a very different thing.

He goes on thus: “But the Instances he brings to solve this Difficulty [namely the Appearances of Inequality] are so many clear Proofs against the thing itself\*.” How unlucky! The In-

\* Exam. of Mr. B’s Account, p. 207.

stances I brought were to shew from whence the Difficulty arose, not to solve it. But with this Writer, to solve or to raise a Difficulty is indeed much the same. Well, the Instances however are these.

1. It appears from the reason of the thing that this Administration did not begin to be exerted in particular Cases, 'till the civil Laws of the Republic had failed of their Efficacy. Thus where any Crime, as for Instance, Disobedience to Parents, was public, it became the Object of the civil Tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to be punished by the Judge\*. But when private and secret, then it became the Object of Divine Vengeance †. Now the Consequence of this was, that when the Laws were remissly or corruptly administred, good and ill would sometimes happen unequally to Men. For we are not to suppose that Providence in this case generally interfered, 'till the corrupt administration itself, when ripe for Vengeance, had been first punished. 2. In this extraordinary Administration, one Part of the wicked was sometimes suffered as a Scourge to the other. 3. The extraordinary Providence to the State might sometimes clash with that to Particulars, as in the Plague for numbering the People. 4. Sometimes the extraordinary Providence was suspended for a Season to bring on a national Repentance: But at the same Time this Suspension was publicly denounced ‡. And a very severe Punishment it was, as leaving a State, which had not the Sanction of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, in a very disconsolate Condition. And this was what occasioned the Complaints of the impatient Jews §, after they had been so long accustomed to an extraordinary Administration ||.

Now what is our Doctor's Answer to all this? Why still the old Song—"If he is obliged in Virtue of the Theocracy to see "that no Transgressor escapes Punishment"\*\*. And again,—"because

\* Exod. xxi. 15. and 17.

† Deut. xxvii. 16. and Prov. xxx. 17.

‡ Isaiah iii. 5. Chap. lix. 2. Chap. lxiv. 7.

§ Isaiah v. 19. Jerem. xvii. 15. Amos v. 18. Zeph. i. 12. Malac. ii. 17.

|| Divine Legat. Vol. II. p. 445, 446. [Vol. III. p. 121, 122. Ed. 4to.]

\*\* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 206.

“ otherwise,



“ otherwise, some *Transgressors would escape Punishment* \*.”—And again, whether an extraordinary Providence over Particulars was then engaged so as that *no Transgressor should escape Punishment, no Observer of the Law should miss present temporal Blessings*, is the Point to be proved †.” And again—“ The great Point was first to have proved, that ever there was such an extraordinary Providence to Particulars as that *no Transgressor ever escaped Punishment, nor did any Observer of the Law miss his present Reward* ‡.” This therefore being all his Answer, I had given him his Reply before-hand. And have now nothing to do but to arraign him again, for a **SECOND ACCOÛPT** of putting off his false Ware.

But his Logic is so very entertaining, that he will allow us to divert ourselves with it a little; especially as he has given us so much leisure, by trusting all to one pitiful Sophism. It is where he says, “ *It appears from the Reason of the thing, that this Administration did not begin to be exerted in particular Cases, till the Civil Laws of the Republic had failed of their Efficacy. Thus, where any Crime, as for Instance, Disobedience to Parents, was public, it became the Object of the Civil Tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to be punished by the Judge. But when private and secret, then it became the Object of divine Vengeance.* Let this be admitted. Now, says Mr. Warburton, the Consequence of this was, that when the Laws were remissly or corruptly administered, Good and Ill would sometimes happen unequally to Men.

“ On the contrary, I say, that this is no Consequence at all: For upon Supposition of an extraordinary Providence, equally administered, the guilty Persons ought to suffer by *Divine Vengeance*, and the corrupt and remiss Magistrate too, as being guilty of a Crime in not doing his Duty §.” Here we see our Disputant mistook, which part of the Syllogism he was to oppose: And so

\* Exam. of Mr. H's Account, p. 207.

† Ibid. p. 210.

‡ Ibid. p. 216.

§ Ibid. p. 205, 206.

instead of the *Premises*, denied the *Conclusion*. For if he will admit that the *Administration* did not begin to be exerted till the civil *Laws* had failed, the *Consequence* is necessary, that, when the civil *Laws* were remissly executed, *Good and Ill* would sometimes fall unequally.—*No Consequence at all*, says Dr. *Sykes*. Why? because “upon Supposition of an extraordinary Providence equally administered, the “guilty Persons ought to suffer by divine Vengeance, &c.” A Man is to be tried by the common Commission of Oyer and Terminer. *Let this be admitted*, says our Disputant. Why then, say I, the Consequence is, that he must stay till that Time comes. *This is no Consequence at all*, replies he; for, upon Supposition that he ought to be hanged sooner, he ought to be tried sooner. But then, good Doctor, if you had this *Supposition* in reserve, why did you admit my *Premises*, which, when admitted, exclude your *Supposition*?—I thought I had done with him on this head when I had laughed at him; but there is something so malignant against the Law itself, in his Answer to what I say of the *Suspension of an extraordinary Providence*, that the Reader must bear a little longer with us both. “This *Suspension* (he tells the Reader) I say was *publicly denounced*. But (he says) not one Proof is produced of such a public Denunciation of the Suspension of the extraordinary Providence to Particulars. The only Passages referred to for this Public Denunciation,—are *Isaiab* iii. 5. lix. 2. lxiv. 7.—“Here is certainly a great Evil threatened to *Jerusalem* and *Judah*; “but as for a Suspension of an extraordinary Providence, **HERE IS NOT ONE WORD**.—It is as true now as it was then, that Iniquities will separate between us and God; and it has no relation to any Suspension of an extraordinary Providence for a particular Time\*.” Was there ever such a Reasoner! Suppose from a Passage in *Livy*, which speaks of the Creation of a *Dictator*, I should infer that the Consular and Senatorial, the Tribunitial and Popular Powers were all for a time suspended; would it be sufficient

\* EXTRACT of Mr. *W*'s Account, &c. p. 211, 212.

to say,—No; all which that Passage proves is the erection of a supreme Magistrate; And erecting a supreme Magistrate, which is a thing that may be done now, does not infer the Suspension of those particular Powers. If to this fine reasoning, it be replied, that the Inference was fair, because, from other Parts of *Livy*, we learn there were such power in the *Roman* State; which consequently on the erection of an higher must needs be suspended; would not that teach the Reader a ready Answer to our Doctor? Is not an extraordinary Providence as clearly declared by the Law of *Moses*, as the Consular and Tribunitial Power by the Law of *Rome*? And consequently, when God tells his People that he will withdraw his Face from them for their Sins, and return to them on their Repentance, is not this as plain a Denunciation of the Suspension of that extraordinary Providence, as the Creation of a Dictator was a Suspension of all the other Magistracies? But so perverse are these *Answerers*, and so much Strangers to their Bible, that an *extraordinary Providence to Particulars*, which is a Scripture Doctrine they dispute with me as if it was my own; and a *Future State* amongst the *Jews*, which is their own, they would have not disputed, as if it were a Scripture Doctrine.—This being premised, let the Bible now speak for itself. *Isaiab* iii. *For behold the Lord of Hosts doth take away from Jerusalem and from Judah the Stay and the Staff, the whole Stay of Bread and the whole Stay of Water,—Thy Men shall fall by the Sword, and thy Mighty in the War, v. 1—25. Chap. lix. Behold the Lord's Hand is not shortened that it cannot save; neither his Ear heavy that it cannot hear. But your Iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your Sins have hid his Face from you, that he will not hear, &c. v. 1, 2. Ch. lxiii. In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the Angel of his Presence saved them: In his Love and his Pity he redeemed them, and he BARE THEM, AND CARRIED THEM ALL THE DAYS OF OLD. But they REBELLED, and vexed his holy Spirit; therefore he was turned to be their Enemy, and he fought against them, v. 10, 11. Ch. lxiv. And there is none that calleth upon thy Name, that stirreth up himself*

*to take hold of thee: for thou hast hid thy Face from us, and hast consumed us because of our Iniquities, v. 7.*

Well, says he, “ But let us admit that a Suspension of the extraordinary Providence was publickly denounced, in these Passages of the Prophet. *It was a very severe Punishment.* To whom? Why to all the *Jews*—ALL of that Nation, the Virtuous and Wicked, the Good and the Bad \*.—Again, “ The *Jews* had been much accustomed to an extraordinary Dispensation, and now this extraordinary Providence is suspended and publickly known to be so. This was a *severe Punishment* certainly to ALL good Men, because God was wont, and had engaged himself to grant particular Blessings to all such; WHEREAS BY THIS SUSPENSION THEY WERE NO LONGER INTITLED TO ANY OF THEM †.” This is his Representation of the State of the Case: and from this he forms all his Difficulties against my Reasoning. Where he got it, I know not: But certainly not from the Bible; the Book of all others he seems the least acquainted with. Had he looked into *That*, he would have found that he had given the most false and injurious, because most contrary Representation of this whole matter. For the Bible tells us, that the *Severity of the Punishment*, in this *Suspension*, fell, as it ought, not upon the *Good*, but upon the *Evil* only. Hear God’s own express Declaration in the very Place, where this *Suspension* is denounced, *viz.* the third Chapter of *Isaiah*; which, too, our Examiner pretends to have read. SAY YE TO THE RIGHTEOUS THAT IT SHALL BE WELL WITH HIM: FOR THEY SHALL EAT THE FRUIT OF THEIR DOINGS. WO UNTO THE WICKED, IT SHALL BE ILL WITH HIM; FOR THE REWARD OF HIS HANDS SHALL BE GIVEN HIM, 10, 11. And we learn, from a Parabolical Command in *Ezekiel*, how exactly these Promises were fulfilled—*And the Lord said unto him, Go through the midst of the City, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a Mark upon the Foreheads of the Men that sigh, and that cry for all the Abominations*

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, p. 213.

† Ibid. p. 214,

*that*

*that be done in the midst thereof. And to others he said in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the City and smite: Let not your Eye spare, neither have you Pity. Slay utterly old and young, both Maids and little Children and Women; but come not near any Man upon whom is the Mark; and begin at my Sanctuary, &c.* chap. ix. 4—6.—And now, will our learned Doctor be pleased to take this for an Answer likewise to the concluding Words of his Paragraph?

“The great Point was first to have been proved that ever there  
“was such an extraordinary Providence to *Particulars*—This, I  
“say, should first have been proved; which, I apprehend, has not  
“been done. Nor, in course, will any of these Passages from  
“the Prophets prove a Suspension of that equal Providence over  
“*Particulars*, which SEEMS never to have been exerted.”

I should not leave the Passage, here quoted, without observing, that, where I have made the Break, it went on with the old Sophism, in this manner,—“As that *no Transgressor ever escaped Punishment, nor did any Observer of the Law miss his present Reward.*”—But I wave it, as beginning now to pity him. It has been observed of your notorious Story-tellers, that, by often repeating a favourite Tale, they have at last come to believe themselves. And thus it seems to be with our good Doctor. He has urged *His own Sense* of the Proposition so often to all my Arguments (not less, I dare say, than twenty Times) that he now seems in good earnest, to take it for *mine*.

## XIV.

But we are drawing towards a Conclusion with him. The Author of *The Divine Legation* (says he) “proceeds, in the last Place, to “give a full and general Solution of the Difficulty. It stands thus: “*The common Cause of these Complaints arose from the gradual withdrawing the extraordinary Providence. Under the Judges it was perfectly equal. When the People had rebelliously demanded a King,*

\* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 214.

“ and—God suffered the Theocracy to be administered by a Viceroy,  
 “ there was—a great Abatement in the Vigour of this extraordinary  
 “ Providence—From hence to the Time of the Captivity the extraordi-  
 “ nary Providence kept gradually decaying; till, on their full Settle-  
 “ ment after their Return, it entirely ceased.—This leaves us as much  
 “ in the dark as any of the Solutions before given. For the ex-  
 “ traordinary Providence over Particulars (by which is ALWAYS  
 “ MEANT such a Providence that no Transgressor escaped Punishment,  
 “ nor Observer of the Law missed his Reward) kept gradually de-  
 “ caying to the Captivity. After Samuel’s Time there was a great  
 “ Abatement in its Vigour; and, from this Time, it gradually de-  
 “ cayed. Its Abatement then must be in not inflicting constantly  
 “ temporal Evils on the one, or in not giving constantly temporal  
 “ Evils to the other: or else”—Well, to stop him short, it did con-  
 “ sist in not giving constantly. What then? Why then (says he) “ it  
 “ cannot be the former of these Notions, because if the equal Pro-  
 “ vidence was not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal.  
 “ For what is the common Providence, or not extraordinary, but  
 “ where Transgressors are often not punished here, but go on and  
 “ prosper in their Wickedness; and good Men are often not re-  
 “ warded but sometimes suffer \*?” A most admirable Argument!  
 and, as well expressed. *It cannot* (says he) *be the former of these*  
*Notions*—Meaning, I suppose, that if the former of these Notions  
 be mine, he will shew it to be a false one. Well, but his Reason:  
 “ BECAUSE if an EQUAL Providence was not constant, it would come  
 “ to be the same as UNEQUAL.” Very well quibbled again. What  
 is not perfectly equal must needs be unequal. Therefore, as more  
 than Ten may be either Eleven or Eleven Thousand; so unequal  
 may signify, as well the highest Degree of Inequality, such as that  
 Providence exercised at present, or some small Deviation only from  
 Equality. And this being so, he only desires you, in courtesy to  
 his Argument, to understand it in the first Sense. And then with

\* Exam. of Mr. H’s Account, &c. p. 217—9.

the same success, he will dispute against the Moon's equal or regular Motion round the Earth. You Astronomers, says he (for, to do him Justice, nothing comes amiss to him; he has confounded all Men in their Turns, and put every Science out of Countenance) you contend for the Moon's equal or regular Motion; and yet you are *forced* to confess that there are some Inequalities or Irregularities in that Motion, arising from the Sun's Attraction, the elliptical Figure of its Orbit, and its not moving in the plain of the Earth's Motion. Now if your equal Motion *be not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal.* For what is regular Motion but that which has no Irregularities? In short, you have a *great Difficulty to surmount when you attempt upon your Scheme of Equality to account for the Representations of Inequality, which Nature so plainly makes.* As *great Authors* as you are, *what has been hitherto published is all Confusion, and full of inextricable Difficulties.*

But, to make his Argument wear the better, he has lined his Quibble with an Equivocation. Observe his Words: *If an equal Providence (says he) was not constant, IT WOULD COME to be the same as unequal.* But *when?* Why the Quibble encourages you to understand *presently*; which is to the Purpose: But if that fail, the Equivocation authorizes you to understand *many Ages afterwards*, though it be nothing to the Purpose.—This equal Providence of Heaven kept gradually declining in its Vigour, till it became at last the present Common unequal Providence; and so could be no longer called equal or extraordinary. Thus again, the regular Motion of the Moon, as our great Philosopher, who has so well accounted for its present Irregularities, tells us, will probably, for the Reasons he assigns, grow more and more irregular, till it become at last so unconstant, that it will be no longer a regular but an irregular Motion.

But we are not got to the stress of the Affair. The old Sophism lies yet at the bottom of the Inkhorn: But now indeed so worn and hacknied, that it is scarce able to support a miserable Quibble.

Yet it still puts its best Foot forward. This choice Reasoning being introduced as usual, “The extraordinary Providence over Particulars; by which is ALWAYS MEANT such a Providence that No Transgressor escaped Punishment, nor Observer of the Law missed his Reward.”—ALWAYS MEANT! Yes, truly, I can’t but say he is constant enough in *this Meaning*. For which Reason I must here, for the **THIRD TIME**, remind him whom it belongs to.—“Mr. Warburton (*says he*) produces some Evidence that an extraordinary Providence revived after the return from the Captivity. He cites *Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi*. But none of these Places prove any thing more than a promised Blessing to the *Jews* nationally considered\*.” Indeed? Why then had he not the Honesty to quote those Places in *The Divine Legation* which do *prove more?* particularly from the Prophet AMOS, where this extraordinary Providence is considered as administered to Particulars. The Words quoted in Page 438 of Vol. II. † of *The Divine Legation* are these—*As I have withholden the Rain from you, when there was yet three Months to the Harvest, AND I CAUSED IT TO RAIN UPON ONE CITY, AND CAUSED IT NOT TO RAIN UPON ANOTHER CITY, ONE PIECE WAS RAINED UPON, AND THE PIECE WHEREUPON IT RAINED NOT, WITHERED ‡.*—But he goes on—“It proves a very strong Promise to bless the Nation of the *Jews*—But as to a Proof of an extraordinary Providence in the Sense that No TRANSGRESSOR WAS TO ESCAPE PUNISHMENT, NOR NO OBSERVER OF THE LAW MISS HIS REWARD, I cannot see the force of his Argument §.” But I can see the Force of *His*, though: And therefore here again accuse him, for the **FOURTH** and last Time, of a very vile Prevarication that has run through all his Reasoning upon this Subject.

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 220.

† Ed. 4to. vol. III. p. 114.

‡ Amos, chap. iv. ver. 7.

§ Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 221.



And now we are happily got through his whole *Examination of my Account of the Nature of the Jewish Theocracy*. A very singular Composition truly! One Part *Blunder*, and two Parts *Fallacy*! Which though it may sometimes make, as a great Writer assures us, a *good Man of the World*, has here however made a very bad Pamphlet. And no wonder. For this kind of Composition requires, in both Cafes, a very nice Adjustment. Otherwise, in playing the Knave (whether it be on Paper or in Public) Folly is so apt to get the upper Hand, that very often the first Dupe a designing Man makes, is himself: As, not to mince the Matter, in the Case of our *Examining Doctor*, whose Wantonness in undertaking a Subject he did not understand, has so far outstript his Art in managing it, that, before his Fallacy had Time to impose upon others, his too frequent and indiscreet Repetition of it had so worked upon himself, that he became no longer able to judge of any thing I had written: And therefore confesses (and I dare say truly) that what I have HITHERTO PUBLISHED IS ALL CONFUSION, to him, AND FULL OF INEXTRICABLE DIFFICULTIES\*.

“But ’tis the Sport to have the Engineer  
Hoist with his own Petar.”

WE have now passed through our Two Examining Doctors. Happy for them had they but known or understood that Maxim of a certain celebrated *French Writer*, DE PRENDRE POUR VRAI CE QUE DIT UN AUTEUR, SANS REJETTER COMME FAUX CE QU’IL NE DIT PAS. In these we find so great a Similitude of Talents, that Dr. S. might very well be mistaken for Dr. S. were it not for some minuter Differences; a kind of Polemic Badges, that just serve to tell us to what Party either Wearer belongs.

But adjusting the Merits of such kind of Authors, is now the least of my Concern. I here bid a final Adieu to Controversy, unless some very gross Provocation draw me back. For though I have

\* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 222.

not overloaded the Public with Writings of this sort, nor attempted to engage its Attention but on Subjects of high Importance; yet even these will receive their best Defence and Support, by being carefully considered together, in the Order I first delivered them. For, as Lord Bacon says excellently well, THE HARMONY OF A SCIENCE, SUPPORTING EACH PART THE OTHER, IS AND OUGHT TO BE THE TRUE AND BRIEF CONFUTATION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL THE SMALLER SORTS OF OBJECTIONS.

But in taking a formal leave it may perhaps be expected, that I should say something why I ever answered *at all*: And why I answered *in this manner*.

To the first of these Questions I must needs confess, that I have never yet seen any thing which, in my own opinion, deserved my notice. But I was willing to submit to better Judgments. *The Public* (says a Friend) *by what I can perceive, thinks there is something in this Pamphlet—thinks there may be something in that.* Well, I subscribe to the public Judgment. I examine, I write, I confute. And what do I get by it? The Mortification of being told, that now, forsooth, *the Public wonders why I should spend my Time upon such Writers.* And in this manner I have been served—more than once.—The Public says *this*; the Public says *that*: In short, the Public's a Wag, and loves to divert itself at the Expence of us poor Authors. Of which Diversion, having so fairly contributed my Quota, I shall now beg leave to retire—*Luffli satis.*—

As to the *Manner* in which I have answered some of my Adversaries: Their insufferable Abuse, and my own Love of Quiet, made it necessary. I had tried all ways to silence an iniquitous Clamour; by Neglect of it; by good Words, by an Explanation of my Meaning; and all without Effect. The *First* Volume of this obnoxious Work had not been out many Days, before I was fallen upon by a furious Ecclesiastical News-writer, with the utmost Brutality. All the Return I then made, or then ever intended to make, was a *Vindication* of my moral Character, wrote with such Temper and Forbearance as seemed Affectation to those who did not know that I only

only wanted to be quiet. But I reckoned without my Host. The angry Man became ten times more outrageous. What was now to be done? I tryed another Method with him. I drew his Picture; I exposed him naked; and shewed the Public of what Parts and Principles this Tumour was made up. It had its Effect; and I never heard more of him. On this Occasion, let me tell the Reader a Story. As a *Scotch* Bag-piper was traversing the Mountains of *Uffier*, he was, one Evening, encountered by a *lunger-starved* *Wolfe*. In this Distress, the poor Man could think of nothing better than to open his Wallet, and try the Effects of his Hospitality. He did so: and the Savage swallowed all that was thrown him with so improving a Voracity, as if his Appetite was but just coming to him. The whole Stock of Provision, you may be sure, was soon spent. And now, his only Recourse was to the Virtue of the Bag-pipe; which the Monster no sooner heard, than he took to the Mountains with the same Precipitation that he had come down. The poor Piper could not so perfectly enjoy his Deliverance, but that, with an angry Look at parting, he shook his Head, and said, *Ay! are these your Tricks?—Had I known your Humour, you should have had your Music before Supper.*

But though I had the *Caduceus of Peace* in my Hands, yet it was only in Cafes of Necessity that I made use of it. And therefore I chose to let pass, without any Chastisement, such impotent Railers as *Dr. Richard Grey*, and one *Bate*, a Zany to a Mountebank. On the other hand, when I happened to be engaged with such very learned and candid Writers as *Dr. Middleton* and *The Master of the Charter-house*, I gave sufficient Proof how much I preferred a different manner of carrying on a Controversy, would my Answerers but afford me the Occasion. But alas! as I never *should* have such learned Men long my Adversaries, and never *would* have these other my Friends, I found that, if I wrote at all, I must be condemned to a manner, which all, who know me, know to be most alienant to my natural Temper. So, on the whole, I resolved to quit my hands of them at once: And turn again to nobler Game, more


*fitable*, as Dr. *Stebbing* tells me, to my Clerical Function, that pestilent Herd of libertine Scriblers, with which the Island is over-run; whom I would hunt down, as good King *Edgar* did his Wolves; from the mighty Author of *Christianity as old as the Creation*, to the drunken blaspheming Cobler, who wrote against *Jesus and the Resurrection* \*.


To conclude, then, if hitherto, in the Course of my just Vindication, any thing has escaped me, offensive to the candid Reader, I heartily wish it unsaid. Not for the sake of those, the so proper Subjects of it, for *Si indignus qui facerem, at illi digni hac contumelia sunt maxime*: but for the sake of the Public, to whom I have Obligations for their fair and generous Reception of my Writings. Not but the Candour and Equity of their Judgment will, I know, always carry along with it what I am now about to say, in Alleviation of any Harshness that may have escaped me, under all the Calumny that Envy, in the Disguise of false Zeal, has so liberally poured out upon me: Which is this: That my sole Motive in writing *The Divine Legation* was the Discovery and Advancement of Truth, and (in that) the Support and Establishment of Revelation. And if I needed a Voucher, I have the *Pleasure* to observe, that the *Encouragement* given to this Attempt, is sufficient to shew, that no considerable Man, either in Church or State, did, indeed, ever think that I had any other Motive.


\* In a Pamphlet, intitled, *The Resurrection of Jesus demonstrated to have no Proof. In answer to a late Pamphlet, called, the Resurrection of Jesus cleared, &c. London, printed for J. Jackson, in Fleet Street. Price One Shilling* — But some say this was no Cobler, but Dr. *Morgan's* own Apothecary; who now writes by his Master's Receipts. Indeed, he is of so strong a Complexion as to make it very probable he must be one whose Trade it has been to apply himself only to the wrong End of Human Kind. But whether he be of this, or the other cleaner Trade, I would recommend it to the fine Gentlemen to consider, if it will not soon be necessary, for their Honour, to profess themselves on the Side of Religion, since *Infidelity* is thus fallen into Attainder, and can now descend no lower.

ERRORS OF THE PRESS IN VOL. VI.

- 1<sup>a</sup>. 7. l. 20. after *suffer*, insert *me*.  
 21. l. 19. for *Gods*, r. God's.  
 34. l. 4. from the bottom, for *ste*, r. *state*.  
 44. m. l. 1. for *dominum*, r. *dominium*.  
 151. l. 70. for *by reach*, r. *my reach*.  
 188. l. 9. from the bottom, for *would*, r. *could*.  
 269. l. 2. for *charitable office*, r. *charitable an office*.  
 350. l. 11. for *wes*, r. *was*.  
 376. l. 25. for believing *bis* having a principle, read and point—*believing is having*, a principle—  
 439. l. 6. for he has learnt, r. he has *not* learnt.  
 522. l. 14. for *unequal* providence, r. equal providence.  
 527. l. 6. for *power*, r. *powers*.  
 530. l. 14. for *evils*, r. *rewards*.  
 535. l. 10. for *in*, i. is.













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